



Durham E-Theses

The main philosophical idea in the writings of Muhammad Iqbal (1877 - 1938)

Hassan, Riffat

How to cite:

Hassan, Riffat (1968) *The main philosophical idea in the writings of Muhammad Iqbal (1877 - 1938)*, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/7986/>

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full Durham E-Theses policy](#) for further details.

THE MAIN PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS
IN THE WRITINGS OF MUHAMMAD
IQBAL (1877 - 1938)

VOLUME 1

BY

RIFFAT HASSAN

Thesis submitted to the Faculty
of Arts in the University of
Durham for the Degree of Doctor
of Philosophy.

MARCH 1968

School of Oriental Studies,
Elvet Hill,
Durham.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
No quotation from it should be published without
his prior written consent and information derived
from it should be acknowledged.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS ENTITLED "MAIN PHILOSOPHICAL

IDEAS IN THE WRITINGS OF MUHAMMAD IQBAL.

(1877 - 1938)"

- I. Chapter One contains the biographical details of Iqbāl's life.
- II. Chapter Two is concerned with Iqbāl's Theory of Knowledge. Man gains knowledge of inner and outer reality by means of sense-perception, reason and intuition. The emphasis is on Intuition or "Ishq"?
- III. Chapter Three contains Iqbāl's views on Space and Time. Of special importance is the distinction Iqbāl draws between serial time and pure duration.
- IV. Chapter Four gives Iqbāl's views about the Universe and God. Nature is a phase of God's consciousness. God is both immanent and transcendent, and is also constantly creative. All life is individual and the scale of egohood runs from the almost-inert (matter) to the Ultimate Ego (God).
- V. Chapter Five deals with the Self - the pivot of Iqbāl's thought and deals with questions relating to the reality, origin, evolution and nature of the Self, the freedom of the will, man's destiny, and personal immortality.
- VI. Chapter Six describes the stages of the development of the Self and the factors which strengthen or weaken 'Khudī' (Selfhood). It also deals with Iqbāl's conception of the Perfect Man and the influences which have a bearing on it.
- VII. Chapter Seven is concerned with the salient ideas underlying Iqbāl's religious (and socio-political) philosophy - 'Tauhīd' (the oneness of God), Muhammad (the Perfect Man for excellence), prayer, the difference between 'mystic and 'prophetic' consciousness, Iblīs (Satān) and the personal relationship between God and Man.

VIII. Chapter Eight gives Iqbal's views on the Nature, Function and Importance of Art.

IX. Chapter Nine describes the development of Iqbal's political philosophy from its first stages to the last. Special stress is laid on the universal nature of Iqbal's vision. This Chapter also elucidates Iqbal's ideas about Pan-Islamism, Imperialism, Socialism, Democracy and the relationship between the individual and the community.

X. In the conclusion an attempt is made to see Iqbal's philosophical position as a whole, to understand the essential aims of his philosophy and the degree of its indebtedness to various sources and traditions, and to evaluate Iqbal's contribution to modern philosophy.

D E D I C A T I O N .

It was my mother who first led me to the magic world of poetry and philosophy. To her, who has been my greatest friend and teacher in life, I dedicate this study, with deep love and gratitude.

RIFFAT HASSAN.

P R E F A C E

The enormous output of work which has been done on Iqbāl in recent years, particularly in Pākistān, is enough to deter any prospective research student. One would be inclined to think after seeing the Iqbāl-bibliography that all possible avenues of research are virtually closed, that all that is needed or had to be done, has been done. But, in fact, this is not the case. Although every major bookshop in Pākistān has a section on 'Iqbāliyāt', yet the truth is, that by far the greater bulk of the work done on Iqbāl touches only a very limited part of his art and thought. Apart from the work of some devoted Iqbāl-scholars, including some European and American writers (notably Professor Bausani, Professor Schimmel, Dr. Jan Marek, and Professor Whittemore), most writings on Iqbāl are merely repetitive and devoid of any deep insight or critical apprehension. This applies equally to the work of Iqbāl's admirers and his detractors. When the subjective element has been sifted from the objective comment, one is left with disappointingly little to guide a student who wishes to understand the complex world of Iqbāl's thought.

As a philosopher, Iqbāl has won wider acceptance outside Pākistān than in Pākistān. Iqbāl's position as a

poet and as a political figure rests secure, but Iqbāl the philosopher is still a long way from being generally recognised. The average literate man in Pākistān knows vaguely that Iqbāl is a philosopher and probably also knows something about some of his concepts (such as the concept of 'Khudī') but if one were to question him further, one would discover that to him the philosophising of Iqbāl is no different from the philosophising of most other poets. Most poets tend to philosophise, he would say, and so does Iqbāl. Perhaps he philosophises a little more than the others - that is why he is known as a poet-philosopher.

Nor is this the view only of the layman. While I was in Pākistān collecting material for this study, I had an opportunity of meeting several post-graduate students reading Iqbāl's philosophy for one of their M.A. papers. To my profound amazement, I learnt that most of them did not consider Iqbāl a philosopher at all. Their opinion, I discovered, was based on one common idea - that there is no system in Iqbāl's thinking. Some of them attributed this lack of system to the fact that Iqbāl had not written any 'text-book' of philosophy. It is rather surprising that Iqbāl's Lectures - which, incidentally, are read by few other than students of philosophy - are not considered by many to be a philosophical work. It is undeniable that

the Lectures are hard to understand. The arguments very often do not follow a logical order and are not laid out systematically. There are frequent repetitions and digressions. Nonetheless, the Lectures are a major contribution to world philosophy. But even if it is conceded that they do not constitute a 'textbook' of philosophy, or disregarded altogether, Iqbāl - on the strength of his poetry alone - would still qualify for the title of a philosopher. There are, after all, as many different varieties of philosophers as there are of poets. All poets do not write in rhymed verse; all philosophers do not write 'textbooks.'

But the general idea - that there is no system in Iqbāl's thinking - must be considered carefully. In my opinion, it is the chief obstacle in the way of Iqbāl's recognition as a philosopher. This idea is based on the assumption that every philosopher has a philosophic system. I accept the validity of this assumption. Random philosophising, however brilliant, does not make a philosopher. There must be discernible in the thinking of a philosopher, at least the outlines of a structure formed by his most important ideas and concepts. The question 'Is Iqbāl a philosopher?' can, then, be resolved into the question 'does Iqbāl have a philosophic system?' In my opinion, the answer is - not just that Iqbāl has such a system but

that it is remarkably consistent in some ways - as this study hopes to show.

It is not possible to say precisely why so many readers of Iqbāl - including students of philosophy - should fail to see any method in his thinking. It is possible to suggest several answers. To my mind the two most important causes or reasons for the widely-prevalent opinion that Iqbāl has no philosophic system, are a) his prominence as a poet and as a political figure; b) the fundamental opposition between poetry and philosophy.

To a considerable extent Iqbāl's prominence as a poet and as a political figure obscures his importance as a philosopher. Compared with a poet, a philosopher's appeal is naturally far more limited. Many more people read Keats than read Kant. Furthermore when one has grown up believing Iqbāl to be first and foremost, a poet - as most Pākistānīs, at least of the present generation, have done, it is not always easy to see him as a philosopher. Coleridge, for instance, was also a metaphysician, but to most people he is simply a poet.

Not only does Iqbāl the poet, but also Iqbāl the spiritual founder of Pākistān, stands in the light of Iqbāl the philosopher. Strictly speaking, Iqbāl was never a politician though he participated in politics. As he himself admitted,

his interest in politics was only secondary. But this confession which is of fundamental importance from the viewpoint of students of his philosophy, is brushed aside in the enthusiasm of a young nation to make him a political hero. Iqbāl was, of course, one of the pioneers of the independence movement. In fact, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that if there had been no Iqbāl there might well have been no Pākistān. The influence he wielded was tremendous. His personal reputation - not only as a poet, but also as a man of unswerving convictions and incorruptible honesty - had a great deal to do with the rallying of Muslims under the banner upheld by the Qā'id-e-A'zam Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāh. Nevertheless it is wrong, in my opinion, to give Iqbāl, the political leader, precedence over Iqbāl, the philosopher. The political circumstances of his time had, of course, a considerable influence on his philosophy. But Iqbāl was, essentially a philosopher and not a politician. A politician's actions and utterances are determined, to a large extent, by motives of political expediency. His philosophy, in other words, is derived from his politics. But in Iqbāl's case, his political views are derived from his philosophy. It seems to me that if this distinction is not clearly made, it is not possible to arrive at a fair estimate of Iqbāl as a philosopher (particularly as a political philosopher).

Something also needs to be said about the opposition between poetry and philosophy. A number of people have difficulty in accepting as philosophy what is written in the form of poetry. By its very nature, poetry working through symbols avoids statement and prefers suggestion, whereas philosophy dealing with logical categories and concepts, demands preciseness in thought and expression. Therefore, in a sense, a poet-philosopher is a paradox. But this paradox finds its basis in human nature itself. There is, in human beings, a straining both towards, and away from, definition of thought and feeling. This psychological phenomenon has found different expressions and outlets at different times in the history of literature and philosophy. Sometimes it has led to poetry becoming philosophical, as in the case of the metaphysical poets; sometimes to philosophy becoming poetical, as in the case of Nietzsche; sometimes to a complete bifurcation between poetry and philosophy (the quarrel between the poet and the philosopher being an ancient one); sometimes to a joining of poetry and philosophy, as in the case of mystic-metaphysicians such as 'Aṭṭār and RŪmī, and also as in the case of Iqbāl.

Iqbāl's philosophical system is not something 'given.' It has to be constructed from a number of philosophical

ideas which appear in his prose and poetical writings. In one sense, Iqbāl's thought consists not of one but of several systems, since he has dealt with and made contributions to many different branches of philosophy, i.e. epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, aesthetics and political philosophy. However, the thread of some central ideas and concepts runs through these various systems and links them into a larger whole.

In this study an attempt has been made both to analyse and to synthesise Iqbāl's main philosophical ideas. The first chapter gives the important biographical details of Iqbāl's life and is intended to familiarise us with Iqbāl the man. The second chapter covers the field of epistemology. The third, fourth and fifth chapters are devoted to Iqbāl's metaphysics. The sixth and seventh chapters contain ideas which have metaphysical and ethical import, but are, perhaps, best described as forming the bulwark of Iqbāl's religious thought. The eighth chapter deals with Iqbāl's aesthetics, and the ninth chapter with Iqbāl's political philosophy.

Some important work has been done on segments of Iqbāl's thought, particularly in the sphere of metaphysics, but so far no attempt has been made to study Iqbāl's philosophy in toto. It is hoped that this study will succeed in filling, to some small degree, this wide gap in the field of Iqbāl studies.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

My thanks are due, first and foremost, to my supervisor Mr. J. A. Haywood whose unfailing kindness has been a source of great strength to me at all times. I also thank the Department of Oriental Studies, in general, and Mr. I. J. C. Foster, The Keeper of Oriental Books of the University Library, in particular, for all the help given to me.

During the course of my research I have received encouragement and help from a number of scholars who have special interest in Iqbāl. Among them my sincere thanks go to my grandfather, Ḥakīm Aḥmad Shujā' (a lifelong friend of Iqbāl and a co-editor with him of some textbooks), my uncle Faqīr Saiyid Waḥīd-ud-dīn (author of Iqbāl's biography Rozgār-e-Faqīr) and Syed 'Abdul Vāḥid (the author of several books on Iqbāl). I would also like to thank Mr. Ḥādī Ḥusain for allowing me access to his unpublished writings. Among other scholars who have helped me in one way or another during my course of study, I would like to thank Professor A. Bausani, Professor A. M. Schimmel, Mr. V. G. Kiernan, Dr. Jan Marek, Dr. 'Ashiq Ḥusain Batālvī and Mr. Mulk Rāj Anand.

A large number of friends, both here and at home, have

been of help to me in the collection of material for this study, and in many other ways. My special thanks are due to Miss Durray Shahwār Kureshī and Mr. Jehān Dāwar Burkī for their unfailing help. I would also like to thank Miss Fākhra Qureshī, Miss Tehseen Qureshī, Miss Mīnoo Rāmyār, Miss Durdāna Gīlānī, Miss Nasreen Muftī, Mr. Nūr-ul-Islām and Mr. Maḥboob Asghar. My brothers Syed Viqār Mueen Ḥassan, Syed Jamshed Nasīm Ḥassan and Syed Ṭāriq Amīn Ḥassan, and my sister Miss Saman Ḥassan, have been of great assistance to me in collecting valuable material and I would also like to thank them.

I owe a debt of deep gratitude to Mrs. M. Holdsworth and Miss E. Chilton, of St. Mary's College, Durham, for their many kindnesses to me in the past years. Last but not least, my earnest thanks go to Mrs. C. Bates and Miss Marion Alderslade who typed the manuscript so painstakingly.

RIFFAT HASSAN.

TRANSLITERATION

(Taken from Platts' Hindustānī - English Dictionary)

VOWELS

ا (اب)	a (ab)
اِ (اس)	i (is)
اُ (اُس)	u (us)
آ (آس)	ā (ās)
اُد (اُد)	ū (ūd)
او (اوک)	o (ok)
اُو (اُد)	au (aur)
ای (ایک)	ī (īk)
ای (ایک)	e (ek)
آی (ایسا)	ai (aisā)

ö, ě denote short vowels

CONSONANTS

ب	b
بھ	bh
پ	p
پھ	ph
ت	t
تھ	th
ٹ	ṭ
ٹھ	ṭh
ث	ṯ
ج	j
جھ	jh
چ	ç

چھ	ch
ح	h
خ	<u>kh</u>
د	d
دھ	dh
د	<u>z</u>
ر	r
ڑ	ṛ
ڑھ	rḥ
ز	z
ر	zh
س	s
ش	sh
ص	ṣ
ض	ẓ
ط	ṭ
ظ	ẓ̣
ع	ʿ
ع	g
ف	f
ق	q
ک	k
کھ	kh
گ	g
گھ	gh
ل	l

ر	m
و	n
و	w or v
د	h (or a at the end of words)
س	y

The symbol hamza is denoted by an apostrophe (')

LIST OF IQBAL'S MAIN WORKS USED EXTENSIVELY
IN THE STUDY

1. Armagan-e-Hijāz, Lāhore, 1948.
2. Asrār-e-Khudī, Lāhore, 1948.
3. Bāl-e-Jibrīl, Lāhore, 1947.
4. Bāng-e-Darā, Lāhore, n.d.
5. Jāvīd Nāma, Lāhore, 1947.
6. Musāfir, Lāhore, 1966.
7. Pas Ī Bāyad Kard Ai Aqwām-e-Sharq? Lāhore, 1966.
8. Payām-e-Mashriq, Lāhore, 1948.
9. Rumūz-e-Bekhudī, Lāhore, 1948.
10. Stray Reflections (Edited by Iqbāl, J.) Lāhore, 1961.
11. Speeches and Statements of Iqbāl (compiled by "Shamloo")
Lāhore, 1948.
12. The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, Lāhore, 1964.
13. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām,
Lāhore, 1962.
14. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl (Edited by Vāhid, S. A.)
Lāhore, 1964.
15. Zabūr-e-'Ajam, Lāhore, 1948.
16. Zarb-e-Kalīm, Lāhore, 1947.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I: IQBAL - BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH AND INTRODUCTION p.23

- IQBAL'S ANCESTRY
- DATE OF BIRTH
- EDUCATION
- IQBAL'S CAREER AS AN EDUCATIONIST
- IQBAL AS A LAWYER
- IQBAL AND POLITICS
- IQBAL'S LITERARY CAREER
- SOME DETAILS OF IQBAL'S LIFE
 - Marriages - Travels - Knighthood -
 - Illness and Death - Last Visitor -
 - Burial.

CHAPTER II: IQBAL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE p.64

- POSSIBILITY AND IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE
- SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE
- MODES OF KNOWLEDGE
 - (1) Sense - perception: importance of empirical study - Nature and Ultimate Reality - Nature and Self.
 - (2) Reason: The connotation of 'reason' and its importance - Nature and function of 'thought' - the sphere of 'thought' - Iqbāl's use of

'reason' in a double sense - Attack on mechanistic interpretation of life - Iqbāl's attitude to 'reason'.

(3) Intuition: Definition of 'intuition' - possibility of intuitive knowledge - characteristics of intuitive (mystic) experience.

- REASON AND INTUITION

The dependence of reason upon intuition - the dependence of intuition upon reason - contrast between Reason and Intuition (Love) in Iqbāl's poetry.

- IQBAL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

In conclusion.

CHAPTER III: IQBAL'S IDEAS ON SPACE AND TIME

p.131

- SPACE

Zeno's arguments: unreality of Space - The Ash'arites: atomic space - Russell: Theory of mathematical continuity - Bergson: psychological approach - 'Irāqī: space as relative - Ouspensky: varying dimensions of space - Newtonian view of space - Space and Relativity.

- TIME

Newton: absolute time - The Ash'arites: atomic time - Time and Relativity -

- Ouspensky - time as the fourth dimension of space - Time as relative: Dāwānī and 'Irāqī - Rāzī and the debate on time - McTaggart: the unreality of time - Nietzsche: cyclic time - Bergson: serial and non-serial time - Bergson: pure duration known intuitively - Bergson: time as creative - Bergson: time as non-teleological movement - The Qōr'ān and the two aspects of time - Time: to sum up
- TIME (AND) SPACE IN IQBAL'S POETRY

CHAPTER IV: THE UNIVERSE AND GOD IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY p.179

- THE NATURE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

Descartes, Locke and Berkeley: theory of matter and its refutation - matter and relativity - Iqbāl's conception of matter.

- PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

The cosmological argument - the teleological (physico-theological) argument - the ontological argument - the argument from innate ideas - Iqbāl's "working proof" for the existence of God - Royce - Rashdall - James Ward - Green - To sum up

- NATURE AND GOD

Nature as finite but boundless -
Pantheism and Deism - Panentheism.

- THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

Personality - Infinity - Creativeness -
Knowledge - Omnipotence - Eternity.

- THE UNIVERSE AND TELEOLOGY

CHAPTER V:

THE SELF IN IQBAL'S THOUGHT

p.226

- THE SELF: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION

Creation - The Fall of Man - Emergence -
Rejection of mechanistic interpretation
of evolution - Emergent Evolution -
Bergson and Iqbāl Creative Evolution -
Evolution and Teleology - Evolution:
Iqbāl's interpretation and attitude -
Opposition an impetus to evolution -
Theory of Evolution: application to
politics and ethics.

- REALITY OF THE SELF

- ASPECTS OF THE SELF

Efficient and Appreciative Self - Body
and Soul.

- THE NATURE OF THE SELF

The Self as a soul - substance - The Self
as a stream of consciousness - The
characteristics of the Ego.

- FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND MAN'S DESTINY

Arguments from Psychology - Personal Causality known through purposive action
 - Can both God and Man be free? -
 Creation implies freedom - The Qōr'ān and freedom of the will - the rejection of the idea of redemption - Freedom implies risk and responsibility - Iqbāl's rejection of the doctrine of 'Qismat' - Man as maker of his own destiny - Submission to the Will of God - Conflict between Necessity and Freedom - Iqbāl's rejection of the idea of 'fanā'.

- IMMORTALITY OF THE SELF

Metaphysical and ethical arguments for Immortality - materialism and immortality
 - Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence - The Qōr'ān and immortality - Iqbāl's views on death and immortality - 'Barzakh' - Resurrection of the body - Heaven and Hell.

CHAPTER VI:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'KHUDI' AND IQBAL'S 'MARD-E-MOMIN' p.322

- THE MEANING OF 'KHUDI'
- THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SELF
- THE FACTORS WHICH STRENGTHEN THE SELF

Desire - Love - 'Faqr' - 'Şaiyādī -
Suffering - Forbearance - Courtesy -
Obstructions.

- THE FACTORS WHICH WEAKEN THE SELF

'Su'āl - Despair, Grief and Fear -
Servitude - 'Nasab - parastī'.

- THE THREE STAGES OF THE SELF

Obedience - Self-Control - Vicegerency
of God.

- IQBAL'S 'MARD-E-MOMIN' AND OTHER INFLUENCES

Iqbāl and Nietzsche - Iqbāl and JILĪ -
Iqbāl and Rūmī.

CHAPTER VII:

IMPORTANT IDEAS FROM IQBAL'S RELIGIOUS
PHILOSOPHY

p. 397

- 'TAUḤĪD'

'Lā' and 'illā' - 'Tauḥīd' the basis of
Islāmic Polity - Iqbāl's interpretation
of 'At-Tauḥīd' - Iqbāl and 'Tauḥīd'.

- MUḤAMMAD

The Prophet of Islām as Perfect Man -
The Prophet of Islām as Social Leader -
The Prophet's 'Mē'rāj' (Ascension) -
Iqbāl and the finality of Prophethood.

- PRAYER

Prayer is instinctive in origin -
Prayer is not auto-suggestion - The

social significance of Prayer - various parts of ritual prayer transmuted into symbols - protest against mechanism and ostentation in prayer - prayer is a means of self-discovery and self-affirmation - prayer leads to freedom - Any act may be an act of prayer - Prayer as petition.

- 'MYSTIC' AND 'PROPHETIC' CONSCIOUSNESS
- GOD AND MAN
- IBLIS (Satan)

Iblīs as the principle of activity -
 Iblīs as a principle of evil - creature of Fire versus Creature of Clay - Iblīs and predestination - Iblīs as a Unitarian - Satan in the poetry of Milton and Iqbāl - Iblīs as a tragic hero.

CHAPTER VIII:

IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART

P. 474

- PURPOSE OF ART
- ATTACK ON 'DECADENT' ART
- TRANSITION FROM 'AJAM TO HIJAZ
- IS 'DECADENT' ART NOT ART AT ALL?
- ATTACK ON ALL ART
- TRUE POETRY VERSUS VERSIFICATION
- ART AS IMITATION

- ART AS IMPROVEMENT ON NATURE
- EMPHASIS ON CREATIVENESS
- THE POET AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
- VISION AND DESIRE
- ART AND LIFE
- INTENSITY IN ART
- ART AND BEAUTY
- POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY
- IQBAL AND NIETZSCHE
- IQBAL AND THE STURM AND DRANG SCHOOL
- BEAUTY AND LOVE IN IQBAL'S AESTHETICS
- IQBAL AND SHELLEY
- THE POET AS PROPHET
- IMPORTANCE OF ARTISTS
- QUESTIONS ABOUT IQBAL'S AESTHETICS
 - (1) Inspiration and purpose ;
 - (2) Iqbāl's functionalism and
'universal' Art.
- IQBAL'S AESTHETICS: SUMMING UP

CHAPTER IX:

IQBAL'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY - DEVELOPMENT AND SALIENT IDEAS p.523

- FIRST PHASE: THE TEMPLE OF LOVE

Difference between 'nationalistic' and 'patriotic poetry - 'Political' poetry - importance of action - Religion and the material world - First phase: summing up.

- SECOND PHASE: SOJOURN IN EUROPE

Emphasis on Love - Iqbāl and Capitalism
 - Reaction against the West - Iqbāl and
 Islām - Beginning of the stress on
 Islāmic internationalism.

- THIRD PHASE: THE VISION UNVEILED

Iqbāl and India - nationality in Islām
 defined - Rejection of nationalism -
 characteristics of the Islāmic 'millat'
 - condemnation of Secularism - Rejection
 of geographical ties - the homogeneity
 of the Islāmic community - Iqbāl's
 philosophy accused of being exclusive -
 unity of man's spiritual and temporal
 life - the development of the communal
 ego - Iqbāl's position reviewed.

- IQBAL'S POLITICAL THOUGHT DIVIDED INTO
 PHASES

- IQBAL AND PAN-ISLAMISM

- IQBAL AND IMPERIALISM

- IQBAL AND SOCIALISM

- IQBAL AND DEMOCRACY

- THE INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY

CONCLUSION

p. 589

BIBLIOGRAPHY

p. 612

CHAPTER I

IQBAL - BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH AND INTRODUCTIONIQBAL'S ANCESTRY

تم گلے ز خیابانِ جنتِ کشمیر
دل از حریمِ محاز و نواز شیراز است

¹(Payām-e-Mashriq, p.214)

Muhammad Iqbāl's ancestors hailed from Kashmīr.

According to Iqbāl² they came from Čakkū Pargan Adūn in Taḥṣīl Kotgān. Long before 1857,³ they had left Kashmīr and settled in Siālkot, near the river Čenāb, an industrial town lying on the trade-route between Western Panjāb and the Province of Jammū and Kashmīr.

Iqbāl's ancestors were Brahmans of 'Saprū'-sub-caste. A Brahman belonged to the highest caste of Hindūs and was known for the subtlety of his intellect and his fine aesthetic sensibility. Iqbāl was proud of his Brahman ancestry.

-
1. My body comes from the paradise of Kashmīr,
My heart from the sanctuary of Ḥijāz and my song from Shīrāz.
 2. Waḥīd-ud-dīn, F. S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Karāchī, Vol.1, (5th edition 1965) p. 238.
 3. Ibid. p. 239.

میرد میرزادہ سیاست دل دہیں باجہ اند
 عز برہمن پسرے محرم اسرار کماست

¹(Bāqiyāt-e-Iqbāl, p.225)

مرا بنگر کہ در ہندوستان دیگنھے بیی

برہمن زادہ دمنز آستانے روم دتسریزاست

²(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p.17)

Regarding his ancestors' sub-caste 'Saprū,' Iqbāl himself throws light on the etymology of the word: "With the advent of Muslims in Kashmīr, the Brahmans of Kashmīr were, by virtue of their conservatism or for some other reasons, not favourably inclined towards the Muslim sciences and their language. The first group among them that devoted itself to a study of the Persian language etc., and after attaining proficiency therein won for itself the confidence and trust of Muslim rulers earned the title of 'Saprū'. 'Saprū' is ordinarily understood to mean a person, who is the first to take a step towards learning... My father held that the epithet was used by the Brahmans of Kashmīr to express their disapproval and contempt for those of their kinsmen who had instead of their ancient literature applied themselves to the pursuit of Islāmic

-
1. Mīr and Mirzā have staked their heart and faith on politics, It is just this son of a Brahman who knows the secrets (of reality).
 2. Look at me for in Hindustān you will not see another Son of Brahman familiar with the secrets of Rūm and Tabrīz.

studies. Gradually the name acquired a permanent association and came to be regarded as a sub-caste. The late Dīwān Tek Ānd, once a Commissioner in the Panjāb, was a great student of Philosophy. In a meeting at Ambālā he told me that the word 'Saprū' was derived from 'Shāhpur' an ancient Irānian King, and that the Saprūs were of Irānian origin, who had migrated to Kashmīr before the advent of Islām in Irān. They however, came to be regarded as Brahmans because of their superior intellect and wisdom."¹

One of Iqbāl's ancestors was known as "Lol Ḥājī" (Lover of Ḥājī)² who performed many pilgrimages to Mecca on foot. He became a disciple of Bābā Naṣīr-ud-Dīn who was an outstanding saint. One of the descendants of 'Lol Ḥājī' was a mystic Muḥammad Akbar whose piety was held in esteem.³ In the third line of his succession was Shaikh Jamāl Dīn. Either he, or his four sons namely, 'Abdul Raḥmān, Muḥammad Ramzān, Muḥammad Rafīq, and Muḥammad 'Abdullāh, migrated to Siālkot, at the end of the eighteenth or the beginning of the nineteenth century, Shaikh Nūr Muhammad, who was the father of Iqbāl was the eleventh son

-
1. Iqbāl's letter to Munshī Muḥammad Dīn Fauq, Editor of "The Kashmīrī," Lāhore, dated 16.1.1934, as referred to by Quraishī, M.A. "Aspects of Iqbāl's Biography" Iqbāl, Lāhore, July 1958, Vol. VII, No.1, pp 65-66.
 2. Wahīd-ud-dīn, F.S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. II, (1st Edition 1964) p. 114.
 3. Quraishī, M.A. "Aspects of Iqbāl's Biography," p. 69.

of Shaikh Muḥammad Rafīq.

Nūr Muḥammad had a small but successful clothing business in Siālkot. He had four daughters and two sons. Iqbāl was the younger of the two sons. Shaikh Nūr Muḥammad had not received a regular education but he was by no means illiterate or mentally unsophisticated.¹ He was a deeply religious man, a man who lived his religion, and added to his piety was a deep strain of mysticism. Iqbāl learned a good deal from his father. To his last day he was to remember how one day his father had said to him that while reading the Qōr'ān it was necessary for him to believe that the Book was meant specially for him and that Allāh Himself conversed with him.² Perhaps it was the memory of his father's exhortation which inspired the lines:-

ترے ضمیر پہ جب تک نہ ہو نردول کتاب
گرہ کشاھے نہ رازی نہ صاحب کشاف

³
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 112)

-
1. Waḥīd-ud-dīn, F.S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. 1, p.240.
 2. Nadvī, A.S. Iqbāl-e-Kāmil A'zamgarh, 1948, p. 4.
 3. Unless the Book (the Qōr'ān) is revealed to your conscience, The knots cannot be untied by Rāzī or the author of the Kashshāf (Abū'l-Qāsim Maḥmūd Zamakhsharī).

Iqbāl has also referred to his forefathers' predilection for mysticism. To his son Jāvīd he wrote:

میں گھر کا تہذیب ہے تو

ہے اس کا مذاق عادات

¹
(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p. 86)

A reference to it was made also by Akbar Allāhābādī who wrote on the death of Iqbāl's mother:-

حضرتِ اقبال میں تو نبیاں پیدا ہوئیں
قوم کی نظریں جو ان کے طرف کی تھیں
اس کی شاہد ہیں کہ ان کے والدین ارادے

² ماحد اہلِ دل تھے صاحبِ اسرار تھے

No account, however brief, of Iqbāl's family background would be complete without a mention of his mother Imām Bībī, who belonged to a Kashmīrī family in Sambaryāl, District Siālkot.³ She was a wise and pious lady known for her kindness and spirit of self-sacrifice. To her memory Iqbāl has dedicated one of the most beautiful and moving elegies in the language. His glowing tribute to her

1. (But) The house of which you are the light,
Has a taste for mysticism.

2. The qualities which were born in Iqbāl,
Which endeared his name to the nation,
Bear witness to the fact that his parents were pious,
Godly and charitable and understood the secrets (of reality)
(Quoted by Quraishī, M.A. "Aspects of Iqbāl's Biography",
p. 70).

3. Wahīd-ud-Dīn, F.S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. II, pp 133-146.

تربیت سے پتری میں انجمن کا ہم قسمت ہوا
گھر مرے اجداد کا سرمایہ عزت ہوا
دفتر ہستی میں تھی ذریں درق پتری حیات
تھی سراپا دین و دنیا کا سبق پتری حیات

¹
(Bāng-e-Darā, p. 250)

has made immortal the image of a lady who passed her days in quiet anonymity amongst her dear ones.

Iqbāl's devotion to his elder brother Shaikh 'Atā Muḥammad (1859-1940) deserves to be mentioned. Shaikh 'Atā Muḥammad looked upon Iqbāl almost as a son and helped him in every way. Many incidents are known which point to the great love the two brothers had for each other.

For his brother the poet prayed:-

وہ میرا یوسفِ ثانی، وہ شمعِ محفلِ عشق
ہوئی ہے جس کی احوت مزارِ جاںِ محلو
جلا کے جس کی محبت نے دفترِ منِ دلی
ہوائے عیسیٰ میں بالاء کیا جواںِ محلو
ریاضِ دہر میں مانند گل رہے خنداں
کہ ہے عزیز تر از خاںِ دہ خاںِ حانِ محلو

²
(Bāng-e-Darā, p. 97)

1. Because of your guidance my destiny became luminous as a star
The house of my forefathers' became a storehouse of honour.
In the Book of Life your life was a golden page,
It was a lesson in the ways of religion and the world.
2. That second Yūsuf to me, the light of Love's assembly,
Whose brotherhood is the comfort of my life,
whose affection obliterated the differences of you and I,
And reared me in an atmosphere of love,
May he be happy as a rose in the garden of this world,
For he, life of my life, is dearer to me than life.

One thing stands clear even after a cursory glance at Iqbāl's background. He was proud of his heritage - proud of it because, in a sense, it had made him what he was - a man not very well-off by worldly standards but well aware of his spiritual wealth and his love for God. Perhaps it is possible to see in the quiet pride which Iqbāl took in his lineage and legacy, the reflection of a greater pride - the supreme pride which he took in being a man which made him audacious enough to fling a challenge before the Almighty:

متاعِ بے باہے درد و سوزِ آرزو مندی
مقامِ بندگی دیکر نہ لوں شانِ خداوندی

¹(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p.21)

In the vast annals of history, it is hard to find a person who took more joy and pride in being a man than the humble tailor's son who was born in a small Panjāb town and whose birth was not even registered.

DATE OF BIRTH

Iqbāl was born in Siālkot. Unfortunately while there is complete agreement about the place of his birth, there is considerable disagreement about the date on which

1. Priceless treasure is the agony and burning of desire,
I would not exchange my manhood for the glory of Godhead.

he was born. Most often the date is given as 1873,¹ or more specifically as 22 February, 1873.² The main reason for regarding this year and date as Iqbāl's date of birth is that in the municipal records there is an entry relating to the birth of a son born to Shaikh Nūr Muḥammad. One research scholar³ has been able to collect the evidence of members of Iqbāl's family and affirms that the record is authentic but that the son referred thereinto is not Iqbāl but an elder brother who died in infancy. Iqbāl's own birth was not recorded but such an occurrence was by no means uncommon at that time.

Some writers have given Iqbāl's year of birth as 1876.⁴ When Iqbāl submitted his Ph.D. thesis at Munich University in 1908, he attached a biographical note to it. In this note he wrote that his date of birth was the 3rd of Zi'l-qa'd 1294 A.H. (A.D. 1876). 1876 was, therefore, accepted as the correct year of his birth. Professor Jan Marek has shown,⁵ however, that the correct conversion of 3rd Zi'l-qa'd 1294 to a date in the

-
1. As for instance in Schimmel, A.M. "Muḥammad Iqbāl (1873-1938)" Die Welt des Islāms, Leiden, 1954, No. III, p. 145; Sālik, A.M. Zikr-e-Iqbāl, Lāhore, 1955, p. 10.
 2. As for instance in Beg, A. A. The Poet of the East Lāhore, 1961, p. 4.
 3. Wahīd-ud-dīn, F. S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. 1, pp 229-237.
 4. As for instance Smith, W. C. Modern Islām in India, London, 1946, p. 101.
 5. Marek, J. "The Date of Muḥammad Iqbāl's Birth" Archiv Orientalni, Prague, 1958, pp 617-620.

Christian era would be to November 9, A.D. 1877. Faqīr Saiyid Waḥīd-ud-dīn¹ also supports the idea of November 9 as being the date of Iqbāl's birth. He has arrived at this conclusion by means of his personal contact with members of Iqbāl's family. (For instance, he mentions that it was common belief in Iqbāl's family that he was born on a Friday. Now from the years 1298 A.H. to 1296 A.H. only the 3rd of Zi'l-qa'd of the year 1294 falls on a Friday.)² It has also been pointed out³ that if November 9, 1877 is accepted as Iqbāl's date of birth it would accord better with the different phases of his academic life at school, college and University than if it is assumed to have been as early as 1873. Since the conversion of the Muslim era into the Christian era is a very complicated process involving complex mathematical calculations, Iqbāl made an approximate rather than an accurate conversion.⁴ After the publication of the illuminating studies⁵ devoted to the clarification of this point, it is now generally being accepted that November

-
1. Waḥīd-ud-dīn, F.S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. I, pp 229-237.
 2. ibid. p. 232.
 3. Schimmel, A.M. Gabriels' Wing, Leiden, 1963, p. 35.
 4. Vāḥid, S.A. "Date of Iqbāl's Birth" Iqbāl Review, Karāchī, October 1964, p. 21-32.
 5. In particular the writings of Waḥīd-ud-dīn, F. S. Marek, J. and Vāḥid, S.A.

9; . 1877 is the date of Iqbāl's birth.

EDUCATION

Like children from most late-nineteenth century lower middle class Muslim families Iqbāl started his education in a 'maktab' in Siālkot. He was a good and conscientious student and won many distinctions throughout his academic career. He won scholarships for his performance in class V Examination, the Middle Examination (which he passed in 1891) and the Matriculation Examination (which he passed in 1893). Apart from his family, perhaps the strongest influence in Iqbāl's early academic life was that of Maulānā Mīr Ḥasan who was a friend of his father and a renowned scholar of Arabic and Persian. Maulānā Mīr Ḥasan was born on 8 April, 1844 at Fīrozwālā, District Gujrānwālā, and died on 25, September, 1929,¹ nine years before the death of his illustrious pupil. Maulānā Mīr Ḥasan taught Iqbāl at the Scotch Mission School, Siālkot, which later became an Intermediate College.² Iqbāl passed the F.A. Examination in 1895 with distinction and once again won a scholarship.

1. 'Abid, A. A. Talmīḥāt-e-Iqbāl, Lāhore, 1959, p. 49.

2. Singh, I. The Ardent Pilgrim, London, 1951, p. 9.

Maulānā Mīr Ḥasan encouraged Iqbāl in every way and besides giving him a serious introduction to Persian literature, he was also responsible for inculcating in Iqbāl a deep sense of dedication to Islāmīc culture and literature.¹ The love and gratitude that Iqbāl cherished for his teacher did not diminish with time. In 1905, on his way to England, when he visited the shrine of Niẓām-ud-dīn Auliya at Delhī, he recited his well known poem 'Iltijā'-e-Musāfir,² in which he referred thus to his old teacher:-

وہ شمعِ نارگہ حادداں مرتصوی
 رہے گا مثلِ حرمِ حس کا آستانِ محکو
 لیس سے جس نے کھلی میری آرزو کی کلی
 سنا یا حس کی مرآت نے ملتہ داں مجکو
 دعا یہ کر کہ خداوندِ آسماں و زمیں
 کرے پھر اسکی زیادت سے ستادماں مجکو

¹(Bāng-e-Darā, pp 96-97)

In 1922, when Iqbāl's name was recommended for knight-hood, he insisted that his old teacher be given the title

1. Beg, A. A. The Poet of the East, p.7.

2. That light of the revered house of 'Alī,
 Whose abode will always be as sacred as the Ka'ba to me.
 And whose being caused the embryo of desire to grow within me,
 Developing in me by means of his humanity and benevolence,
 a better insight into reality.
 Pray that the Lord of sky and of the earth
 Blesses me by granting it to me to be his pilgrim once more.

of Shams-ul-'Ulamā. When asked if his teacher had produced a work of note, Iqbāl is reported to have said that he was himself the living book of his tutor.¹ Since the Scotch Mission College at Siālkot had no degree classes in 1895 Iqbāl moved to Government College, Lāhore. He was once more very fortunate in the choice of his teacher, and came under the influence of Mr. (later Sir) Thomas W. Arnold, who after ten years at 'Alīgarh had joined the Government College, Lāhore, in 1898 as Professor of Philosophy. He initiated Iqbāl to the methods of critical reasoning and the scientific approach of the West to the problems of life. When Sir Thomas Arnold resigned on 26 February, 1904, and returned to England, Iqbāl was deeply aggrieved. In a poem² dedicated to Arnold he wrote:-

دہ میرے دل کا خوردشید آشنا ہونے کو تھا
 آئینہ ٹوٹا ہوا عالم نما ہونے کو تھا
 غل میری آرزوں کا مرا ہونے کو تھا
 آہ! کیا جانے کوئی میں کیا سے کیا ہوے کو تھا
 ابر رحمت دامن از گلزار من برچیدو رفت
 اد کے بر غنچہ ہائے آرزو ماریدو رفت
²(Bāng-e-Darā, p. 73)

1. Waḥīd-ud-dīn, F.S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. I, p. 44.

2. The tiny particle of my heart was soon to expand to hold
 the sun,
 The broken mirror was soon to become a reflector of the
 world.
 The tree of Desire was soon to become green,
 Ah! who knows what I was soon to become.
 The cloud of grace withdrew from the garden and went away,
 For a short while it dropped rain on the buds of Desire
 and then moved on.

Sir Thomas Arnold exercised profound influence on the young student of Philosophy, and also on the young poet. It was he who (along with Sir 'Abdul Qādir)¹ persuaded Iqbāl not to abandon his poetic career at a point in Iqbāl's life when (like Milton and Keats before him) he could not decide whether he wished to lead a life of speculation or a life of action. That he should have achieved both and have built up a philosophy of dynamism and action is perhaps his greatest achievement. Iqbāl owed much to the loving personal influence of his two teachers Maulānā Mīr Ḥasan and Sir Thomas Arnold, the first revealing to him the wealth and beauty of his own heritage, the second inspiring him with a desire to understand the West.

To return to Iqbāl's academic distinctions: he graduated in 1897, winning a scholarship and two gold medals for excellence in English and Arabic. In the M.A. degree which Iqbāl took in Philosophy in 1899, he won the "Nānak Bakhsh Medal" for standing first in the examination. Iqbāl matriculated in Cambridge University as Advanced Student of Trinity College on 21 October, 1905. He proceeded to the degree of Bachelor of Arts on 13 June, 1907 having submitted a dissertation for that degree which

1. Qādir, A. Preface to Bāng-e-Darā, p. ix.

was approved by the special Board for Moral Science on 7 May, 1907.¹ While at Cambridge, Iqbāl studied under McTaggart and James Ward.²

Iqbāl was also admitted to The Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn on 20 October, 1905, and he was called to the Bar in the Trinity Term 1908. Before being called to the Bar he had to keep terms and pass the Bar Examination.³

Iqbāl submitted a thesis on The Development of Metaphysics in Persia⁴ at Munich University in Germany to Professor F. Hommel on 4 November, 1907, (the residence requirement of two years being waived in his case) for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.⁵

IQBĀL'S CAREER AS AN EDUCATIONIST.

On 13 May, 1899, Iqbāl joined the Oriental College as McLeod Reader in Arabic. At that time Sir Thomas Arnold was the acting Principal of the College. Iqbāl was on leave without pay from July 1902, to 3 October, 1902, and from 2 March, 1903 to 2 June, 1903. During his stay at

-
1. Information received by letter reference E.15/392 from University Registry, The Old Schools, Cambridge, University dated 13 September, 1966.
 2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 37.
 3. Information received by letter reference FCC/JM from the Under-Treasurer, The Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn dated 7 June, 1966.
 4. First published by Messrs. Luzac & Co., London in 1905, reprinted by Bazm-i-Iqbāl, Lāhore, in 1954.
 5. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, pp 30-39.

Oriental College Iqbāl wrote an article on "The Doctrine of Absolute Unity as Expounded by 'Abdul Karīm al-Jīlānī.'" He also summarised and translated into Urdū, Stubbs' 'Early Plantagenets' and Walker's 'Political Economy.'¹ During this period he wrote his first book, also on political economy.² In the Preface he stated that Sir Thomas Arnold had encouraged him to write the book which, incidentally was the first book on Economics in Urdū. He also expressed his gratitude to Shiblī who had revised the terminology and language in some parts of the book.

Iqbāl was appointed an additional Professor of English from 1 January, 1901 at the Government College, Lāhore. In July 1901 he reverted to Oriental College. In May, 1903, Iqbāl left Oriental College and on 3 June, 1903 he became an Assistant Professor of English and Philosophy at the Government College, Lāhore. Whilst at the Oriental College, Iqbāl taught B.O.L. and Intermediate classes. To the B.O.L. students he taught History and Economics, and to the Intermediate students Psychology and Logic. At Government College, Lāhore, Iqbāl taught Philosophy and English.

In 1905, Iqbāl was granted leave extraordinary for three years to study in England and he proceeded abroad.

-
1. Zulfiqār, G. H. "Iqbāl in the Oriental College" Iqbāl, April 1962, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp 48-52.
 2. Published in 1903, Reprinted by the Iqbāl Academy, Karāchī, 1961.

While in England Iqbāl taught Arabic for six months at University College, London.

Iqbāl returned to Lāhore on 27 July, 1908, and after a short time he resigned from the Government College, Lāhore, having decided to concentrate on his legal practice which he started in October, 1908. As Iqbāl was getting settled in his new profession Mr. Wyatt Jones, Professor of Philosophy in the Government College, Lāhore, died and Mr. Robson, Principal of the College approached Iqbāl to take up the work as a part-time Professor.¹ As Iqbāl was unwilling to give up his legal work, the Government of the Panjāb requested the Chief Court authorities to take up Iqbāl's cases only in the afternoon. This arrangement went on till the 1st January, 1911 when Mr. L. P. Saunders of Decca College, Poona, was appointed as a permanent Professor of Philosophy in the Government College. Iqbāl was offered a post in the College in the Indian Education Service - at that time a rare honour for any Indian. Iqbāl refused the offer.² He knew he had to choose between a legal and an educational career. He decided on the former. On the day he resigned 'Alī Bakhsh, his old and faithful servant, asked Iqbāl why he had left his teaching job.

1. Vāhid, S. A. "Iqbāl As a Teacher", Iqbāl and Education, Karāchī, n.d., p. 92.

2. Faizī, A. Iqbāl, p. 51.

Iqbāl answered that he had a message to deliver to his people and he could do it better if he adopted an independent profession like law.¹

It was about this time that Iqbāl was offered a part in the M.A.O. College, 'Alīgarh (later on Muslim University, 'Alīgarh) Iqbāl refused this also.² In 1918 Dr. Haig, Professor of Philosophy in Islāmīa College, died and at the request of the Anjuman-e-Ḥimāyat-e-Islām, Iqbāl taught philosophy to the M.A. classes for about two months.³

Although Iqbāl did not adopt teaching as a profession, yet he never lost interest in educational programmes and problems. For many years he was the Dean of Faculty of Oriental Studies and Chairman of the Department of Philosophy.⁴ He was also in close association with the Islāmīa College, Lāhore.⁵ During the sessions of the Round Table Conference in London, he worked on the various committees connected with the educational reforms.⁶

In 1933, he was invited, along with some other educationists, by the Afghānistān Government to visit the

1. Ḥayāt-e-Iqbāl, p. 62.

2. Faizī, A. Iqbāl, p. 37.

3. Vāhid, S.A. "Iqbāl as a Teacher", p.92.

4. Vāhid, S.A. Introduction to Iqbāl, p. 10.

5. ibid.

