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The developmental and social psychology of moral cognition, and its implications for social and political reasoning.

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Award date:
1985

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The Developmental and Social Psychology of Moral Cognition, and its Implications for Social and Political Reasoning

Thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, January 1985

Helen Weinreich-Haste
University of Bath

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Foreword

The ideas developed in these papers have evolved over many years, and many people have contributed to their growth. To re-read one's work covering such a long period is to evoke many friendships and many happy hours of disputation. Also, research on moral development touches so closely on everyday experience that almost every human contact has, on reflection, some relevance to it.

A comprehensive list of the people who have stimulated, knocked down, refined or helped me expand the ideas in these pages would be impossible, but the following people have been especially important:
my parents, Eric and Margaret Haste, who always made me question the basis of moral judgements
my daughter, Joanna, who grew through her own adolescence indulgently tolerating me struggling to understand adolescent development
my husband, Paul Mosley, whose support,encouragement and healthy scepticism helped me to sharpen my thinking and survive the doubting periods
friends, colleagues and advisors, most especially the membership of MOSAIC - in Britain, Germany and the United States - whose unique style of affection, stimulation and breaking down of intellectual boundaries make

working in this field an enriched and fulfilling activity.*

Also Barbara Lloyd, who introduced me to Kohlberg's work, Richard Peters, who introduced me to philosophical issues, Stephen Cotgrove, who proved that sociologists can work with psychologists, Rom Harré, who introduced me to rhetoric, Lois Erickson, who shared much with me, including her data, and Larry Kohlberg, who until 1977 was a dominant but nebulous influence, and since then has been a kind friend.

Finally, I thank Judy Harbutt and Sandra Swaby, who typed various parts of the manuscript.

Helen Weinreich-Haste
January, 1985

*MOSAIC - Moral and Social Action Interdisciplinary Colloquium

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Introduction

The papers in this collection represent my work in the field of moral development. They all relate in some way to the cognitive-developmental model of Lawrence Kohlberg. They include a) critical papers on Kohlberg's and Piaget's theories of development; b) theoretical papers formulating ideas about the development of political and social concepts, and about the role of social psychological explanations in this field; and c) empirical studies relating to those ideas.

The papers are not presented in chronological order, but according to theme. There are four sections. In the first are three reviews of the field of moral development, which put Kohlberg's theory into a broader context of the psychology (and philosophy) of moral development.* The second section is a critical discussion of *structure*. These papers argue the need to delineate the structure of reasoning at each stage, in order to understand the psychological processes involved in transition from stage to stage. All the papers in this section were published between 1974 and 1981. The first paper reports a replication of Kohlberg's original Chicago study,[2] with boys in British schools. The final paper is a detailed critique of Piaget's *Moral Judgement of the Child*;[3] it is included in this section because it is critical analysis, rather than development of theory. However, it also discusses the role of social psychological explanation, a theme picked up in papers in the next section.

The third section represents what I consider to be my own substantive contributions in the field. These are: a) the model of an 'implicit social theory' underlying moral, social and political reasoning (Papers 9, 10, 11 and 12), b) theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between moral, social and political reasoning, and its implications for the interpretation of Kohlberg's theory, and for the 'implicit social theory' (Papers 9, 10, 11, 14), c) consideration of social psychological factors in the reasoning process and in individual development, in particular the role of social experience, and of socio-cultural resources of explanation and 'rhetoric', in individual reasoning (Papers 11, 13 and 14), d) the relationship between moral judgement and action, and the role of personal experience and affect in the development of reasoning (papers 9, 11, 13, 14 and 15).

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*The second of these papers is the Introduction from the book edited by myself and Don Locke, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. The writing was a joint exercise; my contribution is roughly fifty per cent and predominantly is reflected in the first part of the work.[1]

The final section includes a number of book reviews and an article on moral education. The question, 'Is moral education possible?' is addressed in other sections where it is relevant to developmental processes and to structure (e.g. paper 7), and the work on 'just communities' in schools is discussed in the context of social psychological issues (e.g. papers 9, 13 and 14). This section contains pieces which specifically concentrate on moral educational implications of Kohlberg's theory, empirical studies arising from it, and critical discussion.

Background: Kohlberg's Work and its Critics

When psychologists disagree about definitions of 'morality' they are usually disagreeing about what counts as an *important* question. The background to this is a conflict between traditions within philosophy, which became translated into twentieth century psychology. The issues concern the whole range of explanation in developmental psychology, not only the specific field of moral development. There are two dimensions of disagreement. The first dimension is the broad distinction between atomistic and holistic, passive and active, rationalistic and empiricist, which divides behaviourism and social learning theory from constructivist and 'mentalistic' approaches. The second dimension is the distinction between individual and social determinants; is the origin of meaning the individual's own construction and organisation of experience, or does the individual reflect a variety of social processes by which meaning, representation and symbols are constructed?

Along the first dimension, the heirs to behaviourism give weight to the acquisition of those motives and habits which will ensure that the individual becomes a law-abiding member of society. Such habits are built up slowly and atomistically and values and motives are internalised as a consequence of careful training. The heirs to rationalism give weight to reasoning and judgement, and to making the right decision with regard to one's own actions and those of others; rational decision-making will lead to utilitarian and beneficial behaviour. Such reasoning processes are not 'taught', but emerge through development; they involve judgement, not the acquisition of detailed behaviours, and they imply a holistic appreciation, the individual actively 'making sense' of the world.

This brief description is elaborated in papers 1 and 19. But even such a brief account reveals the extent of the gap: each tradition has a different theory of morality and a different theory of development. This leads to mutual non-comprehension. The differences involve the whole perspective on human development; the processes of perception and of learning, and the organisation of individual experience, as well as a fundamental assumption about what counts as legitimate science, are different in each tradition. The broader criticisms within moral development research tend to come from the opposite side of those fences; those reared in the Piaget-Kohlberg tradition, for example, are scathing about the'bag of virtues' or simple-minded conditioning approach to development, those reared in social learning theory are deeply suspicious of focus on 'internal' processes. To reconcile the two approaches would not be a matter of making a better jigsaw with more 'moral components'; it is a deep schism, the more problematic because many of the assumptions are implicit.

The second dimension, individual v. social determinatism, has become a significant battlefield in social science. The key issue is language and its role in the definition of meaning. The point about language is that it is *social*; if language is seen as the main way by which knowledge is acquired and symbols defined, then it is arguable that there is little point in studying the thinking of individuals, except as a *product* of the social process. A more extreme position is that the only useful study is of the meaning-creation process itself, namely social interaction. The distinction is reflected in present-day psychology in the broad differences between social psychologists and developmental psychologists. The former concentrate on the study of the immediate social situation, and argue that the individual's definition of herself and of the social situation is a *consequence* of the social process (e.g. Tajfel).[4] The latter focus on how the child 'makes sense' through her interaction with the physical world, reflecting upon her experience and constructing her own organisation of meaning.

There is another tradition which criticises the emphasis on individual thought processes and meaning creation. The socio-historical tradition emphasises the importance of historical and structural variables; the individual's values are determined by her within the social system. The processes of socialisation reproduce society's values through education and through manipulation of the communication channels. By this means, dominant social paradigms are transmitted and internalised. According to this model, ideology and social explanation are defined by social structure, rather than individual reasoning. Although rooted in sociological theory, this approach comes to social psychology via critical theorists (see Paper 14).

The "individualistic" tradition can be traced back to Kant (even to Plato) and in particular to Brentano and 'act psychology'. According to this model, the individual is active in the construction of meaning and experience. 'Thinking' is not merely the association of ideas, or the linking of language and linguistic symbols with images, but a transformation process. This distinction between passive and active is crucial in these debates; does the individual construct and organise, or does the individual receive or internalise predetermined knowledge - whether that knowledge is predetermined by the nature of the physical world, by social structural factors or by linguistic symbols of socially-negotiated forms of language? The centrality of an active mode of cognitive organisation is what separates the cognitivist-constructivist from the three rather disparate traditions which form the major criticisms of it; the neo-behaviourist social learning approach, the post-Wittgenstein linguistic determinism and neo-Marxist social and economic determinism.[5] According to the constructivist tradition, 'development' (rather than 'learning') involves progressively more complex re-organisation of the processes of acting upon one's experienced world.

Within this model, social experience and social variables - whether interaction or dominant social paradigms - are catalytic rather than determinist; they represent a) a datum to be organised or b) a disequilibrating experience which may promote reflective reorganisation and eventual restructuring.

Kohlberg's thinking about moral development is firmly within the tradition of individualistic constructivism, and the major critiques of Kohlberg fall within one or other of the alternative traditions presented above. Although both Piaget and Kohlberg are individualist constructivists, and their theories of morality and their theories of development reflect this, they are not talking about quite the same things. In Papers 5 and 8 I discuss in detail their differences. In common, their 'theories of morality' define 'moral' by the nature of the reasoning which precedes or accompanies the action (actual or hypothetical). For Piaget, the components of the 'theory of morality' - as defined by what he chose to measure - were rules, retributive justice, intentionality and 'fairness' judgements (which, as I argue in Paper 8, are not the same as distributive justice). Kohlberg's theory of morality is much more explicitly defined; it hardly refers at all to rules or to retributive justice, but concentrations instead on a broad definition of justice as the governing 6 principle of rights, obligations and contractual relations. (see Papers 1, 3, 5, 8 and 14).

Despite the differences, both Piaget and Kohlberg concentrate on those aspects of morality which are primarily cognitive and which imply an understanding of the functions of a moral system for society, not solely a concern with the relationship between the individual and her troublesome conscience or fear or social disapproval. Both theorists also have a transformational theory of development. The process of organisation is not static, but changes developmentally; it is restructured. Piaget's work on moral development did not present"stages" of moral reasoning; he postulated 'phases' of development. He identified in his empirical work a transformation which cut across all the components he was studying (see Paper 8). Kohlberg's model, on the other hand, defines the stages of moral reasoning as rigorously as Piaget defined his stages of logical-mathematical reasoning.

In Paper 3 I discuss in detail the development of Kohlberg's model of moral reasoning development. Here I want to consider the broad story of the theory's development and the dominant criticisms of it. Kohlberg's original study of 72 boys in Chicago schools in the mid-fifties produced a model of six types - later stages - of moral reasoning. At that time Kohlberg was particularly influenced by Baldwin, Mead and Dewey, though he saw himself as elaborating Piaget's stages of moral reasoning. Baldwin's theory of the development of thought provided a model of stages and structure of reasoning; Mead provided a central concept, which has been developed in various ways, of role-taking as an essential part of the developmental process; Dewey influenced Kohlberg's thinking about moral education and the relationship between democratic processes in the classroom and the development of individual moral reasoning, but he also made an important distinction between 'conventional' principles or rules for deciding on rightness and justice, and 'postconventional' principles, which Kohlberg incorporated into his own distinctions between levels of moral reasoning.[7] These three dominant influences, therefore, contributed to both Kohlberg's 'theory of morality' and to his 'theory of development'. (see Paper 14 for further discussion). Up to 1970, Kohlberg's main activities concerned his theory of development. Mainly this involved the longitudinal follow-up of his original sample, and various experimental studies by Turiel, Rest and others also contributed to the refinement of the developmental sequence of moral thought, and its status as irreversible and hierarchical. During this period, the 'theory of morality' remained implicit; in 1971 Kohlberg published a paper of great importance which made the theory of morality explicit.[8]

This paper was entitled 'From Is to Ought; or how to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it.' The main argument was that the developmental evidence of an increasing appreciation of the role of justice in moral reasoning, is direct support for the theory of morality in which justice is the core principle and the basis for a definition of the 'moral'. This paper has been the basis of the subsequent development of his ideas on both morality and development; the subsequent (post 1970) deeper analysis of 'structure' depends on the relationship he describes. But it has also invoked major criticism; by making such an explicit link between the development of reasoning and a particular system of belief, Kohlberg has laid himself open to the charge of being naive about cultural factors in the ontogeny of belief systems (in addition to the more general criticism presented by those who, a priori, do not accept justice as the primary component of morality). These criticisms are explored in Papers 13 and 14.

Following this paper in 1971, Kohlberg embarked on the development of a more fully structural analysis of the stages of reasoning. With his coworkers Colby, Candee, Lieberman and Gibbs in particular, he worked on a detailed coding manual which explicitly focusses on the structure of reasoning, rather than on content.[9] This Manual represents the full description of the developmental theory of morality, and also the operational definition of the theory of morality in practice (see Paper 12 for discussion and detail). It was developed from the longitudinal data, using seven of the original sample, with additional exemplary material from other respondents.

Developing the themes of the 1971 paper, Kohlberg has written a number of papers which consolidate his argument for a link between morality, democracy and liberalism. These extend the idea that the developmental theory, and the evidence for supporting it, demonstrate the 'inevitability' of a progress towards a liberal perspective at national as well as individual level (see Paper 14). Support for this argument also came from studies of campus protest, and political beliefs and judgements about political and social issues, which tended to demonstrate a close relationship between moral stage and political reasoning and action (see Papers 9, 10, 11, 14).

However, despite this body of writing and research, Kohlberg has not become extensively involved in research on the development of political thinking; his interest is confined to *democracy*. This interest has two forms; democracy as the *telos* of a liberal society, and democracy as the *context* in which justice reasoning can flourish and develop. This perspective reflects an integration of the ideas of Mead and Dewey. During the nineteen-seventies, Kohlberg developed a moral education programme in prisons and schools, which reflected his theoretical ideas, and contributed to their further development. Although Kohlberg has always been interested in the question of education, one can trace the development of the education programmes through a series of experimental studies.[10] It is also significant that the moral education programmes have resulted in a shift from looking at the *individual's* reasoning structure, to looking at the *social processes* themselves, that facilitate and reflect changes in individual thought.

In the late 'Sixties Turiel and Rest demonstrated the invariance of the hierarchical sequence by examining individual response to higher and lower stages of thought, relative to the individual's present thinking; these studies indicated the possibility of using plus-one-stage arguments as a disequilibrating stimulus (see Paper 3). Blatt tested this in classroom discussion, and demonstrated that 'socratic' methods of interaction did produce some stage change. As a consequence of these findings, various people developed classroom methods of moral education designed to accelerate moral development. However a further development significantly pushed Kohlberg in a more 'social' direction. Hk argued that socratic discussion in the isolated unit of classroom was likely to have little effect if the 'hidden curriculum' of the rest of the institution reflected in its implicit structure and in institutional interactions, a low stage of reasoning. Many prisons, he argued, reflected a "stage 1" world of summary punishments and unquestionable hierarchies. He therefore attempted to set up 'just communities' in some prisons and schools. The basis of a just community is democratic decision-making structure. In the prisons this was achieved by establishing 'cottages', small units in which staff and inmates lived and worked together, making consensual decisions about policy and sanctions. In the schools, the 'just community' was established as a part of the week's school life, in which the volunteer group of students and staff ran their community and academic activities as a self-governing unit (see Papers 13, 14, 17 and 19).

The just communities did show some success in achieving the goal of promoting moral growth, as defined by individual stage change. However in my view, their interest lies in the shift of emphasis which they represent, from focussing on the individual's internal psychological processes to looking at social psychological processes. These social psychological processes are a) interaction between individuals negotiating a social consensus about community activity, within the constraints of their current moral stage, and b) discussion, disagreement and collective efforts to produce a common definition of what is going on, gradually developing a more complex perception of the implications of 'community'.

(see Papers 13 and 14). Out of this work comes Power, Higgins and Reimer's model of 'Stages of Moral Atmosphere' which is essentially a social psychological concept, and quite far removed from emphasising individual cognitive development.[11]

For Kohlberg, the major purpose was to demonstrate the role of participatory democracy - as proposed by Dewey and Mead - in the generation of justice reasoning. It demonstrated for him that 'stages' of moral reasoning had a validity in practical democracy as well as in rational construction, and that experience of such democracy was a catalyst for development. Subsequently, others have pursued the social psychological issues; in addition to Power, Higgins and Reimer, Damon and Berkowitz have developed methods for analysing interactions between dyads and small groups, observing how fairness, justice and rules are negotiated.[12]

Two other developments of Kohlberg's work during the last decade are of relevance to the papers in this collection. The first is the debate about the theory of morality - notably the criticisms which Carol Gilligan has levelled at the limitation of the 'rights of orientation' of Kohlberg's theory. The second is the relationship between moral judgement and moral action.

Gilligan found that young adult women produced a somewhat different kind of reasoning in response to the Kohlberg interview schedule. They tended to resist questions about the relative rights and duties of competing individuals in the stories, and to offer instead negotiation strategies. They concentrated on the responsibilities of the individuals in the stories, rather than on their conflicting rights. This, Gilligan argued, reflects an orientation of caring and mutuality, as opposed to the contractual basis of obligations which is inherent in Kohlberg's model. In her subsequent work using real-life dilemmas (particularly abortion) Gilligan has developed her concept of a 'responsibility orientation' (in contrast to Kohlberg's 'rights' orientation) as an alternative theory of morality. (see Papers 9, 12 and 13).

Gilligan's formulation of an alternative theory of morality, or 'different voice' as she termed it, seemed to resolve a problem which others had noted, namely that female respondents appeared, in some studies, to score lower than male respondents. In particular, it was argued that women and girls tended to get scored as stage 3 reasoners, because they seemed to show a greater preoccupation with affiliation. Her case was that, because Kohlberg's original sample were all male, his theory had a built-in male bias in the moral orientation it reflected. In fact, the issue of sex differences has largely been resolved, firstly by the development of a scoring method based on structure rather than content, which better picks up complex reasoning on affiliation, and secondly, as Walker has demonstrated in an exhaustive review of thie field, when educational level and occupation are controlled for, sex differences in score disappear.[13]

However, Gilligan's critique is important, irrespective of its role in explaining a psychometric anomaly. Note that she does not make any criticism of the theory of development; Gilligan accepts the theory of development, the cognitive-developmental constructivist framework; but rejects (or at least wants to modify) the theory of morality. She has developed 'levels' of 'responsibility orientation' in collaboration with Lyons and Langdale.[14] By criticising the theory of morality, but from within the same framework of developmental theory, she makes it possible to take an alternative view of the very data which Kohlberg has himself analysed. In Paper 12, I discuss some pilot work which extends this argument, utilising Kohlberg's longitudinal data.

