

NEUTRALISM: its meaning and
significance in contemporary
international politics.



by

Peter Hazelip Lyon.



Abstract

Neutrality - dissociation from the Cold War - can take many forms.

As a doctrine it is to be found in its most comprehensive forms in Asia and Africa; and because its chief proponents are leaders of their countries, it is a profoundly pragmatic and eclectic doctrine. Yet it is deeply grounded in certain widespread hopes and fears, and is usually nourished by nationalism.

Neutralist foreign policies are shaped by, and yet have come to shape, the style and scope of Cold War rivalries. Six forms of policy neutrality may be distinguished. These are: new state neutrality; pioneer neutrality; neutralization; buffer status; traditional neutrality; and erstwhile isolationism. Each of these types of policy represents different ways in which a state can become neutralist, and it is suggested how many states fall into each of these classes. Nearly three quarters of the neutralist states in early 1961 are new states which have become independent since 1945. Many of them practise policies which are in some respects like those of three pioneer neutralists - India, Yugoslavia and Egypt.

Since 1945 neutrality has been of growing significance internationally.

"The study of general contacts and relations and of general resemblances and differences is the only avenue to a general perspective without which neither profit nor pleasure can be extracted from historical research."

Polybius, Book I, Chapter 4.

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Abbreviations*

A.A.A.P.S.S.	The Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science.
A.J.I.L.	The American Journal of International Law.
Akzin	Benjamin Akzin (ed.) - New States and International Organizations. A Report prepared on behalf of The International Political Science Association (U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris, 1955).
A.P.S.R.	The American Political Science Review.
B.Y.I.L.	The British Yearbook of International Law.
Campbell	John C. Campbell - Defense of the Middle East. Problems of American Policy (Frederick Praeger, New York, revised edition, 1960).
Cs.	Chapters.
C.S.M.	The Christian Science Monitor.
D.S.B.	The Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C., fortnightly).
Fifield	Russell H. Fifield - The Diplomacy of South-east Asia: 1945-1958 (Harper Bros., New York, 1958).
Goodwin	Geoffrey L. Goodwin - Britain and the United Nations (Oxford University Press for R.I.I.A., 1957).
J.M.H.	The Journal of Modern History (Chicago).
Lenczowski	George Lenczowski - The Middle East in World Affairs (Cornell University Press, New York, second edition, 1956).
M.S.P. 1961	The Mutual Security Program. Fiscal Year, 1961. A Summary Presentation. (Department of State, Washington, D.C., March 1960).
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht	L. Oppenheim (ed. by H. Lauterpacht) International Law, 2 vols., Longmans, 1948.

* This list does not include such familiar abbreviations as N.A.T.O., S.E.A.T.O., U.N., op.cit., etc.

Abbreviations (continued)

- O.U.P. Oxford University Press
- R.I.I.A. The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- The Middle East The Middle East. A Political and Economic Survey. 3rd edition, edited by Sir Reader Ballard (O.U.P. for R.I.I.A., London, 1958).
- The War & the Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946.
Neutrals The War & the Neutrals, edited by A. & V. M. Toynbee (O.U.P. for R.I.I.A., London, 1956).
- The World in Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946.
March 1939 The World in March 1939, edited by A. Toynbee and F. T. Ashton-Gwatkin (O.U.P. for R.I.I.A., London, 1952).
- U.S.W.A. The United States in World Affairs (Annual volumes. Harper Bros. for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York).
- Y.B.U.N. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations.
- Y.B.W.A. The Year Book of World Affairs (London, Stevens for London Institute of World Affairs).

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 of Neutrality" in Review of Politics, April,
 1960, pp. 255-268.

INTRODUCTION

"We must therefore use ordinary words. They separate us least from the past, which we are trying to understand, and from the present, with its Babel of tongues, in which and to which we must tell what we have understood. But let us not imagine that ordinary words are easy to use. To split the ism demands clarity of thought and constant watchfulness."

Sir Keith Hancock - Country and Calling.

"Neutralism is, of course, one of those rather rotund words which does not readily admit of definition."

Mr. Menzies to the U.N. General Assembly,

5th October, 1960.

Since the end of the Second World War the political neologism¹ 'neutralism' has been used so often by so many people, in such different circumstances and with such different intentions, that its meaning seems to change, chameleon like, depending on the context in which it appears. Contemporary usage has not produced any real consistency in definition, though it is clear that the word invariably has reference to the Cold War struggle between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its satellites on the other. It is the aim of this study to try to distinguish what are the main kinds of neutralism, by reference to what states do, and what statesmen say, to draw attention to their distinguishing features, and to assess their importance in contemporary international politics.

As neutralism is now such a protean term, it is necessary at the outset to clarify its intended use here. Neutralism is taken to mean dissociation from the Cold War. This working definition is sufficiently broad in reference to cover such popular phrases as "non-alignment", "active and peaceful co-existence", "active policy for peace", "independent policy", "positive neutrality", "positive neutralism". During the course of the thesis some of the

1. I have briefly traced the emergence of this neologism in "Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism", Review of Politics, April 1960, pp. 255-268.

favourite euphemisms, circumlocutions and synonyms for neutralism are indicated where appropriate. Indeed, the very looseness with which the term neutralism is used today has endowed it with an element of metaphor. But it is important to bear in mind all the time the difference between the central concern here - which is to try to describe the main ways in which since 1945 there has been dissociation from the Cold War - and the fact that the label neutralist is used tendentiously and varyingly, both by Cold War protagonists and by self-avowed neutralists. Inevitably, the method adopted here necessarily involves controversial attribution of the label neutralist to states or persons where others might deny that this is a permissible usage. It is hoped that the reasons for such attributions will be clear in their context. Obviously, there are many forms of dissociation from the Cold War. It is the task of this thesis to try to indicate which have to date been the major ones, and why.

Though there is much popular confusion between the terms 'neutrality' and 'neutralism', in this study they are regarded as quite distinct. By neutrality is meant non-involvement in war, while by neutralism is meant non-involvement in the Cold War. Though the metaphor of 'Cold' War describes the slurring over of the differences between war and peace, it is important to remember that it is quite

possible for a state to be neutralist in its policy in the Cold War while at the same time being neutral with regard to a given local hot war. Also, a state can be involved in a local hot war while remaining neutralist in the Cold War. And the fact that a state is neutralist in the Cold War is, of course, no guarantee that it would be able to be neutral in a global hot war.

Although as terms neutralism and nationalism are seldom confused, their important interaction as political forces is one of the main themes of this study.

see over

The main concerns and aims of this thesis can best be indicated by reference to the contents of the four main chapters. The period under consideration is 1945 to early 1961, inclusive, and references to events outside these limits are mostly incidental.

Chapter I outlines the main features and phases of the Cold War and thus describes the setting in which neutralism occurs and is shaped. The origins of the Cold War struggle, the growth of the rival military alliances, the emergence of new states, and the growing strength of neutralist currents, are all traced. As neutralism can only be understood by reference to the Cold War struggle, particular attention is paid in this chapter to the official attitudes and policies of the two superpowers to neutralism in general and to neutralist states and leaders in particular.

As the Cold War is, in part at least, an ideological as well as a power political struggle, Chapter II is concerned with neutralism as an ideology or doctrine. Attention is restricted to the pronouncements, arguments and assumptions of official neutralist leaders responsible for their countries' policies in international relations. This chapter endeavours to point out what are the main precepts of the leading neutralists, and why; tries to determine whether these are novel or time-honoured, and to suggest why they are so popular today.

Chapters III and IV are both concerned with neutralism as state policy. Chapter III gives an overall view of the contemporary inter-state system, distinguishes the neutralist from the aligned states, and suggests a six-fold division of the types of neutralist policy, indicates how many states fall into each of these categories, and tries to determine what are the distinctive characteristics and necessary conditions for pursuing such policies. The treatment in this chapter is necessarily general and comparative. Chapter IV examines some particular examples of neutralist states in greater detail than was possible in the preceding chapter, showing the mutual interaction of neutralist diplomacy and pressures of the international environment.

The ambit of the enquiry is international society, the society of sovereign states, and the approach to the study is basically comparative and evaluative rather than particular and descriptive. The aim is to try to establish what has been the significance of neutralism to date, rather than to indulge in prognostication. As far as can be ascertained, this is the first academic attempt to study neutralism in this way, comprehensively, and by endeavouring to assess the impact of neutralism in international politics. The argument is based entirely on published material, but necessarily the method adopted has involved critical scrutiny and rigorous selection of sources. Surprisingly little

has been written directly about neutralism as an independent factor in international politics. Analysis of the available and useful bibliographical and source data, with some indication of the more glaring gaps, is given in the footnotes and bibliography to this study. It is hoped that this general and comparative analysis of neutralism in international politics may be of some use in clarifying discussions about the nature of neutralism and in suggesting some lines for future enquiry.

NEUTRALISM, THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE COLD WAR

"For Warre consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together; so the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary."

Thomas Hobbes: "Leviathan" (1651),

Chapter 13.

The roots of the contemporary Cold War go deep.

Although the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States did not become intense, openly acknowledged on both sides, and of world-wide significance until after the Second World War, the seeds of their antagonism and rivalry were sown at the birth of the new Soviet State.

In Tsarist days contacts between Russia and the United States were few, and were for both countries secondary.¹ In general, the two countries were, as Walter Lippmann reports, "separated by an ideological gulf and joined by the bridge of national interest."² Prior to 1917 they had never clashed in war and, despite the differences between Tsarist autocracy and Presidential democracy, each regarded the other, in effect, as a potential friend in the rear of potential enemies.³ Then, following the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917, the new Soviet regime, through the unofficial agency of Colonel Robins, sought diplomatic recognition and aid from America against Germany. The United States, who had previously made a substantial loan

1. See W. A. Williams - American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947, (New York, 1952.)
2. This mot is quoted in Edward R. Stettinius, Jun. - Roosevelt and the Russians (London, 1950) p.16; but the illustration of this point is in chapter 8 of Lippmann's U.S. Foreign Policy (London, 1943), esp. pp.85-83.
3. Lippmann, *ibid.* p.83; see also pp.89-94.

to Kerensky's provisional government, refused both requests. Instead, for three years following the separate peace of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in March 1918, the Soviets, while cherishing vain hopes of world revolution, had to fight for survival in the face of American and Allied intervention and blockade. The view, so precious to Soviet historiography, that the intervention had from the very beginning the single deliberate motive to "strangle Communism at birth" is tenable only if one neglects the actual record of allied muddle and misunderstanding, of conflicting thoughts and aims, arising during the stress and heat of war.¹ It is, nevertheless, true that the immediate and lasting effect of intervention was to confirm Lenin in everything he had hitherto preached about the inevitable hostility of 'Capitalism' towards 'Communism'. Wilsonian and Leninist messianism thus became not complementary, as had seemed possible for a short while during 1917, but opposed; and the decision for conflict, taken unwillingly in July 1918, prefigured the antagonisms of the post-1945 period. It was ironic that in 1920 the United States was the only truly world power, and repudiated the role; while the Soviets, who so yearned to play such a role, lacked the capacity to do so. When each of them

1. For a masterly, detailed, study, see George F. Kennan - Soviet American Relations, 1917-1920: vol.1, Russia Leaves the War (London, 1956); vol.2, The Decision to Intervene (London, 1958).

became active world powers after 1945, it was as implacable rivals.

Active participation in the latter half of the First World War did not persuade the United States to depart finally from its traditional policy of diplomatic aloofness from Europe, and with the end of the war the Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty, refused to countenance United States membership of the League of Nations, and the country relapsed into isolationism. This return to what was somewhat nostalgically described as "normalcy" was not in the 1920s so absolute a policy of isolation as it became in the next decade. Nor was hostility towards the Soviet Union completely unremitting. It seems that by the time of the Washington Conference in 1922 the United States had begun to act on the assumption that the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union was an American national interest.¹ This did not mean that 'Bolshevism' was deemed any the less abhorrent. What it did mean was that the Soviet state should be allowed to exist, but should be treated as a pariah. Such attitudes found ambiguous expression in economic relations which between 1924 and 1930 produced small but increasing trade, and a diplomatic policy which,

1. See Lippmann, op.cit. p.87, fn.2.

until 1933, was determinedly one of non-recognition.^{1.}

Deciding how, in the words of Washington's Farewell Address, "our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel" in international matters was no easy task, and the strength of isolationism suggested that the United States was unprepared to assume an active world role. Yet no matter how persistently American leaders clung to the national ideal of isolationism,^{2.} there was no denying that now their country had the undoubted capacity of a great power it was difficult, if not impossible, to remain remote from the mainstreams of international politics. Domestic decisions like revaluing the dollar and increasing the stringencies of immigration quotas, and domestic events like the Wall Street "crash" of 1929, had their immediate repercussions everywhere in the world. Yet the moral drawn from these demonstrations of

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1. See Louis Fischer - The Soviets in World Affairs, 2 vols. (London, 1930) esp. chapters 7,8,17 (pp.560-570) & 31; A. Nevins - The United States in a Chaotic World, 1918-1933 (New Haven, 1950); & John D. Hicks - Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933 (London, 1960).
 2. "Isolationism, the ideology or the body of doctrine emanating from the original and deeply rooted belief, not really shaken until 1941, in the geographical remoteness and security of the country, is the underlying expression of American nationalism. Indeed it is nationalism, and like the nationalisms of other countries (or perhaps even more) it is a coat of many colours." Richard W. van Alstyne - The American Empire. Its Historical Pattern and Evolution. (Hist. Assoc. pamphlet G.43, London, 1960) p.27.

world influence was not that isolationism should be abandoned for a more actively international role, but the reverse. The Great Depression undoubtedly strengthened domestic preoccupations and throughout the thirties foreign relations were deemed secondary and intrusive. Though the loosely worded Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements of November 1933¹ ended U.S. non-recognition of the U.S.S.R., and seemed to promise future co-operation, especially in the Far East, resurgent American isolationism foredoomed all such expectations.² American debate about issues of war and peace centred round the succession of Neutrality Acts. There was wide agreement as to the desirability of keeping the country out of war, what was contentious was whether or not municipal legislation was in itself a sufficient and practical way to avoid involvement - a question which received a decisive answer with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December, 1941.

In 1917 the Soviet Union, like the United States in the late 18th century, was born of a revolution proclaiming international ideals; but whereas the American revolution was directed against the overseas metropolitan power and soon embraced a modest and cautious foreign policy of "no entangle-

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1. See Foreign Relations of the U.S.¹ (Washington, 1933) II, pp.785, 789, 790, 793-4.
 2. A. Nevins - The New Deal and World Affairs, 1933-1945, (New Haven, 1950).

ments", the Soviet revolution was aimed not only at overthrowing the Tsarist dynasty but at sparking off world revolution. The Tsars had developed no tradition of neutrality comparable with that of the United States, and the leaders of the new Bolshevik state had neither the inclination nor the opportunity to adopt either an ideological or a diplomatic neutrality towards Europe. Even so, the deepest motif of Soviet policies between 1917 and 1941 was the preservation of the integrity of Soviet power within Russia.¹ This was less obvious in the early years after 1917 while hopes of world revolution still ran high, but it became clear after Stalin assumed leadership - for the slogan "socialism in a single country" was, as Isaac Deutscher² has remarked, nothing but a doctrine of isolationism expressed in Bolshevik idiom) It was a brand of isolationism very different from that of America: whereas the United States was separated from the main conflicts of world politics by two great oceans, Russia's frontiers lay open to any invader. While American isolationism grew out of security and self-sufficiency, that of the Soviets grew out of insecurity and fear (both fed by Soviet doctrine as well as

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1. See Louis Fischer - The Soviets in World Affairs (2 vols. London, 1930); Max Beloff - The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1929-1941 (2 vols. London, 1947 & 1949); and G. F. Kennan - Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941 (Anvii books, New York; 1960).
 2. Isaac Deutscher - The Great Contest (London, 1960) p.45.

by experiences since 1917) and absorption in internal tasks. Soviet determination to secure the safety of their frontiers resulted in a number of treaties of non-aggression and neutrality with neighbouring states.^{1.} These not only had the direct advantage of relieving pressure on Soviet borders, but also, by supporting Germany, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan against Western "imperialist" powers, was an indirect way of diverting pressure away from the Soviet Union too. Official Soviet attitudes towards the United States were ambivalent. The United States was undoubtedly a "capitalist" state and, therefore, a member of the camp rivalling the Soviet Union,^{2.} but American technical

1. "In addition to converting the conception of a neutral obligation from a passive one such as marked 19th century neutrality to one of an active and positive character, the Soviet Union insisted on giving and receiving specific guarantees of non-aggression and non-interference." M. W. Graham, 'The Soviet Security System' quoted in Max Beloff-The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, vol. I, 1929-1936 (London, 1947) p.12. The U.S.S.R. concluded neutrality treaties with Germany, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia & Finland - see Beloff, *ibid.* above, esp. chapter 2. Such treaties may be regarded as forerunners of Cold War 'Peaceful Co-existence' treaties. (See R. N. Carew-Hunt - A Guide to Communist Jargon (London, 1957) pp.26-33 - Coexistence) and below pp. 66
2. Thus Stalin in his Political Report to the 14th Party Congress of the U.S.S.R., 18 Dec. 1925 - "Two Dominant and Mutually antagonist poles of attraction have come into existence, so that the world over, sympathies are diverging towards one pole or the other: the sympathies of the bourgeois governments tending towards the British-American pole, and the sympathies of the workers of the West and of the revolutionists of the East tending towards the Soviet Union pole." in J. Stalin - Problems of Leninism (London, 1938 ed.) pp. 369-70.

efficiency was openly envied.¹ As early as May 1918, Lenin had predicted that America would check the movement of Japanese imperialism against Russia, and with the realisation of this prediction by 1922 it seemed that the chances of direct Soviet-American clashes were remote. Indeed, before 1933 relations between the two countries were virtually non-existent. Even after the Litvinov-Roosevelt agreements, and throughout the ensuing years down to the involvement of both powers in World War Two, relations remained troubled, distant, and devoid of real political content.² [From 1933, with the growth of Fascist power and the consequent development of a third bloc in world politics, the Soviet Union became the most active verbal champion of "collective security" and a sneering denigrator of the "non-intervention" and "neutrality" policies of "capitalist" states.³] The 1939 edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia recorded that "the position of neutrality within the contemporary imperialist system is, under all conditions, not only a dangerous illusion which in no way prevents a neutral state from being drawn into war, but is in fact a justification of aggression, and a contributing factor to the

1. *ibid.* 1954 ed. pp.109-11.

2. Max Beloff, *ibid* above, vol. I, chapter 10.

3. See J. Stalin, *ibid* above, 1954 ed. pp.753-4. John Foster Dulles, who always urged his countrymen to make a close study of Problems of Leninism, quotes this passage in his War or Peace (London, 1950) pp.24-25.

unleashing of war." The article said further that the Soviet Union regards its neutrality pacts as "a weapon in the struggle for the destruction of the front of Imperialist States against the U.S.S.R."¹. These points were underlined when on 23 August 1939 Molotov signed the German-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression and Neutrality.²

Both the United States and the Soviet Union only entered the Second World War fully and formally as a result of direct attack on their own territories. Even so, while both sides were officially neutral for some time after the German attack on Poland in September 1939, they both in fact tilted their neutrality policies in favour of one of the belligerents, though their favours were given to opposite camps. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbour of 7 December 1941, and despite the strength of American isolationism, President Roosevelt's pro-British neutrality³ was shown in such acts as Lend Lease and the transfer of American destroyers to the Royal Navy. Ostensibly, the Soviet Union was scrupulously neutral

1: I am indebted for this translation to my colleague; Dr. Ilya Neustadt.

2. Text in Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (Dept. of State Washington D.C. 1948) pp. 76-78. See also *ibid.* pp. 105-107 for text of the further German-Soviet Treaty of 28 September 1939.

3. See W. L. Langer & G. E. Gleason - The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (London, 1953).

till she suffered German invasion in June 1941.^{1.]} In fact, she faithfully pursued her collaboration with Germany, as entailed in the secret protocols to the agreements of 1939. Her policies were further marked by successive retreats in the Balkans in face of German advances, by the Neutrality Pact with Japan² signed on 13 April 1941 (and destined to last until the Yalta Conference four years later) and by territorial expansion: eastern Poland in September 1939, followed by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Bessarabia, also certain parts of Finland, all during 1940. These contrasting activities pursued by the two greatest neutrals, preceding their direct participation in general war, re-affirmed a lesson taught during the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic and First World Wars: that no great power can

1. David J. Dallin - Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942 (Yale U.P., 1942), & George Ginsburgs - "The Soviet Union as a Neutral, 1939-41" in Soviet Studies (Glasgow) July 1958, pp.12-35. Ginsburg points out that "it is a consistent point of dogma with the Soviets that a bourgeois state is incapable of genuine neutrality and that the U.S.S.R. is infinitely superior in preserving bona fide neutrality."
2. For the terms & significance of this treaty, see F. C. Jones - Japan's New Order in East Asia, 1937-45, (London, 1954) p.214 et seq. [It is interesting to note what Mao Tse-tung was writing in his Yenan retreat at this time: "As the conflict between the socialist Soviet Union and the imperialist powers becomes further intensified it is inevitable that China must stand either on one side or on the other. Is it possible to incline to neither side? No, this is an illusion. All the countries in the world will be swept into one or other of these two camps, and in the world today 'neutrality' is becoming merely a deceptive phrase." - "On New Democracy" (Jan. 1940) in vol.3 of Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (London, 1954) p.135, see also p.125.]

remain completely outside any prolonged war involving the other great powers!

From 1941 a common determination to fight the Fascist powers forged the Grand Alliance. Nevertheless, throughout World War II contacts of all kinds between the Soviet Union and her allies were strictly regulated by the Soviet government. Allied representatives who had to deal with Soviet Russia during the war resented the restrictions and lack of real cordiality in such relations.¹ This essentially military alliance between states of such diametrically opposed outlooks was dictated by, and limited to, short run considerations of mutual advantage. With the defeat of Germany in sight, individual political considerations began to take precedence over the requirements of a common strategy, and the Alliance began to break up. This was partly masked up to the time of the Yalta Conference, in February 1945, with the continuance of the three great wartime leaders - Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill - in power. But by the time of the Potsdam Conference, July - August 1945, - with Roosevelt now succeeded by Truman, and with Churchill superseded by Attlee during the Conference - the rift between the

1. For the ambiguities in Soviet relations with her major allies, see W. H. McNeil - America, Britain and Russia. Their Co-operation and Conflict. R.I.I.A. Survey of International Affairs, 1939-46 (London, 1953), esp. chapter 1, section 3.

Soviet Union and its former allies became patent,^{1.} and reverted to the pre-1941 condition of mutual suspicion and hostility. This situation was appropriately symbolised in the deliberately non-committal way in which Stalin was told of American possession of the first atomic bomb.^{2.} Now, not only were the 19th century prophecies of Alex de Tocqueville, Sir John Seeley and Henry Adams soon to be emphatically realised with the undeniable emergence of the United States and Russia as the two Titans of the postwar world, but their growing rivalry, under the constant shadow of nuclear weapons, ushered in what became widely known as 'the Cold War.'

Though the phrase^{3.} only became current after 1945, neither the idea nor the state of 'Cold War' - intense international tension in a continual atmosphere of rumours and rumbles of war - was new. Indeed, it has been one of the main purposes of the preceding pages to show that the Soviet Union always regards itself in a state of Cold War with the

1. See Herbert Feis - Between War and Peace. The Potsdam Conference, (London, 1960).
2. Ibid. pp.173-178.
3. A Soviet writer G. Dadyants - "The Cold War: Past and Present" in International Affairs (Moscow) June 1960, pp. 5-10, says that the phrase was first coined by Mr. Bernard Baruch, the American financier. Eric F. Goldman - The Crucial Decade & After. America 1945-1960, (New York, 1961), p.60, confirms this in some detail. Undoubtedly, the phrase was first popularised by Mr. Walter Lippmann during 1947 in a series of 14 articles, originally published in the New York Herald-Tribune, critical of Mr. Kennan's "containment" thesis.

"capitalist" world, and that "neutrality" in Soviet theory and practice is a device to be used or vilified in light of prevailing Soviet needs. Furthermore, such different men as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bismarck and Hitler all knew and wrote about different versions of Cold War. What is special about the contemporary Cold War is its extent, in terms of territory and tactics, for the two chief adversaries and that it is waged in the presence of nuclear weapons.

The main vicissitudes of the Cold War can be conveniently outlined in terms of four fairly distinct phases. Each of these phases is characterized by changes: in the most intense areas of Cold War conflict, in the fortunes of the Cold War alliance systems, in the emergence of new states, and in the policies of the superpowers¹ towards neutralism. It is in no way the aim here to attempt a full narrative account, but merely to sketch what appear to be the major developments in the continuing Cold War struggle in relation to neutralism. Following Hobbes' example of meteorological metaphor, these four main Cold War phases may be described as: (1) the great freeze-up (1945-1949), (2) constant cold (1949-1953), (3) partial thaw (1953-1957), (4) variable weather (1957-early 1961).

1. The term was the invention of an American scholar, W.T.R. Fox, see his book The Super-Powers (New York, 1944). To Fox in 1944 it seemed that there would be 3 post-war superpowers - the U.S., the U.S.S.R. & the British Commonwealth.

(1) The Great Freeze-up, 1945-1949

At first sight the growth and consolidation of the two rival Cold War blocs takes on the delusive appearance of inevitability. This view could be sustained by appropriate selections from Soviet 'classic' writings, but a reading of the memoirs of such prominent Americans as Senator Vandenberg¹ and President Truman² conveys a much more confused picture, showing the mixture of nostalgia and resolution with which Americans turned their backs on the national tradition of isolationism, the at first faltering but soon unavoidable recognition of Soviet expansionist policies, and the gradual but quite determined assumption of leadership to stem Communist advances. It is too often forgotten that these immediate post-war years saw a revolution in the conduct of American foreign policy, not only by her willingness to

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1. See The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (London, 1953) Until Pearl Harbour in 1941 Vandenberg was a symbol & a leader of isolationism, or, as he preferred to say, "insulationism"; after 1941 he became a firm advocate of an international role for the U.S. His papers give, as his son attests, "a narrative account of the decade 1941 to 1951, in which the mass mind of America reluctantly forsook its isolationist traditions and accepted the challenge to world leadership." Herbert Agar draws attention to Vandenberg's importance in his brief book - The Unquiet Years. U.S.A. 1945-1955, (London, 1957).
 2. Harry S. Truman - vol. 1, Year of Decisions, 1945, (London 1955); vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953, (London 1956). Truman and Stalin are the two dominant figures of the first two phases of the Cold War.

assume a permanent role of leadership in world politics, but also, domestically, in the forging of a bi-partisan, or non-partisan, foreign policy. Such early American moves, between 1945 and 1947, as the abrupt termination of Lend Lease, rapid demobilisation, and the beginnings of a system of staged withdrawal of her troops from overseas, suggested to many Europeans ominous parallels with American policies after 1919. It was Soviet intransigence¹ and growing American reaction to it, quickly becoming a process of mutual interaction, which soon made these analogies irrelevant.

Soviet influence, operating from a secure base inside Russia, and despite enormous wartime losses in resources and manpower, was from 1945 onwards pressing outward in all directions. She had three main theatres of operation. These were, in ascending order of importance: the Far East, the Middle East and Europe.

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1. Of course, the Soviet view is different. Dadyants, op.cit p.6, who divides up the Cold War into four phases, similar to the divisions used in this chapter, writes: "The causes of the Cold War should be sought not in the alleged desire of the Soviet Union to impose a new order of things upon other countries, but in the real desire of some Western Powers to impose the old order upon peoples who did not want them. The Cold War was caused by the reckless plans of the most aggressive circles of imperialism which, overestimating their own strength, seriously sought to turn back the march of history." For another Soviet view, see: M. Belousov - "Who is responsible for the Cold War?" in International Affairs, (Moscow) Nov. 1958, pp.89-94.

In the Far East the Soviet Union secured, during the latter half of 1945, the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, and her troops occupied Manchuria. In accordance with the Potsdam agreements, she also occupied Korea north of the 38th parallel; with U.S. forces to the south. Towards China she pursued right up to 1949 an equivocal policy of giving slight support to the Chinese Communists, while recognising and dealing more fully with the Kuomintang.¹ In the Middle East traditional Russian pressure on Turkey and on Persia was renewed and attempts to embarrass Western interests in this area led to the Soviet Union casting the first veto in the U.N. Security Council. However, Europe was the prime area of Soviet concern, and where she made her greatest post-war territorial advances. She regained the territories initially obtained during the period of Nazi-Soviet alliance.² In addition, she acquired the province of Petsamo, with its valuable nickel mines, from Finland; part of Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia; and a piece of East Prussia, including the port of Kaliningrad, from Germany. Moreover, most of the countries of Eastern Europe fell under Soviet sway - whether they were the 'liberated' territories of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania and Poland, or the ex-enemy states of Bulgaria, Hungary,

¹ 1. See Hugh Seton-Watson - The Pattern of Communist Revolution (London, 2nd ed. 1960) pp.271-290.

2. See above p.24

Roumania and Finland. With the two exceptions of Yugoslavia,¹ who was to successfully assert her freedom from Cominform control in June 1948, and Finland,² who enjoyed a severely circumscribed freedom under the terms of the Finno-Soviet treaty of April 1948, all these states became Soviet satellites. An interlocking network of treaties developed to bind them to each other and to the Soviet Union in particular. Russia's direct sphere of control also included the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. In areas outside the sway of Soviet armies, especially in Western Europe and South East Asia, Communist efforts concentrated on building up the strength of local parties and on fomenting internal unrest against "bourgeois-capitalist" governments - policies which found doctrinal expression in Zhadnov's speech³ at the founding conference of the Cominform in September 1947.

Zhadnov re-affirmed the doctrine of "two camps", stressed that a world revolutionary situation now existed, and proclaimed that all Communist parties had to go over to the offensive. At the same time a world-wide peace campaign⁴ was launched to provide cover for this aggressive policy.

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1. See below p. 179-182.
 2. See below p. 135-8.
 3. For text, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1947-8, pp.125 et seq.
 4. For a short Soviet history of the Peace Movement, see "Ten Years of the World Peace Movement", New Times (Moscow), April 1959, pp.27-29.

As the U.N. became part of the diplomatic equipment of the Cold War, Stalin's World Peace Movement, seemed intended to create alternative international organisations to a U.N. dominated by American power.¹

As the American reaction to Soviet threats began to crystallise, after the uncertainties of 1945-6, a pattern of bipolarity developed. Official American strategy came to be based on taking up positions all along the perimeter of the Soviet world to resist any further Soviet advance. Translated into operational policy terms, such a "containment" thesis² eventually led the United States to assume commitments over a wide arc stretching from North Cape in Norway, through Central and Southern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, South and South-East Asia, then northwards through the Philippines, the Ryukyu and Ronin islands, Japan and Korea to Alaska. Such long Cold War frontiers became fortified, though gradually, in response to each Soviet challenge and by such actions as seemed dictated by the circumstances.

Prior to 1949, ~~the~~ Soviet breakthroughs seemed to be most likely in Western and South-Eastern Europe, and American Cold War policies began in these areas with emergency pro-

1. See Martin Wight - "The Power Struggle in the U.N." (Los Angeles, 1957).
2. The author of the containment thesis was George F. Kennan. His thesis was first made public in Foreign Affairs, July 1947 under the title "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Up to 1953 Kennan was a steady advocate of the primacy of the problem of limited war, as his analysis of Soviet policy led him to the view that Stalin would be exceedingly cautious about risking major war.

grammes of extensive economic and military aid to combat the twin dangers of Communist subversion and Russian military pressure. Firstly, to Greece and Turkey, under the "Truman Doctrine" of March 1947, then, more comprehensively, under the Marshall Plan from June 1947 onwards. Initially, the Marshall Plan, which was limited to economic aid, had no overt anti-Communist overtones and was ostensibly aimed at increasing inter-European co-operation, peace, order and stability. But, subjected to the pressure of political controversy, it took on a markedly anti-Communist aspect¹ and in so doing pioneered a way for a good deal of later American foreign economic policies. The Berlin Blockade, from early 1948 until May 1949, was the first open test the Soviet Union made of American determination and strength.² Not only did this test harden American resolution to carry containment through to completion, it also helped to bring about the birth of N.A.T.O. in April 1949.³ N.A.T.O. thus became the second post-war multilateral security pact in

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1. In July 1947 the Soviets rejected the application of the Marshall Plan within her sphere of control. In Jan. 1949 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania & the Soviet Union formed a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as a counterweight to the Marshall Plan; and during 1949 the armies of the satellites were rebuilt and re-equipped under Soviet direction.
 2. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1947-8, pp.241 et seq.
 3. With 12 founder members - Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the U.K. & the U.S. For details & text, see Lord Ismay - N.A.T.O. The First Five Years, 1949-54, (Utrecht, 2nd impression 1956).

which the U.S. was to play a leading role. The Rio Pact of 1947¹ was the first, but this was designed for an area still outside the main areas of Cold War conflict, though it was not without relevance to Cold War activities, as over a third of the original members of the U.N. were Latin-American countries and at this time they tended to vote with the U.S. on all Cold War matters.

Direct confrontation between the two main Cold War protagonists, apart from encounters at various U.N. meetings, was rare. Even more rarely, when they found themselves on the same side (as with the birth of Israel in 1948) their mutual embarrassment was obvious. At the inaugural meetings of the U.N. there had been a general feeling that the legal status of neutrality would be redundant with the institution of the U.N. collective security system.² Though two wartime neutrals, Argentina³ and Turkey,⁴ were among the fifty-one

1. The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro was signed in September 1947, by all states of the American hemisphere except Nicaragua, Ecuador and Canada. For this treaty, see Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1947-8, pp.465-476.
2. See Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (San Francisco, 1945) vol.VI, p.459; vol.VII, p.327. For an analysis of changing legal attitudes, see Taubenfeld, H.J. "International Actions and Neutrality", A.J.I.L. vol.47 (1953) pp.377-396.
3. See The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, 1948), vol.I, chapters 23-25 and vol.2, chapter 99.
4. Soviet pressure on Turkey well illustrates the coincidence of Soviet post-war distaste for Second World War neutrals and her shrewd expectations of satisfying territorial ambitions at the expense of the compromised neutrals. See Lenczowski, op.cit. pp.147-150.

original members of the U.N.,¹ there was general agreement in ostracising Franco's Spain. As the Cold War struggle developed and U.N. collective security measures were clearly inoperative, not only was the earlier assumed redundancy of legal neutrality seen to be premature but Cold War necessities, as seen by the two main protagonists, made the question of behaviour during the Second World War less important than present intentions, as each side sought to enlist support and gain strength against her chief adversary. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union appeared ready to accept the idea of genuine non-attachment to either cause; the only essential difference was that the United States could distinguish in practice between active and passive allies, that is, between those with whom she concluded treaties and those others which were, nevertheless, part of the non-Communist world.

1. Before Dec. 1955 only 9 states gained admission to the U.N. following the original 51. These were Afghanistan, Iceland & Sweden (Nov. 1946); Thailand (Dec. 1946); Pakistan & the Yemen (Sept. 1947); Burma (April 1948); Israel (May 1949); & Indonesia (Sept. 1950). The first 3 were wartime neutrals, 2 of them became neutralist, while Iceland joined N.A.T.O. Thailand, an ex-enemy state of World War 2, became an ally of the Western powers. Pakistan was neutralist until 1954 and then an American ally. The Yemen, independent but isolationist since 1918, became neutralist. The last 3 were new states and all became neutralist, though Israel's neutralist took on a marked Western orientation. All other applications were refused. For details, see Y.R.U.N. passim. For the characteristics of a neutralist policy, see below chapter 3.

In Europe neutralism, however vociferous,^{1.} was the concern of impotent cliques not of governments, and probably had no effect at all on policies. States either fell under Communist sway, became formal allies of America, or stayed isolated. In this latter class were Ireland,^{2.} Spain,^{3.} Sweden^{4.} and Switzerland,^{5.} joined by Yugoslavia after its break with the Cominform in 1948.

In Asia ten new states emerged - Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon,^{6.} Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines.^{7.} All of them at this time were mainly absorbed in internal tasks. The governments of Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines each faced internal Communist insurrection. India - in her efforts to speed Indonesia's independence, and in official comments on the situations in Indo-China and Malaya - made clear that Indian concern was rather with the colonial struggle than with Cold War rivalries. Great Britain^{8.} was still the dominant power in the Middle East and appeared as the chief 'protector', however unwelcome, in this area.

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1. See John Marcus - Neutralism and Nationalism in France (New York, 1958); Marina Salvin - Neutralism in France and Germany (New York, 1951); & I. William Zartman - "Neutralism and Neutrality in Scandinavia" in Western Political Quarterly, vol. 7 (2) June 1954, pp.125-160.
 2. See below p.146-7 3. See below p.43 4. See below pp21-8
 5. See below pp.221-8
 6. Independence in Jordan, Syria & Lebanon had been declared during World War 2 but only became effective after 1945. See Lenczowski, op.cit. passim.
 7. The emergence of the Philippines as an independent state was accompanied by a complex set of agreements binding her to the U.S. See Fifield, op.cit. pp.60-65. This is the great exception to the rule that new states become neutralist.

The Soviets¹. openly regarded all the new states - with the possible exception at this time of Israel - as "puppets" of their former colonial masters; while American policy makers erred in assuming too readily that if an Asian state was non-Communist it was naturally ready to take part in American led anti-Communist measures.² On the whole though, these states were not involved in Cold War matters, and the fact of their neutralism was not yet a matter of much international significance.

In the main areas of Cold War concern divisions hardened; both Moscow and Washington enlisted partisans and helped to seal off frontiers or to resolve civil strife. In Germany, east and west became completely cut off from each other (with West Berlin a small island in a Communist sea); in China, the Communists won a conclusive-victory over the Kuomintang, and Chiang Kai-Shek's forces had to evacuate, mostly to Formosa; in Korea, the Russian dominated north faced the American occupied south. In Greece, Turkey and Iran³; Communist pressures were successfully resisted. The only

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1. See George Ginsburgs - "The Soviet Union, Neutrality and Collective Security, 1945-1959" in Osteuropa Recht, Oct. 1959, pp.77-98. - This is an article based on Soviet publications.
 2. See K. S. Latourette - The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951 (New York, 1952), esp. pp.40-42.
 3. See Lenczowski, op.cit. pp.181-190, esp. pp.188-9; for an account of U.S.-Iranian economic and military agreements.

overt loss of an ally suffered by either side during this period was Yugoslavia's defection from the Communist camp; Kuomintang China was not formally an ally of the West, though the victory of the Communists was widely represented as a great American defeat.¹

This first phase of the Cold War was a time of American atomic monopoly and of the Soviet Union's overwhelming superiority in conventional armaments. It is difficult to see what particular diplomatic advantages atomic monopoly gave to the United States. Probably it was a restraining influence on the Soviets, though Stalin constantly denied that there was any special value in the possession of atomic bombs.² America's exclusive atomic monopoly ended in September 1949 with the first explosion of a Soviet bomb, though the world had to learn of it through an American announcement;³ and this event, coming shortly after the signature of the N.A.T.O. treaty and the conclusive victory of the Communists in China, gave dramatic point to the idea of bipolarity which by now had come to be the dominant pattern of world affairs.

1. See Latourette, *ibid.* chapter 8 - "The Great American Defeat". In 1949 Mao Tse-tung wrote: "Not only in China but also in the world without exception, one either leans to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is mere camouflage and a third road does not exist." in "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", reprinted in A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Harvard U.P. 1952), pp.453-4.
2. See Henry A. Kissinger - Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York 1957) pp.362-369.
3. *Ibid.* p.369.

(2) Constant Cold, 1949-1953

If the first phase was dominated by events in Europe, then the second was equally dominated by developments in eastern Asia, and particularly by the Korean War.¹ China had been exempted from the developing bi-partisanship of American policy, and though the Korean war began in June 1950 as a U.N. operation designed to repel a north Korean invasion south of the 38th parallel (a little earlier Soviet troops had withdrawn from north Korea, and American troops from south Korea to Japan), by January 1951 it had become converted, essentially, into a Sino-American conflict, fought solely on Korean soil. In these years American involvement in world affairs deepened, while at the same time domestic criticisms, the obvious misgivings of allies and the distrust of neutralist nations added to the difficulties of American policy makers. Anglo-American relations were openly strained at times, especially over Far Eastern issues, and President Truman later revealed that in 1950 the British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, thought there was a good chance of China becoming the Yugoslavia of Asia,² thus breaking with the Soviet bloc.

In fact, throughout this phase the Soviet Union pursued a far less obviously active international role than did its

1. See Guy Wint - What Happened in Korea (London, 1954).

2. See Truman's Memoirs, op.cit. vol.2, p.427.

main Cold War opponent, perhaps because of Stalin's pre-occupation with purging 'Titoism' within the Soviet empire¹. - and Sino-Soviet co-operation². seemed to increase rather than to suggest strains. Throughout the Korean War, the Soviet Union not only claimed all the privileges and immunities of an officially neutral state, but championed similar claims for Communist China, even though the latter was implicated in the war through the presence of contingents of so-called "Chinese volunteers" on the side of the north Koreans.³

Indeed, one consequence of Korea was the growing identification of Communist China and the Soviet Union, so that for a number of years after most Western observers regarded Peking as Moscow's most faithful ally. The sense of Communist menace, which had been a prime factor in European affairs, right up to 1950, and lingered thereafter as a constant background threat, did not have the same intensity or effect in non-Communist Asia. Europeans feared the U.S.S.R. more than Asians feared China. Though in 1950 China began to absorb Tibet, this apparently caused less concern to most of the

1. See Hugh Seton-Watson - The Pattern of Communist Revolution, op.cit. pp.265-6.
2. Formally based on the Sino-Soviet agreements of Feb. 1950, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1949-50, p.96, and Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1949-50, pp.339-345.
3. See Ginsburgs- "The Soviet Union, Neutrality and Collective Security 1945-1959" op.cit. pp.83-87. The legal aspects of the Korean War & the significance of the war in relation to neutrality in international law is dealt with exhaustively in Julius Stone - Legal Controls of International Conflict. (2nd ed. with supplement, London, 1959) passim.

Asian neutralists than did the continuance of the 'colonial' struggle in Indo-China (and growing identification of French and American interests in this question), while it was increasingly felt that American policies were bringing and spreading the Cold War into Asia.

Though ostensibly a U.N. collective security endeavour, only fifteen U.N. members¹ joined with the U.S. in the Korean fighting, and these formed a roughly accurate list of the states that were by now America's closest allies. A number of neutralist states tried, at first, to reconcile their faith in the U.N. and their Cold War non-alignment by aiding U.N. forces with measures short of becoming active combatants.² When, early in October 1950, General MacArthur's troops pushed northwards across the 38th parallel, neutralist misgivings about the war increased. When, in February 1951, the United States sponsored a U.N. resolution³.

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1. These were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, S. Africa, Thailand & Turkey.
 2. For instance, medical aid was sent by Denmark, India, Italy, Norway & Sweden. Here the differences between the neutralists & some aligned states were not sharp. A full list of aid offered to U.N. forces in Korea is given in Y.B.U.N., 1950, pp.226-8. Goodwin - Britain and the United Nations, op.cit. pp.126-154, well conveys the main U.N. voting trends on Korea, see esp. pp.138-9, showing that in voting matters the differences between the aligned & the non-aligned were more pronounced.
 3. The U.S. resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 1 Feb. 1951 by 44 votes to 7 (Soviet bloc, India & Burma) with 9 abstentions (Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Yemen & Yugoslavia).

condemning Communist China as an aggressor, most neutralist states considered that the war had taken an aggressively anti-Chinese turn and many expressed their loud disapproval. By 1953 American dominance in U.N. General Assembly matters was past its peak, and an Arab-Asian bloc,¹ neutralist in Cold War matters, had begun to cohere.

Neutralist misgivings about U.S. policies heightened as growing American concentration on the Cold War as a quasi-military operation found expression in increasing emphasis on foreign military aid,² in the consolidation of her existing alliances and in the extension of her commitments in the Middle East and the Far East.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 made it a prerequisite of American assistance that the recipient country should unequivocally place itself in support of the U.S. in the Cold War. In fact, American aid to Yugoslavia,³ and the Indian⁴ grain bill of 1952 showed that these were not unqualified conditions even if American preferences⁵ for formal allies, rather than 'ambivalent' neutralists, were now patently clear.

1. See Harry N. Howard -- "The Arab-Asian States in the United Nations" in The Middle East Journal, Summer, 1953.
2. See table of U.S. Foreign Aid 1946-1953 in Reitzel, Kaplan & Coblenz - United States Foreign Policy, 1945-55 (Washington, 1956) p.483.
3. See below pp. 181-2.
4. See below pp. 172-3.
5. American attitudes are brilliantly portrayed in Eric F. Goldman's - The Crucial Decade - and After. America, 1945-1960 (Vintage Books, New York, 1961). For Korea, see chapters 8 & 9.

These years saw the heyday of the neutralism of European public opinion.¹ Ironically, it was probably American enthusiasm for consolidating N.A.T.O. as a means of raising European morale² and countering "creeping neutralism" - the growth of neutralist feeling, sentiment, and ideas in a state whose foreign policy is not ostensibly or avowedly neutralist - that gave European neutralism most succour. In retrospect, neutralism still seems to have been an insignificant force in Europe and fears of "creeping neutralism" exaggerated. In early 1952 Greece and Turkey joined N.A.T.O., thus extending the treaty area of the 'North Atlantic' alliance further; and in September 1953 Spain was linked to the U.S. in three bilateral agreements known collectively as the Madrid Pact.³

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1. See the studies cited in footnote 1 p. 36' above.
 2. Thus, General Eisenhower in his First Annual Report to the Standing Group N.A.T.O. (Paris, 2 April, 1952) - "There was serious question as to the state of public morale among the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.... It was extremely difficult for the average European to see any future in an attempt to build defensive forces which might offset this real and formidable threat. There seemed to be too much of a lead to be overtaken. The doubts of the European peoples gave birth to the false but glittering doctrine of neutralism, through which they hoped to preserve the things they had always held dear.....the cumulative effects of repeated failure to make any headway in conferences with the Soviets produced an intellectual defeatism, in some quarters bordering upon despair."
 3. See Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp.126-132.

Indeed, it seemed to be more and more the aim of U.S. policy to spread the N.A.T.O. pattern of alliances and bases around the whole periphery of the Communist bloc. If this were so, only at the extremities of eastern Asia did American policies meet with any real success, and even here she concluded only bilateral pacts. The United States pushed through a treaty of peace and reconciliation with Japan, despite strong opposition from behind the Iron Curtain, and from some Asian neutralists.¹ The Japanese Peace Treaty, signed at San Francisco in September 1951 - but, more particularly, the simultaneous signing of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty - aroused the fears of several states who were most likely to be threatened in the event of renewed Japanese expansion and aggression, and the opposition of Asian, including Japanese, neutralists.² It was in order to quieten such fears that the U.S. entered into the Philippine-American Defence Pact in August 1951,³ and the A.N.Z.U.S. treaty with Australia and New Zealand in September 1951.⁴ As the French position in Indo-China worsened, American anxiety increased, and American relations with Indonesia, as well as with India and Burma, became increasingly distant. The idea pursued in 1951-2 of a comprehensive regional pact for the Middle East (M.E.D.O.)

1. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1951, pp.378-433.

2. Ibid.

3. See Fifield, *op.cit.* pp.77-80.

4. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1951, pp.384-5, 478-80.

was stillborn.^{1.} Although proposals for this pact were jointly sponsored by the United States and Great Britain, Britain here played the leading role. For a number of reasons - historical, economic and strategic^{2.} - British sensitivity to nationalist and neutralist fears and hopes in south and south-east Asia were not paralleled by a similar appreciation of Middle Eastern nationalism and neutralism. Britain's conflicts with Iran^{3.} and Egypt^{4.} were sufficient at this time to prevent the realisation of M.E.D.O. However, arrangements were made for U.S. air bases in Morocco^{5.}; in Libya^{6.}; and in Saudi Arabia.^{7.} The May 1950 Tripartite Declaration - France, Britain and the United States - aimed at guaranteeing existing Arab-Israeli frontiers and maintaining a balance of forces in the area, had not endeared the

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1. See Campbell, op.cit. chapters 3 & 4.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Lenczowski, op.cit. pp.192-202.
 4. See below pp 191-6
 5. In July 1951 the French government announced that the U.S.A. was to have use of 7 Moroccan airfields. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1951, p.25. Morocco became an independent state on 2 March 1956 and was admitted to the U.N. in Nov. 1956. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1955-6, pp.85-7 & 290-5.
 6. Libya, an Italian colony from 1912 to 1942, was in effect a British protectorate from 1945 until its independence in Dec. 1951. She joined the U.N. in Dec. 1955. Both G.B. & the U.S. give extensive economic aid to Libya & in return are permitted to maintain military bases. In July 1953 G.B. signed a treaty of alliance with Libya promising financial aid for 20 years. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp.119, & Daily Telegraph, 14 July 1960.
 7. The U.S. agreement for an airfield at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia dates from the Second World War. It was re-written in 1951, renewed in 1956, and is now due to expire in 1962. See The Times, 18 March 1961.

Western powers to the Arab states. As it was, this policy depended on the condition that these powers could monopolise the supply of arms to the Middle East - a condition shattered by Egypt's arms deal with the Soviet bloc in 1955.

The first six or eight months of 1953 saw the closing of this Cold War phase and began a series of shifts and changes which eventually affected the whole pattern of international relationships. These changes were symbolised in a change of personalities. Firstly, with General Eisenhower's accession to the American Presidency in January 1953, pledged to end the fighting in Korea, to promote "liberation" in eastern Europe, and to reduce expenditure overseas. Secondly, and more significant, was the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953. August 1953 saw the explosion of the first Soviet H-bomb. The first U.S. experimental H-bomb had only been exploded in November 1952, and it seemed that the gap in nuclear weaponry between the two superpowers was rapidly narrowing, in qualitative terms, at least.

In the summer of 1953 an armistice was signed to end the war in Korea, more than two years after truce talks had opened. The representatives of Sweden and Switzerland,¹ as two of the five member commission of neutral nations, found

1. See Jacques Freymond - "Supervising Agreements. The Korean Experience" in Foreign Affairs, April 1959, pp. 496-503; also "Speeding Korea's Quests" in The Economist 9 June 1956.

themselves in the disagreeable position of being cast in the role of "neutrals" on the side of the West, while Poland and Czechoslovakia were openly "neutral" on the Communist side. Only India, as Chairman of the commission, seemed able to avoid charges of blatant partisanship. As it was, the end of the Korean War brought no settlement, only military stalemate, and did not lead to any political resolution of the essential issues at stake.^{1.}

(3) Partial Thaw, 1953-1957

For the greater part of this third phase of the Cold War there was a marked contrast in apparent Soviet and American priorities, and in most neutralist eyes the post-Stalin policies of the Soviet leaders probably were preferable to the Eisenhower-Dulles policies, at first declaredly based on "massive retaliation"^{2.} and "brinkmanship."^{3.} America, aided at times by her chief allies, Britain and

1. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp.189-230.
2. Mr. Dulles first propounded the principle of "massive & instant retaliation" on 12 Jan. 1954. See Survey (R.I.I.A. 1954, p.98. The author of the 1954 (R.I.I.A.) Survey points out (p.98) that American strategy seemed to presage "a reversion to the pre-Korean reliance on air-atomic power, but with differences - the addition of tactical atomic weapons, & the substitution of the hydrogen for the atomic bomb". See *ibid.* pp.96-123.
3. See *ibid.* p.25. Mr. Dulles first mentioned 'brinkmanship' in relation to Indo-China.

France, seemed determined to extend the range and membership of her military alliances and to give foreign aid only to allies, and then mostly for military purposes. At the same time the Soviets, pursuing a 'new look' policy, began to try openly to encourage the spread of neutralism outside the Soviet bloc and to woo several leading neutralist nations with offers of aid, and, in certain respects, with diplomatic support. It seemed that just as the Americans were offering "swords", and then only on condition that a state was, or became, a formal ally, the Soviets were offering "ploughshares" to neutralist nations and were asking for no formal undertakings in return. These contrasts, dramatised by Soviet propaganda, had some foundation in fact - though Soviet bloc arms to Egypt in 1955 were hardly "ploughshares", even if Egypt was not required to join in a military alliance with the Soviet bloc. These Soviet-American contrasts were softened or obscured with the Suez and Hungary crises in the last quarter of 1956. As it was, the neutralist nations were growing in numbers and self-confidence and were becoming increasingly independent factors in international politics, with consequent effects on the nature of Cold War rivalries.

The fluctuations and contrasts of this phase can be conveniently conveyed in terms of the major developments in: Europe, the Middle East, the rest of Asia, in questions of

foreign aid, and in U.N. matters. An overall chronological treatment would give a better impression of the conjunction of certain events but would make it more difficult to show their significance in relation to neutralism.

The first significant sign of changing Soviet policies occurred when, at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers in January - February 1954, Mr. Molotov suggested, inter alia, bringing into being a re-unified Germany by prohibiting its participation in any alliances and coalitions, by strictly limiting its armaments, by barring all foreign military bases from its territory and by withdrawing all foreign troops.¹ These measures would, according to Mr. Molotov, provide a satisfactory basis for a re-unified, neutralised Germany. A similar status for Austria was advanced by Mr. Molotov at the same time. However, the Soviet proposals were unacceptable to West Germany and her allies, and after more than a year of diplomatic preparations, Western Germany became the fifteenth member of N.A.T.O. in May 1955.² The Soviets' reply to this further consolidation of N.A.T.O. was to announce the knitting together of pre-existing bilateral arrangements in Eastern Europe in a newly comprehensive Warsaw Pact.³ Even so, Soviet abandonment of previous claims that the German and Austrian problems must be con-

1. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pp.131-137.

2. Ibid. pp.137-148, & Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1955-6, pp.37-44, 103-9, 138-147.

3. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1955-6, pp.48-50, 54.

sidered together was able to facilitate Austria's independence by neutralisation during 1955.¹ Soviet endeavours to stimulate support among west European political opinion in favour of military disengagement were shown not only in the parading of 'the Austrian example', but also in the dramatic reconciliation with Yugoslavia,² and in the reversion of the military base at Porkkala to Finland.³ This was the only Soviet military base outside the Soviet bloc, and its relinquishment was probably intended to strengthen demands for the withdrawal of American bases from Europe. Certainly, Soviet leaders and publicists⁴ began to give unprecedented and seemingly unconditional approval to 'neutralism' at this stage of world affairs. The 1954 edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia slightly revised the 1939 section on neutrality⁵ to read that the Soviet Union "used the institution of neutrality as a means of strengthening its own as well as the world's security."⁶ The most important

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1. See below pp 229-238
 2. See below pp 182-5
 3. See below p. 136 and *ibid*? above pp.126-128.
 4. See, e.g. Ginsburgs; *op.cit.* pp.87-97; also D. Melnikov - "Neutrality and the Current Situation", International Affairs (Moscow) 1956, pp.74-81; and L. Modjoryan - "Neutrality", New Times (Moscow), Feb. 1956, pp.12-15.
 5. See above pp 22-3.
 6. I am indebted to my colleague, Mr. Maurice Hookham, for this translation, and for much help in Soviet materials. By 1956 the term 'neutralism' had emerged in Soviet vocabulary, & was used synonymously with 'neutrality'.

Soviet pronouncement was Mr. Khrushchev's first speech at the 20th Party Congress when he adroitly adopted the uncommitted countries of Asia as his friends, describing them as part of "a peace camp" allied to the "socialist" one, with "fraternal Yugoslavia" hovering ambiguously between the two, and ^{with} Finland, Austria and other neutral countries distinguished from America's allies.^{1.}

In fact, the vital, though naturally unpublicised, reservation to Soviet approval of neutralism was that it was only to be encouraged outside the Soviet bloc. This had, perhaps, been implicit in the abortive rising in East Berlin in June 1953 and in the carefully qualified "liberalisation" in Poland in the middle months of 1956,^{2.} but it was brutally demonstrated in October 1956 when Soviet troops crushed the attempts of the Hungarians to defect from the year-old Warsaw Pact and to work out their own variant of neutralism.^{3.} Parallel with events in Hungary, and quite apart from the palpable inability of the Western powers to intervene on

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1. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1955-6, pp.222-229, & Soviet News Booklet, No. 4 (Feb. 1956).
 2. See Hugh Seton-Watson - The Pattern of Communist Revolution, op.cit. pp.357-376, & his Neither War Nor Peace (London, 1960) pp.338-346.
 3. See George Mikes - The Hungarian Revolution (London, 1957); also Imre Nagy on Communism. In Defence of the New Course (London, 1957). Nagy was the Hungarian Communist Prime Minister who tried to adopt a neutralist course in early Oct. 1956. This tract was written during his forced retirement in 1955-6 & reveals some of his neutralist ideas, see esp. chapter 3; also Seton-Watson's introduction to this English translation.

behalf of the Hungarians, came the swift cooling of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the imponderable but undoubted intrusion of China into east European affairs during 1956. After the Hungarian revolution had been quietened, Soviet efforts were concentrated on repairing rifts in the Communist camp. This repair work seemed to be complete by the time of the Moscow meeting of the ruling Communist parties in October 1957, which time seemed also to mark the undoubted emergence of Mr. Khrushchev as the pre-eminent leader in the Soviet Union.¹

In the Middle East during these years there were four dominant trends. Firstly, there was a rapid deterioration in British-Egyptian relations, culminating in the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in October 1956.² Secondly, there was the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, bringing together Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran, though leaving the United States in the ambiguous position of silent partner and not a formal member.³ In fact, this development re-emphasised pre-existing divisions in the Middle East and provoked strenuous responses, especially from Egypt, but also from Syria and Saudi Arabia, as well as from Israel.

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1. See Seton-Watson - The Pattern of Communist Revolution, op.cit. p.359.
2. See Campbell, op.cit. chapters 4-9, & Full Circle, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden (London, 1960) book 3, chapter 1-9.
3. See Campbell, op.cit. chapter 5.

Thirdly, there was the dramatic renewal of active Soviet interest in the region and signs of a growing association between the Soviets and Egypt and Syria.¹ Fourthly, throughout the years 1954-6, inclusive, American policy tried to reconcile the irreconcilable, by seeking to build up Western defenses in the area while at the same time trying to cultivate good relations with Arab neutralist states. Such a vacillating policy found its nemesis when in January 1957 the Eisenhower Doctrine - offering military and economic assistance to any Middle Eastern state that asked for help against "armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism" - met with strong opposition from most states, and only tepid enthusiasm from a few, throughout the whole region.²

By contrast, such Soviet acts as the retrocession of Port Arthur to the Chinese in May 1955,³ and the official "visite of friendship"⁴ by Bulganin and Khrushchev, in late 1955, to India, Burma and Afghanistan (the latter marked by

1. See Walter Z. Laquer - The Soviet Union and the Middle East (London, 1959), esp. pp.211-228 & 247-263.
2. See Campbell, op.cit. chapters 4-9 and 17.
3. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1955-6, pp.53 & 126.
4. For full texts of the Bulganin & Khrushchev speeches in India, Burma & Afghanistan, see supplement in New Times (Moscow) 22 December 1955.

the ceremonious prolongation of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of neutrality and non-aggression, which originated in 1926) were all part and parcel of Moscow's new line of encouraging and co-operating with most of the neutralist nations of the world. Support for Afghanistan's irredentist claims against Pakistan,¹ and the Indian position with regard to Kashmir and Goa,² and offers of aid and trade³ were further instances of this new trend.

