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Mange-Sankoh, Osman Kabonkoh

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
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AFRICANISATION AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENT:
A STUDY OF THE EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND
PRACTICES IN SIERRA LEONE BETWEEN 1955 AND 1978.

submitted by
OSMAN KABONKOH MANGE-SANKOH
for the degree of Ph.D.
of the University of Bath
1981

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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page No.</u>
Summary of the Study	xiii
<u>Introduction</u>	2
1. The objectives of the study	12
2. Scope of the study	13
3. Structure of the study	14
Methodology	16
References	21
 <u>PART I - The Africanisation of the Public Sector</u>	
<u>Chapter 1. The setting and the employment policies of the colonial government</u>	23
1.1 The setting - Sierra Leone	23
1.2 History and constitutional development	28
1.3 The economy	37
1.4 The structure of the economy	39
1.5 The employment policies of the colonial government	59
1.6 The recruitment policy	68
1.7 The size and level of expatriate employment in the public service	74
1.8 Summary	82
References	86
 <u>Chapter 2. Africanisation of the public service</u>	 93
2.1 Introduction	93
2.2 Motivation for Africanisation	96

2.3	Pressures for Africanisation	106
2.4	The machinery for Africanisation	106
2.5	Procedures and progress of Africanisation	120
2.6	The progress and rate of Africanisation	128
2.7	Post-independence period	139
2.8	Tribalism and Africanisation	153
2.9	Discipline	169
2.10	Summary and conclusion	178
	References	184
 <u>PART II - The Private Sector</u>		
	Introduction	193
	<u>Chapter 3. The employment policies of foreign firms</u>	201
3.1	Introduction	201
3.2	The dual labour market	204
3.21	Theories of labour market segmentation	206
3.3	The employment practices of multi-nationals	223
3.4	The size and dimension of expatriate employment in the private sector	238
3.5	The pace of Africanisation	250
3.6	The Sierra Leonean successor	274
3.7	Attitude of the African successor to the expatriate	280
3.8	Summary and conclusions	290
	References	297

<u>Chapter 4.</u> The Africanisation of the private sector: national policy	304
4.1 Introduction	305
4.2 The response of the workers	310
4.21 Two case histories	311
4.3 The socio-economic motivations	323
4.4 The national policy	332
4.41 Immigration control laws	335
4.42 The fiscal policy	364
4.5 Criticisms of current policies	366
4.6 Summary and conclusions	371
Notes and references	374

PART III - The Manpower Supply

Introduction	380
<u>Chapter 5.</u> The manpower supply and requirements	388
5.1 Introduction	389
5.2 Approaches to educational planning	395
5.3 Cost of education and manpower planning	408
5.31 Cost-benefit approach	409
5.32 Requirement and supply of trained personnel	418
5.4 Factors affecting the supply of skilled manpower	436
5.5 The policy implications	456
5.51 Policy choices	457
5.52 Reform of salary and wage structure	460
5.53 Make the education system more relevant	471
5.531 Education for the terminal student	474

5.6 Summary and conclusions	491
Notes and references	495
<u>Chapter 6.</u> Conclusions and proposals	507
6.1 The public sector	509
6.2 The private sector	521
Notes and references	544
Appendix I Map of Sierra Leone	546
Appendix II Programme of field work	547
Appendix III Sectoral composition of G.D.P.	549
Appendix IV Key for Tables 3.8 and 3.11	550
Appendix V Sierra Leone Public Service salary scales (Table 5.5, page 412)	553
Bibliography and References	555

TABLES AND FIGURES

<u>Table</u>	<u>Page No.</u>
1.1 European civil servants in Africa	75
1.2 Number of expatriates in West Africa	76
1.3 Number of expatriates in different job categories	77
1.4 Departmental distribution of expatriates as of April 1955	78
2.1 Number of expatriates and senior African staff in the public service of Sierra Leone - 1953-1959	129
2.2 Departmental distribution of expatriates - 5 years	131
2.3 Percentage distributions of expatriate employment by department	134
2.4 The manpower output from the education system	136
2.5 Number of expatriates employed 1961-1962	139
2.6 High and intermediate-level manpower employment in the public sector.	142
2.7 Number of expatriates in the Civil Service as at 1970	146
2.8 Number of non-Sierra Leonean teachers in the 1977/78 school year	148
2.9 Senior central government officers	157
2.10 Tribal breakdown of senior employment in the public service as at 10/9/79	166
2.11 Number of disciplinary cases 1971-74	172

3.1	Occupational summary of expatriates and Africans employed in the private sector of Sierra Leone as at 1964	202
3.2	Annual average salary and wages of private sector employees in Sierra Leone 1954-1961	203
3.3	Inter-industry wages comparison between expatriate and African personnel	217
3.4	Wages distribution in a mining company in Sierra Leone (£)	221
3.5	Senior personnel list of a foreign-owned mining company, 1975	229
3.6	Changes in the numbers of expatriates and their industrial distribution in the private sector - 1964-1978	241
3.7	Ratio of expatriate employees to total work force in seven selected foreign-owned companies	244
3.8	Expatriates and Africans in managerial and supervisory positions by post category as at 1978	247
3.9	Employment positions of expatriate and African staff in Indian- and European-owned firms as at 1978	251
3.10	Average annual wages of two mining operations in Zambia and Sierra Leone for the years 1971-1975 for their expatriate personnel (converted into pounds sterling)	252
3.11	Expatriate and African employees by qualification - 1978	256

4.1	Expatriates' share of total pay bill in a mining company - 1964-1975	327
4.2	The number of expatriate quotas granted and rejected between 1961 and 1967	343
4.3	Expatriate quota approved between 1968 and 1978	363
4.4	Revenue collected from the expatriate payroll tax - 1973/74-1978/79	365
5.1	Occupational summary of the Brown Report 1965 based on I.S.C.O.	384
5.2	Industrial summary of the Manpower Survey Report 1965 based on I.S.I.C.	385
5.3	Central government expenditure on education 1977-1978	409
5.4	Occupational groups and educational requirements	411
5.5	Median incomes at different levels of educational attainment	412
5.6	Life income profile by level of education	414
5.7	Internal rates of return in education: international comparison	417
5.8	Total and sectoral distribution of high-level (H.L.) and middle-level (M.L.) manpower requirements for the period 1975-1979	421
5.9	Working population cross-classified by sector and occupations	423
5.10	Educational attainment weighted by occupation (per 000 of gross employment)	424

5.11	Sectoral high- and middle-level educated manpower requirement per 000 of total employment	424
5.12	Primary school enrolments 1960/61-1979/80	427
5.13	Secondary school enrolments 1960/61-1979/80	428
5.14	Primary school teacher requirements: 1971/72-1979/80	430
5.15	Secondary school teacher requirements: 1971/72-1979/80	431
5.16	Projected enrolments in the university, the teachers colleges, and technical institutions 1973-1978	432
5.17	Projected post-secondary-trained personnel: requirement and supply 1975-1979	434
5.18a	General Certificate of Education ordinary level 1964-1978	449
5.18b	General Certificate of Education at advanced level results 1964-1977/78	450
5.19	The output of graduates from the University of Sierra Leone from 1960-1979	453
5.20	Central government current expenditure on education for 1972/73	462
5.21	Number of students enrolled in technical institutions 1971-1978	481

Figure

1	Degree of wages differentials by employment	209
2	Degree of wages differentials by industry	209
3	Degree of wages differentials by human capital	210

Summary of the Study

This thesis is the outcome of a research carried out in Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom between 1978 and 1980. It is a study of the post-colonial employment policies and practices in Sierra Leone with references drawn from other African states with similar colonial experience from 1955 to 1978.

The significance of the two dates as the start-off and cut-off points of the study lies in the fact that 1955 marked the end of the first decade after World War II during which nationalism and constitutional development in colonial Africa started, and it was essentially a reaction against the employment policy of the colonial government. It was also during this period that actual economic expansion and development in colonial Africa took shape with the introduction of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1945). The late seventies provided an opportunity to review and evaluate the success of Africanisation policies which had been pursued.

As a process, Africanisation has had different labels and taken different forms. For certain countries, the term Africanisation was not the most desirable term. Instead, localisation, indigenisation or Sierra Leonisation, Nigerianisation, etc. has been preferred. In such cases, these terms might be substituted for Africanisation.

In this study they have been used synonymously to describe the policies which respective African states have pursued in order to increase the employment opportunities and advancement of their nationals in the public and private sectors of their countries. The choice of policies depended on the political orientation and the state of the economy of individual countries. In Sierra Leone, the Africanisation of the public sector took precedence over the private sector. It was much easier to achieve than the private sector where the pressure for Africanisation did not gain momentum until well after independence. However, when the pressure for private sector Africanisation did come, two policies were pursued: the first was the immigration control designed to restrict the employment of non-nationals in activities where Sierra Leonean nationals can equally perform, aimed at a quantitative control of expatriate employment in the private sector; the second was the fiscal policy designed to increase the relative costs of expatriate employment to the employer and thus restrict their employment.

For both sectors, the motivation for Africanisation was political, economic and social, but in the absence of trained and qualified local manpower these goals could not be realized. At the attainment of independence, educational facilities were expanded and improved. It was hoped that this expansion and improvement would increase the supply of trained and qualified local manpower and thus reduce the country's dependence on foreign skills.

But neither the Africanisation policies nor the expansion and improvement in educational facilities had succeeded in reducing the number of expatriates employed in both sectors which stood at 2,500 in 1978 against 1,807 in 1964.

Two reasons were identified to be broadly responsible for this apparent failure of the Africanisation policies to reduce the number of expatriates employed in the economy of Sierra Leone. The first was attributed to the failure of the education system (expanded and improved after independence) to produce the right skill mix required by employers. The second was a hybrid of several factors which expatriate employers used as excuses for their unwillingness to Africanise high-level positions in their respective enterprises. Particularly, the government's lip service to Africanisation policies and its retrograde examples of de-Africanisation on certain state enterprises served private sector expatriate employers very well.

The area of greatest weakness in the study lies in the absence of sufficient statistical data necessary for an adequate analysis of the problems of Africanisation as a dynamic process. The statistics used have normally been drawn either from the publications listed or from the digest of statistics which governments published periodically. It is difficult to guarantee a high standard of accuracy in every case because of the limitations imposed by the scarcity of up-to-date data, and even

those that are in the majority of instances rather crude estimates and invariably do not make explicitly clear as to how expatriate personnel are deployed in both the public and private sectors of the economy. While all this connotes caution in the use of such data, it does not spell despair. Fortunately, statistical surveys, however important they may be, do not bring into relief all that is important in the life of a people. As Cuber and Kenkel pointed out in their work on social stratification:

Historical data, personal observation and illustrative cases are all empirical and highly useful in this and many other fields, even though they yield no coefficient of correlations or chi squares.

It is in this tradition that the writer wants this study to be viewed, and it is his hope that it will provide the basic guideposts for a fuller understanding of the dynamics of Africanisation and will serve as a necessary background for further studies on the contemporary scene.

Africanisation and Manpower Requirements: A Study of Post-Colonial Employment Policies in Sierra Leone - 1955-1978.

INTRODUCTION

Introduction.

In the last two decades, Africanisation had become a matter of such urgency and importance that it was apt to be thought of as a wholly post-colonial issue. This is not so. Africanisation as a policy was conceived in the nineteenth century and was pursued with some success throughout the first half of that century. That it then suffered eclipse for generations was a tragedy for Africa, the extent of which became evident with the passing of the colonial era.¹

Among the major administrative problems which attended the advance of colonial territories to self-government and the final attainment of independence in the 1960s was the manning of the public service during and immediately following the transition period.

In the past, colonial territories had all in varying degrees been administered by personnel recruited from the home countries of the colonial powers, and they came to rely in their political and economic development on the existence of a public service containing a substantial proportion of expatriate officials trained in modern administrative and technical methods. Although the majority of the colonial public servants had at all times been locally recruited, and the overseas officers had been a relatively small minority, they occupied most of the high-level administrative and professional posts in the public services. For example, in Sierra Leone in 1950 there were 471 posts in the senior service of the public service and of these only 54 posts were held by Sierra Leonean nationals.²

In the private sector, the position was no different. The employment policies of foreign-owned firms excluded Africans from high-level employment in these firms. Africans were employed not above the level of clerks, bookkeepers, etc.³ This situation was illustrated in the Ivory Coast where the Minister of Technical Education and Information commented:

Existing industrial activities have contributed very unevenly to the increase in per capita income of the various population groups in the Ivory Coast. Almost all industrial enterprises are controlled by Europeans, and the principal staffs are also Europeans.⁴

Similarly in the Republic of Guinea:

The training of Africans for technical and economic staff positions was practically non-existent, and employment opportunities for the very few who did receive training were limited not only by the country's low level of economic development but also by the preference given to Europeans in employment.⁵

The policies of private sector employers and the colonial administration frequently created dual wage structures which, (when the Africanisation of both sectors finally was achieved), remained and thus aggravated the difficulties and expense for the government and private sector employers.⁶ As Africans gradually entered the civil service and the managerial positions in the large foreign-owned firms, they assumed the basic salaries attached to the posts; so far, the principle of equal pay between Africans and expatriates for equal posts had generally been maintained.⁷ In consequence,

Africanisation brought about a huge gap between the incomes of high-level manpower (the African elites and sub-elites) and the incomes of not only unskilled labour but also between semi-skilled and skilled. Thus, a wage structure had developed with major disparities of scale of income between skill groups.⁸ Although workers might have little capacity to take effective industrial action they did have considerable direct political influence.⁹ For these reasons governments in tropical Africa were easily induced to steadily raise wages either through increases in legal minimum wages or by being major employers of labour and acting as wage leaders. These drives greatly complicated the Africanisation process, particularly in the private sector, and have augmented costs markedly and perhaps prohibitively if the new African industry is to be competitive within Africa and the world market generally.¹⁰ In addition, these dual wages structures have also affected the supply of various categories of manpower from the educational system.

The educational system which developed alongside the economic structure during most of the period was more or less adequate, however, to meet the need for increased agricultural productivity, the development of industry, and the promotion of basic welfare programmes which arose after 1945 and especially after independence.¹¹ In order to appreciate this, the colonial system of education as it developed up to 1945 may be examined from three different points of view - the intention, the content of the teaching, and the extent to which facilities were available.

The intentions of the schools was quite simple. They were established in order to produce the type of manpower needed by a colonial economy and administration. This was true whether the schools were established by missionaries or by the governments themselves. The need was a limited one. Africans could not usually expect to reach the highest level of employment in administration or business, and the demand was mainly for clerks, bookkeepers, custom clerks and primary school teachers.¹² As one prominent Nigerian politician has written:

In many parts of the world at that time, the elites of the society were pastors, catechists, teachers, clerks, and interpreters. They were respected, admired and adored. The sumnum bonum of a Christian parent's ambition was that his sons should after leaving school be like one of them.¹³

Almost all the important policy-making and managerial positions were in the hands of Europeans. Even the more advanced levels of education were mainly staffed by European teachers.¹⁴ Moreover, the number of people employed at these higher levels of responsibility was relatively small. Professor Harbison has estimated that in Nigeria shortly after independence (1962) some 30,000 people, one-third of them still expatriate, were carrying the entire burden of top-level policy decisions and administrative responsibility.¹⁵ The Ghana draft plan made a similar

point when it declared:

The profile of employment in 1960 showed a particularly small proportion of employment in managerial, technician, craftsman and supervisory grades. These are specially the elements in the total labour force on which the economy depends, most for its productive efficiency and its ability to grow.¹⁶

The system of education in operation throughout most of the colonial period therefore tended to produce Africans trained only to take subordinate positions. Institutions like Fourah Bay College in Freetown, Ibadan University College in Nigeria and Achimota College in Ghana could have produced enough advanced students to fill any high-level position open to Africans. Even though the last decade of colonial rule saw an attempt to provide more advanced education - the opening of University Colleges in Nigeria and the Gold Coast - at independence, there were not enough trained people to staff a modern administrative structure and at the same time pursue any ambitious plans for economic development.

Moreover, many of those who had received an advanced education had had training unsuited for the tasks which lay ahead. Since one of the few careers open without restric-

tion to the able African had been law, many had sought a legal training. To become a barrister was associated in a young man's mind with success. Accustomed to see expatriates hold all senior technical posts, he was much less likely to think of becoming an engineer or agricultural expert.

Not only the intention of colonial education but its content predisposed Africans to think this way. Designed mainly to produce clerks, it was literary rather than practical or vocational. It may have provided Africans, as Guy Hunter has argued, with the entry to the heritage of political and religious experience of mankind,¹⁷ but it also gave rise to two attitudes towards education which boded ill for the needs of the new states after independence. First of all, people tended to believe that the only genuine education was a literary one, and that any form of education which included practical training was inferior. Secondly, manual labour was often felt to be undignified for the educated. A school certificate was the passport to the town and the life of the white-collar worker, an escape from the drudgery of the farm. Such attitudes might be understandable in the colonial situation, but they constituted a serious problem for the newly independent states. As a Senegalese publication has put it:

At the moment that our country became independent, it was necessary to launch an appeal to all educators, and more particularly to

the Masters of our primary schools . . . to teach our youths the value of efforts and show them that what must be honoured even more than the diploma is work. The road of national construction and true independence passes through the training of cadres without which the life of the country cannot be assured nor its independence guaranteed.¹⁸

One final feature of West African education in the colonial period must be noted - its extent.

To get any education at all in the colonial period was a privilege. All over West Africa most people in all but the most privileged areas were illiterate when colonial rule entered its last decade. Despite increased attempts to open schools and start programmes of adult education in these last ten years, the great majority was still illiterate and the manpower problem remained.

As each colonial territory progressed toward self-government and independence, the demand for greater indigenous participation in both the public and private sectors of the economy continued. In Nigeria, on the eve of its independence in 1959, the report of the Parliamentary Committee on the Nigerianisation of the Federal Public Service had this to say:

One of the fundamental rights of a self-governing country is that it must have control of its public service. No outside

authority must be in a position to determine, even in the last instance what appointment, promotions and disciplinary actions are taken in respect of the civil service.¹⁹

In Sierra Leone, the report of Cox-George on the African participation in the commerce of Sierra Leone recommended that as a condition of doing business, prospective foreign investors would be required to employ Sierra Leoneans as deputy-general managers, as well as branch managers.²⁰ But in each case, the capacity to do so was limited by the availability of locally qualified manpower which, in fact, was lacking, although in varying degree in each territory. Any Africanisation policy that can necessitate or can only be maintained by external contract/recruitment is not only self-defeating in the sense of failing to accomplish its basic purpose, but also in being wasteful of available resources.²¹

To some people, the obvious course of action might seem to be to delay the process of Africanisation until the newly independent states had trained and recruited from their own sources all or nearly all the staff they required. The withdrawal of overseas officers could then be carried out in an orderly manner. Some of the earlier post-war reports on the Africanisation of the public service in West Africa showed signs that their authors envisaged some such leisurely process, or at least that they assumed that the transfer of power could be so timed as to ensure that there would be no disturbance of the smooth course of administration and not even a temporary loss of efficiency.

Political and economic expectations could not, however, be made to wait upon administrative convenience in this way; the pressures for Africanisation continued. At the time of independence measures designed to speed up the process of Africanisation were adopted. Educational and training facilities were improved and expanded. It was hoped that this would increase the supply of trained and qualified local manpower. In Sierra Leone, the output of manpower from the post-primary educational institutions more than doubled (see Chapter 5) between 1961 and 1978. The number of secondary school leavers with General Certificate of Education at 'O' and 'A' levels increased from 483 per annum in 1961 to 1,240 per annum in 1978 (see tables 5.18 a&b); the number of graduates from the University of Sierra Leone increased from 19 per annum in 1960 to 353 per annum in 1978 (see Table 5.19). There were also corresponding increases from the technical and vocational and teacher training institutions.

At the same time, in order to ensure maximum utilisation of local manpower, administrative and legislative measures designed to restrict the employment of non-nationals by private sector employers were put into effect. Administrative machinery for the control of expatriate employment such as the Immigration Department, Immigration Control Committee, Expatriate Quota Committees, etc. were set up. Legislative measures such as the Non-Citizen Trade Amendments of 1968 and 1970 were enacted. In addition,

fiscal measures, such as the expatriate levy tax of £200 on expatriate payroll, were all aimed at preventing the employment of non-Sierra Leonean nationals in jobs for which there were available Sierra Leoneans with comparable qualifications and job experience.

Nonetheless, neither the expansion and improvement in the educational and training facilities, nor the administrative, legislative and fiscal policies were able to achieve the desired objective of Africanisation. The employment of expatriate personnel of all categories in the private sector and to some extent in the public sector continued. The 1965 Brown Report on the manpower situation in Sierra Leone indicated that there were a total of 1,804 expatriate personnel in the economy of Sierra Leone in 1965. In 1978 a brochure prepared by the Sierra Leone External Telecommunications Ltd. puts the number of expatriates in the economy of Sierra Leone at 2,500; "these were mainly British nationals."

Four inferences may be drawn from this:

First, the demand for trained and qualified manpower of all skills had outstripped supply owing to increased economic and social activities in the country.

Second, the post-independent expansion and improvement in the educational and training facilities had not produced the types of skills which private sector employers required.

Third, the machinery set up to implement the administrative, legislative and fiscal policies was either inadequate or incompetent and therefore ineffective.

Fourth, or a combination of two or more of the above.

Each of these inferences will be fully discussed in the appropriate chapters (4 and 5) below.

1. The objectives of the study.

In most African states, owing to the poverty of statistical information, the size and level of expatriate employment has not been fully stated in numerical terms. There are, however, crude estimates with regards to the size of the problem. Bernard Schaffer put the figures of colonial civil servants in Africa south of the Sahara in 1958 at 100,000.²² He did not, however, state how many were employed in the private sector. But "The Economist" in 1960 put it at 1,000,000.²³ Both sources did not state how these expatriates were deployed in terms of public or private sectors. There has not been any adequate information with regard to resources and availability of indigenous manpower, the recruitment and employment policies of the private sector employers; and the reactions of both their African employees and the government have not also been fully discussed. Nor has there been any careful analysis of the socio-psychological barriers to speedy Africanisation particularly in the private sector. This study attempts to fill these gaps. Its main objectives are

essentially to seek to explore and provide some factual information on the process and progress of Africanisation of both the public and private sector employment, the size and levels of expatriate employment, and their share of the wage bills, and the policies pursued by the Sierra Leone Government from 1955-1978.

2. Scope of the study.

Since little attention to date has been accorded to the analysis of the policy of Africanisation in ex-colonial Africa, the present study is intended to be wide in scope, covering nearly all aspects of Africanisation, for it is felt that it is essential to examine the entire framework within which interesting areas could be identified.

One such area is the recruitment and employment practices of both the colonial and national governments and the private sector employers. A second area is to be found in the existence of a dual wage structure between expatriate personnel and their African counterparts in both the public and private sectors; a third area is to be found in the field of labour relations within the framework of a predominantly foreign-owned and directed private sector, and the responses of the media, public and the government; and finally, a fourth area is to be found in the expansion of the education system designed to meet the manpower demands of the Africanisation policy.

3. Structure of the study.

The study is broadly divided into three parts. The division reflects a logical sequence of the government's policy priorities in the area of Africanisation. However, the division does not make individual parts to be mutually exclusive of each other. On the contrary, they are inter-related.

Part I is divided into two chapters. Chapter 1 provides background information on the setting of the study - Sierra Leone - its people, geography, history, and constitutional development, the economic and social infrastructures, and the employment and recruitment policies of the colonial government. Reference is also made to the size and levels of colonial expatriate employment in both Sierra Leone and other colonial African countries. The analysis in this chapter is mainly historical. The intention is to provide background information against which the moods of African politicians towards Africanisation can be judged.

Chapter 2 provides a survey of the process and progress of Africanisation of the public service. It examines the economic and political motivation behind the nationalist pressures for the Africanisation of the public service from 1950 to 1978. It also examines the socio-political problems arising in a multi-tribal society and the reactions of various interest groups.

Part II is concerned with the Africanisation of the private sector from 1961 to 1978. It starts with the identification of the various types of indigenisation of the private sector. Three types of indigenisation are identified - ownership, control and manpower. This part is also divided into two chapters.

Chapter 3 starts with a review of the size and level of expatriate employment in the private sector in Sierra Leone, at the time of independence and its share of the wage bill. In the main, this chapter looks at the whole spectrum of the employment practices of foreign-owned firms operating in Sierra Leone. The analysis of such practices is based on Perlmutter's universal classification of the employment policies of multi-national corporations (MNC). Also included in this chapter is the description of a dual labour market situation created by the wages differentials between the expatriate personnel and their African counterparts. The rest of the chapter is essentially a report on the field work undertaken by the researcher during his five month study tour of Sierra Leone between September 1978 and February 1979.

Chapter 4 describes the reaction of organized labour against the employment policies of expatriate-owned firms and the government's response towards such reaction. Implicit in the government's responses are the socio-economic motives such as the effect of Africanisation on the country's balance of payments, the income spread among

its nationals, etc. The rest of this chapter discussed the various policies adopted by the government to restrict the employment of non-nationals in the private sector of Sierra Leone and the effectiveness of such policies.

Part III is concerned with the manpower supply side of the Africanisation question. It begins by giving an introductory background to the manpower supply problem.

Chapter 5 also begins with a review of the relevant literature on manpower supply-requirement analysis. Then a detailed analysis of the Sierra Leone manpower situation is carried out in this chapter. Also discussed are some of the policy implications affecting the supply of manpower.

The concluding Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings of the study and some of the proposals made by the respondents during the field study. Some policy alternatives are then outlined.

Methodology.

The literature on Africanisation is marked by two features. First, it is considerable at the primary levels of reports, proposals, slogans, legislation, statements and programmes; second, it has remained scanty at the level of critical interpretation. Kirk-Green recorded that not more than half a dozen academic studies had been undertaken.²⁴ It was against this background of paucity of published materials that the research for this study was undertaken.

For the purpose of information and data collection for this study, two main approaches were adopted.

The first was the archival approach. This involved a review of the available relevant literature on Africanisation and manpower. This information was obtained by visiting various institutions of learning, archives, public records offices, etc. The first of such visits started with the Centre for West African Studies in Birmingham University, (January, 1978) where the researcher had a long discussion on the suitability of the topic as a subject for academic enquiry with the Deputy Director of the Centre, Douglas Rimmer. Mr. Rimmer considered the topic to be interesting for academic work, but pointed out the problems involved in obtaining published materials since not much academic work had been done on the subject. He suggested, however, that much of the work would need to be done by way of field work, particularly in the private sector. However, at the request of the researcher, Mr. Rimmer suggested the following publications which he felt would provide background reading material for the study: Africa in Social Change, The New Elites of Tropical Africa by P.C. Lloyd; Indigenisation of Industry (in Nigeria) by Gaston Rimlinger (in the Quarterly Journal of Administration (1973); The Policy of Indigenisation (in Nigeria): an Overall View by Paul Collins (in Quarterly Journal of Administration (1975); Nigerian Expatriate Management Relationships by the Nigerian Institute of Management, 1971. These, amongst

many others formed the starting point of the literature. In Birmingham, the City Library was visited and useful information was collected.

Subsequently, similar visits were made to: The Royal Geographical Society Library at Kessington Gore, London; the Commonwealth Institute Library, Kensington High Street, London; the Institute of Commonwealth Studies Library, London University, The Institute of Education Library, London University; the School of Oriental and African Studies Library, London University; the Rhodes Library, Oxford University; the Commonwealth and Foreign Office Library, London, Public Records Offices, London; the Bristol University Library, the Institute of Development Studies Library at Sussex University, Brighton.

In Sierra Leone the following libraries and institutions were visited: Fourah Bay College library, Njala University College, the Bank of Sierra Leone library, the Ministries of Education, Labour and Development and Economic Planning libraries were visited; the United States Information Service (USIS) library was also visited.

The second approach was empirical. This included the field work and data collection. It was carried out between September 1978 and February 1979 in Sierra Leone. The field work endeavoured basically to exploit three streams of evidence. The most important source of information was interviews with key employers and retired public servants. In all, 50 interviews were held covering firms employing

six or more employees. Such interviews usually lasted between one hour and quite often over two hours (see Appendix II). The second source, the annual employers' returns to the government such as the employment returns to the Ministry of Labour by companies employing six or more people; the salary and wages annual returns to the Department of Income Tax, Ministry of Finance, and other official documents kept by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, etc. The third source, less reliable though, was the information obtained in informal contacts and interviews with junior employees. This was necessitated by private sector employers refusal in some cases to disclose the salaries of their expatriate personnel, particularly the expatriation allowance, under the cloak of confidentiality. But on several occasions account clerks in wage offices were most willing to sneak out of offices lists of expatriate employees and their salaries.

In their order of importance and reliability, the information and data obtained from the two approaches can be classified as follows: the field work constitutes the primary sources; official documents constitute the second source; and the third source of information is published materials in books and professional journals.

In a study of this nature, particularly where information was provided in the strictest confidence during the field work, detailed references are impossible, but the books, articles, journals and government publications

which the writer has found most useful appear in the bibliographies. These have been attached to individual chapters to enable the reader who is interested in a particular idea to pursue it further.

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PART I THE AFRICANISATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR

CHAPTER 1 THE SETTING AND THE EMPLOYMENT POLICIES OF THE
COLONIAL GOVERNMENT.

1.1 The Setting - Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leone, a small country of 28,000 square miles, is situated on the West Coast of Africa. It lies between latitudes 7 degrees and 10 degrees North and longitude 10.50 degrees and 13.18 degrees West. It has a sea coast line of 210 miles along the Western front which is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean. On the North and East, it is bounded by the Republic of Guinea (French-speaking) and on the Southeast by the Republic of Liberia (the oldest republic in Africa, 1847).¹

The country consists of a peninsula, a couple of off-shore islands and a flat, low-lying coastal strip backed by extensive mangrove swamps, rolling wooded country and hills in the West and South and an upland plateau of 1,500 feet in the North and East. West of the upland plateau rises the Sula and the Kangari hills reaching a height of over 2,000 feet. Near the border with Guinea on the Northwest lie the two highest peaks in the country - the Bintumani (6,400 feet) and the Sankerbriwa (6,000 feet). The country is well watered by a network of fast-flowing rivers and streams which makes inland navigation difficult, a factor responsible for the relative remoteness of the African continent as a whole. It lacks navigable rivers for ocean-going vessels. However, smaller boats and canoes ply up and down most of the country's inland waterways.

The climate is a tropical one with a mean temperature of about 80°F. all year round but with rain and relative humidity increasing as one moves inland from the coast. Rainfall, which averages about 100 inches, is heaviest on the coastal belt.² There are two distinct seasons in Sierra Leone: the "dry season" which starts roughly from November to April and the "rainy season" from May to October. Their periods vary as one moves inland.

The population of Sierra Leone, according to the 1974 census, is 3 million compared to the 1963 figure of 2.2 million, representing an annual growth rate of 2 per cent. However, there have been doubts as to the validity of the 1963 figures which have generally been thought to be a gross under-enumeration of the real figures. Even the director of the 1974 census admitted that the census contains a probably margin of error of + 10%.³ Also, a post-enumeration survey in a sample of 160 enumeration areas designed to check the accuracy of the census revealed that about 3% of the population was not accounted for.⁴

The population density varies considerably - the greatest concentration is around the Western Area Peninsula where the population density is up to 700 persons per square mile, against 117 people per square mile in the rest of the country.⁵ This sharply contrasts the situation in some of the northern districts of the country, where the population density per square mile averages only about 30. The main urban centres and the administrative and commercial capital

is Freetown, which is situated on the northern tip of the Western Area Peninsula. The greater Freetown area contained according to the 1974 census, a total population of 276,000. As the seat of government and the centre of trade, commerce and industry, all activities radiate from Freetown, and it is connected to the outside world by one of the biggest natural harbours in the world and an international airport at Lungi; and to the rest of the country by a bitumenized all-weather road, supplemented by inland waterways for small engine-powered boats and launches. Other important urban centres in the country are Bo (35,000), situated 147 miles from Freetown in the Southern Province; Kenema, with a population of 31,000 in the Eastern Province; Makeni, 26,000, the administrative headquarters of the Northern Province. A number of other towns have grown and developed along the diamond mining operations in the Eastern Province, eg. Sefadu, with a population of 76,000.

About 15 per cent of the population lives permanently in an urban environment in Freetown and the various provincial towns. The rest of the population live in rural areas and engage in subsistence farming as well as small-scale cash-crop production for both domestic and export markets. On the whole, the population is rather sedentary, with hardly any seasonal or periodic migration taking place except between the diamond and non-diamond mining areas. There is, of course, a gradual drift from the rural areas to the urban centres, but such a drift is on a

permanent basis rather than a seasonal basis.⁶ Unfortunately, this rural-urban drift has tended to give rise to the twin problems of under-employment in some areas and unemployment in others.

The population of Sierra Leone comprises at least 13 different tribes, each having its own language. The two main tribes are the Temnes and the Mendes which constitute 648,931 and 672,831, respectively, accounting for over a third of the population (see Table 2.10). The Temnes live in the Northeast and were the principal inhabitants of the Western Area Peninsula when Freetown, the capital, was founded in 1787. The Mendes live in the South and South-eastern parts of the country. Scattered throughout the West of the country are Limbas, Konos, Korankos, Susus, Yelinkas and the Fullas who are found living along the whole of West Africa. There are also communities of Kissis, Vais, and Krus, who originate from neighbouring Guinea and Liberia. Possibly, the most distinctive and influential people in Sierra Leone are the Creoles of Freetown and its neighbourhood (41,783). The Creoles are the descendants of slaves from all over West Africa's coast who were repatriated between 1787 and 1870 and settled with assistance from the British Government on the land bought from the Temne King, Naimbawa.⁷ Cut off from their own traditions, the Creoles acquired the cultural ideals of the British and aided by missions gained substantial education and professional advantages over the majority of the people of the

hinterland and indeed over most West Africans. The Creoles' consciousness of their own superiority and disrespect for the indigenous people's tribal culture created hostility and deep mistrust between them and the rest of the people, particularly the educated provincial people. Even today, when the Creoles form less than two per cent of the population of the country, traditional rivalry between the settlers' descendants and the people from the 'up country', still has a significant, if declining, influence in the country's politics. In addition, there are other minority non-African groups in Sierra Leone. The biggest group is the Lebanese; the 1974 census put them at about 10,000, followed by the Indians at about 3,000. These two groups constitute the entrepreneurial class. All engage in commerce and industry.⁸ European expatriates were estimated to be 2,500 in 1979.⁹

Following the diamond boom of the 1950s and the early 1960s, immigrants from neighbouring African countries, particularly the Republic of Guinea, swelled the population of the diamond mining areas, engaged not only in illicit mining activities and smuggling but also in diverse trading activities. Mainly as a result of the loss of revenue due to diamond smuggling, the government has adopted a stricter attitude towards this category of immigrants over the last 20 years. By the Non-Citizen Residence Act of 1965, "strangers" were required to have a residence permit in order to be able to stay in the Kono diamond area, and

permits were only granted to those engaged in legitimate trade, and business associated with the development of the country. Since the legislation was enacted, it was reported that more than 2,000 African immigrants have been deported on the grounds of being illegal residents in the country.¹⁰

1.2 History and Constitutional Development.

The name Sierra Leone derives from the Portuguese 'Sierra Lyoa' or Lion Mountains, so called by the 15th century explorer Pedro da Cintra. Little was known about the country prior to this period. Slave traders, merchants, and adventurers visited the coast during the next three hundred years, but no permanent settlements resulted until the end of the 18th century when a project headed by Grenville Sharp was begun to settle freed slaves from England on Freetown Peninsula. Four hundred freed slaves were sent out in 1787 to found the settlement of Freetown. Three years later the project was taken over by the Sierra Leone Company and more settlers of African origin were sent from Britain, Nova Scotia in Canada, and Jamaica.¹¹

In 1808 the settlement was declared a Crown Colony and became the main base in West Africa for enforcing the 1807 Act outlawing the slave trade. During the 19th century, many thousands of liberated slaves settled in Freetown Peninsula. British influence was gradually extended into the interior and in 1862 a large tract of coastal land, including Sherbro Island, was added to the colony. In the

following years treaties of friendship were made with the neighbouring paramount chiefs to protect the colony's trade with the hinterland. A Protectorate was declared over the hinterland in 1896, and this was administered separately from the colony until 1924.¹²

Until 1863, the government of the colony of Sierra Leone consisted of a Governor and an advisory council comprising ex-officio, and one or two appointed, members. In 1863, executive and legislative councils were created, and in 1866 Sierra Leone was joined with the Gambia, the Gold Coast, and the colony of Lagos to form the West African settlements with a governor-general in Freetown as the seat of government.¹³ In 1874, Lagos and the Gold Coast became separate colonies, and in 1885 the Gambia was also established as a separate colony.

Although the hinterland was declared a British Protectorate in 1896, following the agreement on the boundary with French Guinea between the British and the French governments the previous year, it was not until 1924 that a new constitution extended the jurisdiction of the colony's legislative council to cover the Protectorate's interest in the law making body through the nomination of literate paramount chiefs. In 1943, for the first time, two Africans were nominated as unofficial members of the executive council which was the official advisory body to the Governor. In 1947 this number was increased to three.

A new constitution which came into being in 1951 greatly enlarged the legislative council to 32 members, including the first set of directly elected members from the colony;¹⁴ the Protectorate members include nominated Paramount chiefs and other members nominated from among representatives of the Protectorate Assembly, a quasi-legislative assembly which dealt with the internal affairs of the Protectorate.¹⁵ By this time, organised political parties had emerged, and the 1951 limited election was fought on a party basis, although the deciding factor was the old cleavage between the colony and the Protectorate people,¹⁶ rather than political party ideology. It was more of a power struggle between the "backward" majority Protectorate people and the more advanced, westernised Creoles of the colony.

The Creoles offered several objections to this arrangement, that the chiefs were too closely tied to the Protectorate administration; that the chiefs did not necessarily represent their people, being nominated as they were, and in view of the current strained relations between chiefs and people owing to alleged misuse of power;¹⁷ and it would be illegal for British-protected persons and aliens under the 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act to legislate for British subjects. In fact, they were afraid of the ultimate destruction of Creole ascendancy in the Legislative Council and the public service.

In 1953, a ministerial system was introduced, and in 1954 the title of Chief Minister was accorded to the leader of the majority party in the new Legislative Council. A new constitution in 1956 replaced the Legislative Council by a House of Representatives with a speaker, four ex-officio members appointed by the Governor, and 51 elected members. At the same time, the franchise was extended to most adult taxpayers in the Protectorate and property owners in the colony. The constitution was altered in 1958 following the 1957 May General Elections which gave the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (S.L.P.P.) a majority in the new House of Representatives. By the exclusion of the four ex-officio members from the Executive Council and the House of Representatives a new Executive Council was formed. This included eleven Ministers appointed from among the elected members of the House of Representatives at the advice of the Chief Minister, now Premier, the leader of the majority party; the late Dr. Sir Milton Margai, the first Protectorate born to qualify as a medical doctor.

On the 27th April, 1961 Sierra Leone became an independent state with the Queen as Head of State (represented by a Governor-General), became a member of the Commonwealth, and was admitted as both member of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The Creoles realised that their future role in an independent Sierra Leone lay not with the politics of the country but with their stronghold in the public service where they

stand to benefit from the early period of Africanisation. In addition, in order to allay their fear of possible discrimination against them by a Protectorate-led government at independence, a Creole was appointed Governor-General; and in a cabinet of 17 ministers in 1962, no less than five were Creoles.¹⁸

The first elections after independence in 1962 were fought between the Sierra Leone Peoples Party under the leadership of Sir Milton Margai and the All Peoples Congress led by Siaka Stevens. The S.L.P.P. won the election with 42 out of 67 popularly elected seats, and Sir Milton Margai was appointed Prime Minister. On his death in 1964 he was succeeded by his younger brother, Albert Margai.

The succession of Albert Margai as Prime Minister and subsequently elected life leader of the S.L.P.P. increased the fear of Mende domination by the Northern tribes headed by the Temnes. The opposition party, the All Peoples Congress (APC) led by a Northerner exploited this fear by preaching tribalism.¹⁹ This was aggravated by Sir Albert Margai's appointment of Mendes in key positions in the public service: the Secretary to the Prime Minister (head of the Civil Service), the Establishment Secretary and the Secretary Recruitment and Training. These appointments also created fear among the Creoles whose stronghold in the public service felt threatened. The obvious course of action open to them was to lend support, overt or covert, to the opposition party. This they did.

Sir Albert Margai saw his declining popularity and support in the Western Area and the Northern Province. In November, 1965, a private member's motion calling for the introduction of a "democratic one-party state" was unanimously passed in an S.L.P.P. dominated parliament. The reason behind this move was clear. Sir Albert Margai wanted to safeguard himself and his supporters and remain in power for life, having been elected life leader of his party. This move was strongly resisted by the people of Sierra Leone and when his political mentor, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was overthrown Sir Albert Margai suspended the one party idea. In January, 1967, Sir Albert Margai made a move to introduce a republican constitution with a ceremonial president. This was unanimously passed in Parliament. This was interpreted by the opposition party as another attempt by the government to bring back the one party issue "through the back door." On March 17, 1967, Sir Albert Margai called a general election with the one party and republican issues fresh in the minds of the electorate.

This was the second election after independence. They were hard fought by the two parties. Each party regarded the 1967 election to be the last free election to be held in Sierra Leone. Later events proved this to be so. Tremendous efforts were made to return the S.L.P.P. into power but the forces against Sir Albert Margai among the Creole community were too strong. The election resulted in

a narrow victory for the A.P.C. winning 32 seats, the S.L.P.P. 28, and 6 independent candidates. Siaka Stevens, the A.P.C. leader was appointed Prime Minister by the Governor General (a Creole), but the military commander Brigadier David Lansana, a Mende by tribe, with a small body of troops declared a martial law and arrested both the newly sworn-in Prime Minister, Siaka Stevens, and the Governor-General saying that Sir Henry Lightfoot Boston's action was unconstitutional. However, Lansana's personal relationship with Sir Albert Margai was too close to permit his motives to stand above suspicion.²⁰ Two days later, a counter-coup by a number of senior army officers who were not prepared to allow Lansana to use the army to keep Sir Albert Margai in power arrested Lansana, together with both Margai and Stevens, and set up as government a National Reformation Council (NRC) consisting of eight officers under the chairmanship of Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier) Andrew Juxon Smith.²¹ However, discontent with the N.R.C. became apparent when it made no move to return the country to civilian rule and in April 17, 1968, one year after its installation, the N.R.C. was overthrown by an uprising of private soldiers and N.C.O.s who formed the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Council Movement with the declared aim of immediate restoration of a civilian rule.

A National Interim Council was set up under the chairmanship of the late Brigadier John Bangura to determine how this might be achieved and it consulted all successful

candidates of the 1967 general elections. Shortly afterwards, a National Government was formed with Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister, on April 24, 1968.²² Political instability continued, however, and a state of emergency was declared in November 1968. In September 1970, following the resignation of two cabinet ministers, another state of emergency was declared. Their resignations led to the formation of a new political party under the leadership of a prominent Northerner, Dr. John Karefa-Smart. This was the culmination of discontent among the young educated Northerners who felt that the Creoles had taken all the jobs in the public service as well as the para-statal corporations. The Mendes were more bitter against the Creoles whom they held as scape goats for the downfall of Sir Albert Margai and their subsequent replacement by Creoles in all the key positions they held during the Albert Margai era. So the new party, the United Democratic Party, was an alliance of provincial people forged from the A.P.C. and S.L.P.P. members. The Creoles once more felt threatened. The Prime Minister also felt insecure with the new party. In October, 8, 1970, the new party was banned and subsequently its leaders were arrested and detained for three years without trial. On April 19, 1971, Sierra Leone was declared a republic with Siaka Stevens as its first Executive President. A virtually continuous state of emergency was in force up to the May 1973 general election which, as the opposition parties were either banned or boycotted, resulted

in the establishment of a de facto one-party state under President Siaka Stevens' A.P.C.²³ Steps were taken to legalise the de facto one-party state which has been in effect since 1973; and in August 1975 (like the earlier attempt made by Sir Albert Margai) a private member's motion calling for the introduction of a one party system of government, subject to the approval of the people via a referendum, was unanimously approved by Parliament. In June 1978 the country was consulted in a referendum regarding the introduction of a one party constitution. President Stevens, in his appeal for the support of the one party constitution, said that it was necessary if the country was not to be disintegrated into tribal factions. Accordingly, 2,152,454 votes were cast in favour of the one party constitution, only 63,132 were against, out of a total population of three million! Thus, Sierra Leone became a de jure one party state in June 1978 with Siaka Stevens as President for a new term of office of seven years subject to re-election in 1985 when he will be 80.²⁴

In summary, two important things need to be noted insofar as they are closely linked with the process of Africanisation. First, constitutional development and the Africanisation of the public service are inseparable - the latter complements the former. As one Sierra Leone Member of the House of Representatives put it in 1960:

Independence will not be real to the Sierra Leonean nationals and would indeed appear to be a sham if after independence the new

born Sierra Leonean nationals would have African Ministers and African Members of Parliament but with expatriate permanent Secretaries and principal advisers.²⁵

Second, political support in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Black Africa is motivated not by any ideological conviction but by tribal or sectional loyalty and for personal gains. Political influence in Africa is always closely involved with the power of economic patronage. The power to allocate benefits to faithful party supporters and the tribe in the forms of lucrative employment such as directors of public corporations, accelerated promotions in the public service, appointments as ambassadors, etc. are largely vested in the party leadership. Hence, President Stevens' appeal for the support of the one party state (notwithstanding his strong opposition in 1966 when he was opposition leader) was overwhelmingly received by the Northern Province where he claimed to have come from.²⁶ It is very unlikely that this situation will change for many years to come. Even with the introduction of the one party state, appointment in the public sector employment will still be influenced by tribal or sectional consideration rather than party loyalty alone, or indeed on a serious determination of individual capability and qualification.

1.3 The Economy.

Although the post-independence period in Sierra Leone witnessed various conscious efforts and attempts to

diversify the economy, the growth rate of the economy did not gain sufficient momentum and was mainly influenced by external market forces.²⁷

The monetised sector of the economy has continued to be characterised by extreme dependence on external factors, acting primarily through the demand by the developed countries for raw materials which include agricultural products and minerals.

Despite the efforts of the government at indigenisation, the greater part of the modern sector of the economy has remained under foreign control and ownership. The mining sector (with the exception of DIMINCO), the modern manufacturing sector and the organised retail and wholesale trade sectors are all predominantly foreign owned.

The major development efforts pursued since independence have been in industrialisation (through import-substitution), in mining, in the provision of physical infrastructure facilities, and in the rapid expansion of educational facilities. The 1960 Development Ordinance Act which granted considerable tax benefits to some 30 industrial companies has fallen short of expectations. Although industrial output and employment expanded until 1968, the process was not sustained and recent growth has been slow. Emphasis was placed on import-substitution industrialisation. The new industries have been largely characterised by capital-intensive methods, low employment generation,

limited re-investment of profits, low-linkage effects with the domestic economy and over-dependence on imported raw materials. A nucleus of modern manufacturing establishments has been created, which provide the basis for future expansion into agro-based and export-oriented industrial development.

1.4 The Structure of the Economy.

Data on Sierra Leone's gross domestic product (G.D.P.) and other national account aggregates are available only for the period 1964/65 through 1976/77. In 1977, the national income estimates were revised in the light of available new data and information on particular sectors of the economy. In particular, estimates of income generated in the agricultural sector were substantially revised on the basis of the result of household expenditure survey of 1970/71. Similarly, the contribution of transport and communications were revised in the light of available survey information from the High Way investment programme in 1970. Data relating to other sectors of the economy also underwent some revision. G.D.P. at current prices for 1972/73 to 1974/75, agriculture accounted on average for 32 per cent, mining for 17 per cent, transport, trade, public administration and other services for 42 per cent and manufacturing, building and public utilities for the remaining 9 per cent. Over one-fifth of the G.D.P. estimate represents the imputed value of subsistence output, almost wholly in agriculture. The

G.D.P. for 1974/75 was put at Le533.8 million at current factor cost.²⁹

The sectoral composition of the G.D.P. was changed considerably between 1973/74 and 1976/77. The share of the mining and quarrying fell from 18.3 to 8.8 per cent, while that of agriculture, forestry, fishing rose by a parallel margin to nearly 40 per cent of G.D.P. Trade and tourism, transport and communications accounted for about 12 or 13 per cent.³⁰

Agriculture, the largest sector in Sierra Leone's economy, provides for the livelihood of about 80 per cent of the population and represents 54 per cent of the total value of the exports (See the table in Appendix 3). Production of the principal export crops of coffee, cacao, and palm kernel has been stimulated by higher producer prices offered by the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (S.L.P.M.B.). In 1976/77 the producer price for coffee was more than doubled and that for cacao was raised by about 80 per cent.³¹ This led to a large increase in deliveries of commodities to the Board and to near doubling of receipts from agricultural exports even though the Board held back about 40 per cent of its 1976/77 purchases of coffee for export sales during the 1977/78 fiscal year.³²

Rice, the staple food crop in Sierra Leone, constituted about 40 per cent of the total value added in the agriculture sector. The output of rice, which expanded at an average rate of about 8 per cent during 1974/75-1975/76,

increased further by some 2 per cent to 560,000 tons in 1976/77. The increase in rice production was stimulated by increase in the producer price (from Le3.2 per bushel in 1973 to Le6.00 in 1976/77).³³ However, in spite of this reported increase in rice production, Sierra Leone still imports 50 per cent of its rice requirements. In fact, at present, the country is experiencing an acute shortage of rice owing to lack of foreign exchange.

Mining - the total contribution of mining to the total export receipts fell from 80 per cent in 1976/77. The production of diamonds is carried out by the National Diamond Mining Company (N.D.M.C.)³⁴ or Diminco for short, and by the private operators licensed under the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (A.D.M.S.).³⁵ In addition, illicit miners produced a substantial amount of diamonds. Between 1970 and 1976, total diamonds output declined by 47.3 per cent or from 1.94 million to 1.08 million carats with the greater part of the contraction occurring during 1976-77-1977/78 period. Preliminary figures indicated a further decline during 1979. The drop in recorded output resulted in part from depletion of the more accessible alluvial mining deposits. However, owing to an increase in the unit value of diamond exports which had dropped from Le74.6 million in 1974 to Le67.3 million in 1975, rose again in 1976 to Le74.8 million. The chairman of the company declared in November 1975 that illicit mining had seriously curtailed the economic life of the enterprise which was "not expected

to be viable for very much longer." Estimates of the remaining life are five years or less but the government is said not to accept them. The company is apparently unwilling to prospect further in its concession because it does not believe that the government could protect new workings from illicit diggers, some of whom are believed to be sponsored by cabinet ministers. There has lately been some suggestion that Kimberlite Mining in the Kono area may be feasible; at present all mining is alluvial.

Iron ore had been mined by the Sierra Leone Development Company (Delco) at Marampa, from where the concentrates were carried by a company railway to Pepel for shipment. The mine was working below capacity in the mid-1960s, but a long-term contract with Japanese steel mills, signed in 1968, revitalized the industry and led to heavy investment in improving port facilities at Pepel. But output of iron ore dropped from 2,512,000 to 1,982,000 metric tons between 1972 and 1974, the mine became unprofitable, and in October 1975 Delco went into voluntary liquidation without a successor having been found to operate the mine.

Exports of bauxite by the Sierra Leone Ores and Metal Company (Sieromco) began in 1964 and had risen by 1975 from 127,000 to 672,000 tons, the latter figure realizing a value of Le 2.3 millions. Exploitation of further bauxite deposits at Port Loko District appears likely following the conclusion in 1978 of an agreement between the Government and Alusuisse; the company may invest in a local alumina plant.

Another mineral under exploitation is rutile. Its exportation from Shebro Minerals Alluvial Mine near Bonthe began in 1967 but in 1971 the company became bankrupt. A new company, Sierra Rutile (owned chiefly by Bethlehem Steel, U.S.A.), took over exploitation of the deposits in 1976; it has invested some Le50 million and began production in early 1979. Annual output may reach 100,000 tons.

In December 1969 the government announced its intention of acquiring compulsorily a 51 per cent holding in the share-capital of each of the four mining companies then operating in the country. Agreement with the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (S.L.S.T.) was reached in September 1970, but the decision was not implemented with the Delco. (The government was, however, represented on the board of Delco by two directors from 1974 until October 1975 when it went into liquidation.

During the field work for this study, the last general manager of Delco (now managing director of Sierra Rutile) was interviewed and asked why he thought Delco had closed. In his view there were two main factors involved in the decision to close the mine. One was the government attempt to nationalise the company in 1975. This attempt, he said, discouraged the parent company, William Baird of Scotland, from investing further in Delco, particularly as the easily accessible ore had been exhausted. The second factor was the government's attempt to impose on the management of Delco its policy of Africanisation. The interviewee's

opinion was that Africanisation should be evolutionary and not revolutionary.

But one wonders whether the nationalisation attempt was not the result of the failure of the evolutionary process of Africanisation, more so when Delco had been in operation for 45 years in 1975, still with expatriate dominated management.³⁶ It is important to note that before the closure of Delco in 1975, the mining companies accounted for about 30 per cent of the expatriate personnel employed in the private sector (see Table 3.4, Chapter 3). Of these, about 90 per cent were employed in middle-level technical grades.³⁷

The manufacturing sector accounts for about five to six per cent of Gross Domestic Product at current prices. About 60 per cent of the manufacturing in Sierra Leone is conducted in establishments employing fewer than six workers.³⁸ Those employing more than six workers (with the exception of the Palm Kernel Oil Mill owned by the S.L.P.M.B.) are expatriate owned. Manufacturing output in 1975/76, the latest year for which information is available, was valued at Le39.6 million. Available data on output in physical terms show that in 1977 output in a number of industries increased significantly. Production of cigarettes increased by 35 per cent over 1976 and the production of alcoholic beverages increased by 31 per cent. However, the output of motor fuel declined by 9 per cent to 60 million gallons in 1976. This is the result of the continuing rise in oil prices which started in 1973. Imported crude oil is refined at Kissy near Freetown, by the Sierra Leone Refining Company

Limited, in which the government has a 50 per cent holding. Because of rises in oil prices over the last seven years, and the lack of sufficient foreign exchange, refining is being operated at half of its productive capacity.

Since independence, the aim of industrial policy has been to promote import-substitution through the selective granting of development Certificates by the Ministry of Trade and Industry under the terms of the Development Ordinance 1960. Development Certificates have been issued to about 30 companies manufacturing various products. Only two certificates have been issued since 1975. The actual concession granted varies from case to case but principally involved exceptions from duty on imported capital goods and raw materials and income tax concessions. The criteria on which these certificates have been granted were not rigid, but generally there was a requirement that the goods to be produced were not already being made in Sierra Leone. Some companies were given tariff protections, but this was not often very effective, partly because of the relative ease with which goods can be smuggled into Sierra Leone. Some firms, including those manufacturing cosmetics, metal and wood furniture, candles, tiles and mineral waters, and suitcases have been established without receiving development certificates, as enterprises may qualify for certain tax and import duty concessions but not development certificates.

The government's industrial policy is under review by a committee, which was established because of a general

disenchantment with the efficacy of the policy outlined above. It was felt that the relatively small effects on income and employment generated by such policies did not justify the government's loss of revenue as a result of the various concessions offered to foreign investors. Moreover, the relatively small size of the Sierra Leone market has been a constraint on large-scale industrial development, particularly that of the relatively capital-intensive and large industries that the Development Ordinance envisaged.

In recent years, there has been a shift in emphasis from general industrial policies into agro-based industries, which it was envisaged will be labour intensive and would use local raw materials. There has been some success in achieving these objectives as demonstrated in the Palm Kernel Oil Mill, tobacco industry and the use of palm oil in the newly established soap factories. The construction of sugar cane refinery mill is near completion. It is hoped that by 1981 it will be in production. Last year, the fruit canning factory was opened at Mabole. Consideration has also been given to the establishment of rice mills, a cacao processing factory, and plywood factory. The apparent effect of these industrial policies (whether factory based or agro-based) on Africanisation was an increase in the employment of expatriate personnel (see Tables 3.6), mainly in technical supervisory grades.

In commerce, at the wholesale level, the trade in import goods is very largely in the hands of a small number of European firms with substantial participation by Lebanese and Indian merchants.³⁹ The Lebanese are also prominent in retail trading from fixed premises.⁴⁰ Market and itinerant trade is carried on by Africans. Between 1963 and 1969 a series of legislative measures was passed (though not always enforced and sometimes repealed) to curtail foreign participation in retail trade and also in specified services and small-scale manufacturing activities.⁴¹

New government ventures include a National Trading Company in the import trade formed in 1971, a National Shipping Company, a publicly owned commercial bank commenced in 1973.⁴² The Budget Statement of 1976 was highly critical of the performance of the public corporations, most of which were said to be barely able to stand on their own feet.⁴³ Subsequently, the Ports Authority lost its autonomous status, and a new contract management was appointed in its place.⁴⁴

Transport and communications account for about 9 to 10 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product of Sierra Leone. Following a report by Itaconsult, which was commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.) in 1966, the government decided to move towards the complete replacement of railways by roads for domestic transportation. The main line owned and operated by the government as a department was a narrow gauge (2½ feet) single-track

system. The main line was originally 310 miles long, stretching eastwards from Freetown to Pendembu; and a branch line started from Bauya to Makeni, the provincial headquarters of the Northern Province. Both main and branch lines acted as economic arteries and veins along which manufactured goods from the "colonial central workshops in the U.K."⁴⁵ are distributed to various parts of the country, and the raw materials were channelled to the coast and then by sea to the central workshop. However, at the attainment of independence, the railway system proved to be inadequate and most unprofitable, with an increasing government subsidy estimated at Le1 million in 1970 prices.⁴⁶ In addition, there was also a private railway owned by the Sierra Leone Development Company, linking the mines at Marampa and its port at Pepel. Like the government-owned railway, it acted as a conduit line through which the iron ore of Marampa mines was exported to the outside world. It became redundant with the closure of the mines in October, 1975.⁴⁷

The country is currently engaged in a heavy programme of road building, the strategy of which is the construction of various arterial roads with a back-up network of feeder roads. The system is based on two principal routes between Freetown and the Eastern part of the country. The more southerly route extends through Tiama and Bo to Kenema and the other through Luusar, Makeni to Safadu. A direct road link between Freetown and Monrovia, shortening the road

distance between the capitals by over 300 miles, is included and is associated with a formal commitment made in 1970 toward eventual economic union of Sierra Leone and Liberia which in fact became a reality in 1973 under the Mano River Union.⁴⁸ In all, Sierra Leone has 4,445 miles of road of which 900 miles are tarred.⁴⁹

There is an international airport at Lungi, north of Freetown, recently modernized (because of the OAU conference), and domestic air services are provided by a national airline in which the government is a majority shareholder. A major quay extension at Freetown harbour was opened in 1970. Towards the end of 1977, the government intimated its intention of building a new international airport, possibly at Newton in the Western Area, partly with a view to encouraging tourism, but a firm decision has not yet been made. Contact with the outside world is maintained through postal services, the cable and wireless system (introduced in the early years of colonial period), and through the Sierra Leone External Telecommunications with the aid of an earth satellite.

Among some of the reasons advanced by African leaders in defence of Africanisation policies is the effect of employing a large contingent of expatriate personnel in a developing country on the country's Balance of Payment and Trade (Chapters 2.2 & 4.3) Starting from only some Le14 million in 1950, Sierra Leone's exports had probably doubled in value by 1954 and reached a level of around Le 60.

million by the end of the decade (with allowances made for diamond smuggling, which is believed to have been at a level of Le20-30 million per annum in the late 1950s).⁵⁰

The volume of diamond smuggling probably fell in the early 1960s and in 1960-67 total recorded or legal exports averaged Le 60 million per annum.⁵¹

The balance of trade, with allowance made for smuggled diamonds, seems to have become adverse in 1961 and to have continued so until 1968. Recorded exports and imports show a deficit of around Le 7. million per annum in 1965-67, and the deficit in the current balance of payments has been estimated at Le.20.0 million per annum in the same period. By the end of 1966 the official foreign exchange reserves had been reduced to about Le11.0 million (from Le30 million in 1964), while external debts totalling over Le 50.0 million with a large medium-term element had been accumulated. In the late 1960s charges on the external debt were running at around Le8 million per annum.⁵²

Improvement of this external position was largely the result of favourable movements in Sierra Leone's commodity terms of trade. It was checked in 1973 by steep increases in import prices, especially of petroleum and rice, and substantial deficits re-appeared in current payments averaging Le44 million per year in 1974-75.⁵³ In November 1975, it was deemed necessary to institute administrative control of foreign exchange expenditures: most imports were made subject to specific import licenses, and specific

authority from the central bank was required to effect payment for all imports. These measures are in all respects similar to those applied on the employment of foreign nationals in Sierra Leone through the immigration control mechanism (Chapter 4). However, with respect to import restriction measures, they constituted a departure from past policy and from the assumption that external transactions could not in practice be controlled which underlay it.

Between 1977 and 1978 exports rose because of price improvements from Le147 to Le187 million, but imports increased from Le206 to Le280 million. Foreign exchange reserves at mid-1978 stood at Le44 million, of which half was blocked by irrevocable commitment to suppliers' credits; by the end of the year current external liabilities exceeded assets by Le16 million. Commitments to commercial creditors in West Germany, the United Kingdom and other countries were re-scheduled in 1978 so that the bulk of the debt relief was worth Le16 million. The leone was devalued against sterling by about 5 per cent in November 1978, but pressure by the I.M.F. for further devaluation early in 1979 was strongly resisted by the Sierra Leone government.⁵⁴

Of the average annual value of le111.5 million in recorded exports of domestic products in the three years from 1973 to 1975, 71 per cent was in minerals (including diamonds 57 per cent, iron ore 11.2 per cent), and most of the remainder in agricultural produce (notably cacao 5.9, coffee 5.8 per cent. palm kernel 5 per cent). Since then

there have been changes in the composition of exports with the disappearance of iron ore, a reduction in the relative importance of diamonds, and an increase in coffee. In 1974 and 1975 food, beverages and tobacco accounted for an average of about 22 per cent of total imports, machinery for 20 per cent, mineral fuels for 10.9 per cent, and chemicals for 6.5 per cent; the residue consisted mainly of manufactured consumer goods, particularly textiles, clothing and footwear. In the same years, 62 per cent of recorded domestic exports went to the United Kingdom (including diamond sales through the Central Selling Organisation in London), 15 per cent to the Netherlands, 3.8 per cent to Japan and 6 per cent to the U.S.A. The main sources of imports were the U.K. (23 per cent), Japan and the U.S.A. (9 per cent each), the Netherlands (4.5 per cent), and in 1975 Nigeria (8 per cent) and the Peoples Republic of China (6 per cent.).⁵⁵

Planning for economic and social development did not start in Sierra Leone until after the last world war when in 1948 a senior colonial expatriate civil servant⁵⁶ (Child) was appointed by the governor to examine the economic system of Sierra Leone, and to recommend measures which would improve the economic well-being of Sierra Leonean population. The report, published in 1949, stated that the purpose of the proposed plan was "to indicate measures and requirements necessary to achieve a substantial increase in economic production, and therefore the prosperity and welfare of the

people of Sierra Leone during the next four or five years".⁵⁷ However, the Child Plan limited itself to the agricultural sector and attempted to give operational meaning to the phrase "substantial increase in economic production." Child explicitly stated that "the aim in regard to agricultural produce, is to double output."⁵⁸

In order to achieve this stated goal, Child recommended five specific projects:⁵⁹

1. Improvement of the government railways (£1,250,000).
2. Extension of the road system and construction of bridges (£800,000).
3. Improvement of inland waterways (£20,000).
4. Development of regional communications, transportation and agriculture by grants to the district councils (£325,000).
5. Development of the oil palm industry (£529,000) through
 - (a) distribution of free improved oil palm varieties to local producers;
 - (b) introduction of mechanical processing including fifty pioneer oil mills; and
 - (c) development of a pilot oil palm plantation.⁶⁰

It is apparent from the nature of these projects that the modus operandi of the Childs Plan consisted primarily of indirect stimuli. The decision to rely upon indirect measures was based on three considerations:

1. Child's belief that the crucial bottlenecks

confronting the agricultural sector were the existing market facilities.⁶¹

2. The apparent success of the Department of Agriculture in developing improved varieties of oil palms, and
3. The belief that stabilization of producers prices through the operation of S.L.P.M.B. would stimulate production.

Childs recognized that his estimates were "open to objection, that imponderable factors, such as those relating to demand and to price and to incentive, can quickly make nonsense of the best of calculations," but he twice reiterated his belief that it is "better to aim and miss than not to aim at all."⁶²

By 1955, almost all the projects advocated by Child had been completed; however, target production was achieved for only coffee and piassava (neither of which was then controlled by S.L.P.M.B.), while the export tonnage of palm kernels, palm oil, kola nut, etc. fell. The absolute decline in the exportation of these commodities was in no way attributable to Child's Plan but must be related to "imponderables", eg. the increase in the illicit diamond mining activities and the pricing policies of SLPMB. However, even if the ceteris paribus assumptions under which Childs was working had not been violated, it is not clear that the agricultural production targets could have been attained. In other words, it was

not known whether the targets were feasible. What was needed was information concerning production relationships and constraints confronting the agricultural sector, such as the availability of skilled manpower (Chapter 5) and the fertility of the soil. Once such knowledge had been obtained, targets could have been established and a set of instruments designed which might have allowed target fulfilment. The Childs proposals were devoid of operational significance since they bore no known relationship to agricultural production.

Sierra Leone's second effort at national planning, which resulted in the implementation of the Ten-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development 1962/63-1971/72, was undertaken shortly after independence in April 1961. The major objectives of the Ten-Year Plan included the strengthening of the Sierra Leone economy, and the acceleration of its rate of growth through a programme of public and private investments. Public sector investments expenditure under the plan was estimated at Le 250 million. Of this amount, 39 per cent was to be spent on social services, including education and health, 21 per cent on transport and communications, 12 per cent on manufacturing, 8 per cent on agriculture, and the remainder on the other sectors of the economy.⁶³ For the private sector, Le 50 million was estimated as investment expenditure over the first five years of the plan period; for the second five-year period no estimates of private sector investment were made in the Plan.

In its implementations several technical and organisational problems beset the plan, including a lack of well-prepared projects, deficiencies in managerial and technical skills, and inadequate co-ordination among the executing authorities in economic decision making. Owing to these difficulties, the Plan was abandoned. However, development expenditure has taken place in the context of the annual development budget.⁶⁴

In 1974, Sierra Leone made its third attempt at planning for economic and social development. A Third National Development Plan (TNDP) for the years 1974/5-1978/79 was introduced. His Excellency President Siaka Stevens described it as "a blueprint for the future"⁶⁵ and the then Honourable Minister of Development and Economic Planning, S.A.J. Pratt, described it as "a milestone in the country's progress towards economic self-reliance."⁶⁶ It is very difficult to discern any major departure from the first two plans discussed earlier. However, in the main, the following are the objectives of the Blue Print 1974/75-1978/79: an accelerated rate of economic growth, increased benefits of economic development for the rural population and more balanced regional development (Child's Plan 1949). The Plan projected that real GDP would grow at a compound annual rate of 6.2 per cent, and that per capita real income would increase at a rate of 3.6 per cent a year. High priority was assigned to agricultural sector (Childs Plan 1949) with the objectives of increasing exports, achieving self-

sufficiency in food and accelerating the annual growth rate of the sector to 4.6 per cent during the planned period. The mining and manufacturing sectors were projected to grow at 10.6 and 4.8 per cent respectively while other important priorities included road improvement (Childs Plan 1949) and hydro-electric projects. Total investment was projected at Le 623.1 million or about Le 125 million annually.⁶⁷

The first progress report indicates that over the first three years of the plan, real growth rate may have been less than the target. The low level of the average annual growth rate for GDP of about 1.9 (6.2) per cent a year resulted mainly from decline in the growth rate of the mining and manufacturing sectors. The annual plan for 1977/78 calls for investment expenditure of le 134.4 million, an increase of 33 per cent from the 1976/77 level of le 101 million. Agriculture is to get the largest share of the total 18.6 per cent of planned investment. In 1978/79, the final year of the planned period, the plan was extended to 1982.

The failure of the Plan to reach its targets within the planned period is partly due to Sierra Leone's fiscal situation which deteriorated sharply in 1974/75 (the first year of the plan) and subsequently remained weak. In fiscal years 1974/75 and 1975/76, government revenues grew at an annual rate of less than 4 per cent, primarily because of slow-down in economic activities and exports which the Plan was designed to "accelerate". The proportion of total

revenue to nominal GDP declined from 19.2 per cent in 1973/74 to 15.6 per cent in 1974/75 while total expenditures expressed as a proportion of GDP rose from 23.6 per cent in 1973/74 to 27.5 per cent in 1974/75 and fell to 24.4 per cent of GDP in 1975/76.

Revenue as a proportion of GDP has been in the range of 16-19 per cent in recent years. Since 1974/75, revenue has been adversely affected by the closure of Delco and the declining contribution of diamonds which fell from 3.6 per cent of GDP in 1973/74 to 1.2 per cent in 1976/77. Current expenditure rose by a yearly average of 19 per cent in 1973/74-1976/77 though with wide year-to-year variations. Outlays on wages and salaries averaged 46 per cent of current expenditure in the period while subsidies and transfer payment averaged 11 per cent. Interest payment rose to 14 per cent of current expenditure in 1975/76, reflecting payment on large short-term foreign debts contracted in the previous years.

During 1976/77, with the upturn in economic activity and incomes, the rate of increases in money supply, which had been 2.4 per cent in 1974/75 and 13.2 per cent in 1975/76, accelerated to 29 per cent, much more than the two preceding years.

The banking system in Sierra Leone comprises the Central Bank of Sierra Leone established in 1964 to replace its forerunner, the West African Currency Board, three commercial banks, one of which is indigenously owned - the

Commercial Bank - and the other two are foreign-owned with indigenous participation, Barclays Bank, D.C.O., and the Standard Bank - all British owned.

The Central Bank is the major source of bank credit to the government in the year which ended in June 1977; it accounted for more than 60 per cent of the annual increase in the banking system net claims on government which rose by slightly more than Le23.0 million in 1975/76 and also in 1976/77.

This section provides a summarised economic background information for the study of the process and progress of Africanisation in Sierra Leone upon which subsequent analysis can be made. However, references will also be made to other African countries, particularly Ghana and Nigeria, with similar colonial experience when such reference is relevant.

1.5 The Employment Policies of the Colonial Governments.

"A traveller to the British settlement on the West Coast of Africa in about 1870 might have transacted his business with the Government almost entirely with African senior officials. The Collector of Customs, the Colonial Secretary, the Medical Officer, the Director of Education and District Commissioner could all have been blacks. Thirty years later probably all would have been white."⁶⁸

Among the colonial policies which educated African elites hated most was the employment policy of the Colonial Government which they saw as apparent discrimination against them in favour of their colonial expatriate counterparts. In the public service racial discrimination was thought to be the basis of selection and advancement rather than educational ability. Even the few Africans who were employed above the grades of clerks were not given treatment equal to their European counterparts.

The analysis in this section is mainly historical. Its significance to this study is that it provides factual information on the employment policies of the Colonial Government from which the validity of the claims of educated African elites can be judged. The section also seeks to provide the reader with an insight into the problems that were likely to confront the African leaders at independence.

Three phases can be distinguished in the development of the public services in British West Africa. First, from about 1830 to 1898, Africans and men of African descent were frequently employed in responsible positions; second, from 1898 to 1946, they were seldom employed in senior posts; third, the final phase, from 1946 until the various territories became independent, there was a policy of progressive Africanisation.

In 1808, when the British Government needed a naval base in West Africa it took over Sierra Leone from the company as a crown colony. Under the company, schools were established in Freetown and it was from these that the British Government was to find staff not only for the colony but for the Gold Coast settlements for which it acquired direct responsibility in 1843 and later for Lagos (see Section 1.2 above).

