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PLATO'S FIVE-FOLD CLASSIFICATIONS  
IN RELATION TO  
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE MIDDLE-PLATONISTS

A thesis submitted by

H.A.S.TARRANT

For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the  
University of Durham, 1971, in the  
Department of Classics  
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## ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The Parmenides shows Plato's concern to relate the various branches of reality which he had earlier discerned; modifying the ontology of Republic VI, he sought to combine four worlds into one in the third of five positive hypotheses. The Sophist then attempts to show that reality is five; the five components are echoed in the "Psychogony" of the Timaeus, in which work Plato is confronted with a choice between one world and five. Two cryptic classifications from the Philebus suggest Plato's continued interest in the number, and the Epinomis and Seventh Letter show that the Academy knew of this.

Speusippus, depending heavily on the Parmenides, adopted a system of five separate "existences", each with their own first-principles. Xenocrates, though favouring tripartitions, preserved a framework in which the five-fold concept of the whole became understandable.

Academic scepticism made it necessary for Posidonius and Antiochus to look back to the works of Xenocrates for guidance, from whom they received an Old-Academic understanding of the Master and new interest in Speusippus. Through this latter Pythagoreans learned to interpret the Parmenides; through him also Theodorus learned to misinterpret the Timaeus.

The Philebus grew in importance, the final classification being authoritative for Arius, Plutarch, and Albinus. Seneca attributes five causes to Plato, Plutarch regards the number as of supreme philosophical importance, Albinus' writings echo this view. Theon, Maximus, and Numenius conform in different ways with a tradition that respects a five-fold metaphysic.

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## Dedication and Acknowledgements

This work is dedicated, without permission and yet with all sincerity, to the city and people of Durham, and above all to my supervisor, Professor J.B.Skemp, to whom my warmest thanks must be extended for all his guidance and instruction since rough and immature ideas began to take their present form.

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Special gratitude is due to Professor John Whittaker for coming to England to advise me concerning the Middle-Platonist aspect of my work; his assistance has been much appreciated.

For their financing of the project my thanks must go to the D.E.S., and also to St. John's College, Cambridge.

Last but not least, for her tolerance and understanding during the crystallization of this volume, may I be allowed to thank my wife.

No mind may work in isolation,

---

H.A.S.T.

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## INTRODUCTION.

It is the peculiar difficulty of metaphysical philosophy that it deals with subjects so speculative, that neither author nor reader is anxious to commit himself to a dogmatic exposition of doctrine. Uncertainty will linger on both sides, and the successful metaphysician is he who is prepared to admit this difficulty. Moreover the subject is designed to study what underlies physical reality, and one finds also that it often underlies the ethical and physical theories of its exponents, often buried, often coming to the surface in strange and disconcerting ways; nowhere is this more true than in Plato's Philebus, which is to provide material central to this study.

But if one is dealing with that which lies beneath the surface of the writings, yet this is not the end of one's problems, for if it should lie beneath an author's work, the outward expression of his inward meditations, then it lies also beneath the surface of his mind, part reason, part feeling.

In recent years Dr. Krämer and Dr. Gaiser have directed the course of German scholarship toward the study of Plato's unwritten doctrines and their subsequent influence of platonist metaphysics down to the time of Plotinus. It has been the general reaction of English-speaking scholarship to ignore the present trend in Germany, on the supposition that it is the literature with which we are concerned, not the man. <sup>1)</sup> Although it is possible to analyse the dialogues without consideration for the man behind them, yet one cannot understand them, let alone their place in the history

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1) For the former view see: H.J. Kramer, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles, Heidelberg 1959, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, 2nd impression, Amsterdam 1967. K. Gaiser, Platons Ungeschriebene Lehre, Stuttgart, 1963. For the latter; R.E. Allen, Plato's Euthyphro and the earlier Theory of Forms, London and New York, 1970, pp.136-145.

of philosophy, without a basic appreciation of the mind of their author, both of his reasoning and of his feelings, and of the opposition which he was facing and the friends who surrounded him.

However, it is also clear that no consideration of unwritten doctrine should be attempted without serious study of the extant literature. Others can report things that Plato had said, but they cannot adequately give expression to his feelings; nor do any but the sarcastic Aristoxenus <sup>2)</sup> portray the context in which these statements have been made, nor the participants in the discussion. The aging Plato will have talked to Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Aristotle about their own first principles in a sympathetic manner, though not necessarily being in full agreement with the accuracy of their concepts. Consequently Krämer and Gaiser are on dangerous ground if they hope to discuss Plato the individual as opposed to Plato the Head of the Academy with more consideration for the evidence of Aristotle than for Plato's own literature. They are similarly liable to criticism if they feel able to interpret snippets from the Sophist or Farmenides in a hyper-technical sense without full consideration for the context.

Again, Kramer's position is difficult if he hopes to use the subsequent history of Platonism, right up to the time of Plotinus, as support for his concept of Plato's beliefs, on the ground that there persisted a continuous body of esoteric doctrine. <sup>3)</sup> If it is possible to deny that Arcesilaus could ever have turned the Academy in an unwavering Pyrrhonian direction <sup>4)</sup>, yet we cannot make the same provisions for the Academy of

- 
- 2) In his famous account of the "Lecture on the Good", The Elements of Harmonics, II. p.39, 6 Da Rios.  
 3) If one may glean anything from UG, p.29, note 30.  
 4) e.g. Tertullian's remarks about Arcesilaus' theology (!) in ad Nat.II 2. p.97. Wiss.
-

Carneades and Clitomachus, which made a genuine science of scepticism. Cicero's allusions to an esoteric doctrine in the New Academy seem sceptical,<sup>5)</sup> while the same author preserves testimony to Clitomachus' ignorance of his master Carneades' opinions.<sup>6)</sup>

However, in the belief that there is a feature of Plato's belief that does not emerge fully in the dialogues, and which is to have considerable influence on his successors, Kramer is unquestionably right. There is every reason to suppose that for the most part Speusippus and Xenocrates were using platonic concepts, and that Plato was willing to use their terminologies for the purpose of discussion, perhaps even for the notorious "Lecture on the Good".<sup>7)</sup> Nor is one to be criticised for the belief that the platonism of the early empire owed much to the Old Academy.

The present work is to tackle an aspect of platonic metaphysics, its origins, its meaning for Plato, its effect upon the Old Academy, its revival at some time previous to Seneca and Plutarch, and its meaning for the Middle-Platonists. Neo-Platonism owes more to the mind of Plotinus than to that of Plato, so far as its metaphysics at least were concerned, and therefore it is proposed to conclude this study with Numenius at the end of the second century A.D.

The subject with which we are concerned is the five-fold classifications that appear in Plato's Sophist<sup>6)</sup> and Philebus<sup>7)</sup>, in the Epinomis,<sup>8)</sup> in the Seventh Letter<sup>9)</sup>, in Speusippus as known in Iamblichus<sup>10)</sup>

- 5) Lucullus 60  
 6) op.cit., p.139  
 7) See above, n.2.  
 6) 254e4.  
 7) 23 cff., 6 aff.  
 8) 984 bff.  
 9) 342 aff.  
 10) De Comm. Math. Sc. IV.

In Seneca's 65th epistle,<sup>11)</sup> in Plutarch's E at Delphi,<sup>12)</sup> and in Middle Platonism in general. The conclusions have been reached in relative independence from Kramer's work in order that a different light may be shed upon the history and origins of platonist metaphysics. It is hoped that the present study will produce a picture of the ageing Plato more true to the spirit of the late dialogues, a more satisfactory account of the systems of Speusippus and Xenocrates, a probable account of the revival of platonism in the first century B.C., and a more penetrating study of middle-platonist metaphysics.

The exposition will adhere, in so far as is practical, to the chronological order of thinkers. This method presents additional difficulties, but it also holds greater rewards. The later evidence for the beliefs of earlier writers must, in most cases where the source is not acknowledged, be held over until later than would seem desirable were one primarily interested in early material; thus one avoids reading the beliefs of later thinkers into, for instance, the Old Academy, at the expense of forfeiting what might seem to be additional evidence. This defect, especially restricting in the case of Xenocrates, will be compensated by an historical unity which facilitates a corresponding historical understanding.

Methods employed with regard to later thinkers will be relatively straightforward, but it has been felt that Plato and the Old Academy urgently require a new approach. To meet this need a method has been devised whereby the actual principles of doctrine are seen to have been applied in certain cases to the construction of the dialogues, so that the form supplements the content. It has been said of Herodotus<sup>13)</sup> that

11) 7 - 10.

12) The penultimate speech, especially 391 Bff.

13) H.R. Immerwahr, Form and Thought in Herodotus, Ch. IV, p.148, Cleveland Ohio, 1966.

"The form is not an arbitrary creation, but the arrangement of the work embodies Herodotus' perception of repetition, patterning, and structure in the sequence of historical events."

How much more then should we look to a philosopher of Plato's brand to provide an ordered method of composition reflecting his own perception of the structure of reality?

With regard to the Old Academy it is proposed to begin our search with the assumption that it has derived the bulk of its doctrine from the Master and from discussions in which he himself took place. Moreover one maintains that it did not go heedless of his intentions in the dialogues also. Failure to understand the pupils in terms of their teacher will do nothing to solve the mystery which pervades the period. <sup>14)</sup>

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14) A mystery brought to light by H. Gerniss, The Riddle of the early Academy, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945, the principal exponent of the belief that we are unjustified in attributing any kind of unwritten philosophy to Plato.

CHAPTER ONE.ONTOLOGICAL PROGRESSION IN THE SYMPOSIUM AND PHAEDRUS.

What are Plato's five-fold classifications and what is their origin? In Plutarch's eyes they embraced the Megista Gene of the Sophist (245e ff.), the metaphysical classification of the Philebus (23c ff.) and the five-fold classification of Goods in the same dialogue (66a ff). <sup>1)</sup> They were supposedly indicative of Plato's realisation of some noble property of the number five, and the earlier classification of the Philebus was presumed to allude to that in the Sophist, which was taken to portray five supreme principles. <sup>2)</sup> Plutarch was able to note in addition the five regular solids of the Timaeus (54e) and the choice between one world and five in the same context (55d.) <sup>3)</sup> One may justly question whether the numerical value of these passages from the dialogues is not purely the product of chance, whether any significant relation may be found to link them, and what special relevance they had for Plato himself. But it would be fatal to allow a naive simplicity which underlies Plutarch's account to repel the reader from undertaking a thorough investigation of the worth of his opinions.

One may clearly perceive that it is a late phenomenon in the dialogues that Plutarch has noticed, for the Sophist, Timaeus, and Philebus, both on the grounds of style <sup>4)</sup> and on the grounds of content, may be placed among the last works, after the Parmenides and Theaetetus, before the unfinished Laws and Critias, and contemporary with the Politicus. It would

1) De Eapud Del, 391 B-D.

2) πενε... τῆς κυριωτάτης... ἀρχῆς 391 B.

3) 389 F- 390 A.

4) For the latest and most complete analysis of this topic, see H. Thesleff, Studies in the Styles of Plato, Helsinki, 1967.



appear, moreover, that these classifications are of primarily metaphysical inspiration, and a truly metaphysical attitude does not appear in the dialogues before the Parmenides, which supersedes the previous ontological approach by demanding the relation rather than the status of various elements of reality.

Yet the metaphysics of the late period is clearly a product of the ontology of the middle period, and a proper understanding of the Sophist, Timaeus, and Philebus depends upon an appreciative understanding of the point which Plato had reached when the formidable Parmenides appears to alter the whole course of his thinking. Since Plutarch cannot supply a convenient point of commencement, one might look to Albinus to provide the only clear instance of a Middle-Platonist thinker moulding a five-fold form around middle period doctrine. In the tenth chapter of his Epitome <sup>5)</sup> we read as follows:

"For when one beholds the beauty in physical bodies, one next progresses to the beauty of soul, then to that of human practises and laws, then to the vast ocean of beauty, after which he understands the good itself..., together with this he comes to an understanding of God also....."

Albinus clearly separates five stages in the advance toward the good, firstly the appreciation of bodily beauty, then ( μετὰ τούτο ) that of soul, then ( εἶτα ) that of customs and laws, then (again εἶτα ) that of the vast ocean of beauty, and finally ( μεθ' οὗ ) that of the supreme good, object of desire, and light of the soul.

5) Albinus, Epitome, ed. P. Louis, Paris, 1945, ch X, 6:

Θεωρῶν γὰρ τις τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασι καλόν, μετὰ τούτο μένειν  
ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος, εἶτα τὸ ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν καὶ νόμοις,  
εἶτα ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέρατος τοῦ καλοῦ, μεθ' οὗ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν νοεῖ,  
..... τούτῳ δὲ καὶ Θεὸν συνεπινοεῖ.....

If we turn to the Symposium we realise that Albinus has cast this five-fold form somewhat unnaturally around the ascent to the beautiful as depicted twice <sup>6)</sup> in Diotima's speech. In the prior account of this ascent Plato demands that the young man should recognise beauty in one body, the kinship of beauty in all bodies, then the beauty in souls, and then ( αἶψα , 210c3) that of customs and laws; after this ( αἶψα 210c7) he will be guided along to see the beauty of knowledge, to observe not one instance of beauty but the vast ocean thereof, until ( εἰς , d6) he reaches the one knowledge of the supreme beauty.

The latter account is somewhat different; once again we begin with one body, proceed to another, then to all beautiful bodies, then to beautiful practices, then to beauty in knowledge, finishing with the knowledge of beauty. Thus in both cases Plato appears to envisage six stages, and the divergence of the two accounts scarcely permits one to see any progression calculated upon metaphysical lines, let alone a five-fold progression so calculated.

Was Albinus merely remembering Plato inaccurately? Was he simply forcing Plato's words into his own favourite form? Or had he some valid reason for this description of the ascent to the beautiful? Plato himself provides the clue to the solution of this problem in a series of repetitions, indicative of a factor that must have had considerable relevance for him. For five times <sup>7)</sup> he makes it clear that this is a progression which is undergone by him who is correctly guided ( ὁρθῶς ). It is no less clear that the earlier speeches up to that of Socrates which serves as a denouement, are designed to depict a progression of views concerning

6) 210a4ff., 211b7ff.

7) 210a 2, 4-5, 6-7, e3, 211b7.

love in the order in which the young man may be expected to adhere to them. In Socrates' speech we meet the doctrine that has influenced this order of speeches. Pausanias has pointed out the inadequacies of Phaedrus' view, <sup>8)</sup> Eryximachus those of Pausanias', <sup>9)</sup> and Aristophanes the shortcomings of mankind's view in general; <sup>10)</sup> Agathon tries to advance on all other speeches by praising the God in his own right. <sup>11)</sup> Since there are five speeches before that of Socrates, and since the first sees only physical love, the second takes account of the soul also, <sup>12)</sup> and the fifth sees love in itself, <sup>13)</sup> it would be tempting to draw the conclusion that each speech represents one step forward along the road to beauty, culminating in perfect beauty in Agathon's speech.

The difficulties, however, that are encountered by the positioning of the speeches of Eryximachus and Aristophanes, would hamper any conclusion of this sort. It is the latter which presents the more anthropological view of love that one would be right to expect from the champion of customs and laws, while the former speaks of the universality of beauty which he is able to discern through the medical profession; not only does he speak of this occupation of his own as an *ἐπιτήμη* <sup>14)</sup>, but also of the crafts of gymnastics, farming and music, <sup>15)</sup> bakery, <sup>16)</sup> astronomy, <sup>17)</sup> and mantic. <sup>18)</sup> Indeed, not only does he examine beauty through the crafts and sciences, but he points out the universality of beauty, <sup>19)</sup> which we should naturally associate with the vast ocean of beauty that Plato connects

8) 180d<sub>4</sub>-d<sub>1</sub>.

9) 185e<sub>7</sub>-186b<sub>2</sub>.

10) 189c<sub>2</sub>-8.

11) 194c<sub>5</sub>-7.

12) e.g. 181b<sub>4</sub>, 183e<sub>1</sub>, cf. 181e<sub>3</sub>.

13) 195a<sub>4</sub>, *πρωτον αὐτον οἶος ἐστιν.*

14) 186c<sub>6</sub>.

15) 187a. cf. d<sub>4</sub>-5 for music as an example of a branch of scientific knowledge

16) 187e<sub>4</sub>.

17) 188b<sub>5</sub>-6

18) 186c<sub>6</sub>ff.

19) *ἐν παντι τοῖς οὐρα*, 186b<sub>6</sub>-7.

with this scientific stage of the ascent. <sup>20)</sup> Aristophanes, however, not only attempts to explain human behaviour by his theories of the origin of love, but initially suggests that such behaviour would be different if mankind were to realise the power of love, <sup>21)</sup> so that it is difficult to see what beauty he can be depicting of not that of customs and laws .

It is no minor contradiction with which one appears to be presented. On the one hand it seems that Plato has given actual verbal indications as to the relation of the subjects of the five early speeches to his own idea of progress in the apprehension of beauty in all things, while on the other hand, though the first, second, and fifth speeches will in that case conform to the technicalities of his theories, the third and fourth appear to be in a reversed position. A table may be useful;

<u>SPEAKER</u>	<u>SPEECHES.</u> <u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>THEORY OF PROGRESSION.</u>	
		<u>210aff.</u>	<u>211bff.</u>
Phaedrus	love in body	bodily beauty (via. universal b.b.)	first body second body universal bodily beauty.
Pausanias	adds love of soul	soul's beauty	----
Eryximachus	love in sciences	laws and customs	customs.
Aristophanes	love a power behind human behaviour	sciences	sciences.
Agathon	love in itself	supreme beauty or knowledge of beauty.	

If one lays aside the present problem, and moves on to consider the relation of the second account of the progression to the speeches themselves, one encounters a different kind of conformity. The second account is altogether more concrete than the first, and it looks at the love of beauty as something to be practised; one may love someone for their soul, but its realisation will still be physical. Hence Pausanias,

20) 210c7-d6.

21) 189d4-8.

though taking the soul into account as something nobler than the body, nevertheless presents only a second view, and a second kind, of physical love. Again Eryximachus, though concerned with the sciences, will yet explain all according to universal physical principles, and he quotes Heraklitus<sup>22)</sup> in so doing, a physician quoting a physicist. As Aristophanes concerns himself with customs, one has only to grant that the beauty of knowledge is revealed in Agathon's scientific method of praising love, before one sees an alternative method of relating structure of theory in the Symposium.

This may provide some small justification for Albinus' belief that the ascent toward beauty can be analysed into five steps: the five early speeches can be seen to reflect such an ascent in both its formulations. The more obvious correspondence takes the following form:

<u>SPEECHES.</u>	<u>211b.</u>
First bodily account of love	beauty in first body
Second bodily account of love	beauty in second body
Universal account of love as a physical principle	beauty in all bodies
Love as the source of man's actions	beauty in customs.
Love in knowledge (=virtue <sup>23)</sup> )	beauty in knowledge.

Yet, as a justification for Albinus, this correspondence breaks down for we can detect a sixth element in the series:

Account of the knowledge of love (Diotima in Socrates' speech)	beauty in the knowledge of beauty.
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Moreover Albinus is clearly attracted rather toward the 210a progression, with its ontological implications that overshadow the physical aspect altogether. For him one body is no different from the next, and so

22) 187a5-6.

23) For virtue, including wisdom, see 196c3ff.

one should advance straight from body to soul, from soul to customs, etc. It is not the order of the young man's actions and pursuits that interest him, but the order of his awareness of different grades of reality. And so the actual construction of the dialogue and the more obvious relationship between form and doctrine he neglects. What he wishes to see is a gradual ontological progression away from the physical toward the transcendent source.

Thus he must choose to interpret the 210a classification as being essentially five-fold, and the only true justification for the rigid imposition of so strict a form upon it would be the discovery of a real correspondence between it and the five early speeches, not their face-value but their ontological content. He must see the three intermediate stages between the physical love praised by Phaedrus and the "Love in Himself" praised by Agathon, between the Oldest of the Gods <sup>24)</sup> and the Youngest, <sup>25)</sup> between first and last. He must be able to place Aristophanes and his explanations of human conduct before Eryximachus and his grasp of the sciences. And this is the order that ought to have been, had not the former had hiccups. Aristophanes alone, when he begins his speech, does not criticise the previous speaker; he speaks only of the inadequacies of mankind's view in general. Thus he alone is not tackling the subject on a higher metaphysical level than the previous speaker.

Thus we see that it is the proposed order and not the actual order that might give Albinus the justification that he requires. But having concluded that a relation exists between structure and doctrine in the Symposium, let us leave Albinus and his pre-conceptions and his metaphysical preoccupations aside, and search for a clearer ontological basis for the doctrine of Plato's middle period, uncoloured by the conclusions of later writers.

24) 178a9ff.

23) 195a8ff.

The method of passing from obscurity to clarity with regard to Plato's ontological methods will be somewhat unfamiliar. For the vehicle of this advance is to be the Phaedrus, a dialogue not noted for its significance in this sphere, and one of the chiefest justifications for the belief that Plato's true metaphysical tenets are not to be revealed in his literary works. <sup>26)</sup> Indeed, Plato's clear admission that his writings were inadequate <sup>27)</sup> would perhaps justify one's passing over the Phaedrus as a serious exercise, especially in view of the fact that the work's purpose is extremely debatable. <sup>28)</sup> One is often at a loss to decide whether its subject is rhetoric, or love and beauty.

But it is not alone in combining these subjects, for in this respect, as in others, it is extremely close to the Symposium. Not only do both dialogues share an interest in rhetorical exposition, aiding a clearly marked forward progression and development of ideas, but each regard rhetoric and love as almost interdependent. One should be left in no doubt as to the legitimacy of the apparent dual-subject technique when one considers the way in which Plato has interwoven remarks about the capacity of the young to compose beautiful speeches with the account of the ascent to the beautiful at 210a<sup>ff</sup>. The first love which the young man experiences will enable him to create beautiful speeches. <sup>29)</sup> Appreciation of the beauty of soul will cause him to compose and to seek for such speeches as will make young men better, <sup>30)</sup> not an unimportant

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- 26) e.g. Retractionen zum Problem des esoterischen Platon, Mus.Helv. xxi (1964), pp. 137-167, page 152ff., Arete, pp.393-5.  
 27) 278c<sup>4</sup>-d<sup>1</sup>.  
 28) On the question of the unity of the Phaedrus, see Paul Plass, The Unity of the Phaedrus, Symb. Os. xliii (1968).  
 29) 210a<sup>7</sup>-8.  
 30) 210c<sup>1</sup>-3.
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clue to the purpose of the dialogues under consideration. The revelation of the vast ocean of beauty will make him able to give birth to many noble speeches, enriched with a multitude of philosophical considerations.

Thus rhetoric will be seen to depend upon the appreciation of beauty, a fact not strange if we consider that it is viewed by Plato in the Gorgias <sup>31)</sup> as an enticement, this being precisely how Plato uses it. He is not unscientific in the manner in which he composes his dialogues, and here we are able to see yet another reason why the order of speeches in the Symposium should conform to the theory of progression - that at every stage a man's ability to speak is controlled by his awareness of beauty. Thus rhetoric eventually becomes dependent upon knowledge at the end of the Phaedrus, <sup>32)</sup> and above all upon the knowledge of the parts of the soul. <sup>33)</sup> As we read at 271c10:

"The power allotted to speech is that of leading the soul."

When Socrates is made to emphasise this dependence of rhetoric upon knowledge, particularly psychology, in the Phaedrus, it may be taken as a reply to criticisms of the Symposium, which can hardly have been lacking from men of the Isocratean breed. It is a statement both of what he has done in the past, and of what he intends to in his present writings. Perhaps his psychology was at fault in the past, perhaps it is at fault still; <sup>34)</sup> but it certainly marks an attempt to discover the correct method of persuasion for each particular faculty of soul at each stage of its progression.

31) 462a3ff,  
 32) e.g. 262a1-3.  
 33) 271d1-2, ψυχῆς ὁμοειδῆς ἰσχυρῆς.  
 34) 265 6ff.



It is strange that Hackforth <sup>35)</sup> cannot bring himself to discern what parts of the soul Plato has in mind when he requires that the orator should know what parts of speech should be applied to what parts of the soul. It is clearly necessary that some effort should be made to elucidate this matter, as Plato clearly regards it as of supreme importance. It is not only treated at length at 270c9-272b2, but it is repeated at 277b5-c6, and anticipated at 264c2-5. When Plato requires that we should discern whether the soul is simple or composite, and if the latter, how many parts it has and what natural properties each possesses, <sup>36)</sup> he is making no unclear allusion to that whose purpose would be halved if not implied here, the tripartite soul of the myth. And while Hackforth cannot envisage Plato exhorting the appetitive part, the bad horse of the myth, yet this is surely the purpose of rhetoric, this *κολακεία*, that the irrational parts of the soul should be won over; for the reasoning part we have dialectic. Thus in Socrates' first speech every effort is made to appeal to the appetitive part, including the use of poetic inspiration. After the Palinode we are lifted to a higher level with an appeal to the emotions; while the dialogue ends in that conversational style appropriate to call upon the reasoning part, together with apologies thereto for the earlier trivialities upon which it is unlikely to have feasted.

If the tripartite division seems all too simple for Plato's purpose, then it may be remembered that it gave rise to five types of character in Republic VIII and IX. <sup>37)</sup> Brumbaugh, <sup>38)</sup> perhaps rightly suggests that it

35) Plato's Phaedrus, p.147n.

36) 271a6ff., cf. 270d1-7.

37) cf. Rep. IV 445c9-d1. There are as many forms of soul as of constitutions.

38) P.M.I. pp.153-154. Brumbaugh, rather than seeing the sub-divisions as well as the basic division resulting from the soul's tripartition, introduces the triad soul, body and external goods, though he admits that his analysis is not perfect.

lies also behind the nine types of life in the Phaedrus.<sup>39)</sup> Possibly one may distinguish between the controlling force behind each character and its own nature, for one may submit to the influence of friends or of the state contrary to one's own natural tendencies. One might table the lives thus:

<u>LIFE.</u>	<u>CONTROLLING FORCE.</u>	<u>NATURE.</u>
Philosopher or lover	Reasoning	Reasoning
Lawful king, warrior-ruler	Reasoning	Spirited
Politician, money-maker	Reasoning	Desiring
Labour-lover, gymnast, doctor	Spirited	Reasoning
Prophet or mystery-priest	Spirited	Spirited
Poet or imitator	Spirited	Desiring
Craftsman, farmer	Desiring	Reasoning
Sophist or demagogue	Desiring	Spirited
Tyrant	Desiring	Desiring

If this has any truth in it (and Plato may well have squared his tripartite soul!), then we may see more clearly how the dialogue progresses. Lysias is an orator. His speech marks the domination of the high-spirited part by the desiring part, the preference for the non-lover rather than the lover. The first speech of Socrates is that of a poet,<sup>40)</sup> where the spirited part is seen to exhort the desires, encouraging moderation. But Socrates' daemon (his rational soul?) intervenes; he recants, and calls for a purificatory rite, which embraces the whole of the following rhetorical section. Here he is acting as a prophet,<sup>41)</sup> and his address takes the form of an exhortation to the spirited part that it should pull ever upward toward

39) 248d1-ē3.

40) Socrates breaks into verse at 24ld, as promised at 238d. This forewarning ensures the importance of the phenomenon.

41) Socrates is regularly depicted as a seer, e.g., 242c4, 278e10. For the myth as a purificatory rite see 243a2.

the final prize. Finally the reasoning part is made to examine all the subjects involved, to verify, and to justify, with special consideration given to the requirement of knowledge in all crafts, and the particular powers of dialectic.

At this point our argument takes one step toward the ontological relevance of these considerations... We have seen a progression in the Phaedrus, and we know that it is in part connected with the tripartite soul. But it in fact takes four parts, and though Lysias' speech may perhaps be regarded as being indispensable as an object of attack, and hence not a part of the speech significant to the theoretical construction, yet it is worth noting a certain conformity with the theory of educational progression as found in the Republic.

Here Plato, having stated his intention to abide by the traditional pattern of Greek education, i.e. music and gymnastics, decides to begin with music. <sup>42)</sup> In music he detects a large element of tales (λόγοι ! some of which are found to be true, but many false. <sup>43)</sup> And of these tales he proposes that the false ones should be taught first, a striking suggestion though not wholeheartedly meant (since the worst falsehoods are to be banned), yet indicative of Plato's interest in beginning at a distance from the truths he wishes to express, and then working towards them.. Again in the Cave, whose purpose is partly to depict the workings of Greek education, <sup>44)</sup> he shows how the prisoners must firstly be forced to look around from the shadows towards the objects that cast them. <sup>45)</sup>

42) 376e6. Music is taken in its widest sense.

43) 377a1-2.

44) e.g. 514a2, παιδείας τε περί και ἀπαιδεύσεως, a5 ἐκ παιδων  
515a5 ἑμοῦς ἡμῶν . See Tanner, Dianoea, C.Q. 1970.

45) 515c5 ff, especially δούιν τε και ἑαδίν τῶν ἀδελφῶν και τῆς ἀφροσύνης.

Thus educational progress always begins with falsehood and imagery, or, in the alternative words of Republic X, three degrees from the truth. 46)

The Cave's ascent from darkness into light, from ignorance to truth, marks a progression from one epistemological stage to the next, these stages being more clearly represented in the Divided Line. 47) The initial stage is consistently a stage of apprehension by images, and Plato is here thinking of literature, art, drama, and rhetoric, etc. 48) If Plato seriously believed that the progression from ignorance to truth is four-fold, and the educational theory, epistemology, and ontology of the Republic confirm that he did so, - he would surely consider it πολλή ἀνοία not to compose in four stages any dialogue subsequent to the Republic that attempted to lead the mind along this upward path.

Thus Lysias' speech is a beginning : it is his own particular brand of rhetoric, of this image of justice. We have seen how ignorance affects the law concerning gratification of lovers in Pausanias' speech in the Symposium 49), how that same inability to speak is coupled with a similarly unsatisfactory opinion, similarly regardless for the compound nature of the soul. 50) Plato has begun by educating the false opinions, by considering the shadows.

But the difficulties do not lie here in the first stage. If we

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- 46) 599a1, τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τῷ οὐτος , cf. 597e3, b5. For the imitation-reflection theme, see 595c4ff, cf. 597 b5.
- 47) For preliminary, but recent, elucidation of this parallel, one may refer the reader to Tanner, Dianoea.
- 48) Perhaps by τῶν τοῦ δικαίου δειψῶν , 517d8-9, we are reminded that rhetoric is imitation justice in the Gorgias 463dff.
- 49) 182blff.
- 50) Compare Symposium, 182a8, b2, ἀπλῶς , b1 ποιητικός , with Phr. 270d1, ἀπλῶς ἢ πολυετής .

grant such a conformity, then we must expect it to continue at every stage. And of those that remain it is the second that creates the most difficulties, but once this has been dealt with our path becomes easier.

What does Plato regard as the second stage of the educational progress? It would on the surface appear to be gymnastics, but this can never be practised without music. Moreover it is not in the slightest degree epistemological as one would perhaps expect; the second epistemological stage is that belief that is occasioned by the cognition of animal and plant life, nourished by the world's *δημιουργός*<sup>51)</sup>, and of those manufactured articles that are produced by the *δημιουργός* of book X.<sup>52)</sup> Does Plato not cater for this stage in his educational theory? He fails to draw an exact parallel at this point but of all choices we should best select the correct balance of music and gymnastics treated in book III,<sup>53)</sup> and the harmony and temperance engendered by correct musical education.<sup>54)</sup> Indeed the two (harmony and gymnastics) are virtually interdependent,<sup>55)</sup> for their product is that inner harmony and concord that Eryximachus had praised in the Symposium. This concord, which would be best described as temperance when applied to the soul,<sup>56)</sup> is perhaps the clue to the understanding of the objects discerned in the second stage of the Line, - animals, plants, and manufactured objects.<sup>57)</sup> In all are found this unifying harmony, and since perception is of like by like, a man

51) The Sun, Rep. 507c6ff.

52) 596b6ff.

53) 404b4ff. esp. 410b10ff., cf. IV 441e8, VII 522a5 *εὐαρμοστίαν*.....

54) 407a7 ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἔργα πέφικε κοσμίου τε καὶ καλοῦ συφρονῆς τε καὶ  
*μουσικῆς ἔργων.*

55) 412a4, N.B. *μετριώτατα* .

56) 442c10.

57) 510a5-6.

must possess such a harmony before he can perceive it. The inner man and what he sees outside himself are always to be connected. It is the principles of physics that may be taken to connect the objects of belief, the concord engendered by mixing gymnastics with music, and the speech of Eryximachus. And of physical theories, it is the Heraclitean concept of a harmony of discordant parts that is particularly implied. In scientific terms it is the path from aesthetics to physics that marks the advance from the shadows to the objects that cast them. Music and gymnastics might thus seem to be applicable to the first and second segments of the line respectively, although because of their consistent interdependence <sup>58)</sup> no such parallel may be drawn. Plato regards the first stage as essentially aesthetic, the second as the moulding of a physical and psychical harmony, and this is equivalent to the advance from the appreciation of individual bodily beauty to that of the universality of beauty in the Symposium.

Just as gymnastics must help balance and control a young man's musical efforts, so must the spirited part of the soul assist the reasoning faculty in subduing the desiring part. <sup>59)</sup> The true musician is the man who has made this consent, for only he will have harmony in his soul. According to our table he is of an appetitive nature, yet controlled by the spirited part. This is why Socrates becomes a poet when he advances one step further than the efforts of Lysias; he has voiced that state of mind that accompanies the epistemological stage of belief, he has seen the universal harmony, and he has seen the reason for temperance,

58) See especially 522a3ff., where Plato had appeared to place gymnastics before music. Music is the ἀντιστροφός of gymnastics, and supplies the attunement and rhythm in the pupils.

59) 442a4-5.

which is the realisation of that harmony in the soul; thus he may say why the lover should not be gratified, but he cannot say why the non-lover should be.

The next epistemological level that one reaches is that of *Σύνορα*. It is to this to which the mathematical sciences pertain. They survey a section of intelligible reality by means of sensible images.<sup>60)</sup> They lead one out of the physical up to the intellectual world, from becoming to being.<sup>61)</sup> This stage marks the great release, the emergence of the prisoner from the cave into the light of day. It is the great step forward for the man who is to become the "man of war and wisdom",<sup>62)</sup> whose spirited part shall ally with his reason.

The release in the Phaedrus is that of the purification of the soul by virtue of the myth's leading it upward into the realm of ideas. The myth, its prelude, and its aftermath<sup>63)</sup> are portrayals (hence images) of intelligible reality that may or may not touch upon some truth concerning it.<sup>64)</sup> Thus if it may have no clear connexion with mathematics,<sup>65)</sup> yet it shares their property of aiming at reality through images. Also it shares with them the feature of presuming the necessary first hypotheses (in this case the existence, motion, and immortality of the soul) and goes on to explain what is secondary.<sup>66)</sup> This may offer some explanation as to why we should first find myth used in the middle of a dialogue in the Phaedrus, unless one should regard the speech of Aristophanes in the Symposium as such.

60) 510e3.

61) e.g. 525c5-6.

62) 525b8, cf. c4-5.

63) i.e. 241d-257b.

64) 265b6-7.

65) Apart from that of the soul's parts, its periods of life, and its connexion with mathematics both in the Timaeus and in the definition of Xenocrates, fr. 60-65, Heinze.

66) Rep. 510cl-d3.

As regards the part of the soul to which this particular section is to apply, we may firstly recall that we have regarded it previously as an appeal to the spirited faculty. It is not, of course, possible to envisage the possibility that Plato considered  $\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\epsilon\iota\tau\iota\kappa\alpha$  possible without the reasoning faculty; but on the other hand he cannot have dispensed with his "good horse" for the journey upward. Thus, when introducing mathematics into his curriculum, he makes it clear that this higher education is for war as well as wisdom,<sup>67)</sup> for the spirited as well as the reasoning part. We have seen a certain minimal conformity with the four virtues also in the first two stages, and it is worth noting that the second most noble virtue, that should be seen to apply particularly at this stage, is particularly applied to the spirited part in preserving the voice of the reason through all trials;<sup>68)</sup> thus here again this stage is particularly pertinent to the former in conjunction with the latter.

It remains to be seen how the final part of the Phaedrus conforms with our pattern. In essence it is logical and dialectical, though not without an occasional morsel of entertainment or inspiration for the desiring and spirited faculties. Aesthetic concerns still apply, but the overall tone has assumed an altogether more serious nature, and the conversational method replaces the allurements of rhetoric and poetic inspiration. One is taught the need for wisdom in all things, and for the accompaniment of love and beauty therewith. Thus concludes the upward path, from images to truth, from the irrational to the rational.

But what we have so far only alluded to or mentioned in brief, is the conformity of the virtues with this upward path. We know that justice is the basic virtue,<sup>69)</sup> that each man or part of the soul should

67) See above, note 61.

68) Rep. 442b11-c3.

69) Rep. 432d2ff., cf. 443b7ff.



fulfil his own particular function. We know that rhetoric is particularly to be considered as an image of it, and that it is in other ways <sup>70)</sup> particularly apprehensible through images. We have seen that temperance is the end of preliminary education, <sup>71)</sup> the sine qua non of belief, and the aim of Socrates' first speech in the Phaedrus. The *δύναμις* of mankind is not to be without that spirited part of the soul by which we call him brave, nor can *ἐπιθυμία* arise without the employment of reason. This is the ascending order of virtues as implied (though not specifically stated) in both the Republic and the Symposium, <sup>72)</sup> and though the parallel is by no means exact, there is certainly some significance behind it.

When dealing with the relation of epistemology to education one should bear in mind that the Greeks found difficulty in conceiving the emotions. They had no adequate word for them, a factor which may help account for their greatness both in tragedy and in philosophy, and consequently they come to rationalise them more quickly than we. Hence aesthetics, the well-being of the soul, and courage, all contribute something to the intellectual progression in Plato's eyes. There is no inconsistency if gymnastics should be seen as being jointly responsible for an awareness of the condition of the world in which one lives. Health becomes an essential for correct belief. As a result one finds throughout the Republic a variety of concepts that concern the soul, all woven carefully and more fully than either we or Plato would care to admit, into a unity that may often break down if subjected to exhaustive examination, yet indicates a vision of supreme value, a vision of unity and of the good. <sup>73)</sup>

70) e.g. 443b4-5.

71) See also Rep. 402e3-403c7.

72) Rep. 428a ff., Symp., 196b ff.

73) For the approximate synonymy of these two terms see Arete, ch.I, pp. 41-145. If the case has been overstated, one should nevertheless not ignore the basic truth that Plato saw the good in unity, e.g. Rep. 462a9-b2.

We have shown how the Phaedrus, in its concern to present its case in a scientific manner, has taken into account various elements of Plato's psychology and educational theory. As such it represents an advance, though not perhaps such a substantial advance, upon an attempt to arrange the speeches of the Symposium scientifically. As far as it is possible to discern the Republic and Phaedrus have abandoned attempts to include the cognition of soul in their theories of educational progression, as was done in the former account in the Symposium. (210a)

It is the latter account in this dialogue that appears to have eventually taken precedence, and here one may see the origin of the later ontology: the aesthetic awareness of one and then another body, is followed by a universal physical awareness; this leads to the awareness of beauty in laws and customs, the nearest the Symposium can reach to images of the intelligible, and this gives way to appreciation of knowledge. Just as the Republic attaches great importance to the "greatest object of apprehension"<sup>74)</sup>, so the Symposium includes the knowledge of the beautiful as something distinct from mere knowledge. It is no contradiction that while the earlier work clearly separates it from the stage before, the latter adds no separate section for it in the Divided Line. For it is not an educational alteration, but an ontological one. The ultimate principle is to be removed from the ranks of being, and yet remain as the goal of education.

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74) Rep. 505a2, 501e4-5, μέγιστον μάθημα.

CHAPTER TWO.ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS IN THE REPUBLIC AND PARMENIDES.

It will have become apparent from the foregoing chapter that the ontological doctrine found in the Republic did not emerge in isolation. In particular one must emphasise the importance of this doctrine for supporting Plato's educational theory. One is correct to speak of supporting rather than initiating, for Plato would surely have proposed a higher education consisting of mathematics and finally dialectic, regardless of the precise epistemological justification for so doing; it is frankly unlikely that his educational doctrine was dependent upon his epistemology in the sense of the dependence of a product upon its cause.

