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ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to present the daily life of the bread salesman in such a way that certain key theoretical issues are explored and elaborated. This is done with an eye to allowing an ethnography to appear in the reading made by others, but I have been more concerned to produce a theoretical understanding of "fiddling", that is, blue-collar occupational theft from customers.

The analysis is based upon extended periods of participant observation and unstructured interviewing. The analysis looks first, in Chapter Two, at the 'moral career' of the recruit salesman (how he is taught to fiddle), and then, in Chapter Three, at the everyday occupational structural support for fiddling which can be derived from the social context of 'service'. Chapter Four then looks at the wider industrial and economic context of occupational theft, and at possible theft types. Chapter Four includes a discussion of other (theoretically related) "part-time" crimes, and tries to show that the managerial tolerance of "inventory shrinkage" allows the deduction and theoretical proposal of both a "hidden economy", and a system of "invisible wages". Chapter Five returns to Wellbreads, the studied bakery, to see how the salesmen seem to combine possible theft types in a "portfolio" of techniques, the practice of which under the guise of one of variously available "characters" protects their identities both practically and psychologically. Chapter Six considers the effect that brute occasions of enforcements have on these "partial" identities, and locates fiddling normatively as a subterranean subculture of 'business' itself. Chapter Seven, the conclusion, attempts to link up, and re-express intermediate conclusions, and suggest that they all find intelligibility in a context then defined as that of Commercial Social Control.

"'THE FIDDLER': A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
FORMS OF BLUE-COLLAR EMPLOYEE THEFT AMONGST
BREAD SALESMEN."

Jason Ditton

Ph.D.

November 1975.

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from it should be acknowledged.

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I typed it.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION: The Wellbread Bakery

THE WELLBREAD BAKERY AND SALES LIFE

"IS THE OUTDOOR LIFE FOR YOU? If so, leave that stuffy indoor job behind and join the happy, healthy outdoor team of Wellbread salesmen who daily tour our delightful town and countryside."

(Local Newspaper advertisement)

"80 hours a week and no perks"

(Anonymously scrawled across a copy of the above advertisement which had been pinned to the notice board)

The Wellbread Bakery^(a) is a medium sized (6-sack) factory production bakery in the south-east of England. It is the major production bakery of a small chain which also includes two other production bakeries, and several smaller distribution depots staffed only with a packing and despatch operative, and a small van-sales fleet.

At Wellbreads, production staff work round the clock producing a variety of bread, rolls, and confectionery. Despatch staff break 'runs' of production down into the individual orders submitted by the salesmen, and prepare for each salesman a bread rack with his completed order ready for him to load onto his van. Each morning, from 2 am onwards, salesmen begin to drift into work, load their vans, and get out to their customers. The Sales department at Wellbreads employs about 17 wholesale salesmen (men driving small lorries who deliver bread, as middle-men, to shops for resale) and about 27 retail men, who are "on the basket". Retail men drive small vans, and they tour a "round" of domestic customers either on the suburban housing estates, or in the surrounding villages.

(a) This name, and all others employed here, is fictitious. Many other irrelevant facts have been altered or disguised to protect the identities of those studied.

The Wellbread chain began as a small, old-fashioned family baker up a side street, Deal Street, in the old part of the town. The owners, the Grundy family, went the way of many small and inefficient bakeries. One employee, a female packer, remembered what it was like. She said:

"...the bakery up the other place, Deal Street, that was all little dark places you know, and when they used to make the hot-cross buns, that was really nice. It was all done in the last week (before Easter), and at every little table or bench, there was men working...you know, kneading ...and there was currants everywhere, you used to stand on them, walk on them...it was nice to see all that..."(a)

Another recalled what it was like, and also remembered how the Grundy family had got into trouble:

"...They used to have real coke ovens and everything, they used to have the coke stacked up in the bakery there!....well, it was originally Grundy's, see?...but what they done, see, they borrowed too much money off of _____ (local flour miller)...until they kept lending it, you know, to expand and expand...until eventually they couldn't pay off their debts, and so, of course, the Mill took them over..."

The Mill that took Grundy's over renamed the bakery 'Wellbreads', and moved the works, lock, stock and barrel up to a shiny new custom-built plant on the commercial outskirts to the north of the town. Although the old management (with the addition of a few Mill personnel) were retained, other things changed:

"...Well, it was a lot happier down there (at Deal Street) it was a lot more closely knit...I mean it was a lot more like a small community... there had only been about 15 of us working in the place...and about 6 women...it was a really happy place to work in..."

(a) Reported speech from bakery workers, management or salesmen is taken from field notes or from typed transcripts of tape-recorded interviews. Irrelevant detail, but not textual, syntactical or grammatical structure, is occasionally altered to preserve anonymity.

The Mill, in its new Wellbread disguise, continued the old policy of allowing flour customers to get too deeply into debt, and then buying them out. The Wellbread chain began to emerge. The same man continued:

"...course, they expanded even further...they were buying all these small bakeries...the Mill was serving people...getting them into debt, closing them, and then opening them up again as Wellbreads, this is how they have grown right the way through.."

At Deal Street, the despatch foreman looked after the salesman as a sort of sideline to his regular despatch duties. His experience as a salesman actually ceased with the advent of motor transport after the first world war. His first hand experience with a horse and cart, and his executive abilities with the fleet of broken-down, second hand first world war ambulances which the Grundys were operating was not the sort of go-ahead team that the Mill had in mind. As one man said: "As soon as the Mill started to get their feet in, they decided that Sales Managers were the thing of the future...so they sacked him off the sales side of things...and got a proper bloke in...". This was the beginning of the Sales department as it is at present constituted. It also marked the onset of increasingly obvious differences between Sales and other bakery departments. Most other department heads hail from the old days, and are usually referred to as the "Deal Street Boys" to distinguish them from the "Blokes from the Mill".

The move from Deal Street, and the subsequent import of a hard-nosed production manager from one of the bakeries which the Mill had indebted, the increase in production size, and the not-so-subtle transmission from craft to factory production, brought some easily noticed changes:^(a)

"...it was terrifically hard work...it was to get harder as time went on...as they increased trade, and as they increased the speed of the plant... things just drifted apart...whereas everybody knew

(a) For a similar account of this sort of change in a different bakery, see: W.W. Daniel (1963, 1964, 1966). For parallel accounts of life in bakeries, see Ditton, (1972, 1972a); Hoogerwerf (1972); Hansen (1974); and Kirkland (1927).

everybody else by their first name at Deal Street...up at Wellbreads, you had different men coming in who nobody knew, and, I dunno, things never seemed to be the same, it was more impersonal than anything, I suppose..."

The objective conditions for unionisation increased, and the Baker's Union got a foothold after one or two shaky starts.^(a) It was at this point that the Sales department began to adopt openly a different identity to that cloaking the rest of the workforce. At one time, at Deal Street, they had been part of the despatch-and-sales department. From here on, new men, and aggressive, short-course trained managers steeped in progressive American sales techniques, and thinly glossed in a patina of anti-union conservatism began to remodel the Sales department:

"...When they opened _____ (an especially built production bakery in a nearby town), they hadn't got a bit of trade there...three weeks before they opened, they hadn't got one shop, but they moved a team of canvassers in there, and they got enough to run the plant within three months of opening...and there was a Wheatkist bakery nearby, and they took that over and transferred all the production to _____.."

The current sales force is run with the curious ideological mixture of strict authoritarianism and team-spirit. The salesmen are unorganised, and sporadic attempts from within by the most experienced and senior salesmen to organise the salesforce as a branch of the TCWU, are ferociously and speedily quashed by the sales management. One salesman commented:

"...We had a meeting in a pub about it..an Irish fellow organised it, it was just when I was about to take over the wholesale round...well, about 16 of us went along, and we all joined for a week, and it all fell through after that...this bloke kept saying: 'If we all stick it, they can't fire all of us'...but I didn't see it that way..they couldn't cover us all from blokes they had at Wellbreads, but they could bring in supervisors from the depots,

(a) One man said: "...It got going when _____ became the new branch secretary, they had to kick the other bloke out in the end for fiddling the funds...at least, that was the unofficial reason given, he was on the fiddle, and he got the sack..."

couldn't they?...anyway, the manager called us in, and accused me of starting it...that's always his way, he does that every time he gets a sniff of the Union..."

There is a sense in which managerial antipathy to the Union is born out of honestly believed conviction that they really are on the same side as their men. Indeed, for the management, bakery life is as time-consuming as it is for the salesmen. As the Senior production manager once sourly said to me: "As my wife keeps telling me, it's not a trade, it's a bloody disease!" The Sales Manager liked his job, but ultimately, he too agreed:

"...take me, I earn a reasonable salary...I worked hard to get where I am mind you...but I've got a responsible job, and I enjoy it...but...it's not just 12 hours a day you know, you've got that bloody telephone by your bed all the time..."

His anti-union stance (when he was a salesman he was, according to an erstwhile fellow salesman, a noted "lick-arse") is partially supported by the supervisory cushion which he has placed between himself and his men. For some organisational purposes in the Sales department, the salesmen are arbitrarily divided into groups of four salesmen, for whom single supervisors have some moral and technical responsibility. Salesmen, as they caustically remark along the loading bays in the early mornings, are those who said "no" to the managerial offer to become a supervisor. Those who say "yes", and become supervisors, do so 'on a promise'. That is, they fall for the rosy picture of future meteoric promotion glowingly sketched out for them in the Sales manager's office. Inevitably, very few get promoted from supervisory ranks. The job of supervisor is the most permanent imaginable step on an illusory promotion ladder.

Individual dreams aside, the supervisors act as relief-salesmen for most of the time, perhaps leaving one or two days a month left for 'proper' supervisory duties such as canvassing, checking on their group's performance, paper-work, and so on. "They use them blokes", as one despatch chargehand sourly remarked, "like a piece of old rag". This administrative set-up allows the Sales manager to wallow undisturbed in a morass of pseudo-sentimental Human Relations mythology.

He explained to me:

"...if the Union recruit anybody here...It'll be my fault...we don't need a Union!...what we've got here is a team, I'm one of them, I'm part of them, I consider them out there, as the family, to me, they're second only to my own family, if anyone's got a complaint, they can come straight to me, the man at the top, and bang!...we'll have it sorted out in two hours...(later)...we tell the salesmen that they are the most important people here, they're the ones with the direct contact with the customer and that sort of time is very expensive,...any firm depends on it's salesmen, they're the men that really count...sales representatives are the backbone of any firm...of course, they're not more important than the lavatory cleaner...we all have a part to play...however big..(sic!)."

As I hope to show later, the main difficulties in the Sales department, as far as the management are concerned, stem from the fact that none of the sales force shares this viewpoint.

A RESEARCH DIARY: GETTING TO KNOW ABOUT THE "FIDDLE"

"...It takes £100 to train a man...you haven't got a chance of being a roundsman as far as I can see...anyway, everything you find out goes straight to the bosses at the Mill doesn't it?..."

(Sales supervisor commenting on my plan to do participant observation, in front of several salesmen)

"...Trouble is, half the blokes out there will say: 'Fuck you and your silly questions'.."

(Sales manager commenting on my plan to interview salesmen)

In 1971, a personal desire to apply for a graduate place to study for a Ph.D appeared to coincide fairly nicely with an epistemological-cum-methodological position which seemed to be the logical development of Matza-type (1969) naturalistic field-work. I wanted to embark upon a period of wholly unstructured participant observation research (as the only method that seemed to operationalise naturalism) wherein I would allow those studied to suggest the direction and substantive content of analysis.

But such methodological wooliness is not the stuff that (even) graduate place applications are made of, and so a rather more formal proposal was needed.^(a) I accordingly proposed (and the proposal was subsequently accepted) to return to Wellbreads (where I had previously worked in the undergraduate vacations of 1969 and 1970) and concentrate upon trying to discover whether or not workers paid by the hour

(a) It would be churlish to dress this attempt at a true research diary up in what Cohen and Taylor (1972, p 32-33) call the "chronological lie". Looking back, I seem to have a similar picture to theirs of what my research 'project' was. They remind us that: "...academic journals are full of studies which follow a fixed sequence of aims, methods, presentation of results, and finally the 'discussions' or 'conclusion'...But as we have already indicated we started without a problem, evolved a set of methods as we worked, and ended up with a collection of observations, anecdotes, and descriptions rather than a table of results..." (*ibid*).

exhibited logically similar patterns of action to those noticed amongst workers paid by the piece ('output restriction'), or amongst those in mental hospitals (the 'making out' so vividly described by Goffman, 1961c).

This was not too much of a sell-out of the original decision to do wholly unstructured participant observation, as even the initial proposal was in fact generated from two summers' bakery experience. Although the graduate grant didn't start until October 1971, I worked through the summer of 1971 as a plant worker, né undercover participant observer, at Wellbreads. Of course, by now, I knew most of the men, and had none of the oft-mentioned-on-the-methods-course-problems of getting permission, getting into the field, getting accepted, or getting going. In fact (and this, I suggest, is perhaps the mark of the truly accepted observer) I had far greater problems in getting out.^(a) My every attempt to leave, each timid suggestion that I might discuss "research plans", was brushed aside, and I was plied with furious pleas to stay and help the management out in the perennial summer labour shortage period!

Nevertheless, I was able to develop personal covert participant observation skills. Right from the start, I found it impossible to keep everything that I wanted to remember in my head until the end of the working day (some of the shifts were over 12 hours long) and so had to take rough notes as I was going along. But I was stuck "on the line", and had nowhere to privately retire to to jot things down. Eventually, the wheeze of using innocently provided lavatory cubicles occurred to me. Looking back, all my notes for that third summer were on Bronco toilet paper! Apart from the awkward tendency for pencilled notes to be self-erasing from hard toilet paper (sometimes before I could even get home), my frequent requests for 'time out' after interesting happenings or conversations in the bakehouse, and the amount of time

(a) Donald Roy (personal communication), probably the most widely experienced and knowledgeable participant observer of them all, first suggested this. For example, he recalls a situation when he was working as a short-order cook in New York during time off from professorial duties. The senior cook took a paternal liking to him, took him under his wing, and tried to get him to "do something with his life"!

that I was spending in the lavatory began to get noticed. I had to pacify some genuinely concerned work-mates, give up totally undercover operations, and "come out" as an observer - albeit in a limited way. I eventually began to scribble notes more openly, but still not in front of people when they were talking. When questioned about this, as I was occasionally, I coyly said that I was writing things down that occurred to me about "my studies".

Ultimately, this allowed me to return to Durham and write some initial material up,^(a) based upon either direct bakery experience, or upon consideration of derived theoretical issues.

By February of 1972, I was beginning to hanker for some non-sedentary activity. A common case of participant observer's Pyles.^(b) Subsequently, I started to open up (what turned out to be unsuccessful) contacts with all the large bakeries near Durham in the hope of embarking upon a detailed study of boredom, using the initial Wellbreads experience as a hypothesis-generating pilot study. Each bakery I contacted refused permission - all for different reasons - that I would be in the way, that there were no vacancies, that they were "reorganising", or that the Union would object.

But my contacts with Wellbreads were still good, and as a response to the difficulties that I'd had attempting to continue research in Durham, I finally decided to instead return to Wellbreads, to study the Despatch and Sales departments (and bone up a little on the production side of things) with the aim of ultimately producing a three-part comparative study. I still intended to let the respondents suggest the research problems for me, and, assuming that these problems might well be different for each department, thought that the end result would no doubt be of only very indirect comparative value.

(a) As Ditton 1972, 1972a, 1972b, 1975 (originally 1972c)

(b) Donald Roy (1975, p 219) names this style of participant observer research (i.e., that of providing a "running view of the war with the compliments of one of the combatants", *ibid.* p 218) as "Ernie Pyle" after the war correspondent Ernie Pyle, who was noted for mixing in with the action, and who was probably a bit empty without it.

Thus, from May to December of 1972, I worked solidly as a despatch operative with just a few days refresher course on the plant. From January to June 1973, I interviewed all the despatch workers, a minority in considerable depth, and had them fill in two questionnaires, one general one querying ordinary demographic data, and one specific one elucidating preferences for the various jobs that despatch staff had to do. Regrettably, involvement with the first questionnaire gobbled up the analysis-time which I had planned to occur between periods of participant observation. Although initially designed purely as a blind - so that attention would be drawn away from the participant side of things, and so that the workers would be able to divide my time into 'actual research' (distributing questionnaires) and just 'getting ready' to do it (all the rest of the time) to attract any deliberate attempts to mislead me from the research proper; the first questionnaire grew into a Frankensteinian monster. Greedily, because I thought that I would have to spend a lot of time designing, producing, distributing and collecting it (even to finally throw it away, as I had originally intended) I thought that I might as well try to extract a bit of research value from it, and so spent more time on it than I otherwise might have done.

A few salesmen, and most of the despatch men, but none of the plant men, the confectioners, the packers, storekeepers, mechanics, fitters, or cleaners would fill it in.^(a) Although I was considerably

(a) I had hoped to be able to compare the departments, at least at the footnoted demographic level. I never fully discovered why I experienced such wholesale refusal, but partly, I think, I should not have asked for names, I should have reduced the length, and clarified the content. Unfortunately, it did coincide with the great Jeremy Thorpe Idiocy about not filling in forms at census times. However, I don't feel that I lost any necessary information, and did, at least, get one splendid reply. A cleaner returned his copy to me with the following scrawled across it in large, spidery letters: "THE ONLY ANSWER YOU WILL GET IS FOR MORE FRESH AIR". The few who did conscientiously fill in the questionnaire did not constitute a sufficiently significant sample to warrant analysis of their replies. In any event, I would stress that I do not consider the analysis to have suffered through the failure of this questionnaire. Whilst the information it might have garnered would have sketched the practical parameters of the sample, the "discovery" model of analysis (see below) does not require the otherwise routine inclusion of standard variables.

disheartened, this was no great loss as far as the original research plan was concerned. But I had just concluded tortuous and difficult negotiations with the Sales manager to work as a salesman (luckily the senior production manager intervened on my behalf) and by then, June 1973, I had to start participant observation in the Sales department. This left me no time to start analysing the data that I had accumulated from my despatch experience, but it was obvious that if I delayed working in sales, I would never get another chance. Four hundred typed foolscap pages of despatch data lies unanalysed in my filing cabinet, although it has been thoroughly searched for any information pertinent to an analysis of the Sales department.

But my experience in despatch did mean that I could start work as a salesman with some colossal advantages from the research point of view. I knew the ins and outs of all the despatch operations, in fact, I was to discover that I knew much more about the internal workings of the bakery than most of the regular salesmen. Additionally, I had worked, for nearly a year, in despatch, and I had made many friends amongst the salesmen. Without this wholly irreplaceable background year working alongside the salesmen, I think it highly unlikely that I would have got the interview and observation data that I was eventually to obtain. By the time I came to do research in the Sales department, some of the salesmen had known me, as a casual worker and student, for four years. Sometimes I almost felt I was doing research on members of my own family.

But I must confess that I began to work and observe in the Sales department with less than a wholly open mind concerning the 'problems' that the research there would concentrate upon. I almost knew that I was going to study "the fiddle", although, coincidentally, it both was the central problem of sales life for most of the salesmen, and represented the particular form that 'making out' took in that department.^(a) But ever since I first started working on the plant

(a) In the sense of "grounded theory" (which I discuss below), my "working hypothesis" (Geer, 1964) was no more sophisticated than this.

there was one topic which guaranteed discussion veiled in analogy, vagueness, mystification, allusion, euphemism and ambiguity. Some of the older plant-hands "knew what went on" amongst the salesmen, but whenever I pressed them for further details, it was always: "I can't say no more than that", or, "Ah! that'd be telling". Perhaps if it had been discussed differently, it would never have caught my attention. But the mixture of awe, reverence, suspicion and ignorance with which the subject was treated by the inside men absorbed my analytic curiosity.

Despatch interaction was roughly the same story. The men wouldn't say much, but inferred that they knew a lot more. In my first week there, the chargehand (an ex-salesman) took me aside and said:

"...take him (a salesman who had just walked past), he's just bought a new Viva...£27 a week he gets and he's got four kids that I know of...How does he do it?..there must be a way, mustn't there?..."

"The wholesale boys", another said, "are up to all the tricks." They all, the others agreed, "make a bit on the side", "have their little perks", "make their tea money", "take the odd loaf". And always the meta-communicative wink: "Y'know", "know what I mean?" The management was deprecating, the managing director said to me: "This fiddling is only a temporary thing (after sacking two dealing despatch men)...I've just sacked the two men involved, so it's all over now." And the night manager just thought of it as tolerable shrinkage: "...I mean, you've got to allow for losses, you do get a percentage of loss in every bakery...you get the odd loaf being taken home and not being paid for, a box of cakes goes, somebody has a nibble..". But always the insidious: "You know (laugh) we all make a bit on the side...know what I mean?" No, I didn't, but by God, I was going to.

I must have been looking too hard, and certainly in the wrong direction whilst I was working in the despatch department. For, three months before I was eventually to start as a salesman, two men with whom I had worked for seven months were sacked for stealing

buscuits from the cake-store in the middle of the night, and subsequently selling them to wholesale salesmen. A third worker on the same shift (who had in fact been fully involved, but not on the night in question) left under a cloud of suspicion. I later was able to interview the two men extensively, and obtain very persuasive proof that there were not only regular instances of domestic stealing, but that large scale dealing had been in progress, that it had been going on for a long time, and that most of the salesmen not only knew about it, but also took part in it, and regularly.

It was not by chance that the sackings came as a surprise to me. The two men involved, one of them a chargehand, had taken great care to ensure that I and the other innocent operative were despatched on wild goose chases to other depots to look for missing bread, or otherwise had our attention waylaid and distracted when dealing was in progress. It is somewhat ironic, but one of the sacked men later said to me: "I thought you knew all about it, we thought you had the sense to know what was going on, but had enough sense to keep quiet. ...we used to say: 'Oh, Jason knows about it, but he won't say anything'...". Whilst there are good reasons why it is particularly difficult to spot the occurrence of this sort of activity^(a) without recourse to inventories, or to jobs which involve checking the work of others (neither of which I had), incidents like this^(b) always acutely embarrass researchers. Luckily, in this particular case, by the time I started work in the sales department, memories had blurred,

(a) Bread is not only "fungible" (Henry, 1974, p 22) i.e., it is indistinguishable from others of its kind, "dealing" is also what Lemert (1953, p 101) calls a very "low visibility" crime, inasmuch as there is nothing visually or objectively criminal: it is very easy for bent inside men to conceal some extra bread on the racks of bread which await the salesman. It would be far beyond the resources of one individual, even if specifically employed for that purpose, to check all the Wellbreads' salesman's racks. Additionally, the "skills" of passing out stolen bread are identical to those required to issue legitimate goods (Lofland, 1969, p 83). As Lomask (1951, p 12) points out, employee theft is easy where the firm (like the bakery) manufactures large quantities of small items.

(b) After one study reporting the lack of worker interest in industrial conflict was published (Goldthorpe et al. 1968) there was a prolonged and bitter strike at the factory! Every research project has its embarrassing moments, this was mine.

and many of the salesmen firmly believed that I had known all along, and could be trusted. I thus not only had in-depth information about a recent, and relevant case of commercial enforcement, I had something much more valuable: I pre-dated the current despatch regime, and, even more irreplaceable, I was trusted.

And so, from June to September of 1973, I worked as a bread salesman, and for the rest of that year interviewed as many salesmen as I could. I was, by then, a fairly experienced interviewer, having already completed taping and typing in-depth interviews with all the despatch men. When I began interviewing salesmen I had developed a fairly useful interview technique. I managed to conduct most initial interviews at the home of the respondent,^(a) and was sufficiently skillful by then to steer wives and children from the room, and pacify any qualms about anonymity before starting. I had a rough check-list of topics which I needed to cover, although in most cases (aside from the inevitable and occasional interview which is tortuously staccato), I put this back in my pocket after a few minutes and allowed each man to talk about whatever aspect of being a salesman most worried, concerned or interested him. None refused to talk about fiddling, many volunteering information far beyond the extent I dared to hope for. I had, by then, perfected a sort of grunt which I inserted into the flow of conversation whenever it seemed to pall. It acted both as an immediate encouragement to the respondent to keep talking, as a sign that I was still interested in what was being said, and crucially, contributed nothing distracting to the reminiscence pattern. Since I typed interviews verbatim afterwards I did not want actually to alter the flow of anecdote, or interrupt any trains of thought. With subtle use of the encouraging grunt, verbatim transcripts came to resemble long paragraphs of fluid reminiscence, rather than merely brief answers to various questions.

In December, 1973 I returned to Durham with a total of over

(a) The only "special qualities" (cf. Skipper and McGaghy, 1972) these respondents had was the occasional inability to be home at the time arranged for an interview. Later interviews with each man were always arranged at my flat (better for taping), once I could be sure that the respondent was going to come.

4,560 hours of participant observation, and 34 taped and typed interviews under my research belt.

Although my original intention to analyse all this data still stood, it soon became apparent that I had too much information. Analytic justice could not have been done to more than a third of it in the remaining year and a half of graduate study. I made no conscious decision about what to leave out, but analysis of fiddling in the Sales department soon grew into an exclusive interest. Nothing had been written about fiddling from a sociological viewpoint (neither Mars, 1973, nor 1974 had been published when I started to check references to fiddling) although it seemed to me to be a particularly interesting case as it appeared to confront many of the taken-for-granted canons of traditional criminological research. Fiddling was practiced by most, and not just a few of the salesmen. It had neither practical nor psychological priority (it was physically and emotionally an irrelevant part of life), and, crucially, practitioners were able to conceive of it successfully as non-criminal action. Finally, it was the most suitable substantive and empirical coathanger that I could find upon which a "theorised ethnography" of bread salesmen might be hung.

A Note on the Participant Observer: The "Defrocked Priest" of Method^(a)

"..You can put that in your fucking book.."
(Irate Despatch Chargehand)

I have nothing very significant to add to the ever expanding sociological literature on the experiences, morals, ethics and practices of the participant observer. I was partially open (after the unfortunate experience with the Bronco toilet paper), but I never fully declared that I was chiefly interested in fiddling. This is partly ethically excusable (and at least not unique, Quinney, 1963,

(a) Goffman, 1959, p 163. One member of a group is always prepared to sell its secrets to another group.

p 211-2, never disclosed to his subjects that he was interested in their pharmacy prescription violation), as the decision to concentrate upon fiddling was not made until some time after returning to Durham. Nevertheless, towards the end of the field research, I had begun to think that an analysis of fiddling would be the basis of the proposed section on the Sales department. I must confess that I did resort to sub-ethical research on occasions, although I would claim, with Polsky (1963) that there is no alternative if crime is to be studied in its natural surroundings. Additionally, I would claim that participant observation is inevitably unethical by virtue of being interactionally deceitful, whether or not intentions are declared or permission sought.

In the first case, I have sought to protect the identity of both the bakery and of those studied by omitting names and changing other irrelevant facts. I have not changed sides since field research was undertaken, but I did not fully disclose all possible intentions to those I watched and interviewed. By using a technique which Gerald Mars (in personal communication) calls the "false question", I was able to note data on the fiddle whilst it was being discussed. If something that was said seemed important but likely to be swiftly dropped if I took written interest in it, I immediately interjected with a wholly spurious question on job preferences or something, and under the apparent guise of noting their answers, was able to make the notes that I wanted. Without reliance on some subterfuge: the practices of subterfuge will not be opened to analysis.^(a)

(a) Sutherland (1937, p 207) refers thus to the associational barriers which thieves commonly and invisibly throw around their activities: "...the barriers can be penetrated from the outside only with great difficulty. A stranger who enters a thieves' hangout is called a 'weed in the garden'. When he enters, conversation either ceases completely or is diverted to innocuous topics...". W.W. Daniel (1963, p 108) did not resort to any unseemly and unethical practices in his study of a bakery. Although the inside men of his study claimed that the salesmen were on the fiddle, the salesmen, in interviews with Daniel, denied this. Daniel concludes that the fact that the roundsmen have cars and the inside men bicycles, is to be explained by the fact that the roundsmen could have part-time jobs, and that different expenditure preference patterns might operate. I cannot find it in my heart to believe this.

The very ethical concern with which field studies are currently scrutinised is perhaps a temporary aberration. The young Talcott Parsons, who used to stroll hospital corridors wearing a 'borrowed' white coat in the interests of (social) science, for example aptly comments (1970, p 108): "...Perhaps with the current concern over ethical aspects of research, this mild deception of patients would now be regarded as unethical...". There is a sense, also, in which all observation breaks hidden rules structuring interaction. The researcher deals in impression-management, character-judgement and many other lay arts, but in an undeclared way.^(a) He is, as Goffman (1957, p 119) notes of the type: "...Conspicuously concerned to an improper degree with the way that the interaction, qua interaction, is proceeding, instead of becoming spontaneously involved in the official topic of conversation..". I adopt Goffman's stance here, and suggest that in practical (although perhaps not in ethical) terms, participant observation is variously a type of alienation from interaction (above) a benign fabrication (Goffman, 1974, p 95) or a refabricated one (ibid, p 171). The sense, of course, in which some ordinary actions share this attribute legitimates the sociological variety. Sociological research, from this viewpoint, is more of an exaggeration of conventional social activities, than something separately constructed and separately justified.

It would be a mistake for me to attempt to recapture the flavour of the research experience by encompassing it within the technical methodological metaphor. The research was done intuitively, without textbooks clutched in the left hand: and so it is immediately unnecessary to provide a retrospective technical account.^(b) Ultimately,

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- (a) Aside from mentioning it, it would be a mistake to make too much of the inevitable conclusion that research of this sort is merely an example of normal life. For too much of this, see Philips (1971, Ch. 3)
- (b) Such an account would confuse original intention with post hoc description. For comparative purposes however, looking back, the research seems to have wavered between the "complete participant" and the "participant as observer" (Gold, 1958). I was overt about research in general, but, as it turns out, covert about the central topic of study.

the ethical questions are not just the responsibility of the researcher. The researched must always face the risk that somebody will "analyse" him behind his back, whether or not that somebody is gainfully employed as a sociologist.^(a) To subtract this responsibility from those studied ignores their everyday competences and abilities. As one salesman said to me, some time after I had finished working full time:

"...I never approached you down the bakery, you stood out, see?...and most people realised that you stood out, you weren't supposed to be there, ...and that was it, you didn't look like a bakery person... _____ (despatch employee) is a push over...he'll give you bread any time..."

(a) I merely wish to note here that I am aware both of the ethical dilemmas of research and involvement with criminal activity (but fully support the programme outlined in Chapter 3 of Polsky, 1967) and of the ethical-moral problems associated with secret or semi-secret research (Erikson, 1965; Roth 1961 et seq.). I feel that, with Roth, research can never be divided into secret and non-secret, and that unethical behaviour is inevitable. Roth (ibid, p 283) says:

"...All research is secret in some ways and to some degree - we can never tell the subjects "everything"... so as long as there exists a separation of the role between the researchers and those researched upon, the gathering of information will inevitably have some hidden aspects even if one is an openly declared observer..."

INTENTIONS

"...of what, then, am I certain? I am certain only that my interpretation could be correct..."

(Abel, 1948, p 45)

The research upon which this thesis is based was not set up to answer any empirical questions, or to verify any empirical hypotheses. The intentions of this work are theoretical, or, more strictly, conceptual. In a strictly empirical sense, from the classical point of view, the data are patchy.^(a) Attention should accordingly be focussed not so much upon whether or not this work has satisfied conventional empirical demands, but rather whether or not a contribution to theory can be established.

Chapter Four alone constitutes a factual digression: a background needed not only to underpin the theoretical work attempted in the other chapters, but also as an initial contribution to a new empirical field.^(b) The other chapters are particularly intended to be doubly-readable: both as potential tools for ethnographic construction, and as an empirically generated theoretical discussion of various concepts, together illustrative of a particular social process.

This thesis is not an attempt to provide a full-blown

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- (a) A rider taken, as were many other things, from Gregory Bateson (1973, p 9). In the sense of statistical significance, the data are possibly "dirty".
- (b) Sutherland (1940, p 240) quoted a few cases of malpractice in the early careers of some businessmen who were to go on to write autobiographies. Sutherland mournfully noted (and it is still true today) that: "No first hand research study from this point of view has ever been reported". I hope, here, to redress this empirical shortcoming.

ethnography of the bread salesman, although I believe that I have, if only by imputation, provided a complete 'recipe' of how bread salesmen may successfully go about fiddling. But ethnography, as such, has an inevitable epistemologically ad hoc status: it is impossible to provide a complete ethnography. My intention is not, then, to 'do' bread salesmen, but specifically to explain theoretically how "fiddling" (which is a criminal offence) can be "fiddling" (that is, practically and psychologically trifling). I have accordingly devoted analytic attention toward describing those general social processes by which a group of men can simultaneously break the criminal law, and yet fully believe themselves to be ordinary, good citizens. I will concentrate then, upon exposing the nature of the "enabling processes" (Rodgers and Buffalo 1974a, p 112) through which salesmen may simultaneously stay good and yet deviate, rather than upon providing analysis of bread salesmen as a real, substantive unit.

In an initial, simple procedural sense, the Wellbreads material is not displayed here in classical doctoral sequence. To so reconstruct this particular research experience would be to indulge in "retrospective falsification" (Barber and Fox, 1958) of the serendipity pattern which actually characterised the research, and to slavishly kowtow to the aged academic mandate to write in the verification rhetoric. Rather than dryly and technically present a pre-selected assortment of elements of the processes which served the end result of the analysis of fiddling, I have tried, instead to relay the experiences of those studied (very strictly speaking) as ordinary ones. I have attempted to lodge the analysis spiritually somewhere between the in-human accounts so often found in criminological literature, and the sub-human ones given by journalists. It is useful if, as Glaser and Strauss (1967, p 3) have suggested, theorising grounded in specific empirical material should be "readily understandable to sociologists of any viewpoint, to students, and to significant laymen." So, rather than filling in the form of the conventional doctoral outline, I have presented the material in a logical, rather than specifically chrono-logical sequence.

The aim is not categorically to type a new crime or criminal. It is rather to illustrate the utterly confusing normality with which the criminal enterprise can sometimes be clothed. In so doing, one learns not so much about 'them' (or even, come to that, about the rest of 'us') but that such divisions are false. To paraphrase Goffman (1963, p 152), it is implied then, that it is not to the ordinary that one should look for understanding our ordinariness, but to the different. I have tried to understand the fiddling salesman qua person, and not qua fiddler. Looking back (for the purposes of epistemological location and procedural comparison) I seem to have produced "grounded theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory is the opposite of logical deduction from a priori assumptions. It is instead based upon the principle of generating theoretical propositions from observations inductively gained from data. Its procedural basis is the constant comparative use of ethnographic incidents (Glaser, 1965) which are collected and collated for this purpose. Relative significance emerges as data-saturation at each level of theory construction, wherein the constant comparison of incidents generates theoretical properties, categories, and integrated theory respectively.

The subsequent reduction in status of the empirical contribution to the final report necessitates a short note on the logical nature of the quoted material. I have not tried, in the text, to indicate that this piece was taped, this statement noted immediately, that speech recalled after a couple of months. In other words, I have not attempted to grade the evaluative contribution to factual quotation. The inability, ultimately, to distinguish fact from theory - to separate the objective from the, however unconscious, subjective injection, produces a dilemma. On the one hand, one might opt for the deprecating shrug - the plea for more objectivity, and the weaknesses of the current report. On the other, one might stand by the overt celebration of inevitable subjectivity by encoding it apologetically in method. The social scientist is faced with datum which is not only saturated with lay interpretation, but also impregnated with theory by himself. Additionally, the simultaneity of collection and analysis not only blurs the epistemological status of the material at hand, but also implies the eventual collapse of data into theory. To return to Glaser and Strauss (1967, p 45) for a moment, replacing the

verification rhetoric with the discovery model of analysis involves one in "theoretical sampling", which is "...the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges..". This particular position allows data as the medium through which concepts should be explored: the window through which relevant theory is espied.

Adoption of the theoretical sampling frame allows the analyst to surmount the difficulty of using mixed status illustrative examples to demonstrate logically obvious categories which may find no actual expression in the empirical field at hand. The attempt to use the actual research field to germinate general conceptual and theoretical understanding is hamstrung if examples drawn from personally unresearched fields are unavailable. Accordingly, I have also tried to select validating examples from diverse sources which I give a similar epistemological standing to material which I have either personally researched, or "clipped".^(a) Garfinkel (1956b) refers to

(a) I have tried to ground possible distinctions between specific assertions about Wellbread salesmen, and general statements about the wider analytic category of occupational theft, by reference to a fairly systematic collection of "clippings" which I have taken from national newspapers. With varying degrees of thoroughness, I have scoured representative national newspapers for any references to occupational crimes reported since early in 1971. Although I have collected reports of 120 cases of occupational theft, and 65 related cuttings of some related relevance, I only use them individually as ex-amples, and not collectively as a sample. Nevertheless, this material was collected with great care, and offers a particularly useful aid in the absence of alternative empirical sociological studies in the field. All "cases" were given a case number (1 to 103, and H.1 to H.17) and dated as of first newspaper report. Only reported cases which conformed to the following definition of occupational theft were collected. "A successful initiation of a prosecution in the U.K., for the illegal utilisation of facilities, or the removal and conversion to one's own use of company or private property, access to which has been gained by the legitimate persuance of an occupation." Where this concerned blue-collar workers, some (generally successful) attempts were made to gather additional information by writing to local newspapers situated near the initial reported court hearing. "Clippings" which were interesting (i.e., only partially satisfied the above definition) were separately collected as "cuttings". In the text that follows, these clippings are referred to as follows: CASES 1-42 (collected between January 1973, and September 1974),

this as the "documentary method". Research proceeds by culling examples from diverse areas of social life and comparing them with ones empirically at hand without attempting to impose a hierarchy of acceptability upon them. Goffman (Preface to 1956 edn. of Goffman, 1959) suggests: "...The justification for this approach (as I take to be the justification of Simmel's also) is that the illustrations together fit into a coherent framework that ties together bits of experience the reader has already had...". So, for example in Chapter Six I have tried to illustrate the motivational world of the fiddler by wittingly comparing his statements with those of others who may be quite different structurally. Because, however, there is an empirical warrant for ethnographic description in this area, I have not merely used material as a springboard for "formal" theorising of the sort recommended by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Instead, I have tried to pitch this analysis somewhere between that option, and the (theoretically impossible but oft-avowed) one of 'pure' ethnography. Commenting upon this use of the "natural metaphor", Garfinkel (*ibid*, p 190) claims:

"...by this it is meant that there are formal similarities in the situations of persons located at different points in the social order. These structurally repeated situations, though they may be known to the participants by different names, are organisationally identical..."

Using this method, research attempts to document a variety of instances, and from them deduce an underlying formal pattern. It is not the case that imagination is substituted for fact (note here the particular care that Goffman takes to produce examples), on the contrary, extraordinary instances are sought for their very ability to reintroduce fact. Jacobs (1967, p 64), preceding an analysis of

(contd) CASES 43-103 (systematically collected from the Times and from the Guardian between October 1974 and September 1975) and H.CASES (HEATHROW CASES) 1-17 (from January 1971 to September 1975: the racket situation at Heathrow is so extraordinary that both cases and cuttings with references to it were collated separately). CUTTINGS 1-50 were collected between January 1973 and September 1975, and H.CUTTINGS (HEATHROW CUTTINGS) 1-15 were collected between December 1971 and September 1975.

suicide notes, commented: "It is the author's belief that such verification is not contingent upon these notes in particular, but that any set of notes collected from within the same cultural environment would do as well." I would accord similar interchangeable status to the collections from my own material which I have used below. Diverse cases indicate an underlying reality: method allows surface diversity to be drawn together.^(a)

A "Theorised Ethnography"

"...Theory is the articulated vision of experience..." (Laing, 1967, p 20)

I am concerned somehow to present the ordinary, daily experiences of the salesman. One way of doing this would be to write a novel. Consider, for example, Solzhenitsyn's (1968) 'day in the life of' treatment of the prisoner, or Bukowski's (1973) amazingly funny yet achingly serious description of 12 years as a postman.

Regrettably, the analytic version of this, that Lofland (1974, p 104) calls the unframed "Then They Do This" eclectic catalogue of vaguely assorted anecdotes is rudely theorised sub-analysis masquerading as reported ethnography. True or false, to believe that this style contains less theory (than perhaps later 'analysis') is similar to the belief that some days display less weather than others. Theory, like weather, is a zero-sum concept: it cannot be more or less there, only more or less recognised and re-ordered. Naked experience is strictly un-presentable as it stands, one can merely be more or less aware of the intrusion of the self upon the object of analysis. Thus, whilst as Rock (1973) astutely notices

(a) And incidentally prevents what Douglas (1971, p 15-16) calls "Bongo-Bongoism". Bongo-Bongoism is to suggest of a theory: 'Ah, yes, that may well be so, but it doesn't apply to the Bongo-Bongo tribe.'

a programmatic tension necessarily exists between phenomenalism (naturalistic reproduction) and essentialism (depicting fundamental social processes) in the study of deviance, there is no practical way that phenomenism can be presented. Rock (ibid, p 18) adds: "Of course, description cannot proceed very far if it is couched solely in the constructs employed by the inhabitants of a deviant world. Some necessary abstraction and elaboration must be undertaken so that the world's contours are more fully understood."

Perversely, the theoretical impossibility of producing pure ethnography legitimates the overt celebration of theory-impregnation. I hope to illustrate the everyday life of the salesman by analysing it: an appropriate and ad hoc ethnography will have to be reconstructed by the reader. All that the analyst can ever do is logically to construct a set of sense-assembly rules - here, a sort of salesman-in-kit-form, from which the perspicacious reader may build sensibility.

Accordingly, I have not merely reported the experiences of the salesmen, but have, at every stage, extended the empirically generated analysis to include diverse examples in the interests of producing formal statements. It is this sense (the production of logically exhaustive typologies of theoretical possibilities, rather than just those options taken out by those actually studied) which defines the "theorised ethnography". Such developed typologies do not 'get anywhere', as they are not designed to specifically illustrate empirical data-at-hand. Admittedly, by implication, such an approach cannot hope to match the ruthless vigour and exhaustive coverage of the sociological "portrait". I have not tried to satisfy the empirical check-list for such a production. Instead, I have selected from my own experiences as a salesman, several theoretical coathangers (such as motive and role) and upon them hung relevant data in such a way as to induce conceptual embellishment.

In producing such a consciously theorised ethnography of salesmen, I have followed the rule of grounding the interpretation of fiddling as an "Everyman Performance". That is, I have tried to depict sufficient conditions for a reasonable man to consider fiddling to be (after reading them) under the circumstances a rational performance.

Bateson (1936, p 1) puts this very well in the introduction to Naven:

"...if it were possible adequately to present the whole of a culture, stressing every aspect exactly, as it is stressed in the culture itself, no single detail would appear bizarre or strange or arbitrary to the reader, but rather the details would all appear neutral and reasonable as they do to the natives who have lived all their lives within the culture.."

In the absence of relevant empirical criteria of significance, it is a complex issue to assess whether or not the analysis which follows makes fiddling appear 'natural'. Does the research succeed? In all non-empirical research of this nature, the analyst is faced with the procedural dilemma so astutely described by MacIntyre (1973, p 1-2). He asks how we are to decide whether or not an instance of a phenomenon is a counter-example, or not an example at all - a dilemma, I suggest, which inevitably arises when grounded theorising is coupled with analytic induction:

"...We use certain criteria to identify this or that as gold or as amino acid or a Christmas pudding. If certain characteristics are present and others absent, then this will suffice in all normal circumstances for the identification. But what if the standard criteria are satisfied and then it turns out that this otherwise normal gold emits radiation...or that this Christmas pudding talks?...Are we to say that this is not gold or not a Christmas pudding, or are we to say that we were mistaken about the properties of gold or of Christmas puddings?...."

This is an extraordinarily complex issue. In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of ignoring it, I have (during research) attempted what Glaser (1965) calls the 'constant comparison' of ethnographic incidents, until it seemed that further research was merely bringing in repeated examples of empirically the same matter. At this point, according to Glaser, the theoretical category in question is appropriately "saturated". I am not convinced that Glaser satisfactorily resolves the MacIntyre Dilemma (or, indeed, that it is at all resolvable) and, rather than close any options, I have most probably over quoted the experiences of the salesmen in the text.

This seemed to be a wiser decision than that recommending a judicious selection of what might be a representative experience. The same issue arises again during theoretical work: Are the typical socialising experiences of recruits to Wellbreads sufficiently similar to those of recruits elsewhere to warrant calling this experience a 'moral career'? Or, are the differences (which certainly exist) sufficiently great to warrant inventing a different theoretical tag? Further, should I say that it is not a 'moral career'? Or, perhaps, that it is a 'sub-type'? Or (finally) that this piece of research is sufficient evidence to change the definitive conditions establishing the presence of moral careers?

I have resolved this issue on a pro rata/ ad hoc intuitive basis when it has arisen. Establishing 'sufficient difference' to, or 'sufficient similarity' with previous formulations is always an idiosyncratic decision (whether or not it is declared as such) and is, thus, one always open to criticism.

Grounding the interpretation of fiddling as an Everyman Performance involves the analyst in making what we might call the "Hughes Assumption". Hughes (1962, p 25) asks:

"...How could such dirty work be done among and, in a sense, by the millions of ordinary, civilised German People?...You will see that there are two orders of questions. One set concerns the good people who did not themselves do this work. The other concerns those who did do it. But the two sets are not really separate; for the crucial question concerning the good people is their relation to the people who did the dirty work, with a related one which asks under what circumstances good people let the others get away with such actions. An easy answer concerning the Germans is that they were not so good after all. We can attribute to them some special inborn or ingrained race consciousness, combined with a penchant for sadistic cruelty and unquestioning acceptance of whatever is done by those who happen to be in authority...(but)I only want to close one easy way out of serious consideration of the problem of good people and dirty work, by demonstrating that the Germans were and are about as good and about as bad as the rest of us..."

The concern is not merely to locate a context in which intelligibility for all the data can be found (although this is also the case), it is rather that we have to explain that good people do dirty work not because they are really bad people, but because, under the circumstances, dirty work is what good people do. Lemert's (1962) brilliant analysis of paranoia is a fine example of perfect analytic operation of the Hughes Assumption. Lemert delicately explains paranoia in such a way that at every stage the reader should exclaim to himself: "Why! that's just what I would do/say/feel!" Both the accusations, and feelings of paranoia become, under Lemert's skillful tutelage, an Everyman Performance.

This is not a demand for the analytic production of logical and objective transpersonal criteria of the good, which research could attempt to match with the sample. Instead, we ask how it could happen (not just in the technical sense, but), after making the Hughes Assumption, what social processes are necessary for a successful infractio and the retention of "goodness". To add a rather clever (and protective) qualification: Donald Cressey (1953) has successfully demonstrated embezzlement as an Everyman Performance. Following the recipes provided by Cressey would generate successful embezzlement without any infringement of the actor's moral societal status. Cressey certainly makes the activity "reasonable": but can we, after Nettler (1974) add that nevertheless, it is empirically likely that embezzlement will occur for "bad" (the traditional 'fast women and slow horses') rather than "good" (Cressey's) reasons? The answer, I think, lies in the perhaps reduced (but sounder) claim for the Hughes Assumption. We may say that whilst Cressey is certainly metaphorically correct, Nettler may well be literally so. However, metaphorical goodness (as a programmatic goal for research) serves to justify conclusions which run counter to practical badness and moral imperfection (necessarily) assumed by enforcement agents and enforcement sociologists.

I hope to do for the fiddler what (albeit in a different way) Cressey did for the embezzler. The assumption is that one's subjects are good: I have made it of the salesman.

Chapter Two

PROCESS: The Moral Career of the Recruit

OCCUPATIONAL THEFT AND MORAL CAREERS

To start with:

"...How I started was quite funny really, I was at the mushroom factory, and I was offered a job driving for this other firm...so I handed in my notice, and then they said I hadn't got the right licence for the job..and that was sort of panic stations...so I went up to the bakery..."

"...then, I was a goody-goody, a little honest innocent little boy, I didn't know no tricks... no, I was just an innocent little boy...20 years old..."

"...I saw it in the paper, and I went down for an interview...and I'll be honest with you, he hadn't been talking for long, when I wondered what the hell he was talking about...he told me the pitfalls, the things you might come up against, but I don't think he mentioned the company much...he didn't try and sell me the job, he just told me the facts of the job..."

Then:

"...I realised that first day that I'd have to learn a lot more than I thought..."

"...I wasn't to know, but all he was concerned with all the first few days, I didn't know nothing, all he taught me was where to go, that was the main thing..."

"...as we went round, I gradually took a bit more interest, and thought: 'Well, there are fiddles in this', I reckoned there were before ...(but) I was dim from the start, I just followed him round, and on the third day, I carried the basket up to the door, and he did all the money...it wasn't until the third day that I realised he was adding it on..."

"...he didn't tell me much about it, not at first, he just used to add a penny and a half-penny on...he didn't tell me too much about it..."

Later:

"...this is the best way to explain to a chap, what I say is: 'Everybody makes mistakes, and one of these days, you're going to lose a fiver, so make a penny where you can, and you'll always be covered then, and they won't be stopping money out of your wage packet'.."

"...then, he near enough said: 'This'll help you run your car and buy cigarettes'..sort of say it and laugh..."

Then:

"...but I never really did it, not for the first six months, I didn't know much about it...I just carried on, and charged the right prices...Until Wellbread started to say I was short, and all the rest of it..."

"...when I was with him, he used to put on the bottom of the debt-sheet: '£2 Discount', put a circle around it, and put his initials there... well, after a bit I cottoned on to this, then I used to write a discount in, put a circle around it, and scribble near it, hand it in and get a discount..."

"...they used to say: 'Put a penny on here, and a half on here'...it was the firm that made me change...once you think at the end of the week, 'Oh! here's an extra £3 in my pocket, I'll try and do it again next week'...that's how it carries on..."

"...I don't worry about it now...I do know that if I didn't overcharge...my rec. wouldn't come out right, I can't think of anybody down there who isn't doing it...it's pathetic really, but you couldn't survive without doing it..."

And, finally:

"...Let's face it, you can tell them anything and they'll believe it...anybody can do anybody, they think they're wise to you, and what you do, but they haven't got any idea...I sometimes wonder how the hell some of these shops ever make a profit..."

"...Look, in every job, where there's a loophole, there's a fiddle..."

"...he's got cash, and anybody who takes cash is on the fiddle..."

"...I've had a hell of a week, I made £18 on Monday alone, and just yesterday, I made £32..."

"...he's been doing a ton... (£100)... on the side, they're jealous... but if they're going to tighten up on everybody, they'll lose them all, if nobody can make a penny on a perk, nobody's going to stay ... you can take that... not one will stay..."

These chronologically arranged excerpts from the occupational biographies of experienced salesmen were collected either in conversations that I had with the men while I was a participant observer in the Sales department, or later during taped interviews. The easy compatibility of these tidbits from salesmen's life-accounts points to an underlying continuity of experienced progress derived from the existence of socialising patterns which cannot wholly be traced to individual predilections. The reason for quoting this pastiche of comment is to throw some analytic light on the processes involved when an employee goes bent. In this case, how and why salesmen, from being raw and innocent recruits, become adept and experienced "fiddlers".

Some measure of sympathy for practitioners of the "fiddle" emerges from a consideration of their harsh employment conditions. As Sharpe (1974) ascorbically notices: "If there is an aristocracy of labour the bakery worker is, without doubt, the peasant." For a six day week, with some workdays of over 14 hours, salesmen are paid on a flat-rate salary basis coupled with commission earnings for passing individual sales targets, and bonus earnings for good sales records during special competitions. This employment structure produced an average earnings figure (in the research summer of 1973) of £32.50 per week gross. On top of this, sales life is organisationally constructed for each salesman in terms of weekly financial accountability. Every salesman is held to be personally responsible for ensuring that the cash collected by him from his customers satisfactorily matches the value of the goods despatched to him.

To ensure fulfilment of such duties, office staffs prepare a weekly audit for each man, but systematic and sophisticated means of checking these verdicts are regularly denied salesmen. Individual

responsibility in ensuring that a suitable balance is negatively achieved by managerial appropriations from the wage packets of those whose financial verdict is 'short' of the required sum. In signing an employment 'contract' with the firm on entry, most men believe that such deductions are legally enforceable. Such an employment structure might beg a more basic question than why employees go bent. Why do they join the firm in the first place?

The managerial recruitment and training tactics not only manage to impress sufficient numbers of entrants to balance a high work-force turnover through controlled suppression and release of unfavourable information; but also, those managerial delegates credited with looking after novices are held personally responsible for ensuring that contrived, staged corruption of neophytes occurs during the training period. The processes of transformation of novice into sophistication rely upon successful internalisation by the recruit of two operational premises of the Wellbread Sales department: firstly, that the department must remain solvent in the accomplishment of its practical affairs (the sum of individual audits must not be in the red); and secondly, the occupational belief that the processes of converting bread into money are fraught with inevitable mistakes disadvantaging the department.

The essence of supervisor's strategies for the presentation of task-relevant information to neophytes is that interpretations are only dispensed if suitable degrees of commitment to the firm can be perceived. Training thus consists of a process of information transmission, accelerating at perceptive turning points in the defined understanding of the recruit. By the time the newcomer realises quite what is expected of him, it is hoped that his progress has made the previously untenable digestible, and that his commitment to the firm dissolves any lingering doubts that he may have concerning the propriety of sales life.

In short, once the (apparently honest) applicant has survived the rigors of the interview, he is elected to trainee-status, where, whilst learning the job, he is gradually made aware of the fact that 'mistakes' (responsibility for which he has already agreed to) and

thus 'shortages' are inevitable.^(a) Once low pay and long hours have become a reality for him, he is considered to be morally and technically ready for a demonstration that both problems may be solved by overcharging customers. For most men, the relief at finding a solution dilutes any remaining moral qualms, and many go on from here to make money for themselves in ways not explicitly accepted by the firm.

Thus, we are faced not with a conventional example of blue-collar occupational theft. Usually, employees either adopt illicit means to rob the organisation which employs them; (see, eg, Dalton, 1964), or they utilise occasions of managerial laxity and tolerance to steal from customers (eg, see Mars, 1974).^(b) At Wellbreads, instead we confront a situation where institutional socialising arrangements are deliberately constructed in order to coax and coach recruits to conspire willingly and efficiently in systematic organisational corruption, whose intention is regularly and invisibly to rob bona fide clients, on behalf of and at the behest of the company.^(c)

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- (a) Philip Corrigan has pointed out (in personal communication) that this strictly notices the neophytes' 'situated honesty', relative to what is here expected of him. Honesty is only tactical: few workmen have not had something away at some time, and thus it is subsequently a moot point as to whether or not transformation is "radical" or "ordinary" (McHugh, 1965-66, p 357). I suspect that those recruits who leave morally affronted would require systematic desocialisation and resocialisation, and not the mere elaborating socialisation that they receive. Honesty is thus "frame relevant" (Goffman, 1974, p 573), and it is not relevant to the working class re-working of work.
- (b) Although most of the trained salesmen go on to later develop a portfolio of employee theft techniques that generally includes these types (see, Chapter Four), both in the sense of their chronological moral development and in that of sociological (theoretical and empirical) relevance, 'fiddling' is a prior and more important type.
- (c) This is a nice example of what Leonard and Weber (1970, p 416) sympathetically and self-explanatorily call "coerced" crime.

We may characterise this situation as being an example of the way that strategically managed "disengaged involvement" by the powerful (their power overrides the apparent contradiction in that phrase by fiat) produces the effect of an "illusory partnership"^(a) in crime, which, when the chips are down, becomes wholly one-sided collusion.^(b) The management implicitly encourage the fiddling activities of their men, but do so via a meta-communicative wink - a secondary injunction ('don't fiddle') actually contradicting the first ('fiddle') - making it simultaneously clear that the primary message will be denied in any dangerous situations. Those of the men perceptive enough to accurately read the accompanying meta-message find no solace in the hidden rider which prevents them from successfully exposing the contradiction which defines their sales employment. Ultimately, the management are more likely to be believed in any enforcement situation than the men.

This situation is a weak, heterodoxical double-bind (derived from Bateson, 1942, et seq., expanded in Chapters Three and Four). That is, the victims can 'comment' on their situation (the men frequently and vociferously point to managerial 'double-standards') and it is in a heterodoxical direction (it is specifically symmetrical with general power directions). It is a double-bind, rather than a mere bind, as the victims' comments, whilst useful for other purposes, cannot undo the situation. Thus a relatively effective 'can't win' situation for the men, is, transversely, a 'can't lose' one for management.

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- (a) The Wellbreads situation is an active "illusory partnership". In other words, the management are personally involved in, and then disengaged from each recruit, and do not passively rely upon historical precedent and workforce custom to produce the rewards that they gain from workforce fiddling. The latter is true in conventional wage-theft systems which share a family resemblance to the current situation inasmuch as they provide sufficient legal distance between the payment of low wages, and the subsequent illicit supplementary income. (This is more fully described in Chapter Four).
- (b) Very nicely referred to by Goffman as collusion with the excolluded (Goffman, 1974, p 575). The trials reported as the Incredible Electrical Conspiracy show how legally effective "disengaged involvement" can be; see Geis (1967); Smith (1961); Brooks (1969).

This is the sense in which the bread salesman lives his occupational life as a wry reflection of the structural fact that all workers live the contradictions of capitalism.

In its simplest empirical form, "fiddling" is overcharging. The salesman overcharges the customer as a way of exerting control in, and profit from customer transactions. The organisation of internal company accounting however, divides and complicates the process. The first stage ("making" money) exploits the trustful basis of customer-relations specifically built up for that purpose, with the talent and poise of the con-man. The second stage ("taking" the profit) is engineered with the delicate positional cover of the embezzler. Interpersonal trust is the structural basis for correct fiddling, and once established, the customer is deluded into regular or periodic adoption of the loser role. The 'fiddle' is normally clothed in the protective fiction of the legitimate ritual sales activity which provides operational protection for the fiddler and illusive satisfaction for the consumer.

I will attend to the problem of defining fiddling again in Chapter Four. To briefly anticipate those arguments: a 'fiddle' is a theft by a service agent from his customer which is practiced in such a way as to make it interactionally and inventorily invisible. Theft from the firm by a service agent (irrespective of whether or not inventories have been altered to cover the loss) is either "stealing", when openly individualistic, or "dealing" when it also involves the subversion of other employees. This distinction between fiddling and stealing^(a) is not formulated through consideration of logical criteria, but is one firmly and irrefutably made by the bakery management. I have taken this 'reaction to deviance' by the

(a) Henry (1974), working at the supra-ethnographic level, interestingly takes the technical criteria of the provision of inventory-cover (as opposed to my own crucial criteria of who loses) as definitive of which thefts count as fiddles, and which as steals. Currently, both these formulations have some ad hoc utility (as does Gerald Mars', 1973, earlier formulation defining 'fiddles' as the group noun relevant to all employee theft techniques) and neither yet is universally accepted. Again, I will develop this in Chapter Four.

powerful as being more persuasive than any analytic considerations as it, rather than any logical formulations, dictates the reality at hand. To illustrate this, I once asked a sales supervisor why men were sacked for 'fiddling'. He said:

"...Who?...Who gets fired for fiddling then? I've never known anybody get fired for fiddling since I've been here...can you name anybody? (I did)..Ah!, he wasn't caught for fiddling, was he?...he was stealing...I know it sounds funny..(but)they don't care what you do in shops, as long as the sales are O.K., and you don't come short...that bloke (that I had mentioned) was taking it from despatch, and that's an entirely different thing..."

As a theoretical problem, fiddling is a special kind of deviance. As it is decidedly not in the interests of those in the know to attempt to clean up the problem, accommodation prompts processes of structural normalisation to intervene at weak points in the fiddle-system to prevent action being taken. This subtraction of control precipitating meaning from the infraction short-circuits the usual deviancy entrapment-amplification spiral. Salesmen even occasionally find that they can fiddle with the full knowledge, and even cooperation, of the customer! For example, one man said:

"...some of them don't care, one of my customers told me this summer that he had to add so much on to one of his customer's bills to cover what I fiddled him...so he obviously knew I was fiddling him, but he wasn't bothered, he passes the fiddle on..."

Because the salesmen do not have to cope with the additional problems of others attempting to malign their characters, they do not have to reconstruct a private self in accord with drastic changes in their public identity. Every recruit is allocated a 'round' of customers, each with a history of customer-roundsman interactions, specifically coloured with the successive biographies of departed salesmen. They discover a "situated self" (Goffman, 1961a, p 41) awaiting them in the expectations of their customers. This identity develops separately from the real 'me' that each man constructs out of work hours, and is rarely aggregated with other moral experiences in the production of a complete self. Thus, fiddling is

supported by the part-time self of work, and thus has auxiliary of partial (rather than master) status in the development of each man's identity.^(a) Supported in this way, fiddling has an occasional quality for the practitioner's psyche. As Becker (1968b, p 335-6) suggests, it only becomes part of a way of life:

"...Their "criminal" activities are not, for them, the one overriding fact about themselves which they must never forget, which they must always consider, no matter what they plan to do. Crime is, instead, just another of their many activities, exciting and daring for some, routine and commonplace for others...(he) expects, at the close of the day's activities to go about his normal business like any other citizen..."

Fiddling, then, does not become 'deviant' as a reaction to (or as the paradoxical and unintended consequences of) social control, but is a straightforward construction of malpractice as the intended (albeit possibly verbally disavowed) consequence of practical business policy. Fiddling is thus primary deviation (in the sense of its implications for the self) and the actions of controllers actively prevent, rather than explicitly seek, the usual development of secondary deviation. Whilst essentially an infraction, fiddling is no 'crime'. As Bensman and Gerver (1963, p 598) define it:

"...A "crime" is not a crime so long as its commission is controlled by those in authority towards goals which they define as socially constructive..."

But if the fiddle does not have amplified negative consequences for the fiddler, it does have one irreversible effect. Once he has fiddled, the fiddler can never look at the world in quite the same way again. As Hughes (1958, p 19) puts it, learning to fiddle is like passing through a 'mirror' into the different world of those 'in the know', from where one is condemned to "seeing the world in reverse".

(a) In this fashion, I should point out that it is not really legitimate for me to refer to a 'fiddler'. Effectively, this is the same as referring to a person who occasionally plays the piano as a 'pianist'. I do refer to the salesmen as fiddlers to clarify the discussion.

The processes involved create a cumulative acquisition of knowledge. If one knows how to fiddle, one may easily stop fiddling, but one cannot stop knowing about it. Strauss, in his brilliant analysis (1959, p 92) puts this perfectly:

"...In coming to new terms a person becomes something other than he once was. Terminological shifts necessitate, but also signalise, new evaluations of self, and others, of events, acts and objects; and the transformation of perception is irreversible; once having changed, there is no going back. One can look back, but he can evaluate only from his new status..."

However, it is quite possible that extenuated changes of status might eventually lead an erstwhile practitioner to regret his past and feel symbolically prevented from renewed participation in infraction (Matza, 1964, p 54). What is more likely, or so it would seem, is that a deliberate decision not to participate is continually adhered to. The point being that once an illegal activity has been tried and learned, then it is always 'on' for the actor to re-indulge. Matza (1969, p 110, 147, et passim) nicely anticipates this point, but fails to follow it up in his discussion of the initial "invitational edge" of deviance. As an ironic consequence of the increase in the mediated component in one's knowledge of deviant activity (which accompanies the growth of mass society) the actual first commission of deviant acts is made awkward. The actor, in this situation, is faced with a dilemma: the disjunction between his secondary, mediated and evilly stereotyped conception of the activity, and his primary, actual and ordinary invitation to indulge in it lodges him temporarily in an "initial participation quandry".^(a) It is not so much that the potential deviant has to

(a) A nicely appropriate analogy is that of going for the first swim of the year. Such occasions are often preceded by half-fearful anticipation, toe-dipping, and procrastination. Once in, of course, the world changes completely. It may partially revert to the way it was just before the next swim, and the plunge will inevitably become something of a feat on the first occasion the next year. To mix the metaphor: once one has plunged into deviance, one can never quite get out again.

decide whether or not he is going to do it (in fact, that decision is pushed into the background), but rather, he has to work out which interpretation is the realistic one. Ironically, the blacker the mediated stereotype, the less likely that the actor will identify the activity at hand as an example of it. In fact, if this "quandry" is resolved in the direction of participation, then the actor (if he is to remain 'good') will either have to define the act as not-an-example of the stereotype, or, the stereotype as not-accurate-on-this-occasion. At the bakery, (as is the case with most alter-directed moral careers) arrangements are made to commit the recruit toward participation in the fiddle before he has resolved the participation-dilemma. This is done to indicate to him that he can easily cope with the psychological implications of infraction.

The outcome of this process of accumulating knowledge of illicit company practices, together with increased psycho-legal involvement and responsibility for them, constitutes a change in personal status for the individual in the direction of a preferred organisational rationale. The recruit successfully completes some stages in a horizontal, occupationally based moral career, and is increasingly committed to continuing the process. Career, here, is used in Goffman's sense (1957a, p 119):

"...to refer to any social strand of any person's course through life...unique outcomes are neglected in favour of such changes over time as are basic and common to the members of a social category... Such a career is not a thing that can be brilliant or disappointing; it can be no more a success than a failure..."

Although this concept of career was originally erected to facilitate discussion of types of deviance, its use is more general. It is a 'moral' career, not because it is based upon any relationship to standardised conceptions of morality, but rather because it allows analysis to take account of the implications that status-passage has for the self. Primarily, it refers to the process of reshaping the self, and may be treated analytically in terms of the successful negotiation of testing 'benchmarks' en route to in-group

acceptance as a qualified practitioner.^(a) Conceptualisation of development in this sense as a series of related transformations of psychological status is existentially distinguishable from movement defined either as goal-attainment (via staged success along a continuum of development) or as peripheral change layered upon an essentially unchanged being.

Learning the fiddle is not simply acquisition of knowledge. It is transformation of being - and thus, doing. The process is also open-ended: whilst the supervisor is aware at the beginning of the sorts of actions, motives and rationales that the recruit will have to encounter, even he cannot be sure of smooth acceptance of all organisational premises. Moral careers that 'go wrong' in this sense can also have repercussions for the identity of the trainer. Failure to inculcate suitable knowledge might lose him face, and persistent failure might jeopardise his own occupational career. Goffman (1959a, p 119, 154) continues:

"...the moral aspects of career - that is, the regular sequence of changes that career entails in the person's self and in his framework of imagery for judging himself and others...the moral career of a person...involves a standard sequence of changes in his way of conceiving of selves, including, importantly, his own. These half-buried lines of development can be followed by studying his moral experiences - that is, happenings which mark a turning point in the way in which a person views the world..."

(a) Sarbin and Adler (1970) have attempted an inductive analysis of many cases of behaviour change and subsequently posit a general "self-reconstitution process". They claim that all such processes have five common themes: a symbolic death/rebirth rhetoric; a required reference group and central "teacher" other; ritual behaviour (singing, praying); proprioceptive stimuli (physical states); and "triggers" (movement precipitating experiences). The moral career described here would be an example of such a process. I prefer Goffman's unification of these properties into the moral career format as opposed to Sarbin and Adler's treatment of them as disparate general factors. Goffman's simpler analysis also seems more appropriate to an analysis of intentionally normalised ether-reconstitution-of-self unmarred by any glossalistic or trance-like excesses.

Micro-sociologically, adult socialisation reflects a similar structure to the childhood processes of developing coping strategies to create an aura of social competence. Goffman (1971, p 293) reminds us that abilities that adults take for granted (such as walking), originally became competent performances through an anxious acquisition process typified by a series of formal tests under supervision, culminating in real and fateful solo trials.

Successful moral career passage in later life necessitates adeptness in formally similar interpersonal skills. Again, the notion of moral career is not here used to convey any necessary alteration in morality. The concept is thus applicable to such diverse skill-acquisition areas and self-reconstitution processes as becoming a marihuana user (Becker, 1963), religious convert (James, 1902) mental patient (Goffman, 1961c), boxer (Weinberg and Arond, 1951), prostitute (Bryan, 1965), corrupt policeman (Maas, 1973; Sherman 1973), bum (Spradley) and relief masseuse (Velarde, 1975). In fact, the rehabilitative construction of conformity from villainy is similarly subject to moral career analysis. McGaghy (1968, p 49) suggests that accepting responsibility (i.e., identity) for their perversion is the essence of treatment for child molesters, and Turner (1971, p 315) notes that the rationale of Alcoholics Anonymous demands deviant self-identification as the first step in recantation and rehabilitation. Additionally, Trice and Roman (1969) have shown that such "status-return" ceremonies are characteristically structurally and symbolically similar to Garfinkel's (1956) "status-degradation" ones. They report that Alcoholics Anonymous's typical construction ~~of~~ of a repentant role is built around an often over-exaggerated status-drop, thus setting the scene for elaborately successful "comeback accomplishments" (ibid, p 543).^(a) Some deviant moral

(a) More recently Bigus (1974, p 20) refers to a "supplanting process" wherein alcoholics disengage from normality, enter a rehabilitation centre, and eventually emerge to reengage normality again. I have only been concerned here with the rehabilitation of individuals, and not with the movements to liberate groups from stigma. Rehabilitation infers changing the individual, liberation, alternatively, that the individual keeps up the practice as a step toward its eventual redefinition. The liberated (see Mawby 1975) share with the unlabeled, a partial deviant identity.

careers thrive upon avowal/disavowal cycles, once participants have perfected certain techniques (Srradley, 1972; Ray, 1964). Also, Rock (1973b) shows that debt-collectors stage the treatment of debtors as a sort of moral anti-career, wherein significant others are chiefly concerned to prevent individuals from moving to the next stage of enforcement. Similarly, even excessively normal situations like becoming an attorney (Sudnow, 1964) require that paper-qualified beginner becomes immersed in typicalities, 'proverbial characterisations', and 'prototypical portrayals' used to locate cases-in-hand in terms of their similarities with other cases-of-this-sort, before becoming acceptable as practised. Once the specific sociological usage of the word 'moral' is grasped, it neither becomes possible nor necessarily desirable (with fiddling as with other careers) to attempt to disentangle completely moral from occupational career.

However the two (moral and occupational career) are not connected merely by coincidence of timing. Aside from a minor sense in which any occupational career involves changes in the self, and thus developments of that self's moral career when the latter concept is tightly defined in the strict socio-psychological sense in which Goffman (1959a) intended, there is a major empirical sense in which the occupational career acts as practical cover and public legitimation for the (more loosely defined) moral career as a deviant. I am concerned not to separate the two in order to preserve this parasitic relationship for analysis.

Of crucial importance in any moral career is the presence of significant others (experienced users, revivalists, psychiatrists, trainers and so on) and institutional arrangements (pads, churches, mental hospitals, apprenticeships, contracts) which negotiate the chrysalis self-in-transition through the identity crisis of status passage. As Goffman (1959a, p 138) puts it:

"...The self arises not merely out of it's possessor's interactions with significant others, but also out of the arrangements that are evolved in an organisation for its members..".

The self is thus not changed. It is the process of change itself. As Mead (1956, p 199) reminds us:

"...The self is something which has a development: it is not initially there at birth but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process..."

In career terms, this becomes (Sutter, 1972, p 78):

"...The changing perspective in which a person orientates himself in relation to others, to the patterned sequence of positions he comes to occupy within a social network, and to a person's developing sense of identity which symbolically emerges in the course of shifting group affiliation..."

Critically, moral careers infused with occupational necessities have three separable stages: recruitment, learning and practice. These reflect general properties of self-reconstitution: processes of 'beginning' have to be initiated, skills have to be learnt to the level of 'passing', and development of post existential re-birth practice denotes 'becoming'.^(a) Whilst becoming is a stage which can never be completed, the process is not one that can be reversed: the self gets another layer, and identity has shifted an

(a) Van Gennep (1908) elucidates three similar stages of role-changing ceremonies, or, rites-de-passage. The Stage of Separation (preliminal dissociation); the Marginal Period (liminal mystic transformation); and the Stage of Aggregation (postliminal rebirth). This has become a familiar metaphor. Sarbin and Adler (1970) have successfully attempted to derive an inductive set of ultimate dimensions of all self-reconstitution processes. They state (p 614):

"...In all these procedures three central processes seem to be at work: (1) a physical and/or psychological assault (symbolic death); a developing confusion about self and other beliefs (the bridge between death and rebirth); (2) surrender and despair (becoming a nonperson), and (3) a working through, active mastery, reeducation or adaption processes (the rebirth experience). We have found ~~the~~ forms of the process to be constant, though the metaphors vary to meet the needs and values of groups of individuals..."

Encapsulating the sense of this within the labeling metaphor, Rotenberg (1974, p 343) refers to "transformative labeling", which is characterised by the necessity for categoric delabeling to occur prior to relabeling if the assigned new label is incompatible with established categoric self-identity.

irreversible degree to gain another facet.

As a status passage, the transition of the embryonic fiddler is a voluntarily undertaken change (as opposed to, for example, ageing), and because of its intricate relationship to occupational knowledge, may be partially repeatable on those occasions when an internal round-change warrants some retraining.^(a) For the neophyte salesman, the typical situation is that the recruitment and practice stages of the career are left more or less to chance, and the learning stage is excessively organised and over-institutionalised by the relevant significant others. The crucial learning stage has four commonly arranged characteristics. Firstly, because one is not born with the relevant skills, they have to be learnt. Skills, as such, are hard to learn in isolation and impossible to learn instantaneously. Here, since fiddling is not a legitimated role, there can be no "anticipatory socialisation" (Merton in Goffman 1959, p 79; and Skipper and McGaghy, 1969, p 399) such as that which precedes the adoption of standard roles such as father or husband. There is a sense, of course, in which the symbolic requirements of the situation take precedent over the technical needs. Goffman (1959, p 55) notes how symbolic affront was generated when the US Army innocently but adequately trained recruit chemists and jewellers in 5 to 6 weeks (it takes four years at colleges) and continues to suggest that there exists:

"...a kind of 'rhetoric of training' whereby labour unions, universities, trade associations and their licencing bodies require practitioners to absorb a mystical range and period of training, in part to maintain a monopoly, but in part to foster the impression that the licenced practitioner is someone who has been reconstituted by his learning experience and is now set apart from other men..."

(a) This analytic smoothness masks what might be a crucial legal distinction. Both Robin (1967) and Spenser (1965, p 337) indicate that different dispositions are likely to be attached to those who take a trustful position in good faith (the naïve recruit) and those who intentionally set out to defraud (the experienced roundsman undergoing retraining).

Accordingly, the career learning path has to negotiate successfully 'contingencies' (precipitate dismissal) and 'dangers' ('mistakes'), both of which are often productive of 'moral experiences' in the processual sense of speeding psychological travel toward an ethical benchmark in the career.

Secondly, stage appropriate status must be arranged and suitably publicised through procedures which serve to differentiate learners from practitioners. At Wellbreads, a supervisor always accompanies a new man to each call. As Douglas (1966, p 117) rightly points out "to behave anti-socially is the proper expression of their marginal position": however, in symbolic terms (to be developed in Chapter Three), marginality is dangerous as it is paradoxical. Douglas (ibid, p 116) continues: "Danger lies in transitional states; simply because transition is neither one state nor the other." But a display of marginal role-signs is crucial if others are to interpret correctly any mistakes that the recruit makes as unintentional (in the sense of identifying him as an actor not yet at the stage of sophistication that would allow him to be capable of making a deliberate and malevolent mistake). Whilst the signs of passage ease the learning path, they simultaneously publically disqualify the marginal member from making any accredited statements about reality. For the learner, things that he defines as real, will not be real in their consequences, as his definitions will have to be demolished in order to accomplish the superior status and role of the trainer. For recruit salesmen, whilst passage signs publically declare his status, they only declare his learner-status in a general sense. For the intents and purposes of the public at large, status-publication refers to occupational, rather than moral training.

Thirdly, progress through status-change must be ceremonially ritualised and routinised (through 'tests' at the end of the three-week training session). Fourthly, progress must be balanced with carefully handled strains and tensions ('readiness' and 'failure') that occur at the turning-points along the career line, at which identity and the self are particularly frail. Whilst 'passing' ritual is minimised for salesmen at Wellbreads, the sudden absence of an

accompanying supervisor significantly changes a man's status in the eyes of his customers. Banton (1965, p 93-4) notices:

"...for an individual to move from one role to another is not always an easy matter...ceremony helps the individual who is changing roles to appreciate that this is a critical moment; for a little while it lifts him out of himself and helps him to feel as if he himself has changed in some way; this facilitates his psychological reorientation..."

Such institutionalisation of the learning-stage of a moral career primarily delegates successful management of status-passage to a significant other legitimised by his role in accepted organisational arrangements as one sanctioned to prepare novices. Within such an analysis, that fiddling is an infraction is just another career contingency.

As such, in all cases where the career is additionally against some or other law, extra care must be taken by relevant instructors to prevent unwarranted career-exits on those grounds. The presence or absence of various laws, then, would alter the content of the staged induction, but not the underlying mechanisms of status passage.

But quite why is there an organisational need for bent employees in the Wellread Sales department? Essentially, those running the department see themselves faced with a set of mutually incompatible problems creating a deficiency which can only be coped with at the employee level. On the one hand, the department is strictly accountable for all the goods that its salesmen are debited with. On the other, they see the process of changing these goods into cash as fraught with inevitable and unintentional mistakes. These mistakes are not seen to be somehow self-balancing as it is believed that customers are less likely to report mistakes to their advantage, than those obviously disadvantaging them. Those running the firm have also, it seems, decided that this problem must be resolved to the financial credit of the firm, in the only practical way. One of the Supervisors said:

"...I mean, you've got to think of the company here...look, if you get a mathematician from the London School of Economics to try it, I guarantee that he won't come right...it's an impossibility..."

Another related problem for the department is that recruitment is expensive (average training is estimated by them to cost £100 per man), so recruits must be both brought to peak efficiency quickly and encouraged to stay as long as possible. Currently, they are faced with an estimated labour turnover of around 83 percent. As the following extract shows, they see part of the answer lying in more intense and more sophisticated training:

"...A large provincial bakery, with three factories, nine distribution depots, and three hundred vans, ...noted that staff turnover amongst its van salesmen was rapidly soaring...The training officer...drew up a three week training programme, which was followed by a four day summing up ... (and) in less than two years, labour turnover decreased by 25%, saving some £10,000 p.a...."
(Published pamphlet referring to Wellbreads)

On top of this, labour turnover breeds a distinct loss of customer goodwill. The ongoing solution to all these problems is to attempt to maintain departmental fiscal solvency by encouraging roundsmen to cover mistakes illegally, which, in turn, by removing their presumed worries about deductions from their wage-packets on account of shortages, decreases labour turnover.

Those running the department admit to the need for their employees to abet corrupt practices, but fall short of assigning to themselves full responsibility for this. A senior supervisor said: "...there's fiddles everywhere...it's like a rat, if you block the hole up, they'll find another one...". Operationally, those in charge of training define the situation as one where the organisation needs bent employees, but that the organisation should do the bending, over a period of time, with great care, and in such a way that the thus bent employee will stay with the firm. The same senior supervisor also said: "...You always have to tell a man the tricks of the trade, ...there's always an easy way to do the job,...and if there's a fiddle, it's a bad thing if the man finds out for himself...".

To cater for the needs of the organisation, recruits must appear sufficiently honest to prevent customer-loss, and to accept that fiddling must be done for the benefit of the firm only. To ensure that this occurs, relevant institutional arrangements 'con' basically honest men into the firm, and then go about systematically constructing appropriately staged moral changes in them.

The next part of this chapter describes (via amalgams of several cases) the possibilities of normative management of identity change. I am not concerned just with bare ethnographic description of normal cases. This chapter is concerned to describe what Rock (1973a, p 63) calls the "basic career" of the learner. Ordinarily successful members become in sequence: prospects, applicants, interviewees, recruits, novices, roundsmen and salesmen.

THE PRE-TRAINING STAGE: BECOMING A RECRUIT

Election to pre-trainee status is a necessary condition of, but not the first step in the moral career. The difference between the motley assortment of prospects, and the rest of the population, lies in an active attempt by the former to pursue vague curiosities about possible lines of action (Becker, 1963, p 42).

To become a learner driver, for instance, prospects (applicants or candidates for recruit status) must satisfy those controlling admission to provisional licence holder status that they possess entry ground-condition qualifications. Filling in the application form weeds out blind people, juveniles, those banned, and so on. In fact, the essence of pre-selection procedures is rejection of the unsuitable, rather than selection of the suitable. The conditions of entry may thus be conceived of as a "funnel" (Lofland, 1966, p 31). In other words: "a structure which systematically reduces the number of persons who can be considered available for recruitment and at the same time specifies who is available" (*ibid*).

Novices negotiating initial acceptance (or attempting to negotiate the agreement to be taught at a later stage) in the Wellbread sales department offer an account of the prior circumstances of this move as a random circulation within the ranks of the industrially dissatisfied.^(a) Some typical statements were:

(a) Recruitment is essentially unproblematic for Wellbreads management. Although it is, on occasions empirically difficult (although cf. the problems experienced in developing a cult following as illustrated in Lofland, 1966, ch 5, *et passim*). Both "direct disembodied" (newspaper advertisements) and "indirect disembodied" (reputation for possible vacancies) mediated recruitment channels are used. There is no actively "embodied" approach. For the men, entry is classically "adventitious" (Sherlock and Cohen, 1966, quoted in Skipper and McGaghy, 1969, p 398), spontaneous and fortuitious, based upon situational pressure and contingency. Most salesmen, like most strippers (*ibid*, p 400) become so ".more by chance than design, more by draft than aspiration.." (*ibid*).

"...I looked in the paper again, and saw that Wellbreads wanted blokes..."

"...I had a little bit of an argument with the management, and got out...never having been on the dcle, I just took the first job that came along...I just took it for the money at the time...I saw it in the paper..."

"...I was a plasterer, and where we worked, we used to see the baker every day, and I thought: 'One day, I'll try that'...I never thought I would, but I got so sick of plastering one day, because of the weather, that I happened to go past Wellbreads, and I just called in on the off chance..."

"...I got stood off from the building, and I went up to Wellbreads and the Creamy Dairy about jobs...they both offered me one, starting the Monday, the dairy at 6.00 am, and the bakery at 6.30 am...I thought: 'Which shall I take? Milk or bread?...and then I thought: 'I'll go to Wellbread, it's nearer'..."

"...I didn't apply for any job, I just went down there on the off chance..."

The almost total lack of systematic institutionalisation of entry routes for bread salesmen indicates the informality (and not necessarily the uncertain or hazardous nature) of the subsequent status-passage. Again the problematic distinction between occupational and moral career arises. The moral career is regulated (or so it seems in the collective recollections of the men) although public knowledge of this sequence is not necessary for satisfactory progress. Of course, Wellbreads can publically advertise vacancies by referring solely to the occupational side of the proposed career.^(a) Learning to fiddle is a temporary, conventionally periodic, transient status. General tie-signs of status-passage are substituted for actual indicators of specific marginality. The embryonic fiddler might have symbolic, albeit generalised, "L" plates, but he doesn't have "trainee-fiddler" emblazoned on his coat.

(a) Prospect-contact does not, then, pose the problems faced by those initiating recruits into exclusively deviant (rather than occupational-cum-deviant) moral careers. Sutherland (1937, p 212) notes how the former often have to rely upon the innate attractions of the career and voluntary recruitment, rather than drumming up custom.

Nobody is refused the chance to fill in an employment application form, and although rejection may result from the interpretation of quite irrelevant details entered there, rejection is never a great blow to the prospect. At this stage, prospects apply, and are rejected/accepted almost randomly by unwittingly demonstrating character blemishes or career stains. The Sales manager once discussed this with me:

"...Come into my office and I'll show you what I mean...(later)...see? (large folder of rejected applications)...all those blokes are rejected for various reasons...see this one here?...ideal, been a roundsman before, for the dairy, that means that he doesn't mind getting up in the mornings, but look at that: "LAST JOB: £32 a week"...that's ruled him out, he was a good prospect though..."

Those not rejected outright pass to the interview stage, where once again the most curious criteria rule out applicants. Again, the Sales manager:

"...some of them don't last ten minutes, if they come in here, and they've got tatoos all over their hands for instance,...I had one bloke in here the other day, great long finger nails, filthy dirty underneath...you don't waste time with blokes like that...out they go...another type is the bloke who comes in here with a mate, I always say that if two apply together, only take one of them...another time is when a bloke comes for an interview that you've arranged after hours, and he hasn't even got the decency to wash and change...or, if a bloke comes for an interview, and he leaves his mate to wait for him in reception...obviously, both are unemployed, and are likely to stay that way..."

As Goffman, in this case most aptly, comments (1961a, p 41):

"...Recruitment for positions is restrictively regulated in some way, assuming that the incumbents will possess certain minimal qualifications, official and unofficial, technically relevant and irrelevant. Incumbency tends to be symbolised through status cues of dress and manner..."

For those who get to sit down, however, a ceremonial fictional morality play (which Wheeler, 1966, p 85, calls the "guided tour") is enacted. For the management, entry is a practical question of how to

manage the advance preparation so as to increase the probability of a successful outcome (Wheeler, *ibid*, p 83). The recruit, on the other hand, is denied control of entry and only participates symbolically whilst decisions are made about, and for him. Van Gennepe characterises such occasions as "rites of the threshold" (1908, p 20-1) which precede later rites of preparation for transition.

The interviewer portrays a jolly, but fictional life (they are alleged to refer to such false props as "healthy", "happy outdoor existence" and "clean vans") which is proffered hopefully to balance interviewee pessimism stemming from the partial descriptions of seedy reality which are simultaneously declared in order to weed out those with a vastly over-optimistic conception of sales life. In this sense alone the bakery is more honest than those managing entry channels to similar moral careers (i.e., those where the ultimate intention of training is initially withheld from the recruit). Moral training that shares this particular oblique feature often use what we may refer to as the "coy advertisement". Employers advertise for, and potential employees apply for a nicely euphemistically worded version of the actual job. Skipper and McGaghy (1969, p 400) admit that many strippers initially naively applied for jobs as "show girls" or "exotic dancers" only to find that a little more show than was estimated, or rather more exotic dancing than was anticipated, is in fact required. Verlarde (1975, p 252) notes that many women at one time naively applied for advertised jobs as masseuses, and that:

"...During the initial interview, the owner did not disclose any of the sexual activities associated with the job, his reluctance being due to strict soliciting laws. One owner started off by telling applicants that "customers are going to be expecting you to jack them off!" He was quickly arrested for soliciting a woman to perform a lewd act. The owner's grapevine used this event for a rationale for evading that topic in subsequent discussions with the masseuse as to what was expected of her. An owner said: 'I don't do things that can get me busted...I wouldn't tell a masseuse to give locals - that's soliciting. Let someone else tell her, like her first John (customer)'..."

At Wellbreads, one of the senior supervisors said:

"...If I had to interview a man for the job...I would spend at least half an hour telling him the worst points, and then ask him if he's still interested...tell him about shortages, what he comes up against, there's a lot of snags in the job...shorts, the weather, the hours..."

The Sales manager also relied upon a crucial 'test':

"...When I do get a bloke who is a likely candidate, I tell him the worst bits first, about working until 6.00 pm on a Saturday, and the six-day week, ...but the first thing I find out is if they watch the football, if they've been going to watch City every week for the last three years, then they aren't going to stick at a job where they have to work until 6.00 pm on Saturday, are they?...."

In the case of moral careers publically legitimated by occupational ones,^(a) it is not possible for the interviewer to openly declare, and publically adjudicate upon the actual selection criteria. Interaction, at this stage, must proceed as if it were on the basis of standardised selection criteria for occupational suitability, whilst the interviewer secretly apprises^a the applicant for his possible moral career.

The inability of Wellbreads interviewers to make correct decisions concerning possible performance (perhaps, also, the irrelevance of such decisions in the light of abilities of supervisors to construct suitable performances in training) leads to a peculiar recruitment formula based upon entry criteria alone. For example, the organisation does not attempt to recruit dishonest persons. It attempts instead (after weeding out the obviously unsuitable morally righteous or the wholly corrupt) to intake basically honest, but sufficiently 'worldly' men. In Brown's (1963) rather eclectic phraseology, applicants are successful if they give off the impression that honesty is a peripheral, rather than a nuclear character trait. For managerial purposes, it takes just two sorts to make the world: the good and the bad (see Chapter Five). The morally ideal applicant is one who is both inherently good, yet sufficiently worldly to be

(a) Hall (1948, p 332) shows that even when occupational careers have no underlying moral shadow, and where exhaustive technical criteria are available, the interviewer is still likely to be working on an additional and shadier wavelength to the applicant.

persuaded to go bad - but, in appropriate directions. Whilst the management freely admit that a few 'bad' ones slip into the firm, socialisation practices are geared to the good. Thus, the key assumption of socialisation is that recruits are not initially willing to engage in devious practices. Suspicion lingers around those recruits who are deemed over eager to fiddle, or who display abilities in that direction before the appointed time. It is usually felt that their presumptuous readiness is derived from genetic deficiency which will propell them irretreviably towards using management-taught methods exclusively for their own use. Subscription to a dualistic weltanschauung of this nature engulfs the management with a warm glow of self-righteousness, and endows them (in their own eyes) with the proselytising moral zeal of crusading assimilative reformism.^(a) One senior supervisor complained:

"...You will always have the chaps who are out to make a bomb out of if...they kill the goose that laid the golden egg...the majority of them would do it whatever phase of life they're in, for the sort of person whose going to do this, he's going to do it from the word 'go'...the corruption is there in the mind every time, we don't corrupt people, we try to put them off, or warn them not to overdo it...."

But any interview can be fixed. Most of the applicants who have got this far, have got this far elsewhere many times before. Even if they do not go to the extent of fixing the interview, they are unlikely to believe what occurs in the interview room. Two successful candidates said:

"...his main concern seemed to be: 'If you like football, the job's no good to you'..although I was a footballer, I didn't tell him, I watched it, and I was still playing..."

"...He interviewed me, and gave me a marvellous impression of the job...(laugh)...he said that there was supposed to be all this social and canteen side of it...(laugh)...which we pay into every week, never did see much of it...all the bull-shit..."

(a) Gusfield 1963, p 68 et seq. A relevant term when the immoral can be defined as savable rather than as lost. Partial identities are redeemable: master identities immutable.

The fiddle is never mentioned to candidates. Instead, fictional rewards like 'high commission' are offered. This, firstly, cons the man into accepting a position in the organisation (the fiction may be maintained until well into training, in fact, until the time is ripe for its replacement with more suitable and realistic rewards). Secondly, it provides the recruit with a moral memory distancing the management from murky, underlife practices, and from which he can later select recollections to substantiate the organisational need for denial of such actions.^(a)

Successful negotiation of an intake selection outcome elects the applicant to trainee status. Abruptly, he will find that encounters designed to invalidate and dismiss him change to those designed to commit him. Having survived the unspoken tests of application, the candidate is now in the position from which the first step in the moral career of becoming a salesman can be made. Acceptance as a recruit indicates the start in the occupational career. As the fiddle has not yet been mentioned, the moral career, the first step in which is unwitting rule-infraction by the neophyte, (Becker, 1963, p 25) has yet to be encountered^{er} by him.

(a) A parallel practice (for white-collar employees) came to light during the trial of the Incredible Electrical Conspirators. Having been meta-communicatively encouraged to conspire to price-fix, the defendants received an official directive urging them to obey the anti-trust laws, (Geis, 1967, p 110). All 'read' the memo and situation with nicety, declaring that they felt that the "directive was only for 'public consumption', and not to be taken seriously", (ibid).

TRAINING: BECOMING A ROUNDSMAN

As a processing system, sales training is relatively undifferentiated accommodation of individual recruits into a serially composed membership group. During the initial stages of the training period, considerable energy is exerted in perfecting method and technique, with the instructor taking over, or coming to the rescue at critical moments. The instructor communicates the bases of the occupational skills with dramatic artificiality (see Young, 1965, p 193) in the use of techniques of idealisation, mystification, and misrepresentation. Such strategies combine to present a strict rule-following model of action for beginners. Whilst, with some degree of mastery, the neophyte will begin to ask questions, only when he can be perceived by the instructor to have internalised the strict rules, will he be allowed to temper negotiations of situations with good sense. Sutherland (1937, p 213) comments upon the very similar form which the tutelage of the embryonic professional thief takes:

"...If he performs these minor duties satisfactorily he is promoted to more important duties. During this probationary period the neophyte is assimilating the general standards of morality, propriety, etiquette, and rights which characterise the profession, and he is acquiring "larceny sense"..."

All moral careers reflect the tutor's search in the neophyte for some evidence of the particular "career sense". Supervisors search trainees at Wellbreads for indications of "sales sense", which is ultimately the interpreted presence of sales-conducive personality characteristics. Supervisors either believe in the existence of "sales sense" or not, but in any case concur that it is neither teachable nor communicable. Teaching is instead a mystical 'bringing out' of such abilities. Like "news sense" (Rock, 1973c, p 74), and "grift sense" (Maurer, 1955), the innateness of the sense is due to

the ordering by learned practitioners of unconscious knowledge of competence. It is 'obviously' innate, because one is just oblivious to the processes which would make it not so. Nevertheless, judgements of it's presence are fateful. Sutherland (1937, p 214) continues:

"...This more general knowledge is seldom transmitted to the neophyte as formal verbal instructions but is assimilated by him without being recognised as instructions. However, he is likely to be dropped from participation in further professional activities for failure to assimilate and use this more general culture as for failure to acquire the specific details of the techniques of theft..."

Howton and Rosenberg (1965, p 281) specifically debating sales-ideology and self-imagery, make a nice distinction in these terms between technical and psychological ground knowledge:

"...The two forms of skill (technical and psychological) appear to be equally important, but they are not equally easy to acquire. One of the most emphatically stated and unambiguous themes in the protocols is that: "there's no way of actually preparing yourself for sales...the ingredients are inborn". The same might have been said, in all consistency, of the "ability to pick up technical information". But it was not said. Apparently, the ability to influence people is seen as more problematic, rarer and more precious, when it comes to the question of what makes a good salesman..."

Initially, the recruit has to demonstrate willingness and ability to be a learner, and not a practitioner. The first unspoken test is successful adoption of the neophyte role. As Goffman (1961a, p 82) notes, a main part of the neophyte role centres upon over emphasis of the prescriptive aspects of the final role. There is a ritual requirement that the recruit "prove his competence, sincerity, and awareness of his place, leaving the showing of distance from a role to a time and place when he is firmly "validated" in that role" (ibid).

Crucially, the self of the learner is eventually persuaded from the strict rule-following model, and is encouraged to adopt

a more suitable glossary of actions, and a more 'practical' vocabulary of accounts and motives. Successful judgements of technical ability allow instructors to move on to intricacies and short-cuts. Acceptance of short-cuts prompts judgements of moral readiness to proceed with other 'tests'. 'Passing' indicates successful status-passage into post-training stages.