6. Vāhid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought, p. 17.

country and give suggestions regarding educational reforms in Afghānistān in general and the administration of Kābul University in particular.¹ Iqbāl took great interest in the Jāmīa-Millia of Delhi and was always prepared to help its promoters in any way he could.² He has left "a permanent impression on three important Universities of the East: Kābul, the Panjāb, and the Jāmīa Millia."³

Iqbāl was a fine teacher. One of his pupils to whom he taught the poetry of Shelley, states that Iqbāl's sensitive appreciation of Shelley was quite unforgettable. He would explain Shelley's poetry often with the help of Urdū verses (his own and others') and his lectures were so engrossing that students were sorry when a lecture ended.⁴ Iqbāl was also a very kind and sympathetic teacher,⁵ who realized that a teacher educates not only by virtue of the knowledge he imparts but also by means of his personal example and influence. A teacher must not only enlighten but also inspire:-

-
1. Vāḥid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought, p. 17
 2. ibid. pp 17-18.
 3. ibid. p. 18.
 4. Raḥmān, M. A. Quoted in 'Arshī S. K. "A Forgotten Leaf from Iqbāl's Life" Iqbāl Review, January 1962, pp 70-71.
 5. Vāḥid, S. A. "Iqbāl as a Teacher" p. 93.

یہ فیضانِ نظر تھا یا کہ ملتب کی کرامت تھی
 سکھائے کس سے اسماعیلؑ کو آدابِ فردندی؟

¹
 (Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 21)

Iqbāl's contribution as an educationist, then, cannot be minimized, although he was not directly connected with education for the major portion of his professional life. This is so, because as an eminent educationist points out, "Education, in its full and correct signification, must be visualised as the sum total of all the cultural forces which play on the life of the individual and the community. If this is clearly understood, it follows that the emergence of an outstanding creative thinker, who has a distinctive message to give or new values to present before the world, is a phenomenon of the greatest interest for the educationist, and the more his ideas catch the imagination, the understanding and the enthusiasm of his contemporaries, the greater must be his influence as an educative force."²

What is Iqbāl's philosophy of Education? He sums it up himself in a letter, "Modern India ought to focus on the discovery of man as a personality - as an independent 'whole' in an all-embracing synthesis of life.

-
1. Was it the gift of the (teacher's) eye or the wonder of the School, That taught Ismā'īl the ways of being a dutiful son?
 2. Saiyidain, K. G. Iqbāl's Educational Philosophy, Lahore 1960. pp 5-6

But does our education today tend to awaken in us such a sense of inner wholeness? My answer is no. Our education does not recognize man as a problem, it impresses on us the visible fact of multiplicity without giving us an insight into the inner unity of life, and thus tends to make us more and more universal in our physical environment. The soul of man is left untouched and the result is a superficial knowledge with a mere illusion of culture and freedom. Amidst this predominantly intellectual culture which must accentuate separate centres within the 'whole' the duty of higher minds in India is to reveal the inner synthesis of life."¹

IQBĀL AS A LAWYER

Iqbāl started his practice of law in 1908. Although he was a conscientious lawyer,² it does not seem evident that he regarded his profession as a vocation.³ In a letter to a friend, he gives us one reason why he adopted law as a profession. "As you know literature is not and never has been a profession in India. Music and painting are professions of a certain extent, literature is not. I know this from personal experience. I have written something in the way of literature but I have to earn my daily living at the Bar."⁴

-
1. Letter dated 5 December, 1925, published in The Indian Review, Madras, January, 1926, Volume XXVII, No. 1, p. 2.
 2. Vāhid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought p. 18
 3. Beg, A. A. The Poet of the East, p. 24.
 4. Iqbāl's letter to Sir William Rothenstein, quoted in Since Fifty (Men and Memories), London, 1931-1939, Vol. III, p. 47.

Law is demanding profession and requires undivided attention which Iqbāl was not able to give to it¹ due to his literary and socio-political activities. Also, he was temperamentally an unambitious man and was not interested in earning more than he required for his needs.² However, the fact of his not being entirely successful at the Bar did cause Iqbāl considerable heart-burning as is apparent from his letter to Sir William Rothenstein, "my rivals and other interested persons have always carried on a propaganda against me on account of my literary pursuits and tried all sorts of means to prejudice the men in authority against me in order to ruin my career as a professional man. In this they have succeeded so far. Please excuse this personal reference. I should have never mentioned it to a less sympathetic mind."³

Iqbāl whose own life was lived in accordance with his exhortation to his son

میرا طریق امیری نہیں فقیری ہے ا

خودی نہ بیج عربی میں نام بیداکر ا

4(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 198)

suffered not so much on account of financial insecurity

-
1. Vāhid, S. A. Introduction to Iqbāl, p. 11.
 2. Vāhid, S. A. Iqbal: His Art and Thought, p. 18.
 3. Quoted in Since Fifty, p. 47.
 4. My way lies not in being rich but in being poor;
Your Selfhood do not sell, in poverty win renown.

as he did due to the lack of understanding of people who mattered to him.

Iqbāl lost his voice in 1934 and could not practise law after that.

IQBĀL AND POLITICS

Iqbāl was interested in the political situation and problems of his country as no sensitive and intelligent young Indian could fail to be, but it was only when he came to realise most of the Muslim political leaders lacked political sagacity and insight that he began to take an active interest in politics.¹

Iqbāl was a member of the Committee of the Muslim League formed in London in 1908 by the Rt. Hon. Amīr 'Alī.² On his return from England, Iqbāl took interest in the working of the Muslim League but did not participate actively in politics from 1910-1923.³ During this period he was trying to create political consciousness and bring about an awakening of his people.⁴

In 1924 Iqbāl joined the National Liberal League of Lāhore but not finding it very effective resigned from it later on.⁵ In 1926, he was elected as a member of the

-
1. Vāḥid, S. A. Studies in Iqbāl. Lāhore, 1967, p. 266.
 2. Wāṣṭī, S. R. Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement 1905 to 1910, Oxford, 1964, p. 227.
 3. Vāḥid, S. A. Studies in Iqbāl, p. 267.
 4. ibid.
 5. ibid. p. 269.

Panjāb Legislative Assembly,¹ and as the various speeches and statements made during his membership of the Council indicate, he took interest in, and made important contributions to, the deliberations of the Legislative body.

In 1928, Iqbāl became Secretary of that branch of the Muslim League which functioned under the Presidentship of Sir Muḥammad Shafī.² Along with other members of the League, he appeared before the Simon Commission³ which had been appointed by the British Government to report on the introduction of further political reforms in the Sub-Continent. The Commission was considerably influenced by the evidence given by the delegates of the League.⁴

While participating eagerly in Panjāb politics, Iqbāl was also interested in All-India politics.⁵ In 1929 he attended the Muslim Conference held in Delhi under the Chairmanship of the Āgā Khān.⁶ "He made some important contributions to the deliberations of the Conference."⁷ In 1930 he was selected to preside at the annual Session of the Muslim League⁸ held at Allāhābād. In his historic

-
1. Sālik, A. M. Zikr-e-Iqbāl, Lāhore, 1955, p. 134.
 2. Khān, M. A. Iqbāl Kā Siyāsī Kārnamā, Karāchī, 1952, p. 122.
 3. Vāhid, S. A. Studies in Iqbāl, p. 274.
 4. Khān, M. A. Iqbāl Kā Siyāsī Kārnamā, p. 121.
 5. Vāhid, S. A. Studies in Iqbāl, p. 279.
 6. ibid.
 7. ibid.
 8. Vāhid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought, p. 19.

Presidential Address, Iqbāl said, "I would like to see the Panjāb, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Balochistān amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."¹ In his "remarkable speech"² Iqbāl laid down the exact historical composition of what is now West Pākistān.³ As an eminent historian remarks, "much was to be done before that conception could make its way into the hearts and the souls of Muslim masses, but the idea was born."⁴

In 1931 Iqbāl attended the Second Round Table Conference in London and served as a member of the Minorities Committee.⁵ He returned to Lahore on 30 December, 1931, "most disappointed at the attitude of Mr. Gāndhī and other Hindū leaders at the Conference, and convinced more than ever, that the only solution of the political troubles of the sub-continent was a division of the country."⁶

-
1. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, pp 170-171.
 2. Williams, L. F. R. "Iqbāl Day Speech" delivered at a meeting held at Overseas House, London, on 22 April, 1959.
 3. ibid.
 4. ibid.
 5. Vāḥid, S. A. Studies in Iqbāl, p. 282.
 6. ibid. p. 283.

On 21 March, 1932 Iqbāl presided at the All-India Muslim Conference held at Lāhore. In his momentous address Iqbāl stressed the intimate link between individual and collective life. "He who desires to change an unfavourable environment must undergo a complete transformation of his inner being. God changeth not the conditions of a people until they themselves take the initiative to change their condition by constantly illuminating the zone of their daily activity in the light of a definite ideal. Our ideal is well defined. It is to win in the coming constitution a position for Islām which may bring her opportunities to fulfil her destiny in this country."¹

In 1932 Iqbāl was invited to attend the Third Round Table Conference.² While the Conference was in progress, Iqbāl grew so dissatisfied with its proceedings that he resigned and returned to India.³

In 1936, on Mr. Jinnāh's suggestion, Iqbāl undertook to work for the Panjāb Parliamentary Board,⁴ which was to conduct elections under the 1935 Constitution. Muslim politics were in chaos at that time and Mr. Jinnāh was facing a very hard time. "But in the midst of all

1. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl. pp 213-214.

2. Vāhid, S. A. Studies in Iqbāl. p. 284.

3. Husain, A. Fazl-i-Husain, A Political Biography, London, 1946, p. 319.

4. Vāhid, S. A. Studies in Iqbāl. p. 288.

this darkness there shone a flickering light in Lāhore and this was Iqbāl who stood steadfast by Jinnāḥ in those trying days and helped him to charter the course of Indo-Muslim politics."¹ When Iqbāl died, Mr. Jinnāḥ sent this message to his son: "To me he was a friend, guide and philosopher and during the darkest moments through which the Muslim League had to go he stood like a rock, and never flinched one single moment."² On 24 March 1940, when the Pakistān Resolution was passed by the Muslim League at Lāhore, Mr. Jinnāḥ said: "Iqbāl is no more amongst us, but had he been alive he would have been happy to know that we did exactly what he wanted us to do."³

No one today disputes that Iqbāl "played a very vital part in the founding of Pākistān."⁴ However, a full appreciation of Iqbāl's political wisdom and far-sightedness is yet to come. Iqbāl was perhaps not a politician in the sense in which Mr. Jinnāḥ or Mr. Nehrū were, but he could see further than almost any other of his contemporaries could. Recounting his meetings with Iqbāl, L. F. Rushbrook Williams observes, "Looking back on that time, it seems to me that many of us who were

-
1. A History of the Freedom Movement, Pākistān Historical Society, Karachi, Vol. III, part II, p. 315.
 2. Quoted in Vāḥid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought, p. 19.
 3. Bolitho, H. Jinnāḥ, Creator of Pākistān. London, 1954, p. 129.
 4. Arberry, A. J. Oriental Essays, London, 1960, p. 214.

working, as we hoped, for the federation of a united India, tended to undervalue the skill and sagacity of Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl and indeed I would not altogether exempt from that category Qā'id-e-A'ẓam himself because I remember being present at various meetings in which Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl insisted that a pre-requisite of the full participation of the Muslim population of India in any projected federation must be their continued protection by a communal electorate. At that time Qā'id-e-A'ẓam was not convinced and I myself who was working as a delegate and representative of the Indian states' side of India, thought that much of Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl was saying, however, valuable it might have been in the past, was perhaps outdated in the 1930s and yet how right he was and how wrong we were, because no sooner were the beginnings of the first stage of federation in operation in 1937 than all the fears that he had outlined with such gravity and with such prophetic foresight were, from the standpoint of the Indian Muslim community only too fully realised."¹

It was part of Iqbāl's greatness that he not only formulated the conception of a Muslim state in India, and outlined its physical boundaries, but also laid down the characteristics which such a state must have,

1. Williams, L. F. R. "Iqbāl Day Speech."

if it were to provide an opportunity for the development of the individual and the community,¹ the part and the whole. These characteristics were:-²

- (i) It should be founded on monotheism which Iqbāl regarded as an essential element in the conception of the brotherhood of man. Monotheism acted as a unifying force, and broke down the division of mankind into belligerent groups. As Iqbāl said:

اینکه در صد سینه پیچید یک نفس
سِرِّے از اسرارِ تو حید است دلبس

³(Rumūz-e-Bekhudī, p. 182)

- (ii) It should have inspired and devoted leadership or prophethood. Iqbāl writes:

از رسالت در جهان شکوین ما
از رسالت دین ما آئین ما
از رسالت صد هزار مایک است
جز در ما از جزو ماینگ است

-
1. Williams, L. F. R. "Iqbāl Day Speech."
 2. Enumerated in Williams, L. F. R. "Iqbāl Day Speech" and Vāhid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought, pp 48-53.
 3. This one breath, winding in a hundred breasts,
Is but one secret of the Unity.
(translation by Arberry, A. J. The Mysteries of Selflessness, London. 1953. p 69.)

هم نفس هم مدعا انتم ما

اد رسالت هم ذالك انتم ما

¹(Rumūz-e-Bekhudī, pp 116-117)

- (iii) It should have an ethical code embodying the ideals and aspirations of that society. For the Muslims, such a code is the Qōr'ān:

نوع انسان را پیام آفرین
عامل او رحمة اللعالمین

²(Rumūz-e-Bekhudī, p. 140)

- (iv) It should have a cognizable centre in space; a territorial focus of the activities and loyalties which such a state would engender. For the Muslims the spiritual centre is Mecca.
- (v) It should have an ideal objective.

1. On Prophethood is based our existence on this earth,
From prophethood are derived our religion, our code.
The Prophet moulded hundreds of thousands of us into one,
So that various parts were inseparably welded into each other.
From prophethood we attained unity of tune,
It imparted to us the unity of breath and the unity of
objective.
(Translation by Vāhid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought,
p. 50).
2. The final message to all humankind
Was borne by him elect of God to be
A mercy unto every living thing.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. The Mysteries of
Selflessness, p. 38).

- (vi) It should aim at conquest over the forces of nature. It should utilize the mechanical and scientific discoveries of the West without subordinating itself to Western values and culture.
- (vii) It should develop a combined social personality which will act as an extension and as a realization of the individuality of its free citizens.
- (viii) It should give full scope for the development of womanhood in all its potential and actual aspects.

IQBĀL'S LITERARY CAREER

Iqbāl was a precocious youth and at a very early age began to write poetry which promised much to the perceptive eye. He took to writing verse seriously probably whilst he was at the Scotch Mission College, Siālkot. He attended the small-scale poetry symposiums held in the town and was sometimes asked to recite his own poetry.¹ When he was an Intermediate student,² he sent his poems for correction to Dāg.

1. Beg, A. A. The Poet of the East, p. 7.

2. Vāhid, S. A. Introduction to Iqbāl, p. 2.

Dāg Dehalvī (1831-1905) was one of the renowned exponents of Urdū poetry who had accepted the tutorship of the Nizām of Hyderābād after the fall of Delhī. Shortly afterwards Dāg told Iqbāl that his poems needed no correction. Such a statement from so eminent a poet must have been a source of great encouragement to the young Iqbāl. Iqbāl always remembered the debt he owed to Dāg:-

جنابِ دآغ کی اقبال پہ ساری کرامت ہے
ترے جیسے کو کر ڈالا سخنداں بھی، سخنِ در بھی

¹(Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. II, p. 278)

Dāg too lived long enough to see Iqbāl's name become a bright new star on the literary horizon of India. Sir 'Abdul Qādir recounts how in a meeting with Dāg in Hyderābād, Dāg had expressed his pride at once having had the privilege of correcting Iqbāl's poetry.²

Dāg's poetry had considerable influence on the young Iqbāl, and Dāg's lively spontaneity became a noteworthy feature of Iqbāl's early 'gazals'. Soon however, the mind of the younger poet widened its horizons in its search for new pastures and found modes of expression other than the 'gazal' whose form tended to impose restrictions of subject and scope.³

1. Iqbāl, it is the miraculous touch of the venerable Dāg which has made one like you both eloquent and a poet.

2. Qādir, A. Preface to Bāng-e-Darā, p. 7.

3. Jūnāgarhī, Q.A. M.A. Iqbāliyāt Kā Tanqīdī Jā'iza, Karāchī, 1955, p. 74.

In 1895, Iqbāl came to Lāhore the centre of the development of Urdū which was replacing Persian as the language of the intellectual élite. In Lāhore it was customary for persons who had a taste for literature to meet at a few well-known places. In 1896 Iqbāl was introduced to the higher literary circle of Lāhore, which had its centre at Bāzār-e-Ḥakīmān, inside Bhātī Gate. Bāzār-e-Ḥakīmān was the venue of the meetings of the 'Urdū Bazm-e-Mushā'ara' which had been founded by Ḥakīm Shujā'-ud-Dīn Muḥammad for the purpose of encouraging the growth of Urdū poetry. Weekly meetings were held at the residence of Ḥakīm Amīn-ud-Dīn.¹ Iqbāl frequently took part in the 'mushā'aras' held there. It was on one of these occasions that he recited his famous couplet:-

مولیٰ سمجھ کے ستانِ کربیا نے بین لے
قطرے گرے تھے جو عرفِ انعال کے

²(Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. II, p. 73)

Mirzā Arshad Gorgānī of Delhī, an Urdū poet of stature, was much impressed and foretold a great future for Iqbāl.³

-
1. I have this on the authority of my grandfather Ḥakīm Ahmad Shujā', the son of Ḥakīm Shujā'-ud-Dīn Muḥammad and the cousin of Ḥakīm Amīn-ud-Dīn. Also corroborated by Vāḥid, S.A., Iqbāl: His Art and Thought, p. 4.
 2. Taking them to be pearls, the Glorious One Gathered what were the fallen tears of shame.
 3. Vāḥid, S.A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought, p. 4.

Iqbāl used to recite his poems at Bāzār-e-Ḥakīmān before he recited them in public.¹ Amongst the poems read there were "Nāla²-e-Yatīm," "Hilāl-e-'Īd" and "Taṣwīr-e-Dard" which were soon to rank among the favourite poems of the nation.

An organization to which Iqbāl was devoted all his life was the Anjuman-e-Ḥimāyat-e-Islām (Society for the Defence of Islām). The annual sessions of the Anjuman fulfilled an emotional need of the Indian Muslims and became national festivals. Muslims attended these sessions devotedly in order to participate in the efforts of their leaders and to affirm the unity of their purpose.²

Iqbāl made an almost-sensational debut in 1900, when he read his poem "Nāla²-e-Yatīm,"³ (The Orphan's Lament) at the fifteenth annual meeting of the Anjuman. The poem begins with a lamentation, "an essay in that plaintive and pathetic mode which often recurs in his early verse."⁴ The lament is followed by an entreaty addressed to the Prophet of Islām. The poem ends with the Prophet's exhortation that the orphans be treated with compassion - for he too had been an orphan:

-
1. Shujā', H.A. Khūn Bahā, Lāhore, 1943, p. 199.
 2. Mālik, H. Moslem Nationalism in India and Pākistān, Washington, D.C. 1963, p. 218.
 3. Mehr, G. R. and Delāwarī, S.A. (Editors) Sarod-e-Rafta, Lāhore, 1951, pp 9-18.
 4. Singh, I. The Ardent Pilgrim, London, 1951, p. 21.

آرو مری بیٹی کی تمہارے ساتھ ہے

¹(Sarod-e-Rafta, p. 18)

Every age has found its spokesmen and interpreters in its creative artists. Iqbāl even at the beginning of his long and fruitful poetic career possessed a genius for being able to feel the pulse of the nation and captivate the mood of the hour. 'Nāla'-e-Yatīm' indeed not a remarkable poem had a remarkable response because it struck a chord of emotional cognizance of deep-rooted psychological needs of those who came to listen to it. The orphan's lament was also the lament of the Indian Muslims who felt desolate and abandoned in an atmosphere of political bondage and spiritual poverty. Iqbāl continued to read his poems at the meetings of the Anjuman and it was at a meeting in April 1911 that Iqbāl read his famous 'Shikwa' - a poem which commands such a unique place in Urdū literature that Iqbāl's fame could rest secure on it alone. A few months later, Iqbāl read his 'Jawāb-e-Shikwa'. In 1912, Iqbāl's 'Shamā aur Shā'ir' was published which gives quite a clear idea of the message which the poet was to deliver.

-
1. To you is entrusted the safeguarding of the dignity of my orphan state.

The publication of Asrār-e-Khudī in 1915 was a great event. His attack on Ḥāfiẓ brought on a storm which took a long time to subside. Iqbāl had undertaken to shake millions out of slumber and sloth and it was no easy task to accomplish. However, with the publication of Asrār-e-Khudī, Iqbāl's commitment of the philosophy of the Ego (with all that its practical application entailed) was complete. Rumūz-e-Bekhudī which dealt with the development of the communal ego, was published in 1918. In 1923 appeared Payām-e-Mashriq, Iqbāl's answer to Goethe's West Östlicher Divān. In 1924 Bāng-e-Darā was published. It was the first collection of Iqbāl's Urdū poetry and contained most poems such as 'Tarāna-e-Hindī', 'Tarāna-e-Millī', 'Shikwa', 'Jawāb-e-Shikwa', 'Shamā aur Shā'ir', which had already become a part of the literary history of Urdū poetry. In addition to these poems, Bāng-e-Darā, also contained 'Khizr-e-Rāh', published in 1921 and 'Ṭulū'-e-Islām', published in 1922. These poems are amongst Iqbāl's finest Urdū poetry.

Zabūr-e-'Ajam was published in 1927, and was followed by Iqbāl's magnum opus, Jāvid Nāma, modelled on Dante's Divine Comedy in 1932. In 1935, Bāl-e-Jibrīl, and in 1936 Zarb-e-Kalīm, two volumes of Urdū poetry appeared. In 1934 Iqbāl had published a Persian poem Musāfir, on account of his visit to Afghānistān and in

1936 appeared another Persian poem Pas Ai Bāyad Kard Ai Aqwām-i-Sharq? . Armagān-e-Ḥijāz, containing both Persian and Urdū verse appeared posthumously in 1938.

Iqbāl's friend Sir 'Abdul Qādir has enumerated the principal themes dealt with by Iqbāl in his Urdū works.¹ These themes are to be found running through all poetical works by Iqbāl and may be summed up thus:-

- (a) The importance of the 'individual' and the need to develop the potentialities of the 'Ego'.
- (b) The exalted station of man in the hierarchy of the universe and the unlimited possibilities of his further rise to perfection.
- (c) The necessity of spiritual guidance to control man's material progress, which if left uncontrolled, could spell disaster.
- (d) A warning to the nations of the West of the calamitous consequences which will accrue if they continue to advance on purely materialistic lines, neglectful of the spiritual sphere of human life.
- (e) A warning to the nations of the East in general and to Muslims in particular, to remember their spiritual heritage and eminence.

1. Qādir, A. "Muslim Culture and Religious Thought" in O'Malley L. S. S. (Editor) Modern India and the West, Oxford, 1941, pp 530-531.

Besides his poetical works, Iqbāl wrote three works in English: 'Ilm-ul-Iqtisād, (the first book on Political Economy in Urdū) appeared in 1903; Iqbāl's doctoral thesis on The Development of Metaphysics in Persia was published in London in 1908; and his lectures on The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām were first published in 1930. Iqbāl also wrote numerous articles in Urdū and English in various journals and newspapers. A number of collections of his articles, letters, speeches and statements have been published.

SOME DETAILS OF IQBĀL'S LIFE.

MARRIAGES: Iqbāl was married three times. His first marriage took place in 1895,¹ when he was barely eighteen years old. His first wife was from Gujrāt and came from a wealthy family.² She bore Iqbāl a son (Aftāb Iqbāl) and a daughter (Maryam who died in infancy).³ This marriage was not a success.⁴ Iqbāl's first wife died in March 1947.⁵ His second wife was from Lāhore⁶ and bore him two children (Jāvid Iqbāl and Munīra). She died in May 1935.⁷ Iqbāl's third wife was from Ludhiāna. She died in 1924.⁸

1. Sālik, A. M. Zīkr-e-Iqbāl, p. 14

2. ibid.

3. ibid.

4. ibid.

5. Wāḥid-ud-dīn, F. S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. I, p. 202.

6. Sālik, A. M. Zīkr-e-Iqbāl, p. 67.

7. Wāḥid-ud-dīn, F. S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. I, p. 202.

8. ibid.

TRAVELS: Iqbāl visited Europe thrice - the first time as a student, when he spent three years (from 1905-1908) and then twice later on in life to attend the Round Table Conferences held in London. In 1933 he met Mussolini in Rome. Mussolini whom Iqbāl described as "Luther without his Bible"¹ asked Iqbāl what he thought of the Italians and Iqbāl answered him "They are quick-witted, they are handsome, they are artistic and they have many years of civilization behind them, but they have no blood."² Iqbāl also met Henri Bergson in Paris and when Iqbāl told him of the Prophet's Tradition 'Do not vilify Time for Time is God', Bergson appeared amazed at the profundity of such an observation.³ In 1933, Iqbāl also visited Spain⁴ and went to Jerusalem to attend the Islāmic Conference held there.⁵

Amongst other visits undertaken are Iqbāl's visit to Madrās, Mysore, Hyderābād, Seringāpatam and 'Alīgarh in 1928 on a lecture tour.⁶ In 1935 he paid a long visit to his friend Sir Ross Masood at Bhopāl.⁷ In 1933 Iqbāl visited Afghānistān along with Maulānā Sulaimān Nadvī and Sir Ross Masood.

1. Iqbāl quoted by Sir Malcolm Darling "Iqbāl Day Speech" delivered at the Iqbāl Day meeting held at Overseas House, London, on 22 April, 1959.

2. ibid.

3. Vahid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought.

4. Vahid-ud-dīn, F. S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. I, p. 245.

5. Vahid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought, p. 17.

6. ibid.

7. Vahid-ud-dīn, F. S. Rozgār-e-Faqīr, Vol. I, p. 245.

KNIGHTHOOD: Iqbāl was knighted on 1 January, 1923. The actual ceremony of knighting him was carried out by the Viceroy of India, on behalf of King George V, at a later date in 1923.¹

ILLNESS AND DEATH: in 1924 Iqbāl developed kidney trouble but was cured of it by 'Abdul Waḥāb Anṣārī known as Ḥakīm Nābīnā, the blind physician.² Iqbāl lost his voice in 1934.³ In 1937 he developed cataract in his eyes.⁴ Iqbāl's illness took a serious turn on 25 March 1938 and he died in the early hours of 21 April, 1938⁵ in the arms of his faithful servant 'Alī Bakḥsh. Half an hour before his death he recited the following verses:-

سُرودِ رحمتِ مادر آید کہ ناید؟
 لیسے اور حجاز آید کہ ناید؟
 سر آمد روز گادِ این فترے
 دگر دانائے داز آید کہ ناید؟

6 (Armagān-e-Ḥijāz, p. 14)

-
1. Information received in a letter dated 16.8.66 from the Secretary, Central Chancery of the Orders of Knighthood, St. James's Palace, London.
 2. Niāzī, S. N. "Allāma Iqbāl Kī Akhīrī 'Alālat" Urdū, (Iqbāl number) Awrangābād. October 1938, p. 1019.
 3. ibid.
 4. Vāḥid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought, p. 22.
 5. ibid. p. 23.
 6. The departed melody may recur or not.
 The zephyr may blow again from Ḥijāz or not.
 The days of this Faqīr have come to an end,
 Another seer may come or not.
 (Translation by Vāḥid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought, p. 231).

LAST VISITOR: Iqbāl's last visitor was his German friend, Baron von Veltheim¹ with whom Iqbal discussed many problems, ranging from poetry and philosophy to politics, which had interested him during his lifetime.

BURIAL: Iqbāl was given almost a sovereign's burial. He was buried near the gate of the Bādshāhī Mosque in Lāhore, with 10,000 people or more in attendance.

It is not possible to give an adequate idea of the richness or achievements of Iqbāl's life merely by mentioning the important events which took place in it. Iqbāl has yet to find a biographer who will do full justice to the man who was not just a poet or philosopher or a politician but one whose versatile genius could not be circumscribed in words, who wanted "to melt the world in the fire of his heart,"² and create a whole new world. In many ways Iqbāl was a remarkably simple man, but anyone who has tried to form a clear picture of the man behind all the legends which he created, knows that coming to know Iqbāl is like exploring a new country - there is so much to see, so much to know, so much to understand. But as

-
1. Vāhid, S. A. Iqbāl: His Art and Thought. p. 14.
 2. Schimmel, A. M. "The Jāvīdnāme in the Light of the Comparative History of Religions" Pakistan Quarterly, Karāchī, Winter 1956, Vol. VI, No.4, p. 39.

Iqbāl's friend and first translator wrote: "It is worthwhile to become acquainted with Iqbāl's rich and forceful personality. Granted that the difficulties are great, so is the reward."¹

1. Nicholson, R. A. "Iqbāl's Message of the East", Islāmīca, Lipsiae, 1924/25, Volume I, p. 115.

CHAPTER II

IQBĀL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.POSSIBILITY AND IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE

According to Kant, the perceptual manifold must fulfil certain formal conditions in order to constitute knowledge. For him, the noumenon or the 'thing-in-itself' is only a limiting or regulative idea. If there is some actuality corresponding to the idea, it transcends 'actual' experience, and consequently its existence cannot be rationally demonstrated. The subject-matter of metaphysics falls outside the boundaries of experience and cannot be systematised by space and time, and therefore, according to Kant, metaphysics is impossible. In Kantian terms, religion is equally impossible, but according to Iqbāl, it is possible to attain knowledge of ultimate Reality, and therefore both metaphysics and religion are possible. In Iqbāl's words, "Kant's verdict can be accepted only if we start with the assumption that all experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible."¹

According to Iqbāl, "it is the lot of man to share in the deeper aspirations of the universe around him and to shape his

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 182.

own destiny as well as that of the universe."¹ In order that man may achieve the fullest possible development of his self and his environment, it is essential for him to possess knowledge. His "life and the onward march of his spirit depend on the establishment of connections with the reality that confronts him. It is knowledge that establishes these connections."²

Man suffers greatly because his knowledge is limited but it is often the consciousness of the incompleteness of his knowledge which provokes greater endeavour and leads to an intellectual renaissance:

تاوانی ہی میری سرمایہ قوت نہ ہو
دشکِ جامِ جم مرا آئینہ حیرت نہ ہو

³
(Bāng-e-Darā, p. 5)

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE: Iqbāl, following the Qōr'ān, maintains that there are two sources of knowledge - the inner consciousness of man ('anfus') and the outer world of nature ('āfāq').⁴

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 12.
2. Ibid.
3. My very weakness may be the source of power,
The mirror of my wonder may be the envy of Jamshed's
(world-revealing) cup.
4. Dār B. A. "Intellect and Intuition in Bergson and Ṣūfīs"
Iqbāl January 1956. Volume IV No. 3. p. 82.

Iqbāl also mentions the study of HISTORY as a source of knowledge. "History or, in the language of the Qōr'ān, 'the days of God,' is the third source of human knowledge ... It is one of the most essential teachings of the Qōr'ān that nations are collectively judged, and suffer for their misdeeds here and now. In order to establish this proposition the Qōr'ān constantly cites historical instances, and urges upon the reader to reflect on the past and present experience of mankind."¹ Iqbāl himself is a great believer in the study of history as a source of knowledge and inspiration. In a poem he says:

دل ہمارے یادِ عہدِ رفتہ سے جلی ہیں
 ایسے شاہوں کو یہ اُمت ہولے والی نہیں
 ہو چکا گو گو م کی نشانِ جلالی کا ظہور
 ہے مگر ماتی الہی نشانِ جمالی کا ظہور
²
 (Bāng-e-Darā, p. 159)

This third source of knowledge may be subsumed under the second source of knowledge i.e. knowledge of the external world.³

Iqbāl cannot be easily or exclusively classified as an 'empiricist', 'rationalist' or 'intuitionist' since he

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām. p. 138.
 2. Our hearts are not free of the memory of past ages,
 This nation will not forget its rulers.
 Though over for this nation are the days of the glory
 of its might,
 Yet the days of the glory of its beauty are yet to come.
 3. Dār B. A. "Intellect and Intuition in Bergson and
 Ṣūfīs" p. 82.

combines sense-perception, reason and intuition in his theory of knowledge.¹ He defines knowledge as "sense-perception elaborated by understanding"² ('understanding' here does not stand exclusively for 'reason' but for all non-perceptual modes of knowledge). There are two ways of establishing connections with the reality that confronts us. The direct way is by means of observation and sense-perception, the other way is through direct association with that reality as it reveals itself within.³

MODES OF KNOWLEDGE

(1) SENSE PERCEPTION

Importance of Empirical Study:

Iqbāl repeatedly points out the empirical attitude of the Qŏr'ān which lays great emphasis on the observable aspects of reality so that by reflective observation of nature man may attain "consciousness of that of which nature is regarded as a symbol."⁴ According to Iqbāl, Nature stands in the same relation to the Ultimate Ego as character does to the human self.⁵ He holds that "the scientific observation of nature

-
1. Khātŏn, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, Karāchī, 1963 p. 3.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 12.
 3. Ibid. p. 15.
 4. Ibid. pp 13-14.
 5. Gibb, H. A. R. Modern Trends in Islām. p. 79.

keeps us in close contact with the behaviour of Reality, and thus sharpens our inner perception for a deeper vision of it ... The scientific observer of Nature is a kind of mystic seeker in the act of prayer."¹

In Asrār-e-Khudī Iqbāl criticises Plato (and by implication all the thinkers who were influenced by Plato in this respect) for reducing the world of phenomena to a myth:

آنجیان اضمون نامحسوس خورد
اعتبار از دست و جستم دگوش بر
منکر صفاً موجود گشت
خالقِ اعیان نامشهود گشت

زنده طایر عالم امکان فوش است
مردم دل را عالم اعیان فوش است

²
(Asrār-e-Khudī, pp 34-35)

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 91.
 2. He was so fascinated by the invisible
That he made hand, eye, and ear of no account.
He disbelieved in the material universe
And became the creator of invisible Ideas.
Sweet is the world of phenomena to the living spirit,
Dear is the world of Ideas to the dead spirit.
(Translation by Nicholson, R. A. The Secrets of the Self,
pp 57-58)

In Zabūr-e-‘Ajam Iqbāl laments over such modes of thinking which have reduced the living world to a mirage:

مکدر کرد مغرب چہتمہ ہائے علم و عرفان را
ہاں را پیرہ تر سارد پہ منائیٰ یہ اشراقی

¹
(Zabūr-e-‘Ajam, p. 38)

To one who denies the reality of the world of the senses, Iqbāl says:

تو چشم بستہ دگفتی کہ این جاں خواب است
کتنائے چشم کہ این خواب خواب بیداری است

²
(Zabūr-e-‘Ajam, p. 108)

Iqbāl points out the difference between the classical spirit, with its contempt for sense-perception, and the Qōr‘ān"which sees in the humble bee a recipient of Divine inspiration and constantly calls upon the reader to observe

-
1. Alas, the western mind hath soiled
The springs of knowledge undefiled.
Stoic alike and Platonist
Have shrouded all the world in mist.
(Translation by Arberrv, A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 21.)
 2. Thou hast closed thine eyes, and said,
"The world's a dream, no less:"
Open thine eyes; this dream-aped
Is all of wakefulness.
(Translation by Arberrv, A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 67)

perpetual change of the winds, the alternation of day and night, the clouds, the starry heavens, and the planets swimming through infinite space."¹ The cultures of the ancient world failed, says Iqbāl, because their approach to Reality was entirely introspective and they moved from within outwards. This gave them theory without power, and on mere theory, no durable civilization can be based.²

Nature and Ultimate Reality.

Iqbāl regards empirical science as an indispensable stage in the evolution of man. He says that the Universe, by offering obstruction to man, sharpens his faculties "and prepares us for an insertion into what lies below the surface of phenomena."³ The Prophet of Islām regarded Nature as one of the 'signs' of God and protested against unhealthy mysticism which forgot that reality lives in its own appearances.⁴ Iqbāl does not believe in man's withdrawal from the world of matter which, despite its temporal flux, is organically related to ultimate Reality.⁵

When the Spirit of the Earth welcomes Adam, it asks him to

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 4.
 2. Ibid. p. 15.
 3. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 114.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Khatoon, J. "Iqbāl's Theory of Knowledge" Iqbāl Review April 1960.

observe the natural phenomena around him for Reality is both concealed and revealed in them:

کھول آنکھ زمیں دیکھ فلک دیکھ فضا دیکھ
مشرق سے ابھرتے سورج کو ذرا دیکھ!
اس جلوئے بے پردہ کو پردوں میں چھپا دیکھ!

¹
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 178)

Nature and Self.

According to Iqbāl, knowledge starts with the concrete.² Nature confronts the self as the "other" existing per se, which the self knows but does not make.³ The Self develops when there is interaction between the ego and the non-ego. "The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this area of mutual invasion. It is present in it as directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience."⁴

-
1. Open **your** eyes and see the earth and the sky! feel the air, See the sun rising from the East! See the open revelation concealed in veils!
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 131.
 3. Dar, B. A. Iqbāl's Gulshan-i Raz-i Jadid and Bandagi Nāmah. p. 27)
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 12.

خستین ہی مایہ مستنیرش
کد آفر بآئیے اسپریش

شعورش ماہان نزدیک تر کرد
عہاں اور از راز او فر کرد

¹
(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 212)

Iqbāl wants to emphasise the fact that the self is not passive in the act of knowledge. The human mind is not a 'tabula rasa' on which external objects simply leave an impression. He states that "the realisation of the total self comes not by merely permitting the wide world to throw its varied impressions on our mind, and then watching what becomes of us."² Iqbāl refers to Einstein who had taught that the knower is intimately related to the object known, and that the act of knowledge is a constitutive element in the objective reality.³ Iqbāl, then, does not deny the objectivity of nature, but merely the passivity of the knower.

-
1. It first floods things with an irradiating light,
And then brings them within its laws' superior might.
It is awareness which has brought it closer to the World
And through the world has its own mystery unfurled.
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of
p. 5)
 2. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 115.
 3. Ibid. p. 111.

(2) REASON: The connotation of 'reason' and its importance.

It is often said that Iqbāl was opposed to reason, that he was anti-rationalist or anti-intellectual. Much confusion has occurred because neither Iqbāl nor most of his critics state exactly what is meant by 'reason'. In its widest sense, the word 'reason' stands for all that differentiates man from the lower animals and expresses itself in the practical sphere and in activities which are non-cognitive or not purely cognitive.¹ Obviously, Iqbāl is not, and no one suggest that he is, opposed to 'reason' in its widest connotation.

When it is said that Iqbāl is anti-rationalist, the word 'reason' is used to stand for the 'discursive' or 'ratiocinative' faculties as opposed to the 'intuitive' faculties. Used in this sense, 'reason' is responsible for both theoretical (deductive) and empirical (inductive) sciences. The question to be asked is whether Iqbāl is, in fact, opposed to 'reason' in this narrower sense of the word. The evidence is that Iqbāl, far from denying the value or validity of reason, always commended it. He cites enthusiastically the Qōr'ānic verses (2:28-31) which state that Man's superiority over angels lay in his power to 'name' things i.e. to form

1. Stocks, J. L. "Reason and Intuition" Reason and Intuition and other essays, London, 1939. p. 2.

concepts.¹ Concepts are not abstract logical entities. They are based on, and indissolubly linked with, facts of sensation.² It is the knowledge of things and their inherent nature that exalted man over celestial creatures, and it is only through an unceasing struggle to attain the knowledge of things that man can maintain his superiority with justice in the world.³

It is with the weapon of conceptual knowledge that man is able to gain mastery over the elements and forces of Nature. Without reason, science would be impossible, and without science very little progress would be made in the material sphere. Iqbāl believed strongly in the power and utility of science, and it is he who speaks through Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī in Jāvid Nāma and calls for "nimble intellects."

قوتِ مغرب نہ ازینک درباب
 نے زرقینِ دفترانِ بے محاب
 نے رسمِ ساحراںِ لالہ دوست
 نے زعمیاںِ ساقِ دے از قطعِ موست
 علمی اورانہ ار لادینی است
 نے نزدغشی ار خطِ لاطیبی است

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 13.
 2. Khātoon, J. "Iqbāl's Theory of Knowledge" p. 94.
 3. Bilgrāmī, H. H. "Iqbāl's Theory of Knowledge and its Significance in his poetry". The Islāmī Literature Lāhore, May 1951. p. 11.

قوتِ امرگ از علم در است
 ار ہمیں آتشِ حراقتِ درش است ا
 علم در را اے نواں بتوح و شگ
 مغزی ما پدہ ملبوس فرگ ا
 فکری جالاکے اگر داری بس است
 طبع ذرا کے اگر داری بس است
 1
 (Jāvīd Nāma, p. 209)

Nature and function of 'thought':

In his theory of knowledge, Bergson draws a sharp distinction between the character of our conceptual knowledge of the external world and consciousness as known from within. The intellect in its scientific study of the external world proceeds by analysis and classification. For analysis, the world must be considered as composed of isolatable objects externally related to each other; for classification these must be regarded as repeatable instances of similar kinds. So the world is interpreted in terms of limited kinds of discrete units, undergoing repeatable rearrangements in space.

-
1. The power of the West comes not from lute and rebeck,
 not from the dancing of unveiled girls,
 not from the magic of tulip-cheeked enchantresses,
 not from naked legs and bobbed hair;
 its solidity springs not from irreligion,
 its glory derives not from the Latin script.
 The power of the West comes from science and technology,
 and with that selfsame flame its lamp is bright:
 For science and technology, elegant young sprig,
 brains are necessary, not European clothes,
 If you have a nimble intellect, that is sufficient,
 If you have a perceptive mind, that is sufficient.
 (Translation by Arberry A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 129)

Hence the intellect thinks naturally of static objects in spatial juxtaposition; it does not grasp fundamental changes through time, but imagines change as a succession of instantaneous spaces. The intellect therefore, Bergson says, "spatializes."¹

Iqbāl does not agree with Bergson as regards the nature and function of thought. For him though outwardly thought spatializes and makes use of only mechanical categories "to break up Reality into static fragments, its real function is to synthesize the elements of experience by employing categories suitable to the various levels which experience presents. It is as much organic as life."² Thought has a deeper movement which goes beyond mechanism.³

The sphere of 'thought':

Iqbāl criticises Kant and Gazzālī for circumscribing the sphere of reason and concluding that reason could not yield knowledge of ultimate Reality. Iqbāl says that the idea that thought is essentially finite and cannot capture the Infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge. "It is the inadequacy of the logical understanding which finds a multiplicity of mutually

-
1. Urmson, J. O. (Editor). The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers London 1960. pp 61-62
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 52. p. xiii.
 3. Rājū, P. T. "The Idealism of Sir Moḥammed Iqbāl". The Visvabhāratī Quarterly Shāntiniketan. August-October 1940. New Series. Volume VI Part II, p. 104.

repellent individualities with no prospect of their ultimate reduction to a unity that makes us sceptical about the conclusiveness of thought".¹ The logical understanding is unable to see this multiplicity as a coherent universe since it proceeds by generalisations based on resemblances, and these generalisations are fictitious unities which do not affect the reality of real things. Thought, however, has a deeper movement in which it can reach an immanent. Infinite. In its essential nature, thought is not static but dynamic, unfolding its interval infinitude in time like the seed which, from the first, carries within itself the organic unity of the tree as a present fact. Thought reveals itself in serial time as a succession of finite concepts appearing to reach a unity which is already present in them. In fact, says Iqbāl, "it is ... the presence of the Infinite in the movement of knowledge that makes finite thinking possible."² In Iqbāl's opinion, what Kant and Gazzālī failed to see was that thought, in the very act of knowledge, passes beyond its own finitude.³ In its progressive movement thought surmounts its finitude, the implicit presence within it of the Infinite, keeping alive within it the flame of aspiration and sustaining it in its endless pursuit. Thought, then, is not inconclusive, because

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 6.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid. pp 6-7.

it is "on its own way a greeting of the finite with the infinite."¹

Iqbāl's use of 'reason' in a double sense:

It may be seen that Iqbāl uses the word 'reason' or 'thought' in two senses. This, in one sense, is the crux of the problem for it is here that the confusions begin. More often than not (particularly in his poetry) Iqbāl uses the word "thought" to stand for the "logical understanding" which has a sectional nature, but sometimes he also refers to "the deeper movement of thought" which is identical with intuition. When Iqbāl criticises "reason" or "thought" it is always its former and not its latter aspect.

Attack on mechanistic interpretation of life:

We have seen that Iqbāl and Bergson are in disagreement regarding the nature and function of intellect, but Iqbāl follows Bergson in attacking the mechanistic interpretation of life. He thinks that the application of mechanical concepts employed by natural sciences for the organization of knowledge is relative to the level of experience to which such concepts are applied. The concept of 'cause', for instance, does not apply to the purposive action of human beings of whom free-will is predicated.² Mechanical concepts, useful as they are for purposes of scientific inquiry, are inadequate for a

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 7.

2. Ibid. pp 43-44.

comprehensive analysis of life. Iqbāl quotes¹ the well-known biologist J. S. Haldane who points out that mechanical causality cannot, for instance, explain self-maintenance and reproduction. It has been assumed by mechanists that bodily organisms are so constructed as to maintain, repair and reproduce themselves. When an event is stated in mechanical terms it is stated as a necessary result of certain simple properties of separate parts which interact in the event. For a mechanical explanation the reacting parts must first be given. The idea of a mechanism which is constantly maintaining or reproducing its own structure is self-contradictory, for such a mechanism would be a mechanism without parts and therefore not a mechanism. It is, ~~the~~ therefore, not possible to apply static concepts to vital processes. In Iqbāl's opinion, it is a mistake to apply concepts which are relevant to one level of experience to another, quite different, level. Like Bergson he opposes mechanism because it forces into the strait jacket of physical concepts the dynamic processes of life.² In the language of poetry, Iqbāl expresses it thus:

زندگی کچھ اور ہے علم سے کچھ اور ہے
زندگی سوزِ جگر ہے علم سے سوزِ دماغ

³
(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p. 78)

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 43-44.
 2. Magill, F. N. (Editor) Masterpieces of World Philosophy (in summary form) London, 1963. p. 769.
 3. Life and knowledge are two different things, Life is heart-burning while knowledge is the working of the mind.

