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ABSTRACT OF A THESIS PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM.

1971.

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Aspects of Patterning in the Vocabulary of Chaucer, with Particular
Reference to his Courtly Terminology.

The present study analyses the senses and sense-relations of approximately fifty words of two major groups signifying benevolence and malevolence within courtly contexts in the works of Chaucer. The analysis is carried out not with individual words alone, but also in such a manner as to indicate how these words enter into patterned relationships of various types and origins, and some of these are described. Though the ultimate contribution of the thesis is conceived to be in terms of a more precise understanding of the conceptual background and stylistic resources of Chaucer's art, thereby furnishing the equipment for a surer and closer criticism of late mediaeval English literature in general, some account is also taken of recent linguistic thought on the structure of the vocabulary and meaning.

The problems of analysis and representation of the meaning of vocabulary items and their inter-relationships are considered as a preliminary: structural semantics, conceptual fields, collocations, idiom-formation and context of situation are discussed, and the contribution of linguistic theory to the method of analysis is indicated at some length. The limitations of the ordinary, synchronic model of linguistic description for the study of the lexis and diction of a mediaeval language are demonstrated, and the reconciliation of synchronic with diachronic methods is urged as a corrective. The notion of a fully extensive semantic field in this area of the vocabulary is rejected in favour of the inter-relation of numerous lesser systems, and the importance of diachronic and extralinguistic factors in the study of vocabulary is then illustrated by their role in explaining the origin and development of the lexical, lexico-grammatical and semantic patterns originally isolated by synchronic analysis. By these means a literary critical procedure is envisaged which would combine the insights of literary and intellectual history with the critical objectivity of descriptive linguistics.

J. D. BURNLEY

ASPECTS OF PATTERNING IN THE VOCABULARY OF CHAUCER
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO HIS COURTLY TERMINOLOGY

VOL. I

Ph.D. Thesis

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The years of the preparation of this thesis have been spent on the move so that my debts, which I acknowledge happily, are scattered throughout the country.

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Introduction

0.1. The aim of the present study is to examine the senses and illuminate the uses of a number of words from a particular area of the vocabulary of Chaucer, indicating, where appropriate, any patterns into which the words enter. But this is not the totality of its aims: the way in which it performs this task is equally important. The information which this study derives must be presented in a form which renders it easily re-applicable to the literature from which it is drawn, whether at the stylistic level or that of the background of ideas. The purpose of this study is not to elicit a theory of semantics, with Chaucer's language for exemplification, but to employ such theoretical considerations as may be useful in the analysis of Chaucer's usage, with the intention of increasing the assurance with which close, textually-based, literary criticism can approach his work. Its representation and discussion of linguistic meaning must therefore be somewhat informal and, with this in mind, I have adopted an eclectic and sometimes flexible attitude to linguistic theory which requires some comment.

0.2. The debt of modern linguistics to the Geneva scholar, De Saussure, is acknowledged to be heavy, and it is nowhere heavier than in its exploitation of the notion that systematic relations are to be found in the vocabulary of a language. This overall system of the vocabulary exists only in the synchronic plane and is a feature of 'langue' rather than 'parole'. It is exemplified by Saussure's famous image of the chess-board, which is paralleled by Ipsen's image of the mosaic.¹ Unfortunately, the compilers of Saussure's book were wont to express his views as axioms, thus (p.83): "The opposition between the two viewpoints, the synchronic and the diachronic, is absolute

¹ A Course in General Linguistics, tr. Wade Baskin, London (1960), pp.88-89. Ipsen's first use of the mosaic image is in: 'Der alte Orient und die Indogermanen' in Stand und Aufgaben der Sprachwissenschaft. Festschrift für Streitberg, Heidelberg (1924), p. 225.

and allows no compromise." and, speaking of the internal and external aspects of language: "In any case, separation of the two viewpoints is mandatory, and the more rigidly they are kept apart, the better it will be."¹ Such rigidity may, however, militate against the supply of information of extreme value to literary understanding. In a synchronic and internal study of a language, Saussure goes so far as to say that loan-words may be entirely satisfactorily treated as members of the language system, regardless of their derivation. Such wilful blindness is, of course, undesirable in a study related to literary criticism and, indeed, in the study of a Middle English writer such as Chaucer, an axiomatic statement of this sort obscures questions of prime importance. Chaucer's language is the English of a man who could express himself equally readily in French, and the recent linguistic history of England was such that we might expect to find elements from at least two language systems in his writing. The extent to which these two linguistic systems and their associated stylistic traditions had coalesced is in itself a pertinent question for any structural study of his language. Can we, in any case, speak of synchrony in relation to these problems, when Chaucer's poetic life extended over thirty-five years, and clear traces of the evolution of his vocabulary are apparent in it?² Furthermore, the greatest proportion of the corpus is poetic; much of it fictional and in verse. Chaucer's wide experience enables him to lend verisimilitude or verbal irony, by employing, correctly or incorrectly, terms from a bewildering range of linguistic registers: his interests include medicine and the law, astronomy and astrology, protocol and the wine-trade. In The Reeve's Tale, he is capable of employing some of the characteristics of Northern Middle English sufficiently well for

¹ op.cit., p.22. By "internal and external", Saussure means the systematic relations within the language structure, and the relations which language contracts with culture, institutions, political history in the external world.

² In translating Le Roman de la Rose, Chaucer used the word honde as a courtly epithet (235: 1305). In later work, its equivalent was in a dialectal sense, "a dog's name." Chaucer's Works, ed. F. J. Furnivall, 1880, p. 1305.

Professor Tolkien to refer to him as a fellow philologist.¹

The fact that so much of the corpus is in verse is significant, not only in respect of the more formal organisation of the language, but also with relation to Chaucer's work as part of the mediæval verse tradition. Much of the diction of Chaucer's poetry is the heritage of earlier writers, borrowed by imitation from English writers or by loan-translation from the French. Thus, many rhymes, verbal formulae and collocations are products, not so much of the synchronic system of the language, as of the diachronic tradition of poetic composition. They form patterns in what E. Coseriu has called the 'architecture' of the language as opposed to its structure. Such patterned usages cannot be economically or elegantly accommodated in the synchronic system of the language and can be better explained diachronically or by extra-linguistic reference; means of explanation which should supplement the synchronic one.²

Considerations of this kind encourage the investigator of a mediæval text to take a less doctrinaire view of synchrony and the propositions dependent upon it than theoretical purity demands. As a result, it is clear that we should expect to find no fully extensive and integrated system in the collection of linguistic usages constituting the Chaucer canon; the more so since our approach is necessarily at the level of 'parole' rather than 'langue' and we can only abstract towards the latter with difficulty. Diversity and variety at the level of usage form as much a part of Chaucer's

¹ 'Chaucer as a Philologist,' TPS (1934), pp.1ff.

² The protests of scholars at the peremptory distinction made between synchronic and diachronic approaches have been heard from Jespersen's review of the Course (1916) onwards.

W. v. Wartburg, Problems and Methods in Linguistics, tr. E. Palmer, Oxford (1969), pp.138ff.

E. Coseriu, 'Lexical Structures and the Teaching of Vocabulary,' in Linguistic Theories and their Application, A.I.D.E.L.A., London (1967).

S. Ullman, The Principles of Semantics, 2nd ed., Oxford (1957), pp.139ff.

G.N. Leech, A Linguistic Guide to English Poetry, London (1969), pp.51-52.

Leech notes the licence of the poet to ignore many of the 'unities' set up by linguistic constructs such as register, dialect and synchrony.

language as his art. Hence, such rigidity as Saussure's theoretical statements presuppose is not only unnecessary, but may prove injurious to the kind of study here undertaken. Nevertheless, though we may not be discussing a single, unified system of language, minor systematic relations must exist, and there remains a compulsion to define, clarify and pursue consistently whatever approach is adopted, and to mark explicitly any deviations from it. We shall commence by the discussion of some theoretical standpoints on the composition of linguistic meaning, hoping to derive from them some stimulus for the creation of a method of investigation.

Section I

Preliminary Discussion

I.I Meaning and Form

I.I.1 At an early stage in any lexical investigation the problem of the representation of lexical items must be faced. Any assumption may be subject to later modification, but it is essential to decide the approximate extent of the syntagmatic string with which we are to deal and to assume a relationship to the abstraction 'lexical item.'

I.I.2 Traditional language study identifies the 'word' as the unit both of grammar and lexis: modern linguistics allows the reality of the item 'word' as a unit of language, but finds difficulty in defining it, according to the means of analysis it has developed, in such a way that the definitions are mutually consistent.¹

Thus, Lyons² speaks of words, differentiated from each other according to the means of analysis applied to the same stretch of utterance, as 'phonological', 'orthographical' and 'grammatical' words. He reserves a fourth category for those forms classifiable together to represent a lexical item.

Halliday considers the word to be one of the units of grammar, filling a place on the scale of rank between the morpheme and the group, but he considers lexis to be an entirely separate level in linguistic analysis, and comments:

¹ Compare C.F. Hockett, A Course in Modern Linguistics, New York (1958), pp.166ff.

D. Bolinger, Aspects of Language, New York (1968), pp.51ff.
and the remark of H.A. Gleason, An Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics, New York (1955), p. 110:

'The word is one of the most difficult concepts in English morphology to define.'

² An Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, Cambridge (1968), p.196.

Interesting comments on the difficulties of defining the word are to be found in: A. Martinet, 'Le Mot' in Problèmes du Langage (Collection Diogenes) 1966.

The variant spellings in Sir Gawain byn aunt; by naunt (2464; 2467) may represent uncertainty concerning the extent of the phonological words. Chaucer's orthographical word lest may represent two grammatical words: 3rd pers. sing. of listen and the noun lust.

the lexical item is not necessarily coextensive on either axis (paradigmatic or syntagmatic) with the item, or rather with any of the items, identified and accounted for in the grammar.¹

The significance of this is borne out by examples like the following, where inflexional variants and similar forms from different word classes may or may not have semantic implications: grace: graces - ire: ires.

kynde(n): kynde(adj): kyndenesse.

- benigne: benignely: benignitee.

pacience: pacient (used attributively)

and pacient (used substantively).

Formally similar phrases (have pitee(on): have pitee) may have quite different significance. On the syntagmatic plane, the lexical item may or may not be represented by a continuous syntactical unit: thus, where we should like to elicit a lexical item represented by the phrase 'have pitee of', we may find a discontinuous sequence: have had of her pyte.

Halliday's conclusion is that:

On the syntagmatic axis, it may be useful to recognize a lexical item which has no defined status in the grammar and is not identified as morpheme, word or group.

I.I.3 The notion of an abstract 'word', consisting of all the inflexional variants of a particular form, is familiar to traditional language studies: the abstract word is realised in a number of different forms according to its system of accidence. This notion seems to be what underlies Lyons' conception of the 'lexeme'; the unit which he takes to be the formal representative of a lexical item.² There seems to be little point in

¹ 'Lexis as a linguistic level' in In Memory of J.R. Firth, ed. Bazell, Catford, Halliday, Robins, London (1966), p.153.

The notion of change in sense, related to inflexional change or other formal distinction, such as gender, is illustrated by Ullman by the French words le poêle, 'stove' and la poêle, 'frying pan' and the German die Kiefer, 'jaws' and die Kiefern, 'firs'

'Semantic Universals' in Universals of Language, ed. J. Greenberg, MIT Press, 2nd ed. (1966), p.236.

² Structural Semantics, Publications of the Philological Society XX, Oxford (1963), p.12. As numbers of allomorphs are classed together as a single morpheme, so the variant forms of the same lexical word are classed together as a lexeme. This lexeme differs from the usage of C.F. Hockett (A Course in Modern Linguistics, p.170) and others, including Martinet (see below, p 8).

distinguishing between inflexional variants of the same word in the process of lexical investigation, though, as noted in the previous paragraph, the investigator cannot simply assume that similarity of form implies similarity of sense. To class a number of inflexional variants as representatives of the same 'lexeme', it is required that they also have the same lexical reference. The investigator who uses the abstraction of 'lexeme' as his basic unit must be aware of the possibility of variety in sense implied by small differences such as those of accident.

I.I.4 Sinclair, employing a method of lexical investigation based upon collocation, suggests that for speedy results the best method is the use of the word; he seems to have a definition of word in mind which would correspond with Lyons' lexeme.¹ He is, however, aware that the distinction in inflexional ending may be important to the sense (daunger; daungers) and is forced to recommend a procedure at the level of the morpheme to obviate such mistakes. Unfortunately, at this level of analysis, his method will furnish a task which is 'beyond the capacity of the most dedicated human drudge', though it might fall within the abilities of a 'very large computer'.

Further complexities are admitted by the recognition of the need to identify polymorphemic lexical items and to distinguish more than one item of the same form.² Presumably, within this procedure, grace would represent a lexical item of single morpheme form, whilst graces would represent a different lexical item realised by the combination of two morphemes. It must of course be noticed that, according to context, the single morpheme grace may have a large number of different lexical references.

¹ 'Beginning the Study of Lexis' in In Memory of J.R. Firth (op. cit.), pp. 419-20.

² By form Sinclair simply means a stretch of language which has not yet been given lexical status. Traditional language studies would consider polymorphemic items to be idioms incapable of resolution by ordinary grammatical rules. The second problem, that of polysemy, is one which has occupied much attention in more traditional works (cf. H. Koziol, Grundzüge der Englischen Semantik, Vienna and Stuttgart (1967), pp.24ff.

Sinclair does not concern himself in this discussion with the theoretical problems of the determination of morphemes or their division into sub-types, though there is no unity among linguists on these points. If we assume that the morpheme is a form/meaning composite, as Sinclair appears to do, we are left with the necessity of the division of morphemes into lexical morphemes (those with which we would be primarily concerned) and functional morphemes¹ (which lack lexical meaning but are capable of the formal or semantic modification of lexical morphemes). Although we are primarily interested in the first type, we cannot ignore the second when they are in combination with morphemes of the first type.

There are obvious advantages in detail and precision in basing an enquiry upon the morpheme, yet it shares many of the disadvantages of the selection of any grammatical unit as the representative of lexical reference. Yet more pressing than theoretical objections are the practical ones of the labour required in differentiating morphemes and detecting polymorphic units.

I.I.5 If we return to the desirability, voiced by Halliday, of separating lexical and grammatical items, Lyons' abstract lexeme seems a possible starting point. An alternative approach is offered by the Saussurean semiotic assumptions of Martinet's syntactic theory. He is unable to find sufficient linguistic criteria for a confident and mutually consistent definition of the word and suggests instead the notion of a syntactic unit consisting of a significans and significatum: this minimal sign, he calls a moneme.² For Martinet, each moneme represents the exercise of a deliberate

¹ This division is made by J. Fisiak, Morphemic Structure of Chaucer's English, Alabama U.P. (1965), pp.16-28.

The division of language into function words and meaning words is a feature of the logical analysis of language from Aristotle to Fries (he speaks of parts of speech and function words and of lexical meaning and structural meaning) The Structure of English, London (1957), pp.54ff. and Weinreich, 'The Semantic Structure of Language' in ed. Greenberg, op. cit., pp.142-216.

H.W. Bloomfield uses the medieval terms categorematic and syncategorematic in 'The Syncategorematic in Poetry' in To Honor Roman Jakobson I, Hague (1967), pp.309-317.

² Elements of General Linguistics, trans. E. Palmer, London (1964), pp.93ff.

choice in the string of utterance from a set of items possible at that point. According to the extent of the set from which the choice is made, the monemes are subdivided into lexemes and morphemes. The former are selected from an infinite or very large set, the latter from a more strictly limited one; thus, in the sentence 'John saw the dog', John, saw and dog would be lexemes whereas the, which is selected from a set of two (a, the), is a morpheme.

The combination of two or more monemes which, within the structure of the sentence, have more intimate ties than with other items in the sentence, Martinet calls a syntagm.¹

Thus, inflected forms are considered to be syntagms consisting of the juxtaposition or amalgamation of lexemes and morphemes. Formally similar word-class variants (pitce, pitous, pitously) are regarded as derivatives composed of a lexeme and one or more monemes of rather ill-defined status.²

I.I.6 As the syntactic theory underlying a semantic investigation, Martinet's ideas have certain features which recommend them. Firstly, it is a syntactic theory overtly based upon a form/meaning relationship; its units are defined by the relationship between form and meaning, thus obviating

¹ Martinet ('Le Mot' in Problèmes du Langage, Collection Diogène, Paris (1966), pp.39-53) gives the following example, in which three syntagms are marked: 'un énorme rocher/surplombait/la voie ferrée.'. He points out that the phrase au/fur et a mesurc, though analysable into five traditional words, represents a single moneme since the sequence of items in it is predetermined allowing no choice after the choice at/is made.

² Martinet seems to consider affixes as a rather untidy unit, a special variety of lexeme, sharing some features with morphemes. (Elements of General Linguistics, pp.127-29). To Lyons, they represent a reason why analysis at the level of morphemes is unsatisfactory (Structural Semantics, p.78). He gives the following examples in which morphemic analysis would spuriously suggest a similar semantic relation: ignores: ignorance.

perseveres: perseverance.

He suggests that the remedy is to treat these at the level of the lexeme, in which case the first pair would represent two lexemes and the second variants of a single lexeme. According to Martinet's theory, the first pair would consist of syntagms composed of two different lexemes and two different morphemes and the second pair would consist of two syntagms, in each of which the same lexeme was combined with different morphemes. It is obvious that from the point of view of semantic analysis, Lyons' conception of the lexeme, although arrived at by a different method than Martinet's, will coincide with Martinet's conception of that term.

the difficulties of polysemy. The meaning of lexemes in this theory is essentially their sense in context. Items consisting of more than one word or more than one morpheme (in the sense used by Sinclair, above) will automatically be accommodated when the criterion of significatum is applied. Secondly, clear practical procedures are suggested by the theory in the comparison of more and more similar utterances until the minimum distinctive sign (the moneme) is isolated. Concentrating upon the significatum, the theory allows the identification of discontinuous significantia in the moneme or syntagma, and the notion of the syntagma allows great flexibility in the relation of linguistic form to lexical reference.

Since the theory will accommodate such variety of syntagmatic 'length' and discontinuity with relation to single lexical reference, a practical method suggests itself which will consist of gathering lengths of text, including the orthographic word (or Lyons' lexeme) we are investigating. The length of the piece must be great enough to ensure that we have included all the significantia of the moneme we are seeking; this means at least clause length, and preferably sentence length. The paradigmatic comparison of a number of occurrences will swiftly reveal the syntagms which concern us and a further such analysis should reveal the monemes and, in particular, the lexemes we wish to identify. The essential feature of the analysis is that it proceeds from larger stretches of text to smaller and does not try to extrapolate the representatives of lexical units at a given size of grammatical unit all in one step.

The effect of this will be of a kind of filter in which the syntagms or monemes of high frequency and great syntagmatic length at the formal level will be set aside early in the analysis. Hence, the two sentences:

John gave bread

John gave alms

may be assumed to have the same structure, but a comparison of the occurrences of alms and bread would soon reveal a greater affinity between this verb and

aims than there exists with bread. The phrase give aims might be treated as a syntagma and we would look out for related phrases. More indivisible idioms would also be separated from ordinary phrases at an early stage. Martinet's theory, with its extraordinary flexibility, proves a fertile and stimulating starting-point for semantic analysis.¹

¹ The flexibility of Martinet's approach is exemplified in the following (Problèmes du Langage, p.53):

.... deux ou plus de deux monèmes qui sont entre eux dans ses rapports plus intimes que ceux qui les relient au reste de l'énoncé forment un syntagme. Tout, dans ce sens, n'est pas syntagme dans un énoncé: dans Jean part demain, il n'y a pas de syntagme mais trois monèmes qui épuisent l'énoncé. on n'a aucun intérêt à poser, entre le monème et l'énoncé complet minimum qui est la phrase, une unité contraignante, de celles dont fait nécessairement partie tout segment de l'énoncé. Libre au linguiste de délimiter des syntagmes là où son exposé y gagnera en clarté. Libre aussi à lui d'opérer avec des mots partout où la structure de la langue à l'étude paraîtra réclamer qu'on mette l'accent sur la cohérence sémantique et formelle de certaines syntagmes.

In view of Halliday's views (quoted above) about the relation of grammar to lexis and the declaration of Lyons (Structural Semantics, p.29) that morpheme, lexeme or a higher unit may be the unit of semantic analysis, the attractions of such flexibility are obvious.

I.II Meaning and Situation

I.II.1 It is well-known that there exists no indissoluble bond between a formal unit of language and its significance, such that this one-to-one relationship is never disrupted. A linguistic form has a given significance, not through any inherent determination, but as a result of the custom of a single speech-community to understand a given utterance in a like way in specified circumstances. This contract, lacking codification, may be broken at any time. Such disruption, and the establishment of new bonds, have been the concern of those who investigate types and causes of semantic change.¹ Change may be brought about by linguistic processes, such as morpho-phonological re-analysis (pinta pint of), ellipsis (general general officer), or word-formation according to the rules inherent in the language (throughput put through),² or, more commonly, as a result of external factors such as psychological, cultural or social modifications in the society using a language. It is obvious from this that, since the significance of linguistic utterance can be affected by extra-linguistic phenomena, we must assume that a portion of the 'meaning' of any linguistic form is to be found in the circumstances of its use. This fact was recognised by traditional semanticists and Stern (p.60) speaks of a kind of central cognitive meaning surrounded by an aura of peripheral meanings composed of other senses and affective associations which might be of first importance in other contexts.

the

This kind of mentalistic notion of the relation between form and significance puts difficulties in the way of semantic analysis. Assuming its existence,

¹ The two most interesting modern theories are those of G. Stern, Meaning and Change of Meaning, Gothenberg, 1931 and S. Ullman, The Principles of Semantics, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1957. A more recent book which, like Stern's, provides a good stock of examples is: R.A. Waldron, Sense and Sense Development, London, 1967.

² This example was collected from The Sunday Times Business News, 5 March, 1967. Speaking of Jet Petroleum, the writer stated that they were seeking a higher 'throughput' per station. The word was still being used in the same context in the same paper in 1970.

how can one isolate the core meaning from a number of occurrences of a linguistic form? The complexity of the problem is increased when we recall that we can find no warrant for selecting any single formal unit as the representative of the lexical item and, even if we could, we should be faced by the problems of multiple meaning and synonymy. The imprecision of the meaning relation is doubly aggravated by the difficulty of both isolating the formal item with specific significance and the relationship between the contextual sense and central cognitive meaning. Considerations of this nature have made linguists reluctant to deal with the ^{meaning}senses of individual formal units in isolation. Emphasis has been placed not only upon use in a wide variety of interpretations of the term 'context', but also upon the problems of the combination of linguistic signs to form higher meaningful units. In this latter case logical consistency is of prime importance and the senses of individual words are of less concern than their combinative properties.

I.II.2 The association of the words 'meaning' and 'use' is most familiarly ascribed to Wittgenstein, though one may commence by quoting the neat formula of Stuart Chase (The Tyranny of Words, London (1938), p.7): 'The true meaning of a word is to be found by observing what a man does with it, not what he says about it.' Wittgenstein's conviction, that the only empirical data which we can assemble on the meaning of an utterance is that gained by describing the conditions of its use, is similarly quotable:

For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. ¹

Wittgenstein does not, however, make clear enough for linguistic analysis exactly what is meant by use. His interest in linguistic meaning was largely centred in the fact that the structure of derived sentences does not always reflect the underlying logical structure very precisely. This point is

¹ Philosophical Investigations, Oxford (1953), p.20.

taken up in a paper by R. Wollis¹ in which he demonstrates discrepancies between grammatical construction and logical inferences in utterances of similar structure. He closes his discussion by demonstrating how some adjectives are much more susceptible than others to contextual effects; psychological factors, relativity, vagueness, and point in time may affect the understanding of some assertions containing words like numerous and futuro. Use, then, is admitted to be more than the relation of grammatical structure and formal items to each other and to logical assertion; in a number of cases it includes also features which we might have considered extra-linguistic.

I.II.3 An attitude in some ways similar to that of Wittgenstein to the meaning of a linguistic utterance is to be found in the theories of J.R. Firth and his followers. Firth, influenced by his own work in the field in Africa and India, and also by the work of anthropologists, notably Malinowski, saw the meaning of utterances as part of an all-embracing theory of meaning by which units at each level of linguistic analysis drew their meaning from syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations as part of an enveloping context of situation. Within this theory, meaning becomes explicitly a matter of relations to a context. The sweeping extent of Firth's concept of meaning is exemplified in the following early statement:

As we know so little about mind and as our study is essentially social, I shall cease to respect the duality of mind and body, thought and word, and be satisfied with the whole man, thinking and acting as a whole, in association with his fellows. I do not therefore follow Ogden and Richards in regarding meaning as relations in a hidden mental process, but chiefly as situational relations in a context of situation and in that kind of language which disturbs the air and other people's ears, as modes of behaviour in relation to the other elements in the context of situation. A thoroughgoing contextual technique does not emphasize the relation between the terms of an historical process or of a mental process, but the interrelations of the terms of the actual observable context itself. In so far as introspection may be relied on, ... (utterances) ... may be considered also in their relations within my context of experience. What may be called memory-contexts or causal contexts are then linked up with the observable situation.

¹ 'Meaning and Use', Word, X (1954), pp.235-50.

Like all those we have reviewed, I propose to split up meaning or function into a series of component functions. Each function will be defined as the use of some language form or element in relation to some context. Meaning, that is to say, is to be regarded as a complex of contextual relations, and phonetics, grammar, lexicography, and semantics each handles its own components of the complex in its appropriate context. ¹

In a later paper² the same views are further developed. Firth makes clear that he regards the text itself as part of the total context of situation and that this context includes both verbal and non-verbal elements. He dissociates himself from Malinowski's view that the situation merely forms a behaviour matrix within which a linguistic utterance has meaning, and he stresses that the verbal and non-verbal aspects are interdependent constituents of the context of situation. Pursuing the analysis no further than the level of lexis: Firth seems to consider that the sense of a word is dependent upon its commutability in the systems of the paradigmatic plane, its collocations,³ and its relations as the exponent of an element of syntactic structure⁴ on the syntagmatic plane, and its interaction with the larger verbal and non-verbal contexts. He illustrates grammatical meaning, separated from any but the most generalised context, by the composition of anomalous sentences such as: "'She slowly rushed upstairs to the cellar and turned the kettle out to boil two fires'."

In this later paper, too, Firth tries to set up more precise schemata

¹ 'The Technique of Semantics', T.P.S. (1935) but reprinted in J.R. Firth, Papers in Linguistics 1934-1951, London (1957), p.19. The same concept of the context of situation is more popularly stated in The Tongues of Men and Speech, L.A.L.L., London (1964), pp.110-114 and pp.173-79. This is a conflation of two books first published respectively in 1937, and 1930.

² 'A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1930-55' repr. in Selected Papers of J.R. Firth, 1952-59, London (1968), pp.175-77.

³ By the collocations of words Firth meant: 'the mere word accompaniment, the other word-material in which they are most commonly or most characteristically embedded.' (ibid p.180). See also below.

⁴ A further syntagmatic relation which Firth recognised was the structural one of colligation. This implied, not the relations between lexical items but between the abstract grammatical classes. (ibid pp.181-83).

to delineate the non-verbal context in a way acceptable to linguistic theory. Although mentioning the 'quotation situation' he no longer speaks of 'memory contexts' or 'causal contexts' and in one statement seems to imply a considerable restriction of the original notion: "The context of situation in the present theory is a schematic construct for application especially to typical 'repetitive events' in the social process."

The implication of a simple, easily delineated situation is realised in Firth's suggested analysis of the situational context as follows:

1. The participants: persons, personalities and relevant features of these.
 - a) The verbal action of the participants.
 - b) The non-verbal action of the participants.
2. The relevant objects and non-verbal and non-personal events.
3. The effect of the verbal action.

This is evidently a fairly simple behaviouristic situation, but there are a number of imponderable abstractions included; the sense of relevant begs almost as many questions as that of personality. The exterior relations of the constituents of the context of situation may present even greater difficulties. Suggested manoeuvres are analyses of the more general frameworks to which a particular context of situation belongs, such as:

- a) The economic, religious or social structures of the society involved.
- b) Type of linguistic discourse to which the text belongs (narrative, monologue, explanations etc.)
- c) Details of age, sex, number of participants in situation.
- d) Types of speech function within social relations.

It is fairly obvious that all of these factors may have an influence on the sense and use of a word, but they are too arbitrary and imprecise to serve as the framework of analytic investigation.

I.II.4 Certain of Firth's followers have attempted to develop and clarify his notion of the context of situation. These efforts may be divided into those aiming to elaborate the theory and those endeavouring to derive from it a practical analytic method. Of the first type is the contribution by

Joffroy Ellis to the volume of memorial essays dedicated to Firth.¹ Ellis's opening sentence adequately represents the view of the theoretical linguist upon Firth's work: "It is generally recognized that one of Firth's decisive contributions to linguistic theory was the concept of 'context of situation'. It is also widely recognized that he left this concept in many ways unelaborated." In Ellis's elaboration verbal context is an interlevel between the non-linguistic situation and the formal level of language (consisting of grammar and lexis). A distinction is made between the instantial contextual meaning of a formal item (that actually occurring in a given instance) and potential contextual meaning (which is the range of possible meanings of a given item when considered outside any specific context or situation). Within this theory, the utterance can be defined as the relation of a unit of form to situation and, from these actualisations of contextual meaning, the categories (the potential meaning) of context may be derived. Thus, the minimum unit of form related to context (that is potential and outside specific situation) is the sentence.

The component of the theory termed situation can not, of course, remain unreduced, and Ellis endeavours to set up a schema for its reduction; the part of his paper which concerns us most at present. Situation is compounded of a number of categories which are of varying importance according to specific instance and which, in contrast to the theoretical relationships outlined above, are not ordered according to any necessary principles of interdependence.

- a) Immediate situation includes everything relevant at the place and time of the speech-event (except items included under other headings).
- b) Wider situation includes anything relevant in the universe at any time.

¹ 'On Contextual Meaning' op. cit. pp.79-95. In a footnote, Mr. Ellis makes a distinction between context and situation. This sub-categorisation, probably necessary for a workable theory, seems to be the first departure he makes from Firth's original formulation. He does, however, recognise (p.81) that this is a theoretical expedient rather than a necessary and desirable division.

On stating these categories, Ellis attempts to vitiate the obvious objection concerning relevance by defining it as (a) what distinguishes one situation and its utterances from another, and (b) what is specific to a given culture and its language. This formulation still promises formidable difficulties in practice, most especially in an unfamiliar culture; yet it is unreasonable to demand extreme rigour in the categorisation of situation. Category (a), too, falls below a high standard of precision since the number and type of other headings cannot be fixed with certainty, and will certainly have to be varied according to the type of text under examination.

Participants includes all relevant features of anyone in the immediate situation who actively determines the utterance or is affected by it.

There then follows a series of sub-categories involving register, the total register-range of the idiolect of a speaker and his place in the range of register in the language, the register-choice, which involves the assignment to specific registers of specific linguistic utterances. These classifications are essentially linguistic but have a relation to the general cultural situation.

By the sub-category of thesis is meant the event, action or state of affairs which the utterance signifies. Its relation to the immediate situation is complex and variable and the notion of thesis, or some development of it, must be of prime importance in the application of this theory to literary texts. The inclusion of thesis introduces into the basic Firthian theory a notion of reference distinct from the immediate situation in which an utterance takes place. With relation to this referential component, Ellis mentions the sub-category of context of mention, which has connections with the formal division of the sentence into given and new, and is therefore related to the formal notions of topic and cohesion. Finally, tone includes those elements of contextual meaning which are non-referential; as tone, feeling, intention.¹

¹ Register, context of mention and non-referential components of meaning are not accepted as part of the competence of semantics by the more formal semanticists. Leech, Towards a Semantic Description of English (pp.83-85) assigns them to a subsidiary study which he terms 'General Stylistics'.

It is fairly clear from this that, despite the highly technical vocabulary and formal presentation of these ideas, they do not form a theory with universal application to any speech act, except at a level of very high abstraction. For example, the notion of 'register' as part of a methodology for the description of an utterance, is extremely imprecise. Ideally, analytic processes must consist of a finite set of mutually exclusive categories; this is patently not the case with the divisions of register. Register is at least partly dependent upon the random nature of circumstance so that, even to derive a set of categories which we can never claim to be exhaustive, would require a considerable programme of research. The notion of register will always be a weak analytic instrument, and so it is with situation. Thus the power of description of the various elements of Ellis's theory is very diverse; in fact, despite the theoretical formulation, his ideas are really, like Firth's, still only a set of suggestions on how to approach the analysis of language in situation.

I.II.5 Certain of Ellis's suggestions have been taken up in the same collection of papers by B.B. Kachru in a study of Indian English.¹ This is a study of the use of English in the writings of bilingual individuals for whom English is a second language. The paper is at first concerned with the relationship between the two languages at the formal level, but quickly demonstrates the necessity of the analysis of context. The 'wider' and 'immediate situations' of Ellis are accepted and methods of procedure are discussed in theoretical terms, but these are of the utmost abstraction, since the actual categories of context are in fact extrapolated from the text itself. The lesson seems to be that one may theorise only in the most general terms about contextual features, but when the necessity for the analysis of a specific text in a specific situation occurs, the details of the procedure must be settled on an ad hoc basis. The 'parameters' which

¹ Ibid. pp.255-287.

Kachru finds relevant to his study are the followings:

A. General Cultural Factors ('wider situation'):

1. Social status of the individual in the group. Expressed in terms of:
 - (a) Position in the hierarchy of caste.
 - (b) Political status and economic position.
2. Religion. (In the Indian setting it is important to know whether a participant is a Hindu, Muslim, etc.)
3. Speaker/addressee relationship: wife/husband, children/parents, teacher/pupil (this may have decisive effects upon the choice of language; as in the use of honorifics).

B. Individual or Personal Factors ('immediate situation'):

1. Sex of the participants.
2. Age of the participants.
3. Educational background of the participants.
4. Characteristics which localise persons.
 - (a) Linguistic: Accent and other language traits.
 - (b) Non-linguistic: Food habits, dress, etc.

Kachru notes that this categorisation is not mutually exclusive since religious differences may intersect the linguistic differences dependent upon geographical origin. He also notes the further necessity of taking account of contextually delimited sub-languages within the language as a whole. A 'restricted language' is one which cuts across idiolectal and dialectal differences and may be used for specific purposes by all the speakers of the language. Such would be the languages of law or administration in India. Register, he takes to be simply a further step in delicacy in a similar sub-categorisation, so that one might expect to find a difference between, legal reporting, sports page and editorial English within the restricted language of newspaper English. A third category might be found within the restricted language of social exchange; this Kachru delineates as speech-function. It would include such easily demarcated functions as abuse and curses, flattery and persuasion, greetings, etc.

This organisation subdivides, though perhaps not very rigorously, that area of contextually linked linguistic usages left unreduced by Ellis under the heading 'register'. Obvious difficulties will arise in assigning language to any one of divisions of this type and, although he does not explicitly say so in this case, it soon becomes obvious that Kachru's division is in fact an ad hoc one. Of course, as a suggestion for analysis, it is none the worse for that, but it must be remembered that it is merely a procedural suggestion rather than a part of an integrated theory. As such it enables Kachru to make interesting observations on certain restricted usages in Indian English.

I.II.6 An attempt to apply somewhat similar ideas, though in a less rigorous way, to certain aspects of simulated spoken language in certain of Shakespeare's plays is made by Vivian Salmon in Words Studies in English, 1967.¹ Mrs. Salmon makes three important general points before citing her evidence, two of which bear closely upon the analysis of situations: firstly, that spoken language arises in a situation and, secondly, that such a situation involves more than one participant, whose language will be influenced by their attitudes to one another. These two facts characterise the colloquial speech with which she is dealing in a number of ways. Since speech arises in a situation:

(a) ritual formulae will arise for those situations which frequently occur.²

(b) speech within a situation need not be so explicit as written language separate from an immediate situation; therefore elliptical forms may occur more frequently.³

¹ 'Elizabethan Colloquial English in the Falstaff Plays', pp.37-70.

² This point was made by Firth in the original formulation of his ideas concerning 'context of situation'. One example he gives is the phrase 'Say when', used when pouring alcohol. The Tongues of Men, p.110.

³ Cf. Martinet, Towards a Functional View of Language, Oxford (1962), pp.58-59. Martinet's concern with self-sufficient communication as the only proper study of linguistics leads him to exclude situation-dependent utterances. This same concentration upon communication in linguistic terms as the sole motive factor in linguistic change ('linguistic evolution is entirely determined by the communicative needs of man': *ibid.* p.21) tends to vitiate Martinet's ideas on diachronic linguistics.

(c) various linguistic devices will reflect the fact that this is an interchange between two or more participants.

(d) sometimes language chosen in such a situation will reflect attitudes or relationships to each other which are permanent, such as those between servant and master, parent and child; sometimes temporary attitudes will be expressed such as dislike or politeness.

These factors (a), (b), (c) are then illustrated from the text by a series of quotations and some of the ritual formulae are subsequently grouped according to the attitude or relationship between the participants in the situation.

The results, though not contributing very greatly to theoretical work on context of situation, represent useful additions to our information on situational usage in early Modern English. The theory behind these results is informally stated and applied, but again acts as a series of procedural suggestions subject to ad hoc modifications. The success of the results is in no small measure due to this.

I.II.7 A locus classicus of situational studies, freely and rightly quoted by most later workers on these lines is the field study conducted in Cyrenaica by T.F. Mitchell.¹ He spends some time on delimiting the scope of his enquiry with as much precision as possible, and the success of his whole paper is perhaps largely dependent upon his choice of a situation which easily admits such treatment. The reciprocal situation of buying and selling allows an easy reduction to an abstract situation of few participants and the ritualised nature of the linguistic exchanges contributes to a simple statement of the data.

Among the observations which Mitchell makes on his method, the following may be quoted. Firstly, he establishes the relation between texts and environment in terms of four main classifications, most of which are by now

¹ 'The Language of Buying and Selling in Cyrenaica: a Situational Statement', Hesperis xliv Paris (1957), pp. 31-71.

familiar.

1. Spatio-temporal situations of persons in context (participants).
2. Activities of participants.
3. Attitudes of participants (exemplified by boasting, cursing, flattering or blaming etc.)
4. Their 'personalities' (including such factors as trade or profession, class or geographical origin, educational standard)

'Personality' is an abstraction within the abstraction 'situation'. It excludes any by-standers and includes only those directly involved in the business of buying and selling. Furthermore, there is no necessary synonymy between the technical term 'personality' and the persons who may be in the vicinity. A 'personality' within a situation may in fact represent a number of persons: a seller may be a group.

Mitchell emphasises that such classifications are not to be regarded as rigorous and definitive. He contends that, in any given statement classification must be ad hoc, so that other categories of classification of the relationship between text and situation may recommend themselves; furthermore, not all texts will permit statement to be made under all four categories which he gives. He points out that no very precise definition of the categories 'Activities' and 'Attitudes' is possible outside their use with reference to a specific situation.

The ascription of any utterance to the class of language proper to a given situation must be broached with caution. Even with pieces of text which may properly be ascribed to the situation of buying and selling, one may expect to find numerous overlaps with other contexts of situation (p.39). Thus a greeting may belong to the 'language of greetings', but if the text is large enough, we may find that it is also part of the ritual exchanges of the buying and selling situation. (It is perhaps needless to add that only the utterances of the 'personalities' involved in the transaction would be considered as part of this language in the first place.) Though most utterances may be usable in a number of situations in addition to that

under examination, there will certainly be a minority which are limited to that particular situation; those may in fact be in the form of the distant collocation of elements which, singly, may be used in a number of situations. Such pieces of text are regarded as technical words proper to that situation.¹

Certain further narrow correlations between text and situation may be suggested in terms of the limitations set upon language by the precise 'personality' and by more specific features such as the object for sale, the locale (in a shop or market-place), method of sale (auction or otherwise).

It is notable that in his approach Mitchell is deliberately flexible; he eschews formal and definite assertions of theory and shows a willingness to adapt method to the task in hand. His classifications are no more than an empirical guide which is flexible enough to be further specified to accommodate the particular circumstances. He avoids the trap, which rigorous theory might require, of attempting to set up mutually exclusive contexts of situation or ascribing any but a few expressions² exclusively to a single situation. In the true Firthian tradition, he acknowledges the difficulty of separating the levels of collocation and of situation and comments on the way in which a familiar situation may presuppose certain stereotyped collocations, giving a predictive element to certain forms in certain situations. To a large extent the separation of collocational and situational levels in this kind of study may simply be a matter of point of view. Although his study is aimed primarily at the buyer-seller situation, 'lexicographical or stylistic statement might envisage collecting the collocations of rínig or hjalíel and stating correlations for them with several situational categories.' (p.54).

¹ In direct contrast to such 'technical' language, Mitchell reminds the investigator that he must not, in his study of the language in which an activity is conducted, disregard the language in which it is explained or discussed (pp.34-35). This helps to relate his main interest to the general cultural matrix.

² I use the term 'expression' rather than 'word' here since it would seem that, in English at least, such situationally restricted utterances are more often common collocations of two or more words than a single orthographical word.

I.II.8 The notion of 'context of situation' as promulgated by Firth and developed by his followers is an important one for lexical analysis. It must not, however, be mistaken for a rigid theoretical statement. An examination of the literature on the subject reveals that, though theory may be useful in suggesting modes of procedure, a detailed and specific theory is impossible and attempts to evolve one tend to be misrepresentative. The most valuable practical work employs general ideas related more to empiric observation than formal theory and it is always ready to evolve ad hoc classifications to deal with each area of study. The sole requirement upon the investigator is to maintain the consistency of the classifications he sets up to deal with the area with which he is concerned.

The value of previous situational studies to lexical research is not, then, in the presentation of an integrated and rigorous theory, so much as in the endorsement of a number of fertile suggestions for enquiry, which may be adopted or rejected according to their explicatory value when applied to the particular data under examination. General suggestions which we may expect to be of value in any investigation of language in situation are the following:

- a) Situation is, at least in part, an abstraction composed of a number of components which are not easily delineated in general terms.
- b) Participants are one important component. They may be stated as 'personalities' which is an abstraction in terms of the situation since, within a situation (e.g. buying and selling), a 'personality' may be represented by a group of individuals.
- c) Delineation of 'personalities' is largely a matter of convenience, but the following divisions may be useful: age, sex, number of participants, educational background, geographical origin.
- d) Their activity in the situation is important.
- e) Their attitudes to one another may also be important. Such attitudes may be transient (annoyance, curses, praise) or may be dictated by unchanging

criteria (social class realised in the speaker/addressee relationship).

f) Certain institutionalised and repetitive situations occur which are accompanied by stereotyped phrasing. This gives an element of predictability to the language in such situations and enables elliptical forms to be used.

g) The investigator must have recourse to related factors outside the immediate situation: to his knowledge of the wider situation, to the type of text over a larger context (involving such factors as speech-function, register, and restricted languages) and also to explicatory language which throws light on the situation under study.

h) Within the situation, especially in literary texts, the thesis¹ of the utterance may also be of importance: behind the immediate situation there may be, contained in the language of the utterance, reference to another situation.

i) Finally it may be noted that situations are not mutually exclusive categories, nor can any utterance be exclusively ascribed to any particular situation.

I.II.9 For comparison with these approaches to the language of situation, drawn from the neo-Firthian school, we may elicit the study of the lexical field of laughing and smiling in Modern English made by Madeleine Schneeberger.² Her approach to situation is by way of the theory of Group Dynamics, but in her analysis of situation, we find importance accorded to many of the same factors as in the Firthian approaches. The participants in the situation may be analysed according to the following criteria (pp.7-8).

- a) Number (the laughing and others present)
- b) Sex (the laughing and others present)
- c) Age

¹ See Ellis's theory above.

² Das Wortfeld des Lachens und Lächelns im modernen Englisch, Winterthur, 1964.

d) Class or Rank - which is divisible into:

- i) objective rank (bestowed upon a person from without and univorsally accepted, e.g. social position, military rank etc.)
- ii) subjective rank (which a man accredits to himself independent of external factors).

In practice Miss Schneobergor finds such a classification inadequate.

In her chosen field the paramctor of Sex is relatively unimportant. Furthermore, she is compelled to sub-categorise and to introduce new classifications to increase the specificity of her analysis. Thus she introduces such criteria as whether or not social contact is made by the smile, grin or chuckle, or whether it is the result of such contact. Details of attitude and sub-divisions of some of the above categories are also included.

It is immediately obvious that, although Miss Schneoberger's categories do not coincide precisely with any of those in the neo-Firthian analyses, there is very considerable overlap between them. Her treatment of rank differs slightly, though it is mostly covered by the Firthian 'attitudo' or 'speaker-addressee' relationship, and her introduction of the teleological aspects of the utterance within the situation is not so tightly drawn in the Firthian theories. The importance ascribed to it in Miss Schneoberger's thesis is obviously ascribable in large part to the subject of her study.

I.II.10 A number of precepts important to an analytical procedure have emerged from these situational studies. Firstly, while dividing the situational context from the verbal context for ease of analysis, we should not imply any hard and fast division in fact, and we should always be ready to re-establish the link in our statement of the evidence. More important still, in adopting the ideas of others for situational research, we must only use the most general theoretical approach, specifying this empirically for each new task. For example, there is quite plainly no justification for using Kachru's category of Religion for a study of any area of the

vocabulary of fourteenth century England, unless perhaps we are interested in texts which might be related to the Pelagian heresy. Other situational studies have much to offer in the form of general guidance as to procedure, but detailed methods must be freshly evolved to accommodate the general situation in fourteenth century England and the type of language and situation under examination.

I.III Meaning and Context

I.III.1 The desire for 'context' when we are asked to explain the sense of an unfamiliar word is usually satisfied, not by a description of the situation in which it was heard, but by positioning it in a verbal string. Only if there is still mystification or ambiguity is the non-verbal situation described. It is clear from this fact that the verbal context of a linguistic item plays an important part in establishing its sense to the hearer. The way in which this is accomplished is much less clear. Occasionally it may be that the verbal context offered relates to our general experience of the non-verbal world so that the word bull is adequately disambiguated by the contextual frame 'the black ——— stamped and belloved'. The fact that, given the linguistic form in isolation, we should probably understand it in this way rather than as a Papal document, is probably a function of its relative frequency in this sense, and does not alter the importance of context in establishing this sense.

The way in which the utterance refers to the non-verbal world is inscrutable in the present state of semantic knowledge. All we can do is to describe the situation, often with the use of ad hoc descriptions, as mentioned above, and state something of the utterance in which the item under examination occurs. The extent of the utterance which it is necessary to take into account is likewise imprecise, but with Ellis,¹ we may assume that an extent corresponding to that of the grammatical sentence is appropriate.

In certain cases the verbal contexts may not relate to anything of our personal experience in the non-verbal world. Given the word pole, two possible clarifications are suggested by the following contextual frames.

In England, the earth's magnetic ——— lies to the west of true North.

Paderowski was a ———.

¹ See above.

The interpretation of these sentences, and of the linguistic form pole in each, lies, not merely in their reference to the phenomenological world, but through our competence in interpreting these sentences in relation to a number of other sentences which we have experienced. They allude, not to recognisable situations, but to other linguistic utterances. At some point, we may expect this circularity to break down into reference to the non-linguistic world,¹ but this point would seem to have little to do with our understanding of these sentences.

Such sentences are an extreme example of the way in which the serial nature of language ensures that distantly removed items in the verbal context may affect the significance of sentences and the senses of lexical items. Although one may take the sentence as the unit with reference to an immediate situation, the senses of items within it are constantly subject to influence by the developing verbal context over an indeterminate distance. This fact presents insurmountable difficulties to rigorous analysis and leads Lyons to posit the notion of 'restricted context'.² Here the utterance is independent of previous utterances and can be understood in relation to the 'restricted context' of a shared language and culture. Further details of context and sense must be adduced and represented according to expediency in the particular example treated. But even this judicious approach to context presents difficulties to the investigator of medieval languages who can at best only partially share the culture associated with the language he is investigating.

I.III.2 Since the sense of a word is to some extent dependent upon its verbal context, we may expect that occurrence in a wide variety of different contexts will result in considerable polysemy. Since frequency of occurrence implies, at least in the case of non-grammatical words, the ability to

¹ Cf. W.P. Alston, The Philosophy of Language, Englewood Cliffs (1964), pp.65ff.

² Theoretical Linguistics, p.419.

appear in a wide variety of contexts, we might expect a distinct correlation between high frequency and extensive polysomy. Statistical research has borne out this link between context and sense.¹

I.III.3 If we re-formulate the notion of 'frequency of occurrence' as 'probability of occurrence' in a range of contexts we arrive at a slightly different perspective which may be of more methodological value to us. The significance of a sentence derives not only from the lexical items of which it is composed but also from underlying syntactical relations holding between them. Thus Lyons can suggest, as a test of synonymy, the ability of a lexical item to be substituted for by another in the same contextual frame without any resulting change in the significance of the sentence. Such a procedure is commonly used where a native speaker is available to arbitrate on the effects of substitution; in the case of a medieval language this method can only be approximated where a piece of discourse is closely repeated in something like the same situation. Nevertheless, the principle that immediate context has a close link with sense is important to the empirical investigation of texts, for we can cite syntagmatic contexts, even though our knowledge of paradigmatic sense relations may be doubtful.

The fact that syntagmatic criteria determine sense may easily be demonstrated by examples, though the manner in which this occurs is less easy to state in formal terms. In the frame 'John kicked the ———' a number of lexical items might be substituted. If the context is extended the sense of the blank space is specified by the relations which it contracts with the rest of the utterance: 'John kicked the ——— which slunk off miaowing'. Clearly the blank can now have the sense only of cat. It cannot be said, however, that it is the extension of the context alone which results in this specification. Certain items play a much more important part than others and it is the form 'miaowing' that clinches the sense here. Similarly,

¹ G.K. Zipf, Human Behaviour and the Principle of Least Effort, New York and London (1949), pp.19ff.

given the frame 'addled ———', we know that only brain or egg could be fitted into the gap. In usages like this not only the sense of the item to be understood but also the form of the item itself is suggested: thus we expect 'addled brain' rather than 'addled mind', although the contextual sense would be identical.

I.III.4 The restricting function of the frames mentioned works strictly in accord with the grammatical relations exhibited in those frames: in the case of 'addled ———' a Modifier/Head structure and, in the case of the other example, through the use of a relative pronoun and a qualifier. From this we might assume that the determination of sense is necessarily related to fixed grammatical structures and that if these are altered a sense alteration might follow or, vice-versa, that sense will not be altered so long as grammatical relations are undisturbed. The falsity of this latter assumption is easily demonstrated by modern English adverbs. Adverbs are normally considered to be verbal modifiers or qualifiers, as in the following sentence:

'The man suddenly took off his hat'

yet in some sentences they seem rather to modify the subject of the sentence:

'The man reluctantly resigned his post'.

Part of the reason for this difference may lie in the obvious derivation of these adverbs from adjectives,¹ when we can say:

'The reluctant man'

but not

'The sudden man'.

It would seem that the function of these lexical items in word-classes whose divisions are not clearly marked can influence the significance of sentences. This being so, other factors of syntagmatic organisation apart

¹ The similarity between English adverbs and adjectives is a commonplace of grammars. Cf. Zandvoort, A Handbook of English Grammar, London (1962), p.187.

from syntactical relations may influence sense. If we look at the adverb cruelly, we find that word order may determine the way in which the significance of the sentence is understood, though the grammatical structure remains unchanged. When the adverb is placed close to the subject in the following sentence, it tells us something of the nature of the man:

'The man cruelly killed the cat'.

but placed finally, it qualifies the action, becoming an ordinary adverb of manner:

'The man killed the cat cruelly'.

It is perhaps unnecessary to remark that both 'the cruel man' and 'the cruel killing' are possible forms.

I.III.5 If we return to the example 'addled egg' for a moment, another perspective which may be of value in sense analysis, can be considered. In a phrase such as that mentioned, the word egg is almost completely predictable given the modifier addled. In terms of information theory, egg is here redundant since, following addled in this syntagm, the set of possible choices is only two, egg or brain. According to the principles of information theory¹ meaning implies choice. At each point in the syntagmatic string, new information is added only when a deliberate choice of a new item is made. The larger the paradigmatic set from which the choice can be made, the more information content has the choice; the smaller the set, the less information is offered. When the set is reduced to a single member, that item cannot be said to have any meaning at all distinct from its immediate verbal context; taken with its immediate verbal context, the resultant phrase may have some meaning in relation to a situational context. Thus the second do in 'How do you do?' cannot be said to have any meaning distinct from the phrase, but the phrase has a situational application

¹ Martinet's linguistic theory (see above, p.8) is stimulated by information theory.

deriving from the paradigmatic opposition it contracts with phrases like 'Pleased to meet you' or with silence.