One may point to the apparent obscurity of the difference between first and second intelligibles <sup>1)</sup> in the Line and Cave as an illustration of this point. It is precisely because of his intention to use the *Σύνορα / ἐπιστήμη* distinction for separating the mathematical sciences from dialectic, that he has to find other less clear methods of drawing the distinction, one being based upon the use of images in the inferior sciences, <sup>2)</sup> the other distinguishing between two kinds of hypotheses; mathematicians are compelled to use their very first principles as hypotheses, point, angles, etc., and to work from these to what is more complex, going not to the beginning but to the end, not to the cause but to the completed shape: <sup>3)</sup> while the dialectician assumes as his hypotheses that which is secondary and inferior, <sup>4)</sup> and works back to the ultimate cause.

1) One feels that Shorey's insistence on the folly of seeing two levels of intelligibility in the upper segments of the Line has now been forgotten. See P. Shorey's edition of Plato Republic (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge (Mass.), 1935, vol.II, p.164. note a: and in answer to this S.Mansion, L'object des mathématiques et l'object de la dialectique selon Platon, Revue Philosophique de Lorraine, lxxii (1969), p.368 et passim.

2) 510b4, etc.

3) ibid. b5-6

4) 511b5.

Plato's belief that the principles of mathematics are unexplained and hypothetical is especially important for moderating Kramer's view that good and evil are ultimately the One and the Dyad in Plato's eyes. When the One is essentially something mathematical, and the Good is the supreme object of dialectic, it is impossible to give precedence to the former. The One is the unexplained and hypothetical first principle of mathematics, and as such it resembles and imitates the Good, not the converse. Otherwise arithmetic would be compelled to take first place, above dialectic, quite an unthinkable suggestion. There is, however, every reason to associate unity and good, as will become apparent.

Also damaging to Kramer's case is the element of imaginative artistry that pervades the Sun, Line, and Cave passage. It would be strange if some undeniable inspiration should be derived from the concept of a One, with or without a dyad. Unity and harmony would indeed contribute to the concept of the Good, but it is difficult to see why the Good should be predicated essentially of the One. Furthermore the element of creative art denies the suggestion that Plato is trying to find a cryptic method of expressing a doctrine to which he is already committed, for art aims at a clearer and more vivid expression of what is obscure in terms of plain language, an obscurity which Plato recognised and lamented. His admission of shortcomings at 506d-e, a favourite passage of Dr. Kramer,<sup>5)</sup> would make nonsense of his preceding demand for clarity in the greatest matters at 504d6-e3, if interpreted in the sense that Plato were deliberately withholding a clearer expression of his beliefs! He is searching wholeheartedly for the most potent method of conveying his ideas, and this method must be of major interest to us.

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5) Retrakt. p.130.

Before any attempt to demonstrate this method, however, it is essential to realise, with Plato, that his argument had reached an impasse at 506d. There is a certain immediacy in his writing that suggests strongly that this inability to pursue his enquiry to an end has suddenly demanded a more comprehensible form of expression. This leads him to devise a method that develops as it progresses. The Sun leads to the line, though it does not include all that the Line includes, while the Line leads to the Cave in a corresponding way. It is hoped that the awareness of the manner in which the argument develops will help to explain some of the difficulties in interpreting the passage. To regard the doctrine of the Line, for instance, as an established dogma, is a most serious handicap to the understanding thereof. It is here in its infancy, and is subsequently to develop further in the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Philebus, perhaps in the Laws X, and ultimately into the four-fold doctrine known to us from Aristotle's work "On Philosophy". 6)

Most important is the fact that the Line grows out of the Sun passage. Previous scholars have paid considerable attention to harmonising the Cave with Line and Sun, but the relation between these two primary elements is far greater than that perceived through their joint roles in the Cave simile. The basic division between intelligible and visible "places" at 508cl-2 is clearly analogous to the primary division of the Line into visible and intelligible segments at 509d. But what is by no means obvious is that the subordinate object-reflection divisions are also prefigured at this early stage, these reflections being present in the organ of cognition, be it eye or mind. For when drawing the Sun-Good comparison, Plato mentions two elements in each "place" besides the Sun

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6) As related in De An.404b18ff.

and the Good themselves, intelligence and intelligibilia in one, sight and sensibles in the other. Now sight is conceived as something actually in the eye at 507d11, 508a11, c7, and d2; it would therefore be correct to suppose intelligence to be something in the mind, and we read, indeed, at 508d4 that the mind thinks in the same manner in which the eye sees. Thus in the sensible realm we have sensible objects and also something occasioned by them in the eye: correspondingly the intelligible world possesses intelligibles and something occasioned by them in the mind.

Now it would be a very naive person who wished to make these four things responsible for the four modes of cognition encountered in the Line; all these are processes within the soul. 7) What is claimed here is that the idea of an essential difference between the sensibles and their ocular image (sight), 8) and between intelligibles and their mental image, gives rise naturally to the feeling that knowing the images is something quite different from knowing the objects. For we read that the absence of light and of truth deprives the eye of clear sight or the mind of genuine intelligence. 9) There is still a vague trace of sight in the eye, still a less distinct image in the mind, that depends upon the sensible world. 10) Out of the semi-sight develops conjecture as opposed to belief, and out of the non-intelligence<sup>11)</sup> develops calculation as opposed to knowledge.

It is now possible to see why Plato uses the distinctions of

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- 7)  $\mu\alpha\theta\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$   $\epsilon\upsilon$   $\tau\eta$   $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  ..... 511d7.  
 8) The difference is brought out at 507d11-e2.  
 9) 508c4, d4. Compare d9  $\nu\omicron\nu$   $\omicron\upsilon\kappa$   $\epsilon\chi\omicron\nu\tau\iota$  with 511d1, d4,  $\nu\omicron\nu$   $\omicron\upsilon\kappa$   $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ ,  $\omicron\upsilon$   $\nu\omicron\nu$ .  
 10) 508c6  $\epsilon\gamma\gamma\upsilon\gamma$ , d7,  $\tau\omicron$   $\tau\eta$   $\delta\iota\omicron\tau\eta$   $\kappa\epsilon\upsilon\kappa\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ .  
 11) 511d1 & 4 are certainly anticipated by 508d in denying the term intelligence to the objects of calculation.

object and image, hypothetical and non-hypothetical reasoning to distinguish his two kinds of intelligibles. The mathematical sciences fall back upon the world of becoming, <sup>12)</sup> building up an image in the mind that is not directly related to the actual intelligibilia. They do so without the knowledge of the true first principle which is not shining upon the mind, <sup>13)</sup> and so they are forced to postulate their own first principles in order to render the objects of their discussion intelligible. Dialectic, however, because it is able to view the intelligibles illuminated by the Good, is able to work therefrom up to this first principle itself, from what lies below to what is above. Clear perception of the actual objects does not necessitate the formulation or construction of artificial images.

The present interpretation of the Divided Line is perhaps not so much of use in its own right, but in the context of its subsequent developments. Thus when we meet the concepts of universals that are thoughts in the mind in the Parmenides <sup>14)</sup> or birds in an aviary, these birds representing mathematical numbers!, <sup>14½)</sup> one should be prepared to associate them with images in the mind and with the objects of mathematics. The fundamental necessity for such an identification will be examined later. At present it will suffice to point out that the doctrine found here does have a later development, and that this development cannot be fully appreciated if one regards the original as an expression of thoroughly analysed dogma; if, moreover, the doctrine is here seen to be moulded into too conscious a form it will imply that it had been so analysed before composition.

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- 12) Compare 510b4 τὰς τὰτε μὴ μὲν θείων etc., with 508d6-9.  
 13) As at 508d4.  
 14) 132b.  
 14½) Theaetetus, 199b.

Brumbaugh has raised the subject of the theoretical construction of the Sun, Line, and Cave passage, <sup>15)</sup> and it is necessary to discern what element of truth lies behind his thoughts on this matter. He sees in the Sun a hyperbolic simile, in the Line a geometrical scheme, in the Cave an allegorical story, and in what follows a detailed curricular proposal. These he associates with the four epistemological methods in the order four, three, one and two, four representing the highest and one the lowest stages of the Line.

Such an order, however, would seem strange. Plato is working progressively down from an intelligible level to the world we live in, from clarity to obscurity; why does he not adhere to the successive epistemological processes which are also classified according to clarity and obscurity? <sup>16)</sup> Furthermore he recognises the need to know the objects before the images in all cases. <sup>17)</sup> It would be logical, since the two belong to the same art, to examine object and image together, but not the image first and then the object. Thus I find it difficult to believe that Plato will have allowed the stage of conjecture to anticipate the stage of belief. The Cave must be regarded as clearer than what follows it, and closer to the truth of the matter, which is obscured from our own perceptions.

If we examine the passage as a whole, down to 521c8 with a view to the content of the individual sections we find precisely the progression which we would expect. The Sun passage is concerned chiefly with the Good

15) Plato on the One, Yale U.P., 1961, p.195.  
 16) 509d9, cf. 511c4, e3.  
 17) Rep. 402b5ff.



and with intelligibles, the Line with the objects of calculation, the Cave with the artificial objects and their manner of presentation rather than with the actual images on the wall, and its aftermath (516c8ff) with the state of those who see only the images. Here the theme of knowing the truth before the images returns again,<sup>18)</sup> and Plato is deeply concerned with what the philosopher experiences when he returns to his seat in the cave, and is confronted with the images which he has left behind.<sup>19)</sup> Obviously these images are to be associated with the every-day world of the Greek man.<sup>20)</sup> It is to this every-day world that Plato has brought us down, from the heights of reality to the lowest shadows, from a vision of the intelligible to our superficial perception of the world in which we live, in order that by knowing the former we may understand the latter. It is interesting to note also that Plato makes considerable use of allusion, not so much in the Cave, which is constructed quite straightforwardly, but in its aftermath where shadows of justice at 517d and ridicule at 518a point toward men like Anytus and Aristophanes, and where the whole course of the argument is subtly directed toward Athenian education and society.

Hence Brumbaugh's view becomes a little difficult to justify, though he may be correct in assuming a certain influence of doctrine upon method in this case. But as it has appeared here, there is nothing to suppose that the pattern of composition was determined when Plato began writing the Sun passage. Its emphasis on the Good itself, which was supposedly beyond being<sup>21)</sup> and therefore not to be contained in the

18) 520c3ff.

19) 516e3.

20) e.g. 517c8, τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δ5, ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων.

21) 509b6-10.

uppermost segment of the line at all, rather than the objects that it illuminates, suggests that we find in the Line the first measurable conformity between method of cognition, object depicted, and construction; hence that all was not predetermined on the commencement of writing the Sun passage. Any conscious system of construction emerged during, not before, the writing of the passage, since it constituted an answer to Plato's self-confessed difficulties at 506d.

Since this conformity is striking in the case of the Divided Line but less so elsewhere, let us leave Brumbaugh's arguments, and examine independently whether there is any cogent reason why this should be so. For if, as we have mentioned, the Good is not to be included within the top segment of the Line, owing to its position as being cause of the objects here to be found, could it conceivably be regarded as the uppermost point of the line? It does seem to be the supreme object of dialectic, in which case one cannot but feel that it should possess some place upon the line. Perhaps such a point could be the origin of a line, just as the sun might be envisaged as the point from which a ray of light originates.

But we are not concerned with speculation, but with fact, and this fact is that the Sun simile is designed to portray the point from which truth and being originates, the line is designed to portray the relative clarity and obscurity of those things which share in this truth, the cave extends this line into a two-dimensional picture in which both height and length are relevant,<sup>22)</sup> and its aftermath reconciles this picture with our perceptions. Laws X suggests that perception is brought about in exactly this way by the addition of one dimension after another so as to reach the third.<sup>23)</sup> The Timaeus, moreover, in a somewhat mysterious

22) Tanner, op.cit., pp.88, 89.

23) 894a.

passage, declares that while the solid bodies originate from basic triangles, only the man dear to God will know the origins of these.<sup>24)</sup> This will be quite understandable if Plato wishes to relate the point and line to the two higher forms of cognition while associating the surface and solid with the lower methods. Aristotle has clearly expressed the relationship of these dimensions to the four-fold epistemology in an essentially platonic work,<sup>25)</sup> and Plato himself can be seen to propose a connexion between point, line, surface, and solid and cognition. The theory may originate from the very passage that we have been considering, and, if it does underlie the construction here, then there is every reason why this conformity should be most evident in the Line!

Before we move on to consider the Parmenides in the light of the epistemology and ontology of the Republic, it is necessary to recall that this dialogue has shed a new light on the subject for Plato and presumably for the rest of the Academy also. It has given rise to a host of new speculations, all of which will need careful estimation and require certain criticisms. Also, while maintaining the inferiority of mathematics to dialectic, and hence of the Pythagoreans to Socrates, it has allowed for certain connexions between the Good and unity, especially if the Good is to be compared to a point.

For such reasons one finds in the Parmenides, perhaps the first of Plato's works to signify that the initial enthusiasm for his new ontology had abated, a move towards a mathematical emphasis in ontological subjects. To the modern world, though not indeed to the ancient as we shall shortly discover, this dialogue has proved particularly difficult to interpret.

24) 53c8ff.

25) De An., loc.cit., Aristotle's terminology, however, is his own.

To those who follow Burnet and Taylor<sup>26)</sup> its formidable "last part", i.e. 135c8 to the end, is little more than a logical joke, and its motivation is of a satirical or polemical nature. Others feel it is serious but fail to produce any systematic interpretation of it. Others may feel pulled toward a Neoplatonic interpretation,<sup>27)</sup> but in doing so they will be misled by an excessive emphasis on theology. Plato had indeed intended that his work should be the subject of speculation and debate, but it is only the difficulties of comprehension that have stimulated a mystical approach.

According to the present analysis this last part is the last of a series of four methods of tackling the one-many problem, a problem central to the dialogue from the beginning,<sup>28)</sup> and originating in the works of Parmenides himself. The division of the work of Plato has more than an incidental correspondence with the two poems of his revered predecessor, his Way of Truth and Way of Seeming, the former of which defended the unity of reality, while the latter accounted for its apparent plurality. For him the final part signified an attempt to reconcile the multiplicity of the world with the existence of unity or universals at the "apparent" level of Eleatic argument, fallacious because of its inability to

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- 26) See A. E. Taylor, Plato's Parmenides, O.U.P., 1934, introduction, p.28f. This view is the object of Ryle's attack in an article of the same title, printed in R. E. Allen (ed.) Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London and New York 1965, pp.97-147. It appears also that Runciman in the ensuing article (pp.149-184) which also bears this title, is arguing in a manner which owes much to the Burnet-Taylor approach, in claiming that the seriousness of the last part lies in its fallacies.
- 27) Perhaps most clearly set out in F.M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, 5th Impression, London, 1964, the preface. Taylor opposes its theological implications, op.cit., p.33.
- 28) Plurality appears at 127e, unity at 128d.

distinguish any measure of difference between particular and universal. Also of relevance is the fact that Plato conveys his meaning in this last part by a series of pictures which his arguments produce, much as Parmenides himself has built up a picture of his One Being through logical means in his Way of Truth.

Before the discussion of these pictures it is necessary to ascertain the nature of the ontology that lies behind the first part. For it has been said that the last part is the last of a series of four attitudes toward the one-many problem, while the first part embraces the other three, in the manner of three possible relationships between form and particular. Firstly the particular is seen to partake of the form;<sup>29)</sup> secondly the form is regarded as a concept in the mind;<sup>30)</sup> thirdly it becomes a pattern in nature, after which the particulars are fashioned.<sup>31)</sup>

These concepts are not in fact alternatives in Plato's eyes, but all contribute to his ontological system, and they correspond to the classes of objects that are considered as candidates for the possession of a form at 130b3 ff. These are mathematical and logical terms (one, many, likeness, all), the great ethical and aesthetic qualities (justice, beauty, good), natural objects (man, fire, water), and things perceived as an orderless mass (hair, mud, dirt). Such universals will be classified as mathematical, ideal, physical, and apparent<sup>32)</sup> respectively.

The appearance of the mathematical group first in the order does not necessarily imply that Plato has given them supremacy over the ideal forms. It is they that have been the subject of discussion since 127e, and

29) Up to 132b2.  
 30) to 132c11.  
 31) to 135c7.  
 32) 130d4, εἶδος δ' τι .

it would have been unnatural for them to have been preceded by any other class in this case. Furthermore it would mark a serious deviation from the ontology of the Republic if one were to consider mathematical form as superior to ethical, though this ontology has not been significantly modified in other respects. That order that is the essence of the living species, and that geometrical arrangement that is attributed to the elements, both underlie those objects that were apprehended by belief at 510a; while lack of order is a feature both of the shadows on the cave wall and of hair and mud etc., which now replace them in signifying the furthest remove from the ordering principle. It would be strange then not to relate the mathematical objects of the Divided Line to those in the Parmenides, or to deny the ethical forms the supreme position accorded to them in the Republic and elsewhere.

That it is fundamentally correct to associate the ontological groups of these two dialogues is assured by the structure of the Parmenides. The first view of the relation of form to particular is particularly appropriate to the ideal form; this is the concept of participation. The second possible relation, which demands that the form should be a concept in the mind, will be especially applicable to the mathematical objects of  $\xi\lambda\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ , the images in the mind. For these mental concepts are a concept of something<sup>33)</sup>, and a concept of something was surely to some extent an image of something in Plato's eyes; but that of which it is an image is surely that in which the particular, and also the concept,<sup>34)</sup> to some extent participates. Only the ideal forms can be those higher entities for which the Politicus finds no adequate illustration in the

33) 132b.

34) 132c9-10.

physical world, <sup>35)</sup> while it is clearly in the mathematical objects that such illustrations can best be found.

While the second view of the one-many problem had sought to remove the argument to a non-physical plane in a bid to escape Eleatic logic, one is brought back firmly into the physical world by the third concept, which not only regards form as a natural or physical exemplar, but also argues the problem according to physical laws, no contact other than physical contact being envisaged, while man is seen only as a physical being. Here one becomes acutely conscious of the need to relate the physical and the ideal worlds, and one is confronted by the choice between complete contact or complete separation; Eleatic logic fails to allow any intermediate possibility. As at the beginning of the argument (127e), sameness and difference are completely irreconcilable. Either the similarity which exists between form and particular is such that the form is just like the individuals, or there exists an unbridgeable difference between the two.

The final section, as we have seen above, reduces the level of enquiry from physics to the world of superficial exercises and playful appearances. <sup>36)</sup> The standard concept of the relation of unity to multiplicity which one encounters here is that of the unity as a homogeneous mass and its attributes as parts thereof, physically detachable from it. Such a concept would be well applied to homogeneous masses such as hair or mud, or on a universal level, to the totality of matter. This is the direct result of the abandonment of the form particular debate in favour of a simpler discussion of the related topic of unity

35) 285e-286a.

36) e.g. 135c8, d4, 137b2.

and multiplicity.

Thus it should be observable that Plato, when considering the relationship of universality and particularity at diminishing levels, has done so in accordance with four concepts of such a relation, all of which were supposed to be valid for one particular ontological class, the four classes being ideal, mathematical, physical, and apparent. But before examining the complicated final part in detail, it would be well to examine how the ontology of the Republic has guided Plato's methods in the Theaetetus.

Here the sceptical framework does not seriously hinder one's observation that Plato's concept of knowledge entailed its separation from three other degrees of cognition. The three subordinate degrees of cognition here are perception, marking a development of conjecture; true opinion, that one may associate with belief; and true opinion with the addition of an account, this latter aspect being sufficient to relate it to the mathematical calculations of the Republic, which likewise relied upon the physical world for a basis. Clearly these points of correspondence should not be over-emphasised, especially since there are traces of real development here. The initial two degrees of cognition have already assumed the same terminology that Aristotle was to apply later, and this is perhaps more accurately able to grasp the essence of the epistemology/ontology implied in the Parmenides, than the terms found in the Republic.

Although Plato's conception of knowledge is nowhere explained in the Theaetetus, one should be aware that Socrates demonstrates that concept throughout the dialogue. It is indicated at 145e, by the simple ability to discern between universal and particulars. A mathematical example follows at 147c-148b. This is followed by the famous comparison



of Socrates with a midwife, before we finally embark upon the empirical (!) substance of the dialogue. The pattern (a) intuitive distinction, (b) mathematical example, (c) complicated analogy, and (d) exposition, follows that of the Sun, Line, and Cave passage in the Republic.

A further example of four-fold composition in this dialogue is constituted by the analysis of false judgement at 188c9ff. Initially it is asked how one can possibly think what is not. Next it is found impossible to explain false judgement as mistaking one thing for another. Then follows the analogy of the memory and the wax tablet, and finally the aviary passage. If this pattern is compared with point, line, plane, and solid, and with the corresponding dimensions, one may proceed further to realise that the object of the first attempt is a transcendent, non-dimensional, non-existent object of thought. That of the second attempt is immanent in the mind in the form of a dialogue of the mind with itself. In the third it is a two-dimensional impression with which we are concerned, which expands in the fourth into a three-dimensional aviary with pieces of ignorance flying amid the pieces of knowledge, as perhaps in Plato's own Athens!

Finally, we may suggest that the four degrees of cognition found in the Theaetetus are perhaps seen also in the natures of the philosophers with whom it deals. Protagoras is the exponent of perception, Heraclitus of right opinion, Parmenides of the account, and Socrates himself of knowledge. This would not be so much dependent upon their respective doctrines but rather upon the fact that the one has regard only for aesthetic truths, the second for his physical speculations, the third for the truths of those universal mathematical concepts that for him constitute true reality; while Socrates has access to something more, as at Parmenides, 135c2-3, when the dianoetic powers (b8) have failed

to triumph in the absence of real universals.

Returning to the final part of the Parmenides with increased assurance of the continued relevance of the four-fold epistemology, one discovers that even these dianoetic powers are for the most part forgotten. On four occasions they are introduced <sup>37)</sup> to recall the essential nature of the one or the many, but the argument is conducted at a level lower than this. Nor can this level be truly physical when no distinct concrete objects are involved. Moreover, the physicist deals with what lies behind the appearances, a hidden rationality which explains our perceptions. But here, Plato is concerned rather with making the intelligible acceptable to our perceptions; it is on the level of appearances that his purpose lies, at the very foundations of knowledge.

Traditionally, the final part is divided into eight hypotheses, four assuming the one's existence, four assuming its non-existence, with a corollary, numbered 2a by Cornford <sup>38)</sup> and Brumbaugh, after the first and second positive hypotheses. In fact Plato clearly numbered this corollary third, <sup>39)</sup> and the ancient thinkers whom we shall later discuss also regarded that it should be taken in its own right. Thus we have five positive hypotheses and only four negative, and they will be numbered here one to nine in accordance with what appears to have been Plato's own intentions. The third is the only one that Plato does, in

37) 143a7, 158c2, 165a8, b6.

38) Cornford, op.cit., p.194. Brumbaugh, Plato on the One, p.146.

39) 155e4.

fact number, and this alone should make it clear that it is here that the most careful interpretation is required.

The first hypothesis simply demands that the one should be one. As a result we obtain an abstract conception of unity deprived of all attribution, including being, and neither known nor perceived. <sup>40)</sup>

The second postulates the existence of the one rather than its unity. Thus the combination of unity and existence initiates and incorporates an ordered plurality, existing, knowable, perceptible.

The third asks what the one, being as it has been seen to be, (i.e. in the first and second hypotheses), must suffer. It paints a picture of perpetual change, for it is now both unity and plurality, not-unity and not-plurality. <sup>41)</sup> It is here that one finds the link by which unity and plurality are properly combined; hence the absence of any equivalent to this hypothesis among the negative ones:- only by the postulation of unity can the four worlds be united.

Fourthly it is asked what must happen to the rest if the one exists. Their nature is properly infinite, yet the one provides them with limitation, <sup>42)</sup> in spite of their being of every kind, both at rest and in motion.

The final positive hypothesis suggests that if the one is one, then the rest will be something different from it, and completely separate. Being deprived of the one there would be no finite number. Thus there would be no duality among them, no opposites, no motion and rest, nothing but the one, which, being all, would no longer be one!

40) 142a3-4.  
41) 155e5-6.  
42) 158d5-6.

In short, the first, second, fourth and fifth hypotheses reveal impredicable unity, divisible unity, unified multiplicity, and deprivation of unity respectively. The third hypothesis introduces coming to be and passing away - a living universe. But are these hypotheses designed to depict "unities" and "multiplicities" or universal unity and universal multiplicity? This problem is complex. The general impression that one receives is that Plato's pictures apply on a universal scale comparable with Parmenides' own poems, but at one particular point, 158c5-7, Plato speaks of the opposite nature to the form:—

τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἶδους.....

Since he could easily have chosen to say τὸ εἶδος this cannot be ignored as insignificant. Moreover, the one-many discussion in the final part is the continuation of the form-particular debate in the earlier pages. In fact it is possible to reconcile the apparent difficulties here by suggesting that Plato is in fact discussing the principles of unity or diversity that lie behind each ontological group, ultimately a principle of form and a principle of individuation; the complete privation of this latter suggests it as a candidate for the origin of the Timaeus' receptacle, especially since this latter is supposed to be apprehended by a sort of bastard reasoning,<sup>43)</sup> a term not unsuitable for the arguments with which we are at present concerned.

But above all there appears to be a foreshadowing of the Philebus' first cause, limit, combination, unlimited, and second cause. The second hypothesis may give rise to a plurality of numbers from the one, but the one itself is bounded:

πεπερασμένον ..... κατὰ τὸ ὄλον

144e8-9.

43) νόθῳ τινὶ λογισμῷ ..... 52b.

The rest in the fourth argument are infinite:

$\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu \dots \pi\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota.$

158c5-6.

And we have a mixed entity in the third hypothesis which is one (1st hypothesis), and many (5th hypothesis), not one (2nd hypothesis) and not many (4th hypothesis).<sup>44)</sup> The crowning feature of this world is the momentary instant, a strange nature entrenched between motion and rest, the vehicle of change between the former state and the latter.<sup>45)</sup>

But the parallel is difficult to pursue further; the first and fifth hypotheses do not present causes of combination and separation like those that can be seen in the Philebus. Indeed they present  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\alpha\iota$ ,<sup>46)</sup> but these  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\alpha\iota$  are the origins of the component features of the combined world, not of their motion. For the first and fifth hypotheses portray the one and many respectively in their absolute senses, corresponding to the sixth and ninth negative hypotheses; while the second and fourth hypotheses, corresponding to the seventh and eighth among the negative arguments, portray the results of those principles when in combination. Should this not be sufficiently clear from a reading of the text, one may point out that of the four uses of the word  $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\alpha$  at 143a7, 158c2, 165a8 & b6, all are employed to recall the mind to the essential nature of the principle concerned when dealing with them in combination, and this in the second, fourth and eighth hypotheses, three of the four in which the principle's combination with existence is considered. The seventh alone refrains from recalling such an essential nature of its principle:- for in this case it is the non-existent one that is considered in combination!

44) See above, n.41.

45) 156d2ff.

46) e.g. 158c, quoted above.

Now what correspondence is there between the final part and the metaphysics that is seen in the rest of the dialogue? The fact that four of the positive hypotheses correspond to four of the negative ones suggests that one should look for any such correspondence in the first, second, fourth and fifth hypotheses. <sup>47)</sup> Of these the first portrays the transcendent principle of unity or form. The second shows how the numbers arise, and suggests only a logical kind of time, a linear progression. Hence the basic scientific and logical terms have arisen from the one. The fourth reveals a variety of objects, which partake of some unity. The fifth shows the principle of multiplicity into which all opposites have been fused, <sup>48)</sup> whose unity lies in its characterless mass. The unity seen in a characterless mass is that which one sees in hair or mud, the apparent universals. The unity of the multiple kinds of objects, is their specific unity as in man or

- 47) This is a basic reason for rejecting the Neoplatonic interpretation of the final part, that sees in the first three hypotheses the triad one, intelligence, and soul. In the first emerges the Plotinian One, transcendent and beyond being. In the second comes  $\nu\delta\delta_1$ , which embraces the forms. In the third is found soul, regarded as the medium of mathematics. The result of this is to associate the four ontological levels with the second to fifth hypotheses, and to associate the one that is above being with the Good above being in the Republic. But the folly of attaching excessive importance to the denial of being to the absolute principle of unity here is demonstrated by Aristotle, Met. 987b21, where the platonic one is virtually equated with being. The one of the first hypothesis is the principle behind the forms' transcendence, and as such it should be removed from existence owing to its being cause and for no other reason (cf. Rep. 509b7-8. Speusippus in Iamblichus De Comm. Math. Sc. IVp151, 1.7-10F.) The Sophist, moreover, dispenses with the idea of removing anything from being. To accept the Neoplatonic interpretation would be to admit a conflict between the Parmenides and the Sophist, and it would further involve the first and not the third hypothesis as being the odd one out, a possibility now tacitly agreed to be refuted by the neglect of the third's independent status by editors.
- 48) 159e, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 987b26. τὸ δὲ ἅπασιν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ καὶ μικρῷ.

or fire. The unity of scientific and logical terms is that of mathematical universals, similar to the ideals in that they are everlasting, but differing from them in that they are not unique, but multiple. <sup>49)</sup> Only the unity of ideal form is truly and inseparably one. Here the unifying principle is seen in isolation, among the mathematical objects it is seen in connexion with its opposite; in the natural species the opposite principle is seen in combination, in formless matter it is seen in isolation.

We have seen how out of an ontology which is essentially four-fold, a metaphysics begins to arise that connects the four levels of reality into one fifth central world. Once again one should emphasise that the doctrine is still in its infancy. Plato's confidence is indeed waning owing to criticisms, which he does not feel able to counter directly. What he hopes may prove the solution to the problem is veiled in the intricacy of these elementary exercises. But the nature and numbering of the third hypothesis is perhaps an indication of where Plato himself saw the solution to lie.

Two steps have been taken to convert the old ontology into metaphysics. Firstly it is not the degrees of reality but the types of unity that may be discerned that separates the groups of objects. Secondly the process of mixing these different aspects of reality has begun, a process to continue to grow in importance in the Sophist, Timaeus, Politicus and Philebus.

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49) Ibid. 987b14-18.

CHAPTER THREE.MIXING PROCESSES.i) The number of reality in the Sophist.

In the Parmenides, Plato has appeared unwilling to allow that there should exist simply two elements of reality which combine simply to form one whole. The mere combination of the one and the many, or of formal and material principles, has failed to satisfy him. At least one ought to allow that the principle should appear differently in combination from when taken alone.

Also necessary but scarcely accounted for in the Parmenides, would appear to be some principle of motion, to combine the two elements, and to separate their essential natures. All that has been allowed to separate the opposite principles has been the power of the *δύναμις* in the four cases mentioned above.<sup>1)</sup> All that had been required to see the one as it is in combination, was the postulation of its existence,<sup>2)</sup> which had subsequently entailed the many's existence also.<sup>3)</sup> Moreover, the opposite principle is allowed to combine after similar concession of existence to the one, and hence also to itself.<sup>4)</sup> Nevertheless, *ούσία* and *δύναμις* sound improbable causes of motion; they may be allowed a causality of another kind, but in respect of motion they can scarcely surpass the self-moving soul in the Phaedrus.<sup>5)</sup>

It is perhaps for this reason that Plato chose, upon raising the question of the components of reality once more in the Sophist, to take as his opposite principles not the one and the many but motion and rest,

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- 1) ch.II, n.37  
 2) 142c2-3.  
 3) 143a2.  
 4) 157b7, and 158b5-7.  
 5) 245c ff.



themselves. Both pairs of opposites bear a certain relation to Plato's former distinction between the world of sense and the world of the intelligence, but in choosing rest and motion at this point Plato has shown himself more aware of his historical background. For it is as a result of his enquiries into the views of his predecessors that he is able here to arrive at a position of his own.

He finds a measure of truth both in Ionian dualism <sup>6)</sup> and in Eleatic monism. <sup>7)</sup> Later, Heraclitus and Empedocles have emphasised principles of love and strife capable of harmonising the elements of unity and multiplicity.

ὡς τὸ ἐν πολλὰ τε καὶ ἐν ἓστιν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ φιλία  
συνέχεται. 242e2.

In these doctrines are detected a foreshadowing of the speculations of the Parmenides, as may be indicated by the pointed use of the one and many in this case. The necessity of combining and separating opposites has been seen in the third hypothesis of the earlier dialogue:

ἔν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνάγκη  
διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; 156b5.

Heracliteanism viewed the continuous balanced opposition of these two powers of separation and combination as essential, while Empedocles alternated the periods of their supremacy. <sup>8)</sup>

6) 242d2.  
7) Ibid. d4.  
8) 242e2ff.

Firstly Plato takes the champions of two opposite powers, asking them whether they do not envisage reality as a third thing over and above the two:

πότερον τρίτον παρά τὰ δύο ἐκείνα, καὶ τρίτα τὸ πᾶν  
ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο ἔτι, καθ' ἑμᾶς τιθῶμεν;

243e2-3.

Then he opposes the champions of the beliefs that being can be restricted either to the physical or to the intellectual realm. 9) Significant here is the fact that the former gentlemen are refuted by the necessity of allowing soul a share in reality, and that the latter are also required to include the principle of motion within the intelligible; the intelligible must be known, it must be the object of some act. 10) One must therefore demand the inclusion of motion, life, soul, and wisdom within the framework of reality. Thus Plato sees the failure to account for life and motion to be the common fault of both physicists and transcendentalists.

The soul is also afforded a central position by Plato's definition of reality as that which has some kind of power at 247e, repeated at 248c. For the soul is in each case the active power, animating the bodies and discerning the intelligibles, both of which are regarded as passive of their own nature. 11) Thus one would already assume that the connexion of the two worlds will lie in the power of the soul.

9) 246a7ff.

10) 248b5ff. It is interesting to compare the παθήματα of τὸ εἶν in the third Parmenidean hypothesis, 157b4.

11) e.g. 248e1 for the intelligible world, which rather refutes the idea that, on admitting life to the real world, Plato is giving life to the intelligible. He is expanding the Eleatic concept of reality, not merely animating their narrow concept thereof.

Initially, however, Plato is merely concerned that such a connexion should exist, and that the two elements characterised as motion and rest should combine to form one reality. Yet in doing so he finds the need for two further principles, those of sameness and difference, which bring the total to five.

καὶ περὶ πάντων ἄλλ' οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὄντων αὐτῶν σκοπεῖον. 254e4-5.

On careful examination these other two are not to be confused with any of the other three "kinds". Sameness is used of any one of these in isolation, <sup>12)</sup> difference applies to them when viewed in the context of another. <sup>13)</sup> But sameness is of little importance to Plato, it seems. It is difference and being that are found to pervade all the "kinds" in their process of mixing, <sup>14)</sup> clearly supplying the answers to two questions that he had described earlier as the business of dialectic: that which pervades all and enables the elements to combine (253c1-2) is being or existence; that which is the cause of division of wholes is difference (c3).

Now it should be possible to determine from where this doctrine has originated. It is early in the Megista Gene passage that one should look for any metaphysical origins, for it gradually assumes a more logical significance as it moves toward the solution of the problem of negation. Even as late as 256c2 an ominous *κατὰ φύσιν* appears to assure the reader that Plato has not forgotten a wider application of the passage, but one is left in no doubt that the refutation of sophistry is the goal. At 253c Plato had still two rather different problems in mind:

- 12) 254d15, etc.  
 13) 255d1.  
 14) 259a5-6.

one is the operation of dialectic, and the metaphysical grounds for the determination of divisions and of species; while the other is the problem inherited from the Parmenides of how to combine two opposite principles into one single reality, while maintaining the components as two separate entities.

Just as it was an admission of their existence that initiated the combination of principles in the hypotheses, so existence appears to embrace <sup>15)</sup> the Gene here. Just as the *Σιδήνοια* could separate them there, so difference appears to be the cause of division here. Seen in relation only to themselves, the principles could be isolated even from existence there, <sup>16)</sup> while it is by participation in sameness that a "kind" is both seen in relation to itself and isolated from the rest, including existence. But the most conclusive similarity between the hypotheses and the "Megista Gene" is that both envisage the two principle components of reality as displaying themselves in two forms either alone or in composition; and whether one adds both forms of each to reality, or whether one combines each with existence and two more ingredients for combination and separation, the total number will in each case be five. Accordingly we are presented with the first clearly indicated case of a five-fold classification, and, with fairness to Plutarch, our author has not been negligent in indicating that this number is not arbitrary. Apart from his initial demand for five rather than three principles at 254e (quoted above), he declares sameness to be fourth, at 255c5, and difference fifth at 49. He refers to them as "the five"

15) *Συνοχουτ* ? . . . 253c1.  
 16) 141e.

at 255e8, and Theaetetus admits that there can be no less at 256d2.

It would appear that considerable debate had arisen in the Academy as a result of the hypotheses of the Parmenides, and that the first of these five-fold classifications was to some extent the result of that debate. It takes into account the concept of a whole resulting from two opposite principles, it tries to account for both change and rest, and it suggests principles for the combination and separation of concepts. But Plato is merely saying what reality includes, not how it functions. Causality is left tantalisingly unexplained, and emphasis shifts away from metaphysics towards logic. The versatility of his mind enables him to shift with capricious ease from one field to another.

ii) The Timaeus.

It is the Timaeus that re-introduces a mood of optimism into Plato's writings. Such a mood may account for allusions to the Republic's earlier books in the introduction,<sup>1)</sup> and for a new willingness to make emphatic statements supported by a minimum of argument. In order to accord himself this privilege in a philosophical atmosphere which was by now tense and critical, Plato is forced to present his work in the form of a myth, a feature which calls in question not the philosophical seriousness of the content, but the readiness of the author to stand by certain details and two essentials of the exposition; These two essentials are the reality of the creator and the temporal creation.

Using the fallibility of human opinions as a defence,<sup>2)</sup> the Timaeus once more emphasises the opposition of an intelligible and unchanging existence, and of another which is perceptible and in flux.<sup>3)</sup> The former is apparently indivisible and the latter divisible, while from the two there appears to come that Essence which combines with Sameness and Difference to constitute the soul.<sup>4)</sup>

The components of soul appear to be five in all, and when one has drawn the legitimate equation of motion and rest as components of reality in the Sophist and the moving and unmoving essences in the Timaeus' psychogony, then there exists a welcome similarity between between the ingredients of both passages. Plutarch has preserved a possible explanation of this feature which dates from the last days of the Old Academy; Crantor<sup>5)</sup> believed that the soul was formed so

- 1) 17b ff.
- 2) 29cd., 48b, 53d.
- 3) 27e-28a.
- 4) 35a.
- 5) De An. Proc. 1012d f.

as to be able to perceive both of the opposite types of reality and the sameness and differences within them. Thus the theory of perception of like by like has demanded that the soul should be composed of five elements equivalent to those which composed reality in the Sophist, so that it might have power to apprehend all five.

The opinion of Xenocrates, however, an active member of the Academy in Plato's own days, would appear to contradict this interpretation. The indivisible and divisible indeed signified opposites but these were the one and the many; Sameness and Difference represented the causes of motion and rest, which were additionally required to give the resultant numerical entity its self-moving feature.<sup>6)</sup>

Through the interpretation of the Parmenides which has here been adopted, it is possible to reconcile these two opinions. The one seen alone and isolated by the intellect (hyp.1) is impotent, while capability of motion is seen to arise only when it is viewed in combination with that to which it is opposite (hyp.2). The many, when isolated in the same manner (hyp.5) appear similarly impotent, but have a host of properties upon admission to contact with the one (hyp.4). When united into one essence the opposites must be regarded as distinct components of a whole, and it is their difference from each other that must be considered. When separated they must be viewed in themselves, and it is their sameness that must be taken into account. When alone, no motion may be seen in either; it is their contact that generates movement, and their complete fusion into one essence that creates a living world.

