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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

PAM HISTORY

Project Analysis Series No. 24
February 20, 1946

STRESSES AND STRAINS OF CENTER LIFE

By

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(Editor's Note: This report was written by the Granada Community Analyst several months after leaving the center. It represents an attempt on his part to look back over the relocation center experience and to describe some of the chief points of strain in staff-evacuee relations. It is an unusually successful analysis of basic factors in the problem which WRA faced in securing the cooperation of evacuees in the agency's program. It is applicable not only to the Granada Relocation Center, but also to all the other relocation centers).

INTRODUCTION: ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY ANALYST

My work, whether by personal inclination or by the necessity of the situation, developed into a liaison function between the evacuee community (particularly through the medium of the Community Council and the Evacuee Information Office) and the administration. I found myself constantly in the role of interpreting WRA policies emanating from the Washington Office and the center administrative staff to the evacuees; and of interpreting evacuee attitudes and reactions to the administrative staff, principally by means of my weekly reports and through participation in various conferences. Misinterpretation on both sides was based on certain fixed attitudinal patterns and on the paradoxes of the situation in which the total community was involved. This liaison function meant talking for the administrative staff and its policies when meeting with the evacuees talking for the evacuees when meeting with the administration; and at the same time attempting to identify and give conscious expression to the essential truth in each position.

Thus, I never became fully identified without reservation with either group and so missed that sense of personal and unqualified acceptance by either side. This, as I interpreted my function, was inevitable. I only mention it here to point out that I must have missed a great deal of importance to students which could only have been obtained by a more complete identification with and acceptance by the evacuee community.

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH CONDITIONED FIXED REACTION PATTERNS

When the writer arrived in Granada Center in January, 1944, there was a very noticeable and fixed division of the community, both socially and professionally, into evacuees and administrative personnel. This division had expressed itself in behavior patterns of mutual suspicion and distrust, especially on the part of the evacuees. There was, on the part of those appointed personnel charged with responsibility for relocation, a behavior pattern of annoyance and even dislike. There was annoyance and aggravation that, in spite of all the best laid plans of the resettlement program and all the opportunities developed for evacuees east of the Rockies, they for some obtuse reason did not respond. There was dislike, as you dislike that which thwarts your success and achievement of a personal goal. On the part of the evacuees, the behavior pattern was one of resistance to any change in the status quo and of distrust engendered by the watchful vigil necessary to prevent any change, whether through fiat or act of persuasion.

Passive resistance to change might well sum up their behavior pattern. It was focused on the WRA administrative staff as the aggressor who was always attempting to bring about that change.

How this came about can only be understood by preceding events. I am told by both evacuees and appointed personnel that the first few months of residence in the center (although filled with many difficult problems) was the most pleasant and cooperative period of center life as far as working relationship between evacuees and the appointed staff was concerned. The important thing is that people accepted the center as a place of residence. They also accepted their status of dependency (with, for many, an emotional content of satisfaction) for the duration of the war, adjusted their lives to it, and set about making the most of it. The appointed staff likewise accepted their duration-of-the-war status with its emotional content of job security for an indefinite time. As yet, relocation had not arisen as a threat to both groups, and the evacuees' normal emotions connected with reassuming individual responsibility for their families had not been aroused.

In the evacuee community only the tough-minded of the Nisei recognized that center life was not a solution and that the abnormal life developed was detrimental to the group individually and collectively. They began, voluntarily, to make plans to move on to a normal community.

Many accepted center life as a satisfactory means of escape from the economic struggle. Many (principally Issei) accepted it as a satisfactory means of escape from the decisions, overt acts, and expression of allegiance either to Japan or to the United States which they would have been compelled to make in a normal community. This, I am convinced, was a secondary reaction to evacuation. Left in

their home communities, it would not have developed except in rare cases. To them, however, the center once established became a small island of neutrality, "a twilight zone in which all objects are gray."