While the Sierra Leone venture was enthusiastically supported by the evangelists in England, the expenses and the heavy death rate among troops and British officials stationed in Freetown made it unpopular in the British Parliament. In the course of a debate in the House of Commons in 1830, therefore, Sir George Murray, the Secretary of State for the colonies announced his intention:

As far as possible to fill all the civil offices of Sierra Leone with people of colour who were not likely to suffer in their health. He hoped finally to make Sierra Leone a free African colony.⁶⁹

This policy was first carried out through the appointment of people of West Indian descent as government officials. Thus, John Carr, Trinidadian, who had been called to the English Bar was sent out as Queens advocate, became chief justice in 1841 and acted as governor. Dr. William Fergusson, an Afro-West Indian with a British medical degree, served as a government doctor in Freetown from 1815,

and eventually was appointed governor of Sierra Leone in 1844; his son became a colonial secretary in 1848. Robert Dougan, another Afro-West Indian, acted as governor in 1854 after spending 33 years in Freetown, first in business and then as Queens advocate. In 1854, however, the Secretary of State for the colonies received a petition from Africans in Sierra Leone protesting against Afro-West Indians being given senior posts and ruled that no more should be sent out.

By this time, Creoles, as men born in Sierra Leone came to be called, were beginning to be appointed to senior posts, and such appointments continued until 1895. George Nicol, of mixed British and African descent and educated in England, became Colonial Secretary in 1854. Thomas Lawson, a Creole of the second generation to be educated in England, became Chief Inspector of Police in 1856; his son was sent on a government scholarship to England to be trained as an engineer and returned as Assistant Colonial Engineer in 1867. Three other scholarships to Britain were provided to train Africans as doctors, who were posted as staff assistant surgeons in the army on their return in 1859. The posts of Secretary for Native Affairs and Queens Advocate were normally held by Creoles in the second half of the 19th century.

Between about 1893 and 1905, there was a sharp change of policy on the West Coast, and most senior posts were placed in British hands. In 1898 the Governor of Sierra

Leone ruled that not only all heads of departments but also their principal assistants must be Europeans. The only two African officers in the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) were pensioned off in 1902. In the same year, the colonial office in London decided that African doctors might not be members of the New West African Medical Service. Henceforth the most senior African doctor was junior to the most recently arrived European, and the African, Dr. Renner, who had often acted as head of the Sierra Leone Medical department, never did so again in his remaining 11 years of service. In 1892, Africans held 18 out of 40 senior posts in the public service; by 1912, out of 92 posts, they held only 15, and of these five were abolished in the next few years.⁷⁰

The new policy of Europeanisation in Africa can largely be attributed to several factors. Some are political and social, the others are medical and racial. First, the political factors: in 1898 a Temne Paramount Chief in the Karene District led his people in a rebellion against the introduction of the Hut Tax⁷¹ in the Protectorate. This Hut Tax War, as it became known later, was fought on the same principles which led the thirteen American colonies to revolt against "the Mother Country - Britain" in 1776 - "no taxation without representation." For Bai Bureh, the Chief of the Temne people, why should his people pay taxes for their huts which the white man did not build for them, was the question. The war was fought very bitterly. Bai

Bureh was captured and deported to the Gold Coast. The colonial government felt threatened. They held the Creoles, trading among the Temnes, responsible. They were discredited.⁷² They were no longer to be trusted as protectors of the British interests.

In 1919, the railway workers struck for a delayed payment of promised war bonuses and the subsequent stoppage by the daily paid public works staff, and in 1926 the general railway workers strikes, the Creole elites were all blamed for having instigated them.

A second factor is no doubt due to Ross' discovery of the means of transmission of Malaria. The insistence of Parliament and of the Colonial Office on Africanisation had been mainly due to the very heavy mortality rate among the Europeans on the West Coast, particularly Sierra Leone, which gained the infamous name of "the Whiteman's Grave", in one year alone, 1859, half the European population of Freetown had died.⁷³ In 1897, Ross in India proved that Malaria was mosquito born and in 1900 the American Army Medical Department showed yellow fever also to be transmitted by mosquitoes. Ross and his collaborators visited Freetown. On their advice not only was spraying carried out but the European population was moved up the hill. More Europeans now came out to West Africa; they conducted more business, demanded better and more comprehensive government services and lived in segregated areas - Hill Station, Cline Town and in the provinces in Reservations.⁷⁴

Once it was decided to retain the West African dependencies, there was an insistence in the British Parliament that they should pay their way. Chamberlain's determination to "develop our West African Estates" required a more intensive administration in which there was insistence on more formal qualification. Thus, the District Commissioners were now required to be barristers or solicitors, but Africans with these qualifications preferred the higher earnings of the Bar. Some of the earlier African administrators had also been traders, but such a combination of functions became impossible as civil service procedures tightened up.

The decision on the replacement of doctors was the most clearly documented. Ripon, as Colonial Secretary in 1893, instructed the Sierra Leone Government that one-third of their doctors should be Africans.⁷⁵ The Colonial Office, in 1901, set up a committee on the amalgamation of the West African Medical Services, consisting of the Principal Medical Officer of the Gold Coast, Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria, together with two Colonial Office officials. Their report concluded:

The Committee are strongly of the opinion that it is in general inadvisable to employ natives of West Africa as medical officers in the government service . . . They do not believe either that in professional capabilities, West African natives doctors are

at a par, except in very rare instances with European doctors or that they possess the confidence of European patients on the Coast. Social conditions, particularly in Southern Nigeria where European officers live together and have their meals under the "mess" system and in the Northern Nigeria where a large proportion of the European staff consists of officers of the regular army makes it extremely undesirable to introduce native medical officers into these Protectorates.⁷⁶

The Committee was not in favour either of a proposal to employ Indian doctors in West Africa, but they gave no reason for this; Chamberlain minuted on the report that it was "pretty clear to men of ordinary sense that British officers could not have confidence in Indian or native doctors."⁷⁷

Another contributory factor to the new policy was a long series of scandals in which African administrators had been involved. In Sierra Leone in 1895, the Post Master of the colony, a Creole, was twice acquitted by juries of a charge of embezzlement. Governor Cardew changed the law in order to have him retired and committed without jury.⁷⁸ The distrust which the colonial government had of Africans holding responsible posts was aggravated by the conviction, in 1919, of the mayor of Freetown and some of his officials on a charge of conspiracy to defraud the Municipality of

Freetown. However, the special commissioner, Sir Charles O'Brien, in his report on Freetown City Council (1924) did not consider that the blame for the failure of the council can fairly be placed upon the shoulders of the Africans alone.

" . . .the institution," he said, "was forced fully-fledged upon a people who were not ripe for the experience."

But the change of mood in London was also important. Even when the West Coast colonies were still regarded as an encumbrance, Kimberly, as Secretary of State, had minuted in 1893 in light of the Gold Coast scandals:

"I fear except in quite subordinate positions we cannot safely employ natives."⁷⁹

Hemming, who was head of the African Department at the Colonial Office, minuted in 1886:

The educated native is the curse of the West Coast, and that "all natives are incorrigible liars."⁸⁰

The Creoles felt disappointed, and betrayed. Their position at the end of the 19th century has been poignantly described by their historian:-

"Hated and despised as they often were, they were yet indispensable, the unrecognized vehicle by which not only British rule but trade, education and Christianity were conveyed to West Africa. In the churches and

schools which most have closed without their ministrations, in mercantile houses and government offices, dependent on their subordinate toil, these gentle pioneers, bringing a European culture which Europeans resented their possessing, could well look round them to see in whatever good Britain brought West Africa in the 19th century a plant which could never have taken roots without their slightest labour.⁸¹

1.6 The Recruitment Policy.

Chamberlain was the first businessman to arrive at the Colonial Office. He was keenly interested in efficiency in government and he instructed Lord Selborne, his Parliamentary Undersecretary, to find out how many colonial officers there were and how they had been appointed. In the course of this survey, the possibility was examined of creating a unified service whose officers could be transferred between territories. The proposal was dropped because service in West Africa was so unpopular that it was felt that the possibility of being transferred to West Africa would adversely affect recruitment for other territories. As Chamberlain noted:

We take inferior men for West Africa and they are not good enough for other colonies.⁸²

The indifferent quality of the European civil servants in African colonies who were appointed by the patronage of the Secretary of State, emerged from Selborne's inquiry; this led to the suggestion that civil servants for the African territories should be recruited by competitive examination, as was done for the Indian Civil Service. But it was concluded that the unpopularity of the West African service would make it impossible to find sufficient candidates for the examinations. Moreover, it was believed that a man's health would stand up better to the climate of the tropics if he did not go out until he was 25, but only men who had failed in other professions were likely to be candidates for an examination held between the ages of 25 and 30. So until the end, entry to the administrative service of the African colonies was obtained by appointment on interview. "Patronage ruled the day in Downing Street," wrote Casely Hayford in 1903,⁸³ contrasting the quality of the British officers in West Africa unfavourably with those who entered the Indian Civil Service by competition. As Sir Ralph Furse of the Colonial Office later developed and described it, "the patronage became systematically organized, with a secret list of Oxford and Cambridge tutors in order of reliability of their reports on under-graduates, and a close connection with the headmasters of public schools - we learnt to eschew publicity and to rely on personal contacts in the most fruitful quarters . . . our methods were mole-like, quite persistent and indirect." Furse believed

that selection by interview to be a better method than competitive written examinations and succeeded ultimately in obtaining control of selection of overseas candidates.

This was not a method of recruitment which tended to obtain the intellectual type of British civil servant as did the Indian Civil Service examination. It was widely believed that a man with a first class degree would have been regarded by Furse and his colleagues as dangerous. It is interesting to speculate how far the difference between the Indian Civil Service types influenced the Indian and African administrators who succeeded them. The Nigerian and Ghanaian governments when they became independent announced that they would recruit their administrative services by written examinations as soon as there were sufficient candidates.

Despite Chamberlain's investigation, each continued to employ its own officials on different salary and pension scales; an American writer observed that officers in the Gold Coast considered themselves superior to those in Sierra Leone, while those in Nigeria considered themselves superior to those in the Gold Coast and that the Northern Nigerian service was rated highest of all because the officers were required to keep horses and play polo.⁸⁵ In the 1920s, another vigorous colonial secretary, L.S. Amery, again took up the question of a unified colonial service. As a result not only a colonial administrative service, but also a colonial medical, forestry, agriculture and other professional

services were established. Little consideration was given to the effects which this step would have on the recruitment of local people to the government service. Although local candidates might be eligible to occupy posts normally held by members of the unified service, they found themselves in competition with British officers who might be transferred from other territories.

Amery's reforms opened recruitment in the services to Canadians and Australians. But this did not extend to the non-white dominions. Until 1942, candidates for the colonial administrative service were required to be "pure European descent."⁸⁶ In the 20th century, unlike the 19th, Africans from one territory did not do service in another. This was in marked contrast to French practice by which Senegalese and Dahomeyans were employed throughout West Africa and as well as Equatorial Africa and the West Indies.

The period between 1898 and 1940 was one of administrative consolidation in British West Africa. It became the established policy that Africans should not be recruited into the administrative service. The latter was regarded as a temporary scaffolding round growing structures of the native administration. To build Africans into such scaffolding, it was argued, would be to create a vested interest which would make its demolition difficult.⁸⁷

In fact the great expansion of the role of the central government in economic and social development brought about by the post war Labour Government's Colonial Development and

Welfare Act, meant that more administrative officers with wider duties would be required after independence, for which West African governments would have been much better prepared had they recruited African administrative officers before 1942. But in the late thirties, as Dr. Perham has observed in respect of Nigeria, "there was an atmosphere of almost unlimited time to complete the tasks regarded then as hardly begun, of building a new Nigeria from bottom to top."⁸⁸

In the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone, it was never forgotten, as the "Gold Coast Independent" stated in 1919, that every office from that of the governorship downwards has been held by a black or coloured man . . . no amount of disparaging their descendants will obliterate the fact.⁸⁹ The system of government was not only more complex than that of the 19th century, but the hierarchies were now more rigid. They had come to be modelled on the sharp differentiation between the administrative and clerical services which existed in the British Civil Service of the time. The African, however bright, was now confined to a "Native Subordinate Service" with no chance for occasional distinction such as had existed in the looser arrangements of the 19th century.

All services of the governments were not equally rigid. Sir Hugh Clifford, for example, who was Governor of the Gold Coast from 1913-1919, was surprised by the small attempts made to use local people in senior posts throughout the

service by comparison with Ceylon where he had previously served and he appointed some Africans as legal officers. But the first overall plan for Africanisation of the service in any British territory was formulated by his successor, Sir Gordon Guggisberg, in 1925.

Guggisberg saw and publicly stated that it was a misguided policy to expect a colony to finance its development from its own revenues. This, he said, was to put the cart before the horse, for the amount of a colony's revenue depends entirely on the development of its natural resources.⁹⁰ He drew up a 10-year development plan but realized that the government could not afford to expand its expatriate staff sufficiently to implement it. He therefore produced a scheme in 1925 for progressive Africanisation of the services under which in twenty years time 231 out of 550 senior posts were to be filled by Africans who in 1925 held only 27 such posts.⁹¹ At the same time, he founded Achimota College, one of whose principal objectives was to educate Africans for government service.

The plan was not carried out. Guggisberg's successors were unenthusiastic. Where he had been prepared to employ Africans even with the risk of a slight loss of efficiency, they insisted that 'standards' could not be reduced and did not insist on departmental training schemes. The output of Achimota students dropped when its budget was reduced during the depression of 1929-32 and some of those Africans who had been appointed to government posts were retrenched together

with the expatriates during that period of stringency. In 1946 there were only 89 Africans in senior posts instead of the 231 anticipated.⁹²

The Guggisberg Plan thus proved to be a 'false start'. Effective overall Africanisation programmes only commenced in British Colonial West Africa after the Second World War.

1.7 The Size and Level of Expatriate Employment in the Public Service.

In sections 1.5 and 1.6 above, historical background information on the employment and recruitment policies of the colonial government has been provided. The argument for and against the exclusion of educated Africans from the territorial civil services has also been presented. In the light of the available evidence it is clear that colonial employment policy discriminated against educated uneducated Africans in favour of the colonial expatriates, and that the basis of such discrimination was racial rather than on ability. Even if it is accepted that the charges of corruption made against the first generation of African administrators are valid, by themselves these charges were not sufficient reasons for excluding Africans in positions of the colonial administration because the history of colonial administration, particularly in India, was fraught with such practice - hence the impeachment of Warren Hastings in the 18th century.

This section considers the size and level of employment in colonial Africa in general, and Sierra Leone in particular, and the problems which confronted the leaders of the new African states as they progressed towards nationhood.

Benveniste and Moran⁹³ estimated the number of colonial expatriate civil servants working in Africa in 1958 to 1960 to be about 65,240 European government administrators, technical experts and educators to serve the colonial and commonwealth administration of France, England, Portugal and Belgium (see Table 1.1 below). In addition, there were thousands of foreign personnel serving in the Spanish territories and independent government such as Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Liberia and Ethiopia, either under direct recruitment or special arrangements with ex-colonial powers or other sources. This does not include technical assistance from the United States or United Nations, or the health and education work done by the thousands of missionaries.⁹⁴

TABLE 1.1 EUROPEAN CIVIL SERVANTS IN AFRICA.^a

<u>British Territories^b</u>		<u>French Territories^c</u>	
<u>Country/Region</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Country/Region</u>	<u>Number</u>
East Africa	2,900	Central African Republic	1,500
Gambia	100	Chad	1,000
Kenya	3,400	Congo	2,000
Nigeria	4,000	Dahomey	500
Nyassaland	800	Gabon	500
Northern Rhodesia	1,300	Ivory Coast	3,000
Sierra Leone	430	Madagascar	1,000
Somaliland	170	Niger	3,000
Tanganyika	2,800	Senegal-Sudan	6,500 ^d
Uganda	1,800	Tunisia-Morocco	-
Zanzibar	140	Upper Volta	1,800
Others	600	Sub-total	22,800
Sub-total	18,440		

<u>Belgian Territories^e</u>		<u>Portuguese Territories</u>	
<u>Country/Region</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Country/Region</u>	<u>Number</u>
Congo	11,000	Mozambique	12,000
Ruanda-Burwadi	1,000		
Sub-total	<u>12,000</u>	Sub-total	<u>12,000</u>
Total British, French, Belgian, Portuguese		65,240.	
Others		<u>34,760.</u>	
Total European Civil Servants in Africa		100,000	

Source: Handbook of African Economic Development, Table 6, Page 61.

In Anglo-phone West Africa, it is suggested that the breakdown in 1958 was:

TABLE 1.2 NUMBER OF EXPATRIATES IN WEST AFRICA.

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Vacancy</u>
Nigerian Federal Government	1,752	300
Northern Nigeria	1,396	500
Western Nigeria	587	626
Eastern Nigeria	265	402
Sub-total	<u>4,000</u>	<u>1,828</u>
Ghana	880	N/A
The Gambia	100	-
Sierra Leone	<u>430</u>	<u>192</u>
Grand Total	5,410	2,020

Sources: For Ghana and Nigeria, Kenneth Younger: Public Service in New States, pages 53, 107, 108, 109 and 110, 1960. For Sierra Leone - P.S.C. Report, 1959. For the Gambia - see Table 1.1 above.

In numerical terms, the figure of 5,410 European civil servants in British West Africa is small, and as a per centage of the total for Africa (5.4 per cent) is not significant. But in terms of the positions they occupied in the public services of these countries and the rewards associated with them, the number is highly significant.

In Sierra Leone, for example, the Annual Report of the Public Service Commission for the year 1959 revealed the following positions:

TABLE 1.3 NUMBER OF EXPATRIATES IN DIFFERENT JOB CATEGORIES.

<u>Post-Category</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Expatriates</u>	<u>Africans</u>	<u>Vacancies</u>
A	360	228	71	61
B	179	125	29	25
C	158	59	85	14
TOTAL	697	412	185	100

Source: Annual Report of the Public Service Commission 1955.

In the above table out of 360 posts classified as A posts for which the normal basic qualification is a university degree, usually with honours, or a recognized professional qualification as the minimum entry for such posts, 228 of them were occupied by expatriate pensionable officers, 71 of them were occupied by Africans with 61 unfilled. In manpower terms these Class A posts constitute the high-level manpower cadres who occupied the most crucial decision-making echelons in the public service. Of the Class B posts, for which the basic qualification is the satisfactory completion of a long and hard apprenticeship training involving manual and skilled labour followed by passing written examinations etc., out of total of 179 posts, 125 were held by expatriates, 29 by Sierra Leoneans and 25 were vacant. These posts constitute the middle manpower grades. From the table, Sierra Leone was most deficient in the provision of this category of manpower and still is today (table 5.17); and in Class C posts, those for which the necessary

experience and knowledge can be obtained during the course of ordinary employment in the department concerned plus in some but not all cases, a special course of instruction. It is in this class of jobs that the Africans formed the bulk of the workers - 85 out of 159 with the expatriates taking 59 of the posts and the rest unfilled.

When the above figures are broken down into individual departments of the public service, it can be seen that expatriates were most predominant in the administrative service and those departments with either professional or technical orientation with the exception of the medical and the judicial departments.

TABLE 1.4 DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPATRIATES AS OF APRIL 1955.

Department	Total Posts	Exp.	Afr.	Filled	Vac.
Administrative Service	76	59	10	69	7
Accountant-General	6	2	4	6	-
Agricultural	45	33	4	37	8
Audit	7	5	1	6	1
Co-operatives	4	4	-	4	-
Customs	6	2	4	6	-
Civil Aviation	8	6	2	8	-
Commerce and Industry	13	4	6	10	3
Education	64	34	18	52	12
Electricity	20	13	7	20	-
Forestry	21	19	1	20	1
Geological Survey	11	8	-	8	3
Income Tax	7	3	3	6	1
Judicial	13	4	9	13	-
Labour	7	2	4	6	1
Legal	6	2	3	5	1
Meteorological	2	2	-	2	-
Mines	2	1	1	2	-
Medical	99	33	51	84	15
Police	30	20	6	26	4
Ports and Marine	11	9	1	10	1
Posts and Telecommunications	18	6	9	15	3
Printing	3	1	1	2	1

TABLE 1.4 continued

Department	Total Posts	Exp.	Afr.	Filled	Vac.
Prisons	6	1	4	5	1
Public Relations	3	-	2	2	1
Public Works	116	76	14	90	26
Railways	67	47	18	65	2
Road Transport	10	8	-	8	2
Social Welfare	2	1	1	2	-
Surveys and Lands	10	5	3	8	2
Veterinary	4	4	-	4	-
TOTALS	697	412	184	596	100

Source: Staff list for 1955-1957.

The pattern of expatriate employment indicated in the above table complicates the prospect for future Africanisation. As it has been stated earlier, the majority of the pensionable expatriates are employed in professional and technical departments such as the Public Works, 76 out of 116, the Railways, 47 out of 67, Road Transport, 8 out of 10, Agriculture, 33 out of 45, Education, 34 out of 64, Forestry, 19 out of 21, etc., and in the Administrative Service where the expatriates account for 59 out of the 76 posts. In the main, these are the public sector departments directly or indirectly responsible for the overall development of the country. This means Sierra Leone would not only have to produce sufficient manpower to meet the growing demand for technical and professional skills as the country progresses toward independence, but also for replacing the 412 expatriates already employed in the public service (see Table 1.4). This problem is compounded by the colonial employment policies which put the responsibility to the

Secretary of State for the Colonies for the initial selection of new recruits, the section of higher posts in the colonies. He could transfer on promotion British members of the Colonial Service from one colony to another. He was also responsible for seeing that the conditions offered to recruits during selections were subsequently observed by the employing government - Sierra Leone Government Officers recruited by him could not be dismissed or receive disciplinary punishment without his sanction. He was, in fact, the ultimate authority for appointment, discipline and the general conditions of service.⁹⁵

A consequence of this remote control mechanism was to increase the pressure for Africanisation. The colonial expatriates themselves were equally uneasy about their positions. As Proudfoot and Wilson reported:

The advent of self-government for Ghana and the prospect of self-government for other African colonies and eventual independence has not seriously disturbed the colonial expatriates who served in the colonies. Since there were no settlers among them, they were not concerned with handing over political or social privileges. They were transient and knew it. What had perturbed them, however, was the official policy of Africanisation - that is the systematic replacement of Europeans in senior posts by local Africans as they become eligible.⁹⁶

Though confident of their superiority in technical posts, at least, Europeans felt insecure and resented appointments made from confessedly nationalist motives. Moreover, it was Africanisation rather than independence which threatened their traditional social life.⁹⁷

To allay their feelings of insecurity and loss of employment as a result of any Africanisation, the British Government entered into "redundancy" agreements with the governments of each of the colonial territories as they progressed towards independence. The terms of the agreement were couched in a White Paper known as Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service⁹⁸. The White Paper stipulated that in the event of self-government and independence, the following conditions would be observed, which expatriate officers were entitled to expect, by each territorial government⁹⁹

First, that their terms of service would not be made less favourable; second, their pensions and other benefits would continue to be paid by the territorial government; third, they would continue to be considered eligible for transfer or promotion to other territories; fourth, the territorial government would not unreasonably refuse to transfer or promote such officers; fifth, they would be given adequate notice of termination of employment due to constitutional changes and Her Majesty's Government would endeavour to find alternative employment; and finally, sixth, they would receive compensation from the territorial government in the event of premature retirement resulting from Africanisation

policy or constitutional progress. With some modifications in another White Paper in 1956¹⁰⁰ the terms of agreement became part of the negotiating terms for the granting of independence to all the African colonies.¹⁰¹

It was clear from the above arrangement that the main preoccupation of Her Majesty's Government was to shift the burden of financial compensation for the would-be 'redundant colonial expatriate civil servants' to the colonies. It was under these conditions among many others that Sierra Leone, like Ghana and Nigeria, was granted her independence in April 27, 1961, with a public service dominated by overseas pensionable officers.¹⁰² The course of events which followed was largely influenced by the employment policies of the colonial government.

1.8 Summary.

This chapter has outlined information on the setting of the study of Sierra Leone to do with its geography and people, its history and constitutional development, its economy and structure and above all, the employment policies of the colonial governments and the size and level of expatriate employment in Black Africa in general and Sierra Leone in particular. Each of these might exert influence on the course of politics and the policy of Africanisation.

First, its people: the division of the population into tribes, and of the country into administrative regions on

tribal lines, eg. the Northern Province inhabited mainly by Temnes (30% of the total population), the South and East by Mendes (30.5%), constituted tribal interests and regional pressure groups. Both constitute an obstacle to progressive Africanisation. Because promotion and appointment to senior positions of the public service are no longer based on merit and ability, but on tribal and regional considerations, support for political parties would not be based on ideological convictions but on tribal or regional sentiment and for personal economic expectations - employment. The net effect of this is a lowering of standards and the efficiency of the public service and a yearning passion for the goodies of the old colonial days when discipline was the order of the day and when seniority, merit, and not whom you know or knows you rules the day.

Second, the history and constitutional development was summarised. This also has its influence on the functioning of the local institutions in a variety of ways. The establishment of Sierra Leone as a colony for freed slaves, repatriated first from Britain and subsequently from America, Canada, and the West Indies, had a tremendous effect on the educational and the constitutional development of the country. The supremacy of the Creoles over the tribal peoples of the provinces was the result of their early exposure to Western education and ways of life, but this Creole supremacy was challenged by the provincial people as a result of the constitutional development of the country.

Constitutional development gave rise to party politics in Sierra Leone, and this has changed the power structure in the country in favour of the "country people". All these changes have their effect on the policies and process of Africanisation.

The third is the economy and its structure. Of course, Africanisation is about employment in both the public and private sectors of the economy which is essentially rural and subsistence. About 90 per cent of the one million people who are economically active are employed in agriculture. Less than 100,000 are employed by the government and by the private firms employing six or more workers.¹⁰³ Since independence, it has been the policies of successive governments in Sierra Leone to diversify the economy by the use of generous economic policies designed to attract foreign investors. In addition, development plans were adopted, all aimed at increasing the Gross Domestic Product; again, the funding of such plans largely depends on foreign capital which in one way or the other effects any vigorous Africanisation policy, particularly in the private sector which accounts for more than 90 per cent of expatriate employment in Sierra Leone.¹⁰⁴

Fourth, the employment policies of the Colonial Government from 1895 to 1946 alienated the educated African elites - the Creoles, and later the 'natives'. In fact, it can be argued that the post-World War II African nationalism was reaction against this employment

discrimination. African leaders sought political powers because, through them, they could redress what they perceived to be unjust. As the former President of Ghana put it:

"Seek ye first the political Kingdom and everything else shall be added unto it."¹⁰⁵

The first thing to be added unto the new "political kingdom" was the Africanisation of the public service and then the private sector.

Finally, the size and level of expatriate employment in the public service - both the number and the types of positions held by expatriates affect the progress of Africanisation because the speed of Africanisation depended on the ease with which an expatriate could be replaced by an African. Since the majority of expatriates were employed in "key" and technical posts (see Table 1.3), it meant the rate of Africanisation would be determined by the availability of local personnel with such competence.

The dilemma that faced the leaders of newly independent African states was how to reconcile these conflicting demands. This is where the problems of Africanisation lay.

The next chapter will consider the process of, the motivation and pressures for Africanisation of the public service in Sierra Leone.

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CHAPTER 2. THE AFRICANISATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

2.1 Introduction.

The position of the Public Service in colonial Africa left a two-fold legacy for the people of Africa and Sierra Leone in particular. Because access to positions of responsibility in the colonial administration was restricted to Europeans, Sierra Leone, like other African states began its existence as an independent state with a shortage of skilled and experienced civil servants. Thus, the country lacked important resources to enable its administrative system to act efficiently and effectively. An obvious solution to the problem of having too few citizens with the qualifications and experience needed to fill certain civil service positions was to hire expatriates with the required experience and skills. Such a policy, however, ran counter to political demands and expectations set in motion in the nationalist movement.

It was the elitist character of the colonial civil service that helped to bestow on the civil service of independent African states an image of high status and political authority. Thus, a revolutionary goal of the nationalist movement was to replace expatriate incumbents of civil service positions with local citizens. However, it is not the mere substitution of one category of individuals for another that is important here but the adoption of recruitment policies fundamental to an efficient

civil service. The policy of recruiting African citizens to fill positions in the public sector that were formerly either filled by or reserved for expatriates is referred to as "Africanisation".

Originally, the Africanisation of the public service was thought of as referring only to staffing of the public service of the state with African nationals in substitution for expatriates. In practice, the term through common usage quickly came to mean the eventual reduction and ultimately ending of expatriate predominance in the public service. But in the context of the condition which was widely prevailing in many of the new independent states, even a broadened definition proved too limited to describe the scope of staffing change-over implicit in the assumption of self-government, and independence. In fact in some countries like Guinea and Mali, Africanisation was interpreted to mean the outright nationalisation of all foreign-owned enterprises, and the recruitment and introduction of progressive staff and syllabi reflecting the manpower needs and aspirations of the local people.¹ For President Sekou Toure of the Republic of Guinea, Africanisation is analogous to "decolonization";

"When we say decolonization, we mean to destroy the habits, conception and ways of conduct of colonialism. We are determined to replace them with forces that are Guinean forces, conceived by the people of Guinea, adapted to the conditions, the means, to the aspiration of Guinea."²

In the main, politically, Africanisation was seen in the movement of more and more African nationals into positions of leadership. Economically, it has meant more local control of the economic resources of the country - though this has been most difficult to effect. Socially and demographically, it was seen as the elimination of the non-nationals from key positions of employment in both the public and private sectors of the economy. And culturally, it involved an institutional change to meet local needs.

In specific countries, Africanisation was pursued under the cloak of nationalism, e.g. in Sierra Leone it was called Sierra Leoneanisation, in Nigeria, it was called Nigerianisation, in Kenya, it was called Kenyanisation and Zambianisation in Zambia. In East and Central Africa, a policy of localisation had sometimes been advocated. This was because of the multi-racial nature of the society in these areas, and it was intended that the public service should reflect the racial complexion of the state or what President Nyerere called "to give it a local outlook".³ On the other hand, there was a racial imbalance in the public services of these states in that the minority racial communities occupied the majority of the posts in the senior grades. A policy of Africanisation rather than localisation came to be adopted in these states owing to the need to achieve a "proper balance between the races, reflecting as nearly as practicable the racial composition of the

population."⁴ In any case, it must be expected that any non-African who assumes citizenship of the state of his adoption, e.g. the Asians in Kenya, becomes African in the continental sense and the use of the term Africanisation should apply to him so long as it is just and equitable to all minority groups. As applied to the private sector, it may be called indigenisation. Again, indigenisation here means the people of the country regardless of their race, colour or nationality. From now on, it is intended to use the three terms interchangeably.

2.2 Motivation for Africanisation.

Africanisation as a policy was generally accepted by all African states as necessary and popular, because it results were easily seen in so much as Africans can be seen in positions previously occupied by European expatriates; it is therefore important to examine some of the motivation implicit in the policy. A.L. Adu broadly divided the motivation into two categories: the first is political, and the second is economic.⁵

The first and most burning issue is one of politics. It was natural that political urge for independence should be reflected also in the urge to create a national public service. Political independence not matched by an administration which was African in complexion would naturally result in disharmony. As Fred G. Burk and Peter L. French pointed out:

The replacement of former colonial officials with nationals is needed to insure public awareness of the transfer of the loci of power and to help construct the basis for support and legitimacy for new independent government.⁶

In similar terms, the final report of the Parliamentary Committee on the Africanisation of the Federal Public Service of Nigeria stated that, Africanisation, politically, must demonstrate in no uncertain terms, a clear break from the colonial regime and reflect the dawn of era of independence and independent states.⁷ The report ended by adding that the Nigerian independence would not be real to the Nigerian nationals if, after independence, there were Nigerian Ministries and Nigerian Members of Parliament but with "expatriate permanent secretaries and principal advisers."⁸

African ministers inevitably realized that they would prefer to work with Africans in policy advising and directing positions even though this might result in some measures of loss of experience in these positions. Any expatriate officers retained for a time after independence in these sensitive positions should be regarded as a temporary expedient until Africans were ready and available to take over from them.

Furthermore, there were some posts which were really sensitive from the national security point of view and key posts such as those in the police, armed forces, in the

Ministry of Defence, External Affairs and the Interior should be taken over by Africans as soon as they can be trained or are adequate to fill them. It became increasingly uncomfortable politically when an independent state was represented in negotiation with representatives of foreign states by non-nationals.

If as happens quite often in all new states, trade agreements are being negotiated with say, Germany, there is always the suspicion that the British or the French official, acting for the government, might not sincerely represent the interests of the host country, or if he is an adviser that he will not advise against the interest of his country of nationality. In any case, the other side might not be willing to confide their business intention to a person whose own country might have rival interests.⁹

However, experience in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Black Africa had shown that the so-called key posts were the last to be Africanised.¹⁰ As for the armed forces, the African leaders were rather wary on the Africanisation of the officer corps.¹¹ In Sierra Leone, the then Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai was most reluctant to Africanise the post of force commander, then held by a British expatriate Brigadier Blackie for well over five years after independence.¹² The reasons why the 'key posts' were the last to be Africanised were due partly to the government policy of gradualism. As the Prime Minister stated in the Sierra Leone's Legislative Council debate in 1959:-

I would not if I have a European at the head of the Public Service, and he was doing his level best for the country, replace him merely because there was a qualified Sierra Leonean. The European would serve his normal term and the African steps in afterwards.¹³

And also the colonial policy that Africanisation must start from below in order that the future incumbent would be allowed to gain experience for the more senior and responsible positions in the public service. Secondly, it was due partly to the tribal nature of the African states. A minister from one tribe would prefer having as his permanent secretary a man from his own tribe. Where there was no tribesman readily available the solution was to retain the services of the expatriate who had no tribal allegiance. In Nigeria, for example, the case of personal secretary to the then Prime Minister of the Federation was most revealing. The Prime Minister was a Hausa from the North where there were very few Western-educated men. He sought to retain the services of a British officer in this key position, but in the end had to bow to a sustained vituperative campaign by many segments of the Nigerian society, including some who were otherwise well disposed to the Prime Minister. "Nigerianisation", they claimed, "required that the incumbent of this and similar posts be a Nigerian."¹⁴

Although political interest and tribal interrelationships are the impetus behind

the application of an accelerated programme of Africanisation, the more important and, to many, the real justification for Africanisation is economic. It is obviously cheaper to employ local rather than expatriate personnel. The markets from which these two sets of people derived are different, and the expatriate market is invariably more expensive than local African ones. Apart from the higher basic salary cost for expatriates, it is necessary to provide them with additional inducements in cash and in kind since otherwise it would not be worth his while leaving his home. For example, in 1957 in Sierra Leone, in addition to basic pay of an expatriate, the following expatriation allowances were awarded:

<u>Basic Salary P.A.</u>	<u>Expatriation Allowance</u>
£ 865 and below	£182 per annum
£ 866 - £1,159	£232 " "
£1,160 - £1,399	£282 " "
£1,400 - £1,449	£300 " "
£1,450 - upwards	£350 " "

Sources: Report of the Commission on the Civil Service of Sierra Leone, 1957, Para. 135-136.

Over and above expatriation allowances officers with families are granted the following: either a free return passage for not more than two children with no minimum residential requirements, or allowances at the rate of £25 a year in respect of each child who is maintained by him outside Sierra Leone for the

whole of his tour of office, the allowance being paid in arrears at the end of the officer's tour of service. In either case the concession is limited to children below the age of 19 years.¹⁵ In some African countries, the British Government, under the Overseas Service Aid, the Voluntary Service Organisation (V.S.O.) schemes, meets the overseas elements of the salaries of those expatriate officers recruited through their agencies. In addition to the V.S.O. there is the British Expatriate Supplementation Scheme (BESS).¹⁶ This is a considerable help since it enables young African countries to have the time in which to train their own personnel while still having access to experience and expertise from overseas without the extra heavy cost of purchase.

Even so, employment of expatriate personnel is still not as cheap as having Africans. Whatever one might say, the fact that overseas officers are working side by side with African staff does have a distorting effect on local salary levels. The Sierra Leone government sets up commissions to devise salary structures which are related to what the local economy would be capable of sustaining and which would reduce the gap between the lowest paid civil servants and the highest paid.¹⁷ These commissions can only have limited success so long as there is a large element of expatriate staff in the senior ranks. One of the reasons for this is that, to begin with, Africans in the senior grades were initially in a minority and they

spent their normal social life with expatriate officers with whom they worked at the Hill Station Club, Cline Club, etc.¹⁸ This is all the more so since in the early stages most of these Africans were themselves trained in Europe and the United States of America where they acquired the pattern and standard of life of these materially more advanced countries. It is unrealistic therefore to attempt to pitch their salary levels too much below those enjoyed by their expatriate counterparts. In equity, all salary commissions and governments must take this factor into account. It does mean, however, that in terms of the proportionate real value of services provided by these local officers to the economy of the country far too big a slice of the national resources is applied to the emolument of what might be called a "privileged few".¹⁹

Moreover, it is normal to guarantee housing for staff recruited from overseas. Each government has had to build and manage large housing estates throughout the country for its expatriate staff. In addition, the government has had to lease additional housing or to pay substantial housing allowances. African officers have come to expect, as stated earlier, that they are also entitled to housing privileges and this is one of the most intractable problems relating to conditions of service there is in the public service administration. The government states that it accepts no responsibility, in principle, for the housing of local staff, but this principle is usually observed in the breach rather

than in its application. However, the government appears at last to have broken with the past and decided to charge economic rental for all houses occupied by local staff. It is too soon, however, to judge how effective this policy is. As an indication of how costly this factor can be, in 1978/79 the Sierra Leone government was spending no less than Le 1,000,000 per annum on housing allowances and rent subsidies.²⁰

Africanisation was also justified by the fact that it ensured stability in the staffing of government services. Employment of staff from overseas can be regarded as a short-term expedient in any case, but the period after independence is particularly difficult in maintaining stable expatriate staff structure. The incidence of the inevitable compensation schemes becomes a most unsettling element in all staffing programmes (1.7). Replacement by recruitment from overseas on contract terms is a useful but not the permanent answer to the problem and it is self-defeating.²¹ To ensure stability, the answer is to build up a local cadre of officers whose careers and fortunes are tied up with those of the state and who are bound to their jobs by ties of responsibility and natural loyalty. If the main core of the staff is African, then such reinforcements in experience and expertise as may be necessary from overseas can be applied with economy and good sense. On the other hand, it is equally arguable that, in tribally segmented countries of Africa south of the Sahara, Africanisation does not

necessarily ensure national loyalty. As it has been pointed out earlier (1.2), in countries such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone loyalty to the tribe and the ethnic group is much stronger than to the nation. An expatriate civil servant might, in fact, prove more loyal to the government of the day (regardless of the tribe of the leader) than an African civil servant.

Another factor was the drain of money out of the country caused by the employment of expatriate officers. This might not be a very large sum compared with other factors in the balance of payments position of a state but it was nevertheless significant. A high proportion of the salaries paid to expatriate officers was spent in the country, but it was natural that savings should be remitted to their home countries overseas. Later, when they retire to their home countries, gratuities and pensions are paid to them overseas. Obviously it was in the country's interest to reduce this cost to the absolute minimum necessary to ensure efficiency by employing local staff to the optimum extent that could be managed by a progressive Africanisation policy.

Perhaps a more important, though less easily observable, economic benefit of Africanisation arose from the different consumption patterns of local and foreign personnel. Foreigners tended to bring with them the tastes and consumption habits developed in their countries of origin; this not only exerts a direct effect on the demand for imports (which is probably small); but, more importantly, introduced the

local population to new tastes and habits which could only be satisfied by imports. If, as often happened, a considerable proportion of the "opinion leaders" in the domestic economy come to adopt these tastes. this "demonstration effect" as Nurkse has called it,²² might prove very difficult for the government to control and at the same time might seriously weaken the country's balance of payments position. This could prove critical to countries which find it necessary to employ considerable numbers of expatriate staff, even when these are provided 'free' under technical assistance programmes; and especially so, if at the same time, they were trying to accelerate their rate of economic growth by stepping up the level of investment, which inevitably entails increased imports of capital goods.²³

Under these circumstances, personnel Africanisation became just as important a part of the development programme as raising the level of domestic savings, but may well prove more difficult to effect. The nature of these difficulties will be examined, but even when the Africanisation policy is well advanced, there will be a considerable time lag before the "demonstration effect" can be overcome.

Ultimately, the real justification for Africanisation was the natural and understandable desire of every country to manage its own internal affairs. Such independence is, to most people, meaningless unless it is matched by the ability of

the people, to actually run their own public service. Moreover, until industry and commerce become large employers (Chapter 3), the opportunities for service through state employment was the best means for inculcating qualities of integrity, hard work and esprit de corps which are vital ingredients in the character of any nation. It was therefore not an unworthy ambition for any state to wish to accelerate the process of Africanisation in its services.

2.3 Pressures for Africanisation.

The relatively high salaries of civil servants in developing countries and the status and authority that accompany civil service positions made employment in the public service very desirable and thus contributed to the internal pressures for Africanisation. A positive response to these pressures is a policy of rapid if not immediate Africanisation of the entire public service. However, if the goal of rapid economic development is to be attained, then an adequate supply of expertise is essential and Africanisation can only proceed as fast as skilled African manpower becomes available.

The lesson of history is that any social transformation by itself or as part of a larger objective must be orchestrated within the overall political and economic objectives of the country's ruling elites, and more specifically, the country's educational and training programmes. Failure to recognize

this point or having recognized it, to take account of it, presents the greatest threat to achieving the objectives of Africanisation. Such failures may be induced by pressures from below, from African nationalists anxious to fill the desirable public service jobs of the expatriates; or it may be induced by doctrinaire consideration or party politics communicated from above to the African population generally.²⁴

In the first place, pressures from below, the question becomes for the most part one of the strength and determination of the government. Where the government is strong and determined, Africanisation is likely to proceed more or less systematically with intensified and accelerated educational and training programmes, and a rapid expansion of facilities needed. But in the case where the government was not strong or determined enough to resist the pressures from party members, there was the possibility of submitting to popular pressures for jobs or to xenophobia.

The Africanisation of the public service became a paramount objective of the African states as they progressed toward independence. One of the things which the nationalist forces most resented in the colonial period was their exclusion from the higher and middle categories of the territorial civil service employment which they regarded to be the traits of independence most sought. This point was clearly illustrated by the demand made by the Tanzanian Union of Public Employees, reported by the London Times, that:

The government should embark on a full-blooded policy to fill the senior posts of the civil service with Africans.

The letter said that the new government had been in power for one month, but so far no changes had been made in the civil service. "We therefore demand that the opportunities we have been refused should now be given to us," said the Union; "certainly a great number of posts held by expatriate officers can be taken by us."²⁵

The Tanzanian incident illustrates how easily the pace and scope of Africanisation can become an internal political issue. In Sierra Leone, a leading member of one of the opposition parties, the Sierra Leone Peoples National Party, P.N.P. for short, was reported saying that:

the ruling Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) was importing redundant whitemen into the country; and said, "the P.N.P. pledges itself to end the practice and will embark on a complete Africanisation of branches of the public service - the African must be given first preference in his own country."²⁶

Here, the ability to Africanise in the sense of developing qualified cadres of Africans not only to replace expatriates but also to take up new jobs engendered by independence and economic growth would have been seriously compromised. The experience of an African state, Sudan, which became independent seven years before Sierra Leone has some relevance here.

In the two years immediately before independence, the Sudanization committee established and operating under the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, granting full internal self-government to the Sudan, reduced the British cadre in the public service from about 1,200 to just over 150. The technical services suffered most. The administrative, policy influencing, and defence services apparently fared better. However, it was believed that the serious revolt in the Southern Sudan shortly before independence in August 1955,

"had as one of its contributing causes the hasty replacements of British officials in the South by Northerners who knew neither the area nor its language."²⁷

By 1958, the Sudan was again employing a large number of British personnel primarily in the technical services and for teaching posts. The Sudan had also in 1958 started to employ British advisers in important posts. The conclusion of Kenneth Younger on the Sudanese experience was that the "Sudanese themselves would probably not now recommend to others a policy as drastic as the one which their exceptionally tense political situation led them to pursue."²⁸

Not even Robert Mugabe who during a B.B.C. Radio 4 interview indicated that the priorities in the agenda for both political and economic decolonisation was first the Africanisation of the public service, second the military and last but not least, the economy.²⁹

Another example of an extreme nature and greater magnitude worth mentioning here is the experience of the Congolese people, immediately after independence in 1960. The Belgian Congo (now Zaire) became independent in mid-April 1960 with only 109 trainees who were to take their place in the senior service. Notwithstanding this manpower handicap, the Congolese government of Patrice Lumumba,³⁰ hastily and almost hysterically embarked on a policy of Africanisation, providing African cadres for every important Ministry. College graduates became permanent secretaries. In the army, corporals were made colonels and sergeants were made generals on the assumption that somehow the change in title and rank would magically confer on the new battalion or divisional army leaders the ability to lead troops, plan and execute logistical and combat operations, and give military advice to the civilian government leaders.³¹ The inevitable result of this was chaos, the collapse of the entire administration of the country, strife and violence ensued, and eventually civil war.³² The Congolese experience reflected in its most acute form the situation obtaining in one degree or another in many parts of Africa. The process of Africanisation must be thought of, then, as embracing for most of Africa not only the replacement of foreign personnel in the public service, but also the political training and experience for Africans to operate their new political structures.

In Sierra Leone, the restrained views put forward by the deputy leader of the P.N.P. probably best represented the party's stand on the issue of Africanisation. Mr. Stevens said that expatriates were necessary because of the skills they possessed, but the Sierra Leoneans must be master in his own house. ". . . we must be given the opportunity of deciding the number, quality and calibre of the people who should come to us, and what is more important, to negotiate with such outsiders on a basis of equality the conditions under which their services would be made available to us. Our policy therefore would be to invite and give every encouragement to expatriates who have specific contributions to make - the P.N.P. will have no place for the know-all type of paternalistic expatriate."³³

The ability of the governments of the new African states to transform the cadre of the public service by developing qualified Africans to replace Europeans significantly involves political patronage, tactics and ideological drives. Political parties in Africa are subject to as much if not more pressures for jobs by the tribesmen and party faithful as is the case in other countries. This is more so in countries with a one party state system of government; the leaders of such parties have used their monopoly over access to the public service to reward their loyal party supporters. In fact, party membership and loyalty may override other considerations such as technical qualification, training and experience in appointment to more senior posts

in the public service.³⁴ The probability is that enthusiasm and devotion to party activities are more important factors than technical, academic and professional qualifications. In addition, it must again be noted that the membership of the party per se is not enough to guarantee one's appointment to certain jobs. There are other factors which tend to over-ride party loyalty and enthusiasm. Such factors as personal loyalty to the leadership of the party, tribal and ethnic consideration, and perhaps regional, or in the case of Sierra Leone, district. All these have tended to influence the appointments of certain individuals to politically strategic and sensitive posts such as the Secretary to the President (Head of the Civil Service), the Financial Secretary, Establishment Secretary, etc.

Finally, even where a strong government was in a position to resist pressures from below, it might for tactical political reasons decide to submit as a way to enhance its mass following or intensify its mass support. For example, in Tanzania, President Nyerere, responding to his party pressure for rapid Africanisation, spelt out his party policy as follows:

First, it will remain the policy of the government that every vacancy arising in the public service of Tanzania should be if possible filled by an appointment made locally and that recourse should only be had to recruitment from outside East Africa if no suitable candidate (of any race) can be found locally; second, within this

policy, in the case of new appointments to the service, it is government's intention that African candidates of Tanzania should have prior claims to consideration; and thirdly, only if no suitable, qualified Tanzanian African candidate is available should other candidates be considered.³⁵

In Franco-phone Africa, from the available literature, the pressure for Africanisation of the public service seemed to come from above.³⁶ With 22,000 French expatriate civil servants out of a total of 100,000 (vide Table 1.1) working in French Colonial Africa, one would have expected that the pressure for Africanisation in these countries should have been greater, and come from below, than the English-speaking countries. But this was not the case. The reasons might be attributed to the French Colonial policy of assimilation whereby Africans with a certain level of education, preferably with a university education in France, would be assimilated and automatically become French citizens. They could be elected as deputies to the French Assembly of Deputies and thus become Cabinet Ministers as well. This policy of assimilation stood in opposition to the British colonial policy of self-determination whereby the colonial subjects were trained not to become British, but to become self-reliant and independent. Self-government and independence for the West African British territories became settled policy for the United Kingdom much earlier than it did for France.³⁷

The pressure for Africanisation in French West Africa was started after 1948, when a Senegalese socialist leader, Lamyne Gueye, succeeded in having incorporated in French law, the principle: 'à travail égal salaire égal' in the loi Lamyue Gueye de 1948 sur "l'harmonisation des traitement de salaire et de travail," the basis was laid for equal pay for equal work in the public service which over time was extended to the private sector.³⁸ This was an important turning point in French West Africa. However, in the absence of an existing cadre of trained Africans, insistence on equal pay for equal work was counter-productive. It meant that there was little incentive to employ and train inexperienced Africans because they would have to be paid the same wage as their more experienced European counterparts. It also meant, no Africanisation of existing categories of jobs into several separate jobs, each with some limited functions and scaling of salaries accordingly so that Africans can proceed up on the employment ladder to increasingly responsible positions. Finally, since it meant no lowering of standards and qualifications it militated against possible replacement of Europeans as a realistic matter for sometime to come.

In fact, it was only with the loi cadre of June 23, 1956, which introduced important advances in African self-government, that the Africanisation of the public service received for the first time recognition and serious consideration in French West Africa.³⁹ Under the loi cadre,

the practice of reserving a percentage of positions in the civil service for Africans was introduced with the objective of facilitating the promotion of Africans to all levels of the civil service. A further step in Africanisation was taken when the Ecole Nationale de la France d'outre Mer, which trained French men to become overseas officers in the French African Colonial Service (similar to Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service in Britain, see 1.6), was transformed in early 1959, as part of the Gaulist decolonization thrust, into an Institute des Hautes Etudes d'outre Mer. The Institute was dedicated to training Africans from Franco-phone Africa and other states of l'expression Francais on friendly terms with France for senior levels of the public service.

Thus, in all the colonial territories of Black Africa, irrespective of the pattern and starting point, the colonial governments came to appreciate that the Africanisation of the public service was an indispensable step toward African self-government and independence.

2.4 The Machinery for Africanisation.

The Africanisation of the public service can be seen in terms of an emergency staffing policy. Once the period of emergency is over, when all top positions in the public service are filled by Africans and there is a flow of suitable candidates to meet the requirements of the public service, the whole operation becomes one of staff development.⁴⁰ In this way Africanisation was an emergency response to staffing shortages in the public service which involves progressive staff development.

Normal bureaucratic institutions for staff development were, however, not adequate in Sierra Leone to give emphasis and impetus to the Africanisation programme, because they were geared to the requirements of a normal stable situation. It required the adoption of extra-ordinary measures for the mobilization of the manpower resources available for the public service and the development of these resources so that they could provide efficiency of operation whilst getting the maximum number of Africans into posts to replace the colonial expatriates. It meant a complete review of the structure of staff in departments, and the qualifications required for the grades of posts within the reformed structure so that they could be related to those essential for the provision of adequate services and standards (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4 above), and not necessarily those suited

both to the purposes of the former colonial power and to its special labour market. New instructions, shaped to fit the requirements of an emergency situation, were therefore necessary. Their force and scope would naturally vary, according to the situation in each department.

The first essential step in each situation was to formulate an operational policy, that is, to translate Africanisation policy of the government into a plan of operations. If an adequately staffed office responsible for Africanisation was available, it could itself prepare this operational plan. In Sierra Leone, like other African countries, it had been found necessary to appoint ad hoc commissions on Africanisation which had been charged with the responsibility for formulating policy to be followed in preparing a blueprint for action and for establishing, to the extent that a forecast of availability of manpower and qualities could be made, a time-table for implementing the Africanisation plan.⁴¹ In very few cases, however, had it been possible to prepare a comprehensive time-table, the manpower availability was too uncertain, and there were a number of other imponderable factors too which made it impracticable to prepare a reliable step-by-step plan. The most that it had been possible to achieve, therefore, was the establishment of working machinery for preparing and executing programmes of action on the basis of what could be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty.

For this purpose, some governments had preferred setting up standing Africanisation commissions with executive responsibility for action in the field of Africanisation. Such bodies would review the situation in each department of government and determine the training programme necessary for accelerating the pace of Africanisation in the departments. It would also review the claims of all Africans in the department for advancement to more responsible positions and decide when and at what pace notices should be given to non-nationals to make room for nationals. The standing commissions were and are at present normally headed by non-officials or even politicians and therefore their actions were likely to be influenced by the day to day political situation and pressures.

If a commission of this nature had the staff which could and would carry out a proper investigation into the situation in each department and which would present facts upon which a realistic programme of Africanisation could be formulated, then it would work. But the Africanisation situation in all new countries was such that the right calibre of staff very often did not exist. In any case, it was politically expedient in African countries to show quick results and the temptation to take short cuts in the acceleration of Africanisation was very great and was not often resisted. But the main objection to a standing commission in Sierra Leone was that it interfered with the functions of the Public Service Commission (P.S.C.).⁴² The

Public Service Commission was given advisory responsibilities over all appointments and promotions.⁴³

In carrying out its responsibilities, it adopted a judicial and impartial approach to the consideration of the claims of all candidates within the framework of the policies, especially the Africanisation policy laid down by the government.⁴⁴ If, then, another commission had already determined who should fill a particular post, either the Public Service Commission became a mere rubber stamp or else situations of conflict arose between the two commissions. Such conflicts would not be in the interest of the public service as a whole and could not be conducive to the efficiency of the public service.

For that reason it was thought better to set up official machinery which was capable of action consistent with government policy whilst at the same time working in close co-operation with the public service commission without interfering in its statutory functions. In Sierra Leone the Office of Secretary for Recruitment and Training was established as an arm of the Colonial Secretary's Office (now the Establishment Secretary's Office).⁴⁵ The Office of Recruitment and Training had overall responsibility for Africanisation and was intended to fulfill this responsibility by controlling the pattern of appointments together with staff development through training programmes. This long term objective was to improve the general supply of skilled public servants so that Africanisation would not

require special machinery to assure an efficient and effective public service.

2.5 Procedures and Progress of Africanisation.

Whatever the machinery set up to give impetus to Africanisation, there were certain methods of operation necessary to meet each local situation. Some of these will be discussed below. A programme of Africanisation implied preferences for African citizens over all others who might be equally or better qualified. Where the policy was one of localisation, the programme would give preference to all citizens over non-citizens in the service. If then, to discuss only Africanisation in this context - an African citizen has adequate experience and qualifications to do a job, even though there are others better qualified or with greater experience, the policy laid down should be such as to give preference to the African.⁴⁶

The first obvious method for promoting Africanisation was to ensure that Africans were recruited or promoted to fill posts as they occurred. In the initial stage, there might not be sufficient numbers of qualified or otherwise suitable candidates even for this limited method of approach. For example, the first progress report of the Public Service Commission on Africanisation showed that:

	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>
Posts provided in estimates	646	695
Posts held by expatriates	407	411
Posts held by Africans	159	184
Posts vacant	80	100

These figures have already been given in greater detail in the last chapter, Table 1.4 above. The Public Service Commission noted that it was not possible to fill every vacancy in a staff of this size on the day it occurred and some vacancies were purely temporary. In a great many other cases, however, it was found impossible to recruit men, whether Africans or expatriates, for posts for which a professional qualification was a basic necessity. This was particularly a problem with doctors and engineers (Grade A posts, see Table 1.3).

But as the process of manpower development (discussed in Chapter 5) gathered momentum, it was found that this approach was too slow and would certainly not match the accelerated programme laid down by the government. Another drawback to this approach was that Africans would normally enter the Civil Service at the bottom of the particular grades of posts (see Table 1.3) and would be unable to rise to the top within a reasonable period of time because of lack of vacancies. It was an approach, therefore, which was unlikely to prove acceptable beyond the first short period of the Africanisation programme. If, however, as happened, the rate of departure of expatriate officers on compensation was fast, then this approach might

be forced on the system since there would be far more vacancies than there were local available candidates to fill them.⁴⁷ In such circumstances expatriate recruitment had to be continued if efficiency was to be maintained.

At some stage in the progress of Africanisation, however, there would be a need for a more drastic approach and one such method was to adopt a policy of displacing non-nationals to make room for suitably qualified Africans. In Sierra Leone (notwithstanding the then Prime Minister's stand on the Africanisation) the government introduced a scheme of limited retirement benefits for non-Sierra Leonean African pensionable officers, so that whenever Sierra Leonean Africans were available to fill posts occupied by non-Sierra Leonean Africans the latter could be retired with limited compensation. This compensation had taken the form of increased pension terms, as if the post had been abolished, with the right to commute a part of the pension for lump sum: based on actuarially calculated higher commutation factors. The terms of agreement for payments of compensation to pensionable expatriate officers of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Servants, designated by the British Government on the taking over of the Civil Service by the territorial government, contained usually a provision for compulsory retirement of any designated officers if this was found necessary to provide vacancies for qualified Africans.⁴⁸ If, of course, the officers to be displaced were on contract terms, then the

usual notice clause could be invoked. This scheme of compulsory retirement of non-Africans in the interest of Africanisation could cause hardship to the retiring officers and at the same time lowered the morale of expatriate serving officers. But in situations such as existed in East Africa, with a large block of Asians staff intervening between Africans and the senior posts, it was inevitable that this scheme had to be applied extensively for a few years.⁴⁹

Another technique used was one of skill dilution. For instance, when expatriate recruitment to the Administrative Service ceased in 1959, there were not enough graduates available to fill all the vacancies. A number of the posts of Assistant District Commissioners in the field and Assistant Secretaries in the Secretariat were down-graded to those of senior Executive Officers. These were then filled by the promotion of senior clerical staff with ability and experience. They took over the routine, although still responsible, jobs formerly performed by administrative officers, leaving policy decisions and the higher responsibilities to the reduced number of administrative officers. In some other cases, it was possible also to split jobs so that they could be filled by Africans. For example, where previously a works superintendent was required to supervise staff for a whole building operation, it might be possible to split the job so that Africans with

experience in either masonry or carpentry could be appointed foremen instead to supervise either section.

Another method that had been applied was promotion on trial. In considering a candidate's suitability for promotion, it was considered necessary in the then circumstances to pay less attention to educational certificates, diplomas or degrees, and more attention to the candidate's experience since leaving school, his general intelligence level, and his capacity to learn. The practice of measuring qualifications by reference to educational certificates was administratively a very convenient formula which the colonial administration used to exclude Africans from the administrative service. This practice might have been acceptable in situations in which there was a ready and abundant supply of suitable candidates, but not in Sierra Leone where the annual output of graduates from its University College was not exceeding eight. Even these eight were denied employment in the administrative service on the grounds that they did not hold honours degrees.⁵⁰

Another method of accelerating the progress of Africanisation was the creation of posts in special 'Trainee' grades. Candidates were appointed or promoted and then given training, either institutional or by direct experience on the job, to qualify them for advancement to higher posts. This scheme was very widely used especially in the executive and technical classes of posts.⁵¹ For instance, there are posts of Trainee Accountant, Trainee Inspector of

Income Tax, Trainee Tax Officer, Trainee Statisticians, etc. This scheme was essentially, however, short-term until the staff and salary structure of the service were such as to ensure a flow of ability from the lower grades upwards without the necessity for the creation of special incentive training grade posts. For instance, if the accounting service provided a structure which enables an officer to join from secondary school as, say, junior Accounting Assistant, and to progress by stages to the grade of Accountant, there would be no need to select younger persons from school and put them straight into Trainee Accountant posts.

In some of the African states, particularly in East and Central Africa, Africanisation at the top was impracticable unless there was some dilution of the standards of experience normally expected. . . . Before independence in Sierra Leone, an officer could not expect to attain the status of Permanent Secretary or head of a department until he had experience over many years, perhaps as much as twenty years.⁵² Obviously, twenty years would be too long to wait,⁵³ but the process had been shortened to as little as ten years or less, in Sierra Leone.⁵⁴ At present in Sierra Leone between 70-80 per cent of the senior posts in the administrative service are held by officers below the age of 40.⁵⁵ Ninety per cent of them entered the civil service in the mid-1960s and the 1970s.⁵⁶ It can be thought that these officers may block the

promotion of juniors for a considerable period.

This is particularly so when the retiring age of public service officers had been raised from 45 to 55 years; and the age difference between these officers and their juniors who would likely succeed them, in most cases, is less than 10.⁵⁷ However, the comforting recourse for the junior officer in Sierra Leone is, at the moment, that promotion in the public service is not based on the traditional bureaucratic criterion of seniority but on merit.⁵⁸

However, in the early stage of Africanisation promotion by dilution of experience and standards involved some elements of risk which would be acceptable if there was a strong supporting staff, but this was not often the case. In such circumstances it was thought necessary to retain the services of some experienced expatriates as advisors to their successors. In some cases, the government considered it necessary to seek, under technical aid from the United Kingdom, consultant staff with the necessary experience to do development thinking and to carry out examination of the facts bearing on issues requiring policy decisions, thus providing the African staff with the materials on which to take or recommend wise decisions. This they were fully capable of doing. Consultant staff were sought to reinforce experience in Civil Service Administration recruitment and training, Treasury control and, in some other departments and ministries requiring technical expertise.

The interesting thing to note about this method of accelerating Africanisation is that whichever way it was done, retaining the services of a retired expatriate as an adviser or seeking the services of an expatriate through technical aid, would only change the nature of his job from a colonial civil servant to an adviser, perhaps with better pay. This might lead to resentment of the expatriate adviser, particularly the retired civil servant cum adviser, from his successor; having their predecessors in office breathing down their necks. It was considered better to delay the promotion of the Africans until they were able to take over full responsibilities of their work.⁵⁸

It was comparatively easy to make rapid progress in Africanisation of posts which were in the administrative, executive and non-technical categories. In technical, professional and scientific departments, however, the standards laid down were usually international and there was no shortcut in the training process to qualify Africans to fill them. This was generally recognized by the government and even by the general public. They knew that doctors, engineers, research officers and technical officers of all kinds should be qualified up to certain recognized standards, and they accepted with reasonable patience the prospect of having to wait a long time to produce Africans with these qualifications. Public sentiment, however, expected that Africans should, as early as practicable, be in charge of departments employing these types of professional personnel.

Here was a situation in which selective Africanisation was feasible. Africans with the basic qualifications, and after an approved minimum period of experience, could be considered for accelerated advancement to top policy and directing posts. In any case, the posts in these categories were the last to be Africanised.

2.6 The Progress and Rate of Africanisation.

In order to determine the rate at which the process of Africanisation had been progressing over the years under review, it is necessary to design criteria for measuring the rate at which Africans were being employed in the public service. Two criteria can be distinguished. One is what may be called a 'general employment index'. This is simply a ratio of the number of Africans employed in the public service (N_A) to the number of expatriates employed (N_E). That is, the African Participation Index or the Replacement Ratio - $API = N_A/N_E$.⁵⁹ The other index is a modified version of this 'general employment index'. In Sierra Leone, like many other African countries, the preoccupation was only in top-level employment, therefore instead of a 'general employment index', a top-level or high-level employment index may be used. Thus, if N_{AH} and N_{EH} represent Africans and Expatriates employees respectively in high-level employment in the Civil Service, then the $API = N_{AH}/N_{EH}$. In this respect, it is assumed that all expatriates employed in the public service were in top or high-level

posts, defined as those posts carrying salaries in super-scales; in Scales M, A, B, and LT.⁶⁰ They are in fact the most responsible, important and most highly paid in the service, and they provide the acid test of progress towards real Africanisation.

Between 1953 and 1959, the number of Africans in the senior service of Sierra Leone increased from 166 to 381, but the number of expatriate personnel did not decrease correspondingly. On the contrary, there was an increase if officers on contract as well as those who were pensionable are included. Table 2.1 below illustrates the point.

TABLE 2.1	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Pensionable Expatriates	316	316	293	293	298	296	297	241
Expatriate Contracts	91	95	114	117	126	142	179	195
Sub-Total	407	411	407	410	424	438	476	436
African Officers	166	184	211	245	267	332	381	652
Grand Total	573	595	618	655	691	770	857	1088
Percentage of Afro/Ex.	30.0	31.0	34.1	37.4	38.6	43.0	44.0	59.9
Replacement Ratio (API)	0.40	0.44	0.51	0.60	0.63	0.76	0.80	1.5
Sources:	Computed from Graph 'A' of Government Statement on Africanisation, Sessional Paper No. 4, 1959, G.P. Freetown 17; vacancies and teachers not included.							

Table 2.1 above denotes the overall progress of Africanisation of the public service from 1953 to 1959, two years to Sierra Leone independence. At the aggregate level, the progress had been impressive. The African share of the

pensionable senior posts in the public service had increased from 27 per cent, with a replacement ratio of 0.38 in 1953, to 44.5 per cent, with a replacement ratio of 0.80 in 1959.⁶¹ This was commendable not only in the sense that there was a remarkable increase in the number of Africans in the senior posts,⁶² but also that the educational institutions and the government training programmes had started to pay off.

However, the figures as they stand do not tell what layers of the public service had been fully or partly Africanised. There is even more to it when the official definition of what constitutes a senior service post was so vague (see note 62, p. 188). The Public Service Commission stated that the acid test of rapid Africanisation was the number of administrative and professional posts that have been effectively Africanised. Accordingly to reveal the position in this respect the figures in Table 2.1 need to be disaggregated on a departmental basis.

Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below show the breakdown department by department of the number of officers actually serving in senior posts between 1954 and 1959 in the following categories: expatriate pensionable officers, expatriate contract officers, and the pensionable senior African officers, and the number of vacancies, because under normal situations the Africanisation "law of replacement" requires that for any colonial expatriate laid off from the civil service, there must be an African ready to take his place; table 2.3 shows the percentage changes in each

TABLE 2.2 DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPATRIATES - 5 YEARS.

1954

1959

Department	Total	Exp.	Afr.	Vac.	Total	P. Exp.	U. Exp.	Afr.	Vac.
Administrative Service	76	59	10	7	95	47	14	23	11
Accountant	6	2	4	-	11	1	-	10	-
Agriculture Department	45	33	4	8	81	27	29	11	14
Audit Department	7	5	1	1	11	6	-	3	2
Co-operatives	4	4	-	-	12	4	2	4	2
Customs and Excise	6	2	4	-	10	1	-	9	-
Civil Aviation	7	4	2	1	9	-	5	3	1
Trade and Industry	13	4	6	3	12	3	1	7	1
Education	63	31	18	12	86	31	8	36	11
Electricity	20	13	4	3	32	6	8	10	8
Forestry	21	19	1	1	24	14	4	3	3
Geological Survey	11	8	-	3	17	7	6	1	3
Income Tax	7	2	4	1	9	1	-	8	-
Judicial	13	4	9	-	22	4	-	12	6
Labour Department	7	2	4	1	9	1	-	8	-
Law Officers	6	2	3	1	11	2	-	6	3
Meteorological	2	2	-	-	3	-	2	1	-
Mines Department	1	1	-	-	17	4	7	1	5
Medical	99	33	51	15	173	27	9	87	50
Police	30	20	6	4	72	32	3	20	17
Port and Marine	11	9	1	1	16	4	8	1	3
Post and Telcom	18	6	9	3	29	5	1	18	5
Printing	3	1	1	1	4	-	-	4	-
Prisons	6	1	4	1	9	2	1	4	2
Public Relations	3	1	2	1	7	1	1	4	1
Public Works	116	76	14	26	127	22	35	39	31
Railways Department	67	47	18	2	87	29	29	26	3
Road Transport	10	8	-	2	20	7	2	10	1
Social Welfare	2	1	1	-	6	1	-	4	1
Surveys and Land	10	5	3	2	16	5	1	5	5
Veterinary Department	4	4	-	-	6	3	-	2	1
TOTALS	695	411	184	100	1,045	297	179	381	192

Sources: Computed from Staff lists - 1954, 1959; prepared by the Establishment Secretary's Office, Freetown, Sierra Leone. Department breakdown for 1960 not available.

group's share of the posts in the same period. The reason is, there might be an overall increase of expatriate employment in one department from 1954 to 1959, but their per centage share of the posts in that department has fallen.

Table 2.2 shows how uneven as between departments Africanisation had been. In the administrative service, which represented the real target of the nationalist pressures for Africanisation, not much had been done. Although there was an increase in the number of Africans in this sector of the public service, from 10 in 1954 to 23 in 1959, an increase of 13, there was also a small increase in the number of expatriates employed in this layer of the public service from 59 in 1954 to 61 in 1959; the number of vacancies had also increased from 7 to 11. Also, in this sector, the number of expatriate pensionable officers fell from 59 to 47, but this fall was off-set by the new element of expatriate employment on contract terms with the Sierra Leone government; they numbered 14, again giving an overall expatriate majority in the administrative service.

In per centage terms (Table 2.3), the African share of the administrative posts had risen from 13.6 per cent in 1954 to 24.2 per cent in 1959, while that of the expatriate declined from 77.6 per cent to 64.2 in the same period. The annual rate of Africanisation is expressed as a percentage change in the number of Africans holding senior posts in the administrative and other public service departments,

divided by the number of years. In the case of the administrative service, $(24.2-13.16) \div 5$, to give a 2.2 per cent annual increase; compared to the annual rate of expatriation of $(64.2-77.6) \div 5 = -2.65$ showed a negative increase. In both cases, the only difficulty for the Sierra Leone government was that there were more experienced expatriates leaving the administrative service than there were Sierra Leoneans to replace them.

In the Department of Agriculture and its allied fields, the progress of Africanisation was very slow. The reason might be that it took a longer time to train an agriculturist than an administrative officer and also that, as the government itself acknowledged the situation: "It is not every youth with a sound secondary education who is willing to train for outdoor jobs if he can get an indoor one."⁶³ This situation was reflected in the department of agriculture's Africanisation record. Between 1954 and 1959, the number of senior posts provided in the estimate increased from 45 to 81, an increase of 36. Of these, only 67 were filled, and 14 left vacant. The expatriates' share of the filled posts had increased from 33 in 1954 to 56 in 1959 and that of the Africans also showed an increase from 4 in 1954 to 11 in 1959. But the increase in the Africans holding senior posts might not be the result of replacement of expatriates whose number showed a corresponding increase, but filling the new posts provided in the estimates. Here, not unlike the administrative service in absolute terms, the per centage

TABLE 2.3 PER CENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF EXPATRIATE EMPLOYMENT BY DEPARTMENT

Departments	1954			1959		
	EXP.	AF	VAC	EXP.	AF	VAC
Administrative Service	100	13.16	9.0	100	24.2	11.56
Accountant General	"	66.66	-	"	91.0	-
Agricultural Dept.	"	77.7	17.77	"	13.6	17.3
Audit Department	"	71.4	14.28	"	27.27	18.18
Co-operatives Dept.	"	100.0	-	"	33.3	16.60
Customs and Excise	"	100.0	-	"	90.0	-
Civil Aviation	"	57.0	14.28	"	33.3	11.11
Trade & Industry	"	30.76	23.0	"	58.3	8.33
Education Department	"	49.2	19.0	"	41.8	12.78
Electricity Dept.	"	65.0	15.0	"	31.25	25.0
Forestry Department	"	90.47	4.76	"	12.5	12.5
Geological Surveys	"	72.7	27.27	"	5.8	17.6
Income Tax Dept.	"	42.85	14.28	"	62.5	12.5
Judicial Dept.	"	30.76	-	"	54.5	27.27
Labour Department	"	28.5	14.28	"	88.88	-
Law Officers Dept.	"	33.3	16.66	"	60.0	30.0
Law Officers Dept.	"	100.0	-	"	33.3	-
Meteorological Dept.	"	100.0	-	"	5.88	28.1
Mines Department	"	33.33	15.15	"	50.28	28.9
Medical Department	"	66.66	13.30	"	27.77	23.6
Police Department	"	81.8	9.1	"	6.25	18.75
Port & Marine Dept.	"	33.33	33.33	"	100.0	-
Printing Department	"	66.66	16.66	"	44.44	22.22
Prisons Department	"	66.66	33.32	"	57.1	14.28
Public Relations	"	65.5	22.4	"	30.7	24.4
Public Works Dept.	"	70.1	2.98	"	29.88	3.4
Railways Dept.	"	80.0	20.0	"	50.0	5.0
Road Transport	"	50.0	-	"	66.66	16.66
Social Welfare	"	50.0	20.0	"	31.25	31.25
Lands and Survey	"	100.0	-	"	30.0	20.0
Veterinary Dept.	"	59.1	14.4	"	36.1	18.4
TOTALS	100	26.17	14.4	100	45.6	18.4

Sources: The same as Table 2.2. API not used owing to the size of the figures.

of expatriates holding senior posts in agriculture had decreased from 94 per cent in 1954 to 83 per cent in 1959, while that of the Africans was increased from 10 per cent in 1954 to 16 per cent in 1959; an increase of 6 per cent. The increase here is more remarkable as compared to the administrative service. The annual rate of Africanisation in this sector was 1.2 per cent, while the rate at which the expatriates were being employed in the department had declined by -2.2 per cent per annum. In fact, without the new policy of contract employment which stood at 29 in the department, the number of expatriates should have been 27, leaving the number of unfilled posts at 43.