Still the four-fold ontology lies at the roots of Platonic

6) Ibid. (fr. 68, Heinze).

metaphysics; the one and the many somehow pertain to, or denote, or imitate, the opposite essences, divisible and indivisible. Each essence is then subdivided; mathematical entities are form in relation to body (as opposed to pure intelligibles), while physical beings are matter moulded into shape by geometrical form (as opposed to pure privation:- this is not an anachronism, since this concept of privation underlies hypothesis five).

However, if the soul must embrace the five Gene of reality, if the ontology behind its structure is essentially four-fold, yet still it is required to be a three-fold entity <sup>7)</sup> and to follow the findings of the Republic and the Phaedrus. And since the divisible and indivisible essences, if regarded as basic ingredients in preference or in addition to Sameness and Difference, could produce only a combined (intelligible and sensible) world, and not a soul at all, it is thus essential that the soul should be regarded as a distinct intermediate essence between the two, which combines with Sameness and Difference, similarly intermediate. The exact nature of these intermediates is difficult to determine; Xenocrates would have claimed that the intermediate essence between the one and the many was number, perhaps mistaking an explanatory example given by his master for his true opinion. But would he have regarded intermediate Sameness and Difference as numerical? One could possibly argue that mathematical equality lay somewhere between qualitative likeness (divisible) and absolute identity (indivisible), and so for inequality, unlikeness, and non-identity. But a more promising candidate for an intermediate place between qualitative likeness and absolute identity may be found in specific or generic samenesses, and so with specific differences.

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7) e. g. 37a 3-5.



In all events the primary ingredients of the soul are the three intermediates - essence, sameness, and difference.

The most elementary difficulty now lies in seeing how the soul can still be regarded as the source of motion. If its own intermediate essence can be regarded as a compound of changing and unchanging essences, then its essence is posterior to both change and rest, and it includes both change and rest. One must demand that the soul's motion and rest should be something substantially different from chaotic flux or transcendental eternity; both its motion and its rest must be something deliberate, something enforced. If rest is to be enforced, then it must involve the prevention of motion, and vice-versa. Thus the motion of the soul in the Timaeus will be that motion from rest to change, or from change to rest, that hyp.3 of the Parmenides laboured over. 8) The soul is the self-moved connecting link between the worlds of change and eternity, and, as we shall shortly see, it later became the established occupant of third position in a five-fold metaphysic that has its origins in that dialogue.

It is through Sameness and Difference that Xenocrates attributes motion and rest to the soul, as we have seen. His claim is to some extent justified in that the circles of the Same and the Different are responsible for the apprehension of the worlds of rest and change respectively. 9) Both circles are of course in motion although the former constitutes that uniform circular motion that declares the truths of the intelligible world, truths which do not change. The Sophist has rejected the idea that cognition can be anything but a motive process. 10) This does not, of course, mean that all motive

8) 155c ff.

9) 37b-c.

10) 248e ff.

processes must be cognitive, for Plato has described how these same circles have accounted for the motions of the heavenly bodies. <sup>11)</sup>

What appears to be a serious objection to Plato's theory of soul in the Timaeus, is the tendency to construct his principle of motion out of a combination of elements. A composite principle seems to be a contradiction in terms. Moreover two of the elements employed in its construction have been described by Xenocrates as the sources of motion and rest. Can a principle of motion include another principle of motion? Can it include a principle of rest? It is first necessary to point out that a principle of deliberate and orderly motion <sup>12)</sup> is rather different from a simple cause of motion; the elements of order require different factors to explain them. Secondly the composite nature of the soul in the Timaeus is foreshadowed by the two horses and charioteer of the Phaedrus, <sup>13)</sup> the very dialogue in which the "soul=cause of motion" equation is first put forward. <sup>14)</sup> Thirdly, the forces of Sameness and Difference should not be regarded as the origins of motion and rest so much as the causes of the direction of the soul's motion towards the world of rest or that of motion. As in the Phaedrus the one horse would readily pull up, but the other was wont to tug in the opposite direction, so here Sameness will reveal concepts on their own, while Difference, a less controllable power, sees them as different parts of a whole. They are the forces which account for the soul's travels along the great chain of genus and species, deciding what predicates may be applied to what objects. <sup>15)</sup>

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- 12) 46c.  
 13) 246a ff.  
 14) 245c9.  
 15) 37b 1-3.

One would not however suggest that there is more than a superficial structural resemblance between the Timaeus' soul and that of the Phaedrus. It is the basic question of how many parts a thing has that serves to link metaphysical passages in the late dialogues, whilst the nature and function of the various parts is often left less clear, being more subject to change from dialogue to dialogue. Thus in the remarkable pattern of the 3-4-5 right-angled triangle that Brumbaugh has associated with the psychology, epistemology, and constitutional theory of the Republic <sup>16)</sup> one is to find a numerical stability in the late dialogues occasioned by the adherence to a three-fold psychology (Laws X excepted), a four-fold ontology, and a five-fold total metaphysic.

Further evidence of Plato's present method of thought is the addition of the  $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma \gamma\acute{\omega}\nu$  to the four forms of living creatures, as though to create a fifth and all-embracing life; <sup>17)</sup> while to the four elements and their respective shapes Plato adds the dodecahedron, <sup>18)</sup> which he reserves for the structure of the whole.

Moreover the question of the unity or plurality of the world is asked in the form of a choice between one world and five. As we shall shortly see, Speusippus had taken the idea of a world in five parts to a point far beyond Plato's conception of it; it is perhaps his nephew's doctrine that Plato wishes to avoid at this point.

A final indication of his conception of a five-fold universe may possibly be discerned from the construction of the Timaeus. It is

16) Enl. p.139  
 17) 37d, 39e.  
 18) 55c4-6.

itself a mixture, portraying the works of intelligence and those of necessity, and the combined products of the two. In the first section <sup>19)</sup> one sees the construction of the soul, accounting for the ordered element in the world, and the multiplicity of ensouled creatures; while in the latter section one sees the nature of the receptacle, which lays the foundations of the sensible aspect of the world, followed by the multiplicity of sensible bodies. After 68d both forces in life are woven into a unity that accounts for the most important aspects of human existence. But prior to this concluding section one has seen in both the intelligible (indivisible) and the sensible (divisible) worlds, their sameness (total soul and total matter) and differences (separate ensouled creatures and separate bodies). And while the sensible bodies could not be without their intelligible structure, nor the ensouled creatures without their physical bodies, yet the soul itself and the receptacle itself are devoid respectively of the physical and of the intelligible elements, when considered in their own right.

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19) Ending at 47e.

iii) The Politicus.

From the metaphysical point of view, the Politicus may seem relatively unimportant, but certain aspects of this work must be considered, since no writing in Plato's late period is entirely devoid of metaphysical interest, nor any solely devoted to such concerns. The dialogue picks up the threads of the Sophist's method of division, offering both criticism and advice, <sup>1)</sup> and it also serves to answer, through the myth, questions of supreme religious and philosophical importance which arise out of the Timaeus.

This latter work has been particularly difficult to explain from the point of view of motive causes. One has the creator, intelligence and necessity, <sup>2)</sup> the soul, the components of soul, and the unordered motion of the receptacle to be taken into consideration. A direct dualism is certainly not to be entertained, but the problem of evil requires an explanation here as always; it must involve some force other than God. Thus it has come about that the creator, whether or not he may be identified with intelligence, <sup>3)</sup> is different both in nature and in status from the cause of uncontrolled flux (necessity), which would seem to be no more than the necessary property of the material principle. The position of soul is difficult to ascertain, though it is certainly prior in the sequence of causality to the physical and secondary causes; moreover it is certainly the only thing through which intelligence can operate, <sup>4)</sup> on which account alone it is to be

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- 1) e.g. 262a, ff., 265a, 287b. See J.B. Skemp, Plato's Politicus, p.66, ff.  
 2) On this see Skemp, PLTM, ch.VI, p.74 ff. et passim.  
 3) See Phil., 27b.  
 4) Tim. 46 cd.

thought of as a beginning of motion. It would appear to receive its rationality from the intelligent cause, and to impart its motion to the physical world, so as to allow the possibility of its being considered as an intermediate. 5) Hence its nature must include unchanging as well as changing components, and the means to connect these.

The myth of the Politicus attributes to the world an εἰμαρμένη or σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία (272e6), once more a necessary property of the material principle, by which it wheels back upon its axis, after being wound sufficiently in one direction by God who is its pilot. This myth is not uninfluenced by Empedocles' concept of Love and Strife, 6) which we saw to be closely connected with the forces of sameness and difference in the Sophist, in that they both cut across the essential division of opposites, pulling them apart and holding them together. Here motion in the preferable direction is toward ordered groups:

κατὰ γένη καὶ ἀγέλας οἷον νομῆς θεοῖσι διεκλήφισαν δάιμονες 271d6-7.

while motion in the contrary direction is toward the depths of confusion and heterogeneity:

εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα πάντων 273d6-e1.

The reconciliation of the idea of two opposing motions and one consistent God has given Plato some difficulty at 269e-270a. He rejects the Zoroastrian idea of two opposite divinities at 270a1-2, so that the εἰμαρμένη τε καὶ σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία at 272e6 may not be equal and opposite to the creator. Would Plato deny that opposite motions have opposite causes, or would he postulate some force other than God

5) See also Tim. 30b.

6) Skemp, Plato's Politicus, p.90.

to be directly responsible for the divine and progressive motion? Must one identify the "divine cause" ( *Θεία αἰτία* ) at 270a3 with God Himself? How far are the divine demons of 271d a force to be reckoned with apart from God Himself? They are clearly obedient to Him, just as the secondary divinities fashioned the mortal creatures in the Timaeus, <sup>1)</sup> but are they not likewise performing a temporal function which would be automatically impossible to associate with Him in person, but belongs rather to soul?

At this point it may be of use to resort to mathematical parallels which were seldom far from the minds of members of the Academy at this time. Since the world's natural inclination is towards infinity at 273d6, one may presume that it is possible to associate God with unity. Just as infinity is never reached by the world's spinning back, so neither is complete unity ever achieved through the operation of the unifying forces. The living creatures are gathered into separate groups by the demons, and mingled into a mixture of different kinds by the innate forces of the universe. The oscillation is between finite points; and since God cannot be associated with finity, finite causes other than Him would naturally be employed to account for motion, a cause obedient and akin to Him in one case, and a cause of a contrary nature in the other.

This brings us to the possibility of associating the tripartite soul, seen on a cosmic level, with the Politicus myth. At first the only justification for any such association would seem to be the use of the word desire or appetite ( *ἐπιθυμία* ) of the world's innate force, though one does find the former state of the world des-

1) 41a ff.

cribed as a "lack of harmony" ( ἀναρμονία 273c7), which might naturally bring to mind the Timaeus' concept of soul especially the nature of Different which had proved awkward to blend. Words like "body-like" ( σωματικός 273b4) serve to connect the innate force with the most physical of the soul's functions, while Plato's words for chaos ( σύγκρασις , 273b4, τὸ συθές b7) emphasise the "form v. confusion" aspect that one might associate with the separating and combining forces, Sameness and Difference. Which forces, being opposites, can only be associated with the demons which collect the herds together and the appetitive nature which muddles them up, since God Himself may have no opposite.

On the other hand, though it may be tempting to associate the opposite forces with the horses of the Phaedrus' chariot and the world's helmsman with the charioteer, it would be ridiculous to associate Him with the intermediate essence which is the third element of the soul in the Timaeus; the helmsman here is the creator there, and only Heaven itself or life itself can be left to fill the gap left by that intermediate essence. Plato is remembering his previous doctrine and the problems out of which they arose, as is also the case with recollection ( ἀνάμνησις ) at Politicus 273b2 and c6. Any question which asks whether or not he has abandoned such middle-period doctrines by this time defies a simple answer. He is not prepared to be dogmatic about them, but he still looks back at them as having contained an element of truth; hence they are not forgotten entirely. It is difficult to blend the former tripartite pattern of soul into the present metaphysical pattern with its tendency to concentrate on the harmonisation of two opposite principles; and dualism, though denied in its extreme form, is nevertheless present in the Politicus. But in spite



of these difficulties, the fact that the soul is a central entity, having an existence of its own, and incorporating faculties that pull toward the respective opposites, allows it still to be viewed as to some degree tripartite.

It is not only in the Timaeus that this is so, but also in the Politicus. The state, it must be remembered, is still analogous to the individual in respect of psychology. The state is now seen to be composed of two types of individual, the placid sort, associated with the virtue of temperance, <sup>2)</sup> whom Plato calls the woof of the state, and the dynamic sort, whose virtue is courage, who are called the warp. Both the virtues and the types of character are opposites. <sup>3)</sup> It is the task of the weaver-statesman to control and blend these two elements, and to guide them with correct opinions concerning the virtues. <sup>4)</sup> Thus then it is he who fills the roll of the state's reasoning part, while the warp and woof represent the constituent forces which pull in opposite directions, toward motion and toward rest, which characterised the opposites in the Sophist. Like the world on its alternate rotations, they never reach the extreme state, but are content with vitality, <sup>5)</sup> and quietude <sup>6)</sup> respectively. Though Plato does not appear to tackle the extremes in this final analysis of the state, these components of change and rest, the physical and the divine, the divided and the indivisible; yet he brings into his web of state two binding ingredients, one human and one divine, one intelligible and one physical. Acknowledgement must be made to both worlds, and Plato selects truth <sup>7)</sup> and marriage, <sup>8)</sup> perhaps with no mild allusion to

- 2) 306a ff.  
 3) 306b9 ff and 307d1-4 respectively.  
 4) 309cd.  
 5) 306e.  
 6) 307a1-2.  
 7) 309c5.  
 8) 310b1-2.

the popular academic characterisation of the opposites, the one and the dyad. If so it is significant that he has insisted that the divine bond should first be matured at 310a7-9, for Plato has reservations about the theory of opposites when regarded also as equals.

Now one must leave the tripartite state and the opposites as they feature here, and return to consider the universe in its light. For although God may not be considered as opposite to the *σώματος ἐπιθυμία*, he does in a sense have a different opposite, though neither equal nor active. At 269d it is made clear that it is simply the bodily element which is opposed to the divine, not a psychic force at all. The relevance of body is repeated at 273b, though, as motion is here concerned, the innate forces are here connected with it. At 269d5 the words *τὸ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὁσίουτος ἔχειν ἀπὸ καὶ ταύτων εἶναι* recall the first of the opposite essences out of which the soul's intermediate essence was formed in the Timaeus, and to this is opposed the bodily nature (*σώματος φύσις*). Between these two the heaven is very precisely placed:-

*ἐν δὲ οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον ἐπονομάκαμεν πολλῶν μὲν καὶ μακαρίων παρὰ τοῦ γενήσαντος μετέιληφεν, ἀτὰρ οὐδὲ κεικοινώνημέ γε καὶ σώματος.*

Between the indivisible God and the divisible bodily element, the one and the dyad, there exists an intermediate universe which is turned by two intermediate powers, the demons and the world's innate desire, now towards an ordered collection of individual unities, now toward a limited intermingling of the several kinds. The extremes, however, are never reached, neither absolute unity, nor absolute heterogeneity, and in this much Plato rejects the Empedoclean cycle.

In this much also, he has harmonised his myth with both the

Parmenides and the Timaeus. In the former there existed between the two isolated extremes, the one and the many, a fully intermediate existence (3rd hypothesis), while the half-way stages are supplied by the unity that partook of some plurality (2nd hypothesis) and the plurality that was not without a limiting factor (4th hypothesis), i.e. unity and plurality when viewed in combination with each other in a complete universe. In the latter work, the soul's essence was constituted of an intermediate mixture between the divisible and the indivisible essences, together with combining and separating forces, similarly intermediate so as to avoid the extremes and create a true mixture. This mixture of opposite worlds is becoming all-important to Plato's metaphysics by this time, and in every case we find not simply three elements involved, two opposites and a combination, but a further two as well to effect the mixture; these will be psychological forces if Plato is blending the intelligible and physical extremes, the indivisible and the divisible, but will be allusions to those extremes if the ingredients are themselves psychological forces as in the web of state.

Throughout Plato is hampered by the need to maintain a tenable theology and yet to blend his conception of God into his metaphysical/mathematical system. The identification of the one with the divinity is sometimes tempting, sometimes difficult. He would perhaps have insisted on the unity of God, of his indivisibility, and of his being absolute. The concept of matter as an infinite heterogeneous plurality is equally understandable. But one suspects that for Plato the equation God=nus=one was to be regarded only as an approximation, a comparison or a convenient analogy. It is, however, not difficult to harmonise the apparent dualism found in his theory of the mixture of two worlds

with his rejection of Zoroastrianism, since God is always found to be the ultimate principle of action qua deliberate. For him motion is passive unless it has an active intelligence to guide it; since God is the source of that intelligence, the opposite principle, deprived completely of God, is completely passive. Primary causation, in the Timaeus is entirely intelligent and non-physical.<sup>8)</sup>

Once again, the structure of the Politicus may be seen to accord with Plato's contemporary theory. Two primary ingredients are used in the composition of the dialogue, the methods of division and of comparison, the latter of which consists of finding an example which will suffice as a pattern for the examination of members of that genus. Also necessary are an eye to the divine archetype, and an eye toward practical considerations. The more severe method of dichotomy leads naturally toward the former, while the method of example, prevalent after 277a, has a bearing on the practical side of the statesman's occupation, since the greatest matters may only be discerned with reference to some physical example.<sup>9)</sup> The final definition thus comes to be compounded of both methods, to maintain its concern for the truth, and to care for practical needs, notably through the institution of "mixed" marriages.

The eye for the absolute truth and comparative requirements is of noticeable importance both in the Politicus and in the Philebus. The former is concerned at 283b ff. with two species of measurement, one against an absolute ethical standard, and one by comparative standards, or, as Plato would say, against the more and the less, the greater and smaller, the hotter and colder. In matters of measurement

8) 46c ff.

9) 285d8 ff.

qualitative opposites are directly opposed to an absolute standard, the physical and perceptible against the intelligible. Both species of measurement would seem necessary for the web of state, for they lurk behind the call for truth and for marriage. Both are necessary for the Philebus' mixed life, since symmetry is second only to absolute measure at 66a-b. And when we read in Laws, IV. 10) that God is the measure of all things, the reversion of the famous Protagorean maxim, one may realise that, apart from its considerable ethical content, Plato's theory of measure relates on the one hand to God, and secondarily to practical considerations, or analogously, to the one and the dyad.

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10) 716c4.

iv) The Philebus.

The Politicus had given to Plato the justification which he required in order to embark upon the formulation of another mammoth political work; the world had been given the responsibility for its own government, 274a4-5. His metaphysical interests were tiring, his regard for common sense increasing. The search for precision in philosophical matters had been temporarily enhanced by the perpetual use of, and comparison with, mathematical principles; but it had been disappointed by the obscurity of the very relation of mathematics with matters more divine. Apart from the Laws and the fragment of the Critias, only the Philebus could reasonably be dated after the Politicus.

The Philebus is the last of the dialogues to show signs of metaphysical speculation, other than that which suffices to demonstrate the the superiority and priority of soul in Laws X. The final question of Socrates at 66b10 indicates Plato's wish to be relieved of his duties as arbitrator in Academic debates such as that on pleasure:

ὀκνῶν καὶ ἀφίετό μὲ ;

The reply of Protarchus promises release quite soon, but shows unwillingness to allow it before his mind has been satisfied; he will remind his leader of the duty that remains to him, a possible allusion to the Laws which were no doubt being composed at this time. Indications of Plato's awareness of the imminence of his death are perhaps also to be found in the first "good" of the final classification at 66a - ... It is to be found in the region of measure and what is measured and timely. This timeliness is new to the dialogue, and it would appear to be in direct opposition to the eternity expressed by αἰδίων (a8), if there is any truth in the text as we have it. This adjective, accompanied by the feminine article, and supposed to indicate the first good, has defied explanation. As the

adjective has no feminine noun to agree with it or be supplied, I have only one explanation to save our reading from its semblance of nonsense. At a6 Plato has used the quasi-feminine form  $\pi\eta$  to mean "somewhere". In the light of the emphasis on place which the  $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$  helps to assert, I feel that no other noun but  $\chi\acute{\upsilon}\rho\alpha\nu$  could be legitimately understood to agree with  $\tau\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\iota\delta\iota\omicron\nu$ . Certainly Plato would have avoided any direct statement of the doctrine of immortality, as seen in the middle dialogues at least, at this stage. Furthermore the adjective has that tempting written proximity to  $\alpha\prime\ \acute{\iota}\delta\iota\omicron\nu$ , "the first form" or "one form", which Plato may have wished to preserve by obscuring the word of agreement.<sup>1)</sup> Though one is ready to admit that a corruption of the text is not unlikely, one is bound to point out the least support for that text. The emphasis on completion and sufficiency in the account of the second "good" may be yet another sign of Plato's awareness of the proximity of death,<sup>2)</sup> while the  $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$  here and the  $\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\varsigma$  in the account of the third "good"<sup>3)</sup> serve to preserve the aspect of location that we have encountered. Moreover, the fourth and fifth "goods" are the soul's alone,<sup>4)</sup> which appears to reveal a revived awareness of the need to separate the soul from the body; Socrates' reappearance as principal speaker indicates a revival of faith that this can be done.

Plato appears to have commenced upon the dialogue with a view to terminating with a five-fold classification such as is to be seen here. He begins with two principles, increases the number to three, then, somewhat uneasily, to four, and finally to five. The influence of previous epistemology may have not been wholly forgotten in the determining of this four-fold form, but this is a matter for the reader's decision.

1) It is clearly important that the first element of this classification should appear to match in its obscurity the fifth and final element of the 23c classification.

2) 66b2.

3) 66b6.

4)  $\tau\eta\varsigma\ \psi\chi\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$  . . . . . 66b8, c5.

The work begins with an obvious distinction between the life of pleasure and the life of reason; a third possibility <sup>5)</sup> is introduced but the battle continues to be fought between  $\nu\omicron\delta\gamma$  and  $\xi\delta\omicron\gamma$ . A similar clear-cut dualism rages between unity and multiplicity. Pleasure will not consent to be divided in spite of her heterogeneity ( $\alpha\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\delta\tau\gamma\varsigma$ ! 13d4), thus maintaining an absolute opposition between herself and intelligence.

A fresh start is made at 13e4 after a verbal impasse has been reached, and at 14b4 the third-possibility adopts a new importance. Socrates and Protarchus are no longer in opposition, and they must become allies. The middle course in the ethical sphere is accompanied by the middle course in the numerical problem; while the one and the many were first viewed in bitter conflict, a limited number of species is now postulated between the universal and the infinite plurality, <sup>6)</sup> and this is supported by a variety of examples.

Protarchus' speech at 19c1 ff. moves the argument into its third stage, into the realm of physics, as is clearly indicated at 23c4. The deficiencies of both original contenders for the title of the "Good Life" are frankly admitted, neither conforming to the new criteria of self-sufficiency and completion. <sup>7)</sup> Here the final product first takes its place in an analysis of the elements of reality alongside two constituent elements, the definite and indefinite, and a motive cause.

- 5) 11d11.  
 6) 16c5 ff.  
 7) 20d1-4.



All this begins to bear a striking resemblance to Aristotle's four causes, final, formal, material, and motive respectively. For a fifth cause one must wait until we move on to consider things on an empirical level rather than that of abstract physics, and the whole dialogue after 31b2 is discussed at such a level. In the very words which serve to promise a further cause,  $\tauὰχ' ἔτι$ , it is made clear that Aristotle is under scrutiny; between 22c5 and 22d2 these words are used three times in a manner which the careful reader will have quickly spotted and associated with the gentleman who, as Bonitz assures us in his Index Aristotelicus, ad loc., usually uses the expression with false modesty rather than to express doubt! Its next use is at 23d11, promising the fifth "cause". Plato does not use the word "cause" of the elements of this division of reality, but restricts it to the description of the agent, <sup>8)</sup> perhaps another implicit criticism of Aristotle. Finally in the stilted language of 28c6, reminiscent of the " $\epsilonἰς κοίρανος$ " <sup>9)</sup> that we can imagine Aristotle to have been fond of quoting, it is stated that all the wise join in saying, with great pride in themselves, that intelligence is our king on earth and in heaven. One may suppose that the object of a friendly attack, along usual fourth century lines, in respect of the failure to name one's opponent, is the young rebel whose  $\epsilonπιγυγνόμενον τέλος$  truly comes at the end of Plato's list of "goods".

Plato's classification of pleasure among the unlimited class, and intelligence's identification with the cause, <sup>10)</sup> allow one to see that Plato had begun by defending a motive cause against a thing unlimited, unity against heterogeneity. The central definite number of species that

8) 26e5.

9) Metaphysics, 1076a4.

10) 27e, 28c.

the second section introduces between unity and plurality, εἷς and ἀπειρα, 11) is surely more akin to the class of πέρους than to any other. The third section has now introduced finality as a criterion, and a fourth class of complete objects. It remains for the long final section to apply truth as the criterion, introducing this as akin to the final principle of measure by which all alien elements may be separated from the good life. 12)

The conscious advance from two principles to five shows the final classification to be anything but arbitrary in length. The Orphic verse at 66c8, the parody of the four Aristotelian causes, and the numerical pointers at 23c4, c5, c12 and d5 and 9 confirm this conclusion. Therefore, there must exist a substantial difference between measure and symmetry with their respective accoutrements at 66a5 and b1; also between understanding, ( νόος ) and the various forms of knowledge. One's problem is that on the one hand it is only by the successful relation of the 23c and 66a classifications that one can expect to see into these fine distinctions; while since Plato had bent his own theories in order to criticise another at 23c ff., one cannot be sure of his exact intentions there (if any!), especially with regard to the suggested second cause of motion, apparently a cause of separation.

Firstly one should notice that at 23c it is the whole of physical reality that is listed under various headings, while at 66a it is the

11) 16d.

12) It is essentially by their falsehood that most pleasures have been excluded from the good life. It is thus strange that truth's inclusion in the mixture at 64b has troubled editors, e.g. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure, O.U.P., 1945, p.132. Although a criterion, it is to be associated rather with intelligence in the final classification, than with measure, e.g. 66b6. But its close association with beauty and measure, 65a1, b8, assure the inter-relation of all three.

various elements of good that relate to human life. The obvious method of relation would involve the attribution of one good as being fitting for each class of existence. Certain points are clear; symmetry, beauty, completion, and sufficiency involve the final object. All have been used as criteria for the good life, the end product of the search. Pleasure has been agreed as a thing unlimited, and pure pleasure, perhaps to be considered as the good applicable to the simple, unregulated side of life, has been singled out from the unlimited species of pleasure. Intelligence has appeared as the cause in heaven and earth at 28c6 ff., and so will no doubt be the good that attaches itself to the principle of motion, to the soul. 13) There remain the host of day to day forms of knowledge, and the elusive element with which measurement and timeliness are to be attached. Since then, limit and limited are the basic ingredients of the final object, and knowledge and pleasure are the basic ingredients of the mixed life, it must surely be right to suppose that knowledge is the good for the determining element in life. But what of measure?

The problem that once faces is that owing to the sarcasm of the allusion to the fifth cause at 23d, one cannot be sure that it is truly a cause of separation. Were that necessarily so, one would be forced to conclude that the first good were that associated with the cause of the dissolution of the good life, perhaps a timely and orderly death. Could Plato here have been influenced by the Heraclitean demand that the sun should not exceed its bounds? 14)

13) 30c9. Wisdom and intelligence could not come into being without soul.

14) Fr. 94, Diels-Krantz.

But though such things were not very far, perhaps, from Plato's mind by this time, and though this concern with measure no doubt offered a natural outlet for his feelings on this matter, it is certain that there was a much wider application of the principles which Plato had in mind. Under separation one may include divisions and distinctions; we may include the exclusion of various impurities from the good life. What is important is that a second cause of motion should have been required at all, as one may infer from Laws X, 896e4. All motion here is due to soul, but soul differs according to whether it lights upon intelligence; both are mentioned as causes, and hence to Plato as motive causes, at 30d in the present work. If intelligence and wisdom are the good for soul, may not measure and time-liness be the good for intelligence? Is it not that element therein that makes it perform aright? One might be tempted to stress the opposition of soul and intelligence in the phrase:

βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχῆν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νόον . . . . . 30d1-2

but it would be wiser to avoid such reasoning. It is the genders which Plato is opposing, not the functions.

The difficulties involved cause one to refer to the Politicus for guidance. The two kinds of measuring which he discovered here, and the two bonds of the web of state, must always go hand in hand. Opposites may be measured against each other, but they must always be measured also against the truth. Different natures may be seen together, but the truth may require them to be seen apart. Plato's theory of mixture still required two basic ingredients, a combined product, and two motive forces, one to take them apart that they may be discerned in themselves, one to bring them together into a balanced whole.

Though such reasoning is still to be applied to the classifications of the Philebus, it may no longer be applied with the precision of the Parmenidean hypotheses, but one should now realise that moral content will bend Plato's formulas now in one direction, now in another. It is the answer to the Academy's debate on pleasure that he is keen to show, not his metaphysical methods.

One may not leave the Philebus before discussing another classification of lesser importance, which also takes what is ultimately a five-fold pattern. This is the classification of knowledge at 55c ff., where Plato first separates all knowledge that concerns education, and then proceeds to classify the remaining productive knowledge into four kinds, that which relies on guess work, that which uses calculation, mathematics in its pure sense, <sup>15)</sup> and dialectic. These Plato values in ascending order, and a remarkable resemblance exists between them and the four epistemological stages of the Divided Line of the Republic. Verbal allusions to that dialogue may be detected in the words *διαλογισμένους* at 58d2 and *εὐκρίτους* at 55e5. Again the resemblance may not be exaggerated, but it is enough to make one feel concerned that the knowledge that relates to education and upbringing has apparently found no place. But since the whole Divided Line had such a purpose, may one not suppose that this knowledge is the knowledge of the whole, not so much the sum of all four, but rather the knowledge of their linking. One may compare the dodecahedron which Plato reserved for the construction of the whole in the Timaeus, <sup>16)</sup> as though to embrace all the other four bodies.

15) That which uses equal units, 56d4 ff.

16) 55d2.

Such is the role of five-fold classification in the Philebus, and such the reasons for interest in these classifications. They should be compared at all times not with similar classifications elsewhere, but with the general conception of the five-fold pattern in Plato's mind at the time. Further evidence of the significance of this pattern may be extracted from both Critias and Laws, though neither requires lengthy elaboration.

Brumbaugh <sup>17)</sup> has shown clearly that the institutions of Atlantis are regulated according to five-fold and six-fold measurements. He rightly emphasises the confusion inherent in the constant alteration of these two principles, quoting 119d3, where the rulers meet.

"...every fifth and sixth year alternately, paying equal court to the odd and even."

What does this confusion represent? To one who reads the myth as an allegory of the victory of truth (Athens) over ignorance (Atlantis) the confusion is one of Being and Not-being known to us from the Parmenides, where the sixth hypothesis involves not-being, and the Sophist, where not-being is included under the heading of difference, hence restricting the number of Kinds to five only. The addition of a sixth Kind there, or a sixth good in the Philebus would plunge one into a mire of not-being where the hated sophist resides.

Two lists of words that appear in Laws X adopt a five-fold pattern reminiscent to some degree of the Philebus. At 892b3 we meet five functions of the soul; these are opinion, concern, <sup>18)</sup> intelligence, skill and

17) B.H.I. p.47 ff.

18) ἐπιμελῆς, of central importance to the Laws.

law. It will be observed that there is a certain upward progression here, and that intelligence is in a central position which it has assumed in the Philebus' 66a classification. If law could assume the position of the absolute standard of measure, if skill (  $\tau\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\gamma$  ) could perhaps be directed towards the final object, it is nevertheless unclear what relation concern and opinion might have with knowledge and pleasure. A list of verbs also expressing the soul's activities at 897a1 differs considerably. The verbs are as follows: to want, to behold, to guide, (  $\epsilon\upsilon\gamma\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\theta\alpha\iota$  ), to take counsel, and to opine. One may perhaps desire the Good, measure or law. One may behold beauty and symmetry, the product of skill. The connexion of intelligence with concern is constantly vital to Laws X, while the connexion of counsel and knowledge is blatant. But the association of opinion and pleasure is still obscure, though it may perhaps lie in their fallibility and heterogeneity.

Perhaps the true relation might better be expressed as follows; the central activity of the soul is intelligence: it may look upward toward the fixed norm, or downward to the world of opinion and fallibility. From above it achieves within itself symmetry and beauty, perhaps by observing the forms in some sense; and upon what lies below it bestows its own particular gifts, limit to the unlimited, in the form of knowledge or care or counsel.

Interpretation is here certainly a matter for the individual. Plato's metaphysical interests had long been fading, but their traces remained. As Tchaikovsky said of Beethoven's late period:

"Here there are glimmers and nothing more".

But who would demand, after the clarity with which Plato expressed his belief in a five-fold reality in the Sophist, that a new explanation of such a system should be given in each subsequent dialogue? Allusions

to it in the Timaeus and Philebus, and shallow reflections to it in the Laws, recall to an ever-diminishing degree the glory of the quasi-mathematical vision of reality that is presented in the Parmenides and Sophist.



CHAPTER FOUR.THE TESTIMONY OF THE SEVENTH LETTER AND EPINOMIS.1. THE SEVENTH LETTER.

It has been shown how a five-fold metaphysics, stemming from Plato's attempts to construct a mixed reality, has gradually emerged from the time of the Parmenides, though never wholly coming to the surface until the Philebus, by which time Plato has largely forsaken metaphysics. The Megista Gene are the only testimony we have to the significance of the five-fold classification during the flower of the critical dialogues, and it is almost as past material that Plato draws upon the doctrine of the interweaving of the limited and unlimited at 23c ff. in the Philebus. This is not, however, true of the 66a classification, even though it may bear a resemblance to the weaving of the web of state in the Politicus.

For this reason it has been thought necessary to consider these two passages, as something distinct from previous theories of a mixed reality, in the light not only of the Laws, but also of the Seventh Letter. This epistle has recently suffered a severe blow in respect of its authenticity; in spite of obvious weaknesses in many of the arguments of L. Edelstein in his misleadingly titled book Plato's Seventh Letter,<sup>1)</sup> the case for the spuriousness of the document has now been impressively put. Edelstein does, however, conclude that it must have been composed shortly after the death of the master by some well-informed person, and there is no reason to suppose that the doctrine contained therein is not indicative of the currents of Plato's own mind in his later days.

The philosophical digression of this letter contains open reference to the transcendent form as "The Fifth", thus apparently equating it with

1) Leiden, 1966.

the highest normative principle in a five-fold platonic metaphysics.<sup>2)</sup> Besides "the fifth" every existing being should possess a science or knowledge ( *ἐπιστήμη* ), an image, a definition, and a name. Apart from the curious central position of the image ( *εἶδωλον* ) the classification appears to be arranged according to hierarchial or ontological significance.

Concerning the nature of the many objects that are said to partake of a form, the author is much influenced by the Parmenides, another reason for associating the five-fold classifications with this dialogue. Firstly come the mathematical entities and then the ethical and aesthetic forms. There follows a host of physical and psychical realities, manufactured objects (recalling Republic 510a6), natural bodies (recalling Parmenides, 130c2), living creatures (recalling both), and the ways of the soul and all actions and passions. Concerning these latter he may have been influenced by the Sophist.<sup>3)</sup>

Thus the author is familiar with Plato's views on ontological matters, and had probably read the dialogues widely and with a keen eye. However there is no five-fold classification within the dialogues with which one can easily compare the doctrine of "the fifth" here. As a point of departure, therefore, one might choose to begin with the most obscure passage so far considered, the list of verbs at Laws 897a. This list has the same peculiarity as the passage under consideration in that the second and third items (working from the bottom) appear in an unexpected order. To begin the ascent one has opining in the one case and the name in the other, which one is not at pains to associate. Next will come counselling and the definition, both of which seem to offer an element of determination

2) 342a7 ff.

3) 247 de, 248b, 248e ff.

upon what lies below in the list and is undetermined. The definition adds an affirmation (  $\rho\eta\mu\alpha$  ) to the name, while counsel may be connected with the concept of limit by association with the every-day knowledge, such as finding one's way home, <sup>4)</sup> which we have found to be the limited element of life in the Philebus. How "being concerned" can be connected with any of the ingredients of knowledge (the matter of the 7th epistle's classification) is difficult to see, but if our author has regarded the image or physical representation as the object of this concern, then he has not erred from the truth, as indicated by the Phaedrus 246b6, where all soul is found to care for all that is inanimate.

To proceed to the question of the fourth and fifth items on the respective lists one may first notice that the latter is in each case the object of the soul's strivings. The Laws postulate the activity of wishing or wanting, while in the epistle only "the fifth" has that after which the soul is searching, <sup>5)</sup> the quiddity rather than the quality. However, one is compelled to draw attention to the fact that in the former case the object of desire is probably the single fixed norm that heads the Philebus' list of "goods", rather than the individual forms which the author of the epistle thinks in terms of. If the forms are at all to be discovered in the objects of this list of verbs in the Laws then they must be the object of beholding, and it is true that the word  $\sigma\kappa\omicron\tau\tau\epsilon\iota\theta\alpha$  does suggest a viewing of intelligibles rather than of sensibles. It is not impossible that Plato may have resumed a more open attitude toward the forms in his later days in his verbal discussions if not in his writings. The testimony of Aristotle as well as that of the present epistle may be taken as indicative of this.

4) Philebus, 62b8-9

5) 343bc.

This viewing of the soul may be applied to the beauty and symmetry which accompanies the second "good" of the Philebus' classification, a good whose relevance would seem to be immanent rather than transcendent, and it could be supposed to be the cause of skill, apparently the second highest activity of soul in the list at 892b. Hence, if it were associated with scientific knowledge, the occupier of a corresponding position in the epistle, one might readily admit some affinity. What Plato appears to be arriving at in his final years seems to be a hierarchy with a transcendent fixed norm and principle of form at its head, a measure, a law, etc., with an immanent resulting form below it, present in knowledge, skill, beauty, symmetry, etc.

This view is supported by the fact that one repeatedly finds that four elements of a list will be immanent, while the fifth is transcendent. The "fifth" of the epistle alone is directed only toward the quiddity. The measure of the Philebus list alone appears to be transcendent. Four divine virtues in Laws I look up toward "the guiding intellect", while four bodily virtues look up toward the soul's.<sup>6)</sup> In both lists of Laws X the fifth element transcends the intellectual associations of the other four, law and the object of will.

Thus the Seventh Epistle may have preserved a useful clue to the leanings of Plato in his last years, but in order to reconstruct the final tendencies one must pass its limited interests by. One must first insist that first position should be occupied by some absolute normative standard. The statesman of the Politicus is of course subservient to the truth; the motive cause of the web of state is obedient to a higher transcendent principle, and requires its pursuit by all in order that his state

6) 631b ff.

may remain stable. Measure dominates in the Philebus, law in the Laws.

Secondly, one should look to the final realisation of the dictates of this principle, correct marriage in the Politicus, symmetry in the Philebus, skill in Laws X, wisdom and health in Laws I, and perhaps knowledge in the letter. The soul must look up toward this end, just as the demiurge of the Timaeus was compelled to look to his model at 28a ff., and its actions are turned toward this end whenever it should light upon the guidance of the norm.

Thirdly the soul itself must act in accordance with the norm. Such action may be deemed intelligent action, and such is also the criterion of the soul's goodness.<sup>7)</sup> Good and intelligent action consists in caring for the bodily world, and may be seen not only in the care of God for man in Laws X, but in that of the statesman in the Politicus, and perhaps in the cause of the mixture in the Philebus. Such care demands the employment of knowledge and decision on the part of the soul, for it now looks down away from the goal toward the bodily world, the world of uncertainty. It is responsible for imposing its cognitive powers upon the world of opinion. Hence the intelligent soul brings limit to the unlimited bodily world, but it is itself guided by the visions of its goal, and subject to the dictates of the fixed norm or measure, which, as Laws IV 716c makes clear, is to be identified with God.

Thus in the Philebus the measure which appears to be both first good and principle of separation, is both divine and the governor of the soul's combinative processes. It is through its limit that it draws to a halt the processes of the soul, and initiates the process of separation. Thus, in accordance with the requirements of the Politicus' myth, God is

7) Laws, 897b1-2.

seen to be some degree responsible for motion in both directions, but only immediately active in respect of the separative process.