Kohlberg's reply to Gilligan has been complex. The evidence of lack of sex differences on structural scoring has undermined the psychometric critique, but Kohlberg has rightly seen Gilligan's critique as an issue in the definition of a theory of morality. In response, he discusses the distinction between morality based on universalisable principles of justice and impartiality, and morality based on special obligations arising from interpersonal ties and obligations. These he argues as a special case of justice reasoning, and also he notes that in cohesive social groups (just community schools) judgements incorporating interpersonal responsibility are more frequent than in less cohesive groups, who are more likely to use justice and rights responses. However he now describes his theory as the "ontogenesis of justice reasoning", rather than as the development of "moral" reasoning.[15]

The final development of Kohlberg's theory that I will consider concerns the judgement-action relationship. This has two parts; firstly, what is the nature of the relationship between moral reasoning and action, and secondly, what is the theoretical basis from which one might interpret any relationship? The first question is largely empirical - what correlates with moral stage? To ask such a question is to enter the field delineated by Hartshorne and May, namely is there such a thing as consistent or predictable morality?[16] As addressed by developmental theorists, this is a question about whether higher stage reasoners behave in any way differently to lower stage reasoners. The second question is more complicated, and is about the significance and meaning of a relationship between thought and action. For a theorist who is sceptical of intervening variables like reasoning, then a "good relationship means that one predicts the other. This counts as validation. Cognitive-developmentalists have tended on the other hand to define 'morality' by intention and reason, rather than actions which may be committed due to a variety of contingent further factors; therefore focussing only on judgement is legitimate. Certain actions may correlate with reasoning, but the emphasis is on reasoning as reflection on action, rather than reasoning as prediction of action; the 'morality' of the action is validated by the reasoning, not the reasoning validated by the predictability of action. A third perspective comes out of social psychological research, which also, but in a different way, concentrates on cognition. According to this approach, behaviour may occur because of external contingencies, but, action having occurred, the individual reflects upon it and makes sense - and justification - of it. So attitude change, for example, or the development of explicit beliefs, is a consequence rather than a cause of behaviour.[17]

Kohlberg's own ventures into the correlates of moral action began with an early study with Grim and White, on cheating behaviour in children. They found a general constellation of 'ego qualities' which seemed to relate to the avoidance of cheating.[18] However, later evidence of a relationship between judgement (as defined by moral stage score) and action emerged from several studies. The studies of campus politics showed that moral stage correlated with protest activity. Studies of certain kinds of behaviour also correlated with moral stage. These behaviours were of a particular sort; they involved performance of actions helpful to others, rather than the avoidance of individual sin. They involve the individual perceiving that she has responsibility to intervene (Papers 9, 14 and 15).

The current model of the judgement-action relationship is outlined in Kohlberg (1984).[19] Moral stage correlates with action because of two factors. Firstly, the higher the moral stage, the more likely is the individual to make the 'deontic choice' that help should be given, intervention should be effected, or whatever. Secondly, the higher the stage, the more likely the individual is to feel it is her personal responsibility to act in accordance with that deontic choice. So Kohlberg's current thinking on the judgement-action relationship focusses mainly on the predictive rather than the reflective relationship, and primarily on cognitive variables. However he does postulate 'ego variables' between the judgement of responsibility and actual action.

I have ignored certain developments of the theory in this review because they do not touch on my own preoccupations - for example, the development of a religious sense and the 'soft stage 7' which has been discussed from time to time in his work (I refer to it in passing in Paper 7). The beginnings of a rapprochement between Habermas' hermeneutic approach to rational reconstruction, and Kohlberg's developmental model of individual reasoning is, in my view, an extremely exciting development, but as I have only begun to consider it in my own work (see Papers 13 and 14) I have not discussed it here.[20]

Dimensions of Criticism

The critics of Kohlberg's theory are numerous. They can be divided into those (like social learning theorists) who are fundamentally outside the paradigm, who work from quite different assumptions both about the definitions of morality and about the validation claims of theory, and those who are within the 'cordon of sympathy' but who perceive problems. The latter's criticisms have frequently contributed to the development of Kohlberg's own thinking; it is this group whom I will consider.

I distinguish two dimensions of criticism, which yield four types of critic. The first dimension is 'focussing v. extending', the second, 'prescribing v. describing'. "Focussers" want to refine the theory, make it more explicit and workable; they seek more detailed and extensive analysis, better measuring techniques and clarification of concepts. "Extenders" want to extend the theory, to take the cognitive-developmental framework that has been refined and validated in the moral domain, and apply it to other areas of social cognition. For some extenders, the moral stages are merely one well-defined exemplar of the theory;for others, the extensions of the theory have relevance also for moral development, either because they see a functional relationship between moral and other forms of reasoning, or because they consider that the way Kohlberg has delineated the domain of 'moral' reasoning is too limiting. On the whole, this dimension tends to apply to the theory of development, rather than to the theory of morality.

In contrast, the dimension of prescribing v. describing tends to apply to the theory of morality. Prescribers want to

Figure 1. Dimensions of Criticism


Focussing
Boyd
(Kohlberg)
Rest
Gibbs
Nisan
Prescriptive
Descriptive
Gilligan
Habermas
Locke
Turiel
Sullivan
Selman
Broughton
Extending

improve or *refine* the theory of morality; describers are relatively unconcerned about an 'ideal' theory of morality, and are instead concerned to describe accurately the ways in which morality is expressed in the data. They tend to be more empirically-oriented than prescribers (see Figure 1).

According to this scheme, Carol Gilligan is a "prescriptive extender". She wishes to extend the *theory of development* to include development of a wider range or reasoning, in particular judgements of responsibility and care. However her aims in doing this are to improve the *theory of morality*. Elliot Turiel is a "descriptive extender"; he largely accepts the criterion of the moral domain as defined by Kohlberg, and a moral theory based on justice reasoning, but he has developed extensively the distinction between moral and conventional reasoning, which his own data supports.[21] So he wants a more adequate *description* of the distinction between moral and conventional reasoning, and to *extend* the cognitive-developmental model to the domain of conventional reasoning development. James Rest is probably best described as a "descriptive focusser"; he has developed quantitative methods of measurement of the moral stages as described originally by Kohlberg. His own theoretical extensions of moral development include the addition of other elements in morality, but he includes moral reasoning in its traditional form, as one of these components.[22] John Gibbs is more critical than Rest of the theory, in that he questions the validity of 'hard' stages beyond stage 4, but nevertheless he is also a descriptive focusser; he wants to improve the theory of *development* as it stands, and he accepts the theory of morality proposed by Kohlberg.[23]

Habermas has attempted to integrate his own model of the development of communicative competence, which is a theory about how people come to be able ultimately to engage in 'ideal speech acts', with Kohlberg's model of moral development.

Because he expresses this integration in terms of the parallel structures between moral stages and levels of communicative action, he might be considered a "focusser"; however Kohlberg regards Habermas' levels as being parallel to Selman's social perspective-taking levels, and thus would represent an extension, rather than a focussing, of the developmental theory. (I think Kohlberg is wrong to equate Selman's essentially individualistic model with Habermas' social psychological model, but I consider that Habermas is an extender rather than a focusser.)[24] He is, however, like Gilligan a prescriber; his orientation to the theory of morality as rational justice is a prescriptive, rather than a descriptive, approach. This is particularly manifest in his postulate of an autonomous, ideal-rational 'stage 7'.

These critics have not attempted to make damning criticisms, but to modify, extend and discuss the theory. More damning criticisms have come in particular from people who question the universality of justice as a moral principle, who consider that Kohlberg's theory is incomplete or biassed because it explicitly endorses a liberal orientation to both rationality and justice, and who argue that Kohlberg is politically naive in being apparently unaware that moral theory is a product of a particular sociocultural and socio-historical situation (see Paper 14). These criticisms can be labelled in my scheme as extensions because they want to claim that other kinds of moral (or social or political) thought can be considered from the point of view of a developmental theory. Critics such as Schweder, Simpson and Sullivan took issue with the conclusions drawn from cross-cultural evidence which tended to show less postconventional and stage 4 reasoning outside Western society. But they also argued that in other cultures (and in subcultures within Western society) there are many different ways of looking at morality, different ways of organising society and different evaluations of justice.[25] Therefore these critics are describers rather than prescribers; they would like to see an approach which is more eclectic in its interpretation of the data (see Papers 9, 13 and 14 for discussion of the criticisms).

The Development of my Own Thinking

On the above scheme I would argue that my early work, as outlined in Section 2, is focussing-descriptive. That work was preoccupied with the need for a more detailed analysis of structure, in order that models of transition and growth could be formulated along the lines of Piagetian logical-mathematical theory. The later work presented in Section 3 is more extending-descriptive; it develops a number of arguments, and reports some empirical work, which try to explore the relationship between moral, social and political thinking which has in my view implications for the developmental theory. I also, in those papers, explore the relationship between individual (intrapersonal), interpersonal and societal 'frames of meaning and ways of making sense', which incorporate social psychological concepts. In doing this I am asking, what actually happens in decision-making? This is an empirical question, ultimately, so I am firmly a describer rather than a prescriber.

I should start with an autobiographical sketch, in order to make sense of the sources upon which my writings have been based. I began working on Kohlberg's theory as a graduate student at the University of Sussex, under the supervision of Marie Jahoda, in 1967. I attempted to replicate Kohlberg's original Chicago study with adolescent boys, in Sussex schools. I used the original nine dilemmas in an interview setting, and some additional questions. My source of coding materials was a microfilm of Kohlberg's doctoral dissertation, and I had access to his published works to that date. (The work which appears as Paper 4 was based on my M.Phil. thesis). For the next six years I had access only to published materials, and was therefore unaware that most of my critical points about structure were being independently covered by the work of Selman, Turiel, Gibbs and others and that a structural coding method was being developed by Kohlberg and his associates at Harvard.

In 1977, at the International Conference on Moral Development and Moral Education at Leicester, where I presented Paper 7, I met Kohlberg, Higgins, Colby and Puka, and at that conference I became aware of the current developments in the area. I visited the Center for Moral Education in July 1978 and had access to the unpublished and in-progress materials available there. At this point I abandoned my interest in structure, and began to consider the implications of the correlation work on political and social concepts. During the period September - January 1980-81 I spent a sabbatical semester at the Center for Moral Education, and became familiar with the work of Carol Gilligan, and the work on just communities, responsibility and the judgement-action issue, which members of the Center were engaged upon. During that period I also began to think about the social psychological issues, such as the role of social negotiation of meaning, and the function of what I would now recognise as Moscovici's 'social representations' in individual and interpersonal moral, social and political 'making sense'.[26] I returned to Cambridge in the summer of 1981 in order to look at Kohlberg's and Erickson's longitudinal studies of male and female reasoning, in order to test my tentative hypothesis that there were more than two orientations in moral reasoning, and that these were not sex-linked (Paper 12).

With Stephen Cotgrove I received an SSRC grant to look at Career Choice and Values, and was able to test some of my hypotheses about the relationship between political and social values and scores on a moral reasoning measure (Papers 9 and 10). This study was in two parts. The first part involved interviewing 40 Sixth formers and undergraduates, and this part yielded the tentative 'levels of implicit social theory' outlined in Paper 9. The second part of the study used a questionnaire format, and the sample was 2000 sixth-formers and undergraduates. This tested the relationship between political values, social values and moral score, on the questionnaire measure (Papers 9 and 10).

The 'implicit social theory' which emerged from the SSRC study primarily concerned the structure of individual thought;

it parallelled in many ways such developments as Selman's levels of social perspective-taking, Adelson's levels of political thinking and Turiel's levels of conventional thinking. (see Paper 14). The social psychological analysis represents a different dimension, they are explored particularly in Paper 13.

There are two issues involved; the concept of 'rhetoric' as described by Harré and others, and the concept of 'social representations' as described by Farr and Moscovici (1984).[27] Both concern the ways in which social meaning is created in a social context, through interactions between individuals and through individuals' access to culturally-current definitions and explanations. (The insight which consolidated my own thinking on this was a recruiting poster, reproduced in Paper 13, urging the men of America to 'Keep the world safe for democracy'; I realised that this poster would be unsuccessful in Britain because it did not reflect a common British rhetoric, and I began to consider how the American child acquires an appreciation of democracy as not only a value, but a way of explaining the social system).

Paper 13 represents the beginnings of a new and probably long-lasting project on these lines, and my current research is taking up some of these issues. Paper 14 also extends some of them; in this paper, I explore the model of individual political development reflected implicitly in Kohlberg's theory, and explicitly in Adelson's, Furth's, Connell's and Torney's models; the interpersonal processes as reflected in Kohlberg's just community studies, and the societal processes as reflected in the Israeli study.

The final project which these papers represent concerns the relationship between thought, action and responsibility. While at Harvard I became aware of the developing interest of Kohlberg and Candee in 'responsibility' - meaning obligation to personally intervene - as an intervening variable between thought and action.[28] (I had considered a primitive version of this concept in Paper 1, postulating the idea of 'competence').

The impetus to write Paper 15 came from a workshop on 'Extraordinary Moral Responsibility' which was held at Yale in November 1983. The main question of that workshop was what is it that makes people perceive a moral issue outside their own lives, and take a stand on it? For many of the participants the particular interest was young people's engagement in the Peace Movement. However the psychological issues apply to any form of commitment on a public issue.

I will now trace the development of the ideas outlined in the autobiographical sketch, in more detail. There are six areas covered by these papers; the discussion of structure, the development of the concept of an 'implicit social theory', the relevance of sex differences in moral orientation, the roles of social interaction and social representations in moral reasoning, the relevance of research in moral development to the question, 'Is moral education possible?', and the relationship between cognition, action and affect.

The structure of moral reason

Kohlberg's identification of six types of moral reasoning in his original study raised the question of the nature of the hierarchy, and its status as a developmental theory. Were these 'hard' stages, based upon a structural transformation, and therefore having the characteristics of irreversibility and hierarchisation? Or were they 'soft' stages, descriptions of a general style of thinking or a cluster of values and beliefs? Eventually longitudinal data did confirm that the sequence was structurally hierarchical and irreversible, and that later stages incorporated and integrated earlier stages.[29] In the early years, however, the only method of testing this was through experimental methods; could people be persuaded or manipulated to produce higher or lower stages of thought? How did the pattern of preference for the arguments of different stages reflect their structural complexity relative to the individuals current stage? What was the relationship between Kohlberg's stages and Piagetian stages of logical reasoning?

Experimental work on these issues by various researchers explored the structure of the moral stages. By 'structure' is meant the ways in which thinking is organised, and the range of variables taken into consideration - for example, does the respondent think a crime should be punished because it would deter the criminal, or because it would set an example to others, or because the legitimacy of law is only maintained when it is seen to be effective? Those three examples represent different appreciations of the function of punishment which reflect widening understanding of the social implications; the first implies that the function of punishment is to control individual behaviour, the last that it has also to do with the way society creates a system of legislation and judicial control, and the meting out of punishment has important symbolic functions. The point about structure is that it is not a matter of alternative ideologies or opinions, but a hierarchy of complexity; the conceptual organisation of an individual's current stage means that limits are set on her cognitive competence and framework of conceptualisation.

The papers presented in Section 2 address questions arising from what seemed to me to be limitations in the detailed analysis of the structure of moral thought, in the published materials then available to me. There was, I argued, too little attention being paid to the cognitive and logical 'substratum' of moral thought, and too much to the content of 'justice'. In these papers I attempted to analyse the logic of the hierarchy, and to explore the underlying dimension of complexity I was addressing the question, how is development to be understood? To comprehend the processes of transition from stage to stage, we have to appreciate the structural changes which are involved; to understand the effect of experience, or of socratic discussion, it is necessary to know in what the disequilibration is being created. In these papers, I sketched logical properties of the stages, and I explored models of the substrate of perception of what variables were seen to be relevant at each stage.

The empirical work of Selman on social perspective-taking, which was taking place in the USA at about the same time, reflected similar arguments to those presented in the Section 2 papers.[30] Studies by Colby and by Kuhn demonstrated the relationship between Piagetian stages and moral stages.[31] The longitudinal study eventually clarified the processes of integration and transition in progressively higher stages of thought; the Standard Coding Manual presents the detailed structural analysis of each stage.

In addition to the discussion of structure, the papers in Section 2 also raised another question. The evidence from the experimental studies, later confirmed by the publication of the longitudinal data, clearly showed that most people did not progress beyond stage 4, and many adults were operating with stage 3 thought. The implications of this for structural analysis are considerable. If people do not progress beyond a certain stage, is it because of a lack of significant and disequilibrating experiences? Or is it that there is something inherent in the structure of reasoning which creates a cognitive defence against disequilibration? This question is discussed in Section 3, with regard to the relationship between political conservatism and stage 4 thought. The model of development was validated by the longitudinal material, but also by the experimental demonstration; higher stages of thought were perceived to be more attractive; socratic discussion, which pitted higher stage arguments against current thinking, was effective in creating disequilibrium; finally, experience of being part of a just community stimulates an understanding of the social functions of rules and responsibilities. This all would suggest that there is a cognitive predisposition towards greater complexity, and a tendency for people to respond to the stimulation for growth and change. The absence of progression amongst large numbers of educated adults brings this model into question.

Implicit Social Theory

The concept of an 'implicit social theory' grew out of my interest in structure, but eventually turned into a substantive critique of Kohlberg's theory of morality, and of the acceptance by psychologists of the philosophical distinction between the 'moral domain' and other domains of thought and action. I now regard it as an alternative theory of development, within the cognitive-developmental model but extending the structural analysis to the fields of social cognitive development and the development of political beliefs.