Iqbāl's attitude to 'reason':

Much has been written about Iqbāl's criticism of "reason". One writer states that, like Bergson, whenever Iqbāl describes thought he condemns it as a mere intellectual mechanism devised only to control the world of space and matter.¹ As we have seen, Iqbāl distinguishes between two types of reason:

اک دانش نوری اک دانش برہانی
ہے دانش برہانی حیرت کی فراوانی!

²
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 31)

Iqbāl does not condemn "reason" even when its connotation is restricted to discursive reason since he has repeatedly pointed out its power and utility. What he does, in fact, is to point out the limitations of discursive reason.

Iqbāl, like Bergson, did react against the predominant trend in modern thinking "to regard the Intellect as providing a wholly adequate instrument for the guidance of life's activities."³ Like Kierkegaard Iqbāl refuses to hand the monopoly of revealing reality to Rationalism.⁴ He does not regard

-
1. Rahmān, F. "Modern Muslim Thought" p. 22.
 2. There is a knowledge which gives light, and a knowledge which proceeds by logic, Discursive knowledge is abundance of curiosity.
 3. Saiyidain, K. G. Iqbāl's Educational Philosophy, p. 132.
 4. 'Erfān, N. "What is common between the Existentialists and Iqbāl." The Pākistān Philosophical Journal, Lāhore, January 1963. Volume VI No. 3. p 32.

science as the measure of all things. "Science seeks to establish uniformities of experience, i.e., the laws of mechanical repetition. Life with its intense feeling of spontaneity constitutes a centre of indetermination, and thus falls outside the domain of necessity. Hence science cannot comprehend life."¹

Iqbāl criticises the purely intellectual method of approaching reality because it does not take account of feelings, purposes and values. In his opinion, the predicament of the modern man is that his life is wholly overshadowed by the results of his intellectual activity and he has ceased to live soulfully i.e. from within having been cut off from the springs of life.² To the "philosophy - addicted" modern man Iqbāl says:

ہے اس کا علم سب نبیالی
ہیگل کا صدف گر سے خالی

ہے فلسفہ زندگی سے دوری
اعمال مردھے سے تصویری

³
(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p. 10)

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 50.
 2. Ibid. pp 186-187
 3. The shell of Hegel's thought is without a pearl,
This magic is all an illusion.
Intellect does not lead to the vision,
Philosophy is detachment from life.

The most obvious limitation of discursive reason is that it cannot capture the organic wholeness of life, and can give only "static snapshots" of reality. At best, discursive reason can beget science, "the piecemeal apprehension of some limited portion of ^{or} aspect ^{of} Reality: it cannot encompass Reality itself."¹ The fact that scientific knowledge is fragmentary does not take away from its value provided science does not assert dogmatically the self-sufficiency of its facts and methods and ideals.²

Perhaps the greatest benefit of scientific knowledge is the confidence it gives to man.³ But this confidence can easily become exaggerated into a sense of power which seeks dominion rather than truth. With Tagore, Iqbāl believes that man's moral and intellectual development must proceed side by side. He would have endorsed Tagore's words that "man with his mental and material power far outgrowing his moral strength is like an exaggerated giraffe whose head has suddenly shot up miles away from the rest of him, making normal communications difficult to establish."⁴

-
1. Ahmad, S. M. The Pilgrimage of Eternity, Lāhore. 1961. p xiii.
 2. Hamīd, K. A. "Remarks on the Development of Iqbāl's Poetic Thought" Poems from Iqbāl (translated by Kiernan, W. G.) Bombay, 1947. p. 131.
 3. Khayāl, T. M. "Iqbāl's Conception of Satan and his place in Ideal Society." Iqbāl July 1953. Volume II No. 1. p. 3.
 4. Tagore quoted in Khān, N. A. "Tagore and Iqbāl" Indo-Iranica September 1961. Volume XIV No. 3. p. 52

Like the existentialists, Iqbāl sounds a warning that an idolatrous attitude towards reason and science leads in the direction of dehumanisation.¹ Lenin protests before God:

ہے دل کے لئے موت مشینوں کی حکومت

احساسِ مرّت کو کجیل دیتے ہیں آلات

²
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 147)

Reason can enable man to mould his physical and social environment but cannot liberate him from the prison-house of his own confusions and doubts:

و عشقِ ناپید دغردے گزدش صورتِ مارا
عقل کو تالچِ فرمانِ نظر کر نہ سکا
ڈھونڈنے والا ستاروں کی گدراگا ہوں کا
اپنے افکار کی دنیا میں سحر کر نہ سکا
ایسی حکمت کے خم و بیج میں اٹھا لیا
آج تک منہمکہ لفع و ضرر کر نہ سکا
جس نے سورج کی شعاعوں کو گرفتار کیا
زندگی کی تپ تار پک سحر کر نہ سکا

³
(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p. 67)

1. "Erfān, N. "What is Common between Existentialists and Iqbāl" p. 32.
2. Death to the heart, machines stand sovereign,
Machines that crush all sense of human kindness.
(Translation by Kiernan, V. G. Poems from Iqbāl, p. 43)
3. Love fled, Mind stung him like a snake: he could not force
it to vision's will;
He sought the orbit of the stars yet could not travel his
thoughts world.
Entangled in the labyrinth of learning,
Lost count of good and ill;
Enchained the sunbeams, yet his hand no dawn
On life's dark night unfurled.
(Translation by Khān, N. A. "Tagore and Iqbāl" pp 52-53)

There, are questions which the Intellect cannot answer:

غبارِ راہ کو محسوس کیا ہے ذوقِ عمل
 مردتا نہیں سکتی کہ مدعا کیا ہے

¹
 (Armagan-e-Hijaz, p. 244)

The intellect is "freed" by modern education but it is unable to cope with its "freedom".

مدرسہ عقل کو آزاد تو کرتا ہے مگر

جھوٹ دیتا ہے خیالات کو بے ربط و نظام

²
 (Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 81)

Another limitation of "thought" is its operation being "essentially symbolic in character, veils the true nature of life, and can only picture it as a universal current flowing through all things. The result of an intellectual view of life therefore, is necessarily pantheistic."³ In other words, since thought works out its end through symbols, which are in essence, general, its result is deindividualization.⁴

-
1. The dust of the wayside has been granted the love of Beauty, The Intellect cannot tell what is the reason.
 2. Education liberates the Intellect, But leaves the thoughts incoherent and disorderly.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 61.
 4. Malik, G. R. "The Nature of the Ego" Iqbal Review October 1964. p. 45.

(3) INTUITION. Definition of 'intuition':

In Iqbāl's philosophy great emphasis has been laid on 'intuition' as a mode of knowledge. The word 'intuition' is derived from a verb which means 'looking at', and its extended use seems to have originated as a metaphor from sight.¹ "It would stand, presumably, for a mental inspection in which a direct revelation is made to the mind, comparable to the direct revelation which accompanies the exposure of a physical object to the eye."² The word is used in the works of Descartes and Locke to mean the apprehension of indubitable, self-evident truths. Descartes explains how intuition is "not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the pure intellectual cognising of which an unclouded and attentive mind is capable, a cognising so ready and so distinct that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we thus intellectually apprehend."³ Locke describes ~~intuitive~~ knowledge as "the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way, and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is perfectly filled with

1. Stocks, J. L. "Reason and Intuition" p. 3.

2. Ibid.

3. Descartes quoted in Aaron, R. I. "Intuitive Knowledge" Mind London October 1942 Volume LI. No 204. pp 297-298.

the clear light of it."¹ Hence the traditional philosophical meaning of 'intuition' is knowing with absolute certainty, or knowing in such a way that there is no room for doubt.

Possibility of intuitive knowledge:

Kant in showing the limitations of pure reason had also demonstrated the impossibility of 'intuitive' experience without which metaphysics and religion are not possible. But paradoxically enough in proving the relativity of the finite objects of experience to the intelligence, he also showed "though without himself being fully conscious of it, and almost, we might say, against his will, that we cannot admit the validity of the empirical consciousness without admitting the validity of the consciousness of that which, in the narrower sense of the word, is beyond experience."² It can be seen clearly from his Lectures that Iqbāl is very anxious to show the possibility and validity of the intuitive consciousness. If intuitive experience is possible then it follows that both metaphysics and religion are possible.

Kant had rejected the possibility of metaphysics because it dealt with that which could not be systematised by the categories of space and time and therefore, in his opinion, could not constitute knowledge. But supposing, says Iqbāl, that there is more than one kind of space and one kind of

-
1. St. John, J. A. (Editor). The Philosophic works of John Locke, London, 1843. p. 386.
 2. Caind, E. The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time" Essays on Literature, Glasgow. 1909. p. 195

time, then it is quite possible "that there are other levels of human experience capable of being systematized by other orders of space and time - levels in which concept and analysis do not play the same role as they do in the case of our normal experience."¹ Iqbāl agrees with Kant in regarding space and time as subjective but he does not look upon them as unvarying modes into which all our knowledge is moulded. Rather, they admit of new meaning in relation to various grades of experience and their import varies as psychic powers increase or decrease.²

Iqbāl has devoted a considerable portion of his Lectures to discussing the question of the nature of Space and Time. It was necessary for him to do so in order to demonstrate the possibility of levels of experience which were free from the "normal" spatio-temporal determinations. The importance he attached to this question can be gathered from his words, "In the history of Muslim Culture, we find that both in the realm of pure intellect and religious psychology, by which term I mean higher ṣūfism, the ideal revealed is the possession and enjoyment of the Infinite. In a culture with such an attitude the problem of Space and Time becomes a question of life and death."³ In the course of his discussions Iqbāl has reviewed the various conceptions of Space and Time held by

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 183.
 2. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, pp 12-18.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.132.

thinkers from the ancient to the present times. Iqbāl's conception of Space and Time which forms a very interesting part of his thought has been discussed in detail in a later chapter. Over here, it would suffice to say that Iqbāl distinguishes between kinds of Space and Time, and points out there are levels of experience which refer not to these forms of experience in their ordinary connotation, but to "the interpenetration of the super-spatial 'here' and super-eternal 'now' in the ultimate Reality."¹ Such an interpenetration suggests "the modern notion of space-time which Professor Alexander, in his lectures on Space, Time and Deity regards as the matrix of all things."²

Iqbāl believes, then, in potential types of consciousness which lie close to our normal consciousness and yield life and knowledge.³ Such knowledge is gained through intuition. Iqbāl describes the main features of intuitive experience when he enumerates the characteristics of mysticism which deals with the ultimate by way of intuitive apprehension.⁴

Characteristics of Intuitive (Mystic) Experience:

(a) The characteristic of intuition which has traditionally been most emphasised is its indubitability. "Intuitionism is the theory which asserts, in the face of all sceptical

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 137.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. p. 185.

4. Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism?" Relativity, Logic and Mysticism, p. 151.

criticism, that absolutely certain knowledge occurs in human experience."¹ Iqbāl states that according to the Qōr'ān, the heart or 'qalb' (the seat of intuition) is "something which 'sees' and its reports, if properly interpreted, are never false."²

(B) It is immediate experience of Reality. A notable writer on mysticism writes, "we can claim for those whom we call mystics - and, in a lesser degree, for innumerable artists and contemplative souls - that experience at its fullest and deepest does include the immediate apprehension of an unchanging Reality, and that this apprehension, in one form or another, is the sheet-anchor of the religious consciousness!"³

Intuitive experience is direct like perception but sensation is not involved in it. As Plato said, intuitions come "in a flash".⁴ Iqbāl the poet says:

عشق کی اک حسرت سے طے کر دیا قصہ تمام

اس زمین و آسمان کو بیکراں سمجھا تھا میں

⁵
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p 29)

-
1. Aaron, J. J. "Intuitive Knowledge" p. 317.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 16.
 3. Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism disperse with Mysticism" pp 149-150.
 4. Aaron, R. I. "Intuitive Knowledge" p. 317.
 5. In one leap Love traversed the length,
I had thought that the earth and sky were boundless.

or, as he says in the Introduction to Zabūr-e-'Ajam:

وادی عشق لبے دور دراز است دے
 طے شود حادثہ صد سالہ آئے گاہ

¹
 (Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 2)

For Iqbāl the immediacy of mystic experience lies in that in it God is known as other objects are known. "God is not a mathematical entity or a system of concept mutually related to one another and having no reference to experience."² As Ibn 'Arabī pointed out, God is a percept not a concept.³

(c) Intuitive experience possesses an unanalysable wholeness. In it Reality is given as one indivisible unity. Iqbāl compares intuitive consciousness with discursive consciousness. "When I experience the table before me, innumerable data of experience merge into the single experience of the table. Out of this wealth of data I select those that fall into a certain order of space and time and round them off in reference to the table. In the mystic state, however vivid, such analysis is not possible."⁴ A writer observes that, here, Iqbāl is denying, by inference, that immediacy to normal experiences which he associated with them earlier.⁵ But a closer analysis shows that

-
1. Very far and wide is the valley of Love,
 But there are times when the journey of a hundred years
 Is completed in the duration of a sigh.
 (Translation by Singh, I. The Ardent Pilgrim, p. 168.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 18.
 3. Ibid, p. 183.
 4. Ibid, p. 18.
 5. Rahman, F. "Iqbāl and Mysticism" Iqbāl as a Thinker
 Lāhore. 1966. p. 220;

Iqbāl is not denying the immediacy of sense-perception but rather trying to show the relative importance of analysis in the two types of consciousness. The rational consciousness specialises in analysis and synthesis but in the mystic consciousness all the diverse stimuli runs into one another forming a single unanalysable unity in which the ordinary distinctness of subject and object does not exist.¹ The distinction between the discursive and intuitive consciousness as regards the apprehension of part and whole has also been brought out by H. H. Price. "In discursive consciousness, there is a passage of the mind from one item to another related item, for instance, from a subject to a concept under which we classify it, or from premises to conclusion ... And when we have discursive consciousness of a whole or complex of any sort (as in counting) although the whole may be vaguely present to the mind from the first, yet definite consciousness of the whole comes after consciousness of the parts. In intuitive consciousness, on the other hand, consciousness of the whole comes before definite consciousness of the parts. And there is no passage of the mind; whatever we intuit is present all at once. We might say that intuitive consciousness is 'totalistic', not 'progressive' or 'additive'!"²

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 18-191
 2. Price, H. H. Perception. London, 1932. pp 151-152.

(d) Intuitive experience is objective. Iqbāl thinks it is erroneous to think that the mystic state is "a mere retirement into the mists of pure subjectivity!"¹ The mystic, for instance, experiences God or the ultimate Reality as both immanent and transcendent. He is in direct communion with the 'Other' and momentarily loses consciousness of himself as a distinct and private personality.² But he emerges from his experience possessing "a Supreme Richness - unspeakable Concreteness - overwhelming Aliveness, having been a witness to that Being which gives Becoming all its worth."³

Iqbāl compares the objectivity of intuitive experience with the objectivity of social experience. We know other minds only by inference and yet "the knowledge that the individual before us is a conscious being floods our mind as an immediate experience."⁴ One test of the objectivity of our social experience is that other persons respond to us. Iqbāl bases the objectivity of religious experience on the testimony of the Qōr'ān that God responds to our call: "And your Lord saith, call Me and I respond to your call" (40:62) "And when My servants ask thee concerning Me, then I am nigh unto them and answer the cry of him that crieth unto Me."⁵(2:182)

-
1. Khātōon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in Iqbāl's Philosophic System p. 12.
 2. Ibid.
 3. F. von. Hügel quoted by Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism disperse with Mysticism?" p. 152.
 4. Khātōon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the System of Iqbāl, p. 13.
 5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp. 19-20.

Iqbāl advances another argument to substantiate the claim that religious experience - which is based on intuition - is objective. "The very fact that religious life is divided into periods indicates that like the student of the scientific method, the practical student of religious psychology learns to sift experience critically in order to eliminate all subjective elements. psychological or physiological, in the content of his experience with a view finally to reach what is absolutely objective."¹

To meet the charge that intuitive experience is purely subjective, Iqbāl points out a number of times that intuition is not a faculty of knowledge qualitatively distinct from reason or perception, but rather as a quality which is implicit in cognition at every level!² Thus while intuition is feeling, this does not mean that it is purely subjective since feeling itself has cognitive content as Bradley and Whitehead have shown.³ In Iqbāl's opinion, this may be seen if we reflect on the character of our knowledge of our Self. Mān rises from the intuition of the finite self to the awareness of life as a centralising ego and the ultimate experience of God as a universal, unifying, telic power.⁴

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp. 197.
 2. Whittemore. R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism", Iqbāl Review April 1966. p. 70.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

(e) Intuitive experience is incommunicable. One of the most oft-repeated objections to intuitive experience is that being incommunicable, its reality cannot really be established. To this Evelyn Underhill would reply: "If expressibility be indeed the criterion of the real, as some philosophers have dared to suggest - and this leads us to the strange spectacle of a Real World laboriously keeping pace with the expanding vocabulary of man - not only our mystical but our highest aesthetic and passional experiences, must be discredited; for it is notorious that in all these supreme ways of human knowing and feeling, only a part of that which is apprehended can be expressed; and that the more completed and soul-satisfying the experience the more its realization approximates to the mystic's silence where all lovers lose themselves."¹

According to Iqbāl, the incommunicability of mystic of mystic experience is due to the fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling, untouched by discursive intellect.² But intuitive experience has a cognitive content which can be translated into idea. Feeling is outward - pushing as idea is outward-reporting.³ The mystic reports not directly but through symbols and "the wonder surely is

1. Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism" p. 153.

2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 21.

3. Ibid.

not that these reports tell so little; but - when we consider our human situation and resources - that they tell so much. The reports are always oblique, but so are the reports of all artists; of whom it is probably true to say that the greater the aesthetic values which they seek to communicate, the more oblique is the method involved.¹

(f) According to Iqbāl, intuitive experience reveals Reality as an eternal 'now' and reveals the unreality of the serial character of time and space.² "All intense religious experience - more than this, all experience in which transcendental feeling is involved - appears to be accompanied by a marked slowing-down of consciousness, a retreat to some deeper levels of apprehension where reality is experienced not merely as succession but as existence: a genuine escape from the tyranny of "clock-time", though not a transcendence of duration."³

But according to Iqbāl this state, does not abide, although it gives a sense of overwhelming authority to those who have experienced it. Both the mystic and the prophet return to levels of ordinary experience, but for Iqbāl the return of the prophet is of greater meaning than that of the mystic.⁴

-
1. Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with mysticism" pp 153-154.
 2. Khāloṅ, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 13.
 3. Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism?"
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 22-23.

(j) Mystic experience springs from the 'heart' but it is not qualitatively different from 'normal' experience. According to Iqbāl, the seat of intuition is the 'heart' "which in the beautiful words of Rūmī, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception."¹ Professor Nicholson tells that in mystic thought, "the qalb, though connected in some mysterious way with the physical heart, is not a thing of flesh and blood. Unlike the English 'heart' its nature is rather intellectual than emotional, but whereas the intellect cannot gain real knowledge of God, the qalb is capable of knowing the essences of all things, and when illuminated by faith and knowledge reflects the whole content of the divine mind, hence the Prophet said, 'My Earth and My Heaven contain Me not, but the heart of My faithful servant contains Me.'"²

Iqbāl does not regard intuitive experience as 'mysterious'. It is "a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word does not play any part. Yet the vista of experience thus opened to us is as real and concrete as any other experience."³ Iqbāl differs from William James who regards religious experience as being completely unconnected with normal experience. According to

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 15-16.
 2. Nicholson, R. A. The Mystics of Islām. London 1914. p. 68.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 16.

William James, religious experience cannot be deduced by analogy from other sorts of experience. It refers to a wider spiritual environment which the ordinary, prudential self cannot enter.¹ Iqbāl, on the other hand, extends the sphere of normal experience to cover mystic experience, since whatever be the mode of knowledge, it is the same Reality which operates on us.²

(h) Intuitive experience reveals life as a centralising ego.

It makes us aware of "the simple fact of experience that life is not a formless fluid, but an organizing principle of unity, a synthetic activity which holds together and focalizes the dispersing dispositions of the living organism for a constructive purpose."³ The intellect tries to reduce the rich variety of experience to a concept, but intuition does not proceed by universalization and as a consequence is able to reveal the true character of concrete things, namely, that every living entity converges upon an egohood.⁴ Like the existentialists Iqbāl holds that the intuitive consciousness grasps Reality not in an abstract theoretical way but in a decisively personal manner.⁵ This 'intuitive insight into individual essence' has been aptly described by Mr. Roth writing on the philosophy of Spinoza: "Abstract recognition passes into

-
1. Khātūn, J. The Place of God, Man, and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 21.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 18.
 3. Ibid. pp 60-61.
 4. Malik, G. R. "The Nature of Ego" p. 45.
 5. 'Erfān, N. "What is common between the Existentialists and Iqbāl" p. 26.

concrete appreciation. Man is then conscious of nature as a unity, but not as before from the outside. He feels it in himself; he understands its wholeness in and from his own being. He thus not only contemplates externally the ways of the universe in which, like everything else, he is caught up. He not only sees himself as one item in the detail controlled by an all-embracing cosmic order. Nature for him is more than an abstract whole of general laws. It is a concrete system of self-directing individualities. He knows himself in it as an individual, and realizes his place in it among other individuals. He grasps both himself and things, not in their universal aspect only, but in their unique singularity."¹

REASON AND INTUITION

The dependence of Reason upon Intuition: Intuition is opposed to demonstration in that it needs no proof and is a single act while reasoning is a complicated process. But reason cannot function without intuition. All demonstration starts with propositions which are themselves incapable of proof. Plato had believed that it was possible to have innate knowledge of universal ideas. "Knowledge of truth, he would have said,

1. Mr. Roth quoted in Stocks, J. L. "Reason and Intuition" p. 12.

is acquired by metaphysical intuition, and the function of logic or scientific method is then deductive."¹ Not only does all reasoning begin with intuitions, intuition is operative continuously throughout every process of reasoning, since every step in the reasoning, taken by itself, is an intuition, self-evident and needing no external justification.² It has been truly said that the necessity of intuitive experience ^{lies} has in the principle that we discover new truths neither by logic nor by scientific investigation, but by reaching out beyond the given, grasping the new thoughts, as it were, in the dark, and only afterwards consolidating them by means of reasoned proof.³ Iqbāl writes of the intellect's indebtedness to intuition

عقل کہ جان سوزد، یک جلوہ بیباکتی
 ار عشق بیامورد، آئینِ حمایتی

⁴
 (Payām-e-Māshriq, p. 156)

Reason is also dependent on intuition in another way.

While speaking of thought and intuition Iqbāl said, "the one grasps Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness.

-
1. Read, H. "The Limits of Logic" The Tenth Muse, London, 1957. p. 108.
 2. Stocks, J. L. "Reason and Intuition" p. 8.
 3. Collingwood, R. G. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism?" Relativity, Logic and Mysticism. A ristotelion Society Supplementary Volume III) London, 1923. p. 174.
 4. The Intellect, whose bold flame enkindles the universe, Learns from Love the art of lighting it up.

The one is present enjoyment of the whole of Reality; the other aims at traversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the various regions of the whole for exclusive observation.¹ Now, an act of reason is a process which occupies a considerable stretch of time. The question arises: how does the thinker hold together the successive moments of his thought? At the end of a process of reasoning there is a conclusion but it depends for its truth and meaning on what was revealed in the course of the process. It is intuition "in its characteristic function of making possible the keeping of a whole in mind,"² which enables the thinker to hold together in his mind all the steps of the process. "We cannot suppose", says J. L. Stocks, that the thinker, as he proceeds to each new proposition, remembers all the propositions which he has previously asserted, and it is equally impossible that he has forgotten them: he has them, evidently, in some real sense in mind. As propositions, as assertions, they are dead and gone; but their work remains. Each proposition, as it is asserted, has its felt source and confirmation in an intuition of the relevant whole, and contributes something to the development of the intuition, so that, when the development is fruitful, other assertions are possible thereafter which were not possible before."³

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 2-3.

2. Stocks, J. L. "Reason and Intuition" p. 9.

3. Ibid. p. 9.

It is implicit in Iqbāl's thought that reasoning is not an autonomous, self-directing power, but dependent on intuition (or 'Love' as he calls it in his poetry) if it is to possess real value and validity. A philosophy which is not based on 'intuition' is lifeless:

یا مردہ ہے یا نزع کی حالت میں گرفتار
تو فلسفہ کلمہ کیا خونِ جگر سے

¹
(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p. 37)

He rejects reason which does not recognise intuition:

ہزار بار نکوتر متاعِ لہری
ردائے کہ دل اور انہی کس تصدیق

²
(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 161)

Spinoza had described intuitive knowledge as the goal of thought and "the function of reasoning may in fact be described without inaccuracy as precisely the development of intuition."³ Iqbāl approves whole-heartedly of 'reason' which has 'intuition' as its goal:

-
1. It is either dead or in a state of stupor
The philosophy which is not written with the heart's blood.
 2. Better a man were blind,
Better a thousandwise,
Than knowledge to have in mind
That the seeing heart denies.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 103.
 3. Stocks, J. L. "Reason and Intuition" p. 10.

علم را مقصود اگر باشند نظر
 می شود هم جاده هم راهبر
 علم تفسیر جان رنگ و لو
 دیده دل پرورش کرد از و

¹
 (Jāvīd Nāma, p. 222)

The dependence of Intuition upon Reason.

Iqbāl states that intuition and thought rejuvenate each other.² The Ego grasps Reality both by intuition and intellect:

درون شیشه او روزگار است
 دله برماند بر آتشکار است

³
 (Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 209)

In his Lectures Iqbāl supports Gazzālī's view that intellectual discipline ought to precede intuitive insight.⁴

Although the final intuition remains unproven and unprovable yet intuition is not a certainty- arising from mere inspections to which reason makes and can make no contribution. Although intuition goes beyond reason yet it does not exclude

-
1. If Vision is the goal of the Intellect,
 It becomes both the path and the guide!
 Intellect elucidates this world of smell and colour,
 It nurtures the eye and the emotions.
 (Translation by Saiyidain, K. G. Iqbāl's Educational Philosophy, p. 150)
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 3.
 3. There is a whole world in the crystal bowl he has,
 But he reveals it slowly phase by phase.
 (Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose - Garden of Mystery. p. 4.)
 4. Dār, B. A. Iqbāl's Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd and Bandagī Nāmah, p. 15.

intellectual spade-work.

رمانہ عقل کو سمجھا ہوا ہے متعلیٰ راہ
کیسے فرقہ حوں بھی ہے صاحب ادراک ا

¹
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 97)

Bergson also states "We do not obtain an intuition from reality that is, an intellectual sympathy with the most intimate part of it - unless we have won its confidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations."²

Iqbāl would not have subscribed to a rationalism which stood for "the view that the world can be known and life lived by something like a set of geometrical theorems,"² but if rationalism stood "for the faith that truth, independent of place and position, is attainable to man"³ then Iqbāl would have supported it wholeheartedly. He realized, as Locke and Mill had done, that "an intuition which claims sacrosanctity and declines the test of reason is ... a moral and social offence, a mere misnomer for blind prejudice and crass superstition."⁴

Iqbāl is very anxious to find in reason an ally for intuitive experience. He says, "Indeed, in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational

-
1. The world regards the intellect as the light of the way, Who knows that passion also has a faculty of reasoning?
 2. Bergson, H. An Introduction to Metaphysics (Translation by Hulme, T. E.) London, 1913. p. 77.
 3. Stocks, J. L. "Reason and Intuition" p. 18.
 4. Ibid. p. 17.

foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science. Science may ignore a rational metaphysics; indeed, it has ignored it so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience and a justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself.¹ Iqbāl states clearly that as regions of normal experience are subject to interpretation of sense-data for our knowledge of the external world, so the region of mystic experience is subject to interpretation for our knowledge of God.² In one sense, then, reason is the interpreter of intuitive experience, and "philosophy has jurisdiction to judge religion."³ But, as Iqbāl points out, religion has no need to be afraid of reason which can give only a sectional view of Reality.⁴ It can find room within its "universe that thinks and knows" for all values, whether scientific, aesthetic, ethical or mystical, finding in the transcendent the worth and meaning of the immanent, and in the immanent a graded revelation of the transcendent.⁵

The relationship and relative importance of Reason and Intuition.

At the very outset of his Lectures, Iqbāl states that

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 2.
 2. Ibid., p. 18.
 3. Ibid., p. 2.
 4. Ibid., p. 42
 5. Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism?" pp 155-156.

there is no reason "to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other."¹ More has been written on the apparent conflict between reason and intuition (or between 'aql' or 'ilm' and 'ishq') in Iqbal's works than on any other aspect of his thought. Yet, there is no doubt that "as a philosopher Iqbal has given intellect its full right besides the intuitional experience."² He went so far as to say that "thought and intuition are organically related."³

If Reason and Intuition are organically related, it follows that neither can function alone but both must operate together.⁴ In its deeper movement thought becomes almost identical with intuition (which, following Bergson, Iqbal describes as a higher kind of intellect⁵). In its narrower sense, reason may be contrasted with intuition, but only in the way in which analysis-synthesis may be opposed as complementary processes within a developing whole of thought.⁶ The basic relationship between reason and intuition remains unaltered, since intuition, "is always found in intimate relation to the reasoning process, never in sheer opposition to it."⁷

-
1. The Reconsturction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 2.
 2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing. p. 137.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 5-6.
 4. Rahman, F. "Modern Muslim Thought" p. 21.
 5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.
 6. Stocks, J. L. "Reason and Intuition" p. 18.
 7. Ibid. p. 16.

Throughout his writings Iqbāl is anxious to show that there is no bifurcation between the temporal and spiritual aspects of life. If intuition and reason are completely unrelated and if intuition alone can reach ultimate Reality, then reason has to be left behind. In some places Iqbāl says precisely that this should be so:

گدرد حا عقل سے آگے کہ یہ نور

جراغِ راہ ہے ، منزل ہیں ہے ا

¹
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 119)

But in fact, one of the chief aims of Iqbāl's philosophy is to show "that neither the world nor thought should be left behind."² His ideal is to unite Reason and Intuition, Power and Love, State and Religion:

تسلوہِ خسرودی این است این است

ہمیں ملک است کو تو ام بدیں است

³
(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 210)

Both reason and intuition are necessary for the fulfilment of human destiny. Both must be employed to grasp the fulness of life. "To see the self only in the state of concentrating

-
1. Pass beyond the Intellect, for this light
Is but the wayside lamp, it is not the destination.
 2. Rājū, P. T. "The Idealism of Sir Moḥammad Iqbāl"
The Visvabhāratī Quarterly August-October 1940.
New Series. Volume IV. Part II. p. 104.
 3. This is indeed a truly regal state,
In which Religion is Dominion's comate.
(Translation by Ḥādī Ḥusain. The New Rose-Garden of
Mystery, p. 5)

its power, of making itself a pearl or diamond, is as wrong as to see it exclusively in its exterior activity."¹
 In "Gulshan-e-Rāz-e-Jadīd" Iqbāl tells us that it is sinful to see the world "with one eye!"

کشمِ خلوتِ خود را نه بیند
 کشمِ خلوتِ خود را نه بیند

اگر یک چشم برسد دگانه است
 اگر نامرد بیند شرط راه است

²
 (Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 208)

Iqbāl tries to show that there is something in common between reason and intuition (or Love)

فکر هم عشق است و از ذوقِ دل بیگانه نیست

³
 (Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 36)

or between intuition and reason:

-
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, pp 105-6)
 2. With one eye it sees the 'khalvat' (reclusion) of his self,
 With one eye it sees the 'jalvat' (manifestation) of his
 self.
 If it closes one eye, it is a sin,
 If it sees with both eyes, it is the condition of the Path.
 (Translation by Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 105.
 3. Intellect is passion too,
 And it knows the joy to view.
 (Translation by Arberry, A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 19)

زمانہ، بیچ نداد حقیقتِ اورا

حنون فُناست کہ موردن لقامتِ فرد است

¹
(Pas Œ1 Bāyad Kard Ai Aqwām-e-Sharq? p. 4)

Perfect knowledge - that, which unites reason and intuition - destroys the idols which stand in the way of the attainment of ultimate Reality.

وہ علم اپنے ستوں کا ہے آبِ اراہیم

کیا ہے جس کو خدا نے دل و لہر کا ندیم

وہ علم کم بصری جس میں مہکنار ہیں

تخلیباتِ کلیم و مشاہداتِ حکیم ا

²
(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p. 19)

And so Iqbāl says:

خرد را بادلِ خود همسفر کن

³
(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 217)

-
1. The world does not understand realities,
Passion is an attire that fits the Intellect.
 2. That knowledge is an Abraham to its own idols
To which God has granted the friendship of the heart and eye
Which is not short-sighted and combines
The vision of Moses and the experiment of the philosopher.
 3. Make intellect a companion of your heart.

and "Bergson's Message" is, in fact, his own too:

تا بر تو آشکار شود رازِ زندگی
خود را حد از شعله مثالِ شکرِ مکن
بهر نظاره جزئی که آستینِ مینار

در سر ز لوم خود چو غریبان گداز مکن
لقنتی که لبت همه اوها هم باطل است

عقلی هم رسان که ادب خوردن دل است¹
(Payām-e-Mashriq, p. 247)

Iqbāl has criticised Gazzālī for abandoning Reason and regarding mystic intuition as the only true source of the knowledge of ultimate Reality. When everything has been said about Iqbāl's defence of reason (as against Bergson for instance) and the importance he gave to it, his fundamental position is, at least in one sense, not very different from Gazzālī's. As Professor Whittemore remarks, "At the heart of Iqbāl's philosophy has the existentialist conviction that Reality is inexpressible purely in terms of reason and science. This is not to deny the import of these latter. Whatever view of man, Universe and God we ultimately arrive at, it must, Iqbāl thinks, be one in which the data of science are accounted for, one in which the demands of reason for coherence are met. Yet below and above the level of

-
1. If thou wouldst read life as an open book,
Be not a spark divided from the brand.
Bring the familiar eye, the friendly look.
Nor visit stranger-like thy native land.
O thou by vain imaginings be-fooled,
Get thee a Reason which the Heart hath schooled!
(Translation by Nicholson, R. A. "Iqbāl's 'Message of the East'" p. 122)

science there is that which man knows simply because he feels it and intuits it."¹ Bergson too had felt that there is something in the universe analogous to the creative spirit of the poet, a living, pushing force, an élan vital which eludes the mathematical intelligence and can be appreciated only by a kind of divinang sympathy or a feeling which approaches nearer to the essence of things than reason.²

Iqbāl holds, then (with Bergson, Bradley, Whitehead, Ibn 'Arabī, Gazzālī, Rūmī and others) that it is through intuition that the Ultimate is known. The experience which leads to this gnosis is not a "conceptually manageable intellectual fact; it is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on inner biological transformation which cannot be captured in the net of logical categories."³ Whitehead calls this vital way "transmutation" and Bradley refers to it as the transformation involved in the passage from the relational to the super-relational level of experience.⁴ Iqbāl, following the Qŏr'ān calls it "Imān" which is not merely a passive belief in one or more propositions of a certain kind, it is a living assurance begotten of a rare experience."⁵ It is "Imān" which makes the reader of the Book into the

1. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 64.

2. Thilly, F. A History of Philosophy, New York. 1931. p 5,7, 8.

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.

4. Whittemore. R. "Iqbāl's in Panentheism" p. 71.

5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 109.

Book itself:

یہ راز کسی کو ہیں معلوم کہ مومن
قاری نظر آتا ہے حقیقت میں ہے قرآن!

¹
(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p. 57)

Contrast between Reason and Intuition (Love) in Iqbāl's Poetry:

Perhaps the most common contrast in Iqbāl's poetry is between 'ishq' and 'aql'. Scientific knowledge is equated with 'aql' and mystic knowledge with 'ishq'. The former is usually associated with the West and the latter with the East.

In Iqbāl's verse the use of both 'Reason' and 'Love' is very wide. We are told that Love "as applied to the mystics is to be understood in its deepest fullest sense; as the ultimate expression of the self's most-vital-tendencies, not as the superficial affection or emotion often dignified by this name ... It is a condition of humble access, a life-movement of the self: more direct in its methods, more valid in its results - even in the hands of the least lettered of its adepts - than the most piercing intellectual vision of the greatest philosophical mind."²

1. No one knows this secret that the 'Momin'
Though he appears as the reader, is in fact the Book (Qōr'ān)
2. Underhill, E. Mysticism, London, 1960. p. 85

Underlying Iqbāl's poetry is the idea that the world yields its secret only to him who sees with the eyes of Love:

بچشم عشق ننگه تا سراغ او گیری
جان بچشم فرد سیمپا و بزرگ است

¹
(Payām-e-Mashriq, p. 178)

What is the difference between scientific and mystic experience? the poet asks. The answer is given in Jāvīd Nāma:

کارِ حکمت دیدن و فرسودن است
کارِ عرفان دیدن و افزودن است
آن بسنجد در ترازوی هنر
این بسنجد در ترازوی نظر
آن بدست آورد آب دفاک را
این پوست آورد جانِ پاک را
آن ننگه را بر تکی می زند
این تکی را بخود گم می کند

²
(Jāvīd Nāma, pp 133-134)

Iqbāl often refers to Intellect as "the wayside-lamp" — which shows the way to the destination but cannot give

-
1. Look at the world with the eyes of love to attain its secret,
For the world, in the eye of the intellect is merely a show of magic.
 2. The task of science is to see and consume,
the work of gnosis is to see and augment;
science weighs in the balance of technology,
gnosis weighs in the balance of intuition;
science holds in its hand water and earth,
gnosis holds in its hand the pure spirit;
science casts its gaze upon phenomena,
gnosis absorbs phenomena into itself.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 90)

knowledge of the Ultimate:

خبرد سے راہِ روشِ لہر ہے
خبرد کیا ہے؟ چراغِ دہکد رہے
دونِ خانہ ہنگامے ہیں کیا کیا
چراغِ دہکد کو کیا فر ہے ۱

¹
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 120)

The poet is inspired by Love and so he has a more direct and intimate access to Reality than the metaphysician:³

دلِ علی اندر غبارِ ناقہ گم
دستِ رومی بردہ و محلِ گرفت

⁴
(Payām-e-Mashriq, p. 122)

Knowledge which is not incandescent with love and remains a stranger to its travails, is of no avail

عطار ہو رومی ہو رازی ہو غزالی ہو
کچھ حاصل ہے نہیں آتا ہے آہِ سحر گامی!

⁵
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 83)

1. Intellect lights up the wayfarer's eyes;
What is Intellect? It is the wayside lamp!
What tumult is within the inner house
What can the wayside lamp know of it?
2. Avicenna gets lost in the dust raised by (Lailā's) camel;
But the hand of Rūmī goes straight to the curtain of (her) palanquin.
3. Nārāvāne, U. S. Modern Indian Thought, London, 1964. p. 299.
4. Vaḥīduddīn, S. "The Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl!" The Aryan Path Bombay. December 1957. Volume XXVIII, p. 550.
5. Be it 'Aṭṭār or Rūmī or Rāzī or Gazzālī,
Nothing can be achieved without the lamentation at dawn.

Reason can yield only 'Khabar' (knowledge) and cannot yield to 'Nazar' (vision)

عقل گو آستان سے دور ہیں اس کی تقدیر میں حضور ہیں
دلِ بینا بھی کر خدا سے طلب آنکھ کا نور دل کا نور ہیں

¹
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 65)

The seeker, needs something more than mere information:

خرد کے یا اس خرد کے سوا کچھ اور ہیں
ترا علاج لڑکے سوا کچھ اور ہیں

²
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 70)

And so he protests

ایں جانِ کوہ و دشت و بحر و برا

ما نظر، خواہیم داؤ گوید 'فر'

³
(Jāvīd Nāma, p. 5)

Iqbāl calls the Intellect "a question" and Love "the

1. Far off from the destination though it is not,
Yet it will never be granted a vision.
Ask God also for a discerning heart,
For the sight of eye is not the sight of heart.
2. The Intellect can yield only information (Khabar)
Your cure lies only in the vision (Nazar)
3. This world of mountain and plain, ocean and land -
We yearn for vision, and it speaks of report.
(Translation by Arberry A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 33)

answer."

عشق کی گرمی سے ہے معرکہ کائنات!
 علم مقام صفات، عشق تماشائے ذات
 عشق سکون و ثبات، عشق حیات و حیات!
 علم ہے پیدا سوال، عشق ہے بننا جواب!

¹(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p.13)

The 'heart' (dil) says to the 'mind' ('aql)

رازِ هستی کو تو سمجھتی ہے
 اور آنکھوں سے دیکھتا ہوں میں
 علم تجھ سے، تو معرفت مجھ سے
 تو خدا تو، خدا نما ہوں میں

²(Bāng-e-Darā, p.26)

The mind insists that vision of God is impossible,
 and yet Love prays hopefully:

فرد گفتم - ادب چشم اندر گنج
 نگاہِ شوق در امیدیم است
 نمیلگرد کن افسانہ بطور
 کہ در مردل تبتائے کلیم است
 (Payām-e-Mashriq, p.30)

1. Creation's miracle is due to the fire of Love,
 Knowledge stops at Attributes, Love sees the Essence.
 Love is peace and stillness, Love is life and death,
 Knowledge was born a question, and Love the hidden answer.
2. You apprehend the secret of life,
 I see it with my eyes.
 You yield knowledge and I the direct vision,
 You seek God, I reveal Him.
3. "The Eye cannot attain Him," said the Mind:
 Yet Yearning's glance trembles in hope and fear.
 It grows not old, the tale of Sinai,
 And every heart yet whispers Moses' prayer.
 (Translation by Arberry, A. J. The Tulip of Sinai, p. 8).

Compared with the treasures hidden in the ocean of Love,
the intellect has very little to offer:

نگذرا از عقل و در آویز موجِ ہم عشق
کہ در آن حوئے نیک مایہ گریبید اینست

¹
(Payām-e-Mashriq, p. 203)

Reason gives power but it cannot answer some fundamental
questions:

علم میں دولت بھی ہے قدرت بھی ہے لذت بھی ہے
اب مشکل ہے کہ حالت آتا ہے ایسا سراغ

²
(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p. 78)

and so the exhortation comes:

اپنے میں ڈوب کر یا حاسراغ زندگی

³
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 48)

An idea found often in Iqbāl's poetry is that it is
Love and not Reason which lead to life-giving and life-
renewing action:

1. Pass beyond the Intellect and come to grips with the waves
of the ocean of Love,
Because in the shallow stream of the Intellect there are
no pearls.
2. In knowledge there is wealth, and power and joy,
But there is one difficulty - one cannot find oneself.
3. Lose yourself in your heart and discover the secret of life.

حکیمان مردہ اور اہودت نگاراندا
بید موشے دم عیسے ندادندا

¹
(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 218)

And so the poet urges:

دل بیدار بیدار کہ دل خوابدہ ہے متک
نہ بتری ضرب ہے کاری نہ میری ضرب ہے کاری

²
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 57)

it is a sheath without a sword:

عشق کی تیغ جگر دار اڑالی کس نے
علم کے ہاتھ میں خالی ہے پیام اے ساقی ا

³
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 17)

For a seeker of knowledge, Iqbāl prays that he may learn to understand what lies beyond the superficial meaning of words:

خدا تجھے کسی طوفان سے آشنا کر دے
کہ بترے کر کی موشوں میں اصطراب ہیں ا
کچھ کتاب سے ممکن ہیں فزع کہ تو
کتاب قرآن سے مگر صاحب کتاب ہیں ا

⁴
(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p. 81)

1. The scientists or philosophers give form to what is inner
but cannot give it life,
For they have neither the Hand of Moses nor the Spirit of
Jesus.
2. Let your heart be wakeful, for till it is awake
Ineffective is your stroke, ineffective is my stroke.
3. Who has stolen the mighty sword of Love?
In the Hand of Knowledge there is but an empty sheath O sāqī.
4. May God acquaint you with some thing momentous
For in your ocean's waves there is no motion.
You cannot do without your books because
You only read the books, you do not know them.

Love "flies into the Divine Presence"¹ unlike reason which moves through the crooked paths of secondary causes:

از طاقون تا طاقون رفت عقل

²
(Jāvīd Nāma, p. 179)

Love, on the other hand, is not circumscribed by anything, and works like lightning:

می نداند عشق سال و ماه را
دیر دزدد و نرد و دور راه را
عقل در کوه شکافی می کند
پاینگردد او طولی می کند
کوه پیش عشق چون کاه بود
دل سریع الیر چون ماسه لور

³
(Jāvīd Nāma, p. 17)

Reason is cautious and fearful and proceeds slowly. Love is audacious and proceeds unhesitatingly - bold in manner and unswerving in resolve:

-
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 359.
 2. Reason makes its way from fact to fact.
(Translation by Arberry A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 113)
 3. Love knows nothing of months and years,
late and soon, near and far upon the road.
Reason drives a fissure through a mountain,
or else makes a circuit round it;
before love the mountain is like a straw,
the heart darts as swiftly as a fish (moon)
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 32)

علم برہیم درقاداد اساس
عاشقان راے امید وئے ہر اس

علم ترساں ار حلال کاشات
عشق غرق اندر جمال کاشات

علم راہ رفتہ دحاصر دل
عشق گوید آئینہ می آید نلرا

علم بیماں بستہ با آئین صر
یارو اد چست عیراز ہر د صرا

عشق آزاد وغیور و ناصور

¹
(Jāvīd Namā, p. 139)

در نماستائے وود آمد جسورا

One significant difference between Reason and Love is that the former is calculating and cowardly but the latter risks all without fear:

بخندہ ہوتی ہے اگر مصلحت اندیش ہو عقل

عشق ہو مصلحت اندیش تو ہے خام الہی
بے خطر کو دیرا آئین مرد میں عشق

عقل ہے محو نماستائے لب نام الہی

²
(Bāng-e-Darā, p. 312)

1. Science is founded upon fear and hope,
Lovers are troubled by neither hope nor fear,
science is fearful of the grandeur of creation,
Love is immersed in the beauty of creation,
science gazes upon the past and the present,
Love cries, 'Look upon what is coming!'
Science has made compact with the canon of constraint
and has no other resource but constraint and resignation,
Love is free and proud and intolerant
And boldly investigates the whole of Being.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 93)
2. If the intellect is calculating it is mature,
If love is calculating it is imperfect.
Fearlessly Love leapt into the fire of Nimrūd,
While Intellect yet watches by the brink.