But no matter how satisfactory the situation was in various degrees, the evacuees increasingly resented the indignity and loss which they suffered through evacuation. They felt that because of their co-operative action they left the West Coast in a fanfare of seeming good-will from the West Coast residents. After leaving the Coast they began to hear rumors of an increase in anti-Japanese sentiment, of pillaging of stored goods, and of betrayal of trust by Caucasians. They then began to feel that they had been taken in and had been "suckers" for submitting so readily to evacuation. With fuller realization of what evacuation had cost them in capital goods, earning power, and legal and civil rights, their resentment increased. It was expressed not only against the government (with WRA as the nearest tangible symbol) but against their own Japanese American Citizens League which had been so active in influencing them to accept evacuation without resistance.

Registration.* Into this atmosphere of growing resentment, registration burst. It served as a focus for all the pent-up anger of the previous year. The compulsory necessity of making a decision brought the Issei forcibly out of their "twilight zone" to the hard realities of life in which they had to choose between allegiance to the country of their birth and the country of their residence which had compelled them to evacuate. The situation was complicated, of course, by the fact that they could not, by American law, apply, even if they wished, for citizenship in the country to which they were being asked to pledge allegiance. The added paradox of requiring Nisei (American citizens) to re-affirm allegiance to their own country further aggravated the situation and increased the resentment. They inferred that they, out of all the racial groups, had been condemned before the trial and were being considered guilty until they had proved themselves innocent. Emotionally they felt rejected; legally they felt unjustly accused.

All the pent-up resentment against the discrimination of the past focused on registration. While they recognized the paradox of their own situation, they failed to recognize the reasons for this move on the part of WRA which was trying to condition a favorable response from American public opinion. They did not recognize the counter unfavorable effect on public opinion of their own expressions of resentment and their vacillation in answering the questions. They were unable to see their situation in perspective in relation to the hope and fears of the country engaged in a war the outcome of which was fraught with uncertainty. Likewise they failed to realize the effect of their actions in conditioning the attitudes toward them of the appointed staff responsible for their welfare.

That this unfortunate crisis resulted from a failure on the part of WRA to understand fully the emotional feelings of the residents and

*The registration program for all evacuees over 17 years of age was instituted and carried out by both the Authority and the Army for the purpose of getting basic data about the evacuees. The Authority intended to use the information for its leave-clearance program which was to determine whether individual evacuees were eligible from the standpoint of national security to relocate on indefinite leave. The Army was using the information in recruiting volunteers for the Japanese American combat teams - Editor's Note.

to secure their participation in its planning is now generally recognized. But at the time, the failure resulted in the evacuees (with their entire attention centered on themselves) not seeing their position in perspective. They began to question the motives of WRA and to suspect some secret plan of WRA not disclosed at the time of registration.

This evacuee attitude of being wary of WRA policies became an obsession, which resulted in a negative response to practically every innovation. Instead of a smooth meshing of the gears of center organization, the gears often worked against each other at every change of policy or change of emphasis in policy. It might almost be likened to a tug of war with WRA personnel and policies pulling in one direction and the evacuee community pulling in the other. It also had the appearance of a football game with WRA staff in a huddle calling signals and then lining up over the ball in an effort to push it across, to make an end run or pass, or even to punt when the evacuee line was working well and successfully to repel all attempts to advance the ball. This figure is more apt than may seem apparent at first thought. There are three similarities. First, the purpose of secret signals is to insure the surprise and confusion of the opposition. Although this practice was used in a lesser degree as it went on, the preparation of the evacuee community to receive and participate in a new policy always contained the element of urgency and haste which precluded intelligent discussion. Second, in order to advance the ball through a pass, one or more members of the team must filter down into the opposition territory to be in a position to receive the ball. Since any member of the appointed staff who succeeded in gaining the confidence of a segment of the evacuee community was in a position at least to receive such a pass, there was difficulty in getting complete confidence. Third, on a number of occasions it was necessary for the administration to punt out on the fourth down without making the yardage.