In analysing the structural basis of the stages of moral reasoning I became aware that the logic of each stage seemed to depend on the range of variables taken into consideration, and the range of social groups and categories incorporated. This is somewhat similar to Selman's 'social perspective taking' stages; however Selman's stages derive from the Meadian orientation of role-taking, putting oneself in the position of other interested participants. It seemed to me that what was involved was perception of the consequences and implications for various groups, rather than the somewhat artificial exercise of 'moral musical chairs'. The main difference lies in whether one is taking a prescriptive or a descriptive stance; the role-taking model, which Kohlberg supports, argues that one arrives at a 'just' - and prescriptive - conclusion about what is right by taking into account the interests, rights and obligations of all parties involved, and the more roles one can take, qua Selman's model, the more comprehensively 'just' is the outcome. In contrast, a descriptive orientation asks, how do people organise their beliefs about social relationships and the consequences of action? It seems to me that the descriptive exercise, 'I believe the world is functional because the following rules, norms, sanctions etc. exist' precedes a prescriptive statement about what should or should not be done. The way people describe their view of the world underlies a whole range of value statements about moral, social and political issues. This is a part of ordinary explanations of living and interaction, not confined to the 'moral domain'; Damon's work on friendship, Turiel's work on conventions, and Peevers and Secord's work on descriptions of self, all manifest a similar developmental pattern of descriptions of how the world of social life operates.[32]

The logic of the implicit social theory was first developed in Paper 9, though early versions of the idea are present in Papers 6 and 7. It represents my most extensive critique of Kohlberg's attempt to conflate a theory of morality and a theory of development, as proposed in his 'From is to Ought' paper. The essential point of my argument is that there is no need to postulate something psychologically special about reasoning in the moral domain. Indeed, to do so leads to loss of data, because in order to conform to the proper criteria of 'moral', it is necessary to look only at prescriptive statements. The logic of coding only prescriptive statements is that one focusses on 'ought'. In any body of data there are, however, many descriptive statements given in justification of action, as in the illustration above.

The underlying structure of moral reasoning reflects the complexity of the individual's understanding of the rights and obligations of the protagonists (actual persons and also institutions) in the hypothetical dilemmas. Kohlberg explains the progressive complexity of structure in terms of Selman's 'levels of perspective-taking' - a quantification of Mead's conceptions of role-taking. Selman's levels of perspective-taking (see Paper 1 for details, and Paper 9 for discussion) have been shown logically and empirically to relate to Kohlberg's moral stages; the parallel stage of social perspective-taking is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the development of a moral stage. It depends very much on how one interprets these findings. Is what is being demonstrated a 'skill' of 'role-taking', or does the stage-specific structure of social-perspective-taking reflect an organisation of cognitions about the social world, and the variables and dimensions taken into account? The distinction is important; if it is a skill that is applied to the moral domain, then it is reasonable to argue that such a skill may facilitate organisation of moral understanding. If however it is structural, then why is it necessary to postulate the development of a distinct and separate structure for moral thought?

The argument behind the model of an 'implicit social theory' developed from considering that relationship, and from a realisation that although one may choose only to look at prescriptive statements, these rest upon an organised description of social functions, such as the maintenance of order, the generation of rules, the application of laws, and the codes necessary to govern interpersonal and institutional relationships. For example, let us consider promise-keeping; this is expected, it is an 'ought'. But if we ask 'why?', we are trying to tap the structural basis of this prescription: we find that it is accompanied by some such argument as "promise-keeping is necessary for the maintenance of trust and harmony", or "people don't like you if you break promises". These arguments are beliefs about the nature of the social world, and about the consequences of certain actions. Although they can be applied to the moral sphere, they are not exclusively concerned with moral or justice issues - they equally apply to friendship, or to organisational questions, or to conventions concerning courtesy behaviours.

It was on the basis of appreciating the nature of these underlying structural conditions for the prescriptive conclusions which represent the 'moral' statements, that I began to consider the idea of a 'theory' which people develop in order to deal with ordinary interactions, interpretations of social and broadly political events, and other fields of social life. It seemed that such a theory is more functional to the individual than a narrow conception of justice which is only applicable to specific issues, many of which do not directly touch one's own life; an implicit social theory applies to friendship and colleagueship, and to the resolution of the most basic conflicts of interest between persons.

The foregoing argument derived originally from the logic of stage structure; in addition it became apparent to me that the structure of thought in other domains had similar underpinnings, in particular the work on conventional thinking, and the work on political thinking. I developed the idea of a common substrate which was applied, according to the demand characteristics of the situation, to moral, political or social questions. The nature of the implicit social theory and its structural development, was deducible from this material, and is described in Paper 9 and Paper 13. Preliminary evidence for it came from the Cotgrove and Weinreich-Haste study; interviews covering a wide range of social, political, economic and moral issues, produced an outline of four levels of the implicit social theory (Paper 12).

The model of an implicit social theory has several advantages. Firstly, it makes sense of many of the structural problems which were discussed in Section 2. Secondly, it avoids the problems associated with the conflation of a theory of morality and a theory of development. Thirdly it makes sense in relation to the kinds of questions which I raise about social rhetoric and social representations.

Sex Differences in Moral Orientation

Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg's theory had two sources, as I outlined above. One was the need to explain the apparent sex differences in moral stage scores which some studies had found, showing that women tended to be classified as stage 3, and men as stage 4. The second was her own observation that there was a qualitative difference between the moral reasoning of women and men; women resisted the definition of the situation in terms of rights, and instead focussed on the responsibilities of the protagonists, and aimed for a negotiated compromise rather than the resolution of a conflict between interests. This qualitative difference in reasoning might also, she argued, account for the sex difference, in that 'affiliative' responses were likely to be coded as stage 3, rather than as the more legalistic and explicitly rights-oriented stage 4. As a result, she developed the argument that women reason about moral issues 'in a different voice', which reflects mutual responsibility rather than a conflict of rights. She extended her thesis by arguing that the way girls experience relationships in the family, the role models for female style of interaction, and the qualities expected of women in social relations, direct them towards a less competitive and rule-oriented style. Thus they are less at home with the legalism which is reflected in Kohlberg's coding system, which was derived from a longitudinal study of males.

A second source of data comes from Lois Erickson's work on the relationship between moral reasoning and ego development, as defined by Loevinger's model. Loevinger's model has many of the characteristics of a cognitive developmental approach, though it retains a dynamic dimension. Loevinger and Kohlberg have disputed over the exact relationship between moral and ego development. Evidence from a male sample appears to indicate that moral stage development precedes ego development. However Erickson argues that amongst her sample of women, a number inverted that sequence; that is, they have a higher ego stage than moral stage. There seems to be a sex difference, therefore, in the relationship between ego and moral stages.[33]

A recent paper by Walker reviewed a large number of studies on sex differences in measurement of moral stage. It concluded that, when education is controlled for, there are no sex differences. But there are a number of interesting questions remaining about the question of a *qualitative* difference in style of reasoning. I am concerned with two. My first question concerned the implications of Gilligan's 'different voice' for the theory of morality; she is, in effect, proposing an alternative 'moral theory', but retaining Kohlberg's theory of *development*. The question is, are there only two possible moral orientations? Within the coding system, Kohlberg and his associates identify a number of *Norms* and *Elements* which provide a way of classifying different kinds of responses. For example, they include in this list not only Law, Contract etc. but also Affiliation. In practice, however, these do not have any effect on the way the primarily justice- and rights-oriented theory is moderated. However it appeared to me from reading the longitudinal material that there were consistent differences in the 'orientation' of different boys, and that these were consistent over time and stage development. The purpose of the Pilot Study reported in Paper 12 was to see how wide a range of different 'orientations' emerged from the data.

The pilot study used Kohlberg's longitudinal male data, and Erickson's longitudinal female data. By using material from both sexes, I hoped to be able to establish a) whether there were consistently different orientations between the sexes, or b)if the same orientations occurred within each sex, they took different forms. In fact, within the time available for the pilot study, I was only able to identify a range of possible orientations, and to establish the themes within each orientation. I have not yet been able to establish the extent to which they are a) distinct and separate orientations or 'moral ideologies' and b) whether they are at all sex-linked in a systematic way.However, my basic position is that the issue of sex differences is largely a red herring.

The second question which Gilligan's work raises for me concerns ~~the~~ social psychological issues.What does her critique tell us about the role of rhetoric and social representations? Her data suggest that women may be more likely to use a moral rhetoric based on responsibility, and for men to use rhetoric based on rights; her argument that this may be the result of different kinds of social and interpersonal experience is quite convincing. However, to what extent is there a distinction between the use of a preferred orientation, and actual competence in an orientation? Work on the social psychology of the experiment makes it quite clear that the questioner has a fair degree of control over the ways a respondent may answer. The follow-up questions to the hypothetical moral dilemmas in the Kohlberg standard methodology are deliberately directed to issues about rights and fairness. These do not bias the stage of response, but do determine the kinds of response. But the fact that a person does 'play the game' and give "rights" responses does not necessarily mean that this would be her preferred response,only that she is competent to use that rhetoric. As Gilligan points out, if one asks, not 'should Heinz steal?' but 'what should Heinz do?' one allows for a wider range of answer. Some respondents (those oriented to legal or rule issues) will focus on the stealing question, but others (who think in terms of responsibility) will consider the responsibilities of Heinz and the chemist. Both types of respondent are familiar with several orientations - in particular, for example, everyone appreciates that Heinz should not steal if he is to obey the law, even if they do not immediately mention the fact.

An obvious area where this issue is important is in cross-cultural studies. Kohlberg has argued that cross-cultural studies demonstrate the universality of the stage sequence, and of justice reasoning. However his data leaves open the question as to whether what he is demonstrating is a general competence to use justice reasoning, or its universality as a mode of reasoning. Provided the individual has grown up in a culture where there exists some social representations of fairness, rights and obligations, it is likely that he or she will be able to utilise this rhetoric, but it may be the case that under ordinary circumstances, that person would think in terms of, say, honour, or kin relationships, or interpersonal responsibility. So the universality of stages may be evidence for a universal theory of development, but not for a universal theory of morality.

However suppose that one is not equally competent in all rhetorical frameworks and moral orientation, even if one does have some access to them? The implication of Gilligan's argument is that one's social group determines the orientation predominantly in use, and one has little practice at an alternative form; this may limit one's competence. Israeli kibbutzniks are reared in a community in which collective decision-making and explicit democratic justice are not only a dominant ideology but practised as a way of life; they score higher than their American peers on the Kohlberg measures, which suggests that practical experience of one predominant orientation does have an effect on competence. (see Paper 14). The relatively depressed scores of Turkish and other non-Western cultures may reflect a lack of opportunity to develop abstract ways of conceiving of social interaction (i.e. affecting the development of an implicit social theory) or it may reflect less experience of the rights orientation - perhaps other moral orientations are more dominant in these countries?

The Gilligan critique is important because it is the first study which explores the effects on moral orientation of different social representations and the social and moral rhetoric of different social groups. Gilligan's work, despite its limitations, has raised some significant questions for the effect of cultural or societal factors on the content of moral reasoning; by 'content' I do not mean what is deemed to be right or wrong, but what kinds of arguments count as important in the discussion of the issue.

The Role of Social Interaction and Social Representations

Earlier in this Introduction I outlined the development of my ideas about social interaction (the effects of interpersonal factors) and social representations (the effects of dominant cultural beliefs, explanations and paradigms). I argued that developmental psychology, social psychology and sociology have each traditionally focussed on only one of these factors, and that each discipline tends to imply determinism rather than exploring interactive or dialectical relationships; theories which focus on the social origins of meaning tend also to treat those origins as determinants; in contrast, individualistic developmental approaches treat the social context as a catalyst in individual thinking, something which creates disequilibrium in the structure. There are some exceptions; Doise's work on the effect of small groups working together on Piagetian tasks, who produce 'better' solutions than might be expected from the developmental level of the individual group members, is an integration of social and developmental processes.[34] Kohlberg's developmental model does consider the role of interactive experience in individual development particularly in the just community studies, but he treats it rather as an independent variable or catalyst. Social psychologists focus on what goes on in interpersonal situations, but tend to ignore the individual's construction of the situation, and frequently ignore also the cultural context in which the interaction takes place.

What is missing from many of these models, therefore, is a framework for examining the interaction between individual, social-interpersonal and societal. These three systems have long been discussed in theories of value socialisation. However it seems to me that they were treated largely as resources for the passive transmission of values; society's values were passed on through instruction - reinforcement, imitation and identification - at a face-to-face level by parents, teachers and peers. The various forms of constructivist models focus on the individual or the group creating meaning and making sense. So for example, Kohlberg's system focusses on the activity of the individual, but assumes a static social system. Psychologists influenced by Wittgensteinian conceptions of language and meaning treat the individual as passive, and society as static; the active construction of meaning is in interpersonal interaction. Psychologists (or more usually sociologists) who accept a socio-historical model of meaning, treat both the individual and the interpersonal as passive or static reflections of the dynamic process of the historical and social-structural determination of meaning and explanation. The model I tentatively begin to propose in Paper 13 tries to consider what would happen if one treated all three as dynamically in interaction.

As was discussed in the previous section, Western respondents do not live in a monolithic society with only one dominant explanation of social and political processes. There is a range of values, and of organised belief systems, to which the growing individual becomes exposed. A child may, for example, receive from parents and teachers the message that 'being nice' is a good universal rule for all human relationships - and later will selectively absorb confirming versions of that message from television and other media sources, because she seeks to affirm that basic value. She will also be aware of other values, other social representations of what 'being a good person' means, such as fairness, justice, honour etc., and she will understand the implications of those other models. Her dominant rhetoric of 'being nice' will affect her own interpretation of the behaviour of others in interpersonal situations. It will also affect the ways she will legitimate her membership of her social group, for example in the form of sanctions she applies to others and in her negotiation of her own behaviour to fit into what appears to be acceptably 'nice' in a social situation (see Paper 13 for a detailed account of this).

But the interpersonal social interactions themselves operate within the context of wider societal dominant paradigms, and our young exemplar is likely to be exposed to other systems of rhetoric - for example 'being tough' or 'being fair' of these are not simply messages that having these qualities will make you a 'good person'. The child also learns that the function of these qualities is to maintain the social system, or to attain certain desirable social ends. The individual has access to available social representations and rhetorics either through interpersonal contacts with people who transmit cultural meaning, or at second-hand through norm-presenting media such as television, literature, and art. Another example is that the British child does not grow up with the same concept of 'democracv' as the American child, and the American child, on the whole, has a stronger belief in individualistic explanations of social issues than the European child, who has more of a collectivist orientation.

So, as Harré demonstrates, a cultural belief about what it is to be a desirable person is translated into action at the interpersonal level; in seeking to demonstrate one's acceptability and worth, one acts out certain patterns of behaviour, and affirms certain values, which are accepted by the group because they are affirmed by and learnt from the cultural media of transmission. And in doing this one is also negotiating the local definition and manifestation of that value; Kohlberg's just community members accepted the cultural value of democratic self-determination and collective decision-making, but the form it took depended on the local conditions (see Paper 14).

Harré's approach focusses solely on the individual in a social role; it ignores the relationship between individual construction and social experience. The developmental data shows that the individual's interpretation of the situation will depend upon her own dominant value system - for example interpreting an unfair act by another as, respectively, 'not nice', or 'insensitive' or 'not playing by the rules', depending on her general orientation - but also on her level of cognitive complexity. So in the just community situations, individual's responses to events reflected their level of cognitive complexity in different ways.

My integrative approach is close to the thinking of two current writers, Youniss and Moscovici. Youniss argues against the dominant model in developmental psychology, of an active individual constructing the world, and engaging in isolated self-reflection; he proposes that we pay more attention to the negotiation of validity and consensus through discourse with others. According to this model, moral development is the increasing capacity to engage in communicative relations. He argues for the translation of Habermas' conception of the development of communicative competence into empirically-based studies of friendship and moral discourse.[35]

Moscovici's conception of 'social representations' is an important link between the interaction between individuals in discourse, and cultural explanations and definitions. 'Social representations' are the frameworks which culture provides for the ways in which we interpret experience; we can make sense of events and social stimuli because we learn that they have symbolism, a conventional interpretation, which enables us to put them into a particular category of meaning. In addition, social representations determine what is the "proper way" to interpret and explain events; they have both prescriptive and descriptive functions. As Moscovici points out, this is no less than Durkheim argued, but as a sociologist, Durkheim stopped with a social-deterministic model. Moscovici considers how people use social representations in communicating, as explanations, metaphors and prescriptions, and in making the unfamiliar familiar by placing it in a setting where it can become comprehensible. So for Youniss, the individual can make sense because she is increasingly developing competence in discourse and interaction; for Moscovici the individual can make sense because she grows up in a world where there are ready-made categories, frameworks and metaphoric representations of experience, and it is because these exist that she can communicate with others - and maybe modify, locally, some of the representations - and also make sense of her own experience.

It seems to me that these approaches are important for both the theory of morality and the theory of development. Justice is clearly one social representation, which can operate at every level from the five-year-old saying 'It's not fair!' to the adult pondering the role of punishment in maintaining the law's legitimacy; both activities reflect a particular view of how to understand equity. This becomes clear if one thinks of counter-examples: the five-year-old responding to that "unfair" event by saying 'It is the will of the tree-spirits', or the sagacious adult arguing for the need to punish in order to purge the village of pollution. Gilligan's formulation of an alternative orientation of caring is at the very least an alternative social representation, and as I have argued, I do not think she exhausts the range of possibilities.

Within a particular social representation, such as the rights orientation, there are several levels of coherent symbolic and representational systems; in a sense each moral stage is such. According to the structural model of stages, each stage of reasoning reflects a premise about the basis for rights and obligations, based on the organisation of cognitics about the social world. So stage 3 reasoning is predicated on an understanding of the role of normative behaviour, virtues and personal qualities in maintaining functional social relations. In support of this, stage 3 reasoning also draws upon folk sayings and conventional expressions about community and gemeinschaft, which exist within the culture. In other words, although each stage of reasoning represents structural limitations within individual thinking, there exist also social representations of the ways to govern social relationships within the culture which are particularly relevant to the thinking of the stage. This is evident in the media; an undergraduate student, Richard Tuffin, analysed the Letters to the Editor and the Editorials in a variety of newspapers, about the Arthur case (mercy killing of a Down's syndrome baby). He found that within each newspaper, there was a tendency for a consistent moral stage of argumentation.[36]

To argue thus is not to suggest that one can talk loosely about 'stages' of cultural myth or normative explanation; it is to say that within a culture, there is a vast resource of social representations, stories and metaphors, which are accessible to the individual who is making sense of the world. The individual's level of complexity, within a particular overall orientation such as rights, is organised according to certain premises; so she will tune in to those resources of the culture which seem to give her a coherent and satisfying explanation. Malcolm Muggeridge wrote a stage 4/5 piece in the Sunday Times on the Arthur case, and a stage 3 version of the same argument for the Daily Mail; this suggests that skilled journalists intuitively appreciate these processes.

Is Moral Education Possible?

This question is addressed specifically in the four papers which form Section 4; but is implicitly present in many other papers. It is because the question is addressed in many forms that I have included three book reviews and a conference paper in the collection - the latter being a summary of part of a book in preparation, on moral education.