To the West (which Iqbāl identified with the cold, loveless Intellect) Iqbāl sent this message:

از من لے مارِ صبا گوے مدانائے فرنگ
عقل تا مال کشتود است گرفتار تر است

برقِ را این بھلگری رد آن رام کند
عشق از عقلِ منوں بیستہ مگردار تر است

¹
(Payām-e-Mashriq, p. 225)

And because Love is "more brave than Intellect" the poet writes:

صح ازل یہ نحو سے کہا جبرئیل نے

تو عقل کا غلام ہو وہ دل نہ کر قبول ا

²
(Zarb-e-Kalīm, p. 71)

Iqbāl "struggles mercilessly against that Intellect which is separated from Love."³ **Wisdom comes only through suffering or 'soz' (a synonym for Love) and the poet prefers such wisdom to analytic knowledge:**

1. O breeze take this message from me to the wise men of the West,
That Intellect since it opened its wings has become more
of a prisoner.
For Love strikes the heart like lightning while Intellect
only domesticates it.
Love is more brave than Intellect the practiser of deceits.
(Translation by Singh, I. The Ardent Pilgrim, pp 116-117.)
2. On the morn of Creation, Gabriel said to me,
Do not accept the heart is a slave of the mind.
3. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 135.

یک ذرہ در دل از علم فلاطون بہ

¹
(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 32)

The Intellect is waylaid by a thousand doubts but Love pursues its objective with single-minded dedication:

نشانِ راهِ عقلِ ہر ار حیلہ میرس
سیا کہ عشق کماے ز یک فی دارد

²
(Payām-e-Mashriq, p. 194)

Iqbāl regards loveless Intellect as being allied to Saīān and forces of evil, of magic and idolatry. In Payām-e-Meshriq he quotes Rūmī's famous line "From Satan logic and from Adam love."³ In Jāvid Nāma he writes:

دل اگر بندد بہ حق، بیغمزی است
ور ز حق بیگانہ گردد کلازی است
علم را بے سوزِ دلِ خوالی ستر است
نورِ ادوارِ بلی، بحرِ دبر است

-
1. Better one distress of heart
Than all Plato's learned art
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 17)
 2. Do not seek guidance from the Intellect
Which has a thousand wiles!
Come to Love which excels
By the singleness of its purpose.
(Translation by Saiyidain, K. G. Iqbāl's Educational Philosophy, pp 135-136)
 3. Rūmī's Masnavī Book IV Line 1042 quoted in Payām-e-Mashriq,
p. 246.

فولس ابلیس دا پادے شہود

لود نار از صہبتِ نارے شہود

علم بے عشق است از طاغوتیاں

علم ما عشق است از لاهوتیاں!

¹
(Jāvīd Nāma, pp 82-83)

Iqbāl often refers to the mind as a creator of Idols,
and as Love as the destroyer of these idols:

رمان زمان شکند آنچه می تراست عقل

سپا کہ عشق سلمان و عقل زناری است!

²
(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 108)

This motif pervades Iqbāl's whole work. Often **Abraham** is

1. If it (science) attaches its heart to God, it is prophecy,
but if it is a stranger to God, it is unbelief.
Science without the heart's glow is pure evil,
for then its light is darkness over sea and land ...
Its power becomes the faithful ally of Satan;
light becomes fire by association with fire.
Science without love is a demonic thing,
science together with love is a thing divine.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 64.
2. Now and now Mind breaketh through
What idols it designed;
Come, for Love believeth true,
And infidel is Mind
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Persian Pslams, p. 67)

shown breaking the idols of his father. Love is a real 'Muslim' because it only worships the One, whereas Reason still wears the 'Zannār' - the Magian's Girdle - "which means not only that it creates new idols before which ignorant people prostrate themselves but also that it is still limited by the spell of serial time which hinders man from grasping the fulness of Divine time."¹

The thought is repeated in times such as these:

عقل ددل د نگاه کامرشد ادلین سے عشق
عشق نہ ہو تو شرع و دین منکدہ تصورات ا

²(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 153)

Love, in effect, becomes the criterion for faith:

اگر ہو عشق، تو ہے کفر بھی مسلمانی
نہ ہو تو سرد مسلمان بھی کافر و زندقہ!

³(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 54)

Iqbāl is unhappy over the fact that modern education does not teach the value of Love but insists on the supremacy of reason:

-
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 135.
 2. Love is the first teacher of the Mind, the Heart and the Eye,
If there is no Love, religion and its precepts are but an
idol-house of fantasies.
 3. If there is Love, even unbelief is faith,
If there is no Love, even a Muslim is a pagan.

دانشِ حاضرِ حجابِ ابراست
 مت پرست و ستِ فروتنی و سنگر است
 یا بزدانِ مظاهرِ بسته
 از عددِ حسنِ مردوں ناجست

¹
 (Asrār-e-Khudī, p. 77)

Only Love can lead to vision, to the true realization
 of man's deepest self:

علم تا از عشق بر خوردار نیست
 جز تماشا خانه افکار نیست
 این تماشا خانه سحرِ سامری است
 علم ے روح القدس افسونگری است
 بے تکی مرد دانا ره نبرد
 از لنگد کوبِ خیالِ فویشِ مرد
 ے تکی زندگی رنجوری است
 عقلِ محوری دینِ مجبوری است

²
 (Jāvid Nāma, pp 4-5.)

Reason can conquer only the visible world, but Love is
 more ambitious:

1. Modern knowledge is the greatest blind
 Idōl-making, idol-selling, idol-worshipping!
 Shackled in the prison-house of phenomena,
 It has not overleaped the limits of the sensible.
 (Translation by Saiyidain, K. G. Iqbāl's Educational
 Philosophy. p. 136)
2. So long as knowledge has no portion of Love
 it is a mere picture-gallery of thoughts.
 This peep-show is the Sāmīrī's
 knowlege without the Holy Ghost is more spell-binding
 Without revelation no wise man ever found the way,
 he died buffeted by his own imaginings;
 without revelation life is a mortal sickness,
 reason is banishment, religion constraint.
 (Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvid Nāma, p. 23)

عقل آدم بر جهان سخن زند
عشق اور لامکان سخن زند

¹
(Jāvīd Nāma, p. 9)

And if man is constant in love, he can capture God Himself:

عاشقی و محکم شواز تقلید یار
تا کمند تو شود یزدان تکار

²
(Asrār-e-Khudī, p. 23)

Love lives on, though reason dies:

ہے اند کے نسو دیرینہ کی مہبید عشق
عقل انسانی ہے فانی، ر مدہ عادیہ عشق

³
(Bāng-e-Darā, p. 163)

The embodiments of Love are not subject to decay. The Mosque at Cordoba, for instance, is a work of art created out of love and faith, and so it lasts while generations of human beings pass away. The whole poem - one of the most beautiful in all Iqbāl's works - is a poem on the potency and efficacy of Love:

1. Man's reason is making assault on the world,
but his love makes assault on the Infinite
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 26)
2. Be a lover constant in devotion to thy beloved,
That thou mayst castanoose and capture God.
(Translation Nicholson, R. A. The Secrets of the Self, p.36.)
3. Love is the preface to the ancient book of Eternity,
Human intellect is mortal but Love is eternal.

اے حرمِ قرطبہ عشق سے پیرا و محمد
عشق سرا یاد دامِ حس میں ہیں رفت و بود

¹
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 129)

Perhaps one of the best known contrasts between Reason and Love occurs in Rumūz-e-Bekhudī where Iqbāl sums up the chief differences which, in his opinion, are to be found between them:

مومن از عشق است و عشق از مومن است
عشق را ناممکن ما ممکن است
عقل سفاک است و اد سفاک تر
یاک تر چالاک تر بیباک تر
عقل در بیجاک اسباب و علل
عشق یوگان ما ز میدانِ عمل
عقل صیدار زور بازو افکند
عقل میکار است و دوائے می زند
عقل را سرمایہ از بیم و شگ است
عشق را عزم و یقین لا یمفک است
آن کند تعمیرنا ویران کند
این کند ویران کہ آبادان کند

1. Shrine of Cordoba! from Love all your existence is sprung,
Love that can know no end, stranger to then - and - now.
(Translation by Kiernan, V. G. Poems from Iqbāl.p. 38)

عقل چون باد است ارزان در جهان
 عشق کمیاب و بهائے او گران
 عقل محکم از اساسِ جون و چند
 عشق عریان از ناسِ جون و چند
 عقل میگوید که خود را پیش کن
 عشق گوید امتحانِ خویش کن
 عقل ماغیر آشنا از آفتاب
 عشق از فضل است و ما خود در صاب
 عقل گوید شاد شو آباد شو
 عشق گوید بنده شو آزاد شو¹
 (Rumūz-e-Bek̄hūdī, pp 125-126)

1. Unto Love belongs
 The true believer, and Love unto him
 Love maketh all things possible to us.
 Reason is ruthless, Love is even more,
 Purer, and nimbler, and more unafraid.
 Lost in the maze of cause and of effect
 Is Reason: Love strikes boldly in the field
 Of Action. Crafty, Reason sets a snare;
 Love overthrows the prey with strong right arm.
 Reason is rich in fear and doubt; but Love
 Has firm resolve, faith indissoluble:
 Reason constructs, to make a wilderness;
 Love lays wide waste, to build all up anew.
 Reason is cheap, and plentiful as air;
 Love is more scarce to find, and of great price.
 Reason stands firm upon phenomena,
 But Love is naked of material robes.
 Reason says, "Thrust thyself into the fire;"
 Love answers, "Try thy heart, and prove thyself."
 Reason by acquisition is informed
 Of other: Love is born of inward grace
 And makes account with Self. Reason declares,
 "Be happy, and be prosperous;" Love replies,
 "Become a servant, that thou mayest be free."
 (Translation by Arberry, The Mysteries of Selflessness, p.26)

IQBĀL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: In conclusion

In a letter to K. G. Saiyidain Iqbāl has summed up his theory of knowledge and made its aims clear: "I have generally used the word 'knowledge' in the sense of knowledge based on the senses. It gives man Power which should be subordinated to Religion. If it is not subordinated to Religion, it is a Satanic force. This knowledge is the first step to true knowledge, as I have pointed out in Jāvid Nāma. The knowledge of Truth is gained first through the senses and then through direct realization. Its ultimate stages cannot be encompassed within consciousness. Knowledge, which cannot be circumscribed within consciousness and which is the final stage of Truth is also called Love or Intuition. Intellect, divorced from Love, is a rebel (like Satan) while Intellect, wedded to Love, has divine attributes. A Muslim should try to convert such knowledge, which is based on senses and is the source of limitless power, to Islām, i.e. transform this (unbeliever) Bū Lahab, into (the perfect Momin) 'Alī. In other words, if the power of knowledge is inspired by religion, it is the greatest blessing for mankind."¹

Iqbāl, the poet-philosopher, scanning the mass of phenomena, finds his own heart, and in his heart and at the heart of the universe like T. S. Eliot and Dante, he finds love.²

-
1. Iqbāl's letter quoted in Saiyidain, K. G. Iqbāl's Educational Philosophy, pp 145-146.
 2. McCarthy, E. "Iqbāl as a poet and philosopher" Iqbāl Review, October 1961. p. 20.

Knowledge begins with sense-perception ('Ilm') and ends with knowledge of ultimate Reality ('Ishq'). A synthesis of 'Ilm' and 'Ishq' is the basis of 'Khudī'!

Knowledge is desired not for its own sake, but for the sake of the power and vision it gives. Man should possess knowledge so that he can transform the world and himself. Philosophy and all thinking should not be just the product of one's mind, but must contain and express the ~~inner~~ concern of a human being. Philosophy, for Iqbāl, is not a disinterested study of concepts and ideas. It is a vocation where one's whole life is at stake. Philosophy aims not to increase knowledge, but to give vision and to lead to purposeful action. As the existentialists believe the ultimate aim of philosophising is not to see something but to be something.¹

Iqbāl was facing a problem which other poets and thinkers have faced before and since his time - the reconciliation of science and religion, reason and faith, intellect and intuition. Like T. S. Eliot Iqbāl too seems to wonder "where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?"² While reading his poetry one is also reminded of Tennyson who facing a similar dilemma had arrived at a conclusion not very different from Iqbāl's:

-
1. 'Erfān, N. "What is common between the Existentialists and Iqbāl" p. 60.
 2. Eliot, T. S. "The Rock" cited in Bartlett J. Familiar Quotations New York, 1956, p. 118.

Who loves not knowledge? Who shall rail
 Against her beauty? May she mix
 With men and prosper! Who shall fix
 Her pillars? Let her work prevail.

Half-grown as yet, a child, and vain-
 She cannot fight the fear of death.
 What is she, cut from love and faith,
 But some wild Pallas from the brain

Of Demons? fiery-hot to burst
 All barriers in her onward race
 For power. Let her know her place,
 She is the second, not the first.

A higher hand must make her mild,
 If all be not in vain; and guide
 Her footsteps, moving side by side
 With wisdom, like the younger child:
 For she is earthly of the mind,
 But Wisdom heavenly of the soul.¹

In his theory of knowledge, as in other parts of his philosophy, Iqbāl was trying to demonstrate that there was no bifurcation between the temporal and spiritual aspects of life, to show that religion could be compatible with science, that religious experience could "unify, inspire and crown man's deepest thought and will, and place the self in fuller and truer relation with the objective world."² It has truly been observed that Iqbāl was "one of the most important vindicators of the power of religion. He proved that the scientific modern man can also be the man of faith and that out of the most rigorous questioning to which a powerful intellect can subject it, faith can emerge not only unimpaired, but strengthened."³

1. Tennyson, A. "In Memoriam A. H. H." Poetical Works, London, 1953. p.260

2. Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism?" p. 154.

3. Avery, P. "Iqbāl and the Message of Persian Metaphysics," a paper read on Iqbāl Way Meeting in London in April 1960.

CHAPTER III

IQBĀL'S IDEAS ON SPACE AND TIME.

A theory of space and time is an integral part of cosmology. In his Lectures, Iqbāl too has devoted considerable attention to elucidating the concepts of space and time (he places much greater emphasis on the latter than on the former). He has discussed a number of conceptions of space and time held by various thinkers through the ages. It is useful to see how far he agrees with or differs from them, for it throws considerable light on his own cosmology.

S P A C E.Zeno's arguments: unreality of space.

To examine first the concept of space, it is to be seen that Iqbāl begins by referring to Zeno's paradox. Zeno's arguments, in some form have afforded grounds for most of the theories of space and time and infinity which have been constructed from his day to our own.¹ These arguments are as follows:

(a) In order to traverse a distance, a body must first traverse half the distance. There still remains half of the distance left to traverse. When it traverses half of this distance, there still remains half, and so on

1. Russell, B. Our Knowledge of the External World, London, 1926, p.183.

ad infinitum. (b) Achilles and a tortoise run a race. If the tortoise is given a start, Achilles can never catch up with it. For he must first run to the place from where the tortoise started. When he gets there, the tortoise will have reached another point. When Achilles reaches that point the tortoise will have reached a third point. This will go on ad infinitum, and so Achilles will never catch up with the tortoise. (e) An object cannot be in two places at the same time. Therefore at any given moment in its flight, an arrow is in one place and not in two. But to be in one place is to be at rest. Therefore in each and every moment of its flight it is at rest, and cannot move.¹

Zeno bases his argument on the idea that space is infinitely divisible, and consequently all movement in space is unreal because it is impossible to pass through an infinity of points in a finite time. The unreality of motion implies the unreality of an independent and objective space.² Zeno asks the question: how can one go from one position at one moment to the next position at the next moment without in the transition being at no position at no moment? This argument rests on the assumption that space and time consist of an infinite number of

1. Stace, W. T. A Critical History of Greek Philosophy. London, 1941. p. 54.

2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 35.

points and instants. If between two points the moving body will be out of place, then clearly motion cannot take place.¹

The Ash'arites: atomic space.

The Ash'arites tried to resolve the paradox of Zeno. They did not believe in the infinite divisibility of space and time, "but put forth rather a quantum theory of space and time inasmuch as they considered space, time and motion to be made up of points and instants which cannot be further subdivided."² If there was a limit to the divisibility of space and time, then movement from one point to another would be possible in a finite time. They explained motion thus: space is generated by the aggregation of atoms. Motion is the atom's passage through space. They could not, however, say that when in motion a body passed over all the intervening points in space, as this would imply the existence of a vacuum as an independent reality.³ Hence they put forward the notion of 'Tafra' or 'Jump' which is similar to the modern quantum jumps postulated by Planck and Bohr. According to this theory the changes of state of a dynamical system are discrete and not continuous. A particle appears at certain discrete

-
1. Şiddīqī, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space", Iqbāl as a Thinker. pp 10-11.
 2. Ibid. pp 11-12.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 68-9.

orbits and takes no notice of any intermediate orbits.¹ Professor Whitehead writes, "It is as though an automobile moving at the average rate of 30 miles an hour along a road did not traverse the road continuously, but appeared successively at the successive milestones remaining for two minutes at each milestone."² Ibn Ḥazm refuted the Ash'arite notion of atomic time and space. He regarded time and space as continuous, a view shared by the mathematician Cantor and his successors.³ Iqbāl confesses that he is unable to understand the Ash'arite solution to the paradox of Zeno involving the question of an independent Space.⁴

Russell: theory of mathematical continuity.

Bertrand Russell has tried to refute Zeno's paradox by arguments based on Cantor's theory of mathematical continuity. In the modern theory of numbers and sets of points, it is shown that between any two points there are an infinite number of points. There are no infinitesimals which make the movement impossible. The arrow is at rest at every moment of its flight but this does not mean that it does not move. There is a one - one correspondence between the infinite series of positions and infinite

1. Ṣiddīqī, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space", p. 12.

2. Whitehead, A. N. Science and the Modern World. Cambridge, 1933, p. 45.

3. Ṣiddīqī, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space" pp 13-14.

4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 69.

series of instants. Thus to every given instant of time there is a corresponding position of the moving body, and to every position of the moving body there is a corresponding instant of time. This correspondence, between instant and point is called movement. This theory makes it possible to affirm the reality of space, time and movement, and at the same time to avoid Zeno's paradox.¹

According to Iqbāl the one - one correspondence between the infinite multiplicity of instants in a finite interval of time and an infinite multiplicity of points in a finite portion of space, does not solve the difficulty arising from divisibility. The mathematical conception of continuity applies not to movement regarded as an act, but to the picture of movement as seen from outside. The act of movement as it is experienced ^{LS} and single and indivisible. The flight of the arrow observed as a passage in space is divisible, but its flight regarded as an act cannot be divided.²

Bergson: psychological approach.

Iqbāl agrees with Bergson that Zeno's paradox can only be resolved by approaching the problem psychologically. According to Bergson, motion is an indivisible act which should be looked upon as a unit or whole and not reduced to its component parts. In other words, if movement is

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 36-37.

2. Ibid. p. 37.

divided into static units, it is impossible to get back the original movement out of the disparate parts. The space traversed by the arrow is divisible because it is a matter of quantity or extension but the movement is not divisible because it is an intensive act of quality. It was this confusion between quality and quantity or between real time and spatialized time which gave rise to Zeno's puzzles.¹

'Irāqī: space as relative

Iqbāl refers in some detail to the conception of space held by the Muslim thinker 'Irāqī who believed in more than one kind of space. According to him there are three kinds of space:

(a) The space of material bodies. This has three classes:
 (i) The space of gross bodies of which we predict roominess. In this space movement takes time, bodies occupy certain places and resist displacement. (ii) The space of subtle bodies, e.g. air and sound. In this space two bodies resist each other and their movement can be measured in terms of time which, however, differs from the time of gross bodies. (iii) The space of light. The velocity of light reduces time to almost a zero. Also, the light of a candle spreads in a room without displacing the air. It shows that the space of light is more subtle than the

1. Dār, B.A. "Intellect and Intuition in Bergson and Ṣūfīs"
 p. 70.

space of air. "In view of the close proximity of these spaces, however, it is not possible to distinguish the one from the other except by purely intellectual analysis and spiritual experience."¹ The space (a) has a metric i.e. there is a distance associated with it.²

(b) The space of immaterial bodies. 'Irāqī briefly describes the main varieties of space operated upon by the various classes of immaterial beings, e.g. angels. The element of space is not entirely absent from these spaces, for immaterial beings, while they can easily pass through stone walls, cannot altogether dispense with motion which, according to 'Irāqī, is evidence of imperfection in spirituality. The highest point in the scale of spatial freedom is reached by the human soul which, in its unique essence, is neither at rest nor in motion.³

(c) The space of God is absolutely free from all dimensions and constitutes the meeting point of all infinities.⁴

According to Iqbāl, 'Irāqī is here vaguely struggling with the concept of space as an infinite continuum. But due to a lack of mathematical knowledge and a psychological inclination towards the Aristotelian concept of a fixed universe, he could not see the full implication of his thought even though his mind moved in the right direction⁵

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 135-136.

2. Şiddīqī, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space." p. 16.

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 136-137.

4. Ibid. p. 137.

5. Ibid. pp 137-138.

Iqbāl agrees with 'Irāqī in holding that there is more than one kind of space. For instance spatial specifications denoted by words such as 'proximity', 'contact' and 'mutual separation' which apply to material bodies do not apply to God.¹ "Divine life is in touch with the whole universe on the analogy of the soul's contact with the body. The soul is neither inside nor outside the body, neither proximate to nor separate from it. Yet its contact with every atom of the body is real, and it is impossible to conceive this contact except by positing some kind of space which befits the subtleness of the soul. The existence of space in relation to the life of God, therefore, cannot be denied; only we should carefully define the kind of space which may be predicated of the Absoluteness of God."²

In Iqbāl's opinion it is not sufficient merely to reduce space and time to a vanishing point-instant when describing the space ^{of}-time of God. The philosophical path leading to God as the omni-psyche of the universe lies through the discovery of living thought as the ultimate principle of space-time. 'Irāqī, conceived God's relation to the universe on the analogy of the human soul to the body, but he did not reach this position through a criticism of the spatial and temporal

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 135.

2. Ibid.

aspects of experience (or, in other words, by realizing the true nature of space and time) but simply postulated it on the basis of his spiritual experience.¹ However, although Iqbāl does not agree with 'Irāqī in toto, he seems to think that by insisting on the plurality of space-orders, 'Irāqī made a significant contribution to Muslim thought.²

Ouspensky: varying dimensions of space.

It is clear that for Iqbāl space is relative to subjective constitution. The Russian thinker P. D. Ouspensky in his Tertium Organum supports this viewpoint. According to Ouspensky, the space of the human being has three dimensions. It is, however, possible to increase or decrease the number of dimensions by increasing or decreasing the psychic powers. For the snail which possesses only sensation and sees the world as a line, space is one-dimensional. Animals have perception and see the world as a surface, and for them space is two-dimensional. Human beings are able to form concepts and measure cubes and for them space is three-dimensional. Thus space is relative to the psychic level.³ The fact of there being dimensions less than three, leads us to the possibility of there being dimensions more than three,

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 137-138.

2. Ibid. p. 183.

3. Enver I, H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, pp 15-16.

depending on an augmentation in psychic powers.¹

Newtonian view of space.

In the Cartesian scheme of things, extension constitutes matter, and matter constitutes space, which is therefore a plenum - there is no void.² Gassendi rejected the doctrine that space is a plenum, and regarded matter not as being co-extensive with space, but as being capable of movement in space of which it occupied only a part.³ Newton adopted Gassendi's principles and regarded space as having a reality of its own, independently of its occupation by material bodies or of its perception by any human mind: it was infinite in extent and eternal in duration. Thus Newton declares that "absolute space, in its own nature, without regard to anything external, remains similar and immovable," and "all things are placed in space as regards order of situation."⁴ Iqbāl does not hold that space is absolute and consequently rejects the Newtonian conception of space as well as the materialism to which it led.⁵

Space and Relativity.

According to Newton space and time presented frameworks of reference subsisting independently of the observer.⁶

-
1. Enver I, H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, pp 15-16.
 2. Whittaker, E. Space and Spirit, London, 1946, p. 72.
 3. Ibid. pp 75-76.
 4. Newton quoted in Ibid. p. 76.
 5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 34-35.
 6. Haldane, R. The Reign of Relativity, London, 1922, p. 45.

Einstein who put forward his general theory of Relativity in 1915, discarded the assumption that space was a uniform characterless vacuum and postulated that it had a property of curvature, varying from point to point.¹ According to Einstein, so far from being frameworks in which, as perceived by us, things exist in the same way under all sets of conditions, and which are always uniform, it is due to the position of the observer that they present themselves with the shapes and measurements we attribute to them as being of their essence. It is only relatively that the current ideas of the relations in them of objects are true, or that they themselves exist as they are. The space and time we observe may have derived their form from the conditions affecting the observers, and so they may turn out to be relative, not absolute.²

Just as we are in the habit of thinking that a unique meaning is to be given to space, that whatever meaning is given to spatial relations in respect to the instrument on the earth the same meaning must be given to them in respect to the instrument on the comet or at rest in the ether,³ we tend to think that the framework of time is quite independent of the framework of space. "But if both space and time are stripped of what is unessential, and

1. Whittaker, E. Space and Spirit, p. 102.

2. Haldane, R. The Reign of Relativity, p. 43.

3. Whitehead, A. N. Science and the Modern World, pp 147-148.

presented in their bare nakedness, they look different. If there were no succession in time, and everything appeared as at one instant, a little reflection shows that we could not apprehend the positions of points in space. Their reality depends for us on their separation, which itself depends on transition, and this on succession in time. On the other hand, if, in the absence of all separation in space, there were only one spatial point in which existence centred for us as time elapsed, it is equally clear that intervals of time would have no meaning. Duration could be immeasurable, for it is by spatialising, as on the dial of a watch, that we measure it. Space and time are really abstractions from a reality which includes both in mutual implication."¹

Thus, according to the theory of relativity, time and space are mutually dependent. The universe is not made up of two separate categories, time and space, but of a single space-time continuum. The three-dimensional world becomes four-dimensional, having four elements, i.e. length, breadth, height and time. Space and time are real, but relative.² "It is not as frameworks subsisting as self-contained phenomena independently of the objects in them, such as are the independent space and time Newton thought of, but as what gets meaning only in our thought about them,

1. Haldane, R. The Reign of Relativity, p. 46.

2. Şiddīqī, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space" p. 24.

that we really discover space and time in our actual experience."¹

Iqbāl is in general agreement with the theory of relativity as regards the nature of space.² He regards space not as something given or static, but as a "dynamic appearance"³ which is relative to various levels of experience. The true nature of space (and time) is realized when one sinks into "one's deeper self," or, in other words, when one does not take a purely intellectual viewpoint, because, in Iqbāl's words:

فرد در لا مکان طرح مکان بست

⁴(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 216)

T I M E.

Time is a central concept in Iqbāl's philosophy. From various accounts we know that the tradition 'lā tasubbū ad-dahr' i.e. Do not vilify Time (for Time is God), accompanied Iqbāl all his life.⁵ He even surprised Henri Bergson with it when he visited the French philosopher in

-
1. Haldane, R. The Reign of Relativity, pp 46-47.
 2. Siddīqī, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space" p. 29.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 137.
 4. The intellect built Space upon the void.
(Translation by Husain, A. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, p. 7).
 5. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 290.

Paris. "He took this prophetic word for a designation of that overwhelming reality of which time and space are only aspects."¹ In 1933, he wrote, "If 'dahr' is continuous and extended and if it is Allāh himself - what then, is space? Just as if time is a kind of reflection of 'dahr,' so space must also be a kind of reflection of 'dahr.'"² Iqbāl emphasises time more than space. Time is more fundamental than space; it is related to space as soul is to the body. It is the mind of space.³ Pure duration is the matrix of the whole universe.⁴

Newton: absolute time.

Newton conceives of time as he conceives of space, as a kind of actually subsisting framework in which objects are set, and so as belonging to the actual in the same fashion for every kind of individual observer, however he may observe, and without reference to any condition.⁵ According to Newton, all motions may be accelerated or retarded, only the flow of absolute time cannot be changed. The same duration with the same persistence occurs in the existence of all things, whether the motion be rapid, slow or zero.⁶ Iqbāl refers to Newton's description of time as 'something which in itself and from its own nature flows equally' and

1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, pp 290-291.

2. Iqbāl quoted in Ibid. p. 291.

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 137.

4. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl. p. 103.

5. Haldane, R. The Reign of Relativity, p. 43.

6. Siddiqi, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space" pp 19-20.

says that the metaphor of stream implied in this description, suggests serious objections to Newton's view of time. "We cannot understand how a thing is affected on its immersion in this stream and how it differs from things that do not participate in its flow. Nor can we form any idea of the beginning, the end, and the boundaries of time if we try to understand it on the analogy of a stream. Moreover, if flow, movement, or 'passage' is the last word as to the nature of time, there must be another time to time the movement of the first time, and another which times the second time, and so on to infinity."¹ Thus, according to Iqbāl the notion of time as something wholly objective is beset with difficulties.

The Ash'arites: atomic time

Time, though it cannot be regarded as objective, is not to be regarded as something unreal. Iqbāl also admits that although we possess no sense-organ to perceive time, it is a kind of flow, and as such, has a genuine objective or atomic aspect.² Modern quantum theory which assumes the discontinuity of matter, confirms the Ash'arite theory of atomic time. Iqbāl quotes Professor Rongier in support: "Contrary to the ancient adage, Nature non facit saltus, it becomes apparent that the universe varies by sudden jumps and not by imperceptible degrees. A physical

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 73-74.

2. Ibid. p.74.

system is capable of only a finite number of distinct states. Since between two different and immediately consecutive states the world remains motionless, time is suspended, so that time itself is discontinuous: there is an atom of time."¹ According to the Ash'arites, then, time is a succession of individual 'nows'. It follows that between moments of time there is an unoccupied moment of time or a void of time.² Iqbāl finds the idea of atomic time unsatisfactory.³ This idea is due to the ignorance or neglect of the psychologically subjective aspect of time and considers time almost as a created, objectively given fact, whereas a personal, living Creator is posited. Now if this Creator is living, one must somehow be able to predicate a time of Him.⁴ In Iqbāl's words, "we cannot apply atomic time to God and conceive Him as a life in the making, as Professor Alexander seems to have done in his Lectures on Space, Time and Deity."⁵ A better understanding of Divine Time can be obtained through introspection, seizing that experience of appreciative time which alone can account for creativeness. In this way, time precedes space psychologically, and is the source of space.⁶

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 74.

2. Ibid. p. 73.

3. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl" p. 180.

4. Ibid.

5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 75.

6. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl" p. 180.

Time and Relativity.

As we have seen, Iqbāl is in general agreement with the theory of relativity as regards the concepts of space and time but he raises one objection to it. Iqbāl thinks that Einstein's theory considers time to be unreal. "A theory which takes time to be a kind of fourth dimension of space must, it seems, regard the future as something already given, as indubitably fixed as the past. Time as a free creative movement has no meaning for the theory. It does not pass, events do not happen; we simply meet them."¹ According to an eminent mathematician, Iqbāl has a misconception about the theory of relativity which regards time as a fourth dimension, not of space, but of the space-time continuum. Thus the theory gives as much reality to time as to space.² It is to be pointed out that Iqbāl did not presume to understand all the implications of the theory of relativity, since he was not a mathematician. "It is not possible," he said, "for us laymen to understand what is the real nature of Einstein's time."³

Ouspensky - time as the fourth dimension of space.

Iqbāl objects to the conception of time held by the Russian writer Ouspensky in his book Tertium Organum.⁴ Ouspensky regards time as a fourth dimension of space and

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 30-39.
2. Ṣiddiqī, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space," pp 29-30.
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 39.
4. Ibid. pp 39-40.

conceives the fourth dimension to be the movement of a three-dimensional figure in a direction not contained in itself. Just as the movement of the point, the line and the surface in a direction not contained in them gives us the ordinary three dimensions of space, in the same way the movement of the three-dimensional figure in a direction not contained in itself must give us the fourth dimension of space. And since time is the distance separating events in order of succession and binding them in different wholes, it is obviously a distance lying in a direction not contained in the three-dimensional space. It is perpendicular to all directions of three-dimensional space and is not parallel to any of them. Ouspensky describes our time-sense as a misty space-sense and argues that our psychic constitution is such, that to one-dimensional, two-dimensional or three-dimensional beings the higher dimension always appears as succession in time.¹ In other words, what appears to us as time is really space. This means that time is not a genuine creative movement, and what we call future events are not fresh happenings but things already given and located in an unknown space. Iqbāl points out that in his search for a fresh direction Ouspensky needed a real serial time, i.e. a distance separating events in the order of succession.

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 39-40.

Thus time which was viewed as succession, at one stage, is reduced, at another stage, to what does not differ in anything from the other lines and dimensions of space.¹

Ouspensky regarded time as a genuinely new direction in space because of its serial character. If it is divested of this character, in Iqbāl's opinion it cannot be regarded as an original direction.² Iqbāl has another objection

to Ouspensky's viewpoint. Rāzi-ud-Dīn Ṣiddīqī writes, "Iqbāl is right when he objects to the theory of serial time put forward by Ouspensky... that on the basis of this theory, it would be possible, by a careful choice of the velocities of the observer and the system in which a given set of events is happening, to make the effect precede the

~~cause~~ course."³

"It appears to me" writes Iqbāl, "that time regarded as a fourth dimension of space really ceases to be time."⁴

Time as relative: Dāwānī and 'Irāqī.

Mullā Jalāl-ud-Dīn-Dāwānī and 'Irāqī take a relativistic view of time. According to the former if we take time to be kind of span which makes possible the appearance of events as a moving procession and conceive this span to be a unity, then we cannot but describe it as an original state of

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 39-40.

2. Ibid. p. 40.

3. Ṣiddīqī, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space", p. 30

4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 39.

Divine activity, encompassing all the succeeding states of that activity. Dāwānī adds that a deeper insight into the nature of succession reveals its relativity, so that it disappears in the case of God to Whom all events are present in a single act of perception.¹

Iqbāl finds 'Irāqī's view of time even more satisfactory.² 'Irāqī conceives of infinite varieties of time, relative to the level of being intervening between materiality and pure spirituality. The time of gross bodies may be divided into past, present and future, and until one day is over the succeeding day does not come. The time of immaterial beings also possesses a serial character but its passage is such that a whole year in the time of gross bodies is not more than a day in the time of an immaterial being. Rising to the highest level we reach Divine time which is absolutely free of the quality of passage, and does not admit of divisibility, sequence and change. It is above eternity, having neither beginning nor end. The priority of God is not due to the priority of time; on the other hand, the priority of time is due to God's priority. The Qōr'ān describes Divine time as the 'Mother of Books' in which the whole of history freed from causal sequence, is gathered up in a single super-eternal 'now'.³

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 75.

2. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl" p. 181.

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 75-76.

As has been pointed out, Iqbāl's conception of "time in God" differs, in fact, even from 'Irāqī's viewpoint, being based on psychological experience unknown to the Muslim philosophers.¹ According to 'Irāqī's conception of Divine Time, divine knowledge is the same as "omniscience in the sense of a single indivisible act of perception which makes God immediately aware of the entire sweep of history regarded as an order of specific events, in an eternal 'now'."² Iqbāl does not hesitate "to carry the robust anthropomorphic conception of God in the Qōr'ān to its farthest consequences, denying God this 'passive omniscience' of traditional theology."³ Iqbāl says, "By conceiving God's knowledge as a kind of reflecting mirror, we no doubt save His fore-knowledge of future events, but it is obvious we do so at the expense of His freedom. The future certainly pre-exists in the organic whole of God's creative life, but it pre-exists as an open possibility, not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines."⁴

Rāzī and the debate on time.

For Iqbāl, Fakhruddīn Rāzī sums up the debate on time in Muslim thought with a declaration of scepticism concerning the real nature of time.⁵ Rāzī's book is mainly explanatory.⁶

-
1. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl", p. 181.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 78.
 3. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl" pp 181-182.
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 79.
 5. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl" p. 181.
 6. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 76.

This does not surprise Iqbāl since Rāzī's method was, on the whole, objective, and "a purely objective point of view is only partially helpful in our understanding of the nature of time. The right course is a careful psychological analysis of our conscious experience which alone reveals the true nature of time."¹

McTaggart - the unreality of time.

Iqbāl refers to Dr. McTaggart's argument relating to the unreality of Time. According to McTaggart, time is unreal because every event is past, present and future. "Past, present, and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must be one or the other, but no event can be more than one... But every event has them all. If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will be present and past. If it is present, it has been future and will be past. Thus all the three incompatible terms are predicable of each event, which is obviously inconsistent with their being incompatible, and inconsistent with their producing change."² To illustrate the point let us take a concrete example. Queen Anne's death is past to us, it was present to her contemporaries and future to William III. Thus the event of Queen Anne's death combines characteristics which are incompatible with each other.³

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 76.
 2. McTaggart, J. E. "The Unreality of Time. Mind, London, 1908. Volume XVII. New Series, No. 68, p. 468.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 57.

In Iqbāl's opinion, McTaggart's argument proceeds on the assumption that serial time is final. "If we regards past, present, and future as essential to time, then we picture time as a straight line, part of which we have travelled and left behind, and part lies yet untravelled before us. This is taking time, not as a living creative movement, but as a static absolute, holding the ordered multiplicity of fully-shaped cosmic events, revealing serially, like the picture of a film, to the outside observer."¹ Iqbāl refers to C. D. Broad who points out that a future event cannot be characterised as an event. Before the death of Queen Anne the event of her death existed only on an unrealized possibility.² Iqbāl's answer to McTaggart's argument is that the future exists only an open possibility and not as a reality. When an event is described as being both past and present it cannot be said to combine incompatible characteristics.³ "The fallacy is in regarding 'E is occurring now' as analysable in a way-similar to-the-analysis of 'X is red': not only is 'now' regarded as a quality like 'red', but a confusion is made between E, an event, and X, a substance."⁴ Iqbāl states that when an event X does happen it enters into an unalterable relation with all the events that have happened before it. These relations are

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 57.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. p. 58.

4. Cleugh, M. F. Time London, 1937, p. 152.

not at all affected by the relation of X with other events which happen after X by the further becoming of Reality. Hence there is no logical difficulty in regarding an event as both past and present.¹ Iqbāl admits, however, that McTaggart's argument "requires much further thinking" even though it does not touch real time or pure duration to which the distinctions of past, present and future do not apply.²

Nietzsche - cyclic time.

Iqbāl criticises Nietzsche's view of time as it appears in connection with his doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.³ In the third book of Thus Spake Zarathustra Nietzsche introduces the theme of Eternal Recurrence. This doctrine states "that all things recur eternally, and we ourselves with them, and that we have already existed an infinite number of times before and all things with us."⁴ So for Nietzsche "everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls the wheel of being."⁵ Whatever is happening now will happen again and has happened before. The great things of the world recur, but so do the small. The return is "not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I shall

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 58.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. p. 114.

4. Nietzsche quoted in Holingdale, R. J. Nietzsche, London, 1965, p. 199.

5. Nietzsche quoted in Magill, F. N. Masterpiece of World Philosophy, p. 690.

return eternally to this identical and self-same life, in the greatest things and in the smallest."¹

According to Nietzsche, time is not a subjective form; it is a real and infinite process which can only be conceived as 'periodic'.² On the principle of the conservation of energy the quantity of energy in the universe is constant. The world is a closed off unity in which there can be no dissipation of energy. The amount of energy being fixed, various combinations of energy-centres recur an infinite number of times.³ Time is thus pictured by Nietzsche as repeating itself in identical cycles. It has no beginning or end. Iqbāl regards Nietzsche's viewpoint as a kind of mechanism based on the hypothetical constancy of quantity of energy.⁴ According to Iqbāl, Nietzsche does not "seriously grapple with the question of time. He takes it objectively and regards it merely as an infinite series of events returning to itself over and over again."⁵ Iqbāl points out the difference between Nietzsche's concept of time and his own concept as described in Asrār-e-Khudī it is regarded as a straight line. Life, therefore, to Nietzsche is repetition, to Asrār-e-Khudī creation. The perfection of the perfect man according to Islām consists in realising this aspect of time which can be described only as the eternal 'now'. To

-
1. Nietzsche quoted in Holingdale, R. J. Nietzsche, p. 199.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 114.
 3. Enver, I. H. The Metaphysics of Iqbāl, p. 53.
 4. Şiddīqī, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space" pp 21-22.
 5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 115.

Nietzsche there is no such thing as the eternal 'now'."¹

Ibn Khaldūn - time as movement.

Iqbāl commends the work of the Muslim historian Ibn Khaldūn who broke away from the Magian conception of time as a circular movement and regarded the historical process as a free creative movement and not as a process which had already been worked out with definite landmarks.² This view has been put forward with greater accuracy in modern times by Bergson.³ Bergson "linked the solution of the problem of time with such vital problems as liberty and personality, thus forestalling Iqbāl's active valuation of time as a sword. Iqbāl corrects Bergson in a theistic sense, pointing to a direction that Bergson himself was eventually to follow in the course of his religious evolution."⁴

Bergson: serial and non-serial time.

In his view of time, Iqbāl comes nearest to Bergson of whom he says "among the representatives of contemporary thought Bergson is the only thinker who has made a keen study of the phenomenon of duration in time."⁵ Bergson uses 'time' in two senses. In its narrow or superficial sense it means spatialized or clock time.⁶ In its wider or real

1. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p.24.

2. Ibid. p. 251 and 296.

3. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl," p. 183.

4. Ibid.

5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 46.

6. Cleugh, E. M. Time, p.109.

sense it is conceived as 'durée' which is not mere blank lastingness, enduring through a hypostatized, spatialized Time - it is ceaseless, continuous flow in which all things live and move and have their being.¹ Like Heraclitus, Bergson insists that the notion of ceaseless change is fundamental, but unlike him he does not stultify the notion by permitting cyclic repetition. For him, durée evolves ever new and newer forms, that is, it is genuinely creative.²

Like Bergson, Iqbāl distinguishes between the serial and non-serial aspects of time. The former is associated with what Iqbāl calls the efficient self and the latter with the appreciative self. The efficient or practical self is related to the spatial world. While retaining its unity as a totality, the efficient self reveals itself as a series of discrete (quantum) states. The time of this efficient self is just a dimension of the space-time continuum. It is of the serial character postulated by the Ash'arites.³ The time in which the efficient self lives is the time of which we predicate 'long' and 'short'. It is hardly distinguishable from space. Time, thus regarded, is not true time, according to Bergson.⁴ The appreciative ego lives in pure duration, i.e. change without succession. According to Iqbāl, the unity of the appreciative ego is like the unity

1. Cleugh, E. M. Time, p. 109.

2. Ibid.

3. Siddīqī, R. "Iqbāl's Conception of Time and Space," pp 32-33.

4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 47.

of the germ in which the experiences of its ancestors exist, not as a plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. There is no numerical distinctness of states in the totality of the ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is wholly qualitative. There is change and movement but they are not divisible. Their elements interpenetrate and are wholly non-serial in character. The time of the appreciative self is a single 'now' which the efficient self spatializes into a series of 'nows'.¹

Bergson also points out the difference between time as infected by the idea of space and pure time: "When we speak of time we generally think of a homogeneous medium in which our conscious states are ranged alongside one another as in space, so as to form a discrete multiplicity. Would not time, thus understood, be to the multiplicity of our psychic states what intensity is to certain of them - a sign, a symbol, absolutely distinct from true duration? Let us ask consciousness to isolate itself from the external world, and, by a vigorous effort of abstraction, to become itself again. We shall then put this question to it: does the multiplicity of our conscious states bear the slightest resemblance to the multiplicity of the units of a number? Has true duration anything to do with space? ... if time, as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a medium in which our conscious

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 48.

states form a discrete series so as to admit of being counted, and if on the other hand our conception of number ends in spreading out in space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that time, understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space ... it follows that pure duration must be something different."¹ It has been pointed out that Bergson does not deny succession to pure duration. For him the flow of pure duration is a succession of interpenetrating states. Iqbāl takes away succession altogether. For him pure duration is eternity in the sense of change without succession.²

Bergson: pure duration known intuitively.

Iqbāl agrees with Bergson that pure duration is known intuitively rather than intellectually.³ Bergson points out the barrenness and artificiality of intellectual abstraction which cannot perceive the organic unity of life. "Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner-becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality."⁴ Iqbāl's distinction between intellect and intuition, like ^{Bergson's} ~~Iqbāl's~~, is in alignment with

-
1. Bergson, H. Time and Free Will (translated by Pogson, F.L.) London, 1910, pp 90-91.
 2. Sharīf, M.M. "Iqbāl on the Nature of Time", Iqbāl Review, October, 1960, p. 37.
 3. Cleugh, E. M. Time, p. 116.
 4. Bergson, H. Creative Evolution (translation by Mitchell, A.) London, 1911, p. 322.

his distinction between spatialized time and durée. In

"Gulshan-e-Rāz-e-Jadīd" Iqbāl says:

ابدرا عقلِ ما ناسا مار است
دیگی، از گیر و دارِ او هزار است
چونک است او سکونِ او دست دارد

نه بیند مغز و دل بر پوست دارد
حقیقت را چون ماصد پاره کردیم
تمیز ثابت و سیاره کردیم
زمان را در ضمیر خود ندیدیم
نه سال و شد روز آفریدیم

¹(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p 216)

and again he comments upon the inadequency^a of the intellectual approach to the question of time:

فرد هر اندر طرفی ندارد
فغس چون سوزن ساعت شمارد
تراست روزها شب ها سحرها
بگرد شعله و جیند شکرها

²(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p 229)

-
1. Unable to perceive infinity,
The intellect just multiplies pure unity.
Lame, it likes to stand still;
And blind, give up the kernel for the shell.
The stars and planets that we see
Are fragments of reality -
Creations of the intellect
Which must dissect.
We never saw Time with our inner sight
And have invented year and month and day and night.
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, p.7)
2. The Intellect counts every breath
With a clock's hand,
As if breath were Time's unit.
So it can never comprehend
And take the measure of Infinity.
It only fashions night and day,
Imaginary parts of Time.
Afraid to seize the flame,
It gathers sparks alone.
(Trans. by Husain, H. Ibid. p.14)

He compares the intuitive and the intellectual mode of perceiving reality:

صمیم زندگانی عاودانی است
بچشم طاهرش بینی، زمانی است

¹(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 228)

Thus for Iqbāl, it is "only in the moments of profound meditation, when the efficient self is in abeyance, that we sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience."² However, it is to be remembered here that Iqbāl does not agree with Bergson in thinking that thought only spatializes living processes. For him, in its deeper movement, that is "in its true nature" thought "is identical with life."³

Bergson: time as creative.