This viewpoint will be of little value in cases where a large set of choices is available, but it serves as a useful warning against seeking too persistently for the cognitive meaning of certain words which are completely predictable in certain verbal contexts and situations, and it may be possible to establish paradigmatic sets of words which occur in relation to particular syntagms in particular situations, and thereby establish some similarity in sense between the utterances. Thus:

Have route on

Have mercy on

Have pity on in the courtly love situation.

It should of course be noted that probability cannot be assessed in any single case without a collection of all occurrences of a single form in the corpus, when probability can be assessed by a paradigmatic comparison of the occurrences of a form in its immediate context.

Although such a comparison will reveal certain predetermined syntagms,¹ determination may exist which is not easily revealed by such methods. A great many extra-linguistic features exert their influence on syntagmatic patterning. The situation and previous context may lead to the omission of certain items or to the occurrence of otherwise unrecorded syntagms.

One may expect that a modifier applied to a head, with no apparent and direct relevance to the immediate situation, would represent a distinct and deliberate choice and would therefore be meaningful. This is not unfortunately always the case. Chaucer can refer to fiers Outrage or fiers Mars using fiers after the manner of a 'fixed epithet'. The determination here is by the general cultural milieu and there is not sufficient evidence of

¹ These will include a range of types distinguished by literary criticism as idioms, clichés, 'fixed' epithets, formulae and so on.

occurrence to suggest any predetermination. The phrase fiors Polyphemus is likewise predetermined, but this time by the fact of its adoption from a French translation of the Latin original ferus Polyphemus. The same may be said of certain items of traditional poetic diction which may not be sufficiently frequently represented to be provable as determinate syntagms.

I.III.6 In traditional studies of semantics a common distinction is made between 'logical', 'cognitive' or 'denotational' meaning and 'affective', 'emotive' or 'connotational' meaning.¹ By the former is meant some kind of central, primary or essential meaning of a lexical item, while the latter refers to the possible aura of emotion or association which surrounds the central meaning. While it is clearly true that in most contexts liberty and freedom will have a similar cognitive sense, yet may differ in their emotional associations,² it is equally obvious that, in view of the way in which sense is dependent upon context, a statement of the relation of cognitive and affective elements in the general 'meaning' of liberty would be hopelessly imprecise and inadequate. Some account of individual contexts must be given and, in doing this, emotive and affective elements may become separately and individually explicable. A second member of the revolutionary triad will serve to illustrate this better. We may concede that fraternal and brotherly are cognitively synonymic, yet a study of their use will reveal sharp distinctions in context which correspond to emotive differences. Thus, fraternal is frequently used in the general context of politics - and more specifically left wing politics; a use largely dependent upon the historical chance of its employment in a

¹ See Ullman, Semantics - An Introduction to the Science of Meaning, Oxford (1962), pp.116ff. Storn, Meaning and Change of Meaning, Bloomington and London (repr. 1968), pp.46ff. C.S. Lewis, Studies in Words (2nd ed.) Cambridge (1967), pp.313ff. Waldron, Sense and Sense Development, London (1967), pp.89-94.

² Cited by Ullman, The Principles of Semantics, Oxford, 2nd ed. (1957), p.109.

revolutionary slogan in 1789 - whilst brotherly is more frequently found in Christian contexts, where it owes its currency at least in part to the monastic ideal and the concept that all mankind is descended from a single father. The collocation with love results in a phrase indisputably connected with this general context. Although there may be analogies between the brotherhood of man in Christian theology and that in Marxist idealism, the use of each particular linguistic form is associated with each particular context and inspires in the hearer the emotions which he personally finds appropriate to each. These emotions will, of course, be conditioned by experiences and memories of other contextual occurrences and they belong, not to linguistics so much as the individual psychology.

It is obviously more desirable in any objective study to state the connotational differences between fraternal and brotherly in terms of their uses in different contexts rather than by vague references to associations. In this way the extent of their synonymy and their differentiation in senses can be accurately stated.

I.III.7 A short illustration of how the study of contextual senses bypasses the difficulties envisaged in the division of meaning into 'cognitive' and 'emotive' may be given from Chaucer's use of colour terminology.¹

We fancy that we know fairly precisely what the denotational meaning of grene is, but a great number of uses (TC.I.157; PF.130; ST.V.54; RR.690; RR.1425; LGW(G)225) also occur in contexts which might enable us to say that this use of grene has also connotations of springtime, natural growth, vigour, luxuriance of nature and joy at these things. Within this type of context grene is a key term in the poetic theme of the raverdie. Any use in this type of context will lead to recognition of the familiar poetic manoeuvre, setting up certain expectations within the literary tradition.

¹ Stern (*op. cit.*, p.56) and Lyons (*op. cit.*, p.450) both anticipate the difficulty of separating cognitive and emotive meaning and resolve to limit their enquiries, as far as possible, to the former.

These will not normally be stirred in other contexts, with other collocations. Yet certain uses of grene outside the descriptive context of the raverdie depend upon this traditional use of the word, and it will appear in contexts in which the sense is shifted, so that the primary emphasis is upon what were once contextual associations. Thus one finds phrases like:

CT.IV.120. And thogh youre grene youthe floure as yit.

The association between grene and youthe is a traditional one, as Boethius shows,¹ and is an obvious analogy to be made in any culture living in a climate with clearly marked seasons of new growth. The word is also used in contexts where this transferred sense is not obvious, yet the ordinary colour sense is out of the question and the reader is forced to assume a sense somehow similar to the connotational meanings in the familiar raverdie context:

CT.IV.1173. I wol with lusty herte, fressh and grene,
Seyn yow a song to glade yow, I wene;

In a passage from the Merchant's Tale the shifted senses of colour terms are used by Chaucer in a clever piece of word-play. He employs a tension between the denotational colour sense of grene and the contextual senses associated with raverdie, and an antithesis with hoor, which has developed a contextual sense of 'old' through its restriction in Chaucer to old men and its formulaic collocation with cold. (cf. MT.IV.1400):

CT.IV.1465. I feelo me nowhero hoor but on myn heed;
Myn herte and alle my lymes been as grene
As laurer thurgh the year is for to sene.

The first line here employs the ordinary colour denotation, selected by the context in the second half of the line, while the first half favours the contextual sense of 'old and feeble'. The second line exploits two finely differentiated contextual senses of grene (heart - 'joyful and vivacious';

¹ Boethius I.m.i. ll.

Gl'ria folicis olim viridisque inventae.

limbo - 'vigorous and youthful'). Finally, the explicit comparison with the laurel draws the sense back to colour denotation, but the more gently since the laurel is presented as an evergreen tree which retains its spring-time youth throughout the year. Such a tour-de-force of senso-manipulation is possible only because this colour adjective has been central to a particular situation repeatedly worked over by poets, and has therefore developed a range of possible senses, any of which can be selected by judicious choice of context. From this it will be seen that I have the strongest reservations about remarks such as Ullman's: 'Many terms of praise and reprobation become saturated with moods and feelings attaching to them in innumerable contexts'.¹ This is far too imprecise a formulation, implying too sharp a differentiation between emotive and cognitive meaning, and the primacy and monolithic contrality of the latter. It would be more just to say that a particular linguistic form has a particular range of possible senses, some of which may be realised in emotive contexts or situations. The emotional value of a linguistic form is not something proper to it, but is drawn from memories of its use in emotive circumstances and by deliberate stylistic exploitation. The emotive elements or the so-called connotational senses of a form are only realised when the present context, in the widest sense of the term, including situation, recalls earlier contexts with emotional overtones. We might well expect that, for these contextual senses to develop, repeated use in them is necessary.

It would seem, therefore, that the most satisfactory compromise between the necessity of treating affective and connotational meanings in a study aimed at providing useful insight for literary criticism, and the demand for objective method made upon the investigator of language, is to treat as far as possible those aspects of meaning as contextual senses, where necessary providing historical, comparative and stylistic data to explain them and

¹ S. Ullman, The Principles of Semantics, Oxford, 2nd ed. (1957), p.100.

their relations.

Reasons of economy will, of course, preclude the statement of each occurrence of a word in context, so that at some point classification of occurrences into senses must be made. This will no doubt furnish difficulties, but in any classification a compromise has to be made between precision and economy, and the decision as to which are the most valuable distinctions between senses will have to be made with regard to the aim of the enquiry and the total body of evidence available.

I.IV Collocation

I.IV.1 In paragraph III.3 (above) it was mentioned that certain items of context appear to have a more significant part than others in specifying the sense of a particular lexical item. In the example offered ('John kicked the cat which slunk off miaowing') it is clear that miaowing has a closer conceptual affinity with cat than slunk off has; it is therefore more important in directing us to the sense of cat, so long as we know what miaowing implies. This habitual co-occurrence of words, associated simply by relative proximity in the syntagmatic string, and not necessarily by very immediate grammatical relations, Firth developed into a technical term for a procedure of analysis. This habitual co-occurrence of lexical items, he called collocation. Since the term was introduced as a level of analysis, there has been some confusion as to its precise sense, so that some discussion of its sense must precede an assessment of its usefulness as an analytical tool.

I.IV.2 Firth introduced the idea of collocation as an instrument of analysis in a paper of 1951, 'Modes of Meaning'.¹ He illustrates his idea by claiming that part of the meaning of ass is its relation to such adjectives as silly, obstinate, stupid, awful and he points out that the relation is mutual: 'One of the meanings of night is its collocability with dark, and of dark, of course, collocation with night.' The peculiar use of the word 'meaning' is noticeable here and also the fact that all the examples given are in a fixed grammatical relation to one another; that of modifier to head. In the following analysis of some of Swinburne's verse, however, Firth deserts the grammatical frame when discussing collocations. This is the attitude he eventually takes to collocation in the most extensive

¹ Essays and Studies 1951, but reprinted in J.R. Firth, Papers in Linguistics 1934-1951, London (1957), pp.190-215.

statement of his theory, where he considers collocation to be a syntagmatic co-occurrence at the lexical level only, while colligation represents relations on the separate syntactical level.¹

Despite the unambiguous statement of his position in the later theoretical paper, the imprecision of the introduction of the idea seems to have led to considerable confusion among followers of Firth, at least in general introductory books on linguistics, if not in more extended works on collocation. Thus, R.H. Robins states quite plainly that collocations are independent of grammatical relationships,² yet gives Firth's example of dark night, and supports it with more examples of a similar grammatical structure. Indeed all Robins' discussion of the question revolves around ^{examples of} lexico-grammatical structures rather than purely lexical relations. Similarly Halliday, McIntosh and Strevens,³ in explaining the notion of 'lexical set', deal with collocation in a way that is not so clear as might be wished. They maintain a comparison between lexical choice and grammatical choices: "Whereas in grammar we can say: 'at this place in structure, these terms are possible, and all others are impossible', in lexis we can never say: 'only these items are possible'". The words chair, seat and settee belong to the same lexical set because they have a number of probable collocations in common; the examples given are of terms which will normally be in direct grammatical relationship with these words: comfortable and sit. Another lexical set given on the same page: table, desk, bench - certainly would not share these grammatically-linked collocations, and we may wonder indeed what collocations they would share, though we would certainly admit the likelihood of them occurring together simply through the co-occurrence of the objects

¹ 'A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1930-1955', repr. in Selected Papers of J.R. Firth, 1952-59, London (1968), pp.180-83.

² General Linguistics: An Introductory Survey, London (1964), pp.67ff and 234.

³ The Linguistic Sciences and Language Teaching, London (1964), pp.33-35.

in the real world.

In both these books interesting observations are made on the phenomenon of habitual collocation but, no doubt partly through the compression of the treatment, clarity falls below the ideal. In each, although the autonomy of lexical relations is urged, the selection of examples of collocations reveals that the authors are guided in their choice primarily by simple grammatical relationships. This of course allows them to offer examples of collocations which the reader immediately accepts as probable, but at the same time, it suggests that collocation is in fact a lexico-grammatical feature. Such an assumption is supported by the impression given that the selection of a lexical item, constituting a collocant, is made at a point in the syntagmatic string from a set of possible choices, which must be conditioned by other items in the string and their syntactical relations. The set therefore appears analogous with the system of grammar and is a paradigmatic relationship. 'In lexis, not only are there more items to choose from at any given point, compared with the items or classes one is choosing from in grammar; also there is no line to be drawn between those that can and those that cannot be chosen.'¹

A further factor tending to confuse the issue of the purely lexical or lexico-grammatical nature of collocation must be Firth's original claim that collocations are 'part of the meaning' of each other. Such a remark is often true with regard to cognitive meaning in simple grammatical structures such as modification; as in Firth's example dark night. It has been stated by linguists that collocational similarity bears no necessary relationship to conceptual or referential similarity,² yet there lingers a vague assumption that some affinity between cognitive meaning and collocation may exist. Such an affinity would only exist with any certainty in the

¹ Ibid. p.34.

² Ibid. p.33, and Sinclair in In Memory of J.R. Firth, pp.410-11.

case of grammatically related items; the identification of other items that may have a conceptual affinity would be most difficult and would require very large samples of text.

I.IV.3 More extended works dealing with lexis show that linguists - sometimes the same linguists as previously mentioned - are aware of these problems. Halliday, in his theoretical work,¹ abstemiously excludes grammatical criteria from collocation, which he says is simply the statistical probability that certain items will occur at certain number of removes from a given lexical item. The lexical set is the paradigmatic structure set up from the collocants occurring in a large number of uses.

In an article devoted to the explanation of the necessity of illustrating patterning on the linguistic level separately from grammar, Halliday closes with the recommendation that the study of collocation on the lexical level alone should not constitute the whole of the enquiry. 'It is not known how far collocational patterns are dependent on the structural relations into which the items enter.'² It is therefore necessary to supplement the purely lexical collocational analysis by a lexico-grammatical analysis; an analysis of the grammatical structures in which the collocating lexical items are found.

I.IV.4 The case made by Halliday for an autonomous study of the co-occurrence of lexical items (collocation) is taken up, with the emphasis on procedural methodology, in the same volume, by Sinclair.³ In his discussion of the problems Sinclair assumes the autonomy of lexis. His attitude is emphasised by his denial that lexical items are chosen, one against the other, in the way that grammatical choices are made: he prefers

¹ 'Categories of the Theory of Grammar' Word (1961), p.276. See also: 'Linguistics and its Application to Teaching' in Patterns and Ranges: Papers in General, Descriptive and Applied Linguistics, London (1966), p.20.

² 'Lexis as a Linguistic Level' in In Memory of J.R. Firth, p.159.

³ 'Beginning the Study of Lexis', pp.410-429.

to consider the occurrence of lexical items, like Halliday, simply as a matter of greater or lesser statistical probability. The investigation of the lexis which he proposes also advances, at least to some extent, by statistical methods. Certain problems in collocational analysis are faced and decisions for procedure are made. For example, since this is to be a purely lexical analysis, the problem of syntagmatic distance of significant collocates presents itself; no guidance should be expected from grammar if the autonomy of lexis is to be maintained. This is solved by the necessary expedient of fixing an arbitrary span of a given number of places at each side of the item under examination; the optimum breadth of this span may be determined by later experience. The identification of items which are significant collocations is to be related to the probability of the collocation, and a formula is suggested for assessing this, which works in terms of the frequencies of the item under investigation, the collocate, the span of places on either side of the item investigated, all in relation to the total number of occurrences of items in the text. The relative proximity of items within the span to the item investigated is not considered important since some obviously important collocates are always at some remove from each other whilst others are always directly succeeding one another in the syntagm.¹ It would appear that to take note of this kind of ordering would be to confuse grammatical with lexical features and such an analysis must wait until later in the investigation. The problems of lexical items composed of several grammatical units and of distinguishing lexical items with the same form (from the formal point of view: polysemantic items) are raised. It is suggested that, with the expenditure of much labour, the former problem can be solved by the test of examining the collocates of the units separately and then determining whether there is any considerable coincidence between the sum of these collocates and the collocates of the

¹ e.g. spick and span; brotherly love; to buy cheap.

suspected multi-unit lexical item. If there is no similarity then the items are distinct. An example given by Sinclair is that of cold feet as an idiom and as an ordinary modifier/head construction.

The second problem is really not so different from the first, since in the traditional sense, both problems involve a kind of polysemy. Yet the fact that single formal items might have different ^{sets of} collocates presents some considerable difficulties; obviously any simple collection of the collocates of any formal unit will not distinguish between those units which represent different lexical items. Sinclair's suggested answer to this problem is that the collocates of each distinct lexical item will tend to collocate themselves, so that hand will collocate with marriage, daughter, engagement, whist, rummy, ace, flush. But if we examine the collocations of each of these in turn, we will find that they will tend to collocate with each other, setting up two distinct groups or ranges. This process will provide the basic data for establishing the structure of the lexis in terms of lexical sets.

The solutions offered to these two problems requires some comment. Although Sinclair formulates the problems as

- °(i) detecting multi-morpheme items;
- (ii) detecting more than one item with the same form.°

he in fact offers no means of detecting multi-morphemic items; what he offers is a means of verifying that certain stretches of language, which we suspect might be single lexical items, but which resemble the co-occurrence of two or more lexical items, are in fact single and distinct from the two separate lexical items. This is not a means of discovery, but of giving validity within the method to something we already suspect. Furthermore the method of verification would seem to be superfluous in view of the fact that the method suggested for the distinguishing of items with more than one form would work equally well for the first problem. In practical terms, however, the objection against this second method is the labour which

it would involve. In a study of fifty words, this might involve the collection of two hundred collocates for each word, followed by the collection and study of two hundred collocates for each of these, before any inkling of the collocational range can be ascertained. It is clear that the amount of effort involved would be very considerable and, depending on the collocational span, the length of the text chosen, and the nature of words examined, the number of collocates might well be considerably greater than two hundred. Sinclair himself found that this work could be attempted only with the aid of a computer. A final difficulty is mentioned towards the end of his paper but dismissed on the assumption that the text for examination would be sufficiently homogeneous to be untroubled by such factors. It is quite clear that certain collocations are found only in specific varieties or registers of a language: thus hand and horse in the context of equitation. One is free to wonder whether homogeneity can be found in a text long enough for the rest of Sinclair's method to work. Certainly such homogeneity is not to be found in the works of Chaucer.

I.IV.5 The view that the study of collocation is to be conducted entirely and separately upon the lexical level is not shared by all linguists. Thus Joos claims that collocation within specified grammatical structures can act as an index of cognitive meaning and illustrates this by the example of the word code.¹ The enquiry is restricted to those senses of code which connote 'legality' rather than 'a symbol system'. The senses are first arranged subjectively and this subjective arrangement is claimed to be validated by collocational criteria. According to Joos, 'semological collocations are always grammatically linked pairs or sets of grammatically identified words',² but he does not admit all such combinations as

¹ 'Semology: a linguistic theory of meaning', Studies in Linguistics 13 (1958), pp. 53-70.

² Ibid., p. 64.

significant. Certain collocations occur with every sense of the word examined and therefore cannot be claimed to help in distinguishing senses; these Joos does not recognise as collocations in his 'semological' sense. Since no indication is given as to how collocations can be distinguished from these non-collocations without first knowing and arranging the cognitive meanings relative to one another, it is clear that Joos's work cannot form the basis of an analytic investigation.

I.IV.6 A much more sophisticated view of collocation in relation to grammar is that offered by Professor McIntosh. His interest in collocation is also explicitly connected with cognitive meaning; he draws an analogy between the syntagmatic relations and phonic reference of the orthography and the meaning relations of language as a whole, and comments:

My main reason for such an exploration is this: that the problems connected with meaning in the ordinary sense are notoriously complicated and it seems to me that in this (graphological) realm we have a somewhat similar system operating in a much simpler fashion.¹

In discussing the relationship between graphological and linguistic meaning, McIntosh makes the distinction between 'potential' and 'actual' meaning (a distinction developed by Ellis - above, p. 17).² The former is to be understood as equivalent, in the lexical sphere, to lexical meaning, whilst the latter corresponds to contextual meaning. 'Potential' meaning involves both grammatical and collocational features and may be considered to be defined by the limited appropriateness of an item to a certain number of places in the verbal context within certain situational contexts. As such, it is a rather ill-defined composition of all the contextual senses of the item. The 'actual' meanings are the senses, occurrence by occurrence, of a particular item taken in its verbal and situational contexts. An extreme

¹ 'Graphology and Meaning' in Patterns and Ranges: Papers in General, Descriptive and Applied Linguistics, ed. McIntosh and Halliday, London (1967), p.102. First printed in Archivum Linguisticum (1961), pp.107-120.

² Ibid., pp.103-105.

view might claim that a linguistic form has as many actual meanings as it has occurrences, but it is clear that the necessity of communication precludes this extreme viewpoint in the everyday use of language. There would therefore seem to be little justification for a linguist to adopt this view in his description of language; he must classify actual meanings into clusters, each of which will represent a single 'use'. This is the principle followed by the compilers of large dictionaries. McIntosh is not here concerned with the compilation of dictionaries and does not discuss the problems of this classification and the degree of objectivity with which it can be carried out.

The relation of grammar and collocation is, however, treated more extensively in the same volume in an article 'Patterns and Ranges', first published in the same year as 'Graphology and Meaning'.¹ Here McIntosh illustrates how the acceptability of a sentence depends not solely on its grammaticality but equally on the collocability of its lexical items. He attempts to set up a system of collocability, the collocational range. The proof that collocability is a necessary requirement separate from grammar is offered by the example of the distinction between sentences which are anomalous but which can be considered to have an application in some situation (the flaming waste-paper basket snored violently) and those for which no possible situation can be envisaged (the molten postage feather scored a weather). In both cases the grammar is well-formed, but since one sentence is perhaps acceptable, whilst the other is not, evidently the anomaly is at the lexical level. One must, however, make the reservation that the anomaly occurs, not merely through the coincidence of these lexical items, but through their collocations within certain syntactic relationships. Professor McIntosh comments:

¹ Ibid., pp.183-199. First published in Language (1961), pp.325-337.

... deal about in particular grammatical patterns in a given instance of a sentence as used in a live situation. (p.188)

but, in discussion of this matter of collocation, he prefers to treat the more general case where it is left to the subjective impression of the reader to decide upon the probability of a situation of application. Furthermore, in deciding the eligibility of collocations, he states as a means of procedure, that which has been the implication of the examples he has given; that, for clarity, he will limit himself to collocations occurring within defined syntactical units in particular grammatical structures. Such a decision is obviously a radical departure from the Firthian conception of collocations as lexical co-occurrences independent of grammar. To McIntosh, a collocational range is that set of lexical items which occurs at a particular point in the syntagmatic string of language, and this is conditioned not only by the lexical items in the vicinity, but also by the grammatical structure in which they appear:

The assessment of a collocation in the last resort involves in one way or another all other lexical items in the context, and there is scarcely a limit to the remove at which these may affect our interpretation of the word we happen to be specially preoccupied with. Furthermore various circumstances in the situational context are likely to be relevant. (p.191).

Despite this theoretical statement, McIntosh is compelled by necessity, for simplicity, to discuss only examples in the most limited grammatical structures such as the modifier/head relationship. He mentions the aspect of linguistic competence which enables the fluent speaker to select the item died rather than passed away within a Subject/Predicate construction of which the rhododendron bush forms the subject. We may never have had cause to use this sentence before, nor even have heard it before, yet we unhesitatingly choose one verb rather than the other. We may state this fact formally by saying that passed away and rhododendron bush each have collocational ranges which do not include the other term. The decision of the speaker to include rhododendron bush in the collocational range of died

rather than passed away, is made from his knowledge of features of the use of died and passed away; he has frequently heard the former in collocation with other plant names, but never the latter. Thus the range is assumed to be extended by analogy; rhododendron bush is known to be a plant name and is so classed, in usage, with other plant names.

It is clear from this that cognitive meaning is involved in the setting-up of collocations of this type, and McIntosh is fully aware of this. He says of the collocation molten feather that a full account of the set of nouns capable of occurring instead of feather (a full account of the collocational range of molten in a modifier/head construction) 'goes a long way towards constituting the meaning of molten' (p.189). The same point is made (p.194) when he assumes that:

the meanings a given word has (however we may define meaning) are in some direct way associated with our experience of that word in a variety of contexts, our association of that word with other words which have, in our experience, a somewhat similar range, and our association of the word with other words of similar shape, often but not always etymologically related. (p.194)

This is, in effect, a restatement of the idea of 'potential meaning' made in 'Graphology and Meaning.'

The claim that collocational range has a definite relation to cognitive meaning, which seems to be made in McIntosh's article, is one which cannot be made for the ordinary Firthian notion of collocation. It is a claim worth investigation since, if it proves to be true, it will provide a powerful instrument for the objective analysis of the senses of lexical items in unfamiliar texts.

I.IV.7 In the following discussion, I intend principally to consider a single modifier/head structure, and only in passing to touch upon more extended verbal context. It will, however, prove necessary to consider how a particular context of situation might impinge on this type of grammatically ordered collocation, and to observe its implications for the relation to cognitive meaning.

At the close of his article McIntosh mentions, but does not develop, the idea that certain peculiarities of collocating pairs might be explicable in terms of their grammatical structure and their informational value: this latter to be understood in terms of the relative restriction of the range from which the collocate is chosen. A basic premise of information theory is that the ability to carry information implies choice and, as a corollary to this, that the limiting of choice, the increase in the probability of the occurrence of a particular item, reduces the informational value of that item.¹ It may be seen from this that each choice of a collocate from a large collocational range, where there is considerable freedom of choice, might contribute more information than a choice from a more restricted range. Though this may hold true in signal systems, certain qualifications have to be made to this assumption when we are discussing ~~lexical~~ ^{lexico-grammatical} collocations, and these are best illustrated by examples.

Firstly, in dealing with collocational ranges, we can not assume that each member is of equal informational value. If we are concerned to establish the meaning of the word leaf, we may discover a wide range of items acting as modifier: dead, green, ivy, shrivelled, and so on. We should find a higher probability of the occurrence of green leaf than marigold leaf, so that, although the former may tell us more about leaves in general, the latter, which is less probable, tells us more about a leaf in a specific context and carries greater informational value. Hence simple breadth of range, without more detailed specification, is inadequate as an index of the informational value of any collocate.

Secondly, peculiarities of the organisation of language complicate the situation. If we take Firth's example dark night we may assume with some justice that it is a frequent collocation. If this is so, recalling the dogma that collocation is a bi-partite relationship, we might imagine that,

¹ Cf. J. Lyons, An Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, Cambridge (1968), p.89.

Given the occurrence of one of the items, the co-occurrence of the other is to some extent probable. It then follows that one collocate must carry some information in common with the other, since the latter is of partially depleted informational value through its predictability. But if we examine this collocation in the ordinary way of information theory, working from left to right, we can not say that, given the form dark, the form night is an especially probable successor. On the other hand, speaking in syntactical terms, if asked to find a modifier for night, dark seems quite a likely choice. In this structure the word night seems to include much of the information given by dark. But even taking grammatical structure into account, the reverse is not true. The relationship is articulated by grammatical relations and is neither the simple sequence envisaged by information theory nor the equal bi-partite relationship of collocational theory. If we wish to discuss it in terms of information theory we have to envisage the sequence as channelled by grammatical structure working here from head to modifier.

Apart from grammatical factors, certain semantic features influence collocation in unpredictable ways. Of the two collocations yellow leaf and withered leaf neither has an inherently greater probability than the other. Yet, subjectively, the latter seems more specific, seems to carry a greater semantic load than the former; we may therefore be tempted to regard it as less probable. This illusion that the latter has greater informational value in this way, is in fact nothing to do with the actual frequency of either modifier within this collocation. It has to do with the fact that yellow, to the competent speaker, is perceived to belong to a clearly defined lexical set of colour words, some members of which (e.g. brown, green) are extremely common collocates of leaf.¹ The peculiarity of withered is that it

¹This kind of organisation by a semantically related set is analogous to the point made by McIntosh concerning rhododendron bush and its collocation with died.

belongs to no such defined set and therefore seems to represent in this collocation a much more deliberate and distinct choice than the colour word. Thus, in saying something of value about the relative informational content of collocations, we must not only take into account the general frequency (including the collocational ranges) of both collocates, but we should also be aware that probability might be affected by certain conceptual groupings within the collocational range.

With this warning, we may consider for a moment the problem which suggested to McIntosh the use of informational criteria. He points out that, in any unusual collocation, what faces us is, not an unusual use of any one lexical item, but rather the rare collocation of two items. Nevertheless our attention is almost always focussed upon the peculiarity of a single word; one collocate seems fixed, while we feel compelled to adjust the sense of the other to account for the collocation. Some indication of grammatical and lexical features which might be involved has already been given; we might now consider further the relationship of semantic and informational features. In informational terms predetermination is equivalent to a lack of any value. Thus the sense 'egg' is implicit in addled since the collocational range of addled in the modifier/head is limited to egg and perhaps brain. But is our feeling for the specific collocate to be changed in sense directly related to probability alone? If we suggest the collocation *addled car, it is the former item which seems strange and has to be understood in another way; yet if we add extra context ('You haven't eaten that addled car, have you?'), the other collocate becomes the dubious one. The examples *asphalt egg and *fierce egg, although the probability of their occurrence is equally small, and each has a fairly large collocational range, elicit the subjective reaction that different halves of the collocation require to be changed. It is inconceivable to the competent speaker that an egg should be made from asphalt, whilst the associations of fierce make it possible that it is a deviant use with the sense 'strong'. One must doubt whether

this has much to do with informational value. If we take the example *addled book the expectation that the modifier will seem odd and will need to be adjusted is not necessarily fulfilled: it is possible to explain this collocation in terms of the transferred sense of book. Addled normally collocates with brain, hence the implication of the collocation may be that the views of the author of the volume are being called in question. In the case of asphalt the possibility is that it belongs to a set of the names of substances from which things are made: again semantic considerations are the answer to a problem rather than statistical ones.

If we were to accept, as is probably the case in some but not all instances, that certain collocates contain part of the sense of the other collocate, would this be valid at any level of lexical meaning above that of the individual contextual sense? To what extent would it contribute to a statement of the more abstract meaning, McIntosh's 'potential' meaning? Since probability is a function of frequency, which is in turn related to the total number of occurrences in a text, we may say that this decision on meaning takes into account all the contexts of an item which correspond with the grammatical frame with which we have chosen to work. As a result these individual statements of meaning relations should have a validity with regard to the overall 'potential' meaning. Unfortunately however the system of language does not seem to function in this neat way, for, apart from the limiting factors already mentioned, new ones are constantly to be found. Thus the term white noise, from the restricted language of acoustical engineering, seems superficially not very different from expressions like green leaf or dark night, but it is hard to see how either of the collocates overlap in sense with each other. Here the lexeme white is used by an analogy with optics, where white light contains all wave-lengths of the visible spectrum, just as white noise contains all wave-lengths of the audible spectrum. Similarly wet night is a fairly frequent collocation so that wet may be considered a probable modifier of night; yet one can hardly

accept that it is a part of the meaning of night. The problem is raised of what degree of probability ensures the apparent overlap in sense in some collocations, and to what extent do common, but non-~~semantically~~ criterial, situational features affect collocations?

I.IV.8 From the analytical point of view, any kind of transferred meaning will tend to disrupt the possible link between collocations and cognitive meaning, whether it be metonymy of the kind found in addled book or anthropomorphic metaphor as in the decision to call the birch tree the 'queen of the woods'. If we are examining the collocations of book or queen these collocations in such a use will differ considerably from the ordinary uses. If, as we must initially, we limit ourselves to the formal level of analysis, certain grammatical features will also prove disruptive. Thus the occurrence of pronouns as collocates will be common so that, at best, these will be of small informational value and, at worst, as when they refer to a noun used in a transferred sense, they will be distinctly misleading. Equally confusing will be those uses which occur with negation. If any coincidence between collocation and cognitive meaning is to be maintained, the negation must be taken into account: as, for example, in the following sentence where we are attempting to determine the sense of the word succulent by examining collocates in a modifier-head construction: 'Most succulents are not spiny as are cacti ...'

Returning to the second half of the question posed at the end of the last paragraph, some indication of the extent to which extra-linguistic features can affect the kinds of collocations to be found in a text may be exemplified from the Chaucerian corpus. If cognitive meaning is assumed to be related to the collocational ranges of lexical items, each collocation, as part of such a range, will influence our judgement of that meaning. A few examples from Chaucer's usage will illustrate some of the ways in which random elements in the context of situation can predetermine collocations,

effect their frequency, and thus upset any easy assumptions as to the relative probability of collocations and their consequent value in assessing cognitive meaning.

Firstly we may cite the lack of homogeneity in Chaucer's language and add that this is a language used in close contact with at least two others, French and Latin. Hence, not only is the culture of fourteenth century England dominated by concepts first formulated in these two languages¹ but, as a result, the English language is often patterned according to patterns originally proper to these languages. This is equally true of the lexical as of the grammatical level. Throughout the works of Chaucer we find numerous lexico-grammatical calques on French phrases: to have despit of; to take leve of; to catch a pitee. Based on Latin phrases, though perhaps by way of French, are places delitables and peynte (Franklin's Tale V. 899, 907, locus amoenus and pingere in the rhetorical manuals). The influence of a foreign language may be more immediate in the sense that it is a direct translation with an identifiable source; thus the collocation fyerse Poli-phemus (Bo. IV m. vii) is simply a rendering of the Latin ferus ... Polyphemus whilst the puzzling outward grace in the Clerk's Tale IV.424 is based upon the Latin of Petrarch (extra cum gratia hominum, vivebat) and the French of the Livre Griseldis (vivoit en grant grace dehors).

The influence of tradition or authority may also affect the lexico-grammatical patterns of a language through deliberate quotation or through the echoing of sentiment. In Chaucer's language collocations such as grene youthe and grene herte are referable to a literary tradition associating the springtime rebirth of nature with the youthful vigour of mankind. This tradition is to be found in Late Classical literature and is maintained in

¹ D.R. Howard, The Three Temptations, Princeton (1966), p.296, comments perceptively that 'the French renaissance of the twelfth century comes to fruition in England in the age of Chaucer almost exactly as much later as the Italian Renaissance of the fourteenth century was to bear fruit in the age of Shakespeare.'

Old French as part of the theme of raverdic. Deliberate quotation is to be found in the use of proverbs and sententiae as well as in excerpts from important works of literature or instruction. Thus the modern English idiom 'to screw up one's courage' seems to be based upon a reminiscence of Shakespeare's imagery in Macbeth.

Certain collocations occur in contexts of didactic or philosophical debate which are deliberately unexpected and even oxymoronic. Thus the collocation good ire in the Parson's Tale is used to shock the reader to attention to the didactic passage which will explain the validity of such modification of ire. Without this accompanying passage, taken as an isolated collocation, this might tend to give a totally erroneous impression of the normal evaluative elements in the meaning of ire. A similarly antithetical collocation, though this time afforded by the peculiarities of situation, is that between white and crow in the Manciple's Tale. Within a limited corpus, such exceptional cases may prove troublesome in the analysis of collocations, though they may be negligible in the context of Halliday's 'twenty million running words'.¹

Finally peculiarities of the sense of one or other of the collocates has been recognised as a cause of peculiar collocations; any transferred or figurative sense may disrupt the pattern we hope to establish and a new pattern may or may not begin to emerge. One such new pattern in Chaucer's usage is that connected with the figurative use of the words grace, mercy, pitee where each is spoken of in the imagery of running water: pitee renneth soone ..; welle of grace; welle of mercy and many others. The analogy between emotions and water suddenly welling up from a spring is so widespread that we might be able to allow for this in treating these collocations, but we should be sacrificing the hoped-for objectivity of our method. We should also be distorting the Chaucerian usage since certainly in the case

¹ 'Lexis as a Linguistic Level', op.cit., p.159.

of grace and mercy the analogy is between water and the theological conception of grace and this derives from Biblical authority and exegetical commentary.¹

I.IV.9 The examination of verbal context and a number of theories about its connection with the meaning of individual lexical items has provided us with a range of suggestions which might help to establish methodological principles. Firstly it is clear that, although verbal context is of extreme importance in the analysis of meaning, it is not sufficient when taken alone, even if each occurrence of a lexical item is studied. A number of features of both general and situational context must be taken into account in establishing each sense. Although the general cultural context can be assumed to be stable throughout the life of a poet, distinct features of it may be brought into prominence by particular uses of a word, and these will require comment in delineating the sense of that occurrence. Thus, in establishing a sense, we should expect to have to draw evidence from the verbal and situational context of the actual utterance, but also, in a way which cannot be formalised, from aspects of the general cultural milieu; which may include evidence from cognate foreign languages.

The study of collocations, in the Firthian sense of lexical co-occurrence, has doubtful links with cognitive meaning, yet it will offer useful evidence concerning habitual uses of some words. In many cases it will reflect the co-occurrence of objects in the referential domain: in the case of material objects this may or may not be of interest, telling us more about the organisation of the real world than the meanings of the words (e.g. table, desk, seat, ruler, pencil), but in the case of abstractions, co-occurrence

¹ Variations of the opposition between water and grace are repeated by all four evangelists and twice in the Acts of the Apostles (e.g. I have baptised you with water; he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit. Mark I.8) Exegetes considered the water at Cana and that drawn by the Samaritan to contrast with the 'living water' or grace which Christ offers. cf. D.W. Robertson, Jr., A Preface to Chaucer, Princeton (1962), p.321.

may be much more germane to meaning. If we are studying emotions or social attitudes, the fact that they are considered together or that they occur together with relation to a single situation, suggests that they are articulated pieces of human behaviour, and such evidence is of prime importance in assessing their meaning.

Lexico-grammatical collocations can act as a useful index of cognitive meaning since they represent a portion of the syntactically ordered verbal context. Inevitably, they lack precision and may be a very fallible guide indeed to cognitive meaning for reasons which have been demonstrated; nevertheless they can act as a useful general guide if not too rigidly applied to the exclusion of valuable extra-linguistic evidence. This type of study is of first rate value in determining lexical items which consist of traditional formulae, idioms or proverbial elements. One might suggest that within the syntactically ordered framework of these collocations it might be possible to set up a scale of idiomaticity according to which a high probability of collocation suggests an idiom with a single lexical reference whilst low probability presupposes two or more distinct items.

Finally, the very flexibility of the use of language, the uncertain link in language between form and meaning and its variable dependence upon situation, should warn us against the dangers of adopting too generalised and rigid a method of the analysis of meaning.¹


¹ An interesting schematisation of context is offered by Sture Allén ('Semantische Strukturen', *Studia Neophilologica* XI, 2 (1968), p.377) who believes that the close linguistic context is formalisable whilst context of situation and general context, which also bear upon the sense of an item, must remain unformalised.

I.V. Patterning

I.V.1 It is advisable at this point in the discussion to consider briefly what the notion of 'pattern' implies, and perhaps to look forward to some kinds of pattern which we might hope to find in a lexical study of an area of the vocabulary of Chaucer. We may begin by drawing a distinction between patterns and sets; a procedure which will also involve the notion of structure. Sets are simply collections of items, established by their conformity to one or more criteria, which may be externally or internally applicable. Table, chair and stool enter a set which may be designated as that of common domestic furniture; a set from which throne would be excluded. Yet throne would be a member of a set of items which are customarily used for sitting on, whilst table would be excluded from this new set. The first of these sets, we might consider to be externally established by virtue of the co-occurrence of these items in a single location; the second is established internally by the fact that its members all share a particular function.

Similarly, lexical sets may be established by the external criterion of the collocation of each of its members with some specific item, or an orthographical set may be ordered by the internal consideration that all its members have the same initial letter. The common conditions of polysemy and synonymy can be simply portrayed in terms of sets ordered by the fact that they share the same formal item. Polysemy is the condition which occurs when a set of senses are assigned to a single formal item; synonymy, when the sets of senses of two formal items intersect.¹ Seen from this

¹ If we have two formal items, X and Y, with the senses 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 4,5,6,7,8,9 respectively, the condition of synonymy and polysemy may be simply represented by a diagram of intersecting sets. No internal articulation is implied by the sequence of numbers.



S : synonymic senses.

simplified point of view, polysemy and synonymy are not structural sense relations since there appears to be no internal ordering involved, but the sets are grouped by an external criterion; the separate occurrence of the members as senses of a single formal item. In truth, however, this is rarely the case. The various contextual senses which are realised in the uses of a single formal item are usually inter-related and are therefore internally, or structurally, ordered. They will all belong to a larger set defined by a particular number of criteria. This will be subdivisible and resolvable into mutually exclusive sub-sets, and eventually to the level of the individual sense, by the addition of new criteria. If these sets have a number of criteria in common in this way, and are therefore members of a more generalised set, their relationship to one another and to the higher level set will be a structural one.¹

Structure implies internal interdependencies between the items entering into it. Ordinarily, when we speak of structure in language we have in mind the syntactic relationships into which the string of discourse enters, but what we imply in talking of the structure of the vocabulary is the interdependence and mutually defining nature of the senses of lexical items. It is plain that if we intend to discover structural relationships of this sort, a preliminary will be the organisation of the items into simple sets.

Pattern is a less easily defined concept in relation to language, but an initial requirement in identifying pattern is that there should be some element of repetition. This may not be precise and exact repetition, for we should include symmetry within the definition of pattern, and here the repetition of the pattern is in some way reversed. The fact that pattern is dependent upon repetition implies that it is a systemic or paradigmatic organisation; thus, by the comparison of repeated syntagmatic features we isolate a paradigmatic pattern in language.

¹ The relation of the larger sets and smaller sets would be analogous to McIntosh's notion of potential and actual meaning (see above, p. 47).

Finally, we may sum up by noting that sets may or may not be internally structured and that, while we should expect structures to correspond to a more general pattern, patterns need not have a narrowly structural form. Some patterns will hold between two distinct levels of language in a way structures do not. Pattern may be found operating simultaneously in both the syntagmatic and paradigmatic planes; thus, in an attempt to discover pattern, we must take into account both system and structure, both set relations and structural ones.

I.V.2 When our primary interest is in lexis we should expect to find patterns of at least three major types. Firstly we shall find patterning in the formal level, the expression system of the language. Those patterns will take the form of lexico-grammatical structures which are repeated whole or in part throughout the corpus. They will comprise idioms, proverbial elements, formulaic expressions of one sort or another, calqued phrases and so forth.

A second type of patterning we may expect to find is semantic patterning. This may be of the structural kind suggested by Trier's theories of the linguistic field, but may be more objectively demonstrated by simpler structural relations such as antonymy or hyponymy.¹ This latter term denotes the condition where a more general term includes the senses of more specific terms and could therefore be substituted for them in certain contexts, though the reverse would not necessarily be true (e.g. the relationship holding between fish and shark, herring, salmon, and carp). We should here take up a point made earlier about synonymy and polysemy. Hyponymy would represent the condition in which, when X = the formal item FISH and d = the sense 'carp', FISH can be used in certain contexts where it has the sense 'carp', or, alternatively, a form CARP (= Y) exists with this sense and can be so used instead. The form CARP, however, cannot be used in certain

¹ A term introduced by J. Lyons, Structural Semantics, p.69.

contexts where the form FISH can be used with the more general sense 'fish'. A more complex version of our diagram may help to elucidate these patterns of sense and form.

Formal items	X	Y		(X)	(Y)
'potential' meaning	M ₁	M ₂		+ M ₃	+ M ₄
contextual or 'actual' senses	a, b, c, d .	d , e, f, g.		+ u, v, w	+ m, n, o

The above diagram now represents two formal items, X and Y, which are polysemantic at the level of contextual meaning. At this level they have one sense, d, in common and so are synonymic in one context. Out of context, the more general set of criteria shared by all the contextual senses which constitute the 'potential' meaning of each formal item, M₁ and M₂, are different enough for there to be no question of synonymy at the level of potential meaning. The relation between M₁ and the set of related senses (a, b, c, d) and M₂ (d, e, f, g) is a structural one of hierarchical formation. Now, if two sets of senses, (u, v, w) and (m, n, o) are also found to be possible for X and Y respectively and these are related internally, but not to any of the other senses, we shall then have to set up new sets of potential meaning, M₃ and M₄, and X and Y will now seem polysemantic outside context. Hyponymy, in Lyons sense, is found when a number of the contextual senses, a, b or c, can be realised by the use of other formal items H, I, J. In that contextual sense, H, I, J are hyponyms of X. It is not necessarily the fact that H, I and J will in every context have the senses a, b and c, so that they may not always be hyponyms of X, yet cases do exist where contextual variation in sense is slight, so that hyponymy appears to be a neat and stable pattern. It is equally obvious that the senses a, b, c are not hyponymic with relation to X when it has the potential meaning M₃. This being so, there are obvious inaccuracies and confusions in stating what is essentially a relation of senses in terms of formal units with which they lack a one to one relationship. It becomes necessary to append to the formal item a key which will refer to a previously delineated potential

hearing. Lyons points out how synonymy may be considered as symmetrical hyponymy. Referring to our revised diagram, if the sense, *s*, is semantically ascribable to formal items *N* and *X* then it can be said that, in some contexts *X* will occur, when it will be a hyponym of *N*, and *N* may occur, when it will be seen as a hyponym of *X*.¹

I.V.3 Patterns within the sphere of new etic need not be structured in the senses we have looked at so far, since we might claim that there are patterns of semantic change. These words, for example, originally related to the sense 'race' frequently develop the sense 'little' and progress to the sense 'mild, gentle'; whilst words with the sense 'low born' tend to develop on a parallel antonymic course to mean 'harsh, cruel'.² It would, of course, be wildly inaccurate to claim this as a general rule, yet enough examples are found to say that it is a pattern of sense development. Synchronically, we may also find that certain words have senses which shift in recognizable ways between subjective and objective reference or active and passive signification (we may cite as examples of the former plum and precious, and of the latter, Shakespearean adjectives with the suffixes -ive and -ible) or between abstract and concrete.

We may also find patterns relating both the phonetic and formal aspects of language; thus the formal resemblance of certain words reinforces a semantic similarity (slip; slither; slide; slip; click - a grouping which enables us to assign a sense to Lewis Carroll's adjective slitley). This coincidence of sense relations and form (first called 'phonosthetic patterning',

¹ This model is still an oversimplified one. It could be improved by inserting a set of 'uses' between the potential meanings and the contextual senses. The typical hierarchical pattern of hyponymy may be found between any of the levels.

² Compare the etymologies of: gentle, reborn, high, O.H. geodan, courteous and cruel, willing, churl. Note illustrate the whole development, others only part of it. Some words (brunt, forthbearing) are directly opposite to it.

³ 'Speech' in The Language of Men and Speech, 1934-5, series, London (1946), pp. 176-88. First published by Ernest Benn Ltd., 1940.

Certain lexical patterns may be intimately connected with situation as, for example, when different lexical items are selected to express the same cognitive meaning in different applications or registers (horses sweat, men perspire, but ladies merely glow) or when a single situation is viewed from different perspectives and the choice of lexical item reflects this difference (buy, sell; offer, accept). A slight extension of the time span may add other associated words (have, ask, give, receive). This relationship is called converseness by Lyons.¹

Other types of pattern will no doubt present themselves in the course of analysis, and a thorough lexical study will not only seek to identify those patterns but will move outside the language in order to suggest influences which are responsible for creating them. A full lexical investigation ought to establish the senses of words, give details of their use, including any patterning, syntactic or semantic, into which they enter, and offer something of their history, internal and external, to account for the patterning. All this information may be of use in the application of the results of investigation by literary criticism for a fuller understanding of the text and its background.

¹ Theoretical Linguistics, p.467.

Lyons definition is slightly different from that given here, since he does not consider situation of importance but rather 'oppositeness' of meaning, so that husband and wife are also examples of converseness.

I.VI The Method

I.VI.1 What is being sought is a method or framework by which to state the facts - in this case the meaning or functioning of words - and the test of any method is the degree to which it enables the facts to be exhaustively, usefully and, as far as may be, simply stated, classified and handled. Any abstractions from the totality of the subject-matter, in this case the functioning of words in speech, that prove useful are justified, and precisely to the extent that they prove useful. ¹

Robins' words on methodological approach are a salutary reminder: abstraction is valuable but clarity is worth more. For the sake of clarity one must, in analytical work, be prepared to sacrifice the apparent conceptual neatness of formal and abstract statement. Yet such an attitude does not confer upon the investigator the freedom to wander haphazardly down each by-road he encounters. A broad consistency of approach is required or clarity becomes the victim of the opposing tendency to atomism and eccentricity. The lesson taught by our introductory discussion of linguists' attitudes to the analysis of meaning is this very lesson: clarity and descriptive value lies in the middle way between formal theory and arbitrary practice; 'vertu is the mene'.

The method adopted, then, draws inspiration from a number of the theoretical and practical approaches discussed above, but inevitably it re-fashions the instruments somewhat to its own purposes. The initial treatment of each lexeme may be of a formal nature, but it is hoped that this justifies itself in the more flexible discussion by which it is supplemented.

I.VI.2 It has been found in practice that it is necessary to treat each lexeme separately in the initial stages of analysis. An attempt to suggest lexical patterning simply by the study of collocations, as Joos suggests might be possible, ² failed for reasons which have been mentioned in the

¹ 'A Problem in the Statement of Meanings', Lingua 3 (1952-3), p.127.

² loc.cit. pp.62ff.

The method does in fact appear to work in the case of a few words (e.g. the relations in sense between merciabile, pitous and despitous), but it has no more general validity.

discussion of collocation above.

The first task of the investigator, then, is to collect all the occurrences of a particular lexeme. This has been done with the help of the Chaucer Concordance in the case of each lexeme studied. Each occurrence must be accompanied by a sufficient indication of its context; normally to the extent of the sentence in which it occurs, and this may be supplemented by notes on the more general context. A complete reading of the corpus is of course necessary in order to contextualise occurrences more fully.¹ For present purposes this corpus was assumed to be all those works which are indisputably Chaucerian in origin; thus doubtful poems such as Against Women Unconstant and fragments B and C of the Romaunt of the Rose and the Equatorie of the Planetes have been excluded from the initial investigation, though evidence offered by them may be brought in more general discussion.

The total number of occurrences of each lexeme is stated since this is of importance, both in assessing the value of the evidence relating to it, and in establishing its status in relation to other items in Chaucer's lexis. The formal scatter of the item has similar importance, and obviously has a direct bearing upon its total frequency, so that the realisation of the lexeme in different word classes should also be stated in quantitative terms. Some sub-division and qualification may be necessary at this point. It might be useful here, for example, to state such differences as that between the use of mercy as a noun and the sub-category where it is used as a sentence substitute in an appeal for mercy.

I.VI.3 From the collection of citations for each occurrence, an account of the situations of use is possible. By these situations we need not imply a situation in which the word is part of an utterance embedded in a coincidence of circumstances of the phenomenological world. The word which

¹ Naturally, fuller contextualisation by wider reading in contemporary literature is of great value.

we are at present concerned with may in fact be part of the narrative which establishes the immediate situation. So that in a sentence like *she granted him grace, the word we are studying refers directly to a narrative situation identified by the sentence of which it is a part. It is clear, therefore, that situation analysis, since not all sentences are narrative in this way,¹ will not be applicable to all occurrences of a particular lexeme. We shall in practice make a distinction between the use of a word in a narrative sentence of this sort and as an utterance within a situation, yet there proves to be little necessity to analyse the situations of each separately.

The analysis of situation of use requires a fairly high degree of generality; the machinery of analysing the situation of each occurrence separately and presenting the results individually would be prohibitively extensive and lend little to clarity. The method of applying each occurrence separately to a more generalised framework and offering an account of the general features of the use of each grammatical representative is clearly preferable. The result, working at the level of the totality of contexts of each grammatical form, will tell us something of the general situational probability of each form. It is a level of abstraction analogous to McIntosh's 'potential' meaning. Since the situational frame used for categorising usage is of such a general nature nothing will be gained by stating the results from it at a level more delicate than that of the particular grammatical realisation of the lexeme. Delicacy of statement relating to peculiarities of individual situational uses - the kind of analysis that may be useful in separating nearly synonymic terms - can more easily be achieved on an ad hoc basis as the investigation continues.

The following schema, adapted from Schneeberger, Mitchell and Kachru, has proved adequate for this rather gross categorisation of the situational

¹ This is especially true among the sententious utterances found among the parts of the corpus devoted to moral philosophy: e.g. 'Somtyme it cometh of Ire or prive hate, that norisseth rancour in herte, as afterward I shal declare.' (CT.X.509).

uses of the Chaucerian terms studied.

A. Does the situation involve individuals or groups?

In general, non-situational uses this question will be unanswerable.

B. Is the relationship between the participants benevolent or malevolent?

C. Does difference of sex play a part in the use?

D. Does the prerogative of action in the situation to which the word applies belong to people who are externally superior or inferior?