It is a question which is much more problematic in Britain than in the United States, due to the traditions of educational thought and practice in each country. Under the pragmatist influence of Dewey, the idea that education facilitated natural development towards more effective individual functioning and a better social system was accepted widely in the American school system. The idea of progression towards improved, if not perfect, individual development and a system of better democracy is a prevalent concept within American culture, present in behaviourism as well as cognitive developmental models. The cult of progressivism facilitated the acceptance of a model of stages of development as an alternative to the other kind of progressivism possible through the environmentalist orientation of Skinner (see Paper 14).

On this side of the Atlantic, progressivism and perfectibility are regarded somewhat more sceptically. There is a powerful social representation that social and economic forces shape our lives and those of our children, and that we can at best fight to ameliorate those effects. In addition, the British lay theories of morality are more concerned with the development of virtue than of reasoning, or even of values (see paper 18). Moral education has always been explicit in the British system, but through extra-curricular activities designed to strengthen character and develop appropriate styles of behaviour - through sports and games, through the development of codes of loyalty to the group and subscription to the ethic of honour, and through practice in certain roles, especially those of follower and leader. Cognition and reflection upon action and experience have a relatively small part to play in this process; conation and affect are of greater importance.

So the question, is moral education possible? is addressed in two ways. Firstly, what can research on moral development tell us about what is feasible within the education system; secondly, is there a case for integrating moral education based on cognitive-developmental approaches into classroom curriculum?

In brief, the data on moral development is not optimistic. Most people do not progress beyond stage 3 reasoning during their school years, and they enter secondary school with stage 2 reasoning. Hence an intervention programme could at best slightly accelerate the transition from stage 2 to 3 - which is more or less the demonstrated effect of just community experience. If accelerative intervention is not the purpose of moral education, then at the very least, the data does usefully indicate the kinds of cognitive organisation with which adolescents of different age/stages are operating; attuning to this level of cognitive structure is likely to be educationally effective. (see Papers 6, 7, 16, 19).

However, put thus, that is perhaps too pessimistic and global a viewpoint. There is much in the just community approach which has suggestive spin-offs for educational practice. The just communities made people aware of the processes operating within the group decision-making process, and encouraged them to focus on collective rather than individual interests. It is possible, though unproven, that such an experience in adolescence may be of benefit to future development in a number of ways;

studies comparing kibbutz dwellers with other Israelis do indicate a different long term orientation to the community, irrespective of moral stage measures.

The research does indicate the minimal usefulness of socratic discussion in classrooms for stimulating thought, and the much greater value of changing the structure of the community, provided it is accompanied by reflective analysis on the part of the participants. So the answer to the second question is that some guidelines for method emerge from the studies,but the chances of revolution are slim.

The Relationship Between Cognition, Action and Affect

According to Kohlberg and Candee's model, a cognitive consequence of higher stage reasoning is increasing integration of 'deontic choice' (what is right and just) and 'responsibility' (the recognition that one is personally obligated to act upon that choice). This model accounts very well for the existing data; moral stage correlates extremely well with perception that one should act, and with action. Their model, however,does not seem to take into account the experience of moral crisis at lower stages (which people certainly report subjectively). Nor do they consider how the experience of a moral crisis may have a significant disequilibrating effect on the structure of thinking. Furthermore, Kohlberg and Candee appear to accept the traditional mechanistic model that attitude should predict behaviour. For many years social psychologists have argued that behaviour may occur for extrinsic or contingent reasons; the individual makes sense of, explains or justifies that behaviour post hoc, thus creating or modifying attitudes and explanations as a consequence of behaviour.

Further, there is the question of affect. Affect tends to be largely ignored in cognitive-constructivist explanations.

At most, the model [cognition → action] is extended to include affect as the *energiser* of action; (I perceive the situation to be unjust, I am angered by injustice, I must act). It became clear to me from reading our own data on individual moral crises that a) some affective experience which did not necessarily have a 'moral' connotation (such as fear, anger, loss of pride) was frequently the prelude to perceiving the situation in 'moral' terms, b) this experience caused a re-organisation of cognitions about the situation; and c) acting upon either affective or cognitive appreciation of the situation itself led to cognitive reconstructions. These observations led me to question the explanatory value of the Kohlberg and Candee model and my proposed alternative model is discussed in Paper 15.

In summary, this model argues that people experience a *triggering event* which initially arouses 'non-moral' or 'reactive' affect. The individual reflects cognitively upon the experience and its accompanying affect, and here the individual's level of cognitive complexity comes into operation. The individual perceives the situation in moral terms consistent with her level of cognitive complexity, which then leads to the arousal of *moral affect*. Action may follow either because the individual's cognitions, strength of feeling or perceived responsibility motivate her, or because there are contingency factors which make action feasible - for example the pressures of peers, or the opportunity for expression of these cognitions. In reflecting upon the implications of her moral affect, or upon the effects of her action, the individual adjusts and reorganises her cognitions, so the experience of moral crisis is itself a stimulus to development. This is what Gilligan found in her study of women confronting the crisis of unwanted pregnancy.[37]

My model differs from Kohlberg's in including affect as a significant variable, and also in exploring the relationship between action and cognition - i.e. the ways that cognition may be a reflection upon affect or action. In the paper I also consider what constitutes 'extraordinary' moral responsibility; by implication, Kohlberg's model suggests that the sense of responsibility for acting is 'extraordinary' in that only higher stage individuals seem to possess it. Our data, and case studies from other sources that I quote in the paper, would suggest that lower stage thinkers are sensitised by their affect and their cognitive reflection upon affect, which might lead to action. The case histories suggest that higher stage reasoners who have been through significant affective experiences, and feel efficacious, may demonstrate what I term 'extraordinary' moral responsibility; they feel that only they can do the task, that their commitment to the moral issue transcends other responsibilities, and cannot be delegated or devolved to others.

Paper 15 is a preliminary discussion of the model, using a small number of case histories. It requires more, preferably longitudinal, data to test the model, and to develop some of the theoretical issues. I regard it as a considerable advance in my own thinking; however it is not part of the work developing the individual-interpersonal-societal dynamic. It is in many ways a return to the earlier questions about structure, the developmental processes, and the role of experience in creating disequilibrium in cognition.

Conclusions

This discussion of the history of my thinking demonstrates a progression, from a narrow concentration upon structure, within an individualistic model of cognitive development, to four parallel strands of theoretical work. I will now consider the future direction of my work in these four areas, and reflect on some implications of it.

The first strand is the extension of my model of an implicit social theory. This model needs a further development of the coding scheme outlined in Paper 11: it also needs a longitudinal study. Currently, I am in the process of setting up a project to study adolescents aged 11 to 17, of both sexes: hopefully, this will become an extended longitudunal study. This study is exploring the relationship between moral reasoning (as measured by Kohlberg dilemmas), political reasoning (as measured by a modified version of Adelson's Islanders story, and by a series of questions about social issues) and broader social cognition about friendship, responsibilities and authority relations.

The material from this study will facilitate the further development and refinement of the stages in the implicit social theory: it will also be the basis for exploring the structural interrelationship between moral, political and social reasoning.

The second area of my interest is part of my concern to integrate social and developmental psychology. In Paper 13 I outline a model for the dynamic relationship between intrapersonal, or individual, cognition, interpersonal negotiation of meaning, and the social represnetations reflected in symbols, rhetoric and metaphor. The analysis of the symbols, rhetoric and social representations which are reflected in the explanations which adolescents give in an individual interview, are one way into an understanding of this dyanmic interrelationship: the taken-for-granted assumptions about social causality, about a priori values, and about the consequences of action, reveal the parameters within which these adolescents are thinking about social, moral and political issues. The social representations which exist within a culture or subculture set the terms of reference for making judgements and providing reasons: I have argued in several Papers, and earlier in the Introduction, that the interesting differences between Gilligan's model of female moral reasoning, and Kohlberg's approach, lies in the different social representations which are invoked as the basis for moral decision-making.

The current study will provide a basis for analysing the pattern of different rhetorics in use amongst British adolescents. The preliminary framework described in Paper 12 is being developed and extended in this analysis. This work is a beginning in the exploration of the relationship between the societal level of meaning systems, and individual cognition.

The relationship between the individual and the social is also the focus of my third field of interest. This is the interaction between the individual's construction of meaning and the social processes of normal dyadic or small group relations - which is the predominant social experience of the growing individual. Many studies indicate that a great deal of the child and adolescent's time is actually spent in establishing the ground-rules for playing, finding an agreed meaning, and sharing common values. This has largely been ignored by developmental psychologists who tend to focus only on individual constructions, forgetting that these are refined, implicitly or explicitly, on a daily basis in ordinary interractions.

We conducted a pilot recently, looking at the relationship between the individual's stage of reasoning, and dominant use of rhetoric, and their performance in discussion between peers, a methodology which has been especially developed by Berkowitz, mentioned earlier. While it is a problematic methodology, it is something that will be introduced into the current study.

The fourth strand of my current research and thinking is the relationship between experience and reasoning. As I discuss in several Papers, it is clear that experience, particularly personal crises and unusually salient events, is accepted by many writers as being very important in the developmental process. However it has largely been understated, except in the work of Gilligan and Belenky on abortion. In Paper 15 I explore specifically the role of crisis in the life of the individual, and present a preliminary model of the interrelationship between affect, cognition and responsibility. This model discusses the need to recognise the role of affect in engaging the individual, and the role of perceived responsibility in creating disequilibrium in the individual's construction of the situation. As yet, the model does not fully articulate the specific relationship between stage of reasoning and construction of experience, nor does it consider at all the important role of social representations - for example of the nature of responsibility, appropriate affect or action - in determining the parameters within which the individual perceives the situation and her role in it.

This work is being continued in the present study: we are asking the sample about personal experiences and crises, and from this, building up data on post-hoc reflections about the events, and about their resolution. A longitudinal study would provide the opportunity for seeing the lead up to, the immediate resolution of, and the llater reconstructed memory of significant events. In the interim, further work on Kohlberg's longitudinal data would provide a rich basis for exploring these issues.

Finally, we are currently piloting a small study od women who have been involved in the Greenham Common protest, to examine some of the specific questions which arise from the Helen John interview discussed in Paper 15.

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3 Moral development

Helen Weinreich-Haste

Introduction

Moral development poses a number of problems for psychologists. Firstly, the definitions and categories of 'moral' are a mixture of folk wisdom and the heritage of philosophy. Secondly, the psychologist is increasingly being asked to make a constructive and practical contribution to the expanding area of moral education. Thirdly, the researcher is expected to demonstrate concern: in contrast with most other areas of psychology, in this field it is considered desirable to express a point of view and a commitment about the long-term effects of one's research.

In this chapter I am going to discuss a number of major issues in the psychology of moral development. I am not attempting a comprehensive review of the literature; several excellent reviews are available (Wright, 1971; Graham, 1972). At present, the term 'moral development' covers a number of aspects of development, growth and socialization, loosely linked by the diffuse, generic category 'moral'. The several theoretical approaches in the field do not only offer different interpretations of the data; they employ different definitions of morality. There is considerable fragmentation; the various aspects of moral development do not, on the whole, show much intercorrelation. The issues which I shall discuss reflect on the origins of this fragmentation, and on the implications for theory and for education.

Firstly, I shall look at different ways of defining 'morality', and consider how this affects the way in which psychologists approach moral socialization. Secondly, I shall consider the major theories and their concepts of development. Thirdly, I shall examine the ideas of 'character' and 'virtue', and the components of morality. Finally, I shall consider whether the evidence offers any possibility of a more integrated psychology of morality, and the implications of theory and data for educational practice.

The nature of morality

Social problems and moral engineering

The definition of morality depends very much on the orientation of the research under consideration. There are pressures on psychologists to explain, and provide recipes for the solution of, certain types of social problem. Considerable research attention has been paid to delinquency and violence. For the lay person, these social problems frequently have moral connotations. However there are few social scientists who would consider that large-scale violence can be accounted for by individual lack of impulse control. Not surprisingly, research on these issues has contributed considerably to an understanding of the cycle of deprivation and the effects of poor family relationships, but little to an understanding of moral development.

In the field of moral education, also, the psychologist is caught between lay and scientific definitions. Lay and traditional expectations of moral education are that it should inculcate discipline and, as Wright says, 'the control of unruly pupils and ... reduction of the incidence of theft, violence, vandalism and the like' (Wright, 1976). In fact, in Britain the role of the psychologist in moral education has been relatively minor to date. However as moral psychology becomes less eclectic and more cognition-oriented, psychologists are becoming more interested in education as 'the facilitation of new insights into moral problems, greater empathic awareness of others, are the growth of more mature cognitive structures' (Wright, 1976). The distinction, even conflict, between a 'vice and virtue' approach and a 'moral reasoning' approach is evident in theory as well as in practice, as will become apparent.

Major moral and ethical issues have been an important impetus to research. The events in Nazi Germany stimulated considerable research into the antecedents of evil (Adorno et al., 1950; Milgram, 1967). In the last decade, the American conscience has experienced many traumas, including the My Lai massacre and the Watergate affair, which between them include most of the major moral issues of Western culture. In addition to these negative moral experiences, there have been a number of positive ones, in particular, individual and collective resistance to oppression and injustice. Many psychologists writing about moral development cite these events, and express a commitment to developing an understanding of morality which might have a public effect. Many show optimism about being able to do so. Whether such a belief in the perfectibility of man is justified will have to be judged from the evidence. More specifically, however, there is a close relationship between the way that 'morality' is defined, and the kind of issue which is cited as a moral problem, as we shall see.

Conceptions of morality

Broadly, the psychologist has a choice of two definitions of morality within which to investigate development. The first is a normative, relativistic definition, which can loosely be called 'sociological'. According to this definition 'moral' acts, values or motives are those regarded as desirable or right by the society in which the individual lives. The basis of this view is that all cultures rear their children to conform to their code, and pass on from generation to generation the values and beliefs held. For the psychologist who adopts a normative definition, the interesting questions concern the means by which conformity to the norms is achieved through socialization of motives, and how values are transmitted across generations and internalized by the growing individuals.

The second definition might loosely be termed 'philosophical'. In a sense this is a meaningless label because three millenia of philosophical preoccupation with the nature of morality have produced a number of philosophical definitions of morality. However, those philosophers who have directly influenced the psychology of morality are united by certain common themes. The first of these is that the domain of 'moral' thought, action and motive can be distinguished from other domains. The second is that moral rules and principles are universal, or at least universalizable. The third is that there is a state or condition of 'moral maturity'; a person grows, at least potentially, to be able not only to generalize from the rule, but to generate new rules. For the psychologist who adopts this definition of morality, the interesting questions concern the growth of moral understanding.

There is a wide range of psychological theory within and between these approaches, and many psychologists use normative concepts to inform their philosophical-moral definitions, and vice versa. It would be a gross oversimplification, for example, to say that the social learning theory approach to moral development is exclusively normative, or that because character typology theorists and cognitive-developmental theorists both concentrate on the progressive development of 'morality', they are talking about the same thing. For the purpose of illustration it is useful to compare two theorists who in *some* ways exemplify each of the definitions. The first is Skinner, whose assumptions can be interpreted as ultra-normative. The second is Kohlberg, whose model is of 'the child as moral philosopher' (1968).

Skinner (1971) specifically denies many of the tenets of Western moral ideals by rejecting the concepts of autonomy and freedom. Skinner's argument is that a number of things follow logically from the scientific realization that everything about a human being's behaviour, values and motives is the consequence of contingencies of reinforcement. Firstly, there can be no freedom of choice, there can only be conflicts between contingencies of reinforcement; therefore education for moral choice is meaningless. Effective 'moral education' (socialization) would eliminate the possibility of choice between a 'good' and a 'bad' alternative, although there might remain some conflict between two equally 'good' alternatives. Secondly, that which is good is that which is reinforced, not vice versa. The only possible definition of 'good' is in these terms; having been reinforced for performing some action, we are then subsequently reinforced for *calling* it 'good', 'right' or 'moral', and these terms may subsequently act as continuing reinforcers for those actions because we learn that it is 'good' to be 'good'.

Thirdly, problems of anti-social behaviour and in fact all forms of 'immorality', including excesses of the appetites, are a consequence of incorrect reinforcement schedules. Therefore the solution to social problems, as well as to individual socialization, is to design a culture so that the contingencies of reinforcement are effective in ensuring the continued survival of the individual, the culture and ultimately the species.

Skinner's views are highly controversial, especially his utopian vision with its implied necessary component of 'psychologist kings' to

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design and control the schedules of reinforcement. For our present purposes, however, Skinner illustrates an extreme form of normative approach. This has a number of characteristics.

Firstly, moralization is not distinguishable from socialization. If being 'moral' equals being 'well socialized' then there is no psychological distinction between learning the moral rule and the mathematical rule, between learning to avoid being run over by cars and to avoid stealing. Secondly, the desired outcome of socialization is conformity to the rule and to the norm. Thirdly, the emphasis of socialization is on impulse control and the learning of the rule. Fourthly, the processes of socialization are processes of *acquisition* – of motives, values and behaviours – strengthened by practice and reinforcement.

Kohlberg (1964; 1969; 1970; 1976) concentrates solely on the development of moral reasoning. He rejects the 'bag of virtues' approach to morality on the grounds that the only acceptable definitions of morality concern ethics, not behaviour. Behaviour is neutral, morally, unless informed by ethical concepts. His research demonstrates the development of moral conceptualization through a series of stages. Kohlberg's approach to the development of morality is Kantian. The predominant theme of moral development is an understanding of justice, which comes to full fruition at stage 6. The definition of justice which Kohlberg employs is that of Rawls (1971). The stages are a succession of qualitative changes in moral 'ideology'; through development the child increases her understanding of relations between people, between the individual and the institution, and between rules and roles. In this process the child differentiates the various components of justice, and gradually integrates them.

Kohlberg has been criticized on several grounds. His emphasis on justice, to the exclusion of other aspects of morality such as concern for others, has been attacked as too limited (Peters, 1971; Puka, 1976). Orthodox empiricists have criticized his lack of interest in the behavioural correlates of moral reasoning (Kurtines and Greif, 1974). Several psychologists feel that, whatever the philosophical definition, psychology should take a more eclectic view of morality, with greater attention to practical issues and lay concepts. Kohlberg's theory is important in current thinking about moral development, so some of these criticisms will be considered in detail later. Here we will consider the contrast between Kohlberg and the normative approach.