Iqbāl shares with enthusiasm an idea found both in the Qōr'ān and in Bergson's philosophy, namely, that time is creative. Bergson vehemently opposed the old idea expressed in Ecclesiastes that "there is nothing new under the sun."⁴ On the contrary, he urges, that if we picture duration as a

-
1. Life's essence is eternal, though
Seen with the body's eye
It is a part of Time.
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, p.1)
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp 47-48.
 3. Ibid. pp 51-52.
 4. Cleugh, E. M. Time, p. 119.

ceaseless flow, we are bound to hold some kind of a evolutionary view in conjunction with it. Time is not static, it is a process continually working towards ever new forms which cannot be predicted.¹ He takes the example of a painter. "The painter is before his canvas, the colours are on the palette, the model is sitting - all this we see, and also we know the painter's style: do we foresee what will appear on the canvas? We possess the elements of the problem; we know in an abstract way, how it will be solved, for the portrait will surely resemble the model and will surely resemble also the artist; but the concrete solution brings with it that unforeseeable nothing which is everything in a work of art."²

According to Bergson, "science can work only on what is supposed to repeat itself - that is to say, on what is withdrawn, by hypothesis, from the action of real time"³ and thus "concentrated on that which repeats, solely pre-occupied in welding the same to the same, intellect turns away from the vision of time."⁴ Iqbāl also points out that creation and not repetition is the characteristic of real time. "If time is real, and not a mere repetition of homogeneous moments which make conscious experience a delusion, then every moment in the life of reality is

1. Cleugh, E. M. Time, p. 120.

2. Bergson, H. Creative Evolution, p. 360.

3. Ibid. p. 31.

4. Bergson, H. Creative Evolution, p. 48.

original, giving birth to what is absolutely novel and unforeseeable... To exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but to create it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation... creation is opposed to repetition which is characteristic of mechanical action. That is why it is impossible to explain the creative activity of life in terms of mechanism."¹

Bergson: time as non-teleological movement.

Despite the many similarities between the thought of Bergson and Iqbāl, there are certain significant differences. Bergson denies the teleological character of Reality on the ground that it makes time unreal. According to him "the portals of the future must remain wide open to Reality" otherwise it will not be free and creative.² Thus if teleology is admitted the primordial freshness of *durée* will be nullified. Iqbāl points out that this objection only holds good so long as teleology means the acting out of a plan in view of a pre-determined purpose. "Such a religious predestinationism would destroy the freedom of both God and man."³ Teleology is to be understood not as a mechanical but as a vitalistic-creative process - a line

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 50.

2. Ibid. pp 53-54.

3. Bānsani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl" Die Welt Des Islāms, 1954, New Series Volume III, p. 161.

not already drawn, but a line in the drawing - an actualization of open possibilities. The world-process "is purposive only in this sense that it is selective in character and brings itself to some sort of present fulfilment by actively preserving and supplementing the past."¹ For Iqbāl, then, ultimate Reality "is pure duration in which thought, life and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity."² In his opinion Bergson's mistake was that he overlooked the forward-looking aspect of consciousness which makes it teleological.³

According to Iqbāl, Bergson was wrong in that he considered pure time as preceding the Person, of whom alone both pure duration and élan vital can be predicated.⁴ Pure time cannot keep the multiplicity of objects and events together. The multiplicity of nature broken up into innumerable instants can only be grasped by the appreciative act of a lasting self which can build it up together in a lasting synthesis.⁵ For Iqbāl, time although an essential element in reality, is not reality itself.⁶ In Greek and Hindū thought time was bound to things visible and escape from it was possible only through self-annihilation, but Iqbāl boldly introduces Time into the very

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp54-55.

2. Ibid. p. 55.

3. Khatoon, J. 'The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl' p. 109.

4. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl" p. 161.

5. Ibid. pp 161-162.

6. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 58.

heart of God.¹ God is not the unmoved mover; the God portrayed by the Qōr'ān is an active, changing and living God.² For Iqbāl, God lives both in eternity and in serial time. The former means change without succession while the latter is organically related to eternity in so far as it is a measure of eternity.³ In Jāvid Nāma, Iqbāl attempts to portray life in the non-serial time of the world beyond creation:

درگد شتم از حدِ این کائنات
یا نادم در همانِ بے حیات

بے یمنی دے لیسار است این جہاں
طالعِ ار لیل و نہاد است این جہاں

اندراں عالمِ ہمارے دیکرے
اصلی اور کس فکانے دیکرے

لازدال دھر زمانِ نوعِ دگر
ناپہ اندر دہم و آپہ در نظر

نہر زمان اور امانے دیکرے
نہر زمان اور امانے دیکرے

-
1. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl", p. 162.
 2. Ibid. p. 163.
 3. Ibid.

روزگارش کے نیاز از ماہ و ہر
گنج اندر ساعتِ او نہ سہرا

¹(Jāvid Nāma pp 178-180)

The Qōr'ān and the two aspects of time.

Serial time comes into existence only by the very act of creation:² "The Time of the Ultimate Ego is revealed as change without succession, i.e. an organic whole which appears atomic because of the creative movement of the ego. This is what Mīr Damad and Mullā Bāqir mean when they say that time is born with the act of creation by which the Ultimate Ego realizes and measures, so to speak, the infinite wealth of His own undetermined possibilities."³ Hence it is possible for Iqbāl to interpret logically the two contrasting statements on creation in the Qōr'ān: "All things have we created bound by a fixed decree; and Our command is no more than a single word, like the twinkling

-
1. I passed beyond the bounds of this universe
and set foot in the undimensioned world,
a world without both right and left,
a world devoid of night and day.
In that universe was another world
Whose origin was from Divine fiat,
undecaying, and every moment transformed,
unimaginable, yet there clearly visible,
every moment clothed in a new perfection,
every moment clad in a new beauty.
Its time had no need of moon and sun;
in its expanse the nine spheres are contained.
(Translation by Arberry, A.J. Jāvid Nāma, pp 113-114).
 2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 292.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 76-77.

of an eye" (54:50);¹ "and do thou trust in Him who liveth and dieth not; and celebrate His praise who hath created the heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, in six days; and then ascended His Throne; the Merciful." (25:60)² Viewed intellectually, one Divine day, in the terminology of the Qōr'ān and the Old Testament becomes equal to a thousand years. But from another viewpoint, the process of creation is a single act as swift as the twinkling of an eye. Iqbāl illustrates this point further. The sensation of red is caused by a wave-motion of the frequency of 400 billions per second and is practically incalculable, yet it is received by the eye in a single momentary act of perception.³

Time: to sum up.

Iqbāl believed that "a keen sense of the reality of time and the concept of life as a continuous movement in time is typical of Islām."⁴ We have seen the importance he attaches to time in his own philosophy. His concept of time "fits in nicely into the general movement of ^erevival of personalism which is under way in today's religious philosophy."⁵ Professor Bausani observes, "Iqbāl's own contribution is that of Islāmic experience,

1. Sale, G. Translation of The Korān, p. 275.

2. Ibid. p. 393.

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 48-49.

4. Ibid. p. 141.

5. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl" p. 185.

which we would do well to consider with greater attention and appreciation."¹ Professor Schimmel thinks that the religious importance of Iqbāl's ideas about time deserves special attention, for "what he wanted was surely not to add a new system of scientific explanations to this most difficult problem, but to draw the attention of the Muslim world back to the contact with the living God. Through a revaluation of the twofold aspect of time he aimed at an actualization of this burning but long forgotten issue for Muslim religious life."²

TIME (AND SPACE) IN IQBĀL'S POETRY.

In his poetry, Iqbāl often describes serial time as the 'zannār' the magian's girdle. This symbol "shows Iqbāl's fine psychological insight - he could not yet foresee what H. Corbin proved many years later that the zannār is the typical Zurvanistic symbol."³ Zārvān is the old Irānian God of Time.⁴ He is conceived as a sorcerer whose spell has to be broken. The man of God recognising the personal creative activity of God, and realizing this power in his own self can break the spell of Zarvān by participating in God's time.⁵

-
1. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl", p.185.
 2. Schimmel, A.M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 298.
 3. Ibid. p. 296.
 4. Schimmel, A.M. "Time and Eternity in the work of Muḥammad Iqbāl" Proceedings of the X International Congress for Religions. Marburg, 1961, pp 55-56.
 5. Schimmel, A.M. "The Jāvidname in the light of the comparative History of Religions." p. 32.

Most of Iqbāl's ideas on time are brought together in "Nawā'e-Waqt" a poem "which has been praised by Dr. Razi-ud-Dīn Şiddīqī, Pākistān's well known authority on atom-physics, as a perfect commentary on Einstein's theory of relativity."¹ It is worth quoting in full:

خودشید بہ دامم ، انجم ہرگز بیانم
 در شہر و بیامانم در کلاخ و تبستانم
 در من نگری ، بیسم ، در خود نگری حاتم
 من دردم و در مانم ، من عیشِ فرادانم
 من تیغِ جان سوزم ، من چشمہٴ حیوانم
 من تنگنہٴ انزلی ، یک حستہٴ شرابِ من
 فونِ جگر مردان ، سامانِ بہارِ من
 انسان و جانِ او ، از نقش و نگارِ من
 من آتشِ سوزانم ، من دوضہٴ رضوانم
 آسودہ و ستیادم ، ایں طرفہٴ تماشا پس
 پیمانہٴ ہمچیز من ، صد عالمِ رغنا پس
 صد کوکبِ غلطان پس ، صد گنبدِ خفا پس
 من کسوتِ السانم ، پیراھنِ یزدانم
 تقدیرِ صنونِ من ، تدبیرِ صنونِ تو
 بھوں روحِ رواں یا کم ، از عیند و چگونِ تو
 تو عاشقِ لیلای ، من دستِ عمونِ تو
 تو رازِ درونِ من ، من رازِ دونِ تو
 از جانِ تو بیدایم ، در جانِ تو بینایم

1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 293.

من دردد تو منزل، من سرور و تو حاصل
 آداره آب و گل ا دریاں مقام دل
 تو ساز صد آئینے، تو گری ایس محفل
 گچیدہ بہ حائے میں این قلزم بے سائل
 از موج بلند تو سر برده طوفانم

¹(Payām-e-Mashriq pp 102-103)

-
1. In my bosom I hold the sun and the stars,
 If you look within me, I am nothing, if you look within
 yourself, I am life itself.
 My dwelling-place are cities and deserts, palaces and
 solitary dens.
- I am malady and pain, I am the balm and limitless joy;
 I am the world-vanquishing sword, I am the fountain of
 eternal life.
 Čingez and Temūr raised but specks of my storm,
 The turmoil of the west is but a spark of my fire.
 Man and his universe are my handiwork,
 From the labour of great men, my spring is born.
 I am the fire of hell and the peace of heaven.
 See this wondrous phenomenon - I am still, yet I move,
 In the crystal ball of my present see the glimpse of
 future days.
- See hidden in me a thousand glorious worlds,
 Thousands of swift-moving stars and thousands of blue skies.
 I am the garment of humanity, and God I behold,
 My spell is destiny, freewill is your chant,
 You love a Lailā I am the wilderness where you roam so
 wildly.
- Like the soul I am free of your how and wherefore,
 You are the secret of my being and I of yours.
 In your soul I am hidden, out of your soul I arise.
 I am the traveller and you the destination, I the field
 and you the harvest.
- You are the glow and the music of the gatherings.
 O wanderer on sea and land, return to your heart;
 See in a cup an ocean without bound,
 You are the lofty wave from which my storm arose.

Space and Time are not absolute realities, says Iqbāl:

جستہ بگستا بر زمان و بر مکان

ایں دو یک حال است اراحوال جان

¹(Jāvīd Nāma p. 19)

Serial time is related to, in fact it derives its reality from, pure duration:

تیرے شب و روز کی اور حقیقت ہے یا

ایک زمانے کی رد حس میں نہ دن ہے نہ رات

²(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 127)

In his Lectures, Iqbāl said, "timeless experience embodies itself in a world-making or world-shaking act and in this form diffuses itself in the time-movement and makes itself effectively visible to the eye of history."³

He repeats this thought again in his famous poem on the Mosque of Cordoba - the Essence reveals its possibilities in a tangible form in serial time:

-
1. Open wide your eyes upon Time and Space,
for these two are but a state of the soul.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 33).
 2. What other sense have your nights, what have your days,
but one
Long blank current of time empty of sunset or dawn?
(Translation by Kiernan, V. G. Poems from Iqbāl, p. 38)
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 184.

من حساب و دوزخ و فردوس و اورا

عالم شش روزه فرزند من است

اُمّ هر میرے کہ ہی پس منم

ار دم هر لحظه بر است این جهان

آن و امردے طلسم من شکست

لی مع اللہ باز فواں از عین جان

¹(Jāvīd Nāma p. 22).

من حیاتم، من ماتم، من لغور

آدم و افرشته در بند من است!

هر خطی که شاخ می جینی منم

در ظلم من اسیر است این جهان

لی مع اللہ هر کرا در دل نشست

گردد فواهی من ناسم در میان

The Prophet's saying "lī ma'a Allāh waqt," i.e. 'I have a time with God (where even Gabriel has no access)' has become, in more or less explicit form, a leitmotif of Iqbāl's whole thinking, beginning from the Asrār."² Many mystics have

-
1. I am life, I am death, I am resurrection,
I am the Judgment, Hell, Heaven and Hourī,
Man and angel are both in bondage to me,
This transitory world is my own child;
I am every rose that you pluck from the branch,
I am the matrix of everything that you see. — — — — —
This world is a prisoner in my talisman,
every moment it ages through my breath.
But he who has in his heart 'I have a time with God',
that doughty hero has broken my talisman;
if you wish that I should not be in the midst,
recite from the depths of your soul 'I have a time with God.'
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 34).
 2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 297.

expressed their unitive experiences through this tradition.¹ Maulānā Rūmī has quoted it several times, and many mystics have built upon it a whole edifice of mystical meanings of the word 'waqt', as Hujwīrī sums up: "Waqt is that whereby a man becomes independent of the past and the future... he has no memory of the past and no thought of that which is not yet come."²

In a section of Asrār-e-Khudī entitled "Time is a sword," Iqbāl gave his first detailed exposition of the concept of time. He wanted to make it clear that "the world of time is not to be regarded as a world of shadows signifying nothing, a play of illusion on the edge of a void as the Hindu mystagogues had preached. Time is real and time is important."³ Time becomes a cutting sword:

من چه گویم بستر این شمنیر چیست آب ادسرمایه دار از زندگیت
 صاحبش مالا ترا امید و بیم دست او بپای ترازد دستِ کلیم

⁴(Asrār-e-Khudī p. 80)

To he who is bound by serial time, the poet says:

-
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 297.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Singh, I. The Ardent Pilgrim, p. 89.
 4. Now shall I say what is the secret of this sword?
 In its flashing edge there is life.
 Its owner is exalted above hope and fear,
 His hand is whiter than the hand of Moses.
 (Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the Self,
 p. 134).

در دل خود عالم دیدگر	ای اسپر دوستی و فراداد زنگر
وقت را مثلِ خطِ بیداشتی	در گلِ خود تخمِ ظلمت کاشتی
فکر تو بس بود طولِ روزگار	ماز با پیمانۀ لیل و نهار
شمعِ بزمِ ملتِ احرار ماش	ملی و آزادی ز نار ماش
از حیاتِ حادان آنگه نه	تو که از اصلِ زمان آنگه نه
آرامشِ الهی و زمانِ نی است	زندگیِ ارد در دهر از زندگی است

¹(Asrār-e-Khudī, pp 81-82)

The mystic Hujwīrī also refers to Time as a sword which "cuts the root of the future and the past, and obliterates care of yesterday and tomorrow from the heart. The sword is a dangerous companion: either it makes its master a king or it destroys him."² For Iqbāl, to live in pure duration

-
1. Look, O thou enthralled by Yesterday and To-morrow,
Behold another world in thine own heart.
Thou hast sown the seed of darkness in thy clay,
Thou hast imagined Time as a line:
~~Thy thought measures length of Time~~
With the measure of night and day.
Art thou a Moslem? Then cast off this girdle.
Be a candle to the feast of the religion of the free.
Knowing not the origin of Time,
Thou art ignorant of everlasting Life.
Life is of Time, and Time is of Life:
"Do not abuse Time." was the command of the Prophet.
(Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the Self
pp 135-138).
 2. Hujwīrī quoted in Schimmel, A.M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 298.

is to be at the centre of destiny.¹ "It is time regarded as an organic whole that the Qurān describes as 'Taqdīr' or the destiny."² By participating in God's time, man is no longer the vehicle of serial time, he is the rider of the mount.

ایام کا مرکز ہیں، راکب ہے قلندر

³(Zarb-e-Kalīm p. 36)

Real life is possible only "on this still point of time"

تو از شمارِ نفسِ زندہ نمیدانی
کہ زندگی نہ شکستِ طلسمِ ایام است

⁴(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 93)

From "There is no God but God" too Iqbāl infers that man must free himself from the bondage of serial time through Love:

-
1. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbāl" p. 162.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 49.
 3. The 'galandar' is not the mount of time but the rider of the mount.
 4. All thy life is breath to take,
Knowing not, frail man,
That true living is to break
The days' talisman.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 58).

اعتقاد از لایزال داریم ما
 خود در عالم رانده داریم ما
 از غم امروز در طرا رسته ایم

تا کی عہد محبت بسندہ ایم
¹(Asrār-e-Khudī p. 85)

Love also frees man from the limitations of the intellect:

خود دعویٰ ہے زمانہ مکان کی زنجاری

ہے زمانہ نہ مکان! لا اِلهَ اِلَّا اللهُ

²(Zarb-e-Kalīm p. 7)

Iqbāl refers to the highly personal character of the experience of time by quoting the story of the Seven Sleepers (Sūra 18:19)³

مہ رسالت نبی ارزد بید جو
 کرب "کم لبینم" عوطہ زں شہو

⁴(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 216)

-
1. We have honour from "There is no God but Allāh,"
 We are the protectors of the universe.
 Freed from the vexation of today and tomorrow,
 We have pledged ourselves to love One.
 (Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the Self
 p. 140).
 2. Intellect is the bondage of time and space,
 There is no time or space, nothing but "There is no God
 but God."
 3. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 294.
 4. Your months and years are meaningless and vain:
 Think over the Qōr'ān's "How long did you remain?"
 (Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery
 p. 7).

Iqbāl does not tire of saying:

حسابِ روزش از دورِ فلک نیست

¹(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 237)

or of stressing the importance of Love through which the soul is freed from the bondage of time, and led to the 'mĕ'rāj' or the Ascension, to pure duration

زمانہ کہ حسابش ز سال و ماہے نیست

²(Payām-e-Mashriq p. 219)

and so in unforgettable lines Iqbāl gives a message based on his life-long philosophy:

اللہی عشق کے امتحاں اور بھی ہیں!

ستاروں سے آگے جہاں اور بھی ہیں

چمن اور بھی آستیاں اور بھی ہیں!

قناعت نہ کر عالم رنگ و لایر

کہ پترے رمان و مکاں اور بھی ہیں!

اسی روز و شب میں الجھ کر نہ رہ جا

³(Bāl-e-Jibrīl pp 89-90)

-
1. The Self's day is not measured by
The revolutions of the sky.
(Translation by Ḥuṣain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery,)
 2. The reckoning of which is not by years or months.
 3. There are yet other worlds beyond the stars,
There are yet other tests of Love to come.
With this world of hue and scent be not content,
For there are other gardens too to see.
Be not entangled in this Day and Night,
There are other times and spaces too for you.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNIVERSE AND GOD IN IQBĀL'S PHILOSOPHYTHE NATURE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

For Iqbāl the external world exists. In perception and in every other form of knowledge, there is the confronting 'other'. "The duality of subject and object is a necessity of all knowledge."¹ According to the old science there is presented in experience an external extended world, which exists in its own right independently of its appearance to the mind of the individual observer. This scientific approach leads to the materialistic world - view - "a void or expanse from which all objects may be abstracted but which itself is a homogeneous, immobile, continuous reality; a matter whose ultimate nature undiscovered, possibly undiscoverable, but which is distributed unequally in masses in the expanse; and a duration or a lapse of time from which events may be abstracted and which is then itself a homogeneous, unchanging, continuous, measurable, reality."² We have seen that Iqbāl does not subscribe to such a world-view as regards his ideas on space and time. We shall see that

1. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, p. 59.

2. Carr, W. H. The General Principle of Relativity, London, 1922. p. 46.

his concept of matter also differs from the materialistic and dualistic standpoint.

Descartes, Locke and Berkeley: theory of Matter and its reputation. Iqbāl disagrees with those physicists who hold that nature is material, made up of small, hard, inert, impenetrable, and indivisible physical entities called atoms of which objects are made, and existing in a void called space. According to Iqbāl, this view is based on the attribution of substantiality to things. Iqbāl points out that the scientific view of nature as pure materiality is associated with the Newtonian view of space as an absolute void in which all things are situated. However, "the criticism of the foundations of the mathematical sciences has fully disclosed that the hypothesis of a pure materiality, an enduring stuff situated in an absolute space is unworkable."²

According to Descartes, matter meant simply corporeal form.³ Extension was the only attribute which was inseparable and indistinguishable from material substance. Every other attribute-colour, weight, sonority, shape could be thought absent, but if we abstracted from its extension, material substance itself would be annihilated.⁴ Locke distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities of substance.

-
1. Tufail, M. M. Iqbāl's Philosophy and Education, Lāhore, 1966. pp 60-61.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 34-35.
 3. Whittaker, E. Space and Spirit, p. 73.
 4. Carr, W. H. The General Principle of Relativity, p. 97.

Primary qualities are those "such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state so ever it be; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers ... it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived."¹ Primary qualities include solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. Secondary qualities "are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, etc."² In other words, primary qualities are objective, they exist "whether any one's senses perceive them or not,"³ but secondary qualities are subjective.

Iqbāl refers to Berkeley's refutation of the theory of matter as the unknown cause of our sensations.⁴ Berkeley pointed out that Locke's primary qualities were as subjective as his secondary qualities. The idea of extension and solidity obtained through the sense of touch is also a sensation in the mind. The idea of extension cannot be separated from the idea of colour and other secondary qualities. One never perceived an extended thing which was not at the same time coloured and so on. The primary qualities are inseparably united with the secondary. One could not abstract the latter

1. Locke, J. Philosophical Works, pp 113-114.

2. Ibid, p. 114.

3. Ibid, p. 115.

4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 33.

and leave behind an extended substance, which is that and nothing else.¹ Hence the subjective idealism of Berkeley refutes the theory of matter as the solid substratum underlying phenomenal reality and being the cause of our sensations.²

Iqbāl observes that on the basis of Locke's theory, colours and sounds are nothing more than subjective states. He writes "If physics constitutes a really coherent and genuine knowledge of perceptively known objects, the traditional theory of matter must be rejected for the obvious reason that it reduces the evidence of our senses on which alone the physicist, as observer and experimenter, must rely, to the mere impressions of the observer's mind. Between Nature and the observer of Nature, the theory creates a gulf which he is compelled to bridge over by resorting to the doubtful hypothesis of an imperceptible something, occupying an absolute space like a thing in a receptacle and causing our sensation by some kind of impact. In the words of Professor Whitehead, the theory reduces one half of Nature to a 'dream' and the other half to a 'conjecture'. Thus physics, finding it necessary to criticise its own foundations has eventually found reason to break its own idol, and the empirical attitude which appeared

1. Thilly, F. A History of Philosophy, p. 338.

2. Khātūn, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 77.

to necessitate scientific materialism has finally ended in a revolt against matter."¹

Iqbāl supports Berkeley in his rejection of Locke's theory of matter, but unlike Berkeley, he does not deny the existence of the external world.² There are times when he speaks in Berkeley's idealistic vein and seems to regard the world as being reducible to the self³ i.e. as not existing in its own right:

جان غیر ادغلی ہائے ماسیت
کہ ہے ماحلوہ لورد صدا نیست

⁴
(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 213)

but on the whole this is not Iqbāl's philosophical position. In his Lectures he says "since objects ... are not subjective states caused by something imperceptible called matter, they are genuine phenomena which constitute the very substance of Nature and which we know as they are in Nature."⁵

Matter and Relativity -

Iqbāl does not deny the existence of matter but he does deny its substantiality and in this he is supported by the theory of relativity which destroys, not the objectivity of nature but the view of substance as simple location in space.⁶

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 33.
2. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, p. 60.
3. Apart from our manifestation the world is nothing, For without us there would be no light and no sound.
4. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 114.
5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 34.
6. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, p. 60.

As Russell observes, the theory of relativity by merging time into space-time has damaged the traditional notion of substance more than all the arguments of the philosophers.¹ The commonsense view of matter is something which persists in time and moves in space, but modern relativity-physics holds matter to be a system of inter-related events rather than a persistent thing with varying states.² As Professor Whitehead points out about the new science, "in the place of the Aristotelian notion of the procession of forms, it has substituted the notion of the forms of process. It has swept away space and matter, and has substituted the study of the internal relations within a complex state of activity."³ In other words, the whole spatial universe has become a field or force or a field of incessant activity.⁴

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 34.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Whitehead, A. N. Nature and Life. Cambridge, 1934. p. 27.
 4. Ibid. p. 36.

Thus for Iqbāl Reality is not something inert or given. It is a process of becoming.¹ He agrees with Professor Whitehead that "Nature is not a static fact situated in an a-dynamic void, but a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow which thoughtcuts up into isolated immobilities out of whose mutual relations arise the concepts of space and time."²

Iqbāl's Conception of Matter

We have seen that Iqbāl describes Nature as an event rather than as a 'thing'. "What we call things are events in the continuity of Nature which thought spatializes and thus regards as mutually isolated for purposes of action. The

-
1. Ḥamīd, K. A. "Iqbāl's Philosophy of the Human Ego" The Visvabhāratī Quarterly February-April 1944. New series Volume IX Part I. p. 301.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 34.

universe which seems to us to be a collection of things is not a solid stuff occupying a void. It is not a thing but an act."¹

Matter exists but matter is not that which is "elementally incapable of evolving the synthesis we call life and mind and needing a transcendental Deity to impregnate it with the sentient and mental."² Iqbāl defines matter as "a colony of egos of a low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order, when their association and interaction reaches a certain degree of co-ordination."³

Like Bergson, Iqbāl believes that an analysis of conscious experience throws light on the nature of matter, space and time.⁴ When we analyse our inner experience we find constant change and movement. "I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold, I am merry or sad, I work or I do nothing, I look at what is around me or I think of something else. Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas - such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I change, then, without ceasing."⁵ Now change or movement from one state to another takes place in time. On the analogy of the self it may now be maintained that the physical world too exists in time.⁶ Since time

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 51.

2. Ibid. p. 106.

3. Ibid. p.

4. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 98.

5. Bergson, H. Creative Evolution, p. 1.

6. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, p. 65.

is the peculiar possession of a self, the world must also be regarded as a self or ego.¹ Thus in Iqbāl, as also in Whitehead, philosophy of nature becomes a philosophy of organism.²

Like Leibniz and McTaggart, Iqbāl believes that Reality is spiritual and consists of only selves or monads.³ According to Leibniz, a monad is a simple, unique, indissoluble substance.⁴ There is a hierarchy of monads some being superior to others in the clearness and distinctness with which they mirror the universe.⁵ The monads range from the completely active to the almost inert. No created monad is completely inactive and none is completely active, but those at the lowest end of the scale would be mere matter, if there were any such thing. God is the only completely active monad. Iqbāl too believes in degrees of consciousness. "Every atom of Divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego. But there are degrees in the expression of egohood. Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it reaches its perfection in man."⁶ There is, however, one significant difference between Iqbāl's ego-unities and Leibniz's

-
1. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, p. 65.
 2. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 66.
 3. Rājū, P. T. "The Idealism of Sir Mohammed Iqbāl" p. 107.
 4. Leibniz, G. W. Philosophical Writings (translated by Morris, M.) London, 1965. pp 3-4.
 5. Russell, B. A History of Western Philosophy, London, 1961. p. 565.
 6. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 71-72.

monads, namely, that Iqbāl does not believe in the 'windowlessness' of the monads.¹ This 'windowlessness' makes interaction of any kind between monads impossible and necessitates the assumption of some kind of "pre-established harmony" to explain how in fact the states of one monad synchronise with the states of the other monads and the actuality of perception.² For Iqbāl the ego is not a closed-off unit. He visualises the life of an ego as "a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this area of mutual invasion."³

For Iqbāl, then, the universe is made up of ego-unities which are living, fluid and dynamic. They are in constant flux and any immobility and solidity which seems to exist is only an appearance.⁴ In the language of poetry

فریبِ نظرِ سکون و ثبات
تڑپا ہے ہر ذرہ کائنات

⁴(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 171)

Iqbāl believes that we live in a growing universe which :

1. Rashīd, A. "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: His life and work". Iqbāl January 1962. Volume 9. No. 3. p. 40.
2. Russell, B. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, London, 1939. p. 134.
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām.
4. Immobility and rest are deceptions of the eye, Each particle of the universe throbs with restlessness.

is "not an already completed product which left the hand of its maker ages ago, and is now lying stretched out in space as a dead mass of matter to which time does nothing, and consequently is nothing."¹ The question arises: can we conceive the universe as lacking deity? Iqbāl's answer is: "By no means".² This is so because "the movement of life, as an organic growth, involves a progressive synthesis of its various stages. Without this synthesis it will cease to be an organic growth. It is determined by ends, and the presence of ends means that it is permeated by intelligence."³ At the level of cosmic unity this intelligence must be conceived as Ultimate Self or Divine Ego.⁴ We shall see that Iqbāl bases his "working proof" for the existence of God on this idea.

PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Since religious experience is personal and incommunicable, Iqbāl advances reasons for believing in God's existence. He begins with an analysis of the theoretical arguments traditionally supposed to prove the existence of God, namely the Cosmological, Teleological and Ontological arguments.

The Cosmological argument may be stated thus: "Events continually happen in the world and every event requires a cause. And the non-divine substances which exist in the

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 55.
 2. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 67.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 52.
 4. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 67.

world cannot have existed eternally, the commencement of the existence of each of these substances is also an event, and will require a cause. Now an event may be caused by another event, but then this earlier event will, like every other, require a cause. If we recognize no causes but events, every cause will itself require a cause, and the series will never be completed. We must, therefore, believe that the ultimate cause of all events is not an event but a being, who never began to exist, and who therefore needs no cause. And this being is said to be God."¹

Iqbāl objects to this argument on the following grounds:-

(a) A finite effect can only be traced back to a finite cause or to an infinite series of finite causes. To use the law of causation which states that everything must have a cause, to prove that there is an uncaused first cause, is to falsify the very basis on which the argument proceeds.²

(b) The first cause in the argument excludes its effect. Thus the effect limits the cause and reduces it to a finite cause.³

(c) The cause in this case cannot be regarded as necessary, because in a cause-effect relationship, the cause and the effect are equally necessary. Furthermore, the necessity of existence is not identical with the conceptual necessity of

1. McTaggart, J. E. Some Dogmas of Religion, London, 1906.p191.

2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 28.

3. Ibid.

causation which is the utmost this argument can prove.¹

In Iqbāl's words, the Cosmological argument "really tries to reach the infinite by merely negating the finite. But the infinite reached by contradicting the finite is a false infinite, which neither explains itself nor the finite. The true infinite does not exclude the finite; it embraces the finite without effacing its finitude, and explains and justifies its being."² Thus, for Iqbāl, the movement from the finite to the infinite as embodied in this argument is quite unwarranted, and the argument fails in toto.³

Iqbāl would agree with the summing up of Kant's criticism of the argument: "The transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient original Being is so overwhelming, so high above everything empirical, which is always conditioned, that we can find no experience enough material to fill such a concept, and can only grope about among things conditioned, looking in vain for the unconditioned, of which no rule of any empirical synthesis can ever give us an example, or even show the way towards it. If the highest Being should stand itself in that chain of conditions it would be a link in the series, and would, exactly like the lower links, above which it is placed, require

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 28.

2. Ibid. pp 28-29.

3. Ibid. p. 29.

further investigation with regard to its own still higher cause. If, on the contrary, we mean to separate it from that chain, and, as a purely intelligible Being, not comprehend it in the series of natural causes, what bridge is then open for reason to reach it, considering that all rules determining the transition from effect to cause, nay, all synthesis and extension of our knowledge in general, refer to nothing but possible experience, and therefore to the objects of the world of sense only, and are valid nowhere else?"¹

What Iqbāl calls the teleological argument has also been called the argument from design or the physico-theological argument. It proceeds thus: "We seem first of all to desire the concept of purposiveness from our acquaintance with human action and to apply this concept by analogy to the living organisms observed on the surface of our planet. We then, by an immense leap, extend it to cover the whole of the vast universe, perhaps on the ground that this also is governed by law, although by law of a different kind; and we may feel this extension to be confirmed by our experience of the beauty in nature. Finally we argue that purposive activity in beings without intelligence must be directed by an intelligence outside and beyond themselves; and so we pass, because of the magnitude and power and order and

1. Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason (Translated by Müller, F.M.) London, 1925, p. 500.

beauty of the world, to the existence of an all-powerful and all-wise intelligence, to which we give the name of God."¹

Iqbāl objects to the teleological argument on the following grounds: (a) The argument, at best, gives us an external contriver and not a creator and certainly not an Omnipotent God.² As J. S. Mill points out, every indication of design in the universe is "so much evidence against the Omnipotence of the Designer. For what is meant by Design? Contrivance: the adaptation of means to an end. But the necessity for contrivance - the need of employing means - is a consequence of the limitation of power. Who would have recourse to means if to attain his end his mere word was sufficient?"³

(b) If we suppose the external contriver also to be the creator of his material then it does no credit to his wisdom to create his own difficulties by first creating intractable material, and then overcoming its resistance by the application of methods alien to its original nature.⁴ "Our admiration of the power and skill of human designer is enhanced by the supposed intractableness of the materials with which he works; but when the divine designer is conceived of as himself the creator of these materials, he must ... be himself responsible for the original intractableness which he is supposed

-
1. Paton, H. J. The Modern Predicament, London, 1955. pp 215-6.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 24.
 3. Mill, J. S. "Theism" in Three Essays on Religion, London, 1874. pp 176-177.
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 29.

afterwards to manifest his skill in overcoming. Where difficulties are of one's own creating, no credit for wisdom can be due to the act which evades or vanquishes them."¹

(c) If the contriver is external to his material then he must always be limited by it, and must solve his problems like a human mechanic.² As Mill observes, according to this argument, the Deity had "to work out his ends by combining materials of a given nature and properties. Out of these materials he had to construct a world in which his designs should be carried into effect through given properties of Matter and Force, working together and working into one another. This did require skill and contrivance, and the means by which it is affected are often such as justly excite our wonder and admiration: but exactly because it requires wisdom, it implies limitation of power."³

(d) There is no real analogy between the natural phenomena that we see and the work of a contriver. An artificer must isolate and then integrate his material, while Nature is composed of organic wholes.⁴

Kant points out that the Physico - Theological argument really rests on the Cosmological argument. It proceeds "from the order and design that can everywhere be observed in the world, as an entirely contingent arrangement, to the existence of a cause, proportionate to it. ... The fact is that, after

-
1. Caird, J. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Glasgow. 1920. p. 136.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 29.
 3. Mill, J. S. "Theism" p. 178.
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 29.

having reached the stage of admiration of the greatness, the wisdom, the power, etc. of the Author of the world, and seeing in further advance possible, one suddenly leaves the argument carried on by empirical proof, and lays hold of that contingency which, from the very first, was inferred from the order and design of the world. The next step from that contingency leads, by means of transcendental concepts, only to the existence of something absolutely necessary, and another step from the absolute necessity of the first cause to its completely determined or determining concept, namely, that of an all-embracing reality. Thus we see that the physico-theological proof, baffled in its own undertaking, takes suddenly refuge in the cosmological proof."¹

The Ontological argument was formulated first by Anselm¹ and elaborated by thinkers such as Descartes, Leibniz and Hegel. This argument is an inference from God's nature to His reality.² The Cartesian form of this argument, which Iqbāl quotes, is as follows: "To say that an attribute is contained in the nature or in the concept of a thing is the same as to say that the attribute is true of this thing and that it may be affirmed to be in it. But necessary existence is contained in the nature or the concept of God. Hence it may be with truth affirmed that necessary existence is in God, or that God exists."³ God is by definition a Perfect Being. If

-
1. Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, pp 505-506.
 2. Paton, H. J. The Modern Predicament, p. 176.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 30.

existence is an element of perfection, no doubt the idea of a Perfect Being must include the idea of His existence.¹ But the crux of the Ontological argument is the contention that we are entitled, and indeed obliged, to pass from the thought or notion of God's perfection to knowledge of His existence - to knowledge that He must necessarily exist.²

Iqbāl refers to Kant's well-known criticism of this argument.³ The notion of a hundred dollars in my mind does not prove that I have them in my pocket. This argument moves from the logical to the real. Existence is not a quality at all. A thing with all its qualities either exists or it does not. It receives no additional quality by existing. "If we decide to say that a being is perfect only when we are able to say that it exists, we are entitled to say that a perfect being must exist. But this alleged necessity is a logical necessity based on the use of language, and it should not be mistaken for an insight into the real necessity of things."⁴

Descartes advances another argument to prove the existence of God. This argument is often referred to as the Argument from Innate Ideas. Descartes is sure that he has the idea of "a Being sovereignly perfect" and "it only remains to me to examine how I have obtained this idea. I have not acquired it through the senses, and it is never presented to me unexpect-

-
1. Caird, J. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 146.
 2. Paton, H. J. The Modern Predicament, p. 176.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 30.
 4. Paton, H. J. The Modern Predicament, p. 177.

edly, as sensible things are wont to be, when these act, or seem to act, on the external sense-organs. Nor is it a product or fiction of my mind; for it is not in my power to take from or add anything to it. Consequently the only alternative is to allow that it is innate in me, just as is the idea of myself."¹ This argument relies on an application to the realm of ideas of the principle that the less cannot give rise to the greater. An idea of a Perfect Being, Descartes argues could not be brought ^{into} being by an imperfect agency. But he himself is imperfect, as is shown by his state of doubt, which is inferior to knowledge. Hence there must really be a Perfect Being, who is the origin of this idea.² Iqbāl points out that "this argument is somewhat of the nature of the cosmological argument since it moves from effect to cause."³

Iqbāl's "working proof" for the existence of God.

According to Iqbal, the living God of the Qōr'ān is different from the purely intellectual God reached through the traditional arguments for the existence of God. The Ontological and Teleological arguments fail because "they look upon 'thought' as an agency working on things from without. This view of thought gives us a mere mechanic in the one case, and creates an unbridgeable gulf between the ideal and the real in the other."⁴ These arguments would acquire

1. Descartes, R. "Meditation III" in Descartes' Philosophical Writings (selected and translated by Smith, N. K. London, 1952, p. 229.
2. Urmson, J. O. (Editor) The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, London, 1960. p. 94.
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 30.
4. Ibid. p. 31.

life only if thought and being are shown to be ultimately one.¹ Iqbāl does not give an elaborate "proof" of the existence of God, the true and living God, but he establishes the basis for a working proof.²

According to Einstein, objective reality is not wholly independent of the act of knowledge. For the knower is intimately related to the object known, and the act of knowledge is a constitutive element in the objective reality. Thus in a sense, Einstein's theory confirms the idealistic position of Kant.³ In "Gulshan-e-Rāz-e-Jadīd" Iqbāl too denies the seeming absoluteness or independence of the objects of perception:

بروں از خویشی بی بینی جان را
دکھ دشت دیم و صحر اوکان را

جهانِ رنگ و بو گلده است، ما
زما آزاد و هم وابسته، ما

خودی اورا بیک تارِ ننگِ لبست

زمین و آسمان و هر و نه لبست

⁴ (Zabūr-e-'Ajām, p. 212)

1. Bausani, A. "Iqbāl Philosophy of Religion and the West" The Pākistān Quarterly, 1952. Volume II No. 3. p. 18.
2. Ibid.
3. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, pp 110-111.
4. You think you see the world outside yourself - these plains, Hills, forests, deserts, seas and mines?
But no, this world of smell and colour is a bouquet made by us:
Each flower self-existent, all collectively arrayed by us.
It is the self that binds it with the string of vision's unity,
Which makes the earth, the sky, the sun, the moon parts of one entity.
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, pp 5-6)

According to Iqbāl and the theory of relativity, then, the object known is relative to the observing self; its size and shape change as his position and speed change. "But whatever the position and speed of the observer, whatever his frame of reference, something must always remain which confronts him as his 'other'."¹ Iqbāl puts forward a question: Is there something absolute in what appears to us as objective reality? His answer is an unqualified "No". "We cannot construe ever-present externality to mean the total independence or absoluteness of what appears as external to the self. Such an interpretation would contradict the very principle which discloses its relativity. If, then, in view of the principle of relativity, the object confronting the subject is really relative, there must be some self to whom it ceases to exist as a confronting 'other'. This self must be non-spatial, non-temporal Absolute, to whom what is external to us must cease to exist as external. Without such an assumption objective reality cannot be relative to the spatial and temporal self. To the absolute Self, then, the Universe is not a reality confronting Him as His 'other'."² Royce Here Iqbāl's argument resembles that of Royce who first proves the existence of objective reality and then passes on to prove the existence of God.³ According to Royce, our experience

1. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 111.

2. Ibid. p. 112-112.

3. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 33.

is dependent upon our constitution and environment. We experience reality in fragments. "Every intelligent interpretation of an experience involves however, the appeal from this experienced fragment to some more organised whole of experience, in whose unity this fragment is conceived as ~~finding~~ finding its organic place."¹ Supposing we deny, says Royce, that there is any absolutely organised experience and insist on a fragmentary experience. Then the question will arise: "What Reality has this fact of the limitation and fragmentariness of the actual world of experiences? If every reality has to exist just in so far as there is experience of its existence, then the determination of the world of experience to be this world and no other, the fact that reality contains no other facts than these, is, as the supposed final reality, itself the object of one's experience, for which the fragmentariness of the finite world appears as a presented and absolute fact, beyond which no reality is to be viewed as ever genuinely possible. For this final experience, the conception of any possible experience beyond is known as an ungrounded conception, as an actual impossibility. But so, this final experience is by hypothesis forthwith defined as One, as all-inclusive, as determined by nothing beyond itself, as assured of the complete fulfilment of its own ideas concerning what is,

1. Royce, C. The Conception of God, London, 1898. p. 42.

- in brief, it becomes an absolute experience. The very effort to deny an absolute experience involves, then, the actual assertion of such an actual experience."¹ Thus there must be an Absolute Experience for which the conception of an absolute reality is fulfilled by the very contents that get presented to this Experience. "This Absolute Experience is related to our experience as an organic whole to its own fragments."²

Rashdall

According to Rashdall also, matter always implies mind.³ Space is made up of relations which would be meaningless apart from the mind which relates. "The relation between point A and point B is not in point A or point B taken by themselves. It is all in the 'between': 'between' from its very nature cannot exist in any one point of space or in several isolated points of space or thing in space, it must exist only in some one existent which holds together and connects these points."⁴ There can be no relatedness without mind, no space without relatedness and no matter without space. Therefore if matter exists, mind also exists.⁵ But it cannot exist merely for our sketchy experience. All the finite minds put together cannot comprehend the whole. Therefore if the

1. Royce, J. The Conception of God, pp 42-43.

2. Ibid, pp 43-44.

3. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the System of Iqbal, p. 34.

4. Rashdall, H. Philosophy and Religion, London 1924. p. 11.

5. Ibid. p. 11.

whole is to exist at all, there must be some one mind which knows the whole - that mind is, God.¹

James Ward James Ward's position also resembles that of Iqbāl.²

The experience of finite individuals is relative and cannot be absolute. But when we remove the relativity implied by individual standpoints, we reach an Absolute Experience, the centre of living and acting spirit, whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere, an experience which is complete and all inclusive.³ According to Ward, the world is

represented in its unity and entirety to God.⁴ "His is not a perspective view such as 'stand-point' implies nor is it a discursive view, such as our limited attention entails. God is ubiquitous and omni-continu^ative. There are no broken lights' in him: he alone can say 'I am that I am'."⁵

Green Iqbāl's position is also, in a sense, similar to that of Green who, following Kant's dictum that the synthetic unity of apperception is present in every act of knowing, concludes that a spiritual principle is implied in the consciousness of events.⁶ The act of self-perception is a synthesis of relations in consciousness which keeps distinct the self and the various parts of the object although it holds it together in the unity of the perceptual act.⁷ This spiritual principle

1. Rashdall, H. Philosophy and Religion, p. 17.
2. Khātūn, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in Iqbāl's Philosophic System, p. 35.
3. Ward, J. The Realm of Ends. Cambridge. 1912. p. 57.
4. Dār, B. A. Iqbāl and Post-Kantian Voluntarism, Lāhore. 1956, p. 366.
5. Ward, J. The Realm of Ends pp 477-478.
6. Khātūn, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 36.
7. Green, T. H. Prolegomena to Ethics, Oxford, 1890. pp 15-16.

is not the passive mind or the 'tabula rasa' conceived by Locke. It is a unifying relating principle which is the condition of all experience, not a precipitate of time but a living and permanent unity.¹

According to Green, man's knowledge of Nature is only an instance of the wider principle that consciousness is prerequisite to the existence of nature itself. By nature we mean "a system of unalterable relations." Now, any relation involves the familiar problem of unity in diversity. But the source of unity and connection cannot be inside nature, for nature is a process of change, and that which gives the world its permanent character cannot itself be subject to change. Intelligence, however, readily accomplishes that which in nature is inconceivable. A multiplicity of feelings and sense-impressions is ordered and unified at every moment of our experience. This is the way the world becomes one for each individual. But, since nature is obviously not dependant on particular human intellects for its existence, there must be a unifying factor prior to our finite minds. It must be the common source of the relations which constitute nature and our conception of it; and, "because the function which it must fulfil ... is one which, on however limited a scale, we ourselves exercise in the acquisition of experience, and exercise by means of such a consciousness", we are

1. Green, T. H. Prolegomena to Ethics, pp 15-16.

justified in concluding that it, too, is "a self-distinguishing consciousness"¹ This consciousness is God.