In the rest of Asia, American attempts to build up defence arrangements against possible Communist attack further alienated neutralist opinion, and official American spokesmen openly regarded neutralism with suspicion and dislike.⁴ The conclusion of the South East Asian Defence Treaty in September 1954⁵ linked the security interests of

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1. See below p133.
 2. See below pp171 & 174.
 3. It is to be remembered that Soviet trade and/or aid offers were also made about this time to Turkey, Pakistan, Iceland, Great Britain, among others.
 4. Thus, President Eisenhower in his 1954 Christmas message: "The times are so critical and the differences between these world systems so vital that grave doubt is cast on the validity of neutralistic argument." See also the speech of American Deputy Under Secretary, Murphy, on 16 November 1954, printed in D.S.B., 29 November 1954, pp.799-803; also Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1954 - "The Politics of Neutralism", pp.283-289.
 5. For a full account, see Collective Defence in South-East Asia, A Report by a Chatham House (R.I.I.A.) Study Group (London, 1956).

the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand (all already linked with the United States) with Britain, France and Pakistan in a comprehensive agreement - S.E.A.T.O. Three of the four successor states of former French Indo-China, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (the fourth was Communist North Vietnam) were declared to be under the 'protection' of the S.E.A.T.O. treaty members, though they did not become full members themselves. The United States' adhesion to the treaty was qualified in a protocol which made clear the American preoccupation with Communist aggression, while appearing to regard other forms of aggression as less reprehensible. Formosa was excluded from S.E.A.T.O., but, under pressure from Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States felt it necessary to conclude a bilateral defence agreement. This was signed on 1 December 1954,¹ and completed the list of formal U.S. defence commitments in the Far East.

In the aftermath of the Korean and Indo-China wars, American concentration on military arrangements seemed to be 'rather backward-looking as the Soviets' rapid development of trade and aid programmes to neutralist states added a new dimension to Cold War rivalries. Previously, the Western powers had been the sole, and rather parsimonious, suppliers to neutralist nations. The first Soviet loan to a non-

1. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1955-6, pp. 7 & 10-14.

Communist country was made to Afghanistan in January 1954 for the sum of \$3.5 million. In that first year, the total aid from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries to non-Communist countries was \$10.6 million. For 1955 it was \$305 million, for 1956 nearly \$1,100 million, and for 1957 over \$1,900 million.¹ In total volume U.S. aid greatly exceeded Soviet aid, but U.S. aid priorities seemed to be with Israel, Libya, South Korea, South Vietnam, Laos and Formosa, whereas the main Soviet efforts were concentrated on Syria, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia and Nepal.² It is notoriously difficult to compare the aid programmes even in economic terms, let alone assess their political effects,³ but, certainly, foreign aid first became a serious matter of Cold War rivalry in these years.] The Soviets began with a number of advantages⁴ over their Western rivals - the novelty of their aid programmes, the prevailing Afro-Asian anti-imperialist image of the U.S.S.R., the apparent absence of political or military 'strings', the procedural advantages of totalitarian govern-

1. See U.S. Dept. of State, The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive in the less Developed Countries (Washington, U.S.G.P.O. 1958).
2. See *ibid*; & V.K.R.V. Rao - International Aid for Economic Development (Leeds, 1960), esp. pp.11-13; & Joseph S. Berliner - Soviet Economic Aid (New York, 1958).
3. See Berliner, *op.cit.* esp. chapters 2 & 4.
4. *Ibid.*

ments in operating foreign aid programmes,¹ and the fact that Soviet bloc aid was growing at a more rapid annual rate than Western aid. ~~Germany, France and Great Britain~~
~~various other neutralist states in these years.~~ The experience of being actively courted by Communist states proffering 'unconditional' aid was not only attractive in itself, to neutralist nations, but it afforded opportunities for provoking the United States to increase, or initiate, its own aid programmes, whatever the misgivings of many Americans about such moves. During June and July 1956 U.S. spokesmen made a spate of contradictory pronouncements,² approving or disapproving of neutralism in general terms - including Mr. Dulles' notorious phrase that "except under very exceptional circumstances" neutrality is an "immoral and shortsighted conception."³ All these pronouncements should be seen in context of the Eisenhower administration's

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1. E.g. a report in The Times, 4 Jan. 1958, showing the main direction of Communist trade & aid, pointed out that "the scale of foreign aid is being withheld from the Russian people."
 2. There is a collection of the major speeches, with commentaries, in Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York) for 15 Aug. 1956, & 15 Feb. 1957. For full texts, see D.S.B. 18 June 1956, pp.999-1004; D.S.B. 25 June 1956, pp.1043-47; & pp. 1063-65; D.S.B. 16 July, 1956, pp.91-5. See also D.S.B. 17 Dec. 1956, pp.943-48 & ibid. 9 July 1957, p.49; also Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1955-6, pp.200-2. For a Soviet comment on these American pronouncements, see "Washington and the Neutrality Problem", New Times (Moscow) July 1956, pp.3-7.
 3. See D.S.B. 18 June, 1956, pp.999-1004.

difficulties in attempting simultaneously to: increase American foreign aid programmes in the face of strong opposition from neo-isolationists at home,^{1.} to placate the anxieties of those allies who feared a reduction of their aid from the United States, and to take increasing account of the needs of neutralist nations.^{2.} By the middle of 1957 there was evidence of a far more balanced estimate than hitherto in influential American thought about neutralism.^{3.}

The Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955^{4.} was a dramatic illustration of trends which were increasingly cutting across strict Cold War rivalries. It was primarily a gathering of Afro-Asian leaders who were

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1. See Norman A. Graebner - The New Isolationism. A Study in Politics & Foreign Policy since 1950, (New York, 1956); also his "Foreign Aid and American Policy" in Current History 1956, pp.212-217.
 2. See The Economist, 16 June 1956, p.1076 for a balanced assessment of the American leaders' predicament. The Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, made a state visit to the U.S. in 1955 and Mr. Nehru & President Sukarno also did so during 1956 - these visits may have had an educative effect on American opinion.
 3. See the analysis of neutralism in the Report on Foreign Policy and Mutual Security, House of Representatives 85th Congress, 11 June 1957 (Washington, 1957) esp.pp.56R-61R.
 4. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) 1955-6, chapter 5; Mary Knatchbull Keynes - "The Bandung Conference" in International Relations, October 1957, pp.362-376; G. M. Kahin - The Asian-African Conference (New York, 1956); & Triska & Koch - "The Asian African Nations & International Organization", Review of Politics, April 1959, pp.417-456.

anxious, above all, to keep out of Cold War quarrels and yet aware, as President Sukarno said, that "the affairs of the world are our affairs, and our future depends on the solution found to all international problems, however far or distant they may seem.^{1.}" It would be wrong to convey the impression that the Bandung Conference was wholly a neutralist meeting, for the views of aligned states were fully ventilated (with Chou En-lai skilfully plying China's current policy of ostensible peace and friendship with Afro-Asian neutralists), and anti-colonialism in its various manifestations was another important theme. However, neutralism was becoming a vital strand in the Afro-Asian movement, though by no means fully synonymous with it, as neutralists began to shed some of their former defensiveness and to move more surely internationally, encouraged by accords with fellow neutralists.^{2.} It was probably in such matters as increasing contacts and seeing the advantages of an international platform that Bandung was most beneficial to neutralists. The conference

1. Kahin, op.cit. pp.46-7.
2. Mrs. Keynes, op.cit. p.375, says that there were 9 confirmed neutralists at Bandung - Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Syria & Yemen. The positions of Egypt, Ethiopia & Saudi Arabia were not fully clear but were at times neutralist. There were 2 Communist states - China & North Vietnam, and 15 anti-Communists - Ceylon, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey & South Vietnam.

met at a time when Cold War deadlocks had prevented for more than five years any expansion in the membership of the United Nations - a fact much regretted by all neutralists and especially by the still 'unenfranchised' states. However, with the so-called U.S.-U.S.S.R. "horse-trading deal"¹. of December 1955, by which the United Nations immediately gained sixteen new members,² and became open to further increases in membership,³ that organisation seemed to gain a new relevance and vitality in world affairs, whilst greatly augmenting the number of neutralist votes and voices.

Though the rivalries between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. quickened, became more varied in scope and, on the whole, slightly less venomous in their verbal interchanges, direct contacts between the two superpowers were virtually as rare and unproductive as in the Stalin-Truman era. Mr. Dulles quickly withdrew the American delegation from participation in the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, leaving Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov to attempt a compromise settlement⁴. Both

1. See Goodwin, op.cit. pp.224-226.
2. These were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Roumania & Spain. Cambodia, Ceylon, Laos & Libya were all new states created since 1945.
3. Sudan, Morocco & Tunisia - all new states - became members in Nov. 1956; Japan in Dec. 1956; Ghana, a new state, in March 1957; & Malaya, another new state, in Sept. 1957.
4. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pp.42-75; & The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden. Full Circle (London, 1960) chapter 6. Eden writes (p.123) "This was the first international meeting at which I was sharply conscious of the deterrent power of the hydrogen bomb. I was grateful for it."

the Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955¹ and the follow-up Conference of Foreign Secretaries in October - November 1955² were unproductive, though there was much superficial talk then and for some time afterwards about a vague but new, welcome and all pervasive "Geneva spirit". As both superpowers developed their nuclear capacities (and the facts or rumours of other emergent nuclear powers became publicised), the need to avoid thermo-nuclear war and agree on some form of "peaceful co-existence" was recognised on all sides. The outstanding problem was to establish a basis on which the two Cold War camps could agree to co-exist. This problem was no nearer solution than it had ever been when the successful launching of the Soviet Sputnik in October 1957 encouraged Mr. Krushchev to claim that this event had altered the power balance in the world. In a sense, this was no doubt true; but other more gradual changes were increasingly affecting the nature of Cold War rivalries. The Soviet Union and the United States were still predominant, but both thenceforward had to give greater attention to independent forces, both within and outside their own alliances.

1. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1955-6, pp.155-160.

2. Ibid. pp.167-174.

(4) Variable Weather, 1957-early 1961

The chief characteristics of this fourth phase of the Cold War, which takes us up to and includes the present, seem to be: the developing global character of Cold War struggles (as Africa and Latin-America now become areas of active Cold War rivalry, too); the greater number of direct contacts between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; the apparently growing attractions of neutralism, and the increasing attention paid by each of the superpowers towards neutralist states.

Following the Soviet success in launching the first earth satellite (Sputnik), it seemed that Soviet leadership had gained fresh confidence and that the Soviet state, now militarily stronger and industrially more powerful than ever before, began to extend the scale of its international operations. However much of this was due to the undoubted emergence of Mr. Khrushchev as the first man in Russia, a more important reason probably was that a new state of 'mutual deterrence' between the two superpowers had been ushered in, now that Russian capacity to launch inter-continental missiles had marked the end of the territorial invulnerability of the American homeland. In such a situation, the advantages accruing from Communist inspired

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1. In July 1957 it was reported that Messrs. Molotov, Kaganovich & Malenkov were expelled from the Praesidium of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mr. Shepilov was demoted, too, & these changes were widely interpreted as marking the further emergence of Mr. Khrushchev. see The Times. 4 July 1957.

local aggression were likely to increase, not only because the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation was less credible as a deterrent to local attack on her minor allies, but also because further developments in America's own weaponry were likely to reduce her dependence on large numbers of fixed overseas bases, and might even reduce the military value of small, exposed allies in her eyes. This did not, of course, reduce the chances of local wars, and between October 1957 and January 1961 there was a succession of skirmishes and war scares over Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Laos, Formosa, Congo, Cuba and Berlin.¹

Another feature of this post-Sputnik phase is the growing number of direct contacts between the citizens and leaders of the two superpowers.² This process began formally with the two year agreement on cultural, technical and educational exchanges, signed in January 1958, though it is doubtful if the superficial cordiality which was becoming customary in these new encounters appreciably lessened the distrust and mutual irritation which marked the fundamental relations between the two governments. In terms of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, the failure of the Paris summit conference of May 1960 was a revealing example of deep-rooted

1. For details, see The United States in World Affairs, annual volumes for 1957, 1958, 1959 & 1960 (New York, 1958, 1959, 1960 & 1961) passim.
2. Ibid. Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. in Sept. 1959 was the most dramatic of these new contacts.

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incompatibilities.

The rivalry between the two superpowers now seemed to be increasingly complicated by incipient stresses and strains within their respective alliance systems, as well as by the growing number of new states which were emerging and pursuing neutralist courses. The days when American leaders acted as energetic recruiting officers gathering more members for military alliances, and when Soviet leaders openly denigrated neutralists, had gone. Many neutralists were proselytisers themselves, now, and the very new neutralist state did not find itself in a world where one was expected to apologise for one's neutralist stance, but where one could point to many notable exemplars and precedents. A new and looser international system, more flexible and multilateral, was in being, and formal ties now seemed far less significant than hitherto.

Stresses and strains were certainly evident throughout America's alliances. The defection of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, following regicide and revolution in July 1958, called forth a reconstruction of that alliance with the U.S. assuming a much more active role in what now became called the Central Treaty Organization (C.E.N.T.O.),¹ with its new headquarters

1. For a brief account of the Iraq revolt, see U.S.W.A. 1958, pp.201-3, & for C.E.N.T.O. see The Daily Telegraph, 24 May 1960 & 26 April 1961, & The Economist 6 May 1961, p. 556.

in Turkey. Five months earlier the union of the two states of Egypt and Syria in a single "United Arab Republic" was proclaimed in Cairo as a first step towards the unification of the Arab peoples.¹ It seemed as if the tide of Nasserite nationalism and neutralism was rising. Within S.E.A.T.O. deteriorating situations in the two 'protected' states of Laos and South Vietnam revealed a lack of any concerted alliance policy;² there were a number of reports that the Philippines and Siam were actively seeking other, unspecified means of ensuring their security,³ and in November 1960 it was announced that Thailand had for the first time accepted Soviet offers of economic assistance.⁴ In January 1960 the U.S. signed a new ten year defence treaty with Japan,⁵ though by the following October a prominent member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee was warning his fellow members of the popular trend towards neutralism in Japan⁶ and the

- 759
*Examination
 Committee*
1. See U.S.W.A. 1958, pp.189-192.
 2. See annual volumes of U.S.W.A. 1957-60, passim.
 3. See Daily Telegraph, 8 June 1961; Economist, 1 April 1961 pp.10-12 & 20 May 1961, pp.791-2; C.S.M. 5 April 1960, & New York Times, 4 Sept. 1960.
 4. See C.S.M. 5 Nov. 1960. A report from Bangkok mentioned America's current balance-of-payments difficulties & the shock to Thais of hearing about an American mission to Bonn "begging for money...the image of a shock-proof American economy was until this year about as firmly lodged in the Asian mind as perhaps the myth of Asian military inferiority to Europe before 1905." See The Guardian, 21 Dec. 1960.
 5. See The Guardian, 20 Jan. 1960.
 6. See Letter of Transmittal by Senator Mike Mansfield to Senate Cttee. on Foreign Relations, 21 Oct. 1960, p.7; & I.I.Morris - "Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralism" in International Affairs (R.I.I.A.) Jan.1960, pp.7-20.

likelihood that this would increase. In Latin America the cumulative effect of the overthrow of pro-American military dictatorships in a number of countries¹ - Peru (1956), Columbia (1957), Venezuela (1958), Cuba (1959) - and growing Russian and Chinese interest in this region prompted the United States to pay greater attention to Latin American affairs, and to increase economic assistance to Latin American countries. Only Cuba, following the accession of Fidel Castro to power in January 1959,² had by early 1961 clearly embarked on a neutralist policy; but it was a sign of the growing attractiveness of neutralism in Latin America that Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador each decided to send official observers³ to the neutralist summit meeting in Belgrade in September 1961. In early 1961 N.A.T.O., of all America's alliances, seemed least threatened by the corrosive effects of 'creeping neutralism' from within the alliance, or the enticements of already neutralist leaders from without. But trade rivalries between member states, the growing self-confidence of France under President de Gaulle (who came to power in June 1958) and Soviet pressure (from November 1958 onwards) on the Western powers to reach a 'permanent solution' of the Berlin question, all added to America's

1. For details, see annual volumes of U.S.W.A. 1957-60, passim.
2. See U.S.W.A., 1958, p.353+ 335-7, also below p.
3. The Times, 6 May 1961, 22 & 24 Aug. 1961.

task of reconciliation and leadership.¹

In some respects the Soviet Union as the leader of the Communist bloc seemed to be experiencing similar difficulties to those of its main Cold War protagonist. The meeting of the ruling Communist parties in Moscow in November 1957 marked the definite failure of Khrushchev's attempts to woo Yugoslavia back into the Communist camp.² Subsequent to that Moscow meeting and right up to the ending of a similar meeting, also in Moscow, in November 1960, there was considerable evidence of Sino-Soviet disagreements.³ Whatever the full reasons for Sino-Soviet tensions in these years, Chinese dissatisfaction with the way that Mr. Khrushchev was promoting good relations with India and Indonesia, even to the extent of neglecting to support China's interests in her quarrels with these two countries, was undoubtedly one of the immediate causes.⁴ Certainly, in these years China showed a greater militancy and aggressiveness internationally than did the Soviet Union, and the official Chinese attitude to neutralism⁵ was, in general, less friendly than that of

1. See U.S.W.A., 1957-60, passim.
2. See H. Seton-Watson -- Neither War Nor Peace (London, 1960) pp.357-8.
3. See The Sino-Soviet Dispute. Documents and Analysis by G.F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal & Roderick MacFarquhar, (published by The China Quarterly, 1961).
4. Ibid, esp. pp. 5 & 7.
5. See A. M. Halpern - "The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism" in The China Quarterly, Jan-March 1961, pp.90-115. This article surveys Chinese statements on neutralism between Nov. 1957 & Dec. 1960.

her senior partner,¹ though both powers preferred to distinguish between neutralists they approved of and those who, for various reasons, met with their disapproval.²

One of the most striking developments since 1957 has been the considerable increase in the number of new neutralist states, and with their emergence - they are almost all African states - sub-tropical Africa has at last become drawn into the mainstreams of international politics. Indeed, eighteen newly independent states were born, seventeen in Africa, between January 1958 and October 1960 - all of them professed neutralists and all of them becoming members of the U.N.³

1. In March 1958 a leading Soviet publicist again made clear that neutralism was only to be welcomed outside the Soviet bloc - "a system of collective security (i.e. any Soviet alliance) serves as a barrier to aggression and is, hence, a higher form of struggle for peace than the policy of neutrality. That is why a retreat from collective security in favour of neutrality would be a step backward, not forward, in international relations", quoted from E. Korovin - "The Problem of Neutrality Today" in International Affairs (Moscow) March 1958, p.6. The bracketed interpretation is mine, but this meaning is clear in the context of the whole article.
2. In the Nov. 1960 Moscow Manifesto the neutralist states approved of by the Communist powers were generally, & thus conveniently, styled "independent national democracies." See Hudson, Lowenthal & MacFarquhar, op.cit. pp.192-6, esp. pp.194-5. The statement made clear that to secure Communist approval a neutralist must 'fight' against all forms of 'imperialism.'
3. Guinea joined the U.N. in Dec. 1958; Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (capital Brazzaville), Congo (capital Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Togo & Upper Volta all joined the U.N. in Sept. 1960; & Nigeria joined in Oct. 1960. All these were new states & all but Cyprus were African states. Cameroun, Togo & Somalia were formerly U.N. trust territories.

This large addition to the ranks of the neutralist nations not only gave new impetus and strength to neutralist currents, but increasingly there are signs of a willingness on the part of a large number of neutralist leaders to try to concert together on issues of common concern. This latter trend was particularly evident in the autumn 1960 session of the U.N. General Assembly,^{1.} and in the summoning of a neutralist 'summit' in Belgrade in September 1961.^{2.} This is not to say that a neutralist 'bloc' has emerged, or even is emerging. But the sheer number of neutralist states and the importance of some of the larger ones - India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Ghana and the United Arab Republic, for example, - has forced both superpowers to pay increasing attention to them. Mr. Khrushchev's attendance and behaviour (a mixture of bluster and blandishments) at the U.N. General Assembly in September 1960, made clear his interest in 'the neutralist world'. His proposal that most of the important international organisation should be re-organised on a 'Troika'^{3.} basis - i.e. with equally weighted Western, Communist and Neutralist representation - served the dual purpose of forwarding Soviet aims to secure a permanent veto in a wider range of international organisations than the Security Council, whilst also appearing

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1. See Tom Little - "Mr. Khrushchev & the Neutrals at the U.N." World Today, Dec. 1960.
 2. See The Times, 21 & 24 Aug. 1961.
 3. See Alan James - "The Soviet Troika Proposals" in World Today, Sept. 1961, pp. 368-376.

to advocate a new importance for neutralist nations. The new Kennedy administration, in office since January 1961, has to date been at pains to show that it, too, is aware of the needs and prejudices of 'friendly' neutralist nations.¹ The difficulties of trying to please both allies and 'friendly'² neutralists, whilst also pursuing their own interests, are now familiar predicaments, common to both superpowers. The results of their endeavours will vary with the issues at stake, the attitudes and policies of individual neutralists, and their own expectations and aims.

1. In April 1961 the text of a lecture entitled United States Policy in Africa, printed for and circulated by the United States Information Service, said (on p.9) a propos of African neutralism "... from the onset of the African independence revolution the U.S. has not sought membership in or adhesion to Western military alliances of independent African states."
2. See M.S.P. 1961, p. 101, which refers to 'friendly' neutral nations.

NEUTRALISM AS INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE

"The spread of neutralist doctrine in an ever-widening circle from Bandung outwards is perhaps the clearest evidence of a new constellation in international affairs."

Professor Geoffrey Barraclough in 'Confluence'. \

Fall, 1957.

"Political thought is very pragmatist. Yet we must not leave the other side out of our reckoning. If ideas in politics more than elsewhere are the children of practical needs, none the less is it true, that the actual world is the result of men's thoughts."

J. N. Figgis.

Anyone who begins to think about neutralist doctrine must regard the words of Professor Barraclough, quoted overleaf, as being somewhat ironic. For it certainly requires some temerity to write of a doctrine which seems to have no canonical works, no authoritative exegesis, and not yet even a collection of representative neutralist pronouncements.¹ It may help to understand some of the characteristics of such an apparently insubstantial doctrine when we remember who the leading neutralist 'ideologues' usually are, what roles they perform, what aims and aspirations they have in common.

Most people would almost certainly want to describe Mr. Nehru as an exponent of neutralist doctrine, and would probably agree to dub him as the world's foremost neutralist. It has even been suggested that neutralism is a peculiarly Indian invention, and that the spread of neutralist doctrine is a process whereby Mr. Nehru's old

1. There is a small collection in the appendices to this thesis, with some references to other sources. Inevitably this collection is in many respects unsatisfactory, as it is limited both by the brevity of this study and by the shortcomings of the compiler's knowledge - especially of languages. Nevertheless, there is a real scholarly need for a good collection. The one offered here is included mainly in order to reduce the need for extensive quotation in the text and footnotes to this chapter, and also to provide some convenient points of reference for the chapter on neutralism as policy.

arguments become the world's commonplaces,¹ but this is surely to exaggerate Mr. Nehru's influence and the novelty of his pronouncements.² For it has become common to consider Nehru, Tito and Nasser together as "the high priests" of the doctrine of neutralism,³ and to regard the writings and speeches of all three men as significant expressions of neutralist holy writ. Though the importance of some other figures who come to mind - President Sukarno, U Nu, Prince Sihanouk, the late Solomon Bandaranaike, Kwame Nkrumah - might arouse more controversy, there is little doubt that the list of prominent and representative neutralist 'ideologues' could be added to without great difficulty.

While it would be wrong to discount the uniquely personal⁴ elements shaping individual expressions of neutralist doctrine, it is more significant for present

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1. "Neutralism.... imparts an aura of high moral purpose; it is theoretical and Brahminical." Economist, 29 October 1955, p. 377; see also Economist, 21 September 1957, pp. 948-9.
 2. See introduction to Appendix 3 below pp 274-5.
 3. See, e.g. The Times, 1st leader of 26 October 1959 - "Neutralism."
 4. Brief biographical notes, with further detailed references, are prefixed to the selections of neutralist doctrine given in the appendices below.

purposes that most of the leading neutralist 'ideologues' share a wide range of strikingly similar national and personal problems, that they are facing these problems at approximately the same time, and that these similarities tend to give something of a common character, even an international aspect to neutralist doctrine. For most of these 'ideologues' are not only prominent figures in international politics, they nearly all spring from the western-educated intelligentsia¹ of their countries. They are all, in a sense, both producers and consumers of anti-colonial and nationalist revolution, and have to act as the chief spokesmen - at home and abroad - for their generally new, poor, ex-colonial states. At home they may, or may not, be demagogues; they will almost certainly have to act as pedagogues, the prime political educators of their largely illiterate populaces. Abroad, they need to justify their policies and to enlist support. And in this self-consciously ideological age, with the Cold War touching so many matters to which it does not seem germane, there is

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1. There are valuable discussions of this theme in: Edward Shils - "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States", World Politics, April 1960, pp. 329-368; Harry J. Benda - "Non-Western Intelligentsias as Political Elites", Australian Journal of Politics and History, November 1960, pp. 205-218; and Hugh Seton-Watson - Neither War Nor Peace, (London, 1960), chapter 6, especially pp. 182-183.

much need to fasten on to some generally acceptable criteria in terms of which a neutralist case can usually be made.

All neutralists begin by rejecting emphatically the notion that they should view the world from within the 'confines' of a Cold War alliance. Thereafter, having avoided, in their own view, the prevailing East-West stereotypes, they are liable to accept some other deceptively simple view(s) of the inter-state system - the big versus the small, the old versus the new, the colonialist versus the anti-colonialist, the rich versus the poor, are four favourites. Such dichotomies, which cut across and divide Cold War solidarities, can suggest to many neutralists a spectrum of common sympathies and antipathies, and these become powerful influences shaping their world outlook.

Even so, ambiguities inevitably arise within various versions of the doctrine - mainly from the conjunction of influences which are not always similarly and simultaneously present - and it is by remembering these deep emotional well-springs that one can begin to see why neutralist doctrine reflects such a variety of often contradictory views. Why it is sometimes doctrinaire, and yet more often extremely pragmatist. Why its exponents sometimes make exaggerated claims for the novelty of their proposals.

Why it unmistakably bears the mark of its time and contains matter which is wholly ephemeral. Also, why, there is much evidence of ex-parte statement - for all neutralist doctrine is, in some respects at least, an essay in advocacy adapted to the urgencies of Cold War situations. Yet, what is perhaps most surprising about contemporary neutralist doctrine is not the nationalist colourings and the partisan pleading in which it is undoubtedly invested, but its markedly international tinge, and the degree to which it presents, in part at least, an explicitly general view of international relations.

see over

~~wholly with 'hot' war; it was based almost entirely on custom and usage, its criteria were essentially juridical, and it was irretrievably discredited by the general disregard it suffered during the First World War. Contemporary neutralist doctrine is concerned with non-alignment in global Cold War, its essential criteria are political and it, too, claims some degree of international relevance.~~

It is in Africa and Asia that the leading neutralist¹. 'philosopher-kings' reside.² For it was in the Afro-Asian world, during the third phase of the Cold War,³ that neutralism began to crystallise as an international doctrine; and it is still in Asia and Africa that the most comprehensive expressions of the doctrine can be found.⁴ Up to the time of writing there has been since 1945 no Latin American neutralist 'ideologue' of international significance, though since 1958 Fidel Castro seems to be aspiring to this role.

1. See appendices below, nos. 1-10.
2. For the way in which this Platonic notion is relevant to modern nationalism, see Elie Kedourie - Nationalism (London, 1960), pp. 49-50.
3. See above pp. 47-61.
4. This is not to subscribe to the belief sometimes propounded by Asian and African neutralists that neutralism is 'intrinsically' and/or distinctively Afro-Asian. For reasons already outlined it is suggested that, in any case, emotional affinities are more important than geographical propinquities.

In Europe neutralist doctrine is generally either not strongly couched in international terms, or its proponents lack significant political influence. Even exceptionally where official neutralist pronouncements chime with those from Africa and Asia, this seems to be mostly coincidental, as in the case of some Swedish statements, or carefully contrived, as in the case with Yugoslav neutralism. French neutralist pronouncements are also excluded. For French neutralism, though often expressed by men of great intellectual distinction and displaying a bewildering variety of articulate opinion, has, to date, lacked effective political influence in France, and has never enjoyed an international platform. Like many French intellectual movements, it is characterised by a defiant ethnocentrism, is an affair of coterie, and is best studied solely as a French phenomenon.¹ And, for similar reasons, British neutralism² can be ignored here.

1. To date, French neutralism has attracted a surprising amount of scholarly attention, considering its insignificance internationally. John T. Marcus's book Neutralism and Nationalism in France (New York, 1958) is a thorough study of the available sources and has a good bibliography. Marcus repeatedly stresses (though he is too immersed in detail to demonstrate this clearly) the close connection between neutralism and nationalism in France.
2. There is as yet no satisfactory study of British neutralism.¹ Two partially helpful references are Leon Epstein - Britain, Uneasy Ally (Chicago, 1954); & John Strachey - The Pursuit of Peace (Fabian Tract 329, London, Dec. 1960) Constantine Fitzgibbon's novel - When the Kissing had to Stop (London, 1960) is a fable designed to show the dangers of British neutralism.

It is assumed, then, that for present purposes we must look not to philosophers but to rulers for authoritative, influential, expositions of neutralist doctrine; that to be internationally significant the protagonists of neutralism need the nourishment of political power; and that neutralist doctrine is more likely to be learned at the press conference or from the public platform than in the study or seminar. And if public forums are the academies of neutralism, it must be expected that neutralist doctrine will at best present not a corpus of knowledge, an integrated body of theory, but rather a constellation of concepts - and these will be shrouded in a confusing medley of supporting argument.

Yet, despite these difficulties of interpretation, it does seem possible to detect five main threads in the tangled skein of neutralist argument. These are:-

- (1) that Cold War conditions can be mitigated and perhaps removed altogether;
- (2) that neutralism is morally justifiable;
- (3) that neutralists must pursue an 'independent' foreign policy;
- (4) that all forms of colonialism must be eradicated;
- (5) that foreign aid must be given without strings.

It is not pretended that all neutralists would willingly subscribe to the above list, nor that any of these propositions are necessarily exclusive to them. All that is

claimed is that these five affirmations suggest what are the central concerns of virtually all neutralists. In actual discourse all five points habitually run together and become enmeshed - certainly, point number (3) should be considered as primary, and points (4) and (5) as common corollaries of it. They are separated out here in order to provide some fixed points round which ideas that often recur can be examined in order to show their main supporting arguments, the degree of novelty present, and reveal their underlying assumptions, affinities, and incongruities.

I.

Fear of 'hot' war and irritation at the continuation of the Cold War are constant themes in neutralist rhetoric. Yet it is not this that distinguishes neutralists, but rather the diagnoses, and, especially, the prognoses they offer of this common predicament. Neutralists tend to place great stress on the role of fear¹ as a tension-breeding factor, and with this often goes the implication that many fears are unwarranted and, hence, removable. They maintain that the mutual fears of the Cold War antagonists create a war-like atmosphere which discourages any

1. E.g. see appendices below, pp 271 A, 283.

possibility of lessening tension and unfreezing the Cold War. It seems almost as if the neutralist believes that there is a Zeitgeist and that he understands it better, and so can think more purposefully, than can any non-neutralist.¹ Such a view necessarily lays great trust in the therapeutic power of neutralist advice and lays stress on the moral suasive power of 'independent' example and 'the healing touch'² of the man of peace.³

The view that general war is entered into as a deliberate act of policy is seldom heard today, and the classic isolationist case for non-involvement - that, for the isolationist, participation in war can, in fact, be avoided - now represents

1. See appendices below pp 283 & 321.
2. See below, section II too. These optimistic assumptions, & the parallel one that ignorance of each other's ways greatly aggravates fears and increases tensions, are part of the common currency of Anglo-American liberalism, & are enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution of U.N.E.S.C.O. In this respect many present day neutralists seem to re-echo Gladstone and Woodrow Wilson. E.g. Woodrow Wilson - "The example of America must be a special example... not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not." See The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson ed. by Baker & Dodd, v.1., p. 321 c.f. particularly, appendices 3 & 8.
3. It is a widely held view that men from the Hindu-Buddhist world of South & South East Asia are peculiarly well fitted to be neutralists and men of peace. This is usually maintained by people favourably disposed towards neutralists, & as a contemporary version of the well known maxim "ex oriente lux." But it is notoriously difficult to trace definite connections between cultural patterns & political behaviour. This theory is more plausible at the level of doctrine than of policy.

a relatively minor part of neutralist argument. . Though the emotional attitudes of present day neutralists and pre-war isolationists may be similar, the situations faced by each are different enough to elicit quite different responses. No neutralist today can confidently assert, as did a leading Canadian isolationist¹ in the 1920s, that he lives in a 'fireproof house'; he does not even claim that his Cold War neutralism necessarily means that his own country would not become involved in a general 'hot' war. . The present defence of neutralism is, substantially, that it can help to prevent war.

There are three popular variants of this argument in neutralist circles.

The first is that neutralists should play a 'third' role in world affairs. In its strongest form this view sees neutralists acting together as a 'Third Force', holding a position that can save the world from self destruction. Very few neutralists, however, now see any practical possibility in the idea of a Third Force, though there are hints

1. Senator Dandurand in 1924 to the League of Nations - see P. N. S. Mansergh - Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Problems of External Policy 1931-1939, (London, 1952), p. 95.

of such thinking in their most optimistic expressions.¹ The weaker, and more common, form of this argument is to see neutralists as creators and spreaders of areas of disengagement² from Cold War struggles, "areas of peace" is Mr. Nehru's favourite description of these disengaged regions.³ By themselves refusing to take sides in the Cold War struggle, neutralists claim to slow down the drift towards a bipolar world, in which international tensions would be raised to an intolerable pitch and war would become an immediate and ever present danger. Though neutralists dislike talking about 'balancing power', their implicit assumption is that a multilateral balance can be substituted

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1. Strong neutralist advocacy of Third Force views is usually connected with ardent support for some particular scheme - the Commonwealth, European Union, the Afro-Asian bloc, Pan-Africa, the Asian Socialist Conference, are some examples. The past achievements and future prospects of such schemes are viewed by their proponents with greater respect than their actual impact on world affairs would seem to warrant, and their common neutralist character is always exaggerated.
 2. Disengagement is a term which has already been stretched to cover many different plans. Captain Hinterhoff's encyclopaedic book Disengagement (London, 1959), though devoted mainly to Europe, lists 174 different projects. Clearly, one does not have to be a neutralist to advocate disengagement, but if one is a neutralist, then, logically, one must be prepared to include one's own country in some kind of disengagement scheme.
 3. See below p. 278.

for the present bi-lateral, or near bi-lateral, balance and that this would make for peace. At the very least, the existence of, and the need to woo, unaligned states is conceived of as exercising a form of restraint on the Cold War combatants.

The second variant concerns "bridgemanhip", for neutralists often assert that they offer the best remaining hope for ultimately bridging the gap between the Communist powers and the Western world.¹ They claim that their middle position enables them to provide acceptable channels of communication across Cold War barriers. Here again, the neutralist sees his role as one which facilitates understanding and breaks down the mutual ignorance Cold War contestants have of each other's views.² Neutralists stress, too, that they can undertake with some hope of success to act as friendly mediators. "Their proposals for the settlement of outstanding disputes are (in their view) more likely to get a respectful hearing from both Cold War camps than those advanced by the partisans of a particular side; "

1. See, e.g. appendix below p. 316

2. E.g. Mr. Nehru- "The role of India is a sort of catalyst. We are the uncommitted people. That is why we try to steer a middle course between two camps, so that both will trust us... we are in a position to break down mutual prejudice." Lok Sabha Debs. 17 March 1953, vol. 2, No.7: 2147. See also appendix 2. This view necessarily presupposes that the Cold War contestants are willing to accept neutralist intermediaries, & this is not always the case. Canadian policy since 1945 provides at least some refutations of the claim that only neutralist states can act as mediators, moderators, purveyors of compromise formulae.

and in present circumstances they regard their availability for service on armistice, observation, and other comparable commissions as invaluable. Even though it is admitted that such activities are seldom spectacular, it is claimed that by slow and patient conciliation a firmer base for international co-operation may eventually be secured. Neutralists and non-neutralists alike agree that negotiation and peaceful settlement are not panaceas for all the problems of international politics, but neutralists claim that they encourage a greater use than might otherwise be possible of these sometimes valuable solvents. The neutralist thus sees himself acting as a prophylactic; seeking to prevent tension by removing its causes, calming the atmosphere by keeping calm himself, evoking goodwill by showing it.

The third, and most ambitious, variant of the view that neutralism aids international peace conceives of the neutralist role in even larger terms, and believes that neutralism can make a more effective contribution to the containment of Communist expansion, and the amelioration of Cold War difficulties, than can any Western sponsored regional defence arrangement. This argument maintains that the neutralists by deliberately adopting a non-aligned posture in the face of Western warnings, by declining to join in any measures of a hostile character aimed at Communist states and by placing public faith in Communist

intentions, have thereby produced earnestness of Communist good behaviour. If a Communist power were to attack one of the neutralist countries, it would, according to this theory, irretrievably destroy its political credit throughout the uncommitted world. This seems to be the rationale underlying most neutralist faith in Panch Sheel¹ type of agreements. Of course, the whole argument hinges on the assumption that Communist states making such public pledges² will go to great lengths to avoid offending neutralist opinion, and it seems to exaggerate the extent to which

1. Panch Sheel, or "the 5 principles of peaceful co-existence" were formally enunciated in the preamble to the Sino-Indian treaty on trade & communications with Tibet of 29 April 1954. The principles are (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity & sovereignty, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality & mutual benefit, & (5) peaceful co-existence. Though neutralists in general, & Mr. Nehru in particular, seem to regard these principles as being a special contribution to world politics, they are not at all original, are repetitious, & really boil down to the edict that a state's independence should not be infringed. There seems to be no need to seek deep philosophical sources for such an unremarkable point, but such searches persist. See, e.g. Panch Sheel: Its Meaning and History (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1955) & the discussion reported in The Indian Journal of Political Science, Jan. - March 1956.
2. E.g. Nehru - "It is not a question of believing the other party's word; it is a question of creating conditions where the other party cannot break its word, or if I may say so, where it finds it difficult to break its word." If it did, it was "likely to find itself in a much worse quandary." Lok Sabha Debs. 29 Sept. 1954, vol. VII, part 2, col. 3687. See also cols. 3692-3.

neutralist states might regard a hostile act against one neutralist state as being a hostile act against the whole neutralist world.

It is ironic that the practical efficacy of Panch Sheel agreements should first be called into question seriously as a result of rapid deterioration in the relations between the two original promoters, India and China. Actually, most Panch Sheel agreements between neutralist and Communist states are unlikely to be subject to similar strains, if only because the direct clash of interests is less likely where there is geographical separation of the signatory states. For it is important to remember that all the foregoing arguments have been concerned with international peace and security rather than national security. While it does not necessarily follow that without international security there can be no national security, neutralists seldom make this distinction openly. Appeals to history - quite apart from the argument about the degree of novelty inherent in Cold War situations in the presence of thermo-nuclear weapons - are inevitably inconclusive. For, in the past, neither alliance nor ^{non-alignment} ~~neutrality~~ policies have proved to be infallible recipes for preventing, or even avoiding, war.

II.

One of the most vital elements in neutralist doctrine is the resistance that is put up to claims that either Cold War camp commands an exclusive monopoly of rectitude. Neutralist resistance to American policies was probably heightened by some of Mr. Dulles' more notorious phrases - "massive retaliation", "the brink of war", "neutrality is an immoral and shortsighted conception", "agonising re-appraisal", are some which immediately come to mind. What many neutralists say is that they themselves have no messianic mission, they do not think in terms of moral absolutes and they quite genuinely do not see everything in the Cold War as incidents in a drama where the 'good' forces of the Western world will confound the 'evil' forces of the Communist bloc.¹ They refuse to see the East-West struggle in terms of a conflict between 'right' and 'wrong', and, hence, to be drawn into a crusade to extirpate evil on either side. This is an effective counter to some of the more extravagant or hypocritical moral claims advanced by the committed in the Cold War and is a pertinent reminder of the values of humility and sincerity in politics.

1. E.g. see K. M. Panikkar - Common Sense About India, (London, 1960), p. 148, and appendices

But humility is not the only moral attitude of neutralists.. For some of them assert a moral neutralism, an indifference, with regard to the two Cold War camps because they consider that both sides in the Cold War are basically at the same moral level. The extreme negative and positive poles of this view are summed up in the phrases "a plague on both your houses"¹. and "I am holier than thou." No matter whether the negative or the positive variant is dominant in a particular argument, all expressions of moral neutralism rest on a loose identification of the Soviet and Western systems with values from which the neutralist feels equidistant,². and on loose analogies between Soviet and Western policies with scant regard for their vital differences.³.

The negative attitude of "a plague on both your houses" expresses a desire to "think neutralism" and thus to assert

1. Thus Mr. Nehru - "If there is a Cold War today, certainly we are neutral. It does not matter who is right and who is wrong. We will not join in this exhibition of mutual abuse." Lok Sabha Debs. 12 June 1952, vol. 2(1), p. 1662.
2. Thus President Sukarno in an unsolicited letter to the New Statesman (London) 28 June 1958, p. 828 - "It is past time for the West, Communist and anti-Communist alike (sic) to draw back from the edge of complete moral bankruptcy... There can be no question of the West giving moral leadership to Asia. Your moral leadership has, for us, meant first colonialism and now the philosophical, moral, political and social bankruptcy of a nuclear arms race." The whole letter is a fascinating statement by a leading neutralist.
3. I owe this point to Denis Healey - Neutralism (London, 1955), p. 20.

an impartiality of mind towards the moral issues involved in the Cold War. In its most defensive position this negative mood finds refuge in tu quoque argument - for which, of course, in politics there are endless opportunities. Righteous indignation at Indian 'appeasement' of Communist aggression in Tibet, for example, tempts those who are scolded to cite the record of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam - the attempted 'appeasement' of Soviet dictatorship by the 'surrender' of the liberties of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Invariably, the Suez and Hungary episodes of 1956 get dragged into these inevitably inconclusive arguments. A more aggressive defence of this negative moral neutralism is to assert that there are no moral issues involved in the Cold War struggle. In fact, those who take such a stand are driven to adopt, implicitly, a double standard of judgement - an exacting one for the 'parliamentary democracies and a complaisant one for the totalitarian dictatorships.

In a sense, of course, double standards are always being applied in international politics; this is mainly because the moral agents in international relations are not individuals only but governments, and governments are far more intimately concerned with issues that seem to involve the national interest, and are often indifferent to others that do not. But any responsible moral comparison between the two rival Cold War groupings must surely take into

account respective responsibilities for the development of the Cold War, and the behaviour of the parties in this struggle towards allies, opponents and neutralists. If, after such analysis, the neutralist still publicly¹ insists that the behaviour of both Cold War camps is morally identical, protagonists of either side in the Cold War would, no doubt, immediately reply that such a judgement amounts to refusing to distinguish between light grey and dark black - an ironic reply to indefatigable moralists who constantly claim to "decide each issue on its merits."²

Furthermore, there is a persistent tendency for some neutralists to act as if verbal pronouncements, without any subsequent substantive policy on their own part, are sufficient to 'decide' complex issues in international politics, without assuming any responsibility for seeing that a verbal 'decision' is carried out. In fact, for most neutralists staying non-aligned must often seem more important

1. Privately, it may be that the neutralist makes use of the facile back-handed compliment that he expects higher standards of probity from the Western than the Communist camp, or admits that people under Communist rule are too well sealed off to be open to much neutralist persuasion.
2. Hence, presumably, the working distinction observed by most neutralists who refuse to be anti-Communist in foreign policy, though actively anti-Communist in their domestic policy. Perhaps a useful touchstone of state morality is to see to what extent a distinction is preserved between public policy & private attitude; for it is arguable that the degree to which a state permits its own citizens to criticise government policies is one rough indicator of the probity to be expected from it in its international dealings. There is no common neutralist standard here, though.

than the issues involved in a particular dispute - unless they are themselves a contending party - because both their concept of their own proper role in world affairs and their bargaining position depend on remaining non-aligned.

Though the claim that "I am holier than thou" is rarely voiced explicitly,¹ such claims to moral superiority as are implicit in some neutralist rhetoric are immediately open to the objection mentioned earlier about moral chauvinism. For there seems to be no logical reason to deny oneself the very humility which is urged on the Cold War rivals.²

Yet it seems almost customary now for neutralists to regard themselves as in some way custodians of a notional 'world opinion' (which by means of an unexplained equation sometimes seems to become a kind of 'world conscience'), and to talk as if voting majorities in the United Nations General Assembly³ were proximate expressions of 'world

1. Though occasionally one comes across such remarks as - "Independence is not synonymous with stylishness or pomp. There is no merit in hiding our poverty. India's status in the world depends upon her moral supremacy." Mahatma Gandhi's Delhi Diary, 22 Jan. 1947, p. 370.
2. There may be powerful historical-emotional reasons, though many of the most prominent contemporary neutralists, while leading 'independence' movements in the days of colonial rule, claimed as against their rulers a superior morality. They also claimed that they had the support of 'the people' of their country & that the colonial rulers did not. Such attitudes, once adopted, die hard, & probably influence thinking in post-independence days.
3. See Alistair Cooke's instructive article - "A Letter from The United Nations", The Listener, 6 Oct. 1960, pp.549-50; & Robert Stephens "Neutralists Take the Offensive", The Observer, 2 Oct. 1960. The attractions of the U.N. for neutralists are briefly discussed below, p. 99-

opinion.' This view may stem from a vague and implicit populism - some parallels lie in: appeals to the people, conspiracy theories of history, militant reformism, nationalism and anti-imperialism¹ - crudely applied to international politics. Just as nationalist leadership by its nature involves an appeal to, or, at least, a reference to, 'the people', so heroic leaders, such as President Sukarno or Mr. Nehru, can claim not only to be the spokesmen for one state in an international organization made up of states, but also for the whole of their large populations - and such a role may encourage the speaker to remind his listeners of the many 'uncommitted' people in the world and perhaps to quote, with high approval, the opening words of the Preamble to the United Nations Charter - "We the Peoples of the United Nations..." Even the neutralist from a country with a small population can derive satisfaction from dramatically reminding his listeners that his country is part of this large neutralist world.

In defining his own position the customary language of the Cold War neutralist is significantly different in emphasis from that usually to be expected from a neutral in time of war. The neutral will tend to stress that there is a

1. For the international outlook of populism, see Shils, *ibid* above, & Hugh Seton-Watson, *ibid* above, c.f. also Richard Hofstadter - The Age of Reform (New York, 1955), chapter 2, "The Folklore of Populism", esp. section 3.

legal right of states to be neutral and that if international law is respected neutrality will be respected. The neutralist tends rather to stress that it is morally right for any state to be neutralist, and that "world opinion" endorses the rightness of neutralist policies or wishes. The neutralist tends to talk of law more than of morality. The neutralist tends to talk of morality more than of law. Admittedly, this is only a difference of emphasis, for it is not pretended that it is an especially neutralist characteristic to be neglectful of international law. However, many neutralists do feel that whilst the established legal rules of international society certainly need strengthening, these rules have hitherto been too 'Western' in character and now need to have a larger 'Afro-Asian' content.¹ Furthermore, it is often felt that international law favours the status quo powers, and whereas pre-1939 neutrals were, generally speaking, satisfied states territorially, the present day neutralist often has a piece of 'unfinished business',² the completion of which it is thought 'world opinion' may approve

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1. See, for example, Mr. Nehru's speech at the Asian Legal Consultative Committee Meeting quoted in Appendix 3 below, p. 281-3.
 2. E.g. Mr. Nehru covets Goa & President Sukarno West Irian. Presidents Nasser & Nkrumah seem to have larger but less precise 'business' to settle. (But they have significantly different views of the permissible methods to be employed in the completion of 'Unfinished business'.)

of, or at least condone, while existing international law may more likely serve as an obstruction. 'World opinion,' like 'non-intervention', as enshrined in the Panch Sheel principles, is thus regarded as a permissive or protective, never as a prohibitive, force.

Even if it can be granted that a rough and ready measure of 'world opinion' on particular issues is to be found by the size of the majority in favour of the motion in the U.N. General Assembly - and this is often dubious - it may seem difficult to know what moral significance¹ to attach to such political arithmetic. But this is not a prime concern for the student of politics. For there is no necessary and inevitable relationship between morality and the number of votes cast for a resolution, any more than there is between morality and the strength, or size, or age, of a state. Arguments which bring such categories together more often serve to confuse than to clarify political appraisals. For with states, as with individuals, one should not judge behaviour primarily by reference to physical attributes but by reference to behaviour.

1. This is not to deny that such votes can have considerable political significance. For two penetrating discussions of this problem, see P. S. Northedge - "The Authority of the U.N. General Assembly", International Relations, Oct. 1957, pp. 349-361 & 376; & Vernon Aspaturian - "The Metamorphosis of the U.N." in Yale Review, Summer, 1957.

. III.

A dominant strand in all neutralist assertion is the claim to pursue an 'independent' foreign policy. In fact, of course, all states seek to conduct an independent foreign policy, but the type of independence sought will be strongly influenced by past experiences as well as by present predilections and power considerations. 'Independence' is naturally attractive to the newly independent, and as most neutralists come from newly independent countries and are the heirs of nationalist and anti-colonial revolution, they tend to be sensitively aware of their newness in international society, suspicious of their former colonial rulers, and fearful of the direction great power policies may take in the future.

Neutralists fear that formal alignment with either Cold War bloc would impair their newly acquired independence.¹ For most of them the Cold War struggle pre-dates their own independence,² and they feel that the issues involved are

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1. These currents are all especially strong in Arab neutralism. See below appendix 5 pp 290-306. This may in part be due - as Henry A. Kissinger suggests in his Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957) p. 257 - to significantly different experiences of colonial rule.
 2. Of the 99 members of the United Nations in June 1961 more than a third of these have become independent since 1945, and virtually all of these pursue neutralist foreign policies. See further below chapters 3 & 4.

not central to their own concerns.^{1.} They suspect that if they were to become 'aligned' they would quickly sink to the level of neglected junior partners in a large alliance. No longer would they be 'honest brokers', & bridges of peace, between competing coalitions. No longer would they be wooed by the great powers. They fear they would be taken for granted, and instead of taking vital foreign policy decisions themselves, they feel that these would be decided for them by their older, 'stronger and richer partners.

Furthermore, though nationalist^{2.} claims^{may} have helped to bring independent statehood, 'the nation' legitimatising the

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1. It is here that the popular analogy between early American isolationists and present day neutralists is most suggestive. For instance, with very little alteration many of the themes & language of George Washington's Farewell Address of 1796 could be usefully borrowed by today's neutralists. Washington said: "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation...Why... entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambitions, rivalry, interest or caprice?" Substitute the Great Powers for Europe, & the newly freed colonies for the U.S., and these words might well be spoken by Nehru, Nasser or Nkrumah. Some other themes - the need to clarify the national interest, the need for national unity, the dangers of party strife, for example - are easily & equally susceptible to similar treatment.
 2. Thus, President Sukarno - "For us nationalism is everything. Though nationalism in the West may be an out-of-date doctrine for many, for us in Asia and Africa it is the mainspring of our efforts", quoted from Appendix 6 below p.308
And President Nasser - "Positive neutrality is in itself a protection for independence, and independence is, in its turn, a protection for Arab nationalism." quoted in The Times, 26 Oct. 1959.

state, national unity is often precarious and its roots shallow. National unity thus has to be strengthened and consolidated, and it is thought that a truly 'independent' foreign policy will facilitate this.¹ The acquisition of statehood brings with it the realisation that state boundaries are important points of discontinuity with the rest of the world, and that there is a real need to discover, articulate and pursue one's own national interest in the world. Two crucial touchstones here are: freedom from external control, and the desire for status² - for acceptance, as of right, in the eyes of the outside world. Such preoccupations often give rise to two common dilemmas. Firstly, whether insistence on 'complete' national sovereignty can be reconciled with the simultaneous pursuit of a wide range of international friendships, full international co-operation and world peace. Secondly, there is an uncertainty whether domestic matters should take precedence over foreign policy, or whether neutralists, too, should accept Ranke's principle of "the primacy of foreign policy."

1. See below appendices 8 & 9.
2. Thus, M. Senghor of Senegal - "We intend to show our independence by claiming all the attributes of sovereignty, even if that sovereignty is bound to be partly theoretical" quoted in C.S.M. 15 Sept. 1959. One remembers, too, the ringing motto of Dr. Nkrumah's party in the days before Ghanaian independence - "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto you." See Ghana. The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (Nelson ed. Edinburgh, 1957) p.155. The search for status often becomes confusingly mingled with freedom - individual & national - as Isaiah Berlin warns in his Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford, 1958), pp. 39-47.

The first dilemma is often resolved by professions of faith in the United Nations, and by asserting the need for its universality of membership. Nor is it surprising that men who have probably grown up diplomatically with the United Nations, who regard their state's membership in this organization as the most tangible expression of their enfranchisement in international society, and who see their state enjoying formal equality with the other states participating in United Nations activities, should attach great importance to United Nations happenings. At the very least, membership in the United Nations helps a state to avoid diplomatic isolation without involving that attachment to power blocs which, in Mr. Nehru's view, inhibits national freedom and is said to be detrimental to the growth of 'true' democracy² on an international plane. While besides

1. Nehru - "alignment means regimentation. I object to communist regimentation of individuals and countries as I object equally to non-communist regimentation because both are opposed to democracy", reported in the Daily Telegraph, 7 July 1956. A common corollary of this view is that the aligned should show more respect for the neutralist position. Ironically, this plea seldom admits a reciprocal obligation on the part of the neutralist to respect the position of the aligned.
2. Not surprisingly each neutralist cherishes his own brand of 'democracy', & there is no common neutralist brand. Some - Nehru & Bandaranaike, e.g. - hint that their concept of democracy embraces a synthesis of what is 'best' in the East and West. See e.g. appendices 3 & 7, pp. 170-1 & 315-17. There is a temperate & wise discussion of the relations between democracy & Afro-Asian nationalism in Rupert Emerson's From Empire to Nation. The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples, (Harvard, 1960), esp. part 3.

relishing the role of 'floating voter' in United Nations assemblies, the neutralist generally regards his membership also as important in the pursuit of the much professed neutralist ideal of 'equal friendship'¹ with all, regardless of ideological and political differences. But 'equal friendship' is an easy precept, difficult to practise. In reality, no state, nor any individual, is, or can be, friendly with all. And too much can be claimed for the mere fact of being formally uninvolved in Cold War alignments. For alliances are not the only, nor necessarily the most compelling, way of forging diplomatic friendships, and the world pattern of diplomatic friendships and enmities at any particular time is not sufficiently explained in terms of the aligned and non-aligned.²

At first glance it may seem that the second dilemma is entirely theoretical. For no statesman today can pursue either a domestic or foreign policy to the exclusion of the other. Clearly, the task of statesmanship is to work out one's scale of national priorities and to concert both foreign and domestic policies. But for a number of neutralist leaders, faced with an acute shortage of highly

1. President Tito, in particular, strongly professes 'equal friendship' with all. See below appendix 4, pp. 286-7.
2. See below chapters 3 and 4.

trained administrators, diplomats, or technicians, the allocation of scarce, skilled manpower resources between the competing claims of pressing domestic and foreign policy tasks, may make them talk as if the vital question was one of opting for either a foreign or a domestic policy.

In one mood the neutralist is inclined to say that he and his compatriots have been conquered, exploited, and fought over quite enough in the past, and now they want just to be left alone. They do not want to be fenced in by the formal constrictions of alignment. Theirs are transitional societies, their cultures are in disarray,¹ their own problems are overwhelming, they want only to rebuild in peace, to discover and give expression to their 'true national',² or, at most, their 'continental',³ personalities.

1. An interesting discussion of some of these problems is reported by Edward Shils - "Old Societies, New States", in Encounter, March 1959, pp. 32-41.
2. Some outstanding literary examples of this kind of quest are - Jawaharlal Nehru - The Discovery of India, (London, 1946); K. M. Panikkar - Asia and Western Dominance, (London, 1953); G. A. Nasser - The Philosophy of the Revolution (Economica Books, Buffalo, U.S.A., 1959); & Kwame Nkrumah's Autobiography: Ghana, (London, 1957).
3. Pan-continental enthusiasms relate to neutralism only to the extent that some neutralists imply that the 'true' Asian or African character is neutralist, & because they sometimes assert Asian or African Monroe Doctrines. Such convictions can contrast sharply with actual developments in Asia and/or Africa. See further P. H. Lyon - "The Pan-Continental Movements of Asia and Africa, 1947-58", Australian Outlook, June 1959, pp.100-111. The compatibility of nationalism & pan-continentalism was one of Mazzini's favourite themes.

In a contrasting mood the neutralist is often inclined to escape, temporarily, from seemingly intractable domestic problems, where each action has its political price to the more dramatic and possibly less demanding task of suggesting 'solutions' to hitherto intractable world problems - disarmament is a favourite theme - where on an international tour, or in the congenial atmosphere of some international arena, the kind of admirable general principles which so often resist easy translation into practice at home, now meet with widespread applause and acclamation. Nevertheless, this seeming readiness, on occasions, to abandon a national for a world role is more apparent than real. For though self-respect may demand the giving of advice as well as the taking of aid, even so neutralist statesmen often succeed in suggesting some remarkable coincidences between what would be globally beneficial to all and yet nationally advantageous to themselves; especially stressing the desirability of great powers spending less on armaments and giving more unconditional aid to the poor and newly independent states, or the need for concerted efforts to remove all remaining vestiges of colonialism. Thus, the paradox of strengthening both 'independence' and 'inter-dependence'¹ simultaneously is resolved.

1. See, for instance, appendix 8, p. 324.

IV.