Segregation. Again, in segregation, the large picture of their relation to American public opinion as a whole was lost on the evacuees as was the effect of center attitudes on their life in the future. Or if it was not lost, it was geared to the uncertain outcome of the war. The majority thought only in terms of the present and refused to believe that WRA was concerned with their best welfare in the future.

Employment. After segregation had been completed, the Issei more or less settled down again to a vigil of waiting for the end of the war. Their principal concern was with center problems. Life was focused on the family, barrack, block, messhall, school, hospital, religious life, games of go and shogi and center employment. Some jobs were preferred to others. The messhall jobs are a case in point. They were preferred because the work was light, was in the block, and was supervised by evacuees. Block residents resisted being forced to accept work in the slaughter house, on the farm, and at the coal unloading station. Jobs in these places were less desirable, more difficult, and farther from the residence blocks.

The evacuees were greatly concerned when employment problems threatened the service at the hospital and the messhalls. But all efforts of the administration to place the burden of the employment problem on the evacuees and to get them to recruit workers for the less desirable jobs were countered with the statement, "The government put us here, and it is up to it to take care of us."

Among themselves, evacuees debated as to the fairness of the practice of some of their number who periodically took seasonal leave to earn money but left their families in the center for others to provide services for. They would then return in the winter to rest and refuse center employment. The same antagonism was shown toward bachelors who took seasonal leave in the summer and loafed in camp all winter, while other evacuees worked the year around at center wages to maintain normal services in the center for them.

It was suggested that no one be allowed to take seasonal leave who could not prove that he had been employed in the center for three months previously. It was also suggested that every one who went on seasonal leave pay a certain amount into a center-wide fund to be paid to the workers who remained in the center. Even if these suggestions had been carried out, the problem of maintaining the center in the summer when farming operations required more workers (though fewer were available) would not have been alleviated.

The evacuees who remained in the center the year around resented the administration's tendency to push the importance of farming which was interpreted as providing food for "seasonal leavers" in the winter. While the evacuees stressed the importance of maintaining routine center services in the face of the depleted manpower, they felt that more should not be expected of them.

In the case of the slaughter house workers the Council early set a precedent by agreeing to supplement the \$16 rate of pay with an additional \$3 per month from Council funds. This placed the slaughter house workers on an economic par with the doctors and others considered socially above them. In part it made up for the performance of an onerous and despised task allotted in Japan to the "Eta" group. This fund was paid out of a contribution of \$500 per year made to the Council by the Co-op for the welfare of center residents.

This practice set a precedent for a similar supplementing of wages of doctors and nurses in the fall of 1944 when relocation depleted the hospital staff. The Ishi Koen Kai was formed at this time to raise funds from center residents at the rate of five cents per person per month to increase the salary of doctors to \$50 and other hospital workers in proportion. It was also designed to offset the custom of doctors accepting money on the side as gifts from patients who could afford to pay.

When a shortage developed in manpower for an essential service supplying food or other needs of the evacuees, the administration often laid the problem in the lap of the Council and the Block Managers

with the statement, "This is your problem. Either find workers to haul coal and food, slaughter cattle, and nurse the sick, or go without this service. We have supplied the materials. It is up to you to provide the workers." After the ball had been tossed back and forth a few times, the evacuees usually accepted the fact and the job grudgingly. But, in every instance, resentment deepened toward the paradoxes of their lot and was usually focused on the administration of the center and WRA in general.

Problems Connected With Authority From The Top. The appointed staff which followed authority from the top down came to adopt the practice of following rules rigidly for their own personal security. As long as they followed the letter of the rule, they were, in a sense, relieved of responsibility for the result if it did not prove satisfactory. This may have been due to fear developed in the personnel by the rare but unpleasant incidents in other centers. Also, the "holier than thou" attitude of certain Washington officials did not foster creative thinking in the center. Whenever the center staff failed after using a method different from the one outlined, these officials would say, "If you had followed our advice, you wouldn't have got into trouble."