To sum up: We have seen that for various reasons Iqbāl rejects the traditional arguments for the existence of God. It is through intuitive experience that one attains knowledge of God, or Iqbāl's Ultimate Ego, who combines the Absolute of philosophy with the Person of theology. Since mystic experience is not 'communicable' and 'verifiable' in the common sense of these words, Iqbāl seeks to establish a basis for a "working proof" of God's existence. He agrees with Einstein's theory of relativity which does not destroy the objectivity of Nature but regards it as being relative to the experiencing mind. Iqbāl's ideas have also some similarity with those of Royce, Rashdall, Ward and Green.

NATURE AND GOD

We have seen that according to Iqbāl "the universe does not confront the Absolute Self in the same way as it confronts the human self."² It is a fleeting moment in the life of God. "It is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the Ultimate Self. Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self. In the picturesque phase of the Qurān it is the habit of Allāh."³

1. Green, T. H. Prolegomena to Ethics p. 683.

2. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 112.

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 56.

Nature is ego as event and act. "Reality", says Iqbāl, "is ... essentially spirit. But, of course, there are degrees of spirit ... I have conceived the Ultimate Reality as an Ego; and I must add now that from the Ultimate Ego only egos proceed. The creative energy of the Ultimate Ego, in whom deed and thought are identical, functions as ego-unities. The world, in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the 'Great I am'."¹

The Universe as finite but boundless.

Iqbāl supports Einstein's view that the universe is finite but boundless.² It is finite because it is a passing phase of God's extensively infinite consciousness, and boundless because the creative power of God is intensively infinite.³ Nature has no external limits, its only limit is the immanent self which creates and sustains the whole.⁴ According to Iqbāl the universe is liable to increase.⁵ He translates the Qōr'ānic words "Innā ilā rabbika al-muntahā" (53:43) as "And verily towards God is thy limit." Professor Bausani comments: "This is a good instance of a characteristic

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 71.

2. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 112.

3. Ibid.

4. Dār, B. A. Iqbāl's Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd and Bandagī Nāmāh, p. 27.

5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 68.

of Iqbāl, that of interpreting in modern terms some Qur'ānic passages which no doubt mean something else if literally translated. So here it seems that a literal translation would amount simply to say that every being's end is in God, a return to God. However, the metaphysical implications Iqbāl wants to find in the verse are in no wise, in my opinion, contrary to the spirit of Qur'ān."¹ Since Nature is organically related to the creative self, it can grow, and is consequently infinite in the sense that none of its limits is final - nature is organically finite only towards the innermost essence of God.² Iqbāl expresses this thought thus in "Gulshan-e-Rāz-e-Jadīd"

حقیقت لادال و لامکان است
مگو دیگر که عالم بے کران است
کرانِ او درون است و بیرون نیست
درونش لیت بالا کم فزون نیست

³
(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 216)

Pantheism and Deism

The relation of the Ultimate Ego to the finite ego may be conceived in several ways. For instant the Ultimate Ego may be regarded as the sole reality absorbing all the finite

1. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl" p. 162.
2. Ibid.
3. Reality is beyond time and space,
Don't say any more that the universe is without a limit.
Its limit is internal, not external,
There are no distinctions of low and high, more or less,
in its internal aspect
(Translation by Dār, B. A. Iqbāl's Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd and Bandagī Namah, p. 23.

egos, or as holding the finite egos within His own Self without obliterating their individuality, or as existing apart from finite egos.¹ The first of the afore-mentioned positions is rooted in pantheism even though it attributes personality to Ultimate Reality. It is an advance on those pantheistic modes of thought which regard the ultimate nature of Reality as being impersonal in character e.g., light, or force.² However, it negates the individuality of the finite egos. Professor Sharīf points out that in the first period of his thought, extending from 1901 to about 1908, Iqbāl's writing had a pantheistic tinge. "God is universal and all-inclusive like the ocean, and the individual is like a drop. Again, God is like the sun and the individual is like a candle, and the candle ceases to burn in the presence of the sun. Like a bubble or a spark, life is transitory - nay, the whole of existence is transitory."³

The first part of Bāng-e-Darā contains several poems referring to the doctrine of the immanence of God ("waḥdat-al-wujūd"). Nature from being the Word of God becomes God. God's immanence is described thus:

وہی اک سن سے لیکن نظر آتا ہے ہر شے میں

⁴
(Bāng-e-Darā, p. 71)

1. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, pp 80-81.
2. Ibid. p. 81.
3. Sharīf, M. M. About Iqbāl and His Thought, Lāhore, 1964 p.11
4. Beauty is One though it is seen in all things.

At this stage, Iqbāl's God is Beauty rather than Love and the same Beauty manifests itself in all things:

حسنِ ازل کی پیدا ہر چیز میں مہلک ہے
 انسان میں وہ سخن ہے، غنچے میں وہ جگمگ ہے
 کترت میں ہو گیا ہے وحدت کا راز مخفی
 گلشن میں جو جگمگ ہے، وہ بھول میں لگ ہے

¹
 (Bāng-e-Darā, p. 88)

This idea is delicately expressed at one place when the poet refers to the 'promise' of God to reveal Himself on the Day of Judgment. Since God is visible in everything, the asks:

دیکھنے والے پاں بھی دیکھ لیتے ہیں تجھے
 پھر یہ وعدہ حشر کا صبر آزمائے بونگر ہوا

²
 (Bāng-e-Darā, p. 101)

In 'sham'ā' (The Candle) Iqbāl states the doctrine of 'waḥdat-al-wujūd' in much the same way as Ibn 'Arabī might have done i.e. he makes the beloved identical with the lover, since he considers the relation between the world and God as one of identity.³

1. Visible in everything is Beauty everlasting,
 It is speech in Man and a sparkle in the bud.
 The secret of One has become hidden in the Many,
 The fire-fly's glow is the flower's scent.
2. Those who have sight can see you even here,
 How then is the Promise of the Last Day a test of patience?
3. Fārūqī, B. A. The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawḥīd,
 Lāhore, 1940, p. 91.

صیاد آبِ حلقہٴ دایمِ ستم بھی آپ

¹
(Bāng-e-Darā, p. 32)

Iqbāl's position here resembles that of Gālib:²

اصل شہود و شاہد و مشہود ایک ہے

جہاں ہوں میر متاھدہ ہے کس حساب میں ³

Iqbāl's pantheistic ideas derive from Plato's conception of God as Eternal Beauty which is manifest in all things.

"This Platonic conception, as interpreted by Plotinus, adopted by the early Muslim scholastics and adapted to pantheism by the pantheistic mystics, came down to Iqbāl as a long tradition in Persian and Urdū poetry, and was supplemented by his study of the English romantic poets".⁴

Iqbāl, however, soon outgrew his pantheism. His old teacher at Cambridge, McTaggart wrote to him on reading Nicholson's translation of Asrār-e-Khudī, "Have you not changed your position very much? Surely, in the days when we used to talk philosophy together, you were much more of a pantheist and mystic."⁵ This is a very illuminating remark.

1. The hunter and the object of the hunt are the same.

2. Dīwān-e-Gālib Lāhore (Tāj Company Edition) p. 99.

3. The object, witness and witnessing is all the same thing, I'm wonderstruck what, then, can 'vision' mean?

4. Sharīf, M. M. About Iqbāl and His Thought, p. 11.

5. McTaggart quoted by Iqbāl in Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 118.

For Iqbāl, in his later thought, the relation of the finite to Infinite Ego is one in which "true infinite does not exclude the finite," but rather "embraces the finite without effacing its finitude and explains and justifies its being."¹ "It is clear", says Professor Whittemore, "that Iqbāl does not intend that the Infinite be regarded merely as an abstract totality of finites."² Iqbāl's doctrine is not pantheism (meaning by this term the doctrine that the world is identical with God). This is confirmed by the fact that nowhere in his philosophy does Iqbāl refer to God in terms of featureless totality.³ Referring to Farnell's view on the attributes of God, Iqbāl remarks that the history of religious thought discloses various ways of escape from an individualistic conception of the ultimate Reality which is conceived as some vague, vast, and pervasive cosmic element, such as light. This is the view that Farnell has taken ... I agree that the history of religion reveals modes of thought that tend towards pantheism; but I venture to think that in so far as the Qurānic identification of God with light is concerned Farnell's view is incorrect ... Personally, I think the description of God as light, in the revealed literature of Judaism, Christianity and Islām, must now be interpreted differently ...

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 29.
 2. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 71.
 3. Ibid, pp. 71-72.

The metaphor of light as applied to God ... must, in view of modern knowledge, be taken to suggest the Absoluteness of God and not His Omnipresence which easily lends itself to pantheistic interpretation."¹ Iqbāl always refers to God in terms such "Ultimate Ego", "Creative Self," "Ommipsyche" and to the finite in terms of egos or selves. "The reference is always plural. Even in his doctrine of transformation (transmutation) Iqbāl is at pains to stress his conviction that the individual is neither in time nor eternity lost in God."² On Iqbāl's words, "the end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it."³

Iqbāl rejects deism, the view that the world is separate from God. Outside of God there is nothing, so deism is meaningless.⁴ Neo-Platonic ideas resembling the Buddhist Vedantas culminated in the famous doctrine of Monism. This doctrine preached the belief in an immanent God and considered the world as a mere incarnation. It substituted pantheistic deism for the personal and transcendent God of the Qōr'ān, and led to the blossoming of pseudo-mysticism.⁵ Iqbāl attached Monism on practical ground also. For him

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 63-64.
2. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 72.
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 198.
4. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 72.
5. Maitre, L. C. Introduction to the Thought of Iqbāl (Translated by Dār, M. A. M.) pp 6-7.

"all life is individual; there is no such thing as universal life."¹

Panentheism.

Iqbāl's view is panentheistic, panentheism being the doctrine that the world is not identical with God, nor separate from God, but in God, who in His divine nature transcends it. Iqbāl's view is panentheistic because "according to it God as individual, while not other than that universe which is His physical being, is more than the sum of egos and sub-egos of which this universe is composed."²

The relation of the Ultimate Ego to the finite egos in Iqbāl's philosophy has been summarised thus: "the Ultimate Ego holds the finite egos in His own Being without obliterating their existence. The Ultimate Reality must be regarded as of the nature of the self. But further this self does not lie apart from the universe, as if separated by a space lying between Him and ourselves. The Ultimate Self, therefore is not transcendent, as is conceived by the anthropomorphic theists. He is immanent, for He comprehends and encompasses the whole universe. But he is not immanent in the sense of the pantheists of the traditional type, because He is a personal and not an impersonal reality ... He is, in short, immanent and transcendent both, and yet neither the one nor the other. Both immanence and transcendence are

-
1. Iqbāl quoted by Nicholson, R. A. in Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. XVII.
 2. Whittmore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 72.

true of the Ultimate Reality. But Iqbāl emphasizes the transcendence of the Ultimate Ego rather than His immanence".¹

In his rejection of the doctrine of unityism or 'waḥdat-al-wujūd' Iqbāl was deeply influenced by Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindī, also known as Mujaddid-e-Alf-e-Sānī. In a letter written in 1917 Iqbāl said "I have very great respect in my heart for Mujaddid Sirhind."² Like Iqbāl, the Mujaddid passed through 'wujūdiyyat' or unityism and reached 'abdiyyat' or servitude.³ The Mujaddid stressed the transcendence of God. "He is beyond all 'shuyūn-o-i'tibārāt' or modes and relations, all 'zuhūr-o-buṭūn' or externalisation and internalization, beyond all 'burūz-o-kumūn' or projection and introjection, beyond all 'mawṣūl-o-mafṣūl' or realisable and explicable, beyond all 'kashf-o-shuhūd' or mystic intuition and experience; may even beyond all 'maḥsūs-o-ma'qūl', empirical and rational, and beyond all 'mawhūm-o-mutakhayal' or conceivable and imaginable ... He the Holy One is beyond the Beyond, again beyond the Beyond, again beyond the Beyond."⁴

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD.

Personality: For Iqbāl the ultimate ground^{of} all experience is a rationally directed will or an ego. He points out that

1. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, pp 85-86.
2. Letter to Nadvi, S. S. quoted in Aḥmad, M. M. "'Allāma Iqbāl and Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Sānī" Iqbāl Review January 1964. pp 112-113.
3. Fārūqī, B. A. The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhīd. p. 118.
4. Ibid. pp 119-120.

in order to emphasise the individuality of the Ultimate Ego, the Q̣or'ān gives Him the proper name of Allāh.¹ As Bergson has stated in Creative Evolution individuality is a matter of degrees and is not fully realised even in the case of a human being.² "In particular, it may be said of individuality," says Bergson, "that, while the tendency to individuate in³ everywhere opposed by the tendency towards reproduction. For the individuality to be perfect, it would be necessary that no detached part of the organism could live separately. But then reproduction would be impossible. For what is reproduction, but the building up of a new organism with a detached fragment of the old? Individuality therefore harbours its enemy at home."³ According to Iqbāl, the perfect individual - God, cannot be conceived as harbouring its own enemy at home, and must therefore be regarded as a superior to the antagonistic tendency of reproduction.⁴ "This characteristic of the perfect ego is one of the most essential elements in the Qurānic conception of God; and the Qurān mentions it over and over again, not so much with a view to attack the current Christian conception as to accentuate its own view of a perfect individual."⁵

Iqbāl refers to the Q̣or'ānic verse which identifies God with light: "God is the light of heaven and earth: the

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.62.

2. Ibid.

3. Bergson, H. Creative Evolution, p.14.

4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 62-63.

5. Ibid. p.63.

similitude of his light is as a niche in a wall, wherein a lamp is placed, and the lamp enclosed in a case of glass, the glass appears as it were a shining star."(24:35)¹ We have already noted that Iqbāl denies the pantheistic interpretation of this verse. He uses this verse to support his own personalistic conception of God as the Absolute. "No doubt," says Iqbāl, "the opening sentence of the verse gives the impression of an escape from an individualistic conception of God. But when we follow the metaphor of light in the rest of the verse, it gives just the opposite impression. The development of the metaphor is meant rather to exclude the suggestion of a formless cosmic element by centralizing the light in a flame which is further individualized by its encasement in a glass likened unto a well-defined star."² In "Gulshan-e-Rāz-e-Jadīd" Iqbāl writes:

مَجْمُوعِ مَطْلُوقِ دَرِیْنِ دَیْرِ مَكَانَاتِ
 كِهْ مَطْلُوقِ نِیْتِ جِزْ نُورِ السَّمَوَاتِ

³
 (Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 215)

Professor Schimmel refers to the Naqshbandī mystic Khwāja Mīr Dard of Delhī (1720-1784) who reached the conclusion that the metaphor of light for God suggests both Absolutism and Omnipresence which covers both transcendentalism and all-

-
1. Sale, G. Translation of The Korān, p. 267.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 63.
 4. Do not seek the Absolute in the monastery of the world,
 For nothing is Absolute but the Light of the Heavens.

immanency of the Supreme Being.¹

For Iqbāl then, God is a Person. He is an ego also because He responds to our reflection and our prayer; for the real test of a self is whether it responds to the call of another self.² Iqbāl, however refutes the charge of anthropomorphism: "Ultimate Reality," he says, "is a rationally directed creative life. To interpret this life as a personality is not to fashion God after the image of man. It is only to accept the simple fact of experience that life is not a formless fluid but an organizing principle of unity - a synthetic activity which holds together and focalizes the dispersing dispositions of the living organism for a creative purpose."³

Infinity. Iqbāl, thus, conceives of God as a Person. The question then arises: does not individuality imply finitude? According to Iqbāl, "God cannot be conceived as infinite in the sense of spatial infinity. In matters of spiritual valuation mere immensity counts for nothing."⁴ True infinity does not mean infinite extension which cannot be conceived without embracing all available finite extensions. Its nature consists in intensity and not extensity. "The ultimate limit," says Iqbāl, "is sought not in the directions of stars, but in an infinite cosmic life and spirituality."⁵

1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 100.

2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 19.

3. Ibid. pp 60-61.

4. Ibid. p. 64.

5. Ibid. p. 132.

In contrast to the classical conception of God, Iqbāl emphasizes the idea of a changing God.¹ For him "the infinity of the Ultimate Ego consists in infinite inner possibilities of his creative activity of which the universe as known to us, is only a partial expression. In one word, God's infinity is intensive, not extensive. It involves an infinite series, but is not that series."² Iqbāl writes:

دردکش خالی از مالاد زیراست

ولے بردن اود سعت بدیراست

³
(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 216)

Creativeness. Iqbāl's universe is dynamic. The Ultimate Ego is essentially creative. By means of His Creativeness, He affirms His Reality. God is not a mere contriver working on something given. Iqbāl believes that God created the world out of Himself. In orthodox Islāmic theology, however, creation always means creation ex nihilo.⁴ Professor Whittemore observes "On this point it may well be that Iqbāl has reconstructed Islāmic religious thought somewhat more extensively than the original architects would care to acknowledge."⁵

Iqbāl points out that we are apt "to regard the act of creation as a specific past event, and the universe appears to

1. Bausani, A. "Iqbāl's Philosophy of Religion, and the West" p. 18.
2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 64.
3. His inside is void of Up and Down,
But His outside is accepting Space.
(Translation by Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing. p. 99.)
4. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 99.
5. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 73.

us as a manufactured article ... Thus regarded the universe is a mere accident in the life of God and might not have been created ... from the Divine point of view, there is no creation in the sense of a specific event having a 'before' and an 'after'"¹ Creation is a continuous and continuing process in time

ظہیر تائیں کاروان وجود
کہ ہر لحظہ تازہ ہے شان وجود

²
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 171.)

Professor Bausani states that in Muslim thought, utmost importance has always been given to creation, even going so far as to consider human acts as created in order to save the idea of the absolute creativeness of God. The Ash'arites, in order to abolish the Aristotelian "causae secundae" which could compromise the freedom of the creative act of God, elaborated the theory of atomism. According to the Ash'arites, the world is composed of 'jawāhīr' - infinitely small parts or atoms which are indivisible. The essence of the atom is independent of its existence i.e. existence is a quality imposed on the atom by God. Before receiving this quality, the atom lies dormant. Since the creative activity of God is ceaseless, fresh atoms come to being every moment and

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 65.
 2. The caravan of being does not stop,
For every instant there is a new phase of God's Being.
 3. Bausani, A. "Iqbāl's Philosophy of Religion and the West"
p. 19.
 4. Ibid.

therefore the universe is constantly growing.¹ Iqbāl too, as we have seen, believes in a growing universe, but unlike the Ash'arites, he thinks that the universe changes not "in an atomistic development moving from point to point but in a never ceasing organic movement in the Divine Ego itself. This is proved, for the philosopher poet, by the Qur'ānic attestation^{God} 'increases' (Sūra 35:1) which hints at the ever fresh possibilities that may emerge from the fathomless depths of the intensive Divine life and be manifested in the created serial time.² In a well-known couplet, Iqbāl says

یہ کائنات ابھی نا تمام ہے شاید
کہ آدھی ہے دما دم صدائے کن فیکوں ا

³
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 44)

and in a letter to Professor Nicholson, "the universe is not a completed act: it is still in the course of formation."⁴

Opposing the Ash'arites' ideas on substance and creation, Iqbāl points out that "they used the word substance or atom with a vague implication of extennality; but their criticism, actuated by a pious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, reduced the Universe to a mere show of ordered

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 68-70.

2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing. p. 100.

3. Perhaps this universe is still incomplete,

For each instant there can be heard the cry of "Be, and
it came into being."

4. Iqbāl quoted by Nicholson, R. A. Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. xvii.

subjectivities which, as they maintained like Berkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the Will of God."¹

Knowledge: The Ultimate Ego is omniscient. In the case of finite beings, knowledge even if extended to the point of omniscience, must always remain relative to the confronting 'other', and cannot, therefore, be predicated of the Ultimate Ego who, being all-inclusive, cannot be conceived as having a perspective like the finite ego.² Discursive knowledge cannot be predicated of an ego who knows and who also forms the ground of the object known.

For Iqbāl omniscience does not, however, mean a single indivisible act of perception which makes God immediately aware of the entire sweep of history, regarded as an order of specific events, in an eternal 'now'. Dāwānī, 'Irāqī and Royce conceive of God's knowledge in this way.³ Iqbāl observes, "there is an element of truth in this conception. But it suggests a closed universe, a fixed futurity, a pre-determined, unalterable order of specific events which, like a superior fate, has once for all determined the directions of God's creative activity."⁴ Divine knowledge is not "passive omniscience" but "a living creative activity to which the objects that appear to exist in their own right are organically related."⁵ If God's knowledge is conceived as a

1. The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, p. 57.

2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 77.

3. Ibid. p. 78.

4. Ibid. p. 78

5. Ibid. pp 78-79.

kind of a mirror reflecting preordained events, there is no room left for initiative and free creativeness. "We must, therefore, conceive of His knowledge as a perfectly self-conscious, living, creative activity - an activity in which knowing and creating are one."¹

Omnipotence Iqbāl points out that omnipotence, abstractly conceived, is merely a blind, capricious power without limits. The Qōr'ān finds Divine omnipotence closely related to Divine wisdom, and finds God's power revealed, not in the arbitrary and the capricious, but in the recurrent, the regular and the orderly. Simultaneously, the Qōr'ān conceives of God as holding all goodness in His Hands.² "If, then, the rationally directed Divine will is good," then, asks Iqbāl, "how is it ... possible to reconcile the goodness' and omnipotence of God with the immense volume of evil in His creation. The painful problem is really the crux of Theism."³ Iqbāl wonders if, with Browning, one is to regard God as all-good, or, with Schopenhauer as all evil.⁴ According to Iqbāl sin or evil is not something which hangs over mankind as a curse. It is looked upon as a challenge. It is the presence of evil which makes us recognise good, and acts as a whetstone for the development of personality. Iqbāl's point resembles that of William James⁵ (as indeed he intends that

1. Sharīf, M. M. About Iqbāl and His Thought, p. 22.

2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 80.

3. Ibid. pp 80-81.

4. Sharīf, M. M. About Iqbāl and His Thought, p. 21.

5. James, W. Pragmatism, London, 1910 especially pp 165-194.

it should since he adapts James's language to his purposes).¹ "The teaching of the Qurān, which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism, which recognises a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man's eventual victory over evil."² Professor Bausani points out that in Iqbāl's conception of a continuously creative God there "lies also hidden a new solution of the old problem, the crux of theism, i.e. the problem of Evil. Nature is neither bad nor good in itself, it is one of the first exercises of God."³ As the Qur'ān says: "Say, Go through the earth, and see how he originally produceth creatures: afterwards will God reproduce another production" (29: 19)⁴

Eternity. God is eternal but not so in the sense in which a thing is supposed to last for all time. This implies a wrong view of time making it external to Him.⁵ Iqbāl's God is a changing God but change does not mean serial change. God lives both in eternity and in serial time. To Iqbāl the former means non-successional change, while the latter is organically related to eternity in so far as it is a measure of non-successional change. "In this sense alone it is

-
1. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 76.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 81.
 3. Bausani, A. "Iqbāl's Philosophy of Religion, and the West" p. 18.
 4. Sale, G. Translation of The Korān, p. 298.
 5. Sharīf, M. M. About Iqbāl and His Thought. p. 23.

possible," says Iqbāl "to understand the Qurānic verse: 'To God belongs the alternation of day and night.' (23:82)."¹

THE UNIVERSE AND TELEOLOGY

According to Iqbāl, the movement of the universe has a purpose. He disagrees with Nietzsche who "recognises no spiritual purpose in the universe. To him there is no ethical purpose resident in the forces of history. Virtue, Justice, Duty, Love all are meaningless terms to him. The process of history is determined purely by economical forces and the only principle that governs is 'Might is Right.'"²

Iqbāl considers Reality to be an ego-determined, ego-inspired flux within which purposes are at work. There are finite purposes when the determining egos are finite, but there is also a supreme purpose of which the Arch-Ego is the author - this Purpose is the development and perfection of ego, till they, on their finite scale, approximate to Deity.³ As Iqbāl says:

تعمیر خودی میں سے خدائی

⁴
(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 79)

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām.
2. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 242.
3. Hamīd, K. A. "Iqbāl's Philosophy of the Human Ego". The Visvabhāratī Quarterly (New Series) February-April 1944 Volume 9 Part I. pp 301-303.
4. Godhead lies in the building up of Selfhood.

The Universe is in its nature, teleological, not in the sense of mechanism which repudiates the idea of free activity but in the sense that the world has been created for a purpose.¹ As the Q̣or'ān says: "We have not created the heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, by way of sport: We have created them no otherwise than in truth" (Sūra 44:38)²

According to Iqbāl, the movement of the Universe is a genuinely creative movement which is not to be understood as being cyclic in which the end shall necessarily return to its starting point as in Greek philosophy. Whatever be the criterion by which to judge the forward steps of a creative movement, if it is conceived as cyclic, it ceases to be creative.³

Iqbāl does not believe that the universe is moving towards a fixed destiny. "To endow the world process with purpose in this sense is to rob it of its originality and its creative character. Its ends are termination of a career; they are ends to come and not necessarily premeditated."⁴ Iqbāl believes in 'immanent' teleology which may be said to be at work in the creative activity of an artist. A writer's actual work is not to be taken as a mere transcribing of a pre-existent vision into words. The vision does not "pre-exist" save in a very vague sense, but comes into existence while the technical and physical work of painting or writing goes on. The artist starts

-
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing p. 311.
 2. Sale, G. (translation of) The Korān, p. 368.
 3. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbāl" p. 167.
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 55.

with a tentative plan in mind but as the work develops it begins to have a life of its own and often the artist finds himself deviating from his original plan. The artist does have a purpose in that he wishes to create something, but the actual creation is not a pre-determined product.¹ The Universe, or the analogy of our Self, is of a free, creative character. It is an organic unity of thought, life and purpose.² It is "gradually travelling from chaos to cosmos,"³ and is not "chaotic, false, cruel, contradictory and seductive"⁴ as Nietzsche thought. It has both a reason and a plan but the end like an ever-receding shore will forever remain in the future. "There is, therefore, no final state to the universe. It is a constantly progressing, self-generating and self-evolving universe, whose inner possibilities of growth and evolution will never know any limits."⁵

-
1. Dār, B. A. Post-Kantian Voluntarism, p. 217.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 55.
 3. Iqbāl quoted by Nicholson, R. A. in Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. xvii.
 4. Nietzsche quoted by Enver, I. H. in Metaphysics of Iqbāl, p. 75.
 5. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, p. 75.

CHAPTER V.

THE SELF IN IQBĀL'S THOUGHTTHE SELF: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION

Since times immemorial philosophers have asked questions regarding the origin of Man. Sometimes he is looked upon as a being created by God who fell from a state of bliss due to an act of disobedience, sometimes, as Darwin postulated,¹ as a creature who developed like all living organisms over the course of aeons, from a common primitive germ.

Creation. Iqbāl refers to the Qōr'ānic description of the birth of Man. The process may be stated thus:² man is created for a certain appointed period of time (Sūra 6:2), growing gradually from the earth (Sūra 32 : 7, 55 : 14), from an extract of certain elements of the earth (Sūra 6:2, 22:5), then by receiving nourishment (Sūra 17:70), being endowed with life and made up of water (Sūra 21 : 30) and black mud (Sūra 15: 26) or plastic clay (Sūra 37 : 11), moulded into shape in due proportions (Sūra 15 : 26) as a life-germ, a clot of congealed blood (Sūra 96 : 2) growing into a lump of flesh, and further developing into bones clothed with flesh and finally emerging as a new creation

-
1. McKenzie, A.E.E. The Major Achievements of Science, Cambridge, 1961. Volume I, p. 200.
 2. Sharīf, M. M. "The Philosophical Teaching of the Qurān" in A History of Muslim Philosophy (Edited by Sharīf, M.M.) Wiesbaden, 1963, Volume I, p. 145.

(Sūra 23:14)

Thus we find in the Qōr'ān explicit statements to the effect that man owes his existence to God. He is created by God from matter and moulded by Him as clay is moulded by the potter.¹ He is created from blood and therefore is a living creature, since in all Semitic thought, blood represents the principle of life.² If man has been created by God, then some questions arise, namely, regarding his appearance on earth, and how the theory of evolution applies to his emergence.

The Fall of Man. Iqbāl points out that according to the Qōr'ān, the earth is the 'dwelling-place' of man and a 'source of profit to him' and that he is not a stranger to it.³ Man's first appearance on earth is not as the result of the Fall.⁴ Iqbāl does not think that having been created by God, Man was placed in a supersensual paradise from whence he fell on earth. The 'Jannat' (Garden) from which Man was expelled is not regarded by Iqbāl as the Heaven which is the eternal abode of the righteous, "the reward of those who keep their duty" (Sūra 13:35)⁵ since the very first event which took place there was an act of

-
1. Smith, H.B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" The Muslim World July-October 1954, volume XLIV, numbers 3 and 4.
 2. Smith, H.B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" p. 203.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 84.
 4. Ibid. p. 85.
 5. Pickthall, H. M. The Meaning of the Glorious Korān, New York, 1960, p. 85.

disobedience. Iqbāl regards the 'Jannat' associated with the Fall of Man as "a primitive state in which Man is practically unrelated to his environments and consequently does not feel the sting of human wants."¹ It is a state of effortless bliss, which a Promethean like Iqbāl could relish no more than Milton could.

According to Iqbāl, the purpose of the Qōr'ānic narration is ^{not} historical, i.e., it does not refer to a particular event which took place at a particular time. The 'Adam' of the legend is a concept rather than an individual.² (Iqbāl points out that the Qōr'ān uses the word 'Bashar' or 'Insān' for Man, and uses 'Adam' only to designate Man in his capacity as God's vicegerent on earth³) Thus by 'Adam' is meant Man "who has become self-conscious, civilized and able to bear the burden of moral and spiritual responsibility which has been laid upon him from the very beginning of his existence, but the ability to bear which became manifest only when 'Insān' reached the stage of 'Adam'."⁴ Adam's story, is therefore, not the history of the first man, but the ethical experience, in symbolic form, of every man.⁵

Emergence. For Iqbāl evolution is a fact.⁶ He says:

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 84.

2. Ibid. p. 83.

3. Ibid.

4. Khātūn, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 118.

5. Dār, B. A. Qurānic Ethics, Lāhore, 1960, p. 38.

6. Rafiuddin, M. "Iqbāl's Idea of the Self" Iqbāl Review October 1963, volume IV, No. 3. p. 7.

جو مطرت می تراشد بیکرے را
تماستی کی کدو دور گارے

¹(Payām-e-Mashriq p. 88)

He seeks support for the evolutionary theory not only in the Qōr'ān but also in the history of Muslim philosophy. Jahiz had hinted at the evolutionary process, and the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān-al-Ṣafā) had believed that the process of evolution advanced from the mineral to the human stage being directed or prompted by the inner spiritual yearning for a return to God.² Iqbāl has devoted considerable attention to the theory of evolution as stated by Ibn-e-Miskawaih.³ Miskawaih's theory is basically the same as that of the Brethren of Purity.⁴ According to Miskawaih evolution consists of four stages: the mineral, the vegetable, the animal and the human. Coral, date-palm and ape, mark the transition from the mineral to the vegetable, from the vegetable to the animal, and from the animal to the human kingdom respectively.⁵

Iqbāl's view of evolution has been greatly influenced

-
1. When Nature carves a figure,
It takes a period of time to complete it.
 2. Rasā'il Ikhwān-al-Ṣafā. Egypt. 1928, Volume IV, pp 314-319.
 3. The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, p. 29; also The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 121, pp 133-134.
 4. Badaw, A. "Miskawaih" in A History of Muslim Philosophy, Volume I, p. 472.
 5. Ibid. p. 472.

by Rūmī whose ideas on the subject were a message of hope and joy and did not bring the gloom and despair which came in the wake of Darwin's theory.¹ For Rūmī the lowest form of life is matter but matter is not dead or inert:

باد و خاک و آب و آتش بنده اند

با من و تو مرده ما حق رنده اند 2

According to Rūmī, the self originated in the form of matter consisting of dimly-conscious monads. Rūmī's theory is stated thus:

دو سجده‌ای در نباتی اوفتاد	آمده اهل ما قلمیم حماد
و از سجده‌ای یاد ندادد از نبرد	سالمنا اندر نباتی عمر کرد
ما مدتش حال سانی بیج یاد	و ز نباتی چون بحیوان اوفتاد
خاصه در وقت بهار و صحران	تزهان میلی که دارد سوی آن

3 (continued on p 231)

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 121-122.
2. Rūmī, J. Maghawī-e-Ma'nawī (edited by Furūzānfar, B. and Darvīsh, M.) Tehran, 1963. Book I, p. 53.
Air and Earth and Fire are slaves,
For you and I they are dead, but not for God.
3. First man appeared in the class of inorganic things
Next he passed therefrom into that of plants.
For years he lived on as one of the plants,
Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different;
And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state,
He had no remembrance of his state as a plant,
Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants,
Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers;

سز میل بود نداند در لبان
 میکنند آن خالق که داشتین
 تا سندان کون عاقل دانا در رفت
 هم ازین عقلتی تحول کرد نیست

همچو میل کودکان بامادران
 باز از حیوان سوی السامین
 همچنین اقلیم تا اقلیم رفت
 عقلمای اولیتس یاد نیست

(Maṣnawī - e. Ma'nawī Book IV pp 173-174)

For Iqbāl, as for Ibn Miskawaih and Rūmī, God is the ultimate source and ground of evolution.¹ We have seen that for Iqbāl matter is not something dead because from the Ultimate Ego only egos proceed:

فریزد حد خودی از بر تو او
 نخبیزد جز گرا در دوا او

²(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 224)

Man is a spiritual reality. In a sense he exists eternally as a possibility of God's creative activity. In "Lāla²e-Tūr" Iqbāl writes

Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers,
 Which knew not the cause of their inclination to the breast.
 Again the great Creator, as you know,
 Drew men out of the animal state into the human state.
 Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,
 Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now.
 Of his first souls he has now no remembrance,
 And he will be again changed from his present soul.
 (Translation by Iqbāl, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 121-122).

1. Khātōn, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 121.
2. From its ray nothing comes into being save egos,
 From its sea, nothing appears save pearls.
 (Translation by Ḍār, B.A. Iqbāl's Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd and Bandagī Nāmāh, p. 36).

ذآعادِ خودی کس را خبر نیست
 خودی در حلقهٔ شام و سحر نیست
 در خفا این نکتهٔ مادر شنیدم
 که کرار موجِ خودِ دیرینه تر نیست

¹(Payām-e-Mashriq p. 64)

But although, as we have pointed out, in one sense the ego is eternal, it emerges within the spatio-temporal order due to the realization of the Divine possibility through the evolutionary process.² The Ultimate Ego is immanent in matter and makes the emergent emerge out of it. There are various levels of being or grades of consciousness. The rising note of egohood culminates in man.³

According to the Qōr'ān, in one sense, Man is of the earth, yet he is also divine in that God has breathed His own spirit into him (Sūra 32:9). Following this, Iqbāl believes, on the one hand, the divine creation of Man and, on the other, the principle that Man has evolved from matter. It is possible to do this because in his thought there is no impassable gulf between matter and spirit.

For him matter is "endowed with such intrinsic powers that

-
1. The origins of Selfhood no man knows,
 To dawn and eve no fellowship it owes.
 I heard this wisdom from the Heavenly Guide:
 "Not older than its wave the ocean flows."
 (Translation by Arberry, A.J. The Tulip of Sinai, p. 22)
 2. Khātoōn, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, pp 114-115.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 71-72.

we should see 'spirit' sleeping in matter, awakening in plants, awake in animals, self-conscious in man."¹

Iqbāl writes:

تو ہے بیدار الساں میں وہ گری بند سونا ہے
شکر میں، بھول میں، حیواں میں، بھر میں، ستارے میں

²(Bāng-e-Darā p. 143)

Rejection of Mechanistic Interpretation of Evolution.

Iqbāl rejects, as Bergson did, the mechanistic views of biological evolution which began with Charles Darwin.³

Darwin had explained evolution as the mechanical operation of natural selection on variations arising apparently, by chance.⁴ A writer points out that natural selection cannot account for all organic evolution. "'Natural selection' is an unfortunate and most misleading word, and sounds as if Nature did this or that by a deliberate act of choice. — Natural selection does nothing, produces nothing. Its effect is purely negative. All it means is that in the struggle for existence the weak go to the wall and do not survive... 'Natural Selection' can be called the 'occasion' or 'condition' of organic evolution,

1. Cohu, J. R. Vital Problems of Religion. Edinburgh, 1914, p.41.
2. That which is conscious in Man, sleeps a deep sleep in trees, flowers, animals, stones and stars.
3. Ahmad, A. "Sources of Iqbāl's Perfect Man" Iqbāl, July 1958, Volume VII, No.1, p. 9.
4. McKenzie, A.E.E. The Major Achievements of Science, Volume I, p. 216.

but certainly not its cause. All plant and animal variations are due to inherent energy in the organisms themselves.¹ Iqbāl does not believe in "the blind and dreary mechanism of struggle and destruction"² described by Darwin and Spencer.

Iqbāl considers the concepts employed by mechanists to be inadequate for the analysis of life. For instance mechanical causality cannot explain self-maintenance and reproduction³ nor can it explain the emergence of the intellect from matter - a view necessitated by the application of physical concepts to life.⁴ The word "epiphenomenon" was coined by T. H Huxley to express his idea that consciousness is a one-sided phenomenon, a by-product or concomitant of organization, an effect possessing in itself no efficiency.⁵ According to Iqbāl, to describe life as "an epi-phēnomenon of the processes of matter is to deny it as an independent activity, and to deny it as an independent activity is to deny the validity of all knowledge which is only a systematized expression of consciousness."⁶

Iqbāl, then, rejects Darwinism which forces into the strait jacket of physical concepts the dynamic processes of

-
1. Coahu, J. R. Vital Problems of Religion, pp 52-53.
 2. Durant, W. The Story of Philosophy, New York, 1933, p.343.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 43-44.
 4. Ibid. pp 44-45.
 5. Carr, H. W. The Unique Status of Man, London, 1928, p. 134.
 6. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 40-41.

life and by stressing that the future is determined completely by the past, repudiates the duration, freedom and creation which are found in real life.¹ Furthermore it throws no light on the ultimate nature of reality² and does not admit the existence of a goal towards which evolution is progressing.

Iqbāl believes in the "factual wholeness" of life described by the German biologist Driesch³ who maintains that there is an internal regulating principle within the organism which shapes it in the interest of the whole, guiding and moulding its purpose.⁴ This principle is interested not only in the development of the individual organism but in the development and evolution of life as a whole. Consciousness in all its phases of development and adaptation "possesses a career which is unthinkable in the case of a machine."⁵ To say that it possesses a career means that the sources of its activity cannot be understood save with reference to its remote past the origin of which lies in that spiritual reality which reveals itself in spatial experience but cannot be discovered by an analysis of it. In other words, it would seem that "life

1. Magill, F. N. (Editor) The Masterpieces of World Philosophy p. 769.

2. Khātoōn, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 122.

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 44.

4. Refiuddin, M. "Iqbāl's Idea of the Self", p. 11.

5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 44.

is foundational and anterior to the routine of physical and chemical processes which must be regarded as a kind of fixed behaviour formed during a long course of evolution."¹

Emergent Evolution. Iqbāl refers with approval to the theory of emergent evolution put forward by C. Lloyd Morgan.²

"Emergent evolution works upwards from matter, through life, to consciousness which attains in man its highest or supra-reflective level."³ It regards the emergence of the higher from the lower as being due to a driving force welling up from below and drawing upwards through activity.⁴ The emergent is an unforeseeable and novel fact in its own plane of being which cannot be explained mechanistically or resolved into that which has conditioned its birth and growth.⁵ According to the theory of emergent evolution even if soul-life emerges from a physical level it does not follow that the new emergent can be adequately explained in terms of the physical only.

Bergson and Iqbāl: creative evolution. Like Bergson, Iqbāl believes that "it is consciousness or rather supra-consciousness that is at the origin of life."⁶ This consciousness is the need of creation.⁷ Bergson believes in a

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 44.
 2. Ibid. pp 106-107.
 3. Morgan, C. L. Emergent Evolution, London, 1923, p. 297.
 4. Siddiqi, M. "Iqbāl's Concept of Evolution" Iqbāl, January 1954, Volume II, No.3, p. 22.
 5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 44-45.
 6. Bergson, H. Creative Evolution, p. 275.
 7. Ibid.

sort of cosmic vitalism in which the vital principle or élan vital, as he calls it, is life itself as it has endured through the ages and evolution is the history of the effort of life to free itself from the domination of matter and to achieve self-consciousness.¹ In other words, evolution is the outcome of an impulse of life manifesting itself in innumerable forms.² The vital impulse determines the direction of evolution as well as evolution itself. This ever-changing activity is in fact life. Life is that which makes efforts, which pushes upwards and outwards and on. All the striving is due to the élan vital in us, "that vital urge which makes us grow, and transforms this wandering planet into a theatre of unending creation."³ In Bergson's view "the whole of nature is said to be the outcome of a force which thrusts itself forward into new and unforeseen forms of organised structure. These store and utilize energy, maintaining their power of growth and adaptive novelty up to a point and then relapse into repetitive routine and ultimately into the degradation of energy."⁴ According to Bergson, the universe shows two tendencies. There is a reality which is making itself in a reality which

-
1. Magill, F. N. (Editor) Masterpieces of World Philosophy, p. 769.
 2. Urmson, J. O. (Editor) Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 63.
 3. Durant, W. The Story of Philosophy, pp 345-346.
 4. Urmson, J. O. (Editor) Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 63.

is unmaking itself. The laws of the tendency to repetition and the dissipation of energy are the laws of matter; the counter tendency is the thrust of life.¹ For Iqbāl, the function of consciousness is "to provide a luminous point in order to enlighten the forward rush of life. It is a case of tension, a state of self-concentration, by means of which life manages to shut out all memories and associations which have no bearing on present action."² Like Bergson, Iqbāl believes in the dynamic principle (whether it is called 'soul', 'life', 'personality', 'consciousness', or whatever else) within organisms. It is to this principle "that we owe our eyes, ears, hands, feet, nerves, brain, our physical everything. It simply called all our organs into being in response to stimuli or prompting from the Reality outside itself, i.e. Nature, which it wanted to interpret."³ Iqbāl expresses this idea thus:

کتاب یا از شوخی دوتار یافت

بلبل ار سعی بر استوار یافت

-
1. Urmson, J. O. (Editor) Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 63.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 40.
 3. Coahu, J. R. Vital Problems of Religion, p. 54.

دست و دندان و دماغ و چشم و گوش
فکر و تخیل و شعور و پیاد و ہوش

زندگی مرکب چودر حتماہ ساعت

ہر حقیقہ جو لپٹس اس آلآت ساعت

¹(Asrār-e-Khudī p. 17)

Iqbāl's well-known poem "Sāqī Nāma" contains most of his ideas on evolution:

وہ جوئے کیستاں اچلتی ہوئی
انگلی بچکتی سرکتی ہوئی

ایچلتی پھلتی سنھلتی ہوئی
لڑے بیج کھا کر لکٹی ہوئی

دمادم رواں ہےم دنئی
ہر اک نشے سے بیدارم زندگی

اسی سے ہوئی ہے بدن کی نمود
کہ تنھے میں یوتیدہ سے موج دودا

گراں گریہ ہے صحتِ آبِ دکل
خوش آئی اسے محنتِ آبِ دکل

یہ تامت بھی ہے اور تپار بھی
عسام کے بھندوں سے بزار بھی

1. The partridge's leg is derived from the elegance of its gait,
The nightingale's beak from its endeavour to sing,
Nose, hand, brain, eye and ear,
Thought, imagination, feeling, memory and understanding -
All these weapons devised by life for self-preservation
In its ceaseless struggle.
(Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the Self,
pp 25-26.

یہ وحدت ہے کثرت میں مردم اسیر
 مگر ہر کہیں سے جیوں سے نظر
 یہ عالم یہ نہایت سستی صلت
 اسی نے تراشا ہے یہ کوسات
¹(Bāl-Jibrīl pp 166-170)

Evolution and teleology.

Iqbāl accepts Bergson's biological approach to the problem of evolution² but unlike Bergson he takes a teleological view of the evolutionary process. Bergson rejects teleology which he calls "inverted mechanism" since it pertains to development tied to the realization of pre-determined ends.³ Therefore, according to Bergson, the vital urge to which emergence is due is both non-mechanical and non-teleological.

-
1. Down from the heights that rill comes leaping,
 Slipping, spurling, recoiling, creeping,
 Stumbling, recovering, while it winds
 Through a hundred turnings until it finds
 Its way. (Translation by Kiernan, V.G. Poems from Iqbāl, p.46)
 Perpetual rolls life's ocean: all
 That it shows life ephemeral.
 From it, like smoke curls
 In fire, the body emerges, blent
 Of earth and moisture, irksome, yet
 In their leading life delights: life, set
 In the labyrinth, chafing, of the gross
 Elements; undying, transient; close
 Captive, thus undivisible,
 In diversity, yet in all things still
 Unparagoned, single. This immense
 Idol-temple, the world of sense,
 This world the three-dimension fence
 Was reared by Life.
 (Translation by Kiernan, V.G. quoted by Ahmad, A.
 "Sources of Iqbāl's Perfect Man" p. 14).
2. Lindsay, A. D. The Philosophy of Bergson, London, 1911, p.28.
 3. Urmson, J. O. (Editor) Concise Encyclopaedia of Western
 Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 63.

Lamarck's explanation of evolution is teleological postulating in organisms a striving or will to evolve.¹ McDougall built up a whole system of animal and social psychology on the basis of teleological causation as opposed to mechanistic causation, explaining animal and human actions in terms of inner drives tending towards some goal which satisfies the innermost being of the organism.² Iqbāl looks upon the creative urge not as mere blind will but essentially of the nature of thought and intelligence. Purpose holds a fundamental position in Iqbāl's concept of the evolution of life.