"We talk about the crisis of our time and many people view it in different ways. Probably in the U.S.A. the crisis of the time is supposed to be Communism versus anti-Communism. It may be so to some extent. But the crisis of the time in Asia is colonialism versus anti-colonialism, let us be quite clear about it."¹

Most neutralists would agree with Mr. Nehru that to talk of defeating Communism, whatever this may mean, is all very well, but a prior and more important task is the ending of colonialism² and imperialism - in contemporary polemic the words are virtually exact synonyms - in all forms. Just as an 'independent' foreign policy is considered to be an essential corollary of national independence, a consequence of being freed from the shackles of imperial rule, so the neutralist deems it obligatory to help remove the remaining vestiges of colonial power wherever they may be.³ Furthermore,

1. Mr. Nehru quoted in The Times of India, 27 Aug. 1954. Though by 1961 he seemed inclined to stress 'world peace' more than 'colonialism' v. 'anti-colonialism'.
2. The whole debate about colonial rule & self-government is, of course, much wider & more complicated than will appear from this brief treatment which is concerned only with the relation to neutralist argument. John Plamenatz' book On Alien Rule and Self-Government (London, 1960) is an extraordinarily lucid exposition & criticism of the central arguments in the colonialism debate. See also Denis Healey, op.cit. pp. 20-28.
3. By 1961 African expressions of anti-colonialism were generally much stronger than Asian because there were so many more 'vestiges' of (Western) 'colonialism' in Africa than in Asia.

this task is often considered to be preventative as well as curative; an alert eye has to be kept open for 'neo-colonialism' which it is felt may come in more subtle forms than did the older colonialism. Besides, to have a common external enemy is one way of discovering common internal interests.

Not surprisingly, the problem of identifying 'colonialism' in 'all its forms' is highly controversial, and produces a spate of tendentious working definitions. In effect, the colonial problem cuts across Cold War issues, mostly to the advantage of the Communist powers.

The greater sensitivity of most neutralists to Western rather than Communist colonialism is perhaps surprising in view of Communist expansion and the large scale contraction of Western colonial empires since 1945. Yet such a bias is probably to be explained by the slowness with which certain ideas and experiences disappear from men's minds and others take hold.

For one should not underrate the importance and influence in ex-colonialist states of Hobson-Leninist theories of imperialism, even on non-Marxist neutralists. Lenin's notion of the imperialist powers keeping themselves going by milking their overseas territories in order to provide surplus value to appease their own proletariats¹. is a congenial and

1. See V. I. Lenin - Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1916 (Little Lenin Library, vol.15, London, 1948), esp. p. 132.

superficially convincing explanation for Asians and Africans. Lenin also disposes of 'capitalist' claims to have granted former colonial territories political independence by asserting a theory of 'neo-colonialism' which is often simply taken over by many neutralist leaders without acknowledgement.^{1.}

Indeed, some version of Marxism^{2.} is almost bound to be popular in ex-colonial countries, since it can offer, as well as idealism,^{3.} a rationale and justification for present fears, suspicions and resentments felt towards former colonial masters. This often makes possible a coincidence of neutralist and Communist demands which is unlikely to occur where either emancipation from colonial rule is not so recent, or feelings about the nature of the

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1. I am indebted to Professor J. D. B. Miller for this point.
 2. This theme is dealt with in detail: for South & South-East Asia in Saul Rose - Socialism in Southern Asia (London, 1959); J. H. Brimmell - Communism in South East Asia (London, 1959); & in Frank N. Trager (ed.) - Marxism in South East Asia (Stanford, 1960); for the Middle East by Walter Z. Laquer - Communism & Nationalism in the Middle East (London, 1956); & for Africa, briefly, by Thomas Hodgkin - "A Note on the Language of African Nationalism" in St. Antony's Papers, No. 10. African Affairs, No. 1 (London, 1961) pp. 22-40. Robert A. Scalapino - "Neutralism in Asia", A.P.S.R. March 1954, pp. 49-62, suggests that Marxism is attractive to neutralists both for domestic & international reasons.
 3. Thus, Harold Laski - Communism (Home University Library, London, 1927). "Communism has made its way by its idealism and not its realism, by its spiritual promise, not its materialistic prospect." (p. 250). See also J. Nehru's Autobiography (New York, 1936), p. 592.

international threat from Communism are more directly engaged. Though Americans may talk of the 'free' and 'unfree' parts of the world, in terms of whether a state has a Communist government or not, the neutralist much prefers to distinguish between colonial status and, 'freedom' from it.^{1.}

So, while neutralists have experienced Western rule and memories of it are still strong, there seems to be small awareness of the extent or finality with which 'Western colonialism' has receded, and continues to recede.^{2.} The facts of Communist colonialism^{3.} may not yet have sunk in or appear so immediate.^{4.} It seems that there is still a widespread acceptance of 'the salt water fallacy' about colonialism - the supposition that only if salt water lies between the metropolitan power and 'the colony' can the relationship of colonialism be said to exist. By this

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1. For some time after 1949 much of neutralist approval for Mao's, as opposed to Chiang Kai-Shek's, China seems to have been based on some such incompletely descriptive definition of freedom. See further C. P. Fitzgerald - Revolution in China (London, 1952) p. 214; also Nasser, see below p. 196, fn. 1.
 2. This view would be strongly repudiated by Arab neutralists who would cite Western landings in Egypt 1956, in Jordan & Lebanon 1958, & in Kuwait 1961; besides mentioning the tenacity with which Britain holds on to her Persian Gulf interests, & the Western powers' attempts to safeguard their oil interests.
 3. See Walter Kolarz - Russia and Her Colonies (London 1952); & Geoffrey Wheeler - "Colonialism and the U.S.S.R." in The Political Quarterly, July-Sept. 1958, pp. 215-223.
 4. Save, perhaps, since 1957, to the neutralist states bordering China - India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Sikkim, Laos. And it is worthwhile remembering that there is at present no 'new' state formed from the Soviet empire.

device Western overseas territories, holdings, bases and transmarine alliances can all be dubbed as 'colonialism', or 'neo-colonialism', while the policies of Communist governments can usually escape such opprobrium. When neutralists voice fears of the re-imposition of Western rule, these fears may seem ridiculously exaggerated to Westerners virtuously conscious of their own reformed characters, but this does not seem so to neutralists. After all, the neutralist view of Western alliances and bases in Asia and Africa (which is, not surprisingly, voiced by the Communists too) as imperialist arrangements is understandable within their frame of reference, ^{where} ~~for~~ the word 'imperialist', ~~which to them~~ is associated with the defence and promotion of Western interests. For the defence and promotion of Western interests is at least one of the main purposes of having such alliances and bases. Of course, from a Western point of view the word 'imperialist' has overtones connoting an active expansionist, probably annexationist, policy, and it seems absurd to apply it to instruments so clearly intended to prevent Communist expansionism. However, the identification of Western interests overseas with states at loggerheads with their neutralist neighbours gives the neutralist an added concern. For, not only is it complained that this 'brings the Cold War' into regions where it has no relevance, but it is

suspected that Pakistan or Thailand's membership of 'S.E.A.T.O., for example, is not merely a result of a dedication to anti-Communist causes, but is mainly a means of gaining powerful support for the furtherance of more immediate, local rivalries.¹

The notion that Western imperialism is still a strong and potentially dangerous force is reinforced by the tendency of most Asian and African neutralists not only to identify themselves with territories which are still Western dependencies, but with non-European peoples anywhere in conflict with European ones. The revolt against colonial status thus merges with the revolt against the old European ascendancy, and the demand for equality becomes racial as well as political, economic and diplomatic.² The West is embarrassed, not only by the practices of the past, but by the remnants of discrimination that a good many non-Europeans still encounter from Europeans. White Americans, too, share in this obloquy, not only by reason of their close political and diplomatic ties with Europe - a kind of 'guilt by association' - but also because of their own 'Negro problem,'

1. See, e.g. appendix 5, p. 305.

2. Thus, Mr. Nehru, talking of those who attended the Bandung Conference: "The common factor was rather against Western domination. Everybody agreed about that... They were levellers in the political sense, as between Europe, America, and Asia or Africa. That was the dominant feeling and most of them were levellers, both patient and impatient, in the social sense." - in Tibor Mende - Conversations with Mr. Nehru (London, 1956), p. 62.

and the greater publicity that unsavoury aspects of United States politics receive in the world at large by comparison with the Soviet Union. So the colour question, too, cuts across the Cold War struggle to the propaganda advantage of the Communist bloc, in as much as Communist China is non-white and because the Soviet Union has skilfully, and with some success, propagated the idea that she is politically and racially 'colour-blind'.¹

Though anti-colonialist clamour today reaches a larger audience and probably commands more support than ever before, its arguments are not novel. For they were common currency in Western 'leftist' circles in the thirties; indeed, many of today's neutralists shaped their views from the publications of European Left Book clubs, from what Louis Fischer has aptly described as 'Laskiology'.² Whatever the significance of these echoes of early education, it seems undeniable that neutralist identification with anti-colonialism³ is apt to have a confusing effect on their

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1. See Plamenatz, op.cit. pp. 186-197.
 2. In chapter 17, pp. 220-236, of The Great Challenge, (London, 1947).
 3. There is much to be said for Richard Lowenthal's contention that "the real line of division that emerges from a study of the facts is not between true nationalists and neo-colonial stooges, or between progressives & traditionalists, or even between revolutionaries & reformists - it is simply one between states that are territorially satisfied & those with programmes of nationalist expansion." - see Encounter, March 1961, p.64. N.B. too, Mr. Nehru's distinction (see above p.108) between the patient & the impatient.

judgement of what could otherwise be regarded as fairly straightforward political or strategic issues - for ~~neutralists~~, neutralist opposition to Western pacts and bases in Asia and Africa is wholly explicable without the anti-colonialist arguments which are persistently dragged into it. Geography and politics have compelled the Western powers to rely on methods of defence which neutralists automatically dislike. The Communist powers could dispense with formal alliances, for they have far more compulsive bonds; the Western allies cannot. Again, the geographical remoteness of the United States has made the alliances of which it is the core embarrassingly dependent on a system of far-flung bases, and on the development of nuclear weapons to counterbalance the huge standing armies which the Communist powers could quickly deploy in conventional warfare in Europe or Asia. And it is alliances, foreign bases and nuclear explosions that particularly scandalise the neutralists.

V.

Another plane of contrasts which the neutralist commonly asserts as being more important than that between the aligned and the non-aligned is that of the 'rich' and the 'poor', the 'have' and the 'have-nots',¹ the developed and the

1. The phrase 'have-not powers' seems to have been first used by A. T. Mahan in Some Neglected Aspects of War (1907), pp. 69-70.

underdeveloped,¹ nations. This assertion tends to be strengthened rather than weakened by the claim that the anti-colonial campaign deserves more attention than the Cold War struggle, as both sets of inequalities are quite often attributed to the same general source - 'colonialism.'² Marxism may seem to have an oblique relevance here, too. For even if Marx's prophecy of increasing inequalities, in respect of internal class divisions within states, has not been fulfilled, it has been unexpectedly realised in the field of national divisions between states.³ Furthermore, neutralists seem to see great pertinence in the Leninist cliché that economic subordination to a foreign power can

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1. Thus Sekou Touré of Guinea: "For us the division of the world does not consist of two blocks, East and West, but of two wholes clearly distinguished by the obvious fact that one is developed and the other underdeveloped." - quoted in The Guardian, 4 May 1960.
 2. Thus Nasser, addressing the Indian Parliament, said that the Arabs must be ready to face "the monopoly of science, imperialism's new style." - quoted in The Times, 1 March 1960.
 3. See Emerson, op.cit. p.181, who describes how Lenin 'sidled up' to the theory of rich bourgeois nations versus poor proletarian nations. Reviewing Emerson, Martin Wright writes: "It was by the ex-socialist journalist Mussolini that the theory was at last espoused, to become standard Fascist doctrine echoed at the Bandung Conference." - see International Affairs (R.I.I.A.), July 1961, pp. 343-4. One thinks particularly of Sukarno and Nasser in this connection.

be just as crippling to national independence as can overt political control.¹

Undeniably it is difficult to avoid all the snares of economic control when every neutralist leader wants his country to have an industrialized, technically efficient, 'rich', national economy, to augment national power and national welfare. Whatever the real limitations to such national plans are - and, of course, these differ widely - it is universally believed that much can be done. The desired changes and required growth in the national economy are not conceived of as aims to be achieved in a remote future, but as immediate goals to be achieved as speedily as possible.² With the requirement of urgency comes the realisation, however unwilling, that outside capital and technicians are essential if rapid development is to begin, let alone to be sustained. But it is insisted that this aid must be obtained in such ways as not to compromise national independence. Hence the common neutralist insistence that the way in which aid is proffered is as

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1. E.g. Mr. Nehru talking of economic control: "They will be called self-governing countries, but will in reality be under the control of this small minority from Europe or from America... Yes, this is what is called Latin Americanization in South East Asia... but it is really worse in Africa because of the racialism, the segregation and all that" - Tibor Mende - Conversations with Mr. Nehru (London, 1956), p. 134.
 2. See below appendices pp. 322-4 & 328-9.

important as the quality and quantity of the aid itself. A wide range¹ of opportunist and high-minded appeals are produced to buttress the plea for aid without 'strings', but, basically, four main sets of justifications are offered, and what all four have in common is the priority which political considerations take over economic. Briefly, these pleas for aid use the language of retribution, common humanity, mutual interest or blackmail.

The claim that aid ought to be given in order to expiate for past-misdeeds was heard of mostly in the years before 1954 - that is, before the Communist bloc had embarked on foreign aid programmes to neutralists, when the Western powers were the sole source that neutralists could appeal to, and when, in fact, the Western powers were not giving substantial aid to neutralists. It is certain that such pleas did not move Western governments much, though they may have caused unease to some individuals. Even if a government were to accept responsibility to pay retribution for 'colonialist sins', which is highly unlikely, the vexed question of who has to decide the manner and scale of

1. The literature on foreign aid is already immense & growing fast. To my knowledge, there is no single study which concentrates on neutralism & foreign aid. Three useful recent works are: George Liska - The New Statecraft. Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1960); Joseph Berliner - Soviet Economic Aid (New York, 1958); & F. Benham - Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries (London, 1961).

retribution remains. However, from 1954 onwards, as foreign aid issues became a matter of Cold War rivalry, little has been heard of the retribution plea and it tends to be resurrected only occasionally as a rhetorical reminder by a speaker who disclaims its appropriateness himself.¹

It might be expected that claims for aid on grounds of common humanity, in the absence of any political allegiances, would consist of appeals to the highmindedness of the potential donor, pointing to the obvious needs of the neutralist, and asking for aid to be given in a spirit of undemanding generosity. It would be wrong to say that appeals of this kind are never made, but it is more often the case that the neutralist suggests that rich states show their disinterested desire to help by channelling more aid through international institutions. It is felt that the best interests of the recipient country are more likely to be served in this way, and even if international bodies do attach conditions to their aid, these seem far more innocuous than any strings which may be attached to the bi-lateral aid which is feared as a calculated method of drawing neutralists into Cold War conflicts. It, apparently, matters less that the greater part of international aid comes originally from

1. See, e.g., appendix 6, pp. 311-12.

American funds than that it is to be channelled through agencies thought to be less directly contaminated by Cold War considerations. Unhappily for neutralists, international aid of this sort represents but a small proportion of foreign aid, and there is very little prospect of this proportion being substantially increased.

The claim that the granting of foreign aid is in the interest of the donor as well as the recipient neutralist, even though the latter is unwilling to accept any 'strings', rests on some dubious assumptions about the relation of prosperity to peace, of peace being brought nearer by a progressive reduction of the gap in the standard of living of 'have' and 'have-not' countries¹ - though it has yet to be proved that there is a necessary connection between peace and prosperity. The simple fact is that all neutralist countries today want material improvement. Some neutralists - the Indians most notably - try to give an earnest of their real priorities by insisting that the aid they receive shall be economic only and not military; but this is by no means a widespread urge, for many neutralists regard being aided in the procurement of 'essential' weapons for self-defence

1. See Emerson's discussion of this point in Empire to Nation, op.cit., especially chapter 9.

as important as other forms of aid. Be this as it may, it is doubtful if there is any simple connection between peace and political viability, or economic advance and the incidence of foreign aid.¹ All donors would like to impose some strings though they may not feel it politic to insist on this, and a potential donor is not easily persuaded that it is as much in his interest as in the neutralist's that he should make aid freely available, although no strings are to be attached.

Fourthly, there are quite often hints of blackmail in statements about neutralist need of foreign aid, and this is most evident where the neutralist is obviously aware and eager to take advantage of the possibilities for playing off one side in the Cold War against another. Such hints can take many forms. It can be implied that if one bloc were to withdraw, or substantially reduce, its aid, then the neutralist would thereby lose its freedom of action - that is, its neutralism - and would, therefore, probably end up in the opposite Cold War camp.² It can

1. E.g. the lack of economic advance in Laos, despite substantial U.S. aid since 1955.
2. E.g. Prince Sihanouk - "If the U.S.A. withdraws its aid as a reaction against Communist aid... our neutrality will have to be compromised... but what would the U.S.A. gain by seeing our country completely integrated with the Communist bloc?" - see Norodom Sihanouk, Analyse de la Conference du Prince Norodom Sihanouk à Kampot, 6 avril, 1956 (Phnom Penh, 1956?), pp. 6 & 15.

be said that if certain kinds of 'essential' aid, particularly military aid,^{1.} are refused by one bloc, then the neutralist has no alternative but to seek satisfaction from the other side, with all the attendant risks that such unbalanced dependence implies. It can be implied that unless one bloc gives as much aid as the other bloc,^{2.} then there is a real danger that the neutralist will fall under the undue influence of the more generous.

The four types of claim outlined above are seldom stated in the stark way that they have been sketched here, but one or more is present ^{mostly} in a muddled or disguised way in every neutralist argument about foreign aid.

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1. E.g. President Nasser's justification of his Czech arms deal in 1955 was that the Western powers were refusing arms to Egypt whilst supplying them to Israel: see Keith Wheelock - Nasser's New Egypt (London, 1960), pp. 228-231.
 2. A ~~clear~~ ^{clear} ~~reflection~~ ^{expression} of such thinking appeared in a speech of President Nkrumah when he claimed that as there were now 3,000 Ghanaian students studying in Soviet bloc countries, as well as 3,000 already studying in the Western world, this was "a practical demonstration of the Ghana philosophy of positive neutralism and non-alignment" quoted in The Daily Graphic (Accra) 12 Dec. 1960. A more blatant admission was that of President Nasser: "Tito is a great man. He showed me how to get help from both sides - without joining either", quoted in New York Times, 3 March 1958.

Neutralists' insistence on aid without strings openly draws attention to their thin-skinned sensitivity about potential encroachments on their sovereignty. Yet such misgivings are not peculiar to neutralists. All states find difficulty today in demonstrating, preserving and increasing the traditional attributes of national sovereignty at a time when these have shrunk, and when it is certain that there are no longer solutions for pressing national problems within the confines of isolationism and national self-sufficiency.

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It might be appropriate to end this chapter with an excerpt from one of the speeches of the late Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. Bandaranaike. It seems appropriate because it is a terse and frank statement of neutralist doctrine:

"We have to build up a new society for ourselves, as I have said, which best suits the genius of our country. We should like to get some ideas and some principles from this side, and some from the other, until a coherent form of society is made up that suits our own people in the context of the changing world of today. That is why we do not range ourselves on the side of this Power-bloc or that Power-bloc. That is the philosophy of neutralism.

"It is not something dishonest. It is not a matter of sitting on the fence to see whether we can get the best of both worlds. It is a position that is inexorably thrust upon us by the circumstances of the case. It is a position that will be of great help in the world situation today, for we do provide a bridge over the gulf between the two opposing factions."¹

It is obvious from this statement by a leading neutralist and, perhaps, from this chapter's survey of some common neutralist assumptions and arguments, that neutralist doctrine is not very sophisticated and is frankly pragmatist and eclectic. There are a number of possible reasons for this. An oblique one may be the inherent difficulty of theorising about international politics² in view of the changing multi-dimensional complexity of international politics. More direct reasons certainly stem, as was suggested at the beginning of this chapter, from the roles played by leading neutralists. For it is not a major aim of active political leaders to be profound and subtle political theorists,

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1. Address to the U.N. General Assembly 22 Nov. 1956, quoted in The Foreign Policy of Ceylon (Ceylon Govt. Press), p. 5.
 2. This theme has been discussed recently with great penetration by Martin Wight - "Why is there no International Theory?" International Relations, Vol. 2, no. 1, April 1960: pp. 35-48.

even though they may often make important pronouncements. Certainly, there is nothing very original in neutralist ideas. Most of them can be found earlier in the controversies of Europe or North America.

Considered as international doctrine, neutralism appears to do little more than invoke pious generalities, ill-substantiated assertions and loosely connected propositions. It may even be contended that neutralism is in no way an international doctrine and that the only useful exercise is to uncover the distinctive characteristics of various versions of neutralist affirmation. Certainly, this would be useful and would call for a great deal more exploration than was attempted here, but it would be wrong to deny it any international character. For, not only does neutralist doctrine express the felt needs, the apparent interests and the dominant prejudices of its proponents, but there seems to be a sufficiently common predicament, sufficient similarity in certain pressing problems to be faced, to elicit similar ways of thinking about the Cold War and the problems raised by it, and these similarities often encourage neutralists to stress their likenesses rather than their differences.

Furthermore, to admit that the doctrine is superficial in its arguments is not to deny its importance, appeal, or

influence. Its importance stems directly from the very fact that the leading proponents are nationalist leaders articulating and transmitting national hopes and fears to the world at large. Their main precepts have widespread appeal because they express in slogans some of the dominant fears and hopes of large masses of people throughout the world, and particularly in Asia and Africa. Finally, it is not paradoxical to suggest that these new national movements are, in a sense, international movements, too. For not only can new national leaders meet together easily and often, should they want to, but changes in the means of communication have also meant that infections of fear, hatred and sympathy can pass rapidly across continents to create new and larger areas of shared loyalties and enmities. Though the connection between nationalist emotions and nationalist policies will vary with each particular case, the ideas and feelings that men have about events in which their lives are engaged are a dimension of the events themselves. The things nationalists think and feel most strongly about become ingredients in the very Cold War struggle in which they are unwillingly embroiled.

NEUTRALISM AS STATE POLICY - an overall view

"The whole question on the ordinary diplomatic plane is to decide whether the advantages of non-involvement outweigh those of alliance."

Raymond Aron.

There is a problem in defining the differences between the neutralist and the aligned states. At first glance, it may seem easy - they are simply those who refrain from any legally binding military attachment to either Cold War camp. Thirty-nine and perhaps forty-seven of the ninety-nine members of the United Nations were, in January 1961, neutralist by this definition.¹ Yet this formal distinction - resting as it does on the existence of known treaty arrangements at a particular time - can reveal little about the nature and significance of neutralism as state policy. For the factual situation, and contemporary reading of it at any particular time, is, of course, much more complicated and controversial than the obvious forms of alignment and non-alignment would indicate. An ostensibly neutralist state may, in fact, be more fettered than some aligned states; and many neutralists, even when they do their best to achieve freedom from international entanglements, are so vulnerable to the play of international politics, so needful of foreign aid, that they cannot help being caught in the very entanglements they seek to avoid. Furthermore, the global pattern of alignment and non-alignment changes (as was shown in Chapter I); a

1. See table below pp. 255-259. The eight debatable cases are Cuba, Finland, Libya, Malaya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Senegal & Tunisia, mentioned below pp. 150, 135-8, 144-5 A 160-2

neutralist may become aligned (as Pakistan did in 1954), or an aligned state may revoke alliance commitments and adopt a neutralist policy instead (as Iraq did after 1958). Diplomatic conventions are also important. The persistent determination of a superpower to treat a state merely as a client or satellite of its rival may have the effect of restricting it, however unwillingly, to that rôle. The agreement of a number of neutralist states to recognise, or not to recognise, another state as a fellow neutralist can be vital in determining what kind of foreign policy can be pursued.

With all these hazards in mind, six types of neutralist policy may be usefully distinguished. A neutralist policy may be practised by:-

- (1) a neutralized state,
 - (2) a traditional neutral,
 - (3) a buffer or former buffer,
 - (4) an erstwhile isolationist,
 - (5) a pioneer neutralist,
- or (6) a new state neutralist.

This classification serves a twofold purpose: it helps to explain why the policies of certain states have been singled out for more detailed attention in the next chapter; and at the same time it is a convenient way of drawing attention to certain major aspects of neutralism as state

policy and the forces which shape them. These categories are not to be regarded as mutually exclusive, though they do roughly correspond to some important differences in kind.

Ever since 1945 it has been widely recognised, both by students of neutralism and in diplomatic practice, that no member of a Cold War multilateral security pact can be a neutralist state. But the fact of having a bilateral pact or a military base agreement with one of the Cold War camps, which used to preclude neutralism, has ceased since 1957 to be a necessary disqualification - certainly in the eyes of the leading self-avowed neutralists. It may be in the future that it will be possible for a state to be regarded as a full, formal member of a Cold War multilateral security pact and yet neutralist. As it is, the present position of a number of Latin American states makes it difficult to decide whether or not the Rio Pact of 1947 can be regarded as a Cold War pact at all comparable in its main features and functions with, say, N.A.T.O. or S.E.A.T.O.¹. For increasingly since 1957 United States policies towards Latin American states seem to have been shaped very much as if these states were like Asian and African states in their need of economic as well as military aid; in their

1. In terms of direct involvement in Cold War matters, the Rio Pact has certainly played a lesser role than any of the other American multilateral security treaties. Also, the inequality of military & economic power between the U.S. & all its fellow Rio Pact members is greater than is the U.S. position vis-a-vis all other members of her other multilateral systems.

poverty; and in their anti-colonialism.¹ Undoubtedly, striking similarities do exist. Yet, apart from a brief mention of Cuba,² Latin American states are excluded from this survey. This is a matter of convenience rather than of conviction, for there are many analogues for the present policies of Afro-Asian neutralists in the past and present policies of Latin American states. Yet, though there are bonds of sympathy, actual diplomatic contacts between Afro-Asian and Latin American states have so far been few. Furthermore, not only was Latin America outside the area of active Cold War rivalries until 1957 - as illustrated in the contrast³ between American handling of the Guatemalan and Cuban affairs in 1954 and 1958, respectively, but Latin American leaders have made ~~fewer~~ ^{fewer} official international tours than have their Afro-Asian counterparts.

1. Four powers - Great Britain, the U.S., France & Holland - still control territories in Latin America or off its shores. Lenin regarded Latin America as exemplifying 'economic imperialism': "...countries which, officially, are politically independent, but which are, in fact, enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence" - V. I. Lenin - Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916); (London, 1948, Little Lenin Library, vol. 15) p. 104, see also p. 116.
2. For Cuba, see below p. 150 Neither Ecuador nor Nicaragua were signatories of the Rio Pact in 1947 because of domestic upheavals - see Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1947-8, pp 469-471. Both joined the Pact at a later stage. Regarding U.S. security policies in Latin America in 1960, see M.S.P. Fiscal Year 1961, (Dept. of State, Washington, March 1960) pp. 103-110.
3. For this contrast & further details, see Latin American Supplements in The Times, 1, 8, 15, 22, 29 June 1959 & 10 Aug. 1959.

(1) Neutralization

Before 1955 neutralization¹ - the institution of a status of permanent neutrality - had seemed obsolete. It was a device recognised in nineteenth century international law by which great powers brought about a change in the status of small states, in an endeavour to remove small but strategically important territories outside the active sphere of international rivalries. It was also a way of indicating that the great powers, by making this neutralization agreement, intended to respect the independence of the neutralized state.¹ Both motives were probably at work when the Russians brought about Austria's² neutralization in 1955.

Legally neutralization requires an international agreement between interested great powers and the state concerned, whereby the former guarantee individually and/or collectively the independence and integrity of the latter, which must agree to abstain from any hostile action or any international connections likely to involve it in hostility. There is no marked uniformity of practice here, the terms prescribing a neutralized status for Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg were each defined somewhat differently in the nineteenth century.³

1. See Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op.cit. vol. 2, p. 244; & C.R.M.F. Cruttwell - A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World (London, 1937), pp. 183-192; & below pp. 229-238
2. See above pp. 49-50 and below pp. 229-238
3. See Cruttwell, *ibid.* pp. 112-116 & 183-192.

Neutralization definitely involves some form of international tutelage, and this is probably why states are more ready to recommend it for others than to adopt it themselves. At the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1961 Prince Norodom Sihanouk was recommending "an Austrian style neutrality" for Laos,¹ though it was Cambodian representatives, at the Geneva Conference of 1954, who succeeded by pertinacious diplomacy² in avoiding the imposition of a neutralized status on Cambodia. Contrary to popular opinion, none of the successor states of former French Indo-China were formally neutralized by the 1954 Geneva agreements. This has been ably demonstrated by J. A. Modelski,³ though his further point that these states are not precluded from full membership in S.E.A.T.O. has, to date, more significance legally than politically. For none of them has shown a strong desire to become full members of S.E.A.T.O., nor have they shown a desire to be neutralized. A vital factor in the way of a neutralized Laos has been the lack of sufficient consensus among Laotian leaders to agree on such a status - quite apart from Soviet, American and Chinese disagreement concerning the terms for a neutralized Laos.

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1. See The Guardian, 17 May, 1961.
 2. See Fifield, op.cit. pp. 370-4; & Ellen J. Hamner - The Struggle for Indo China Continues. Geneva to Bandung, (Stanford, 1955), esp. p. 8.
 3. J. A. Modelski - "Indochina and S.E.A.T.O." in Australian Outlook, March 1959, pp. 27-54.

The successful maintenance of neutralization depends on the continuance of the balance of power which produced it, and/or the determination and ability of the neutralized state to resist encroachments on its status. To enumerate these conditions is to reveal that neutralization is far from being a universal panacea. In Cold War conditions it is perhaps best seen as an alternative to occupation and partition. It is only in this restricted sense that one should speak of the 'Austrian example'.¹

(2) Traditional Neutrality

Sweden and Switzerland are together a class apart. They are distinguished from all other non-aligned states in two ways. They are the only states to have successfully practised from the nineteenth century to today policies of complete abstention from military alliances, neutrality in wartime, and non-alignment in the Cold War. Their policies reflect standards of success and prosperity which may be envied or admired but are widely recognised as distinctive. However attractive Swiss or Swedish 'models' may seem to other countries, their own nationals rightly regard their neutrality as national traditions which cannot be transplanted abroad, nor could they be easily restored once lost.

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1. See below pp 229-245

Much of the history of neutrality, right up to its absorption in the contemporary Cold War, is reflected in the contrasting historical experiences of these two states. The study below¹ is an analysis of problems arising within two different national traditions of non-attachment, showing how these traditions fare in changing situations.

(3) Buffer or Former Buffer Status

In international politics a buffer is a small state interposed between two or more greater states. Buffer states can be roughly divided into neutrals and protectorates. Neutral buffer states are states without an active foreign policy at all; a buffer protectorate is a state whose foreign policy is, in fact, controlled by another power.² territorially satisfied power usually prefers to surround its frontiers with neutral buffers or allies. A territorially expansionist power usually prefers to surround its frontiers with buffer protectorates or satellites.

Neutral buffer status is best preserved where a small, landlocked state is kept in being by the reciprocal enmities of two or more roughly equal powers around its frontiers. A

1. "See below pp. 211-228r

2. Russo-British imperial rivalries in Southern-Central Asia, during the latter half of the 19th century, produced classic examples of the creation and preservation of buffer states in the interests of great powers. See the excellent article - "Buffer States. Their Historic Service to Peace" in Round Table, vol. XLV, pp. 334-345.

multi-balance of power is more beneficial to the buffer than is a bi-lateral balance, as the latter always contains the threat of one of the two powers securing hegemony and turning the neutral buffer into a protectorate or even a satellite. Alternatively, they might agree together to dismember the intermediary state - as has been Poland's fate at least three times in the past. Switzerland was more secure from invasion¹ between 1815 and 1871 when she was the still centre of a multi-balance of power system, than she was in the eighteenth century when France was the preponderant neighbour. In the nineteenth century neutral protectorates, though subordinate internationally to the 'protecting' power, maintained and valued highly their internal freedom, and this was the main principle secured by the buffer concept in practice.²

Because of the geographical separation of the Soviet Union and the United States, and the American adoption of a 'containment' thesis, Cold War buffers have hitherto existed only along the frontiers of the Sino-Soviet bloc. There are other buffer states - Outer Mongolia is one obvious one - but it is only where the Soviet and American alliance systems meet, or nearly meet, that buffer status has so far been of significance in Cold War terms.

1. See further below pp 212-15

2. See Round Table, vol. 45, *ibid.* pp. 344-5.

Afghanistan is the oldest of the Asian buffers. When the term was first adopted into international politics at the end of the nineteenth century,¹ buffers were required between British power in India and an expanding Tsarist Russia.² Until 1919 Afghanistan was under British tutelage, and for exactly one hundred and ten years British policy had vacillated between treating her as a neutral or a 'protected' buffer. After 1919, following regicide and war with Britain, Afghanistan began to develop her own foreign relations, concentrating on building up friendly terms with neighbouring states and, on the whole, leaning more heavily towards Russia than towards Britain.³ Neutral throughout the Second World War,⁴ as she had been throughout the First World War, she became a member of the United Nations in November 1946. Since 1946 she has endeavoured to carefully balance much needed trade and diplomatic friendships, not only with the superpowers, but also with those close neighbours with whom she has historical ties. This has been a difficult policy to practise and was especially so during the third

1. See Round Table, vol. 45, *ibid*, p. 334; & Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-9.
2. In 1840 a Captain Arthur Connolly described Anglo-Russian rivalries, especially around Afghanistan, as "the Great Game." See The Guardian, 28 & 29 June, & 4 July 1960.
3. See Afghanistan. Reference Division. Central Office of Information (London, April 1960). See esp. p.11 regarding Russo-Afghan pacts of 'neutrality and non-aggression' of 1926 and 1931.
4. See Lenczowski, *op. cit.* pp. 219-221.

phase of the Cold War. In 1955 Afghanistan rejected Turkey's invitation to join the Baghdad Pact and welcomed Soviet endorsement of her irredentist claims against Pakistan - the so-called 'Pakhtunistan' issue.¹ Geography and the desire to modernise what is still one of the most backward of all the United Nations' members impose salutary checks on Afghanistan. With no trade outlets, save through Pakistan or through Russia, and with the need to seek foreign aid, non-alignment is the only tenable international posture. By 1960 Soviet economic aid probably exceeded Western aid in the country.² No doubt, Afghan leaders intend their country to stay independent. The vital question is whether she can avoid slipping into the Soviet orbit in view of the opportunities for infiltration afforded by the multifarious Soviet activities within her territory. After all, Afghanistan is geographically to the Soviet Union ^{as} ~~what~~ Mexico is to the United States.

Concern with the creation and preservation of buffer protectorates is not restricted to the 'committed' powers in the Cold War. India has inherited and carried on, however unwillingly, Britain's buffer state system along her Himalayan

1. See Peter G. Franck - Afghanistan, between East and West. The Economics of Competitive Coexistence (National Planning Association, Washington, D.C., May 1960).
2. See Afghanistan, C.O.I., *ibid.* above, pp. 13-14. Soviet aid to neutralist states began with a small agreement with Afghanistan in 1954:

frontiers. A dynamic situation only developed after 1950 with Chinese Communist occupation of Tibet. Subsequently, the Himalayan rivalry of India and China has been shaped by political and strategic, and perhaps ideological, considerations, most of them of long standing. It is in Nepal that we can see the afflictions that 'the age of the common man' is bringing to the rulers of a buffer state. King Mahendra has a difficult task in trying to secure material improvements for an independent Nepal, especially as the country had suffered under the Rana oligarchy until the popular revolt of 1950,¹ and still has to recognise India's frankly expressed 'protective' interest in Nepal.² No ministry since 1950 has brought internal stability to the country; though there is no lack of political parties.³ The difficulty is that even if the neighbouring powers of India and China avoid interfering in internal affairs, Nepalese politicians actively espouse one side or the other. Membership of the United Nations, secured in December 1955, has been an encouragement to develop a more active international role,⁴ and so Indian 'protection' must necessarily be tactful.

1. See Frank Moraes - Jawaharlal Nehru (New York, 1956) pp. 462-5.
2. Ibid.
3. See Saul Rose - Socialism in Southern Asia (London, 1959) chapter 5 - Nepal, pp. 70-81.
4. See Werner Levi - "Nepal in World Politics" in Pacific Affairs, Summer 1957.

The roles of Bhutan and Sikkim are, to date, a little less complicated. Bhutan, legally an independent state, is obliged by a treaty of August 1949 to accept Indian 'guidance' in foreign affairs, including defence. Sikkim, a more open and better known country, formerly a British protectorate, was declared an Indian protectorate in June 1949.¹ Though both are too small to apply for United Nations membership, as long as Sino-Indian tensions persist there is little chance of either sinking into the internationally inconsequential role of vestigial buffer states - Asian counterparts of Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Liechtenstein.²

Since 1945 Finland has been a buffer protectorate of the Soviet Union in a double sense. Her continued independence is generally believed to be a means of keeping Sweden out of N.A.T.O., and the Soviets also regard Finnish neutrality as a form of re-insurance for themselves against future German attack. It is widely believed that if Finland was absorbed as a Soviet satellite, Sweden would join N.A.T.O.³ A further vital condition of Finland's precarious independence is the unwavering hostility of Finns to Soviet encroachments,

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1. See Werner Levi - "Bhutan and Sikkim: Two Buffer States" in World Today, December 1959, pp. 492-500.
 2. For these four European Lilliputian states, see Martin Wight - The World in March, 1939, op.cit. p. 152, fn. 1.
 3. See below p. 224

as two Finno-Soviet wars between 1939 and 1944 showed.^{1.}
 The legal basis of Finland's circumscribed brand of neutrality^{2.}
 is a single phrase in the preamble to the Defence Treaty
 signed with Russia in April 1948. This mentions Finland's
 wish "to remain outside the conflict of interests of the
 Great Powers."^{3.} Ironically enough, the Treaty immediately
 goes on to destroy that neutrality, at least in the event of
 war affecting Finland's territory. For under Article 1,
 Finland is bound to oppose Germany, or any ally of Germany,
 attacking either Finland, or Russia through Finland, "with
 the assistance in case of necessity of the Soviet Union."
 In 1955 the Soviet Union secured a twenty year extension of
 this 1948 agreement, in return for handing back to Finland
 the Soviet-occupied Porkkala base. And though the bilateral
 defence pact still binds Finland to Moscow in a hot war,
 since 1955 Soviet spokesmen have abandoned their reticence

1. After Finland's second capitulation in 1944 Russia took 1/12 of her territory, on which about 1/10th of her population lived (these all emigrated to what was left of Finland rather than accept Soviet rule) and imposed reparations which the Finns could meet only with dollar aid from the U.S. See further Anatole G. Mazour - Finland between East and West (New York, 1956).
2. The common Finnish word for neutrality is puoluettomuus, which translates literally as "impartiality."
3. See U.N. Treaty Series, vol. 48, pp. 149-61. A Finnish statesman who helped to negotiate the original Moscow agreement later told a British reporter (see Daily Telegraph, 2 July 1959) that the then Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyshinsky, objected violently to even this watery legal recognition of Finnish neutrality. Though he was finally talked down on this, it was not until after 1955 that Soviet spokesmen referred publicly to Finland's 'neutrality.'

about Finno-Soviet relations and have widely advertised the ¹Paasikivi line¹. as a model of what relations between the Soviet Union and a neutral state could and should be. In fact, since 1955 Soviet policy has been characterised by alternate use of 'the carrot and the stick' - the carrot in such measures as permitting Finland's full membership of the Nordic Council and, after much hard bargaining, agreeing to her associate status with E.F.T.A. in March 1961.² The stick was much used in 1958 when by withdrawing the Soviet ambassador, by suspending purchases from Finland,³ and by other pressures,⁴ she secured a change of government⁵ and

1. The 'Paasikivi line' - so called after its late author, the Prime Minister (1944-6) & President (1946-56) of Finland - assumes that her independence depends on maintaining good relations with the U.S.S.R., by keeping outside the conflicts between the great powers, & by avoiding suspicion in any quarter. See further Allan A. Kuusisto - "The Paasikivi line in Finland's Foreign Policy" in Western Political Quarterly, March 1959, part 1, pp. 37-49. For a Soviet view, see the review article of Paasikivi's published speeches by P. Krynov & E. Lavnov - "The Paasikivi Foreign Policy", International Affairs (Moscow), Sept.1957:160-4.
2. See The Guardian, 28 March 1961.
3. Only 20% of Finland's foreign trade is with Russia. Her principal trading partner is Britain, & her biggest supplier of manufactured goods is W. Germany; but she is dependent for all her basic imports - coal, steel, fertilisers, cereals, cotton & crude oil - on Russia, & this dependence is buttressed by a most-favoured-nation-clause in the Soviet-Finnish trade treaty.
4. See Kent Forster - "The Finnish-Soviet Crisis of 1958-9", International Journal, Spring 1960, pp. 147-150.
5. The conventions & inevitable manoeuvrings of Finland's multi-party system provide opportunities for Russian intervention to further her interests. By July 1961 Finland had had 46 cabinets in 43 years of independence. For internal Finnish politics, see A. Kuusisto - "Parliamentary Crises and Presidential Governments in Finland" in Parliamentary Affairs, Summer, 1958.

its replacement by a cabinet more acceptable to Moscow. Finland is neither a Communist state nor a Soviet satellite, but there is no doubt that all major foreign policy moves must secure at least tacit Soviet approval.

It seems that buffer status is becoming less and less possible or popular in this atomic and Cold War age. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, buffer status was a device more clearly appropriate to an age when fighting had to be by close contact. Today, small buffer states are less able to act as barriers separating combatants when hostile powers can wage war using high speed aircraft, rockets and missiles, and the so-called buffer can now be easily overflowed, or overshoot, if not overrun. Secondly, while the term buffer state suggests something inert and passive, compared with the powers adjoining it, passivity has now gone. Neutralist doctrine now seems to be the natural creed of the former buffer. Certainly, their neutralist leaders are nowadays numbered among the world's assiduous travellers and seekers of foreign aid and trade.

(4) Erstwhile Isolationism

Isolationism as a state policy rests essentially on two conditions: the determination of those in charge of their country's affairs to eschew an active involvement in international affairs, and geographical or military conditions

favourable to ensure this. The history of isolationism has been one of the progressive undermining of both of these conditions in the face of an increasingly interwoven network of international contacts, and developing military technology.

Strictly, isolationism implies no foreign policy at all, but in general it has been regarded much more loosely and relatively. Both China and Japan successfully practised strict isolationism from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.¹ The prime reason for their failure to maintain this was the superior military strength of Western powers determined to have dealings with them. Neither American isolationism,² nor Britain's so-called "splendid isolation" or "policy of the free hand"³ - was ever a policy of complete abstention from all international affairs.⁴ And though the avoidance of permanent military commitments was a

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1. A minor qualification to this picture of complete isolation is necessary in each case. China permitted a restricted foreign trade through Canton; while, similarly, Japan permitted a limited trade through the single port of Nagasaki. See G. F. Hudson - The Far East in World Affairs, (London, 1939), chapter 2, pp. 12-26.
 2. See above pp. 17-19. See also Molotov's & Cordell Hull's mutual badinage, at the Moscow Conference in 1943, about the ending of their respective country's isolationism, in The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, 1948), vol. 2, pp. 1297 & 1310.
 3. See description in British Security. A Report by a Chatham House Study Group (London, 1946) ch. 3, pp. 37-46.
 4. Indeed, both are more accurately designated by the term "unilateralism" - but this is not an established usage in this context.

persistent and popular tradition in both countries, though obviously in different ways and for different reasons, both have abandoned this in the post-1945 world.

Apart from the freedom for independent manoeuvre cherished by the large isolationist power, many small states have in the past sought in isolationism security through self-effacement, or complete non-involvement in international matters. Switzerland long practised this policy successfully, though her military reputation and mountainous topography probably counted for more than diplomatic skill; today she is best regarded as a traditional or unique neutral.¹ The fate of Tibet since 1950² shows that mere willingness to remain inactive internationally is not sufficient to ensure isolationism.

Because isolationism implies aloofness or indifference to world affairs and a reluctance to engage in widespread diplomatic relations, it is an unpopular term today, thought to describe a policy incompatible with membership in the United Nations and to be an admission of national backwardness diplomatically. Five states in particular - Ethiopia, Liberia, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen and Ireland - illustrate different ways in which erstwhile isolationists can evolve into neutralist states.

1. See below pp 211-228.

2. See Frank Moraes - The Revolt in Tibet (New York, 1960).

Ethiopia and Liberia were two of the four independent states of Africa in 1945 - the Union of South Africa and Egypt were the other two. Of all the five states briefly considered here, Liberia has done least to modify her former isolationism. Though she has been independent for one hundred and fourteen years, and was an original member of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, she is still notorious for her general backwardness. Described by one historian as "that poor and neglected African step-child of the United States,"¹ she allowed the United States to construct airports on her soil during the Second World War, though all American forces left after the war. Cold War issues have so far left Liberia untouched. It is only since the emergence of three new states - Guinea, Ivory Coast and (Sierra Leone) - around her land frontiers, as successors to French colonial power, that she has begun to show significant signs of active interest in the world outside her borders. She acted as host to a conference² of 'moderate' independent African states in June 1961, though it was reported that her "prestige in African eyes might have remained greater had the realities of Liberia's domestic situation not been brought home to so many African leaders."³

1. See F. P. Walters - A History of the League of Nations (London, 1952), p. 568. See esp. pp. 569-571.
2. See "The Monrovia Conference" in The British Survey, June 1. 1961 (Main Series, No. 147) pp. 20-22.
3. See Hella Pick - "Liberia's Poor Showing Among Africans" in The Guardian, 28 June 1961.

Ethiopia¹. has the longest record of independence of any African state in modern times; and, apart from Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941, has not otherwise been under foreign domination throughout her known history. For almost three thousand years prior to the Italian air, sea and land invasion in 1935, Ethiopia was too inaccessible, too mountainous and impregnable to large scale attack. Indeed, the Ethiopian defeat of Italian forces at Adowa in 1895 was as important an event in African history as Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 was in Asian annals, and Mussolini vowed revenge for this Italian 'national' humiliation, just as in 1945 Stalin claimed retribution for the defeat of 1905. Ethiopia is a benevolent despotism, ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie ever since 1930. It is Haile Selassie who has closely identified Ethiopia with other African and Asian neutralist states since 1955. The country has perhaps the highest economic potential, and yet has so far achieved proportionately the least actual development of potential, in the whole of Africa. But in attempts to speed up development, Haile Selassie has been an assiduous world traveller on behalf of his country's interests; paying state visits to the United States and to most West European countries, including Yugoslavia in 1954, and visiting Moscow in June 1959

1. See Edward Ullendorff - The Ethiopians (O.U.P., London, 1960); & "Ethiopia" The British Survey, June 1961 (Main Series, No. 147), pp. 1-19.

whence he returned home with promises of substantial Soviet aid. India, Sweden and Israel each provide technicians and teachers to forward the Emperor's development plans. The Americans have a radio and monitoring station at Radio Marina, Asmara, in Eritrea,¹ and provide various forms of technical aid, including equipment and training for Ethiopia's armed forces.² Not only did Ethiopia send a delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955, but her capital city, Addis Ababa, has been the venue for several all-Africa conferences recently and has become the permanent headquarters of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, founded in 1960. With Sudan becoming independent in 1956, with the emergence of a new republic of Somalia in 1960 keen to promote irredentist claims against Ethiopia, and with Kenya to become an independent state in due course, Ethiopia will soon have entirely new nation-states in place of her former 'imperialist' neighbours. By early 1961 Ethiopia had clearly moved from an apparently pro-Western position, held at the time of her participation in the Korean War, to a position of undoubted moderate neutralism internationally.

1. The former Italian colony of Eritrea became in 1952 "an autonomous state federated with Ethiopia", and consequently Ethiopia acquired a sea-board. See G.K.N. Trevaskis Eritrea. A Colony in Transition, 1941-52. (O.U.P., London, 1960).

2. See M:S.P. 1961, op.cit. p. 80.

Ethiopia's two near neighbours across the Red Sea, the Yemen¹. and Saudi Arabia,². are both states which are now to be numbered among the neutralists. Both were isolationist states prior to the Second World War, though the Yemen even more so than Saudi Arabia. They were two of the four³. independent states of the inter-war period who never applied for membership of the League of Nations. Both are still feudal monarchies, still mostly absorbed in Arab quarrels and parochial concerns, but now less determined and less able to insulate their countries from outside influences. Both have sought to come to terms with Nasser's Egypt and to stay neutralist in the Cold War, though they have attempted to do this in different ways.

Saudi Arabia has had close ties with the United States - unofficially, through the American oil companies' development of Saudi Arabian oilfields since the 1930s, and, officially, since the Second World War with the establishment of a large U.S. air base at Dhahran. This air base agreement has been renewed roughly every five years since the war, but in March 1961⁴. Saudi Arabia notified Washington that she would not

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1. See Lenczowski, op.cit. ch. 13, pp. 455-466; The Middle East, op.cit. pp. 94-102; & Campbell, op.cit. passim.
 2. See Lenczowski, op.cit. ch. 12, pp. 431-454; The Middle East, op.cit. pp. 75-94; & Campbell, op.cit. passim.
 3. The other two were the U.S.A. and Nepal.
 4. See The Times, 18 March 1961; & Daily Telegraph, 20 March 1961.

renew the agreement when it expires on 1st April, 1962, - probably because of nationalist pressures within the Arab world. Saudi relations with the Communist powers have been virtually non-existent, and relations with Egypt have fluctuated considerably - reaching their lowest point in March 1958 when King Saud was implicated in abortive attempts to stage a military coup in Syria; secure the murder of Nasser; and prise apart the new United Arab Republic. Her relations with Britain have been strained, particularly since 1952, over the disputed Buraimi Oasis, on the border between Muscat and Trucial Oman. Yemen's foreign policy is dominated by the quest to realise irredentist claims against Aden, though otherwise, and even before she effected her purely nominal union with the United Arab Republic in 1958, she had followed the Egyptian line in her foreign policy. In April 1956 she concluded a tripartite agreement with Egypt (who had already agreed to supply aircraft, guns and tanks) and with Saudi Arabia. The 1927 Treaty of Friendship with the U.S.S.R. expired in 1954, but in 1955 it was decided to renew it and to strengthen economic relations with the U.S.S.R. China began aid programmes to Yemen in 1958. Both Saudi Arabia and the Yemen are finding it increasingly difficult to square the circle of token support for radical Arab nationalism outside their frontiers while yet preserving mildly progressive, feudal monarchical systems at home.

It is strange to have to include Ireland among the erstwhile isolationists because for at least ten years after becoming an independent state in 1921 she proclaimed policies¹ which were in their anti-colonialism, championship of the rights of small nations, expressions of pride in her membership of the League of Nations, insistence on the need for economic development, and obsessive irredentist claims (against the six 'lost' counties of Ulster), very like the avowed policies of so many new state neutralists today. Then, from 1935 to 1936 - that is, from the time of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, and the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1936 whereby Britain evacuated her treaty ports in South West Ireland - she relapsed into isolationism. This was intensified by her neutrality throughout the Second World War,² and this isolationism, in effect, lasted until she gained admission to the United Nations in December 1955 - because the Soviet Union vetoed her application for United Nations membership in 1945. Ireland's active involvement in a wide range of international issues since joining the

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1. See Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Nationality, 1918 - 1956 by W. K. Hancock (O.U.P., London, 1937), cs. 5 & 6; and Problems of External Policy, 1931-1939 by Nicholas Mansergh (O.U.P., London, 1952) ch. 8, and pp. 400-407.
 2. See The War and the Neutrals, op.cit. pp. 230-256.

United Nations¹ - she sent troops to serve in the United Nations observer corps in Lebanon in 1958 and a large contingent to the Congo in 1960, she has supported Indian moves to consider the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, and has proposed disengagement schemes for central Europe - is a dramatic example of how United Nations membership can lead to a radical alteration in the policies of an erstwhile isolationist.

While it has been the aim here to indicate different ways in which some states have come to modify their former isolationism, it is not, of course, implied that all erstwhile isolationist states become neutralist. Spain, isolationist at least from 1937 to 1953, ended her isolationism by allying with the United States; and it is arguable that the policies of such small island states as Iceland and Haiti are still fundamentally isolationist, despite their Cold War alignments and United Nations membership, and even if less so than formerly.

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1. There is, as yet, no survey of Ireland's post 1945 foreign policy comparable with those of Hancock and Mansergh for the inter-war period. All the important speeches delivered by Irish delegates at U.N. meetings are collected & published annually as pamphlets by Dha Scilling a Luach. See also Irish Parliamentary Debates (Dail Eireann), esp. vol. 164 (no. 8) 28 Nov. 1957, columns 1167-1260; vol. 167 (nos. 2 & 3) 16 & 17 April 1958, columns 251-312 & 313-15; & vol. 176 (nos. 4 & 5) 2 & 7 July 1959, columns 490-520, 554-586, 587, 601-716.

(5) Pioneer Neutralism

The reason for considering India, Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic together and apart from other neutralist states is that they are the three leading neutralist states today, and each of them has initiated certain policies which are now widely regarded as being neutralist in character. In asserting that these states have been pioneers it is not necessarily claimed that many other neutralist states have become neutralist by deliberately imitating them - indeed, this is unlikely. What is claimed is that these three states were, in their different ways, the first to practise in Cold War conditions certain policies which many neutralist states now practise, or seek to practise.

India spread, by advocacy and example, the idea that neutralism could be a respectable and responsible policy, and that a neutralist state could usefully act as a mediator in international disputes - and she did this at a time when all forms of neutralism were regarded with great suspicion by both Cold War camps. Indian leaders stressed that their preoccupations in managing a newly independent state were with preserving and consolidating national independence, with industrialising, or at least 'modernising', the state, and in staying out of avoidable international conflict.

1. Yugoslavia showed that a neutralist state could resist strong pressures from one superpower without having to

become a formal member of the other Cold War camp. She also showed that it was possible to receive aid from both of the Cold War camps without becoming beholden to either.

Egypt (in the years before she joined with Syria in the United Arab Republic) showed that it was possible to persuade a Western power to evacuate an important military base, and also led the way in pursuing an 'active' neutralist policy of simultaneous dalliance with both Cold War camps. In so doing, Egypt showed that an 'active' neutralist policy requires very quick reactions to the moves of the superpowers; positions held too long can become compromising if a wholesale dependence on one Cold War camp seems to be developing. She has shown that this policy, if it is to succeed, must exhibit qualities of flexibility, some would say inconsistency, similar to those for which -- in rather different circumstances -- 'Perfidious Albion' became notorious from the time of Cardinal Wolsey onwards.

These points are illustrated in their context in Chapter IV.¹ There are other ways in which these three states are of significance in the history of neutralism, but these, too, are mentioned in the case study.

Two other states - Cuba and Iraq - can be conveniently mentioned here. To date they are the only two states to

1. See below pp: 168-210

become neutralist by defecting from multilateral Western alliances - Cuba¹. from the Rio Pact, and Iraq². from the former Baghdad Pact. Both of them did so by means of revolutions which overthrew strongly pro-Western regimes, and installed the dominant revolutionary leader in power - Castro in Cuba, and Kassem in Iraq - in the name of social reform and national independence. Both states have become 'pioneers' just by defecting from Western alliances, but it is doubtful if either of them will themselves acquire a sizeable following of fellow neutralist states in their own respective regions. For it is unlikely that such large Latin American states as Argentina or Brazil will be led to line up behind Cuba. This is not to say that such countries will not become more neutralist for other reasons. It remains to be seen if Iraq will wrest the leading role in the Arab world from Egypt, or whether in defecting from a Western alliance she has set a precedent for her neighbours,

1. Following Fidel Castro's accession to power in January 1959. Castro's policy since 1959 has been one of seeking armaments & diplomatic support from the Soviet bloc, sequestering U.S. property in Cuba while refraining from attacking the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba, & of identifying Cuba with the neutralist states. See The Times, 2 June 1960; 18 July 1960; 9 Aug. 1960 & 5 Sept. 1960.
2. The Iraqi Prime Minister announced in March 1959 that Iraq had withdrawn from the Baghdad Pact, thus formalizing a situation which had existed in effect since the Iraq revolution of July 1958. (Both Cuba & Iraq sent full delegations to the Belgrade Neutralist Summit in Sept. 1961). See The Times, 16 & 17 Dec. 1958; & The Observer, 24 May 1959.

Persia¹ and Turkey. The only other two possible alternatives are that she could continue with her present shaky independence, or become a Soviet satellite. This latter fate is probably avoidable as long as C.E.N.T.O. is in being, if only because the territories of Turkey and Persia separate Iraq from the Soviet Union.

(6) New State Neutralism

In January 1961 thirty-two of the neutralist states were newly independent states.² That is to say that they had all acquired their independence since 1945, and none of them was a member of a Cold War multilateral alliance, though they were all members of the United Nations. Of course, newness and age are relative concepts³. and any attempt to

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1. The attractions of neutralism for Persians are discussed in L. P. Elwell-Sutton - "Nationalism and Neutralism in Iran" in The Middle Eastern Journal, Winter 1955, p.20-32.
 2. See table below, pp. 255-9 Only India of the post 1945 'new' states has been deliberately excluded from this category of new state neutralists. She is more appropriately considered as a pioneer neutralist - see above p.148.
 3. It is arguable that some states, formally independent before 1945, become new, as it were, by coup d'etat or by revolution. For instance, Egypt after 1952, Iraq after 1958, or Cuba after 1959, could all be cited in support of this argument. But such claims raise many controversial issues about the degree of continuity and discontinuity in foreign policy after a coup or revolution. Under the heading of new state neutralists we are here concerned only with those former colonies or mandated territories which have since 1945 gained, or after a longish period regained, sovereign status internationally, and become U.N. members.

discuss neutralist policies by reference to the quality of 'newness'¹. is helpful only if its relative arbitrariness is recognised. Yet the very fact that so many of the present day neutralist states are new sovereignties internationally is too important a coincidence to be neglected, though, admittedly, new states born into Cold War conditions have many problems similar to those of other neutralist states. But precisely because they are new states, they face all their problems at once and right from the moment of independence.

Many of the factors already mentioned², which persuade other states to adopt a neutralist policy - most notably, the impracticability of isolation, the quest for material improvement, and the desire to keep free of Cold War ties - all converge to impel new states along a neutralist course. What the leaders of all new neutralist states want, above all, is to show their new states' independence internationally and to convince their nationals that the new state is truly independent. Here, forms may be as important as realities.

Four points, all connected, must be mentioned again as they are especially important in understanding new state

1. For discussions of the quality of newness, see Akzin, op. cit. & Emerson - From Empire to Nation, ibid. ch. 20, pp. 397-419.
2. See above pp. 127-150.

neutralism. First, is the concern with national unity. Second, is the importance of membership in the United Nations. Third, is the diminishing significance of foreign military bases as a necessary disqualification of neutralist status. And fourth, is the relevance of economic factors in shaping a neutralist course.