The maintenance of a peaceful center was accepted as the test of good administration. And good administration came to be accepted as the result of following the letter of the regulation.

WRA is an agency performing a task for which there is no precedent. It is self-evident, then, that, in such an unprecedented task, where so much responsibility for administrative direction exists at the top of the hierarchy, there must be close liaison between the Washington staff and the center. The adequacy of this liaison work may be judged not only by the phrasing of the policy but by the manner in which the policy was put into effect and the amount of time and effort given to preparing the evacuees for it.

Selective Service. As late as the early part of 1944, policies such as the "drafting of the Nisei" (the reinstitution of Selective Service for the Nisei) were put into effect with such speed as to condition a negative reaction. It may be argued that to have proceeded slowly might have caused reactions in the evacuee community which would have prejudiced the action of the War Department in accepting Nisei for the armed services. It may also be argued that once the War Department decides on a policy, it announces it without preparation or recourse. But from the point of view of the effect on the evacuee community, the reinstitution of Selective Service for the Nisei was a bombshell generating sudden reactions which might have been avoided if the evacuee community had been carried along in the thinking.

Relocation. While evacuees maintained that their reason for resisting WRA was the inefficient manner and lack of appreciative understanding with which its policies were put into effect, this can be only partially true. For no matter how carefully a policy or a program was introduced, it inevitably met with resistance if it effected the status quo of center life. It was resisted if it meant a change in the evacuees' essential position of passive neutrality and their

accepted and desired determination to remain in the center for the duration of the war. Granted that with proper preparation of the people through their chosen representatives for any inter-center changes, center life would have proceeded with less friction. But because relocation, the most vital part of the WRA program, went counter to the wishes of the majority of the population, there was friction and resistance. Resistance thus became an obsession which extended beyond the program of relocation to center issues as well.

In the summer of 1944, Dr. E. Adamson Hoebel (who was then Community Analyst) developed a well laid program to get people to talk about relocation. This program had been introduced by the evacuees themselves to prepare people in advance for the relocation program. Dr. Hoebel succeeded admirably in getting them to talk through his development of the evacuee-initiated program. However, their principal concern was to tell why it was impossible to accept relocation as a possibility. Accepting it in principle, they revealed, meant a change in thinking which would undermine their determination to keep the status quo.

Up to the time that I left the center in July, 1945, only one group (the Community Council under the leadership of Dr. Ichibashi and with the support of the Evacuee Information Bureau) had the tenacity openly to advocate relocation as an accepted policy. And this group met with so much criticism that it had to back-track and adopt a more passive attitude of helping to iron out some of the minor kinks in relocation. People, even at that late date, were in no mood to be stampeded into relocation. Acceptance could only come about through gradual recession from the evacuee concept of center residence for the duration, or from the actual end of the war itself.

One might sensibly reason that the evacuees would have come to accept relocation much sooner if every issue had been approached in open discussion between the evacuees and the appointed staff, with both on the same footing. Into this open discussion could have come all the center policies, programs, and WRA thinking about relocation and the necessity for it. The appointed staff could have presented the position of WRA, admitted the need for change when need was seen, and overcome rumors with facts. However, the doubts, misgivings, and uncertainties in the minds of the evacuees would have complicated such an open discussion and the attaining of the goal of relocation acceptance.

These emotional problems stemmed from the unique position of the evacuees, outside public opinion, and from the uncertainties of events in a world at war, a war the outcome of which none could foresee or control. There is also grave doubt that any amount of free discussion could have changed the attitudes of a group of people from an accepted neutrality to a willing choice (come what may) which would forever cast their lot with the side that had rejected them and discriminated against them.