With the exception of the law, medicine and accountancy departments where Africanisation had made rapid strides, the situation of slow progress of Africanisation in the Department of Agriculture and the administrative service seemed to persist right across the spectrum of the public service. The employment of expatriates continued side by side with the growing number of unfilled posts. Between 1954 and 1959 the number of expatriates employed in the public service had increased from 411 in 1954 to 476 in 1959. Similarly, the number of vacant posts had also increased from 100 in 1954 to 182 in 1959. Another phenomenon, perhaps of temporary nature, was the growing number of expatriates employed on contract terms. Their share of the public service senior posts had increased from 95 in 1954 to 179 in 1959 (Table 2.1).

Two possible reasons might be given. First, the demand for rapid Africanisation had not been matched by rapid manpower development which is an integral part of Africanisation. This is reflected in the manpower output from the education institutions (see Table 2.4 below). The annual reports of the Public Service Commission for the period 1953-1958 revealed the following manpower situation in the country.

TABLE 2.4 THE MANPOWER OUTPUT FROM THE EDUCATION SYSTEM.

A. Higher School Certificates (A-level equivalent)

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. Sat</u>	<u>No. Passed</u>	<u>% Passes Total</u>
1953	18	13	72
1954	24	9	37
1955	2	2	100
1956	12	6	50
1957	26	11	42
1958	<u>37</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>48</u>
TOTALS	119	56	58

B. School Certificates.

1953	177	84	47
1954	210	108	51
1955	217	119	54.8
1956	196	109	55.8
1957	281	152	54.8
1958	<u>380</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>39.2</u>
TOTALS	1.461	721	50.36

C. (Degrees) Graduates.

<u>Year</u>	<u>B.A. General</u>	<u>B.Sc. Education</u>	<u>Total</u>
1953	4	-	4
1954	4	2	6
1955	4	1	5
1956	1	2	3
1957	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>
TOTALS	18	8	26

Source: P.S.C. Annual Reports.

The reports went further to say that even if all the school certificate holders were to go into the employment market immediately, ". . . the present number would fall far below the demands of the public service and of other private sector employers,"⁶⁴ the report concluded. But in fact the majority of them went to some kind of higher education on government sponsorship as part of its Africanisation programme.

The second reason is a by-product of the first. It was the instructions of the Public Service Commission to all heads of government departments and permanent secretaries. It requested among other things that in making recommendations for first appointments to the public service, it shall be guided by the principle that no consideration should be given to non-Sierra Leonean candidates unless and until it had reviewed the claims of Sierra Leoneans candidates, and be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that no qualified and suitable Sierra Leonean was available. And that where no such candidate was available, the principle should be that the post should if possible be filled by an expatriate for a limited period of contract. And where it appeared that this principle could not be put into practice, the Commission should after consultation with the Permanent Secretary to the ministry concerned, through the Establishment Secretary, should recommend whether the post be filled by an expatriate on pensionable terms or having regards to training schemes, be held in abeyance.⁶⁵

This latter policy of holding posts in abeyance was largely responsible for the growing number of unfilled posts. The implication of such policy that the existence of unfilled posts in a department or ministry might cause frustration to serving officers who considered themselves to be eligible for promotion but yet could not be considered.⁶⁶

In summary, if the pace of Africanisation during the last years of colonial rule is to be judged from Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 above, and what the Public Service Commission considered to be the acid test, i.e. the degree to which the administrative and professional posts had been Africanised, one can state categorically that the progress of Africanisation in Sierra Leone had not kept pace with the constitutional development of the country (Chapter 1.2). On the other hand, it can be equally argued that the number of pensionable expatriate officers had declined from 316 to 241 within a six year period (Table 2.1), and that the 195 expatriate officers on contract employment were those the country needed for its economic development projects which the country could not possibly do without in the short-term. The only doubt about these expatriates on contract employment was that they often renewed their contract periods making it difficult to draw the line between pensionable and non-pensionable expatriate officers. Moreover, contract recruitment was not only self-defeating, but also very costly and can give rise to trouble if the salary rates offered were pushed too far beyond those

offered for permanent engagement. For example, Sierra Leone was offering an enhancement of 25 per cent on basic salary for contract appointment, to the professional engineer grades, together with a gratuity of £37-10-0d for every three months' service.⁶⁷

Nonetheless it is important to note that the progress of Africanisation depends on the availability of qualified and experienced manpower which was not available to fill all existing vacancies in the public service (see Table 2.4). However, the policy of cautious Africanisation continued to be pursued until the country became independent on April 27, 1961.

2.7 Post Independence Period.

Ken Post⁶⁸ has compared the level of expatriate employment in Sierra Leone at independence with those of Ghana and Nigeria. He suggests that the number of pensionable expatriate officers in former British territories was:

TABLE 2.5 NUMBER OF EXPATRIATES EMPLOYED 1961-1962.

<u>Territory</u>	<u>At Independence</u>		<u>In Mid-1962</u>
Nigeria:			
Federal Government	870	(1960)	555
North	900		640
Eastern Region	105		90
Western Region	135		110
Sub-Total	<u>2,010</u>		<u>1,395</u>
Ghana	580	(1957)	30
Sierra Leone	250	(1961)	115
Grand Total	<u>2,840</u>		<u>1,540</u>

Source: Ken Post: The New States of West Africa, p. 137, Table VI.

For Sierra Leone: P.S.C. Report, 1961, pp. 5-6.

What Mr. Post did not include in his figures was the level of expatriates on contract employment, which stood at 170, and which seemed to replace the employment policies of the old colonial order. For Sierra Leone, the 250 expatriate pensionable officers at independence did not represent a marked fall from the 1959 pre-independence figures of 297 (Table 2.2). It meant that between 1959 and 1961, only 47 expatriate posts in the pensionable grades had been Africanised or rendered vacant. However, the year immediately after independence saw the most dramatic progress in Africanisation. Nearly 54 per cent of all pensionable posts held by expatriates were either Africanised or rendered vacant by pre-mature retirement (see Table 2.5) or otherwise. In retrospect, the main reason was due to premature retirement induced by the pre-independence redundancy agreement (Chapter 1.6), transfer to other dependent territories or for attitudinal reasons. For example, some of the expatriate officers found it very hard to receive orders from or work under an African head of a department. Others would have liked to stay but the euphoric slogans of independence - "Africa for the Africans", and the attitudes of some Africans towards the colonial expatriates made this impossible.

A case in point was that of an expatriate teacher. This man was one of the best and most capable teachers which the school had ever had. He was teaching English language up to Form V, English literature up to Form VI, French and Latin up to Form VI as well, until 1961. A 3rd Class graduate of

Fourah Bay College was recruited to the academic staff of the school where he had in fact been a pupil. He was asked to teach English language and literature in the junior forms. He felt slighted in favour of "the Whiteman". He started inciting the boys against the man on the use of text-books the man recommended. His behaviour towards the expatriate became insulting, and at the end of the year the expatriate found it intolerable. He was transferred to Aden, another British dependent territory. Another example of a political nature was the case of John Hatch (now Lord Hatch). He was the Head of the Extra-Mural Department at Fourah Bay College. In 1962 he was deported from Sierra Leone for publishing an article about women's circumcision in Sierra Leone, in a British weekly, "The New Statesman".

However, the post-independent development programmes seemed to put a brake on the country's drive towards the goal of full Africanisation. The demand for both high and intermediate skilled manpower had increased. This increased demand for manpower with technical qualifications could only be met by the employment of non-Sierra Leonean nationals. In 1964, three years after independence, Sierra Leone had employed 586 expatriates in its public sector. This was revealed by the manpower survey conducted by Robert Brown⁶⁹ for the Sierra Leone government. The report classified the level of expatriates employed under the following occupational divisions:

TABLE 2.6 High and intermediate level manpower employed in the public sector of Sierra Leone, 1964, classified by O.C.E.E. 70

Group	Occupation	Expat.	Afr.
0	Professional, technical and related workers.	504	5,579
1	Administrative, executive and managerial	50	639
2	Clerical workers	16	1,631
3	Sales workers	-	-
4	Farmers and farm managers	-	-
5	Miners and quarrymen	-	-
6	Transport workers & commercial op.	16	225
7	Service, sports & section workers	-	23
	TOTAL	586	8,097

Source: Report to the government of Sierra Leone on the manpower situation 1964, Table 1. Includes all categories of teachers.

There are a few things which need to be noted about the above table (2.6). Between 1962 and 1964, the number of expatriates employed by the Sierra Leone government had more than trebled. It increased from 115 in 1962 to 586 in 1964, an increase of 471 in two years. The main increase occurred in the professional, technical and related workers, accounting for 504 out of 586. This reflects the growing demand for both professional and technical manpower generated by the post-independent expansion in economic and social activities. In the administrative, executive and managerial grades, the share of expatriates of these posts had considerably reduced as contrasted with those in the professional grades. There were two feasible explanations why Africanisation had proceeded faster in the administrative service, clerical,

and to a lesser extent managerial levels than the professional and technical. An obvious reason is that where there is a shortage of skilled manpower that shortage will be more severe in areas where a degree of specialization and additional years of formal education are required than where a more general training is needed. Since administrative positions require less specialization than technical positions, it appears more justifiable to place someone without special skills or training in an administrative job than a technical one.

The desire to secure African control over the newly independent government provides another rationale for rapidly Africanizing the administrative service. Given the acceptance of the colonial model in which generalist administrators are to direct and co-ordinate the activities of technical specialists and in which the administrator is the basic point of contact between government and the people, it was politically necessary after independence to Africanize the administrative service. The most visible positions in the public service are permanent secretaries, provincial and district commissioners.⁷¹

In relative terms, the number of expatriates in the public service as compared to their African counterparts was small: even at the professional and technical category, 504 against 5,579 Africans. That represents an Africanisation index or a replacement ratio of 11.069 (compare this to those in Table 2.1 above). In the managerial, adminis-

trative and executive categories, the index is 12.78. In both cases, Africanisation in terms of numbers ceased to be a problem. But if it is possible to break down these figures into high- and middle-level categories in each occupational grouping, one would realize that even though the expatriates are in the minority numerically, they occupied the majority of the high-level positions while the Africans occupied the intermediate positions.

However, what the Brown Report failed to reveal is the composition of expatriates, eg. the number on pensionable grades and those on contract terms. According to Ken Post, at independence there were 250 pensionable overseas officers in the Sierra Leone Public Service, some 12 months later, this number was reduced to 115 (see Table 2.5). By 1964 the picture had further changed and of the 504 expatriates employed in the public service as professional, technical and related workers, only 46 were on pensionable grades and 458 were on contract terms. Of the 50 employed in the administrative, executive and managerial grades, 15 of them were still in the pensionable establishment and the rest (35) on contract terms. Thus in 1964, three years after independence, there were 491 expatriate civil servants employed on contract terms and 61 expatriate officers on the pensionable establishment.

1964 may be regarded as the watershed of the Africanisation policy. It marked the end of Sir Milton Margai's cautious approach to the problem. He died in April, 1964

and he was succeeded as Prime Minister by a more dynamic man known to be committed to the Africanisation of the public service.⁷² Within two years of his appointment as Prime Minister, Sir Albert Margai intensified the Africanisation programmes. A new university - the Njala University College - was opened, the number of faculties at Fourah Bay College were increased, more government scholarships for overseas training were awarded, etc.⁷³ In 1970, the government appointed a Commission of Inquiry on the Civil Service of Sierra Leone. The chairman, Hugh Clarke, was a retired Permanent Secretary. In its findings on the employment of expatriates in the public service it revealed that out of a total of 12,262 civil servants, there were now only 73 non-Sierra Leoneans employed on contract in the following departments/ministries.⁷⁴

From Table 2.7 it can be seen that expatriates were mostly employed in selective areas of the Civil Service such as the legal, engineering, technical, medical, agricultural, mines, geological, audit and the Civil Aviation Department. (Compare this list to Table 2.2 above.) Not all these expatriates were employed at a policy-making level. Nevertheless, they were all employed in the important areas of development and provided the expertise, professionalism and experience so sadly lacking in the country.

TABLE 2.7 NUMBER OF EXPATRIATES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE
AS AT 1970.

<u>Department/Ministry</u>	<u>No. of Expatriates</u>
Judiciary	5
Administration	4
Ministry of Works	16
Law Officers	5
Ministry of Health	18
Ministry of Housing	1
Ministry of Agriculture	5
Ministry of Mines	4
Governor-General's Office	1
Ministry of Education	1
Civil Aviation	4
Ministry of Information	3
Railways Department	2
Accountant-General	2
Post and Telecommunications	<u>2</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>73</u>

Source: Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the
Civil Service of Sierra Leone, 1970, Table 33,
pp. 96-98.

Closer analysis of the list shows that there were ten expatriates in the judicial and legal service, eighteen in the dental and medical fields, 22 in the various engineering positions including four in the Civil Aviation, etc. Leaving

aside the judicial personnel, all these revealed gaps in the armoury of expertise in the public service, and it should rationally be government policy to fill in these gaps as part of the Africanisation. But in the absence of a more scientific and technological manpower policy, these figures reflected the dimension of immediate need in the public service which should have been given the highest priority. In this respect, if the aim of Africanisation was to produce competent and efficient local replacements for expatriates rather than replacing them by contract employment, as it has been the practice in the years immediately after independence, then the government must increase its efforts on its manpower programme.

The post-independent expansion in the public sector which necessitated the employment of foreign skilled manpower ended with the 1960s.⁷⁵ The 1970s saw the decline in the public sector activities. The closure of the railways which used to be one of the biggest employers of foreign skills, the government building and construction programme has been removed from the Ministry of Works and given to foreign contractors mainly to the funding countries; for example, the contract for the extension of Queen Elizabeth II Quay, with a loan from France, was given to a French construction company; the government road construction programme was largely financed by the Federal Government of West Germany, etc. In addition, some government departments which used to be major employers of expatriates were made into

corporations - the Electricity, Ports and Marine, Road Transport, Forest Industries Departments became corporations respectively.⁷⁶ With the exception of the Ministry of Education which continues to employ a large number of non-nationals, the net effect of these was a tremendous fall in the number of expatriates employed in the civil service.

In 1978 there were 29 British nationals in the civil service of Sierra Leone under the British Expatriates Supplementation Scheme (BESS) employed in the following fields: 17 in the Ministry of Education as teachers in secondary schools and the University of Sierra Leone, 3 in the Electricity Corporation as engineers and technicians, 4 in the Ministry of Works, etc.

Besides, the Planning Unit of the Ministry of Education indicated that there were in the Sierra Leone teaching service 485 non-Sierra Leonean teachers at the end of 1977/78 school year, distributed as follows:

TABLE 2.8 NUMBER OF NON-SIERRA LEONEAN TEACHERS IN THE 1977/78 SCHOOL YEAR.

<u>Institution</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. Secondary school:			
Volunteers	67	49	116
Contract	<u>199</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>289</u>
Sub-Total	266	139	405
2. Higher Education:			
Fourah Bay College	35	5	40
Njala University College	12	5	17
Teachers Colleges	<u>22</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>32</u>
Sub-Total	<u>69</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>89</u>
Grand Total	<u>335</u>	<u>159</u>	<u>485</u>

Source: Collected from the Planning Division of the Ministry of Education, Freetown, 1978.

These pockets of expatriates employment in various sectors of the public service, either as volunteers, contract employees, or as technical assistants, became a characteristic feature in the new independent African states. It reflects the inadequacy of the education system developed during the colonial period, notwithstanding its expansion and improvement in the early years of independence. With the primary objective of replacing the colonial administrator,⁷⁷ the reliance on foreign skills for certain categories of employment will continue for some time to come, because even if a condition exists where a country is capable of meeting its own manpower requirements, it is highly unlikely that it will attain a 100 per cent indigenisation, except perhaps within the countries of the Iron Curtain. There is always the need for foreign skills which are either not adequately produced or cannot possibly be produced locally to fill in the gaps in the manpower balance sheet.

In addition, in a developing economy like that of Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa, the continuance of a small expatriate element in both the public and the private sectors has other advantages than that of bringing in new techniques and teaching them to national counterparts. Expatriates with the appropriate background can act as the carriers of new ideas in the administration and management of the public service that will permeate the whole organization. Employed on contract of limited duration, they

bring flexibility into staff structure, enabling nationals to be trained overseas or their promotion deferred until their experience is fully rounded. These are important factors in an effective programme of Africanisation and staff development.⁷⁸

Like all other progress in the process of nation-building, Africanisation has had its setbacks in the state enterprises. In recent years in Sierra Leone, and perhaps in other African countries, there has been (regretfully) a policy of de-Africanisation adopted by the government. The Road Transport Corporation, the Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation and the Sierra Leone Port Authority were established in 1964 as quasi-autonomous bodies. In 1971, the Road Transport Corporation became bankrupt owing to reported financial mismanagement by its 100 per cent African management. In the same year, the government dissolved its Board of Directors and dismissed its management. German experts were invited to study the financial viability of the corporation. The government acted on the report of the experts' study, appointed a new Board of Directors, and contracted the management of the corporation to a German management team, which comprised the general manager, works manager, financial controller and traffic manager.

The next candidate in the process of de-Africanisation was the Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation. This was formerly a government department under the Ministry of Works. It became a corporation in 1964 with a 100 per cent

African management. But like the Road Transport Corporation, the management of the corporation became inept and was under constant pressure from its employees, the public and the press. The main allegations were of mismanagement of the corporation's affairs, corruption charges against the general manager and engineer-in-chief, constant power failures, undue delay in paying the work force, etc. The government responded to an appeal by the Electricity Workers Union to dismiss the management of the corporation. In 1972, the government dissolved the Board of Directors, sacked the entire management and again invited a German management team to take over the corporation. The German management team comprised as at 14 November 1978 the following: the general manager, financial controller, chief engineer (generation), chief engineer (distribution), work shop superintendent, and the senior maintenance engineer. This team has been in the country since 1973, it was reported.⁷⁹

The third and most recent case in the government's response to de-Africanisation is that of the Sierra Leone Port Authority. In 1976, the Port's management became the subject of constant attack from the press for reckless financial mismanagement, corruption and fraudulent activities which resulted in the Port's losing port dues, etc. Following these allegations, the government appointed a committee of inquiry into the management of the Port Authority. In its report, the committee recommended, among

other things, the dissolution of the Board of Directors and the dismissal of the whole of the management team. The government accepted these recommendations and appointed a new board of directors, and the management of the ports was contracted to an international management team - Werportman International. At the time of the visit in November 1978, the management of the Ports Authority comprised the following:

<u>Position</u>	<u>Nationality</u>
Chief Executive	Expatriate
General Manager	"
Deputy General Manager	"
Ports Security Manager	"
Mechanical Plant Engineer	"
Chief Accountant	"
Stevedore Manager	"
Harbour Master	"
5 Marine Officers	"
Chief Marine Engineer	"
5 Pilots	"
Civil Engineer	Sierra Leonean
Assistant Civil Engineer	"
Secretary to the Board	"

Source: Prepared by the Personnel Department of the Ports at the request of the writer.

However, it is important to note that Sierra Leone is not unique in this retrograde policy of de-Africanisation of its state enterprises. In Nigeria, two cases of de-Africanisation of state enterprises were reported. In 1978 the Federal Government contracted the management of the Nigerian Railway Corporation to an Indian management team - the "Rail India Technical and Economic Services",⁸⁰ and the management of the Nigerian Airways to the Dutch airline - K.L.M.

The reasons for all these actions in Nigeria are not different from the Sierra Leone experiences cited in the three cases. They are all indicative of some degree of overt failures of Africanisation policy which would influence the progress of Africanisation in the private sector (Part II). The question arises whether these apparent failures in the management of the state enterprises were the result of putting "square pegs in round holes" because of such factors as political patronage, tribal connection or ethnic affinity. The next section will consider this.

2.8 Tribalism and Africanisation.

In terms of numbers, the Africanisation of the public service in Sierra Leone has ceased to be a political issue since 1960 as Table 2.1 shows. The number of expatriates in pensionable employment in the public service constituted 22.7 per cent of the total senior posts. They numbered 241 against 652 Africans in senior service posts. However, in a multi-tribal society like Sierra Leone, the success and progress of Africanisation of the public service cannot be measured only in terms of the proportion of Sierra Leoneans to expatriates but also on the pattern of recruitment from the social and political groups within the country. A fear that pervades African politicians and Sierra Leoneans in particular is that Africanisation policy might develop to a pattern of recruitment, appointment,

promotion and even transfers favouring nationals from certain provinces, districts, chiefdoms or linguistic-ethnic groups and disadvantaging others.⁸¹

The replacement of expatriates with Africans in the public service in the post-colonial period raised the important question about the criteria used in appointing Africans to senior positions in the Civil Service. The answer to this question both affects and is affected by the course of political development. As a political variable, the composition of the Civil Service can reflect the efforts of a culturally or ethnically distinct group to establish and institutionalise its control over all aspects of society. In the absence of sufficient evidence, an index may be provided of egalitarianism in the political process or of the inability of any single group to attain a position of dominance. As an independent variable, the Civil Service can have an impact on the nature of political order in that civil servants perceive and act in the common interest that they have as civil servants. In other words, the authority, status and wealth that civil servants enjoy may form the basis for the formation of an important segment of a politically active socio-economic class.

The dimension of cleavage most critical to an understanding of post-colonial politics in Sierra Leone has been that which divides Sierra Leoneans according to their ethnic-linguistic-regional identity. The possibility that any given ethno-regional group might achieve a position of

dominance and then disadvantage others has been a matter of major concern in post-colonial politics of Sierra Leone. Although no systematic data has been collected on the exact nature of this apprehension among the various ethnic groups, the charges that the Sierra Leone Civil Service has been dominated by the Creoles, the Mendes or the Temnes, depending on which political party is in power, were made. When the Sierra Leone Peoples Party was in power, particularly during Sir Albert Margai's period of ascendancy into power as Prime Minister between 1964 and 1967, it was often charged that he gave all the key Civil Service posts to his tribesmen.⁸² In October, 1965, an article appeared in the opposition newspaper entitled "Tribalism in the Public Service, Who is Encouraging It?". The article argued:

There are 15 tribes in Sierra Leone and their interest must be balanced. But look at the arrangement; the Prime Minister, Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Establishment Secretary, the Secretary for Recruitment and Training, and the Chairman Public Service Commission all belong to one tribe - the Mendes.⁸³

The reactions of other ethnic or tribal groupings to such allegations were obvious. The Creoles, in particular, who by virtue of their educational supremacy over any single ethnic group, considered themselves the de facto successors to the departing colonial expatriates, felt that their position was threatened. The Temnes, the second biggest tribe to the Mendes, felt that the latter were trying to dominate the employment in the public service. This fear was made worse by two things: First, the posting practices of the government whereby the Mende-speaking administrative officers were posted as district officers in the non-Mende tribal district of the Northern Province.⁸⁴ The second was the arrest and detention in February 1967 of the Deputy Force Commander with four other officers (all Temnes) for an allegedly attempted coup to overthrow the government of Sir Albert Margai.⁸⁵ Both the Temnes and the Creoles formed an informal alliance under the political banner of the All Peoples Congress with Siaka Stevens as leader against the Sierra Leone Peoples Party which came to be regarded as a Mende party with Sir Albert Margai as leader.⁸⁶ The following general elections on 17 March 1967 were fought on these lines. The Sierra Leone Peoples Party lost the elections by 28 seats to 32 with six independent elected candidates. However, the Force Commander, a Mende by tribe, intervened and declared a Martial Law. Four days later he himself was removed by another Mende-dominated group of Army officers. Military rule of Sierra Leone

continued for one year, then in April 1968, after a counter-military coup, the All Peoples Congress with Mr. Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister, was restored in power.

The effect of this on the Civil Service employment, particularly the administrative service, was a reversal of order. The Creoles became the beneficiaries of the change in government. All the key posts which were previously held by Mendes passed into the hands of Creoles. The posts of Secretary to the Prime Minister (later President and head of the Civil Service), the Establishment Secretary, the Secretary to the Cabinet, Secretary Recruitment and Training, the Chairman, Public Service Commission, and the Financial Secretary all went to the Creoles,⁸⁷ and nearly all the professional leadership with the exception of the Chief Agricultural Officer, were held by Creoles. The position up to 1973 is shown in Table 2.9 below.

TABLE 2.9 SENIOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICERS.

A. Permanent Secretaries and Equivalent by Province of Origin. (Professional heads.)

<u>Origin</u>	<u>Jan. 1963</u>	<u>Jan. 1968</u>	<u>Sept. 1973</u>
Foreign	7	0	0
Western Area	7	6	16
Northern Province	0	3	1
Eastern Province	1	1	4
Southern Province	0	0	1
TOTAL	15	10	22

The list includes all permanent secretaries, Secretary to the Prime Minister or President, the Establishment Secretary, provincial secretaries, and Secretary to the Cabinet, with

their equivalent under the N.R.C. For the purpose of this study, the figures for the Western Area represent the Creoles only unless otherwise stated, notwithstanding the fact that there are non-Creole residents in the Western Area towns. But most of them being from the provinces, they are classified by their province of origin.

B. Senior Assistant Secretaries and Above by Province of Origin. (Administrative and professional heads.)

<u>Origin</u>	<u>Jan. 1963</u>	<u>Jan. 1968</u>	<u>Sept. 1973</u>
Foreign	9	2	0
Western Area	17	24	37
Northern Province	0	5	4
Eastern Province	1	2	9
Southern Province	1	4	8
TOTAL	28	37	58

This list includes all permanent secretaries, deputy secretaries, senior assistant secretaries and other officials of equivalent ranks.

Source: Taken from "Liberia and Sierra Leone: An Essay In Comparative Politics."⁸⁸

The above table shows the regional distribution of senior civil service posts above the grade of assistant secretary in three respective dates - 1963, 1968 and 1973. It is clear that in 1963, after the colonial expatriates, the Western Area had the highest number of posts in the upper segment of the Civil Service. From a position of parity with the colonial expatriates in 1963 (Table 2.9-A) to a position of leadership in 1968 and 1973 holding 24 out of 37 and 37 out of 58 respectively, of all posts of

permanent secretaries and above. What the table does not tell is the exact nature of tribal and ethnic allocation of the posts. But from both a geographical and administrative distribution of the population of Sierra Leone point of view, it is deemed that the Creoles in terms of job allocations represent the Western Area; the Mendes, Southern and part of the Eastern Provinces; the Temnes, the Northern Province.⁸⁹ In this view the claims that the Mendes were dominating the Civil Service of Sierra Leone is not supported by evidence shown in the table, except perhaps that the table does not show positions in the intervening years between 1963 and 1968. However, from the table, both the Eastern and the Southern Provinces, the home of the Mendes, were under-represented in all categories of civil service posts, each holding 1 out of 28 in 1963, 2 and 4 out of 37 in 1968, and 9 and 8 out of 58 posts in 1973. The Northern Province, the home of the Temnes and the Limbas, etc. seemed to have done well during the military rule in 1968. They held 5 out of 37 posts and relapsed in 1973 holding 4 out of 58 posts when the party of the North was in power. The Northerners, especially the Temnes, felt that the government had let them down. The Mendes exploited these feelings and sought the alliance of the young educated and dissatisfied Temnes against the Creoles' domination of the Civil Service posts. The Creoles were aware of it, but their ability to communicate easily and manipulate situations through their exclusive Freemasonry Lodges, in which they succeeded in

recruiting as members the President and some key members of his cabinet, remained as the dominant group in all public service posts until 1977 when the opportunity for the provincial people to strike came in the 1977 May General Elections.

In Sierra Leone, it seems to be that general elections are always followed by an unforeseen change in the composition of the Civil Service, especially the administrative posts. The most vulnerable posts are those of the Secretary to the President, the Establishment Secretary, Recruitment and Training Secretary and Financial Secretary. The first three went to the Temnes. The Mendes formed the core of provincial administration. The Creoles once again felt threatened in what they considered to be their last stronghold in the country - the Civil Service - by this new spirit of provincialism. In the early 1950s, they lost their political powers to the Protectorate people, in the commercial life of the country they lost their early leadership to the Lebanese, and now the Indians and perhaps the Provincial people. The Creoles are not farmers. Moreover, the land tenure system in Sierra Leone forbids the purchase of land outside the Western Area.⁹⁰ Their only means of livelihood is from paid employment. Their resentment of this provincial threat was reflected in an article written by an anonymous correspondent. Part of the article reads:

No country or government can successfully
implement its plans without an efficient

Civil Service. In Sierra Leone today, tribalism and not efficiency is the sine qua non in the Civil Service. A number of Creole civil servants of proven ability, efficiency and experience have been sent on enforced leave prior to premature retirement and replaced by Provincials of inferior qualifications, experience and ability. It is any wonder that Sierra Leone suffers from a continuous brain drain.⁹¹

This article raises two important points which need to be examined on the basis of available evidence before considering the official and individual responses it aroused. First, the question of enforced leave prior to premature retirement. In Sierra Leone, the public service regulations contained in the General Order (G.O.) requires and entitles every employee of the public service to an annual leave. The length of the leave varied from 14 days to 35 days depending on the grade of the individual in the service. But for some reasons top civil servants do not always wish to go on leave year after year. The usual explanation is the pressure of work. This is true of both the administrative and the professional sectors of the Civil Service. This might be convenient from an administrative viewpoint. But from a manpower development point of view, it could mean, by implication, to deny the subordinates the opportunity to gain experience by acting as heads of departments or

permanent secretaries while the substantive head is on leave. For example, in December of 1978, in the administrative service, there were 8 officers above the rank of deputy secretary who were asked to go on accumulated leave ranging from six months to 11 months.⁹² This means these officers had not been on leave for the past 5 to 10 years. From the names of officers listed, it seems to be that all of them were Creoles from the Western Area. As regards the question of premature retirement, in Sierra Leone a public service employee has the option to ask for retirement at the age of 40, by medical recommendation at any age, or the government's retiring age of 55 years. The oldest among the eight officers who were on leave was born in 1925, the next in 1927, 1928, 1930 and 1932.

The second point raised by the correspondent was the qualification and experience of the provincial people as compared to their Creole counterparts. In the first place, since independence, in the administrative service, academic qualification has never been the main criterion for promotion to the upper echelon of the service. Of the first four African heads of the Civil Service (secretaries to the Prime Minister or President) before 1978, only one had a university degree (M.A.), and he was a Mende; the rest including two Creoles were without degrees.⁹³ The present incumbent is also without a university degree. For the post of Establishment Secretary, four Africans have held the post since independence - three provincials (two Mendes and one

Temne) and one Western Area (Creole). Of these four, only the Creole was without a university degree. Similarly, for the post of Financial Secretary, four Sierra Leoneans have held the post, two provincials and two Creoles. All but one held university degrees in economics and that one was a Creole.⁹⁴

Finally, it is important to note that in the past, in most cases, when tribal domination was charged, the accusation is that a certain ethno-regional group receives preferential treatment when appointments and promotions are made. The evidence given to support such claims is that the proportion of people in a given position who are from the allegedly favoured group is higher than the proportion of the total population that group represents. For instance, the Creoles represent 1.9 per cent of the population but hold 57 per cent of the top posts (see Table 2.10 below). The accusation does not always carry with it a charge, as the above article did, that unqualified people are in certain posts and that qualified persons from less favoured ethno-regional groups are available to fill these posts. Tribalism can mean that when other factors are equal members of one ethnic group are consistently treated better than those from others. It is also important to remember that it is an ethno-regional group's percentage of the total population which is important in calculating the representative nature of the Civil Service. Ethnic break-downs of qualified personnel available, applicants for civil jobs,

school leavers, graduates or some other groupings more relevant than the total population are not used by those alleging the existence of tribalism.

However, both individual and official responses to the above article chose to follow the former - ethnic distribution. The first response came from a former Financial Secretary now living in Maryland, U.S.A. In his reply to the above allegation of tribalism in the Civil Service, the former Financial Secretary cited a similar allegation in the past when the Sierra Leone Peoples Party government was accused of "Menderization" of the Civil Service. This accusation, he said, became the subject of Parliamentary debate and it was led by no less a person than the late I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson - one of the pioneers of nationalism in West Africa. And the former Financial Secretary went on to give a detail of the former late Prime Minister (Sir Milton Margai) as head of the Civil Service, that contrary to the allegation, the statistics proved abundantly clear that the S.L.P.P. appointed Creoles as the first Africans to these posts: Governor-General, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice, President of the Appeal Court, Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, Director of Public Works, Director of Education, Commissioner of Police, Engineer-in-Chief of the Electricity Department, etc. "Over 75 per cent of permanent secretaries and directors of departments (Civil Service) and corporations were Creoles," the letter added. "And yet, the S.L.P.P. was accused of

Menderization of the Civil Service. This time, the All Peoples Congress Government is accused of victimisation of the Creoles," ended the letter.⁹⁵

The next response to the allegation of tribalism in the public service of Sierra Leone came from the government - the State House. It came in the form of a release from the State House and it reads as follows:

In view of many anonymous letters addressed to the President, Dr. Siaka Stevens, and published in foreign journals alleging that promotions and appointments in the Civil Service are made on tribal and ethnic considerations rather than merit and ability, a list of top administrative and professional posts in the Civil Service has been released by the President's Office.⁹⁶

The list revealed that Creoles dominate top administrative and professional posts with 52 officers, followed by the Mendes with 21 and the Temnes with 11. The release from the State House also indicated that Konos, Sherbroes, Susus and Fullahs shared six top posts.⁹⁷ One week later, the list was published with the following addenda:

the State House Release has catalogued the list of top administrative and professional posts in the Civil Service to "disprove" allegations that appointments and promotions in the Civil Service were being made on

ethnic and tribal considerations rather than on merits and ability.

TABLE 2.10 TRIBAL BREAKDOWN OF SENIOR EMPLOYMENTS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE AS AT 10/9/79.

<u>Tribe/Ethnic</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Admin.</u>	<u>Prof.</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>% Total</u>
Mendes	672,831	30.9	16	5	21	23.07
Temnes	648,931	29.8	10	1	11	12.08
Limbas	183,496	8.4	-	-	-	-
Konos	104,573	4.8	2	-	2	2.19
Korankos	80,732	3.7	-	-	-	-
Sherbro/Bullin	74,674	3.4	1	-	1	1.09
Susus	67,288	3.1	1	-	1	1.09
Fullahs	66,824	3.1	-	1	1	1.09
Lokos	64,459	3.0	-	-	-	-
Mandigos	51,074	2.3	-	-	-	-
Kissis	48,954	2.2	-	-	-	-
Creoles	41,783	1.9	27	25	52	57.14
Jellimkas	15,005	0.7	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	3,000,000	100.0	58	33	91	100.00

Sources: Population figures are taken from the 1974 census, and the top posts from the State House list, 1979.

From Table 2.10 above, it can clearly be seen that the Creoles are most preponderant in the top administrative and professional posts, holding 57.14 per cent of the posts, followed by the Mendes and the Temnes with 23 and 12 per cent each respectively. If appointments and promotion to such posts are to be made on a quota basis, reflecting the numerical strength of each tribe, the Creoles should have held only 1.9 per cent of the 91 top posts. But, on the contrary, this was not the philosophy of Africanisation policy. It may be recalled that the Public Service Commission Instructions to all heads of departments stated inter alia that:

In making recommendations for promotions of persons in the public service, the Public Service Commission shall be guided by the principles of merit and ability, as well as seniority and experience and official qualifications.⁹⁸

It is not the intention of the writer to argue the case for the government, nor to enter into the debate of the post-colonial scramble for the spoils of the employment in the public service beyond the academic requirement of this study. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that neither the former Financial Secretary's recollection nor the Release from the State House had refuted the allegation of the correspondent. The contention of the correspondent was that in Sierra Leone in 1979, "Provincial people with inferior qualifications and experience and ability are promoted in preference to the Creoles with proven ability" Since ability and merit are criteria that cannot easily be assessed and determined without some elements of subjectivity, what the State House could have done in addition to the list of top posts, was to add the qualifications and years of experience of all officers concerned as an alternative. That would, in fact, have shown whether some of the Creoles in both sectors of the public service were not appointed on the same ethnic ticket which they now condemned. Or, since the accusation was about recent appointments and promotions, the State House should have prepared a list of

the candidates for the said appointments and promotions with their qualifications and years of experience, as the second alternative; thus demonstrating the allegation as unfounded.

The impact of tribal affiliation as a possible factor in appointing and promoting personnel in the public service can be felt on a horizontal as well as a vertical dimension. That is, certain ministries and departments may appear to be the preserve of a certain ethno-regional group. The evidence and the "folklore" indicate that such a phenomenon exists in Sierra Leone. Since independence, the Judiciary and the Law Officers Departments have been and still are predominantly Creole strongholds. Before 1977, the Establishment Secretary's office was also dominated by Creoles - the Establishment Secretary was a Creole, his two deputies were Creoles, and even the two senior Establishment Officers were all Creoles.⁹⁹ In the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, it is the Mendes that are predominant. For the past ten years, successive Chief Agricultural Officers have all been Mendes, the Chief Forest Conservator is also a Mende.¹⁰⁰

It may, of course, be accidental that when the bulk of the most significant and visible positions in a single ministry/department, or the government as a whole are filled by the members of one ethnic group. The motive of an individual seeking transfer to a ministry or department where members of his ethno-regional group are in the majority may be related to the type of work done in that

ministry or to personalities. These motives may have no relevance to tribal considerations.

Ethno-regional predominance in the Sierra Leone public service as a whole or in part is not so overwhelming as to rule out the possibility of merit and ability being the actual operating criteria for recruitment and promotion. With regard to tribal differences in academic achievement, there is no sound evidence to support the view that members of one ethnic group are inherently more apt in either academic or mechanical skills than any other. University examination results do not show that one ethnic group produces better scientists, whilst another provides more brilliant arts graduates. Any irregularities in the distribution of talent can usually be attributed to the different quality of secondary schools and to the vagaries of the selection processes. On the other hand, some parts of the country, in general the Western Area, have enjoyed Western education for a much longer period than others; and the tendency has been for this part to maintain their earlier advantages so that at the present time they produce more secondary school and university-educated persons in proportion to their total population.¹⁰¹ They even appear to dominate certain fields of employment.¹⁰²

2.9 Discipline

A dysfunctional by-product of Africanisation and tribalism is the decline in discipline in the Civil Service. This is often expressed by the older generation of civil servants. This may simply be nostalgia on their part. However, an indicator of the degree to which institutional-

isation or organisational integrity exists in the Sierra Leone public service is the extent to which personnel conform with the "rules of the game" as set forth in the normal rules and regulations governing their ethical behaviour.¹⁰³ These rules and regulations are basic and general, and they apply to all civil servants regardless of their particular assignment in the public service. To some extent then, the existence or non-existence of discipline is a measure of the most elementary institutionalisation of rules and norms in a civil service. The rules and regulations of the Sierra Leone Civil Service are common to those found in Ghana and Nigerian public services.¹⁰⁴ They cover a range of behaviour from reporting for duty on time to abstaining from committing an act of treason against the state.

Complaints of indiscipline in the Sierra Leone public service were made by just about all civil servants and politicians who were interviewed during the study tour in Sierra Leone. The cry often expressed by the older civil servants is the return to the "Colonial days when discipline was the order of the day." To find out how widely held such views were, a decision to interview at random some retired senior civil servants, present civil servants who were in the service before independence, and some who entered the Civil Service after independence who, in fact, constitute the majority of active civil servants, was made by the researcher. A total of 45 were interviewed.

When asked if they believed that there was more lack of discipline in the Civil Service since independence than before, 59.8 per cent of the respondents replied affirmatively. The breakdown of those providing this answer is interesting. 77.5 per cent of those who had been in the Civil Service before independence and presumably were in the best position to answer the question believed that there had been an increase in indiscipline, whereas only 31.5 per cent of those who joined the Civil Service after independence felt this way. To put it another way, 75.6 per cent of those who agreed that there had been an increase in lack of discipline became members of the public service prior to independence. When asked what they considered to be acts of indiscipline in the Civil Service, their answers varied from reporting to work late to total non-observance of the Civil Service Code of Conduct. For example, the Civil Service Code of Conduct normally lays down rules of conduct in respect of the following matters: obligation to discharge duties assigned, absence from duty or from the country, insubordination, engagement in trade, private business and private employment, financial interest in local business, pecuniary embarrassment, private agency, receipt of valuable presents, official secrets, custody and disbursement of public funds, etc. None of these the respondents noted is observed nowadays, particularly acts of insubordination, absence from work without permission, refusal to go on transfer to other parts of the country, receipt of valuable

presents, are the most blatantly violated rules of conduct in the public service. All the respondents were unanimous in identifying them.¹⁰⁵

When asked further what they considered to be the main causes for such breakdown in discipline in the public service, their answers varied from politics, tribalism, nepotism, to corruption in high places, etc. Seventy-five per cent of the respondents attributed the lack of discipline in the public service to politics and corruption. The rest attributed it to tribalism and nepotism.¹⁰⁶

As one can imagine, although the complaints of indiscipline in the Civil Service are readily apparent, it is difficult to collect data measuring what the incidence of indiscipline actually is. The Public Service Commission is charged with the responsibility to enforce Civil Service regulations and with the processing of formal reports of civil servants who have violated some of these rules.

Table 2.11 below presents a summary of the disciplinary actions taken by the Public Service Commission.

TABLE 2.11 NUMBER OF DISCIPLINARY CASES 1971-74.

<u>Action Taken</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>
Dismissals	51	56	70	75
Terminations	5	4	1	9
Stoppage of Increment	-	-	-	-
Probation period extended	2	7	14	16
Reduction in rank	2	1	4	4
Reprimands	-	-	1	4
Increment withheld	-	2	4	1
Suspension	-	-	1	1
TOTALS	60	70	94	110

Source: Annual Report of the Public Service Commission.

From the data presented in Table 2.11 one could conclude that indiscipline in the public service was on the increase. In a four year period (1971-1974), the number of disciplinary measures taken by the Public Service Commission had nearly doubled - from 60 in 1971 to 110 in 1974. Of course, it could mean that the P.S.C. was tightening up standards rather than a change in behaviour. But since the P.S.C. only acted on cases reported to it by various heads of departments through the Establishment Secretary's office; it also means that there could have been more cases of indiscipline but not sanctioned by the P.S.C. or reported to the P.S.C.

A major difficulty already indicated is the charge by senior civil servants that junior officers who are sanctioned can have their punishment nullified by obtaining the support of government ministers, more so when the country is now under a one party state system of government. All the people interviewed had indicated that they had actually experienced political intervention in disciplinary matters. The fear that party officials can and will prevent individual civil servants, particularly party activists, being sanctioned and may even put those initiating disciplinary action in disfavour with the government by branding them as anti-A.P.C. government or an enemies of the state, is great and this could cause them not to discipline.

However, the President, Dr. Siaka Stevens, was not unaware of the state of indiscipline in the Civil Service,

and the difficulties senior officers were facing in their endeavour to maintain discipline. In an address to a delegation of senior civil servants in the State House, the President admitted that the Civil Service had been going through a very difficult period in which the new and undisciplined had wished to take advantage of the political climate engendered by independence and subsequently the introduction of the one-party state; but the President went on, he could not accept this as a valid excuse for senior officers to lie down and relinquish their responsibilities to enforce legitimate discipline. He ended by saying:

"I would frankly like to see some officers with the courage of their convictions confront these people who want to get away with indiscipline because only such confrontation will prove whether or not my government condones indiscipline; such officers have my wholehearted support."¹⁰⁷

Political interference, and to a lesser extent the weakness of senior civil servants, is claimed as the root cause of indiscipline in the Civil Service. But like the interaction theory of leadership, a good leader must also be a good follower.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, in disciplinary terms, a good disciplinarian must himself be disciplined. To find out the truth of this in the Sierra Leone Civil Service, a representative sample of junior civil servants, 50 in all, were interviewed.¹⁰⁹ When asked about the state of discipline in the Civil

Service, they all accepted that as compared to the colonial period, discipline has considerably declined. But they attributed this mainly to the lack of discipline among senior officers who succeeded the "Whiteman". One respondent went further to say, "We are often reminded of the discipline in the colonial days. We accept the fact that there was strict discipline in the colonial days, but the colonial expatriate was a disciplined man; a fair man. He recommended his junior officers for promotion without being bribed. But today, in order to be considered for promotion, you have to bribe and even with that you are not sure that you will be considered. How can we be disciplined?" he asked. "If I have to force my promotion through the help of a politician, I would have no choice but to seek the help of that politician," he ended.

Another respondent retorted: "How can these so-called senior civil servants maintain discipline when they themselves are not disciplined? They come to work late - 10 o'clock instead of 8.30 - leave offices before 12 o'clock for lunch and will not come back until 2 o'clock, ready to break off at 3.45 p.m." He ended by saying that the Code of Conduct in the Civil Service does not draw a distinction between junior and senior civil servants when it comes to its observations. One staff superintendent intimated that the senior officers made it very difficult for him to maintain discipline in the ministry. He said, "How can I maintain discipline, particularly among our female personnel,

when they return late after lunch and I ask them to explain, they will say, I went to lunch with the Minister, the deputy Minister, the "Perm. Sec.", the deputy Secretary, etc. and at the end of the day, they turn around and blame us for not maintaining discipline in the Ministry," he ended. And finally, two old messengers who claimed to have worked under five different Provincial Commissioners during the last 15 years of the colonial rule each said: "My son, I have worked under Commissioner Fenton, Commissioner McRobert, and Commissioner Beatie, none of them has insulted me; but these small boys "born yesterday" have no respect for old people like us." He ended by adding that the whiteman had left gaps in the country. The second, who claimed to have been to Burma, simply said: "The White Master knew no tribe. If you worked very hard, you will be rewarded; but now, it is not hard work that counts but who knows you," he ended. And finally, a Higher Executive Officer in the Ministry in answering the same question of discipline has this to say: "Discipline cannot be maintained where people are not equally treated for what they are. Here is a case in point. Two of us were employed as Executive Officers-In-Training three years ago. We finished our training period which coincided with our three year probationary period. When both of us were promoted as Executive Officers, we were put on Scale CE2-4. They started my colleague at a higher point on the scale. When I protested to the Establishment Secretary, I was told that

I had no right to question discretion of the Establishment Secretary. Technically, my colleague is senior to me now. Tell me, brother, how can you maintain discipline under this iniquitous situation?" he asked. "The problem is, in Sierra Leone today, as the saying goes - it is not what you know but who you know that is the order of the day." Such are the views expressed by the two sides of the public service - senior and junior members of the Sierra Leone Civil Service. The senior civil servants claimed that the lack of discipline in the public service was due to political interference in their endeavour to enforce disciplinary measures. They were constrained to do so because of political intervention. On the other hand, the junior civil servants interviewed claimed that political intervention per se in the administration of disciplinary measures is not wholly responsible for the decline in discipline in the public service. There are other factors, such as corruption, nepotism, tribalism and the lack of self-discipline among senior civil servants themselves, which the junior civil servants considered to be largely responsible for the decline in discipline in the Civil Service.

One thing that is clear from the debate on the decline of discipline in the public service. Both sides of the service accepted the existence of the state of indiscipline in the public service of Sierra Leone, since independence. On what causes the existence of such a state, they disagreed. However, like many other problems of such a nature in post-

colonial Africa, any failure to tackle such problems is always attributed to "our ex-colonial masters." The failure to maintain discipline in the post-colonial public service of Sierra Leone is often attributed to the pre-independent policy of Africanisation which had resulted in the promotion of Africans to senior positions for which they neither had the academic qualifications nor the training and experience which such positions required, notwithstanding the Nationalist pressures for Africanisation of the public service (see Chapter 2.3 above).

2.10 Summary and Conclusion.

In the preceding chapter attempts have been made to discuss the various aspects of the Africanisation of the public service of Sierra Leone with references to other African states. First, a working definition of the term Africanisation was provided (Chapter 2.1). It implies the process of replacing expatriate civil servants by nationals. This interpretation was emphasized in the early years of independence when European colonial officers occupied most upper-level civil service posts. However, it soon became apparent that mere replacement of whites with black faces would not necessarily transform the public service into an African one. A second and more encompassing definition evolved. According to this, Africanisation was contrived as a process of transforming a colonial type civil service into a national one. In addition to changes in citizenship

and perhaps the race of personnel, the process was also envisaged to include training and development of this personnel, structural changes of the public service, and a change in the spirit of service in accordance with the policies of new government.

Second, the motivation and justification for the Africanisation of the public service was discussed (see Chapter 2.2 above). Politically, the attainment of independence would have to be matched with an African administration for reasons of nationalistic honour, pride and legitimacy. The struggle against colonial rule was in a sense an expression of the desire of the people to manage their own affairs. It was also in part an expression of the desire to build a more responsible or honourable public service to the wider national constituency in contrast to the narrow cover of the colonial civil service.

Equally discussed was the economic aspect of Africanisation. Expatriate manpower consisting of old colonial expatriates commanded high salaries. Even when they possessed similar educational qualifications with nationals, expatriate personnel received invariably higher salaries, and the gap between the two groups widened further by several inducements including transport costs, child allowances, ample loan facilities, highly subsidised housing and contract remuneration available to the latter group. In addition, expatriate salaries were a considerable drain on the country's foreign exchange reserves. The presence of

expatriate personnel was also discussed as a cost-push factor in that Africans with comparable qualifications demand for equal salaries and fringe benefits (see Chapter 2.2 above).

Closely related to political and economic concerns considered were the socio-cultural ones. The colonial civil servant stood aloof from the society he served. He came from an alien culture and often with racial prejudices. At independence there was a natural desire to make the civil servant more aware of the socio-cultural setting of the country. African officials could be expected to be in tune with local psychology and attitudes of the people as a whole. And finally, there was the issue of national security. Some sensitive departments, including the police, the army, foreign affairs and intelligence units needed loyal and nationalistic personnel. It became increasingly difficult to confide official business to foreign officials whose parent countries might have rival interests. In these departments and units, Africanisation became a matter of national security (see Chapter 2.2).

The pressure for Africanisation of the public service was the culmination of the motivational forces summarised above. It was induced by the employment policies of the colonial government which excluded educated Africans to high-level employment in the public service, particularly in the administrative service. Two pressures were identified. The first came from above and the second from below (see Chapter 2.3 above).

In discussing the process of Africanisation, three stages or periods were distinguished. The first stage was the pre-independent stage. In this, appointments and promotions in the senior service were based purely on merit, seniority, ability and qualifications.¹¹⁰ This period lasted up to 1964. Also included in this period was the practice of contract employment of overseas officers (see Table 2.1). The second period, the post-independence period, started with the ascendancy of Sir Albert Margai as Prime Minister after the death of his elder brother, Sir Milton Margai in 1964. It was during this period that the Africanisation of the public service started to degenerate into tribal and ethno-regional policy. The period from 1964 to 1977 can, in retrospect, be regarded as the country's worst period in terms of tribal and ethno-regional politics, bitterness, rivalries in employment (see Chapter 1.2, pp. 6-18). National issues were blurred by these negative social forces, and appointments and promotions in the public service and state enterprises were judged in terms of tribal and ethnic labels rather than the qualifications and the ability of the individual. The third phase of Africanisation of the public service took place between 1977 and 1978. The politicalisation of the administrative service occurred. In this period, appointments and promotions to certain positions in the public service, particularly the top echelons of the administrative, largely depended on membership of the "recognized party".¹¹¹ It was

hoped that the politicalisation of the public sector employment would guarantee equal treatment to all people regardless of tribe, origin, and ethnic identity. But this does not seem to be the case. As late as 1979, allegations that people "with inferior qualifications and work experience" of provincial origin were being promoted and appointed to positions of greater responsibilities in preference to people of "proven ability and superior qualifications" were still made.

Africanisation of the public service is thus multifaceted. Choice must be made in the face of conflicting demands for the rapid replacement of expatriates in the public service and for providing the manpower (Part III) needed for rapid economic development in the country. Part of the legacy of colonial rule for Sierra Leone was the shortage of skilled and experienced citizens to staff the public service that aims to play a vital role in promoting economic development. In response to these demands to establish an independent identity and to develop the economy, the Sierra Leone government had placed its citizens in the most visible administrative posts while at the same time relying on external sources for technical and professional personnel.

In the process of Africanisation of the public service, successive governments have failed to convince the people that all Sierra Leoneans with the necessary qualifications have equal career prospects in the public service regardless

of ethno-regional identity. While the Civil Service is considered to be not the preserve of any ethno-tribal group in Sierra Leone, there is evidence which at least partially supports the charges of those who perceive prejudice in appointments and promotions (see Table 2.10).

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87. Staff list for 1968-1972. See also monthly posting lists for the administrative service for the same period.
88. Clapham, C., op. cit., Table 3, p. 51.
89. In each province or district there are other minority tribes such as the Konos, Kissis in the Eastern Province; the Limbas, Korankos, Lokos, Yelimbas, etc. in the Northern Province, but all lumped to belong to the majority tribes, i.e. the Temnes in the Northern Province and the Mendes in the Eastern and Southern Provinces.
90. Saylor, R.G., op. cit., 147.
91. The weekly, West Africa, No. 3214, February 19, 1979, p. 282, ("The Way Forward for Sierra Leone").
92. Administrative postings as at 1st December, 1978, Establishment Secretary's Office, Freetown.
93. Staff list for 1964-1972, Government Printer, Freetown.
94. Staff list for the same period as in Note 93.
95. The weekly, West Africa, No. 3220, April 1979, caption: Creole Incitement, p. 59.
96. West Africa, No. 3243, 3 September, 1979, p. 1623.
97. Ibid., p. 1624.
98. P.S.C. Instructions, Paragraph 9, 1954.
99. Administrative posting as at 1 December, 1977.
100. Staff list, Government Printer, Freetown, 1970.
101. Population census of Sierra Leone, 1963, Vol. III, Economic Characteristics. Central Statistical Office, Freetown.
102. Staff list, Government Printer, Freetown, 1978.
103. General Order (G.O.), Sierra Leone Government Printer, Freetown.
104. Adu, A.L. The Civil Service in Commonwealth Africa. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, p. 164.

105. The evidence of certain junior civil servants on this topic in the Hugh Clarke Report on the Civil Service of Sierra Leone, 1970, p. 25, Paragraph 65, Government Printer, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
106. Andreski, A. provides a vivid account of such practices of graft given in public service employment in Chapter 7, - "Kleptocracy or Corruption as a System of Government" in his book The African Predicament: a study in the pathology of modernisation. Michael Joseph, London, 1968, pp. 92-108.
107. President Siaka Stevens: Address to a delegation of senior civil servants at the State House, March, 1976.
108. Hollander, E.H. Conformity, status and idiosyncrasy credit. Psychological Review, Vol. 65, pp. 115-127.
109. A junior civil servant for the purpose of this study is defined as an employee of the public service below the grade of Higher Executive officer or its equivalent in the professional grades.
110. Government Statement on Africanisation, op. cit., Paragraph 1, p. 1, 1959.
111. The One-Party Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1978, op. cit., section 139(3), p. 92.

Africanisation and Manpower Requirement

PART II THE PRIVATE SECTOR

INTRODUCTION

The last two chapters in Part I were concerned with the Africanisation of the public service. Chapter one provided background information on the setting of the study, the employment policies of the Colonial Government and the size and level of expatriate employment in Colonial Africa, and Sierra Leone in particular; and Chapter Two looked at the motivation, the government policies and the progress of Africanisation of the public service and its related problems.

The next two chapters in Part II will consider the Africanisation of the private sector. In the order of precedence, the Africanisation of the private sector came second. It was based on the recognition by an increasing number of developing countries that political independence was meaningless unless accompanied by some measure of economic independence. But such economic independence could but be relative rather than absolute, because complete economic independence in a rapidly increasingly inter-dependent economy could be seriously contemplated by any government.

Since independence, there had been two broad nation-building movements sweeping over Black Africa. The first was primarily political and aimed at replacing all the colonial expatriate personnel by African nationals; it was an aspect of national sovereignty and self-determination. This was achieved by the majority of African countries by the mid-

1960s; in Sierra Leone the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Civil Service of Sierra Leone indicated that there were in 1970 only 73 expatriate personnel employed in selective government departments on contract terms.¹ The second movement which was an essential complement to the first, aimed at economic independence, had as its primary objective national control over the development and management of the country's economic resources.

Almost inevitably, the movement for economic independence could not commence until after the achievement of political independence and the Africanisation of the public service. In general, it was not until the second half of the 1960s that African countries developed systematic policies aimed at gaining effective control over their economic destinies. Among these policies, indigenisation of the private sector played a major role. The indigenisation of the private sector took three forms: the first was concerned with ownership and aimed at giving the nationals of the country either individually or collectively an ownership stake in the economic establishments in their country. Such indigenisation of ownership could be accomplished either through public or private ownership or through a combination of the two.² Indigenisation of public ownership could be brought about by the government either through total or partial nationalisation of enterprise, i.e. the acquisition of all the assets of enterprises or purchase of some of the shares of enterprises. Control of the diamond mining company was by

a wholly British owned company before 1970 when it was acquired by the Sierra Leone Government with 51 per cent controlling shares and changed its name from Sierra Leone Selection Trust to the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC). In the second case, indigenisation by private ownership, this could be achieved by government legislation, eg. the commercial and industrial activities of non-nationals might be restricted. In Ghana, the Ghanaian Business Promotion Act, No. 334, which became effective on August 1970 had not only reserved certain sectors of the economy for its nationals, but also stipulated which categories of enterprises were exclusively reserved for them.³ In Nigeria, the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decrees, February 1972 and 1977, both sought to promote indigenisation by reserving certain industries exclusively for Nigerian ownership and by limiting the role of foreign enterprises in others.⁴ In Sierra Leone, the Non-Citizens (Restriction of Trade or Business) Act No. 30 of 1965 stipulated the areas of industrial and commercial activities where non-nationals are not allowed to operate. For example, section 5(c) of the Act specified the following areas as indigenous reserves : the manufacture of concrete blocks for sale, the supply of granite, stone or sand, the provision of commercial transport by road, sea, or river whether for his own business or otherwise, etc.⁵ In the third case, the government exercises control over the activities of foreign enterprises by nominating

nationals to sit on the Boards of Directors of foreign enterprises. Such nominees were intended to be watchdogs protecting the interest of the country. However, experience in Sierra Leone had shown that these Board members themselves became absorbed into the activities of these foreign enterprises as if they represented the interest of shareholders of that enterprise and not the interest of their country which they deemed to represent. A case in point is that of the former Sierra Leone Development Company. This was a subsidiary of William Bairds group of companies based in Glasgow, which had mined iron ore in Sierra Leone since 1935. On its Board there were two Sierra Leonean nationals. One was the Resident Director nominated by the Government (since 1964), and the other was nominated by the local authority of the Chiefdom where the mines were located. Every year, these directors attended Board Meetings in the United Kingdom where important policies affecting the company were discussed and formulated. In 1975, without giving due notice to the Sierra Leone Government, the company went into voluntary liquidation on the grounds that the mines were not making profit.⁶ The Government became panic-stricken and rushed legislation in the Parliament with retroactive powers in order to protect the interest of local creditors and the employees of the company. The question is, did the local director have any advance knowledge of this closure? If they had, why did they not inform the government which nominated them to represent the

interest of the country. The evidence available suggests that they knew.⁷ It was no wonder that a Paramount Chief Member of Parliament from the area, during the debate on that legislation, advocated the immediate arrest and imprisonment of the two directors for a betrayal of the trust reposed upon them by the country.⁸

Thirdly, there was manpower indigenisation, otherwise known as Africanisation or localisation. This was the first form of indigenisation policy discussed in Part I, the Public Service. As far as the private sector was concerned, it aimed at developing indigenous competence in modern industrial and commercial operations and management. Experience in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Black Africa has demonstrated that without a strong government intervention to try to reconcile the interest of foreign private investment with national goals and aspirations, the economy could continue to grow and expand without any visible sign of development among its people.⁹ It was in this light that indigenous participation in the economic life of the nation was seen as essential for the acquisition of skills and experience needed to run the economy. As Professor W. Arthur Lewis rightly put it:

If no one will employ the local people above the level of clerks, they cannot learn how to manage industrial businesses for themselves, their economic affairs will then always be dominated by foreigners and economic growth

will be retarded by the costs and shortages involved in dependence upon foreign enterprises. This is one reason why most countries as soon as they become independent pass legislation or take other steps to compel foreign firms to open up managerial positions to local people.¹⁰

In Sierra Leone, the Africanisation of the private sector became a national policy in 1952 (see 4.4(1)). With the rapid post-war increase in economic activities throughout the country, it was thought necessary that opportunities created by such development should be made available to increasing numbers of Sierra Leoneans to participate in the ownership, control, and management of the economic resources of the nation. These categories of indigenisation are by no means mutually exclusive. On the contrary, a country could at a particular stage in its development pursue one or the other of the types of indigenisation or a combination of two or more. This section of the study is concerned with the last two - control and manpower indigenisation.¹¹ Its main objectives are to review Sierra Leonean Africanisation policy of the private sector since independence and examine the progress made during the period.

Since the employment practices and procedures are the vehicles through which Africans can and do get recruited into the employment of expatriate firms in the private sector of the economy, these practices and procedures are

inevitably interlaced with the government policy of Africanisation. Indeed, this is the vehicle through which Sierra Leonean nationals can enter the managerial, professional and technical grades in the private sector. It is therefore necessary to examine first the employment policies of expatriate firms in Sierra Leone. Chapter three looks at this.

The data used for the statistical analysis in this chapter were derived mainly from the Sierra Leone Central Statistics Office, industrial surveys, the annual returns of private sector employers to the Income Tax Department, Ministry of Labour, and by personal visit to individual employers, etc. Although the C.S.O. surveys constitute the most authentic and comprehensive sources of information on the Sierra Leone industrial sector, they are marked by imperfections. The most serious of the defects, as far as the present analysis is concerned, is that the surveys cover only establishments with six or more employees. Establishments with fewer than six employees, which are quite numerous and are estimated to account for at least as much employment as the larger establishments, can thus not be brought directly into our analysis.¹²

There is, however, nothing magical or special about the number six. One could as easily take 10, 15, 20 or 40 as the number of employees forming the dividing line between small- and large-scale establishments.^{12^a} If any consistent pattern is found to exist between the size of establishment

and the level of wages using establishments with six or more employees as the dividing line, a plausible inference can then be drawn about such differentials as between expatriates and their African counterparts employed in particular.

Moreover, because the number of family businesses employing less than six people is greater, we can deduce the nature of the bias with the omission of this group of enterprises.

Thus, despite the lack of relevant data for establishments with fewer than six employees, it is felt that reasonably reliable conclusions about the size of expatriate employment and the wages differentials between them and their African counterparts can still be drawn from the analysis.

Another defect of the surveys is the non-uniformity of their year to year coverage. While the number of industries included in the surveys has been rising over the years, the geographical coverage of all surveys was more concentrated in the Western Area with the provincial and district headquarters only. This limits the comparability of public and private sector wages structure to some extent and reduces its usefulness for time series analysis. The present chapter, however, is a basically cross-sectional one and hence no serious bias is expected to be imparted into the results by this imperfection.

CHAPTER 3. THE EMPLOYMENT POLICIES OF FOREIGN FIRMS.

3.1 Introduction.

During the last years of colonial rule and in the years immediately after independence, the picture of employment in the private sector of the economy of Sierra Leone showed a broad base of unskilled workers composed almost entirely of Africans, a middle section of technicians and other skilled workers composed mainly of Europeans and a sprinkling of Africans. There was then a small top group of managers and professional workers composed largely of Europeans, Indians and Lebanese, depending on whether the enterprise was European, Lebanese or Indian controlled.

The Report of the Manpower Survey conducted by Robert Brown, in 1964, indicated that there were 1,221 expatriate personnel in the private sector of Sierra Leone, against 2,666 Africans, the majority of whom were employed as clerks and in sub-professional categories (see Table 3.1 below). The occupational distribution of these employees (Table 3.1) also shows that the expatriates were most preponderant in the higher echelons of the administrative, managerial, executive and selected workers groups - 125 Africans as against 291 expatriates. In the professional, technical and related workers, the Africans appeared to have a lead over the expatriates, 791 against 655, but if the top cream of this group is syphoned, the expatriates were most preponderant (see Table 3.1b below).

TABLE 3.1 OCCUPATIONAL SUMMARY OF EXPATRIATE AND AFRICANS
EMPLOYED IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS AT 1964.

Major Group	Classification	Total	Afr.	Exp.
0	Professional, technical & related	1,446	791	655
1	Administrative and managerial	416	125	291
2	Clerical workers	1,546	1,390	156
3	Sales workers	300	228	72
4	Farmers & related workers	5	5	-
5	Miners & quarry workers	Not included		
6	Transport & comm. workers	162	118	44
7/8	Craftsmen & prod. workers	Not included		
9	Service, sports, etc. workers	12	9	3
All Groups TOTAL		3,887	2,666	1,221

Source: Occupational summary of Robert Brown Report on the manpower situation in Sierra Leone, 1964.

TABLE 3.1b TECHNICAL AND RELATED WORKERS.

Group	Classification	Total	Afr.	Exp.
0-01	Architects	5	1	4
0-0102	Civil Engineers	41	4	37
0-02	Electrical Engineers	15	5	10
0-02	Mechanical Engineers	31	1	30
0-02	Mining Engineers	54	3	51
0-274	Engineers (others)	30	3	27
0-2.8	Surgeons	41	9	32
All Groups TOTAL		217	26	191

Source: Table III of the Brown Report, 1964.

In addition, the employment policy of private sector foreign employers created wages structure which differentiated between their European employees and their African counterparts. The average wage gap between the expatriate personnel and their African employees was tremendous (see Table 3.2 below). It was claimed to reflect the high

inducement wage necessary to attract skilled labour from abroad.¹³

TABLE 3.2 ANNUAL AVERAGE SALARY AND WAGES OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES IN SIERRA LEONE - 1954-1961.

Year	£ M	£ M	Average Annual Wage	
	Afri.	Euro.	Afri.	Euro.
1954	£4.73	£2.93	£36	£1,008
1955	5.59	3.26	39	1,067
1956	6.56	3.80	41	1,145
1957	7.22	4.22	45	1,181
1958	8.04	4.71	50	1,192
1959	8.56	4.87	54	1,242
1960	8.67	4.92	57	1,269
1961	8.75	5.02	60	1,289

Source: Central Statistics Office, Freetown.

From the above table, the pace of increase in African earnings in the private sector, however, exceeded that for Europeans. Thus, total wages and salaries payment to Africans were some 185 per cent greater in 1961 than in 1954 and average earnings were approximately 167 per cent higher in the terminal than in the initial year. The corresponding index for their European counterparts registered 173 and 128 respectively. The extreme absolute difference between African and European average annual earnings, however, showed up Sierra Leone's historical socio-economic structure which manifested limited African access to schooling and skills acquisition and restricted African entrance into high-level employment positions. To close these gaps was the corner-stone of Africanisation policies. In effect, the pictures of the employment pattern, and the

wage structure in the private sector demonstrated by Tables 3.1a, b and 3.3 reflect the existence of a dual labour market structure.

3.2 The Dual Labour Market.

One feature of developing countries which has received considerable attention in economic literature is the dualistic structure of their economies. Very often the dualism is specified in terms of a modern urban wage sector and a traditional non-wage sector, and much of the discussion centred on the allocation of labour between the two sectors and on the determinations of their relative earnings. Of increasing significance in most developing countries is another type of dualism - that between the earnings of expatriate personnel of foreign-owned companies on the one hand, and their African counterparts on the other. The co-existence of these two wage-structures in the private sector is intriguing and raises some interesting questions. How large are the wage differentials between expatriate employees and their African counterparts in the private sector, and what are the determinants of these differentials? These two questions are examined in the context of the Sierra Leone experience. In providing an explanatory hypothesis for the differentials an attempt will be made to evaluate the relative importance of economic and institutional forces.

In recent years, the conditions of the working poor, particularly among minority groups in North America, had

stimulated a large volume of research centred on the functioning of labour markets. It has been suggested that labour market segmentation, where significant differences in wages and working conditions of employment co-exist in different parts of the labour market, had not been eliminated by market forces and hence has become a major contributor to existing employment and income distribution problems.¹⁴ While some scholars have sought to explain the historical evolution of labour segmentation,¹⁵ others have been less ambitious and have simply examined the numerous facets of the duality of the labour market and enumerated various aspects of the observed income differentials.¹⁶

In less developed countries, the recent emphasis has been placed on problems of income distribution which have been aggravated and made more visible by the rapid increase in the number of expatriates employed in the economy, while at the same time, there are increasing signs of visible unemployment and under-employment among educated Africans. According to this line of reasoning:

(1) social and institutional factors have helped to preserve income differentials between workers of different educational backgrounds and between expatriate and local employees;

(2) *Paternalistic* management systems protect the employment conditions of European workers from encroachment by the local personnel;

(3) different industrial relations systems helped to maintain wide income differences between expatriate personnel and their African counterparts on the one hand, and between foreign-owned firms and the public sector on the other.

Combining these factors, the extent of the labour market segmentation can be seen as a major determinant of both the existing distribution of income and the extent of the constraints and barriers to be overcome if the Africanisation of the private sector is to result in an equitable distribution of income.¹⁷

In the first part of this section a brief survey of some of the theoretical work that has been done on labour market segmentation will be reviewed. The second part develops in some detail a standard method used for measuring the extent of market segmentation in the light of the available evidence on the existence of dual labour market in Sierra Leone; this is analysed and discussed.

3.2.1 Theories of Labour Market Segmentation.

According to Reich, Gordon and Edwards, labour market segmentation is a historical process which divides the labour market into sub-markets, each with identifiable characteristics and behavioural rules.¹⁸ They go on to argue that labour markets have become segmented because of the growth of monopoly capitalist enterprises in Western countries. Faced with an increasing homogeneous work force

which was hostile to the growth of corporate power, the capitalists made conscious efforts to "divide and conquer" by creating "internal labour market" which separated the experiences of different workers and undermined their common opposition to their employers. The creation of job ladders with entry level qualifications and set patterns of promotion, which were different for white and blue-collar workers, was one of dividing the work force.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the growth of giant multi-national corporations added systematic forces that reinforced segmentation. A dualistic industrial structure evolved where large, capital-intensive firms with market power and high rates of profit and growth shared their earnings with their more stabilised work force. The smaller, more competitive labour-intensive firms lived in a world of instability and low pay.


An alternative theory of labour market segmentation argues that key aspects of the economy function quite differently than postulated in a neo-classical model.²⁰ The stability of equilibrium in the neo-classical labour market is based on the interaction of relative prices for the output of the firm. However, in situations where the static neo-classical view does not hold, labour market segmentation may occur. If, because of some random disturbance, the price of labour available to a certain activity rises, capital-embodied technical change may occur where capital is substituted for labour. If the product market of this

activity is characterised by oligopoly, then the increased productivity of the labour employed will be shared by the capital and labour employed in the form of dividend payments and higher wage settlements, rather than with society at large in the form of lower prices. The whole process typically is irreversible. The reduced demand for labour in this activity increases the supply of labour available to other activities. As a result, the need to obtain labour-saving innovations in these alternative activities is reduced; these activities tend to become technologically stagnant, labour productivity increases their lag behind that of the first activity, and a wage disparity among the two types of activities emerges.