Some hint of the processes of ⁿaccommodating novices to new and illicit routines is given in Bensman and Gerver's (1963) account of the illicit use of the "tap" in an aircraft factory. The "tap" is a hard steel screw, officially outlawed in the factory, but widely used by employees to realign nuts and plate openings distorted in the assembly of aircraft. Bensman and Gerver (ibid, p 591) note:

"...To most workers entering an aircraft plant, the tap is an unknown instrument...The new worker does not come into contact with the tap until he finds it impossible to align the holes...In desperation... he turns to his partner (a more experienced worker) and states his problem. The experienced worker will try every legitimate technique...(then) he resorts to the tap. He taps the new thread himself, not permitting the novice to use the tap. While tapping it he gives the novice a lecture on the dangers of getting caught. For several weeks the older worker will not permit his inexperienced partner to use a tap when its use is required. He leaves his own work in order to do the required tapping...if the novice demonstrates sufficient ability and care in other aspects of his work he will be allowed to tap the hold under supervision..."

For the psychological purposes of status conscious practised members, all aspirants are defined (for status-incubation, or prestige-quarantine periods) as fools. Only the exhibition of suitable and sufficient subservience removes them from the temporary borderline status. More specifically, the novice is allowed "clumsy fool" status (Klapp, 1962, p 70). A clumsy fool is one who "...proves himself disgracefully inept in carrying out roles required of the average member or status incumbent..". Those initially ill-prepared to be thus degraded are occasionally encouraged to attempt tasks beyond their capacities, and subsequently experience a humbling feeling which paves the way to voluntary subjugation to the expert tuition of the coach. More perceptive recruits immediately adopt "simple fool"

status. Klapp (1949, p 148) reminds us that those adopting such a stance do so by "...a demonstration of deficiency of intelligence... he is classed as naive, senseless, backward..".

In other words, the neophyte role is a temporary, unstructured status assignment, with which the recruit must concur. Lack of willingness to relinquish control over the direction of one's identity, may precipitate status-forcing tactics (Strauss, 1959) from the coach.

Although the training stage may have, thus, many sub-stages, typically, throughout its duration, there is firstly, a public exhibition of marginality, so that others may make suitable (and discountable) 'allowances'. To quote Hughes (1958, p 120), during training, the individual temporarily becomes a "marginal man". Customers who are aware of the dramatic niceties of everyday sales life will thus be able to exhibit some tact in handling the new performer. Goffman (1959, p 225) notes:

"...when the performer is known to be a beginner, and more subject than otherwise to embarrassing mistakes, the audience frequently shows extra consideration, refraining from causing the difficulties it might otherwise create..."

This marginality is acknowledged as temporary, and is seen as a passing status: one to which only short-term adaption need be made by those audiences concerned. ^(a)

In addition, responsibility and liability for outcomes is temporarily suspended. Strauss (1959, p 104) suggests that this period of tolerance is a structural necessity, and is often enacted by coaching trial runs in a rhetoric of "make believe", or "not for

(a) The pharmacist (McCormack, 1955-56) and the chiropractor (Wardwell, 1952) are examples of permanently marginal positions. I intend to convey Wardwell's meaning of marginal role (ibid, p 340) as "...an imperfectly institutionalised one which means that there is some ambiguity in the pattern of behaviour legitimately expected of a person filling the role...". In a strict sense (defined in Chapter Three) marginal roles are paradoxical.

keeps", wherein performance is not recorded in the dramatic biography of the actor. Such suspension of reality is not merely to absolve the newcomer from liability for his actions, but also constitutes a mutual discovery phase for both parties, who withhold full involvement in the joint construction of interpersonal change until satisfactory conjoint understanding is achieved. These themes of both marginality and tolerance are summed up by Goffman (1961a, p 91-2):

"...When an individual is first wakening to his role, he will be allowed to approach his tasks differently, an excuse and an apology already on his lips. At this time he is likely to make many otherwise discreditable mistakes, for this time he has a learner's period of grace in which to make them a period in which he is not quite the person he will shortly be, and, therefore, cannot badly damage himself by the expression of maladroit actions... This temporary licence...(may be) institutionalised ...(but) for a while it is possible to say that the (trainer's) role makes allowances for maladroitness in beginners..."

Novices in the Sales department are often verbally prepared for this status. One man remembered:

"...any mistakes I made, well, he said to me: 'Any mistakes you make...we'll leave it for a month or so until it settles down'...more or less saying that if you can't get it right within a month, that's your own fault..."

The structure of selling at Wellbreads also dictates that training be done singly. This method is particularly effective where significant changes are required from the recruit. The ever-present supervisor ensures that any anxieties created by the discrepancy between available definitions of the fiddle are suitably harmonised. Becker (1964, p 283) notes, with his usual clarity, that those socialised alone find it easier to change their ways than those who subculturally identify with fellow-trainees.

Symbolically, the supervisor is a very important significant other. Interactionally, he plays the role of 'coach' - a specific relationship pertaining during relatively institutionalised but regulated status-passages conducted serially on those occasions

where, however sure the recruit might be of his final goal (in this case, becoming a salesman), only the trainer who has negotiated a similar moral career himself in the past, is clear on all future steps to be taken. Weinberg and Arond (1951, p 466) show how important the trainer is to the future success of the boxer, by not only transmitting appropriate boxing skills, but also by becoming an authoritative anchor point of emotional security. The trainer chaperones the boxer through bouts of worry and tension, and manipulates his conduct by boosting morale or by withdrawing praise.

The sales supervisor is more a private tutor than a class teacher, and systematic corruption of employees is managed by carefully chaperoned and sheltered transformation. In addition to being serially, rather than cohort managed, fiddlers at Wellbreads describe a moral career pattern which we may characterise as an involuntarily-undertaken, informationally-subtle, initially-intention-closed, Fagin-type, alter-managed moral career.^(a) This is so because the status change is voluntary (in the sense of being a social rather than physical change); initially participated in willingly by recruits; because information about fiddling is released almost imperceptibly (as it is in the moral training of both nudists, see Weinberg, 1966, p 243; and relief-masseuses, Verlarde, 1975, p 252 et seq.) and not in the form of formal indoctrination. The eventual career intentions are initially concealed from the recruit (here, compare, recruit pickpockets in Maurer, 1955, p 158-162, who are conversely socialised on an 'open Fagin-type' pattern); and teacher-pupil are in a numerically one-to-one relationship - reminiscent of Fagin and Oliver Twist.

(a) Moral careers are rarely ego-managed (i.e. conducted in solitary) although Lemert (1953, p 106) poses an isolation hypothesis for the initiation of most cheque-forgers, and Maurer (1955, p 166-7) found one story of a strictly self-taught pickpocket. The latter case is particularly interesting as the girl in question not only was wholly ignorant of the appropriate argot, but also was unaware of standard techniques. Her success derived exclusively from her very small hands with which she could search pockets without "reefing" them.

The actual staging of the fiddler transformation follows a rhetorical form typical of all moral careers. An existential death/rebirth cycle typified by, as Goffman (1961, p 155) puts it: "alienation and mortification followed by a new set of beliefs about the world and a new way of conceiving of selves."

Stage 1: Chaperoned Mortification and Alienation

Demonstrations and Trials: Generally, the demonstration and trial period of training absorbs only the first week of training at Wellbreads, but the period may be extended until a satisfactory assessment of technical readiness can be made.^(a) The novice is treated as a fool, but is expected to absorb the strict rules. The Wellbread Supervisors' training manual refers thus to the first week of training: "It has taken you years to reach your stage of experience, remember this man knows nothing of the bread trade. Explain easily, step by step." A supervisor explained to me what this meant:

"...The whole idea is to get the bloke to know where he's going, that's the main thing, you do this the first week, and try and sort of familiarise him with the procedure, the bread.... yeah, the first week, I just have the chap follow me..."

The new man is expected to learn by rote the route he will have to take on his own eventually, the different types of bread, and how to order goods for his round. One man remembered that during his first week:

(a) Bigus (1972, p 141) notes that milkmen, who only get one week's training, only have time to master technical issues such as: "...the instrumental aspects of the job, such as driving a truck, keeping the route-books in order, "working a load", and so forth...". Although encouraged to "deal" by supervisors (meaning to offer a package-deal to customers as distinct from the meaning here attached to "deal" - see Chapter Four) the milkmen in this study were not taught to fiddle (i.e., steal from customers).

"...What he was concerned with was where I was going...some of them (calls) were difficult, you know, 'First house after poplar trees', that sort of thing, you know...I did get lost the first few days, I didn't know anything about it for the first few days...all he was concerned with, I didn't know nothing...all he taught me was where to go..."

Another man admitted that:

"...That was my first real contact with bread, customers, and everything...he just flew round, I did a week with him, he wasn't interested in showing you anything, and I was just acting as a passenger really..."

In fact, even bona fide deviant occupations (rather than those with deviant sidelines) require that entrants gradually become initially accustomed to occupational basics. Verlarde (1975, p 253-4) suggests:

"...There are various steps which a masseuse must psychologically master before gaining competence in this profession. The first is confrontation with a naked man. She usually begins the massage at her own pace with the most non-erotic part of the naked stranger, the neck. This gives her time to feel at ease. She slowly works down the man's body during the next half-hour. By this time she has rebounded from the initial shock of touching a strange man in the nude. She barely notices his nudity until the time comes for him to flip over on his back. Again, she starts with the throat and goes down to his arms and chest while she gets used to seeing (and stops staring at) his penis..."

This extract nicely shows that even sub-arts like alter-masturbation may well be an issue of technical ability before being ~~one~~ of moral readiness, and that even quite innocuous technical issues are a necessary pre-condition of eventually successful moral conversion.

The learning stage of the moral career at Wellbreads is excessively timetabled. Whilst common-sense tells us that cohort training goes ~~awry~~ if trainee-groups lag behind or speed up in their development (as this provokes tension vis-a-vis other recruits) emphasis on regularly timetabled development in serial socialisation is demanded to satisfy symbolic rather than practical requirements.

Slow learners easily accommodate such structural niceties, their tardiness being easily rationalised, with a certain amount of pride, as due to the intricacies of the job. Staged and well-ordered succession is also necessary to complete the quota of required salesmen. Tardy or over-speedy training are both indicative of poor supervision, one indicating incompetent, the other skimped progress. However, the over-zealous often pose a status threat to experienced hands by failing to see that several informal stages have to be traversed before certification is final (see Strauss, 1959, p 104).

Socialisation can thus go astray if technical or organisational commitments curtail full training. One man remembered that: "...They told me that I would get three weeks (training)...but I only got 8 days, and they sent me out on my own...chucked me in the deep end, because they didn't have enough staff to send somebody with me...".

Mortification, as the deliberate disorganisation and disorientation of the victim in order to make him more receptive/susceptible to moral reinterpretations of action, begins here. The novice begins to worry about his performance in what has been described to him, so far, as a perfect system. He naturally begins to suffer what Davis (1968, p 242), in a similar context, notices: "...as feelings of embarrassment, uselessness, and personal inadequacy...worry, disappointment, frustration...". The Wellbread Supervisor's manual reminds supervisors that for the new man, "This is his first day in a bakery and he will undoubtedly be confused by the hustle and bustle...he is probably nervous knocking on a door for the first time." One supervisor complained of a recruit: "...The man was bewildered, he didn't know what I was talking about..", and a salesman admitted:

"...I was a bit nervous at first, I was nervous about meeting people, I'd never done the job before. I hadn't done the knocking on doors to women and that...and the moans and groans that some of them come up with...it was strange, I thought: "Christ! I wonder if I'll be able to add up?"...I was worried about what the job was going to be like, I didn't want not to be any good at it, I didn't want to be a fool..."

Some attempts are made by supervisors to reassure novices (mostly to prevent them leaving) and the supervisor takes over at critical moments created by those customers who choose the departure of the regular baker and the training of a new one as the best moment to change their loyalties. However, following the pattern of pessimism featured in the interview, the strict rule-tutoring model curiously over-emphasises some problems. Two supervisors said:

"...Well, when you train a person, he should always carry a basket...I don't still carry a basket to the door, I would tell you that... but if I was training a man I wouldn't say that, I don't think you should do, I would say: 'Take the basket to every door'...but after a while he's not going to, is he?..."

"...on the first week, I always drag a man out, I always fuck about, talk to people, and stop for about three cups of tea, so we probably come rolling into the bakery when it's getting dark, and the bloke thinks: 'Bloody Hell! this job is going to be terrible', and if the bloke's one of those who wants to finish at 2.00 pm every day, he'll give his notice in then..."

A general social process, the "fictional re-run" is involved here. The fictional re-run is an elaborately stage-managed re-play of the set of connected steps, which, if put in their logically occurring sequence, lead the disbeliever through the preferred stages of an organisational rationale. It is a sort of lay version of the Hughes Assumption (see Chapter One), explicitly enacted to ensure long-term belief in the preferred outcome rather than mere slavish and short-term obedience to and practice of it. Supervisors who lead novice salesmen through examples of those formal occasions, the formally rational solution to which would, if annotated in their logical sequence, lead any rational actor toward reasonable adoption of the fiddle, would typically experience greater success in training than those who merely and baldly announce the necessity to fiddle. Since, alas, it would be inappropriate (for reasons of maintaining continuity of price to individual customers) to allow recruits to actually experience this sequence of steps, the "re-run" for fiddlers is necessarily "fictional". The "fictional re-run" is a particular

variation of a basic way that socially-framed activity may be "keyed" (Goffman, 1974, p 59-61) as a technical re-doing. All technical re-doings are strips of ordinary activity abstracted from their normal context. Here, this is done as a "practising", which highlights the understanding that the original outcome will not occur, the activity being keyed as non-literal. As Goffman (*ibid*, p 64) nicely notes, practice sessions are likely to involve a higher concentration of varied difficulties and mock emergencies than "real life", making practice paradoxically harder than ~~the~~ the real thing. ^(a)

The supervisor (whilst the "fictional re-run" is in play) is probably fiddling for the good organisational reasons given above (i.e., in order to recover financial loss inevitably occurring in transactions with customers), but the novice is too busy learning basics to notice anything untoward:

"...I couldn't pick up what he was saying, he was too quick for me..."

"...No...I can't remember (whether or not the supervisor was fiddling)...you can't remember things like that, not when you're learning the round, can you?..."

"...When I started, I didn't know nothing about it...I didn't know whether he was doing it, he didn't tell me nothing..."

"...At the beginning of the job, when you start, you're sort of dim in a sense, when the job is new, and you don't sort of know anything else..."

(a) Klockars (1974, p 35-6) recites an example of a street-hustler who tried to sell 'Barker' pens straight, but who had to placate customer suspicions and increase sales by initially (but erroneously) saying that they were stolen. In Lofland's (1966) study of cultic conversion, potential converts arrive armed with sufficient real and personal experience of problems and tensions which would satisfactorily precipitate eventual conversion. This notices the difference between overt and covert (under occupational guise) moral careers, and indicates that the "fictional re-run" is probably preserved for the latter when the appropriate audience might be unfortunately disturbed by witnessing a real re-run.

But when demonstrations become trials, the novice may "latch-on" to something:

"...See, I noticed him eating something, that was when I had the bag, he didn't pay for it..."

"...I didn't know he was doing it, until he got back into the cab...that was only because I counted it...I twigged it, but he hadn't told me, I thought: 'Christ! that's a rum one, he's booked that, and we only had this amount of bread on...'"

It is both inevitable and essential that the novice now begins to latch-on. A senior supervisor explained the problems of a novice taking over and charging the right price, and how this is forestalled:

"...this comes out with the supervisor when he says to the new roundsman: 'Watch out for her, she's an old so-and-so'...and he adds: 'If you stick a halfpenny on...'...and its just slipped out, 'She'll be watching her account', and the new man picks this up straight away, and says, 'What do you mean about this halfpenny?'..."

Some customers may take the opportunity to initiate their own fiddles ('flankers') during the training period, and thus unwittingly educate the trainee. This is quite common amongst the experiences of apprentices of illicit occupations. A neophyte prostitute in Bryan (1965) noticed:

"...It is quite rough when you are starting out. You get stiffed a lot of times...they take advantage of you any time they can..."

Another difficulty, explained to me by a senior supervisor, is negotiating the breach of customer expectations likely if the fiddle is temporarily abandoned whilst educating a novice in the early stages:

"...I've gone to the door, and the woman says, 'Here's the money for the small loaf, Baker', and she puts 7½p in my hand, and I've known that it's only 7p..but I've looked in the route book, and I've seen '7½p' marked right through it, so it's put me in a very embarrassing position, what do I do? If I tell the woman it's only 7p, what happens?...the new bloke has lost a customer, she's not going to think of the one ½p saved, but of all the other ½p's she's lost in the past..."

The novice may also have heard a conversation in the canteen, or whilst loading, between experienced men. If the newcomer is noticed, he may have the conversation explained to him:

"...Yeah..you learn them in the canteen, and you get the idea as you go along..."

"...Well, the bloke who'd done my round for 40 years, he took over the milk round out there, well, I used to see him every day, and he used to tell me all the answers..."

The earlier strict rules are thus outmoded:

"...Well, shortages, that was the thing to start with...he always seemed to be on about it at first, even if you wanted something to eat, off the van, he used to say: 'You'll have to put that in', or something like that...I did to start with, but not after I caught him not doing it..."

But latching-on rarely precipitates full disclosure of the fiddle system, although probably now judged as ready to transcend basics, the recruit is not yet morally ready, nor is he sufficiently committed, and can only be offered a temporary meaning structure. If the novice gets a glimpse of things too early, then the fiddle will be denied. One man remembered that his supervisor: "...Didn't tell me about it, not at first, he just said to add a penny or a halfpenny on, he didn't tell me too much about it..". Whilst the status relationship pertaining between recruit and supervisor absolves the latter from the interpersonal necessity of giving an account, his transient role of coach requires that he be on hand at all times to proffer the relevant organisational explanation of phenomena. Supervisors' awareness of correct staging however, allows them to conclude that the time may not be quite ripe for the truth. Thus, the most likely outcome at the present stage is postponement of correct understanding until the recruit is more heavily committed to the organisation. Typically, this is achieved by the instructor side-tracking, stalling, or using joking references (indicative of to pave the way to smooth transition into the next stage. The secondary purpose of such dramatisation is to construct a sufficient

number of 'usual' situations in a short time as tests for the recruit, whose response can be monitored, interpreted and rationalised.^(a) The artificiality of such situations created by the duplicity of the supervisor allows him to remain in control of the process. Artificial benchmarks of this sort are often formalised in occupational careers, generally, as Strauss (1959, p 94-5) indicates, as the "challenge" which is a turning point similar to the "latching-on" described above. For most men however, such 'tests' come as a shock:

"..what happened with _____ (a supervisor), we went to a call, I went with him, but he done the call, and when he wrote it in the book, I was watching to see...I was watching to see how he wrote it in the book...and I noticed he put the wrong price in...(laugh)...and I said to him: 'That's the wrong price'...you know, green that I was, I said: 'I'm sure you've put too much down there'..and he said: 'I'll tell you about that later'..."

"...When I took the round over, all the farmhouse loaves were extra, a penny extra, I think, yeah, Old Dick, who'd been on there for years had been doing it...the supervisor kept that one actually, he did explain to me, he said: 'That's old Dick's doing, we'll carry it on...'"

"...I realised it because on the Friday, at the Post Office, I made the order up, and I noticed that he'd booked more than they had had, but when I queried it, he just said: 'You'll learn later on' ...and as we went round, I gradually took a bit more interest, and thought: 'Well, there are fiddles in this'...I reckoned that there were before, but it wasn't until that day, that I realised that he was adding it on, and he said: 'You'll learn later on'...I was puzzled, it looked as if I'd made the order up wrong, but he wasn't going to tell me, that was his only comment..."

(a) Scott and Lyman (1968) suggest mystification, referral and identity-switching as similar "styles for avoiding accounts". More generally these strategies would constitute "sealing-off" or "opening-up" sub-moves initiated during the covering phase of an information game (Scott and Lyman, 1970, p 59). Goffman (1959, p 157) notes how those saddled with the discrepant role of "training specialist" have a double function on such occasions. They: "...have the complicated task of teaching the performer how to build up a desirable impression while at the same time taking the part of the future audience and illustrating by punishments the consequences of improprieties..."

"...introduce it as a joke, that's the best way, you can't say to a new bloke: 'You've got to be a twisting bleeder to do this job' can you?...yes, you can always make a joke out of it, when you're doing the booking, you say: 'That's so-and-so, and so-and-so, plus a bit for V.A.T.'..and pass it off as a joke..."

Verlarde (1975, p 254) illustrates that with raw relief-masseusses, similarly, the true nature of the job is not only a shock, but further, is a shock that occupational routines demand be quickly absorbed:

"...When the massage nears the end, the excited man asks for the 'local' (hand masturbation). This is where the job requirement suddenly comes into revelation. Every naive masseuse in the study was startled at this point, but the situation only allowed a few minutes to contemplate her decision ...She is either so disgusted that she leaves the profession at once, or she becomes accustomed to it...."

The novice at the bakery is eventually defined as one with sufficient understanding to cope with the technical side of the fiddle. The definition of 'technical readiness' requires successful passage through intervening informal stages, or unspoken tests, passing of which is deduced by supervisors from symbolic and verbal cues gleaned in interaction with the novice. He must be able to see subtle changes in the attitude of the learner, because, as Strauss (1959, p 102), tells us:

"...different motivations frequently become appropriate at each successive status. Passage from one to another involves not only changes of action and demeanor, but of the verbalised reasons that are associated with them...motivations appropriate to earlier - and usually lower - status must be sloughed off or transmuted, and new ones added or substituted..."

Technical readiness for recruit salesmen is generally or specifically negotiated by supervisors. Judgements of character and ability are gradually made, and sometimes specifically tested. Such reworkings of the training frame are not keyings, but are benign fabrications (Goffman, 1974, p 96-98). Done (allegedly) for the benefit of those contained in the illusion, Goffman defines the "training hoax" as one in which the neophyte is treated as though he

was engaging reality directly, although in fact he is later informed that he was insulated from the world he thought he was engaging. At Wellbreads, some of the supervisors said:

"...three weeks is really necessary, not so much in a young man, he's probably got the hang of it after a fortnight...but an older man, it takes him a bit longer to learn.."

"...when you get the average bloke, you have to treat him as if he's as thick as shit...if he takes the initiative, you know, takes hold of the basket, let him carry on with it, see how he gets on...unless the chap's a complete fucking idiot, he must get the hang of it..."

"...eventually, one day, I'll stay with him to start with, and then I'll say: 'Oh, I've got to go round the corner and see a customer', and let him get on with it. And if you come back and the bloke is sweating and shaking, you know he's not ready for it...on the other hand...if he's further ahead than you thought he would be, you know he's got the idea and you let him have one day completely on his own..."

If suitable judgements of technical grasp can be made, then organisational commitment must also be engendered.^(a) Usually as novices begin to articulate basic routines with panache, they may successfully give the supervisor the impression that they are "over-ready". Goffman (1961a, p 83) notes that this is a form of role-distancing designed to publicly demonstrate that one is about to abandon a lesser status. The life of the novice must be so

(a) I am not so much concerned here with subjective as with objective (hence organisational) commitment. In other words, I do not refer to personal involvement, so nicely defined by Davis and Olesen (1970, p 89) as: "...how far they are prepared to commit themselves to it (occupation) as against how far they chose to remain responsive to and preoccupied with the more mundane pleasures and pursuits of the world..". I suggest later (see Chapter Three) that this is of sufficiently formal status conceptually to warrant reference to it as an "involvement dilemma". Organisational commitment is perceived to be required when commitment per se is necessary, but where personal commitment is typically unlikely.

arranged that, upon raw discovery of the fiddle, neither organisational solvency nor customer routines will be upset unnecessarily. Becker (1960, p 267-8) calls this the process of making side-bets:

"...a person finds that his involvement in social organisation has, in effect, made side bets for him and thus constrained his future activity... A person often finds that side bets have been made for him by the operation of impersonal bureaucratic arrangements..."

When a side-bet is made on behalf of an individual: it is a trap. In relief massage parlours, for example (Verlarde, 1975, p 254) practice itself (together with the prospect of ego's eventual self-consideration as a practiced rule-breaker) is used as a means of commitment:

"...Typically he (the owner) tells the older masseuses to let the apprentice get more customers, so as to break her in...This allows her to give many locals during the first day before going home to contemplate. The naive masseuse finds out suddenly what her new job entails and, by and large, hastily and unthinkingly gives a local. The pace of business is so great on the first day that, while she must give five or six more locals she still has little time to think about the sexual requirements..."

At Wellbreads, supervisors conspire to engender decisive allegiance of the recruit's self and projects against either leaving the firm, or practising honesty. Negative commitment is created by unwitting collaboration in devious practices by the recruit, which apart from convincing him that it can be done successfully, attempts to persuade him that he has less to lose by continuing than by stopping. This sort of intimidation is more important than positive commitment, through which it is hoped that the newcomer will form a positive attachment to the perks that are obtained.

In some moral careers (notably, it seems, the institutionalised transition from American Rookie to fully-fledged cop) commitment follows specific universally legitimised graft stages. Sherman (1973) suggests that these are firstly, "perks" (free coffee and meals from bars on the beat); secondly, accepting a drink (and then perhaps letting a bar

stay open) and finally small bribes (such as those found in American driving licences). Sherman (ibid, p 11.) continues:

"...If he does accept the minor perks, he then has a different image of self to contend with when a bar owner operating after closing hours offers him a drink...(later)...he may accept or reject the bribe, but acceptance is made easier if he is used to taking gifts from restaurants and bars..."

Maas (1973) notes that refusal in the early stages does not necessarily make later rejection easier. In fact, it makes others even more suspicious. In addition, although the righteously untainted performer may become more determined in his honesty, he will experience less and less shock as more and more of the game is revealed to him. The righteous straight, then, is transformed in a similar way to most other recruits. In addition, he makes the hard decision not to practice what he has learned.

Recruit salesmen at Wellbreads are similarly encouraged to unwillingly increase their commitment in stages. In fact, the subtle side-bet is often indistinguishable from the early stages of fiddler-training. Supervisors often offer neophytes cakes en route, and a loaf "for yourself" at the end of the day. During my first training week, when the supervisor and I ate an apple pie from the van, he said: "Remind me to declare it as waste at the end of the week", when we had a packet of biscuits, he winked and said: "Remind me to check that the last bloke didn't put these down on his stock!" In a similar way, police recruits (Stoddard, 1968, p 232) are gradually 'tested' with activities (like stealing 30c candy bars) which, although illegal, could be laughed off if reported. The recruit becomes implicated by unreported association, before a point of reportable clarity is reached. At Wellbreads, a financial side-bet is also often made:

"...I never let a chap handle the cash the first week, because we've had too much trouble with these blokes who help themselves to the money...so I always wait until we've got enough money, until he's a week in hand, so if anything happens, they don't come up to me and complain..."

The company hopes quickly to establish a psychological bond between the novice and the organisation, and the threat of insufficient attachment is countermanded and documented in the employment "contract". One man told me:

"...you need a bond you see, you need a reference, and they always give you a bad one here...they try to keep the blokes that way, you see?...they're always saying things like: 'I've only got to snap my fingers outside the door twice, and we'll have 15 blokes up here after your job'..."

The Sales manager privately agreed that the "contract" was just a gambit. He said: "...Mind you, it isn't worth the paper it's printed on, but it's....persuasive..".

Once there is perceived commitment, the path is clear to proceed to establish success at the next stage: that of 'moral readiness'. Acceptance is a tricky procedure, as the supervisor must be able to deduce not only the willingness of the recruit, but also his willingness after his reconsideration of what he has agreed to. Verlarde (1975, p 256) indicates that there are two basic advantages for trainers who gradually divulge information and then impress it in bulk. Firstly, financial rewards, and secondly, lack of expected guilt feelings can be appreciated by the recruit. Verlarde comments:

"...An owner (of a relief massage parlour) said: 'There is no advantage in letting her know on her first day that she can make a lot of money by playing ball. Sending in a lot of customers to her on her first day drives the point across clearly.' Another, probably unrealised, source of influence is that the vast amount of business given to the new masseuse is basically to facilitate adaptation to performing locals..."

Once this hurdle has been surmounted, and acceptance offered, then the recruit will be taught what Becker and Strauss (1956b) refer to as "crucial trade secrets". (a)

(a) There is an extended discussion of "trade information" in Chapter Three.

Introduction to Inefficiencies: Ideally, this stage should be reached by the second week of salesman training at Wellbreads. The recruit is now doing all the leg-work, and the supervisor is beginning to retreat into the background. The fool has become a little wiser, and is now ready for alienation precipitated by gradual awareness of structural deficiencies in the selling process. Until now, the supervisor has been coping with these problems invisibly. The time is now ripe to crumble the edifice of strict rule obedience, and introduce patterns of managing strategies in their stead. Although the recruit learns all sorts of 'management' tactics, of crucial significance to his moral career progress is the way that he discovers the inevitability of uncorrectable mistakes (until now, he has only been tutored in careful checking to avoid unnecessary mistakes), and the fact of his accountability for shortages in his personal 'debit/credit balance:

"...Well, I never expect a round to work out dead right...and when I have a new chap, I always show him how to make a few coppers, and that helps cover that sort of thing...everybody makes mistakes...when you're adding up a load of figures, everybody makes mistakes, so you're going to lose a few coppers here and there... this is the best way to explain it to a chap..."

"...he said that I'd have to pay shortages and things like that, and I thought: 'Christ! I don't want to come short in the money'...."

What is being pointed out to the new man here is not merely that for the time being his mistakes will be tolerated, but more importantly, that these mistakes are inevitable and will continue to occur long after the conclusion of the period of tolerance. Whilst putting the man at his ease (a favourite learning slogan at the bakery) it simultaneously notes that there are problems that must be faced in a different way in the future. For the moment, the roundsman is negotiated into situations where it is likely that he will 'catch-on' to the fiddle. Testing now becomes that of moral readiness not only to apply the appropriate solutions to a specific

set of tasks, but also to successfully apprehend one's self as a practitioner of such activities.

Whereas before, the novice was only introduced to morally neutral 'tricks', like negotiating an acceptable 'fit' between supply and demand for the customer, he is now shown tricks of a more illicit nature. These include telling customers that he has run out of bread (whereas in reality he is keeping some back for awkward customers at the end of his round), buying bread in from shops if he runs out, and selling it to cafes if he has too much rather than return it to the bakery and show a high waste figure at the end of the week. Roundsmen also learn to "hold" bread on the vans overnight to balance the problems of being over-issued one day and short-issued the next:

"...Yeah, he taught me about holding on the van, and that sort of thing, he'd say: 'Oh, don't put them three smalls in, we'll need them tomorrow', and let's face it, everybody does it, that's what he said, at the time.."

During the process of coping with these problems, the supervisor watches intently so see if the novice is prepared to apply shady means to obtain generally sanctioned ends. Indeed, some of the men find it difficult to adjust to what is required:

"..it shocked me at the time, he didn't tell me why we had to do it, not really, I knew it wasn't O.K., but it was...I'd never done it before, never..."

Realisation of what may be required of them pushes most men into a tense stage of identity-crisis. It will suddenly be put to them to apply the shady means that they have learnt, and adapt their learned skills of underhand 'management' to areas which are not generally sanctioned. They are precipitated into an existential limbo, from which, if they wish to stay with the firm, they must emerge as fully-fledged fiddlers. The double-bind situation of unrelievable anxiety created by forewarning of future 'new' methods of handling mistakes prevents the likely righteous comparison of strict rules with 'good sense'. This is not a comparison which regularly occurs to the men, partly due to the diminished control

over their biographies that they have during training.

Stage 2: Tension, Transformation and Rebirth Through the "Fiddle"

Thus, the sequence of training carefully lays the structural foundations of transformation of recruit into qualified practitioner. The novice salesman has learnt techniques, methods and problems. He now has to put them all together and arrive at the organisationally correct solution. Movement into psychological identity crisis is negotiated in interaction. Becker (1964, p 299) says of the recruit at this stage:

"...In his effort to continue interaction to communicate, the person is continually confronted with his own wrong guesses on this score and thus with the need to revise the roles of others he has incorporated into his self...the individual turns himself into the kind of person the situation demands...his perspectives will shift with his movement..."

Strauss (1959, p 124) adds:

"...Different motivations frequently become appropriate at each successive stage...you would say that the people are sanctioned to be different during different periods...A person is, during a crucial phase, quite literally a different person than when he was not..."

Such changes in the self provoke considerable tension for the embryonic salesman as career success (in this instance) demands a resolution of the dilemma of having to choose between solution of practical problems (with a deceitful set of moral standards), or occupational exit with previously held standards intacto. At this point, the coach needs carefully to cushion the neophyte against feelings of betrayal that might arise in the sense that all along he has been misled, or that now, suddenly, the supervisor appears to be an outright villain, and not the model of rectitude he once appeared to be. As Strauss (1959, p 99) continues, a "...critical

juncture in the maintenance of identity occurs when a person discovers... that one of his chief referential terms is completely erroneous..". Although most of the recruits experience shock at this point, and no amount of interpersonal chauffeuring can totally eradicate the 'moral experience' of fiddle-discovery, (and the sense of personal turning point that it breeds) most of the men resolve these problems quickly, and at the level of practical guilt:

"...that did shock me at the time, he told me to do it if I wanted to cover shortages..."

"...Yeah, I do, I worry too much...I feel guilty about doing it...and worry about being caught..."

"...It used to worry me in case I might get caught sometimes...when I first started, I was hesitant whether to do it or not...I was a bit scared...really the fear of getting caught... although I don't think nothing of it...really, that's nasty...I don't feel guilty about it now, although it still strikes me as a bit immoral..."

Thus, case-hardening (a particular empirical development of the shock of an initial experience "fading") allows the significant psychological stress suggested by Becker and Strauss (op cit) to be cooled out almost immediately, with tensions and conflicts being worked out at a practical level. Again, the recruit begins to experience misalignment - "surprise, shock, chagrin, anxiety, tension, bafflement, self-questioning" (Strauss, 1959, p 93), although now they are encouraged to ask questions as a means of calming the deliberately induced crisis of psychological status:

"...Well, finally, I said to him: 'What are the prices?'...and then he told me, towards the end of the latter part of the second week..."

Supervisors deliberately engineer interaction so that the recruit experiences this sort of dilemma in their presence. By now, the supervisor has become the main significant other in the occupational life of the novice. The supervisors' "answers" thus gather psychological weight precisely at the time when the recruit experiences the need for information and moral reassurance. As Strauss (1959, p 111,112,112-3) puts it:

"...The coach stands ready to interpret his responses, which may otherwise only have the status of ambiguous signs...because the sequence steps are (sic) in some measure obscure, and because one's own responses become something out of the ordinary, someone must stand ready prepared to predict, indicate and explain the signs...(in addition) the coach has to know when to force his man over a hurdle, and when to let him sidle up to it; when to schedule definite moves, and when to allow a period of relative free play..."

Simultaneously, the supervisor must subtly steer the novice to a position of high suggestibility. Whilst this is being done, a new plausibility structure is being cannily built from the ashes of the old. The recruit must be sufficiently prepared to face the world on his own, and practice sanctioned actions, with only an imaginary supervisor with him. This tense period is one, then, when the supervisor prepares the man for what is to come through myth, story, example and direct instruction. A supervisor explained both the wrong and then the right way of doing this:

"...Yeah, I made a big mistake with him (a trainee who left)...I just told him what we were doing, I put it to him that if he was short, he was responsible...and if it couldn't be found in mistakes in charges, it would be assumed that he'd taken the money, that he'd had the money out, and he'd lose it out of his wages...but, this is the way you should do it...you've got to get him on your side, you say: 'I know how to get round that'...you give them the problem first, if you don't, they think it's money in their pockets...having explained that, I say: 'Well, there is a way round it, providing you don't make a fool of yourself, or try to be greedy...there are customers, who don't check what they have, and by adding a couple of pence on, you can cover yourself, for any shorts you might have..."

The correct sequence of discovery is crucial. What counts is that the meaning of the fiddle will not vouchsafe itself to the newcomer until he has experienced its use in the light of non-gratuitous need, and reconsidered himself in the light of how he was, and in relation to himself as a practitioner. It is also hoped that the resulting dishonesty will be situationally specific and peripheral in future development of an occupational character. Although mortification can be established, and then immediately

replaced by rewards and privileges, the final step lies with the candidate. Whilst the public doubting of the efficacy that the recruit brings to work increases the attractiveness of the means offered for self-reassembly, what counts, and Matza (1969, p 122) puts it brilliantly, is what happens then: "Accordingly, he makes up his mind, literally." The subject has to mediate the process of becoming. Self-construction is never instantaneous. The most frequent empirical form that the process takes at the bakery may most accurately be analysed as what Goffman (1963, p 51-2) terms "affiliation cycles" - where the individual oscillates between alternatively available motivational vocabularies - here, the standard moral societal vocabulary, and the specifically immoral one of Wellbreads.

But if supervisors are dealers in a new plausibility: they are also dealers in an underhand plausibility. The possibility of an recruit blowing the whistle on the fiddle means that, at every step, they have to inoculate themselves against the implications of systematic corruption. Teaching the arts of fiddling ~~must be~~ must be done with an existentially aloof wink: the idea here is to so construct situations of transformation that the novice believes that he thought of it himself. In this way, the recruit not only "soon learns which message he is supposed to hear; (Becker, 1968b, p 331) but also he feels that it is a message that he sent as well as received. When I was being trained, a customer once refused a loaf, and we had to take it back to the van. The supervisor said to me: "She's paid for that loaf", and then he winked at me and said: "Well, you know what to do in future, don't you?...Don't say I told you though, I don't want to know anything about it." Another supervisor reported:

"...during conversation, this does come out,
...then he must say: 'If you're going to do
it, for God's sake be careful, and don't come
back to me, I don't know nothing about it'..."

And one of the salesmen remembered:

"...Well, I personally was told, that the supervisor didn't want to know, the supervisor who was on with me, told me he didn't want to know anything about it..."

If the man hears and accepts the message, he will have passed the most important test: and he will have gained the moral licence.^(a) They are now especially qualified to fiddle customers, although, as Scott and Lyman (1963, p 34) note; whilst committed to the practice, they are not supposed to become attached to it. As we shall see later in this chapter, it is precisely this possibility that eventually proves so exasperating for the bakery management.

Satisfactorily defined commitment produces a sudden willingness in supervisors to explicate and demonstrate the techniques of the fiddle. The supervisor changes from coach to mock-audience, as the man assumes new liability as a credited actor, and performs his growing repertoire of fiddles. Initially, supervisors open with a frank description of the fiddle. Strauss (1959, p 94), notices this as a common stage in identity change. He suggests that the novice is told by the old-timer "Your clients will be of such and such sorts, and you'll have such and such experiences with them."

(a) Whilst Goffman (1974, ffl, p 84) sadly notes the decline of the English wink, he stresses the retention of its most crucial meaning. Thus (*ibid*, p 488, 515):

"...By carefully selecting his terms and carefully guiding intonation and stress, the actor can use a word, a phrase, or a sentence to say something that he can disclaim having said should the need arise. All of this, of course, is perfectly well known; now one should see that it is only to be expected - given the unavoidable flexibility of framing practices...(this) allow(s) a speaker to address remarks to a recipient which the latter will understand quite well, be known to understand, know that he is known to understand; and yet neither participant will be able to hold the other responsible for what has been understood. Here we have the controlled, systematic use of the multiple meanings of words and phrases in order to conceal speech behind speech, thereby effecting collusive communication between the very persons who are excolluded..."

One of the supervisors who trained me, said:

"...Look, you can make it a bit easier for yourself, anyway...you always charge a bit over for the small tin loaves...everybody does, so instead of charging 6½p, charge 7½p..that makes it easier, doesn't it?....and rolls are 20p a dozen, and not 19p...you have to charge up a bit anyway, nobody's infallible, we all make mistakes...you'll find whatever you do, you'll undercharge a penny here, and two pence here, so you'll have to make it up if you don't want to come short every week..."

The psychological transformation of recruit into roundsman constitutes the point of no return for both parties. As suggested above, the trainee now "knows" what goes on, and his possession of such knowledge is permanent. William James (1902, p 198-9) defines a transformation in the following way:

"...Our ordinary alterations of character, as we pass from one of our aims to another, are not commonly called transformations, because each of them is so rapidly succeeded by another in the reverse direction; but whenever one aim grows so stable as to expel definitely its previous rivals from the individual's life, we tend to speak of the phenomenon, and perhaps to wonder at it, as a 'transformation'...."

For the roundsman, informational-denial swiftly transforms itself into eclectic information-dumping. This is accompanied by a tension-relieving bout of demonstration. This phase is common to most illicit moral careers. An apprentice prostitute in Bryan (1965) claimed that her 'coach': "would go round the bar and say, now look at that man over there, he's this way and that, and this is what he would like, and these are what his problems are". Reiss (1964, p 192) similarly reports that experienced juveniles actually demonstrate to younger boys not only how to "blow" queers, but further how to beat them up should that need arise. Two of the salesmen reported:

"...On the second week, we carried on the same way, but between calls, he'd tell me things like: 'This one's an easy push, so naturally, the more cakes you push there, the more money you can make'...and he said: 'If she's got a bill of 75p, push it up to 83½p, so it's not an even round figure, because they might think that there's an odd half there...'"

"...Yeah, the prices were up on this round, and I said: "Well, why is this?", and he said: 'If you don't charge over the price, you'll always be coming short'...and: 'Your round will never work out right'...in other words, you were told to charge more so that you wouldn't be short, ...yeah, so I said to him: 'How much are those jam tarts?' and he said: 'Two bob' and I said: 'Two bob? That's a dear old jam tart!'...the actual price of them was 1/4 (laugh); and he said: 'Well, you must do it'...it was obvious he was getting away with overcharging on these jam tarts, and other various things above the price...and the customers thought it was the standard charge...and he'd done it, and I hadn't spotted him...."

Nevertheless, this period of information garnering does require some self-revaluation, some identity stock-taking. This self re-judgement allows the graph of personal experience to be plotted and confirmed. Such lulls in the processes of self-construction means that the individual can recognise his own transformation. Moral readiness notwithstanding, practical problems remain. Engendered preparedness does not automatically create dexterity. The supervisor begins to withdraw from the chaperone role, and to herald the end of coaching by not coming to the roundsman's aid in times of difficulty.

This first period of reflexivity is, interestingly, typically different to those experienced by other moral careers. Rather than being retrospective reinterpretation to establish the meanings of current actions somewhere in the past (Kitsuse, 1962), or, an alteration of total identity such as that contrived by public degradation ceremonies (Garfinkel, 1956), the addition of an auxiliary (rather than master) status, is the lamination or layering of a new set of attributes to an old identity core. The typical accounting mode for newly experienced salesmen is apologetic: new-found knowledge allows the old self to be interpreted "properly". Rather than thinking: "This is what I was like all along", salesmen think: "I was a fool then, but now I know". As opposed to interpreting the past to understand the past, it is realisation in the present to aid the future. One man said:

"...when I first went in there, the supervisor showed me how to do it...he thought he knew it all, but I now realise that he doesn't know half of it...when I suddenly noticed the other bloke was doing it, I thought: 'Well, I'll keep quiet'...I wasn't checking on him, but he'd fill in the book, and I'd look at it while we were going to the next call...so I thought: 'Oh, that's how you do it'...that's how I noticed it, I thought: 'Well, there's no need to ask him, I know now'...then I knew how it was done..." (a)

Unfortunately, for various reasons, some recruits slip the socialisation net, and are released upon the customer world with insufficient organisational commitment or technical knowledge to survive. Others, through poor socialisation, make organisationally incorrect decisions and unwarranted career exits.

Bad Supervisors, Straights, and "Good Boys"

One problem for the organisation is that supervisors make bad decisions about the successful status passage of recruits. By failing to suitably judge passing of informal stages, some recruits suffer 'over-teach', and some 'under-teach'. Both these problems are believed to stem from the poor quality of employed supervisors. One salesman thought this was due to personal inability, but a supervisor put it down to policy inadequacy:

"...they haven't got any 'supervisors' there have they?...some of those blokes haven't been there ten minutes...six of the good ones have left, and look who he's got now...the good blokes have all gone..."

"...see, the trouble is, I used to train all the supervisors here, but when they went back to their depots, the manager tells them: 'Don't take any bloody notice of what they tell you there'..."

(a) This is elsewhere expressed as one type of "realising experience" (Bigus, 1974, p 51). Logically, such experiences necessarily occur before (and naturally provide the psychological momentum for) progression through any sub-stage.

Typically, new supervisors lose potential employees through under-teach, and then over-correct on the next occasion and fail through over-teach. Two supervisors told me:

"...I went to see him, and he offered me the job of assistant supervisor, and that was the first I knew about it...I never had no guide about training other blokes or anything... I didn't let that bloke (first trainee) do enough on his own, and I pushed him too much...the second bloke I trained, we went through it bit by bit...but I showed him how to make a bit extra right from the start, which was a mistake with him...he was a good chap, but eventually, he got caught, and I had no choice but to give him the sack..."

"...they just took me in the office, and sent me out to train a bloke, I hadn't got a clue, ...I must have lost 15 blokes on that round until I got one to stay any length of time... Look, I know that if I don't tell blokes properly, I'm going to be on that round until kingdom come..."

Over-teach is primarily omitting crucial prior stages in the recruit's career. Information is dispensed too readily, rather than too profusely. As one roundsman said:

"...they've just had a bloke on my brother's old round, but he only lasted three days, apparently, they were at this shop, and whoever was with him took in ten loaves, and showed him how to do the booking...well, he booked twelve see?...and the new bloke said: 'I don't understand that, you only gave him 10', and the supervisor said: 'Don't worry about that, I'll show you later'...and the bloke said: Oh! fuck that! that's too confusing'..yeah! he left because of that!...said it was 'too confusing!'..."

Under-teach, as untoward procrastination in the dispensing of factory knowledge, is more common. Practically all those who go on to become salesmen decide to leave more than once because of the lack of suitable communication in the early stages of training. One man remembered that:

"...the supervisor on the round they put me on, he was the biggest fiddler out then, but I never knew all this until I eventually went on there

myself...but I got fed up with that round, one of the shops on there, I couldn't stand going in there, and I could never understand what the bloke was saying, and I thought: 'Christ! If I've got to work with this bloke, I can't see no future in it, if I've got to put up with him, I can't see myself putting up with the job'...I probably would have left if I'd been stuck with that bloke, but they put me on a different round...but there, we were starting at 5.00 in the morning, and we weren't getting back until about 4.00 so I went to see him again (the sales manager) and said: 'I can't stand this'...so they altered it for me..."

Men re-entering training (changing to a different type of round, or transferring from another bakery) also sometimes experience under-teach. Although the expert has no moral problems, technical information may not be forthcoming:

"...if blokes come down here for a job, if they've been on the vans before, the first thing they ask is: 'What are the fiddles?', if they haven't, it just takes a bit longer, that's all..."

"...When I started on wholesale delivery (after three years as a retailer), he took me into Woolworths, and he booked them about three trays they never had...I was so simple then, I didn't know what he was doing!...I even said to him: 'Heh! You've booked that wrong'...but he showed me how to do it, he used to walk in there with a ticket with about ten trays booked on it, and he used to fight his way in there on a Saturday afternoon, and find some girl who was busy, and stand there chatting her up, and then he'd say: 'Sign this for me, darling'...and she'd sign for ten times more than they'd get, and he'd go and arrange them on the stand so that it looked like a lot..."

"...they'll tell you, but they'll never tell you all of it...everybody keeps a little bit back..."

But these quotes are from men who eventually picked up the threads. "Good boys" is the term used by experienced roundsmen to refer to those recruits who, because of moral refusal to fiddle, or lack of technical training in the art, have been caught in the cycle

of inevitable mistakes, shortages, and deductions from the wage-packet, and have left:

"...shortages is where you lose a lot of blokes, not in the training period, but directly they get out on their own, after two or three weeks, their Rec sheets start to come out wrong, and they start stopping their money...a lot of the boys, a lot of the straight and honest boys who have come here in the past are always coming short, and that's why a lot of them have left..."

"...if somebody innocent came here, I've seen it, blokes come here, damn nice blokes, start work here, stay a month...and they don't know what's going on..."

On the other hand, the management occasionally allows men to come short persistently during the post-training probationary period (with minimal amounts anyway) and then apply various moral induction back-up techniques to drive the message home. Most likely is the confrontation in the office, where the roundsman's tacit claim to be an operator of normal competence and character is questioned:

"...when I first came here, you won't believe this, but for the first year, I never got a thing for myself...never overcharged even a halfpenny, but then, one day, I was having the Rec. out with the manager, and he said: 'You've been here long enough, there's no need for you to come short all the time'...and I said: 'What do you mean?', and he said: 'You know what goes on, I don't have to tell you, you've got some calls where the people don't know what they're getting, haven't you?...need I say more?'...well, after that, I really started..."

"...I started to come short, I never found out why, this went on for months, short each week, then, eventually, they had me in the office, he didn't say he'd stop me, he told me, sort of, 'Start charging people more'...more or less, in a round-about fashion...he never told me how to do it..."

The same man indicated that he might get a second, but not a third chance. He continued: "...when I changed rounds, as soon as I started going out by myself...I started coming short, I don't know why, but they stopped it out of my wages that time...". Others try

it straight, and are then told to fiddle. One man remembered that:

"..I didn't really, for the first 6 months, I didn't really know much about it, I just carried on and charged the right prices, until Wellbread started to say I was short..."

If more confrontations are necessary, they are likely to involve lengthy pleas, exhortations, threats, and detailed explanations (cf. Maas, 1973, p 126-8) petering out finally, and half-heartedly (if somewhat bitterly) now that non-conformity can be defined as deliberate rather than arising out of ignorance. Outside the office, prompts may come from deliberate hints, or unintentional asides: (a)

"...there's one honest bloke left here...he comes £2 short regularly, every week, one week, I told him: 'Why don't you add a penny onto each bill, just to see if you can come over once?', but he said: 'Oh, I don't know, I don't want to do that'..but he did it, or I think he did, because he came £2 over that week, although he was £2 short the next week..."

"...one day, I had a different supervisor with me, and he said to me: 'Whatever you do, don't hurt old Bill'...and I said: 'What do you mean?' and he said: 'Don't fiddle him', he added: 'He's alright, but it doesn't matter about the others' ...that's when it really sunk into me!...I thought: 'Well, they must be doing it to the bloody lot of them!!....'"

"...When I went out with him..(to learn a wholesale route) it was totally different to the first time, when I was trained,..he just said: "Twist him, and twist him"...I knew about fiddling, but not on wholesale..."

(a) Parenthetically, we might note that the greater the delay in discovery of the fiddle, the more violent the reaction. For those who adopt deviance, this is born in embarrassment at one's naivete, and at lost commercial opportunities. Verlarde (1975, p 255) interviewed one girl who said: "...I couldn't figure out what was going on at the first place (massage parlour) I worked. I was twice as pretty than the other girls, but they were getting all the customers. I found out later they were turning tricks...". Those who stay straight can, conversely, use reminiscence of the period of ignorance and straight activity to show to themselves that one can exist without commission, and that the straight role is viable.

The firm will only tolerate honesty if it doesn't provide additional organisational problems.^(a) The accepted existence of untroublesome non-fiddlers testifies to the ambiguity of managerial values, the existence of alternative interpretations in the 'culture of mistakes' (in which the Sales department is immersed), and to the relatively voluntary structure of the moral career. Those who are prepared to fiddle for the organisation (and not for their own personal use) present no problem. Those, however, who adopt some form of 'straight' occupational character (see, Chapter Five for a detailed discussion of this) command both grudging respect, and interactional avoidance. For example, one over-zealous "good boy" began to report others for overcharging customers. Potential supervisors are hard to come by (many are selected, but few accept) so the firm promoted him. As a supervisor, he canvassed for moral rearmament even more vehemently, until finally, he had to be disposed of as a night packer in one of the depots.^(b)

At the end of the chaperoned training period, the novice has 'become' a roundsman. As I have shown, this period may be extended beyond the three week induction time, and concludes when the recruit accepts the need for the fiddle, and practices it. However, the primary justification model for fiddling has only temporary relevance. Most men discard the notion of fiddling just for the firm in favour or a secondary one which specifies that only a basic percentage of money be left in to cover mistakes, and prevent wage-packet deductions. Whereas passage through the training stage was concocted by suitable engineered and chauffeured transformation, in the post-training stages, perversion of such corruption now occurs at turning points of abrupt conversion created by class-based career contingencies.

(a) Dalton (1964, p 198) notes that honest employees who did not pad their expense accounts were forced to inflate their expenses by superiors: "so as not to 'show up the fat accounts' of the habitual users".

(b) Sutherland (1937, p 84) reports that only two policemen on the entire Chicago force couldn't be fixed. He continues: "...In fact, they are so honest that the important people finally decided that they were in the way and kicked them upstairs...".

THE POST-TRAINING STAGE: BECOMING A SALESMAN

"...An occupation consists, in part of a successful claim of some people to licence to carry out certain activities that others may not...in such licence...we have the prime manifestation of the moral devision of labour..."

(Hughes, 1958a, p 78, 79-80)

'Passing' the test is gaining the moral licence to practice on one's own. Having learnt the techniques of marihuana use, users now proceed to embark upon some practical pattern of consumption related to their interactions with other users, suppliers, and the law (Becker, 1963, suggests that one can become an occasional or regular user, and so on). Anybody successfully taking a driving test can now practice in solitary in a more or less probationary sense. Similarly, Bensman and Gerver (1963, p 591) notice:

"...When the veteran partner is absent, and the now initiated worker can use the tap at his own discretion, he feels a sense of pride. ...he frequently uses the tap when it is not necessary..he may forgo the easier legal methods..."

Occupational 'success' is, of course, immediate for most men at Wellbreads. One man remembered that: "..on the fourth week, when I was by myself, the first call was surprised to see me alone, and I sold, she was a customer who never had cakes...and I achieved a sale...I was really pleased..". This semi-mystical thrill is part of, according to Howton and Rosenberg (1965, p 282) subscription to the "cultic metaphor of sales". Importantly, it demonstrates to the new man that he can make a success of a sales career.

Similar sort of success with the fiddle (although it takes the new salesman a return visit to the customer to be sure that he has got away with it!) precipitates the conclusion of training. That he exhibits such characteristics of "stage fright" indicates just how

aware he is of the sense in which being employed in the service industry is often employment as a dramatic performer (Scott and Lyman, 1970, and Chapter Three). Initially, however, he feels that his illicit actions are transparent. Matza (1969, p 150) comments:

"...the sense of transparency is eventually managed and overcome...being bedeviled is no small matter even if eventually managed, and a first signal of being bedeviled is the common fear that we appear in the world looking that way.."

Subsequently, the experience of being a fiddler (which has been a part-time occupationally, but full-time psychological status during training) dwindles to auxiliary, partial psychological status. As Bigus (1974, p 59) so nicely puts it, the experience "fades":
 "...a gradual diminishing of the cognizance, significance and potency, and therefore of the effect, of a particular experience...". Training may be deemed to finally have concluded when fiddle-occasions lose their "countability". Sudnow (1967, ff2, p 38) provides a brilliantly perceptive maxim:

"...It is a matter of general sociological interest that a significant transformation occurs when an event comes to be seen as having ordinal properties, i.e., where it is not merely an occurrence but one which is seen as an event in a series..."(a)

Thus, successful solitary practice completes the sense of psychological status change. Success in fiddling the first customer allows the salesman to finally solidify his feelings that he is somebody "new". The reality of his ability to play a role that he once might not have believed himself capable of playing (had he conceived of playing it) is fully brought home to him. As Strauss (1959, p 97) suggests, "it brings him face to face with his potential, as well as his actual self".

(a) The excellence of this lies chiefly in its theoretically and logically formal quality. It is an example of the sort of formal conceptualisation which Glaser and Strauss (1967) recommend, and more importantly, shows how questions demanding empirically 'ad hoc' answers (i.e., 'when?') may be solved by specifying the formally conditional qualities which the answer should have. Sudnow provides an inductively universal statement of indisputable veracity.

But before Wellbread salesmen can go on to perfect patterns of technique and usage of the fiddle, they are expected to pass the last 'test' of diverting some of the "made" money to their own pockets. This is not related to any fiscal needs of the organisation, but rather to indirect managers' expectations about proper conduct conducive to maintaining a stable workforce. The second part of Bensman and Gerber's (1963, p 598) interesting treatment of acceptable crime runs as follows:

"....A violation of law is treated as a crime when it is not directed and controlled by those in authority or when it is used for exclusively personal ends..."

Nevertheless, whilst fiddling for oneself is condemned in principle by the management, it is allowed in practice. As the Sales manager says: "...they're not real salesmen if they can't make a bob or two on the side, are they?..." The ambiguous managerial viewpoint over personal use of fiddling by experienced men partly derives from consideration of it as a sensible means of minimising workforce turnover at relatively low cost (as long as the men only fiddle customers, and not steal from the firm), partly from personal sympathy (all supervisors used to do it before they were promoted), partly from resigned acceptance of inevitability (the management is not aware of successful means of preventing it), and partly out of admiration for the way that unrestrained fiddling, in spite of being against the law, successfully demonstrates allegiance to core selling values.

However, managerial lack of control over personal use of fiddling by their men, and the relative indirectness of its relationship to organisational ends forces a discrepancy between their expectations (that it will happen) and their affective stance towards it. Whilst the personal fiddle has indirect advantages for the organisation, it is simultaneously felt that expressed leniency might encourage unwholesome digression into unsanctioned practices (such as stealing from the company, or dealing with some of its more unscrupulous employees), and create a standard of living for the salesmen higher than that of the management. Reducing labour

turnover in this way, however, breeds other problems that the Sales department will have to deal with, such as customer-loss through their discovery of unrestrained fiddling. Accordingly, the primary justification model for fiddling ("just to cover mistakes") carries the seeds of its own destruction. By allowing the men to steal from customers instead of (effectively) paying them a living wage, the management immediately introduce the possibility that, since it is easier sometimes to steal from the firm, they will become the major target for fiddlers.

From the very start of training, roundsmen perceive interesting features of the fiddle:

"...they seem to think that taking bread from them is wrong, and fiddling their customers is right..."

"...(when I introduce the fiddle as a joke during training)most of them say: 'Ha Ha! that's funny', and they do it themselves,...it's probably in the back of their minds, 'I can do that for myself and make a few shillings'..."

Sometimes, alternative meanings for the fiddle are suggested as an incentive rhetoric, dropped into the conversation casually, or even overtly mentioned as a means of covering financial needs occurring during the day's work. One roundsman remembered that:

"..He told me I should do it to cover myself, just for a packet of fags..", and another recalled: "..he was also saying I should pocket it, whatever I could make...he didn't say any specific amount..". Two more men said:

"...Then, he near enough said: "This will help to run your car, and buy cigarettes", he'd sort of say it and laugh...say: 'This'll put petrol in your car!'...so I said to him, at that point, 'How much can you make?'...and he said: 'Well, you can have bad weeks, and good weeks, some weeks you won't make hardly anything, until the people know you, until they come to trust you, because they'll check on you as soon as you start to walk away'...he reckoned about £4-5..."

"...He (supervisor) wasn't taking any out... unless he wanted it there and then, for fags, or something, on the journey..."

As the roundsman practices by himself, he will mix more with the other salesmen than with the supervisors. He will eat less of the goods, make fewer mistakes, and begin to build up (exploitable) trust with his customers. Importantly, he will develop sleight of hand at fiddling generally, and specifically learn the "easy touches" on his route. The likelihood of him continuing to come short on his weekly reconciliation decreases just at the same time as his skills at fiddling improve. Two of the roundsmen commented:

"...although I was still making mistakes after a month, I wasn't coming short...I was making a few..and then I used to do a bit too much, and cover myself too much, and that showed up as over..."

"...You can't get away with anything...when you first start off...they're all a bit wary of you...but after a bit they trust you, and you can start fiddling them more and more..."

Instead of commitment to organisational goals, the roundsman develops attachment to the possible profits and to the shady means, together with the increased standard of living that they bring. Self-awareness of other uses to which "made" money could be put arise in the process of "trying out" the fiddle:

"...after a bit you got to know the ones what add up what they had, and the ones that didn't . . .I used to try them out...I used to think: 'Oh! I'll put threepence on, and see if she say anything'...if the bill was 4/6, I used to say: 'That'll be 4/9 please, M'am', and if she didn't say anything about it, I'd know she didn't add up...Put a penny on this, put a penny on that, you try it, then you think: 'Oh, well, that's two or three pounds extra in my pocket'..that used to worry me at first...but it isn't pennies now, it's pounds..."

"...If I can't make a couple of quid out of it, I don't bother...I wouldn't cross the road for a couple of bob now..."

The roundsman thus emerges with a vocabulary of fiddle-techniques and possibilities far superior to that needed to satisfy corrupt ends suggested by erstwhile supervisors. Sooner or later he will make a decision to use the organisationally taught practices

for his own benefit. Commitment to the 'end' of fiddling subtly transforms itself into attachment to the means of fiddling. Typically, the men look back and account for this rationalisation of the proceeds as precipitated by an abrupt hostile act of class aggression by the management: (a)

"...they started to say that I was short, and all the rest of it...and you haven't got no proof of anything...and I think it's that...it's the company what make you... what you are, because they're twisting us!..."

"...Well, I thought it would be handy,... a bit of extra money...I suppose it was sudden, really..."

"...one of the supervisors took over from me, and forgot to take any out, so we went to look at the Rec., to see how much he had made, and he was £5 over...I told him I would take it out next week, and split it with him..but when we looked at it again, it was only a few odd shillings over, the rest had been struck off..."

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- (a) This is not an inevitable conclusion to the type of moral career that I have described. Bigus' (1972, passim) milkmen do not fiddle customers. Bigus (personal communication) suggests that this may be because American milkmen are quite well paid, and that, conversely, because they are in a competitive market situation, milkmen are forced to reduce prices to customers. Incidentally, they cover this by "dealing" with customers by "dumping" imaginary waste and "juggling" casual cash-income to balance (See Chapter Four). Bigus points out that whilst milkmen are in a similar weak, heterodoxical bind, it is positive rather than negative--as it is for bread roundsmen. Whilst the dairy formally denies but informally encourages "dealing", recruits are taught to do this speedily and openly as the process benefits, rather than disadvantages the customer. Nevertheless, (Bigus, 1972, p 145-6) milkmen effectively steal from the firm in order to support benevolent "dealing" with customers, and Bigus notes that teaching to "deal" is also covert teaching to "steal". I would add that such experiences create for the baker a psychic milieu within which stealing (aside from fiddling) may be defined as acceptable occupational practice and thus as an Everyman Performance. Additionally, note that Skipper and McGaghy (1969, p 400) suggest that a prior employment pattern of exhibitionistic behaviour: go-go dancer, singer, hat-check girl, - makes the eventual career move to stripping a small rather than large step. Here, immersion in the fiddling world makes the final move to stealing outright from the firm less of a psychological hurdle.

"...(Roundsmen had helped the bakery out in a time of labour shortage)...when I came to get my pay for that week, they hadn't even paid me for the Thursday!...and I'd come to work!.. I'd never had a day off or anything, that's just the way they treat you here, I told one of the blokes in despatch about it, and he said: 'I'll stuff extra on your rack to make up for that next week, don't worry, mate, I'll pay you back for them'...and he did...I got it all back..."

"...You know, I was there for a year before I realised what was going on...yeah, it must have been a year before I knew what all the others were doing...when I was first there, I wouldn't have dreamed of what was going on...I wouldn't have taken a farthing...then, (laugh) I saw the light..."

"...I didn't know anything about it until after six months, until I really got in with the blokes, and I knew what went on...it was the firm that changed me, they made me feel: 'Oh! right, if you're going to rob me, I'm going to rob you..."

"..I remember when I started to take a bit out, I remember it clearly, funnily enough...my holiday pay was short, and I went to see about it, and they explained to me that although I'd been there a full 12 months, they take it from the April, and I'd only been there since July...I accepted this, but I was still short, he said: 'We can't work that out now, you'll have to go on your holiday, and we'll work it out and give it to you when you get back'...I thought: 'Why should I?'.. and I had it out of the bag...that was the first time I'd ever done it for my own ends...Oh, yeah, I used to make a pint of beer, and a smoke...but I hadn't gone out particularly to make money to put in my pocket at the end of the week..."

Whilst an aggressive managerial act precipitates the conversion^(a) it is more likely that the decision to "start your own business" is a gradual one. The change is probably so mundane that it would pass unnoticed until an incident of great conceptual and personal significance is encountered. Such "moral experiences" (Goffman, 1959a, p 129) are used at the time, and in later accounts, to justify the switch, to close another period in an individual biography, and to

(a) Defined by Berger (1963, p 76) as those experiences in which the past is transformed to generate interpretative order in the present.

reconstitute psychological equilibrium after hazardous transition. In retrospect, the men envisage the unofficial transition period between roundsman and salesman as a "tentative status" (Sutherland, 1937, p 214).

Conversion, like commitment is essentially negative: an allegiance of self and projects against alternatives. The political conversion referred to here is different to the psychological transformation sustained in the passage to experienced fiddler. Conversion is volitional, regenerative, and crystallised from sudden consciousness of a slow, personal maturation process. To recapitulate, transformation is subtly engineered by others, and is permanent. The possible transience of conversion affects its stability, although, in practice at the bakery, the conditions for maturation (low pay, success of the fiddle, the attitude of the management) persist, and fiddling for oneself achieves a high situational durability. The key, however, is that conversion, unlike transformation, cannot happen behind the actor's back. As Matza (1969, p 119) puts it, conversion can only be "mediated through a reconsideration of the self and its affinities."

It would be difficult to account for the startling similarities in reactions to and accounts of training in terms of the expectations and personalities that recruits bring to Wellbreads, although such concepts may be helpful in understanding how salesmen go on to use the moral licence to fiddle customers awarded them by the management. In fact, the varieties of solitary licence use (the men variously combine available techniques in separable 'portfolios', which are enacted as performer "characters" and named "sharks", "rogues", "robin hoods", "professionals" and "straights" - see, Chapter Five) emphasise that the regularities produced in patterned induction are not traceable to individual predilections. The skillful organisation of training drastically reduces the possible random variations in response that might otherwise arise from prior expectations.

In fact, the intended consequence of the mortifying process is precisely to reduce the effect of a person's past upon his present.

The total interactional gamut incorporating the fiddle at Wellbreads overwhelms the newcomer with such a powerful facticity that prior orientations and beliefs collapse as plausible interpretations of actions. Training provides the decompression chamber for the gradual reorganisation of moral meaning: to pass the air-lock, recruit must have transformed into salesman.

Chapter Three

INTERACTION: Managing Customers

THE FADING OF SOCIALISATION: THE GROUNDING OF SECONDARY ADJUSTMENT

"...I suppose one might want to ask what a salesgirl does in a store by virtue of her being a salesgirl. The test of close analysis, however, is to study what a person who is a salesgirl does in a store that persons who are not salesgirls do not do, for much of what salesgirls do in stores is not done by them qua salesgirls and has nothing to do with sales..."

(Goffman, 1961a, p 95)

I have just outlined (in Chapter Two) the subtle socialising tactics of moral corruption employed by supervisors in the Sales department of the Wellbread bakery to suitably mould novitiate salesmen. To recover the analysis in brief: Management's selection procedures appeared to be explicitly designed to recruit honest applicants who could nevertheless be characterised as of sufficiently malleable potential to successfully undergo staged persuasion to adopt the necessary tactics and morality for covert "fiddling". In this way, customers lose small amounts of money to 'cover' the uncorrectable mistakes that inevitably occur in the process of transforming bread into money. Supervisory staffs are responsible personally for ensuring that such staged moral conversion successfully occurs during the three week training period. Such chaperoned training only concludes when and if the appropriate supervisor decides that the recruit is 'ready' to engage in the business of abetting organisational corruption relatively willingly and efficiently.

Imprinted socialisation always retains an image: but it fades. Regrettably, for the organisation, in achieving salesman-status, the recruit passes from the highly homogenised training setting to the highly differentiated network of fully-fledged salesmen. The sharp lessons of socialisation dim just as the chrysalis-salesman emerges to interact freely with customer and peer. This, as Wheeler, (1966, p 79) suggests, changes the situation from one where:

"...free interaction time...is restricted where there is little opportunity for like-minded inmates to locate each other, talk, and therefore perhaps reinforce the effect of their past on their present (to the post training stage where) in assertive processes...there is a higher correlation between what a man once was, and what he feels about his present position..."

Not only does the availability of alternative plausibility structures cast shadows of doubt upon the previously overwhelming facticity of salesman-ideology as presented by supervisors, but also, the continued integrity of the reasons for fiddling deflates precisely as skill in the arts of fiddling improves. This anomic situation rarely lasts. Those probationary salesmen who fail to divert surplus money to their own account are exhorted and encouraged by management to do so. Involvement in the fiddle thus gradually changes from commitment to corrupt organisational goals, into attachment to the means of achieving them. For Goffman, this reflects the evolution of secondary from primary adjustments (1957b, p 172):^(a)

"...Secondary adjustments represent ways in which the individual stands apart from the role and the self that were taken for him by the institution..."

Zurcher (1970, p 160), discussing the initiation of new poker players into an established school, refers to acceptance as the moment when old members accept that the new man should drop "you" questions, and start making "we" statements. Sarbin and Adler (1970, p 612) view this as a shift from viewing oneself as agency to that of viewing the self as agent - a final ritual in all self-reconstitution processes. Goffman (1961b, p 18) refers to this as the moment of the emergence of a joint "we rationale", and Clemmer (1940, p 93) talks of a theoretically similar process of 'prisonization':^(b)

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- (a) Guenther (1975) suggests that in total institutions, stealing appears to be a secondary adjustment enacted to satisfy various tertiary social needs.
- (b) Bigus (1974, p 99) mentions, in terms of alcoholics undergoing rehabilitation, a related feeling amongst inmates who begin to feel that they belong, as "scating" their lives in the institution.

"...After the new arrival recovers from the effects of the swallowing-up procedures, he assigns new meaning to the conditions that he had previously taken for granted...it is only after some weeks or months that there comes to him a new interpretation...This new conception results from a mingling with other men and it places emphasis on the fact that the environment should administer to him..."

Traditionally, this change passes unnoticed until an event of great personal and symbolic significance is encountered in dealings with the management. Often, in the Sales department, dramatic confrontations with the management offer the men an experiential turning-point which they can use at the time, and in later biographical accounts, to justify their retaliation for organisational failure in the provision of services and assistance in return for their willingness to commit illegal acts for the benefit of the company. Salesmen, in such transitions are engaged, as Berger (1973, p 75) so nicely puts it, in the "perennial pastime of correcting fortune by remaking history".

But precisely the point that conversion experience makes to the self is that self-recognition as a reborn person heralds the end of a process hitherto enacted unnoticed. It is a mere truism to report that the final experience is dramatic re-cognition (in a time-shortening moment which Lofland, 1969, p 41, calls "encapsulation") of the everyday minutiae, and routinely mundane mosaic of gradual change. However, in precisely what context does the latter conversion take place? In what context can we make sense of this ordinary erosion of business piety?

Actual solitary practice produces the ground conditions of salesmen's conversions. This happens because customer interactions fail to replicate the lessons and experiences which not only produced but also maintained transformation. In short, salesmen become cynical through the experienced malfunction of foisted managerial ideals of business efficiency, and this cynicism becomes a reality through which all managerial actions are re-membered.

"SALESMANSHIP": SERVICE AS LITERAL DRAMA

Reading Goffman

"...And now a final comment. In developing the conceptual framework employed in this report, some language of the stage was used. I spoke of performers and audiences; of routines and parts; of performances coming off or falling flat; of cues, stage settings and backstage; of dramaturgical needs, dramaturgical skills and dramaturgical strategies. Now it should be admitted that this attempt to press a mere analogy so far was in part a rhetoric and a manoeuvre..."
 (Goffman, 1959, p 246)

The conventional analytic reading of Goffman is as producing a pragmatic reconstruction of life using the 'theatrical metaphor', or, 'the dramatic analogy'. There have, of course, been some gross mis-readings, such as Martindale's suggestion (quoted in Messinger et al., 1962, ff 14, p 695) that Goffman's work is a representation of the growing amorality of urban individuals. This aside, submerged even in the conventional reading, there seems, at times, to lie a paradox. This paradox, I suggest, can only be unravelled by recourse to the context of discovery of Goffman's dramatic similitude.

At critical points the dramatic analogy becomes intensely awkward. In trying to dramaturgically describe the occupational life of the entertainer, for example, we are faced with the irritating paradox of descriptive category exhaustion. Here, the literal sense of performance coincides with the metaphoric sense in which it is drama. Consequently, the metaphor exhausts available common-sense descriptions, and leaves nothing for literal meaning. Another question. How could one describe a play using the dramaturgic vocabulary? The disconcerting convergence between metaphoric performer and the actual "performer" is occasionally obliquely recognised, but never directly

confronted by Goffman. Periodically, he is forced into unwelcome regression. For example, (1959, p 134-5):

"...one can become so habituated to one's front region activity (and front region character) that it may be necessary to handle one's relaxation from it as a performance..."

Alternating with this sort of regression, are distinctions supported merely by quotation marks, or by the tenacity of the reader (ibid, p 79-80):

"...The legitimate performances of everyday life are not 'acted' or 'put on' in the sense that the performer knows in advance just what he is going to do, and does this solely because of the effect it is likely to have...the details of the expressions and movements used do not come from a script but from command of an idiom, a command that is exercised from moment to moment with little calculation or forethought..."

The metaphor kidnaps the available vocabulary of descriptive language retiring reality to cumbersome phraseology such as "staged play", to refer to the performance defined as such by an audience in a theatre.^(a) The problem here is partly that of giving an adequate

(a) In Frame Analysis (1974) Goffman has made an extensive and relatively successful attempt to solve this problem. The cinematographic metaphor (more strictly, the kinesic one) of the "frame" and "strip" of activity has replaced the theatrical metaphor of the stage generated in 1959. The frame- analogy precisely allows Goffman to distinguish the separate senses in which drama may be framed. To approach the problem of exhaustion given above, we would now circumvent the issue by referring to "laminations" on a frame "core". In this way, many media (and now the theatre has no greater significance than the film, radio, novel or just talk) may be themselves analysed. This new concentration by Goffman upon the experience (rather than the appearances) of actors reduces the theatre-stage (now called the "legitimate (live) stage", there is still a residue of terminological confusion) merely to "root imagery" (1974, p 216). A 'play' can now be rightly analysed as a transformation, a reworking of life itself. Most innovative is the reflexive quality of this analysis. A 'play' can now be analysed in precisely the same way that life itself is analysed. I propose that Goffman's new approach validates, rather than vitiates the criticism given here of The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Although Frame Analysis successfully adopts all the analytically fatherless scripts produced by Goffman since 1959, we should resist

and separable description of those participating in drama in logically different and simultaneous ways, and partly that of distinguishing such people from the rest of us. For Goffman, this distinction is an empirical rather than a theoretical issue, to be settled as and when the analytic occasion arises (1959, p 221):

"...(There is of course, a danger here. A completely scripted performance, as found in a staged play, is very effective provided no untoward event breaks the planned sequence of statement and events; for once this sequence is disrupted, the performers may not be able to find their way back to the cue that will enable them to pick up where the planned sequence had been disrupted. Scripted performers, then, can get themselves into a worse position than is possible for those who perform a less organised show)..."

To unravel this paradox of proximity, to prise apart the apparent confusion of phenomena of different logical orders, a distinction between metaphoric and literal levels is required. To revert again to the play, in the literal sense, only the actors are "performing". Metaphorically, however, both actors and audience are performers. As Bateson et al. (1956, p 194) note:

"...We are not so much concerned with the content of fiction...as with the formal problems involved in simultaneous existence of multiple levels of message in the fictional representation of 'reality'. The drama is especially interesting in this respect, with both performers and spectators responding to messages about both the actual and the theatrical reality..."

(contd) the easy view that 1984 is already here, and that Frame Analysis is the doubleplusgood newspeak for symbolic interactionists! Frame Analysis is not a rewriting, it is rather a sourcebook of interpretation and collation of all the problems that were thrown up in Goffman's later attempts to explore the world in terms of the initial dramatic analogy. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life is a classic in its own right; and the specific pragmatic sense in which that analysis may be used (as here) makes it continually valid. However, in a general sense, the criticism of metaphorically based analysis still stands, and still applies to Goffman 1974. The current metaphor of "frame" gobbles up all legitimacy for the word, and eliminates (at least, makes confusing) alternative usages. Whilst it is to the credit of Frame Analysis that it can deal with, for example, the 'frame-up' (i.e., fit-up) it nevertheless cannot do so without ambiguity.

To be more specific, the metaphoric explanation (taking metaphor to explain the unknown in terms of the known, Perman, 1973 p 16) used by Goffman is of the sort characterised by Gouldner (1974, p 390) as iconic. In iconic, as opposed to say, functional or conceptual metaphor, equivalence is established perceptually: by seeing particular cases as similar to others. Garfinkel (1956a, p 190) suggests that its particular use by Goffman warrants the term 'Natural Metaphor', by which is meant that:

"..there are formal similarities in the situations of persons located at different points in the social order. These structurally repeated situations, though they may be known to the participants by different names, are organisationally identical. The participant's ways of describing their own situations may be used as the metaphor or model for appreciating the formally identical features in the situations of others..."

Goffman (1959, p 114) puts it in his own, inimitable way: ^(a)

"...It should be plain that while persons who are obliged to make-work and make-no-work are likely to be on opposite sides of the track, they must yet adapt themselves to the same side of the footlights.."

But, we are thus led to a second contradiction. The theatrical metaphor is strictly a similife (i.e., it is based upon an iconic metaphoric resemblance). Unfortunately the word 'metaphor' is used both to describe both the similic method, and the eclectic illustrative procedure. In fact, a close reading of Goffman produces two contexts of discovery, analysis of which may disentangle the paradox. In Goffman's (1952) analysis of the con-man, ^(b) the

(a) A nice example of this perception is found in Goffman (1972, p 149), where a general set of "remedial interchanges" is defined, to be used, we are told, "...whether a toe has been accidentally stepped on or a destroyer accidentally sunk..."

(b) Not just con-men, but all professional thieves use standard dramatic arts for occupational ends. Sutherland (1937) agrees that con-men: "...Must, first of all, be good actors. The whole con game is a matter of acting" (ff 13, p 56); that pickpockets in 'mobs' enact parts in a structural play; that hotel prowlers and jug heels depend similarly upon dramaturgic expertise (ibid, p 145, 51-2)

illustrative "performance" was quite consciously and openly false. Similarly, the method of analysis was specific description, and then empirical and theoretical generalisation. By 1959 however, 'performances' were unconsciously so, and could thus be true or false. Treatment of the routine had replaced consideration of the criminally extraordinary, and straight generalisation had become similitic. Early, rude pragmatic concern with "performances" developed, in a different empirical context, to become a subtle methodic distinction between 'performer' and performer. By 1959, the analysis needs to make a distinction between true and false performances in two conceptually separate senses:

(Contd) Sutherland continues (p 52): "...In many large banks a thief can get in behind the cages, put his cap in his pocket, put on a green eyeshade, stick a pencil behind his ear, and wander around as though he were an employee...". Lemert (1967, p 122) allows the check forger the same attributes: "...In a very literal sense the check forger becomes a real life actor, deliberately assuming a variety of roles and identities..(but)..while they require some acting ability, it is of low order and easily learned...". For Sutherland (*ibid*, p 197-8) "wits", "front" and "talking ability" distinguish the professional from amateur, this being the "larceny sense", possession of which is essential for apprenticeship in professional theft (see Chapter Two). In addition to this, there are two senses in which the service industry and professional crime are intimately (albeit empirically) connected. Firstly, being in the same dramaturgic game and exhibiting the same performance cynicism towards the "john"; a high proportion of criminal "tipsters" are otherwise employed in the service sector (Shover, 1973, p 507). Secondly, there seems to be a high inter-occupational mobility (corresponding to a low social distance) between the two. A high number of down-and-out service employees turn to crime (often practising upon those they once served in a very different manner) and Sutherland, (1937, p 23) lists examples from both sexes: waiter, cab driver, hotel clerk, bellboy, waitress, cashier, and "...kindred hotel and restaurant employees..". Conversely, upon retirement, many professional thieves take up legitimate employment in the service sector, such as hotelier, saloon owner, casino owner (*ibid*, ff 19, p 25), where they can presumably maintain contact with old colleagues. There is finally a sense in which failed "grifters" subsequently drift into "...certain types of sales jobs..." (Gibbons and Garrity, 1962, p 32). Levens (1964, p 330-1), in his study of British white collar offenders, found that 20% were salesmen, with clerks and self-employed business men having a high recidivism rate. Mayhew (1862, Vol. iv, pp 289-291) not only notes the high incidence and probability of pilferage by servants, but also points out that there is a specific class of sneak-thief - the area or lobby sneak - who pretend to be selling trifling commodities door-to-door only at those doors which are shut and unattended. We may conclude with Goffman (1974, p 175) that most actors do not appear upon the legitimate stage.

"...A character staged in a theatre is not in some ways real, nor does it have the same kind of real consequences as does the thoroughly contrived character performed by a confidence man; but the successful staging of either of these types of false figures involves the use of real techniques - the same techniques by which everyday persons sustain their real social situations. Those who conduct face-to-face interaction on a theatre's stage must meet the key requirement of real situations: they must expressively sustain a definition of the situation; but this they do in circumstances that have facilitated their developing an apt terminology for the interactional tasks that all of us share..."

(Goffman, 1959, p 246-7)

Thus, for Goffman, the model of stage-actor as performer replaced that of con-man as performer.^(a) Unfortunately, this distinction becomes distorted when early ethnographic naivete is replaced with later documentary cunning. Whilst the early empirical model of the conman is clearly shown as the base of the analogy, 'Shetland Hotel', as the context of discovery of the stage-actor analogy, is suppressed before the analysis goes to print. The immediate generalisation of the source of the analogy to crofter's tea-parties, and from thence to the usual grovelling rag-bag of archbishops, prostitutes and filling-station managers, allows a subtle merging of the two contexts of discovery. Goffman (1959, p 76-7, 79) takes this up:

"...In our own Anglo-American culture there seem to be two common-sense models according to which we formulate our conceptions of behaviour; the real, sincere, or honest performance; and the false one that thorough fabricators assemble for us, whether meant to be taken unseriously, as in the work of stage actors, or seriously, as in the work of

(a) Thus, both these occupations, actor and conman, are still literally (although not in the originally intended sense that protects service workers) appropriate for dramaturgic analysis. In analysis of these occupations then, "...Goffman's normative model constitutes in fact an empirical description of social reality..." (Scott and Lyman, 1970, ff 6, p 161). An interesting indicator of the distinction between actors and service workers arises here: actors appear to get more stage "frightened" the more experienced they become - service agents become less so.

confidence men...(both)...a theatrical performance or a staged confidence game requires a thorough scripting of the spoken content of the routine..."

The move to eclectic documentation unwittingly conceals the contexts in which the analysis is literally, as well as being merely metaphorically applicable. As Glaser and Strauss (1967, p 138-9) note, such "circumstantial sampling" makes it very difficult to assess how, and to what extent, theory held together by an internal logic is grounded. Whilst it is true that some performers see themselves as 'performers' (although not necessarily as "performers") - Goffman gives the example of the party hostess (1957, p 120), and Messinger et al. (1962) the mental patient - there is a context in which some of the performers feel their performance to be "fictive" (in Burns' 1953, sense) in an originally intended sense. I refer, of course, to the service occupations, wherein phrases like "perform a service", have a literal sense, and from whence Goffman's metaphoric concepts like "daily round" (vide, Goffman, 1956b, p 104; 1963, p 113-4, 1971, p 49) were abstracted.

Thus, in a very real sense, as the context of the literal generation of the dramatic analogy, workers in the service sector are 'performers' and their customers and clients, 'audiences'.^(a) If Goffman's analysis is generally applicable, it is specifically germane to the analysis of salesmen.^(b) In a separate context,

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- (a) Using Goffman in the originally intended sense transforms some valid criticisms of his approach (eg, Weinstein and Deutchberger, 1963-4, p 454: "The self initially presented in the encounter is, for Goffman, pretty much the true determining one") into assets. Howton and Rosenberg (1965, p 297) note what they call the "appositeness" of Goffman's dramaturgic analysis to the analysis of salesmen, but they unfortunately proceed to document some quite specious and irrelevant empirical characteristics of the sales act (eg, they claim that solitary salesmen have no "team" to back them up) as evidence for not fully using Goffman's work.
- (b) This original context does seep into Goffman's general formulations. As Bradbury et al. note (p 44), Goffman's actor is a parody of man, his act only analogously related to being. The model of the actor (as personas, character, rather than actor) is very dependant upon the visual service image of the waiter who totally alters as he passes through the swing doors that separate kitchen and dining room.

Goffman (1961d, p 283) defines the analytically relevant conception of service:

"...In our Western society, an important way in which two individuals may deal with each other is as server and served...specialised occupational tasks can be divided into two categories, one where the practitioner "meets the public" through his work, a second where he does not, performing it only for the established members of his work organisation. I assume that the problem of facing the public and controlling it is sufficiently central to warrant treating together all who experience it..."

The men of the Sales department qualify as performers in the analytic sense as they routinely engage in direct communication with the public (compared, for example, with charladies, who don't) and because the service they proffer is executed "in" public, as distinct, that is, from those sectors of the service industry where the work is carried on out of sight of the customer. The salesmen perform a fairly perfunctory and routinely technical service (compared with the rational demonstration of expertise and competence given by doctors and dentists) and crucially, travel to their customers, who, as audiences, view the performance sequentially and individually. Structurally, the salesmen may be seen as (Goffman, 1959, p 33):

"...quite profane performers of the pedlar class who move their place of work between performances, often being forced to do so..."

The particular form of service that bread-selling involves generates a peculiar (if most ethnographies are to be believed) absence of self or other typing by the men. A brief comparative analysis of other relevant trades (see Diagram 1.) shows that self-typing only occurs when performers work in groups, and audience-typing only on those occasions where performers compete for customers for whom service is fleeting and periodic.

When both these typing conditions are present, customers are interpretatively apprehended as instances of one member of a vocabulary of types (see Donovan 1929, p 47; and Geller, 1934, p 284-285), and because of inevitable competition for customers from

a battery of performers, service resource (as well as demand) is stratified (see here James B. Gale's brilliant typology of Macey's salesladies in Mills, 1951, p 174, et seq.).

Diagram 1. Performer Theoretical Typing Feasibilities

		CUSTOMER (Audience)	
		No Competition for Customers UNIQUE Service REPEATED	Competition for Customers TYPICAL Service FLEETING
SERVER (Performer)	Solitary	NON-TYPING eg, Bakers	TYPING (ii) Technical Other-Typing Eg, Cab-drivers
	Cohort	TYPING (i) Functional Self-typing Eg, Stage actors	DOUBLE-TYPING Eg, Department Store Salesladies

When customers return in an unproblematic way, but are nevertheless served by a group, the need for audience typing will decrease as the need for some sort of organisational functional role self-typing arises. Conversely, (see Fred Davis' 1959 excellent ethnography of the cab-driver) when customers are relatively scarce, but are only met fleetingly and served once, each individual customer will have to be immediately typed so that he may be appropriately and accordingly treated.

The repeated meetings of solitary performers and their customers breed lasting and continuous relationships which mean that customers gradually become to be defined as unique, and not as merely instances of a particular type.^(a) Wellbreads salesmen are not in

(a) Caplovitz (1963, esp. p 137-154) has studied a different type of door-to-door salesman: the "customer peddler". These are salesmen who do not require a stable and uncomplaining round of customers for occupational success. Caplovitz (p 25-8) suggests four types: the "customer peddlers" (who specialise in customers rather than merchandise); "outdoor salesmen" (canvassers for stores); "independant peddlers" (credit-brokers for various stores); and "specialist peddlers" (selling particular commodities, like encyclopedias, see also Buller, 1972). We may define these peddlers as offering a fleeting, non-repeat service. This is so chiefly in the sense that the goods which they pressure-sell are generally bought no more than once by each customer. Although 'good' customers often build up lifetime relationships with various peddlers, Caplovitz (p 138) notes that "more than a third of the families had some regrets" after purchase. I cannot imagine this being the case with the Wellbread salesman's customers. Thus the relative anonymity and non-repeat sales structure of the peddler-customer relationship allows the practice of quite unconnected frauds by some peddlers. Caplovitz notes that common tricks are practiced with no attempt to cool-out customers for continued custom. Typically practiced are the "bait and switch", "something for nothing", "pyramid-selling", "contest" selling gambits, peddler misrepresentation of self as bureaucratic official installing appliances and then sending the bill, deliberate price-misrepresentation (price increases between installation and invoice), merchandise substitution (of lower quality or reconditioned for new after payment for new). This is fraud rather than fiddling: this definition is appropriate when the illegal sector engulfs the legal end of the business which thus ceases to be self-supporting.

direct competition for customers (at least, not from other members of the same work force), and thus can apprehend their peers as friends and not as competitors. I must admit that audience-typing is theoretically possible under all service conditions because of the very basic performer-audience status. Types, such as 'phony' stem from this source, rather than from particular occupational necessities. Donovan (1929, p 49-50) thus finds the 'window-shopper':

"...they expect the clerk to follow them around from rack to rack and from case to case, explaining and displaying merchandise, to carry armfuls of dresses into fitting rooms, and to stand attentive while 'madame' tries them on...this foolish little comedy.. (similarly, some servants themselves come shopping to)...act out a little drama of mistress and maid...with the usual positions reversed in her mind for the time being..."

Performers and Audiences: Structural Modes

"...When the salesperson and customer meet, each brings to bear on the other valuations by which the other's status category can be tentatively ascertained....the status relationship between them is always present... in the case of the physician and his patients, the plumber and his customers, the minister and his parishioners, and in others, there is a status relationship of which both parties are more or less aware and which influences the pattern of their interactions..."

(Gold, 1952, p 257)

The classic service relationship may be seen, with Goffman, as an example of a broader category of "asymmetrical rules of conduct" (Goffman, 1956a, p 53). An asymmetrical relationship is "...one that leads others to treat and be treated by an individual differently from the way he treats and is treated by them.." (*ibid*). But if status is an openly declared dimension of a relationship, a concealed dimension is the distribution of available knowledge of the relationship's ground conditions and consequences. Paradoxically, in

the service relationship, knowledge is inversely coupled with status, transforming the situation into a doubly-asymmetrical relationship. The customers' high status is coupled with scanty knowledge, and the server's low status is balanced by the considerable extent and scope of his interaction-knowledge. Strictly, this may be referred to as a knowledge-dilemma, and contrasted with the status-dilemma of high-status specialists who have little knowledge of the particular problem affecting their clients. (a)

In any situation, the knowledge-dilemma provokes a form of undeclared cynicism. Goffman (1959, p 106) chooses a delightful example from the First World War, where:

"...Working class sergeants managed the delicate task of covertly teaching their new lieutenants to take a dramatically expressive role at the head of the platoon and to die quickly in a prominent dramatic position, as befits public school men. The sergeants themselves took their modest place at the rear of the platoon and tended to live to train still other lieutenants..."

This ability generally appears, in the context of the service industries as a form of "subtle aggressiveness" (*ibid*, p 22) wherein occupational success hinges upon the ability of the performer to seize and hold interactional initiative. Generally speaking, as Schutz (1943, p 500) notes, the world for any actor seems to him at any given moment to be stratified in different layers of relevance, requiring different degrees of knowledge. More specifically, to use James's (1890, p 221-223) distinction between knowledge-of-acquaintance, and knowledge-about (but in the way that Schutz uses them) we may suggest that the customer has vague knowledge-about the service relationship, but that the server has an explicit (albeit concealed) knowledge-of-intimate-acquaintance. Combining knowledge possibilities with the structurally essential "three crucial roles" (Goffman, 1959, p 144) found in any performance, produces the distinctions outlined in Diagram 2 (page 114).

(a) The knowledge dilemma may also be suffered in a non-performance context. See Strauss (1962) for a sympathetic analysis of the purchasing agent in these terms.

Diagram 2. Knowledge Categories

PLANE OF EXPERIENCE (Functional Knowledge)	AUDIENCE Knowledge About
	PERFORMER Knowledge of Acquaintance
PLANE OF ANALYSIS (Formal Knowledge)	OUTSIDER Knowledge of Analysis

The continued existence of this categorical difference is guaranteed by the somewhat ironic fact that a performer cannot reveal his knowledge without the audience reading it as a status-challenge.

The performer's knowledge-of-acquaintance is, in fact, of two distinct kinds: ascribed Regional knowledge, and achieved Trade knowledge. These two types correspond to Schutz's (1943, p 500) "scope" and "intensity" of relevance.

Firstly, the performer has a multi-regional contact with service action which is totally denied to audiences. As Taylor (1974a, p 17) suggests:

"...If (the) respective boundaries of proper location are breached, the consequence is disgust. If I find a sock in my custard, or if I tip treacle pudding over my shirt, matter is out of place, and dirt results. Crucially, the clean-ness of the sock or shirt is irrelevant; if custard is dirty and sweat is dirty, the harm does not come from the mixing of dirt with dirt but from the violation of boundaries..."

What is precisely at issue here is that this "disgust" may well be felt by audiences, but not by performers. For practical purposes, a sock in the custard (or custard in your socks) is no real problem for those working in custard or sock factories. Treacle on your collar is no real threat to those gainfully employed in producing treacle or shirts. As Taylor (1974a) brilliantly reports, the layout of things-for-sale on the shop-floor of supermarkets not only denotes rules of layout in physical space, but also connotes rules of relations between elements at a deeper level. Soap is not put next to the fish for good semiological, as well as sound olfactory reasons. But, I once worked in a supermarket, and what was true in the shop was definitely impractical in the stock-room. There, purely technical rules of storage took over. Admittedly, soap was still not put next to fish, but give-away pants and nylons were all jumbled up with the cornflakes, and cartons of baked beans lay amid piles of safari jackets. In other words, the rules of relations between elements in semiological space are irrelevant to order in back-regions. For performers, performance generates the ability to unconsciously manage contradictory phenomena. Taboo, here the uncomfortable convergence of normally separate categories, the out-of-placeness which defines dirt, is regionally indexical. Orwell (1933, p 60-1) offers some beautiful examples from his hotel experiences:

"...It was amusing to look around the filthy little scullery and think that only a double door was between us and the dining-room. There sat the customers in all their splendour - spotless table-cloths, bowls of flowers, mirrors, and gilt cornices and painted cherubim; and here, just a few feet away, we in our disgusting filth. There was no time to sweep the floor until evening, and we slithered about in a compound of soapy water, lettuce-leaves, torn paper and trampled food. A dozen waiters with their coats off, showing their sweaty armpits, sat at the table mixing salads and sticking their thumbs into the cream pots...There were only two sinks and no washing basin, and it was nothing unusual for a waiter to wash his face in the water in which clean crockery was rinsing..."