In a number of private conversations, responsible Nisei and Issei pointed out that a group of fanatic Issei "on the hill" (the local name for the evacuee residence area of Granada Center) who believed that Japan was going to win the war were the main obstacle to the

relocation of others. No one mentioned names, or wanted his name mentioned, but each was convinced that this group served as a powerful deterrent to relocation.

Given the situation in which the resentment of the evacuees was expressed in resistance to most WRA policies, one could reason that the solution lay in the hands of the personnel and their treatment of the problem. If they had accepted this resentment as natural, kept their heads in every interview with the evacuees, given them the opportunity to express that resentment without counter-charge or recrimination, and maintained a positive and healthy attitude toward the realities of the relocation program, the evacuees would have gradually adjusted their thinking to a healthier point of view. But that would have required a staff of trained psychiatrists (who would probably have bungled the routine, business end of the work). We did not have such a staff. We had one which was subject to the same mixture of feelings of anger, fear, guilt, insecurity, and good-will as the evacuees themselves. Sometimes it is amazing that the appointed personnel kept their heads as well as they often did among the uncertainties of the situation and the pressure from the top to get on with the job of relocation.

CENTER POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

Assembly Center Origins.

Granada Center was made up largely of evacuees from Merced and Santa Anita Assembly Centers. There was, of course, a movement between the centers to reunite family groups. Then several hundred were transferred to Granada from Tule Lake at the time of segregation, and five hundred came from Jerome at the time that center closed.

The people from the Merced Assembly Center were the first to arrive and therefore had the first choice of housing. Whether by choice or by administration planning, this group settled in the blocks on the west and north side of the center, with the exception of Block 6E where construction was not complete. These blocks were very accessible to the administration area and the Co-op. However, the southwest corner was farthest from the hospital and the grade school which indicates that the administration defined certain areas into which they could move. Small locality groups tended to settle in one block, or two or three adjacent blocks, where they continued their close social relationships.

When the Santa Anita group arrived, they filled in the vacancies left in the blocks by the Merced group and settled the blocks south east of the high school and on the extreme east side of the center.

The Santa Anita group was more homogeneous than the Mercedians. All came from a much larger Japanese population which had been located in a more or less segregated area of Los Angeles. However, there were no indications of any particular street or community group being carried over to the blocks in which the Santa Anitans settled. By contrast, this settling together was very noticeable among the people from Merced Assembly Center. Whole blocks were settled by former residents of Marin County, Sonoma County, Merced County, and Sacramento. At least two-thirds of 9H block was made up of former

residents of Livingston, California, with the balance from nearby Cressey and other neighboring towns.

The Merced Assembly Center groups were characterized by their rural origin. The people were made up of vegetable farmers, fruit and nut growers, farm managers, and farm laborers. The Buddhist religion predominated among them, except in 9H Block which was primarily Christian.

The Santa Anita Assembly Center group was characterized by the urban origin of its people who were gardeners, produce dealers, skilled laborers, and small business men. The Christian religion predominated among them.

Age, Sex, and Citizenship Distribution. The age and sex distribution of the community was never normal, even at the beginning of the center, due to the influence of the manner of Japanese immigration to America. Immigration began with adult, able-bodied, single men, and was followed by the advent of younger, picture-brides several years later. This made for an average spread of fifteen years between the ages of husband and wife. Thus the typical family was composed of young children of middle-aged mothers and much older fathers. In a normal community this would have resulted in a high dependency rate of families within a few years when the fathers became unemployable.

Evacuation thrust dependency upon them. A tremendous block to re-settlement was the insecurity felt by the many older fathers in starting over again after suffering so much loss and in re-establishing their families at a time when they were least physically able to do so.

This was apparent by August, 1944, when Dr. Hoebel wrote, "For re-settlement and future management of this community, the important fact is that there are relatively few family heads (males) in the vigorous age of initiative and responsibility left. Of the 2909 males in the population only 665 are between 20-54 years old. Of these only 373 are citizens. On the other hand, we have 903 males who are over 55 years of age. They constitute 31% of the total male population. At the other extreme of the age scale, we have 2575 dependent boys and girls 19 years old and under...Conclusion: Physically the residual population consists mainly of over-aged Issei and dependent under-aged Nisei."*

Also there were nearly 500 single, elderly males who prior to evacuation were nominally attached to some family group but were mostly migratory workers.