The sense of externally here refers to superiority according to some generally accepted criteria (e.g. social criteria) outside the situation in which the confrontation of the participants takes place.

E. What does the external superiority consist in?

This may include such factors as divinity (pagan or Christian), ascendancy in the social hierarchy (vassal/lord; man/wife) or perhaps moral ascendancy. Although theologically indefensible, the treatment of the Virgin Mary as divine as opposed to mortal seems justified by usage in the text.

F. Does the above prerogative belong to the participant who is superior or inferior within the situation?

G. What does this internal superiority consist in?

It may include physical force, previously agreed rights, particular effect of a recognised code of behaviour or any of a range of circumstantial factors.

I.VI.4 After the occurrences of lexemes have been divided into word-classes, the analysis of verbal context commences with the collection of the lexico-grammatical collocations proper to each word-class. In order to maintain comparability between each lexeme at this stage of the analysis, it is divided so that the collocations proper to each grammatical structure are stated separately.¹ Thus a lexeme is first divided into its realisations as noun, adjective and adverb and then the structures into which

¹ These correspond approximately to Martinet's syntagms. They are of sufficient syntagmatic length to include phrases of a single lexical reference.

the noun enters - subject + predicator; predicator + object etc. - are examined separately, the realisation of the predicator being stated for each actual occurrence. It is clear that, although I have called the starting point of this investigation a lexeme, such an appellation is justified in only a very loose way. The progress of the study will reveal to what extent the form has the same lexical reference. At the beginning of the investigation all we know is that there is formal and etymological similarity between the items we are examining.

The examination of these lexico-grammatical features, when taken with the analysis of situation, begins to delimit a broad area of cognitive meaning and the repetition of particular phrasal devices suggests formulae and idioms. Furthermore, similarity in situational use and a considerable coincidence of lexico-grammatical collocational range will suggest some degree of synonymy between lexemes, the extent of which can later be determined at the level of the contextual sense, or the slightly more generalised level of use.

The second part of the formal analysis of verbal context is that devoted to purely lexical collocation of the type theoretically suggested by Firth and practically studied by Sinclair. The stretch of context involved in the collection of these lexical collocations is, in the primary instance, the sentence in which the word studied occurs. Nevertheless, since this part of the study is lexical and related more directly to situation or associative contexts than to grammar, one must be prepared to retrieve lexical collocations from outside the sentence limits if this retrieval seems to be sanctioned by the bulk of the evidence from within sentence limits. Lexical collocations are considered significant largely on account of their frequency, and here stylistic factors are perhaps of more import than the relation of the words to the actual situation. Conventionalism in description is part of the nature of mediaeval poetry, so that we find the same epithets co-occurring on repeated occasions. The mere listing of

the collocates will reveal little in such cases and may even lead to false assumptions. It is therefore worth attempting to classify the collocates in a way not purely lexical nor yet grammatical but, rather, with reference to their stylistic employment. Such a classification will also have some value in assessing aspects of the cognitive meaning of the word under study. Within the same major classification of structure (e.g. modifier) a number of items may appear; these may be simply listed (We was she gay, fresh, ne jolyf, RR.435) or, as is very commonly found, paired (Largesse, that sette al hir entente / For to be honourable and free. RR.1151). Certain other relationships can be suggested, but these are either less frequent (such as occurrences at the same point in deliberately parallel structures, metrical balance within the line) or less easily delineated. Of this latter type, is what I shall call in the analysis, the linked relationship between a word studied and a frequent collocate. By this is meant certain more distant grammatical relationships, such as those set up between the modifier of a relative pronoun and the modifier of the noun to which the relative refers, or, perhaps, with reference to the situation, certain causal links represented in the sentence. Linking is a relationship between frequently occurring collocates which is dependent more upon a general understanding of the significance of the sentence than upon narrowly definable features of style. Finally, it may be added that the value of this kind of lexical collocation, further ordered by the above stylistic considerations, is equally great in suggesting related words for the expansion of the study as in the stylistic information it offers.

I.VI.5 This formal method may serve to indicate certain sense relations and establish the meaning of terms with a fairly high generality, yet it will fail to reveal individual senses or uses. Much must be assigned arbitrarily and many minor aspects of usage will not be revealed. This can be corrected only by a commentary upon the formal analysis which will help

to fill out its inadequacies in the presentation of the precise details of usage, stylistic and situational, of each word.

From the evidence collected and arranged in this way¹ and from a reconsideration of the citations originally gathered, an attempt can be made to classify the contextual senses of each formal item into 'uses'. For this task, it is allowable to use evidence from outside the corpus and, if necessary outside the language, so long as the details of this use of evidence are given. Indeed in the case of the Chaucerian corpus evidence from French and Latin originals may be of great importance at this point in the analysis. When this stylistic syntactical and semantic evidence has been collected we shall be in a position to discuss the evidence of patterning within the lexis of Chaucer.

¹ A statement of this evidence is offered in the Appendix.

Section II

The Senses of the Words

GRACE

Easily the most frequent collocations of grace are mercy, pitee, and love.

Translation is frequently a matter of borrowing from the original, thus grace is almost exclusively gratia in Boethius, and grace in Holibec. Some indication of the semantic breadth of the term in Chaucer is afforded by the considerable, though sporadic, use for translating other forms. A few examples are given below.

- RR.1255 God yeve hir right good grace ; la seue merci.
- RR.1169 ... she stod in love and grace / Of rich and povor;
ele a devise / L'amour des povros e des riches.
- CT.VII.1207 grace; amour
- CT.IV.102 grace; grace; carum.
- CT.IV.395 hath swich favour sent hiro of his grace;
tantum divinis favoris affulserat;
Dieu ... envoia tant grace.
- RR.1428 was of such a grace; estoit de tel aire.
- CT.VII.1764 by the grace of oure Lord God; se Dieu plait.
- CT.IV.613 knave child Ful gracious and fair;
filium elegantissimum.

The Nouns

Grace

1. Use as an exclamation.

Use as a complement: ask g.

do a g.

Grace here represents a kindly feeling, a benevolent attitude, in a superior person which will lead to material benefit (beneficium) to a petitioner. Occasionally there is some confusion between the action itself and the feeling which inspires it, so that grace then refers exclusively to the action.

This stress upon the concrete is encapsulated in the syntactic structure of phrases of the type do a gr

LGM(F)451 For whoso yevoth a yifte, or dooth a grace,
Do it by tyme, his thank ys wel the more.

We may further refine our general characterisation of the senses here involved by noting the use of these syntagms in two sharply defined situations: those of the pleading of the courtly lover and that of the judgement by a lord of evil-doers.

In the first of these, the narrower sense of compliance with the request for love develops. This undergoes a certain concretisation in syntagms of the type illustrated above;

TC.III.922 ... though that she did hym as thanne a grace,
and also by its collocation with verbs such as challenge and disserve. This process is hastened when, in a lower social register, where the petitioner is equal or even superior to the potential grantor, the word takes on an ironic, euphemistic sense when compared with its more decorous situations of use:

CT.I.3726 For after this I hope ther cometh moore.
Lemman, thy grace, and sweete bryd, thyn oore!

The specificity of grace here is suggested by the fact that Alisoun has just agreed to let Absolon kiss her; he hopes, expects, and appeals for moore.

The second situation, that of the judgement of a lord, is found clearly when grace acts as the complement of a verb. Here the petitioner is frequently a guilty man and grace takes on a specific sense close to the modern sense of 'mercy', 'clemency' or 'pardon':

CT.III.895 But that the queene and othere ladyes mo
So longe preyeden the kyng of grace,
Til he his lyf hym graunted in the place,

CT.II.647 Have ye nat seyn sometye a pale face,
Among a prees, of hym that hath be lad
Toward his dooth, wher as hym gat no grace,

It is especially in this situation that syntagmatic links with mercy are found in Chaucer:

CT.I.1827 And hym of lordshipe and of mercy procyde,
 And he hem graunteth grace, and thus he seyde:

As in the previous situation, this sense of grace can be concretised, so that grace can be evaluated and made to apply in a comparative way to various acts of clemency:

CT.I.1874 When Theseus hath doon so fair a grace?

This last quotation is an assessment of the act expressed in the quotation immediately preceding it.

2. Use as a Complement: stande in g.

The syntagmatic structures grouped under the above heading express the concept of GRACE in a way different from those examined above: the criteria of Petitioner, Grantor, Recipient, which can be perceived in many of those uses, are here much less apparent. The interaction between the person who is in grace and his patron is not marked and, indeed, external forces alone may bring about this state. Nor is there a direct and necessary benefit to be derived from being in grace, for in some cases the prerogative belongs to an inferior. Boethius, for example, despises the grace of the multitude (Bo. III, p. vi, 29). Evidently here the sense is one of a gratuitous benevolence, and syntagmatic links with love are important. In these syntagms, grace is love and favour and implies no more than an attitude.

The phrases in this group are commonly used in the courtly love situation, and a new syntagm is formed for this application:

CT.VIII.1348 Ne knyght in armes to doon a hardy dede,
 To stonden in grace of his lady deere,

This sense of the lexeme GRACE is also frequently specified in a use implying popularity:

CT.IV.1590 Another stant so in peples grace
 For hire sadnesse and hire benyngnytee
 That of the peple grettest voys hath she;

The notion of the esteem of the populace is repeated several times with some variation in wording (TC.I.1077; RR.1169; LGW.1014). Such uses contrast with the more patrician contexts where mercy and clemency are important senses.

3. Use as a Complement: fynde g. to.

In uses with this group of syntagms the subject of the verb is often a divinity, the receipt of whose grace enables the recipient to achieve a desired aim. Thus grace is not here confused with an act by a grantor; it is that favour which bestows upon a man the power to act on his own behalf. When the grantor is a divinity, grace is a supernatural power. It may even have domain over the functioning of the conscience, emotions or intellect:¹

LGW.2457 And ek to haste me in my legendo,
 (Which to performe God me grace sende!)

CT.IV.1666 And olles, God forbode but he sente
 A wedded man hym grace to repente
 Wel ofte rather than a sengle man!

Divine grace may prove the agent of salvation:

PF.84 Then shul they come into this blysfyl place,
 To which to comen God the sende his grace.

When the subject of the sentence is human, these senses of a supernatural enabling power are manifestly impossible. Instead, grace develops the sense of 'permission':

LGW.2258 For Philomene, with salte teres eke,
 Gan of hire fador grace to beseke
 To sen hire syster, that she loveth so;

4. Use as a Complement: fynde that g. that

This structure illustrates further developments in sense. With application to a clear situation and a human grantor, the sense is often similar to the senses of those syntagms grouped with ask g., and the consecutive clause merely illustrates the concrete acts called grace:

CT.VII.2331 That ther nas kyng ne prynce in al that lond
 That he nas glad, if he that grace fond,
 That she ne wolde upon his lond werreye.

Even in this example, however, there is the possibility that the grantor of the specific grace is not the lady in question, but some unnamed agency such as Fortune or God. A second example will illustrate a development of this

¹ The grace of gyle in Piers Plowman (c-text) VII, 213, provides a useful example of the sense of the donation of an enabling power.

when the grantor is evidently supernatural and grace is qualified and stated to be of such a kind as to achieve a certain state of affairs:

CT.VIII.354 And after this, Tiburce gat swich grace
 That every day he saugh, in tyme and space,
 Tho aungel of God;

There is here the possibility of understanding the events outlined by the sentence to mean that Tiburce acquired the ability to see angels by no external help, but through a quality inherent in him. Such a reading is openly invited by a third example, and is inevitable in a fourth:

CT.III.1683 'Now, sire,' quod he, 'han freres swich a grace
 That noon of hem shal com to this place?'

RR.1099 And yit the stoon hadde such a grace
 That he was siker in every place,
 All thilke day, nat blynd to ben,
 That fastyng myghte that stoon seen.

Here the grantor is at last totally absent, and grace is simply a supernatural quality possessed by the stone and specified in the succeeding clause.

In uses of the syntagms fynde g. to; do a g.; fynde that g. that there is a similar tendency to particularise the reference of the word grace, reducing the importance of the grantor, and resulting in a modification of the point of view in understanding the sentence. As the source of grace becomes less important, so emphasis is concentrated upon the actual deed or its effect, either of which may be called a grace. Modifiers may be introduced into the syntagm, evaluating particular examples of grace and, when these coincide with a verb such as gat or han, there is rarely any need to understand the existence of a grantor at all. The simple situation is disrupted and a new sense appears. This sense, of an endowed quality, is explicit when applied to an inanimate object, and it is a small step from here to see the quality as proper to the object rather than endowed.¹

¹ Compare the usage of the Floure and the Leafe (ed. Pearsall) line 557:
 (leaves) Whose lusty green May may not appaired be,
 But aye kepynge their beauty fresh and greene
 For there nis storme that may hem deface,
 Haile nor snow, wind nor frosts kene;
 Wherefore they have this propertie and grace.

Ambiguity, however, remains when this type of syntagm relates to human beings. The senso of an inherent quality is found, with a slightly different syntactical construction in:

RR.1428 That th'orthe was of such a grace
 That it of floures hath plente,
 That both in somer and wynter be.

Both the quotations from the Romaunt of the Rose are direct translations of similar French expressions (avoit un tel eür; estoit de tel aire) which are normally taken to refer to fate or fortune.

5. Certain uses in Chaucer seem to be ambiguous between the senses of 'property', 'endowed quality' and 'fortune':

CT.II.980 And longe tyme dwelled she in that place,
 In hooly werkes evere, as was hir grace.

Sometimes, however, certain beneficent circumstances may be explicitly the gift of Fortune:

CT.I.1861 Thanne shal I yeve Emelya to wyve
 To whom that Fortune yeveth so fair a grace.

and, with a modified point of view which concentrates attention solely on the recipients, we find:

CT.VI.783 Ey! Goddes precious dignitee! who wende
 Today that we sholde han so faire a grace?

Finally, use with an impersonal verb gives the sense of an entirely fortuitous event, lacking any external direction:

TC.I.907 For by my trouthe, in love I dorste have sworn
 The sholde nevere han tid thus fayr a grace.

From this sense of a lucky event, a generalised, abstract sense of 'luck' is readily derived:

TC.IV.1233 "Than if I hadde spoken, as grace was,
 Yo wolde han slayn youreself anon?" quod she.

The imprecations or good wishes expressed by such exclamations as With harde grace , with sory grace , goode grace are also referable to this sense.

6. That Chaucer's contemporaries carelessly used the word grace as a synonym of the modern word 'luck' is undeniable, but when he wished to lend extra significance to some event, or feels it necessary to use language with philosophical exactitude, Chaucer himself has recourse to the more rigidly defined sense of grace as a divine beneficium and to the situation in which God is grantor and mankind recipient. In this careful use of grace, the distinction between an unmotivated chance and a grace is made by contrasting it with hap or aventure. In such uses the sense of grace is closer to the Christian conception of Providence than the vague notion of 'luck':

DD.609 Shal I clepe hyt hap other grace
 That brought me there?

Pandarus, too, stresses the vital difference between two kinds of apparently random event:

FC.I.896 ... for nought but good it is
 To loven wel, and in a worthy place;
 The oghte nat to clepe it hap, but grace.

This habitual contrast between hap or aventure (Harr, 60) and grace is one in which Chaucer echoes, in conventional expression, the philosophical problem of Free Will and Predestination which forms an important theme in his more extensive works. The collocation of grace with hap or aventure ensures an allusion to this body of philosophical debate and, hence, ensures that the sense of grace is taken to be that defined sense which it is given in that literature.

Although Chaucer, in more serious philosophical works, or as a technique of rhetorical persuasion, distinguished between hap and grace in a way corresponding to the philosophical distinction between chance and providence, on a more relaxed level of composition, he fails to do so and it is very improbable that the distinction in senses was maintained in ordinary usage of the period. The author of the Harley lyric Allysoun uses the word hap in a context which is proper to the defined sense of grace:

An henty hap ichabbe yhent,
ichot from heuene it is me sent;

In Chaucer's more colloquial tone, also, we find:

GP.573 Now is nat that of God a ful fair grace
 That swich a lewed mannes wit shal pace
 The wisdom of an heep of lorned men?

Here, a balance between the sense of God's providence, favour or pure chance, pivots upon the irony of its disreputable manifestation.

In certain contexts, where grace is not paralleled closely by any specific event, but is firmly attached to a person, as in the sense 'quality', it may come to signify 'destiny'. The hand of God is seen in the shaping of destiny, but there may be a certain ambiguity in the respect that the word may refer to an endowment of character:

CT.III.553 what wiste I wher my grace
 Was shapen for to be, or in what place?

7. Noun, adverbial and adjectival phrases correlate closely in sense with uses already discussed, but the noun phrases in particular represent grace as an abstraction, as do the adjectival phrases, so that such phrases as ful of grace, in the absence of any exemplar of the function of grace, become no more than commendatory formulae. The collocation of fair and ful of grace (CT.VIII.67) suggests how the modern sense of physical common-dation may have arisen. That the Chaucerian usage could be understood in this way remains doubtful. The temptation to understand a passage in the Clerk's Tale as referring to an overt personal quality, perhaps physical excellence, is modified when the quotation is paralleled by its sources:

CT.IV.424 In Goddes pees lyveth ful esily
 At hoom, and outward grace ynogh had he;

Petrarch Sic Valterius ... summa domi in pace, extra
 vero summa cum gratia hominum, vivebat;

Le Livre Grisoldis

Et ainsi le marquis, ... vivoit en bonne paix
 en sa maison et en grant grace dehors;

It is clear from this that in the sources Walter is envisaged as living in the peples grace, but Chaucer's translation has introduced the possibility

of re-analysing his sentence and understanding outward grace as a particular quality possessed by Walter.

8. The senses delineated above have been derived from the examination of the interaction between certain syntagms and situations. It may now be interesting to examine in detail the uses and sense-developments of grace in a specific situation (that of the judgement of an evil-doer) and, separately, the permutations of a single common syntagm: have ... grace.

We have already noted the sense of 'clemency' found in the situation of judgement with syntagms of the type ask g. A man who gat no grace is seen on the way to execution, and grace received in this situation can be particularised and categorised according to the benevolence of the judgement (so fair a g. etc.). This particularised sense, within the strictly delimited situation, may be expressed in a more impersonal way:

LGW.1947 Not senden his owene sone, Theseus,
Sith that the lot is fallen hym upon,
To ben devoured, for grace is there non.

The emphasis here is not so much upon a judgement as upon a penalty exacted, from which there is no escape. The sense of grace in uses like this approaches that of the phrase is ther no remedye? (CT.VI.236), though the use of the form grace also recalls its senses of 'mercy' or 'chance':

TC.IV.952 To doon hym sone out of this world to pace;
For wel he thoughte ther was non other grace.

The special situation with which we are dealing is instrumental in forming a specialised sense which we have not noted earlier:

CT.VI.240 For, pardee, Jepte yaf his daughter grace
For to compleyne, er he hir slow, allas!

Here the fact that the situation is one which encourages a sense of 'mercy' tends to obscure the sense of 'permission' which we would normally ascribe to this usage.¹ The sense of temporary acquittal or stay of execution, which is reinforced by the insertion of the purposive for before the

¹ The sense 'permission' is acknowledged by the M.E.D. in Cursor Mundi and Piers Plowman (A text) but is not quoted for Chaucer.

infinitive, is not recorded by the H.E.D., nor by the O.E.D., until 1711.

Turning to the syntagm have grace we find that, depending upon the immediate context, it is capable of two interpretations. When the context makes the presence of a grantor clear, then have g. can be interpreted as related to ask g. and means something like being in receipt of grace. When no grantor is posited, the syntagm is attributive and refers to a quality possessed without reference to its origin. There are, however, numerous ambiguous examples:

CC.III.928 And, em, iwis, fayn wolde I don the beste,
 If that ich hadde grace to do so.

Problems are raised, too, by the interpretation of the following, where power is collocated with grace in a sentence where both will require different interpretations of the verb have:

CT.VI.383 Swich folk shal have no power ne no grace
 To offren to my relikes in this place.

Taken with power, have must be understood in the sense of 'possession' without implication of a grantor; with grace, and taking cognizance of the adversative ne, have seems to imply receipt from a grantor. This dual possibility of the interpretation of the structure with have is also surely an important factor in the development of the senses of 'quality' and 'chance' which grace exhibits. The distinction drawn syntagmatically between inherent power and granted grace (permission) parallels the distinction made in other contexts between hap and grace.

9. The plural form of the noun (gracos) is used in Chaucer exclusively to signify 'thanks'.

The Adjectives. Gracious; graceless

The senses of the adjectives gracious and graceless are closely related to those of the noun grace. The former is used with both subjective and objective reference. With subjective reference, it may apply to a person in power who is likely to show grace to another (CT.VII.1821, where merciable pitee is attributed to a gracious lord); with objective reference, it applies to the weaker party and suggests that he is in receipt of grace, that he is pleasing to the superior, as in Absolon's approach to his lady:

CT.I.3695 Under his tonge a trewe-love he beer,
For thorby wende he to ben gracious.

The adjective may also be applied in a more general sense of 'pleasing to behold,' as in the following:

CT.IV.613 A knave child she bar by this Walter,
Ful gracious and fair for to biholde.

The fact that this renders the Latin elegantissimum encourages us in the assumption that gracious is beginning to develop connotations of aesthetic pleasure. Such an assumption is supported by the nonce occurrence of a noun formed upon this adjective, where the reference is to the deceptive fairness, treacherous pleasure, of the words of a false lover:

IGM.1675 Why lykede me thy youthe and thy faynesse,
And of thy tonge, the infynyt graciousnesse?

Graceless occurs only twice (TC.I.781; CT.VIII.1078) and has a sense directly contrary to that of gracious in the first passage quoted above. In its use in The Canon's Yeoman's Tale, it seems to have the sense of lacking grace as an enabling power, a power granting salvation from the wiles of an enemy.

CORE

This lexeme is used once only in the entire works of Chaucer. Its antecedent form in Old English gr appears to be in the process of being superseded by the French borrowing grace, with which it is synonymic. Its ^{particular} use in Chaucer, in the Miller's Tale, seems to be precipitated by its frequency in the popular lyric, from which it is chosen, together with hendo, as part of the burlesque of courtly ideals which is found in this tale.¹

¹ E.T. Donaldson, 'The Idiom of Popular Poetry in The Miller's Tale', English Institute Essays, New York (1950).

MERCY

Collocations of importance are *pitie*, *grace* and *recorde*.

In *Leleche*, *merc*, translates French *misericordie* on most occasions and, once, (CP.VIII.1664) *domineur*. In *Doething*, it translated *misericordie*, rendered *pitie* by Jean de Louan.

MERCY

Mercy

1. The situation of use of the lexeme *MERCY* is often very similar to the situations in which *GRACE* is used, containing a petitioner, grantor and perhaps a recipient. *MERCY* is mildness shown towards a petitioner, who is usually in some distress; distress which is often the result of a relationship between the persons involved in the situation but which is, itself, outside the relationship denoted by *MERCY*. In precise terms, this might mean gentleness and kindness shown by a lady to a distraught lover, or it might mean clemency shown by a lord to a penitent and miserable vassal who has previously transgressed against him.

Within the situation of courtly love, the previous affront may be acknowledged:

AGP (F) 155 And thoo that hadde doon unkyndnesse-
 As dooth the tyddil, for newfangelnesse-
 Besoghte mercy of hir trespassynge,

On other occasions, there is no affront, but *mercy* seems to presuppose self-abasement (CP.II.1076). In a lower social register, the self-effacement of a penitent petitioner is replaced by a presumption, born of self-assurance, in asking for the mercy of a lady:

CP.I.3288 This Nicholas gan mercy for to cove,
 And spak so faire, and profred him so faste,
 That she her love hym granted atte last,

This behaviour might well be compared with Chaucer's account of Diomedes's wooing of Briseide (D.V.1011), where very similar phrases, in used. It is so at odds with the normal behaviour of the petitioner for mercy,¹ that it suggests a precision in sense that makes the use of *mercy* a euphemism. Such a euphemistic use is closely paralleled in the use of *grace*.

Two examples will amply illustrate the use of *mercy* in the situation of judgment. The touchstones are the penitential misery and guilt of the petitioner and his humble acknowledgement of it:

MS. (P) 404 And if so be he may byn nat excuse,
 But asketh mercy with a sorrowful herte,
 and prayeth him, myght in his bare sherte,
 To ben myght at your owen judgement.

MS. 301 Myght rather deeth than do so foul a dede!
 and ask mercy, giltlesse, o what nedet!

The basic situation in which these syntagmas are used is obviously a very stable and precise one; nevertheless it may be disturbed and, with the disturbance, there occurs a modification in sense. With emphasis on the idea of imminent violence, as the execution of revenge justice, we quickly arrive at situations where violence is threatened outside the application of strict justice, yet the word *mercy* is still used: the threatened person may exclaim 'mercy!' Thus, we find the syntagma used in situations of single oppression and, in a similar way, when the oppressor is not clearly stated, or even when the cause of misery is something external and remote from the possible grantor of *mercy*. The plea in this situation is not a plea to refrain from an action of oppression, but as sometimes in the courtly love situation, it is a plea for positive aid. The only syntagma to appear in such a situation is *hineken my*, which appears thus twice:

MS.I.918 Hat ge vath us goude glorie and goude loour,
 But ve hineken mercy and socour.

MS.II.316 In his langage mercy she bisoyghe
 She byt out of his body for to trynne,
 Wile to delivere of vo that she was fenne.

¹ Compare the Parson's characterization of *mercy* (D.V.992ff): 'A man that hath trespassed to a lord, and comth for to see mercy and taken his accord, and set him down anon by the lord, men wolde holden hym outrageous, and nat worthy to come for to have remission of his mercy.'

2. There is, in the uses of mercy, a very common syntagm, have m., which further examination reveals must be sub-divided with regard to its sense in relation to the basic situation of use. In one use, it forms part of the group to which the syntagms fynde m. and receyven m. also belong, and here it signifies the receipt by the petitioner of mercy:

ABC.120 Thanne needeth us no wepon us for to save,
But only ther we dide not, as us oughte,
Doo penitence, and merci axe and have.

In the second use, the grantor is envisaged as exhibiting mercy (having mercy) towards another:

BD.867 Hir eyen semed anoon she wolde
Have mercy; fooles venden soo;
But hyt was never the rather doo.

The above quotation forms part of a eulogistic description of a dead lady. The sense of mercy required is that narrowed by use in the situation of courtly love: thus it is a marked virtue to be tardy in showing mercy to sudden petitioners. Clearly, in a situation where the grantor is said to have mercy, this phrase must be understood in a sense different from its use in a situation where the recipient is subject of the phrase.

The syntagm have m. reveals a similar sense range to syntagms already discussed. It is especially common, and frequently collocated with pitoo, in the situation mentioned above, where suffering is caused by some external agency. It is used as an appeal by the distressed, and by the narrator as a simple statement. Ambiguity between the two senses of have m. is rare since both are of rare occurrence and since one of them is simply an elliptical form of the much commoner and longer syntagm have mercy on/of. On their rare occurrences, however, a distinction has to be drawn between them from the larger context, since in the smaller context their uses may be identical.

The ambiguity of this elliptical form of the syntagm can be easily explained in historical terms, which will also illustrate the different relationships of the two uses of an apparently identical formal marker.

The ordinary Old English way of expressing the sense of the phrase have mercy on/of was by the two common verbs miltsian and arian;¹ this phrase is therefore a calque upon the French phrase avoir merci de. As such, it replaces, in Chaucer's language, the common Old English expressions. The calque, however, which should be understood as a single unit of sense equivalent to the single Old English word form, is composed, at least partially, by words of native derivation and can be interpreted in a less idiomatic way. The common Old English sense of habban, still current in Middle English, was 'to have, to possess'; and a secondary sense 'to get' was not unusual. Thus, on occasions when the object of the calque phrase is obvious, so that its linguistic representation can be omitted together with the particle of/on, the remaining syntagm (have mercy) can be interpreted in two ways: either as a portion of the total calque phrase, or according to the ordinary native sense of have in this grammatical structure. The differentiation of the possible significances of have mercy is possible only by the analysis of its linguistic and situational context of use.

3. The senses of MERCY are fairly easily defined by their uses in relation to particular events and situations, but it may be useful to note something of the use of the concept of MERCY as argued by Chaucer as a conscious moral philosopher. This is particularly well illustrated in structures where mercy is the subject of a verb. Here the extent of MERCY is of prime interest to Chaucer: the idea that the extent of MERCY is greater than the transgression of those to whom it is offered is found; MERCY extends beyond strict justice. Christ and the Virgin are very frequently the epitomes of such MERCY, but lords who are willing to extend MERCY to the undeserving may also be the object of Chaucer's approbation. A similar notion is also

¹ Thus in Aelfric's homily on the Assumption of St. John:
 ... and gif man oðrum miltsað, hu micle swiðor wile God miltsian
 and arian mannum his handgeworce!
 The Alfredian Boethius twice translates by the use of the verb miltsian
 ideas which Chaucer was later to translate by the use of the phrase
have pite on (IV.p.iv.257; IV. m. iv. 18).

invoked in the courtly love situations:

CT.I.3089 It mooste been considered, loeveth me;
For gentil mercy oghte to passen right. 1

4. The senses of the adjectives merciful and merciable present no problems.

In every occurrence they mean 'ready or likely to show mercy' and are applied to social attitudes (pitee) as well as to ^{those parts} ~~the portions~~ of people conventionally expected to indicate attitudes (sighe) and to persons (in particular the Virgin and the Christian divinity).² Merçiabile is most

a/ commonly used in a situation of repentant guilt (IGW.410; CT.VII.1886; 1823) but is also applied to a more general situation of the reaction to any kind of unspecific misery. In CT.V.1036 it is the modifier of sighe and collocates with benignytee and pitee and in ABC 1 it refers to the Virgin Mary and collocates with socour. IGW.410 represents the consequences of being merçiabile as eschewing ire and becoming tretable.

5. The phrase grant mercy is an idiom of thanks borrowed from French usage:

TC.II.239 'Iwis, myn uncle,' quod she, 'grant mercy.

¹ These uses, in which mercy is assumed to be capable of surpassing reason, have the air of pleading a cause. An ancient tradition considered mercy to be regulated by reason as distinct from the emotional reaction of pity. See below, p. 419; and compare the same idea in Piers Plowman (c-text) VIII, 62 where the lexeme GRACE is used.

² In addition to the obvious association of merçiabile with the name of the Virgin in Chaucer, the sole occurrence of merciful is in collocation with mayde, with the same reference. Compare the allegorical representation of Mercy in Piers Plowman, B text, XVIII, 115-16:

Mercy hiȝt þat mayde . a meke þynge with alle,
A ful bonygne buirde . and boxome of speche.

PITEEThe Noun. Pitee; pitee

The most important collocations are mercy, compassioun, routhe, gentillesse, the verb wepen and the noun herte. Collocation with a small set of verbs of perception is also important. Translation evidence of two distinct senses is offered by Boethius since Chaucer uses the same form to translate both the adjectives miser and pius and their derivatives. His translations from French offer no valuable evidence since he normally borrows the French word-form.

1. The point must firstly be made that the differences in form of the noun, illustrated above, do not consistently correspond to sharply distinct senses in Chaucer's usage, modelled upon the distinction between Latin miser and pius. There is, on the contrary, evidence which should deter us from establishing two distinct lexemes in Chaucer's usage, and assume the existence of a single one, which covers a broad area in terms of contextual senses, and includes the senses of both of these Latin words.

2. One of the commonest uses of the noun pitee is in the syntagm have pitee on/of which, like the similar phrase employing mercy, is a calque on French usage. Certain situational differences distinguish the use of the two phrases in many, though not all, occurrences. When one 'has pitee' there is no necessary suggestion of superiority with respect to the person pitied, nor need there be any suggestion of any previous relationship between the participants; hence there is no suggestion of guilt or repentance in most uses of pitee. Pitee may therefore be used in situations which are very similar to those where mercy might be used, though close analysis will sometimes reveal distinctions. In the following example guilt is declared, but the superiority of one of the participants and the waiving of the threat

of judgement is not clear:

CT.X.1030 another is to han pitee of defaute of his neighebores;

In the courtly love situation, the use of PITEE is more restricted than the use of GRACE or MERCY, though sometimes the uses may be precisely parallel, and pitee may be paired with mercy (TC.II.655). The judicial situation provides an interesting occurrence where pitee may seem to be used identically to mercy. The reference is to the account of the trial of Boethius where the gloss has been added: 'it ne enclyned som juge to have pite or compassioun'. At first this seems to be typical of the situation in which mercy is used, when the guilty man is accused and his accuser has power of execution. There is, however, the crucial difference here that Boethius has repeatedly assured us of his innocence. Perhaps pitee was therefore felt to be more appropriate than mercy, for Chaucer uses it when, in a lawsuit, the injured party, not himself guilty, asks the judge for pitee rather than mercy:

Bo.IV.p.iv.256 for thei enforcen hem to commoeve the juges to han pite
of hem

The Latin original of the above uses the form miserationem, which implies the emotional reaction towards which the rhetorical skills of the advocates would be directed.

3. A further distinction of importance between the senses of mercy and pitee is in the far greater emotional significance of the latter. Pitee is very frequently an emotional reaction to distress or misery, as is implied by the high frequency of its collocations with verbs signifying weeping; mercy is far less emotional:

RR.335 In world nys wight so hard of herte
That hadde sen her sorowes smerte,
That nolde have had of her pyte.

Social standing in this relationship is of no importance in most uses, yet suffering in the just and worthy is often assumed to inspire pitee more

intensely. Medieval popular philosophy considered the heart to be the seat of the emotions, equating it in general usage with the 'sensitive' portion of the soul. It is therefore not surprising to find the word herte frequently used to designate the place where pitee is felt as the result of the perception of the woe of others:

LGW.1078 Anon hire herte hath pite of his wo,
And with that pite love come in also;
And thus, for pite and for gentillesse,
Refreshed moste he bean of his distresse.

The collocation of pitee, herte and GENTILLESSE is three times repeated in Chaucer's works in a phrase which is reminiscent of proverbial usage:¹

CT.I.1761 Til at the laste aslaked was his mood,
For pitee renneth soone in gentil herte.

The heart of one who aspires to gentillesse is frequently considered to be sensitive to emotion and susceptible to external stimuli, whether the song of the birds in spring-time or the sufferings of one's fellow-creature. It is arguable that the sorrow of the gentil herte at the suffering of another is analogous to the wretchedness of the sufferer; that, in fact, in certain uses, pitee may signify 'sympathy':

CT.V.479 "That pitee renneth soone in gentil herte,
Feelynge his similitude in peynes smerte,
Is proved alday, as men may it see,
As wel by werk as by auctoritee;

I take this quotation to mean that pitee is the feeling (sympathy) felt by the sensitive heart at perceiving the sorrow felt in a heart similar to itself.²

¹ This, or a similar idea, seems to have had wide currency in European courtly society. Compare Dante, Inferno, V, 100: 'Amor, ch'al cor gentil ratto s'apprende,' which is itself an echo of Guinizzelli's: 'Foco d'amore in gentil cor s'apprende.'

² For the sense of his similitude, see CT.I.3228. This interpretation of pitee is strongly supported by the usage of Lydgate, Temple of Glas, 841ff:
That euenlich and with þe same fire
She mai be het, as I nov brenne and melt,
So þat hir hert be flaumed bi desire,
That she mai knowe bi feruence hou I swelt.
For of pite pleinli if she felt
The self hete þat dop myn hert enbrace,
I hope of roupe she would do me grace.

The Book of Vices and Virtues gives this assumption patristic authority.

This sense of PITEE, implying the sensitivity of the person showing pitee and their sympathetic nature, is that with which the adjective and adjectival phrases are included in a set of moral attributes of the courtly man or woman:

LGV.1255 O sely wemen, ful of innocence,
Ful of pite, of trouthe, and conscience,

The Prioress's attempts to counterfeit the behaviour of the court are chiefly marked by an extreme Jane Austen - like sensibility, which is carried to sentimental extremes, leading her to weep at the sight of a mouse in suffering.

4. After the syntagm have p. of/on, the commonest use of pitee is in the construction with the verb 'to be'. We may sub-divide the occurrences of this structure into three types according to the extent to which the context evokes the presence of a participant who feels pitee, or whether this feeling is left entirely to the reader.

In the first type, pitee is followed by the infinitive of a verb of perception which suggests the presence of a perceiver who has pity in the sense set out in paragraph 1:

TC.II.1577 Compleyned ek Eleyne of his siknosse
So feythfully, that pite was to heere,

(Footnote 2 continued from previous page).

It is associated with St. Paul's figure of the ^{Church} ~~human race~~ as members of the same body (p.146; 203) and (203.32): 'seynt Gregori seiþ þat þe more parfiȝt þat a man is, þe more he feleþ operes sorwes.'

Gower's story of Constantine and Sylvester (CA.II.3187ff) which illustrates the action of pitee allied to Christian charity, mentions the equality of all men at birth and before fortune and counsels that one should deal with another as he would wish to be dealt with. Pitee is then reciprocal, both on earth and in terms of final judgement:

3339. 'O Constantin, for thou hast served
Pite, thou hast pite deserved:
Forthi thou schalt such pite have
That god thurgh pite woll thee save.

At VII, 3107ff. he goes so far as to consider pitee as the cause, through Christ's incarnation, of human salvation.

Secondly, especially in relation to events communicated, the inter-personal nature of pitee as a relation becomes obscured, and it becomes possible to regard it as parallel to the event. The narrator shares the reaction of pitee with the reader rather than suggests it in a participant in a fictional situation:

CT.V.1428 O Gedasus, it is ful greet pitee
 To reden how thy doughtren deyde, allas!

Finally, when the special class of verbs of perception or communication are replaced by a verb from outside this class, pitee is totally impersonalised. The reference is directly to the event and comes to signify 'a sorrowful thing' or 'a matter for regret':

CT.III.2015 It is greet harm and certes greet pitee
 To sette an irous man in heighe degree.

BD.1266 And pitee were I shulde sterve,
 Syth that I wilned noon harm, ywis.

As mentioned above, so in the use of this syntagm, the suffering of a person of social or moral worth is more readily considered to be a pittee than the suffering of the less eminent. The worthy may be good peple, seintes, nobles and true lovers or a king's son, Theseus:

LGW.1976 A kynges sone to ben in swich prysoun,
 And ben devoured, thoughte hem gret pite.

5. The association of weeping with PITEE is evident in a great number of uses, but nowhere more markedly than in the uses of pitee in adverbial phrases. The verbs modified by for pitee signify weeping very frequently and, to a lesser extent, helping the afflicted. In the following quotation, where pitee at the plight of the oppressed leads to weeping, the phrase is modelled upon the calque have p. on:

CT.VIII.371 Hem hente, and whan he forth the seintes ladde,
 Hymself he weep for pitee that he hadde.

If we compare this kind of usage with that of the previous type (BD.107 And wepte, that pittee was to heere), we can visualise a situation in which a person in misery weeps, inspires pitee in the observer (hearer) who, because

of his pitoe, also weeps. By this means a neat illustration of the developing sense of 'sympathy' can be made. The susceptibility, the pitoe, in the observer is an essential quality of the gentil herte.

As an alternative to weeping, the pitoe of the observer may, if he is in a position of sufficient power, incite him to help the distressed. In such situations, pitoe may refer to emotional sensitivity or, by their contiguity, to the action resulting from the emotion. In these situations pitoe is frequently found in collocation with grace and mercy, and the precise sense of each is lost in their combined application to imprecise aspects of the same situation. Discussion of such uses is deferred to a later discussion of synonymy.

The Adjective: pitous; pitous.

1. As with the noun, the two main forms of the adjective do not clearly correspond to distinctions in sense. The two major divisions of the sense of pitous are its use with subjective and with objective reference: that is 'emotionally sensitive, likely to feel pitoe' and 'distressful, likely to evoke pitoe.' It is, however, noteworthy that the spelling pitous occurs only with subjective reference, or in ambiguous uses, and never with objective reference.

2. Applied to characters, pitous may be one of a set of virtuous attributes conventionally ascribed to courtly people:

Gentillesse, 9 This firste stok was ful of rightwisnesse,
 Trew of his word, sobre, pitous, and free,
 Clene of his gost ...

The use of pitous, with its etymological connection with pius, may be significant in this poem where courtliness and religious faith coalesce. In the judge, the attribute pitous implies the tempering of harsh justice by emotional sensitivity to suffering; advocates should be debonnaire and pitous (Bo. IV, p. iv, 263-4), and the ideal king is:

'pitous and just alwey yliche;' (CT.V.20).

3. When applied to events, inanimate objects and actions, pitous normally implies that some aspect of them will inspire pitee in the heart of an observer:

IG.I.904 That in o grave yfere we moten lye,
Sith love hath brought us to this pitous ende,

CT.II.809 And whan that he this pitous lettre say,
Ful ofte he seyde, "Allas! and weylaway!"

4. Thus, most of the occurrences of pitous may be easily referred to senses of pitee, yet a number present difficulties. The broadest sense of pitous, as a strong tendency for emotional reaction or great sensitivity, together with its etymology and its affinity for moral contexts, seems sometimes to be narrowed into a religious application, as suggested in paragraph 2, and come to mean 'pious'. Such possible occurrences are usually ambiguous, as in the description of Hypocrisy (Poope-Holiness) in the Romaunt of the Roses:

RR.420 With pale visage and pitous,
And semeth a simple creature.

The pale face gives us an external reference which an observer might find evoked his pity; hence the sense of pitous is here ambiguous. One of the very few unambiguous uses is to be found in the Parson's Tale:

CT.X.1039 orisouns or preyeres is for to seyn a pitous wyl of herte.

A number of occurrences as modifier of the word herte also lead to ambiguity. In the following examples, Troilus is no doubt suffering, but the suggestion that pitous is applied to herte, because the suffering heart may inspire pity in Criseyde is untenable. It would be possible to relate these uses of pitous to the syntagm it is pitee and suggest that they simply mean 'sorrowful', yet we feel that in this context pitous is more closely related to the senses essential to the courtly ideal. There may even be, as well as the implication of strong feeling, some of the moral sense of 'piety', 'sincerity', 'integrity' derived from the Latin pius:

TC.IV.1499 "For which, with humble, trewe and pitous herte,
A thousand tymes mercy I yow preye;
So rueth on myn aspre peynes smerte,

TC.V.451 For evere in oon his herte pietous
Ful bisyly Criseyde, his lady, soughte

Certain uses of pitous to modify emotions also present difficulties of interpretation. When he considers his imminent departure from Criseyde, with the coming of day, Troilus is distressed:

TC.III.1444 ... for pitous distresse,
The bloody teris from his herte melte,

The fact that what causes such sudden misery out of joy, is simply the prospect of temporarily losing the pleasure of Criseyde's company, also suggests that pitous is here intended to have reference to the extreme sensitivity of the hero and, hence, the intensity of the distress.

On three separate occasions pitous is collocated with joye. On two of these, Chaucer is merely adopting the usage of his source so that, in TC.IV.683, 'wommen...com../ For pitous joie,' renders Boccaccio's 'tutte pieno/ Di pietosa allegrezza', and 'piteuses joyes' in the Roman de Troyle et de Criseida. In the Clerk's Tale (IV.1080), 'aswoune down she falleth/ For pitous joye' renders Petrarch's Latin 'illa ... pene gaudio exanimis et pietate amens.' The third example is an addition to the source, which refers only to 'joy', by Chaucer:

CT.II.1114 Who kan the pitous joye tellen al
Bitwixe hem thre, syn they been thus ymette?

It is tempting to explain all these uses as simply referring to the strength of feeling of the persons concerned, but there is some evidence to suggest that the senses associated with Latin miser also have some part here. Just as in the collocation with distresse, pitous is used when there is a sudden reversal of emotion from joy to dread, so the phrase pitous joye seems especially to be associated with a reversal of emotion from misery to joy. In the Clerk's Tale and in Chaucer's original use in the Man of Law's Tale, this occurs at the joyful denouement; in the Troilus the ladies who are filled with pitous joye are so affected because they are pleased that

Criseyde may rejoin her father, though they are sorry that she is leaving them. All three occasions are occasions for highly wrought emotions and tears, following evident emotional reserve. A similar use of this particular collocation is also found in Old French poetry when pathos and joy are found at the relief of emotional restraint under suffering.¹ A similar coalition of joy and PITEE is found in the description of the song of the birds in the Romaunt of the Rose:

RR.89 The smale briddes syngen clere
(cf. 497) Her blisful swete song pitous.

Here the birds sing a song celebrating their escape into Springtime from the rigours of winter which had robbed them of their song (71ff.). The song of such birds is notorious for its effect upon the sensitive heart of the courtly listener.² Here the sense of pitous, borrowed directly from the French, seems to be that of the power of the song to move the heart of a listener; its pathetic power.

The Adverb. pitously.

1. The uses of the adverb correspond in sense closely to those of the adjective and furnish no further problems.

¹ Cf. the Old French chanson Amis et Amiles, 185-6; 3233-5, and the Anglo-Norman version, lines 489-90.

² The French original Roman de la Rose ties bird-song and the effect on the heart much more closely than Chaucer:

81-83. Mout a dur cuer qui en mai n'aime,
 Quant il ot chanter sor la raine
 As oiseus les douz chanz piteus.

and compare Hue de Rotelande's Ipomedon;
8905-96. Kar chant d'oysel e estrument
 E d'amur un angusement;

ROUTE

The only collocation of importance is pitee.

Translation evidence is scanty, but routhe translates pitie and pietas (Ct.IV.579) and for routhe and for pitee translates illacrimans.

The Noun: Routhe

1. The use of the syntagma have routhe of/on is extremely common in the courtly love situation where its sense is close to that of the similar uses of MERCY and PITEE. Synonymy with contextual uses of the latter two is common and, like PITEE, ROUTHE is felt at the suffering of the guiltless:

Ct.V.1319 Ye sle me giltelees for verray peyne.
 But of my deeth thogh that ye have no routhe,

Although the courtly love situation produces analogies of this type with the judicial situation, there appears to be no euphemistic sense of ROUTHE in this situation parallel to the use of GRACE and MERCY. Nevertheless the use of modifiers like som, other, swich, manere routhe suggest degrees of ROUTHE which can only be referred to actions stemming from the emotion.

ROUTE as a distinct emotional quality is found in uses where its place in the human constitution is indicated:

LGW.1063 And in hire herte she hadde routhe and wo
 That evere swich a noble man as he
 Shal ben disherited in swich degre;

Occurrences may also be found in which the person to whom ROUTHE is directed is not clearly stated. In such uses the relational sense ('pity') is subordinated to an absolute emotional one ('sadness'). The lexeme ROUTHE can therefore mean 'to be sad' as well as 'to be sorry for..':

LGW.1345 ...- of which I may nat wryte,
 So gret a routhe I have it for t'endite -

2. The syntagm with the verb 'to be' occurs in two distinct forms: followed by the infinitive of a verb of perception or communication, and standing alone. The former type, preserving the notion of an observer who is affected by the suffering of others, is identical in sense to the similar use of PITEE. The latter type is used without reference to relationship in a situation and, like the similar use of PITEE, is used with application to events. As an emotional assessment of events, ROUTHE is frequently collocated with such words as synne, harme, wo and, as with PITEE, the downfall of a worthy person is most likely to provoke this usage:

CT.IV.1908 "He is a gentil squier, by my trouthe!
 If that he deyde, it were harm and route.

The single use with an impersonal verb results in an ambiguity of sense between application to a regrettable event and the evocation of a generalised, depersonalised emotional reaction:

HF.383 But wol-away! the harm, the route,
 That hath betyd for such untrouthe,

3. The association between PITEE and help or weeping is also maintained in the usage of ROUTHE. It is best exemplified in the uses of the adverbial for route:

CT.II.529 The constable hath of hire so greet pitee,
 And eek his wyf, that they wepen for route.

Even more extreme than weeping, the sensitive heart may feel such affliction at the sorrow of another that death is threatened:

CT.V.438 Wel neigh for the route almoost she deyde

The interpolation of the definite article into the adverbial above, presents a problem of interpretation. It is not now clear whether the route referred to is the emotion of Canacee or the pleynte of the falcon whom she pities. That route, in certain linguistic environments, can mean pleynte is illustrated by its use to render the French phrase faire plainte. ROUTHE does not, however, presuppose articulate lament:

LGW.669 This woful Cleopatre hath mad swich route

The Verb. Rewe (on)

The uses of the verb fall into three main types:

transitive: rewe on/upon (misery; miserable person)

intransitive: (s'one) rewe.

impersonal: it (s'one) rewe.

1. The first of these is used overwhelmingly in the courtly love situation and is there equivalent to the phrase have routhe. Gentillesse is concerned with the disposition to rewe upon misery (CT.II.853) and there is an association with weeping (TC.V.260).

2. The intransitive use destroys the sense of ROUTHE as a relation and the sense is now 'to be sorry' rather than 'to be sorry for s'one'. The distinction may not be very clear in certain uses:

TC.III.114 Therwith his manly sorwe to biholde
 It myghte han mad an herte of stoon to rewe;

Regret at earlier folly is a common sense:

CT.I.3530 'Werk al by conseil, and thou shalt nat rewe.'

3. The impersonal use also often has the sense of regret at previous actions:

CT.IV.2432 Me reweth soore I am unto hire teyd

as well as colloquially expressed sorrow:

CT.VII.3097 God woot, it reweth me; and have good day!

and 'pity' within the burlesque courtly love situation:

CT.I.3462 But yet, by seint Thomas,
 Me reweth soore of hende Nicholas

The Adjectives. Routheless; Rewful

1. The adjective Routheless is applied only to human beings and is used

- (a) to represent a permanent trait of character in the courtly situation.
- (b) as a reaction in a particular situation and implying obliviousness to suffering.

- (c) in a heightened sense which means something like 'cruel', since it implies the infliction of suffering, as well as failure to be affected by it.

2. Rerful is applied to persons and to events with objective reference only. It implies a condition likely to evoke ROUTH, and never the state of mind of a person likely to show ROUTH.

COMPASSIOUN

1. The lexeme COMPASSIOUN is of extremely limited use, since it is restricted to a nominal use in a single calqued phrase, have compassioun on. To have compassioun of a person in distress or of their weeping is an attitude opposed to taking it a-game (Hars, 276). The gentil herte is particularly susceptible to compassioun at the distress of others and this may result in sympathetic weeping:

CT.II.659 This Alla kyng hath swich compassioun,
 As gentil herte is fulfild of pitee,
 That from his eyen ran the water down.

When a person of power is similarly affected, this may result in an act beneficial to the sufferer:

CT.VII.2221 And thanne hadde God of hym compassioun,
 And hym restored his regne and his figure.

2. A distinction may be drawn between PITEE, ROUTHE and COMPASSIOUN in that the last, seen over the totality of its uses, seems to have a more elevated tone than the two former. This, it derives from its frequent use in passages of moral exhortation or moral philosophy. Outside such passages it is also frequently the prerogative of socially elevated characters. COMPASSIOUN may also be used outside the particular situation, where it is part of a desirable attitude in a fixed moral or social order. In the Legend of Good Women the ideal attitude for a lord is set out:

LGW(F) 390 Yit mot he doon bothe ryght, to poore and ryche,
 Al be that hire estaat be nat yliche,
 And han of poore folk compassioun.

and in the Parson's Tale (X.810) we are enjoined to have pitee and compassioun on our fellow-sinners. In a general situation such as this, where no particular relation exists between the pitied and the pitying, and inferiority of the former is either unclear or externally determined, the sense of the word must be in an area where the concepts of charity and largesse are not far distant.

FAVOUR

The Noun: Favour

Collocations: Favour is collocated with grace, gentillesse and with less elevated concepts, envye, meede.

Translation evidence is unimportant, though in Boethius Chaucer twice prefers a direct Latin borrowing (favor) to the French of Jean de Meun (grace).

1. From the point of view of situational analysis there is a strong correlation between the use of the word favour and the granting of the desire of a weaker person by a stronger. It is natural that Fortune should be regarded as a source of favour. The kindly feeling of women is dependent upon the favour of Fortune (CT.I.2682); the lack of her favour casts men into misery (Fortune, 5); and the possession of it places him in an enviable position (CT.IV.69); but Fortune is notoriously fickle in her favour (CT.VII.2724). This use of favour as an aspect of Fortune - a way of discussing good and bad luck - together with its use in the syntagm favour of peple, tends, in the context of Boece, to make for a pejorative sense of the word. Favour tends to be seen as unstable, undeserved, administered without justice and equally unjustly lost. This pejorative development of favour is also clear enough in moral passages outside Boece. The Parson gives a list of some of the motives for perjury and includes favour among them:

CT.X.595

Eek thow shalt nat swere for envye, ne for
favour, ne for meede, but for rightwisnesse,

The infamy of certain acts motivated by the desire for favour may also taint the concept:

CT.VII.2691

... a fals traitour,
His head of smoot, to wynnyn hym favour
Of Julius,..

and in the Troilus, favour is posited as a possible enemy of truth:

TC.II.1136 "And loketh now if this be resonable,
And letteth nought, for favour ne for slouthe,
To seyn a sooth...