زندگی را لغات مدعاست
 کاددالستی را در ار مدعاست
 زندگی در جستجوی پوشیده است
 اصل ادراک در آرزو پوشیده است
 آرزو هنگامه آرای خودی
 موج بیتای در دریای خودی

³(Asrār-e-Khudī p. 16)

Purpose is born of desire or the will-to-live. For Iqbāl the driving force of evolution lies in the conative

-
1. McKenzie, A.E.E. The Major Achievements of Science, Volume I, p. 202.
 2. Siddīqī, M. "Iqbāl's Concept of Evolution" p. 25.
 3. Life is preserved by purpose,
 Because of the goal its caravan-bell tinkles.
 Life is latent in seeking,
 Its origin is hidden in desire.
 Desire keeps the self in perpetual uproar
 It is a restless wave of the self's sea.
 (Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the Self
 pp 23-24).

tendency of things. This tendency may be called love. For Iqbāl all the processes of assimilation, growth and reproduction are manifestations of Love.¹ It is interesting to note that in Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion (1932) Bergson too is prepared to call 'élan vital' 'love' which is either God or from God.² It has been observed that Iqbāl's theory of Love is little else than a theory of intrinsic teleology operating from within the mind and spirit of man in the shape of instinctive desires.³ This type of causation does not dispense with the idea of God, but God as conceived by the intrinsic teleologist is the creative principle of life, the guide who makes every organism conscious of its goal, implants in it the desire for the attainment of that goal.⁴

Man is not a mere episode or accident in the huge evolutionary process. On the contrary, the whole cosmos is there to serve as the basis and ground for the emergence and perfection of the Ego.⁵ The purpose of evolution is Man in whom Life gained freedom:

-
1. Ṣiddīqī, M. "Iqbāl's Concept of Evolution" p. 27.
 2. Urmson, J. O. (Editor) Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 63.
 3. Ṣiddīqī, M. "Iqbal's Concept of Evolution" p. 33.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal, pp 113-114.

زندگی گفت کہ در خاک نییدم ہمہ عمر
تا رہیں گسیدہ پرینہ درے بیداشت

¹(Payām-e-Mashriq, p. 97)

Life finds its perfection in Man in whom it becomes self-consciousness for the first time since the beginning of creation.

دل سے ہے یہ کشفِ کسبِ اسیر
ہوئی خاکِ آدم میں صورتِ زیر

²(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 173)

The universe has waited for man for a long time:

آیہ کائنات کا معنی دیریاں تو ا
لکے تری تلاش میں فائدہ ہائے رنگِ دلو

³(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 153)

The universe has been created so that Man's Selfhood may be revealed to him:

یہ ہے مقصدِ گردشِ کائنات
کہ پتری خودی تجھ پہ صو آشکار

⁴(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 174)

1. Life said, "I writhed in dust aeon after aeon,
Now at last a door opens out of this old prison.
2. Since eternity it is involved in striving,
It appeared in the form of man's clay.
3. You are the late-discovered meaning of the universe,
The world of hue and scent have been searching for you.
4. Time's revolutions have one goal,
To show you what is your own soul.
(Translation by Kiernan, V. G. Poems from Iqbāl, p. 49)

Evolution: Iqbāl's interpretation and attitude.

As we have seen, like Leibniz Iqbāl believed in grades of consciousness. Evolution is the transition from near-consciousness to consciousness and from consciousness to self-consciousness. In a very early poem¹ Iqbāl makes life describe the process of evolution thus:

کس کس جس سے میں نے پایا
رتہ مارتنہ پایہ پایہ
جامد کو نامی، امی کو حیوان
حیوان کو وحشی، وحشی کو انسان²

Consciousness, in creating anew the universe from moment to moment for the sake of its self-expression, is continually breaking through its own resistance and outgrowing itself, and thereby gradually advancing towards its goal.³ For Iqbāl, evolution is the passage of life and consciousness from the death like stupor of things almost unconscious to the first glimpse of 'I-am-ness' in Man. The transition from one plane of existence to another takes place not by means of total extinction but by the transformation of the lower into the higher self.⁴

-
1. Cited in Badvī, L. "A forgotten Composition of Iqbāl" Iqbāl Review, January 1965. pp 77-78.
 2. With what great effort have I made
Rank by rank, part by part,
Inorganic into organic, organic into animal,
Animal into brute, brute into man.
 3. Rafīuddīn, M. "Iqbāl's Idea of the Self" p. 7.
 4. Dār, B. A. A Study in Iqbāl's Philosophy, Lāhore, 1944, p.54.

It is apparent from Iqbāl's poetry that Iqbāl regards the advent of Man on earth as a great and glorious event, not as an event signifying Man's sinfulness and degradation. For Iqbāl, the Fall symbolizes a transition from "a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and disobedience ... man's transition from simple consciousness to the first flash of self-consciousness, a kind of waking up from the dream of nature with a throb of causality in one's own being."¹ Adam's emergence marks that stage in evolution when simple and conative tendencies, native impulse, instincts and propensities are transformed into self-conscious behaviour, purposive will and creative faculties.² Greeting Adam, the Earth says:

خوشیہ جاں تاب کی صو پترے تر میں
آباد ہے اک تارہ جاں پترے صر میں

جیتے ہیں بختے سوے فردوس نظر میں
جنت تری بنانا ہے ترے حق جگہ میں
اے بیکر گل کو شش بہیم کی جزا دیکھ!

³(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p. 179)

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 85.
 2. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal, p. 118.
 3. The light of the world-illuminating sun is in your spark,
A new world lives in your talents.
Unacceptable is a Paradise which is given,
Your Paradise lies hidden in your blood,
O form of clay see the reward of constant endeavour.

In "Taskhīr-e-Fiṭrat"¹ Iqbāl points out that Adam though created out of matter rises to eminence and glory. He possesses immense powers by means of which he can invade both the visible and the non-visible. He has much to do on earth and is in no hurry to return to his celestial abode. The daring poet says to God:

ما عِ بَهْتت سے مجھے حکمِ سفر دیا تھا کیوں؟

کارِ ہاں دراز ہے اب مرا انتظار کرا

²(Bāl-e-Jibrīl, p.9)

Such is Man's evolution that even the heavenly bodies are beginning to fear his ascent:

عروجِ آدمِ خاکی سے انجم سے مارتے ہیں

کہ یہ ٹوٹا ہوا تارِ امیرِ کامل نہ س جائے!

³(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 14)

Man's evolution has, by no means, come to an end. His destiny lies far beyond this world. He has to conquer worlds yet uncreated.

1. Payām-e-Mashriq, pp 97-101.

2. Why did you ask me to leave the Garden of Eden?
There is much to do in the world. Now you must wait for me!

3. Seeing man's ascent, the stars grow fearful,
Lest this fallen star become the full moon.

خودی کی یہ ہے منزلِ اولیں
مسافرا یہ پترالین ہیں

تری آگ اس خالداں سے ہیں!
جہاں تجھ سے ہے تو ماں سے ہیں!

بڑھے حایہ کوہِ گراں تو ڈر
طلسمِ زمانِ دماں تو ڈر

خودی شیرِ مولا جہاں اس کا صید!
زمین اس کی صید آسمان اس کا صید!

جہاں اور بھی ہیں ابھی بے نمود
کہ حالی نہیں ہے ضمیرِ وجود

ہر اک منتظرِ پتریِ یلغار کا
تری ستوجی، فکر و کردار کا

¹(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 174)

Concerned as he is about the question of his origin,
Iqbāl is more anxious to know about the future of man:

-
1. This is the Self's first halting-place,
Wayfarer, not your home. Its base
Cinder-heap was not your flame's source:
Not you by earth's, earth by your force
Exists. Pierce its huge rocks, and climb!
Burst the dark spells of space and time!
The Self, true lion of God, is given
For quarry the world, all earth, all heaven,
As yet: creation's heart beats still.
All things await your onset and
Your restless urge of brain and hand.

(Translation by Kiernan, V. G. Poems from Iqbāl, p. 49)

ہردمندوں سے کیا پوچھوں کہ میری ابتدا کیا ہے
 کہ میں اس فکر میں رہتا ہوں میری ابتدا کیا ہے ا
¹(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 81)

The man of courage does not put a limit to his evolution:

در دشتِ جنوں میں جبریلِ ذلّوں سپدے
 یزداں نہ کند آوری اے صمتِ مردانہ

²(Payām-e-Mashriq p.198)

Opposition an impetus to evolution. According to Iqbāl, the greatest obstacle in the way of life is matter or Nature, and yet "Nature is not evil, since it enables the inner powers of life to unfold themselves."³ Life, in fact, as Iqbāl conceives it, advances through opposition. Like Hegel, Iqbāl thinks that life creates its own oppositions and contradictions in order to realize its potentialities.⁴

There can be no evolution without conflict. "According to my belief reality is a collection of individualities tending to become a harmonious whole through conflict which must inevitably lead to mutual adjustment. This conflict is a necessity in the interests of the evolution of higher forms of life and of personal immortality."⁵

-
1. Why should I ask of wise men what my origin is?
I am anxious to find out what my destiny is.
 2. In the wilderness of my madness Gabriel is a poor prey,
O courage of manhood cast your noose and capture God.
 3. Iqbāl quoted by Nicholson, R. A. in The Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. xix.
 4. Asrār-e-Khudī, p.12.
 5. Iqbāl's letter to R.A. Nicholson. "Asrār-e-Khudī - The Secrets of the Self" The Quest, London, July to October, 1920. Volume XII p. 487.

Theory of Evolution: application to politics and ethics.

Like Nietzsche, Iqbāl applies the theory of evolution both to politics and ethics¹ though, in Iqbāl's own words, his interest in conflict - which is the agent of evolution - is "mainly ethical and not political."² Iqbāl points out that "modern physical science has taught us that the atom of material energy has achieved its present form through many thousands of years of evolution yet it is unstable and can be made to disappear. The same is the case with the atom of mind - energy, i.e. the human person. It has achieved its present form through aeons of incessant effort and conflict; yet in spite of all this its instability is clear from the various phenomena of mental pathology. If it is to continue intact it cannot ignore the lessons learnt from its past career, and will require the same (or similar) forces to maintain its stability which it has availed itself of before."³ As Iqbāl puts in the language of poetry:

زندگی جدالت و استقامت نیست
حر العلم النفس و آفاق نیست

⁴(Payām-e-Mashrīq, p.5)

-
1. Kashyāp, S. "Sir Mohammad Iqbāl and Friedrich Nietzsche." The Islamic Quarterly, London, 1955, Volume 2, No.2, p.191.
 2. Iqbāl's letter to R.A. Nicholson "Asrār-e-Khudī - The Secrets of the Self" p. 488.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Life is exertion, it is not a right,
It is meant only for acquiring knowledge of Self and the Universe.

REALITY OF THE SELF.

Iqbāl's philosophy is the philosophy of the Self.

"The Self is at once the starting, and the basic point of his thought. It is the Self which affords him a high road to metaphysics, because it is the intuition of the Self which makes metaphysics possible for him."¹ According to Iqbāl, the Self is a reality. As Descartes's historical utterance "Cogito ergo sum" i.e. "I think, therefore I am" stated, all thinking presupposes a subject who thinks. Iqbāl puts it thus:

من ار بود و بود خودم
 اگر گویم کہ ہستم و دیر ہستم
 دلیلی این نوائے سادہ کیست
 کہے در سینہ می گوید کہ ہستم

²(Payām-e-Mashriq p. 38)

Iqbāl refers to F. H. Bradley who he considers of all modern thinkers to furnish "the best evidence for the impossibility of denying reality to the ego."³ In his first book Ethical Studies, Bradley assumes the reality of the self; in his Principles of Logic he takes it only as a working hypothesis; in his greatest work Appearance and

1. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, p. 37.

2. Whether I am, or not, I hold my peace -

To say "I am" were self-idolatry:

Who is the singer, then, and whose the song

That cries "I am" within the heart of me?

(Translation by Arberry, A.J. The Tulip of Sinai, p. 11)

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp 97-98.

Reality he subjects the concept of the self to a searching examination.¹ According to Bradley, quality and relation, substance and cause, space and time, self and object, are all of them, if taken as real, beset by insoluble contradictions and must therefore be dismissed as "appearance". The absolute reality must have a nature which transcends all these categories. Relations are grounded in the nature of their terms, and no term can be understood apart from its relations.² Whatever may be our view of the Self it can only be examined by the canons of thought, which, in its nature, is relational, and all relations involve contradictions, yet though his "ruthless logic"³ has shown the Self to be "a mass of confusion,"⁴ yet, as Iqbāl points out, "Bradley has to admit that the Self must be 'in some sense real,' 'in some sense an indisputable fact!'"⁵

For Iqbāl, there is no doubt whatever about the reality of the Self. In fact, he says:

منکر حق نزد ملا کافر است
منکر خود برد من کافر تر است

6

(Jāvīd Nāma, p. 239)

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 98.
 2. Urmson, J.O. (Editor) The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, pp 72-73.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 98.
 4. Bradley, F. H. Appearance and Reality, London, 1908, p. 316.
 5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 98.
 6. He who denies God is an infidel for the mulla,
He who denies the Self is a greater infidel to me.

He points out that "our feeling of egohood is ultimate and is powerful enough to extract from Professor Bradley the reluctant admission of its reality."¹ The Self is undoubtedly real, though "its reality is too profound to be intellectualised."² In "Gulshan-e-Rāz-e-Jadīd," Iqbal puts forward his ideas on the reality of the Self:

اگر گوی کہ دس، دہم دگمان است خودتس جوں لمودِ این دآن است
 بگو بامس کہ داراے گمان کیست یکے در خود نگر آں بے نشان کیست
 جہاں پیراد محتاج دلیدے! ہی آید فکرِ جرئیدے

یکے ادیش ددریابِ اپس چہ راز است! خودی پنہاں ز حجت بے نیاز است!
³(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 237)

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 98.

2. Ibid.

3. If you say that the "I"
 Is all pure fantasy,
 Nothing but an illusory
 Thing seen by the mind's eye,
 Then tell me whose experience
 Is this delusion of the inner sense?
 Who is the subject of this fantasy?
 Look inward at yourself: are you not he?
 Apparent though the world is, yet
 You have to prove that it exists;
 But doing so resists
 A Gabriel's ethereal wit.
 The Self, is on the other hand,
 Concealed from view, and yet
 It is self-evident,
 Beyond all argument.
 Reflect a little on this and
 Endeavour to find out
 The meaning of this mystery.
 The Self is not Illusion but Reality.
 (Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery,
 p. 18).

ASPECTS OF THE SELF.

Efficient and Appreciative Self.

We have already referred to the distinction Iqbāl draws between the aspects of the Self. The Self has, Iqbāl says, "two sides which may be described as appreciative and efficient."¹ The efficient self is what associationist psychology concerns itself with - "the practical self of daily life in its dealing with the external order of things which determine our passing states of consciousness and stamp on these states their own spatial feature of mutual isolation."² Thus the efficient self is that which is concerned with, and is itself partially formed by, the physical world.³ It apprehends the succession of impressions, living as it were, "outside itself... and, while retaining its unity as totality, (it) discloses itself as nothing more than a series of specific and consequently numerable states."⁴ Iqbāl likens the efficient self to Kant's transcendental unity of apperception⁵ which "according to the determinations of our state, is, with all our internal perceptions, empirical only."⁶

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 47.

2. Ibid.

3. Harre, R. "Iqbāl: A Reformer of Islāmic Philosophy" p. 335.

4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 47.

5. Harre, R. "Iqbāl: A Reformer of Islāmic Philosophy" p. 335.

6. Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason (translated by Müller, F.M.) p. 88.

The Self has also an appreciative aspect which lives not in spatialised time but in pure duration. Iqbāl is supported in his viewpoint that consciousness has a deeper aspect, by a notable scientist: "Feelings, purpose, values, make up our consciousness as much as sense-impressions. We follow up the sense-perceptions and find that they lead into an external world discussed by science; we follow up the other elements of our being and find that they lead - not into the world of space and time, but surely somewhere... consciousness as a whole is greater than those quasi-metrical aspects of it which are abstracted to compose the physical brain."¹

According to Iqbāl the tragedy of the modern man is that he has become alienated from his deeper self. He is so caught up in the material world that "his hidden sources of spiritual energy" have become impoverished.² To such a man Iqbāl says:

اپنے من میں ڈوب کر یا جا سراعِ زندگی
تو اگر میرا ہیں ستانہ س، اپنا نہ س !

³(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 48)

-
1. Eddington, A.S. The Nature of the Physical World, Cambridge, 1929, p. 323.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 188-189.
 3. Look in, and in yourself, life's secret see,
To your own self be true, if not to me.

One becomes aware of the appreciative self "only in the moments of profound meditation, when the efficient self is in abeyance," and sinking into our deeper self we "reach the inner centre of experience."¹ The unity of the appreciative ego is such that in it each experience permeates the whole. The multiplicity of its elements is, unlike that of the efficient self, wholly qualitative. "There is change and movement, but this change and movement are indivisible; their elements inter-penetrate and are wholly non-serial in character."² The movement of the appreciative ego is not a movement in space and time since the time of the appreciative ego is a single 'now.'³

The appreciative self is creative. It does not find things, it makes them. "Not only do we make things, but in political and ethical action among things, Iqbāl believes that we also make our ends. He regards this as a consequence of the two kinds of experience, the inner and the outer. The result of our inner experience is the grasping of a continual succession of goals and purposes which give

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 48-49.

2. Ibid. p. 49.

3. Ahmad, M. M. "Iqbāl's Appreciative Self" Iqbāl Review, October, 1961, p. 17.

significance to everything that happens."¹ Thus, for Iqbāl, the life of the Self consists in its movement from appreciation to efficiency, from intuition to intellect, from pure duration to serial time which is born of this movement.²

Body and Soul. For Descartes, there is one absolute substance, God, and two relative substances, mind and body, existing independently of each other but both depending on God.³ Iqbāl rejects the Cartesian bifurcation between mind and matter which cannot account for the interaction of the spiritual with material being.⁴ If body and mind are fundamentally different, as Descartes assumed, then "the changes of both run on exactly parallel lines, owing to some kind of pre-established harmony, as Leibniz thought. This reduces the soul to a merely passive spectator of the happenings of the body."⁵ Thus Iqbāl rejects parallelism.

If the mind and body are regarded as affecting each other, "then we cannot find any observable facts to show

-
1. Harrè, R. "Iqbāl: A Reformer of Islāmic Philosophy" pp 335-356.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 76.
 3. Thilly, F. A History of Philosophy, pp 279-280.
 4. Whittaker, E. Space and Spirit, p. 72.
 5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 105.

how and where exactly their interaction takes place, and which of the two takes the initiative. The soul is an organ of the body which exploits it for physiological purposes, or the body is an instrument of the soul, are equally true propositions on the theory of interaction."¹

Iqbāl refers to Lange's theory of emotion "which tends to show that the body takes the initiative in the act of interaction. There are, however, facts to contradict this theory ... even if the body takes the initiative, the mind does enter as a consenting factor at a definite stage in the development of emotion, and this is equally true of the external stimuli which are constantly working on the mind."²

Thus interaction is also unsatisfactory. Iqbāl does not believe in the duality of body and spirit. They are one as becomes visible in action. "When I take up a book from my table, my act is single and indivisible. It is impossible to draw a line of cleavage between the share of the body and that of the mind in this act."³ According to Iqbāl, "the

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 105.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

body is not a thing situated in an absolute void; it is a system of events or acts. The system of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system of acts. This does not obliterate the distinction of soul and body; it only brings them closer together. The characteristic of the ego is spontaneity; the acts composing the body repeat themselves. The body is accumulated action or habit of the soul; and as such undetachable from it. It is a permanent element of consciousness which, in view of this permanent element, appears from the outside as something stable."¹

For Iqbāl then, body and mind are not two antithetical entities. His viewpoint is supported by many Vedantic systems.³ We have seen that Iqbāl regards matter not as something dead but as a sub-ego. Hence matter is itself resolved to spirit and will.³ "When seen in this light, it becomes fully evident that the determining force of the body is will and not matter. Will, or spirit, assumes the form of body in order to fulfil its purpose in the present

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 105.
 2. Rājū, P. T. "The Idealism of Sir Moḥammad Iqbāl" p. 108.
 3. Khātoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the in the Philosophic System of God, p. 124.

environment."¹ As is clear from Iqbāl's views on evolution, it is the creative will which evolves the various physical organs to aid it in its unceasing struggle for the realisation of its evergrowing ideals.²

The body and soul are not two independent substances. The body is "the attribute of the same reality whose manifestation is the soul." In Jāvid Nāma Iqbāl says:

اے کہ گئی مجھ جان است تن
سیرِ جاں را در نگر بر تن مت
محلے نے ، حالے از احوال اوست
مجلس خواندن فریب گفتگوست
چہیت جاں ؛ جذب و سرور و سوز و درد
ذوق تسخیر سپہر گرد گردا
چہیت تن ؛ بارنگ دلو فو کردن است
ما مقام یار سو فو کردن است

³(Jāvid Nāma, p. 20)

1. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 124.
2. Asrar-e-Khudi, pp 16-17.
3. You who say that the soul is the soul's vehicle, consider the soul's secret; tangle not with the body. It is not a vehicle; it is a state of the soul; to call it its vehicle is a confusion of terms. What is the soul? Rapture, joy, burning and anguish, delight in mastering the revolving sphere. What is the body? Habit of colour and scent, habit of dwelling in the world's dimensions. (Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvid Nāma, p. 33)

Iqbāl regards the bifurcation of the essential unity of Man's life into the physical and the spiritual spheres of being sinful:

تن و جان را دو تا گشت کلام است
 تن و جان را دو تا دیدن حرام است

¹(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 216)

The soul is "the pure act, the body is only the act become visible and hence measurable."² In Iqbāl's thought there is great emphasis placed on the idea that "Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interests of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islām matter is spirit realising itself in space and time."³ It is the violation of the essential unity of human life that has led to the cleavage between the temporal and the spiritual life of Man in the West:

بدن را تا زنگ از جان جدا دید
 نگاهش ملک ددین را هم دو تا دید

⁴(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, pp 217)

-
1. To talk of body and soul as two separate entities is wrong, To see them as two is sinful.
(Translation by Dār, B.A. Iqbāl's Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd and Bandagī Nāmāh, p. 24)
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 71.
 3. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 163.
 4. The West thinks Soul and Body to be separate; Hence the dichotomy between Religion and the State.
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, p. 7).

The relation between the body and soul is the same as the relation between the Universe and God. The Universe is the objectification of God, and the body is the objectification of the soul. The body is necessary for the expression and manifestation of the soul.¹ Both have their life and significance when they are related to each other.

تن زنده و جان زنده ز ربط تن و جان است

²(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p. 117)

However, for Iqbāl, the soul is more fundamental than the body since the latter owes its existence to the former which has its source in God.³ (Sūra 15:29, 32:9, 38:72)

THE NATURE OF THE SELF.

The Self as a soul-substance: Iqbāl refers to the school of thought represented by Gazzālī who considers the ego to be a simple, indivisible and immutable soul-substance, entirely different from the group of our mental states and unaffected by the passage of time. Our conscious experience is a unity because our mental states are related as so many qualities to this simple substance which persists unchanged during the flux of its qualities.⁴ Iqbāl does not regard the soul

-
1. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, pp 134-135.
 2. Body lives and spirit lives
By the life their union gives.
(Translation by Arberry, G. J. Persian Psalms, p. 75)
 3. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 135.
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 100.

as a substratum in which mental states inhere and agrees with Kant's objections to the conception of soul as a metaphysical entity.¹ According to Kant, the 'I think' which accompanies every thought is a purely formal condition of thought, and the transition from a purely formal condition of thought to ontological substance is logically unwarranted.² Furthermore, the indivisibility of a substance does not prove its indestructibility, since, as Kant points out, the indivisible substance may disappear into nothingness like an intensive quality.³

This theory fails to satisfy both from a metaphysical and a psychological point of view.⁴ Iqbāl points out that it is difficult to regard the elements of our conscious experience as qualities of a soul-substance in the sense in which, for example, the weight of a body is a quality of the body.⁵ "Observation reveals experience to be particular acts of reference, and as such they possess a specific being of their own. They constitute, as Laird acutely remarks, 'a new world' and not merely new features in an old world."⁶ Moreover, even if we regard experiences as qualities, we cannot know how they inhere in the soul-substance. "Thus

-
1. Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbāl, p. 125.
 2. Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, pp 295-296.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 101.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.

we see that our conscious experience can give us no clue to the ego regarded as soul-substance, for by hypothesis the soul-substance does not reveal itself in experience."¹

Iqbāl also points out that in view of the improbability of the different soul-substances controlling the same body at different times, the theory can offer no adequate explanation of psychological aberrations such as the schizophrenic personality.²

The Self as a stream of consciousness. According to William James, the essence of the mental life is experienced as a "flow" in which each succeeding moment grasps back upon and "owns" its predecessor.³ According to James, there is "a kind of gregarious principle working in our experiences which have, as it were, 'hooks' on them, and thereby catch up one another in the flow of mental life. The ego consists of the feelings of personal life, and is, as such, part of the system of thought. Every pulse of thought, present or perishing is an indivisible unity which knows and recollects. The appropriation of the present pulse of thought, and that of the present by its successor, is the ego."⁴ Iqbāl admits that James's description of mental life is "extremely ingenious" but it is not true to consciousness as we find it

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.101.

2. Ibid.

3. Urmson, J. O. (Editor) The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 195.

4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 102.

in ourselves, as "consciousness is something single, pre-supposed in all mental life, and not bits of consciousness mutually reporting to one another."¹ The fact is that for all his demands that Hume's "bricks" of experience are not the entire picture, that the "mortar" which holds the bricks together is equally a part of experience. William James does accept Hume's bricks and must therefore deny that the self exists over and apart from the mental states which constitute experience.² Iqbāl rejects his view-point which "entirely ignores the relatively permanent element in experience" and cannot explain how one passing thought which is irrevocably lost can be known and appreciated by the present thought if there is no continuity of being between the passing thoughts.³ Iqbāl does not suggest that the ego is something outside the mutually penetrating multiplicity called experience but wishes to stress the unity and continuity of the ego which is appreciated in the act of perceiving, judging and willing.⁴

The Characteristics of the Self.

(a) The ego is unique. According to Iqbāl, the ego reveals itself as a unity of what we call mental states. Mental states do not exist in mutual isolation but exist as phases

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 102.

2. Ibid.

3. Urmson, J. O. (Editor) The Concise Engyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, p. 196.

4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 102.

of a complex whole, called mind. The unity which these inter-related states possess is organic unity. Fundamentally different from the unity of the parts of a material thing. Mental unity is absolutely unique.¹

(b) The ego is not space-bound. Iqbāl points out that the ego is not space-bound in the sense in which the body is space-bound. "We cannot say that one of my beliefs is situated on the right or left of my other belief. Nor is it possible to say that my appreciation of the beauty of the Tāj varies with my distance from Āgra. My thought of space is not spatially related to space. Indeed the ego can think of more than one space-order. The space of waking consciousness and dream-space have no mutual relation."²

(c) The ego alone possesses time-duration. Iqbāl states that mental and physical events are both in time but the time-span of the ego is fundamentally different from the time-span of the physical event. "The duration of the physical event is stretched out in space as a present fact, the ego's duration is concentrated within it and linked with its present and future in a unique manner. The formation of a physical event discloses certain present marks which show that it has passed through a time-duration, but these marks are merely emblematic of its time-duration, not time-duration itself.

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 98-99.

2. Ibid, p. 99.

True time-duration belongs to the ego alone."¹

(d) The ego possesses that privacy which reveals its uniqueness. Iqbāl points out that private nature of inner experience. "In order to reach a certain conclusion all the premises of a syllogism must be believed in by one and the same mind... Again, my desire for a certain thing is essentially mine... My pleasures, pains and desires are exclusively mine, forming a part and parcel of my ego alone. My feelings, hates and loves, judgments and resolutions are exclusively mine... My recognition of a place or person means reference to my past experience, and not the past experience of another ego."²

(3) The ego is spontaneous. The ego is a system of acts which possesses spontaneity as distinguished from the body which is "accumulated action."³

(f) The ego is directive. Iqbāl points out that according to the Qōr'ān, the essential nature of the soul is directive, as it proceeds from the directive energy of God (Sūra 17:87).⁴ He draws attention to the distinction made by the Qor'ān between 'Khalq' and 'Amr.' "'Khalq' is creation; 'Amr' is direction."⁵ The Qōr'ān uses 'Khalq' to indicate the relation of the Universe of matter to God, and 'Amr' to

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 99-100.

2. Ibid. pp 99-100.

3. Ibid. p. 100.

4. Ibid. p. 103.

5. Ibid.

indicate the relation of the human self to the Divine Self.¹ "‘Amr’," says Iqbāl "is not related to God in the same way as ‘Khalq’ is. The ‘Amr’ is distinct but not isolated from God."² He, however, admits that we cannot "intellectually apprehend this relationship any more than Rumi" whose couplet he quotes:³

اتصال بے تخیل بے تیس

4

صفت رب الناس رانا جان ناس

It has been observed that "the world of ‘amr’ ... is the world of significance, of meaning; and represents from man’s point of view the inward movement of God’s creative power. What issues forth as a result of God’s command ‘Be’ is both ‘creation’ and ‘significance’."⁵ The self, then, belonging to the world of ‘amr’, consists of, and is known through, its directive attitude. Iqbāl says, "you cannot perceive me like a thing in space, or a set of experiences in temporal order; you must interpret, understand and appreciate me in my judgments, in my will-attitudes, aims and aspirations."⁶

1. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 113.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. A contact beyond intuition and beyond imagination
Exists between the God of man and the soul of man.

5. Brōhī, A. K. "Iqbāl as a Philosopher-Poet" Iqbāl Review
April, 1961, p. 5.

6. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 103.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND MAN'S DESTINY.

Arguments from Psychology. According to Iqbāl, the Self possesses freedom of the will and is not a rigidly determined reality. Freedom is not a mere hypothesis. As the psychological argument in favour of the freedom of the will states, we intuitively perceive that we are free to choose and act.¹ Iqbāl has pointed out that the operation of thought is essentially not mechanical. The thinking self is free. This is the basic assumption of all knowledge. One thought may lead to, and affect, another thought, but the relation between these two is not that of mechanical necessity. Furthermore, in every act of judgment, there is a judging self, and this self is felt to be free.² Freedom is not a ~~post~~ postulate which we assume in order to make morality possible, as Kant imagined, but a fact of the human consciousness itself, as our intuitive experience reveals.³ Iqbāl's viewpoint is reminiscent of Nietzsche who said, "He who feels that his will is not free is insane, he who denies it is foolish."⁴

The associationists, to whom Iqbāl refers, regard the human act of deliberation as "a conflict of motives which are conceived, not as the ego's own present or inherited

-
1. Haq, I. "Freedom of Will and Determinism" Al-Hikmat, Lāhore, 1967. p. 83.
 2. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, pp 48-49.
 3. Ibid. p. 50.
 4. Nietzsche, F. quoted in The Encyclopaedia of Religious Quotations (Edited by Mead, F.S.) London, 1965, p. 154.

tendencies of action or inaction, but as so many external forces fighting one another, gladiator-like, on the arena of the mind... The final choice is ... determined by the strongest force."¹ According to Iqbāl, the controversy between the advocates of Mechanism and Freedom arises from a wrong view of intelligent action, namely, that ego-activity is a succession of thoughts and ideas, ultimately resolvable to units of sensations.² As the German Configuration Psychology points out, "a careful study of intelligent behaviour discloses the fact of 'insight' over and above the mere succession of sensations. This 'insight' is the ego's appreciation of temporal, spatial, and causal relation of things - the choice, that is to say, of data, in a complex whole, in view of the goal or purpose which the ego has set before itself for the time being."³ Thus by considerations based on Configuration Psychology, Iqbāl refutes the arguments of those who claim that the determinism of the ego and that of Nature are not mutually exclusive, and that the scientific method is equally applicable to human action.⁴

As a scientist points out, the principle of determinism, of strict causality, has been discarded even by physics.⁵ In 1927, Heisenberg discovered the Principle

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 107.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ṣiddīqī, R. "Iqbāl and Free Will" The Pākistān Quarterly, August, 1954, Volume IV No.3, pp 20-21.

5. Ibid. p. 22.

of Indeterminacy in Quantum Mechanics which demolished Newton's mechanical determinism. Heisenberg showed that the behaviour of even a single atomic particle is not determined; there are an infinite number of possibilities of which any one might happen.¹ Thus Iqbāl's viewpoint is supported, rather than contradicted by science, even though he thought that the dynamic movement of life could not be fully understood by means of the concepts and categories of science.²

Personal causality known through purposive action:

It is man's fundamental experience of purposive actions, of striving towards and reaching ends which convinces Iqbāl of the individual ego's efficiency as a personal cause.³ The ego stands outside the causal chain in which the advocates of determinism try to find a place for it. Iqbāl points out that the causal chain "is itself an artificial construction of the ego for its purposes."⁴ The ego in order to deal with the material world, reduces the rich multiplicity of life to some kind of a system. "The view of environment as a system of cause and effect is thus an indispensable instrument of the ego, and not a final expression of the nature of Reality. Indeed in

-
1. Siddīqī, R. "Iqbāl and Free Will", The Pākistān Quarterly, August 1954, volume IV, No.3, p. 22.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 50.
 3. Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man", p. 207.
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 108.

interpreting Nature in this way the ego understands and masters its environment, and thereby acquires and amplifies its freedom."¹

Can both God and Man be free?

The element of guidance and directive control in the activity of the ego shows that the ego is a free personal causality akin to the Ultimate Ego. God permitted, even purposed, the emergence of a finite ego, capable of private initiative and in so doing He limited the freedom of His own free will.² The question arises: how can God and man both be free? Iqbāl answers as follows: "The truth is that the whole theological controversy relating to pre-destination is due to pure speculation with no eye on the spontaneity of life, which is a fact of actual experience. No doubt the emergence of egos endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action is, in a sense, a limitation of the freedom of the all-inclusive Ego. But this limitation is not externally imposed. It is born out of God's creative freedom, whereby he has chosen finite egos to be participants of his life, power and freedom."³

Creation implies freedom:

The appreciative self lives in pure duration which means that it is not bound by the fetters of serial time

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 108.
 2. Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man", p. 207.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 79-80.

but creates it from moment to moment and is absolutely free and original in creation.¹ Iqbāl points out that the very conception of life as a creative movement involves the idea of freedom. "In fact all creative activity is free activity. Creation is opposed to repetition which is a characteristic of mechanical action."² Professor Bausani observes that "Man is a Creator" could be given as the essence of Iqbāl's philosophy of religion.³ The Qŏr'ān too, says Iqbāl, admits the possibility of creators other than God when it describes God as the best of creators (Sūra 23:14).⁴

The Qŏr'ān and freedom of the will.

Iqbāl is constantly turning to the Qŏr'ān to justify his belief in human freedom. As H. B. Smith writes, "There are authoritative passages in the Qŏr'ān to justify both positions (i.e. freedom and predestination). Many passages state explicitly or imply a doctrine of complete predestination. A survey of the divergent passages will reveal the fact that wherever attention is centred on God, stress is laid on His absolute and ultimate sovereignty. It is in this connection that men's actions, good and evil alike, are thought of as directly caused by the Divine Will,

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 50.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Bausani, A. "Iqbāl's Philosophy of Religion, and the West." p. 54.
 4. Iqbāl's quoted by Nicholson, R.A. Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. XVIII.

since nothing happens unless God wills it or permits it... when the focus of attention is turned on man, however, it is evident that man is endowed by God with freedom and moral responsibility. Each man is a free moral unit, held responsible by God for his thoughts, decisions, and actions."¹

Iqbāl points out that Islām recognises man to be a centre of latent power in that he is capable of responding to or of rejecting God's guidance. "The truth is from your Lord; wherefore let him who will, believe, and let him who will, be incredulous." (Sūra 18:28).² Man is free to choose between good and evil, and as he chooses so will he be requited. "If ye do well, yet will ye do well to your own souls; and if ye do evil, ye will do it unto the same" (Sūra 17:7).³ Iqbāl would have agreed with Dante when he said: "The greatest gift which God in His bounty bestowed in creating, and the most conformed to His own goodness, and that which He prizes the most, was the freedom of the will, with which the creatures that have intelligence, they all and they alone, were and are endowed."⁴

The power to act freely is not uniform. Iqbāl points out that Islām takes cognisance of this important fact of human psychology - the rise and fall of the power to exercise

1. Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" pp 203-204.

2. Sale, G. (translation of) The Korān, p. 220.

3. Ibid. p. 207.

4. Dante, A. quoted in The Encyclopaedia of Religious Quotations (Edited by Mead, F.S.) London, 1965, p. 151.

the freedom of the will, and that it "is anxious to retain the power to act freely as a constant and undiminished factor in the life of the ego."¹

The rejection of the idea of redemption. Iqbāl points out that "the Qūr'ān in its simple, forceful manner emphasizes the individuality and uniqueness of man."² It is in consequence of this view that Islām rejects the idea of redemption according to which one individual can bear the sins and burdens of others.³ Iqbāl finds the independent moral responsibility of each human being "expressed clearly in the Qūr'ān when it states that each individual 'shall come to Him (the divine judge) on that Day (the day of judgment) singly' (Sūra 19:25). 'No soul shall labour but for itself, and no one shall bear another's burden' (Sūra 6:164). 'For its own works lieth every soul in pledge' (Sūra 74:41)."⁴ Thus the burdens, joys and pains of each man are exclusively his own. He is a centre of moral autonomy and "his salvation is his own business. There is no mediator between God and man."⁵

Freedom implies risk and responsibility. Like the existentialists Iqbāl realizes that freedom involves a great risk and responsibility.⁶ Man is "the trustee of a free

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 109.

2. Ibid. p. 95.

3. Ibid.

4. Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" p. 207.

5. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 38.

6. 'Erfān, N. "What is Common Between the Existentialists and Iqbāl" p. 56.

personality which he accepted at his peril."¹ Freedom is a condition of goodness but "to permit the emergence of a finite ego who has the power to choose... is really to take a great risk; for the freedom to choose good involves also the freedom to choose what is the opposite of good. That God has taken this risk shows His immense faith in man; it is for man now to justify this faith."² Iqbāl points out that according to the Qōr'ānic narration, Adam's first transgression was forgiven because his first act of disobedience was also his first act of free choice.³

It is the risk involved in freedom of choice which makes it possible to test and develop the potentialities of man. As the Qōr'ān says: "And we will prove you with evil, and with good, for a trial of you" (Sūra 21:33).⁴ "Good and evil," says Iqbāl, "though opposites must fall within the same whole."⁵ The consequences of the freedom of will are tragic for "the mutual conflict of opposing individuality is the world-pain which both illuminates and darkens the temporal career of life. In the case of man in whom individuality deepens with personality, opening up possibilities of wrong-doing, the sense of the tragedy of life becomes much more acute. But the acceptance of

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 95.

2. Ibid p. 85.

3. Ibid.

4. Sale, G. (translation of) The Korān, p. 244.

5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 85.

selfhood as a form of life involves the acceptance of all the imperfections that flow from the finitude of selfhood."¹

According to Iqbāl, God took the risk of creating a creature capable of both good and evil, because

تعمیر فوادی میں ہے خدائی!

²(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 79)

If man had not the choice of rejecting evil, he could not prove himself to be good. As Iqbāl points out, "goodness is not a matter of compulsion; it is the self's free surrender to the moral ideal... A being whose movements are wholly determined like a machine cannot produce goodness."³

Iqbāl has referred a number of times in his writings to Sūra 33:72. "We proposed the faith unto the heavens, and the earth, and the mountains: and they refused to undertake the same, and were afraid thereof; but man undertook it: verily he was unjust to himself, and foolish."⁴ Even though man has not kept his faith or managed the world worthily having become unjust and senseless, yet he alone had the daring to undertake such a responsibility. In man's freedom of will lies "both the measure of his greatness and of his sin. Had he not been free, he could not have sinned, yet at the

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 88.

2. Godhead lies in creating Selfhood.

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 85.

4. Sale, G. (translation of) The Korān, p. 321.

same time the burden of responsibility could not have been placed upon him."¹ Whenever Iqbāl speaks of the "trust" man undertook it is in a tone reflecting both pride and humility:

یہ گویم از دمن، داز تویش و تابش
 کند انا عر ضنا لے نقابش
 فلک دائرہ برتن از فراو
 رمان و صم مکان اندر بر او
 نشین رادلِ آدم نهاد است
 نصیبِ مشیتِ خاکی او فتاد است

²(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 225)

Iqbāl's rejection of the doctrine of 'Qismat'

Iqbāl is vehemently opposed to the doctrine of 'Qismat' which embodies "a most degrading type of fatalism."³ He ascribes the fatalistic element in Islām to the influence of Greek thought. Reaching back through a chain of cause and

1. Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" p. 204.

2. What can I say, what can I say

About the "I", its splendour and its might?

It was the "I" that answered the Creator's call

To take up His vicegerency,

Which caused the heavens to quail

And draw back in sheer fright.

The heavens still tremble at its majesty.

It holds in its embrace

Both Time and Space.

It has selected man's heart for its dwelling-place

A hut of mud to house a King.

(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, p. 12.)

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 110.

effect to a first cause in the classical tradition the Muslim philosophers tended to regard the ultimate First Cause as the only cause and therefore denied the existence of intermediary secondary causes, thus making God the only author of whatever happened. Two other factors added to the growth of fatalism. One was political expediency seeking to justify political atrocities by attributing them to the decrees of God. The second was the diminishing force of the life - impulse of original Islām which produced apathy favourable to a fatalistic outlook,¹ and made the Muslims forget that "Islām is itself Destiny and will not suffer a destiny."²

Leibniz had held that "the natural changes of the come from an internal principle."³ Whatever happens to a monad has its origin within it and is the unfolding or working out of that which has been present in it from the beginning so that the present is pregnant with the future which it holds potentially within itself.⁴ Iqbāl conceives of consciousness as unfolding its "internal infinitude in time like the seed which from the very beginning, carries within it the organic unity of the tree as a present fact."⁵

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 110-111.
 2. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 165.
 3. Leibniz, G. W. Philosophical Writings (translated by Morris, M.) London, 1965, p. 6.
 4. Rashīd, A. "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: His Life and Work" p. 37.
 5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 6.

But although in one sense the future pre-exists in the present, Iqbāl does not believe that life is moving towards a fixed destiny. We have seen that Iqbāl conceives of Creation as the continuous unfolding and fulfilment by God in time of the unlimited possibilities open for His realisation, rather than, as orthodoxy has it, the making of a finished product outstretched in space, confronting God as His "other."¹ This being so, Iqbāl sees Destiny not as "an unrelenting fate working from without like a taskmaster; it is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, and serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external compulsion."² The Qŏr'ānic verse "All things have We created bound by a fixed decree" (Sūra 54:50)³ would then mean that each creature is endowed with a fixed potential which it is free to realize or not.⁴ Professor Bausani observes, "If the centre of the spirituality of the Qŏr'ān is - and it is - the personality of God, then, however paradoxical it may seem, Iqbāl's judgment is true that there is nothing further from the Qŏr'ān than the feeling of a pre-determined universe."⁵ Also, the very essence of

1. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p. 75.

2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 50.

3. Sale, G. (translation of) The Korān, p. 393.

4. Smith, H. B. "The Muslim Doctrine of Man" p. 207.

5. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl, p. 172.

religious experience - prayer and repentance - does not postulate a closed universe in which God is fettered or man predetermined either by omnipotence or omniscience.¹

Man as the maker of his own destiny.

Iqbāl places great emphasis on human freedom. Like Berdyaev he too believes that "God has laid upon Man the duty of being free, of safeguarding freedom of spirit, no matter how difficult that may be, or how much sacrifice and suffering it may require."² Of all God's creations, Man alone is "capable of consciously participating in the creative life of his maker" and of moulding "what is into what ought to be."³ In 1910, Iqbāl wrote in his diary, "Given character and healthy imagination, it is possible to reconstruct this world of sin and misery into a veritable paradise."⁴ Throughout his works, runs the note - forceful and clear - that "the powerful man creates environment, the feeble have to adjust themselves to it."⁵

Iqbāl is a passionate believer in the personal creation of destiny, for him "man... is maker of his own destiny."⁶ "Both God and the Devil" he observed trenchantly in his diary,

-
1. Dār, B.A. Qur'ānic Ethics, p. 31.
 2. Berdyaev, N. quoted in The Encyclopaedia of Religious Quotations (edited by Mead, F.S.) p. 150.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 72.
 4. Stray Reflections, p. 102.
 5. Ibid, p. 91.
 6. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 38.

"give man opportunities only, leaving him to make use of them in the way he thinks fit."¹ This thought finds utterance in memorable lines:

عمل سے زندگی سستی ہے جنت بھی ہمیں بھی
یہ خاکِ ایسی صطرت میں نہ لوری ہے نہ ناری ہے

²(Bāng-e-Darā p. 307)

Like Browning, Iqbāl does not seek omniscience because "complete knowledge will destroy the liberty of human choice."³ He does not believe in "star-gazing," and says with profound contempt:

ستارہ کیا مری تقدیر کی فردے گا
وہ خود فراخیء املاک میں سے غوارِ دُربوں

⁴(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 43)

The key to one's destiny lies in one's character. "Character," says Iqbāl, "is the ultimate equipment of man, since it is from character that all actions flow."⁵ In a poem written on a visit to Napoleon - whom Iqbāl admired for

1. Stray Reflections, p. 134.

2. Through action life is made heaven or hell,
This man of clay, by origin is neither heavenly (light) nor
hellish (fire).

3. Stray Reflections

4. How will the star inform one of my fate?

It is itself so wretched and helpless in the wideness of
the skies.

5. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 38.

being a man of action - he says:

داڑھے دارھے لَقْدِیرِ جہانِ تَنگِ دتار
 حوشِ کُردار سے کھل جاتے ہیں لَقْدِیرِ کئے دار
 صفِ جہگاہ میں مردانِ عدا کی تکبیر
 حوشِ کُردار سے ہستی سے عدا کی آوارا

¹(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 201)

By doing nothing and just waiting expectantly for the manna to drop from heaven, one cannot hope to achieve the destiny which man could make for himself were he to strive, "for man is man and master of his fate."²

گرچہ ہی دائم کہ روزے سے نقاب آید بردوں
 تانہ بنداری کہ جاں از بیچِ دتاب آید بردوں
 صریتے باید کہ جانِ خفتہ بر خیزد ز خاک
 نالہ کئے بے زخمہ از تارِ رباب آید بردوں

-
1. Strange, strange the fates that govern
 This world of stress and strain,
 But in the fires of action
 Fate's mysteries are made plain.
 The prayers of God's folk treading
 The battlefield's red sod,
 Forged in the flame of action
 Become the voice of God.

(Translation by Kiernan, V.G. Poems from Iqbāl, p. 55)

2. Tennyson, A. quoted in The Encyclopaedia of Religious Quotations (edited by Mead, F.S.) p. 143.

درگذرد از خاک د خود را بسپرد خالی مگر
چاک اگر در سینه ز پیری ماضیات آید بردن!