This tendency for wage disparity is reinforced by increased labour skill requirements typically associated with the labour-saving technological change in the first activity. The rise in average skills strengthens the bargaining power of the labour force employed there. The higher wages paid motivate and finance self-investment in skills by the employees and induces a firm to invest in its work force. There is not a comparable need for skilled labour in the alternative activities so there is neither the motivation nor the available means to invest in the upgrading of labour skills.

A theory of labour market segmentation which incorporates some elements of both models discussed above and which is more amenable to empirical testing, has been presented by Wachtel and Betsey.²¹ Concentrating initially on


the demand side of the labour market, the structure of an industry or region can be examined to determine its impact on the wage of the employees within the market. With one homogeneous labour supply function and two segmented industries or regions with differing labour demand functions - perhaps because of differing techniques of production, capital labour ratios or market structure conditions - the wage differential of $W_2 - W_1$ in Figure 1 below would be a measure of the degree of labour market segmentation.



Alternatively, Figure 2 portrays one industry or region which employs individuals with varying amounts of human capital, reflecting differences in formal education, on-the-job training, cultural background, etc. Again, $W_2 - W_1$ measures the degree of labour market segmentation. If the supply function in Figure 2 are written in the form $S = a + bW$, then the two shift parameters, a_1 and a_2 , capture the

differences in the reservation price of workers which is related to the differences in the stock of human capital embodied in the two groups of workers.

A synthesis of these two models, as suggested by the earlier work of Bluestone, is represented in Figure 3 below.²²



Here segmentation is shown to exist on both sides of the labour market. The structure of the different industries and regions is indicated by I_1 and I_2 while the variations in human capital among workers is depicted by H_1 and H_2 . Now, it could be discerned that persons with similar human capital, perhaps working in similar classified occupations, receiving different wages because they are of different nationality, or they are employed in different industries or regions. The resulting wage differential is shown as

$W_3 - W_1$. Alternatively, the extent to which wages vary within an industry or a firm, depending on the different amount of human capital of its employees, is measured as $W_2 - W_3$.

The extent of wage differentials between foreign- and locally-owned firms, and between expatriate personnel and their local counterparts, vary widely from industry to industry, from employer to employer and from country to country, depending on the status of the enterprise. However, with regards to multi-national companies, a number of reasons have been suggested as to why they might set different wages levels than local employers. The most frequently mentioned is that to some degree the ability to pay of these firms is superior to that of local employers. In part, this is associated with the sectors in which the direct investments by multinationals is made. For multinationals in the extractive industries such as mining,²³ production labour costs are rarely a significant element in total costs, and the surplus available for distribution can be quite large.²⁴ In manufacturing, multinationals are mainly located in the sectors less subject to competition and frequently predominate where advanced technology and large-scale, capital-intensive production is involved. Even in industry where there are both foreign and locally-owned firms using the same kinds of production techniques, multi-nationals may still possess some competitive advantage due to product differentiation, greater efficiency in

operation or economies of scale at the enterprise level. The competitive conditions in which many foreign-owned firms operate can make it possible for higher wages to be absorbed by low profit or passed along in the form of higher prices. Although these conditions are likely to vary greatly between industries and countries as indicated earlier, it would appear likely that the competitive advantages of multi-nationals vis-a-vis local employers will be greatest in capital intensive or monopoly industries in developing countries.

While the competitive environment in which multi-nationals operate may create the potential for paying higher wages, whether these firms actually do so will be influenced by a variety of other factors. One of these is the characteristics of the industrial relations in the host country. In countries where collective bargaining is extensively practised, and both foreign and locally-owned firms are organised, the pressure for parity in wage levels may be strong. As a rule, this would be particularly true where industry-wide bargaining takes place (or with trade group bargaining as in Sierra Leone) and has a major impact on the wages actually paid at the enterprise level.²⁵ On the other hand, if collective bargaining is not well established and trade unions have little bargaining power, the possibility of large differentials between the two types of firms exists. This would also be the case if, for example, the sectors where foreign-owned firms operate are organised, or

the one of greatest trade union strength. The prevailing pattern of union organisation in a number of developing countries would suggest that wage structure disparities between foreign- and locally-owned firms might be larger than elsewhere. In some cases, the wages policy of foreign firms might be greatly influenced by the industrial relations practices in the home country.²⁶

Other explanations have been given to support why foreign-owned firms, particularly when operating in developing countries, might pay comparatively higher wages. Foreign owned firms with a large number of expatriate personnel have to pay them at least as much as they would earn in their home country, if not more. There is always a large difference between their earnings and those of the locally recruited workers. The extent of this wage differential between expatriate personnel and their locally recruited counterparts constitutes a dual wage structure in Sierra Leone. It can be a source of considerable discontent. (4.2, p. 310)

The personnel director of Dunlop realised their problems when he said that the problem arising out of paying salaries to expatriate employees varied greatly from country to country and that they were affected by the size of the company and the scope of its operations. "There are however certain problems" he said, "that are common to all expatriate-employing companies." The main one, he added was the problem of adopting either a United Kingdom based salary structure or a locally based one. He went further,

"recognising the transferable work of an expatriate employee had adopted a salary structure founded on a U.K. basic salary which is also the pensionable salary."²⁷

Implicit in the above was the acceptance of the co-existence of two salary structures - one for its expatriate personnel based on the United Kingdom salary level while their locally recruited employees were rewarded on the basis of local salary levels. On similar terms, Shell International claimed that all its international operations were conducted within the national framework of the host country which influences general policy on wages and conditions of work (for its locally recruited work force). The only exception to this rule lay in the employment of international or expatriate staff "whose general conditions of service seek to take into account the special burdens of separation from their countries, and to establish a degree of parity between expatriates working in different countries",²⁸ One would expect that if European expatriates work in an African country where the cost of living is relatively lower than the home country, salaries of such expatriates should be based on the host country's cost of living index plus any expatriation allowances.

However, this does not seem to be the practice, particularly in countries like Sierra Leone where salaries are relatively lower. Peter Lloyd, writing on the West African situation (though on an earlier period), commented among other things, that wages in West Africa are low while the salaries of expatriate

staff in government and commercial firms were related to those obtaining in the metropolitan countries - with added perquisites to compensate for the "discomfort of tropical life" and perhaps the necessity of maintaining two homes. The wages of African workers were related to the income of subsistence farmers and to the belief that all African workers were migrants who did not have to maintain their families in towns".²⁹

The central problem is the expatriation extras. No one questions the validity of paying extra inducement to expatriate employees working in an alien environment. But when these inducements were seen by the local people as a racial distinction between the European expatriate worker and his African counterpart, then a potential source of conflict arose ; particularly so in a situation where the expatriation allowances seem to widen the wage gap between expatriates and their African counterparts. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the findings of the National Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry (defunct since 1973)³⁰ in its Interim Report to the Ministry of Finance, indicated that although all the companies they investigated pointed out to them that there was no discrimination in salaries between African employees and non-Africans in comparable positions except with the expatriation elements in their pay. But this was not reflected in the information available to the committee. Among the multi-national companies investigated were the

Sierra Leone Development Company, the Standard Bank Sierra Leone Ltd., the Barclays Bank D.C.O. Sierra Leone Ltd., the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, the oil companies, etc. In each of these firms, the committee was convinced that the wage gap between their expatriate employees and their African counterparts was substantial to be explained in terms of expatriation allowances alone. However, in its final report it commented on the salary structure of foreign-owned firms:

The Committee is also disturbed that there are wide discrepancies between the salaries and earnings of expatriate and inpatriate staff even within the post-categories and even taking into account their qualifications and experience.³¹

For example, in one insurance company, the committee noted that the average salary of expatriates stood at £3,095 per annum (1973) basic, whereas the expatriation allowance worked out £3,850 which gave an average total income to the expatriate of £6,945 compared with the average salary to senior Africans of £1,950 or £2,350 including allowances.³²

Five years later (1978) the situation has hardly changed. The extent of wage-differentials between expatriate and African personnel in foreign-owned companies remained proportionally unchanged. The following data collected during the field work of this study show the extent of salary differentials between expatriate and African workers in comparable posts.³³ Table 3.3 shows the salaries of expatriates and their African counterparts in three main industries of the private sector.

TABLE 3.3 Inter-industry wages comparison between expatriate and African personnel.

TABLE 3.3A BANKING SECTOR.

Position Held	Salary (in £)		Differentials
	Expat.	Afric.	
Chairman	35,125	20,750	14,375
Managing Directors	25,575	15,800	9,775
General Managers	20,400	12,320	8,080
District Managers	15,000	10,100	4,900
Branch Managers	13,820	7,180	6,640
Accountants	12,400	6,680	5,720
Administrative Managers	12,000	5,500	6,500
Staff Manager	10,500	4,500	6,000
Signator A	8,400	3,900	4,500
Signator B	7,000	3,500	3,500

Source: Annual company returns to the Income Tax Department, Ministry of Finance, 1978.

Note: Salary differentials in this table for the posts of Chairman, Managing Director and General Manager, etc. can occur either when the post is Africanised or, as for the others, when both incumbents are still working.

TABLE 3.3B THE MINING SECTOR.

Positions	Salary (in £)		Differentials
	Expat.	Afric.	
Grade 1 Posts - Senior			
"	9,588	4,848	4,740
"	8,340	4,470	4,870
"	8,304	4,080	4,224
"	7,440	3,810	3,630
"	6,840	3,840	3,000
"	6,512	3,390	3,162
"	6,420	3,480	3,072
"	6,300	3,030	3,270
"	6,330	2,820	3,510
"	6,300	2,700	3,600

TABLE 3.3B - continued

Positions	Salary (in £)		Differentials
	Expat.	Afric.	
Grade 2 Posts	5,832	2,340	3,492
"	4,968	2,520	2,448
"	5,460	2,400	3,060
"	4,830	2,700	2,130
"	5,394	2,700	2,694
"	4,800	2,130	2,670
Grade 3 Posts	3,375	2,425	950
"	4,250	3,050	1,200
"	3,425	2,325	1,100
"	3,605	2,275	1,330
"	3,750	2,125	1,575
"	3,425	2,225	1,200
"	3,725	2,475	1,300
"	3,400	2,325	1,075
"	3,425	2,255	1,170
"	3,650	2,175	1,425

Source: from the company payrolls, annual returns to the Income Tax Department for the year 1978/79.

TABLE 3.3C THE OIL COMPANIES.

Positions	Salary (in £)		Differentials
	Expat.	Afric.	
Chairman	15,000	10,000	5,000
Managing Director	10,320	7,125	2,875
General Manager	8,000	5,000	3,000
District Manager	7,943	4,500	3,443
Sales Manager	7,620	4,800	2,820
Chief Accountant	9,325	5,670	3,655
Internal Auditor	8,120	5,700	2,420
Personnel Manager	6,020	4,900	1,120
District Engineer	6,180	4,900	1,280
Operations Manager	6,120	5,000	1,120

Source: Compiled from the Annual Returns of companies to the Income Tax Department of the Ministry of Finance, 1978/79.

The data in Tables 3.3A, B and C are meant to support the earlier hypothesis that the extent of wage differentials in the private sector between expatriates and their African counterparts varies widely from industry to industry, from employer to employer and even within the same industry and

employer. This has tended to create a wage structure which demarcates the work force into two segments not in line with the theories of labour market segmentation discussed above - between white and blue collar workers or on occupational lines - but between expatriate and local employees.

In the banking sector (Table 3.3A) an expatriate chairman of a bank earns £14,375 per annum, more than an African chairman who succeeds him in the same bank or another bank. An expatriate managing director earns £25,575 per annum while an African employed in the same capacity in the same bank or another bank receives £15,800 per annum, £9,775 less than the expatriate counterpart. The pattern continues right to the ~~least~~ senior employee in the banking industry.

In both mining and oil industries, although they pay lower salaries and wages than the banking industry, the expatriates' earnings superiority over their African counterparts is also apparent. Even if allowances for expatriation pay are ignored, the income disparity between an African employee and his European counterpart is rather disturbingly wide. For example, the expatriation allowances for the oil companies in Sierra Leone is reported to be 15 per cent of basic pay. Using the information contained in Table 3.3C above, if the 15 per cent expatriation allowance is removed, an annual salary of £13,043 is left for an expatriate chairman, i.e. he is still earning £3,043 more than his local counterpart or his successor. The situation is worse

in the banking sector where the writer was informed that the expatriation allowance is 20 per cent of basic pay and is not taxable. For the expatriate chairman of one of the expatriate-owned banks, if the 20 per cent expatriation allowance is removed (£5,854) he would still be receiving £29,270 per annum while his African successor would be receiving £8,570 less per annum.

The position becomes more apparent if the analysis is reduced to a single firm situation. The extent of wage differentials between two groups of employees classified as expatriate and senior African employees is more marked over a period of 12 years. To give an overall picture of wage distribution in this company, a second group of African workers classified as Intermediate and Daily rated is included (see Table 3.4 below). The first conclusion to be drawn from Table 3.4 is that the average salary of expatriates has more than doubled between 1964 and 1975, by 117 per cent, representing an annual increase of 7.3 per cent, while the average salary of a senior African employee has only increased by 73 per cent over the same period, representing an annual increase of 5.1 per cent (all in money terms). In groups 3 and 4 together, the average annual wages of all African workers put together for the years 1964, 1970 and 1975 will be £537.38, £732.33 and £960.60 against expatriate average annual earnings for the same period of £3,196, £4,182 and £6,949 respectively.

TABLE 3.4 Wages distribution in a mining company in Sierra Leone (£)

Year	No. of Exp.	Average Salary		No. of Senior African	Average Salary		No. of Intermed African	Average Salary		No. of Daily Wage	Average Wage
		1	2		3	4					
1964	124	3,196	1,149	47	381	£313.56	2,374	£149.58			
1965	119	3,510	1,259	58	425	332.0	2,476	158.0			
1966	112	3,455	1,395	70	439	352.0	2,577	171.00			
1967	100	3,539	1,387	76	442	345.0	1,895	168.00			
1968	100	3,932	1,441	75	468	354.0	1,951	188.00			
1969	101	3,856	1,483	84	514	390.0	2,091	216.0			
1970	98	4,182	1,607	113	599	373.0	2,218	217.0			
1971	97	4,354	1,632	131	635	393.0	2,178	224.0			
1972	97	4,954	1,754	132	621	421.0	2,039	240.0			
1973	89	5,630	1,965	141	580	462.0	1,904	264.0			
1974	65	6,887	1,980	154	559	515.0	1,848	302.0			
1975	63	6,949	1,992	170	560	550.0	1,890	380.0			

Source: Compiled and computed from the records of the former Sierra Leone Development Company, Iron Ore Mines at Marampa, Sierra Leone, 1978.

The second conclusion is that there was no reduction in the ratio of expatriate earnings to local earnings. In money terms the average salary of an expatriate for the same years (1964, 1970 and 1975) is 2.78, 2.60 and 3.49 times more than the average salary of a senior African employee, respectively. Again, if Groups 3 and 4 are included, the average salary of an expatriate will be 10 times more than Groups 3 (Intermediate) and 21.3 times more than Group 4 (Daily Rated) in 1964; in 1970, 11 and 19.27 times more than Group 3 and 4; and in 1975, 12.63 and 20.43 times more than the intermediate and daily rated African workers in the company.

An expatriate Personnel Director of this company might accept the fact that his company pays its expatriate personnel three times, 11 times and 20 times more than their senior African counterparts, intermediate staff and the daily rated workers respectively. He would then point out from the same Table 3.4 that there is also an income disparity between the senior African employee and his intermediate compatriot in the same proportion as the gap between him and his expatriate counterpart (see Table 3.4). The questions will then arise, what are the causes of the labour market segmentation and in what line?

From the available evidence so far discussed, the causes of the labour market segmentation in the private sector enumerated above come from the demand side of the labour market. On the supply side, the major emphasis on

formal educational qualifications as prerequisites for employment, together with the general dearth of high-level manpower available in less developed countries, can contribute to the size of inter-occupational income differentials but cannot be the cause of it. And the line in which it is segmented is neither on tribal nor on occupational terms, but between expatriate and local employees. The fact is, the whole question of the existence of a dual salary structure, dual labour market in the private sector, rests on the demand side of the market - the employment practices of foreign-owned firms which give preference to employing their own nationals in positions of higher responsibilities than the local people.³⁴

3.3 The Employment Practices of Multinationals.

Tables 3.1a and b and subsequent analysis in the last two sections indicated that the picture of employment in the private sector showed an expatriate preponderance in all high-level positions with high remuneration which set them apart from their African counterparts. However, it is important to note that such practice varied from firm to firm depending on the home country of the employer. For example, in the survey referred to earlier, European controlled firms have done better in employing Africans in senior positions than the Indian and Lebanese controlled firms. Even among the European based firms, there were variations among them; depending on the employment prac-

tices of individual firms. Such variation in employment procedures of foreign-based multi-national corporations can best be discussed under Perlmutter's conceptual classifications of the employment policies of the multi-national corporation in developing countries.³⁵

Basing his classification on the recruitment pattern of the multinational corporations, Perlmutter identified three behaviour characteristics of foreign-owned firms.

First, the Ethnocentric multi-national corporations - these generally wholly own overseas subsidiaries which are managed by individuals of the country in which the corporation is based. They are in effect a cultural, as well as an economic extension of the parent corporation.

The second, Polycentric multi-nationals - these often have local participation in the capital ownership of their subsidiaries which are managed by citizens of the host countries. The cultural pattern of management is predominantly local (see the introduction).

The third, Geocentric multi-nationals, are international in their management structure. Staff are appointed purely on the basis of the best man for the job, irrespective of nationality. The cultural climate of the corporation is like an international agency of the United Nations divorced entirely from the pursuit of the national interest of any ethnic group or nation state.

There are in fact no truly geocentric corporations in being at the present time, but Perlmutter believes that by

the end of this century the world's trade will be dominated by three hundred corporations of this type. He cited such corporations as I.B.M., Nestles, Unilever and Shell to have come closer to being geocentric in their employment policies, but all of these corporations at the present time are in the last resort dominated by the interest of their primary shareholders who are highly concentrated and not spread evenly over the areas of the world in which these corporations engage in their activities. They are also at the top managed in terms of cultural style and to a large extent in ethnic composition by persons drawn from the countries in which the parent organisation had their origin and are located.

Perlmutter is convinced that technological, economic, political and social factors will bring a progressive transition from ethnocentric and polycentric corporations to geocentric corporations.³⁶ In the long run, Perlmutter may be correct, but in the immediate future there are substantial obstacles to the development of truly geocentric corporations.

At the present time the countries in which multinational corporations have their legal headquarters and majority shareholders would be extremely reluctant to agree to a transfer of the ultimate control of these corporations' activities elsewhere.

Moreover, there are technical reasons why multinational corporations are becoming in certain respects more not less centralised in their decision-making. The development of modern communications (the aeroplane, telex and telephone) has made it possible for the head office to exercise a more immediate and direct control over subsidiaries and the men on the spot. The computer has, at the same time, provided the rationale for centralised decisions, since it increasingly enables a central board to manage its total resources in the most efficient way. These developments suggest that while the corporation of the future may be geocentric in the sense that its trading and staff may be increasingly international, its capital and its critical decisions are likely to remain under highly centralised control, and political pressures bearing on the present corporation. In fact, in Sierra Leone, what seemed to happen is the reverse of Perlmutter's order of progression. There, the geocentric stage becomes the second stage and polycentric the last of development. In the Sierra Leonean setting, foreign-owned companies have tended to be more ethnocentric in their employment policies than geocentric. However, the degree to which a corporation can either be geo- or ethno-centrics would depend on the extent of its activities, i.e. local or international. For example, Lebanese and Indian companies locally registered with head offices in Sierra Leone have tended to be more or wholly ethnocentric, while the European and American

controlled firms, because of their trans-national activities in Africa, have tended to be both ethnocentric and geocentric, eg. the Standard Bank, a subsidiary of the British Chartered Groups of Banks with head office in London, has branches in all former British territories in Africa. In West Africa, its regional head office is in Lagos, Nigeria. The same thing is also true of the Barclays Bank D.C.O., and the oil companies such as Shell, B.P., Texaco, Mobil., etc.

Polycentric, on the other hand, is the desired stage of all African governments for all foreign-owned companies to operate. The policy objectives of any private sector Africanisation is to bring, where possible, all foreign-owned firms under local management control, to conform to local economic policies - indigenisation of ownership, control and management (see Introduction above).

In similar terms, Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers observed three types of management recruitment processes analogous to Perlmutter's ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric types: Patrimonial, political and professional management.³⁷

Kerr, et al. described patrimonial management to be one in which ownership, major policy making positions and significant proportion of other top jobs in the hierarchy are held by members of an extended family. The effective decision-making authority is concentrated in the family, the goals of the enterprise are oriented towards the interest of the family, and its aspirations. Most Indians

and Lebanese-owned enterprises are managed in this way.

Professional management, like geocentric on the other hand, is the enterprise management in which major policy-making positions and nearly all other positions in the hierarchy are held by persons on the basis of claimed or demonstrated technical qualifications. In professional management, technical ability, experience, education, knowledge of the organisation, and ability to impress people who make decisions are more important than family or political connections. Most transnational firms practice this form of management recruitment procedures.

Finally, political management is less common, and like patrimonial management, the chances for survival are slim in modern industrial societies. Political management exists where ownership, major policy-making, and key administrative posts are held by persons on the basis of party political affiliation and loyalties. Access is thus dominated by political considerations and the orientations and interest of management are coloured throughout by political goals. However, just as patrimonial management may hire professionals to work under its direction, so political management may enlist the services of professionally trained managers and technicians. A good example (already cited in Part I) is the case of Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation and the Port Authority, both have contract expatriate management.

Using both Perlmutter and Kerr, et al. classifications, one can examine some of the influences of cultural factors

on recruitment practices and procedures of private sector foreign employers, in Sierra Leone.

The essential characteristics of the ethnocentric corporation's managerial philosophy is that it prefers to employ as managers of its subsidiary companies nationals of the home country. For instance, British companies operating in Sierra Leone prefer to employ British nationals in the more responsible management positions and also the French (see Table 3.5 below). The reasoning behind this preference is that the manager of the subsidiary company should possess a certain knowledge and experience which can only be acquired by first working in the headquarters of the organisation, a belief that home-recruited staff are more to be trusted and will be more efficient than staff recruited from the host country, the highly-skilled staff required are more easily found in the home country.

TABLE 3.5 SENIOR PERSONNEL LIST OF A FOREIGN-OWNED MINING COMPANY, 1975.

<u>Position (Grade)</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Afr.</u>	<u>Exp.</u>
Management	10	1	9
Grade IA senior staff	3	-	3
Grade IB senior staff	20	3	17
Grade II senior staff	46	11	35
Grade III senior staff	87	52	35
Grade IV senior staff	65	65	-
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>231</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>99</u>

Source: Collected from the Personnel Office of the company.

The extent to which foreign companies, particularly American and European based companies, operate in Sierra Leone, hold these views has been revealed by Tables

3.5 above and 3.8 below, and the 1965 manpower survey which put the size of expatriate employment in the private sector at 1,221 (Table 3.1); the majority of them were United Kingdom nationals; virtually all of them were employed in key management positions (see Table 3.8 below). Since the cost of employing an expatriate has been estimated to be substantially greater than the cost of employing a locally recruited manager (see Tables 3.3A, B and C above), it is clear that overseas-based trans-national companies regard their home-recruited managers as considerably superior. For example, in an interview with the managing director of one of the mining operations in Sierra Leone (U.K. based) on the recruitment policies of his company, among other things, he said that there were certain jobs which could not be seen as being localised in the foreseeable future. Those jobs he defined as "jobs of a highly specialised nature requiring considerable experience, not at present available in Sierra Leone."³⁸

However, the managing director pointed out that his company was making all efforts to bring in as many Sierra Leonean nationals into senior staff cadre as could be possible but that it would take some time before complete Africanisation of different positions can be achieved. He further said, "With regard to the recruitment of Sierra Leoneans in the company, cognizance must be taken of the fact that they must not block the way for young Sierra Leoneans training overseas under the auspices of the company,

and who are expected to return in a few years time, as these men," he said, "have been earmarked for filling the positions now held by their expatriate counterparts."

Looking at the list of both expatriate and African senior personnel (summarised in Table 3.5 above), it was observed that one clear principle which went throughout the list was the fact that the African personnel were under-represented in the first three categories of senior grades. The list revealed that all the posts but one in the management positions were held by expatriates. The managing director was asked to comment on why it was so.

In his reply, the managing director said, "I am not aware of any Sierra Leonean qualified and capable enough to undertake jobs specified in the first three categories such as jobs in the superintendent cadre, eg. being mines superintendent, hill superintendent or plant instructor, to name a few. There," he continued, "are some of the difficulties which we have been facing for quite a long time in the recruitment of Sierra Leoneans to these positions."

In any case, he ended by saying that Sierra Leoneans were receiving the necessary training in various fields of operations in the company, some of whom have been earmarked for promotions or appointments to those positions in due course.

In addition, the managing director gave an outline of the company's employment procedures. He said that when a vacancy occurred, the first step taken by the company was to

consult the training schemes provided under that particular post. If no Sierra Leonean was currently in training for the post, the head office in London is informed of the vacancy and at the same time told that no local person was available for recruitment. Continuing, the managing director stated that this was followed by the request and particularly for the necessary advertisement in the press both in Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom. He admitted, however, that the company had not insisted in the past upon finding locally qualified people. Very little advertisement was being done in Sierra Leone before resorting to advertisement in the United Kingdom.

The use of staff from head office as managers is widespread among the commercial banks and enterprises in Sierra Leone. Among the former, the reasons often given for applying for additional expatriate quotas were to relieve an expatriate senior manager or branch manager going on leave to the United Kingdom or to replace an expatriate whose tour of office has expired, etc.³⁹

With regard to the Indian and Lebanese enterprises, a more apposite description of their employment policy is the patrimonial type. They usually start as family business which requires some degree of personal commitment. Although some of them have grown locally to the sizes of the multinational corporations to justify their ethnocentric or patrimonial employment practices.

On the other hand, the multinational or trans-national corporation with a polycentric type of organisation is willing to employ managers recruited locally. It accepts this situation in the belief that local managers will be more capable of understanding the local situation; they will not be an alien element and come into conflict with other staff or the environment in which they work. These factors, it is assumed, will make them more efficient than outsiders. Behind these assumptions, however, may well lie the fact that the transnational corporation has bought a going concern, rather than created a new enterprise. Where a multi-national corporation buys in either to extend the market for its own product, to obtain control of a rival, to secure technical knowledge, or simply to participate in a successful business that is vulnerable to a take-over, and it leaves a substantial element of local capital holding, it is likely to leave a considerable degree of management.

It sometimes happened, however, that foreign-owned firms become dissatisfied with the performance and profitability of their subsidiary under local management. They then might seek to improve the performance of the subsidiary by shifting from a polycentric situation to an ethnocentric situation or something close to it. This was also true of the Sierra Leone government-owned corporations. Two of them have been de-Africanised after they had been fully Africanised, owing to the inability of its local management to run them profitably (see Chapter 2.7 above).

However, with regard to a situation where a multi-national company, having adopted a polycentric employment policy and then reverted to ethnocentric, the case of the Aureal Tobacco Company in Sierra Leone comes into mind. The Aureal Tobacco Company is one of the subsidiaries of British American Tobacco (with head office in London) in Africa. It started manufacturing cigarettes in 1960 with 16 expatriate personnel. In October 1978, during the field work of this study, the company was visited. The employment position of the company was:

Work force	419
Management staff, African	17
Senior non-management staff	51
Expatriate staff	5
TOTAL	492

Posts held by expatriates.
Managing Director
Financial Controller
Production/Factory Manager
Leaf Adviser
Technical Instructor

Before that time, the posts of Factory Manager and Financial Controller had been fully Africanised. Both posts were held by Sierra Leonean nationals. Within a few years of these appointments the company started losing money and in the factory cigarette pilfering became rampant. It was reported that the factory manager was associated with a theft scandal (not connected with the company). When C.I.D. personnel were sent to search his house, a hundred cases of cigarettes were found. The factory manager was arrested and charged, subsequently convicted. He lost his job. Both

the factory manager and the financial controller lost their jobs and were replaced not by other Africans but by European expatriates from the head office in London.

Finally, the geocentric employment practices of trans-national corporations is examined. Perlmutter believed that as multinational corporations reach a certain size and scale of operation, and they begin to take on the characteristics of the geocentric organisation, they are faced with problems of creating a corporate culture which is appropriate to their role as geocentric corporations. This means that they have to weld together teams of managers who have been educated in different national environments. Mr. Vansina, at the University of Louvain, has recently demonstrated that managers from different cultural backgrounds have different perceptions of the attributes that effective managers should possess.⁴⁰ He has also pointed out that the differences are likely to have some influence on the pattern of promotions within the multi-national corporations, though he was not yet in a position to demonstrate to significance, in this respect, the stereotypes held by the ethnic groups who were in a position to determine career development in multi-national corporations. Some of the characteristics of the geocentric organisation were to be found in each of the multinational companies already referred to as operating in Sierra Leone, namely Shell, Texaco, B.P. oil companies, the others being British American Tobacco, Barclays Bank, the Standard Bank. Within these, the major cultural

influence is still that of the parent organisation's base. The dominant national groups have a natural reluctance to appoint from outside for the reasons that emerged from Vanina's work and also for the simple technical reason that recruitments at the bottom are mainly in the headquarters. Since promotions from within are regarded as an essential feature of large-scale corporations, this has tended to maintain the strength of the dominant national groups.

In a paper presented to a conference organized by the British Institute of Management, Max Gloor, Director, Nestle Alimentana, S.A., discussed this aspect of his company. He agreed that there was a certain predominance of Swiss nationals in executive positions without monopolising these anywhere to any extent. "Nevertheless, he added, we have in each case, and at all times, done what we thought is in the best interests of the company. Adapting itself to the local scene has generally been facilitated by the type of man appointed and it is this factor more than any other which has determined the recruitment policies for overseas managers."⁴¹ In Sierra Leone, the geocentric employment policies of the trans-national companies is only limited to expatriate personnel. It was a common practice among these companies to transfer an expatriate employee of a multinational company from Sierra Leone to Kenya or Kenya to Sierra Leone. For example, the case of the Aureol Tobacco Company (subsidiary of the British American Tobacco) cited earlier was one where both the Leaf Adviser

and the Technical Instructor (British) were previously working for the British American Tobacco subsidiary in East Africa with Nairobi as regional headquarters and were transferred to Sierra Leone. The curious thing was, why not East African employees? The fact is, among their African employees, the geocentric employment practice does not seem to apply as far as the present day is concerned. In the colonial period, before the advent of the "economic nationalism"⁴² among African states, there used to exist a geocentric movement among the African personnel of some transnational companies such as the United Africa Company (UAC), Shell, B.P., Mobil, Standard Bank of West Africa, but this ceased to be the practice as each country is economically pursuing an independent policy requiring a more local control of the employment policies of these companies. For example, at present, instead of the United African Company Ltd. or Standard Bank of West Africa, as they used to be, there are now United Africa Company (S.L.) Ltd., the Standard Bank (S.L.) Ltd., (Ghana) Ltd., (Nigeria) Ltd., etc. Each of them is deemed to be autonomous in its employment policies. But the preference to employ people from the "mother country" remained.⁴³

In summary, an attempt has been made to examine the employment policies and practices of foreign-owned firms operating in Sierra Leone, within a theoretical framework. However, it must be noted that the type of employment policy pursued by individual companies or groups of companies is a

function of many variables, political, economic, sociological, etc. For example, an Indian or Lebanese-owned firm may tend to pursue ethnocentric/patrimonial employment practices, while among the European and American-based enterprises, the tendency to pursue a more ethnocentric/professional or geocentric management recruitment policy is stronger than in the Asian and Lebanese-owned enterprises. But the government policy objective of Africanisation is to make all foreign-owned firms, where practicable, adopt a polycentric recruitment policy.

3.4 The Size and Dimension of Expatriate Employment in the Private Sector.

The Manpower Survey Report of 1964 put the number of expatriates employed in the private sector of Sierra Leone economy at 1,221 (see Tables 3.1a and b above). The majority of them were employed in the professional, technical, managerial and administrative grades of their individual organisations (see Table 3.1b). That was 16 years ago. How many were they in 1978 when the field work for this study was undertaken?

It is difficult to ascertain the number of expatriates currently employed in the private sector of Sierra Leone, for the government itself has no accurate information on the exact number of expatriates either employed or in residence in Sierra Leone.⁴⁴ Foreign embassies were of some assistance, but they generally do not have complete records of

their nationals employed in Sierra Leone, only those on technical assistance, and therefore, were able to make only a rough estimate of the number likely to be employed in the private sector.

Based on what government data is available, together with the figures obtained from the embassies and the individual employers annual returns, a cautious estimate of the number of expatriates employed in the private sector is in the range of 1,500 to 2,500 but probably closer to the lower range. A brochure prepared by the Sierra Leone External Telecommunications (SLET) put the figure at 2,500 "mainly British nationals".⁴⁵ This figure does not include the self-employed, Lebanese, non-Sierra Leonean teachers (who numbered in 1977/78, 484), missionaries, doctors, nor expatriate personnel on technical assistance to the Sierra Leone Government. But of these only 1,588 were employed in established enterprises in the country and even then only 896 were employed in supervisory and above positions (Table 3.8). The rest were mainly employed on short term contracts by the companies of foreign contracting companies such as the German Road Construction Company, ABU. Total employment of both Sierra Leoneans and expatriates in the modern sector,⁴⁶ was estimated at the end of 1975 to be in the order of 101,000 and the total work force was about 1,040,000.⁴⁷ This means that only 10 per cent of the total labour force is engaged in wage employment and 2.4 per cent of that are non-Africans.

The largest concentration of expatriates is in Freetown with lesser concentration in the mining enclaves of Yengewa, Tongofield, Mokamji, Gbangbatoke, and before 1975, Marampa.

The majority of the expatriates were employed in local subsidiaries of companies with head offices in Europe or America (see Section 3.3 above). They may be hired on contract specifically to work in the Sierra Leone subsidiary or they may be seconded by the head office for a tour of duty in Sierra Leone.⁴⁸ Lebanese nationals tend to be either self-employed or associated with family operations and are largely engaged in commercial activities, although recently, an increasing number have been going into manufacturing and construction.

The pattern of expatriate employment in the private sector in Sierra Leone did not at first seem drastically different from that of expatriate employment in neighbouring West African (English speaking) countries, except perhaps that there were more of them in Sierra Leone than Ghana or Nigeria (relative to population), and that they filled a wider range of posts. A closer analysis of the expatriate employment structure (indicated in Table 3.1) since independence in 1961 reflects the relative shortage of certain skills in the economy and the recruitment policies and practices of private sector employers. Commercial firms and mining and construction still have a higher absolute number of foreign employees than any other sector of the economy, a total which continued to rise as late as 1978 (see Table 3.6 below). And while expatriate personnel in the manufacturing industry fell by 50 per cent, between 1964 and 1978, the mining operations continue to employ a sizeable number of expatriates in a wider range of jobs than any other industry - from director to skilled worker (see Table 4.2 below).

TABLE 3.6 CHANGES IN THE NUMBERS OF EXPATRIATES AND THEIR INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 1964-1978.

Industry (ISIC)	1964	1978	% Change
Division 0-Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	47	100	112.7
" 1-Mining and Quarrying	150	348	132.0
" 2/3-Manufacturing	82	40	-51.0
" 4-Building & Construction	173	300	73.4
" 5-Electricity, gas & water	30	20	-33.3
" 6-Commerce	346	500	44.5
" 7-Transport & Communication	220	180	-18.1
" 8-Services, banking, etc.	173	100	-42.1
TOTAL	1221	1588	

Source: For 1964 - Manpower Report 1964, Table II; for 1978 - collected from individual employers during field work, 1978/79.

From the table, between 1964 and 1978 there has been an increase in the overall expatriate employment from 1221 in 1964 to 1588 in 1978, an increase of 367, representing 30 per cent for the period, an average annual growth of 1.87 per cent.

The 112.7 per cent increase in expatriate employment in the agricultural industry since 1964 reflects the government's policy towards the development of agro-based industries such as the fruit canning, sugar cane refinery, large-scale commercial plantations, and also the fishing industry.

Since 1964, the increase in expatriate employment in the mining industry is due to the opening of two new mining operations - the Sierra Leone Ores and Metals Company (Swiss owned), the Sierra Rutile (American owned), and also the

impending opening of new deposits of bauxite at Port Loko District, etc. The commercial sector has rather little increase in expatriate employment. The reason is due to the government's indigenisation policy of ownership, as well as control and manpower (see the Introduction above), which restricts foreigners in certain commercial activities.⁴⁹

The other sector that has had a big increase in the number of expatriate employment is the construction industry. It has nearly doubled its share of expatriate personnel from 173 in 1964 to 300 in 1978. The increase in expatriate employment in this industry is due to government policies on new roads, new public buildings, new schools, improvements in the rural infrastructure, and also the private sector activities.

On the other hand, the decline in expatriate employment in the manufacturing industry is most noticeable between 1964 and 1978, the number of expatriates employed in this sector has dropped from 82 in 1964 to 40 in 1978. This was due to two factors. The first is the government's change of policy from post-independent emphasis on industrialisation to more agro-based industries; the second is the Africanisation policy. Similar reasons also explained why changes in the service sector, particularly in banking, insurance and the accounting firms occurred. It is clear from Table 3.6 that even after 20 years of Africanisation policy in Sierra Leone, there still exists the view that Sierra Leone cannot provide all the skilled manpower it needs. Indeed, the

demand for expatriate personnel was greater in 1978 than it was at independence. Perhaps the crucial issue is not whether expatriates are needed, for even the most developed of capitalist countries seem to need the stimulus of some imported employees, but how these expatriates are deployed. In other words, in what occupational categories are they employed, where are they and what do they do. For example, one firm or industry may have fewer expatriates than another, but these expatriates may play a more pervasive and controlling role in the organisation to the exclusion of their Sierra Leonean counterparts. Similarly, a firm may reduce the number of its expatriate employees but at the same time the overall role of these expatriates may remain the same if responsibility is not transferred to their Sierra Leonean colleagues. In other words, expatriate intensiveness is a function of positions and not mere numbers. Take for instance Table 3.8a and b as one example. The occupational distribution of expatriates revealed that in Group '0' the professional, technical and related workers, there are more Sierra Leoneans in that group, in numerical terms, than expatriates, 791 Sierra Leoneans against 655 expatriates. But when the group is broken down into various professional components, the expatriates became predominant.

Another reason why one should not rely on the use of numbers of expatriates or the ratio of expatriates to the total work force (see Table 3.7 below) as a measure of

responsiveness to Africanisation policy (Chapter 4 below) is that the number of expatriates a company or firm employs is a function of a variety of autonomous factors - including the technology involved, the length of time the industry has been established, the type of manpower skills required (Chapter 5), and the available supply of those skills (Chapter 5). Because these factors affect the need for expatriates, they must be taken into consideration in making judgements concerning the role of expatriates and the record of Africanisation. Take as an example the following Table 3.7 which shows the ratios of expatriate employees to total work force in seven selected foreign-owned companies. Three are mining companies, three manufacturing and one a banking firm.

TABLE 3.7 RATIO OF EXPATRIATE EMPLOYEES TO TOTAL WORK FORCE IN SEVEN SELECTED FOREIGN-OWNED COMPANIES.

<u>Company/Firm</u>	<u>Total Work Force</u>	<u>Exp.</u>	<u>Ratio E:TWF</u>
National Diamond Mining Company	3,500	250	1:14
Sierra Rutile	800	35	1:23
Sieromco	1,000	30	1:33
Aureal Tobacco Company	419	5	1:84
Sierra Leone Breweries	300	3	1:100
National Confectionary Company	400	25	1:16
Barclay Bank	492	9	1:47

Source: Collected from the Employment Division of the Ministry of Labour, Freetown, 1978.

From Table 3.7 above, the National Diamond Mining Company has the highest ratio of expatriates to total workforce of 1:14, followed by National Confectionary Company 1:16, and Sierra Rutile 1:23 and Sierromco 1:33 in the industry. The reason is that mining

operations are usually capital intensive with high technology. In the absence of skilled local manpower (particularly when these companies are located in remote parts of the country) expatriates were employed to fill the gap.

The two manufacturing companies, the Aural Tobacco, and the Sierra Leone Breweries have the lowest ratios of expatriates to work force (with the exception of NATCO), 1:84 and 1:100 respectively; followed by the Commercial Bank with a ratio of 1:47. In each case, as was stated earlier, the number of expatriates employed in a company is determined by the nature of the business and the level of technology.

During the field work for this study, it was found that the ratio of expatriates to total employees tended to understate the significance of expatriates in each firm which has a large labour force of skilled and semi-skilled workers. In these firms there are few expatriates compared to the total number of African employees (although the absolute number of expatriates may be high), but in many cases these expatriates hold all or nearly all management positions (see Table 3.5 above). Such firms could be termed unresponsive to Africanisation.

In other industries where companies have smaller numbers of employees or where a greater proportion of employees are technically skilled or administrative personnel, as in the mining companies, the ratio of expatriates to total employees

tends to be higher (Table 3.7). Yet in many cases, these companies will have a greater degree of Sierra Leonean participation at management level. In spite of the higher ratios, these companies are more responsive to Africanisation than those with lower ratios.

To appreciate the respective roles of expatriates and Sierra Leoneans in the private sector, it is necessary to look at the type of positions within the firm they occupy in particular to answer three main questions.

First, what was the distribution of expatriates according to managerial and supervisory functions? Second, what proportion of management positions at various levels were held by expatriates and by Sierra Leoneans? And third, what qualifications were required of both expatriates and Sierra Leoneans before they could fill a management position?

Disaggregated data on the occupational distribution of expatriate/African personnel and their educational qualifications were difficult to obtain by an individual researcher. However, with the help of the occupational and educational qualifications, classifications used by the Central Statistics Office in the 1974 population census, an employment and qualifications profile of expatriate and African personnel was constructed. For the industrial classifications, the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) is used. The keys for Tables 3.8a and 3.8b are given as Appendix III.

TABLE 3.8 EXPATRIATES AND AFRICANS IN MANAGERIAL AND SUPERVISORY POSITIONS BY POST

CATEGORY AS AT 1978.

(a) Expatriate Post Categories.

Ind.	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	01-09	01-18
'0'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	11	3	-	3	5	67	-	8	-	2	-	2	-	116	113	1	12	5	97	348
2/3	21	3	2	2	2	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	37	40
4	22	-	13	13	13	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	28	-	21	12	78	130
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	69	107	3	9	8	19	2	5	-	-	-	1	-	3	4	1	-	9	222	240
7	36	2	1	1	2	7	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	4	1	2	4	49	65
8	36	8	6	1	12	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	66	73
TOTAL	173	123	12	30	42	114	2	13	-	2	-	5	6	134	152	3	35	30	349	896

(b) African Post Categories.

Ind.	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	01-09	01-18
'0'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	7	2	1	7	11	30	10	2	3	-	-	3	3	60	62	14	70	20	72	298
2/3	11	9	-	3	5	4	2	-	-	3	-	1	4	3	26	5	1	9	34	86
4	2	-	-	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	2	-	2	5	17
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	20	38	10	8	7	3	5	3	5	-	24	2	-	27	38	17	9	30	99	246
7	2	6	4	10	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	5	5	2	28	34
8	20	8	3	7	14	26	1	13	10	12	1	7	-	14	6	13	15	11	92	253
TOTAL	62	63	18	37	77	69	18	18	18	15	25	14	7	104	137	51	100	74	380	904

Source: Computed from data collected from individual employers during the field work - September 1978 to January 1979.

Both Table 3.8(a) and (b) show a functional and industrial distribution of expatriates and African employees in managerial and supervisory grades in the private sector in Sierra Leone. Categories 01 and 02 represent the grades of managing directors, general managers, divisional managers and their assistants. In actual fact the real managerial cadre are covered in categories 01-09 and 10-18 covered the supervisory grades (see key in Appendix III), in manpower terms, it constitutes the mid-level - the technical - intermediate.

From the tables, it could be seen that the expatriates are most preponderant in the managerial and technical grades 01-04 and 14-15. In category 01, there are 173 expatriate personnel against 62 Africans in the same category. Of the total employment in this, the expatriates constitute 73.6 per cent of and the Africans 26.4 per cent, with a replacement ratio of 0.35.

The Africans were most represented in the non-technical supervisory grades (10-13 and 16-18), the clerical grades, while the expatriates have the lion's share of all the technical supervisory grades (14-15). Private sector employers defended their policies of employing expatriates in supervisory grades on the grounds of educational and skills differentials between expatriates and their African counterparts. Expatriates remain in supervisory posts because of difficulties in the existing training facilities in the country made their employment indispensable. There

is a particularly high proportion of expatriate skilled labour in new industries which have immediate need for specialists who cannot be readily trained on the spot.⁵⁰ Where the expatriates remained in the junior technical posts (17-18) they were usually classified as skilled worker as distinct from the senior skilled African workers trained on the job. There was in general a wide gulf in educational standards between expatriate and Africans in these grades (14-18) as a large number of the African workers were entirely without formal education (see Table 3.9 below).

In both the highest and lowest categories in the employment structure of the private sector, the pattern was one typical of West African countries which rely on expatriate capital and personnel for the former with a largely unskilled or semi-skilled local labour force constituting the latter (see Table 3.8). There are still many more foreign employers (mainly Europeans) than Africans employing six or more employees, for while there are thousands of Africans involved in petty trade (by the road-side) and business throughout the country, few of them have any declared or regular employees. Expatriates retain a near-monopoly of executive and managerial posts (01-09) and remain significant even among other levels of white collar workers. In Sierra Leone, the pattern in middle-level employment is rather different from that of Ghana and Nigeria, for a substantial number of expatriates are

employed in the lower categories, including junior assistants in accounts, sales and credit control. In 1976 category 18, the lowest category, contained 35 expatriates and 100 Africans.

3.5 The Pace of Africanisation.

Like the recruitment policies of foreign-owned firms (discussed in Section 3.3 above), the pace of Africanisation of the private sector varied from company to company, and from employer to employer depending on the nationality of the employer and the status of the enterprise. For example, in Table 3.9 below, the relatively low level of Africanisation by Indian firms may be explained by the tendency of these firms to start as family enterprises which provide employment and financial support for an extended family in India or Lebanon (in the case of the Lebanese). In a small firm of this type, there is little incentive to employ persons of different culture or ethnic group at the executive level, because to do so will reduce the amount of income to be distributed among the members of the family and decrease job opportunities for the family. For the European and American based firms, the economic goal is simply to produce at a satisfactory level of profits for the shareholders and re-investment capital to cover growth and depreciation using the most productive method available to meet these goals.

TABLE 3.9 EMPLOYMENT POSITION OF EXPATRIATE AND AFRICAN STAFF IN INDIAN AND EUROPEAN-OWNED FIRMS AS AT 1978.

Name of Firm	No. of Senior Staff	Afr.	Exp.
<u>European/American Owned</u>			
Sierra Leone Development Co.	231	132	99
Aureal Tobacco Co.	22	17	5
SIERROMCO	29	8	21
Barclays Bank D.Co.	56	47	9
Sierra Rutile	55	24	31
Standard Bank S.L. Ltd.	43	34	9
United African Co. S.L. Ltd.	60	45	15
<u>Indian-Owned Firms</u>			
New Indian Insurance	4	-	4
NATCO	25	3	22
Chaurai Chemicals	30	6	24
J.T. Chamrai Ltd.	25	5	20
K. Challarau Ltd.	12	4	8
Choithram and Sons Ltd.	50	40	10

Source: Annual Employment Returns to the Ministry of Labour 1978.

There are, however, some independent factors which have increased the rate of Africanisation at a slow but steady pace. Expatriate personnel, even though considered more efficient and reliable by employers and managers, are much more expensive. Not only are salary levels for expatriate personnel generally higher in developing countries than in advanced countries (see Table 3.3a, b and c and Table 3.4), but it is often necessary to pay personnel some form of "inducements bonus," to persuade them to accept service abroad. In addition to these higher direct payments, employers are frequently forced to provide all sorts of fringe benefits for the expatriate staff which are either

not necessary in the case of local employees, whether in advanced or developing countries. As one expatriate employer admitted during an interview with him:

Naturally, I would prefer to employ Africans to replace Europeans because the former costs so much less to maintain. Three month's leave with pay every year is not obligatory and does not have to look after the problems of getting them settled in Sierra Leone, being concerned about their adaptability and introduction to the social milieu.⁵¹

The effects of these fringe benefits is to raise the cost of labour to about double the direct cost, although the actual ratio will depend upon conditions in the country of employment. For example, the cost of expatriate skilled labour is higher in the Zambian copper mines than in the Sierra Leone diamond mines. Table 3.10 below compares such costs.

TABLE 3.10 AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGES OF TWO MINING OPERATIONS IN ZAMBIA AND SIERRA LEONE FOR THE YEARS 1971-1975 FOR THEIR EXPATRIATE PERSONNEL (CONVERTED INTO POUNDS STERLING).

	<u>£ = 0.77</u>	<u>£ - 2 leons (1973)</u>
<u>Year</u>	<u>Zambian Copper</u>	<u>Sierra Leone Diamond</u>
1971	£5,994.45	£4,182.00
1972	7,227.99	4,954.00
1973	8,650.18	5,630.00
1974	9,992.29	6,887.00
1975	9,997.68	6,949.00

Source: Zambia Copper from Africanisation, Nationalisation and Equality, Table 7.5 Annual Average Earnings in Zambian

Copper Mines by Phillip Daniel, 1970, p. 152; for Sierra Leone, Annual Returns to the Income Tax Department, 1975.

Given the higher basic wage paid to expatriates than to local staff (see Table 3.3), the total labour cost of expatriates was from two to three times as high. Thus, provided local personnel could approach the productivity of expatriates, the policy of Africanisation could be expected to have a beneficial effect on a firm's profits and loss accounts. More usually, there could not be a one-for-one replacement of expatriates by Africans, at least initially, because of the lack of experience among the latter. To the extent that the replacement ratio tended towards the labour-cost ratio, the inducement to Africanise was reduced.⁵² Other things being equal, the rate at which Africanisation proceeded could be expected to accelerate once the initial inertia had been overcome.⁵³

In addition, there were a number of other factors which favoured the employment of local personnel, though the strength of these varied considerably according to the nature of both the firms operations and the actual job concerned. For example, in jobs which were concerned with sales promotion or personnel administration, it was often found that the local employees' familiarity with the country's people and institutions gave them an advantage over expatriates in this type of work (see Table 3.8 above). For the same reason, firms often found it politic to retain local professionals in advisory capacities even when there was little demand for their professional

services - for the sake of the business connections which they bring with them.⁵⁴

Given the benefits which private sector employers stood to gain from a policy of Africanisation, the question to be answered is why its implementation has proved to be so tardy. The conventional answer to this question points to the insufficient supply of suitable personnel in the country. This was clearly an important factor but does not seem to be the whole story since it omits at least one of the important factors operating on the demand side.

First, the supply side - there were still not enough well trained Africans to replace all Europeans, especially those high-level managerial or professional posts (see Table 3.8). The problem therefore was not entirely to be viewed from costs-benefits analysis. It was a problem of replacement of foreign personnel by Sierra Leonean personnel. If the basic premise is accepted, that is the maintenance in fact of current level of efficiency, then the local replacements must be comparable in quality to the displaced expatriate personnel. In other words, strictly speaking, the problem here is one of displacements of skills. Quality in this connection is determined essentially and fundamentally by two things: the first is the basic education and training of people, and the second is by experience. It would appear that in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa, attention in the past had been focussed more on the second, that is to say, experience, and basic education and training,

particularly in the case of the local recruits, had been relatively neglected or rather, the attitude to it had been one of indifference. This is amply demonstrated in Table 3.11 a and b below. Some 506 out of 896 expatriate management and supervisory personnel in the firms included in the study, and 567 of the 904 Africans, have no background educational qualifications beyond school certificate or the equivalent and in several cases below that level. Speculatively, the reasons for this may be manifold. They may vary from a rationalisation in order to perpetuate the colonial system to the lack of institutions locally for gaining the specific type of education and training or the lack of incentives for emphasising the importance for such job opportunities of the specific type of education and training or they may be due to stereotypes in social attitudes which in fact discourage such types of activities, or they may be due to the discouragement by existing expatriate management, itself because of self-preservation, or of its own lack of understanding of the problem.

The problem of replacement itself must be seen in a dynamic light. In the first place, there was the replacement of existing foreign personnel. Then there was the replacement of personnel which might be the result of normal retirement or the appearance of incidental gaps and so on. There was also the necessity to project future demand. Thus, if expansion takes place and provision is not made to meet the need for personnel that expansion entails, then it would

TABLE 3.11 EXPATRIATE AND AFRICAN EMPLOYEES BY QUALIFICATIONS - 1978.

(a) Expatriate Employees by Qualifications.

Ind.	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	00-17
'0'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	199	5	3	6	1	2	28	5	6	6	3	-	5	-	37	38	2	5	350
2/3	15	7	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	2	-	-	40
4	46	1	-	-	-	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	60	1	2	119
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	163	13	2	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	33	23	-	-	240
7	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	6	3	-	63
8	45	4	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	8	2	2	3	3	8	2	4	-	84
TOTAL	506	32	7	10	2	3	32	7	7	14	6	2	7	4	188	128	10	7	896

(b) African Employees by Qualifications.

Ind.	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	00-17
0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	179	2	2	10	1	17	2	8	-	2	2	2	4	-	15	32	12	-	298
2/3	53	2	1	4	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	4	10	5	1	86
4	11	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	17
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	168	7	9	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	23	23	2	-	246
7	65	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	12	1	-	-	81
8	92	17	-	4	-	5	1	-	-	4	3	3	-	11	12	9	-	-	176
TOTAL	567	30	12	18	1	26	4	8	1	2	9	7	6	2	67	79	28	1	904

Source: Computed as Table 3.8 above. Key is attached as Appendix 3.

become necessary to satisfy the demand for increased management by reverting to the employment of expatriates.⁵⁴ Thus, replacement without projection of demand may lead to a reversal of the move to Africanise. If future demand exceeds future supply, the supply can only be satisfied by the use of expatriates or the development and expansion will be embarrassed or checkmated. Hence replacement in a dynamic sense would embrace not only the demand for immediate replacement but also the future expansion of demand. This requires projection of future demand which are directly linked up with expected growth rate in businesses and development plans.(Table 5.17).

In Table 3.8a above, the total number of expatriates in the private sector employment was 896. If complete Africanisation was the immediate objective, then it meant the 896 expatriates need to be replaced with Africans. If the government views on this are held to be serious, then expatriate personnel need to be replaced in the first stage. The horizontal subtotals in Table 3.8 above provides the numbers which were required in each category to effect displacement. These indicated quite clearly that categories 01 and 02 totalling 312 were crucial. Indeed, these were the groups which were founded on management education and training distributed over by on-the-job-training in each category or group of businesses or industry. Categories 03-05 were essentially professional accountants and 06 were engineers. Categories 14 and 15 were

inflated by the security services and a number of middle technical and engineering personnel in the mining industry, mainly. There was no reason given why the special security services of these mining companies could not be fully Africanised by then and so ease the unemployment problems among Africans. Some of these categories had to be combed fine (particularly in the 10 to 18 categories which were melanges) so as to differentiate the engineers from the accountants and indeed engineers of various categories - mechanical, civil, mining and electrical. Here, however, one has a first approximation of the dimension of the problem of Africanising the private sector employment. This does not take account of growth. The indication seemed to be that the business community assumed an annual growth rate of the order of 10 per cent. If this was correct, the policy must also provide allowances - particularly in planning training - for such increase. Otherwise, not only would the policy itself be frustrated but the progress of the economy would be retarded.

Table 3.8(a) above compared to 3.8(b) gives an easy feeling that the solution of the problem presented in the latter is a simple one. From the overall point of view the divergence in number is slight and therefore it would seem the solution would be to move the Africans already occupying these places into the places of the expatriates and so on. This is a vain illusion. Many of the Sierra Leoneans in these categories had only been

promoted and others were nearing their retirement. Considering the past recruitment policies of businesses (Section 3.3) several of these Sierra Leoneans had already reached their limit. They have entered these categories practically only through on-the-job training without the requisite educational and professional background.

However, it has been earlier noted that the shortage of qualified personnel was not the only factor involved in Africanisation. The advantages enjoyed by these expatriates while working in Sierra Leone or Black Africa in general, and their attitudes towards the African workers, constituted a formidable obstacle to the pace of Africanisation.

There are certain obvious personal advantages to expatriate employees working in Sierra Leone, especially those in the first third of their careers who seek to take advantage of the opportunity. Young expatriates look upon overseas employment chiefly as a means of advancement. Promotion prospects were written into some contracts as one of the rewards of service overseas. And for others, advancement which could be expected in overseas positions with the firm on return to Europe or America. For these reasons young expatriates often sought jobs with firms which required a certain amount of overseas operations. The most important attraction in taking a job overseas remains, however, not in advancement, but in earning power. Salaries are set at approximately 35 to 40 per cent above

the basic in their home countries (see Table 3.3 above) for a given job in order to compensate for the increased cost of living and expenses defined as "expatriate costs". And since most expatriates saved this increase by purchasing only the basic necessities overseas, it can be deposited as savings in a bank account in Europe or America. The average expatriate salary in the private sector in Sierra Leone as at 1978 prices was £6,000 per annum.

excluding the cost of transportation, children's education at home and housing , which are provided by the employer for all expatriate contracts.⁵⁵

Among the general advantages of being in Africa mentioned by the respondents, they cited the material benefits. Among those who cited the accumulation of savings as most significant advantage, all except a few who were privately employed, while it was ironically the technical assistants who were traditionally accused by the members of the private sector of living in deliberately austere circumstances in order to accumulate savings. Another major advantage which was mentioned was the availability of domestic servants employed by all Europeans (at the expense of the company) which would have been beyond the means of the majority of the expatriates when resident in their respective countries in Europe or America.

These factors contributed to an explanation of why many Europeans interviewed considered working conditions to be superior in Sierra Leone to those in Europe or

America. Among the advantages specifically related to working conditions which were cited by the expatriate respondents were professional advancement and more diversity and responsibility on the job. Some expanded on this by explaining that in the United Kingdom, for example, they were compartmentalised into a small slot of work, whereas in Sierra Leone, they had much more varied tasks to perform and more freedom and individual initiative in performing them. They naturally, therefore, found overseas jobs to be much more interesting, more satisfying, and they also appreciated the lack of rigidity and strictness in working hours. Several also mentioned the relaxed working conditions and easy transportation to and from work as compared with the 'frantic' pace of work and travel in their home countries' major cities. Life in Sierra Leone for expatriate personnel took on a naturally slow pace of its own - partly a function of the tropical climate and partly reinforced by the traditionally easy rhythm of expatriate life in such environment. One of the most distinctive advantages of expatriate working conditions was considered to be "Senior Staff Club", a European club. Proudfoot and Wilson provided a picturesque description of an expatriate club in Freetown as follows:

Moreover, it is 'Africanisation' rather than independence which threatens their traditional social life. After the day's work, with its inevitable strain of culture contacts and

language problems, it was pleasant to withdraw into expatriate clubs. These though they varied among themselves, were alike being exclusive and became both symbols of communal unity and agencies of social control.⁵⁶

In these clubs, the atmosphere among expatriate employees is cordial. The relationship between an executive and a more junior employee was much closer and more amicable than would have been the case in Britain. Several expatriate employees of the companies visited mentioned how the ease of personal contact and European solidarity provided a pleasant working atmosphere.

The disadvantages of working in Sierra Leone which were mentioned by those expatriates interviewed were in particular the heavy responsibility and work load they had to assume because they felt they were not adequately supported by their African colleagues or subordinates. Certain of them felt that the Sierra Leoneans were generally difficult to work with, others considered that the Sierra Leoneans did not work as hard as their European counterparts and that they were slow and lacked initiative.

The actual output of African workers, its limitations and deficiencies have been analysed in a number of studies.⁵⁷ On general aptitude, Africans workers showed identical scores to European workers, but on practical tests, there was a net difference between outputs when the employee was permitted to organise his own work. Thus, African labourers

in routine jobs, or on assembly lines, have exactly the same output, given equal conditions, as their European counterparts, but in jobs demanding decisions and organisation the African labourer was less effective. It was also found that Africans trained to take over supervisory posts in industries from expatriates did not always possess all the "non-technical qualities" required to make efficient foremen. The appropriate technical skills, knowledge and aptitude for promotion were often found among workers who lacked more general education or the personal authority and adaptability to handle unforeseen and (for them) unprecedented difficulties arising in production.⁵⁸

Part of the explanation for the differences in output and performance lies in the general problem of transforming a peasant or the son of a peasant into a factory or mines workshop worker.⁵⁹ This transformation from a domestic mode of production to factory or workshop modes usually requires some degree or stages of commitments which a substantial number of African workers have not yet reached their final stage of adjustment - the third and fourth stages.⁶⁰

While the European, on the other hand, often has a tradition of industrial experience behind him, where his father and even grandfather were familiar with the working environment of the factory, the African does not. He is usually a first generation employee or labourer, whose father and grandfather were peasant farmers or roadside hawkers, whose methods of work were often incompatible

with the new demands made of him. Such factors may partially explain why it was found that African skilled workers had little desire for advancement in the industrial context,⁶¹ an attitude condemned by their European counterparts as "I don't care-ism", the words used to describe African behaviour at work by some of the expatriates interviewed during the field study.

Generalisation concerning the behaviour of African workers and officials were abundant throughout among private sector employers and their expatriate counterparts as well: their lack of practical knowledge, their inability to plan ahead, their lack of professional conscientiousness and their ineptitude in financial matters were felt to contribute to their generally low level of output. These were most often expressed in the same phrases (reflecting Douglas McGregor's Theory X):⁶²

"They are indolent by nature."

"They have no courage."

"They have no taste for work in their blood."

"They don't look further than the work specifically demanded of them or have the mentality to carry it to conclusion."

"They lack initiative and a sense of responsibility."

"They lack a sense of rigour or duty in their character."

"They are non-chalant; the time of day has no significance to them."⁶³

The point here to be examined is, however, not the truth or otherwise of these assertions, but rather the

nature of the explanation given for that which is believed to be true by expatriates. One such explanation is based on the physical and climatic conditions of the working environment. A second, relied on a priori sweeping judgements of the racial, national or cultural characteristics of all Africans, the corollary of which was to attribute observed behaviour to specific personality characteristics which were seen as biologically or culturally determined. A third, was to associate observed behaviour with a certain stage of human and cultural evolution, which it was believed could be directly related to the stage of socio-economic development of the country itself. The fourth category of explanation relied on economic or social factors present in the existing situation - that is the inexperience of newly trained executives and employees, underemployment, owing to redundancy or the lack of appropriate education or training at all levels. Another is that the comments say more about the speakers than the subjects of the comments.

The tropical climate and poor nutrition are explanations for poor work output which have at least some basis for possible verification. While the Sierra Leonean diet is considerably better than that of some other peoples in the underdeveloped world, it is certainly not as rich in vitamin or protein intake as an average European diet. The tropical climate seems to have some influence on work output which affects Africans and Europeans alike.

Those who felt that sub-standard work was culturally determined attributed this to such factors as African family structure, child-rearing pattern, etc. The causal relationship of such beliefs to inferior work output is, however, quite difficult to certify.

Other explanations for low African work output could be related, perhaps, to a lower standard of demand made on Africans in Sierra Leone than, for example, in the equivalent context in Britain. Since expatriates on the job were available to pick up where Africans left off, a European standard of demand was hardly ever applied.

At the executive level, the preparation of an African employee was usually done personally by the departing European boss whose place he was supposed to take. This was an unfortunate but inevitable means of achieving this specialised preparation, and it was often done in an unfortunate atmosphere. Feeling a certain amount of resentment over impending departure, the European may find it actually rather difficult to explain these functions to his African subordinate. The following description of such a situation was given by a young Sierra Leonean executive with a medium size manufacturing company in Freetown:

My superior had six weeks to prepare me to do his work, but he did nothing. On the last day he handed me an enormous dossier and said, "Here it is." The actual know-how of executive and managerial positions is kept a well-guarded secret between Europeans themselves.

This happens at many levels of employment and training. Africans are frequently poorly prepared for the tasks they are supposed to perform, and they learn at best on an ad hoc basis. In industry:

When top management of a firm decides to Africanise, it must rely on local management who must (in turn) rely on expatriate supervisors. Most expatriate supervisors do not have the capacity to provide adequate training up to now, they have been absolute masters in their own department; they exercised a paternalistic authority over their African staff and had powers to dismiss their subordinates. There was no incentive for expatriate supervisors to raise the technical abilities of their African teams; indeed, the very authority of an expatriate supervisor (often of mediocre ability) rested on the incapacity of his African subordinate.⁶⁴

Although this description hardly tallies with the impression given by some of the expatriate supervisors interviewed in the field study, but it was corroborated by a final category of respondents (25) who rejected cultural inferiority as the basis of explanation for the poor performance of African employees. Among the line

supervisors (15) interviewed, none mentioned African racial inferiority as an explanation for inferior or low work output. Having the most direct contact with African workers on the shop floor, they were perhaps in a better position than most Europeans to judge deficiencies which they attributed to lack of training and adequate preparation for the job. Their assessment is particularly interesting because it was their position, above all which were threatened with Africanisation; fear or sense of competition with African subordinates did not necessarily lead them to the prejudice-based stereotypes found among some groups of expatriate workers (10) interviewed. In sum, for the time being, the advantages enjoyed by expatriates working in Africa, and Sierra Leone in particular, and the stereotype views they hold of their African counterparts, among many others presented obstacles to the success of any Africanisation policy (Chapter 4).

So far attention has been concentrated on the strictly economic, supply, and psychological aspects of the problem, but in discussing this question, considerable prominence was generally given to the sociological factors. This was especially true when dealing specifically with Africanisation, since it was often maintained that there are certain characteristics of African social organisation and personality structure which accentuate the difficulties of Africanisation in Africa. It is also worth noting that the view that Africans do not easily adapt to the require-

ments of an industrial society is held by both Africans and Europeans; the former maintain that industrial development in Africa will be on uniquely African lines, in order to fit in with the African personality; while the latter maintain that industrial development will only come about at all on condition that African social structure is transformed into something near to the European model.⁶⁵

A typical example of the latter point of view - which is the relevant one when considering the advancement of Africans in foreign-owned enterprises - was given in a booklet on African private enterprise:

In Africa, as in other traditional societies the primary obligations are to the family as the basic social unit - and the family often extends to literally hundreds of people.

These traditional family obligations require that African entrepreneurs will provide jobs for their relatives; they may also strengthen African reluctance to enter partnerships with non-members of the family or tribe or to entrust outsiders employed in the business with important responsibilities.⁶⁶

Although these remarks were mainly directed to the question of local ownership, they are clearly also relevant to the question of advancement of local employees in foreign firms. If this view is correct, employers will be understandably anxious lest their African workers allow

family and tribal obligations to override their business responsibilities, and hence be reluctant to promote them. There is no doubt that this view was strongly held by expatriate management, for example, in Sierra Leone during the field work for this study an expatriate employer commented:

If you employ an African tribesman as personnel manager, he will employ all his tribesmen in preference to other tribes, regardless of their qualification and suitability for the job. This is not what we as employers want, we want people who can do the job and make a profit.⁶⁷

Andreski, writing on Africa as a whole, made a similar point when he wrote:

An African who has reached the top is expected to provide jobs for hundreds of his clansmen. Unless he receives a substantial bribe from a non-kinsman, he would give all the appointments which he controls to his kinsmen. Except in cases of more complicated arrangements based on bargaining between clans, in consequence of which an official may appoint a kinsman of a man who has appointed, or will appoint, his kinsman in return.⁶⁸

The relative importance of bribery as compared with kinship-nepotism depends on the extent to which a given set has

become de-tribalised, as detribalisation involves weakening of kin-solidarity and thereby gives more scope to unfettered cupidity.

An interesting point here is that bribery and nepotism are often combined; a man in the position to decide whom to employ will give preference to his kinsmen, but they will still have to hand over to him a part of their pay. The resulting network of social relations will somewhat resemble the old African custom of giving presents to the head of the clans, the Paramount Chief, etc. and will be less ruthlessly necessary than when strangers are involved. It will present a fascinating and intricate hybrid of kin-solidarity - commercialisation of offices.⁶⁹

Yet, there is little evidence that these sociological factors are peculiar either to Africa or to the developing countries in general. It is interesting to compare the above quotation with one from an article on the same subject but concerned with a different part of the world, Latin America:

Despite the varied origins of Latin American business ownership . . . there is a recognizable pattern of life deriving in large part from the prevailing Iberian background. An important element derived from this background is the strong emphasis on family loyalty which often leads to the exclusion of outsiders from responsible positions, no matter how much

they might benefit the family firm. The sharp distinction between social friends and business friends reinforces this form of exclusiveness. This attitude is not conducive to the establishment or expansion of employees training programmes in the older type of enterprises.⁷⁰

It would appear that what is specifically African is also specifically Spanish! Certainly, some type of social relationships tend to be conducive to the development of managerial and entrepreneurial talents than do others, but there seems to be little merit in becoming involved in these indirect and often nebulous hinderances to African advancement when there are so many direct barriers to be surmounted.

A final, and perhaps a more important sociological factor that constituted a potent obstacle to progressive Africanisation is the honesty and integrity that is largely lacking by these Africans already in senior responsible positions in both the public and private sectors in Sierra Leone. In Chapter 2, Part 1, and Chapter 3 of this Part (II), two cases in the para-statal corporation and one case in the private sector were cited. In the first two cases, the Sierra Leone Government was forced to evolve into a policy of de-Africanisation, whereby the managements of the two corporations were entrusted to contract expatriate managements. In the private sector, the case of the

Aureol Tobacco Company, the posts of Financial Controller and Factory Manager being de-Africanised for reasons already explained before.

When Private Sector employers were asked why they were reluctant to Africanise such posts as accountants, financial controller, etc. the answers were invariably the same, the main complaint they used as an argument against Africanising such posts was that of dishonesty. The stories of dishonesty and corruption among African employees in responsible positions varied from petty pilfering to blatant forgeries and embezzlement. Employers cited several cases where senior African personnel given company money to be deposited in the company bank, only to run away with the money; the case of a bank cashier who overpaid a customer after conniving with the customer to defraud the bank, and later on, received part of the money from the customer, etc.

Because of these high incidents of such dishonest practices among Africans some levantine businesses would like to make the Africanisation of their business conditional on the African employed in managerial and supervisory capacities being bonded or guaranteed by sureties.

On the face of it, it would seem that what was considered wrong was more the recruitment policies of these concerns. Indeed, the incidence of such occurrences appears to be higher with the levantine firms than with European firms (see Section 3.2 above). The latter employed a much higher quality of Africans on the whole than a Lebanese or Indian

businessman. An impressionistic view of the crime statistics in Sierra Leone were negatively correlated with the level of education of the employee. The higher the level of education the less is the likelihood of the occurrence of these petty crimes. But when they do occur, heavy sums of money were always involved. However, the higher the education of an individual is the higher the social value in the community and the greater the stake in losing that value because the deeper is the self-regarding sentiment involved. Consequently, the higher the educational attainment of the employee, the more responsible the latter becomes and the greater the opportunity cost of losing that status and all that goes with it. By recruiting at the appropriate level, these companies could insulate themselves from the higher incidence of such dishonest practices which is the price they have to pay otherwise.