Though, in Piers Plowman, Lady Meede is a morally ambivalent personification, and we can find uses in Chaucer without overt pejorative overtones, this portrayal of favour as the motivation behind unworthy deeds, its grouping with familiar vices, and its treatment in Boece, lead to it having in every use a distinct potential of pejorative connotation.

2. Favour, like grace, can mean 'kindly feeling', that good disposition which culminates in an act also called favour. It is used thus with Fortune, and apparently also referring to God's benevolence:

CT.IV.395 I seye that to this newe markysesse
God hath swich favour sent hire of his grace,
That it ne semed nat by liklynesse
That she was born and fed in rudenesse,

We may perhaps make a distinction here between God's favour and his grace. Of his grace (kindly feeling) God has sent Griselda a particular gift so that her appearance has been changed: this is not the grace to empower her to do anything, but merely an act which makes her appear different to others.

3. Also, like grace, favour may apply to various beneficial acts in particular situations:

PF.626 Thanne wol I don hire this favour, that she
Shal han right hym on whom hire herte is set,

HF.1788 ... if I hit graunte
Or do yow favour, yow to avaunte!

4. A peculiar use of the noun is to be found in the Proem of Book II of the House of Fame where Chaucer asks for inspiration from the Love Goddess and the Muses:

HF.519 Now faire blisfull, O Cipris,
So be my favour at this tyme!
And ye, me to endite and ryme
Helpeth, that on Parnaso duelle,

The sense seems to imply that Cipris is being asked to show favour, yet the syntax is more appropriate to similar uses of the words socour and help.

The Adjective: Favorable

1. The rare adjective is used with subjective reference only. Its sense is 'showing favour' and, on one of its two occurrences, it has strong pejorative connotations:

HF. 1479

Con soode that Our made lyes,
Feynyng in hys poetries,
and was to the Grekes favorable.

MISERICORDEThe Noun: Misericorde

1. The corpus includes few occurrences of the noun misericorde, and these are individually unrevealing. Little can be discerned of individual senses from context, but there is a long passage in the Parson's Tale which purports to explain the function of misericorde as an element of a theory of behaviour which includes such concepts as pitee, compassioun, mercy, charitee. The fact that the French word misericorde in sources is often rendered by Chaucer as mercy and the associations with the Virgin which it shares with the latter word indicate the general area of its senses.

Misericorde is entirely limited, but for a single occurrence, to the religious situation: devotional texts or the speech of ecclesiastics, which we may assume has been conditioned by such texts. The single exception is that of the exclamatory use in Troilus and Criseyde, where love relationships echo those of theology:

TC.III.1177 Be any wrong, I wol no more trespace.
 Doth what yow list, I am al in youre grace."

 And she answerde, "Of gilt misericorde!
 That is to seyn, that I foryeve al this.

A few lines earlier Troilus begs for mercy. In this use of misericorde, with its stress on the guilt of the penitent, the situation is precisely similar to that in many uses of mercy. Similar criteria are found in the use in the religious situation in ABC.35.

At Ct.X.804, the Parson gives a long account of the function of misericorde as a remedy against avarice. The former is made equivalent to pitee as a cure for this vice, so that, together, they are efficacious in the relief of one's fellow man and turn the mind from the delight in wealth. There follows a tentative differentiation of misericorde and pitee

in which the former is seen as the first stirrings of sympathy whilst the latter leads directly to action:

CT.X.806ff. Thanne is misericorde, as seith the philosophre, a vertu by which the corage of a man is stired by the mysese of hym that is mysessed./ Upon which misericorde folweth pitee in parfournynge of charitable werkes of misericorde./

It is observed that Christ allowed the crucifixion to take place as a result of his misericorde for mankind,¹ then examples of misericorde in human actions are given. These actions of misericorde include the experience of pitee:

CT.X.810 The speses of misericorde been, as for to lene and for to yeve, and to foryeven and relesse, and for to han pitee in herte and compassioun of the meschief of his evene-Cristene, and eek to chastise, there as nede is./

Thus misericorde is seen to represent two aspects: actions, or an emotive predisposition to actions, stemming from concern for the welfare, according to Christian principles, of one's fellow man. As well as the relief of misery and the extension of MERCY, it may connote a more metaphysical aim, which may not be obvious to the recipient: it aims to help against the spiritual distress of sin, even against the wishes of the recipient, and this may lead to secular punishment. Thus the ecclesiastical use of misericorde, with its spiritual associations, might conceivably result in uses antonymic to the common secular uses of mercy.

¹ We may recall the assertion of Gower that pitee was the emotion which stimulated Christian salvation (above p.93, n.2).

CHAPTER

The Noun: charitee; chiertee.

1. The two forms of the noun represent two distinct borrowings into Old French from the Latin accusative caritatem. The form chiertee is a Gallo-Roman borrowing which has undergone a series of phonological modifications within the spoken language. In Central French, the phoneme /k/ is palatalised before /a/, developing by the thirteenth century, to /ʃ/. Concurrently, /a/ is raised to /ɛ/ and subsequently diphthongised, giving the falling diphthong /iɛ/. The concentration of stress in Gallo-Roman upon the penultimate syllable results in the unstressing of the antepenultimate syllable in this word, and the consequent syncope of /i/. The form charitee attests the restoration of /i/, together with the root vowel proper to Latin pronunciation, under the influence of the literary Latin renovatio of the twelfth century. It will be of interest to determine whether the formal distinction, in view of the different histories of the forms, indicates any semantic differentiation.

The form chiertee is rare, and two out of three of its occurrences are in a phrase clearly based upon French usage:

CT.III.396 Yet tikled I his kerte, for that he
Wende that I hadde of hym so greet chiertee!

CT.V.881 Whanne semed it ye hadde a greet chiertee
Toward mankynde; but how thonne may it bee
That ye swiche meenes make it to destroyen.

The sense of these examples seems not far removed from the French sense of the word: 'love and esteem.' This general sense of love and kindly feeling is also found in the exclamatory use of charitee as a title for the God of Love in Troilus and Criseyde. Fortune, as one of a series of antithetical titles designed to demonstrate her instability, is called th'envyouse charite (BD.642). Here the sense is less specific than that of sexual love found in Troilus and Criseyde.

2. The prevalence of the word charitee in theological and moral contexts reveals its most typical sense to be one conditioned by Christian thought. The significance of the fact that the form charitee is most frequently used

in this context is to some extent vitiated by the overall preponderance of this form; yet it is reasonable to consider the form charitee as having a largely secular application in Chaucer's works. The adverbials in charitee and out of charitee refer to the state of the soul in its attitude to fellow men rather as the phrase in grace refers to the relationship to a superior, perhaps God. In some situations the relation to other persons is clear:

CT.X.519 And in dede thou shalt love hym in swich wise that thou
shalt doon to hym in charitee as thou woldest that it were doon to thyn
owene persone.

In other occurrences, the phrases are used as semi-mystical moral or religious phrases without any particular application, but implying holiness; a state of the individual soul:

GP.532 A trewe swynkere and a good was he,
Lyvyng in pees and parfyt charitee.

In more colloquial passages, the syntagm has a rather flippant secular sense, implying simply good or ill-feeling between ordinary people: this use is entirely devoid of moral seriousness:

TC.I.49 To prey for hem that Loves servauntz be,
And write hire wo, and lyve in charite,

And for to have of hem compassioun,
As though I were hire owne brother dere.

The above example derives irony from comparison with Christian moral teaching, with which the diction is in close correspondence. The irony of the next quotation resides, not so much in the total expression, but in relating this colloquial use of the phrase to the circumstances of its use, whilst recalling its proper religious employment. It relates the Wife of Bath's attitude as a result of being preceded by other women of the parish; an occurrence which she takes to be a snub to her dignity when carrying out religious observances:

GP.452 And if ther dide, certeyn so wrooth was she,
That she was out of alle charitee.

The irony is explicit in the contrast between the Wife's behaviour and the Parson's earnest warning that, when they are about to pray the pater noster,

the congregation should 'be ful war that thow ne be nat out of charitee.'

3. The syntagms for seint charitee and par charitee are used only as reinforcements to requests; they are suggested motives for complying with such requests. The semantic content ascribable to them varies from use to use: sometimes they are little more than a tag; on other occasions they may be firmly applied to a situation and conditions of action. In one such occurrence charitee is posited as a motive for granting a request to a totally impotent petitioner. There is an evident correspondence in sense here with such phrases as for your grace and for youre curtesye. This relation will be studied later:

CT.I.1721 And as thou art a rightful lord and juge,
 Ne yif us neither mercy ne refuge,
 But sle me first, for seinte charitee!

4. In common with many of the words studied, charitee as a motive for action beneficial to fellow-men, and the action itself, become confused. In the Christian sense, the Parson speaks of werkes of charitee among men, and in a corresponding secular sense, charitee is a designation applied to the act of a lord giving advancement to a humble, but worthy, retainer:

CT.I.1433 They seyden that it were a charitee
 That Theseus wolde enhauncen his degree,
 And putten hym in worshipful servyse,
 Ther as he myghte his vertu exercise.

There is the suggestion here that Theseus has done a charitable act not simply in respect of his appointee, but to the whole of his court by his choice of a worthy young man. A charitee is a deed generally judged to be a good one, rather than a simple act of favour conferred upon one man in a way which might be ethically ambivalent. This is true also of the other use of charitee in this sense (PF.508).

5. That use of charitee in some syntagms which seems to imply a vague state of holiness, a kind of spiritual power, is reinforced by one of its uses as

a subject. It is clear that in this use the primary sense of charitee is not that of beneficial acts, nor simply of good disposition towards one's fellow-men; rather it seems to imply a force like that of prayer, acting at the spiritual level. This seems to be a derived sense: something like 'blessedness' or 'spiritual fortitude' resulting from love of and good works toward one's fellow-men:

CP.III.865 For now the grote charitee and prayeres,
 Of lymytours and othere hooly freres
 ... makoth that ther ben no fayeryes.

SOCOURE

The Noun: Socour; socours

Translation evidence is available from the Romaunt of the Rose:

Wher may nothyng ben his socour : Ne puet avoir garant ne mire

The lexeme is frequently collocated with the lexemes GRACE, PITEE and MERCY.

1. A quotation from the Knight's Tale will illustrate the coincidence of the use of socour with uses of mercy and pitee:

CT.I.918. Nat greveth us youre glorie and youre honour,
 But we biseken mercy and socour.
 Have mercy on ourc wo and ourc distresse!
 Som drope of pitee, thurgh thy gentillesse,

The situation of the use of these phrases is that of the encounter of the victorious Theseus with a group of distressed ladies who seek his sympathy and aid. This is the kind of situation in which the use of PITEE might be expected, rather than the use of the lexeme MERCY, since the distress which the lord observes is the result of causes external to the present relationship. In any case, the desire for PITEE and MERCY in this situation is clearly correlated with the desire for SOCOUR.

The use of SOCOUR in this kind of situation, in syntagms of the type biseken/ do socour, is further specified in four uses in the Legend of Good Women (1053; 1476; 2432; 2440). Here the petitioners are shipwrecked sailors cast ashore in an unknown land: they ask the ruler of that land for socour. A fifth uses an impersonal construction:

IGW.1489 If they were broken, or ought wo begon,
 Or hadden nede of lodman or vitayle;
 For of socour they sholde nothyng faylo,

Clearly, in examples such as this, SOCOUR, which the petitioner craves, is a particular kind of aid; he is asking for particular acts to alleviate his distress, and he is asking them from some-one previously unknown. In these

uses, then, socour implies specific practical help. In the courtly love situation, socour comes from a third party and, instead of material help, means aid to achieve a desired goal. At the same time, however, the conceit of the 'lover's malady' enables the word to be understood in this situation as direct physical help:

Mars.292 Compleyneth eke, ye lovers, al in-fere,
For her that with unfeyned humble chere
Was evere redy to do yow socour;

The lady in question is the Goddess of Love.

Socour may also refer to unspecified help in situations of danger or misery connected with emotional rather than physical well-being. Thus Calkas asks for socour from the Greek lords after prophesying the fall of Troy:

TC.IV.131 So longe he gan of socour hem biseke
That, for to hele hym of his sorwes soore,
They yave hym Antenor, withouten moore.

This rather unspecific, non-physical sense of socour is also found with application to the Virgin Mary as grantor. Just as the direct concrete form of socour is reinforcement to the body and material estate, so in this context, if any precision is given to the kind of help offered, it is reinforcement to the spiritual part in order to overcome sin:

ABC.156 ... thou me wisse and counsaile
How I may have thi grace and thi socour,
All have I ben in filthe and in errour.

Socour, then, involves actual help in various situations. It may be collocated with GRACE, MERCY and PITY, but unlike them, is incapable of designating a human relationship, emotion or attitude. Were it possible to analyse the relationship of SOCOUR to the other three lexemes in their application to a situation, we should find that the emotions or attitudes signified by the latter three serve as the stimulus of the action signified by socour. In many uses, however, this theoretical distinction is not maintained, since words denoting agentive emotions are frequently uncritically applied to the actions they provoke. The emotion and the action are

linguistically represented by a single designation which may be used to denote either the action or the emotion or a complex of the two.

2. As with the lexemes GRACE and PITIE, socour can be used without application to a situation in which two participants, one granting the other receiving socour, appear. Here the implication of socour is merely that an escape from present ills, without suggestion of the kind nor source of this help:

CT.V.1357 That unwar wrapped has me in thy cheyne,
 Fro which t'escape woot I no socour,
 Have oonly deeth or elles dishonour;

A similar, rather imprecise sense of socour is to be found in uses with the verb 'to be'; here the subject is frequently the Virgin, who is a help for mankind against the ever-present threats of his fallen state, and acts as an intercessor with God. This general, vague sense may also include ideas of 'protection' against the common ills of Fortune or even enchantment:

RR.1606 For whoso loketh in that mirrour,
 There may nothyng ben his socour
 That he ne shall there sen somthyng
 That shal hym lede into lovyng.

HELP

1. The lexeme HELP, in most of its uses cannot be claimed to belong to the sense area with which we are concerned. In a few uses with the syntagms ask h., biseken h., seken h., take h. there is a similarity in sense to related syntagms using the form grace. There is, however, no orientation with regard to social eminence.

2. Collocations of help with neede are common both in the syntagm have neede of and with the impersonal verb neede. At its most general, help is merely the answer to a particular need, and may come from anyone, bidden or unbidden. In the Tale of Melibee (VII.1306) and Troilus and Criseyde (V.1027) it is made clear that help is most useful from a friend. Boethius inveighs against forcyn help ('help fro withoute' III, p.xii) and contrasts this need with suffisaunce. This thought associates neatly with the use of socour in the resolution of the poem Fortune:

My suffisaunce shal be my socour;
For fynally, Fortune, I thee defye!

3. Help and grace may be situationally synonymous and they are juxtaposed in an exclamation in Troilus and Criseyde (IV.103). In The Merchant's Tale (IV.2334) help is used as an exclamation by the wife, May, who claims that she will die if she cannot have some green pears. The situation in both these cases is that of the urgent desire for the granting of a petition, but in both cases also a particular aim, a specific action is desired, rather than merely a favourable attitude.

4. Help and grace are again collocated in the single occurrence of the adverbial phrase withouten help:

CT.I.2400 And, wel I woot, withouten help or grace
Of thee, ne may my strengthe noght availle.

The sense of grace here is that found when a divinity is the subject of the phrase grace to & infin. : 'an enabling gift from the divine'. The distinction between help and grace here may be that the former implies the direct intervention of God. The Parson sees the help of God as a direct reinforcement of personal fortitude:

CT.X.1075 and eek he shal han strengthe of the help of God,
 and of hooly chirche,

DEBONAIRETEE

In the case of the lexeme DEBONAIRETEE there seems to be little point in endeavouring to discover the sense of each word class separately, since the noun, at least, is inadequately represented and the uses of the words do not seem to suggest any great divergences of sense corresponding to grammatical function. Nevertheless the fact that the noun is used predominantly in moral psychological exposition is a warning that vigilance must be maintained with regard to semantic differences between word classes.

The most important collocations of DEBONAIRETEE are: pitee, pitous, goodnesse, good, goodly, faire, meke, pacience, and ire.

In translations the lexeme is used exclusively to render the identical French word. Predicated of enemies Chaucer uses a pairing debonaire and meke to translate simply debonnaire in the original. The range of Latin words in Boethius which are rendered by DEBONAIRETEE is very large: mitis (of a tame tiger and Zephyrus); prospera and blanda (of Fortuna); propitius (of judges); benigna (of force); pius (of people in general). It is clear, however, that Chaucer simply adopted the French of Jean de Meun in all these cases. Etymologically, the earliest form of the word is the adjective, which is in turn derived from an Old French adjectival phrase de bon aire, which has an original sense of 'belonging to a noble lineage'. In common with many such words, there is an early confusion between nobility of birth and nobility of behaviour, so that the lexeme need not imply noble birth in Chaucer's time.

1. A most striking fact about Chaucer's usage of the adjective debonaire and its derivatives is the frequency of its occurrence outside a courtly context as a term of moral philosophy, one of the contending elements of the psyche. The Parson (CT.X.654ff.) gives a detailed analysis of it as

a remedium contra peccatum Ire, and his deliberations offer a useful opportunity of determining what the abstract ideal, derived from the imprecise adjective, might mean.

The Parson begins by equating debonairetee with mansuetude, and allies it with pacience, which he equates with suffraunce, as antithetical to ire. He explains the psychological functions by stating that debonairetee is a virtue which suppresses sudden emotional outbursts, in particular those aimed against others. Debonairetee is the active virtue parallel to the passive one of patient acceptance: the former prevents aggression and the latter too fierce a defence against external attack. Debonairetee is visualised as a quality inherent in man, or as a part of God's grace, but it is evidently not taught as a social accomplishment.

Since the disposition of the powerful is of more direct importance than that of others, the moral import of debonairetee is especially interesting in regard to lords, and hence judges. The Parson and Prudence, echoing the Latin tradition of Seneca, both agree that debonairetee is desirable in the judicial lord:

CT.X.467

'Ther is no thing moore convenable to a man of heigh estaat than debonairetee and pitee.

CT.VII.1861

'Ther is no thyng so comendable in a greet lord/ as whan he is debonaire and meeke, and appeseth him lightly.'

The lord who shows debonairetee will restrain his desire for harsh revenge justice against the guilty and will be benigne to his deserving inferiors. Thus, according to the Parson, Christ acts debonairly in sparing sinful man (CT.X.315), and in Boece IV p.iv 263 it is recommended that judges should be 'nat wroothe but pytous and debonayre' and, instead of harsh justice, should seek to rehabilitate criminals. The antagonists of Melibeus submit to him because they are assured that he is debonaire (VII.1820) and 'debonaire and meeke, large, curteys' (VII.1760). Debonairetee, although it evidently implies gentleness, kindness and magnanimity to follow men, does not preclude

the possibility of anger; a sweetness and stillness of spirit it may be, but in an important passage the Parson envisages a kind of Ire which embodies debonairetee. 'Good Ire,' he says, 'is with debonairetee, and it is wrooth withouten bitternesse; nat wrooth agayns the man, but wrooth with the mysdede of the man.' Here there is evidence that, in the sense of the word which the Parson intends, debonairetee is not merely a simple tranquillity of nature, but a genuine concern for one's fellow Christian. To what extent the Parson is recasting the senses of the words for doctrinal purposes is hard to say, but the uses of the noun in these moral philosophical passages would all admit of this interpretation, and there is additional evidence in the oxymoronic phrases dispitouse debonaire (BD.626) to refer to Fortune, and debonayre force of God (Bo.III.pxii 135) which destroyed the giants. This last phrase evidently bears some sense of the modification of violence, being channelled to beneficent ends: the Latin original has benigna fortitudo (Jean de Meun: la debonnaire force).

2. That debonairetee of whatever kind is regarded as an attribute of character and not an accomplishment nor a momentary emotion, is suggested by its frequent use as a general descriptive term for the characters of people separate from any situation, and also by such noun phrases as 'herte of misericorde, debonairetee, suffraunce...' (CT.X.1054), together with the description of persons whose clothes belie the impression given by their faces of their inner constitution:

CT.X.430 God woot that though the visages of somme of hem seme
ful chaast and debonaire, yet notifie they in hire array of
atyr likerousnesse and pride.

Here the antithetical arrangement of the sentence seems to imply a sense of 'humble' or 'meeK' for debonaire.¹

3. Debonaire and its derivatives are also used in courtly contexts. The noun is so used only once, and as an abstract quality of character, it seems much more a part of moral philosophy. In some contexts the sense of

debonairly in the courtly situation seems to be equivalent to that understood by the Parson. Compare the sense in the following quotation with those in which lords or Christ show concern and judge mildly those who trespass against them:

BD.1284 She wolde alway so goodly
 Foryeve me so debonairly.

In the courtly situation, too, debonaire is used to represent an attribute of character and is especially applied to courtly women. The allegorical figures Fraunchise (RR.1220) and Curtesie (RR.797) are both called debonaire, as are Criseyde (I.181), Blanche the Duchess (BD.860), Alceste (LGM (F) 179), Pertelote (CT.VII.2871) and Emelye (CT.I.2282). In all of these, the term is one of general description used of a courtly lady: Emelye and Fraunchise have debonaire hearts; Blanche and Criseyde have debonaire eyes and chere respectively. The latter application occurs in a more graphic situation than the others, which may help to throw some light on the sense of debonairetee in a courtly lady:

F. J. I.181 And yet she stood ful love and stille allone,
 Byhynden other folk, in litel brede,
 And neigh the dore, ay undre shames drede,
 Simple of atir and debonaire of chere
 With ful assured lokyng and manere.

The picture is of a lady who, while not overcome by awkward embarrassment, is less than forceful and strident; she is diametrically opposed to the Wife of Bath, who must always go first. This restraint in her behaviour is again seen when she stands beside her father after her return from Troy; here her submissiveness is called mansuete.

This sense of gentleness, of moderation, predominates over that of benevolence in some courtly contexts, though the component of concern for others can rarely be discounted in the sense:

BD.518 And had ygret hym as I best koude,
 Debonayrly, and nothing lowde

Here the overt sense is one of moderation and gentleness, but this tone is

adopted, and the words chosen, from concern for the suffering man in Black.

In courtly relations between man and woman, the look is often of great importance. Blanche is portrayed as looking debonairly upon all, but Chaucer takes great pains to stress that, although she looks kindly and gently on all, it is with moderation and no pejorative implication can be made:

BD.851 Laughe and pleye so womanly,
 And loke so debonairly,
 So goodly speke and so frendly.

Criseyde, too, shows kindness in her look on Troilus, but it is tempered with the same moderation:

TC.III.156 With that she gan hire eyen on him caste
 Ful esily and ful debonairly,
 Avysing hire, and hied nought to faste
 With nevere a word,

In Boethius (II, p.viii, 12-13) Fortune, personified as a great lady, is twice called debonaire, glossing two distinct Latin words, prosperam and blanda.

The former use, he contrasts with contrarious Fortune, and in following Jean de Meun's choice of debonaire to translate both Latin terms, Chaucer obscures a distinction made in the Latin between an impersonal application (prosperam) meaning simply 'favourable' and a personal one (blanda) meaning (perhaps dissimulatingly) 'kind'.

4. A number of minor uses remain to be examined. In the Parson's Tale, we find him insisting on the necessity of tranquillity to the spiritual life:

3T.X.560 (ire) bynymeth from man his wit and his resoun,
 and al his debonaire lif espirituel that should
 kepen his soule.

while a second use in Boethius implies that Chaucer considers that calm gentleness of spirit is the desired behaviour of a Christian, for he translates Boethius' pius as debonaire:¹

Bo.III, m.ix, 45 (God) thou art cleernesse, thou art pesible
 reste to debonaire folk

¹ This use of debonaire in a context of Christian morality is paralleled in the roughly contemporary Book of Vices and Virtues, ed. W.N. Francis, E.E.T.S. (O.S.217), 1942, p.94. Beatitudes, 33-34: Blessed be þe debonere, for þei schulle be lordes of þe erþe. The word debonaire here was added by Jean de Meun. Chaucer chooses this rather than piteus.

circumstances. In dealing with the lexeme DEBONAIREMENT, we are dealing with a word which comes within the sphere of Christian moral psychology, so that the defined sense of the word may, at times, differ slightly from actual contextual uses. Thus the Parson uses a similar linguistic context to the examples above when he defines PACIENCE as the ability to suffer debonairely: but, here, debonairely means simply 'mildly, tranquilly':

CT.X.660

The philosopre seith that pacience is thilke vertu that suffreth debonairely all the outrages of advorsitee and every wikked word.

BENIGNITUDE

The commonest collocations of BENIGNITUDE are: deere, feith(ful), honorable, stable, discreet, sad.

Chaucer seems to have a predilection for the word benigne which encourages him to use it even when unprompted by the text he is translating. Translation evidence is, in fact, sparse and unrevealing. The adjective benigne, and the adverb benignoly, are direct borrowings from the French in the Tale of Melibee (benigne and benignement), but both here and in the Clerk's Tale, Chaucer uses the lexeme as an unprompted addition. At CT.IV.1053 he translates bonne foy et vraye humilité by feith and benyngnytee. According to the Boethius Concordance, benigna occurs twice in Boethius' works: on one occasion, prompted by Jean de Meun, Chaucer renders this debonaire, on the other (Bo.III,m.ix,41) he merely adopts the Latin word, ignoring the French translation.

1. BENIGNITUDE is clearly an essential trait of character and a trait which works to the benefit of others. It is listed with a host of womanly virtues in the description of Griselda:

CT.IV.929 Hire goost was evere in pleyn humylitee;
 No tendre mouth, noon herte delicaat,
 No pompe, no semblant of roialtee,
 But ful of pacient benyngnytee,
 Discreet and prideles, ay honorable,
 And to hire housbonde evere meke and stable.

and its uses with a possessive emphasise its part as a component of personality. Griselda's husband puts her BENIGNITUDE to the test:

CT.IV.1053 I have thy feith and thy benyngnytee,
 As wel as evere woman was, assayed,

The Parson analyses the endowments of mankind into 'goodes' of nature, fortune and grace. The heritage of nature (i.e. by virtue of birth), he divides into two: 'goodes of body' (heele of body, strengthe, delivernesse, beautee, gentrice, franchise) and 'goodes of soule' (good wit, sharp

understondynge, subtil enayn, vertu naturel, good memorie). Wealth, advancement and popularity are in the gift of Fortune, whilst BENIGNITIE, together with a number of spiritual virtues, is a gift from God, of which it is foolish to boast (CT.X.450ff.).

Such examples as these reveal BENIGNITIE to be a trait of human personality closely connected to Christian ideals and dependent upon the grace of God. The moral-evaluative implications of most of its more important collocations may have prepared us for this finding.

2. The above uses suggest that BENIGNITIE is purely a passive virtue. Its occurrence in association with PACIENCE and humblesse in a number of uses, together with the disproportionately large number of occurrences in the Clark's Tale, and elsewhere, applied to suffering women, increase this awareness of connotations of sweet submissiveness. The Parson sums up the situation quite well:

CT.X.109 Penitence destreyneth a man to accepte benygnely
every peyne that hym is enjoyned,

and Prudence asks her husband to listen patiently to the unwelcome things which she intends to tell him:

CT.VII.1238 And soothly, I hope that youre benyngnytee wol
taken it in pacience

BENIGNITIE, in these examples, indicates the spiritual condition which will predispose one to accept hardship without complaint; but not only without complaint or animosity, rather with a positive sweetness of spirit, a distinct mildness towards the source of what might otherwise be irritation. This is clearly suggested by the following description of an ideal priest:

GP.483 Benygne he was, and wonder diligent,
And in adversitee ful pacient,

Here BENIGNITIE is the condition of being loving to others and, at once, maintaining tranquility in one's own hardships. The first element of this, kindness to others, is explicit in a second reference to the Parson:

GP.518 He was to synful men nat despitous,
Ne of his speche daungerous ne digne,
But in his techyng discreet and benygne.

3. The use of the lexeme BENIGNITEE in contexts such as those quoted has given it strong moralistic connotations which are closely connected with Christian ideals. Nonetheless, it is used as a descriptive term in the presentation of the characteristics of great courtly ladies. Indeed, despite numerous applications to men, the sense of submissiveness and its echoes in most uses of BENIGNITEE, tend to make it especially associated with the description of women. As well as applying to submissive, oppressed women, the term may apply to women of some power and prestige. Thus we find the princess Canacee showing compassion for a distressed bird:

CP.V.486 I se wel that ye han of my distresse
 Compassion, my faire Canacee,
 Of verray wommanly bonigaytee
 That Nature in youre principles hath set.

The queen who accompanies the terrifying God of Love in the prologue to the Legend of Good Women (f) 243 is similarly described:

So womanly, so benigne, and so meke,

This BENIGNITEE is evident in the face and the voice as well as in the behaviour of some great ladies. Blanche, the Duchess, is thus described:

BD.918 Ne sholde have founde to discryve
 In al hir face a wikked sygne;
 For hit was sad, symple, and benygne.

It would seem from such examples as these that benigne is applied to great ladies, not in any attempt to emphasise their social elevation or physical beauty, but rather the perfection of their souls, especially in humility and kindness. Note that Chaucer, in the first of these three quotations, contradicts what he claims above about BENIGNITEE being a goode of grace.

In the Complaint of Mars (178), amidst a list of conventional virtues of a lady, we find that of benigne humblosse, and the allegorised Pitee in the complaint of the same name (58) is called humblest of herte ...

Benygne flour .

However, in some contexts, humility and submission do not seem to be important criteria in the sense. Thus the penitents in the Tale of Heliboe

approach Prudence with the words:

(1743) And therefore, deere and benygne lady, we
 preien yow and biseken yow as mekely as we konne ...

Evidently they consider that the character of the lady will predispose her to help them, and indeed it does, bringing about peace by careful counsel and magnanimity, so that the tale is closed as one of Prudence 'and hire benygnytee' (CT.VIII.1690). The Virgin Mary is also a benigno lady in a position of power:

CT.VIII.54 But often tyme, of thy benygnytee,
 Thil frely, or that men thyn help biseche,
 Thou goost biforn, and art hir lyves leche. ¹

Thus benignitee may have quite an active sense when applied to ladies; more than lacking animosity, it can have a positive sense of being well-disposed to some-one and ready to help them. Many of the adverbial clauses become simply formulae in the situation where a petitioner calls upon the great for help and invokes an aspect of their character which might be connected with the will to help:

TC.III.39 Now, lady bryght, for thi benignite,
 At reverence of hem that serven the,
 Whos clerc I am, so techeth me devyse ...

TC.II.532 Thow be my sheld, for thi benignite.

There is no doubt that adverbial phrases, such as these, are situationally inspired tags adding politeness to a request of a greater person. There is no distinction in sense between these and for thi grace or any others of these formulae, but if we do assume that the word has sense within the phrase, the sense must be an active one.

4: In its application to men, BENIGNITEE is generally active, an exception being the Clerk of Oxenford who admirably demonstrates the passive sense:

CT.IV.21 This worthy clerk benignely answerde:
 "Hooste," quod he, "I am under youre yerde;
 Ye han of us as now the governaunce,

¹ Cf. the almost identical idea in The Prioress's Prologue, VIII. 478.

More typical of the application to men is the following, in which the Parson claims that it is a sign of true gentillesse for a lord 'to be benigne to his good subgetis' (CT.X.467). BENIGNITEE in men is often shown by their actions towards the less fortunate. Troilus, blessed by the love of Criseyde, becomes a paragon of virtue:

TC.III.1802 And though that he be come of blood roial,
 Hym liste of pride at no wright for to chace;
 Benigne he was to ooh in general,
 For which he gat hym thank in every place.

Alceste (DGN (G) 361) says that a lord ought to 'Shewen his peple pleyn benygante,'; Troilus appeals to the God of Love 'so beth to me benigne;' (TC.I.431); the Parson intimates that it is a sin when a man 'herkeneth nat benignely the compleint of the povre;' (PT.X.373); Aurelio appeals to Lord Phoebus for help in his hopeless love, assuming that, as in Canacee (see above), BENIGNITEE is related to PITIE (CT.V.1039); Lelibee raises his penitent vassals from the ground ful benignely (CT.VII.1827); and Griselda tells her children that their benyngne fader has tenderly protected them (CT.IV.1097). In Parson's Tale 582, the narrator indicates that the mercy of God will be extended even to the worst sinners because He is so benigne.

Thus BENIGNITEE is associated with acts of beneficence and magnanimity towards people in general, pity for the distressed, and forbearance and forgiveness towards the guilty. A benigne judge encourages the submission of the criminal:

CT.VII.1821 But yet, for the grete goodnesse and debonairetee
 that al the world witnesseth of youre persone,/ ve
 submytten us to the excellence and benignitee of youre
 gracious lordshipe,/

Any differentiation in sense between the key terms of the above quotation would be hard to make. At the end of the Troilus, Chaucer addresses it to Gower and Strode, asking them to correct it 'Of youre benignites and zoles goode' (TC.V.1859): he submits his work to assessors whom he expects to

balance conscientious fervour against forbearance in their judgement of it.

On a considerable number of occasions, BENIGNITEE is used without any clear act of benevolence towards a human being, and in such uses it becomes one of the list of courtly moral epithets; its sense is very vague and must be inferred from uses where it is a trait of character inspiring beneficence. The king in the Squire's Tale (21) is, among other things, 'pitous and just, alwey yliche;/ Sooth of his word, benigne and honourable,'. The formal eagle of RF.375 is 'The moste benygne and the goodlieste' among birds, and Citherea (Venus) is called benigne (CT.I.2215).

The association of the Goddess of Love with benignitee is scarcely surprising, taking into account the fact that the term involves being well-disposed to mankind. We may also remember that love made Troilus benigne and this function is supported by the explicit claim (TC.III.26) that Venus makes lovers corteys, fresshe and benigne. The personification Love is awarded the same epithet (TC.III.1261) and in the Merchant's Tale (IV.2093) May loves Damyan so benygnely that she will die if she may not have him. The context suggests a sense directly opposed to that of gentle philosophical submissiveness with which we started: something like 'violently' or 'forcefully' could be substituted. This intensification is the result of the use of the adverb semi-tautologously. Other emotions or acts of benevolence which are reinforced in this way are curteisye (CT II.179) and the grace of God (CT.X.1091).

5. As well as benevolence towards mankind, harshness may ideally be tempered by BENIGNITEE, as we may guess by Chaucer's dedication to Strode and Gover. Thus, the restrictions put upon mankind by adherence to the code of religion are for his own benefit, and are called (Bo.III,m.ix,41) 'thi benygne lawe'. The Parson is at pains to emphasise the value of mildness and benevolence in reproving evil-doers. One must be careful to avoid anger or one might 'sleeth hym, which that he myghte chastise with benygntee.' (CT.X.628).¹

¹ See also CT.X.518.

6. Most uses of benignitee involve human relations and attitudes, yet one use is to be found where the adjective is applied to the weather (CT.V.52) of a kind which makes the birds sing. It is obviously spring weather, weather which is kindly and benevolent to the birds, gentle but yet joyful (lusty) and invigorating. In short, from the point of view of the birds, the weather is fine and favorable.

MANSUETE

This lexeme represents the adoption, perhaps via French, of the Latin mansuetudo. It is used by the Parson, where it is described as the remedy for IRE, and glossed for the ignorant as debonairetee. Its significance is clearly the same sweet tranquility of spirit as the latter lexeme signifies in these moral treatises. In its only occurrence outside moral treatises, it is applied to Criseyde as she stands obediently by her father after her return from Troy. Here it collocates with muwet and milde, contributing to a totally passive and submissive picture of a dutiful daughter:

TC.V.194

She seyde ek, she was fayn with hym to mete,
And stood forth muwet, milde, and mansuete.

MEKE

Translation evidence is limited, though the lexeme seems to be used to render French debonaire. In Melibee, paired adjectives debonaire and meke are used to render the French simplex debonaires on three separate occasions, and mekely and benignely renders benignement once. The fact that mekenesse renders clementia once in Boece is probably due to the use of Jean de Meun's translation where it is rendered debonaireté (IV, p. iv, 152). MEKE is also used to render French humblement / humilité and Latin humilitas.

Collocation evidence is plentiful since, like the adjective kynde, meke is frequently used in paired constructions. The most important collocations are: debonaire, kynde, humble/humylitee, patient, and benigne, but a great many more occur: large, fre, faire, young, fresche, curteys, stille, stable, buxom, hooly, womanly, and, antithetically, fiers.

1. The collocation womanly directs us to a significant feature of the use of MEKE in that it is very frequently predicated of women; as wives within the marriage relationship, as the object of courtly affection, or in the person of the Virgin. Typically, the Wife of Bath reverses the common usage here in her desire for: 'Housbondes meke, young, and fresch abedde,' (GP.III.1259). This association with women, and more especially with the Virgin, is perhaps referable to the identification made between mekenesse and one of the special 'privileges' which the fourteenth century cult of the Virgin considered were specially granted to Mary.¹ This association is also suggested by the repeated comparison of meekness with that of a mayde (GP.69; CP.I.3202). The lexeme is also applied to the mild judge, where it is paired with debonaire, and to Christ. This last application is supported

¹ Middle English Sermons, ed. W.O. Ross, EMTS 209, 251.19. Mekenes is here the gloss of humilitas.

by the association of the lexeme with the word lamb .

2. The use of the lexeme MEKE implies gentleness, humility and submission, consequent imperviousness to violent emotion and, hence, tranquility of spirit. In Chaucer's usage it is contrasted with FIERS:

CT.VIII.199 "For thilke spouse that she took right now
Ful lyk a fiers leoun, she sendeth heere,
As meke as evore was any lomb, to yow!"

Such an opposition has the sanction of moralistic writings, since mekenesse is seen as 'rote and begynnyng of all vertewe' and, so, diametrically opposed to pride.¹

3. The contextual senses of MEKE may be grouped simply into those uses where the sense is active, and those where it is passive. In the former, meekness is seen as a quality which encourages the asking of petitions; kindness, graciousness is implied:

CT.VII.597 And evore on Cristes mooder meeke and kynde
She crido,

Within the situation of courtly love, this active sense can imply readiness to grant grace. The application to Christ is arranged as a deliberate contrast to the daunger and turbulence of earthly loves:

TC.V.1847 And syn he best to love is, and most meke,
What nedeth feynode loves for to seke?

Within the courtly situation, but with passive application, the lexeme seems chiefly to imply submissiveness and humility:²

CT.V.739 But atte laste she, for his worthynesse,
And namely for his meke obeysaunce,
Hath swich a pitee caught of his penaunce.

This is also the sense found in the marriage relationship and in more general situations:

CT.IV.538 Grisildis moot al suffre and al consente;
And as a lamb she sitteth meke and stille,
And leet this cruell sergeant doon his velle.

¹ Ibid., 20.29. The same is true of the Parson's Tale, X. 475.

² A rare verbal use (CT.VII.1684) renders 'je me aille humilier.' The verbal use also occurs with similar sense in Gower, CA.I.866 and Piers Plowman (c-text) V.90.

4. In Chaucer's later work, in common with a number of other morally evaluative terms, meek seems to be used in senses which must be considered ironic, when viewed against the ideal of moralistic writing. Thus, the meekness of hende Nicholas is tainted with the suggestion of self-interest; it is certainly torn from the established framework of its position as the first branch in the tree of virtues:¹

CT.I.3202 This clerk was cleped hende Nicholas.
 Of decerne love he koude and of solas;
 and therto he was sleigh and ful privee,
 And lyk a mayden meke for to see.

¹ Compare CT.IV.1745; CT.III.434 and perhaps CT.V.739. For the status of mekenes in the hierarchy of virtues, see The Book of Vices and Virtues p. 126ff.

MILDE

Strangely, this is a very rare word in Chaucer; the adjective alone is found, and then only in one occurrence. This is when Calcas, in Book V of Troilus and Criseyde, welcomes his daughter after her issue from Troy:

TC.V.194 And twenty tyme he kiste his doughter sweete,
 And seyde, "O deere doughter myn, welcome!"
 She seyde ek, she was fayn with hym to mete,
 And stood forth muwet, milde, and mansuete.

The vocabulary of the line in which this occurs is noteworthy, for mansuete also is a nonce occurrence, and muwet is uncommon. The sense of milde here is 'quiet and gentle.'

KINDENESS/KYNDE

A. G.S. Lewis has shown (Studies in words, pp.26ff.) the large range of senses of the word Kynde, most of which are outside the area laid down as being of interest in the present study; yet, since they are senses subsumed under the same formal unit of language as those senses which concern us, they should receive some mention. This is the more necessary since the formal resemblance also suggests some semantic relation either diachronic or, possibly, synchronic.

1. The O.E. antecedent gocynde is related to the word cynn, which gives us the modern 'kin', and referred to race or lineage. This sense is used in Chaucer:

CT.VIII.121 This mayden bright Cecilie, as hir lif seith,
Was comen of Romayns, and of noble kynde,

CT.CT.III.1101
'comen of so lough a kynde,'

2. A second well-recognised sense is that of nature as a semi-deity and the vicar of God, glossing Latin Natura:

PF.316 And right as Aleyn, in the Pleynt of Kynde,
Devyseth Nature of away and face,

BD.512 Thogh Pan, that men clepe god of kynde,

3. Kynde may also refer to the individual nature of a person, persons or things. Here it identifies and refers to traits characteristic of those things or persons:

AA.201 The kynde of mannes herte is to delyte
In thing that straunge is,

CT.V.608 men loven of propre kynde nowefangelnesse,

CT.I.2451 Saturne anon, to stynten strif and drede,
Al be it that it is agayn his kynde,
Of al this strif he gan remedie fynde.

4. Kynde may also refer to that class of objects or persons which display certain characteristic traits enabling them to be grouped. They are classified according to their nature and the class formed may be called by the same word. Kynde here glosses the Latin genus in Boethius:

Bo. IV, p. iii, 74 (that is to seyn, wikwide the kynde, which that is the uttereste and the worste kynde of schrewednesse)

Bo. IV, p. i, 57 And thou schalt wel knowe manye thinges of this kynde,

Bo. III, p. ix, 31 "Suffisaunce and power ben thanne of o kynde?"

The third of these may easily be understood with sense 4, but in fact translates natura, whilst the second translates genus.

5. A more consciously classifying sense is used by the Canon's Yeoman:

CT. VIII. 789 Though I by ordre hem nat reherce kan,
By cause that I am a lewed man,
Yet wol I telle hem as they come to mynde,
Thogh I ne kan nat sette hem in hir kynde:

a number of phrases give idiomatic extension to the sense above.

6. By (wey of) K.

a) This is related to the sense of nature (characteristic traits) and also to the group of things which fall within a class marked by certain traits. There is a sense of normality; the ordinary course of events, what is natural or normal:

CT. VII. 650 "My throte is kut unto my nekke boon,"
Seyde this child, "and, as by wey of kynde,
I sholde have dyed,

b) It can also refer to certain inborn characteristics, as opposed to those taught, and hence has the sense 'instinct':

CT. VII. 3196 And knew by kynde, and by noon oother loore,
That it was pryme, and crew with blisful stevene.

7. Love of K. This phrase is opposed to celestial love. It is the antithesis of natural creation and also the ordinary species of love; carnal love:

TC. I. 979 That was unapt to suffren loves hete,
Celestial, or elles love of kynde;

8. When actions are grouped according to particular facets of them, the use of Kynde extends into the territory of modern way or manner:

TC.III.334 I shal thi proces set in swych a kynde,
And God toforn, that it shal the suffise,

9. Finally the following from the Parson's section on Lechery:

CT.X.965 For if the chirche be halwed, and man or womman
spille his kynde inwith that place, by wey of synne
or by wikked temptacioun, the chirche is entredited til
it be reconciled by the bysshop.

The adverb formed on the noun kynde (kyndely) and the adjective of identical form have senses related to those mentioned above. Thus, speaking of his service to love, the Man in Black of the Book of the Duchess, 777 says his ability to serve came from instinct:

I trowe hit cam me kyndely

A few lines earlier he speaks of kyndely understandyng, meaning perhaps that intellect is a characteristic trait in the nature of mankind or that he had a natural, instinctual understanding of the game of love.

When the Wife of Bath says (III.402):

Deceite, wepyng, spynnyng God hath yive
To women kyndely,

she is not referring to God's beneficence, but to a trait of the nature of women.

Genitive apposition (cf. Mustanoja p.85) accounts for phrases such as his kynde noriture (TC.IV.768) and the following, where the sense may equally imply a place reserved for a particular class or for objects of a particular nature:

HF.836 That kyndely the mansioune
Of every speche, of every soun,
Be hyt eyther foul or fair,
Hath hys kynde place in ayr.
And syn that every thyng that is
Out of hys kynde place, ywys
Moveth thidder for to goo,

In some uses a different sense might be understood, as in the following,

which records the beneficent effect of the sun on flowers:

TC.II.970 But right as floures, thourgh the cold of nyght
 Iclosed, stoupen on hire stalke lowe,
 Redressen hem ayein the sonne bright,
 And spreden on hire kynde cours by rowe,

A use such as this brings us to those senses which will engage our prime attention.

B. No translation evidence exists for these uses of the lexeme. The evidence of collocation shows collocations with TREWE (inc. trouthe) to be easily the most important, with GENTIL next and, following and of equal importance, meeke; parfit; sadde. The collocation with beste might be mentioned as semantically related to parfit. The only head words which are twice modified by the adjective are: herte, man, and references to the character of Griselda; though the collocation is actually with a pronoun in one occurrence. As mentioned above, only guyte (with) occurs twice governing the object kyndenesse.

1. The commonest single situation for the use of KYNDE in the senses which concern us is the situation of love and marriage. Here either partner may be said to be Kynde, but along with TROUTHE, it is generally presumed to be a trait more typical of women. The essential relational nature of the word in this situation is repeated:

TC.IV.1417 And treweliche, as writen wel I fynde,
 That al this thyng was seyde of good entente;
 And that hire herte trewe was and kynde
 Towardes hym,

The mutual bond of TROUTHE and KYNDENESSE is exemplified in the claim of the Wife of Bath:

CT.III.823 After that day we hadden never debaat.
 God helpe me so, I was to him as kynde
 As any wyf from Denmark unto Ynde,
 And also trewe, and so was he to me.

Thus Kyndenesse in marriage consists of avoiding acrimonious exchanges. In

a general sense it can simply mean being pleasant to people, doing something for their benefit; thus Chaucer asks lovers to repay the good deeds of Venus with similar Kyndenesse:

Mars 298 Compleyneth thilke ensample of al honour,
That never dide but al gentilesse;
Kytheth therefore on her sum kyndenesse.

The constant juxtaposition in the love situation of trewe and kynde makes the borders of the concepts ill-defined. A lover who is one is also the other: one of the ways in which a lover may be good to his love is to be constant. Constancy is often assumed to be a characteristic trait of ladies:

Mars 281 And ye, my ladyes, that ben true and stable,
Be wey of kynde,

But, though ladies are constant by nature, men often loven novelrie:

LGW.921 For it is deynte to us men to fynde
A man that can in love been trewe and kynde.

The borders of the concepts become so ill-defined, the phrase becomes so attached to a situation, developing a single sense for both terms in concert, that either component may be used as an elliptical variant with the same sense as the total phrase:

LGW.665 But herkeneth, ye that speken of kyndenesse,
Ye men that falsly sweren many an oth
That ye wol deye, if that youre love be wroth,
Here may ye sen of wemen which a trouthe!

Here the term kyndenesse is understood to include trouthe. At the end of Troilus and Criseyde, the fact of his love's inconstancy is realised by the hero. In the following sentence the word kynde seems to be equivalent to trewe:

TC.V.1643 ... Troilus wel understod that she
Nas nought so kynde as that hire oughte be.

Finally, we might note a transferred use where kynde directly modifies love:

TC.V.920 "And thenketh wel, ye shal in Grekis fynde
A moore parfit love, or it be nyght,
Than any Troian is, and more kynde,
And bet to serven yow wol don his myght.

2. As well as kyndeness in love - which does not seem to undergo the pejorative development of Grace or Mercy in this use - the word may be applied, chiefly to women, outside the love situation and having overtones of moral worth or nobility. Christ's mother is called meeke and kynde (CT.VII.597); Griselda is pacient and kynde and sad and kynde (CT.IV.1187, 602); Griselda says that Walter seemed gentil ... and kynde (CT.IV.852). Here the collocation is with ideals of moral philosophy and these collocations seem to specify the vague sense of good disposition of kynde. The worth of the folk of Troy is summed up in a few words covering their learning, accomplishment and benevolence:

TC.V.970 but certeyn, men shal fynde
 As worthi folk withinne Troie toun,
 As konnyng, and as parfit, and as kynde,
 As ben bitwixen Orkades and Inde.

In reference to Alceste the word seems to have a sense almost exclusively of nobility of character rather than benevolence to another; though this forms part of her excellence. The benevolence and faith which she shows to her husband is of so elevated an order that the sense of kynde, approaching that of trewe (as above), and also the good disposition mentioned here, mounts to heights of moral implication above either:

TC.V.1527 "As wel thow myghtest lien on Alceste,
 That was of creatures, but men lye,

 That evere weren, kyndest and the beste!
 For whan hire housbonde was in jupertye
 To dye hymself, but if she wolde dye,
 She ches for hym to dye and gon to helle,
 And starf anon.

3. The vague sense of benevolence towards others, also, is used on the level of everyday good turns. The first example is evidently an adverb formed on the adjective which in turn is a special development of the noun kynde. It is the only occurrence of this form with this kind of sense; the adjective and adverb kyndely normally refer to natural traits or classifications:

CT.VII.353 And if that I were riche, as have I blisse,
 Of twenty thousand sheeld sholde ye nat mysse,
 For ye so kyndely this oother day
 Lent me gold;

Pandarus' good turn in wooing Criseyde on Troilus' behalf is acknowledged in a transferred use:

TC.III.1610 That thanked be the heighe worthynesse
Of Love, and ek thi kynde bysynesse.

"Thus hastow me no litel thing yyive,

Custance begs her father to thank her husband for his kyndenesse in his treatment of her (CT.II.1113).

Finally a pejorative use might be noted in which kynde and gentil are ironically applied to one of the worst villains of the pilgrimage to Canterbury:

GP.647 He was a gentil harlot and a kynde;
A bettre felawe sholde men nocht fynde.

This is the only use of kynde in a deliberately ironic context, though gentil is so used in the Wife's Prologue. The fact that the rather-vague concepts of KYNDENESSE and GENTILLESSE are normally treated with such respect increases the irony immensely.

4. A final sense which seems well-removed from the others is worth mention. Criseyde weeps bitterly when she must leave Troy and her lover, but those around her think she is weeping because she is leaving their company, and they weep in sympathy. Those around her consider that it is kyndenesse which makes her so distressed, thus kyndenesse is seen as a softness of temperament akin to pitee, and Criseyde a moment later (731) is called ful of sorweful pite .

TC.IV.720 And they that hadde ^{yknowen} ~~kynden~~ hire of yore
Seigh hire so wepe, and thought it kyndenesse,
And ech of hem wepte eke for hire destresse.

BUXOMNESSE

BUXOMNESSE is a rare lexeme in Chaucer, lacking translation evidence and having no particularly important collocational relations.

1. The most striking single fact about the use of BUXOMNESSE is its frequent application to the relationship between man and wife. In particular, it seems to be a virtue required of a wife in relation to her husband.¹ A wife who is called buxom is also trewe, vertuous and ententyf to her husband's welfare:

CT.IV.1287 Wel may his herte in joy and blisse habounde,
 For who kan be so buxom as a wyf?
 Who is so trewe, and eek so ententyf
 To kepe hym, syk and hool, as is his make?

Hence, since the wife of the man is his help and is so buxom (ibid.1333) they must needs live in concord.

The sense of buxom, in relation to wifely virtue, seems to imply not only obedience and submission, but deference and solicitude for the spouse. This sense is apparent in the uses in the Shipman's Tale. The husband, departing on a journey to Flanders, asks his wife to manage his affairs during his absence:

CT.VII.242 For which, my deere wyf, I thee biseke,
 As be to every wight buxom and meke,
 And for to kepeoure good be curious,
 And honestly governe weloure hous.

The departing merchant would hardly ask his wife to be compliant to everyone; in fact he is asking her to be mild-mannered, deferential and eager to please his business colleagues. This also must be the sense of the following:

CT.VII.177 They wolde that hir housbondes sholde be
 Hardy, and wise, and riche, and therto free,
 And buxom unto his wyf, and fressh abedde.