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

The Block Managers Assembly being the first evacuated organization formed in the center on a block by block basis more or less set the pattern for the later Community Council. The jockeying for positions of leadership which went on in the selection of the Block Managers (the usual practice was for the block to select three, and the administration to choose one of these three) resulted in the

* Washington file number 94 of Granada Community Analysis Reports.

Nisei obtaining the majority of these jobs. This was due to their facility in speaking English and their past experience as "go-betweens" in transacting business for the older Issei population, who nevertheless retained the final voice in family and economic matters.

When the regulation was later made requiring the establishment of a Community Council the provision was also made that no alien could hold this office. The provision caused a good deal of resentment in the Issei population, and there developed a struggle for leadership between the Issei and the Nisei. To offset this tendency, the Nisei among the Block Managers said, "Since the Issei cannot become Councilmen, it does not seem fair that we Nisei should dominate both groups. So, we will resign as Block Managers and turn this function over to the Issei." This was done. As a result the Block Managers Assembly came to be composed of Issei, and the Council, of Nisei. This may have been satisfactory as a compromise solution but it continued to make for friction between the two groups in defining their functions. If the Block Managers were subordinated to the Council, the Nisei were getting a break. If the Council was subordinated to the Block Managers, the Issei were getting a break. This rivalry was only partially alleviated by the later removal of the provision which had required all Councilmen to be Nisei.

In the meantime, although the Block Managers Assembly was designed to be an administrative group, and the Council, a policy making group, both groups tended to discuss and pass judgment on policy matters. This was even more confusing to the evacuee community than to the administration. One evacuee, in expressing this overlapping, said, "One person goes to the Block Managers about a situation and says 'fix-em-up;' another goes to the Council about the same situation and says 'fix-em-up.' So they both try to 'fix-em-up' and only make it worse."

In general, the Council failed to gain the support of either the evacuee community or the administrative staff. When they adequately represented the will of the people regarding an administrative policy, it was usually a sharp negative response or drastic modification. This displeased administrative personnel and led to the Council being regarded with annoyance. As a result, it was left pretty much alone by the administration, except, as Councilmen expressed it, "When they had some unpleasant job they wanted done." This job on rare occasions was presented to the Council by a sudden attendance at its meeting, for a half-hour or more, of a dozen or more of the appointed staff. They would present the problem and then abruptly exit leaving the job in the lap of the Council. Occasionally the opportunity was given for discussion, but usually the problem was presented and then left for the Council to discuss among themselves.

The Block Managers, being chosen by the administration from a list of three selected by the people and paid by the administration, felt a greater responsibility toward the administration. The Block Managers and the administration had one predominant desire in common. That was "to maintain a peaceful community." More and more as time went on, the administrative staff leaned on the Block Managers not only regarding administrative functions but also for advice on policy-making functions.

The Block Managers were the ones who could get things done in the blocks for the residents' comfort in return for insuring that the residents remained fairly tractable to administrative policies. The system has been likened among evacuees to the English Colonial system with the Block Managers assuming the position of the Maharajahs of India who ruled over small segments of the country, saw to it that the people remained tractable, and at the same time wheedled concessions out of the government in return for their services. The Council was also likened to the Indian Congress which was chosen by and represented (in theory) the native population, but which had little power to bring about important and permanent changes in the lot of the native population.

As a result, constant rivalry existed between the two groups. The most heated discussions in each group developed about Council-Block Manager relationships.