National self-determination,¹ with all its ambiguous power, has been the principle for justifying the existence of all the new states, irrespective of whether or not a broadly based national movement preceded the achievement of independent statehood, and regardless of whether or not national unity is at all attainable. National unity is thus the overriding and unavoidable concern of all nationalist leaders in new states. Yet it is not a measurable commodity, it is more often noticeable for its absence than assessable by its presence. In all the new states an awareness that national unity is either non-existent or precarious has been a powerful influence keeping the state out of Cold War alliances. Two factors seem especially relevant. Firstly, the neutralist state has one important advantage over the aligned state in

1. It should be remembered that some version of national self-determination has been a battlecry of Liberal, Communist or Fascist movements. See Alfred Cobban - National Self-Determination (London, O.U.P. for R.I.I.A., 1945); Elie Kedourie - Nationalism, op.cit. ch. 5; & Emerson - From Empire to Nation, op.cit. pp. 295-359.

that its interests and, hence, its efforts can be almost wholly local and limited, it does not have to strive to concert ~~itself~~ closely and continually with the policies of its alliance partners. The leaders of a new state can thus stress the independence of action enjoyed in virtue of not being a member of an alliance, and can insist that the national interest is their dominant concern, whereas membership in an alliance would involve at least some compromise in the interests of coalition diplomacy, and may even involve subordination to the stronger powers. Secondly, any obvious military alignment with a foreign power inevitably becomes a move in domestic politics too, and the government thus runs the risk of losing the leadership of the national movement if its opponents can plausibly represent it as 'selling' the new and cherished independence to a foreign power.

Soon after its inception the first government of independent Burma had to face a succession of rebellions and armed threats - from the Karens, Arakanese, Kuomintang Chinese, White and Red Flag Communists.¹ The survival of U Nu's government and of Burma within its present boundaries in these early post independent years was possible only because

 1. See Hugh Tinker - The Union of Burma (2nd ed., London, 1959) ch. 2 "The Background of Civil War 1948-55," & John F. Cady - A History of Modern Burma (Cornell U.P., 1958), ch. 17 - "Rebellion and Recovery." Appendix 8 below.

its opponents were separate groups of rebels, unwilling or unable to combine with each other, and the government continued to speak in the name of the majority of the nation and of the national independence movement. Alliance with a foreign power would have jeopardised its position by offering a vulnerable target for its opponents to attack. Even small but vital military aid from India in these years had to be given and accepted very discreetly.¹ Indonesia has faced similar difficulties. The fact that this new state is an archipelago of more than three thousand islands has certainly added to the task of welding an Indonesian national unity.² The difficulties of Burma and Indonesia in trying to secure national unity can be roughly paralleled in the experiences of most of the new states.

One of the most effective arguments neutralist leaders have been able to use against indigenous Communists is that they give their primary allegiance to a foreign power and are thus subversive of national unity. Irredentism, too, may be one way of trying to solidify the national movement behind the leadership; though in as much as a neutralist state seeks the support of other states in the furtherance

1. See Tinker, *ibid.* p. 355.
2. See G. M. Kahin - Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Cornell UP., 1952); v. Appendix 6 below.

of its irredentist claims, most of them have had to rely on fellow neutralists or on Communist powers, as the satisfaction of such claims must nearly always be at the expense of a Western or Western-aligned power. Even so, it is to be remembered that irredentist claims are made in the name of 'the nation' and a distinction between new state neutralists in terms of 'moderate' and 'militant' nationalism is likely to be more profitable than one in terms of whether they are pro-Western or pro-Communist.

The initial direction of a new state neutralist's course will be strongly influenced by the way in which the new state breaks with the metropolitan power. Where the parting is amicable, as with Ceylon and all the French West African territories, except Guinea, the new state's neutralism is likely to show, initially at least, a markedly pro-Western bent. When the severing of colonial ties is less smooth, as in the cases of Indonesia and Guinea,¹ the new state's neutralist course is almost inevitably anti-Western and militant in support of national claims.

The political complexion of a neutralist regime does not seem to be a decisive factor shaping its neutralist course. Where leadership is conspicuously strong the absence of national unity or social cohesion appears to be less

1. See Harold Silver - "Guinea Red and Black" in The Listener, 20 July 1961, pp. 81-3.

important. One of the striking differences between Cambodia and Laos since 1954 has been the presence of a single undoubted leader, Prince Sihanouk, in Cambodia and the lack of any similar dominating personality in Laos. Similarly, Nigeria has no one man who has attained a pre-eminence comparable with that of Dr. Nkrumah in Ghana. Strong and undoubted leadership gives a purpose and a direction to a country's foreign policy. Leaders like Nehru, Nasser and Tito not only seem to personify their nations, but because of their pre-eminence they become the embodiment of their country's neutralism to the outside world.

The overriding importance of nationalism, and ^{of} national leadership in particular, is clearly apparent throughout Africa where new states are arising on the basis of administrative units established by the colonial powers. Virtually all these new states are not unified nations but congeries of tribes and parts of tribes. It remains to be seen if these states will eventually create nations, though it seems certain that they need nationalism, in the sense of a ~~national~~ community of feeling and will roughly coincidental with the state, if they are to weld together into working units the diverse elements of which they are composed. All these new African states are formally non-aligned in the Cold War, though their neutralism, like their nationalism, is still

immature and unsettled. The neutralist policies of these states often closely reflect substantial differences between those 'moderate' nationalist leaders who seem content to work largely within their inherited boundaries, and those 'militants' - President Nkrumah of Ghana¹ is the most notable example - who claim to regard their new state as merely a springboard in the creation of larger political units. Although the attractive force of pan-African ideas, at least among some of the African leaders, has been shown in a number of symbolic (so far, none of them could be said to be at all substantive) unions,² the vital question remains - who is to head these new and larger unions? As yet, the "African nation" seems even less ripe for a takeover than does the "Arab nation."

Membership in the United Nations is valued by all new state neutralists as perhaps the most important symbol of recognition and enfranchisement in international society. Membership enables the neutralist to avoid the discomforts of isolation and encourages the making of a wide range of international contacts, many of which would otherwise be difficult

1. See appendix 10 below, pp. 327-9

2. The Union of Ghana and Guinea proclaimed in May 1959 does not seem to have progressed much further than this proclamation; the union of Senegal and Soudan (now known as Mali) lasted only two months - June-July 1960 - after independence. For Nkrumah see Appendix 10 below.

for an uncommitted state. Nevertheless, the obligations of United Nations membership can encourage a confusing mingling of precept and practice, of neutralist doctrine¹ and policy, ~~inasmuch as~~ ^{This is perhaps unavoidable because as a UN member} a new state has to vote and adopt at least declaratory policies on a wide range of international questions, many of them remote from immediate national concerns, and at a time when ~~its~~ substantive policies of ~~these new states~~ are often inchoate and groping. The pattern of a neutralist state's voting behaviour is one rough indication of its international orientation. By this test one survey,² published in 1960, suggested that, at that time, three Afro-Asian neutralists - Laos, Liberia and Malaya - consistently adopted an anti-Communist line; eleven of them - Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Sudan, United Arab Republic and Yemen - constituted a 'hard-core' neutralist vote; while nine - Ethiopia, Cambodia, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia - were left as 'floating' votes.³

1. Many of the ambiguities in neutralist doctrine, discussed in chapter II above, are reflected in neutralist policies, & much of what was said in that chapter about independence, foreign aid, etc. has a direct relevance here.
2. See G. Goodwin - "The Expanding United Nations - I" in International Affairs (R.I.I.A.) April 1960, pp. 174-187. He warns that "voting figures merely record arithmetical totals. They cannot indicate the intensity of feeling of the majority - or minority; or the extent to which national interests are directly involved; or the degree of actual power rather than voting power which the majority commands relative to that of the minority." (p. 185).
3. Ibid. p. 181.

For some new states it has been a virtual condition of achieving independence that they should grant or permit the continuance of military bases or facilities to the departing metropolitan power and/or its allies. Before 1957 the possession of such bases by an independent state was generally regarded as disqualifying it for neutralist status - no-one seemed to regard Morocco, Tunisia and Libya as neutralist states then, nor was Ceylon regarded as neutralist until the evacuation of the British bases at Trincomalee and Katunayake shortly after Mr. Bandaranaike's electoral victory in 1956.¹ Since 1957, with the increasing numbers and growing self-confidence of neutralist states, there seems to be a growing opinion amongst them that the presence of foreign military bases within the boundaries of an otherwise independent state does not necessarily preclude neutralist status. Even so, it seems that a state becomes 'more neutralist', as it were, if it is able to fix a terminal date for the final evacuation of such bases as it has on its soil, or if it imposes more stringent conditions upon the power enjoying such facilities.

After negotiations begun in 1957, Morocco had by September 1960 persuaded France to evacuate her bases from Morocco by the end of 1963. Further negotiations led to a supplementary

1. See W. C. B. Tunstall - The Commonwealth and Regional Defence (London, 1959); pp. 54-55; & appendix 7 below.

agreement that all these bases would be evacuated by October 1961, two years ahead of the previously agreed schedule.¹ Intermittent negotiations have also been held for the evacuation of the three main United States bases.² Tunisia has been negotiating with France since 1958 to secure the withdrawal of French forces from Bizerta, though in such a moderate manner that in the eyes of many 'militant' neutralists she is probably regarded as being far too pro-Western³ in orientation. Malaya has consistently sought to give a restrictive interpretation of British military rights on her soil; and both Malayan and Singaporean leaders have said that in the event of a union between Malaya and Singapore, now being explored, Britain's most important overseas base of Singapore would not be available for the use of S.E.A.T.O.⁴ By adroit, stubborn and prolonged negotiation when the terms of independence for Cyprus were being worked out, Archbishop Makarios whittled down the areas for Britain's 'sovereign'

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1. See The Times, 6 March 1961.
 2. See ibid., also M.S.P. 1961, op.cit., p. 78.
 3. Senegal which harbours French military bases, and Nigeria which has signed a defence pact with Britain, would probably be included in a similar indictment. ^{See Daily Telegraph, 22 Nov. 1960} For Tunis, see M.S.P. 1961, op.cit. p79
 4. See John Lowe - "The Malayan Experiment" Fabian Society Research Series 213, March 1960, esp. pp. 32-3 & 41; also Lennox Mills - Malaya. A Political & Economic Appraisal (London, O.U.P. 1958), pp. 148-9.

bases in independent Cyprus, closely defined the conditions by which they were to be occupied and used, and insisted that the agreements should be subject to review after five years.¹ Even Libya, who has the largest of America's overseas bases on her soil, is attempting to increase "the rental" paid by the Americans and is in other ways identifying herself with the militant neutralists of the Casablanca powers.²

All the new neutralist states consider themselves to have underdeveloped economies. The only way they could insulate themselves from outside economic pressures would be to give up cherished industrial aspirations and remain peasant economies. As they are all unwilling to do this, they have to seek trade with and aid from other states, and this makes them susceptible to economic pressures. In general, all neutralists regard/wide pattern of economic relations, preferably with both of the Cold War blocs, as being the best way to avoid the snares of economic control, though

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1. See Cmd. 1093 (H.M.S.O., 1960); & The Economist, 28 Feb. 1959, pp. 753-4 & 767; also The Guardian, 16 Jan. 1960.
 2. See Roger Owen - Libya. A Brief Political and Economic Survey (R.I.I.A. Memoranda, May 1961); M.S.P. 1961, op. cit., pp. 77-8 - "The very discouraging long range outlook for Libya's economy changed dramatically in 1959 on the discovery of large oil deposits...the government should then (i.e. by 1965 or 1966) become independent of foreign assistance to finance normal governmental operations and its development programme."

obviously their opportunities to achieve such aims vary considerably. It is a striking feature of the Cold War that neutralist vulnerability to outside economic pressures is probably less now than there are chances of obtaining aid from both Cold War camps, whereas before 1954 neutralists were wholly dependent on Western aid and trade. As the number of potential donors and markets has increased and has come to involve both Cold War camps, the possibilities for neutralist states to gain economic advantages from playing off rival powers have increased considerably,¹ as, in general, neither Cold War camp appears anxious to see a neutralist state become an economic, and then perhaps a political, dependency of its rival.

In fact, some of the new and ostensibly neutralist states are almost wholly dependent on Western aid - Jordan².

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1. Cambodia has hitherto been a very successful practitioner of this art. See Fifield, op.cit., pp. 366-393. See also The Economist, 11 May 1957, p. 508; The Observer, 16 June 1957 & 3 July 1960; & The Times, 20 June 1960 & 31 Dec. 1960.
 2. This was certainly true of Jordan from 1948-57, see The Middle East, op.cit. ch. 7, esp. pp. 345-349; see also M.S.F. 1961, op.cit. p. 84 - "Jordan is not a viable economic unit, yet preservation of its stability remains vital to preservation of peace in the area. Therefore the United States, and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom, contribute substantial direct support for Jordan's national budget."

and Israel¹ are notable examples - for their economic viability. To date, no neutralist state has lost its political independence¹ as a result of Soviet economic pressure. Probably the nearest example was Syria² in the two or three years before it joined with Egypt in the United Arab Republic, but even here other factors - especially the pan-Arabism of Syria's Baathist leaders - need to be adduced also in order to explain fully why she joined with Egypt in February 1958.

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Finally, there are two marked exceptions to the general tendency that new states become neutralist. These are the Philippines and Pakistan. The close alignment of the Philippines with the United States stems not only from the

1. See The Middle East, op.cit. pp. 312-14; see also special Economist survey on Israel, 16 May 1959, pp. 1-24 - "Israel gets financial help from the U.S.; credits, jets & sympathy from France; reparations on the generous side from West Germany; warships from Britain. All this is welcome - and necessary - but does not alter the fact of Israel's basic isolation" p. 7. The survey does, however, suggest that Israel is reducing this isolation by developing friendships with such neutralist states as Yugoslavia, Burma & Ghana. Even so, Israel's policy is generally regarded as pro-Western despite the lack of formal ties. Neutralism is thought of as a possible 'new line', not as descriptive of present policies, see W. Z. Laqueur - "Israel's Great Foreign Policy Debate" in Commentary, August 1955, p. 110..
2. See Walter Z. Laqueur - The Soviet Union and the Middle East (London, 1959), esp. pp. 247-280; & George Kirk - "The Syrian Crisis of 1957; Fact and Fiction" in International Affairs (R.I.I.A.) Jan. 1960, pp. 58-61.

agreements made on the eve of independence¹. in 1946, but also from her unique status and experience as America's only Asian 'colony' before 1945. Certainly, Filipino-American relations seem to reflect a mutuality of interests which have continued with surprisingly few strains since 1946.² This is not to say that the Philippines could not become a neutralist state, it is to say that neutralism has, so far, seemed to be an insignificant force in Filipino politics. Pakistan³ is a less strong exception to the rule than is the Philippines. She was without formal commitments to either Cold War camp prior to 1954.⁴ Then at least five factors helped to bring about an abandonment of non-alignment. These were: the patent failure of attempts to put Pakistan at the head of an association of Islamic states, or even to establish cordial relations with most Arab states; worsening relations both

1. See Fifield, op.cit. pp. 60-66.
2. See Fifield, ibid. pp. 60-107; & Hahn, Peters & Rosenthal - "The United States and the Philippines" in American-Asian Tensions, ed. by Strausz-Hupe, Cottrell & Dougherty (New York, 1956), pp. 123-146.
3. See Keith Callard - Pakistan. A Political Study (Allen & Unwin, London, 1957), esp. ch. 10, "Pakistan and the World."
4. See Callard, ibid.; & James W. Spain - "Military Assistance for Pakistan" in A.P.S.R., Sept. 1953, pp. 738-751.

with Afghanistan and with India; a real sense of vulnerability especially strong in a state divided into two parts and separated by more than a thousand miles of territory occupied by an unfriendly neighbour; famine in 1953 in what had hitherto been a grain surplus producing country; and American enthusiasm - at that time - for making aid agreements mostly with formal military allies. Together these were powerful enough influences to pull Pakistan into an alliance.

NEUTRALISM AS STATE POLICY - some case studies.

"There is room for a more detailed analysis of the logic of situations."

Karl Popper.

India, Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic - three pioneer neutralists.

India, Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic¹ are the contemporary neutralist states par excellence. Each of them has pioneered policies which are now, in some respects at least, generally regarded as being typically neutralist. All three of them provide articulate, even vehement, spokesmen for anti-colonial causes; all three seek foreign aid to forward their ambitious plans for national development; and all three are 'revisionist' rather than 'status quo' powers, though the quality of their revisionism differs. Awareness of their affinities, and the currents of contemporary international politics, has encouraged them to develop diplomatic contacts with each other. Together their three leaders, Mr. Nehru, President Tito and President Nasser, make up a formidable triumvirate, each coming from a different continent and each aspiring to play an influential part in world affairs. None of these leaders regards a neutralist foreign policy merely as a way of keeping out of Cold War quarrels. On the contrary, they each aspire to a position of importance and of leadership in international affairs. Both the Cold War struggle and the emergence of new state neutralism have

1. The United Arab Republic came into being by the union of Egypt and Syria in Feb. 1958. Here we are concerned almost exclusively with the Egyptian half of the United Arab Republic, and with Egypt from 1945 to 1958.

enabled them to realise these ambitions, though in different ways, to the extent that in 1961 India, Yugoslavia and Egypt are the leading neutralist states in the world. Here the three states will be considered separately before comparing them together.

India

For many people India's foreign policy is the paradigm of a neutralist foreign policy. For not only is India the first, the largest and perhaps the most predictable of the new state neutralists of the Cold War (and occupying a pivotal position in Asia), but in the quality of her leadership and the scrupulousness of her diplomacy she is perhaps the most convincingly independent of the new state neutralists.

Any analysis of India's neutralist policy must begin by acknowledging the paramount role and importance of the man who continuously since 1947 has been both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of independent India. But Mr. Nehru's¹ great influence goes back further than 1947, to his work and influence in the Congress Party from the 1920s onwards and to his intimate association with Gandhi. Mr. Nehru's habit of public comment on the outstanding international issues of the day also dates from the 1920s, for he has always conceived

1. The two best of the many studies of Nehru are by Frank Moraes - Jawaharlal Nehru (New York, 1956) & by Michael Brecher - Nehru. A Political Biography (London, 1959).

of India being able to play an important role in world politics in harmony with the promotion of India's immediate interests. Though it would be wrong to say that the precise course of India's foreign policy was charted before 1947, it would be right to say that many of her post-1947 preoccupations - concern with world peace, sympathy for anti-colonialist and anti-racialist causes, a conception of India's importance in world affairs - were prefigured in Mr. Nehru's writings and speeches before she emerged as an independent state. This preceding period of verbal formulation of India's policy, and Mr. Nehru's insistence from the 1920s onwards that the Congress Party must have an international outlook, has a threefold relevance today. Firstly, it helped to create an impression from the earliest days of Indian independence that India's favourite foreign policy methods¹ were generally well thought out and related to a general pattern of policy. Secondly, it goes a long way towards explaining why Indians themselves seem to place such importance on 'correct thinking' and 'the intrinsic power of ideas.' Thirdly, and most

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1. These have been well summarised by Professor Appadorai as: "To keep the peace, by peaceful means - negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation and arbitration; listen to the viewpoint of both parties to a dispute expressed by their duly constituted representatives; hesitate to condemn either party as an aggressor, until facts proved by international enquiry indisputably testify to aggression; believe the bona fides of both until proof to the contrary; and explore fully the possibilities of negotiation and at least localize war - this is India's view", quoted in Benjamin Akzin - New States and International Organizations (Paris, 1955), p. 174.

relevant to neutralism generally, it indicates why it was that India, through the person of Mr. Nehru, was able to pioneer the notion that neutralism could be a carefully thought out, intelligible and respectable policy. Not only was he the first internationally influential exponent of neutralist doctrine,¹ but he showed that he could translate his ideas into practice with some considerable success, even though Indian policy had to be alert to the vicissitudes of the Cold War. While it is probably true to say that the intentions of India's policy makers have remained broadly the same since 1947, the actual course of India's neutralist policy has gone through three stages..

Between 1947 and 1950 India was preoccupied with immediate tasks flowing from the newly achieved independence following the partition of British India. Domestic and foreign policy tasks were closely linked, for not only was the promotion and consolidation of national unity essential, but Nehru clearly saw that popular support for foreign policy could become an important cement of national unity. Great stress, too, was laid on India's need to industrialise. It was perhaps inevitable that Indo-Pakistan relations should be strained from the start, considering the circumstances of their mutual origin, but the unresolved fate of Kashmir².

1. See Independence and After. A collection of the more important speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 to May 1949 (Delhi, 1949), esp. pp. 199-338, & appendix 3 below, pp. 274-283.
2. See Moraes, op.cit. pp. 385-399.

undoubtedly magnified mutual animosities. India's continuing close relationship with Great Britain should be seen, therefore, not only in terms of a large legacy of goodwill, expressed especially in good relations with the Attlee government and in close economic ties, but also as a means of preventing Pakistan developing exclusive relations with Britain to the detriment of India. Apart from the Kashmir issue, India's championship of Indonesian independence was her most active international concern in these years.¹ At this time Indian neutralism seemed to have a pro-Western orientation. This was partly shown in India's success in being the first Asian state to reconcile independent status with Commonwealth membership, though her relations with the United States were merely correct and tepid, as Mr. Nehru's visit to that country in 1949² seemed to underline. More significantly, this apparent pro-Western inclination was the unavoidable consequence of Soviet propaganda, and of the Asian Communist parties' persistence in portraying India as not, in fact, independent at all, but as still tied to the 'imperialists.'

From 1951 to 1956 India pursued a fairly active mediatorial role and moved from a Western orientated neutralism towards a more strictly middle-of-the-road position. The strengths and limitations of Indian neutralist diplomacy were

1. For details, see K. P. Karunakaran - India in World Affairs 1947-50 (Bombay, 1952).
2. See Brecher, op.cit. pp. 419-20.

shown by her behaviour towards such issues as the Korean, Indo-Chinese and Suez wars and the Hungarian Revolution.^{1.} It was a period during which Indian relations with Russia generally improved, while those with the United States deteriorated, and those with Britain showed some considerable fluctuations. Two working assumptions of Indian diplomacy, always there, but particularly evident in this phase, are that Asian affairs should be decided by Asians and that all remaining vestiges of "colonialism" must be removed.^{2.} In effect, the policies flowing from these assumptions tended to improve Indian relations with the Communist powers, and in particular with Communist China,^{3.} and to embarrass or put strain on her relations with the Western powers. During these years Indian leaders tended to stress China's Asian, rather than her Communist, character; and to hint that she was a potential neutralist, perhaps an Asian Titoist. Certainly, both during the Korean and the Indo-China war, India cast herself in the role of intermediary between the Communist powers and the West, showed great solicitude for Chinese feelings, great suspicion of American aggressiveness, and worked hard to secure satisfactory compromises and peaceful settlement. An

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1. For details, see K. P. Karunakaran - India in World Affairs 1950-53 (Bombay, 1958), & Brecher, *op.cit.* chapter 19.
 2. See Moraes, *op.cit.* chapter 26 - "India and Asia."
 3. See Brecher, *op.cit.* pp. 588-592.

undramatic yet significant aspect of India's diplomacy on these occasions was her close continuing contacts and, at times, working co-operation with Great Britain. Commonwealth ties here probably aided co-operation where no conflicting interests were involved. By contrast, British and, more importantly, Pakistan adherence to the Baghdad Pact and to S.E.A.T.O. called forth much criticism of Britain, both from India's official leadership and ^{from} Indian opinion at large.^{1.} Bulganin and Khrushchev, when they paid a state visit to India in 1955, received such an apparently enthusiastic welcome that widespread alarms were expressed in many Western countries. These probably exaggerated the diplomatic implications of India's reception of these two Communist leaders, for it is far more likely that such a reception was compounded of public curiosity, genuine hospitality, and relief on the part of the official leadership now that Soviet policies towards India had changed for the better.^{2.}

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1. See M. S. Rajan - "Stresses and Strains in Indo-British Relations, 1954-6" in International Studies (Delhi), October, 1960, pp. 153-189. *In 1954 Nehru had to take action to restrain Indians from trying to occupy the Portuguese enclave in India of Goa.*
 2. See Geoffrey Tyson - "India and the Russian Visitors", International Affairs (R.I.I.A.) April 1956, pp. 173-180. It was Tyson's view (p. 180) that "Mr. Nehru's political neutralism has now been extended to the economic sphere, where its practical application means that India will consider herself free to accept assistance of every kind from the Communist world without prejudice to her relations with the West." [An Economist survey of 26 March 1960 pp. 1263-1285, showed that 90% of foreign aid to India came from Western sources & only 10% from the Soviet bloc, see esp. p. 1281. Another Economist appraisal of the Indian economy, 28 Jan. 1961, pp. 342-350, concluded that "India will not find economic independence in the next decade."]

From 1951 onwards India had assiduously striven to build up close relations with a number of fellow neutralist states, and was widely regarded as the leader of the so-called Arab-Asian bloc¹ in the United Nations. With the rapid expansion of Asian and African membership of the United Nations, this bloc grew correspondingly, became known as the Afro-Asian bloc², became more unwieldy, and India's undisputed leadership began to diminish, though between 1954 and the first half of 1956 India seemed to be developing especially close diplomatic ties with Egypt and Yugoslavia.³ With the eruption of the Suez and Hungarian crises in 1956, India's neutralist policies were less effective than during the Korean and Indo-China wars. With Britain a belligerent in the Suez war (and with Hungary part of the Soviet empire), it was not possible to resume Indo-British compromise procedures as had worked at the time of the Korean and Indo-China wars. Though in the Suez question India approved of the active mediatorial role of her fellow Commonwealth member, Canada, she herself came to support her neutralist friend, Egypt, with whose plight she had a great deal of sympathy. Mr. Nehru's initial public

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1. Early Arab-Asian co-operation is discussed in Egypt and the United Nations (New York, 1957), pp. 73-75.
 2. See Triska and Koch - "The Asian-African Nations and International Organization" in Review of Politics, April 1959, pp. 417-456.
 3. See Economist, 14 July 1956, p.111; the Scotsman, 19 July 1956; & Time and Tide, 21 July 1956.

reaction to the Hungarian Revolution was vacillating and then rather evasive. This caused great annoyance in the Western world and among a sizeable segment of Indian opinion, and he was accused of applying double standards, either as between the Suez and Hungary questions, or as between Asian and European questions. His own explanation about his early reaction to Hungarian events was that it was difficult to find out, exactly what was happening, and this may have been true if, as was likely, he was relying on President Tito as his prime source for information¹ - for Tito's reaction to the Hungarian Revolution was equally equivocal.² Another factor influencing the course of Indian neutralism was the development of Soviet aid programmes from 1954 onwards. From a neutralist point of view, this had the political advantage of removing a wholesale dependence on the Western powers for vital foreign aid to fulfil the goals of her five-year plans, and also eventually stimulated increased offers of aid from the Western powers. By the end of 1956 India had evolved a neutralist foreign policy recognised by both Cold War camps as independent, and, if only by contrast with the years 1947-51, it seemed slightly inclined in favour of the Soviet bloc.³

1. I owe this point to Richard Lowenthal - "Tito's Gamble" in Encounter, October, 1958, p. 61.

2. See below pp. 186-7.

3. See Brecher, op.cit. pp. 582-8.

Since 1957 India has tended to be content with a rather quieter role internationally than hitherto; by contrast with, say, either Egypt or Yugoslavia, to be more moderate, less radical and revisionist, even on anti-colonial issues. These contrasts have been particularly evident in the policies of these three states towards the problems arising from the civil war in the former Belgian Congo.¹ This generally quieter, moderate role is not only to be explained in terms of the free inclinations of India's leaders - their distaste for belligerent methods and their preference for trying to reconcile "anti-colonial" with "repentant colonial" states - but, also, because India has felt the need to devote, more energy than hitherto to pressing foreign policy tasks nearer home. Furthermore, the hitherto broadly based national unity about India's neutralist foreign policy has shown some signs of weakening.² The dispute with China over Tibet and the

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1. See Daily Telegraph, 16 Dec. 1960, & Observer, 5 March 1961
 2. See two articles by Cyril Dunn in the Observer, 10 & 17 April 1960. The most telling arguments have not been directed against the fact of India's neutralism - this is still broadly accepted as right - but whether the methods adopted are best designed to secure India's interests. Less attention to world problems and more attention to Indian problems is what is wanted, say Nehru's critics. One of the ablest of these is Acharya Kripalani (leader of the Praja Socialist Party), see his article - "For a Principled Neutrality", Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1959, pp. 46-60. The Indian interests most referred to by critics are Kashmir and Goa, and relations with China, Pakistan and Ceylon.

Indian border¹. is the most dramatic of these concerns, but the growing demands of linguistic nationalism - or even separatism, as in the case of the Nagas - and the continuance of bad relations with a now militarily stronger Pakistan, are further reasons for Indian disquiet. These recent trends have provoked Mr. Nehru to strongly re-affirm the essential rightness of Indian neutralism². in face of such difficulties. Yet the paradox of India's position remains. Though territorially large and with a large population, she is neither militarily nor economically strong. She is neither a small state, nor a world power. As the leading neutralist power, the more successful her foreign policy is, the more influential she becomes, the greater are the temptations to take on tasks which divert resources and energies from domestic tasks and from the safeguarding of her frontiers.



1. See Cyril Dunn - "The Double Policy of Mr. Nehru" in the Observer, 13 Sept. 1959. The 'double policy' is one of simultaneously fortifying India's Himalayan frontiers while trying to settle all border disputes with Communist China by negotiation. See also William Kirk - "The Sino-Indian Frontier Dispute" in The Scottish Geographical Magazine, 1960, pp. 3-13.
2. See, for example, speeches reported in The Guardian, 2 Nov. 1959; & The Times, 11 Nov. 1959.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia's neutralist policy originated with her ex-communication from the Cominform in June 1948. It sprang from Tito's determination to resist, and Stalin's determination to impose, a strict ideological and political conformity on Yugoslavia under Soviet leadership.¹ The seeds of the clash, and the most powerful reasons for Tito's successful resistance, lay in the unique Second World War experiences of Yugoslavia² among the eventual east European satellites of the Soviet Union. Altogether three factors were most important: (1) Yugoslavia was the only east European fighting ally of both the Soviet Union and the Allied powers simultaneously; (2) Yugoslavia was not subjected to Soviet occupation and ^{so} the Yugoslav Communist leadership was not beholden to the Red Army for its power; (3) Geographically, ~~she~~ ^{Yugoslavia} is the largest Balkan state and is, except for Albania, at the remotest corner of the Soviet's European satellite system. It is probable that Soviet pressures on Yugoslavia, especially between 1947 and 1949, did much to consolidate

1. For an account of the dispute, see H. F. Armstrong - Tito and Goliath, (London, 1951), esp. chapters 2-11; & Adam B. Ulam - Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge, Mass. 1952)
2. See Hugh Seton-Watson - The East European Revolution (2nd ed., London, 1952) pp. 118-131, 157-161, 219-225; & Vladimir Dedijer - Tito Speaks, (London, 1953), part 2, pp. 95-248.

Tito's regime in power and perhaps to forge a greater sense of Yugoslav national unity than hitherto. This latter point is admittedly conjectural, but Soviet bloc pressure in these years was the first time that a substantial external threat seemed to work against the whole and not a part of the mosaic of nationalities¹ which make up Yugoslavia. Though the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute inevitably took on the appearance of an ideological struggle,² its real substance centred upon Yugoslav insistence upon maintaining the independence of their state and Tito's ~~stance~~^{policies} concerning Communism in the Balkans.³ Yugoslavia's success in resisting Soviet pressures was the first dramatic instance of the ability of a non-aligned state to resist considerable great power pressure in Cold War conditions, while remaining formally uncommitted to the other Cold War camp. Since June 1948 Yugoslavia's neutralist policy has varied with the fluctuations in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, and correspondingly these have reflected fairly closely the major vicissitudes of the Cold War.

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1. For a fascinating pre-war picture of this diversity, see Rebecca West's Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (2 vols. London, 1942). For some more recent discussions of the significance of Yugoslavia's multi-national composition, see J. Frankel - "Federalism in Yugoslavia" in A.P.S.R. 1955, pp. 416-430, & Richard Good-Adams - "Yugoslavia Between Two Worlds" in The Listener, 12 July, 1956, pp.41-2.
 2. The published correspondence at the time of the Yugoslav break with the Cominform is collected and edited in Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (R.I.I.A., London, 1948).
 3. See Vladimir Dedijer - Tito Speaks, op.cit. part 3, pp. 249-384.

The years from 1948 to 1953 were marked by the unrelenting hostility of all Communist states towards Yugoslavia, against whom they imposed a complete boycott and blockade. For more than a year after she left the Cominform Yugoslavia was completely isolated. For as a Communist state she was regarded with suspicion by all the Western powers (and, in particular, she was at loggerheads with Italy over Trieste, and with Greece because of Yugoslav aid to Greek Communists), and having seceded from the Soviet bloc in the name of the sovereign independence of small states, she was under a political necessity not to enter subserviently a rival bloc. Then she began, of necessity, to work for a detente with the Western powers.¹ Tito needed economic aid to counteract the Cominform's blockade and to forward his economic plans, and he needed military aid to deter or, if necessary, to repel Soviet attacks. He got both,² and - of great significance in the history of neutralism - he got them on terms he could accept without endangering his standing in his own country. In effect, the unremitting hostility of the Soviet bloc and such acts (in addition to taking Western aid) as the verbal condemnation of North Korean aggression,³ the conclusion

1. For details, see Survey for 1949-50 (R.I.I.A.) pp. 258-281.

2. For details, see Survey for 1951 (R.I.I.A.), pp. 240-254.

3. This was a difficult decision for the Yugoslav leadership. After more than 2 months' vacillation, she declared in Sept 1950 that North Korea was the aggressor, though she excused herself even a symbolic part in the military action by maintaining that as she was threatened herself her best service to the cause of peace would be to concentrate her forces on the protection of her own frontiers.

of a treaty of friendship and co-operation with two N.A.T.O. powers - Greece and Turkey - in February 1953,¹ and Tito's state visit to Britain in March 1953, all gave a strong impression of a pro-Western orientation. Yet Tito was constantly at pains to stress Yugoslav independence of either Cold War camp, to insist that Western aid was "without strings", to criticise either camp whenever he saw fit, and to develop an ideological intermediacy² distinguishing Yugoslavia from either "capitalism" or "Stalinism" in the name of "true" Marxist-Leninism.

Following the death of Stalin in March 1953, a gradual Soviet/Yugoslav detente began to unfold with gestures of conciliation and, at times, even of contrition being made by Soviet leaders, though these were, at first, regarded with some scepticism or, at least, coolness by President Tito.³ The first half of 1955 saw a definite broadening in Yugoslav policy. Though one aspect of this was the growing rapprochement with the Soviet bloc, this renewed amity was restrained,

1. In fact, this Balkan alliance - the Ankara Pact, as it is sometimes called - fell into abeyance soon after its inauguration as the Cyprus dispute divided Greece & Turkey. After the Cyprus settlement Yugoslavia was too far committed to neutralism to wish to be reminded of her links with military blocs. Its demise was officially announced in June 1960. See The Times, 25 June, 1960.
2. This did not emerge clearly until the 6th Yugoslav Communist Party Congress in Nov. 1952, see R. Barry Farrell - Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1948-1956. An Analysis with Documents (Yale U.P. 1957) esp. pp.125-141 & 146-160.
3. See Ernst Halperin - The Triumphant Heretic. Tito's Struggle Against Stalin (London, 1958) pp. 260-277.

not only by the legacy of past years of enmity, but also because Tito in his journeyings in Asia between 17th December, 1954 and 11th February, 1955, was developing contacts with Asian neutralist states,¹ and giving his hitherto proclaimed policy of independence of the two Cold War blocs a more positive content. Hitherto, Yugoslav neutralism had been mainly rather negative, concerned to show that Yugoslavia was not subservient to either Cold War camp, now it was to be shown that she had friends and influence among other uncommitted states. This was a shrewd (or, at least, fortunate) anticipation of developing trends, for not only did it open the way for future Yugoslav identification and co-operation with the Bandung neutralists; but in so doing it gave her a lead over the Soviets when they, too, began to develop friendly relations with Asian and African neutralists.

The reconciliation between the Soviets and Yugoslavia² was developed first by improving economic relations, and consummated with Khrushchev's public apology in Belgrade in May 1955, when he admitted that the previous policy of the

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1. See Survey (R.I.I.A.) for 1955-6, pp. 54-6. The authors suggest that as a result of this tour Tito's policy "acquired the essential points d'appui which it had hitherto lacked." Though Tito repeatedly opposed the creation of a third bloc, he identified Yugoslavia's policy closely with India's, both of them being "neither 'neutrality' nor 'neutralism' and therefore passivity...but...a positive, active and constructive policy seeking to lead to collective peace." (ibid. p. 55).
 2. Ibid. pp. 133-138 and 268-272.

Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia had been mistaken, and blamed these mistakes on the executed Beria. The official Yugoslav reaction to this visit was to re-affirm her determination to continue to pursue an independent policy internationally, to express satisfaction at improving relations with the Soviet Union, while emphasising that the rapprochement was between the two states not between two Communist parties. Though during the next twelve months Tito came to agree to the restoration of amicable party contacts and to endorse Soviet stands on a number of major international issues¹ - especially Germany - he continued to emphasise his determination to belong to neither Cold War camp. His problem was, in fact, to establish and maintain good relations with all three groups in world politics - the Western powers, the Soviet bloc, and the uncommitted countries, while avoiding the danger (always a real one for governments in intermediate positions) of being thought a nuisance by all three. Improved relations with the Soviet bloc reduced his reliance on the Western powers for help and increased his freedom for manoeuvre. Between 1954 and 1957 Tito sought to discover how far Soviet-Yugoslav co-operation could go, short of Yugoslav subservience to the Soviet Union. Good relations with fellow neutralist states here enhanced Tito's bargaining power inasmuch as the Soviets

1. Ibid. p. 135 fn. 3 & p. 270.

seemed to regard reconciliation with Yugoslavia as an essential part of the Soviet 'new line' of wooing the neutralist states.

May 1955 to June 1956 saw the steady development of this new Soviet-Yugoslav cordiality. Thereafter relations were subject to dramatic fluctuations, probably depending on events inside the Soviet bloc - and particularly on Sino-Soviet relations, as China came to be the most powerfully implacable opponent of 'Titoism'. May 1955 was the time of Khrushchev's journey of reconciliation to Belgrade. In February 1956, at the Soviet 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev spoke of Stalin's "shameful role" in the conflict with Yugoslavia. Shortly afterwards Rajk and other victims of various earlier anti-Titoist trials were rehabilitated. Molotov, a symbol of the Stalinist line towards Yugoslavia, was removed from the post of Soviet Foreign Minister; and the Cominform, instrument of Yugoslavia's earlier expulsion from the Soviet camp, was dissolved. In June 1956 Tito was Khrushchev's honoured guest in Moscow.

Thereafter there was a deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Riots in Poznan, Poland, soon after Tito's visit to Moscow, led to strong Soviet hints that they were opposed to any spread of "Titoist" influences inside the Communist camp. Yugoslav policies between June 1956 and November 1957, when she refused to rejoin the Soviet camp, are shrouded in

ambiguity and their significance has been a subject of considerable controversy among Western scholars,¹ though it seems that Tito was endeavouring to encourage 'de-Stalinisation' without dismembering the Communist camp. Yugoslav moves in this period, some idea of their confusing meanderings, can be conveniently portrayed by means of a short chronological table:-

1956

- June Tito visits Moscow (deliberately avoiding Hungarian territory en route).
Riots in Poland. Gomulka - the Polish Titoist - becomes Poland's Prime Minister.
- July Brioni talks between Nehru, Nasser and Tito.
U.S. aid to Yugoslavia severely cut.
- August New Soviet-Yugoslav trade agreement signed.
- Aug. - Titó supports Nasser in Suez crisis.
Feb. 1957
- 27 Sept. - Tito in Crimea for discussions with Khrushchev,
5 Oct. reportedly to reach agreement concerning Hungary.
- 15-23 Oct. Delegation from Central Committee of Hungarian Workers' Party visited Yugoslavia (this delegation had been immediately preceded by Italian, Polish and Bulgarian delegations, and was followed by a Roumanian one - signs that Belgrade might become a focal point for a new Balkan Communist alliance.)

1. c.f. Fitzroy Maclean - Disputed Barricade. The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito (London, 1957) pp. 457-460; R. Lowenthal - "Tito's Gamble" in Encounter, Oct. 1958, pp.56-65; Bromke & Drachkovitch - "Poland and Yugoslavia: The Abortive Alliance" in Problems of Communism, March-April 1961, pp.26-33; A. Barcan - "Yugoslavia and the Hungarian Revolution" in Australian Outlook, April 1960, pp 30-39.

1956 (contd.)

- 23 Oct. Fighting broke out in Budapest, capital of Hungary.
- 24 Oct. Nagy, a known sympathiser with Tito, took over the Hungarian Premiership. Geroe invited in Soviet troops, though he is himself succeeded as head of Hungarian Communist Party by Kadar the next day.
- 28 Oct. The question of holding a debate on Hungarian, crisis was discussed in U.N. Security Council. The Yugoslav delegate said that it might only aggravate the situation and Yugoslavia would normally have opposed it. As, however, his government was opposed to the use of foreign troops on the territory of other countries, he would abstain from voting.
- 1 Nov. Nagy government renounced the Warsaw Pact, declared Hungary's neutrality and asked for Four Power guarantees and for the question of Hungary to be placed before the United Nations.
- 1-23 Nov. Nagy and seventeen others took refuge in Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. When they left, following guarantees of security by Kadar, they were immediately taken into custody by the Soviet authorities.
- 11 Nov. Tito, in a speech at Pula, justified the second Soviet intervention as necessary to crush counter-revolution, but blamed the first intervention for having prevented acceptable reforms.

1957

February Soviets cancel aid agreement with Yugoslavia.

1957 (contd.)

- April Tito, in a speech from Brioni, plays down significance of Soviet/Yugoslav tensions.
- August Khrushchev and Tito meet for talks in Roumania. The cancelled Soviet/Yugoslav economic aid agreements revived. Tito publicly subscribes to Soviet formula of "proletarian internationalism" as a guide to foreign policy.
- September Gómulka visits Yugoslavia. Tito supports Polish claims to permanent recognition of Oder-Neisse frontier. *de jure* Tito grants diplomatic recognition to eastern Germany - the first neutralist state to do so - thus breaking off diplomatic relations with western Germany.
- November Yugoslav delegates refuse to sign the Moscow declaration of twelve ruling Communist parties, which faced them with the implicit choice of unconditionally joining the Warsaw Pact, or being attacked as 'revisionists' and kept outside the Communist family.

Since November 1957 Yugoslavia's foreign policy has aptly reflected what are perhaps the three most important facts to remember in an appreciation of her international position: that she is a state which is Communist, experiencing rapid economic growth, and is neutralist.

Though she is clearly outside the Communist camp and her relations with members of the camp are subject to considerable fluctuations, this does not preclude extensive Yugoslav agree-

ment with Soviet views on a wide range of current international issues.¹ Rather, this is to be expected from the very fact that she is a Communist state. And though she is politically a pariah from the Communist camp, she continues to trade, though somewhat haphazardly and strictly on a bilateral basis, with a number of Soviet bloc countries.

Secondly, Yugoslavia's economy is developing rapidly,² and the uncertainties of economic relations with the Soviet bloc seem to have persuaded her to turn primarily towards the Western powers,³ if only in economic matters.

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1. For example, Tito's speech, enthusiastically applauded by Khrushchev, at the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly when he dealt at length with Western colonialism, called for the admission of China to the U.N., expressed anxiety about German militarism, criticised U.N. work in the Congo, supported Russian disarmament proposals and questioned the good faith of the West in disarmament negotiations. See The Times, 23 Sept. 1960.
 2. "Industrial production has increased fivefold since 1946 (when admittedly it was very low). The national income, which between 1948 & 1952 was increasing at an annual rate of 1.9%, has for the past 4 years been rising, they claim, by nearly 13% a year. This year they are embarking upon their fourth five-year plan, at the end of which they confidently predict that Yugoslavia will have become a developed country," quoted from The Economist, 7 Jan. 1961, p. 20. For details, see Yugoslav Survey. A Record of Facts and Information (Belgrade), April 1960, et seq. quarterly, passim.
 3. In 1960 Yugoslav requests for permanent observer status on the Communist Council for Mutual Economic Aid were turned down; subsequently she sought to strengthen existing links with O.E.E.C. (reconstituted in 1961 as O.E.C.D.), to become a full member of G.A.T.T., and to undertake currency reform in order to improve trading relations with Western powers. See C.S.M., 9 Jan. 1961; & Economist, 7 Jan. 1961, pp. 19-20.

Finally, as a neutralist state, Yugoslavia has not only avoided diplomatic isolation but has gained considerable prestige and influence by strengthening and increasing friendly relations with a number of fellow neutralist states. This has been done not only by Tito's international tours¹ and by taking part in various neutralist meetings - of which the neutralist summit in Belgrade in September 1961 is *the most* dramatic instance - but also by developing Yugoslav trade and aid with neutralist states in Asia and Africa.² Thus, by the beginning of 1961 Yugoslavia had become one of the leading neutralists of the world, and was acting as a mentor to other neutralist states.

1. Tito made a 10 week tour of Asian and Middle Eastern neutralist countries between Dec. 1958 and March 1959. Speaking of this tour, before his departure Tito stressed that he wanted to see neutralist nations more engaged in influencing events. See The Times, 24 Nov. 1958, & *ibid.* 2 Dec. 1958.
2. "In 1959 and 1960 Yugoslavia granted credits of more than \$125 mn. to African and Asian countries so they could buy capital goods and other products from Yugoslavia... The biggest credit, \$40 mn. went to India... Other credits have gone to Ghana, Sudan, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic." See C.S.M., 20 July, 1961.

Egypt

Egypt's neutralist policy has no obvious starting point comparable with Yugoslavia's break with the Cominform or India's achievement of independence. For an Egyptian it might be dated from the onset of the Cold War, or from the July Revolution of 1952, or from the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of October 1954 regarding the British evacuation of the Suez base, or from the actual departure of the last of the British troops from Suez in 1956 - a few weeks before Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Be this as it may, Egyptian neutralism has always reflected the volatility of Egyptian nationalism and the tensions between specifically Egyptian and pan-Arab interests.

Indeed, it may be thought idle to search for the starting point of Egyptian neutralism, and be maintained instead that Egyptians are neutralists by nature. On this view Egyptian policies merely translate into action such widespread and deep-rooted attitudes as: chronic suspicion of great power policies, the desire for an untrammelled national independence and for recognition and respect in the eyes of the outside world, a willingness to play off great powers against each other, and an urge to promote Arab unity.¹ Certainly, these

1. See Jean & Simonne Lacouture - Egypt in Transition (translated by Francis Scarfe (London, 1958), pp. 221-222; & the Economist, 27 July 1957 - "Neutralism was not invented by President Nasser and the Syrian socialists. It is almost as old as Arab nationalism itself." p. 313.

attitudes are as old as Egyptian nationalism and are all part and parcel of radical Arab nationalism (perhaps all contemporary radical nationalisms) today. By 1961 Egypt's leaders were practising a form of neutralism frankly opportunist and eclectic, propagandist and proselytist, friendly to virulent anti-Western and truculent nationalist movements in the Arab lands and in Africa; a policy which had placed Egypt among the leading neutralist states of the world.

Situated at the junction of Africa and Asia, midway between Morocco and Iraq, with her cultural tradition, relatively large population, and historic sense of identity, Egypt seems to be marked out for leadership in the Arab world. Yet before the July Revolution this seems to have been a role which Egyptian leaders were unwilling or unable to perform.¹ Indeed, right up to 1954 Egyptian leaders were preoccupied with winnowing down and removing all traces of British power and privilege within Egypt, as speedily as possible. Since 1882 Egypt had been occupied by Great Britain following the coincidence of an army revolt in Egypt and a revolt in Sudan against Egyptian rule. Formally neutral in both world wars, Egypt had, in fact, served as an important operational base for Britain in both wars. Declared formally independent by the British in 1922, Egypt had to wait until the Anglo-

1. See Anwar G. Chejne - "Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan-Arabism" in Middle East Affairs, Summer 1957, pp. 253-268.

Egyptian treaty of 1936 before achieving any measure of control in her foreign relations, and even this was circumscribed by the requirement that British should be able to maintain a permanent military base in the Suez Canal zone - though with provision for negotiation on the terms of Britain's occupancy after twenty years.^{1.}

Egypt emerged from the Second World War determined to ✓ revise the 1936 treaty; in particular, to secure the removal of British troops from her soil, and to end British control over the Sudan in the expectation of joining Egypt and the Sudan in the "Unity of the Nile Valley."^{2.} Ironically, it was Great Britain who brought Egypt actively into Arab politics and persuaded her leaders to take a leading role in the Arab League,^{3.} founded in 1945. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 gave the Arab League a common enemy, and added an immediate and lasting sore to Egyptian and, indeed, to Arab hatred and distrust of great power policies. The humiliation suffered by the Arab, and especially the Egyptian, armies in the Palestine war against Israel was a potent factor

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1. For details, see The Middle East, op.cit. pp. 183-190; & Lenczowski, op.cit. pp. 393-406. [Eventual Sudanese independence in 1956 was a rebuff to Egyptian hopes of an Egyptian/Sudanese union.]
 2. For details, see Lenczowski, op.cit. pp. 406-414.
 3. See J. S. Raleigh -. "Ten Years of the Arab League" in Middle East Affairs, March 1955, pp. 65-77.

making for the creation of the Arab Collective Security Pact of 1950,¹ and in paving the way for the eventual overthrow of Egyptian monarchy in 1952.²

While it is true that prior to the overthrow of the monarchy in July 1952 Egyptian leaders failed to secure the eviction of British troops from Suez and the new settlement of Sudan's status,³ they nevertheless had endeavoured to demonstrate Egypt's neutralism in the Cold War and dissatisfaction with the continuance of formal ties with Britain by such acts as: concluding trade agreements with the Soviet Union in February 1948 and July 1951,⁴ by refusing to contribute forces to the United Nations contingent in Korea

1. See Keith Wheelock - Nasser's New Egypt (London, 1960), p. 207. It is this pact which Nasser later referred to as "the best possible system to defend our part of the world against any possible aggression." See below appendix 5^{p299}
2. Detailed accounts of the background and course of 'the revolution' have been written by two of the main participants - see Anwar el Sadat - Revolt on the Nile, translated by Thomas Graham (London, 1957); & Mohammed Neguib - Egypt's Destiny (London, 1955). Gamal Nassor's tract - The Philosophy of the Revolution, written about 1953, (Economica books, Buffalo, 1959) has only cursory references to the revolution and is, as Neguib suggests (Egypt's Destiny, *ibid.* p. 215) better regarded as giving the psychology of the revolutionaries.
3. Though the Sidki-Bevin agreement of 1946 proposed terms concerning the Suez Canal Zone quite acceptable to the Egyptians, they eventually refused to ratify the agreement on account of the Sudanese question. See Lenczowski, *op.cit.* pp. 410-12.
4. See Lenczowski, *op.cit.* p. 416.

as a protest against British "occupation";¹ and by unilaterally repudiating both the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan of 1899, just two days after the receipt of a proposal that Egypt should join with other Middle Eastern states and with Western powers in a Middle East Defence Organisation, in October 1951.²

In its first two years of power the new revolutionary ^{liberals} regime, and Nasser in particular, not only consolidated ^{its} power, and inaugurated internal reforms,³ but it secured an agreement with Britain concerning the future of the Sudan and another one laying down conditions for the evacuation of the Suez Canal base.⁴ There was hard bargaining, domestic opposition, and some give and take on both sides. Though at one stage an Egyptian spokesman "hinted strongly..." that Egypt would align herself with the neutralist bloc of Asian nations⁵ in an effort to end Britain's 'imperialist' occupation of the Suez Canal Zone,⁶ on the whole, Egypt

1. Ibid. p. 418. India, Yugoslavia & Egypt were all sitting as non-permanent members of the Security Council when the Korean War began. See Eric F. Goldman - The Crucial Decade And After, 1945-1960 (New York, 1961), pp. 150-161.
2. See Campbell, op.cit. pp. 39-46.
3. For details, see Wheelock, op.cit. chapters 4 - 7, pp. 209-218.
4. See Wheelock, ibid. pp. 209-218.
5. Official representatives of 12 Afro-Asian countries convening in Cairo on 23 Dec. 1952 held the first meeting of its kind outside the U.N.
6. Quoted in Wheelock, ibid above, p. 215.

seemed to be assuming a markedly pro-Western orientation, if only in expectation of substantial economic and military aid from the West,¹ and Egyptian-Israeli relations were probably less tense than at any previous time since 1948.²

The time between the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian agreements on Suez in October 1954, and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956, was seminal in the shaping of Nasser's neutralist policy, and it was during this period that its general character began to unfold.

Until 1954 Nasser had been content to speak for Egypt, henceforward he assumed the role of chief spokesman and champion of the 'Arab People'.³ The Israeli commando attack on Egyptian territory in Gaza at the end of February 1955 brought about a swift deterioration in Egyptian-Israeli relations⁴ and heightened Egypt's quest for arms and

1. Such expectations did not preclude the expression of such sentiments as "The so-called 'free world', particularly the United States, proclaim they are helping to attain self-determination and are helping underdeveloped countries to advance. We consider such talk as opium administered by the 'free world' to enslaved peoples so that they may remain under its domination and not seek liberation." - Nasser, 27 Nov. 1953, quoted in Wheelock, op.cit. p. 215.
2. See J. & S. Lacouture - Egypt in Transition, op.cit. pp. 203-9.
3. Nasser's working assumption from 1954 onwards seems to be that all Arabs, all 'true' nationalists in Afro-Asia, are naturally neutralists. If African or Asian states are not neutralist this is due, on this view, to the perversities of governments, not the desires of their subjects. Since 1954 Egypt has become a home in exile for discontented Arab nationalists & for many other dissident nationalists. "The dependent peoples, in particular, come (to Cairo) to voice their grievances. Cairo is the capital of malcontents and sans-culottes" quoted from J. & S. Lacouture, *ibid.* p. 412, see also pp. 216-18, 512.
4. See *ibid.* above. p. 211.

diplomatic support. In the following September Nasser announced the purchase of a substantial amount of arms from Czechoslovakia, forced on Egypt, he said, because "the West refuses us the means of defending our existence."¹ Simultaneous bargaining with both Cold War camps was becoming one of Nasser's favourite tactics, and perhaps his most novel and influential contribution to neutralist diplomacy. Certainly, Nasser was the first significant neutralist to pursue a policy of active dalliance² with both camps, taking the initiative himself, in attempts to elicit aid. "We have invented positive neutralism,"³ claimed Mohammed Husanain Haykal, one of Nasser's chief spokesmen, the day after the Soviets offered to build Egypt an atomic power station and immediately following the West's first offer to finance the Aswan High Dam.⁴ Tito may have led the way in showing that aid could be obtained without sacrificing one's independence, but Nasser

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1. In October 1954 an Egyptian government spokesman had admitted that Nasser had renounced American military aid — because "the conditions imposed" were "incompatible with respect for our national sovereignty." *ibid.* p. 215.
 2. This is the application in Cold War terms of what the Lacoutures describe as Nasser's principal diplomatic tactic: leverage. "Means: a lever. Objective: to smash one by one the shackles on Egyptian independence. He made excellent use of the American lever against the British... Against the Americans he used the Soviet lever." *ibid.* p. 224
 3. *Ibid.* p. 244.
 4. For the significance of the Aswan Dam in Nasser's schemes, see *ibid.* pp. 388 et seq., also Keith Wheelock — Nasser's New Egypt, *op.cit.* chapter 8.

was the first neutralist to actively exploit the opportunities latent in the situation created by the new Soviet line¹ - of offering aid and diplomatic support to certain neutralist nations - by pitting Soviet and American offers against each other. Whereas Tito had accepted offers of aid, though after close scrutiny, Nasser was soliciting for rival tenders.

One other significant aspect of Egypt's neutralist policy took shape during 1955. This was Egypt's undoubted emergence not only among the ranks of the neutralist states, but among the leaders. The year began with Nasser calling on Tito in Yugoslavia and ended with Tito repaying the visit in Cairo. In between times, Nasser attended the Bandung Conference,² where he was accorded a leading role, secured Chinese support for the Arabs' case against Israel, and had several long consultations with Nehru. Apart from both being Afro-Asian neutralists, Nehru and Nasser were at this time facing a

1. See above pp. 47-57.
2. On his return from Bandung, Nasser said, during a speech to a Cairo crowd: "I went to Bandung to announce that Egypt has been liberated, and that it speaks for the cause of self-determination and freedom of the nations, the suppression of imperialism, and the independence of all states." reported in New York Times, 3 May 1955. Many commentators date Nasser's popularity in Egypt & throughout the Arab world from the time of his return from Bandung. For the significance of Bandung for Nasser, see Georgina Stevens - "Arab Neutralism and Bandung" in Middle East Journal, spring 1957, pp. 139-152; Keith Wheelock, op.cit. pp. 225; & "Nasser Imports Bandoengism" in The Economist, 24 March, 1956, p. 649.

common problem: both were opposed to the newly created Baghdad Pact. Whatever the intensity of their opposition to 'Cold War moves' near to their own frontiers, this was undoubtedly heightened for Nehru by the fact that Pakistan was associated with the scheme, and for Nasser because of Iraq's membership of the Pact. Egyptian opposition was a contributory factor in limiting the membership¹ and future operations of the Pact - just as, similarly, Indian opposition helped to limit the membership and restrict the operations of S.E.A.T.O.; but whereas Nehru attempted no military-diplomatic countermove, Nasser's opposition led to the conclusion of two military agreements, with Syria and with Saudi Arabia, both during October 1958, each of which placed the signatories' armed forces under a joint command headed by Egyptian generals.²

As well as these military measures, Nasser continued to try to strengthen his diplomatic friendships with fellow neutralists, especially with India and with Yugoslavia. Indeed, Nasser, accompanied by Nehru, had just left Yugoslavia where he had been in conclave with Tito and Nehru, when Dulles abruptly announced the withdrawal of the American offer to provide aid in the building of the Aswan High Dam. It

1. This applies mostly to Jordan. See Economist, 20 April 1957, pp. 200-2; also Sir John Glubb - A Soldier with the Arabs (London, 1957) pp. 378, 422, 425-6; & The Middle East, op.cit. p. 31, for contrasting views.
2. See Lenczowski, op.cit. p. 429; & Economist, 24 March 1956, p. 649.

was one of the ironies of this withdrawal that Dulles' success in wresting aid for Yugoslavia from an unwilling Congress had reduced the chances of giving financial assistance to Egypt.¹ Already the same week had brought Nasser two diplomatic setbacks: for the Soviet Union had concluded a sizeable oil deal with Israel which dealt a severe blow to the Arab economic boycott, and Tito and Nehru did not subscribe fully to Nasser's views on Algeria, Israel and east Africa.² It seemed that Nasser's prestige and projects were irretrievably deflated.