Performers gain access to regional knowledge by virtue of

occupational position alone. Thus, regional knowledge is workplace-specific, although gaining it becomes a matter of course for an employee with multi-workplace experience. Regional knowledge is not only immediately ascribed to newcomers (whilst working in factories, I have seen middle-class students take temporary jobs and immediately start to stir their tea with their pencils, unconsciously pick dirty loaves off the floor and replace them on the racks of other people's breakfast, and sneeze all over trays of rolls without the slightest qualm), it is also lost, or more strictly, sublimated, in the return to audience status in the same way that (as Goffman 1959, p 125) reports that back lanes and alleys have a vivid meaning to children, but a meaning which regrettably disappears as they get older. Similarly, professional waiters occasionally achieve notoriety by stating that they would never eat in a restaurant, knowing what they do about what inevitably goes on in kitchens. Nevertheless, such statements are usually metaphoric, and the same waiters manage to eat out now and again. This testifies not so much to the weakness of regional knowledge, but to the power of the clean-service myth, which washes over and penetrates the experience of all who adopt the customer role.

Service workers, then are "dirty" workers. But not just in the general sense that Hughes (1964) intended, but also in the rather more specific sense outlined by Mary Douglas (1966, p 12 et seq.):

"...dirt is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as absolute dirt: it exists in the eye of the beholder...In the course of any imposing of order, whether in the mind or in the external world, the attitude to rejected bits and pieces goes through two stages. First they are recognisably out of place, a threat to good order, and so are regarded as objectionable and vigorously brushed away. At this stage they have some identity: they can be seen to be unwanted bits of whatever it was they came from; hair, or food, or wrappings. This is the stage at which they are dangerous, their half-identity still clings to them and the clarity of the scene in which they intrude is impaired by their presence. But a long process of pulverising, dissolving and rotting away awaits any physical things that have been recognised as dirt. In the end, all identity is gone..."

Service workers deal with dirt precisely at the dangerous, half-identity stage that Douglas mentions - some workers, literally so. Gold (1952) reflects that janitors of large blocks of flats handle the rubbish of all the tenants, thus giving them specific inside knowledge of particular tenant practices, as well as regional ability to handle 'dirty' rubbish. Habenstein (1962) relates that some corpses are so loathsome that they have to be re-built and 'restored' in an area to which only employees have access. More specifically, in terms of negotiating dirty food with customers, Orwell (1933, p 102) remarks:

"...Fool! Why do you wash that plate? Wipe it on your trousers. Who cares about the customers? They don't know what's going on. What is restaurant work? You are carving a chicken and it falls on the floor, you apologise, you bow, you go out; and in five minutes you come back by another door - with the same chicken. That is restaurant work, etc..."

Hutter (1970) relates how performers seem to have an intuitive knowledge of the non-regional sensibilities of customers. If a customer should intrude upon the kitchen:

"...the waiter will remove his fingers from the pudding he is sampling, the bread which has fallen on the floor will be placed in the garbage (only to be removed and used when the intruder leaves) the dirty dishes which have been only wiped clean and used are sent to the dishwasher to rewash, etc..."
(ibid, p 221)

On top of having to perform in a literal sense, audiences routinely demand of performers in the serving trades that they do dirty jobs (too filthy or macabre for the audience to handle) with a certain amount of dramatic propriety and circumspection so as not to profanise the audience's image of the situation. Additionally, the actor-performer will thus have to occasionally act the conman-performer, and fake quite false emotion and feelings. Dentists and ambulancemen will need to treat pain extraordinarily for the benefit of onlookers and patients, and as Habenstein (op cit, p 224) notes, funeral directors will have to fake grief and sorrow for corpse after corpse after corpse.

A complementary form of performer specific knowledge is Trade knowledge. Performers are often conscious of their trade knowledge, and accordingly protective and secretive about it. Thus, "trade secrets" (Strauss, 1959) are not only "dark" (concealed from audiences) but also "inside" secrets, or, those whose possession marks an individual as a performer (Goffman, 1959, p 141-2). To the audience, of course, this is sometimes unnecessary, as information jealously guarded by performers is seen as purely picayune or mundane. Although both regional and trade knowledge are occupationally specific, a novice performer has to be initiated into trade knowledge, which is, conversely, never forgotten. For barman, for example, the "head" on a glass of beer (taken as the one immediately available index of quality for the customer) merely represents the way that that glass of beer was "pulled". In the works canteen of a large factory, I once overheard the following conversation:

Foreman: "I went to the club at _____, and the collar (head) on the beer was that thick! (about four inches) Why, lad, it was marvellous, looked lovely!"

Worker (ex-barman) "It's just how far from the tap you hold the glass...and you can alter the gas jet with the nozzle...on the old pull-pumps, you just had to give it a sharp pull at the end...it means nothing man."

They all ignored him. What he said was unpalatable.

Audiences rarely recognise that the warmly familiar terms of address that they come to expect as customers are never used when performers talk amongst themselves. The salesmen at Wellbreads, for example, never refer to their customers by name, preferring abstract combinations of technical address and consumer-rating, such as "No. 3 is a large brown". Goffman (1959, p 171) comments:

"...In the absence of the audience, the audience tends to be referred to by bare surname, first name where this is not permissible to their faces, or slighting pronunciation of full name. Sometimes, members of the audience are referred to not even by a slighting name, but by a

code title which assimilates them fully to an abstract category. Thus doctors in the absence of a patient may refer to him as 'the cardiac' or 'the strep'..."

What is significant is not so much that this is so, but that the fact that it is so is wholly unobtainable to customers. Performers will always treat audiences this way: but the audience will always believe that they are exceptional.

As Diagram 3 shows, the availability of these two types of knowledge produces four empirical possibilities. Taking the two fully-fledged categories of salesman and customer, I will now specify some relevant differences between them.

Diagram 3. Knowledge Availability

	TRADE	NO TRADE
REGIONAL	SALESMAN (Knowledge of Acquaintance)	TRAINEE SALESMAN
NON- REGIONAL	EX-BAKER	CUSTOMER (Knowledge About)

In the terms I have been using, audience knowledge is, on the one hand, media-ated through image-inary data, and on the other, because of this, particularly rigid and inflexible. The service is not a central concern for the customer, and as Douglas (1966, p 109) points out, similarly:

"...As businessman, farmer, housewife, no one of us has time or inclination to work out a systematic metaphysics. Our view of the world is arrived at piecemeal, in response to particular problems..."

But as Young (1971, p 179) notes, it is this very indirectness which produces it's own rigid inflexibility:

"...it selects events which are atypical, presents them in a stereotypical fashion, and contrasts them against a backcloth of normality which is overtypical..."

As Marcuse (1964, p 84) notes, at this level, for audiences, that which the performers express as a concept, the audience receives as an image. Perhaps this is what Marx means when he said (1867, Vol I, p 76):

"...A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. This analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties, and theological nicetiesThe mystical character of commodities does not originate, therefore, in their use-value..."

To take an example from the bakery, while I was working in the Despatch department, a woman came in one evening, and asked for a pink wrapped loaf. I remember smiling indulgently, looking for one, but not being able to find one, offering her an alternatively wrapped, but otherwise identical loaf. She protested, and claimed that her son would only eat bread if it was in a pink wrapper. I suggested that there was no difference, but she steadfastly refused to believe it, saying: "They're not all the same, they're quite different". The only way to understand this is to realise that for customers, the wrapper-image is all important, and the concept-content

(important for performers) irrelevant.

Thus, the sincerity of the customers' belief is coupled with significant intolerance of any ambiguity or deviance. Indirect knowledge-about feeds the audience with no folk-recipe for dealing with any anomaly. Whereas bakers regularly spill bread on the ground and furtively, but quite unconcernedly pick it up, for customers, a loaf on the ground would immediately be perceived to be dirty, or, out of place. Dirt, like the taboo which forbids it, occurs at the interstices of, or the boundaries between contradictory phenomena, or normally separated categories. When usually apart categories merge, audiences feel (Leach, 1964, p 46 et seq):

"...an uncomfortable approximation...we are only able to perceive the environment as composed of separate things by suppressing our recognition of the non-things which fill the interstices...taboo applies to categories which are anomalous with respect to clear-cut category oppositions...we make binary distinctions and then mediate the distinction by creating an ambiguous (and taboo-loaded) intermediary category..."

As Leach remarks elsewhere (Leach, 1972, p 51-52), convention infringement produces emotional shock, embarrassment, excitement, or horror. This is particularly apparent in the experimental studies, where these categorical difficulties can be pursued to unhuman lengths. Bateson (1971, p 267) refers to:

"...the well-known phenomena of 'experimental neurosis'. Typically an animal is trained, either in a Pavlovian or instrumental learning context, to discriminate between some X and some Y; e.g., between an ellipse and a circle. When this discrimination has been learned, the task is made more difficult: the ellipse is made progressively fatter and the circle is flattened. Finally, a stage is reached at which discrimination is impossible. At this stage the animal starts to show symptoms of severe disturbance..."

However, whilst performers can easily psychologically manage such problems, they traditionally gently protect their audiences

from too much horror. But there will always be times, alas, when some leakage is inevitable. Taylor (1974a) notes that the childless sometimes feel disgust when mothers economically and quite acceptably wipe the faces of their children with soft toilet paper; and those choosing to see the inside of factories on guided tours have to learn to cope with the apparent difficulties of seeing behind the production of highly expensive and very small bottles of whiskey, large vats of liquid with unconcerned workers splashing around in wellington boots, and of seeing, in sugar refineries, sugar piled up in pre-hygienic mounds on the floor.^(a)

Although the typical bread salesman's life is enacted as a "performer", he sometimes acts as audience to managerial interactional performance. In fact, the unconscious irony of the (already discussed) ambiguous managerial position over the fiddle finds clearer meaning in the sense of 'ambiguity' just mentioned. In effect, the managerial stance on fiddling places the men in what I shall later define as a weak heterodoxical bind (i.e., one which is contradictory, but not uncommendable, as the salesman's vociferous statement of the managerial 'double standards' shows) in terms of the two available definitions of their occupational role. On the one hand, the management demand that the men are an absurdly idealistic audience to managerial idealism over selling, and on the other hand, allow them a measure of ordinary cynicism as performers in their interactions with customers. Thus, while the managerial injunction to fiddle is strong, the meta-rule (that fiddling should only be of customers) is weak. The management cannot anticipate their own aggressiveness, and thus not the grounds of future rule-applicability. In a quite unintended sense, managerial 'ambiguity' over the fiddle (intended, to the degree that it is consciously intentional, to trap the men in a relatively powerless position) offers the salesman an inter-occupational choice. In this way, in terms of job 'status',

(a) Goffman (1974, p 302) adds that this is particularly puzzling as there is an expectation that the world ought not to be ambiguous in precisely the way that perception reveals that it is.

the men are presented with, like all audiences are, paradoxical status-disorder.

In an existential sense, this disorder may be characterised as the "non-person dilemma". Looking at the situation from the perspective of technical role, salesmen at the bakery are incarcerated within a taboo category which combines some of the elements of 'salesman' (i.e., the solicitation of orders from customers) with some of those of pure 'delivery'. This combination produces the paradoxical amalgam of 'roundsman', which, in status terms, illustrates a blue-collar/white-collar mixture. In 'delivery' terms, the baker's roundsmen are existentially socially incomplete (along with domestics and children) as they merely deliver the bread in an invisible and unnoticed way. As 'salesman', the baker is the opposite of the "non-person" (Goffman, 1959, p 150), and is the "service specialist", whose dilemma is one already characterised as that of relative excess of status over knowledge. Unfortunately, the classic tradesman's resolution of this situation (the attempt to gain a professional mandate, and thus absolution of the necessity to be prudently humble in performance) is not available to bakers, who, with respect to management, inhabit the ambiguous category of "roundsman".

But when an audience becomes a performer, when the roundsmen confront their customers, then their knowledge of the situation is more flexible and tolerant. This is because performers, as Douglas (1966, p 51) suggests:

"...can deliberately confront the anomaly and try to create a new pattern of reality in which it has a place. It is not impossible for an individual to revise his own personal scheme of classifications..."

As a performer interacting with his customers, the roundsman becomes cynical through the access he has to both knowledge-from-his-consumer-status, and his (Regional and Trade) knowledge-as-a-service-agent. The folk-image of bread production in England (encouraged by every advertising campaign mounted by

the major bakery consortia) is of lovingly but hygienically batch-produced loaves which are fresh every day, clean, eatable, wrapped and untouched by human hand. Of course, it is simultaneously believed that each one is hand-made! To this, the roundsman can add, or contrast his 'knowledge' that the bread is baked in mass, continuous production in a large dirty factory. He knows that it is not always fresh, that the customer confuses freshness with pliability, and that the wrapper itself indicates cleanliness.

Whatever they firmly believe, audiences/customers cannot arrive at the actual knowledge of the performer/server. That many customers fully feel that they know "what goes on", merely shows that they are confusing two logically separable orders of thought. From acquaintance with domestic kitchens, most housewife-customers proceed to think about industrial ones. Of course, with the knowledge that the factory is bigger than the home, they may imagine a scaled-up domestic kitchen, but not one qualitatively different. One customer who I asked to imagine what the inside of a bakery looked like artfully described a domestic (or, traditional bakers') kitchen, and managed to avoid the hand-made/untouched-by-human-hand potential paradox by suggesting that "little metal hands" attached to machines, did all the work!

Attached to product beliefs, customers also have similar denotative selling-beliefs. For example, that the price of bread is fixed at source, that there is an immediate and exact fit between the bread on the van and the bread that the customers require, that the roundsman would naturally recognise the customer if he met her in a different setting, and so on. Naturally, experience as performer allows the roundsman to view such beliefs with jaded and undiluted cynicism!

Structure of Performer/Audience Relationship

I have discussed some of the enknnowledged differences between performer and audience, and how the enactment of separable dramatic structural roles allocates and guarantees irremediably unequal knowledge access. Therefore, interactions which are literally as well as metaphorically performed (i.e., those to which the double sense of performance may be applied) will be, in Silverman's (1975, p 96) sense, "doubly-readable". In other words, viewing interaction symbolically, as a 'sign' it becomes "ambiguous" (Barthes, 1957, p 115): seeing it as 'meaning', or the more sophisticated reading of it as 'form' allows it to have "two aspects" (*ibid*, p 124). To give an example of the two (contradictory) readings of the plane of experience (see Diagram 2), consider the problem page of any woman's magazine. A typical bachelor reading is cynical. Surprisingly, this is also the common reading mode of many young women (whose expected sincere reading creates the cynical enjoyment of the bachelor), who might otherwise have been thought to have constituted the main sincere readership. Thus, both groups read cynically. And more than that. They only so read on the basis that there are a few enlightened cynics such as themselves who may breezily scoff at such tame stuff on the basis that elsewhere there exists a multitude of sincere followers against whose earnestness, the cynic may contrast his disbelief! The trouble is, as Laing (1967, p 68,71) notes:

"...It is possible to think what everyone else thinks and to believe that one is in a minority. It is possible to think what few people think and to suppose that one is in the majority...There is conformity to a presence that is everywhere elsewhere..."

To fully comprehend the ramifications of the literal performance context, we have to consider action not just as the backcloth to meaning, but itself as W.E.H. Turner, quoted in Taylor, 1974a, p 11, puts it; "a humanised realm saturated with significations."

One way of expressing this theoretical ambiguity that literal performance action has, is to coopt Roland Barthes' type of semiology. Semiology, thus defined, is a method for the study of cultural artefacts derived from de Saussurian linguistics. In this way, viewing service interaction as meaningful allows it to be considered as performance, and alternatively, viewing it as form, permits it to be located within the grammar of exploitation. Barthes (1957, p 113-4) suggests:

"...any semiology postulates a relation between two terms, a signifier and a signified...take a bunch of roses; I use it to signify my passion...on the plane of analysis, we do have three terms; for these roses weighted with passion perfectly and correctly allow themselves to be decomposed into roses and passion: the former and the latter existed before uniting and forming this third object, which is the sign. It is as true to say that on the plane of experience, I cannot dissociate the roses from the message they carry, as to say that on the plane of analysis I cannot confuse the roses as signifier and the roses as sign: the signifier is empty, the sign is full, it is a meaning..."


Taylor (1974a, p 13) cleverly selects, as another example, the Rolls-Royce as signifying high status in a capitalist economy. By contrast, he continues, a Ford Anglia signifies low status in the same situation. All this apart from being means of transport. So, aside from denoting high or low status, there is a deeper level at which either car will connotate a status-ridden commodity economy. I use Barthes' (1957) spatial metaphoric representation to depict this in Diagram 4.

From this simple, but well-chosen example of Taylor's, the general structure of a double semiological system (as shown in Diagram 5) should now be clear:

Diagram 4. Example Semiological Structure

Sr R-Royce F. Anglia	Sd Means of Transport		
Sn Economic Status	R-R → F.A. →	High Position Low Position	
2Sr		2Sd	
2Sn Status-Ridden Commodity Economy			

Diagram 5. Interactional Control in Literal Performances



Thus, interactional ambiguity is, in fact, structural ambiguity, and personal triambiguity. A comparison with Diagram 2 on page 114 (supra) will illustrate the two planes (of experience and analysis), but, as Barthes later suggests (1964b, p 47), three readings of the image are possible. He earlier (1957, p 128) refers to this possibility as being three "focii", or, three "types of reading". They are, firstly: dynamic consumption of the interaction as an inextricably meaningful whole (AUDIENCE); secondly: cynical focus upon the interaction as merely the form for the collection of meaning elsewhere (PERFORMER); and thirdly: focus upon both parts of the interaction, but clearly distinguishing meaning from form (OUTSIDER).

The reading which the audience makes of interaction is as full of meaningfully identifiable messages. Reality has such an overwhelming obviousness, that it is not seen as constructed. Instead, it is felt as wholly ordinary. Silverman (1975, p 85) characterises this sort of reading as "passive", like "reading a book is accepting the sense which its words impose upon us", and Barthes suggests that in addition to being a reading which dynamically consumes meaning, it is a wholly untrained and automatic one. In the sense of performance, the audience, as the dynamic consumers of interaction, participate in a metaphoric sense only. As Goffman (1959, p 81) notes:

"...The unthinking ease with which performers consistently carry off such standard-maintaining routines does not deny that a performance has occurred, merely that the participants have been aware of it..."

This total unawareness of any other reading results from one's possession of complete "unselfconsciousness" (Goffman, 1974, p 564). In other words, the dynamic reading becomes "obvious". The trouble with the obvious is, as Laing (1968, p 13-4, 17-8) puts it:

"...The obvious is literally that which stands in one's way...someone whose mind is imprisoned in the metaphor just cannot see it as a metaphor. It is just obvious..."

For example, retail customers are never aware that they are being "switched", even in establishments (Conant, 1936) where no other sales technique is used; and where the furniture with which they are "baited" is even screwed to the floor to prevent obstinate customers from trying to buy it! As Caplovitz (1965, p 241) indicates, those customers who do realise that they have been cheated only do so through accident. In fact, there is a sense in which the very belief itself renders analysis of it impossible to the believer. As Schopenhauer (in Taylor, 1974a, p 15) reminds us "what is signified at once suppresses consciousness of the sign which signifies it". In the words of McLuhan (1964, p 16, 62):

"...the "content" of the medium blinds us to the character of the medium...The message (of Cubism) it seemed, was the "content", as people used to ask what a painting was about. Yet they never thought to ask what a melody was about, nor what a house or a dress was about..."

Therefore the sincere audience reading is ignorant of what it takes for granted as obvious. This blinds the reader to any deeper reading. In semiological terms, one thus cannot dissociate constitutive concepts at one's plane of sincere experience: the 'reader' is excused analysis, and can only, instead, grasp the associative total which constitutes the interaction. This straight reading is "isological": audience-language welds the signifiers and signifieds together in an undifferentiatable way, totally concealing the concept behind the image, giving it no separate reality, and interaction no two aspects. For the consumer, the interaction is meaning: each element has a varied sense. As such, the discourse of interaction is, for the audience, what Barthes (1957, p 122, 124) calls a "primary language", a "factual discourse" with "literal sense".

Doctors, for example, considered here as performers, grow cynical when they discover that it is their credibility, and not their medicine which cures the diseases of their more sincere patients. Lewis Arrowsmith (1931, p 3, 4) noticed that:

"...the usual preparation for tonsillitis is Yellow mixture, so called on account of its appearance. It is tincture of ferric chloride. On adding one grain of antipyrine to a two-ounce bottle the appearance becomes bright red, which gives it the appearance of a new medicine with no change of action... People are readily influenced by a doctor with a good front. As a matter of fact, a knowledge of medicine is hardly necessary, given a commanding voice and figure..."

This sincerity is self-sealing. Experience is unlikely to alter it. In "bait-and-switch" furniture stores, a Turn Over man is employed to deal with awkward customers and is purposely dressed to look as if he were the manager. Conant (1936, p 173) comments cynically:

"...The T.O. man has reduced the price without destroying the vital illusion that the Borax house is a one-priced store. Don't old customers get wise you wonder? One's customers don't have to be T.O.'d. Having confidence in the store, they are shnookels and can be sold at top price..."

Garfinkel (1967, p 70) notices the amazing irony involved:

"...If upon the arousal of troubled feelings persons avoid tinkering with these "standardised" expectancies, the standardisation would consist of an attributed standardisation that is supported by the fact that persons avoid the very situations in which they might learn about them..."

Opposed to all this, the reading which the performer makes (cynical tolerance rather than sincere intolerance) presupposes a meta-context where reality is sincerely engaged, and where interaction is not seen as meaningless and merely exemplaristic of a common interactional form. Performers have the cynical belief that what is reality for the audience, is, in fact, sheer illusion. This will not mean, naturally, that 'performers' (in the practical sense) will be poor performers (in the sense which we are all so): In audience-meaningful activity, the performer, as Goffman (1959, p 210) puts it: "...is ostensibly immersed and given over to the activity he is performing, and is apparently

engrossed in his actions in a spontaneous, uncalculating way...". Operative cynicism, then, is guaranteed in the unconscious feeling that the performance is "only a front" (*ibid*, p 66). In the semiological sense, the performer can decompose the image into its constituents, but only intuitively. Culler (1973, p 25) refers to this as "practical mastery" (compared with an intellectual one) of events, and Shimmin (1959) as "functional" as opposed to "formal" understanding. Hall (1972, p 76) uses the example of the journalist who selects and presents events from a potential structure in terms of rules which are "un-transparent even to those who professionally know most how to operate it."

Performers thus view the elements of interaction as purely interchangeable units of a "discourse", any one of which can stand for the same (lack of) meaning. The sentiment "it's all the same to me" pervades performer reflection upon performance, and this construction of interaction means that, as Barthes (1957, p 117) puts it: "meaning leaves its contingency behind; it empties itself, it becomes impoverished, history evaporates, only the letter remains". Thus we have, as Goffman (1974, p 116) tells us:

"...the understanding that persons such as janitors, stagehands, newspapermen, waiters and servants may be involved only in a very narrow aspect of a given undertaking, since they often have a right to treat the whole activity as merely one instance of the type..."(a)

To a performer, interaction is just talk. And any talk will do. The interaction, as far as he is concerned, is deodorised, laundered, drained of connotation. To appliance salesman, stoves, washing machines, refrigerators and so on are just called "white goods" (Consumer Reports, 1958, p 547) and, as they cynically say at the bakery: 'You can tell 'em anything, and they'll believe you'.

(a) Goffman (*ibid*, p 346) goes on to suggest that the difference between performer and audience in this sense is a matter of relative situational involvement. I would suggest, alternatively that involvement reflects a basically different perspective (such as that pertaining between fabricators and the contained) and is "rekeying", and not just "downkeying".

If accused of fiddling, Wellbread salesmen claim that they use one of the following 'lines':

"...As long as you keep talking to them, they'll take anything...just keep talking to them, that's all, give 'em any excuse, and they'll believe it...they'll believe anything.."

"...if they guess, it doesn't matter, just pretend to look at your sheet, and pretend to look surprised, and say: 'Oh! I am sorry, you are right', and leave a little note in your book to say: 'Don't try it here again'.."

"...If they catch you, just look at your book and come back and say: 'Yes, you are right', and talk your way round it, say: 'My pen must have slipped'...anything, make it up as you go along...."

Similarly, shoe salesmen, sadly lacking the customer's preferred size of shoe, will fit a smaller one and promise that the leather will soon "give". Drapers sell coats with over-long arms to the unsuspecting on the understanding that the "sleeves will soon ride up, sir". Haberdashers, (Dubin, 1951, p 562) without too many sizes of bathing trunks left will offer the remaining stock to a customer by suggesting that "there's a lot of stretch in them if you need it."

Telling them anything, or, the provision of an "impressive" story", is an art particularly cultivated by 'invisible' repair specialists - those who repair appliances and provide other services necessarily out of sight of the customer. Strodbeck and Sussman (1961, p 606) report examples of watch-repair customers to whom it was explained that their watch had cost a lot to repair as it was "sensitive" to temperature changes, because "the magnetism in her (customer's) body had caused her watch to stop", and, once, because the customer's "skin was rough on a watch". Riis and Patric (1942) also report receiving a number of wholly fictitious analyses of motor trouble when they toured America in a specially

doctored car. They refer to this as "analyser talk", and one repairman claimed (with refreshing, if rather naive candour) that: "...we never tell a customer what's wrong...and why? Because he wouldn't understand us. Especially women. Can we go into technical detail with customers? They'd get all confused. So we just tell them whatever sounds most reasonable. That's the way we keep our customers satisfied...". Most interestingly, and this is also true for visible service-performers like the Wellbread salesmen, experienced men soon discover that the fiction is often not only more palatable, but also more believable than the truth. One watch-repairer claimed to Patric (*ibid*, p 167): "If I were to tell him the screw was loose and charge him a quarter, why, he wouldn't believe me". Another watch-repairer (*ibid*, p 174) not only made a false diagnosis (that the mainspring was a fault) but to this also added an erroneous explanation (that the inclement weather broke mainsprings).

Thus, performers view the interaction as an "idiolect" (Barthes, 1964, p 21) any part of which is virtually interchangeable with any other part without any change in effect. This, inevitably, makes for cynicism. Goffman (1959, p 28-9) notes:

"...When an individual has no belief in his own act and no ultimate concern with the beliefs of his audience, we may call him cynical, reserving the term 'sincere' for individuals who believe in the impression fostered by their own performance..."

All performers who work unscripted before an audience will subsequently need a separate, sincere language to allow "real" communication. As Goffman (*ibid*, p 175) mentions, most sales groups have a "subterranean language" which members use to communicate with each other in front of an unknowing and unsuspecting audience.^(a) For singly operative bread-roundsmen, secret

(a) See Conant (1936, p 172); Geller (1934, p 283); Caplovitz (1963, p 27; 1965, p 242); Sutherland (1937, p 18, 20); and Maurer (1931, p 328). Later Goffman (1974, p 84) extends this (rightly)

communication is neither necessary nor possible, although secret information is exchanged in date-codes on products, and gypsy-codes (concerning errant customers) in route books: a nice example of what Sutherland (1937, p 18) refers to as the "indirect method of conversation".

Servers as performers act cynically in interactions with customers in ways that are patterned throughout the whole service sector. Conant (1936, p 170) reports how the "bait" in a bait-and-switch store brings hundreds into the store, but never leaves itself, this being not because the customers don't want it, but because the house won't sell it. A peek at both a shoe store, and a department store, tells us that width fittings and dress sizes might mean a lot to a customer, but they are "all the same" to the vendor:

"...Salesmen have invented a gag to fool the customer on the length and width of the shoes. If the shoes have been described to the customer as of B width and the customer is still in doubt, the salesman will call to another salesman down the aisle and say, 'Benny, what size is this shoe?' By calling the salesman, 'Benny', he implies that the answer should be that the width is B. Thus the customer is convinced that he is given the proper width..."
(Geller, 1934, p 284)

"...When a customer has tried on a dress that is suitable and fits well, one that she says she likes, but she insists upon a size larger or smaller, the saleswoman will leave the fitting-room with the garment, change the size on the ticket, return, and sell the customer the same dress..."
(Donovan, 1929, p 49)

This is a good example of a server duping the customer, not for mercenary gain, but for what the server considers to be in the customer's best interests. As Goffman (1959, p 29) notes:

(Contd) to become a structural necessity to all those who contain others in frame re-worked fabrications, breeding the necessity (p 223 et seq.) to use minor communicative "tracks" for major collusive communication.

"...We know that in service occupations practitioners who may otherwise be sincere are sometimes forced to delude their customers because their customers show such a heartfelt demand for it. Doctors who are led into giving placebos, filling station attendants who resignedly check and re-check tyre pressures for women motorists, shoe clerks who sell a shoe that fits but tell the customer it is the size she wants to hear - these are cynical performers whose audience will not allow them to be sincere.."

But sincerity is an impossibility, and not merely an interactional difficulty, for performers. This is so as the very structure of, for example, service is apprehended by performers as drama. Donovan (1920, p 63) working in a restaurant as a waitress, felt that eating out is "something of a ceremony, a ceremony in which the waitress plays an important role", and she contributed consciously to this feeling by various false acts such as "jollyng" the customers (ibid, p 68), and "working" them for tips (ibid, p 196).

For bread salesmen, training overtly practices familiarity (and thus contempt) with the manipulative operation of a service discourse. At one level, solitary experience alone breeds cynicism through sheer jaded reflection upon consecutive repetition. Road accidents, for example, out of the ordinary for most people, are just another occupational hazard for roundsmen. After my first accident, I tremulously returned to the bakery, expecting the sack. The first supervisor I met transformed the whole experience into a mundane everyday occurrence by saying:

"...It doesn't matter anyway...if you're driving day in and day out, it's bound to happen sooner or later...anyway, our company settles knock for knock..."

Second to this sort of experience of "differentness" between the roundsman and customer comes the later amazing discovery of credibility, both of performing self, and of product. As the roundsman learns that, in a very real sense, the product will sell itself through the weight of its image alone, and that no expression

that he can give will contradict this given-off expression from the product itself, he will begin to get cynical not just of the audience, but of the whole performance, including himself. As a car-salesman in Miller (1964, p 22) comments, personal targets, or idiosyncratic indices of satisfaction replace sanctioned organisational ones:

"...Anybody can sell something that they (the customers) want, but the real bit is to make them think that they need exactly what you've got to sell, only more of it..."

As Goffman (1959, p 29) notes, this sort of "unprofessional pleasure" can reach extraordinary lengths. Most salesmen use mundane grammatical decoys like "I can recommend this, Madam", but most salesmen eventually realise (probably through sheer accident) that they can be quite perverse, and yet still sell the bread. My own favourite trick was to leave a nicely wrapped stale loaf in the basket on or near the back of the van, and tell all enquirers that it was stale. This never failed to intrigue female customers who (naturally) thought that I was "only saying that", and that really I was "saving it for somebody else". Nine times out of ten they would take it, and of course, they couldn't complain when it tasted stale! Another roundsman who I once accompanied used to offer eggs and potatoes as a sideline, and his verbal sideline to any reticent customers was that they would be wiser to buy as "they talk about a world shortage, you know"! Another roundsman commented:

"...I like selling though, that's why I stay on retail and don't try to get a wholesale job...I like the challenge of selling to people who don't want anything...and selling them things that they don't want...I shout at them and tell them that it's stale, and they still buy it! I like it when they look in the basket and start pawing things about, I hate them fingering the cakes, but I know that they are going to buy something...so I show them things that get more and more expensive...."

The discovery of axiomatic credibility of performance is

analysed by the roundsmen, with a dash or irony, as intuitively derived from customer stupidity, rather than from the structural nature of the interaction.^(a) One Wellbreads salesman complained: "The public is so bloody dense, they'll believe anything", another that "they're all fucking thick...really!" Sometimes, the stupidity of the customer is not only a source of derision, but also of money, as another roundsman explained:

"...Silly fucker!...the warehouseman signs it each morning, but he never checks it,... he just counts the trays, I ask you?...what fucking use is that?...count the trays!... I don't know!..."

If literal performance interaction has a semiological structural nature, it also has a political context. Asymmetrical relations are not benevolent. To the contrary, as Bigus (1972, p 160-1) suggests, asymmetry is power:

"...Quite simply a relationship which is characterised by power asymmetry is one in which one party, for any number of reasons, exercises more control over the course of the relationship (in this case within the servicing context) than does the other party. The milkman-customer relationship, for example, is one which is characterised, at least initially, by acute power asymmetry..."

Customers are audiences in the interactional rhetoric of performance. They are simultaneously victims in the underlying grammar of exploitation. Knowledge is control, but control of a particular sort. As the notion of "sincerity" suggests (see, eg, Laing, 1968, p 18) a 'bind' may be involved. It would seem that the way that I have just characterised the discrepancy in communicative ability that exists between performer and the audience

(a) To be fair, there is also a third reading. The only occupant of the plane of analysis, the outsider-reading is parallel to Barthes (1957, p 128) "demystifying focus", and adopts (yet another) terminology-ologically paradoxical mode. This time of "sarcastic indifference". There is a reflexive rather than procedural necessity for this category. As Goffman (1974, p 83) has now come to recognise: "...a correct view of a scene must include the viewing of it as part of it..".

(especially, the customers' inability to perceive that conversations which they have with salesmen mean absolutely nothing to the performer) is derived from the basic knowledge discrepancy analysed above, and productive of (as Bateson, et al., 1956, p 180, suggest) communicative contradiction:

"...An individual will take a metaphorical statement literally when he is in a situation where he must respond, where he is faced with contradictory messages, and when he is unable to comment on the contradictions..."

I suggest that the server/customer relationship is a double-bind (Bateson, et al., 1956) in a classically structural sense. The service relationship is powerfully asymmetrical, but in a way that is not openly (intellectually) available to audiences. The customer, after all, always thinks that she dictates the terms of the interaction. It is at this juncture, as much as anywhere, that the analysis given here departs from Goffman's (1959) analytic donation. I now become concerned with the sociological expression of structural conflict which pure allegiance to the procedure of the "natural metaphor" cannot capture. (a)

A double-bind has various "necessary ingredients" (ibid., p 178). First of all, there must be two or more persons, one of whom (here, the customer) must be designated as the "victim". Further, the experience must be repeated to at least the stage where its occurrence becomes an habitual expectation for the victim. Contradiction arises as a disjunction between a primary negative injunction (in the service relationship, this would be an unverballed equivalent of: 'Your status depends upon this relationship, if you don't buy from me, you will suffer status-loss, so buy and survive') and a secondary injunction conflicting with the first, but at a more abstract level (all

(a) As Goffman (1974, p 14) blandly asserts (and nicely summarises the limits of his own contribution to sociology) "...and analysis developed (in Frame Analysis) does not catch at the differences between the advantaged and disadvantaged classes, and can be said to direct attention away from such matters..."

customers know, of course, that 'really', the roundsman does not sleep in his overall and basket, and that he is other things to other people. This does not infer that they realise that he despises them) and a tertiary negative injunction preventing the victim's escape. Although the sense of the last ingredient is supplied in the primary negative injunction, there is nothing to logically prevent the customer from seeking customer status from a different performer. It is the fact that customers awkwardly change firms (rather than the possibility that they should cease to become customers altogether) which is the problem that monopolies are designed to solve. At Wellbreads (as, no doubt, with all other bakers in the area) customers are offered quite spurious and capricious promises of 'better' service and devotion than could be provided elsewhere, and Bigus (1972) notes that this kind of 'personalising' is a central part of the American milkman-customer relationship.

The applicability of the double-bind analysis to customers is perhaps immediately apparent. To offer a few examples, a central heating recruit training manual donates the following bizarre examples:

"...In theory at least, there can be no possible objection to having _____ (trade name). It can only do good. So why object?...no Prospect will object unless he is actively thinking of buying...your manner therefore calls for extreme sincerity and reassurance..."

"Closing" sales is another area rich in double-bind strategies: again the central heating manual, and a training manual from another bakery:

"...Use the Dual Positive Suggestion (eg) Were you thinking of using a personal loan or had you decided to invest the full amount now? (this) places two alternatives before the person both of which results in a course of action which results in a sale..."

"...Minor Point Method. Draw the customers attention to a minor matter which assumes she is buying the merchandise. "Would you like the jam roll, or shall I get you the jam and cream roll from the van?"..."

Although double-bind analysis has become over-associated with analyses of schizophrenia (on those rare occasions when the analysis is used correctly) the original formulation was not content-specific. Indeed, Bateson et al (1956, p 193) specify that they are thinking in terms of "general principles" and that therefore "many informative similarities can be found in 'normal' situations". Also, it could be said that precisely the power of the application of the analysis to mental illness lies in the fact that (as Laing, 1967, p 31, notes) the double-bind:^(a) "is not unusual. People are doing such things to each other all the time."

In this particular political sense, the audience-customer-victim's reading is of a specifiable, logical sort. Firstly, as victim, the customer interprets literal reality as metaphoric, for instance, by only seeing the bread roundsman as just another performer (similar to oneself) in the metaphoric sense. Secondly, although this, from the point of view of the performer, is a misreading, the victim is both ignorant of the fact that it is a misreading, and ignorant of her ignorance (cf. Laing, 1968, p 25). Thirdly, audience-performer utterances shift to the metaphoric level for interactional "safety" (Bateson, et al, p 181). This is primarily safety for the audience because if the performance fractures, then the audience 'loses' (in the status sense outlined above), as audience awareness would indict the person, the performer, on whom the audience's identity depends. As Bateson (et al, p 182, et seq,) conclude:

(a) And Goffman, who has very recently coopted the double-bind (1974, p 387) as a form of "negative experience" occurring between frames, or, as a result of frame-breakage, notes: "...it seems that self-negating statements and actions are very commonly found at certain junctures in personal dealings...". Within Goffman's new framework, the double-bind is a "frame-trap": an occasion wherein the world is so arranged that all information corrective of an incorrect view is systematically prevented from getting through. Subsequently, (p 482) "every account releases a further example of what it tries to explain away". How can you ever logically (asks Goffman) convince somebody that you have deceived them?

"...(for the audience) to recognise that he (the performer) was speaking metaphorically he would need to be aware that he was defending himself and therefore was afraid of the other person. To him, such an awareness would be an indictment of the other person and therefore provoke disaster ... (the audience) must not accurately interpret (the performer's) communication if he is to maintain his relationship..."

Although the resulting structure is not clearly and visibly a victim-relationship, nevertheless, cynicism and sincerity are not merely dramatic modes. There is also a way in which they are political emotions. As Laing (1968, p 18) notes, performers should not appear: "cynical or ruthless; they should be sincere and concerned". This heralds a refinement of the double bind made by Pearson (1974, p 148):

"...the word 'victim' (is) only a convenience; in actual fact, the double-bind always binds both parties, and, strictly speaking, there is no binder and bound, but rather two victims bound in a paradoxical system..."

In practice then, the performance is neutered and "naturalised" (in fact, alienated) from its true (literal) being. Paradoxically, "naturalness" is a constructed feeling. This is quite the distinction which Messinger et al. (1962) rightly point out that Goffman (1959) fails to make (how, in other words, do we distinguish between role-playing and situations of role-playing-at, between experiencing action as performer, and just experiencing it?).^(a) Admittedly, elsewhere (Goffman, 1957, p 119) Goffman refers to a feeling of "interaction-consciousness", but this cannot successfully capture the feeling-of-the-audience. Foss (1972, p 299) does so particularly well with the sentence: "audience is the self-centeredness which can only think of itself (as nature) and not-itself as actor (as appearance)."

To demonstrate the construction of naturalness, we need, with Barthes (1957) to re-historise service-occasions. Barthes

(a) A question which, I must confess, Goffman (1974) eloquently and diligently addresses.

(ibid, p 142) refers to the process as one of transformation of the reality of the world into an image of the world. An inversion of History into Nature, which gives politically constructed events an obvious, going-without-sayingness, which inverts and thus drains meaning from interaction. Of course, this inversion is mystified, but for performers and not for "performers". Empirically however, there is always some interactional feedback with the performer's perception of connotative levels of meaning not exhausting his sight of (the audiences') denotative meaning, thus partially absorbing negative cynicism within the performers' positive participation in the performance at hand. As Sammy Davis Jnr. reputedly said (in Messinger, et al, 1962, p 690)"..As soon as I go out of the front door of my house in the morning, I'm on, Daddy, I'm on. And further, but when I'm with the group I can relax, we trust each other..."


The life of the bread roundsman includes both sorts of performance analysed here. Sincere (audience) performances with the bakery management, and cynical "performances" with customers. The reflexive outcome of these performances constitutes his work self. As Goffman (1956a, p 84-5) so eloquently and elegantly puts it: "...for a complete man to be expressed, individuals must hold hands in a chain of ceremony...". The baker with one hand grasps his customers, and by the other is held firmly by the management: his work-self is thus created and maintained.

Situating Goffman: Locating the Materialist Basis of "Performance"

The occupational dilemma for the roundsman is that their own situation is structurally paradoxical in terms of contradictory and imposed performance injunctions. Occupational life is thus participation in two worlds: one literally, but one so only metaphorically. I have already suggested that roundsman/customer and management/roundsman interactions are both examples of a


structurally semiological and politically contradictory set-up. The two interactional structures are semiologically similar, but the roundsmen occupy successively oppositional interactional roles.

There have been, however, few other attempts to get to grips with awkward reality combinations of these two structures. Whyte (1949, p 245) for example, tries to depict the nature of the dilemma with the following spatial metaphor, wherein the arrows indicate the direction of orders:



I could, of course, do this for the Wellbread salesmen. In fact, I will:

R	Roundsman
C	Customer
SS	Sales Supervisor
CO	Comptometer Operator
DW	Despatch Worker
Ca	Cashier
CD	Cake Despatch




Whyte (ibid, ff 2, p 245) cannily indicates that: "This is, of course, an oversimplified picture", but misses the point, I feel, which is that such diagrams are just examples of what Becker (1967, p 126), in another context, refers to as the type of diagram where the arrows (whatever they are alleged to be indicating) always point upwards! This is not just weak criticism. This sort of feeble metaphoric description is merely, in Leach's (1964) perfect words: (analytically) "just a parlour game". It repeats description whilst purporting to analyse it.

I have tried to capture the sense of the double-semiological system involved here in Diagram 6 (on page 145). Something of a theoretical problem arises, however, in trying to justify the restriction of available interpretations to three. Laing (1967, p 66) for example, considers that possible interpretations multiply "in a logically vertiginous spiral to infinity", and whilst not quite so eclectic, Bateson (1955, 1960) occasionally considers a fourth meaning level (to go with zero-, proto-, and dutero-learning) of trito-learning. Goffman (1966) I think, manages to inject some logical thought into this debate by consideration of the same sort of situation (1966, p 69) and arriving at the conclusion that although there may exist an empirical situation of multi-layered interpretation, in theory, this still leaves us with only two possibilities:

"...When the situation seems to be exactly what it appears to be, the closest likely alternative is that the situation has been completely faked..." (a)

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- (a) This is a view which Goffman (1974) still holds, although his wrestling with the problem has brought a clearer formulation of the position. Although in an earlier work, Goffman (1969a) endlessly posed the interexperience problem in a rather weak text, this concern has now been settled simply as: "...the mirror problem. if he thinks that I think that he thinks and so on..." (ibid, ff 48, p 185). Currently (1974, p 487) Goffman refers to this frailty as the "vulnerability of experience, for what seems perfectly natural can be suspected precisely on those grounds". Thus, whilst in an empirical sense, it is possible (within frame analysis) that the core of a frame (the primary framework) may be obscured by successive laminations of working, reworking, rereworking etc., there is a limited number of possible identities (either a keying or a fabrication) for the frame rim.

Diagram 6. Empirical Semiological Structure of Service



Thus, in theory, we have two possible levels of meaning. These have been variously characterised as: surface/deep (Lane, 1973, p 28); conscious/unconscious (Marcuse, 1955, p 31); spontaneous/unspoken (Foucault, 1970, p xx); embedded/matrix (Lyons, 1970, p 82); and so on. The relationship between the two levels is similar to that between sincere and cynical readings of interaction. At surface/sincere levels, readings of difference become, at the deep/cynical level, readings of similarity.

Empirically, however, we have a triple structure. More strictly, this is a double-dyadic semiological structure. Barthes (1957, p 135) does consider the possibility of a third level (he refers to a "third semiological chain", and to "an experimental myth, a second-order myth"), but only in an empirical sense. Hall (1972) too, in a very cogent application of Barthes' method to newspaper photographs, generates three ideal-types (of dominant, negotiated and oppositional) for ad hoc analysis.

In the same way, there are, I suggest, three empirical readings of the service situation. The interaction can be read, firstly, (see Diagram 6) at the denotative level, as just denoting a linguistic message selected from a 'lexis' (a vocabulary, or repertory of permissible terms). Secondly, it can be read as connotative of a coded, iconic analogic message selected from an available rhetoric. A rhetoric is a persuasive, but vague selection made for a specific purpose. Burke (1950, p xiii) defines it as an "intermediate area of expression that is not wholly deliberate, yet not wholly unconscious. It lies midway between aimless utterance and speech directly purposive". Barthes (1957, p 150) defines rhetoric as a "set of fixed, regulated, insistent figures." The third and final possible reading is of interaction as 'inflecting' (Hall's word) ideology. In one specific instance, Barthes (1957, p 38) indicates the existence of this level: "... (we) must not...forget that there is one plane on which Persil and Omo are one and the same: the plane of the Anglo-Dutch trust Unilever...".

For some purposes, it is desirable to display this structure as a "frame" (Goffman, 1974). Accordingly, salesmen enmesh customers within an (unseen) exploitative fabrication (called "service") within which customers are contained. The "service" framework has an extra lamination for salesmen. Whilst frame rim and core are equally "untransformed reality" for customer, salesmen rework the service-frame and insert (for themselves) an additional fabrication lamination, which is then presented to customers as theatrically keyed service. But Goffman, (ibid, p 118) adds:

"...when one turns to various occupational settings in which a server has special reasons for holding and controlling the customer, then, of course, the line between ordinary activity and fabrications becomes still harder to draw..."

Essentially, for the management, the service-frame is more complex still. A refabrication of the artful salesman fabrication takes place: the engineers of the first fabrication become recontained in turn. Although in the bakery (this is the service-situation boundary interpretative problem), empirically, for various reasons, the initial fabrication is invisible to some customers, and the refabrication is partly apparent to most roundsmen.

All three theoretically possible readings are made of the roundsman's interactions with his customers. The audience-customer's sincere belief in the literal reality of interaction means that, for them, service denotes a zero-read-lexis. Of course, customers are totally oblivious to the reading that the management make of the interaction, although a few customers (for example, ex-bakers) may be partly aware of the roundsman's reading. The roundsman-performer, on the other hand, has only a cynical metaphoric half belief in the interaction as an audience reality (and correspondingly, for them, the managements' reading is merely structurally opaque.) Roundsmen proto-read "service" as just rhetorically connotative. For them, it is selling, and not service, which is the real thing. The management-outsider, conversely, has a sarcastic total dis-belief

in the audience's reality, which they deutero-read as (meta-meta-phor) or) cliché. For the management, "service" merely inflects a useful ideology. The management's reality is naturally 'obvious' to the firm.

Management-roundsmen interactions are wholly unavailable to customers, and thus produce only two (formally similar, but in content different) readings: the roundsman becomes the 'audience', and the management the 'performer'. "Selling" denotes lexis for roundsman, but also connotes a rhetoric of exploitation for the management.

Competence: Personal Codes

"...Before a set of task-like activities can become an identity-providing role, these activities must be clothed in a moral performance of some kind..."


(Goffman, 1961a, p 54)

Whilst knowledge access is structurally guaranteed and irrefutable, personal ability and experience can marginally en-code reading. As Diagram 7 (page 149) shows, reading-ability varies basically (looking centrally and vertically), and these common varieties of competence are re-coded and thus found both amongst audiences and performers.

Paradoxically, competence is coupled with powerlessness. The pull of both investment and divestment of self in situations generates the typically found category of quietly perfect cultural perception: powerless 'moderation' derived from the management and sublimation of contradiction and dilemma. Such "one-dimensional thought" is nicely described by Marcuse (1964, p 178-9) who in 1955 had already captured the sense of contradiction with the phrase "repressive tolerance":

Diagram 7.

Situation-Reading and Self-Alignment: Competence Variations.



"...The tolerance of positive thinking is enforced tolerance - ...The absorption of the negative by the positive is validated in the daily experience, which obfuscates the distinction between rational appearance and irrational reality...harmonisation... the happy marriage of the positive and the negative - the objective ambiguity which adheres to the data of experience..."

Ultimately, for each of us, there is an area of reality where this is inescapable. Barthes (1957, p 158) notes that even the supposedly above-it-all outsider/mythologist, when discussing wine as a myth is faced with the dilemma that "wine is objectively good, and at the same time, the goodness of wine is a myth." Laing (eg, 1968, p 47, 50, 61) eternally tries to escape the gravitational pull of 'normality', and perhaps succeeds with the sentence (*ibid*, p 33): "'There's nothing to be afraid of.' The ultimate reassurance, and the ultimate terror".

The perfectly socialised and quietened actor, is, as Goffman (1961a, p 91) argues: "a juggler and a synthesiser, an accom^modator and appeaser". This subsequently mystified combination of reality and contrivance (in acting) produces the ideal politically catatonic state.

In general terms, the audience's sincere re-coding allows them to perfectly acceptably interpret the logically intended strata of messages. For example, (Bateson, 1964, p 260):^(a)

"...an audience is watching Hamlet on the stage, and hears the hero discuss suicide in the context of his relationship with his dead father, Ophelia and the rest. The audience members do not immediately telephone for the police because they have received information about the context of Hamlet's context. They know that it is a 'play' and have received this information from many markers of context of context -

(a) In piece-rate payment situations, the perfectly adjusted worker is he who restricts unseemingly. The restricter is he who is too little involved in morality, and the ratebuster is the man exasperatingly over-involved in work. (See Ditton, 1975).

the playbills, the seating arrangements, the curtain etc...etc. The 'king', on the other hand, when he lets his conscience be pricked by the play within the play, is ignoring many 'markers of context of context'..."

But there is 'something' real, even about a play. With Goffman (1974, p 47) "...we would say that the staging of these actions was really or are really occurring. Nonliteral activity is literally that, or is if everyday usage is to be followed..". Alternatively (*ibid*, p 248) it is the mode of transformation (and not what is transformed) which is geared into the real world.

When the roundsman's customer is an audience (I shall not discuss the roundsman himself until a later part of this Chapter) sincere re-coding requires that the proffered deference be 'correctly' received. As Goffman (1956, p 60, 61-2, 76) notes, this necessitates action-sensitivity:

"..People sense that the recipient ought not to take the actor literally or force his hand, and ought to rest content with the show of appreciation as opposed to a more substantive expression of it...as an implication of this dilemma, we must see that social intercourse involves a constant dialectic between presentation rituals and avoidance rituals..."

For performers, perfect cynicism requires that neither too much, nor too little be expressed or felt. Goffman (1961a, p 55) notes that "only the manager of the store will display identification with his role, and even he appreciates that he must not throw himself too much into his calling". On the other hand, (Goffman, 1959, p 208) performers: "must be taken in by their own performance to the degree that it is necessary to prevent them from sounding hollow and false to the audience".

Perhaps the most exasperating form of incompetence is a thorough over-investment of the self in the situation, and consequently an absurd and powerful sense in which everything (regardless of message level) is taken literally. Instead of acceptable role-distance, the actor here opts for role-embrace:

"...to embrace a role is to disappear completely into the virtual self available in the situation, to be fully seen in terms of the image, and to confirm expressively one's acceptance of it..."
 (Goffman, 1961a, p 60)

Here, none of the world is seen through, none defined as contrivance, and all, subsequently, is perceived as reality. In this group are those individuals who throw themselves into the performance, and thus come to idealistically believe that the reality they are projecting is the real reality. Eventually, of course, self-delusion takes over, and the actor becomes his own audience, and ultimately, his own observer.

For some reason, it seems easier to find examples of audiences who fail to meta-qualify statements in this way (and therefore, 'take everything literally'). Goffman (1957b, p 175, 273) recalls:

"...it is possible for participants to show more commitment and attachment to the entity than had been asked for, or, sometimes, than is desired by management. A parishioner may try to live too much in and for the church; a junior officer may insist on going down with the ship...in the hospital laundry, for example, there was a patient who had been on the job for several years,...he threw himself into his work with a capacity, devotion, and seriousness that was evident to many...and yet there was something grotesque in his adjustment, for it was apparent that his deep voyage into the work world had a slightly make-believe character..."

Although occasionally exasperating, such people rarely constitute a social problem, and may even, for some, be a positive asset. The mass-media not only seem prone to investment-displays (by those failing to see that 'it's only a play') that whole industries have sprung up to commercially cater for such absurd needs. Apparently, there exists a pair of middle-aged ladies who travel the country catching every matinee and evening performance of *The Sound of Music*, and I am (perhaps apocryphically) informed that somewhere, there is a Welshman in eternal search for repeat

performances of *The Jolson Story*. It is not that this sort of reading is a permanent disability (we would not expect the Welshman in the last example to walk into a restaurant and eat the menu, or, purposelessly knock on every door which has a "please knock" sign on it) but rather that in certain situations, such a reading can even be deemed culturally appropriate. Although we can agree with Bateson (1955, p 168):

"...There are people, for example, who, when Big Sister in the soap opera suffers from a cold, will send a bottle of aspirin to the radio station, or recommend a cure for Big Sister's cold, in spite of the fact that Big Sister is a fictitious character within a radio soap opera. These particular members of the audience are apparently a little bit askew in their identification of what sort of communication this is that is coming from their radio...."

This is probably context-specific behaviour to the degree that it is often encouraged "involvement", both sponsored and longed for by the makers of commercial fantasy.^(a) Specifically thinking in terms of customers, we are here concerned with those customers who demand more deference than they perceive themselves to be receiving - and, paradoxically, merely succeed in getting a greater show of it! This is essentially a misreading of the meaning of deference as something essential (rather than as something enacted). Such demands are particularly likely from those occupying a status category which is in uncomfortable proximity to the server. Gold (1953, p 260) gives a nice example of tenants who earn less than their janitor:

"...The janitor often refers to those tenants as "fourflushers". They live on the brink of bankruptcy, and he knows it. Status symbols are very important to them. Unlike the janitor, they apparently strain their budgets to improve the appearance of their persons and their apartments. When they see the janitor's new car or television aricl;

(a) Embarrassingly paradoxical (and horribly self-fulfilling) is the response that Messinger et al. (1962, p 693) noticed by mental patients to the question: 'How do you feel?'. Many of them thought that they were in a 'test' situation, and responded with a lengthy description of their current state of mind or body!

their idea of high status symbols, it is almost more than they can bear. It violates their sense of social justice..."(a)

Although less frequently found, idealistic performers are perhaps more irritating.^(b) The supervisor referred to in Chapter Two (who took his blue coat so seriously that he had to be despatched to a far away depot where he could do less harm) also muddled up the actual message contained in the managerial injunction that the roundsmen should try to avoid running out of bread by attempting in a supervisor's meeting to get the management to install radios in every cab so that the drivers could call in when they were getting short of products! The senior supervisor who told me this, continued: "The bloke's a fucking nutter, he'll have to go...he's another Grubbit (a recently sacked supervisor)..an idiot!"

Yet another Wellbreads supervisor (who previously had been caught by the Police for delivering bread and picking up bottles of milk - to the ludicrous extent of having a van full of bottles of milk!) didn't quite get hold of the inferred managerial directive that the roundsmen should not come short on their weekly financial reckoning, and, as one of the roundsmen

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- (a) Buller (1972, p 67), in an amazing discussion of door-to-door encyclopedia selling, calls another sort of naive customer a "mooch". Mooches are those customers who irritatingly ignore the service presentation, and inevitably insist upon purchasing the encyclopedias before the pitch can be made. Mooches are not even fair game: they trip before the salesman like a deer with a broken leg before a hunter out for sport. "...Mooches can be generally defined as people who like to buy the product; they see the encyclopedia salesman as the bearer of a rare and desirable gift..."
- (b) Buller (1972, p 66) recognises a nice class of idealistic performer called "fishes" - amongst encyclopedia salesmen. "...The fishes actually believe that they are advertising representatives and they stay with the company not only for the money, but because they believe in education and the product. (These people become very defensive of their jobs and bristle at the mention of any other encyclopedia)...". Goffman (1974, p 362-3) notes some nice examples of actors getting carried away and actually assaulting actresses they were supposed to figuratively attack, and of audiences crossing the footlights to berate actors playing "nasty" parts.

in his section said:

"...he'll do anything for you, he'll help anybody out...he'll break his neck bringing all his rounds over, like when _____ was short, he helped him out by giving him cakes and bread, and by telling him to pay it in and come over...so it looks good on his record...he wants the Manager to come up to him and say: "You're doing a wonderful job"...just as long as his job is done properly, he's chuffed...."

Interaction misinvolvement (self-divestment) is overt recognition in the present, of the fact that real reality for the actor lies elsewhere. As Goffman (1961a, p 73) puts it:

"...When the individual withdraws from a situated self he does not withdraw into some psychological world that he creates for himself but rather acts in the name of some other socially created identity. ...disdain for a situated role is a result of respect for another basis of identification..."

Viewing the world as all contrivance, then, means that doing ceases to be being: "The person who is the salesman has a self, but is is not the self of a salesman" (Reid, p 55). Cliche-readings by the audience poses problems for the performer. Blind to the actual content and exclusively concentrating upon the meta-context makes them particularly alive to any picayune discrepancy in the performance that they might use to discredit it. A less likely, but perhaps more ironic situation might also develop. Whilst audience scepticism might make them awkward to deal with, this is strictly because of a decision to treat them 'easily' by performers. Sceptical knowledge is only imagined grasp of connotated meaning. The lack of actual comparability of it with performer-knowledge means that it cannot contribute to the game status of the audience.

A sceptical audience is likely to mock a deferential display by a server (qua a display), and demand a more blase performance, believing this, of course, to be more representative of reality.

This depicts the frailty of audience-scepticism, and the irony: sceptics are more at the mercy of performers than are the naive - who at least are demanding the avoidance that they inevitably get, albeit under a different name. By demanding though (as the sceptic does) to be treated with more 'matiness' on the grounds that this will cull less of a display, will merely produce in performers a more (dumb insolent) deferential display. An example of taking it literally and objecting to it, rather than to the lack of it.

Audience scepticism, then, is not the same as performer cynicism, nor, in fact, is it even a comparably knowledgeable position with, for example, the idealistic performer. The performer, however competent, has access to Regional and Trade knowledge which the audience, at best, can only guess at. For example, sceptical querying of the validity of a performance might make fiddling tricky, but it has an additional, paradoxical effect. Any warning story not only communicates some knowledge of trade-secrets, but also (meta-)communicates that the sceptic is unaware that cover is routinely provided. Scepticism is not that the interaction is a "performance", but that, taking for granted that it is real, that it is the wrong performance. Whilst the sceptic cannot guarantee immunity from the fiddle, she may, empirically, get it. I asked one of the roundsmen if he would continue to fiddle a customer who had caught him fiddling her:

"...probably, if you could catch him once, you could hit him again, but I always think: 'Well, if he's got me once, he might get me again'...although, as I say, he probably isn't even checking...just thinking that you think he is..."

Blase performance, on the other hand, is difficult to recognise outside of one's membership of a particular group. I did, however, once overhear two bakery sales supervisors talking:

"You can only get monkeys to work for you if you only pay them bananas"


(Other, sourly) "If you only pay peanuts, you can only expect to get monkeys..."

Facade and Reality: Generated Interactional Order

Diagram 7 (page 149) has illustrated various interaction-competences and positions. Each separate performer/audience interaction will therefore generate its own order, and the resulting reality will be a matter of interactional co-production, rather than specifically and exclusively the effect of a single competence.

The nine possible interactions crystallise into three conceptual forms (see Diagram 3 on page 158). Orthodox interactions, where the created facade is thoroughly ordinary to all concerned; heterodox occasions, where the performer/audience relationship is over-typical, and the resulting facade is thus "thick" (for example, during a 'play' the situation is thick for that part of the audience who are totally 'away'). A third possibility is that in which the performer/audience relationship is a-typical. The fact that here the categorical distinction between performer and audience begins to narrow, warrants the term paradoxical. Under such circumstances, the facade starts to crumble, and become "thin". For example, when one of the actors in a 'play' requires a prompt which is loud enough for the audience to hear.

It is primarily experience with paradoxical action that requires the continuous and historic negotiation of order. Facades, like houses, need continual re-painting: the reality of service needs re-mystification as audience experience begins to exhaust the patina.

Diagram 8. Facade Forms

As Barthes (1964, p 93, 94) mentions, it is not only so that nothing in principle prevents a metalanguage becoming, in turn, a language-object for a new metalanguage; but rather the very inevitability that "fronts", considered representative one year, will merely be felt to be decorative a few years later

(Goffman, 1959, p 68). For example, "action" orientated trendy groups will need to periodically invent new in-talk as the public takes over their once exclusive slang, and it becomes cliché (Becker, 1963, notices that this is particularly true of jazz-playing and pot-smoking groups).

In a purely organisational sense, service becomes a "fiction" in the specific sense outlined by Cohen (1931, p 492):

"...assertions that contain an element admittedly false but convenient and even indispensable to bring about certain desired results. Although fictions border on myths which are genuinely believed and on pious frauds which are intended to deceive...(they have) an element of implicit analogy...(and) the practical convenience of brevity outweighs the theoretical gain of greater accuracy..."

As Dalton (1964, p 195) reminds us, the perpetual organisational "velvetisation" of language allows expediency to be "periodically reclothed with new protective fictions" (*ibid*, p 205). Such tricks as, for example, calling exploitation "selling", selling "service", service "consultancy" (another one from the central heating manual) are, of course, just successively effective means of displaying power.

With this extensive framework in mind, the two interactions which generate the roundsman's occupational self will now be analysed: when he is, to his customers, a cynical "performer", and when to the management he is, just like the rest of us, a sincere unthinking performer.

CUSTOMER INTERACTIONS: ORGANISING A SERVICE FACADE AS PERFORMER

"...Most kinds of work bring people together in definable roles...In many occupations there is some category of persons with whom the people at work regularly come into crucial contact. In some occupations the most crucial relations are those with one's fellow workers. It is they who can make life sweet or sour. Often, however, it is the people in some other position. And in many there is a category of persons who are the consumers of one's work or service. It is probably that the people in the occupation will have a chronic fight for status, for personal dignity with this group of consumers of their services. Part of the social psychological problem of the occupation is the maintenance of a certain freedom and social distance from these people most crucially and intimately concerned with one's work..."
 (Hughes, 1958, p 53)

Facade as Construction: Service as a Presentation

A "region" is "bounded in some degree by barriers to perception" (Goffman, 1959, p 109). It is not so much a question of space, but of style. A specifically back region is one where "the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course" (*ibid*, p 114).

Roundsmen interact solitarily with their customers. For them, service occasions occur in the front region, and interaction which occurs there is only psychologically supportable by the existence of a back-region (which for solitary workers is a

psychological place, where "derisive collusion" takes place between the performer and himself, and where he mutters darkly about his customers) where discrepancies between the reality and appearance of standards becomes tolerable. In back regions, paradoxical convergence is manageable. In Shetland Hotel, (Goffman, 1959, p 120):

"...Often the remains of a joint of meat or the broken remains of a batch of tarts would be served...if a pudding made from stale bread and cakes did not pass the test of what was good enough for guests, it was eaten in the kitchen....(where) mould would sometimes form on soup yet to be used. Over the kitchen stove, wet socks would be dried on the steaming kettle..."

Whilst the roundsman will personally feel a similar tolerance for ambiguity in the presentation and collation of things; in the front region of service, the customer secures the unwitting agreement of the roundsman to tacitly obey customer rules-for-ordering-sales-occasions. This is partially mercenary (loaves that fall on the ground do not easily get sold), partly because even front-region irreverence tends to be of a structured kind, and partly because even back regions carry some of the standards of front.

Thus, whilst service/front region behaviour is in agreement with audience/customer rules for enabling such occasions, the roundsman controls sales-interactions by not only subtly influencing the definition of the situation that the customer will make, but also by maintaining control of available information and knowledge in the situation. The selling setting is so arranged that even inquisitive customers can be well catered for; the roundsman's props, his basket full of goods and his van are especially prepared for those customers not satisfied with standard service, and instead demand a more real image. Accordingly, the van and basket are kept clean, fresh and tidy to give the impression that the back region is not only visible, but also palatable.

Service, then, is consciously presented to the customer. This is also true of the "product". First, a note on marketing irony. A basic organisational trouble with the service industries is that many otherwise hidden costs need to be transferred to the customer.^(a) Characteristically, with bread, gaudy and eternally re-designed packaging is produced in order to dramatically re-live invisible costs. Unfortunately, this transforms the denoted meaning of bread from necessity to luxury: from being the basic staff, to just another inessential frippery of life. Short term competitive marketing generates a long term elasticity of consumer demand typical of the necessity-luxury change (cf, Douglas and Nicod, 1974, p 747). Peas for example, have been progressively packaged and processed to death. Once bought (admittedly only in season) in the pod, they have now become a

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- (a) Invisible service agents (those who service out of sight of the customer) feel the problem of materialising invisible costs particularly acutely. This is typically resolved by (i) artificially generating an "impressive" delay between the initiation and conclusion of service. Riis and Patric (1942) were frequently and unnecessarily asked to leave their car, radio or watch and "come back in a few days". Strodoeck and Sussman (1961, p 606) add: "...the delay is often utilised as a technique to conceal the simplicity of many repair operations...". (ii) by using a very "impressive" testing machine while the customer is present. Riis and Patric (1942) came across these phony machines so frequently in their crafty travels, that they even developed a name for them: 'Rube Goldbergs' (ibid, p 108). In trade publications (restricted to performers) these "business producers", or "merchandising machines" are even explicitly advertised as machines that sell service (ibid, p 110) rather than test appliances. Some of the 'Rube Goldbergs' are even designed so that, judiciously handled, they will actually destroy the part allegedly being tested in order to guarantee the necessity for a replacement. It is especially hard to tell if the appliances left for repair have been crookedly serviced as the diagnosis-prognosis situation is complex. Additionally, there are several possibilities for "gyppery" of this sort. (a) Real repair work is done, a real explanation is given, but the work wasn't in fact necessary, (b) a real explanation is given, but the work was in fact not done as it was unnecessary, and (c) a charge was made but the reasoning was faulty, and the work wasn't done because it was unnecessary. Nevertheless, there is some real justification for the convention plea of an invisible-service agent caught in the act: that of large 'overheads' (see the excellent argument offered by Leonard and Weber, 1970, on the implications that automobile production pricing arrangements has for dealers trying to fulfil service warranties.)

freezer luxury with typical price elasticity and demand flexibility. Milk consumption perhaps perfectly illustrates this dilemma: in America (see, Bigus, 1972) where it is packaged in cartons, flavoured with chocolate and sold with yoghurt, it needs to be sold during daylight hours. In the U.K., it is still "unpackaged", still a necessity, and thus, can still be delivered. Potatoes are yet another useful example, the Cadbury's Smash bed-sitter absurdity aside (too redolent of dehydrated water which was sold in cans to Americans with nuclear fall-out shelters in the more hysterical fifties) the supermarket move towards the washed and polythened potato perfectly reflects the marketing exchange of a dirty product for a clean image.

Similarly with bread, slicing and wrapping transforms the original concept-loaf into its modern luxury-image. In knowledge-about culture, as Marcuse (1964, p 90) tells us, the image of the thing is much more tolerable than the thing itself:

"...The language controls by reducing the linguistic forms and symbols of reflection, abstraction, development, contradiction; by substituting images for concepts. It denies or absorbs the transcendent vocabulary; it does not search for but establishes and imposes truth..."

In the hotel business, it seems that the customer demands for nice demonstrations of attentiveness pragmatically preclude the actual construction of what is displayed. Ironically, as Orwell (1933, p 71-3) bitterly tells us, so much time is spent on the show of the thing, that there is just not time for the thing itself:

"...The customer pays, as he sees it, for good service; the employee is paid, as he sees it, for the boulot - meaning, as a rule an imitation of good service. The result is, though hotels are miracles of punctuality, they are worse than the worse private houses in the things that matter...Yet we were clean when we recognised cleanliness as part of the boulot. We scrubbed the tables and polished the brasswork regularly, because we had orders to do that; but we had no orders to be genuinely clean, and in any case we had no time for it. We were simply

carrying out our duties; and as our first duty was punctuality, we saved time by being dirty...Roughly speaking, the more one pays for food, the more sweat and spittle one is obliged to eat with it...Dirtiness is inherent in hotels and restaurants, because sound food is sacrificed to punctuality and smartness..."

At Wellbreads, what for the foundsman, then, is a concept-loaf, must be presented to the customer as an image-loaf. The natural rigidity and intolerance of deviations from the image must, of course, be considered.

At an extreme level, any "contradictory" products are destroyed at source (over or under weight, or coloured bread is destroyed by despatch workers who live nicely on the boundaries between production and sale, and who can thus fulfil such duties with a fine sense of balance) in the same way that no imperfect stamps or banknotes are allowed to leave the mint. Thus, in both cases supporting the very reactions that such practices are designed to forestall (a nice control irony) - although with food, a gut, rather than cultural reaction is involved.

To keep any product-image "clean", product handling rules are specifically taught to service agents. The idea, of course, is to conform to the image, and not necessarily to the reality. Perfectly acceptable hams, for example, are injected with chemicals to make them more 'ham-like', and breasts with silicones to make them conform with more rigidity (MacCannel, 1973, p 591). In general, the more distant that production gets from the consumer, the more the consumer-knowledge will be mediated, and the more that its sale will have to visually conform to the product-safety rules (for the latter, see Douglas, 1966, p 52-3). In fact, food has so completely been taken out of the direct hands of the populace in advanced economies that product-paradox-rules are legally codified. For example, dirty hands, hair, overalls are forbidden, untidy hair is actually an offense, and one should not lick one's fingers when turning pages, pick one's nose, spit, smoke, take snuff, fail to wash one's hands after visiting the lavatory, and so on.

The greatest problem for roundsmen is bread-freshness: successfully dealing with it in customer interactions is a long, learnt process. Adequate performance however, can reduce what is essentially a technical problem. The management, of course, are dogmatic: when I first relayed customer complaints about the age of their bread to the manager, he said:

"...Look, there's no such thing as stale bread at this bakery, so go back and tell them that. There's only fresh bread, ...and bread which isn't quite as fresh as it normally is..."

A confectionary worker, in a similar vein, sarcastically remarked:

"...Well, you know what old _____
(previous Sales manager) used to say?
'There's no stale bread here, just fresh bread....and bread with a fur coat on!'"

Rather than continually return bread to the bakery, new salesmen are always tempted to try to 'pass' stale bread to customers and thus avoid the occupational embarrassment of witnessed sales- and round-management failure back at the depot. Occasional initial attempts to democratically rotate stales among the customers are soon replaced by choosing customers to whom one might regularly palm stales off, thus eroding their criteria of difference by offering them continuity of stale experience. Some roundsmen manage to convince themselves (and sometimes their customers) that they have enough customers who actually prefer their bread a day old. One roundsman said:

"...funnily enough, I've got one or two on here who like bread a day or two old ...well, if you get stuck with too much you have to know where to bung it on.. I have bunged stale bread in a shop, but never in a small shop...mainly, because ...this firm depends so much on the corner shop...also, you put them in a big store because there, you can get away with it

(a) Cf. Gross (1970, p 149) When questioned about date-coding, a U.S. baker replied: "You just get customers confused. Fresh bread isn't good for you anyway...it's not healthy".

...in the big stores that I do...we don't do sale-and-return...so the crafty fuckers can't push them back at me the next day!."

Initially, roundsmen are only able to pass sliced bread as the waxed wrapper keeps the bread tolerably pliable. Learning the 'polythene trick' (uncut bread stored overnight in a polythene bag retains its pliability which of course, customers, when they are handling the bread, can be led to confuse with softness and freshness) allows the roundsman to "hold" any bread on the van overnight and successfully pass it the next day. The same salesman continued:

"...nowadays I hardly ever sell uncut bread that's a day old...if I'm pushed, I'd use it, but normally I'd chuck it off when I got back, even if it was in polythene...I don't try it too often, I think you can detect it too easily.. sliced bread, well, there, in many cases, you can get hold of a loaf and it feels as good as a fresh one...and that's what I do with stale uncut ones, I try it, feel it, and think: 'Oh, that one don't feel too bad'..."

After a bit, the roundsman begins to rely less on technical manipulation (in the 'passing' of stale bread) and more on verbal dexterity, practicing at first with absent customers:

"...Well, I work a crafty one!...you get to know which customerrs are going to be out, that saves any arguments ...(once) I only had one of yesterdays left...so, instead of taking it round the back, I put it in a bag, and left it round the front in the sun...when I got there next time, she said: 'That bread felt a bit stale outside, you didn't leave it in the right place'..and I said: 'It was probably the sun'...."

There comes a time, naturally, when the very ability to verbally handle customers contributes to occupational cynicism. As one roundsman said: "Well, I'd tell them a lie or something, that the machine had broken down, anything", and I found personally that this can sometimes degenerate into the production of the most bizarre and absurd reasons, which cannot, quite frankly, be read sensibly however you look at it. I used to say things like: "Well,

you can't really tell by feeling it", or, "It's alright really, it just tastes stale." Another roundsman told me:

"...nobody used to say much about the stales, sometimes they would say: 'Bread wasn't very fresh yesterday'...so I'd make up some cock and bull story that the machine had broken down...you've got so many excuses that you can use, I used to blame the weather...I used to blame that quite a bit, if it was cold, it would make the bread hard, and in the summer, the heat would make it go mouldy!...I used to blame atmospheric conditions...different things like that..."

A final clean-trick enabled one to use bread that was two days old. When the weather was particularly hot, even sliced bread used to go hard overnight. To counteract this, some of the more experienced men would place a day-old loaf end-up on the floor, and stand on it. It would be compressed to about three to four inches long, but by the time the driver had reached the first call, it would have concertinaed to feel beautifully soft.

A secondary product-image problem was keeping the products clean. Loaves that are dropped on the ground in front of the customer are naturally and immediately thrown into a waste bin at the front of the van (to be retrieved for the next customer). A more difficult problem is keeping the hands clean. For a stranger, housing estates have a desert-like quality: never a public lavatory or a wash basin anywhere, and perpetual handling of dirty steering wheels and van-doors creates problems. One of the salesmen commented:

"...when I want to wash my hands, I go up to the door before I serve her, and say: 'Can I wash my hands please, M'am, I got a bit dirty on the last customer's gate', never serve her first, they wouldn't like that..."

A subsidiary problem is image-tidiness. A loaf with a torn wrapper is as difficult to pass as one which is three days old. ^(a)

(a) The success in sales of second-hand furniture recovered to 'pass' as 'new' testifies to the service fact that it is the 'wrapper', and not the content that counts. (Caplovitz, 1963, p 28, 151).

Held correctly, it can be sold without too much trouble, and even returned to the bakery, it can at least be rewrapped, and sent out to do duty again.

But the roundsmen have to keep their smile, as well as their bread fresh. Self, as well as product, must be presented. The self-presentation rules that all salesmen learn (keep one's overalls clean, etc.),(a) if obeyed, transform their action into an expression of service. Using semiology in a real sense (rather than the metaphoric sense which has been used to create the structure of this Chapter), the salesman is dressed (clean hands, tidy hair, shiny overalls) to be a "whole image" (Barthes, 1964, p 46), fully saturated with image-meaning. To the roundsman, the service-image is 'only a front' - his dramatic face, or work self, it functions to define the situation as an acceptable one for customers.

For performers, "service" refers to that sort of consideration of the customer's comfort which is second only to her capacity to pay! (Maurer, 1931, p 325). For customers, the service image is 'idealised' in the way that Goffman (1959, p 36, 40, 83) reminds us:

"...many service occupations offer their clients a performance that is illuminated with dramatic expressions of cleanliness, modernity, competence and integrity. While in fact these abstract standards have a different significance in different occupational performances, the observer is

(a) Blue-collar workers are, of course, given overalls to bring their appearance up to the service ideal. That ideal, however, is not just a refinement of normal dress: over-dressed employees would need to dress down for the part. Trillion (1969, p 8) quotes the example of a highly successful apple-store owner having to take his neat business suit off, and don "an old pair of corduroy pants and a dark cardigan sweater" instead. "That's a farm outlet, and people don't want to see a business executive out there," he said: "You got to look the part". Similarly, Caplovitz (1963, p 20) reports that credit stores employ Puerto Rican salesmen, who are less likely to presentationally intimidate poorly-dressed potential customers.

encouraged to stress the abstract similarities...the individual typically infuses his activity with signs which dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory facts that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure...whatever this manner conveys about them, often its major purpose is to establish a favourable definition of their service or product..."

In terms of the particular components of the service-front, the scenic aspects are symbolically very tricky for the salesman to negotiate. Whilst his visual image acts as a social licence for his presence on urban housing estates during working hours, selling takes place on the doorstep; which, in dramatic terms, becomes the proscenium arch between two symbolic settings. Operating thus where public reality intersects with private life, the roundsman is interactionally disadvantaged in predictably standard ways (see, for example, Douglas, 1966, p 137, 146). Whilst each customer may become accustomed to the validity of the roundsman's credentials, in any conversational fracture, unless the man's foot is in the door, so to speak, then the customer can easily and abruptly terminate the encounter. Subsequently, the personal aspects of front are highly stressed:

"Your approach should be positive. You should look neatly dressed and remember to SMILE...."

(Central Heating Manual)

"...Have a courteous and friendly disposition, and be capable of smiling in adversity, of sincere character, and be enthusiastic..."

(Sales Manual from Another Bakery)

"...the best way to increase your sales is by selling yourself first - by your enthusiasm for the job, your cheerfulness, and enthusiasm for Wellbreads, with a smiling face, smart appearance, and friendly, obliging courteous, conscientious service. This is the way to build customer goodwill..."

(Wellbroad Sales Manual)

The roundsman's cynical reflection upon the cynical effect of the sales image allows him to manipulate the fact that, for them, given cannot contradict given-off expression. Central Heating

salesmen are even overtly told: "Your manner therefore calls for extreme, sincerity and reassurance...IT'S NOT WHAT YOU SAY BUT HOW YOU SAY IT...so speak clearly, concisely and in a language that your prospect understands." Care is nevertheless necessarily expended to keep given-off communication low profile. The performer has to give a performance which will not be so much technically correct but dramatically so. He will have to, chiefly, conform to the customers' stereotype of how he should be and act; this 'idealisation' of front is created by the practice of various "credibility enhancement strategies" which Weiler and Weinstein (1972) suggest are used to "tighten" projected fronts. The particular techniques that the roundsmen use (apart from informational control which is standard to most service agents) are particularly, 'ingratiation' ("never argue with a customer", "win the argument and lose the sale") especially, 'opinion conformity', and positive 'assertion', i.e., of one's sincerity, qualifications and involvement.

A key technique in the roundsman's self-presentation is a thorough going "personalisation" of each and every encounter with customers. Of course, this is primarily achieved just through smiling - the problem lying not so much in just doing it, but in doing it in such a way that it will appear "warm", and "spontaneous". The very fact that, for bread salesmen, customers are individually dispersed allows them to present the same smile 300 times a day. Mills (1951, p 134) comments on what can happen:

"...In one large department store, a planted observer said of one girl:
 'I have been watching her for three days now. She wears a fixed smile on her made-up face, and it never varies, no matter to whom she speaks. I never heard her laugh spontaneously or naturally...when a customer approaches, she immediately assumes her hard, forced smile...'"

As Bigus (1972, p 153) suggests, the personalisation problem is generally solved by 'cultivating' a 'pseudo relationship'

with each customer. The initially exasperating tendency of practically every customer to demand to be treated as the roundsman's favourite can, in fact, be accommodated. Goffman (1959, p 56-7) reminds us that "individuals often foster the impression that the routine they are presently performing is their only routine or at least their most essential one". Bakers, being literal performers, do so regularly. As one man told me: "You get to know the names, but you do find that you're saying all the same things to each customer...but still, you do get your favourite people that you can have a laugh and joke with...you've got to be happy-go-lucky, you've got to smile." A senior supervisor explained that, in fact, there is really more to it than that:

"...there are no actual tricks...apart from the tricks of getting round the customer, to win the customer round... that is the only real trick of the trade ...like dealing with children, you must never put a child off, or they'll never come to the door again...if they put their hands into the basket, you mustn't say: 'Gerrof! you little bastard!' or you'll never get the mother's confidence... some of the blokes get to know the child's name, and the name of all the children on the round, so that they can make a note of their birthdays, and remind the mother to order a birthday sponge...."

Exasperatingly, every customer is the same to the roundsman (at least, to the extent that he is cynical of the interaction) but differences in quite frivolous information, such as having birthdays on different days, have to be remembered. To do this requires phenomenal in-round chameleonic adaption, beautifully described by two of the men:

"...You have to have a different approach for different people...it's off the cuff, on the spot...you say: 'Good morning Missus' but the next one, you have to say: 'G'Morning M'am' and 'Ho M'am'...and another one, you can say: 'Morning, Doris, alright? alright last night, gal?'...these are the various ways you can go up to these people, and there again, you see, you have to get to know your customer..."

"...But they're all different, some you can stand at the door and tell her a dirty joke, and the next one, you wouldn't dare...you have to act different with different people, different types of customer as they come along....I adapt myself to each customer as they come along, I gradually get to know what they're like...I let them approach me first, to see how they do it, what they're like, see how they speak to me, I think this is the safest way, you're less likely to upset her then...I just think of them in my mind, as you go from one customer to another: 'Oh, yes, old so-and-so, I'd better be careful what I say to this one' ...sort of rearrange myself as I go along...."(a)

Coupled with "personalisation" techniques, is playing the "memory game". The game is to pretend to remember irrelevant instructions given by customers, such as 'call tomorrow', when this would be standard practice or, 'bring me a large white sliced one tomorrow', when this information is written in the route book, and would be done anyway. It is simpler and quicker to pretend to commit such orders to memory, than to painstakingly explain to customers trade-secrets concerning how the round and the bread is really managed. Of course, next day, in the absence of specifically recalled information, the man will have to "simulate a memory" (Joad, in Goffman, 1959, p 58), and give the impression that he is well-aware of yesterday's conversation, whereas, in fact, the 300 customer-conversations that he has had since then have irredeemably blurred his recall.

Wholly expressing the "don't argue with the customer" rule which is commonly held by performers in all sales-service situations, is the "rule of agreement". Basically, whatever the customer says, janus-like, the roundsman will agree with her. When I was being trained on my first round the supervisor handled two consecutive

(a) Both fine examples of the manipulative ability of the service agent which Farberman and Weinstein (1969, p 450) refer to as "simulated intimacy", and which Sutherland (1937, p 208) nicely labels "predatory intimacy" (vide also, Klockars, 1974, p 184) to indicate the ulterior motives of connen whose relationships with prospects are cold-blooded.

queries in the following way:

1st Customer: "Oh, I'm so glad that the other man has gone...he was so rude that I hardly dared come out for a loaf...I used to have to get my neighbour to get it for me"

Supervisor: "Yes, Madam, we've had a lot of complaints about him...but this chap will be serving you from now on, and he'll do his best for you."

2nd Customer: "Oh, I shall miss Bert."

Supervisor: "Yes, Ma'm...he was a good roundsman, he's gone to a different round on the other side of town now, we shall all miss him."

Selling, on the other hand, is relatively easy. For service agents with naturally repeating customers (see Diagram 1, on page 119) the selling process is unproblematic. Customer-contact is purely a technical problem of catching the customer at home; the "pitch" is, for regular customers, unnecessary;^(a) and the only problem with the "close" is to complete it with sufficient speed to visit all the customers on the round in good time. Of importance here, is that in the same way that the colour-ful bread wrapper enacts hidden costs, the unnoticed rituals of customer-interaction dramatically re-live and express background social relations. Organisational "fictions" are "metaphors to express abstract social relations" (Cohen, 1931, p 490) - taken for granted 'rituals' like letting the customer, but not the roundsman get into debt, handing over the bread before taking the money,^(b) fulfill and create the social relations of service.

-
- (a) Opening, and maintaining open interaction with customers, is no problem for bread salesmen. Compare the apochryphal shoe-salesman who commits the prospect to his store by getting him sat down, and taking one shoe away; and the waitress (Gorfman, 1974, p 265) who, similarly interested in re-bracketing waiting-time as serving time, sets the table and takes the order of customers for whom she is unable to proceed with actual delivery of food.
- (b) Vending machines, that take the money first, are subject to ferocious aggression if they fail to produce the goods. Service without the smile is no service at all.

Performer Expression Styles

As performer, the roundsman faces a major dilemma: How much of his "self" should he psychologically invest in sales occasions? Too much invested, and he will have no authentic home life. Too little, and the day's work will become totally psychologically unmanageable. In deciding how much separation should be maintained between work self and real self, each man has to bear in mind that this must be done sincerely. As Messinger et al. (1962, p 692) point out, over concern with the creation of a "show" for others misses the essential truth that the greatest and most important show is for the self.

As Strauss (1959, p 62-3) notices, involvement can be just a technical outcome of interaction - a conjointly negotiated issue:

"...Even when interaction is fleeting, occasionally it is likely to have a cumulative and developmental character - as between a woman and her grocer... But the matter is yet more complicated; for instance, both parties may be deeply involved with one another, or only one with the other..."

But, I am here concerned more with work-involvement than with the possibility of personal involvement with others in the work situation. On the one hand, roundsmen are asked to identify with the produce. As a senior supervisor told me:

"..I teach them that they've got to sell themselves first, once you've sold yourself, you can sell them something ...you've got to get yourself liked... you've got to think of little phrases to say to them that you'll know they'll like...like patting the dog, it doesn't matter how stupid it sounds, that woman loves her dog, so if you like her dog,

do if you like her dog, she's going to think the world of you...you go to the door and chat about everything but business, and then at the last minute after you've patted the dog, cat, or child, you pick up the box of cakes, and by that time, you've got her interested..."

One of the roundsmen, on the other hand, reports what too much job-involvement leads to:


"...strain...I can't stand the strain, the driving, the mileage...it's getting me down...it's also getting my wife down, when she gets back from work, she expects to talk to somebody, but I'm not available to talk to...I'm so tired, I just can't keep awake...for instance, some people came round the other night, and I fell asleep, and kept moaning, in my sleep, about stuff being out of code...I reckon that's time to quit..."

The "involvement-decision" - a general problem for all workers, whether to invest the self in work, to see work as an end in itself; or, to wholly divest the self from work, just viewing work as a means for the achievement of other ends - resolves itself for different roundsmen at Wellbreads in different styles of working. These styles are displayed in Diagram 9, (on page 176) which is derived from Diagram 7 (given on page 149).^(a)

The compromise style (Diagram 9) - "salesman" - is the bakery-content performer form of the perfectly accommodated and alienated actor. Theoretically, the compromise between uninvolved and over-involvement is temporary, and there is always the possibility of spilling over into either too much or too little investment. The compromise needs delicate, but continual psychological engineering. In a parallel situation, the completely

(a) They are styles and not types. For example, men who adopt the salesman style all week, might suddenly revert to "carver" on the Saturday morning before a big football match.

Diagram 9.

Performance Expression Styles

accommodated prisoner does his time the easy way:

"...When Roland arrived in E-Wing, he turned to Paul for advice on the structuring of time. 'How am I going to do twenty years?' Paul, on the basis of three years experience of an equally long sentence, provided the only reassurance he knew: 'It's easy, do it five years at a time'..."

(Cohen and Taylor, 1972, p 97)

Similarly, (Ditton, 1972a, p 629), the production men at the bakery managed to engender a crafty mix of involvement and disinvolvement, thus producing, as a solution to the problem of boredom, the ability to maintain "surface mental attention" and combine sufficient presence with sufficient distance.

Firstly, the "salesmen" will have to structure time in an acceptable way. Doorstep interaction occurs at the intersection of roundsman and customer timetables. In an objective sense, if the roundsman is 'about' at a normal time, then he will become wholly socially 'invisible' in the suburban drabness (Wittles, 1949, p 11), or, as White (1974m p 197) puts it, totally "transparent". White (ibid) refers to "...baker's roundsmen, whose very ordinaryness camouflages them like chameleons..". Regular intersection of customer and roundsman timetables produces a conjoint pattern of the correct sale, regularly occurring at the "right-time". If the roundsman appears when he is expected to (i.e., on temporal cue) then service may proceed uncontaminated with irrelevant problems and details of timetable norm infringement. The compromise is particularly apparent with wholesale customers all of whom want a delivery at 8.30 am. Here the roundsman experiences the dilemma of having to resolve the problems thrown up by the firm seeking a competitive edge by promising arrival-time which cannot be scheduled. It is only a slight over-characterisation of managerial action to say that they promise all customers an 8.30 am delivery, and then leave it to the roundsman to solve the impossible temporal structure that this throws up.

"Salesmen" treat time conventionally. One commented that: "I used to make targets to reach on the round where you could relax... 'cup-of-tea calls', or, people you can have a talk with... you force your way to each sort of stage on the round, you can get to one of the calls, tell them that you're bloody cheesed off, and then start again." Another "salesman" suggested a more unusual strategy for managing his timetable:

"...Well, I used to love to change the route... I used to start in the middle of the round sometimes, and work outwards, ... I'm unpredictable, so that people can't say: 'Oh, old Jim's coming at a particular time'... because I'd be there at 6.00 one week, and 10.00 the next, ... one or two used to worry about it, but I didn't do it until I knew them all, I used to look at all the little side roads, and think: 'I wonder where they go?'... and one day, you experiment... to break the monotony, I might go round a different way to see somebody else first, and also I'd get the people who are going to stand there and tell you about their families... and you just naturally try and avoid people like that... by the time I got there, later on, I had the excuse that: 'I'm sorry, I'm late, I can't stop'...."

Route-management (ensuring that one has customers by sufficiently balancing customer-recruitment with customer-loss to produce round regeneration) provides roundsmen with yet another problematic area. However, "salesmen" (almost by definition) generally manage to match gain with loss, and produce, at worst, what the management define and tolerate as acceptable wastage.

Marketing, however, does pose problems for all. Marketing is managing to negotiate a daily fit between actual customer demand, and actual bread supply. Embryonic salesmen are initially surprised that the fit is not axiomatic, and initially vastly overreact by increasing the supply order. As one man said of his first week:

"...Well, the ordering was the only thing that I found peculiar, I always found that I used to order a hell of a lot more than I sold, I thought it would go...it was only when I bought a whole load of stale cake back, that they told me to cut the order down..."

Each "salesman" gradually learns to match supply with demand (he cannot just take over the previous man's solution, as the character, and thus the extent of the round depends partially upon the roundsman) until they reach a stage of fine fit. For example, one man reported that: "But I got it all sorted out by the next Easter, and on that holiday weekend, I only bought one loaf back the whole two days!" This is not a mathematical, but a negotiating skills problem. Another man commented:

"...You play this one against her...and you think: 'I'll leave her out this week', and, 'I'll leave her a Tin instead of a Farmhouse, but make sure that Mrs. So-and-so up the road gets one'...and normally, you get out like that...you could always sort of pull yourself by,...get by on the round..."

"Getting by" is not only skillful, but also covert. This ability is learned in parallel with that of being able to fully use yesterday's (bread) 'overs' as a solution to today's (bread) shortages. Without knowledge of the battery of stale-bread management techniques, the situation is un-manageable. The salesman has to learn to "hold": to keep bread on his van overnight for future marketing problems. One man said: "I don't have too much over now, because I keep the majority of it on, I found I was coming over and handing it in, and the management were bollocking me over the waste...but I just chuck it into my hospitals or contracts now." Another man believing (correctly) that the despatch manager was 'on the fiddle' with the fresh bread that he, the salesman, was able to return daily, subsequently refused to hand any bread back at all, and is, of course, the possessor of the cleanest waste record.

But "getting by" is an anxious process, and never predictable in outcome. Each day requires constant and searching analysis:

"...you see, after you've done it for a few weeks, you look to see how it's going, and think to yourself: 'Cor! it's not going like it did last week', and 'Yes, I'm getting low here', and you go through your book, and you think: 'Christ! I could do with another 20 of them!...'"

"..I used to always stop, and say: 'Well, I want 6 Farmhouse for my regulars', and I used to put them aside and the casuals on the caravan site had to have what was left...I did it that way, stop for ten minutes and sort it all out..."

"...you've got to start checking that little bit further ahead on wholesales, when you get so far, you look at your bread and think: you've got calls with a standing order, and you've got calls where you put in what you like, so I begin to cut down on them...and take it out of the shops where they depend on casual sales..."

But not everybody has the ability to 'compromise' in this way. There are those who take no personal interest in work, and those who, absurdly, 'live' there.

"Cap-Doffers" is the bakery name for those roundsmen who subordinate their selves to a customer-audience they read as being superior. As Goffman (1956a, p 62) notes, this is primarily over-stress upon avoidance rituals in the false belief that one's presence will contaminate the ideal-personal sphere of the other. England (1973, p 6-7) in an unpublished study of alienated shop-workers refers to a parallel category which he calls the 'old-School'. The Old School:^(a)

(a) Mills (1951, p 178) notices a similar category: the completely accommodated Old-Timer. One old-timer said: "'I put on my things and come to Macy's. It's almost automatic: in fact, several times I did all that on Sundays, once getting as far as the train before I came to and realised that it was Sunday. Just an old fire-horse listening for the bell, that's me.'" One of the Wellbread salesmen said of the cap-doffers: "...they see it one way, work is like a tunnel to them, and there's a little light at the end that they keep looking at...called retirement..."

"...live vicariously through their customers. they create a social hierarchy for themselves by using the criteria of the social positions of their customers. I always found myself struck by the rather pathetic similarity of this attitude to the past hierarchic groups of domestic servants ranked by the criteria of those who employed them...To work with such people is a trying experience as their true selves are submerged as to be virtually unknowable..."

Whilst in theory, such self-profanisation demeans the customer to whom it is directed, country people rarely actually demand the deference they might otherwise be entitled to, quite paradoxically in fact, as country rounds are precisely the level to which most regular practitioners of the "cap-doffing" style gravitate. Thus, the work interrelationships of "cap-doffers" are typically working-class deferential, and their round of rural customers provides them with a parody of traditional life: ancient landlords and simple folk. Deference is not demanded as the rich have no need to make status-demands of their tradesmen, and the poor no call to. As one "cap-doffer" said:

"...Well, I used to find that a lot of them used to think of me as their friend, rather than as a bloke who just calls at the door with the bread. In a country round, you do get more personal with the customers..."

As a supervisor reports:

"...generally, (in the country) they used to treat me alright, and hardly ever as a tradesman...even the better class of people, funnily enough, I found the people who treated you worse, were your own working-class people...especially in the towns..."

In timetable terms, "cap-doffers" are plodders. Getting done and getting home are the least of their worries, although lateness may disrupt their interactions with their customers. Timing, for the "cap-doffer", is to be on time:

"...If I get behind, I sort of hammer and make it up somehow...I'm so regular, that if I am ten minutes late, the old girls wonder what the hell is the matter..."