¹ The use of BUXOMNESSE in relation to the state of marriage occurs, though rarely, in Gower (e.g. CA.V.2807).

Here all other virtues are active and the sense 'submissive' would clash with them; nothing more passive than 'deferential' or 'solicitous' seems to be implied.

The collocation with heart in the situation of courtly love, in which a lover outlines the extent of his submission to his implacable lady, may suggest a sense of 'submission' plainly and simply, but the larger context is one of straining to find some grounds on which to please the lady, even agreeing to die to do so:

Lady 119 But I, my lyf and deeth, to yow obeye,
 And with right buxom herte hooly I preye,
 As [is] your moste plesure, so doth by me;
 Wel lever is me liken yow and deye
 Than for to anythyng or thynke or seye
 That yow myghte offende in any tyme.

Thus, the sense of buxom, though loosely including the senses 'obedient' and 'submissive,' also has the associations in Chaucer of 'eager to please' and 'solicitudinous'.¹

2. Buxomly seems to have little active sense; its only use seems to be connected with humility and submission rather than the specific desire to please:

CT.IV.186 He graunted hem a day, swich as hym leste,
 On which he wolde be wedded sikerly,
 And seyde he did al this at hir requeste.
 And they, with humble entente, buxomly,
 Knelynge upon hir knees ful reverently,
 Hym thonken alle;

3. Buxommenesse has a perfectly passive sense; it is used once in a counsel of passive acceptance, submission to, fate:

Truth 15 That thee is sent, receyve in buxommenesse;
 The wrastling for this world axeth a fal.

The only trace of activity expected of the recipient of the worldly lot is evidently contentment with it. Buxommenesse, then, must mean cheerful submission rather than merely submission.

¹ The notion of suffering buxomly the pains of love is also found in Gower, CA.I.1370.

PACIENCE

Translation evidence from Boethius is of limited value. Pacience translates the Latin patientia. Translations of phrases are perhaps more interesting, though two of these have their phrasing prompted by the French translation: thus lost p. ^a is rendering of 'dederit impatientiae manus' and suffre in p. is the translation of 'patienter(que) tolerasset' and is gratuitously added in translating 'aequo animo tolere'.

A wide range of collocations are found but the only ones occurring *those* ^k more than once are ^k with individual forms of the lexemes: BENIGNE, ATTEMPTAUNCE, MEKE, and, perhaps, DEBONAIRE.

There are no interestingly frequent modifications of head words by the adjective, but the adverb repeatedly modifies suffre and take. This fact encourages the mention of other symmetries in usage. It might be noted that the only nouns which the adjective modifies, other than those referring to human beings, are the abstractions suffraunce and benyngnytee.

The frequency of suffre and take as the head words modified by the adverb phrase in p. is worthy of mention. The equational sentences with Pacience as the subject all have the word vertu as object; this is reflected by the noun phrase vertu of p. and a collocation with vertu in the adverbial phrasal use of the noun.

1. The association with vertu which is demonstrable in context corresponds to the place of PACIENCE in the scheme of ideas of penitential theology. Thus it is the remedie agayns Ire of the Parson's Tale. This virtue, contrary to the vice of Ire, is also called suffrance (CT.X.654). This complements the internal associations with SUFFRE drawn from context.

The definition offered by the Parson is: 'a vertu that suffreth swetely every mannes goodnesse, and is nat wrooth for noon harm that is doon to hym....

thilke vertu that suffreth debonairely alle the outrages of adversitee and every wikked word.'

In both the Tale of Melibee and that of the Parson, Pacience is treated as a philosophical or theological precept of behaviour, a virtue which enables one to suffer ill words, deeds or fortune with fortitude and mildness:¹

CT.VII.1514 And the same Salomon seith, 'The angry and wrathful man maketh noyses, and the pacient man atempreth hem and stilleth.'/ He seith also, 'It is moore worth to be pacient than for to be right strong;

CT.VII.1480 And therefore seye I that it is good as now that ye suffre and be pacient.

One of the virtues of the Parson of the General Prologue is his pacience, which seems to be a function of Benignitee:

GP.484 Benygne he was, and wonder diligent,
And in adversitee ful pacient.

Pacience, in its broadest theological sense, is the willing sufferance of all kinds of hardship and affliction (CT.X.1056). According to the Parson the first of these;

CT.X.663 The first grevance is of wikkede wordes. Thilke suffrede Jhesu Crist withouten grucchyng, ful patiently, whan the Jewes despised and repreved hym ful ofte./ Suffre thou therefore patiently;

Thus we have the collocation herkne patiently (CT.III.1996).

2. The Parson mentions of women that they lack the ability to show pacience in the suffering of insults:

CT.X.928 Also, certes, God ne made nat womman of the foot of Adam, for she ne sholde nat been holden to lowe; for she kan nat patiently suffre.

Such a claim may be expected to have its opposition and this is well represented in a series of uses where Pacience is used to refer to the tribulations in mariage and the suffering of it. Thus Griselda is the flour

¹ Pacience is, of course, the virtue of the philosopher who is not disturbed by troubling emotion. Gower (CA.III.639ff.) uses the traditional example of Socrates.

of wyfly pacience (CT.IV.919), she is humble and ful of pacient benyngnytee .

Griselda is unjustly provoked, but shows nothing but meekness:

CT.IV.623 O nedelees was she tempted in assay!
 But wedded men ne knowe no mesure,
 Whan that they fynde a pacient creature.

The Man of Law observes, with more specific reference, and perhaps with legal sanctions in mind:

CT.II.710 For thogh that wyves be ful hooly thynges,
 They moste take in pacience at nyght
 Swiche manere necessaries as been plesynges
 To folk that han ywedded hem with rynges,

In her typical way, the Wife of Bath reverses the roles of the sexes when cajoling her husband to be al pacient and meke (CT.III.434). Both the Merchant and the Host envy those husbands whose wives are pacient:

CT.VII.1895 That Goodelief, my wyf, hadde herd this tale!
 For she nys no thyng of swich pacience
 As was this Melibeus wyf Prudence.

CT.IV.1224 Ther is a long and large difference
 Bitwix Grisidis grete pacience
 And of my wyf the passyng crueltee.

Thus Pacience in marriage refers to the submission of the one partner to the will of the other in much the same way as the use of the word Buxom. The former is also used in reference to the attitude of the lover to the sufferings of his frustration, which may colloquially be called 'luck':

Mars 21 Yet at the leste renoveleth your servyse;
 Confermeth hyt perpetuely to dure,
 And patiently taketh your aventure.

The Clerk neatly draws together Pacience in its theological use, relating to the hazards of fortune or providence, and its restricted use in the relations of men and women:

CT.IV.1149 For, sith a womman was so pacient
 Unto a mortal man, wel moore us oghte
 Receyven al in gree that God us sent;

The Parson notes that submission and obedience are a part of Pacience:

CT.X.675 Of pacience comth obedience, thurgh which a man is
 obedient to Crist....

3. It is obvious that the adverb paciently generally refers to passive states, and acceptances of events, rather than to deliberate acts. When referring to verbs like take and suffre the equivalence of the phrase in p. and the adverb has been noted. However the phrase is occasionally used with other verbal compounds. Thus we have:

CT.VII.2826 Syn thilke day that she was last a wyf,
 In pacience ladde a ful symple lyf,
 For litel was her catel and hir rente

This use and the phrase answer in p. suggest a slight distinction in sense where the emphasis is upon the sweetness of character of the person and their habitual behaviour rather than on their reaction to a particular affliction. It is a slightly more active sense of the word; pacience is a virtue in dealings with others as well as in the reception given to others dealing with oneself. Thus, the adverb too is occasionally used in this more active way:

CT.X.861 Man sholde loven hys wyf by discrecioun, paciently
 and atemprely; and thanne is she as though it were his
 suster.

Here paciently is in direct opposition to 'violently' and it implies understanding and regard for the wife and sweetness of attitude to her. Moderation and gentleness are the essential elements decreed.

4. As with other abstract attitudes or emotions, pacience is used in the syntagmatic frame have ... to indicate possession of it as a quality of character. A distinction is made between have p. and have p. in: the former represents a general attitude of character, whilst the latter may have two distinct senses. Firstly, and commonly, it refers to the reaction of pacience in response to, or amid, tribulation. Thus:

CT.VII.1493 I seye that ther be ful manye thynges that shul
 restreyne yow of vengeance-takyng,/ and make yow for to
 enclyne to suffre, and for to han pacience in the wronges
 that han been doon to yow.

With which may be compared:

CT.IV.2369 And she answerde, "Sire, what eyleth yow?
 Have pacience and resoun in your mynde!

Here the same linguistic structure has two different semantic implications: in one, emphasis is upon the character who has to show pacience, and the assumed seat of the attitude is gratuitously added; in the other, the occasion of the necessity of pacience is of concern. This latter type is common enough and consistent enough to be regarded as an idiom which may be represented in a number of ways:

grete pacience which the seintes ... han had in tribulaciouns
 us oghte, ... in the deeth of oure children ... have pacience.
 to han pacience in the wronges ...

TRETABLE

There are four occurrences of the adjective tretable in the works of Chaucer, two of which occur in the phrase tretable to . . . good(nesse). The significance of this seems to be that of tending towards goodness, a sense which is perhaps clearer in view of the etymology of the word from French traire.¹ Used of human attitudes, its sense is that of easy approachability, of gentleness:

Ch. K. 658 "A man is a quyk thing, by nature debonaire and
tretable to goodnesse;

B. 533 Loo! how goodly spak this knyght,
As hit had be another wyght;
He made hit nouthen tounge no queynte.
and I saw that, and gan me aqweynte
With hym, and fond hym so tretable,
Ryght wonder skylful and resonable,
As me thoughte, for al hys bale.

¹ Godefroy s.v. traitable.

HENDE

Translation evidence is offered by the Roman de la Rose, where hende folk and wys and free renders Franches genz e bien enseignies, whilst hende and wis renders bien apris.

The only important collocations are: wis, curteys, free, joly.

1. In deciding the senses of hende, it is necessary to divide its uses into two: those in which it is a fixed epithet applied ironically to clerks, and the two uses in the translation of the Romaunt. In the latter two uses, hende is clearly associated with nurture, with accomplishment in the skills of proper behaviour. Its association with the art of courtly manners is clear in a third example:

CT.III.1286 Oure Hoost tho spak, "A! sire, ye sholde be hende
 And curteys, as a man of youre estaat;
 In compaignye we wol have no debaat.

2. The ironic application to clerks perhaps derives from this strain in the meaning of the term, where its application deliberately recalls the skill of clerks, proverbial in the fabliaux, in the art of deerne love.

session, was a complex hierarchy of relations between men who were alert to the slightest infringement of the order, the smallest affront to honour: it was the business of the seneschal (steward) to be aware of the structure of court society and to arrange protocol accordingly. Such an awareness of curteisie is revealed in the utterance of the strange knight in the Squire's Tale:

CT.V.95 Saleweth kyng and queene and lordes alle,
 By ordre, as they seten in the halle,
 With so heigh reverence and obeisaunce,
 As wel in speche as in his contenaunce,
 That Gawayn, with his olde curteisye,
 Though he were comen ayeyn out of Fairye,
 Ne koude hym nat amende with a word.

He greets the court with due regard for its hierarchy and speaks and conducts himself with ceremonious respect and self-restraint towards it. The excellence of his speech is especially remarked.¹ In the court of Love in the Legend of Good Women (G. 231) the lords and ladies sit 'As they were of degre, ful curteysly;'. A less hallowed courtly custom evidently justifies the use of curteisie to describe Troilus riding to his farewell to Criseyde. The reference here is to the pomp of a ceremonious excursion:²

TC.V.64 This Troilus, in wise of curteysie,
 With hawk on honde, and with an huge route
 Of knyghtes, rood and did hire companye,

The same band, when riding to war, might inspire the use of the term chivalrie, yet when we are told that Chaucer's Knyght always loved both chivalrie and curteisie we are unwilling to accept that they are merely different sides of the same coin. The first may imply feats of arms, but placed beside concepts like trouthe and honour, the second seems to indicate something more than the complementary arts of peace, the ceremony of courtly order. Like the

¹ The hero of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight shows great concern for the forms of his speech: lines 360 and 1295.

² In the Anglo-Norman version of Ipomedon (2620ff.) an elaborate, mounted procession is associated with curteisie and the hero is credited with the invention of this elaborate, formal progress. W.O. Evans, Mediaeval Studies 29 (1967), p.145, prefers to interpret this as referring to the conventions of curteisie, seen as kindly behaviour.

curteisie taught to Nero which, paired with moralitee, staved off his incipient tyranny for many years, the curteisie loved by the Knyght seems to connote an ethic, an ideal of conduct.¹

2. There is, however, no need to move away from the society of the court to discover ideals of behaviour. The noblest heroes valued both sapientia and fortitudo, the former was thought of in terms of wise counsel in the hall. Wisdom gains expression in speech and in familiarity with courtly custom. The heroes of English romance are frequently wis and war and hende; those of French romance are bien parlé e enseigné and de bel afeitement. The strange knight of the Squire's Tale accords well with these formulae: he appreciates the hierarchy of the court, but the stress is upon the excellence of his speech, both in its ceremonious correctness and in its content. The faire speche of Curteisie is fair both in expression and content (RR.1251). This content exhibits the concern of the speaker for the comfort of his interlocutor; speeches are calculated so that their content embodies this concern and their subtlety of construction acts as a compliment. At RR.799, the allegorical Curteisie decorously invites the shy onlooker to join the dance; the Canon's Yeoman, who is ful of curteisye (CT.VIII.587) addresses the pilgrims with deference; most striking of all, is the delicacy of the bluff Host's request for the Prioress to tell a tale, with its subtle rhythms, its respect for the lady, and its gentle qualifications of the direct request:

CT.VII.445

.... and with that word he sayde,
As curteisly as it had been a mayde,
"My lady Prioress, by youre leve,
So that I wiste I sholde yow nat greve,
I wolde demen that ye tellen sholde
A tale next, if so were that ye wolde.
Now wol ye vouche sauf, my lady deere?"

¹ Curteisie to Gawain is likewise more than dalliance, though the lady and the inhabitants of Bercilak's castle think of it as 'luf-talkyng', and an accomplishment which can be learned superficially:

'Is þe lel layk of luf, þe letture of armes;' (1513).

In a speech of this kind, where language is used as a social instrument within a code of courtly behaviour, the elevated style of the utterance is as important as the ideals contained by it; they both serve to reassure and compliment the addressee. This is indeed a faire speche.

By contrast, the revellers of The Pardoner's Tale lack curteisie in that they address the old man whom they meet with something less than solicitude for his welfare:

CT.VI.717 ... "What, carl, with sory grace!
Why artow al forwrapped save thy face?
Why lyvestow so longe in so greet age?"

The old man, having thus been mysseid (RR.1260),¹ replies that:

... it is no curteisye
To speken to an old man vileynye,
But he trespasse in word, or elles in dede.

From these examples, it appears that the ideal of curteisie includes the decorous expression of consideration for the feelings of others; although the old man of The Pardoner's Tale implies that it may be forgotten if one has actually suffered harm from one's interlocutor. In fact, other examples prove that this is not the case; the old man's words serve merely to emphasise the enormity of the behaviour of the revellers. The rough and ready reply which he suggests may be justified by an insult perhaps represents common practice, but is far from the ideal of curteisie. It is no curteisie to give a dusty answer any more than it is curteisie to initiate insults. The allegorical figure of RR.1251 is: 'Of fair speche, and of fair answer;' and she bears no malice. Thus, the drunken Miller (CT.I.3123) acknowledges respect for neither God nor man and rants blasphemously, disregarding curteisie; Proserpyne, in contention with her husband in The Merchant's Tale, cries that she will not, for the sake of curteisie, refrain from retaliation against those who speak ill of women:

CT.IV.2309 As evere hool I moote brouke my tresses,
I shal nat spare, for no curteisye,
To speke hym harm that wolde us vileynye."

¹Cf. CT.III.1207ff.

Where there is no curteisie on either side, a quarrel is likely. Thus, at CT.III.1287, the Host is forced to remind the Friar that he should be hende/ And curteys, since they desire no debaat between him and the Summoner, and at the latter's reply, he appeals for Pees .

Thus the ideal of curteisie as a relation between persons is one of solicitude for the welfare of others, which is often expressed in ceremonious speech, and which is carried to the lengths of foregoing the right to reply in kind to insults.

3. The denial of rights over another person which curteisie often implies is obvious in the Host's request to the Prioress (quoted above). At the beginning of the Pilgrimage, the Host had been granted charge of the organization of story-telling and vested with the sanction against disobedience of making the offender pay for the whole expedition. His deference in asking the Prioress whether she is willing to tell a tale is in some measure a voluntary renunciation of this right. His curteisie, like that of Nero in his early days, prevents him from exercising his right tyrannically. This criterion of the sense of curteisie is especially common among those uses where the word forms part of an adverbial phrase. Both the Summoner and the Manciple ask the Host or the company to waive their right to order the telling of tales of ... curteisye and to allow them to tell a tale when they, themselves, desire to do so (CT.III.1669; CT.IX.28). His curteisie is given as the reason why Absolon, the clerk, will accept no offering from ladies, and when hende Nicholas seizes Alisoun she calls him to decorum on the same account. A situation such as this (CT.I.3287) burlesques those situations where at a more elevated level curteisie involves the renunciation of self-interest for the sake of another.

With this aspect of its sense in mind, curteisie enters frequently into the same situation as mercy or grace. In a judicial situation, the judge may renounce his power of immediate condemnation in order to hear the plea

of the victim. The God of Love is urged to do this by Alceste in the Prologue of the Legend of Good Women, 342, and Chaucer, aware that his audience has the right to be critical and judge him by his writings, begs them not to ascribe to his person the awkwardness and roughness of the language of his characters:

GP.725 But first I praye yow, of youre curteisye,
 That ye n'arette it nat my vileynye,
 Thogh that I pleyedly speke in this mateere,
 To telle yow hir wordes and hir cheere,
 Ne thogh I speke hir wordes proprely.

When a judgement is made, if it is done curteisly, the prisoner receives 'moore esy sentences and juggementz' (CT.VII.1855).

The actions which exhibit curteisie are not always speech or the renunciation of personal interest for the sake of another. Sometimes a right may be enforced, but in a manner which acknowledges the inviolability of the personality of another. As in the example of marital harmony envisaged by the Merchant and quoted above, curteisie is reciprocated by favorable behaviour on the part of the person to whom it is shown: "he that moost curteisly comandeth, to hym men moost obeyen." (CT.VII.1856).

Finally, as noted above, when speaking of adverbial phrases, curteisie is sometimes applied simply to acts on behalf of others which work to their benefit and which are not demanded by any form of compulsion upon their agent; as, for example, when Deiphebus takes the trouble to go personally to invite Criseyde to dinner.

4. The social affiliations of the ideal of CURTEISIE are not obvious from the situational analysis, though etymology would suggest that it was restricted to the higher echelons. An examination of its occurrences shows that CURTEISIE is not the monopoly of the upper classes by any means, but supports the view that it is an ideal proper to them, and adopted by others. The most serious uses of the term are to refer to aristocratic persons, and when it is used as a general epithet of description, it applies to the gently born Walter:

Gt.IV.74 Wherwith he was, to spoke as of lynage,
 The gentilleste yborn of Lumbardye,
 A fair person, and strong, and yong of age,
 And ful of honour and of curteisye;

The Parson lists curteisie as one of the marks of the special form of gentillesse which he envisages (Gt.X.465); a gentillesse not so much of lineage as of spirit. In endeavouring to still the incipient quarrel of the Summoner and the Friar, the Host claims that curteisie is to be expected of a man of the latter rank. To this evidence of the assumption that curteisie is the inevitable possession of the higher levels of society, must be added the evidence of the general sense noted earlier of familiarity with various aspects of the customs of the court. Nevertheless, it is not felt to be anomalous to say that a yeoman may show curteisie: in such uses it is clear that such people are endeavouring to follow the most creditable courtly ideal; a manner of behaviour or expression which demonstrates a desire to acknowledge the value of another.

The social position of the person exercising curteisie naturally has an effect upon how it manifests itself. If a lowly person shows curteisie to a more elevated one, this is exhibited in deference. The Squire (Gt.99, is lowly, and servysable whilst the Friar, who would only have dealings with the well-to-do, was curteis and lowly of servyse (Gt.250).

As has already been noted, the exercise of curteisie in persons of elevated rank consists in the limitation of their power to do harm to those beneath them, or their deliberate attempts to do good when this is not necessitated by circumstances. Curteisie is therefore celebrated as a desirable quality in the mighty. The moral senses of curteisie as a relation between persons are qualities desirable in anybody and may appear in anybody; but they are a matter of general concern only in the powerful, whose character and mode of behaviour ^{have} ~~has~~ wide repercussions. The most important part of the curteisie, which Chaucer considered that Seneca taught Nero, was not the protocol of court, nor the art of complimentary speech, but

the moral attitude (moralitee) which demanded the consideration of other people preparatory to any action and which acted as a counter to his natural tendencies to evil and tyranny.

5. A number of problematical uses of the lexeme curteisie occur which suggest senses somewhat outside those sketched above:

CT.I.3997 For which this millere stal bothe mele and corn
 an hundred tyme moore than biforn;
 For therbiforn he stal but curteisly,
 But now he was a thief outrageously,

In the above example we are told that, on hearing that the manciple lay ill, the miller redoubled his thefts of grain brought to him to be ground. When challenged, he boldly denies it. The key to the sense of the expression here lies in its opposition to outrageously, a word which is normally opposed to some derivative form of mesure. Mesure (moderation in externals and self-restraint in behaviour and emotions) is a necessary companion virtue of CURTEISIE; indeed, in many situations, it makes it possible, one virtue being impossible without the other. The collocation of mesure, or of words indicating self-control with curteisie, is not uncommon: CT.VIII.2300; CT.VIII.2871; CT.I.465. The allegorical picture of curteisie (RR.1251) stresses the fact that she was neither nyce nor outrageous. These facts, taken together with the sense of curteisie as related to the ordered procedures of the court, give us some idea to what extent Chaucer stretches the sense of curteisly here. Previously, the miller stole with deliberate restraint, with decent moderation; after the illness of the manciple he steals with neither order nor restraint. The natural phrase for Chaucer to use might have been by mesure, but his choice of curteisly, in collocation with stal, discovers in the situation a marvellous air of paradox and irony which pervades the medieval social norm that millers were sneak-thieves of their customers' grain; a custom, indeed, almost as hallowed by usage as the protocols of the court.

The adjective curteis is applied by the Parson to the Lord Jesus Christ (CP.A.246) when discussing the latter's desire to see each good deed count towards salvation. The allusion here seems to be to Christ's mercy, his benevolent disposition towards all men.¹

The modern association between CURTEISIE and love which is enshrined in the phrase 'courtly love' is borne out to a remarkably small extent in the works of Chaucer. It is occasionally accepted that one may become curteis by love as well as by instructions:

TC.III.26 He do hem corteys be, froshe and bonighe;

yet an association between love and CURTEISIE is much rarer than we might expect. There is no suggestion that a lady described as curteis is especially likely to show mercy to one who claims to be distressed by the suffering of love.

Finally, a peculiar use of curteisly must be noticed:

TC.IV.590 "Jevyns not in resoun ay so depe
He corteisly, but help thiself anon.
Bot is that others than thiselven wope,

This use is divergent from the pattern of sense which we have established thus far: it can be reconciled with it only by unconvincing *ad hoc* explanation. We have to assume that Pandarus is using the adverb in an *unprecedentedly* broad sense, taking it from context and intending it to refer to a general ideal of CURTEISIE. He is attempting to persuade Troilus to act outrageously, rejecting the ordered moderation of CURTEISIE and selfishly renouncing the solicitude for others which is also a part of its meaning. Such an interpretation appears strained.² Manuscript evidence reveals that the earliest

¹ The Gawayn poet uses CURTEISIE freely with reference to God and the Virgin: Patience, 417; Pearl, 432ff; Gawayn, 774. In his usage, CURTEISIE approximates to GRACE and CHARITY. Cf. D.S. Brewer, 'Courtesy and the Gawayn-Poet' in Patterns of Love and Courtesy, London (1966), p.65.

² This, however, is the explanation offered by Evans, "'Cortaysye" in Middle English', loc.cit., p.149. His interpretation is that Pandarus is advising Troilus 'to ignore convention and abduct Criseyde' and, though (rightly) denying the association of "cortaysye" and courtly love in Middle English, he suggests that, in fact, here the word is applied to a prime characteristic of courtly love since, according to him, 'It is in concern for Criseyde's honour, since the love must be kept secret, that Troilus would be acting corteisly.'

(alpha) manuscripts all read preciously at this point. Although the adverb with the sense 'fastidiously' is not recorded until the nineteenth century, an adjective with this sense is twice recorded in Chaucer (CT.III.148; CT.IV.1962). Carton's printed edition, which is a beta text, has curiously, a reading which Robinson notes may be supported by the Italian sottilmente. In view of the disarray of the manuscript evidence here, and the peculiarity of this use of curtously, it seems wisest to disregard it as primary evidence of a sense of CURTILISE in Chaucer's language.

THANK

Collocational evidence is sparse: the only repeated collocation is pris.

Translation evidence is equally inconclusive. In Boece thank glosses laudibus (French: ces loenges) once, and once bene mereatur (French: bonnes gracez). The phrase yeldynge graces and thankynges renders en rendant graces in the French source of The Tale of Melibee.

Thank

1. In the use of thank it is noteworthy that, although there are syntagms have and get thank, and some with moral implications (deserve and win thank), there is no occurrence of *yeve or *ask thank. The situation is linguistically realised solely from the point of view of the recipient or possessor of thank. The syntagm have thank is never used with subjective reference in the manner of an idiom derived from French syntax, like have pitee on, but is always used objectively, like have grace.

2. In determining the senses of thank, a first point of importance is that it is generally in the nature of a reciprocal action, a reaction to a particular action in a situation in which the participants and the actions are well specified. Thus it is said of the Reeve that:

GP.612 His lord wel koude he plesen subtilly,
 To yeve and lene hym of his owene good,
 And have a thank, and yet a cote and a hood.

A thank is here distinguished from a material reward for pleasing the lord. The sense of thank is similar when May (CT.IV.2388) complains that vilification is the only thank she gets for her kindly deed to her husband. The syntagm deserve thank is also used in specific circumstances, as when Troilus hints that, if he lives, he will reward Pandarus:

TC.I.1015 "Now blisful Venus helpe, er that I sterve,
 Of the, Pandare, I mowe som thank deserve.

In uses such as these, specific persons perform or intimate beneficent actions, and are recipients of the gratitude of the beneficiary in a way identical to the modern usage of the word.

3. The syntagm deserve thank, apart from the use quoted above, is employed in a very consistent way: in four out of five occurrences of the syntagm, all in Troilus and Criseyde, deserve rhymes with serve, and in three of these four, a lover is to serve a lady in order to deserve her thank:

TC.III.441 And for the more part, the long nyght
 He lay and thoughte how that he myghte serve
 His lady best, hire thonk for to deserve.

The service in which a knight might engage for his lady's sake is often far removed from any action which might be directly beneficial to her: the use of the syntagm wynne thank illustrates this:

TC.III.1777 And this encrees of hardynesse and myght
 Com hym of love, his ladies thank to wynne,
 That altered his spirit so withinne.

In this type of use, the lady's thank is not in response to any direct action on her behalf by the lover: the latter has simply performed some deed or perfected his character as a compliment to her. The modern sense of 'thanks' is inapposite here. Etymology would suggest that the sense of the word is related to 'thought' and must mean something like 'favourable thought' or 'good opinion'. Such a translation is perhaps close to Chaucer's meaning, and in most of the uses, there seems to be a close approach to synonymy with certain uses of grace. Any distinction lies in the amount of deliberate activity we allow to the lady in each use. The syntagm wynne .. ladies thank is particularly reminiscent of some uses of grace, though it does not precisely correspond with any of them.

4. The syntagm get thank seems generally to be used in less well-marked situations. An example from Boece exhibits the sense 'good opinion' very clearly:

Bo.III,p.vi,13 And yif that folk han geten hem thonk or preysynge
by here dissertes, what thyng hath thilke pris echid or
encrested to the conscience of wise folk ...

There is no precise Latin phrase to correspond, though Chaucer seems to be expressing the Latin laudibus . The same sense is implicit in the following where good behaviour results in good opinion:

TC.II.376 Then ek how wel and wisely that he kan
Governe hymself, that he no thyng foryeteth,
That where he cometh, he pris and thank hym geteth;

The distinction between good opinion and open praise is again one of passivity and activity. Chaucer's attitude to lovers in the Proem of Troilus and Criseyde is rather more active, perhaps signifying 'good wishes' rather than merely 'good opinion'. Chaucer asserts his benevolence to lovers:

TC.I.21 But natheles, if this may don gladnesse
To any lovere, and his cause availle,
Have he my thonk, and myn be this travaille!

Later Chaucer seems to use the word with a much more active sense even than this:

TC.II.15 Wherefore I nyl have neither thank ne blame
Of al this werk, but prey yow mekely,
Disblameth me, if any word be lame,
For as myn auctour seyde, so sey I.

A translation 'good opinion' would be appropriate here, but the stronger expression 'praise' would be more natural.

Just what is the sense of Pandarus' words to Troilus, in persuading him not to allow himself to die with his love undeclared, is not so clear.

Everyone would think that he died of fear for the Greeks and:

TC.I.803 Lord, which a thonk than shaltow han of this!
Thus wol she seyn, and al the toun attones,
'The wrecche is ded, the devel have his bones!'

Here the thank seems to be ironically related to the courtly love situation. Troilus' action, instead of service to his lady, is death; her reaction instead of a good opinion, or an act of grace, is a derogatory speech. Instead of praise there is depreciation. None of the modern periphrases would do to translate this, for its ironic usage excludes some of them and it holds elements of all of them: a translation as 'esteem' or 'thanks'

would be equally justifiable.

In a similar use, we find the syntagm thank ys: one who does a grace or gives a gift without delay has the greater thank because of his alacrity (LGW (F) 452). Either the sense 'thanks' or the sense 'esteem' (in the estimation of the recipient) are satisfactory.¹

The syntagm thank be to has plainly the sense 'praise':

CT.IX.101 O thou Bacus, yblessed be thy name,
That so kanst turnen earnest into game!
Worshipe and thank be to thy deitee!
Of that mateere ye gete namoore of me.

The adverbial phrases from the Parson's Tale plainly have the sense 'good opinion':

CT.X.1035 But nathelees, if thow mayst nat doon it prively, thow
shalt nat forbere to doon almesse though men seen it, so that
it be nat doon for thank of the world, but onoly for thank
of Jhesu Crist.

The adverbial phrase from the Merchant's Tale:

CT.IV.1801 For which departed is this lusty route
Fro Januarie, with thank on every syde.
Hoom to hir houses lustily they ryde,

presumably refers to thanks - in the modern sense - given to a host. The other possibility, attractive since thank applies all round, is that the revellers go home with a good opinion of each other, a jovial esteem for all members of the party.

Thankynges/Thankes

The syntagm faillie yow my th. obviously has the sense of modern 'thanks' but there is also the implication of something more material; more material too, perhaps, than good opinion:

ST.VII.188 Daun John, I seye, lene me thi hundred frankes.
Pardee, I wol nat faille yow my thankes,
If that yow list to doon that I yow preye.

¹ The sense of open praise or esteem is evident in Gower's description of a Roman triumph which is held for a victorious general:
'In thonk of his chivalerie
And for non other flaterie.' (CA.VII.2379).

Thankynges certainly has the sense of modern thanks:

CT.VII.1804 ... and answereden 'ful mekely and benignely,/ yeldyng
graces and thankynges to hir lord Melibee...

The very consistent usage willen + possessive + thankes + infinitive contains an inflected genitive, and is an idiom in which it is difficult to isolate the sense of THANK. It may be related to the sense of good opinion, and its sense in this usage is 'willingly' or 'eagerly'. Bo.III,p.xi,86 is a rendering of the Latin: 'et ad interitum sponte festinent'. The version of Jean de Meun reads: 'de leur gré', and Chaucer: 'or that wole, his thankes, hasten hym to dyen.'

SERVYSE, SERVYSABLE

This lexeme perhaps does not fall inside the area to be studied; nevertheless an account of some uses showing an affinity with Curteis may be noted.

The noun is used commonly whilst the adjective is quite rare. Senses of the noun are generally specific versions of a general concept of 'an act or acts done for the benefit of another'. There is the fairly institutionalised sense in which the lover or the man may enter into the service of a lady or a lord, theoretically directing his acts to the benefit of that person. Such service may be for a salary (CT.I.1803) or according to feudal dependence, and may be of a high or low estimate in the eyes of society (CT.I.1415; 1435). The service of God, as well as continuing day to day, is ritualised in the church, just as the service of a lord may be ceremonialised in the hall. A slight shift in meaning makes the term apply to the liturgy itself (GP.122).

1. The attribution to Griselda exemplifies the simplest sense closest to the basic concept of the noun. It has the sense 'useful in service; willing in service', with perhaps some overtone of humility:

CT.IV.979 Preyngge the chambereres, for Goddes sake,
 To hasten hem, and faste swepe and shake;
 And she, the mooste servysable of alle,
 Hath every chambre arrayed and his halle.

The application to the Squire of the General Prologue, and another squire, is significant, for it was the duty of the squire to serve the knight. In the famous use in the General Prologue an example of the kind of task given to the Squire is found:

GP.99 Curteis he was, lowely, and servysable,
 And carf biforn his fader at the table.

Elsewhere (CT.IV.1911) servysable is one of a series of virtues of a squire, but no acts justifying its application are given. Here it is necessary to

mention an adjective phrase formed from the noun and to compare it with the description above of the Squire:

GP.250 And over al, ther as profit sholde arise,
 Curteis he was and lowely of servyse.
 Ther nas no man nowher so vertuous.

The sense is the same as that in describing the Squire - implying lack of arrogance, pleasant disposition to others and eagerness to do some deed on their behalf - but the irony of the context has often been noticed.

Finally the use in the tale of the Canon's Yeoman also debases the currency of the term:

CT.VIII.1014 In Londoun was a preest, an annueleer,
 That therinne dwelled hadde many a yeer,
 Which was so plesaunt and so servysable
 Unto the wyf, where he was at table,
 That she wolde suffre hym no thyng for to payne
 For bord ne clothyng,

GRAME

1. The commonest sense is one of mortification, annoyance and grief, the emotion resultant upon the frustration of favoured plans; so in Troilus, IV. 529 and in:

CT.VIII.1403 Lo! swich a lucre is in this lusty game,
 A mannes myrthe it wol turne unto grame,
 And empten also grete and hevye purses,

2. As a word with reference to a relationship, it refers to an act or acts, which might result in the bitterness and anger of the first sense:

AA.276 And putte yow in sclaunder now and blame,
 And do to me adversite and grame,
 That love you most -

It may also refer to bitterness directed towards a person, and be close in sense to 'hate':

TC.III.1028 'Ye, jalousie is love!'
 And wolde a busshel venym al excusen,
 For that o greyn of love is on it shove.
 But that woot heighe God that sit above,
 If it be likkere love, or hate, or grame
 And after that, it oughte bere his name.

STIFStif, stifly

Collocations are not repeated, though the word is paired with bold and toght.

Translation evidence is limited to two occurrences in RR where stif and bold translates grant e roide or fort e roide (of a stream) and a phrase styf in stour is applied in place of genz.

1. There is a major dichotomy in the senses of stif. Firstly, in collocation with bely, the word has much the same sense (hard and inflexible) as the modern terms:

CT.III.2267 Thanne shal this cherl, with bely stif and toght
As any tabour, hyder been ybrought;

This is the only use with this physical sense: the rest of the uses of stif are in stereotypes or intensifying.

2. A knight is stif in stour (RR.1270), which is part of a stereotyped epithet replacing an equally formulaic use in French (biaus e genz); a stream descends 'ful stif and bold' (RR 115), a phrase corresponding to one of the French versions: grant e roide, fort e r. or possibly, celere e r. The content of these phrases certainly involves elements of violence and, perhaps, boldness.

3.
GP.673 This Somonour bar to hym a stif burdoun;
Was nevere trompe of half so greet a soun.

The significance here seems to be that the Summoner is a larger than life character with a voice as powerful as his personality.

The Wife states:

CT.III.380 Lordynges, right thus, as ye have understonde,
Baar I stifly myne olde housbondes on honde
That thus they seyden in hir dronkenesse;

This is the Wife's reply to the charge that women destroy their husbands; a charge made by the man she tyrannises. In this situation, violence and power become harshness and cruelty. If the Wife does not intend to abrogate to herself the negative moral judgement implied by the word 'cruelty', then she intends to be understood in terms of firmness, strictness and implacability.

STIBOURN

The lexeme is exceedingly rare; only two occurrences are found, both in the Wife's Prologue and used to describe herself:

CT.III.456 And I was yong and ful of ragerye,
 Stibourn and strong, and joly as a pye.

CT.III.637 Stibourn I was as is a leonesse,
 And of my tonge a verray jangleresse,

The first quotation celebrates the wildness and vigour of her youth, the second her unwillingness to submit to her husband's will. Stibourn seems to imply something like 'forceful and strong-willed'.

STERN

The only important collocations are: cruel and stout.

Translation evidence is offered by the Clerk's Tale:

With stierne face and with ful trouble cheere,
 aussy comme tout courrouciez et troublez
 turbida fronte

and Boethius: rigidus. (Jean de Meun: li roidez)

1. The association with male persons and attributes is especially noticeable. It is further associated with violent acts and men who are notable for their ability in battle. Application to these people may extend beyond their actual deeds, and may seem to refer to traits or attitudes of character, as in the Boethian reference to Cato.

2. The association with arms is found in a large proportion of the uses. Mars (CT.I.2441) is called the stierne god armypotente, and the Romans besieging a city are similarly described:

LGW.1695 Whan Ardea beseged was aboute
 With Romeyns, that ful sterne were and stoute,

and in the Knight's Tale stern-ness is established as a quality of the emotional attitude of fighting men:

CT.I.2154 An hundred lordes hadde he in his route,
 Armed ful wel, with hertes stierne and stoute.

Stern, when applied to men, either when they are actually indulging in warfare or when the major concern is their ability in battle, is a commendatory epithet relating to their intent of doing harm to an enemy. They are harsh, cruel, bent on violent mischief.

Such traits of character may exist in a man outside the precise situation in which they are exhibited and the attitude of a man's disposition may be determined from attributes such as his voice (Diomedes: TC.V.801) or

his face, as in the Clerk's Tale, when Walter is about to announce the first of his acts of cruelty to his long-suffering wife:

CT.IV.465 For which this markys wroghte in this manere:
He cam allone a-nyght, ther as she lay,
With stierne face and with ful trouble cheere,
And seyde thus:

The use of the epithet here is hardly laudatory of Walter's character, but the sense of determination to do harm is unchanged. The adverb is used to describe the implacability of the God of Love on meeting Chaucer at the beginning of the Legend:

LGW(F)239 For sternely on me he gan byholde,
So that his loking dooth myn herte colde.

3. Outside the field of battle, and in circumstances where the emphasis is not on the power of the man named to do direct harm (often violent physical harm) to anyone, stern seems to develop a weaker sense, implying not so much a determination to do harm, as a failure to do expected good or a refusal to be swayed to leniency or mildness.

Applied to Cato (Bo.II,m.vii,19), this is a commendatory epithet (Latin rigidus), as it is when applied to a judge (in this case the judge of sinners):

PT.X.170 there shal the stierne and wrothe juge sitte above,
and under hym the horrible pit of helle open to destroyen
hym that moot biknowen his synnes,

It must be admitted, however, that the harsh judge is also balanced by the clement judge in medieval ideals.

Calkas, for his cruelty in leaving his daughter in the doomed city of Troy, considers himself in an ill light, and as a father both stern and cruel. The modern sense of the word in this collocation - something like strict, implying an attitude to the child's behaviour - is missing. He is simply harsh in his failure to care for the welfare of his only daughter.

4. Stern, in its sense of violence and hostility, can be applied, with an element of personification, to meteorological phenomena; thus, in Troilus, it is applied both to wind and rain. The emphasis seems in both to be on

the violence rather than the hostility of the elements; at least it must be through this criterion of sense that the transferred collocation takes place, since this is not a true personification:

TC.III.743 The sterne wynd so loude gan to route
That no wight oother noise myghte heere;

TC.III. 677 And evere mo so sterneliche it ron,
And blew therwith so wondirliche loude,
That wel neigh no man heren other koude,

This last quotation is an impersonal construction, denying any sense as a trait of character, and concentrating instead on the violence and insistence of the rain.

Finally, two problematic uses remain: the first, from *The Knight's Tale*, occurs in the description of a battle:

CT.I.2610 The helmes they tohewen and toshrede;
Out brest the blood with stierne stremes rede;

The precise sense of stierne here is difficult to isolate. It is employed in an amplifying adverbial phrase, describing the way in which the blood burst forth, increasing the violence and vividness of the picture. Perhaps the best way of interpreting this, is as the conflation of the adverb with an adverbial: 'in red streams.' On so doing, the sense of stierne seems to be essentially concerned with the violence and force of the issue of blood. There is, however, an inevitable association between the senses where malevolence is an important criterion, and the fact that these are wounds inflicted by an enemy who might also be called stern.

The second use is even more confusing:

HF.1498 Thoo saugh I on a piler by,
Of yren wrought ful sternely,
The grete poete, daun Lucan.

Here confusion is again caused by the transfer of use between adverb and adjective, and the pillar and the poet; an adverb is used in an adjectival phrase, and the phrase must be understood as a unit. No good sense can be assumed for sternely if it is assumed to modify only its past participle. The pillar, then, is of

the adjective would be stretched by this. There can be no reference to hostile intent nor any direct one to violence. The only justification for the application of this adjective here is because of the association of iron with weapons and battle and because of the nature of the poetry of Lucan. The application of stern to Cato supports the view that it might apply to men as a result of the determinedly serious and moral tone of their literary works.

STOUT

No translation evidence is available from the work which is generally accepted as Chaucer's own.

The most important collocations are: sterne; cruel; (harde) and strong; byg; grete; brode; rounde and longe.

1. It is clear from these applications and collocations that STOUT is concerned with notions of size, strength and the capacity for violent action. In special circumstances this violent action is submitted to that moral judgement which distinguishes cruelty.

2. With purely physical application, we have the collocations with browes, tuskes, carl; but each is set in a context which presupposes the destructive power of the thing or person described. Thus, from the introductory impression of the Miller, we pass on to his wrestling prowess and his ability to break doors from their hinges:

GP.545 The MILLERE was a stout carl for the nones;
Ful byg he was of brawn, and eek of bones.

The description of Lygurge (CT.I.2134) follows the reference to his browes with mention of his brawnes harde and stronge . In the reference to browes, the implication must be of knotty thickness, which is evoked in the description of the Miller as: 'short-sholdred, brood, a thikke knarre;'.
.

The tusks of the boar, of which Troilus dreams, carry an implicit sense of menace in their very strength; there is no other justification for their existence:

TC.V.1454 And hire bisoughte assoilen hym the doute
Of the stronge boor with tuskes stoute;

3. Applied to the physique as a whole, stout seems to imply a bulky solidity, acceptable in a churl, but lacking the blend of grace with strength which is desirable in a nobleman. Thus the following cannot be taken to have an exclusively physical reference:

TC.V.1493 She tolde ek how Hemonydes asterte,
Whan Tideus slough fifty knyghtes stoute.

The assumption must be that, in making this collocation, the emphasis is upon the sense of destructive ability which is immanent in the previous uses. Stout, therefore, seems to be a term of approbation of knights in their function as agents of destruction. The fact that they themselves are destroyed may suggest that this is a stereotyped epithet or may simply be a stylistic device to emphasise the achievement of Tideus.

4. The collocation with hertes can hardly be taken physically and, in any case, the term is paired with the word stierne, which bestows overtones of mental or emotional attitude:

CT.I.2154 An hundred lordes hadde he in his route,
Armed ful wel, with hertes stierne and stoute.

The phrase stierne and stoute seems to imply that these men are determined upon violence, upon wreaking havoc upon the enemy. Such a sense is also probably intended in the applications to Romeyns:

LGW.627 Octovyan, that wod was of this dede,
Shop hym an ost on Antony to lede
Al uterly for his destruccioun.
With stoute Romeyns, crewel as lyoun,
To ship they wente,

LGW.1695 Whan Ardea beseged was aboute
With Romeyns, that ful sterne were and stoute,
Ful longe lay the sege, and lytel wroughten,

In all these occurrences, violence is still at the stage of intention. The implication is that there is a mental resolve to do destruction. The formulaic phrase sterne .. and stoute can hardly be broken into two complementary senses; both seem to imply firmness of mind in a resolve to do

violence. In one of the quoted uses, stern is replaced by cruel, though this seems to be a sense of cruel which lacks moral obloquy, and concentrates on the power to do violence. In this kind of use stout comes close to the sense of (physical) bravery in its sense of 'resolution'; hence, perhaps, the later development of the phrase 'stout-hearted'. The doubtfully Chaucerian sections of the Romaunt reveal collocations with proud. Given suitable situations, stout could probably have the senses 'proud' and 'cruel'.

STRONG

The most important collocations with head words are: kyng, god, peynes.
The most important collocations with other modifiers are: sharpe; yong;
fressh. It collocates twice with each. Note the special circumstances of
the last two, which are used as approbatory epithets.

Translation evidence is offered by the Romaunt:

eisel strong : lessu fort

cold so strong is not exactly paralleled but

fort tens d'iver occurs in the next line.

and The Tale of Melibee

strong paas : fors pas.

The Parson, talking of inner strength, says:

PT.X.728

Agayns this horrible synne of Accidie, and the branches
of the same, ther is a vertu that is called frtitudo or
strengthe, that is an affeccioun thurgh which a man despiseth
anoyouse thinges./

1. STRONG has a similar spread of sense to the modern English lexeme. It
can refer to the physical strength of an individual or of an animal like
the horse (CT.V.192). Hercules is regarded as the epitome of Strengthe in
this sense:

CT.VII.2116

And every reawme wente he for to see.
He was so strong that no man myghte hym lette.

In ideal descriptions, physical strength is often accompanied by boldness
(CT.VII.2030): 'To speke of strengthe, and therwith of hardynesse;'. It
may also be balanced with moral attributes, or others recognised as courtly,
as in the conventional sequence with fressh and yong mentioned above.

2. STRONG may also refer to the resistance of an inanimate object.

CT.VII.865

And over that a fyn hauberck,
Was al ywroght of Jewes werk,
Ful strong it was of plate;

or the inner resistance of a human being to sin, as we saw in the excerpt from the Parson's exposition.

3. A thing may be judged strong by the efficacy of its functioning in any respect: this includes the functioning of things which have no physical strength or even animation:

RR.72 The byrdes that han left her song,
While thei suffride cold so strong,
In wedres gryl and derk to sighte.

The sense of intensity, judged by results, also underlies the application to poison (CT.VI.867) and perhaps eisel (RR.217).

4. The modern sense of powerful is that of the Chaucerian application to the abstraction God's purveiaunce (CT.I.1665), and this indirect sense of strength is also that of the collocations with goode folk and the phrase stronge of freendes.

5. The application to witnesse is the result of figurative usage. Ideas of the way in which testimony may prove unshakeable, when tested against the known facts of a case, perhaps underlie it. The sense is of unassailability:

CT.IX.284 O every man, be war of rakelnesse!
Ne trowe no thyng withouten strong witnesse.

6. In certain of the collocations already mentioned, a possibility exists of the recognition of a criterion of harmfulness (e.g. in collocation with poison). This criterion of harm and hostility is evident in a number of collocations and situations where STRONG is used in relation to martial concerns, where strength is directed exclusively to the harm of another. Thus this possibility invades the ordinary interpretation of the phrase strong kyng in the following:

CT.I.2638 The stronge kyng Emetreus gan hente
This Palamon, as he faught with Arcite,
And made his swerd depe in his flesh to byte;

In the picture of the boar, its strength is essentially its capability for destruction.

TC.V.1454 And hire bisoughte assoilen hym the doute
Of the stronge boor with tuskes stoute;

The application to speres (CT.I.1653) is gratuitous if taken in its ordinary sense, but the fact that it is collocated with sharpe suggests this sense of strength in doing harm. Mars is referred to as the stronge god (CT.I.2373) and, though the use of the word may imply no more than physical strength, there is an unavoidable association of his function as fomenter of discord. This is emphasised when Chaucer speaks of the skills of Mars:

CT.I.2409 Thy sovereyn temple wol I moost honouren
Of any place, and alwey moost labouren
In thy plesaunce and in thy craftes stronge.

In this example of metonymic transfer, the sense is certainly close to that of violence, harshness, and cruelty.

7. The term is also collocated with feelings and afflictions: thus 'throwes sharpe and wonder stronge' (TC.V.1201) may refer to the intensity of the pain, yet the collocation with sharpe suggests the sense 'harsh' or 'cruel'. The situation is similar with regard to the repeated collocation with peynes:

CT.I.2771 Allas, the wo! allas, the peynes stronge,
That I for you have suffred, and so longe!

8. Strength may lead to oppression, and oppression through closeness of keeping and resistance to escape is certainly an association of the following use:¹

CT.I.1451 In darknesse and horrible and strong prisoun
These seven yeer hath seten Palamoun
Forpynded, what for wo and for distresse.

9. Finally, a number of uses far removed from any ideas of physical strength, moral strength, intensity or resistance must be noted. The cuckolded husband of the Merchant's Tale cries out:

CT.IV.2367 "Out! help; allas! harrow!" he gan to crye,
"O stronge lady stoore, what dostow?"

¹ In legal usage, this collocation has a technical reference to the rigorous and coercive confinement intended by a statute of Edward I (1275) to persuade notorious malefactors to submit to trial by jury: 'seient remis en la prison forte et dure.' F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, The History of English Law before the time of Edward I, 2nd ed., Cambridge (1898), II, 651n.5.

Clearly neither physical nor moral strength is involved; what she is doing is extreme, outrageous and also cruel.

Similarly the revellers of the Pardoner's sermon are apprehensive lest they be taken for theves stronge (CT.VI.789). The word contains the sense of outrage to ordinary people, and the harm done by thieves.

Two further examples in which the sense of harshness is uppermost are:

CT.VII.1445 I bithenke me now and take heede how Fortune hath
norissed me fro my childhede, and hath holpen me to passe
many a stroong paas.

CT.IV.1139 This world is nat so strong, it is no nay,
As it hath been in olde tymes yoore,

10. Note. Most of the uses (all except two) with deviant senses are attributive.

STURDY

Sturdy, sturdily.

1. Sturdy is used of persons who oppress others; as of the masters who beat the lions in their keeping:

Bo.III.m.ii,11 Al be it so that the lyouns of the contre of Pene beren
the fayre chaynes, and taken metes of the handes of folk
that yeven it hem, and dreden hir stourdy maistres of whiche
thei ben wont to suffre betynges;

(Latin: metuantque trucem
Soliti uerbera ferre magistrum,)

(French: leur felon maistre).

In this sense of 'harsh and cruel' it is twice applied to Walter in The Clerk's Tale (IV.698, 1049). In the latter, it occurs when Walter has a change of heart and begins to rewen upon his wife.

Finally, the word is used by the Wife of Bath to describe an aspect of her character:

CT.III.612 For certes, I am al Venerien
In feelynge, and myn herte is Marcien.
Venus me yaf my lust, my likerousnesse,
And Mars yaf me my sturdy hardynesse;

Here the sense of sturdy can scarcely be taken to be simply harsh or cruel; there is an unmistakable sense of forcefulness, of vigour here. Here the criterion of violence is uppermost.

2. This association with violence and forcefulness is present in three uses where the lexeme describes the manner of motion of a man possessed by strong feeling. These account for one of the uses of the adverb and one use of the adjective in an adverbial phrase:

CT.III.2162 He looked as it were a wilde boor;
He grynte with his teeth, so was he wrooth.
A sturdy paas down to the court he gooth,
Wher as ther woned a man of greet honour.

....

This frere cam as he were in a rage,

When we take into account the parallelism of sturdely and hastely in describing the passage of Phoebus on his way to catch Mars and Venus together (Mars 82), it might seem that the main point in the sense of both these uses is speed, vigorous motion, though there is certainly a malevolence which is the occasion of the haste. In the Miller's Tale the violence is there, but no trace of cruelty or malevolence. The emphasis is upon speed and urgency resulting from the carpenter's concern for Nicholas' health:

CT.I.3434 "Go up," quod he unto his knave anon,

 This knave gooth hym up ful sturdily
 And at the chambre dore while that he stood,
 He cride and knocked as that he were wood,

The final phrase emphasises the frenetic nature of the activity. Here, sturdily seems to have a sense suggesting little more than speed, an intensifying use.