The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, the Suez War,³ and their aftermath, restored Nasser's prestige and showed the wide sympathy and diplomatic support that a neutralist state could secure in repelling what is widely believed, or said, to be 'imperialist' pressures. The Soviet Union quickly showed that any neutralist state at loggerheads with Western powers can count on Soviet support, and there began a period of close Egyptian/Soviet accord. By contrast, equivocal American attempts, under the shadow of impending Presidential elections, to reconcile the antagonists only estranged her from both sides. Subsequently, Egypt abstained

1. See Wheelock, op.cit. pp. 195-6; & J. & S. Lacouture, op.cit. p. 419.
- 2: See Wheelock, ibid. pp. 195, 237, 253.
3. For details, see Wheelock, ibid. passim; & Guy Wint & Peter Calvocressi - Middle East Crisis (Penguin books, 1957).

on all ten U.N. General Assembly resolutions criticising Soviet aggression on Hungary.^{1.}

Widespread, if somewhat ephemeral, sympathy throughout Asia and Africa for the Egyptian cause during the Suez crisis seemed to encourage Egypt to revive and revitalise ideas of Afro-Asian solidarity, which had languished somewhat since the Bandung Conference. By the end of 1957 Cairo had become the headquarters of the permanent non-governmental Afro-Asian movement,^{2.} and Egypt and the Sino-Soviet bloc seemed to be working in close harness.^{3.}

The identification of Egypt and the Communist powers in the so-called 'Afro-Asian People's Movement' - though uneasy and necessarily temporary - was not unnatural. For continental imperialism^{4.} of the types represented by international Communism and Nasser's brand of pan-Arab nationalism can work together^{5.} so long as there is rough agreement about a common

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1. Later Nasser explained that these abstentions were "because the Soviet Union was the only country in the Security Council that supported us in our dispute over Suez. We abstained out of gratitude." See interview reported in Daily Express, 11 June 1957.
 2. See P. H. Lyon - "The Pan-Continental Movements of Asia and Africa, 1947-58" in Australian Outlook, June 1959, pp. 100-111.
 3. See Wheelock, op.cit. pp. 254-5, 266-70; & W. Z. Laqueur-- The Soviet Union and the Middle East (London, 1959) pp. 307-311.
 4. See Hannah Arendt - The Burden of Our Time (London, 1951) chapter 8 - "Continental imperialism: the Pan-Movements."
 5. This is the main theme of the study by W. Z. Laqueur - The Soviet Union and the Middle East (London, 1959). See esp. pp. 316-347.

enemy - in this case 'imperialism' - and before there is any serious argument as to who should be master and arrange the division of spoils. Communists and Nasserite nationalists each believe that 'the people' are on their side, even if governments are not; that political boundaries are 'inherently temporary and must, in any case, be re-drawn. Both are self-consciously proletarian movements;¹ and Moscow radio is roughly paralleled by Cairo radio, Communist magazines by Arab nationalist magazines; Communist party zealots by Egypt's expatriate teachers.² The analogy must not be pushed too far but there are sufficient affinities to explain why a temporary coincidence of Soviet and Egyptian aims need not be seen as wholly fortuitous.

This apparent Egyptian/Soviet accord lasted until the inauguration of the United Arab Republic in February 1958. Indeed, Egypt, as well as Syria, seemed to be becoming increasingly dependent economically on the Soviet bloc during these years, as the Western powers generally boycotted Egypt and Syria. There are indications that Nasser was disturbed

1. Though Communists by doctrine & pan-Arab nationalists more by feeling. "The national movements in Africa and Asia, and those in the Middle East most of all, remind one more and more of proletarian associations. They have the same harshness and energy caused by long years of waiting and a lasting sense of frustration. The Arabs as a whole are people who all complain in the same language of the same humiliation, the same hunger." J. & S. Lacouture, op.cit. p. 515.
2. See The Times, 8 & 9 Oct. 1958 - "African War of Words"; & The Economist, 27 April 1957, pp.289-90 - "Egypt's Empire-Builders", which shows that Egypt's prime instruments of propaganda are Cairo radio, illustrated weekly magazines & the export of teachers.

by this growing dependence on the Soviets,¹ but such gestures as his October 1957 decree ordering all branches of the government and the press to present Egypt as a strictly neutralist country, and his reported willingness to substitute the term "positive neutrality", with its unfavourable connotations in the West, for the more euphemistic term "non-alignment", were not sufficient to bring about an appreciable detente with the West.² Egyptian tirades against Western interests and pro-Western elements throughout the Middle East and Africa continued unabated throughout 1957.

In fact, Nasser restored a great deal of his freedom of manoeuvre between East and West, following the union of Egypt and Syria in February 1958. Though the initiative came from Syria, within a year the overwhelming dominance of Egyptian leadership in this new United Arab Republic was patent, though the Union was showing signs of strain.³ Furthermore, relations with the Soviet Union now became considerably cooler, no doubt because Soviet influence in Syria had been nullified, and Nasser was achieving a detente with the United

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1. See Laqueur, *ibid.* chapter 5 - "Soviet Trade & Economic Aid: 1954-1958".
 2. See Wheelock, *ibid.* p. 256; & Daily Telegraph, 10 Oct. 1957.
 3. See Wheelock, *ibid.* pp. 271-4 & 282-3; also The Spectator, 27 Nov. 1959, p. 757. 6) The union of the U.A.R. with the Yemen, proclaimed as the United Arab States in March 1958, remained merely a paper union. Egyptian support for Yemen's irredentist claims on Aden was obtainable without union.

States.¹ Certainly, from mid-1958 onwards Nasser made clear his preference for political connections with neutralist² rather than Communist states, and he began to pursue an active line in the Pan-African movement to the exclusion of the Soviet Union.

Throughout 1959-60 it was clear that the Soviet Union was as unwilling to see Nasser as the uncontested leader of the Arab world as were Great Britain, France and the United States between 1954 and 1956.³ Following the revolution in Iraq of July 1958, Soviet interest in the United Arab Republic appeared to lessen, probably because the former seemed to be a more profitable area. Even so, Soviet moves had to be

1. See Wheelock, *ibid.* pp. 261-2 & 275-6; & The Observer, 18 May 1958. On 16 May 1958 Nasser said in a speech in Cairo: "I feel that this policy, for the maintenance of which we have struggled, this independent policy of positive neutralism and non-alignment, has finally triumphed, having been recognised by the two strongest powers in the whole world, the Soviet Union and the United States." See Wheelock, p. 262.

2. In May 1958 Nasser paid a visit to Moscow where he was careful to present himself as a neutralist and to stress his friendship for Tito, despite an intensification of Soviet bloc tirades against Yugoslavia during his stay. It is reported that before leaving for Moscow Nasser called for the complete file of Nehru's speeches during the latter's recent Russian tour. See The Observer, 18 May, 1958. By early 1961 Nasser was acting with the radical revisionist African states of the so-called Casablanca grouping and was sponsoring the projected neutralist summit to be held in Belgrade.

3. See Geoffrey Wheeler.- "Russia and the Arab World" in The World Today, July 1961, pp. 307-18. Like Nehru, Nasser has consistently, but more ruthlessly, taken a strong line against Communists at home. Many neutralists seem to agree with Nasser in attributing the strength of 'domestic' Communism to the continuance of 'imperialism' & the non-fulfilment of nationalist demands. See below appendix 5.

circumspect and her preferences not too favourable to one, in view of continuing Egyptian/Iraqi rivalry.¹ Since 1958 Soviet/Egyptian ties have loosened, their different interests have become more obvious, but Soviet aid has continued.

'Positive neutrality' as practised by Nasser since 1955 seems to be a policy which, despite its name, has been sustained by two powerful negative themes - anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism - and by radical Arab nationalism. It demands the right to be left alone but does not leave other states alone. It seeks to proselytise, yet it lacks a distinctive creed of its own.² It embodies a radical, resentful, linguistic nationalism, operating across state boundaries believed to be artificial and temporary; yet it appears to lack any precise plans for what has to succeed what is to be overthrown - perhaps because 'anti-imperialism' masks a 'neo-imperialism'. By great tactical skill and flexibility it has raised Egypt's diplomatic standing; it has not produced any substantial measure of pan-Arab unity. Though it has

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- 1. See P. Seale - "The United Arab Republic and the Iraqi Challenge" in The World Today, July 1960, pp. 296-305.
 - 2. Nasser: "... as far as ideologies go we still have no final position. We are still at the formative stage. We haven't really made our choice between liberalism and controls in matters of economics and politics. Our decisions will be taken according to specific problems and needs." - quoted in J. & S. Lacouture, *op.cit.* p. 465. For similar statements, see Wheelock, *op.cit.* pp. 216, 227, 236, 263.

initiated a number of long overdue domestic reforms,¹ it has not so far brought about any appreciable increase in the standard of living of Egyptians.

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Commenting on the July 1956 Brioni talks between Tito, Nehru and Nasser, a journalist wrote: "Their juxtaposition is a product of the Cold War, which all three condemn; an accurate image may be that of the three men on an ice-floe, congratulating each other on the speed with which the warmth of their bodies is thawing it and yet not fully aware that they owe both their eminence and their close association to the ice-floes continued existence."²

This suggestive but rather condescending image has some truth in it. But the roles of these three men must not be seen only in terms of similar personal inclinations or without an appreciation of which of the currently popular aspects of neutralism they have each pioneered. For their policies stem not only from the contrasting personalities of their formulators, but also from the basic forces which impelled them to be neutralist.

1. Consideration of Nasser's domestic policies is outside the scope of this short study but it is probable that in the eyes of the great majority of Egyptians his regime is preferable to that of his predecessors. Nasser's domestic policies are analysed in some detail in both Wheelock's and the Lacoutures' studies.
2. In The Economist, 14 July 1956, p. 111, editorial entitled "Three men on the ice-floe."

Nehru began to shape India's neutralist policies at a time when the Cold War seemed to be essentially a European affair, though an admitted non-alignment anywhere was soon regarded with suspicion and hostility by the Cold War protagonists. Nehru provided neutralist policies with respectable arguments and, a little later, popularised the idea that neutralist states were eminently suited to act as moderators and conciliators. He invested neutralism with an air of moral grandeur, and of aloofness from Cold War squabbles. Studied moderation in language and action is Nehru's especial contribution to neutralism. India is the first and foremost of the new state neutralists, and Nehru stands for a peaceful, moderate neutralism. *(I'm not sure if well as the original)*

Tito was forced to adopt a neutralist course for Yugoslavia originally because of Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet bloc. She became a neutralist state because it seemed the only way her leadership could retain their independent sway to shape Yugoslav Communism themselves. Her initial survival as a neutralist state was due to her willingness to shoulder a very heavy defence burden, to strongly resist Soviet bloc pressures, and to the tacit support of the Western powers. Yugoslavia showed that it was possible for a small state to resist great power pressures without becoming a formal member of a Cold War camp. Though something of a pariah in Europe, Yugoslavia, by virtue of skilful

identification of her interests with such different states as Egypt, India, Burma, Ghana, Indonesia and Israel, has subsequently become an honorary Afro-Asian state, thus avoiding diplomatic isolation. And as well as her unique position as the sole defector from the Soviet camp, willing to educate fellow neutralists about Marxism and the Communist world, she is a striking example of a state which has successfully gained considerable aid from both Cold War camps and has herself shown remarkable economic development. Her achievements to date thus chime with the aspirations of many newer neutralist states. Tito stands for a progressive, independent, Marxist neutralism.

Nasser pioneered two currently popular aspects of neutralist policies. Firstly, he successfully negotiated the evacuation of the large British military base in Suez, and in thus ridding the 'national soil' of a foreign base achieved what many neutralists have since done or aspire to do. Secondly, he was the first neutralist leader to actively and blatantly exploit Cold War rivalries, taking advantage of the new situation created when the Communist powers began to develop foreign trade and aid programmes to neutralist states. Another facet of Nasser's neutralism is of especial interest. By deliberately casting himself in the role of pupil of Nehru and of Tito, he was thereby able to imply that there was no need for him to produce his own distinctive doctrine or justification for his policies, his neutralism was like that

of his associates - even if his methods were more 'positive'. Nasser was thus the first of the frankly opportunist, unconcernedly undoctinaire neutralists - many African neutralist leaders of the post-1957 period are like this now, their strength and weaknesses, like those of Nasser, depending very much on the nationalist movement they lead. Nasser has become a leading champion of radical, resentful, revisionist nationalism - the kind of nationalism distinguished by the over-estimation of one's own nation and the denigration of others, and by the tendency to attribute anything wrong with one's nation to the evil-doing of others. Nasser stands for a belligerently nationalist neutralism.

There are some striking contrasts in the policies which these three men practise. Tito's domestic Communism contrasts with Nehru's and Nasser's proscription of their domestic Communists. Nehru's consistent appeasement - though in the technical, not in the pejorative sense - of China contrasts with Nasser's continual state of war with Israel. To avert war anywhere, and especially with China or Pakistan, has been a constant principle of Nehru's policy; permanent war with Israel has been Nasser's constant theme. Tito and Nasser are fundamentally anti-Western in their sympathies and suspicions, and far, far more so than Nehru. Tito and Nasser are radical revisionists - though Nasser more so, in fact, than Tito - while Nehru is a meliorist. This list of

contrasts could be extended, but we must come back to the fact of their association. *Whether* fortuitous or deliberated in its origins, it has now acquired a certain logic of its own. For while there have been several reports, and at different times,¹ of rifts and strains in the relations between these three men, their consultations are likely to continue, if only because each is now widely recognised as a prominent leader in the neutralist world, and because they all feel they are fellow-travelling neutralists and not fellow-travellers for either Moscow or Washington.

1. See, e.g. Keith Wheelock, op. cit. pp. 237 & 253; The Guardian, 14 July, 1956 & 30 March, 1960; & The Observer, 24 May, 1959.

Switzerland and Sweden - the traditional neutrals

Switzerland and Sweden are neutralist states, in the sense that they are not members of any Cold War alliance, because such a policy is consistent with their national traditions of non-involvement in peacetime and of neutrality in time of war. They can conveniently be considered together because in important respects they resemble each other and no other states.

Both states take pride in a great military past.¹ Both have now avoided active involvement in war for more than 140 years, while both have restrained, adapted and canalised their traditional skills into national policies of an alert, armed, but purely defensive, neutrality. Neither of them have colonial possessions, nor do they lay claim to any irredenta. Spiritual neutrality has never been demanded of their citizens or of their press.

Yet it would be wrong to assume that it is merely a long series of lucky accidents² that has brought about their present prosperity and

1. Both states illustrate Toynbee's principle of the transmigration of the martial spirit. See - A Study of History (London) vol. 9, pp. 493-4. Switzerland (strictly 'the Old Confederation') was at the height of its power between 1315-1515. See C. W. C. Oman - The Art of War in the Middle Ages. Revised and edited by John H. Becker (New York, 1953) pp. 93-116, and 160-172. Sweden's Great Power period was from 1611 to 1709. See Ingvar Andersson - A History of Sweden (New York, 1956).
2. Though this is a common contention, especially among the nationals of these countries; and it is interesting to note that a best selling Swedish novel of 1952 - "Paradise for Us" - argued that Sweden's successful neutrality in the Second World War was entirely a matter of luck. Later it was discovered that the pseudonymous author was Gunnar Hagglof - one of the most brilliant younger Swedish diplomats. See also below p. 220 f. 2.

much envied neutrality. For Swedish, but more especially Swiss, national history is not only a quiet record of commercial progress but is full of narrow escapes from invasion, or at least involvement in war, and there is plenty of evidence that their statesmen have invariably appreciated that national survival depends on defensive strength and a constantly varying approximation of the desirable to the practicable. But a policy which survives through the years, which generations of statesmen practise and modify, gradually begins to take on the aspect of a dogma and to become independent of the purposes for which it was first devised. To a great extent this is now true of both Swiss and Swedish neutrality policies. Public explanations and justifications of present policies have to be placed within the cherished tradition; and so a study of Swiss and Swedish neutrality in the Cold War must first try to make clear the reasons for, and remember the continuing and powerful influence of, these distinct traditions.

....1....

The notion of Swiss neutrality is older than the notion of a Swiss nation. For a country - one of the smallest in Europe - which contains three official languages and two religions, and whose unity is achieved only by due respect for all these different elements,¹ neutrality was as much a necessary condition of internal stability as of external security. Swiss concepts of nationality are primarily territorial and to maintain

1. The total population at the 1950 census was 4,714,922, made up of German speaking 72.1%; French speaking 20.3%; Italian speaking 5.9%. See Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse 1959 (Bâle 1960). Racial, religious, linguistic and territorial boundaries do not correspond. This is very important, because where people are dis-united by ethnic background they are often brought together by common religion - see C. J. Hughes - The Federal Constitution of Switzerland (Oxford 1954) pp. 88-89 and 128.

unity between Catholic and Protestant, between Germanic, French and Italian speaking citizens, it has been vital to avoid dividing the national territory either by civil strife or by foreign invasion. Swiss history shows that this has been far from easy. Religion in the 17th century, when the policy of neutrality was first developed in the Confederation,¹ was as disruptive as political ideology today. The Swiss could only retain their identity and their freedom in diversity by a policy which accommodated theological differences within the Confederation² but forbade an active bias towards one's co-religionists abroad. - Externally, much depended on the ability of her larger neighbours to balance, and so nullify, each other's designs on Swiss territory. Further deterrents were the mountainous topography, the absence of natural resources to capture and the military reputation of Swiss soldiers.

The defeat at Marignano in 1515 terminated Swiss pre-eminence in the Italian wars. Thereafter the Confederation sank into the modest role of a buffer between France, Austria, and the Spanish power in Italy; and developed a policy of neutrality which was proclaimed as a principle in 1674 at the beginning of the General Wars of 1672 - 1713, but as a policy developed only slowly and organically from the old Swiss policy of confederacy. The hope of the confederacy to keep its entire territory out of war by following a restrained foreign policy was

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1. William Martin - Histoire de la Suisse (Lausanne, 1943); Edgar Bonjour - Swiss Neutrality, translated by Mary Hottingen (London, 1946), and W. E. Rappard - Collective Security in Swiss Experience (London, 1948).
 2. The religious settlement of the Old Confederation followed the principle *cujus regio, ejus religio* of the Peace of Augsburg, 1555. The religious boundaries therefore coincided with the political boundaries, and the religious map of the present day is a patchwork which reproduces the sovereignty-structure of the Old Confederation. See C. J. Hughes *op.cit.* pp. 61-64.

realizable only if its neutrality was armed. Fearing that the adoption of international guarantees might be detrimental to its neutrality and lead to foreign entanglements, the confederacy continually refused to adopt such binding obligations. Even so, in these early years the Confederation's success as a neutral buffer probably owed much to the implicit support of France,¹ though this point is not stressed by Swiss historians. From 1713 to 1789 the policy of Swiss neutrality was exposed to the reactions created by changes in the European equilibrium, and in the midst of these changes it required all the experienced diplomatic art of the old sovereigns to preserve the territorial integrity of the confederacy. Eventually, France became the first despoiler, after being the initial protector of Swiss neutrality. For it was during the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars that the most substantial violations of Swiss neutrality occurred: first, when, following the collapse of 1798,² the whole of the country was for a time engulfed in the Napoleonic Empire; and, second, when her neutrality was disregarded by the Coalition Powers in 1814. At the end of these wars the independence and territorial integrity of Switzerland was guaranteed by the Great Powers in the "declaration of Vienna" in 1815, and for the first time the permanent neutrality of a small state became part of the law of nations.³

1. Buffer status usually carries with it the implication that the region is in some sense a protectorate. See further, above p. 130-138, esp. p. 131.
2. W. E. Rappard op.cit. pp. 74-9.
3. C. K. Webster - Congress of Vienna (London, 1945) p. 134. Technically, this process amounted to neutralization. For which see below p. et seq. In Switzerland today neutrality is part of the material, though not part of the formal, constitution and the "Assembly declares neutrality rather as other nations declare war" C. J. Hughes, op.cit. p. 44, see also 169-71. [By contrast, in Sweden neutrality is not deeply imbedded in constitutional practices.] What was implied by this neutralization was important: for it suggested that Switzerland had ceased to be a keypoint in the European order; and this moderates the point illustrated in the following footnote.

Whether or not the confederacy would possess sufficient strength to transfer into political actuality these proclaimed principles and whether the Great Powers would observe their solemn assurances remained to be seen. In fact, though the confederacy was subjected to certain restrictions by the Holy Alliance and was subsequently endangered on several occasions, Swiss neutrality survived¹ unimpaired throughout the 19th century and the First World War.² At the end of the war the Swiss cantons and people, by a narrow majority,³ voted in favour of Switzerland's entry into the League of Nations; Geneva became the seat of the new international organization,⁴ but Switzerland's special status as a permanently neutral state was recognized by a League Council resolution of 13th February 1920⁵ which exempted her from the military obligations contained in the League Covenant.

1. Somewhat precariously in 1647, when the seven R.C. cantons unsuccessfully tried to secede from the Confederation, see Jean Halperin "The Transformation of Switzerland," in - The Opening of an Era: 1848, ed. by Francois Fejto (London 1948) pp. 50-66; and determinedly in the 1830s and 1856, 1859, 1860, 1866 and 1870, when the threat was rather from outside. See W. E. Rappard, *op.cit.* p. 143 et seq.
2. Luigi Albertini - The Origins of the War, translated by Isabella M. Massey (O.U.P. 3 vols. 1952-7). In vol. 3 Albertini discusses: the neutrality of Switzerland, p. 685; Swiss pro-German sentiment, p. 685; the 'Two Colonels' espionage scandal, p. 689.
3. See Andre Siegfried - Switzerland (London, 1950) pp. 181-2; see also C. J. Hughes, *op.cit.* p. 94 and George Soloveytschik - Switzerland in Perspective (London, 1954) pp. 230-236.
4. Article 7 of the League Covenant.
5. See A. J. Toynbee - The World After the Peace Conference (R.I.I.A. 1925) pp. 37-8; and David Hunter Miller - The Drafting of the Covenant, 2 vols. (New York, 1928) pp. 437-8. See also Article 21 of the League Covenant and Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles.

....2....

Sweden, the third largest state in Europe territorially,^{1.} with a nationally homogeneous population, and situated on the fringes of the traditional European battlefields, achieved her position as a 'traditional' neutral^{2.} without suffering the process of neutralization, and so evolved a tradition of neutrality more voluntarily and more gradually than Switzerland.

Enjoying its Great Power period nearly a century after the waning of Switzerland's period of eminence, Sweden played a great part in the wars of Europe in the 17th and early 18th centuries. With the death of Charles XII in 1718, Swedish power was past its zenith, the resources of the nation had been over-taxed, and the last quarter of the 18th century was full of domestic unrest.^{3.} Despite these acute internal

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1. Excluding European Russia. The two largest are France and Spain. The population of Sweden is approximately 7 million.
 3. Ingvar Andersson - A History of Sweden (New York, 1956).
 2. The Swedes have never shown a marked liking for the terms 'neutral' or 'neutrality' to be applied to their own country's policy. Today they prefer the term "non-alliance", while during the 19th century "the word neutrality tended in the popular vocabulary to become synonymous with a peace policy, or a peace loving policy. In reality, however, neutrality had never during those 100 years been a consistent password for Swedish foreign policy" - quoted from Sweden and the United Nations (Swedish Institute of International Affairs) (New York, 1956) p. 20.
 - The Swiss seem largely indifferent to the actual label given to their foreign policy, as long as the uniqueness of the Swiss position is duly recognized.

troubles, and her membership of the anti-British Armed Neutrality League between 1778 and 1780, Sweden joined Pitt's Third Coalition against France in 1805; and, until 1814, she was an active participant in the struggle against Napoleon. The Congress of Vienna recognised and confirmed the fortunes of war with respect to Scandinavia. Russia received Finland, which for 550 years had been united with Sweden. While, by way of compensation, Sweden obtained Norway - though Castlereagh had to put pressure on Norway before she gave way.^{1.} Neutrality as a national tradition only evolved after 1815, and then not because of any strong sense of the need for retirement from international politics, but because realistic appraisals of national strength always moderated any initial impulse to adopt an adventurous foreign policy. Between 1815 and 1914 Sweden was not in fact involved in war, though on several occasions her participation seemed imminent^{2.} - attracted each time by Scandinavian interests. Despite intense hostility to Russia and strong tendencies toward alliance with Germany by her governing and military classes, Sweden declared her neutrality on 4 August 1914.^{3.} Henceforward she consistently espoused a neutral policy and was instrumental in the
 ○ unsuccessful attempt to secure respect for neutral rights^{4.} by co-operative neutral endeavour. At the end of the war, Sweden was one of the thirteen neutral states which became original members of the League.^{5.}

1. G. K. Webster - The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh (London, 1950), vol. 1, pp. 306-9.
2. Herbert Tingsten - "Issues in Swedish Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs April 1959, refers to Swedish activist movements in 1854-6; 1864; 1905; 1914; 1921; 1939. There was also an activist movement in 1848 in favour of intervention in Denmark. See F. Tegner - "The Events of 1848 in Scandinavia", in Francois Fejto, op. cit. pp. 167-179.
3. Albertini, op. cit. vol. 3, pp. 662; 669-72.
4. Orvik, op. cit. ~~xxxxx~~ pp. 89-108.
5. Resolutions to join the League passed by 86 votes to 47 in the Upper Chamber and 152 votes to 67 in the Lower. See Sweden and the United Nations (New York, 1956) pp. 17-19.

....3....

Far from happy with her new commitments, despite her special status as a League member, Switzerland's League policy was highly individual and somewhat temporizing.¹ Obligated to impose economic sanctions if necessary, the Swiss did not insist that this was consistent with the traditional policy nor were they preoccupied with the principle of neutrality qua principle. Their predominant concern was to ensure that the Swiss version of neutrality was recognised and respected.² Nevertheless, so long as the League of Nations looked like working, the Swiss were prepared to 'differentiate' their neutrality. But when Germany and Italy left the League and soon laid bare the weaknesses of the League system, the Swiss Government became convinced that their only hope of escaping involvement in a general war was for Switzerland to revert to her old policy of absolute neutrality. This she did in 1938.³ League recognition of this avowal of complete impartiality again illustrated Switzerland's remarkable success in securing international recognition for her peculiar status. The attitude of Hitler's Germany towards Switzerland from 1933 onwards was not characterised by a comparable degree of respect.⁴

1. See the critical account of F. P. Walters - A History of the League of Nations (London, 1952) pp. 92-3, 123, 136, 184, 198, 765; a Swiss account by Jacqueline Belin - La Suisse et les Nations Unies (New York 1956) pps. 39-58; and G. Soloveytschik - "The League of Nations and Motta's era" in Switzerland in Perspective (London 1954) pp. 227-250; Walter R. Zahlen - "Switzerland & the League of Nations" A.P.S.R. Aug. 1936.
2. This is the characteristic Swiss attitude. See Rappard, op. cit. p.149; and below, Appendix 1, especially pp. 269.
3. Orvik op. cit. p. 182; Hans J. Morgenthau - "The End of Switzerland's Differential Neutrality", A.I.L. 1938.
4. Elizabeth Wiskemann - Undeclared War (London, 1939) pp. 280-309; and Edvard Hambro's exposition and rebuttal of National Socialist doctrines concerning neutrality. See "Ideological Neutrality" in Nordisk tidskrift for international ret: Acta Scandinavica juris gentium, ft 1939 (vol. 10, n. 2-3) pp. 109-117.

Sweden's League policy was distinguished not so much by obsessive fears that her security and material well-being might be compromised by the obligations of League membership, but by an adroit and faithful¹ use of the facilities of the new international organization² to safeguard traditional interests. A judicious blend of internationalism with the long established policy of friendly relations with Germany was evinced in Swedish policy towards the Ruhr occupation problem in 1923, and over the question of Germany's admission to the League in 1926. By January 1938, in the face of the obvious collapse of the League collective security system, Sweden was first of the European neutrals to announce, in effect, its complete lack of confidence in the League system of security and its determination to rely on the *sauf-qui-peut* of re-
armament.³

....4....

Throughout the Second World War both Switzerland and Sweden preserved their neutrality, though precariously, and not without some infringements.⁴ From the politics-strategic point of view, the weakest point in both countries' boundaries was ^{where} the borders faced Germany. German invasion of Switzerland, which seemed certain on two occasions at least between 1940 and 1945, was thwarted by a mixture of economic appeasement and military threats. The latter included plans for the destruction of

1. See Aaland Islands question. Walters, op. cit. pp. 103-5.
2. H. Tingsten - The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden 1919-1939 (London, 1949); The Diplomats 1919-1939, ed. by Gordon A. Craig & Felix Gilbert (New York, 1953) c.3 Sweden, "The Diplomacy of Osten Unden": Erik Lonnroth, pp. 87-99.
3. Orvik, op. cit. pp. 79-80; Hans J. Morgenthau - "The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe", A.P.S.R. June 1939, pp. 473-486.
4. W. N. Medlicott - The Economic Blockade, 2 vols. (London 1952 and 1959) vol. 1, cs 4, 5 (3), 17, 19; and vol. 2, cs 6, 7, 16, 17.

all the tunnels through the Alps, a scorched earth policy in the industrial areas of the north, and the military defence of the fortified Redoubt in the central mountains.^{1.} Sweden's policy,^{2.} even more than Switzerland's, shifted like a weathervane pointing the fortunes of war. Yet she sought, not always successfully, to reconcile a strict neutrality with the active policy of giving generous help to other Scandinavian countries - her considerable aid to Finland amounting to non-belligerent intervention. During the war both countries provided humanitarian and diplomatic services, as well as valuable war material to both sides.

Since the Second World War both Switzerland and Sweden have been left much worse off strategically than they were after the First World War - this greater vulnerability has been publicly acknowledged by leading spokesmen in each country.^{3.} In part, of course, given the power and range of modern weapons, this is a predicament common to all states, but for the two traditional neutrals their security now seems more precarious than hitherto because of the eclipse of the European power balance which was one of the principal prerequisites of their success as free, neutral

1. See the memoirs of the British Minister in Berne, Sir David Kelly - The Ruling Few (London 1953) c 13, esp. pp. 275-80 and 285; Constance Howard - "Switzerland 1939-46" in The War and the Neutrals, ed. by A. & V. M. Toynbee, R.I.I.A. (London 1956).
2. Agnes H. Hicks - "Sweden" in The War and the Neutrals, *ibid.* pp. 171-199; Annette Baker Fox - The Power of Small States. Diplomacy in World War II. Chapter 5 - "Sweden: Armed Neutral" (London, 1959); and Gunnar Hagglof - "A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War." International Affairs (R.I.I.A.) April 1960, pp. 153-167. For a harsh Soviet critique of Hagglof's article see A. Pogodin - "Gunnar Hagglof's Short Memory" in International Affairs (Moscow) February 1960 pp 94-5.
3. In Switzerland, for example, by M. Petitpierre, Head of Swiss Dept. of Political Affairs, see New York Times 20 March 1953, Christian Science Monitor 18 April 1953 and Times 27 March 1958. See also Professor Rappard reported in Manchester Guardian 22 December 1952. In Sweden by Foreign Minister, Osten Unden, see Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1950-51 (Stockholm, 1957) p. 15.

states. In the dimensions of world politics, Western Europe has become as central, exposed and almost as small as Switzerland, compared with the old European Powers. And, as the Cold War alignments took shape, Switzerland, instead of being the still centre of a European system of delicately balanced antagonisms, has found herself surrounded - with the sole exception of post-1955 Austria - by states allied with America. For Sweden, too, the situation is radically changed; Russia has gained control of almost the entire coast of the Baltic and instead of Germany balancing Russia, Germany is divided and the principal military bases in the Baltic are under the control of one Power. The semi-encirclement of Sweden was completed with Russian bases at Petsamo and Murmansk in the far north;¹ while, since 1949 (when Norway and Denmark joined N.A.T.O.), the chance that she will be able to keep out of a future third world war seems greatly reduced.

....5....

The neutrality policies of these two countries in the postwar world show strongly the influence of their national traditions and experience. They have broadly similar defence and foreign economic policies but, in other respects, Sweden's neutral stand has been less rigorous and more pragmatic than that of Switzerland - this last point is particularly aptly illustrated in their different approaches to participation in the United Nations.

For both countries neutrality means an armed defensive neutrality. But the problems of defence in the atomic age seem almost insuperable;

1. See Walter Kolarz - Russia and Her Colonies (London, 1952) pp. 88-95 for a brief discussion of the historical significance of Petsamo and Murmansk in Suedo-Russian relations.

and, as in other western democracies, the heavy expenditure required for modern systems (quite apart from the vexed question of their dependability) arouses public controversy. Military leaders in both countries, true to their profession, have voiced their disquiet about the efficacy of the old methods; and in Sweden, though not in Switzerland, some have advocated membership in, or at least association with, the N.A.T.O. powers. However, both countries still rely on long established conscript systems and not on standing armies, and pride themselves on the speed with which a large national army can be raised in this way within forty eight hours^{1.} with each man specially trained to fight on his national territory. Both countries have built up their air strength considerably since 1945, particularly since the Korean War and the advent of nuclear weapons.^{2.} Switzerland, naturally, has no navy,* while Sweden has shown that hers is an 'active' form of non-alliance policy by allowing her navy, on occasions, to conduct manoeuvres with units of the fleets of the N.A.T.O. powers.^{3.}

Basically, both countries follow a strategy of deterrence - aimed at convincing a would-be aggressor that the cost of aggression would be disproportionate to any likely gains. As it is often argued that the only way to deter a nuclear aggressor is to possess nuclear weapons oneself

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1. See The Swedish Army (London, 1955) and Economist Supplement on Sweden 29 Oct. 1955. Sweden makes nearly all her purchases of arms in Britain. See E. Wiskemann - "The State of Switzerland in 1956" International Affairs. R.I.I.A. Oct. 1956, pp. 436-445, The Times Supplement on Switzerland, 5 Oct. 1959, and Christopher Hughes, op. cit. p. 13-19.
 2. The growth can be traced in the annual volumes of "Jane's All the World's Aircraft." Both countries have modern jet fighters. In 1955 Sweden had the fourth largest air force in the world with a front line strength of 1200 planes. The Swiss bought 100 British Hunter jet fighters in 1958.
 3. Documents on Sweden's Foreign Policy 1950-51 (Stockholm, 1957) p. 27.
cf India whose navy has conducted manoeuvres in Asian waters with the fleets of fellow Commonwealth members.
- * Though, curiously, Great Britain keeps a naval attache at Berno.

(the opposite argument is that the mere possession of such weapons ensures that an aggressor must nullify that nuclear capability at the outbreak of war), there has been much debate in ^{Sweden and a little in Switzerland about} both countries whether they should equip themselves with nuclear weapons. At the time of writing, both countries have postponed taking a decision on this matter. Quite apart from the enormous cost of manufacturing these weapons, while the present nuclear Powers are reputedly unwilling to sell, (and for Switzerland, particularly, there would be difficulties in testing all but the smallest weapons) it may be that both countries have been influenced, while officially repudiating, the Soviet Union's oft repeated contention that possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with neutrality.¹

In both countries civil defence is regarded as an integral and important part of their country's defence, and is given far more attention than in most countries within N.A.T.O.²

In the ^{age long} argument between the two main schools of Swiss military strategy, cold war conditions seem to have favoured, for psychological as well as purely military reasons, the advocates of a flexible defence of the frontier. For it is this policy which has gained official approval since 1945, as against the alternative policy of retirement to 'the alpine redout.'³

1. For Soviet attitudes, see O. Afanasyeva - "Switzerland. Neutrality Armed with the Hydrogen Bomb," International Affairs (Moscow), October 1958, pp. 92-93; and D. Melnikov - "Scandinavia Today: Sweden" op. cit. December 1958, pp. 53-57.
2. For Swedish civil defence, see Philip Noel Baker - The Arms Race (London, 1958), pp. 168-9. For Swiss civil defence, see The Times, 9th October 1959.
3. See the speech of the Chief of the Swiss General Staff, Colonel Annasohn, reported in The Guardian, 3rd December 1959.

For Sweden the American project to create N.A.T.O. compelled her to re-examine her neutrality policy, to reappraise her relations with her immediate neighbours, and it touched off a domestic debate of great importance and complexity.¹ Swedish army leaders, who in effect argued that the military basis of Sweden's neutrality was now virtually untenable, were in favour of joining N.A.T.O. But the government leaders replied that their concern was with the political as well as the military aspects of the problem, that Sweden's policy of neutrality did much to allay Russian suspicions, and Russian hostility would be too high a price for the limited military assistance they were likely to receive on joining N.A.T.O. The position and importance of Finland weighed heavily in the arguments of both sides; ^{and especially} ~~for~~ in Swedish appraisals of Soviet policy, ^{Finland} in the political as well as the military sense, Finland² is Sweden's 'alarm clock.' There was never any strong probability that Sweden would join N.A.T.O. and when the Swedish government's alternative proposal for a Ten Year Neutral Nordic Defence Union was rejected³ by Denmark and Norway (mainly because their experiences of neutrality had been less happy than Sweden, and the economic sacrifices involved were considered too great);⁴ Sweden immediately devoted attention to the strengthening of the airforce and to the provision of defences against submarines and mines in the Baltic.

1. See Harald Wigforss - "Sweden and the Atlantic Pact" International Organization, August 1949, pp. 434-443; and I. William Zartman - "Neutralism and Neutrality in Scandinavia" Western Political Quarterly, June 1954, pp. 143-160.

2. For Finland, see above pp. 135-8

3. Conflicting conceptions of national interest had again shown the flimsiness of pan-Scandinavianism. Sweden has remained attached, however, to all non-military forms of co-operation with her Scandinavian neighbours. See Raymond E. Lindgren - "International Co-operation in Scandinavia," Y.B.W.A. 1959, pp. 95-114.

4. Furthermore, Sweden was economically and militarily the strongest of the three, and it is also noticeable that both Norway and Denmark are North Atlantic powers, whereas Sweden is wholly a Baltic state. ^{For Danish & Norwegian neutralism see Zartman. op. cit. pp 125-144.}

In both Switzerland and Sweden military leaders have said that in the event of their territory being attacked their aim would be to hold off the aggressor until they could secure help from the N.A.T.O. powers. The diplomatic implications of this are important and tend to contradict, or dilute their claims of self reliance and non-committedness. at least challenge the military thinking. Yet such military co-operation cannot, as the Belgians found in 1940, be built up overnight; though unless actual invasion is thought of as highly likely, it can hardly be maintained that the soldiers' diplomatic indiscretions prove the anachronistic nature of their military policy.

In their foreign economic policies Sweden and Switzerland are directly dependent on foreign trade for their national prosperity, and so indirectly dependent on trade for the continuance of their neutrality policies which presuppose the need for both a high defence capability and the preservation of a high standard of living for their nationals. The greatest problem in this connection is a pressing shortage of certain raw materials. Sweden regularly imports coal, iron, oil and petroleum products and textile fibres. Switzerland normally imports nine-tenths of her raw materials, particularly oil, coal and iron. Both countries usually have an adverse trading balance of imports against exports on their current accounts, though Switzerland much more so than Sweden. Receipts from her mercantile shipping enable Sweden to more than offset her trading deficit, while overseas investments, banking, insurance and the tourist industry enable Switzerland to achieve a favourable overall balance of payments position. Since 1945 both countries have increased their trade with each of the Superpowers, though trade with the Soviet Union is still relatively small. Both countries feel a greater dependence on the United States than their trading figures indicate, for they fear that their own prosperity is

inextricably linked with the continuance of American prosperity, an American recession could mean a Swiss or Swedish depression.¹ Because both countries favour liberalisation and multilateralism in trade and avoid associations which they feel might compromise their neutrality, they both have joined the 'Outer Seven' of the European Free Trade Association, rather than the 'Six' of the European Common Market. It is typical that Sweden is taking a leading part in the formation of the 'Seven' and in the efforts at 'bridge-building' with the 'Six',² while Switzerland plays a very quiet role.³

This contrast in styles is even more marked if one compares their policies in regard to international organization. Sweden became a member of the United Nations in 1946, though warily and without much enthusiasm, and her policy inside the organization is characterized by a careful, mediatory, form of co-operation which serves as the basis of all Swedish international action beyond the scope of immediate Swedish

1. For details on the above points see the annual volumes of the U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. Specifically, see "Switzerland. Oasis of Free Enterprise" by Blair Bolles in Foreign Policy Reports. New York, 15 January 1959, and G. Soloveytschik - "Switzerland Copes with Prosperity", Lloyds Bank Review, July 1957. Economist supplement on Sweden, 29 October 1955. In 1946 Switzerland and U.S.S.R. resumed diplomatic and commercial relations after a break of 22 years. In 1946 Sweden signed a highly controversial Trade & Credit Agreement with the U.S.S.R., and a far less controversial trade pact in January 1959.
2. See The Observer, 10th May 1959 and The Economist, 27th February 1960, pp. 819-822; 1. Negotiations for a European Free Trade Area 1956-1958 (The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1959).
3. See "Sixes and Sevens" in The Times Supplement, 5th October 1959, p. vii; and Henri Stanner - Neutralite Suisse et Solidarite Europeene (Lausanne 1959) who points out that two-thirds of Swiss foreign trade is with Western Europe and argues for Swiss association with the Common Market.

interests.^{1.} Switzerland has not joined the United Nations and there has never been a thorough public discussion of this question,^{2.} though no doubt memories of her difficulties as a member of the League and the intention of giving executive authority to the Security Council were sufficient deterrents in 1945. Nevertheless, the Swiss, just as much as the Swedes, are conscious that their neutrality is more likely to be respected if, as well as benefitting themselves, it can be used to provide international services. And while both Powers are at pains to ensure that if war breaks out their neutrality will not be violated, they both realize that prevention of war is the prior concern and endeavour to contribute towards this task. Sweden here makes use of the opportunities afforded by her membership of the United Nations.^{3.} Switzerland shows that hers is not a completely introverted neutrality by such acts as serving with Sweden on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on Korea;^{4.} by representing British and French interests in Egypt after the break of 1956; and, above all, encouraging the use of her national territory for international conferences^{5.} and for the headquarters of international

1. See Sweden and the United Nations, report by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (New York, 1956).
2. See Jacqueline Belin - La Suisse et les Nations Unies (New York, 1956); and W. E. Rappard - "Switzerland and the United Nations" (A.A.A.P.S.S. July, 1946).
3. Apart from her membership of the Neutral Nations Commission in Korea; one remembers the military contingent contributed to the U.N. emergency force in Sinai in 1957 and the efforts of her official representative, Jarring, in his capacity of President of the Security Council, over the Kashmir question. See also Appendix 2 below, especially pp. 272-3
and in the Congo in 1960
4. Both the Swiss and the Swedes found this a disagreeable task - see Jacques Freymond - "Supervising Agreements. The Korean Experience." Foreign Affairs, April 1959, pp. 496-503.
5. Typical was her unsuccessful effort to convene a 'summit' conference in the autumn of 1956 to discuss Middle Eastern problems. The list of important conferences held on Swiss soil is extremely long; one need only mention the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1955 as examples.

organizations.¹ The tension between neutrality and international solidarity is thus eased by the twin conceptions of international services and humanitarian mission, the most cherished expression of which is the International Red Cross with its headquarters in Geneva and a directing personnel recruited only among Swiss citizens.

There is no doubt that the sympathies of the vast majority of Swiss and Swedish citizens lie with the N.A.T.O. Powers in the struggle with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Yet, more emphatically, the traditional policies of neutrality have a time-tested sacredness, almost a talismanic quality. In Sweden this is evinced by the fact that public discussion of foreign policy concentrates almost exclusively on defining and justifying Sweden's "alliance-free" policy,² and in Switzerland the Swiss remain true to their national custom of not discussing among themselves why they are neutral while assuring other people that Swiss neutrality is unique and not susceptible of being duplicated on the international plane. It is inconceivable that either country will easily abandon its neutrality; and, whatever the dangers of 'magic charm' neutrality may be, it remains true that the actual policies of both powers are singularly free from illusions.

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1. In Geneva alone there were 142 international organizations in 1959. See The Times Supplement, 5th October 1959, p. XVI.
2. See I. William Zartman, op. cit. pp. 143-157; and Sweden and the United Nations, op. cit. pp. 157-160, for brief discussions of the public debate about the kind of neutrality Sweden should pursue.

Austria - a Neutralized State

Prior to 1955, neutralization¹ - the institution of a status of permanent neutrality - had seemed to be an obsolete 19th century practice. The neutralization of Austria in that year revived public interest in the device of neutralization and led to much, rather loose, talk about "the Austrian example." Yet it is doubtful if the success of Austria in achieving some degree of immunisation from the struggles of the Cold War can provide a truly heartening example for other states. After all, it took nine years of occupation and the cumbersome method of four Power control to restore the sovereignty of a small country with a population of only 7 million people; and, even so, the progress of the negotiations for Austrian independence were extremely hazardous and influenced at all stages by the general climate of east-west relations. Austria's new status, which involved shouldering some onerous burdens, sprang almost entirely from her insignificance as a military factor; and, more specifically, from a coincidence of Russian strategic re-assessments and propaganda aims in the context of 1955.²

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1. Neutralization requires an international treaty between the Great Powers and the State concerned, whereby the former guarantee collectively the independence and integrity of the latter, which must agree to abstain from any hostile action or any international agreement likely to involve it in hostilities. In the past neutralization has been applied only to small, weak states and to situations where a rough balance of power prevails. See Fred Greene - "Neutralization and the Balance of Power", AFSM, vol. 47, 1953; 1041-1057, and C. R. M. F. Cruttwell - A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World (London 1937) pp. 183-192, and Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, vol. 2, p. 244. From the above requirements it is clear, despite some assertions to the contrary, that Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were not neutralized by the Geneva agreements of 1954. For further discussion of this point, see J. A. Modelski - "Indochina and S.E.A.T.O." in Australian Outlook 13 (1) March 1 959; 27-54, see also above p. 127-9.
 2. See above pp. 47-52, and below p. 234.

Indeed, Austria's strategic position, her experiences since 1918, and, more particularly, the power constellations of the Cold War, seem to have confirmed her position as the new cross-roads of Europe, in place of Switzerland. Bounded to the north-west by the Federal Republic of Germany, with its north-eastern frontiers merging into part of the Iron Curtain, with Switzerland and Italy to its west and south-west, and Yugoslavia on its southern frontier, the Austrian Federal Republic has common frontiers with six states. Her newly found unity and prosperity stand in relief with the declining years of Habsburg rule, even more markedly with the divisions, poverty and ignominy of the interwar period; and her present independence contrasts sharply with the occupation of 1945 to 1955.

For more than a hundred years political leaders in Austria, whether Imperialists or Republicans, have had to face the twin problems of how to find a satisfactory "state idea," and how to come to terms with the impulses of nationalism. While there may be good reason for doubting a popular assertion that the last effective Habsburg ruler, Francis Joseph (1848-1916), played off one nationality against another within his Empire and that 'Divide et Impera' was his guiding political principle, it is nevertheless doubtful if that monarch's actual maxim of government, "Viribus Unitis", was more happily designed for his age.¹ Though it is true that Francis Joseph's personal rule was in defiance of a 'solution'

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1. See A. F. Fribram - Austria-Hungary and Great Britain 1908-1914, translated by Ian D. F. Morrow (London 1951), p.61. The tensions caused by nationalism within the Habsburg Empire are examined by R. A. Kann - The Multinational Empire (London, 2 vols. 1950); and "The Fall of Habsburg Austria" in The Times Literary Supplement, 20 July 1951, pp. 445-7, is a penetrating essay on Austrian failures to find a 'state idea' during the same period.

to the nationalities problem of the Habsburg lands, it is also true that the truncated rump of that polyglot empire - constituted the Republic of Austria,¹ by the peacemakers in 1919, as a state comprising mostly of German speaking peoples - lacked either the will or the means to existence, and between the wars it scarcely had an active foreign policy. The original wish of most German speaking Austrians was for an Anschluss with Germany,² but this was forbidden by the Allies.³ The state was only kept in being during its first years by means of substantial League of Nations reconstruction loans; while as early as 1927 the final overthrow of Austrian liberties and the destruction of national independence was prefigured in the bloody 15th July - one of the four fateful days (see over)

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1. The name "German-Austria" used at first by the new Republic, was forbidden by the Allies, and the name Austria accepted. The Austrian Republic comprises nine provinces - Vienna, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Carinthia, Styria and Burgenland. See further James Viscount Bryce - International Relations (London 1922), p. 44.
 2. See S. W. Gould "Austrian Attitudes toward Anschluss, October 1918 - September 1919." J. M. H. Sept. 1950, pp. 220-231.
 3. In Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles; but under this clause Austria could be united to Germany "with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations." cf. also Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain.

for Austrian liberties.¹ The difficulties of adaptation from being the centre of the vast Danubian Empire of the Habsburgs to playing the part of a small autonomous state (burdened by a now over-large capital city) among the fiercely nationalistic successor states, were magnified by the great depression. The Austrians were easily persuaded by National Socialist propaganda that their state was not economically viable, that a high proportion of unemployed was therefore inevitable, and that the only 'solution' lay in union with Germany. Though Italian and French opposition was sufficient to stifle at birth the Austro-German customs union of March 1931, in March 1938 Hitler's Germany forced through the Anschluss without encountering much opposition from either the League Powers or the Austrian people.²

Ironically, it was the German and subsequently the four Power occupations which helped to forge a sense of national unity and to lay some of the economic foundations of Austria's present prosperity. Certainly, the experience of foreign occupation since 1938 seems to have induced a greater national solidarity than previously. For whereas in the interwar period antagonism between the Austrian Clericals and Socialists was so great that civil war broke out between them in 1934, their successors have combined to form a coalition which since

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1. The other three being the suppression of Parliament by Dollfus in March 1933 and the two 12ths of February - that of the Counter Revolution of 1934, and that of the Berchtesgaden meeting of 1938, which through the German invasion and Nazi revolution brought the Schuschnigg regime to an end just one month later on 11 March 1938. See G. E. R. Gedye - Fallen Bastions (London 1939) p. 35.
 2. Frank Borckenau - Austria and After (London 1938); Kurt von Schuschnigg - Farewell Austria (London 1938) and Austrian Requiem (London, 1947). Schuschnigg was Chancellor of the Austrian Federal Republic July 1934 to March 1938. See G. E. R. Gedye's assessment of Schuschnigg - Fallen Bastions, op.cit. c 12.

1945 has governed the country without a major split.¹ Furthermore, it was during the occupations that the Germans prospected further oil fields in Lower Austria and the Russians developed and worked them. After 1945, with Russia determined to treat Austria as a defeated nation and to wring as much reparation as possible, Austrian leaders could only turn to the Western Powers for the foreign aid necessary to economic recovery. It was their considerable achievement that Austria became a member of the Marshall Plan organization and of the European Payments Union without driving the Soviet authorities to believe that Austria was bound irretrievably to the Western camp.

Indeed, in many respects the period of four power occupation appears as a trying and extremely difficult training for the post-1955 role of permanent diplomatic neutrality. From 1945 until 1955² Austria, though divided into four occupation zones, had a government whose authority was recognised throughout the country and by all four occupying Powers.³ If the evacuation of all foreign forces was to be achieved - for in the heyday of their co-operation the Allied Powers had stated, in the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, that they wished "to see re-established a free and independent Austria" - Austrian bona fides had to be acceptable to both of the cold war camps.

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1. Though inevitably there have been frictions. See Gordon Shepherd - The Austrian Odyssey (London 1957); U. W. Kitzinger - "The Electoral System in Austria", Parliamentary Affairs, Autumn 1959.
 2. There is no completely satisfactory history of these nine years. But see Cary Travers Grayson, Jr. - Austria's International Position, 1938-53 (Geneva 1953); R. Hiscocks - The Rebirth of Austria (London 1953); Philip Mosely - "The Treaty with Austria", International Organization, vol. 4 1950: 219-35; D. C. Watt - "Some Reflections on Austrian Foreign Policy 1945-1955", International Relations, vol. 1 (6) Oct. 1956: 259-269.
 3. By the Russians equally, despite the constant electoral resistance of the Austrians to Communism.

This tour de force was achieved, despite the nine years of occupation and the trials of several hundred Great Power meetings before the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. The end to the deadlock sprang entirely from a dramatic reversal of Soviet policy.¹ The process began with Mr. Kolotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet at the beginning of March 1955, when he declared that delay in concluding an Austrian State Treaty was unjustified but that guarantees must be found against another Anschluss and against Austria's participation in any alliance before the treaty could be signed. Later he amplified these remarks to Austria's ambassador in Moscow, making it clear that agreement between the powers about Germany was no longer regarded by the Soviet government as an indispensable prerequisite to any settlement of Austria's status. At the end of March the Austrian Federal Chancellor was invited to Moscow and an Austrian delegation duly arrived there on 12 April where, after two days' negotiations, a memorandum² was signed on 15 April by which Austria agreed to make a declaration "in a form imposing upon Austria an international obligation, that Austria will maintain permanent neutrality of the

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1. See Edward Crankshaw's argument that the Soviet reversal was due to propaganda requirements - the post-Stalin 'new-look', the detente with Tito, the wooing of Asian neutralists - and to strategic re-assessments. See *The Observer*, 20 September 1959, p. 13. See also *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden*, (London 1960) p. 290. There were logistic advantages for the Soviet Union in thus separating two NATO powers in Italy and West Germany, and Austria's neutralization entailed the transfer of 5,000 US troops from Salzburg to south of the Brenner.
 2. Text, in English translation, printed in *New Times (Moscow)* No. 22 May 20, 1955. - Supplement of Documents, pp. 5-7.

same type as that maintained by Switzerland";¹ agreed to delivery of goods to the U.S.S.R. in payment of the value of the Soviet enterprises in Austria to be transferred in accordance with the Austrian State Treaty;² agreed that Austria should pay (1 million tons of crude oil annually for ten years) for the transfer of oil properties belonging to the U.S.S.R. in Austria, and in United States dollars for the transfer of the assets of the Soviet held Danube Shipping Company in eastern Austria; and, agreed that the two countries should conclude trade, barter and payments agreements to last, in the first instance, for five years. Exactly one month later the Foreign Ministers of the four occupying Powers signed in Vienna the Austrian State Treaty³ providing for the establishment of a sovereign and democratic Austria within the frontiers of 1938.⁴ An Anschluss was forbidden and the rights of non-German minorities were guaranteed.⁵ Austria was allowed

1. Mr. Molotov's oft-repeated comparison of Austria's position with Switzerland was inexact. Switzerland suffers no constitutional or international limitation on the kind of armaments it can possess, as Austria does in Article 13 of the State Treaty. But such a limitation has not, traditionally, been regarded as incompatible with neutralization. In 1914 Luxembourg was forbidden to keep a standing army. It is interesting to note that two years later Mr. Mikoyan was recommending to Austrian leaders that they should follow the model of Finnish neutrality, stressing that whenever he referred to Austrian neutrality he meant "a neutrality without any reservations whatever." Daily Telegraph, 23 April 1957. On Finland, see ibid. pp. 135-8.
2. See detailed list in Article 22 of State Treaty. The Russians obtained compensation worth \$ 150 m. for these assets (Western estimates placed their value at only \$ 40 m.)
3. For text, see British Treaty series no. 58, 1957 cmd. 214. The treaty bears many marks of hasty drafting and the need to gloss over doctrinal differences. For criticism on this score, see Janko Musulin - "Austria after the Hungarian Rising", International Affairs, April 1957: 133-142.
4. State Treaty, Articles 1 and 5.
5. Ibid. Articles 4 and 7.

to keep an army of whatever size it wished, but atomic and other special weapons were forbidden.¹ There were to be no reparations, but the onerous terms of the Moscow Memorandum were to be fulfilled by Austria.²

These two instruments, together with the Constitutional Law of Neutrality of 26 October 1955³ - which came into force and was given international publicity on 5 November 1955 - regulate Austria's new international status. General international recognition of this new status was soon forthcoming, and in December 1955 Austria was one of sixteen states admitted to the United Nations under the East-West package deal. On a strict reading of the Charter, and one that prevailed at the San Francisco Conference in 1945,⁴ neutrality and United Nations membership are incompatible; but a more flexible interpretation allows that the Charter admits neutrality by implication.⁵ In line with this latter view a leading Austrian international lawyer⁶

1. Article 13.

2. Articles 21 and 22.

3. The neutrality declaration which became an integral part of the Constitution on 5 November 1955 contained the following passage: "With the object of the lasting and perpetual maintenance of its independence.... Austria declares of its own free will its perpetual neutrality and will maintain and defend it with all the means at its disposal, Austria will never join a military alliance nor allow the establishment of military bases of foreign states on its territory. New York Times, 7 November 1955.

4. Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation (San Francisco, 1945), vol. 6, p. 459; vol. 7, p. 327.

5. In Articles 43 (3) and 48 (1) where member states may be called upon to act for the maintenance of international peace and security as the Security Council may determine; it is arguable that in certain circumstances a state may be excluded from these provisions.

6. Alfred Verdross - "Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the U.N." A.J.I.L. Jan. 1956, pp. 61-68.

has argued, plausibly, that by the time Austria was admitted to the United Nations her neutrality had already received almost universal recognition and that in consequence members are obliged to respect this status if sanctions are invoked. The then Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Bruno Kreisky,¹ defined the official Austrian conception of neutrality in an article he wrote for a leading American journal

"Actually it is not accurate to speak of neutrality in peacetime, because what the term means is non-participation in war. An attitude of indifference toward the ideological struggle has more properly been called *neutralism* (as opposed to neutrality). But this should not be taken to mean that neutrality does not impose any obligations whatever upon a country in peacetime. Such obligations can be summarised as follows:

(1) A neutral country cannot join a military alliance in time of peace because in so doing it would destroy its ability to remain neutral in time of war.

(2) Similarly, a neutral country must bar foreign military bases from its territory, since they would diminish its former freedom of action - or rather non-action - in time of war.

(3) A neutral country must not accept any obligations - political, economic or other - which would tend to impair its neutrality in wartime²

1. Dr. Kreisky, at one time a career diplomat (before his rapid rise in the Austrian Socialist party), succeeded Dr. Leopold Figl as Austrian Foreign Minister in July 1959, and for the first time the Foreign Minister was permitted to be independent head of his Ministry, now freed from the Federal Chancellor's office. It is interesting to note that Dr. Kreisky spent the entire war years in Sweden and that he has a Swedish wife.
2. Bruno Kreisky - "Austria Draws the Balance." Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1959, pp. 269-281. This is in part a paraphrase of the Austrian Constitutional Federal Statute of 26 October 1955 which expressly mentions these three duties. See further Josef L. Kunz - "Austria's Permanent Neutrality." A.J.I.L. April 1956, p. 413.