Firstly, the conventional meaning of 'socialization' is not appropriate; Kohlberg argues that moral judgement development is not a matter of direct teaching. A cognitively stimulating environment, and socratic dialectical educational methods, may induce conflict and disequilibrium in the child, which may act as an impetus to further development, but moral judgement is not *learnt*. Secondly, the outcome of moral development is the capacity to make judgements on the basis of principle. Far from conforming, the individual may act in a disruptive way in accordance with these principles, for example to restore justice. Thirdly, the emphasis of socialization is on the encouragement of more differentiated and more integrated forms of reasoning and sociomoral comprehension. Fourthly, the focus is on *development*, not on acquisition. Moral *knowledge* is of course acquired, early in life, but the interesting questions concern how the rule is understood and justified. Development is via qualitative, not quantitative, changes in moral reasoning.

These two perspectives are theoretically consistent and systematic. In contrast, much research on moral development has been problem-centred or focused on one aspect of morality, and only fairly loosely linked to a specific theoretical approach. For most psychologists, the working definition of morality is a cluster of components: resistance to temptation, guilt, altruism, moral belief and moral insight. The origin of this cluster is cultural tradition; we have inherited a conception of the 'virtuous person', who possesses each of these components in good measure. In fact, psychological research has demonstrated very little correlation between these aspects of morality, but rather than modify the concept of the virtuous person, psychologists have concentrated on increasing the rigour of their investigation of the individual components.

The nature of the beast

All cultures have their model of the 'virtuous person', and employ various measures designed to produce a majority of such persons in every rising generation. Such a person knows the rules, and has acquired the motives which sustain her adherence to those rules. She herself contributes to general social control by judging her peers and operating shaming sanctions, or appeals to guilt, if they deviate. Ultimately, she will socialize those members of the next generation who are in her care.

Bronfenbrenner has illustrated the relationship between the cultural conception of the virtuous person and the socialization methods designed to produce her (Bronfenbrenner, 1962; Garbarino and

Bronfenbrenner, 1976). The cultural goal affects not only the content of socialization, but also its form. In Soviet society, following the teachings of Makarenko, the peer group is used extensively as the mediator of socialization, rather than direct adult authority. This reflects – and implements – the desired outcome of a collectivist morality. Parallels can be drawn with the kibbutz and other communally based societies.

Within our culture, the components and characteristics of the virtuous person are generally agreed, but there are considerable differences in assumptions about the inherent nature of man. The model of man affects the definition of morality and the conception of development. Is man passively moulded into virtue, or is virtue actively sought? Is man fundamentally evil, fundamentally good, or neither? Is virtue the triumph of reason over passion, or the triumph of good passion over evil passion? These are central questions, and different theories of moral development have different underlying assumptions.

Four distinct models can be detected in current approaches to moral development. In the first the infant is neither moral nor immoral at birth; she is devoid of motives, either pro- or anti-social. She is moulded and conditioned, and essentially passive. She acquires habits, motives and values, which may be pro- or anti-social. Temperamental variables may affect how easily she is conditioned, but conditioning also may modify some temperamental or innate tendencies.

In the second, in contrast, the infant is born with considerable potential for being anti-social. Development is a continual conflict between the pressures of the socializing environment, and the demands and desires of the individual. The lay version of this model places some emphasis on 'sin', and both lay and psychological models stress the importance of guilt and the development of impulse control.

The third model presumes that the individual is fundamentally good and would, if left alone, develop naturally into a virtuous person. The effect of society is largely corrupting. This viewpoint is usually attributed to Rousseau (1762). While it has few adherents within orthodox psychology, it has been influential in 'deschooling' educational movements and in some forms of progressive education (Neill, 1961). Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) link this model with psychoanalytically-based self-realization models as 'romantic' conceptions of man.

In the fourth model the individual actively seeks to understand the social world and to formulate rules for social intercourse. Virtue in this

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model is to a large extent equated with reason. The dominant issue of development is rational judgement rather than the growth of a sense of sin.

Theories of development

The three major theories of socialization, in their treatment of moral development, contain implicit models of man which affect how *development* is conceived. The implicit model also affects which aspects of morality are emphasized.

Social learning theory

Social learning theory has departed from the traditional behaviourism exemplified by Skinner in a number of significant ways, but it retains some of the assumptions. 'Socialization' is the acquisition of cultural values and the conditioning of moral anxiety, or conscience. The desired outcome of this is self-direction and impulse control by the individual, in ways appropriate to the culture. The emphasis of social learning theory is on the investigation of that which is observable, which predominantly means behaviour. Increasingly however there is a shift towards analysis of the intervening variables, and away from the contingencies of conditioning anxiety. The intervening variables include cognition, and the mechanisms of internalization (Aronfreed, 1968, 1976).

For some years the main focus of attention has been on modelling as the primary mechanism through which identification occurs. Modelling is a form of identification, though lacking many of the connotations which this concept has in psychoanalytic theory (see Graham, 1972). The child imitates the behaviour and the values of a significant other, because that person has characteristics which arouse a motive state in the child. The parent's love may be, or appear to be, contingent upon the child's good behaviour. Imitation in this context would have a dual function. The behaviour elicits direct approval from the parent, and by imitating the approving parent the child provides the basis for self-regulation. Her own acts, previously rewarded by the parent, can be reinforced when performed alone by her own imitative self-approval, 'Good girl!'. There is extensive evidence of the role of the modelling process in the acquisition of behaviour and values (Bandura and Walters, 1963; Berkowitz, 1964; Sears et al., 1965; Gewirtz, 1969).

Within the terminology of social learning theory conscience is conditioned anxiety, but there are a variety of ways in which this can be construed. At the most minimal level, conscience is anxiety which is conditioned classically to punishment, as demonstrated by the experiments of Solomon (1960, 1968). Solomon induced resistance to temptation and manifest anxiety ('guilt') in puppies. Eysenck (1976) argues that the only possible *scientific* theory of morality is in these terms. Like Skinner, he argues that 'immoral' or anti-social behaviour is caused by and can be dealt with by conditioning procedures and, as is widely known, he contends that biologically based differences in conditionability can account for failures of socialization.

Conscience is more liberally construed by other social learning theorists. Aronfreed (1976), for example, considers that there is a wide range of stimuli to which anxiety may be conditioned. He refers to these as 'monitors'. 'The precursors of a punished act may consist for example of behavioural cues which are produced by the child's own motoric orienting actions. But they may also take the far more interesting form of cognitive processes which range from the simplest representational images to the most complex evaluative structures (such as principles)' (p. 59).

Within its own terms of reference, social learning theory accounts adequately for the socialization of many aspects of social and moral behaviour. These terms emphasize the control, and self-control, of specific actions and habits, and the development of certain general dispositions and response tendencies – which might in another framework be termed 'virtues'.

Psychoanalytic theory

Traditional psychoanalytic theory emphasized the role of the superego in conscience development. With the resolution of the Oedipus complex a reservoir of guilt-energy was created from residual id energy, and concurrently parental values were introjected to form the ego-ideal (Freud, 1923). Latterday psychoanalytic writers have placed less emphasis on the development of the superego and the specific crisis at the age of five or six. Instead they have elaborated the integration typical of the ego, a process which involves balancing the destructive self-directed aggression of guilt against the love-oriented altruism directed towards others. Freud separated the judging function of the superego and the reasoning function of the ego. This implied a conflict relationship additional to the conflicts already existing between the id and other aspects of personality. Ego psychologists, however, regard the integration of the ego as the manifestation of full moral development (Gilligan, 1976; Loevinger, 1976).

In the terms of traditional theory, the anti-social and fantasy-based impulses of the individual, which equip her ill for survival in the social world, are channelled to reality and to the control of the self. The developmental process is conceived as conflict, between fantasy and reality, and between reason and passion. The role of guilt is problematic. Guilt is the internalized mechanism of control, and is essential therefore to the individual and to society; aggression turned in towards the self prevents aggression to others (Freud, 1930). Yet guilt inhibits happiness, and too much guilt creates neurosis. The oversocialized individual is not ego-balanced (Gilligan, 1976). The desirable outcome from the point of view of psychoanalytic theory, is the triumph of reason. Reason can resolve some of the conflicts, but reason is an ego function, and therefore, particularly in the terms of traditional theory, it cannot be free from conflict with id and superego influences.

The psychoanalytic analogue is unsatisfactory to many psychologists because it appears to be untestable. Many would prefer to argue that it is 'of historical interest only' – a generous euphemism. However, Freud has had a wide influence on our culture and on those grounds alone his conceptions of guilt and the dynamics of the sense of sin deserve to be given consideration. If nothing else, traditional psychoanalytic theory provides insight into why we think in terms of 'sin' and 'evil', rather in the more static terms of 'deviance' or 'lack of socialization'. To date no other approach in psychology has come to terms with the power of emotion associated with moral outrage, deep shame or existential guilt. The phenomena which are termed responses of the ego to threat, namely distortion of reality and of judgement, polarization of belief, and a rigid conviction of righteousness, are important and recognizable aspects of moral beliefs. The unsatisfactoriness of the developmental theory should not blind psychologists to the importance of the phenomenon.

Cognitive-developmental theory

Cognitive-developmental theory, the third perspective, will be treated more extensively, partly because of its rapidly growing importance and partly because, particularly in Britain, much of the material is relatively inaccessible. The main tenets of the approach have already been described; the emphasis on moral reasoning and the sense of justice, the conception of the child actively construing her world, with progressively greater differentiation and integration, and the progression through a series of qualitatively different stages of thought.

The originator of cognitive-developmental theory is of course Piaget. His work on the moral judgement of the child (1932) demonstrated three stages of moral thought in primary-school and prepubescent children; moral realism, morality of cooperation, and morality of equity. Although Piaget never integrated his cognitive and moral theories, the same principles and criteria of stage development can be applied in both. The stages are consistent internally – *structured wholes* – which form a hierarchy of successive progression, each stage integrating and consolidating the previous one (Pinard and Laurendeau, 1969; Flavell, 1971).

Kohlberg's work has considerably elaborated and extended many aspects of Piaget's model of moral development. His method, like Piaget's, presents the subject with four moral dilemmas which elicit moral reasoning. Kohlberg's stages are presented in Table 3.1. The claims of the stages to fulfil the criteria of cognitive-developmental theory have been established by experimental and by longitudinal studies. Kohlberg's original sample (1958) have been followed through into adulthood – the oldest subjects are now approaching forty (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969; Kohlberg, 1973). Studies by Turiel (1966; 1969) and Rest (1969; 1973) have demonstrated that

Table 3.1 Moral stages

	Content of stage	
Level and stage	*What is right*	*Reasons for doing right*
LEVEL I: PRECONVENTIONAL		
Stage 1: Heteronomous morality	To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.
Stage 2: Individualism, instrumental purpose, and exchange	Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.	To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests too.

	Content of stage	
Level and stage	*What is right*	*Reasons for doing right*
LEVEL II: CONVENTIONAL		
Stage 3: Multi interpersonal expectations, relationships, and interpersonal conformity	Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. 'Being good' is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude.	The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behaviour.
Stage 4: Social system and conscience	Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system 'if everyone did it', or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations.
LEVEL III: POST-CONVENTIONAL or PRINCIPLED		
Stage 5. Social contract or utility and individual rights	Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some non-relative values and rights like life and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.	A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, 'the greatest good for the greatest number'.
Stage 6. Universal ethical principles	Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.	The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them

From Lickona (1976)

subjects reject the reasoning of earlier stages, and both prefer and comprehend best their current stage reasoning, and that of one stage above. Material of a higher stage is reinterpreted by the subject in terms of the reasoning of her own stage. Attempts to promote development progression to the next stage experimentally, using discussions, socratic methods and so forth, have demonstrated the difficulty of upsetting the existing structure of thinking except in the case of subjects who are already in transition (Lorimer, 1971; Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975).

These findings confirm that moral development is a slow process. In contrast with Piaget's conclusion, Kohlberg and others have shown that moral realism does not cease at the age of eight; it is still prevalent in ten-year-olds. The second stage of moral reasoning is found frequently in adults. Rational morality, in the sense of post-conventional reasoning, only begins to appear in late adolescence or in adulthood, and in any case it is very rare; studies of adult populations with above-average ability reveal a predominance of conventional reasoning (Haan, Smith and Block, 1968; Fontana and Noel, 1973).

As noted earlier, Kohlberg argues that the evidence supports a definition of morality based on the principle of justice (1971). In his view, justice is the only moral principle which (a) subsumes other aspects of morality, and (b) in the course of development passes through and subsequently transcends both conventional and utilitarian-contractual reasoning. He sees the stages as increasingly sophisticated conceptions of justice. They demonstrate awareness of increasingly complex equity, and a growing understanding of the variables necessarily to be considered in making a just judgement. Until the final stage, the individual is, as it were, juggling with these variables, in each stage in an increasingly complex manner. At the final stage there comes the full realization that only the principle itself can be the basis for judgement.

Studies of the correlates of moral reasoning development provide a basis for assessing Kohlberg's claims for the greater moral adequacy of the later stages, and the primacy of the principle of justice. First, let us consider the relationship between moral judgement and moral action. There is little evidence that conventionally 'moral' behaviour relates *directly* to moral reasoning. A possible exception to this is a finding by Thornton (1977) that the *type* of crime committed was related to stage of moral reasoning. On the whole, where a relationship exists, there is ample evidence of a third variable intervening. Usually this is intelligence, which correlates highly with moral reasoning. Delinquents show immature moral reasoning but they show other characteristics as well (Kohlberg, 1958; Hudgins and Prentice, 1973). Kohlberg urges that ego-strength and other forms of personal competence intervene between moral judgement and impulse control (Kohlberg, 1963; Grim, Kohlberg and White, 1968).

In contrast, there is a definite relationship between moral judgement and what might be termed action performed in the service of an ideological belief or principle. Subjects with post-conventional reasoning were likely to resist an experimenter's pressure to inflict pain on subjects (Milgram, 1965; McNamee, 1977). Post-conventional students and faculty were much more likely than conventional ones to be involved in disruptive activities protesting against what they regarded as unethical tactics of institutions (Haan et al., 1968; Fishkin, Keniston and McKinnon, 1973). Stage 2 students (but not faculty) were also involved in protest; in their case, it seems that their moral outrage was less a matter of ethics, more a reaction to unfairness conceived in concrete terms of 'we' and 'they'.

It would seem from this evidence that moral judgement mediates action which *intervenes in the social process*, rather than acting as a control on personal impulse. There is some evidence, however, that the link between personal morality and moral judgement is through guilt. The description of subjective guilt reflects the general orientation of the dominant stage; for example, stage 2 subjects describe it as a fear of being caught, stage 4 subjects as an *alter ego*, judging the self (Weinreich, 1970).

A second correlate of moral reasoning is role-taking ability. 'Role-taking' is a rather confused concept which has been used to refer to anything from an empathic response to a simple perceptual capacity. For many people, empathy is a central concept of morality and, as we shall see later, there is some debate as to whether empathy is the consequence of moral development or one of its origins. Piaget defined role-taking as the capacity to see the other's point of view, and regarded it as a prerequisite for movement into the second stage. He also argued that it developed as a consequence of peer interaction. Subsequent attempts to relate peer interaction and moral stage have not been particularly successful (Kohlberg, 1958). Latterly, however, Selman (1976) has developed a satisfactory measure of *social perspective taking*. Stages of social perspective taking parallel, and are *prerequisites* for, the development of moral stages (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Selman's stages of social perspective-taking

I *Egocentric point of view.* Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.	II *Concrete individualistic perspective.* Aware that everybody has his own interest to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).
III *Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals.* Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete. Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other guy's shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.	IV *Differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives.* Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.
V *Prior-to-society perspective.* Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement contract, objective impartiality, and due process. Consider moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.	VI *Perspective of a moral point of view* from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

From Lickona (1976)

A third correlate of moral reasoning is cognitive development. This does not directly affect the claims of greater *moral* adequacy of the later stages, but there are some implications for the way the stages are seen as a total system. Several studies indicate that formal operations are a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for proper transition from stage 3 to stage 4 (Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan, 1972; Cauble, 1976). Less clear evidence suggests that stage 2, but not stage 1, requires concrete operations. Traditionally, the stages

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have been linked in pairs to form levels, on the basis of the dominant content themes. The evidence of related cognitive function suggests that the levels may be misleading. Changing the grouping of the stages would have little effect on the view that justice is the primary issue. On the other hand it would make *possible* an alternative interpretation. This is that the first three stages represent progress from an authority-based morality, through a morality of expediency and utility, to a morality of humanity and compassion. The second three stages *repeat* this cycle, at an *abstract* level. A form of this view is that the final three stages are *parallel* forms of abstract moral reasoning, not sequential (e.g. Gibbs, 1977).

Kohlberg's theory has been widely accepted, especially in the United States. The particular appeal seems to be on two counts: firstly the emphasis on cognition, secondly the fact that it is a developmental theory. There has been in psychology an increasing interest in cognition and information processing, and a movement towards a more active model of man. Developmental theory implies a theory of progress, a shift away from deterministic models which concentrate on acquisition mediated by the social environment. Sullivan (1977) also argues that the theory has particular appeal to contemporary culture: 'In a culture deeply involved in moral problems related to race, poverty and war, this theory offered a concept of justice which promised to deal with the quagmire of value relativity.'

Not everyone is enthusiastic, however. The emphasis on justice, despite its honourable Kantian tradition, is to many people too limiting as a definitional criterion of morality. There is still an unresolved issue, as to whether the concept of justice is in fact necessary for the *developmental* theory (as opposed to the *moral* theory). Redefinitions like that of Gibbs cited above, suggest that the developmental theory could operate with a different core emphasis. Could not cognitions be about compassion rather than about justice?

Finally, there are reservations about the empirical status of the theory. While the earlier stages are well-documented by cross-age samples, and by longitudinal studies, post-conventional thought is rare and the number of its examples small. This creates difficulties especially in view of the importance of post-conventional thought to the definitional base of the theory. It is not helped either by Kohlberg's recent (1977) re-analysis of stages 5 and 6 (Kurtines and Greif, 1974; Trainer, 1977).

'Character' and 'virtue'

The theories outlined above, particularly social learning and cognitive-developmental theory, focus very specifically and in depth on certain aspects and conceptions of morality, ignoring others. Neither theory makes any attempt to incorporate traditional conceptions of 'character'. There are historical reasons why 'character' has apparently not survived psychological analysis.