A feature to be noticed in respect of the lists and classifications of Plato's latest period is once again the central position of the soul, or of the soul's most pertinent activity when all stages pertain to the soul. It lies between intelligible and sensible extremes, receiving order from above through the vision of formal/final principles, and imparts order to what lies below through its knowledge.

A table of comparison may serve to suggest a possible line of development.

<u>Politicus.</u>	<u>Philebus.</u>	<u>Laws 892b.</u>	<u>Laws 897a.</u>	<u>7th Letter.</u>
1) Truth	Measure	Law	Desiring	The "fifth"
2) Right marriage	Symmetry	Skill	Gazing	Knowledge
3) Statesman	Intelligence	Intelligence	Caring	Image
4) Warp	Knowledge	Caring	Counselling	Definition
5) Woof	True Pleasure	Opinion	Opining	Name.

To all may be applied the principles of Philebus 23c ff., these being, in ascending order: unlimited, <sup>limited,</sup> combining cause, end/final clause, separating cause or controller of combining cause.

ii) The Epinomis.

The Epinomis like the "fifth" of the Seventh Letter, bears witness to an aura of mystery that shadowed some kind of interest in five-fold classification in Plato's later days. Like most of the material in the Epinomis, which will here be presumed to be the work of Philip of Opus, the passage concerned is of inferior philosophical value; it is concerned with ranging five forms of intelligent being alongside the five elements. The only example of such comparisons or associations within Plato is at Timaeus 38e-40a, where there is a minimal association of the various living creatures with the elements: birds with the air, animals in some cases with water, in some cases with earth, and Gods with fire. As we have said before, it is only necessary to assume the addition of the perfect living creature and the strange fifth body, before one is confronted with two associated five-fold lists.

Whether the author of the Epinomis has been influenced by this passage, or whether he is relying upon a genre of speculation that was not uncommon in the oral discussions of the Academy, must remain unknown. In all events the numerical emphasis tends even to absurd proportions. One may quote 984b4-5:

τὰ τρίτα τὰ μέσα τῶν πέντε τὰ μεταξὺ τούτων . . .

984c7-d2 makes an even stronger assertion of the length of the list:

δευτέρα δὲ καὶ τρίτα καὶ τέταρτα καὶ πέμπτα, ἀπὸ θεῶν τῶν φανερῶν ἀρχαίμεινα γενέσεως, εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀποτελευτῶν.

Finally, one may mention 985c1:

τούτων δὲ τῶν πέντε ὄντως ὄντων ζώων, . . .

Our author associates the heavenly bodies with fire, and mankind with earth; between the two he places three intermediate kinds of God related to aether, air, and water respectively. These appear to be some

kind of spirit (called daemons at 984d8-e1), a race responsible for prophesy etc., and shadowy demi-gods, 985b6-7.

This passage will receive further attention when the demonology and theology of Albinus and Maximus of Tyre are discussed, and other aspects of the work will be found of relevance to Xenocrates and to Middle Platonism; but at present it is sufficient to note the mysterious consequences that certain speculations of Plato had engendered. Perhaps an aspect of real significance is the testimony of these quasi-mystical passages to a more and more cryptic attitude on the part of the master to matters of theology, metaphysics, ontology, and demonology. Such an attitude may well have prompted those who claimed to understand his intentions to write works more dogmatical than he would ever have envisaged and to adopt a more revelationist manner of exposition.



PART TWO.CHAPTER FIVE:THE SYSTEM OF SPEUSIPPUS.

In the years immediately following the death of Plato the Academy was concerned not so much to explain the dialogues as to justify them. Plato himself, by his own reluctance to express firm opinions on matters of uncertainty, encouraged a wide variety of doctrine to emerge within his school; in general this would not be contrary to his own views, and yet it often failed to accord with his manner of approach, or to harmonise with his true feelings. It had often been necessary for his supporters to deduce his position by careful assessment of his criticisms of the views of others, criticisms which in his last days were often based as much upon common sense as upon conflict of dogma or rapacious dialectic.

For Speusippus it was necessary to justify the dialogues in order to justify his position in the Academy. Aristotle had set an example by leaving Plato's school, and hence by relying primarily upon his own reputation, not upon that of his teacher. Speusippus on the other hand, since he claimed to be the successor of his uncle, was forced to find material within the dialogues that might be thought to bear a resemblance to his own views. He was forced to maintain a tradition, even though, at a superficial glance, he had no more in common with Plato's middle-period doctrine than had Aristotle. Both alike shared in the rejection of the "theory of forms" which had provided the back-bone of middle-period speculation; and the mathematical realism which Speusippus substituted for his master's conceptual realism could scarcely fulfil the same epistemological or emotional purpose.

But it was not only with regard to the "theory of forms" that



thought. Fortunately we are now the possessors of a valuable new fragment of some Speusippean work, which Professor Merlan has discovered in the fourth chapter of Iamblichus' De Communi Mathematica Scientia.<sup>6)</sup> This long passage (some four to five pages) appears to have been preserved no less faithfully than the fragments of Aristotle's Protrepticus that may be found in the work of the same title by Iamblichus. Merlan has been able to produce both stylistic and terminological evidence to support the attribution of the extract to Speusippus, in addition to the many conclusive doctrinal similarities.

In view of Speusippus' affection for the Parmenides it is not strange that the number of stages of reality postulated by this extract are five.<sup>7)</sup> Indeed there is no conclusive proof that Plato should not have consulted his nephew when writing this work; nor is it unlikely that Speusippus' tendency to separate rigidly the various branches of existence had prompted his uncle's decision to choose between one world and five in the Timæus;<sup>8)</sup> but a third dialogue where Speusippus appears to have been in the front of Plato's mind is the Philebus. Mathematics and quasi-pythagorean metaphysics are never far from the surface in the early pages, an anti-hedonist attitude seems to be defended, the final classification may seem unnaturally prolonged;<sup>9)</sup> all these features will remind the attentive reader of Speusippus, and may indicate a not uncritical appreciation of his investigations on the part of Plato.

It is not sufficient to determine the number of Speusippus'

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- 6) PN., ch.IV, Speusippus in Iamblichus. The Iamblichus work is edited by Festa, Leipzig (Teubner), 1891.  
 7) De Comm. Math. Sc., p.19, 1.9, F.  
 8) Timæus, 55d2.  
 9) Would Aristotle have used ἐκτείνε of Plato's thought here as he does of Speusippus' system, fr. 33a?

grades or stages of reality; one must also enquire as to the nature of each, and if possible offer suggestions as to what may have been their respective first principles. The former question is by no means easy to answer, for the present writer must disagree with Krämer's findings on this matter, while the latter demands what would in certain cases be impossible even to guess. Certain of the most important points, however, may come to light in the translation and examination of the Iamblichus fragment.

Ch. IV., p.14, 1.18, Festa.

"And should it also be necessary to define the particular first-principles that relate to each of the sciences, saying what they are, of what sort, of what particular status, and in what relation they stand both to each other and to all the other first-principles of all substances, 10) then the time has now come to relate this also. But best of all, since there is a certain due order among them, and some are considered foremost not only in rank<sup>11)</sup> but also by nature, (for they co-exclude but are not co-excluded, they co-imply but are not co-implied),<sup>12)</sup> while some are deficient both in seniority and in simplicity, for these reasons it befits us too to follow their natural order, and to speak firstly of the first, and then likewise about the rest.

- 10) One should notice that the first-principles are all related not only to the other members of their own level of being, but also with other first-principles of different levels of being.
- 11) 11.24-25, the structural order of reality is determined both according to rank and according to nature.
- 12) *δυναμικῶς* and *δυσμετρίως*; these are Aristotelian logical terms applied to the relationship of *genus* and *differentia* with the species.

p.15, 1.6: Of mathematical numbers one should assume two primary and topmost principles, the one (which should then not even be called a substance, <sup>13)</sup> on account of its being simple <sup>14)</sup> and its being the foundation-stone of substances, and of the fact that the cause is not yet such as those things of which it is the cause), and conversely another principle, that of multiplicity, which is also able to provide division of its own accord, on which account we indicate its likeness to some material that is damp <sup>15)</sup> and malleable in every sense, suitably comparing <sup>it</sup> by its potential. From these are furnished the first genus, <sup>16)</sup> from the one and the principle of multiplicity, put together out of both these numbers, in accordance with some persuasive compulsion. <sup>17)</sup>

- 13) 1.8, οὐδὲν ἔτι πᾶν - the one is not yet being for Speusippus, cf., fr. 34e, Arist. Meta. 1092a, 14-16. This agrees with the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, 141e. One should notice that the present discussion is confined to mathematical numbers which are for him the first order of reality, for see 11.3-4, πρῶτον . . . . . πρὶ τῶν πρώτων, For Speusippus there was no ideal grade of number, superior to or different from the mathematical, fr.42c, Arist. Meta. 1080b 11, fr. 42e, Meta. 1086a2.
- 14) 1.8, ἀπλῶν -cf. line 2 above, ἀπλότητι. Speusippus regards that which is prior as being equivalent to that which is simple. Thus he conflicts directly with Aristotle's dogma that the man precedes the seed.
- 15) Strange adjectives to describe the material principle, but reminiscent of the part played by moisture in the very early traces of "philosophy" in connexion with nourishment, chaos, sexual imagery, etc., and of the opposites dry and moist, still important to the medical profession, and to Aristotle. I have translated εἰς δύναμιν as meaning "with reference to its potential" rather than Merlan's "to the best of our ability", because I feel that it is impossible that the word, placed thus, may not remind one of the Aristotelian concept of the matter. There must at least be a pun here.
- 16) Genus is the word that Speusippus seems generally to apply to his branches of reality here, rather than the "οὐδένα" by which Aristotle prefers to speak of them, fr. 33a, 3.
- 17) Merlan (FN, p.106) rightly connects this with reason's persuading necessity in the Timæus 48a, but I should hesitate to use this fact to justify the translation of π.θελῶς in its passive sense of "persuasive". Speusippus is introducing this necessity as an aid or agent in the process of combination and hence it plays a role contrary to the force of necessity in the Timæus.

p.15, 1.17: And it is necessary when going through each of the numbers to require that this nature<sup>18)</sup> should provide every division for every number and the size as considered as a whole; but that it should be the seal of the homogeneous and indivisible principle that fashions the character of each when still fixed and undivided. It is perhaps not fitting to attribute evil or baseness to such a thing, whose property is to be responsible of its own accord for both size and division, and even for increase. For we are not in other matters accustomed to connect such a kind with an evil apportionment, and there are times when one should say with a fair degree of truth that the great is responsible for magnificence and liberality when it is conjoined with some quality.

p.16: And so it would be far from the mark to call it evil. Furthermore, if one happened to praise the nature of the one also, on account of its self-sufficiency and its being responsible for certain fine properties among numbers,<sup>19)</sup> how could it not be illogical to claim that what is evil or base should be receptive of such a thing? For it would no longer happen that the evil and the base should be in all ways culpable, presuming that one must regard as praiseworthy that which is the recipient of what is praiseworthy. Let this principle then be considered by us along those lines. But as for the one it should not rightly be called beautiful or good, owing to its being over and above<sup>20</sup>

18) "This nature" of course, refers to the dyad.

19) Speusippus appears to have had a certain sympathy for the Pythagorean tradition which associates the one with goodness, a sympathy which Aristotle recognises, Meta., 1096b5, fr. 37a.

20) Σπεύσιππος, making it quite clear that Speusippus' failure to attribute goodness and being to the one was not due to his regarding it as in any sense inferior to the one of nature. Rist in The Neoplatonic One and Plato's Parmenides depicts the establishment of this point as an advance by Merlan over a contrary opinion held by Armstrong in The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus, Cambridge, 1940, p.22.

both the beautiful and the good. For as nature progresses further from <sup>21)</sup> the first stages, firstly the beautiful appears, and then, at a greater distance from the elements, the good. <sup>22)</sup>

p.16, 1.15: The first receptacle and magnitude then, or whatever one should call it, fashioned the form of numbers, indefinite in multitude

- 21)  $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\iota\omicron\upsilon\sigma\eta\varsigma \dots \tau\eta\varsigma \phi\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$  , cf. Arist. Meta. 1901 a35, fr.34  
 $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\epsilon\lambda\theta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\eta\varsigma \tau\eta\varsigma \tau\omicron\upsilon\upsilon \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omega\upsilon \phi\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$  . As we have seen before  
 Speusippus' successive grades of existence are subject to a natural progression.
- 22) Beauty first appears in mathematical, goodness in soul.  
 Possibly  $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu$  might improve  $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu\tau\omega\nu$  in line 14, the last syllable having been reduplicated from the following  $\tau\omega\nu$  . The sense is clear in either case.

The location of the good at a distance from the first principles is interesting for a number of reasons. Merlan (FN. p.105) suggests comparison with fragment 41 from Theophrastus. Here that which is praiseworthy (  $\tau\omicron \tau\acute{\iota}\mu\iota\omicron\nu$  ) is placed at the centre of being (  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota \tau\eta\upsilon \tau\omicron\upsilon \mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\upsilon \chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\tau\omicron\upsilon$  ) with the extremes on either side (  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \delta\prime \acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omega\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  ). It would seem pointless to make such a remark merely about Speusippus' doctrine of the mean, as seen in fr. 60 with regard to pleasure. Theophrastus has in mind a far more distinctive element of Speusippus' thought which may be applied to the whole of being,  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota \tau\eta\varsigma \acute{\omicron}\lambda\eta\varsigma \omicron\upsilon\sigma\eta\varsigma$  . Krämer (DG. p.214, n.57) appears to reject this view, as being a leading interpretation. It does not suit Krämer's system to place the good in the middle of the chain of being. He places the one at the head of the list of  $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\eta\iota\alpha$  , thus following Ps-Alexander, fr. 33b, although it is not an  $\acute{\omicron}\nu$  , and although Iamblichus clearly shows the arithmeticals to be the first "kind". Thus he is forced to make the numbers second, geometricals third, and soul, where the good first appears, fourth. Sensible bodies are supplied from fr.50 to fill the fifth place.

When interpreting the Theophrastus fragment in question, it should be noticed that Speusippus' system contains twin sets of extremes, one being the principles of each "kind" as opposed to the "kind" itself, the other consisting of highest and lowest "kinds" as opposed to the central kind. Should "the praiseworthy" be confined to the central kind or to the centre of each kind?

one will grant, but somehow limited in form by its having received a share in the one. If one postulates just one unlimited matter and receptacle for all things, then it will no doubt be an illogical result that, when the "idea" of the one inhabits it, it should not also render the same "kinds" if it too is alike throughout, with the result that all the "kinds" will be totally of numbers. For we shall have no suitable point of difference to add to it, that could explain why at this point the nature of numbers have arisen, and after this that of lines and planes and solid shapes, rather than the same kind of thing all the time, seeing that they come from like elements joined together in like fashion, p.17: One might postulate one first cause for all multiplicity and magnitude, yet exhibiting many differences within itself, through which it naturally gives birth to one kind and another through the whole realm of nature although the one indwells the whole without difference; for not even this always displays with accuracy its own nature on account of the unwieldiness of the matter, just like the grain in certain cheap timbers. This would perhaps not involve one in inconsistencies, but one could justifiably be disconcerted that the primary element should incorporate divisions leading to such wide differences, especially if one were in all cases to base one's argument on such examples. For the most simple is in all cases the element.

The remaining alternative is to postulate some other cause of magnitude, and, just as the monad is used for the one in numbers, to posit the point in lines, and position and distance, and for locations lines areas and solids must first of all be postulated, with place too appearing next according to the same principles, the point where the difference in the receptacle bestows its own particular characteristic upon the "kind" that comes from it. And if one were to make the claim



and criticism that the elements of continuity and interfusion<sup>23)</sup> arising from this nature were more pronounced and more unwieldy,<sup>24)</sup> one would not, perhaps, be in error. And up to these things the second kind would be rendered complete; for I place in the same category lines, and solids, and surface areas. First then is the matter of numbers, second that of lines, surfaces, and solid shapes. And in the same manner individual receptacles should be posited for the other sciences, as many as reason may find and of whatever sort.

p.18, 1.1: May this then be so for us; the elements from which the numbers come are not yet fundamentally beautiful or good; but out of the combination of the one and the material cause of multiplicity number is woven, and therein being and beauty make their first appearance. Immediately thereafter, from the elements of lines, the geometrical essence appears, in which being and beauty are similarly found, where dwells nothing base and nothing evil; but coming to the lowest ranks, the fourth and fifth which are put together from the final elements, there

23) On the meaning of *συμμεσολυμένον* see Merlan *PN* p:110-111, where he tries to choose between the meanings "entirely tainted" and "entirely underdone", neither of which can retain much meaning when applied in the present context. I find *συμμόλυνω* the more probable origin of the word, although one might naturally associate anything "tainted" with an evil nature of some sort, which matter is clearly not. One should not forget that the adjective is coupled with *συνεχές*, and considerable emphasis must therefore fall upon the prefix, a factor which Merlan has neglected. Since *συμμόλυνω* can mean "I stain" it would perhaps be possible to envisage several dyes with which a garment has been coloured running into each other. Hence my translation "interfusion", in accordance with what the context appears to demand.

24) 1.21: *παχύτερον* -emphasising the intractability of the material principle of geometricals, as *παχύτητα* at line 6.

evil appears, not from design, but from some of nature's powers falling away and failing to prevail."

In view of the fact that this paragraph appears to take up what has gone before, one might tend to regard this as a product of Iamblichus himself. But it is too precise in its details to allow one to accept that it does not conform to a very explicit system, a system based on five levels of reality, number, geometricals, and three others, of which it is to the last two alone that evil may be assigned.

p.18, 1.13: "From this then it is also clear what difference the mathematical causes have from others; they precede the final ones, on account of their being bodily in a way, while these are immaterial; they precede those which are examined in connexion with life, through their being characterised by motion while these are immobile; and they stand out from intelligibles, since they are indivisible and pre-subsisting, while these provide the source of combination and division. May the general account of mathematical principles and the particular account of each be thus defined for us; and may this be judged the way in which they differ from the other first-principles."

In this final paragraph, on the other hand, Iamblichus almost certainly takes over. The τελευτάων admittedly may take up the ἐσχατῶν of line 9 in the previous paragraph, and refers to the fourth and fifth levels of reality, signifying that both were almost certainly to be connected with body; possibly they should be associated with the last two ontological levels of the Parmenides 130cd, discussed in ch.II, ordered physicals and unordered masses. The fact that a comparison with ensouled creatures then follows suggests that these constituted the next

grade up in Speusippus' system, but the comparison with intelligibles is a little more difficult to understand. What part could intelligibles have played in a system where forms were rejected, and were replaced by mathematical numbers as the first grade of reality? Perhaps the  $\pi\rho\omicron\upsilon\tau\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\upsilon\delta\omega\nu$  provides the answer; the intelligibles could be the initial principles, the opposites from which each grade is formed. But it must nevertheless be doubted whether Speusippus himself would have called them by this name, in spite of the evidence of Asclepius in fr.33d,  $\delta\lambda\lambda\eta\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\delta\iota\alpha\nu\ \nu\omicron\upsilon$ , which probably only refers to the separate existence of the Speusippean  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  -God known to us from Ps-Aëtius, fr. 38.

The conclusion of this paragraph seems without any doubt to have been written by Iamblichus in order to weave the paragraph as a whole into his account.

The primary questions that emerge from the passage above are two: what were Speusippus' five  $\omicron\upsilon\delta\iota\alpha\iota$ , and what are the first principles of each? Is one to follow Merlan and demand that the soul should be central, with numbers and geometricals coming before and two kinds of bodily existence after? Or should one side with Krämer, regarding the one as the first level, with numbers, geometricals, soul and bodies following in that order?

In favour of Krämer's approach to the matter, one may point out that Aristotle mentions only numbers, geometricals, soul and bodies as forming the stages of Speusippus' episodic development.<sup>25)</sup> If one regards the development as being towards what is structurally more complete, then it is difficult to find anything which one may add to

25) Meta. 1090b13, fr. 50, Lang.

the list at the end, while the one may be conveniently placed at the beginning, as by Ps. Alexander.<sup>26)</sup> If one examines the Aristotelian passage upon which this latter intends to comment,<sup>27)</sup> one is able to sympathise with his view; Speusippus we are told, postulates more *ἀρχαί* (than Plato) beginning from the one, and first-principles of each *ἀρχή*, one for numbers, another for magnitudes, and next one for soul.

If, however, each *ἀρχή* must have a first-principle, then the one, being the ultimate first-principle, cannot be classified as an *ἀρχή*; it is certainly not an *ἀρχή*.<sup>28)</sup> Speusippus admittedly begins with the one, but it does not constitute an *ἀρχή*. It appears that when Aristotle refers to principles of each essence, he wishes to draw attention to the different material principles, regarding the one as the common starting-point of each; the Iamblichus passage suggests that it remains essentially the same at each level, though differences arise in its manifestations.<sup>29)</sup>

Asclepius, commenting on Metaphysics 1028b2, fr. 33d, Lang, postulates a much greater selection of Speusippean *ἀρχαί*, but he should be read with a degree of scepticism, since the Iamblichus passage denies certain details of this. It is quite dogmatic that numbers con-

26) Fr. 33b, Lang.

27) Meta. 1028b21 ff., fr. 33a., Lang.

28) De Comm. Math. Sc., p. 15, 1.8, F; fr. 34e, Lang.

29) Ibid., p. 17, 11.5-7, F.

stitute the first genus, and all geometricals the second.<sup>30)</sup> It is also plain that the total number of "kinds" is five, and that the fourth and fifth are to be regarded as the lowest.<sup>31)</sup> Thus provided that the passage has been correctly identified as belonging to Speusippus, and provided that the details have not been significantly altered, then one must prefer Merlan's account of the five οὐσίαι.

There is definite evidence in Aristotle to place the realm of the soul after that of geometrical magnitudes. We read<sup>32)</sup>

" ἄλλῃ δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς ."

This order is also implied in fr.50, where it would certainly seem that the physical bodies are placed after soul in fourth position. But what of the fifth kind?

This is the point at which we must revert to Plato's Parmenides for clues as to the origin of Speusippus' system. Just as one finds Plato's central positive hypothesis introducing the notion of coming-to-be and passing away, so here one finds the soul central to Speusippus' system. Just as one found the coexistence of the principle of multiplicity and a degree of finitude creating an ordered multiplicity in the fourth hypothesis, so one finds the physical bodies in fourth position in Speusippus' list. This latter places in first and second positions what he regards to be the formal elements of nature, numbers when viewed alone, lines etc., when viewed in combination with matter. Similarly

30) p.17, 11.22-29.

31) p.18, 1.9.

32) Fr.33a, Meta. 1028b23.

Plato has placed the formal principles seen alone in first position, and seen in combination with its opposite in second rank. Thus one might legitimately expect, just as Plato had placed in fourth and fifth positions the opposite principle seen at one moment partaking of limit and at another isolated therefrom, that Speusippus will have placed ordered bodies in fourth position and unordered masses, the  $\phi\alpha\upsilon\lambda\acute{o}\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$  of Parmenides 130c7, in fifth position.

The difficulty lies in the fact that it would be more natural to associate Speusippus' one with the first hypothesis, which also recognises a one above or beyond being, and the numbers with the second hypothesis where they are seen to appear. This appears to add great weight to Dr. Kramer's case. But as we have seen in chapter two above, the hypotheses were to some extent a product of the four-fold epistemology and ontology, the third signifying a kind of mixed and intermediate essence. Speusippus will have been aware of this, and his two highest ontological levels, equivalent to form and mathematical, were numbers and geometricals. In both cases soul will constitute the centre, and ordered and orderless masses the remainder.

The difficulty in Speusippus' system lies in the fact that the form-matter lines run both horizontally and vertically. That is to say that just as there are five  $\sigma\upsilon\beta\acute{\alpha}\iota\alpha$  which diminish in status, and of which the first are more formal in character, the last more bodily, so too each  $\sigma\upsilon\beta\acute{\alpha}\iota\alpha$  itself possesses its own formal and material principles, a relation of the one and a principle of division. Although each rung, as it were, of his ladder possessed a place in determined order, the real form-matter distinction was present independently in each of these rungs

A very significant point at issue is how far Speusippus depended directly upon the Parmenides, and how far upon the consequences of this work upon Plato's later dialogues as a whole. In the Philebus intelligence appears central in the list of "goods", and ought perhaps to be regarded as that good which may be particularly associated with the soul. <sup>33)</sup> In the Laws <sup>34)</sup> intelligence adopts a similar position. The Philebus' first two "goods", measure and symmetry, could be closely connected with the Speusippean numbers and geometricals; while knowledge and pure pleasure, which assume fourth and fifth positions, mark those desirable things in life to which the truth has and has not penetrated. And this is the stage at which the formal principle seems gradually to fade in Speusippus' system. It may not be too speculative to propose that Speusippus' had a reasonable insight into Plato's metaphysics in its latest stage of development, and that, having altered it sufficiently to exclude all notion of transcendent forms, was quite prepared to adapt it. He above all others may have understood the reason behind the five-fold metaphysics, and recognised the position of the soul in the centre thereof.

It is to the centre that Theophrastus allots the slender portion of good in Speusippus' system, <sup>35)</sup> while we learn from Iamblichus that the fourth and fifth stages alone include evil. Should one recall that the products of intelligence in the Timaeus were all closely connected with soul, while necessity was responsible both for

33) See above, ch.III, iv. Phil. 66b5.

34) 892b3.

35) Fr.41, Lang, and De. Comm. Math. Sc., p.18, 1.9F.

the material receptacle and for the solid bodies, then it is not difficult to understand why τὸ τίμιον should fall in the realm of soul alone for Speusippus, while both bodies and masses show signs of deficiency, owing to the failure of the formal principle to penetrate. Merlan thus uses the Theophrastus fragment to support his case for the central position of the soul, <sup>36)</sup> while Krämer naturally refuses this interpretation of it. <sup>37)</sup>

One must here mention Speusippus' view of what the soul actually was, for it is a little problematic. He envisaged it in the "idea of the all-extended", <sup>38)</sup> which would appear to give it a geometrical basis, though it is certainly to be excluded from the realm of common geometricals. If it is to be an "idea" of some sort, then one would expect it to be abstracted from matter, and also perhaps a unifying force, possessing the key to three-dimensional coherence. Such an essence might also prove the logical essence of an intermediate standing to position between geometrical abstracts and sensible bodies.

From soul one may pass naturally to God, and what this being was deemed to be in the context of Speusippus' system. Cicero, <sup>39)</sup> says that it was a "vis animalis", which suggests that it is either connected with his concept of nature, or part of his central realm of soul. Nature is that which unravels the successive stages of reality, <sup>40)</sup>

36) FN. p.110.

37) UG. p.214, n.57.

38) Fr.40, Lang.

39) De Nat. De., I, 13,32, fr. 39a, Lang.

40) Meta. 1090b19, fr.50; Meta. 1091a35, fr. 34f.



though in a strictly non-temporal sense,<sup>41)</sup> This would seem to make it an intelligible force if not intelligent, and it would neither be identifiable with the one, nor with the good, in accordance with the demands of fr.38. God must be neither of these but of its own nature, "ἴδιον φύσιν".

If one were to connect God with the realm of the soul, one would perhaps find difficulty in explaining why it should not be good (or the good). However, by regarding it as the cause of soul and equivalent to the monad in numbers and the point in lines, one would be rescued by Speusippus' claim that the cause is not yet like that of which it is the cause.<sup>42)</sup> It would explain its difference from the one, while still maintaining some connexion; it would justify Theophrastus' criticism that honourable elements were confined to the centre of the system, within the outside elements of the central genus; it would explain Asclepius' close association of soul and intelligence in fr.33d; and it would assent to the central position of intelligence in the list of "goods" at Philebus 66a, in spite of it being the governing motive force for both Plato and Speusippus.<sup>43)</sup> Yet in spite of the close connexion of soul and intelligence in Plato, the subject must remain the subject of speculation in Speusippus.

Final testimony as to the nature of Speusippus' system may be extracted from the important fragment from Theophrastus concerning the

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- 41) As demanded by fr. 54a, b.  
 42) De Comm. Math. Sc., p.15, 1.19-20.  
 43) Phil. 28c, Speusippus fr.39a, Lang.
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mathematical dualism of the Old Academy. <sup>44)</sup> Theophrastus is complaining that those who postulate the one and the dyad do not follow the consequences of their system to an end; the followers of Speusippus will show how numbers are generated, and magnitudes too, but they pass over most other things quite quickly except for demonstrating that some are from the dyad, others from the numbers and the one. In the former category fall place and void and infinite; in the latter soul and certain other things. Then there follows a clause usually bracketed:

ἤρῳν δ' ἄμα καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ ἕτερα δὲ πλείω .

This can be conveniently attached neither to what precedes nor what follows. But it is not difficult, when reading the passage, to understand γένεσθαι λέγουσι, in which case no more would be implied than that time and the heavens came into being at the same time as soul, i.e. that they belong to the same evolutionary stage of Speusippus' spasmodic φύσις. This would also harmonise with Xenocrates' system, which is shortly to be described by Theophrastus as centred on the heavens, a fact also attested to by fr.5 of Heinze's collection.

The products of the dyad, place, void and infinite, may well be the names of the various material principles at each level of being. Place is certainly associated with the receptacle of geometrical magnitudes at p.17, 1.18-9<sup>F</sup> of the Iamblichus passage, and fr.52, though marked uncertain in Lang's edition, appears to consent to the connexion. But any strict identification of place with the receptacle of geometricals would have to account for the fact that it is seen to appear last in its

44) VIa, 23, Usener, fr.51, Lang, = fr.26, Heinze.

genus at p.17, 1.18, claiming that its late appearance does not entail an actual posteriority.

What could be the matter of bodies? It would need to imply the solidity of structure by which a cube of earth differs from the rectangular construction of twelve equal sides. Space is required in addition to mere dimension, and this could be indicated by the term κενόν. But for formless masses, since they are already possessed of an indeterminate nature, only a term implying complete lack of form will suffice; one can only suggest ἀπειρον.

No term suitable for soul can be found in the Theophrastus fragment; time cannot provide our "soul-matter" if it is co-existent with the soul, for the material cause will be prior. Moreover the material element supplies quantity to that which it jointly produces,<sup>45)</sup> while time is that quantity in the field of motion.<sup>46)</sup> It is the field itself that should be considered the material and divisible element, and we may tentatively offer motion as candidate for the third matter.<sup>47)</sup>

- 45) De Comm. Math. Sc., p.15, 11.19-20.
- 46) Fr.53, Plutarch, Qu.Plat. 1007A.
- 47) Results may be tabled thus:-

	<u>Genus.</u>	<u>Causes or elements.</u>	<u>Properties.</u>
I	numbers	one-, dyad.	beauty, being.
II	magnitudes	point, place.	beauty, being.
III	soul	( <u>νόσος</u> ), motion.	goodness.
IV	bodies	? , <u>κενόν</u> .	possibility of evil
V	masses	? , <u>ἀπειρον</u> .	

CHAPTER SIX.THE MARK OF XENOCRATES.

From Speusippus, to whom a five-fold system may almost certainly be attributed, one must pass to Xenocrates, a thinker of a very different nature, in whom one can detect no certain interest in any such system. Speusippus had produced a very intricate metaphysic of no immediate appeal, far removed from the spirit of Plato's "middle period" doctrines. If the Academy were to produce new interests in its activities and make a lively impression upon Greek society, then it had to simplify its metaphysic, to revive its interest in educational methods, and to pay attention to the kind of thing that people wanted to hear.

Xenocrates had the character and the ability to do exactly this. Not above the superstitions of the common man and his beliefs in demons and other such powers, he nevertheless was concerned to rationalise the theology and the metaphysics of the school, and to think of such subjects in arithmetical terms. In particular he favoured a system of two opposite mathematical principles placed either side of a combined central world. This central world could be regarded as the equivalent of Speusippus' realm of soul, but because Xenocrates rather favoured the association of motion with matter, the soul, qua principle of life and motion, became just as appropriate to the Xenocratean substrate (i.e. the dyad), and surrendered to the heavens the central place in the Xenocratean world.

Theophrastus, in that same fragment that has just now been used to determine the first-principles of the system of Speusippus, informs us as follows:

"This man (sc. Xenocrates) somehow places everything around the cosmos, sensibles, intelligibles, and mathematical alike, and even divinities." (Fr.26, Heinze)

Sextus Empiricus is more explicit:

"Xenocrates postulates three οὐσίαι, one sensible, one intelligible, and one combined and opinable; of these the sensible is within the heaven, the intelligible is of all things outside the heaven, and the opinable and combined essence is that of the heaven itself. For it may be perceived through the senses, and apprehended through 'astrology'." (Fr.5, Heinze).

Sextus goes on to say that while the intelligible world was apprehended by *ἐπιστήμη* and the *ἐπιστημονικός λόγος* which was steadfast and unerring, the senses provided a kind of imperfect truth concerning the sensible world; but in the mixed world of opinion truth and falsehood were equally to be found. To each region a fate was allotted, Atropos to the intelligible, Clotho to the sensible, and Lachesis to the realm of opinion.

This kind of three-fold grouping is a salient feature of Xenocrates' writings. It may be seen in something as basic as his division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic in the first of Heinze's collected fragments.

In the eyes of the ancients the first belonged to the realm of the sensible, and the last to the realm of the intelligible. Ethics is of course to be connected with the central position not

because of any intimate connexion with the heavens, but on account of its relevance to soul; and since one has to qualify soul when it is considered in the light of Xenocrates' system, one must add that it is the composite ordered soul of the Timaeus that is here significant, that which assumes a central place between body and intelligence as at Timaeus 30b. The Timaeus' soul was fundamentally associated with the movements of the heavenly bodies, even the individual soul being required to conform with these movements. Thus perhaps it might curb the disorderly element in life, this being in the eyes of Xenocrates the ultimate purpose of ethics.<sup>1)</sup>

In this way the soul, qua principle of ordered motion, does indeed assume a central position for Xenocrates as for Speusippus. On account of such a position, the soul must be divided into two faculties, one dealing with the intellectual world and intellectual virtues, the other dealing with their sensible counterparts:- the world of change and practical ethics. The dualism is most apparent in the sphere of cognition, and in this respect it is perhaps foreshadowed in the doctrine of the "Friends of the Forms" in the Sophist.<sup>2)</sup> Here it is claimed that there are two worlds, one static and consisting of intelligible forms, the other a world of change and becoming. The soul associates with the one through reason, and with the other through the senses. Life and soul could not be separated from either world in Plato's own eyes, and one may detect here the beginnings of its central position in a basically dualistic context.

Clement of Alexandria reports that Xenocrates postulated two

1) Fr. 4, Heinze.

2) 248 e.

kinds of wisdom, theoretical and practical; <sup>3)</sup> it must receive instruction from above, and apply its learning to action in the physical world. Even in the definition of soul the element of dualism appears; the self-moving number as it is called, shares in the numerical nature of the intelligibles, <sup>4)</sup> and the motion that is attributed to the material principle. <sup>5)</sup> Aristotle clearly shows its compound nature:

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν..... καὶ γνωριστικὸν..... σύνπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν (De An.404b27)

Xenocratean intermediates generally share a common feature with each of the two extremes. Thus daemons constitute a third world between Gods and men, sharing the power of the former, and the emotions of the latter; while the isosceles triangle occupies a similar position between the scalene and equilateral, having a share of both equality and inequality. <sup>6)</sup> From these triads it is also possible to observe that Xenocratean tripartitions are based upon analogy rather than interrelation; this feature adds a certain fluidity to his system, but makes the business of reconstruction more hazardous. There is not the same mechanical rigidity as in Speusippus, although the initial impression received from those fragments which deal with corresponding tripartitions is one of an even more tightly-knit system. For in spite of his having been well known in Middle Platonist times, accounts of his views often appear

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- 3) Fr.6. Both forms of wisdom are called *φρόνησις*, but *σοφία* is used of the higher only.
- 4) Fr.34. Numbers and forms are identical in Xenocrates' opinion.
- 5) Fr.28.
- 6) Fr.23.
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slightly inconsistent; it is difficult to believe that some of these inconsistencies were not prompted by deficiencies in his writings themselves.

The tripartition of rational living beings into Gods, demons, and men leads one back to a Platonic precedent in the Symposium, 7) where it is clearly demanded that demons should have an intermediate position between Gods and men. Dependence in the sphere of demonology raises the question whether further dependence upon triadic patterns in the Symposium can be found. One thinks especially of the three kinds of human being which originated from sun, moon, and earth, 8) in Aristophanes' speech. These were male, common, and female respectively, the mixed nature being interposed between the two opposites. 9)

Though Xenocrates' opposite principles were indeed one male and one female, it is rather the triad sun, moon, and earth with which we are concerned, since according to the De Facie 10) of Plutarch these three heavenly bodies were the homes of intelligence, soul, and body respectively. Shortly afterwards 11) Xenocrates is named as the source of a doctrine concerning the composition and relative densities of these three bodies during a passage full of

- 7) 202d13-e1.  
 8) 190b1-3.  
 9) 189de.  
 10) 943ab.  
 11) 943e, fr.56, Heinze.



of tripartitions. The first four of these are as follows:

- A. The moon's nature is "neither simple nor unmixed, but like a combination of star and earth."
- B. Its intermediate position is similar to that of softness, the product of earth and water, or:
- C. Perception, the product of flesh and blood.
- D. "They say that the moon is mixed throughout its depth with aether, so as to be ensouled and fertile, but at the same time to maintain a symmetry of light elements against heavy."

Plutarch has so far spoken on his own authority, but one cannot rule out the possibility of a Xenocratean source, which may or may not have been made available by an intermediary such as Posidonius. The following point is one that may be related to the central place of the heavens in Xenocrates' system:

- E "For the very universe also, by being bound together together with upward- and downward-moving forces, is completely freed from movement from place to place."

It is now said that Xenocrates also seems to have noticed this, taking his cue from Plato. This latter demonstrated that each of the stars is composed of earth and fire, and Plutarch appears to be saying that Plato's method was one of analogy with other intermediate natures:

" διὰ τῶν μεταρὺ φύσεων ἀναλογία σοθειῶν . . . . "

Plutarch then proceeds as follows:

F. "But Xenocrates says that the stars and the sun are composed of fire and the first density, the moon of the second density and its native air, and the earth of water and fire and the third of the densities, but...."

G. "Neither the dense nor the rare was of itself receptive of soul."

It is very difficult to see exactly what similarity Plutarch or his source is trying to detect between the opinions of Xenocrates, i.e. points F and G, and those revealed in points A to E. The relation of sun, moon, and earth to the three densities does not seem particularly pertinent to the central fixed position of the heavens, let alone to the moon's being a mixture of star and earth; indeed this latter point is denied by its being composed of air according to Xenocrates. Owing to the obscurity of Plutarch's line of thought, one must consider the possibility that he had misunderstood his source, which seems to have been primarily concerned with composite intermediates, with special reference to the heavens.

Though the whole passage is printed in Heinze's collection of the fragments, and though it may mostly be reconciled with ease with Xenocrates' system, one should not suppose that he is Plutarch's direct source. The latter is comparing with his own views those of some other thinker who is concerned with the intermediate place and nature of the moon, a thinker who had probably tackled his subject doxographically, and who was certainly familiar with Xenocrates. Posidonius would be worthy of consideration in this context.

It is not only the intermediate position of the moon that is

of importance, but also that of the soul, which seems able to dwell only in the right intermediate density between the dense and the rare. One might guess that this would apply particularly to the intermediate density which belongs to the moon. It may seem curious that the material quality of density should in any way apply to the soul, but a Stoic such as Posidonius would not have sneered at such a connexion. Xenocrates too did not exclude from his soul the material element, mixing it from the one and the dyad, these being the principles of the intelligible and the material respectively. <sup>12)</sup>

Now if it were from Xenocrates that there came this attempt to locate the moon in a central position, and the soul too by virtue of its dwelling only in bodies of an intermediate density, then it is not unlikely that the placing of soul with the moon, intelligence with the sun, and body with the earth less than a page beforehand, will also be due to a Xenocratean source. And the fact that he could have found a parallel for the intermediate position of the moon in a work of Plato with which he appears to have been familiar, gives some support for any such argument.