3.6 The Sierra Leonean Successor.

Africanisation has been described as a forced succession in the sense that personnel from both races have privately questioned the legitimacy of the displacement of white by black, and also in the sense that the new incumbent has often been inadequately prepared to take over the new position. The policy to Africanise the private sector has been 'forced' upon private sector employers by the political climate of Independence, which demands the fulfilment of African aspiration by replacing white

personnel with Sierra Leonean personnel as quickly as was consistent with efficiency.⁷¹

The legitimacy of the authority exercised by the whites developed from their colour, which over the years had come to symbolise in the mind of the African on the one hand expertise and on the other brutal and often arbitrary discipline.⁷² The social distance which separated the races and the unquestioning supremacy of one made it impossible for the African to temper white oppression through informal social and political pressure. White man's authority bore strong elements of 'tradition' and 'charisma' which the African, when he takes over, is not able to emulate. Though he may try to act like a "massa",⁷³ he may fail because, for one thing, he does not bear the symbol of authority and, for another, unlike his predecessor, he is subject to informal social, economic and political pressures from his subordinates. But such influences can also work in the reverse direction, and, as it shall be seen, the Sierra Leonean supervisor is able, under favourable conditions, to manipulate informal social controls to strengthen his position. Nevertheless, the crisis of legitimacy brought about by the breakdown of traditional and charismatic authority leads the Sierra Leonean national to place ever-increasing reliance on authority derived from the bureaucratic system.

Unfortunately for the Sierra Leonean successor this too is often a diminished version of what was potentially

available to his predecessor. For the authority exercised by the newly appointed or promoted African over his subordinates derives from the support extended to him by his supervisor and other expatriates who control the bureaucratic apparatus. Because the expatriate is often indifferent, if not resistant, to the success of Africanisation, the support the African successor receives from above is not always the same as his predecessor used to enjoy. The attitudes of the expatriate can be explained by reference to the peculiar circumstances and the history of black-white relations during the colonial period in all aspects of economic life, the racial prejudice of both the African and the expatriate communities, the continuing racial stratification within each industry, and the transient commitment associated with expatriate status. On the other hand, such resistance to change is a common phenomenon in industry,⁷⁴ and is also found, for example, among civil servants when there is a change of government. There is a natural resistance to any succession which is seen by the permanent incumbent as threatening their interests or demanding adjustment.

Acknowledging the inevitability of some resistance by expatriates to Africanisation, and assuming that efficiency can be maintained only if displacement takes place in a systematic and planned manner, the private sector employers are required each year to submit a progress report on their Africanisation programme to the

appropriate Ministry.⁷⁵ For the mining companies, to the Ministry of Mines. In these programmes are included also Africanisation forecasts which are available to the government for examination, and considerable pressure is applied by top management on the lower levels of management to fulfill the predictions. In this way, the companies can be assured that progress is being made and can present visible evidence of this to the government. On the other hand, the very bureaucratic manner in which departments are compelled to adhere to Africanisation forecasts, and the assumption that without these the department would in fact resist Africanisation policy of the company, have given rise to manipulation which militates against effective Africanisation. When Africanisation is imposed from above, whole-hearted co-operation is unlikely to prevail. When there is compulsion to satisfy forecasts, then there is a danger that Sierra Leonean nationals will be promoted to positions for which they are obviously unprepared, with the result that new posts may be created for expatriates to oversee the new African successor.

The heritage of educational underdevelopment and resistance to Africanisation has left the Sierra Leonean often unprepared to take over many of the new jobs. The consequences of sometimes inadequate training, low level of literacy and numeracy and the remorseless implementation of Africanisation programmes has been to promote a number of Africans above what Lawrence Peters calls their 'level of

competence'.⁷⁶ All these factors add up to what is called "window-dressing Africanisation".

As a result of expatriate resistance and possibly of the African successor's inadequacy, the latter may not be accorded, either formally or informally or both, the same status as his white predecessor or his white colleagues. He may not be invited to the meetings which his predecessor attended, or he may not be granted the same powers by his supervisor, such as awarding overtime to his subordinates. In each case his authority over his subordinates is undermined and the respect he can command from them is diminished.

It is to be expected in any well prepared Africanisation scheme that as Africanisation progresses so one level of expatriates disappears after the next and that those who remain are at the top of the pyramid. In contrast to the civil service (Section 1) where the top ranks were Africanised at an early stage, in the private sector, particularly the mining industry, the accepted view is that the absence of technical qualifications and the long experience of mining among top-level management would endanger production. In addition to the tendency to Africanise only from below, those who prepare the Africanisation programmes for their departments have taken great pains to ensure that stratification by race invariably coincides with the stratification by authority and that no expatriate has to take instructions from an African.

As a result, expatriates were

never found competing for the favours of a Sierra Leonean national; hence they retain their solidarity in opposition to the Sierra Leonean and their grip over the bureaucratic structure, and apparatus. They were able to decide how much authority and power shall be delegated, who shall be promoted and how the organisation shall be structured.

To the extent that they are concerned to protect hitherto white jobs from being Africanised, those who controlled the departmental organisation can introduce a number of barriers. One such barrier is the introduction of qualification requirements in excess of the actual requirements. This is to be found most commonly in the technical field where promotion may be barred to those who have not the requisite 'diploma' or 'certificate' or the number of years of experience.⁷⁷ Yet, supervising expatriates do not have these same qualifications which are required of the aspiring Sierra Leonean national (see Tables 3.11a and 3.11b above). It is only since Africanisation has become a reality that qualifications have become such an important criterion for progression within industry. Apart from the refusal to promote Africans because they lack some basic attribute which may have little to do with the quality of the job performance, in some instances Africans have been held in acting positions for long until they have become so frustrated that some left the firms.⁷⁸ Another organisational manipulation which has the same consequence is the expansion of the department to include

a greater number of organisational levels. By bringing in 'experts' from overseas with fancy job titles who do relatively mundane jobs, so expanding the department, the organisational gap between the African and the head of department is widened. For example, in one of the mining operations in Sierra Leone, there are the posts of Managing Director, General Manager, the Personnel Director, Personnel Manager, all expatriates, two personnel officers, one for administration, and the other for welfare, both Africans, etc.

3.7 Attitude of the African Successor to the Expatriate.

Brought up in an atmosphere of racial discrimination and discovering that, no matter how high he moves, still the whites have a monopoly of the control of the industry or enterprise, the African becomes an "outcast" among his expatriate colleagues. To the Sierra Leonean they are a hostile group determined to undermine his performance and disgrace him before his subordinates.

The following are some of the comments by senior African employees of a major mining company in Sierra Leone which has been in operation since 1935. First, an assistant supervisor, mining:

The expatriate colleague is listened to by higher officials who are also expatriates. He is treated better, and shown some respect, while I am not. He keeps company with higher

officials outside work (in clubs) but keeps himself to himself at work . . . Our expatriate colleagues usually move faster than Africans . . . because they have patrons in higher positions. When I find an expatriate colleague or even an African who is less qualified than myself getting promoted before myself I don't care how hard I try to feel calm and friendly to this fellow, I find I can't. So even though I don't think he is responsible for the injustice, I group him together with the higher supervisors who pull him by deliberately throwing away the correct promotion procedure and adopting one based on rival groupings.

One particularly sensitive area was the training and occupational mobility of the expatriate as compared to the African. Here is a comment from another senior African assistant supervisor, electrical:

For Africans of similar or the same qualifications as expatriates, training periods on the job are far too excessive. The reason given is that we need experience, but then if we need this experience why don't the expatriates? Some of the expatriates are novices right from their technical colleges or polytechnics. You ask them why they only

spend a little time on training and they answer you that even the management knows that they are on contract and that they cannot afford to spend too much time on useless jobs so they move up rapidly. You ask them if they can do the jobs in the higher ranks after not doing so well in the lower ranks. They tell you that it is no concern of theirs, the management knows better.

Some Sierra Leoneans were as well qualified, some were more qualified than other expatriates, and yet they still received inferior treatment. This is interpreted by the Africans to mean that management and possibly Government also assumed the African product to be inferior to the expatriate product simply because it is African. Here are the views of an African foreman, production:

Our supervisors have made up their mind that Africans can't be competent. If you give them excellent work they pat you on the shoulder, but behind the scenes, they wonder if you actually did the work. The African qualifications are treated with suspect. A Sierra Leonean does not necessarily find people in the mines - bosses, that is - who recognize him as a qualified person. His capability is always doubted for reasons of keeping him down. An African given the same task to do

as an expatriate usually does it better and in a shorter time, but he is given more work to prove himself capable, whereas an expatriate is passed as competent and taken to the next stage.

Comments from the shift bosses who have obtained promotion on the basis of experience rather than qualifications were as follows:

There is a lack of trust among whites when it comes to Africans in responsible jobs. They just fear Government action, that's why they give us such jobs.

The Africans trained overseas (U.K. mainly) also resent the different conditions of service which applied to him and not to his expatriate colleagues with the same qualifications. One of them interviewed has the following comments to make:

An African graduate's salary compared to that of an expatriate of the same qualifications is somewhat between one-third and one half. The companies defend themselves by saying expatriates get allowances which boost their salaries, but how can they pay more in allowances than in salaries? An African is not allowed a loan of any kind. On arrival in Sierra Leone from overseas university, an African is told, "You have your parents here

in Sierra Leone, so you can't have a loan!" Housing is a problem for African graduates. If after a long period of waiting he is promised a house, the promise is good only if no expatriate arrives before the date when the African is to get the house.

At the conclusion of the interview this graduate declared:

My future, like that of many others in my position, is at the mercy of the expatriate officials as long as I remain on this company. There is only one hope. This is to leave the company and seek employment in some other industry where conditions of service are much more attractive, economically, socially and with respect to job content. This action is not easy to take, for it means changing a career, but it can be done even to this extreme because the company is really bad at the moment. Some people have been contemplating going back to study for another course and that way getting over the problem of joining some other industry as a non-graduate if their present qualification is confined to their present jobs.

Private sector employers' reasons for favouring their expatriate employees are not here being questioned, but what is presented here is the African successors' interpre-

tation of them; that they symptomize the assumption of African "inferiority". The Government and private sector employers were faced with the problem of having to recruit expatriate labour from other countries to do the same jobs as Sierra Leonean nationals, yet paying them rates determined by the international market and the necessary inducements to work in an independent African state, to pay the African incumbents at these same rates would not only be expensive but disastrous to the economy as a whole (see Tables 3.3).

At the same time one can readily appreciate the African graduate's perception of his circumstances and his resentment towards the expatriates who controlled his progress, his job and his status, apparently with the acquiescence of his Government under the cloak of non-government interference in the affairs of the private sector, even if at the detriment of its nationals.

It is without any doubt that current Africanisation policy is being described as mere 'window-dressing' or "token Africanisation" whereby expatriate employers indulge in appointing Sierra Leoneans into newly created posts rather than formerly expatriate-held positions, or for every senior post occupied by an African, a new, more senior post is created for an expatriate. As a senior African employee of a mining company put it:

Africanisation in our company simply means more jobs being done by Africans, but for

every new job taken up by an African there must be a new and better job for an expatriate. As an example, now that we have an African senior personnel officer, we have also an expatriate personnel superintendent. It has not been necessary to have these people before; what now has made it necessary to have an expatriate personnel superintendent besides the Personnel Manager who is also an expatriate?⁷⁹

The implication is that expatriate employers wanted to have senior African managers but they were unwilling to give up any position which carries with it significant power. Such employers appointed Sierra Leoneans to positions which were senior in name only. This type of appointment has been most common in respect of such staff positions as Company Secretary, Public Relations Officer, Personnel Officer, etc. In some cases, the company had no such position in the past; in others, the position was previously considered to be a junior one, and was up-graded to senior status.

It was also claimed that the degree of responsibility of some African managers was diluted in one of several ways. In some cases, the local manager was carefully supervised by an expatriate. The indigenous manager did all the work associated with his position, but there was a 'check on him'. In other words, a Sierra Leonean is appointed to the position but an expatriate is retained as

an adviser. A case in point is that of the Plantation Division of the Sierra Leone Aureale Tobacco Company where the post of Leaf Manager was Africanised, but the expatriate predecessor was retained as Leaf Adviser (see Page 235, Chapter 3). As an employee of that company commented:

Fragmentation and creation of new posts, quite reasonable expedients in some circumstances, is the white man's means of prolonging his lucrative stay in Sierra Leone.⁸⁰

In another type of situation, a Sierra Leonean was appointed to replace a departing expatriate manager, but was given only a portion of the duties of his predecessor, the other responsibilities were taken over by another expatriate manager. Another case in mind is that of the Standard Bank Sierra Leone Ltd. Before November, 1978, the Chairman of the Bank was an expatriate, as the chief executive of the bank; below him was a managing director and a general manager. In November 1978, following the example of a sister bank, Barclays Bank, the post of Chairman was Africanised, but the duties of the chief executive of the bank were assumed by the expatriate Managing Director. The post of chairman became non-executive.

However, on the other hand, private sector employers interviewed would reject the charges that they appointed 'window-dressing' managers. They insisted that it was not in their interests to do so and that in the long run such actions were self-defeating. In regard to the charge of "token Africanisation" the employers argued that growth in business has led to a need for new senior management positions and that these happened to be the ones for which qualified Sierra Leoneans were available. In time, Sierra Leoneans would be appointed to other types of senior positions as well. Answering the charge of "diluted" management responsibilities, the employers argued that these were temporary adaptations necessitated by the inexperience of the Sierra Leoneans who have been appointed to the position. As the Sierra Leonean gained experience, such 'check' will no longer be necessary.

To a large extent, the judgement of whether managerial appointment is or is not token or window-dressing Africanisation comes down to a judgement of the firm's intention: whether, the intention of the firm is to have only a "token manager" with no real authority and responsibility, so that the firm appears to be Africanising "because they just fear the Government" or whether what might appear as a 'window-dressing' appointment is actually a temporary situation designed to assist in the training of the manager in question to assume full responsibility.

Alternatively, given the relatively weak social constraints on human behaviour within an industrial setting, the concept of window-dressing Africanisation presupposes a deliberate managerial manipulation to withhold power and responsibility from the newly promoted or appointed African while the actual decisions were taken by an expatriate less visibly situated. In this connection, one could put up a strong case for regarding the African successor, referred to earlier, as being an example of window-dressing. However, in the general-case, to validate such an evaluation it is necessary to show that the Sierra Leonean concerned is indeed unable to exercise that power and responsibility should he so desire. The analysis of this section implies that some Sierra Leoneans promoted or appointed to high positions will not show much interest in taking initiatives, assuming responsibilities and exercising decision-making powers where this would require considerable self-discipline and dedication to the job. Labelling Africanisation as 'window-dressing' on the one hand, excuses the failures of the Sierra Leoneans in high positions and on the other, legitimizes a very casual approach to work, indulging in the reward without paying the costs or making sacrifices. Of course, the expatriate is content to see the African abdicating his responsibilities and commitments since this not only confirms his racial prejudices but also allows him to continue to make the decisions in his own interest. At the same time this does not necessarily imply that the

expatriate deliberately attempts to manipulate the organisation to achieve such an end; the African may well play into his hands.

Consequently, it is extremely difficult for a person outside the firm to pass judgement on whether "window-dressing Africanisation" in a given case is fact or appearance. However, this situation illustrates one of the problems facing Africanisation enforcement authorities and, above all, the Principal Immigration Officer. It also highlighted the need to enlist active support for Africanisation policy from the business community through their representative bodies, such as the Sierra Leone Employers Federation, the Sierra Leone Chambers of Commerce and Mines respectively.

3.8 Summary and Conclusions.

In this chapter some attempts have been made, first to spell out the policy objectives (in the general introduction to Part II) for the Africanisation of the private sector, and its various aspects. Three of these aspects were identified - ownership, control, and manpower substitution. The study was concerned with the last two. But all three can be used simultaneously, depending on individual country's choice of policy priorities. But as a first stage of economic development, most African countries have tended to start with the last two, and Sierra Leone is not an exception to this. Second, chapter three looked at the employment policies of foreign-owned firms operating in

Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa. Section 3.1 provided a bird's eye view of the pattern of employment in the private sector. It gave a statistical distribution of expatriate and African employment into each occupational category; and the average annual income of expatriate and African employees. Section 3.2 attempted to provide theoretical and factual information to support the thesis that the employment policies of foreign-owned companies created a dual labour market structure segmented between expatriates and African employees. The expatriate employees occupied the primary sector with higher salaries based on the level of pay in their home countries, better conditions of service; while their African counterparts occupied the secondary sector with relatively lower salaries based on local pay levels and less attractive conditions of service. The cause of this segmentation was perceived to be demand determined, and not supply-caused.

Section 3.3 looked at the recruitment practices of multi-national corporations. Three types of recruitment practices were identified: ethnocentric or patrimonial, polycentric or political, and geocentric or professional. The choice of any of these depended on the ownership, the nationality, the nature and extent of the company's operations, and its stage of development and the political climate in the host country. For example, Indian and Lebanese-owned enterprises had tended to be more patrimonial in their recruitment practices than the European or American

based companies which tended to be a combination of the three.

Section 3.4 looked at the size and dimension of expatriate employment in the private sector since 1964. Between 1964 and 1978, the number of expatriates employed in the private sector had increased from 1221 in 1964 to 1,588 (see Table 3.7). But the increase was not evenly distributed per industry. There were some industries that have experienced a decline in expatriate employment and others a rise in the absolute number of expatriates employed. The biggest increases per sector were in agriculture, mining, the construction and building, and commerce. At administrative, managerial and executive levels, the number of expatriates employed had increased from 291 in 1964 to 396 in 1978 (see Table 3.1 and 3.8 above). From the above tables, it can be categorically concluded that the Africanisation policy has had very little, if any, effect on the employment of expatriates in the managerial grades of the private sector. Between 1964 and 1978 the number of expatriate personnel employed in the private sector as managers, supervisors, etc. has increased from 291 in 1964 to 524 in 1978, a net increase of 233 representing a percentage increase of 80.4 for the whole period. Of course, it may also be argued that in the absence of Africanisation policy (Chapter 4), the number might have been more, or the increase in the expatriate employment in the managerial and supervisory

grades was due to the establishment of new enterprises where the initial requirements for expatriate skills was inevitable.

The Africans, on the other hand, had increased their share of the top level managerial and supervisory posts in the private sector from 125 in 1964 to 325 in 1978, representing a net increase of 201 and a percentage increase of 160.8 for the period. Of course, the increase in the number of Africans employed in the managerial grades was due to the Africanisation policy. A complementary factor is the low cost of employing an African manager as opposed to an expatriate held to check the growth of expatriate employment in the non-technical grades.

Section 3.5 (the pace of Africanisation) looked at the advantage enjoyed by the expatriate personnel in Sierra Leone, and their attitudes towards their African counterparts and sociological factors inherent among African employees. All these constituted the most formidable obstacles which no Government legislation can easily remove. As one expatriate senior employee of a mining company admitted:

Who would like to forego all these facilities, swimming pool, free housing, free education for our children, two months leave with pay every year, the company pays for all our domestic servants and above all - the "sun is lovely."

What the expatriate friend omitted in his list was the "fat" salary, the senior staff club where drinks of all sorts were sold below cost prices, and the relatively low cost of living in Sierra Leone. And above all, the possibility of getting employment in his home country might not be bright. However, in a life situation what was considered to be an inducement for expatriate personnel to work in Sierra Leone has turned out to be a disadvantage for the advancement of their African counterparts. Stereotype ideas such as inferior performance of the African, the low work output of an African employee, the uncommitted nature of the African to an industrial way of life were all mooted out of the unwillingness of the expatriate to forego the near-free facilities enjoyed by them under the "African sun".

Under this section were discussed also a detailed analysis of the perceived social obstacles to Africanisation policy. Modern business enterprise requires personal loyalty and commitment from its employees. But such loyalty and commitment are in conflict with the African employees loyalty and commitment to his family and ethnic or tribe to the extent that an African personnel manager would give preference in employment to his own family member or kinship and tribe at the expense of other tribes or kinship.

Another social factor which has tended to withhold the progress of Africans in expatriate enterprises is the lack of honesty of Africans. Again this dishonesty might

be the result of family pressure owing to the extended family system. These are all contributing factors to the expatriate employers' opposition to Africanisation policy.

Sections 3.6 and 3.7 looked at the position of the African successor in relation to the power and responsibility he enjoyed as compared to his predecessor. It was established in this section that while the African is promoted to succeed an expatriate predecessor, his power and responsibilities were being diluted, and his authority undermined. This led to the accusation that the attempt to promote Africans in positions of more responsibilities are, in fact, 'window-dressing' and 'token Africanisation', designed to convince the Government that the private sector employers are complying with the Government policy of Africanisation. However, the truth of such allegations is difficult to establish by an outsider. Because what is interpreted to be window-dressing Africanisation might be intended to be a gradual transfer of responsibility period designed to benefit the African incumbent.

The conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis and the evidence available are that the Africanisation policies to be discussed in Chapter 4 have not succeeded in altering the employment practices of foreign-owned firms. This is reflected in the increase in the number of expatriates employed in the private sector of the Sierra Leone economy from 1,221 in 1964 to 2,652 in 1978. The reasons for this might be due to the demand side of the Africanisa-

tion equation. Such as those already discussed in Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 above. Or they might be due to the supply side of Africanisation equation, the shortage of manpower with the right skills to replace expatriates. If the demand side is discounted as minor factors, that is, expatriate employers are willing to Africanise if there is available manpower supply, then the main obstacle to the progress of Africanisation of the private sector employment is supply determined. Therefore, the success and failure of Africanisation policies will depend essentially upon the supply and availability of the manpower in the right number, at the right time, in the right place and with the right balance of technical knowledge and practical skills.⁸¹ (see Chapter 5, Part III.) Because any Africanisation policy which fails to take the above factors into consideration but rely on persuasion, legislative and fiscal measures alone, is bound to failure. Chapter 4 looks at this policy mix.

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53. i.e. as more experience is gained by local employees, R will tend to fall more rapidly than C. This assumes an elastic supply of educated local personnel, an assumption which is valid for some of the posts. If, on the other hand, the supply of educated local labour is inelastic, C may fall more rapidly than R to the extent that Africanisation may reduce short-run profits.
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CHAPTER 4. THE AFRICANISATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR: THE
NATIONAL POLICY.

4.1 Introduction

In the last chapter a detailed analysis of the employment and recruitment policies and practices of foreign-owned companies and their responses and attitudes towards the Africanisation issues was done. The present chapter looks at the efforts of both organized labour and the government to influence changes in such policies and practices since the country became self-governing and independent in 1961.

An important aspect of the drive for independence in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Black Africa was the determination to have greater African control over the running of national affairs. As a result, independence has been followed by a substantial Africanisation of the public service and to a lesser degree, the private sector.

Upon achieving independence all African governments found it necessary to give most politically sensitive posts to Africans regardless of their qualifications. The new governments were also pressed to seek out qualified Africans, promote them to advanced positions in the public service. There was also a tendency, frequently warranted, to review colonial staffing patterns to eliminate unnecessary positions and to reduce the qualification requirements for some posts in order to increase the opportunities available to the Africans, eg. honours degree requirements, for example, reduced to ordinary degree for appointment to

the administrative service. This led to a substantial increase in African staff in the public service, but did not completely diminish the need for foreign personnel, since many of the newly appointed Africans, because of their lack of training and experience, needed foreign advisers while they were establishing themselves. The post-colonial expansion in government activities has resulted in an overall increase in the requirements for foreign personnel, although they were of different types from those employed under a colonial administration. For example, the technical assistance and contract employment has replaced the employment of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Servants (see Table 2.5 above).

The pressure for Africanisation in the private sector did not manifest itself very strongly until after independence, but was still of importance. Meeting this pressure was more difficult in the private sector than the public sector employment. This was due to the fear that any such pressure would destroy the confidence of foreign-owned firms at a time when it was the declared policy of the government to encourage more foreign investors into the country.¹ Moreover, government offered a far greater attraction to most Africans than private businesses, so that the number of educated Africans prepared to work for local and foreign-owned firms was limited. However, with the attainment of independence the pressure for more African participation in the administrative, managerial and

technical employment in the private sector grew stronger from two directions. The first came from the African employees or their representatives (the Unions) who perceived the employment practices as discriminatory in favour of expatriate employees, for example, expatriates were better paid and enjoyed better conditions of service (see Chapter 3.2 and 3.5 above). The second, complementary to the first, came from the government which considered such employment practices to be socially, politically and economically not in tune with the national aspiration of an independent sovereign state. As the pressure for Africanisation in the private sector grew, the government and labour organisations made this pressure effective by the former's use of administrative, legislative, fiscal policies and penalties, while Unions used threat of strikes. Under popular pressure, government could not be expected to accept the lack of qualified African candidates as sufficient reason for inaction on Africanisation. Thus foreign firms found it necessary to institute or accelerate training programmes of their own to meet the demand of African personnel.

Despite increased African participation at all levels of employment in the private sector, the expanded economic development of the country over the past two decades has increased the number of foreign firms in mining, manufacturing and construction and has resulted in a net increase in the number of expatriates employed in the private

sector and the economy as a whole (Table 3.6).²

This increased demand for foreign personnel was commented on in 1960 by a leading British weekly publication:

Estimates of demand for white men in Africa cannot be expressed in statistics, just because the nature of their work is changing. In all Africa, other than the Mediterranean countries and South Africa, there were in 1956 just over one million whites, or rather more than one-half of one per cent of the total population. If this proportion remains steady, there will be two million whites mostly in better paid jobs than now in 20 years time. But the growth of African development, under the driving pressure of dynamic and competitive African leaders, and the business opportunities which will accompany it, suggests that there may be many more than 2 million "top-whites". To get these men and women, Africa will have to pay wages that more than compare with those obtainable in the affluent societies of Europe and America. The more difficult Africans make life for expatriates, the more they will have to pay them.³

Rightly so, in the light of the size and level of

expatriate employment with their share of the national income in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa, the predictions of the "Economist" were correct.⁴ Nevertheless, the African demand for Africanisation or greater African participation in the private sector was not against the employment of expatriates in their economies if there were any need for them.

On the contrary, African leaders did realize the continuing need for foreign skills as the economies of their respective countries grew, and the costs of employing such personnel. As the former President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah admitted:

In Ghana, we have had to obtain technical knowledge, and skilled supply from better equipped sources, and this process will continue until we are able to produce sufficient numbers of our own experts.

Even where the demands are too heavy to leave complete supply of best quality people. In order to secure even the minimum of well qualified technicians, we are having to offer terms of service which made development for us disproportionately costly. Money which we could otherwise spend on more basic requirements has to go for example into housing and other amenities.⁵

What the pressures from organized labour and the

government's policies for Africanisation were against was the employment policies of private sector foreign employers which discriminated against local employees in favour of their expatriate counterparts in pay and other conditions of service, and above all, the continuing employment of expatriate personnel to fill in jobs for which there were equally qualified Africans with the same work experience, available to fill in such posts. As President Stevens pointed out:

Sierra Leone would not close its doors to those expatriates who had a contribution to make to its development. But Africanisation of the private sector must proceed as rapidly as compatible with the maintenance of standards and efficiency.⁶

4.2 The Response of the Workers.

The ethnocentric or patrimonial employment practices of multi-national or foreign-owned companies, discussed in the last chapter, were likely to have a great problem in maintaining good industrial relations between their managements and their indigenous employees. In the ethnocentric firms, for example, any conflict over conditions of employment is always in danger of being exacerbated by the cultural gap that exists between management and workers. This problem is particularly acute when the companies are operating in less developed countries especially if they are former colonial territories.

Here again, as with the public sector, it was the unfavourable attitudes which tended to come to light,

though for very different reasons. The relationship between an African worker or employee and his white boss was potentially or acutely fraught with antagonism which was apt to take on a racial form; at the same time, a subordinate is not normally in a position to voice his opinion publicly. Hence it was only when the tension inherent in such a relationship becomes sufficiently acute to precipitate an incident that attitudes were given overt expression; and even then the expression was mainly a collective one, channelled through trade unions.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding it must be made quite clear that outbursts of this kind were exceptional. On the whole Africans and Europeans got on very well together at work, putting up with each other's idiosyncracies without complaint. A detailed analysis of labour relations during the last ten years of colonial rule, some of which were turbulent politically, was carried out on the basis of detailed official records. This indicated that only about one-tenth of all disputes resulted directly from friction between Africans and Europeans. The emphasis here is on conflict not because it was typical, but because under such circumstances latent elements come to the surface and could be observed.

4.21 Two Case Histories.

When disputes involving relations between Africans and Europeans as such were examined, several ostensible causes could be distinguished. (The word "ostensible" is

used because the causation of industrial disputes is mostly complex.) These include demand concerning Africanisation, complaints about discrimination and a few instances of actual physical assaults. But the most common issue, and also the most instructive one from the present point of view, was that of insults (real or imagined) to African employees. Two such disputes will be discussed in some detail. Both affected large numbers of workers and had extensive repercussions on the government's attitudes towards the behaviour of expatriate employees to their African counterparts.

Case 1. This concerns a strike in a maintenance department of a mining operation, following a quarrel to which the European superintendent at first attached no great importance. As he put it, a maintenance workshop is not a kindergarten and incidents happen in all countries from time to time and are best ignored. It soon became clear, however, that the matter could not be dismissed so lightly, and the Union representative was asked to state his complaint on behalf of his members. This is summarised below.

Mr. Amadu Sankoh,^{*7} an African employed in the workshop, said that the Chief Workshop Superintendent told the men that an important part of one of the engines was missing and gave them instructions to look for it. After they had searched for some time, Amadu Sankoh himself happened to visit another workshop and found the missing part there.

It had been sent there a few days earlier for repairs by Mr. Tom Brown (a European, the central figure in the dispute). When the missing part was returned, the men who had been searching appeared to be under the impression that they had been accused of having stolen the part. There was some disagreement about this when Tom Brown intervened and told them to get on with their work; it was also alleged that he had told them they were acting like small children, and moreover, that Mr. Brown had called them "black cats and black monkeys".⁸ The men resented this attitude and referred the matter to the Union and a stoppage of work by the Union followed.

Mr. Brown was asked for his version and whilst confirming the first part of the story he denied having called the men names, but claimed that he had merely asked them what the trouble was and why they had such long faces.

As the controversy developed and became public, a newly appointed African Minister in charge of labour matters intervened with the management of the company. And the management wrote about the result of this intervention as follows:

"Following our discussion with the Minister, who seemed to consider that Mr. Brown, having used the term, 'Why have you got such long faces?' was a term of abuse and the management had some difficulties in explaining to him it was not an unusual term for a European to

use in addressing a person who appeared to be unhappy, and that in no circumstances could it be considered as abuse.

"The Works Committee of the Union, on the other hand, maintained that Mr. Brown had called them "monkeys and cats". If that was so, monkeys and cats never worked together with human beings. So while they would normally be prepared to consider returning to work before negotiations began, the peculiar circumstances of the present case made that impossible."

It was not clear whether or not the offensive terms complained of were actually used on that occasion; a committee set up to investigate the matter did not publish its findings. Two things, however, are established. First, there was a previous history of friction between Mr. Brown and the workers in his charge; second, the Union leaders deliberately siezed on the racial elements of the dispute to arouse public sympathy for their campaign against European domination of high-level employment in the private sector, otherwise they would not have been successful in this, but also for the special sensitivity to name-calling of the type described and the belief that it did reflect the attitudes of whites towards Africans.¹⁰

Case 2. The scene of the second case was in a public-owned enterprise with expatriate management in Freetown,

and the main figure was a Mr. Paul Edwards, a European inspector of works. Some time before the strike, this inspector had become embroiled in a quarrel with Alpha Kamara, the Union leader, which the latter described as follows: knowing that Mr. Paul Edwards was on his first tour he had always come to him to discuss matters in a friendly manner, but one day he made a suggestion on which Paul Edwards replied that he was talking rubbish. Offence was taken and an acrimonious argument ensued.

Shortly afterwards, a strike was called to support a demand that Paul Edwards should be dismissed and be sent home. The main complaint against him, expressed in a Union resolution, was that:

"From Paul Edwards' behaviour from day to day, we have discovered that he has not the least respect for the African."

Violence occurred, but it is important to note that this was not exclusively directed at whites, but also against the Africans considered to be collaborators. Thus, workers attempted to manhandle an African personnel officer and to over-turn an African accountant's car. A large number of men crowded into the (European) district engineer's office, creating a disturbance; they shouted abusive terms at this official, spat on the floor and threatened the clerical staff with violence if they did not leave their work; to add to the weight of their persuasion they removed all the clerks' chairs.

Messages were posted upon the walls of the work yards such as: "Away with unscrupulous expatriates", "Mr. Edwards, your doings are above the workers' satisfaction, go to your country now or fly", "Workers strike, we hate fooling". "Sierra Leone of today is not of yesterday."

The sequence of events in this case is perfectly clear. The Union leader, having adopted a protective and advisory role towards a relatively inexperienced European employee in the sense of being new to the country - had been rebuffed; the rebuff might have been unintentional that led to the use of the term "rubbish", but what matters was the way it was interpreted. In the nationalist press the terms of abuse alleged to have been used by Mr. Edwards came to be greatly enlarged. The reaction of the Union leader sparked off a good deal of latent aggression engendered by the heightened feelings of economic nationalism and xenophobia. For a fuller understanding of these factors, the social aspects of the relationship between white employers or supervisors or managers and African workers have to be considered.

It might be added that the final settlement of this dispute was made more difficult than it might have been by one of the Europeans concerned in the negotiations with the Union leaders. He was one of the old school who "knew the Africans" after many years on the West Coast of Africa and was not going to put up with any nonsense. Needless to say, this sort of approach did not get him very far for "Sierra

Leone of today is not as of yesterday."¹¹

In conclusion, it is important to realize that the European manager in charge of African employees occupied a dual role in the multi-national corporation. One of his roles is purely functional: he is an employer, or more often a supervisor, whose aim by virtue of his role is to get the most out of the people working under him. This means that his interests are opposed to those of the workers, who wish to make a living without sacrificing too much effort and leisure. The other role is precisely that of a European, a foreigner belonging to a different ethnic group which in the past had monopolised positions of authority so that both roles came to be fused in the minds of the African employees. Various attitudes can be accounted for in this way.

A high proportion of Europeans were engaged in office work as managers and administrators, and even in Western countries, the managerial and administrative functions that have to be performed at a desk are not readily understood by the workers. In a country where a high percentage of the workers are illiterates, this was held far more strongly; it was widely held that Europeans got fat salaries for doing precious little, merely because they were Europeans, and it may be added that this view was by no means confined to illiterates as may be illustrated by a statement made in the House of Representatives:

Do Hon. Members often see any European engineers

of the Post and Telecommunications Department out in the town repairing switchboards or anything like telephones? (Some Hon. Members - No.) The only engineer I know is the cable engineer who goes round with Africans. He knows his work at his finger tips. Others sit down in the offices and drink tea.¹²

This feeling was exacerbated by the vast gap between the remuneration of European expatriates in charge and that of their African subordinates (see Table 3.3 above); this applied not only to labourers, but even to clerks, and their counterparts in comparable positions. The ratio between the earnings of expatriates to senior African employees, intermediate African employees, and the daily rated African employees for the year 1975 as demonstrated in Table 3.4 above is as follows: 3.5:1, 12.6:1, and 20.4:1 respectively. It was not uncommon for a clerk who handled the transport claims of his expatriate European boss to find that these exceeded his own monthly remuneration. There are, of course, good reasons why qualified men in Sierra Leone or West Africa should be well paid; and apart from the expatriation allowances, an African in a senior post receives exactly the same as their European counterparts. Nevertheless, a disparity of this order is irksome, especially in a period when prices are rising and in a society where the claims of the extended family make it very hard to get ends to meet.

The above examples are indicative of the new economic

nationalism expressed in industrial actions. This was meant to draw the attention of the government, the media, and the general public that all was not well in the private sector employment. The African workers wanted to participate in the decision-making processes of the foreign firms above clerical and supervisory levels. But the employment practices of foreign employers did not give them the scope for advancement above the level of clerks.¹³ As Michael Crowder put it:

The young European assistant is placed in each department in turn, until he is familiar with all sides of the business, while his African counterpart lives and dies a clerk, a book-keeper, store clerk and custom clerk.¹⁴

It was against the background of African lack of opportunities for advancement "in European commercial companies" that led in 1958 to the appointment of Professor Cox-George to investigate the possibilities of African participation in the commerce of Sierra Leone. In his report Professor Cox-George expressed the views that:

One of the essential conditions which must be imposed on entry of any new expatriate business in the country is that it must be required to have at least an African deputy general manager, an African manager in each established branch who should be given every facility to gain experience in every aspect of the business.¹⁵

Although the views of Professor Cox-George formed the basis of later Africanisation policies of the private sector in Sierra Leone, they were not at first accepted by the Government of the day for the following reasons: first, they were contrary to the government's "open door economic policy" designed to attract foreign investors into the country; and it was thought that no foreign investor would like to be told how to run his business or whom to appoint or promote as "deputy general manager or branch manager", etc. It was declared policy of the government to intervene as little as possible with foreign enterprises as long as their activities were not inimical to the interest of the country. This is reflected in the then Prime Minister's statement on the issue of nationalisation of foreign enterprises:

"The government wishes to make it clear that it has no intention either now or in the future of nationalising any form of commercial mining or industrial undertaking. If, however, new and unforeseen circumstances should lead to any change in this policy, government hereby acknowledges its obligations to pay fair compensation, in every case of nationalisation, and in the event of disagreement between itself and the parties concerned on what constitutes reasonable compensation in a given case, hereby states its willingness to refer the matter to arbitration by some mutually agreed international body.¹⁶

Secondly, Cox-George proposals were too radical to be accepted by the Prime Minister whose stand on the Africanisation of the public sector was rather cautious.¹⁷ This precisely explained the government's stand on the issue of Africanisation in both the public and private sectors. The fact is, Sierra Leone became independent in 1961 without a single manufacturing industry and only two mining companies. To impose pre-conditions on prospective foreign investors was seen to be self-defeating. Moreover, when there was a scarcity of skilled and experienced manpower in the country (see Table 2.4). In fact, the government viewed the Africanisation of the private sector from a manpower development standpoint and not just a programme for the replacement of expatriate personnel in private sector employment. As this was evidenced in a later agreement signed between the government of Sierra Leone and the Swiss-based multi-national Alusuisse Company Ltd. for the exploitation of the deposits of bauxite in the Port Loko District in 1978. Among other things, the agreement stated that "the company should use its best endeavour to provide capable and skilled personnel for the operation of the mine and where possible, preference should be given at all levels of operation to adequately qualified Sierra Leonean citizens who, in the opinion of the company, are competent to perform and discharge the duties or functions of the office or employment to be filled as and when they were available."¹⁸

In furtherance of these objectives, the agreement

further provides that:

The company shall within its resources and needs provide for the training of Sierra Leoneans designed to qualify them for operating technical, administrative, managerial and supervisory positions in the company. The company shall submit to the Ministry of Mines, annually, a report of the training programmes and their results and future objectives. The company shall ensure that the higher echelons of the management as well as of the technical services shall be occupied by Sierra Leoneans within a reasonable period of time.¹⁹

During a period of growing unemployment among primary and secondary school leavers it would have been a grave omission if nothing ~~was~~ said about the employment of unskilled labour in such an agreement. For this reason Claus IX further provides that:

The company shall not import unskilled labour except in the event that local manpower supply proves inadequate for its needs and on such an event the company undertakes to import only such unskilled foreign labour as shall be acceptable to the Minister of Mines. The Government agrees, subject to the provisions of the Non-Citizens (Registration, Immigration and Expulsion) Act, No. 6, 1967.²⁰

From the tone of the above section of the agreement, it leaves no doubt to the reader that the government was not unaware of both the social and economic consequences of pursuing a vigorous and unilateral Africanisation policy, as Professor Cox-George seemed to have suggested in his report (20 years earlier).²¹ Of course, by the same token, it can be argued that the government had given too much to the company the major decisions on Africanisation; and that it was only paying lip service to Africanisation policies. The agreement, in short, was one-sided. However, it must not be forgotten that the closure of another mining company which has been operating in the country since 1930, three years earlier (1975); left the government in a weaker bargaining position to dictate terms, particularly when the reasons for the closure of the company were not unconnected with the government's earlier attempt to acquire a 51 per cent controlling share of the company (1970) and its Africanisation attempts also.²² After all, Africanisation policies must be seen from a utilitarian viewpoint - the greatest benefits to the greatest number of unskilled labour and not to the small number of educated Africans employed in the private sector.

4.3 The Socio-Economic Motivations.

From the above discussion two extreme views of Africanisation emerged: those which wanted a more vigorous Africanisation policy to be pursued, and those which wanted

the cautious approach. Between these plethora of moderation and extremism hung the pendulum of Sierra Leone's Africanisation policy. In both cases, the motivation is social as well as economic. A judicious Africanisation policy would, therefore, accrue the following advantages to both the country and the Sierra Leonean employed in the expatriate businesses and, perhaps, to the employers themselves.

Firstly, an equitable Africanisation policy would reduce the wages gaps between the high-level, intermediate and unskilled labour in the private sector demonstrated in Table 3.3 above. This is based on the assumption that an African replacing an expatriate would only be entitled to the expatriate pay less the expatriation allowances. But the evidence available in both the public and the private sectors does not seem to support this assumption. What seems to happen is that an African succeeding an expatriate will always want to enjoy the total benefits accorded to that office. The emotive reasoning is that why should an African successor to an expatriate post be denied the same benefits which his predecessor "whiteman" used to enjoy. Invariably, such arguments always stand. To ignore it by an expatriate employer is seen as an act of racial discrimination. For example, it is the policy of all foreign enterprises in Sierra Leone to provide free accommodation for all their expatriate personnel at the company expense. This is an important item of cost in the company accounts which might be removed or reduced in the event of

Africanisation. But this has not been the case; an African promoted or appointed to the same level as his expatriate counterpart would receive a rent subsidy or allowance even if he lives in his own home or house. The income gap remained. One result of this has been that as other semi-skilled and skilled African cadres emerged, they sought the elevated European wages standard as a matter of right, irrespective of the ability and experience of the newly trained African worker to perform at the same level as his European counterpart. Another result has been the growing inflationary pressure by the unskilled workers to close the gap now that their African compatriots have scaled the heights and have achieved or are close to achieving the higher levels of the wages and benefits structure.

These two drives have greatly complicated the Africanisation policy, particularly in the private sector, and have augmented costs markedly and perhaps prohibitively. Tinker and Hoogvelt's case study on the closure of the Sierra Leone Development Company in 1975 provides an example; they have this to say about the effect of Africanisation on the company's wage bill:

The much higher total wage bill in this last period is a consequence of the government's insistence on Sierra Leonisation which not only swelled the number of Sierra Leoneans in the ranks of the ten times better paid jobs previously only held by expatriates,

also increased the number of such jobs. By the time of its closure, Delco employed some 218 supervisory salaried staff of whom 164 were Sierra Leoneans earning an average salary of £3,041 per annum. In 1974 this black salaried contingent received a total income of £422,320, not much below the total wage bill of £513,215 paid to the 2,317 black manual labourers. This Sierra Leonisation programme which presented a very heavy cost to the company's operations was not in fact justified when viewed from a purely commercial perspective.²³

Secondly, a judicious Africanisation policy would perhaps have an effect on the income of nationals. To the extent that the indigenous staff successfully replaced expatriates, the share of the national income that flows to the indigenous population increases. Unfortunately, there are no official figures at the aggregate level in Sierra Leone indicating the proportion of national income paid to expatriates as profits, interest, wages or salaries. But at plant or company level, there is no doubt that expatriates share of the wages bill is inversely proportional to their size in the work force. For example, Table 4.1 shows the annual return of a mining company to the Ministry of Mines for the period 1964 to 1978.

TABLE 4.1 Expatriates' share of total pay bill in a mining company - 1964-1975

Year	Total Work Force	No. of Expat.	% of Expat.	Total Pay Bill	Expat. Pay Bill	Expat. % of Total
1964	2,925	124	4.2	£891,480	£369,317	41.4
1965	3,078	119	3.8	1,013,569	417,699	41.2
1966	3,218	112	3.4	1,038,764	387,438	37.3
1967	2,513	100	3.9	928,079	357,398	38.5
1968	2,594	100	3.8	1,027,651	393,194	38.2
1969	2,691	101	3.7	1,154,203	397,192	34.4
1970	3,028	98	3.2	1,295,809	418,172	32.2
1971	3,042	97	3.1	1,363,178	425,302	31.2
1972	2,889	97	3.3	1,440,264	480,503	33.3
1973	2,714	89	3.2	1,517,835	500,813	33.1
1974	2,626	65	2.4	1,594,013	440,777	27.8
1975	2,643	63	2.3	1,697,410	437,620	26.1

Source: Company annual returns to the Ministry of Mines, Freetown.

From the above table, it can be seen that the expatriates' percentage share of the total pay bill (Column 5) declines as their number in the work force declined, viz. in 1964 with 124 expatriates employed in this company, (4.2% of work force) their share of the total pay bill was correspondingly high - 41.4%. In 1975, with a 49 per cent fall in the number of expatriates employed in this company (which might be the result of Africanisation policy) their share of the total pay bill had also declined from 41.2 per cent in 1964 to 26.1 per cent in 1975. By the same token, the African share of the total pay bill had increased from 48.8 per cent in 1964 (100 - 41.28%) to 73.9 per cent in 1975 (100 - 26.1%). Of course, the fact still remained that although the expatriates constituted less than 5 per cent of the total work force all throughout the

period, but their percentage share of the total pay bill was disproportionately high.

A third advantage of Africanisation is the employment opportunities it provides for the nationals of the country. No african government could for long tolerate the employment of expatriates in jobs for which there are qualified nationals. In Nigeria, for example, the Second Five Year National Economic and Social Development 1974/75-1978/79 Plan was very explicit on this point:

The Government cannot continue to tolerate a situation in which high-level Sierra Leonean personnel educated and trained at great cost to the nation are denied employment in their own country by foreign business establishments in preference for their own nationals.²⁴

A fourth advantage from a more rapid Africanisation is an acceleration of training. Many managerial and technical skills can be acquired only through experience. The pressure for indigenisation will give more rapid access to responsible jobs and thereby hasten the process of learning while doing. In addition, employers, knowing that they have to put nationals into positions of responsibility will be more inclined to give them supplementary training opportunities. This accelerated training is a very important investment in the productive capacity of the country.

All these potential advantages will of course vanish if the Africanisation is ill conceived or as an expatriate employer put it, "if not intelligently executed." The Sierra Leone Government is very aware of these limitations. An Africanisation policy that would undermine economic growth and confidence either by seriously discouraging the inflow of capital and skills or by destroying the efficiency of existing enterprises would be self-defeating.

A successful Africanisation policy is one which provides rapidly increasing employment opportunities for nationals at all levels of skills and responsibility. Until the time comes when the country can be more or less self-sufficient in capital and technical and managerial know-how, such a policy, when applied to a largely free enterprise economy, must recognise that (as the managing director of a manufacturing company put it):

Expatriate firms are in business for profit.

They will expand their business activities and thereby generate more income for your government and employment for your nationals only so long as the return from our investment in your country is at least as high as what we can earn in other countries, taking into account comparable risks and uncertainties.²⁵

On the other hand, it is equally important to note that an expansion in the activities of expatriate businesses that will provide employment for unskilled and semi-skilled

nationals and income will result to what Clower, et al. called "economic growth without development",²⁶ in that an increase in the business activities of foreign firms that will induce the need for the employment of expatriate skills with limited development of African skills will see the fruits go mainly to foreign capital and skills.

However, keeping in mind that foreign enterprises saw an element of risk in rapid Africanisation, it is worth spelling out the conditions which determine the speed at which successful Africanisation can be carried out.

First among these conditions was the availability of qualified indigenous manpower to take over jobs which demand technical and managerial skills. It would clearly be harmful to economic growth and efficiency if Africanisation resulted in putting into positions for which they could not become competent in a reasonable period of time. In some instances, it may be possible to alter job responsibilities to fit more closely the qualifications of available personnel. This is equally true of the public sector. By and large, however, an effective Africanisation policy requires to be complemented by major manpower training efforts (Chapter 4.5).

The second condition which affects the speed of successful Africanisation is the availability of domestic capital, entrepreneurship and technical know-how. Where these elements are in short supply, it is obviously not possible for indigenous enterprises alone to generate rapid

economic growth and employment. Africanisation therefore implies a government policy of support to indigenous capital formation and development of technical know-how.

A third factor which influences the possible progress of Africanisation is the economic opportunities presented by the country. A country which is favoured with natural and human resources and has a good infrastructure and which therefore presents attractive investment opportunities can afford to pursue a much more aggressive Africanisation policy than a less privileged country. Whatever risks expatriate firms may see in Africanisation tend to be offset by other aspects such as political stability, a good domestic market, etc. that favour high returns, will be willing to do so. It should be expected that countries such as Nigeria and Kenya, with a stable political system, good infrastructure, for Nigeria - oil, abundant manpower resources, and huge domestic market - can afford to pursue a vigorous Africanisation policy with little damage to their economies.

A fourth condition which is important for a speedy and successful Africanisation is strong leadership and executive capacity on the part of the government. It is essential that the policy be fair but unequivocal, so long as the government wishes to attract foreign capital and expertise, it is important to maintain the confidence of serious foreign investors. Inconsistency and uneven enforcement of mild Africanisation laws and government bureaucratic

inefficiencies which cause delays and uncertainties may be much more harmful than very tough laws that are fairly and efficiently enforced. For example, although the Wales Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of the Immigration Quota Committee did not find any malpractices among the committee members, there were irregularities in the granting of the expatriate quotas.²⁷

Finally, the fifth and by no means least factor is the attitudes of the expatriate employers and managers.

Expatriate employers who have no faith and who can only see their African employees through colonial eyes are obviously a hindrance to successful Africanisation.²⁸ The expatriate employer who can grasp some of the fundamental aspects of culture in which he operates and knows how to develop local talent serves his own interest as well as those of the host country.²⁹

4.4 The National Policy.

We have seen in section 4.2 two instances where organized labour attempted to arouse national awareness through industrial action against the employment practices of their expatriate employers. We have also seen how the public, the media and politicians responded to these attempts. Under such circumstances an elected government could not remain unresponsive and ignore such popular action. But unlike the Africanisation of the public sector the capacity of the government to intervene in the affairs

of private sector foreign employers is constrained by two factors: the availability of trained and experienced personnel, and the fear that going too far would destroy the confidence of foreign investors. Both of these challenges were of equal urgency and can call for conflicting responses.

Fortunately, no real world situations are like zero-sum games in which players either win or lose rather than sharing victory or defeat. Ways are usually found to satisfy at least partially conflicting demands. In Sierra Leone, an attempt to resolve the crises as they relate to the recruitment and employment practices of expatriate employers was to adopt a judicious Africanisation policy which could benefit all parties concerned - the country, the employees and the employers (see section 4.3 above). In this respect, the Africanisation policy in the private sector can best be summarised as one of cautious Africanisation of control and manpower with due regard for growth and efficiency. The first progress report of the Second National Development Plan 1974/75-1978/79 has again stated with emphasis that: "Africanisation does not slow down the rate of economic growth."³⁰

Another fundamental aspect of Sierra Leone's Africanisation policy is the continuation of efforts to attract foreign capital and expertise, but to restrict them to areas where they were not in competition with Sierra Leoneans.

The Second National Development Plan was explicit on this point:

Foreign investments are still welcome and will for a long time be welcome as an important component in economic development. In fact many business incentives operating the country are aimed at encouraging private foreign investment in Sierra Leone. What the Africanisation policy seeks to do is to delimit the areas in which foreign private investors will operate.³¹

In retrospect, from the discussion on the employment and recruitment practices of foreign-owned firms in Sierra Leone (Chapter 3) and elsewhere in Africa, two policy implications were deduced. The first was that if expatriate employers were discriminating against the Africans in their pattern of recruitment on the basis of personal characteristics other than prior formal training or educational programmes, then the manpower development programmes external to the company are of limited value. The second was that the expatriate employers wished to employ Africans in senior positions but they lacked the training and experience required by those positions. The first is an attitudinal problem while the second is a manpower development problem. The objective of any effective Africanisation policy is to provide solutions to both problems. The former is a behaviour problem which may require political remedial solutions while the latter is a technical labour supply problem which cannot be resolved in the short-run. It is

therefore expedient to start with the behavioural problem while the manpower problem will be the subject of Chapter 5, Part III.

In the main, there are two main policies which the government may use to effect changes in the recruitment and employment practices of expatriate employers. They are, through immigration control and fiscal policies.

4.41 Immigration Control Laws.

The laws of the majority of countries in Africa have specific procedures relating to entry and employment of non-national workers who need to obtain authorization either in the form of a work permit or identity card. In certain countries such as Nigeria a residence permit is assimilated to work permit. In others a residence permit is assumed to have been given when a non-national worker actually applied for employment. There are some countries such as Senegal and Zambia where the employers are under an obligation to submit regular reports of the number of non-nationals employed to the government.

Countries in Africa do not follow the same pattern of immigration policies. The only point common to the majority of the ex-French countries of Africa is that a special department of the Ministry of Labour handles all questions relating to the employment of foreigners, while in English-speaking countries the jurisdiction is distributed among several ministries including Ministries of Trade and

Industry, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Interior.

In Sierra Leone the first attempt by the government to restrict the employment of non-nationals in the private sector was made by the introduction of the Immigration Control Ordinance Cap. 86 in 1952. Among other things, Section 18 of the Ordinance stated that:

The policy of the Government is that there would be no further economic penetration by non-nationals of Sierra Leone. A non-national may enter Sierra Leone and be issued with employment and occupation permit if his activities will be beneficial to the country and if he will supply a need which will not otherwise be supplied.³²

The main weaknesses of this ordinance were that it did not stipulate how many quotas to be allowed to an individual expatriate employer; and how long will a work permit holder be allowed to stay in the country. Above all the Ordinance's definition of what "activities and needs" which an expatriate can supply and be of benefit to the country was not clear. More particularly, when the onus for the interpretation of this law rests with one man, the Principal Immigration Officer. Furthermore, the Ordinance did not provide specific guidelines under which the Principal Immigration Officer could base his decisions whether to accept or reject an application for work permit.

Under such circumstances the decision of the Principal Immigration Officer became discretionary and perhaps subjective as well.

It was owing to this weakness that between 1952 and 1956 a total number of 500 expatriates was recorded to have entered the country to take up employment in the private sector. However, with some periodical modification in its implementation machinery, the Ordinance remained as the cornerstone of the government's Africanisation policy of the private sector until well after independence in 1965.

The first modification to the Ordinance was in 1956 when the government appointed an ad hoc committee - the Immigration Control Committee.³³ The function of the committee was purely advisory; it was to advise the government on applications for an immigration quota referred to it by the Principal Immigration Officer. The committee was required after considering all applications for quotas to submit its recommendations to the Minister of Trade and Industry who would take decisions on behalf of the government. In making its recommendations to the Minister, the Immigration Control Committee was guided by the following conditions under which immigration quotas be granted:³⁴

. . . that no quota should be allotted to any such firms until it has registered its business under the appropriate ordinance; that the quota should be for a period of three

years only, i.e. all entry permits under it should be renewed at the end of that period, that the quota should be additional to all partners, proprietors and employees already in the country; and that all leave reliefs should be found from the permitted quota; and finally that any marginal case in which it is not clear to the Principal Immigration Officer whether the firm should be allotted a quota or whether the allotted quota should be larger or smaller should be referred to the Immigration Control Committee.

The directives further emphasised that the above conditions should be strictly applied and particularly that entry under any quota granted in terms of these conditions must be limited to a period of three years.³⁵

There are a few important points to note about the above development. First, under the 1952 Ordinance, the Principal Immigration Officer had the ultimate authority to interpret the law, to decide on what "activities of expatriate personnel were beneficial to the country", and the power to grant or reject an application for work permit was removed from him. Second, with the new arrangement the final decision whether to approve or reject an application for immigration quota lay with the Minister of Trade and Industry who in return had to act (though not bound to) on the recommendations and advice of the Immigration Control

Committee. Third, the directives did not spell out the kind of skills, qualifications or professional competence an expatriate must possess before a work permit be issued to such an expatriate. What in fact the directive provided was that "the Committee should advise the Minister on economic grounds". This was not good enough. The government should have been specific on this issue if it was to avoid the possibility of disagreement among committee members on what constitutes the economic grounds under which an application for expatriate quota be granted or rejected. If the committee members disagreed on what constitutes "economic grounds" (as happened in one case), should the Minister be bound by the recommendations of the majority of the committee members? The evidence so far available did not seem to support that. Perhaps a case study of a situation where the Minister accepted a minority recommendation is relevant but not illustrative of any malpractice.

Case 3. Argument for and against Africanisation of certain Indian firms.

(a) As from 1st January 1961, the Immigration Control Committee consisted of the following:

1. Mr. D.G. Maurice - Expatriate Permanent Secretary - Trade and Industry - Chairman.
2. Mr. G.S. Panda - African S.L., Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Mines and Labour - member.
3. Mr. C.A. Asgill - Retired Deputy Controller of Customs - member.

(b) On the 13th April, 1961, the committee considered among others the application of Messrs. T. Choithram. The applicants had at the time 30 quotas including eight directors and wanted six more quotas.

The recommendations of each of the two members present and the Minister's as contained in the Minutes were as follows:

- (i) Mr. Panda considered that the application for six more expatriate quota was justified, taking into account the impressive increase in the firm's turnover and the need for leave reliefs. Moreover, their records of public service were good. Therefore approval should be given for the whole six.
- (ii) Mr. Maurice, the chairman, on the other hand, held the view that there was not sufficient evidence of any real attempt on the part of this firm to Africanise, and he did not think that a firm's contribution to charities, however good, should be the criterion for increasing their quota. He would therefore not recommend an increase of more than three in this case.
- (iii) The Minister's decision was as follows: I agree with the view of the only member (Mr. Panda) and approve that the additional quota of 6 (six) expatriate employees be granted to this firm in view of the reasons given by Mr. Panda and by the applicants themselves. In as much as we would welcome

Africanisation of expatriate businesses, that reason itself cannot alone be a bar to expansion of such businesses in case of delay. We should, however, endeavour to convince businesses that expansion and training of Africans should as best as possible go side by side. The possibility of wholly Africanising expatriate businesses is very remote.³⁶

Few comments need to be made on the decision of the Minister of Trade and Industry. His decision to approve six quotas for a firm which already had 30 quotas and ruling out the impressive argument in favour of Africanisation put up by an expatriate member of the Immigration Quota Committee was not only out of proportion but also most revealing and a downright tricky business. Furthermore, the Minister's decision was contrary to the directives of the government of which he was a member. What is more revealing about the Minister's decisions was his comments and pessimistic view on the Africanisation issue, particularly when he was politically responsible for the initiation and implementation of the policy. Of course, no one would deny the fact that effective Africanisation depends on the availability of trained and experienced manpower but to pronounce it as "remote" was rather disturbing and absurd. On the other hand, it can equally be argued that the Minister of Trade and Industry was also the minister politically responsible for the formulation and implementation of the government's industrial development policies, which must be seen by

foreign investors at home and abroad to be fair and attractive. Moreover, the Minister made his decision in 1961, the year of independence when the government was to restore and inspire confidence to existing foreign investors at home and abroad. As it was stated earlier in this section that to pursue a vigorous Africanisation policy in order to provide jobs for a few educated nationals at the expense of perhaps the vast majority of unskilled and semi-skilled workers (in the event of closure) employed by these firms would not only be economically self-defeating but also politically suicidal. It must not also be forgotten that the two personalities involved in this case; one was a Sierra Leonean, former Commissioner of Labour and then Permanent Secretary, and the other a colonial expatriate permanent secretary, both advising a Sierra Leonean Minister in opposition to each other. The situation was made more complex when the firm involved was an Indian-owned one. If it were British-owned, perhaps the situation might have been different.

The important thing to note about the case is that it demonstrates the kind of situation which may arise when the government's policy is ill-defined. However, the Immigration law remained as it stood in 1956 until 1965 when a more comprehensive legislation was passed. The Non-Citizens (Restriction, Immigration and Expulsion) Act No. 14, 1965.

Under this Act, the Immigration Control Committee was renamed Commercial Immigration Quota Committee, and its

membership reconstituted; it now includes four cabinet ministers, one of whom, the Minister of Trade and Industry, is chairman.

Like the 1956 government directives on immigration control, the motivation behind the introduction of the Non-Citizens (Restriction, Immigration and Expulsion) Act, as contained in a memorandum prepared by the Prime Minister's office, was to exercise closer control on immigration so that the fullest use of available Sierra Leone manpower and expertise be made. This, the memorandum continued, will reduce unemployment among the educated nationals.³⁷

However, despite these declared policies, the flow of expatriate personnel into the country to take up employment in the private sector continued. Between 1961 and 1967 a total of 504 expatriate quotas were granted out of a total of 841 applications made. Table 4.2 illustrates the position.

TABLE 4.2 The Number of Expatriate Quotas Granted and Rejected Between 1961 and 1967.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Applications</u>	<u>No. Approved</u>	<u>No. Rejected</u>	<u>% Approved</u>
1961	142	85	57	59.8
1962	138	88	50	63.7
1963	94	48	46	51.0
1964	125	91	34	72.8
1965	171	78	93	45.6
1966	74	42	32	56.7
1967	97	72	25	74.2
<u>Total</u>	<u>841</u>	<u>504</u>	<u>337</u>	<u>59.9</u>

Source: Compiled from the Immigration Quota Committee confidential file, 1968.

Perhaps disturbed by the above figures, in 1967 the Military Government, the National Reformation Council (see Chapter 1.2) appointed the Wales Commission with the following terms of reference: to investigate whether or not any malpractice or irregularity was committed by any member of the Immigration Quota Committee during the period 1961 to 1967; the nature of such malpractice and irregularity, the identity of the persons involved in such malpractices and irregularities, and to make recommendations for a better and more effective system of granting of immigration quotas.

The Wales Commission submitted its report on 28th October 1968 but did not find any member of the Immigration Quota Committee guilty of malpractice and irregularities outside the provisions of either the 1952 Immigration Ordinance as modified in 1956 or the Non-Citizens (Restriction, Immigration and Expulsion) Act No. 14 of 1965.

However, with regard to the other terms of reference on the effective control of the immigration quota system, the Wales Commission found the mechanism for granting immigration quotas lax and therefore made the following recommendations, all but one of which the government accepted. Among those accepted by the government were:

(a) No individual or firm shall be granted any immigration quota unless such individual or firm makes the following undertakings. (b) Sierra Leoneans will be employed in top posts or more responsible positions in the business on the

approval of the quota applied for, as soon as possible.

(c) Sierra Leoneans will be trained to fill such posts within a period not exceeding three years from the date of approval of the quota. (d) Steps should be taken to ensure that the quota granted to such individual or firm is reduced by half at least, within a period of two years, in order to make way for suitable Sierra Leoneans where available.

(e) Failure on the part of any individual or firm to comply with the undertaking declared in the application form after the expiry of the stipulated period for the necessary absorption of Sierra Leoneans will render the individual or firm concerned liable to the forfeiture of the quota in respect of which the undertaking were given.

(f) No expatriate employee shall be brought to Sierra Leone on quota granted by the Business Immigration Quota Committee unless it has been previously proved to the satisfaction of both the Principal Immigration Officer and the Chairman of the Quota Committee that he possesses the professional or technical or expert knowledge required to do a special job for which a Sierra Leonean is available. (g) Finally, the Commission recommended a reconstitution of the Immigration Quota Committee to include the Minister of Trade and Industry - chairman, with two other ministers (External Affairs and Economic Development) and a representative of the Chamber of Commerce, two citizens appointed by the President, and the Principal Immigration Officer to act as secretary.

Judging from earlier government statements of policy objectives on immigration control, it is very difficult to see how the recommendations of the Wales Commission could make any improvement on the system of immigration quota granting, particularly when none of the Wales recommendations were in any sense different from earlier recommendations made by Professor Cox-George (ten years earlier), the provisions of the Immigration Control Ordinance of 1952, and the government directives to the Principal Immigration Officer (1956), and the 1965 Non-Citizens (Restrictions, Immigration and Expulsion) Act No. 14. For example, the first recommendation which required expatriate firms to make an undertaking that they should employ Sierra Leonean nationals in more responsible senior positions is no different from the views expressed by Cox-George in his report on African participation in the commerce of Sierra Leone in 1958. Similarly, the second and third recommendations - one can hardly see any discernible differences between them and the directives of the 1956 which the Minister of Trade and Industry quoted earlier (see Case study 3). And finally, one wonders why the Immigration Quota Committee had to have cabinet ministers as members and the Minister of Trade and Industry as its chairman. This makes the whole of the immigration control exercise look more like a political gimmick than any serious attempt to restrict the employment of non-nationals in the private sector of the country.

In the writer's view, the central problem in the administration of the quota system lay in the implementation machinery. While the Immigration Quota Committee takes decisions on what quota to approve or reject, the Principal Immigration Officer is expected to implement such decisions. In implementing its review policy, the Quota Committee faces two major problems. First, there is a lack of information on which to base its decisions and second, a lack of an effective enforcement agency.

To carry out its review policy, the Quota Committee should ideally have at its disposal an objective evaluation of both the need of each firm for expatriate staff and the ability of each firm to decrease the number of its expatriate staff without impairing productivity. The latter aspect would require accurate and detailed information on available indigenous manpower. The quota committee, however, did not have sufficient staff to enable it to visit each firm to evaluate its needs, nor did it have sufficient manpower information. The committee had to rely heavily on the information provided by the applicants.

Companies have an understandable interest in preserving as much freedom as possible in staff recruitment. They naturally present their case to suit their interest. In order to support their request for more expatriate staff firms often tended to overstate, for example, the length of time it will take to Africanise a certain position, the education and experience required for the position and the

adverse consequences of losing a particular expatriate staff, and the difficulties they have had in finding a suitable Sierra Leonean with necessary qualifications to replace an expatriate. For example, from one reputable company the story was told of a new Fourah Bay College graduate who was interviewed four times for a civil engineering job to replace an expatriate and was selected and appointed but failed to turn up. When traced later on at his home his excuse was that the location of the job - only 80 miles from Freetown - was too far removed from Freetown. There are stories galore of these civil engineering graduates in other companies refusing on-site assignments which the employer claimed are crucial in the training of building construction engineers.

Because it is usually unable to evaluate the information provided by each firm, the Committee must often rely on intuition in making a decision. Where possible, as a check on what a firm says, it will also look at what similar firms have accomplished in Africanisation to see if they have Africanised positions which another firm says it cannot because of lack of qualified Sierra Leoneans.

The firms, for their part, often feel that the Committee does not recognize their particular needs. They complain that quotas are cut in seemingly arbitrary fashion and without sufficient understanding on the part of the Committee of the qualifications required for certain positions. In fact, an expatriate employer complained bitterly

that it was the delay in reviewing their application for quotas they resented most. "In the business world", he said, "time is money." ended an angry employer who claimed that he submitted an application for three expatriate quotas and it has taken four months without hearing from the Principal Immigration Officer.

Perhaps a more important factor that has affected the effectiveness of the Immigration Committee in the past was its lack of ultimate power to enforce its decisions on expatriate quota issues. In the past, an expatriate employer who felt dissatisfied with the decisions of the quota committee could appeal to the Prime Minister or President for redress. In one or more occasions the Prime Minister had over-ruled the decision of the Committee. A case in view was that of the Sierra Leone Entertainment Company Limited.

In August 23, 1965, the Sierra Leone Entertainment Company Limited applied for 35 expatriate quotas in order to start the business. The Immigration Quota Committee approved of 10 quotas and rejected the rest. The Sierra Leone Entertainment Company were not satisfied with the decision of the Committee and petitioned the Prime Minister. Their petition letter reads:

"Sierra Leone Entertainment Co. Ltd.

(1) "Dear Sir,

"The Directors of the above company wish to appeal against the recent decision of the Commercial Immigration

Quota Committee who granted an Immigration Quota for only ten personnel as against their application for thirty-five.

"The facts which we wish to submit to your understanding judgment are as follows:-

"1. It will be impossible to run the casino with a staff of ten skilled operators.

"2. A quota of thirty-five is necessary for:

Directors	3
Croupiers	20
Inspectors	5
Casino Cashiers	2
Gambling Managers	2
Bar and Catering Managers	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	35

"There will be four roulette tables and four blackjack tables. The croupiers and dealers must alternate at thirty minute intervals and therefore four operators are necessary for each roulette table and three for each blackjack table.

"3. The Commercial Immigration Quota Committee considered that Sierra Leoneans should be trained at the outset to perform these duties.

"Although Sierra Leoneans will be trained from the outset the profession is highly skilled and takes up to three years of training to acquire the necessary degree of proficiency. It is planned that expatriate croupiers and dealers will eventually be replaced by Sierra Leoneans but a premature change-over would result in considerable losses to the company.

"We would like to point out that one of the staff has twenty years experience of teaching the profession in Las

Vegas and the company intends to operate a training scheme for Sierra Leoneans.

"We hope that this request will be favourably received, as the success of the project depends on the granting of an adequate commercial quota.

"Yours faithfully,

"M.J. Connally

"Resident Director."

The decision of the Prime Minister was conveyed to the Commercial Immigration Quota Committee in a Minute written by the Secretary to the Prime Minister who was the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Mines, Lands and Labour and a member of the previous Immigration Control Committee (see Case 3 above). The Minutes read:

(2) "From: The Secretary to the Prime Minister.

"To: The Principal Immigration Officer.

"Sierra Leone Entertainment Company Ltd.

"Application for Immigration Quota.

"The above company has petitioned the Honourable the Prime Minister in a letter No. 231/Sec/"FT/J.M.O. dated 23 August, 1965, a photostat copy of which I attach, and I am directed to convey approval of the Prime Minister of the thirty-five expatriates required to start the company in Sierra Leone.

"2. Since an undertaking is given by the company that Sierra Leoneans will be trained from the outset this quota will be reviewed after two years to ascertain whether in

fact such training has taken place among Sierra Leoneans.

"G.S. Panda

"Secretary to the

"Prime Minister."

A month later, following his Minutes of approval of the 35 quotas to the Immigration Quota Committee, the Secretary to the Prime Minister sent another minute to the Committee which reads as follows:

(3) "I am directed by the Honourable Prime Minister to instruct you (the Immigration Quota Committee) that as from now henceforth the above Committee should be required to submit their recommendations to me since, under the Act (1965), I have responsibility for controlling immigration in this country. It should also be let known that any person whose application for quota has been turned down is allowed to appeal to me within seven days of the notification of the decision of the Committee.

"(Sgd) G.S. Panda.

"Secretary to the Prime Minister.

"22nd September, 1965."

This last Minute from the Secretary to the Prime Minister, claiming final responsibility for granting expatriate immigration quotas provoked a response from one member of the Quota Committee, who felt that it was an affront to the integrity of the Committee which was composed of cabinet ministers, to have its decisions over-ruled by a civil servant and receive instructions from him.

His protest letter to the Honourable the Prime Minister reads:

(4) "Dear Prime Minister,

"I have to refer to letter reference No. Conf. OPM. 511/5/T(26) of 22nd September, 1965, addressed to the Commercial Immigration Committee by your Secretary (copy-enclosed).

"(2) I have the following comments to make:-

"1. In accepting membership of this Committee, I was under the impression that it was a cabinet committee whose direct responsibility was to you as Prime Minister. Quite naturally, it was generally accepted that the Committee's decisions were in the nature of recommendations which only you as Prime Minister could over-rule. As you will see from the letter of your Secretary, however, he is claiming in plain terms that a Committee which consists of cabinet ministers is directly responsible to him, a civil servant, and that he has powers to overrule a cabinet committee so constituted.

"2. This raises a grave issue of administration in this country which in any view ought without delay to be clarified.

"3. The matter in my view is made the more serious by the fact that on at least two occasions where the Committee has decided on what it considered the national interest to reject applications for entry into this country of non-technical foreign workers (35 in one case), the Secretary to the Prime Minister has without any consultation with the

Committee taken upon himself to write to the Secretary of the Committee in your name overruling the Committee's. This has naturally caused me grave concern especially at a time when your open and declared policy has been, wherever possible, to check the inflow of foreigners into trades and professions which could well be carried on by Sierra Leone nationals.

"4. I therefore propose, subject to your ruling, not to attend future meetings of this Committee until our position vis-a-vis the Secretary to the Prime Minister is clarified.