Character traditionally has two meanings. One encompasses the concept of the virtuous person; a collection of moral traits with the assumption of predictability between them. The other means adherence to a higher-order principle, which implies strength of will as well as a grasp of the principle. The demolition of the trait model occurred early in the history of research. Hartshorne and May (1928–30), as is well known, found low correlations between honesty and other moral traits. Their findings have been highly influential in the argument that many 'virtues' and traits are situation-specific, and mutually independent. In fact, subsequent re-analysis of their data (Brogden, 1940; Eysenck, 1953; Burton, 1963) produced some evidence of a common 'moral' factor, and Mackinnon (1938) did find interpredictability from one aspect of morality to another, but with an adult sample.

The problem may be partly methodological. Many studies of moral traits are conducted in laboratories, frequently with trivial tasks, which may evoke more situational than moral variables. Quasi-naturalistic studies by Milgram (1963; 1965) and by Zimbardo (1974) demonstrated that the situation can wreak havoc with character and virtue, when the pressures are against, rather than towards, 'moral' action. (Zimbardo and his associates ran a prison simulation with students, and were disturbed to find how rapidly the actors degenerated into their roles.)

'Developmental character typologies' exist in various forms and have a long history. They have tended to present a mixed bag, not only of virtues, but of reasoning, values, and motives. However, even if supported by empirical studies, they offer little. Their common theme is that development progresses from anarchy, through authority-based and then peer-based sanctions, until the final state of autonomy is achieved. Ostensibly, all aspects of morality are integrated in the process. Theoretically, these models are eclectic. Because they lack rigour, they cannot be called 'stage' theories.

Wright (1971) has summarized the character typologies diagrammatically. (see Figure 3.1). The hierarchy reflects an *evaluation*, regarding the degree of moral sophistication of the type. It does not necessarily follow that there is only one route to moral autonomy. The problem with these typologies is that there is insufficient empirical data to substantiate them. The cost of their eclecticism is a lack of definitional clarity. The question of transition from one type to the 'next', is not dealt with, and the supposed interrelationship between the various aspects of morality is taken for granted, without analysis. While there may be strong arguments in favour of attempting to integrate, the character typologies in existence are too speculative, and too reliant on an unquestioning acceptance of lay assumptions, to be equipped to come to terms with the difficult conceptual issues involved.


Altruistic-autonomous
Conscientious-rule-following
Collectivist
degree of internalization of socializing influence
Authoritarian
Conformist
Amoral
Mainly adult influence
Mainly peer influence

Fig. 3.1 Diagrammatic summary of character typologies (Wright, 1971) based on material from McDougall (1908); Swainson (1949); Havighurst and Taba (1949); Peck and Havighurst (1960) *inter alia.*

But there are many who defend a pluralistic conception of morality, despite the problems of the psychological evidence. Hogan (1973) proposed a five-dimensional model of moral character, deriving from man's 'natural' rule-following and rule-formulating tendencies. These dimensions are moral knowledge, socialization, empathy, autonomy, and moral judgement. They are sequential phases of development, which interact with one another and influence both conduct and perception. (Hogan's model resembles the character typologists, but differs from them in the rigour of its conceptualization and experimentation.) Peters (1971) defends virtue as a necessary addition to any rational model of moral development.

These writers are seeking to define morality in a way which integrates philosophical and psychological considerations. They are not asking the same *kind* of questions as those psychologists who, accepting the implications of the Hartshorne and May study, have devoted themselves to one aspect of morality. Peters' main criticisms of Kohlberg, for example, indicate the kind of integration he is seeking. 'How do children come to care? This seems to me to be the most important question in moral education; but no clear answer to it can be found in Kohlberg's writings.' (1971, p. 262)

Secondly, Peters (1963; 1971; 1974) defends the Aristotelian conception of moral growth, that the individual enters the palace of reason through the courtyard of habit. Rules are learnt through action, and subsequently the rules are given meaning, through reason. This perspective could be integrative; unfortunately, Kohlberg's rejoinder is that there is no evidence that early habit-training has an effect on later moral judgement. To date, however, research effort has been directed to the various components of morality, in isolation. Empirical rigour has not been lacking. Although in some cases the delineation of the issues and the definition of the problems have been somewhat narrow, at least it can be said that there exists some sound and useful data. From this data it is possible to assess the effects of different methods of socialization, and to make at least some headway in distinguishing between situational variables and enduring individual characteristics.

The components of morality

Altruism

Of all the components of morality, altruism has been the least

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amenable to analysis. It has tended to be seen as an extension of empathy, yet the research data consistently seems to indicate strong situational dependence. In part, the difficulty is to define what is to be explained. Many of the characteristics which come under this heading are general traits or qualities; people are *expected* to be helpful, sympathetic and so forth, and selfishness is not usually regarded as a *moral* failing. Altruism concerns the extremes. Apart from obvious acts of heroism, at the positive end there are forms of good samaritanism, going out of one's way, being self-sacrificing for the benefit of another. The negative aspect is exemplified by the case of Kitty Genovese, who was murdered in front of thirty-eight witnesses. This event created the same degree of moral outrage and impetus to research among psychologists as the other traumas mentioned at the beginning of the chapter.

Explanation of altruism is complicated by the basic assumptions of most psychological theories, that man is inherently selfish and hedonistic. Rosenhan (1969; 1972) has found a kind of solution in social learning theory terms. Either the gratitude or other positive affect of the recipient of altruism is rewarding, or alternatively the child develops a response tendency as a consequence of receiving approval from parents for the performance of altruistic acts. This theory however builds in a concept of self-reward, which rather diminishes the usual definition of altruism.

Psychoanalytic theory has been cynical about altruism; altruistic behaviour is the symptom of inner conflicts, and the manifestation of a desire for domination or manipulation, or a projection of one's needs on to others.

A less pessimistic interpretation is provided by a theory which does not otherwise contribute to moral psychology. This is equity theory, a cognitive social theory, on Lewinian principles, which accounts for interpretations of the social situation (Walster and Piliavin, 1972). A sense of imbalance is created in the bystander by the perception of differential equity, e.g. by an injured person or a victim. The bystander can rectify this inequality either by helping, or by distorting the situation (diminishing its seriousness), denying her responsibility, or degrading the victim. The advantage of equity theory is that it accounts for various possible reactions in social-psychological rather than in moral terms.

There persists, however, a view that altruism must relate to empathy. The distinction has already been made between approaches

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which regard empathy as the manifestation of moral maturity, and those which regard empathy as a prime force in impelling development. Ego psychologists, for example, regard altruism as part of the ego process; the self depends upon the altruism of others, and can achieve its fullest expression only in social interaction. Altruism is therefore regarded as a consequence of ego integration (Katz, 1972).

The correlates of altruism do not support a personality or trait model. The data on the whole suggest situational determinants (Wispé, 1972). Huston and Korte (1976) argue that there is a 'good samaritan' profile, which consists of a constellation of values or world view rather than motives or traits. Cognitive-based variables are important; we have already noted the relationship between moral reasoning levels and certain types of helping behaviour under difficult conditions (Milgram, 1967; McNamee, 1977). Schwartz (1968) found that people who regard themselves as responsible for the welfare of others are more likely to show helpfulness under emergency conditions. Overall the findings consistently show that a general *competence*, including cognitive competence, are significant variables in altruism. We shall return to competence later.

Resistance to temptation

Resistance to temptation is for many people *the* central issue of morality. Partly this is because effective resistance to temptation has been regarded as a valid criterion of internalization. Partly however it arises from the traditional combination of Protestant values, in which pleasure is regarded with suspicion, and resistance to the temptations of the flesh and of the spirit is the mark of the godly.

There are two ways of looking at the origins of resistance to temptation. One, the more simplistic, is to treat it simply as the result of effective anxiety conditioning. The tempting stimulus becomes the CS, eliciting the CR, guilt (or avoidance behaviour). Another, more complex, approach argues that resistance to temptation is part of a wider response style, and is not purely a moral phenomenon. Grim, Kohlberg and White (1968), for example, found that the best predictor of resistance to temptation was span of attention. Mischel and Mischel (1976) report a series of their own studies which demonstrate the relationship between a capacity to delay gratification in general, and resistance to temptation and self-control. Their argument is that resistance to temptation, and self-regulation in general, is part of *competence*. 'Competence' includes a wide range of intellectual and cognitive functions, including life-planning, of which 'moral' characteristics are necessarily a part. We saw above that competence is an important associated variable of altruism also.

Guilt

The importance of guilt to the theory of socialization has already been discussed. A central issue for psychologists has been to establish the antecedents of guilt. However, guilt has many meanings.

One meaning of guilt is ***pre-transgression anxiety***. Ostensibly, this operates as an inhibitor; its measured strength should in some sense be an indication of the probability of the performance of unacceptable action. Another meaning of guilt is ***post-transgression anxiety***. This takes a number of forms, for example confession, restitution, remorse, and intrapunitive behaviour. As it obviously is not concerned with the effective control of behaviour, its operation has a different interest. It is a motive state; usually it has been treated as an indicator of the extent of the individual's guilt – that is, as an indirect measure of the success of internalization (Johnson, Dockecki and Mowrer, 1972). However, as a motive state, it is likely to affect perceptions of the situation. Wright (1971) has argued that the cognitive-dissonance aspects of post-transgression anxiety have been ignored. What is the relationship between the extent of post-transgression anxiety, for example, and the perceived magnitude of the sin? There are interestin questions regarding the way in which atonement or post-hoc justifications operate as means of adjusting or overcoming the anxiety.

A further aspect, or perhaps an analogue, of guilt is shame. Several writers have suggested that the emphasis on guilt may be ethnocentric. (Ausubel, 1955; Gilligan, 1976). Benedict (1946) distinguished between 'guilt' cultures and 'shame' cultures. The former instil controls through the development of intrapunitive aggression, the latter through the force of public disapproval, or extrapunitive aggression. This distinction creates problems for Western psychologists, because shame is regarded as a less developed form of anxiety than guilt; most developmental theories postulate a stage or form of shame-based morality, through which the individual passes before the full internalization of guilt. Benedict however argues that 'in the United States we do not expect shame to do the heavy work of morality. We do not harness the acute personal chagrin which accompanies shame to our fundamental system of morality'.

This illustrates some of the possible limitations of our conception of

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guilt. We assume that shame and guilt operate in different ways. Shame is the judgement by others for failure to uphold the social code; it is not necessarily only concerned with moral issues. Guilt implies a sense of sin, it is exclusively a moral category, and concerns judgement by the self, not others. Yet as has been noted, many people describe their sense of guilt in terms of the *implied* judgement of others. Ausubel (1955) considers that the distinction is too pure to be useful psychologically. Shame and guilt operate in all cultures; shame cultures classify as 'shame' much that in American culture would be called guilt, and guilt cultures define 'shame' in terms of guilt. This resolution retains the developmental relationship between shame and guilt, but alerts us to the confusions arising from an idealization of guilt.

Finally, it is generally held that guilt is not enough. The 'morally mature' individual transcends guilt, particularly irrational-conscientious guilt, and becomes 'autonomous' or at least develops 'existential guilt'. These terms cover a variety of conceptions, but there is considerable evidence that there is a valid concept of a morality not governed solely by protestant-ethic anxiety.

The antecedents of conscience

Hoffman's studies on the antecedents of morality indicate that there are three types of conscience, and there is a definite relationship between the type of conscience and parental socialization methods (1963; 1970; Hoffman and Salzstein, 1967).

The first type of conscience is characterized by punishment anxiety, which *may* operate as a deterrent to action, but is equally likely to be evoked only after transgression. The second type of conscience is characterized by fear of loss of love. This has powerful guilt force, effective in maintaining what Hoffman (and others) call a 'conventional' morality. Both these types of guilt rest upon anxiety about the consequences of transgression to the *actor.* Hoffman distinguishes a third type of conscience characterized by 'existential' or 'ontological' guilt. Such guilt is directed to the effects of actions upon others rather than upon the self. It is an empathic rather than an intrapunitive form of guilt. Hoffman calls this type of conscience a 'humanistic' morality.

He studied the effects of power assertive, love withdrawal and induction (reasoning about the consequences of action) techniques of child-rearing. On various measures of guilt and other moral responses, the induction technique emerged as clearly superior. In contrast,

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power assertive methods actually had *negative* effects. Love withdrawal was more associated with the development of conventional morality, and induction with the development of humanistic morality. Hoffman came to five conclusions, which provide a succinct summary of the process of interaction between child-rearing practices and conscience development.

(1) Power assertion generates anger in the child and also provides the child with a model for the expression of anger.
(2) All techniques of discipline imply parental disapproval, and therefore arouse the child's need for approval. Love withdrawal techniques increase this anxiety; induction techniques diminish this anxiety because disapproval is only part of the process of induction, and the reasoning process gives a *justification* for the disapproval.
(3) Power assertive and love withdrawal techniques focus both affect and attention on the actor, whereas induction techniques focus on the effects of actions upon others.
(4) Expectations are built up in the child, based on previous experience of discipline techniques: therefore the child will interpret a particular act of discipline in terms of the prevalent mode to which she is accustomed. ('Whilst I was writing this, Benny Green told an apposite anecdote of a music critic who reported admonishing his nagging son thus: '"Shut up!" I explained.')
(5) Effective techniques are those which enlist existing emotional and motivational resources within the child. Obviously the need for parental approval is essential for the acquisition of guilt.

Hoffman contends that *empathy* is important. He does not regard it as something which is acquired, but as a *natural proclivity*, elicited by appropriate (inductive) techniques. Empathy then becomes a motive force in its own right on which further moral socialization can develop (Hoffman, 1976).

Some studies of the correlates of moral reasoning substantiate Hoffman's conclusions. The relationship between moral reasoning and political action was discussed earlier. These studies also demonstrated a relationship between moral stage and the evaluation of desirable personal characteristics, and between moral stage and reported parental socialization techniques (Haan et al., 1968). Stage 5 and

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stage 6 subjects reported parents who were not particularly expressive, but were concerned with respect for individual rights. These parents were seen as actively involved with their children, and as conflict-inducing. Conventional stage 3 and stage 4 subjects, in contrast, reported relatively conflict-free relations with their parents, clear rules, and clear expectations of good behaviour. Parents used privileges as a means of encouragement and of discipline.'

All these findings pose something of a theoretical problem. In the case of the moral reasoning studies, it is explicit that a developmental sequence is involved. It is not clear whether Hoffman regards his types of conscience as forming a developmental sequence, but much of what he says implies that they are treated as such. The conventional approach of seeking antecedent conditions is a means of accounting for individual or group differences; it assumes that the antecedent conditions determine the *type*. This kind of exercise would therefore only be meaningful in this situation if the stages manifested among these students can be regarded as *terminal*: if the question we are asking is, what are the antecedent conditions which prevent people progressing beyond stage 3 or 4, or whatever. If we assume that these subjects are en route to further development, then we can only ask the weaker question, why are these subjects developing more slowly.

Implications

Moral education

What are the implications of the issues and evidence discussed above for moral education? The increasing emphasis on cognition, and on development rather than on acquisition, has highlighted the importance of the period of adolescence in moral growth. Acquisition models, in contrast, emphasize the significance of early childhood. The existing evidence, however, continues to stress the role of parents in fostering development, rather than the school. Some points, by no means exhaustive, can be drawn from the foregoing discussions.

Firstly, it remains a matter of debate as to whether any form of *virtues* can be taught in the school situation. As we have seen Kohlberg strongly attacks such a concept of moral education, partly on the grounds of its ineffectiveness. Other writers (e.g. Sugarman, 1973) argue that the school does have some influence on what might be termed virtues or response tendencies, if only because the child spends

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a great deal of time, and is exposed to a wide variety of influences, information and interactions at school. The strongest conclusion that can be made, given both theory and evidence, is that the school has prevailing *norms*, of behaviour and values, which are likely to have an effect over time. This includes, of course, both official and unofficial norms.

One way in which the school can be effective is by the provision of a 'just community' (Kohlberg, 1970; Fenton, 1976). In such a community, the primary principle, justice, is practised in such a way that every member of the community is involved. In such an environment, the child can be constantly exposed to moral discussion as well. While such a community demands quite radical changes in the school system, it has at least the merit of being demonstrably successful. The evidence, however, has more specific relevance to the micro-situation of teaching, the class contact between teacher and pupils, and most particularly to moral reasoning. The emphasis on cognitive aspects of morality (not only reasoning) and on the importance of cognitive stimulation in the developmental process, gives teachers scope for intervention. The danger is, however, that this may be interpreted as being an effective way to produce principled morality. A proper interpretation of the data is more pessimistic.

Socratic methods and discussions in which children are exposed to the arguments of a higher moral stage are effective in stimulating movement to the next stage *only* if the individual is already on the way towards transition. The process of consolidation and integration of a stage of moral thought is slow and complex; only up to a point can it be accelerated. The advantages of conflictual discussion and the stimulation of questioning is that it leads to what the Americans call 'values clarification' a process which itself promotes change. While it is, therefore, unlikely that such a programme of moral education will produce many more post-conventional sixth-formers, it is likely to produce stage 3 fourth-formers with a livelier awareness of the issues and of alternative interpretations of them.

What are the implications for dealing with specific issues? The main conclusion of all studies is that the individual reinterprets whatever is presented in terms of her own stage of thought, and that material that is, or appears to be, couched in terms of a lower stage is rejected. Hampden-Turner and Whitten (1971) argue that one of the problems arising from this is that the stage 4 person may reject a stage 6 argument partly because it *sounds like* a stage 2 argument, given that the subtleties of stage 6 reasoning elude her. Therefore, whether the teacher's aim is to increase consideration for others, or to counter the arguments of the National Front, the message of the data is clear; she must present a basis for discussion within the parameters of the stage appropriate to that at which the children are currently operating.

The state of psychological theory

The weight of the evidence reviewed in this chapter supports the general direction in which theory is going, towards an increasing emphasis on cognitive rather than on personality processes. This is not only an emphasis on reasoning; there is increased recognition of the role that rational process and cognition play in other aspects of morality (Ausubel, 1971).

Secondly, the concept of development is undergoing revision and clarification. Increasingly the evidence is in favour of morality *developing*, not being acquired as a consequence of teaching or training. Undoubtedly certain aspects of morality are acquired, for example basic moral knowledge, and specific forms of guilt anxiety, but this is a *basis*. There is constant change and modification taking place throughout childhood and adolescence.