"...Now, you take those old buggers, they do drag it out, yeah...if you go out with one of them, and you help him, it's a waste of time, because if you get done early, he'll stop...they all hang it out...if there's two or three women who say: 'Don't call today' which puts him a bit early, ahead of his time, he'll stop...they won't go to Mrs. So-and-so until the normal time that they get there..."

"...If I thought I was behind, I wouldn't tear about to catch up, but I would sort of speed up a bit,...if I was forward, I would slow down..."

In terms of route-management, rather than allow events to assume their naturally regenerative pose "cap-doffers" deliberately ditch bad customers, even if they are good fiddle-calls:

"...Well, if they buy a fair bit, O.K., but if they don't, I just lose them...I tell them straight: 'You're wasting my time, and I'm wasting yours'...if they don't buy something three times in a week, I don't call there any more..."

"...If I lose some, I always make sure that I gain some as well, I got four the last fortnight, and they're always the good ones...worth up to a pound each, some of them..."

"...I've got a good round now...I've sorted it all out, and weeded all the useless ones out...I've still got a few left that I don't want, but I'm working on them..."

In terms of marketing, "cap-doffers" fulfil their managerial definition (Sales manager: "there are always the old men with what I call 'doffing-the-cap' sales, they always go to the back door, and they always touch the cap to the customer") by preferring to negotiate staleness with customers in face-to-face interaction, rather than deviously. When short, "cap-doffers" are usually too far from the bakery to have time to come back for more, and so either buy some bread in (as one of them said: "just to satisfy the customers") from a nearby shop, or actually face the customer and explain the situation to her, possibly cooling-out any inconvenience by offering bread at slightly reduced rates. Normally operating in a route a long way from the depot, "cap-doffers" inevitably come

'over' in their bread order. The standard practice for them is to hold large amounts on the van, and to sell off uncut loaves cheaply (when they are stale) to country customers with large numbers of dogs or pigs.

In total contrast to the "cap-doffer", the "Dropper" displays wholesale resistance to the 'servant' self-label. Stemming from an unserious reading of 'service', the self is seen as at least equal to the customer-audience. Lynn Butler (1972, p 71) offers an excellent example of a co-worker from her experience as an encyclopedia salesperson:

"...This salesman looks like the original Hells' Angel, is usually half-soused, and doesn't brush his teeth for days. When he flails his timber-like arms in the air and yells, 'Ah, you're stupid! You're wife's stupid! Ya want the kids to be stupid? Sign the fucking card," they sign. For some odd reason, his orders are verified the next morning, too..."

With respect to deference, this "dropper" style illustrates presentational rather than (self-) avoidance patterns. As opposed to the 'old school', the "dropper" is the same as England's "distanced actor" (1973, p 5):

"...those assistants who display the symptoms that would define them as alienated by the behavioural criteria so admirably described by Jean-Paul Sartre in his description of a waiter in a cafe...(they)...perform all their duties in the shop with a style and an attitude which tells everyone that they really should not be there at all. Distanced salespeople have little interest in the product that they sell, and have a relatively high turnover of jobs...They are prickly and sensitive to affront, real or imagined..."

This is a permanent style like that of the "cap-doffer" (and thus unlike the "salesman") but the end, rather than being retirement, is job-exit. Some of the more astute retail-droppers manage to negotiate a change to wholesale work (where the style can be advantageous) and those who fail to do so, leave. Two

wholesalers referred to their experiences as retailers:

"...I couldn't go on the doors again...it's soul destroying...bloody soul-destroying, up to each bloody door with a basket..."What would you like today?"...and ten to one they want something that's on the bloody van..."

"...I don't think I could fetch and carry for people now....that would really get up my goat (sic)..."

"Droppers" have a distinctive style of timetable-management, occasionally referred to as 'ruining'. Although "dropping" refers to the sub-marketing strategy of leaving the bread at the door without bothering to knock, this is done primarily to save time. In terms of intersection with customer-timetables, the "dropper" is always early and concerned to terminate customer interactions as speedily as humanly possible. As one customer said to me about her previous roundsman, who had "dropped" at her doorstep:

"...sometimes, I'd never see him for weeks on end, he never used to knock, or anything...and he hardly ever had what we wanted or ordered he would leave us any odd thing...and he used to try and hide them, sometimes, we wouldn't find them for days...sometimes my husband would go out to the garage to do something, and he'd come back with a mouldy loaf, that looked as if it had been out there for weeks..."

My field notes recall a round where I felt persuaded to adopt a similar strategy:

"...(the round) was finished by the time I inherited it. After the first two weeks, I began to recognise easily negotiable finishing times for each day, and some days it was as early as 11.30 am, having only started at 7.00 am. I could never fix Saturdays, though, I didn't like Saturday, it was a much longer day, and there didn't seem to be much relation between the finishing time when I had speeded or when I had taken it easily. But the other days were different. I used to try and beat my own record, and on one Wednesday, I was done by 11.00. After a bit, no time was wasted in either conversation or refreshment. Sometimes,

I even used to miss my mid-morning tea in the cafe to get round early. It was a part-time job: what they call at Wellbreads a 'doddle'. I got to hate talkative customers, with them I was swift, curt, and to the point, but never rude enough to warrant their delaying me with a ticking-off... When things were going particularly well, when I thought I was onto a record-breaker, I would do everything I could to speed things up. If a series of entanglements slowed me down, or if I knew I was about to run out of bread, I would sometimes relax, and just take it as it came..."

'Runners' tend to view the job as just a piece-rate one. Merely, as one man put it, "seeing how you can get from A to B the quickest". Another added: "I just get done as quick as I can." One of the most extraordinary examples of this under-involvement in anything not strictly necessary was relayed to me by a supervisor:

"...he wouldn't even stop for a cup of tea, if anyone offered him one, he wouldn't stop to argue about, he'd take it, and as soon as they'd gone, he's pour it down the sink!... yeah!...that sort of attitude...if somebody offered us a cup of tea (when I was on with him) I used to think: 'Thank God', but as soon as they'd turned their back, he'd be rid of it, and away...."

Although not "dropping" every customer, "droppers" will at least "carve" up the round by progressively alienating a sufficiently large number of customers to gradually shrink the round. Not bringing the basket to every door is a common trick:

"...I wouldn't say he was carving the round up bad, not to that extent...he wasn't running to the door, and dropping the bread before they had a chance to get there...but he didn't like carrying the basket (when I was a relief, one of the customers) saw the basket and went mad!... bought loads of things...she'd never seen it before..."

Another trick is to regularly underestimate consumer-demand (on the basis of a few occasions when the call has been fruitless) and mark many of the calls in the round-book as "E.O.D."

(every-other-day, only). Those customers who waste too much time talking are dropped completely from the route-book, as are those who demand too much deference:

"...(customer reported roundsman for 'cheek')
 ...when I went to that house the next time,
 she came out and said: 'I hope your ticking
 off did you good', so I said: 'Yes, M'am',
 and I went and got the book, and tore her
 page out, and threw it in a little ball on
 her path...silly cow!..."

Unfortunately, the very customers who are undesirable are generally the ones who are exceptionally hard to ditch. As Bigus (1972, p 158-9) notices, both what he calls the 'holdover' (leaving 'held-over', or stale produce) or the 'incompetence' tactic can be used to drive home the message. Since it is preferable that the customer terminates the relationship (thus avoiding any nastiness with the management) some roundsmen occasionally resort to the delightful, but all too rarely done practice of "posting". Here, a wrapped loaf is undone, and posted through the appropriate letter-box, slice by slice!

"Droppers" are traditionally poor marketers. They always prefer the less time-consuming practice of leaving stales to customers who are out, to negotiating staleness face to face. Although it is stressed during training that: "deal with the customer who comes to the door rather than upset the one who is out", a senior supervisor went on to admit that: "this is how we lose a lot of customers...by leaving it with the woman who is out". Further, dropping can actually pay off, as one man suggested:

"...if there was nobody there, I'd leave a loaf and a box of cakes...although I'd know that they didn't want any bloody cakes!
 ...and when I saw them, 9 times out of 10,
 they would say: 'I didn't want them cakes,
 but my little girl has started on them now,
 so I'll have to have them..."

When short, "droppers" will either leave customers out altogether, or, if facing them is inevitable, offer them two alternative loaves for the price of one. When over, a specific

trick is to sell the surplus off at half-price rather than go the trouble of returning it to the bakery, or of holding it on the van. One dropper said that when he was short:

"...Anything up to 14 loaves, I buy from the shop, I did ring up the first time it happened, and they said that they'd bring it out to me, ...but I sat there waiting and waiting, but they never turned up...then once, I couldn't find a shop selling Wellbread, but I saw the Superloaf man...and I thought: 'Well, bread's bread'...and I started off telling the customers that there had been a breakdown at the bakery, but I don't bother now...some of them even think that I'm the Superloaf man!!...after that, I never did bother to ring up again...as the bloke in the cafe used to sell me some bread that the wholesale Wellbreads bloke had left, back at $\frac{1}{2}$ p off...I even started making money out of it...and also, if I had a load of smalls over, I would say to them: 'Would you accept two smalls for a large?'...and like as not, they would...you'd lose a bit on it, but you'd get it back, either from them, or from somebody further up the road..."

The same man had also developed considerable time-saving skills to use on those occasions when he had too much bread:

"...Well, the first time, I handed it all in, but they said: 'Your waste is too high'... so now, I just keep it on the van...experience tells you when you've got too much, so you go and see the bloke at the cafe, or, you leave two loaves on the doorstep instead of one,... or find a shop, and sell it for half...and cut your losses...I still worry about it...I can't stand to see colossal amounts of bread left over...it seems to me that I'm not doing my job...so I handed it in for the first two or three weeks, but then I thought: 'Why bother? Why bother to adjust the order? Why not just leave it on?'...so I just carried it, look at my van now!...I've got 9 trays on!..."

Facade as Negotiated Order: Problems

When the service-facade is nicely and typically balanced, interaction is orthodoxically unproblematic (see Diagram 8, on page 158). But problems can arise if a discrepancy between roundsman/customer en-coded action appears. Firstly, there are regular occasions when the customer takes the idea of service much more seriously than the roundsman. We may characterise such interaction as over-typically heterodoxical, and the resulting facade as "thick".

A "thick" facade often produces what Davis (1959, p 266), Goffman (1959), and Bigus (1972, p 155) and many other commentators of the service scene refer to as 'non-person treatment'. Here, it is not only too much deference that is demanded, but too much of everything. In interactions of this sort, the simple baker's roundsman is expected to be a baby-sitter, postman, psychiatrist, friend and confidant. Most salesmen respond to such demands that they fulfill role-extras by subtly training their customers to be less demanding. Whyte (1949, p 248), and Goffman (1959, p 15) refer to the subtle "aggressiveness" of servers attempting to wrest interactional control, and similarly, one day early in my career as a bread-roundsman, it was explained to me in the canteen that:

"...don't worry, you'll soon get the hang of it...once you get used to the round.. and the customers get used to you....the first few days, they'll try it on, to see how much you'll do for them...they ask you to run back to the van for them, and you have to do it for a bit...they want to know how willing you are...then, one day, you'll tell her to poke it..."

Coupled with attempts to train the customer to the ways of the roundsman in a technical sense, most (especially blase

roundsmen) will demand existential 'person treatment'. Like the janitors in Gold's (1952, p 260) study who refused to be called by their "dirty" name of 'janitor', one Wellbread salesman said that:

"...I won't let them call me 'baker' though, I hate that name....I make them call me by my real name...and the same with them...I won't call them 'Madam', or, 'Sir'....one bloke, really well-off he is,...I always say to him: 'Hello, mate'...he loves it..."

Similarly derivative of a "thick" facade, are cantankerous customers: always demanding more of whatever it is they think they haven't got, and always complaining when they don't get it. With the cantankerous, "cap-doffers" merely quietly persist:

"...I had a miserable old cow on the first round that I was on...everybody said the same thing about her...she was the most miserable woman I've ever met...when I eventually came off that round....she said to me: 'Oh, I am sorry, I look forward to seeing you every morning'...I nearly fell off the doorstep!..."

"...Once this cantankerous old bitch asked me to come to the back door...because she would be more likely to hear me come...but one morning she was waving to her husband at the front, and I came up the path, and she slammed the door in my face!...the old cow thought I was going to walk around the back..."

"Salesmen", on the other hand, dislike such people, but are determined to win them over:

"...these people did eventually see my way of thinking...but you have to educate them.. you have to train them...one I had, she was a sod, I left her some tarts one day, it was in the book to leave them on a weekend... when she saw me, she didn't half carry on! ...I had to show her the book and where it was written and everything...she was a right bitch...but as time went on, I could say to her: 'I'm sorry, I haven't got a thick loaf, will you help me out, and take this one?'... and she accepted it...and I got on well with her in the end...there was even a cup of tea there for me...it was just a question of winning that woman over..."

"Droppers", though, are less likely to go to such pains, and will probably just refuse to serve the customer, or will, with varying degrees of subtlety, retaliate. Donovan (1929, p 57) notes how salesgirls in department stores can make the life of the customer miserable without laying the salesgirl open to possible reprimand, and Mills (1951, p 173) to the almost universal phenomena of occasional customer-hatred. Orwell (1933, p 101) gives substance to the secret retribution enacted by all waiters everywhere, irrespective of how 'nice' the customer is: "(the waiter) told me, as a matter of pride, that he had sometimes wrung a dirty dishcloth into a customer's soup before taking it in, just to be revenged upon a member of the bourgeoisie." This is not so much retaliation, but self-definition. The wayward apprentice in an apochryphal story about sales training was finally and exasperatingly told (Consumer Reports, 1958, p 546):

"... 'Fella, you're not going to sell a damn thing until you realise one simple fact: The man on the other side of the counter is THE ENEMY'..."

Whilst not wishing to make too much of the fiddle as a way of generating psychological and secretive advantage in a sales-situation (although this is occasionally a primary, rather than a secondary and reflective meaning) there is a sense in which retaliation of any kind is artful redefinition of status-asymmetrical relationships.^(a) One "dropper" at Wellbreads had his own inimicable style:

(a) Sutherland's (1937, p 69) professional thief says: "...Above all, every deception, every imposture is an assumption of power. The person deceived is reduced in stature, symbolically nullified, whilst the imposter is temporarily powerful, even greater than if he were the real thing...". Schur (1957, p 299-300) comments: "...It may well be that from the psychodynamic standpoint, the assertion of power over the victim is as important to the swindler (although perhaps not on the conscious level) as is obtaining the sought-after money or property. Indeed, the concepts of power and power relations seem quite appropriate to an analysis of defrauding...".

"...I used to keep the stale bread for the awkward customers...and I used to make them pay for making me write debt sheets out, and things like that..running back to the van...a sort of surcharge...one old bugger, if I went to the front door, she'd come to the door, but she wouldn't open it, she'd just shout: 'Tradesman's entrance round the back', I gave her a stale loaf every time I delivered there...with some of the orders, I might get my revenge later, running over the cat, or something!...(laugh)...I didn't actually do that...(laugh)...but I did kill a pig once though...but that was a mistake...I had one awkward one, she had a pebbled drive, she was a widow, and always running me back to the van for something...I used to put my foot hard down on the floorboards going out and try to scatter pebbles all over the grass to fuck the lawn-mower up...I used to apologise though..."

Inevitably, there are those occasions when the roundsman, rather than the customer, treats the interaction over-seriously. Such a-typical, or paradoxical interaction produces a "thin" facade. Falling into this category, are customer "flankers": occasions of successful anti-fiddle - where, paradoxically, the customer fiddles the roundsman!^(a) Typically, "salesmen" never quite know whether any particular action is a flanker, or just plain stupidity. One said: "I've seen the girl on the cash desk take one before he's checked it in...I don't know whether she's just thick, or whether she's trying a flanker."

"Droppers" (who are more likely to be experienced with flankers as they typically work in seedy urban areas where they are commonly practiced, cf. Barnes, 1974, p 50) will conversely

(a) Anti-fiddle in terms of the experience of the men of this study. Any of those stealing from the electric, gas and other supply companies and bureaucracies (vide, Smigel 1953, and 1956,) would, in the U.K., define it as fiddling. Gersh (1952, p 256) cleverly frames this dramaturgically: "...most good actors and actresses come out of working class areas. Part of the reason, besides the fact that the poor are so deserving, is the training we got when a storekeeper gave us too much change. We would stand innocently, smiling beatifically, then walk slowly out of the door while our hearts jumped with fear..."

tend to define all complaints as concealed flankers:

"...Had an old girl today, she gave me a loaf back that she said was mouldy...only had three slices left, said that I'd sold it to her last Friday, well, I thought she was trying to work a flanker, see?...she said: 'What are you going to do about it? are you going to give me something to make it up, or shall I go down to see the Health Inspector?'...so I said to her: 'What about the rest of the loaf, then?... you've enjoyed 22 slices, and you want to complain about the other 4!..so she said: 'Well, it makes me sick to think what I've eaten', so I said: 'You should feel well then, because when the doctor gives you Penicillin, all it is is mould!'....she got mad!...but I knew she was flanking, I'd sold her a Wellbread loaf, and she was handing me these slices in a farmhouse wrapper (he explained this to the customer, who looked in the dustbin for the correct wrapper) ...her old man came out..and I left them there, going through the dustbin like a pair of ferrets, tossing old cornflake packets out, and snotty rags and all...dirty fuckers...I left them at it..."

Conversely, "cap-doffers" may recognise a flanker, but will rarely be able to define it as actionable. One man had a particularly good example:

"...Yeah, they've tried it on me...and you won't believe this, but the one who did do me was the managing director's wife!..that's a fact!...she was known for doing it...I was warned about her, too...she had me for a packet of biscuits...she just wouldn't have it that she'd had them, she said that if she had, it would have been down on her little list that she kept...because usually, if you do have a customer who checks, and they can forget, then you have to say: 'Do you remember me going back to the van to get it for you?'... and generally they do...I remember another call, her bill was less than 15 shillings, and I gave her change for a pound by mistake... because we were talking...and I realised it. before I left, the obvious look, I could read it on her face...that she knew what I had done, I didn't have to say anything, I could read it on her face...just as well..."

A "thin" outcome to unequal interactional definitions is a necessary precondition for customers getting into excessive

debt. A "debt" is defined as money owing which the debtor refuses to pay. Although owed amounts are carried onto debt-sheets by roundsmen even when they will manage to collect them, this is considered to represent a sale, rather than a loss. All roundsmen are nevertheless reminded (in a note pasted to the back cover of each route book) that "A sale which hasn't been paid for, hasn't been made".

"Cap-doffers" rarely have trouble with debtors, generally because they always define outstanding debts as collectable. "Salesmen" similarly have little problem, but here, mainly because they operate a firm rule of not allowing too much credit. It is the "droppers" who find debtors the greater hazard: "droppers" seem to be unable to read the surface enthusiasm of the intentional large debtor (quite common in the service trades; Barnes, 1974, p 48 refers to them as "knockers", and Bigus, 1972, p 151, as "deadbeats") for what it will eventually come to be, or, in fact, to maintain a service relationship with initially non-motivated, but eventually ensoured debtors. The Achilles heel of the "dropper" is thus the intentional debtor; this perhaps results from his naivete where actual selling is involved. Two "Droppers" said:

"...one woman came out, all smiles, and asked me to serve her, she paid me to start with, but on the fourth week, she sent her little girl out for some cakes, she was a good call, £6 a week, and I always got paid, so why worry?...a few weeks later, she gave it to me, the sob story, well,....I'm a sucker for that sort of thing...and I let it go up to £21...when I eventually caught her, she just turned round and said: "Piss off"..."

"...I'm too soft, if somebody builds up a debt, they've only got to give me a sob-story, and I will accept it...one got up to £12... and he started to dispute it...said it was £9...he never did pay anything..."

MANAGEMENT INTERACTIONS: MANAGING A SALES REALITY AS AUDIENCE

The roundsmen's interactions with the bakery management constitute a theoretical back-region for their service-relationships with their customers. As such, as Goffman (1959, p 168-9) tells us:

"...In service trades, for example, customers who are treated respectfully during the performance are often ridiculed, gossiped about, caricatured, cursed, and criticised when the performers are backstage; here, too, plans may be worked out for 'selling' them, or employing 'angles' against them, or pacifying them..."

Whilst, admittedly, there is some preparatory communication between salesmen (whilst loading, in the canteen in the morning for an early cup of tea, whilst unloading in the evening) such pre-performance collaboration is merely perfunctory and spontaneous. What is crucial is that (in the psychological sense of region already suggested) is that the theoretical service back region is the cryptic sales front region. To analyse this situation in Goffmanesque terms would be a mutilation of the actual experience of the men. At this "level", the dramatic type of analysis is only appropriate to their experiences in a metaphoric, and no longer in a literal sense. The performers have become the audience to a bigger, and hidden drama: the management are now the performers.

Audience Impression Styles

As audience, the roundsman faces another dilemma: to what degree should he prepare for his customer interactions? Too much preparation, and selling will degenerate into a boring, mere "delivery boy" function. Too little, and selling resources far beyond his capabilities will be demanded if he is not to become an occupational failure and either be grossly short or over in his estimation of customer demand.

The roundsman, then, is caught in the "preparation dilemma". As with the involvement-dilemma which he faced as a performer, he somehow needs to come to a decision as to how he will organise his organisational, as opposed to his presentational, self. Preparation means, for the roundsman, submitting an adequate bread, cake and morning-goods order so that, each day, he will be able to satisfy his customers without having too much produce over. One way of trying to simultaneously cater for both customer and management is to technically refine the otherwise rather hazy process of preparation by making out all one's orders from a sophisticated master bread-order. This produces, for the roundsman concerned, an "exact" amount of bread. I suggested this to the Sales manager:


"...Well, I don't know about that, I'm against that in a way, you see, then you have to write down for each customer, whether on retail or on wholesale...write it down in the book...so that if you have what sort of cake the woman wants in the book, granted you might get it for her, but you'll only go to the door with her loaf, and the packet of Crumbles, say, that she usually has...whereas what I would call a good salesman, would be the person who tries to sell her something different each week, perhaps, he still sells her Crumbles...but he also tries to sell her some Chocolate Weasels as well...you see the sort of bloke that I mean on the Sales Charts, one week, it's £97...the next, £102, the next, £110..."

The managerial point, then, is not to over-prepare calls as this will in the long run produce lower sales. Thus, the wholly accommodated/alienated category of "roundsman" is born through the compromise solution to the dilemma. Too much preparation will 'kill' selling, too little will make it impossible: the ideal is just enough of each. Diagram 10 on page 197 (again derived from Diagram 7 on page 149) shows the possible solutions to this dilemma.

For "roundsman", the positive side of the sales reality (selling) absorbs it's negative pole of preparation, and generates a tenuous, and temporary existence. This category is empirically and not just theoretically temporary, as ever-increasing profits must eventually level off, as consumer demand is locally exhausted. There is the ever-present possibility that the "roundsman" will concentrate too much on selling (and become a "salesman", in the audience, rather than performer sense), or upon preparation, and slide into the "delivery boy" exit funnel.

One sure way of preventing this degeneration is for retail roundsmen to move to wholesale rounds, and there bask in the status-reflected glory of association with early hours, large loads, big lorries and large profits. Becoming a "delivery" man (rather than boy) allows the derogatory implications of the latter to be siphoned off. About a shop manager who had complained that a large order was a measly three loaves short, one man said: "...this morning, I went in with six trays...I only deal in trays...not odd loaves...". Concern with the sheer effort of physically managing bulk orders excuses such men from too much concern with selling. For them, delivery is a socially and psychologically acceptable activity. As another wholesaler put it:

"...Yeah...I just copy the orders out from the last time, unless I get a new call...if they give me one that is...I have to increase the order a bit...but I don't look for new calls (laugh)...not bloody likely!...I've got enough on my plate without going out canvassing..."

Diagram 10.Audience Impression Styles

There is the feeling that the lack of direct access to customers reduces, for them, the appropriateness of the selling ethos. But there is always the nagging feeling that they are, at heart, salesmen. I once overheard the following conversation between two "roundsmen"/delivery-men:

"...I never put the same order in week after week like some of the others do you know...I always start afresh and try to think what I can sell...I get all mine boxed up when I come in in the morning, and so all my box-drops early, so I'm in the main town by 6.00..."

"..But that's not selling is it?... you're just delivering, aren't you?..."

(quickly) "...Look, I've put that round up by £80 since I took it over..."

But even some wholesale men manage to become "salesmen" by over-identification with the selling ethos. Life in this non-compromise category regrettably accelerates towards "sales-death". Over-concentration upon selling produces, ironically, it's own exhaustion. Psychologically, this has the real effect of allowing, on some occasions, little sleep. One man recalled:

"...I keep doing that, in the middle of the night, I wake up, and I can't see the clock properly, and I keep looking at it, and all of a sudden the hands look the other way round...and I think: 'Christ! Half past four!..'and I run downstairs, still half asleep, pour the milk on the cornflakes...start eating them, and then all of a sudden, my eyes begin to open properly, and I notice the clock on the wall...and it's bloody 12.00!!...and I have to go back to bed again...I'm always doing that just lately...my missus say: 'That bloody job, it's playing on your conscience'..."

Totally over-selling a round of customers pushes profits high, but the continued chances of ever increasing these profits dwindle. One top salesman recalled his early days:

"...there was some incentive there, but you get your sort of level...I had one of the biggest rounds, even on retail,...I was in the top 6 (salesmen)...but you couldn't go much above it, only by a few pounds...if there was a carnival, or a wedding, or something...you reached your level, and you just couldn't go above itthere wasn't any scope for any new calls...you couldn't fit in any new calls.."

One solution to the problem of sales-death is periodic change to a new round of customers (in fact, the last man went on to say: "that was why I decided to go on wholesale...I'd been on there for five years, and when you've been on a round for that long, the change is due") more likely, it seems, is that the "salseman" fails to see that possibility, and leaves. One such man, who left soon after I spoke to him, said:

"...Well, I've got the highest sales retail round there is...but what can I do now?... I can't sell any more, I'm up to my limit now...I can't take any more customers, on, it'd dead now, isn't it?..."

One pays a price, then for naivete. But the sceptical audience - here the "delivery boy" style - the man who over-concentrates on preparation produces a similar occupational boredom, and an identical ending for himself. As the Sales manager said:

"...I'm against writing down too much in the route book, I'm against too much detail.... if you have "cake only Tuesday and Thursday" in the book, then he'll only get the basket out them...I have a lot of this trouble from the wholesale rounds, they write down a stand-ard order for each shop and (never change it)..."

Most of the "delivery boys" admit that they can write out all their orders from memory, and that selling, for most of them, is a farce. One man I spoke to said: "I'm just a fucking delivery bloke...a salesmen tries to sell his stuff...(laugh)... I don't try...if they don't want it, bugger 'em!...(laugh)...". But unfortunately, delivery is boring. Two of the others said:

"...the boredom is in the repetition... going to the same places every day... seeing the same people...going round the same old journey...you get to know where everything is...on retail, I knew where every gate-catch was...what was behind every door...if you saw anybody, you know who they was, and what they were going to say...I'm a delivery boy, not a salesman,I'm more of a delivery boy than a salesman definitely..."

"...they take you for granted after a time, they don't bother to get up, or come to the door to see you...you just drive up to the door, open it, put whatever it is they want inside...you don't talk to them any more...you're just delivering...so it changes from selling to delivering...which I find highly boring..."

Ultimately, the result is the same for over-preparation as it is for over-selling. Occupational "death". A roundsman recounted why the previous man had left the round that he was then doing:

"...He had his run highly organised..he built it up so much, he involved himself in it, he messed himself up...do you see what I mean?...in the end there was no variety in it for him...because he'd got it so organised...he got too involved with the round..."

Reality and Contest

In management/worker interactions, typically orthodox (see Diagram 8, page 158) inter-involvement produces a nicely balanced and wholly ordinary facade. But this is rarely the case. A small number of interactions are absurdly, heterodoxically over-typical and "thick", but most of the time, the management struggle to solidify a precariously "thin" facade.

Some of the roundsmen take sales too seriously, and thus

in dealings with blase managerial performers, feel injured. For example, although most of the men regard all the 'motivational' charts that the supervisors pin up on the sales office walls (they list sales, waste and profit performance) with undiluted scepticism - one man even feeling that they indicate a "schoolmaster-pupil relationship, with a sarcastic ring about it" - there are those who, absurdly, feel that they are not being motivated enough. One complained:

"..I like to know what I'm doing...you know, sales-wise...but they don't put them charts up regular like they used to... you need some sort,of, I dunno, sort of motivation..."

Roundsmen for whom the sales-reality is "thick" similarly feel embittered when orders that they fill in are not completely adhered to by despatch staffs, or when the management arbitrarily cuts the bread orders all round to reduce weekly waste. These men have mis-read the meta-message: "You must be a 'salesman', yes, but not if it interferes with profit".

Far more likely however, is paradoxical, a-typical interaction: and a resulting "thin" facade. This is so because the bakery management are not completely and always in full control of the objective supporting conditions of the sales-reality. For example, when the firms which supply the bakery with cakes and biscuits fail to fill their orders, through no fault of the Wellbread's management, individual order-shortfall for the roundsmen will indicate to them the hollowness of the managerial exhortations to sell. Additionally, in the other context that I have discussed, roundsman/customer interactions, sceptical customers can be easily disposed of. Sceptical members of the sales force however, may stay to contaminate the rest of the group. Where customers are a category, segregated and treated individually, salesmen are a cohesive group. Management/worker interactions have a history: customer/roundsman ones do not.

So, although the sceptics amongst the men deny any

credibility to the sales facade (one of the top roundsmen said: "I never go to these sales meetings...they're a bloody waste of time...the senior area manager even asked me why I didn't go, and I told him: 'I haven't got time to waste evenings listening to his stupid ramblings'...all he does is say: 'Now, boys, you must push this'...bah!..") money is a basic and unalterable necessity. A roundsman commented:

"...let's be honest, what you're after is more money in the wage packet every week, this is the main thing...this is why I was trying to sell, I think this is the ultimate for everybody, isn't it?..."

But, importantly, the fact that the men are sceptical audiences to a poor performance does not make them performers. In a literally dramatic way, the management has, and will thus always have, the upper hand. The Manager perpetually tries to thicken the sales facade, referring to the sales-force as a "team" (a concept which Goffman, 1959, p 203, rightly points out is a dramatic device for ensuring loyalty) and blocks every move by the men to Unionise themselves. The Union, of course, being dramatically antithetical to the managerial definition of what is going on. The Sales manager said to me:

"..if the Union's a success here, there'll only be one man to blame...and that's me.. if the Union recruit anybody here...it'll be my fault..we don't need a Union!...what we've got here is a team...I'm one of them part of them...I consider them to be a family ...everybody wants to belong...do you know what I mean...that sense of belongingness ...the men need to be able to go past the factory and say: 'That's my factory'..."

Managerial attempts to thicken, and worker reactions to progressively thin the sales reality create an historical set of cycles similar to that of managerial "efficiency" and the resulting shop-floor "fix" noticed so astutely by Roy (1955). Take pay, for example. The men are paid on a flat-rate basis with commission earnings (of 10, and later 15%) on all cash taken on each round over a certain target. The targets may have been set fairly and democratically in the first instance, but the situation

has changed since then. Some rounds shrink, some grow; making it easy to make commission on some rounds, and hard on others. Vaguely aware of the impossibility of setting a fair rate (for more on this, see Ditton, 1975) the men begin to use one of the few bargaining weapons that they have - threatening to leave - to gain a drop in the target on their round. So, what starts as a means of individually and divisively controlling the sales team 'efficiently', in the final analysis, gets 'fixed'. The men then view commission no longer as an incentive, but instead, sceptically:

"...I nearly went after a job at the meat pie factory today...and _____ (Sales manager) got wind of it, he must have got a whisper, because he had me in the office, 'Come and have a cup of tea, Sid'...I wondered what he was going to say to stop me going...(commission target dropped by £15)..."

It is only a short and easily recognisable step from here to quite falsely threatening to leave just to get an effective pay increase:

"..._____ (roundsman) played up well, he complained that he was on a lower target than me...in the end he (manager) put him on the same level as me...he argued sufficiently to get it down..."

"...I gave my notice in...but he came round to see me at my house and offered me (better) terms...(left eventually)...when I was working for the sweet firm, he came round again and offered more..."

"...I said that I was going to give a week's notice...and he said that it wouldn't happen again (deducted for coming short)...but it did happen again...so I handed my notice in again, and he did the same thing (returned money deducted)...if they do it again, I shall threaten to leave again..."

Eventually, of course, most of the men realise that commission is class-based, and that nobody will ever make a fortune out of breaking the target (Ditton, op cit). One man commented sourly: "they make sure, even on wholesale, they

make sure that you get about £5 commission...to keep you happy... but not much more", and a supervisor reported the following case:

"...when we took over _____ (a small bakery) there was a bloke there getting about £45 a week...and this was in 1965! ...they buttered him up, they said that he was the type of bloke that they needed to build the company up...all the old flannel, and they got him to take a job as a supervisor...he dropped about £20 in wages!...just so that they could re-target the round and bring the wage down, but as far as I can see, and this is my honest opinion, it's a lot of fucking guesswork...you can get your target changed if you go and see the manager, ...and long as you've got something to back your claim up..."

Similarly, when recent governmental "efficiency" barred sale-and-return, the men who had depended on that system as a locale for inserting a fiddle, had to "fix" it.^(a) One said: "That'll fuck me up good...most of mine was on returns...still, I won't lose, I'll have to put it on the booking now". When the manager arbitrarily cuts bread orders when the waste gets a bit high, most of the men manage to anticipate and initially over-order to counteract the cut. Again, though, they read the action as class-based political action, and not merely as acceptable profit-expediency:

(a) Zeitlin (1971, p 24) contributes a nice example testifying to the added difficulties management can expect if they try to control remote interaction:

"...drivers for a retail bakery routinely turned over as many as 4,000 loaves of bread a day to supermarket managers in return for kickbacks. Because retail prices were rising, the bakery couldn't tack the cost of thievery onto the retail price of the bread. So the company began charging drivers the full wholesale price (29c per loaf) for bread unaccounted for...Drivers countered by continuing their illicit sales and replacing the bread so disposed of with day-old bread purchased for 10 cents a loaf from the company's day-old bread store..."

"...he's a bastard for that...he did that to me the other day...I went after him in the canteen, and didn't half swear at him, he cut half my bread off...I asked him if he was going to give me the commission that it would lose me..."

Several regular interactions reach a final total-charade stage in the eyes of the men, with the "fix" going in, in some cases, before the "efficiency". Most of the roundsmen inflate their estimate of their weekly cake waste as they feel that they know full well that the submitted sum will be reduced by office staffs, and perpetual battles are waged over the men's refusal to put their cash-calls (which are essential for fiddling on wholesale) on invoiced dockets.

A particularly relevant sector of sales experience for this analysis is the competitions which the management stage for roundsmen. Periodically, an outside sponsor (usually the agency promoting a high-cost, name-brand loaf) will support a competition for the highest sales of its product, and provide various cash and luxury goods rewards. This is particularly interesting as it provokes ideological confrontation between management and worker as the management simultaneously tries to motivate the workforce (paint the facade) and systematically test that motivation. Competitions, are then, in the reality sense, "competitions".^(a)

The men are immediately dubious of the supporting ethic. One commented: "I'm a bit suspicious of the competitions...with the same bloke winning all the time", and most believe them to be a theoretically unsound idea. As one man frankly and cleverly pointed out:

(a) Competition, as the late Walter Lippman once said, only survives where men are unable to abolish it. Cross (1969) notes how commercial competitions rapidly invite fixing in order that their concealed aim of improved sales be more speedily achieved. In this way, a win can be "planted on the most talkative woman in the neighbourhood", and in fact to ensure this, the General Marketing Corporation invited sponsors to purchase a competition for customers for which they "...will programme a pre-pack of cards to give you automatic distribution of the winners you specify to the exact locations of your choice..." (ibid).

"...if you're doing the job properly, they're (competitions) a farce...you shouldn't be able to do any better than you normally do...to tell the truth, I never take any interest in them.."

Scepticism abounds. "It's worked out on a most stupid system. A system of points where you get four points for selling loaves over a certain datum...it gets more stupid and complicated as it goes on...at the end, they hand round a little catalogue, and you can choose things to get with the points you've accumulated." But this attitude is not born in thin air. It is derived from hard, concrete experience that every stage of every competition is a "fix".

The datum for any particular competition (the quantity which must be over-sold to accumulate points) is usually set on an average performance basis taken from the sales record of each man during the four weeks preceeding the initiation of the competition. Bright 'competitors' need in the first instance to discover when a competition is coming up. It is said of one man, "He can go out, and he can take any prize that he wants. I still say that he fixes it, because he's in the know with the blokes at the bakery...and if something's coming up, they have to know to order more flour and things like that." Alternatively, the roundsman can bribe the man setting the targets to do so, in one instance at least, favourably:

"...he came up to me and said: 'I'm doing the targets for so-and-so competition'...this was last year, he said this...and he said: 'Ounce of tobacco, and I'll drop it 50'...there you go, look!...if he'd drop mine 50, how did I know he wasn't dropping some other bugger's?..."

One man thought that the targets were not even set before the competition began, but that instead, "they wait for the first week's result, they they set the datum for about £2 less than that result," providing yet another example of class-pay. Competitions degenerate into a game, and not the sort of game that the management intend. After a while, competitions begin to contradict,

and not support the sales ethos:

"...I only used to go for the Slimloaf competition...which was the only one I reckoned I stood a chance in...you get certain blokes always win certain competitions...like _____, he'll always win the Weatie Loaf one, it's a trick of the trade, you know when these competitions are going to come...he gets a tip off...and I always know that 4 weeks after that one, mine will come up... therefore, I drop my sales right down in those four weeks, and bump it right up during the competition..."

The real business of the competition can be fixed too. A standardised practice is to "stuff" the shops with the relevant loaf, and even refuse to supply customers with near alternatives, insisting, instead, that they take the competition loaf. One man overcharges his customers for the competition loaves, but tells them that he is giving them to them at half-price. Consequently, the shop-keeper sells more bread, customers get it cheaply, and the man's datum is exceeded. Everybody, at least as far as they know, is happy. Those loaves which fail to sell are either held on the van until after the competition is over, and quietly returned at a later date, or are slipped back into the bakery with the connivance of a despatch employee.

The winner is fixed anyway. When the figures are analysed after the competition is over, one man firmly believed that the supervisors concerned with checking results clip odd amounts off the submitted totals if "they look excessive". An experienced roundsman added:

"...old _____ had been coming short for some time, and he owed them quite a bit of money...but there was this competition, see?...with cash prizes...well, we should have had similar datums because we were doing about the same sales then...but he won the first prize of £15...and of course, they took the cheque as the money he owed them ...I said to him at the time: Your target is £20 lower than mine'..."

that was the biggest bloody fiddle going...they're just fixed...no doubt about it..."

Several men have bitterly experienced survival at every stage of the competition, but yet, at the last hurdle, have failed to get their prize. At one level, the management just point blank refuse to hand the goods over. One man, who should have won five bottles of whiskey, only got three. He said: "I went and complained to him, and he said that that was all they could afford to give me. He said that they'd only had 80 bottles for the whole firm. Well, I helped the bloke unload the whiskey when the lorry arrived. Twenty crates with 320 bottles in....I went back and saw him, to complain, and he said: "We've lost the papers for the competition now". The same roundsman had already had a similar experience:

"...they'd had a competition before, and I'd already won about £40 in the previous one...well, they forgot to take into account that the football was starting, and I came over my datum by thousands of pounds, and should have got about £90... well, to start with, they only paid me £30...when I complained about that, they gave me another £20..but what good was that?...eventually, I didn't pay my cash in...well, he paid me the same day...out of a little tin he had in the office.. and he was the same bloke who said that the firm couldn't afford to pay me..."

MASQUERADING AS "A SALES PERSONALITY": ORGANISING SELF

"..Do I realise that I have a sales personality which can be developed and improved?..."

(Wellbread Sales Manual
Question put to recruits)

Managing the Dilemma of Identification

The dilemma of identification affects all service workers. All servers demonstrate this in the ways that they handle those inevitable recurring customers who overestimate the extent and scope of servility. Barmaids and air-hostesses, for example, face this to such a degree that they are forced to develop occupational rhetorics to redefine "suggestions" un-seriously. As Garbin and Boles (1974) tell us, strip-tease artists are so vulnerable to members of the audience mistaking the appearance for the reality of availability, that their rhetorics degenerate into viscious taunts.

Male service workers, on the other hand, face inverted consequences of sexism. All male servers support, directly or indirectly, what we might accurately, if a little indelicately, call the customer-fucking myth. Goffman (1959, p 190) reports:^(a)

(a) Thompson (1971, p 103) claims that there was a time when, especially for bakers, this was literally, rather than merely figuratively the case. Women had their corn ground at the mill, and Thompson (ibid) supposes that the venacular "grinding" merely reflects that one sort of grinding was done in return for another.

"..when we study service occupations, especially lowly ones, inevitably, we find that practitioners have anecdotes to tell about the time they or one of their colleagues redefined the service relationship into a sexual one (or had it redefined for them). Tales of such aggressive redefinitions are a significant part of the mythology not only of particular occupations, but also of the male subculture generally..."

As Goffman points out (ibid, p 186) customer-fucking would, if practiced, be a workable way of redefining the service deference, and its usual connotation of lowliness, in a more acceptable way, and consequently realigning work self with real self. Of course, it does happen, but rarely. As Gold (1952, p 265) points out, there are good reasons for performers to avoid such entanglements, the offer alone being enough to satisfactorily realign self.

The dilemma is thus not a practical one. Customer-fucking would fail to solve the basic problems of "performers" which are literally dramatic rather than metaphorically substantive. As I have tried to show, "method" acting in this context, has its own difficulties. As an example of the over-involved (cf, the "nutter" in Ditton, 1972a, p 681) Consider the following statement:

"...See that bloke?...he used to be with us, but he was too slow...honest, but bloody slow....he never used to get back to the bakery until about 9.00!...we started off thinking that he was just slow, and couldn't manage it, so on Bank Holidays ...we used to send a supervisor out with him, and they used to get back about 2.00...and it turned out that he wasn't slow...he didn't want to go home...when we used to get him finished early, he used to sit in the cafe for two hours, so he wouldn't have to take his wife out, said that he couldn't afford to take her out on the money he was earning!..."

The more "classical" mode of actor-disinvolvement (i.e., the "delivery-boy" exit funnel) is equally existentially awkward, as I have already shown.

Thus, competent management is a (paradoxical) combination of elements of both involvement and disinvolvement, and the particular empirical situation which faces baker's roundsmen (a "weak" and segregated audience, see Goffman, 1959, p 137-141, 168) forces consciousness of the part-time self of work upon the worker. Serially visiting 300 separated audiences, "rearranging" oneself (as one man delightfully put it) between times, itself acknowledges the literal performer status of the roundsman.

Actually developing 'competence' is typically a trial-and-error process, culminating in eventual adoption of a particular style. One man recounted this process:

"..You get an initial boredom, at the beginning of the job, when you start, you're dim in a sense...when the job is new...and you don't sort of know anything else, then, you don't get boredom...then, if you've got any intelligence at all, you start to get bored...and you see the same people day in and day out...so they treat you as part of the family, and the boredom wears off...for about four weeks, until people get to know you, it's boring.. then gradually the boredom starts to wear off...course, it stays, relatively interesting until the times comes when you've had enough, and people tend to pry, and it goes too far...the round I've just started, I've got to get over that initial boredom, by getting up and thinking: 'No, it's not going to be the same today, it's going to be different'...I actually tell myself that in the morning...."

Service, Selling and the Fiddle

The service relationship thus provides the psychological as well as the material and empirical context for fiddling. Whilst there is an obvious quantitative relation between fiddling and

selling (in the sense that the bigger the transaction, the greater the amount of the fiddle that can be slipped into it) some astute commentators have noticed that, aside from this symbiotic harness, an ironic convergence between the two:

"...Look, I don't know whether you've got a tape-recorder up your sleeve, but I know that if I've got 15 salesmen out there, I've got 15 fiddlers...and I've got this theory, and it's only a theory, that the top salesmen are the top fiddlers..."

(Manager at the Tiger Bakery)

There are not only practical similarities then. The fiddle appears to demand exactly the same qualities as selling. Fiddling seems to be an exasperating microcosm of the capitalist structure - the one difference between it and selling being the successful decoration legitimization of conventional economic exchange.

The particular context of bread selling demands the negotiation and management of a service relationship. The very consciousness of this demand produces, for the roundsman, interactional sense-as-performance. Reflection upon this interpenetration produces only one satisfactory and permanent resolution of the stage-dilemma of involvement in and reflection upon performance: the part-time self. Subsequently, it is this existential partiality which legitimates the fiddle.

Chapter Four

STRUCTURE: Conditions of Successful Fiddling, Stealing,
and Dealing.

INTRODUCTION: ORGANISING PARAMETERS OF OCCUPATIONAL THEFT

I have dealt with both the persuasive processes which initially encourage, and the dramatic interactional niceties which subsequently foster the erosion of uprightness in Wellbread salesmen. Transformation of raw, situationally honest recruit salesmen is managed through what I was able to characterise as an involuntarily-undertaken, informationally-subtle, initially-intentionally-closed, Fagin-type, alter-directed moral career. Neophytes are manipulated with exquisite care into accepting that they need to fiddle customers out of small amounts of money so as to counterbalance deficits which inevitably occur in the selling process.

By asking the salesmen to fiddle, and yet, alas, inevitably failing to protect them should they be actually caught doing so, the management occupationally locate the salesmen in a weak, heterodoxical bind. They expect the men to act cynically with customers (and fiddle them) but idealistically with themselves (and not steal from management). Subsequently, the primary injunction (to fiddle) is strong, and the secondary negative meta-injunction (that only customers should be fiddled) is really contradictory. Unfortunately for the management, the application of this secondary negative injunction ironically depends upon their own future good behaviour. Eventually, for most men, the management do something which is interpreted by the salesmen as an act of class-based aggression. This usually invalidates the grounds of applicability of the weak meta-rule, and the men are suddenly converted to (in addition to fiddling customers) stealing from the firm.

Analysis of the everyday grounding and maintenance of

this experience in sales occasions (given in Chapter Three) shows that Goffman's dramatic analysis is literally applicable (in an originally intended sense) to an understanding of Wellbread salesmen, as well as being perhaps metaphorically relevant. The salesmen literally 'perform' for their customer 'audiences'. This base-structure itself makes fiddling a sensible practice. The doubly-asymmetrical service relationship elects customers to a perceptively exploitable category (both motivationally and technically) and routine and repeated customer/audience demands force the salesman/performer to become irretreivable occupationally cynical.

Whilst variations in standard interactional competences are interpersonally possible (occasionally producing paradoxical occasions, such as when the customer fiddles the salesman), competent salesmen are typically "cynical", and customers typically "sincere". Accordingly, gradually and inevitably generated in unalterable dramaturgic structure, salesmen make a typically accomodated response to the universal "involvement-dilemma". The decision to operate the subsequent part-time self acts as a psychologically insulating and legitimating scaffolding for fiddling. The various strategies evolved for dealing with customers, and customer-related problems (such as timetabling, route-management, and marketing) usually reflect this decision. Available factory folk-wisdom constantly reminds erring "salesmen" of the drawbacks of over-involvement (the "cap-doffer") or under-involvement (the "dropper") in work.

The concealed background to the service relationship (i.e., interactions with the bakery management) reflects a similar set of situation-readings. In response to the "preparation-dilemma" (the necessary decision as to how the organisational as well as the presentational self is managed) the cynicism of customer-dealings is replaced by sincerity before management. The "ideal" roundsman (in the management's eyes) makes a nice compromise between over-preparing, and over-selling his round. Those who, contrarily, invest insufficient energy in the managerial business of selling (and who over-refine the preparation of their

bread orders) find boredom in just being a "delivery" agent. Those, conversely, too involved in selling and too little in preparation find that, exasperatingly, the management are interested in profit before any sub-moral allegiance to the selling ethos, and will not provide the perfect set of back-up conditions for selling, when loss is a possibility.

Before describing the portfolio of practical techniques with which the Wellbread salesmen profit from both customer and the firm, some crucial parameters of success in making illicit earnings require examination. The post-socialist career of each salesman depends upon the differences in scope that his relations with customers will outline, and the variations in contexts of opportunities that are presented to him in his dealings with the inside bakery staffs. Before illustrating the influence of these two conditional parameters, a descriptive prologue is needed.

Salesmen are paid on a flat-rate salary basis coupled with commission earnings for passing individual sales-targets. Occasionally, bonus earnings for good sales records during special competitions are possible. This structure has remained virtually unchanged since the beginning of the century.^(a) The moral rationale behind such a wage-structure was further explained to me by a supervisor on a very hot day:

"...Oh, well, when you sign your employment contract, they're very careful to specify that the basic is for 54 hours, so that they don't get stung for any overtime claims... anyway, you can't have people on hourly rate, you'd never know where they were half the time, take us...we could be sunning ourselves on the heath for two hours every day, couldn't we?....."

(a) Kirkland (1911, Vol.III, p 249) notes: "With big firms, both barrowmen and vanmen are paid only very small standing wages, just sufficient to constitute them as paid servants, and receive the remainder as commission on sales only. The objects, of course, are to keep the deliverers in a state of anxiety to increase their wages by larger sales...".

Sales life is organisationally constructed for each salesman in weekly financial accountability terms. Every salesman is held to be personally responsible for ensuring that the cash collected by him satisfactorily matches the value of the goods despatched to him. To ensure fulfilment of such duties, a financial debit-credit "Reconciliation" (Rec.) sheet, is prepared weekly by the office staff for each man. "Recs." are a lengthy mathematical trial for each man, and by balancing debits with credits, culminate with a personal verdict. Individual responsibility in ensuring that a balance is achieved is negatively enforced by managerial appropriations from the wage-packets of those whose verdict is "short" of the required sum. If the verdict falls on the credit side however, surpluses (or, "overs") are theoretically transferred by the Sales manager to balance an overall weekly departmental accountability. Each salesman has an individual page in his 'Big Book', and weekly verdicts are systematically recorded there, providing a cumulative running total of his historical fiscal biography in the departments' employ.

As well as such calculative accountability, each salesman is ultimately responsible for checking that appropriate goods are ordered, adjusted, despatched, and loaded, and that he is accurately credited with unsold goods that he returns to the depot.

The salesman is thus responsible for the financial destiny of his accounts in areas where he has neither access nor control, and under conditions where the tools of checking are systematically and regularly denied him. One salesman commented sadly:

"...They've got you by the short and curlies, and there's nothing you can do...look, in the office, they allow 'private' discounts that we're not supposed to know about...how can we check that?...all the discounts vary from shop to shop...sometimes, it's 12%, sometimes 12½%, sometimes, 15%, 22½%...too complex to keep track of...you haven't got the time to do it for a start, and you haven't got the facilities for another...then there's credits and extras, and returns, and shorts,...you

don't know whether they've put the credit in or not, but you assume it is....maybe your charges don't go through, maybe your credits don't go through...maybe your accounts aren't worked out right...on the big stores, you don't even see the invoice, how do you know there isn't a mistake?..."

Thus, low pay,^(a) and responsibility for matters generally outside the salesman's control provide an occupational structuring, which, when coupled with the biographical experiences of socialisation "coerce" (in Leonard and Weber's 1970 strict meaning) illegal activity.

The form that this activity takes depends partially upon the scope offered the roundsman by the type and size of the 'round' to which he has been allocated. The sales hinterland is divided into a set of 49 routes, 19 of which are Wholesale (W/S), and the remainder Retail (Rt.). But 'routes' are mere geographical circuits: a 'round' is a route specially coloured with a particular and unique history of biographies of salesmen and customers. Recruits are always trained on used rounds, and thus any situationally and characterologically appropriate choice of a 'correct' mode of fiddling will succeed or fail in terms of its ability to merge with historically accepted practices on that round. This "situated self" (Goffman, 1961a, p 41) strongly etches performance norms upon the tabula rasa of the neophyte salesman. As initial socialisation proceeds by example, recruits are accordingly encouraged by supervisors to fiddle by 'appeals to continuity', which may or may not be phrased as 'appeals to loyalty'. One salesman remembered:

"...all the farmhouse loaves were a penny extra, I think, yeah, Old Dick, who'd been on there for years had been doing it...the supervisor kept that one actually, he did explain to me, he said: 'This is Old Dick's doing, we'll carry it on'..."

So, when training induces a recruit to practice the fiddle,

(a) In the research summer of 1973, basic salary was £27.75 p.w. Average commission earnings were a publicised £4.75 pw. Despatch men were making an average of £51 p.w.

it induces him to do it in certain ways. Salesmen failing to accept the need to curtail practice to fit pre-existing fiddle-patterns that have historically passed on the round, experience particular problems. In fact, it is this discrepancy (or its absence) between recruit predilections and idiosyncratic historically accepted practices which either entraps or protects salesmen. For example, it is said of some who have failed to literally follow in their predecessor's fiddle-steps:

"...he got greedy in the end...he got to the point where the customers got suspicious, none of them did anything, but they all started checking him out, ...he couldn't make any more..."

"...He's a useless bugger...they want to get rid of him...he carved up that seaside run...they don't like him down there..."

"...I had a good round...but the chap that went on there after me, he was what you'd call a 'shark'...he just done everybody ...doing people left, right and centre.. he was doing accounts that they'd obviously find out about..."

Differences in scope can also arise from the ways that the management organises customers into groups served by different types of round. W/S rounds deal in large quantities of goods, selling to a small number of customers (about 30, but taking up to £1,000 a week gross sales). Essentially, W/S salesmen deliver to re-sale outlets as middle-men, operating on a planned marketing basis. More time and care is given to each customer, and the wholesalers, as a group, are an elitist band recruited from the best of the retail salesman. One W/S man said:

"..I prefer wholesale...I don't know why, you feel as if you're selling more...if you sell an extra bit of cake on retail, you get pleased with yourself, in a shop it's an extra tray.. because it's bigger, it seems to give more satisfaction...On W/S, let's be honest, you don't go out to make a couple of bob..(on fiddles)...like retail, do you?...you go out to make four or five quid, don't you?..."

Retail salesmen, on the other hand, sell much smaller quantities of goods to a larger number of customers, probably 250-300 customers, but only taking about £100 - £250 a week in sales. Retail men act as door-to-door salesmen, and operate by 'pushing' the goods as front men. The most important difference for Rt. men in organising fiddling is the type of customer, and the sorts of treatment that the salesman can expect from different types. This is primarily seen as the difference between country and town people. Two salesmen said:

"...country people are quite different aren't they?...much more character than the people in the town..."

"....I wish I had a country round...much nicer, they treat you differently in the country...they great you...like...you were coming round to help them...as an equal...whereas in the town, they just think you're a servant..."

The typical result of fiddling customers is to add a bit onto the bill. In retrospect, this amounts to adding a percentage od.^(a) With skill and finesse, this can be as great as ten percent. Ultimately, however, the differences in the gross amounts that can be creamed off are dependant upon the size of the round. Two, fairly typical, examples will do:

W/S: "...I normally, on a good week, have about £25 out, but I took an extra £57 out that week, because I was going on holiday..and I still came £2 over on the Rec!..."

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- (a) Most of the deprecating argot of occupational theft reflects this theme of the Metaphor of the Parasitic Percentage. When referring to the profit to be gained, this is typically thought of as slight accretion - "packing", or "padding" of a legitimately earned income. But when, as is more often the case, the transaction is conceived of as a slight loss to the victim, the more common erosion metaphor is invoked: "bilk", "chisel", "cream", "cut", "doctor", "fleece", "gouge", "milk", "mulet", "nickel-and-dime", "skim", "water", etc.. Whilst it is sometimes held that a professed absence of well-recognised argot patterns in the speech of occupational criminals testifies to their (alleged) non-criminal status, this brief look at their metaphoric vocabulary reflects not the legitimacy of the referred practices, but instead to the number of employees cognisant of so indulging, and recognisant of its criminal status.

Rt.: "...I used to reckon on making about £2 to £3 a week, and that was pretty good"

The other major organising parameter lies in the variations in contexts of opportunity, themselves dependant upon variations in timing and territory. Rounds are scheduled to tie in with customer timetables, and because there are not enough loading bays at the bakery to accomodate all salesmen loading simultaneously, every round has a scheduled arrival and departure time at the depot. Smaller loads for smaller rounds obviously take less time to load and serve: in this sense, the two organising parameters are linked.

Such entry-timing is crucial to the understanding of the variations of opportunity that different salesmen have for stealing from, and dealing with despatch staffs. Although synchronisation of arrival is well-planned, coindidence of entry at different points in the despatch staffs' work pattern produces four distince entry-statuses for salesmen, called by despatch staffs: "Early Birds", "Big Boys", "Old-Stagers", and "Small-Timers".^(a)

Three of the W/S salesmen arrive particularly early at the depot (about 3.00 am) either to synchronise with early customers (ships leaving early from the docks), or to travel long distances before starting to sell. Their arrival coincides with the completion of normal duties by despatch staffs, who are still issuing or slicing bread, and who have not yet changed from stock production and stock distribution to stock-control. At this time in the morning, greater areas of the despatch territory are open for free access by salesmen, although gradually,

(a) These labels are formed and used by despatch staffs. I have not tried to sharpen them analytically: they form a descriptive, not analytic, typology. They inevitably overlap with salesmen's self-typing (given in Chapter Five) which although generated in different conditions (of reactions to labelling) are similar to the extent that careers and practices of salesmen are situated. I discuss them at length in order to illustrate the extent to which deviant success is a result of ascription rather than achievement.

as the morning matures, these free-access areas will diminish in size, and be replaced by large areas restricted to non-sales personnel. Despatch staffs are still, however, at this time in the morning, working at various points in the despatch area, and are not yet concentrated in the office at one end of the despatch area, where they eventually congregate to drink tea, and from which their collective view of what is going on in the territory for which they are responsible, is limited.

Thus, despatch staffs's knowledge of the practices of "Early Birds" is extensive, and their relations with them tend to be either extremely good, or extremely bad. One "early Bird", who was subtle enough not to try to take advantage of despatch staffs' preoccupation with work rather than stock-control found that he was allowed to take a few extra loaves each morning from the rack of spare day-stock bread which is situated a long way from his loading bay, and near the despatch office:

"...I do it openly, and let them see me, mostly, I just take it, and they won't book it...unless they tell you...sometimes they've got so much stock there, they allow you to take a bit...it's a sort of deal really, they're easy with you as long as you don't go too heavy...if you don't go too heavy, you can pick up a few..."

Another "Early Bird" has sufficiently annoyed despatch staff with complaints and petty thefts which they would have to rectify:

"...Despatch have been watching him apparently, watching him like a hawk...he's getting fed up, because he can't make anything..."

"...Yeah, it used to be alright...but you can't even get a tray of bread nowadays...you used to be able to get that at least, you could start the day off right...but not now..."

The "Big Boys", wholesalers on large local delivery, begin to arrive at 4.30 am, but are normally loaded and away by 5.30 am. Their arrival coincides with the despatch tea-break, which symbolises for despatch staff the change from stock

distribution to stock-control. "Big Boys" have typically good relations with despatch men, providing somebody for the latter to talk to, and share tea with. Although, by now, the day stock is counted and out of bounds for "Big Boys", control is only exercised mildly and haphazardly from inside the despatch office. Although this office was designed and built so as to afford a fine view of all the loading-bays to which the salesmen drag their racks prior to loading, the despatch manager (who finds it more personally profitable to watch over stale bread returns) obscures this view with racks of stale bread. A "Big Boy" commented upon usual relations with despatch staff:

"...they don't come and check you if you say that you're short of something...we have pretty good relations with them really...if you tell them you're short, they'll give it to you without much fuss as a rule..."

Between 6.00 and 6.45 am, the "Old-Stagers" arrive and load on the top bays of the depot, furthest from the office. Accurate timing is crucial for them, as to successfully retrieve stale bread from the 'back passage' (a long passage, out of sight of the despatch office, running from the despatch area parallel with the plant, in which stales which have come in from the outlying depot during the night are stored prior to being checked by the despatch manager) they need to be there after the despatch shift has gone home (about 6.00) but before the despatch manager arrives for work at 6.20 am. Most of the "Old-Stagers" are middle-aged retailers on large country rounds who rely upon selling a few stales to sell to customers as dog-food. Because, however, their entry-timing is close enough to the exit of the despatch staffs, they sometimes also deal in a small way with minor despatch men.

"Small-Timers", on the other hand, are not supposed to arrive until after the despatch manager. This is actually a rule. "Small-Timers" comprise the rest of the retail salesmen, and their arrival between 6.45 am and 7.45 am precludes them from dealing with despatch staff (as they cannot synchronise with

them for the 'payoff') and from any significant stealing from stock under the watchful eye of the manager. Some members of this group have occasionally tried to overcome these problems by earlier arrival, but the immediate suspicion that this places them in requires that they either substantiate their presence with an acceptable verbalisation (such as: 'getting a good start to get finished early to go on holiday'), or subject their vans to rigorous search. One man complained:

"...Fucking _____ (despatch manager)...
he said I shouldn't be here this early,
he searched my motor and took a whole
tray off that I'd bought...he said that
if he caught me here before him again,
he'd report me..."

On top of this, although the character of despatch territory changes between arrival status-groups,^(a) salesmans' attempts to operate in off-limits or out-of-bounds areas will render them liable to report, challenge or suspicion, and may label them as marked men:

"...For instance, there's a supervisor in the cake-store at the moment...but I know he won't take anything...he knows that I saw him go in, that's why...and I caught him at it before.. (i.e, stealing)...and I told him that if I caught him doing it again, I'd give him the sack..."

Thus, although different entry-statuses may create significant variations in the conditions for stealing and dealing in despatch, status is no licence for territory infringement or invasion. What is crucial is that a salesman's interactions with despatch staffs is (often unwittingly) governed by the category to which he is arbitrarily allocated. His subsequent entry-status then acts as an invisible harness upon his illegal activities. In sum, the objective extent of fiddling customers (i.e., the weekly "take" he may expect) will be, in the last analysis, ruled by the scope that round of customers offers.

(a) To recapitulate, territory gradually becomes less accessible to salesmen as despatch workers progressively adopt a controlling role, and cease their distributive function.

The legitimate size of his round (and its type) will typically allocate him an entry-status which will irremediably condition the nature of his relationships with despatch staffs: a vital condition for both successful stealing from, and successful dealing with them.

As I have already pointed out (in Chapter Two) the Wellbreads management makes an interesting, and somewhat mysterious distinction in the acceptance or rejection of different types of theft. As one, rather puzzled, recruit put it: "They seem to think that taking bread from them is wrong, and fiddling their customers is right." Before describing fiddling, stealing and dealing in more detail, I will try to make this managerial maxim into an Everyman Performance. This leads us to a discussion of the economic context of blue-collar occupational theft in general, and to a consideration of "inventory shrinkage" in particular.

STEALING FROM WORK

"Inventory Shrinkage"

Most organisational inventories sustain losses. These losses are a technical matter though, and not issues for the invocation of moral concern. What is important in an organisation is that such losses be accurately calculated, rather than that their actual nature be accurately diagnosed. I would like to suggest some sound reasons why descriptions of these losses are typically inaccurate.

Aside from non-inventory loss (i.e., the loss of obviously missing, but non-inventorised stock), and accurately accounted loss, there is also the possibility of misaccounted loss, and unaccounted losses. Misaccounted losses arise through inventory classification error.^(a) All inventories have an initial loss-sorting vocabulary, which acts as a set of labeling-pending trays for losses. There is often reticence to label loss as due to malign, rather than to understandably benign sources. At Wellbreads, when despatch staffs discover that goods are "missing", an elaborately evasive vocabulary is used. Since inefficiency is as likely as theft, a non-stigmatising batch of terms which reserve final judgement is used. Absent chocolate fingers were said to have "walked", bread to have "gone astray" (if permanently, to have "vanished"), jam puffs and other confectionary to have "disappeared", and boxed cake to have "flown". These preliminary and kindly categories reflect later official inventory euphemisms, such as "distressed" merchandise (Klockars,

(a) This describes Palmer's (1973, p 20) sense of "hidden" loss. Lay commentators commonly refer to pilferage totals as hidden because they haven't heard of them before. Actually, the loss itself is obvious, only its cause is hidden from the layman.

1974, p 184), "inventory shrinkage" and so on.^(a) This is not pure philanthropy. The Wellbreads despatch staff were schooled by the despatch manager not to make unprovable assertions about the characters of others. Additionally, as Crawford (1915, p 116) points out, loss-sorting dilemmas are not always inherently resolvable. A true inventory reality is not necessarily decipheral in closer analysis as "...mistakes and false entries are often distinguished only by the connected facts..." (emphasis added, ibid).

All inventories contain traditional 'dustbin' or 'et cetera' categories where loss may be discounted as "worn", "spoiled", "damaged", "broken", "reject", "seconds", "lost", and so on. However, it is generally within the organisational power of those stealing such goods to have them thus labeled. The well-schooled employee thief will indulge in inventory-buck-passing, and thus successfully pass off his own thefts as incurred elsewhere in the organisation. For example, Wellbreads inside dealers dealt whole racks of bread which they then claimed that they had been short-delivered by the other production bakery in the chain. When straight despatch staff found 'extra' bread on salesmen's racks, they were told that "inexperienced casuals must have made a mistake". As Wahl points out (1963, p 76), the chances of permanently being able to do this are enhanced when there is a category (such as "shoplifters" for thieving store employees) who can regularly be blamed, but whose honesty cannot be systematically checked.^(b)

(a) "Shortage" is often erroneously interchanged with the word "shrinkage". Shortage refers to the: "absence of material to satisfy customer or user demand" (Pritchard and Eable, 1965, p 138) its cost is equal to the marginal profit lost in not immediately satisfying customer demand (Magee and Boodman, 1958, p 390). Shrinkage refers to: "...the difference between the sum of the closing inventory plus net sales, discounts, price changes, mark downs, and the starting inventory plus purchases..." (Edwards, 1958, p 3).

(b) Anderson (1923, p 161) recounts that Hobos claim that train crews steal merchandise from their loads and blame unnamed 'hobos' to shield themselves. The exasperating success of this deliberate manipulation of inventories occurs as the inventory is (one might deduce) based upon what I have elsewhere characterised as a linear set of beliefs (Ditton, 1975, p 7). Such a system cannot

In this way, normal inventory taking might be characterised as a partial "succeed-safe" system. That is, it only works under intermally benign, and externally malign circumstances. It accurately labels internal technically unavoidable losses, and successfully reflects any outside intentional theft. Typically, however, inside theft is miscounted. (a)

(Contd) cope, in a control sense, with those controlled correctly interpreting the theory. Goffman (1974, p 324) rather nicely calls this the "breeding" characteristic of events. The latter possibility produces a feature which we may call "asymptotic swinging". Thievery may anticipate the likely response to itself and incorporate a pre-paid reply. Ultimately, this becomes hackneyed, and the pendulum of credibility swings away to rest upon the first 'wide-boy' to pre-incorporate an answer to the rationale which first defeated the initial pre-planned reply. For example, when management attempt to cut ordinary losses by offering workers damaged goods at reduced prices, the relatively random supply of such goods is rationalised by the men, and patched into consumer demand by "organising" 'damage' to chosen goods. Davis (1957, p 259), Dalton (1964, p 208), and Edwards (1958, p 107-8) all testify to the fact that goods are systematically marred, bought cheap, and even repaired on company time. Similarly, taxi-drivers "make change" (Davis, 1959, p 269): by fumbling for change, or by giving it in small denominations, "organise" they encourage tardy tippers. Sutherland (1937, p 16) notes that thieves believe that "98%" of reported robberies of jewellers are inflated for the insurance, and that (swinging the other way), mobsmen may 'burn' their confederates (take part of the loot) due to the credibility of being able to say that the victim's claims about how much he lost in the raid are probably exaggerated.

(a) Similarly, dockers (eg, as in Mars, 1974) claim that shortage always occurs where they are not. In CASE 56 (20.11.74), for example, Ipswich dockers officially charged with pilferage, claimed that the pilferage had taken place in Poland, the port of loading. In H.CASE 9 (10.7.72) it is reported that Heathrow baggage porters made sure that looted suitcases belong to foreigners who are flying out, so that there is less chance of them flying in again, and complaining. However, when a famous show-jumper had all his International Horse Show winnings taken (H.CASE 11: 5.7.73) on a trip to Germany, he did complain. No doubt the thieves were surprised: one can normally count on silence from those with large numbers of notes stashed in their luggage.

On top of miscounting, there is generally considerable clerical error in inventory taking. This produces the somewhat ironic term (used by accountants) of "book loss", used to resolve unmatched sides of accounts. Curtis (1960, p 585-7) reports a study made of one American store. It was found that one in every ten clerical transactions had produced an error:

"...The study showed that in a single year about 1,200,000 such clerical errors were made...Sales amounting to over \$420,000 were not rung up. There were fifteen types of error in the study. Nine of these were found to have caused a gross shortage of about \$580,000 and a net shortage of about \$440,000..."

Unaccounted losses, on the other hand, are "invisible" to inventory search. They may either be permanently unaccountable, such as when customers are fiddled by salesmen, or temporarily unaccountable, such as when an employee 'covers' his thefts by carrying (rather than euphemistically resorting) his stolen deficit.

No estimate of customer losses is possible, as customers have no collective (and often no individual) audit. Accordingly, inventory-track of sustained losses is permanently lost. However, when inventory-entries are falsified to carry deficits, losses are theoretically discoverable. Whilst they may lay dormant for very long periods,^(a) the initial loss can never be perfectly eradicated. As Crawford (1915, p 114, emphasis added) so nicely puts it:

"...Some have asked why crimes are not more often successfully concealed - why it is that a man, after the most careful planning, fails to provide against the little things that lead to his undoing. The answer is that crime is a violation of the eternal fitness of things. There runs an endless chain of circumstances

(a) Jaspan and Black (1960, p 12) estimate that between \$10 and \$25 billion has been stolen, but as yet, "invisibly". Similarly, Conner (1954, p 21) adds that such losses "remain undiscovered for an average period of three years in commercial and industrial concerns and seven years in financial institutions". Business Week (1948a, p 88) puts the average time period of concealment as high as 11 years.

leading to expected events. The usual attracts no attention; we pass it with the remark that it is natural. It is the unexpected, the thing which does not fit into the circumstantial chain, that arrests our mind and of itself demands an explanation...No man has lived capable of perfecting a chain of circumstances to explain or cover his misdeed..."(a)

In fact, as Barrett (1895, p 197) notices, embezzlers are classically discovered by their inability to continue to cover their thefts, rather than by outside discovery of the initial theft. Of course, "uncovered" thefts will surface as a loss in the same inventory time-span as that in which the loss itself occurred: the definitive feature of unaccounted theft is that it is at least concealed during one inventory check.^(b)

These initial distinctions will make later analysis more sensible.^(c) But before I go on to discuss the Wellbreads

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- (a) Of course, fraudulent use of computers by employee thieves has changed all this. It is now possible to steal via the computer, and then programme the computer to go back and erase the illicit transaction from its memory banks - and also erase the fact that the transaction has been erased.
- (b) By "covered" theft, I mean theft that has been made inventorially-invisible by systematic inventory falsification. This is not a novel distinction (i.e., it is made by Hartung, 1950, p 29; and Clinard, 1946, p 79) and whilst it may be physical (for example, nailing empty merchandise crates to the floor so that they feel full during the next inventory check, Ross, 1960, p 21), physical "concealment" alone (for example, transportation of stolen merchandise past security checks under the coat - Davis, 1957, p 233, or in a tool-box - Factory Management and Maintenance, 1954, p 89, - via the "postal racket", posting items to oneself Hewitt, 1963, p 15 - with the "overcoat gag", Ross, 1960, p 140, wearing stolen clothing items out - or with the "garbage trick", sending items out in refuse to be picked up later, Astor, 1964, p 27, Conner, 1954, p 21, Llockars, 1974, p 85; which are all non-inventory altering tactics. For examples of the latter, in CASE 4 (2.2.73) an employee of the West India Dock was imprisoned for removing articles pilfered from ships in a secret compartment which he had installed in his car. Similarly, employees at the Polaris refitting base have been prosecuted for theft (CASE 102, 30.9.75) of materials carried out on car boots especially altered and strengthened for the job.
- (c) "Fiddling" is permanently unaccountable loss, "dealing" is temporarily unaccountable when traffic, but with "stealing", it is accountable when trade.

salesmen in detail, a discussion of the general features of employee theft provides the general framework for appreciating their situation.

There is no available summation of totals lost to the United Kingdom economy through employee theft.^(a) It is presumptively likely, however, that the situation will be similar to that experienced in America, as employee theft is intricately related (as I will show in Chapter Six) to core industrial and business values shared by both cultures. The American data presents a picture of rapidly increasing inventory loss through employee thefts. Barrett (1895, p 196) claims that losses due to banks alone amounted to \$9 millions in 1892, rising to \$19 millions and \$25 millions in 1893, and 1894 respectively. Smith (1920, p 14) reported an annual defalcation total loss in 1912 of \$40 millions, which had increased to \$100 millions per year by 1919. By 1946, Peterson (1946, p 94) claimed a total loss of \$400 millions, and by 1949, Abramson (1949, p 45) suggested that this had increased to \$500 millions per year.

Eight years later, in 1957, Davis (1957, p 221) relayed an estimate of \$600 millions per year, and by the end of the next decade, Ross (1961, p 140), and Gregory (1962, p 68) both

(a) Even the much publicised figure of £248 millions (£1 millions lost per working day) a figure extrapolated and subsequently bandied around in 1973 (see: CUTTINGS, 1: 4.2.73, and Palmer, 1973, p 20) was a total extrapolated from a smaller sample, and plus-costed to take account of inflation. There have been some partial-economy estimates, for example, the N.F.B.T.E. regularly estimates (CUTTING 1, 13,2.75; and CUTTING 28, 21.3.75) a loss to the building industry of £100 millions per year, and Home Office (1973, para 1.10) estimates shop loss from staff thefts as between £135 and £200 millions per year. Unfortunately, these estimates are derived from inventories wherein staff-theft is merely a (generally disbelieved) residual category. It is most likely that staff-losses are systematically and randomly misaccounted. Of course, these totals do not refer to any permanently unaccounted loss. Comparatively, the current British picture infers that approximately 18 million blue-collar workers are responsible for £248 millions of loss; and 6 million white-collar office workers alone are responsible for a £12 millions per year "paperclip robbery" loss (CUTTINGS 3: 26.7.73).

agreed that the total had climbed to \$1 billions annually. Wahl (1963, p 71) put employee theft loss at between \$1 and \$2 billions annually, and more recently, Robin (1965, p 5) estimated that this had topped the \$5 billions mark, and Zeitlin (1971, p 22) puts the current total at between \$8.5 and \$10 billion per year.

Whilst these figures are vague, sometimes speculative, and occasionally merely incestuously inflation-costed, they are all basically a collection of small-scale but officially reported loss statements which have been extrapolated to reflect the probable loss to the whole economy.^(a) I introduce them here merely to indicate generally persistent and widespread trends which may be held to be relevant to all advanced capitalist economies.

But there is a sense in which some statistical speculation

(a) Those publishing such statistics generally admit that such extrapolations are somewhat unreliable. The Home Office (1973, para: 1.10) noted: "...None of the persons making such estimates offer any indication as to how they arrived at the figures. Presumably, they were based on personal experience multiplied by what the investigator considered to be an appropriate factor..". Whilst this is true, it is inevitable and unavoidable. However, the 'multiplication factor' has remained fairly constant since the beginning of the century. Hartshorne (1922, p 41) estimated that tool theft written off as breakage was between $1\frac{1}{4}$ and 2% of total losses. Ross (1961, p 141) puts the figure at 1.35% of sales, and Jaspán and Black (1960, p 37) very similarly argue for 1.4% of sales. This, on a profit margin of, say, 2%, would create a loss equal to 70% of sales profits. It has now become conventional amongst loss statisticians to melodramatically describe losses in terms of the volume of sales necessary to recoup the theft. Thus, loss is multiplied by either 50, or by 100 (depending on whether or not the profit level is taken to be 1% or 2% of gross turnover) to show the percentage of the profits that the loss represents. For example, loss of a \$1 item (on a 2% profit basis) means that \$50 worth of goods will have to be sold to recoup the loss-to-profit, rather than merely the loss-to-stock. Zeitlin's recent (1971, p 22) estimate that theft losses are 5% of sales, implies that \$500 worth of goods must be sold to recoup the same \$1 loss. This should indicate that part of the problem in giving a statistical account of loss trends is the changing procedures of fact collection itself.

might be valuable. Whilst the total weekly illegal "take" that the Wellbreads salesmen made from fiddling, dealing and stealing was ultimately proportionate to the organising parameters of size and type of round and context of opportunity, the amount that an experienced and sophisticated roundsman would take hovered around the "10 percent of gross sales" level. This gave some of the "Big Boys" an illicit income of over £100 per week, whereas most of the "Small-Timers" had to be content with a mere £3 or £4 on a good week. Nevertheless, each man had an illicit income on top of his legitimate income amounting to approximately ten percent of his Gross Sales Volume. About a fifth of this illicit income (equivalent to 2% of each man's G.S.V.) would have appeared in the next audit as a loss to the firm (i.e., was either stealing, or trade-dealing). The remaining four fifths of the illicit income (equivalent to 8% of each man's G.S.V.) was in the form of systematically concealed (and thus unaccountable and "invisible") thefts from customers or from the firm. At least half of this 8% (4% of each man's G.S.V.) was fiddled from customers. Conventionally and conservatively reducing this figure of 4% of individual G.S.V to a standard, for loss-statisticians, of 2% of G.S.V. (cf. Palmer, 1973, p 21) which has become a common basis of extrapolation of national visible inventory loss, we may speculatively suggest that totals fiddled from customers by employees in comparable employment situations (i.e., the service industries) would be at least equivalent to 2% of their contribution to the Gross Domestic Product.

The contribution of the service industries to the United Kingdom G.D.P. in 1973 was £28,000 millions (taken as 45.7% of the overall total of £62,000 millions). Accordingly, we have a probably invisible fiddling total of £558 millions per year. (a)

(a) I include this extrapolation to indicate the probable financial significance of fiddling. It is, however, a "sensitising" statistic, and it is intended to be neither rigorous nor significant. I should add that by this reckoning, there is a further £250 millions, or so, of temporarily unaccounted loss. I am not attempting to lay blame for economic loss wholly upon the the working class. To the contrary, it seems more likely that the

Returning to extrapolations of visible loss, it is possible to break the overall figures down. Employee thefts are generally of merchandise (Ross, 1961, p 140, suggests that 75-80% of thefts are in goods, and the rest in cash) and together account for a far greater amount of net, accountable inventory-loss than outside thefts. Ross (ibid) also points out that (for American department stores) 70% of losses are due to deliberate internal employee theft, with only 30% attributable to benign clerical error or damage, or to outside forms like shoplifting.^(a) Palmer (1973, p 20) similarly indicates that 62% of losses are attributable to staff-theft, nearly twice that believed to be caused by shoplifting.

In terms of materials, Dalton (1964, p 207) suggests that, in one of the firms that he studied, 15% of all "thievable" materials,^(b) were taken and never accounted for. Possible materials were deemed to amount to 15% of existing materials, and so the invisible internal pilferage rate (expressed as percentage value of stock on hand) emerges as 2.25%: very similar to the 2% figure for the identical temporarily unaccountable loss figure for Wellbreads extrapolated above (Supra, p 222). As to frequency and individual value of thefts, Jaspan and Balck (1960, p 51-2) note that loss by blue-collar salesmen (as opposed to white-collar employee losses) tends to be relatively frequent and small-time, reflecting a general truism that employee

(Contd) various varieties of middle and upper-class fiddling reap greater total illicit rewards for those practitioners. Brooks (1969, p 103) estimates that tax-fiddling alone in America loses the Inland Revenue Service there of at least \$25 billions per year, and Jaspan and Black (1960, p 109) suggest that only 40% of discovered losses are traceable to blue-collar employees.

- (a) This is not a generally accepted breakdown, although it seems to be an acceptable one. There is no real agreement amongst commentators as to how the overall figure should be broken down. Panopoulos (1961, p 10) for example, suggests the following alternative: 33% pricing error; 20% faulty stock handling; 20% poor stock keeping; 10% sales errors; 5% office errors; 5% faulty bookkeeping; 7% shoplifting.
- (b) Defined as those that it would be possible to walk out of the plant with undetected.

losses tend to become more infrequent, but larger, as one ascends the status-ladder:

"...This point was emphasised in a five-year study of 2,651 claims made by the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Sales personnel, for example, were responsible for 1,289 thefts or forty-nine percent of the claims. The total amount stolen by the salesmen came to \$271,628 or nearly twenty per cent of the total loss of \$1,374,719...(conversly)...ten percent of these listed in the study stole nearly twice as much as about fifty per cent of those who committed dishonest acts....As might be expected the most severe losses are those created by employees in the positions of greatest trust and responsibility, such as paymasters and corporate officials. To put it another way, any white collar employee is in a position to bite the hand that feeds him. The difference is that while the ordinary worker may nibble on a finger or two, the executive invariable swallows the arm and sometimes the whole corporate body...."

The gross numbers of individuals actually thieving from their place of work can be extrapolated to match Jaspan and Black's inverse relationship hypothesis (ibid, i.e., that blue-collar employees take smaller amounts in greater numbers than white-collar employees) if estimated as real totals are substituted for superficially apparent ones. In 1971, there were just over 13,000 prosecutions for employee theft in the U.K. (Palmer, 1973, p 21). Martin (1962, p 87) estimates that about 69-79% of those caught stealing at work are never taken to court, and Palmer (ibid, p 22) quotes a report from a commercial security firm which puts this "twilight" figure as high as 86%. This would indicate about 85,000 discovered but unprocessed employee theft cases. If this figure is multiplied by the accepted "black" crime rate (the losses may be discovered, but the thief is never caught) of 85%, then at least half a million employees are involved in the regular commission of illegal acts at their place of work, and because of traditional policies of not taking even apprehended employee thieves to court, there is presumptive evidence that even this figure is vastly underestimated. Martin's (1962) analysis of a sample of firms tends to support this. Martin found that 32% of

large firms (n = 42), and 56% of small firms (n = 48) had a case of theft. In the large firms, this amounted to one case per 269 men, and out of 40 offences, 25 were "stealing from the firm", and 8 were "stealing from a customer". With the smaller firms, one man in 73 had been apprehended, 11 out of 27 for "stealing from the firm", and 4 for "stealing from a customer". Martin notes that the slight disparities between the rates for smaller and larger firms may merely reflect variations in held distinctions between "theft" and "pilferage". These figures do not include losses with no obvious culprit, or incidents which did not become hardened into cases.

Whilst admittedly speculative, these statistics do allow the conclusion that occupational employee theft is common. That the losses involved are incontrovertably fiscally important may be demonstrated by comparing sums lost through employee theft with those lost through classically spectacular crimes like bank robbery.^(a)

Cort (1959, p 339) estimated that occupational thieves committed 1,641 crimes, netting over \$1,500 millions profit. In the same year, there were only 600 classical crimes, producing a paltry \$500 millions.^(b) Sutherland (1949, p 12-13) puts this disparity nicely in perspective:

"...An officer of a chain grocery store in one year embezzled \$600,000 which was six times the annual losses from 500 burglaries and robberies of the stores on that chain. Public Enemies number one to six secured \$130,000 by burglary and robbery in 1938,

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- (a) Sutherland (1940, p 44) also rather dramatically cites distrust, low social morale, and "social disorganisation on a large scale" as inevitable outcomes of white-collar crime. Clinard (1946, p 76) notices that "the injury to society" is more "flagrant" than for ordinary crimes; and Newman (1958, p 744) bows to a familiar rhetoric: "...corruptions, frauds and swindles of various sorts undoubtedly come closer to destroying our political and economic ideologies than all of our conventional crimes combined...". Whilst it is a little paradoxical that social, political and community leaders also be our chief criminals, these inflammatory and wild assertions are no substitute for science.
- (b) That is, the F.B.I. dealt with 600 spectacular crimes, and 1,641 embezzlements. The relative losses are derived from another source.

while the sum stolen by Ivar Krueger is estimated at \$250,000,000, or nearly two thousand times as much..."

The standard explanation of employee theft (i.e., that upon which the security precautions and costing estimates are based) usually rests upon one of two possible stereotypes. Firstly, the morally-defective-individual; and secondly, the ordinary-man-with-extraordinary-problems. Whilst sociological theorising has become more sophisticated (see, for example, Clinard, 1946, p 82, et seq.), these two explanations are still the most successful for the practical purposes of enforcement, as Nettler (1974) shows. The two moral types are used not so much to explain as to entrap the stereotypical "pilferer" and "embezzler" of industrial and commercial folklore. Both are held to be weak individuals, one innately, and the other circumstantially out of his depth. Two separate types are needed (not to depict any logical difference between visible or invisible thefts, but) to maintain status distinctions between white-collar and blue-collar workers.

The "pilferer" is usually located with the 'rotten apple' thesis.^(a) He is seen as basically "just a bit defective" (Abramson, 1949, p 47), or as suffering from "lack of inner resistance" (Macrae, 1963, p 22), and wholly unable to resist the internal pressures of cupidity when in combination with the unrestrained temptation provided by some environments (Knight and Richardson, 1963, p 11). So few pilferers are actually caught that those who are, are assumed to be unimportant minions masterminded by professional criminals (this surmounts the disparity between incapable individuals and vast unaccountable sums lost) or simply representative of a pitifully inadequate assortment of petty thieves who manage to steal quite large amounts over extended periods not because of their own abilities, but because of the insufficiency and inefficiency of control. Simple statistical

(a) Sometimes neutralised with the "Human Magpie" (obsessive collector of other people's property) tag, cf CASES, 11, 14, 21, 41. To get this 'reduction', pilfered items must not be disposed of although (as with tools, CASE 41) they may be used.

comparison could easily defuse this myth by counting admitted amounts lost through prosecuted employees and putting that amount alongside totals lost through deliberate and accountable inventory shrinkage. This comparison is never made. Additionally, the thesis that there exist small numbers of weak individuals stealing relatively large amounts is not necessarily supported by the data claimed on its behalf. The statistically undeniably large amounts could also support the contention that practically all employees regularly take relatively small amounts.

There is some slight evidence (Factory Management and Maintenance, 1954, p 86) that blue-collar pilferers follow a typical pilferage career of taking predominantly tools in early work life, and generally materials as they get older. What (sketchy) empirical evidence is available tends to support the view that fraud is small-time and frequent. Spencer (1965, ff 3, p 346) has complete data for the Metropolitan Police area for 1957, when, of 4,112 fraud convictions, only 122 involved amounts of over £100. Zeitlin (1971, p 24) rationalises extrapolated totals to staff numbers and emerges with the data that \$300 per year (\$1.50 per day) is stolen in retail establishments per employee, and that "all the evidence" (*ibid*) points to an implicated 75% of all employees. Similarly, Jaspán and Black (1960, p 236) admit that there was at least a 50% dishonest-employee rate even among those firms who had called in Jaspán's consultancy firm on quite other grounds.

'Rotten Apple' explanations quite exasperatingly fail to ensnare the blue-collar offender.^(a) Ironically, typical offenders

(a) The "embezzler" stereotype is exclusively attached to white-collar offenders. The 'embezzler' (the-ordinary-man-with-extraordinary-problems) traditionally has good dramatic or red-blooded reasons for his theft. Smith (1920, p 15 *et seq.*) characterises these as those of necessity (poverty, protection of needy relatives or blackmail); dissipation (wine, women, and gambling) or ambition (speculation or promotion). Nettler (1974, p 73) refers to the two general explanations which are subsequently applied as "The Bondsman's Hypothesis" (the 'theory of the 3 B's; the classic 'babes, bookies and booze', otherwise known as 'Starlet Fever') or the more cynical "Auditor's Assumption" (anybody would

are not criminally stereotypical ones. Employee offenders often (aside from, naturally, the crucial characteristic of their dishonesty) resemble the archetypically perfect employee. They often (regrettably) fill highly trusted blue-collar positions (Abramson, 1949, p 46), they are often the first to arrive and the last to leave (ibid, p 45),^(a) and in between times are the hardest workers (Conner, 1954, p 22; Hewitt, 1963, p 15; Zeitlin, 1971, p 26). Frequently, they gallantly offer to stay behind to check stock and carry out other inventory tasks (Conner, 1954, p 23; J.R. Davis, 1964, p 46; Gregory, 1962, p 71; Hewitt, 1963, p 15). Blue-collar employee crime is, then, excessively and zealously businesslike.

There is extensive but scattered evidence that blue-collar employee theft is very widely practiced at most places of work. Riis and Patric (1942) note that 63% of the garages that they "tested" (218 out of 347) employed mechanics who attempted to "gyp" them, and 64% of radio repair men (195 men), and 49% of watch-repairers were similarly dishonest. Laird (1950, p 211) quotes the example of an American Drug manufacturing chain who sustained a \$1.5 millions loss in 6 months. The firm used lie-detector tests on 1,400 employees, 62% of whom admitted petty thefts before the tests were administered, with a further 14% admitting similar offences after test completion. Robin (1965, p 7) quotes another firm where all those with access to money were tested, and 54 out of 59 confessed to thefts. Yet

(Contd) do it given half the chance). Ordinary men are alleged to get involved in such extraordinary circumstances initially "by accident" (Gregory, 1962, p 69) and their bad start is compounded by a series of "bad breaks" (Abramson, 1949, p 46). See Cressey (1953) for a sociological explanation.

(a) Cf. CASE 8 (21.2.73). A B.R.S.Lorry driver, who was considered to be a "model worker", by his bosses, for arriving 5 minutes early for work, was eventually successfully prosecuted for using that time to steal parcels. See also CASE 35 (24.6.74) reporting an employee who arrived an hour early each day in order to stock his home with (to him) useless X-ray table component parts.

another American firm discovered that 80% of its employees were regularly stealing at least \$2 each per week; a supermarket study revealed that 90% of those employed created shortages of \$1.5 millions per year through thefts; 86% of parcel delivery men in Chicago admitted stealing packages from their vans, and Horning (1970, p 60) found that 91% of factory employees had pilfered from their place of work.^(a) Cort (1959, p 341) discovered that 75% of chain-store employees steal from the store, and Curtis (1960, p 66) quotes a remarkable example of one store which he investigated where 150 employees were simultaneously but separately thieving. Robin (1965, p 11) concludes that, on average, 65% of money-handling employees steal cash, and that the thief-proportions in workforces with merchandise-access is even greater.

This evidence is impressive. Conventional explanations of "pilfering" are certainly not relevant to these data. Accordingly, how can blue-collar employee theft (such as those varieties found at Wellbreads) be explained? I shall now turn to this question.

(a) These data offer presumptive evidence for believing shoplifters to have been held accountable for considerable more loss than in fact they were actually responsible for. I would tentatively suggest that many deliberate inventory losses are created by employees stealing and subsequent classification by them as shoplifting. Similarly, Ken Bath (National Sales Director, Group Four Security) in Palmer (1973, p 22) suggests that employees account for 62% of thefts, stealing £2 for every £1 taken by customers. A recent newspaper report (CUTTING 41: 13.6.75) claims a Home Office source for the estimate that for every £1 lost in a shop, 30p is through "natural wastage", 30p through shoplifting, and 40p through staff losses.

Occupational Crime: Analytic Ambiguity

In short, what sort of crime is "fiddling"? As an offence type, blue-collar crimes committed in the course of legitimate employment are recognised in no ancient typology of criminals.^(a) I have been able to find no explicit reference to 'fiddling' in even the most extensive typology provided by Mayhew (1862, Vol. IV, p 25).^(b) Whilst more recent typologies include a faintly contradictory catch-all category for those not placeable somewhere else in the typology (eg, Cavan's "criminals who live in the non-criminal world", in Clinard, 1951, p 561), it is apparent that in terms of two of the generally accepted criteria for adjudging good typologies (mutual exclusivity and parsimony, see, Gibbons, 1975, p 143) 'fiddling' is a paradoxical category. This is so because, in terms of the core themes of traditional criminal typologies, it simultaneously combines the following wholly irreconcilable features:

- i. It is a mala in se crime. The 'natural' crime of theft is regularly and habitually indulged, and
- ii The offender gives the offence occasional and partial psychological status similar to that typically felt by "folk criminals" (Ross, 1960-61, p 326). That is, fiddlers conceive of themselves as non-stigmatised offenders, in the same way as those who offend against merely mala prohibita rules.

(a) Although by default the fiddler would fit Lombroso's "occasional" type, Mayhew's "casual" offender, and Moreau's "habitual" offender, these categories are nicely superceded by Mack's (1964) recent "full-time miscreant". Although they share with the fiddler the greed before need motivation (Tappan, 1947, p 369), in typological terms, they represent an 'etcetera' clause inserted to represent the "criminal classes".

(b) Although Mayhew (ibid) does mention such phenomenally idiosyncratic and regrettable deal criminal types as the "deal lurker" who are "those who steal coats and umbrellas from passages at dusk, or on Sunday afternoons". It is at least possible to say that 'fiddling' was never a full-time criminal occupation, and does not, thus, share a history of de-specialisation with the shoplifter.

Discarding, temporarily, the sense in which fiddling is "classically" criminal,^(a) I would like initially to consider its alternative possible inclusion as a white-collar crime. Sutherland (1949, p 9) defined white-collar crime as follows:

"...white collar crime may be defined approximately as a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation..."^(b)

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- (a) Terminological confusion reigns here. By "classical" crime, I refer to the morally terrible and not the merely technically illegal ("quiet") crime. Becker (1968b) very confusingly uses the work "conventional" crimes to refer to those that are psychologically "conventionalised", or "normalised", and subsequently not subject to prosecution or punishment. Cavan (1964, p 235) used the word "tolerated" to refer to those crimes which fall within the bounds "of public condonation", and Clinard (1956, p 76) invokes the legal distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita. Others, (eg, Newman, 1953, p 292) use "conventional" to refer to "classical" rather than "quiet" crime, and still others (eg, Robin 1974, p 251) prefer the label "ordinary" to "classical". Similarly, Bonger (1916, p 106-6) and Maurer (1964, p 10, 26, 131) use "occasional" to refer to the (in)frequency of commission, whereas I feel it appropriate here to restrict that word to characterise the psychological implications. I adopt "part-time" to refer to the relative frequency of offence when compared to legitimate occupational activity, and "partial" to refer to the (separately generated) minimal psychological implications the offence has for the public and private status of the offender. I occasionally use the words 'conventional' and 'occasional' in this latter psychological, and not the former practical context.
- (b) Sutherland's definition is eclectic, proslytising and vague. It has outlived its usefulness. The parameters of his definition are arguable: in an immediate footnote (Sutherland, 1949, ff 7, p 9), he claims to use "white-collar" in the lay sense that Sloan (an autobiography writing ex-president of General Motors) used it to refer to himself, However by 1956 (Sutherland, 1956, p 58) Sutherland had changed from viewing "respectable" and "high" as pure alternatives (Sutherland, 1940, ff, p 40) to using the word white collar "...more generally to refer to the wage-earning class that wears good clothes to work, such as clerks in stores...". A long way from Sloan. Additionally, (Clinard and Quinncy, 1967, p 188), Sutherland lends ambiguity by defining the field in terms of occupational activity and researching it in terms of corporate violations. Sutherland is empirically extensive in his viewing as criminal all 'punishable' (1945, p 356), or 'convictable' (1940, p 45) acts, as opposed to, for instance, the empirically intensive Tappan (1947, p 372). An extra difficulty is that lay conceptions of socio-economic status do not travel well across the Atlantic. The tension within "white-collar" (i.e., the spirit of the letter of Sutherland?) is masked by current American conceptions (eg, Ross, 1960-61, p 233ff) which similarly include clerical and sales jobs.