"5. To continue to do so would in view of the Secretary's letter amount to abdicating the legal position and authority of a cabinet minister in favour of a civil servant even though a respected and eminent one as in this case.

"I remain sir,

"Yours very truly,

"(Sgd) K.I. Kai Samba

"Hon. Minister of Agriculture

"and Natural Resources.

"4th November, 1965."

The response from the Prime Minister to the Honourable Minister's protest letter was directed not to him, but to the Commercial Immigration Quota Committee. It reads:

(5) "I am directed by the Honourable Prime Minister to instruct you that as from now henceforth the above Committee

should be required to submit their recommendations to him, since under the Act, he has responsibility for controlling immigration in this country. It should also be let known that any person whose application for quota has been turned down is allowed an appeal to the Prime Minister within seven days of the notification of the decision of the Committee.

"(Sgd) G.S. Panda,

"Secretary to the

"Prime Minister.

"5th November, 1965."³⁸

The only difference between this correspondence and the previous one (No. 3) was the change in pronouns - from "me" to "him". The rest of the content of the Memorandum remained unaltered; and so the powers of the Commercial Immigration Quota Committee remained weakened and undermined. Under such circumstances, demonstrated by this case study, it was extremely very difficult to exercise effective control over the employment of non-nationals in the private sector, notwithstanding any such policies and recommendations. The crux of the matter is the implementation machinery.

However, despite these implementation problems created by the structure of decision-making and the enforcement agency of the immigration laws, the search for a more lasting solution continued. Within 12 months of submission of the Wales Report, the Minister of Finance appointed a

committee on the Africanisation of commerce and industry under the chairmanship of Professor Cox-George in June, 1969.³⁹ Under its terms of reference, the committee was required first, to examine the Africanisation programmes and policies of all major companies and firms operating in Sierra Leone; second, in association with the companies or firms concerned, to work out a programme aimed at training Sierra Leoneans to assume managerial and professional positions in each company or firm; third, to keep Sierra Leonean students abroad informed of employment opportunities at home in the field of commerce and industry; fourth, to review existing programmes of Africanisation of every company or firm; fifth, to submit proposals to the government in the light of information received under these and how best the Africanisation programme in commerce and industry can be accelerated; sixth, to call upon the companies or firms to submit periodic returns showing the strength of their expatriate staff (the responses of expatriate employers to this request is fully discussed in Chapter 3.5); and finally, seventh, to submit its proposals to the government not later than six months from the date of its appointment (16/6/69).⁴⁰ However, the Committee did not submit its final report until 1973, four years after its date of appointment.

In its final report to the government, the Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry made 26 proposals which, they thought, if accepted and implemented by the

government could go a long way to solve the expatriate immigration problem. In the light of its terms of reference these proposals can be grouped and summarised under three main headings. First, these proposals called for more stringent conditions to be imposed as pre-conditions for allowing foreign investors to enter Sierra Leone and establish businesses. For instance, the second proposal of the Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry suggested among other things that:

(i) A necessary pre-condition for the establishment of new industries by foreign concerns and for granting of development certificates should be that the companies accept and agree before hand to provide opportunities for training Sierra Leoneans for responsible positions in them and in all aspects of the business of such industries.⁴¹

(ii) That the deputy-general manager of such a company must be Sierra Leonean and must have facilities for management training to the topmost level open to him or her.

One can hardly see any marked difference between the above proposals of the Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry, and those put forward by the Wales Commission in 1968, the provisions of the Non-Citizens (Restriction, Immigration and Expulsion) Act No. 14, 1965, and the 1952 Government Directives on the Immigration Ordinance 1946, Cep. 86, and above all the views expressed earlier by the chairman in his report on African participation in the commerce of Sierra Leone, 1958 (see

page 319 above). In fact, the proposals of the Committee under this category merely reflect the thinking of its chairman - Professor Cox-George who had been very consistent in his stand on the call for the Africanisation of commerce and industry.

The second category of proposals concerned with the establishment of enforcement agencies or institutions. For example, the Committee recommended the establishment of two commissions, one on immigration with a secretariat which would review the implementation of the government's immigration policy regularly twice a year in order to ensure strict execution of that policy; and the second on Africanisation which would function as the new Africanisation Authority with a secretariat too. This second category of proposals reflected the terms of reference (third and sixth) which required the Committee to keep Sierra Leone students abroad informed of the existence of job opportunities in the private sector and which also required all companies or firms to submit periodical reports on the level of their expatriate staff. The problems associated with these proposals if accepted are the creation of new control bureaucratic structures which would result in unnecessary delay and perhaps more malpractices of the kind described in the last case study (4), will lower the morale of the business community for further investment.

The third group of proposals concerned with the manpower aspect of Africanisation. These proposals were

based on the Committee's realization that effective implementation of immigration policies depends largely on the availability of qualified and experienced manpower resources. The Committee, therefore, made the following recommendations:

(i) that the resources of the local Institute of Management, the University of Sierra Leone, the business and industrial community and of the government should be brought together to give strength, stimulus and direction to the development of business and management studies at all levels;

(ii) a body comprising all these interests should advise the appropriate authorities on the development programmes of management education and training;⁴²

(iii) and finally, the Committee recommended that the government should consider the advisability of consultation with Ghana and Nigeria and the professional organisations in Sierra Leone for the purpose of establishing a West African professional accounting qualifications.⁴³

The proposals of the Cox-George Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry are good and far reaching like previous recommendations. But the willingness and ability of the government to accept and implement them was another matter. The interesting question is, was the setting up of the Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry necessary within one year of the submission of the Wales Commission Report? This is more so when the

government accepted all but one⁴⁴ of the recommendations of the Wales Commission in the first place, and in the second place, from the standpoint that some of the recommendations made by both the Wales Commission and the Cox-George Committee, with the exception of the Committee's proposals on the establishment of enforcement agencies and those on manpower were identical. Previous discussion on the immigration quota system indicated that the Minister of Trade and Industry in conjunction with the Principal Immigration Officer was responsible for the administration of the system. The second question is, why did the Minister of Finance take over the responsibility to appoint the Committee on Africanisation while under the Non-Citizens (Registration, Immigration and Expulsion) Act No. 14, 1965 the responsibility is given to the Minister of Trade and Industry?

Answers to these questions ~~were~~ difficult to get from official sources, despite the attempts made to interview officials in both Ministries - Finance and Trade and Industry. This was partly because, since the appointment of the Cox-George Committee on the Africanisation of Commerce and Industry in June 1969 to 1978, there has been no less than six finance ministers and seven trade and industry ministers,⁴⁵ and partly because civil servants interviewed were unwilling to give any information relating to the immigration control issue. However, from the unofficial sources, the following reasons were not

unconnected with why the government considered it necessary to appoint the second committee immediately after the Wales Commission Report: that the Wales Commission was appointed under a military government which the civilian government considered to be unconstitutional.⁴⁶ That the Wales Commission Report did not go far enough to provide lasting solutions to the immigration control problem in the country.

A possible answer to the second question is that, unlike the Trade and Industry Minister who saw the Africanisation of the private sector from a purely social viewpoint, i.e. providing employment for the few educated Africans, the Minister of Finance saw the Africanisation policy from an economic standpoint. The adverse effect of expatriate employment on the country's balance of payment and foreign exchange (see Chapter 2.2 and section 4.3 above).

However, even if the above reasons were the underlying factors behind the appointment of the National Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry by the then Minister of Finance, the government did not accept all its recommendations. For instance, the government did not accept the proposals on the establishment of commissions of immigration and Africanisation with secretariats. Perhaps the reason why the government did not accept these categories of proposals was that the Committee was not explicit on whether the Commission on Immigration Control should also have its own secretariat or continue to use its existing facilities - the Principal Immigration Officer. In any event, if these

proposals had been accepted by the government, they would have created a bureaucratic structure with resulting effect of delay and thus aggravate the fear often expressed by the business community (see page 349 above). If, for example, the government had accepted the proposals on the establishment of the two commissions, it could have meant that the Commission on Immigration Control could only grant expatriate quotas to the applicants after it has received clearance from the Commission for Africanisation. This would have been time consuming for a businessman who regards "time as money". Added to this is the possibility of conflict between the two bodies. This might manifest itself in a situation where both commissions differ on what each considers to be the national interest in the granting or rejection of immigration quotas (see Case 3).

Another reason, perhaps, of greater importance than the previous ones is why the government did not accept the proposals on the establishment of the two commissions was the financial costs involved. The costs of office accommodation, staffing, etc. would have been substantial to the government, which was already spending a third of its revenue on personal emolument alone.⁴⁶

However, in the nature of things, the government has accepted the first and third categories of the National Committee on Africanisation of Commerce and Industry's proposals under the administration of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Principal Immigration Officer. The

Minister of Trade and Industry remained chairman of the Immigration Quota Committee and the Principal Immigration Officer as its Secretary, and the rest of the membership also remained as it was before. Under these circumstances one cannot avoid making perhaps sweeping conclusions that the appointment of these commissions one after another was nothing more than a public relations exercise designed to convince the public that the government was making efforts or seemed to be making efforts to restrict the employment of non-nationals in the private sector. This is because from the available data the employment of expatriates in the private sector was on the increase. Between 1968 and 1978, out of a total of 895 expatriate quotas applied for, 601 were approved, representing 67.2 per cent of the total against 59.9 per cent in 1961-67 (see Table 4.2 above.) This is also reflected in the following table.

TABLE 4.3 Expatriate Quota Approved Between 1968 and 1978.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number Applied For</u>	<u>Number Approved</u>	<u>Number Rejected</u>	<u>% Approved</u>
1968	80	60	20	75.0
1969	70	52	18	74.3
1970	95	70	25	73.7
1971	264	171	93	64.8
1972	49	33	16	67.0
1973	44	24	20	54.5
1974	47	28	19	59.6
1975	93	63	30	67.7
1976	46	36	10	78.0
1977	54	39	15	72.0
1978	33	25	8	75.6
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>895</u>	<u>601</u>	<u>274</u>	<u>67.2</u>

Source: Collected from the Immigration Quota Confidential Minute File, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Freetown, 1978.

In summary, it may be said categorically that the use of the immigration quota system as an instrument of the government's Africanisation policies had not been very successful in so far as its effect on the size and level of expatriate employment in the private sector. Between 1961 and 1967 (Table 4.2), the number of expatriate quotas granted by respective Immigration Control Committees was 504 representing 59.9 per cent of the total quotas (841) applied for by expatriate employers. And between 1968 and 1971, despite the recommendations and proposals of the Wales Commission's Report (1968), a further 509 quotas were applied for, of which 353 were granted. However, subsequent to the National Committee on the Africanisation of Commerce and Industry's recommendations (1973), and the fiscal controls discussed below, there was a dramatic fall-off in applications, for between 1972 and 1978, but with the exception of 1975,⁴⁷ applications never exceeded 54. The ratio of approval to applications, however, hardly changed, as Table 4.3 shows.

4.42 The Fiscal Policy.

Disillusioned perhaps with what seemed to be an apparent failure of its Africanisation policy through the use of immigration control mechanisms, the government decided to adopt (in addition to its immigration controls), the use of fiscal policy. In 1972, by an Act of Parliament, the Sierra Leone Government introduced a payroll tax levy of £200 on each expatriate employed by private sector

employers. The rationale behind the use of fiscal policy as an instrument of Africanisation policies is based on the assumption that a tax levy on the expatriate payroll will increase the cost of the expatriate to the employer. Consequently, he would prefer to employ local labour.⁴⁸

But the evidence available so far does not seem to support that. From the annual revenue the Government collect, it shows that the fiscal policy, though intended to act as a deterrent to expatriate employment in the private sector as its primary objective, also has a secondary effect, the raising of Government revenue (see Table 4.4 below).

TABLE 4.4 Revenue Collected From the Expatriate Payroll Tax - 1973/74-1978/79 (£1 - Le2).

<u>Year</u>	<u>Revenue Estimate</u>	<u>% of Total Revenue</u>
1973/74	69,186.50	1.4
1974/75	625,000.00	0.7
1975/76	250,000.00	0.27
1976/77	250,000.00	0.2
1977/78	187,500.00	0.13
1978/79	149,250.00	0.1
TOTAL REVENUE	£3,218,436.50	

Source: Government Annual Estimate of Revenue and Expenditures 1978/79.

From the above table it appears that the revenue produced from the quotas granted became a significant source of income to the Government, and it might be thought that revenue raising could encourage the granting of more quotas, not fewer. But who benefits from such a tax?

The fact is, with the exception of the mining companies which are export-oriented with world market competition, the majority of foreign-owned firms enjoyed monopoly positions in Sierra Leone. Besides being the sole manufacturers of certain commodities, they also enjoy the protection of the government from foreign competition. Moreover, some of them are regarded as import-substitutes. Some even enjoy a five-year tax-free holiday.⁴⁹ To levy a tax on their expatriate employees' payroll will, of course, increase costs to the employer, but being in monopoly positions they will pass the cost to the consumer without the effect of reducing the number of expatriates employed, nor even the profits of the company. Besides, a tax levy on expatriate employees payroll can also be treated by the employer either as a production cost or trading expense which is recoverable from the company's turnover and thus reduces the company's taxable profit to the government. What the Government gains in tax in one way is lost in another. Sierra Leoneans lose because job opportunities are reduced, while the consumer loses if he has to bear part of the additional cost of the expatriate to the employer in the form of increased prices.

4.5 Criticism of Current Policies.

The foregoing analysis has important implications for current Africanisation policies. It is possible to group current policies into quantitative controls, general and specific, and controls which alter relative prices, again general and specific.

There are two significant kinds of quantitative controls to achieve increased African employment which have been popular. One is immigration policies which restrict the number of foreigners entering the country to work. Restrictions are placed either through licensing schemes or through explicit quotas. These restrictions are usually industry-specific. Although such immigration restrictions on the inflow of foreign personnel have been most popular devices, there have also been recommendations that there be laws stipulating that the Africans must be employed in certain jobs within a specified period of time as long as they were judged "qualified".⁵⁰ A system of work permits has also been recommended.⁵¹ Such permits would be good for a specific period of time and subject to renewal as the law specifies; for example, as soon as qualified nationals become available for certain posts the work permit of expatriates holding these posts will not be renewed.

Immigration restrictions and renewable work permits or quotas are subject to several weaknesses. They do not ensure that of the potential expatriates willing and able to work within the country the most productive ones actually come in. In this regard, policies which involve auctioning work permits to foreigners and which allow such permits to be freely transferable will not be subject to this shortcoming.

In addition, immigration restrictions and work permits do not ensure that foreigners actually go where they are most

valuable to the economy, unless such policies are company or industry-specific. Even if transferable work permits are auctioned to foreigners, if the foreigners once they enter are free to work wherever they choose, this shortcoming can still exist.⁵²

Furthermore, immigration restrictions and work permits do not ensure that the employment of Africans actually increases when expatriate employment is decreased. Indeed, not only is it possible for the number of Africans not to alter as the number of expatriates falls, but it is also possible for their number to actually decrease.⁵³

In view of the above, it would appear that a policy of auctioning entry or work permits to foreigners would be similar in its effects to the fiscal policy outlined above. This would have been so had it not been for the fact that such auctioning policies impinge disadvantageously on those with high discount rates. Hence, small expatriate firms such as Lebanese or Indian family businesses or individual employers with limited access to capital markets are at a disadvantage in bidding for work permits. Instead of lump sum payments work permits can be sold strictly on rental basis. This would remove the capital advantage. But an efficient policy involving work permits would involve transfer of work permits. This would soon engender a market for buying and selling permits, tying up valuable resources and allowing some lucky or prescient dealer to reap the "profit", at the expense of the government and nationals.

Such consideration makes a policy involving auctioning transferable work permits or entry rights less attractive than a policy involving a constant percentage tax on wages of expatriate employees.

To return to the main argument, immigration restrictions and work permits, especially when they do not involve auctioning, are administratively complex and conducive to irregularities (see Cases 3 and 4 above). Generally, as in Sierra Leone, some individual or group of individuals such as the Principal Immigration Officer, the Minister of Trade and Industry, or the Immigration Quota Committee, etc. must decide on the basis of ill-defined criteria whether an individual who has applied for an entry visa (usually the firm employing the individual will forward or make the application) is to be granted the permit. It is not difficult to see that the decision-making process involved can become quite complex and somewhat arbitrary and that the opportunities for bribery and corruption are enormous. To forestall such opportunities, it has been suggested⁵⁴ that immigration quotas be granted on the basis of clear, well-publicised criteria. This no doubt would help although it would not completely eliminate corruption and arbitrary decisions (see Cases 3 and 4 above).

Before 1972, policies which increase relative cost of expatriate employee to induce Africanisation of employment had been non-existent. This makes the Sierra Leone so-called payroll tax introduced in 1972⁵⁵ particularly interesting.

It is really a unit tax imposed on a factor of production (labour), and is a specific sum placed on the employment of any expatriate irrespective of his earnings or position in the organisation. This tax has serious disadvantages as compared with a percentage of income tax. In particular, such a tax will not be more effective in discouraging employment of the highly-paid. If the problem of Africanisation is most serious in the top posts, then a policy which fails to discriminate between high and low salary expatriates is less desirable than one that does so, for it makes it no more expensive to recruit a managing director than a clerk. Furthermore, a percentage tax may promote greater efficiency in the utilization of different categories of foreign employees. However, the social cost of getting rid of any given number of expatriates or of preventing the entry of any given number of foreign employees, may be higher in the percentage tax case than in the per unit tax case. In addition to these considerations, the Sierra Leone payroll tax is an 'incomplete' policy in the sense that it does not ensure that African employment increases at the same time that expatriate employment decreases. On a similar point, T.M. Yusufu has expressed the following opinion:

The immediate employment impact of such policies, is, however, highly debatable, particularly as it leads to a large-scale repatriation of capital. Indeed the replacement of highly-skilled personnel could easily have the initial effect not only of

reducing the level of economic activity but also the level of employment.⁵⁶

A similar tone of caution is also discernable in the analysis of a group of economists working at the University College, Nairobi in 1968. They stressed that the cost of diverting Kenyans from new, growth-created jobs into 'replacement jobs' where they could make no net addition to national product be seriously considered. Furthermore, they estimated that the diversion of each such Kenyan would on average mean sacrificing about U.S. \$6,000 worth of potential output. They added:

Perhaps even more significantly, as each high-level person (employer or senior expatriate employee) on the average creates jobs for ten others besides himself, each high-level job not filled as a result of diverting a qualified Kenyan to replacement also means about ten additional unskilled or semi-skilled workers being deprived of the chances of earning wage income.⁵⁷

Thus, while there may be good argument for a well planned and phased reduction in the number of non-nationals in employment, properly related to manpower requirements (Chapter 5 below), and replacement possibilities, hasty and drastic measures may have a reversible effect on the objectives of the policies of Africanisation in the private sector.

4.6 Summary and Conclusions.

In the above chapter, some attempts have been made to discuss in greater depth the responses of both organized African labour and the government to the recruitment and employment policies of foreign-owned firms operating in Sierra Leone. Organized labour saw the employment policies of foreign employers as discriminatory. To them, the apparent preponderance of expatriates in all top jobs with high pay, better conditions of service, represented the colonial mentality of the white man towards the African, "the beast of burden" who must only be paid just sufficient to keep him living, could no longer be tolerated in an independent sovereign nation. The workers responded in the form of industrial action strikes. The purpose of this was to draw the attention of the public, the media, intellectuals (like Professor Cox-George), and the politicians (section 4.2). The government could not remain indifferent under such popular pressures. It responded. Implicit in its responses were the socio-economic motivations (4.3). The social and economic motives for Africanisation were based on the assumption that a successful replacement of expatriates by African personnel would have a beneficial spread effect to the society through the acquisition of skills and increased income and will also effect the country's balance of payment and foreign exchange position.

To achieve these objectives the government adopted two policy measures: immigration control, and the use of fiscal policy. Under the Immigration Control policy (4.4(1)),

legislation which restricted the employment of non-nationals in the private sector were passed. Under these legislations the machinery for the implementation of these laws was created, such as the Immigration Control Committee, the Office of the Principal Immigration Officer, etc. with the Minister of Trade and Industry as the final decision taker on all immigration quota issues. To ensure the proper application and implementation of such laws, a Commission of Inquiry and committees were appointed to suggest ways and means by which such policies could effectively be implemented. Invariably, the recommendations and proposals of such commission and committee reports were accepted by the government but to implement them successfully was another matter.

In addition to the immigration control policies was the fiscal policy. This policy introduced in 1972 imposed a tax levy on expatriate payroll. It was hoped that by so doing it would alter the relative cost of expatriate employees in favour of their African counterparts, but this was not realised.

In any event, it is clear that the success of all these policies discussed above depended upon the increased supply of suitably qualified nationals to replace non-nationals, and that these could not be pursued as ends in themselves without regard to their possible effects on other objectives, in particular economic growth and the growth of employment. The next chapter in Part III will look at the manpower requirements for Africanisation.

Notes and References

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8. This aspect of the story was meant, perhaps, to give legitimacy to the disputes. See B.E. Partridge: The process of leadership on the shop floor, 1976.
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18. Clause IX of the Agreement signed between the Government of Sierra Leone on one hand and the Alusuisse International Bauxite Mining Corporation on the other, 1978, p. 90.
19. Ibid., p. 91.
20. Ibid., p. 91.
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30. The Second Five Year National Development Plan, Progress Report, Ministry of Development and Economic Planning, Freetown, 1978. p. 15.
31. The Second Five Year (1974/5-1978/9) National Development Plan. Ministry of Development and Economic Planning, Freetown, p. 78.

32. Immigration and Restriction Ordinance 1952, Section 18, Cap. 86. Sierra Leone Government Printer, Freetown, 1952.
33. The composition of the Immigration Control Committee was as follows: The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry - Chairman; the Administrative Secretary; the Commissioner of Labour; Deputy Controller of Customs; and the Inspector of Produce.
34. In September 24, 1956, the Government issued new directives which provide the guidelines under which immigration quotas be awarded.
35. Sierra Leone Government Directive under 'Secret Cover', 24 September 1956.
36. The information for this case study is extracted from the Proceedings of the Immigration Control Committee's Minute File, 1956-1965 (Confidential), Ministry of Trade and Industry, Freetown, 1978.
37. See Robert Brown Report on the Manpower Situation in Sierra Leone 1965, Ministry of Overseas Development Administration, London, 1965.
38. Extracted from the Minutes of the Commercial Immigration Quota Committee for the year 1964-1965, Confidential File, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Freetown, 1978.
39. Professor Cox-George is an eminent economist and head of the Department of Economics and Social Studies at Fourah Bay College, the University of Sierra Leone.
40. Appointment letter, MF/66(13) of the 16/6/69 of the National Committee on the Africanisation of Commerce and Industry.
41. An example of this recommendation at work was the agreement signed between the Sierra Leone Government and the Swiss-based International Bauxite Mining Company, 1978 (see 4.2 above).
42. Paragraph 57, recommendation 12 of the Report of the National Committee on the Africanisation of Commerce and Industry, Government Printer, Freetown, 1973, p. 74.
43. Proposal 8, Paragraph 36 of the Committee Report, 1973, p. 74.
44. The Wales Commission suggested that the limit of immigration quotas to be granted to any applicant must be based on the scale laid down in this rule according

to the capital and size of the business as follows.

Classification	Capital Le	Quota
Business with capital exceeding	2,000,000	20
Business with capital not exceeding	2,000,000	18
" " " " "	1,000,000	16
" " " " "	900,000	14
" " " " "	700,000	12
" " " " "	500,000	10
" " " " "	300,000	8
" " " " "	100,000	6
" " " " "	80,000	3
" " " " "	50,000	2
Business with capital below	50,000	1

The government did not accept this particular recommendation.

45. The Finance Minister who appointed the Cox-George Committee on the Africanisation of Commerce and Industry resigned from the Government in September 1970, was subsequently arrested, charged and hanged for an attempted coup to over-throw the government in 1975.
46. Government Annual Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure.
47. This increase in the employment of expatriates in the private sector might be the result of rapid economic expansion which necessitated the employment of foreign skills which the country could not easily provide.
48. Johnson, Omotunde E.G. On the economics of localisation in Africa. Eastern Africa Economic Review, 4(2), 1972, pp. 53-66. ✓
49. Saylor, R.G. Economic system of Sierra Leone. Duke, 1967, Chapter 10.
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51. Johnson, H.G. A theoretical model of economic nationalism in new developing states. In: Economic nationalism in old and new states, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1968, pp. 1-16.
52. Kilby, B. Industrialisation in an open economy: Nigeria 1945-1966, Cambridge University Press, 1969.
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55. The Pay-Roll Tax Act 1972, Freetown, Government Printer, 1972.
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57. Smith, Graham, et al, op. cit., March 1968, p. 7.

Africanisation and Manpower

Requirements:- PART THREE

The Manpower Supply

Africanisation and Manpower Requirements:- PART THREE:

Education and Manpower Supply.

INTRODUCTION

Economists have tended in the past to underrate the role of manpower resources in the economic development of the third world countries and concentrated too much on the inability of these countries to accumulate capital.¹ Only recently have they come to consider manpower resources with the respect that the subject undoubtedly deserves in the development equation. Indeed, as always, the pendulum has swung to the other extreme: it is already fashionable and part of the new 'orthodoxy' to underplay the role of capital and to explain underdevelopment essentially in terms of the limitations imposed by inadequate manpower resources.²

By the same token, the African policy makers have come to realize that, as part of the process of both economic and political decolonisation, the progress and success of Africanisation policies in both the public and private sectors depend essentially upon the supply and availability of local manpower resources, in the right number, at the right time, in the right place and with the right balance of technical knowledge and practical skills.³ This is because, as Seltzer pointed out:

Any Africanisation policy that necessitates or can only be maintained by external recruitments is not only self-defeating in the sense

of failing to accomplish its basic objectives, but it's also wasteful of available resources - external recruitments tend to be more costly than the utilization of present personnel.⁴

Since independence in 1961, successive governments (military or civilian) in Sierra Leone have indicated their awareness that to be successful, Africanisation policy must be complemented by sound manpower development policies - designed to improve the manpower situation in the country. For example, the First Ten Years National Economic and Social Development Plan (1962/63-1972/73)⁵ recognized the government's responsibility to take steps to meeting the increased demand for qualified manpower in the future. One of the priorities of the Plan was:

The production of high- and intermediate-levels of manpower (especially in science and technology) to satisfy the requirements of the public and the private sector establishments such that the majority of the expatriate personnel in industry and commerce would be replaced by Sierra Leonean nationals.⁶

In another place the plan states:

Official policy is committed to reducing the extreme reliance on expatriate manpower, and to relating through increased training efforts and expansion of educational facilities, the supply of high- and intermediate levels of

manpower to the needs of the economy in general and the industry in particular.⁷

It was against this background that in 1964 the Sierra Leone government with the aid of the British Ministry of Overseas Development Administration, appointed Robert Brown to conduct a survey on the manpower situation in Sierra Leone, with the following terms of reference:

To report on the manpower requirements of the civil service, commerce and industry; for administrative, professional, technical and clerical staff with recommendations for training facilities both locally and abroad; and to relate such requirements to the country's ability to meet the cost.⁸

The results of the survey are illustrated in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below, the occupational and industrial distribution of high- and intermediate-level manpower. The survey consisted of a questionnaire mailed to every governmental agency and private firms employing six or more workers. The questionee was requested to report present, intermediate, and high-level manpower employment (administrative, managerial, professional, technical and clerical staff) and to estimate manpower requirements for 1969. The returns were then tabulated and submitted to the government as an estimate of manpower needs for 1969. No attempts were made to check individual estimates within a given industry against one another or against independent estimates of

future demands for the final product of the firms in question. The report merely concluded that existing stock of intermediate and high level manpower would have to increase by 10 per cent per year until 1969.

The importance of the survey for this study lies not in its crude estimation of future manpower needs but its findings concerning the distribution of skills among the existing labour force and between government and private employment. The survey shows that out of an estimated 60,000 workers, only 12,570 could be classified as intermediate or high-level manpower (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). Of the 12,570, one-quarter were teachers at all levels of education and one-third were clerical workers. Because of the large number of teachers and clerical workers employed by the government, over 65 per cent of the enumerated employees were engaged by the government. (The projections of the survey estimated that this percentage will rise to 70 per cent in 1969.) The survey also revealed that 15 per cent of the workers surveyed were expatriates holding key positions in both the public and the private sectors. For example, 57 of the 77 lecturers at Forah Bay College were expatriates, 75 per cent of the 267 architects, engineers and surveyors were expatriates (Table 3.2 above), (the percentage increases to 87 per cent if the public sector is excluded); 24 per cent of the 38 chemists were expatriates, and 71 per cent of the 194 directors and managers in the private sector were expatriates (60 per cent if the public sector is included).

TABLE 5.1 Occupational Summary of the Brown Report 1965 based on I.S.C.O.†

Occup. Group	Analysis	Public Sector		Private Sector		Totals	Estimated Requirements for 1965		
		S.Leon. Expat.	504	791	S.Leon. Expat.		655	Public Priv. Totals	Public Priv. Totals
Major Group 0	Professional, technical & related workers	5,579	504	791	655	7,529	9,970	11,840	
Major Group 1	Administrative, executive & managerial	639	50	125	291	1,105	920	1,450	
Major Group 2	Clerical workers	1,631	16	1,390	156	3,193	2,340	4,690	
Major Group 3	Sales workers	-	-	228	72	300	-	410	
Major Group 4	Farm workers	-	-	5	-	5	-	10	
Major Group 5	NOT INCLUDED IN THE SURVEY								
Major Group 6	Workers in transport & communications	225	16	118	44	403	310	500	
Major Group 7/8	Craftsmen, production process & labour NEC*	NOT INCLUDED IN THE SURVEY							
Major Group 9	Services, sports, etc.	23	-	9	3	35	40	50	
TOTALS		8,097	586	2,666	1,221	12,570	13,580	18,950	

Source: Table 1 of Robert Brown Report on the Manpower Situation of Sierra Leone, 1965.

† International Standard Classification of Occupations.

* Not elsewhere classified.

TABLE 5.2 Industrial Summary of the Manpower Survey Report 1965 based on I.S.I.C.

ISIC of all Economic Activities	Analysis	Public Sector		Private Sector		Estimated Requirements for 1969			
		S.Leon. Expat.	29	S.Leon. Expat.	47	Public	Priv.	Totals	
Division 0	Agriculture, forestry, hunting & fishing	205	29	70	47	351	515	145	660
Division 1	Mining & quarrying	21	6	218	150	395	50	470	520
Division 2/3	Manufacturing	199	19	160	82	460	320	360	680
Division 4	Construction	292	39	160	173	664	540	440	980
Division 5	Electricity, gas, water & sanitary services	-	-	128	30	158	-	240	240
Division 6	Commerce	5	1	910	346	1,262	10	1,780	1,790
Division 7	Transport, storage & communications	799	53	506	220	1,578	1,150	820	1,970
Division 8	Services (incl. gov't., business, community & personal)	6,576	439	514	173	7,702	10,995	1,115	12,110
TOTALS		8,097	586	2,666	1,221	12,570	13,580	5,370	18,950

Source: Table II of the Robert Brown Report on the Manpower Situation in Sierra Leone 1965 based on International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities.

The ability of both the private sector and the public sector to import foreign specialists for key positions suggests that manpower deficiencies at the highest levels may be minimal. The acute shortage of manpower, as indicated by the annual reports of the various ministries, is at a sub-professional, technical level; for example, agricultural assistants, mechanics, electricians, nurses, laboratory technicians, etc. For example, the Railway Department stated in its annual report for 1963/64 that:

It became increasingly clear during the year that an increasingly large percentage of failures were due to inadequate attention to routine maintenance procedures. In common with many other countries of the world, Sierra Leone has to face new technical and staff problems created by dieselisation and, until such time as local staff of the right calibre can be thoroughly trained in theory and practice of diesel engine maintenance, it will be essential to enlist outside assistance to obtain the full benefit of dieselisation.⁹

The Electricity Corporation reported in 1964/65 that: there are still many men who require constant supervision, and there is still a serious shortage of men capable of locating faults on the increasing number of machines and apparatus being installed.¹⁰

Additional examples of reported manpower deficiencies will be cited in later chapters, but enough has been said here to indicate the types of shortages encountered which has tended to restrict and retard the capacity of the Sierra Leone Government to implement its policy of Africanisation of both the private and public sector employments since its inception. Thus, in Parts I and II of this study, some attempts have been made to establish the case for the manpower demand aspect of Africanisation of both the public and private sectors' employments in Sierra Leone, with references to other African states with similar colonial experiences. Part I looked at the Africanisation of the public service while Part II discussed that of the private sector. In both cases, the government and private sector employers had wanted to Africanise, but they claimed that their willingness to do so was constrained by the absence of enough people with the right qualifications and experience to replace existing expatriates and to fill new vacancies as they occurred. Part III of this study will therefore consider the manpower supply side of the Africanisation equation. It will look at the various approaches to manpower planning such as the rate of return in investment in education, the cost-benefit approach to manpower planning, the manpower supply-requirements, etc., and then the policy implications of such approaches for the policy makers.

CHAPTER 5 THE MANPOWER SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS.

5.1 Introduction.

At independence, African countries had four common features of their manpower situation: firstly, most professional and senior administrative positions in the economy were held by non-nationals (see Tables 1.4 and 3.8). Secondly, the public sector not only accounted for about half of all wage employment but also employed a very large proportion, perhaps three-quarters or more of high-level manpower (defined as those whose jobs normally require a university degree or its equivalent).¹¹ Thirdly, while there was a shortage of high level manpower in many fields, on the whole the shortage was 'long term' rather than immediate. But the shortage of middle-level manpower (those with a secondary school education and/or with a post secondary school technical and vocational training) was already acute and may well continue to be acute for some years to come (Table 5.17 below). Lastly, the possession of school certificate neatly divided the population into two groups: the educated few with good opportunities of present employment, and the vast majority of the semi-skilled whose employment was stagnant or falling, whose prospects of advancement were minimal and who were increasingly confined to self-employment in agriculture and petty commercial activities.

These factors have several implications for manpower planning and development policies. The existence and availability of expatriate manpower at the high levels at the time of independence meant that the immediate manpower

shortage was that of qualified persons,¹² and was therefore political rather than economic. Its degree of scarcity was as much a function of the speed with which African governments would wish to Africanize senior posts in the economy, as of the rate of growth of output which they propose to achieve.

It follows that if Africanisation would receive a high political priority as well as demographic wastage, it would absorb a large proportion of the prospective output of the educational system over the next ten to fifteen years. This procedure was undoubtedly expensive as it was devoted to replacement of scarce resources which would otherwise be used for growth; but it simplified the technical task of manpower planning, as replacement needs can be forecast with greater degree of confidence than needs arising from the projected growth of the economy.¹³

The simultaneous existence of manpower shortage at the high-level skills and the surpluses of other grades of labour is not unique to Sierra Leone. Harbison and Myers found it common in all developing countries.¹⁴ In Sierra Leone it is more acutely felt owing to the fact that the output of the educational system has been expanding faster than employment opportunities for school leavers¹⁵ (see Table 5.18). It is not suggested that aggregate wage employment would have grown faster or unemployment slower if education has grown less. On the contrary, schools have acted as weirs postponing and regulating the entry of

youngsters into the labour market. In recent years, however, the output of secondary school education has reached a level (Table 5.18) that is now not only sufficient to fill many labour market vacancies which were previously taken by youngsters with primary school education, but has also enabled middle-level training institutions (primary school teacher training colleges, technical and vocational institutes) to raise their sights and demand school certificate or general certificate of education at 'O' level as a condition of entry. It may not be far off the mark to suggest that besides acting as a feeder of secondary schools, the principal function of the recent expansion of primary education has been to ensure that seekers after urban jobs enter the labour market somewhat later and somewhat better educated than otherwise would have done. In such circumstances, it would appear profitable to examine ways in which education could contribute to creating new opportunities for the advancement of not only this 'surplus' but the mass of the population.

However, concurrent with the educated unemployed, there exists critical shortage of specific types of manpower mainly in the technical fields. Moreover, these shortages are regarded as "bottlenecks" in both the progress of Africanisation (Table 3.8) and the development of Sierra Leone's economy, and in the opinion of some planners, wherever a country confronts a few bottlenecks it should concentrate a major proportion of its efforts on removing the bottlenecks.

This will involve in the main 'manpower requirements' approach to educational planning, the fundamental axiom of which is that lack of qualified manpower constitutes a bottleneck. Although this section of the study does not attempt to contribute to the general debate on the merits and limitations of the manpower requirements approach which in the opinion of Jolly and Colclough,¹⁶ has for many years dominated the literature on the economies of education, it is nevertheless important to briefly discuss the manpower planning approaches in relation to education and economic development.

The current interest in the economic aspect of education stems partly from the increased burden of educational expenditure on government budget (in Sierra Leone more than 25 per cent of total government revenue is spent on education in 1978/79 financial year), and partly from the belief of economists and educators that returns to investment in human capital are very high and education is more important than capital accumulation as an engine of economic growth, accounting for a large unexplained part of its so-called "residual factor".¹⁷ Salary differentials benefiting high-level manpower and educated persons seemed to support this concept (see 5.5).

The literature on education and manpower may broadly be divided into two schools of thoughts. On the one hand are the writers who try to integrate education into the general body of economic theory as a factor of production

analogous to physical capital. They ask such questions as: Has education in the past contributed significantly to economic growth? Can one define and measure the stock of education embodied in the labour force? Can one define and calculate the average and marginal rate of return on this stock?¹⁸

The second school of thought takes it for granted that education and training are pre-conditions of economic progress that as economies grow large and more complex, so will their demand for human skills and that most of these skills can be provided efficiently through education and training. Manpower planners attempt to calculate on certain assumptions about the level of and composition of future economic activity, and other recent social and political variables - the demand for manpower classified by occupations (Table 5.1) to convert this classification of demand by occupation into demand by educational attainment and to devise plans and policies aimed at equating projected demands and probably supplies.¹⁹

Several attempts have been made to quantify the contribution of education to economic growth. The methods used to obtain these results has often been referred to as the 'residual factor approach. The essence of this approach is to compare an increase in inputs of labour and capital with the expansion of gross national product over a long period. In various studies, it was found that the increase in imports was small in comparison with G.N.P.

growth and so it was assumed that the improvement in production was due to the 'residual factor' often defined as "education".

Several economists, led by Schultz, Auckrust, Solow and Denison, have estimated that a sizeable proportion (ranging from 20-90 per cent) of the growth rate over a given period was due to the educational level of the labour force. Solow²⁰ estimated that 97.5 per cent of growth in the United States of America between 1900 and 1960 could be attributed to the residual factor. Aukrast²¹ claimed about 60 per cent for a similar period (1900-1955) in Norway, and Schultz²² attributed 83 per cent of growth in the U.S.A. between 1910 and 1945 to the residual factor. Denison's²³ result was much less than the others, being 43 per cent. His later study of Western Europe attributed a smaller share of increased output to the residual factor:- 13 per cent for the United Kingdom and only 6 per cent for France.²⁴

The residual factor has many imperfections.²⁵ Much of the controversy centres on its assumption (namely that the residual factor is education) or the use of guesstimates and its attempts to explain growth in terms of simple variables,²⁶ moreover, as Schultz admitted, ignores the issue about the efficiency and productivity of the internal operations of education. Balogh and Streeten²⁷ have strongly argued that failure to take account of these reasons that the approach has little value for developing countries. Nevertheless, despite its limitations, it has been applied in Greece²⁸ and Chile.²⁹

The large amounts of resources devoted to education and the belief that education is an important cause of economic growth has resulted in the creation of educational plans in most developing countries.³⁰

5.2 Approaches to Educational Planning.

If one restricts himself to the planning methods available, he would find that economists and educationalists have a wide range of choice in the selection of a method or criterion for educational planning. The Tinbergen³¹ method is an economic approach to planning education which relies on input-output analysis. The manpower requirement approach may be described as an attempt to devise required educational output from a set of economic projections. The rate of return approach, relying on cost-benefits techniques, is set apart from the others by its explicit attempt to measure both economic benefits and the cost of schooling.

Logically, all of them are different ways of attempting to assess the 'returns': the manpower approach accepts meeting skills requirements as a satisfactory approximation to measuring returns. Tinbergen indicates the percentage of government expenditure to be spent on education to maximize returns on this form of investment as opposed to any other. But basically, there is no way of avoiding a 'cost-benefit' approach to educational planning. The Government should invest where the yield is highest and only in education if the results show greater measurable economic benefit per unit of cost. The

manpower and Tinbergen's approaches are complementary to this fundamental approach and not substitutes.

In attempting to measure the return to investment in education one is often confronted with the so-called controversy over whether education is an investment or consumer good.³² In the author's opinion, this is not the real problem since it is a fact that education is both a 'capital' and a 'consumer good' as are certain other forms of investments. The real problem in measuring the direct or indirect return to education is the lack of adequate data and techniques with which to measure these returns. As Mark Blaug says:

We cannot measure private consumption benefits of education without more knowledge of household behaviour and so we cannot measure the social consumption benefits of education without more knowledge of collective behaviour.³³

But by measuring the investment components, "we could come close to the final answer."³⁴

Econometric is another approach to educational planning which was developed by a group of economists in the Netherlands principally Tinbergen, Bos and Correa.³⁵ Their model is concerned with establishing the necessary educational conditions to sustain a given rate of growth of output.

In contrast to those who apply cost-benefit analysis to education, the econometric approach views the problem of planning education as one of adapting education to growth.³⁶ It tries to relate the stock of educated people and the flow of students at different levels directly to national output of goods and services without using manpower forecasts in order to show how the structure of education should change with different growth rates of the economy.

Their methods have been subjected to considerable criticism,³⁷ primarily on the basis that their planning models assume that a given level of output requires a fixed volume of manpower with a fixed amount of education and training. Clearly, in the case of manpower output, a given output could be produced with a small number of highly trained workers or a large number of less trained workers.³⁸ The choice of technology would determine the choice between more educated/training and less employment, or less educated/training and more employment. Their approach also ignores the immense difficulties of classifying occupations by educational attainment.³⁹ Finally, while this concern with volume of education as opposed to the composition of education tells us something about aggregates, it tells us nothing about the different kinds of education and how to design an educational system in any detail. For although Tinbergen set out to ask:

"What structure of education system is needed in order to let the economy grow at a given

rate and how does it change with that growth rate?"

he failed to answer his own question.⁴⁰ This approach may be considered to have some value in developed countries because they have the requisite time series on output per man cross-classified by sector, occupation and educational qualifications. However, its value is less certain for a developing country like Sierra Leone because it focusses on a mere quantitative expansion of what in many cases is inappropriate to the system of education.⁴¹

The rate of return approach - rather than attempting to estimate the level of schooling required by a particular pattern of economic growth, practitioners of the rate-of-return approach seek to estimate the social profitability of particular types of schooling expenditures.

Thus, unlike the Tinbergen approach, this rate of returns approach is concerned with the question of efficient allocation of resources among competing uses. The rate of return or cost-benefit analysis should not be confused with the 'personal income approach'. In default of a theoretically perfect cost-benefit approach one has to make do with various approximations of which the income approach is one. This assumes that differences in income are close approximations to differences in individual contribution to G.N.P. and differences in earnings are the result of differences in educational background. By combining these assumptions, a rough measure of the contribution to total social product of

additional years of education of various types can be obtained. The measurement of benefits at individual level, let alone from the community's aspects, introduces all sorts of problems.⁴² The two major defects of this approach are that:

(a) income is not a perfect measure of contribution to total output. For example, there are many 'imperfect markets' for labour especially in developing countries. This is a crucial argument and much is made of it by critics of this approach;⁴³

(b) differences in income do not only reflect differences in educational background but in social privileges and perhaps intelligence.

In short, it ignores the social, institutional and political factors which influence wages and incomes and so a simple correlation between education and income would prove nothing. Nevertheless, efforts have been made to measure returns to investment in education from income differentials in the U.S.A., India and Mexico.⁴⁴ Many of the limitations apply not to the 'rate of returns' approach as such but the less ambitious income differentials approach. This attempts to improve the technique of the income approach whose problems are all conceptually soluble, have contributed to a more refined cost-benefits analysis.

Another method of educational planning is the social demand approach. This method of planning, although rarely advocated by academics, is for political reasons still

adopted in some developing countries, particularly in Africa. It is an attempt to estimate changes in the demand by various groups of people for different types of education by extrapolational expansion is then geared to that demand. It ignores conditions on the labour market since the education system would meet the demand of students rather than that of industry. Consequently, bottlenecks (mentioned earlier) and surplus would probably arise in different sectors of the labour market.

Finally, perhaps, the manpower requirement approach. This approach to educational planning may be described as an attempt to derive required educational outputs from a set of economic growth targets. Basically, this approach rests on forecasts of future demand for qualified manpower to support the sorts of economy envisaged by an economic development plan (Table 5.1). These forecasts are then converted into educational requirements on the basis of which the educational system is then structured.

This approach is based on the assumption that the main link of education with economic development is through the knowledge and skills it produces in the labour force. It implies that if the educational system produces qualified people in the right number and places, the major part of the economic and social contribution of educational planning is achieved. It recognized, of course, that the educational system must provide also for those not in the labour force, but it regards projections of manpower needs as basic to educational planning.

Notwithstanding the fact that the manpower-requirement approach is the leading method employed throughout the world for integrating educational and economic planning, it has serious deficiencies. Some of the criticisms against this approach are particularly damaging to the extent that one must question its effectiveness, especially since this is the approach adopted in Sierra Leone.⁴⁵ The major criticisms which are in general applicable to the manpower requirement approach irrespective of the different types of manpower forecasting techniques used, and particularly relevant in developing countries.

First, there is the question of the time lag. It will be the future pattern of manpower that must guide today's educational decisions since there is a time lag between taking the decision to construct new schools and providing the requisite manpower. The time perspective required by education as a whole is 15-20 years, though it is possible to influence the supply in the pipeline over shorter periods. On this side, one could therefore conclude that there is a necessity for long-term forecasts of manpower. But in the context of an undeveloped country is this possible? Forecast of manpower needs is rarely reliable beyond 3-5 years. Yet, this critical assumption of long-term forecasting has not been questioned by manpower forecasters. Some advocates of manpower forecasting settle for a 'general guide' to future manpower requirements. But a margin of error in predicting manpower initially will be greatly widened in 10-15 years.

Some manpower planners argued for 'broad guidelines',⁴⁶ others for detailed plans. It is more difficult to make estimates of individual industrial sectors than of the overall economy,⁴⁷ but it is essential for manpower planners to have such details. However, there is often in developing countries a shortage of statistical information on which to base such estimates. Manpower forecasts need to be very detailed especially if they are to be useful to educational planners. At the lower end of the occupational scale (unskilled workers) accuracy is not necessary for there is almost complete transferability among jobs or at least in regard to necessary educational qualifications. At the higher levels where such mobility is difficult greater precision is required.

Manpower forecasts inevitably calculate the educational distribution of the labour force in the target year from observations of the past trends. But should planners accept the existing connection between occupation and education and project that into the future?

The relationship between occupation and specific educational qualifications is very far from being clearly established and yet it is the most important link in the whole manpower approach. The translation of employment projections into educational groupings present enormous problems.⁴⁸

The educational components of different occupations changes with technological progress. In addition, a changing

technology will alter the ways in which goods and services are produced. The input mix of factors of production will almost certainly change. Unfortunately, most manpower forecasters assume a fixed relationship between input of educated workers and output of industry or economy. This assumption of a fixed and constant labour input-output ratio is a fundamental weakness since it ignores the many different techniques of production, the combination of inputs and the possibility of substitution between factors. For example, the use of more automation could well reduce the labour required. So what type of future demand pattern does the manpower planner take into consideration?

Most manpower forecasts are linked to planned production programmes of national plans. This is sound if the plan is adhered to but if, as so often happens, the plan is revised because of political changes or otherwise, the manpower plan is dangerously upset. On the other hand, manpower plans can be hampered by the lack of any overall policy for economic development.

The occupational needs of an economy are not the whole of society's needs for education. The manpower planners have been accused unjustly of ignoring other cultural, political and social goals. Few would wish to convey the impression that economic development is the sole objective of education. But whatever may be said of the cultural importance and values of education, it would hardly perform its social function if it did not serve economic development to the fullest possible extent.

Furthermore, as Schultz questions: Is the distinction between 'cultural' and economic so sharp?

"Implicit in this distinction is a dichotomy which separates culture from economy, or the art of living viewed as culture from the practice of earning a living which is excluded from culture. A general and comprehensive concept of culture does not exclude the consumption and production activities on which so much of economic analysis concentrates. How people earn their living is in general an integral part of culture."⁴⁹

On a more fundamental point, the manpower approach assumes that skills requirements are a proper basis for determining the amount and pattern of investment in the educational system. But it tells little about whether the skills can be better supplied by on-the-job training or formal education and nothing about the relative costs and returns of formal schooling versus on-the-job training for particular jobs.

Finally, to quote a major critic of the manpower approach:

The cost of producing the educated manpower do not determine the outcome of manpower forecasts . . . not only are the cost of education ignored as critical variable in the manpower requirements approach but also.

are the wages and salaries of educated people.

In fact, prices are simply left out of account altogether."⁵⁰

The many different manpower forecasting techniques also present major difficulties,⁵¹ but they do not concern us here. The advocates of manpower planning⁵² have in some instances presented their cases with either unqualified enthusiasm or marked reservations. Vaizey and Harbison are guilty of contradictions and false assumptions; Parnes and Hollister conceded that some aspects of manpower forecasting are meaningless.⁵³ O'Donnougher after comparing the views of Vaizey, Hollister and Debeauvais concluded that ". . . among those that have been active in this area for some time, the role and usefulness of manpower forecasts are still matters of belief rather than of knowledge."⁵⁴

For example, Vaizey's main argument for advocating manpower planning is that it will partly solve the problem of the intellectual unemployment.⁵⁵ Cash, on the other hand, argues that one of the consequences of over-investment in education resulting from manpower planning would be the problem of the educated unemployed.⁵⁶

This catalogue of the problems facing manpower plans is not so great as to invalidate manpower forecasts altogether. Manpower planning may be the 'bastard' child of economics,⁵⁷ but as Streeten maintained, "for less developed countries, manpower planning approach has very considerable merits. When 'bottlenecks' do not exist as in many developed

countries, then the usefulness of such an exercise is considerably lessened and the need to consider other criteria for educational provision is more important.⁵⁸

Furthermore, in Parnes' view, "so long as one grants that manpower considerations are one of the elements which ought to influence educational decisions, then all such decisions . . . involve manpower forecasts. The question is not whether forecasts are to be made, but the extent to which they are going to be as systematic as possible . . . If allocation of resources to education were governed entirely by market forces . . . centralised decisions would disappear."⁵⁹ Since this is not the case, government must assume responsibility of forecasting. Educational planning cannot get away from the need to make ex-ante estimates of the likely future change in the demand for skilled manpower projections.

Here one encounters the crux of the matter; it is not the need to forecast that is the real problem but the duration of the forecast. As Blaug pointed out:

If long-term forecasts are really as subject to error as Parnes himself admits, it is difficult to see how they can be justified; the fact that all educational decisions have manpower implications makes errors more serious not less . . . the question is not whether to forecast inaccurately as much as ten to fifteen years ahead of being accurate; so the issue seems to reduce to a case of long-term versus medium-term forecasting.⁶⁰

It is arguable, however, that in the final analysis no approach is defensible on rational grounds except cost-benefits analysis because there can be no rational justification for expending investment in education unless it will bring more benefits for a given cost than any other investments. To quote Cash,

"Education should be expanded only if the yield justifies the investment."

Few would disagree with this fundamental rule of resources allocation in education. But the lack of sufficient data on personal earnings, cross-classified by age and education, make it difficult to apply the rate-of-return approach to educational planning in Sierra Leone and perhaps in other African states, as Smyth and Bennet⁶¹ found. Nevertheless, despite these difficulties they were able to calculate the social rate of return to four levels of education. It did enable them to conclude:

Until more is known about the return from investment in education and the return from other public investments, crucial decisions about the allocation of resources between education and alternative growth inducing activities must continue to be based on political customary philosophical criteria and related only haphazardly to the economic end of the policy.⁶²

Similarly, the manpower-requirement approach has its limitations. Smyth and Bennet concluded that "unless the manpower approach to educational planning in its present form is re-examined, using a more rigorous analysis of just what are the returns on investment in education, there is a real danger that a country may be pursuing an education policy which may not be relevant to its manpower needs."⁶³ It is in this respect that the rest of this chapter is intended to examine, through the use of the cost-benefits and manpower-requirements approaches, Sierra Leone's post-independent policies in the light of the country's manpower situation.

5.3 Cost of Education and Manpower Planning.

In the absence of reliable data, the application of cost-benefit techniques to evaluate educational investment in Sierra Leone is difficult. However, there is no doubt that such evaluation would be extremely useful for manpower planning policy purposes.

Sierra Leone, like many other developing countries, has recognized the importance of manpower resources as a powerful factor of economic development. In 1963, the total attendance at the nation's educational institutions was found to be 111,000 by the population census.⁶⁴ In 1978, roughly 268,230 students were enrolled in the various institutions of learning.⁶⁵ The total government recurrent expenditure on education increased from approximately Le 53 Million

(£26.5 million) in 1963/64 to Le 215 million (£107.5 million) in 1977/78.⁶⁶ At present, approximately 26.2 per cent of total government current revenue is allocated to education.⁶⁷

One characteristic of educational expenditure in Sierra Leone should be emphasized. It relates to the differences in the amount spent per head on primary, secondary and university education (see Table 5.3). With the enrolments and expenditure of 1977/78, the annual central government expenditure per student at primary, secondary and university levels are illustrated in Table 5.3 below.

TABLE 5.3 Central Government Expenditure on Education 1977-1978.

Level of Education	Total Exp. in Le	Enrolment	Exp. Per Student
1	2	3	4
Primary	Le 7,439,228	182,100	Le 40.85
Secondary	6,558,166	42,500	154.30
University	4,215,331	1,780	Le 1,280.00
<u>Sources: Estimate of Revenue and Expenditure and Development Estimates 1977/78; for Col. 2 and Col. 3, Sierra Leone's Education 1978</u>			

As the level of education rises, some differences in expense per head are justifiable. But can differences as enormous as these be justified? The cost-benefit technique may provide an answer.

5.31 Cost-Benefit Approach.

In carrying out a cost-benefit analysis of Sierra Leone's educational system, it is possible to quantify only

the direct benefits - the incremental earnings of persons with a certain level of education. These are calculated on the basis of income data from two sources. First, to obtain income streams for individuals with primary, secondary/technical or university education, the Sierra Leone government's salary scales are adopted.⁶⁸ The same thing also applied to the salaries of teachers with varying qualifications. These are largely in conformity with civil service scales (see Appendix V). To obtain the lifetime income profile of those without any education, a second source of information is also used - the household surveys conducted by the Central Statistics Office throughout the country over the years 1967 to 1969.⁶⁹ From these surveys information is available on average annual incomes earned in different occupations. In all, 34 occupations are catalogued. The level of education required to perform successfully in each occupation has to be determined to convert the educational classification into an economic one. Without such a conversion, it will not be possible to compare the average annual incomes at different levels of educational attainment. For Sierra Leone, there are no data available about the existing educational attainment in different job clusters or occupations. Consequently, the correlation of occupational groups into educational requirements is largely based on personal judgement. In Table 5.4 below an attempted conversion is set out.

TABLE 5.4 Occupational Groups and Educational Requirements.

<u>Primary or No Education</u>	<u>Primary or Sec. Education</u>	<u>Secondary or Tech. Education</u>	<u>University or Equivalent</u>
<u>Retail trades street seller</u>	<u>Salesmen and Shop assistant</u>	<u>Medical worker, technicians</u>	<u>Physicians</u>
<u>Tailor, seam- stress, upho- lsterer</u>	<u>Sailors</u>	<u>Teachers</u>	<u>Teachers</u>
<u>Leather workers</u>	<u>Motor vehicle drivers</u>	<u>Draughtsmen, engineering technicians</u>	<u>Administrator government</u>
<u>Masonry and building workers</u>	<u>Postmen and messengers</u>	<u>Stenographers and typists</u>	<u>Directors, managers, etc. non- government</u>
<u>Millers, oil makers, butchers and bakers.</u>	<u>Bus conductors</u>	<u>Bookkeepers and cashiers</u>	
<u>Labourers</u>	<u>Textile-pro- duction worker</u>	<u>Clerks</u>	
<u>Housekeeper, cooks and maintenance</u>	<u>Jeweller, goldsmith and watch reparer</u>	<u>Telephone, telegraphic operators</u>	
<u>Barbers, hairdressers</u>	<u>Machinist, fitters, mechanics and repair men</u>	<u>Printers and pressmen</u>	
<u>Launderers, dry cleaners, pressers</u>	<u>Electrical workers</u>		
	<u>Carpenters, joiners and woodworkers</u>		
	<u>Painters and paper hangers</u>		
	<u>Police, fire- men, guards</u>		

Source: Central Statistics Office, Freetown.

The average median incomes determined from the Household Surveys and the civil service scales of the government are presented in Table 5.5 below. The median income of the uneducated is derived from the Household Survey data. The median incomes at the other levels of educational attainments are derived from the Sierra Leone civil service scales. With the help of Table 5.4 above and the household surveys income data, the pre-1970/71 average annual incomes at primary, secondary/technical and university

education levels work out at Le398.00, Le545.00 and Le1,260.00 respectively. Whereas at the primary education level the

TABLE 5.5 Median Incomes at Different Levels of Educational Attainment.

<u>Educational Attainment</u>	<u>Median Pre-1970/71</u>	<u>Post-1970/71</u>	<u>Starting Salary Post-1970/71</u>
None	Le 260.00	Le 292.00 PA	-
Primary	Le 390.00	Le 493.00 PA	Le 243.00 PA
Secondary/technical	Le 840.00	Le 884.00	Le 607.00
University	Le2,664.00	Le2,731.00	Le1,436.00

Source: Computed from Household Surveys and Civil Service Salary Scales.

average income on the basis of the Household Surveys is quite in conformity with the civil service scales for the secondary, technical and university levels, the surveys yield a much smaller average income. In fact, the discrepancy between the two increases as the level of education rises. The difficulty of specifying the educational requirements for some of the occupational groupings was a major cause of this discrepancy. Many occupations tentatively deemed to require secondary and/or university education (Table 5.4) really refer to job titles and not to the nature of the job. For example, the class "government administrators" would include personnel at various stages of the administrative ladder, some of whom may require university education while others have only secondary or primary education (see 2.7). The same is true for occupational group "directors, managers, non-government" since it will

include managerial personnel at all levels and in all types of business - private, proprietorship, partnership and established companies (see Tables 3.8a and b and 3.11a and b). On the other hand, at lower levels of education the occupational groupings relate more to the nature of the job and hence it is easier to specify the educational qualifications required to get into them. Thus, the lifetime income stream of the uneducated alone is derived from the Household Surveys. For the income profiles at other levels of education one has to depend upon the civil service scales.⁷⁰

Since Household Surveys permit the calculation of only the average income for those without any education, certain assumptions are adopted to construct the lifetime income profiles of such persons. First, a person is expected to work for 30 years.⁷¹ The computed post-1970/71 average income of Le 292.00 is attributed to the 14th year of work, and to obtain incomes prior to and subsequent to the 14th year, a compound rate of growth of 3 per cent per annum is assumed to prevail throughout the person's working life.⁷² The lifetime income profiles for persons without any education and those with primary, secondary/technical and university education are presented in Table 5.5 above. On the basis of the civil service scales, persons with university education are found to reach the top of the scales in the 17th year of service; those with secondary/technical education in the 20th year of service; and those with primary education in the 28th year of service. These lifetime income streams are

TABLE 5.6 Lifetime Income Profiles by Level of Education
(Leones per year).

Year	No Ed.	Pri. Ed.	Sec./Tec. Ed.	Univ.
0	197	243	697	1,436
1	203	257	627	1,525
2	209	270	653	1,613
3	215	284	686	1,877
4	222	297	713	1,966
5	229	311	726	2,054
6	236	324	739	2,091
7	243	338	752	2,263
8	251	351	785	2,349
9	259	365	818	2,435
10	267	378	851	2,534
11	275	392	884	2,632
12	283	412	924	2,731
13	292	432	964	2,829
14	301	452	1003	2,927
15	310	473	1043	3,026
16	319	493	1071	3,026
17	329	513	1082	3,026
18	339	527	1109	3,026
19	349	554	1159	3,026
20	359	568	1159	3,026
21	370	581	1159	3,026
22	381	594	1159	3,026
23	392	607	1159	3,026
24	404	620	1159	3,026
25	416	634	1159	3,026
26	429	660	1159	3,026
27	442	686	1159	3,026
28	442	686	1159	3,026
29	469	686	1159	3,026

Source: * C.S.O. Household Surveys 1967-1970, Freetown.

used to quantify the social benefits in the calculations on investment in education at various levels.

With respect to the measurement of costs at the primary, secondary and university levels, the major portion of the direct operating costs is borne by the central government. The central government's expenditure per student in primary schools, secondary schools and institutions of

higher learning can be easily calculated from the government budgets and the total enrolment at the various levels of the education system (see Table 5.3). In Sierra Leone, there are a few denominational schools at the primary level and a great many at the secondary level. These schools obtained private funds in addition to assistance from the central government grants estimated to be Le 25.00 per student at primary, Le 113.00 at secondary and Le 1,924.00 at higher education level.⁷³ These are likely to be slight over-estimates of the direct operating costs because not all the annual government grants and private donations are used for current expenditure: a part is expended on capital goods as well. However, this over-estimation is expected to be largely offset by the failure to include capital costs. It has not been possible to obtain capital resources costs per student since complete data on the assets of educational institutions are not available. The net result, however, may not be much distorted.

In addition, associated with the education of students in institutions of higher learning and those in forms IV and V of secondary schools, there are the opportunity costs of earnings foregone. The minimum entry age at the primary is 5+ years in Sierra Leone. Thus, a student is 12+ years old when he or she completes primary education and 15+ years old when Form III is attained. The assumption that the opportunity cost of the earnings foregone begins to be incurred in form IV implies a minimum age of 15 for entering the job market and this appears to be reasonable.

The miscellaneous costs of education by students or their parents include expenditure on tuition fees, books, stationery, uniforms and travel. Fees are charged at all levels of the education system. In primary education a yearly tuition fee is Le 3,00 for classes I and II, Le 4.00 for classes III to VI and Le 6.00 for class VII.⁷⁴ In secondary schools, the annual tuition fee is Le 21.00 per student. In addition to fees, primary and secondary school students or their parents have to meet costs every year for books, stationery, uniforms and travel which, in the absence of relevant data, are put at Le 10.00 and Le 25.00 respectively. Fees are also charged for university education averaging annually Le 1000.00 per student. But in most cases, these are covered by scholarships awarded to students by the central government. These scholarships also covered the various miscellaneous costs of education such as expenditure on books, stationery, registration and student union charges. For example, in 1976-77, scholarship grants to students at the University of Sierra Leone and the teachers' colleges totalled Le 1.14 million, averaging Le 416.00 per student. These grants are already included in the annual direct operating costs at the higher education level of Le 1,924.00 per student. It was on the basis of these benefits and costs magnitudes that the evaluation of education programmes at various levels was undertaken by the Education Review Committee.⁷⁵ The social internal rate of return on investment in primary, secondary and university

education were 20 per cent, 22 per cent and 9.5 per cent respectively in 1971/72. In Table 5.7 below, the internal rates of return on investment in education are presented for Kenya, Uganda, India and Sierra Leone.

TABLE 5.7 Internal Rates of Return in Education: International Comparison.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Pri. Ed.</u>	<u>Sec. Ed.</u>	<u>Univ. Ed.</u>
Kenya (1968)	22	24	9
Uganda (1965)	66	22	12
India (1966)	17	16	13
Sierra Leone (1971/72)	20	22	9.5 (Table 5.6)

Source: Cost-benefit Analysis in Education, a Case Study of Kenya; World Bank staff; occasional Papers No. 14, I.B.R.D. 1972, p. 94.

The rates of return obtained in the above example are similar to those for some other developing countries. The ranking of the educational ladder is also identical in various countries. The calculations and analysis reported so far have significant implications for the planning of the education system of Sierra Leone and the supply of manpower. The lifetime earning profile (Table 5.6) illustrates that individual earnings in Sierra Leone are principally related to the educational attainment of individuals rather than for work actually done. The effect of this on the manpower supply of all categories will be seen in the next section - the manpower-requirement approach (see Table 5.18).

5.3(2) The Requirement and Supply of Trained Personnel.

Manpower planning techniques involve the estimation of future manpower requirements and supply and the determination of areas of critical shortage. Making forecasts about manpower needs in a developing country which depends largely on foreign investment for its economic development programmes is a risky venture. Such forecasts are extremely unreliable even when copious data are available. In the absence of all necessary data and information, one should inevitably be forced to substitute judgement and 'educated guesses' for hard facts. Personal judgements, especially when they refer to the future, are patently fallible. Hence projections of manpower needs and supply should be interpreted as giving a broad trend rather than exact numbers (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).

There are several methods of making projections of future manpower needs. One is to make use of past trends for projecting future requirements. But for Sierra Leone, like many other developing countries, it is not possible to get past data to construct an adequate time series for the country. The use of more sophisticated techniques, like that opted in the OECD Mediterranean Regional Project (MRP),⁷⁶ has to be rejected because of the inadequacy of the available data in Sierra Leone. Consequently a simple disaggregative approach is adopted in this study. This approach is discussed in relation to the projection of Sierra Leone's manpower requirements for the years 1975 to

1979. The word 'requirement' is used instead of demand in order to avoid the problem of wage structure and labour absorption associated with the latter concept. In other words, the requirements are worked out without any specific reference to the price of different types of manpower. In respect of Sierra Leone, this is an important qualification since there are some grounds for believing that wage pricing arrangements need examination.⁷⁷ Furthermore, filling 'requirements' in the public service - the largest employer of high and middle-level and teaching manpower - may be restricted by the size of the government's current budget. It should also be noted that the present requirement forecasts are conditional upon a set of assumptions about the structure and rate of growth of the Sierra Leone economy set out in the National Development Plan 1974/75 to 1978/79.⁷⁸

The requirements and supply projections presented in this section are divided into three groups:

i. High-level - positions normally considered to require completion of secondary education and four or more years of university education or its equivalent.

ii. Middle-level - positions normally considered to require less than four years of university education such as Agricultural Certificate training and technical/vocational education the entry requirements for which may or may not be the completion of secondary education with General Certificate of Education passes at four 'O' levels.

iii. Primary and secondary school teachers who are separated from the high- and middle-level grouping for two reasons. First, although they might normally be considered middle-level manpower, most secondary school teachers are university graduates which would qualify them as high-level manpower. Second, unlike many middle-level manpower positions which are sometimes filled by persons with on-the-job training in lieu of specific school-based education, teaching is generally thought to require some kind of pre-service training such as the post-graduate diploma course in education, High Teachers Certificate course, etc.

The starting point of the method adopted for projecting high and middle-level manpower needs is the distribution of the working population by various industry groups or sectors in the economy. The estimates of the 1974 and 1979 work force distribution by sectors are available in the Plan document⁷⁹ and are reproduced in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.8.⁸⁰ The estimate of the sectoral distribution of high- and middle-level manpower in 1974 are represented in Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5.8 below. The estimates are based on the data available in the population census of 1963 and the Household Surveys conducted by the Central Statistics Office in 1967-1970. The census provides a classification of the working population by occupation and sector of employment based on the International Standard classification of occupations and Standard Industrial classifications (ISCO and ISIC). In all, eight occupations and eight sectors are

TABLE 5.8 Total and Sectoral Distribution of High-level (H.L.) and Middle-level (M.L.) Manpower

Requirements for the Period 1975-1979.

	Work Force		No. of Jobs Classified				Recruitment of New			Replacement of Present Stock			Manpower Requirement
	(000)		H.L.	M.L.	H.L.	M.L.	H.L.	M.L.	H.L.	M.L.	H.L.	M.L.	
Industrial Sector	1974	1979	1974	1979	1979	1975-1979	1975-1979	1975-1979	1975-1979	1975-1979	1975-1979	1975-1979	1975-1979
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
0 Agriculture	805	870	123	8,614	132	9,256	9	642	10	675	19	1,317	
1 Mining	33	28	85	1,099	75	966	-10	-133	5	76	-5	-57	
2/3 Manufacturing	52	62	440	7,441	567	9,588	127	2147	39	654	166	2,801	
4 Construction	26	35	376	4,456	478	5,656	102	1200	33	388	135	1,588	
5 Electricity and Water	4	4	78	800	78	800	-	-	5	60	5	60	
6 Commerce	81	95	288	8,699	339	10,203	51	1504	24	721	75	2,225	
7 Transport and Communications	28	33	588	5,082	714	6,176	126	1089	50	431	176	1,520	
8 Public Administration	41	52	3546	8,024	3923	10,176	377	2152	283	699	660	2,851	
TOTALS	1070	1179	5524	44,215	6306	52,816	782	8601	449	3704	1231	12,305	

Source: Computed from the National Development Plan 1974/75-1978/79.

distinguished in the census tabulation (Table 5.9 below). The Household Surveys permit computations of educational attainment in each occupation.⁸¹ The professional, technical, administrative, managerial and clerical occupations are intensive in the use of high- and middle-level manpower. The secondary/technical/vocational and university education requirements of various sectors are determined by multiplying the sector-occupation matrix (Table 5.9 below) by the occupation-education matrix (Table 5.10 below).

These sectoral high- and middle-level educated manpower requirements per thousand of total employment in each sector are presented in Table 5.11.

By multiplying these by the corresponding sectoral working population (in thousands) Column 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Table 5.8 are derived. The new recruitments for high- and middle-level manpower over the years 1975 to 1979 are given by the difference between Columns 5 and 3 and 6 and 4.

The replacement requirements caused by the Africanisation policies, death or retirement of the members of the present stock of educated manpower (Columns 3 and 4, Table 5.8) should be added to the new recruitments. An attrition rate of 1.50 per cent per year for all high- and middle-level manpower is used for this purpose. The estimated replacement needs for the period 1975 to 1979 are recorded in Columns 9 and 10, Table 5.8.

The total requirements for high- and middle-level manpower is calculated in the above manner are expected to

TABLE 5.9 Working Population Cross-Classified by Sector and Occupations.

Industrial Sector	Occupations, Professional, Technical &	Administrative & Managerial Executive	Clerical Workers	Sales Workers	Farm Workers	Transport and Communications	Craftsmen, etc.	Services and Recreation
Agriculture	0.409	0.044	0.164	0.170	698.490	0.103	1.583	0.094
Mining	0.347	0.065	0.872	0.041	42.750	0.572	2.334	1.067
Manufacturing	0.113	0.092	0.373	0.128	0.283	0.221	39.790	0.200
Construction	0.231	0.314	0.640	0.029	0.096	0.669	13.800	0.367
Electricity & Water	0.109	0.014	0.176	0.055	0.025	0.082	1.700	0.085
Commerce	0.098	0.358	1.510	46.690	0.246	0.599	2.880	0.739
Transport and Communications	0.296	0.187	1.150	0.033	0.015	10.090	3.900	0.497
Public Administration	9.460	1.310	2.470	0.095	0.160	0.951	3.980	11.100

Source: 1963 Population Census of Sierra Leone, Vol. 3, Economic Characteristics (C.S.O. 1965) Table 13, p. 100.

TABLE 5.10 Educational Attainment Weighted by Occupation
(Per 000 of Gross Employment).

Occupation (ISCO)	Sec/Tech/ Vocational	University
0 Professional, Technical &	415.4	198.8
1 Administrative, Managerial, etc.	487.2	166.1
2 Clerical Workers	755.7	33.3
3 Sales Workers	79.6	0.6
4 Farmers, Fishermen and Miners	9.9	0.0
5 Transport, Communications	119.7	18.1
6 Craft and Labourers	135.4	7.4
7/8 Services and Recreation	231.8	0.0

Source: Computed from the 1963 census result.

TABLE 5.11 Sectoral High- and Middle-Level Educated
Manpower Requirement Per 000 of Total Employment.