Thirdly, trait models have been shown to be unsatisfactory. While many 'moral traits' or, in Peters' terminology, 'virtues' are desirable in their own right and merit fostering in the child, their relationship to other aspects of morality seems to be tenuous. On the whole, virtues are endstates; they do not seem to be an impetus to further moral growth or to the integration of morality. A possible exception is empathy, which, as has been noted, is regarded by some writers as a catalyst for growth and development. Increasingly, however, as the definitions become less confused and the investigations more rigorous, it appears that it is the more cognitive elements of empathy which are important in development.

The consistent finding which emerges is the relationship between many facets of morality, and *competence* of various kinds. Competence implies effectiveness, personality integration, ego strength and the capacity for life planning. Indirect support for this trend is provided by the evidence that the child-rearing practices which appear to be conducive to the development of the 'morally mature' person are also those associated with the production of competence (Baumrind, 1967, 1972).

Mischel and Mischel (1976) have developed a model which deals with a specific definition of competence. In their 'cognitive social learning' approach they attempt to integrate moral judgement, moral conduct and self-regulation. In this model, there are two moral components: the individual's *competence* to generate pro-social behaviours, and the motivational variables effecting the *performance* of these behaviours. This model allows for the separate analysis of the two components, in addition to providing a basis for theoretical integration. 'Competence' in this sense includes the active organization of information, and is closely related to intelligence and to intellectual functioning. Moral reasoning is in many ways that sort of function, with a particular and specialist area of discourse, and with affective elements to be included in the organization.

Mischel and Mischel's analysis of moral stages as a competence function is, potentially, a possible way of bridging the gap between thought and action which has always been a problem in moral psychology. Furthermore, there is a wide range of overlap between moral and other activities associated with appraisal, both of the self and of the environment. If treating moral reasoning as a competence function is a way of integrating these theoretically, it is possibly a first step to bridging the gap between the definition of 'moral' derived from philosophical bases, and the more diffuse operational definitions of morality which have been prevalent in psychological studies.

Finally, the boundaries of the definition of 'moral' are changing, particularly in the context of moral reasoning. The now well-established relationships between moral, political and social reasoning, and the overlap with cognition and also with ego processes are provocative (Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1971; Podd, 1972; Candee, 1974; Haan, Stroud and Holstein, 1973; Weinreich, 1974, 1977). To date, these have been explained in terms of one form of development being separate from another but a prerequisite for it (Kohlberg et al., 1977). In the writer's view, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that more is going on in this area of development than the present models, and the present definitions of morality, can fully account for.

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Introduction

Morality, according to Shaw's character Dubedat, consists in suspecting other people of not being legally married. Certainly if you ask the average passer-by about morals, he or she will probably think of one of three things. There are first individual peccadilloes, especially of the sexual kind that figure so prominently in the tabloid press, but also including lying, promise-breaking, and other minor dishonesties: the sort of sins that most people commit at some time. Then there is the grand guignol of the moral world, those dramatic forms of deviance which have always horrified, but also enthralled, the averagely law-abiding sinner: spectacular robberies, rape, murder, terrorism, and genocide. And finally there are the more diffuse, de-individualized forms of anti-social behaviour which increasingly affect most people directly or indirectly, whether as victims or observers: vandalism, hooliganism, teenage violence at football grounds or on public beaches, riots, and political violence.

When people complain of a decline in public morality, in the schools and in the streets, it is probably this third category, the 'collapse of law and order', rather than promiscuity, murders, or organized crime, that they have most in mind. Here, they insist, something must be done, and there is no lack of suggestions as to what that something should be. The very phrase 'when law and order breaks down' is a revealing one. It might refer simply to the fact that people do not do what the authorities tell them to; but it also implies a failure of internalized constraints, the inability of some people to control themselves as the rest of us do. So the moral seems plain: we must train people to behave themselves, to control their impulses and observe the norms and conventions of civilized society. But if, in the meantime, these internal controls are inadequate, then we must increase the external constraints, legal enforcement and the threat of punishment.

In fact there is no reason to expect that these methods will be any more successful in controlling the third form of immorality than they have ever been with the other two. Of course we can punish our children, shame our friends, fine and imprison our fellow citizens, as we have always done. But these perhaps

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have more effect on what we will *regard* as acceptable behaviour than on individual action as such. Despite extensive efforts to make people chaste, honest, and truthful, we have learned to live in, and even enjoy, a world of moderate immorality. If the grand guignol crimes are relatively rare, it may only be because they do not fall within the normal range of temptation of most healthy and adjusted people. We do not, on the whole, abstain from murder from a fear of the consequences, or because we have been taught not to kill. The circumstances of our ordinary lives typically preclude murder arising as an option for us. If we are driven to it then, self-defence aside, it is typically the result of extreme emotion towards someone close to us whom we, perhaps temporarily, find intolerable. Under those circumstances anything may be possible, even—and perhaps especially—for the most self-restrained of us. As the statistics demonstrate, you run more danger of being killed by your nearest and dearest than by a total stranger.

The de-individualized anti-social behaviours of contemporary concern also lie, on the whole, outside the range of normal temptation, except under the pressure of social circumstance or particular group norms. Riots do not break out spontaneously, nor are they merely triggered by chance occurrences; they require a background of disaffection and alienation. Teenage hooliganism may, like duelling, have more to do with symbolic acts of honour and display, with the presentation of self and the maintenance of prestige both for the group and within the group, than with violence and aggression as such. This is not necessarily to find such behaviour excusable, let alone acceptable. The ancient adage that to understand all is to forgive all does not preclude a desire to change things, to ensure that they need not happen again. The moral is not that we have to tolerate social disorder, violence, and lawlessness as the product of our circumstances and not ourselves. The moral is that we have to understand these phenomena—more to the point, we have to be able to explain them—before we can hope to modify or affect them.

Yet the unfortunate fact is that we know almost nothing about why people behave morally or immorally. Despite the competing claims of everyone from sociobiologists to psychoanalysts we lack any agreed and comprehensive account of why people in general behave as they do, individually or together. But the study of moral behaviour in particular has, until recently, been relatively ignored, especially within orthodox psychology, as too indefinite, too value-laden, and, perhaps, too complex. Research was conducted covertly even within the portals of behaviourism, under such headings as the conditioning of anxiety or guilt, the social transmission of values, or the acquisition of norms, habits, and skills. These investigations did not examine the nature of morality, but simply assumed that 'immoral' was equivalent to 'deviant'. The function of the psychologist was therefore to account for this socially deviant behaviour, by reference to the contingencies of socialization. The assumption was that both pro- and anti-social behaviour, and their associated beliefs, were inculcated

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into a passive individual through reward and punishment; the desired outcome would be self-motivated restraint, and the self-monitoring of behaviour by reference to internalized cultural values. The label 'social learning theory' says it all: the acquisition of morality is a branch of learning theory, with conditioning the primary mechanism; and what is thus learnt or acquired is essentially social, the conventions and expectations of the group.

But morality cannot be reduced to social norms. It is, on the contrary, something in terms of which social norms can be, and ought to be, criticized. The identification of 'moralization' with socialization presupposes a particular view of morality, and of the role of moral training, which has as its goal an individual who is self-controlled and law-abiding. This is in marked contrast to the dominant philosophical tradition, at least since Kant, that moral maturity consists not in conformity but in autonomy, the ability to decide for oneself and act on one's own judgement. Of course the assumption is that the autonomous individual will also be self-controlled and law-abiding, but only to the extent that morality requires: in a conflict between law or social expectation and morality, the latter will take precedence. And underlying these different conceptions of morality are different conceptions of human nature, one which sees the human being as inherently sinful, as needing to be kept from evil by the combined forces of social pressure and internalized constraints; the other which sees the human being as tending naturally to the good, as needing to be free, independent, and self-governing, in order to discover what is right and act accordingly. It is still an open question which of these ancient conceptions is correct. No doubt the truth, as often, lies in some combination of the two.

But neither is morality simply a matter of what people do, of how they behave. Similar behaviours, breaking a law or keeping a promise for example, can be profoundly immoral in one context and supremely moral in another. Individual motivation is relevant too. What one person does from a sense of duty or obligation, another may do for reasons of pure self-interest, and the morality of their conduct varies accordingly. Hence we cannot study morality without taking account of the various reasons, justifications, and rationalizations which lead people to behave as they do: morality is also a matter of what people think, and in particular of what they think they ought to do. Behaviour can be identified as moral only by reference to the agent's beliefs and understanding, both about morality and about what he is doing.

Yet for many psychologists attitudes and values have often been of interest only as 'mediating variables', having significance merely as potential predictors of behaviour. In other words, an attitude is explicable, and justifiable as an object of study, only insofar as it can be related directly to the primary process, behaviour. First consistency theories and latterly attribution theory have made inroads on this assumption, dealing with attitudes and beliefs as subjects of study in their own right, even if they are seen as providing only a post-hoc justification of behaviour.

Increasingly there is interest within psychology in cognitive processes as such, in contrast to the previous bias towards motivational factors. This shift of attention forces the psychologist to confront a wide range of new issues. The important questions of cognitive development concern the individual's understanding of the physical and social world, and here the reasoning process is primary, whether in the form of problem-solving or in the form of construal, the organization of understanding. And once we begin to take seriously the view that the person is an active, thinking being, rather than a passive creature controlled directly by contingencies of reward and punishment, then we have to take account of moral thought a well as moral conduct. Once we recognize that morality is not simply a matter of social conformity, we see also that the explanation of moral thought and behaviour must go beyond the assimilation of social norms and social skills, to the understanding and elucidation of morality itself. We need to know what morality is, and how different individuals understand it, before we can identify, explain, and ultimately, one hopes, promote moral thinking and moral action.

Philosophers, of course, have discussed these problems for centuries, but without arriving at any generally agreed solutions. But that may be because the questions are not wholly philosophical. An anthropologist—or, one day perhaps, an astronaut—faced with some alien community, the Ik of Northern Uganda for example, whose values, if they have any, seem radically different from ours; a psychologist, faced with subjects who seem prepared to administer massive electrical shocks to their victims because they feel they ought to do as the experimenter says, or with school children who insist that lying and cheating are wrong, but do it just the same; a teacher presented with a curriculum which includes 'moral education', or merely faced with the conflicting behaviour of children from a variety of social and ethnic backgrounds, and wondering what, if anything, he ought to do about it; any private individual struggling to reconcile personal need with moral obligation—all of these may find themselves asking 'But what *is* morality, after all?', and the answers they need need not be the same.

But it is also apparent that these fundamental questions of morality cannot be answered in purely philosophical fashion, without reference to the empirical facts. Moral philosophy is idle and empty if carried on in isolation from the facts of human development, and implictly or explicitly the major moral theories, from Aristotle to Sartre, are also theories of human nature: it is because man is as he is, they argue in effect, that morals are as they are. Philosophers have traditionally operated with a 'rational man' conception of humanity, as suspect for its intellectualism as for its sexism. The dominant questions of much contemporary moral philosophy have been: what form of morality would it be rational to adopt? what form of morality would a rational man choose to support? But we are not, for the most past, rational in the philosophers' sense; and we do not choose our moralities, if we choose them at all, for those sorts of reasons. Our

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morality is not, accordingly, that of the philosophers' rational man. If morality consists, for example, in acting only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law of nature, then there is precious little morality, even among philosophers.

There is, moreover, a difference in interest, in emphasis. The philosopher is primarily concerned to understand morality, to define moral judgments and analyse moral concepts. The psychologist is more concerned to explain morality, to discover its function and origins, at both an individual and a social level. But asked in a new context, old questions may yet acquire new answers. The definition of morality may be one thing in a philosophy seminar, quite another when we probe the thought of the average 13-year-old. And in seeking to understand the latter, we may learn something new about the former.

There thus arises a subject area, or overlap of subject areas, which we might call 'the psychology of morals'. What is morality? Where does it come from? Why do people accept it, if they do? How do they understand it? How far does it influence their behaviour? These are questions of enormous theoretical interest and practical importance to which we hardly begin to know the answers. They are questions whose answers require both philosophical analysis and psychological explanation.

The contributors to this volume, for all their other differences, share the belief that morality cannot be explained or understood without bringing together the varying perspectives of philosophers and psychologists, both social and developmental. Philosophical theories can be criticized for their psychological implications (see Kitwood, Chapter 12); psychological theories for their philosophical assumptions (Emler, Chapter 3); philosophical distinctions can be used to justify a psychological position (Thornton and Thornton, Chapter 4), psychological data to illuminate a philosophical problem (Straughan, Chapter 7); and sometimes the influences can run in both directions: psychological concepts are used to support a philosophical thesis which in turn has implications for psychological theory (Vine, Chapter 2).

Inevitably there are problems of communication across these interdisciplinary boundaries, and what appears an answer from one point of view may seem an irrelevance from another. What, for example, is the point or purpose of a theory of morality? The philosopher will be looking for a definition, some set of necessary and sufficient conditions, which enables us to distinguish morality and moral judgment from other social phenomena and forms of discourse. The developmental psychologist will want to understand the nature of moral development, not so much what makes it moral development as how it works, what processes it involves and what functions it serves. The social psychologist, similarly, will be concerned with the function of morality and moral judgment, and especially their social utility, serving both individual and group needs, rather than their role in personal development. All of these have to be distinguished from the moralist proper who wants, more concretely, some account of the things that are moral and immoral, and why. And underlying all these concerns is the prior theoretical question of whether and how far they can ultimately be separated: of whether some presuppose others, and if so which.

These differences of approach will also be reflected in the answers provided. When the philosophically-minded confront the question 'What is morality?' they naturally seek an answer which sets a definitive limit to what is to count as moral: this attempt to circumscribe the moral domain is evidenced, for example, in the approaches of Vine (Chapter 2), Thornton and Thornton (Chapter 4), and Locke (Chapter 6), though while all agree on the need to keep this definition neutral as between competing moral viewpoints, the conclusions they draw as regards the possible contents for different moralities are very different. But from a developmental point of view Weinreich-Haste (Chapter 5) argues that narrowly philosophical criteria of morality disguise the psychological processes involved, inasmuch as the empirical phenomena demarcated by the philosophical definition in fact overlap with other aspects of social and interpersonal development. And from a social-psychological perspective Breakwell (Chapter 13) tacitly assumes a more functional and relativistic position, where the key isue is not what moral judgments are, but what they do.

Similarly, when we confront the issue of thought and action, there is for philosophers like Straughan (Chapter 7) and Locke (Chapter 9) a clear conceptual distinction between judgment and behaviour: what people think they should do is not necessarily what they do do. The problem, accordingly, is to explain how and why the two connect in practice, which is one aspect of the traditional philosophical problem of *akrasia* or weakness of will, the failure to translate moral principle into action. But for psychologists like Wright (Chapter 8) and Emler (Chapter 11), in very different ways, the problem runs in the opposite direction, not from moral thought to action, but from action to moral thought or moral character generally. In re-assessing Piaget, Wright is concerned with the developmental issue of how action gives rise to thought; underlying Emler's discussion is the broader methodological issue of how far overt behaviour can justify the ascription to the individual of specifically moral characteristics, be they personality traits or levels of moral judgment, which might then enable us to classify, and perhaps even explain, the behaviour in question. The problem of bringing these different approaches to grips with one another is in part theoretical, in part empirical. First, tentative, steps in this direction are taken by Locke (Chapter 9) and Kutnick (Chapter 10).

With these differences of background and concern to separate us, we have not pretended to provide any comprehensive or consistent solution to the problems which unite us. Each chapter is an independent contribution to its particular topic, though informed by discussion of, and disagreement with, the contributions of others. The psychologist, forced outside his technical terminology by the incomprehension of the philosopher, may find it difficult to view that terminology, and the theories it encapsulates, in the same light again; the philosopher, asked to relate his abstractions to the facts of human development, may find the received truths of moral philosophy less easy to receive. By raising traditional issues in this interdisciplinary context, we hope not merely to suggest new answers, but to raise new questions.

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Developmental moral theory, with special reference to Kohlberg

Educational Analysis 5, 5-15, 1983

EDUCATIONAL ANALYSIS, 1983, VOL 5, NO 1, 5-15

Developmental Moral Theory, with Special Reference to Kohlberg

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If we ask the question, 'How do people become moral?', we are making implicit assumptions about what we mean by 'moral', and about what we mean by 'becoming' – in other words, about the processes of development. The differences which exist between psychologists and educationalists on the subject of moral development arise mostly from differing explanations of the processes of development, and differing assumptions about the desirable outcomes of effective socialization and development. Although there are many variations in approach, the main distinction is between a theoretical orientation which focusses upon the control of anti-social behaviour and the acquisition of habits, motives and behavioural repertoires which facilitate socially appropriate forms of action, and an orientation which focusses on the development of individual moral autonomy, ethical principles and the capacity to make moral decisions. The first orientation places more emphasis on the processes of learning, the cumulative acquisition of cultural mores, and the conditioning of behaviour and feeling. The second orientation places more emphasis on ethical understanding, and the development of reasoning processes. It is on the second orientation which I shall concentrate in this article.

If one is examining the control of impulse, the obvious method of research is to present the subjects with some kind of temptation, and observe reactions. A second, more verbal, method is to try to establish the extent of guilt and anxiety about transgression. It is however notoriously difficult to set up temptation situations in a laboratory context which are not basically trivial. More 'realistic' studies of 'bystander apathy' and altruism have tended to demonstrate the powerful effect of the social situation upon individual behaviour: individual tendencies towards pro-social behaviour tend to be overridden by social pressures. However, there are variations in individual behaviour, which have been explained differently by different theoretical viewpoints.

If, on the other hand, one is examining the development of moral reasoning, the method of investigation is to ask the respondent to demonstrate her reasoning processes through the resolution of some moral dilemma, a method which reveals what she deems to be important, what her dominant values are, and what degree of complexity she can handle. Piaget's early study of the

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development of understanding of justice, rules and punishment used simple dilemmas which contrasted the amount of damage done, with the intentions of the actor. He also asked children about rules of games; of boys he asked about marbles, of girls. hide-and-seek (Piaget, 1932). He found that in middle childhood there is a shift from a *heteronomous* morality, judgements which reflect a unilateral respect for authority and rules, to an *autonomous* morality, in which weight is given to intentions as well as consequences, and in which rules are seen to be negotiable amongst peers. Piaget's own interest in this work was mainly in trying to understand how it can be that a child, who inevitably must acquire her knowledge of rules through the authority and respect relationship of parent and child, comes to be able to make independent judgements based on mutual respect between persons. His hypothesis (though he did not test this empirically) was that the experience of peer interaction facilitated a shift from unilateral to mutual respect. Subsequent followers of Piaget in this field have tended to focus almost exclusively upon the cognitive changes in morality, the shift to intentionality and the waning of the concept of imminent justice. Some 25 years after Piaget's monograph was published, Kohlberg undertook his study of adolescent moral reasoning, with boys aged 10 to 16. Subsequently, 58 of these boys have been followed up at 3 year intervals, over 20 years.