If the intelligence-soul-body divisions of the De Facie myth were in fact the product of Xenocratean doctrine, then it is upon his foundations that an important five-fold phenomenon in Plutarch is based. The combination of intelligence and soul produces reason, while that of soul and body produces either perception or passion, depending upon how one fills an infuriating lacuna at 943a. Intelligence implants an impression upon soul, and soul in turn plants an impression upon body. <sup>13)</sup> Were one to regard perception to be the

12) Plutarch, De An. Proc., 1012d ff., fr.68, Heinze.

13) 945a.

product of soul and body, then these two impressions by which the higher essence ruled the lower could be thought of as intelligible and sensible form respectively.

Yet cruelly one is prevented from knowing how much of the De Facie myth may be attributed to ancient sources. The sixth fragment of Aristotle's Protrepticus includes a discussion of the relative merits of body, soul, reason, and truth; this discussion is related to another Middle Platonist passage always compared with the Plutarch extract.<sup>14)</sup> It cannot be the direct source of the 943a doctrines, since it appears to regard reason as part of the soul, while Plutarch is insisting that intelligence is a definite third principle, independent of soul and body. His manner is such that one might think him to be attacking the Aristotelian doctrine in question. Such an attack may have been foreshadowed in a source contemporary with Aristotle, and in one inclined towards a three-fold concept of reality; Xenocrates would indeed answer these requirements.

A further item of evidence is the relation of the three fates to the sun, the moon, and the earth at 945c. As we have seen before, the three fates were related in Xenocrates' system to his three realms of being, and their mention in relation to another triad here immediately suggests that this association had its origins in the same system. When worked out fully, however, this theory exhibits one serious defect; while Lachesis was allotted to the central region in fragment five, and Clotho to the sublunary world, the former is here associated with the earth, the latter with the moon. It was for the sake of comparison that Xenocrates had used his triad of fates, and it

14) Albinus, Epitome X ii., on which see below, ch. XII.

is not impossible that it should have been applied wherever it appeared useful, and with little regard for modern concepts of consistency. But one must allow for the possibility of a change in doctrine by Plutarch or by an intermediate source, and for any inaccuracies which might result owing to deficiencies in memory.

No final judgement, therefore, may be passed on the question of whether or not the De Facie myth should be regarded as evidence, in any sense, for the doctrines propounded by Xenocrates. One may merely say that they are reminiscent of this thinker. It is similarly impossible to determine how much of the De Inside belongs to Old Academic sources. It is certainly unquestionable that Plutarch will have had much to add to outdated assessments of Egyptian religion, but it remains true that his interpretation is essentially Greek. Kramer has considered the De Inside as evidence for Xenocrates at some length, <sup>15)</sup> and our present discussion of it must be restricted to the subject of this thesis.

Five-fold aspects are not obvious in the De Inside, indeed they are not to be expected. We shall later encounter distinctions between the functions of Osiris and those of his efflux, <sup>16)</sup> the former appearing as a transcendent principle of goodness, the latter as more immanent. In Isis we find a quasi-material principle, almost the Aristotelian passive intellect, <sup>17)</sup> intermediate between the forces of goodness and evil, between Osiris and Typhon. Through the seed of Osiris she conceives Horus, the sensible image of the intelligible world. <sup>18)</sup> In receiving the seed, she is receiving the shapes and <sup>19)</sup> ideas at

15) U.G. p.94, ff.

16) 371a.

17) 374ef.

18) 373b.

19) 378a.

reason's bidding, in order that she may then mould her own informed, sensible creation. Thus she, torn between Osiris and Typhon, resembles the soul, torn between the sensible body and the intelligence above in the De Facie 943a, and Osiris' seed or efflux is the imprint which she receives from above at 945a, Horus being the sensible being produced by her overcoming the material nature below.

While there is little doubt that the details of Plutarch's exposition are not determined by his having followed Xenocrates, Eudoxus, or any other ancient thinker, one cannot rule out the possibility that the metaphysical framework may owe some debt to Xenocratean tripartition, and that the two additional elements, Osiris' efflux and Horus, being the intelligible and the created forms respectively, may also have found some precedent in Xenocrates' system; they may, perhaps, have been the objects of theoretical and practical wisdom respectively. 20)

Since then the most problematic questions of contact between Plutarch and Xenocrates lie in the field of the sublime, let us examine the theological system of the latter through the most revealing fragments, that from the doxographical work ascribed to Aëtius.<sup>21)</sup> Here one finds firstly that the two basic mathematical principles are divinities. The one is the male principle, having the status of father, and ruling in the heavens: he may be known as Zeus or the Odd or intelligence. The dyad is the female principle with the role of mother to the Gods, governing the whole sublunary sequence of allotted events (  $\lambda\eta\gamma\gamma\upsilon$  ), and acting as the soul of the all. As it is

20) Fr.6, Heinze.

21) Fr.15, Heinze.

plain that the origins of the threefold system lie in the soul's bridging a fundamental dualism, it is hardly surprising that the theology in its mathematical form, its most basic form in Xenocrates' eyes, should appear dualistic. One may scarcely credit the combined world with a separate first principle.

What is more surprising is Aëtius' description of the dyad as the soul of the all. Plutarch is of the belief that Xenocrates considered Plato's world soul as the product of the one and the principle of multiplicity, while Theophrastus holds that the production of the soul from the one and the numbers is a feature common to all mathematical dualists of the Academy. <sup>22)</sup> It is difficult to reconcile Aëtius' first-principle with the compound entity more usually thought to be Xenocrates' soul. While it may be unsafe to suggest that his doctrine was any more stable than Plato's, it is certainly a fact that no other ancient philosopher's views have been seen to vary greatly after the initial achievement of maturity. Hence one is confronted by the difficult choice of presuming radical inconsistencies within Xenocrates' works, or allowing that "the soul of the all" in Aëtius does not represent the world-soul, or at least not in a Platonic sense.

It is not difficult to see why a principle of multiplicity should be regarded as belonging to "the all", far easier in fact, than to see why it should belong to the "cosmos"; cosmos suggests universal order, and this would involve a formal rather than a material principle. But why should our thinker refer to his second principle as soul at all, if not in a Platonic sense? The answer may lie in the

22) Fr. 68 and fr. 26, Heinze, for the respective reports of Plutarch and Theophrastus.

Philebus,<sup>23)</sup> where Plato saw two ruling causes in the traditional concept of divinity, one female being soul, the other male being intelligence. Indeed one should not exclude the possibility that Plato was alluding to the views of the younger man here, for the passage contains veiled criticisms of other current opinions,<sup>24)</sup> though it would clearly be impossible to determine any such allusion. What is more important is that the juxtaposition of genders is of importance to both passages, and that the Plato passage is also considering soul as a cause; but he does not consider it as a formal cause, nor as a material cause, but as a principle of motion. Similarly Xenocrates does not wish to emphasise the material aspect of his dyad, although it may have such an aspect; he wishes to propose it as a source of motion.

Motion was perpetually associated with Xenocrates' principle of matter, as would seem certain from its description as  $\alpha\epsilon\upsilon\alpha\omicron\nu$ . It is Aëtius that preserves the report that Xenocrates constituted the "all" from the one and the " $\alpha\epsilon\upsilon\alpha\omicron\nu$ ", a feature which certainly seems to indicate that he (Aëtius) at least believed in the identification of the dyad of fr.26 and the " $\alpha\epsilon\upsilon\alpha\omicron\nu$ " of fr.28, which is also called matter ( $\sigma\upsilon\lambda\eta$ ). Thus matter would become equivalent to "the soul of the all", the all being the complete universe which results from the one as the formal principle and the dyad as the material principle. Are we then to make the incredible identification, soul of all=matter of all? Clearly this would be a philosophical absurdity. All that Xenocrates has done is combine in his concept of the chaotic principle both the seeds of motion and the seeds of body. One observed in the doctrines of Speusippus the fact that the material principle was of

23) 30c.

24) See above, ch.III, iv.



itself able to provide divisibility,<sup>25)</sup> thus signifying that it possesses a certain power. This view must have been taken to its extreme by Xenocrates, and it seems to have become accepted by Plutarch's day. The De Animae Procreatione contains precisely this view of a joint psychical and physical chaos,<sup>26)</sup> while the combined soul-matter principle is seen clearly in Isis, for which Plutarch's apology<sup>27)</sup> reveals that he is not the original source.

Our concern, however, does not lie in the exact nature of the opposite principles but in what lies between them. It is not only them that Aetius regards as the Xenocratean divinities, but also the heaven and heavenly bodies, the daemons, and certain powers which pervade the material elements. Is there a genuine order, a hierarchy, to indicate the exact positions of each in one coherent theological system, or are the Gods of our thinker merely what he chooses, at any one moment, to designate as divine? One must surely begin with the former presumption, and abandon it only when forced to do so.

Therefore one may begin by determining the position of the opposite principles. These do not stand at the head of the system, with the priority of causes over caused, but at opposite ends. Plutarch and Clement,<sup>28)</sup> both bear witness to the fact that our thinker postulated two Zeuses which he called highest (ὕψιστος) and lowest (νεώτατος). Of these the former ruled in the world of stability, the other in the sublunary regions. Such functions not

25) Iamblichus, De. Comm. Math. IV., p.14, 18-20.

26) 1014B

27) 374E

28) Fr.18, Heinze.

only conform to those of the one and the dyad in Aëtius, but they also suggest that the one was applicable to the epistemological world above the heavens, the other to that below the heavens. Thus they belong to the extreme worlds, not to the combined world in the heavens.

The rest of Xenocrates' theology seems rather to be centred on the heavens themselves, though it must be admitted that fragment 15 does also include invisible daemons and the divine powers within the material elements, Hades in air, Poseidon in water, Demeter in earth; Aëtius here seems to have grouped Xenocrates' secondary Gods into three groups, the other being made up of the heaven and heavenly bodies. Thus the fragment as a whole, when the mathematical opposites have been included, would depict a triad within the basic opposites, conforming in this way with the Epinomis where similar astral theology may be found:

τὰ τρία τὰ μετὰ τῶν πέντε 984b4.

It could be that the Homeric passage about the division of the universe (Iliad XV, 187), well-known to Plutarch (infra, p.167), was already used to guide Academic divisions.

The similarity is purely one of pattern; the Epinomis associates each class of living creature with an element, and thus can hardly be expected to postulate elemental powers as its lowest kind of intermediate divinity; these are water-spirits. Moreover the Epinomis uses the highest visible heavenly bodies and man as its extremes, nothing mathematical at all, and in the latter case nothing divine.

One might, however, object that Aëtius mentions both heaven

and heavenly bodies, and that if we try to impose the pattern of the Epinomis upon his fragment, then we do so at the cost of ignoring this distinction. A passage from Cicero clearly shows that Xenocrates held heavenly bodies, a combination of the fixed stars, and the sun and moon to be three distinct groups of heavenly bodies.<sup>29)</sup> Clement of Alexandria confirms this belief, although he does not separate sun and moon from the rest of the planets as Cicero does.<sup>30)</sup>

It would seem that the impression to be gained from Xenocrates' theological works was inclined to vary from book to book. For instance, Tertullian,<sup>31)</sup> perhaps not a reliable source but certainly not entirely ignorant, merely ascribed two kinds of God to Xenocrates, Olympians (which fr.15 identifies with heavenly bodies) and Titans (which should be identified with daemons, e.g. fr.24). He is aware of their resulting from a pair of opposites, one male and one female, but in his haste to reconcile these opposites with those used by mythology, and, apparently, Arcesilaus, he has overlooked their numerical aspect entirely.

Cicero is clearly taking his information about Xenocrates' theology from one particular set of works:

"cuius in libris, qui sunt de natura deorum,....."

Therefore one should be content to search for a rather different approach to theology than is to be found in the doxographic fragment, where Aëtius may have used either different or additional

29) Fr.17, Heinze.

30) Ibid.

31) Fr.19, Heinze.

sources, especially since Cicero does not seem to be aware of the existence of any kind of God other than the astral in Xenocrates' eyes. The source used by Cicero has divided the heavens into three, using the planets as central, the fixed stars above, and the sun and moon below, there being tendencies to rely on the three-world ontology here. One may see how the fixed stars may exemplify the world of fixed intelligibles, the sun and moon provide a focal point for the sensible world, and the planets display that element of uncertainty in their wanderings that makes the world of the heavens identifiable with the realm of opinion. Clearly Xenocrates has not framed this triadic astral theology within two other divinities, or Cicero would have said something of them, being only too ready to point out the folly of our thinker's ways. But one could at least say that the true intelligible world still lay beyond the fixed stars, while the sensible world lay within sun and moon. All three grades of astral Gods were thus framed in the centre of his system, if only by virtue of the central position of the heavens.

One may detect in the preceding passage an attempt to impose unnaturally a sinister five-fold pattern upon the theology of an author in whom we have no evidence for such concerns. Certainly no such pattern has been allowed to dominate in Xenocrates' work, and the system of triads is much more a central feature. But our thinker has clear similarities of opinion with the writer of the Epinomis before him, and both perhaps have had considerable influence upon later "gradings of divinities".<sup>32)</sup> Kramer associates him with the theology of both Albinus and Maximus Tyrius, and justifiably so.

32) UG. pp. 92-119.

In the former the highest God is followed by the "power from above" (= eighth God of Xenocrates, composed of fixed stars), planets, daemons, and earth. <sup>33)</sup> In the latter God is superseded by three kinds of subordinate God in a passage somewhat unclear as to the nature of each; <sup>34)</sup> one may simply supply man in fifth place, and the pattern is then completed:- two opposing poles and three intermediate grades.

In Xenocrates one may find the forerunner of the whole realm of Middle Platonist theology; or one may detect the figure who through his unattractive theology failed not only to interest Cicero, but even to maintain the high standing of the Old Academy, initiating a long process of decline in the face of <sup>growing opposition from</sup> the Lyceum and Porch. Clearly a middle course must be taken, but one must bear in mind that many have been unpopular in their own era, yet worshipped in ages to come. This would be a great exaggeration if applied to Xenocrates, and he surely halted temporarily the process of Academic decay; but one may surmise that his message was not best suited to his own day, and that the full force of his influence was not felt until the doxographic era.

By the time that substantial interest in his works had been awakened, his true intentions could no longer be attested except by such standards of scholarship as were foreign to the ancient world. His works were read one by one, and different impressions received. If these impressions made a favourable impact, they became part of a thinker's philosophical machinery, if not they were rejected.

33) Didasc. ch. XIV. vii - XV.

34) XI, 12d ff.

Because of this absorption of Xenocratean elements into the traditions of the time, one can seldom extract specifically dependent passages from the Middle Platonists. There is no room for Raingeard's naive assumptions:

"Est-il besoin de se mettre ici en quête des sources Plutarque, et de prononcer le nom de Xénocrate?" 35)

A certain consistency is found in the works of Plutarch, based upon the assumption that the transcendent intelligence passes form down to soul, which then implants it in matter. Although this same basis is present to a greater or lesser degree in other Middle Platonists, yet no Platonic original can clearly be pointed out. Authors are not conscious of following any particular source, as though they depend upon a particular understanding of Plato that has arisen imperceptibly. This understanding is not such as would have been preserved by means of esoteric dogma, but such as may have been awakened in man's mind by the inspiration of a particular kind of literature at the time when the world was ready for such a reawakening.

As to this time one may be in no doubt; the period of Posidonius and Antiochus of Ascalon produced new understanding of a wide range of views after a long period of intolerance. As we shall shortly see, both thinkers followed Xenocrates to a large degree, as in him one finds the clearest case of Platonist agreement with the dualism of the Stoic God-matter conception of the universe. Xenocrates surely had the power to attract the reader, and to awaken his imagination. An emphasis upon Plato's middle period may have proved

35) Le Περὶ τοῦ Προσωπικοῦ de Plutarque, Paris, 1935, p.148, ad De Facie, 943a.

attractive, even infatuating, an incentive to serious study.  
Hence one might have been lured back to Plato and Speusippus,  
and to see them in a Xenocratean light.

CHAPTER SEVEN.THE NEW AWAKENING AND THE  
REACTION TO ANTIOCHUS.

In Xenocrates there remain traces, neither clearly indicated nor immediately recognisable, of that attraction to a five-fold metaphysic that emerged during Plato's last days. Plato himself, the Epinomis and the Seventh Letter have all indicated that some strange importance lurks behind these rows of five. It also appears that Speusippus preserved a five-fold system, but he has not emphasised the numerical feature. Indeed to do so would have been inviting the most scathing criticism from his opponents; it would have been subversive in the eyes of the tetractys-loving Pythagoreans; and it would be overlooking the fact that the origins of the doctrine are purely philosophical. Xenocrates provides a basis nicely constructed to allow similarities with much late-platonic doctrine, and, having followed the "Friends of the Forms" in the Sophist, and the theological tendencies of the Epinomis, may have preserved traces of a five-fold metaphysic and theology.

After this thinker, however, the Academy tends to neglect its interest in metaphysics and transcendentalism, which had wavered ever since the onslaughts of Aristotle. In the field of ethics and politics the Academy of Polemo and Crates may have preserved some of its former influence, but the Stoa was now propounding a satisfactory system based on purely physical, and hence more comprehensible, principles. If one possessed strange metaphysical notions the world of philosophical debate was not the place to voice them. Thus it became necessary to find another outlet for one's ideas.



The only outlet readily available was the fostering of one's ideas upon others. It may be that the acute consciousness of this restriction had produced such documents as the Second Letter and other epistles ascribed to Plato. The political interests of the Academy at this time are well known, and it is not impossible that a great deal of historical research should have been conducted at this critical juncture, with a view to justifying the master, upon whose high regard, now threatened, the school as a whole was entirely dependent.

Crantor discovered a new and more useful method of voicing his opinions; he studied Plato's writings with, perhaps, a little more diligence than had been usual before him, and then wrote notes on them for the benefit of the reader. Whether such notes would qualify for description as commentaries we do not know, but they certainly constituted the origin thereof. It is his work on the Timaeus, the most physical of Plato's writings and that most understandable to men of the times, that assumed the greatest importance among his attempts to interpret the master. Since it was no doubt used by successive subsequent interpreters, one may consider it a possible source for the preservation of the Old Academic doctrine and manner of speculation after the sceptical revolution.

One speaks of a sceptical revolution simply because, with the few details of doctrinal changes that we have, there appears to be a marked change of direction in the school under Arcesilaus. In fact the change must have taken some considerable time, and have begun before this figure, though not reaching its culmination until the time of Carneades. As has been said, the Academy was already under considerable pressure to confine its speculations to the visible world

and its practical problems, and on these Stoic terms they were naturally unable to combat Stoic doctrine. The Stoa had a rigid system and were able to be dogmatic; the Academy had no such system and little agreement among its members. It was the natural champion of the sceptic cause, provided only that it was prepared to sacrifice its aspirations to some higher knowledge.

What then became of the five-fold classification after the death of Xenocrates? By the time of Plutarch it has clearly established itself as part of the platonist heritage, but its history until that period is shrouded in uncertainty. We meet traces of it, however, in Seneca and Arius Didymus, and there are signs in Plutarch to suggest that he was not the first to speculate upon the importance of the number five for Plato.

The evidence of Moderatus too ensures that the five-fold classification had become of relevance, in this case, to that branch of Pythagoreanism which depended upon the Parmenides of Plato for its vitality; one may further require that the interpretation of this dialogue upon which he depended should have owed much to Speusippus also.

Our present purpose is to determine the causes which led to a revival of interest in five-fold expression, to estimate at what time of history this revival took place, and to discern the chief thinkers involved. Background causes include the availability of relevant literature, since ancient support for one's views was by now an essential. Also necessary was the correct intellectual climate; dynamic views arose out of more open hostility between schools, a sense of urgency, and of importance; more intricate and

more speculative elaborations depended upon a quieter, more scholarly atmosphere.

Of immediate causes the influence and encouragement of both teachers and friends is indeed necessary, but one should not neglect the fact that doctrines invariably arise in answer to an opponent or in answer to a trend that has appeared to the thinker in question to be deficient in certain respects. The principle of action and reaction applies not only to the physical world, but to the world of the mind also.

Hence it is possible to regard both the revival of transcendentalism and the new interest in five-fold classification, both appearing in the first century A.D. or shortly before, as a reaction, either jointly or independently, against one or more of the features of the philosophy which were then replaced. One possibility is that of a reaction against a materialistic four-fold system (the Stoic-Academic syncretism), which reveals itself in Philo Judaeus, among others, though with the materialism censored.

A second method of accounting for the revival in question is the search for a thinker who shows an interest in the necessary Old Academic writings, thus providing the material for the revival. Such a search will lead to Posidonius especially.

It is now proposed to examine Arius Didymus, Seneca, and Moderatus, with a view to the discernment of the sources and motives for the five-fold classifications which their works display. During our discussions it would be well to observe the following points. From Arius it appears that the revival of transcendentalism is to be associated with the five-fold pattern. The second and fourth elements are often found to be composite. The source of Seneca

seems to be a Timaeus-commentary, possibly that of his fellow-Stoic Posidonius. Two levels of intelligible are found in certain classifications, and Posidonius may have used the term "first-intelligible". In Moderatus we find an established four-fold classification, to which a fifth transcendent principle is added, this being reminiscent of Seneca's 65<sup>th</sup> Epistle. The ultimate source of Moderatus is undoubtedly the Parmenides, while Plutarch neglects this work in favour of the Timaeus, Sophist, and Philebus.

Arius Didymus was a doxographer of the Alexandrian tradition at the close of the first century B.C. He has much to say of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. If we may believe Witt,<sup>1)</sup> he owes much to the brand of eclecticism initiated in the Academy by Antiochus of Ascalon, the principal figure of the revived dogmatism.

When treating the division of "goods" which is supposed to have been recognised by Plato, he first draws the distinction between divine and human "goods",<sup>2)</sup> a distinction particularly reminiscent of the Laws I, 631b6 ff. Having passed the famous remark that Plato, being many-voiced, not of many opinions, divided the good in several ways, he goes on to enumerate three locations of good qualities; some are within the soul, some within the body, some external. This will remind the reader of the ancient division that may be found, for instance, in the 8<sup>th</sup> Epistle,<sup>3)</sup> and Arius includes

1) R. E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, Cambridge 1937, ch.VIII, p.95 ff.

2) Mullach, Fr.Ph.Gr. II, p.61a12.

3) 355b.

in the first group the virtues, in the second good health ( *εὐεργία* ), and in the third resources ( *εὐπορία* ). The final two groups are both regarded as belonging to the human half, the first as constituting the divine half.

Then Arius proceeds to demonstrate how Plato postulated five forms ( *εἶδη* ) of "goods". These were the "idea" itself, the combination of wisdom and pleasure, wisdom in itself, the combination of sciences and crafts, and pleasure in itself.

Arius mentions that these divisions are to be found in the first book of the Laws, but especially in the Philebus. It is interesting to note how Arius tackles his sources. For no mention is made of the sub-divisions of the "divine" and "human" groups of "goods" in the Laws, where both classes are found to consist of four components. Admittedly Arius is considerably more interested in the Philebus passage, but it is strange that the most obvious platonic instance of the four-fold division of the virtues is neglected. Laws I enumerates wisdom, temperance, justice, and courage, a division which not only conforms with Stoic teaching, but also meets the special approval of Philo Judaeus, another Alexandrian who lived only a short while after Arius. If it is true that Arius is keen to avoid fourfold divisions, preference being given to the five-fold groups of the Philebus, then it may be possible to determine his chief opponent.

On examining his analysis of the 66a classification, one sees that Arius has sided with the transcendentalists. The first good he assumes to be the idea of the good itself, and this may indicate that he had read " *τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν* " at 66a8. This idea was both divine and

separable. Elsewhere <sup>4)</sup> Arius has more to say about the platonic idea, which was the archetype of sensibles, cause of definition and of knowledge. <sup>5)</sup> Thus it would seem that Arius was no supporter of any attempt to fuse the Stoic and Platonic systems into one, and was particularly concerned to oppose the ideas being publicised by the followers of Antiochus of Ascalon. <sup>6)</sup> He was primarily a transcendentalist, having no sympathy for empirical theories of knowledge (when ascribed to Plato, at least), or for the identification of the ideas with the Stoic "φυσικὴ ἐννοια". The idea served a distinct purpose.

The second form of goodness was for Arius a mixture of pleasure and wisdom (φρόνησις). It was seen as the final mixture of the "good life" as opposed to the transcendent form of that mixture. He says that some regarded this to be the goal (τέλος) of human life, reminding one that Carneades is said to have viewed the "pleasure+virtue" alternative of his famous "Carneadea Divisio" with an air of approbation. <sup>7)</sup> In all events it is during the sceptical Academy's debates on the "τέλος" that the Philebus classification is likely to have acquired new status. <sup>8)</sup>

The fact that the pleasures which Plato includes in his list of "goods" are here described as "pleasure in itself" may seem strange. It may be that Arius wishes to emphasise the fact that the

4) DG., p.447, also introduction, p.69ff.

5) There may be a relationship with the doctrine of the 7th Epistle, 342a7ff.

6) On him see G. Luck, Der Akademiker Antiochos, Berlin 1953.

7) Cicero, Lucullus 139, originally Callipho's opinion, cf.131.

8) Although the work is not mentioned by Cicero in the De Fin.

third and fifth "goods" respectively are wisdom and pleasure viewed alone, while the second is the correct mixture of the two. He may also have noticed that Plato describes the admissible kinds of pleasure as "pure pleasure" at 66c5.

Also difficult to understand is why Arius should regard his second and fourth "goods" as composite ( σύνθετον in each case), while the first, third, and fifth are all simple:

τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτῆν . . . αὐτῆν καθ' αὐτῆν . . . αὐτῆν καθ' αὐτῆν .

At present it will be sufficient merely to notice this aspect of the series, since both in Plutarch and in Numenius similar patterns are to be found.

Apart from all else this passage seems to indicate that the dialogues had by now been thoroughly investigated. One may seriously wonder whether this could have been the case in Antiochus' day, when Plato could still be held to agree with both Aristotle and the Stoa. Antiochus is said <sup>9)</sup> to have modelled his platonism on Aristotle and Xenocrates, but the influence that has appeared most strongly in the fragments is that of his teacher, the Stoic Mnesarchus. His view of the world seems to have been primarily materialistic,<sup>10)</sup> and his epistemology quite empirical. In this respect he must surely have been following the Theaetetus, the one attempt by Plato to find a purely empirical basis for exact knowledge, and doubly important because it was also the chief platonic precedent for Academic scepticism, which provided his object of attack. Here four degrees of

9) Cicero, Lucullus, 137

10) Though see Witt, Albinus, p.69 for a discussion of Antiochus' first principles, which Theiler claims were never as materialistic as Cicero (Post.Ac. 24-29) would maintain.

cognition are implied, sensation, opinion, opinion with an account, and the knowledge that the work has set out to define. Stoic epistemology begins with sensation, proceeds to the stage of presentation, then to that presentation that bears the signs of its own correctness, then finally to knowledge. While the beginning and the end are in each case identical, the third is marked by the addition of a distinguishing mark to the second. The doctrine of the Divided Line also presents one with a four-fold epistemology, as does the work On Philosophy of Aristotle, where each stage is related to the progression from point to solid body. 11)

The traditional association of the number four with the solid body is not by any means confined to Pythagorean writings, but appears, for instance, in the works of both Philo Judaeus and Plutarch. Both these thinkers hold that a fifth unit must be added to account for the life of that body. 12) Thus the number four might naturally be thought appropriate to materialism, the number five to the inclusion of a non-material substance.

The Stoics did not confine their four-fold divisions to epistemology only, but emphasised also the four Cardinal virtues, 13) leading to the same end as the successive modes of cognition, the Stoic

11) De Anima. 404b21.

12) E at Delphi, 390c9ff; also De Opif. Mundi, 62, where the reason for such an association of five with living creatures is alleged to be the five senses.

13) e.g. SVF. III, 256, 262, 263 (Philo, Leg.All.I, 63) 264, 265, 266, 280, 295.



sage. In the works of Philo Judaeus special respect is paid to the number four, and it has certainly not all arisen from Pythagorean sources. One may point to the division  $\epsilon\beta\iota\varsigma$  -  $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$  -  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  -  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  λογικῆς, <sup>14)</sup> the division of passions, <sup>15)</sup> and the use of the four Stoic elements, as at De Opif. Mundi 52, even though Philo recognises the fifth.

What then may be the result of this discussion? It seems that there was at the time of Philo a movement in Alexandria that swayed toward four-fold divisions, and this in turn seems to belong to the Stoic-Platonic brand of eclecticism. Nothing in Philo seems to point to any such interest in the number five as may be found in Plutarch's E at Delphi. He passes briefly over the fifth day of the creation, only adducing the five senses to prove the suitability of the number. <sup>16)</sup> And when he comes to offer five final lessons that one may learn from the creation story, <sup>17)</sup> each seems to be directed against the tradition of the Parmenides and of Speusippus.

Firstly he insists that God exists, and as we have seen Speusippus and the first hypothesis join in denying existence to the first one. Secondly God is alleged to be one, and the lesson to be

14) Quod Deus S.I., 35, SVF II, 458, cf. 460.

15) Leg. All. II, 99, cf. SVF. III, 381, 378.

16) De Opif. Mundi, 62.

17) Ibid, 170-172.

drawn from the second hypothesis and from its Pythagorean interpretation found in Eudorus,<sup>18)</sup> a fellow-Alexandrian, is that the existent one produces the many as its co-principle. Thirdly the world is supposed to be created, a direct contradiction of Speusippus<sup>19)</sup> and perhaps too of the picture of successive coming-to-be and passing away presented by the third hypothesis. Fourthly the world is one, while the fourth hypothesis merely limits a plurality, and while Speusippus perhaps favoured five worlds.<sup>20)</sup> Fifthly the world is governed by God's providence, while the fifth hypothesis sees the rest cut off from the one, and while Speusippus' theology was noted for its lack of human appeal.<sup>21)</sup>

Here then one may detect an intriguing rebuttal of the Neo-Pythagorean tradition that Alexandria was now harbouring, a tradition dependent both upon Speusippus and upon the Parmenides.<sup>22)</sup> In particular it should be noticed that Philo accepts the oneness of God, and will thus correctly interpret their "one above being" as God. It is the not-being of God that he cannot accept:-

ὅτι εἰς ὁ ὢν ὁὕτως ἐστὶ ... (172)

18) Simplicius, In Phys., 181, 10-30, Diels.

19) Fr. 54, Lang.

20) The words of Philo may recall Timaeus 55c-d, e.g. εἰδὶ γὰρ οἱ πλείους ..... κόσμους, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀπείρους.

21) Fr. 39, Lang.

22) See Risø, The NeoPlatonic One and Plato's Parmenides, TAPA xciii (1962), 389-401. Risø, however, slightly underplays the importance of Speusippus.

It would certainly seem that there was at Alexandria at this moment a certain conflict among the platonist ranks. Some took sides with the Stoics, following in the tradition of Antiochus, others preferred the Old Academic approach which often bordered upon Pythagoreanism. Arius, being a doxographer, probably stood aloof from both factions, but he pays his respects to Eudorus<sup>23)</sup> who certainly should be included in the second group, and to Philo of Larissa,<sup>24)</sup> the chief figure of the Academy into which Antiochus had intruded with his alien doctrine,<sup>25)</sup> and a man who refused to follow the Antiochean syncretism too far. The doxographer had to examine the multitude of different opinions which the Greek world had been able to produce. Variety was the foundation of his art. The syncretist, on the other hand, had two primary tasks: to foil unsympathetic scepticism by pointing to the common purpose of all philosophy, and to unite all religious thinkers against the agnostic. All examples of common doctrine were clearly beneficial to his case, and he was seldom above claiming unjustified similarities in unrelated thinkers.

Classifications, divisions, and groupings were of central importance to the philosophy of the times, as is shown by the space which Arius devotes to the ethical divisions of Philo and Eudorus. With regard to numerical groupings, one may point to the arrangements of the Platonic dialogues, into trilogies by Aristophanes of Byzantium,

23) Lullach II, p.56a18.

24) *ibid*, p.55a7.

25) Numenius, fr.8, Leemans.

into tetralogies by Thrasyllus. Moreover, there are strong triadic elements in the philosophy of Posidonius. One may observe the Zeus-nature-destiny triad,<sup>26)</sup> the triple description of the cause,<sup>27)</sup> the platonist psychology,<sup>28)</sup> and the division intelligibles, mathematical, sensibles.<sup>29)</sup>

We have now seen also a tendency toward four-fold groups in Philo, while Plutarch favours five-fold divisions. The original purpose of such groupings is very difficult to see, unless one presumes both the importance of patterns of division and the Pythagorean characterisations of the individual numbers such as may be found in the Theologumena Arithmeticae and the works of Nichomachus of Gerasa. The significant factor in these traditions is the applicability of the number four to the solid body, and the number five to the living being.<sup>30)</sup> This is what may most easily differentiate the two trends, by the association of the number four with materialism, five with transcendentalism; one must except Philo, of course, as his motives are chiefly scriptural.

In the case of the number four we have mentioned how it may have been used to relate the Stoic system with the Platonic epistemology. Also relevant were the Platonic virtues, especially the four divine and four human goods at Laws I 631b ff., which Arius neglects to mention when treating this passage. Antiochus also wished to

- 
- 26) DG. p.324a4 (Aetius).  
 27) ibid., p.457, 14 ff. (Arius).  
 28) Galen, De Placitis, 405  
 29) Plutarch, De An.Proc., 1023b.  
 30) e.g. E at Delphi, 390 c.

harmonise Aristotle's thought with Platonism, and the four causes may have undergone comparison with Philebus 23c ff. We have not yet mentioned the Stoic system of four categories, <sup>31)</sup> which might possibly have been put to use.

Yet if one grants that there has been some conflict between factions of pro-Stoic and pro-Pythagorean platonists at the time when interest in five-fold classification reappears; if one allows that the number four seems to have been supported by Philo and neglected by Arius, the converse being true of five; it still seems impossible to father the four-fold system upon Antiochus with any degree of certainty.

The picture of him which Cicero presents in the fifth book of the De Finibus, in the Lucullus, and in the Academics, does not confirm any interest in finessing with four-fold or other numerical delicacies. He is depicted as the champion of sound sense in ethics rather than that of any physical/metaphysical reconciliations. For him the Stoics had simply stolen the doctrine of the Academy and Peripatus, and then proceeded to change the terms. <sup>32)</sup> Doctrinal innovations were not what was to be expected of him, indeed he had sought to look back to the days of the Old Academy, <sup>33)</sup> and, in respect of his theory of knowledge, to Xenocrates in particular. From him he took over the concept of a dual reality, now consisting of an active element, passive matter, and the fusion of the two, this last being more in the nature of the Stoic *επαίσις δι' ὄλου* than of the

31) SVE II, 369 ff.

32) De Fin. V, 74.

33) Lucullus, 137.

Academic intermediate world.<sup>34)</sup>

It is interesting to note how Antiochus used the Xenocratean epistemology for his own purposes, i.e. for the refutation of scepticism. It is evident that he adhered to the standard dualistic λόγος - αἰσθησις foundation,<sup>35)</sup> regarding both reason and perception to be true. In this much he followed Xenocrates,<sup>36)</sup> opposing the sceptics. He realised that now the Stoics had themselves withdrawn to a more tenable position and a less fatalistic view of the world, the Academic role of sceptical opposition was already outdated. His ambitions finally brought about a quarrel with Philo of Larissa over the question of the continuity of the Academic tradition;<sup>37)</sup> Philo held that there was only one Academy, and possibly saw Antiochus' rigid separation of the Old and the New as a challenge of his own headship.

Whatever the circumstances of his relations with Philo, he certainly proved to be the champion of dogmatism, and it was to this end that he slightly modified the epistemology of Xenocrates. It was in the central world that this latter had observed errors arising, in the combination of reason and sense. Antiochus seems to have seen ἐπιβύβη as the correct result of the combination of reason and sense.<sup>38)</sup>

34) Ac.Po. 24.

35) This is visible in fr. 66, Luck.

36) Fr.5., Heinze.

37) Ac.Po. 13.

38) See Witt's discussion of Clement Strom. VIII, Albinus, p.34. also Strom. II, 13.

and to have minimised the possibility of error in this sphere too. How far one may use Clement as a source for the Antiochean theory of knowledge is not at all certain, but the quasi-agnostic catechist of Alexandria held equally firm views about the possibility of the attainment of knowledge as did both Antiochus and Philo of Alexandria.<sup>39)</sup>

One may presume that the importance of the subject of knowledge and faith would have led both religious thinkers to ponder the problem themselves, but it may also have made them quick to reap the benefit of any support which secular philosophy could offer. In particular one should note an instance in Strom. II of Clement's temporarily overlooking faith (πίστις) and enumerating four kinds of cognition, of which sensation (αἰσθησις) and intelligence (νοῦς) seem very platonic and Aristotelian,<sup>40)</sup> knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is common to all, and the preference for ἐπιληψις rather than σοφία would appear to be Stoic. Witt regards the passage as Antiochean, and in this case there is no reason to suspect any other source. If one compares the two degrees of cognition that fall between the extremes, i.e. between intelligence and sensation, one finds that one, ἐπιληψις is uncertain, the word implying something that falls short of ἀποληψις, while the other is regarded as definite. This seems not to conflict with the Platonic πίστις - δόξα distinction, nor the early Aristotelian σοφία - ἐπιστήμη distinction, and to be in particular harmony with the Stoic differentiation between conclusive and non-conclusive presentations. While Witt points out several cases where πίστις<sup>41)</sup>

39) For a comparison with Philo, see Witt, op.cit., p.34, n.3.

40) There being particular conformity to the work On Philosophy (De.An. 404b21), the early "esoteric" works having possibly received more attention from Antiochus.

41) See Witt, op.cit., p.34.

is used in a quite unplatonic sense, the *διάνοια* is quite naturally associated with *κατάληψις* in the fifth chapter of Strom.VIII, <sup>42)</sup> a passage also found to be Antiochean. It thus seems that Clement's epistemological source accepted both the platonic *διάνοια* and the Aristotelian *ἐπιστήμη* for the second highest degree of cognition, while rejecting the use of both *πίστις* and *δόξα* for the third.

This peculiarity is quite natural in view of the way in which Antiochus has used Xenocrates as his foundation. Between the realms of perception and intelligence, both being true, there lies a third world which admits both truth and falsehood. This Antiochus finds identical to the Stoic world of presentation. Of this world that which is true (*ἐπιστήμη*) must involve *κατάληψις*, that which may be false *ὑπόληψις*. One may understand how it would be impossible to associate faith with so chance a realm of opinion; for Clement at least, faith is concerned with the truth.

Thus, but for the difficulties involving faith, it is clear that the theory of knowledge found in Clement Strom. II, 13, conforms with all that needs to be true of an anti-sceptical epistemology claiming to reconcile Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoa. Such an epistemology must have been the basis of Antiochus' reintroduction of dogmatism into the Academy. The theory, though based on the

42) *ibid.*, p.36. *κατάληψις δι' ἐπίσ και συγκατάθεσις τῆς διάνοιας.*



Xenocratean tripartition, may be seen to be four-fold on account of the sub-division of the intermediate world, in accordance with a criterion such as both the Stoics and the Theaetetus demand in order to separate the second and third stages of cognition. An attraction to the number four is then to be found in the works of Philo Judaeus, a religious eclectic from Alexandria where Antiochus had taught, and this attraction reveals itself in classifications which are Stoic rather than Pythagorean. Posidonius may not be regarded as the source for such an attraction, since his system has an appearance of being three-fold in so far as it departs from standard Stoic teaching.

Philo may also have been aware of attempts by a group of pythagorean platonists to discredit both the eclectic movement at large, and its four-fold basis, by a revived interest in the Parmenides and the Philebus. Arius must feature as an associate of such a group, since in classifying the platonic "goods" he mentions two, three, and five-fold divisions, while avoiding mention of the four platonic virtues. He must also rank among those who have preserved the transcendental element in platonism, and must have resisted exaggerated Stoic-Platonic syncretism. He is well disposed towards Eudorus, who may be placed among the pythagoreanising faction, and towards Philo of Larissa who had fallen out with Antiochus.