The answer to the inclusion dilemma is regrettable empirically post hoc. Those commentators who interpret Sutherland extensively allow the inclusion of 'fiddling' as a white-collar crime. Fiddling would, for example, be an occasion of Pepinsky's (1974, p 229) "challenge to an alleged use of private property", or Caldwell's (1958, p 377) " a breach of trust which is usually accompanied and consummated by misrepresentation." Newman (1958, p 737) considers the fact of occupational occupancy as more essential than its status, and thus considers:

"...The chief criterion for a crime to be "white-collar" is that it occurs as part of, or a deviation from, the violators' occupational role. Technically, this is more crucial than the type of law violated or the relative prestige of the violator...likewise farmers, repairmen, and others in essentially non white-collar occupations could, through such illegalities as watering milk for public consumption, making unnecessary "repairs" on television sets, and so forth, be classified as white-collar violators...."

Although as I have suggested above (ff b, p 241), Sutherland's definition of white-collar is vague, if not downright ambiguous, it has become conventional to concentrate upon the status of the offender (rather than the fact that his offence is intimately related to his gainful employment) and to restrict white-collar to those violators with a high social status. Thus, Shoemaker and South (1974, p 193) omit clerical and sales positions from inclusion as their status, although white-collar, is not any higher than many blue-collar skilled jobs. Levens (1964, p 328) similarly comments:

"...a number of white collar offences can equally be committed by persons of acceptably white-collar status (like solicitors, managers, clerks, accountants) and by others who would not normally qualify for such a description (postman, general dealers, dairy roundsmen, shop assistants, etc)..."

Acceptance of the intensive interpretation of Sutherland has bred a tightening of the concept by Bloch and Geis (quoted in Quinney, 1964, p 209). I do not particularly wish to engage the

white-collar crime argument in detail: as a body of literature, it is particularly repetitive, incestuous, hypothetical and stale. Suffice it to say that Bloch and Geis have attempted to separate white collar crimes committed by (i) individuals as individuals (eg, doctors and lawyers), (ii) by employees against the corporation (eg, embezzlers), (iii) by policy-making officials for the corporation (eg, as in anti-trust cases), (iv) by agents of the corporation against the general public (eg, advertising fraud), and (v) by merchants against consumers (eg, consumer frauds).^(a) Geis (1962, p 171) has suggested restricting the appellation "white-collar crime" merely to corporate violations of the third category (anti-trust cases).

Coextensive with this narrowing of the concept of white-collar crime, there has been a parallel movement to re-structure the overall field on a more logical basis. Quinney (1964, p 210) has introduced the logical alternative: "occupational crime", which Robin (1974, p 262) defines as:

"...nonviolent vocational property offences
...occupational crimes may be defined to
include all violations that occur during the
course of occupational activity and are related
to employment..."

Whilst blue-collar crime would fall under this rubric, a further definition is needed to avoid the standard paradoxical compositions construction to depict blue-collar crime: such as Hall's "embezzler in shirt sleeves, the truck driver and warehouse employee" (quoted in Robin, 1967, p 691), or the standard paraphrase of Sutherland: 'A crime committed by a person of low social status in the course of his occupation'. Donald Horning (1970, p 48) provides an excellent definition of blue-collar theft:

(a) Although group (v) sound most immediately relevant to fiddling customers, I am not at all sure that employees count as 'merchants' or that 'gouging' is the sort of consumer fraud that Bloch and Geis have in mind. Of course, although group (ii) ceases to be called white-collar (henceforth reserved for group (iii)), Bloch and Geis's intention is probably to refer to embezzlers rather than pilferers.

"...one form of blue collar crime, may be defined simply as the illegal or unauthorised utilistation of facilities or removal and conversion to one's own use of company property or personal property located on the plant premises by nonsalaried personnel employed in the plant..."

This definition seems to satisfactorily resolve the inclusionist-dilemma thrown up by Sutherland's initial formulations. But having adequately resolved the apparent weak paradox of combining blue-collar people with essentially white-collar criminal acts, we must now consider the possibility that "fiddling" is most comprehensively understood in the sense in which it is a "classical" crime (i.e., theft).

Because theft is mala in se, the blue-collar thief shares some characteristics with the full-time criminal.^(a) For instance, "fiddling" (in the specific sense of theft from customers) would count as a 'racket' in Sutherland's (1937, p 43) terms, as it involves:

"...manipulation of suckers by nonviolent methods. For this purpose the skills required in the different rackets differ from one another somewhat. But in all of them the thief must be a good actor, and a good salesman in order to manipulate the sucker..."^(b)

A crucial difference is, however, that the fiddler is practicing an identical legitimate occupation within which he submerges his illegal speculations.

Another interesting possibility is analytic allegiance

(a) Mack's (1964, p 39) substitution of "full-time miscreant" for Sutherland's original "professional" thief is a significant and welcome injection of sound logical formulation into aged emotional zeal.

(b) The 'fiddle' would also fit Maurer's (1964, p 30) definition of "grift": "...which includes all the infinity of rackets which utilise the skilled hand or the sharp wit, or both..". The fiddle should be distinguished from Bogdanoff and Glass's (1954, p 80-1) definition of an "outside racket": side-jobs pursued by Chicago case-workers during working hours, but which are mala prohibita.

with occupational "sharp" or "fringe" practices. Most occupations are typically considered to have a characteristically illegal periphery. However this periphery is generally only conceptualised in one of two ways: firstly, as a marginal percentage of all the separate businesses which make up an industry are seen to be wholly fraudulent (eg, between 4% and 8% of all the home-improvement operators in America are regarded as totally deceptive, President's Committee, 1966, p 246); or, secondly, marginal occupations (such as chemist, Quinncy, 1963, and McCormack, 1955-56) or low-status professions (lawyer, Ri stein, 1965) that indulge in borderline criminal activity (prescription violation, and ambulance-chasing) on a regular basis.

However, the portrayed situation is one with a few excessive rule-breakers operating on, and disgracing, the fringe of an occupation or profession - much to the chagrin of the majority of legitimate practitioners.

The situation at Wellbreads is that (rather than a few salesmen fiddling all the time, or, to the exclusion of legitimate activity) all the salesmen commit definitely illegal acts on a part-time basis. Fiddling is individually (rather than generally) peripheral rule-breaking. It is in this practical sense that fiddling is part-time crime. Illegality is not sporadically but wholeheartedly engaged (the "classical" occasional offender), but instead is regularly, "quietly"^(a) and simultaneously practiced.

(a) "Quiet" crime is a term suggested by Ross, 1960, 1960a. Shields 1961, p 90; and Jaspan and Black 1960 passim, regularly, if rather ironically use the phrase "silent partner" to refer to embezzlers.

"Part-Time Crime"

Fiddling is "part-time crime". Part-time crime is not just the opposite of full-time crime. Mack (1964, p 30) defines the latter as follows:

"...although the people concerned have some nominal occupation which they practice more or less regularly, they are known to be engaged in or available for criminal activities at all times..."

In fact, part-time crime shares some similarities with full-time crime. For example, practitioners of both types are rarely caught, and virtually never imprisoned. A vital distinction is, however, that whereas for the full-time criminal legitimate employment is "nominal", the part-time criminal views his illegitimate activities as similarly nominal. We may accordingly define part-time rulebreakers as follows:

"Part-time" rulebreakers have a full-time occupation in which they are predominantly involved, both in terms of time, and in terms of personal involvement and commitment. During the course of proper practice of that occupation, they simultaneously but surreptitiously, regularly and habitually indulge in occupationally related minor illegal acts which are generally visibly indistinguishable from their legitimate activity. (a)

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- (a) The "part-time" rulebreaker should be crucially distinguished from several quite near criminal patterns, such as the following: "Peripheral" rulebreakers: similar psychological consequences (i.e., partiality) but not practiced under the aegis of, nor parasitic upon a covering occupation. For example, the "snitcher" or, non-professional shop-lifter (see, Cameron, 1964, p 182). Cameron (ibid, p 184) notes: "...their crimes are peripheral to rather than central to their lives...The peripheral criminal has a vocation which is legitimate. His career may be in merchandising, clerical work, teaching, machine operating, nursing, truck

Other "part-time" crimes would include, for example, expences and payroll "padding" (Dalton, 1964, p 109), use of the "tap" (Bensman and Gerver, 1963), "ghost surgery" (unnecessary dental activity by dentists) "adulteration" of foodstuffs (Clinard, 1969; Schuck, 1972), or "cabbage" production (extra clothes made from material artfully cut from a roll designed to produce a fixed number of garments). All these activities are regularly and habitually immersed in standard occupational routines, and carried on as a side-involvement to everyday legitimate occupational activity.

A psychological corollary of "part-time" criminal activity is excessively muted societal reaction, producing a psychological status for the infringement as an auxiliary, "partial" trait. Generally speaking, the criminalisation rather than the normalisation of activity converts partial, "quiet" crimes into ordinary "classical" ones. However, with "part-time" (and other non-full-time rulebreaking) societal reaction switches totally to normalisation. This feature of the control setting alone generates the psychological "partiality" of the criminal activity (rather than a possible "totality", or "master" status) in the actor's

(contd) driving, police work, medicine. His major source of livelihood is from his respectable career and he identifies with the dominant values of society..".

"Fringe" rulebreakers: One who sporadically but wholeheartedly performs illegal, occupationally-related acts. For example, a doctor performing an occasional illegal abortion, or practising euthemasia (CUTTING 10: 8.11.74) upon deserving patients.

"Sharp" rulebreaker: One who regularly and wholeheartedly performs illegal, occupationally-related acts. For example, those selling unsolicited "trade directories", cheap central heating, (CUTTING 35: 11.5.75) or "imaginary whiskey" (Mack, 1972). Their success parasitically depends upon the bulk existence of legitimate practitioners.

"Second Job" rulebreaker: One who occasionally or regularly indulges in illegal activity for gain after completing a full-time job. For example, secretaries who have a second job as a prostitute (Jackman et al. 1963, p 160); milkmen who are part-time burglars (CASE 22: 3.9.73) or electronics engineers who are swagmen in the evenings (Emerson, 1971).

reflexive construction of his self.

Whereas, for example with shoplifting, peripheral practitioners may alter what was once a specific trade (vide, Mayhew, 1862, Vol IV, p 25) into a non-full-time activity; in this context, the lack of archaic reference to fiddling suggests that it has arisen as a simple response to changing historical circumstances without ever having had a full-time historical precedent. In fact, I would suggest, it would be impossible to fiddle on a full-time basis. When so practiced, the techniques of theft-and-systematic-concealment-and-falsification-thereof become defined, labeled and processes as 'embezzlement'. This is the only time when the white-collar appropriate stereotype of "embezzler" is applied to blue-collar workers: when it is felt by those doing the defining that (as is - ironically - inevitably the case with white-collar workers) the thieving activities are "essential" and "master" in the psychological construction of the offender.

"Part-time" crime is a hobby (Cort, 1959, p 340) an avocation rather than a vocation: it is a luxury way of earning money, it earns money for luxuries.^(a) Finally, whilst it has no historical precedent, it is a "craft" theft type, as McIntosh (1971, p 102, 105, 122) defines it:

"...It became possible to develop criminal techniques of taking small amounts from a large number of victims, and these were routinised, repetitive and highly skilled techniques...People do not bother to protect themselves very carefully against minor crimes...so the salient feature of craft thieving is that the routinised patterns of behaviour make it a relatively safe way of earning a steady but rather low income...Craft criminals aim not to be

(a) I am not attempting to present the hackneyed second-wage/"pin money" class stereotype. The money is needed to sustain an ordinary working-class life style. Nevertheless, it is small compared with regular income, is immensurable in familial budgets, and can be forgone if an enforcement crisis demands it (See Chapter Five).

noticed while they are working, even though their victims may be present at the time. Indeed, many a craft theft is never discovered at all since it is hard to know whether things have been lost or stolen. This is the major way in which craft criminals reduce the risks of detection..."

With these economic and analytic discussions in mind, I shall now try to characterise the nature, extent and types of "part-time" crime at Wellbreads.

"PART-TIME" CRIMES AT WELLBREADS: FIDDLING, STEALING AND DEALING

Fiddling

"..High on the list of trouble spots in any store is the receiving dock or whatever you may call the place where merchandise is received. We have learned through bitter experience that you can not leave cartons of merchandise unguarded for any length of time... Dishonest delivery men man put the right number of cartons on the receiving platform. After they have been signed for, and each given a delivery number, delivery men have been known to put a carton back on the truck. It it not unheard of either for deliveries to be made with one carton short..."

(Panopoulos, 1961, p 12-13)

Skill at "fiddling" customers survives as the major criteria of unofficial status amongst Wellbread salesmem. Fiddling has been mentioned elsewhere (eg, Morris, 1963 p 232; Mars, 1973) but normally in contextual and specific terms which lack clarity, definition and the inductive methodological ability to be universally relevant.^(a) The term fiddling has a number of possible derivative

(a) Morris (*ibid*) feels that the term fiddling should only refer to the trifling amounts allegedly and apochraphally involved. There is a sense in which the weakness of the moral imperative against fiddling is traceable to the recency of its illegal definition. Until 1473, 'appropriation by a middle man' was legal, and "mere private cheating" was still legal until 1757 (Geis, 1968, p 9-10). Two recent American white-collar examples are provided by Clinard's (1946, p 79) classic study of price-ceiling evasion during the last war (although the customer was a willing and knowing victim); and Quinney's (1963) study of retail pharmacy prescription violation (although it is unclear what 'violation' actually refers to here). In the U.K., the 1968 Theft Act has clarified an originally ambiguous situation. Fiddling customers would have been indictable as

sources all of which probably combine to give it its current usage.^(a) It can mean a player of the fiddle (stringed instrument), and hence an entertainer; a small sum (originally 1/16 of £1 on the London Stock Exchange); and probably derives from a strictly defined term in book-binding, where, to "fiddle the books" actually meant sewing book sections together by hand with a type of cross stitch. The art of fiddling inevitable comes from a subsidiary meaning as sleight of hand;^(b) as Webster (1934, p 940) defines it: "...To keep the hands and fingers actively moving as the fiddler does; to move the hands and fingers restlessly or in busy idleness; hence, to trifle, to engage busily in trivial pursuits..".

(Contd) Obtaining by False Pretences, or as Larceny by a Trick (2.2. of S(1) of the old Larceny Act). As the law now stands, fiddling would be indictable as either Obtaining Property by Deception S(15)(1); or as Obtaining Pecuniary Advantage by Deception S(16)(1)(2)(a), and Falso Accounting S(17)(1).

- (a) Dictionary definitions, such as these, have a direct and creative influence as well as an indirect reflective and descriptive ability where concepts are concerned. Ball (1970, p 331) notes: "...Although dictionaries present ideal or 'correct' meanings, rather than those actually in vogue at a particular time in space, there is no a priori reason for assuming that the discrepancy is either large or systematic; and furthermore, such definitions are constructed by lexicographers out of the stuff of social reality...". An obvious point perhaps. I belabour it here as I feel that the superimposition of logical categorisation upon the experiences of the group studied requires painstaking justification.
- (b) Chesney (1970, p 229-230) recalls the ancient trick of "fiddle-duffing", where a drunken violin player offers to sell his allegedly expensive violin for a song. However, the presence of "duffing" by itself in Mayhew's (1862, Vol IV, p 25) extensive typology - meaning to sell fake goods - indicates that in Chesney's example, 'fiddle' was a noun, and 'duffing' an adjective. The word 'fiddle' is not in current usage in America. It is there partly replaced by the word "finagle" (vide, Davis, 1959, p 270) derived from "fainaigue", meaning to revoke at cards, and thus (to feign) to shirk, be underhand, to cheat or be devious (Webster, 1934, Vol. I, p 910). Riis and Patric (1942, passim) use the verb "gyp" to refer to fraudulent overcharging by service agents, and others (Leonard and Weber, 1970, p 415, and Henslin, 1968, p 152, Carper, 1969) use what seems to be a currently more prevalent U.S. term: "gouging".

In transactional terms, a successful fiddle refers to the practice by salesmen of invisibly altering the ownership of real or imaginary goods in transactions with customers an unspecified number of times, to mask or cover expropriations from a money or equivalent source either on the spot, or elsewhere, but still within the fiddler's control.^(a) Such an extensive inductive definition is needed to take account of not only simple overcharging, but also the complex procedures needed on some occasions to obtain the cash benefit.^(b) The formal

(a) I refer again to alternative analytic definitions of "fiddling" (vide, Chapter Two). I shall not debate Mars' (1973) general, and perhaps uncritical, usage of the word (i.e., the way that employees use the word fiddle to refer to all their theft practices) as Mars, in personal communication, has since indicated that he may in future wish to retreat from that definition. Instead, I would like to concentrate upon Henry's (1975a, 1975b) sophisticated alternative definition. Whereas I take the criteria of who loses as principally definitive of the fiddle (with fiddles only possible of customers), Henry (eg, 1975a, p 16) gives precedence to that criteria of the provision of inventory-cover. These two formulations are not always mutually incompatible. We agree that inventory-covered (concealed) thefts from customers constitute 'fiddles', and that unconcealed thefts from the firm are pilferage. We disagree over unconcealed thefts from customers (which I call fiddles, and Henry pilferage), and over concealed thefts from the firm (which I call pilferage, and Henry, fiddles). There is also a secondary sense in which we disagree: the provision of inventory-cover - when a theft is made non-accountable - can be of several different sorts, which Henry's analysis cannot describe. As I have mentioned, inventory non-accountability may be either 'misaccounted' loss (eg, when written-off as "waste"), or 'unaccounted' (where inventories have been altered to conceal the loss). Importantly, the latter may be temporarily so, and this is always the case when thefts from the firm are concealed (as the loss-discovery is merely procrastinated) or permanently so - as is the case when the theft is from a non-inventory-accountable source, i.e., a domestic or retail customer. The point that I wish to make is that I argue not so much for the primacy of my own typology for future universal analysis; but rather, for its ad hoc suitability for analysis of the data at hand. I have pursued a small scale empirical study, and have generated a typology out of the experiences of the men studied. They don't use words like 'pilferage', and 'collusive theft', so I haven't either. They use words like 'stealing' and 'dealing', and I have followed suit.

(b) See CASE 51 (16.11.74) for an example of the difficulties that dustmen have in fiddling their customers: 64 London dustmen rather unwisely chose to extort cash by demanding money with menaces from clients. Unless paid, the dustmen refused to collect rubbish, or worse, tipped it all over the pavement in front of the call in question.

procedures of selling provide both the loopholes and the obstacles for fiddling.

Even overcharging can be of two sorts: firstly, the price is simply increased to unknowing customers, (although the "price of bread" is heavily invested with moral and symbolic significance, few people actually know what it is). Secondly, the price, but nothing else, remains constant. Traditionally (Thompson, 1971) bakers rarely let an opportunity to squeeze customers pass by. Corn merchants and dealers engaged in adulteration (Thompson, ibid, p 86; Engels, 1845, p 106-110)^(a) and in "forestalling" (selling by sample by restricted rings of buyers rather than on the open market, Thompson, ibid); and millers were frequently, according to Thompson (ibid, p 104):

"...Accused of quaintly medieval customs - oversize toll dishes, flour concealed in the casings of stones, etc...some millers purchased at half price damaged corn which they then mixed with the corn of their customers..."(b)

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- (a) Adulteration seems to be no longer common amongst the big Bakers, In the U.K., although the the American economy has again been wracked by another massive grain fiddle (CUTTING 45: 19.8.75) incorporating both shortweighing and adulteration. British "snob" foods still do seem to suffer however. See, for example, the notorious "winegate" scandal which recently rocked Bordeaux (CUTTING 9: 20.10.74). The defendants had exploited a nice loophole: a failure to document the colour of the wine in official receipts. Similar quantities (321,000 gallons) of ordinary red, and appelation controllee ^{white} were purchased. But the acquit vert (green docket of authenticity of Bordeaux wines) did not specify the colour of either shipment. The defendants "doctored", or "baptised" both shipments (one defendant liked to refer to this as "improving", or "blending") and switched the certificates so that they now possessed "appelation controllee" red, and some ordinary white. The price difference for the two whites was minimal; upgrading the red increased profits by 400%. Document laundering (deoderising is a common way of evading awkward laws, which, for example, prevent trade to South Africa, Presidential payments to burglars, or arms sales to unstable countries (CUTTING 15: 24.11.74).
- (b) Of course this isn't done now. Naturally, the U.K. grain store is cut with hard Canadian wheat every year, to produce a better loaf, but that, naturally, is a different thing.

In medieval times, the baker himself was frequently accused (*ibid*, p 107) of making and selling inferior, adulterated, and light-weight loaves. Analytically, either the quality can be reduced and the price stay constant ("shortdeliver", or, "underweigh"), or the quantity may similarly suffer.^(a) Mayhew (1862, Vol IV, p 383) notes: "...embezzlement is often committed by journeymen bakers entrusted by their employers with quantities of bread to distribute to customers...", and similarly, Kirkland (1911, Vol. III, p 249) adds: "...as these barrowmen have to collect weekly amounts as well as deliver bread, it is not surprising that, particularly among the poorly paid ones, that there is a good deal of trouble with petty thefts and embezzlements...".

The situation is simple for retail salesmen: customers lose money in sales transactions in clear, simple and easily specifiable ways. The fiddled retail customer either gets the ordered number of items at a higher price (overcharged), or a reduced number of items for the standard price (shortdeliver). Whilst this is occurring, the customer may unwittingly accept insufficient change (shortchange).^(b) The percentage made is simply physically diverted from the cash-bag (a large leather pocket hung by a leather thong from the salesman's neck, and hanging down to his waist) to the salesman's own pocket.

Wholesalers, on the other hand, have a separate triplicate-carbon, receipt-invoice docket for each call. The top copy of each docket is divided into six, easily removed sections, each section consecutively representing a day of the week. Each week, the salesman is given a fresh docket for each call by the Wellbread

(a) See Crapsey (1871, p 407-8) for some nice examples of short-delivering by river lightermen, and Fiefer (1965, p 325) for an example of "cutting" of "watering" of flour with moisture to increase its selling power.

(b) With till-operators (sales persons in stores) these techniques are collectively named "underringing" (see, Panopoulos, 1961, p 15). Cf. CASE 23 (18.9.73) a supermarket cashier was fined for charging a policeman the correct price for an article, but underringing the amount on the till on two separate occasions.

sales office. Each day, upon delivery, he fills in the daily section, and tears off the section, or "stub", and gives it to the customer. At the end of the week, the customer has six identifiable docket-stubs, which he may later check against his bill. The salesman returns the remaining two complete carbons for each call to the sales office. Office staffs price each invoice, after deducting discounts, and the salesman normally returns one priced carbon to each customer the next week as a bill. As the office thus has a complete and accurate check of how much cash is required from each wholesale customer, none can be diverted by salesmen. Since the customer has a collection of delivery docket-stubs, which can be checked against the returned bill, the roundsman cannot add fictitious amounts to daily invoices after he has delivered the goods.

It seems to be a very closed and tight system. However, most wholesale rounds have 'cash-calls':^(a) customers who, for various reasons, prefer to pay in cash rather than be invoiced. The Wellbreads sales office thus, has no record of how much is paid in by these customers to the salesman each week. Additionally, the assumption that the customer is competent to check that the bread given to him tallies with that listed on the delivery docket-stub which he is given at the time, that the amounts on this stub tally with those on the returned invoice/bill, and that the office addition and discounting has been done accurately is theoretically satisfactorily, but (as we shall see) wholly impractical.

Calls, for the fiddling wholesaler, are thus divided into "make" calls and "take" calls, and the process of fiddling (instantaneous in practical terms for the retailer) has two practically separable stages. Firstly, fiddling "make" calls to provide cover for, secondly, complete or partial withdrawal

(a) Milking cash-calls is a standard technique in other service industries (see Abramson, 1949, p 49; Bigus, 1972, p 145-6)

of funds from "take" cash-calls. (a) The crucial difference between wholesale and retail fiddling lies in the theoretical possibility that sales office staff might check up on the absence of cash-in-flow from cash-calls that they know about. However, as one supervisor put it when I questioned him about the difference between wholesale and retail:

"...Well, not so much different, I suppose you've got more chance of getting caught on wholesale...well, no, put it this way, if somebody wanted to catch you, they could more easily...but they won't bother you...they only check if you're short on the Rec.... I remember once, one of the women in the office started comparing the amounts of ordered bread with the returned dockets, ...she said that she had to check one off with the other when a bloke was 'short', so why shouldn't she do it when blokes came 'over'?...the blokes got together, and they soon told her to stop doing that..."

The two stages of fiddling (theoretically for retailers, and empirically for wholesalers) that I have described, analytically exhibit dramaturgic characteristics of both con-men, and of embezzlers, as described by Goffman (1952, p 483):

"...The con is practiced on private persons by talented actors who methodically and regularly build up informal social relationships just for the purpose of abusing them; white-collar crime is practiced on organisations by persons who learn to abuse positions of trust which they once filled faithfully. The one exploits poise; the other, position..."

(a) The "take" has no argot name at Wellbreads. Mars (personal communication) has discovered the use of "turnover" for similar salesmen in London, the "weed" in English fairgrounds, the "dropsy" amongst waiters, and the "sparrow" for dustmen. Bigus's milkmen (1972, p 145-6) often initiated personalising "deals" with customers. The loss that the milkman makes on the deal is recovered by him "dumping" the product given away (i.e., padding his sour returns claim), and by "juggling" the books to conceal the deal. Bigus has indicated (personal communication) that occasionally the deal is illusory, and the customer merely imagines that she is getting the goods. This would, under this definition, be a fiddle. Fiddling per se, is not so rare amongst British milkmen: see CASE 36 (4.7.74), which reports a milkman fiddling at least £300 from his takings; and CASE 22 (8.9.73) reporting a milkman who used his occupational knowledge to steal £12,000 from 37 empty houses on his round.

Unlike the con, however, there are no practices designed to make the 'mark' aware of what has happened to him, and the success of the transaction does not rely upon the greedy collaboration of the victim. In fact, it is essential that the victim never discovers her loss. The overall cover for the fiddler is the legitimate work transaction. Since this is periodically repeated, the fiddler does not have, for example, the pickpocket's advantage of never "tooling the same mark twice" (Maurer, 1967, p 467-478). In interactional terms, the fiddle emerges as a delusive set interaction undertaken within a legitimate dealing, and wherein the fiddler is unaware of his role, and thus an unwitting aid in the process of property-ownership-alteration. It is an exploitative fabrication (Goffman, 1974, p 104), but those (customers) for whom this "lamination" is intended to deceive are unaware of its existence.

Salesmen fully recognise that the need for trust as a structural basis for successful fiddling, and the peculiar clues that typical customers rely upon in establishing trustworthiness in salesman. I shall discuss trust again in detail later (see, Chapter Six, p 13). Of interest here is the way that trust reflects the performer/audience structure analysed in Chapter Three. What for customers is an unalterable and natural (and thus indicative) phenomena of trust, is supremely man-made for salesmen. Genuineness, for salesmen, is an acquirable trait. Being a salesman is to act to induce the customer to experience the salesman trustingly (Laing, 1966, p 137-140). The dramatic structure of the relationship prevents (what Matza, 1964, p 97, refers to as the natural development of) hypocrisy emerging to interactionally corrode trust. To retreat again to Goffman: the salesman's "body gloss" (ibid, 1971, p 162) is overwhelming, he exudes trust carefully and deliberately, as well as occupationally axiomatically. The salesman gains interactional control. Goffman (1959, p 14) continues:

"...This control is achieved largely by influencing the definition of the situation which the others come to formulate, and he can influence this definition by expressing himself in such a way as to give them the kind of impression that will lead them to act voluntarily in accordance with his own plan..."

Two of the Wellbreads salesmen commented upon the curious construction of trust:

"...you've got to have trust...you've got to be nice to your customers..respect, really, you've got to respect them...this bloke I've just trained on my old route.. he'll never last, I don't know how to put this...when he goes up to the door, he doesn't say: 'Good Morning', or anything, it's just: 'Ehh?'...they'll never trust him...he'll never make anything..."

"...I never give my customers a thing for themselves, not a thing...that was the way I started, and I've never given any of them anything...it makes them trust me funnily enough...you don't want to let them think you can cover anything..."

The fiddle is thus slipped into standard interactions in subtle ways that serve to clothe it in protective fictions. The fiddle is a socially invisible, and technically non-existent act. There are no tools nor booty to be concealed from the gaze of the victim, and the financial losses to the customer are strictly unaccountable. If the fiddle 'fails', then it will be immediately apparent, and the rent in the delicate interactional fabric that failure produces can be invisibly and easily verbally repaired.

In the sales act, legitimate selling emerges as the "dominant role" (Gross and Stone, 1970, p 179) of the fiddler, or his "virtual" social identity (Goffman, 1968, p 12). The fiddle itself is an "adjunct" role, (Gross and Stone, ibid), a disguised and hidden "actual" social identity, a side-involvement knowingly performed only by the fiddler, in parallel with his dominant role performance. As Goffman (1959, p 71) most astutely generalises:

"...we find that there is hardly a legitimate everyday vocation or relationship whose performers do not engage in concealed practices which are incompatible with fostered impressions. Although particular performances, and even particular parts or routines may place a performer in a position of having nothing to hide, somewhere in the full round of his activities there will be something he cannot treat openly..."

Looking at it in this way, fiddling is a "dark secret" (ibid, p 140) in the ordinary occupational culture of the bread salesman. It is a fact which is known, but which is concealed because it is incompatible with the impression of self that the performance wishes to foster.

The customer varies considerably in the sort of "interest" he has in checking the sales transaction, and it is sometimes necessary for the fiddler to use sophisticated distracting techniques to waylay accurate checking. Structurally, however, retailers are faced with customers who are simultaneously checker, consumer and payer. Wholesalers, on the other hand, experience selling situations where one or more of these functional roles is not played. The consumer role is never present during the checking situation for wholesale salesmen, and at some calls, such as hospitals, payment is on a national basis, consumption is by inmates, and checking is enacted by disinterested bureaucratic subordinates. St. Mary's hospital was such a call:

"...St. Mary's hospital used to be a hell of a call, they used to over-book, ditch stales, deal with the chef...the lot...nobody checked the bread in, we were supposed to go into the kitchen, and see how much bread was left in the cupboard...and make it up to 25 sliced, and ten smalls...well, they used to chuck a couple of stales in, and book them the full amount... not every day, of course, they used to knock one or two off now and again, to make it look good..."

Customers also initiate different means of checking, which have to be understood before fiddling can proceed unhindered. The 'single check' is to check one of either: the amount of bread coming

in, the number of loaves on the docket-stub, or, the office addition on the bill. 'Double checkers' might check the bread-in against the bread-billed (fiddler would overcharge); the office addition against the bread-in (fiddler would add bread onto the bill, or short-deliver); or the office addition against the bread-billed (where the fiddler would overbook). 'Treble checking' checks all three, and if this is combined with a systematically closed system (i.e., one with no occasional slips) fiddling chances dwindle. However, most checking systems, or whatever complexity, are relatively open in this sense, thus allowing occasions for large amounts of money or goods to be invisibly added to the bill.

Salesmen find checking procedures more time consuming than insulting, as most wholesalers have very tight timetables, and probably other, very loose, calls. One salesman remembered:

"...One shop takes me half an hour..for one call!...that holds me up, and it holds other shopkeepers up, there's no reason for him to check...he's been doing it like that for 18 months, and he's never caught me, it's a bit of an insult, I suppose, he knows that if I put the stuff on the floor, and give him a docket, he's going to check it, and he knows that I know that he's going to... sometimes I say to him: 'I'll give you a fiver if you can find a mistake'... hoping that he'll say: 'You can put it up'...(put bread on display)...not because I've fiddled him, just to save time..."

Establishing whether or not a call can be fiddled is the outcome of a delicate process of "trying-out". For wholesale salesmen, once a call has been successfully tried-out, it is regularly and effortlessly fiddled. For retailers, on the other hand, calls are tried-out, and if they prove to be what the men refer to as "easy touches", attempts are regularly made to "try it on" with them. A retailer explained:

"...after a bit, I got to know the ones who added up what they had, and the ones who didn't...I used to try them out...I used to think: 'Oh, I'll put three pence on and see if she say anything', and I used to say, if it was 4/6? 'Four shillings and ninepence'...and if she give me the monCy, I'd wonder if she'd say anything the next day, and if she'd didn't, I'd know she didn't add it up..."

Another retailer said:

"...(the supervisor would) tell me things, like: 'This one's an easy push!... and he said: 'The more cakes you push here, the more money you can make', he said: 'If she's got a bill of 75p, push it up to 83p., so it's not an even round figure, because they might think there's an odd half there..."

Two wholesalers said:

"...A lot of the calls, they think that you make it on stale returns...they wouldn't dream that I book extra bread in!...but they check my returns religiously!...and if I leave a single loaf off the returns, they'll leave me a note the next day..."

"...he (the previous roundsman)...never used to give credit for returns from the shops, that's how he used to make his cover, ...or sometimes, he'd make 12 loaves look like 14 on a tray, if you hold it up high, or grip it close to your belly, they don't know that you haven't got 14 on a tray... that's the best way, you walk past, and say: 'here's a tray', and carry it above your head...I often do that..."

Rather than having specifically inefficient checking procedures, some customers are just generally careless or incapable, and some salesmen are phenomenally quick-witted and dexterous. One retailer recalled, admiringly:

"...You know, I once went with this bloke from the Superloaf Bakery...he said: 'Short-change them, yeah, but never overcharge them, you're daft if you do, it's against the Trades Descriptions Act'...he'd been on

that round for about 5 years, and he was a fly bugger! He used to count the change so fast....then he'd say: 'Sorry, M'am, it's a shilling short', she'd give him the other shilling, and then he'd turn his hand over, just to me, and he'd have it tucked between his fingers underneath...and he used to take the money, and then ask if she had a pound note, as he had so much change, and then he used to take the money again, and give her a whole load of 2-bob-bits to make up for it...you know, so it looked a lot! ...he made £5 in a morning, think what he made in a week..."(a)

Such processes are generally applied by salesmen in situations which separate analytically as three basic strategy-types. These strategy-types (standard techniques, techniques particular to specific control-checking systems, and techniques to exploit sporadically occurring, or one-off occasions) in fact apply to the analysis of the commission of all part-time crimes undertaken by Wellbread salesmen.

Firstly, just in terms of fiddling, standard techniques of fiddling are applied universally to all the alls, thus in fact, constructing a price system which is related to criteria other than cost or profit concerns. Regular bread price changes provide temporary learning problems for the salesmen, but almost

(a) This is archaic and international. Giles (1954, p 220) quotes a case of "Ringing the changes" which was successfully tried as larceny in 1868: "...the defendant put down a sixpence and six pence in copper and asked the shopkeeper for a shilling. She took a shilling from the till and placed it beside the coins the defendant had put down. He then said she might as well give him a florin, and take it all. She took a florin from the till, and the prisoner went off with it...". Sutherland (1937, p 74) refers to an identical practice as the "hype" (variously as "laying the note", and the "stingaree") and adds that: ".in the event of a tumble the majority of cases are straightened out by an apology for an apparently natural error on the part of the thief...". Edwards (1958, p 143) refers to it as "short-change manipulation", adding that the manipulator engages the hapless cashier in quick-fire banter to distract her attention.

continual ignorance for the customer. During inflationary times, there is no time for a regular price to become stabilised in consumer culture. Thus, ineffectual moaning by customers replaces effective checking, and (as we shall see in Chapter Six) the fairly pointless "warning story" on most occasions replaces the long-term, or lateral check on the salesman's honesty. This technically sanctions the situation within which each salesman carries a personal price-list with official prices sufficiently re-arranged to cover uncalculable mistakes that occur to his disadvantage. This is fiddling in the way that supervisors intend (see Chapter Two), and is sufficiently and customarily recognised in the food retail trade to be known as "buncing". "Buncing" is minimal standard overcharging to cover small but inevitable loss. For Wellbreads retailers, this means marking up specific items:

"...Look, you can make it a bit easier on yourself, anyway, you always charge a bit over for the small tin loaves, everybody does, so instead of 6½p, charge 7½p,..... that makes it easier, doesn't it?..rolls are 20p a dozen, and not 19p, and if you sell four, charge them the same as a packet, 8p..."

On wholesale, standard overcharging emerges as up-pricing un-priced goods, such as cakes and confectionary, as bread prices are stipulated on the dockets that the customer sees, and the office prices. Similar techniques are used in other service industries, although bakery salesmen differ inasmuch as, in this case, "made" money is left in the kitty to cover mistakes. Dalton (1964, p 209) reports that in a clothing store:

"...Heads of the various men's departments usually clothed themselves from each other's stocks at little or no cost. This might be accomplished, for example, by selling a bargain stock of two thousand pairs of socks not at the agreed price of 59 cents a pair, but at 69 cents, which accumulated a fund of \$200 above profit requirements. A given head could then draw from this to cover..."

The second major technique is the application of regular techniques differentially to specific control-checking systems.

The gambit of 'doing' the "easy touch" on retail is similar to practices performed on "live ones" by cab-drivers. Davis (1959, p 269) reports that "live ones" are:

"...out of town conventioners or other revelers...(with whom)..drivers feel less inhibited about padding charges and finagling extras from Live Ones...(as they) ...are also frequently careless and forget to tip altogether. Knowing that Live Ones are out to 'blow their money' anyway, many drivers believe that they are justified in seeing to it that they are not deprived of a small portion..."

Differentially exploiting various control-checking systems is the chief modus operandi of the wholesaler. At one wholesale call (on a wholesale round on which I was being trained), the supervisor murmured that he had forgotten the price of the large fruit slabs. Quickly and accurately, I replied: "46¹/₂p". In tones of utmost horror, he turned to me and said: "...Good god! No!... not the real price...what he charges them here...I think it's 60p, yes, we'll charge them that..". Another wholesaler related his experience at an Army camp on his round:

"...Yeah, and cakes too, I had to drop their stuff off in three separate places, and I had to give them the big cakes, and charge them for three small ones...in the end I was even doing it with swiss rolls, and charging them for fruit slabs!..."

The final basic strategy-type concerns the development of a sophisticated corpus of bent-knowledge to exploit sporadic of one-off occasions. Retailers regularly fiddle casual customers in ways that their regular calls might easily detect. Not only are casuals charged more (justified as a surcharge for inconvenience) but also they are often duped with stales. The price-ignorance and non-return of casual customers makes them easily exploitable in most service industries. Mars (1973, p 205) reports that in the hotel dining room trade, only casuals (called 'chance') are eligible for fiddling as residents charge meals to their bill. Davis (1959, p 270) reports that taxi-drivers are advised that:

"When you pick up one of these yokels...take him to where he is going, show him what the fare is on the meter, and tell him that it costs 15 cents extra on the top for each piece of luggage." Wellbreads wholesalers have to rely either on the ignorance of a substitute checker, or upon uncharacteristic slip-ups by the regular man. One reported:

"...some calls you just can't do...I've got one call like that on my round...he checks everything, it's just not possible to do him...mind you, I had a field day when he was on holiday..."

Dimensions crucially distinguishing the fiddle from other ways of making money on the side, are firstly, tolerance of it or even overt recommendation of it by management because secondly, the loser is exclusively the customer and not the firm. In terms of these two criteria, stealing is defined quite differently from fiddling at Wellbreads.

Stealing

"...Outside employees, such as deliverymen and salesmen who collect, have always shown a poor loss ratio. Careful underwriters will not write fiddly on a firm that is predominantly made up of outside employees.."
(Wahl, 1963, p 76)

"Stealing"^(a) refers to the application of similar sorts

(a) Although the empirical content of some of the thefts reported below would warrant calling the practice "pilferage" by, for example, the various criteria reported by Martin (1962, p 125-6), I will not use this term in this context. Pilferage is not a term which has been used specifically in connection with employee theft (see Cameron's 1964, p 184 usage) although all instances of it share one common trait: it reflects a decision

of illicit skills,^(a) but to the firm rather than to the customer.^(b) A successful steal is the removal of some sort of asset skillfully, unobserved, and without permission. Salesmen steal both convertible consumer goods for re-sale to their customers, and non-convertible assets, such as plastic-bags and clipboards, which, as tools of the trade, make occupational life easier.

Transactionally, stealing is obtaining goods either for personal use, or as cover for later cash withdrawals. Although changed ownership of goods is the outcome, the practice is in essence the realignment of responsibility frontiers between actors for goods for which they were organisationally responsible and accountable. In interactional terms, stealing is generally a solitary action, completed in the absence of other

(Contd) made not to continue with any proceedings with somebody caught stealing. I will later thus define pilferage as "employee theft which is treated ambiguously", and pursue this at length at the the end of this chapter.

- (a) Of course, the firm can lose in customer-transactions, for example, as in CASE 67 (17.1.75) where a supermarket cashier regularly and systematically undercharged customers who were friends and relatives, to the extent of reducing the store's profit to zero for six months.
- (b) This does not mean to say that stealing from customers is impossible, just that it would not here be regarded as an institutionalised instance of occupational theft. Nevertheless, several of the more notorious "rogues" at Wellbreads take trays of bread into shops and packets of cigarettes out.. Some thefts are difficult to fit into this nice division. Postmen, for example, have "calls" rather than customers, and cannot fiddle. However, they can steal parcels and packages addressed to "calls" in transit. For example, in CASE 64, 15.1.75, a postman was indicted for stealing packets at the rate of 100 per week for a year. Inside post-office employees exercise considerable ingenuity in officially selling "bent" National Insurance Stamps. Here, CASE 84, (3.6.75), 8 G.P.O. counter clerks were imprisoned for "quietly" selling £433,000 worth of stamps which had been "spectacularly" stolen in an armed robbery two years before. Inside G.P.O. employees have also been known to fictitiously inflate overtime payments (CASE 100: 25.9.75), and in one case (CASE 96: 20.9.75) of receiving overtime payments whilst on holiday in Spain! Others with no access directly to money, customers or goods practice institutionalised techniques (CASE 73: 5.4.75) 9 employees of the Ministry of Defence were accused^{ed} of fraudulent inflation of overtime claims.

actors, but highly cognisant of their possible presence or sudden appearance. As opposed to fiddling, which has a functional role in the system of the powerful, stealing constitutes a marginal threat to the firm as the management see it. It is a threat because it involves the subtle rearranging of segments of official practices; it is only marginally so because the losses involved can be predicted and planned into production, or economically tolerated.

As salesmen are held accountable for accurate ordering, checking, loading and returning of goods, they are allowed some access to relevant stages of despatch work. Each day, on return to the depot, the salesman initially returns unsold bread, and credits his current bread-order sheet accordingly. These bread-order sheets are kept in the despatch office in a pile on the desk, and each salesman comes in with his returns, rifles through the pile for his old order, and enters his returns in the appropriate column for the office staff to eventually credit his account. He is then allowed into the despatch area, where all the racks of orders are being prepared for the next day's selling, so that he can check and make minor adjustments to his next day's order sheet which is attached to his rack. Subsequently, he is supposed to complete separate orders for bread, cakes, biscuits and confectionary in the sales office. When this is done, these advance orders are passed to the office staff so that his round account may be appropriately debited. Adjustments and returns figures are later passed to the sales office for credit or debit reassessments.

When he arrives to work the next day, he checks that the bread that has been issued to him tallies with the order that he has made out. If he has been under-issued, he can complain to the despatch staff, who, if in agreement, may complete his order. If his order is complete, but in his estimation, either too small or too large, he may obtain "extras" (for which he is debited) or hand back surpluses for credit. Cake, confectionery, and biscuit returns are tallied weekly and processed similarly.

Every stage of this process is regularly fixed by salesmen, using three basic strategy-types similar to those used to fiddle. All salesmen (including "straights") exploit specific errors in standard situations. Errors regularly occur in despatch work, and salesmen rarely report those disadvantaging them. More actively, some salesmen construct orders in ways they feel will make positive mistakes more likely (by, for example, writing figures which they hope the sales office will interpret as a '7', and despatch staff as a '9')^(a) or by adding figures after orders have been charged to their accounts. One salesman doing this:

"...got caught by the despatch manager in the end...and they hadn't got much choice but to sack him...he'd altered his ticket, and it was noticed, he changed a 10 to a 100...pity we (supervisors) didn't see it, one of us could have seen him and told him not to be so bloody daft..."

Some experienced men hope to rely on double-checking laxity by despatch staffs, by first of all checking the stock racks (to see what stock bread is available), and then posting an appropriate complaint. Skilled despatch men are, however, aware of this gambit, although they regularly allow some salesmen to take small amounts in this way. One despatch charge-hand told me:

"...I stick the spare stock in the bakery... nobody's ever short then!...take old Sid, he always comes over to the stock rack to see what we've got before telling me he's short of anything..."

Skilled salesmen also regularly exploit general weaknesses in bakery control-checking systems. Occupants of different salesman statuses have widely varying access to stealable merchandise, as I have already discussed, but even within

(a) Mars (1973, p 204) similarly notes that, for waiters: "writing can be made deliberately ambiguous. For example, fives can be made to look like threes; the customer accepts the five, the clerk accepts the three..."

relatively free-access areas, the despatch acceptability of stealing varies with the sort of definitions that they have attached to various goods. As Diagram 11 (below) shows, a knowledgeable salesman arriving at an appropriate time will experience less difficulty than the naive late-comer.

Exploiting general weaknesses primarily refers to: collection of stock odds and ends lying on the floor, removal of stales and stealing of day stock bread from the stock racks near the

Diagram 11. Merchandise Categories

RESPONSIBILITY	TYPE OF STOCK	VICTIM
Counted Stock DESPATCH RESPONSIBILITY	Future stock Tomorrow's Stock Day Sliced Stock (After 5.30 am)	IMPERSONAL PROPERTY Removal may offend Despatch Staffs
Uncounted Stock STOCK OF INTERMEDIATE AND SUSPENDED RESPONSIBILITY	Other Day Stock Stales	VICTIMLESS Removal rarely offends anybody before 6.20 am.
Issued and Counted Stock SALESMAN'S RESPONSIBILITY	Issued Bread	PERSONAL PROPERTY Removal Offends Everybody

despatch office (if this can be accomplished unseen), or enlarging credits on return sheets, and reducing debits that pass to individual sales accounts.^(a) Returning cake-waste on Saturday provides the best opportunity for making large regular amounts, as the process is relatively unchecked. One man recalled a subtle way of using this to his advantage:

"...My waste is always £9...I keep it the same so that they won't suspect anything, and cut it down...it's £9 whether it's actually £9 or £2...well, I book some figure like £8.79, or something like that...I have to remember to make it slightly different each week..."

Sometimes forgetfulness, of the absence of sufficiently extensive ordering systems creates the necessity to develop an alternative. Another salesman remembered how he had done this, but that it had backfired:

"...I was taking flour out there..(Wellbreads) 2 bags a week to be precise, large sacks!.. well, I needed them! one of my customers wanted some, so I went back to the depot, but I didn't know where the hell it was kept...anyway, I forgot to order it, so I had to ask the manager to get me some, not bent, he booked it...but then I forgot it again, and he said: 'no, I can't get you another one, you should have ordered it'...well, after having the first bag, I knew what it looked like, so I went up to the top (the flour store) to get one, and

(a) The technique of "padding" has a good pedigree. Bigus (1972, p 145) refers to it as "dumping"; Edwards (1958, p 190) as "fake refunds"; Shields (1961, p 22) as "phony refunds"; and Tocchio (1962, p 28) as "fictitious refunds". Cf CASE 24 (9.9.73), the great Ford Scrap Fiddle (which also employed a conventional irony, that of money-in-rubbish), 10 men were indicted for taking part in 4 different covered-steals: (i) "swinging the weighbridge" (the manipulation of weighbridge tickets for a lorry load of scrap which allowed registry of a maximum weight), (ii) "double ticket fiddle", (getting two heavy tickets for a heavy load, the second one to be used to weigh a light load), (iii) "enhanced weight swindle" (higher weight registry by turning the bridge adjustment screw), (iv) "double weight" swindle (loads weighed twice). Scrap dealers paid staff £15 per ton for buckshee weights.

there was no one around, and the door was open, so I picked one up, and I thought: 'I'll push my luck, if anybody says anything, I'll say I've been told to come up from the bottom to get one'...thinking: 'I'll bluff it out that way'..well, I just put it on to the van and thought: 'I'm onto a good thing here'...well, it became a habit, and I used to take them and store them at home...trouble was, they started to go off...and I had to throw them in the river...no, it's not funny...I had a hell of a job getting them down there, and when I threw them in, they didn't sink...(laugh)..."

General weaknesses may also be exploited passively. Rather than chance offence by placing despatch staff, or other salesmen in awkward situations, some salesmen prefer to fix figures in the credit or debit columns of accounting situations within their control. Retailers are often particularly adept at fixing 'debts'. Every retail salesman has a debt-folder in which he records weekly money owing to him by his customers, to that office staff may accurately balance his books. If customers leave, they may be recorded as having 'flitted' with large debts, and wholly fictitious debts may be inserted to cover withdrawals necessary to allow particular expences. This "phoney debt" trick (Abramson, 1949, p 49) is also a common one: collecting doubtful debts but reporting them uncollectable seems to occur to most service agents. The possibilities and variations at Wellbreads are enormous. One man remembered:

"...(the supervisor) used to put on the bottom of the debt-sheet: '£2 discount' ...and put a little scribble near it, and hand it in...and used to get credit for it...so I used to fix myself a 'discount' see, on the Rec. (discounts are) just a little figure on the top, I knew it was O.K...they never bothered to check it, it became quite a habit, just to put '£2 dicsount' each week...until I filled up the sheet on the debt-sheet, so I had to lose the page, so I just ripped it out, and re-wrote another one...so if they looked in my debt-folder, there would be nothing there...I used to sign (the manager's) initials!..anything that would look good...it was never queried..."

The third steal-strategy involves the development of a sufficiently experienced corpus of knowledge to that potential breakdowns in bakery control can be espied and exploited. Sometimes relevant information is passed between trusted salesmen, as in the following case:

"...That's rich that is!...I just asked (the relief manager) for some extras, and he's put them in the short-despatch column!...(roundsman would be credited rather than debited with the amount in question)...go and ask him for a tray of bread!...see if you get it free..here, Bert, look what I just got!..."

More frequent, however, are potential control-lapses that are sumultaneously 'sussed' by several salesmen:

"...Do you know what happened the other day?...I got back to the depot, and the Cake bloke was there...and he said: 'How long am I supposed to wait here' (to be unloaded)..so I said: 'Just stick them on the bay, mate'..didn't I?...and after that, the Packet Cake man arrived and unloaded, and after him the Fruit Loaf man copied him...well, I didn't know all this was going on, as I was in the canteen having my lunch...when I came out, I saw it all stacked up there...I couldn't take my eyes off it!...all the blokes were coming into the yard, they would walk past, not seeing it, say: 'Hello' to me, and I would see their eyes move past me and see all this stuff lying about...well, three of us got together didn't we?...backed a van up, one of us inside, and two watching outside, we stashed the stuff at 'X's' house...just as well, we nearly got caught you know, apparently, all the Fruit Loaves were date-coded, and they (Wellbreads) returned the rest to the company...se we were the only ones with Loaves stamped '13th'...I was planning to stick a few of them in as cake-waste, you know, dirty them up a bit, stamp on them and pull them about, luckily (a supervisor) warned me, and I warned the boys...lucky I did, or we would have been out for sure..."

Occasionally, two or more salesmen will pair up as a team, for a one-off attempt. One or more to provide distraction, or

look-out, and one to steal:

"...I used to think that was the safest way, that way you were the only one who knew you had it (stealing as opposed to dealing)...I used to 'borrow' a tray from stock...(laugh)..you have to wait until the right moment, we used to work in a pair...'X' and myself, one would cover for the other one, if you come in here at the right time in the morning, you'd find them all drinking tea in the office, and you didn't have a lot to watch, if you positioned yourself right, you could make sure that none of them moved...we never went past them, we used to put it on the rack, and then pull the rack across..."

Dealing

All stealing however implies the possibility of collision with agents of control. Such inherent dangers are deliberately removed in the third form of occupational "part-time" crime practiced by Wellbreads salesmen: "dealing".^(a) Dealing can be defined as meaning a part, or portion, which is distributed on

(a) Bigus (1972, p 145-6) uses the word 'dealing' to refer to a form of "cut price kickback" system (i.e., supplying goods to, or reducing the cost of goods to a customer for a direct cash bribe) similar to that strategy widely practiced and known as the "tie-in sale" (where several unattractive goods are price-tied to a valued one) see, Clinard, 1946, p 80. Bigus's milkmen gave their good customers 'deals' by giving them free dairy goods at specified intervals. Bigus comments that: "...Deals carried out in this manner were easier to cover up than other types of deals....all the driver needed to do was "dump" the produce which was given away. Dumping consisted of claiming the product had gone sour, or had been damaged. This allowed the driver to balance the books without taking the loss himself. Other forms of dealing included reducing the price of specific products and eliminating the delivery charge. These deals were more difficult to cover up because they involved "juggling" the books.." (i.e., balancing by bringing in chance cash).

a clandestine basis to the mutual interest and profit of those concerned and involved.^(a) Collision become collusion. Separated relationships become "cozy" (Klockars, 1974, p 181). Generally, "cozy" relationships are founded upon inter-departmental "back-washing" (Shields, 1961, p 23), or "backscratching", wherein the domestic needs of employees are satisfied in other departments of the same organisation in exchange for similar favours in return. I refer here however, not so much to abettment (by one employee in the nefarious designs of another) nor just to collusion (a fraudulent secret understanding between ostensible opponents) but specifically to subversion by salesmen of inside staffs and of the organisational rule which legitiamately distances them.^(b)

Transactionally, collaborative dealing between salesmen and others constitutes a central threat to the way that the powerful in the factory have designed the distribution of goods and roles. A deal is essentially a role-change inasmuch as the same number of roles is present in the interaction, but they are assumed by different and fewer actors. In such a rationalisation of service, the firm loses it's percentage of the "action" to both the dealer (who deals) and the dealee (to whom it is dealt). By assuming a role not officially allocated to him, the dealer distributes goods which may or may not have been deliberately manipulated by him to become "invisible" at the next inventory.

(a) By "clandestine", I mean to contrast objectively identical activity. The despatch worker gives the salesman bread. That is his job. But, he can do it openly (legitimately), and sometimes, as well as this, clandestinely (dealing). Both are executed with care: the latter being an attempt to imitate the first in all possible and visible aspects - except one! I am grateful to Henry (1975a, ff 18; 1975b, p 26) for pointing out that this could be interpreted as just meaning "secretly". Henry ably shows that "second job" amateur dealing is done carefully, but not secretly.

(b) I take these definitions from some excellent unpublished papers by Tony Hill (Department of Sociology, University of Durham).

The sharing of standard roles between conniving incumbents crosses official work group boundaries and elevates the steal-team into a deal-plot.

These practices together produce what we may here refer to as a "hidden-economy".^(a) Merchandise is regularly and "invisible" stolen, covered, transported, exchanged, purchased and consumed in ways that never "come to light". The "hidden-economy" may be defined as the: 'Sub-commercial movement of materials and finance, together with systematic concealment of that process, for illegal gain.' The hidden economy is a microcosmic, wry reflection of the visible economic structure, upon which it parasitically feeds.

The hidden-economy, then, runs to the "side" of the legitimate one. In fact, there is an extensive metaphoric argot testifying to the lack of economic centrality of the concealed structure. Illicitly organised production is referred to as "under the counter" (Baumhart, 1961, p 133), or as "left-handed" (Feifer, 1965, p 323), or, simply, "on the side". Jobs involving illicit despatch are referred to as "sidelines", "side-sales", or "side-jobs" (Bogdanoff and Glass, 1954, p 34-6), although the same terms are used legitimately by waiters (Hutter, 1970, p 211) and waitresses (Donovan, 1920, p 120-1) to mean 'sideboard-jobs': essential, yet ceremonially marginal work like cleaning ashtrays or mixing salads. "Side Jobs" may only depict invisible earnings (i.e., the untaxed earnings of second-job holders) and occasionally (Donovan, 1920, p 202) all invisible earnings are referred to as "side money".

At the bakery, the deliberate buying-in of control agents simultaneously provides extra safety, but a smaller percentage of

(a) This possibility is unsystematically realised elsewhere. Klockars (1974, p ix) refers to "subterranean economies", and Sutherland, (1937, p 5-6) to the fact that thefts-in-progress are only 'visible' to the "wise"; Jacques Leslie (Guardian, 9.8.75) to India's extensive black-marketed "parallel economy". These formulations are redolent of the "underworld" (full-time crime) formulations, and do not connote the systematically invisible structure.

the illicit profit for the salesman. In addition, this percentage can be further reduced if the salesman indulges in multiple-dealing (buying from bakery staffs, and selling to morally unrestrained customers as 'hot' bread) rather than mere single-dealing (buying from a bakery dealer, i.e., collusive buying, and selling normally; or collusive selling, i.e., "making" goods somewhere on the round, and then selling the thus covered goods covertly to a shopkeeper in exchange for cash or groceries). But whatever the cover bought by the dealer, the multi-staged dealing process is similar.

The first stage in successful dealing is the "set-up"^(a) (Goffman, 1972, p 210), which is the "clandestine phase", (*ibid*, p 304) of the operation, constituting (Goffman, 1963a, p 91) an:

"...opening move, typically by means of a special expression of the eyes but sometimes by a statement or special tone of voice at the beginning of a statement..."^(b)

The penalties for rejection of an offered deal (from either side) have been defined as such that an outright offer is acknowledged as being out of the question. Instead, the "request" (Goffman, 1972, p 145), or stimulated-offer is substituted. This is necessary because one can neither offer to, nor accept a deal without the suspicion that it might be a 'set-up' of an undesired sort.^(c) One of the Wellbroads salesmen

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- (a) Henry (1975b, p 17) criticises this additional usage of the phrase 'set up' as it already has four distinct meanings (Henry, 1974, p 10, 39). I mean exactly to confuse. At this stage of the proceedings, any interaction is ambiguous: any proffered set-up could well be a 'fit-up'.
- (b) Eye-contact is a culturally-acknowledged rather than bakery-specific alerting phrase. Cavan (1966, p 51-2) notes: "...while eye contact is not a necessary prelude to an encounter in the public drinking place it is sufficient to discredit the display that is used to decline the status of being open..".
- (c) Working at the supra-ethnographic level, Henry (1975b, p 8) is able to classify an important structural pre-condition of dealing. The ceteris paribus clause of dealing masks, Henry suggests, the essential necessity of interaction to occur within a legitimate

remembered:

"...I used to have a deal with 'Y'... but I missed out on the good run...I never pushed myself forward, I didn't want to lay myself open...for any come-back on me...I thought: 'I'll wait until they ask me'...I knew it was going on...because I used to see this bloody trolley coming round at 5.30, and everybody was getting bread off it...I knew something was 'on'...but I thought I'd wait..."

The initial individual set-up is generally the construction of a non-chance transaction from an everyday casual encounter by a particularly interested member who believes that others have similar interests. The deal is 'on' when both parties combine all the passible communicative elements of the interaction in the same way, thus elevating the 'conversation' to a new meaning structure. Thus, "putting out feelers" (Goffman, 1959, p 183-90) may result in successful "double-talk" (*ibid*, p 191) which only performers can read and understand. The strata of "being known", which Henry (1975b, p 17) accurately tells us is a precondition of acceptance, lies beneath this superior level of being "in the know".

The object of this pseudo-conversation is to prevent the legitimate transaction moving to the official end of fiscal accountability, via a democratic negotiation of the implications of non-accountability. Classically, between sales and bakery staff, the "alerting phrase" for those "in the know" is the demand for, or offer of 'extra bread', or the query: 'Is there any bread about?'. Such talk is straightforwardly legitimate (if partially absurd) for straights, but ambiguous for experienced men.^(a) Indeed, Henry (1974, *passim*) notes how the amateur

(contd) context. That is, part-time crime never engulfs the legitimate activities upon which it is parasitic: for dealing to be possible, one must first be employed as a despatch operative or as a salesman.

(a) Mars (in personal communication) has indicated that London driver salesmen use the word "turnover" in a similarly ambiguous sense.

dealing in stolen goods is managed through what he refers to as "the ambiguous presentation of goods" (Henry, 1975b, p 19). This sort of dealing is initiated "...with what members described variously as a "test-line" or a "probe-line" concerning the request for or offer of "cheap goods", "cheap gear", "cheap stuff"..." (*ibid*, p 18). This means that each actor has to fill in the meaning in his own way: the wise 'wisely', and the ignorant innocently.

All deviant activity which requires recruitment of deviant personnel from mixed-status ranks of others, stands the risk of having an invitation to indulge offered to the wrong people. As Humphreys (1970, p 50) reminds us, it is this very ambiguity of role-identification of these 'wrong people' which allows conmen, narcotics agents and so on, to operate. For some regular deviants, this is partially resolved by nominating areas within which people might more often be labeled deviant than not, or within which there is a preferred interpretation of conventional "alerting-phrases". Reiss (1961, p 189) suggests that locations for picking up homosexuals simultaneously carry a justifying rationale for both parties to be there legitimately, and may thus justifiably be called "contact situations."^(a)

At Wellbreads, at the set-up stage of a deal, the "alerting phrases" act as a significant symbol for the bakery 'wise'. As Mead (in Strauss, 1956, pp 158, 175) notes:

"...the vocal gesture becomes a significant symbol...when it has the same effect on the individual making it as it has on the individual to whom it is addressed or who explicitly responds to it...The actual gesture is

(Contd) To ask one of these salesmen what his "turnover" is might bring forth one of two possible answers. Straights are told what their gross sales are, and others what the fiddle-"take" is.

(a) We might suggest that in such a homosexual "contact situation", eye-contact gathers a situationally specific meaning (Humphreys, 1970, p 49; Glaser and Strauss, 1964, p 10). Note also the ambiguous illicit and ambiguous arm movements noticed by Mars of pilfering dockers (1974).

within limits arbitrary. Whether one points with his finger, or points with the glance of an eye, or motions of the head, or the attitude of the body, or by means of a vocal gesture in one language or another, is indifferent, provided it does call out the response that belongs to that thing which is indicated..."

At the set-up stage, such a request can mean either the legitimate booking of bread in the extras column of the salesman's bread order sheet, or, it can mean that the bread should not be booked anywycere. I asked an inside-dealer, who wss well-aware of the possibilities and traps involved, how deals get set-up:

"...it's hard to say really..I don't know how it comes about, might be like 'L' (a straight despatch man)...a roundsman asked him for two 'extra' trays of bread one morning...and he said: 'Don't Book them, I'll see you later'...course, 'L' went right in and told the manager...but if you were included to make a few bob, you'd most likely say: 'Fair enough mate', and start off like that...or, you can get asked for 'extra', like one bloke did, and he gave it to him, and he just didn't book it down, see?...and later, the roundsman said: 'You didn't book that tray'...and the bloke said: 'No, I don't think I'll bother'...so he said: 'O.K.',...and it starts from there, it usually trrns into a regular thing..."

For set-up to succeed, then the dealer must understand the dealee (and vice versa), and both must trust one another. In Glaser and Strauss' terms (1964), set-up changes from a closed awareness context (wherein neither knows the others' identity) through a suspicion awareness context, to a final open awareness context. Glaser and Strauss (*ibid*, p 11) tell us:

"...Thus, a closed context can be shattered by arousing suspicions; but if suspicions are quelled the closed context is reinstated, if suspicions are validated, the context may change to either pretence or open context.." (a)

(a) As Henry (1975, p 16 et seq.) has nicely pointed out in a

If the set-up is 'on', then the parties involved have tactically negotiated a successful, and favourably judged awareness context change. Sometimes, however, such subtleties are dropped, especially by experienced dealers, when attempting to set up what they define as good prospects. Several salesmen offered accounts of blunt and surprisingly risky opening gambits by inside dealers:

"..I wanted some extra bread, and he just said: 'You can pay me Friday'...just like that!.."

"...I never used to be in on it, but one day, I asked for an extra tray, and he said: 'I won't book that one, you can make it right with me at the end of the week, right?' so I said: 'Yeah'...."

"...It was funny how it started...one day I came in and found an extra 14 on...well, I didn't say anything, just put them on the van...and the next day, the same thing happened...well, I happened to see 'T' and 'U' in the canteen, and 'T' looked at me and said to 'U': 'He's so tight, he'd sell his grandmother', well, I didn't connect the two at the time, but I saw them again, after I had found more bread on my rack..and they started saying that I was tight again, so I said to them: 'What do you mean?'...see, I wondered where those trays came from, but you can't go up to anybody and say: 'Have you been putting extra on my rack?' can you? ...you have to wait until they approach you ...so I gave him a quid, and said: 'That alright?'...and he looked at me, and said: 'You'll do'...."

Behind the scenes however, it occasionally happens that a salesman who is 'in', will recommend a friend of his not at that time involved. Alternatively, 'wise' salesmen may understand

(contd) discussion of this analysis, "awareness" not only moves through these stages, but is additionally, at the suspicion and open stages, adjudged either as a favourable or unfavourable context. Only when typing of the other is done, and done favourable (Henry divides these possibilities into "alright" and "dodgy others) will the deal proceed. This is inevitable and not to be confused with the "straight" and "bent" characters that I will introduce in Chapter Five, which are strictly reactions to managerial typing of individual members of the sales force in terms of their believed propensities to steal from the bakery.

what is going on, and pester friends who are currently benefiting to be allowed 'in'. Thus, knowledge of dealing is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of its practice. Two salesmen commented upon two examples of sidling into dealing:

"...One of the other blokes said: 'well, there is a deal going on, I don't know whether you want some'...one of the (inside) shifts worked like that...but the other one just put it on my rack, and then came round, quite open about it, and asked for the money...the other shift, you had to ask for it to be set up...but the first one, just put it on the rack, and then came round after I'd checked the bread, it I hadn't said that I'd got extra.."

"...Christ Almighty!...he'd only been back two weeks (from being suspended for dealing) and he came up to me and said: 'Could I get him into the cheap bread'...just like that..."

Goffman (1963, p 91-92) defines the second (theoretical) move in dealing as 'acknowledgement': "...The engagement proper begins when this overture is acknowledged by the other, who signals back with his eyes, voice, or stance that he has placed himself at the disposal of the other...". However, in practical respects, acknowledgement completes the 'set-up' stage, and allows the second stage proper - "transaction" to proceed. This stage is relatively unproblematic, unless several inside men are dealing simultaneously, and in extreme, with only one salesman. One dealer-salesman, who was double-dealing in this way, explained the difficulties involved:

"...I told him not to do it, when 'O' (inside dealer chargehand) was on...but he was careful about it, though...he didn't do it in the same way all the time, one night, he'd put it on the van, I'd leave it inlocked for him, and another time under the ramp, or on the rack..."

Generally, though, in simple deal situations, bread can be left inconspicuously on racks of bread legitimately prepared

for salesmen.^(a) Potentially far more visible however, is the final stage, the "pay-off". Traditionally, loose cash is never offered nor accepted, and all pay-offs are conducted in notes. Because it is difficult to find a sufficiently hidden place to accept and check the payoff at the depot at loading times, and because the sight of such transactions has only one possible interpretation for uninvolved staff, most dealers stipulate a pay-off time and place. Two salesmen said:

"...he would never take any money on the spot, he used to say that he wouldn't take it, but he'd see me downtown of something like that, and take it then..."

"...I would never give him any money, he would have to do it several times first...even then I wouldn't pay him until he was out of the way, if he came up to me when there was other people around, he wouldn't get it... I would say to him: 'Oh, I'll see you up the road then'...same with 'M', I wouldn't pay him unless I saw him elsewhere, and he knew that...I could trust him, but I wouldn't pay him where anybody could see us...I wouldn't even talk to him in the depot in case somebody got suspicious...even if I was short of bread, I might ask the charge-hand, but never 'M', I'd avoid him and he'd avoid me, the moment the despatch manager sees you talking to somebody, he suspects...I'd never leave the money anywhere, I'd never give the money to anybody to give it him...you can't trust anybody..."(b)

For the salesman, varieties of deals are available, and most salesmen take advantage of all possibilities. Analytically, deals can be either traffic (a strategy, whereby the dealer purposefully plans the transaction and deliberately passes the

(a) Thus, clandestine set-up moves relatively unproblematically to the "covert phase" (Goffman, 1972, p 304, ff 18) of the transaction where potential matters for alarm are easily disguised.

(b) Cf. Goffman, 1959, p 73,--appearances count.

inventory-responsibility for the goods involved, elsewhere), and trade (a tactic, or, unplanned game, without inventory cover whose success relies upon successful immediate game-playing abilities by the players). Traffic-deals tend to become regularised, whereas trade-deals are specifically ad hoc, requiring renewed negotiation each time, even with and between trusted traders.

Inside traffic offers the greatest potential safety and profit to the experienced salesmen. Primarily, they involve thick-sliced or thin-sliced bread, dealt by the inside chargehands and their associates. Only chargehands have both the access to stock figures, and the power to alter them to cover 'losses'. One salesman claimed that his dealing was (inventorily) protected because his dealer, a chargehand: "...knows what he's doing, he goes through those figures with a fine tooth-comb... he knows what he can cover....". In the production bakery departments, those in charge regularly make out stock sheets. Despatch chargehands have sanctioned access to these sheets so that they may regularly check that the amounts of products that they require matches those they are about to receive. Chargehands who are also dealers can change the figures recorded on these sheets to cover the products they are dealing. For example, a high waste figure for a particular run of bread may be pencilled in, and the amount added on can then be deducted and dealt without a loss ever becoming visible.

It has also been suggested to me (by a chargehand despatch dealer), although I have been unable to verify it, that there is a certain amount of what Fiefer (1965, p 323) calls "left-handed production" at the bakery: i.e., bread collusively and secretly baked for the very purpose of selling it on the same left side. It is technically possible (by fractionally reducing the divider weights - which cut up and weight each separate dough) to squeeze more loaves out of a mix than prudence requires be officially declared. A general inventory-manipulation point: any process can be squeezed for extra as long as it contains an "elastic variable". An elastic variable is an element of an accounting/

production process which is not clearly finitely divisible. At Wellbreads, the amount of (free) water in a dough can increase or decrease its weight, and therefore the number of loaves that it can produce. It would certainly be possible to bake on the side at Wellbreads, although whether or not it occurs is a moot point.

Inside traffic deals can also be set-up with inside staff members not strictly related to the despatching process. Such deals are not so common, and usually evolve out of personal ties which cross-cut official work responsibilities. Two salesmen had set-up interesting deals in this way, the first one with his supervisor, the second with an office girl:

"...I got them (cakes) from 'Q' (supervisor) ...I come in in the morning, early, and take my cakes and load them onto the van, give him the slip (the order slip)...you know, the green cake order...and he goes into the cake-room and slips it under somebody's cake issue,...and throws their green order away, then I goes in and asks another supervisor for my cake order, see?...."

"...the first thing I did was to tap 'E' (an office girl)...I used to give her lifts home...then I took her out to dinner once.. then I gradually got round to the idea, and, the way she did it was, I would write out two orders, a small one for charging, and a large one that she'd pass through for issuing..."

Individual despatch workers, if not embroiled in the trafficking of chargehands, may decide to set-up on their own, and trade with willing salesmen. Because they often do not have the power to order straights from the dealing scene, payoffs cut drastically into their profit margins. Coupled with this, each trade has to be situationally re-negotiated on a fresh basis, thus reducing the predictability and consequent value of trading for salesmen.

Outside the depot, traffic-deals are called "sidelines", and constitute more the use of work allocated sales roles to make individual profit on unofficial goods than the subversive

perversion of control agents to illicitly obtain standard produce. On occasions where sidelines are pushed, retailers concentrate on high bulk/high fragility items (such as eggs and potatoes), whereas wholesalers use their different type of customer access occasionally to fence high profit/low bulk items, such as stolen coats and radios.

Sometimes, chances arise for salesmen to trade-deal with usual suppliers to the bakery. One man recalled:

"...I saw the Fruit Loaf man unloading at lunchtime, so I asked him if he had any 'spare'...he said: 'yeah, take as many as you want'...I took three boxes, and he said that he normally got 84p a box for them... so I gave him £2.52, which was a third of what they were worth..."

Alternatively, these trade-deals are set up with some of Wellbreads' official customers. Three salesmen suggested that the process of setting up these trade-deals is very similar to that enacted at the bakery:

"...I was loaded up with bloody cakes one week, and it was quite by accident really.. I said to him (shop manager) 'Can you shift some for me?', and he said: 'What do you mean?'...so I said: 'I'll let you make a few bob at it'...so he said: 'Yeah, O.K., I'll take them'..."

"...Well, it sort of happened that he said: 'cor! I've got a load of stales!'...and I thought: 'I'll cut you in, so I said: 'I'll tell you what I'll do, to cut your losses, I'll give you half credit'...he wasn't on sale-and-return, so if you walk out with a quid's worth, you know you've made 10 bob, ...I dreamed that one up myself, that was helping him, and me at the same time..."

"...Well, first you've got to know the person...and keep your ears open to what people say, once you know he's on the bent side, then you can approach him...I spoke to the Superloaf man about 'V' (shop manager) and other bits and pieces came in, then, you're going in there daily, and you begin to talk to him, and then you say: 'Would anything interest you?'...you have to come out with it sooner or later...anyway he ('V') was always coming

up to me and saying: 'Hello, Baker, got anything on the van?'...(laugh)...and I knew the Superloaf man was dealing with him..."

Dealing, however, is a chancy business, and although dealer and dealee have interests in common (dealer can obtain the goods, but not profitably dispose of them himself; whereas dealees can easily dispose of such goods, but not systematically obtain them) such mutual interest is dissected by certain inherent structural work conflicts. The dealee (the salesman) requires regularity and predictability in the illicit flow of goods in order that he may plan extras into his ordering, thus rendering them invisible and protecting himself from unwarranted exposure. Conversely, the dealer (especially inside bread traffickers) cannot guarantee what he can cover prior to the transaction, and needs a certain flexibility in demand to prevent him risking under-covered deals. Sometimes, as one salesman explained, it is precisely these problems that breed inter-shift conflict amongst despatch dealers:

"... 'T' (despatch chagemend) was putting them on for me during the day, see?...but I wasn't getting them... 'S' (the other chagehand) was checking, and taking them off at hight... 'T' had a row with 'S', but there was nothing he could do..."

Another problem for the salesman-dealee is that of deciding whether or not to accept dealer-offers. One salesman commented:

"..When that bloke 'O' came up to me at first, he said: 'Do you want any cheap bread?'...well, of course, I said: 'No, I don't touch the stuff, don't want anything to do with it'..but he kept on at me, saying: 'No, I'm on the level, how much can you take, three trays?'...eventually, I said: 'Yeah, you can put it on if you like'...but that other bloke came over, you know, that one with the limp,.. and he said: 'Do you want extra bread for 50p a tray?'...I just said: 'No, I don't have anything to do with that sort of thing',....I didn't trust him, it didn't seem right, somehow..."

A potentially more dangerous problem is that of dealing near straight members of management. Whilst straights are inevitable ignorant of the processes of set-up, they may come, quite by chance, perilously close to discovering what is going on. The "covert phase" of transaction (Goffman, 1972, p 304, ff 18) may, under unpredictable circumstances, become "exposed" in the same way that open pay-off can. One salesman recalled:

"...Cor!...it worried me sometimes, I remember snce, I was late in, and the bloke had put the (extra) bread on for me...and the manager was helping me load it onto the van....I kept saying: 'That's alright, mate, I can manage'...but he wouldn't stop, and I was trying to load, sweating like a pig!...I thought I'd had it then?..."

Occasionally, dealees chance exposure unwittingly and quite accidentally. Carefully stage-managed aspects of depot-reality occasionally become falsified by the background reality which normally plays no part in the fabrication. One despatch chargehand told me:

"...I took the manager home, early in the morning once, that was when he'd just started, and didn't know what was going on...and we went past one of the big W/S vans on the way...and he was unloading big boxes of tea and taking them into a shop...and wholesalers aren't supposed to carry tea...bloody great boxes with "P.G. Tips" written all over them in bloody great letters!...he (the manager) didn't bat an eyelid, but I was shitting bricks...he didn't know what was going on then, see?..."

But satisfactorily and successfully concluding a deal is just the start of the salesman's problems. Crucially, he has to somehow prevent the customer finding out that she has become an unwitting accomplice (which is relatively easy), and the sales management from discovering that they have become unwitting victims (which is considerably harder). The next section of this chapter will address this latter problem.

PROBLEMS IN THE ORGANISATION OF OCCUPATIONAL THEFT

When initially taking over a new round, salesmen are faced with the problem of maintaining the continuity^(a) of fiddles in the face of the need to re-negotiate a basis for being trusted. On the one hand:

"...it would have looked silly me taking over, and he had, say, been charging two shillings for a box of jam tarts, and me suddenly putting them down to 1/4 a box! ...so ebody's going to be for the high jump right sharpish, aren't they?..."

And then on the other:

"...he told me (the previous roundsman) to take some bread in, and take some of the stales, and add them onto what you charged her...but the old cow was checking me, just because I was new!..."

(a) I would dare to suggest that continuity with history is also worth establishing. Again demonstrating the similarities between business and the fiddle, the working class always lose out a bit. To quote Engels (1845, p 110): "...But the lion's share of the evil results of these frauds falls to the workers...". See also Caplovitz (1967, passim), who explains that the poor lose not so much through their insensitive palates and their disreputable shops, but because they have to buy on credit. In addition, as Engels (ibid) continues: "...Not in the quality alone, but in the quantity of his goods as well, is the English working man defrauded. The small dealers usually have false weights and measures, and an incredible number of convictions for such offences may be read in the police reports...". Further, Marx, (1867, Vol.1, p 238-242, 514) notes how "under-selling" bakers only got by: "...by first defrauding the public, and next getting 18 hour's work out of their men for 12 hours wages...".

Even if, eventually, satisfactory 'arrangements' can be made with customers, salesmen will still have to solve the problem of equalising the potential visibility of fiddles, steals and deals with the continuity of sales. Simple overcharging, for example, doesn't show in weekly sales figures produced for motivational purposes by the sales office, but reducing the amounts of bread ordered to take account of the probable purchase of 'cheap' bread, or, increasing cake-waste to cover appropriations from the cash-bag, become immediately 'visible' to a trained and cynical eye cast upon weekly sales figures. Fiddles vary in terms of their visibility in weekly salesmen's accounts, steals are always highly visible, and the potential sales-visibility of deals varies with the degree to which they are pre-planned.

In addition to the solutions to these sorts of problems, salesmen must also (for their own purposes) balance profitability with the predictability of fiddles. Generally, the predictability of deals makes up for their loss of percentage profitability, and in some cases, especially where wholesale men wish to regularise their deductions from their cash-calls, predictability becomes the overriding concern.

Risks of entrapment and probable consequences need also to be taken into consideration, sometimes in very sophisticated schemes. A wholesaler explained how he managed these problems:

"...I don't go across and take any...I don't steal...I can cover all the cash on overbooking, I don't "make" it to the extent of what some of the others do... for the simple reason that I haven't got the calls...it's pointless taking risks above your cash calls...although they haven't had a check of the vans recently...before, I was buying most of it from the dealers, and I wasn't hardly touching the customers at all... dealing isn't as risky as fiddling...the risk is the most important, if you didn't have the job, you wouldn't have any money at all would you?...it's worth losing a little bit for the safety..."

Most of the problems mentioned so far in this section can be indefinitely 'solved'. A perennial problem for roundsmen is the transferability of fiddles, steals and deals to holiday reliefs. Without sufficient warning of what to do and expect, reliefs might unwittingly expose previous practices. One supervisor remembered:

"...I took over a round once, and all the women kept giving me a shilling extra each morning for their order...I didn't say anything, I just thought that I'd ask him at the end of the week what it was all about...he was charging a penny on all items...and 6 pence on rolls..."

Usually, however, salesmen confer and pass tips to each other either verbally, or via the gypsy-code which is added to the definition of the customer on each page of the salesman's route book. More regularly, the transferability problem is that of passing a round to a supervisor who is either straight, greedy or incompetent. Two salesmen complained:

"...I said to him...I said: 'add a bob or two on here, and a few pence on there, but he wouldn't do it...that sort of thing can ougger things up for you... word gets round..."

"...I always add a few pence on there myself, but when 'K' (supervisor) does it...he really hammers them, he does them for a fiver some weeks..."

Deals have to be maintained during holiday periods for the reasons given above, but often dealers are not prepared to work in consort with relief dealers. An inside dealer once told me:

"..'B' is on holiday this week, and the supervisor who is on his round came up to me and said that 'B' had said that I was alright for a couple of trays...I didn't know what to say, so I just left it open, and said: 'I'll see what I can do'..and when I saw him again, I told him: 'Apparently, you have to put all extra bread on the sheet'...and walked off..."

Although there are quite specific and detailed systems available for the transfer of deals, both parties are always very wary, as a famous bakery sacking was once the result of such temporary collaboration. The following strategies were instituted by the big inside dealers to prevent this occurring again:

"...when the bloke goes on holiday, he pays you in advance for the bread, right, that he will require for that week, to keep his books straight...so the bloke pays the bill before he goes...and whatever the supervisor makes, is his, less the amount that the bloke has paid for the bread...so the supervisor never handles the money...the regular bloke pays the paymaster...and the supervisor 'doesn't know' it's on there...he don't 'check it', as far as he's concerned, he just comes in, loads his bread, and if anybody asks, he didn't check it, right?..."

An alternative for worried salesmen is to arrange the customer side of things, or, failing that, to resist all managerial attempts to be sent on holiday at all! Two salesmen told me:

"...I don't know what to do about my holiday, if the manager goes on there, or somebody like that, they'll see that I need about three or four extra trays a week...(after the holiday)...I thought the manager was going to do it, so I wrote half the customers down as on holiday...in the route book... but they found out what I'd done, customers were ringing in and everything!...I told them that I had had flu', and that I had been so bad that I hadn't known what I was doing!..."

"...trouble is, holidays, I've told him though, 'I never want to go on holiday!'...I never want a holiday!'....."

Salesmen occasionally perceive that inter-mixing of the types of "making" will provide satisfactory solutions to all these problems, thus forming what we might call "making-spirals". Roles such as fiddlee, dealee, stealee become successive minor functional roles offered to customers, each acting as an additional laminating fabrication upon his core structural role as customer.

Sometimes these spirals can be protective, as for example, when the dealee becomes in turn his own dealer, or when a salesman subversively deals with his fiddlee, as in the following two cases:

"...all the blokes there (another depot) were on the fiddle, when we did their rounds, we had to call at the fire station ...and all the firemen came out for their 'cheap' bread...same at the Police station!..."

"...I rook them, but I let them think they're making money out of me as well...take yesterday, they're not supposed to be on sale-and-return, and he (shop manager) said that I'd given him too many french loaves...well, I booked them, and then took them back at half price, ...well, I just doubled the order on the second run, and got them all back at half price the next day!!..."

Other spirals, although only performed by a few of the men, are generally accepted only as they do not threaten the cohesiveness of the sales group, or spoil the relations with despatch staffs. Stealing whilst simultaneously fiddling or dealing with a customer are marginally acceptable practices:

"...(the checker at the institution) used to give me whole sides of lamb...and one day, I nicked a great big tin of coffee... he was a good bloke, though, he used to give me (institutional) butter, and I used to sell it on the round..."

Wholly divisive, on the other hand, are practices such as inter-group stealing (I shall explore how significant stealing from ones' co-workers is in Chapter Five), or double-dealing. Most threatening by far is double-dealing, and stealing from the dealer. When double-dealing is thought to have occurred, it is up to the dealer to control both the dealer and the salesman. An experienced inside dealer suggested two ways of doing this:

"...I watched him for a week, and saw who was giving it to him...so I went up to the bloke concerned and I told him: 'If I catch you again, I'll shop you, if you want bread, in future, you'll get it

off me, and not from 'P' or 'Q', and I said: 'You come straight to me, and you deal with me only, they'll get their cut, but I take the responsibility'..."

"...'X' (chargehand dealer) caught one or two of the blokes at it once, he was livid, ...I had asked one of them to go and get me some rolls, and 'X' came up, furious, he was, flinging his arms about...I thought he was going to put one on me! he said: 'I'm in charge here, don't you deal with anybody else...I'll get you the sack if you do...and don't you forget it' ...he stopped all rolls then, everything, they used to be free...buckshee, but not now,...it's 'pay for everything'..."

Stealing from the dealer generally carries temporary, rather than permanent penalties. As one indignant inside dealer said:

"...'A' is a fucking rogue, though!...I caught him proper once, he did me for 140 thick...I searched everywhere for them... and suddenly, I saw them being passed up and down between the bays near the vans I cottoned on...I waited until they'd all loaded, and then popped my head around the corner and said that I wanted to spot-check all the vans...I found all 140 of them, and officially charged 'A' with them...he was man! called me a bastard and everything... he came after me and asked me to take them back...but I wouldn't see?...he'd conned me, I didn't like that...I said to him: 'You were going to sell them, so carry on'... and I told him: 'If you'd come and asked me, I'd have given them to you for a couple of quid...but you went behind me back..."

Double-dealers may be subjected to stringent sanctions, although the blackmail-potential of their knowledge is too great to allow them to become embittered. Entrapped minor double-dealers are normally severely restricted for short periods, and then coerced into the big deal-networks. Occasionally, this is done with nice cat-and-mouse humour:

"...I got 'P' (salesman) once though, he came up to me and asked if I could give 'Y' (despatch man) three pounds that he owed him

'Y' was dealing on the side, see?...he and 'P' thought I didn't know about it...so I said: 'O.K.'...and just kept it, I thought I'd teach him a lesson...well, 'Y' must have asked 'P' for the money, and 'P' told him that he'd given it to me...'Y' came up to me and asked for it: 'Did 'Y' give you some money for me?'...'No', I said, 'What money?'...he went all red and I could see that he was getting angry...'No', I said: 'I don't know anything about any money'... I thought I'd just leave it at that, and hope that 'Y' would see what was going on but he was too greedy...eventually, to keep him quiet, I said: 'What was this money for anyway?'...that shut him up, and I didn't have any more trouble from him after that..."

I have hinted at some of the possible ways of resolving a few of the practical problems of occupational theft, and its concealment within legitimate occupational action. In Chapter Five I will explore in detail some of the psychological implications of routine occupational satisfaction of these structural problems. But first, what is the context in which occupational blue-collar theft finds intelligibility as an institutionalised practice?

INVISIBLE-WAGE SYSTEMS

Everybody gets part of their wages in "kind". Although this is obviously and institutionally so for some jobs (clergymen are not commonly held to be motivated by financial reward), and difficult to perceive for others (few dustmen feel the 'call' to dispose of other people's rubbish), it is theoretically impossible to denude even the most inhospitable of work environments of some degree of satisfaction. Lisl Klien (1964, p 1) mentions a research worker who once interviewed a female worker who spent all her working life in a factory picking up tiny circular pieces of cork and inserting them in toothpaste tube caps. The research worker asked her whether the work felt boring, and the girl replied: "Oh, no! They come up different every time!" Roy (1959-60, p 160) adds:

"...De Man cites the case of one worker who wrapped 13,000 incandescent bulbs a day; she found her outlet for creative impulse, her self-determination, her meaning in work by varying her wrapping movements a little from time to time..."

For most of us, satisfaction is equally indirect and non-material, although probably not as bizarre as in these two cases. Importantly, for most of us, extra satisfaction is wholly informal, unofficial, and personal. For large groups of workers, however, "on the side" satisfaction is vigorously and extensively codified into officially institutionalised wage-perk payment.^(b)

(a) Webster (1934, vol ii, p 1026) defines "perk" as: "...a gain or profit incidentally made from employment in addition to regular salary or wages...especially one made by custom expected or claimed...". Margaret Powell (1968, p 74) offers two nice examples which show that whilst incidental, perks are not easily dispensed with: "...I used to try and get it off (animal skin) in one go because anything like that, rabbits' skins or hares' skins were

Wage-Perk Payment

Under a wage-perk system, an employee is openly and legally paid part of his wages in kind. There are no circumstances under which an employee can be prosecuted for taking advantage of this system, which is often institutionalised as such into public job advertisements. Quite often, wage-perk structures are the mature outcome of a long history of legitimising a wage-pilferage system, especially when pilferage (as with the bus-conductor's leisure time bus-pass, the miner's coal^(a)) is particularly difficult to otherwise control. When members of management profit (as those who have company cars do), the perk is generally thought of as an added incentive. When the workforce are entitled to perks (such as those living in "tied" cottages) the perks themselves subtly undergo a transformation from being 'extra' pay, to becoming just added commitment to the employer. Ultimately, wage-perk payment acts to the disadvantage of the work-force. As soon as it is institutionalised, it immediately begins to unfurl as a wage-depressant. On top of this, it systematically reduces the worker's own choice in the way that his wages are spent. This affects those who live in on the job (their wages are subsequently reduced to pay for this facility), and, most seriously, frequently harshly depressing the wages of those who are alleged to be motivated by higher things than just money (for example, nurses and au pairs) to absurd and cruel levels.^(b)

(contd) my perks. The rag-and-bone man used to give me ninepence for a hare skin...(of two glasses of port used for cooking rabbit)... One glass used to go into the jugged hare, the other glass went down (the cook's) gullet. If she knew I'd seen her, she'd say: 'Oh, well, it's the cook's perks. Everybody does it...".

(a) Perks do not operate during strikes. See CASE 31 (23.2.74). A miner who took 'his' coal during a strike was fined £5 for "Stealing".

(b) Cf. CASE 10 (12.5.73) A French au pair was conditionally discharged for stealing 3 dresses from her employers who paid her £7.50 per week - and took £5 of that back for rent. In CASE 20 (23.8.73), a

Unscrupulous employers use this opportunity to make profit not only out of the customers (and, incidentally, out of the goods that their employees are allowed as perks), but also by overcharging employees. Mendleson and Hapgood (1974, p 97) note how nursing home owners have been known to charge the government \$14 per day to feed their inmates, whom they subsequently manage to just keep alive on \$0.78 per day.^(a) Hutter (1970, p 209) similarly notes:

"...Free meals and lodgings are, of course, included in calculating an employee's salary. The Schlockhaus (small Jewish hotel) owner prefers to deduct the cost of the employee's meals and lodgings, -the cost according to his own calculations - rather than pay the employee's actual value. If the employee requests cash instead of meals or the lodgings, his request is denied..."

Wage-Pilferage Systems

When these "kind" payments are unofficial, then we may talk of a wage-pilferage system. A crucial difference between pilferage and perks, is that anybody caught pilfering is stopped, but not prosecuted. Pilferage is itself a paradoxical state. It is a transition stage between wage-perk (which is officially

(contd) cleaning lady was put on probation for stealing £16 from offices which she cleaned professionally. She was given a small room, free electricity, and £1.50 as a week's wages.

(a) The aged, when grouped, seem to be a good target. See CASE 33 (30.5.74), a report of staff thefts of geriatric pocket money, and CASE 69 (31.1.75) for a case report of a nursing home proprietor who had rather more than conventional concern in the legal wills of his charges.

institutionalised) and wage-theft (which is officially condemned). Consequently, pilferage is "employee theft which is pre-defined ambiguously". The potential pilferer must himself qualify the possible advantages of his occupational theft with the a priori knowledge that what will happen to him should he be caught is, apropos of the reaction to the theft, wholly uncertain. He may successfully define the theft as pilferage to himself, but an equivalently ambiguously legal reaction is impossible. There is no such charge as "pilferage": occupational theft is either proceeded against as "stealing", or is not proceeded against because it is defined as a "perk". This is the paradox of wage-pilferage systems: irrespective of whether or not those in control initially practiced the sort of "disengaged involvement" I discussed in Chapter Two, whether or not the theft in question is defined as "stealing" or as "just a perk" will depend upon quite arbitrary, extraneous, and separate dictates of those in control.

On top of this, whether or not an employee theft is defined as "pilferage" or as "stealing" varies for different industries. Martin (1962, p 117) also found, rather ominously, that the individual worker can also be introduced as a variable in this calculation. One employer told Martin (ibid, p 118) that this definition: "...depends on the person, if you know a chap is a bit of a rogue it is different from an honest man...". The line between pilferage and stealing also seems to waver quite imponderably. I once asked one of the Wellbreads managers what sort of overall daily shortage figure would be acceptable. He replied:

"...Anything up to £100, but it's very hard to say, because on some occasions, we've been £30 or £40 short and they've not said a word, and sometimes, we're £35 or £45 short, and they'll say: 'You're short'...you see, you can't really pin this down to a specific amount..."

Whilst for some practical intents and purposes, the broad empirical outlines of the criteria of everyday distinction are clear, the situation is specifically and indefinitely ambiguous.

Martin (1962), in an extensive study of the criteria used to distinguish between pilferage and stealing by various firms, emerges with the following summary (ibid, p 125-6):

"...'Pilfering' (when 'legitimate') involves one or more of the following features - the items taken are of 'small' value, they are taken for the worker's own use, the quantities involved are small, and the act is unpremeditated. 'Stealing' is any taking of cash (the only definition with which no one disagreed), or one of more of the following - taking of stamps, items from 'stock' goods in large quantities (by the box, sack or crate), items over a given value, items over a given value, small items taken repeatedly, taking for resale, taking with pre-meditation and unauthorised taking when it is known that the items would be given away on request..."

This is a summary of all possible criteria used by all of the firms studied, and does not represent a set of criteria used by any one individual firm. It is also an excellent summary of the possible reasons which could be given for labeling a theft as either 'pilferage' or 'stealing'. Nevertheless, it is an ostensive but weak definition; it does not settle upon any particular, universal criteria (except the theft of cash, I will come to that in a moment), and whilst dressed to look specific, actually contains several elastic "weasel" words like 'small'. By definition, we would have to say that the theft of a "handful of screws", a "spiritual bouquet", a "light bulb", "half a can of shoe polish", and a "photograph", the theft of which several meat-inspectors from Boston were indicted in 1971 (Schuck, 1972, p 87) were not small things!^(a)

Employee thefts remain ambiguous at the time of theft. We cannot specify a priori whether or not they will be defined as 'pilferage' or as 'stealing'. Nevertheless, this ambiguity

(a) Contrarily, CASE 37 (7.7.74) reports the absolute discharge given to a man who had taken a worthless box from his employers. The judge accepted that the defendant didn't know that there was a sextant inside the box.

has a systematic rather than a random effect. It disadvantages the workforce, and advantages the management. Since both worker and management can pilfer, we have two distinct types of wage-pilferage: Collective/stable "customary (wage) pilferage", and Individualistic/unstable "supplementary (salary) rewards".