Dr. Kreisky maintained that Austria's permanent neutrality was a question of Hobson's choice if Austria was to become independent: "To venture out into the open without having sought shelter with one of the blocs seemed fraught with grave consequences. Whatever the merit of this argument, it had the flaw of pre-supposing a choice which in fact did not exist. At the very best, we could choose between neutrality and the status quo. At no time could we choose between neutrality and alignment with a bloc. And in fact what did the status quo amount to? Was it not itself a form of passive neutralization - neutralization by occupation? Under the circumstances, what alternative was open to a nation which longed to be master once again of its own destiny?"¹.

Nevertheless, the Austrians have shown great skill in making a friend of necessity and in evolving a form of *diplomacy* which is, perhaps surprisingly,² more like that of Sweden than of their Western neighbour, Switzerland. By joining the Council of Europe,³ like Sweden and unlike Switzerland, Austria openly demonstrated its affinities

1. Kreisky, *ibid.* p. 273.

2. Writing before the State Treaty, both Elizabeth Wiskemann - Undeclared War (London, 1939) p. 5, and Oscar Halecki - The Limits and Divisions of European History (London, 1950) pp. 134-5, mention the relevance of the Swiss example for Austria. But E. Wiskemann "Resurgent Austria" Contemporary Review, No. 1099, July 1957, p. 8, writes: "Austria has developed a new kind of neutralism. Something less negative and more actively European in spirit than the neutrality of Switzerland."

3. When Austria joined the Council of Europe - a purely advisory, non-military organisation - the Austrian Foreign Minister was reported as saying "We are a militarily neutral state, but there is no neutralism." New York Times, 22 Feb. 1956. cf. Professor Wiskemann's opinion, in the preceding footnote.

with the West. However, as a vital condition of her continued independence, she has been scrupulous in the maintenance of her military and diplomatic neutrality between both blocs: providing a neutral stage for international conferences of all political complexions;¹ expelling the Secretariat of the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions from Austrian soil;² performing neutral good offices during and after the Hungarian Revolution, despite strained relations with neighbouring Communist states;³ and protesting strongly at the violation of Austrian air space by American military transport planes on route southwards during the crisis in Jordan and Lebanon in the summer of 1958.⁴

In dealing with these difficulties, Austrian leaders have shown considerable diplomatic skill, a skill which is equally evident in the way Austria manages to keep on generally favourable terms with both Super-powers. Since 1945, relations with the United States have been consistently amicable. In addition to vital American economic aid, given during the nine years of occupation, subsequently the United States Export-Import Bank has advanced substantial loans for developing Austria's iron industry. Only two relatively minor, and related, issues have threatened to impair relations. These were the question of the settlement of the claims of American oil companies whose properties were confiscated by Hitler's Germany in 1938, and the question of the release of 2,000 million schillings in counterpart funds held in a blocked account to the

1. "Burdens of Neutrality" The Times, 23 April 1959.
2. "Austrians Interpret Neutrality." Economist 3 March 1956, pp. 611-12.
3. "Unintimidated". Manchester Guardian, 4 March 1957; "Austria Scores Budapest Steps". New York Times, 4 March 1957, & "Austria Neutral Neighbour". Economist, 17 November 1956, pp. 611-12.
4. The Times, 27 August 1958.

credit of the United States. Both of these issues were settled, virtually, by the end of 1959.¹ Equally, and in sharp contrast to the pre-1955 period, there has been marked evidence since 1955 of official Austro-Russian cordiality. The visit of Mr. Mikoyan in April 1957 was an undoubted success and produced a Soviet promise that Austrian deliveries of oil to Russia would be reduced, provided trade in general between the two countries continued to rise. In the following year the Russians agreed to reduce by one half Austrian oil delivery obligations under the State Treaty.² The Russians, who had never had vital need of Austrian crude oil, now seemed more interested in stimulating Danubian trade and in underlining the power of 'the Austrian example.'³ The Austrians wisely realise that it is in their every interest to agree with the Soviet claims that peaceful and profitable relations can be maintained between a 'bourgeois' and a 'socialist' state.

Most states, and especially small states, have some difficulties with their neighbours. Austria is no exception. Only relations with Switzerland seem entirely trouble-free. Her relations with neighbouring

1. New York Times, 17 November 1959; A.C.S.M. 14 June 1961.
2. The desire to stimulate Danubian trade is the probable explanation of the curiously roundabout method chosen by the Soviet leaders to effect this reduction (Austria to continue to deliver 1 mn. tons of crude oil to Russia for the next 7 years as stipulated by the treaty, but from 1959 Russia to compensate her by delivering half that amount of her own oil from Eaku to Austria via the Danube - see The Times, 27 August 1958.) The, tacit, quid pro quo seems to have been that Austria would join - as she did in April 1959 - with the Communist powers who were parties to the 1947 Belgrade Convention on the navigation of the Danube; the Russians said frankly that they hoped the Federal Republic of Germany would also adhere to the Convention. No doubt the revival of the old tradition of expanding trade down the Danube is seen by some Austrians as a pull away from the strong economic ties with Western Germany.
3. See, for example, S. Okhantsev "An Example of Peaceful Coexistence," International Affairs (Moscow), Sept. 1958: 65-6. For an earlier example see A. Markov - "Austrian Neutrality - The First Year" New Times (Moscow) October 1956 pp 9-11.

Communist states are invariably uneasy, not least because of the refugees who seek refuge in Austria - strained relations with Hungary during and after the Hungarian Revolution were thus, in a sense, an unusually severe eruption of a general problem. With Italy, the only continental source of tension is the question of the treatment of the German speaking population in the Italian province of Alto Adige.¹ This issue has a long history but to date there is no sign of it becoming a dominating factor in Austrian ^{domestic} politics. Another constant, though minor, source of irritation is Yugoslavia's ² claim on Austria's Slovene and Croatian minorities in her south-eastern provinces of Carinthia and Styria.

Undoubtedly, however, economic ties and sentiment, as well as long intertwined histories, make Western Germany the most important of Austria's neighbours. The Austrian State Treaty, the chief 'charter' of neutralized Austria, expressly forbids "all agreements having the effect, either directly or indirectly, of promoting political or economic union with Germany."³ As the majority of Austrian industrialists are *grossdeutsch* by tradition and interest⁴, and as Germany is the most important customer and supplier in Austria's close overall links with the six European Common Market countries,⁵ it seems that the government's reason for joining the 'Outer Seven' of the European Free Trade Association was based not so much

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1. Known to the Austrians as South Tyrol. For a brief account of the history of this dispute, see James Viscount Eryco. op.cit. pp. 46-47. See further "Tensions in South Tyrol", World today, January 1958 ^{The Times 16 Sept 1961}
 2. Hugh Seton-Watson - The East European Revolution (London 1950), pp. 369-71
 3. In Article 4 para. 2.
 4. See E. Winkemann op. cit; and Gordon Shephard's argument that Austria will be forced into the German orbit by sheer economic pressure - The Austrian Odyssey (London, 1957).
 5. In 1959 50% of Austria's exports went to Common Market countries; and between 50 & 60% of her imports came from these countries. 26% of her exports went to Western Germany.

on economic considerations, but rather because of a strict regard for Austria's neutral status.¹

If non-Communist Europe is really to congeal into two separate economic blocs, then Austria, like Switzerland, will find herself separated from her main markets. And in terms of the Cold War as well as of Western European rivalries, the political and economic factors converge to emphasize that Austria, more than Switzerland, is at the blocked cross-roads of Europe: "The eastern frontier of the common market just like the western frontier of the Soviet block, cuts across the natural trade routes of central Europe. Since these are political as well as economic frontiers, they leave no room for a stable position for a country placed as Austria is. Austria's problem of association probably cannot be really settled until the relationships between western and eastern Europe changes, and what used to be central Europe can, in some form, come into existence again. Until then, the Austrians can only improvise."² This situation is a powerful inducement to the kind of economic 'bridge-building' Austria is now attempting, ^{though} here ^{again} her 'active' ~~foreign~~ diplomacy reminds one more of Sweden than of Switzerland.

1. The government's view of neutrality was expressed by Professor Alfred Verdross in these terms: "A permanently neutral state cannot join a multinational economic group such as the Common Market because (such an organisation) aims at fusion of the national economies concerned, and to this end it deposes authority to a central organ to follow a united economic policy which is binding on the member states." Verdross further argues that in case of war Austria must be able to free itself from restrictions on the course of its trade which might hamper it in the protection of its physical independence. See "Austria's European Choice", Economist, 30 January 1960, pp. 437-8.

2. The Economist, 13 February 1960, p. 598.

Such dilemmas are¹² from being merely contemporary, for, similar problems of orientation are as old as the idea of Austria.

See J. M. Thompson, — An Historical Geography of Europe 800-1789.

(Oxford 1929) pp 21 A 139.

Though analogies between Austria and Germany are often made, ~~likewise, neutrality does an empirical matter, and so~~ there are many reasons why 'the Austrian example' of neutralization is far from suggesting a clear precedent for Germany,¹ despite the attractions of this idea for some Germans.² As long as Germany is divided, the fact of division is likely to deter increases in the strength of the old Alldeutsch impulses within Austria towards a new Anschluss - though Professor Wiskemann maintains that there are signs that such sentiments are still present in the Tyrol, Salzburg and in Styria.³ Their influence in Austria's political life so far seems small. The Austrian two party coalition, as well as preventing the civil strife of inter-war years, may be a guarantee of independence in another sense - at least as long as there is strong one party rule in the Federal Republic of Germany. For between the wars, and especially in 1931 and 1938 when Germany and Austria had roughly similar regimes,⁴ among the German Austrians separatism was never very strong. Actual experience of the consequences of union with Germany may now have made independence seem more attractive than it did between 1918

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1. The most compelling differences are that Austria has a population of 7 mn. while there would be over 70 mn. in a neutral Germany, made up of the two Germanys of today; Austria's is an armed neutrality with no limit on the size of her army - a freedom hardly likely to be granted to a 'neutralized' Germany. Moreover, Germany cannot be compared to a small, non-aggressive state with no revisionist demands or ability to impose its will on others. Even if Germany stayed aloof from Cold War entanglements, its neighbours would be concerned over its foreign policy to an extent which would make neutralization an essentially unreal status.
 2. See Terence Prittie - "The Impact of the Austrian Treaty on Germany", The Listener, 16 June 1955, pp. 1057-58.
 3. E. Wiskemann - "Resurgent Austria," op.cit. p. 10.
 4. E. Wiskemann - "Austria in 1959", World today 15 (11) Nov. 59, p.492 "The ill-fated Weimar Republic had been governed by coalitions; it is at any rate curious to observe how Austria and Germany have reversed their pre-war attitudes towards political coalition; today it is the Germans who keep their Socialist party in opposition." See also Peter Matthews - European Balance (London, 1945) p. 144.

and 1938.¹ For the non-German minorities² of the 'new' Austria, separatism seems to be a negligible force, though in order to fortify "the Austrian idea"³ new and inexpensive books on Austrian history are being published and generously circulated under government sponsorship.

Few would now dispute the contention of Herr Raab, the Austrian Chancellor, who during his visit to Moscow in July 1958 said that "the overwhelming majority of Austrians today favour this neutrality, and it is increasingly realized that we took the right decision for our future."⁴ It may be that the old tag of Imperial days - "Felix Austria"⁵ - has again become appropriate. Less than five years after the Austrian State Treaty the internal aspect seems as propitious as her external relations. But both are delicately poised. The example of Switzerland and Sweden suggests that a successful neutral needs, as well as restraint and care in her external relations, national unity and stability in internal politics, undoubted viability in economic life and military strength sufficient to deter a would-be aggressor from achieving easy conquest.

1. The "Handbook of the Austrian National and Federal Assemblies" for 1959 showed that 92 of the National Assembly's 165 members were in prisons or concentration camps of Hitler's Germany or in prisons of pre-Nazi authoritarian regimes in Austria. Quoted in New York Times, 10 May 1959. *Prison camp friendships may well be one unelaborated explanation of Austria's greater national unity today.*
2. At the 1951 census there were only 2% of the total population, and were mostly Slovene in Carinthia.
3. A.J.P. Taylor - who is rather sceptical about a 'distinctively' Austrian idea, insisting, with some reason, that so much depends on the larger neighbour Germany - has traced some of the past vicissitudes and ambiguities of 'the Austrian idea' in his book "The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918" (2nd ed. 1948), see esp. the epilogue, pp. 252-261. The political significance of national history has been clearly appreciated, and so rewritten, by each 20th century Austrian regime in turn. See R. John Rath - "History of Citizenship Training - An Austrian Example", J.M.H. Sept. 1949, pp. 227-238.
4. Quoted in The Times, 27 August 1958.
5. This was a recognition of diplomatic finesse, as opposed to armed might. For Austria was once known as Felix Austria because the Habsburg Monarchy acquired an empire by marriage compacts rather than by conquest, "Bolla gerant alii, tu felix Austria, mibo."

To date, Austrian leaders have amply shown their diplomatic skills, but it is too early to be confident of the country's national unity or its economic strength, and its puny defences have already caused its military leaders much disquiet.^{1.}

The "failure and downfall" of the Austrian Empire was due to its "efforts to span two worlds,"^{2.} and one remembers the misfortunes of Luxembourg and Belgium in 1914 following the collapse of the balance of power which had initially enabled their neutralization. It would be rash to assert that the post-1955 neutralism of the Austrian Federal Republic is deeply entrenched. So far, it has not been severely tested.

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1. The visit of the Austrian Defence Minister and senior army officers to inspect Soviet military installations, during October 1958, seemed an suspicious start to the campaign to obtain a revision of the present military clauses of the Austrian State Treaty which, according to the Austrians, prevent an effective protection of neutrality. "At present the Austrians possess three modern fighter aircraft bought in England early this year. Their aim is to build up a strong protective fighter unit and also to obtain the revision of clause 13 of the Austrian Treaty which prohibits the possession of anti-aircraft missiles. If Russia agrees to that, it is unlikely that the other Powers will object." Lajos Lederer - "Austria's Arms Talks with Russia," Observer, 12 October 1958. The size of the Austrian army in 1956 was only 30,000 men. "Burdens of Neutrality," The Times, 23 April 1959.
 2. Geoffrey Barraclough - History in a Changing World (Oxford, 1957) p. 134.

CONCLUSION

It has not been an aim of this study to make an anthology of verbal definitions and equivalents of the term neutralism, nor to end up with a single terse definition. Indeed, it is believed that it is a mistake and a *distracton* of political enquiry from its proper concerns to seek for a quintessential neutralism. The term neutralism at least connotes certain definite states and statesmen, with their similarities and differences, influenced by and influencing the character of the Cold War. The first reaction to the use of the term should be: whose neutralism is referred to and what forms does it take, how general or particular are these forms? For fruitful generalisations about the significance of neutralism in international politics should be generalisations about the actual policies of states and the attitudes and opinions of statesmen, and are to be justified by reference to and debate about particular instances and examples.

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All the new states of the postwar world have become neutralist save two, the Philippines and Pakistan. And all these are African or Asian states apart from Cyprus. These new state neutralists were thirty-two of the forty-seven neutralist states in a total United Nations membership in

January 1961 of ninety-nine. In the conjunction of new statehood and non-alignment lies the main key to an understanding of the nature and significance of neutralism in contemporary international politics. Being neutralist has become a well nigh inevitable consequence of new statehood in the postwar world. There are at least five other avenues by which a state has become neutralist, and these have sometimes intersected, but, so far, the transition from dependency to new statehood has been the main highway.

Of the other five avenues to policy neutralism, that of three pioneer neutralists - India, Yugoslavia and Egypt - is the most important, as these three states have initiated certain policies which are now widely recognised as being neutralist, and which new states have copied, or at least come to practise themselves. These three states have shown ways for translating certain widespread-urges--especially about military pacts, bases, foreign aid, 'imperialism' and national independence - into policy forms, and in so doing they have attained positions of leadership) in the neutralist world.

Of the four remaining categories, three - neutralization, buffer status, traditional neutrality - are survivals, or revivals, of nineteenth century practices, while the fourth category - the erstwhile isolationists - illustrates the

growing impracticability of isolationist policies today.

There is only one currently neutralized state - Austria - and it is unlikely that there will be many more. Buffer status is now generally unpopular, and the conditions which created buffer states in the nineteenth century do not obtain today. The traditional neutrals - Sweden and Switzerland - are a class apart, because of their prosperity and the fact that they are the only states to have successfully practised a non-alignment policy from the nineteenth century right up to the present day.

The dismantling of Western colonial empires has proceeded so rapidly in recent years that the creation of new states by this means will probably soon come to a halt. Even on the assumption that all the remaining Western overseas territories secure their independence, it is unlikely that more than a dozen new states remain to be created in this way and most of these will be African states. It may well be that anti-Western anti-imperialism will thus become a fading force, though the fact of Communist expansion since 1945 shows that the age of empires is not yet over.

Hitherto, the steady growth in the number of neutralist states has given an impression of growing momentum and has caused the superpowers to take increasing account of factors outside their opposed alliance systems. The difficulties of trying simultaneously to forge friendly relations with

neutralist nations while preserving the material strength and morale within their own alliance systems are now problems common to both superpowers.

The most dramatic example of the growing impact of neutralist states has been shown in the increasing neutralist membership of the United Nations, especially since December 1955, and the greater attention paid in that organization to neutralist themes and interests as a consequence of the changing pattern of membership.

Even so, it would be wrong to lay great stress on the solidarity or agreement of neutralist states among themselves, for they represent a wide range of different and sometimes conflicting interests. Although there has been much talk about the notion of an association bringing together all neutralist states in a neutralist bloc, this has not materialised so far, nor does this seem likely. Indeed, some neutralists regard a bloc of the non-aligned as a contradiction in terms. However, there have been and will, no doubt, continue to be ad hoc groupings of some neutralist states bent on pursuing certain specific ends in common.

It is probably in the expression of neutralist doctrine, rather than the practices of neutralist states, that neutralist leaders seem to be most in accord. For words can unite where actions may divide. All neutralists are agreed on the truth of their central propositions - the need to abate

the Cold War rivalries, the iniquities of colonialism, the need of poor countries for economic aid, the horrors of nuclear weapons. Indeed, such propositions now meet with such general verbal assent that, in this loose sense, it is possible to say that "we are all neutralists now." But the significant fact is that neutralist doctrine in its broader forms seems most convincingly, a philosophy of state practice in Africa and Asia, where it is nourished by new nationalisms.

Afro-Asian neutralist doctrine, rather paradoxically, expresses both highly sensitive suspicion of all foreign influences and more or less tolerance for all modern political doctrines regarded as useful to neutralists. It is a highly eclectic and pragmatic doctrine, not least because its most influential proponents are leaders of neutralist states. Its arguments are not novel but this does not mean that they lack appeal, rather the reverse. For neutralist doctrine can provide a rationale and sense of direction for new nationalisms seeking expression in a world where increasingly there are pressures forcing each state to adopt at least declaratory policies on a whole host of international problems, and where national isolation is a virtual impossibility. At the root of most Afro-Asian neutralist attitudes to the Cold War lie widely popular demands for national independence, national equality, and for augmenting national

power and welfare. Throughout the greater part of Asia and Africa the effective choice of political attitudes is not a choice between Communism and anti-Communism, but between various shades of anti-Western neutralist-nationalism and various degrees of concern about local and regional problems.

In retrospect, three popular beliefs about neutralism as a state policy seem to have been mistaken.

Firstly, there has been a prevalent assumption that if neutralist states oppose the Soviet bloc on certain issues, they must therefore support Western policies instead, or vice versa. Yet opposition to a particular policy of one of the Cold War camps does not necessarily mean approval of the other. In fact, neither Cold War camp can rely on the majority of neutralists to consistently take their side in Cold War disputes. Although Cold War protagonists will persist in trying to see to which of the camps particular neutralists are inclined, it is important to remember that neutralist leaders are virtually all genuinely concerned to stay non-aligned, for it is their fundamental conviction that the benefits of non-alignment outweigh any advantages that commitment could bring.

Secondly, American fears of "creeping neutralism", the growth of neutralist feeling and sentiment within her alliances, resulting in the defection of some of the members, seem, so far, to have been exaggerated. Of course, it is

arguable that the actual voicing of these fears and warnings helped to prevent their realisation, though this is a dubious contention. Japanese, French and British neutralist movements, however vocal, have so far been without international significance as they have not engendered sufficient strength to take command of the state. Effective neutralism must be an attribute of statehood, the state being its measure and mould. The only states which have so far become neutralist as a result of defecting from a Western alliance are Iraq and Cuba. It should be borne in mind, however, that these defections have both occurred since 1958. It remains to be seen if there will be further arrivals in the ranks of neutralists from the Western alliance systems.

Thirdly, there seems to be little justification to date for the view that neutralism is a first step to Communism. Americans have feared this and Communists may have believed it, but so far no neutralist state has become Communist - though one Communist state has become neutralist. This view was widely held in both parts of the committed world because of the necessarily anti-Western character of nationalism in Western colonial territories. In fact, Afro-Asian national leaders see their neutralism as a natural expression of their state's sovereign independence in international politics. Ironically, although the neutralist nations could not hope to survive a global Communist victory, their barbs

are directed mostly against the Western powers.

Neutralism should be seen not as a degeneration of the principles of nineteenth century neutrality, but primarily as the expression of new sovereignties and new nationalisms in prevailing Cold War conditions.

Membership of the United Nations in January 1961

	DATE OF JOINING THE UNITED NATIONS.	DATE OF INDEPENDENCE IF SINCE 1945	COLD WAR AFFILIATION	CATEGORY OF NEUTRALISM.
	1.	2.	3.	4.
Afghanistan	1946			ex-buffer
Albania	1955		Warsaw Pact	
Argentina	1945		Rio Pact	
Australia	1945		SEATO & ANZUS	
Austria	1955			neutralized
Belgium	1945		NATO	
Bolivia	1945		Rio Pact	
Brazil	1945		Rio Pact	
Bulgaria	1955		Warsaw Pact	
Burma	1948	1948		new state
Byelorussia SSR	1945		Soviet satellite	
Cambodia	1955	1954		new state
Cameroun	1960	1960		new state
Canada	1945		NATO	
Central African Republic	1960	1960		new state
Ceylon	1955	1947		new state
Chad	1960	1960		new state
Chile	1945		Rio Pact	

	1.	2.	3.	4.
China (Formosa)	1945		bi-lateral pact with U.S.	
Columbia	1945		Rio Pact	
Congo (Brazzaville)	1960	1960		new state
Congo (Leopoldville)	1960	1960		new state
Costa Rica	1945		Rio Pact	
Cuba	1945		U.S. base ex-Rio Pact	pioneer (?)
Cyprus	1960	1960		new state
Czechoslovakia	1945		Warsaw Pact	
Dahomey	1960	1960		new state
Denmark	1945		NATO	
Dominican Republic	1945		Rio Pact	
Ecuador	1945		Rio Pact	
El Salvador	1945		Rio Pact	
Ethiopia	1945			ex-isolation- ist
Finland	1955		bilateral pact with U.S.S.R.	ex-buffer
France	1945		NATO & SEATO	
Gabon	1960	1960		new state
Ghana	1957	1957		new state
Greece	1945		NATO	
Guatemala	1945		Rio Pact	
Guinea	1958	1958		new state

	1.	2.	3.	4.
Haiti	1945		Rio Pact	
Honduras	1945		Rio Pact	
Hungary	1955		Warsaw Pact	
Iceland	1946		NATO	
India	1945	1947		pioneer
Indonesia	1950	1949		new state
Iran	1945		CENTO	
Iraq	1945		ex-Baghdad Pact	pioneer (?)
Ireland	1955			ex-isolation- ist
Israel	1949	1948		new state
Italy	1955		NATO	
Ivory Coast	1960	1960		new state
Japan	1956		bilateral pact with U.S.	
Jordan	1955	1946		new state
Laos	1955	1954		new state
Lebanon	1945	1941/6		new state
Liberia	1945			ex-isolation- ist
Libya	1955	1951	U.S. bases	new state
Luxembourg	1945		NATO	
Madagascar	1960	1960		new state
Malaya	1957	1957	pact with U.K.	new state
Mali	1960	1960		new state
Mexico	1945		Rio Pact	

	1.	2.	3.	4.
Morocco	1956	1956	U.S. & French bases	new state
Nepal	1955			ex-buffer
Netherlands	1945		NATO	
New Zealand	1945		SEATO & ANZUS	
Nicaragua	1945		Rio Pact	
Niger	1960	1960		new state
Nigeria	1960	1960		new state
Norway	1945		NATO	
Pakistan	1947	1947	SEATO & CENTO	
Panama	1945		Rio Pact	
Paraguay	1945		Rio Pact	
Peru	1945		Rio Pact	
Philippines	1945	1946	SEATO	
Poland	1945		Warsaw Pact	
Portugal	1955		NATO	
Roumania	1955		Warsaw Pact	
Saudi Arabia	1945		U.S. bases	ex-isolation- ist
Senegal	1960	1960	French base	new state
Somalia	1960	1960		new state
South Africa	1945		bilateral pact with U.K.	
Spain	1955		bilateral pact with U.S.	
Sudan	1956	1956		new state

	1.	2.	3.	4.
Sweden	1946			traditional neutral
Thailand	1946		SEATO	
Togo	1960	1960		new state
Tunisia	1956	1956	French base	new state
Turkey	1945		NATO & CENTO	
Ukrainian S.S.R.	1945		Soviet satellite	
U.S.S.R.	1945		Warsaw Pact etc.	
United Arab Republic	1945			pioneer
United Kingdom	1945		NATO, SEATO & CENTO	
U.S.A.	1945		NATO, SEATO, CENTO, etc.	
Upper Volta	1960	1960		new state
Uruguay	1945		Rio Pact	
Venezuela	1945		Rio Pact	
Yemen	1947			ex-isolation- ist
Yugoslavia	1945			pioneer

Notes:

1. In 1958 Egypt and Syria, original members of the U.N. were united in a single state, the United Arab Republic.
2. Switzerland (traditional neutral), Bhutan & Sikkim (buffer states) are the only neutralist states not members of the U.N.
3. India is here counted as a pioneer neutralist and hence not as a new state neutralist, though she only became independent in 1947.

Select Bibliography

It would not be helpful to others simply to list all the sources cited in the footnotes to this thesis. They are better seen in the context in which they are used. It seems more useful to finish off with a short list of the studies which have been found most helpful in preparing this thesis. All the books already listed in the table of abbreviations are not re-listed here, as my debts to them will be mostly obvious from the citations in my footnotes. Nor does it seem necessary to list standard works.

1. Some general surveys of neutralism are:-

- H. F. Armstrong "Neutrality: Varying Tunes." in Foreign Affairs, October 1956, pp. 57-83.
- Aldo Garosci "Neutralism" in European Integration, edited by C. Grove Haines (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1957) pp. 196-214.
- Denis Healey Neutralism (Bellman Books, no. 4, Ampersand, London, 1955).
- William Henderson "The Roots of Neutralism in Southern Asia" in International Journal, Toronto, vol. 13 (1), Winter 1957-8, pp. 30-40.
- Henry A. Kissinger "The New Cult of Neutralism" in The Reporter, 24 November 1960, pp. 26-9.
- W. A. Lewis "Neutralism in Africa" in The Reporter, 10 November 1960, pp. 31-3.
- Stanley Mayes "'Neutralism' in South East Asia" in The Listener, 25 June 1959, pp. 1093-1094.
- Hans J. Morgenthau "Neutrality and Neutralism", in Dilemmas of Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1958) pp. 185-209.
- Robert A. Scalapino "Neutralism in Asia" in The American Political Science Review, March 1954, pp. 49-62.

2. Some more specialised analyses of neutralism are:-

- John T. Marcus "Neutralism in France" in The Review of Politics, July 1955, pp. 295-328.
Neutralism and Nationalism in France (Bookman Associates, New York, 1958).
- I. I. Morris "Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralism in International Affairs, R.I.I.A., London, January 1960, pp. 7-20.
- Marina Salvin Neutralism in France and Germany, (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951).
- John H. Wuorinen "Neutralism in Scandinavia" in Current History, 1956, pp. 276-280.
- I. William Zartman "Neutralism and Neutrality in Scandinavia" in The Western Political Quarterly, June 1954, pp. 125-160.

3. Some aspects of Communism and neutralism are dealt with in:-

- George Ginsburgs "The Soviet Union, Neutrality and Collective Security, 1945-1959" in Osteuropa Recht, October 1959, pp. 77-98.
- A. M. Halpern "The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism" in The China Quarterly, January-March, 1961, pp. 90-115.
- E. Korovin "The Problem of Neutrality Today" in International Affairs (Moscow), March 1958, pp. 36-40.
- D. Melnikov "Neutrality and the Current Situation" in International Affairs (Moscow), February, 1956, pp. 74-81.
- I. Modjoryan "Neutrality" in New Times (Moscow), February 1956, pp. 15-18.

4. On 'classical' neutrality, see:-

- Philip S. Jessup (ed.) Neutrality: its History, Economics and Law, 4 vols. (New York, 1935-6).
- Nils Orvik The Decline of Neutrality, 1914-41, (Tanum, Oslo, 1953).

- Nicolas Politis Neutrality and Peace (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1935).
5. On nationalism, see especially:-
- D. W. Brogan The Price of Revolution (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1951), especially pp. 105-127.
- Rupert Emerson From Empire to Nation. The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1960).
- Thomas Hodgkin Nationalism in Colonial Africa (Muller, London, 1956).
- Elie Kedourie Nationalism (Hutchinson's, London, 1960).
6. On the Cold War and contemporary politics generally, see especially:-
- Raymond Aron The Century of Total War (translated from the French by E. W. Dicks and O. S. Griffiths), Derek Verschoyle, London, 1954.
- On War. Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy (translated by Terence Kilmartin), Secker & Warburg, 1958.
- Arnold Wolfers (ed.) Alliance Policy in the Cold War, (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1959)

Appendix 1.Swiss Neutrality. An Official
Statement.

I owe the discovery and translation of the following document to my colleague, Mr. Christopher Hughes. The prefatory note is his, too.

.....

This document, dated 1954, has recently been published as the first entry in the annual series (always now several years in arrear) of Administrative Decisions of the Federal Authorities. Most of these decisions are in that part of Federal Administrative Law where the administrative (as opposed to the judicial) authority is competent to decide. Thus, most of them wear a semi-judicial character. By the nature of things, however, the decisions of the Swiss Foreign Office (the Political Department) are more administrative or even political in character. The present document must be taken as publication of an instruction circulated within the service. It is not addressed to the general public, but to Swiss officials at home and abroad.

The picture of neutrality given is affected by this. It is proper for the Swiss people to consider neutrality as a political ideal rather than a political expedient. The present document is, no doubt, consistent with this: officials are paid to represent the national interests, not ideals. That there is not the least trace of idealism visible (at first reading) in the document is only evidence for the official, within-the-service, attitude. It is not evidence for any popular cynicism. Indeed, within some spheres, the Swiss people rather than Swiss officials prevail, but the broad general trend is to throw legislation open to democracy, and to confine administration to the administrators.

So this statement does not represent the national ideal. It is tempting to go to the other extreme, and insert the words "Swiss Foreign Policy" - the power politics of a small power - instead of the words "the duty of a permanently neutral state." But this would probably also be a distortion. The mere description of the policy by the general word "neutrality" (even though it is perfectly understood that of this particular sort of neutrality Switzerland will always be the unique example) makes a certain implicit idealism nevertheless unavoidable. Somewhere between these two interpretations is the right frame of mind to read this remarkably frank, official instruction to Swiss officials and diplomats.

Source: Verwaltungsentscheide der Bundesbehoerden. Jurisprudence des
autorites administratives de la Confederation. Heft - Fascicule - 24.1954.
En vent au bureau des imprimes de la Chancellerie federale.

1. Beziehungen zum Ausland: Relations avec l'étranger. (1) Begriff der Neutralität: Notion de la neutralité. (p. 9-13)

The complete document, as published, is printed here. (Published 1959).

Translation. The document is in German only. One might guess from the style of the original that it is the work of several hands. For example, in s.lll. no. (1), paragraph one, might well have been originally drafted in French, while paragraph two is cast in one mould as a sentence which might well have been thought out in German. (The present Minister for the Political Department speaks French as mother-tongue, while the Head of the Judicial Division of the Department speaks German.)

The words "oblige" and "obligation" represent the German "verpflichten, verpflichtung", which carry the meaning of pflicht, duty, and not of purely external force. The word vorwirkung is difficult to render: "pre-effect" translates the two components: it is therefore left in German.

The sentences in (parentheses) are in the original. Those in ((double brackets)) are the translator's insertions.

The Concept of Neutrality

The Political Department summarised the ruling doctrine under the following heads:

I.

A distinction must be made between "ordinary" and "permanent" neutrality.

Ordinary neutrality denotes the legal status of a state which does not take part in a war which has broken out between other states. Therefore its presuppositions are:

1. A war, as understood by the Law of Nations.
2. Non-participation of a state in the hostilities.

Permanent neutrality consists in a state taking upon itself the obligation to be permanently neutral. This may be combined with the ((verpflichtung)) express obligation taken by other states to respect that neutrality. Hence, the distinction must be made between one-sided permanent neutrality, and permanent neutrality arising out of treaties. Both these may be combined, as in the case of Switzerland.

II.

Ordinary neutrality creates no rights and duties in time of peace. Only for a permanently neutral state do rights and duties arise even in time of peace. These may be described as:

1. The duty to begin no war.
2. The duty to defend neutrality or independence, as the case may be.
3. The so-called secondary duties of permanent neutrality, (vorwirkungen).

These may be comprehensively summarised in the phrase; that a permanently neutral state must do everything to stop itself being involved in a war, and nothing which could get it drawn into a war. That is to say, it must, in general, avoid taking sides in a conflict between third-party states. It is obliged to follow a Neutralitaetspolitik. The carrying into effect of this policy of neutrality is a matter for its own judgment.

III.

No further explanation is needed of the two chief duties ((described above)) of a permanently neutral state in time of peace. But investigation is needed concerning the so-called vorwirkungen. What political, military and economic duties are implicit in them?

1. Political neutrality can be described as the obligation of the neutral state so to conduct its foreign policy that it can be drawn into no war. In particular, it should conclude no treaty that could lead to

its being obliged to wage war, e.g. offensive alliances, defensive leagues with reciprocal effect, treaties of guarantee, collective security agreements. The obligation is, like all others, to be construed restrictively, and can only apply to foreign-policy acts properly so-called, and in any case not to other actions of the state (e.g. humanitarian activities in favour of the inhabitants of particular states, governmental explanations of the political situation to its own people, intra-state organisation and arrangements, etc.) It need not be said that there is no obligation to a so-called moral neutrality. The individual is not a subject of duties of neutrality under the Law of Nations. (Hence, in principle, neutrality demands no restriction of the liberty of the Press).

As regards participation in international conferences and organisations, the distinction must be made between whether they display a predominantly political or a predominantly economic, cultural or technical aspect. If it is a conference or organisation of a political character, then the only possible question of participation arises if it displays a certain universality. The principal representatives of the political groupings in question must participate, and in particular both parties of a possible conflict. Here also Switzerland has to avoid taking sides.

As against this, neutral states have the right to offer "good services" or "mediation" - even during any hostilities; exercise of this right can never be understood by one of the conflicting parties as an unfriendly action (Art. 3 of the Hague Agreement for Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, of 18 Oct. 1907).

2. Concerning military neutrality, all one can say is that the permanently neutral state should in general conclude no military agreements with other states. The same applies as under No. 1 above.

3. There is only economic neutrality insofar as the permanently neutral state should conclude no customs or economic union with another state, through which it might affect in greater or less degree its independence in a political context also. This only applies when the neutral state is the weaker party and thereby falls into dependence on its stronger partner; in such a case even the legal possibility of discharge of the contract of union or a special war clause would make no difference.

Apart from this, there is no such thing as economic neutrality, unless the neutral state expressly and intentionally supports ((either)) the armament or politically motivated economic measures of other states, directed against their adversary - so that the attitude of the neutral state would be pre-judged in a war and doubt arise as to its attitude.

In general the point must be made that the permanently neutral state should enter upon no ties with other states which in case of war would oblige it to un-neutral attitudes, i.e. to an attitude in conflict with the provisions of the ordinary law of neutrality (which applies only in war).

IV.

When war breaks out, the duties of an ordinary neutral according to the general law of neutrality come to apply to the duties of a permanently neutral state.

In principle, the latter ((the duties of a permanently neutral state)) prescribe that the neutral should not intervene in war to the advantage of one party (prohibition of intervention, including political (or economic measures). By the side of this the principle of equality of treatment prevails; but positive law contains numerous exceptions from this rule.

Neutrality ends for the neutral when a state of war starts (but not with the rebuttal by force of a breach of neutrality: Art. 10 of the Fifth Hague Convention.)

Political and military obligations of neutrality can hardly be separated. In short, the following are involved:

1. Prohibition of hostilities against a belligerent.
2. Prohibition against sending troops.
3. Prohibition against handing over rights of sovereignty by the neutral state to a belligerent.
4. Duty to maintain the inviolability of the territory of a neutral state.

In particular the following are to be prevented: acts of war, passage of troops or convoys of food and munitions, handing over neutral territory as basis of operations, erection of agencies to encourage recruitment or for enlistment, maintenance of wireless stations, passage of aircraft over the territory.

These duties are to be fulfilled according to the measure of the means at the disposal of the neutral state. (Even if the Fifth Hague Agreement Concerning Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Event of War on Land does not contain any stipulation to this effect, such as Articles 3, 8 and 25 of the Thirteenth Agreement on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in the Event of a War at Sea, nevertheless it is quite clear that a general principle of law is concerned here.)

- 6 -

Economic neutrality can only be spoken of insofar as the neutral state is obliged to afford the belligerents no financial support (by this is meant, of course, loans and financial payments intended for direct use for the conduct of the war: it does not exclude credits for trade-political purposes, more especially credits for the maintenance of normal trade relations) or to deliver weapons and munitions to them, and not even to do so if both parties are treated alike (absolute duty). As against this, it is not obliged to forbid private persons the export or transit of weapons, munitions and other war material. If, however, such prohibitions are issued, then the neutral must apply them equally to all belligerents.

Beyond this there is no economic neutrality. On the contrary, the neutral state has a right to trade with the belligerents. Switzerland has always represented this point of view (cf. Message of the Federal Council of 4 August 1919 concerning the entry of Switzerland into the League of Nations.) The neutral state must only "put up with" certain infringements on the part of belligerents (e.g. prohibition of contraband, blockade, etc.). The principles of constant normal and equal contribution in trade followed by the Confederation in the last war are principles of trade policy chosen by the Confederation herself.

Nevertheless, it follows from the general duty of non-intervention in hostilities, that an exceptional and especially significant economic favouring of one party constitutes an infringement of neutrality.

V.

In principle, all duties arising out of neutrality are to be interpreted restrictively, as being limitations upon sovereignty.

If a neutral state, and especially Switzerland, does more than the duties of permanent or ordinary neutrality demand, then this is done not in performance of a legal duty, but from political calculations, with the intent that the confidence of the belligerents in the maintenance of neutrality shall be strengthened.

(Political Department, 26 November 1954)

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In contrast to the preceding document, which is a professional directive, the following excerpt is intended to represent Switzerland's 'public voice'. It is from the Message of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on 20 August 1948, about Swiss adherence to the newly formed Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC):

"Being situated in the heart of Europe, our country dare not allow itself to be economically isolated, nor ignore what goes on outside its borders. Within the limits of its power, which is not great, our country must join in the efforts that are now under way to attempt the reconstruction of the continent and to set up for this task a regime of mutual understanding, a condition of stability and peace. Our status as neutrals forbids us - indeed the sense of solidarity which is the natural counterpart of this same neutrality compels us - to take part in the economic reconstruction of Europe. As has been justly remarked, "Switzerland seems almost as if fated by its geographical situation, as well as prepared by its history, to fulfil the international duties closest to the root idea of neutrality, and to strip off the character of selfish privilege which is usually imputed to her by her neighbours when at war." (Bonjour).
(Cited from the New York Times, 21 August 1948.)

Appendix 2.

Swedish Neutrality

The following statements of the Swedish viewpoint are all taken from speeches of Osten Unden, who has been the Foreign Minister and the chief architect of Sweden's postwar neutrality policy ever since 1945. No doubt Unden's background in international law serves to explain his constant attempt to define clearly the whole scope of Swedish foreign policy. Unden, who was born in 1886, joined the newly formed Social Democratic Party while an undergraduate at Lund University. In 1917 he was appointed to the Chair of Civil Law at the University of Uppsala. When the first Social Democrat government was formed in 1920, Unden became Minister of Justice. From 1921 to 1924 he worked for the Swedish Foreign Office as an expert on international law. From 1924 to 1926 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Branting and Sandler cabinets. Unden, who had expressed his hatred of Hitler's Germany with more frankness than most Swedish parliamentarians during the war, became Foreign Minister again in 1945. Despite some criticism of his "legalisms" there is little doubt that his conception of Swedish neutrality commands the support of the vast majority of the Swedish people.

1. Statement to the Riksdag on Foreign Policy in the First Chamber by the Prime Minister, in the Second Chamber by Osten Unden, both on 22nd March 1950 (see Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1950-51, published by The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1957, pp. 13-27).

"The allegation sometimes made in our public debate that we are pursuing an isolationist policy is a mere catchword of propaganda. Swedish foreign policy is no more a policy of isolation than it was during the inter-war period. This country is keeping outside military blocs, but that we have done previously during the present century, and long before that, without being called isolationist.

"The idea of a coming world war cannot be allowed to dominate our minds to such an extent as to make us neglect the interests that present themselves in peacetime. We do not wish to pursue a foreign policy that might help to make our corner of the world a centre of unrest and a cause of friction between East and West.

"If Sweden were to join a military Great Power bloc, this would not appreciably affect either the general policy of the leading states, or the balance of power between them. Nor do we imagine that we are able to play any part in bridging the gap that exists between the groups of Great Powers. On the other hand, we are not over-presumptuous if we believe that it may be useful also from an international point of view

if we make our aim gradually to evolve a type of society that implies both political and economic democracy..... It is by no means unimportant that the view should be countered that the world is moving inevitably toward a division into a capitalist and a communist bloc which are bound ultimately to come to grips in a final struggle for world hegemony. This catastrophe theory in an international version is most likely to be deprived of its grip on people's minds if the actual development lends support to the possibility of a state of affairs in which political democracies do in fact conform to the idea of a welfare state, such as we in this country, for instance, are trying to realize. Such a development can hardly fail in the long run to influence ideas, even in countries under the dictatorship of the proletariat in which it has up till now been an article of faith that the rebuilding of the economic structure of the community for which those countries are striving is not possible under a system of genuine political democracy.

"The foreign policy which Sweden desires to continue in the future is designed to make neutrality possible should a general conflict nevertheless break out. We are aware that a policy of neutrality has prospects of succeeding only under such external conditions that our neutrality is not found to be irreconcilable with the vital interests of the belligerents.

"Were Sweden a military Great Power and, moreover, situated at a great distance from the war fronts, her policy of neutrality might conceivably be replaced by the more arbitrary policy of a non-belligerent. But our experience from two world wars should have taught us how very little freedom of choice, during untoward conditions, a neutral country may have between different lines of action within the framework of preserved neutrality. No responsible government can take upon itself in peacetime to define in detail the neutrality policy that a future government may be able to pursue, under conditions as yet unknown."

2. Speech by Osten Unden at an inter-Scandinavian Congress held at Karlstad of the Social Democratic Youth League on 6th June 1954. (see Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1954, Stockholm, 1957, pp. 39-43).

Reflections on the failure of Swedish proposals for a Scandinavian defence pact in 1949.

"I would only venture to say that a Scandinavian group outside the Great Power blocs would, in my opinion, have had a greater mission to perform in international politics than can now be carried out by the three countries. It may be very well to talk disparagingly of neutrality as an obsolete practice. It is natural to appeal to the solidarity amongst Western nations as a natural sense of community between nations who have the same concepts of democracy and human rights.

The indivisible character of peace may also be propagated. All these arguments carried great weight amongst our neighbours, with their experience of the last world war. But there are also other aspects to be taken into account in dealing with international politics, aspects which have been considered more important in Sweden. Is it in the interest of peace, we may ask, that all states should take sides and, as it were, be assembled in two great military camps? Is it of service to peace that, owing to the military alliances, real power is being concentrated more and more in a few large states directing the course of world affairs on the strength of their dominating position within their respective alliances?"

3. Speech by Osten Unden in Oslo on 20th November 1955 - The Philosophy of Collective Security (see Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1955, Stockholm, 1957, pp.55).

"The fact that Sweden has not relinquished her position outside the allied blocs but is carrying on her traditional foreign policy in spite of the emergence of the United Nations is in itself an expression of the view that in its essence the international constellation is the same as before the League and the United Nations. There has been no profound change in international politics. They still spell the formula of balance of power as their most characteristic theme. Collective security remains a distant ideal. States are not associated in a standing institution for peace, an international body of a higher order than the national states. The military forces of the Western Powers and their allies are not an instrument of international policy, capable of holding disturbers of peace under control. The design of world organisation drawn up so attractively in the United Nations Charter, remains for the present Utopian. The Great Powers who laid down the provisions of the Charter were also aware of the fact that it carried no guarantee for the realization of their attractive programme within any near future. Their right of veto in the Security Council is a realistic memento of their retaining their freedom of action as national states. None of them have been ready to enter a supra-national federation."

4. "Freedom from Alliances gives increased responsibility."
(Article by Osten Unden in Swedish paper Morgon Tidningen, 30 December 1956, reproduced in Acta Scandinavica juris gentium, vol. 26, 1956, d.52).

"The path of neutrality which Sweden has chosen in her foreign policy enjoys general support in the Riksdag. . . But questions of the application of that policy have not infrequently led to severe differences of opinion. This may sometimes imply a departure from the generally accepted path..." Unden goes on to argue that this is not so.

"Sweden's neutrality policy is not so marked as that, for example, of Switzerland. Our membership of the United Nations involves restrictions on neutrality. A member of the United Nations has to express itself and take a standpoint on all international questions from the platform which the organization constitutes. The fact that Sweden is not bound to any group of states by alliances to some extent facilitates the taking up of an objective position. From another point of view, this freer position entails increased responsibilities. During the past few years Sweden has tried to maintain her position of freedom. Sometimes it has been complained that we have shown too much caution by abstaining from voting on certain occasions. In my opinion this criticism is not justified. Has the United States of America shown excessive caution in abstaining from voting on certain questions concerning "colonialism."?

"The permanent factors which have determined our foreign policy objectives remain unchanged."

5. From "Our Foreign Policy", a pamphlet issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, being the text, with certain additions, of an address by Osten Unden on 5th June 1952 to the Social Democratic Party Congress.

"There is much to indicate that the leaders of the Soviet Union, on their part, base their policy upon fear of the Western Powers.

"Ideologically, Communism is a fanatical creed to which tolerance is utterly foreign. To this there is no counterpart on the other side, no uniform philosophy with aggressive tendencies."

Appendix 3.Jawaharlal Nehru of India

"We receive you not only in your capacity as the Prime Minister of India but also as the political educator of all Asia."¹ These words were spoken by the Syrian Foreign Minister, Salah el Bitar, when welcoming Mr. Nehru to Damascus; and even when due allowance is made for the customary eulogy that greets the arrival of any leading statesman in another country, his words do contain a kernel of truth. Mr. Nehru has been Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs ever since India achieved independence in 1947 and, on his own admission, he has been largely responsible for making Indians think of other countries, of world affairs generally, since he became chief spokesman on questions of foreign affairs for the Congress Party in the 1920s.

Yet Nehru's influence is not confined within India. For, without doubt, he is the world's most articulate, most influential, and best known neutralist. It has been decided here to give only three quotations from the vast number of Nehru's speeches and writings, to allow the first two to be fairly long, and to take the excerpts from the most recent collection of Nehru's speeches.³ This has been done because it is not pretended that the passages quoted in these appendices are anything more than representative selections of fairly common neutralist expressions; because it is felt that only lengthy quotation can convey any worthwhile impression of the rambling nature of Nehru's mellow expositions concerning international politics; and because Nehru, in his statements of general principles, in his theorizing about the essence of all foreign policy, has stressed that his enunciations of ideal precepts, even his broad practical recommendations, often do not have reference merely to Indian policies but have a wider application.

Furthermore, it is only in the context of such events as the Korean War, the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet which gave birth to the Fanchsheel principles, the settlement over Indo-China at Geneva, the inauguration of SEATO, and the Bandung Conference that Nehru's international conceptions seem to have finally congealed.⁴ Certainly, it is against the background of such events - where Indian interests have been directly involved - that critics of Nehru have been able to compare profession and practice, and some of them have made the gibe that Nehru

1. The Hindu, 22 June 1956.
2. Tibor Mende - Conversations with Mr. Nehru (London, 1956) p. 126.
3. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches (vol. 3, March 1953 to August 1957) Delhi 1958.
4. The evolution of Nehru's political beliefs can be traced in the most important of his works - An Autobiography (London 1936) & The Discovery of India (London 1946); in the 3 postwar volumes of his public speeches; and in the recent biography by Michael Brecher - Nehru. A Political Biography. (London, 1959).

conducts a foreign policy which appears to help solve all international problems except India's own. Of course, it may be rash to suggest that no new dramatic events - especially developments in Sino-Indian relations could induce a revision of Nehru's international doctrine, especially as his mind is practical rather than speculative and he is a politician rather than an ideologue. But Mr. Nehru was 65 years old in 1954, and men in their middle sixties do not easily revise their world view. And, when that world view is as broad and generalised as Mr. Nehru's is today, it can accommodate all but the most cataclysmic changes.

Finally, Nehru, for all his unique qualities, is in a certain sense a type. In Asia and Africa among the nationalist, especially the western educated, leaders, there are many Nehrus - Nehrus without India, Nehrus without Gandhi, Nehrus of right and left, with and without power. They are a response to the broad forces which have played upon them and their societies, especially if they are leading a 'new' state in international society. And to the extent that the interaction of these forces create similar national and personal problems, it creates also tendencies toward similar approaches. This is why such different men as the late S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike of Ceylon, President Nasser, U Nu, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and Kwame Nkrumah can each, with some measure of truth, acknowledge the influence of Nehru in the shaping of their own international conceptions..

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(a) Speech in Lok Sabha during a debate on the President's Address, February 25, 1955. Nehru's Speeches, vol. 3, pp. 280-287.

"I am a little afraid that this House in its enthusiasm might perhaps imagine that we are doing more than we are really doing. I am referring particularly to the international sphere, because some hon. Members in their speeches seemed to make out that India was playing a very important role, almost a dominating role, in regard to some world problems. Let us have a more correct perspective.

"I believe that we have helped, occasionally, in regard to the solution of some problems, and in the relaxation or lessening of tension. We might take due credit for that, but let us not go beyond that. After all a country's capacity to influence events is determined by various factors. You will find that India is lacking in most of those factors. If we have been successful in some measure, the success has been due not obviously to any kind of military strength or financial

1. One remembers Nehru's poignant words, written of himself in February 1935, while in prison: "I have become a queer mixture of the East and West, out of place everywhere at home nowhere... I cannot get rid of either that past inheritance or my recent acquisitions. They are both part of me, and, though they help me in both the East and West, they also create in me a feeling of spiritual loneliness not only in public activities but in life itself. I am a stranger and alien in the West. I cannot be of it. But in my own country also, sometimes, I have an exile's feeling." Autobiography, pp. 597-8.

power, but because we took a correct view of events. If I may say so in all modesty, we understood them more correctly than others, because we were more in tune with the spirit of the age. We do not have the strength to threaten anybody; nor do we want to.

"We feel, in so far as international policy is concerned, that right or wrong counts. But it is not the rightness of a proposition that makes it listened to but rather the person or the country which says so and the strength behind that country. The international policy of a country depends ultimately on the domestic state of affairs in that country; the two have to be in line and they cannot be isolated from each other. Indeed it is the internal state of affairs of a country that enables it to speak with some strength, force and authority in the international sphere. I do not wish to indulge in invidious comparisons. But hon. Members can look at our country as it is today and a number of other countries and decide for themselves how far India has progressed in the last six or seven years compared with most other countries. It is indeed due to this feeling that India is marching forward, that India is a country which is firmly established and is dynamic, that people in the rest of the world look upon us with a measure of respect.

"One hears frequently about pacts and military alliances in Europe, in the Middle East, in South-East Asia and elsewhere. There are in the world today two mighty Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. There are some other great Powers also, the United Kingdom and one or two others, who are also big in varying degree. I can understand, although I would not approve, military alliances between great Powers. That would have some meaning. But I do not understand military pacts and alliances between a huge giant of a power and a little pigmy of a country. It has no meaning in a military sense to me. In this nuclear age the only countries that count, from the nuclear war point of view, are those great countries which are, unfortunately, in a position to use these bombs. But to attach small countries to themselves in alliance really means - and I say so with all respect to those countries - that they are becoming very much dependent on these countries. Such associates do not add to their defensive power, for they have little or no military value. Perhaps such alliances have some psychological value. I wish to refrain from saying anything which might militate against others. But in this nuclear age, to think of war itself is insanity. Any person who has given thought to it - many generals, in England, France, U.S.A. and the Soviet Union have done so - would realize that war today is unthinkable, because a war is fought to achieve certain results, not to bring ruin on oneself. War, today, will bring ruin to every country involved, not only one. All the great countries appear to be clear about it and are absolutely certain that there is no country in the world which wants war. To talk about warmongers and the rest is completely wrong. There may be some individuals who might want war, but no country wants it. If that is so, what is the value of this policy of military alliances and armaments? It does not logically follow from the first assumption. The development of the thermonuclear bomb has changed the whole picture of fighting today. What might have been good a few years ago is no longer good.

"The fact that one country has a few more bombs than the other is of no great relevance. The point is that even the country that has less, has reached the saturation point, that is, it has enough to cause infinite damage to the other country. There is no real defence against nuclear weapons; you can at best damage or ruin the other country. When you have arrived at the saturation point, you have arrived at the stage of mutual extermination. Then the only way out is to prevent war, to avoid it. There is no other way. All talk of reduction of armaments, good as it is, does not help much. That is the first point we should remember.

"Secondly, we must consider what use alliances and pacts really have in this age of nuclear warfare. As I said earlier, they do not, help in a military sense, though psychologically, they may. I am not asking these countries to disband their armies or their air forces. The only effect of these pacts and alliances, it appears to me, is to hold a kind of threat. These threats are being thrown about by both the Power blocs. But even this business of threatening through military pacts has become obsolete in this nuclear age. You cannot threaten a big Power which has nuclear weapons, for it is not likely to be frightened. You can at best threaten small countries.

As things are today, we have reached a certain balance - it may be a very unstable balance, but it is still some kind of balance - when any kind of major aggression is likely to lead to a world war. That itself is a restraining factor. Whether aggression takes place in a small country or a big one, it tends to upset the unstable balance in the world and is therefore likely to lead to war. It is because of this that in the Geneva Conference there was so much argument about the Indo-China States. Either of the major parties was afraid that if any of these States linked up with or was coerced into joining one group, it would be to the disadvantage of the other. For instance, suppose countries like Laos and Cambodia were overwhelmed and drawn into the sphere of China, the countries on the other side would naturally be frightened. On the other hand, if Laos and Cambodia became hostile to China and could be used as bases for an attack on China, naturally China would object to it very strongly. What is the way out of the difficulty? Either you have war to decide who is stronger, or you place Laos, Cambodia and all the Indo-China States more or less outside the spheres of influence, outside the alignments, and outside the military pacts of the two groups, so that both could feel, at least to some extent, secure in the knowledge that these Indo-China States were not going to be used against them. There is no other way out. So at Geneva, they wisely decided, more or less, though not in clear language, that the Indo-China States should keep out of military pacts or alliances on either side, or, in other words, remain neutralized.

"If you extend the argument, you will see that the only way to avoid conflicts is to accept things more or less as they are. No doubt many things require to be changed, but you must not think of changing them by

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war. War does not do what you want to do; it does something much worse. Further, by enlarging the area of peace, that is, of countries which are not aligned to this group or that, but which are friendly to both, you reduce the chance of war.

"As the House knows, the policy adopted by India and followed consistently during the last few years has been appreciated by many countries. Some other countries of Asia, not because of us, but because of their own reasons, have followed a similar policy. Even countries which have not followed it have begun to appreciate our policy. We are following it because we are convinced that it is the right policy. We would follow it even if there was no other country in the world that followed it. It is not a question, as some hon. Members seem to imagine, of balancing the considerations and sitting on the fence. Ours is a positive policy and we follow it with conviction and faith.

It "The House knows of some countries which are our good friends in Asia, like Burma and Indonesia who have been following a similar policy in international affairs. Recently, when the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had come here, he and I issued a statement in which reference was made to Fanchsheel, the Five Principles. That indicates how the idea is spreading. I can assure this House that even though many Governments may not publicly approve of Fanchsheel, people in many countries have been attracted to it more and more.

"Among the many schools of thought and action in international affairs today is the school of strong action, as it calls itself. I suppose it is a relic of the old days when a warship or cruiser was sent down to frighten into submission any small country which misbehaved. Strong action might bring results when a very big country shows the mailed fist to a small country, but strong action does not go very far when the other country has also got a big fist. Then there is the school which talks about negotiation through strength. It is true that nobody will listen to you if you are weak. But, as you develop your strength to negotiate, unfortunately the other party also goes on developing its strength.

"Then there is the school of - shall I say - learned confusion. It talks very learnedly about international affairs, delivers speeches, writes articles, but never gets out of a confused state of mind. There is a fourth school, equally prominent, of ignorant confusion. So that, between all these various schools it is a little difficult to get to know where we are and what we are, more especially when the problem relates to Asia, because most of the currents of thought today in international affairs come from Europe and America. They are great countries, to be respected, but the greatness of a country does not necessarily endow it with greater understanding of some other country; and the fact that Asia has changed and is changing has not wholly been grasped by many people in other continents. Therefore their confusion is the greater when thinking of Asia.

"The world seems to be divided into two mighty camps, the communist and the anti-communist, and either party cannot understand how anyone can be foolish enough not to line up with itself. That just shows how little understanding these people have of the mind of Asia. Talking of India only, and not of all Asia, we have fairly clear ideas about our political and economic structure. We function in this country under a constitution which may be described as a parliamentary democracy. It has not been imposed upon us. We propose to continue with it. We do not intend changing it. We intend to function on the economic plane, too, in our own way. With all respect to some hon. Members opposite, we have no intention to turn communists. At the same time, we have no intention of being dragooned in any other direction. Putting it simply, we mean no ill to anybody. Every country has a right to choose its own path and go along it. We have chosen our path and we propose to go along it, and to vary it as and when we choose, not at somebody's dictate or pressure; and we are not afraid of any other country imposing its will upon us by military methods or any other methods. The only way for us is to build up our own strength, which we intend doing. Meanwhile we want to be friendly with other countries. Our thinking and our approach do not fit in with this great crusade of communism or crusade of anti-communism."