Among those thinkers with whom we are familiar, either Philo of Larissa, or Eudorus, or Arius, may be responsible for the re-introduction of an interest in the five-fold aspects of Plato's thought, with a view to refuting the new dogmatism. Possible arguments include the refutation of the identification of the four Aristotelian causes with the elements

of the Philebus' 23c classification by the insistence that a fifth clause is implied at 23d; the insistence that the form of the good constitutes a fifth stage in Republic VI, over and above those entailed by the four modes of cognition, this being due to the "Good's" transcending being at 509b9; and the reminder that all of Plato's "Cardinal Virtues" at Laws I, 631b ff., look up to a fifth principle, *τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν* 631d5. In each case the fifth stage that is added may be seen to be transcendent, and a revival of transcendent Gods and "ideas" is the most important feature of the Platonism of the first and second centuries A.D. At the time of Eudorus this revival was uncertain, and we see transcendentalism fathered upon the Pythagoreans; by the time of Arius the movement had sufficient confidence to be able to insist on Plato's own "other-worldliness" as something distinct from Pythagoreanism.

CHAPTER EIGHTSENECA AND PLATONISM.

The letters of Seneca include two valuable pieces of evidence concerning the position of Platonism at this time. The 58<sup>th</sup> Epistle contains a classification of which purports to be Plato's own, and the 65<sup>th</sup> Epistle, <sup>1)</sup> depicts Plato as having added a fifth cause to Aristotle's four. This should by now be no surprise, since it has been observed that any reaction against an attempt to reconcile the four causes of Aristotle with Philebus 23c ff., may be refuted by the observation that Plato appears to favour the addition of a cause of separation at 23d. There is little difference it could be argued, between a cause ostensibly designated for the work of separation, an *αἰτία διακρίσεως*, and a cause responsible for the gulf between intelligibles and sensibles, an *αἰτία χωρίσματος*. The cryptic reply at 23d11 might be supposed to contain an allusion to that kind of separation which Plato has attributed to his "ideas". It is precisely these "ideas" that Seneca wishes to see as the fifth Platonic cause.

Seneca seems sure of a definite Platonic dogma concerning five causes, since he criticises both Plato and Aristotle in paragraph 11 for not including time, place, and motion among their causes. The only passage in Plato that might lead one to suspect that he posits a definite number of causes, adding one to those of Aristotle, is this Philebus passage, with or without its relation

to the Megista Gene of the Sophist.<sup>2)</sup>

The influence of the Timaeus<sup>3)</sup> is apparent in Seneca's description of the fifth Platonic cause, as is that of the Republic. Here the artisan made his bed by observing the "idea", and Seneca finds the idea to be that to which the craftsman looks (ad quod respiciens) while creating what he has planned. It matters little, he says, whether this exemplar is within or without,<sup>4)</sup> but the universal craftsman contains within himself the pattern of things, and in his mind he embraces the numbers and harmonies of all things to be made.

Although Theiler rejects Posidonius as a source for Seneca's brand of Platonism, one may notice that this thinker used a combination of number and harmony to account for the motions of the world-soul,<sup>5)</sup> which one might wish to compare with the "numerosque universorum...et modos" which are here to be found as the exemplars in Seneca. Secondly one may point to the fact that Posidonius is as likely a candidate as any for the much-debated title of institutor of the view that the "ideas" were the thoughts of God, and he is supported in this claim by the efforts of Rist.<sup>6)</sup> He might easily have wished to draw attention to the fact that God may look to something

2) As in Plutarch, E at Delphi, 391b-c.

3) In particular, 28a ff.

4) For the ἔργον - εἶδος question see also Albinus, Epit. IX i.

5) Plutarch, De An.Proc. 1023b, κατ' ἀριθμὸν . . . ἀρμονίαν περιέχοντα. For Theiler's view see VN, p.34.

6) Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge 1969, p.207.

within himself as well as without when commenting on Timaeus 28ab; as a Stoic he would best understand the Platonic ideas as being the less refined precedent of the Stoic *σπερματικοὶ λόγοι*, the seeds of things contained by the divine fire.

Moreover, Posidonius' world-soul was itself an idea, not by the criterion of eternal static existence, separated from all being, but by some other criterion. And what better than by its being a thought of God, a numerical pattern in God's mind? It could indeed be unchanging qua thought of God, but be the permanent idea of a changing world. Indeed nothing could be more explicit from the Plutarch fragment, <sup>7)</sup> than that the soul was a mixed nature between intelligibles and sensibles, both being *αἰθερίος* and *πῶθιτικός*. In Ep. 65 the two worlds are distinguished by the permanence of the one, and the sufferings of the other. However one must accept the fact that Antiochus is still very much a candidate for the reintroduction of the "idea" in its transcendent sense, being supported in this claim by both <sup>8)</sup> Theiler and Luck; if so, a need would have arisen to make its reinstatement acceptable to the Stoic, and it is difficult to see how this could be done except by positioning it within the divine mind and within the bounds of the Stoic system.

Another feature of Epistle 65 which may be Posidonian is the description of the immanent form ( *forma* ) as that "in which" (*id in quo*). This is part of a row of similar descriptions of each of the five causes. No reader would be surprised at these prepositional

7) loc.cit.

8) VN. p.40 ff., Antiochus, p.28 ff.

descriptions provided he were familiar with the Metaphysics or Physics <sup>9)</sup> of Aristotle, but one should mention that H. Dorrie has discussed them at some length in his article in the tribute to W. Theiler which constitutes the latter part of the 1969 volume of Musaeum Helveticum. <sup>10)</sup> However, it may cause some surprise that the immanent form should be called "id in quo" rather than "id in quod", as one might expect from the precedent in Metaphysics XII, 1070a1-2.

Though one must confess that there is no proof that the description "that in which" comes from Posidonius, we do know that he attached considerable importance to the limits of the solid body, this being the immanent aspect of form. Similarly, accepting from Aristotle <sup>11)</sup> the notion that soul fulfils the role of form in a living body, he welcomes the suggestion that a major part of the soul's functions should be to form the outer limits of a solid body, and thereby to supply its coherence. This concept of soul becomes particularly popular by the second century A.D., being visible in Numenius <sup>12)</sup> and Maximus Tyrius, <sup>13)</sup> And Achilles Tattius, <sup>14)</sup> confirms that it originates with Posidonius. One hesitates to suppose that he saw the soul purely as a container, but he certainly held, as did

9) Meta. IV, 1013b24 ff., Phys. 194b23 ff.

10) Präpositionen und Metaphysik, Mus.Helv. 26, pp.217-228.

11) De.An. 412a20.

12) Test.29, Leemans.

13) XI, 6a, Hobein.

14) Comm.in Arati Phen. 13 ὡς οὐ τὰ σώματα τὰς ψυχὰς συνεχῆι,  
ἀλλ' αἱ ψυχὰι τὰ σώματα.

other Stoics, that the active principle is that which moulds and informs.<sup>15)</sup>

In this context, it would be advisable to examine the self-interested explanation which Posidonius offers of the Platonic world-soul.<sup>16)</sup> He interprets the essence that is divided about the bodies as being the essence of limits (περατα). This does not mean "the substance within the limits" as Rist<sup>17)</sup> supposes, for the word οὐσία (essence or substance) is not used in the materialistic sense of the Stoics. It is used by a Platonist (Plutarch) following an interpretation of a use of this word by Plato. The equation which Posidonius is drawing is simply "That which is divisible about the bodies equals περατα"; Plutarch understands no more than this:-

τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων περασίν ὕστερον κ.τ.λ.

It is the appearance of limits later than soul, not any substance between these limits, that Plutarch regards as the refutation of the Posidonian interpretation.

Diogenes Laertius<sup>18)</sup> confirms that περατα are merely the limits of a solid body in Posidonian terminology. These limits are clearly viewed as wrappers, stretched around the physical bodies, and divisible either in their own right or by the material with which

15) See Rist, op.cit., p.204-8, and DDG. p.302b22.

16) Plutarch, De An.Proc., 1023bc.

17) p.205, following Merlan, PN. p.34.

18) VII, 135.

they are fused. Divisible essence equals divisible form, and this equation is rendered possible because Posidonius holds the existence, for Plato at least, of a second degree of form, the  $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha \nu\omicron\gamma\tau\acute{\alpha}$ . Between these and sensibles lies the whole world of mathematical, all of which appear to be connected with concept of immanent form, and the most important of which was soul.

The two degrees of form must be regarded as another common feature of the Platonic interpretations of Posidonius and Seneca. The notion is essential to much of Middle Platonism, and underlies the work of Plutarch, Albinus, and Numenius in varying degrees.

One should also be aware that the 23c classification of the Philebus may be important to each. It has been noted that this is the best Platonic justification for a system of five-fold division of causes; used as such the class of  $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$  ( limit ) will become the equivalent of immanent form. Posidonius makes precisely this identification.

Another fact to connect Epistle 65 with Posidonius is that the Timaeus is clearly held to be the most relevant of Plato's works here. It is quoted <sup>19)</sup> at paragraph ten, where Seneca attempts to identify Plato's final cause with goodness. Though this does not, for instance, exclude the possibility of Eudorus as source, one should bear in mind that Posidonius is far more popular with Seneca than any other thinker known to have interpreted the Timaeus, either in whole or in part.

It would seem that these points of contact demand that one should test the theory that Posidonius himself conceived of five causes



in Plato. While it would be impossible to prove or to disprove such a suggestion, one might regard with interest the various elements that comprise the Posidonian view of the Timaeus. We meet in the extract from the De Anima Procreatione matter, limits of sensible bodies, mathematical including soul, first intelligibles, and God. No other separate ingredient is to be found.

One might attempt to see the material cause in matter, the formal cause in the limits, the exemplar in the first intelligibles, and the active cause in God. But can one detect the final cause in mathematics? The final cause is goodness in Seneca, and one can scarcely associate this with the mathematical.

One could try the substitution of "soul" for "mathematical", in which case the argument becomes more plausible. Speusippus, whom Posidonius follows with regard to the definition of soul, had confined goodness, according to the interpretation set forth in chapter five, to the realm of the soul. Posidonius may have read his works quite widely, and could have echoed his five-fold system when interpreting the Timaeus.

It is also evident from Plutarch that Posidonius regarded the soul as the last important part of the universe to be constructed, being posterior to the limits of bodies. One could suppose a loose connexion between it and the final cause, but no more. Admittedly it is a composite entity, and could be readily confused with the μεικτόν of Philebus 23c, the nearest thing to a final cause that may here be detected, but one may not detect an unlimited element in Posidonius' account of the soul's composition as there is in the composition of the μεικτόν.

The grounds for the association of Epistle 65 with Posidonius are strong, but one cannot exclude other possibilities. In particular one has to allow the possibility that a member of his school may have provided Seneca with the concepts required, or any other thinker who had been influenced by Posidonius. One may not insist that Seneca is following any source slavishly, but it is difficult to envisage any great originality on his part. And the fact that the problem of causation is viewed in anything but a platonic manner suggests a platonising Stoic rather than a stoicising Platonist as the primary influence. And the fact that subsequent Platonist sources do not employ five-fold classification for the purpose of enumerating "causes" seems to confirm this view.

Further enlightenment may be sought from the 58<sup>th</sup> Epistle,<sup>20)</sup> where at first sight one finds nothing of obvious relevance to the history of the five-fold classification. For Plato is said to have divided  $\tau\acute{o} \delta\acute{\nu}$  into six parts, the intelligible, God, ideas, forms, specific things like man, beasts, and goods, and semi-existences (*quae quasi sunt*) like void and time. The objects of sense-perception were not, however, considered to be existences, owing to their transitory character.

It is quite obvious that two distinct elements have constituted this classification; firstly there is the opposition of intelligibles and sensibles, of permanence and flux, and secondly a quite separate ontological classification of God, ideas, forms, specific entities, and time, void, etc. In no other way is it possible to explain the priority of intelligibles to God in the list, the apparent failure to identify intelligibles with ideas, and the inclusion of

homines, pecora, and res in the list of entities in spite of their being among the transitory things of the senses.

The former element, the distinction of intelligible and sensible, would appear to be the answer to a vital question in the Timaeus,<sup>21)</sup> 27d: τί τὸ ὄν ἀεί , γένεσιν δ' οὐκ ἔχον , καὶ τί τὸ γ' <sup>ε</sup> νόμμενον μὲν <sup>ε</sup> ἀεί , ὄν δ' οὐδέποτε ;

The section on sensibles is thought by Whittaker<sup>22)</sup> to bear remarkable resemblances to Plutarch<sup>23)</sup> and others, and he suggests Eudorus' Timaeus-commentary as a source. What we know of this thinker, however, suggests that he may have been a little too logical and scientific, a little too unemotional, to be ultimately responsible for literary passages like these.

The group of five kinds of ὄντα listed below intelligibles is probably derived from a source not other than that of the intelligible-sensible distinction. For the E at Delphi is clearly identifying being and unity at 393a-c, and our Seneca passage is listing what will surely have appeared in the source as different degrees of unity, a list dependent on the Parmenides, though very indirectly. The εἶδος δ' εἰ τι of 130d<sub>4</sub> has become "ea quae quasi sunt", while the physical universals, those of man, fire, water, etc., have become "ea quae communiter sunt", "omnia, homines, pecora, res." The mathematical degree of form has become immanent form, the ideal form has remained

21) Compare Numenius, frs. 16, 17, where the Timaeus passage is quoted.

22) J.F. Whittaker, Ammonius on the Delphic E, CQ. lxxiii (1969) pp. 185-192.

23) E. Delph. 392a ff. Note ~~τι οὐδ' οὐτως ὄν ἐστι~~ ; at 392e.

the idea. But there is another degree of unity which the Middle Platonists recognise in the first hypothesis of the Farmenides, the transcendent unity of God, "quod eminat et exsuperat omnia." Seneca and Plutarch acknowledge this transcendent unity, but agree that such a unity does not transcend being, and there is no reason to suppose otherwise of Eudorus. The remaining four kinds of unity will then have been attached to the remaining four hypotheses which presume the one's existence, in accordance with the tradition that each hypothesis described its own particular class or object.

There is no need to search for the ultimate origin of this tradition, for Speusippus' five-fold reality is similarly formulated. No subsequent thinker will have been unaware that considerable alterations were required in order to convert the Speusippean system into something acceptable to Plato, and the obvious emendation to harmonise with the Farmenides would be the substitution of a one-God for numbers in first position, and of the ideas for magnitudes in the second position. The pressing question is how Speusippus' ideas come to be popularised, and the safest link between the Old Academy and Middle Platonism is Posidonius, who had readily made use of both Speusippus and Xenocrates when interpreting the Timaeus. He might well have produced a quasi-Speusippean list of "καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρρέμενος" when answering the fundamental question "τί τὸ ὄν;"

The necessity of Seneca's source having been familiar with Xenocrates as well as Speusippus is made clear by the use of the Xenocratean definition of the idea <sup>24)</sup> in paragraph 19. The definition

24) Fr. 30, Heinze.

not only describes the idea as a *παράδειγμα* (Latin exemplar), but also, in its original form though not in Epistle 58, as a cause. This suggests that it may also have had some bearing upon the addition of a fifth paradeigmatic cause in Epistle 65. One must ask the question "Is there a common source for both letters, or at least for the platonic aspects of each?" Posidonius is the first figure who springs to mind, and Eudorus the second. Arius must also be mentioned owing to his explanations of the ideas,<sup>25)</sup> and his attested use of five-fold classification.<sup>26)</sup>

25) DDG. 447a

26) See ch.7 above.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER EIGHT.

It would be profitable, before leaving Seneca, to draw attention to a peculiar little classification found in Epistle 89, and attributed to the Cyrenaics. It constitutes fragment 147b in Mannebach's edition, 147a being Sextus Empiricus' account of the same doctrine. <sup>1)</sup> Though these gentlemen ( the Cyrenaics ) are said to have excluded logic and physics from their system, we are told that they brought these subjects into their scope in other ways. Ethical philosophy was divided into five groups: the first dealt with what was to be pursued or avoided, the second with the  $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$ , the third actions, the fourth causes, and the fifth arguments. It would not be impossible to regard this unlikely sounding classification as a Cyrenaic answer to the Philebus and to Speusippus, neither having been the natural friend of these hedonists. What was to be avoided or shunned was clearly pleasure and pain for the Cyrenaic. <sup>2)</sup> The " adfectus " envisaged may have been the Cyrenaic cognitive processes, for on the one hand sensation is the only reliable method of cognition, <sup>3)</sup> and on the other sensation is itself confined to the perception of the emotions. <sup>4)</sup> Emotion is the source of cognition for the Cyrenaic. Thus we see the Philebus 66a classification appearing in reverse order. Wisdom, in third position, may be related to the Cyrenaic  $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ , since wisdom is only valuable for what it can produce. <sup>5)</sup>

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- 1) Adv.Math. VII II.  
 2) Frs. 155-162, Mannebach.  
 3) Frs. 211-218, Mannebach.  
 4) Fr. 210, Mannebach.  
 5) Fr. 223, Mannebach.

Causes may relate to final causes ( what other cause but their  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  do the Cyrenaics have ? ) and so conform with the second good of the Philebus, while arguments (Sextus gives  $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\nu$  ) suggest that it is the criterion that is here relevant, parallel to "measure", etc., in the Philebus. Each of the Cyrenaic parts of philosophy relates to pleasure in the following manner:

what is to be pursued	=	pleasure.
emotions	=	pleasure, pain.
wisdom of action	=	ability to obtain pleasure.
causes	final c.	= pleasure.
criteria	=	pleasure.

And the Philebus is related to the parts of philosophy as follows:

measure	=	criterion.
symmetry, etc.	=	final cause.
wisdom	=	wisdom of action.
knowledge, etc.	=	sensation of passions.
pleasure	=	what must be pursued.

How the classification was preserved for Seneca and Sextus we cannot say, but an anti-hedonist work of Speusippus is not unlikely. It may have reached them from the same source as that of Epistles 58 & 65, but this must be purely a guess.

## CHAPTER NINE

MODERATUS AND ONTOLOGY

Before one moves on to consider the evidence of Middle Platonism proper, a little must be said of Moderatus' Pythagorean interpretation of the Parmenides,<sup>1)</sup> which may be found in Simplicius.<sup>2)</sup> Firstly one encounters a one above being, secondly another one which is the truly real (ὄντως ὄν) and intelligible, i.e. the forms. Thirdly comes the medium of the soul (τὸ ψυχικόν), partaking of the one and the forms,<sup>3)</sup> and finally the nature of sensible bodies, not partaking of them but ordered by their reflection, a shadow in the bodily matter; the place of this latter is still lower in the order of reality. Moderatus' concept of matter is one of not-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν)<sup>4)</sup>, of complete privation of the unifying principle,<sup>5)</sup>. It is that of the multiplicity that is deprived of the one in the fifth hypothesis of the Parmenides, and as such it may be regarded as a fifth element in Moderatus' classification.

It is not the purpose here to prove the dependence on the Parmenides, since this has already been adequately demonstrated by Dodds and others. But it would be valuable to detect any other element of ontological doctrine that may underlie the present classification.

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- 1) On the question in general see E. R. Dodds, The Parmenides of Plato and the origins of the Neoplatonic One, C.Q., xxii (1928) 129-142. Also J.M. Rist, The Neoplatonic One and Plato's Parmenides. TAPA. xciii (1962) 389-401.
  - 2) Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, ed. H. Diels, Berlin 1882, p.230, 1.34 ff.
  - 3) Cf. Speusippus, fr.51, Lang, "From the numbers and the one, like soul."
  - 4) p.231, 1.4.
  - 5) p.231, 1.8, 16.



The thing that immediately stands out is the description of the forms as  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu$ , and that matter is regarded as the privation of being; this suggests that Moderatus may be using an ancient ontological system known to us from Proclus.<sup>6)</sup> It is said that certain of the ancients ( by which term any pre-Plotinian thinker may be described ) say that the intelligible is the truly real, the ensouled is real but not truly so, bodies not real but truly so, and matter truly not real (  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\nu \acute{\alpha}\nu$  ). The doctrine reappears at II 128 and 241. It does not seem particularly reminiscent of the four-fold ontology of Republic VI, owing to the psychic rather than mathematical nature of the second highest level. Whilst an identification of mathematical and psychicals may indeed underlie the doctrine, it would be foolish to suppose that the substitution of the latter for the former would have been made by any one primarily interested in the Republic. It is most likely then that this ontology was used with reference to the Timaeus rather than any other dialogue, since here the soul is a very complicated mathematical and harmonic structure. This would also explain its presence in Proclus' commentary on that work.

Crantor had appeared to emphasise a four-fold ontology in his work on the Timaeus as is revealed by Plutarch.<sup>7)</sup> The soul had to judge sensibles and intelligibles, and their sameness and differences in themselves and in relation to each other. Thus the two spheres of cognition might be seen either in themselves or in contact with the other. A substitution of being for intelligible, not-being

6) Commentary on the Timaeus, I, p.233, 1.1, ed. E. Diehl, Amsterdam, 1965 (Teubner).

7) De An.Proc., 1012 f.

when in contact with the sensible, and this latter's partaking of being when in contact with the intelligible.

Posidonius seems to have welcomed the soul= mathematical equation, and so he too could be responsible for the doctrine at hand; <sup>8)</sup> but this is unlikely owing to his regarding the soul as central. Such a feature would not square with a four-fold system. Eudorus may also be a candidate, having adopted what he found useful in the commentaries of his predecessors. He may also have been responsible for the notion that the first one was above being, adding the fifth transcendent element to the classification. For the first Pythagorean one, which he calls a "  $\sigma\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$  θεός " <sup>9)</sup> anticipates the interest of Moderatus in a Pythagorean-based interpretation of Plato's Parmenides.

The term "  $\sigma\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega$  " was first used in a conspicuously transcendental sense by Speusippus of his one above being, <sup>10)</sup> and should this description have occurred in his work "On Pythagorean Numbers" <sup>11)</sup> then it is not difficult to understand why its followers regard the doctrine as Pythagorean rather than Platonic. It may be from this book that the Iamblichus extract had been taken, for at one point it seems that the author's purpose is to go through the properties of each number, <sup>12)</sup> just as is reported of the first half of On Pythagorean Numbers, <sup>13)</sup> One may also note the interest in the

8) *ibid.* 1023bc.

9) Simplicius, Phys. p.181, l.19, Diehl.

10) De Comm.Math.Sc. p.15, l.11.

11) Fr.4, Lang, a work not mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, see Lang, p.26

12) p.15, l.18.

13) Fr.4, l.6 ff., Lang.

five regular solids, <sup>14)</sup> and the sub-division of the decad into two groups of five in the same work; <sup>15)</sup> this makes it a possible source for the transmission of an interest in that number down to Middle Platonist times.

There is, however, a definite barrier against one regarding Eudorus as the promulgator of the doctrine of a "one above being" along Speusippean lines; one might have to choose a source other than him for the one existent God of Seneca's 58<sup>th</sup> Epistle and Plutarch's E at Delphi, where a common source is thought to be required. <sup>16)</sup> Possibly Eudorus may have felt entitled to regard the "one above being" as specifically Pythagorean, while crediting Plato with an equation of God and perfect being. But so little is known of him that it is convenient to father all sorts of doctrines upon him without fear of contradiction. He cannot have been responsible for every innovation, any more than can Posidonius, Antiochus, or Arius. The question of common sources during the period with which we are dealing is grossly exaggerated. A thinker has to be able to think for himself on occasions. Written works may influence him or inspire him, but only in such directions as may accord with his own beliefs or feelings. Traditions often influence him just as much as particular written works, and teachers have more chance than any to mould the young philosopher's mind. Thus thinkers whom we do not know of may be responsible for doctrines just as important as any whose origins have been ascertained.

14) *ibid*, 1.9.

15) *ibid*, 1.34.

16) J.F. Whittaker, Ammonius on the Delphic E, C.G., 1969.

Our present search is devoted primarily to the discovery of a source of new interest in five-fold classifications. It is possible that the source of Moderatus substituted for the four-fold ontology that we found in Proclus, a five-fold one dependent on the recognition of a fifth transcendent principle, such as the "Good" which exists above the elements of the four-fold ontology of Republic VI.<sup>17)</sup> The findings of the Sun and Line passage may have been reconciled with those of the Parmenides, possibly with the Philebus also. The purpose of such innovations may have been the refutation of a movement that wished to see a four-fold basis for Plato's writings, but this is by no means certain. We may only assume that the revived Platonism with its new transcendentalism was accompanied by a revived interest in five-fold classification.

In certain cases a knowledge of the Parmenides and of Speusippus and Xenocrates was essential for such a revival. An important figure in this respect must have been Posidonius, who is also significant in the transmission of interest in the Timaeus. Furthermore he appears to have seen the universe as consisting of God, ideas, soul/mathematicals, sensibles, and matter, which is exactly the view that Moderatus held. There is no evidence, however, to show that either thinker attached significance to the numerological implications of any such divisions, and one may safely look later than Posidonius for special interest in the five-fold implications of the system. But it would appear from Seneca that any such sources were highly coloured by Posidonian influence, particularly in respect of the concept of immanent form, two levels of intelligibles, and possibly of the ideas as the products of God's intelligence.

17) 509b.

The Alexandrian Platonists may have devoted themselves to separating Plato from Aristotle and the Stoa by way of attributing to him an extra cause or an extra ontological rung. Among these one may include Eudorus and the doxographer Arius, both scholarly, both interested in a wide range of philosophical ideas, both with marked interest in the revived transcendentalism.

NeoPythagoreanism may have been a relevant factor in the transmission of a new interpretation of the Parmenides. Its adherents appear to have used passages in Plato as a source for their own ancient doctrine, and consequently, by the time of Numenius, the Pythagorean is virtually indistinguishable from the Platonist. A feature of the school at the time of Eudorus and Moderatus is the reference to special  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\iota$  18) which might well be taken to refer to the arguments of the Parmenidean hypotheses, already shrouded in an artificial atmosphere of mystery.

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18) Simplicius, Phys. p.231, 1.7, 16. ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ and also p.181, 1.10, 12, (Eudorus), cf. κατ' ἄλλου τρόπον 1.17, alluding to the fifth hypothesis where the one becomes all, Parmenides, 160b.

PART THREE.CHAPTER TEN.PLUTARCH.

We come now to tackle Plutarch upon whom the contemporary interest in five-fold classification has clearly made an impression. The sixth explanation of the Delphic E which he offers is a numerical one, exalting the properties of the number five. In this are contained references not only to the classifications of the Philebus, 23c and 66a, but also to the Megista Gene of the Sophist, and the Timaeus 55d2.

Now it is possible that Plutarch had simply added the evidence of Plato's dialogues to the traditional Pythagorean account of the number in question, or that the Platonic passages had already been absorbed into the Pythagorean tradition. <sup>1)</sup> It is, however, the Platonic part of his material which is used to built up to the climax of the speech, and it would seem likely that a movement within Platonism had made use of Pythagorean mathematics when explaining the importance of the number five for Plato. The explanations of Plato's mathematics by one Theororus of Soli, <sup>2)</sup> were the starting point of another eulogy of the number five in the De Defectu, and a mention of Delphic E there also <sup>3)</sup> serves to relate the two passages.

Theodorus appears to have examined the mathematics of the Timaeus in some detail, and to have related the five elements and

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- 1) Though Plutarch himself admits a certain deficiency of the number five when judged by Pythagorean standards, De Defectu, 426e.
  - 2) Moralia, 427a ff., cf. 1022c, 1027d.
  - 3) 426 f.

shapes to the question of whether there should be one world or five at 55d2. He not only seems to have been in favour of the five worlds, but also wishes to see them arising in a certain natural progression, simplest first and then what was more complex, for they did not all derive from the same matter.<sup>4)</sup>

It seems abundantly clear that Theodorus is following the mathematics of Speusippus to a considerable extent. We may remember that this thinker also postulated a separate matter for each of his five levels of being, and that he supported a natural progression beginning with what was simple, and concluding with what was more complex.<sup>5)</sup>

Theodorus, however, rather than demanding a different kind of matter for each element or world, supposes that matter should simply be divided into five.<sup>6)</sup> Also troublesome according to the report of Ammonius<sup>7)</sup> is his neglect of the cube on account of its having been constructed out of different triangles. But whatever the intricacies of his doctrine, he certainly seems to have adapted Speusippean ideas so that they might accord with the Timaeus. Evidence for his influence upon Plutarch concerning Platonic passages in other dialogues is lacking, though one may point out that the near identification of beauty and symmetry at 427a is reminiscent of Philebus 66b1. While there is little doubt that Theodorus was an important source, it is also certain that not only Plutarch, but also the extent of his source material, goes well beyond what this mathematician had to offer.

4) 427b, cf. e-f.

5) De Comm.Math. Sc. p.14, 1.23 ff.

6) 427c.

7) 427f.

The De Genio passage which follows the account of Theodorus' doctrine repeats some of the arguments used in the E at Delphi to support the number five, and adds some extra ones. But as a source for Platonic interpretation it is inferior as it mentions only the Sophist<sup>8)</sup> and Timaeus, overlooking the Philebus. For this reason it becomes more convenient to concentrate one's attention on the E at Delphi.

Here it is first related that the sum of the first odd and first even numbers is five (388a). This is also the starting point of the account of five's properties in Theologumena Arithmeticae.<sup>9)</sup>

Secondly we are told that it is known as marriage for this reason, the even resembling the female, and the odd the male. The Theologumena continues with the same description<sup>10)</sup>, and Plutarch confirms that it is of Pythagorean origin.<sup>11)</sup> Elsewhere, however, the description of six as marriage is equally common (being the product rather than the sum of odd and even), and Plutarch actually uses the comparison of marriage and the number six in the De Animae Procreatione.<sup>12)</sup>

Thirdly it is called nature because it always reproduces itself when squared, and exceeds six in this property by also reproducing itself when cubed, i.e. ε', κε', ρκε'; the Theologumena also uses this argument next, though not using the term 'nature'.

Nicomachus of Gerasa, however, refers to the pentad as:-

πρώτη μέσότητος τῆς ἀρίστης καὶ φυσικωτάτης ἐμφαντικῆς<sup>13)</sup>

8) 428c.

9) p.30, l.17, Falco.

10) ibid. l.18.

11) 388c4.

12) 1C18c.

13) Photius, Bibl. 144a21.



The Theologumena uses a similar description at p.31,  
1.17.<sup>14)</sup>

Fourthly however many times five is multiplied by itself it always produces a five or a ten, depending on whether the other factor is odd or even.<sup>15)</sup> And as the God sometimes takes the form of fire, sometimes that of the universe, so five sometimes makes five, sometimes ten (the number of the universe).

There follow musical arguments in favour of the number five. There are five chords, five positions of the tetra-chord,<sup>16)</sup> five primary tones, modes or harmonies, and five elements of melody.

At 389f comes the first mention of Plato, which interprets Timaeus 55d2 as meaning that there are five worlds if more than one, and one should compare De Defectu 421f. Here the view that there are five worlds in the whole is attributed to Homer<sup>17)</sup> on the strength of Iliad, XV, 187. The possibility that this Homeric passage had been used in support of a five-fold system even in Old Academic times must be taken into account, and it may be that it had significantly influenced the "Three in the middle of the five" in the Epinomis.<sup>18)</sup>

The E at Delphi next arrays the five senses alongside the five elements, earth with touch, water with taste, etc.<sup>19)</sup> As in the

14) Using ἐπιδευτική not ἐμφοτική .

15) cf. 429d.

16) cf. Theologumena, p.31, 1.10.

17) 422f.

18) See above ch.IV, ii.

19) cf. 429 e.

De Defectu Homer is introduced for his allotment of the three regions, sea, darkness, and aether to Poseidon, Hades, and Zeus, and for his reserving the extremes - earth and Olympus - for common tenure.

Next Plutarch shows how four is the number of the solid body, a tradition that certainly dated from early times, was associated with Platonism by Aristotle, <sup>20)</sup> and was now certainly an accepted part of the tradition. We are told that a fifth element should be added before the solid body may be rendered complete, this element being life. <sup>21)</sup>

There are five classes of living creature, Gods, demi-gods, heroes, men, and "fifth and last the irrational and bestial." The list differs from that of Maximus Tyrius <sup>22)</sup> in including heroes <sup>23)</sup> and not subdividing the last class into plants and animals, possibly because the Stoics did not regard plants as ensouled or living. <sup>24)</sup> Thus the classifications of Plutarch and Maximus differ in content, but not in number. The enumeration of the categories of living creatures in the Timaeus 40d is ignored by both.

There are five powers of the soul; nourishing, <sup>25)</sup> sensitive, appetitive, spirited, and reasoning. Maximus <sup>26)</sup> describes the first two similarly, the third as motive, the fourth as emotional, and the fifth as intelligent. Thus both differ significantly from the five-

20) De Anima 404.b22

21) 390e2.

22) IX, 1, d, ff.

23) with Hesiod, WD 122, cf. Moralia 415b

24) Clement, Strom. VIII, 10.

25) De Defectu 429e has  $\psi\upsilon\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ .

26) XI, 8, e.

fold list of Aristotle in the De Anima 414a31.

After a little excursion on the merits of the product of one and four (the most perfect form and matter, as Plutarch says), he then moves on to Plato in connexion with the number five. From 391b to e the principal subject is the Megista Gene of the Sophist and the two Philebus classifications with which we are concerned.

Being, sameness, difference, motion, and rest are described as the five κοινώταται ἀρχαί. In the De Defectu 27) the Megista Gene are directly related to the five elements, earth to rest being a cube, fire to motion being a pyramid, and so forth. Here, however, Plutarch relates the Sophist with comparative success to Philebus 23c. He concludes that

"these are spoken of as allusions to those."

The former are five aspects of being, the latter five aspects of coming-to-be. Being is reflected in the object that comes to be, the μεικτόν. Motion is reflected in the indefinite, 28) rest in the definite, sameness in the cause of the mixture, difference in the cause of separation. Plutarch suggests that even if the analogy is incorrect both classifications would still carry weight. But Plato was clearly not the first to stress the importance of five; somebody had anticipated him when constructing the E.

The 66a classification is dealt with more briefly, with no apparent wish to relate it to the other passages from Plato. Plutarch's

27) 428c.

28) Not the Heraclitean concept of matter, but soul as self-mover, cf. De An.Proc. 1014d, where this identification of soul with the indefinite of Philebus 23c is explicit.

interpretation is simple. The good appears in five  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$  of which the first is "the measured", the second is "the symmetrical", the third intelligence, the fourth "the sciences, crafts and true opinions around the soul", and the fifth "any pleasure that may be pure and unmixed with regard to what causes grief."

Plutarch has selected one term only by which to characterise the first two goods, and he has not included the  $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ , which is in both cases to be found in the text of Plato. It seems that Plutarch is content to see the first two items of the list as the principle of measure and the objects' conformity therewith. He is prepared to commit himself where Plato was not.

It is noted that the various forms of knowledge are concerned with the soul or belong to it, but Plutarch forgets, perhaps carefully, that pleasure is similarly associated with the soul in Platonic original. It is probable that he wishes to regard  $\eta\delta\omicron\nu\eta$  as something bodily, hence his hypothetical attitude ( indicated by  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\iota\varsigma\ \eta\delta\omicron\nu\eta\ \kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}$  ) towards pure pleasure. Moreover his concept of pure pleasure is not some ideal of pleasure free from the body, but of freedom from pain, a practical attitude. This suggests that since intelligence rather than wisdom characterises the third good, and since soul is strongly associated with the fourth, the fifth is held to be appropriate to the body. Plutarch adheres to the intelligence-soul-body tripartition elsewhere, <sup>29)</sup> and it looks very much as though he is here associating each member of this triad with one of the three lower goods. This would leave the two higher goods to be connected with those elements which arise from the interrelations of intelligence, soul, and body at De Facie 945a:-- the principles of transcendent and immanent form.

29) De Facie 943a, 945a.

This is just one instance of how a relation can exist between these obscure, and for the Middle Platonist correspondingly important, passages of Plato and the meat of his own metaphysical system. The way in which Plutarch interprets Plato's five-fold classifications has both affected, and been affected by, his metaphysical system as a whole.

It is true that Plutarch had a very long active career, and that developments and even alterations in doctrine may have been made. 30) It is true also that it is extremely difficult to search for a stable metaphysical basis for the works whose chief aim was that of a moralist, and whose method was such that he drew on a plurality of sources. For it was his message rather than his technicalities that were important. Yet, bearing these difficulties in mind, it is necessary to search, in so far as may be possible for the latent metaphysical foundation of other works, and to try to relate it to Plutarch's attitude toward Plato's own incursions into this field.

An initial point of contact may be found in the unharnessed soul of the De Anima Procreatione, which is identified with the of the 23c classification:-

"The essence of soul he called indefiniteness in the Philebus, being the privation of number and proportion, having within itself no limit or measure of its deficiency and excess,<sup>31)</sup> and difference and unlikeness." 32)

30) See Griffiths, De Inside, p.25, who cites an article on this subject by F. Bock.

31) cf. Politicus.

32) 1014d. It is interesting to note that the Politicus and Philebus are the most appropriate sources for a study of measure in Plato (283c-287b, 64d9ff.) The references to the more and the less in the Politicus passage connect it with the indefinite of 23c.

Thus the relation of Philebus 23c to this work necessitates an examination of Plutarch's cosmology. He begins with three principles, God, essence, and matter; these three have always existed.<sup>33)</sup> Chaos was neither without body, nor without motion, nor without soul, but the bodily element was formless and unstable, while the motive element was senseless and irrational,<sup>34)</sup> this latter being the lack of attunement in soul devoid of  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ . Matter possessed both its tactile and its mechanical characteristics, soul its imaginative and motive properties.<sup>35)</sup>

Now the essence of body is not other than the receptacle of becoming in the Timaeus, and the essence of soul was the indefinite of the Philebus.<sup>36)</sup> The nature that is said to be mingled with the undivided in the Timaeus (35a), and to be divided itself about the bodies<sup>37)</sup> should not be thought of in arithmetical terms, for these signify body rather than soul; it is the chaotic and self-moving principle described as the bad soul in the Laws (896d ff). This was soul  $\kappa\alpha\theta' \epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\acute{\nu}$ , which, on partaking of reason and harmony, became the world-soul.

Plutarch's acceptance of the doctrine of the mean<sup>38)</sup> has

33) 1014b.

34) 1014b.

35) 1014c.

36) 1014d.

37) cf. Numenius fr. 20, p.138, 1.1, Leemans.

38) De Virt. Mor. 447c, cf. De Sup. 171e, Arist. Nic.Eth. 1024a, 25.

brought him to envisage evil as something that springs from the excesses and deficiencies in the soul, while the  $\delta\rho\theta\acute{o}\varsigma$   $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  <sup>39)</sup> is that which corrects the soul's wanderings. In consequence he attaches an ethical significance to the 23c classification, where the  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  becomes the  $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ , and the  $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\epsilon\rho\beta\omicron\lambda\acute{\eta}$  and  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\epsilon\psi\iota\varsigma$  become the  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ . This ethical aspect of the 23c classification, seen together with the passage on measure in the Politicus (283c ff) enables Plutarch to regard the doctrine of the mean as Platonic in origin, and he receives further support from the concept of the soul's attunement in the Phaedo (93c).

Matter itself, being devoid of all quality, could not possibly be the cause of motion that is evil, and this excludes for Plutarch the possibility of its being evil at all. Of itself it possesses no principle of motion, but is  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{o}\nu$   $\epsilon\grave{\iota}\varsigma$   $\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\upsilon$ , 1015a2. There is no conflict with 1015e, which suggests that God did not restore to order a stationary  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta$ , but did so when it was confused by the senseless cause. Plutarch merely wishes to draw attention to the inseparability of primal matter from primal soul, not to a principle of motion within matter, as something distinct from soul. Thevanaz <sup>40)</sup> suggests that matter has a destructive power in the De Defectu, quoting 414d5:

39) Nic.Eth. 1103b32, cf. Moralia 1014b, d.

40) L'ame du Monde, le Devenir, et la Matiere, p.108

"Nature brings destruction and privation upon certain things, or rather matter, being privation, frequently disperses and releases what is being brought into being by the better cause,...."