"Customary pilferage" traps the worker in a double-bind. His wages are geared down to an invisible pilferage value of his job, but his attempt to secure this invisible value could well lose him his job and land him in court. This double-bind is heterodoxical (since there is an obvious power difference between management and worker), and whilst it is in theory strong, it is weakened by the simultaneous presence of custom. Custom acts as a weak paradoxical bind on management: for many intents and purposes, they are "bound" to allow some pilferage. In the building industry, for example, custom weakens the heterodoxical double-bind upon the worker to such an extent that (Martin, 1962, p 117):

"...The building industry always accepts that no man ever pays for nails, screws, or firewood, but if he took something bigger, it would be theft..."

It is similarly traditional that meat-inspectors (who have to reconcile the technically irreconcilable governmental top-heavy regulations with the short-cuts necessary for the economic survival of the slaughter-houses by using "common sense") are entitled to extra reward called "cumshaw" (meat for their domestic use)^(a) for oiling the wheels of commerce (Schuck, 1972).

It seems that pilferage may become "customary" (although not yet officially a "perk") when one or more of the following are appropriate. The pilfered goods may not be a 'real' loss to the firm: Martin (1962, p 115) rather nicely asks, what is the

(a) Zurcher (1964-65, p 399) notes that "cumshaw" is also used similarly in the U.S. Navy. Zurcher (*ibid*) claims that it is originally a Chinese word meaning tip.

carpenter to do with the unneeded cut-offs? the waiter with the half-empty bottles of wine? As Mars (1973, p 202) and Hutter (1970, p 206) notes the management is usually especially lenient if worthless items are "scoffed" on the premises. The management may be similarly genial even if goods with some real value are pilfered as long as the loss may be euphemistically and alternatively categorised at inventory-time (i.e., the pilferage must be of 'kind' as inventories do not contain a category of "broken" or "spoilt" money); as long as the loss may be organised systematically into production (at Wellbreads, an extra 40 loaves are unofficially baked everyday to provide the 'men's bread'); and as long as the loss is of repeatable or disposable goods.

Management may be keen to institute customary pilferage if they feel that the act of theft itself creates a hedonistic surplus, a psychic percentage extra invisible wage on top of the value of the goods pilfered, whilst simultaneously retaining the spirit of the Damoclean sword of defining it as stealing. Zeitlin (1971, p 26) considers that a "system of controlled larceny" may well be cheaper than paying higher wages, and Aufhauser (1973, p 819) notes how slave-owners shrewdly allowed the rebelliousness of their slaves expression through minor theft. Aside from imaginery invisible extra wages accruing from pilferage of items rather than purchase of them on the market, there is a real sense in which (because pilfered wages are untaxed wages) it is cheaper for both management and worker. Alternatively, when the firm's customers are the object of pilferage, the firm will more readily allow maturation of the practice to become customary.^(a)

When pilferage is institutionalised and common amongst

(a) Conversely, when customers steal from the firm, they sometimes do so because of the operation of what they feel is over-pricing. Wallerstein and Wyle (1947, p 5) comment on the practice: "...Larceny of objects under \$100 in value covered such items as towels, a bathmat, a spoon and stamps. One man asserted that his high bill at least gave him a moral right to steal from the hotel where he was staying..."

members of management it is a gross mistake to similarly label it 'institutionalised theft', as Dalton (1964, p 212, 215) so accurately and eloquently argues. Managerial "organised pilfering rights" are explicitly (albeit unspokenly) "unofficial rewards" for the minutiae of individual managerial achievement, (ibid, p 198-199). As Dalton shows, formal ranking is too rigid and too slow to accurately recompense managerial effort, and informal rewards supplement wages and simultaneously support the existing status quo ante. The unofficial reward system functions as what Dalton (ibid, p 206) calls an "elastic incentive": effort can be recognised without disrupting the more cumbersome and symbolic procedures of promotion, and in addition to this, "dirty work", for which it would be unwise to reward directly, can be obtained.^(a)

Unofficial reward, or, managerial "supplementary reward systems" are double-binds, but are orthodox (i.e., exist between managers) and are consequently weak. Whilst there is little chance of managers being processed or prosecuted for accepting informal rewards (at least under normal circumstances) the system is inevitably subterranean. If formalised, it would conflict with the official reward system, and so it must always be surrounded by what Dalton (ibid, p 195) refers to as "double-talk". Each manager who takes advantage of the system cannot simultaneously benefit from it and refuse to accept responsibility for personally managing the ambiguity involved. Dalton cites two cases of female managers unable to thus benefit (Dalton, 1962, p 208, 211):

"...Some female heads regularly, but discreetly, gave certain items a 'damaged' appearance. Division heads unofficially knew of this, and set no limit to the markdown that could be made, other things being equal. However, those department heads who shrank from the ambiguities of

(a) The rewards were not directly in cash (as with the workers), but were in kind. Dalton (ibid, p 199-200) cites lengthy examples of "foreigners" (using the firm's time and money to produce items for domestic usage), and other 'extras' like free petrol (ibid, p 202). Jaspán and Black (1960, p 187) estimate that such "kickbacks" cost the American economy \$5 billions per year.

exercising their authority and asked a division manager the limit for a markdown were usually told "30 percent"... (another female department head) "worried the life out of" her division heads because only rarely could she "make decisions on her own". She, too, desired "shopworn" items, including jewelry with chipped stones, but she called upon the merchandising chief for judgements on the markdown she should make and was repeatedly given the official "30 percent". Knowing that others were than doubled this figure, she caused trouble by her gossip and insinuations..."

Thus, in Dalton's cases, the reward for personally accepting the management of unofficial reward ambiguity was an extra 30 percent on top of the standard markdown. As Martin (1962, p 23, 126) so nicely points out, the nearest equivalent to these unofficial rewards that the workforce gets is the cut-price concessions for purchasing company-produced goods, and not items customarily pilfered by the men.

Generally speaking then, wage-pilferage systems inasmuch as they function as what Zeitlin (1971, p 64) refers to as a "system of controlled larceny", can actually benefit those who lose the goods in question more than they benefit those who stand to gain them. The advantage of these systems is the power that accrues to those who control them. It does not lie in the possession of the material goods and services in question. This is especially so for workers rather than for management, as the former often have to deduct the cost of "sweeteners" from their invisible earnings in order to secure services from fellow workers who have no access to pilferage (see: Hutter, 1970, p 213; Davis, 1959, p 270). Additionally, those workers whose wage has been customarily geared down because of the expectancy of tips from customers may regularly get "stiffed" (Hutter, 1970, p 212, meaning not tipped) by customers who consider tips to be an extra, and not an essential part of the wage. Inevitably, the invisibility of invisible wages means that for prestige-purposes, workers may only claim that they are paid the invisible amount (Liebow, 1967, p 40).

Crucially, in all unofficial wage-pilferage agreements, there is the "of course" clause. This rider specifies that "of course, if X (naturally, unspecified) happens, we will have to treat this as theft". In any event, the primary injunction (to be honest, and not pilfer) can be emphasised, and the secondary negative meta-injunction (pilfer) can be denied. It is this (i.e., that this can happen) which is the message of wage-pilferage. The will of the pilferer is mortgaged to the manager to whom he is "technically", as they say, a thief.

Unfortunate (unintentional) disobedience of concealed, ambiguous, non-specific and ad hoc meta-rules (such as "too much" theft, of "large" items, of the "wrong" sort, "openly", and so on) can transform pilferage into stealing. When this happens, the wage-pilferage system becomes a wage-theft structure.

Wage-Theft Structure

In a wage-theft structure, harsh consequentiality replaces uncertainty. The structure is wholly unambiguous, but on the other hand, there is no chance of this ambiguity being resolved positively for the thief as it is for the pilferer.^(a) On all occasions, occupational theft will be defined as stealing. This is the category of "pure theft" which Dalton (1964, p 201) tries to distinguish from "supplementary rewards". Again, wage-theft is a double-bind: it is heterodoxical (between managers and workers) but it is weak (there is no ambiguity over the outcome of exposure). It is nevertheless a double bind where low wages are in harness with either direct (occupational) or indirect

(a) For example, CASE 29 (25.1.74). A store employee who stole store goods was fined. He claimed that he took the goods because he was underpaid.

(societal) imperatives to maintain a certain standard of living,^(a) which the visible component of the wage cannot support.

Martin (1962, p 117) provides a nice example of the clear-cut, but harsh wage-theft structure:

"...there would be trouble here is an employee took anything. He would be dismissed. I don't think there is any distinction. If he had only pinched something worth a shilling, we would dismiss him..."

So, compared with wage-pilferage, where the employer is in wage-supplement collusion with the employee; in a wage-theft structure, the worker has to steal his own wages. Leibow (1967, p 38-9) provides an excellent example of this with 'Tonk', one of his subjects, who was paid £35 per week, was expected to steal an additional £35 to make up his wages. Leibow continues:

"...the employer is not in wage-theft collusion with the employee...Were he to have caught 'Tonk' in the act of stealing, he would, of course, have fired him from the job and perhaps called the police as well....The employer knowingly provides the conditions which entice (force) the employee to steal the unpaid value of his labour, but at the same time, he punishes him for theft if he catches him doing it..."

But what of the Wellbread salesmen? Their position (bearing this typology in mind) is ambiguous. Needless to say, this makes their occupational life even more precarious and powerless. Whilst there are simply no recognised unilaterally applicable "perks", and whilst the situation is clearly and publically defined as an ambiguous wage-theft structure,^(b) two processes

(a) Salesmen and bank clerks are particularly prone to being paid as blue-collar employees, but asked to appear at work as white-collar ones. Abranson (1949, p 48) notes that this is referred to being asked to "put on the dog". Inevitably, there are those who will read the secondary injunction (to appear well) as more important than they standard primary injunction not to steal.

(b) Banks normally provide good examples of wage-theft structures.

operate to obscure this harsh/fair situation, producing in effect, an unfair and harsh regime.

Whilst the official managerial Wellbreads' line is to treat all theft from the firm by salesmen as stealing, this is watered by their unofficial definition of stealing from customers as "fiddling". "Fiddling" customers is the same sort of bind as 'pilferage': it is generally tolerated by the bakery management as long as irate customers do not demand retributive action. Whilst they may practice this type of pilferage, salesmen have no customary institutionalised pilferage rights back at the bakery. Whilst all production workers do have pilfering rights to a loaf of bread each day (extra bread is baked to cover this loss)^(a) salesmen are excluded from this privilege.

(Contd) In banks, it is not so much that there is no theft (as is commonly supposed), it is rather that all theft is unambiguously defined as stealing. A bank contacted by Martin (1962, p 117) commented: "...In a bank there is no line...(between pilferage and stealing)...you just don't do it. One thing leads to another and we do ask for a high standard and maintain it...". Since banks only handle money, and since there would be no way to, for example, define what "domestic consumption", or a "small" amount of money might be, allowing clerks to dip into the till would inevitably lead to a situation where, as was suggested, "one thing leads to another". On top of this, there is no inventory euphemism (such as "damaged") where lost money might be alternatively located. This difference between banks and retail outlets is indicated by a significant difference in their relative prosecution rates as tabled by Robin (1967, p 589). Banks prosecute 87% of their embezzling employees, whereas department stores only bother to prosecute 17%. To contradict the common assumption that banks are relatively free from employee theft, Shields (1961, p 18) reports that one bank in ten regularly reports a major internal theft, and Cort (1959, p 341) notes that polygraph testing showed that 20% of tellers had pilfered assets. McEvoy (1941, p 71) recalls one Chicago bank that lost \$16,000 in 1931 through the embezzling activities of 9 out of 54 employees; Hoover (1933, p 659) noted how the peculations of 12 officials in one bank wiped out nearly all its assets, and how, in another bank, all 6 tellers were embezzling simultaneously. Barrett (1865, p 203) found 13 tellers with their hands in the till in one bank, and even the bank examiner was using frozen cash from the vault for personal use. No "pilferage" by definition, since all theft is defined as "stealing". No doubt that if it wasn't for the excessively zealous daily checks (see J.R. Davis, 1957, p 226-7) the actual loss would be much higher than it is.

- (a) The loaf a day is not a perk. The loaf cannot be taken openly, but must instead be secretly pilfered by the men while the despatch manager is at lunch.

It is assumed that production staff have no outlet other than domestic consumption for pilfered loaves, and that this empirical feature of the practice will de facto limit the amount of bread that they will take. Salesmen, on the other hand, are assumed to have guaranteed occupational access to facilities (a round of customers) through which they could systematically violate the wage-pilferage meta-injunction which is applied: domestic consumption. The vagueness of the meta-injunction, in this case, means that the pilferage bind cannot be thrown round salesmen at the bakery itself, the invisible component of the wage being satisfactorily garnered indirectly from customers.

Wellbreads salesmen are thus unequivocally incarcerated in an occupational bind which specifies that they be paid low wages, which they may make up by either wage-theft from the firm (which will be treated as actionable), or be wage-pilferage from customers - which only might lead to trouble.

Chapter Five

Public Negotiation and Managerial Reaction

PROTOTYPICAL "CHARACTERS" AND ARCHETYPAL PORTFOLIOS

Stages in the Process of Part-Time Thieving

Ironically, the typical salesman's resolution of the tension behind the socialisation double-bind (failure to universally specify the grounds of applicability of the fiddle injunction leads, eventually, to management being "fiddled" as well as customers) places him in yet another double-bind. He is 'asked' to accept the invisible-wage "bribe" in order to bring himself up to a demanded materially advantaged position, and to simultaneously mortgage any legitimate political exercise of his will. The typical action taken by the men under these constrained circumstances is to relinquish the principles and take the money.

Thus, for most of the salesmen, a necessary (although insufficient) condition of successfully managing the occupationally paradoxical life as a salesman at Wellbreads is to be able to become technically competent in the "part-time crimes" of fiddling, dealing and stealing. Whilst practice of these strategies resolves some of the dilemmas thrown up by the occupational fact that salesman-wages have a large invisible component (i.e., just to settle for the invisible crumbs sanctioned by the management - fiddling customers - would not satisfactorily meet the vague societal injunction to maintain a certain standard of living), it simultaneously and conversely throws into bold relief the generation of ambiguity and the erosion of occupational responsibility and personal control that acceptance of a large invisible wage over a small visible one implies. What

the salesman gains on the financial swings: he loses on the 'political' roundabouts.

The salesman (and this also produces his conservatism), is subsequently particularly dependant upon the continuing good-will of the management (and not his own efforts) for his standard of living. Although he is also held organisationally responsible for all the goods credited to his round, he is systematically denied access to full technical means for cross-checking the managerial computations for the sales-system he 'controls'. But whilst he is forced to rely upon the honesty of management, he is well aware of the nature of the occupational contradiction. It is common knowledge amongst salesmen that the managerial hand that generally feeds deviance sometimes has been known to arbitrarily turn and crush it instead.

Thus, while the organisation encourages deviance in its employees, it randomly fails to provide sufficient "cover" for the practitioners in times of crisis. The salesmen are faced with the structurally weak heterodoxical double-bind of having no "realistic" alternative but to 'make' money "on the side"; whilst doing so is (albeit variously) punishable by the very people who demand the practice in the first place.

The orientation of much sales activity is towards various balancing strategies. As we saw in the penultimate section of the Chapter Four, the salesman has to walk a narrow tight-rope between customer-trust and the continuity of sales, the visibility of fiddles and the continuity of sales, the profitability with the transferability of fiddles, and between the risks of various fiddles and their entrapment consequences. This testifies to the presence of attempts to organise "part-time crime" invisibly. One type of practical format for the organisation of illegality under such conditions (progressively spiralling techniques) is sometimes adopted, and occasionally sanctioned. Unfortunately, although 'spiralling' satisfactorily deals with

the necessity to make money, it intrinsically fails to automatically generate activity, and identity, "cover". Activity cover is axiomatically provided by competence in practicing fiddling, stealing and dealing, and by judicious selection of a corps of techniques which are unrelated. Irrespective of this, additional care must be taken to ensure that the implications that illegal activity has for the self remain minimal, and that deviance merely remains as one small character trait amongst many, and is not elected by unwarranted preeminence by force of societal reaction alone.

If salesmen's illegal activities are to retain their "part-time" practical status, this needs to be supported by a psychological stratum wherein the deviant character trait has an equivalent "partial" status. Accordingly, salesmen require an operational basis for their illegal but essential practices that will simultaneously provide the requisite invisible material benefits, and practical and psychological protection.

Principally, management "prototype" the salesmen into good or bad categories. Paradoxically, semi-official processing within the firm, coupled with the men's reactions and remoulding of this labeling and processing, endows each man with one of a variety of available "archetypal" melodramatic "characters". The operation of these "characters" produces a "portfolio" of relevant and linked techniques of theft: a practical selection whose linking structure automatically and practically protects the actor. A batch of techniques is selected by each man in order that exposure in the practice of one will not inevitably escalate to general exposure as a thief; as the rest of the portfolio may continue to be practiced unseen and unhindered.

Study of sales-portfolios, and the "characters" emerging as process in the subsequent daily interactions, provides a sociological basis for exploring the differences between salesmen in a way not dependant upon any unseemly postulations about personality variations, nor upon uncritical adoption of the concept 'role'. I will turn first to a discussion of the latter.

Problems with Role as Process: 'Types'

Critics of 'role' have emphasised the definitional confusion characterising the debate, to the detriment of clarifying the essential duality of the concept. Initially, role has the fivefold metaphorical vocabulary enumerated by Dahrendorf (1973, p 8-9):

"...Identical or at least related concepts. The words we encounter time and time again in this context are mask, persona, character, and role or part...Role, part, persona, character and mask are words whose basic context, allowing for different stages of the development of language, is the same, namely the theater...These words have a number of characteristics in common. (1) All of them indicate something that is given to the actor for the occasion, something that is outside himself. (2) This 'something' may be described as a complex of modes of behaviour, which (3) in turn connects with other complexes to form a whole, and is in that sense a 'part' (as the Latin pars and the English 'part' for the actor's role still indicate). (4) Since these modes of behaviour are given to the actor, he must learn them in order to be able to play his part. (5) From the point of view of the actor, no role, no dramatis personae, is exhaustive; he can learn and play a multitude of roles..."

It is alleged by most observers that role is a mediating concept, aiding analytical understanding of the nature of order, and the relationship between actor and structure. The very broadness of the concept, however, perpetuates rather than bridges the action/society hiatus. It generates two analytical levels as opposed to one intervening tool. The first sense of role is its ability to reflect society through its meaning as structural part. The common feature here is reference to "behavioural expectations", or, "normative regularities", which (it is suggested) depict the moral division of labour necessary for the orderly production of meaning, and the essential 'parts' sufficient

for the successful conclusion of a set action. Men, inasmuch as they can be seen as the products of socialisation, warrant this meaning. Indeed, as Mackay (in Turner, 1974, o 181) tells us: "for the sociologist, to be human is to be socialised. To be socialised is to acquire roles." Goffman (1961a, p 41) reminds us that role not only implies socialisation, but also connotes an affective stance toward this perspective: "...role implies a social determinism and a doctrine about socialisation...Role, then is the basic unit of socialisation..".

For the purposes of analysing the illicit arts of salesmen, this structural sense of role has already performed in Chapter Four in the portrayal of a distinction between (for example) fiddler and fiddlee. In this chapter I am interested not so much in the turns taken in the action, but in the secondary, more ethereal meaning of role: dramaturgical actors or 'masks'. Analogy perhaps best describes and differentiates this. Consider an explicitly staged performance (a common-sense staged play in a theatre). The organisation of the production (as I have already discussed in Chapter Three) generates dramaturgic distinctions at two levels. Literally, we have the performers, and the audience. Metaphorically, we also read the audience and the performers as performers of a more abstract sort. Given this, looking at the performance in terms of role, we only have distinctions at a relatively mundane structural level between actors, audiences, and various ancillary role-fillers like stage-managers, clappers, producers, prompts, ticket-sellers and ice-cream girls, all of whom are more or less necessary for the successful completion of the performance, and all having allotted structurally scripted turns for taking part, in the way that even the audience "takes part" in the performance.

What interests us particularly here is the less structurally relevant meaning of role: here, for example, the varieties in the way that actors on the stage 'play' the actor role. This is what Mead means when he refers to (in Strauss, 1956, p 250) the "varied forms" of the "common response", and Sapir (in Goffman, 1961a, p 132) when he talks of "a series of petty truancies from the official

socialised self".

In any performance, a particular formal part might be played by a star, a walk-on, a bit-player, a character-actor, and so on. In the structural sense, the 'cast' would be further divisible into 'leads', 'supporting actors', and 'crowds'. But unless strict role analysis is to become infinitely regressive, then, a quite separate concept must be elucidated to draw attention to this ephemeral reflection of structure that interests us here. Role cannot openly cope with the reflexive element noticed by Strauss (1959, p 55):

"...The terms "enact" or "act out a role" suggest but do not come to grips with the complexity and phase-like character of inter-play, nor do they emphasise the frequently unexpected results of inter-actional drama..."

Orrin Klapp, in an amazingly lengthy and determined analysis, approaches this topic in his treatment of "types". It is no easy task to pin Klapp down to a consistent definition of types,^(a) but

(a) Klapp's doggedness sacrifices accuracy. "Types" are variously "role models" (1962, p ix); or, "roles" (1954, p 61), although sometimes, this is only true of certain types" (1958, p 676). Confusion is also rampant between the different levels of types: The main three (hero, villain, and fool) are alternatively "main dramatic types" (1964, p 169), "normative idealised concepts" (1962, p 11), "kinds of persons or roles" (1962, p 9), "thematic categories and labels" (1962, p 12), "role alternatives" (1954, p 58) and so on. This relationship between type, sub-type, and sub-sub-type (see, 1962) is unclear: sometimes they are "normative" (1954, p 57) and occasionally "status" (1949, p 161). The most acceptable version of 'type' that he provides is: "...a social type is plainly an abstraction. Even proper names like Simon Legree refer to a kind of person. The name is a symbol of a class present in our minds as a concept. Social types are not, however, logical categories. Unlike scientific and logical categories, they are based on praactical experience, common sense judgements of situations as lived rather than observed. They result from insight rather than reasoning. They have the truth of the proverb rather than the proposition of the hypothesis. Though simplified, they are be no means necessarily distorted pictures..." (1962, p 9). The most relevant definition to this particular analysis is: "...A "social type" is a kind of person or role found in a certain milieu...It is not however a mere occupational category, but usually refers to a type of character...Nor is it a personality type, in the sense of being a psychologically adequate description of an individual..."

one short footnote (Kalpp, 1962, ff 20, p 19) summarises the main distinctions relevant here:

"...A distinction between social type and social role is also in order. First, roles vary greatly in degree of consensus...Social types are roles which, although informal, have become rather well conceptualised and on which there is a comparatively high degree of consensus. Second, while many roles are widely allocated and do not "belong" to any particular kind of person, some get conceptually linked with a particular kind of person. At this point we may speak of the role-consensus as having developed into a social type....This stress on the kind-of-person who-acts-that-way helps also to clarify the distinction of social types from formal roles, which tend to be more abstract and impersonal..."

Crucially, types are informal, invisible, abstract, submerged, vague, preliminary aspects of the social structure, essentially without normative impetus. Klapp (1958, p 674) tells us:

"...Social types, as I shall try to suggest, are consensual concepts of roles that have not been fully codified and rationalised, which help us find our way about in the social system...They are a chart to role-structures otherwise largely invisible and submerged..."

The greater flexibility of "types" allows finer discrimination than is possible with formal structures, and helps cushion the emergence of new formal roles, and the phasing out of old ones. Of particular interest to this chapter, is the way that types can be seen to aid informal status allocation and prompt social control, and allow self/other location in the processes of identification. However, the overemphasis on the idea of types as some sort of 'shadow' role in Klapp's writings warns of a structural overtone redolent of role-as-behavioural-expectation. Consideration of the processes of 'typing' in the bakery show that a spin-off from Klapp's analysis - the notion of a "character" - is particularly appropriate.

"Character" Ascription: Casting as Prototyping

"...The social 'script' may be as constraining as that of a play, but it frequently allows more options; the 'director' is often present in real life as a supervisor, parent, teacher, or coach; the 'audience' in real life consists of all those who observe the position member's behaviour; the position member's performance in life, as in the play; is attributable to his familiarity with the 'part', his personality and personal history in general...."

(Biddle and Thomas, 1966, p 4)

The "casting" procedures of the Sales management at Wellbreads allocate salesmen to particular rounds of customers. The particular strains of the round (set against the strains of the job in general) can be seen as a conflict between the 'situated activity role', and the 'role title' (Goffman, 1961a, p 86) in the name of which the job is carried on.^(a) Specific practices become embedded in the expectations of customers, providing a work specific self for the roundsman. This work self of the roundsman will emerge and exist in his relations with his customers. As Goffman (1961a, p 41) sets the scene:

"...A self, then, initially awaits the individual entering a position; he need only conform to the pressures on him and he will find a me ready-made for him; In the words of Kenneth Burke, doing is being...A situated self, then, awaits the individual..."

Ascribing a round of customers to a salesman ascribes to him also a situated self: one enforced by the unequal distribution of scope and opportunity contexts (see Chapter Four) allotted at the bakery. Goffman (1959, p 37) notes that "...when an actor takes

(a) Thus the Wellbread salesmen are relieved of the necessity to establish and generate a clientele. Accordingly, there is no direct competition between salesmen for customers, and none of the customer "grabbing" difficulties which Lombard (1955, p 91, 124, 204) noticed amongst groups of salesgirls competing for customers in a department store.

on an established social role, usually he finds that a particular front has already been established for it..". As a performer, (a "harried prefabricator of impressions", *ibid*, p 244), the customer-audience views the salesman as a 'character'. Goffman (1959, p 235) continues:

"...A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self to a performed character, but this imputation - this self - is a product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it. The self, then, ia a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location ...it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that it presents ..."

As Goffman (1974, p 129) more recently notices (and here recall the literal sense of the stage for service workers as discussed in Chapter Three), that he will now "...use the term 'role' as an equivalent to specialised capacity or function, understanding this to occur both in offstage, real life, and in its staged version; the term 'person' will refer to the subject of a biography, the term 'part' or 'character' to a staged version thereof..".

But this situated self that the roundsman has does not necessarily concur with the conceptualisation of 'me' that the individual holds. In fact, for most workers, work 'roles' have an essentially apparent constructedness, that Burns (1953, p 654) calls their "fictive characger". Although on rare occasions, ^(a) salesmen adopt the work-identity on a full-time basis, for most of the men, what they do and how they feel at work has no relevance to the 'real me' that is constructed out of work hours. Mead (in Strauss, 1956, p 167, 207) reminds us that this is common:

"...identities which are relevant to everyday social behaviour; and in that sense, or as having that meaning, they are existant only relative to that behaviour...We carry on a

(a) One "rogue", for example, is notorious for extending his specific work abilities to his private life. The direct result of such "role-embracement" (Goffman, 1961a, p 60) is that his car is said to be an amalgam of of the other cars parked in his street at night!

whole series of different relationships to different people. We are one thing to one man and another thing to another... We divide ourselves up in all sorts of different selves with reference to our acquaintances...there are all sorts of different selves answering to all sorts of different social reactions...."

We might profitably view the salesman's round as a situated activity system (Goffman, 1961a, p 49), providing on most occasions the individual with a part-time self distinguishable and distinguished from that self upon which the individual relies for the development of his 'real', or 'complete' identity, and quite separate from what Goffman (1974, p 293) calls the "peduring" self. All identities are ultimately situated as Foote (1951, p 18) reminds us. Foote says: "It is the unique concatenation of relevant statuses at this one time and place - in this situation - which constitutes identity." But this does not really catch on to the sense of situationally specific identity - an isolated, separated and distinct self - which can sponsor an identity which remains forever locked into particular empirical situations. All identity is situated: but some situated identities do not aid the construction of that lasting self that the actor takes to be "real".

This part-time self is the psychological contest of intelligibility for the practice of the part-time crimes described in Chapter Four. But not only does the salesman's round generate a situated, part-time self (i.e., one that is relevant only to the particular activity system of selling), the exclusiveness of the "work-me" in turn curtails and stunts its impingement upon the complete me of the individual. In addition, then, the work-me has significance only as an elementary, or partial self. Publically, it is unconfirmed: psychologically it has auxiliary rather than master status in the private development of a complete self. As Weinberg (1970, p 390) tells us, it is precisely "...participation in, and commitment to, multiple worlds of moral meaning (that) make the relevance of various emotions specific to where the event occurs...".

Normally, the complete self is constructed through the operation of what Mead calls the "social process". The two general stages of this process are, firstly, the response of the self to the attitudes of others towards the self, and secondly, that which Mead (in Strauss, 1956, p 209) calls: "their attitudes towards the various phases or aspects of the common social activity or set of social undertakings in which, as members of an organised society or social group they are all engaged".

The problem in organising the possible response to specifically deviant activity is that a contradiction arises between what law-abiding society thinks, and the attitudes of the deviant social group. It is this contradiction (together with the practiced protection against societal reaction) which prevents the usual agglomeration of "elementary selves" in the usual way, and maintains the exclusivity of the part-time self.^(a) As Mead (ibid, p 208) puts it, these situationally-specific elementary selves usually congeal to provide the balanced, societally respectable self:

"...the various elementary selves which constitute, or are organised into, a complete self are the various aspects of the structure of that complete self answering to the various aspects of the social process as a whole; the structure of the complete self is thus a reflection of the complete social process..."

For practitioners, thus, fiddling, stealing and dealing have only occasional psychological status in the general everyday production of social identity. The fact that a salesman fiddles, steals or deals features for him, in biographical terms, as what Goffman (1963, p 89) refers to as a "dead" diary fact: one totally ignored in his reflexive construction of his

(a) A common irony operates here. It is so, as Goffman (1974, p 573) suggests that "...whenever we are issued a uniform we are likely to be issued a skin...". The situated self frame carries the seeds of its own destruction to the degree that it itself establishes the line for its own reframing.

self. Becker (1968b, p 335-336) more specifically comments:^(a)

"...Their "criminal" activities are not, for them, the one overriding fact about themselves which they must never forget, which they must always consider, no matter what they plan to do. Crime, is, instead, just another one of their many activities, exciting and daring for some, routine and commonplace for others ... (he)... expects at the close of the day's activities, to go about his normal business like any other citizen... because the actor does not conceive of himself as a criminal and does not think of his activity as criminal, it is possible for conventional crime (sic) to be integrated into or interdependent with the more "normal" aspects of the person's life..."

At heart, there is irony. Because there is an empirical contradiction between what society-as-a-whole and the immediate-social-group thinks, the attitudes of the righteous, as ascertained by the non-so-righteous, prevent the development of a full criminal identity by the law-breakers, inasmuch as that is dependant upon self-apprehension of the label. Thus without a criminal identity per se, there would, for example, be no chance of successful punishment or rehabilitation. Here, we may suggest that it is then, precisely the attitudes of the righteous that, ironically, because they happen to contradict those held by the actor's reference group, themselves constitute the psychological conditions of successful infraction.

Thus, both the form and the content of identity-production is ascribed to individual salesmen by the Wellbroad organisation. Within such an analytic framework, the moral business of managerial prototyping of the workforce finds sense as a categorical distinction between good and evil generated from their dual, simplistic and oppositional interpretation of reality.^(b) The Sales manager

(a) Becker uses the word "conventional" here in a quite idiosyncratic fashion to refer to "quiet" rather than to "classical" crimes. (See, ff (a), p 241, Chapter Four). Becker's usage has a psychological referent (ordinary rather than extraordinary status in identity construction) upon which this quotation is predicated.

(b) This is a feature of Commercial Social Control (a pattern that I will explore in Chapter Seven). Commercial Social Control allows no liberal middle-of-the-road frivolity like the "disturbed"

put this well: "...I know all the blokes personally in here, and, well, there are villains and honest blokes, aren't there? ...villains and others...". The sales management face a continual crisis in dealing with the attempts by their workforce to undermine their authority and challenge their moral position. Their reaction is typical, as Klapp (1954, p 60) suggests:

"...In times of moral crisis, vilification movements tend to arise spontaneously as an urge to find and punish culprits. A villifying movement seems to arise typically from a widespread feeling of moral alarm, resulting perhaps...from the failure of an institution..."

Moral alarm similarly provokes a dualistic simplification of response by the respectable coupled with a considerable dramatisation of the social forces allegedly at play. Divisions and moral boundaries become melodramatically etched, finer distinctions are withdrawn, and in the primitive process of prototype-ascription, characters are located in terms of moral images drawn a very basic societal vocabulary of common generic types. Klapp (1956, p 340) comments on the effects of calling someone a villain:

"...we can judge that naming a villain has status-placing and defining functions, that is, to set him apart from normal people, idealise or exaggerate his character negatively, create a state of alarm and call for strenuous role-playing to adequately deal with such a dangerous deviant...."

Ultimately, there are only two possible prototypes which individual salesmen may be seen by management as examples of. Informed by the Platonic necessity of implication of opposites, if there exist the "good", then alas, there must also be, of necessity, the "evil". First the Sales manager, and then two salesmen:

(Contd) classification in its vocabulary of moral reaction. Here, see Emerson, 1969, p 90.

"...there are good and bad, yes,...there are always some bad salesmen in the bunch, ...we employ 64 here, and I would be very pleased if 63 were good, but we possibly have 6 or 7 who are no good..."

"...On the wholesāle side?...there isn't any different types of roundsman...they're all villains, every one, and I know them all, pretty well...yeah...they all do it, the whole lot of them...I'd put my shirt on it...well, I know they all do it, there's nobody straight on wholesale...except that bloke with the glasses who goes down to the cost...and never speaks to anyone..."

"...they ("sharks") do cause a lot of bad feeling here; they used to take a whole lot of stuff, biscuits, and plant the charges on you...there's a lot of good blokes left here because of 'shorts', ...as soon as you're short, they class you as a villain...."

Moral labeling of this nature by the management is only refutable under certain conditions which do not ordinarily pertain. Defining a member of the workforce as a "Villain" is routinely successful identity assassination,^(a) not usually disavowable by victims. The resulting status-destruction is only alterable in the revolutionary sense of categoric change that I will detail later. Of significance here is that such personal characteristics are held to be unalterably part of the personality of the individual so-labeled. It is an inauthentic question to ask if somebody in the Sales department is "still on the fiddle". Salesmen, like leopards, son't change their spots. A senior Sales supervisor commented:

"...You'll always have the chaps who are out to make a bomb out of it (fiddling)...they kill the goose that laid the golden egg... the majority of them would do it whatever phase of life they're in...for the sort of person who's going to do this, he's going to do it from the word: 'Go'...the corruption is there in the mind every time, we don't corrupt people, we try to put them off, or warn them not to overdo it..."

(a) Basically this is possible as neither the negative descriptive label "villain", nor the positive descriptive label "other" is incompatible with the ambiguous categoric label "salesman", See Rotenberg, 1974, p 340-1.

But the limited prototypical possibilities are insufficient to order life and interaction to the satisfaction of the salesmen. The managerial definitions are not ignored by the men, instead they are redefined and divided to provide a working constellation of sub-types, which here I will refer to as "characters". These "characters" are variations on either the Villain or Other moral prototype, or subtle blends of facets of each. They are erected and maintained in inter-salesman interactions (and specifically not sustained in dealings with customers) as commonly exchanged 'models' of types of illicit practitioner created by other's judgements of esteem in either Villain or Other role-play.

Distinguishing the current usage of "character" from common meanings helps to define it. It does not share meaning with the idea of a 'national character' (a summation of mean personality attributes), not does it share the distortion which appears as a stereotype (I am interested here in characterisations rather than caricatures). Neither do "characters" provide choice role-models for actors.^(a) The sociological concept of "character" need only occasionally mean the common-sense, capricious, quixotic 'character': the odd, colourful, or interesting specimen. More importantly, it bears no relation to the psychological statement of character. "Characters", like Klapp's 'types', are not derived from personalities.^(b)

(a) Laud Humphreys (1970, p 129-130) faced a similar analytic problem, and emerged with the following suggestion: "...I have tried to make it impossible for any close associate to recognise the real people behind the disguised composites portrayed in this chapter...my one certainty is that there is no single composite with whom all may identify...In delineating styles of adaptation, I do not intend to imply that these men are faced with an array of styles from which they may pick one, or even a combination..."

(b) Klapp (1948-9, p 138) comments: "...In general, personal traits are relatively unimportant...personal traits are subordinate to roles...(audiences)...cannot perceive their actual traits..."; and, (1954, p 59) "...It is obvious that a person need not actually possess the traits or perform the roles..."; and (1964, p 31) "...It is not so easy in most cases to identify such an unusual and outstanding personality trait...(such as Charisma) ...More generally, we are unable to find anything very 'different'..."

A "character" is not a form of behaviour explicitly derived from particular personalities. It is a tag conferred upon actors by witnessing audiences. As a concept, it shares something with Nadel's idea of a 'person', as mentioned by Dahrendorf (1973, p 45):

"...Nadel introduces the...concept of "person", a term that we have encountered in a similar meaning in the "persona" of the drama..."(then quoting Nadel)"...We might speak of different 'aspects' of a person, or of different 'roles' assumed by it, or simply of different "persons"..."

More specifically, perhaps, "characters" embody two core processes in the identity generating business. Firstly, location and social control within action, and secondly, identification and orientation.^(a) To characterise, in this sense, is to archetype.

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- (a) Messinger et al.'s (1962) "character" might seem relevant. Although both salesmen and inmates share the concept of character as a specially created and distanced situated self, constructed for a particular audience, inmates appear to exhibit an exploitative awareness of the dramaturgical simile. Messinger et al. comment: "...instead of a 'natural' phenomena, flowing from and reflecting the self, the mental patient's character comes to appear to him as a 'constructed object'...the connection between self and character becomes a questionable, dependable matter...". In a somewhat different way, Cavan (1966, p 79-87) proposes that for equitable drinking in bars, persons typically present a "bar biography" and a "bar character". Cavan's conceptualisation rather effectively grasps at the way I mean "character" to be taken. She says (ibid, p 80, 82-3, 86): "...the patron is also at liberty to prefabricate an entire life for himself with little likelihood that it will later be exposed as a sham. Thus the patrons of the public drinking place can be people whose biographies are more socially satisfactory, more exciting, or more exotic than they would be in settings where more extensive and verifiable biographies are a requirement for entrance...the new biographies that can be spun for one's duration within the bar are typically limited only by the extent to which one can provide a coherent, internally consistent presentation of self...Those whose bar biography is localised to the bar itself form the general category of "bar characters"...their "character" status may be vested in them either by other patrons or by the employees of the establishment, or both...the characteristic feature of the bar-created reputations is that they have no consequences outside the public drinking place. Thus the events that take place within the public drinking place may become an item in the patron's diary although not necessarily an item in his biography...". However, these bar characters do not await the patron in the expectations of those around him. Instead, they are achieved by him, and are not necessarily situated to any particular locale. Additionally, although one's bar character is a part-time self, it is, at least

To archetype is to purposively provide thematic variations within the Villain or Other prototype. ^(b)

Portfolio Production: "Archotyping" as Accomplishment
of Psychological and Practical Morality

"...what an audience is likely to see in a drama is limited by the cultural type repertoire...Thus, the choice of dramatic definitions made by any audience occurs within the limits of the stock of available types, which also provide the alternatives for the likely events..."

(Klapp, 1964, p 173)

Managerial prototyping of the Sales force produces an ambivalent reaction by those so-typed. This reaction is typified by some acceptance laced with suitable and variable modification. These thus created "archetypes" are shown in Diagrams 12, and 13 (on page 325), which differentiate the various responses in terms of two core matters for the men (how good the illicit "make" is, and how successfully it is protected from the gaze of those who might seek to expose it) and two separate concerns for supervisors (whether or not they will fiddle customers to cover standard losses, and whether or not they will, in addition, make

(Contd) whilst it is adopted, a wholly consummating self. It may be contradicted elsewhere, but it is a total (rather than a side) interest: a dominant (rather than adjunct) role.

(a) Dramaturgically, "character" implies personae rather than actor: someone locked irretreiviably within the play (with management; "characters" are useless outside the contest of interaction) rather than available to come forward to play various parts. In the sense that service agents "perform" only for their customers; and relax from those performances out of eyesight and earshot, then performance of these bakery "characters" constitutes a backstage performance (See Goffman, 1959, p 134-135, quoted in Chapter Six supra). Here, backstage relaxation is handled as a performance, but out of the necessity or resolving various rude pragmatic concerns (practical and psychological protection), and not merely because the bakers' roundsmen have become sated with customer interaction.

Diagram 12. The Villain Response

	Good Make	Successful Protection
Professional	+	+
Rogue	+	-
Robin Hood	-	+
Shark	-	-

Diagram 13. 'Others': The Straight Response

	Make for Company	Make for Self	Contamination
Bent-Straight	+	+	Personal Contamination Only
Wise-Straight	+	-	Interpersonal Contamination Only
Righteous-Straight	-	-	No Personal or Interpersonal Contamination

a bit for themselves). Diagram 14 (on page 327) breaks the available "characters" down into their melodramatic components. Each bakery "character" contains different proportions of the hero, villain and fool types. As Klapp (1954, p 59) suggests: "it is usual for a problematic person at the outset to be defined in several contradictory ways at once." Diagram 14 is derived from Klapp's analysis. It is an attempt to capture not only the dramaturgic differences between archetypes, but also to display the sociological similarities between them.

Basically these "characters" ("professional", "rogue", "Robin Hood", "shark", "wise-straight", "bent-straight", and "righteous-straight") provide the salesmen with the core of an interpretative strategy which functions as a set of abstract models embedded in language, revealing a common response to the shared problem of managerial prototyping. Although not regularly and repeatedly bandied around in salesmen's conversations, they do constitute a specific argot in the limited sense that those who face customers alone (see Diagram 1 on page 110) possess such an argot. Sykes (1958, p 85-86) comments:^(a)

"...The more critical function of argot... would appear to be its utility in ordering and classifying experience in terms which deal specifically with the major problems of life...As Strong has pointed out, social groups are apt to characterise individuals in terms of crucial "axes of life", or lines in interests, problems, and concerns which the group faces, and then attach distinctive names to the resulting types of typical social roles. By doing so, the group provides itself with a sort of shorthand which com-

(a) As Strauss (1959, p 15, 19, 20) notes: "...Any name is a container; poured into it are the conscious or unwitting evaluations of the namer...to name, then, is not only to indicate: it is to identify...the naming sets it within a context of quite differently related classes. The nature or essence of an object does not reside mysteriously within the object itself but is dependant upon how it is defined by the namer...". Whilst nomen est omen is a little over-enthusiatic, Rotenberg nicely illustrates the power of the name in his description of the process of "transmutive labeling". Putting it alternatively, (Foote, 1951, p 17) naming is the process of achieving identification.

Diagram 14.

Melodramatic Components of Characters

	HERO	VILLAIN	FOOL
PROFESSIONAL (Getting what you want)	<u>Winner</u> (smart operator) (top dog)	<u>Usurper & Abuser</u> (selfish grabber)	<u>Discounted as</u> (show-off) (small-minded)
	<u>Splendid Performer</u> (prima-donna)	<u>Traitor & Sneak</u> (sneak attacker) (chisellers & parasites)	
ROGUE (Licensed performer)	<u>Winner</u> (smart operator)	<u>Threat to order & status</u> (rogue) (flouter)	<u>Ludicrous Role failure</u> (rash)
	<u>Clever hero</u>	<u>Traitor & Sneak</u> (deceiver)	<u>Discounted as</u> (nuisance) <u>Nonconforming</u> (character) (comic rogue)
SHARK (Outlaw)		<u>Threat to order & status</u> (troublemaker & flouter)	<u>Discounted as</u> (small-minded) (nuisance) (upstart)
		<u>Usurper & Abuser</u> (selfish-grabber)	
		<u>Villainous Stranger</u> (suspicious isolate)	
		<u>Traitor & Sneak</u> (hidden traitor) (sneak-attacker) (renegade) (chiseller & parasite)	
		<u>Social Undesirable</u> (pariah)	
ROBIN HOOD (Solidarity)	<u>Independent Spirit</u>	<u>Threat to order & status</u> (rogue) (flouter)	<u>Nonconforming</u> (character)
	<u>Group Servant</u> (do-gooder) (benefactor)		
	<u>Hero of Social</u> <u>Acceptability</u> (good fellow)		
	<u>Clever Hero</u>		
RIGHTEOUS- STRAIGHT (Super- conformity)	<u>Hero of Social</u> <u>Acceptability</u> (conforming hero/ moralist) (stickler)	<u>Usurper & Abuser</u> (moral persecutor)	<u>Ludicrous Role failure</u> (weak fool)
	<u>Group Servant</u> (crusaders)	<u>Villainous Stranger</u> (suspicious isolate)	<u>Discounted as</u> (stuffed shirt) (comic phoney)
		<u>Traitor & Sneak</u> (renegade)	<u>Nonconforming</u> (strange fool) (mock hero)
		<u>Social Undesirable</u> (pariah)	<u>Overconforming</u> (high-minded)
BENT-STRAIGHT (Hypocrite)		<u>Villainous Stranger</u> (suspicious isolate)	<u>Overconforming</u> (yes-man)
		<u>Traitor & Sneak</u> (hidden traitor)(deceiver)	
		<u>Corruptor</u>	
WISE-STRAIGHT (Over- conformity)	<u>Hero of Social</u> <u>Acceptability</u> (conforming hero/ moralist) (diehard)	<u>Villainous Stranger</u> (suspicious isolate)	<u>Ludicrous Role failure</u> (clumsy fool)(simpleson)
	<u>Group Servant</u> (defender)	<u>Traitor & Sneak</u> (shirker)	<u>Discounted as</u> (second-rater) (nobody)
			<u>Overconforming</u> (rigid fool)

-presses the variegated range of its experience into a manageable framework. By distinguishing and naming we prepare ourselves for action....The activities of group members are no longer an undifferentiated stream of events; rather, they have been analysed, classified, given labels; and these labels supply an evaluation and interpretation of experience as well as a set of convenient names...."

Simultaneously, the language of characterisation illuminates the self-contradictions underlying the generation of a part-time self, and emerges as the sort of bitter, self-lacerating vocabulary typical of those groups who are unsure of their identity, position and status. Although qualified salesmen are aware of the selection of imputable "characters", these names are only used in conversations that occur during bouts of inter-salesman conflict and aggression. Nevertheless, the resulting vocabulary of moral differentiation (expressed via the language of vilification and vituperation) aids self-identification through self/other-location. As Klapp (1962, p 4-5) puts it:

"...The effort to type oneself, of course, also includes the effort to type others. We are continually creating, as it were, the other fellow...Social relationships hinge upon fitting the other into a category that makes it possible to deal with him successfully...It does what a personnel file might do: provides us with a convenient precis of the one with whom we wish to deal ...It is impossible to separate this typing of others from the typing of oneself...the other as we type him is a key to our construct of oneself. We find ourselves by the responses of others...we cannot, then, without knowing him, know who we are..."

The other side of the self/other location coin is social control. To continually qualify for 'licence' to perform a particular character requires obedience to the conditions under which licences are issued. The crucial moral boundaries for salesmen are, firstly, the stealing of goods for which other

salesmen are accountable; and secondly, either the acceptance of promotion to supervisor, or, the refusal to fiddle for oneself. Individual salesmen's regular practices are judged in terms of these two Achilles' Heels, and they are allocated an archetypal character accordingly. Diagram 15 (below) shows how the seven Wellbreads "characters" are related in these terms.

Diagram 15. Performance 'Licences': Sources of Moral Immunity from Attack

	"CHARACTER"	TAKING SALESMAN ACCOUNTABLE GOODS	'WORKING CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS' (Accepting Fiddle or, rejecting promotion)
CORE MEMBERS	"Rogue" "Robin Hood"	Never	Always
CORE MEMBER	"Professional"	Rare	Always
PARTIAL OUTCAST	"Shark"	Often	Always
OUTCASTS	"Bent Straight" "Wise Straight" "Righteous Straight"	Never	Never

The reactions of members of the sales force to managerial prototyping are essentially attempts to challenge and redefine moral control. Construction of characters in interaction is an attempt to partially restore identities damaged in psychological assassination attempts. The bifurcated managerial action, provoked through the moral alarm that they feel over the activities of their salesmen, becomes overlaid and submerged under the varieties of salesmen's responses.

Although the salesmen do serve as semi-responsible agents of their own social control, the continued interaction by them as a group with the bakery management considerably complicates the situation. A metaphor from metallurgy perhaps best elucidates and illustrates the processes at work here. In addition to a natural analytic concern with the power and determination of the (managerial) labelers in their attempts to defame (salesmen's) characters, I also want to introduce a rather old-fashioned variable: the nature and degree of resistance to such definitions by the labeled - what I shall now refer to as the "tensility" of the salesmen's selves.

Looking at the situation from the point of view of the labelers, the effect that the processes of character-defamation or type-imputation have may either be "plastic" (irremedial typing) or "elastic" (remedial typing). However, the resistance of the labeled to defamation, their tensility, also varies. Type-penetration might be "malleable" in its effect on the salesman's self (the imputed type might take on master-status), or, at the other analytic extreme, type-penetration might be easily rebuffed by the pliant, supple, "pliable" self, for whom temporary transformation (rather than permanent conversion) to auxiliary-status is easily disavowable.

I have tried, in Diagram 16 on page 331, to analytically order and locate sales-characters in the terms described above. The possibilities of change between characters, however, remains

Diagram 16. The Processes of Character Defamation

PENETRATION

Apprehension of Definitions: Tensility of Selves

		MALLEABLE SELF	PLIABLE SELF
		"VILLAINS"	"OTHERS"
<p><u>PLASTIC DEFAMATION</u> Irremedial Typing: "Conversion" To Master- Status</p> <p><u>IMPUTATION</u> Power and Determination of Labelers</p>	<p>Plastic "Shark" (Crooked)</p> <p>Not Disavowable, Rigidly Cast Public Character</p> <p>(eg, Physical Stigmata)</p>	<p>Elasto-Plastic "Righteous Straight" (Straight, Upright)</p> <p>Logic of Suspicion Counteracts Attempts to Personally re- define Status.</p> <p>(eg, Sex Offender)</p>	
	<p><u>ELASTIC DEFAMATION</u> Remedial Typing: (Disavowal Possible) "Transformation" To Auxiliary Status</p>	<p>Plasto-Elastic "Robin Hood" "Professional" "Rogue" (All Bent)</p> <p>Abstinence/Relapse, Adoption/Disavowal Cycles Practiced</p> <p>(eg, Alcoholic)</p>	<p>Elastic "Bent Straight" "Wise Straight" (Stooped or 'Passing')</p> <p>Temporary Role- Play</p> <p>(eg, Driving Offender)</p>

unconsidered. (a) "Elastic" defamation literally means the spontaneous resumption of usual or characteristic shape following attempts to contract, dilate, or distort. As Diagram 16 tries to show, although "Robin Hoods", "Professionals" and "Rogues" would have difficulty in becoming accredited and successful performers of the "Bent Straight" or "Wise Straight" characters, a few witnessed out-of-character actions of their behalf might easily persuade others to re-characterise them as "Sharks". Here, the metallurgic metaphor approaches the criminologic one: it is much easier to become a shade more 'bent' than it is to 'straighten' out. The "Bent Straight" and "Wise Straight", on the other hand, share flexibility of self with resistance to definition. This creates two very temporary characters, and prompts easy movement for incumbents from there to re-characterisation as either more or less upright. So, characters in elastic categories may thus very easily, and characters in plasto-elastic categories may relatively easily disavow definition through the utilisation of dramatic-personal escape routes.

Those in the "plastic" categories, on the other hand, are (for most intents and purposes) irremediably typed. To change character, the "Shark" or the "Righteous Straight" would need to benefit from either collaborative-structural changes in the

(a) I am concerned in this diagram (Diagram 16 on page 331) to illustrate a theoretical relationship between two "variables" (strength of reaction to labeling, power of the label) crucially undernourished in both the empirical and theoretical work underpinning the labeling perspective of deviance. It is not designed to criticise or replace Rodgers and Buffalo's (1974a, p 106) excellent typology of individual modes of possible adaptation to the label. Rodgers and Buffalo provide a set of logical possibilities in terms of two core variables: the penetration of the definition, and the tactical manoeuvrings of the so-labeled. The nine resulting types are not designed (as is Diagram 16) to specifically cater for the interactional set of responses in one situation. In fact, "part-time crime" would (in Rodgers and Buffalo's terms) be a manipulative-rejection ("evasion") of the mala in se theft label combined with an obliterative-exchange ("alteration") of the otherwise implied mala in se psychological implications. In this framework, the contradiction of part-time crime lies in the necessity of locating "part-time crime" as two modes of adaptation.

social control policy of the sales force, or, alternatively, personally leaving the actual work situation. As Klapp (1954, p 60) points out, it is easy to move to characterological extremes, but, "...it seems almost impossible to remove the stigma of vilification..." which pushed the actor there in the first place. Viewing this in terms offered by McHugh (1965-66), changing from plastic typing requires radical transformation 'of', rather than mere ordinary transformation 'in'. In most senses, plastic typing creates permanent characterisation of an individual,^(a) producing a situation where others, as Klapp (1962, p 2) suggests: "know him well enough to have his number and put him into an inescapable category. Once so categorised, he can change his social identity only by moving on."

The business of character application proceeds along three basic moral dimensions of status-enhancing heroisation, status-degrading vilification, and status-deflating mockery. The shared vocabulary of slang thus mediates the characterological re-shuffling process, dispersing informal sanctions through epithet.

Portfolio: The Practices of Characterisation

Thus, situated "characters" are primarily linguistic terms exchanged in moral, and heated debate between salesmen. As resolutions of the structurally weak, heterodoxical occupational double-binds that the salesmen face (illegality demanded with one hand, and punished with the other), situated argot characters

(a) Emerson (1969, p 90-91) notices that, in the American juvenile courts, whilst character-assessments are nearly always open to some sort of modification, it is much easier to recast a defined normal character as, in fact, a problematic one, than it is to remove an assessment of poor character.

provide simultaneously: practical protection from moral-legal processing, and a psychological shield warding off contamination and preserving honesty, in the maintenance on a socially acceptable self. In this way, a salesman (who is 'in character') practices a style readily recognisable by other salesmen, which is relevant to the particular constraints of his round, and which locates him as a bona fide member of the sales force. Although different characters may be differentiated in terms of the content and precise nature of their "making", characteristic practices per se share the ability to solve the core problems in similar ways.

In terms of the provision of practical protection, the infinite possibilities for "making" are ultimately unclassifiable. Old styles are constantly discarded, and new ones adopted. Salesmen thus select (from the constellation of possibilities of which they are personally aware) a variety of styles, productive of an equitable income. Crucially, this collection of styles is, above all, mutually discrete in control terms. The essence is that discovery in the practice of one style should not automatically disclose the practice of others. This, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter Six, has considerable psychological as well as practical implications. So, whilst it is not possible to list the styles of making endemic to each "character", I have endeavoured, in Diagram 17 on page 335, to outline some major criteria of difference between the "portfolios" of practical techniques adopted in the social maintenance and creation of various characters.

"Characters" are thus equipped with a practically protective portfolio of techniques. The extent and nature of this portfolio might be said to represent the constructed tolerance of customers, and the personal limit at which dishonesty might begin to affect the 'complete' self. Admittedly, salesmen will know of many more techniques than they actually practice. In a sense, their selection pre-solves the problem of guilt of them, and ensures that their

Diagram 17. Elements of Portfolios

	Robin Hood (R.T.)	Rogue (R.T./W.S.)	Professional (W.S.)	Shark (R.T./W.S.)	Bent Straight (Supervisor)	Wise Straight (R.T./W.S.)	Righteous Straight (Supervisor)
Sales Pattern	Medium High Static	Very Variable	High increasing	Low decreasing	Slightly reduced	Medium Static	Conscientious Canvasser
Moral Ceiling	Variable in-round consumption and fixed ceiling	Wholly unrestricted	Restricted to cash available	Unrestricted	Slightly lower than full-time roundsmen	No self-fiddles	No
Steals	Of stale bread only	Yes	Never	Yes	Yes	No	No
Company Fiddles	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Private Fiddles	Yes with regular fiddles	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Inside Deal	Occasional & low (strategic traffic)	Whenever possible (tactical trade)	High strategic traffic (refuses trade)	Never	Whatever is planned	No	No
Sidelines (Outside Deals)	Purchased low value, high bulk & fragile (eggs, potatoes, tea)	Anything (butter, tights)	High-priced, stolen (radios, coats)	No	If on Van	Occasional like Robin Hood	No
Method of Figuring Take	Haphazard	Exact	Lax	Over-take (guessed)	Rough	No Method Needed	No
Organisational Control	Lax/Static	High	Efficient extensive	Static	Low	Lapsed control pattern	Static moralistic control
Perception of Office	Do their best	On the Fiddle	Incompetent	Malevolent	Incompetent	Benign	Benevolent
Handling of Shortage	Ignore	Complain	Powerful re-check rebufferal	Accept Deductions	Licensed	No deductions	Never occurs

"crimes" will, at least for psychological purposes, be "part-time" ones. Techniques which might, for a particular individual provide too heavy a burden of guilt after commission, are discarded in favour of those for which psychological implications may easily be assimilated. As Nelson Foote (1951, p 16) so astutely puts it:

"...In play or in role-playing experiments a person may disclose the great range of his latent repertoire. The reason he limits his real or realistic behaviour to a selected few of all the roles he has learnt is that he knows and defines only those certain ones as his own. And he can only ascertain which role is his in each situation by knowing who he is..."

The separateness and unconnectedness of a salesman's repertoire, or portfolio, builds in an allowance for the discovery and uncovering of one practice, without either affecting successful exploitation of other schemes, or, interrupting the continuous satisfaction of those conditions essential to smooth practice. As the following examples show, social control permits practical re-growth (style-switching) rather than apprehension or loss:

Whilst one of the "Professionals" was off sick, some of the supervisors attempted to reduce his "make" by putting some of his cash-calls on dockets. He said to me:

"...It looks like I've lost two of my cash-calls for good...it's annoying really... if you make £15, you want to be able to take £15 out...they put those two on dockets, ...actually I've still got three left... and there's two pubs I do for 50% off...I expect I'll be able to work it somehow..I'll think of some way round it I expect...that's what my wife said: 'You've always been able to fix it before'..so I expect I shall be able to think of something..."

At a later date, the bakery's policy of sending bread to shops and other wholesale calls on a sale-and-return basis was cancelled by the government. This hit some of the roundsmen hard:

"Professional": "...No, it won't affect me at all, I don't touch returns most of the time..."

"Rogue": "...Yeah, it's going to fuck me up good, most of mine was on returns, Still, I won't lose, I'll have to put it on the booking now...I shouldn't think I'll drop any, I'll put it all on the booking...they'll pay for it anyway..."

At the psychological level, the practice of mutually sealed styles generates separated rather than summated impingement upon the self. In Goffman's recent terms, (1974, p 121-122), this practice forshortens the potential backward and forward "reach" that discrediting might have. The sub-elementary selves reflecting and operating portfolio component practice do not spread psychic contamination to the complete, 'honest' self. Possible psychological effects are nullified by tactics actually designed for more practical purposes. For example, one particular practice is delaying the booking on wholesale rounds. Salesmen are supposed to give each call a completed docket-stub every day. If this can be waived, then the chances of and for over-booking increase. But even for those calls who never expect or receive a docket, the falsified docket is rarely completed before the end of the day. Now, partially, this is practical protection against spot checking. Should the customer suddenly realise that no docket has been left with the order, and ring the bakery to demand one, then it would not be too late to fill the docket in correctly. Importantly, delay allows the salesman some psychological leeway. He may leave a decent delay before filling the docket with an incorrect amount to, in some mysterious psychological way, allow the customer to actually forget what was received.^(a) I once asked a wholesaler why he had filled in none of the dockets for his calls that day. He told me: "...Well, if I filled them in each day, they'd all know what they'd had, wouldn't they?...I always think to myself: 'If I've forgotten what they had, they must have to' .."

(a) I will go into the details of how some practical techniques may produce a desired psychological consequence in Chapter Six.

PORTFOLIOS IN THE MORAL ORGANISATION OF THEFT

Plastic Archetypes: The "Shark"

"Shark": "..You can't afford scruples in this job..."

Sennir Sales Supervisor: "...You'll always have the chaps who are out to make a bomb out of it....they kill the goose who laid the golden egg..."

The most divisive and unrespectable act that a salesman can commit is to steal from his mates. Disgust would be levelled at any salesman who fiddled blind men or pensioners, but he would not be outlawed like the man who takes from his fellow workers. To do so is to publically indicate total lack of salesman's "scruples" (which Mills, 1940, p 908, defined as "moral vocabularies of motive"). Essentially, the "shark" misunderstands the crucial distinction between customers and other salesmen, and erroneously treats all as 'fair game'. He may understand that scruples are necessary, but his is essentially a misreading of the conditions of application of those scruples. One "shark" tried to claim to me that he was, in fact, quite scrupulous:

"...Look, there's people I don't fiddle, yeah, certain people, old aged pensioners, people like that...there must be some people with no scruples at all...I suppose there must be some, but I don't know if there is many of us who'd say: 'Couple of bob on her bill, she's blind'..."

Another "shark" who (unsuccessfully) tried to free himself from the appellation, suggested how he felt:

"...I got £68 in tips last Chrstitmas...plus, fags, drink...after-shave lotion even!..I was astounded really, they were tipping 50p, £1 at a time, I even gave some of them back because I had treated them so rotten!..."

In melodramatic terms (see Diagram 14 on page 327), the key traits of the "shark" are the 'selfish grabber' and the 'malicious stranger'. Klapp (1962, p 57-58) suggests:

"...(The selfish grabber) abrogates not authority but privilege...ignores the rule of equality, and takes too much for himself ... (he is also the suspicious isolate)... whose strangeness or detached or marginal position mark them not as belonging and arouse suspicion of what he may be up to ...Suspicious isolates are mistrusted..."

Witnessed stealing from another allesman marks a man with the "shark" taint for the rest of his occupational career. In Strauss' (1959, p 77) terms, this amounts to irreversible occupational status-forcing. Two other salesmen offered examples:

"Rogue": "...You know, I saw Sid go onto my van one day and take four loaves off...I didn't say anything...but I'm waiting for him to come up to me and say that he owes me four loaves...that's one thing I wouldn't do...take anything off another salesman's van...even if he left the doors wide open..."

"Rogue": "....I'll take it from the firm... I don't mind that...but I'll tell you one thing, I'll never take it from a friend... that's one thing I could never do,...not nothing!...some blokes do, you know..."

Sometimes the steals of "sharks" become very sophisticated. The exposure of one extensive, cooperative steal (where the financial accounts of innocent salesmen were debited to the value of the goods taken by "sharks") made the whole sales force suspicious:

"Shark": "...if I want biscuits, I can easily nick them by ordering them on somebody's else's route number, and by going in early and taking them before anybody's about..."

"Rogue": "...I've just cotted onto something else this week, 'X' and 'Y' and the cakes, I didn't think 'Y' was like that...but you know all our cakes are left outside the cake store for us...and one rack will have the cake for several rounds on it...well, 'X' always has a rack to himself,....and 'Y' always takes his rack to him...I noticed it this week...I kept thinking of it..so one day I went over and had a look...and there was far more cakes on there than there should have been...I know it can be done, because 'P' and 'Q' used to work a 'flanker' in there...and 'Y' used to cover by saying that: 'It's gone missing'..(i.e., this indicates that 'Y' is not prepared to make accusations in case his own deal is discovered)..."

If mistakenly overissued with bread that they cannot get rid of, roundsmen are expected to share the surplus out amongst their friends. The "shark" ignores this cohesive move, and prefers instead to attempt to sell it, at reduced price, to any roundsman who can safely dispose of it. Those using such strategies in American prisons are called 'merchants', exhibiting what Sykes (1958, p 93) calls:

"...a manipulative mode of adjustment to the rigours of imprisonment, (but) these swindles are overshadowed by the act of selling itself...a prisoner who sells when he should give is labeled a 'merchant' or 'pedlar'..."

In Mars' terms (Mars, 1974) the "shark" offends against the unwritten code which supports the occupational morality of corruption (See Chapter Six for examples of formulae and scruples for psychological protection). Subsequently, the "shark" is not sufficiently trusted by the other salesmen to be allowed to take part in any deals that are going. A "professional" and a "shark" commented:

"Professional": "...'H' (a "shark") is a useless buggar, they want to get rid of him, he's carved up that seaside run proper, ...and he'll drop you in the shit if he can, you know,...he'll go in the office and tell them anything about you...you can't trust him an inch..."

"Shark": "...I asked him (inside man) if he had any extra, but I wasn't bothered... and d'you know what he did?...he went and saw the Manager straight away didn't he? ...and told him that one of his salesmen was asking for cheap bread...I don't know why, maybe, he was set up to shop me or something..."

Thus, the "shark" becomes locked in irretrevable status-deflation, living, in a sense, on borrowed time. He is not allowed in on the deals, so he has to steal more to make up for it. Because he steals, he further reduces his chances of participation in any future deals:

"Shark": "...I've got a shop where I've been taking bread in and taking it out again, and charging him for it twice...he must catch on...he must do, I've been doing it for weeks..."

"Shark": "...I dunno...whenever I come in in the morning, my rack is stood by itself, when I go to check it, he (the Despatch Manager) said: 'No need to check that, I've already checked it'...but I was four short, and when I went up to him, d'you know what he said: 'Fucking marvellous, as soon as you come back from holiday, bread goes missing'..."

Of one "shark" it was said: "He's a bit of a shark, he'd sell his own mother if he had a chance", and, "He's really carved this round up...it used to be a good one", and, finally, "Keep your hand on your cash-bag when he's around". The despised status of the "shark" allows the management to proceed against him in ways that would not otherwise be tolerated. Salesmen often come short in their weekly takings. "Sharks" sometimes get sacked for it, as in the following case, where the ostensible reason appears to be the number of cars owned by the man:

Senior Supervisor: "...He swore blind that he'd put it in..(deposited cash with the pay girl)..and we knew that he hand't... his brother told us afterwards, that we were daft to take him on...we knew what he was up to..."

Supervisor: "...His sales were the same, and so were his debts, but his cash was down, that's how we knew...anyway, he runs four cars, and he's got a woman tucked away somewhere...well, I know what a job I have to run one home, let alone two...so he was obviously taking it out of the bag..."

Elasto-Plastic Archetypes: The "Righteous Straight"

The "Righteous Straight" is similarly status-entrenched. However, a period of tolerance by him, or a sufficient number of witness infractions might move him to re-classification in the "wise straight" or "bent straight" categories. His personal and interpersonal uncontamination types him as a moral outcast, embodying what Klapp (1962, p 41, 55-6) refers to as the heroic trait of conforming moralist with the villainous moral persecutor twist:

"...moralists are a little too austere, even unfriendly to be good sports...(one thing is) may not do is 'give' on the principle of which he is a model...he will sacrifice friendliness to it and so seem rigid...(also moral persecutor) whose relentlessness is part of their moral zeal..."

Where the "shark" of the last section takes the injunction to steal rather too seriously, the "righteous straight" makes a similarly incompetent situation reading (see Diagram 7 on page 149) but takes the moral rather than the immoral aspect of their ambiguous occupational definition too seriously. Supervisors who do so are in a small, but troublesome minority. The Training Officer at Wellbreads commented:

"...Of course, the correct attitude is to say: 'You will not overcharge the customer, this is the correct price, and that's what you will

charge'...that's something you should say, and something you should stick by, ...but only about 1% of the supervisors do do that...because the supervisor is doing the same thing (i.e., fiddling)..."

"Righteous straights" are thought of as supervisors who take life much too seriously, and who, furthermore, actually believe that the management wants them to behave in the super-conformist way that they publically espouse. The "righteous straight" lives the life of the 'center man', a type of American prisoner described by Sykes (1958, p 90):

"...the rat is a man who pretends to be on the side of the inmates and yet betrays them, the center man is a man who makes no secret of where his sympathies lie..."

"Righteous straights" share the common fate of initiation into a mock-heroisation spiral, usually being sent, grandly named, to a depot where they can do no further damage.^(a) Dalton (1964, p 213) gives a nice example of the type which he refers to as 'rule-devotees'. Such people are devoted to the rules, but only because they see rule-devotion as one resolution of the difficulties associated with living in an ambiguously defined situation:

"...After two years of mounting resentments, (derived from her refusal to allow employees to pilfer) she quit the firm. The store manager regarded her as a failure because she did not understand what he would not tell her - that her margin of profits was too high, and that some social use of materials, not theft, was expected. In his mind, she was a little too concerned with the system's harmony, and too devoted to formalities..."

(a) I have already quoted an example of this sort of 'promotion' in Chapter Two. Peter and Hull (1966, p.34) refer to this as the "Lateral Arabesque", or "...pseudo promotion. Without being raised in rank - sometimes without even a pay rise - the incompetent employee is given a new and longer title and is moved to an office in a remote part of the building..."

Elastic Archetypes: The "Bent Straight" and the
"Wise Straight"

(i) The "Wise Straight"

"...the "wise", namely, persons who are normal but whose special situation has made them intimately privy to the secret life of the stigmatised individual and sympathetic to it, and who find themselves accorded a measure of acceptance, a measure of courtesy membership in the clan. Wise persons are the marginal men before whom the individual with a fault need feel no shame, nor exert self-control knowing that in spite of his failings he will be seen as an ordinary actor...One type of wise person is he whose wiseness comes from working in an establishment which caters...to the wants of those with a particular stigma..."

(Goffman, 1963, p 41-2)

Two distinct groups are seen as "wise" in the bakery. They are supervisors who are prepared to fiddle for the company, and not report the private infractions of others; and secondly, ordinary salesmen who are not prepared to fiddle for themselves. This second group is also a temporary resting place for all the neophytes and 'good boys' who have yet to demonstrate that they are long-term employees deserving of proper, long-term characterological classification. Thus "wise straights" are, in Klapp's (1962, p 46, 75) terms either, as in the first case, 'group servants and defenders of order', or, as in the second, (see Diagram 14 on page 327)'fools' discounted as being 'nobodys':

"...Defenders...save people from trouble
...No account demotes several steps lower
...names like 'nobody' imply that he is so insignificant that it is unnecessary to consider him at all...he is not listened to, indeed, it might seem as though he were not there..."

"Old woman", or, "bit of a nuisance" is the usual bakery slang for the "wise straight" supervisor, partly because of his reticence to indulge in private fiddles, and partly because one's own business is harder to run in his presence. But as one supervisor astutely noticed, the second type of "wise", the 'good boy', might be a con:

"...I told him to fiddle) but he said:
'Oh, I don't know, I don't want to do that'...but he did it, or, I think he did, because he came £2 over that week, next week, £2 short again, mind you, he might be a faker...pulling our legs over this all the time..."

(ii) The "Bent Straight" Supervisor

One step down from the "righteous straight", the "bent straight" supervisor wears his blue supervisor's coat superficially, and is a rogue underneath. His acceptance of promotion personally contaminates him, but his tacit and acknowledged agreement to share the men's private fiddles (and to practice them when acting as relief) provokes ambiguous reactions from the rest of the workforce. Melodramatically, "bent straight" supervisors assume the paradoxical combination of 'traitor and sneak' on the one hand, with what Klapp (1962, p 60, 84) calls the 'yes man' over-conforming fool status:

"...(hidden traitors) who sell out or bore from within while in a position of trust
...(yes man) It is hard to tell where he really stands, or who stands behind him, because of his shifting position..."

Occasionally, a "bent straight" supervisor will use his current position to gain particular advantages, as in the following case:

"Bent Straight": "...You know, I've done relief in 'T's round ever since I became a supervisor...how?...I used to go in and see the Under Manager, and he used to say: 'You're on K's round', and I used to get a packet of Players out of one pocket and pass it to another, and look him in the eye, and he used to say: 'Which round do you want?'..."

More usually, however, "bent straights" work hand in glove with the men in their section, occasionally crossing the line just to get the credit for high sales figures. As in the following example, where the supervisor in question displays nicely the paradoxical combination of honesty and crookedness which defines his role:

"...he used to help me make money, and yet he won't take any off me...he won't accept anything...that's why I'm laughing...the times I've tried, I've come up to him, and said: 'Look, I've made so much this week, and half belongs to you'...and he says: 'You take it, you need it,' he's quite honest when it comes down to it, but he'll do anything to help you out, he'll bring all his rounds over, he'll break his neck bringing them over...like when 'J' was short, he helped him out by giving him cakes, and bread, telling him to pay it in and come over...just so that it looks good on his record...he wants the manager to come up to him and pat him on the back and say: 'You're doing a wonderful job'...as long as the job is done alright, he's chuffed, silly prat!...."

Most "bent straights" understand the problems facing their salesmen, especially the need to show continuity of sales figures during holiday times. As one "professional" commented: "...the point is that if a supervisor jumps a round, he has to show a similar book to what the regular bloke does...". However, this is additionally difficult for supervisors. They have to attempt to maintain price, sales, and fiddle-continuity without quite the same quality of trust-relationship with the customer that the regular man has. As one "bent straight" supervisor put it:

"...If it shows up, you could lose customers over it, couldn't you?...you've got to (fiddle)...let's be honest, you're helping yourself, aren't you?...but I don't attempt to go to the extremes that some of the salesmen go to...I try to find somewhere in between, keep the customer happy, and keep everybody else happy at the same time...if I'm on a journey and I know I've made £5, I won't keep £5... I'll leave a pound in to cover me...I've got a ceiling, even on wholesale, and I won't go above it...I always feel that when you go on wholesale with a bloke to learn his journey, he doesn't tell you everything, there's always something he keeps to himself...that's why I put a ceiling on, so that I don't fall into a ruddy trap!..."

But however hard they try, "bent straights" are never fully accepted. As one salesman acidly, but finally, commented: "when they're loading up beside you, out with you, they're certainly one of you, but when you're at the works, they're definitely one of them."

Plasto-Elastic Archetypes: "Rogue", "Professional" and "Robin Hood"

Plasto-elastic archetypes are essentially licenced performers, although the actual nature of their respective licences varies. As Klapp (1964, p 132-3) defines it:

"...While some...are excessively criticised for small faults, we find the paradox that others get away with murder, remaining popular as they do things that ruin the reputation of an ordinary man. We can trace this immunity to at least two general sources...First, each role has its privileges...a second source of immunity for misbehaving public figures is in the elements in their image that compensate for whatever faults they possess..."

(i) The "Rogue"

"Rogue": "...Spare cash-bag?...no, I sold all my bags to the milkman on my round!..."

"Rogue": "...I'm no fiddler!...well, I might play the fiddle a bit, but not like some of the blokes up heree..I saw Bob this morning, and he was really pissed off...he said it would cost him about £15 to £18 a week (a new checking system) ...still, he's not just a fiddler, he plays the whole bloody orchestra!..."

The "rogue"'s passport to privilege is his disarming grin, coupled with his tongue in cheek denials of dishonesty. A rogue, it is said, can resist anything but temptation. At the bakery, the "rogue" has, like the "shark", proceeded to theoretically intolerable stages of the moral career. Here, however, the "rogue" disarms opponents, and mediates the moral harm that he generates with his ability to somehow 'disarm'. As Klapp (1964, p 134) says specifically of the "rogue":

"...make it funny enough and you can get away with murder, and that is the licence of the comic rogue. Falstaff was a coward, a glutton, a drunkard, a liar, a thief, and a fraud, but it was psychologically impossible to see him as a villain..."

"Rogues" possess sufficient interactional ingenuousness to be able to deny the deed, smile, and then, deprecatingly, admit it. One "rogue" said to me: "...Honestly, I can't make a thing on this round...well, not much anyway", and another: "They used to think that I had stuff off my brother (who was on a wholesale round)...but I didn't...well, only a few trays here and there!"

The portfolio of the "rogue" is extensive, and appears to operate on the assumption that the most profitable approach is the percentage playing of all possible styles. "Rogues" are

particularly renown for skill and dexterity in the practical arts of fiddling, for living by laughs, and for conning well-diddled customers into leaving them large tips at Christmas.

One "rogue" told me:

"...I didn't lose many customers, I had a good round, I used to lose the odd one, and pick up the odd one, I used to treat them alright, used to give them a good Divi!...if they spent a pound, I used to give them a packet of biscuits and say: 'Here you are, here's a packet of biscuits for you'...and used to get it back off them by the end of the week!...I even used to be a driving instructor for one of my customers...£1 for three hours!..."

Generally, in financial terms, the "rogue" portfolio pays handsomely. Willingness, for example, to push any 'sideline' often provides large dividends. Another "rogue":

"...he used to sell me tins of biscuits for 50p, and I used to sell them on the round for 75p...I had 24 boxes one Christmas...I liked that Army bloke, he used to give me butter, and I used to sell it...but one day, a woman said to me: 'Here, that butter you sold me the other week, it had 'N.A.A.F.I.' written all down the side of it!'...so I thought I'd better pack that in...when I was serving that army place, I never touched the money I made, I just put it in a tin, and in the few months I worked for them, d'you know how much I made?...well, after I'd finished, I opened the tin, and put over £370 in the bank..."

"Rogues" aspire to be "professionals". However, the two are permanently distinguished by the "rogue"'s total lack of power, his refusal to believe that, in spite of his careful calculations, he could ever be short, and the subsequent injured righteousness which he adopts in the perpetual battle that he wages with the sales management. At different times, three "rogues" said to me:

"...I know that I can't come short..It's just not possible...they made me £3 short the other week..."

"...What I can't understand is being made short..I can't be...it isn't possible.. I always keep track of what is going on, and leave 30 bob in to cover mistakes..."

"...You can never be accurate, can you? take last week, I came 32p over...and this week, I should have been 58p over ...yet they made me £8.89 short...impossible...there's just no way it could happen..."

The "rogues"'s comradely feelings towards other salesmen (see, for example, the quotes on page 339, supra) are matched by the disgust with which he views supervisors. If "Robin Hoods" represent the traditional/deferential worker (Lockwood, 1966), and "professionals" the privatised worker, then the "rogue" forms the proletarian core. As one "rogue" put it:

"...You know, if they offered me that job (supervisor), I'd say: 'No, thanks', and if they asked me why, I'd say: 'Well, I don't want demotion'...that's how much I think of them!..."

(ii) The "Professional"

The sophistication of "rogue" tactics gradually achieves "professional" status in the eyes of other salesmen. The "professional" eventually becomes differentiated from the "rogue" through the (in some cases, considerable) personal power that the "professional" manages to accumulate on the larger wholesale rounds. This is matched, in particular, by total lack of conceit about personal fiddling abilities. I once watched a "professional" add a few loaves to his returns sheet in the despatch office. He claimed: "...I'm still learning, see?..". Two other "professionals" put it in the same way:

"...When I hear a new trick, I think: 'That's a good one, I'll have to remember that'...store that in the back of my mind, I've never heard of that one before, that'll come in handy someday'...it gives you broader scope..."

"...You learn little things all the time...you're always learning...you never finish.."

It is their pure ability which gives them the licence to operate the power that they wield. Their key trait, as Klapp (1964, p 134; 1962, p 32) defines it, is that of 'smart operator':

"...A great performer is permitted to be a prima donna...he puts things over on people, gets what he wants, by slick deals, comes out on top...knows how to make a fast buck without being a crook...it is easier to understand the popularity of the smart operator if we recognise him as the modern version of the clever hero of folklore..."

In the world of the fiddler, the "professional" plays the part of the 'expert'. His status (and the cache that he stands to lose if caught) constructs a portfolio which entirely omits stealing, and instead, concentrates upon fiddles and deals. Two "professionals" explained why they did this:

"..What? Take if from the bakery, you mean?
...No, I don't bother to do that, I don't plan on doing it...I only do it when there's nobody about...there's no reason to do it, I think I can make enough without doing it,
...same with dealing, I don't watch for it, but if anything comes up, I'll have it..."

"...I don't go across and take any..(I.e., does not leave his loading bay and go to the stock racks near the despatch office to steal bread)...I don't steal...I can cover all the cash on overbooking, I don't make it to the extent of what some of the others do...for the simple reason that I haven't got the calls.. it's pointless taking risks above your cash-calls...it's pointless....although, they haven't had a check of the vans lately...before, I was buying most of it from the dealers, and I wasn't hardly touching the customers at all, dealing isn't as risky as fiddling...the risk is the most important, if you didn't have the job, you wouldn't have any money at all, would you?...it's worth losing a little bit for the safety..." (a)

(a) Whilst selling to unscrupulous shopkeepers reduces the likelihood

The "professional" and the "rogue" share a common loathing of supervisors, but crucially, whereas the "rogue" plays the fiddling-game almost for its own sake, the "professional" coolly calculates all the risks, and never makes any money that he cannot realise. Another distinguishing mark of the "professional" character is the deliberate creation of trust by him in all his dealings.^(a) Mars (1973, p 204) comments on a similar strategy in a restaurant:

"...One very experienced middle-aged waitress with a whimsical turn of humour recounted what happened when she moved to a new job in a coffee house: 'I said: "Six coffecs". That shook them. They all looked at me as if I was bloody daft! That way everybody thought I was the most innocent one there was.'...Her reputation for n#ivete established with the checker, she was then able to fiddle without being suspected..."

One of the Wellbreads' "professionals" claimed:

"...He (the despatch manager) trusts me, he always has...he watches some of them, 'G', for example, that bloke can't do a thing right for the Manager, he used to be a bit

(Contd) of their initiating legal proceedings (and subsequently makes discovery less likely) the penalties upon conviction would be greater. In CASE 58 (7.12.74), a shop-owner was convicted with a bread-rounder for receiving stolen bread. Both were fined: the owner twice as much as the driver, nicely reversing the procedural logic of Wellbread's Managing Director, who believes that receivers are always blameless.

(a) Bigus (1972, p 148-151) cites the following trust-inducing tactics: "The Sincerity Act" (being 'open', Bigus adds, "the sincerity act is not, of course, used exclusively by milkmen. It is employed by just about all persons who deal with customers"); "Contrived Disclosure" (Pretended disclosure of 'insider' information to customers, carrying the implication that, in the dramatic sense, the salesman is more a member of the customer's team, than of the bakery's); "Situational mitigation" (confronting and deflating individual grounds of distrust); and "accidental honesty" (when convenient, overtly display honesty). There is no particular consciousness about these techniques amongst Wellbread salesmen. There is nevertheless awareness and practice of them, which is informed by their general dramatic role as 'performers' (see Chapter Three).

of a "rogue" when he was on retail...but I used to give him a tray back now and again, when I was issued too much, I'd go up to him, and I'd say: 'Here you are, I'm honest, I give you a tray back when I've been given too much'... I didn't used to give him all of it back, mind you, only some, if I thought I couldn't get rid of it...he trusts me, I wouldn't say that he trusts me completely,...but more than the rest..."

The management by "professionals" of large wholesale rounds provides them with relationships with good customers which are more significant than the relationships that these customers have with the Wellbreads' management. The "professionals" can thus threaten to leave (taking the customers with them) with great effect. Two of the salesmen commented:

"Professional": "...I like being at the top....(of the sales charts)...because you can get more done, which helps you keep at the top...it's easier in the top three, because you don't have to fight so hard ...I always used to take the bloke above me (in the sales charts)...as a sort of target...and this is another thing about being at the top, they don't stop any money when you're short..."

"Rogue": "...'R' and 'W' are "professionals", ...'U' did 'R''S round when he was on holiday, and he even had shops taking 70 loaves a day, and apologising...apologising!...for having 5 returns..."

The large "make" of the "professional" means that he can afford to operate via a system of kickbacks, sweeteners, and hush-money (in much the same way that Davis, 1959, p 270-1, complains that taxi-drivers are compelled to). Occasionally, staff in useful positions at the bakery are indebted, so that their services can be called upon at appropriate times:

"Professional": "...Yeah, if whoever's on lets me book a tray, well, I'll give him a packet of cigarettes, or something, or a few boxes of cakes, and they're happy, ...Old 'P' (a supervisor) used to be the boy for that, give him a quid, and he'd be over the moon...give them something each time, and they won't mind the next time will they?..."

"Professional": "...I always give him (good customer) a loaf for himself and about a quid's worth of cake each week..."

"Professional": "...If there's any trouble, I get on well with my customers, they'll back me up if I want them to, I know most of mine, and if I'm not sure whether or not I'm covered, I'll just ring one of them up and say: 'You didn't pay me this week, O.K., Bill?', and he'll say: 'Right, sure, mate'..."

Inside Dealer: "...he just took them, and I never thought any more about it, it just went from my mind completely,...anyway, after the holiday, he came up to me, and gave me a fiver, and said: 'You look after me, and I'll look after you'..."

"Professional": "...I tipped all my calls the wink ages ago, three cafes, all owned by the same bloke, and he knows the score...he used to work for Tiger Cakes...that's how he got the money for the cakes, taking Tiger for so much!..."

"Professional": "...If I find out that it was that bastard supervisor who shopped me over those cash-calls, then I'll call that £50 I lent him to buy that poncey car of his..."

Partly through the artificial creation of trust, and partly as a favour, "professionals" rarely get caught in the spot-checks that are sometimes carried out by the bakery management. Somehow, they always seem to know exactly when random and unplanned checks are due. Two bakery staff members suggested possible reasons:

Inside Chargehand: "...One night, the phone in Despatch went...it was for 'Y' (a dealer) ...it was one of the big wholesale boys...I stood by the desk while he was talking to him, and you know the way he talks, I heard everything...'Don't put any bread on, there's a check in the morning'...they used to have these checks, but he always knew, and he used to phone in..."

Night Manager: "...You know, I spent two nights sitting up on top of the despatch office...hidden in all the shit and dust.. I knew stuff was going, I knew who was taking it, I knew the times, and everything...but,

no action,...about three months later, somebody came up to me and said: 'You were a cunt sitting up there, weren't you?'...only two people knew about it, I only told two people! and it got back to the blokes who were doing it..."

The Sales managerial office staff are left with virtually no control whatsoever over the "professionals". The office is believed by them to be wholly incompetent, and is 'fixed' forthwith. One "professional" told me:

"...they're (office staff) on the fiddle, I caught the chief accountant once, well, he was caught several times, I caught him on the round once, taking stuff out of the boot of his car, and putting it into somebody else's...I made sure that he saw me.. I had never spoken to him before...but I bibbed the horn and lent out of the cab... I never came short after that while he was the accountant...they're all fiddling in that office...no office could be as incompetent as ours is without a fiddle behind it...."

If communication with the management is essential, then the Under Managers (who are supposed to deal with the salesmen) are ignored. One "professional" stated that "...I never go to his Sales Meetings, they're a bloody waste of time. I told the Senior Manager: 'I haven't got time to waste listening to his (Manager's) stupid ramblings'...I don't get on with him, I always go to the Senior Manager if I want something." Whereas it is the power of the "professional" that, for example, lowers his sales target (thus allowing him to make more commission), in the short term, it is mere long-term attendance by the final "character" - the "Robin Hood" - that achieves the same result. By waiting patiently in the wings, the "Robin Hood" manages to be around at the right time to benefit from any drop in the commission rates.

(iii) The "Robin Hood"

"Robin Hood": "...One old boy said to me today: 'You're the only honest bugger we have to this door, boy!!' (laugh)..but I never rob anybody unless they've got more money than I have (laugh)...I don't...some of these old pensioners, and farm boys, I could no more rook them than....some of them, the old girls, I give them a bit back...I have done...I'll say: 'You're a good old sort, and you've helped me a bit'...."

As Klapp (1964, 134) points out, the immunity of the "Robin Hood" lies in the fact that something he does pleases public sentiment more than his misdeeds shock. Because of this, his crimes just seem like a technicality. Melodramatically, the "Robin Hood" character is symbolised by the heroic 'Goodfellow', and 'independant spirit'. Klapp (1962, p 41, 43) continues:

"...for friendliness he is hard to beat... he is a comfortable person to have around no trouble maker or rebel, doesn't needle people, never sets himself above others, measures success in acceptance rather than achievement, no prodical but a plodder, not a fireball but a friend..."

The static sales pattern of the "Robin Hood" coupled with a very low sales target (see Diagram 17, page 335) is legendary. One "rogue" said to me:

"...Take old Alfred...he's no fool, he can't sell anything, I bet you he never changes his orders from year to year...if he sold somebody a packet of doughnuts one week, he'd take her a packet the next...never vary it...not to try and sell her more...but I saw his wage-packet once...£35 in fivers in it he had, and a couple of singles as well..."

The "making" portfolio of the "Robin Hood" is a regular, restricted, consumption-related mixture of many possible styles. Outright stealing achieves a quite different meaning in the "Robin Hood" context. Both the snatch and the sell are redefined as "re-cycling", and as "public service". One "Robin Hood" felt that he could only sustain this redefinition if stealing was done in moderation:

"...It doesn't matter...I always help myself to a few stales from up the passage when the Manager isn't looking...they only go to waste if I don't take them...or, some poor sod gets them for contract...the bloke I sell them to, he only takes them for his dogs, and I only charge him half-price for them...four loaves, that's four bob, isn't it?...it all helps doesn't it?...I used to deal for about a dozen or so each day...until they got caught, they got too greedy in the end...a dozen 1 loaves a week doesn't hurt anybody does it? ...it's beer money for me, and for him..."

But the schematic backbone of the "Robin Hood"'s business is 'perks', tips and sidelines:

"Robin Hood": "...I'm always there...when they move from the Naval houses...sometimes, they only get about 24 hours notice, and then they're off to Malta, or somewhere, I got an £80 T.V. once for £40...it was brand new... they hadn't got time to sell it, see?...and I could have had a new car once for £300, but I hadn't got the cash..."

"Bent Straight": "....My first year, I got £60 in tips, but when they made me a supervisor, they all thought: 'We don't have to give him so much now, he's earning more'... take old Bert, he's got one of the best rounds here, he cares, see?...he knows all his customers, and has knows them for years, Remember Rocky last year? he should have been on the club, but he came in special on Christmas Eve to get all his tips...he took about £80 too...Old Fred, he's another one, he had a real top round down at the coast, all the classy houses, now, he used to look after them, he even used to go and do the shopping for them, and before he went on holiday, he used to say to them all: 'Be away on holiday next week, M'am'...and they used to give him about 10 bob, and say: 'Have a nice

time, Baker'...he used to make about £60 out of that alone...like old Sam, they all think he's dim, but he's got it made...there was a couple of old ladies on his round, and he always used to fill the coal bucket up for them...one of them died, and left him about £400...now, he's filling the coal bucket up for the other one and hoping for the best!..."

When I acted as a relief on normally "professional" rounds I was instructed to push 'bent' coats, radios and other high-priced goods. "Robin Hood" rounds on the other hand (see Diagram 17 on page 335) are permanently stocked with sacks of potatoes, boxes of eggs, packets of tea, butter, and cheap tights, all involving considerable extra effort for very low profit margins, often themselves eroded by high wastage and breakage. Whilst I was being instructed on a "Robin Hood" round, the regular man told me:

"...You'll be alright on here, you can make yourself a few bob, eggs and new potatoes and stuff, all legal.."

"Robin Hoods" are so defined by the contents of their portfolio, rather than by the style by which they operate it. Of all the Wellbreads' "characters", the "Robin Hoods" are most easily visible: older men, in cloth caps, serving the large retail country rounds. Empirically (albeit impressionistically) there is a high degree of convergence here between the "Robin Hood" character, and the "cap doffer" performer-style outlined in Chapter Three, and the "old-stagers" of Chapter Four. (a)

(a) Similarly impressionistically, it might help to add that the "shark" seems to converge with the "small timer" salesman status, and the "delivery boy" and "dropper" impression and expression styles. The "rogue" is applicable to any salesman status, and reflects "salesman" impression and expression styles. The "professional" is similarly a "salesman", but is probably classed as a "Big Boy" in entry-status terms. The "Robin Hood" is a "roundsman" impression style in addition to being a "cap doffer" in performer terms. The "wise straight" occupies any entry-status, is a "salesman" to the management, and a "roundsman" to his customers. "Bent straight" and "righteous straight" are supervisors, and occupy neither entry-statuses nor impression or expression styles.

They are the least affected by the dynamic approach to selling taken by the manager, and generally, they ignore all special competitions, datums, targets and other office paraphernalia designed to boost sales. One "Robin Hood" said:

"...I've never had to pay any shorts, I never have any problems with the office, if I'm short one week, I pick it up the next, I don't worry about it...competitions? I never take any interest in them...if they plus them up, I don't worry...I never bother with them...I never have much to do with the management really, and they never say much to me, I've had a couple of dust-ups with them, but it doesn't happen very often...when I first started, I used to do all the booking on the knock (i.e. properly) ...now, all I do is book what they owe me, I can never see any point in writing it all down...same with the stock Saturday, I guess at it, it comes out over a period of a week or two...they know it...they laugh and say: 'Old Bill's been guessing his stock again!'...when I come a fiver over...they never say anything about it, as long as it works out over the weeks, as long as it turns up..."

Few of the "Robin Hoods" ever bother to systematically of accurately calculate what they have "made", preferring instead to just allow the 'kitty' to subsidise mid-week consumption of beer, petrol, and tobacco. More than any other making-portfolio, they have the high moral scruples of the traditional/deferential worker. One said:

- "...Tom had been on this round for 47 years of something before I took it over...that's all I heard for the first year I was on here, ...what old Tom used to do...but it used to break my heart...he used to 'cane' the old ones you know...there's an old dear down the road, she hadn't a clue where the money is concerned, he used to cane her something rotten...he used to sting her no end!...I don't believe in that, you know...O.K., cane those who can afford it...once old _____ added up the bill, you know the old girl with the Spanish Butler?...she added it up and made it 40p more than me...well, I didn't say anything...but I wouldn't take it off anybody who couldn't afford to lose it...even if they couldn't add up..."

STATUS RELATIONS IN "NORMAL" AND CRISIS TIMES

Normal Status

The timing and territory, and round ascription differences that provide salesmen with the organisational basis for character adoption and imputation also interrelate them in a network of symbolic relationships. Although salesmen-statuses are produced specifically by timing and territory, the processes of status-maintenance are part and parcel of the procedures for character-presentation which I have just discussed. As status crucially differentiates salesmen (in a sense that, for example, similarity of wages does not, personal status becomes tenuous and fragile, and any status-challenges are treated with extreme touchiness. A "professional" thus reports how a customer had unwittingly slurred his "character":

"...This morning I went in with 6 trays, and he was moaning as usual...said there was three missing, three fucking loaves! and me with 8 other big calls to do before 9.00 am...when I got through the door, and he said that there was three missing, cor! ...that fucking annoyed me...I only deal in trays...."