"Many people in those countries do not understand this approach of ours. And yet many countries of Asia have inevitably to follow this policy, unless they are much too weak to stand on their own feet. When they seek shelter and help it is because they cannot rely upon themselves. There is a type of help which countries take in friendship, which we are willing to take, of course, but there is another type of help which countries take because they are too weak to stand on their own legs. Well, that help does not help at all, because it weakens. And hence, we have been careful in this matter to make it clear always that our policies cannot be affected by and there must be no strings attached to any kind of help that we get, and that we would rather struggle through ourselves without any help than have our policies affected in any way by outside pressure."

"I was mentioning just now the change in Asia which is taking many forms. Presently, in the course of about seven weeks, there is going to be a conference at Bandung in Indonesia - an Asian-African conference it is called - to which a number of independent countries of Asia and Africa have been invited. So far as I know, every country that has been invited is likely to attend. I am not quite sure that all the replies have come, but I think they will all attend. What this conference is going to do is not up to me or even the sponsoring countries to say. It is the conference which will draw up its own agenda and decide. I was therefore a little surprised when the hon. Member, Shri Asoka Mehta, said something about the conference drawing up a vast programme for the liberation of suppressed countries. We are all for the liberation of suppressed countries, but the idea of associating the conference with a programme of this type seems to me completely to misunderstand its purpose. The House will remember it will be an

official-level conference in which Governments will be represented. In fact, Prime Ministers will be attending it, from countries with completely different ideologies and political and economic structures. There will be countries in this Conference which are aligned to this or that great Power bloc, and there are countries like India and Burma and Indonesia which are not aligned with any. This assortment of countries of Asia and Africa will therefore have much in common, and also much not in common. It is going to be an extraordinary meeting. The mere fact of our meeting is of the highest significance. It is the first time that such a meeting is taking place. It represents, rather unconsciously, subconsciously, Asia and Africa coming to the forefront. I do not know whether this idea was present wholly in the mind of the original sponsor of this conference, but because the proposal was made at the right time, it accorded with the spirit of the times.

"By its very nature, a conference of this type is hardly likely to discuss controversial issues as between the countries represented there. Also, if I may express my own opinion, I hope it will not function as if it was setting up a group in rivalry to the others. It is essentially an experiment in coexistence, for the countries of Asia and Africa - some of which are inclined this way, and some the other way in regard to the Power blocs - are meeting together in a friendly way and trying to find what common ground there is for co-operation in the economic, cultural and political fields. Therefore, it is a development of great importance from the point of view not only of Asia but of the world.

"The hon. Member, Shrimati Renu Chakravartty, did me the honour of quoting at some length from one of my own books about democracy. I have looked up the passage, and I may tell her that by and large I agree with what I had written twenty-two years ago, although I hope I have developed very much since then. What I then said - if I might repeat it - was that democracy, if it is confined to political democracy, and does not become economic democracy at all, is not full democracy. Many people want to hide themselves under this cloak of political democracy, and prevent other kinds of progress. When we speak of political democracy we should remember that adult suffrage is a very recent development even in the Western countries. The argument that political democracy was in favour of vested interests, while quite true when the franchise was small and restricted, does not apply with the same force when there is adult suffrage in a country.

"The problem that we really have to face is whether the changes we want to make in the economic domain can be effected peacefully by the democratic method or not. If democracy does not function in the political plane properly, then there is no way to bring about a change except by some kind of pressure, violence or revolution. But where this peaceful method is available, and where there is adult suffrage, there the question of trying to change things by violence is absurd and wholly wrong. To my thinking, it means that a small number of people are trying to impose their will, by means of violence, on a much larger number, having failed to change their opinions by the normal method of reasoning or argument. That, certainly, is not

democracy, political or economic or any other. Therefore, the problem before us is to have democracy - and we have it politically - and to extend it in the economic field."

- (2) Speech at the Asian Legal Consultative Committee meeting, New Delhi, April 18, 1957. Nehru's Speeches, vol. 3, pp. 508-513.

"Today we see certain tendencies of the revival of holy alliances. They are not called by that name, but certain groups of nations function more or less on the basis of the holy alliance idea. They consider themselves the centre of the world and expect other countries to fall in line. This may have some justification, but it does put these other countries in an embarrassing position. Either one joins the holy alliance or one is outside the pale of international law, in a sense. The emergence of Asian and African countries as independent nations and this return to the holy alliance idea make it important that concepts of international law should be examined closely.

"Let us take the United Nations. I think it was supposed to be an international organization inclusive of all the independent nations of the world. There is a tendency, however, to regard it as something less than that - a tendency, which, I suppose, emanates from the holy alliance idea. This in turn has affected other problems also. Politicians and statesmen who discuss such problems are naturally influenced by their political approach, and so we do not get what might be called a scholarly, objective estimate. Further, it so happens, that what we generally get is the non-Asian or non-African side. I respect that side, but it is possible that the scholars of that persuasion might not bear in mind some aspects which would be obvious to Asian scholars and jurists. Therefore, it is desirable that the various aspects of international law should be considered objectively and in a scholarly manner by the eminent lawyers and jurists of Asia and Africa.

"Nowadays many words and phrases are used the dictionary meaning and significance of which have changed completely in the hands of politicians, that is, people of my tribe. We used to know, for example, what 'belligerency' was. Belligerency, I believe, is defined as waging a regular and recognized war. It must be regular and it must be recognized; otherwise, I suppose, it is guerilla fighting, which is not belligerency. And in so far as States or rulers are concerned, the opposite of belligerency used to be neutrality, that is, not siding with a power which is belligerent or which is waging an active and recognized war. Yet, delegates here must know how vaguely the word 'neutrality', or 'neutralism', as it is sometimes called, is used now - sometimes as a term of abuse, sometimes in a different way, but mostly in a manner which does not describe what is meant exactly. As I understand the terms, belligerency and neutrality, in relation to Powers, refer to a state of war or to countries not joining a war. But as everyone knows, these words are used even when there is no active war. If a country is supposed to be neutral today, then

presumably some other country which is not neutral should be described as belligerent. And yet that would be a wrong description, because the other country is not engaged in regular or recognized warfare. I do not quite know how international law or jurists of repute would define what is called cold war, which is presumably some kind of suspended belligerency."

"As I said, we find today a return, to some extent, to the idea of the old holy alliance, backed by military pacts and economic measures. I should say that there is more than one holy alliance. Behind all this lies enormous danger to the world in case of war. I take it that international law is meant primarily to prevent war. Its purpose is to settle problems and disputes by methods other than war. War is an absence of law. It is true that so far international law does not have behind it the same strength that domestic law does. But its main purpose is the avoidance of war. Almost everybody in the wide world dislikes the idea of war today because it is so dangerous. How can jurists and lawyers help in the avoidance of war? They cannot, I suppose, help directly in political developments but they can at least help in clear thinking. Such clarity is needed because the concept of new holy alliances to which I referred, and the concept of cold war and the peculiar interpretation given to neutrality, confuse our thinking and our actions. I hope you will help us by analysing these concepts so that we may not be led away by the slogans of politicians and statesmen."

"You have referred, Mr. Attorney-General, to Panchsheel, the Five Principles which have been accepted by a number of countries of Asia and some countries outside Asia. I claim no special virtue for them. They are only some simple principles which, if adopted by nations in regard to international relationships, will not only lead us away from war but will establish healthy relationships. They are really simple and I do not see how anyone anywhere can object to any of them - the recognition of sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs. When a country does not conform to these principles it is misbehaving, interfering. It is not acting according to the real basis of international law, which consists of non-aggression, non-interference, recognition of sovereignty, mutual respect, all these leading up to peaceful co-existence. Peaceful coexistence means coexistence of countries which differ in their policies. There is no point in saying that two persons or two countries who agree should exist peacefully. They do. There is no point in my saying that I should be tolerant towards my neighbour if he and I have no reason to differ. The question of my tolerating my neighbour, and his tolerating me, arises only when we differ. The question of peaceful coexistence therefore comes in only when countries differ in their policies, provided always that they do not interfere with each other, either internally or externally. If they do, then that is a breach. Therefore, I submit that these Five Principles which are sometimes called Panchsheel, are a healthy basis for international relations, and I would further say in all humility that there is no other basis unless you accept the basis which leads to conflict, which of course is not our objective.

Surely international law should not encourage any attempt to compel or coerce a country to do something against its will, or to fall in line with something that will bring conflicts."

"I cannot suggest that you should find remedies for the world's ills but I do hope that you will show us some way of clear thinking which will lead to right action."

(c) From reply to debate on International Affairs, Lok Sabha, November 20, 1956. Nehru's Speeches, vol. 3, pp. 44-46.

"We sometimes venture to express our opinion. Why? For two reasons: first, we think that it is the right of every country, as of every individual, to express its opinion; and out of the welter of ideas truth sometimes emerges. Secondly, we are so placed - and that is a virtue which we possess - that we are not consumed with hatred of this country or that. If a country is consumed with hatred and fear, then its mind is clogged. It cannot think straight. I say with all respect that in the United States there is no clear thinking about Russia just as there is no clear thinking in Russia about the United States, because the minds of both are clogged with indignation, with fear and hatred of each other. I have not the shadow of a doubt that if they come to know each other more - it does not matter whether they agree or not and they probably will not agree about many things - hatred and misconceptions will go and they will realize one thing more than anything else, namely, that the other country, whatever it is, however wrong it may be in its opinion, is a living entity, a growing entity, has something new and worthwhile that has to be studied. That is the important thing. That is why we have always sought to encourage contacts and mutual understanding."

"Now, I claim this as a virtue for us, for our country, for this Parliament and for our people. We are not obsessed by fear. We are not obsessed by hatred of any country. We are not obsessed even by the dislike of any other country. Our minds are a little more receptive than those of others - communists, anti-communists or socialists. I do think that is a virtue in us and it is in the good democratic tradition. When that goes, it is bad for the world."

Appendix 4.President Tito and Yugoslav Neutralism

There is no need for a lengthy justification of the choice of Tito as the prime spokesman for Yugoslav neutralism.^{1.} As Head of State, Commander-in-Chief, Head of Government, and General Secretary of the Party, Tito is a real life Yugoslav 'Poo-bah'; and though Kardelj and Rankovic (and, prior to his 'disgrace', Djilas) reputedly^{2.} take major parts in the formulation and execution of Yugoslav policies, there is no doubt that these are supporting roles to the central figure of Tito.

It is essential to an understanding of Yugoslav neutralism to remember that it was the direct product of the clash between Stalin and Tito which came to a head in June 1948 with the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform; and that, as an international doctrine, it was not the cause but the product of the Soviet bloc's campaign against Yugoslavia. This explains the eminently practical bent of Yugoslav neutralist doctrine, its extremely pragmatic, expedient, and often apparently contradictory character. For, by and large, Yugoslav neutralist doctrine, just as Yugoslav policy, has been shaped by a negative consideration - namely, opposition to all things 'Stalinist', and consequently the tone and expression of the doctrine depends on the state of Soviet-Yugoslav relations at any particular time.^{3.}

Yet it would be wrong to give the impression that doctrine is unimportant to Tito. For he is himself a Moscow trained Marxist-Leninist, anxious to assert the truth and relevance for Yugoslavia of the well known Marxist principle of the unity of theory and practice. Tito has always claimed to be a legitimate heir of Marx and Lenin, and has rebutted accusations that Yugoslav communists are guilty of "~~Marxism~~", as other communists often charge. In a speech at Zagreb in December 1959, Tito said that Yugoslavs were revising "bad practice" - i.e. Stalinist-type practice - and not communist theory. He claimed that Yugoslavs remained pupils of Marx and Lenin but they did not accept their teachings dogmatically because neither "Marx nor Engels nor Lenin knew that today rockets would be flying to the moon, that the atomic bomb would be invented and that new relations in the world would be created."^{4.} Consistent with his claim that he is interpreting Marxist-Leninism dialectically and undogmatically, Tito denies that the Russians can rightly claim to expound the sole, universally valid, orthodoxy, and he further denies that there is any real meaning to such terms as "Titoism" or "national Communism."^{5.}

1. The Yugoslavs dislike the term 'neutralism' which they say implies passivity or indifference. They prefer "peaceful and active coexistence." Tito spoke on this question of terminology during a speech made to the Yugoslav National Assembly in Belgrade on 7 March 1956. See report in The Times, 9 March 1956.
2. See Tito's 'authorized' biography - "Tito Speaks" by Vladimir Dedijer (London 1953), esp. pp. 432-3. This book also gives accounts of the roles of Bebler, Pijade and Popovic.
3. For the main vicissitudes of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, see above pp. 177-190.
4. Quoted in The Times, 14 December 1959.
5. See Dedijer, op. cit. pp. 446-450.

Indeed, it is probably only since the 'Second' Soviet-Yugoslav dispute became public in November 1957 that the ideological differences between the two countries have become fully articulated and the subject of public debate between the two sides. The 'first' dispute of 1948 had clearly been prompted by Stalin's brutal handling of Soviet-Yugoslav national and party relations. An ideological structure was hastily erected by Stalin to cover the chief substance of the struggle - sheer power considerations and Stalin's own dictatorial attitude. And it was not until the sixth Yugoslav Communist Party Congress in November 1952 that Tito and his leading supporters succeeded in fitting their very tentative new ideas and their various ad hoc experiments into some form of a coherent ideology. In consequence, the 'Second' Soviet-Yugoslav dispute assumed the character of a serious ideological conflict, inadvertently reviving, to some extent, the exchange of views on controversial matters which had been completely dormant under Stalin's arbitrary dogmatism.

Nevertheless, while Yugoslav doctrine does vary with the changing condition of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, such oscillations as do occur are between two not vastly different stands, and neither of these stand-points appears incompatible with the expressed Soviet view over a large range of specific issues (e.g. Disarmament and recognition of Communist China.)

During the time of greatest Soviet-Yugoslav tension the Yugoslavs produced a number of propositions challenging Stalinist precepts - the view that Stalin's policies were partly responsible for the onset and continuation of the Cold War; the doctrine that there are several roads to Socialism, i.e. Communism; the belief that war is not inevitable; and the suggestion that peaceful means can be used to overthrow capitalism. At times of considerable Soviet-Yugoslav amity (summer 1955 to summer 1956, for example) Yugoslav doctrine is virtually identical with "proletarian internationalism" and entails full support for the foreign policies of the Soviet bloc. All that remains of Tito's rejection of the Soviet doctrine of two camps - the Soviet camp, or rather 'community', of peace and the Western imperialist camp of war - in world affairs is simply the rejection of an outright military alliance. The responsibility of Stalin for a large part of the Cold War strife, whilst not denied, is played down, and there is a marked tendency to assert that the chief danger to peace springs from Western policies.

The excerpts given below are from an article which was written for a well known American journal at a time when relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and its satellites were worsening but before the Yugoslav representatives refused to sign the Moscow Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Worker's Parties of the Socialist Countries in late October 1957.

Josip Broz-Tito - ON CERTAIN CURRENT INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS.
Foreign Affairs, October 1957, pp. 66-77.

"When I was asked to express my views on developments in the sphere of present-day international relations, I was sure that I was not expected to write something in which I did not believe merely for the sake of giving pleasure to anyone. I must say what I really have in mind and what I think the American public might usefully be acquainted with. Naturally I can make no pretense at giving an exhaustive analysis of current international problems or of providing a blueprint for their solution. I think I can, however, lay some claim to not having been mistaken as regards the causes of many of today's difficulties and of the adverse trends which it now is essential to do away with. At the same time new mistakes must be avoided and thus even more dangerous consequences prevented from arising. The main point I wish to emphasize is that it would be unforgivable if responsible statesmen neglected to learn from past experience and failed to take bold steps to establish the kind of international relations which mankind requires at the present stage of history - relations based on comprehensive cooperation and a determination to settle all outstanding problems by peaceful means."

"The origin of the tensions plaguing the world today may be traced back to the time of Tehran, Yalta and the other international conferences and to the mistaken views of the protagonists at those conferences on certain international problems such as the division of the world into spheres of influence. For them, the world consisted of three Great Powers; all the other nations were looked upon as wards and their aspirations and interests were ignored.

"It was precisely through this division of the world into spheres of influence that the strivings of both large and small nations towards genuine independence were to be thwarted, both in principle and in practice. Today certain countries in the West frequently invoke the principle of independence for propaganda purposes, while their actual practice runs in quite the opposite direction. This, however, does not prevent them from accusing others of violating the principle of independence. Until the principle of independence is adopted in practice by all states, and particularly by the Great Powers, this issue will be a constant element of conflict."

"The causes of existing tensions are also to be sought in the erroneous foreign policy of Stalin and in the rigidity of Molotov, whose offensive and aggressive attitudes in postwar international affairs aroused a growing measure of suspicion and apprehension regarding the intentions of the Soviet Union."

"It is difficult, however, to understand that even now, four years after Stalin's death, this mistrust not only persists but actually is increasing in certain circles in the West, regardless of the efforts which are being made by the present-day Soviet leaders to correct Stalin's mistakes. Why is every move on the part of the Soviet leaders looked upon even now with suspicion? Has not the time come for the

steps which the Soviet Government is taking towards an alleviation of international tension to be viewed with more realism and with greater confidence?"

"The Soviet leaders look upon this, rightly in my opinion, as a policy of encirclement, a threat of war and an aggressive attempt to isolate the Soviet Union."

"If the setting up of NATO did have some justification at the time, there can be no justification today for the continuing existence, development and extension of the Alliance, which undoubtedly contributes to the widening rift and the growing lack of confidence between East and West."

"The changes which have occurred in a number of countries of Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the war, and which resulted in the replacement of the previous Fascist or capitalist forms of social organization by socialist forms of organization, cannot be reversed by anyone; and it would of course be a mistake even to consider any such possibility. A new social system has struck deep roots in practically all these countries. A social process creating a system of tremendous vitality is now making headway regardless of temporary weaknesses of either a subjective or objective nature. Interference from outside can only fetter and retard the development of the democratic forms of the system without in any way changing the system itself. I therefore consider that propaganda conducted from abroad, and with foreign aid, by persons who have fled their own countries can only feed international tension. There is no prospect of restoring the former system: it is merely an attempt to turn the clock back, and it will not work.

"What then? Is there to be war in order to bring discarded forms back into being? The answer of the people, clearly and naturally, can only be no. To engage in an armaments race in order to be able to negotiate from positions of force for the restoration of old and obsolete forms or organization is both senseless and useless. I am convinced that not one of the countries involved would permit this to happen; they would resist any such attempt. It seems to me, therefore, that all such harmful propaganda against the countries of socialism, as well as against my own country, should cease - in the interest of decreasing international tension, in the interest of promoting peace and international cooperation, in the interest of establishing sincere confidence between states and nations. Responsible statesmen the world around should, I feel, approach all these questions with a greater measure of realism. They should take things as they are, seeking to establish such relations among nations as would permit people to live without fear for their future.

"What then remains, if we reject war as a method of settling international differences? The only alternative is, of course, co-existence among states and nations irrespective of their different social systems. There are two main and distinctive systems in the world today, the socialist and the capitalist. Within each there

exist certain nuances. Should the countries with different social systems decide to settle by war which of the two systems is to triumph, in other words, attempt to impose their system on others by force? That would be absurd and would bring a new catastrophe to the whole of mankind. The internal social system of any country is a matter for the people of that country to decide; they have the right to shape their own destiny and no one is entitled to interfere in this from outside. At the present stage of human history, problems between countries cannot be solved through war, and this method should therefore be discarded. The only alternative is peaceful and active coexistence among states and nations."

"The question is frequently asked in the West: Where does Yugoslavia now stand, and where will she stand in the future? Various conjectures are indulged in. This speculation stems from the fact that Yugoslavia is a socialist country and is building socialism; hence it is supposed that her goal is the same as that of the Soviet Union and of the other Eastern European countries. This is how Western thinking runs. Yes, it is quite true that our goal is the same, although we differ with regard to certain questions of internal development, i.e. with regard to our respective methods of building socialism. We also differ at certain points in our interpretation of the science of Marxism-Leninism, in assessing the correctness of our respective roads to socialism. All these are not such weighty matters that they should lead to tension in our mutual relations. The future will provide the best answer, I think, as to who was more nearly correct and who was less so. The one who is proved less correct will be the one to suffer and will have only himself to blame.

"The Belgrade and Moscow Declarations of June 1955 and July 1956 contain the principles upon which the relations and the cooperation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia should be based. Considerable progress has been achieved, I feel, in improving our relations. This gives us assurance that the principles set forth in the Declarations will be put even more speedily into effect in our mutual relations in the future."

"We have never given anybody reason to hope that we would join the Western bloc, or any other bloc for that matter. To do so would be contrary to the principles on which our foreign policy rests. Our foreign policy is based on the clearly expressed principle of coexistence, on peaceful and equal cooperation with all countries, small or large. If one takes the trouble to examine the line to which our foreign policy has adhered hitherto it will be realized that it is only natural for us to seek to have as good relations as possible with the Soviet Union and with the other people's democracies, and not only with the Western countries."

"We have learned that it is not advisable to conduct a too one-sided policy in a world where a growing number of elements of common interest are at work - particularly elements making for economic integration and linking the world more and more into a whole. The process continues

notwithstanding the powerful resistance offered by certain subjective factors. It is interesting, though hardly comforting, to note that people have the most difficulty in perceiving the importance of the very social laws of which they are themselves creating the elements and in the development of which they are themselves participating."

"The reason is that we consider that our cooperation with the West on questions of common interest is extremely advantageous for our country and that in addition it contributes both to the easing of international tensions and to the strengthening of peace."

FURTHER REFERENCES CONCERNING YUGOSLAV NEUTRALISM:

(1) The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London, R.I.I.A. 1948) which contains the public correspondence conducted by the Russian and Yugoslav communist parties during the 'first' dispute.

Two collections covering a wider span are:-

(2) Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1948-1956. An Analysis with Documents, edited and introduced by R. Barry Farrell (The Shoestring Press 1956), and

(3) The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy 1948-1958. A Documentary Record. Edited by Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marberry (New York, 1959) - particular attention should be paid to the Report of Marshall Tito to the Fifth Party Congress in 1948, the Report on Yugoslav Foreign Policy by Edvard Kardelj at the Sixth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in November 1952; the lecture on "Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia" delivered by Kardelj in Oslo, Norway, in September 1955, and the addresses given by Tito on Foreign Relations at Belgrade on 25 October 1954 and at Karlovac on 27 July 1955.

The November 1957 Moscow Declaration of Communist Parties and the highly controversial programme of the League of Communists in Yugoslavia (adopted by the 7th Party Congress at Ljubljana in April 1958) are given in:-

(4) The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute. Full Text of Main Documents April - June 1958 with an introductory analysis. Slavic and East European Series, vol. 14 (Indiana University Press, 1959, pp. xiii. 272). Edited by Vaclav L. Benes, R. F. Byrnes and Nicholas Spulber.

Articles on international relations, by Yugoslav writers, may be read in the English language edition of:-

(5) Review of International Affairs. Belgrade.

Marshall Tito's complete works (to the end of 1957) have been published in Serbo-Croat:-

(6) Govori I. Glanci. 12 vols. by Josip Broz Tito. Zagreb, Naprijed, 1959.

Appendix 5.

President Nasser and Pan-Arab
Neutrality.

Arab neutrality, 'positive neutrality', 'Cold War non-belligerency', is just a part, though an important part, of contemporary pan-Arab nationalism. According to one leading authority, W. Z. Laqueur, the three basic concepts of Arab nationalism are independence, unity and neutrality.¹ Laqueur further maintains that the anti-Western theme is dominant in the Arab concept of neutrality, and that "practical neutrality" preceded the doctrine, which evolved because the West had "pushed the Arabs into Russian arms" - though he says that Arab nationalists maintain that neutrality would have prevailed anyway because it was their logical and natural orientation.

Of course, the Arabs do not speak with one voice, but it seems clear that since 1955 President Nasser has become the chief spokesman for Arab nationalism, and so the foremost proponent of pan-Arab neutrality. Several scholarly commentators have stressed the hybrid quality of Nasser's political thinking, and one of them has described it as: "borrowed from a variety of ideologies, ancient and modern; it presents a mixture of Fascism, Communism, racialism and Kemalism, topped off with some ideas from the Qu'ran. In the sphere of Arab nationalism it only repeats and amplifies, by giving them an expression apt to flatter and excite the crowd, themes that were announced at the beginning of this century by an elite of Arab patriots in revolt against the yoke of the Ottoman Empire. Considered as an ideology of the revolution, Nasser contributes no new element and contains very little that is original."²

The obvious source to quote from would seem to be Nasser's "The Philosophy of the Revolution", first published in Cairo in 1953. But the style is too rambling to be

1. See Walter Z. Laqueur - The Soviet Union and the Middle-East (London, 1959), pp. 317 et seq.
2. Quoted from Jean Vigneau - "The Ideology of the Egyptian Revolution" in The Middle East in Transition, ed. by W. Z. Laqueur (London, 1958), pp. 128-144. See also Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh - The Ideas of Arab Nationalism (Ithaca, 1956).

quoted in short excerpts here. Instead, two other examples of Nasser's thinking are given. The first is from an article which he wrote for a leading American journal published in January 1955. The second is from a recorded conversation between Nasser and an English Arabphil which took place in the summer of 1957 and contains in a more terse form most of the central propositions of "The Philosophy of the Revolution."¹ I have added some explanatory footnotes.

The other excerpt is an English translation of a lecture given by the then Syrian Foreign Minister, Salah el Bitar,² to the Young Arab Club in Damascus.³ It is felt that this lecture is worth repeating in entirety because it is interesting to read something which was designed not for a foreign but for a domestic audience, and it puts very clearly the major concerns and interpretation of world trends of a leading Arab politician and intellectual.

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1. Nasser - The Philosophy of the Revolution, with an introduction by John S. Badeau & biographical sketch by John Gunther (Economica Books, Buffalo, 1959).
2. Salah el Bitar, born 1912. Educated Damascus & Sorbonne. Teacher of science in Damascus secondary schools 1935 - 1942. Took part in 1941 revolt in Iraq against British. Helped to build up the Baath (pan-Arab socialist) Party organization & became secretary-general. Resigned teaching post in 1942, ostensibly in protest against French influence in Syrian system of education. Exiled by French in 1945, returned in 1946 & founded a newspaper for the party called Baath "resurrection." Was suspected of plotting against Shishakly government in 1952 & escaped to Lebanon, to return in October 1953. M.P. in 1955, & representative of Syria at the Bandung Conference. Syrian Foreign Minister June 1956 to Feb. 1958. Minister of Culture & National Guidance in the United Arab Republic March 1958, until his resignation, with other Syrian Baathist leaders, at the end of Dec. 1959.
3. My thanks are due to a Jordanian friend, Khaled el Shair, for giving me the printed Arabic version of the lecture & for making the translation.

(1) Gamal Abdel Nasser - The Egyptian Revolution (Foreign Affairs, January 1955, pp. 199-211).

"For a century and a half the Arab world has been following a negative policy. It has known what it wanted to do away with, but it has not known what it wanted to build. The Western conquest of the Middle East was mental no less than physical. Overwhelmed and unsettled, Eastern minds lost almost all national values, yet could not absorb Western values. Misapplication of Western patterns of government brought a confused mixture of political systems and philosophies. Democracy was only a veil for dictatorship. Constitutions framed in the interest of the people of the Middle East became instruments for their exploitation and domination.

"Egypt's story in these years centers upon the effort to free the country from a foreign yoke and to find a policy capable of eradicating the evils accumulated by feudalism and compounded by misuse of governmental power. It was a long and painful search. Egyptians hoped for leaders to champion their cause and defend their interests, but politicians and factions for the most part made themselves subservient to the forces that were ravaging the country - British rulers, corrupt monarchs, feudal overlords, a non-Egyptian ruling class and its Egyptian satellites."

"The problems confronting the Egyptian nation have thus for a long period seemed to fall into two parts: a struggle between the nation and its rulers on one hand, and a struggle between the nation and foreign intervention on the other."

"And so the Egyptian nation carried on the battle to find constitutional stability, along with a second battle for sovereignty and self-government. One aspect of this was the struggle for autonomy in financial matters, and beyond that for an increase in individual and national incomes and a lifting of cultural and social standards. The problem was to restore human dignity in Egypt.

"Throughout the period national struggle assumed different forms, some pacific and some revolutionary. The first was based on argument and logic, giving rise to the formation of political parties and the founding of newspapers and magazines to enlighten public opinion. But whenever the nation understood that peaceful methods would not avail, recourse was had to force. So Egypt had to pass through three revolutions: the Arabi revolution, the revolution of 1919 and the revolution of July 1952. Any revolution which fails to realize its basic objectives inevitably lays the seeds for a subsequent uprising. Our national struggle was therefore one continual and unremitting battle, despite intermittent weaknesses. Always there were the two great objectives - to check despotism and make the nation itself the source of powers, and to put an end to foreign intervention and the usurpation of Egypt's resources.

"In 1936, a treaty provided for the ending of British occupation, but it also required a permanent agreement between Egypt and Britain - a provision very likely to mean permanent occupation. After 1936 the

British took the opportunity of party frictions to renew their intervention in Egyptian affairs. The thirst of party leaders after power was also utilized by King Farouk to realize personal ambitions at the expense of the vital interests of the people. He claimed exemptions from taxation and got control of thousands of acres of state property and entailed land. Merit was no criterion for rewards, nor was there any equality of opportunity; privileges were reserved for relatives and favorites of ministers in power. The results were nepotism and corruption. Egypt had a working constitution, but it veiled arbitrary rule.

"When Arab countries felt the enthusiasm to rescue Palestine, the Egyptian Government was ill-prepared for the task. Mismanagement and corruption by the King's clique, which included trading in defective arms, rendered fruitless the bitter sacrifices made by the Egyptian Army which would otherwise have secured victory. The war revealed the extent of evils which pervaded the court and government, and stirred the nation to protest. An attempt was made to divert the attention of the masses to external issues - the key to the abolition of the 1936 treaty. Its abolition was certainly consonant with the national desire, and would have been a genuinely national achievement had the government taken the necessary measures of reform afterward. It did not. Hence the formation of "liberation commando squads." But while these operated in the Canal Zone, there came the shamelessly contrived burning of Cairo on January 26, 1952. The commandos were paralyzed and the gap between the government and the governed widened.

"Revolution was the only way out. And it came in 1952, led by the army and backed by the nation. In the pre-revolutionary period the army was an instrument in the hand of despotic rulers who used it against the nationalist movements. Now it understood its position and joined the ranks of the people to head the movement for national liberation.

"This revolution, it will be understood, has been markedly bloodless in character because it is in essence the expression of a sentiment long suppressed but harbored in the heart of the nation. It was purely national with no international intervention. Conscious of the trend of events to follow, it realized its objectives within a shorter time than expected. The nation had sworn allegiance to Mohammed Ali in the attempt to overthrow the rule of the Mamelukes, but Mohammed Ali and his descendants unfortunately forfeited this loyalty, embarking on despotic enterprises and usurping the rights of the people. Thus it was an unconditional imperative that the revolution should overthrow the ruling dynasty, reclaim its birthright and restore the lost national prestige. So it deposed the Monarch, abolished monarchy, and established the Egyptian Republic."

"As a major concern of the revolution was the realization of state sovereignty, it was imperative that the British forces should be evacuated entirely."

"A closing word about Egypt's foreign relations: despite all reports to the contrary by enemies of the Arab world, the Arab League is a reality. There are social and economic differences between one Arab nation and another, just as there are, for example, among the nations of the Western European Union, but by the same token we have more in common than the various European nations which hope to work together. The nations of the Arab League believe that they can unite in a force that contributes to the cause of world peace.

"Efforts to unite have been blocked, to some extent, by local differences and dynastic rivalries, and to a greater extent by outside forces conspiring against us. But the League can be made the instrument through which a greater unity can be achieved among the Arab nations in every field of activity. Its member states can form an effective force for the defense of this area. Throughout the negotiations for the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal, the Government of Egypt has pointed out that this evacuation will not create a military "vacuum" in the Middle East but will pave the way for strengthening the area's defenses.

("The defense of the Middle East must rest primarily with the inhabitants of the area. No outside forces can defend this soil as effectively as the people who live here. That is why Egypt has made every effort to strengthen the Arab League's Collective Security Pact. It is the best possible system to defend our part of the world against any possible aggression.

"Over a century ago, Egypt, with less than half her present population, had an army of more than 200,000. There is no reason why the 70,000,000 Arabs could not build up an army of several divisions for the defense of their lands. Our countries possess great potential wealth, not to speak of the oil for which our deserts are famous. Those of our Arab brethren who have been given the chance of education have proved to be no less capable than any other people in the world. We still lack development, but industrialization will increase our capabilities.

"In the meantime, we believe that all those more developed Powers who believe in peace should and will help us to strengthen ourselves against aggression. Starting with the Collective Security Pact as the basis for our own defense, we can consider - once it has been adequately implemented - coordinating our defense plans with those of any other nation interested in defense against aggression in this area.

"The objection has often been made that if the Arabs were to receive military assistance they would immediately attack Israel. Egyptians feel that a great injustice was committed against the Arabs generally, and especially against the million or more Palestinian Arabs who are now refugees. Israel's policy is aggressive and expansionist, and Israel will continue her attempts to prevent any strengthening of the area. However, we do not want to start any conflict. War has no place in the constructive policy which we have designed to improve the lot of our people. We have much to do in Egypt, and the rest of the Arab world has much to do. A war would cause us to lose, rather than gain, much of what we seek to achieve.

"In other quarters there has been talk of "Communist infiltration" in the various Arab and African nationalist movements. It would be unwise for the United States to take that view of nationalist activities, led by sincere patriots whose only desire is to see their nations free from foreign domination. Americans recognize this to be the inalienable right of every man, yet balk at supporting these nationalists for fear of annoying some colonial Power that has refused to move with the times. It is this procrastination that gives the Communists the chance to take over what usually start as genuinely patriotic movements. Such was the case of Indo-China.

"There would not be any Communist infiltration in any part of the Middle East and Africa if the United States could develop a courageous policy - and the only morally correct one - of supporting those who are anxious to get rid of foreign domination and exploitation. Real independence would be the greatest defense against Communist - or any other type - of infiltration or aggression. Free men are the most fanatical defenders of their liberty, nor do they lightly forget those who have championed their struggle for independence."

(2) Young Egypt by Desmond Stewart (London, 1958) pp. 184-188. Report of a conversation between Stewart and Nasser in the summer of 1957.

"S. Were you influenced by any writers?"

N. Yes, by many. From 1934 I read the works of Mustafa Kamil;¹. I read his biography; I read all the articles by him which had appeared in the newspapers. To do this I went to the public library and asked for their files. Then I read Towfik al-Hakim ². and Taha Hussein.³ Of course, I was particularly interested in the history of Egypt in the nineteenth century. Again, it was a combination; a combination of novels and biographies; newspaper articles and poetry. Above all, I was interested to read about the French Revolution. I read their lives, the revolutionaries, again and again.

S. Which of them did you admire? Danton? Robespierre?

N. None of them really. I admired Voltaire. Because he was a calm man, not cruel. The other leaders were too bloodshedding. They all killed each other. Everyone died by violence. Do you know one who did not? I read the novel of Dickens. You have read it? A Tale of Two Cities? I read that several times. I learnt from it something - not to be bloodshedding. If we started with blood, we would not stop. We would go on, and others would imitate us. That I learnt from Charles Dickens.

1. The Egyptian nationalist, not the Turkish dictator.
2. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith - Islam in Modern History (Mentor Books, New York, 1959), p. 68-9.
3. Ibid. pp. 69, 71.

S. Napoleon - what do you think of him?

N. I was against Napoleon, because he invaded Egypt. He put his guns on the Moqattam hills and shelled Cairo - so of course I was against him, as a schoolboy. Now? Well, it was the policy of force. Believe me, although I am a soldier, and a revolutionary, I hate war, I hate violence. Revolution must go side by side with principle and character. It is not the heroic actions which matter - though they get spoken of in the newspapers - but heroic principles. For example, the Turkish Revolution: I do not like Ataturk's brutality. He was cold, not sentimental, and he signed the death mandate of his best friend, his closest friend, without being affected. What good is a revolution if it does not make the individual free? If it is just by force? I also admire George Washington. He was a gentle man, not a cruel man.

S. But your dislike of violence, your discipleship of Gandhi - in a way your choice of a career, as an officer, goes against this?

N. It may seem so, but not really. In countries like Egypt the army is a force of education. The role of an army can differ from one country to another. But did you know, at the start of the Revolution I was personally against having a big army? I was peaceful, even towards Israel. It was other officers who insisted on the dangers. All this changed when the Gaza raid happened. It all changed in one night: February 28th, 1955. Then we had to have arms, to defend ourselves. You know, I saw the refugees; and I was terrified to see Egyptians become as refugees. So we asked the West for arms, and they refused us. So we took them without conditions from Czechoslovakia.

S. Returning to Arab nationalism, who for you is an Arab?

N. Anyone who speaks Arabic, as his mother-tongue.

S. You don't go for the theories which make Egyptians Pharaonic, the Lebanese Phoenicians, and so on?

N. No, it is all rubbish, but rubbish intentionally exploited.

S. In what sense are those who speak Arabic a nation? In the sense that the Germans are a nation already, even though divided? Or in the sense that the Europeans may one day become a nation.

N. The Arabs are a people united by speaking the same language, which you do not do in Europe; but more important, they also have similar reactions to events and incidents. If something happens to one section of them, it concerns all of them, from end to end. They have in the last hundred years all been victims of the same imperialism.

S. Who has done most for the Arab cause in the last century?

N. The Arab people as a whole.

- S. And who did most to retard the cause?
- N. A combination of foreigners - you will excuse me saying this? - with Arab political leaders working for their own selfish interests.
- S. Do you think that men like Cromer were sincere? That they really believed that what they did was for the benefit of the people?
- N. I think Cromer was a sincere imperialist - that is, he sincerely, wanted to dominate the Egyptians for the advantages of his own country.

Arab nationalism means Arab independence and Arab co-operation. We cannot say more than that. We are trying not to interfere in other countries - whatever some people say. But in my speeches, when I speak about reforms which we have made - for example, when I say in Parliament that for the last two years we have built an average of two new schools every three days - this is listened to abroad, not only in Egypt. Naturally in Arab countries where there have not yet been reforms people become hungry for them. That is natural. People can draw their own implications. We spend money on factories, on electrification, on education, on health, not on palaces or presents.

Arab nationalism arose as a political concept, for me, at the Staff College when we studied problems of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. I mean, strategy. I had read our Arab history, and I knew that when we cooperated, all the Arab countries, we were able to defeat the invaders, from the time of the Tartars to the Crusades. But whenever the Arabs let themselves be split up, they were subject to defeat and foreign domination. That was my mental background to our discussions at the Staff College. In the light of all the horrible new weapons of war, we were discussing strategy: how to defend Egypt. At once it became evident that taken alone Egypt cannot be defended. But in co-operation with other Arab states, Egypt can be defended. And the same was true of the other Arab states: each one was indefensible if it stood alone. But all could stand against anyone, if all stood together. Why? Because the theatre of operations would be spread - it would not be just where the attacker chose - it would be over a great area. And in this wide area there was an even wider extent of interests. And because throughout the Arab world an extent of public opinion would exist too: to fight together.

- S. When did these discussions take place?
- N. The year before the Revolution, 1951. And another thing, Egypt's greatest weakness had all along been its strategic position. 1.

After all, it was for its strategic position that it had been occupied, by the Turks in 1517, because it commanded the route to the East, by Napoleon in 1798, and by the British in 1882. My idea was to turn this disadvantage into our biggest advantage: not to attack other countries, but to defend our own. Again, we had studied the wealth of the Arabs; the oil in particular. In the Palestine war, for example, every Arab country was frightened for its wealth, for its oil. Again, we would turn this to the Arabs' advantage. We would use the threat to oil against invaders. Again, not to attack, but in self-defence. This was not to cut the throat of Europe. On the contrary. It was to force the West to co-operate with us, as equals, not dominate over us. We wanted a new relationship. The same thing with the Canal. When it was built, the Khedive thought it would be of use to Egypt. In the result, it served all the world: but Egypt - it served only as an excuse for our occupation.

So the strategy of Arab nationalism took shape: as a strategy.¹ By it, we can defend Egypt and the Arab countries. We can win respect from the world; we can feel an important and useful member of the world, not just people whom orders are given to. Our dignity is safe. But I repeat again, Arab nationalism is something practical, not sentimental.

- S. Were you influenced by Abdu,² or his master Afghani?³ Does Panislamism play a part?
- N. Our idea is that if we mix religion and politics, politics will dominate over religion, and in this way kill religion. Never forget, we are trying to escape from six hundred years of the domination by the Turks, and then by the British. To escape from this, I had to look for support, for a base of strength, from which to act. I mentioned this in my book, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*.⁴ But it led to two misunderstandings in foreign countries. I found Egypt at the centre of three circles: circles of force. First, the Arabs: we are at the centre of the Arab world, half-way between Morocco and Iraq. What happens to us will affect all the Arabs. Second, we are Moslems: we are at the centre of the Islamic world. What happens to us will be felt by all Moslems. And third, we are in Africa. We are an African country. The people of Africa will not regard us as strangers. What happens here affects all Africa."

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1. c.f. *ibid.* pp. 71-2.
 2. Shaykh Muhammad 'Abdu (?1849 - 1905). See W. Cantwell Smith, *op. cit.* pp. 62, 72, 81.
 3. Jamalud-Din Afghani (1839-97). See *ibid.* pp. 54-8.
 4. In *Economica Books* edition, 1959, pp. 59-62. See also 78.

- (3) Salah el Bitar - Facts in the Atom Age (lecture to the Young Arab Club in Damascus, 30th March, 1956. Printed in Cairo in Arabic).

"The Middle East is a meeting point - by reason of geography and strategy - of East and West. Foreigners cannot but look on the Middle East except in terms of tangible advantages - ports, aerodromes, etc. We, the peoples of the Middle East, look at it from the other way as bringing benefits for ourselves. There must be a difference between these ways of thinking and also in the evaluation of things.

"(1) In what age do we live now?

"International relations are conditioned by power politics. Hence the importance of possession, and then the kind of arms. The relevance of nuclear weapons to power status can be seen by considering the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The dropping of these two bombs on Japan served two purposes other than the winning of the war: (a) it made Russians aware of U.S. strength and showed U.S./Great Britain solidarity. (b) it forwarded the creation of the Western camp and the containment of Communism both in Europe and in Asia.

"Soon afterwards East/West conditions became frozen. But the contending powers did not solve their problems or reach an agreement which they were hoping to arrive at. So began the Cold War, the Russian development of the atomic bomb and the ensuing atomic bomb race. As a result of (and during) this atomic Cold War and arms race we (i.e. the Arab peoples) began to measure the strength of either camp by the number of atomic bombs held at a certain time and/or by what was held in conventional weapons. The atomic age began to condition our way of thinking, but people did not realise that it was only to be a short age unlike the Iron Age. For in 1952 the atomic age ended and a new age began - the age of the hydrogen bomb. The hydrogen bomb is infinitely more destructive than the atomic bomb. Furthermore, this is not a secret but known to all.

"As a result of this common knowledge, people began to have complexes and fear. Even the responsible politicians of the world, when they talked about the coming of the hydrogen bomb, described it as completely destructive and

ruinous. History shows that the invention of any new weapon tends to produce its defensive opposite (e.g. sword - shield; cannon - castle), but the hydrogen bomb has no defensive opposite. I conclude that (a) there is no defence against the hydrogen bomb, and (b) that its cost of production is less than the cost of building up similar strength by conventional weapons.

"As we have not the material power to protect ourselves against this all destructive weapon, we must appeal to the spiritual and ethical forces in humanity and put our hope in the human conscience which may become stronger and persuade the people who possess this terrible weapon not to use it, and what is more, not to manufacture it; and, further, to prevent these powers from having tests as a preliminary step to preventing manufacture.

"(2) In what direction is history going, towards peace or war?

"In the coming war, if there is a war, there would be no place for courage or feelings of triumph, and there would be no heroism of defence. War today differs also from previous wars in that it is not restricted merely to the fighting men but extends to the whole population. Although there have been many instances in the past when war could not be localised and had to include many nations, or even the whole world, yet the battlefields were localised. The new weapons will lead to a new way of thinking about international relations which are not conditioned by ideals only but also by the necessities of life. In the past, war has been an instrument of coercion used by one side or both sides to come to a settlement. Now there can never be such a settlement dictated by one side on the other. In the past, the usual slogan was "Peace or War" but today the current slogan is "Peace or Death" because war can never lead to one side's victory over the other but only to death for both sides.

"Thus an understanding of peace and co-existence has been transformed with the atomic age from being the product of wisdom and idealism to a human necessity for the continuing existence of man and society.

"The direction of history is towards peace and peaceful co-existence and away from war. Wisdom and pure logic in dealing with international problems in the nuclear age is the logic of peace and not the logic of war.

"The nuclear age and its evil inventions has produced both on psychological and social levels the two following effects which are necessitous for the existence of human life:-

"(i) that all the peoples of the world are fully convinced that the two major camps have enough arms, whether atomic or nuclear, to destroy the whole earth.

"(ii) that the peoples of the world have realised the great benefit which they will get if the atomic and nuclear powers are used for peaceful purposes. The nuclear powers could get rid of poverty and make life luxurious. And I will mention only as one example the British White Paper issued recently on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The White Paper predicts that by 1975 a quarter of the British electrical power will derive from atomic or nuclear power. These plans, which aim at producing electric power by atomic means, will be a starting point of a new industrial revolution more magnificent than that which came to a climax in the 19th century and which depended on coal.

"(3) What is the relation of the Arab peoples to the military pacts and what positive policies should they follow?

"This idea of peaceful coexistence, although it has become a human necessity, is still only a mere hope if it does not take a form through which it will realise itself, and if it does not become a powerful current which will take the peoples of the world with it. And also if it does not become a positive policy of governments which would make it a standard of international relations.

"I want to tell you how the idea of co-existence and positive neutralism progressed until it became a definite policy of its own.

"The hope of the peoples of the world that the last war would be the last war of all from which all the victorious powers would draw the lesson of eradicating the policy of power and control (Nazi) and what results from it: international injustice; and also the lesson of following a just policy which would realize the freedom and equality of all the peoples of the world. That hope ended the moment the war ended, and in less than one year after the victory of the Communist/capitalist camp over the Nazi and the Fascist, in less than a year, the world was divided into two camps East and West, and they began their quarrel on the ideological, political and military levels.

"At this point liberals from every country in Europe and Asia, and some popular movements, such as in the Arab countries (and some from both groups, such as India, Burma, Yugoslavia) all these peoples who became free of either the capitalist or the communist system, those people who did not find in either camp the real, positive solution to the problems of nations, individuals, or societies, thought of the necessity of leaving both camps and the politics of those camps. They took a special standpoint called neutralism, which is not a status of neutrality which was known traditionally, it is not a neutrality which is based on isolation or running away from war, because that neutrality did not materialise for those countries which adopted it and which tried to keep it, when the last war occurred, merely with its conventional warfare and limited destruction. How could any nation in this atomic and nuclear age guarantee its neutrality while it knows that the atomic radiation must reach her even if she escaped destruction? This kind of neutrality - neutrality during war, or neutrality in the atmosphere of war - is how the opportunists try to describe our neutralism. This is not the positive neutralism which we advocate as a policy of peace in the nuclear age.

"Positive neutralism is the policy of peace adopted by some independent states (independent of either the Eastern or Western camp) which is a manifestation of the feelings of hundreds of millions of human beings who belong to all the nations who want the establishment of international peace: a peace which is based on justice, freedom and equality for all the peoples of the world by peaceful co-existence. This will begin by decreasing international tension through a policy of non-alignment with either camp and then by dissolving the system of camps and opening the ways of contact between the peoples of the world so that ideas, philosophies and codes will fuse together to produce a more just, and better social system.

"The evolution of neutralism has produced in the big camps a suspicion of the small nations and this is producing disintegration in the blocs. This disintegration, together with the human necessity of peaceful co-existence, are the fundamental factors which have so far decreased tension between the two camps, although slowly. As a result, the world is certainly moving towards peace, although there have been a few small wars here and there, in spite of the increase in the production of nuclear weapons.

"At a first glance it seems that there is no dis-integration and that both camps are trying to strengthen their position by making pacts such as N.A.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O. and the programmes for S.E. Asia and the Middle East. Yet if we go deeper we can notice three things:-

"(i) that those pacts are not static but change according to circumstances. They started like the Marshall Plan in Western Europe and then were transformed into defence systems at the start of the Cold War. Even now the Western countries differ as to the forms and purposes of those pacts.

"(ii) that those pacts started before the production of the hydrogen bomb, and in this sense the existence of these pacts could be considered as a continuation of the outlook which existed before the hydrogen bomb age - that war is certainly coming.

"(iii) that the form of those pacts remains substantially the same, but the idea behind them has changed. They are no longer conceived of as a grouping for armaments or a preparation for war, but each camp attempts to convince the other that it has more states on its side, believing in its social, political and economic system, and anxious to make those countries a defence against the propaganda devices of the opposite camp and in favour of their own system.

"In other words, the pacts which started with a military implication do not have that implication now and are evolving towards peace and an atmosphere of peace.

"Lastly, I wish to make one important point about the material side of this neutralism which is being led in our day by the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru. Pandit Nehru has warned us repeatedly that positive neutralism is not to be taken to mean the formation of a third bloc by the countries which believe in it because neutralism is essentially against the policy of camps, and that policy can never lead to one of the main aims of neutralism, namely, the disintegration of camps. Such a third camp would involve this camp in the power politics of the two other camps and would involve it in military organisation just like any other camp. The relation between the countries who believe in neutralism should be based on the Five Principles agreed on between Nehru and Tito (called the Nehru-Tito Five Principles):-

1. Recognition of independence and sovereignty.
2. Internal unity of each country.
3. Non-aggression.
4. Non-interference in the internal affairs of any other country.
5. Co-existence on an international level.

"I shall put my case for the Arab countries on the assumption that there will be peace and not war. If there is to be a war it will not come now but some time in the future, and if it comes, the pacts and the defensive alliances which the West is trying to impose on us would be quite useless.

"The main problem of the Arab peoples is that their homeland is divided and dominated, in some parts by Western imperialism and Zionism. Therefore, our job in this period of our history is freedom from imperialism and Zionism, and Arab unity.

"Zionism is being protected by imperialism and the two are allies and will remain allies until the imperialists realize that by protecting Israel they will get only enmity from the Arabs, and this means that any view which says that we can get rid of Israel by co-operation with imperialism is a misleading policy.

"The Arab peoples as a nation are trying to rid themselves of all forms of domination from outside, whether economic or political. As a nation they want a just peace based on equality between all the peoples of the world, and therefore they cannot have any benefit except by working with the nations that have common aims and which adopt for themselves a policy of non-alignment to any of the camps and positive neutralism. Therefore, we must refuse any policy, from either camp, that aims at including us with any of them. My answer for those who fear the Communist threat is that all the preparations which were taken by the Western camp have changed into peaceful negotiations since the hydrogen bomb was invented. From the Communist point of view, as well as the Western point of view, a destructive war cannot be avoided but by peaceful co-existence.

"My answer to those who fear the Communists from the inside is that such a threat, if it exists at all, is certainly due to imperialism from outside, and from economic and political domination in order to maintain reactionary conditions inside the Arab homeland. The only way of removing such a Communist threat is by decreasing the gap between rich and poor and increasing the equality of opportunity for all people.

"The Arab countries are not entirely free of Western domination and its influence is still evident in Iraq, Libya, the Aden protectorates and Algeria. Now Western domination tries to mask itself by the excuse of defence against the Communist threat. For its only aim is to spread their dominance by some form or other. When the West looks at the Middle East they think of that area as a strategic region, irrespective of what it contains in different nationalities, history, social and psychological conditions, and irrespective of the great problem which they themselves have created, namely, Israel. We can say that the Middle East is formed of the Arab countries, Persia, Pakistan, Turkey and Israel. Some of these states did not resist going into pacts, and some of them have resisted and still resist.

"For Turkey, her own good is to be on the side of the West because it borders the Soviet Union which will always constitute a threat to its national sovereignty, especially when the Soviet Union demands an influence in the Straits and some Eastern provinces of Turkey. That national factor has persuaded Turkey to enter a pact with the West.

"As to Pakistan, it has a national question with India (Kashmir). And because of the tension between Pakistan and India, Pakistan sought the Baghdad Pact as a means of support in her policy over Kashmir. What about Israel? Her government knows quite well that after occupying Arab land and establishing the Israel state she could not exist without the help of the West.

"We come to the conclusion that all these countries have entered into the Western pacts against Communist aggression for purely nationalist purposes, and Communism itself has nothing to do with it. But there arises a further question. Since the alignment of such countries was for purely nationalist reasons, why could not the Arabs do the same and try to implement their nationalist aims by entering such pacts? That is a very serious question and I must answer it frankly.

"The first question to answer is what is the nationalist aim of the Arabs which could be implemented through the Western treaty organizations? Our nationalist aims are summarised in the following: evacuation of foreign armies, the ending of treaties, the solution of the question of Israel and Arab unity.

"Do the Western pacts realise these aims? Firstly, it is said that the Arab countries will be on the same footing as the Western countries in those pacts. That certainly looks very nice. But this equality between the contracting countries could never exist even if it is written into the treaty. For one reason - and that is that our countries are economically, militarily and politically backward, and between our countries and the Western powers is such a great difference in strength that a contract could only be one between the strong and the weak. A treaty between the United States and Great Britain could be said to be one of equality, and it could be said that the U.S. bases in Great Britain do not affect the freedom and independence of the latter country. For example, the American aircraft in Great Britain are not allowed to leave their bases except by permission from the British government.

"While the oil companies, according to the terms of their agreements, should be supervised by the government of the oil well bearing countries, even so, those governments, by reason of their present backward nature, cannot supervise the administrative machinery of the oil company.

"Secondly, if our countries are filled with bases and military missions, the Arab armies will be looked upon by the Western leadership as an instrument for one purpose. That is, exclusively against the Communist threat. Thus, after losing our military independence, we would also lose some of our economic and political independence.

"Thirdly, Israel will certainly join military pacts which will help her to realise her essential aim - peace with the Arabs. Moreover, the West will arm Israel much more than all the Arab countries put together, and the West will always be careful when arming the Arab armies either not to arm them effectively, or to retain effective control of those arms.

"Fourthly, the essential aim of the Arabs - Arab unity - is certainly contradictory to the policy of the West and could never be realised by military pacts."

Appendix 6.President Sukarno of Indonesia.

Achmed Sukarno¹. was born in Java in 1901. After taking part in the unsuccessful revolt against the Dutch in 1926, he fused the native parties of the Netherlands East Indies into one nationalist organization modelled on the Indian Congress Party. Between 1929 and 1942 he spent eleven years in Dutch jails. When the Japanese invaded the East Indies in 1942 Sukarno ostensibly collaborated with them, though with the purpose of building up the force of Indonesian nationalism. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Dutch fought for four years to restore their former control, and Sukarno was arrested again. He was released in July 1949 and became President of the new, independent republic of Indonesia in the following December, which office he has held ever since. Since 1949 Sukarno's flamboyant charismatic leadership has been virtually the only political force making for unity in a state wracked by centrifugal forces. In view of his experiences, it is not surprising that his thinking about international politics should be dominated by nationalism and anti-colonialism. His cast of thought is authoritarian, rather than democratic, and it has been said that his thinking expresses "the syncretism which is a feature of the Indonesian and particularly the Javanese intellectual and religious tradition, the cast of thinking which emphasizes an ultimate mystical and aesthetic unity of things underlying what appear as material conflicts and logical incompatibilities."²

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1. There is no adequate biography of Sukarno in English. These notes have been gleaned from "Profile: Sukarno" in The Observer, 2 March 1958, & G. M. Kahin - Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Cornell U.P. 1952).
2. Herbert Feith, 'Indonesia' in G. McT. Kahin (ed.) - Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia (Cornell U.P., 1959), p. 192.

- (1) Address to the Congress of the United States by President Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia, 17th May, 1956 (published in Indonesian Information, Summer-Autumn, 1956).

"Over half the world the burning words which fired the American War of Independence have been closely studied as a source of inspiration and a plan of action. Yes, this period is the period of Asian and African resurgence.

"If we could see the passage of history as yesterday I saw your country from the windows of an aeroplane, we could have no doubt that the world is passing through the period of Asian and African nationalism.

"I hesitate at using that word "nationalism," for I know that in many countries and in many nations nationalism is an out-of-date political doctrine. Please remember, Mr. Speaker, that for us of Asia and Africa nationalism is a young and progressive creed. We do not equate nationalism with chauvinism, and we do not interpret nationalism as meaning the superiority of our peoples over others. No! For us, nationalism means the rebuilding of our nations; it means the effort to provide equal esteem for our peoples; it means the determination to take the future into our own hands. For us, nationalism is the love of country and the determination to improve it which, not so very long ago, illumined the actions of the founders of your nation. Nationalism may be an out-of-date doctrine for many in this world; for us of Asia and Africa, it is the mainspring of our efforts. Understand that, and you have the key to much of post-war history. Fail to understand it, and no amount of thinking, no torrent of words, and no Niagara of dollars will produce anything but bitterness and disillusionment.

"We who are living in Asia and Africa during this period of Asian and African nationalism, and particularly those of us who have been called upon to guide the destiny of nations, we ask that the rest of the world should show understanding and sympathy. After all, for what do we struggle? Not for fame; not for conquests; not for territorial aggrandisement; not for domination over other peoples. Our efforts and the sacrifices we have made have been for the release of our people from a colonial tyranny lasting for generations and centuries. It has been a struggle - it is still a struggle - for the simple human demands which the rest of the world has long taken for granted.

"We ask you to understand our national struggle, and we ask you to sympathize with it. We ask you to understand and sympathize with the fact that our national struggle is still incomplete. How can it be complete when millions of our people in Asia and Africa are still under colonial domination, are still not free? How can the national struggle in Indonesia be complete when part of our own country and part of our own nation are still unfree?"

"I recall with the very greatest pleasure that shortly after the first Asian-African Conference last year, this Congress unanimously approved a resolution reaffirming America's traditional anti-colonial attitude. That Conference in Bandung, in which the leaders of twenty-nine States took part, and which represented far more than half the population of the world, was a clear indication of history's direction. Practically all shades of the political spectrum were represented there, and almost all were but recently emancipated from colonialism. They were united by many things, but chiefly by their abhorrence of colonialism. They produced a Declaration which explicitly stated their continuing opposition to colonialism in all its forms. This Congress, noting that Conference and its Declaration, then unanimously re-stated, for all the world to know, its own long-standing opposition to colonialism. By that action, this Congress demonstrated its sympathy with our efforts. In the scales of history, your weight was placed resoundingly onto the side of the future."

"It is now almost eleven years since, on the 17th of August 1945, the Indonesian people proclaimed themselves independent. Note! I said the Indonesian people. Not those of Java alone, nor Sumatra alone, nor Celebes alone, but all of them, from the north of Sumatra to the southernmost corner of West New Guinea, which we call Irian Barat."