¹(Zabūr-e-'Ajam pp 138-139)

It is up to man to make himself a helpless prisoner of Fate or to rise up and carve his destiny. Should he make the effort, Iqbāl believes that the way will open before his advancing steps.

بیا بی خود مرن ز نجر تقدیر
تو این گسید گردان ره هست
اگر مادر نداری، خیر در پاپ
که چون پاد آلی جو لاگت هست

²(Payām-e-Mashriq p. 49)

-
1. Although the soul, I know,
One day unveiled shall be,
Think not it shall be so
By writhing endlessly.
It needs a blow, to stir
The sleeping soul from earth;
Unswapt, the harp can ne'er
Bring melody to birth.
Transcend the dust, nor take
Thyself but dust to be;
If thou thy breast will break,
The moon shall shine from thee.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Persian Psalms, p. 89)
 2. Set not the chain of Fate upon thy foot;
There is a Way beyond this rolling sphere;
If thou believest not, rise up, and find
Thy foot uplifted leapeth in the air.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. The Tulip of Sinai, p. 16)

If man does not find his environment congenial to himself, there is no reason why he should not - in the words of 'Omar Khayyām - "shatter it to bits, and remould it nearer to the heart's desire." In Jāvīd Nāma the Voice of Beauty says:

زنده؟؛ مشتاق نشو خلاق شو	بمجو ما بزنده آفاق شو!
درشکر آزاده ناپید سادگار	از صمیر خود دگر عالم پیارا
سده آزاد را آید گراں	ریشن اندر جهان دیگران!
هر که ادرا حوثِ خلق نیست	بسی ما عز کافر و زندق نیست!
در حال ما نصیب خود بنزد	از تحصیل زندگانی برمورد
مرد حق ابرنده چون شمشیر باش	
خودمان جولت را تقدیر باش!	

¹(Jāvīd Nāma p. 225)

-
1. Are you alive? Be vehement, be creative;
 Like Us, embrace all horizons;-
 Break whatsoever is uncongenial,
 Out of your heart's heart produce a new world -
 It is irksome to the free servitor
 To live in a world belonging to others.
 Whoever possesses not the power to create
 In Our sight is naught but an infidel, a heathen;
 Such a one has not taken his share of Our Beauty,
 Has not tasted the fruit of the Tree of Life.
 Man of God, be trenchant as a sword,
 Be yourself your own world's destiny.
 (Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 138)

In Iqbāl's eyes, the creation of something new, even if it is sinful, is an accomplishment:

گرازدستِ تو کارِ نادر آید
گناہے ہم اگر باشد ثواب است

¹(Payām-e-Mashriq p. 62)

The sinner he depicts is proud of his deed and does not wish to be relieved of its responsibility:

گناہِ غیورم مُزد سے خدمتِ ہی گیرم
ار اں داغم کہ بر تقدیر او ستمِ تقصیرم

²(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 144)

If a man or a nation does not strive, then it is worthy of a glorious future. To such a man or such a nation Iqbāl extends neither hope nor sympathy.

وہ قوم نہیں لائقِ ہنگامہ فردا
بس قوم کی تقدیر میں امروز نہیں ہے!

³(Zarb-e-Kalīm p. 143)

-
1. If by thy labour something rare is wrought,
Though it be sin, it hath its own reward.
(Translation by Arberry, A.J. The Tulip of Sinai, p. 21)
 2. A sinner proud am I; no need
I take, except I work for it;
I rage, because men say He writ
Predestinate my wilful deed.
(Translation by Arberry, A.J. Persian Psalms, p. 92)
 3. That nation does not deserve the renaissance of To-morrow
Which has not in its destiny a Today.

Iqbāl constantly refers to the Qōr'ānic verse, "Verily God will not change the condition of men, till they change what is in themselves" (Sūra 13:12)¹. If Man "does not take the initiative, if he does not evolve the inner richness of his being, if he ceases to feel the inward push of advancing life, then the spirit within him hardens into stone and he is reduced to the level of dead matter."² But if he does transform himself, God will ask him to choose his own destiny:

خودی کو کونسا کلمہ ہر تقدیر سے پہلے
خدا بندے سے خود پوچھے گا پتلی رسالیا ہے ا

³(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 81)

Or man can petition God for a new destiny if he be not satisfied with his present one:

گر زین تقدیر فوں گرد دگر
خواہ از حق حکم تقدیر دگر
تو اگر تقدیر لو خواہی رداست
زانکہ تقدیرات حق لا انتہاست
ارضیاں تقدیر خودی در یافتند
ملکہ تقدیر التواضع

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 12.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Elevate your Selfhood so, that before each Judgment God Himself should ask of Man "What is it you wish?"

دہن مار بلیش بحر فی مہر است
لو آئر دپلر شوی او دپلر است ۱

حاک بنو نذر ہوا سازد ترا
سگ بنو بر شیشہ اندازد ترا ۱

شبنمی؟ افتندی تقدیر لست
تعلزی؟ پایندی تقدیر لست ۱

¹(Jāvīd Nāma p. 123)

In "Jawāb-e-Shikwa" God promises that if Man be indeed faithful, then his destiny is whatever he desires it to be-

یہ جاں چیز ہے کیا، لوح و قلم تیرے ہیں

²(Bāng-e-Darā p. 226)

-
1. If your heart bleeds on account of one destiny,
Petition God to decree another destiny;
If you pray for a new destiny, that is lawful,
Seeing that God's destinies are infinite.
Earthlings have gambled away the coin of selfhood,
Not comprehending the subtle meaning of destiny;
Its subtlety is contained in a single phrase-
'If you transform yourself, it too will be transformed.'
Be dust, and fate will give you the winds;
Be stone, and it will hurl you against glass.
Are you a dew-drop? your destiny is to perish;
Are you an ocean? your destiny is to endure.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 85).
 2. This world is nothing, the Tablet and Pen are yours.

Submission to the Will of God.

One important question arises from Iqbāl's view of freedom of the will and destiny: how is man's freedom of choice compatible with the idea of submission to God's will which plays such an important part in Islāmic belief? For Iqbāl, to submit to the will of God, to say "Thy Will be done," is not to contradict or curtail our own freedom, it is "to obey the prompting of my own personality, to give free scope and full expression to my true self, i.e. to be perfectly free."¹ In a poem entitled "Taslīm-o-Razā," he explains the meaning of submission:

ہر شاخ سے پہ نکتہٴ بیخیرہ ہے بیدار
 بودوں کو بھی احساس ہے ہناتے و فضا کا!
 ظلمت کردہٴ خاک یہ شاکر ہیں رفتا
 ہر لفظ ہے دانے کو جنوں نشو و نما کا
 فطرت کے تقاضوں پر نہ کر راہِ عمل بند
 مقصود ہے کچھ اور بھی تسلیم درمنا کا!

1. Cohu, J. R. Vital Problems of Religion p. 183.

عزات ہو موی تو صانتگ ہیں ہے ا
 اے مرد خدا ملکِ عدانتگ ہیں ہے ا

¹(Zarb-e-Kalīm p. 49)

Resignation to God's will - 'tawwakul' - is not mere acceptance of that which is inevitable. 'Tawwakul' is born not out of an awareness of one's helplessness, but is the result of 'Imān', the vital way of making the world our own.² "Imān," says Iqbāl, "is not merely a passive belief in one or more propositions of a certain kind; it is a living assurance begotten of a rare experience."³ This experience became embodied in classic utterances such as "I am the creative Truth" (Ḥallāj), "I am destiny" (Mu'āwiyā), and "I am the speaking Qor'ān" ('Alī).⁴ Only "strong personalities are capable of rising to this experience and the 'higher fatalism' implied in it."⁵ This 'higher fatalism' does not

-
1. In every branch this subtle truth is manifest
 That even plants desire the wide space.
 The seed is not content to remain in the dark soil,
 It longs to shoot up and grow to full bloom.
 Do not suppress the functions of your nature -
 This is not what is meant by submission.
 If you have the courage to advance, then space is unbounded,
 O man of God, God's earth is not so narrow.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 109.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid. p. 110.
 5. Ibid. pp 109-110.

look upon the affairs of the world as a fortuitous conco-
mitation of atoms, but recognises the all-embracing activity
of the wise and loving Creator.¹ In a remarkable passage in
Jāvīd Nāma, Hallāj explains the true meaning and significance
of predestination:

هر که از تقدیر دارد ساز و برگ	هر که از تقدیر دارد ساز و برگ
هر دین مرد صاحب علمت است	هر دین مرد صاحب علمت است
بخت مرده بخت تو گردد ز هر	بخت مرده بخت تو گردد ز هر
کار مردان است نسیم در صفا	کار مردان است نسیم در صفا
ای که گوئی بودنی این بود، شد	ای که گوئی بودنی این بود، شد
معنی تقدیر کم فهمیده	معنی تقدیر کم فهمیده
مردِ موسی ما خدا دارد نیاز	مردِ موسی ما خدا دارد نیاز
عزم او حلاق تقدیر حق است	عزم او حلاق تقدیر حق است

²(Jāvīd Nāma pp 141-142)

1. Arnold, T. W. The Islāmic Faith, London, 1928, p. 24.

2. Whoever possesses the apparatus of destiny,
Iblīs and death tremble before his might.
Predestination is the religion of man of zeal,
Predestination for heroes is the perfection of power.
Ripe souls become yet riper through constraint
Which for raw man is the embrace of the tomb.
The business of true men is resignation and submission;
This garment does not suit the weaklings.
You who say, "This was to be, and so happened,
All things were tethered to a divine decree, and so happened,"
You have little understood the meaning of destiny;
You have seen neither selfhood nor God:
The believer true thus petitions God:
'We accord with you, so accord with us.'
His resolution is the creator of God's determination
And on the day of battle his arrow is God's arrow.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, pp 94-95)

The higher fatalism described thus by Tennyson:

"Our wills are ours, we know not how,
Our wills are ours to make them Thine."¹

"which the great religious heroes of all times and religions have described as the highest and most paradoxical experience"² is, for Iqbāl, generative of "life and boundless power which recognises no obstruction, and can make a man calmly offer his prayers when bullets are showering around him."³ The man of God whose will is perfectly attuned to the Will of God, becomes the maker of history and destiny:

غلامی میں نہ کام آتی ہیں شمشیریں نہ تدبیریں
جو ہو ذوقِ یقین پیدا تو کٹ جاتی ہیں زنجیریں
کوئی اندازہ کر سکتا ہے اس کے زورِ بازو کا ؟
نگاہِ مردِ مومن سے بدل جاتی ہیں تقدیریں !

(Bāng-e-Darā p. 303)

1. Tennyson, A. "In Memoriam A.H.H." The Poetical Works. London, 1959, p.239.
2. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 312.
3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 110.
4. In servitude, both swords and schemes are useless,
When faith is born, the chains are broken loose.
Who can imagine what the strength of his arm would be?
The gaze of a man of God can alter fate.

With his hand he can work miracles, for

حالتی اللہ کا بندہ مومن کا حالتی

¹(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 132)

Iqbāl believes that "man is really free only in God, the source of his freedom."² Until such time as man finds his faith and can see the source of divine law within the depths of his being, he is troubled by doubt:

بندہ تاقوت رانہ بیند آشکار
برخی آید ز جبر د اختیار

³(Pas Ūi Bāyad Kard Ai Aqwām-e-Sharq? p.40)

But having grasped the "vital way" of life, he acquires unlimited power:

چون فنا اندر رضائے حق شود
بندہ مومن قضائے حق شود

⁴(Pas Ūi Bāyad Kard Ai Aqwām-e-Sharq? p. 14)

-
1. The hand of a faithful is the Hand of God.
 2. Eddy, S. quoted in The Encyclopaedia of Religious Quotations (edited by Mead, F.S.) p. 151.
 3. As long as man does not behold God, He does not emerge from predestination and free-choice.
 4. When he loses himself in the satisfaction of God The faithful becomes God's instrument of destiny.

Conflict between Necessity and Freedom

One writer has contended that Iqbāl, despite his insistence on human freedom, is a believer in determinism, since he has admitted on several occasions that when there is a conflict between 'taqdīr' (Divine decree) and 'tadbīr' (human design), the latter is unable to do anything.¹ For instance, Iqbāl says,

درہ درہ دھر کا زندگی تقدیر ہے
یردہ محسوس و بیچارگی تدبیر ہے

²(Bāng-e-Darā p. 246)

آزمودہ فنہ ہے اک اور بھی گردوں کے یاس
سامنے تقدیر کے رسوائی تدبیر دیکھ ا

³(Bāng-e-Darā p. 297)

آثار تو کچھ کچھ نظر آتے ہیں کہ آفر
تدبیر کو تقدیر کے شاطرے کیامات

⁴(Bāl-e-Jibrīl p. 147)

-
1. Rahmān, M.W. "Iqbāl's Doctrine of Destiny" The Islāmic Culture 1939, Volume 13, pp 159-160.
 2. Every particle of the Universe is a captive of Destiny, Human effort is mere helplessness and futility.
 3. Heaven has another well-tried affliction - See the humiliation of man's efforts before Destiny.
 4. There are some signs to say that ultimately The chess-expert of Destiny defeated human endeavour.

جز خدا کس خالقِ تقدیر نیست
چارهٔ تقدیر از تدبیر نیست !

¹(Jāvīd Nāma p. 122)

These verses do not contradict or repudiate Iqbāl's belief in human freedom. They merely indicate that Iqbāl recognises an over-ruling Power which disposes while Man proposes. Iqbāl has nowhere asserted that Man is completely free. Only God - the most Perfect Individual - possesses perfect freedom. But this does not mean that Man is completely determined. His will is limited only by the Will of God:

تقدیر کے باندنیات و محادات
موس فقط احکام الی کا ہے باند !

²(Zarb-e-Kalīm p. 62)

and the more perfect his Selfhood becomes, the more willingly he surrenders his will to the Will of God.

In his letter to Professor Nicholson, Iqbāl points out

-
1. None but God is the creator of destiny
And against destiny human design is powerless.
(Translation by Arberry, A. J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 85)
 2. Plants and animals are bound by the decree of Fate,
But the Man of God is only subject to the Laws of God.

that the ego is "partly free, partly determined, and reaches fuller freedom by approaching the Individual Who is most free - God. In one word, life is an endeavour for freedom."¹

This view is based on the ḥadīṡ: "Faith lies between Necessity and Freedom." Man is subject to God's Will but since "God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to Man's loyalty to his own ideal nature."²
In Zabūr-e-'Ajam, Iqbāl says

بتقدیرش مقام هست و لود است
مخود خویش و صفیٰ این نمود است

چه می برسی چه گوی است و چه گوی نیست
که تقدیر از نهاد آوردن نیست

چه گوئی از جگونی و بے گلوئی
برون محمود مختار اندر دنی

چنین فرموده سلطان بدر است
که ایمان در میان هر قدر هست

تو هر مخلوق را مجبور گوئی
اسیر بند نرد و دور گوئی

-
1. Iqbāl quoted by Nicholson, R.A. in the Introduction to The Secrets of the Self pp XX-XXI.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 147.

و لے ہاں از دم ہاں آفریں است
بچندیں جلوہ ہا طوت نئیں است

ز خرا و حدیثے در میان نیست
کہ ہاں بے فطرتِ آزاد ہاں نیست

شینوں بر جانِ کبف و کم زد
ز مجبوری مختاری قدم زد

(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p228)

-
1. For it (the Self) has been allotted the supreme
Control of the realm of existence so
That it may manifest itself infinitely.
Its destiny is immanent
In its own nature and, though outwardly
Dependent on pure accident,
It is completely free.
What more can I tell you about
What it is like, what not?
The Holy Prophet said that Faith
Resides between Necessity and Freedom. You
Think all created things are subject to
A foreordained Necessity.
But O the Soul is God's own breath,
Enshrined, for all its self-display,
In its inviolable retreat,
From Nature's hurly-burly far away.
There is no question of Necessity -
Ordaining it;
For Soul cannot be Soul, unless completely free.
Created by Necessity, it hurled
Itself at this material world
And, conquering it, gained
A freedom unrestrained.
(Translation by Husain H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery,
p. 13).

Like Rūmī, Iqbāl does not consider the freedom of choice as an end in itself; the end of freedom is that man may decide freely to live according to his higher self. The end of freedom is self-determination at a higher plane. At the end freedom and determination (which is not the same as coercion or constraint) become one. "Life starts with determinism at the lower plane, develops to the capacity of Free Choice in man, in order to rise to a Higher Determinism again, where man makes a free offer of his freedom."¹ Kant had held that the source of the moral law is in the innermost self of man, and that man's autonomy consists in imposing this law upon himself. For Iqbāl's viewpoint also "the individual achieves a free personality, not by releasing himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the ultimate source of the law within the depths of his own consciousness."²

Iqbāl's rejection of the idea of 'fanā'

"It has been argued" says Professor Nicholson, "that Ṣūfism reaches its logical conclusion in the state of 'fanā'... when the self 'passes away' from itself."³ This idea is completely unacceptable to Iqbāl. According to him, the ideal of perfect manhood in Islām is that full-grown ego

1. Iqbāl, A. "Rūmī as a Thinker" p. 17.

2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 181.

3. Nicholson, R.A. The Idea of Personality in Ṣūfism. Cambridge, 1923, pp 14-18.

which can retain its self-possession even in the case of a direct contact with the all-embracing Ego.¹ He refers² to the Prophet's vision of the Ultimate Ego, quoting the Qōr'ānic verse: "his eyesight turned not aside, neither did it wander" (Sūra 53:17)³ and the verse:

4
 موسیٰ ز هوش رفت بیک جلوهٔ صفات
 تو عین ذات حی نگری و در تسمی

to show that the Perfect Man can stand before God without being annihilated.

Like Tillich, Iqbāl believes that "the centre of a completely individualized being cannot be entered by any other individualized being, and it cannot be made into a mere part of higher unity."⁵ In "Gulshan-e-Rāz-e-Jadīd," Iqbāl says:

نه محرش گم شدن انجام ما نیست
 اگر اورا تو در گپری فنا نیست
 خودی اندر خودی گنجد محال است!

خودی را عین خود بودن کمال است!

6 (Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 222)

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.118.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Sale, G. (translation of) The Korān, p. 390.
 4. Moses fainted having seen only the Attributes,
You see the Essence with a smile.
 5. Tillich, P. Love, Power, and Justice, London, 1959, p. 26.
 6. To be lost in His sea is not our destiny;
And if you span it, you can never cease to be.
That Self should be submerged in Self is an impossibility:
To be the essence of Selfhood is the Self's apogee.
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery,
p. 10).

Rather than losing oneself in God as a drop loses itself in the ocean, "the true person ... absorbs God into his ego,"¹ i.e., "we do not enter God's unity, but rather make him enter the unity of our selves."² "The moral and religious ideal of man," says Iqbāl, "is not self-negation but self-affirmation, and he attains to this ideal by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique. The Prophet said, 'create in yourselves the attributes of Allāh,' and thus man becomes unique by becoming more and more like the most unique Individual."³

Iqbāl points out that Islām does not contemplate complete liberation from finitude as the highest state of human bliss. He sees no contradiction between realising the Infinite and retaining one's individuality.⁴ "True infinity," he says, "does not mean infinite extension which cannot be achieved without embracing all available finite extensions. Its nature consists in intensity, and not extensity. And the moment we fix our gaze upon intensity, we begin to see that the finite ego must be distinct though not isolated from the Infinite."⁵

"Iqbāl's mysticism," says E. M. Forster, "does not seek union with God. We shall see God perhaps. We shall

-
1. Iqbāl quoted by Nicholson, R.A. in Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. xix.
 2. Rajū, P.T. "The Idealism of Sir Moḥammad Iqbāl," p. 113.
 3. Iqbāl quoted by Nicholson, R.A. in Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. xviii.
 4. Naravane, V.S. Modern Indian Thought, London, 1964, p. 290.
 5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 118.

never be God."¹ Iqbāl's Ideal Man is not willing to part with his Selfhood either for immortality

اگر یک دہم گم کرددز انگیز وجود من

باین قیمت نمی گیرم حیاتِ جاودانی را

²(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 77)

or for a vision of God

اگر نظارہ از خود رفتگی آرد حجاب ادلی

بگیرد باین اس سودا ہا ارلس گراں خواہی

³(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p. 60)

Iqbāl points out that "the 'fanā' in the Islāmic mysticism means not extinction but complete surrender of the human ego to the Divine Ego. The ideal of Islāmic mysticism is a stage beyond the stage of 'fanā' i.e. 'baqā' which from my point of view is the highest stage of self-affirmation."⁴

1. Forster, E.M. "Mohammad Iqbāl" p. 297.

2. If but^{an} atom must I give
Of this fabric that I live,
Too great a price were that, for me
To purchase immortality.
(Translation by Arberry, A.J. Persian Psalms, p. 45)

3. If vision self-effacement bring,
The veil is a far better thing;
Thy trade hath little to entice
That doth require so great a price.
(Translation by Arberry, A.J. Persian Psalms, p. 35)

4. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 244.

Following the tradition "Heaven and earth do not contain Me, but the heart of my faithful servant contains Me,"¹ Iqbāl describes unitive experience not as "the finite ego effacing its own identity by some sort of absorption into the Infinite Ego," but rather as "the Infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite."² For Iqbāl "the end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it."³ Man can discover God only by retaining his Selfhood not by resigning it, as the great lover of God, Ḥallāj says:

اے کہ جوئی در فنا مقصود را

در نمی یابد عدم موجود را!

⁴(Jāvīd Nāma p. 154)

IMMORTALITY OF THE SELF.

Metaphysical and ethical arguments for Immortality.

Iqbāl points out that "purely metaphysical arguments cannot give us a positive belief in personal immortality."⁵ He refers to Ibn-e-Rushd who distinguished between sense and intelligence probably because of the expressions 'nafs'

-
1. Schimmel, A.M. Gabriel's Wing, p. 121.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.110.
 3. Ibid. p. 198.
 4. You who seek your goal in annihilation,
Non-existence can never discover existence.
(Translation by Arberry, A.J. Jāvīd Nāma, p. 101.
 5. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.111.

and 'rūḥ' used in the Qūr'ān¹ (although according to Iqbāl, "the word 'nafs' does not seem to have been used in the Qurān in any technical sense of the kind imagined by Muslim theologians"²). According to Ibn-e-Rushd intelligence is not a form of the body but belongs to a different order of being. It transcends individuality and is one, universal, and eternal. "This obviously means that, since unitary intellect transcends individuality, its appearance as so many unities in the multiplicity of human persons is a mere illusion. The eternal unity of intellect may mean, as ~~R~~man thinks, the everlastingness of humanity and civilization; it does not surely mean personal immortality."³ Iqbāl, therefore, rejects Ibn-e-Rushd's metaphysical viewpoint.

Iqbāl next views ethical arguments, such as that of Kant and modern versions of the Kantian position. Such arguments, says Iqbāl, "depend on a kind of faith in the fulfilment of the claims of justice, or in the irreplaceable and unique work of man as an individual pursuer of infinite ideals."⁴ Kant considers immortality to be beyond the scope of speculative reason. For him it is a postulate of

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.111.

2. Ibid. p. 112.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

practical reason which is derived from "the practically necessary condition of a duration adequate to the perfect fulfilment of the moral law."¹ According to Kant "the highest good is practically possible only on the supposition of the immortality of the soul,"² but Iqbāl remarks, "it is not clear... why the consummation of virtue and happiness should take infinite time."³ Hence the soul need not be immortal.

Materialism and immortality.

Iqbāl refers to "modern materialism which rejects immortality, holding that consciousness is merely a function of the brain, and therefore ceases with the cessation of the brain-process."⁴ William James thinks this argument is valid only if the function in question is taken to be productive. The mere fact that certain mental and bodily changes coincide does not mean that mental changes are ceased bodily changes. The function may not be necessarily productive, but only permissive or transmissive like the function of the trigger of a cross-bow or that of a reflecting lens.⁵ Iqbāl says, "This view which suggests that our inner life is due to the operation in us of a kind of transcendental mechanism of consciousness, somehow choosing a

1. Kant, I. Critique of Practical Reason (translated by Beck, L.W.) Chicago (Illinois) 1949, p. 235.

2. Ibid. p. 226.

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 113.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

physical medium for a short period of sport, does not give us any assurance of the continuance of the content of our actual experience."¹ The proper way of meeting materialism, says Iqbāl, is to confine science to certain specific aspects of reality for although "man has a spatial aspect... this is not the only aspect of man. There are other aspects ... which science must necessarily exclude from its study, and the understanding of which requires categories other than those employed by science."² To the materialist philosopher, all that Iqbāl can say is:

تری نجاتِ عمِ مرگ سے نہیں ممکن
 کہ توفیق کو سمجھتا ہے بیکرِ حالی

³(Zarb-e-Kalīm p. 3)

Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence.

We have already referred to Iqbāl's rejection of Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence which Iqbāl considers the "one positive view of immortality."⁴ Nietzsche believes in a temporal infinity behind us and ahead of us. The number of possible forms in which our ever-changing reality appears is, however, not infinite. Therefore all

-
1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.113.
 2. Ibid. pp 113-114.
 3. You cannot be free from the fear of death
For you consider the Self merely to be a body of clay.
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 114.

events must recur an infinite number of times.¹ Nietzsche's mistake, according to Iqbāl, is to consider time as an infinite series of events moving in a circle - in this case immortality does exist but becomes "absolutely intolerable."² "It is energy and the process of its eternal recurrence in finite centres that is to be regarded as immortal, and not 'I' and 'you.'"³ Iqbāl points out that according to Nietzsche what makes this kind of immortality bearable is "the expectation that a recurrence of the combination of energy-centres which constitutes my personal existence is a necessary factor in the birth of that ideal combination which he calls 'superman.' But the superman has been an infinite number of times before. His birth is inevitable; how can the prospect give me any aspiration?"⁴ Iqbāl considers Nietzsche's view as "a fatalism worse than the one summed up in the word 'qismat.' Such a doctrine, far from keeping up the human organism for the fight of life, tends to destroy its action-tendencies and relaxes the tension of the ego."⁵

The Qŏr'ān and immortality.

Iqbāl points out that the Qŏr'ān upholds the belief in

-
1. Holingdale, R. J. Nietzsche, pp 200-201.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.115.
 3. Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbāl, p. 53.
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 115-116.
 5. Ibid. p. 116.

resurrection and immortality (Sūra . 22:5; 75:36 ff), the "Qurānic doctrine of personal immortality being based on three propositions:

(1) That the ego has a beginning in time and did not pre-exist its emergence in the spatio-temporal order.

(3) That there is no possibility of return to this earth (Sūra 23:101 f; 84:19; 56:59 ff).

(3) That finitude is not a misfortune (Sūra. 19:95 f).¹

Iqbāl's views on death and immortality. Iqbāl believes in immortality, but it is not everybody's lot by right, as if the soul qua soul, were immortal. "Personal immortality," he says, "is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it... The ego must continue to struggle until he is able to gather himself up, and win his resurrection."² Thus Iqbāl does not regard immortality as man's inalienable right guaranteed by his faith.³ He is supported in his viewpoint by Professor

Pringle-Pattison: "People talk as if the being of a soul were something which almost defied annihilation, which at any rate could be brought to an end only by special fiat of the Deity.

But surely it is quite the other way. It is but a relaxing of

1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 116-119.

2. Ibid. pp 119-120.

3. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p.75.

control, and a process of dissociation at once begins. Nothing seems more fatally easy than the dissolution in this fashion of the coherent unity which we call a mind, if the process is allowed to continue and to spread. We can observe the phenomenon frequently in cases of disease, when it affects the practical activities of life; but the mere relaxation of moral effort may initiate the same process in the spiritual sphere. And without the unity implied in some continuous purpose, what prospect can there be of eternal life, or what meaning can it have?"¹

Iqbāl regards personal immortality as an aspiration "you can have it if you make an effort to achieve it. It depends on our adopting in this life modes of thought and activity which tend to maintain the state of tension... if our activity is directed towards the maintenance of a state of tension, the shock of death is not likely to affect it."² The "weak, created and dependent Ego ... can be made permanent by adopting a certain mode of life and thereby bringing it into contact with the ultimate source of life."³ Thus, for Iqbāl it is "the deed that prepares the ego for dissolution, or disciplines him for a future career."⁴

-
1. Pringle-Pattison, A.S. The Idea of Immortality, Oxford, 1922 p. 197.
 2. Iqbāl quoted by Nicholson, R.A. Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p xxiv.
 3. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl, p. 239.
 4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 119.

In his early poetry, Iqbāl seems to think of all human life as being immortal. In "Kinār-e-Rāvī," for instance, he says:

رواں ہے سینہ دریا پہ اک سفینہٴ بتر
 ہوا ہے موج سے ملاح جس کا گرم ستر
 سک رومی میں ہے مثلِ نگاہِ پیکتی
 لکل کے حلقہٴ حدِ نظر سے دور گئی
 ہمارِ زندگی، آدمی رواں ہے پو نہیں
 اند کے کر میں پیدا پو نہیں نہاں ہے پو نہیں
 تلکت سے پہ کبھی آشنا نہیں ہوتا
 نظر سے چھپتا ہے، لیکن ما نہیں ہوتا

¹(Bāng-e-Darā p.95)

Again,

مرنے والے مرتے ہیں لیکن فنا ہوتے نہیں
 یہ حقیقت میں کبھی ہم سے جدا ہوتے نہیں

²(Bāng-e-Darā p. 164)

Sometimes he speaks in words reminiscent of Shelley's "Adonais"

-
1. Swiftly across the river's bosom glides
 A boat, the oarsman wrestling with the waves,
 A skiff light - motioned as a darting glance,
 Soon far beyond the eye's curved boundary.
 So glides the bark of mortal life, in the ocean
 Of eternity so born, so vanishing,
 Yet never knowing what is death; for it
 May disappear from sight, but cannot perish.
 (Translation by Kiernan, V.G. Poems from Iqbāl, p. 9)
 2. Those who die, die but are not annihilated,
 In reality they do not part from us.

in which the dead Keats is ultimately shown as having become a star.

مرے فالوں کی جیسی روشنی ہے اس ظلمات میں
جس طرح تارے جھلکتے ہیں اندھری رات میں

¹(Bāng-e-Darā p.165)

In his very moving elegy on his mother's death, Iqbāl treats the question of death and immortality as if to suggest that human life cannot perish:

زندگی کی آگ کا انجام خاکتر نہیں ا
لٹنا جس کا مقدر ہو، یہ وہ گوہر ہیں

زندگی محبوب الہی دیدہٗ قدرت میں ہے
ذوقِ حقیقہٗ زندگی ہر پیر کی طراوت میں ہے
موت کے مہلکوں سے مٹ سکتا اگر نقشِ حیات
عام یوں اس کو نہ کر دیتا نظامِ کائنات

ہے اگر ارادہاں تو یہ سمجھو اصل کچھ بھی نہیں
جس طرح سوئے سے جیسے میں حلل کچھ بھی نہیں ا
آن اعلیٰ موت کا رازِ نمان کچھ اور ہے
نقش کی نایا پداری سے عیاں کچھ اور ہے ا

2. The forehead of our dead one shines in this darkness
As stars gleam in a dark night.

جنتِ نظارہ ہے نقشِ ہوا مالائے آب
موج مضطر توڑ کر تعمیر کرتی ہے حباب

موج کے دامن میں پھر اس کو جھیا دیتی ہے یہ
کتنی بے دردی سے نقشِ اپنا مٹا دیتی ہے یہ

بھرنہ کر سکتی حباب اپنا اگر پیدا ہوا
توڑنے میں اس کے یوں عوفی نہ بے پروا ہوا
فطرتِ ہستی شہید آرزو رہتی نہ ہو
خوب تر بیکر کی اس کو حسرتی رہتی نہ ہو

¹(Bāng-e-Darā pp 253-254)

-
1. Life's flame is not destined to end in ashes,
This pearl is not destined to be shattered,
Life is so precious in the eyes of Nature,
In everything there is the desire to preserve it.
~~If death could have erased the mark of life,~~
The universal order would not have made it so common.
If it is common and cheap, think that death is nothing,
Just as to the living sleep is nothing.
Unknowing One death's secret is something else,
The impermanence of life shows something else.
The air above the waves is delightful to see
It breaks up the restless wave to make a bubble.
Then hides it in the bosom of the wave -
Now heartlessly it wipes out its own manifestation.
If the air could not again create its own bubble
Then it would not have destroyed it so carelessly.
The nature of Being is the prey of yearning,
It seeks to create^a more flawless form.

The emphasis here is on the evolution of life towards greater perfection rather than on the effort involved on the part of the individual ego to win its resurrection. However, we know that already in 1910, Iqbāl was beginning to think of immortality not as "a state" but as "a process."¹ Life offers man "a scope for ego-activity, and death is the first test of the synthetic activity of the ego."² This idea is repeated throughout Iqbāl's mature writings:

خودی ہے زندہ تو ہے موت اک مقامِ حیات
کہ عشقِ موت سے کرتا ہے امتحانِ ثبات

³ (Armagan-e-Hijaz p. 245)

or

بخود مار آؤدی را بختہ ترگیر
اگر پُری، پس از مردن پُری

⁴ (Payām-e-Mashriq p. 36)

-
1. Stray Reflections, p. 17.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p. 119.
 3. If Selfhood is alive then death is but a Stage in life, For love tests immutability by means of death.
 4. Fear not; take thou a Selfhood more mature, Which grasping, after death thou shalt not die. (Translation by Arberry, A.J. The Tulip of Sinai, p.10).

The problem of death and everlasting life is envisaged
in a poem entitled "Eternal Life"

گمانِ سرکہ بیایاں رسید کارِ مغان	ہزار مادہٴ ناخوردہ در دُبِ ناک است
چمن و سن است دلین جو عجب ستوانِ زلیبت	قنائے زندگیش از دمِ صفا پاک است
اگر ز زمینِ حیاتِ اگلی، محوے و مگر	دے کہ از حلتی خار آرزو پاک است
سخود فریدہ و محکم جو کو صاراں زی	جو حسِ مری کہ هوا بیز و شعلہ بیباک است

¹(Payām-e-Mashriq p.108)

Immortality is not "a static condition to be achieved
and enjoyed in an eternity of restful glory."² Iqbāl says:

سیاراں از دمِ بر ساطل کہ آنجا
دے زندگانِ نرم خیز است
بدر یا غلط و ماصحش در آدیر
حیاتِ حا و داں ابد سبیر است

³(Payām-e-Mashriq p.41)

1. Think ye not that the Magi have finished their work:
A thousand wines yet undrunk are frothing in the vine's
own heart.
A meadow is beautiful, but thou canst not live as a bud
forever;

Divine breezes do tear the garment of life from thee.
If thou hast well comprehended the secret mystery of life
Trust not a heart that is free from the twinging thorn of
desire.

Live drawn within thyself, mighty as a mountain
Not like a fluttering straw: beware, quick is the
wind and brave and burning the flame.

(Translation by Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the
Religious Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbāl" p.177.

2. Whittemore, R. "Iqbāl's Panentheism" p.75.

3. Take not thy banquet on the shore, for there
Too gently flows the melody of life:
Plunge in the sea, do battle with the waves,
For immortality is won in strife.

(Translation by Arberry, A. J. The Tulip of Sinai, p.12)

As the parable of the thirsty bird¹ in Asrār-e-Khudī illustrates, if one is a dew-drop one is bound to be swallowed by the bird, but if one is a diamond then one can withstand all forces of disintegration and dissolution.

Iqbāl's belief in conditional immortality is regarded by one writer as "a serious deviation from the orthodox teaching that is based on the Qurānic vision of the life beyond. Islām and Christianity consider the ego immortal as such and make its state in the Hereafter depend on what it does here and now."² Another writer, however, points out the emphasis placed by the Qūr'ān on the importance of man's efforts in the direction of immortality. "Those who do wish for the hereafter, and strive therefor with all due striving, and have faith - they are the ones whose striving is acceptable" (Sūra 17:19).³ It has been observed by Professor Schimmel that Iqbāl's ideas on immortality find support also in the works of many Western philosophers.⁴ Pannwitz, for instance writes, "if immortality is equal to the preservation of what is eternal in man, then it is unthinkable that men should be immortal in the same manner. In many of them there may be nothing eternal which would be worthy of immortality."⁵

1. Asrār-e-Khudī pp 60-62.

2. Vahiduddin, S. "The Philosophy of Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl" The Aryan Path, Bombay, December 1957. Volume XXVIII, p.548.

3. Dar, B.A. Qur'anic Ethics, p.51.

4. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p.283.

5. Pannwitz, R. quoted by Schimmel, A.M. Gabriel's Wing, p.284.

Iqbāl, then, regards death as the end of the weak but not of the self-fortified ego which realises that "we are timeless, and it is possible to realise our timelessness even in this life."¹ In Jāvīd Nāma, Tīpū Sultān, the martyr-king, speaks of death as if it were a moment of triumph rather than of horror:

در جان شاهین بزی شاهین نیر ۱	سینه داری اگر در خود برتر
از خدا کم خواستم طول حیات ۱	ز آنکه در عرض حیات آمد ثبک
یک مقام ار صد مقام ادست مرگ ۱	مندو حق صبغم و آهوست مرگ
عقل شاهین که افتد بر حمام ۱	می فتد بر مرگ آن مرد نام
زندگی اورا امرام از بیم مرگ ۱	هر زمان میرد غلام از بیم مرگ
مرگ اورا می دهد حای دگر ۱	مندو آزاد را شاه دگر
مرگ آراداں ز آئے بیش نیست ۱	ادفود اندیشی است مرگ اندیش نیست ۱

²(Jāvīd Nāma p.217)

1. Iqbāl quoted by Nicholson R.A. in Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. xxv.
2. If you have a breast worthy of an arrow,
Live like a falcon, and like a falcon die,
Immortality is in the breadth of life -
I do not ask of God for length of days.
The Man of God is a lion, and death a fawn;
Death is but one station for him of a hundred.
The perfect man swoops upon death
Even as a falcon swooping upon a dove,
The slave dies every moment in fear of death;
The fear of death makes life for him a thing forbidden,
The free servant has another dignity,
Death bestows upon him a new life.
He is anxious for the self, but not for death,
Since to the free death is no more than an instant.
(Translation by Arberry, A.J. Jāvīd Nāma, pp 133-134.)

Iqbāl has a habit of seeing the familiar in an unfamiliar way, and so once again he makes a rather startling comparison of Man with God:

گر جہ مادِ بخانِ بے مال و یریم
ار خدا در علم مرگ افزوں تریم

¹(Jāvīd Nāma p.39)

The immortality which Man wins is better than the immortality of God:

دوامِ حق عز کے کا دِ اوستیت کہ اورا اس دِوامِ ار حسبِ توستیت
دوامِ آن نہ کہ حانِ مستعاده نشود ار عشق و مستی یابد ارے

²(Zabūr-e-'Ajam p.237)

The Man of God does not fear death, for death is but the opening of another door. When death comes, it finds him smiling.

لشانِ مردِ حقِ دیکرِ جہ گویم
3. مرگ آید تبسم بر لبِ اوست

³(Armagan-e-Hijaz p.165)

1. Though we are birds without wings or feathers,
We know more of the science of death than God.
(Translation by Arberry, A.J. Jāvīd Nāma, p.42)
2. The Immortality of God
Is not His deed's reward:
It is an elemental attribute,
Not a sought-after fruit.
Far better is that immortality
Which is won by a borrowed soul
As its love's need, its frenzy's goal.
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, p.19)
3. What is the sign of the faithful man?
When death comes, he has a smile on his lips.

The death to be feared is not the physical event of dying. In "Gulshan -e-Rāz-e-Jadīd," Iqbāl speaks of the death of the body and of the soul:

اوراں نورے کہ داسیند داری	تو ادرا فانی د آئی شماری
اوراں مرگے کہ ہی آید چہ ماک است	مودی جون بختہ سدا مرگ یاک است
ز مرگِ دیگرے نرزد دلِ من	دلِ من جانِ من آب و گلِ من
ز کارِ عشقِ و مستی برفتادن	شرارِ خودِ غاشقا کے ندادن
بدستِ خودِ کفنِ بر خودِ بریدن	بجتمِ فویشِ مرگِ فویشِ دیدن
ترا اپن مرگِ مردم در کمین است	شرسار وے کہ مرگِ ما ہیں است

کد گورِ تو اندر بیگرِ تو
نکیر و شکرِ اد در برِ تو

¹(Zabūr-e-'Ajam, p.230)

-
1. Because you cannot see the light
Revealed to the Self's eyes,
You think it is mere mortal dust.
But at its perfect best, ---
It is immune from death,
The stoppage of mere breath
The body's death is not the death to dread,
But death of that more subtle kind -
Death of the soul, the heart, the mind;
The death in which the Self lies dead;
In which love's task is disavowed;
In which you selfishly deny
Your spark to someone else's clay;
In which you tailor your own shroud
And witness your own funeral.
This is the death which all
The time is stalking you;
This is the death which you have to eschew.
This death digs your grave inside you,
With your Recording Angel astride you.
(Translation by Husain, H. The New Rose-Garden of Mystery,
p.15).

Following the tradition so dear to the mystics: 'mūtū qabla an tamūtū' (die before you die) Iqbāl believes in the possibility of finding a purifying death even before the time of death. He says:

اے مثالِ مردہ در صدوقِ گور
می توان بر حاستن بے مانگِ صورا

¹ (Jāvīd Nāma p. 18)

Barzakh. According to Iqbāl, the struggle through which man wins immortality is not one which culminates with death. Death is the last serial event.² Resurrection and immortality are not external events, they are accomplished within the self and are "the consummation of a life process within the ego."³ If present action has sufficiently fortified the ego against the shock that physical dissolution brings, then death "is only a kind of passage to what the Qurān describes as 'Barzakh'... a state of consciousness characterised by a change in the ego's attitude towards time and space."⁴

-
1. You who are like a dead man in the grave's coffer, Resurrection is possible without the sound of the Trumpet. (Translation by Arberry, A.J. Jāvīd Nāma, p.32)
 2. Bausani, A. "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl" p.174.
 3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.120.
 4. Ibid. pp 119-120.

The concept of 'Barzakh' (Sūra 25:55; 55:19) has been described by Muslim theologians and mystics "partly as a temporary, partly as a spatial, waiting period or room between death and resurrection, and which later on developed into a kind of purgatory."¹ This concept interested Iqbal throughout his life.² To Professor Nicholson he wrote, "After death there may be an interval of relaxation, as the Korān speaks of a 'barzakh,' or intermediate state, which lasts until the Day of Resurrection."³ According to Iqbal, 'Barzakh' "does not seem to be merely a passive state of expectation; it is a state in which the ego catches a glimpse of fresh aspects of Reality, and prepares himself for adjustment to these aspects."⁴ The ego, therefore, does not relax even in 'Barzakh.'

Resurrection of the body. In passing Iqbal touches the question whether the resurrection of the ego is also accompanied by the resurrection of the body. He refers to Shāh Walī Ullāh "the last great theologian of Islām," who is inclined to think that ego's resurrection "does involve at least some kind of physical medium suitable to the ego's new environment."⁵ Also, in his letter to Professor Nicholson he says, "although life abhors repetition in its evolution,

1. Schimmel, A.M. Gabriel's Wing, p.277.

2. Ibid.

3. Iqbal quoted by Nicholson, R.A. in Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. xxiv.

4. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp120.

5. Ibid. p.122.

yet on Bergson's principles the resurrection of the body too, as Wildon Carr says, is quite possible.¹ Iqbāl himself is rather non-committal and vague on this point. He points out that, "the nature of the universe is such that it is open to it to maintain in some other way the kind of individuality necessary for the final working out of human action, even after the disintegration of what appears to specify his individuality in his present environment. What that other way is we do not know. Nor do we gain any further insight into the nature of the 'second creation' by associating it with some kind of body, however subtle it may be. The analogies of the Qurān only suggest it as a fact; they are not meant to reveal its nature and character. Philosophically speaking, therefore, we cannot go further than this - that in view of the past history of man it is highly improbable that his career should come to an end with the dissolution of his body."²

Heaven and Hell. Iqbāl does not regard Heaven and Hell as localities, but states of the spirit. Hell is the painful realisation of one's failure as a man and Heaven the joy of triumph over the forces of disintegration.³ Professor Schimmel points out that Iqbāl's conception of Heaven and Hell is similar to that of Ibn 'Arabī who considers Hell to

1. Iqbāl quoted by Nicholson, R.A. Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. xxiv.

2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, pp 122-123.

3. Ibid. p.123.

be the realisation of the individual self as slave, and Heaven as the realisation of the self in the state of 'rubūbiya', the Lordship.¹

Iqbāl conceives of Hell not as "a pit of everlasting torture inflicted by a revengeful God; it is a corrective experience which may make a hardened ego once more sensitive to the living breeze of Divine Grace. Nor is Heaven a holiday... the recipient of Divine illumination is not merely a passive recipient. Every act of a free ego creates a new situation, and thus offers further opportunities of creative unfolding."²

The journey of the ego does not end in Paradise. As 'Aṭṭār had stated "When the way towards God is finished, the way in God begins."³ The Man of God is not enticed by the so-called joys of Paradise:

کہتے ہیں فرشتے کہ دلاؤ پیر سے مومن

خوردوں کو شکایت ہے کم آئین سے مومن

⁴(Zarb-e-Kalīm p.41)

In Payām-e-Mashriq he shows Goethe refusing to stay with the houri because

-
1. Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p.285.
 2. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām, p.123.
 3. 'Aṭṭār quoted by Schimmel, A. M. Gabriel's Wing, p.286.
 4. The angels say: "The faithful is gracious,"
The houris complain: "The faithful is aloof!"

دلِ عاشقانِ کمیرد نہ ایشیتِ حاودانے

¹(Payām-e-Mashriq p.149)

For Iqbāl the idea of a static paradise is quite unbearable

گر نجاتِ ما فراع از حسرت
گود خوشتر از ایشیتِ رنگِ دولت

²(Jāvid Nāma p.30)

Goethe's prayer could also be Iqbāl's in spirit: "Let us continue working until we are called back by the Divine Spirit, return into the Ether. May then, the Eternally living God, not withhold from us new activities, analogous to those which we were used to in this world."³

-
1. The lover's heart dies from eternal paradise.
 2. If our salvation amounts to freedom from yearning, Then the grave is better than a paradise of hue and scent.
 3. Goethe quoted by Schimmel, A.M. Talk on The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām at Lāhore on 13.4.61.