3. Finally, sturdy is used of an inanimate object, an oak tree, and of a man outside any suggested relationship with another. There is no question of harshness or oppression nor of vigorous action; rather the word is applied to signify static strength and vigour.

TC.II.1380 "Thenk here-ayeins: whan that the stordy ook,
 On which men hakketh ofte, for the nones,
 Receyved hath the happy fallyng strook,

In application to the man, the word may have some pejorative sense derived from its senses of harshness and cruelty and from its collocation with harlot.¹

CT.III.1754 A sturdy harlot wente ay hem bihynde,
 That was hir hostes man, and bar a sak,
 And what men yaf hem, leyde it on his bak.

¹ Although the O.E.D. gives this occurrence as an example of the physical sense, pejorative senses of both sturdy and harlot are common, both separately and in the collocation of words in the same area of sense as harlot (beggars etc.) S.v. sturdy 5c and harlot l.

FIERS

Important head words modified by the adjective are: Mars, Arcite, corage and leoun; another collocation of importance is: despitous.

Translation evidence is limited to the rendering of Latin ferus ... Polyphemus, where the French translation crueus is ignored, and Old French 'Pleins de desdein e de fierte' by fiers and daungerous.

Fiers, fiersly

1. The great majority of the attributive uses of fiers are applied in destructive and violent references; thus Mars, the pagan god of battle, is three times called fiers; the dangerous and destructive lion is called fiers once and Arcite is also likened to a lion in his ferocity. Furthermore, the fact that a fiers leoun is paralleled by a meke lomb suggests that both epithets are proverbial of the particular animals. Achilles and Arcite are called fiers in the moment when they are bent on armed destruction, and Polyphemus receives the same distinction together with the information that he has eaten Ulysses' companions. Such uses leave little doubt as to the sense of fiers. Its primary meaning seems to be 'violent and destructive to human life:'

CT.VIII.198 "For thilke spouse that she took but now
Ful lyk a fiers leoun, she sendeth heere,
As meke as evere was any lomb, to yow!"

CT.I.1598 This Arcite, with ful despitous herte,
Whan he hym knew, and hadde his tale herd,
As fiers as leon pulled out his swerd,

TC.V.1806 Despitously hym slough the fierse Achille.

There is an interesting correlation between FIERS-ness in a man and behaviour which is called despitous.

2. As well as applying to a person and his attitude in the moment of destruction, FIERS may also apply to the heart; it may be an emotional

attitude and, as such, extend beyond martial or physical destruction to other harsh or violent, but only moderately harmful, action such as Sir Thopas spurring his horse because of the FIERSSness of his spirit:

CT.VII.780 Sire Thopas eek so wery was
 For prikyng on the softe gras,
 So fiers was his corage,
 That down he leyde him in that plas
 To make his steede som solas,

It is also possible to talk of the sea and its waves which 'fiersly ... growen/
 To drenchen erthe ...' (TC.III.1760).

3. There exist, however, one or two uses in which little or no active harm is done to another, and the application of FIERSS seems peculiar, especially in the case where the reason for this FIERSSness is given:

RR.1482 But natheles, for his beaute,
 So feirs and daungerous was he,
 That he nolde graunten hir askyng,

Fortunately the French version of this exists:

RR.1449 Mais cil fu, por sa grant biauté,
 Pleins de desdein e de fierté,
 Si ne la li vost otreier,

In O.F. the word Fiers could mean either 'proud' or 'fierce': the latter evidently related to a sense 'proud in martial skills'.

The collocation of fiers with knyght, in which it is coupled with proude (TC.I.225), may seem to correspond better with this sense, but the context reveals that the sense must be similar to that in which it is applied to Narcissus in the Romance. In the Troilus, it refers to the hero, who will have no dealings in love. The sequence of events in the stories mentioned and the collocations, together with translation evidence, leave no doubt that the sense of FIERSS, here, is one approaching pride or arrogance. What is probably implied is a species of pride which is offensive to others, pride which is aggressive, pride which prevents a man from showing kindness in love. If we envisage pride as self-obsession resulting in the despising of others, this is the sort of attitude implied.

4. One final collocation presents a difficulty:

CT.II.300 Thy crowdyng set the hevene in swich array
 At the bigymnyng of this fiers viage,
 That crueel Mars hath slayn the mariage.

The enterprise on which Custance is embarking is one which is not dear to her and it will prove disastrous; at the same time it may be assumed to be one carried out with some pomp, since it is to her marriage. This transferred use, then, may have the sense of 'proud' or of 'destructive'. Since there is more description of woe than ceremony, it is safest to assume that this is a unique application of FIERs to an abstract, non-human event, and that it has the sense 'intensely harmful', or 'cruel'.

GRIM

The lexeme is rare in Chaucer. It is collocated twice with leoun and is used in the Romaunt of the Rose to gloss O.F. hisdosement (grymly).

Grim, grymly, grymnesse.

1. Of the two uses which are clearly accompanied by actions, grymnesse is associated with the power to inflict harm:

HF.541 And with hys grymme pawes stronge,
 Withyn hys sharp nayles longe,
 Me, fleynge, in a swap he hente,

The danger and the destructive power of the eagle's talons are evoked, but there is no question of the parts described having an independent attitude to their unfortunate victim. In the following, there is a strong probability that devils possess not only the power to harm, but also the necessary malice to desire to do so:

CT.X.864 ther as they shul han the fyr and the wormes that evere
 shul lasten, and wepynge and wailynge, sharp hunger and thurst,
 and grymnesse of develes, that shullen al totrede hem without
 respit and withouten ende.

Here, grymnesse refers to the deliberate acts of sentient beings, and presumes an attitude of harshness and cruelty.

2. The application to lions, to the statue of Mars, and to the knight, are without any such action or relationship as justifies the use of the word in the above example. They represent instead a simple assumption by an observer as to character, perceived from appearance, looks or repute. Thus the statue of Mars looks grim (CT.I.2042) and the crowd speculating on the merits of Palamon and Arcite consider that one looks grim and is therefore likely to be an effective combatant (CT.I.2519). The cock, Chauntecleer, in the Nun's Priest's Tale, when daylight comes, to compensate for his timidity in the face of dreams, imitates the demeanour of a lion:

CT.VII.3179 He looketh as it were a grym leoun,
 And on his toos he rometh up and doun;

The two collocations of grim with lion in such a limited use of the word suggest that grimness is a quality especially appropriate to lions; and the fact that it is to efface timidity suggests that, what is meant, is ferocity. Thus grimness is an expected and necessary quality of warriors and lions: the power and desire to do destruction.

3. The use of the adverb is to describe the way in which ~~the head of~~ the allegorical figure of Hate in the opening of the Romaunt of the Rose has her head bound up with a large cloth:

RR.161 Hir heed ywrithen was, ywis,
 Ful grymly with a greet towayle.

(French 148) E si estoit entortilliee
 Hisdusement d'une toaille.

Here there is no hint of threat or power to do harm in the sense of grymly. The French suggests only that this is an unpleasant, perhaps frightening, sight. The word here can mean little more than ugly and unpleasant.

CRUELTEECruel, crueltee, cruelly

The lexeme CRUELTEE does not enter into any repeated idiomatic constructions, unless the common adverbial-forming procedure of prefixing the noun with for or through be considered such. Even these phrases are uncommon. The adverb is also applied on a total of three occasions to the idioms wreken ... ire and aboughte ... ire. The adjective is applied more than once to a number of head words: Fortune, pagan gods (especially Mars), tigre, herte, are most common. There is a distinct tendency to occurrence with peyne, wo or torment, where the modification of one seems to stimulate the occurrence of the others.

Significant collocations of CRUELTEE are: jelosye(2); tyrannye (2); peyne (4); malice (3); wood (2); wo(2); torment (2); sterne (2); dispitouse(2); felle (2); felonous (1).

The Latin equivalents are as follows, according to the evidence of Boethius. Most of these are rendered cruel by Jean de Meun.

Crueltee: severitas; saevitia; crudelitas.

Cruel: saevus (easily commonest); ferus; torvus; ferox; atrox (of about equal occurrence); and inmites.

The phrase cruel harmes occurs as a translation of strages.

1. The commonest use of CRUELTEE is with a sense close to the modern meaning. It can refer to a deed (a crueltee) of violent hostility against another, the abstract state of mind, or character of persons gratuitously committing such acts (crueltee):

CT.VII.2413

In which tour in prisoun put was he,
And with hym been his litel children thre;
The eldeste scarsly fyf yeer was of age.
Allas, Fortune! it was greet crueltee
Swiche briddes for to putte in swich a cage!

The action which is called a crueltee, or betrays the abstract character trait in a person, may be parallel to the term. Thus may be seen:

CT.II.72 The crueltee of the, queene Medea,
Thy litel children hangynge by the hals,
For thy Jason, that was of love so fals!

Normally, acts of unnecessary violence against the innocent are regarded as immoral, thus we have their contrast with 'virtue':

Bo.II,p.vi,67 So that the tormentz that this tyraunt wende to han
makede matere of cruelte, this wise man maked it matere
of vertu.

Crueltee frequently means the torment of the weak, powerless or acquiescent:

TC.I.9 To the clepe I, thow goddesse of torment,
Thow cruwel Furie, sorwyng evere yn peyne,

CT.IV.539 Grisildis moot al suffre and al consente;
And as a lamb she sitteth meke and stille,
And leet this crueel sergeant doon his wille.

In the Complaint to Pity, Crueltee is directly opposed as a personification to Pitee, and the lover is represented as complaining to Pitee of the harsh oppression of Love:

Pity 6 My purpos was to Pitee to compleyne
Upon the crueltee and tirannye
Of Love, that for my trouthe doth me dye.

Two important uses of CRUELTEE are united in this example and these will be further exemplified; they are: CRUELTEE allied to oppression by wickedness conjoined with power, CRUELTEE within the courtly love situation. The latter may be deferred while examples of the former are given below.

2. CRUELTEE, along with some others of the words studied, takes its place among those terms appropriate for the discussion of the duties and behaviour of a lord with temporal power:

Bo.III,m.vi,35 Allas! it is grevous fortune as ofte as wikkid sweerd
is joyned to cruel venym (that is so seyn, venymous cruelte
to lordschipe)."

This sentiment is repeated in substantially the same form in the Monk's comment upon Nero (VII.2493) as the murderer of his mother. Alceste puts the Boethian and feudal commonplace:

LGW(F)377 For he that kynge or lord ys naturel,
 Hym oghte nat be tiraunt ne crewel,
 As is a fermour, to doon the harm he kan.
 He moste thinks yt is his lige man,

A number of the ways in which a lord may be cruel to those dependent upon him are given in the Parson's Tale:

CT.X.568 "Leon rorynge and bere hongry been like to the crueel lordshipes in withholdynge or abreggyng of the shepe (or the hyre), or of the wages of servauntz, or else in usure, or in withdrawynge of the almesse of povre folk./

Crueltee, then, is not necessarily synonymous with violence in acts against an individual; it is rather to be judged as such by its deleterious effects. It would also be objectively judged to be an evil or unjustified act. The word is also used in reference to the lord's function as judge, so when Melibee decides to disinherit and exile his rebellious enemies:

CT.VII.1836 "Certes," quod dame Prudence, "this were a crueel sentence and muchel agayn resoun.

There is a clue here to the attitude that crueltee is unreasoning, an attitude which re-appears from time to time.¹ Boethius complains that his judges showed him no Pitee:

Bo.I,p.iv,229 But now thow mayst wel seen to what eende I am comen for myn innocence; I resceyve peyne of fals felonye for guerdon of verrai vertu. And what open confessioun of felonye hadde evere juges so accordaunt in cruelte

As the term is used of the harshness of earthly lords, so it may be used of that of the pagan deities:

TC.IV.1192 Than seyde he thus, fulfild of heigh desdayn:
 "O cruel Jove, and thow, Fortune adverse,
 This al and som, that falsly have ye slayn
 Criseyde,

The pagan god most often called cruel is Mars, though a slight shift in sense is indicated in most of these uses. There is an emphasis on the harshness and violence of Mars as the god of war and destruction. Treatment of this sense will be deferred.

¹ In contradiction to the Senecan definition of crudelitas as justifiable harshness (see below, p.416).

3. Closely allied to the concept of justice is that of revenge. There is no sense here of moral evil in the application of the term; rather the stress is upon the effectiveness and violence of the act. Vengeance, like righteous ire, is ethically respectable enough to be ascribed to the Christian God;

CT.VII.2615 The wreche of God hym smoot so cruelly
 That thurgh his body wikked wormes crepte,
 And therwithal he stank horribly

but it is also the property of men and pagan gods:

TC.V.896 That Manes, which that goddes ben of peyne,
 Shal ben agast that Grekes wol hem shende.
 And men shul drede, unto the worldes ende,
 From hennesforth to ravysshen any queene,
 So cruel shal our wreche on hem be seene.

It might also be noted that vengeance may be unjust when it is visited for no other cause than the spleen or imagination of the avenger (~~wreken his ire~~ --

CT.VII.2597).

4. Close to this sense, but where the emphasis is upon the criterion of violence and harshness rather than upon criteria of evil, lack of reason or effect on the person acted upon, is a further division of sense. The frequent collocations with the pagan god Mars fall within this sense area:

LGW.2245 Of Trace was he lord, and kyn to Marte,
 The cruwel god that stant with bloody darte;

There are few occurrences where the stress is on violence alone; other collocations with Mars are coupled with words such as despitouse, which indicate a morally reprehensible attitude to others. In describing the fighting propensities of the Amazon queen, Chaucer says:

CT.VII.2329 and with her propre hond
 Agayn hir foos she faught so cruelly
 That ther nas kyng ne prynce in al that lond
 That he nas glad, if he that grace fond,
 That she ne wold upon his lond werreye.

The ferocity and lack of human feeling of the Romans in battle is compared to that of a lion:

LGW.627 With stoute Romeyns, crewel as lyoun,
 To ship they wente, and thus I lat hem sayle.

The violence and hostility of a warrior is paralleled by that of a wild beast: both lack the sense of deliberation and consequent moral obloquy found in the same behaviour, or similar deeds, of a man in peace-time. Thus we find the word collocated with the idea of vengeance again, and vengeance divorced from reason, not entirely without disapproval:

CT.VII.1009 And by the manere of his speche it semed that in herte
 he baar a crueel ire, redy to doon vengeance upon his foes,
 and sodeynly desired that the werre sholde bigynne;

This sense of violence and hostility without deliberation is that applied to animals. In a substantial proportion of these collocations, the animal is a man-eater:

LGW.1929 This Mynos hadde a monstre, a wiked best,
 That was so crewel that, without arest,
 Whan that a man was brought in his presence,
 He wolde hym ete; ther helpeth no defence.

Such uses as this preserve the basic situation of harshness or violence to another individual. When applied to more orthodox creatures, the sense is purely of their ferocity, their potential danger rather than their actual deeds against humankind:

CT.I.2628 Ther nas no tygre in the vale of Galgopheye,
 Whan that hir whelp is stole whan it is lite,
 So crueel on the hunte as is Arcite
 For jelous herte upon this Palamon.

5. Here mention might be made of the common figurative applications of cruel. Thus, by metonymy, we have cruel mowth (Bo.IV,m.ii,6), in talking of the menacing of oppressive kings; thought crewel (Bo,IV,p.iv,8), when describing the attitude of the wicked in encompassing the downfall of the virtuous. By personification, we find crueel firmament, referring to the oppressive tendency of the prime mover to reverse the natural west to east motion of the other spheres (CT.II.295), and the cruel whiel of Fortune is so called because of its function in promoting the harm of men (TC.I.839). Similarly, the trumpets of war, Boethius' classica saeua, are translated cruele clariouns (Bo.II,m.v,24), the epithet being applied through their

association with the battle, where the adjective might seem more proper. Criseyde (TC.IV.772) cannot contemplate suicide by the sword, for the crueltee of the weapon.

6. Somewhat similar in sense to the foregoing are the uses of CRUELTEE with relation to abstractions such as emotions or other indefinite phenomena. In these uses the sense is of harshness and violence:

CT.I.1382 What sholde I al day of his wo endite?
Whan he endured hadde a yeer or two
This cruuel torment and this peyne and wo.

The emphasis upon the criteria of harshness and violence is revealed also in two similar uses:

TC.IV.844 "Whoso me seeth, he seeth sorwe al atonys,
Peyne, torment, pleynte, wo, distresse!
Out of my woful body harm ther noon is,
As angwissh, langour, cruel bittrenesse,
Anoy, smert, drede, fury, and ek siknesse.
I trowe, ywys, from hevene teeris reyne
For pite of myn aspre and cruel peyne."

HF.36 Or that the cruel lyf unsofte
Which these ilke lovers leden
That hopen over-muche or dreden.

In uses like these CRUELTEE might be replaced by PITEE were it not for the fact that the emphasis is here upon the violence and harshness itself, whilst, if PITEE were substituted, the emphasis would be upon the reaction of an observer.

This use also accounts for an interesting transferred sense of cruelly. Normally we might expect the adverb to modify the action of a person actively inflicting harm on another; however, it can also apply to the harms inflicted:

CT.I.2303 As keepe me fro thy vengeance and thyn ire,
That Attheon aboughte cruelly.

In the following, the source of the discomfort is not a real agent either, therefore crueltee cannot be ascribed to it as a deliberate act. The judgement of the harm and its violence is purely from the point of view of the recipient of events:

TC.IV.1304 "The soth is this: the twynnyng of us tweyne
 Wol us disese and cruelich anoye;
 But hym byhoveth sometyme han a peyne,
 That serveth Love, if that he wol have joye.

Finally, an example from Boethius might help to reinforce the point. Here the stress is upon violence and harmfulness:

Bo.II,m.v,34 But the anguysschous love of havynge brenneth in folk
 more cruely than the fyre of the mountaigne of Ethna that
 ay brenneth.
 (saeuior)

7. It was noted earlier that, in the courtly context, crueltee is opposed to pitee when speaking of love petitions. A number of occurrences may be found in which CRUELTEE has little emphasis on violence, on evil and malicious destruction, or harm to others. The sense seems to be a much weakened one of failure to react to the suffering of others with pitee:

CT.V.419 And with hir beek hirselves so she prighte,
 That ther nys tygre, ne so crueel beest,
 That dwelleth outhere in wode or in forest,
 That nolde han wept, if that he wepe koude,
 For sorwe of hire,

A single occurrence such as this is valueless, since it is a fair assumption that a fierce and destructive animal like the tiger would not be considered to be soft-hearted, and the sense of cruel could be that above, when applied to a tiger. Compare, however:

TC.V.722 In al this world ther nys so cruel herte
 That hire hadde herd compleynen in hire sorwe,
 That nolde han wepen for hir peynes smerte,
 So tendrely she wepte, bothe eve and morwe.

Here, there is no object of crueltee, it is quite inactive; the state of a heart observing the distress of another: the implication is that a cruel herte would not be moved by ordinary distress. Similarly, Griselda is content to submit to the will of Walter and to allow her child to be taken from her; she is inactive, but her crueltee is raised as a possibility.

CT.IV.692 He wolde have wend that of som subtiltee,
 And of malice, or for crueel corage,
 That she hadde suffred this with sad visage.

Calkas considers himself a sterne and cruel father (TC.IV.94) because he failed to save his daughter from the doomed city of Troy. Troilus' heart becomes cruel (TC.V.1534) after he is enraged by Cassandra's prophesy, though there is no immediate outlet for this except in his brusqueness to the prophetess.

Earlier in the poem, the refining influence of love had had its effect upon Troilus, so that one of the vices which had been suppressed was crueltee. There is no evidence that his crueltee extended any further than disdain of lovers, but this is replaced by friendliness and magnanimity:

TC.I.1083 For he bicom the frendliest wight,
 The gentilest, and ek the moost fre,
 The thriftiest and oon the beste knyght,
 That in his tyme was or myghte be.
 Dede were his japes and his cruelte,
 His heighe port and his manere estraunge,
 And ecch of the gan for a vertu chaunge.

The transformation is similar to that wrought in Mars by Venus (Mars 37), when jelosye, cruelte, bost and tyrannye are forbidden him.

Magnanimity to other humans and the lack of it have special significance in the relationship of courtly love or of friendship. Thus, Pandarus considers it a crueltee not to confide in him as a friend (TC.I.586), while the crueltee of the noble lady is in caring nothing for the suffering and death of her lover: in short, lacking pitee:

TC.II.337 "If it be so that ye so cruel be,
 That of his deth yow liste nought to recche,
 That is so trewe and worthi, as ye se,
 Namoore than of a japer or a wrecche, -

8. Finally, CRUEL may be used with a distinct social relevance to refer to those who do not behave to each other as do people aware of the exigencies of the courtly code:

RR.265 For, trustith wel, she goth nygh wod
 When any chaunce happith god.
 Envie is of such crueltee
 That feith ne trouthe holdith she
 To freend ne felawe, bad or good.

Chaucer is here closely following the French (cruauté).

The necessity of good behaviour to others and the resultant good reputation is stressed again in Tale of Melibee:

CT.VII.1647 And he that trusteth hym so muchel in his goode
 conscience/ that he displeseth, and settleth at nocht
 his goode name or loos, and rekketh nocht though he kepe
 nat his goode name, nys but a crueel cherl./

The collocation with the socially inferior cherl, together with the depreciatory but, and the abstraction and distancing of any act of hostility to others, helps to give this use purely social application.¹ Cruel here, referring to the social advancement of a churl, and ^{to the fact} that he has no conception of the proper code of behaviour, is nearly equivalent in sense to vileyn.

¹ This sense of the adjective cruel is supported by the French source of the Tale of Melibee: 'il negligé sa bonne renommée et ne fait force de lui garder, il est cruel et vilain.' (Bryan and Dempster, p. 604). No doubt this shift in sense, which is recognised by none of the standard dictionaries of either language, is dependent upon the assumption that churls are lacking in the sensitivity which is proper to the courtly person (cf. paragraph 7). The social misdemeanour of Tristran and Isolde is called cruauté in Bérout's Tristran, line 616. Ewert glosses this 'wickedness'.

WOODNESSEWood, woodnesse, wooly

The lexeme WOODNESSE enters into a number of consistent idiomatic constructions, most of these involving the predicative adjective. Only one typical construction with the noun emerges (falle in woodnesse). The adjective modifies a wide variety of head words, of which leoun, and pronouns referring to all sorts and conditions of men and women, are notable. Less notable is the modification of tyraunt (2 occurrences, but also a number of applications to pagan gods and others whose behaviour is tyrannical).

On grounds of frequency, the most significant collocations are: ire, cruel, dronke (lewe)(nesse).

The word is used as a translation of Boethian:

wood: saeuiens; furiosus; saeuus (w. + felenous); rabidus furibundus

woodnesse: ira; furor; rabies

wax w.: saeuire

It also translates the French of the Romance of the Rose.

wood: forsenee

go/be w.: enrager and Jean de Meun renders the variety of the Latin by the same two lexemes.

1. The Boethian evidence suggests the presence of a criterion of violence and destructiveness in the sense of WOOD. This is supported by the use of Woodnesse as a personification; here a sense of unreason is joined by other, more violent personifications, and the evocation of violent death:

CT.I.2011 Yet saugh I Woodnesse, laughynge in his rage,
Armed Compleint, Outhees, and fiers Outrage;
The careyne in the busk, with throte ycorve;

2. The common gloss for WOODNESSE would be, however, madness, mad, and also

angry or enraged. The noun woodnesse can mean an act of folly or unreason:

CT.VII.1481 Forthermoore, ye knowen wel that after the comune sawe,
'it is a woodnesse a man to stryve with a strengre ...

and it can also mean a fit of unreasoning behaviour, a fit of madness:

TC.III.794 "And he is come in swich peyne and distresse
That, but he be al fully wood by this,
He sodeynly mot falle into wodnesse,

A man who is mad loses all faculty of reasoning and shows disregard for his situation; so does the drunken man and the lover, and both these parallels are drawn:

CT.VII.496 ... a man that is out of his mynde
And a man which that is dronkelewe,
But that woodnesse, yfallen in a shrewe,
Persevereth lenger than doth dronkenesse.

TC.III.1382 Tho besy wrecches, ful of wo and drede!
Thei callen love a woodnesse or a folie,
But it shall falle hem as I shal yow rede;

The phrases w. out of his mynde/wit illustrate the commonplace nature of this concept, which has spawned a number of consistent idioms (see below p.315)

There are less emphatic uses, such as that in which Pandarus suggests an arrangement of terms in this field, by putting WOODNESSE at one end of his scale and progressing to LEWED:

TC.III.398 I am nought wood, al if I lewed be!

Pandarus makes a distinction between the unlearned and the intellectually defective.

The sense of the word may be narrowed by context to mean the rash foolishness of presumption:

Lady, 84 And lat me serve yow forth; lo, this is al!
For I am not so hardy, ne so wood,
For to desire that ye shulde love me;

the advanced stage of the state of being daswed by reading (HF.658):

GP.184 What sholde he studie and make hymselfen wood,
Upon a book in cloystre alwey to poure,

or (cf. the reference to Nero in paragraph 9 below) to the foolish irresponsibility of a spendthrift:

GP.582 To make hym lyve by his propre good
In honour dettelees (but if he were wood),

3. The connection of WOODNESSE with the violence of IRE is made by a number of occurrences in which they are juxtaposed. There is deliberate parallelism to make a didactic point in:

CT.III.2087 'Ne be no felawe to an irous man,
Ne with no wood man walke by the weye,
Lest thee repente;'

Extreme IRE and woodnesse are not far separate:

CT.III.2121 This sike man wax wel ny wood for ire;
He wolde that the frere had been on-fire,
With his false dissymulacioun.

Ire and Woodnesse together combine in destructive hostility.

4. WOODNESSE is also used to describe the ferocity and hostility of the warrior or the wild beast; a violence distinct from that of the man in peacetime because, although unreasoning, it is justifiable as the nature of the animal or man and may be valuable in the profession of the latter as a warrior:

Mars 123 Now wol I speke of Mars, furious and wod.

The animal called Wood is par excellence the lion, and the collocation appears to be a proverbial one. It occurs on five separate occasions in similar linguistic environments. Two of them are nearly identical for a considerable span of units:

CT.III.2152 The frere up stirte as dooth a wood leoun, -

CT.III.794 And he up stirte as dooth a wood leoun,
And with his fest he smoot me on the heed,

Variations on the basic simile are possible as the following

CT.I.2631 Ne in Belmarye ther nys so fel leon,
That hunted is, or for his hunger wood,
Ne of his praye desireth so the blood,
As Palamon to sleen his foo Arcite.

This example combines another common use of Wood; that in which the cause of Woodnesse is given: the syntagm w. for...

5. WOODNESSE is used too of the oppressive violence of persons in elevated positions; a violence which may be intentional and deliberate. Thus, beside the WOODNESSE of Mars, which may be morally excused as a necessity of the God of War, we have the vengeful WOODNESSE of the goddess Juno:

CT.I.1329 But I moot been in prisoun thurgh Saturne,
 And eek thurgh Juno, jalous and eek wood,
 That hath destroyed wel ny al the blood
 Of Thebes

In Boethius II,m.vi,28, WOODNESSE is identified explicitly with wickedness in the shape of Nero, but is a translation of the Latin rabies. There is evidently no equivocation between wickedness and madness; if a mad man does evil deeds they are nonetheless wicked and he must be considered evil himself, since he is the author of them. The modern humanistic view of diminished responsibility is not so common in the Middle Ages.¹ Thus, a cruel tyrant can be called wood from the point of view of good folk, even when his actions are deliberate, as in the torture of a worthy man:

Bo.II,p.vi,58 but this freman boot of his owene tonge, and caste it
 in the visage of thilke wode tyraunt.

Earlier, WOODNESSE is used with a word of undoubted moral implications, the two combining ideas of madness, cruelty, wickedness and violence:

Bo.I,m.iv,14 Wharto thanne, o wrecches, drede ye tiraunz that ben
 wode and felenous withouten ony strengthe?

6. The sense of furious hostility is present in applications to abstractions or attitudes of mind:

TC.V.1213 Therwith the wikked spirit, God us blesse,
 Which that men clepeth the woode jalousie,
 Gan in hym crepe, in al this hevynesse;

It may also be applied in a sense reminiscent of a similar use of CRUELTEE in which the reason for its application is to be judged from its effects.

The emphasis is upon violence and deleterious effect:

¹ Foolishness, lack of judgement, is sometimes distinguished from deliberate transgression, however, as in Chaucer's defence to the God of Love in the Prologue to the Legend of Good Women or the words of Criseyde in TC.III.326.

TC.II.1355 And Pandarus, that sey his woode peyne,
Wex wel neigh ded for routhe,

Sometimes the sense may include the criterion of 'unreasonable' but the stress may be upon the gratuitous hostility of the agent so that the application closely parallels similar uses of CRUELTEE:

CT.VIII.450 "Yowre princes erren, as youre nobleye dooth."
Quod tho Cecile, "and with a wood sentence
Ye make us gilty, and it is nat sooth.

7. The sense of violence is emphasised when the word is applied to inanimate objects, particularly those which seem to have an activity of their own.

Woodnesses is coupled with Ires to describe the turbulence of the air (aetheris iras) (Bo.II,m.iv,18) and in the Miller's Tale:

CT.I.3517 That now a Monday next, at quarter nyght,
Shall falle a reyn, and that so wilde and wood,
That half so greet was nevere Noes flood.

Again in Boethius I, p.iii,77, we find the phrase tumolte and wood noyse (furiosi tumultus), where there is certainly some disdain for the follies of the world, but the criterion of violent action is also present. The adverb is also used with the stress upon the criterion of violence as is, on two occasions, the semi-substantivised use of the adjective for wood:¹

LGW.1752 And caughte to this lady swich desyr
That in his herte brende as any fyr
So woodly that his wit was al forgeten.

LGW.2420 The se, by nyghte, as any torche it brende
For wod, and possith hym now up, now down,

Uses like this of WOODNESSE, simply to refer to violence, almost certainly derive from the idiomatic use of the adjective wood in phrases comparing some violent action to that of a mad man:

CT.III.1542 The cartere smoot, and cryde as he were wood,

The popular assumption seems to be that madness is accompanied by violent action and shouting:

TC.II.1554 But swich a nede was to preye hym themme
As for to bidde a wood man for to renne.

¹ See T.F. Mustanoja, op.cit., p.381.

Thus the idiom to do s'thing as he were wood is as much as to say 'to do something violently and unheedingly.'

This idiom, logically appropriate only to the actions of persons, is extended to inanimate objects which may seem to have their own activity:

CT.I.2950 And coppes fulle of wyn, and milk, and blood,
 Into the fyr, that brente as it were wood;

From here it is a short step to the application of the adjective to some inanimate objects in the sense of violence illustrated above.

8. The syntagms be w.; make w. and wexen w., and also one attributive use, are sometimes used with a sense which appears to be more or less idiomatic, varying from fury or violence towards another, to such violent hostility as is deserved by the other's actions - the modern anger.

The least idiomatic uses are those translated from Boethius, such as:

Bo.I, p.iv, 12 And scheweth it nat ynogh by hymselfe the scharpnesse
 of Fortune, that waxeth wood ayens me?

(saeuientis: not a close translation).

When some reason for furious hostility is evident, a sense change occurs, be it ever so slight:

Bo.IV, m.vii, 22 But natheles Poliphemus, wood for his blynde visage, ...
 (furibundus)

Thus, the following has a sense very close to modern 'angry', though the sense of the violence of the anger is still felt:

LGW.624 Octovyan, that wod was of this dede,
 Shop hym an ost on Antony to lede
 Al uterly for his destruccioun.

The violence is also felt in the more colloquial atmosphere of the Summoner's

Tale:

CT.III.1666 This Sumonour in his styropes hye stood;
 Upon this Frere his herte was so wood
 That lyk an aspen leef he quook for ire.

Finally three truly colloquial uses may be mentioned. There is no explicit violence though there is an indication that the anger is intense. The use is equivalent to the modern colloquial 'mad' to mean 'angry':

CT.I.3394 For though that Absolon be wood or wrooth,
By cause that he fer was from hire sight,
'This nye Nicholas stood in his light.

CT.III.1576 I wole han twelf pens, though that she be wood,
Or I wol sompne hire unto cure office;

There are four uses of the syntagm though ... be w. (see p. 528); two have a negative in the main clause and all are colloquial in tone and have the sense of anger:

CT.III.664 This made hym with me wood al outrelly;

In this environment care must be taken not to confuse with in this example (a construction dating from O.E. times. Cf. wrath with .. - Mustanoja, 419) and ayens in an example above. The latter has the sense of 'hostility towards'. Perhaps, however, the distinction in Chaucer is more stylistic than semantic.

9. A number of other, rare, uses are to be found. The first is with a sense where the emphasis is essentially on lack of reason and not at all upon violence; its sense is similar to a stronger version of modern 'foolish':

Bo.III,m.iv,2 Al be it so that the proude Nero, with al his wode
luxurie, kembde hym and apparayled hym with faire purpres
of Tyrie ... (saeuientis).

In the application to Muse (Bo.I,p.v,65) the sense is something like 'crazed':

RR.203 For coveitise is evere wod
To gripen other folkis god.

(que toz jorz enrage/ Covoitise de l'autrui prendre)

The sense here is madly, furiously eager (cf. Mars 239). In RR.276, the adjective is used substantivally, evidently to translate French duel (Que par un poi de duel ne font)

And hath such (wo) whan folk doth good,
That nygh she meltith for pure wood.

Here the sense seems to be one of violence but violent discomfiture. The moral criterion is important since we are here discussing the emblematic figure of Envie. The sense of French duel is one of sorrow and anger in their most extravagant forms.

Finally, it is worthy of note that, although WOODNESSE has uses both in ordinary colloquial speech and in philosophical discourse (the noun form being proportionately far more important in Boethius), it is never used in courtly situations. The nearest approach, when it becomes a respectable term for literary composition, is in appreciatively describing the ferocity of lions, warriors and warrior-gods.

HARDNESSEHardnesse, hard, harde

The collocations in reducing order of importance are: sharo, grevous, perilous, daungerous, depe, sore, penaunce, peyne, myghtily, spitously, pitee, gentillesse, debonairetee.

Translation evidence is of little importance.

Boece: Hard (adj.): dura. (Jean de Meun: dure/durtéz)

Hardnesses (n.): dura.

Romance de la Rose: Hard (adj.): dur(s).

1. In examining the senses of this lexeme, some note must be taken of the repeated collocation of various exponents of the lexeme with the word herte. The collocation is an ancient, stereotyped part of poetic diction; perhaps its conceptual origins are in a simile like the following, where the heart and soul are confused as the sensitive recipient of impressions from without, and the seat of emotion. Lack of susceptibility, concretised, leads to the application of the adjective HARD:¹

CT.IV.1990 Som tyrant is, as ther be many oon,
That hath an herte as hard as any stoon,
Which wolde han lat hym sterven in the place.

A similar image is used by Pandarus of Troilus' attempts to influence Criseyde:

TC.II.1241 "But ye han played the tirant neigh to longe,
And harde was it youre herte for to grave.

De Lorris sees hardness of heart as insensitivity to the spring and its concomitants:

RR.85 Hard is the hert that loveth nought
In May, whan al this mirth is wrought,

8lff. Mout a dur cuer qui en mai n'aime,
Quant il ot chanter sor la raine
As oisiaus les douz chanz piteus.

¹ The image, by which the sensitive part of the soul is likened to wax, ready to take sense-impressions, is common in Classical philosophy and is found in the transmitters of this philosophy to the Middle Ages. Boethius himself expands on this notion in Book Five, metre vi.

Various grammatical arrangements of the basic collocation are noted below; for example, the composite adjective hardherted. This condition is of concern to the Persoun because it hampers the action of charity and prevents contrition. Too hard a heart is considered sinful in Melibee (VII.1696) and the Persoun identifies it with Augustinian malitia:

CT.X.486 Now hath malice two speses; that is to seyn, hardnesse
of herte in wikkednesse, ...

Here the sense of fixity of intentions is implied. The Friar excuses extortion by the similar notion that people whose hearts are insensible to remorse cannot reveal it by weeping, and can therefore compound in cash:

GP.229 For many a man so hard is of his herte,
He may nat wepe, although hym soore smerte.

2. The simple concrete sense of the adjective hard is well exemplified by the following:

CT.IV.228 And whan she homward cam, she wolde brynge
Wortes or othere herbes tymes ofte,
The whiche she shredde and seeth for hir lyvyng,
And made hir bed ful hard and nothyng softe;

3. As an adverb, harde is used to modify verbs of violent action; here it acts as an intensifier:

CT.I.3476 And hente hym by the sholdres myghtily,
And shook hym harde, and cride spitously,

4. The adjective, particularly in idioms with the verb 'to be', has the sense 'difficult':

PF.534 "Ful hard were it to preve by resoun
Who loveth best this gentil formel heere;

CT.IV.1164 It were ful harde to fynde now-a-dayes
In al a toun Grisildis thre or two;

Often the use of the word has a less clear-cut sense of 'difficult'. Chaucer notes that: 'hard language and hard matere/ Ys encombrous for to here/ Attones;' Difficulty causes distress in the hearer, so that the subject and its presentation may be said to be 'hard' in another sense; that of

being harsh and unpleasant to the hearer. The Parson acknowledges the coincidence of the two senses:

CT.X.732 This vertu maketh folk to undertake harde thynges and grevouse thynges, by hir owene wil, wisely and resonably.

Here the parallelism with grevouse underlines the coincidence of difficulty and distress suggested by this use of harde. Again, the balanced antithesis of the following, and the variable sense of the word hard, increase the oxymoronic effect of the line:

PF.2 The lyf so short, the craft so long to lerne,
Th'assay so hard, so sharp the conquerynge,

5. Hardness of heart, mentioned earlier, implies a failure to react to the misery of others, an emotional insensitivity which may be intensified into active cruelty to others. The hard-hearted may be so inflexible and careless of external good that hard-heartedness is considered by the Parson to be equivalent to Malice. The Romaunt, however, sees it as mere insensitivity:¹

RR.333 In world nys wight so hard of herte
That hadde sen her sorowes smerte,
That nolde have had of her pyte,

325ff Nus tant fust durs ne la veist (N. t. d. coeurs n.)
A cui grant pitié n'en preist

Insensitivity to others may, however, soon lead to the deliberation of cruelty: a tyrant may let a man die, through his hardness of heart (CT.IV.1990), a father may do injury to his child, despite its innocence (CT.II.857), and Calkas laments his cruelty in leaving his daughter to perish in the city of Troy:

TC.IV.95 O sterne, O cruel fader that I was!
How myghte I have in that so hard an herte?

Fortune is represented as taking positive delight in the suffering of others:

Bo.II,m.i,12 No sche neither heereth, ne rekketh of wrecchide wepynges; and she is so hard that sche laugheth and scorneth the wepynges of hem, the whiche sche hath maked wepe with hir free wille.

¹ Cf. Troilus and Criseyde, IV, 1140.

This reminds us of the moral orientation of hardness and pity which is evident in the Parson's identification with Malice and his derivation of severity and tyranny in lords from the sin of Coveitise (CT.X.755). The 'bailiff' of the Friar's Tale complains of the severity of his lord:

CT.III.1427 My wages been ful streite and ful smale.
 My lord is hard to me and daungerous,
 And myn office is ful laborous,

The adjective hard, as might be expected from the above collocation, is often used of the attitude of the courtly lady who refuses to respond to professions of love: her insensitivity works her lover peyne and may therefore be seen as cruelty.

At TC.II.1271, having routhe is opposed to having been hard and, in Complaint to his Lady, the same opposition is expressed:

Lady 100 But the more that I love yow, goodly free,
 The lasse fynde I that ye loven me;
 Allas! whan shal that harde wit amende?
 Wher is now al your wommanly pitee,
 Your gentillesse and your debonairtee?

Pandarus makes the only use of the adjective hard in a substantival use when he says that Criseyde has been won of hard in a sentence where hard might be replaced by daunger. Elsewhere he implies the synonymy of hardnesse and daunger in the love situation:

TC.II.1245 Al wolde ye the forme of daunger save,
 But hasteth yow to doon hym joye have;
 For trusteth wel, to longe ydoon hardnesse
 Causeth despit ful often for destresse."

6. The adverb harde is used in the courtly love situation in a use where it seems to have more sense content than a mere intensifier:

TC.III.1531 So harde hym wrong of sharp desir the peyne,
 For to ben eft there he was in plesaunce,
 That it may nevere out of his remembraunce.

This use seems to stand between the intensifier and concentration on the suffering of another, which enables words like cruel, which have a primary application to a person and his acts, to be applied to unmotivated events or

purely to suffering as a result of the acts. This type of use is not uncommon with hard. It is represented in the common expression with harde grace!; Alas! the harde stounde (AA.238); hard mischaunce, (Venus 47); and

CT.VIII.873 Swich supposyng and hope is sharp and hard;
I warne yow wel, it is to seken evere.

The common syntagm To Be + hard + infin. can, as well as 'difficult', be used in the way mentioned above. The passive infinitive exemplifies the particular mischaunce referred to:

Bukton 32 God graunteth yow your lyf frely to lede
In fredom; for ful hard is to be bonde.

The noun hardnesse is used with the modern sense 'hardship' (CT.X.688; Bo.IV,p.v,35). Finally, concentrating solely on the recipient, the adverb is used in a framework common with cruelly, the concentration being upon violence, though there are overtones of pathos, as in the use of CRUELTEE:

LGW.2483 And that hath she so harde and sore about,
 Allas! that, as the storyes us recorde,
 She was hire owene deth ryght with a corde,

7. Something should be said here about the French derived form Hardy, Hardely, Hardynesse (Hardiment).

Firstly it may be noticed that the adverb here is formed by an alternative process to the formation of the adverb from the O.E. hard: here an ly suffix is added rather than the e.

Secondly, the French adjective, hardy, is exceptionally rare (1 occasion). The only form in which confusion between the lexemes is at all probable is the substantive, which is formed in the same way, though the French preserves the original i or y. It seems as though there has been an attempt to avoid homonymic clash in the adoption and re-formation of the French term.

Hardely. This is fairly rarely used with its etymological sense of 'boldly' (translating Boethius' audacter):

CT.IV.2273 Al hadde man seyn a thyng with bothe his yen,
Yit shul we wommen visage it hardily,
And wepe, and swere, and chyde subtilly,
So that ye men shul been as lewed as gees.

The more common sense is derived from its use in colloquial language as an asseveration inserted into bold statements. In uses like this it may be glossed as 'indeed'; 'no doubt'; 'certainly' 'surely' etc:

HF.359 'Loo, ryght as she hath don, now she
Wol doo eft-sones, hardely;'

BD.1043 "By oure Lord," quod I, "y trowe yow wel!
Hardely, your love was wel beset;

In certain uses there is, however, the possibility of confusion with the adverb formed from O.E. heard:

Lady 112 And this I wol beseche yow hertely,
That, ther ever ye fynde, whyl ye lyve,
A trewer servant to yow than am I,
Leveth thanne, and sleeth me hardely,

The translation here is in doubt; 'make sure you slay me', 'slay me harshly' or 'slay me boldly'?

Hardynesse. This word has the clear French sense of 'boldness' which is found in the adopted Hardyment at TC.IV.533. It usually implies boldness in undertaking some direct action - physical courage involving strength or violence. As a corollary, the compound Foolhardynesse is also found (PF.227). It is often collocated with strengthe or myght, and, unlike hardnesse, is almost always considered a virtue:

CT.II.939 Who yaf Judith corage or hardynesse
To sleen hym Olofermus in his tente,

CT.VII.2020 Was nevere swich another as was hee,
To speke of strengthe, and therwith hardynesse;

(Samson)

LGW.611 He was, of persone and of gentillesse,
And of discrecioun and hardynesse,
Worthi to any wyght that liven may;

The other side of this adulation of Hardiness as a virtue is given by the Parson:

CT.X.460 strengthe of body and worldly hardynesse causeth ful
ofte many a man to peril and meschaunce.

Sometimes this wordly hardynesse may coincide with hardnesse

CT.X.438 and namely whan that meynee is felonous and damageous
to the peple by hardynesse of heigh lordshipe or by wey of
offices.

The familiar-seeming phrase hardynesse of his herte (CT.VII.2508)
is distinguished from the commoner phrase by its context.

DAUNGERDaunger, daungerous

Neither collocational nor translation evidence offer valuable information.

1. The modern sense of something which threatens safety is represented by a single plural occurrence from the General Prologue's description of the Shipman:

GP.402 But of his craft to rekene wel his tydes,
 His stremes, and his daungers hym bisides,
 His herberwe, and his moone, his lodemenage,
 There nas noon swich

2. Daunger and daungerous are familiar words in the context of courtly love. At a more prosaic level, one partner in a marriage may be daungerous with regard to his love for another:

CT.III.514 That thogh he hadde me bete on every bon,
 He koude wynne agayn my love anon.
 I trowe I loved hym best, for that he
 Was of his love daungerous to me.

A loved one who is daungerous does not accede to the other's desire for affection:

TC.II.1376 Seyth Daunger, 'Nay, thow shalt me nevere wynne!'

Such an attitude of restraint in love, bordering on scorn for the lover, is associated with pride:

RR.1482 But natheles, for his beaute,
 So feirs and daungerous was he,
 That he nolde graunten hir askyng,

The French original has here, for the second line:

Pleins de desdein e de fierté

a collocation represented in Chaucer's work by the juxtaposing of the personifications Disdayn and Daunger in PF.136.

In LGW(F)160 Daunger is opposed to Curtesye, and Criseyde is said to

have played the tirant and will continue to retain the form of daunger (TC. II.1243). Restraint and lack of response may be, or may be represented by the sufferer as, active cruelty which is likely to bring about his death:

TC.II.384 But alwey, goode nece, to stynte his woo,
 So lat youre daunger sucred ben a lite,
 That of his deth ye be naught for to wite."

This active and destructive concept of daunger seems to be limited to the high style and the pretensions of courtly society where the sensitivity of the rejected lover is assumed to be greater and the threat to his emotional balance is more intense. A simple transfer portrays this as the result of more active malice on the part of the beloved:

AA.186 His newe lady holdeth him so narowe
 Up by the bridil, at the staves ende,
 That every word he dredeth as an arowe;
 Her daunger made him bothe bowe and bende,
 And as her liste, made him turne or wende;
 For she ne graunted him in her lyvyng
 No grace, whi that he hath lust to singe,

Here, the opposition between Grace and Daunger in the courtly situation is neatly exemplified.

In the situation of more ordinary love, daunger may simply mean 'restraint,' perhaps with overtones of scorn, as though for an inferior. The knight of the Wife's tale believes the hag he has been compelled to marry is inferior to him and he shows simple restraint:

CT.III.1090 "O deere housbonde, benedicitee!
 Fareth every knyght thus with his wyf as ye?
 Is this the lawe of kyng Arthures hous?
 Is every knyght of his so dangerous?

Finally, at the simplest and most grotesque level, the Wife can use the term simply with reference to restraint in sexual matters, and the irony by comparison with its higher style uses is evident:

CT.III.151 In wyfhod I wol use myn instrument
 As frely as my Makere hath it sent.
 If I be daungerous, God yeve me sorwe.

This irony is reinforced by the covert image of sex as a gift of God, a prerogative of action freely bestowed by God, like Grace, which is a common collocation with the phrase *God sende.

3. The associations of restraint, superiority and oppressive behaviour, which are noticeable in the courtly love situation, are also found, with varying degrees of emphasis, in other contexts. One of the Wife's scabrous images bridges the gulf between the marriage bed and the market place in respect of the first of these associations:

CT.III.521 With daunger oute we al oure chaffare;
Greet prees at the market maketh deere ware,
And to greet cheep is holde at litel prys:

The same sense is evident in the description of the generosity of the personified Richesse:

RR.1147. And hym alwey sich plente sende
Of golde and silver for to spende
Withoute lakking or daunger,
As it were poured in a garner.

As well as the sense of restraint in the bestowal of goods, daunger can also refer to restriction placed by a lord upon the action of others:

CT.I.1849 My wyl is this,

 That everich of you shal goon where hym leste
 Frely, withouten raunson or daunger;

4. The thread of sense represented by restriction, control, domination and oppression is also to be found outside the courtly situation. Thus the image of love as a tyrannous lord is used to represent the plight of Narcissus:

RR.1470 Narcisus was a bachelor,
That Love had caught in his danger,
And in his net gan hym so strayne,

All the world is under the domination of Richesse (RR.1049). Chaucer's irony is again evident in his observation that the Summoner had the power over young people of the diocese, perhaps because he knew all their schemes and handed them advice:

GP.663 In daunger hadde he at his owene gise
The yonge girles of the diocise,
And knew hir conseil, and was al hir reed.

Domination and control stray easily into oppression as the 'bailiff' of the Friar's Tale claims:

CT.III.1427 My wages been ful streite and ful smale.
My lord is hard to me and daungerous,
And myn office is ful laborous.

5. The thread of sense involving superiority, arrogance and disdain is found in general situations: thus the garden, described so fulsomely in the Romance of the Rose, is not too superior and disdainful to harbour small birds:

RR.490 The gardeyn was not daungerous
To herberwe briddes many oon.

(A French variant reading is: N'estoit ne desdeigneus ne chiches).

One may be disdainful and superior in addressing another, and it is a notable virtue of the lady Ydelnesse (RR.591) that her response to a civil question is neither unmeke nor daungerous. Though the Persoun is evidently a superior person, he is neither harsh nor scornful of his moral inferiors and his tone, unlike that of Absolon (CT.I.3338), is neither superior and high-sounding, nor harsh and oppressive:

GP.517 And though he hooly were and vertuous,
He was to synful men nat despitous,
Ne of his speche daungerous ne digne,
But in his techyng discreet and benygne.

The Persoun's lack of arrogance is especially praiseworthy in a man of such perfection, and contributes to that perfection.

Finally, Chaucer proposes to tell his prose tale and insists that the other pilgrims will like it if they are not daungerous:

CT.VII.939 I wol telle a litel thyng in prose
That oghte liken yow, as I suppose,
Or elles, certes, ye been to daungerous.

The sense is obviously one of superiority, arrogance which disposes an audience to judge itself beyond pleasing by any simple little tale.

HAUTEYN

1. It is clear from the collocations that hauteyn is connected with nobility and its behaviour. It is used in this way as an appreciative term. The falcon fit to hunt the heron was one of the finest of its race (LGW.1120), and there is no trace of pejorative sense in the application to Richesse:

PF.262 And in a prive corner in disport
 Fond I Venus and hire porter Richesse,
 That was ful noble and hautayn of hyre port.

2. The other two uses have some pejorative sense. To the ecclesiast, the significant trait of elegant behaviour was the way in which it was prone to the sin of Pride:

CT.X.613 For sothe, Salomon seith that "flaterie is wors than
 detraccioun." For somtyme detraccioun maketh an hauteyn
 man be the moore humble, for he dredeth detraccioun;

3. The Pardoner uses a manner of speech which he hopes will impress his audience. Here the sense of hauteyn seems to imply, not only an elegant manner of pronunciation, but a style of delivery packed with high-sounding but probably meaningless phrases. The Pardoner cultivates pomposity of expression:

CT.VI.330 "Lordynges," quod he, "in chirches whan I preche,
 I peyne me to han an hauteyn speche,
 And rynges it out as round as gooth a belle,
 For I kan al by rote that I telle.

The aspect of the behaviour of the nobility, which springs from arrogance and results in cruelty to people they scorn, is not covered by the word hauteyn in Chaucer, but in the disputed section of the Romance of the Rose (6101) hauteyn is coupled with cruel in just this sense.

DESPIT

Despit, despitous, despitously

Translation evidence is found in the Romaunt and Melibee alone and the usage is very close to the Chaucerian: 'E le tint a si grant despit/Que' is rendered 'And took it in so gret dispit/That'. The use of the French verb tenir is interesting in the light of the English idiom halt ... d. of.

Collocation evidence reveals the most important collocations to be: vilanye, hate, tirannye, sorwe, furie.

1. Examining the syntagms evidently modelled upon French phrasing which are arranged in the left hand column in the syntactical treatment (Appendix, p. 549), we find that despit here clearly refers to an emotion or attitude of mind. This attitude is plainly scorn or contempt for an act, situation or person regarded as unworthy. The various syntagms are derived from the common French expression aveir despit ... and from a similar French expression el despit de. As well as the simple calqued expression we may find analogical developments of it: take in d. and be in d.

Friars claim to contemn the delights of the world:

CT.III.1876 We han this worldes lust al in despit.