What we have here is Plutarch's cause of separation, equivalent to that of Philebus 23d9. Privation implies absence of quality, and therefore absence of evil also, for evil is a matter of excess or deficiency in quality. Nevertheless Plutarch is liable to regard the other cause as better, for this will surely allude to the cause of combination in the Philebus 23d7, i.e. to intelligence. But in the realm of pure ethics it is the  $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$  or mean that is the good element, and the  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma$  or deviation from the mean that is evil.

Now at 1015a Plutarch identifies his evil soul with " $\delta\upsilon\mu\phi\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$   $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ " of the Politicus 272e6. This would clearly make his soul a kind of  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\theta\upsilon\mu\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$   $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  in its unordered condition, and the question arises "How does Plutarch incorporate the other elements of soul into his system?" We may recall a passage from the De Iside:

"...absolutely no less than two (souls), of which the one is beneficent, the other is its opposite, creating opposite effects; but there remains a third intermediate nature neither lifeless nor irrational nor unmoved in itself as some people think, ..."

370f.

Now Plutarch here postulates not two souls, but three, and the temptation to link this with the famous Platonic tripartition is strong. Thevenaz <sup>41)</sup> cites the following allusions to the chariot

41) op.cit., p.121



of the Phaedrus:

Work	Good Horse	Bad horse	Charioteer	Correction.
De Is.	371b	369c	369c, 371a	369c
De V.M.	445bc	442cd, 445bc		446b
De G.S.		592b		
Qu. Pl.	1008c	1009a	1003a	
De A.P.	1015a/1026e <sup>32</sup>		1024c, 26e	1027a.
Adv. Co.		1119a		
De Def.				426c

( $\pi$  = mine)

In the present passage there is no difficulty in identifying the bad horse with the evil soul, and hence with Typhon. The rational soul, the part that has responded to the ordering from above, would be naturally identified with Osiris, who at 360e is not regarded as a transcendent God, but is classed with the daemons who share the contaminations of body and soul, though there is some conflict here with 373b where he is apparently an unmixed and passionless  $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ . But as  $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  is regarded as the product of soul and intelligence in the De Facie (943a), then he might be easily regarded as pure reasoning soul, free from the body and its contaminations, but linked to the soul.

Now the third kind of soul here is obviously to be identified with Isis, for it continuously desires and pursues the better; she

too always inclines toward the good at 372e. This it would seem that she could be legitimately identified with the good horse of the chariot.

Plutarch, however, identifies her with Plato's nurse and mother of becoming; <sup>42)</sup> she is the "place" and "matter" of both good and evil, <sup>43)</sup> though always ready to be impregnated by the emanations (ἐκποροί) of the good. So on the one hand she has a resemblance to Plato's central impassioned soul, and on the other she is found represented by the Timaeus' receptacle, although unmistakably a soul and a daemonic power. Clearly the analogy of form and substrate is to hold good for the soul just as for the physical world, and Plutarch confirms that this is so at 374e. Here it is the *Σιάσις* that is the "matter" of knowledge and virtue, and it is reason's (λόγος) job to harmonise this "matter".

Up to a point these comparisons are profitable, but one must never forget that the significance of the De Inside is not in the field of metaphysics; it is an allegory of human life, portraying the *μαίευσις* and *κρήσις* of the soul, which eventually brings forth fruit, in spite of the disruptive element in life. Direct comparison with the De Anima Procreatione is not then possible. This latter portrays a final act, while the De Inside portrays continuous processes.

It is, however, noteworthy that once the creation is finished, even the De Anima Procreatione suggests three kinds of soul; 1026c-e shows that the *Ὀυγγὴ καὶ περὶ τὰ βλάστα πλάσθη μέρη* still

42) 372e.

43) 372f.

remains in the mixture, nor is sight lost of the *θεῖα καὶ ἀπαθής* *μερίς*, the better part. So good and bad coexist, but the mixture is always such that good prevails. In a sense the mixture constitutes a third kind of soul, neither good nor evil in itself, but inclining toward the better, just like Isis.

Just as the unordered soul corresponds to the indefinite of the Philebus 23c, so here the mixture (*μικτόν*) corresponds to the *μεικτόν* of that dialogue. The definite there is represented by such terms as *λόγος*, *ἀριθμός*, and *μέτρον*, but also by *πέρας* at 1014d. The cause of the combination may be thought to be the creator, while it is left for the De Defectu to supply matter to fill the place of the separating cause. <sup>44)</sup> From the *λόγος*, the *μικτόν*, and the *ἄπειρον* one might expect logical, spirited, and appetitive soul to emerge.

The legitimacy of such an assumption would surely be confirmed if one was able to rely on Fohlenz' excellent conjecture at De Facie 943a:

*παρεῖ δὲ ἡ μὲν ψυχῆς < καὶ σώματος μίξις ἀπόθυσιν, ἡ  
δὲ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς > σύνθεσις λόγου, ἐν τῷ μὲν ἡδονῆς  
ἀρχῇ καὶ πόνου, τὸ δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας.*

Here *λόγος* is clearly the element of rationality produced in the soul by intelligence, while the source of pleasure and pain, be it perception or whatever, is clearly the business of the lower part of the soul which is in contact with the body. Once more the existence or non-existence of a third and central part of the soul is not made

44) 414d.

explicit. On the one hand there appears to be a basic λογος -  
 πῶς division, as in the De Virtute Morali, where Plutarch leans  
 towards an Aristotelian doctrine of soul, in so far as that is per-  
 missable for a good Platonist. Generally one finds an association  
 of the emotions with the material element here, while reason is the  
 form; the combination of the two brings about moral virtue; <sup>45)</sup>  
 reason curbs the emotional movements, and implants the moral virtues,  
 the means between various extremes. <sup>46)</sup>

On the other hand the soul itself is not identical with either  
 reason or the source of pleasure and pain; in a sense it is the whole  
 which comprises both these elements, both reason and emotion, but then  
 these represent functions while "soul" has no comparable associations.  
 One remembers Isis torn between Osiris and Typhon. It is clear that  
 there is some confusion in Plutarch's mind as to whether the soul is  
 a two-fold entity, but it is equally clear that the three-fold aspect  
 always underlies those passages where an ethical dualism demands two-  
 fold expression. It is the soul's contact with the body which gives  
 rise to the particularly irrational perceptions, pleasures, etc; it is  
 its contact with intelligence that results in its rationality. In  
 primitive chaos it existed without this intelligence but in contact  
 with the bodily element, hence its irrational swaying from one dir-  
 ection to another, hence its evil nature. In the present world it  
 lies between the two, no longer retaining its former nature, but  
 with a definite inclination toward the good. It appears to be pleasure  
 which above all may pervert this type of soul, thus preventing its  
 natural tendency. <sup>47)</sup>

45) 440d.

46) *ibid.*

47) See De Virtute Morali, 442c.

Since then the soul seems to be triple, the differences arising through her contact with intelligence on the one hand and body on the other, one might profitably examine a further passage in the De Facie which speaks of the intelligence-soul-body triad. We are told at 945a that intelligence imprints (  $\tauυπ\omega\upsilon\upsilon$  ) soul, and that soul imprints body. It would appear that the soul receives its formal element from above, and is itself required to transfer this ordering to the physical world. Thus order passes indirectly from the intelligible to the sensible via soul. 48)

At this juncture it is necessary to introduce one of the more interesting features of the De Iside, the apparent duality of Osiris, who may himself be seen in the soul, while his  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\sigma\pi\omicron\sigma\eta$  is the element of goodness that penetrates to the material world. Thus the efflux and image of Osiris is the order which soul passes down to physical existence ( Plutarch mentions the elements, the heavens, and the seasons ), while he himself is the order of God in the soul.

Similarly in the Quaestiones Platonicae 49) we find a divine element that is passed from God into the world-soul, an element of intelligence, calculation, and harmony, which is an off-shoot 50) of God himself. 51) But limits and shapes represent the orderer's power upon the material world at 1001b. Because there are two principles which always require ordering in Plutarch, body and soul, he always requires a two-fold formal principle, the higher being not the exemplar

48) cf. Numenius, frs. 21, 22, 27.

49) 1001c.

50)  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\sigma\pi\omicron\sigma\eta$ , a chiefly Hellenistic term used by Epicurus, Zeno, and Chrysippus.

51) 1001a.

of Seneca's 65<sup>th</sup> Epistle, but a force that may actually be seen in operation.

Thus one usually sees in the works of Plutarch, God passing reason down to soul, and the combination passing order down to the material world. On the scale of the macrocosm such an analysis might work for the De Iside as well, but it certainly fails when applied to the microcosm which is the chief object of the work:- the human mind. At this level Osiris is the supreme order, which impregnates the mind ( Isis ) with his efflux ( the perception of immanent order ), so that she produces Horus ( a coherent concept of the universe ), thus triumphing over Typhon ( the confusion caused by the passions ).

How nice an interpretation this would be for one who wished to see the influence of our Platonic passages upon Plutarch's own views. The principle of order, through its ordered products within the world, activates the human intellect; thus it produces knowledge, and triumphs over the falsehoods of pleasure. Measure, symmetry, intelligence, knowledge etc., and any purified pleasure formed Plutarch's concept of the Philebus 66a classification. One might then claim that he saw a genuine hierarchical order within the goods that pertained to human life, an order that pertained to both his view of the Egyptian religion, and his concept of Plato's late ethics.

This would almost certainly be deemed pure speculation, but it is never inappropriate to point out the least consistency in any thinker's mind, even though he may not be fully aware of that consistency. There is a certain harmony in the individual's aesthetic tastes, moral prejudices, and in his way of looking at the world. And Plutarch, with his concept of soul poised between the rational and the irrational, and with his regular insistence on two degrees of form, is fairly con-

sistent with his choice of five-fold metaphysical patterns, and with his infatuation concerning the number five.

At 429e-430a this infatuation extends to the point at which he sees fit to mention the five fingers, the limit of human powers by the impossibility of more than five simultaneous births, the five births of Rhea<sup>52)</sup>, five zones, five rings, and perhaps five heavenly circles.

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52) cf. De Iside, 355ef.

CHAPTER ELEVEN.THEON AND ALBINUS' INTRODUCTION.

The next Middle Platonist with whom one must deal is Theon Smyrnaeus. In his work on Plato's mathematics none but the most ardent optimist would expect to find a wealth of metaphysical information. The book is of a factual, informative nature, and does not appear to tackle arithmetic from the mystical point of view which one associates with the Pythagorean works of the day.

When Theon deals with the nature of philosophy, however, one is able to detect a considerable amount of relevance to our enquiries. For it is compared to a religious initiation ceremony.<sup>1)</sup> Five stages mark the progress of the philosopher in his chosen rite, and one begins with mathematics, which hold an important position in Theon's eyes. Without them one was unable to light upon the good life, and Theon ascribes this view to Plato:

διὰ πολλῶν πένυ δηλώσας ὡς οὐ χρεὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ἀμελεῖν

Plato's words on the purificatory nature of mathematics in the Republic<sup>2)</sup> are recalled, and these sciences are themselves divided into five. But together they are the first stage in the five-fold process of becoming a philosopher.

- 1) p. 14, 1.18, Hiller: τὴν φιλοσοφίαν μύσιν φείη τις ἐν ἀληθείᾳ τελευτῆς, καὶ τῶν ὄντων ὡς ἀληθῆς μυστηρίων παράδοσιν.
- 2) 527a7.



Participation in holy mysteries is considered to be made up of the following five stages. Purification forms the deliberate beginning, shortly followed by the handing down of the rite. Next in line comes ἵποπτεία, perhaps a kind of senior enlistment. In fourth place is the wearing of the garland, and finally the divine εὐδαιμονία.

Then Theon proceeds to demonstrate how Plato's view of education conforms with such a rite. Beginning with a reference to a significant πέντε in Empedocles,<sup>3</sup> he tells us that Plato began with a five-fold purification (mathematics of course); after this came the παράδοσις of the θεωρήματα of philosophy, i.e. logic, politics, and physics; next came ἵποπτεία, which involved the study of the ideas, the intelligible, and the truly real; the crowning touch was the ability to teach others what one had been through oneself, and the final goal was likeness to God, the almost universal Middle Platonist τέλος.<sup>4)</sup>

The five-fold expression in this passage could scarcely be emphasised any more. The reference to Empedocles, and the forward references to the division of mathematics, show quite clearly that Theon attaches more than usual significance to the five-fold pattern. This is strange, for his doctrines exhibit no clear dependence upon Plato's dialogues, apart from oddments such as the quotation from Republic VII and the "likeness to God" doctrine. One cannot compare Theon's progression with the ascent to the good, nor with the ascent

3) Fr. 143, Diels-Krantz: κρηνῶν ἀπὸ πέντε <sup>τῶν μόνων</sup> ἀνιμῶντος <έν>  
ἀτειρεὶ χαλκῶ <δεῖν ἀπορρῦπτεσθαι>

4) E.g. Albinus, Epitome, XXVIII, i. Theaetetus-commentary 7, 13; cf. Plato, Theaetetus, 176b.

to the beautiful in the Symposium. One might possibly reap some small reward if one were to view the 66a classification of the Philebus as a progression; the term  $\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$  applies to pleasures on the fifth row, and might mark the stage of purification, while most forms of knowledge are to be found at the next rank up; wisdom at the third position seems appropriate to the  $\epsilon\pi\omicron\pi\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$  of the forms, while Plato's first good might be supposed to involve "likeness to God" in view of its measure, God being the "measure of all things" in Laws IV. 5) One would be in difficulties, however, if asked to explain the relation of teaching to symmetry at the stage below this!

It therefore appears that what we have met in Theon is part of a tradition, having a certain basic dependence on Plato, but very far removed from the witness of the dialogues at times. The bookish trend is indicated by the complicated religious setting starved of all true religious feeling. Theon's approach is consciously non-mystical, and exhibits none of the interest in romanticisation and winged journeys of the soul, such as one finds in the works of Philo or Maximus.

We have seen that the initial purification of the soul was the task of the mathematical sciences. Theon regards these as essential for all who wish to understand Plato's works, though he does not suggest that one should spend one's whole life with geometrical diagrams and songs! 6) These are for the young, - preparatory and purifying.

The natural 7) order of the mathematical sciences is arithmetic, geometry, stereometry, astronomy, music. This is not the case in practice, as music "naturally" refers to the music of the heavenly

5) See above, ch.III, iii and iv.

6) p.16, 1.14, Hiller.

7) p.17, 1.14, Hiller:  $\tau\eta\nu\ \phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\eta\nu\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\nu$

bodies, and it is necessary to appreciate a kind of arithmetical harmony before proceeding further than the arithmetical stage. 8)

The distinction between the natural and practical order emphasises that it is not merely Theon's practical theories that he wishes to promulgate; his doctrine is not determined by practical considerations, and hence one suspects that they include a metaphysical element, and rest upon a metaphysical foundation. One may notice that each science adds a dimension to the preceding one, for astronomy deals with solid bodies in motion, and music studies a further aspect of these moving solid bodies. But more important than this physical basis for the mathematical order, is the consideration of the soul's progression; for there is something analogous between the ascent towards the likeness to God which there marks the final point in the ethical progression, and our reaching the stage of music in our mathematical studies here. For in music we strive towards the cosmic God, and fasten our sights upon the cosmic harmony, 9) which lies in the motion, order, and symphony of the heavenly bodies. 10)

Thus Theon's concept of music, and of its place in mathematics, has engineered another five-fold series leading from the beginnings of learning, up to the heavens and the divine mind. It would surely be strange to pass these theories by as being purely incidental lists, especially in the light of the affection shown for the number five in

8) p.16, 1.24, Hiller.

9) p.17, 1.2, Hiller.

10) p.17, 1.6, Hiller.

Plutarch's writings. Since Theon himself discusses the properties of numbers one may examine his results in order to determine whether or not there is any numerological reason for his preferences.

Two aspects of the number five are all that he finds worthy of mention in his numerological passage, which is on the whole brief and non-mystical, though he does assent to the Pythagorean belief that number is the "beginning, spring, and root of all."

After a mere three lines on the number four,<sup>11)</sup> he spends ten in showing how five is the middle number of the decad, since from whatever numbers are paired to compose the decad, five will be found mid-way between them. Then he describes five as embracing the form of number as a whole. It contains the first odd and the first even, three and two. Once again five is found by the man of Platonist aspirations to be the number appropriate to the whole. Although one does not encounter the same arguments for this as in Plutarch,<sup>12)</sup> where it is found that four, the number of the solid body, is deficient, and requires the addition of an extra unit, representative of life, to make it complete, yet one may observe Theon's readiness to accept four as belonging to the solid body,<sup>13)</sup> and notice that his preference is definitely given to five.

It is true that the primary influences upon Theon's concept of the number five may depend somewhat upon the Megista Gene of the Sophist with its groups of three and two making up the whole.<sup>14)</sup>

11) p.101, 1.11-13, Hiller.

12) E at Delphi, 390e.

13) p.101, 1.11, Hiller.

14. 254e.

But one should be aware that it is necessary for somebody to have pointed out the relevance of this passage in a dialogue not popular at this time. Such a person would surely have been a Platonist rather than a Pythagorean, for there is little to suggest the influence of non-Platonic numerology upon Theon's description of the properties of numbers.

Theon's failure to support his five-fold classifications with numerological arguments is a severe blow to any attempt to join five-fold classification as a whole to the mathematical traditions. It is clear that one is confronted with a philosophy whose interests in number were secondary to its interests in metaphysics. Nowhere in Albinus, Maximus, and Numenius are the qualities of the number five expounded with such relish as in the Π at Delphi and De Genio of Plutarch. And even here the interest in Plato's own five-fold lists supersedes any other alien motivation.

The importance of the Platonic tradition is revealed by certain similarities of the Introduction of Albinus with the present work. The Introduction deals with the nature and purpose of the dialogues, and the order in which they should be taught; it lasts for only six chapters.

Three similarities are particularly noticeable. At the commencement of chapter two one encounters a list of the meanings of λόγος, beginning with the ἐνδιδάκτορος - προφορικός distinction, as did Theon's list,<sup>15)</sup> where the distinction is specified as belonging to the Lyceum, not to the Porch as one would expect.

15) p.72, 1.24 ff., Hiller.

We meet in each the concept of "likeness to God" as the moral aim, though this is not associated with the final stage in Albinus as it is in Theon. One may not regard this as strange, since it is likeness to his second God which Albinus advocates,<sup>16)</sup> not to his first, to whom moral qualities are completely foreign; "likeness to God" must therefore occupy a more central position in his list, comparable to that of his second God in his metaphysical system.

It is Merlan,<sup>17)</sup> who has noticed the third similarity between these works of Theon and Albinus. They share the belief in a five-fold advancement to knowledge, and their accounts of it bear certain resemblances. In Paragraph six, the final paragraph of the work, Albinus suggests that one should begin ( *πρῶτον μὲν* ) with purification and deliverance from all false doctrine. Next ( *μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐκκαθαίρειν* ) the natural notions ( *φυσικὰς ἐννοίας* ) should be awakened. Thirdly ( *ἐνὶ ταύταις* ) the soul must receive the doctrines through which she attains completion, physical theological, ethical, and political. Then the doctrines must be bound by "the reasoning of the cause", so that they may remain unmoved within the soul. In addition to this ( *ἐπι ταύταις* ) it is necessary to provide immunity from the efforts of the sophist, lest one should be led into their way of thinking.

Albinus then runs through each of these steps again allotting a particular type of dialogue to them. The purification of false

16) Epitome, XXVIII, iii.

17) A.H. Armstrong (editor), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, p.80, n.1.

doctrine is achieved by the "πραγματικός" dialogue, which possesses elenctic and cathartic elements. The emergence of the innate notions is effected by the "μαθηματικός" dialogue. The bestowal of the appropriate doctrines is the task of the "ὑψηλότερος" dialogue, both the practical and the theoretical doctrines being directed towards "likeness to God". One is then committed to these doctrines by the logical or "ζητητικός" dialogue. Finally the "ἐπισκοπικός" or "ἀνατρεπτικός" dialogue protects us from the Sophists.

One may see that the resemblances with Theon do not go far beyond the length of the classification. But apart from the five-fold aspect one notices the purificatory nature of the first stage. The handing down of the doctrine is here left over until the third stage rather than the second, and the fourth and fifth stages are virtually unrelated. One must, however, provide for some connexion between the two passages, and the fact that they are so far apart suggests that they may be alternative interpretations of some Platonic passage.

It is no more difficult to argue for this passage having been Philebus 66a in the case of Albinus than in that of Theon. The purification stage might mark the deliverance from false pleasure, while the natural notions and "εἰκῆα δόγματα" may interpret the two degrees of apprehension that knowledge and wisdom represent in the work of Plato. As in Plato the final two stages are difficult to interpret and to distinguish from each other, but the fourth is clearly internal, while the fifth is something wider. This harmonises slightly with symmetry and measure, but not in such a way as to permit any certainty in the argument. It might be concluded that the Philebus list was widely

regarded as an inverted classification of the stages that lead up to the good life; the tendency to take its lowest stages first is demonstrated quite clearly in Albinus' Epitome X, iii, a passage that has been discussed by Krämer. 18) That Albinus saw educational progression as comprising of five stages is further demonstrated by X v which is clearly dependent upon the Symposium. 19)

One may perhaps maintain that considerable discussion of the five-fold aspect of Plato's writings had arisen by this time, and that no particular passage may ever be entirely responsible for such doctrines as are found here. Theon might well have mingled an interest in the Philebus with the affection that a mathematician and education-  
alist might be expected to have for the Epinomis. For at 986cd an account of man's progression towards happiness is found; one first marvels at the heavenly order, then desires to learn all that is within man's power, and finally becomes the observer of all things beautiful,

μεμυγμένος ἀληθῶς τε καὶ οὐτως. Theon's account is also of a μύσις 20).

Before leaving Albinus' Introduction one must mention briefly the five-fold division of reasons for aptitude in philosophy in chapter five. Differences arise by nature ( φύσις ), age ( ηλικία ), intention ( προαίρεσις ), condition ( εἶσις ) 21 and matter ( ἕλη ). 22) The terms nature, condition, and matter suggest metaphysical associations, and

18) UG. p.108 ff.

19) See above, ch.I.

20) p.14, 1.18, Hiller. cf. also Ep.VII, 333e4 μύσειν καὶ ἐπιπτεύειν and Phaedrus, 250c4.

21) Seemingly applied to accomplishment and learning.

22) Applied to circumstances.



as we are about to see with regard to Albinus' Epitome, such classifications with a slight metaphysical colouring are not unpopular with him. They are not, however, usually worked out to conform exactly to any metaphysical tenets, but do give some indication of these tenets.

CHAPTER TWELVE.ALBINUS' EPITOME.

The major contribution of Albinus is his Epitome. Witt has tended to regard the contents of this instructive work as stemming from a Xenocratean approach to Platonism promulgated by Antiochus and Arius. <sup>1)</sup> On the other hand, Loenen <sup>2)</sup> has adequately demonstrated that although Albinus has indeed borrowed from Arius ( or from Arius' source ) at the beginning of the twelfth chapter of the Didascalicus, as the work is also called, affinities to the Platonism of Plutarch are no less in evidence. <sup>3)</sup> Similarities are found to include the introduction of a transcendent God; a dualism between God and world-soul ( though stronger in Plutarch ); the rejection of the creation ex nihilo; and the concept of a world-soul that strives after God, less obvious in Plutarch ( 944e, 371 a ) but also found in Maximus Tyrius. <sup>4)</sup>

The general coherence of Albinus' thought has been criticised by Witt, but defended by Loenen. The inconsistencies found by Witt are as follows:

1. Albinus speaks of temporal creation where it suits him, atemporal creation where it does not.
2. The highest intellect has both final and efficient causal functions.

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1) Witt, p.103.

2) Albinus' Metaphysics, Mnem.IV, 10 (1957), 35-55.

3) ibid., p.46f.

4) ibid., pp. 50-51.

3. The relation between first and second intellects is obscure.
4. It is odd that intelligence may not exist without soul.
5. The inferior Gods are a strange offspring of an inert intellect.

The solution to the first problem is implicit in the phrase "ἀπὸ ἐν γενέσει ἔστί". Loenen <sup>5)</sup> cites Proclus In Tim. I, 219, 2, which shows Albinus' interpretation of the Timaeus to favour an ungenerated cosmos, which nevertheless possesses a principle of generation, so as to be both ἀπὸ ἄν and γενετός. Generation was not a matter of a final act, but of an everlasting process. Loenen feels that Albinus' use of the phrases "before the generation of the heavens" and "is always in creation" is justified by similar expressions in the Timaeus itself. <sup>6)</sup> It is his view that our author is only reiterating problems to be found in the text of the Timaeus itself, and that he is conscious of maintaining two modes of exposition which he finds in the dialogues. <sup>7)</sup>

Such consciousness is demonstrated by the phrase κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον. <sup>8)</sup> From these words it is concluded that efficient causation is not attributed to the first God, for while such an image is used in the physical chapters, the truly metaphysical section contains no mention of creator of creation as such. One finds at XIV, iii that God has not created the world-soul, but has reduced it to order as in

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- 5) Albinus' Metaphysics I, linem. IV, ix (1956) 296-319, p.301.
  - 6) Proclus, In Tim. I 340. Albinus believes that Plato dogmatizes in two ways, ἐπιστημονικῶς or εἰκαστολογικῶς.
  - 7) 52d, 38c.
  - 8) XII, ii, Loenen I, p.303.

Plutarch. Thus Loenen feels that it is no longer necessary to explain why an inert God should be regarded as an efficient cause.

The mythical aspect of the Timaeus is also the basis for Loenen's defence of the obscure position of the subordinate Gods of XVI, i. They could, he feels, be the celestial bodies or daemons of XIV, vii and XV, i. In all events their exact relation to the world-soul and intellect is not discussed by Plato. 9)

As far as concerns the relation of the world-soul, cosmic intellect, and first intellect, Loenen is of the opinion that the cosmic intellect is a function of the soul. 10) One should not be misled by any attempt to see the Plotinian hypostases in Albinus. In principle Loenen may be correct, but the details of his view of Albinus' metaphysics are subject to certain criticisms.

Loenen is forced to take the view that the hierarchial order soul-potential intellect-active intellect-first God ( X ii) is purely an order of values. In so far as it is based upon Aristotle's Protrepticus, 11) this may be correct, but in fact Albinus appears to transfer the doctrine of his source from a human to a cosmic scale, this being scarcely compatible with any attempt to assess ethical values. And though the order may not imply an ontology which corresponds to it, it would naturally be presumed on the part of the reader that such an ontology did exist. And since the related passage in the De Facie of Plutarch (943a) is metaphysical in nature, one may be assured that Albinus also thinks of the problem as an ontological or metaphysical one. 12)

9) Loenen I, p.304.

10) *ibid*, p.305.

11) Iamblichus, Protrepticus 7, p.41, 29 Pistelli. (fr.6 Ross).

12) Against Loenen I, p.307

While Loenen considers the second intellect as primarily a function of the world-soul, it must be noted that the latter is always that of the cosmos, while the intellect concerned is always that of the heavens. <sup>13)</sup> It would seem that the heavenly intellect is regarded as the ἡγεμονικόν of the cosmic soul, which is extended right from the limits to the centre ( XIV, iv ). Thus the two are no more coextensive than body and brain, though the heavenly intellect does of course govern the whole cosmos, just as the brain governs the whole man. Moreover it will govern through the soul, sufficient reason for Albinus' doubts as to whether intelligence can exist without soul at XIV iv.

Now the implications behind the final sentence of X, iii: "Who (the world-soul's intellect ), having been ordered by the father, arranges all nature within the cosmos," is that God's own causality is channelled through the second intellect. Again the sentence which precedes appears to show that God has filled all things of himself via firstly the world-intellect, secondly the world-soul; the former has an existence which is entirely dependent upon God, while the latter may be seen in sleep apart from Him. Thus the second intellect, being dependent upon both soul and God, is in a similar position to the reason which was the product of soul and intelligence at De Facie 943a. Here too it would be equally incorrect to regard reason as simply a function of soul.

A further objection to the first article of Loenen is that he fails to go far enough in one respect. In criticising attempts to see

13) Apart from X ii, one may point to X iii, and the heavenly God of XXVIII, iii.

the Plotinian hypostases in Albinus, he perpetually speaks himself in terms of God, intelligence, and soul. If he wished to demonstrate the "inner consistency" of Albinus, then he might have paid attention to the fact that the three principles which Albinus posits are God, ideas, and matter. He appears to have concerned himself only with theology, which gives a very incomplete picture of the situation. Albinus tackles matter first, then ideas, and finally God. I do not contend that this is not an order of ascending importance for Albinus, but I do contend that he would not approve of any interpretation of his work that completely ignored Chapters VIII and IX. It must surely be necessary to try to express the relationship between all three of the first-principles, before coming to any striking conclusions about the relationship between the various recipients of God's order.

Only one passage stands out as demonstrating a relationship between ideas and God, matter and ideas, a passage having the additional advantage of expressing relationships between ideas and man, cosmos and ideas. We read at IX, i that the idea is "in relation to God, his thought, to us the first intelligible, to matter its measure, to the sensible world its exemplar, and to itself existence." There has indeed been much debate of the concept of the idea as the thought of God, but the other functions of the forms tend to have been neglected. This may be partly due to the difficulty in assessing the significance of the five items mentioned. Albinus does not expand upon them, but tends to take them for granted, as though part of the underlying tradition.

One finds, however, that the other two principles are also given groups of five names:-

- VII ii: Ταύτην (sc. τὴν ὄλην) τούτου ἐκμαχῆϊός τε καὶ πανδελφίς  
καὶ τιθήνη καὶ μητέρα καὶ χώραν ὀνομάζει . . . .
- X iii: θειότης, οὐσιότης, ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν.

To this last list are attached the words:

"I do not speak as one separating these, but as though in all one object is perceived."

If the differences do not lie in the object under consideration, then they may lie in that to which it is related once again. Further investigation is necessary.

Firstly, Albinus offers a reason for God's being good. Then he gives the reason for his being beautiful, having the inherent qualities of completion and symmetry. The 66a classification is clearly his source for the association of beauty, symmetry, and completion at the second level. Truth, which is next to receive its justification as a description of God, is not foreign to the third "good" of the Philebus, and it also appears at 64b2, 65a2, b8, and d5. If one regards the first Philebus "good" as "the good", then the three final words in this five-fold list of Albinus become related to the first three "goods" of Plato. Yet our author does not expand upon the first two descriptions of his list, neither of which can be related in this way, but goes on to describe why God should be regarded as father, a term not previously used.

In the sentence which precedes this striking five-fold list God is again described in five ways, though here with less emphasis on the pattern. The adjectives used are αἰδιός, ἄρρητος, ἀτοτελής, ἀειτελής, παντελής, and it is by no means easy to relate these terms to the

second list or to any other. One may notice that the succession of terms seems to suggest an ever-increasing expansiveness of God's power rather like the one's changing into the all by a succession of stages in the hypotheses of the Parmenides, a change made all too clear at the close of the fifth and final hypothesis. 14)

If one is to relate successfully the various five-fold lists in Albinus, the indispensable first step will be the rearrangement of the passage concerning the five aspects of the idea. In two respects its order appears to deviate from what would be most natural; the idea's relation to itself has been withheld until last, and matter has been considered before the sensible world though it will most certainly have a lower ontological status. Making the required adjustments to the order, let us formulate a table:

<u>IX i of ideas</u>		<u>X iii of God</u>		<u>VIII ii of ὅλη</u>
God	thought	divinity	eternal	ἐκμαγεῖον
Ideas	essence	essentiality	ἑρρητός	all-receptive
Man	1st intel.	truth	self-complete	nurse
Cosmos	exemplar	symmetry	ever-complete	mother
Matter	measure	good	all-complete	place

Matter will receive attention first; the term all-receptive is most obviously related to the forms in any interpretation of the Timaeus. That the term nurse applies to mankind is no less likely. Slightly less clear is the applicability of the term mother to the sensible world, but it is interesting to recall the birth of Horus (the sensible world) from Isis in the work of Plutarch devoted to her and to Osiris. As for place, one may at least say that it is not the place for God; He dwells above the heavens according to XXVIII, iii. It is not for the forms, for they dwell in the mind

14) ... πάντα τέ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ... - Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.



of God, nor for man who dwells upon earth. It may be the place for the sensible world, but it is just as likely to be the place for itself, the place of the material flux.

Finally one must examine the word *ἐμψυγῆσις*. One remembers the universal philosophical importance of the concept of the wax imprint being analogous to the force of the formal principle over matter. Plutarch had made extensive use of the same idea at De Anima Procreatione 1024c and De Facie 945a, and Albinus assures us that he has adopted the Stoic notion of God's enforming matter at XIII, iii, using the word approved by Plutarch:— *τυπῶν*. For Albinus God moulds matter with the various regular shapes, and it is quite clear that in relation to God matter is that which receives impressions.

Let us next examine the attributes of God, if they may be so called ( for X iv is of the opinion that He is not without quality, nor qualified ). His divinity would naturally express His relation to Himself, while His essentiality surely expresses His relation to the ideas, which being essence in themselves will owe their essentiality to God whose thoughts they are. Nor is truth an unnatural relation of God to mankind; if the forms are to us the first-intelligibles, then God will surely be that which gives them their intelligibility. Symmetry may apply to the sensible world, that which is brought into order by God's proportioning activities. Finally goodness, being the most absolute expression of God's ethical or aesthetic superiority is a term best explained in relation to that which is most deficient in such ethical or aesthetic quality, matter itself, being negative in value and "touched with absence of perception", VII, ii. The term "goodness" implies the same absolute dualism as does the term "*ἐμψυγῆσις*".

When one turns to the adjectives used of the Divinity in the previous sentence, one is forced to confess that the situation is less clear. The word  $\alpha\iota\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$  does indeed recall the first "good" of the Philebus at the point where the text is unclear (66a8). But neither comparison with this work nor relation to the Parmenides yields more than superficial success. Albinus has these works in mind, but is equally interested in building up a five-fold system of his own, with man placed central between God and matter, partaking in the intellectual activity proper to the former through the forms, but sharing the perception of the sensible world.

Man does not always take so important a place in Albinus' system however. At X, ii the anthropocentric Aristotelian source is modified in such a way as to introduce Albinus' own peculiar heavenly intellect:

Iamblichus Protrepticus, p.41, 1.29, Pistelli, Aris. Prtr. fr.6.

(Ross translation, vol. XII, Oxford, 1952, p.34):

"Therefore soul is better than body (being more authoritative), and of soul, that which has reason and thought; .... Whatever excellence, then, is the excellence of this part must be...the most desirable...; for one would (methinks) maintain that this part is...ourselves. ...Now we can name no better work of thought...than the attainment of truth. Truth therefore is the supreme work of this part of the soul. Now this work it does simply in virtue of knowledge, or rather in virtue of what is more completely knowledge, for the supreme end of this is contemplation."<sup>15)</sup>

15) cf. fr.11 (Ross), p.51, 1.24. Pistelli.

A second significant fragment seems to be fr.14, p.49, Ross, p.56, 1.15, Pistelli:

"The word "live" seems to be used in two senses, one implying a potentiality, the other an actuality..... we sometimes mean by it the use of a faculty, actual contemplation, and sometimes the possession of a faculty of knowledge."

(Latter half concerning the word "cognition". )

Albinus has accepted on principle the views of Aristotle, but for him the human intellect may be regarded as potential in essence. Only an intellect in perpetual act is regarded as substantially better, and this intellect is his heavenly God, the intellect which he regards as the ruling part of the world-soul. It is the combination of God's intelligence and the soul's motive power.

Aristotle had said that man may be regarded as simple, and have just this one activity directed towards the ultimate truth, or he may be regarded as composite, having several activities of which contemplation is the best. <sup>16)</sup> Albinus retains a certain doubt about the intellect in act, whether it should be thought of as simple or composite, for he appears to use both singular and plural demonstratives to refer to it. He may think of it as the combination of the various heavenly Gods (planets) like the eighth God of Xenocrates (fr.17), or he may envisage it as the medium of the forms, second from God in the hierarchial order.

This slight hesitancy of Albinus concerning the use of singulars and plurals has added to the doubts of the reader as to the exact hierarchial order which he envisages. One might easily have

16) p.42, 1. 9-20, Pistelli.

supposed that his reference to "the cause of this and what is still higher than these " implied two levels higher than the heavenly intellect, e.g. the forms ( the cause of the intellect in act ) and God ( higher than the forms ). One is deterred from such an interpretation by the fact that Albinus then calls the first God "cause" of the heavenly intellect, but one might still wish to make the  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$  the ideas, on the grounds that it refers back to the thoughts of the active intellect ( i.e.  $\nu\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha$  ) not to the intellect itself.

The scale of values is further complicated by the absence of any reference to body or to matter, and while one may suppose that Albinus considered soul better than body, this is not made explicit. Nor may we know whether there is one or two levels below soul. At X, vi, Albinus' theory of progression <sup>17)</sup> shows five stages of appreciation, that of body, of soul, of customs and laws, of the vast ocean of beauty, and of the good. Since the vast ocean of beauty has been connected by Plato with the beauty of knowledge, it is tempting to suggest the following conformity between X, vi, and the hierarchial order:

X, vi.

the good  
ocean of beauty  
laws, customs  
soul  
body

X, ii.

First God  
intellect in act  
potential intellect  
soul  
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In this case only body could be seen as inferior to soul, as in both Aristotle's Protrepticus and the De Facie of Plutarch. <sup>18)</sup>

17) See Chapter one.

18) 943a, 945a, see chapter ten.

A possible reason for the omission of matter ( quite hypothetical since Plato himself does not include it ) at X, vi, is its complete lack of form, hence of beauty. Similarly one might say that it is quite negative in value, and thus would not qualify for consideration.

But as we are now concerned with seeing how Albinus weaves certain five-fold elements into his system, and as the hierarchial list is not consciously five-fold, as is so much else in Albinus, it would be well merely to note its relation to the system as a whole. So far this system has appeared to centre upon mankind rather than upon soul, which had provided the centre of Speusippus' system. From X, ii and vi, it appears that soul has actually been demoted, and is now second from bottom in the list of values. Potential intellect has here assumed central position, and this may profitably be related to mankind. Active intellect or knowledge has assumed the second highest place, and since Aristotle's active intellect seemed to really be the forms at De Anima 429a27f ( passive intellect being the forms in potential ), one is forced to admit a strong relation between active intellect and intelligibles in Albinus. God is ever at the head of the list, first position never varying.

It remains for one to find a method of associating soul with the sensible world, body with matter, and the following table is within one's powers of vision:

God	First God	Good
Ideas	Active intellect	Knowledge
Man	Potential intellect	laws, etc.
Sensible world	Soul	Soul
Matter	---	Body

The central three terms have been grouped more closely

together, since soul is in no case foreign to them. It belongs to mankind, it belongs too to the world-intellect. The most that can be said of the desiring part of the soul is that it is soul; the most that can be said of the spirited is that it may respond to reason; but one may say of the reasoning part that it actually is reason. What Albinus has done is to transfer the tripartite soul to a universal scale, to see the reasoning part in the heavenly intellect, the intermediate part in man, and the last part, that which associates with the body, with the sensible world. He depends as heavily upon Plutarch at X ii, or at least upon a source related to Plutarch, as he does upon Aristotle, and his system may be compared with De Facie 943a in the following manner:

<u>943a.</u>	<u>Albinus.</u>
<u>intelligence</u>	<u>First God</u>
reason	active intelligence
soul	passive intelligence
<u>perception</u>	<u>lower soul</u>
body	body

Of course the central position of the passive intellect is most reminiscent of Isis in the De Iside, the perceptible world suggests Horus, and perhaps one may compare active intelligence with Osiris' efflux. Exact parallels are not to be found, but it is the general understanding that so often appears the same in Middle Platonism; this understanding finds expression in the writings, but never complete expression. This one would not dare to expect.