Sector (ISIC)	High-level	Middle-level
0 Agriculture	0.153	10.7
1 Mining	2.584	33.3
2/3 Manufacturing	8.463	143.1
4 Construction	14.476	171.4
5 Electricity & Water	19.563	199.9
6 Commerce	3.565	107.4
7 Transport, Communications	21.004	181.5
8 Public Administration	75.446	195.7

be approximately 1,230 and 12,305 respectively. Of the total high-level manpower requirements of 1,230, some 660 or 56 per cent are expected to be employed in the public

service and otherwise. This sector share of the middle-level manpower requirements is about 23 per cent. The other important sector in order of their high-level manpower needs are transport, storage and communications (14 per cent); manufacturing (13 per cent); construction (11 per cent); commerce (6 per cent); and finally, agriculture (1.5 per cent). On the basis of the middle-level manpower needs, the various important sectors are: manufacturing (23 per cent); commerce (18 per cent); construction (13 per cent); transport, storage and communications (12 per cent) and agriculture (11 per cent). Since no expansion of the electricity, water and sanitary services sector is planned and employment in mining is expected to decline, these sectors do not figure prominently in the high and middle-level manpower requirements between 1975 and 1979.

The requirements for primary and secondary school teachers are based on projected school enrolments which are presented in Tables 5.12 and 5.13. These projections were not based upon any "optimal" rate of growth but were derived from past trends in rate of progression, that is, the proportion of pupils in Class I who proceed to Class II and so on up the education ladder, and the trends in growth of enrolment in Class I. During the 1960s enrolment in Class I grew at 4.8 per cent per annum (much more slowly than the total primary enrolment growth of 7.7 per cent). In the last part, of the decade, the increase in the first year enrolment averaged only about 1 per cent per annum.

On the assumption that enrolment in Class I will return to an average annual increase of 4 per cent, the total primary enrolment can be expected to grow at about 5 per cent. per annum during the planned period. The projected primary enrolments are shown in Table 5.12.

The secondary school enrolment patterns presented in Table 5.13 are based on an implied rate of enrolment growth of 5.9 per cent per annum for the 1957 to 1979 period. At present, the proportion of primary school pupils in Class VII who proceed to Form 1 the following year is found to be approximately 58 per cent. For the purpose of projections, it is assumed that roughly the same percentage of Class VII pupils will find places in secondary schools the following year. The progression rates from one form to the next are assumed to be those currently obtained in the various secondary schools. The computation necessary to derive the teacher requirements are shown in Table 5.14 and 5.15. Thus, the primary and secondary school teacher requirements over the five-year plan period are 2,920 and 1,195 respectively.

The first step in estimating the supply of high/middle-level manpower and teachers is to obtain the projected enrolments at the University of Sierra Leone, the various teacher training colleges, the School of Nursing, and the technical and commercial institutes in the country. Outputs from these institutions can then be based upon certain assumptions governing progression rates and the

TABLE 5.12 Primary School Enrolments 1960/61-1979/80.

Years	Class							Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
1960/61 ²	23,984	14,631	12,373	9,774	7,955	6,200	4,207	79,132
1970/71 ²	38,164	26,334	25,208	22,953	20,227	16,708	16,513	166,007
1971/72	39,690	29,390	26,330	23,950	21,810	18,200	18,380	177,750
1972/73	41,280	30,560	29,390	25,020	22,750	19,620	20,020	188,640
1973/74	42,930	31,790	30,560	27,920	23,770	20,480	21,590	199,040
1974/75	44,650	33,060	31,790	29,030	26,520	21,390	22,520	208,960
1975/76	46,430	34,380	33,060	30,200	27,580	23,870	23,530	219,050
1976/77	48,290	35,750	34,380	31,400	28,690	24,820	26,260	229,530
1977/78	50,220	37,180	35,750	32,660	29,830	25,820	27,310	238,770
1978/79	52,230	38,670	37,180	33,960	31,030	26,850	28,400	248,320
1979/80	54,320	80,220	38,670	35,320	32,270	27,930	29,530	238,260

Implied rate of enrolment growth per annum 1970/71-1979/80: 5.0 per cent.

1. (i) Class I enrolments increase 4 per cent per annum.

(ii) Apparent progression rates:

- Class 1-2: .77
- Class 2-3: 1.00
- Class 3-4: .95
- Class 4-5: .95
- Class 5-6: .90
- Class 6-7: 1.10

2. Actual enrolments.

TABLE 5.13 Secondary School Enrolments 1960/61-1979/80:1

Year	Form							TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1960/61 ²	1,881	1,514	1,320	844	560	99	47	6,265
1970/71	11,460	8,180	5,999	4,325	2,932	233	189	33,318
1971/72	11,080	8,694	7,077	4,997	3,281	196	182	35,507
1972/73	12,370	9,090	7,130	5,660	4,200	330	175	39,455
1973/74	14,010	10,550	7,450	5,700	4,760	420	300	43,190
1974/75	15,110	11,490	8,650	5,960	4,790	480	380	46,860
1975/76	15,760	12,390	9,420	6,920	5,010	480	430	50,410
1976/77	16,470	12,930	10,160	7,540	5,820	500	430	53,850
1977/78	18,380	13,510	10,600	8,130	6,330	580	450	57,980
1978/79	19,120	15,070	11,070	8,480	6,830	630	520	61,720
1979/80	19,880	15,680	12,360	8,860	7,120	680	570	65,150

Implied rate of enrolment growth per annum 1970/71-1979/80: 7.6%.

1. Assuming (i) For 1 enrolment equal 90% of primary Class 7 enrolment of previous year.

(ii) Apparent progression rate:

Form I- II: .82 Form IV- V: .84
 Form II-III: .82 Form V- VI: .10
 Form III- IV: .80 Form VI-VII: .90

(iii) 14 per cent Form V enrolment pass 4 or more 'O' level examinations; 54 per cent Form VII enrolments pass 2 or more 'A' level examinations.

2. Actual.

proportion of graduates who are Sierra Leoneans. These hypotheses are summarised in Table 5.23. Being derived from very limited enrolment progression data, these may contain some error. The supply figures are calculated one year ahead of manpower requirements to allow for a lag between graduation and job placement.

The projected enrolment in the university, teacher colleges and technical institutions are taken from the National Development Plan and were obtained from the Principals of various colleges and institutions. These enrolment projections are presented in Table 5.16.

Graduates from Fourah Bay College in the Faculty of Arts, Social Studies and Pure and Applied Sciences belong to the high-level manpower class. Successful candidates from the Department of Education are classified as secondary school teachers. Njala University College comprises two faculties - those of agriculture and education. Graduates of the Faculty of Agriculture are included in high-level manpower, those of the Faculty of Education are assumed to augment the supply of secondary school teachers. From the various teacher-training institutions, the candidates obtaining the Higher Teachers Certificate are included in the supply of secondary school teachers; the Certificate holders are assumed to constitute the supply of primary school teachers. All those who pass through the technical institutes are assumed to form part of middle-level manpower.

TABLE 5.14 Primary School Teacher Requirements: 1971/72-1979/80.

Year	Total Pri. Sch. Enrol. (1)		Increase in Enrol. over Prev. Year		New Teachers Required to:			
	1	2	2	3	Meet Increased Enrolment (2)	Maintain Existing Teacher Stock (3)	4	Total 3 + 4
1971/72	177,750	11,640	365	210	365	210	575	
1972/73	188,640	10,890	340	225	340	225	565	
1973/74	199,040	10,400	325	240	325	240	565	
1974/75	208,960	9,920	310	250	310	250	560	
1975/76	219,050	10,090	315	265	315	265	580	
1976/77	229,590	10,540	330	275	330	275	605	
1977/78	238,770	9,180	285	290	285	290	575	
1978/79	240,320	9,550	300	300	300	300	600	
1979/80	258,260	9,940	310	315	310	315	625	
1974/75-1978/79	1,144,690	49,280	1,540	1,380	1,540	1,380	2,920	

Notes: (1) Assuming the continuation of the present trends in primary school enrolment growth.
 (2) Assuming the continuation of the present teacher-pupil ratio of 1:32.
 (3) Assuming the attrition rate of the present stock of 4 per cent of which 20 per cent are qualified teachers.

TABLE 5.15 Secondary School Teacher Requirements: 1971/72-1979/80.

Year	Total Sec. Sch. Enrol. 1	Increase in Enrol. over Prev. Year 2	New Teachers Required to:			Total 3 + 4
			Meet Increased Enrolment (2) 3	Maintain Existing Teacher Stock ³ 4		
1971/72	35,507	2,189	210 ⁴	50		260
1972/73	39,455	3,950	180	55		235
1973/74	43,190	3,735	170	60		230
1974/75	46,860	3,670	165	65		230
1975/76	50,410	3,550	160	70		230
1976/77	53,850	3,440	155	70		225
1977/78	57,980	4,130	190	75		265
1978/79	61,720	3,740	170	75		245
1979/80	65,150	3,430	155	80		235
1974/75- 1978/79	220,820	18,530	840	355		1,195

- Notes: 1. Assuming continuation of the present trend in secondary school enrolment growth.
 2. Assuming continuation of the 1970/71 teacher-student ratio of 1:22.
 3. Assuming the attrituiou rate 2.5 per cent for qualified and 4.0 for unqualified teachers.
 4. The figure is higher than 1:22 teacher-student ratio but represents the actual increase in teacher stock from 1,495 in 1970/71 to 1,760 in 1971/72.

TABLE 5.16 Projected Enrolments in the University, the Teachers College and

Technical Institutions 1973-1978.

Institutions	1978	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
<u>Fourah Bay College</u>						
Faculty of Arts (except Ph.D.Ed.)	537	535	546	575	585	589
Economics & Social Studies	128	127	128	125	210	125
& Applied Science	340	374	416	451	479	525
Department of Education	71	75	80	85	90	90
<u>Njala University College</u>						
Faculty of Agriculture	174	177	205	214	214	214
Faculty of Education	289	300	314	311	306	306
Milton Margin Teachers College	345	350	350	350	350	350
Primary School Teachers College	1,036	1,310	1,500	1,880	2,070	2,160
Technical Institutions	1,230	1,180	1,520	1,690	1,880	2,060

Source: National Development Plan 1974/75-1978/79, Tables 5, 6, 7 and 9, pages 250

With the help of the completion rates, the percentage of Sierra Leoneans in various institutions and the duration of different education programmes, the supply of high- and middle-level manpower and secondary school and primary school teachers over the plan period can be calculated.⁸² The Sierra Leoneans returning from study abroad should be added to the indigenous supply of high-level manpower. At present, there are approximately 1,200 Sierra Leonean students,⁸³ and it is assumed that this number will remain fairly constant over the next five years. Some of these students will be secondary school leavers; others will be graduates from the University of Sierra Leone seeking advanced degrees abroad. In calculating the high-level manpower supply it is assumed that the net inflow of persons returning from study abroad will average 30 graduates per year during the 1975 to 1979 plan period. Finally, the high-level supply figures are net of Sierra Leonean graduates from the University who go on to the Department of Education for a one-year diploma course. These graduates are consequently shown under the supply of high-level teachers.

The supply projections for the 1974-75 to 1978-79 plan period are presented in Table 5.17 below. For the sake of comparison, the requirements of educated manpower are reproduced in Column 2 of this table. The absolute shortfalls (requirement - supply) are shown in Column 3 and the supply/requirement percentage is presented in Column 4.

TABLE 5.17 Projected Post-Secondary-Trained Personnel:

Requirement and Supply, 1975-1979.

<u>Manpower Category</u>	<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Supply</u>	<u>Short-falls</u>	<u>Supp./Req. %</u>
<u>High-Level</u>				
(1) Sciences	431	254	167	59.0
(2) Non-sciences	715	508	267	71.0
(3) Agriculture	86	70	16	81.4
TOTALS	1,232	837	390	68.0
<u>Middle-Level</u>				
Sciences & Non-sciences	11,029	6,047	4,982	55.0
Agriculture	1,178	1,130	48	96.0
TOTALS	12,207	7,177	5,030	59.0
<u>Teachers</u>				
Primary	2,920	2,616	304	90.0
Secondary	1,195	996	199	83.0
TOTALS	4,115	3,612	503	86.5
GRAND TOTALS	17,554	11,626	5,923	71.0

Source: Computed from previous tables above.

Demands on the education system to fill needs for post-secondary trained personnel will be lower than total requirements, since a proportion of requirements is expected to be filled by upgrading of persons already employed. It is assumed that 95 per cent of high-level jobs will be filled by university graduates; the remaining 5 per cent consisting of primarily high-level management which must be filled either by expatriate personnel or with local people with job experience. At the middle-level, a large proportion will be filled by upgrading of personnel. It is estimated, although somewhat arbitrarily, that 70 per cent of middle-level positions should be filled by persons with some prior training. For teachers, it is assumed that all new teachers should have some pre-service training.

The Table 5.17 above illustrates high- and middle-level manpower and teachers requirements and supply by major fields of study, sciences, non-sciences, agriculture, and primary and secondary teaching. The implications of these figures, particularly for the Africanisation policies are discussed more fully in Section 5.4. In brief, the output of high-level manpower varies by categories. In the sciences projected requirements for high-level manpower exceeded the projected supply by 167, representing a supply shortfall of 41 per cent. This is particularly important in that the majority of non-nationals employed in both public and private sectors fall under this category (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). In the non-sciences, the requirement/supply shortfall is only 29 per cent. This reflects students' greater preference for art subjects as demonstrated in Table 5.16 above. The area of most critical shortage is middle-level. Where supply is estimated to reach only 59 per cent of requirements. In the private sector, this is the area where most expatriate personnel are engaged (see Table 3.8a). The supply of teachers for both primary and secondary schools in relation to requirements seems to fall short of only 12 per cent. The total supply of post-secondary trained manpower for the period 1975-1979 is 11,626 or about 71 per cent of requirements.

The lack of data on skilled and semi-skilled manpower requirements should not draw attention away from the importance of this skill-level for modern sector growth and

replacement.⁸⁴ Given the fact that the middle-level manpower personnel required will be considerably higher than that for high-level manpower (Table 5.17). Yet, enrolment at the University of Sierra Leone for the years 1972 through 1977 exceeded that of technical and vocational training institutions put together; implying the likelihood that the manpower shortage could be most severe at the skilled-level (where expatriates are most preponderantly employed in the private sector) for some years to come. This is the situation which Dr. Jim Funna might have seen when he commented:

It is easy to find a graduate civil engineer in Sierra Leone, but less easy to find someone who can mend a typewriter.⁸⁵

5.4 Factors affecting the supply of skilled manpower.

The explanation for the above undesirable anomalous state of the Sierra Leone employment market can be found in the salary and wage structure, the education system of the country and status considerations in the society, all inherited from the colonial period.

1. Wages and salary structure.

The wages and salaries paid for high-level manpower relative to middle-level, semi-skilled and unskilled wages or the level of alternative incomes earnings opportunities in Sierra Leone were determined by what was needed to attract expatriates from abroad than local market conditions. In the post-independence period, the levels of wages for high-level positions in the public service were maintained

even when expatriates were replaced by Sierra Leoneans. Since the public sector is by far the largest employer of high-level manpower in Sierra Leone, these peculiarities of the wage structures have had very important effects on the supply of skilled manpower. Far from serving to provide a set of proper incentives for the growth of a rational spectrum of skills, the system has had serious adverse effects. First, because of the great salary or wage differentials between high- and middle-level jobs (see Table 5.5 and 5.6 above), it has proved very difficult to encourage bright and brilliant students to enter middle-level careers, since with a very little more effort and training they can hope to move into the "stratosphere of high-level salaries".⁸⁶ Secondly, the salaries for high-level manpower soak up a large part of the budget in the public service.⁸⁷ This feature of the wage structure has created a negative feedback to the educational system. The whole question of what determines wage and salary structures in developing countries is difficult and complex. It is clear and well documented that the labour market systems in Black Africa are highly imperfect.⁸⁸ The relative earnings of different jobs seem not to reflect the major priorities of development and may even attract people away from occupations in which their skills are most needed.⁸⁹ Wages and salaries are determined largely by political, institutional or other factors which may have very little or no relevance to the economic realities of the economy.

One of the most striking characteristics of the structure of wages and salaries in Sierra Leone, however, is the degree to which earnings of workers are influenced by the level of their educational attainment (Table 5.5).

In 1977, the average earnings of Sierra Leoneans with degrees were about four times those of a skilled worker with a secondary education, seven times as great as those of unskilled workers with a primary school education and nine times greater than an uneducated rural worker's wage (Tables 5.5 and 5.6). These differentials are not high by standards elsewhere in Africa. Yet, comparative figures for European countries (not those noted for egalitarian policies) reveal average earnings at the highest level of education which, for all age groups, are not greater than five times those of workers at the lowest levels of education.⁹⁰

The question which needs to be answered is, why has this inherited wage and salary structure persisted in the face of the growing demand for skilled- middle-level manpower relative to high-level manpower? First, the high incomes earned in Sierra Leone tend to have a disproportionate amount of political and economic control and they have no vested interest in changing the structure. Second, there has been a continued reliance on expatriate labour particularly in the private sector of the economy. Wages paid to attract them have served as "pace setters" in the economy which has served to preserve the inherited structure.⁹¹

A third explanation is the built-in inertia in any wage structure. Such pervasive continuation of existing wages structures under certain conditions has been noted by Ulman:

Some excess-supply situation may not connote the presence of unstable wage relationships whether or not they are associated with factor or product substitution. Thus, under equilibrium in the broader sense, things in the relative rates of compensation may not constitute a necessary condition for changes in relative employment and in wages structure . . . however . . . given the stimulus of exceptionally large changes . . . in conditions of demand or supply the forces of competition might be expected to prevail, and changes in wage structure could then discharge an important allocational function.⁹²

The existence of the first condition outlined by Ulman has been labelled the "job vacancy hypothesis".⁹³ Whether the job vacancy thesis or the competitive theory as applied in Sierra Leone during the time of the study can be established by testing for the correlation between wage earnings and the type of employment. According to the job vacancy hypothesis: "given changes in patterns of employment may not 'require' changes in the existing wage structure; if the relevant wages are maintained at excess-supply

levels, labour may move from low to high-wage sections solely in response to increases in job vacancies."⁹⁴

Conversely, the competitive model, "associates any changes in the sectoral distribution of employment caused by changes in conditions of either demand or supply - with either a decline or an increase in relative wages (except where changes in demand and supply are simultaneous, equal and in the same direction)."⁹⁵

To substantiate the job vacancy thesis, where labour flows to high-wage industries, one would expect to find positive and significant correlation between the original levels of earnings and changes in employment. Confirmation of the competitive theory would be suggested by a positive and significant correlation coefficient between the percentage or absolute changes in earnings and the percentage or absolute change in employment.

Central to this thesis of institutional intervention in the labour market, in the form of inherited wage structure persisting over time, is the stability of the occupational wage structure. It remains stable in the sense that relative differences in the wage paid to different occupational categories remain fairly constant even if the wage levels are shifting upwards.

The salary/wage structure described above, which is also typical of that in each of the new independent African states, points to many problems related to the theme of this study. Where salaries and wages are so closely

linked to the level of education and certification, the possibility of payment by education rather than by job (still less by performance) becomes operational. This phenomenon is often formalised in the public service where salaries in many posts are explicitly linked to levels of formal education. In this situation, rapidly expanding school outputs can cause average earnings to rise without any change in the existing wage and salary structure (App. V). Thus, one of the limiting factors on the extent to which the primary school teaching service can be upgraded in Sierra Leone is the high cost of employing people with five, as opposed to two or three, years of post-secondary education as primary school teachers.

Similar effects can be seen in the private sector, where the high salary costs will probably involve some slowing down in employment growth as educated employment expands.⁹⁶ Once such salary differences are established, they usually remained entrenched. Any such trend is accentuated in cases where training is largely given or financed by employers. Here, there are financial incentives to push as many of the costs as possible onto the formal education system, and the economic and scarcity rent chargeable by workers with five years as opposed to two years post-secondary education is given justification in so far as the employer saves the extra training costs he would otherwise incur if the less educated man had been recruited.

The problem is, however, that this bias in the labour market often has much greater implications. The returns to higher levels of education at once accelerate the social pressures for increased continuation rates from primary through secondary school, and from there on to the university. And those same returns may even justify such expansion in the eyes of some economists who see salaries as just rewards for higher productivity.⁹⁷ The increased outputs imply in turn that educational hiring standards will be raised - employers, to protect the standard of their recruits begin to look to the university rather than to the secondary/technical schools and vocational training institutions, which feeds again the pressures from students to stay on at school longer.

To say that the net result of this process is the existence of a middle-level manpower gap and an over-supply of high-level manpower is not enough. Educational expansion becomes an expensive way of producing an elite who continue to be privileged by post-school financial rewards. The system gives expectation of comfort and riches to the lucky few and vain desires for the same in the frustrated majority. On this interpretation, education becomes a source of social division and unrest, a system which most who join have to leave as failures, which increases the awareness of what has not been gained rather than of what has, and which vocational skills only be most indirect and circuitous process.⁹⁸

The above argument would not be so powerful if differences of education among workers in the same occupation were strongly limited with productivity differentials. But the evidence suggests that this is not the case. In Sierra Leone, for instance, there is a significant difference between the private rate of return to increased amount of formal education and training. Even though in many skilled occupations such as engineering, dentistry, medical etc. training and education are alternatives as preparation for job entry, the latter has much stronger positive effects upon future earnings than the former. The most likely explanation for this is that the salary structure has been distorted by the market imperfection: that historical and institutional bias in favour of formal education causes earning differences and productivity differentials with occupational groups are not highly correlated.

2. The Education System.

The education system of Sierra Leone is patterned after that of the United Kingdom. Historically its principal function was the production of a small elite to serve the colonial system and to support the metropolitan culture.⁹⁹ The programme was largely of an academic and literary nature leading to administration or priesthood and to positions in the public sector or missionary work. Thus, it produced a white collar elite culturally distant from the rural masses of the population.¹⁰⁰ With the coming

of independence in 1961, the objectives of education were broadened and the system was seen as a means to promote economic development through the expansion of educational opportunities throughout the country. However, since the basic characteristics of the system have remained largely unchanged, the outcome in terms of student attitudes and expectations is similar to that of previous decades.

Education is still viewed largely as an entree to public administration and urban society.¹⁰¹

The 1970 Government White Paper on education made a broad outline of the functions of the education system as: child-care, character training, preparation for citizenship; development of scholastic aptitudes; and of course certification and selection for eventual entry into the world of work.¹⁰² The last, that is the occupational selection function - the continual shifting of students to successive rungs of the educational ladder - has come to dominate the other functions of education in Sierra Leone. The explanation is found partly in the origins and evolution of Sierra Leone's education system, particularly in the post-independence drive to provide highly trained personnel to replace the colonial expatriate personnel both in the public service and in private sector employment; to meet the need for the rapidly expanding network of government services; and partly to fulfil the commitment to the ideal of self-development for all. The latter was espoused without reference to the future needs of the economy, and

the limited resources available to realise that ideal. The result has been an upward thrust throughout all levels of schooling. This has subordinated the whole system to the interests of the small minority of children who actually reach upper secondary and higher levels of education and neglected the vast majority who barely complete the primary cycle (see Tables 5.10 and 5.11 above).

The primary school grades do, of course, serve to create a certain number of literate, numerate school-leavers; but in practice, their principle concern seems to be to prepare students for secondary education. What was intended to be the primary school leaving examination became known as first, the Common Entrance Examination. Later the title was changed to the secondary school common entrance examination, and then the Selective Entrance examination. Since two-thirds of the products of primary schools do not proceed to secondary education, there is little relationship between the objectives of primary schooling and the needs of most school-leavers who, in effect, start working at the age of 12 or 13.

Pupils and their parents understandably view schooling mainly as an avenue to the better-paid and otherwise more desirable occupations, eg., the law, medicine, etc. It is seen as an escape route from agriculture and the blue-collar occupations. The curriculum, the examination system, and the attitudes of teachers clearly imply that the central function of primary schooling is to prepare

students for higher education, after which the escape from the traditional or informal sectors is guaranteed.¹⁰³ No wonder then that every attempt to "ruralise" the curriculum of primary schools, or to make the content of primary education more directly relevant to rural environments, is vigorously opposed by pupils and parents. To decry this opposition would be merely to close one's eyes to the "upward push" that has now been firmly built into the educational system. There is nothing uniquely Sierra Leonean in this situation: in one degree or another, the "upward push" characterises education in almost all the new independent African states.

The problem is not confined to primary education. Secondary level education too ought to be treated as terminal preparation for middle-level employment because fewer than 5 per cent of secondary students will continue to the tertiary level of the educational system, (see Tables 5.13 and 5.14 above). Here again, the emphasis is on selection for higher education. This selection bias implies a constant pre-occupation with examinations, a premium on rote memorising, a dulling of initiative, and the extinction in all but very exceptional children of the pleasures of learning for its own sake. Furthermore, when the selection process lends to one set of schools for those judged to be potential candidates for entry into higher education, and terminal "vocational" schools for those judged to be incapable of attaining high grades in the

general Certificate of Education, or School Certificate, the result is neither good academic nor good vocational education. No pupil who can get into the academic stream chooses the vocational one, and those forced into vocational stream by the rationing of places then seek indirect routes to higher education via admission to technical institutes at the upper secondary and tertiary level. They concentrate on the academic subjects in a nominally vocational curriculum, and the schools are under constant pressure to expand these subjects at the expense of the vocational ones. Thus what one gets are pseudo-vocational streams, which are in fact extremely expensive and scholastically inferior academic streams. At the same time the avowedly academic streams become bookish and examination-oriented, because any suggestion of "shop courses" or "practical project" in the academic stream is resisted by students as being irrelevant to higher grades in the School Certificate examinations. The Brown Manpower Survey results showed that private sector employers in Sierra Leone were dissatisfied with the vocational content of both the technical institutes and trade centres and prefer the product of their own on-the-job training programmes; in addition, nearly half of the surveyed students who proceeded to the tertiary level expressed the view that their secondary school preparation was unsatisfactory - a view which was shared by the tertiary institutions which had admitted them.¹⁰⁴

The writer heard frequent criticism of the balance of subjects in various streams at the secondary level, particularly in vocational streams, coupled with the often-expressed view that all would be well if only more pupils chose the vocational stream rather than the academic.. Some of this criticism derives from a misconception of what schools can accomplish in terms of vocational preparation. Given the changes that are constantly taking place in the labour market requirements, a school that prepared students to take up specific occupations would, in fact, risk preparing many students for the wrong occupation. If, instead, it emphasised general preparation for the world of work, the relevance of its training to subsequent occupations would be likely to be tenuous.

There remains, in any case, the intractable problem of selection in an "upward push" situation in which almost every secondary school pupil tries to stay in the stream leading to the tertiary level. Quite apart from pupil motivation and preference, the diagnostic problem is formidable. Experience round the world shows that there is no perfect selection system which can distinguish, at the secondary entrance level, those most fitted eventually to benefit from the small number of places available in higher education.

If the "upward push" is partly responsible for thwarting all plans to broaden vocational and technical education, it is also mainly responsible for the continuing

expansion of the numbers proceeding from primary to secondary levels in expectation of finding employment in the urban sector, non-farm activities. The expectation is already quite unrealistic for many pupils and will become increasingly so. The output of secondary schools has been growing at 11 per cent annually since independence and 28 per cent annually in the last decade. This is about five times the rate of growth in modern sector employment in recent years. Table 5.18a and b below shows the number of candidates who passed in certain number of subjects in the General Certificate of Education at Ordinary and Advanced Levels examination between 1964-1978.

TABLE 5.18a General Certificate of Education at Ordinary Level 1964-1978.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Candidates</u>	<u>Total Passes</u>	<u>4+</u>	<u>5+</u>	<u>% of Passes to Total</u>
1964	874	189		101	21.6
1965	931	271		163	29.1
1966	1,347	261		149	9.5
1967	1,960	295		160	15.0
1968	1,983	294		154	14.7
1969	2,236	316		157	14.1
1970	2,043	276		151	13.5
1971/72	2,659	375		178	14.1
1972/73	4,200	590		367	14.0
1973/74	4,760	670		418	14.0
1974/75	4,790	670		386	14.0
1975/76	5,010	700		337	13.9
1976/77	5,820	810		400	13.9
1977/78	6,330	890		427	14.0

Source: Computed from the West African Examination Council Office, Freetown, 1978.

An aggregation of the above figures (Table 5.18a) shows that during the fourteen years 1964-1977/78, 6,607 candidates passed the General Certificate of Education at 'O'

TABLE 5.18b General Certificate of Education at Advanced Level Results 1964-1977/78.

Year	FORM VI No. of Candidates	Passes with 2+	% of Total
1964	167	72	43.1
1965	152	74	48.7
1966	105	59	56.2
1967	122	42	34.4
1968	147	46	31.3
1969	197	95	48.2
1970	212	99	46.1
1971/72	182	98	53.8
1972/73	175	95	52.2
1973/74	300	160	53.3
1974/75	380	210	52.3
1975/76	430	230	53.5
1976/77	430	230	53.5
1977/78	450	240	53.5

Source: Collected from the West African Examination Council Office, Freetown Branch, 1978.

level in four or more subjects (3,548 with five or more subjects). This makes for 14.3 per cent of the total number of students (44,943) enrolled in Form V at the end of preceeding years 1964-1977/78. However, the minimum entry requirement for each of the colleges of the University of Sierra Leone is at least 5 G.C.E. 'O' levels including English language, which renders the majority of the school leavers unsuitable for admission to the colleges. Some would seek admission to teachers' colleges as second best, and the rest would either opt to go to technical and vocational institutes or seek employment as clerks, shop assistants, messengers, etc.¹⁰⁵

There are analogous problems of relevance at the tertiary level. The first lies in the proportion of

university students studying subjects that are unrelated to the needs of the economy. As one private expatriate employer bluntly pointed out:

The education system of your country put out people who don't want to do dirty work. They want to sit in offices with air conditioning. We employers need people who can do the job and teach other people how to do it. That required the possession of both the technical knowledge and skills which your system of education could not give to your people.¹⁰⁶

Support for these views is contained in both the preponderance of expatriate personnel in mid-level technical jobs in the private sector (see Table 3.8) and the proportion of students for degree courses in arts and general sciences to total students enrolment at the University of Sierra Leone (Table 5.16). Approximately two-thirds of the students study arts, economics and education, while very few study agriculture and engineering skills which have long been in short supply. Once again, however, the fault does not lie with the student for the following reasons: firstly, in the past the emphasis has been to produce graduates with the liberal arts in order to replace the colonial expatriates in the administrative service. This is illustrated in the Fourah Bay College's expansion programme which lay more emphasis on "the development of

philosophy, classics and theology".¹⁰⁷ The second reason is that some students having failed to qualify for courses such as medicine (for overseas scholarships) and engineering opt as second best for arts, economics and general degrees in science courses.

Perhaps the most obvious set of problems that have characterised the Sierra Leone graduate labour market is that created by the mis-match between the outflow of students from the education system and the employment demand for certain skills. The reason is that at independence, expatriate labour was most predominant, particularly in senior positions in both the public and private sectors of the economy. The solution to the problem was seen in terms of creating a cadre of personnel with the same education and training as that possessed by expatriates doing the jobs in question. The recommendation of the Committee on Africanisation of the public service was explicit in this when it stated:

There shall be no lowering of the qualifications and other standards prescribed for appointment to the "Senior Service". The efficiency of the Civil Service should be regarded as the governing consideration in this and all other respects.¹⁰⁸

This tendency was reinforced by employers in the private sector who demanded that certain levels of education were absolutely necessary for appointment to various kinds of jobs and by the government whose schemes of service

adopted the same or similar educational requirements for entry as for the colonial civil service. Very rapidly the view became entrenched that the education system created the required skills. The problem of producing sufficient local manpower was simply a question of expanding educational facilities to produce enough Africans with school certificates (see Table 5.18 above) and university degrees in order to Africanise existing jobs and meet the annual requirements of the economy for growth and replacement owing to demographic factors. This is reflected in the tremendous increase in the output of university graduates from the University of Sierra Leone from 19 in 1960 to 410 in 1977.

TABLE 5.19 The Output of Graduates from the University of Sierra Leone from 1966-1979.

Year	F.B.C.	N.U.C.	Total	% Increase
1960	19	-	19	100.0
1966	50	29	79	315.7
1967	75	27	102	29.1
1968	69	74	143	40.2
1969	80	67	147	2.7
1970	90	71	161	9.5
1971	95	84	179	10.0
1972	100	84	184	3.3
1973	150	89	255	38.5
1974	170	105	286	13.7
1975	200	116	375	31.1
1976	225	175	400	6.6
1977	230	180	410	2.5
1978	220	160	380	-5.0
1979	223	130	353	-7.1
TOTAL	1,977	1,391	3,454	175.1
Average	141	99	246.7	12.5

Source: Compiled from the annual examination results of the two colleges published in the Sierra Leone Government Gazette.

Table 5.19 is intended to illustrate the aggregate output of university graduates in response to the post-independent demand for high-level manpower. Between 1966 and 1979, a total of 3,454 high-level manpower has been produced by the two constituent colleges of the University of Sierra Leone (Fourah Bay College and the Njala University College). The output from overseas institutions is not known, but a 'guesstimate' would put it at an annual average of 30. This includes doctors, lawyers and other professionals which the University of Sierra Leone could not train due to lack of facilities and the cost of training such people at home, (see Table 5.19 above.) But inspite of this increase, which stands at an average of 246.7 per annum representing an annual growth rate of 12.5 per cent, and the projected shortfall in the supply of all categories of manpower (see Table 5.17), there are still in Sierra Leone a total of 2,500 expatriate personnel employed in the economy. The majority of them are employed in the middle-level grades, i.e. the technical grades (see Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 above), while at the same time, the country is experiencing an increasing unemployment among its educated manpower, most acute among school leavers.¹⁰⁹

Two conclusions follow: first, it appears that the post-independent expansion in education has not always produced the right mix of skills. For example, if the figures in Table 5.19 above are disaggregated into output per course of study or discipline in each year, the picture

will be that more than 50 per cent are arts graduates, the next 20 per cent is in economics, 10 per cent in general degree courses in sciences, 10 per cent in agricultural education and the rest in engineering and allied fields. In 1978, for instance, the total output of graduates by the University of Sierra Leone was 380 (see Table 5.19). Of these, 180 were arts graduates - 58 with post-graduate Diploma in Education (90 per cent of them are arts graduates of the previous year 1977), 18 with Bachelor of Engineering degrees, 53 in pure and applied science, etc.¹¹⁰ Second, that those which are surplus to the needs of the economy cannot easily be absorbed elsewhere in the economy. It is against this paradox of shortage in the midst of surplus that the folly of the education system lies. The next section would seek to suggest some solutions.

The question which one is bound to ask is, given the nature of the manpower problems and its perceived causes discussed above, and also given the present size and level of expatriate employment (Table 3.8a) in Sierra Leone as at 1978, what are the policy implications of the cost-benefits, private rates of return, and the manpower-requirement approaches discussed above in investment in education for the supply of high- and middle-level manpower, particularly the latter where expatriates appeared to be most predominant in the private sector of Sierra Leone?

5.5 The Policy Implications.

The cost-benefit, rates of return and manpower-requirement approaches to investment in education have identical policy implications. But opinions are divided on the choice of policies. Both the nature and expansion of primary education has been criticised for two main reasons. First, it is said to be too academic and literary, not preparing the child for the real environment in which he will live. Second, since there is no "manpower" requirement for more primary school leavers in the wage-paid sector - indeed, there is a likelihood that further expansion might be regarded as both costly to the state and frustrating to the individual. These criticisms, however, in their current form do not get to the root of the matter or provide any really helpful standpoint for assessing future policy. There is certainly a belief that more educated men and women are needed at the secondary/technical and higher level education, as the present need for foreigners at these levels witnesses. Since the present pattern of university education is small and expensive in its output, the tendency is to think of down-grading the university in quality, increasing its output and changing its content toward more applied studies, especially in science and technology. This could certainly seem to be a way to get the worst of both worlds - a large number of less qualified graduates who will expect just as high rewards and disdain the work of a technician.

However, in the light of the previous analysis on the nature of the manpower situation in Sierra Leone, the following are some policy choices considered appropriate to the manpower situation.

5.51 Policy Choices.

1. Diversion of resources from higher education to middle and lower-level education.

Since primary and secondary/technical education are found to be socially more profitable than higher education, and the greatest relative shortage is expected to occur at the middle-level manpower (see Tables 5.7 and 5.17), it is evident that future educational policy in Sierra Leone should place greater emphasis on the development of the middle-level and lower levels of the educational ladder. Furthermore, the prevailing rates of return at the various levels of the educational system can be expected to hold beyond marginal increases in investments because the manpower projection techniques anticipate shortages at all levels (see Table 5.17). More funds can be made available for primary and secondary/technical education by diverting resources from higher education. Of course, it can be argued that a 9.5 per cent rate of return on higher education is not unimpressive, especially when one bears in mind that it is the lower limit of the true social rate of return on investment at this level. But a reliable assessment of resources likely to be available for education

sector suggests that no option, other than diversion of funds from higher to lower levels of education, may be open.

The government current expenditure on education has grown rapidly over the past decade with an average rate of increase of 10 per cent per annum in constant 1970-71 prices. It constituted about 22 per cent of current revenue and 25 per cent of current expenditure in 1976/77. This represents a considerable increase over its 1963-64 share of 15 and 18 per cent current revenue and expenditure respectively. The current education expenditure was 2.3 per cent of GDP in 1963-64 and rose to 3.1 per cent in 1977/78. It is highly unlikely that substantially more than 28 per cent of the government current revenue will be devoted to education in the coming years. If one assumes that the G.D.P. will increase at an average annual rate of 5.5 per cent and that some 26 per cent of the current revenue will be devoted to education, the total resources available for education will approximately be Le 88 million over the 1974/75-1978/79 plan period with enrolment in educational institutions at the level projected above (see Tables 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16); this resources constraint implies the pegging of unit cost at all levels of the educational system. No expansion or improvement at the middle- or lower levels of the educational pyramid will be possible unless more resources can be made available from the upper level.

An expansion of primary education can be supported not only on economic grounds (20 per cent rate of return) but on socio-political grounds as well. Even with the attainment of the primary enrolment projections in the plan (4 per cent per annum in the years 1975 onwards) substantially less than one-half of the 5-11 year olds of the population will be in schools. The need for improving the quality of education in the primary and secondary schools is no less acute than the need for increasing the enrolments. On the bases of repeaters and dropouts data provided by the Planning Unit of the Ministry of Education it has been estimated that at the secondary school level some 50.9 students years are required to produce one secondary school leaver with four or more 'O' level passes.¹¹¹ Undoubtedly, the social and family environment in which a student has to live is partly responsible for this. But the conditions of schools such as over-crowding, poor housing, also leave a lot to be desired. In 1973/74, only 55 per cent of primary school teachers were qualified.¹¹² As the various teachers colleges increase the supply of qualified teachers, the percentage of these in the total stock of teachers will increase but so also will the salary bill.¹¹³ Thus, the expansion and improvement of primary, secondary and technical education will require substantial resources which may have to be found from elsewhere in the education sector itself.

Perhaps the diversion of resources from the higher to middle-level of education might be accomplished without any reduction in the university output, but even at the university level no surplus is forecast over the planned period. A reduction in the total intake of resources without a corresponding decrease in the student output will thus require efforts to rationalise expenditures at the University of Sierra Leone and its constituent colleges, particularly the cost of administration which stood at Le 541,210 in 1972/73 Education Budget (see Table 5.20). The need to reduce the unit cost of higher education is also imperative. The ratio of social unit cost in higher education to that in primary education is in the neighbourhood of 66 for Sierra Leone. For some developed countries (New Zealand, the United States of America and the U.K.) the ratio is 17.6.¹¹⁴ Moreover, if one considers only the cost to the central government, the ratio for Sierra Leone rises to over 120.

5.5(2) Reform of Salary and Wage Structure.

In his article "Human Resources Development Planning in Modernising Economies" Harbison pointed out among other things that:

In the strategy of human resources development, the purpose of building incentives is to encourage men and women to prepare for and engage in the kind of productive activity which is needed for accelerated growth. To accomplish this, the compensation of an

individual should be related to the importance of his job in the modernising society. It should not depend upon his level of formal education, the number of degrees held, family status, or political connections, and the relative importance of jobs should be based not on traditions or heritage for colonial regimes, but on assessment of the manpower needs of the country for a period of 20 years.¹¹⁵

What Harbison seemed to have omitted in his prescriptions is the question of who determines the value of each job and what criteria should be used. Perhaps a nationwide job evaluation could be an answer. However, he went on to cite examples which politically and economically attractive and sensible, but practically not feasible. For example, Harbison suggested that if agricultural officers or village workers are desperately needed in rural areas to carry forward a programme of development in agriculture, their pay and status position may have to exceed that of professionally trained people who have desk job in the cities.¹¹⁶ If technicians with limited education can perform work normally assigned to an engineer, he should receive the same pay and perquisites as the engineer on that job. If science and mathematics teachers are urgently needed (as is the case in Sierra Leone), in secondary schools, their reward should be higher than those of other less urgently needed teachers (whether university graduates or not) and

TABLE 5.20 Central Government Current Expenditure on Education for 1972/73 (in Leones).

Level of Education	Teachers		%	Administrative		%
	Salaries			Salaries		
Administration				171,590	30.0	
Primary Education	3,000,000		76.3	121,530	3.1	
Secondary Education	2,772,580		84.7	118,400	3.6	
Teacher Training	522,210		45.7	39,100	3.4	
Technical Education	146,280		60.8	45,760	19.0	
Teaching Aids	-		-	27,600	76.1	
Higher Education -	834,210		21.4	541,210	13.8	
consisting of:						
Fourah Bay College	(504,540)		-	(219,990)	-	
Njala University College	(329,670)		-	(238,220)	-	
University of Sierra Leone	-		-	(83,000)	-	
Overseas Scholarships	-		-	-	-	
Library Grant	-		-	-	-	
TOTALS	7,275,280		55.5	1,065,090	8.1	

Source: Sierra Leone Government Estimates of Revenue and Expenditures 1973/74.

(Table 5.20 continued)

Other Expenses ¹	%	Total	%	Enrollment	Average Cost Per Student Year
399,620	20.0	571,210	100	-	-
812,000 ²	20.6	3,933,530	100	178,100	22
384,000 ³	11.7	3,274,980	100	39,455	83
580,420	50.8	1,141,730	100	1,391	821
48,600	20.2	240,640	100	890	270
8,650	23.9	36,250	100	-	-
2,527,820	64.8	3,903,240	100	-	-
(1,070,110)	-	(1,794,640)	-	925	1,940
(493,630)	-	(1,061,520)	-	428	2,480
(10,000)	-	(93,000)	-	-	-
(872,080)	-	(872,080)	-	1,200	727
(82,000)	-	(82,000)	-	-	-
4,802,910	36.4	13,101,580	100	-	-

Notes:

1. Includes scholarships (local and overseas) - 2,012,540.
2. Includes 800,000 grants to primary schools.
3. Includes boarding grants - 120,000.

perhaps higher also than professionally trained people in some other less essential activities. If technicians, nurses, and foremen are in very short supply (as is also the case in Sierra Leone), their rates of pay may need to be higher than those of some university graduates holding down administrative jobs for which many persons could qualify. In some cases, medical technicians or the agricultural assistant who is willing to live in the bush deserves to be compensated as much as the doctor or the agronomist who insists on living in the city.¹¹⁷ And the manager of an enterprise who may have had only a limited secondary education should be entitled to higher compensation than the university graduates who are his subordinates. Admittedly, pay alone may not be a sufficient incentive for choosing a job as Herbison seemed to have suggested. The status of occupation and social attitudes are of equal if not greater importance; but a rise in relative pay in itself may contribute to the raising of the status level of a job.

Large financial outlays for education are unlikely to produce the kind of manpower needed if the appropriate incentives are lacking. In Sierra Leone, like other African countries, any university degree is looked upon by the holder almost as a right to employment in the government service. Thus, if one is admitted to a university and completes the requirements for a degree, he may thereby have gained tenure in the higher paid ranks of government

employees. He is also strongly motivated to prefer work in the larger urban areas. The idea that a university education is a "permanent escape from the bush" is widespread in Sierra Leone. The reason for the critical shortage of technicians of all kinds is not the lack of places and facilities in technical and vocational institutions, but rather the reluctance of students to go into them.¹¹⁸ Obviously, in the minds of young people, the employment opportunities are not as attractive in agriculture as in some other fields which are less vital for the country's development. For the same reasons, technical education, particularly at the intermediate level, has had little appeal in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa. For example, the Ashby Report: 'Post-school Certificate and Higher Education in Nigeria pointed out:

The literary tradition and the university degree have become indelible symbols of prestige in Nigeria; by contrast, technology, agriculture and other practical subjects, particularly at the sub-professional level, have not won esteem.¹¹⁹

It is argued most strongly that situations of this kind will not be corrected by the building of more educational institutions. They will be changed only when the system of rewards and status in the society are changed and the initiative in making changes must come from the government itself in the form of a complete revision of the entire system of compensation of government employees.

Robinson Hollister¹²⁰ suggested four ways which might be applied by the government to reduce the effects of distortions in the wage structure on the supply of skilled-level manpower:

(1) A downward revision of the upper salary scales in the public sector;

(2) A major increase in the supply of high-level manpower in order to break the dominance of the public sector in the skilled-manpower market;

(3) The control of the distribution of high-level manpower; and

(4) The revision of the requirements for high-level manpower, by means of extensive job analysis.

First, the downward revision of upper salary scales in the public sector - this can be done by direct action to establish a more equitable, narrower differential between skills levels would obviously be the most rational move. However, there are two major obstacles to this: first, it seems highly unlikely that political pressures against such a move could be overcome since the highest-level civil servants who would lose most are the very persons who would have to plan and implement such a move; Second, many African countries require rather large numbers of expatriate personnel in high-level positions, and it would be very difficult to pay them the high salaries necessary to attract them while at the same time paying their African counterparts generally reduced salaries (even

if the differential is made up of various expatriation allowances or fringe benefits, this does not disguise the fact that the African officials are being paid less).

Thirdly, an increase in the supply of high-level manpower - Hollister argues that the salary structure problem will be solved by the natural increase in the supply of high-level manpower; that this increase will be large enough to meet the requirements in the public service and provides an excess supply for the use of the private sector, so that the dominance of the public sector in this part of the employment market, and hence the dominance of its distorted wages scales, could be broken. However, this development does not seem very likely. In the first place, the short-term cost of producing a large amount of high-level manpower have already been shown to be very high. The scope for further expansion of this sector is therefore limited. Moreover, even in the cases where supply is expanding rapidly, the possibility of breaking the dominance of the public sector would seem remote, for unless it is carefully controlled, the public sector will tend to respond to the increasing supply by increasing its requirements. Finally, even if large increases in the supply of high-level manpower eventually successful in inundating the market and thereby cutting the tie to the distorted public sector wage structure as Hollister suggested, this will be an extremely expensive procedure in the short-run.

The third solution Hollister suggested was a control of the distribution of high-level manpower where the wage system fails to perform its proper distributive function adequately; the usual alternative is to resort to direct control. It seems likely that the method used to alleviate the effects of the wage structure on the high-level manpower problem will be the establishment of some degree of control.

Allocative controls can be set up in varying degrees at various points of the system. The most obvious point is at the source of supply, namely in the education and training system. This can take the form of manipulation of the scholarship system by the Ministry of Education, to encourage movement towards careers in which the greatest shortages are foreseen (middle-level manpower), lump sum payments to influence career choice or direct allocation of students to particular education or training institutions. Also, allocative controls can be established at the point of entry into the employment market. Requests from various public sector agencies for skilled manpower can be funneled through a single agency which can keep close control on the number of new entrants taken up by the public sector and reduce competitive bidding among various agencies in the sector. Moreover, the controls at the point of entry into the employment market can be such as to favour private sector employers. Finally, controls can be established over the distribution of all high-level manpower. They may be limited to the public sector or

extended to the private sector as well. In the public sector they can be used to inhibit the expansion of recruitment for high-level manpower and prevent the escalation of average salaries that result from competitive bidding within the sector. Controls in the private sector can be particularly important as regards the use of expatriate immigration quota system (see Chapter 4 above), and for ensuring the adequate development of training schemes in the sector.

The temptation to establish direct control is great, but past experience in Sierra Leone with the use of such instruments in areas besides manpower has not been successful.¹²¹ It proves very difficult to keep control of mechanism efficient and flexible enough to respond to the dynamics of the economy.¹²² So although this method, suggested by Hollister, is the most likely to be used, it would be wise to regard it as a last resort to be applied only when other options have been clearly ruled out and to be strictly limited to the point where the desired result can be produced with the minimum of control machinery. As Bhagwati put it: "Controls create privilege instead of equality, lead to corruption, bribery, etc."¹²³

The fourth solution suggested by Hollister is job analysis. For him, the revision of the requirements for high-level manpower by means of extensive job analysis "is a course of action that recommends itself" regardless of the wage structure problems or the other measures taken to

solve these problems. Job analysis can be of direct benefit in the public sector by achieving a more efficient use of manpower, by the allocation of less qualified assistant to lowly tasks previously carried out by highly qualified employees and the breaking up of high-skill tasks into components that can be performed by groups of less skilled individuals. This type of analysis is very time-consuming and sometimes politically difficult to implement because of resentment from the workers directly affected by such a move. However, if implemented, it could lead to considerable savings in high-level manpower.

Another way in which Hollister suggested job analysis can help is by breaking the tie between salary levels and educational qualifications which typifies many of the present civil service scales in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa. Determining salaries in accordance with the responsibilities of the job rather than the educational attainments of the employees will reduce the upward drift of salaries that, under the present system, accompanies the natural growth in average educational qualifications in the public service as a whole. But like the first solution the reaction to such measures will come from the top civil servants who would stand to lose most. It will therefore be regarded as retrograde and both politically and administratively unworkable.

Mark Blaug¹²⁴ lent support to Hollister's first suggestion. He too advocated for a narrowing of the skill

differentials as "a more potent indirect means of reducing the attractiveness of the upper secondary and higher education in the labour market."¹²⁵ This call for narrowing differentials is most difficult to implement for reasons already given above. For example, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Mission to Kenya Report¹²⁶ made a number of suggestions for reducing the private returns to education. The Kenyan report suggested that entry points on the public service pay scales should be reduced by 25 per cent for a five year period, after which entry points should no longer be determined in terms of formal education. This suggestion was not accepted by the Kenyan government. Nevertheless, the government of Kenya did accept the principle of working towards a narrowing of skills differentials in the years ahead.¹²⁷ Thus, in the words of Harbison:

A primary condition for solution of all manpower problems, whether they be critical skill bottlenecks in the modern sector or mounting labour surplus throughout the nation, is the building of appropriate pay systems. Lacking this, massive expenditure on training and education will contribute little to accelerate development. The notion that there is a direct relationship between the development of education (the residual factor) and economic growth can be misleading and planners should be wary of accepting it without careful scrutiny.¹²⁸

5.53 Make the Education System More Relevant.

The first two policy implications discussed above advocated the transfer of resources from the production of more high-level manpower to the more middle-level manpower where the manpower requirements for Africanisation are greater. The first suggested a reduction in government expenditure on higher education and increases in its expenditure on primary and secondary and technical education, because it is socially more profitable to do so. The second advocated a rather more subtle and indirect way through the reform of salary and wages structures whereby an individual's earning power will not be determined by his or her level of formal educational attainment alone but on his contribution to development of the country and the value society attaches to his job. This, it is hoped, will help to reduce the attractiveness of higher education.

However, both of them do not guarantee the provision of the relevant education system which the country needs for the supply of manpower appropriate to the needs of both public and private sector employers.

President Julius K. Nyerere's booklet "Education for Self-Reliance"¹²⁹ is an important document: important not only for Tanzania, but for all countries considering educational development in agriculturally based societies.

Briefly, the thesis is that schools have a dual role in the regeneration of society. First, there is the social role; through education pupils learn attitudes appropriate

for a socialist society in a rural economy. Education "has to foster the social goals of living together and working together for the common good . . . Our education must therefore inculcate a sense of commitment to the total community and help the pupils to accept the values appropriate to our kind of future, not those appropriate to our colonial past."¹³⁰ This social role applies at all levels of the education system - primary, secondary and university - but it is crucially important at the secondary and university levels because of the patent danger that the students in the post-primary education will become alienated from the rural community from which they come. It is here that the dangers of elitism are strongest.

Second, there is the vocational role, particularly in the primary school. The majority of those children who go to school will be educated only at this level. They should learn those vocational skills which will prepare them for their roles as better farmers in a predominantly agricultural society. Through the development of appropriate skills at school, the farmer of the future will be able to contribute substantially to the improvement of agriculture which is at the heart of economic improvement through "self-reliance".

Each of these roles, the social and vocational, has implications for the other. "But although these aspects are in some ways separate, they are also inter-locked. One cannot integrate the pupils and students into the future

society simply by theoretical teaching however well designed it is. Neither can the society fully benefit from an education system which is thoroughly integrated into local life but does not teach people the basic skills - for example, of literacy and arithmetic, or which fails to excite in them a curiosity about ideas."¹³¹ The social role of the school bears upon the attitude toward agriculture and the recognition of its importance for the country, the community and the village. On the other hand, the vocational role of the school bears upon the social role because without a consequent improvement in agriculture and the emergence of the "good life" in rural society, there is a danger that the social vision will become a mockery.

Since the majority of expatriate personnel employed in both public and private sectors employments are mainly engaged in the technical fields (Table 4.7), and the anticipated shortage is also greatest at this level of economic activities (about 3,000, see Table 5.17), it is with this second aspect, the vocational/technical role of the education system that policy proposals must be made.

While recognising the many economically and socially valuable aspects of Sierra Leone's education as the system stands, one would wish to propose a package programme of reform which it is believed will enable the system to serve its declared aims and objectives better. Basically, the proposals are designed to reduce the "upward push" for

higher education which is no longer justified either by economic demand or social justice, and to diminish the emphasis on examination results as the be-all and end all of education. Specifically, the policy proposals are intended to reduce the education system's pre-occupation with professional high-level manpower and to focus attention instead on sub-professional and technical manpower that bears relevance to the needs of both the public and private sectors employers; in other words, "Education For Self-Reliance" and not on the continuing reliance on expatriate labour.

5.531 Education for the Terminal Student.

In spite of the rapid growth of enrolment at all sectors of the education system in Sierra Leone, perhaps as many as 60 per cent of those who start their primary education did not complete it. For example, from Table 5.12 above, of the 38,164 children who started primary school (Class I) in 1970/71, only 26,260 were able to reach Class VII after seven years of primary education in 1976/77. That represented a completion rate of 68 per cent.¹³² Of those who did, less than half went to secondary. Thus, for the great majority, primary education is the only formal schooling they will ever receive. The same applies mutatis mutandis for all subsequent stages; they are terminal points for the majority of students enrolled in them (see Tables 5.13 and 5.18a and b). It is true that there are vocational and technical alternatives to general

secondary schooling after Form III, but in the majority of cases these absorbed only a small minority of post-primary students and this situation is unlikely to alter significantly in the near future for two main reasons already discussed in the last sub-section.

While each level of education is terminal for the majority of those who started, it is generally agreed that each educational cycle is dominated by the needs of the minority, i.e. those who continue their education. Public examinations at the end of each stage are selective tests for the coveted next stage, and these have a persuasive influence on what is taught and how. In short, the "need" of the next level dominates the one below. The whole educational system can thus be seen as one long preparation for the university and hence is irrelevant to the needs of the majority who will never get that far.¹³³

How serious is this charge? This depends on whether one thinks that terminal students need to be taught different things - and perhaps in different ways - from those who will continue their education further. Tanzania has taken this problem very seriously and has tackled it more systematically than perhaps any other African country. Unfortunately, it is too early to evaluate this experiment in "education for self-reliance" which has stirred up some instructive but inconclusive controversy.¹³⁴

In Sierra Leone, the Education Review Committee has recommended that primary education should focus on the needs

of the majority who will have to find their livelihood in the rural areas. But serious queries still remain. Philip Forster shows convincingly that school farms, growing cash crops for profit, are more likely than not to be educationally counter-productive; if the primary school does its job properly in equipping students with basic literacy, numeracy, and some grasp of scientific method, it will have no time for vocational instruction in agriculture.¹³⁵ While the issue is still open, one would wish to offer four points for discussion.

(i) The success or failure of this basic education experiment will turn on the relevance and applicability of the syllabus as a whole and not on the explicit self-reliance activities.¹³⁶

(ii) Despite worsening employment prospects for secondary school leavers, most primary school students aim to be admitted to a secondary school. Therefore, if any new primary syllabus is to secure the support of teachers, students and their parents, the secondary school selection examinations must measure - and reward - the same qualities and attainment that the primary syllabus is designed to promote. As Forster says, "If it is not in the examination, students won't bother with it."¹³⁷

(iii) Even if most students leave their primary school full of the spirit of innovation, they cannot become independent decision-makers until many years later.

Their chances of applying their knowledge and skills

will depend mainly on the understanding and support they receive from their parents. Consequently, in communities still largely illiterate, programmes of adult education are likely to raise the social productivity of primary education in addition to any direct value they possess.

(iv) Those who leave school seek not an escape from rural life as such, but from the prospect of earning no more than a bare subsistence income. They can see that even the most unskilled urban wage employee earns more than the average farmer.

Rural primary education will become 'relevant and functional' not by teaching youngsters how to run farms and grow particular crops, but by showing them and their parents that small farmers and entrepreneurs who experiment can also earn more than semi-skilled urban wage-earners. The experience of the Japanese agricultural revolution in the late eighteenth century may be relevant. This was based not on agricultural education as such, but on the simultaneous improvement by rural craftsmen and peasant farmers of tools, seeds and methods of cultivation. While no single innovation was striking in itself, the process became cumulative as news of improved and more profitable farming practices spread.¹³⁸ Nevertheless, the presence of a large number of Chinese expatriates in Sierra Leone in the agricultural sector as technicians at the experimental farm level justified the call for the introduction of vocational education at the primary education level.¹³⁹ To quote the

words of an expatriate employer in Freetown, Sierra Leone, when he was asked about the level at which Africanisation should start:

If Sierra Leone is to benefit from her Africanisation policy, it is my considered belief that it must start from foreman level. That is, Africanisation must start from below and not from the top as your government seem to suggest.¹⁴⁰

By the same token, if the government call for the return to the land or the Green Revolution is to be successful, it must be done by Sierra Leonean technicians and not by Chinese, Korean and United States Peace Corps technicians. This requires that Sierra Leone produce technically competent Sierra Leonean nationals. In the words of Chandrakant:

It is imperative for all developing countries to train and develop their own indigenous personnel as competent technicians. Because, in the final analysis, the pace and direction of the economic progress of developing countries will largely depend upon how far they solve their technician problem.¹⁴¹

In a similar tone, MacLennan, C.B.E., expressed his views that:

The shortage of trained technicians in developing countries has retarded their pace of

industrialisation, and that future economic and social progress will depend on the quality and quantity of technicians they produce.¹⁴²

Sierra Leone was not unaware of the importance of technically qualified manpower in her policies of Africanisation and economic development. Since independence in 1961, tremendous efforts have been made to increase the supply of technically competent manpower, but this has not been matched with the requirements of both public and private sector employers as is demonstrated in Table 5.17.

Two things therefore need to be discussed about this segment of the educational system which we take to embrace all forms of specialised training below the level of university. The first is to argue the necessity of a complete review of the training facilities available. The second is to draw attention to the basic problem of relevance and psychological problems which at present inhibit the development of vocational training in most fields.

Unlike primary and secondary education and teacher training, vocational training is not concluded under the auspices of a single government ministry. At least three ministries have major commitments - the Ministry of Education through its technical institutes in Freetown and Kenema and its trade centres Kissy and Magbaraka (see Table 5.21 below); the Ministry of Health for the training of nurses, dispensers, and health inspectors; and the

Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources for the training of agricultural instructors, etc. But every ministry has assumed responsibilities in this field: each conducts training programmes, each despatches personnel overseas for study, each either has or would like to have on its establishment a training officer.

Nor is vocational training confined to government departments. There are other employers in the private sector which have instituted training programmes in their companies, particularly in the mining industry. Other firms co-operate with the technical institutes in apprenticeship schemes. There are a few private institutions which provide specialised training, for example, the Y.W.C.A. vocational institute.

The significance of these various institutions and agencies is, of course, uneven; the Freetown Technical Institute with 490 full time and 780 part-time students in a considerable variety of courses can hardly be compared with Magbarata Trade Centre with 144 full time students (see Table 5.21 below). But it is important for those who must plan the educational development of Sierra Leone during the next ten or twenty years to know precisely what facilities are available. If funds are limited - and it is known that they will continue to be so - then duplication must be avoided and existing facilities utilised to the full.

TABLE 5.21 Number of Students Enrolled in Technical Institutions 1971-1978.

Institution	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Freetown Technical Institute	93	78	91	106	115	125	145	165
Technological Section Full Time	138	147	131	102	162	230	250	270
Part Time Day Course	69	111	104	115	127	140	154	170
Evening Courses	122	116	120	162	230	280	305	325
Commercial Section Full Time	201	194	215	236	260	286	315	346
Evening Courses								
Kenema - Full Time	150	109	134	167	201	210	245	280
Magburata Trade Centre	64	65	64	97	114	140	144	144
Kissy Trade Centre Full Time	374	425	371	192	302	270	319	360
TOTALS	1,210	1,245	1,230	1,180	1,520	1,690	1,800	2,060

Sources: National Development Plan 1974/75-1978/79, Table 6, page 251.

Fifteen years ago, it could have been argued that the inhibiting factor in vocational training was the dearth of facilities. No doubt the present facilities as demonstrated by the above table (5.21) need to be improved and expanded. But in 1978, it can hardly be claimed that the opportunities were not available for sound training in almost every field. The expansion of vocational training during the last two decades has been quite as remarkable as the expansion in primary and secondary education.

No, the real problem is the relevance and quality of training provided by the institutions. There is an important problem of designing relevant curricula for post primary level vocational education. It is tempting and dangerous to assume that vocational and technical education alone is the answer and that it necessarily leads to better employment or earnings opportunities which now are enjoyed by expatriate employees (Table 3.8). There are three factors involved: numbers, content and selection.

1. Numbers. As the majority of African primary school leavers are over 14 years of age, they are old enough to receive vocational education. One controversial definition of 'relevance' might be that post-primary education should equip all students with specific occupational skills distributed in numbers in which they are going to be required in the years of their graduation. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the present educational distribution of the labour force in Sierra Leone is

fragmentary and usually 3-5 years out of date. Even short-term forecasts of manpower requirements created by growth and replacements (Table 5.8) needs in any specific occupation (Table 5.1) and probably subject to margin of error of ± 50 per cent.¹⁴³ No African country has yet derived a system of monitoring the correctness of its manpower projections, analysing the discrepancies, and providing feedback to those concerned. If reasonably accurate forecasts of even short-term trends in occupational demands are as yet unattainable, is it not reckless to gear the whole educational system to their fulfilment? If the most one can hope for is to predict the demand for 'industrial, commercial, agricultural skills, etc.' with a tolerable degree of accuracy, it is unwise to disaggregate the projections any further, and the pre-employment education provided should be no more specialised than the forecast (see Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.17).

2. Contents. The uncertainty about future occupational demands is matched by the relative ignorance of the qualities and attainment employers want, which training institutions to develop and which they cannot do better themselves. Philip Forster has shown for Ghana that:

If we define vocational skills as those that lead to remunerative employment, then most ostensibly, vocational education has turned out to be dysfunctional.¹⁴⁴

In Sierra Leone, despite the apparent shortages of technically trained manpower given the very small number of vocational and technical school graduates each year (70), there are indications that many graduates, particularly those in industrial training, have difficulties in finding employment. This is due primarily to a short-coming common to many training programmes: instructions are overtly theoretical both at vocational/technical training institutions and vocational streams of secondary schools; students receive almost no practical training. There is very little liason between employers and training institutions regarding curricula or job placement, and few of the teaching staff have had experience in commerce and industry. The quality of students is also below average since vocational and technical education is viewed by students and parents and teachers as second rate education. The low prestige awarded to technical education is reflected in the number of students enrolled in technical institution compared to those enrolled in secondary schools (see Tables 5.13 and 5.21); and in the government current budget, less than 2 per cent of education expenditure is allocated to technical education (see Table 5.20).

On the other hand, until the education explosion of the last 20 years, academic education has paid off. Whereas, the technical education shows few signs of delivery even equal benefits.

The conclusion which should be drawn is that the public educational system should offer a combination of pure and applied range of sciences thus opening a wide range of occupational options to students. Vocational education of a specific-job kind is best provided under the sponsorship and general supervision of employers. This is because, as Harbison pointed out:

The essential function of formal education is to prepare people for training rather than to train people for particular occupations. In other words, the principal output of formal education should be educated 'trainable' people. Like a photographic film, the capacities of people are developed after exposure to productive activity. Pre-employment education, as in the coating of the film, determines the future sensitivity of man for understanding and continuous learning. In this three phase strategy of human resources development, therefore, the right incentive and proper arrangement for in-service training are necessary if formal pre-employment education is to contribute effectively to accelerated growth.¹⁴⁵

The most appropriate task for the government is to prod all private sector employers into making their own manpower plans and providing for themselves what they conceive to be their training needs.

The Nigerian experiment of setting up an Industrial Training Fund (ITF) on the British Industrial Training Board lines, deserves close attention. Its functions is to plan and cater for the needs of related group of firms who, on their own, have been unable or unwilling to run such training schemes. This Fund in Nigeria is centrally controlled by a body appointed by the federal government.

In Sierra Leone, on similar lines to those in Britain and Nigeria, the National Committee on the Africanisation of Commerce and Industry recommended the establishment of industrial training boards, but this was not realised. The reason is an earlier experiment by the four mining companies to pool their resources together under a single training institution failed.¹⁴⁶ The failure was due to the relevance of the technical courses offered by the institution to the needs of the individual members. The fact is, the four major mining companies were subsidiaries of multinational corporations with head offices in Britain, Switzerland and the United States of America. While the method of mining was basically the same, there was a tendency for them to incline towards machinery and equipment favoured by their source countries. Thus, the Swiss-oriented company favours German or Continental machinery and equipment, the British-oriented favour British machinery, etc. This renders a unified in-service technical training unworkable. Under such circumstances it might conceivably be the best approach for the government to enter into

agreement with individual firms as a pre-condition to provide technical training for its middle-level manpower personnel.

3. Selection. It has been argued that a narrowly defined vocational approach may well diminish the relevance or pay-off of secondary school education. So long as there continue to be separate vocational, technical and academic institutions and so long as the last of these is the sole avenue to further education and the majority of well-paid jobs, this will cream off the top of the ability range, leaving the less capable student for the first two. Even those employers looking for technical aptitude will either give preference to the supposedly bright student from the academic stream (and then pay for his training) or resolve to use expatriate employees on the grounds of his inability to find suitably qualified local candidates (while many with an expensive vocational education will fail to gain employment). Such a waste of resources can be avoided only if one accepts that students choose the education which holds out the best earning prospects and which gives them appropriate incentives to respond to.

Similar considerations apply to the question of relevance in the design of university courses. Some of these, especially in the faculties of agriculture and engineering, are already ostensibly vocational in their objectives. Most of the others are not, and the criteria by which they judge themselves have more to do with the

"scholarly publications in Overseas Journal" of the 5 per cent of the students who go on to post-graduate work, than with contribution to society of the 95 per cent who find employment in commerce, industry and government services.¹⁴⁷

It is, of course, legitimate to argue that university also has other functions which are only remotely connected with any vocational objective - for example, as critics of the society in which they live. But the problem of resources allocation cannot be avoided. When the cost of a university degree is 4 times the G.N.P. per capita (see Table 5.20), how much of its resources should a poor country like Sierra Leone (where the G.N.P. per capita is less than £300) devote to a form of education that is frankly non-vocational in its objectives? Some, undoubtedly, but should it be as much as it is now?

In a survey recently administered in the country only about a quarter of the final year undergraduates interviewed in the non-professional faculties said that they had chosen their university course because of its relevance to a career they were hoping to pursue. Is this satisfactory? Not long ago a mission from the Manpower Division of the World Bank visited Sierra Leone. While in the country, they asked the heads of departments of non-professional faculties the following questions: For what occupation or group of occupations (excluding teaching) is a degree in your subject a better preparation than a degree in any other non-professional subject? The majority said they did

not know and a significant majority thought the question irrelevant to their objectives.¹⁴⁸

Irrelevant though this question might seem to the university departmental heads, it is relevant that a university in a developing country like Sierra Leone should not only concern itself with the production of high-level manpower, but also how they are deployed in the economy, and how well they do (particularly those with engineering qualifications). This can be done by developing a follow-up programme designed to obtain feedback from the employers. Otherwise, the university will end up producing graduates who the employers would not want as is often the case. This will provide an easy, ready-made excuse to the private sector expatriate employers who continue to employ expatriate personnel on the pretext that the University of Sierra Leone is not producing people suitable for their needs. For example, in one of the mining companies visited during the field work for this study, the managing director (expatriate) complained that as much as he would like to speed up the pace of Africanisation, there were not enough Sierra Leonean nationals with the technical skills and knowledge to replace his expatriate personnel. "Even though academically they (expatriates) are less qualified, they could do the job; that is what we want."¹⁴⁹

The writer's views on what type of people the formal education system should produce are summed up by the exaggerated comment of Mr. Krushchev on the education system of Russia when he said:

We criticised Stalin because he destroyed Lenins principles of the school system and went back to the classical gymnasium. There they prepared girls for marriage and boys for taking a stroll. They twirled moustaches but still hadn't learnt anything . . . we want people with a deep knowledge of technology.¹⁵⁰

Similarly, in Sierra Leone, we blame our former colonial masters for introducing an education system which alienated people from their rural melieu and irrelevant to their mode of economic activities. Yet, after 20 years of political independence, we still cling to the education system bequeathed from our former colonial masters. Sierra Leone, like Russia of Nikita Krushchev, wants people with a knowledge of science and technology because, as the UNESCO Interim Report on Education and Economic Development in Sierra Leone pointed out:

Tractors, lorries and power stations may improve the output of farmers and workshops and contribute to the comfort of living. But to be useful, they must be operated and kept in repair. To operate them and keep them in repair requires that they be understood. Understanding requires education.¹⁵¹

5.6 Summaries and Conclusion.

To be successful, Africanisation policy must be orchestrated with sound manpower supply policies. This is because (as it has already been stated in the introduction to Part Three) any Africanisation policy which could only be implemented through contract employment is not only self-defeating but it was also wasteful of resources. It was on this premise that Part Three of this study was based. Its central focus was the manpower supply side of Africanisation policy, as the first two parts were concerned with the manpower demand side.

The general introduction to Part Three was meant to provide a background information on the importance of the manpower resources in a country's development process, and how respective governments in Sierra Leone responded to this. For example, the manpower survey conducted in 1964 was indicative of the realisation by the government of the importance of manpower resources in its development programmes.

Section 5.1, the introduction to Chapter 5, discussed how African governments responded to their urgent needs for trained and qualified manpower necessitated by their post-independent Africanisation policies. The immediate response was the production of high-level manpower to replace the colonial expatriates and then an overall expansion of the education systems. At some stage, this expansion had resulted in a labour supply glut particularly

from the primary and secondary sectors of the education system, thus threatening unemployment among school leavers.¹⁵²

Hence the need to link investments in education with the manpower requirements of the country. Section 5.2 attempted to synthesize and discuss broadly the various views on investment in education and its contribution to economic growth - the residual factor. Two schools of thought were identified in this connection. The first school took education merely as a factor of production analogous to the physical capital; and the second looked at education and training merely as pre-conditions for economic growth (see notes 18 and 19 above). Also discussed in this section were the various approaches and their limitations to educational and manpower planning. Tinbergen or econometric, cost-benefits or rate of return, and the manpower-requirements approaches were broadly discussed. Each of them, perhaps, with the exception of the last two, had limited value in solving the manpower problems which confronted Sierra Leone at the time of its independence. However, an attempt to apply the last two approaches in analysing the present manpower situation in Sierra Leone was made.