The question of division of function, however, remained more or less dormant until July, 1944, when the newly elected Council Chairman brought it out into the open. As one evacuee said, "The new Council Chairman seems to enjoy being the center of a controversy and usually regards himself as the hero of the piece." Copies of the administrative regulations relating to the functions of the Block Managers and of the Council were said to have been inadvertently left on the Chairman's table after the meeting of the Council on a Thursday. They were there the next Monday when the Block Managers met. The latter felt that the copies had been left on purpose and became very angry. They charged the Council with attempting to revive old issues and to undermine the status of the Block Managers. The Council charged that the Block Managers were residents just like others, and as such they did not represent the people as they often assumed to do. The ball was tossed back and forth many times with various individuals trying to bring about a reconciliation through mediation between the two groups. The Chairman of the Council had a majority of the Council behind him, but fully one-third were opposed to his methods. Finally a combined meeting was held in which the proverbial hatchet was given its proverbial burial in the interest of all working for the welfare of the people.

However, the issue broke out anew a month later when the Council Chairman, during a combined meeting, ruled that the Block Managers could not vote on the issue under question since they were not representatives of the people. The Block Managers walked out in a body. From then on, there was no reconciliation until the end of the Council term when the new Council was elected and the former Chairmen relocated.

During this time, center residents (or those who were concerned at all) were either on one side or the other. Those of the appointed staff who knew anything about the rift generally favored the Block Managers and criticized the Council. Even after a new Council was formed, there was never an actual reconciliation but only a withdrawal from discussing the rivalry. Later the Council refused to invite the Block Managers as such into plans for the Inter-Center conference or for the selection of delegates to it.

When the new Council began to be more interested in relocation and to reorganize the Evacuee Information Bureau, it was the Block Managers who were most vocal in criticizing the mass meeting at which Dr. Ichihashi spoke under the auspices of the Council. This meeting proved, however, to be one of the most important incidents in shaping the attitudes of the people to a more favorable acceptance of relocation. It might be concluded that while the Block Managers were concerned with maintaining a peaceful center, they did not consider relocation to be a part of that task. Several evacuees stated in private that the Block Managers, especially about seven of the leading members, opposed relocation. For that matter, the Council probably never had even a majority committed to resettlement, but they did have a few influential leaders who were and who succeeded in getting some action from the group.

A partial solution to the problem of defining the function of each of the two groups was attempted by certain Councilmen. It happened that both the Council and the Block Managers were under the supervision of the Assistant Director who was in charge of Community Management. The Councilmen in question proposed that the Council be taken out of this Division and made responsible to the Assistant Director who was in charge of Administration. The reason for this choice was purely personal. These Councilmen felt that they had a better relationship with the latter than they did with the former. On a functional basis, it was recognized that the Block Managers, being concerned with center maintenance, should have originally been set up under the Division of Administrative Management, while the Council, being concerned with over-all policy, should have been under the Division of Community Management. However, so much had happened and so many fixed patterns had been forced of a personal nature that it did not seem practical to make the drastic change at so late a date.

One thing more. The development of community government in Granada and the relocation of the thinking and vigorous Nisei resulted in the election of less and less capable men and women to the Council. A block committee would be formed to secure nominees. The problem was to get the best man in the block to accept the nomination. The best man would be approached by the committee. He would often refuse. Then the next best man would refuse and the next, until the committee finally nominated anyone who would accept the job.

In this connection it is worth noting that the Issei who were leaders in their communities before evacuation and to whom one would expect people to turn for center leadership practically abdicated all leadership. Many of them were parolees who had been picked up on suspicion because they were in positions of prominence. Some were prominent people who had assumed leadership in the Assembly Centers and for some reason had found themselves on a spot. Others just wanted to keep out of the limelight to avoid any suspicion. They often accepted responsible jobs in the hospital, the school, and the Co-op, or menial block jobs, but they steadfastly retreated from positions of leadership in community government. Some actually felt that they would be degrading their own status by associating with the calibre of men who made up the Council and the Block Managers. Although wanting no active part in shaping center policies, they continued to influence public opinion in their blocks through their own personal opinions.