One might expect that it should be possible to see the workings of any such understanding reflected in Albinus' account of the mythical beliefs of Plato in the physical chapters of his work. In these chapters

one finds the following additional divinities : Sun, Moon and planets; an eighth power which is scattered around them all from above; daemons, both visible and invisible; and finally the earth. Of the seven planets it is clear that they are placed in the seven inner circles of the heavens. This implies that the eighth force belongs to the outer circle, and is exemplified in the fixed stars, though this is nowhere stated. That we have an allusion to the eighth God of Xenocrates (fr.17) is reasonably certain, a god for the heaven as a whole. Since it is described as a power "from above" one might presume a connexion with the supra-cosmic first God. It may perhaps have originated from Him, and descended upon the whole heavens. Immediately after admitting an eighth God, Albinus says that all are intelligent living beings, and spherical in shape. Thus one may suppose that this sphericity applies to the eighth also, and it is difficult to see what it may represent if not the sphere of the fixed stars. On the other hand its description as a power scattered about all<sup>19)</sup> seems to envisage it as being in a definite relation with all the planets, suggesting some kind of generic force, or an all-pervading breath. But if one recalls that at XIV, iv, the dominant motion of the heavens is that of the outer circle whose influence is not confined to its own specific area, then it is possible to reconcile these two apparently conflicting impressions with which Albinus has left his reader.

Albinus' daemons are created Gods, some visible, some not, belonging to each of the elements. The Xenocratean notion of element-powers other than daemons (fr.15) is rejected, as is the Epinomis'

19) ὁ γὰρ δὲ πᾶσιν ἡ ἀνωθεν δύναμις περιβέβληται.

Presumably the dative does not express the agent here, or how would this power be seen to come from above?

claim that each kind of rational being may be associated with a particular element.<sup>20)</sup> When relating the daemons to the elements, however, Albinus does not mention earth, but only the other four. Is this because the traditional province for the operation of such creatures is the lower heavens, or because the earth is regarded as a God in its own right at XV, iii? Either seems unlikely, for Albinus says that the daemons control "all beneath the moon, and all on earth".

Now if one adds to the daemons and the heavenly forces the highest God above and the earth below, just as Xenocrates may have done (fr.19), arranging them in their natural order in the universe, one observes the following result:

Creator	- above heavens
Power from above	- outer circle
Planets	- inner circles
Daemons	- below moon, and on earth.
Earth	- centre of universe.

Now assuming that the creator is the mythical representation of the first intellect, and that the earth is the mythical representation of body, can one legitimately conclude that the three other forms of divinity are representations of actual intermediates? One is here thinking especially of the active intellect, passive intellect, and lower soul. Both inner and outer circles are clearly concerned with soul, and both with its epistemological functions, the former with true opinion, the latter with intellection. The daemons are also concerned with soul, for they exist "so that no part of the cosmos may be without a share in soul" (XV, i). But Middle Platonism accepts the Xenocratean notion (fr.23) that they are subject to the passions, and Albinus, in connecting

20) See above, ch. IV, ii.



them with the elements, has marked them as being representative of that part of the soul which associates with the bodily nature.

Thus it would not be impossible to say that the various divinities in Albinus' portrayal of the physical universe each pertained to a rung of his metaphysical system; and that intelligence in act was mirrored in the outer circle of fixed stars, potential intelligence in the planets of the inner circles being individual intelligent entities, and the lower soul in the daemons, the race responsible for the care of the material universe. The creator symbolises the highest, supra-celestial intellect, the earth symbolises matter. The five-fold system is complete.

The foundation of the system seems to a large extent to rely upon the tripartition of the soul, as it did in Plutarch. It must possess true intelligence, a central part respecting this intelligence, and a separate part whose concern is with material existence. The system applies equally to man and to the universe, for the souls of each "both partake of the same mixture" (XXV, iv), though one refers to the parts of the souls of divinities in a different manner. (XXV, vii):

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{λογιστικόν} = \text{κριτικόν} \\ \text{θυμοειδές} = \text{ἐρμητικόν} \\ \text{ἐπιθυμητικόν} = \text{οἰκείωτικόν} \end{array}$$

Of these three parts one would have supposed that the second was most truly soul in itself, midway between the divine and the bodily as in Plutarch. The heavenly intelligence intercedes between

it and the first God, while the sensible world is produced from it and from matter (XIII, i). To this extent Albinus would not have quarrelled with those who placed soul centrally. The motive soul which answers to reason is indeed so placed, but it is this property of being able to receive reason by which it is especially characterised, and it is as a result of this that it may be deemed of a superior nature to simple soul at X, ii. It is potentially intellect, its reasoning part actually intellect, activated from above by God.

At IX, i, man had taken the place of this potential intellect, the forms of the actual intellect, and the sensible world of the combination of soul and the material element. At X, vi, laws and customs showed the beauty of potential intellect, the vast sea of beauty that of actual intellect and of the forms, the soul showed the beauty of the guardian of body. Five-fold verbal and nonal lists from Laws X,<sup>21)</sup> have found their counterparts in five-fold lists of words which describe Albinus' first-principles; and intermediate divinities between the two opposites ( God and earth ), recall the speculations of the Epinomis' "three in the middle of five", and of Aetius' report of Xenocrates' theology (fr.15) which exhibits similar traits.<sup>22)</sup>

But Albinus' vision is by no means infallible. He often sees fit to mention five-fold classifications that cannot be easily woven into his own system; indeed his aim is no more than a superficial resemblance. For instance, rather than being content with the more normal four-fold epistemology, Albinus feels it necessary to add

21) 897a, 892b, see ch.III, iv; IV, i.

22) See ch. VI.

a fifth class of objects at IV, vii. Admittedly Albinus appears content to postulate only intellection, perception, an *ἐπιστημονικός λόγος*, and a *λογιστικός λόγος*. But it is equally clear that there are first and second sensibles, first and second intelligibles, and an *ἄθροισμα*. Of intelligibles the first are the ideas, the second immanent forms; of sensibles the first are qualities, the second what is qualified; and examples of the strange last class are fire and honey, collected masses of the same substance. One wonders whether this last is not the result of the combined, central sphere of cognition in Xenocrates,<sup>23)</sup> since for that too opinion had been particularly applicable. The spirit of Albinus' epistemology is essentially Old Academic, possibly tainted with shades of the influence of Antiochus.<sup>24)</sup> But the objects of cognition bear the particular flavour of a favourite doctrine of Albinus himself. His five-fold system demanded that there should be objects of cognition applicable to the transcendent and the immanent intellects, objects of perception applicable to the sensible world ( qualities ) and to matter ( what is qualified ). A central kind of object was also demanded, and this Albinus discovered in a group of objects which combined form with quality, neither a geometrical form nor an accidental quality, but a quality that was the form.

A mild consistency is present, but little more; to relate all aspects of the Epitome and of the Introduction is not easy. The vision of Albinus has been inherited, not perhaps from any one thinker, though Plutarch is an obvious candidate, but rather from the traditions current at the time, which must have originated before Plutarch. The willingness to dogmatise may stem from Antiochus, and possibly the

23) Fr. 5, see ch. VI.

24) See ch. VII, the intellection, knowledge, opinion, and perception of Albinus may be compared with Clement, Strom. II, 13, and Aristotle, De An. 404b21.

epistemology also, but the general understanding probably arises from a subjective approach to philosophy that had been a special feature of the Posidonian school; but although the theory of five zones had been expounded with some relish by this platonising Stoic, one must allow that the unusual interest in the number five displayed in Plutarch, and the attempt to reduce almost everything to a five-fold pattern by Albinus, are witness to developments later than Posidonius. But the reintroduction of the Platonic tripartition of the soul by this latter <sup>25)</sup> has appeared both in Plutarch and in Albinus to have been an essential prerequisite of the revived interest in the pentad, or rather in a genuine five-fold metaphysic.

Whatever were the sources of Plutarch and Albinus, one must not rob them of a certain amount of credit for their systems. It is an achievement to achieve any measure of coherence in the sphere of metaphysics, and each must have used a sufficiently wide range of sources to make it necessary that such coherence was present in their own understanding of the subject, and was not purely the result of doctrine inherited from others.

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25) For the platonic tripartition in Posidonius, see Galen, De Placitis, 405; for the five zones see Strabon, Geog. II, 2, ii (C94)

CHAPTER THIRTEENMAXIMUS

Although Albinus may have moulded the tradition into a system that was characteristically his own, the limited interest of Maximus of Tyre in the subject of metaphysics ensures that all we shall find of relevance here belongs to the tradition rather than to his own original thought. Like others of his time, Maximus saw the human soul poised between the world of the intellect and that of the senses, and this allows for the appropriate divisions of the soul, whose essence remains quite central in a now less obvious five-fold system.

Thus it is an anthropocentric philosophy that is preached by Maximus, who, although called a Platonist in the title of his work, had a certain affection for the Cynic way of life, and an attitude toward philosophy as something transcending the distinctions between individual schools. He writes in a style now rhetorical, now almost prophetic, <sup>1)</sup> rather like an evangelical preacher.

Maximus sees the soul as being engulfed in the mists and allusions of the physical world, yet striving ever upwards to what lies in higher regions, to the intelligible world and to God. Consequently the soul consists of the usual divine and mortal parts, the one called "intelligence" and the other "perceptions"; <sup>2)</sup> their ultimate objects are God and matter respectively. The triad intelligence-soul-body, and the two processes that take place between the first two and the last two of these, form the basis of Maximus' doctrine

1) e.g. I, 10, g, Hobein

2) XI, 7, a.

as of that of Plutarch; for echoes of De Facie 943a and of Albinus X, ii, may be found in the treatise "Who is God according to Plato":<sup>3)</sup> "As is the lifeless to the ensouled, so is intelligent soul, just this, to soul as a whole." The passage shows similar dependence to the doctrines of Aristotle's Protrepticus (fr.6.), and our author, not being content with the tripartition, goes on to distinguish between what would resemble an Aristotelian active intelligence, and another incomplete intelligence. This may not only be related to the distinction of reason from intelligence in the Plutarch passage, but also to the active and potential intellects of Albinus X ii.

Maximus says that the nature of the former is to think even if it is not thinking (!), but the nature of the latter is incomplete if one does not attribute to it eternal (  $\alpha\iota\tau\iota\acute{o}\nu$  ) and universal (  $\pi\alpha\sigma\chi\omega\sigma$  ) contemplation, two of the properties of Albinus' ever-active intellect. The one is described as divine, the other is human. The former sees all that the orbit of the sun would see, not merely the orbiting sun; that is to say that it forms a complete circle in the heavens, being far more than a heavenly body.<sup>4)</sup> Its most striking resemblance to Albinus' heavenly intellect may be seen in the statement (8,g):

"So that the most complete would be that which thinks always, all, and at the same time."

Distinction between the two kinds of intellect arises in answer to the question "Where amongst these shall we place God?", and it thus seems that Maximus is content to regard the most perfect heavenly intellect as the true divinity. In failing to take so transcendental a line as Albinus, Maximus may remind one of the Posidonian doctrine that the

3) XI, 8, f.

4) One must compare the eighth God of Xenocrates (fr.17).

periphery of the heavens <sup>5)</sup> was the essence of God. God does not take up a position higher than the ever-active intelligence, for Maximus absolutely rejects the concept of an inert God. <sup>6)</sup> Having excluded the bodily faculties, the soul may use reason to rise up to God's intelligence: (8:g) "It is left then to mount up by reason as if to the acropolis, and place God alongside the most authoritative intelligence."

Whether the use of the word "reason" as the force that leads up to intelligence reflects the Plutarchian intermediate between soul and intelligence is unclear, but suspicions of strong contact between Plutarch and Maximus are justified by the preceding division of the soul's parts into five, - nourishing, sensible, motive, emotive, and intelligent. The fact that Plutarch agrees in ascribing five parts to the soul (E at Delphi 390f), and uses similar terms for the first two of these, is far less important than the fact that Maximus has enumerated the parts in a kind of ascending hierarchial order, provided only that the emotive part may be associated with the lower or passive intelligence. The nourishing part is concerned with the body, and the next is the perceptive faculty that has been conjectured to represent the stage intermediate between body and soul at De Facie 943a. The motive part is appropriate to soul regardless of any external connexions, and the intelligent part is the highest faculty and the part directed towards God.

But it is not so easy to associate the emotions with that part of the soul which leads up to the highest intelligence, and one must here point out that the passions are associated by Maximus with the second

5) Diogenes Laertius, VII, 148.

6) XIV, 6, f, cf. XXIII, 3, f.

highest of his species of life, IX, I, d.

These are:

1. Gods	-	free from emotion	-	immortal
2. Daemons	-	immortal	-	emotional.
3. Men	-	emotional	-	mortal.
4. Animals	-	irrational	-	sensitive.
5. Planets	-	ensouled	-	free from emotion.

While the perceptions are apparently an animal function in essence, the emotions belong to a class higher than man. This suggests that one should examine the relationship between the emotions and the reason, for both have come to belong to a stage intermediate between the soul in itself and intelligence. They can scarcely be identified, but one must be aware that it was essentially two processes that Plutarch had placed between intelligence and soul, soul and body; one was a reasoning process, the other perhaps a perceptive process. In Maximus the reason is found to be the subject of a process of preserving and measuring the emotions, XXVII, 5. One may then conclude that the subordinate intelligence is only truly applicable to creatures with emotive faculties, and this explains why creatures of a passionate nature should occupy the second highest position; their passion implies passive intelligence also.

The fifth chapter of oration XXVII is remarkable for a different reason. In the Paris manuscript (marked R by Hobein) a scribe has added the following five-fold diagram to the text:

	— soul —	
1.	reason	passions
2.	saves	is saved
3.	measures	is measured
4.	each theoretical form of knowledge	everything ordered by the theoretical faculty
5.	wisdom (i.e. knowledge)	virtue (stemming from knowledge).



From other diagrams, arranged generally in threes and fives, one begins to realise that the scribe was apparently aware of something more than ourselves; it is difficult to estimate the value of this scribe's observations, or to say how acquainted he was with Middle Platonism in general. His activities cannot even be dated. But one is bound to say that the same manuscripts contain the Epitome of Albinus, where a similar kind of diagram also features, and another lost work of some magnitude by the same author. It would therefore have been quite possible for him to have gained a not inaccurate impression of a type of Platonism that revolved around a three-fold psychology and a five-fold total metaphysic.

Returning to the question of the reason measuring the passions, it might be advisable to ascertain Maximus' attitude toward the Philebus, which, besides being more relevant to the question of five-fold classification than other dialogues, is especially concerned with preservation and measuring at 64d9 ff.; virtue appears at 64e7; the forms of theoretical craft are discussed earlier and may reappear at 66b; and of those things ordered by the theoretical faculty, it is pleasure that constantly appears foremost in the Philebus.

Thus all the subjects tackled here by Maximus have been previously grouped into one passage in a work of Plato himself. Yet in spite of a three-fold division of skills two sections previously, another feature that one might adduce to connect the passage with its Platonic counterpart, it is impossible to claim that Maximus is interpreting the Philebus here. He has probably read the work, but his primary authority is in all probability not a written one, but the common consensus of Platonist opinion in his day.

In XXXIII, 7, a ff., Homer's view of man, body, soul and the good is discussed, and here one finds an initial dualism of intelligence and body; to this may be added a dualism of reason and pleasure:

"Pleasures are the peculiar product of the flesh, reason that of intelligence."

Maximus suggests that a method of finding the good would be to search for the function; the method of finding this would be to search for the organ; the method of finding this would be to search for that which preserves. Of body and soul the preserver is soul; of soul the organ is intelligence; of intelligence the function of course will be wisdom; and then Maximus maintains that one will be able to find the good. A progression may be detected from body, soul, intelligence, and wisdom to the good. Apart from the obvious influence of fragment six of Aristotle's Protrepticus once again, it is difficult to believe that the 66a classification of the Philebus, whose lowest three items seemed <sup>7)</sup> to be now connected with body, soul, and intelligence, and whose highest item was thought to be the good itself, <sup>8)</sup> was very far from Maximus' mind at the time of writing.

In speech XXXII, the last of four consecutive works devoted to showing that even if pleasure is a good thing it is still not substantial, another passage particularly reminiscent of the Philebus examines the effects of mixing reason and pleasure:

7) The interpretation of Plutarch, see ch.X.

8) The interpretation of Arius, see ch. VII.

"There being these two things in the soul of man, pleasure and reason, pleasure mixed with reason removes nothing of its necessity, but adds to it increased attractiveness; and when reason associates with pleasure it increases their limit through resourcefulness, and removes the element of necessity from what is naturally enjoyable." ( XXXII, 3, d.)

One remembers the close association of measure and limit with the mixing processes that the Philebus recommends for the good life. The work seems to have made a considerable impression on Maximus, but again it is certain that he is not using it directly, that he is going beyond its doctrines, and that where he does so strong influences may be presumed from current evaluations of that work.

Let us now move away from the question of Platonic influence, and consider Maximus' theology. In one case his description of his supreme deity rivals the five-fold lists of words supplied by Albinus X, iii, "Who is helmsman, who general, who law-giver, who farmer, who householder?", he asks. This description from IV, 9, d, may be compared with another from XXIX, 7, g:

"έν, άνεμητορ, άφθονον, άνεργεις, πολυαρκες."

We have learned from Albinus that such descriptions must not be related exclusively to one Platonic passage, but to one common understanding of Plato.

The best known theological passage in Maximus may be found at XI, 12, d, ff. The subordinate Gods have just been described as being of an infinite number, as demonstrated by the number of stars in the heaven, or of daemons in the aether. But Maximus claims that he can better demonstrate this by comparing God's rule with an earthly

kingdom. One finds the king himself, unflinching like the law, providing those who obey Him with salvation. He has associates in His kingdom, many visible Gods and many invisible, some whirling round His gates, heralds who dine and feast with Him, some the servants of these, and some even more subordinate. These three ranks probably belong to their own separate places in the heavens, and one would naturally suppose them to be appropriate to the sphere of the fixed stars, the region of the planets, and the sub-lunary world. We have discovered here only three kinds of subordinate God and the one supreme ruler, and unless one can supply a fifth element then it is impossible to see any far-reaching effect of a five-fold system in this case. It is possible, but unsafe, to supply earth at the other extreme, with a view to relating the passage to Xenocratean theology, particularly fr. 19.

It is four elements again that one detects in an account of some mythical Gods at IX, 8, h. Here Zeus is clearly the supreme God, and He is followed by Athena who is wisdom, Apollo who is the sun, and Poseidon, a breath pervading earth and sea, and effecting their stability and harmony. Since one finds the first three of these Gods addressed in this order at V, 8, e, one may presume that Maximus envisages this as the hierarchial order. Since Apollo clearly rules in the heavens, Poseidon in the sublunary world, one might infer that the power of Athena was to be seen in the sphere of the fixed stars. Once again one cannot presume the addition of the earth or any other divinity in fifth place.

Maximus' account of the progress of the soul upward through the heavens must now be examined, for here there appear three regions applicable to three stages of the soul's path, which are not other than the regions in which the three subordinate divinities function.

The following table will show how the three stages feature in X, 2-3, and XI, 9-10; first is a journey through confusion, second the inward turning of the mind, thirdly the journey to the truth.

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>
X, 3, a, b.	ἠδονῶν, πικρῶν, ταραχῶν.	ἐπιστρέφασθαι εἰς ἑαυτὴν τοῦ νοῦν	ἔμπροσθεν ἐν τοῦ χάρακι τῷ ἀληθείᾳ
" " "	ἐν ἀχλὺσίν τε καὶ ταρατ- τήσιν τῷ ἀέρι	ὑψοῦ ἐν σταθερῶ ἀθέρῃ	ἐπὶ τὸ ἀληθές
XI, 10	σκοτεινῶν	ἀποφράττων τὰ ὦτα, ἀπο- στρέφον τὰς ὄψεις	ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ τόπον.

While action A takes place in the lowest region of the heaven, B belongs to the heavens themselves, where God may be seen and heard (XI, 10, e); but, we are told, "the end of the journey is not in the heavens nor the heavenly bodies.... It is necessary to go even above these, to transcend the heavens, unto the true place and the calm therein." The three stages belong to the sublunary regions, the heavens proper, and an even higher place. Earth is indeed below (μηδὲ εἰς γῆν μεταφρόμενος, XI, 10 a) but the soul is seen only to move in the three steps above it; God is presumably in a similar position above, but never truly arrived at. The termination of the journey is the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος of Phaedrus 247c.

Bearing in mind this division of the celestial world through which the soul passes, one might wish to associate each realm with a subordinate divinity, Athena with the highest, Apollo with the planets, Poseidon with the place of greater confusion, where his harmonising influence<sup>9)</sup> is required. As the first God must remain above, so must

9) cf. XIII, 3, g.

earth remain below. If Maximus does not array his divinities with the elements, as does the Epinomis, he certainly believes in the five, thus conforming with the tradition which is the object of our concerns, and has much to say of aether at XI, 6, d. Its position, and more especially its silence, <sup>2)</sup> seem analogous to that of God, and from this one may infer what one will. Maximus recognises the tradition; but adds little to it.

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10) XI, 6, d, for that of aether, XI, 10, d, and X, 3, a for that of God.

CHAPTER FOURTEENNUMENIUS

The pattern that is implicit in the Epitome of Albinus, and reflected also in the writings of Maximus, appears again in a rather different form in the fragments of Numenius. This thinker, normally considered as a Pythagorean, especially in his own day,<sup>1)</sup> is mentioned as a Platonist by Iamblichus and Proclus.<sup>2)</sup> He lived in the latter half of the second century, and as such he was, even in ancient times, thought to be a forerunner of Plotinus.<sup>3)</sup> Therefore his three Gods, apparently the most interesting feature of his system, have been regarded as the corner-stone of his philosophy, on a level with the Plotinian hypostases.

When one examines the very first of Leeman's collection of ancient testimony regarding his theology, one is confronted by the first difficulty which hampers him who would see the triple Godhead as the simple sum of Numenius' theology. The relationship of the three Gods is not, in the text as it has come down to us, one of father, son, and grandson, but one of grandfather, grandson and descendant:

πάππον, ἕγγονον, ἀπόγονον

Leemans in his note to this 24<sup>th</sup> item of his collection remarks that we should perhaps change the text so that the second word reads ἕγγονον to conform with Timaeus 50d. It is true that the kappa may

- 1) By Clement, Origen, Porphyry and Longinus, test 4.
- 2) Test. 5.
- 3) Test. 15.

easily have been changed to a gamma; it is true that there may have been times in the history of the Greek language when the difference in meaning was in any case minimal; but one has to present concrete reasons before emending a text such as this, where the primary incentive to make the emendation comes from the difficulty of understanding the present text. If one is able to understand that text, then there is no reason to make the change. We are assured in a technical passage from the works of Nicomachus <sup>4)</sup> that *ἐγγονός* did mean specifically a grandson at this time, and here the interesting doctrine is put forward that succession is only completed in the grandson, third in line. May Numenius have been aware of the same Pythagorean tradition?

What we shall discover in this chapter is that between the first God and the second (grandson or not), and between the second and the third, there exist two other levels, not indeed regarded as Gods for they are multiplicities rather than unities, but nevertheless an indispensable part of Numenius' system; without these it would become an arbitrary and unphilosophical misrepresentation of Plato, whom he purports to expound in his chief work, On the Good.

The following piece of evidence in Leemans' collection also serves to bring one closer to a five-fold interpretation of Numenian metaphysics. The first God appears to function on an intermediate level between Himself and the second, the second on a level between himself and the third.

"Numenius correlates the first intelligence and the principle of life, saying that it thinks in connexion with the second, and the

4) In Theologumena Arithmeticae, p.66, 1.10; an ancient tradition knew the son by the grandfather's name.



second he relates to the intellect, creating in the company of the third, while the third is related to what is *διανοούμενον*.<sup>5)</sup>

Thus the two divine functions, intellection and creation, are found to take place on a level between the Gods themselves.

Let us look for the moment at the three Gods themselves. Test.24 describes them first as father, creator, and creation, for, says Proclus, the cosmos itself is the third God. He also assumes that the craftsman of the Timaeus had been two-fold, representing a combination of goodness and creative power. However, the fragments prove that this latter is associated only with the second God, and so this may be regarded as the closest thing to the Platonic craftsman that Numenius has to offer.<sup>6)</sup> Thought of in terms of causes, one finds that these Gods are the ultimate formal power, the efficient force, and the final product respectively. It is scarcely strange that Numenius' divinities should appear to lack another material cause, for matter is regarded as evil in its own right, and it is goodness that connects Numenius' divinities.

Now of the three Gods the second appears to be closer to the conventional intellect, though both first and second are so described in Test.25, and the first alone in fr.25. The second is intimately connected with the heavens in fr.21, whence intelligence is sent down so that physical things may have life. The use of intelligence in this instance shows quite clearly that the first and second Gods are

5) This does not of course imply that the third is *διανοούμενον* any more than the second is intelligence, or the first life. Intelligibility is simply the criterion of its order, as is life of goodness, or intelligence of ordering power.

6) Frs. 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29.

intelligent entities rather than simple "intelligence".

The fact that the second God is an intelligent entity which functions in the heavens, leads us to the solution of Leemans' problem concerning fragment 22. Here Numenius has described the relation of the first God to the second as that of a γεωργός to ὁ φύτεύων, the farmer and his hand. The one sows the seed of all soul upon all that are allotted a share in it, while the other plants it (φύτεύει), distributes it (διανέμει), and transplants it (μεταφύτεύει) in each of us. Thus one has the following pattern:

First God → seed → creator → seed → us

The importance of this will be described shortly, but our immediate concern is Numenius' reason for calling his second God a law-giver (νομοθέτης) in this context. Like Albinus Numenius associates his second God with the order of the heavens, where it is the principle of intelligent motion. Our thinker is not uninterested in astrology as his fragments on immortality prove, <sup>7)</sup> and that the heavens regulate life on earth is no less the contention of astrology than that the heavens regulate time. Since the second God is clearly responsible for the distribution of the seeds of life and order to use, then he is no less our law-giver than the origin of that seed. It was Moses, not God, who was the law-giver of the Jews, he through whom the law was passed down.

That the first God cannot be regarded as a law-giver is evident from the fact that it shares the same transcendence and the same freedom from motion as the first God of Albinus. For the former quality one may point to fragments 26, 11, and 20, where the terms "unknown", "desolate",

7) Test. 42 - 47.

and "simple" respectively are used to describe Him; for the latter one should look to fragment 21, where He is described as "inert", and 24, where one finds the phrase " τὴν προσέστηκεν τῷ πρώτῳ ἁπλοῦς." "

The exact status of the third God is a little difficult to ascertain. We have seen it described as the cosmos itself, the creation of the first via the second but more specifically of the second itself, and that in connexion with which the second creates.<sup>8)</sup> This last description does not entail the relationship's being any more than one of subject to object. However, fragment 20 shows the third God in a slightly different light. In contrast to the unity, transcendence, and indivisibility of the first God, it is claimed that the second and third are mutually inseparable, they are one; it is only because of the contact with matter and its dwelling therein that the two are split. What exactly does Numenius mean by this close connexion of second and third Gods?

Now in the case of a Pythagorean the obvious answer would be to suppose that a dyad, a double God, should be placed below the first simple one (or One.). On the other hand, Numenius' dyad appears to be matter itself, and this is confirmed by the very same fragment (20) and by Test.30 (p.91, 1.9 Leemans). Perhaps Numenius postulates two dyads, or perhaps matter imparts its duality to the second and third Gods. The latter suggestion appears more likely, harmonises with a reasonable interpretation of the Parmenides, 2nd and 3rd hypotheses, and bears a certain resemblance to Eudorus' doctrine of a second one which is opposed to the dyad.<sup>9)</sup>

8) Test. 24 - 25.

9) Simplicius, Phys. p.181, see ch. IX

Suspensions that the second and third God(s) receives its duality from matter are apparently confirmed by the statement "coming into contact with matter it unites (  $\epsilon\upsilon\omega\alpha$  ) it, but is split by it." Itself a principle of unity, it is nevertheless divided by that which it unites. Could it be that Numenius is bearing in mind Timaeus 35a, where God forms a compound of the divided and the undivided essences to produce the world-soul? A one and a dyad (second God and matter) are fused to make an intermediate nature, allowing divisibility to soul and form to matter.

That we are considering soul in fragment 20 is apparently proved by the fact that the lower God(s) takes care of matter, as soul does of body in the Phaedrus 246b, where it is also said to wander about the heavens. In taking care of matter it becomes  $\alpha\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$   $\epsilon\delta\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$  and is no longer ranged with the intelligible. It "touches upon the perceptible, encircles it, and draws it out into its own particular character." This conforms with what we are told about Numenius' concept of soul, which, being that which holds the body together, is closely connected with the surface area, though extended inwards, <sup>10)</sup> and comes to be a geometrical entity. <sup>11)</sup> It is responsible for the body's cohesion, and we find in Test. 29 the use of the terms  $\sigma\upsilon\upsilon\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ ,  $\sigma\upsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ , and  $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\upsilon\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\nu$ . Here in fr. 20 we see a force descending upon matter and moulding it into shape, an external force genuinely comparable with a craftsman.

But if the second God is really a soul, then it must surely be a rational soul. Numenius' matter has a soul of its own, and this is

10) Test. 29.

11) Test. 31 - 32.

described in fr.20 as an "appetitive character", and one cannot conceive of his third God as being soul-less. The third is no longer rational like the second, for it is directed towards matter, and since it is presumably not evil like matter, one might credit it with the one remaining type of soul, the spirited kind. Such an analysis, however, probably goes far beyond Numenius' intentions.

The stage in the creation which follows the splitting up of second and third Gods seems to be depicted in fragment 25. It describes the second God as double, himself creating his own idea and the cosmos, being its craftsman: "then he is entirely contemplative."

Numenius sees the creation of the world-soul in the Timaeus as the creation of his own pattern by the craftsman, and envisages the creation of the physical world as coming next in line. Then, having brought into being this third God, he may withdraw into himself and return to his contemplation in the heaven,<sup>12)</sup> separate from this new God.

It is now time to examine the place of the idea in Numenius' system. In the same fragment it is claimed that:

"If the essence and the idea is a thing intelligible, and the intellect is admitted to be ~~posterior~~ prior to and responsible for this, then this very thing (i.e. intellect) has been found to be the good."

Essence and the idea are intelligible, and their cause is the first intelligence, which is also the good. Essence and idea are spoken of in one breath, and one may presume their identity. They

12) Fr.20, ἀπερίσπτος, may be compared with fr.21, περιωπή, both recalling Politicus 272e5, where the helmsman returns to his watch-tower.

are of the same nature as the first intelligence, but one might be right, seeing that he clearly occupies a stage higher than them, being logically and causally prior, to place them at one stage below, the stage where the first's intellection takes place in contact with the second; for they will surely be apprehensible to the second as to the first.

Now if one is to find the essence and idea of the first God intermediate between Him and the second, then one has surely to place the essence of the second between him and the third, being on the same plain as his creative act. For the relationship of *γένεσις* to *οὐσία* is analogous to that of second God to first, and it even seems that *γένεσις* may be termed the *οὐσία* of the second.<sup>13)</sup> Indeed it appears that the term *γένεσις* has been very loosely applied, for Numenius sums up the results of fragment 25 as follows:

"... let these be the four; the first God, the good-in-itself; his imitator the good creator; and essence ( *οὐσία* ), one of the first, another of the second; whose imitation is the fine world, beautified by participation in the beautiful."

In place of the word "becoming", whose relationship to the creator was previously analogous to that of essence to the first, we have the essence of the second. In spite of Numenius' explicit reference to four terms, he has listed five separate items: God I; essence I; God II; essence II; physical world. The essence of the second must surely be some kind of formal principle, analogous to the ideas, but on an immanent rather than a transcendental level. As it is referred

13) p.141, 1.5.

to as "coming-to-be", one might identify it with the ordered activity which takes place at a level intermediate between second and third Gods. Just as in Test.25, one found two activities between first and seconds, and second and third Gods, so here one finds two *νοήματα*.

Now as we have seen before the first God is seen in fr.22 to sow the seed of all soul into the things destined to partake of it, while the second is responsible for the distribution and general maintenance of it. Could the seed of life be analogous to, or representative of the formal principle, being handed down first to the second God, then to this world?

The clearest exposition of this pattern comes in fragment 27. Here the creator is likened to a helmsman, who drives a ship in the middle of the sea, and although the ship lies on the water, yet the course of his mind lies up through the heavens, and he guides the ship by its rudder. This is the way in which the creator sails upon matter to which he is bonded by harmony. He sits upon harmony as though upon a ship sailing on a sea of matter; and he directs this harmony, navigating by the ideas, and looking up to God through the heavens.

Here the intermediate position of the second God between the material world and the first God is once again in evidence, as are the two formal elements which lie in the intervals, now described as the ideas and harmony respectively. We are thus left in no doubt as to the applicability of the term "ideas" to the transcendent formal principle, nor does harmony seem foreign to our concept of an immanent formal element at the fourth rank, the position, one will remember, of Poseidon's harmonising activities in Maximus Tyrius.<sup>14)</sup>

14) IV, 8, h. Hobein, see ch. XIII.

We have seen the dual direction of the creator clearly expressed in fr.27. He sails upon the ship on the sea, but his eyes are fastened on the heavens. Now in fragment 21, it is said that through the second God *στολος* comes to us, as mind is sent down to all those things destined to partake of it. When God turns and looks to each of us, then our bodies have life, but when he turns back to his own *περιωπή*, all these things are quenched, and mind lives on to enjoy a prosperous life.

Bearing fragment 27 in mind, we appear to have here a picture of the second God now turning upwards to the intelligible world, now down to physical existence. But are we really talking of the second God rather than the first? Initially it must be noted that the term "intelligence" or "mind" is not used of either God, at least not at 1.20, p.138 Leemans. It is sent down to earth, and therefore it must be sent by something, and that something is presumably not the inert first God; it is therefore surely the second. What is here called *νοος* must be the seminal principle, the seed of fr.22, and it must surely be the second God that is sending it down to us, and then withdrawing it, as though its light were obscured by an eclipse. One may compare a passage from the Corpus Hermeticum where the sun is found to be an image of the heavenly creator-God.<sup>15)</sup> It is the sun which Numenius thinks of here.

Thus while in fragment 22 it was a seed that was passed from the first God, via the second, down to us, while in fragment 27 it was the ordering principle that was passed down to the creator and then to the

15) Fr. XXI, 2, Nock-Festugière.



material world, here it is intelligence that is sent down upon us via ( *διὰ τούτου* p.138, 1.19) the creator.

One is by no means bound to regard the system of Numenius as five-fold, but it is hoped that it has not proved unprofitable pointing out that there are means of connecting one God with another in his system, and that these give rise to two intermediate levels between his three divinities. Great advances have indeed been made since the times of Plutarch, when intelligence, soul, and body were first seen clearly to be split by two intermediate stages.<sup>16)</sup> These advances are to carry the path of philosophy on from Platonism into Plotinianism, to the beginning of a new and different discipline.

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16) De Facie, 943a, and more especially 945a, where these two extra stages have a formal character.

CONCLUSION.

The five-fold pattern did not die completely with Numenius. A striking example of it may be found in the Hermetic Corpus, where God eternity, the cosmos, time, and becoming are viewed as five distinct elements of reality. <sup>1)</sup> God creates eternity, eternity the cosmos, the cosmos time, and time becoming. As in Numenius two further elements are interposed between the transcendental, the heavenly, and the worldly. The link between eternity and the ideas is strong; strong too is that between time and immanent order.

This confirms, once again, that the pattern belongs to a tradition, a tradition that may be traced back before the time of Plutarch. To trace it to one particular thinker is not possible. It relies upon the whole course of Platonist philosophy, and, at times, upon that of other philosophies also. Without authoritative passages in the dialogues of the Master no such tradition could have flourished at the time of Plutarch; without Speusippus the important Parmenides might have been forgotten. One requires the work of Xenocrates to put into words the Old Academic understanding of the universe; one requires Posidonius to appreciate this understanding, to make certain concessions to it, and to add to it from his experience as a Stoic. Antiochus is needed to provide a solid epistemological basis for a revival of dogmatism, and the doxographers help to find a justification for present ideas in their conformity with the views of the old masters.

What we have studied in these five-fold classifications is not a doctrine as such, but a way of viewing the universe; the

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1) Cor.Herm. XI, 2, Nock-Festugiere p.147, 1.8ff.

central position of the soul, at the level of the microcosm at least, assures one that this concept of reality is unusually subjective. At the level of the macrocosm the central position is eventually given to the heavenly intellect or motive God, unto whom it is man's duty to liken himself.

It should not be thought strange that a five-fold pattern of thought should have existed and flourished. We are wont to think in terms of dualism, monism, polytheism, etc., and in Middle Platonism, and more especially in Plutarch and Albinus, one finds a more sophisticated attempt to give a number to reality, an attempt similar to that of Plato himself in the Sophist. It was a principal tenet of Platonism that it was unbecoming to postulate an infinity of worlds; to postulate just one aspect of existence was a little difficult, as the listener to Parmenides must have felt; to postulate two opposite principles along Zoroastrian lines was forbidden.

It was decided that the elements of love and strife in the world demanded that neither its unity nor its duality should be forgotten. They demanded that a combined world should be seen to arise from the mixture of the one and the dyad, but also that the principles themselves, the one and the dyad, should not be lost completely in the mixture. And to these demands the five positive hypotheses of the Parmenides bear witness.

Even today such words as dualism and polytheism reflect an ability to see the world in mathematical terms. The author has found it particularly easy to conceive of a five-fold reality, and to extract from a long period of philosophical history some

examples of similar conceptions among Platonists. On the other hand Theiler has felt that much of the philosophy of the first two centuries A.D. is based upon a four-fold metaphysic, and he inserts several diagrams into his article Gott und Seele im Kaiserzeitlichen Denken <sup>2)</sup> to prove his case. From this apparent conflict of opinion, one learns to realise the strong danger that one's own ability to view the world in terms of a given number of components may cause one to see similar leanings in the philosophy of others.

It is a fact, however, that Plutarch spends considerable time on an explanation of the Delphic E in numerical terms, giving a lengthy and varied exposition of the cosmic merits of the number five; his affection for this number is revealed elsewhere in his writings, an affection shared by Albinus, who uses five-fold descriptions of each of his first-principles. Maximus followed the traditions which these thinkers helped to form, while Numenius adapts them to his own ends. Theon and Seneca supply evidence valuable to our case, while a short passage from Arius offers some scope for insight into the events of the first century B.C.

It was surely at about this time that a more numerological approach to philosophy arose, as may be seen in the works of Philo of Alexandria, who favoured four, six, seven, and ten, but paid little or no attention to five. In Seneca emphasis was placed upon the number of causes that each school postulated. Arius curiously avoids seeing four-fold divisions in Plato. Exactly what line Antiochus took is obscure; from Cicero <sup>3)</sup> one learns

2) Entretiens III, 1955, pp.65-91, reprinted in Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus, Berlin 1966, pp.104-123.

3) The relevant passages are Ac.Po. 26, cf.39, Fin. IV, 12.

to suspect that he was in some difficulties over the question of the number of elements which should be postulated, but one may feel that he was more likely to fall back upon the Stoicism of Mnesarchus than upon the Lyceum.

The place of Antiochus must remain a mystery; even the importance of his influence is difficult to ascertain. Cicero alone displays great enthusiasm for his teachings, and the philosophical tastes of Cicero did not always accord with those of others. The line of Platonic interpretation appears to run through Posidonius rather than through his eclectic counterpart in the Academy. And were the two really so different in their views?

Perhaps it would be more profitable to suggest that they were normally interested in different subjects. Cognition was the speciality of Antiochus, while Posidonius thought it easier to think in terms of the heaven or the soul. Indeed his mind was centred on the heart of the five-fold vision, and one may suspect that it was from his understanding of the world, nourished by his reading of Old Academic works, that the system found in Middle Platonism developed.

Almost always interest in five-fold classification has been detected alongside interest in the Philebus of Plato, a work whose two five-fold classifications are sufficiently obscure to stimulate interest in any items of metaphysical thought which may lay behind them. For Plotinus the work was not a great authority,<sup>4)</sup> but its importance is revealed again in his successors. And it was they who showed the greater dependence upon genuine Middle Platonist thought.

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4) The conclusion of H.R.Schwyzler, Plotin und Platons Philebus, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, xxiv (1970) pp.181-193.

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