"The return of West Irian is for us the remaining part of our national political aspiration. It is the final installment on the colonial debt. We see our brothers still in chains, who joined with us in proclaiming our common independence, and so our own freedom is not yet complete. The salt of liberty cannot have its full savour for us until all of Indonesia is again united under the freedom which is the birthright of all men."

ii "We are anti-colonialists, for the sweat of our labor has been extorted by other nations, leaving us poverty-stricken with the sorrow of our hearts. We are nationalists.

for it is our right to win back the worthy place in the family of nations torn from our forefathers three and a half centuries ago. In all of this, we do not claim to have discovered novel principles. No, but like your forefathers, we regard our findings as universal values, as the common property of all mankind."

"Indonesia is indeed grateful for the technical assistance she has received to date from America, and in acknowledging my gratitude I want to express myself with the frankness of a friend.... For the furtherance of their function as defenders of freedom, America and Indonesia need to realize how to obtain lasting results, and these depend upon the specific conditions of Asian countries and the development of the national aspirations of the Asian people, which, indeed, America cannot be expected immediately to know, or to understand. The approach to the question of foreign aid should be based upon different principles in different countries. Without adequate knowledge of those countries, and even if your motives in granting aid were solely the stability of this region, the results could be adverse, and the flow of billions of dollars could lead only to strained relations. Certainly military aid is no substitute for Asian stability. It will only serve to make countries accepting it more dependent upon America, and their worth as genuine partners in the universal struggle for liberty, peace and prosperity will consequently decline. The main aim should be for the people of Asia, like the Western nations, to become economically stable but also politically stable, and thus be able to defend their freedom against all assaults. Political stability comes only with the stability of the political heart. And this heart of ours is now still an unsatisfied heart. The Asian people must soon be brought to the stage of development where they are capable of cherishing their hard-won freedom."

- (2) Address at the Opening Meeting of the Ministers of the Colombo Plan countries in Jogjakarta (Central Java) by President Sukarno, 11th November, 1958 (published in Indonesian Information, Summer-Autumn, 1959).

"Indonesia is the only nation which has won its independence against physical opposition and yet has retained its unity.... Our greatest achievement is that we survived. Yes, we have survived as a nation. We have survived as a unified and independent state for fourteen years. That has so far been the greatest achievement of our nation. That has so far been the greatest achievement of Indonesia."

"In all things, colonialism, which is an unmitigatedly evil thing, stunts, binds and inhibits men. In all things - with but one exception. That exception is the opposition to colonialism. In that opposition, that growth of nationalism and patriotism, there springs the finest fruit, of human effort. And that tree of nationalism, that tree of liberty, that tree of self-respect and self-dignity, gives shelter and shade to the customs and traditions of its people. When the day of liberation comes, those customs and traditions themselves bear fruit, and themselves begin to inspire and guide the nation."

"First, I must enter a caveat against applying the adjective "under-developed" or "undeveloped" to countries like Indonesia. Under-developed we certainly are, and so is every nation in the world, for nowhere is man's potential developed and used to the full. So our countries are not alone in our under-developed condition. We object to the description of ourselves as under-developed. . Qualify the expression! Call it economically under-developed, or technically under-developed, and, with some reservations, I would agree. But spiritually, mentally, culturally, I disagree wholly and completely.

"Development, I have said, and I repeat it with insistence is inter-dependent, with all its aspects and facets closely linked. It follows then, as night follows day, that economic development must be linked with, must be geared to, and must be concurrent with, changes in all other fields."

"Do not think that assistance will produce a nation in your own image. Do not think that what applies in other countries will necessarily apply here. The Indonesian nation is an ancient nation, a nation with proud memories, but a nation whose natural course of growth has been bent and distorted. That has left its marks, and one of our tasks has had to be the application of the surgeon's knife to end this cripple, and to remove these scars. The Indonesian nation has its own traditions. It will develop in accordance with those traditions. The injection of new technical knowledge and new skills will produce a synthesis, and that synthesis, too, will be Indonesian, not a reflection of others."

"It has been said that all schemes of aid originating in the West are only an attempt to redeem the evils of the past by a cash payment in the present, while hoping for a further dividend in the future. It has also been said that they are

the present payment of conscience money for past sins, with the hope of absolution in the future.

"To me, they are neither. Certainly, they are a sign of humanity's awakening conscience. But more than that, they can be a sign of mankind's growing maturity."

FURTHER REFERENCES CONCERNING INDONESIAN NEUTRALISM:

- (1) There is no single collection in English of President Sukarno's speeches, though most of the important ones are printed soon after they are delivered in -
Indonesian Information, published by the Information Department of the Indonesian Embassy in London.
also in -
Indonesian Review, issued twice a year by the Ministry of Information, Djakarta.
- (2) There is a study of Indonesian diplomacy in -
 - (a) R. H. Russell Fifield - The Diplomacy of South East Asia, 1945-1958, chapter 5. See also the excellent bibliography, pp. 544-548.
 - (b) Justus van der Kroef - Indonesia in the Modern World, Part 2, (Bandung, 1956) chapter 10.

Appendix 7.

S. W. R. Bandaranaike of Ceylon

The late Mr. Bandaranaike¹ was the Prime Minister of Ceylon from 1956 until he was murdered in September 1959. His career has been sketched in a little more detail than some of the others in these appendices in order to outline the career of at least one Asian neutralist-nationalist leader from a small country. He was born into a wealthy Sinhalese noble family of large landowners. He was educated at Oxford, where he was Secretary of the Union, and where he developed a strong attachment to Sinhalese nationalism and became an impassioned advocate of self-government for Ceylon. After being called to the Bar, he returned to Ceylon and lived the life of a wealthy young barrister. But before long he resigned his practice; gave up his former "English" hobbies of tennis and riding, learned the Sinhalese language thoroughly and identified himself with Sinhalese, as opposed to British culture. The ideals of Gandhi made a powerful appeal to him: he learned to use the spinning wheel and customarily wore home-spun clothes. He renounced Christianity and became a Buddhist.

Entering political life as an exponent of Sinhalese language and customs, he became Secretary to the Ceylon National Congress, but soon broke away to form his own organization, the Sinhala Maha Sabha. This party won a number of seats in the first real parliamentary election held in Ceylon, and Bandaranaike became Minister of Health and Local Government, and led the Ceylonese delegation to the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi during March-April 1947.

Before long he broke with his colleagues, and just before the 1952 elections he formed a new group, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, and by 1956 what seemed to be a growing feeling that Bandaranaike's moderate Socialism and strong Sinhalese nationalism were stabilising factors of great value in Ceylonese politics, swept him back into power - this time as Prime Minister - in the elections of 1956. His government was described as being completely different from that of its predecessor as it was one of "intellectual nationalists."²

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1. The details given here are drawn from V. Howard Wiggins - Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton U.P., 196D); also The Times, 6 Oct. 1958, 28 Sept. 1959 & 12 Jan. 1960.
 2. Quoted from The Economist, 9 June 1956, p. 1004.

He soon showed his intention of breaking completely with his predecessor's pro-Western foreign policy by negotiating with Britain for the withdrawal of British naval and air forces from Ceylon; by cultivating close relations with Mr. Nehru - whose disciple he claimed to be - and by adopting for Ceylon an avowed neutralist outlook¹ in the Cold War.

Though he secured the gradual rendition of the British bases to Ceylon sovereignty, and although he was at pains to identify himself primarily with a specifically Asian view of international politics; Ceylon's relations with Britain remained cordial. In his domestic policies Mr. Bandaranaike was far less successful. In particular, friction with the Tamil minority and a growing bellicosity on the part of the Buddhist priesthood, inflamed communal tensions and led to his own assassination. Some months after his death his widow became his successor as Ceylon's Prime Minister, and inherited all the major problems which had previously troubled her husband. These were six basically: Buddhist and Singhalese revivalism, Singhalese-Tamil communalism, the lack of stable political parties, the difficulties of economic development in a plural society faced by mounting population pressures, isolation from the rest of the people of the Westernized political elite, and the search for a settled foreign policy.

1. See The Foreign Policy of Ceylon, a collection of Bandaranaike's speeches from which the following excerpts are taken:

Three Extracts from Statements by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, printed in - The Foreign Policy of Ceylon (Ceylon Government Press, 1957).

- (1) Statement in the House of Representatives, 2 August, 1956, pp. 1-2.

"I think the House will agree with me that the foreign affairs of this country, have taken a more 'positive' turn today than before. Earlier, we did not know where we were. There was talk of 'non-aligning', 'power blocs', 'preserving an attitude of neutralism', though, in fact, their (the previous government) actions were quite different. We have altered that now.

"What do we mean by this word 'neutralism'? I do not like that word. In this period of world history, when a good many of our Asian countries have once again regained their freedom, and the world itself is in a state of change, is it wrong for us to look about - we do not want to look either to the capitalism of the West or the communism of the East - till we find the precise form of society that we think is most suited to our country? Is it wrong, in pursuance of that view, that we do not range ourselves on the side of one or the other of those power blocs but would like to be friendly with all? I say, in this world today of a system which is changing but not yet completely disappeared - where the world is still in doubt in the case of various countries of the world, as to what particular thing it would like to have in place of the old - in that state of affairs, naturally, various conflicts emerge - ideological conflicts, conflicts arising out of the resurgence of nationalism here, there and everywhere, various types of conflicts in the world; the wise course obviously is that which is summed up by the rather ugly phrase 'co-existence.'

"We have just to make up our minds to avoid any serious danger of a general flare-up of war. The potentialities of some of the weapons that have been discovered are very vaguely known by ordinary laymen. There is in them something more terrible than what even the most imaginative writer can portray. They are so terrible in their results. We therefore want peace and we have to achieve peace under very difficult circumstances today, amidst so many conflicts all

over, while preserving fundamentally the things for which we stand. We have to work out some scheme of living and letting others live if we are to prevent humanity from generally going down. That is the minimum - the philosophy of neutralism for which I stand."

(2) Address to the U.N. General Assembly, 22 November, 1956, pp. 3-7.

"We of Asia who have suffered under imperialistic colonial rule for many centuries are, naturally, extremely sensitive towards anything approaching a resurgence of the spirit of imperialism and colonialism. I hope we are wrong, but we feel strongly that the happenings in Egypt, and perhaps the echo of those happenings in Hungary, are a manifestation once again of a certain resurgence of the spirit of colonialism, the desire of a strong power to achieve its purposes and to impose its will, even by force, on a weaker power."

"That is a philosophy behind the doctrine of co-existence. We have to build up a new society for ourselves, as I have said, which best suits the genius of our country. We should like to get some ideas and some principles from this side, and some from the other, until a coherent form of society is made up that suits our own people in the context of the changing world of today. That is why we do not range ourselves on the side of this Power-bloc or that Power-bloc. That is the philosophy of neutralism. It is not something dishonest. It is not a matter of sitting on the fence to see whether we can get the best of both worlds. It is a position that is inexorably thrust upon us by the circumstances of the case. It is a position that will be of great help in the world situation today, for we do provide a bridge over the gulf between the two opposing factions.

"We are supposed to be the 'uncommitted' nations. I strongly object to that word. We are committed up to the hilt. We are committed to preserve decency in dealings between nations, we are committed to the cause of justice and freedom as much as anyone is. That, briefly is our position in Asia. I trust it will not be misunderstood."

"My country is a small one, a weak one and a poor one, but I venture to think that today, particularly in an Organisation such as this, the service that a country can render - that a member can render - is not to be measured alone by the size of that country, its population, its power

or its strength. This is an Organisation which expresses itself most effectively by bringing to bear a certain moral force - the collective moral force and decency of human beings. That is a task in which the weak as well as the strong can render a useful service, and I give the Assembly the assurance, on behalf of my country, that as far as we are concerned every endeavour that we can make in all sincerity to assist in the achievement of those noble ideals for which this Organisation stands will always be forthcoming in the fullest measure."

- (3) Address to the Commonwealth Press Association, 5 July, 1956, pp. 8-9.

"Our attitude, the attitude of my own country, is an attitude of neutralism and is one which some in the West do not understand, perhaps do not wish to understand. It is not a sign of cowardice; it is not a desire to have the best of both worlds. It is something much more than a negative and passive attitude; something very positive."

"Now I feel that in pursuing this ideal of peace, for us it is best that we do not align ourselves with these military blocs, - either of the West or of the East; that we preserve friendship with all and try perhaps to provide a bridge between the two radically opposed points of view. Neutralism, but dynamic neutralism, is in the interest not only of our own countries but of mankind as a whole. I am glad that there is more evidence of understanding, even in countries which, understandably, do not quite appreciate our point of view."

Appendix 8.

Burmese Neutralism

Burma has consistently pursued a neutralist course^{1.} since independence in 1948; and U Nu,^{2.} who has been Burma's Prime Minister (apart from one or two brief interruptions), has been the leading exponent of Burmese neutralism to the outside world. Besides being a national leader, U Nu is a devout Buddhist, a leading religious scholar, an author and a playwright. His literary work includes a study of "Burma under the Japanese"; various plays, and translations of Karl Marx's "Das Kapital" and of Dale Carnegie's "How to Win Friends and Influence People" into Burmese. His play, "The People Win Through", a dramatic account of Burma's fight against Communist insurrection and subversion, has been produced in America. All of U Nu's speeches^{3.} and writings on foreign policy are of interest to the student of neutralism, but besides the excerpt given below, two other brief quotations seemed so relevant to the points made about 'independence' and 'synthesis' in Chapter II above, that they are included here.

Firstly, in his remarkably frank and unflattering account of his Second World War experiences as a Minister in the Japanese-puppet government of Burma, U Nu writes -
 "... it was really good for me to meet the Japanese. For then one had to recognise the 'Made in Japan' stamp on one's forehead. Otherwise with flattery on every side, one might easily have mistaken our pine-wood independence for real solid teak."^{4.}

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1. See Hugh Tinker - The Union of Burma (2nd ed., London, 1959) esp. ch. 12; also John Seabury Thomson - "Burmese Neutralism" in The Political Science Quarterly, June 1957, pp. 261-283.
 2. See Hugh Tinker - "Nu, the Serene Statesman" in Pacific Affairs, June 1957.
 3. See esp. the following collections: Towards Peace & Democracy (1949); From Peace to Stability (1951); Towards a Welfare State (1952); Forward with the People (1955); Resurgence: Premier U Nu at Bandung (1955).
 4. See Thakin Nu - Burma Under the Japanese (London, 1954), p. 77.

Secondly, in his presidential address to the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League U Nu said: "Largely on hearsay and cursory reading, we at one time impetuously and loudly claimed that Marxism was the same as Buddhism. We are very remorseful for having made such ill-considered and unfounded claims."¹.

The second excerpt given below gives a clear account of the central conceptions of Burmese neutralism as seen by the leading Burmese career diplomat, James Barrington.

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1. Quoted in The Times, 30 Jan. 1958.

- (1) From the Translation of a Speech Delivered by the Burmese Prime Minister, U. Nu, in the Chamber of Deputies on 27th September, 1957, pp. 31-2 (issued by the Burmese Embassy in London, no date or place of publication given).

"Our foreign policy is directed towards:

- (i) securing a world peace based on international justice and morality,
- (ii) establishing and maintaining friendly relations with all other nations and co-operating with them for our mutual benefit, but at the same time avoiding any entanglements which might entail the loss of our freedom of action in foreign affairs.

"The principal obstacle to world peace has been, and is, the cold war. We therefore refuse to take part in the cold war. Besides, joining one side would mean making enemies of the other, and, in addition, compromising our independent foreign policy. This refusal to take sides does not however mean that we have taken a purely negative attitude towards the cold war or that we behaved like the proverbial ostrich sticking its head in the sand. We could not afford to assume such a posture, even if we were tempted to do so, because as I have already explained the cold war was too close to us for us to be able to ignore it. We know only too well that another war would mean an end not only to those who are directly involved, but also to those who are not. Not that there was any danger of someone deliberately starting a war in the Hitlerian manner. But the principal parties in the cold war had drifted so far apart, and had become so suspicious of each other, that there was ever present the danger that some distant spark might set off the conflagration in a world more heavily armed than it was at any time in its past history. I know that many in this country feel that we should concentrate on our own internal business, and not get involved in the major international issues of the day. They point to the United States of America which for over a hundred years steered clear of involvement in the strife and struggles of the then world, and concentrated on building up the nation. It is certainly tempting to take this view but I find no comfort in it whatsoever. In fact, I regard it as a most dangerous doctrine, completely out of line with the current situation in the world. The United States could stay out of the nineteenth century struggles because of the facts of

geography. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans acted as sure shields behind which the United States could concentrate on the essential tasks of nation-building. The fact that not a single German or Japanese warship or bomber was able to reach the American mainland all through the Second World War is eloquent tribute to the effectiveness of this double-sided shield. But things have changed since the end of the World War II, although that war came to an end only twelve years ago. In this short space of time, distance has been annihilated, and our concepts of geography have undergone a revolution. The development of long range jet bombers and now of long range guided missiles, both capable of carrying atomic and thermonuclear weapons, means that geography is no longer a factor on which a nation can count for its defence. It is this which has forced the United States completely to abandon her policy of isolationism, and to begin to take an active part in the affairs of the world. And what applies to the United States applies even more strongly to the Union of Burma. I would like to recall that Burma became a battlefield in World War II even though she was at that time far far away from the starting point of the war. Judging from this, can anyone really doubt what our fate would be should another major war break out? Is it not certain that we would be engulfed regardless of our feelings? And if this is certain, is there anyone who would still maintain that the Union of Burma should seek safety in isolation? Is the Government not under a duty to their people to do all in their power to prevent the ultimate catastrophe? But there are some others who say what can a small, weak country like Burma do when the giant States of today seem bent on mutual suicide? To this my answer is that rather than wait supinely for what may sometimes seem inevitable, the small and weak States must exert all the normal pressure at their command on their big powerful brethren in a supreme effort to avert total disaster. This has been one of the principal reasons for my visits to China, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom in recent years. In making these visits, my purpose was not only to promote better understanding between ourselves and the peoples of these countries, but also to try to promote better understanding between such of them as are in opposing camps in the cold war. Our well recognized position of neutrality in the cold war made it possible for us to speak with complete candour to both sides."

- (2) From an Article entitled "The Concept of Neutralism. What Lies Behind Burma's Foreign Policy", by James Barrington* in the Special Burma Supplement of The Atlantic Monthly in 1958, pp. 29-30.

"Unfortunately for the Union of Burma, her emergence as an independent State coincided with the onset of that product of the nuclear age, the cold war. Since the cold war has dominated the international scene, either by drawing other international issues into its orbit so completely as to make them lose their original identity, or by reducing them to relative insignificance, it is not surprising that Burma's foreign policy, like that of every other State, should today tend to be judged by its attitude towards the cold war. Applying the terminology of war to the cold war, the States which, like Burma, refuse to take sides in the cold war have come to be known as the "neutrals." Later, when it became clear that the terminology of war did not quite fit the circumstances of the cold war, attempts were made to find a more apt description. Hence the evolution of the terms "uncommitted" and "unaligned". But these are only slight refinements of the original term "neutral." None of them provides a completely accurate description of the foreign policy of the Union of Burma - which is far more than a mere attitude, or a series of unrelated reactions to successive international issues."

"Genuine independence in Burmese minds is synonymous with an independent foreign policy. The reason for this is quite simple. To the great credit of the British, it must be admitted that they gave Burma progressive doses of "home rule," culminating in full internal autonomy in 1937. But right till the end, the British Government retained control of Burma's foreign affairs, with which was linked external defense. Thus the ability of a nation to make its own foreign policy decisions, without outside domination or pressure, became in the eyes of the Burmese people the test of independence. It remains so today. Any suspicion that

* James Barrington has been Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office of the Union of Burma since 1948, except for a five-year period when he served as Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations. An Anglo-Burman, he was born in Moulmein in 1911, educated at Rangoon and Oxford, and then entered the Indian Civil Service, which administered ^{Burma} before independence.

the Government had accepted the dictation of another country or group of countries, or that it had succumbed to pressure, would immediately put the Government in trouble. This is one reason why the Union of Burma steadfastly refuses to join either bloc in the cold war."

"This determination to follow an independent policy does not mean that Burma adopts an attitude of blind neutrality toward all international issues except those in which she has a direct interest. She realizes that isolationism, which was the basis of nineteenth-century neutralism, no longer provides a safe refuge for any nation in the circumstances of today, and that there is no running away from the problems of the world. If proof were needed of this, it is provided by the fact that the first major move of the Union of Burma in the international field was to join the United Nations. There is thus all the difference between Burma's brand of neutrality, and the neutrality of the nineteenth century. Since there is no getting away from the world, we have decided that the best course for us to adopt is to maintain friendly relations with all other nations, to interest ourselves in the problems which beset this planet, and to help find solutions to them from our position of independence which we believe enables us best to judge each issue strictly on its merits. Thus Burma's neutrality is not neutrality as between right and wrong. It is neutrality in the sense that in an extended conflict in which neither side is absolutely right nor absolutely wrong, she refuses to line up absolutely with either side. This, her policy of judging each individual issue as it arises strictly on its merits causes her to vote sometimes with one side and sometimes with the other, or to abstain where the issue is not a clear-cut one. This is very far from the "plague on both your houses" attitude which we are sometimes accused of adopting toward the two blocs in the cold war.

"Independence, then, is the driving force behind Burma's foreign policy. It furnishes the explanation for most of the attitudes which Burma has adopted on international issues. From it stems her strong opposition to colonialism in any form. We realize however that to remain independent Burma must build up her strength. Unless she does so, independence would become nothing but an empty slogan. The most urgent need is for her to strengthen her economic and social foundations. And in order that she may do this the Union needs peace above all else."

"Together with most of the countries of Asia, Africa, and South America, Burma was passed over by the industrial revolution. Before she has had a chance to catch up with

them, the more advanced countries of the world are already moving into the era of the atomic revolution, threatening to widen the gap which already exists between them and the underdeveloped countries. If independence is to have any meaning for Burma, it is absolutely imperative that she should be able rapidly to narrow this gap, bringing to her people an increasing measure of the benefits which modern science can provide. If true peace is to be established on this earth, it is equally imperative that the other underdeveloped countries should do the same. We all realize that we cannot do this by ourselves within the time that our people are prepared to wait. To meet the deadline, we need all the assistance we can get from outside, particularly from the technically advanced countries. Burma therefore welcomes all such assistance, subject only to one condition: the acceptance of assistance must not in any way compromise our independent foreign policy. Provided this condition is satisfied, we are prepared to accept assistance from any quarter; and in token of our gratitude we would like to make repayment, now or in the future, for all such assistance to the extent that our resources will permit. We know however that there is a direct relation between the availability of such assistance and the state of tension in the world. An outright shooting war would probably mean the end of everything. It is for this reason that it has become unthinkable. But from the viewpoint of progress, it is not enough to be able to prevent a shooting war. As long as the major powers continue to set aside more than half of their national budgets for defense purposes, it would be unrealistic to expect them to make available the kind and volume of assistance we all need. And as long as world tensions remain as high as they are, we cannot expect any substantial reduction in expenditure on armaments. Therefore Burma's own interests require that world tensions should be reduced."

"The main objective of our foreign policy is simply to preserve our independence. For this we need peace, and we need co-operation among all nations. In other words, we recognize clearly that there is a close link between independence and interdependence."

Appendix 9.

Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia

Whether officially Premier or indulging one of his periodic 'spells of resignation from office, Prince Sihanouk has been the effective ruler of Cambodia¹. since 1954. Though he is not the first Prime Minister to regularly receive 99% majorities in national referenda, he is certainly the first to carry out the Shavian idea of abdicating the throne in order to become his country's elected leader. Sihanouk's undoubted ascendancy in Cambodia dates from the time when he held up the signing of the Geneva agreements of 1954 by refusing any suggestion that the Vietminh dominated Khmer Issarak should continue in control of any part of Cambodian soil. He won his point and perhaps saved his country from a civil war. His neutralist foreign policy has brought Cambodia financial aid from the Soviet Union, China, the U.S.A. and France. In an interview with Le Monde, 13 June, 1956, Sihanouk emphasised that Cambodia's neutrality did not derive "from any ideology... it is of a practical kind because it seems to us the best... Cambodian neutrality which is comparable to that of India, is an obligatory consequence of the Indo-China War."

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1. See Martin F. Herz - "A Short History of Cambodia" (London, 1958); Saul Rose - "Socialism in Southern Asia" (London, 1959), ch. 10; V. M. Reddy - "A Study of Cambodia's Neutralism" in International Studies, October 1960, pp. 190-205. -

The following is from an article written by Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Foreign Affairs, July 1958, pp. 582-586, entitled - Cambodia Neutral. The Dictate of Necessity. —

"In our foreign relations we have favoured neutrality, which in the United States is all too often confused with 'neutralism', although it is fundamentally different. We are neutral in the way Switzerland and Sweden are neutral - not neutralist like Egypt or Indonesia. Let anyone examine our votes in the United Nations; they are not often 'aligned' with those of the 'bloc' of 'neutralist' nations.

"Our neutrality has been imposed on us by necessity. A glance at the map in our part of the world will show that we are wedged in between two medium-sized nations of the Western bloc and only thinly screened by Laos from the scrutiny of two countries of the Eastern bloc, - North Vietnam and the vast People's Republic of China. What choice have we but to try to maintain an equal balance between the 'blocs.'"

"The fact is, I abdicated in 1955 to save the monarchy - not to abandon it."

"If I have no particular liking for Communism, neither have I any cause or means to join a crusade - even a moral one - against the nations that have adopted that ideology and which since 1954 have not given my country sufficient grounds for complaint. It would be absurd to suppose that a tiny country like mine, geographically situated as it is, would risk provoking the Chinese and Soviet colossi now that planes fly so fast and rockets so far.

"We are not a 'breach' in the Western bloc merely because we cannot be a 'rampart'. In the event of a world conflict, we might very well become one of the first victims of a harsh occupation. In that case, the 'free world' would have other things to do besides undertaking our liberation - or rather the liberation of what remained of us.

"Are we selfish or 'wrong-minded' in thinking as we do? I maintain that we are merely being realistic. By practising a genuine neutrality which eliminates any pretext we have a chance of not bringing down a storm on our heads; and a storm can be dangerous where there is no lightning-conductor."

Appendix 10.

President Nkrumah and Ghanaian/Pan-African
Neutralism.

In 1951 Dr. Nkrumah was released from prison and became in 1958 the first of the modern nationalist leaders of sub-tropical Africa to head a new state, and to actively sponsor pan-Africanism from a place of power. Like Nehru, the best sources for an understanding of Nkrumah's neutralism are his Autobiography¹ and his published speeches.² Like Nasser, there is an ambivalence in Nkrumah's nationalist claims - for just as Nasser is both an Egyptian and an Arab nationalist, so Nkrumah is both a Ghanaian and an African nationalist. Nkrumah espouses what might be called a Trotsky view of national revolution. For he has always urged the need for a double revolution; one at home to convert a 'colonial type' of economy into a modern Socialist³ society; the other to secure the genuine (as opposed to "sham") independence of the whole of Africa.

Nkrumah claims to see forces at work in Africa which will make political union inevitable. He sees progress in the fact that there were twenty-eight independent states by early 1961, but is disturbed because nine of them have populations of less than three million. "Can we seriously believe that the colonial Powers meant these countries to be independent, viable states?" he says.

He sees other signs of 'neo-colonialism' in that many of the new states have their economies geared to Europe's. He believes that the ultimate breaking of colonial power and the development of Africa's wealth demands the planning of the continent's economic development as a whole. The difficulty is that not one of the political leaders heading a new state in West Africa shows signs of willingness to sacrifice his own authority in the interests of pan-African ideals.

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1. See Ghana. The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, (Nelson, London, 1957).
 2. See Kwame Nkrumah - I Speak of Freedom (Heinemann, London, 1961).
 3. See Charles Janson - "Which kind of African socialism: Dr. Nkrumah or Professor Potekhin" in The Listener, 15 June 1961, pp. 1029-30.

The following is from the text of President Nkrumah's statement to the National Assembly of Ghana on 15th July, 1958 (reported in the Daily Graphic, Accra, 16th July, 1958).

"The aim of the Government since the independence of Ghana has been to follow an independent foreign policy, that is, a policy that is not committed ideologically or aligned with any particular power or political bloc.

"As I have stated elsewhere, this policy is one of positive neutralism and non-alignment and we have interpreted this to imply that Government would act as it sees best at any particular time in the light of the country's obligation under the United Nations Charter, our position in relation to the African Continent, our adherence to the principles enunciated at the Accra and the Bandung Conferences and our desire to safeguard our independence sovereignty and territorial integrity."

"It is generally agreed that, small nation though we be, we have the chance, through the United Nations, of making a positive contribution to international peace and goodwill and it is our intention to live up to the expectations which other nations have in us."

"The only hope of a small nation like ours is to ensure that the United Nations becomes an effective instrument for world peace and that through the United Nations the interests of all peoples and nations will be safeguarded.

"Furthermore, Ghana has emerged in the world scene at a significant period in the history of the African continent, a period which is pregnant with developments of a far-reaching nature, a period of the re-awakening of African nationalism and patriotism.

"It is in the context that the significance of Ghana's independence should be viewed.

"Our becoming independent at this time casts us in a role unique among the truly independent African nations in Africa.

"We have attained our freedom from colonial rule and servitude by a path which many others still under foreign domination may aspire to tread.

"We must not only make our independence a success in terms of the economic and social well-being of our people and the positive part we play in international affairs, but we, in co-operation with other independent states in Africa, should give a lead to our brethren who are still struggling to be free.

"Our success and our action are consequently of great significance to the future course of the history of Africa.

"It is the intention of the Government to do everything within its power to give encouragement to all nationalist movements in any part of Africa that are dedicated to the emancipation of colonial people and to the welfare and prosperity of their peoples.

"It is to that end that we hope to welcome in Ghana a conference of leaders of nationalist movements in all the dependent territories of Africa. We hope, through this conference, a blue-print can be worked out for the total liberation of other dependent territories in Africa.

"We are aware that nationalism in Africa today presents a challenge not only to us who belong to the continent, but to all those countries that have interests in Africa.

"If the colonial powers are prepared to co-operate with this newly invigorated spirit of nationalism, the result might well be beneficial to them as it will be to us in Africa. But make no mistake, the struggle for freedom and independence in Africa is on the move and cannot be stayed.

"This leads me to my final major thought on the role of Ghana in international affairs. It is in Africa that Ghana's foreign policy really lies.

"The conference of independent African states has established a fundamental unity of outlook on foreign policy which is of deep significance to the role of the African nations in international affairs."

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PETER LYON



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Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism

Peter Lyon

RECENTLY, Mr. Nehru, in one of his more censorious moods, complained of the manner in which words lose their meaning in cold war terminology.¹ Such a complaint might well have provoked the reply that Mr. Nehru is as much a sinner as sinned against, and that the varying descriptions of India's foreign policy² display a degree of slipperiness equal with that of "free world," "peace," and "democracy" — the "masked words"³ he mentioned. Ironically, it was the cold war which engendered the connotations that have given neutralism its chameleon cloak. And while popular usage readily applies the term to India, Indian spokesmen⁴ provide implicit support for the firm contention of those who insist that neutralism is essentially "a subjective term."⁵ No doubt Indian equivocation, which is far from unique, is easily explicable. For a language attuned to the compulsions and contingencies of political life is often unavoidably ambiguous; and the

¹ *The Times* December 9, 1958.

² Mr. Nehru's latest biographer reports that "the term to describe Indian foreign policy has undergone frequent change. It began with 'neutrality' or 'dynamic neutrality,' later became 'neutralism' and then 'non-alignment.' Nehru prefers the phrase 'positive policy for peace,' he told the author in New Delhi on 13 June 1956." Michael Brecher, *Nehru. A Political Biography* (London, 1959), p. 563, footnote 2. Mr. Nehru's testimonies on other occasions have been somewhat different: "I do not like the word neutralism which is commonly used in wartime. In peacetime it indicates a sort of war mentality. India's neutralism meant simply that they had an independent policy and judged questions on their merits." Mr. Nehru reported in *The Times*, July 7, 1956. Cf. Mr. Nehru's speech in *Lok Sabha Debates*, March 29, 1956, cols. 3729-3730.

³ "Yes; and words, if they are not watched will do deadly work sometimes. There are masked words droning and skulking about us . . . there are masked words abroad, I say, which nobody understands, but which everybody uses . . . for such words wear chameleon cloaks." John Ruskin (1893) in *Sesame and Lilies* (London, 1899), pp. 22-23.

⁴ Cf. Krishna Menon: "Neutralism is an inept word used during a war. You are not belligerent in peacetime. The word has no meaning." *New York Times*, July 16, 1956. But an editorial in *The Hindu* (Madras), December 20, 1955, spoke otherwise: "What the Western Powers have to realize is that neutralism is a force that is worthy of the greatest respect even in these days of nuclear warfare."

⁵ *Economist*, March 10, 1956, p. 574.

political "isms," which so proliferate today, seem to act as semantic vortices, blurring and engrossing the meaning of words of more ancient lineage.

The concept of neutralism has come to ^{connote} denote a whole gamut of policies, attitudes and sentiments expressing dissociation from the contemporary cold war. Such a broad embrace contains a host of proximate equivalents, euphemisms or circumlocutions — "non-alignment," "peaceful and active co-existence," "active formal neutralism," "positive neutralism," "isolationism" are but some. Undoubtedly, however, it is neutrality which is most often used interchangeably⁶ with neutralism and whose meaning most overlaps the more expansive term.

Neutralism shares with its nearest congener the same Latin root, but the purist in etymology might charge that neutralism is a hybrid, because of its Greek suffix, whereas neutrality, with its Latin suffix is admirably thoroughbred. The terms neutral and neutrality date back as far as the fourteenth century where they are to be discovered in diplomatic correspondence and in treaties used in the sense of nonparticipation in an armed conflict between princes.⁷ From the *Oxford English Dictionary* it appears that neutrality⁸ — the state or condition of being on neither side or inclined neither way — emerged in English language during the fifteenth century in an ecclesiastical context, while neutralism⁹ was first used a century later meaning an attitude of indifference, apathy, or passivity. The same source shows that neutralist was used in the seventeenth century to denote one who maintains a neutral attitude, and referred especially to matters of religion.

⁶ *Oxford English Dictionary*, Vol. VII (Oxford, 1908), p. 110. "Neutralism — maintenance of neutrality." Funk and Wagnalls, *New Standard Dictionary of the English Language*, (New York, 1949), p. 1670. "Neutralism—the spirit and practice of neutrality." The two words are used coterminously in J. C. Kundra, *Neutrality in the Past and Present* (New Delhi, 1957), p. 2; in Hans J. Morgenthau, "Neutrality and Neutralism" in *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago 1958), pp. 185-209; and in L. Modjoryan "Neutrality," *New Times* (Moscow), February 16, 1956, p. 12.

⁷ Lothar Koczub, *The Concept of War in Contemporary History and International Law* (Geneva, 1956), pp. 128-146.

⁸ Neutrality. In 1480 Caxton wrote: "The threefold governance in the chyrche that is to quotes of Eugeny, of the Counseyll and of the neutralyte" in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, (Oxford, 1908). VI, pt. 2, 110, "neutralism — the maintenance of neutrality."

⁹ Neutralism 1379. W. Wilkinson. Confut. Familie of Love. "Our owne Neutralisme and lukewarmnes shall utterly condemnes us."

Neutrality has a strictly legal¹⁰ as well as a general diplomatic or political¹¹ connotation. This is what distinguishes neutrality most sharply from neutralism, for no one has suggested that the latter should be construed as a legal¹² as well as a political term. Yet this distinction is not very helpful today as the recognition of legal neutrality depends on differentiating clearly between peace and war as two distinct situations defined by international law. Given the present fuzzy *status mixtus* of war and peace which we call cold war, legal neutrality today can only have reference to limited wars of the Korean or Suez type.

As political terms neutrality and neutralism are virtually exact synonyms, the only difference being that neutralism seems to draw forth a greater multiplicity of meanings than its older counterpart, and to imply a greater profusion of theory and practice. It is not paradoxical to suggest that both concepts are much older than the words themselves, certainly much older than neutralism which is a political neologism. For there is no clear dividing line between the history of neutrality,¹³ its theory and practice, and the present condition of neutralism with all the problems and controversies that surround it. Some knowledge of the vicissitudes of neutrality is indispensable in an appreciation of the emergence of neutralism.

I

The practice of diplomatic neutrality can be traced back to very ancient times and is historically prior to the recognition of neutrality as a legal status. For instance, a *sui generis* conception was well known in India in Mauryan times (fourth to second centuries B.C.),¹⁴ and the recognition of neutrality was an im-

¹⁰ Definitions of legal neutrality are legion. Some representative references are cited in T. Kořarnicki, "The Place of Neutrality in the Modern System of International Law," *Recueil des Cours, Academie de droit international de la Haye* (1952), I.

¹¹ Diplomatic or political neutrality connotes a state of fact, two parties in conflict and a third adopting a policy or attitude of being on neither side.

¹² C. G. Fenwick, "The legal aspects of neutralism," *American Journal of International Law* (hereafter *AJIL*), Jan. 1957, p. 71-74.

¹³ For detailed treatment see Philip S. Jessup (ed.), *Neutrality: its History, Economics and Law*, 4 vols. (New York, 1935-6); N. Politis, *Neutrality and Peace*, (Washington, 1935); and Nils Orvik, *The Decline of Neutrality, 1914-41* (Oslo, 1953).

¹⁴ K. K. R. Sastry, "A Note on Udasina: Neutrality in Ancient India," *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs* (1954), pp. 131-134.

portant factor in the mitigation of conflict in ancient Greece,¹⁵ where factious war between the independent Hellenic states was endemic. The anarchy, individualism, and license of interstate relations in ancient Greece contrasted sharply with the order, conformity, and discipline that the Roman Empire imposed on its world. Under the Roman Empire application of the dogma that those who were not for her were against her, that there was no middle ground between ally and enemy,¹⁶ meant that there could be no recognition of neutrality. Only fleetingly, when dictates of expediency ran roughshod over dogma, did neutrality enjoy a precarious existence.¹⁷

Throughout the Middle Ages neutrality in any positive sense was virtually unknown. Feudal ties, the universal sway of the Roman Empire, and tacit acceptance of the unity of the Christendom were strong obstacles to the adoption of such a concept in law or in practice. As the strength of the Empire waned, the imperial bonds loosened and new states sprang up in the void left by the weakening giant. These new states found that there were few external restraints to inhibit their freedom of action. It was in this setting, contemporaneous with the birth of the modern law of nations, that neutrality as a legal concept was born.

Gradually, with the passing of the Middle Ages, the notion of neutrality developed from its embryonic character as a political concept into that of a recognized legal status under international law. During this early formative period more was heard of neutral rights than of neutral duties, except when the latter were specifically entailed in particular treaties. For some time even the right of neutrality was limited by the survival of the mediaeval doctrine of the just war, whereby a state wishing to be impartial in a conflict should not hinder the belligerent whose cause was just nor help the belligerent whose cause was unjust. So while the legal rights of a neutral were but vaguely understood, it was natural for governments to seek precision in written undertakings, and it was in this way that the law of neutrality was formed and became explicit during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Even so, neutrality was not recognized or respected by such

¹⁵ "If you prefer to be neutral. . . receive both sides in peace, but neither for the purpose of war." Jowett, *Thucydides* (Oxford, 1881), I, 142.

¹⁶ Livy, XXXII, 21.

¹⁷ C. Phillipson, *International Law and Customs of Ancient Greece and Rome* (London, 1911), II, 301-312.

warrior kings as Gustavus Adolphus or Frederick the Great. In 1630 the Elector of Brandenburg pleaded the right to remain neutral in the war between the Emperor and his brother-in-law, the king of Sweden. Gustavus Adolphus' reply was: "What kind of a thing is that? Neutrality — I don't understand it. It is nothing to me."¹⁸ And he compelled the unwilling Elector to become his ally. No wonder it was not until well on in the eighteenth century that "neutrality" became a term of general use. From then onwards, up to the First World War, the development of international law was greatly influenced by the concept of neutrality which became its finest, and most fragile, flower.

II

The French Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars clearly emphasized the broad lesson of international history that if a state lacks the strength to defend its neutrality, that neutrality will be violated whenever a belligerent can use the argument of military necessity. The resemblance between the Napoleonic and the Roman Empire, an analogy pursued entertainingly by H. A. L. Fisher,¹⁹ was certainly paralleled inasmuch as neutrality was neither respected nor regarded under either regime. Even when, after the Act of Mediation of 1803, Napoleon compelled the Swiss to accept the position of "absolute" neutrality, he was capable of saying on the outbreak of the Austrian war in 1809: "If I have need to march into Switzerland I shall do it. I can always find a pretext — the most insignificant pamphlet aimed at me will serve my purpose."²⁰

Meanwhile, the leaders of the infant United States republic had added to the concept of neutrality the notion of neutral duties commensurate with neutral rights. This was inaugurated by Washington's brief and simple neutrality proclamation of April 22, 1793, which does not even mention the word neutrality, and was elaborated — notably by Hamilton and Jefferson — in a number of policy pronouncements carefully designed to keep the country out of current wars.²¹ While insisting on the distinction

¹⁸ Sir Geoffrey Butler & S. Maccoby, *The Development of International Law* (London, 1928), p. 231.

¹⁹ H. A. L. Fisher, *Napoleon* (London, 1950), pp. 135-137.

²⁰ Butler & Maccoby, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

²¹ Charles S. Hyneman, *The First American Neutrality* (Urbana 1934) and Charles M. Thomas, *American Neutrality in 1793* (New York, 1931).

between the acts of individuals and those of the neutral state, the new American neutrality stressed, for the first time, impartiality as one of the main duties of a neutral. This American version of neutrality was not based on legal precedents. Nevertheless, it was quickly accepted by the European powers; while the prudent and specific policies of the Founding Fathers soon became shrouded in the mythology of American national history and interpreted as dogma. Henceforward the United States was to have a potent influence on the future shape and fortunes of the concept of neutrality — and of neutralism.²²

In the century following the Napoleonic wars neutrality enjoyed a generally placid, prosperous, career. In historical retrospect, and in light of the present day threat of thermonuclear extinction, the period between 1815 and 1914 seems like a golden age for the theory and practice of neutrality — a brief spell of unusually favorable weather, reflecting the coincidence of a multiple balance of power, a general respect for international law, and the absence of any widespread and prolonged international conflict. This period found its apogee in the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907; for the law of neutrality as proclaimed in the Hague Conventions was based upon three centuries of practice, upon hundreds of decisions of prize courts and upon many important treaties. Even so, the fragility of the structure was beginning to be apparent at the turn of the century. The Schlieffen Plan of the German General Staff was made in 1897, and at the very time that the lawyers were talking at the Hague, the soldiers and diplomats of Europe suspected that it was Germany's intention in the next war to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

III

While the concept and practice of neutrality were enjoying

²² Even if we grant Professor Northrop's firm contention that the policies of the Founding Fathers are the true analogues for present-day neutralism (F. S. C. Northrop, "Neutralism and United States Foreign Policy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* [July 1957, 42-68]), it is as well to remember that United States neutrality — more usually described as isolationism — invariably tended to be more a question of unilateral decision and of domestic enactment than of conforming with the prevailing international law and practice of neutrality. The spate of U. S. neutrality legislation in the 1930's was but the continuation of a practice begun in 1794. The U. S. was one of the three signatory states that did not ratify the Hague Conventions of 1907 and to date it has not ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

their heyday, neutralism was a term still apparently little used. In 1861, when Matthew Arnold wrote of neutralism in his "Popular Education of Holland,"²³ he was using the term somewhat ironically, for Arnold was a staunch supporter of the Established Church as preferable to the fanaticism and vain pretensions of so many religions, especially the religions of dissent against which he tilted so deftly in his "Culture and Anarchy." It may be that neutralism was soon made redundant by the coining of a stronger, more positive word by Arnold's friend, T. H. Huxley. For agnosticism — meaning not passivity or indifference but the more positive assertion that nothing is known, or is likely to be known, of anything beyond material phenomena — was invented at the beginning of the eighteen seventies and, with its able propagation by Huxley and his disciples, neutralism fell into limbo in English until it re-emerged from France between 1947 and 1950, now in political language.

Neutralism was to break into political vocabulary first, though briefly, in Italy where the word was applied to a vital, though purely domestic, debate of whether or not the country ought to intervene in the war which had broken out in Europe in the summer of 1914. Alone among the European great powers Italy entered the war as a result of deliberate bargaining. Neutral at the outset, she negotiated actively with both sides to obtain the maximum advantage for intervention and obtained it from the Entente Powers, who agreed to satisfy Italian irredentist claims, mainly at the expense of her former ally, Austria-Hungary.²⁴ Within Italy during 1914, the terms neutralist and interventionist came into vogue. The application of these terms revealed the fluidity of Italian political life, for the neutralists comprised a heterogeneous collection of Clericals, most of the Conservatives, the official Socialists and the Syndicalists, whilst the interven-

²³ "It is not unreasonable to ask of those 'Religions of the Future' which the present day so prodigally announces that they will equip themselves with a substantial shape, with a worship, a ministry and a flock before we legislate for popular education in accordance with their exigencies. But when we have done this, this neutralism will be at an end, denominationalism will have made them prisoners; the denominationalism of Groningen or Tübingen, instead of that of Utrecht or Geneva." Matthew Arnold, *Popular Education on the Continent* (London 1861), pp. 221-222. A year earlier Walter Bagehot had used the word "indifferentism" in a roughly equivalent sense. See Bagehot's essay on Gladstone in *Biographical Studies* (London, 1895), p. 95.

²⁴ A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918* (Oxford, 1954), pp. 544-548.

tionists were made up of the Nationalists, some Conservatives, the Liberals, the Radicals, the Republicans and the Reformist Socialists. The country was torn by increasingly violent polemics; the record of this conflict can best be followed in the contemporary press.²⁵ The struggle did not finally end in 1915, but was renewed from 1919 to 1922. Neutralism now became opposition to the state as such, and the neutralists became the object of repression and proselytism by those erstwhile interventionists who had evolved into Fascists.²⁶ When in October, 1922, the Fascists took control of the Italian state, even the stoutest advocates of neutralism were silenced.

In Britain at this time the domestic debate was briefer, less important, less bitter, and conducted in time honored idiom. The political capital of Cobdenism and of Gladstonism was not quite exhausted, and Norman Angell's Neutrality League²⁷ attracted favorable support from such names as C. P. Scott, John Morley,²⁸ Charles Trevelyan, and Ramsay MacDonald. But the days of "the free hand" and of easy security had gone, and with the British declaration of war on August 4, 1914, the country was committed, in the view of the German Chancellor, "just for a word, neutrality, just for a scrap of paper."²⁹ The events of that day also put a sudden end to the British Neutrality League. The country seemed purged of "neutralism," while "neutralist," a term used freely in British newspapers from 1915,³⁰ was reserved exclusively for reporting Italian politics. By 1928 the coauthors of a standard textbook of International Law could write of "the strong neutralist sentiment which was such a feature of the 19th century."³¹ During

²⁵ A convenient source is the British General Staff publication, *Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Allied Press Supplement* (London 1916-19) in 6 vols.

²⁶ Aldo Garosci, "Neutralism" in *European Integration*, ed. by C. Grove Haines (Baltimore, 1951), p. 198.

²⁷ *After All: The Autobiography of Norman Angell* (London 1951), pp. 181-183.

²⁸ See Lord Morley's *Memorandum on Resignation* (London 1915), an eloquent statement of the Cobdenite viewpoint; see also the editorials of the *Economist*, a faithful mouthpiece of Cobdenism, prior to August 4, 1914. Cf. *The Political Writings of Richard Cobden* (London 1903), I., 33-34, and II., 462-536, especially 533.

²⁹ Reported by Sir E. Goschen (British Ambassador in Berlin) to Sir Edward Grey, *British Diplomatic Correspondence* (London 1915), No. 160.

³⁰ Some representative examples may be found in: *The Times*, March 1, 1915, and March 3, 1916; *Morning Post*, February 1, 1915; *Glasgow Herald*, May 26, 1920.

³¹ Butler & Maccoby, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

the interwar period at least three members of the Commonwealth — Ireland, South Africa and Canada³² — seem to have anticipated what would today be called neutralism.

In the America of August, 1914, there was virtually no debate about what appeared essentially as a European affair. Woodrow Wilson's proclamation of American neutrality on August 4, 1914, was so much in accord with the predilections of the President and the nation, and in tune with the national tradition of aloofness from European struggles, that anything other than American neutrality was impossible at that time. Wilson's plea to his countrymen, fourteen days later, to be "impartial in thought as well as in action" seems, in retrospect, rather to have anticipated the National Socialist prescription of neutrality³³ than, as some have maintained, to have drawn its inspiration from the traditions founded by Washington and Jefferson.³⁴ Such an aberration probably sprang from Wilson's lack of acquaintance with foreign politics and his genuine uncertainty and doubts, at first, about the issues involved in the war and of their significance for America. By October of the following year he was declaring in public: "Neutrality is a negative word. It does not express what America ought to feel."³⁵ Yet it was another eighteen months before Wilson put his war message before Congress when he said "neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable. . . . We have seen the last of neutrality."³⁶ Less than three years later, as Wilson faded from the political scene, America returned to what was somewhat misleadingly called "normalcy." The obsessive American isolationism of the nineteen twenties and thirties prefigured many of the preoccupations of Europe's present-day neutralists,³⁷ while the Pan-American Union possessed, in Argentina, an early anticipation of South and South-East Asia's type of neutralism.³⁸

³² N. Mansergh, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1939* (London 1952).

³³ See the account and severe criticism of National Socialist doctrines of neutrality by Edvard Hambro, "Ideological Neutrality" in *Nordisk Tidsskrift for international ret. Acta Scandinavica juris gentium*, 1939 (X, n. 2-3), 109-117.

³⁴ Harley Notter, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (Baltimore, 1937), pp. 317-319; & F. S. C. Northrop, *loc. cit.*

³⁵ Quoted in Orvik, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³⁷ McGeorge Bundy, "Isolationists & Neutralists: A sketch in Similarities," *Confluence* (June, 1952), p. 70-78.

³⁸ *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*. 2 (London, 1948). I, 23-25, and II, 199.

IV

Two world wars completely shattered the whole fabric of legal neutrality as it stood in 1907. The First World War re-taught, and the Second World War re-emphasized the lesson of the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars, that in any wide-spread and prolonged war the rights of neutrals will be little regarded.

The twentieth-century invention of institutionalized collective security provisions firmly prevented any possibility of restoring legal neutrality to its 1907 position. Before the creation of the League of Nations international law had no alternative but to accept war as legitimate, quite apart from the justice or injustice of its cause. The League Covenant, the abortive Kellogg-Pact, and the United Nations more particularly, formally restricted the conditions under which war was lawful, thus, by implication, reviving the mediaeval distinction between just and unjust wars. No doubt in strict logic collective security and neutrality are incompatible, "the more there is of the one the less there is of the other,"³⁹ but in fact the two are seldom entirely opposed and may often coexist. The League Council openly recognized such a situation in 1920 when Switzerland was invited to become a League member,⁴⁰ and, as Nils Örvik has shown, neutrality existed in fact and in law throughout the life of the League.⁴¹

Of all the states which took refuge in neutrality during the Second World War, few found safety in it. The first stage of the war provided a number of illustrations of the general low regard for and virtual abandonment of impartial neutrality. With that delicate recourse to circumlocution which is a favorite camouflage of statesmen, Italy, Turkey, Spain, Egypt, and Argentina immediately described their positions as "non-belligerency."⁴² When in 1940 and 1941 the United States clearly departed from the conventional nineteenth-century rules of strict, impartial neutrality, she invoked the argument, among others, that with the general renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the right

³⁹ H. Lauterpacht, "Neutrality and Collective Security," *Politica* (1936), 149.

⁴⁰ David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (New York, 1928), II, pp. 437-438.

⁴¹ Örvik, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-187.

⁴² Robert R. Wilson — "Non-belligerency in relation to the terminology of neutrality," *A.J.I.L.* (January 1941), 121.

asserted by the founders of international law to discriminate against the aggressors was fully restored.⁴³ All these "non-belligerent" states were asserting that there could be an intermediate position between impartial neutrality and belligerency. In practice the degree of partiality shown by these states varied considerably at different stages of the war. Essentially the relations between belligerents and non-belligerents were governed not by legal formulas but by political considerations.

Even the most cursory glance at the fate of some of the states which adopted a neutrality policy can suggest reasons why, in the minds of many, the concept and even the word became further discredited and disregarded. National Socialist Germany bettered the example of Imperial Germany and invaded not only neutral Belgium, but also Holland, Denmark, and Norway. Japan occupied the Portuguese-half of the island of Timor, while Switzerland and Ireland were among the several neutrals which experienced the "unintended" effects of someone else's bombs. Clearly the lot of most neutrals, as traditionally defined in textbooks of international law, was not a happy one.

When in 1945 the United Nations Charter was drafted at San Francisco neutrality was generally regarded with disfavor.⁴⁴ After 1945 the question whether the Charter could be interpreted as permitting or excluding neutrality seemed to have only a theoretical interest,⁴⁵ as so many of its provisions were clearly inoperative, given the lack of the presupposed agreement of the great powers. Yet, irrespective of the United Nations' political or constitutional weaknesses, neutrality soon was insinuated again in the law of nations. The Geneva Conventions of August 1949 definitely prescribe neutrality. In the Korean War the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was composed, apart from Switzerland, entirely of members of the United Nations; and in April, 1955, Austria was recognized as a permanently neutral state. Eight months later she was admitted as a member of the United Nations.⁴⁶

⁴³ Cordell Hull, *op. cit.* II, 671-916.

⁴⁴ *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization* (San Francisco, 1945) VI, 459; VII, 327.

⁴⁵ Hans Kelsen has argued that neutrality was possible even if the Charter worked as was intended by its makers. H. Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations* (London, 1950), pp. 94 and 108.

⁴⁶ Josef L. Kunz, "Austria's Permanent Neutrality," *A.J.I.L.* (April, 1956), 418; and Alfred Verdross, "Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations," *A.J.I.L.* (January, 1956), 61-68.

One influential writer has claimed that "the law of neutrality is not visibly more obsolete in the mid-twentieth century than it was in the ill-fated League of Nations."⁴⁷ Certainly, the law of neutrality is no less ambiguous today than it was in the days of the League. Legal neutrality in the modern world seems to mean little more than trying to avoid involvement in a shooting war, regardless of the "rights" that may be overlooked or the "duties" that may be ignored. However, it may be unwise to claim that the law of neutrality is now dead, or even dying, for throughout the last four hundred years there has been evident a phoenix-like quality just when funeral orations seemed most apt. There is much to be said for a Marxist claim, "Neutrality is an historically developed concept, and like all such concepts it denotes different things at different times."⁴⁸

Today, neutrality and neutralism as political concepts can each denote different things in different places at the same time. Some recent attempts by scholars⁴⁹ to distinguish them as illustrating the difference between policy and attitude are vitiated by the fact that the history of neutrality alone shows that the distinction can be extremely tenuous, while in contemporary usage neutralism embraces both policies and attitudes. The distinction between policy and attitude might be applicable when the neutralist is not responsible for his country's foreign policy, as in the cases of Étienne Gilson and Claude Bourdet; but when the neutralist is Nehru, who combines the offices of Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, and Bandaranaike, who also combined them, the distinction between their neutralism and India's or Ceylon's foreign policy respectively becomes rather nice, to say the least. As the fact of neutrality seems to be of perennial occurrence whereas neutralism, so called, has only sprung to light during the world's present predicament, the most helpful distinction of the two concepts today — though it is by no means a generally accepted one — would be that neutrality means keeping aloof from shooting wars whereas neutralism means dissociation from the

⁴⁷ Julius Stone, *Legal Controls of International Conflict* (London, 1954), p. 382.

⁴⁸ L. Modjoryan, "Neutrality," *New Times* (Moscow), February 16, 1956, p. 17.

⁴⁹ Denis Healey, *Neutralism* (London, 1955), p. 11; Coral Bell in *Survey of International Affairs, 1954*. Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 1957), p. 283; and Harry L. Roberts, *Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects* (London, 1956), p. 127.

cold war while, perhaps, involving efforts to remove or, at least, mitigate some of the harshness of the cold war struggle.

V

It was perhaps appropriate, as Alexander Werth⁵⁰ has suggested, that with the onset of the cold war it was from France that neutralism came into ~~the~~ political vocabulary, after the period of French mediation between the superpowers had passed.⁵¹ Étienne Gilson and Hubert Beuve-Méry in *Le Monde* and Claude Bourdet in *Combat* and later in *L'Observateur*, soon became widely regarded as the exponents of neutralism;⁵² though Gilson soon made clear that for him, at least, the difference between neutralism and neutrality was "only unfortunately over words."⁵³ Indeed, the term neutralism was not embraced readily by the so-called proponents of the doctrine, and in a letter to the editor of *Le Figaro Littéraire* Gilson strongly denied that he was a "champion of neutralism."⁵⁴ His denial provoked the counter comment from the editor, Pierre Brisson, that Gilson "having launched the idea refuses to accept the word."⁵⁵ Gilson's refusal was not unique. Support for neutralism in France seemed to be far greater than the liking for the label. Bourdet's ironical formula "I'm not a neutralist, but —" aptly described the mood of an immense number of Frenchmen.

In the summer of 1958 Bourdet, in the new journal of his British counterparts, described the genesis of this rather unwelcome term as it emerged during 1947-8: "It was unpopular at that time to be a 'neutralist.' The name, which we did not choose, was picked for us by our opponents and by the pressmen. Rather than deny the title, which was not a particularly fortunate choice because of the aura of sit-back-and-do-nothing that surrounded it, we preferred to take it up and try to popularize it. 'Neutralism' very quickly had people worried."⁵⁶

Bourdet describes how the stigma attached to neutralism began

⁵⁰ Alexander Werth, *France 1940-1955* (London, 1956), p. 361.

⁵¹ Dorothy Pickles, *French Politics* (London, 1953), pp. 186-191.

⁵² John Marcus, "Neutralism in France," *Review of Politics* (July, 1955).

⁵³ Étienne Gilson, "Querelles de Mots," *Le Monde*, August 31, 1950.

⁵⁴ *Le Figaro Littéraire*, February 17, 1951.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Claude Bourdet, "The Way to European Independence" *The New Reasoner* (Summer, 1958), 12-13.

to diminish among "serious-thinking people" (*sic*) as India and Yugoslavia became popularly identified as neutralist states. As if to acknowledge the expansiveness of neutralism and with an appropriate Humpty-Dumpty-like insouciance towards the meaning of words, Bourdet claims that by 1958 both sides in the cold war "seemed prepared to agree that active neutrality, or disengagement — the name is unimportant — was not such a bad thing . . . as long as it did not spread within their own ranks. The growth in the acceptance of these ideas has been astonishing when one remembers that it has taken place over a period of only ten years."⁵⁷

Neutralism has undoubtedly emerged, but, like Proteus, can assume many forms. *Si definitionem requiris, circumspice.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*