Section 5.3 attempted, with the use of cost-benefits or rates of return and manpower-requirements approaches to educational planning, to analyse the manpower-supply-requirements situation in Sierra Leone. The purpose of the former was to establish whether there was a direct correlation

between the earnings of individuals or groups of individuals and the level of their educational attainment (Table 5.5) and how this earnings-educational correlation had affected the supply of various categories of manpower (Table 5.17). The latter, the manpower-requirement approach tried to explain the manpower-supply-demand equation in terms of economic growth and development. In this regard, three categories of manpower were classified with different educational attainment: high-level (H-L), middle-level (M-L) and primary and secondary school teachers. In each case, it had been established that in spite of increased government expenditure in education, the country would still experience a manpower shortage of all three categories. But the shortage would be most severe at the middle-level (Table 5.17) category. The reasons for the shortage at this level were attributed to the structure of wage and salaries; the education system itself, and the social attitudes, etc.

Section 5.4 discussed the policy implications for future manpower development policies and attempted to suggest solutions. Sub-section 5.4(1) discussed the social returns on investment in education which happened to be greater at technical/secondary level than at a university level. It was therefore suggested that more resources be diverted from higher education to secondary/technical education. Sub-section 5.4(1) looked at the causal relationship between the structure of wages and the supply of different categories of manpower and suggested a reform

which would mean that a wage or salary of an individual would not be determined by educational attainment alone. The last, Sub-section 5.4(3), discussed the relevance of the present education system of Sierra Leone and the problems inherent in any possible reforms suggested.

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77. For example, graduates of Njala University College from the Faculty of Agriculture experience great difficulty in finding jobs because they all want to work in Freetown. Rural remuneration is not attractive enough to offset the urban pull. Also, see Rene Dumont, False start in Africa. Paris, 1964, p. 72.
78. The National Development Plan 1974/75-1978/79, Freetown Ministry of Development and Economic Planning, Central Planning Unit, 1974.
79. Ibid., p. 27.

80. Since teachers requirements are derived from the projected enrolment increases in primary and secondary schools (and not on the basis of sectoral growth rates), the 1974 and 1979 workforce in the sector Public Administration and other services is net of the estimated teaching personnel in these two years.
81. The national educational attainments in each occupation are the weighted average of the rural-urban educational attainments in the provinces and the Western area. The weights (derived from the 1963 population census) are the number of workers in each occupation cross-classified by province and in sector of employment.
82. Some assumptions about proportion of enrolment completing programmes and of Sierra Leoneans to total number are given below:
- (1) At Fourah Bay College, the following proportion of new enrolments are assumed to complete the four-year programme:
- Faculty of Arts (excluding the Department of Education) - 80 per cent.
 - Department of Education (one year post-graduate programme) - 90 per cent.
 - Faculty of Economic and Social Studies - 85 per cent.
 - Faculty of Pure and Applied Sciences - 85 per cent.
- Between 1971 and 1979, Sierra Leoneans are expected to constitute 80 per cent of graduates in all faculties except the Department of Education, where they will constitute 90 per cent.
- (2) At Njala University College the following completion rates and proportion of Sierra Leonean graduates are observed to prevail:
- Department of Agriculture -
- 4 year degree programme:
 - 90 per cent completion rate;
 - Sierra Leonean graduates 70 per cent of total graduates 1971 to 1979;
 - 2-year certificate programme:
 - 68 per cent completion;
 - Sierra Leonean graduates 80 per cent of total graduates 1971 to 1979.
- Department of Education -
- 4 year degree programme:
 - 95 per cent completion rate;
 - Sierra Leonean graduates 87 per cent of total graduates 1971 to 1979.
 - 3 year high teachers certificate programme:
 - 70 per cent completion rate;
 - Sierra Leonean graduates 90 per cent of total graduates 1971 to 1979.

- (3) For the Milton Margai Teachers College, 3 year programme leading to the Higher Teacher Certificate, a completion rate of 92 per cent is assumed. Sierra Leoneans are expected to constitute 92 per cent of total graduates, 1971 to 1979.
 - (4) At the primary teacher college, all students are assumed to be Sierra Leoneans. The completion rate for the 3-year programme is expected to be 94 per cent.
 - (5) At the technical/vocational institutes, all students are assumed to be Sierra Leoneans. For lack of any information, a 100 per cent completion rate is assumed to prevail for the students in these institutions.
83. List of students on government scholarship, other than teacher training students for the years 1976-1979. Ministry of Education, Freetown.
 84. Colclough, C. Manpower Planning in developing countries: some problems. Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1971.
 85. Funna, Dr. J.S.A. quoted in the Courier, No. 54, March-April 1979, p. 35, Vol. 1.
 86. Hollister, Robinson. Manpower problems and policies in sub-Saharan Africa. International Labour Review, 99, 1969, pp. 515-532.
 87. Op. cit., p. 517.
 88. See particularly, the evidence given by Turner, A.A. Wages trends, wages policies and collective bargaining: the problem for underdeveloped countries. Cambridge, 1965.
 89. In Sierra Leone, it was recorded by the Public Service Commission that between 1973 and 1978, 40 out of every 100 applicants for appointments in the administrative service were secondary school teachers.
 90. Compare for example the age-earnings profile for the United Kingdom provided by Mark Blaug. An introduction to the economics of education. London, 1970, pp. 24-28.
 91. Ghai, D.P. Analytical aspect of an income policy for Kenya. Discussion Paper No. 50, Institute for Development Studies, University College, Nairobi, May 1967, p. 11.
 92. Ulman, L. Labour mobility and international wage structure in the post-war United States. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 79, Feb. 1965, p. 74.

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94. Ulman, op. cit., p. 76.
95. Ulman, op. cit., p. 77.
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97. Becker, G.S. Investment in human capital: a theoretical analysis. Journal of Political Economy, LXX, Part 2, October 1962, p. 9-49.
98. Colclough, C. Education expansion or change - some choices for Central and Southern Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 12, Sept. 1974, pp. 459-470.
99. Carnoy, Martin. Education as cultural imperialism. Stamford University Centre for Economic Studies, 1974, David MacKay Company, Inc., N.Y., p. 78-155.
100. Dumont, Rene. False start in Africa. Sphere Books, London, 1968, p. 72.
101. Dumont, Rene, op. cit., p. 75.
102. Ministry of Education White Paper on Educational Policy, Government Printer, Freetown, 1970.
103. Dumont, Rene, op. cit., p. 75.
104. Students and institutions interviewed and visited during field work of the study, September 1978.
105. The National Development Plan 1974/75-1978/79, p. 244.
106. An expatriate employer interviewed in Freetown, Sierra Leone, October, 1978.
107. Quoted in Robert Brown's Report on the Manpower Situation in Sierra Leone - "Academic Development Plan", p. 18, paragraph 53.
108. Government Statement on Africanisation, Sessional Paper No. 4, 1959, Government Printer, Freetown.
109. Callaway, Archibald. Problem of youth unemployment in Africa. Insight, No. 15, Jan. 1967.
110. Annual Examination Results of the University of Sierra Leone, Government Gazettes, July 1977, 1978 and 1979.

111. Edstron, Judith, op. cit., p. 6.
112. Ministry of Education Annual Report, 1975, Government Printer, Freetown.
113. By the end of the plan period, roughly 68 per cent of secondary and 56 per cent of primary school teachers will be qualified.
114. Blaug, Mark. Education and employment problems in developing countries, I.L.O. Office, Geneva, 1973, p.24.
115. Harbison, Frederick. Human resources development planning in modernising societies. International Labour Review, March 1962, LXXXV(5), pp. 435-458.
116. Ibid., p. 443.
117. Ibid., p. 443.
118. Government Statement on Africanisation, Sessional Paper No. 4, 1959, p. 8.
119. Investment in Education - The Report of the Commission on Post-School Certificate and Higher Education in Nigeria. Nigeria Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos, 1960, Government Printer, p. 21.
120. Hollister, Robinson, op. cit., p. 515.
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138. Cf. C. Smith, Okura Nagatsewe and the technologists. In: Selbey, A.M. and D.H. (eds.) Personality and Japanese history. Los Angeles, 1970.
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146. In 1968, the four mining companies, DELCO (British owned), S.L.S.T. (British), Sierra Rutile (American) and SIEROMCO (Swiss owned) joined to form a common technical programme but failed on the ground of technological variations.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS.

Between the end of World War II and the independence of African nations, there was a plethora of studies examining the extent and determinants of similarities and contrasts between urban and rural life style but little research dealing with the income of population living in urban centres.¹ Similarly, there have been an increasing number of books describing both the pattern of success in educational institutions and occupational aspiration or expectations of the student population, but few articles analysing the actual occupational destinations of school leavers.²

By the same token, there have been a few studies dealing with the attitudes of the African workers and their patterns of associations both within and without their places of employment but a dearth of studies investigating the contrast in working conditions between the expatriate employees and their African counterparts in both the public and the private sectors in terms of pay, opportunities for advancement, etc. In other words, the employment policies of the colonial governments and foreign-owned enterprises, and the reactions of organized labour and nationalist movements against such practices has not attracted much attention.³ In the public sector, the position is worse. There has been no serious discussion beyond newspapers, journal articles and official statements on the issues of Africanisation. In brief, it looks as if the study of Africanisation of both public and private sectors has been treated as a taboo.⁴

The problems presented by the absence of reliable published materials and the lack of up-to-date data on the field of Africanisation were compounded by the difficulties encountered during the empirical field work for the present study in Sierra Leone. Both government officials and private sector employers were in most cases unwilling to disclose or allow the researcher access to information about the size of their expatriate employment, the level of expatriate employment, their educational and occupational qualifications, the types of jobs they do, their salaries and expatriation allowances, etc. Even those who did disclose some information were in most cases out of date. Nevertheless, after many difficulties it has been possible to put together the various facets that seemed to the researcher to constitute the central themes of the Africanisation of the public and the private sectors. The purpose of this concluding chapter is therefore to isolate from the study and discuss the main problems that have tended to frustrate some of the objectives of Africanisation policies enunciated in the 1950s and 1960s for both public and private sectors, and then attempt to suggest alternative policies for improvement.

6.1 The public sector.

In the public sector, Kirk-Greene⁵ and Peter Lloyd⁶ respectively observed that in the former British West African territories, the Africanisation of the public

service, particularly the administrative service, by the mid 1960s was a matter of history. It was a fait' accompli. It was no longer a problem. These observations might have been correct if the Africanisation of the public service is only viewed from a personnel replacements perspective. That is, by 1965 more than 90 per cent of the high-level posts in the public service were held by Africans in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. But on the other hand, if the Africanisation of the public service is viewed from a social change perspective in a dynamic multi-tribal ethnic context, the evidence from this study suggests that the Africanisation of the public service is still a problem. Perhaps, what has changed is the nature of the problem. To relegate it into the realm of history is to miss an important point that any form of social change creates its own problems. The Africanisation of the public service is not an exception to this rule. It is therefore wrong to look at the Africanisation of the public service purely in quantitative terms. It is not just the simple replacement of non-Africans by Africans. It is the process of transforming a colonial type of public service into a national public service. It implies the gradual elimination of expatriate predominance at all levels in the public service and a reassessment of the machinery and the procedures to meet new functions and circumstances.

As a social change, the Africanisation of the public service has created its own problems. Prominent among them

are politics, tribalism and corruption. These are the triangular tenet of public life in post-colonial Africa. As noted in Chapter 1.2, political support and loyalty in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Black Africa is not induced by ideological motivation but by tribal or ethnic loyalty and material expectations and rewards.

As noted in the concluding section of Chapter Two, the pre-independent government's policy on the Africanisation of the public service was explicit on the principles of merit, seniority and appropriate qualifications as the basis of appointments and promotions or transfers in the public service.⁷ But the post-independence struggle for employment in the public service between the two main tribes, the Temnes and the Mendes (Table 2.10), exploited by the rivalry between the two main political parties (each with sectional and tribal supports) and a non-tribal minority clique - the Creoles, has rendered the merits, seniority principles unworkable in an independent Sierra Leone. The desire to reward tribal and political party supporters and induce more following had come to be more important and taken precedence over the merit principles and the maintenance of standards and efficiency in the civil service.

In certain government departments which became corporations after independence, appointments to these state enterprises were based on political patronage and tribal considerations. Little or no regard was given to qualifica-

tions and experience. Even where the person appointed was qualified the appointment was made in such circumstances as to leave no doubt in the mind of the appointee about the relative merits of political acceptability and qualification.⁸

Such appointments have had disastrous effects on the objects and operations of the corporations. They became instruments of political rather than economic policy (Chapter 2.7). One of the commissions that inquired into the Produce Marketing Board and other state corporations quoted a witness who said that a one-time managing director of the corporation was so politically and tribally motivated that "he did not know the difference between the office of the corporation and those of his political party."⁹

In the Civil Service, as noted in Chapter 2.9, the 1971 Republic Constitution put the power to appoint persons to hold or act in any of the following offices: Secretary to the Vice-Presidents, Secretary to the Prime Minister, Secretary to the Cabinet, Financial Secretary, all Provincial Secretaries, all Professional Heads of Government Departments, etc. including powers to make appointments on promotion, transfer from one office to another, confirm appointments and to remove persons from any such office, in the hands of the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.¹⁰ This has put almost the entire senior sector of the public service outside the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission¹¹ and thereby excluded from the principles of merit, seniority and qualifications.

The politicalization of the public service reached its peak in 1978 when Sierra Leone became a 'de jure' one-party state system of government. It was argued that the neutrality of the public service under a one-party constitution was not necessary since the interest of the party and the Civil Service would be identical. It was further argued that a public service that identified itself with the ideals and policies would implement them effectively. By the same reasoning it was also argued that the one-party state system would end the tribal and political rivalry for high-office appointments in the public service and state enterprises, etc. Accordingly, the One-Party State Constitution of 1978 allowed civil servants to freely participate in politics. In addition, it became a condition- precedent or subsequent for such persons appointed as permanent secretaries, provincial secretaries, professional heads of government departments, judges of the law courts, ambassadors, etc. to be registered members of the "Recognized Party" - the All Peoples Congress (APC).¹² However, civil servants were not allowed to hold any party office due to the demanding nature of their jobs.

The official interpretation of these changes was that in the past tribalism and party membership used to be main considerations for appointment and promotion in the public service and state enterprises, the one-party state would restore the merits, seniority and qualifications, and discipline in the Civil Service. The interpretation went further:

This does not mean that the one party would throw the Civil Service ethics into the wind; not by any means. On the contrary, the Civil servants, by identifying themselves with the Recognized Party, by participating in politics through exercising their democratic rights should take pains to ensure that they do nothing which will reflect adversely on the public service as a whole.¹³

This statement of intentions and objectives justifying the introduction of the one-party state system of government sounds good on paper and rhetoric. But in substance and realization, the evidence from this study (Chapter 2.8) showed that the ideals of the Party Constitution in connection with Civil Service appointments and promotions were just political rhetoric. As late as 1979, barely one year after the introduction of the One-Party Constitution, allegations that appointments and promotions in the senior grades of the public service on sectional and tribal grounds were still made against the government (Chapter 2.8). The validity of these allegations has been discussed in Chapter 2.8. What is important in the present discussion is the persistence of such allegations one year after the introduction of the one-party state with the promises made by it. The fact is, as pointed out in Chapter 1.2, political parties in Black Africa are a conglomeration of diverse tribal, ethnic and sectional interest groups with personal, tribal, ethnic and sectional ambitions. In recent

years, the formation of 'Descendants Associations' as pressure or interest groups at district levels¹⁴ are examples of these aspects of sectional interest. Even within the same party these interest groups exist and consideration for appointments to the cabinet are based on a variety of interests and personal loyalty to the leadership. In the same vein, appointments to some posts in the public service, such as the Establishment Secretary and the Secretary to the President were made to reflect these interest groups at a district level. It is therefore illusory to hope that the introduction of the one-party state would restore the lofty ideals of the pre-independence Africanisation policies. In fact, even within the one party context, mistrust, suspicions and rivalry exist among its most senior members.

Born out of these ethnic, tribal and sectional struggles for employment in both the Civil Service and state corporations is the bastard child of corruption at all levels of public life. Some of the people interviewed rated bribery and corruption as equal to tribalism as a social force destructive of national development in general and of the success of the public enterprises and the maintenance of standards in the Civil Service in particular. A host of the other negative factors discussed in section 6.1 could be said to hang or converge on bribery and corruption. Of course, it is not possible to state in statistical terms or inferences the magnitude of bribery and

corruption in public life in Sierra Leone. But personal experience and the experiences of people interviewed during the field work in Sierra Leone suggest that bribery features in employment and staff management, when initial employment and future promotions have to be bought; it features in the award of contracts, in the administration of local purchase orders (L.P.O.), etc., in public investments, decisions, etc.¹⁵ In the state enterprises like the Electricity Corporation, Transport Corporation, Port Authority, to name the three leaders, the recent Reports of Commissions of Inquiries into activities of these enterprises are most revealing. In the Civil Service, particularly the administrative sector, charges that members of the Public Service Commission were receiving financial bribes from applicants for appointment into the administrative service, that administrative officers posted as provincial secretaries and district officers have to pay monthly bribes to the Establishment Secretary, Secretary to the President, etc. if they are to stay in their posts; that to be recommended for promotion you have to bribe your Head of the department and for promotion, the Establishment Secretary and the Secretary to the President, etc. Again, as stated earlier, it is equally difficult to establish the substance of these charges of briberies and corruptions in the Civil Service. But the actual behaviour of these "successors to the colonial expatriates" whom Fannon¹⁶ calls "the nouveau riche, the national bourgeoisie", Peter Lloyd¹⁷ calls "the new elites of tropical Africa" and Nurkse¹⁸ calls "the

opinion leaders", as reflected by their life style and high consumption patterns relative to their earnings, would leave no doubt to anybody that there are substances to these charges of bribery and corruption made against these men. However, the main concern here is not the existence of such practices per se, but how they have tended to frustrate the original objectives of public sector Africanisation, such as the maintenance of standards, efficiency and good discipline and the morale of the public service.

The evidence from this study suggests that the retrogression of the ideals of the Africanisation of the public sector from the merits, seniority and qualification principles to tribalism, politics and corruption and bribery has affected standards of performance, discipline and attitudes towards work in the public sector (Chapter 2.9).

The idea inherited from the colonial past that employment in the public sector is "White Man' work" is held by a large number of Sierra Leoneans. Often this is accentuated by political patronage, tribalism and bribery and corruption, and the results are quite detrimental to the best performance of the public service and the state enterprises. "'White-Man' or 'Government' work" makes it possible for one to be indolent without immediate retribution, for discipline to be remote and circuitous, for tenure and promotion to be unaffected by efficiency and productivity. Even in cases where attempts to apply sanctions for acts of indiscipline, political interference always intervened on

the grounds of unfair victimization (Chapter 2.9 and Table 2.11). The problem is, as one interviewee in the study (2.9) pointed out, ". . . it is difficult to enforce disciplinary measures and to seem equitable when those who administer these measures are themselves not disciplined." The very act of receiving a bribe from a junior officer for promotion or transfer to another department where the opportunities for corrupt practices are greater undermines the power and authority of the senior officer to exercise control over his department. Under these circumstances discussed above, the public service as an instrument of development is weakened and incompetent to live up to its expectations. The question is, what can be done in order to reverse this situation within the context of the one-party state system of government?

There are no easy solutions to this problem. In the state enterprises three examples were cited where the government was forced to take retrograde actions of de-Africanisation. But it was a stop-go policy in the extreme (Chapter 2.7). They are not feasible in the Civil Service; to do so will be politically self-defeating and will run counter to the objectives of the Africanisation of the public sector, discussed in Chapter 2.2. Perhaps the establishment of a commission or an ombudsman for public complaints to be charged with the responsibility to receive and investigate complaints from affected civil servants of all grades and the general public on the conduct of the

public service with respect to the discharge of their duties to the public as a whole. Zambia has a similar set-up but under the Office of the President who also happens to be the leader of the only Zambian political party.¹⁹ Under such conditions the decisions of the commission or ombudsman would undoubtedly not be free from political influences. In Sierra Leone, to follow the Zambian pattern would automatically put the ombudsman or the commission under the grip of the Secretary to the President and thus destroy his independence. The other alternative is to set up an independent machinery within which the commission for public complaints or the ombudsman operates. This will of course increase the bureaucratic control structures in the public service with the attending problems of staffing, and would perhaps become equally corrupt like the Public Service Commission and the Immigration Quota Committee (Chapters 4.41 and 5.4). However, the choice has to be made between these two probable evils. Neither of them is strong enough to reject the proposal. It is better than not doing anything. At least it will provide a safety valve through which dissatisfied civil servants and the general public can vent their feelings, even if nothing is seen to be done.

In the state corporations, the Nigerian example is worth following. The establishment of a Public Enterprise Commission (PEC) as the counterpart of the Public Service Commission. It will be responsible for the appointment, transfer, and dismissal of senior personnel for all public

enterprises in the country. The board members of each enterprise will be left with the other functions of the enterprise, excluding the appointment of senior staff with an income above Le 3,000 per annum. The responsibility to appoint the Public Enterprise Commission would rest with the President, but its chairman must not be a retired civil servant as is usually the case with the Public Service Commission. The chairman and the other members of the commission should be people of high and reputable public standing chosen from the business community. However, like the proposal for the establishment of the commission or ombudsman for public complaints, it will be difficult to guarantee that the Public Enterprises Commission will not fall into the ills of politics, tribalism and bribery and corruption. But in the light of the present position, it is worth the risk.

Finally, it must again be noted that even if these proposals are accepted and implemented, they are by themselves not sufficient to solve the problems discussed above; mere institutional changes are not enough. They require strong political leadership and the will to change them. Of course one cannot be definitive on what would happen if nothing is done to reverse the situation. But experience in Nigeria showed that the 1966 military coups which eventually led to the outbreak of the civil war between 1967 and 1970 was the result of political, tribal and sectional discrimination over employment in the federal public sector. In

Liberia, the military take-over by Sergeant Doe in 1980 was attributed to similar problems discussed above. They might be of greater magnitude in Liberia than in Sierra Leone, but if the present state of indiscipline in the public sector continues, the likelihood of a military take-over in Sierra Leone cannot be ruled out. Sierra Leone's public service was once described as the best to be inherited from the colonial rule in Africa in terms of discipline, high-level of performance, and the observance of the principles of merit, seniority and qualifications. But in the light of the evidence presented in this study, this description no longer holds true after 20 or more years of Africanisation policies. Tribalism, nepotism, ethnic, political and sectional interests, and bribery and corruption have taken the places of those principles as the basis for appointments and promotions in the public sector. This explains the older generation of public servants nostalgia for the 'good old colonial days' when discipline, promotion by merit, seniority and experience was the order of the day and not by who knows you. This may also explain why among other things private sector expatriate employers are paying lip service to Africanisation policies.

6.2 The private sector.

The problems discussed in the last section are the aftermath of Africanisation. They are the result of the socio-political context within which the public service

operates in Black Africa. In the private sector the problems are not the aftermath, they are preventive to Africanisation and much more complex and difficult to tackle. The employment policies of foreign-owned firms discussed in Chapter 3 presented some dilemmas to the Sierra Leone Government's Africanisation policies, which might not necessarily be solved by references to other African countries which have passed through the same process and experiences. The presence of expatriate personnel in a firm has direct effect on the occupational attainment of African workers. It restricts the access of local wage earners to managerial functions and hence prevents them from exerting any major degree of control over their own economic, technical and social future (Chapter 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7). But the presence of expatriates as pointed out in Chapter 3.2 also seems to lead to the adoption of high wage policy. Thus, the meaning of the concept of Africanisation in the private sector is twofold: it corresponds to an increased individual occupational mobility regardless of earnings, and as such hinges on a distribution of political power; but it also implies a more equitable allocation of rewards derived from work and this focuses mostly on a redistribution of economic power which in this case does not include the ownership of capital.

Clearly, the differential stress placed on a redistribution of economic as opposed to political power has distinct implications. A first view of Africanisation

stressed the need to develop African owned business (that is, ownership indigenisation - Introduction to Part II), and more specifically the need to stimulate intermediate types of enterprises designed to erode the tension arising from the co-existence of large-scale foreign-run organizations and traditional oriented commercial and agricultural activities. As against this first view of Africanisation, a second model recognized implicitly the positive influence of bureaucratic multi-national organisations, on national integration and economic development, and correspondingly aimed merely at increasing the number of African workers engaged in managerial and high-level technical activities within such organizations.

Although these two models, as pointed out in the introduction to Part II of the study, are not mutually exclusive; they rely on distinct theoretical constructs. In the first perspective, one assumes similarities not only between the current situation in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in some African countries, and the position of some European nations in the last century, but also between the respective development patterns. Thus, development is seen as following a 'push' model, resulting mainly from forces operating within the system itself. Conversely, in the second perspective, one emphasises the implications attached to the diffusion of the organizational forms currently prevailing in more industrialised societies. Development is thus seen as following a 'pull' pattern, and hence as being primarily dependent on forces operating outside the local system.

However, the dilemmas that the Sierra Leone Government confronted with respect to the definition and implementation of Africanisation policies are not only theoretical but political as well. Firstly, the Government must determine the extent to which industrialisation may modify the current distribution of political and economic power, the development of various types of modern enterprises in different parts of the country affects not only the distribution of active population between urban and rural areas but also the level of resources of their respective inhabitants. As these changes are associated with the development of tension among regions and their inhabitants, the government may be tempted to favour the development of small-scale African-owned enterprises. But if such a strategy prevents the negative effects of social and ethnic differentiation, it may also slow down overall economic development and limit interaction between the local economy and international markets.

Secondly, if the government advocates for industrialisation of the country, it must choose among the variety of strategies attached to the notion of Africanisation. In one perspective what counts is a mere change in the system of allocation of the profits accruing to modern activities. The government is anxious to facilitate the emergence of technically developed enterprises in order to enhance the size of the "pie" to be shared. In brief, this particular perspective asserts that development comes first and that

Africanisation, that is an increase in income per capita, is the offspring of development and industrialisation. But an increase in the size of the pie is not necessarily associated with an increase in each one of the shares assigned to various social groups. Alternatively, the government might feel that a mere redistribution of profits is insufficient and that for both economic and political reasons an increasing number of Africans must gain access to top positions and managerial roles within the modern foreign-owned enterprises. Although this strategy is likely to decrease invidious comparisons between expatriates and their African counterparts, it is likely to accentuate social differentiation among African workers and hence to enhance the possibility of conflict among them (Chapter 4.2).

This study has shown, however, that successive governments in Sierra Leone had tended to follow a mixture of the three strategies. They intervened quite directly in the functioning of the labour market by one or a combination of the following: by restricting the employment of expatriates through legislation such as the Non-Citizen (Registration, Immigration, Expulsion) Act No. 14 of 1965 (Chapter 4.41) and the Expatriate Payroll Tax Levy Act 1972. The government can impose minimum wage standards or by virtue of being the biggest employer, make unilateral wage increases even if its standards may be lower than the basic needs of the wage-earning population. At the same time it has shown its commitment to the policy of Africanisation by

giving preferential fiscal treatment to foreign investors who were willing to train their African personnel to perform managerial and highly technical functions (Chapter 4.3).

In sum, the Sierra Leone Government wish to continue to import foreign capital and skills especially those in short supply but both capital and skills were to be restricted to certain areas. They were to be kept out of areas where indigenous capital and skills had already demonstrated their capacity to meet existing needs and growth requirements (Chapter 4.4). In areas of fundamental importance to the national economy, foreign capital and skills would have to play an increasingly subordinate role. Foreign skills were expected to provide services which local personnel could not provide.

This study has found general acceptance within the expatriate business community of the government's Africanisation policy. There is no doubt that much progress has been made in recent years in replacing expatriates with Sierra Leonean nationals, but mainly in functions which have to do with local personnel (3.4). Although it is difficult to measure the degree of responsiveness to Africanisation policy by individual firms or companies, it is found in this study that there are wide differences in responsiveness between industries and between firms within the same industry. It depends on the home country, the technology of the industry and the ownership of the company. For instance, British owned or based enterprises in Sierra

Leone were more responsive to Africanisation than American or French owned, and European and American owned firms were more readily responsive to private sector Africanisation than Indians or Lebanese owned. Similarly, responsiveness to Africanisation is less in family-owned businesses than in public-owned enterprises (Chapter 3.4 and Table 3.9) etc. The functional areas in which the least progress in Africanisation has been made is in production, i.e. mining, and in general jobs which required technical skills and experience (Table 3.8a and 3.8b). In most industries supervisory and middle-level non-technical jobs have been extensively Africanised. Relatively little Africanisation has taken place at senior line managerial levels (see Tables 3.5, 3.8a and 3.8b).

There are, however, a number of factors or problems which this study has found inhibitive to the success of Africanisation policies. Some of them are peculiar to the Africanisation of the private sector, others are general to both sectors. Among these that are general to both sectors are politics, tribalism, bribery and corruption and stealing were considered by expatriate employers to be among the highest inhibiting factors to their responsiveness to Africanisation of certain senior management positions, particularly those which have to do with financial management and perhaps personnel (Chapter 3.5). These problems have already been discussed in the last section (6.1) on the public sector. They are part of the supplied determined

problems which cannot easily be solved by any Africanisation policies however sound they may be. As stated in the last section, they are the product of the social setting in which the economy operates. But unlike the public service, and to some extent the state enterprises, evidence from this study suggests that foreign-owned enterprises could not afford the luxury of these dysfunctional social ills. As some expatriate employers pointed out: "Our employment policies are based on merits and competence. We employ those men and women who could contribute to the overall objectives of our enterprises - profits. But not on the basis of politics and tribalism, etc."

A second factor considered by all private sector employers to be visibly most crucial in the success of Africanisation policy is the manpower supply factor. It is also a problem common to both sectors. As stated in Chapter 5.1, the success of Africanisation policies and the rate at which it progresses depends largely on the availability of the manpower supply "of the right skill mix, of the right number at the right time and in the right place" (Chapter 5.1). But evidence from the study suggests that there was and still is a manpower supply shortage. The Manpower Survey Report of Robert Brown²¹ showed that Sierra Leone at independence faced four major manpower problems which were inhibitive to Africanisation, particularly in the private sector: a scarcity of skilled and educated manpower, a surplus of unskilled labour beyond the

number of wage earning jobs which the economy could provide, attitudes which reflected the values of the colonial and traditional pasts, an extreme dependence on expatriate manpower at most levels of skilled employment in the public and in the private sectors (Tables 5.1 and 5.2).

However, since independence in 1961, the country has made particularly tremendous efforts to expand and to improve its educational facilities at all levels of the educational system - primary, secondary, technical, teacher training, and university. Enrolment in each of these sectors had more than doubled in the past two decades (Chapter 5.3). But notwithstanding these achievements Sierra Leone is still heavily reliant on foreign skills and capital for its development programmes in both the public and private sectors of the economy. In 1978, it was estimated that a total of 2,500 non-Sierra Leonean nationals were employed in the economy. The majority of them were deployed as technicians in both sectors: in the public sector from rural farm instructor to managing director of a Rural Integrated Agricultural Development Programme, etc;²² in the private sector, from foreman to managing director, etc. (Table 3.8a); in the education system, from primary school teacher to university professor etc. (Table 2.8). However, the greatest shortage in supply-requirements terms relative to other categories of manpower is at the mid-level which is the most critical for any successful implementation of Africanisation policy (Table 5.17).

Several reasons had been advanced to explain why skilled manpower showed the greatest shortage relative to its requirements (Table 5.17). Among them were: social attitudes towards non-white-collar jobs. The education system inherited from the colonial period and improved after independence did not produce the right manpower mix, the emphasis was on academic qualifications other than technical, because it was more rewarding to hold an academic qualification than a technical one. An implicit causal factor in the manpower supply problem is the structure of wages developed and inherited from the colonial period. Wages skewed towards academic qualifications instead of being determined by the forces of supply and demand in the labour market. They therefore constituted a mal-function in the labour market. A third problem akin to manpower supply is the manpower development. As it has been pointed out in Chapter 5.4, the function of formal education is to produce "educated trainable people".²³ It was also pointed out in Chapter 5.1 that the success of Africanisation policy would depend crucially on the appropriate training and utilization of local skilled manpower. Clearly, one of the areas in which a large proportion of the non-nationals employed in the private sector (Table 3.8a) are deployed in skilled occupations in such activities as the building and construction trades, repair services, machine operators, etc. These activities are also those most likely to be severely disturbed by an

unplanned Africanisation policy. While these occupations need considerable judgement and skills, their requirements in respect of formal education are low, ranging from a minimum of three years of secondary education to two or three years of post-secondary training.

But experience and evidence from the study showed that a properly organized training programmes are expensive and often elaborate affairs. In industries where the typical firm is large (such as in the mining industry), the number of firms is small (4) and enjoys a large measure of protection from foreign competition (i.e., the mining or the manufacturing of cigarettes), a firm can mount an ambitious training programme without having to worry greatly that it will lose sales if it passes on training costs to consumers, or having to fear that it will lose trained staff to a competitor who did not have to incur similar expenses. On the other hand, in industries where the number of firms is large, the typical firm is small, and competition is keen, few individual firms would care to incur substantial training costs (even if they had the financial resources for doing so), unless they know that their competitors are doing likewise. In any case, such a course may have a minimum efficient scale which make them too large and costly for any individual firm to contemplate.

Under both circumstances the government has two policy options from which to choose:

The first option and its policy implications has already been discussed under Chapter 5.5. However, for the purpose of emphasis, two of them need to be re-stated here. It requires direct government intervention in the labour market to correct the mal-functioning caused by the wages and salary system in the country. This it can do either of the following ways: (a) being the biggest employer of all categories of manpower in the country, it can break the link between an individual's level of educational attainment and his level of remuneration.²⁴ That is, if the country requires the services of a City and Guild Certificate holder in plumbing, the country must be prepared to pay him more than a university degree holder in history whose services are less required by the country. This would have the twin objectives of channelling manpower resources to those occupations where they are most productive and required (Chapter 5.5); (b) being the sole financier of all educational institutions, the government can directly or indirectly control the number of students pursuing different courses of studies either through selective scholarship awards at home and abroad, by asking those who opt to study chosen fields of studies of their own to meet the full costs of their education at home as well as abroad, or by diverting resources from those areas of the education system which showed some signs of over-production of certain manpower categories and skills. For example, if the university sector of the education system

shows signs of over-production of graduates, resources should be transferred from the university to other sectors of the education system where there are signs of under-production, eg. technical or teacher education. Of the two proposals, it is highly unlikely that the government would accept the first for the same reasons already discussed in Chapter 5.5. Even if it does accept it, it is doubtful that it will be implemented by the administrative service whose members stand to lose most. With the second proposal, the evidence is that the government is moving towards it. There have been some conscious efforts to plan educational expenditures in line with the manpower needs requirements of the economy as a whole. Of course, all these proposals, to be accepted and successfully implemented, require a very strong political leadership and which is believed to be present in a one-party state system of government in Sierra Leone.

The second policy option is based on the evidence presented in Table 3.11, which shows that the manpower needs requirements of some industries are specific to those industries. They cannot be met by the policy proposals made above. It is therefore considered prudent for the government to enter into discussion with private sector employers on an industry-by-industry basis:

(a) to evaluate the success or otherwise of existing training schemes, preferably on a cost-benefit basis with a view to improving future performances in this field;

(b) to discuss for each industry or skill group whether training programmes are most appropriately mounted within each firm, within some firms acting as training institutions for the whole industry, within institutions of vocational/technical education in Sierra Leone, in West Africa or overseas;

(c) to agree on appropriate methods of financing such courses which serve several firms with a view to incorporating such agreement into appropriate legislation. The idea of a training levy on each firm to be disbursed by an industry-wide organisation, but it is suspected that in the case of some industries, government assistance is likely to be necessary.

It is believed that such programmes should be run under the control of each industry, with an appropriately strengthened inspectorate of the Ministry of Education to approve syllabuses and to see to it that appropriate standards are maintained.

A fourth problem which is equally important but largely neglected as an inhibiting factor of Africanisation concerns the utilization and promotion of already available skilled manpower. Evidence from this study seems to suggest that the following situations existing in some foreign-owned firms:

(a) Sierra Leonean nationals, though willingly engaged by firms in junior professional, managerial and executive positions, are not being given the chances to

acquire the knowledge, experience and judgement to fit them for promotion to more senior posts; and that firms are hoarding capable Sierra Leoneans whom they are not putting into good use (Chapter 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7);

(b) that where Sierra Leonean nationals in junior management positions are acquiring the skills and aptitudes needed for promotion, they are nevertheless constantly being passed over in favour of non-nationals (Chapter 3.6);

(c) that Sierra Leonean nationals are being both hired and promoted, many of them are holding shadow-posts with no real power (Chapter 3.7).

These practices do in fact commonly occur. They constitute serious barriers to effective Africanisation of high-level posts, and are wasteful of scarce manpower resources. It is suggested that the government should ascertain the existence and extent of the prevalence of such practices in the private sector, and find ways and means by which such practices can be discontinued. This might not be an easy thing to do, for expatriate employers might interpret it to be an industrial police force swooping into the ruining of the private sector employment policies. But it can be done by either inspection of training standards and quality from the Ministry of Education suggested earlier, or through Factory Inspectors from the Ministry of Labour, etc.

A fifth problem akin to the last and equally inhibitive to effective Africanisation is "Window-dressing Africanisation." Evidence from this study showed that there is a tendency for certain companies to employ retired African public servants to enhance the company's interests. In some cases, the Africans in the top posts tend to feel insecure and become suspicious of their fellow Africans so that they prefer to have only non-Africans around them for fear that other Africans might take their jobs. This is particularly true of Africans who have been put in top posts for the purpose of window-dressing Africanisation. It is therefore suggested that this tendency should be checked and stopped by the government by using the same method suggested above.

A sixth problem of greater magnitude is that relating to family-owned businesses. Numerically, the majority of commercial firms in Sierra Leone are small retail businesses owned and run by Lebanese and Indian families. Opinions varied on the choice of policy on the question of family-owned businesses. Some members of the public suggested that if such families are prepared to identify themselves with the country by taking up Sierra Leonean citizenship and by investing their capital in the country, they should be permitted to stay. If not, they should not be permitted to continue in their present form.

Other members of the public have pointed out that Africanisation is going to be very difficult with the

presence of such a large number of family-owned businesses, and such businesses will not find it easy to throw out their kith and kin for the sake of Africanisation. It was therefore proposed by the same people interviewed that in order to solve this problem, the government should set a time limit during which all these family businesses should become public. However, one would have thought that before a time limit is set, the government should first conduct a survey of family-owned businesses with a new definition of what constitutes a small business. The present official definition of a small business is "any business unit employing less than six people for a wage" (see Introduction to Part II). New definition based on the following parameters: annual turnover, the amount of capital employed etc. in the business, would be better indicators, because a family business might be employing less than six people while its annual sales turnover or the capital invested in it, are greater than in a similar family-owned business employing six or more paid people. It is therefore suggested that only after a new official definition on what constitutes a small family-owned business should a time limit be set for such businesses which would no longer be qualified as small, be required to declare their businesses public.

Finally, a seventh problem contingent to those discussed above, part of which has previously been discussed in Chapter 4.41, is the implementation of the two policies discussed in Chapters 4.4 and 4.5. Even if all the

inhibiting factors to Africanisation discussed above are removed, evidence from this study suggests that Sierra Leone, like many other African countries, would continue to need some expatriate personnel in some fields for a number of years to come; that these expatriates will continue to be needed despite the very great expansion and improvement in the educational facilities.

In fact, some economists pointed out that if the Sierra Leonean economy developed as planned, the employment opportunities created by economic growth will fully absorb all the skilled Sierra Leonean nationals that the education system will produce (see Table 5.17), and that this alone will lead to rapid Africanisation of the private sector of the economy. While this latter assessment may appear to be correct on paper, in practice it has not worked out that way. Experience shows that the establishment of every new industry is always accompanied by new applications made to the Immigration Department for expatriate immigration quotas for Lebanese, Indian, Europeans or Americans who are needed to run the new industry on the pretext that no Sierra Leonean national with the requisite qualifications and job experience is available, (Tables 4.2, 4.3). Even when recruiting locally for such industries, the investors kith and kin (who are always non-Africans) are often given the best jobs even where suitable Africans are available.

Thus, in spite of the recent growth of the economy and the creation of new job opportunities, that has come

with it. The employment of Africans particularly in managerial and executive positions, has not kept pace with increased employment opportunities created by economic growth (compare Tables 3.1 and 3.6). This has obviously put into question the effectiveness of the Africanisation policies that have been pursued so far.

In the light of available evidence discussed in this study, should current Africanisation policies be continued in spite of their apparent failure to achieve their objectives? The answer is not difficult to find but for the Government to accept it is another matter. But it will serve no useful purpose to continue with the present Africanisation policies because evidence from this study suggests that they have not only failed to achieve their objectives, i.e. increased employment opportunities for educated Africans in the private sector, but have also been counter-productive. They have, in the past, been partly responsible for the closure of foreign-owned companies. For example, the closure of the Sierra Leone Development Company in 1975 was partly attributed to the Government's Africanisation policy (Chapter 1.4, page 43). In addition, the implementation machinery of current Africanisation policies, particularly the expatriate quota system, has proved to be incompetent, ineffective, corrupt, and administratively complex and difficult to enforce (4.5). With regard to the payroll tax on expatriate labour, undoubtedly it will in the short run

raise Government revenue as Table 4.4 would show. But its effectiveness as an instrument of Africanisation is difficult to see. In fact, one can categorically conclude that the use of Fiscal Policy in Africanisation is nothing more than a revenue raising exercise rather than any serious attempt to control the employment of expatriates in the private sector. Moreover, as a cost item, the payroll tax on expatriate labour, per se, does not constitute a significant cost item to deter further expatriate employment in foreign-owned companies. More importantly, the majority of foreign companies employing a substantial number of expatriate and African personnel are engaged in either import-substituting, manufacturing or export-oriented mining industries with some degree of Government protection from foreign competition for the former (Chapter 4.4). An increase in the relative cost of expatriate employment will definitely be passed to the consumer at home and abroad in the form of higher prices. This would have a reversible two-fold effect on the economy: first, domestically, it is inflationary and would lead to increased demand for more wages in the export sector of the economy; secondly, abroad, it will affect the competitiveness of these companies in the world market. The net effect of these is a decline in employment opportunities for Africans either in the event of the closure of a foreign company, or employers would resort to labour-substituting devices through the intro-

duction of capital intensive method of production which in fact will only result in increased employment for skilled expatriate labour.

And finally, as has already been pointed out in Chapter 1.4, the degree to which a government can pursue its private sector Africanisation policies without losing the confidence of foreign investors depends on the size and strength of the economy. Nigeria, it was cited, with a prosperous expanding economy could afford to pursue a more vigorous Africanisation policy without losing the confidence of foreign investors. But Sierra Leone, with a small and stagnant economy, cannot even continue with its present Africanisation policies without further adverse effect on its economy. It will have a pay off effect in the overall employment in the country if the government abandons its present Africanisation policies and replaces it with more persuasion. It is highly likely that the government would object to this proposal for three main reasons already discussed: first, the membership of the various Immigration Expatriate Quota Committees confers financial and political powers on individual members with access to the business community, particularly the Minister of Trade and Industry and the President who holds ultimate power on the expatriate quota issues. Any proposal which seeks to abandon the immigration control policy as an instrument of Africanisation policy will undoubtedly be resisted by the government.

The three case studies cited in Chapter 4.3 are illustrative of the reasons why the government may not accept this proposal. The second is that taxation on expatriate labour brings additional revenue to the government's annual budget; to discontinue with it means a loss of that item of revenue. And the third is that while the government would accept the fact that current Africanisation policies have not been effective and are open to malpractices, they will argue that in the absence of such policies the number of expatriates employed in the private sector would have been more. This, of course, is true; but who benefits? It is the educated few at the expense of the majority of the working population. Charles Elliott has found in some independent African states that, among other things, Africanisation has resulted in more increased employment opportunities for high-level manpower than for overall employment in the economies of each of these countries.²⁵ Sierra Leone is not an exception to this, and it is the writer's belief that Sierra Leone would have more to gain in terms of increased employment opportunities for its working population if current Africanisation policies were abandoned.

In conclusion, the objectives and scope of this study had already been stated in the introduction to this study. Throughout this study one theme has persisted: the problem of Africanisation and manpower development are closely inter-related and of fundamental importance to Sierra Leone as well as to other African states with similar colonial

experience. Their importance has been underlined by the attention paid to them in national development plans, in government legislations, decrees, and in policy statements by government leaders. But in spite of the importance attached to them, and in spite of the great many people affected by them, there has been very little success in their implementation because there has been a serious lack of reliable information in the country on which to base policy decisions. This study (notwithstanding the problems encountered during the archival and empirical work) has attempted to shed light on this subject for future policy makers.

CHAPTER 6

Notes and References

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3. See Chapters 2.7 and 3.2 of the present study.
4. Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. The new African administrator. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. , 1972, pp.92-107.
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6. Lloyd, P.C.: Africa in social change. Penguin African Library, Reprint 1975, p. 148.
7. Government Statement on Africanisation Sessional Paper No. 4, Government Printer, Freetown, 1959, p. 1.
8. See the Percy Davis Commission Report on the Management of the Produce Marketing Board, 1967, Government Printer, Freetown.
9. Ibid., Government Printer.
10. P.S.C. Annual Report 1974, Government Printer, Freetown, p. 6.
11. It may be recalled that the Public Service Commission was and still is a statutory body established in 1954, charged with the responsibilities to determine the criteria for appointment and promotion of all categories of employees in the public service of Sierra Leone (see Chapter 2.1).
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13. 'We Yone' Publication, A.P.C. Official Party Newspaper, Freetown, 1965.
14. Prominent among these descendent associations is the Kansia District Descendents' Association to which belong the President, Second Vice-President, Foreign Minister, Secretary to the President, etc.
15. The reports of the various commissions of inquiry such as: (1) Commission of Inquiry into Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board and on Palm Oil by Beoko Bettles (1968); (2) Commission of Inquiry into the Activities of the Freetown City Council, 1968, by Percy Davies; (3) Commission of Inquiry into the Conduct of the Immigration Quota Committee, 1968, etc. Government Printer, Freetown.
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APPENDIX I

Sierra Leone

Area:

28 000 sq. miles (72 772 km²)

Population:

3 272 000 (1978)

Density:

117 per square mile (1978)

Capital:

Freetown (pop. 276 247)

Other main towns:

Makeni (26781), Bo (39371), Kenema (31458), Koidu (75846)

Official language:

English

Date of Independence:

27 April 1961

Political system:

Presidential, with a national parliament

Political party:

APC (the All People's Congress)

Head of State:

H.E. Dr Siaka P. Stevens

Currency:

Leone (EUI = Le 1.28)

GNP:

Le 726.1 million (at current prices) 1976/77

National income:

Le 590.1 million (at current prices) 1976/77

Per capita income:

Le 228.6 (GNP level) 1976/77
Le 259.1 (GDP level) 1976/77

Main products:

Diamonds, bauxite, rice, cocoa, coffee, palm kernel products

Foreign trade:

Exports (f.o.b.) Le 147 650 000 (1977)
Imports (c.i.f.) Le 186 218 000 (1976)

Main exports (Le '000) (1977)

a) Minerals:

Diamonds 61 574
Bauxite 7 886

b) Agricultural products:


Cocoa 18 100
Coffee 46 048
Palm kernels 1 379

Education:

Primary: 218 376 pupils (1976/77)
Secondary & technical: 51 564 pupils (1976/77)
Higher education: 2 985 students (1976/77)

Sierra Leone:

showing minerals, districts and provinces



1977-78 budget(1)

Revenue: Le 143.7 m (US \$ 131.6 m);
expenditure: Le 139.7 m (US \$ 127.9 m)

15.5% is earmarked for agriculture
14.8% for mining and 14.4% for trans port.

Development plan

The 1975-79 plan covers an outlay of some Le 623 m (\$ 689.1 m), of which

(1) Source: European Parliament, directorate general for research and documentation, 1978.

External trade (1973-76)

US \$ '000	1973	1974	1975	1976
Imports from:				
EEC	76 243	92 694	90 820	77 000
other	81 426	129 696	95 670	79 000
Total	157 669	222 390	186 490	156 000
Exports to:				
EEC(2)	105 176	119 473	94 450	80 000
other	26 208	26 769	34 937	32 000
Total	131 384	146 242	129 387	112 000

(2) The exports to the EEC concern principally the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

APPENDIX II

OSMAN SANKOH, PH.D. STUDENT IN MANPOWER STUDIES
BATH UNIVERSITY, U.K.

FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE PERMANENT SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF
EDUCATION: BELOW IS THE PROGRAMME OF FIELD-WORK WHILE THE
ABOVE NAMED STUDENT IS IN SIERRA LEONE.

DATE	WEEK	ACTIVITIES
7/9/78	Week 1	Report to: 1, Ministry of Education
	" "	2, Principal, Civil Service Training College
	" "	3, Secretary, Recruitment and Training
	" "	4, The Establishment Secretary
11/9/78	Week 2	Visit 1. Ministry of Education
	" "	2. Ministry of Labour
18/9/78	Week 3	3. Ministry of Works
	" "	4. Ministry of Development & Planning
	" "	5. Ministry of Trade & Industry
25/9/78	Week 4	6. Ministry of Finance
	" "	Immigration Department
2/10/78	Week 5	Office of the Public Service Commission
	" "	Establishment Secretary's Office
9/10/78	Week 6	Secretary, Recruitment & Training
16/10/78	Week 7	1. Produce Marketing Board
	" "	2. Road Transport Corporation
23/10/78	Week 8	Sierra Leone Ports Authority
	" "	Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation
30/10/78	Week 9	Sierra Leone Railways Department
	" "	Forest Industries - Kenema
6/11/70	Week 10	Progress Report to Supervisor - Brian Barrett

DATE	WEEK	ACTIVITIES
		<u>The Mining Sector</u>
13/11/78	Week 11	Sierra Leone Development Company
20/11/78	Week 12	National Diamond Mining Company (Yengema & Tongo)
27/11/78	Week 13	Bauxite Mining Company and Rutile
		<u>Manufacturing Sector</u>
4/12/78	Week 14	Sierra Leone Breweries
	" "	Aureole Tobacco Company
	" "	Sierra Leone Distilleries
11/12/78	Week 15	National Confectionery Company
	" "	S.L. Palm Kernel Oil Mill
	" "	Oxygen Manufacturing Company
		<u>COMMERCIAL HOUSES</u>
18/12/78	Week 16	Sierra Leone Oil Refinery
	" "	Shell Petroleum Company
1/1/79	Week 17	British Petroleum Company
	" "	Mobil Oil Company
		<u>BANKS - COMMERCIAL</u>
8/1/79	Week 18	Standard Bank, S.L. Ltd.
	" "	Barclays Bank Ltd.
15/1/79	Week 19	Retail Trade
22/1/78	Week 20	Progress Report to the Supervisor
29/1/79	Week 21	Visit to all Provincial and District Head Quarters
9/2/79	Week 22	DATE OF DEPARTURE TO U.K.

APPENDIX III Sierra Leone: Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices by Major Sector-
1963/64 and 1966/67-1970/71 (in Millions of Le).

Sector	1963/64	1966/67	1967/68	1968/69	1969/70	1970/71
Agriculture	82.2	94.1	96.7	101.4	101.7	107.3
Mining and quarrying	36.6	42.1	37.9	45.4	63.5	54.7
Manufacturing	12.0	15.6	14.9	16.8	18.4	17.6
Construction	7.1	8.6	8.5	10.3	13.7	14.9
Electricity, gas and water	1.1	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.8	2.5
Transport and communications	14.8	22.4	23.4	26.9	32.5	36.4
Trade and commerce	29.6	35.7	36.0	44.7	51.6	55.5
Financial institutions	12.9	18.2	19.0	20.1	23.9	25.2
Public Admin., other services	18.4	21.6	22.2	24.1	26.5	27.4
G.D.P. at factor cost	214.8	260.6	260.9	292.1	334.6	343.5
Indirect taxes net of subsidies	15.0	23.5	23.0	32.8	34.4	31.8
G.D.P. at market prices	229.8	284.1	283.9	324.9	369.0	375.3
Net factor payment abroad	-5.5	-5.4	-8.2	-8.0	-6.2	-6.7
Gross National Product at market prices	224.3	278.7	275.7	316.9	362.8	368.7
Population (000)	2,306	2,439	2,475	2,512	2,550	2,558
G.D.P. per capita (in leones)	99.7	116.5	114.7	129.3	141.2	145.0

Source: Central Statistics Office, National Accounting of Sierra Leone, 1963/64, 1960/67-1970/71.

APPENDIX IV Key for Tables 3.8 and 3.11

POSTS

General Manager/District Manager	01
Sales Manager	02
Finance Manager	03
Operations Manager	04
Chief Accountant/Accountant/Internal Auditor	05
Engineer/Analyst	06
Personnel Manager	07
Personnel Asst/Personnel Officer	08
Senior Sales Asst/Special Product Asst	09
Sales Asst/Sales Repr./Sales Execut.	10
Salesman/Sales Inspector	11
Asst Engineer/Asst. Accountant/Audit Asst.	12
Eng.-In-Trg/Distr. Asst-In-Trg/Accts Trainee	13

SUPERINTENDENTS 14

Bunkering/Installation/Depot
Terminal and Aviation
Operations Supervisor
Marine
Maintenance Asst

SUPERVISORS - TECHNICAL 15

Depot/Aviation Bunkering
Retail Equipment/Accounts

Terminal/Accounts Trainee
Warehouseman/Asst. Tugmaster
Maintenance Foreman.

SUPERVISORS - CLERICAL

16

General Duties/Invoicing/Senior
Conf. Clerk/Secretary/Conf. Sec./
Manager's Secretary/Credit Controller

JUNIOR ASSISTANTS

17

Accounts/Sales/Operations
Treasury Asst/Credit Controller/
Mechanic/Section Ad. (Analysis)/
Section Ad. (Cash)/Section Ad. (Bills)
Asst Tugmaster/Maritime Foreman/
Engineers Asst/Personnel Supt.
Nursing Sister/Fire Supt. Off.

CLERKS

18

Accounts/Cashier/Shorthand
Typist/Depot Storekeeper/Accts
Clerks II and III/Clerk/Bulk
Store Clerk/Customs Clerk

QUALIFICATIONS

NIL	00
B.A./B.Sc./B.A. (Econs)/B.Comm.	01
M.A./M.Sc./M.A. (Econs)	02
B.A. (Hons)/B.Sc. (Hons)/B.A. (Econs. Hons)	03
Ph.D.	04
H.N.D.	05
H.N.C.	06
A.M.I. Mech. E./A.M.I.C.E.	07
M.I. Mech. E.	08
C.A.	09
ACCA/M.I.C.A.	10
ACCS/A.A.I.A.	11
ACIS/	12
CIS	13
T.C./G.C.E.(O)/Sch. Cert.	14
D.P.A. Dip. Econs/Dip. Agric/	
Dip. Elect. Eng./A.C.S.M.	15
Dip. BKKeeping/Higher Secr. Dip.	16
Cort. BK.Keeping	
B.Sc. AMI Mech. Eng.	17

APPENDIX V



REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

CIVIL SERVICE REVISION OF SALARIES—1ST NOVEMBER, 1978

The conversion tables below are compiled as a result of the salary increase which came into force with effect from 1st November, 1978, as follows:—

- 25% on salaries from Le360 per annum--Le775 per annum subject to a minimum initial salary of Le540 per annum.
- 20% on salaries from Le776 per annum to Le3,783 per annum.
- 15% on salaries from Le3,784 per annum to Le5,550 per annum.
- 10% on salaries of Le5,551 and above.

SCALES		Le	Le	Le	Le	Le	Le	Le
A LOWER	Old	1,795.00	1,904.00	2,016.00	2,346.00	2,458.00	2,568.00	2,614.00
	New	2,154.00	2,285.00	2,419.00	2,815.00	2,950.00	3,082.00	3,137.00
	Old	2,721.00	2,829.00	2,936.00	3,044.00	3,168.00		
	New	3,265.00	3,395.00	3,523.00	3,653.00	3,802.00		
UPPER	Old	3,290.00	3,414.00	3,536.00	3,659.00	3,783.00		
	New	3,948.00	4,097.00	4,243.00	4,391.00	4,540.00		
B 1	Old	1,733.00	1,828.00	1,921.00	2,205.00	2,300.00		
	New	2,080.00	2,194.00	2,305.00	2,646.00	2,760.00		
2	Old	2,394.00	2,489.00	2,599.00	2,645.00	2,753.00		
	New	2,873.00	2,987.00	3,119.00	3,174.00	3,304.00		
3	Old	2,860.00	2,968.00	3,075.00	3,183.00			
	New	3,432.00	3,562.00	3,690.00	3,820.00			
4	Old	3,290.00	3,414.00	3,536.00	3,659.00	3,783.00		
	New	3,948.00	4,097.00	4,243.00	4,391.00	4,540.00		

SCALE C(T) 1-7

C (TECHNICAL) TRAINING GRADE

		Le	Le	Le	Le	Le	Le
C(T)	Old	1,031.00	1,073.00	1,123.00			
	New	1,237.00	1,288.00	1,348.00			
C(T) 1	Old	1,254.00	1,304.00	1,339.00	1,353.00	1,386.00	1,449.00
	New	1,505.00	1,565.00	1,607.00	1,624.00	1,663.00	1,739.00
2	Old	1,480.00	1,544.00	1,606.00	1,670.00		
	New	1,776.00	1,853.00	1,927.00	2,004.00		
3A	Old	1,733.00	1,811.00	1,890.00	1,969.00	2,048.00	
	New	2,080.00	2,173.00	2,268.00	2,363.00	2,458.00	
3	Old	1,733.00	1,811.00	1,890.00	2,126.00	2,221.00	
	New	2,080.00	2,173.00	2,268.00	2,551.00	2,665.00	
4	Old	2,315.00	2,410.00	2,504.00	2,599.00		
	New	2,778.00	2,892.00	3,005.00	3,119.00		
5	Old	2,645.00	2,753.00	2,860.00			
	New	3,174.00	3,304.00	3,432.00			
6	Old	2,968.00	3,075.00	3,183.00			
	New	3,562.00	3,690.00	3,820.00			
7	Old	3,290.00	3,414.00	3,536.00	3,659.00	3,783.00	
	New	3,948.00	4,097.00	4,243.00	4,391.00	4,540.00	

SCALE C (EXECUTIVE) TRAINING GRADE

C(E)		Le	Le	Le	Le	Le	Le
	Old	990.00	1,031.00	1,073.00			
	New	1,148.00	1,237.00	1,288.00			
1	Old	1,205.00	1,254.00	1,304.00	1,339.00	1,386.00	1,386.00
	New	1,446.00	1,505.00	1,565.00	1,607.00	1,624.00	1,663.00
2	Old	1,418.00	1,480.00	1,544.00	1,606.00		
	New	1,702.00	1,776.00	1,853.00	1,927.00		
3A	Old	1,670.00	1,749.00	1,828.00	1,906.00	1,985.00	
	New	2,004.00	2,099.00	2,194.00	2,287.00	2,382.00	

		<i>Le</i>	<i>Le</i>	<i>Le</i>	<i>Le</i>	<i>Le</i>	<i>Le</i>	<i>Le</i>
C(E) 3	Old	1,670.00	1,749.00	1,828.00	2,064.00	2,141.00		
	New	2,004.00	2,099.00	2,194.00	2,477.00	2,569.00		
4	Old	2,221.00	2,315.00	2,409.00	2,504.00	2,599.00		
	New	2,665.00	2,778.00	2,891.00	3,005.00	3,119.00		
5	Old	2,645.00	2,753.00	2,860.00				
	New	3,174.00	3,304.00	3,432.00				
6	Old	2,968.00	3,075.00	3,183.00				
	New	3,562.00	3,690.00	3,820.00				
7	Old	3,290.00	3,414.00	3,536.00	3,659.00	3,783.00		
	New	3,948.00	4,097.00	4,243.00	4,391.00	4,540.00		
M SCALE	Old	3,639.00	3,793.00	3,936.00	4,084.00	4,231.00	4,379.00	4,526.00
	New	4,367.00	4,416.00	4,526.00	4,697.00	4,866.00	5,036.00	5,205.00
	Old	4,674.00	4,822.00	4,969.00	5,117.00			
	New	5,375.00	5,545.00	5,714.00	5,885.00			
N SCALE	Old	477.00	504.00	531.00	559.00	585.00	612.00	639.00
	New	597.00	630.00	664.00	699.00	731.00	765.00	799.00
1	Old	667.00	693.00	693.00	710.00	743.00	775.00	
	New	834.00	869.00	877.00	888.00	929.00	969.00	
	Old	816.00	858.00	899.00	940.00	981.00	1,023.00	1,064.00
	New	979.00	1,030.00	1,079.00	1,128.00	1,177.00	1,228.00	1,277.00
2	Old	1,105.00	1,155.00	1,205.00				
	New	1,326.00	1,386.00	1,446.00				
	Old	1,254.00	1,304.00	1,339.00	1,353.00	1,386.00	1,449.00	
3	New	1,505.00	1,565.00	1,607.00	1,624.00	1,663.00	1,737.00	
	Old	1,480.00	1,544.00	1,606.00	1,670.00	1,733.00	1,811.00	1,890.00
4	New	1,776.00	1,853.00	1,927.00	2,004.00	2,080.00	2,173.00	2,268.00
	Old	1,969.00	2,048.00					
	New	2,363.00	2,548.00					
5	Old	1,654.00	1,733.00	1,811.00	2,048.00	2,126.00	2,221.00	2,315.00
	New	1,985.00	2,080.00	2,173.00	2,458.00	2,551.00	2,665.00	2,778.00
	Old	2,410.00	2,504.00					
6	New	2,892.00	3,005.00					
	Old	2,645.00	2,753.00	2,860.00	2,968.00			
7	New	3,174.00	3,304.00	3,432.00	3,561.00			
	Old	3,075.00	3,183.00	3,290.00				
8	New	3,690.00	3,820.00	3,948.00				
	Old	3,536.00	3,659.00	3,783.00				
New	Old	4,243.00	4,391.00	4,540.00				
	New							
SCALE F 1	Old	504.00	531.00	559.00	612.00	639.00	667.00	693.00
	New	630.00	664.00	699.00	765.00	799.00	834.00	869.00
	Old	693.00	710.00	743.00				
	New	877.00	888.00	929.00				
SCALE F 2	Old	784.00	825.00	866.00	908.00	949.00	990.00	1,031.00
	New	941.00	990.00	1,041.00	1,090.00	1,139.00	1,188.00	1,237.00
	Old	1,073.00	1,114.00	1,155.00				
	New	1,288.00	1,339.00	1,386.00				
SCALE F 3	Old	1,205.00	1,254.00	1,304.00	1,339.00	1,353.00	1,386.00	
	New	1,446.00	1,505.00	1,555.00	1,606.00	1,624.00	1,663.00	
SCALE G 1	Old	559.00	585.00	612.00	667.00	693.00	693.00	710.00
	New	699.00	731.00	765.00	834.00	866.00	877.00	888.00
	Old	743.00	775.00					
	New	929.00	969.00					
SCALE G 2	Old	816.00	858.00	890.00	940.00	981.00	1,023.00	1,064.00
	New	979.00	1,030.00	1,079.00	1,128.00	1,177.00	1,228.00	1,277.00
	Old	1,105.00	1,155.00	1,205.00				
	New	1,326.00	1,386.00	1,446.00				
SCALE G 3	Old	1,254.00	1,304.00	1,339.00	1,353.00	1,386.00	1,449.00	
	New	1,505.00	1,565.00	1,606.00	1,624.00	1,663.00	1,739.00	
SCALE H 1	Old	432.00	469.00	495.00	523.00	549.00	576.00	603.00
	New	540.00	586.00	619.00	654.00	686.00	720.00	754.00
	Old	631.00	657.00					
	New	789.00	821.00					

		Le	Le	Le	Le	Le	Le	Le
SCALE H 2	Old	680.00	693.00	693.00	701.00	726.00	759.00	804.00
	New	850.00	866.00	877.00	876.00	908.00	949.00	965.00
SCALE P 1	Old	825.00	858.00					
	New	990.00	1,030.00					
P 2	Old	432.00						
	New	540.00						
P 3	Old	468.00	487.00	504.00	523.00	540.00	567.00	595.00
	New	585.00	608.00	630.00	654.00	675.00	712.00	744.00
P 4	Old	621.00	648.00					
	New	776.00	810.00					
P 5	Old	680.00	693.00	693.00	710.00	743.00		
	New	850.00	867.00	877.00	888.00	929.00		
P 6	Old	759.00	793.00	825.00	858.00	891.00	924.00	
	New	949.00	952.50	990.00	1,030.00	1,069.00	1,109.00	
P 7	Old	759.00	981.00	1,023.00	1,064.00	1,105.00	1,150.00	1,188.00
	New	1,128.00	1,177.00	1,228.00	1,277.00	1,326.00	1,380.00	1,426.00
TRAINING GRADE	Old	990.00	1,031.00	1,073.00				
	New	1,188.00	1,237.00	1,288.00				
P 8	Old	1,205.00	1,254.00	1,304.00	1,370.00	1,434.00		
	New	1,446.00	1,505.00	1,565.00	1,644.00	1,721.00		
P 9	Old	1,496.00	1,575.00	1,654.00	1,753.00	1,811.00	1,890.00	
	New	1,795.00	1,890.00	1,985.00	2,104.00	2,173.00	2,268.00	
SCALE S 1	Old	1,811.00	1,890.00	1,969.00	2,048.00	2,126.00		
	New	2,173.00	2,268.00	2,363.00	2,458.00	2,551.00		
S 2	Old	360.00	370.00	379.00				
	New	540.00	550.00	559.00				
S 3	Old	396.00	415.00	432.00				
	New	576.00	595.00	612.00				
S 4	Old	451.00	468.00	487.00	504.00			
	New	631.00	648.00	667.00	684.00			
S 5	Old	525.00	549.00	576.00	603.00			
	New	705.00	729.00	756.00	783.00			
T 1	Old	631.00	657.00	680.00	693.00			
	New	811.00	837.00	860.00	869.00			
T 2	Old	360.00	360.00	370.00				
	New	540.00	545.00	550.00				
T 3	Old	379.00	396.00	415.00	432.00	451.00	468.00	487.00
	New	559.00	576.00	595.00	612.00	631.00	648.00	667.00

CONTRACT SALARY SCALES

SCALE							
AA LOWER	Old	1,974.00	2,098.00	2,219.00	2,580.00	2,640.00	2,758.00
	New	2,369.00	2,518.00	2,663.00	3,096.00	3,168.00	3,310.00
AA UPPER	Old	2,875.00	2,993.00	3,111.00	3,231.00	3,349.00	3,485.00
	New	3,450.00	3,592.00	3,733.00	3,877.00	4,019.00	4,182.00
BA 1	Old	3,619.00	3,754.00	3,890.00	3,995.00	3,995.00	
	New	4,344.00	4,505.00	4,530.00	4,594.00	4,599.00	
BA 2	Old	1,906.00	2,011.00	2,114.00	2,425.00	2,530.00	
	New	2,287.00	2,413.00	2,537.00	2,919.00	3,036.00	
3	Old	2,570.00	2,673.00	2,790.00	2,909.00	3,026.00	
	New	3,084.00	3,209.00	3,348.00	3,491.00	3,631.00	
4	Old	3,146.00	3,265.00	3,383.00	3,500.00		
	New	3,775.00	3,918.00	4,060.00	4,200.00		
C(T) A 3	Old	3,619.00	3,754.00	3,890.00	3,995.00	3,995.00	
	New	4,343.00	4,505.00	4,530.00	4,594.00	4,599.00	
4	Old	1,906.00	1,993.00	2,079.00	2,339.00	2,444.00	
	New	2,287.00	2,392.00	2,495.00	2,807.00	2,933.00	
5	Old	2,546.00	2,589.00	2,688.00	2,790.00		
	New	3,055.00	3,107.00	3,226.00	3,348.00		
6	Old	2,909.00	3,026.00	3,146.00			
	New	3,491.00	3,631.00	3,775.00			
7	Old	3,265.00	3,383.00	3,500.00			
	New	3,918.00	4,060.00	4,200.00			
E(A) 3	Old	3,619.00	3,754.00	3,890.00	3,995.00	3,995.00	
	New	4,343.00	4,505.00	4,530.00	4,594.00	4,599.00	
4	Old	1,838.00	1,924.00	2,011.00	2,271.00	2,358.00	
	New	2,206.00	2,309.00	2,413.00	2,725.00	2,830.00	
5	Old	2,444.00	2,546.00	2,589.00	2,688.00	2,790.00	
	New	2,933.00	3,055.00	3,107.00	3,226.00	3,348.00	

SCALE		Le	Le	Le	Le	Le	Le	Le
5	Old	2,909.00	3,026.00	3,146.00				
	New	3,491.00	3,631.00	3,775.00				
6	Old	3,265.00	3,383.00	3,500.00				
	New	3,918.00	4,060.00	4,200.00				
7	Old	3,619.00	3,754.00	3,890.00	3,995.00	3,995.00		
	New	4,303.00	4,505.00	4,530.00	4,594.00	4,599.00		
MA	Old	2,758.00	2,875.00	2,993.00	3,111.00	3,231.00	3,349.00	3,485.00
	New	3,310.00	3,450.00	3,592.00	3,733.00	3,877.00	4,019.00	4,182.00
	Old	3,619.00	3,754.00					
	New	4,343.00	4,505.00					
	Old	3,890.00	3,995.00	3,995.00	4,140.00	4,285.00	4,433.00	4,621.00
	New	4,474.00	4,594.00	4,599.00	4,761.00	4,928.00	5,098.00	5,314.00
	Old	4,726.00						
	New	5,435.00						

SUPER SCALE GROUPS

GROUP GA	Old	5,505.00						
	New	6,331.00						
GROUP HA	Old	4,330.00	4,492.00	4,655.00				
	New	4,980.00	5,166.00	5,353.00				
GROUP	Old	A 7,670.00	B 6,720.00	C 6,250.00	D 5,900.00	E ¹ 5,550.00	F 5,400.00	G 5,290.00
	New	8,437.00	7,392.00	6,875.00	6,490.00	6,383.00	6,210.00	6,084.00
GROUP H	Old	3,936.00	4,084.00	4,231.00				
	New	4,620.00	4,697.00	4,866.00				

PERSONAL EMOLUMENTS OUTSIDE GROUP AND SCALE SCHEDULE

	Old Le	New Le
1. President	16,100.00	17,710.00
2. Chief Justice	8,740.00	9,614.00
3. Supreme Court Justices	7,762.00	8,538.00
4. Justices of Appeal	7,418.00	8,160.00
5. Puisne Judge	6,843.00	7,527.00
6. Chairman, Public Service Commission	6,325.00	6,958.00
7. Chief Electoral Commissioner	5,658.00	6,224.00
8. Vice-President	8,280.00	9,108.00
9. Minister	7,245.00	7,970.00
10. Minister of State	6,253.00	6,878.00
11. Deputy Minister	4,608.00	5,299.00
12. Parliamentary Special Assistant	4,608.00	5,299.00
13. Member of Parliament	2,550.00	3,060.00
14. Speaker	6,555.00	7,211.00
15. Deputy Speaker	3,960.00	4,554.00
16. Attorney-General	7,245.00	7,970.00
17. Solicitor-General	6,843.00	7,527.00
18. First Parliamentary Counsel	6,525.00	7,178.00
19. Customary Law Officer	6,525.00	7,178.00
20. Registrar, Law Reports	6,095.00	6,705.00
21. Registrar, Court of Appeal	5,750.00	6,325.00
22. Chief Commissioner (National Registration)	7,773.00	8,550.00
23. High Commissioner	6,900.00	7,590.00
24. Deputy High Commissioner	5,750.00	6,325.00
25. Director of Public Prosecutions	15,000.00	16,500.00

18th November, 1978.

P. W. R. PARKINSON,
Accountant-General.

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West Africa

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