The virtuous courtly lover holds all wickedness in contempt:

TC.III.1787 And moost of love and vertu was his speche,
And in despit hadde alle wrecchednesse;

(cf. TC.IV.1675)

One may feel contempt to commit a particular act or simply to allow oneself to suffer an insult:

CT.V.1395 Now sith that maydens hadden swich despit
To been defouled with mannes foul delit,
Wel oghte a wyf rather hirselves sleet
Than be defouled,

The disinterest of a lady may at length cause her lover to hold her in

contempt, perhaps even hate her:

TC.II.711 If I wolde outreliche his sighte flee,
 Peraunter he myghte have me in dispit,
 Thorough whicch I myght stonde in worse plit.
 Now were I wis, me hate to purchase,
 Withouten nede, ther I may stonde in grace?

(cf. TC.II.1246)

Two of these syntagms, however, have senses for which the ideas of scorn or contempt would be inadequate. The suggestion of something other than scorn is evident above; in the following, it is even clearer:

RR.1487 And whanne she herde hym werne her soo,
 She hadde in herte so gret woo,
 And took it in so gret dispit,
 That she, withoute more respit,
 Was deed anoon.

CT.III.481 I seye, I hadde in herte greet despit
 That he of any oother had delit.

Both these examples, at their very different levels, refer to the frustrations and vexations of love. Both ladies have been treated with contempt by their lovers and their reaction is of intense emotion compounded with annoyance and chagrin. We find this same sense of 'bitterness' with the adverb and adjective:

TC.V.199 ... this woful Troilus,
 In sorwe aboven alle sorwes smerte,
 With feloun look and face dispitous.

CT.I.1124 This Palamon, whan he tho wordes herde,
 Dispitously he looked and answerde,

In the Wife's Prologue, one may even commit suicide through bitterness of heart:

CT.III.761 ... a tree
 On which he seyde how that his wyves thre
 Hanged hemsself for herte despitus.

Troilus's reaction to the troubling dream of Criseyde and the boar is sorrow and despit in this sense:

TC.V.1243 For sorwe of which, whan he it gan byholde,
 And for despit, out of his slep he breyde,

2. The column of syntagms on the right hand side of page 549 in the Appendix, some of which have despit preceded by the indefinite article, use the word in a sense which suggests an action rather than an attitude or emotion. What seems to be implied is the carrying on into action of the emotion or attitude. This is an action which reveals contempt for the position or the feelings of the person against whom it is carried out: it is a slight, an affront or an insult:

CT.II.699 She wolde noght hir sone had do so;
 Hir thoughte a despit that he sholde take
 So strange a creature unto his make.

A despit in this sense requires vengeance as Absolon testifies:

CT.I.3752 "My soule bitake I unto Sathanas,
 But me were levere than al this toun," quod he,
 "Of this despit awroken for to be.

and the unfortunate Friar of the Summoner's creation complains:

CT.III.2176 "I have," quod he, "had a despit this day,

3. The adverbial phrase in d. of has on most occasions a stronger sense than its modern equivalent, which has the sense 'notwithstanding'. In Chaucer it means 'in contempt for' the opinions of people and often has the sense of 'as an insult to' as well. This sense of injury is evident in Troilus' cry:

TC.III.1705 Pirous and tho swifte steedes thre,
 Which that drawn forth the sonnes char,
 Han gon som bi-path in dispit of me;
 That maketh it so soone day to be;

This intention to insult and demean is even more clear in the following:

LGW(F)134 In his dispit hem thoghte yt did hem good
 To syng of hym, and in hir song despise
 The foule cherl ...

Here Chaucer is picturing the triumph of small birds in Spring and their delight in pillorying in song the bird-catcher who tyrannised them during the winter months.

The sense 'in contempt for' rather than that of injury is represented by:

CT.X.429 that foule partie shewe they to the peple prowdly in
despit of honestitee,

The syntagm in d. seems to be able to refer to an act done in anger with the intention of insulting (LGW.1938) or to have a purposive sense (like the French phrase) i.e. 'in order to shame':

CT.I.947 And wol nat suffren hem, by noon assent,
Neither to been yburyed nor ybrent,
But maketh houndes ete hem in despit."

The adverbial for d. may also have this purposive use:

CT.V.649 Right for despit were peynted hem bisyde,
Pyes, on hem for to crie and chyde.

Other uses cover the senses of adverbial phrases of manner: for annoyance or vexation:

CT.X.507 and forasmuche as they dar nat openly withseye the
comaundementz of hir sovereyns, yet wol they seyn harm,
and grucche, ~~and marmure~~ prively for verray despit; /

Other senses are 'to show contempt' (CT.III.2061) or simply 'because of contempt' and perhaps even 'because of a desire to injure'.

4. Contempt for one's fellow man may indicate pride in one's demeanour, so that despitous is frequently associated with pride:

CT.I.1777 ... "Ty
Upon a lord that wol have no mercy,
But been a leon, bothe in word and dede,
To hem that been in repentaunce and drede,
As wel as to a proud despitous man
That wol mayntene that he first bigan.

CT.X.395 Despitous is he that hath desdeyn of his neighebor ...
or hath despit to doon that hym oghte to do.

5. Contempt may not be far removed from cruelty and violence, and this sense shift is no doubt hastened by the analogy of despitous with the sense of the adjective pitous. Thus, when the day interrupts lovers, it is cruel as well as contemptuous:

TC.III.1458 Allas! what have thise loveris the agylt,
Dispitous day?

Mars is also cruel and dispitouse (TC.II.435) as an essential trait of his

character as god of war. Hence, when Troilus falls to Achilles, only the occurrence independently of the adjective fierse discourages us from understanding despitously as 'fiercely, cruelly' and compels us to understand it as meaning 'contemptuously':

TC.V.1806 Despitously hym slough the fierse Achille.

In less heroic combat, the sense of violence seems primary:

CT.I.4274 And by the throte-bolle he caughte Alayn,
 And he hente hym despitously agayn,
 And on the nose he smoot hym with his fest.

Furious violence is certainly indicated when the aphetic form is applied to shouting:

CT.I.3476 This carpenter wende he were in despeir,
 And hente hym by the sholdres myghtily,
 And shook hym harde, and cride spitously,
 "Wha! Nicolay! wha, how!"

That connotations of lack of sympathy, roughness or contempt are present in these uses, where the primary sense is concerned with physical violence, is indicated by a use in the Clerk's Tale, where the French source is available to us:

CT.IV.534 ... but out the child he hente
 Despitously, and gan a cheere make
 As though he wolde han slayn it er he wente.

The French original concentrates on the roughness, the lack of courtesy of the servant, who carries off the child: 'prist l'enfant par rude et lourde maniere.'

DESDAYN

1. The senses of Desdayn plainly spring from the inequality between two or more people in some situation, or the self-esteem of one in regard to a particular act. These two facts are well-represented in the Verb/Object and related idioms. The Virgin is said to have so ennobled mankind that God no longer had desdayn of it:

CT.VIII.41 Thow nobledest so ferforth oure nature,
 That no desdeyn the Makere hadde of kynde
 His Sone in blood and flesh to clothe and wynde.

The word nature has the possible polysemy of 'birth and hereditary in the social sense' or simply 'inherent characteristics'.

The Parson repeatedly equates sinfulness to servitude and gives this as a reason why sins should be shunned:

CT.X.143 Certes, wel oghte a man have desdayn of synne, and
 withdrawe hym from that thraldom and vileynye./

(cf. ibid. 148, 152).

At line 150, the Persoun assumes that desdayn is natural when a servant sins, and argues that such desdayn should extend to a sinful master also. From the Persoun's attitude, it is possible to see that desdayn is essentially a social feeling, an attitude of the superior to his inferior; the Persoun is endeavouring to give it moral significance.

2. As with other words denoting social relationships, desdayn is also used to refer to the air of superiority adopted by the courtly lady, which makes her reject her lover:

TC.II.1217 She went allone, and gan hire herte unfettre
 Out of desdaynes prison but a lite,
 And sette hire down, and gan a lettre write,

In the lettering over the gate of the park of Love in the Parliament of Fowls (136), Disdayn is coupled with Daunger.

3. The idioms have s'one in d. and taak it .. in d. appear to have a slightly different sense from those mentioned above. There seems to be no question here of superiority of one person over another, nor of self-esteem preventing an act unworthy of a person. If any sense of scorn is involved, it is scorn of the ideas set forth by one man in a situation:

GP.789 "Lordynges," quod he, "now herkneth for the beste;
But taak it nought, I prey yow, in desdeyn.

The Host is here introducing his idea of telling tales on the road to Canterbury. The second use is when the same host interrupts the Franklin's words in praise of the gentillesse of the Squire, and reminds him of his promise to tell a tale to the order of the Host:

CT.V.700 "That knowe I wel, sire," quod the Frankeleyn.
"I prey yow, haveth me nat in desdeyn,
Though to this man I speke a word or two"

The reminder of the agreement is rather peremptory and the Franklin may well be referring to this lack of ceremony which would be appropriate in addressing a person worthy of disdain.

4. Two more occurrences require examination. Desdayn normally implies an action, some direct connection with a situation or person, scorning to act in a particular way or scorning a person. In Troilus, the hero, thinking Criseyde is dead, prepares to kill himself and desdayn is the strong emotion which calls forth his exclamatio:

TC.IV.1191 Than seyde he thus, fulfild of heigh desdayn:
"O cruel Jove, and thow, Fortune adverse,

Here, desdayn seems to be the desire to dissociate himself from the life of men and specifically from his own worldly lot:

Bo.III,p.iv,9 And therof cometh it that Y have right gret disdayn that
dignytes ben yvven ofte to wikkide men.

Here Chaucer is adopting, almost without modification, Jean de Meun's translation of quo fit ut indignemur If scorn is involved, it is scorn felt at the whole moral climate of the world and the injustice of human life.

ILLUSTRATION

Only one occurrence of this word is found:

De III, 10, 11, 50. "But now an upheaval in their world has arisen," quod nunc
"that I have an unprofitable battle against fortune,

Latin sed in eo incommensabile contra fortunam pugno bellum puto,

Allegory and no precise sense applies

Such a translation of the Latin is 'impossible'.

It would seem that the epithet has been transferred to bellum

and not then to the attitude of philosophy. The Latin is not bellum

to denote the sense of this is indicated by the collocation with the

reverse word bellum.

(11)

...a word of single occurrence, despite the occurrence of its (or
antecedent) sign. The common form of the word, *pid*, does not occur in this text.

[R.148] *magico cano y l'isto torde,*
 que por las matras, que, and ome,
 quede to dex a covarose,

French [R.13988]

las en le pillen vi' r'ne,
pi le curra e d'at'ne (de l'iney de cañe)
Seuble bien or'el' r'ne,

...This word occurs in an early work, it does appear that there is a
genuine example of a word which went out of use during the course of
Francis's life; indeed it may be revived here simply for the rhyme

MALICE

Malice, Malicious

Translation evidence offered by Boethius shows that MALICE has a fairly broad application. Thus, as an exclamation, it is the translation of o nefas!, when the subversion of human nature is described, it is malitia, and malice of schismes is the translation of improbitas.

The Roman de la Rose shows that the same orthographic form is used in French.

There seem to be no habitual expressions into which malice enters, causa . . . of m. is repeated as a causal explanation of the links in the Parson's psychology; possibly the repeated think . . . m. represents, with герман m., a kind of idiom. The repeated adverbial phrases are merely idiomatic ways of forming adverbs with many nouns.

The most important collocations are: Malitia, felie and, based on structural considerations rather than frequency, malitient, pacience, virginitate, gratia.

1. The Parson deals shortly with MALICE at the beginning of his section on ENVIE. He implies an opposition with bonitate and says that ENVIE is drawn from INJUSTICE, which makes it a sin against the holy ghost. He then goes on to describe two kinds of MALICE, obduracy in sin or refusal to recognise that it is sin (s.v. HAER), and persecution of truth or God's gifts to another. MALICE in a person is seen in their vices and it is destructive of virtue and innocence of the soul:

MF.II.363 O feyned woman, al that may confounde
Vertu and innocence, though thy malice,
Is bred in thee, as nest of every vice!

In Boethius the subversion of human nature when it becomes malice is reflected in the shape of men turned to beasts:

Bo.IV,p.iii,94 Therefore, when they ben perverted and turned into malice,
cortes, thanne have they forlorne the nature of mankynde.

2. The defined sense of malice as the desire and love of doing harm is supported by a number of ordinary uses in non-explanatory contexts. The following gives malice as the reason for an unjust accusation:

Bo.I,p.iv,272 But O malice! For they that accusen me

Malice seems to include not only the inclination to do harm but also implies the ability to do it:

LGW.2590 The rede Mars was that tyme of the yeere
So feble that his malyce is hym raft;
Repressed hath Venus his crewel craft,
..... venim is adoun,

This sense of the activity of the desire to do harm is also found in the collocation with tirannye, in which the ordinary senses of both are influenced by the other; malice - 'evil' tirannye - 'oppressive power' coalesce in a sense of delight in the power to do harm:

CT.II.779 O Donegild, I ne have noon Englissh digne
Unto thy malice and thy tirannye!

3. In a more passive sense, where active harm is not found, malice can have a sense merely of ill-feeling. Thus we can compare the following references to the same events in the Clerk's account of Griselda's suffering and Walter's cruelty. Malice may apply to the active wickedness of Walter in his persecution of his children and wife:

CT.IV.1074 "And folk that ootherweys han seyde of me,
I warne hem wel that I have doon this deede
For no malice, ne for no crueltee,
But for t'assaye in the thy wommanhede,

It may also apply to the possibility that Griselda is so hardened in evil that she passively suffers the persecution of her children:

CT.IV.692 and if that he
Ne hadde soothly knowen therbifoore
That parfitly hir children loved she,
He wolde have wend that of som subtiltee,
And of malice, or for crueel corage,
That she hadde suffred this with sad visage.

This passive use is reinforced by the contrast with pacience in line 1045.

It is notable that Crueltee appears in both active and passive uses with malice.

4. The phrase malice . . . deserves mention as the only thing approaching an idiom. The word has the sense 'suspect':

FGI.1720 This noble wif sat by hire beddes side
Dischevele, for no malice she no thoughte;

FGI.2307 And hym conveyeth though the myghte detecte
Of athenes, and to the re hym broughte,
And turneth hom; no malice he no thoughte.

The first of these refers to Lucretia facing Tarquinus, and the second to Pandion extracting his daughter to Tercus. In both, the usual, abstract sense of evil or evil intention may be equally well be replaced by the sense 'harm' if taken from the point of view of the result to the person suspecting, or to another (i.e. if the reference is to the person who turns out bad, at this point in time malice must mean 'evil' or 'evil intention', whereas if the emphasis is upon the coming victim, malice simply means 'harm'.)

The sense of malice as evil intent, passive ill-wishing, is reinforced by the parallel with hate in the following:

FGI(B)167 and thus thise fowles, void of al malice,
acorded to love, and latten vice
Of hate, and songen wile of con acord,

5. An important consideration when malice results in active harm is whether or not it is intended. Taken from the point of view of the harm done, intention seems to be an important criterion for ascription to malice. If it is not intended this leads to the collocations with folie.

Thus it is argued that Chaucer could be foolish enough to do harm, without intending to, through his habit of translation or adaptation of other authors:

FGI(B)363 And eke, peruntor, for this man ys nyce,
He myghte doon yt, gessing no malice,
But for he wote thynge for to make;
Hym reketh nought of what harme he take.

In Deipylus, Criseyde considers that foolishness is at least a source of harm as malice:

TC.III.326 "I sey nought this for no mistrust of yow,
 Ne for no wise men, but for foles nyce,
 And for the harm that in the werld is now,
 As wel for folie ofte as for malice;

(cf. also TC.III.880)

The use of the adjective is in a passage referring to those critics of the House of Fame who would judge it according to unfair criteria:

HF.93 And sende hem al that may hem plese,
 That take hit wel and skorne hyt noght,
 Ne hyt mysdemen in her thoght
 Thorgh malicious entencion.

This use can well be compared with some uses of Envye in a similar situation.

ENVY

Translation evidence: the French corresponding to Chaucer's usage is repeatedly envie or envieus. The phrase ful of envie may represent the French plein d'envie, but the phrase had ... rich lust and envie, / that ... is used to render n'ou crist si grant envie (22.1610). More unusual is the rendering for e. bruned she of the French ela fondoit d'ire e ardoit (287). Boethius offers a little Latin evidence. Here envie glosses invidia and withouto envye, / luore carens both rendered envie by Jean de Sain.

The most important collocations are greatly influenced by the moral doctrines of the seven sins. Thus the most important is the one which precedes it in the usual order: Pride and of considerable importance too is the one following, ire; avarice too is important from the point of view of collocation. The other important collocations are: jealous, cruel, dispitous, smooth, hate and we may note the occurrence of tresoun and traitor. It may be of interest that dispit is regarded by the fourteenth century Book of Vices and Virtues as a branch of Pride. If we examine the branches there mentioned we find that the collocations are indubitably influenced by the sort of moral theological thinking found in such works, thus the subdivisions of Pride are: (untrewþe) fals, traitor, tresoun, vilanye, despit, presumpcion, coveitise. Of Ire, wratthe, hate, contek.

1. The sin of envye, as described by works on the seven chief sins, is defined on numerous occasions in Chaucer's works. It is regarded with a seriousness which is not present in today's use of the term and it may be listed together with such grave misdeeds as murder (Monner, l. 62). The Parson opens his discussion of it by characterising it as "sove of oother mennes prosperitee"; and after the word of Saint Augustyn, it is "sove of oother mennes wolo, and joye of oother mennes harm." (21.484). Such a

definition corresponds closely to the representation of Envy in the language of the text and the more naturalistic mentions:

¶¶.III.11. That thurgh that land they preised mine eshon
 That loved vertu, save Envye allons,
 That son, is of nother mannes welle,
 And glad is of his sorwe and his wretched.
 (The doctour maketh this descriptioun).

Chaucer makes ironic irony of the stock definition by ascribing it to his physician's original diagnostic powers. The Parson also points out the obvious connection between Envy and lies:

¶¶.III.58. For soothly, whome hath Envy upon his neighbor, such
 he wole comunly fynde by the nature of untruth, in word or
 in dede, agayns hym to whom he hath Envy.

The difference between hatred and anger at someone is small, so that persistent Envy may soon lead to hate:

¶¶.III.724. Furthe wroth he slowgh and slowgh, and soone wol be
 wroth, and soone is enclined to hate and to envye.

The Parson's elaborations of the basic doctrine reveal that Envy, Hate and Hatred may all be component parts of the same situation, different facets of the same set of relationships between people; one involves or leads to another.

2. In Chaucerian English *envye* seems very often to have a much more active sense than at present; in referring to a situation in which the ill-feeling of the *envyours* man is stressed, Chaucer will use the term *envye*, where a modern reader might see more hatred and malice. Thus persons in a position which is equally as desirable as the person they envy are said to show *envye* and at the same time this is realized in their destructive power. In the following, Fortune is allowed to be of great power, and the suggestion that she serves *envyours* is, in a sense, undeniable. Rather, this is a described struggle of anger, malice, hatred at the joy of another:

¶¶.IV.275 "Alas, wretched is that man, hit is for
 displeasur made unto the foule envye,
 Why he heedestowgh of this, byng of woe,
 O, wofull the hit . . ."

Again, in referring to Satan, reason is given why he should desire something of Man's state, a reference is made to past joy when the stress is on present danger. Here the emphasis is more upon Satan's malice and destructive potential than upon his desire for his old heritage:

CT.II.365 O Sathan, envious syn thilke day
 That thou were chaced from oure heritage,
 Wel knowestow to wommen the olde way!

Malice and harm is obviously paramount in the following:

LGW.902 And now, ye wrechede jelos fadres oure,
 We that whilom were children youre,
 We preyen yow, withouten more envye,
 That in o grave yfere we moten lye,

Similarly, the reason for bearing false witness is malice and the desire to do harm rather than coveting any good of the victim's:

CT.X.796 whan thou for ire, or for meede, or for envye, berest
 fals witesse, etc.

Compare also LGW.1899 et al., where stress is rather upon malice than desire.

3. A few uses make a clear distinction between the modern sense of envy and the implications of malice and hatred which are usually found in the Chaucerian use of the word. In one use envye is explicitly a mutual relation and not the attitude of one person to the good of another:

HF.1476 But yet I gan ful wel espie,
 Betwex hem was a litil envye.
 Oon seyde that Omer made lyes,

Here envye is preceded by the indefinite article and seems to have the sense of contention, dispute, and malice in the detraction of one poet's work by another. Similarly, mentioning the tale of the Calydonian boar, Chaucer recalls the disagreement and strife which arose from Meleager presenting the head of the boar to Atlanta. His uncles felt they had been slighted:

TC.V.1479 "Of which, as olde bokes tellen us,
 Ther ros a contek and a greet envye;

Here envye refers to the malice and hatred felt mutually and is somewhat abstracted to the sense 'strife'.

Compare the use in the Knight's Tale where Theseus endeavours to prevent hostile feelings developing into open strife:

Q2.1.2732 For which such the literature hath envye,
No objection shall withstand the envye,
The game is wof of a ryle as of gothwe,

4. A number of uses, however, have stress not on the hostility of persons involved, but upon the good fortune or achievement of one and the mortification of another or social, sometimes coupled with an implied desire to achieve a similar feat:

133.1409 Of which this Pollexus hadde just envye,
Imagynyng that Jason myght be
Unharned so,

The wife in her colloquial way uses envye thus:

91.IV.95 I garrante it not, I have noon envye,
Thogh I wyldrede profoure bigyne.

and Therscur, returning, in triumph and encountering a group of laughing women, puts forward the text book definition of *envye*:

91.I.967 Quod Therscur. "Have ye so greet envye
Of myn honour, that thus complayne and crye?"

There is here, however, implied opposition in the use of *envye* to Therscur and his triumph. It is possible that the ladies are reviling his success. Similarly Chaucer torments people eager to misconstrue his *House of Fame* through *envye* (95) which can equally be malice or frustrated desire to write something as good. In the *Prologue* he says that the work is a mere adaptation and not the product of his own ingenuity, finishing:

Astr. Intro. 64 And with this sword shal I sleen envye.

Here, the *envye* that he has in mind is clearly the detraction of malicious critics which may be stimulated by a resentment of his ability. In almost every use of the word *envye* there is alongside the covetousness of another's achievement or good fortune this trace of resentment at it and consequent hostility to the person; the difference in use is primarily in the emphasis given to this hostility. Even when the ability is stressed, hostility is clearly present:

91.VIII.1372 For, and men knowen al my subtiltee,
By God, they wolden han so greet envye
To me, by cause of my philosophye,
I shold be dede;

One use is found, however, which Chaucer translated from the French, in which the sense of malice, resentment or hostility is entirely absent. It describes the attitude of a single man without any reference to relations with another:

RR.1653 Tho hadde I sich lust and envie,
 That for Parys ne for Pavie
 Nolde I have left to goon and see
 There grettist hep of roses be.

This is a translation of E lors m'en prist si grant envie, and we should note the different syntactic structure (followed by that) and the fact that the word lust is imported into the translation to reinforce the sense of 'desire'. The English translation of this French sense (cf. mod. French avoir envie de) requires the specifying function of lust; it is translated by a phrase because the Middle English sense of envye is almost exclusively pejorative and has implications of its neighbouring deadly sins. This sense of desire is approached by the verb envien (HF.1231) as are senses of 'compete' (BD.406) and 'compete with the aim of detraction' (TC.V.1789).

5. The conventions of courtly love required that those who were in love should be considered to be greater blessed than those excluded; hence they were constantly the possible targets of the envyous. Therefore, although the profit or advantage of lovers may not be obvious and the malice of detractors may be overt, this kind of malice is always modified by the assumption that they covet the estate of the lovers.

This is least noticeable in the ascription of envye to a wall by Pyramus and Thisbe (LGW.757). The impression is that the word is habitually applied to all those obstructive to lovers and the wall qualifies for this broad classification, thus, too, is day classified, in the traditional aube situation:

TC.III.1700 And day they gonnen to despise al newe,
 Callyng it traitour, envyous, and worse,
 And bitterly the dayes light thei corse.

The text book of courtly love in northern France, the Roman de la Rose, makes

reference or more than one occasion to the conventional jealousy and
 detractors the use of envye (106) and eager to displease and to find
 fault (1031):

II. 7. 436 No fowls of wilded tonges jangle,
 How evens an love han wroches had envye.

All course are the natural habitat of envye (II. 1031; III. 330) and that of
 love is especially so.

In defence of his heroine, Chaucer, thrusts the weight of this
 whole tradition into play when he challenges his audience with the words

III. 666 "Your righte son bewiched jangle thane,
 "Thi was a wodeyn love;"

The word jangle, too, has a high frequency in the situation of the malice
 shown by the envious to lovers.¹

Thus, like numerous other novel terms, envye has a special set of sense
 associations hallowed by convention in the description of opposition to
 courtly lovers. Moreover it is used in this context in similar associations
 of malice and hostility, with the frustrated desire of the envious to share
 in the delightful existence of lovers.

¹ The collocation of jangle and envye is not limited to the words of Chaucer.
 It is common also in *Love's Labour's Lost*, III. 363ff.; III. 687.

FELONYEFelonye, felonous, feloun

Comparatively few of the occurrences of the lexeme are found outside Boethius, and this is in part the result of Jean de Meun's predilection for it.

Translation evidence is of course plentiful. Partly as a result of the use of the French translation, the grammatical categories of the original are not always identical with those of Chaucer's work. Thus the noun improbitas is translated 'felonous wikkidnesse' and nefas, 'felonous synne'.

The main glosses of Felonye are: scelus (sceleratus); nefas; nequitia;
iniquitas; facinus.

The first two are easily the commonest.

For Felonous: sceleratus (scelus); nefarius (nefas); improbus (improbitas); perniciosus, and once each, toruus; saeuus (applied to tyrants) and ferox.

The first two are again more common.

For Feloun scelus; facinus.

The Roman de la Rose also gives us the French word felonie.

The most important head words are: those representing types of people - man, folk, citezeens, tirantz - in a general way, and there are collocations with different words which are more or less semantically equivalent: do; performen; apparailen and wikkidnesse; cursydnesse; synne.

The most important collocations are: wikkide (wikke); synne;

and with negative implication: vertu; innocentz;

also despitous/spitous; and one occurrence each of

the semantically related yvel, schrewednesse, mysdedes.

1. It is already clear from the evidence above that FELONYE has, as its commonest sense, something to do with the commission of evil acts. Its sense

seem to be essentially a moral one, of the translation evidence (p. 111),
 Heron, (p. 111) occasionally, suggest the sense of violence and cruelty
 evident in MELOM, and such a possibility in some is upheld by sporadic
 collocations.

Directly a felony may be characterised as an act which is morally evil:
 p. IV, p. iii, 243 But for to knowen don yvel and felonye as and can be
 referred to good.

There is a reported assertion of the antipathy which men who are felonye
 feel for good men; this is related to the abstract moral conflict of good
 and evil:

p. I, p. iv, 193 But al hulle it ben lawfull that felonous folk, that
 now desisen the blood and the death of alle gode men ...

The third, concrete example above is reported on the abstract level of
 including a virtue:

p. I, p. iv, 190 In which whyng some hath nocht so dullely wgt, that
 they plegne only that schrewed folk's apparelon felonye as one
 vertu;

It is also stated in terms of the guilty in conflict with the innocent
 (p. I, p. iv, 197):

MELOM refers to the wicked deed committed, and also to the
 abstract principle of guilt and evil opposed to virtue and innocence.

Naturally moral guilt also intersects legal guilt so that there is some
 discussion of the punishment deserved by MELOM:

p. IV, p. v, 17 ... that namely prison, laue, and thise othere tormentis
 of lawfull paynes ben rather owed to felonous citizens, for
 whiche felonous citizens the paynes ben established than
 for good folk."

Thus, MELOM enters the same range of 'criminal', and in opposition virtu
 also has its reference as 'law-abiding'.

p. I, p. iv, 227 I rescuue paynes of this felonye for goodoun of vertue
 and what open comite toum of felonye hadde ewere
 juged so accordant in chawte. ...

(cf. also p. IV, p. v, 22).

2. MELOM, then, includes deeds which are both immoral and illegal, and

their gravity varies considerably. They may include all those acts of which the Furies were traditionally the avengers (Bo.III,m.xii,34); murder is also included (CT.VII.3040; and CT.II.643). But, besides this more emotional use of felonye to refer to serious crimes, it can be used for apparently less serious misdemeanours. It is used, for example, of the plottings of Boethius' adversaries:

Bo.I,p.v,52 And of the felonyes and fraudes of thyn accusours ... and in the Parson's Tale 438 a meynee is called felonous which is damageous to other people. Other things worthy of the appellation are the desire to do vengeance, and the tendency to anger (CT.X.543; Bo.IV,p.iii,107). The equivalenee of a felonye and a synne is suggested by the translation in Boethius I,p.iv,154:

~~For shal I clepe it thanne a felonye or a synno, that~~
I have desired the savacioun of the ordre of the senat?

The syntax of the English might suggest a distinction between the two terms, but this cannot be maintained along the lines of legality/morality in other contexts, nor is it supported by the Latin where the single word nefas is used. The present phrase is the product of a dilemma in the French translation.

3. FELONYE is used of illegality according to the laws of the state and of immorality according to the laws of society; it is also used of sins against man or God in religious estimation. The Parson speaks of the sin of Despair, pointing out that it is the origin of all varieties of wrongdoing, probably judged from the religious viewpoint:

CT.X.696 This horrible synne is so perilous that he that is despeired, ther nys no felonye ne no synne that he douteth for to do;

In speaking of sins against God, felonous can have the sense 'blasphemous'

Bo.V,p.iii,125 But not oonly to trowe that God is disseyved, but for to speke it with mouthe, it is a felonous synne.

To think that God is not sovereign good is called a felenous cursydesse

(20:11, 20:12) ... felony ...
 (20:11, 20:12) ... felony ...
 ... of ...
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... another ...
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4. The fact that ...
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In speaking of Ire, the Parson distinguished a reprehensible kind which leads to premeditated desire for vengeance; the source of this is felonie of herte (CT.X.543). In a similar sense, felonye is one of a list of vices given in Boethius IV, prosa iii. These include avarice, ire, timidity, sloth, inconstancy, lechery, and treachery (insidiator occultus):

Bo.IV,p.iii,107 and if he be felonous and withoute reste, and exercise his tonge to chidynges, thow schalt likne hym to the hound.

(Ferox atque iniquies linguam litigiis exercet?)

Here felonous is certainly evil to others, in the sense of quarrelsome, malicious and perhaps Envyous.

In the Romance, the arrow in the quiver of Swete-Lokyng which is called Vylanye is said to be poisoned with felonye and spitous blame. Again the sense seems to be one of harmfulness to the lover, one of malice. Earlier in the poem (165) the image of Felonie is set between those of Hate and Vilanye.

The collocation felonous talenz (Bo.V,p.ii,38) is slightly ambiguous in significance, since it may mean the desires and affections of an evil man, or it may mean affections which are destructive to that man. The latter sense squares best with the Latin (perniciosis ... affectibus).

5. The form Feloun as a substantive simply means one who is felonous or commits felonyes. It occurs in the same kind of contexts as these two words: virtue receives the punishments suitable to felouns (Bo.IV,p.i,31) and; Bo.I,m.v,37 so that anyous peyne, that scholde duweliche punysche felons, punysscheth innocentz?

The adjectival use is more difficult to account for:

TC.V.199 To Troie is come this woful Troilus,
In sorwe aboven alle sorwes smerte,
With feloun look and face dispitous.

The clue to the sense of this must be given by the considerations given in the preceding paragraph. Here, the term must signify a look of malice to all mankind, related to the sense of FELONYE in the Romance of the Rose. We may compare it with a second usage in the same poem: Ses felons cuers (RR.265).

VILAINY

Vylaynye, vylayn, vylaynaly, vylaynous.

The commonest collocations are, in descending order of frequency, huma, vrona, shche, zime/synful, wikrod, pentil, despit, lochehnye. Noticeable also are the number of the seven sins and their branches which are collocated with Vilaynye: vica, ira, hate, glotnye, enwe, usure. There are also a number of collocations which represent the lower sections of society: thraldom, unkindely, cherlyesh and of higher society with some antithetical sense adjustments: custardio, pentillope.

The Romance offers little useful translation evidence, though vilaynaly is Chaucer's translation of vilment.

Boethius offers the following glosses: with hir v. : sua contorsione.
(French vilment)

how grete v. curtina .. deceus.
(French honte)

1. Some of the collocations of VILAINY, together with the translations from Latin deceus and French vilment, suggest a reference to the social hierarchy, which is the primary use of the lexeme in the earlier Old French texts. The substantive vilayn, referring to a member of the lower social orders, occurs only in the doubtfully Chaucerian parts of the Romaunt of the Rose. Earlier in the Romaunt, however, this sense is preserved in Chaucer's usage, social baseness being measured by lack of knowledge of the custom and manners of the more elevated members of society:

R.R. 178 Ful foul and cherlyesh seemed she,
 and eek vylaynous for to be,
 and litel coude of morture,
 to worships any creature.

Chaucer considers that the baseness of the personification of Vylayne consists in her lack of training to treat anyone with honour. The French original adds the conception of worthiness of honour:

165ff. Qu'el sembloit bien chose vilaine;
 Bien sembloit estre d'afiz pleine
 E fame qui petit sellist
 D'enorer ce qu'ele delist.

Roughness of speech and expression may be considered indicative of social baseness, as Chaucer was aware when he defended verisimilitude of speech at the commencement of the Canterbury Tales:

GP.726 But first I pray yow, of youre curteisye,
 That ye n'arete it nat my vileynye,
 Thogh that I pleynly speke in this mateere,
 To tell yow hir wordes and hir cheere,

A man may be considered to exhibit VYLAYNYE in his speech according to two criteria; those of the form of his speech and of its content. Chaucer adds to the above:

GP.740 Crist spak hymself ful brode in hooly writ,
 And wel ye woot no vileynye is it.

When speaking of vylayne as a speech-act, the usual implication is that it refers to the content of what is said. The person of refinement was, unlike the personification of Vylayne, supposed to esteem his fellow highly; hence, if he detracted from them, he fell below this ideal and behaved in a manner more fitted to the level of churl:

GP.70 He nevere yet no vileynye ne sayde
 In al his lyf unto no maner wight.
 He was a verray, parfit gentil knyght.

One who speaks ill of another may find himself accused of VYLAYNYE:

TC.IV.21 Allas! that they sholde evere cause fynde
 To speke hire harm, and if they on hire lye,
 Iwis, hemsself sholde han the vilanye.

An antonymy with Curteisie is suggested in the following and reinforced by

CT.IV.2303:

CT.VI.740 But, sires, to yow it is no curteisye
 To speken to an old man vileynye,
 But he trespasse in word, or elles dede.

Within the ethos of courtly manners, VYLAYNYE may refer to acts wider than a mode of address: thus Pandarus dissuades Troilus from leaving the house of Sarpedoun at an earlier time than expected in case this is construed as VYLAYNYE:

[R.V.490

..... I had not fallen within
 the right way, if I shall not be soya,
 that any right is of no more toya
 than Sarpodoun; and if we honour hie
 that Sarpodoun, I holde it vylanye,

Hys that we sayen that we holde blame
 with hys a vylanye;

to leave only, implies a poor estimation of Sarpodoun's company.

The essential criterion of baseness, borrowed from the original social reference, is also used morally, both in the secular morality of knighthood and the spiritual morality of the church:

[R.V.2729

It was unretted hys no vylanye;
 when any no sin clepe it covardise.

[R.V.143

Wether, well oghte a man have covardise of tyme, and
 withdrew hys from that trealdom and vylanye./

The transition from a reference to social baseness to one of moral baseness is exemplified by theorists of gentillesse such as the wife of Bath:

[R.V.1158

And nat hymselfen do no gentil dedis,
 he foloweth the gentil maner that dooth us,
 he nys nat gentil, be he knye or knyght,
 for vylanye is ful of covardise e chere.

Similarly (11.1), she has pointed out that people do not always behave true to type and that a lord's son may often do these and vylanye.

2. One may commit an act which, in isolation, is judged to be a base one, but acts having a direct effect on others are also called vylanye. Such acts are usually harmful to another and often imply a decrease in their value or a detraction from them. Thus Strachan in the lament is over eager not to seem to despise her lover:

[R.1231

But she hys holpe his hys to avoide;
 his thought it elles a vylanye.

Conversely, the unfaithfulness of men is considered as a lapse from the proper behaviour of the lover and called vylanye, (R.V.2911) and involves a danger that he wills anything to do so, so that women learn of vylanye (R.V.1033). This sense of vylanye as 'dishonest' a harm that detracts from social prestige is also present in the reference to Waldschloz wyl in

CT.V.1404 She took hir children alle, and skipte adoun
 Into the fyr, and chees rather to dye
 Than any Romayn dide hir vileynye.

Creon's treatment of the dead bodies of his enemies (CT.I.942) is regarded as an act of Vylayne; a reduction of the esteem in which they should be held, a gross insult. VYLAYNYE is also one of the possible reasons for unfair critics detracting from the House of Fame:

HF.96 And whoso thorgh presumpcion,
 Or hate, or skorn, or thorgh envye,
 Dispit, or jape, or vilanye,
 Mysdeme hyt,

And words described as Vileyns may not simply be poorly formed but may have a content which detracts from the person to whom they are addressed:

CT.VII.1503 for he dide nevere synne, ne nevere cam ther a vileyns
 word out of his mouth./ Whan men cursed hym, he cursed hem
 noght;

Frequently, VYLAYNYE seems to apply to an act close to betrayal, in which a person who should by the established order of things respect and be loyal to another, does them harm:

CT.IV.1791 O Januarie, dronken in plesaunce
 In mariage, se how thy Damyan,
 Thyn owene squier and thy borne man,
 Entendeth for to do thee vileynye.

(With this type should be compared the Vylayne of false lovers).

Wives, in their adultery, do vylanye to their husbands (CT.IV.2261), and also in betraying their secrets (CT.III.962).

Also VYLAYNYE is used simply to refer to an act done to the detriment of another with overtones neither of betrayal nor of deliberate detraction:

TC.II.438 So lat me nevere out of this hous departe,
 If I mente harm or any vilenye!

CT.VII.1459 ... thanne have ye noon oother remedie but for to have
 youre recours unto the sovereyn Juge that vengeth alle
 vileynyes and wronges./

3. As mentioned above, the baseness of sin may be implied by the use of VYLAYNYE - especially in a religious context, but also in the colloquial language (CT.III.962), where both are used with less strict application.

In the usage of the lexicon and other ecclesiastical, Vilniai is frequently associated with one or another of the deadly sins or their branches: envy (LI.VII.491) and gluttony (LI.VI.503) and, last but not of all, is its association with lechery. In this connection there is a reference to Netifant's wife (LI.II.800) and a series of distinctions made by Vilniai to qualify ordinary human relations; thus vileyas tomshams in Alkeda namene (LI.II.674), love in vileynye (LI.VIII.156), likhen in vileynye (LI.II.857) and the following opposition to chastity:

LI.VIII.291 He moves right shall soon learn with a sick ye,
 But he be chaste and hate vileynye.

Vilniai is also paired with lechery:

LI.II.940 Tho thirde is for to encheve lecherye and vileynye.
 And at one point identified with it as: vilia vileyne (ibid. 991). In a broader sense of sin in general, a man may have vileyng thoughts, speak vileyng words, and have a vileyng heart:

LI.II.627 and certes, chidyng may not come but out of a vileynge
 herte.

This idea should be compared with the idea of words of detraction mentioned above.

Sin at its vilest may be characterized in the same way:

LI.II.802 for which every vileyns synne, that was don in synne
 places may be cleped synnyll;

The devil tries to draw people into his vileynye (LI.II.852).

4. The adverb Vileynly has a very limited use (3 uses), and is restricted to the modification of past participles, used passively, in two of these. The exception illustrates the sense with overtones of betrayal, as well as behaviour unbecoming to social position, and is contrasted with the behaviour of the person persecuted:

LI.II.154 ... and bohte him fro the deeth with his herte-
 blood, that they so unkyndely, agayns his gentillesse,
 quiten hym so vileynly to slaughter of his owne soles./

The passive used place the word in a position which facilitates interpretation

in a new sense. It is in fact a term formed using and referring back to the action, but now modifies a past participle which in turn modifies the acted upon. Thus attention is directed to the person mentioned and a new sense of *villainy* is needed:

1456 When should he fool in every vein
 that sorowe breeds lovers miken,
 that ben so villainously forsaken.

The logical situation is much clearer in the French:

1464 Si porroit savoir e entendre
 quel uol ont li loial quant
 au l'en forsake li vilient.

Here there is a notion towards synonymy with *GUILLIAMS*.

Fate seems like a creator of discord and has an attitude of heart called fel, and the Harpies are called cruel bryddes felle (CF.VII.2100):

CF.I.2630 Ther nas no tygre
 So cruel on the hunte as is Arcite
 For jelous herte upon this Palamon.
 He in Delmarye ther nys so fel leon,
 That hunted is, or for his hunger wood,

Felnesse evidently implies no moral judgement, but simply harshness, cruelty, violence, ferocity. The destructive ferocity of Mars and Juno is expressed in the only direct application to a human referent; though immortal, rather than human, and above moral judgement:

CF.I.1559 Allas, thou felle Mars! allas, Juno!
 Thus hath youre ireoure lynage al fordo,

2. The Old French use of fel regularly applied to human beings and had a range of sense from 'wicked' through 'cruel' to 'traitor'. It would seem, therefore, that the English senses are all transferred senses of the original. There is, however, a use in Troilus and Criseyde which closely approaches these other French uses:

TC.V.50 But why he nolde don so fel a dede,
 That shal I seyn, and whi hym liste it spare:

The deed mentioned is the projected slaying of Diomedes and the carrying off of Criseyde. Troilus rejects the idea lest Criseyde be injured. Although the deed is one of violence and harshness, the stress is not upon the cruelty of Troilus; the fact that this is a human act, which is debated, invites moral judgement. Thus, perhaps, fel has some of its French sense of 'evil' or even 'mad' or 'desperate' which may be justified in view of the gloss of Latin insanum (see above + compare WOOD).

Again, this moral sense is invoked when Troilus is searching for some justification for Criseyde's desertion:

TC.V.1257 What wratthe of juste cause have ye to me?
 What gilte of me, what fel experience,
 Hath fro me raft, allas! thyn advertence?

JALOUSYEJalous, jalousye

No translation evidence is offered by either Boethius or the Romanunce.

The most common associations by collocation are, in decreasing order of frequency: strif; love; wood; cruelte; envyous; hate; novelrie. Some of these occur in simple lists while others recur in syntactically patterned positions; of the latter, strif, envyous, wood and love are important.

Other words of similar sense occurring in syntactically patterned positions are: debat, teene, fore, angre, wrothe.

1. The lexeme JALOUSYE is easily the most common in relation to the situations of lovers or of husbands and wives. A husband or a lover may be jalous without the threat of a third party, and this is demonstrated by his deeds which, however, presuppose the possibility of a rival.

The longest explication of JALOUSYE is given by Criseyde's musings on the behaviour of Troilus, who has fallen into miserable speculation on her supposed infidelity:

TC.III.1023ff. "Ek al my wo is this, that folk now usen
To seyn right thus, 'Ye, jalousie is love!'
And wolde a busshel venym al excusen,
For that o greyn of love is on it shove.
But that woot heighe God that sit above,
If it be likkere love, or hate, or grame;
And after that, it oughte bere his name.

Criseyde goes on to say that some kinds of jalousye are excusable, as for example when it is repressed by Piete, so that the sufferer does not do or say amiss; this gentillesse makes jalousye excusable. By comparison, she says, there is also jalousye, full of furie and despit, which overcomes all efforts to repress it. She finally admits that Troilus succeeds in the repression of his jalousye and this makes for his discomfort.

2. In the jalousye exhibited by husbands or accepted lovers, an important criterion of the sense is that of possessiveness, and the desire to retain the prize; this desire often necessitating repression of the wife or beloved.

In the case of wives this may extend to the threat of death:

CT.IV.2073 And therwithal the fyr of jalousie,
Lest that his wyf sholde falle in som folye,
So brente his herte that he wolde fayn
That som man bothe hire and hym had slayn.

There may be no immediate threat and jalousye may be an habitual attitude resulting in restriction and oppression of the one who is possessed:

CT.I.3224 Jalous he was, and heeld hire narwe in cage,
For she was wylde and yong, and he was old,
And dened hymself been lik a cokewold.

In the following, jalousye is coupled with kepyng, which demonstrates the primacy of this idea in this sense and situation:

CT.I.3851 Thus swyved was this carpenteris wyf,
For al his kepyng and his jaloucye;

JALOUSYE in this primary sense, then, is the reaction of lovers or husbands at the contemplation of their partner entering a sexual liaison with another.

Within this broad terminology a further situation may be included; the reaction of fathers of daughters to a similar threat to their children:

LGM.900 And now, ye wrechede jelos fadres oure,
we that whilom were children youre,
We preyen yow, withouten more envye,
That in o grave yfere we moten lye,
Sith love hath brought us to this pitous ende.

Piramus and Thisbe are the speakers.

The lexeme is also used in this kind of situation with a good deal of vagueness as to who shows the emotion:

LGM.722 For in that contre yit, withouten doute,
Maydenes been ykept, for jelosye,
Ful streyte, lest they diden som folye.

The lover who is jalous may sometimes be in no position to restrain his beloved by force so that the most he can do, short of unacceptable violence, is to speak bitter words to her; thus, by metonymy, we have: jalous wordes (TC.III.907), and in describing the perfect marriage:

CP.I.3106 And Emelye hym loveth so tenderly,
 And he hire serveth al so gentilly,
 That nevere was ther no word hem bitwene
 Of jalousie or any oother teene.

Cf. too CP.V.748.

Thus, within the field of marriage and sexual relations generally, jalousie indicates primarily a kind of possessiveness with overtones of unreasonableness, and an inevitable contiguity in the situation with oppression and violence.¹

2. JALOUSYE also has the criterion of suspiciousness:

Venus 33 Jelousie be hanged be a cable!
 She wolde al knowe thurgh her espyng.
 Ther doth no wyght nothing so reasonable,
 That al nys harm in her ymagynng.

The personification of Jelousie is considered as ever vigilant for harm and transcending reason in her alertness. This attitude, implying distrust of one's beloved (TC.III.837), is of course anathema to courtly love, and is considered one of the mortal vices in that situation:

RF.458 "I dar seyn, if she me fynde fals,
 Unkynde, janglere, or rebel any wyse,
 Or jelous, do me hangen by the helle!"

3. A number of uses of JALOUSYE in the Knight's Tale deserve special mention, since their sense seems to be affected by the special situation there, where intense rivalry exists between two equals in the estimation of a single lady. The lady does not care passionately for either.

Since neither has possession of the lady and the rivalry is open, allowing no suspicion, neither of these criteria are stressed. The emphasis seems to be on the strength of feeling and the anxiety felt by each lest the other should be successful. This leads to violent hostility between

¹ Both jalousye and avarice are considered traditionally typical of the old, and both included this element of kepyng. Gower comments upon the affinity between the two:

CA.V.596 Non mai wel make a likelikedo
 Betwen him which is averous
 Of gold and him that is jelous
 Of love,

them and the sense of the lexeme, through the comparative lack of involvement of the lady and the suppression of the other criteria, moves towards that of hatred:

CT.I.2785 I have hoer with my cosyn Palamon
Had strif and rancour many a day agon
For love of yow, and for my jalousye.

Earlier in the poem, the pairing of strif and jalousye seem to invite understanding as similar, in referring to the relationship of Palamon and Arcite, which is seen to be an inimical one:

CT.I.1634 I speke as for my suster Emelye,
For whom ye have this strif and jalousye.

This impression is strengthened by a similar pairing a few lines later:

CT.I.1840 That is to soyn, she may nat now hen bothe,
Al be ye never so jalouse ne so wrothe.

Theseus is preparing to arbitrate between Palamon and Arcite. In their final battle we hear that Arcite is cruel and fierce to Palamon For jelous herte (CT.I.2629) and, by metonymy, a few lines later we have the interesting collocation:

CT.I.2634 The jelous stroked on hir helmet byte;
Out renneth blood on bothe hir sydes rede,

From this context we would be almost justified in reading jelous as synonymous with 'hostile' or, avoiding figurative language, simply 'violent'.

4. A number of uses occur also which seem to be closely similar in sense to some of the senses of envyous. The persons who are likely to be jalous are not clearly specified and seem to have a very tenuous connection with those against whom their malevolence is directed. They seem to occupy the place of the losengiers of French courtly poetry who are always ready to defame courtly lovers:

LG.(G)331 For in youre court is many a losengeour,
And many a qucynte totelere accusour,
That tabouren in youre eres many a thyng
For hate, or for jelous ymagynyng.

Chaucer is here talking of the court of Love, but there is no hint of competition between the accusers and accused, and the stress seems to be more

upon gratuitous malice than strongly emotional motives. For the barefacedness of the accusations, compare the phrasing of Venus 33 (above). Again, in The Squire's Tale, V, 286, the strategems of lovers against the perception of vague jalous men are mentioned, and in Venus, 62, the adjective is used substantively to suggest the unspecified persons who might prove a threat to the lover's resolution. Finally, in Mars, 7, the light of the sun is seen as the candle which reveals lovers' secrets to the jalous and enables their slanderous tongues to wag:

Mars 7 But ye lovers, that lye in any drede,
 Fleeth, lest wikked tonges yow espye!
 Lo! yond the sunne, the candel of jelosye!

This is an adaptation of the classical gube and it has its lozenjers in attendance; people who are not personally involved, but who are malicious, though less than immediately desirous of being in the position of the lovers.

5. The sense of violent enmity mentioned above is to be found more explicitly in the following. Here there is no suggestion of possessiveness, nor even a vague desire for the position of the person against whom the malice is directed. The emphasis is purely upon unreasoning malice and violence:

OT.I.1329 But I moot been in prisoun thurgh Saturne,
 And eek thurgh Juno, jalous and eek wood,
 That hath destroyed wel ny al the blood
 Of Thebes,

This uniquely clear example of jalous in the sense 'malicious' is also its only application to a female.

6. Also unique is its application to an animal, the swan. This comes in a list of birds in which distinctive features are given:

PF.342 There was the douve with hire y'en meke;
 The jelous swan, ayens his deoth that syngeth;

The precise contextual sense here is difficult to establish, but Professor J.A.W. Bennett remarks that JALOUSYE was traditionally ascribed to swans.¹

¹ The Parlement of Foules, p.150, where he quotes this association in Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy.

7. Finally a peculiar use in the Parson's Tale may be noted:

CT.X.539

The good Ire is by jalousie of goodnesse, thurgh which
a man is wroothe with wikkednesse and agayns wikkednesse;

This sense is evidently not very different from senses in paragraphs 1 to 3,
and seems to imply a fervent desire to possess.

TIRANNYETirannye, tiraunt

Translation evidence of Boethius shows that tiraunt is used only to gloss tyrannus, though the sentence may be arranged so that tiramyne glosses tyrannos.

Collocation evidence: the most important collocations are: cruel/ crueltee (easily most important), wode, felonous. There is also a reciprocal relation between the antithetical relation of vertuous and the positive one of vice. It might be added that the names of the following vices are found among the collocants: ire, pryde, envye, avarice (the last 3 in a single passage).

1. Viciousness and oppression are obviously components of the sense of TIRANNYE from the collocations mentioned above. The Latin tyrannus is derived from the Greek and is generally taken to mean 'absolute ruler' but it is clear that the association with cruelty had been made in the Late Latin of Boethius. There are occasional uses in Chaucer where the wickedness of the man of power called a tiraunt is not stressed:

Bo.III,p.v,23 A tyraunt, that was kyng of Sysyle, that hadde assayed
the peril of his estat, schewede by simylitude the dredes
of remes by gastnesse of a swerd that heng over the hed.

In the Franklin's Tale, Chaucer speaks of tirauntz in the Greek sense, but the more modern sense is also applicable for they are ful of cursednesse (V.1368) and involved in deeds of violent oppression (CT.V.1387).

Elsewhere, tiraunt refers to a man of power who is also wicked and oppressive, and tirannye always has the emphasis on evil and cruelty. Tiraunts are false (CT.VII.2537); felounous and wode (Bo.I,m.iv,13; IV,m.i,42); cruel (CT.VII.2103): tirannye is listed with other violently harmful abstractions in CT.I.2015 and is, with other vices, notable by its absence from the ideal Former Age 54. Pursuing a conception of recurrent interest

to Chaucer, it is regarded as undesirable in the man of power. It is his particular vice:

CT.VII.2508 "Sire," wolde he seyn, "an emperour moot nede
De vertuous and hate tiramnye -"

(see also ibid. I.2502).