On top of this sort of status conflict with the customer, similar troubles with other roundsman are also possible. Retail salesmen serving the same domestic hinterland that the shops which the wholesale drivers deliver to depend for their living upon successfully eradicating the competition which inevitably arises in such an over-sold environment. One "rogue" complained:

"...trouble is, 'T''s shops (a "professional") down Humbold Street sell Hat Rings for 9p each, and I have to sell them door-to-door, round about, for 11p....not 2p difference, but 1p

and 2p each time...I doubt whether it's worth getting the basket out twice a day down there..."

To soften this particular attack on his standard of living, the above "professional" allowed the "rogue" in question to help him clean out his van at the end of the day. The "rogue" was paid as much as 70p (in stakes which he could cash in the next day) for this slight task. Such symbiosis is further maintained by the rule that spare bread should be given away to fellow workers, and that no attempt should be made to sell it. A minor rule derived from this is that rolls are free. Partly because the big inside dealers never fully understood this, one particular deal-empire collapsed. The fact that the inside men wanted money for rolls indicated over-greediness to the roundsmen, and heralded the ultimate crumbling of the deal-structure. They were no longer prepared to support a structure (although they were prepared to continue to buy 'cheap' bread) which had begun to contradict some very basic group rules.

Sometimes the different price/value interpretations held by retailers and wholesalers produces a long-lasting symbiotic relationship between a retailer and a wholesaler in the same customer-area. When, in ignorance, I tried to sell off some spare bread when I was acting as a relief salesman, I was gently and kindly told:

"...Can't you find a retailer? that's what I used to do when I was on there...one who's a bit short of bread, and can give you cash for it...you 'll probably get nearly full price for it..."

Procedures such as this help to maintain characterological boundaries, and allow smooth and easy 'staying-in-character' for practitioners. Unfortunately, however, managerial social control can occasionally stymie such created harmony. How do salesmen manage their characters in times of crisis?

Crisis and Status-Slip: "Staying-in-Character"
versus Character-Lapse.

In normal times, the portfolio provides ongoing resolution of the core problems of maintaining the continuity of fiddles, the bases for trust, of equalising the visibility of fiddles with the continuity of the sales pattern, and so on. The attempts by the bakery management to penetrate this protective shield (which we might refer to as 'clean-up campaigns') are rarely successful along the lines that they intend. They do, however, make life temporarily difficult for those with particular "characters". For most salesmen, "making" styles usually dismissed with disgust, are temporarily adopted as a stop-gap measure.^(a) Two "professionals" found their status particularly vulnerable during the suspension of dealing:

"...You watch the Old-Stagers up the top there in the mornings (on the top bays near the passage where the stales are stored) they're all after the extra loaf, what they can find hanging about...it's pathetic really, just for a few old stales...I can do alright without doing that...without stooping to that...I have done it...I have done it in the past when things have been a bit tight, I've been and got myself a couple of trays of stales..."

"...When 'T' and the others were caught (inside dealers), it was madness for a few days...it was murder for a few days, I mean, you have to cover what you have been getting don't you?...otherside it would show...especially at a time like that, when they're looking for that sort of thing...."

During this particular enforcement-crisis, one of the big inside dealers who had been sacked told me that although

(a) Lemert (1967, p 127) similarly notes how status-degrading forgers find life when they have to drop to passing small-time cheques when the 'heat' is on.

times were hard for those who had previously depended upon his illicit services, one man at least, a "professional":

"...is alright though, he said that he'd managed to make the 200 loaves (which he had previously been buying cheap per day) just by shorting his shops, it's easy, he's been going there for years, and they trust him...he did one shop for 42 loaves!..."

Similarly, if inside dealers get windy, then steals (as well as fiddles, as in the last example) will probably increase. If stealing from one's mates, on the other hand, is the advantage taken in such precarious situations, then what might be seen as a temporary character-lapse by others, will instead become irradicable and irremediably defined as characterological change. One "professional" used to work alongside a friend with a similar characteristic disposition, until:

"...I used to share everything with 'Z'... if I got 4 trays, I would give him a couple, he'd pay me mind, but he used to do the same for me...share stuff, stuff that he'd got, but I've noticed that recently, when he's got bread, he hasn't shared it with me... take the other day, he was telling the Manager that he hadn't got all his bread, but I'd seen him put it on his van, 56 loaves, but he didn't give any to me, even when I said to him: 'What's all this? Got some extra coming?'...so now, if I get something, I might not say anything..."

Such "sounding" (Matza, 1964, p 43) is commonly used to settle membership questions at character-slippage times. The result in the above example was that, in other words, the speaker began to treat his friend like a "shark". A similar effect can be created on the round. For example, the use of "rogue" tactics on customers who have conventionally been accustomed to a "Robin Hood" approach can deposit the salesman in a spiral of decreasing trust and status-deflation. It was said of one man:

"...He got greedy in the end...he got to the point where the customers got suspicious, none of them did anything, but they all started checking him out, and he couldn't make any more..."

Although not so much of a problem for new recruits (who find a 'situated self', a "character", awaiting them in the expectations of their customers), this can be particularly a problem for salesmen changing rounds in mid career stream. Although the Sales manager tries to 'fit' an existing roundsman to another round, this is not always successful, and if the situated self to which he comes differs from the one to which he has become used, conflict (which will be unresolvable if it is contrary to characterological personal change directions, see Diagram 16 on page 331) will result. Again, sufficient witnessing of infraction of the core moral rules of the group can lead, alternatively, to irretretivble re-classification for the offender. As Klapp (1964, p 174-5) puts it:

"...If an individual acts out of character, he can produce a role-crisis for himself, and perhaps for someone else as well, by making it impossible for the drama to go on as defined and expected. It may occur because the audience can no longer believe in him in the part, or because he sabotages his partner's role..."

Character Problems in Portfolio-Change: Image Trouble

A portfolio developed from a round-appropriate character may prove an embarrassment if the content of the round is sufficiently altered to provide a structural change, or if the salesmen themselves are changed over. Many men manage to make a successful policy change. One man who had operated with success on a "Robin Hood" round, recalled his smooth transition to "professional" status:

"....A lot of the old girls, I used to let them have stale bread for the birds and that sort of thing...I'd let them have it, and not charge them...things like that, I never used to make a lot on Retail, about a fiver a week, I suppose, when you change,

it isn't that much different...(when I was being retrained)...I expected him to do it (fiddle), and I was watching him, but the amount surprised me..."

Image-change in the possible directions indicated earlier (Diagram 16, page 331, and pages 330 to 333) is relatively simple. Change from irremedial to remedial categories on the other hand, for example, from "shark" to "professional", is never fully achieved. One man attempting such a switch, found that:

"...I've had many a barney with the Desatch Manager, he's always calling me a "thief" and things like that, and _____ (the Sales manager) said the other day; when I showed him a photograph of my son: 'Fancy having a Dad who's a thief!'...I suppose he was joking, but he's said that to me once or twice...he says things, and you just have to take it with a pinch of salt..."

As Klapp puts it (1964, p 143) one cannot switch from an image that one's public wants to one that it does not want. It is simple to re-make some "characters", for example, all but "shark" and "righteous straight" can be re-made (albeit in systematically preferred directions) one cannot just arbitrarily re-make characters along types purely of one's own choosing.

Thus, the ability to break out of a previously held character in order to successfully adopt a new make-portfolio depends upon the nature of the publicised biography of the salesman concerned, and upon the characterological direction in which he wishes to travel.

EVERYDAY CHARACTER MANAGEMENT

Financial Account Management

The organisation of the Sales department runs on the premise that the salesmen are fiscally responsible for accounting for all the goods for which they are credited each week. A financial reconciliation-sheet of debits and credits (a 'Rec. '), is prepared for each man every week. It comprises a lengthy arithmetical trial for every salesman, culminating in a personal financial verdict, which is either 'short' of, or 'over' the requisite balance. To 'come over' is a puzzle to be solved by the men by initiating refined in-portfolio practices. To 'come short' initiates various sets of interaction with the management, whose outcome is characterologically negotiable.

It is theroretically possible, but practically impossible to 'come out'. In the history of the Sales department at Wellbreads, no salesman has ever exactly matched his debits with his credits. As the Sales manager put it: "To do a journey and to come out spot on, is nearly impossible." This is optimistic. Should chance befall a salesman, and his rec. 'come out', this would not pass the eagle-eye of the sales office. As a senior spuervisor put it:

"...You know, if one of my blokes ever came out exactly right (in the Rec.), I'd sack him on the spot...it's impossible, and if somebody did it, I'd suspect that he was was on the fiddle...he must be...it's impossible..."

The nice double-bind that floods this managerial definition is inescapably apparent. In addition, it is backed by the feeling, held by all members of the management that I talked to, that the

office calculations, upon which the reconciliations are exclusively based, are infallible. As the Training Officer put it:

"...Some of the youngsters here, they think that they can take a fiver out of the bag, because they can always say: 'Oh, well, they've made a mistake in the office'... but, as a matter of a fact, they don't make mistakes in the office...it's impossible, because the work is checked... but that's the biggest enemy of the job, the man doesn't understand that he has to account for every penny that he takes out..."

Coming 'over' merely depicts bad calculations by retailers. Most wholesale rounds, however, have only a fixed amount of ready cash (from the limited supply of cash-calls) to which the weekly "make" must be regularly and accurately matched. If a salesman's "make" regularly exceeds his "take", then he is merely wasting time making money that he cannot realise, and which automatically swells the coffers of the firm. Most salesmen therefore try and plan "making" arrangements to neatly tie in with predictable "take" levels. For example, two "professionals" claimed:

"...Yeah, that was partly why I turned 'M' (potential inside dealer) down, I mean, I can't have everybody giving me bread, can I?...that's three trays each, that's thirty quids worth I have to get rid of...in one day...you'll just keep coming 'over' and that's no good to you, you can't get it out..."

"....Well, I asked for a tray extra the other day, and he said: 'I won't book that one, you can make it right with me at the end of the week'...so I said: 'Yeah, that's four trays'...it's a waste of time really, I can cover all I can get out already...still, you know, one week, I had £24 out and I still came £32 over..."

Devious managerial practices prevent systematically summated 'overs' acting as 'savings' in the personal financial accounts of the men, from which they might draw in times of future shortage. Peculiar things seem to happen to the running totals of each round near the end of the financial year. Many of the salesmen

claimed that a "leveling out" process occurred. Two of them said:

"Rogue": "...It's such a cock-eyed system they always balance it out anyway, they don't care exactly...they just work it out roughly...last summer when I was on the coastal run, I came about £220 over by the end of the season...well, they 'evened it out'...and in the end, I just broke even..."

"Professional": "...Trouble is, get too far ahead, and you lose it all...at the end of the last financial year, I was up three figures, and I lost the lot, yeah, I was about £300 up, and they took it to balance off another round...still, if you're down in the book, they'll help to balance it up...."

To consistently come 'over' is the mark of a "rogue" on a big round. Unable to resist the sport, he continues to make money for the firm, when he cannot realise it himself. This can provoke awkward questions, as one "rogue" remembered:

"...when you come over, they just take it off, and pay somebody else's debts with it, that happened to me...I came about £225 over one year, just before they cleared the books, and they took it all off, and left me with nothing...I got furious, and went and saw _____ (the accountant) and said: 'Why should you take it all off?' and he said: 'If you don't shut up, I'll want to know how you came so much over'..."

The last sentence of that quote only too aptly illustrates the unfortunate political position of those who take the money and relinquish the principles in the way that I described at the start of this chapter. Only the "professional" is astute enough to cut his double-bind losses here, and coopt these possibilities into his portfolio. Two "professionals" claimed:

"...Dealing?...I never do that, although I've been offered, I don't see why I should part with my money when I can make it otherwise...purely financial, they used to come round every morning, and it was 50p a tray ...if you bought one every morning, that was

£3.50 at the end of the week...I haven't got the sort of stores where I can get rid of an extra tray a day, that's why I don't go into the bakery and steal it, I can't get rid of it... Oh, I know I can sell it to a retailer for a quid...still..."

"...I never turn down the advantage to fiddle...well, It depends on the circumstances at the time, I suppose...if I've made enough to cover all the cash-calls, then it's a waste of time doing any more like 'D' does (a "rogue")...he'll fiddle as much as he can all the time...he'll come £30 over each week, it's a waste of time really...it's just money for the company..."

Various strategies have been evolved by the Wellbread salesmen to aid those suffering from a chronic and regular shortage of available cash on their rounds. Most experienced wholesale roundsmen have Imaginary Shops^(a) (where the firm thinks that the salesman calls at a shop, but there isn't one and the salesman pockets the percentage discount) and, more frequently, Anonymous Shops^(b) (the salesman serves a call that

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- (a) The 'Imaginary Shop' has a good pedigree in the essentially limited collection of techniques characteristic of illicit practice in the service industries. It is roughly similar to "payroll padding" - the claiming of salary for "straw men" (Abramson, 1949, p 49; Barrett, 1995, p 199), or "phantom payrollers" (JR. Davis, 1957, p 249) who do not actually receive it. Interestingly, all the inside staff at Wellbreads firmly believe that the management is reticent to pay casuals when more men are needed because they are already pocketing money paid to "imaginary casuals". Jaspán and Black (1960, p 190) suggest the "dummy corporation" may be a white-collar variation of the blue-collar "imaginary shop".
- (b) The 'Anonymous Shops' syndrome is also especially common amongst that sector of the invisible repair service industry which has to work in the customer's home. Particularly (as, for example, with T.V. repairmen) when spare parts are small and very cheap to the firm, unscrupulous employees will soon go into business for themselves and begin to service some of the firm's clients wholly on the side. Hewitt (1963, p 14) refers to this as the "service representatives racket" and cites a nice example of an employee who gave clients his own telephone number, and subsequently took over \$600 of company parts, and \$1,200 worth of service calls in three months. Ross (1960, p 21) recalls an example where, in a Californian carpet store, an employee

the management knows nothing about, covers the order by under-booking elsewhere, and pockets all the cash from that call). One "professional" claimed that: "...everyone here's got their own little calls...I've got three, and there isn't a wholesaler who hasn't..". Two more salesmen admitted:

"Rogue": "...I've got calls on the side that they don't even know about...a couple of pubs ...only a couple of loaves and a few rolls a day, mind you, but it all adds up, doesn't it?..."

"Professional": "...The manager's been asking how many cash-calls the blokes have got, something about them being put on dockets...(the salesman told the management that he had two cash-calls)...I've got six actually, I've got some that nobody knows about..."

If a call-checker is bent, but has no access to organisational cash, an alternative strategy (where there is a will, but, alas, no other way) is to exchange for kind. I was told by a "rogue":

"...Well, see one of the managers in the shops, then, offer him some bread for some groceries or something...I do it all the time, on here, they're only too glad to do it most of the time, it doesn't bother them, if I want a couple of bottles of drink or anything, I give them a couple of loaves...but I go outside and book them!...."

Periodically, when they have sufficient but otherwise un-"takable" cash in their hypothetical "make"-kitty, some of the "professionals" close a shop. This means that the docket-bill is presented to the shop-keeper in the usual way, but instead of collecting the money, and turning it over to Wellbreads in the conventional way, the money is pocketed by the salesman, and the firm is told that the shop-keeper closed up the shop for that week to go on holiday. One "professional" told me:

(Contd) managed to set himself up in elaborate competition with the firm, by erratically cancelling orders, and slowing delivery down, and then offering service to the thus disgruntled customers at a cheaper rate. The store lost \$250,000 of carpet, and had even paid \$ 200,000 in overtime for the fitters to install the stolen carpets!

"...I closed Johnsons just before I went on holiday, yeah, closed him for a week, and took an extra £57 out of the kitty that week...trouble is you can't close them too often, I told them in the office that he was away on holiday for a week, and had closed down...I'd been 'over' for weeks, see?... I'd been counting it up, and what they told me I was over, I thought I'd come 'short' to even it out...but I still came £2 over!..."

Perhaps more dangerous, but at least an alternative way of getting cash in a tight situation, is conversion. This is not a regular practice, and is only enacted by "rogues", one of whom told me when I complained that I hadn't got sufficient cash on my round:

"...You shouldn't let that worry you!... look, if you have a cash-call, and he pays you £20 by cheque, just pay that in and take £10 from somewhere else, as long as you can cover it, you're O.K....if they say anything, all you have to say is: 'Well, he only owed £10, but he wanted £10 cash, so I let him give me a cheque for £20'...not that they will want to know, but just in case they do, you're covered...you can always cover it at the other end too in you want, I do sometimes, I get on well with my customers, they'll back me up if I want them to..."

Not only dangerous, but also particularly short-term, are the policies of carrying forward^(a) (the short-term suppression of paper profits in order to allow them to emerge later to suit accounting practices), and delaying payment^(b) (presenting bills

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- (a) Technically, this is known as "lapping" (Peter A. Zimmerman, p 552 of S.J. Curtis, 1960). Sampson (1972, p 160) suggests that profit-spreading has become a regular feature of the economy of large corporations. He claims that I.T.&T. regularly manage to produce a 10% yearly profit.
- (b) Money is easily made at "make" calls, but there are no un-invoiced "take" calls. Money is taken from invoiced calls, the invoice receipt is torn up, and the salesman reports to the bakery (thus providing very short-term cover) that the call didn't pay. Subsequently, that call will be invoiced for two weeks' bread the next week. To cover the initial defalcation without arousing suspicion, the salesman must either pay the money out of his own funds, or repeat the trick for another unsuspecting call. "Making" money by fiddling other calls is quite irrelevant. In banks, the pay-back process is called

to customers in the usual way, but pocketing the money. The call is reinvoiced by the bakery the following week, but then the salesman delays the payment of another call to deflect suspicion from himself, and pay the outstanding amount owed by the first call. It is a procedure that, once embarked upon, ends in almost certain entrapment.) A salesman and a supervisor commented upon these strategies respectively:

"Professional": "... Look, if you've made a lot one week, and can't get it out, make sure you have a lot of stock on the van, and don't book it on Saturday night...so the money is there when you need it..."

"Bent Straight": "...I remember one wholesaler...he hadn't got the cash-calls on his round, but he was the star-boy, his sales went sky-high, and he managed to keep them up, but then, one day, there was a query about one of his calls, there was a difference between what he had been booking out to them, and what he had...anyway...the Manager went round to his house to see him....and he had loads of bread round there!...he had it stockpiled all along the sides of his house, in the shed, everywhere!...he could cover it, you see, cover it easily...he always came over, but he couldn't get cash for it, there were no cash-calls on that round, and he couldn't manage to pick any up...and he didn't want to hand the stuff in as returns....then one week, he was £20 short, in his own pocket, so he took it out of the money from one of the shops, and put a ticket in to the firm saying that they hadn't paid, then next week, when they got a bill for a balance that they had already paid, he paid it off out of somebody else's money...they he borrowed some more from somebody else...in the end, he owed about £300...." (a)

(Contd) "making whole" (Hoover, 1933, p 661) derived from the Anglo Saxon 'hal' (meaning recovered, Brooks, 1969, p 193) which refers to taking larger and larger sums to cover and recover. Dalton (1964, p 209) has a similar example: "...if emergencies prevented this, he reported his stock as larger than it was at the time of inventory; for instance, he might report thirty suits on hand, when he only had twenty-seven..."

(a) Van drivers carrying perishable goods may well be able to solve the "cash-flow" problem by systematically visiting a 'fence'. Klockars' (1974) fence makes a distinction between his part-time and full-time suppliers: (p 61) "...Your truck drivers are basically honest men. Many of them would never steal anything. But

Abramson (1949, p 49) notes examples of employees caught because they found the mechanisms of paying it back much harder than taking it, and Cressey (1971, p 109, 118) analyses the drawbacks of this procedure:

"...Even by doing this, however, he did not merely transfer his debts from one place to another, but kept getting further into debt...It is much more difficult to restore runds to an account than it is to take them in the first place..."

A much trickier problem for salesmen to negotiate than this one of 'coming over', is that of 'coming short'. Few men accept the management's procedures for dealing with their shortages, and most define the subsequent pay-packet deductions as clearly being class-based retaliative punishment. The Under Manager explained to me the logic behind the managerial policy of deducting some shortages from salesmen's pay-packets:

"...Well, it's difficult to say really, how we handle shortages...we don't do it by any hard and fast system, we have to have a think about it, and if a bloke is coming short regularly, and the total that he is short keeps building up, I'll get him in here, and say to him: 'Look, if this doesn't come out right next week, we'll have to knock a couple of quid off'...after I've found out whether he's doing any of the system wrong of anything like that...."

If deductions are actually made, the salesmen have three choices: they can accept it, use it, or fight it. Some accept it only if they happen to agree with it. One man claimed to me: "If I am short, then fair enough, I don't mind if they do take it out of the wages...I always think back to myself, and say: 'Did I have that much out? if I did, then fair enough.'" Another salesman thought that deductions could not only be used, but also used

(Contd) every time they get an overload, they'd drop it off to me.."
 (p 87) "...your drivers are a shole different thing entirely... honest, hard-working men with families to support..." (p 140):
 "to me, a thief an' a driver is two entirely different things..."

systematically:

"...If you're short, and you know you're short, they deduct it, but you don't pay tax on it do you?...you gain...there used to be a bloke here, he used to be a fiver short regularly, every week, consequently they used to stop him a fiver every week, but actually, he was gaining about £2 tax on it..."

As far as the third choice goes, different "characters" specify different preferred procedures for fighting attempted wage-packet deductions. The "rogue" either counter-attacks by back-dipping (a spiral wherein whatever is deducted, is simply retaken out of the cash bag) or threatening to leave:

"...I know why I'm short now, I take it back out every week, last week, they took £6 out of my wage-packet...so I just took £6 out of the bag, what else can I do?..."

"...Yeah, the first time I was stopped, they had me in the office, and I was stopped about £2 or £3, so I said I was going to give a week's notice...so they let me off...but they did it again, so I handed in my notice again, and they said the same thing, and I got the money back..."

"Robin Hoods", in contrast, are left very much on their own, and are trusted to allow their accounts to even out in the long-term. One "Robin Hood" recalled:

"...If you take too much out, they'll start looking around your car to see if you've bought any new tyres!...(laugh) but I never bother (to look at the Rec.) I just take it and look at the bottom, and think: 'Oh, dear,' or, 'Oh, that's a surprise' or something like that...I don't worry about it..."

"Professionals", like "rogues", fight tooth and nail to avoid deductions, but from a position of power and sophistication, rather than mere bitterness. A "professional" rather blandly told me:

"...Well, you have to leave enough in to cover the mistakes in the office sometimes!...they make me £100 short sometimes...and I know I'm not short, I've got so many shops with peculiar percentages, see?...that I have to knock off on the spot, and they always cock the calculations up on the office, I had to spend a whole week on the office working it out properly once...other times, I have to get 'B' (a supervisor) to go through and check all the discounts for me..."

The "shark", on the other hand, because of his relationships with other salesmen, and his public image, is virtually defenceless against the deductions system (see, for example, what happened to the "shark" chronicled in the quotes on pages 341 and 342 supra). Any attempts by the "shark" to use "rogue", "professional", or "Robin Hood" strategies, will just get him the sack.

But how can the moral business of managerial prototyping be matched with the technological/mathematical one of reconciliation? Importantly, does computing superiority produce moral control?

Moral Control

Managerial prototyping practices further extent to re-classification procedures in producing a moral "profile" for salesmen which reflects their personal history of reconciliation performance. "Shorts" amongst the sales force are so regular in toto, and yet relatively unpredictable as to the particular members of the sales force thus deemed. Accordingly, managerial success in publically establishing reconciliation verdicts for the salesmen will be more ably and easily obtained if some degree of labeling regularity (i.e., the same salesmen each week) can be implanted into rec. verdict production procedures.

The management are not usually personally malicious. But they do feel that sales-life must "add up" for the workforce as a whole. To recall a departmental maxim introduced in Chapter Two, the sales department must remain solvent in its practical affairs. As the Sales manager commented:

"...As I said, we'd rather have shortages than stales on the rounds...that way, you see, a mistake can be found, and it can be traced that somebody isn't doing their job...it can be put down to bad management ...if it's the roundsman's fault, I blame myself, I take a look in the mirror...I do a bit of self-analysis...I tell myself that I've slipped up somewhere in his tr training...it's not always that poor bastard's fault..you've got to pick the right man in the first place..."

Nevertheless, the "poor bastards" are at a particular disadvantage. In the weekly business of auditing salesmen's figures, management have computer-sophistication as their method of 'figuring the "take"', and on top of this, they have access to collaborative and cross-checking information.

Sometimes, as I demonstrated in Chapter Four, a situation can provide a "part-time" criminal with manipulative control over validating inventories. When chargehands in despatch are also inside dealers, for example, they can not only attempt to get a little "left handed" production from the bread plant, they can also check production records for mistakes which they can use, and alter them to cover amounts that they sell. In other words, managerial delegates (the charghands on night duty) have the same access to render losses 'invisible' that Dalton (1964, p 209) noticed:

"...Detailed records of what he removed for himself or others in the interdepartmental trading, and careful balancing of the dollar value of total merchandise withdrawn against the dollar value of unofficial mark-ups enabled the department chief to meet the inventory..."

At Wellbreads, on the other hand, management procedures are

separated from the selling function by both staff and office. Special facilities are available to management which allow the smooth running of accounting, thus producing effectively high-status results. The salesmen's calculations, contrarily, are unofficial and subsidiary, and cannot match the symbolic weight of the managerial computations. One salesman believed that it is because management know this, that they allow laxity and carelessness:

"...There's a lot of them girls in the office, and everybody makes mistakes, the fact that we are committed to pay shorts, eliminates re-checking by them...they've obviously got a lot of work to do, therefore they can't spend too long on one job...if they find a rec. sheet that works out at £6 short, they know they can make us pay it, and that cuts out their double-check and their treble-check..."

The "Robin Hood", as I have already suggested, displays a legitimated refusal to play the "rec. game" at all. The "rogue", at the other extreme, fights a sophisticated, but losing battle. The "rogue" often calculates every halfpenny that he "makes" or "takes":

"..Yeah, I did alright, this week, made a fiver on Monday, see?...I've got it all written down here on the roof of the cab quid there...see? a monthly account...well, you've got to start the week off right, haven't you?...I always write it down somewhere...sometimes, I do it on the windscreen, and rub it off at the end of the day...I tot it all up and that's what I take out of the bag...all except the halfpennies, I leave them in...and I know that I take out 15 smalls every day, and about 10 Slimloafs...and that cover me for a cup of tea and a roll if I go into the cafe..."

"...When I'm out on the round, I put it all down in a little notebook...you've got to take into account all the discounts...at the end of the week, just total it up..."

Such methods may be theoretically accurate, but they are

never accepted by the management. This will be so whatever methods are used to oppose managerial calculations. One "rogue" even bought an electronic calculator! He claimed: "I'm going to work the whole lot out, just to see what they do." "Professionals", on the other hand, use satisfactory guesstimation as ultimately more cost-effective than endless and pointless calculations:^(a)

"...I always say to myself, at the end of the week, 'Have I had a good week?'..."

"...I never write anything down...I cover what I take out...I know roughly in my head...say X amount of trays, I work it out when I come home, then, come Friday, I think: 'Well, I've made 6 trays today'..."

"...I never write it down like some of them do...I don't know...some of them write every loaf that they make down...I just take all the cash!..."

A history of puzzled inability to cross-match the financial verdicts produced by both parties, generally encourages most of the salesmen, in the long run, to drop the time-consuming tactic of exactly matching "make" with "take", and to settle instead on the pro rata rule of 'leave a bit in', on top of sufficient financial cover, and leave the settlement of any issues arising to reconciliation-debate.

Perhaps greater problems for salesmen are generated by the managerial refusal to disclose relevant information about a salesman's personal financial standing. Some calls are invoiced directly, by post, by the sales office, and this prevents separate computation by the salesmen involved. More importantly, although salesmen believe that they are supposed to have unfettered access to the standing sum of their weekly verdicts, they are systematically

(a) It is especially difficult for wholesalers to actually calculate in fact what they have made, as the selling price may not be known to them because of secret deals (i.e., extra percentage discounts) that Wellbreads makes with some of its customers. They thus only may "take" a percentage of what they "make". Cf. CASE 3 (25.8.71) for a similar example: Here, thefts in the duty-free shop at Heathrow Airport allowed some employees to "make" the difference between duty-free and ordinary prices.

denied access to the 'Big Book' where weekly Recs. are tabulated and summated. Three of the salesmen suggested:

"...there's only one copy of the bread order sheet, which you don't see again, (and for some calls) the top docket goes to the customer on the day, he's sent the second one as an invoice, and the third copy stays in the office as a record..."

"...When 'L' (previous Sales Manager) was in charge, he said that you were always entitled to look at your sheet in the ledger, you can't do this now, I've asked on four occasions, what the balance of my route is, and all you get met with is: 'Oh, I don't know', 'I don't know where the book is', or 'You're alright'..."

"...Whenever I ask to see his black book, to ask: 'How much am I in credit?'...he just says: 'Enough'...so I say: 'How much is enough?' and he says: 'I haven't finished it yet'...and he tells you to come in the next week..."

One salesman suggested that the only way to find out the exact amount that one was in credit, was to "take a dip" (in the bag) of a regular amount over consecutive weeks, until told that the round was short. He told me: "You never know whether you're short or over...all you can do is 'take a dip', and wait until they suddenly tell you that you're short, then you know where you were." On many occasions, persistent demands for re-checking are ignored by the management. Anyway, even re-checking itself rarely establishes anything that the salesmen believe to be true. One salesman claimed that he had not only not seen his 'big Book' total for a long time, but also he had not even seen a Rec. for seven months. Two more said:

"...If, for instance, you are £100 short, and you haven't had a dip in the bag, you know there's been a mistake..but convincing them is very hard...trouble is, they start with the attitude that it'll work it self out next week, and then it's getting a bit later...and it's even harder to trace..."

"...They had overcharged me with about £60 worth of stuff...and that put me about £17 in the red, and they stopped the whole £17 out of my wages...so I spent two hours going over it, and found it all, plus a bit more, plus a bit more...how could I do that?... and they never even put it in the Big Book..."

Thus, each man's personal experience with the reconciliation system sours his erstwhile respect for it. Even superficially acceptable verdicts become suspect. One man told me: "Well, the funny thing was, I came exactly £3.96 short two weeks running". It is only within the context of suspicion that this would become pregnant with the meaning that this man attached to it. Another claimed, quite logically, "They (the office) must be on the fiddle...they take money out of the wage-pocket, right?...where the hell does that go?". Sometimes re-checking the managerial verdicts produces bizarre results. Paradoxically, discovering managerial mistakes often saddens rather than gladdens the Salesmen. Occasionally, they get the feeling that if only they checked a bit more thoroughly, the management would owe them money! One salesman recalled: "They made me £26 short last week, so I went and got the Rec., and in ten minutes, I'd found £33...ridiculous isn't it?...if I'd found £26, alright, but how the hell could I find £33?" Two other salesmen had even stranger experiences:

"...Now, my brother works on one route, and his mate works on the one the next number up, ...now, this whole thing can get laughable, he found that he and his friend were alternately coming short, he came short one week, and his mate the next...it got so consistent that they pointed it out to the manager..they both played up about it, and then for the next 6 weeks, they both came short in the same week, and then the next week, they both came over..."

"...I had about £26 worth of cake waste one week, when they changed from sale-and-return, the next week, on the Rec., there was only £16 down there, so I saw the supervisor, and asked him if he had put it all down...and he said: 'I saw the Manager, and we've worked something between us'...what the fuck does that mean?...what have they "worked" between them...either you've got £26 worth of cake waste, or you haven't got £26 worth of cake waste..."

In terms of the core premise of the Sales department, (that in weekly terms, the department must remain solvent), these assumptions are justifiable bearing in mind the amounts actually stolen from the bakery by the salesmen every week, and the quantities siphoned off by the inside dealers. Most of these latter losses though, are lost to the Despatch department. Accordingly, the book-balancing tricks of the Sales management, are compounded by the "juggling" of the Despatch manager. One of the senior Sales managers told me to: "..watch _____ (Despatch manager) like a hawk if I was a salesman. It's your money he's playing with when he is doing your returns..if he doesn't put them down properly, you're going to be short the next week." Ultimately, a salesman wishing to re-compute his debit/credit balance each week faces the daunting task of not only cross-checking all the office figures (on his fingers), but also adding financial outcomes of all the (invisible) managerial dirty tricks into this. I don't know how this could be done, and I met no salesmen who claimed to be able to do it.

Nevertheless, rather than unqualified acceptance of managerial reconciliation, salesmen define the accounting business as an issue of moral, rather than mathematical control. The auditing process is defined, by the salesmen, as one of a-moral "construction", cunningly contrived about criteria other than truth and accuracy. One exceptionally perceptive salesman suggested that these criteria are primarily presentational, and furthermore, are individually "constructed" to suit particular characters:

"...Look, they can just stick on any charges they like, he (the Manager) can put on an extra charge, or miss a credit.. mostly, you've got credits to come, as 9 times out of ten you never get all the cakes you order...and he knows I'm just slaphappy...I chuck the tickets away each morning, never keep them to check off with the Rec....he's got to rectify his books, he's got to bring them straight, if he's so much down, he's got to get it back... he hits particular rounds each time... what happens is, the girls in the office

might think it's correct, but he will go into the office before they're all (i.e., the Recs.) written out, and change the figures...you don't want an untidy Rec. do you?...that would make anybody suspicious, if it was all crossed out, and stamped all over...if a credit is crossed out, you would ask what it was for...but a nice tidy rec. goes a long way with me...he goes into the inner office and tells the girl that it's not supposed to be in there (i.e., that a credit is not supposed to be entered on the rec.) and she knocks it off...and he'll only do to blokes he knows won't be believed... Take 'P' (the "shark from pages 341-2 supra) he was too much of a liar to know when he was telling the truth, nobody believed him about anything...and the Manager knew that nobody would believe anything he said...and they never fully explain the system to new blokes...they show them the rec., and the bloke doesn't even know what he's looking for...he knows (the Manager) that the blokes are more interested in getting off home, not sitting here for a couple of hours trying to work it out...in all, they make it far too complicated, so that you can't understand it..."

The organisational necessity (so defined by the management) of weekly financial balancing of individual salesmen's accounts creates an official routine of moral "character" construction overlaying standard managerial prototyping. This serves to satisfy the normal organiaational ends of controlling the work force. Recs., considered as weekly moral statements, are added to the 'Big Book' which lists periodic melodramatic definitions, and generates an ongoing mean, moral profile for each "character".

I have discussed normal times, and some difficulties that "characters" generated in such situations might have when, for indirect reasons, the supportive environment temporarily fails to extend its support. I have considered the 'public negotiation' of self in the execution of "part-time" crimes. How do the salesmen manage 'private preservation' of part-time selves in situations designed to make those part-time selves, full-time ones?

Chapter Six

Private Preservation: Getting Caught and Getting Off

MOTIVATIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND SELF-MAINTENANCE

"..Men are reward or punished not for what they do, but rather for how their acts are defined. This is why men are more interested in better justifying themselves than in better behaving themselves.."

(Szasz, 1973, p 29)

"...It cannot be overstated that people respond to our symbolic restructuring of our deeds, much more than to the deeds themselves.."

(Blumstein et al 1974, p 565)

For the good organisational reasons outlined in Chapter Two, Wellbreads bread salesmen fiddle their customers. Unfortunately, the very people who encourage the practice in their employees fail subsequently to protect them. Paradoxically, however, the moral prototyping practiced by the Sales management (dividing the workforce into Villains and Others) provides the salesmen with interactional material from which they may fashion identity constitutive and protective "characters". Characters provide moral guidelines in the selection of a practical portfolio of fiddle-techniques taken from an extensive glossary of "making" styles. Portfolio practice (character-enactment) routinely satisfies practical and psychological 'cover' needs.

Thus, managerial 'casting' procedures (allocating salesmen to particular rounds of customers) provides the salesmen with a "situated", work-self. Salesmen rarely 'live' at work, however, and this part-time self is distinguished and distinguishable from the self that each man considers to be his natural, real and 'complete' one. Consequently, this work-self is specific to sales occasions. Additionally, it is theoretically partial. Publically unrecognised, it has mere auxiliary, elementary status

in the private development of identity.

The partial and part-time self may be taken for granted in routine moments. But the moral trauma of entrapment threatens the psychological and practical stability of such "part-time" criminals. It is commonplace to deal ably with dreary routine. It is definitively crucial to satisfactorily handle the bizarre and exciting. Discreditable identities lie dormant until they are questioned. Conversely, every demand for an account of the role of the self in the construction of events is a manifestation of an underlying negotiation of identity. The acid-test of the sort of partial/part-time fiddler-identity that I have proposed as the existential basis for part-time crime lies in its ability to deal with problematic events (and not just mundane ones) without either disintegration or encapsulation. Without a workable part-time self, fiddling would not be possible. As Nelson Foote (1951, p 18-99) puts it: "When doubt of identity creeps in, action is paralyzed...Doubt of identity, or confusion, where it does not cause complete disorientation, certainly drains action of its meaning."

The Symbolic Construction of Motives

The fiddler faces a procedural dilemma. Successful commerce requires the maintenance of routine, and yet, on the other hand, fiddling is an intrinsically unprotected practice which constantly exposes the practitioner to the possibility of entrapment. Normal prevention of such transactional fracture testifies to the diplomatic skills of the fiddling salesman.

Interest in this chapter is not devoted to somehow attempting to look behind the situational symbolic restructuring of events to elucidate the "real" motives of fiddling. Instead I will try to conceptualise the processes whereby the successful production, avowal, denial, and imputation of various 'motives' in moral

interactions affects the practical careers, and psychological states of deviant practitioners. I would thus dispute the treatment of motives which is informed by recourse to what Burke (1945, p 59) terms the "representative anecdote of the behavioural 'mainspring'". Making the distinction between "his" and "the" reasons (Peters, 1958, p 34) is to, as Blum and McHugh (1971, p 100) put it: "to confuse the state of affairs which motives report with the analytic status of the term." Interest in the social function of motives (and their use in the production and maintenance of "selves") implies a particular theoretical perspective. Here, motive is taken as a linguistic matter, and the defences of partial selves are verbal. As Scott and Lyman (1970, p 3-4) put it:

"..Action consists of the pursuit of ends by social actors capable of deliberating about the line of activity they undertake and of choosing among alternatives to the same end. This does not mean that men always proceed action by deliberation. This is manifestly not the case. What it does mean is that men are capable of giving an account of their actions either as preactivity mental images of the action, its consequences and meanings, or as post hoc retrospective readings of completed acts. As images either before or after completion, these constructions emerge as statements made by the actor which give meaning to his actions. These constructions are not unintelligible to others. Most important, these statements constitute the actual meaning, though not necessarily the cause, of these actions...."

This conception of motives owes much to the pioneering work of C. Wright Mills. Mills (1940, p 905) demarcated the general conditions of motive-imputation and motive-avowal as being circumscribed by what we normally call the "question":

"...It is in this latter assent and dissent phase of conversation that persuasive and disquisive speech and vocabulary arise..It is then that awareness of self and motive occur...The avowal and imputation of motives are features of such conversations as arise in "question" situations.."

Taking 'motives' as part of conversations, Mills (ibid) goes on to suggest that: "Motives are words...They stand for anticipated situational consequences of questioned conduct. Motives are names for consequential situations, and surrogates for actions leading to them." This concept of 'motive' implies use on special occasions. As Peters suggests (1958, p 29): "In the first place, we only ask about a man's motives when we wish, in some way, to hold his conduct up for assessment." Apart from the function of motive in the assessment of moral character, the verbalisations that accompany questioned acts are not so much manipulative, but situated.

Because different situations have differently appropriate 'answers to questions' (vocabularies of motives if we take motive to be the conversational artefact suggested by Mills), then ex post facto motive-avowal is not necessarily strategically ulterior, as the possibility of making such statements is crucial in guiding the energy-release allowing the action in the first place. The profession and confession of motive obviously depends upon the vocabulary available to the actor. Mills 1940, p.911, thus concludes: "...motives may be considered as typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in delimited societal situations...Motives are common grounds for mediated behaviours."(a)

To talk then, of the 'motives' of salesmen is to talk of their replies to those questioning their honesty. It is also to refer to how the possibility of making such replies might sanction the initial decision to fiddle (through 'identification' with socially available reasons that might be acceptably verbalised after the act takes place), and to the processes which might account for the maintenance of a non-deviant self in the face of the commission of deviant actions (the 'neutralisation' of morality).

(a) Mills' paper has been made to do too much. His definitions are sometimes tautologous, his distinction into justifications and verbalisations is simplistic, and his terminology (comprising vocabularies, constellations, terminologies, congeries, and clusters of motive) is diffuse and vague.

Criticisms and Confusions

Nelson Foote first proposed that the concept of identification was needed to fill what he termed (1961, p 14): "an unanalysed hiatus between words and acts, of mystery as to just how language does in fact motivate." This was, he continued, due to identification, which he defined as the appropriation of and commitment to a particular identity or series of identities.

Foote's contribution to the debate was taken up in particular by theorists of alleged "compulsive" crimes. It was thus possible for them to suggest that labels like "compulsive" were applicable on those occasions where "the subject is unable to account for his behaviour in terms that are current, popular or sanctioned in a particular culture" (Taylor, 1972, p 26). The argument runs that through a form of diffuse differential identification, solitary deviants assemble behaviouristic 'rationalisations' before the deviant act, as a means of identifying themselves. Unfortunately, this release of the deviant from the clutches of 'unconscious motivation' inevitably entangles him in accusations of malevolent manipulation in account provision. Providing 'intelligibility' to hitherto senseless deviance requires that rationalisations be accredited with an a priori, and not merely an ex post facto status. The injection of meaning into 'motiveless' crime amounts to the injection of ulterior motives. Intelligibility infers prior consideration of situated acceptability, which is taken to be manipulative by fiat alone.

The concept 'neutralisation', on the other hand, was proposed by Matza and Sykes (1957) as in principle, benevolent. In a later formulation, Matza (1964, p 61) puts this explicitly:

"...Norms may be violated without surrendering allegiance to them...Norms, especially legal norms, may be neutralised. Criminal law is

especially susceptible to neutralisation because the conditions of applicability, and thus inapplicability, are explicitly stated...Because in law the conditions are specified, neutralisation is not only possible, it is invited...There is no point in suggesting that delinquents seize upon the loopholes provided and exploit them. They may try but that is not the idea of neutralisation..."

Whilst some (for example, Hartung, 1965) have tried to cast delinquents into the Machiavellian mould, this merely demonstrates the opposition of the concept with that of identification. As Taylor comments (1972, ff 10) "The delinquent is seen as manipulating definitions to his own advantage. His production of particular motives is this seen as a way out for him - a way in which he can 'dodge' his responsibility. Matza's account does not include this 'exploitative' element." As R. A. Ball (1966) nicely suggests, neutralisation is of the 'oughtness' of norms, which as a sort of vague definition of the situation, acts as a precondition of the drift into infraction. Matza (1964, p 176) succinctly summarises:

"...Drift is made possible by the neutralisation of the criminal law and, subsequently, by the temporary liquidation of the bond between the actor and the legal order. The points at which neutralisation may take place are noteworthy since they indicate, again, the sense in which infraction is an organising principle of crime and delinquency. Neutralisation consists of obliterating the infractious nature of the behaviour. It converts infraction into mere action. This is accomplished by subcultural dissent from the principles that constitute the foundations of the criminal law...."

Whilst the concept of neutralisation is able to account for, for example, displays of guilt and shame in a non-manipulative framework, it does have certain weaknesses. Initially, there is a vagueness about the timing of neutralisation. Matza and Sykes (1957, p 251) suggest:

"..Disapproval flowing from internalised norms and conforming others in the social environment is neutralised, turned back, or deflected in advance. Social controls that serve to check or inhibit deviant motivational patterns are rendered inoperative, and the individual is freed to engage in delinquency without serious damage to his self image...they are (also) viewed as following deviant behaviour and as protecting the individual from self-blame and the blame of others after the act..."

As one can see from this quote, neutralisation is not a rigorously defined concept. It can act before and after the act, upon a broad spectrum of audience (both the self and others), and operates within an extensive arena (it refers to practical and psychological consequences). Pitched at the general level at which Matza was working, this diffuseness is precisely the strength of the concept. Looking at a particular substantive area, however, the concept needs a little paring and sharpening. The general contribution of this chapter will be to suggest how differences in timing, audience and arena might be made.

A quite separate confusion emerges from collective analysis of the various typologies of Matza and Sykes (ibid) call the "unrecognised extensions of defences to crimes". H. L. A. Hart (1952, 1968) provided the initial analytic groundwork and conceptual clarification here by suggesting that some offences were not subject to the strict liability rule,^(a) and were, thus, conceptually 'defeasible'. Hart (1952, p 148, p61-2) says:

"...used of a legal interest in property which is subject to termination or 'defeat' in a number of different contingencies but remains intact if no such contingencies mature...a defeasible concept (is) to be defined through exceptions and not by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions..."

(a) For example, one would not expect to be able to plead drunkenness as an excuse (or 'defeat') for drunken driving. (cf Hart, 1968, p 23).

Accordingly, accusations in English courts may be challenged in two ways. Firstly, by a denial of the facts, and secondly, by (*ibid*, p 147-8): "a plea that although all the circumstances on which a claim could succeed are present, yet in the particular case, the claim or accusation could not succeed because other circumstances are present which bring the case under some recognised head of exception." Hart cites the multiple criteria for excluding or reducing liability in criminal cases as (*ibid*, p 153): "Mistakes of Fact, Accident, Coercion, Duress, Provocation, Insanity, Infancy." The presentational form of a defence cannot be decided a priori of a particular case. The same exception might be a justification, an excuse, or a mitigation upon different occasions. Hart (1968, p 16) comments: "Though the central cases are distinct enough, the borderlines between justification, excuse and mitigation are not."

The 'techniques of neutralisation' suggested by Matza and Sykes (1957) are primarily lay variations of this archaic legal vocabulary. Their five-fold classification of techniques includes: the Denial of Responsibility ("I didn't mean it"); the Denial of Injury ("I didn't really hurt anybody"); the Denial of the Victim ("They had it coming to them"); the Condemnation of the Condemners ("Everyone's picking on me"); and the Appeal to Higher Loyalties ("I didn't do it for myself").

Apart from being somewhat unsatisfactory for the reasons outlined above (vague in terms of timing, audience and arena), the rigor of the typology does not stand up to prolonged analytic scrutiny. It would be difficult to claim that the typology is mutually exclusive, comprehensive or parsimonious (all criteria which Gibbons, 1975, p 143, feels to be indicative of good typologies). For example, the Condemnation of Condemners could be taken to refer to the sort of moralistic condemnation of moralism that Becker (1964, p 5) criticises as "unconventional sentimentality". Additionally, it is not really a sufficient conceptualisation of the more common sentiment: "Everybody else does it", which P. Cressey (1932, p 85) rather nicely calls "the impersonal sanction of numbers", and D. Cressey as the

"comfortable sense of conforming" (1954, p 453). Matza and Sykes refer to the division into five techniques as a matter of "convenience" (1957, p 252), which is sufficient for a sensitising concept, but not for an operative one. More importantly, at an analytic level, it is impossible to separate those techniques and effects which are specific to studies of delinquency, from those general to all cases of neutralisation.

In response to a generalised need to explore the concept of neutralisation, Scott and Lyman suggested that the field could be essentially subsumed beneath the rubric of "accounts". An account is (Scott and Lyman, 1970a, p 93): "a statement made by social actors to relieve themselves of culpability for untoward or unanticipated acts." Accounts (techniques of neutralisation in a different order, and under a different name) fall into two separate types. Firstly, Justifications, or, "accounts in which one accepts responsibility for the act in question but denies the pejorative quality associated with it" (Scott and Lyman, 1968, p 25); and secondly, Excuses, which are "accounts in which one admits that the act in question was bad, wrong or inappropriate, but denies full responsibility" (*ibid*). This distinction is nicely parsimonious, and useful. Scott and Lyman are not, however, prepared to suggest that it is one specifically related to the timing of the neutralisation (cf, Taylor, 1972, p 28). In fact, Emerson, (1969, p 142-3) criticises Scott and Lyman's distinction on the grounds that the logical distinction and pairing of pejorativeness and responsibility is abstract and in reality, each plea includes at least a part of the other. I would add that there are two other logical possibilities: the act defined as good with responsibility for it denied; and the act defined as bad with responsibility for it accepted, (with the latter being recently defined by Hepworth and Taylor, 1974, p 47, as the "confession").

The possible consequences of accounts for action is ignored. Instead, over-concern with the realm of 'talk' trivialises the debate unnecessarily. Scott and Lyman's somewhat eclectic contribution is weak in just those places where it is original. For

example, a 'sad tale' is included as a justification where it is merely a form of biography; and 'self-fulfilment' is similarly offered to the exclusion of other possibilities such as altruism, fatalism, and so on.

The final major contributor is Goffman. Goffman has been concerned with the problem of "remedial work" at three specific stages in his writing career. In 1955, he proposed a formulation of the ritual strategies of corrective face-work. Here, Goffman was concerned with the possibilities of neutralising threats to the self that occurred as disruptions to the ritual/expressive order. This was to be done through the adoption of corrective interchanges to balance line and face discrepancies. In 1961, Goffman re-proposed the subject, this time as disqualifying moves designed to realign information about the self, with self-conceptions. Threat-neutralisation became implication-control, and emphasis upon the ritual structure dissolved into concern with the specification of possible types of "buffering" that could be made in response to a "challenge".

By 1971, problems of self became those of moral responsibility. These problems emerged, and were finally settled through the "ritual idiom of remedial moves", which were interchanges supportive of the moral order. The concern expressed by Goffman in his previous essay (Goffman, 1961a) was extended, and the typology produced there was tentatively extended to a choice between explanation, apology, joking and righteous indignation.

Whilst the form of Goffman's contribution has varied, it essentially remains remarkable close to the original formulation. His concern is with 'rituatistic' and 'restitutive' work related to the moral order, which he describes in terms which would allow it to apply to all levels of the social structure. For Goffman (1971, p 149), "a single ritual idiom of remedial moves must be called on whether a toe has been accidentally stepped on or a destroyer accidentally sunk." The moral order is related to the legal order inasmuch as everyday situations

are (*ibid*, p 137): "settings for racing through versions in miniature of the entire judicial process." Whatever the occasion, remedial work is required to transform the offensive into the acceptable. Goffman tries to overcome the considerable definitional ambiguity involved with the currency of accounts by proposing an extensive scheme, composed of three "devices", accounts, apologies, and requests. Accounts can be one of five relevant "pleas", and can arrive in one of three "terms", explanation, excuse, or pretext. Apologies include the usual Goffman grovel-procedures, and requests are just timed a little better. Surprisingly, Goffman's final typology (1971) has an eclectively inclusive air, and is particularly vague about the actual effects upon the selves of the participants. Rather than synthesise other typologies, Goffman expansively includes them all.

In sum, the procedural centrality, but theoretical inconclusiveness of the concept 'neutralisation' requires that it be rigorously extended to order to fully explicate the exact nature of the defences of the self. That there is no satisfactory typology of defensive possibilities for the self requires immediate attention.

An Alternative: Self-Maintenance Terminologies

The typology, given in Diagram 18 on page 394, is a conceptual construction based upon the principle of paired opposites.^(a) The basis of its utility is that it is logically inductive (and

(a) Here, as elsewhere, there is always MacIntyre's Dilemma (1973, p 2): "...we do not know how to decide whether a given alleged instance of a phenomena is to be treated as a counter-example to a proposed generalisation, or as not an example of the phenomena at all...".

Diagram 18.

Self-Maintenance Terminologies

	DEFENSIVE (Retreating) LINGUALISATIONS	OFFENSIVE (Attacking) LINGUALISATIONS
	<p>Morality-Neutralising</p> <p>Shameful Penitence (Strategic Alliance) -Mood of Fatalism-</p> <p><u>APOLOGETIC JUSTIFICATION</u> (Disputing Responsibility Allegations)</p> <p>RESTITUTIVE Self-Inclusion Pleas (Deviance)</p>	<p>Morality-Rejecting</p> <p>Righteous Indignation (Principled Opposition) -Sense of Injustice-</p> <p><u>RADICAL JUSTIFICATION</u> (Disputing Pejorativeness Imputations)</p> <p>RETALIATORY Self-Exclusion Pleas (Politics)</p>
1 DENIAL	(a) "Flat" Denial of Total Responsibility	(b) "King Edward" Denial of Total Pejorativeness
2 QUALIFIED ADMISSION	<p>(a) "Defeats" of Allegation (Denial of Responsibility)</p> <p>(1) <u>Circumstantial Excuse</u> (Projection) Act-Adjustment to Defeat Fault: Non- conventional Situation Claim</p> <p>(2) <u>Psychological Excuse</u> (Introjection) Actor- Adjustment to defeat imputability: Non-theoretic actor claim/fiat.</p>	<p>(b) "Ignore Accusation (Counter-Denunciation) (Condemnation of Condemners) (Denial of Victim) (Denial of Injury-Persons)</p> <p>PRINCIPLED JUSTIFICATION Universal Counterstatement</p>
3 MITIGATED ADMISSION	<p>(a) "Reductions" of Logical Punishment. (Denial of Injury-Objects)</p>	<p>(b) "Balance" Accusation. SITUATIONAL JUSTIFICATION Particularistic Defence (Appeal to Higher Loyalties)</p>
4 FULL ADMISSION	(a) Active: with Full Explanation (Submit to mercy of judge)	(b) Passive: Non-Participation (Refusal to acknowledge judgement)

thus exhaustive in a preliminary fashion), but that the nature, extent, and effect of the logical possibilities is an empirical question. Diagram 19 (below) will describe the empirical situation for salesmen at Wellbreads.

The crucial element of the defensive, apologetic form of the terminology (the left hand side of Diagram 18) is its mode of expression.^(a) Goffman (1971, p 144-145) characterises the apology as follows:

"...expression of embarrassment and chagrin; clarification that one knows what conduct and been expected and sympathises with the application of negative sanction; verbal rejection, repudiation, and disavowal of the wrong way of behaving along with vilification of the self that so behaved; espousal of the right way and an avowal henceforth to pursue that course; performance of penance and the volunteering of restitution...apologies represent a splitting of the self into a blameworthy part and a part that stands back and sympathises with the blame-giving..."

But whilst there is full admission of the pejorativeness of the act in question, there is disputed agreement over full responsibility for its commission. The "Flat" denial of responsibility (1a on Diagram 18) which is technically a 'traverse', or 'joinder of issue', requires substantiation of the claim that the act wasn't done, or that the accused didn't do it. Goffman (1974, p 330) has recently referred to this sort of denial as an "innocence claim" which can, similarly, be grounded in either incorrectness or inadvertance.

Qualified "Defeats" of the allegation (2a on Diagram 18) require the demonstration that circumstances, or states of mind are sufficient to reduce the charge itself. If the accused can

(a) I am concerned with the mode, and not the form of expression. Robin (1967, p 687) suggests, for example, that typical forms of expression just of the denial are: anger, shock, indignation, and silence.

demonstrate that he was what McHugh (1971) calls being in a "non-theoretic" state, or a "non-conventional" situation, then, although self-abasement is still partially necessary, the allegation needs restructuring. In legal terms, the responsibility has been excluded because, as Hart (1968, p 14) puts it:

"...What has been done is something which is deplored, but the psychological state of the agent when he did it exemplified one or more of a variety of conditions which are held to rule out the public condemnation and punishment of individuals..."

Some occasions can be so defended that although the act is still deplored, and the actor held responsible for it, there still remain grounds for total offence "Reduction", (3a in Diagram 18).^(a) The vocabulary of responsibility is extensive and often contradictory in application. From a vast range of types (Hart, 1968, traces at least thirteen current meanings), we are concerned here with denials/admissions of liability, and the varieties of attempts to re-define and qualify such self-liabilities. "Reductions" can also include those occasions when the actor personalises his 'account', and through selective re-counting of past events, and their amalgamation in a nicely reconstituted biography, tries to consolidate liability claims made in the present. Primarily, this amounts to morally re-crediting work which helps to balance the disclosive (discrediting) work of others. A 'biography' is an abstract selection of facts from a person's "diary" (Cavan, 1966, p 86). Blum and McHugh (1971, p 105) define it as a set of owned experiences with which to engage the world, a "view of himself that he can usefully expound in current situations," (Goffman, 1961, p 139). Defensive biographies tend to view the actor as an object, and thus a matter for excusing. The prime example, the 'Sad Tale' is again provided by Goffman (1961, p 140) who tells us that: "if the facts of a person's past and present are extremely dismal, then

(a) Hart (1968, p 13) quotes an amazing example: "In 1811 Mr. Purcell of County Cork, a septuagenarian, was knighted for killing four burglars with a carving knife."

about the best he can do is show that he is not responsible for what has become of him." The Sad Tale is often instrumental, and outside of the institutional context (where Goffman locates it) generally fictional.^(a) P. Cressey says of the taxi-dancer (1932, p 54):

"...When apprehended, a girl of this sort (taxi-dancer) may present a fascinating and entertaining story of being an 'orphan' who has had to 'shift for herself' since the age of three', or even of a 'world-search for her mother' in which she is engaged. But in more than a majority of the cases it is safe to say that the parental families are somewhere in Chacago..."

Other defensive biographies are the 'Apologia' (of which Goffman, 1959a, p 140, says: "the person's line concerning self defensively brings him into appropriate alignment with the basic values of his society"); together with 'Atrocity Takes' and 'Trickster Stories' (Goffman, 1963, p 33, 37) wherein current personal situation is explained by extreme mistreatment or sheer deceit by others in the past.

Defensive biographies are primarily self-respecting, reciprocally sustained fictions, aimed at successful management of current experience in peer-group interaction. Their substance lies somewhere between reality and fiction, as Goffman (1959a, p 141) puts it: "they serve as one another's audience for self-supporting tales - tales that are somewhat more solid than pure fantasy and somewhat thinner than the facts." Defensive biographies are essentially relevant to analyses of grossly processed deviants, who must make a personal contribution to the "circle of lament" (Goffman, 1963, p 32) if they are to withdraw any moral support. Discussion of them is included here as a logical exploration of

(a) Prostitutes in Boles and Garbin (1974) offer customers a "Perils of Pauline" story, in reply to the usual question, in order that they be seen as exploited by heartless circumstance rather than as cynically responsible for their occupation. "Stanley" (Shaw's 1930 Jackroller) persistently frames his biography in a similar way. Shaw (ibid, p 47, ff 2) comments: "In this paragraph and throughout the entire document, he makes a rather definite attempt to place the responsibility for his misconduct upon fate, circumstances, and other persons."

the typology, rather than as a theoretical prologue to the empirical data to be introduced in subsequent sections about Wellbreads.^(a)

The offensive, attacking, radical form of the terminology, on the other hand, is principally organised from the oppositional subculture (Matza, 1964, p 41), and characterised by righteous indignation.^(b) A display of righteousness has a similar format to the apology. But here (the right hand side of Diagram 18 on page 394), it is the accuser, rather than a split-off part of the self who is abased. In these terms, the "King Edward" denial (1b in Diagram 18) actually denies the act in question, but asserts that it's commission would be a good thing.^(c) Because of the nature of the relationship between justifier and accuser, "Ignoring" (2b in Diagram 18) and "Balancing" (3b in the Diagram) an accusation with lateral pleas, are unlikely to be successful, aside from perhaps moderating stringent punishment. "Passive" non-participation in the proceedings (4b in Diagram 18) is taken as tacit admission of guilt but total rejection of the legitimacy of the accuser. If the guilty is representative of an unthreatening alliance then his lack of cooperation will not affect the verdict. In terms of the latter, George Ince, for

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- (a) The "Active" full admission (submitting to the mercy of the accuser (4a in Diagram 18), being simple to understand, needs no lengthy exposition here. The "active" admission is not a technique upon which analysis of the Wellbreads salesmen will dwell.
- (b) Humphreys (1972, p 135-156) offers a nice, but ethnographically restricted typology of ways of stigma-management (a refinement of Goffman, 1963) which captures the apologetic/radical difference well: stigma-evasion (shame, repair, passing, covering, group alignment) and stigma-confrontation (conversion, redemption). See also Rogers and Buffals (1974a)'s nine-fold typology.
- (c) The name derives from an apocryphal story about a potato-seller challenged with selling falsely-described goods. He replied: 'Of course they're King Edwards. And anyway, what do you expect for twopence a pound?' All, naturally, in a righteously indignant tone of voice. The absurd over-covering of the self in such statements is in fact quite common especially amongst "folk" criminals, a term developed by Ross (1960-61). Cahn (1955, p 196-197) notes, for example, that the "balm and unguents for abrasions of the tax-payers conscience" are often so extensive that they contradict one another.

example, (wrongly accused of the 1972 "Barn Murders") repeatedly turned his back on the Judge at his first trial, and refused to have any more to do with the proceedings. It is generally true that anything is better than silence. Spike Milligan, with an admittedly somewhat absurd grasp of this, when accused of illegally crossing a white line in his car, claimed that whilst his car was stationary, a policeman jumped out of the hedge, and painted a white line on the road behind his car. It was not a notably successful defence, although a nice justification for Judge Biddle's famous words (in Vance and Wynne, 1934, p 485) "The unwritten law isn't worth the paper it isn't written on"! Lack of preparation of an account (particularly problematic for the innocent) leaves the defendant, like many American policemen with suddenly discovered large bank balances (one claimed in Wittels, 1949, p 122, that he had made \$40,000 by breeding canaries) "flatfooted".^(a)

Offensive styles (as do defensive styles) have re-counting resources as well as a-counting ones. Appropriate biographies here are justifying rather than apologising ones. The actor begins to feature as hero rather than as victim. Goffman (1959a, p 140) suggests in particular, the 'Success Story' where, if:

"...the person can manage to present a view of his current situation which shows the operation of favourable personal qualities in the past, and a favourable destiny awaiting him, it may be called a success story..."

(a) As Matza (1964, p 41) astutely notices, members of accomodating subcultures may use radical justifications absurdly inappropriately in quite inconsequential situations. "Thus, the indignation of the delinquent differs from that of, say, a nationalist rebel. The delinquent's is a wrongful indignation."

Diagram 19. Empirical Use of Self-Maintenance Terminology
by Wellbread Salesmen

<u>ALIBIS (Public)</u> Vocabularies For Practical Consequences	<u>ALIASES (Private)</u> Vocabularies of Psychological Contemplation
<p>BEFORE Strategic deflection cunning procedural presentational psychological</p>	<p>BEFORE Adjustment rhetoric INNOCULATION</p>
<p>AFTER</p> <p>(1) <u>Successful COVERY: Getting caught.</u></p> <p><u>Challenges</u> Pretense - vague accusation cautionary tale warning story Suspicion -hidden accusation -hasty accusation</p> <p><u>Responses</u> Offensive - righteous denial 1b/2b - strategic counter- denunciations - avoidance Defensive -(corroctive) - talk (circumstantial defeat) 2a - ill/new (psychological defeat)</p> <p>(11) <u>Unsuccessful DIS-COVERY: Getting caught out</u></p> <p><u>Challenges</u> Longitudinal check/latitudinal check</p> <p><u>Responses</u> 4b Offensive - too inflammatory 4a Defensive - denials implausible - full admission (mitigated by restitution)</p>	<p>(1) <u>Restrictions</u> - Practical limits - scruples/formulae</p> <p>(11) <u>Defense: Apologetic justification</u> <u>Actor Adjustment</u> - (I'm insignificant) Qualified admission (defeats) Denial responsibility Negation responsibility "Couldn't help it" 2a "Told to do it" "Would be done anyway"</p> <p><u>Act Adjustment</u> - (It's insignificant) Mitigated admission (Reductions) Denial injury (objects) Assertion of tort 3a "Not really crime"</p> <p>AFTER Reconciliation rhetoric INSULATION</p> <p>(1) <u>Camouflages</u> - similarity of skills - invisibility of offense</p> <p>(11) <u>Offense: Radical justification</u> <u>Counter-Denunciation</u> Qualified admission (ignore) Condemnation of Condemners Denial of injury (persons) Denial of victims Sense of injustice Assertion of tort 2b "We all do it" "They do it" "They do it to us" "They deserve to lose it" "They can afford it" "They invite it" "They want it"</p> <p><u>Appeal to Higher Loyalties</u> Mitigated Admission (Balance) Primacy of custom 3b "We deserve it" "We need it"</p>

ALIBIS: PUBLIC COVERS-FOR-OTHERS: NEUTRALISATION OF OTHER-
APPREHENSION (BLAME)

The Preconditions of Standard Interactions.

Members of the working-class (as opposed to members of the middle-class) have occupationally implanted a priori dis-trust as a condition of employemnt.^(a) This dis-trust is particularly apparent in salesmen's dealings with those customers who, Bigus (1972, p 147) notes: "...kept day to day itemised accounts of the products they purchased, along with the prices at which they had been advertised. When they received their bill they compared it against this itemised list to check for discrepancies." Goffman (1961d, p 291) adds that trust is only contractually essential on those occasions where the work setting of the servant is removed from the sight of the customer. The Wellbread salesmen, however, are laden with direct restitutive, rather than ritualistic sacred accountability as they are required to handle money as part of their job. Paradoxically, however, as I tried to show in Chapter Three, trust gradually emerges as a feature of salesmen's relationships with their regular customers for reasons that the men consider to be merely governed by the casual development of a relationship, and the arbitrary passage of time.^(b)

(a) This successfully distinguishes 'fiddlers' from 'embezzlers' in a technical sense not dependant upon watery class difference (see, Mannheim, 1965, p 474-475) when both have accepted the initial position in good faith.

(b) There is, typically, puzzlement about this amongst the salesmen. Similarly, Howton and Rosenberg (1965, p 286) comment that the salesmen they interviewed feel that: "'genuinness' is an acquirable trait", and that a good salesman can generate an authentic expression of real motives and sentiments.

Two men suggested:

"...You can't get away with everything... when you first start off, they're all a bit wary of you...but after a bit they trust you; and you can start fiddling them more and more..."

"..they're the easiest to do (i.e., regular customers) once they know you..but if new people, or supervisors, or anything (go on)...they'll check it down to the last loaf..."

The more sophisticated amongst the salesmen attempt to deliberately create trust (see, for example, the tactics of the "professional", described on pages 352 and 353 of Chapter Five, supra), but attempts to do this would look quite out of character (and thus suspicious) in some of the salesmen. One man commented on the awkward repercussions that he had experienced:

"...He's the one who poisons the place (the Despatch manager)..I wouldn't bother to give him bread that I've been over-issued any more...I've heard what he's said about people, blokes who've given him a couple of trays back..he says: 'What about the other tray then?'...so, I'll give him some back (in the future), but not all of it, and never when I can get rid of it somewhere else..."

Looking at this in game terms, a precondition of fiddling is that the salesman be a routinely successful practitioner of an obscure version of the sort of game which Scott and Lyman (1970) refer to as an 'information game'. In game play, the salesman's virtual identity as a salesman aids the covering of his actual identity as fiddler. In game terms, this crucially distinguishes the salesman from the customer. As Scott and Lyman (ibid, p 58) put it:

"..Information games arise whenever one actor wishes to uncover information from another who wishes to conceal it...All men are placed in positions of information control and concealment when they present themselves on any social scene, for by its very nature

any social scene is habitable only by a few of the identities which make up the total personality. The unwelcome identities will have to be inhibited or hidden..."

In game terms, the checking process of the customer might be seen as a 'control move' (information seeking), and the routine ways that the salesman prevents discreditable information leaking out during checking, as a 'covering move'. 'Moves', as such, are not necessarily perceptively and sequentially organised in that way. In fact, neither participant need be aware of the game-like structure of the proceedings at all (Scott, 1968, p 158). Nevertheless, the salesman's awareness of his fiddling-identity transforms him (in game terms) into a carcer-deceiver, as Scott and Lyman (1970, p 58-9) put it, rather than a situational-falsifier:

"...some persons and categories of persons must play information games almost all the time, or as part of their occupations.. (such as) all those charged with keeping institutional secrets. Presumably those who are regular players in information games are more adept at it or conscious of the exigencies than occasional players or amateurs..."

Suffice it to say here (refer to Chapter Three for a more detailed exposition), that most salesmen play this information game up to three hundred times a day with customers who only play once or twice a day. In fact, by virtue of the very fact of being a salesman, the men routinely present an honest, clean, tidy, cheerful front as a gloss designed to sweeten the essentially exploitative nature of selling. Inevitably and quite unwittingly, this aids the accomplishment of fiddling. Selling could not proceed on a dis-trustful basis: the salesmen must offer, and the customer accept, a self-definition as trusted (i.e. commercially qualified) member.

In terms of identity, the fiddler has to "pass" (cf. Goffman, 1963, p 93) in front of customers, although he can drop

this strategic-self for short periods in dealings with his peers back at the deoot. Successful sealing off of unmanageable biographic facts prodeces a 'closed awareness context' (Glaser and Struass, 1964, p 10), wherein: "one interactant does not know either the other's identity or the other's view of his identity." This context is basically unstable because successful uncovering moves by customers are always theroetically possible, however empirically unlikely.

An important symbolic precondition of fiddling is typification of members of the salesman's world as 'customer'. The particular identity, and through it, special self, that the salesmen presents will vary in terms of the way that he defines his audience. In fact, as Goffman (1963, p 102) reports:

"...due to social identity, the individual with a secret differentness will find himself during the daily and weekly round in three possible kinds of places where persons of the kind he can be shown to be are forbidden...civil places..(and) back places..."

Although a particular constellation of selves and accounts is appropriate to that part of the salesman's world called 'customer', this universe is further broken up into customers who are disqualified from being fiddled (generally disabled, or excellent game-players, for example, blind persioners or hefty ex-salesmen - both of whom would provide problems as victims, one psychologically, and the other practically), and the rest, who qualify as 'fair game'. This is important. Not all customers are fiddled, merely those who can be fiddled without infringing the psychological or practical status of the part-time self. By being selective, by giving the world a chance to defend itself in this way, allows the salesman to redefine fiddling from the unremittingly exploitative, to the fair-game contest. The particular election of which actual customer to which of these game categories is specified in the moral rules that differentiate the various occupational "characters" which I detailed in Chapter Five.

Similarly, American cab-drivers are reticent about adding 'extras' onto the fare unless the customer is locatable as a 'live one'. Davis (1959, p 269) reports:

"...many drivers feel less inhibited about padding charges and finagling extras from Live Ones (out of town revellers in search of licentious forms of entertainment) than they do from other fares. Often extravagant in their tips because of high spirits and drink, Live Ones are also frequently careless and forget to tip altogether. Knowing that Live Ones are out to "blow their money" anyway, many drivers believe that they are justified in seeing to it that they are not deprived of a small portion..."

Rock (1973, p 78) summarises the situation succinctly. "The deviant thus lives in a world which is populated by the knowing, the unknowing and the too-knowing". The fiddler lives in a world where customers may know nothing, too much, or just possess that little knowledge that qualifies them (in the game sense) for play. As I have shown in Chapter Three, customers are unlikely to know what typificatory "keys" (to use Hewitt and Stokes, 1975, p 3, term), salesmen use to allocate them differentially to these categories. In fact, customers are usually wholly oblivious to the fact of this "sizing-up" process (Henslin, 1968, p 142) unless they 'know' enough to be, for all practical part-time purposes, excluded from it.

Having elaborated these interactional preconditions, I shall, in the next two sections of this chapter, examine the 'motives' of the Wellbread salesmen as a particular empirical instance best described in terms of the logical structure set out earlier, and summarised in Diagram 18 on page 394. This empirical contribution is precised in Diagram 19 on page 399. I shall look first at some practical problems (the left hand side of that Diagram), and then at some derived psychological ones (the right hand side of Diagram 19).

Vocabularies for Practical Consequences

The major immediate concern of the fiddler is the practical consequences of his public sales dealings. The warrant for practical self-maintenance is a conception of self as being bounded by the physical body in which it is housed. In other words, the conception of self-as-body. Contrived practical protection from actual apprehension by others resides in the deflection of, and protection from blame. The necessity for practical 'cover' is dictated by the commercial requisite of routine task-fulfilment. Bread has to be sold. The fiddler has thus to prevent his deviant identity from becoming public. The partial self requires an "alibi", or, a "presented piece of biography that ordinarily would not have become part of one's biography at all" (Goffman, 1963, p 89).^(a) Having tortuously constructed a part-time identity in socialisation, the salesman must subsequently deal with what Matza (1969, p 151) calls the problem of "transparency". Matza says:

"...To work at being opaque is in its very nature conducive to being sensitive to the possibility of being transparent ...Before gaining the confidence of persistent self-possession, the fear that we can be seen through is nagging..."

For sophisticated fiddlers, provision of public cover can partially be an anterior matter of strategic blame-deflection. Experienced men are well aware of the crude accusations of dishonesty that their customers will possibly come up with, and plan accordingly. Goffman (1974, p 464) refers to this as building cover backwards in time. One "rogue" was adept at this:

"...I always add a bit onto the monthly accounts, they never know, but you have to be careful that they're not checking...so

(a) See also Goffman, 1966, p 20, where the "spotty alibi", and the "reserve story" are discussed.

what I do is tell the period that it's for...the best thing is to alter the length of the month...know what I mean? say they really owe £5.63...then say to them: 'That'll be £6.44 please', and if they're checking on you, if they've kept a note of what they've had, just say something like: 'Well, it's not an exact month, see, it's five weeks!' ...or, tell them that it's not right up to date, and then carry an extra bit over to next time...then you've covered, see?...you've got to cover you'relf.."(a)

To prevent the initial formulation of suspicion is, after all, better and more conducive to good customer relations than to allow sour feelings to curdle into accusation. Another salesman thought this was a procedural question, whereas a more cynical colleague considered it to be a matter of personal presentation:

"...Just be careful to charge what's on the packet...otherwise they could get inside and ring up the Weights and Measures and have you for the Trades Descriptions Act...short-change them, yeah,...I often do that, but don't overcharge them.."

"...What?...Smile?...Smile?...if you smile round here, they think you've made money of something...smile and they'll search your van!..."

The most artful salesmen apply what Davis (1959, p 270) calls the "psychological" approach.^(b) One astute salesman said:

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- (a) Of course, provision of a "reserve story", or cover which unfolds in time (Goffman, 1974) may backfire if apprehension goes back further and exposes the reserve story as evidence of premeditation. This occurred in CASE 11 (13.5.73) where an Army stores sergeant who had furnished his home with army property produced a "temporary loan voucher" which was subsequently proven to be a forgery.
- (b) "Disclaimers" (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975) are not available to the fiddler. Whilst his appearance is designed to create trust, there are no verbal recipes available for extinguishing customer-doubt. In fact, any attempt (for example: "I know you think I'm going to fiddle you, but...") is doomed to create or increase suspicion. "Disclaimers" only refer to the public-verbal sphere of communication, and are thus not applicable at the private level.

"...What I always do is talk about what they want to take about when we're checking the stuff in, there's one girl who's mad of speedway, so I go on about speedway all the time...there's another one who's sex mad...so I go on about all the bits of stuff that I've seen bending down as I drive around the town...and the bloke at Robinsons, he's always moaning at something...I'm diddling him left right and center, but I'm moaning all the time, and he loves it...when I go, and I've done him for about £15..he shouts: 'Cheerio, Boy', and gives me the thumbs-up sign..."

Sheer practice breeds the development of the capacity to respond to alarming signs effectively with the least disturbance to routine. As Goffman (1971, p 287-8) comments:

"...This can involve more than a capacity to handle emergencies with composure and skill. Also involved: the quick discounting of false alarms; the capacity to deal effectively with events after having allowed them to develop a little further than others safely can; a nose for minute cues that others miss; leading to an earlier than usual awareness of something being up, thus leaving a longer than usual time to cope with it before it is too late.."

However, what is crucial about public covers is whether or not they are successful, rather than their particular timing. I will first discuss successful (covered) alibis, and then unsuccessful (dis-covered) ones.

(i) Posterior Getting Caught: Ordinary Identity Negotiation:
"Close Ones", Account-Success and COVERY

"...In many cases...it can be expected that the termination of the dialogue will mark a state of moral pacification of the parties involved, allowing the troublesome matter at hand to be dropped and

other business to be attended to. Or if misgivings remain, at least some sort of show can be sustained that matters have been put right..."

(Goffman, 1971, p 151)

Sometimes, customers seem to think that it is sound commercial logic to warn their visiting bread salesmen about their dishonesty, but sheer moral extravagance to push things any further. Questions about the actor's intentions are irrelevant to the smooth running of commercial social control, and superseded by concentration upon ensuring future restitution. It is sometimes even conceived to be a matter of little concern that the loss suffered by the customer is a result of deliberate swindling or unintentional mistake. In fact, since future prevention is the crucial issue, belief in accident-proneness is more likely to lead to increased checking procedures in the future, than an established case of fiddling. A rather nice commercial irony, but more than that, a foreshadowing of the nature of commercial social control which I shall discuss in Chapter Seven.

Customers are usually prepared to allow their suspicions of malpractice to be refuted on most occasions, specifically to allow the commercial routine to continue. Rarely, however, will they pass up the chance to comment on the situation, being unwilling to sacrifice the chance of offering moral superiority displays and lectures upon proper commercial practice.

To endure restitution and continuance, "getting caught" (in effect, always getting off), has a symbolic ritual quality. Offended and offender jointly participate in what Sudnow (1964, p 263) calls 'recipe reductions'. These amount to victim-participation in negotiated partial denials of the 'crime' in question. To ensure that this occurs satisfactorily, the "agenda" (Scheff, 1968, p 13) is precipitously revealed to the villain. Scheff (*ibid*) defines: "the situation as one of striking a bargain, rather than as a relentless pursuit of the absolute facts of the matter."

In game terms, the verbal contributions of the salesmen

successfully transforms a pretence awareness context ("both interactants are fully aware but pretend not to be, Glaser and Strauss, 1964, p 10), or a suspicion awareness context ("one participant suspects the true identity of the other or the other's view of his own identity, or both", ibid) into an effectively closed context. The game element might be simultaneously seen as cleverly managed re-covering moves in an Information Game (with opaqueness being restored to the interaction), and as a routinely successful corrective 'face game'. Goffman (1955, p 9) defines face-work as "the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face". Face is (ibid): "the positive value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact." The ritual order is re-established by neutralising such threats through participation in a series of ritual moves. Scott and Lyman (1970a) have extended Goffman's (1955) analysis, and suggest the following typical moves. Firstly, Initiation ("an occurrence that openly damages the identity of one of the persons", ibid), secondly, the Challenge, "which calls attention to the offensive deed, designates the person responsible, and calls for an admission of responsibility or a statement or deed of exculpation." Finally, there is the Response, which is a statement typically selected from either the offensive or the defensive range of the self-maintenance terminology outlined in Diagram 18.

Although the nature of the Initiation move varies situationally, initiation indicates a breakdown in practical cover arrangements, and not a change in the techniques of fiddling. For some unspecified reason, the performance begins to thin, and the customer begins to perceive discrepancies between the impressions that the salesman 'gives' and those he 'gives-off', (Goffman, 1959, p 14). As Matza puts it, (Matza, 1969, p 152) this opens: "the intricate and sensitive network of gestural clues, shifting eyes, tell-tale expression, nervous avoidance, assiduous interest, informational slips, and everything else that composes the sensibility of suspicion."

There are two basic modes of presenting warnings to salesmen. By pretence, and by suspicion. Both serve to "anesthetize" deviance, that McHugh (1970, p 169) claims is to act: "as if his knowledge were only by familiarity. It is a device made available by the theoretic organisation of the materials of deviance themselves. He can act dumb."

Sufficient pretence is contained within the Vague Accusation, whereby face-encounters are initiated by notifying acknowledgement of a morally disturbing event as justification for attack, but withdrawal just prior to the challenge proper. The studied non-observance of ritual fracture is blatantly obvious. The first type of vague Accusation is what Goffman (1963, p 104) calls the 'cautionary tale'. He continues:

"...This consideration will partly overlap with folk wisdom; cautionary tales concerning the contingencies of passing form part of the morality which we employ to keep people in their places..."

The 'cautionary tale' is a specific form of exemplary moral tale (which are "provided by biographical and autobiographical form illustrating a desirable code of conduct for the stigmatised", ibid, p 37) which the teller imagines will prevent the miscreant from so-behaving in the future. Regrettably, salesmen accept the tale as personal verification that the customer telling the tale has been (and thus may be in the future) successfully fiddled. I once had a conversation with a customer who not only 'cautioned' me, but also managed to tell me that she would not, after all, be able to catch me if the caution failed. She said:

"...My bills seem to be getting bigger nowadays...about £12, instead of what they used to be..about £9 or £10, you're not adding a bit on, are you?...I don't know I never check it...I hope you're doing it properly, I don't know what all the prices are nowadays..."

One of the salesmen explained how pointless it was for customers to indulge in this sort of purging of their worries:

"...Take the manager of Johnsons, the first time he came, he said: 'You've got to watch all bakers, and cake deliverers, because they're the biggest twisting bleeders under the sun!'...which is stupid really because he's the greenest of any of them...they're always the easiest, the ones who say that sort of thing...they're saps, because they can't be bothered to check you...they think that's enough, just to warn you..."

Another form of the Vague Accusation is the 'warning story'. Here, the customer similarly indicates that she is not going to pursue the matter to the courts, but whilst she indicates that she is aware of quite what has happened, she is prepared to act as if a mistake has occurred. Goffman (1959, p 227) refers to this tactic as an audience 'hint': "it is through hints that the audience can warn the performer that his show is unacceptable, and that he had better modify it quickly if the situation is to be saved." Cameron (1964, p 16-7) provides some good examples of the same tactic, but in a context, from shop-owner to customer, wherein it is generally successful:

"...Independent merchants empirically develop their own methods of dealing with shoplifters. One grocer said that when he sees an adult lifting something, he adds \$5 to the bill. When the Thief asks: 'What is this?', the grocer answers significantly, 'You know'... most independent merchants seem to believe that after having once tactfully let a thief know that he has been 'spotted', he will never return to the store..."(a)

Notification of suspicion is the second general way of getting a particular point across to the roundsman without invol-

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- (a) The Warning Story is classically used by those with identity and role-strain problems. Peer group members additionally saddled with controlling duties resort to such lines as a means of satisfying such difficulties. For example, the Night Manager at Wellbreads told me: "He's one bloke that I trust..you know why? I caught him nicking something before, that's why! He won't do it again when I'm around, he knows I'm watching him...(later) I know he won't take anything, he knows I saw him go in there (cake store) that's why, and I caught him at it before..".

ving oneself in irksome moral combat. The inevitable 'scene' (Goffman, 1959, p 205) which would follow the alternative 'outright accusation' would be difficult to justify commercially. The challenge may be, firstly, the Hidden Accusation. Here, apprehensiveness replaces apprehension in a very subtle way. Moral opprobrium can be satisfactorily conveyed, and yet the inferred guilt is unchallengeable without publically acknowledging the accusation. To do the latter is to admit the guilt on the basis that only the guilty would be sufficiently sensitive to notice the accusation. Cameron (1964, p 16) suggests that in some cases:

"...the store manager never arrests a shoplifter, sales clerks are (instead) instructed to "breath down the neck" of anyone suspected of stealing. A suspected thief is watched so carefully - even obviously - that he goes away..."

One of the Wellbreads salesmen commented of one of his calls: "Well, there's one of my shops, he's never actually accused me of fiddling him...but he makes sure that he checks it when I'm looking." The same man said of the bakery despatch manager:

"...whenever I come in in the morning, my rack is stood by itself...when I go to check it off, he says to me: 'No need to check that, I've already done it'...well, as it happened, on one of the trays, two large browns were spaced out funny, and sure enough, I was a couple short, when I told him, d'you know what he said?...'Fucking marvellous, as soon as you come back from holiday, bread goes missing'..."

An interpretative error by customers (rather than a moral decision) produces the final type of warning presentation mode: the Hasty Accusation. In this case, customers actually bent upon entrapment have not waited for the accumulation of sufficient proof. A customer once said to me: "You're not cheating me like the other one did, are you?" thus allowing me both an easy denial and an insight into the customer's ignorance. A more experienced salesman recounted the following case:

"...I've been caught, yea,...but the manager couldn't prove anything..mind you, he checked the bread for months after that see...I had the warehouseman's slip signed so he couldn't prove a thing...silly fucker! the warehouseman signs it each morning, but he never checks it...he just counts the trays (thus leaving open the fiddle-possibility of reducing the number of loaves on each tray)...I ask you! what fucking use is that?....count the trays! I don't know!.."

Responses to such challenges (following the logical stages of the game metaphor) are rarely offensive as this might precipitate a moral reaction from a customer hitherto prepared to forget the issue altogether. Sometimes, the morally offended can be persuaded to reconsider the accusation, and tactical righteous indignation is deployed when suspicion needs cooling. If stealing has become an issue at the depot, then (since future practical and social relations depend upon it) efforts will be made to get the accuser to retract the accusation. For example, although the Despatch manager privately told me that: "You've got to have 100 percent proof, it's a man's character you're talking about, you've got to be sure", one of his salesmen commented, of a separate occasion when this nice rule had apparently been waived:

"..He'd better stop making accusations like that, or I'll get a solicitor's letter...like I had to when he started saying things like that before..."

Away from the bakery, righteous offensive denials are only used on those occasions when it is considered that the only way to stop accusations interfering with everyday business is to threaten counter-suit, or to bluntly stress the unfactual nature of the accusation. The latter is a possible level for the argument as the accusation may disrupt the dramatic, but not the real reality. Two salesmen reported such outcomes:

"...He (shopkeeper) said that he'd report me, so I just said: 'Oh well, please your fucking self'...and drove off. I was fed up with him saying things...."

"...(after argument with customer about the bill) so I said: 'are you accusing me of fiddling, then?' and he said: 'Yes' ...what the hell could I do?...I just left...he said he was going to ring the bakery, but he never did..."

The most useful offensive tack is to "ignore" the accusation, and, in effect, deny the injury. Typically, this takes the form of a strategic 'fight-back'. One salesman claimed:

"...(after relief had been on) the manager said: 'well, he never put 60 in there, you can't get 60 on that shelf'...well, I could drop Alf (the relief) in the cart, so I said to the manager of the shop: 'Clear that shelf and I'll show you how to get 60 on there'...I managed to get 60 on, but he still didn't believe me, he said: 'It wasn't as full as that'...I told Alf so that when he goes again, he can put 60 on...if he can't, then we'll have to make another excuse, he'll have to say: 'I'm sorry, I read the wrong note, it was 50 not 60'..."

More regularly, however, on such occasions, the offender agrees with his moral label in the encounter, and instead attempts a form of face-work. Rare, but just possible, is avoidance face-work, wherein contact with the person threatening one's face is reduced. For example, one man claimed:

"...whenever he (fiddled Army sargeant) sent for me, I used to start to sweat around the collar, one of the corporals used to say to me: 'Hang on a mnute, the Sarg. wants a word with you'...I used to sweat, and say: 'Some other time, I'm in a hurry this morning'..."

But in these situations, although anger may cool, the situation has to be faced eventually, when corrective face-work will be needed. Defensive work here centers upon "defeats". The flat denial is morally careless and might anger the offended, and admission is wholly unnecessary. The nature of the defeat is conceived by salesmen to be just 'talk'. This conception is shared by Scott and Lyman (1969, p 24) who state:

"...Our concern here is with one feature of talk: its ability to shore up the fractured timbers of sociation, its ability to throw bridges between the promised and the performed, its ability to repair the broken and restore the estranged..."

As Goffman (1971, p 283) suggests, talk serves to stitch up the tears in the moral order sheerly by its structural composition. Talk prevents the free-running of alarm, and stalls the mobilisation of customer anxiety. Goffman continues:

"...For the individual (customer), then normal appearances mean that it is safe and sound to continue on with the activity at hand with only peripheral attention given to checking on the stability of the environment...business is handled as a side-involvement..."

It becomes clear to the cynical roundsman that the actual content of 'talk' isn't too important. With alarmed customers I was told by other roundsmen to "pretend to look surprised", or, "have a ready-made excuse". To confront accusations of fiddling, I was told:

"...As long as you keep talking to them, they'll take anything...just keep talking that's all, give 'em any excuse, and they'll believe it..they'll believe anything..."

"...If they catch you, just look at your book, and come back and say: 'Yes, you're right' and talk your way round it, say: 'My pen must have slipped'..anything, make it up as you go along..."

"...Go away and look at the book, and come back and say: 'Yes, you're right'...the public is so bloody dense, they'll believe anything....."

Successful talk renders the indignant unconscious of any infringement. Based upon verbal dexterity, and presence of mind, the acute salesman is able to suggest that, with Goffman (1971, p 309): "although things look strange, they are really explicable, and furthermore, explicable in a way that will remove cause for

concern." Talk that allows a potentially disturbing event to be assimilated into the normal sphere is thus, on the same terms, (ibid, p 142-3) 'good':

"...When an individual speaks of a good account for an act, they seem to mean an account that succeeds in restructuring the initial response of the offended and appreciable reducing the fault of the actor...A 'bad' account is one that fails to perform this service...true accounts are often good, but false accounts are sometimes better..."

Much less frequently, psychological defeats of imputability are employed. By fiat, the trainee salesman has a special excuse by virtue of his temporary role (see Chapter Two), and more accomplished members of the work force occasionally plead variations on the 'I didn't know what came over me' theme.^(a) One man reportedly had strategically periodic bouts of 'flu. He told me: "When she (customer) asked me about it, I told her that I'd had 'flu all the previous week, and I pretended that I didn't know what I was doing."

The very nature of positing a defeat, of course, assumes that financial restitution will be automatically made. Only customers, salesmen feel, are prepared to fight over the odd packet of biscuits, and most of the men give the customer the benefit of any available doubt on the basis that any shortfall on their sales accounts can be balanced elsewhere, or at the same call upon future days.

What counts practically, then, is not so much the nature of the account offered to customers, but its effect. Distinctions may exist between malign and benign mistakes, but for practical purposes, one only has to establish that a mistake has been made. I have dealt with the successful deflection of blame. What happens when deflection attempts fail?

(a) Cf. CASE 28 (17.10.73). A man cleared of stealing funds and falsifying official entries claimed that he had 'no recollection' of what had happened to the money, although he admitted putting it in his pocket. This defence can not only excuse the act; but also, or so it would seem, it may justify it.

- (ii) Posterior Getting Caught Out. Extra-Ordinary Identity Sacrifice: "Slip-Ups", Account-Failure and DIS-COVERY

"...The excuse of accident is acceptable precisely because of the irregularity and infrequency of accidents occurring to any single actor..."

(Scott and Lyman, 1968, p 26)

"...circumstances can, of course, arise when a virtual offender having just provided a remedy and just received a relief, happens then to immediately create again the same offence involving the same victim. And this may occur a third time, and in some special cases, a fourth. It is then that the pair will find that no ritual work is readily available to deal accomodatively and routinely with what is happening..."

(Goffman, 1971, p 201)

The folk-fear of the fiddler is that design or accident will correlate a sufficient number of suspicions, thereby translating theoretical dishonesty into empirical guilt. Cross checking is not routinely done by any member of the fiddler's universe, and those within his control who attempt it may be prevented from taking action on the grounds of information thus collected. The fiddler's moral world is thus predicated upon the theoretically fragile (albeit empirically tough) assumption that others will only have "small information" (Goffman, 1974, p 448) about his activities. This usually, but not always occurs. When an originally minded office clerk at Wellbreads decided to cross-check bread despatched to salesmen with that invoiced for each journey, the salesmen got together and complained to the management who prevented the woman in question from completing her investigations. (a)

(a) Of course, this is not to say that management do not cross-check the men's financial accounts in their interests. They do so if a salesman has come short several weeks in succession, thus rendering himself eligible for suspicion.

The relevant empirical conditions for concrete and unnegotiable discovery are thus either the Longitudinal or the Lateral check. The Longitudinal check is successful if the customer has collated and summated an inordinate number of mischievous mistakes, a list of which he can face the roundsman with. The customer's "list on the larder wall" (cf Bigus, 1972, p 142, quoted on page 400, supra) terrifies Wellbreads retail salesmen. One of them told me:

"...Watch out for her, the other day, I wasn't fiddling luckily, but I looked into the larder, and she had all the prices chalked up on the wall..."

Similarly, a customer once told me: "I always write down what I have on the fridge door so that I don't get cheated..when the other baker used to add it up, it always used to come to more than I made it, I think he used to add it on." Wholesale men, on the other hand, face the possibility that they are being cross-checked over long periods without their knowledge. Regrettably, salesmen always have to take the customer's naivete and stupidity on trust:

"...I've been caught out, and have had to pay them back...I mean caught properly, over a period of time, that's what you've got to watch for, when they try and catch you over a period of time...otherwise, you can just say it was a mistake..."

Customers can also unwittingly get together and happen to entrap the salesmen through the Lateral check. One man expressed this as the "coffee morning fear": he was constantly worried that all his customers might meet over coffee and accidentally reveal to one another that their baker was charging them all different prices! Wholesale men might suffer from haphazard canvassing:

".... _____ (Sales manager) went to one of my calls last week, to see if everything was alright....and the fucker told him that he had £42 worth of stuff every week from me, well, he came back and saw that I only booked him for about £20...he told _____ (supervisor) that "something funny was going on"...prat!..."

There is thus a pragmatic as well as a dramaturgical reason for the proper scheduling of sales-performances, and for the maintenance of audience segregation. It is not just that (as all performances do) the sales-performance contains what Goffman (1929, p 143) calls "latent secrets" (i.e., "facts about almost every performance which are incompatible with the impression fostered by the performance but which have not been collected and organised into a usable form by anyone") but rather that the audience or customers is structurally "weak". This means (*ibid*, p 164) a type of audience whose members are not in face-to-face contact with one another during the performance, but who later come together to pool their criticisms of it. The possibility of external collusion of victims is, as I shall discuss in Chapter Seven, one of the few ways of catching occupational criminals.

So, a discovered regularity of empirical events can purposefully or accidentally symbolically reverse roles in the sales encounter. The successful game uncovering moves temporarily open the awareness context characterising the relationship. The success of the accusation transforms the game into what Scott and Lyman characterise as a 'negative relationship game', which they (1970, p 48-9) define as:

"..A betrayal of trust indicates to the betrayed party that fundamental and intrinsic elements of the intimate relationship no longer occupy their quasi-sacred place, and that any future activities with the betrayer ought to be governed with at least that degree of formality accorded to a stranger..."

Peculiarly, offensive replies are possible to solid accusations of this nature. For instance, the classical 'pilferers' plea' might be offered. A pilferers' plea contains hidden "weasel words"^(a)

(a) Cunning words inserted in advertising copy to evade the letter but not the spirit of the law (see, Gould, 1975). Knowledge of these words would be "trade" knowledge as defined in Chapter Three. Another court case (CASE 15: 17.7.72) has it that a garage employee

which sound innocuous enough, but do, in fact, legally protect the pilferer. For example, at Wellbreads, one could plead: "I asked the despatch man whether he wanted the bread, and he replied: 'You can have the whole bloody lot as far as I'm concerned, mate'". The joke answer is set-up, and subsequently used. In a recent court case (CASE 48: 9.1..74) 120 policemen, who one might expect to have a sound knowledge of such verbal shenanigans, stripped a lorry of its load of 5 tons of groceries after it had over-turned on the M5 motorway. To a man, they claimed that the driver had said: 'Help yourselves'!