The essential wickedness of the tiraunt is clearly stated in the following:

CT.IX.223 Right so bitwixe a titlelees tiraunt
And an outlawe, or a theef erraunt,
The same I seye, ther is no difference.
To alisaundre was toold this sentence,
That, for the tiraunt is of gretter myght,
By force of meynee, for to sleen downright,

In this definition, the word titlelees is important, since it implies a distinction between wrongful oppression and rightful severity. In general use this distinction is subject to blurring. The peculiar use where tiraunt seems to be used adjectivally is an example of such blurring; the fermour has the right to be severe in administration of his tenure, but the line between oppression and justifiable and expected severity is a subjective one:

IG.(F)377 For he that kyng or lord ys naturel,
Hym oghte nat be tiraunt ne crewel,
As is a fermour, to doon the harm he kan.

It is assumed that one who has no ties, inherited by birth, with his liegemen, will be oppressive.

2. The cruelty and oppression of persons in power may be referred to in abstract terms, as in adverbial phrases of manner. In such uses tirannye seems to become a quality of the mind like crueltee:

CT.I.941 Fulfild of ire and of iniquitee,
He, for despit and for his tirannye,
To do the dede bodyes vileynye
Of alle our lordes whiche that been yalawe,
Hath alle the bodyes on an heep ydrawe,

and again:

AI.66 And whan the olde Orcon gan espye
How that the blood roial was brought a-down,
He held the cite by his tyrannye,

With emphasis rather upon cruelty and violence than upon regal power, the

term tiraunt is used figuratively to apply to the goshawk:¹

Pt.334 Ther was the tiraunt with his fetheres done
And grey, I mene the goshawk, that doth pyne
To bryddes for his outrageous ravyne.

3. As is often the case, tirannye is used both in the discussion of political and social behaviour and also, by figurative transfer, in the discussion of courtly love. Thus Criseyde, with reference to her reluctance to accede to Troilus's desires, is accused of playing the tirant (TC.II.1240). The thinking which allows the application of the term to a reluctant mistress is set out in the following:

CT.IV.1989 Som tyrant is, as ther be many oon,
That hath an horte as hard as any stoon,
Which wolde han let hym sterven in the place
Wel rather than han graunted hym hire grace;
And hem rejoysen in hire crueel pryde,
And rekke nat to been an homycide.

When Love is personified, tirannye may be used as a quality of its 'character'; likewise it may be referred to the behaviour of the personified Crueltee (Rity 6; 67). The first is stated in a favourite antithesis of deserts and treatment received. (cf. MEMOIRS):

Rity 6 My purpos was to Pite to complayne
Upon the crueltee and tirannye
Of Love, that for my trouthe doth me dye.

Here, tirannye can hardly be considered a part of character, but is rather judged as a result of effects on another; it is oppression by a hypothetical entity which can be defined only by its harsh results.

4. Finally a number of uses exist outside the courtly love situation and which have little emphasis on violent power. They seem to be primarily moral uses. This accounts for the use in the description of Custance, though the contrast with humility suggests that tirannye here, though primarily moral, implies haughtiness and superior attitude:

¹ Bennett, The Parlement of Foules, p. 150, says that Chaucer is here following Alain of Lille and that the word had a special association with birds of prey.

CT.II.165 Murblowse hath slayn in hire al tyrannye.
 She is mirour of alle curteisye;
 Hir herte is verray chambre of hoolynesse,
 Hir hand, ministre of fredam for almese."

Such a sense is probably present in the purging of a courtly lover:

Lang 37 For she forbad him jclooye at al,
 And cruelte, and bost, and tyrannye;

But the sense may sometimes suggest no tendency to set oneself above others and may simply imply evil and violence to others:

CT.II.779 O Donegild, I ne have noon Englishs digne
 Unto thy malice and thy tyrannye!

and the same lady said to be ful of tyrannye (696).

The lady in love can complain of the tirannye done by men, where the word means no more than the wicked and cruel deeds done to the undeserving:

LCW.1883 And as of men, loke ye which tyrannye
 They doon wlday; assay hem whoso lyste,
 The trewest ys ful brotel for to triste,

5. The Use of Tiraunt as an adjective

The use in appositive function of the noun, as in the tiraunt Aristocleides (CT.V.1387), is fairly common. Such uses call for no comment other than that, if an adjective of identical form exists, it would be impossible in such uses to distinguish the attributive adjective and the noun. This is equally true in predicative constructions:

LCW(F)377 For he that kynge or lord ys naturel,
 Hym oghte nat be tiraunt ne crevel,

This unique use closely parallels a common predicative use of adjectives in which two adjectives are paired by the use of a conjunction. This fact of usage encourages the interpretation of this particular use of tiraunt as an adjectival one.

IREIre, irous

Translation evidence is restricted, since the form of the word is frequently adopted directly from Latin or French.

From Old French: for hir wrathe, yre, and onde - de corroz et d'ataine
 he that is irous and wrooth - qui est courroucie
 stiroth...to enyre and to ire - a courrouz et a yre
 he baar a cruell ire - il estoit moult courrociez

In these examples, selected from outside those uses where Chaucer merely adopts the word ire from his source, it is most striking how consistently he pairs ire with wrooth in translating the French lexeme CORROZ. This seems to be a specifying or clarifying technique akin to the glossator's pairing of terms.

From Latin: In Boethius Chaucer's use represents the ira of Latin and the ire of Jean de Meun.

Collocational evidence is, as might be expected, affected by the presence of IRE as one of the chief sins. It collocates frequently with other sins and their branches (lecherye, envye, pride, covetise, hate, falsnesse et al.). It commonly collocates also with words signifying sorrow or misery. Its other most important collocates are: CRUELTEE, WOODNESSE, WRATHIE, ANGER, VENGEANCE.

Before endeavouring to ascertain the senses and sense-relations of IRE from its uses, it might be instructive to look at the terms in which it is defined in didactic contexts expounding the seven capital sins. The Parson has a long section on IRE and the means to combat it. The theological attitude may, however, be introduced by the Summoner:

CT.III.2005 Ire is a synne, oon of the grete of sevene,
 Abhomyable unto God of hevene;
 And to hymself it is destruccion.
 This every lewed viker or person
 Kan seye, how ire engendreth homycide.
 Ire is, in wrooth, executour of pryde.

Surely enough, the Parson opens his section on Ire by pointing out its origins in Pride and Envy:

CT.X.534 for soothly, he that is proud or envyous is lightly wrooth.

he goes on: 'This synne of Ire, after the discryving of Scint Augustyn, is wikked wil to been avenged by word or by dede.

There follows a pseudo-scientific description of the perturbation of the blood in the heart, causing a man to wish harm to those he hates, and resulting in the clouding of his reason. The Parson then divides IRE into two: good IRE, which is IRE against evil deeds, and wicked IRE, which can itself be divided. The first of these divisions is sodeyn or hastif Ire which springs without premeditation; the second, and the graver, is that species of IRE which is a determination to do vengeance and is premeditated as such. This form is mortal sin.

The results of IRE are that a man is robbed of his spiritual tranquillity; he is subject to hatred and discord, liable to strife and murder. There is no need to follow the subtleties of the operations of IRE which might face the parish priest in his pastoral duties: the Parson ends by counselling DEBOLIAIRETE and PACIENCE as antidotes to IRE.

Amongst this multiple definition of IRE, offered by two of the Churchmen on the Pilgrimage, we have encountered a number of the criteria of sense which emerge in use.

1. Firstly, IRE is a sin and is forbidden by God (CT.III.1834), as the Parson says; it finds offence in others and leads to vengeance:

CT.I.1765 And although that his ire hir gilt accused,
 Yet in his resoun he hem bothe excused,

Thesous is a just lord who is able to overrule IRE by his intellect. Otherwise, he might have taken vengeance for a real or imagined insult:

CT.IX.279 O rakel hand, to doon so foule amys!
 O trouble wit, o ire recchelees,
 That unavysed smyteth gilteles!

The group of syntagms with ire as subject or complement, and implying the exaction of vengeance, reflect Augustinian and earlier definitions of

the term. Outside this group the usage in Troilus V.1464 illustrates the association:

"Diane, which that wroth was and in ire
 For Grekis nolde don hire sacrificise,

 Wraak hire in a wonder cruel wise;

Apart from vengeance, IRE is listed as one of those causes of general evil-doing and speech:

CT.V.781 Ire, siknesse, or constellacioun,
 Wyn, wo, or chaungynge of complexioun
 Causeth ful ofte to doon amys or speken.

IRE, alone, might be the immediate motivation of murder:

CT.IX.265 his bowe he bente, and sette therinne a flo,
 And in his ire his wyf thanne hath he slayn.

2. The Parson has listed all these aspects of IRE, but another important concept associated with it does not fall within his parish; this is the effect of IRE as affecting a man of power and prestige. The setting forth of this problem falls within the sphere of interest of the Tale of Melibee, and the concern there expressed is voiced elsewhere in the Canterbury Tales:

CT.VII.1125 And secoundely, he that is irous and wrooth, he may
 nat wel deme;

Prudence then goes on to advise her husband to put aside certain attitudes in taking counsel about his course of action with regard to repentent vassals. Shortly afterwards she finds cause to rebuke him:

CT.VII.1246 .. ye have erred, for ye han broght with yow to youre
 conseil ire, coveitise, and hastifnesse/ the whiche thre
 thinges been contrarious to every conseil honest and
 profitable;/

The final judgement is made by the Summoner:

CT.III.2014 And therefore preye I God, bothe day and nyght,
 An irous man, God sende hym litel nyght!
 It is greet harm and certes greet pitee
 To sette an irous man in heigh degree.

Boethius advises the sufferer on how to weather the onslaught of the irous man of power, concluding:

Bo.I,m.ii,16 Wharto thanne, o wrecches, drede ye tirauntz that
ben wode and felenous withouten any strongthe? Hope
aftir no thyng, ne drede nat; and so schaltow desarmen
the ire of thilke unmighty tiraunt.

Both the Parson and the Summoner in the passage quoted make the point
that IRE is dangerous not only to others but to the one who experiences it.
This is taken up elsewhere: in the Man of Law's Tale, the joyful state of
one whose heart is not stirred by IRE is contemplated:

CT.II.1137 Who lyved euere in swich delit o day
That hym ne moeved outhir conscience,
Or ire, or talent, or som kynnes affray,
Envye, or pride, or passion, or offence?

Boethius (I,p.v,69 and IV,m.ii,10) imagines a man tortured by his own IRE:

Bo.IV,m.ii,10 For lecherye tormenteth hem on that o side with gredy
venymes; and troublable ire, that areyseth in hem the
floodes of troublinges, tormenteth upon that othir side
hir thought;

The same idea is repeated in the Squire's Tale V 455 and in Troilus and
Criseyde V 1223:

So he was lene, and therto pale and wan,
And feble, that he walketh by potente;
And with his ire he thus hymselfe thente.

3. In many of its uses, then, IRE is sufficiently well-defined by the
Parson as a persistent attitude of mind which makes a man ready to take
violent action against those around him; it is the theological deadly sin,
a condition of the spirit. The adjective irous, and the noun used in
adjectival phrases, most frequently have this sense, unless they are applied
in respect of some particular situation which reveals the ire to be sudden
and temporary. Thus examples like the following sum up the character of
individuals:

CT.III.2017 Whilom ther was an irous potestat,
As seith Senek, ...

The man who is suffering from the sin of IRE is not a worthy companion for
any friend, for no one is safe from his outbursts any more than if he were
mad:

Sp.III.2036 'He be no felawe to an irous man,
 He with no wood man walke by the weye,
 Lest thee repente;'

The adjective *irous* apparently means, not only a man who is temporarily enraged, nor a man permanently incensed against a particular object, but also a man subject to the sin of IRE, and therefore a double danger to the human race in his sudden maddened outbursts, and in his capacity for maintaining implacable hatred, perhaps without cause. Such a sense is easily the commonest one of the adjective. Sometimes any sense of anger connected with a deed of oppression may be missing; the deed, like that of Cambises in slaying the son of a critic, is a premeditated deed of cruelty with little provocation, and committed while in considerable control of one's faculties (Sp.III.2033ff). In such situations *irous* has much of the import of *cruel*.

This sense of implacability, cruelty and persistent considered hatred, is that appropriate to the use of IRE in the portrait of *Hate* given in

Requint of the Rone:

Sp.148 Anydde soug I Hate stonde,
 That for his wrathe, ire, and ende,
 Semde to ben a moveence;

4. The rather artificial idea of a good Ire, suggested by the Dawson, finds no echo in Chaucer's usage elsewhere; however, in one or two passages, in describing the emotions of battle, wicked ire comes near to being approved. After all, a vice among friends might prove a virtue when threatened by enemies. In the Knights Tale IRE, when subjected to moderation and REIGN, becomes a virtue in a military thing. Whereas, on discovering Arcite and Palamon fighting in spite of his laws and sentence of banishment, and the latter having escaped from prison, is seized by IRE (l.1762), yet he is circumspect and merciful and compels the IRE to subside:

Sp.l.1782 And shortly, when his ire is thus agoon,
 He gan to looken up with eyen lighte,

Here, IRE is justifiable, and the rone so because it is controlled and overcome.

IRE is treated with some admiration in the description of the struggle between Falstaff and Justice, where it implies the ardorous desire to destroy the antagonist, which is valuable in hand to hand fighting:

31.I.1655 Thou mightst wene that this Falstaff
 In his fighting were a wood leon,
 And as a cruel tiger was Justice;
 He wilde boret downe they to caughte,
 That frothen whit as foam for ire wood.

Such uses as these are specially content-conditioned uses of the sense of IRE as a sudden and limited outbreak of hostility against another.

5. The sense of IRE as a burst of rage (The Parson's vocal sin) is common enough and is the sense represented by cognates like to be i. and caught on i. and in the following:

31.I.3802 But it were oonly, Onewold the love.
 By cause he was of carpenters craft,
 A litel ire is in his herte glaft;
 He gan to grouch, and blamed it a lite.

Although this kind of IRE is of limited duration, its intensity may be very great:

31.III.2121 This olde man was wel ny used for ire;
 The constant colloction with grouch emphasizes the point.

The use of the word figuratively in boasting to refer to the sudden turbulence of the weather (31.IV.19 - woodnesses and the ire of the eye) is closely allied to this sense.

6. The association of IRE with sorrow is ascribable to the claim by commentators that IRE was harmful to the one afflicted by it. The emblematic course of the Mount of the Rose is twice said to be distinguished by her IRE; she refuses any intervention to assuage her misery, as does Troilus when first seized by the pangs of love:

31.I.793 "But come, Alton, for thy coward herte,
 And for thyn ire and folisch wilfulness,
 For wantrust, telleth of thy sennes cherte,

Troilus enters a similar state of despair after his betrayal (31.V.1223). In

used like that, I'd) seems simply to signify the ineluctability of misery; there is no outburst of fun, this is an enduring state in which a man abandons himself to misery and human-human contact, concerned with hatred for all and for the situation in which he finds himself. There are a number of collocations between the word used in this sense and pyggy.

WRATH

The most frequent collocations of WRATH, in Middle English, were, and are, *WRATH*, *WRATH*, *WRATHFUL*/*WRATHLESS*, *WRATH* *pride* and *blithe*.

The lexeme is used, sometimes paired with *WRATH* or *WRATHFUL*, to render the French lexeme *COUREUX* and, more rarely, *WRATH*. The phrase *gentil men ... were wrothe* renders 'descours ... et contencions ... entre nobles', which in its turn is related to Petrarch's Latin 'lites ... discordias.'

The Latin evidence of Boethius shows the lexeme used to translate *ira*, and also *offensio* and the phrase *writh wroth* renders *gracioso*, whilst the adverb renders *iracundus*.

1. The sense of WRATH seem to admit of a major division into those which indicate a relation between two or more people and those which imply an isolated emotion of annoyance, frustration or chagrin. It is in this latter sense of vexation that it is contrasted with joy and good humour.

13363 In wrothe ye turned by pleyng

which is the annoyance and vexation at the turn of events, the irreducible complacency of circumstance:

13364 This is to sayn, the day hit now han botte,
al be ye never so jalouse ne so wrothe.

2. The cause of vexation may more often be the activities of another person constituting an insult or injury which results in a reaction of WRATH.

This notion of offence seems to be an important part of the meaning of the lexeme. In pursuit of justice Boethius did not shrink from giving offence to powerful men and stirring their WRATH:

13365 the wroththe of more myghty folk hath alwey ben
despised of ne for avacuous of right.

The Latin here is *potentiorum ... offensio*. Within the feudal organisation, the lord against whom a vassal might trespass was also his judge, hence some

confidence in seeking legal reconciliation might be found:

CP.VII.1748 But peradventure he hath such hevynesse and such
wratthe to us ward, by cause of oure offence, / that he
wole enjoyne us swich a peyne as we move nat here ne
custeneo.

For the WRATTHE which results from an offence leads to a desire for vengeance
as in the Greek attitude to Troy:

CP.V.960 "That Greeks wolde hire wrath on Troie wreke,
If that they myght, I knowe it wel, ivie.

the justification for WRATHE and the desire for vengeance is important in
the judicial as in other situations. Is the offence a genuine one or is
it imagined? Is the execution of justice real or merely the wrooking of
unjustifiable revenge? In the face of Brineyde's cruelty, Troilus reviews
whether he has given her cause for hostility:

CP.V.1256 What wratthe of just cause have ye to me?
What gilt of me, what fel experience,
Hath fro me raft, alas! thyn advertence?

The just WRATHE of the stern and wrothe juge has condemned all mankind
for original sin:

CP.X.335 And therefore be we alle born comen of wratthe and of
dampnacioun perdurable,

It may happen, however, that WRATHE has no just cause and springs singly
from the disordered spirit of sinful man:

CP.X.533 For soothly, whose hath envye upon his neighbor, anon
he wole comunly fynde hym a matere of wratthe, in word or in
dede, agayns hym to whom he hath envye.

and 'he that is proud or envyous is lightly wrooth.' Thus ladies who
enjoy a prime position in the parish become enraged when their primacy is
challenged:

CP.451 In al the parisshe wif ne was ther noon
That to the offrynge bifore hire sholde goon;
And if ther dide, certeyn so wrooth was she,
That she was out of alle charitee.

It may be that WRATHE is justifiable, but is excessive, and such emotion
is to be avoided, for it clouds the reason and impairs judgement:

CP.VII.1699 they that been wrothe witen nat wel what they doon,
ne what they seyn.

3. The lexeme WRATH Lat., as we have seen, an important one in the judicial situation. It also, by a common figurative transfer, becomes important in the courtly love and religious situations. God is the wrothe juge,¹ and the courtly lady may, equally be seen in a similar role, her displeasure at the lover's service being cast in terms of the lexeme WRATH, perhaps with its feudal connotations of vengeance. Such a usage becomes of almost idiomatic frequency in the Artilus, where the hero even offers to commit suicide in order to assuage a possible insult to his lady. He will administer justice to himself:

10.III.110 That shal I wrothe upon myn own lif
 Right soon, I trowe, and do youre herte an ese,
 If with it, both youre wrothe the I may spere.

In mitigating circumstances, the lady may carefully distinguish between her sorrow at the imperfect service of her lover, and WRATH. She remains well-disposed towards him:

10.III.1074 "Of which I am right sorow, but naught wrothe;

4. The phrase to be wroth with is used frequently in everyday situations to indicate annoyance with someone. It has an idiomatic flavour in uson like the following:

31.VII.383 "By god," quod he, "I am a litel wroth
 With you, my wyf,

31.IV.1962 But lest that precious folk be with me wroth,

5. The phrase to be wroth seems often to be a more elliptical version of the preceding phrase, but occasionally, has a somewhat different implication:

31.III.1239 "Kys me," quod she, "we be no longer wrothe,

Here we have the reconciliation of a quarrel and it seems to be implied that both sides had been wroth with each other. Here, rather than a one-sided relationship of anger and hostility at an insult, we seem to have an equally matched contention. That this is the sense is indicated by translation

¹ The association between WRATH and vengeance in application to the Christian God is to be found in Sierra Florencia (c-text) I, 117.

evidence at CE.IV.437. The setting of the scene of Troilus and Criseyde, and the fortunes of the Greeks and Trojans 'whil that they were wrothe.' (I.140) also illustrates this sense. It is a sense which has a number of figurative derivations and can be used, as well as its primary sense of 'to be in conflict,' to signify incompatibility or incongruity.¹

CE.IV.4398 Revel and trouthe, as in a lowe degree,
They been ful wrothe al day, as men may see.

BE.532 My lyf, my lustes, be me loothe,
For al welfare and I be wrothe.

The Parson associates WRATH with continued contention.

BE.IV.616 if o man be wroth with another, thanne wole he floure
som wight to sustene hym in his querole.

and he equates enflouring WRATH with hatred (K.562).

6. The offence which frequently causes WRATH may be mitigated by the claim that it is intended only in jest and the Host repeatedly uses this protection from the WRATH of other pilgrims:

CE.IV.4354 But yet I pray thee, be nat wroth for jeme;
A man may seye ful sooth in jeme and jle."

The protection which is offered to the victim of insults from immoderate WRATH is the virtue of patience: a man who has patience 'is nat wroth for noon harm that is doon to hym.' (CE.IV.559).

7. Finally, a connotation which was suggested at the outset must be reinforced. Whilst in the judicial situation, and most other uses, WRATH is contrasted with the tranquility of PIECE, DEBONAIRETES (De.IV, p. iv, 263) and PACIFEROS, the distinct association with sorrow and chagrin is sometimes emphasised by a contrast drawn with words connoting happiness and prosperity. An attitude of WRATH is opposed twice to being blythe in The Parliament of Fowls (504; 622), and the rhetorical antithetical lists of The Book of the Duchess present similar oppositions between jovial happiness and WRATH:

BE.605 My good ye hant, and evermoore
In wrathe ye turned my pleyng
And my delyt into sorowage.

¹ Compare these quotations with the similar usage in Piers Plowman (c-text) WYB., 69, where it is stated that burmesse and boot are ever at wrothe.

Ed. 1292

... wylche they suffred thoo
Oo blyss, and eke oo sorwe bothe;
Wylche they were bothe glad and wrothe;

Vexation at the turn of events, indistinguishably intermingled with sorrow,
in a possible sense of *TRAMPEL*.

ANGER

The most important collocations, in order of diminishing frequency, are: IRE, WRATH, jalouseye, maltalent, angred, olde, hokerly.

ANGER translates the French lexeme CORROZ and it may be paired with WRATH in the English translation. ANGER seems to be used with peculiar consistency to translate CORROZ as is demonstrated by the following doublets:

a courrouz et a ire : to angre and to ire.

semblent d'outraire yre ne courrouce : semblant of wrathe ne anger.

de maltalent et de corroz : for angre and for maltalent.

There is no translation evidence from Latin.

1. The Parson makes clear the close association in sense between ANGER and the sin of IRE. He conceives it as a sudden fit of pique as when 'a man is sharply corrected in his christ to forleten his wyne, / thanne wole he be angry, and answeren hokerly and angrily, and defenden or excusen his wyne ...' (R.584). He considers that DEBONAIRTE is the remedy of such behaviour (R.655). Such a conception of ANGER evidently underlies Pandarus' psychology in his approach to Priolus, hoping to make him forget sorrow in ANGER. Here the noun angre simply means a fit of anger:

RG.I.563 These wordes seyde he for the nones alle,
 That with swich thing he myght hym angry maken,
 And with an angre don his wo to falle,

Exactly this sequence of events is portrayed as happening spontaneously later in the story (V.1535).

2. As is common with emotions in medieval psychology, little distinction is made between the sudden emotion and the overall tendency of character ^{that} so_K as in the use of the lexeme IRE, we find that ANGER can connote a trait of character. It is applied as an epithet of the Furies, the angry Parcan (RG.V.3), and the personification Hate in the romant is called Au angry wight (150). ANGER, like all violent emotion, disturbs the reason so

that 'a man shal not taken his conseil of false folk, ne of angry folk, ne of grevous folk' (CP.A.640).

3. WRETH, like IRE and WRATH, is associated with the desire for vengeance:

CP.I.3745 and on his lippe he gan for anger byte,
 And to hymself he sayde, "I shal thee quyte."

It is also specifically associated in Chaucer's usage with old age. It is listed with envyng, lynyn, and covytise as the besetting sins of those advanced in years (CP.I.3884), and the Wife renounces this association, with a curse:

CP.III.1263 and elde and age, regarded of dispence,
 God sende hem some verray penitence!

4. MEGR, in the case of certain aged husbands, may be a corrosive and self-destructive emotion, charged at their inability to re-train too spirited young wives. The Wife has used it as a weapon in domestic troubles:

CP.III.760 that in his owene place I made hym fyve
 For anger, and for verray jalouye.

The Wife's practical demonstration of the self-destructive nature of MEGR is matched by the diagnostic ability of the Summoner's caricature of a friar offering pastoral advice:

CP.III.2092 Why artow angry with my tale now?

5. In addition to this inward, turbulent emotion, MEGR can be used in much the same way as WRATH to connote a relationship of hostility and annoyance between two people. This use is, however, relatively uncommon:

CP.I.3157 Why artow angry with my tale now?

6. As with WRATH there is the opposition to jovial good humour evident in what appears to have the air of a well-worn platitude:

CP.IV.1563 "and if so be that pees heere-after take,
 An oldey happeth arter anger game.

Section III

The Occurrence and Application of the Words

III.1 In any full account of the use of a lexeme in the language, attention must be paid to the frequency of its use and to its applications. Clearly, the former is a function of the latter, since overall frequency will be related to the opportunities for use; if a lexeme has a very restricted application, and the circumstances of that application are rare, the frequency of occurrence of the word, even in a long corpus, will obviously be low. Similarly the grammatical scatter of a lexeme may influence the frequency of occurrence. If a particular lexeme occurs only as a noun, its opportunities for use in the string of syntax will be reduced, as compared with a lexeme with a scatter including a noun, adjective and adverb. There is therefore a relationship between frequency of occurrence and possible varieties of use; a statement which might be re-worded by saying that there exists a relationship between frequency of occurrence and variety in sense, since we have decided that sense is to some extent dependent upon situational and verbal contexts. The repeated recurrence of familiar topics and the establishment of invariable idioms tends, however, to work against this simple relationship between frequency of occurrence and variety of sense, so that the effect in natural language is not so marked as we might theoretically predict.¹ This matter of favourite topics, idioms, and variety in the register of language, tends to make information of frequency of occurrence far more a stylistic statement, when restricted to a single author, than a linguistic one.

¹ See Zipf, *op.cit.*, p.21. Zipf sees this in terms of a balance between speaker's and auditor's economy. The first moves towards idiomaticity, while the latter requires a one to one correspondence between formal and semantic items. Zipf's tendency to reason by analogy, and his mathematical exactitude, based upon the inexactitude of dictionary entries, do much to vitiate his work, though the general principles cannot be disregarded.

III.2 The following tables show the grammatical scatter and the frequency of the lexemes examined. It will be noticed that most of the lexemes which exhibit a distinct form for nominal function also employ that form in idioms allowing adverbial and verbal uses. The commonest way of constructing a verbal idiom is by the use of the verbs have and do, on the model of French idiom.

Table 1 : Grammatical Scatter

	Adj.	Noun	Advb.	Verb
<u>Wrathe</u>	x	x	x*	x*
<u>Despit</u>	x	x	x*	x*
<u>Hardnesse</u>	x	x	x	x*
<u>Woodnesse</u>	x	x	x*	x*
<u>Crueltee</u>	x	x	x*	*
<u>Pitee</u>	x	x	x*	*
<u>Curteisio</u>	x	x	x*	-
<u>Debonairetee</u>	x	x	x*	-
<u>Kyndenesse</u> ¹	x	x	x*	-
<u>Benignitee</u>	x	x	x*	-
<u>Buxomnosse</u>	x	x	x*	-
<u>Anger</u>	x	x	x*	-
<u>Pacience</u>	x ²	x	x*	*
<u>Routhe</u>	x	x	x*	x* ³
<u>Graco</u>	x	x ⁴	x*	*
<u>Charitee</u>	x	x	x*	*
<u>Strong</u> ⁵	x	(x)	x(*)	?x?
<u>Grimnesse</u>	x	x	x	-
<u>Vilaynye</u>	x ⁶	x	x*	*
<u>Felnesse</u>	x	x	x	-
<u>Hoko</u>	x	x	x*	x
<u>Sturdinesse</u>	x	x	x*	-
<u>Mercy</u>	x ⁷	x	*	*
<u>Servyse</u>	x	x	-	x
<u>Favour</u>	x	x	*	x*

x A distinct form is found fulfilling the marked function.

* An idiom is formed with the noun to create an adverbial or verbal phrase.

1. Kynde; kyndenesse. The nominal kynde has a distinct lexical reference from the same form acting as modifier.
2. The form pacient occurs both as adjective and noun.
3. The verb reve on occurs beside the idiom have routhe on.
4. Graco occurs in singular and plural with distinct lexical reference.
5. Strengthe has a distinct lexical reference from the adjective.
6. Vylaneus occurs beside a quasi-nominal viloyns.
7. Two adjectival forms are found: merciabile and merciful.

	<u>Adj.</u>	<u>Noun</u>	<u>Advb.</u>	<u>Verb</u>
<u>Malice</u>	x	x	*	*
<u>Envye</u>	x	x	*	x*
<u>Felonye</u> ¹	x	x	*	*
<u>Tirannye</u> ²	x	x	*	*
<u>Jalousie</u>	x	x	*	*
<u>Ire</u>	x	x	*	*
<u>Daunger</u>	x	x	-	-
<u>Fierc</u>	x	-	x	-
<u>Stif</u>	x	-	x	-
<u>Stern</u>	x	-	x	-
<u>Desdayn</u>	-	x	*	x*
<u>Untrotable</u>	x	-	-	-
<u>Tretable</u>	x	-	-	-
<u>Hauteyn</u>	x	-	-	-
<u>Stoute</u>	x	-	-	-
<u>Stibourn</u>	x	-	-	-
<u>Milde</u>	x	-	-	-
<u>Mansuete</u>	x	-	-	-
<u>Hende</u>	x	-	-	-
<u>Oore</u>	-	x	-	-
<u>Compassioun</u>	-	x	-	*
<u>Socour</u>	-	x	*	*
<u>Thank</u> ³	-	x	*	x
<u>Grame</u>	-	x	-	-
<u>Onde</u>	-	x	-	-
<u>Misericorde</u>	-	x	-	-

1. The form folon occurs both in nominal and adjectival function; the chart merely refers to felonye.
2. The form tirant occurs in nominal and adjectival function; the chart refers to the scatter of tirannye alone.
3. The noun has the formal and semantic variants thankynges and thankes.

Table 2 : Frequency of Occurrence1-4 occurrences

graces	merciful	reweful	favorable
graciousnesse	milde	rewfully	mansueto
gracelees	tretable	buxomnesse	untretable
oare	grimnesse	buxomly	thankynges
servysable	grimly	stif	stibourn
fiersly	woodly	stifly	stemly
hauteyn	sturdinesse	ondo	malicious
vylayneus	sturdily	wrathly	felnesse
vylaynslly		wrathful	angrily

5-9 occurrences

gracious	merciabile	routhelees	charitable
benignely	kyndenesse	buxom	mekenesse
grame	grim	stoute	thankes
cruelly	hardnesse	despitously	felon
	sturdy		

10-19 occurrences

compassioun	misericorde	debonairetee	favour
patiently	kynde ¹	debonairly	hende
curteisly	woodnosse	daunger	stern
curteis	tirannye	daungerous	felle
fiers	desdayn	despitous	envious
vylayns		irous	felonous
			angry
			anger

20-39 occurrences

benignitee	jalousye	socour	charitee
benigne	jalous	debonaire	meko
patient ²	tirant	wrathe	thank
curteisie			felonye
crueltee			malice

40-59 occurrences

pacience	pitous	despit
	pitously	rewe (on)

60-79 occurrences

vylaynyo	wrooth	envyo
----------	--------	-------

1. Includes only adjectival use.

2. Includes only adjectival use.

80-100 occurrences

cruel	wood	routhe
		ire

More than 120 occurrences

pitee

More than 150 occurrences

mercy

More than 250 occurrences

grace

It is worth noting how, in relation to particular topics, frequency may or may not be related to grammatical scatter. In the case of PITEE, the three distinct forms are all of common occurrence, whilst ~~the~~ GRACE and MERCY owe their common occurrence essentially to a single common nominal form.

Because of the difficulties of deciding which uses to include in the reckoning, no figures are given for STRONG and HARD. The latter has, however, about eighty occurrences in the works of Chaucer, of which somewhat less than half fall within the semantic area of this study.

Function and form are not always inseparable in grammatical semantics, any more than in lexical semantics, so that a number of forms normally used as adjectives are used occasionally as nouns. Among these are: debonaire; envyous; jealous; reweful; gracelees; wood. This converted use does not, however, disturb Table 1, since all those lexemes also exhibit forms proper to nominal function. Nevertheless, the reminder of the separability of form and function which this entails prompts us to examine the variety of form ('formal scatter') which can be associated with a single grammatical function. Such variety of form may serve stylistic ends and, indeed, may provide the basis for sense development. Thus, as a noun, the lexeme GRACE may be represented by the forms:

Grace; graces; graciousnesse.¹

¹ Here there are distinctions in sense, see above, p. 82.

and similarly: Thank; thankes; thankynges.
 Help; helpynge.
 Kynde; kyndenesse.
 Charitee; chiertee.
 Felonye; felon.
 Tirannye; tirant.

Variant forms occurring in adjectival function are:

Gracious; gracelees.
Merciable; merciful.
Reuful; rewthelees.
Vylaneus; vyleyns.

As Verbs: have routhe on; rewe on.

Examination of the senses of these forms may encourage us to treat graces as a different lexeme from the other members of its group, but there would perhaps be less justification for regarding thankes and thankynges as separate from thank. We may have to descend to a fairly delicate level of analysis to separate a sense of thank, which is synonymic with thankes and thankynges, and graces, from a sense which is synonymic with the grace of a lord. Kynde, as an adjective, belongs to the same lexeme as kyndenesse, but as a noun, their senses are distinctly different. Felon and tirant differ from felonye and tirannye in a parallel way; each referring to an act and its agent.¹ The difference is perhaps sufficient to demand statement as distinct lexemes, though such a distinction is of a fairly arbitrary nature. The distinction in form between the unique vylaneus and vileyns is not paralleled by any distinction in sense so that, synchronically, we would class them as representatives of the same lexeme but, diachronically, it is necessary to add to this description the information that both derive from distinct adjectival forms in French and that the latter seems, in some

¹ Felon is also used attributively as an adjective on one occasion.

contexts, to be understood as exhibiting the inflexion of the possessive genitive of nouns in Middle English.¹ This seems to be the case despite the fact that no other inflected forms of a noun *vileyn occur in Chaucer's works. The distinction between charitee and chiertee, representing a formal distinction in French, preserved by Latin influence, is not consistently maintained in use with relation to any distinction of sense or application. Nevertheless, the former is more common in contexts with a religious application, whilst the latter form tends to have a secular application.

III.3 The syntax of the adjective is of some interest in discussions of occurrence, and its substantival use has already been mentioned. As a modifier, the adjective is normally used either attributively or predicatively and, after collecting occurrences of all adjectives, it is discovered that most adjectives are used in both ways. There are, however, two or three notable exceptions. The word dangerous is used exclusively as a predicative adjective in a highly consistent syntagm (see p.320 below). This is, in fact, the only adjective of those examined which is limited to predicative use. By contrast, the words vileyns and sturdy are restricted to attributive use. The restriction of the former is perhaps related to its similarity to an inflected noun, as explained above. The lack of symmetry in the use of the latter is unrelated to any specific features of its usage, and may be purely a matter of chance, since the adjective occurs only seven times in the corpus.

III.4 The syntax of the noun is similar in most of those examined. Almost all are found as the direct or indirect object of a transitive verb. If we exclude certain uses of the verbs 'have', 'do' and 'to be', on the grounds that they are part of an established idiom, only the following fail to appear in the structure: sturdinesse, felnesse, buxumnesse, misericorde, grymnesse,

¹ This interpretation is supported by the limitation of vileyns to attributive use whilst vylaneus is limited to predicative use.

charitee, compassioun, desdayn. The first five of these are so rare that it is impossible to draw any conclusions from the peculiarity of their occurrence; the last three are restricted to peculiarly consistent usages: with the verb 'havo' in the case of the latter two, and with the verbs 'have' and 'to be' in the case of charitee.

If we exclude obviously personifying uses and uses with the verb 'to be' (equative uses), a high proportion of the nouns studied do not occur as the subject of a verb. Those which do occur in this position are the following: grace; pitee; mercy; routhe; charitee; benignitee; woodnesse; daunger; malice; envie; jalousie; tyrannie; tirant; ire; wrathe; anger; debonairetee; grame. The last two occur only as the subjects of passive verbs. A number occur only very rarely as a subject, whilst envie, ire, tirant, jalousie are common as subject. Certain patterns of usage which emerge in the subject function are deferred for discussion under syntagmatic patterning in the next chapter.

III.5 Some details of application are also valuable in determining and distinguishing senses; indeed, in certain familiar situational uses, a fairly precise description of application may be all that is required. Such would be the case in the use of a single word as an exclamatory plea. A number of the words are used in this way and they are all lexemes which bear some relation to the general, petitioner-grantor situation: grace; oare; help; mercy. A very few other words are used as exclamations, although outside this situation, thus O malice! is used as an exclamation of indignation to express the Latin of Boethius I, p. iv, 272, O nefas! With these may be compared similar exclamations, O ire reccheles (CT.IX.279), O charite (TC.III.1254) and O gracelees (CT.VIII.1078).

Certain of the nouns undergo a comparable stylistic specialisation of use when they are explicitly and deliberately used as personifications. The distinction between a stylistic and a semantic process is made deliberately here, for it is frequently the case that anthropomorphic elements in language,

and in some cases simply metonymic features (e.g. 'his ire hir gilt accused,' (CT.I.1765), credit abstractions or inanimate objects with purely human acts. By stylistic personification, is meant deliberate anthropomorphism consciously sustained by the extended verbal context, of the type which modern editors recognise typographically by the use of a capital.¹ This kind of personification allegory is typical of courtly poetry which, drawing its sophistication in this sphere from moral and pastoral treatises, employs it to study the psychology of fine amour. The words used thus as personifications are central to the complex of courtly and moral psychology: Curteisie; Pitee; Mercy; Danger; Crueltee; Reuthelees; Woodnesse; Jalousye; Envye; Desdayn; Vylanye; Felonie; Ire. The Book of Vices and Virtues treats Vylanye and Woodnesse as branches of untrewþe, which is itself a branch of Pride. Felonie and Ire are considered equivalent and are related to Woodnesse. Pitee and Mercy are considered to be gifts of the Holy Ghost.

III.6 Discussion of the application of the adjective will almost certainly tend to overlap with discussion of its syntagmatic patterning and its senses, so that much discussion must be deferred until later. Nevertheless syntagmatic pattern, concerned as it is primarily with the formal level of language and its intersection with semantics, is not the place to treat certain general points which might be made in terms of application. Certain adjectives exhibit a conceptual restriction of their uses, which may be stated here. Thus the following charts some peculiarities of the uses of the adjectives studied. In the case of rare occurrences the total number is stated afterwards in parenthesis.

¹ M.W. Bloomfield endeavours to distinguish personification allegory from simple animate metaphor, emblems etc. by the criterion of their predicates when they act as subject of a sentence. Predicates which bring about personification are not easily distinguished from simple animate metaphors such as the example he gives from the General Prologue: 'Aprill .../ The droghte of March hath perced ...' 'A Grammatical Approach to Personification Allegory', in Essays and Explorations, Camb., Mass. (1970), pp.243-260.

a Applied only to males

irous; stern; stoute; stif (5); sturdy; graceless (2);
wrathful (1); hende (and one mixed group, see below).

b Applied only to females

mansuete; milde¹; vylandus (1); stibourn (2)².

c Applied to animals as well as humans

meke; hauteyn (4); strong; jalous; cruel; wood; grim (7);
fiers; fel.³

d Applied to weather or meteorological phenomena as well as humans

benigne; debonaire; strong; stern; fel; wood.

e Applied to concrete objects and to humans

stoute; hard; strong; grim (7); stif (5); sturdy; cruel; fel.

f Applied to divinitiesChristian or the VirginPaganmerciablemerciabledebonairedebonairebenignebenignestrongstrongsternsternmeek

-

curteis

-

-

pitous

-

gracious

-

fiers

-

fel

-

wood

¹ Both milde and mansuete applied on a single occasion to Criseyde.

² Both occurrences are applied to the Wife of Bath.

³ A number of these applications to animals are conventional, illustrating fancied anthropomorphic attributes of the animals. (see below, p.315).

Christian or the VirginPagan

-

envyous

-

jealous

-

cruel

-

despitouswroothangryg Applied to eventspitous; rewful (3); hard.h Applied to human actsDeedsSpeech Actscruelcruelvileynsvileynsfelon (1)¹

-

fel

-

benigne

-

charitable

-

-

hauteyn (4)

-

hard

-

jealous

-

wood

Certain of these adjectives have uses which are restricted in a way beyond the ability of the chart to demonstrate. There is little doubt in some cases that Chaucer employs this restriction as a stylistic device. The narrow application of hende to amorous clerks has been recognised in the Miller's Tale as an example of Chaucerian irony - but the relationship of this usage to the corpus as a whole has not been recognised. The narrow domestic application of buxom (see below, p.310) should be noted, as should the special application of meke to Christ, the Virgin and, in the 'Marriage Group'

¹ Two substantive occurrences are also found.

of the Canterbury Tales, to husbands and wives in respect of the matter of sovereignty. The lexeme MERCY also seems to have a special association with the Virgin and the Christian God, as does the lexeme SOCOUR; the latter particularly noticeable in the short poem An ABC. There is a similar association between the lexeme FAVOUR and Fortune, whilst the Wife of Bath, and no-one else, is called stibourn. The normally masculine sturdy is also used with application to her character. Servysable has a special association with squires, analogous to that of hende with clerks, whilst curteis is used, in religious contexts, of Jesus Christ, though not of the rest of the Trinity. This last use is not an uncommon one in Middle English verse and may have some link with the image of the Christ knight.¹

III.7 In the everyday use of language, words acquire certain connotations; a term which was defined above as composed of memories and associations of earlier contexts and uses. An awareness of the connotational import of words forms the basis of the Classical theory of the three levels of style which, in the Middle Ages, became firmly associated with three levels of social estate. Since Chaucer is a literary writer, well acquainted with the theory of his craft, he might be expected to employ words with an overt awareness of the three levels of style, low, middle or high, so that we may expect to be able to assign much of his diction to one of these three categories. In practice this proves extremely difficult and, I believe, inadvisable. There is, for example, no warrant for assigning synonyms such as herte and corage, visage, face and chiere to any particular stylistic level. In any case the manuals considered the mark of stylus gravis to be the employment of certain 'difficult' tropes, with a consequent increase in emotional vehemence, rather than the use of a specially restricted vocabulary.

¹ A useful summary of the Christ-knight exemplum is to be found in, W. Gaffney, 'The Allegory of the Christ-knight in Piers Plowman', PMLA, XLVI (1931), pp.155-69.

Chaucer speaks of heigh style as the language in which it is suitable to write to kings (CT.IV.18), and a glance at the letters exchanged between the citizenry of London and Henry V, campaigning in France, will give us an inept *version* of what he perhaps had in mind.¹ The letters are constructed in lengthy periodic sentences, almost entirely from formulaic and Latinate phrases, so that their informational content is reduced to a fraction of their elaborate lexical embellishment. Although we can be fairly sure that Chaucer, a few lines later in the Clerk's introduction to his tale, does not praise Petrarch for this kind of writing, we must admit that the notion of 'enlumining' by high style might include this kind of lexical embellishment as well as the use of difficult tropes. It was for his lexical skill that the fifteenth century revered him.² Yet, though we might with confidence assign certain outlandish Latinate coinages to high style, such confidence would falter when we consider our area of the vocabulary, just as when we examine a lengthy passage of Chaucer's work. If we may phrase it thus, Chaucer seems to exhibit a constant tendency to work towards a colloquial mean, a middle, or, more properly mixed, style of narration (stylus mixtus). This tendency is evident in the opening of the General Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, as it is in the Proem of Book II of the Troilus, and as it will be seen to be in the more general use of the vocabulary. Certain words may be used in courtly, religious or philosophical contexts in a decidedly solemn style, but these will also appear elsewhere in a more relaxed colloquial style without any sense of strangeness.³

If we examine the social associations of his language, we will discover a few words which seem to be restricted to particular social strata, though this is rare within our area of prime interest. Chaucer reveals himself to

¹ ed. Chambers, R.W. and Daunt, M., A Book of London English 1384-1425, Oxford (1931), pp.64ff.

² A convenient collection of examples of fifteenth century appreciation is supplied by J.A. Burrow, in Geoffrey Chaucer (Penguin Critical Anthologies), Harmondsworth (1969), pp.40ff.

³ See below, pp.292ff.

be aware of the conditioning of words by social register and speaks of tyrants as differing from bandits only in their power in the social situation, and of unchaste women he says:

CT.IX.212-20 Ther nys no difference, trewely,
 Bitwixe a wyf that is of heigh degree,
 If of hir body dishonest she bee,
 And a povre wenche, oother than this -
 If it so be they werke both amys -
 But that the gentile, in estaat above,
 She shal be cleped his lady, as in love;
 And for that oother is a povre womman,
 She shal be cleped his wenche or his lemman.

The word and the deed must be in accord, he says, and so prefers, just as the Parson delights in speaking of the thralls of sin, to couple moral turpitude to social baseness.¹ This ironic weapon of style is forged, not through the correspondence of the lexical items to any artificial levels, but through their habitual use in relation to certain social levels. The habitual use of words in relation to a particular situation equips them with the connotations of that situation; if the situation is arranged into a stratified relationship with other situations, then we have some justification for talking of levels of style. Otherwise, certain words merely have certain connotations and certain proper applications.

That Chaucer is aware of decorum in the use of words outside the stratified notion of propriety is argued by Pandarus's advice to Troilus on the construction of a love-letter:

TC.II.1037-43 "Ne jompre ek no discordant thyng yfeere,
 As thus, to usen termes of phisik
 In loves termes; hold of thi matere
 The forme alway, and do that it be lik;
 For if a peyntour wolde peynte a pyk
 With asses feet, and hede it as an ape,
 It cordeth naught, so nere it but a jape."

Thus, misapplication and resultant incongruity on the lexical level are literary techniques known and, as examination would show, used by Chaucer. They may produce comic effects or ironical ones, and everywhere produce

¹ Compare also the helle hæfton (captivus inferni) of Beowulf, 788.

stylistic variety. In so doing, of course, they present a possible source of confusion ^{for} ~~to~~ any attempt at objective analysis. Instead of the severe restriction of lexical items to particular applications and hence, in some cases, to particular levels, we find them scattered in a great number of applications. Assignment to a 'proper' application will become a matter of frequency and probability rather than of absolute decision.

The area of vocabulary with which we are concerned is not much illuminated by the association of levels of style with social levels, and indeed an analysis of its stylistic applications is not profitably made in terms of levels at all, except insofar as levels are implied by the distinction between ordinary everyday usage and courtly and literary vocabulary. A certain proportion of the words in this area belong to a restricted technical language of moral philosophy, which in turn is essentially theologically-based; yet it is rare that a sharp distinction can be made between the secular interest in morals and manners implied in the courtly tradition and the pastoral interest which inspires theological tradition in this area. Similarly the language of feudalism is shared by the discussion of theology and courtly civilisation. Certain words, however, seem to belong more particularly to the technical language of the moral/theological vocabulary, and among these, certain ^{do so} pre-eminently. Thus the following lexemes might be classed as typical of serious Christian moral discussion:

PACIENCE; FELONYE;¹ ENVYE; MALICE; IRE; MISERICORDE; CHARITEE; MEKE;
MANSUETE.

Some others are extremely common in this kind of use but are also frequent in other spheres:

DESDAYN; COMPASSIOUN; BENIGNITEE; BUXOMNESSE; STRENGTHE;
(this last in a different sense from that which primarily concerns us, signifying spiritual fortitude and glossing Latin fortitudo).

¹ FELONYE is further determinable as primarily a Boethian word glossing a fairly wide range of Latin forms. See below, p. 418.

Certain words are common here but also equally common in courtly or feudal situations and sometimes in the ordinary usage of everyday situations. Among these are:

DEBONAIRETEE; VYLAYNYE; JALOUSYE; GRACE; MERCY; PITEE; DESPIT.

A few words are particularly associated with the courtly situation, though all are found in reference to a feudal relationship:

DAUNGER; SERVYSE; THANK; KYNDENESSE; CRUELTEE; FAVOUR; HELP; TRETABLE; UNTRETABLE; HAUTEYN; SOCOUR.

The lexeme CURTEISIE is also frequently used in religious contexts, whilst ROUTHE tends to be of ordinary, everyday use and is also used in the burlesque courtly love situation of The Miller's Tale. A large group of words of English origin we may take as being of ordinary use, but most of these may occasionally be found in courtly or theological contexts: STURDY; STOUT; STERN; STIF; HARDNESSE; GRIM; WOODNESSE.

III.8 The development of Chaucer's linguistic and stylistic resources necessarily brought about changes in even this tentative arrangement of his lexis. He uses a number of words in his early works in serious contexts which are used only with ironical intent, or not at all, in his later works. The case of hende, used in a serious courtly context in The Romaunt of the Rose, has already been mentioned. Except in the early Anelida and Arcite, grame is used exclusively in colloquial passages, as is stif, again with the exception of the Romaunt, where the sole occurrence of onde is also to be found. Buxom is used in serious, unironical passages only in the earlier poems and the shorter poems written before 1390.

We might assume that Chaucer was deliberately expunging certain ordinary, native-derived words from his diction; but that this is a defective assumption is suggested by his *unique* uses of the words stibourn, in the Wife's Prologue, and of oore, in The Miller's Tale. Similarly grim and stoute are used in serious passages only in the later Canterbury Tales.

The truth of the matter seems to be a little more complicated than our initial assumption. Although Chaucer abandons the serious use of one or two hackneyed terms of English poetic diction, he is equally ready to use some evidently colloquial words for the first time. Furthermore, certain words, often of French derivation like gentil, which have become devalued by use, are re-assessed in the later work. Thus, in the General Prologue description of the Prioress, the word pitous is given ironic overtones, just as curteisly acquires them in the description of the miller's dishonesty in The Reeve's Tale I 3997, and grace in the situation of Absolon's appeal in The Miller's Tale I 3726. Daungerous is used with swingeing irony in the marriage situation of the Wife of Bath:

CT.III.151 In wyfhod I wol use myn instrument
 As frely as my Makere hath it sent.
 If I be dangerous, God yeve me sorwe.

CT.III.521 With daunger oute we al oure chaffare;
 Greet prees at the market maketh deere ware,
 And to greet cheep is holde at litel prys:

The irony, which is evident in the use of some of these words in Chaucer's later work, derives largely from a growing awareness in the poet of appropriateness of diction and its corollary, incongruity. The settings of The Canterbury Tales are far more various than those of the early courtly poetry and on a number of occasions Chaucer asserts the necessity of suiting the language to the matter; the word must be cosyn to the dede. But words such as pitous, grace and daunger are essentially part of a structure of ideal concepts, related to well-discussed precepts of behaviour, and possessing its own specific vocabulary. When these words are torn from this setting and placed in a new, unaristocratic, unidealised situation, collocating with such distinctly colloquial words as lemman, as grace does in The Miller's Tale, the effect is one of incongruity and, when we juxtapose the applications proper to the words, of irony.

While we should accept that peculiarities of occurrence and application in the case of some of these words are sometimes due to the increasing stylistic

subtlety of the mature poet, we should exercise caution in claiming that this is a conscious revival of Horatian poetic principles by the greatest poet of the English Middle Ages, and purely an individual stylistic innovation. The fact that Gower uses buxom to refer to the marriage relationship, and that Langland uses curteisly ironically, indicates that the inclusion of buxom in the marriage service, and the removal of esteemed concepts from their proper contexts, were represented by a broader feature of usage.¹ What Chaucer is doing, indeed, in many of these kind of uses, is borrowing from everyday language, sharpening the incongruities and pointing the irony. It is unnecessary to stress again how this consummate skill of the developed Chaucerian style, exploiting connotational meaning to the full and alluding covertly to other situations, complicates, if not confounds, any attempt to order Chaucer's vocabulary into neat categories of application and finally of sense.

¹ CA.V.2807. Piers Plowman (C-text) III, 164.