More likely from the salesmen are varieties of mitigated and full defensive admission, since denial would be somewhat impractical and possible inflammatory under the circumstances. One wholesaler reported:

"...I got caught proper soon after I started, I had to carry on where the other bloke left off, or it would have looked bad...it was a bit embarrassing going back there at first, but she just seemed to think of it as amusing, she seemed to treat it as a victory...he had told me to take some old loaves out, and put them on top and book them, but she'd marked them all, put little crosses on them!...I just had to admit it, there wasn't anything else I could say..."

On occasions such as this, little more than mere restitution (exact compensation for the amount lost) is necessary. However, if wily customers are prepared to retaliate in kind, they can claim that much more was lost than their one act of checking can demonstrate. In these cases, the salesman has to bribe the customer to keep quiet. One of the senior supervisors is particularly adept at arriving at an agreeable settlement, and is used informally by the more sophisticated salesmen specifically for that purpose. One wholesaler told me that a fellow salesman: "got caught heavily the other day, he phoned _____ (the senior supervisor) up, and the manager never got to know about it...and the supervisor

(Contd) charged with stealing a toolbox (a promotional gift) successfully claimed that a motorist had gained entitlement to it, but had not taken it.

went down and sorted it out."

Although it is extremely unlikely that an aggrieved customer will actually take a salesman to court (for reasons that I shall detail in Chapter Seven), the salesman faces the embarrassing necessity of having to return to the scene of the previous entrapment every day. Luckily, the commercial necessity of routine face re-engagement absorbs residual indignation and guarantees eventual return to normalcy, albeit to a re-normalised setting. As Gross and Stone (1970, p 175) suggest: "embarrassment occurs whenever some central assumption in a transaction has been unexpectedly and unqualifiedly discredited". But although the exposure of one participant as having unacceptable moral qualities is potentially shattering, even the wounded party feels a structural sympathy (for having brought misfortune on another) and a necessity to deny his own implication (maintaining the embarrassment similarly sustains the fact that he is, or was, a fool) which satisfactorily normalises the setting. The residual knowledge, however, always exists. As Goffman (1956b, p 104) puts it: "The individual is likely to know that certain special situations always make him uncomfortable and that he has certain 'faulty' relationships which always cause him uneasiness." The salesman's round is exactly this. There are always a few awkward calls which are served awkwardly, formally, stiltedly, and haltingly. One man claimed, for instance, of one call: "it's embarrassing serving him now, but he never seems to notice," noticing that the effect of embarrassment can persevere long after the embarrassment itself has cooled.

Thus, public life can be adequately managed by the work self, the part-time self, of the fiddler. Even provably occasions of theft do not allow apprehension to spread embarrassment into the inner, basic layers of the self. But is self-maintenance privately manageable?

ALIASES: PRIVATE COVERS-FOR-SELF: NEUTRALISATION OF SELF-APPREHENSION (SHANE)

The relationship of this section to the previous one is equivalent to what Berger and Luckman (1966, p 68) call "eccentric". They continue: "On the one hand, man is a body, in the same way, that this may be said of every other animal organism. On the other hand, man has a body." We are concerned in this section with the conception of self as bounded by the limits of mind. Self-maintenance at this level involves protecting the basic self from the self that is employed in a practical sense in day-to-day dealings.

Vocabularies of Psychological Contemplation

Constructing the self-maintenance terminology at a psychological level (as opposed to the practical, public arena just discussed in the last section) elucidates a crucial difference in timing, rather than in relative success and failure. What counts publically is whether or not the account succeeds: what seems central privately is whether or not the account 'occurs' before or after the act.

Importantly, the terminology has two forms here: an anterior rhetoric, and a posterior rhetoric.^(a) The logic of the two rhet-

(a) D. Ball (1966, p 18) defines a rhetoric as a "vocabulary of limited purpose", which suits the usage I make of the term here.

-orics is not so much that they are timed to be appropriate either before or after a particular act (in the way that, for example, Tailor, 1972, p 28, suggests that justifications should be seen as occurring before an act, and excuses after it), but that the Adjustment Rhetoric may, in fact, be formulated or conceptualised by the actor after an act takes place, but is seen by him as being causally antecedant. Implied here is the idea of "toying" with an act (Rock, 1973, p 66), or rehearsing the consequences in one's imagination.^(a) The Reconciliation Rhetoric, on the other hand, might have been called upon for self-maintenance before act-commission. It nevertheless involves a conception of the future as releasing the self to act in the present, and a conception of self as having already acted, and as having personal reflective knowledge of self-as-actor.

- (i) Anterior Adjustment Rhetorics: INNOCULATION of Work Activity from Real Self (Denials of Responsibility): THE PART-TIME SELF.

"...In considering the individual's participation in social action, we must understand that in a sense he does not participate as a total person but rather in terms of a special capacity or status; in short, in terms of a special self.."
(Goffman, 1956, p 52, emphasis added)

The process of adjustment allows the individual to constitute a separate self, and perform self-commission of deviant acts whilst simultaneously maintaining that the self that does so is not the "real me", by advance neutralisation of the self-as-violator. Adjustment of discrepant self-conceptions allows the individual to proceed with the dubious activity in question without infecting the 'real self' with shame. In fact, whilst acts of the same logical category as that committed may be defined

(a) See, for example, the nice examples given by Cressey, 1953, especially ff 10, on p 175-6.

as morally wrong, a special vocabulary is used in an a priori fashion to accomplish the definition that the current case is not an instance of that category. Cressey (1953, p 95, 96, 99) defines adjustment as follows:^(a)

"...the application of certain key verbalisations to his conduct enables the trusted person to "adjust" his conceptions of himself as a trusted person with his conception of himself as a user of entrusted funds...It follows from this kind of definition that the person may prepare his rationalisation before he acts...The rationalisation is his motivation, and it not only makes his behaviour intelligible to others, it makes it intelligible to himself... When used by the individual, such ideologies adjust contradictory personal values in regard to criminality on the one hand, and integrity, honesty and morality on the other..."

Sometimes, adjustment can become so complete, and the special work-self so separated from the real self, that crimes committed during the day may be condemned by the same actor in the evening. McGaghy found that child molesters who claimed that they were drunk during the sexual encounter with the child, were more critical than average of child molesters who claimed full consciousness (McCaghy, 1968, p 46). Similarly ironically, Humphreys (1970, p 141) discovered that many of his fellating respondents espoused particularly conservative attitudes outside of the fellating context, often outwardly condemning the very crimes that they at other times practiced. Jaspán and Black (1960, p 12-13) put this nicely in perspective:

(a) Sutherland (1949, p 236) quotes a nice example of euphemistic adjustment by an (ex) used-car salesman, who said: "...The thing that struck me as strange was that all these people were proud of their ability to fleece customers. They boasted of their crookedness and were admired by their friends and enemies in proportion to their ability to get away with a crooked deal. It was called shrewdness...they never regarded themselves as in the same class (as petty thieves) and were bitterly indignant if accused of dishonesty: it was just good business..."

"...Frank Gibney, writing in Life recently on white collar crooks, took a long look at an active, if somewhat compact, day of a reputable New York state businessman. During the day, the businessman bribed a cop, cheated on his income tax, entertained his wife at the expense of the company, bribed a building inspector, took a kickback in the form of a T.V. set, juggled his books, issued a misleading ad, lifted an office desk for his own use and advised his wife to forget the maid's social security tax. Writes Gibney: "Laying aside the cares of the day, he settles town to watch the news on his souvenir T.B. set - and fulminates about the dishonesty of the 'union racketeers' he sees on the screen..."(a)

The theoretically possible limits of adjustment for salesmen are indicated by their restrictions that they place on their deviant activity. The very nature of their "portfolio" (discussed in Chapter Five) describes the limits above which dishonesty might begin to infect the real self. This seems to be a general phenomenon. Cameron (1966, p 168), for example, noting that many shoplifters prefer to steal goods that they might have been able to afford (most such offences occur in the bargain basement) rather than filch expensive items that might pose problems of psychological management back home.

Salesmen typically experience 'honesty-lapses' of the same nature. For instance, one said: "you might have a good day, you really go daft..(laugh), erratic, and then you start to worry about it the following day, thinking: 'I didn't half sting them well yesterday'..(laugh), feeling sorry for them, and you start to think: 'I'll knock a bit off today'. More likely than this sort of guilty paying-back, and in order to be able to use reconciliatory justifications at a later stage, the salesmen pursue a policy of situational honesty. Most men don't fiddle the small, corner shops. Losses here are too real, their effects too obvious, and the relationships with the shopkeeper sometimes too

(a) Gibney (1960, p 3) adds that this businessman could have been fined \$31,000 and jailed for 33 years if successfully prosecuted.

close. One man reported: "sometimes when you do a little one (fiddle a corner shop) it hurts, I mean you've only got to do them for a loaf, and that's their whole week's profit gone." Sometimes the small shops are not fiddled because the chances of getting caught are there are so much higher, and the partial-honesty policy is also thought to increase the chances of customers honestly returning bread that they might have been given in error. Recalling these benign occasions allows the salesman to righteously offer that he is not all bad. This use of the "metaphoric ledger" (from Klockars, 1974, p 151) in which good events are set against the bad, is useful in some personally reflective moments.

As individuals, salesmen have "scruples" - which Mills (1940, p 908) defined as 'moral vocabularies of motive'. Here, there are derived from the occupational 'characters' that they adopt as a social reaction to portfolio practice. As one salesman said:

"...I don't do it all the time.....
 you've got to have respect for some
 people, otherwise, life would be un-
 bearable, wouldn't it?...that would be
 defeating the object as far as I'm
 concerned, you'd be just one big fiddle,
 that's all your life would consist of,
 you have to have a break now and again,
 to know that somebody is actually paying
 for what they've got...it would make
 me feel evil if I did it too much..."

Scruples seem to be generally available to even full-time criminals. Maurer (1955, p 190-1) recounts that: "no pickpocket with any principle whatever would rob a cripple or a blind man", for example, and it would appear that the fact of traditional and widespread sentiments like that are adapted to meet specific occupational contingencies by employees. One Wellbread salesman claimed of another salesman: "he was doing things which it's against my principle to to...putting Saturdays' bread in the shops on Monday," although this particular example does not reflect a widely held bakery maxim.

At a collectively recognised level, many occupational/deviant groups have group formulae, which are jointly consulted to relieve possible self-stigmatisation. Gerald Mars (1974, p 224-5) suggests that organised pilferage amongst dock workers is morally organised by constant recourse to an unequivocal limit beyond which pilferage becomes defined by the pilferers themselves, as stealing:

"...Longshoremen have a phrase to describe the process of obtaining entitlement - they call it 'working the value of the boat'. Thus, if a boat is expected to provide ten hours work at £2 an hour then the boat is 'good for' £20 in wages. 'Working the value of the boat' in this case would mean obtaining cargo up to but not more than an estimated value of £20..."

Mars (in personal communication) also recounts the following formula used by fiddling taxi-drivers. It is a verbatim conversation from a taxi-driver:

"...What you are supposed to do it hand in all your takings, but what you do is this, you multiply the mileage that you've driven by a multiple of 6 for a reasonable day, or 5 for a bad day (say, when it's Sunday, or when it's raining) Say for instance that you've driven 200 miles, which is usual for most days, then you multiply 200 by 6 and call it pence. That's 1200, isn't it? Which is £12. This £12 now becomes the take that you hand in, instead of the £20 that it should have been..."

In much the same way, Maurer (1955, p 185) reports that pickpockets often declare that certain possible 'marks' are professionally untouchable. Jewish pickpockets, for example, don't like taking rabbis, and so declare themselves "out" on such occasions. These formulae order the fiddler's environment easily into possible and impossible victims, or more generally serve to remove the responsibility for the theft from the shoulders of the thief to the milieu of his cultural support. Anyway, these codified scruples (such as the Wellbreads' maxim of 'don't steal from your mates') act simultaneously as restrictions upon actual

practice, and psychological defence against self-apprehension qua criminal. The Rhetoric of Adjustment adapts the apologetic justification framework with a format which Lofland (1966, p 86) calls "conventionalising":

"...By 'conventionalisation' is meant the practice of continuing to believe that the general class of deviance in question is wrong and subjectively unavailable, but managing to avoid defining the actual act as an instance of the subjectively unavailable class..."

Adjustment may be achieved in one of two ways. Firstly, by adjustment of the actor, which amounts to a denial of full responsibility by psychologically excusing the self on the grounds of the denial of imputability. Secondly, through the application of various definitions, it is possible to adjust the fault component of the act in question as a form of circumstantial excuse.

By actor-adjustment, the self manages periodic release from the moral bind of the law. In a specific industrial context, we might call this guilt-reduction by recourse to the "plant lore theme" (a term coined by Horning, 1970, p 59, to refer to such statements as "The company expects it") as a particular example of the neutralising technique that Matza refers to as the Denial of Responsibility (with Sykes, 1957) and then later (1964, p 82, 89) redefines as the Negation of Responsibility:

"...Extenuation is granted because the actor did not cause the act. Thus, the accused is released from legal responsibility...Thus, intent, the mental element in crime, periodically vanishes, when it does, the moral bind is broken, and one may drift..."

Typical denials of full responsibility are 'I couldn't help it (it started by accident, and now it's a habit)'.^(a)

(a) Cf. CASE 23 (18.9.73). A supermarket cashier fined for under-ringing, claimed that she committed the offences in desperation as her husband had stopped her from buying cigarettes. This

Most of the salesmen feel that the nature of their socialisation into the firm (outlined in Chapter Two) means that once they realise what was required of them, it is too late to extricate themselves from the firm without making sacrifices. One man's comment was typical:

"...When I started I didn't know anything about it..(fiddles) before you sign on, they let you think that only a fool would make mistakes, and come short in the money, but they've got you by the short and curlies, by the time you realise that you can't check everything, it's too late, you've agreed to pay shortages..."

Once initiated into the black arts of fiddling, however, the salesmen believe that practice reflects basic and unchangeable human traits. This nicely mirrors a common pattern amongst performers, also emerging amongst salesmen as, for example, the feeling that sales-genuineness is an acquirable trait. Most of the salesmen profess to a belief that fiddling is habit-forming, and that it represents (in the words of one man): "greed...it's greed isn't it? Let's face it, everybody will make an extra couple of bob if he can."

A second classic responsibility denial theme is: 'I was told to do it'. Geis (1967, p 109) found that the executives prosecuted in what is now known as the Incredible Electrical Conspiracy clearly felt that the price-rigging for which they were indicted was part of their legitimate job. One of the convicted men said: "I thought it was part of my duty to do so". The wellbred salesmen expressed similar sentiments, perhaps more bitterly. One claimed: "they used to say: 'Put a penny on here, and a half on here'...it was the firm what made me change", and another, more explicitly, that: "It's the company that make you..what you are, because they're twisting us!" Another man put it directly:

(Contd) defence nicely balanced both the need for extra money, and the 'enslaved' and unscrupulous way it was obtained.

"...Their attitude towards everything, and the way that they treat you, that made you feel, 'Oh, alright, if you're going to rob me, I'm going to rob you'..."

A third, commonly felt, but rarely expressed feeling is that: 'If I don't do it, somebody else will (I'm only a pawn)'. Geis (ibid, p 110), for example, quotes the following statement from the of the General Electric defendants: "If I didn't do it, I felt that somebody else would', said one with an obvious note of self-justification. 'I would be removed and somebody else would do it.'"(a)

The other major adjustive device transfers attention from the actor, to the act. Here, the personalised plea of "I'm insignificant" becomes directed at the act, and emerges as "It's insignificant". "Actor transforms" (Goffman, 1974, p 189) are reworked as "act transforms". Appeals to psychological defeats change to pleas for circumstantion mitigations.

The underlying technique of neutralisation here is the Denial of Injury (inasmuch as it refers to objects), or as Matza (1964, p 161) later defines it, the Assertion of Tort:

"...Other acts are not so self-evidently wrong. They do not so obviously warrant the intervention of the state, and thus their prohibition is a topic of debate and discussion both among experts and the ordinary citizenry. These acts are in effect mala prohibita..."

The theme involved here is guilt-reduction by the 'don't regard it as theft' theme developed by Horning (1970, p 59). Here, the actor contrasts his admission that he committed the

(a) A fourth feeling (although not expressed by the Wellbreads salesman) is literally that which suggests that the actor in question is "not really me". Verlarde (1975, p 256) quotes relief masseuses as reducing the psychological impact of their jobs by saying: "It's only your hand", and thus distancing the act from their body; and by defining their jobs as masseuses as 'temporary' though which they can force distance between the activity and their life-pattern.

act with the moral argument that his particular case had trifling consequences of a non-moral nature.^(a) Typical sentiments expressed by pilfering factory workers studied by Horning (ibid) were: "I don't like the word taken. It's not like I was stealing those screws. They're not worth anything". The embezzlers in Cressey's (1953) study found that a symbolic precondition of embezzlement was the definition of the use of entrusted funds as mere 'borrowing', or, that such funds really 'belonged to' the self. Similarly, Geis (1967, p 108) quotes the defence of a Westinghouse executive: "Illegal? Yes, but not criminal. I didn't find that out until I read the indictment...I assumed that criminal action meant damaging someone, and we did not do that." Smith (1961, p 359) analysing the same case, again found reference to the mala prohibita/male in se distinction: "'Sure collusion was illegal', explained an old G.E. hand, 'But it wasn't unethical'".^(b)

The bread salesmen not only use the very word 'fiddle' (in its sense as a trifling sum, originally 1/16 of a pound sterling) to cover very large amounts, they also continually and rather archly refer to the total "take" as, 'the odd bob or two', 'a few coppers', 'enough to buy a cup of tea', 'enough

(a) This is a nice example of the diminishing returns derived from "classical" crime stereotypes. Generally the mediated stereotype is so effective that even the (de facto) most promising candidates fail to identify with it. It becomes ironic that (eg, Cameron, 1964) middle-aged and light-fingered women just cannot see themselves as "shoplifters". Orwell (1933, p 176) comments: "I imagine there are quite a lot of tramps who thank God they are not tramps. They are like trippers who say such cutting things about trippers." Wellbread salesmen use such 'contra-indicators' (Bigus, 1974, p 79) to thus indicate that they are not "criminals".

(b) Another occasionally felt, but rarely invoked feeling is that sanctioned by the power of tradition: 'It's always been this way', applicable to acts outlawed but never successfully. Gardner (1967, p 125) notes that a high degree of exposure to political corruption amongst the citizenry of 'Wincanton' led to wholesale desensitisation and fatalism. It was commonly felt that 'All politicians are and always will be crooks, so there's nothing we can do about it'. Consequently, 96% of the residents agreed with the statement: 'No matter what you do, people will always gamble' (which, at the time, was illegal).

for a packet of fags'. Each of these statements serve to produce a verbally shared conception of the amounts involved as being petty ones. Also, the cash-bag (which contains money belonging solely to the company) is generally referred to as the 'kitty', which serves to neutralise the otherwise morally threatening and possible psychologically disturbing nature of appropriations therefrom. Overall, the shared definition that fiddling is 'just to cover mistakes', although technically misleading, has obvious psychological utility. It is ironic that the justifications that the firm teach the men to psychologically cover fiddling-for-the-company is used by them to also cover fiddling-for-the-self.

Taken as a whole, however, the vocabulary of adjustment is unable to satisfactorily cover the self in private after the commission of the act. A separate category of definition, the Rhetoric of Reconciliation, is needed to cope with the implications of the knowledge of the self-as-violator.

(ii) Posterior Reconciliation Rhetorics: INSULATION of Work Self from Real Self (Denials of Pejorativeness):
THE PARTIAL SELF

The psychologically divorced proceedings of day to day work allows the creation of a part-time self: the fiddling-self. The nature of the relationship of the core-self to this special self (through the strategies of inoculation before the act, and insulation after it) means that in the social processes that make up identities, the part-time self has mere partial, or elemental status. Whereas inoculation prevented self-apprehension through the deflection of disapproval before the logical occurrence of the act in question, insulation acts by post hoc protection from disapproval. Separating reflected knowledge of self-as-violator from one's 'natural' self (separating the

judged act from the self-itself) amounts to the neutralisation of internalised social, rather than self-control.

Self-camouflage is provided at one level by fiat: the behavioural similarity of skills between fiddling and selling. The fiddler shares with the call-girl (Bryan, 1965, p. 449) the absence of any tell-tale insignia of deviant identification, and with the cheque forger (Lemert, 1967, p. 120) a procedural similarity of actions. ^(a) Lofland (1969, p. 83) remarks:

"...To train persons in the mysteries of locksmithery is to create a strata uniquely capable of theft from banks and residential units. To train persons as printers and engravers is to train possible counterfeiters ...Indeed, there seem to be few skilled occupations that do not simultaneously provide the technical knowledge and skills for one or another kind of deviant act..."

Cressey (1953, p. 82, 103) similarly admits that:

"...the technical skill necessary to trust violation is simply the technical skill necessary to holding that position in the first place...'borrowing' the deposits for a short time was an easy and logical step to take since the ordinary practice of the businessman was similar to such borrowing..."

The only 'original' act that the salesmen commit (i.e., that is not used in legitimate selling), is the wholly private and occasional act of transferring sums of company money to his own pocket. The structure of the fiddle adds another layer of insulation around the practice. Its tactical essence is non-discovery (as opposed to burglary, pick-pocketing, cheque-forgery, etc, all of which eventually come to light as an infraction), its practice is isolated, and by virtue of the practical 'covers'

(a) Thus, (Lemert, 1967, p. 101, 106) cheque forgery has low perceived 'criminality' because of both the simplicity of actions involved, and lack of necessity for anything other than standard skills. Sutherland (1949, p. 224) notes that it is precisely necessary in white-collar crime to conceal the fact of infraction rather than just the identity of the perpetrator.

which form a part of its analytic structure, it is (if successful) untraceable.^(a) As Rock (1973, p 80) suggests, some "deviancy is likely to be (also) socially invisible, when, to the unwary, it seems to be a natural part of some conventional setting." Within the victim population, the 'known-aboutness' (Goffman, 1963, p 67) is slight, and its 'obtrusiveness' (the extent to which it interferes with the ongoing interaction) imperceptible. The nature of the fiddle gives it characteristics similar to situations that Goffman (1971, p 133) terms "situational delicts":

"...Stealth in infractions typically leaves the offended ignorant of the culprit's identity and the date of the offence. Stealth in situational delicts typically leaves the offended ignorant of these matters but also raises the issue as to whether in fact any delict was committed..."

Self-camouflage may also be deliberately constructed, or be the result of action orientated toward the end of concealment. The fellators in Humphrey's sample chose fast, impersonal relationships in specifically public rest-rooms to (1970, p 105): "avoid just such exposure (i.e., of permanent relationships) predicated on a desire to protect their family relationships." Similarly, as a guarantee of anonymity and protection of identity, the 'queers' in Reiss' study chose locations which could simultaneously give alternative legitimate rationales for the co-presence of both queers and 'peers'.

Aprrt from the camouflage provided by the activity structure of the fiddle, the self is also insulated from the special self of work by various "smokescreens" (Pittenger, 1960, p 255)

(a) Klockars (1974, p 80-85) describes how Vincent, a professional fence, systematically affords himself practical cover by making the goods that he handles untraceable. "When necessary, gems can be taken from their settings, minks refashioned, numbers changed, labels removed". Often, in addition, to cover the fencing of, say, a dozen hot electric razors, Vincent would buy himself a dozen from a wholesaler to get himself a bill which could later legitimate more than one dozen razors.

that the actor may lay to obscure the relationship between the two selves, for-himself. In Weiler and Weinstein's (1972) terms, the real self becomes the audience for the work self's tactics of embellishment. Sometimes, total insulation can be achieved,^(a) although generally, however, partial insulation is attempted by the diminished use of usual sociable activity.^(b) The almost total absence of stigmatising interaction occurring between the fiddler and his customer reduces the need for such insulation techniques to be conjointly entertained. However, during the sales-act, the paractitioner is inwardly participating in rituals of silence, and affective and informational neutrality, and thus neutralisation.^(c)

Camouflaging the participation of the work-self in evil is essential for the successful adoption by the Rhetoric of Reconciliation of the racial mode of justification. Reflected denial of involvement allows simultaneous denial of the pejorative quality of the action, and the successful liberation of the self from the throes of guilt. To adequately "ignore" possible accusations, retaliative counter-denunciation is essential. Neutralisation here combines the Condemnation of Condemners, the Denial of Injury (persons), and the Denial of the Victim. Matza (1964, p 101) later defines these more explicitly as, on the one hand, the Sense of Injustice, "a simmering resentment - a setting of antagonism and antipathy - within which a variety of exten-

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- (a) Such as, for example, achieved by the prostitutes studied by Jackman et al. (1963) of whom some totally depersonalised their prostitution roles, and 'lived' in the world of middle-class values. Similarly, child-molesters (McCaghy, 1968), and compulsive criminals (Cressey, 1954) could sufficiently insulate their core-self from their reported behaviour by pleading diminished consciousness, that there was (Cressey, ibid., p 46): "a high probability of denial to himself that in the second role that 'he' behaved at all."
- (b) For examples, the silence usually practiced during fleeting fellation and pederasty (Humphreys, 1970, p 154; Reiss, op. cit. p 191), the lack of acknowledgement of erstwhile partners when encountered amongst different scenery (Reiss, p 206) and specific affective neutrality during perverse sexual acts (ibid., p 184).
- (c) Needless to say, enforcers are aware of all this, and a latent function of interrogation (Robin, 1965, p212) is to strip rationalisations and reveal self-criminality to him-self.

-uating circumstances may abrogate the moral bind to the law", and on the other, (ibid, p 172) as the Assertion of Tort, wherein: "the wrong can be conceived of as a private transaction between the accused and the victim." Cumulatively, this amounts to the total defeat of crime by disputing it's basic logical meaning. By attempting to demonstrate that the number of deviant practitioners is so obviously large, then, as Young (1970, p 41) puts it, the common-sense meaning of crime as abnormality, falls.

The first sense of counter-denunciation is 'we all do it'. For example, several prostitutes in Bryan (1965) considered that (ibid, p 444): "'Actually, all women are whores in my opinion whether they get married for it or whatever it is, there are just different ways of being a whore'", and many of Cressey's (1953, p 110-111) defaulters:^(a) "often believed that such practices were extensive and rationalised accordingly, (one man said)... 'There is nothing original in what I do. It is done every day'". Smith (1961, p 372) traced similar feelings of injured righteousness (expressing, as Matza suggests, an essential disbelief in the consistency of the law) among the guilty defendants in the Incredible Electrical Conspiracy:

"...They protested that they should be no more held up to blame than many other American businessmen, for conspiracy is just as much a "way of life" in other fields as it was in electrical equipment. "Why pick on us?" was the attitude. "Look at some of those other fellows"..."

The bread salesmen believe, almost to a man, that fiddling is inevitable, widespread, and thus justifiable. One said to me: "Look, in every job, where there's a loophole, there's a fiddle", and another, in more detail:

"...Well, the way I look at it is this: you've got to look after yourself...everybody is doing it, this probably comes as a shock to you, that everybody is doing it, even the shops where you're doing it, they're doing it to somebody else...perhaps

(a) Levens (1964), and Spenser (1965, p 342-3) found similar feelings.

even just to the tax-man, and the government is doing it to another government, it's just part of life.. thinking that, eases your conscience..."

The practice is also believed to be explicitly sanctioned by actual participation in the fiddle by bakery supervisors, who regularly "show a similar book" (take similar amounts from the kitty when they are on relief work). As a pilferer in Horning's (1970, p 57) study suggested: "Well, you can't feel very guilty when you know that even the supers. approve."

Coupled with this second sense of "they do it higher up" (the first sense was "we all do it"), is a third feeling of "they do it to us". Some of the Wellbreads salesmen merely feel that they are recouping money that they lose elsewhere and that the whole fiddle-business is one eternal round. One man said, with a note of desperation:

"...You have to do it, everybody over-charges you, I know, because we have the milkman and the paper-boy call at ours, and even now, the milkman charges me a bit extra every week...all door-to-door selling is the same..."

On top of this, there is always the elusive feeling that some of the customers are "trying it on". A specific focus for this sense of retaliatory injustice is the feeling that the management is deliberately robbing the sales force. Virtually every roundsman believes that the manager steal money from them as a matter of sales policy, and most of them feel that they, at least, are in the possession of actual proof. One claimed, a little bitterly: "They're all fiddling in the office, no office could be as incompetent as ours without a fiddle behind it", but for many, no real reasons are present, just manical belief. For example, one salesman said: "I wish I knew what they were up to in the office, I know they're on the fiddle somehow". Some men do, however, seem to have latched onto discrepancies which can only be explained in one way:

"..I can't say for sure that there's a fiddle going, but it makes you suspicious ...take care waste...that must be a fiddle...why were they cutting it?.."

"...I've seen it....I've gone into the office some days, and the supervisors are working out the competitions, and they say: 'Oh, that can't be right' and they knock it off...not the datums, they clip the sales...it makes you suspicious..."

"...I caught the chief accountant once... well, he was caught several times...I caught him on the round once, taking stuff out of the boot of his car, and putting it into someone else's..."

The sense of retaliation is also fed by the cynicism that comes naturally with the adoption of the selling role from constantly dealing with stupid people. Here, the sense that "they deserve to lose it" is born. A shoplifter (in Launay, 1974) said: "People who work in bookshops are so dim they're asking for it", and equivalent sentiments are found amongst the bread salesmen.^(a) One man said: "I just say that the bloke (customer) is a bloody fool if you can get away with it", and two more, that:

"...I look at it this way, if they're stupid enough to let you do it, then they deserve to have it done to them..."

"...Mind you, I only used to do it to awkward customers, the ones that used to make me run back to the van for things... sort of retaliation..."

Another classic sense of retaliation derives from the definition of the victim as rich enough to easily withstand the loss, or sufficiently well insured to re-claim it (see, for example, the

(a) Large stores again suffer on this score. Sutherland (1937, p 176) reports that professional thieves use the "conscience palliative" of justifying hitting big stores because of the low wages that these stores pay to their staff. Goffman (1952, p 209) suggests that if those "service occupations which involve routine cheating" didn't already feel it, they would have to indulge in thus instrumental "audience-blackening".

knowledge that dockers have of the insurance-claim possibilities which the ship-owners from whom they pilfer have, in Mars, 1974). One of the salesmen, speaking for many of the men, said: "You don't feel so guilty with the big stores...you know it's wrong, but you know that they are allowed wastage."

A closely related sentiment to that of "they can afford it" is "nobody suffers".^(a) Shoplifters apprehended in large chain stores, (Launay, *ibid*) say: "If they were nice, if they were human and cared about you, I wouldn't do it. But it's like robbing a machine". And a pilferer who talked to Horning (1970, p 55) suggested: "It's like a corporation..it's not like taking it from one person...the people justify it by saying that the corporation wouldn't be hurt by it...they just jack the price up and screw the customer." Smigel and Ross (1970, p 7) suggest, sensibly, that:

"...crimes against large organisations are more acceptable to the public than are other categories of crime..(because) our system of ethics lacks rules which specifically apply to relationships between individuals and large organisations..."

(a) In victimless crimes, it is easy for the criminal to invoke the spirit of the Denial of Injury. Velarde's (1975, p 262) relief-masseuses typically (and righteously) claimed: "Who are we hurting? We don't have obnoxious signs out on front, no barkers dragging unwilling citizens inside. Everyone who comes in to ask for our services does so of their own free will and that includes the police who come in to bust us." Brennan (1974, p 390) nicely reports: "...In abortion, a major approach used to deny the victim is through a series of words - glob of protoplasm, conceptual or fetal material, conceptus, abortus, piece of tissue, which convey the impression what what exists in pregnancy is a less-than-human entity. These abstract linguistic categories have the effect of depersonalising the unborn to the status of a non-victim, an object devoid of humanity.." Brennan (*ibid*) adds that this is technically supported by the physically destructive effects of vacuum aspiration upon the foetus, and by the lack of foetal movement before 16 weeks. Nevertheless, it is possible (although I cannot recall being offered this reasoning from any of the salesmen) for those who have clearly created victims to feel that they are simultaneously doing them a favour. For example, Zeitlin (1971, p 26) quotes the following case: "one fellow argued ingeniously that his thefts of men's clothing actually benefited the store, by his being seen around the town

Cahn (1955, p 199) claims that the following maxim applies: "As soon as the owner becomes too large or too impersonal to permit an imaginative interchange with him, even very honest men may act as though they were blind to his rights". This suggestion nicely translates Smigel and Ross' (ibid) 'lack of moral rules specifying the relationship between individuals and corporations' into action prescription. For the inside man, Cort (1959, p 340) does a similar job. He suggests that, for the employee is faced with "mere figures in a ledger, which have no moral meaning", and which can be falsified without confronting any scruples.

Giving final breath to counter-denunciation is the feeling that either "their inactivity sanctions it", or "their lack of enforcement-consistency invites it".^(a) Two of the Wellbreads salesmen said:

"...They know what goes on, and they don't do much about it...
(Managing Director) worked up from the ranks...he knows all about it.."

"...They seem to think that taking bread from them is wrong and fiddling their customers is right..."

These extensive direct attacks are "balanced" by mitigating self-admissions which merely affect a tangential, glancing blow at the feelings which the Rhetoric of Reconciliation is designed to overcome. Where 'qualified admission' involves (at this level of self-development) a variety of forms of counter-denunciation, 'mitigated admission' appeals to higher loyalties. Generally, as

(Contd) in the New Look." Generally, however, when there is a victim, radical justification becomes apologetic. For example, cheque-forgers support their activity with the belief that "You can't kill anyone with a fountain pen" (quoted in Gibbons and Garrity, 1962, p 34).

(a) (Cf. Wilkins, 1964, p 51). Another well-known possibility not exercised by the Wellbreads salesmen may be characterised as the "Capone whine" (see, Kobler, 1971). The "Capone whine" asserts "they want us to do it (public demand sanctions it)". Capone frequently justified his illicit activities (bootlegging, gambling, prostitution) merely by pointing out how many upright citizens used the services he provided.

Matza (1964, p 158) talks of the Appeal to Higher Loyalties in terms of conflicting customary convictions which:

"...merely hold the offence to be mitigated. the act is still wrong, and warrants official intervention; but less wrong because it was motivated and inspired by sentiments that in a different context everybody would consider fine and noble. Thus, the illegal behaviour obscures an ethical act..."(a)

In the factory, this feeling adopts the twin economic themes of "we need it", and "we deserve it". "We need it" relates low pay with the management's known knowledge of the fiddle. The men that talk in these terms are overtly recognising the invisible portion of their wages:

"...£30 a week, do you think that's good? when you have to get up at 3.00 in the morning in mid-winter?...6 days a week..."

"...(supervisor) I wouldn't come in at the times and work the hours that these blokes do...I think they've got to be rewarded for it..."

"...I don't bother about it at all...I just think if of as subsidising my wages, that's all..."

"We deserve it", on the other hand, combines estimations of work done, with definitions of acceptable standards of living.^(b)
Two salesmen told me:

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- (a) The words "in another context" opens the door to the analysis of competence in context-reading presented above (Chapter Three). To look at it this way, the appeals just do not apply to this context. To read them as being applicable mistakes the fantasy for the reality of power. They do apply to empowered positions, and not to powerless ones. To miss this meta-contextual qualification is to incompetently read the situation literally.
- (b) As Abramson (1949, p 9) notes, there are some embezzlers who only embezzle money that they feel they are 'owed' because they have not received promised wage-rises, back-pay, etc. Remarkably, in such cases, when they finally get the rise to which they thought they were initially entitled, if amounting to more than they had calculated they were worth, they start paying money secretly back to the firm! This feeling here, however, refers to the salesmen's personal calculations of wage and personal worth which underpin (and in fact are essential for) the "invisible" structure described at the end of Chapter Four.

"..it is a sort of general feeling...
I know that it's a bad attitude to take,
(laugh)...it's like if someone threw a
stone through my window, and then I start
doing it, just because everybody else
does...but you can't live on the normal
wage...that's why it really is need..."

"...I don't like to do it..that's all
there is to it...it's part of the job as
far as I'm concerned...I've got to do
it because everybody else does..."

Thus, by exhaustive conversion of the self-maintenance terminology, with an emphasis on timing, rather than upon success, the specific fiddling self of the salesman is both inculcated from and insulated against the moral implications of rule-infraction, and from the knowledge of the self as rule-breaker.

THE STRUCTURAL ORIGINS OF NORMATIVE SUPPORT: A SUBCULTURE
OF FIDDLING

"...Occupational crime cannot be fully understood without reference to the structure and values of society..."
(Clinard and Quinney, 1967, p 195)

Salesmen do not believe that fiddling will eventually overthrow the capitalist economy. Although, as Mills (1951, p 164) delicately puts it, "they are not captains of industry, but the corporals or retailing", they fully believe themselves to be in the same army. The value system to which the Wellbread salesmen subscribe is the value system of acquisitive, small-time business.^(a) The surrounding moral precepts of business, however, are tinkered with, and this produces a subcultural version of the conventional tradition of commerce. Relatively integrated subcultures of this nature are defined by Matza (1964, p 52):

"...the code is relatively latent. It is not written...(and is) characterised as a relatively inarticulate oral tradition. Its precepts are neither codified nor formally transmitted. Rather they are inferred from action which obviously includes speech...Thus, they infer ideology from each other...It is cued...the mutual inference is a...subculture..."

The customs of the subculture are delicately balanced between conventional and criminal activity, creating, in effect,

(a) Needless to say, white-collar entrepreneurial values are not those which blue-collar workers are supposed to subscribe to (See, Ditton, 1975).

what Matza (1961, p 105) calls a "subterranean" version of conventional business life:

"...Thus, the individual deviant is linked to the society in minimal fashion through companies of deviants and through localised traditions. To speak of subterranean traditions is to extend the notion of linking to the wider social system; it is to posit connections between localised deviant traditions and the broader traditions of conventional society. The notion of subterranean implies that there is an ongoing dialectic between conventional and deviant traditions, and that, in the process of exchange, both are modified..."

The subterranean version of business - fiddling - lives side by side with conventional activity as a simplistic and "incompetent" (in the sense in which that word was defined in Chapter Three) extraction and undue emphasis of some of its minor values and moral imperatives. An incompetent reading, then, that takes literally some metaphorically meant imperatives. Subterranean traditions, whilst publically denounced and only adhered to by a minority of the population, are familiar to, and tolerated by, large segments of society, who experience conventional versions of the same basic tradition. The reaction to subterranean versions is crucially definitive of the publically experienced and privately felt sentiment toward the fiddle. As Matza (ibid) puts it:

"...these traditions are viewed with ambivalence in the privacy of contemplation by a majority of adults, and, thus, public reactions are subject to faddish oscillation ranging from sympathetic tolerance to outright suppression....whenever there are available counterthemes, there will be varying degrees of indulgence in these traditions ranging from relatively complete immersion to occasional vicarious appreciation..."

Structure of Conventional Support and Betrayal

Basically, the norms supportive of conventional activity are the very norms which support the subterranean version of that activity. Cavan (1964, p 237) sees a "certain degree of commensuralism and cooperation" between crime and business, and Schur (1969, p 185-6) sees interesting parallels between business and some types of crime (especially fraud):

"...Of course, this undercurrent of values conducive to business crimes and related offences is not surprising, given the extensive influence of the "business spirit" in our society. Indeed, certain of the values that help promote criminality in America are far from being subterranean in character. Thus, sociologist Donald Taft has cited the following characteristics of American society as having possible significance in the causation of crime: "its dynamic quality, complexity, materialism, wrong impersonality, individualism, insistence upon the importance of status, restricted group loyalties, survivals of frontier traditions, race discrimination, lack of scientific orientation in the social field, tolerance of political corruption, general faith in law, disrespect for some law, and acceptance of quasi-criminal exploitation..."

These values caricature, but essentially reflect the structure of British society. At root, they stem from a normative order which hinges upon business itself. These norms are really qualified guidelines for a zone of acceptable activity, rather than categorical imperatives demanding particular courses of action. Matza and Sykes (1957, p 251) refer to this as the "flexibility" of conformity prescriptions, indicating that their applicability is limited to particular circumstances. Matza (1964, p 62-3), in his inimicable style, suggests:

"...Beneath the surface differences lies an obscured similarity...the continued existence of the subculture is facilitated and perhaps even dependant upon support and reinforcement from conventional sources. The subculture is buttressed by beliefs that flourish in influential sectors of the normative order...The subculture... receives cultural support from conventional traditions..."

Support for fiddling derives specifically from the irony of defeasibility in law. Hart (1952, p 161-2) suggests that defeasible concepts are "to be defined through exceptions and not by a series of necessary and sufficient conditions." Liability, for example, depends upon the successful demonstration that the excusing or invalidating conditions of the concept do not pertain in this particular case. Similarly, McHugh (1970, p 164) suggests that "deviance is to fail in the absence of conditions of failure." In this sense, neutralisation is based upon what Matza and Sykes (1957, p 257) refer to as "unrecognised extensions of defences to crimes". The relationship of the deviant to the conventional order is thus one of well-reasoned interpretation. In this way, cultural support is ironically received for deviant activity. Matza (1964, p 59, 70, 74) continues:

"...The norms and sentiments of the subculture are beliefs that function as the extenuating conditions under which (infraction)...is possible...Norms, especially legal norms, may be neutralised. Criminal law is especially susceptible of neutralisation because the conditions of applicability, and thus inapplicability are explicitly stated....because in law the conditions are specified, neutralisation is not possible, it is invited.... the law contains the seeds of its own neutralisation...the subculture (member) unwittingly extends the conditions of inapplicability...Neutralisation of legal precepts depends partly on equivocation - the unwitting use of concepts in markedly different ways...Each point in law is extended, and in that sense, distorted.."

But whilst support is forthcoming, criminal activity is additionally subject to public disqualification. The very fact of banning an activity transforms its practice through the moral injection of guilt. Although guilt may be managed, or totally neutralised, structural support is thus conditional upon the extent of cultural betrayal.

In addition, neutralisation is not a process that needs to be re-created, de novo, by each deviant. Neutralisations are ready-made, processed, and delivered through the channels of symbolic communication. Stocks of neutralisations, posing as motives, are culturally stored, and exist as shared "habits of thought" (Hartung, 1965, p 135), creating what Lofland (1966, p 88) calls a "pool of publically legitimated platitudes". The verbalisations derived from these popular ideologies are assimilated and internalised by individuals, and publically or privately regurgitated at motivationally appropriate intervals.

The deviant thus in effect participates in what Jackman, et al., (1963) refer to as a "dual world". Having a foot in both the conventional and subterranean camp gives the fiddler a nicely balanced (what Matza, 1964, p 50, calls "two minded") worldly perspective.

"Business" and the Fiddle: Conventional Tradition
and Subterranean Version.

"...A merchant shall hardly keep himself
from doing wrong, and a huckster shall
not be freed from sin...As a nail sticketh
fast between the joinings of the stones,
so doth sin stick close to buying and
selling..."

(Ecclesiastes, 27:2. in Geis, 1968, p 8)

"...Illicit practices, of every form and shade, from venial deception to all but direct theft, may be brought home to the higher grades of our commercial world. Tricks innumerable, lies acted or uttered, elaborately devised frauds, are prevalent - many of them established as "customs of the trade"; nay, not only established, but defended..."
 (Spencer, "The Morals of Trade", in Hartung, 1953, p 33)

The fiddler's conventional reflection is the small-time capitalist entrepreneur, what Veblen referred to as the "ideal pecuniary man" (quoted in Sutherland, 1949, p 217), the basic-commission salesman, the epitomy of the capitalist "spirit".^(a) The key features of the capitalist geist that the subculture of fiddling reflects are dutiful, non-hedonistic unscrupulousness. Weber (1930, p 51, 53, 57) reminds us:

"...above all the idea of a duty of an individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself...above all completely devoid of any eudaemonistic, not to say hedonistic, admixture...The universal reign of absolute unscrupulousness in the pursuit of selfish interest in the making of money..".

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- (a) Importantly, it is business (and not just capitalism) which is conventional version of fiddling. White collar crime (and, presumably, fiddling) occurs in the U.S.S.R., (see, Feifer, 1965), as well as in the U.S.A. However, the judicial disposition of successfully prosecuted offenders varies considerably between the two countries. In the U.S.S.R., (where white collar criminals typically set up private enterprise systems with state-owned goods - here, fiddling is capitalism), white collar criminals are generally shot! Mannheim (1965, p 497) explains: "The Russian whitecollar criminals are not those who try to restrict free competition but those who try to compete with the economic activities of the monopolistic state." In the U.S.A., on the other hand, both business and business crime are capitalistic, and business crime is processed accordingly. Only 26% of white collar criminals in the U.S.A. are imprisoned, the rest are just fined, Robin, 1967. Lane (1953, p 96) indicates that it is pro-business conservatism (rather than any anti-business sentiments) that feeds illegality. This is in accord with Quinney's (1964, p 214) finding that prescription violation is more likely amongst those pharmacists who define pharmacy as a business, than amongst those who think of it as a profession.

Conventional business manages to succeed only by practicing one set of values whilst publically espousing another.^(a) The justifying philosophies of organisations are rarely their working ones. To take just one example, 'profit maximisation' is the justifying philosophy of the managerial class. Actual working use of such an ideal would be economic disaster: over-production would create a glut. So, illegal cartels are often constructed (for example, the Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, Smith, 1961), as the inevitable and regrettable result of unrestrained capitalism.^(b) The fiddler, exasperatingly, actually operates upon the basis of capitalism's justifying philosophy. To paraphrase Matza, the fiddler misinterprets the conditions of applicability (i.e., justification only) of the philosophy of capitalism, and naively sees the philosophy as a set of practical, procedural rules. In other words, the fiddler makes an incompetent reading of the philosophy (see Diagram 7 on page 149, and text et seq.). Absurdly, the fiddler believes that just because the values of business may be attached to the practices of crime, that this is enough

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- (a) A somewhat more sympathetic interpretation is provided by Clinard and Quinney (1967, p 195) who note that many conventional business practices have only recently been criminalised.
- (b) I should note here that there are two ways of looking at the coincidence of crime and business. To view business as crime, and crime as business. I am chiefly concerned with the former, but in terms of the latter, see Sellin 1963, and Rath, 1967, p 121, who notes: "...The drive toward success in the legitimate world produces unmeasurable pressures toward illegitimate means. Does organised crime exploit a pre-existing ethic? Is it merely that ethic stripped of its handsome theoretical gloss and practiced in a somewhat cruder form?..." For an excellent example of a description of crime framed in the business vernacular, see Chambliss, 1972. Sutherland's (1937, p 140) professional thief also seems very interested in defining himself as a 'businessman'. He says: "...Professional stealing as a business is much like any other business. The conversation among thieves is a police station, prison, or hangout is concerned principally with their business, and it is not different in that respect from the conversation of monument salesmen in their meetings. Business possibilities, conditions, and returns are the foremost subjects of conversation, and just as the salesman learns of fertile territory, new methods, new laws which affect the business, so does the thief. It involves as much hard work as any other business. There is little thrill about it..."

in itself. Schur (1957, p 301-2) accurately summarises the stock of values common to both crime and business. The fiddler reads this coincidence of support for a similarity of support. Schur says:

"...One system of values which may foster crime, and particularly fraud, in our society, is that relating to the phenomena of salesmanship. As Sugarland notes "the confidence games are based essentially on salesmanship". To a great extent, our society is built on salesmanship, and the term implies much more than the mere sale of material goods. In an era when an increased premium is being put on "idea men", the ability to "sell a bill of goods" (in the figurative sense as well as the literal) takes on added importance. It is just this ability which the successful conman must demonstrate. Closely related to "selling a bill of goods" is the cultural stress on "putting across" one's "personality"...These socially sanctioned attributes are the very hallmark of the experienced swindler..."(a)

It is in these terms of general societal membership that the fiddler makes an incompetent, naive, literal reading of the support that he can expect from society as a whole for fiddling. It is the precise structural powerlessness of the (blue-collar) salesman which makes his use of such values bizarre, absurd, and misplaced. However, this is not an innovatory usage. Core business values have sedimented at the blue-collar level as a subtle, wry, reflection of the sentiments from which they were initially derived. Lofland (1966, p 99), for example, quotes "Honesty is the best policy, but business is business, and a businessman would be a fool if he didn't cover his hand" as typical of the way that business has tried to interweave the moral and commercial orders. But such sentiments were meant for private rationalisation, and not for public presentation. The subterranean adherent not only

(a) To cut through the absurdity involved in the fiddler's abstraction of values from society, we may agree with Alex Cockburn (Review of R.A. Hutchinson, Vesco, in N.Y.R.B., Vol. xxii, March 20, 1975): "...Swindles and frauds are best regarded as parodies of conventional business behaviour. In the swindle, greed outstrips discretion. In conventional business, discretion tempers greed..."

misreads the conditions of applicability of these warped maxims (they are not for the working class), he also mis-takes their epistemological status, and sees them (literally) as reality, rather than as reflection. Thus, traditional sardonic comments upon the unintended consequences of business practice, such as: "It's a dog-eat-dog world", "May the best man win", "Business is business", "We are not in business for our health" (Sutherland, 1949, p 240), "No business was built on the beatitudes" (ibid, p 246), "Patriotism is a very beautiful thing, but it mustn't be allowed to interfere with business" (ibid, p 174), and "Look after number one", are taken by the fiddler to be the guiding, rather than the qualifying moral precepts of action. Popular ideology is taken to sanction crime. Cressey (1953, p 97) notes:

"...(the following phrases)..amount to ideologies which sanction the crime:
 "Some of our most respectable citizens got their start in life by using other peoples money temporarily", "In the real estate business there is nothing wrong about using deposits before the deal is closed", "All people steal when they get into a tight spot", the use of the verbalisations in this way is necessarily preceeded by the observation of rather general criminal ideologies...."

In particular, fiddling is an extension of the excusing conditions of the surface practice of selling. Within selling situations, the caveat emptor rider prevails.^(a) And so, selling situations would expropriate different sectors of conventional justifying rhetoric than simple service ones. Taylor (1971, p 105) adds:

"...So, for example, stealing money may be made easier for salesmen by the presence in the culture of the phrase "making a bit on the side". A bank clerk however,

(a) As Gibney (1960, p 24) points out, the phrase acts like a red rag to a bull when mentioned to old fashioned manufacturers, although only one in five modern executives fully adhere to its implications (Baumhart, 1961, p 121).

can hardly assume himself as he contemplates dipping into the till that others would accept a similar motivational account for his contemplated behaviour..."

The subterranean rationalisation of the selling process re-creates the historic form of "booty" capitalism,^(a) where the price, for example, for a particular commodity depends not on elaborate costing procedures, but instead upon the amount of money that a particular salesman can extricate from a particular customer on each occasion.^(b) Thus, the disturbing reflection or caricature of ordinary business that fiddling represents, calls for an ambiguous and oscillating public reaction, allowing practical escape and private insulation. It is the precise absence of power backing the fiddler's production of reality-definitions that fails to donate the quality of "exhoneration" (Robin, 1974, p 259) from stigmatisation accorded to industrial and corporate activity.

Available support for practical and private self-maintenance is thus traceable to the way that crime is intricately enmeshed

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- (a) This is particularly so for invisible repair agents (i.e., those who repair or service items out of customer sight). In such case, the price of repair is considerably more than its cost (see, Strodbeck and Sussman, 1961).
- (b) Cooper (1936), and Henry (1974) both note how the "hidden economy" can only actually survive because of the patronage of the legitimate community. Henry (ibid, p 33-36) very nicely suggests that this is only explicable in terms of the norms of conventional society. Henry adds: "...Indeed a fundamental feature of the role of the consumer in industrial societies is to purchase commodities at the cheapest possible price. Consequently, there is a social tendency for most of us to purchase goods whose value is under-represented by their price. Such a purchase is known as a "bargain", and implies that we are able to get something for nothing and further that such a state of affairs is desirable... however, the recent evidence suggests that the main support of illegal sales from the thief is the legitimate businessman...". Inevitably (see the idea of "asymptotic swinging" in Chapter Four), the percolation of watered information about street-goods has reached both the high street trader (see the analysis of "flash offers" - those bargain-reductions actually printed on the container - Fair Trading, 1975) and the street-corner hustler, who, ironically, finds currently that the best way to sell legitimately cheap goods to the punters is to describe them as 'hot'! (Henry, 1975).

with everyday society (see, Bell, 1960). The subculture of fiddling is not supported by contra-values, but instead by an exasperating combination of caricatured definitions of reality.

THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

Paradox in the Practical Dispersal of Spoils

"...A very widely employed strategy of the discreditable person is to handle his risks by dividing the world into a large group to whom he tells nothing, and a small group to whom he tells all, and upon whose help he then relies..."

(Goffman, 1963, p 117)

Who can the Wellbreads salesman entrust with knowledge that they are simultaneously fiddlers? Generally, the salesman keeps tight control over information about their part-time crimes outside the work situation. Information release, when it does occur, is usually only to the wife, who provides accommodative informational support, rather than any blackmail threat. However, the salesman faces yet another dilemma here. To be overly secretive about his fiddling would be to force the self to demand to know the reasons for secrecy, thus permeating the existential membrane between the 'work' and 'real' selves. They all did, after all, tell me about their fiddling. As Henry (1975b, p 25) so cleverly deduces, some control (yet not too much) is necessary to balance (just here contradictory) psychological and practical demands. Rather than being either "open", or "secretive" about his work life, the fiddler is "careful" about such information.

In any case, paradoxically, whereas for some deviant activities, loot-dispersal can provide obvious indicators to various others that the individual has a suspect source of income, the fiddler's income is sufficiently small and regular (in most cases) to be totally immersed in the familial budget. It is also very

stable (cf. the income from professional crime, in Sutherland, 1937, p 143) - a feature which adds morals as well as budgets. Thus, rather than increased spending power indicating immorality to inquisitive neighbours, the fiddler's ability to better provide for his family is taken as indicative of his very morality.^(a)

However, within the fiddler's knowledgeable world, all finances need good management irrespective of the legality of their origin. Purchase of a new car, for example, is imbued with guilt in the eyes of peers who are in the know. Such purchases are dominated by the fact that the fiddle, however indirectly, contributed to it. When one of the salesmen bought a brand new Mercedes, it had, as one salesmen reported, unfortunate consequences:

(a) Similarly, Levens (1964, p 334) notices that most of the embezzlers in his sample spent their illicit takings on respectable (rather than naughty) middle-class things. This is often the downfall of the employee thief: to actually maintain protective claims that (for example) the theft was only for domestic use, the thief must keep incriminating evidence with him. For example, CASE 11 (13.5.73), an Army stores sergeant was fined £100 for equipping his home with army-supplied blankets, alarm clocks, dustbins, carpets, etc, and CASE 21 (24.8.73), a BBC props man was fined for furnishing his flat with props. There is also a common "magpie" pattern amongst pilferers, perhaps indicating that ability to pilfer exceeds ability to consume the spoils. For example, CASE 14 (30.6.73), two head teachers (with alleged assets of £70,000) were imprisoned for stealing property from their schools. This hoarding was not actively "obsessive" as was claimed, as they had furnished their Corsican villa from the proceeds. Police discovered, however, that their English house was crammed full of school property - including such extraordinary and useless items as bottles of school milk, and sample tubes of toothpaste. "Obsessive hoarding" does seem to characterise many employee thefts of goods. See, for example, CASE 41 (10.9.74). The defendant, billed as the "human magpie", collected a garden shed full of tools (many duplicated) from the shipyard where he worked. He claimed: "I just had a mania for collecting". In CASE 56 (20.11.74), it took police 3 days to clear the defendant's garage of goods pilfered from cargo-vessels. Police described the garage as a "miniature warehouse". The Wellbreads salesmen do not really face the consumption/dispersal problems of some of their light-fingered blue-collar colleagues as they either take money which presents no problems, or bread and cakes, which only present digestive ones.

"...you should have seen _____ (Sales manager)...went man!...hs said: 'What? second hand?' and 'W' said, 'No, 'M' registration, actually'...well, the fucking manager hit the roof, he said: 'Right, the hospital's coming off your route, and so's the Coop'..."

The salesman with the new car explained to me:

"...It gets awkward...living in this fucking great house, and now that car, when I'm out in it, and one of my customers sees me, I always say: 'It's the manager's'...they suspect you because of your standard of living...I inherited the money...I know it looks bad..I know that they all think I must be on the fiddle..."

Control of one's moral identity in the bakery, can also be punctured by events. Another salesman reported: "If you take too much out..(i.e., come short), they'll start looking around your car to see if you've bought any new tyres." In addition to this, situations can occasionally make spoils-handling impossible. On the very day that one inside dealer was sacked for 'stealing', he arrived to work in an unmistakably new car!

Obviously, if the consumption of spoils can be successfully concealed (apart from the rather extraordinary instances that I have just described) from both the public, and from the real self, then the chances of self-apprehension as deviant, and resulting guilt, are reduced. Do salesmen feel 'guilty' about their fiddling at all?

Group Ideology and Individual Guilt

The very definition of an activity as 'banned' (Matza, 1969), imbues it with guilt. That salesmen-fiddlers feel, at least part-

-ially, guilty testifies to their identification with a subterranean value tradition, and is indicated by their apparent necessity to justify their activities with a verbalisations of combinations of accounts, rather than with single lines. To give another example of this, a shoplifter studied by Weiner (1970, p 216) uses the typical presentational style of non full-time criminals. "Well, you know, I don't do it all the time. And I only get what I need. Like that mascara. But not what I don't need, because that's dumb. Nobody misses stuff in a store like that. I mean, everybody does it. It's easy to get things."

Although the successful routine public honouring of salesmen's accounts means that reality rarely intrudes to break down the defensive ideology, and although biographies are accounts are rarely checked against alternative documentation, it is inevitable that the meaning of the fiddle spreads a bit, permeates brief periods, of the conventional existence of the salesman. The problem is, as Matza (1969, p 151) puts it, is that:

"...when among the right-minded, the subject may sense his transparency... the possibility of hiding from righteous scrutiny - of being opaque - is subverted by the conscious existence of society in mind..."

There are times when living a double-life is profoundly brought home to the subject. Although the processes of socialisation (which I outlined in Chapter Two) that salesmen undergo are designed to alleviate misplaced guilt, the two realities cannot not always be held apart, and "shock" results. For instance, recruits typically experience initial shock. Their comments echo fairly standard feelings. One said: "It shocked me at the time, he didn't tell me why I had to do it"; another: "it did shock me at the time, he told me to do it if I wanted to cover shortages"; and a third, "I used to worry in case I might get caught sometimes...when I first started."

Socialisation is never fully successful (in its communicated, rather than in its meta-communicated aims), and occasionally even the experienced men feel guilty. One told me: "Yeah, I do...I worry

too much...I feel guilty about doing it," and another, that guilt was currently less of a problem than it could be, or, in fact, was:

"..Yeah, I did...I still do see it as immoral...although I don't think nothing of it...really...that's nasty, bloody horrible thing to do...I don't feel so guilty about it now, although it still strikes me as a bit immoral..."

Generally, however, residual guilt is sufficient for most of the men to dislike the fiddle ("I don't like going into a shop and fiddling them...but I have to do it") and themselves for doing it. Guilt at this level is alleviated by various counter-denunciations (especially, "they deserve it"), which are pridefully collected in gullibility testimonials, and shared with peers. The availability of shared support for illegality strengthens psychological resolve. Group defence is particularly common amongst pilfering factory workers. As Horning (1970, p 62) says:

"...the mechanisms through which these norms are conveyed to the workers appear, for the most part, to be in the form of folk tales about heroes and miscreants. These folk tales consist of congeries of episodes about pilferers - each tale bearing its own message..."

Every salesman I spoke to at Wellbreads seemed to have a gullibility-testimonial of a past event in which a salesman figured heroically. These tales were repeated to me as examples of great fiddles that had been pulled off, or, more seriously, as illustrative of moral maxims or indicators of the limits of group tolerance and the initiation of social control.

A final irony. Guilt is not necessarily a negative experience. A nicely judicious amount of guilt can in fact reinforce, rather than condemn, the practice to which the guilt is directed. To feel strongly guilty is to beg for punishment: a twinge of guilt is sufficient punishment itself.

Chapter Seven

CONCLUSION: "Part-Time Crime" and Commercial Social Control

"ULTIMATE" DEVIANCE

The very existence of such 'gullibility-testimonials' (referred to at the end of Chapter Six), indicates the lack of sincerity placed in the public/practical accounts that the Well-breads salesmen give. Obviously, too, to some extent, disbelief permeates private identity shields. The Incredible Electrical Conspirators who, in communications with each other, referred to themselves as the "Christmas card list", and to their clandestine meetings as "choir practice", did not 'really believe' that this was what they were really up to.

There is, then, some spillage-feedback. In a positive sense between publically espoused, and privately held belief; and negatively, between levels of self-conception. Public protection against practical processing denies the effect of the societal reaction, prevents an alignment between public and private selves, and maintains acknowledgement of the self-conception as the master identity.

On the one hand, whilst practical protection creates psychological safety per se, private protection may be possible even whilst the body is publically shamed and incarcerated. Sometimes, law-enforcers perceive the societal reaction, rate the effects as harmful, and subsequently aid the offender's self-insulation. Physical narcotic addicts, for example (Winick, 1964), normally have hushed-up trials, and offenders, although convicted, may refute or publically denounce the sentence. Similarly, after conviction, the General Electric vice-president (quoted in Geis, 1967, p 112) reportedly: "...issued a statement to the press, noting that he had to serve a jail term "for conduct which has been interpreted as being in conflict with complex antitrust laws..."

Sometimes, also, enforcers will agree with the public~~ly~~ false self-conceptions that rule-breakers hold. In a recent case (CASE 57: 30.11.74), three coal merchants were convicted, and sentenced to jail, for defrauding the National Coal Board by 'fiddling the weighbridge'. Releasing them, the judge explained that he had done so: "Because we feel that we can extend a measure of leniency toward these men and that it would be in the public interest at this time of year to enable them to resume Christmas coal deliveries."^(a)

Cressey (1953) also found that several convicted embezzlers found that they could maintain original protective self-conceptions even behind bars. Humphreys (1970, p 134) calls such psychological ability donning the "breastplate of righteousness". He defines it as:

"...a process whereby the threatened deviant supplements his resistance...the taking on of a protective covering, the assumption of a defensive shield to ward off social disapproval...a thick nimbus of propriety...in donning the breastplate of righteousness, the covert deviant assumes a protective shield of super-propriety..."

(a) With similar, almost touching chivalry, the prosecution dropped all charges in an £880,000 fraud case against 3 defendants when the fourth defendant was unfortunately killed in a road accident (CASE 81: 29.4.75). The prosecution claimed that they acted out of "common humanity". Also, a French perfumery found guilty of selling perfume in bottles advertised as containing "not less than 7 cc." (but in fact incapable of holding more than 5.8 cc.), were granted a conditional discharge. Doing so, the chairman of the magistrates said: "...We are of the opinion that the adverse publicity to an old established company which might occur is of far greater consequence than any monetary penalty we might impose..". To be fair, a sentimental streak seems to materialise in all occupational theft case hearings at Christmas time. Perhaps this indicates the business-like nature of, and approach to, the crime. Ross (1961, p 207) comments: "...Some companies carry their indulgence of thieves even further. One employer called in private detectives to apprehend a salesman suspected of stealing...After the man was caught, the employer promised him he would not prosecute if the salesman would sign a confession - for use with the insurance company. The salesman agreed to confess, provided he was not required to make restitution, and received a letter of recommendation - and two week's severance pay. The employer agreed. "It was just before Christmas", he explained..."

Psychic investment may become so heavy in secondary selves, that the logical strata of the self may get permanently obscured. In Humphrey's (1970) sample, one fellator was a full-time clergyman (presumably posing problems in the unbiased establishment of which 'me' is the "real" one), and the problem arises excruciatingly when both "me's" appear to demand all the actor's time.^(a)

The psychological consequences of exposure as a deviant depends upon the nature of skill development. Skills that are developed individually are backed by private insulation that is much better than public cover. Those developed subculturally, on the other hand, create an extensive public cover battery coupled with minimal private insulation. This disparity becomes particularly apparent during apprehension situations. The sorts of skills which are successful at adjusting and reconciling self-conceptions in private are insufficient for the public avoidance of legal liability. Individually developed private accounts are not publically legitimate, although they may seem privately effective and

(a) Mr. Takei, for example, is simultaneously president of Zen-ai-Kaiga (a confederation of right-wing, and gangster organisations) and a Bhuddist grand monk (Sunday Times, 7.4.74). Lemert (1967, p 126-7, 131) notes an ironic consequence: "...The (cheque) forger, by choice, enacts the form but not the substance of social roles. He lacks, avoids, or rejects conflict with reference groups which could validate those roles, or fix an underlying identity....Apart from the lack of opportunity to do so, the forger dares not put to much of what he regards as his "true self" into these identities...In a sense the forger fails because he succeeds; he is able to fend off or evade self-degradative consequences of his actions but in so doing he rejects forms of interaction necessary to convert his rewards in positive, status-specific self-evaluations...". Because fiddling, dealing and stealing are "part-time crimes" (as opposed to cheque-forgery which is "peripheral" rule-breaking), assuming that the make-total is not excessive, and can be submerged into the household budget, and thus bulwark neighbourhood status relations. Also, although the embezzler classically leads "two lives" (Jaspan and Black, 1960, p 26-7), and the forger feels that he has a "Jekyll-Hyde" character (Lemert, 1958, p 116), the total compatibility of part-time/full-time selves for the fiddler opens no such self-doubt for him.

reasonable (Scott and Lyman, 1968, p 34). Public challenges of deviance, then, will not be routinely rebuffed with the simple verbalisation of private inoculations and insulations.

The situation of possible apprehension is adequately dealt with by the fiddler because of his cynical disbelief in the 'truth' of the public accounts that he gives. Apprehension-situations do not, thus, for the salesman, precipitate shocking redefinition and realignment of the public and private self. The fiddler: "learns that a defensible picture of self can be seen as something outside oneself that can be constructed, lost, and rebuilt, all with great speed and equanimity" (Goffman, 1961, p 151). Although to some extent the degree of self-shock that will be felt on apprehension will depend on the quality of the information of a discreditable nature within the person's biography (Humphreys, 1970, p 134), over-insulation of the self denies the theoretical possibility of apprehension, and thus, idle inner debate cannot prepare the self. In this way, as Cameron (1964, p 150-163) puts it, the shock of entrapment hits 'selfmade' deviants particularly hard:

"...In attempting to explain away their thefts, adult pilferers were using the lies, rationalisations, and alibis characteristic of children caught in acts considered reprehensible by adults...(some) continue feeling that although they are adults, they are, in fact, acting as naughty children and not really criminal ...Store detectives use the naivete of pilferers as an assistance in arrest procedures...it becomes increasingly clear to the pilferer that he is considered a thief and is in imminent danger of being hauled into court and publically exhibited as such. The realisation is often accompanied by a dramatic change in attitudes; and by severe emotional disturbance...'This can't be happening to me'...'This is a nightmare', 'Oh, why, oh why can't I find out that it isn't so'..."

Apprehension also forces changes in the insulation procedures that allowed the infraction in the first instance. Cressey (1953, p 100) notes: "Those who realise that they are 'in too deep' are

forced to recognise that their reasoning in regard to borrowing has been "phony" or that they have been "kidding themselves"...". For the fiddler, it is inability of wounded others to disclose the partial self of the salesman which aids him. Manipulation of practical accounts (and non-alignment of practical outcomes with self-sustenance) means that public or private discrediting work does not spread the deviance, in a psychological sense, to the complete, real self.

For salesmen, the control context of action is commercial, rather than moral-legal. Above the level of successful adjustment to ban, deviant instances are theoretically "primary".^(a) Briefly, this is because the very nature of embarrassment re-normalises commercial settings (and fails to stigmatise fiddlers), after the fracture of entrapment. In the exceedingly rare instances when fiddlers who are 'caught-out' are processed by the legitimate courts, then their re-employment (and subsequent deviant action as thus theoretically "secondary") would be an impossibility for insurance reasons. Salesmen have to be 'bonded' by an insurance company (as do all blue-collar cash-handling employees) who do not willingly guarantee those with a record of failure.

Thus, public enforcement is private reenforcement of partial and part-time deviant selves. Since secondary deviation is not a

(a) As defined by Lemert (1964, p 17): "Primary deviation is assumed to arise in a wide variety of social, cultural and psychological contexts, and it best has only marginal implications for the psychic structure of the individual; it does not lead to symbolic reorganisation at the level of self-regarding attitudes and social roles." I do not wish to directly engage the theoretical problems of the labeling perspective. One further point, however. There is a sense in which fiddling cannot avoid being defined as "secret deviance" (Becker, 1963, p 20: "Here an improper act is committed, yet noone notices it or reacts to it as a violation of the rules"). Later Becker (1973, p 48) defines "secret deviance (as being) consist(ing) of being vulnerable to the commonly used procedures for discovering deviance of a particular kind, of being in a position where it will be easy to make the definition stick." In other words, exactly the same thing. However, it does notice one feature not shared by the fiddler: the fiddler (and here "ultimate" replaces "secret") has no chance of being processed as such. If caught out and transferred to legal processing, he would be processed as a thief or as an embezzler, and not as a fiddler.

possibility (for the reasons just outlined), then this additionally experienced deviance should be renamed "ultimate" deviation. It is not quite primary (in the psychological sense that would be appropriate to shoplifters who have never been caught), and yet, enforcement attempts do not force realignment of self-levels which would precipitate secondary deviation. Instead, enforcement re-grounds, and empirically and publically embeds hitherto private definitions.

Since theft is so basically contradictory to the ideal values of capitalism (and business), there will not, in the future, be mass rallies or public meetings for fiddlers to attend, to protest their self-consciousness, and to tactically adopt a secondary deviation pose as a strategy for eventually release from stigmatisation. Fiddlers-lib would not gather much support: from the fiddlers themselves, let alone their victims. Self-belief in public accounts is created by retreat into consonance of self-conception precipitated by successful control. The possibility of successfully situated "selves" implies that exposure as a practitioner need not elect the partial self to the existential pantheon, nor need it increase the occasional use of the part-time self to regular and full-time significance.

A NOTE ON COMMERCIAL SOCIAL CONTROL

"...Apprehension for department store trust violation, then, results in automatic discharge, but only infrequently in prosecution...therefore, legal action against dishonest department store employees as an occupational group must be considered minimal.."
 (Robin, 1967, p 688, 689)

"...In other words, only 5 percent of the convicted offenders were sentenced to prison. Nonpunitive sentences were given in 95 percent of the cases. And of the nonpunitive sentences, most were nominal, representing minimal judicial action. Employee thieves, obviously, are among the least stigmatised offenders in American society..."
 (Clinard and Quinney, 1967, p 201, commenting on Robin 1967. Emphasis added)

These two quotations aptly, if a little bluntly, summarise the typical dispositional career of the employee offender in any capitalist setting.^(a) Whilst I undertook research as Wellbreads, no salesman was ever taken to court for theft, either by the firm, or by one of it's customers.^(b) Those few who were "caught out" (discussed in Chapter Six), successfully managed to wriggle off the judicial hook before any involvement with official law-enforcement agencies. One man's reminiscence is sufficient here:

(a) See Chapter Six. Whilst it is business which is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the generation of fiddling, it is the capitalist version of it which is responsible for the excessively light penalties for practitioners.

(b) Mars (1974, p 223) similarly notes that none of the dockers that he studied were legally prosecuted, and Zeitlin (1971, p 24) caustically notes that during his one-year study of a large American clothing store, 32 employees were discharged for stealing, and none had been prosecuted.

"...I got caught proper after I started, I had to carry on where the other bloke left off, or it would have looked bad... it was a bit embarrassing going back there at first, but she just seemed to think of it as amusing, she seemed to treat it as a victory...he had told me to take some old loaves out, and put them on top and book them but she'd marked them all, put little crosses on them!...I just had to admit it, there wasn't anything else I could say..(another time, this salesman was reported to the Managing Director of Wellbreads)..he said to me that my name had been mentioned to him, about discrepancies, between certain dates, and I said to him: 'I was on holiday for two of those dates'...and he said: 'don't make excuses!'...so I just shut up! and he said: 'If your name is mentioned again, you're going to take a long walk up the road'...normally if you get caught, they leave it to you, well, the best person to see is _____ (a supervisor), he'll go down there and sort it out, and you'll probably keep the call..."

The control context of occupational theft is one of bland tolerance. As Cavan (1964, p 235) puts it: "It represents a practical adjustment of legal behaviour to meet certain inconveniences and exigencies of socio-economic life." Added to systematic failure to effectively and publically sanction offenders, is a general resistance to notifying future prospective employers of a sacked employee that he has been suspected of a criminal offence, or that any unofficial action has been taken against him. This is not born out of an altruistic desire to allow an employee to start afresh after penance for a 'mistake', but rather out of a more cynical regard for possible legal reprisals which might be sparked off if unofficially handled misdemeanors are mentioned in testimonials. (a)

But although occupational theft may be non-reverberative in the moral sense, the most minor occupational theft may have considerable implications for the offender's occupational status. For

(a) Jaspan and Black (1960, p 242) call this the "flareback" risk.

example, (CASE 34: 19.6.74), an N.C.B. office employee was sacked from his job for stealing £1.25 worth of office stationery from the N.C.B., while he was (unsuccessfully, as it turned out) campaigning as a Tory Law-and-Order candidate in a municipal election! In CASE 44 (22.10.74) a chief inspector of police who falsified his travel expenses to the tune of £46 was fined £55, but was additionally sacked from his job, and automatically forfeited his rights to an annual pension of £1,700 per annum. Further, as Martin (1962, p 75) notes, systematic concealment of offences from official statistics (and, come to that, from official enforcers) abrogates the need for a full, legal trial (and all that might entail for the defendant), but nevertheless creates the possibility that employees may be sacked for offences for which under law they could only be described, at best, as 'suspects'. The considerable reticence that most employers display in dutifully passing all cases of employee theft to the police reflects very well grounded fears that the cost of doing so could be indirectly prohibitive. The arrest of three baggage loaders at Heathrow Airport on the 5th August, 1973, on suspicion of pilferage, sparked off an immediate walk-out by 500 fellow T.W.A. baggage-handlers, grounding all Pan Am and T.W.A. flights for seven hours. Another 1,500 ground staff from other airlines soon came out in protest (H-CUTTINGS: 3: 5.8.73; 4: 19.8.73).^(a) By the 8th August, a K.L.M. shop-steward apparently

(a) In these two cases, reticence in taking employee-thieves to court is well-founded upon the belief that such action will be considerably uneconomic in the short-term. Very large tracts of goods-in-transit management land (such as docks, airport termini, and railway property) are a special case inasmuch as they are policed by special police forces empowered to act under the 1927 Special Constabulary Act. Thus, Heathrow is policed by 380 Airport Police (dubbed "Toytown Police", and the "Plastic Policemen" by loaders, H-CUTTING 3j: 12.8.73) of which only 25 are of the plain-cloths investigative branch. Although newspaper estimates of losses at 'Theifrow' have been astronomical (from £5 millions per year by the Daily Express, H-CUTTING 1: 15.11.71, to £8 millions per year by the Daily Mail, H-CUTTING 3g: 8.8.73), official estimates have been considerably smaller. In August 1973 (H-CUTTING 3h: 10.8.73), the B.A.A. released figures showing that in the first six months of 1973, £615,000 was stolen (this figure included an armed robbery of £500,000) compared with £446,000 stolen during the whole of 1972. By July, 1974, (H-CUTTING 14: 23.6.74) a Tory M.P. claimed that the B.A.S. lost £377,000 in 1972 compared with £280,000 in 1971, and £233,000 in 1970. However, if these figures are put

speaking on behalf of 10,000 men claimed that baggage-loaders would in future be armed with pick-axe handles (H-CUTTING 3g: 8.8.73) to deal with any plain clothes policemen suspected of snooping on ground staff operations. When police tried to get all staff to wear identity tags on the 16th August, more trouble flared, and on the 18th, there was another (this time, two-hour) walk-out when more ground staff were searched by police. Similarly, (CASE 56: 20.11.74), 300 warehousemen recently walked off the Ipswich docks in protest against a police inquiry into alleged thefts of goods from the port. Five days later, another 37 men refused to turn a Polish ship around because they believed that the cargo had been broken into in Poland and that they would be blamed for any missing items. Nevertheless, five men were eventually and successfully prosecuted for large-scale pilferage at the same docks.

"Caught", for the employee thief, rarely means "court". Nevertheless, the employer's attitude is not wholly practical. If the case in hand is located as unambiguously one of "theft" (rather than as acceptable "pilferage" - see Chapter Four for an extended discussion of this), or, rather, as vaguely "serious",

(Contd) into some sort of perspective, a much milder picture emerges. Firstly, it seems acceptable to suggest that two quite distinct forms of criminal organisation operate at Heathrow: involving both "full-time", and "part-time" criminals. The first form would appear to account for the platinum thefts (H-CUTTING 12: 27.2.74), gold bar thefts (H CASE 6), the car-parking frauds (H CASE 1), gem thefts (H CASES: 2,4,5,7,8,13), and traveller's cheque frauds (H CASE 15). The second ("part-time" thefts) are almost exclusively for baggage pilfering and small-time receiving (H CASES, 3.9.11.12.14,16). The first sort, the "full-time" criminals are allegedly referred to as the "heavy mob" (Daily Express, H-CUTTING 1: 15.11.71), and the "part-time" criminals as either "small potatoes" (ibid), or as "dipper gangs" (Daily Express, H-CUTTING 3f: 8.8.73). But, secondly, even without this distinction, the total loss at Heathrow is not great. Heathrow is a small town of over 52,000 working people with an annual passenger flow of over 60 million visitors. Total arrests for theft in 1972 (B.A.A. figures) were only 376, of which only 79 were employees. Heathrow has at least £3,1000 millions of freight moved every year (Financial Times, H-CUTTING 3d: 7.8.73), as well as at least £2,000 millions in passenger valuables. This totals roughly £5,000 millions, of which the admitted theft of £½ million annually only amounts to 0.001% of the total. Compared with a similar freight flow, Liverpool docks (H-CUTTING, 3i: 12.8.73) lose a relatively unpublicised £148,000 from thefts, per year.

then community responsibility and civic duty magically appear to spring to the forefront of concern, and often quite irrational efforts are made to prosecute in the courts.^(a) But such prosecutions are often difficult to secure successfully. The 'fungibility' (see Chapter One) of some stolen items renders them inadmissible as prima facie evidence (Davis, 1957, p 223), and the interactional 'invisibility' of some part-time crimes coupled with the lack of inventory evidence of loss, quite frankly, would make many prospective cases "untrialable" (Newman, 1958, p 740).

Sometimes, the court will refuse to accept informally the covert declaration that the matter is to be treated as a mala in se offence (derived from the very decision to prosecute), and redefine the infraction as merely the breach of mala prohibita rules. For example, (CASE 29a: 6.2.74), a housewife facing 30 charges of thefts from a clothing store where she worked, which had been committed over a period of 17 months, was bailed for merely £10. However, whilst the inter-industry disposition rate varies considerably (Martin, 1962, p 86, found that the larger firms in his sample prosecuted 41% of cases, and smaller firms in only 24% of cases; and Robin, 1967, p 689, discovered that whereas banks tend to prosecute in 87% of all cases of theft by employees, shops only take 17% of their miscreants to court), and is generally low, this is matched by a generally high level of successful prosecution. Robin (1967, p 696) comments:

(a) To decide that a case of loss is "theft" is the same sort of decision as that of deciding whether or not to prosecute (see, Chapter Four). In other words, it is made on the basis of eternally empirically ad hoc criteria. Although the broad empirical outlines of such decisions are clear (i.e., as Robin, 1967, p 693 shows, the size of theft is generally very important, with a significant break at the \$100 level for American department store employee thieves: 19% of those who stole less than \$100 were prosecuted, and 57% of those who stole more). Ability to recover a lost amount is also conducive to a benign decision. However, these empirical features are never quite enough to produce a successful prediction of the outcome of the decision as to whether or not to prosecute.

"...Two hundred and fifty-six of the 259 prosecuted trust violators in Companies A, B and C were convicted, 249 (96 percent) pleading guilty. This near-perfect conviction record was a result of the companies' very careful selection of whom to prosecute and when..."

The vigour with which prosecution is concluded is a little watered, however, by the sentencing policies normally consulted for employee offenders. Robin (1967, p 697) continues:

"...The offender was fined in 73 of the 256 cases. The average fine imposed was 72 dollars for those receiving any fine, and 20 dollars for all convicted offenders; one quarter of the fines were 100 dollars or more...The offender's sentence was suspended in 55 percent of the 256 cases. Among those given any suspended sentence, the average length was 11 months, with two-thirds given less than 1 year and only 9 percent 3 years or more...the offender was put on probation in 46 percent of the 256 cases..."

In real terms, then, the judicial disposition of occupational thieves is non penal. Only 12 percent of Robin's sample (*ibid*, p 698), were imprisoned. However, the fines given to convicted "quiet" criminals are usually wholly disproportionate to their ability to make restitution. As Geis (1974, p 350) notes, with a touch of asperity, "the \$437,000 fine against General Electric was equivalent to a \$3 parking fine for a man with an income of \$175,000 a year." But whilst this inequality is generally beneficial to white-collar offenders, the fine is just randomly disproportionate to the cost of the crime for blue-collar offenders.

For example, in CASE 1 (19.1.73), four blue-collar employees prosecuted for stealing stock worth £1,200 from a crisp factory were only fined from between £20 and £40 each. Conversely, in CASE 3 (21.1.73), a railway porter accused of stealing newspapers valued at 57p from a train, was fined £20, and ordered to pay £20 costs. In the first case, the fines amounted to 1-3 percent of the cost of the loss, whereas in the second, the fine amounted to 40 times the original loss.

Nevertheless, irrespective of the high rate of successful prosecutions which employees are able to secure against their employee offenders, taking people to court is a costly and time-consuming venture. The usual managerial folk-wisdom quite accurately reflects this: the normal (cynical, and perhaps ironic) conclusion is non-moral tolerance of employee theft is cheaper than preventing it in the first place,^(a) or than attempting to recover the loss through the courts. Whilst there may be specific cases where court action might secure considerable restitution, in general, and as far as employers are concerned, there is no room for civic sentimentality in business. A policy of prosecuting all those employees against whom employers have sufficient evidence to proceed with a prosecution would unremittably clog the courts, and bankrupt most of the economy.

Accordingly, the realistic context (and the structural guarantee) of "part-time crime" lies in the nature of the commercial social control setting in which it is immediately, primarily and initially enmeshed. The courts, even when invoked, are merely a secondary offence processing capability, only to be used if inadvertantly involved (when a third party calls in the police without first attempting commercial control), or on those few occasions when the offence seems to warrant definition as a "real" crime, and the commercial deterrence milieu a little direct bolstering.

These considerations reflect a major difference in the processing and controlling of "quiet", rather than "classical" crimes. The context of occupational crime is commercial social control. In the factory, "crime" is absorbed into ordinary work-life. It is "just another management problem" (Factory M. & M.,

(a) See, for example, Ross (1961, p 143), and Palmer (1973, p 21) for a discussion of this. Industrial security is very expensive (just the 7 biggest companies in America have joint earnings of \$ 648 millions per year, CUTTINGS, 34: 5.5.75). However, individual losses are difficult to calculate, as there are several ways of establishing the extent of loss, all giving different amounts.

1954, p 85). In brief, if legal control may be characterised as having a moral basis, guilt-orientation, formally bureaucratic style, technical-judicial decision making, and public hearings; then, in contrast, commercial social control has a calculative basis, a profit orientation, an eclectic ad hocness in the procedures by which it comes to decisions, a "rough" sense of justice, with mock 'trials' held in private. Not to put too fine a point on it, commercial social control is everything that legal social control should not be. I will now treat four crucial differentiating dimensions (discovery-pattern, treatment ideology, aims, and procedures) in a little more detail in order to tease out some of the practical implications of the commercial control setting.

Commercial social control features a random rather than systematic offence discovery pattern. A basic problem is noted by Jaspán and Black (1960, p 51):

"...An auditor must conclude, after he examines the documents which have been falsified by defaulters in a wide variety of cases, that the modern embezzler may be assumed to be sufficiently clever to fabricate the documents which the auditor expects to see..."

Systematic discovery being thus impractical, it is chiefly replaced by accidental offence discovery. For example, Smith (1920, p 54) recalls a case when an employer spotted a clerk in his employ wearing an \$18 shirt - when he was only receiving wages of \$25 a week. Further enquiries revealed that the employee was purchasing them by the dozen! Ross (1961, p 142) cites several similar cases. A concealed theft 'ring' broken merely because store detectives opened the wrong locker and found a duplicate official stamp; a fishing tackle wholesaler who didn't discover that he had a \$40,000 shortage until police told him that similar gear was being sold in a nearby town at very low prices; and a laundry employee who was serving several "anonymous" calls was only discovered when these calls telephoned the depot to complain of late delivery! In CASE 16 (18.7.73), an office cleaner stole two opera tickets from her

employer, and was caught when she tried to claim her seats at the theatre from her boss who had meanwhile obtained two duplicate ones!

Supplementing accidental discovery, is discovery through legitimate indirect external collusion. In CASE 24 (19.9.73), the great 'Ford Scrap Fiddle', Ford only discovered that they were losing scrap when an analyst discovered that the company were buying scrap which had originated with the firm. Similarly, Tocchio (1962, p 56), cites a case where a company shoe salesman, soliciting orders from a local retail dealer, was told by the dealer that he could get the same shoes for less money elsewhere; from one of the company's stock-room clerks, at it transpired! At Wellbreads, only the "professional" salesmen systematically buy-off this possibility by bringing the retail purchaser of the 'hot' bread into the illicit action.

In terms of treatment ideology, the private administration of justice generates its "rough", rather than "fine" judicial profile. At Wellbreads, the managing director is prosecuting counsel, judge, and jury. One inside dealer, dismissed (with references) for dealing, said:

"...so I went in there (Managing Director's office) and there was these two security men from Head Office, in there with him... well, he told them they could wait outside, and these was just him and _____ (Bakery Manager) in the corner scribbling notes. _____ (Managing Director) said to me: 'I've got a signed statement here alleging that you and the said _____ (alleged accomplice) took £62 worth of cake on October 3rd, do you plead Guilty, or Not Guilty?'...Well, the first thing I said was 'What a load of rubbish, let me see that statement'...so he let me see it, see, but he kept his finger over that bit where it was signed...Then I said: 'Before I go any further, I want to see my solicitor', and he said: 'Well, in that case, we will have no option but to go to the police'...Then I thought a bit, see, and I thought: 'Well, if they do that, the amount of stuff I've nicked in my time, I might get 12 years!'...so I said: 'Well, I admit to that, except for the bit which includes _____, I did it by myself'...."

An alternative is the quasi-official, selectively public kangaroo-courts periodically held by firms like Cadbury-Schweppes, and Rowntree-Mackintosh (CASE 2: 29.1.73). Here, a panel of 'judges' (often including trade union representatives), decides upon an appropriate punishment for those employees actually caught stealing. This is quite within the law, and this particular case (CASE 2) received a stamp of official approval from the Assistant Chief Constable of Birmingham. On occasion, however, secondary justice of this sort can succeed where primary processing fails. CASE 48 (9.11.74) reports that 40 policemen officially cleared of looting an overturned lorry were subsequently fined by their Chief Constable, rather nicely demonstrating that "rough" justice may bluntly override "fine".

The aims of commercial social control are assimilative (rather than coercive), and restitutive and preventative, rather than retributive and apprehension-orientated. Pragmatic, rather than moral entrepreneurship fires crises and reform (for example, CUTTING 4: 14.3.73 mentions scaffolding-theft by employees, and thus cites 'safety' as the main reason for heavier penalties for offenders), and the 'disturbed offender' category for offenders (introduced alongside the 'normal' and the 'crooked' as standard judicial interpretative categories) is wholly absent.

In procedural terms, the profit rather than guilt orientation underlies an essentially practical approach to infraction. As Martin (1962, p 104) aptly comments: "Their (employers) policy may be described as a mixture of humanity and expediency." Justice may well be rough, but this alone does not necessarily make it inhuman. It doesn't make it democratic either. The practical approach to prevention has spawned a related form of control: commercial psychological control. Since it is the threat of enforcement which is so effective, the (psychological) threat of control may easily be substituted for control itself. Palmer (1973, p 21) adds:

"...There's also the administrative factor to be considered. As one director of an engineering company put it: 'Security can entail so much paperwork that you reach the ridiculous situation of it becoming more expensive to stop pilfering than to let it continue. But this same company used a bit cunning in overcoming - or at least containing - their problems. Concluding that it was the processing of paperwork in stock control that was unjustifiably expensive, it retained the forms, but did away with the administrative checking. 'In other words', said the director, 'employees assume that in having to fill in stock requisition sheets some sort of follow-up check is made. It's a psychological tactic that has proved reasonable effective'..."

Recently, at Heathrow, (H-CASE 13: 6.10.73) an electronic bleeper device contained in a small box and disguised as a parcel of gems, was, to the accompaniment of a fanfare of national publicity, allegedly put to work to catch light-fingered loaders. (Only one employee has subsequently been caught in this way). However, the wholly practical emphasis on control, and the subsequent transformation of control from a moral to a technological issue actually detracts from the morally-dependant success of psychological control. Frequent changes in credit-card phone codes (to reduce 'phreaking', CUTTING 6: 16.9.73), periodic re-programming of parking-lot entry cards (to prevent Los Angeles undergraduates from using duplicated computer cards, CUTTING 34: 6.5.75), and the exchange of plastic for lead on the seals running through the locks on lorry containers (to stop driver-pilferage, CUTTING 36, 18.5.75), inadvertently confers a mantle of gamey respectability upon the very practices it is designed to prevent.

Although neither the Wellbread management nor the firm's customers use these advanced technological control aids (being a small firm allows them to be 'old fashioned' in their methods), their approach to occupational theft is primarily commercial. Most offences are summarily and immediately dealt with ('Put that bloody loaf down!!!'), and laughingly dismissed. Those few defined as theft, proceed to the Managing Director, where they receive even more summary (but considerably less amusing) treatment.

There were only apocryphal cases of employees who had been defined as having committed sufficiently "serious" crimes to warrant passage to the courts.

CONCLUSIONS

"...I have at times doubted whether the prolongation of this work has had any other basis than an inability on my part to come to a conclusion..."

(Charles Booth reflecting upon The Life and Labour of the People of London, quoted in Abrams, 1968, p 63.)

Conclusions, it is sometimes said, are introductions written in the past tense. I shall not try here to recapitulate what was said in the introduction. To write an introduction posing a few hypothetical problems; to examine these problems in the thesis itself; and then to retrospectively assess the merits of that examination is part of the conventional doctoral rhetoric into which I have tried hard to avoid lapsing. In other words, I wrote the introduction last, and the aims presented there faithfully reflected the body of the (already complete) thesis.^(a) This conclusion does not have the conventional functional role of teasing out and aptly sequencing the major discoveries. I hope it does two things: count as an interesting contribution in its own right, and, nevertheless, build upon the succeeding material.

(a) One point. I have not resolved the phenomenalist/essentialist tension: but I have at least not avoided it. I have perhaps quoted too many lengthy speeches from the salesmen. But if I have, it was consciously done to allow the subjects to speak for themselves. And more than that. I have allowed them to speak the analysis for themselves. In case it is thought that some of the quotations are superfluous, I disagree. The quotations (and this prescription includes the quotations from other authors), do not elaborate or illustrate points succinctly made in the text: the quotations are part of the text, and more than that, they are the part wherein much of the analysis lies.

These features which guarantee the practical "part-timeness" of blue-collar occupational theft, serve also to produce and maintain its psychological "partiality". The structural features of the commercial control setting most emphatically do not produce the conditions of identity degradation, although they do provide normal channels for transferring miscreants from penultimate commercial, to ultimate legal realms. Following Garfinkel's (1956) check-list of the essential conditions of successful self-degradation; the caught, but non-court blue-collar employee thief is not defined as "out of the ordinary"; neither the theft nor the thief is naturally treated as an example of a phenomenally extraordinary batch of similar occurrences. Contrary to public denunciation, there is no social metaphysic demanding a perceptive similarity between audience and denouncer, and no great show is made of rallying ultimate societal values to the defence of the prosecution.

"Ultimately" (both in the lay sense, and in the special sense outlined above), the fiddling Wellbreads bread salesman manages to preserve his self, and conduct his occupational life, as well as his private life, as a "good" citizen.

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List of Abbreviations Used in the Bibliography

A.J.S.	American Journal of Sociology
Am. Anthropol.	American Anthropologist
Am. Crim. L. Quart.	American Criminal Law Quarterly
Am. Soc.	American Sociologist
Annals A.A.S.P.S.	Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science
A.P.A. Psychiatric Res. Rep	American Psychiatric Association Psychiatric Research Reports
A.S.Q.	Administrative Science Quarterly
A.S.R.	American Sociological Review
Behav. Sci.	Behavioural Science
B.J.Crim.	British Journal of Criminology
B.J.L.S.	British Journal of Law and Society
B.J.S.	British Journal of Sociology
Crim. and Del.	Crime and Delinquency
Econ. and Soc.	Economy and Society
Fed. Prob.	Federal Probation
H.J.Pen.C.P.	Howard Journal of Penology and Crime Prevention
Hum. Rels.	Human Relations
Ind. Man.	Industrial Management
J.Acc.	Journal of Accountancy
J.A.Folk	Journal of American Folklore
J.C.L., C., & P.S.	Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science
J.C.L.& C.	Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
J.Econ. Hist.	Journal of Economic History
J. of H. & S.B.	Journal of Health and Social Behaviour
J.S.S.	Jewish Social Studies
Law & C.Probs.	Law and Contemporary Problems
L. Soc. Rev	Law and Society Review
Man. Rev	Management Review
N. Tax J.	National Tax Journal
Phil. Soc. Sci.	Philosophy of Social Science Journal
P.S.R.	Pacific Sociological Review

Psy. Res. Rep.	Psychiatric Research Reports
Psy. Rev.	Psychiatric Review
Sat. Ev. P.	Saturday Evening Post
Soc. Forces	Social Forces
Sociol.	Sociology
Sociom.	Sociometry
Soc. Inq.	Sociological Inquiry
Soc. Stud.	Sociological Studies
Soc. Probs.	Social Problems
Soc. Quart.	Sociological Quarterly
Soc. Res.	Social Research
Soc. Rev.	Sociological Review
Soc. and Soc Rev.	Sociology and Social Research
U.L.C.	Urban Life and Culture
Wis. Law. Rev.	Wisconsin Law Review
Wis. Soc.	Wisconsin Sociologist
W.P.C.S.	Working Papers in Cultural Studies