The moral dilemmas which Kohlberg used were different from Piaget's, in that they posed problems about adult life and conflicts of authority and personal duties, which are challenging to adults as well as children – indeed, they are too complex for use with younger children. An example of one of the 9 dilemmas used by Kohlberg appears in *Figure 1*. The probe questions explore issues of duty, the rights of the chemist, and the question of punishment. These probe questions elicit the underlying reasoning and moral comprehension of the respondents.

> *Figure 1*
>
> In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid £200 for the radium and charged £2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about £1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, 'No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it.' So Heinz got desperate and considered breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.
>
> (1) Should Heinz steal the drug? Why or why not?
> (2) If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the drug for her?
> (3) Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger.

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Should Heinz steal the drug for the stranger? Why or why not?

(4) (If you favour stealing the drug for a friend:) Suppose it's a pet animal he loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal? Why or why not?

(5) Why should people do everything they can to save another's life, anyhow?

(6) It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally wrong? Why or why not?

From analysis of his original study, Kohlberg identified 6 stages of moral reasoning. These stages are laid out in *Figure 2*. The stages represent the changes and transformations which occur over time in how the adolescent understands, interprets and integrates moral and legal rules, rights and obligations, and most particularly, in the concept of *justice*. For Kohlberg, the concept of justice is central to morality, and it is the development of the understanding of justice that is for him the core process of moral development (Kohlberg, 1971 a and b). The stages of moral reasoning form a hierarchy of increasing *differentiation* and *integration*. Each stage integrates and transforms the thinking of the previous one, and each stage involves qualitative change in moral understanding, reflected in the resolution of the moral dilemmas.

Let us consider the stages of moral reasoning as laid out in *Figure 2*. Even on a *prima facie* basis, they clearly represent a progression from the simple to the complex in ethical and conceptual processes. The first level reflects reasoning based upon extrinsic considerations such as reward and punishment, and an unreflective acceptance of rules, codes and labels. Even though the individual may argue that the law should be broken in a particular case, the law itself is never questioned. An example of *stage 1* reasoning about Heinz could be that if Heinz stole, he would be a thief – a simple labelling of deviancy. Alternatively, the *stage 1* thinker might argue that he should steal, for such irrelevant and extrinsic reasons that his wife might be a rich person with lots of possessions. At *stage 1*, there is no real recognition of any conflict; only one aspect of the situation is oriented to, whether this is the rule or some essentially irrelevant aspect of the person such as their wealth.

With the development of *stage 2*, there comes a recognition of the possibility of conflict between the rules and individual needs. The resolution is couched in terms of instrumental outcomes – if he steals he will probably be caught and they will all be worse off. If he does not steal, his wife will die and be lost to him, so he should steal and hope to get away with it.

Between pre-conventional and conventional reasoning there is a shift in how rules are understood. At the conventional level, the individual understands the function and origin of rules as social utilities. However, there are many kinds of rules, and much of Level II thought is engaged in assessing the conflicting demands of laws, moral rules and natural justice. *Stage 3* reasoning on the Heinz dilemma reflects a conflict between normative role expectations – a *good husband* would act to save his wife if possible – and legal constraints – a *good citizen* obeys and upholds the law. With *stage 4* comes a

Figure 2: Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning (from Lickona 1976)

	Content of Stage		
Level and Stage	What Is Right	Reasons for Doing Right	*Social Perspective of Stage*
LEVEL I—PRECONVENTIONAL Stage 1—Heteronomous Morality	To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.	*Egocentric point of view.* Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.
Stage 2—Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange	Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.	To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests, too.	*Concrete individualistic perspective.* Aware that everybody has his own interest to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).
LEVEL II—CONVENTIONAL Stage 3—Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity	Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty respect and gratitude.	The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior.	*Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals.* Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other guy's shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.
Stage 4—Social System and Conscience	Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system 'if everyone did it,' or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations (Easily confused with Stage 3 belief in rules and authority; see text.)	*Differentiaties societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives.* Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system
LEVEL III—POST-CONVENTIONAL, or PRINCIPLED Stage 5—Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights	Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights like *life* and *liberty*, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.	A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, 'the greatest good for the greatest number.'	*Prior-to-society perspective.* Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. Considers moral and legal points of view, recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them
Stage 6—Universal Ethical Principles	Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights.	The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.	*Perspective of a moral point of view* from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

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significant change in the understanding of *society* as an abstraction; if Heinz steals his action and its consequences may set a precedent which could undermine the legal system and affect the wider society, not simply that group of individuals directly involved. If the individual reasoning at *stage 4* advocates that Heinz should steal, it is because marriage as an institution places obligations on the partners for mutual support, irrespective of the feelings they have, or alternatively, because there is a moral *rule* to preserve life which is higher than the legal constraint against stealing.

Post-conventional reasoning marks a shift to a more relativistic understanding: the individual can recognize that rules exist in all societies. and can see the functions that rules serve, irrespective of their form. Broad moral principles. rather than culturally-derived rules, are the criteria by which the legal rule should be legitimised. Where there is conflict between the legal and the moral, the moral should almost always take precedence. because the law should serve the moral principle. Legal rules are supported on the principle that, on the whole, they represent the greatest good for the greatest number, and they are, generally, the product of democratic social contract. Bad laws should be changed, not just defied, though it is recognized that public defiance of the law may call attention to its inadequacies. If it is argued that Heinz should not steal, the justification is that maintaining the social contract is of greater benefit to society, and therefore more important than. specific individual cases. It is relatively rare that a post-conventional thinker does argue against Heinz stealing; the social contract argument is presented as a caveat, a matter of general principle, rather than as an objection to Heinz's action.

The stages were originally derived from the reasoning of Kohlberg's Chicago sample of 72 adolescent boys in 1958 (Kohlberg 1958, 1969). The distribution of stages in this study can be seen in *Figure 3*. As is apparent. post-conventional reasoning was rare, and stage 6 hardly existed. Reformulations of the coding method have taken place partly as a consequence of the increase of data accruing from the follow-ups of the longitudinal sample, and partly from the increasing rigour of the analytical techniques.

There has been in particular a shift towards the scoring of *structure* rather than *content* (Colby, 1978; Colby *et al* 1983b). *Structural scoring* takes into account the underlying assumptions the individual holds about the social system and the function of rules, roles and rights. For example, the statement 'if there were no laws there'd be chaos' might reflect a simple vision of Armageddon; the existence of law *defines* order, and the absence of law defines anarchy, a topsy-turvy world. Alternatively, the individual might be taking a more differentiated view in which he or she understands the function of the judiciary and legislature, and appreciates the ways in which the law does impose social order. Another example of a similarly rhetorical statement whose interpretation depends upon context, is 'saving lives is the most important thing'. This may be the mouthing of normative platitudes, or it may be a fundamental principle whose implications for other principles, moral and legal rules has been fully considered.

The modifications in scoring have been designed to move away from

Figure 3: Stage Distribution according to Kohlberg's 1958 scoring



Figure 4: Mean Percentage of Reasoning at Each Stage for Each Age Group



manifest expressed opinion and towards underlying structure. The revisions have considerably improved reliability of scoring, and have also reduced the variation of scores within individuals. The effect of the revisions on the overall pattern of results, however, has been slightly to depress the scores. In particular, this is true at the higher stages; there are no *stage 6* subjects in the longitudinal sample, and the few who do operate substantially with *stage 5* reasoning have a considerable amount of *stage 4* mixed with it (Colby *et al* 1983a). Some adults who were originally scored as *stage 2* now appear as *stage 3/4* or *4/5*.

The material now available on adult moral reasoning suggests that most adults operate with *stage 3* or *stage 4* reasoning. Post-conventional reasoning is quite rare.

There are now extant a large number of studies based on Kohlberg's theory, which have addressed two questions; firstly, what are the processes involved in the development of moral reasoning, and secondly, what does stage of moral reasoning predict?

Research on the processes of moral development has tested the extent to which the model fulfils the requirements of a stage model of development – are the stages hierarchical, irreversible and does each stage integrate the previous one (Pinard and Laurendeau, 1969; Flavell, 1971)? Ultimately, the longitudinal data answered most of these questions, but there were a number of studies by Kohlberg's students, notably Rest, Turiel and Blatt, which experimentally tested aspects of the model. Rest and Turiel found that people preferred the stage with marginally greater complexity than their current mode of thought, and that when they were presented with the arguments of a higher stage, they reinterpreted it in the terms and concepts of their current stage. Blatt (and subsequently others) found that exposing the individual to discussion with others of a stage higher than themselves, produced disequilibrium in their thinking, and stimulated more complex thinking (Turiel, 1966; Rest *et al*, 1969; Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975). These studies were important contributions to the theory of development; but they also had practical spin-offs for the development of intervention programmes in moral education. In a recent review volume, Mosher has collected together a number of these studies (Mosher, 1980).

Moral reasoning does not exist in isolation. Firstly, it seems to depend on the development of logical operations. Several studies have indicated that the development of *stage 4* moral reasoning requires formal operational thinking (Kuhn *et al*, 1977; Colby *et al*, 1983a) and that the development of *stage 2* reasoning requires concrete operations (Smith, 1978). It is not surprising that logical operations should be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the development of moral reasoning; there is a strong cognitive element involved in Kohlberg's theory, in particular in the changing comprehension of 'society' and 'law' (Weinreich-Haste, 1983). The translation of logical operations into moral operations however requires another intervening step, *role-taking*. Role-taking is a difficult concept. In particular, there is frequent confusion between 'I *feel* what you feel' and 'I can put myself in your position and *see* things as you do'. Different approaches to moral development have focussed on different meanings of the term (Lickona, 1976). Selman however, has focussed specifically upon the second of the two definitions, upon the capacity to take the perspective of the other. In a series of studies, he and Walker have established that stages of social perspective-taking are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of the parallel stages of moral reasoning (Selman, 1980; Walker, 1980).

To some extent the research on the behavioural correlates of moral reasoning extends the theory of moral judgement development; to some extent it is an attempt to test the 'commonsense' assertion that moral judgement should be 'validated' by moral action. There have been several studies of the relationship between moral reasoning and both pro- and anti- social behaviour, and also between moral reasoning and political behaviour. In a review of this material, Blasi concluded:

> The body of research seems to offer considerable support for the hypothesis that moral reasoning and moral action are statistically related. This statement, however, should be qualified as soon as one looks at the findings in more detail. Empirical support, in fact, varies from area to area. It is strongest for the hypothesis that moral reasoning differs between delinquents and non-delinquents and that at higher stages of moral reasoning, there is greater resistance to the pressure of conforming one's judgement to others' views. The support is clear but less strong for the hypothesis that higher moral stage individuals tend to be more honest and more altruistic.
>
> Blasi, 1980:37

Let us consider specific studies as illustration. In a study of bystander intervention – helping others when doing so requires counter-normative behaviour or resistance to authority pressure – McNamee found that the post-conventional reasoners responded and acted on behalf of the distressed (McNamee, 1977). In a study in which the subjects were under pressure to give electric shocks, it was the higher stage subjects who quit (Milgram, 1965).

Studies of student protest behaviour, which usually involve behaviour countering the institutional rules and articulating a moral position of objection, show that moral stage predicts political action quite well. In the Berkeley Free Speech Movement in 1964, the higher stage thinkers aligned themselves actively with the protest position (Haan *et al*, 1968). Kohlberg and Candee (1981) argue that two things are happening in parallel. As the individual grows through the stages, she/he both increases the complexity of moral thought and also sees herself or himself as personnally *responsible* and *committed* to acting upon the judgement made.

The body of research represented by the examples above does clearly validate the predictive relationship between moral reason and moral action. It also demonstrates a relationship between reasoning on moral issues, and reasoning on social and political issues.

Over the last decade, there has been increasing interest in the possible practical applications of Kohlberg's work. The most obvious application,

Figure 5: Relationship between moral stage and sitting-in in the Berkeley Free Speech Movement Sit-In. (Haan, Smith & Block, 1968) From; Kohlberg & Candee 1981; respondents re-scored according to 1979 Revised Manual.



apart from explanation of social and political behaviour and attitudes, is to moral education. The work of Blatt and others, on socratic techniques of stimulating moral reasoning through the introduction of disequilibrium in the current way of thinking, naturally led to a wide range of classroom discussion techniques being developed. These have taken place in a number of disciplines – history, social studies, English. Mosher has collected material on a number of these intervention methods (Mosher, 1980) and Erickson and Wasserman describe some in detail in this issue of the journal. A further development of intervention methods arose out of Kohlberg's argument that institutions have an *implicit stage* of functioning; in other words, the norms of the institution, the way in which authority relationships and peer interaction operate, reflect assumptions about the maintenance of order and the nature of rules and rights, which effectively are reifications of stages of moral thought. Kohlberg experimented in prisons and, most particularly, in schools, with establishing a 'just community'. In a just community, participatory democracy is practised, and the members are actively involved in reflecting upon their moral and rule-making decisions (Mosher, 1980; Wasserman, 1976). Wasserman describes the school studies in this journal.

There is of course nothing very novel about participatory democracy in progressive educational (or even correctional) institutions, and indeed, part of Kohlberg's inspiration came from work by him and his associates on moral atmosphere and moral reasoning in the kibbutzim (Reimer and Power, 1980). What Kohlberg and his associates have done is to make explicit the *moral processes* in the just communities. As others have found, this kind of participatory democracy in the classroom is demanding in terms of time, effort and emotional commitment. Both the just community and the socratic discussion methods in the classroom, produce demonstrable development of moral reasoning; on average, the pupils in these programmes progress one stage in about two and a half years, which is better than occurs among 'control' subjects.

There have been several criticisms of Kohlberg's theory. These criticisms can be divided into basically three types; those directed mainly at the cumbersome method of measurement; those which accept the general theory of *development*, but object to the way Kohlberg defines 'morality'; and those which reject the whole exercise because they consider that moral development research should attend to other factors than reasoning.

Some critics who accept the cognitive-developmental model as an account of the developmental process have, nevertheless, been harsh about the way Kohlberg defines and interprets the 'moral domain'. For example, some critics consider that a preoccupation with justice as the basis of morality may be a culturally limited view, and that Kohlberg's claim of its universality may be a potentially pernicious form of cultural bias (Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977). Others have argued that Kohlberg's theory is vulnerable to the biases of individualism, rationalism and liberalism (Emler, 1983).

Critics from other theoretical perspectives have tended to focus on Kohlberg's definition of morality, and they object to dealing with moral development purely in terms of moral reasoning. Both psychologists and philosophers of various theoretical persuasions have attacked Kohlberg for ignoring feeling and emotion, for paying inadequate attention to social and cultural factors in developmental processes, and also in the criteria which culturally define the moral domain. Broadly speaking, psychologists have concentrated on the developmental processes and on socialization, and philosophers on the limitations of the moral theory as expressed in its most complete hypothetical form, *stage 6* (Lickona, 1976; Peters, 1971, 1978; Alston, 1971). These criticisms are wide-ranging and reflect a variety of assumptions.

So far, Kohlberg's theory has withstood its critics by virtue of the strength of the empirical support for the developmental sequence, at least up to the level of *stage 4* reasoning. The correlates of moral reasoning indicate that it is not isolated and irrelevant to other issues, though the exact nature of the determining or cotermining relationships needs considerable attention. Currently, Kohlberg and his associates are looking at whether *responsibility* – the extent to which the individual feels him or herself personally responsible for enacting the analytical conclusions of moral reasoning – is the significant intervening variable between reason and action (Kohlberg and Candee, 1981). Other research is widening the definition of the 'moral'; in particular, Gilligan

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has found that women tend to think about the moral dilemmas in a different way, focussing more on relationships and interpersonal responsibility and less on rights and rules (Gilligan, 1982).

The criticisms indicate that there are still limitations of both the theory and the database, while at the same time recognizing the great importance of the theory in changing and expanding the way in which psychologists and philosophers have come to look at what it means to 'become moral'.

Some consequences of replicating Kohlberg's original moral development study on a British sample.

Journal of Moral Education 7, 33-39, 1977

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Some Consequences of Replicating Kohlberg's Original Moral Development Study on a British Sample

Helen Weinreich

Abstract
Kohlberg's original Chicago study was replicated on a comparable sample of British boys. The extent to which the replication confirms Kohlberg's system of moral development is discussed. Cross-cultural similarities and differences are examined. Some theoretical and methodological problems associated with the system are considered, and an analysis made of the prerequisites for future development of theory, with particular reference to the question of transition from one stage to the next.

Introduction

The findings reported in this paper are the results of a replication of Kohlberg's original moral judgment study (Kohlberg, 1958). Despite the extensive use of the Kohlberg measure of moral judgment in research on adolescents and adults, as both a dependent and independent variable, there have been few actual replications. The measures widely used have been a truncated form of the interview, using three of the original nine stories, and usually analysed by a simple global rating scale. This replication studied a comparable sample of British boys to that which Kohlberg studied, used the full set of stories, and in the analysis, conformed as closely as possible to the methods used by Kohlberg. The replication also included a rating by the subjects' teachers of a number of behavioural and character traits.

Kohlberg's model of six stages of moral thought, which derived from his 1958 study, has generated considerable interest and attention among psychologists, philosophers, and in the field of education. The six stages of moral thought have been demonstrated to correlate with, or be predictive of, other aspects of development, some belief systems, and some behaviour. The developmental process, and issues regarding the status of the model within cognitive–developmental theory, have been investigated by Turiel (1969, 1973), Rest (1970) and Keasey (1973) among others. Some of Kohlberg's original sample of subjects have been followed through to young adulthood (e.g. Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969), thus providing data validating the sequence. There have been a number of studies on adults and late adolescents which indicate something of the characteristics associated with the crystallized stages (in particular, related belief systems) (e.g. Haan *et al.*, 1968; Fishkin *et al.*, 1973; Haan *et al.*, 1973).

There are however a number of problematic issues both of the methodology and the theoretical framework of Kohlberg's system (Kurtines and Greif, 1974; Simpson, 1974). Kurtines and Greif have criticized several aspects of the methodology, and the lack of attention paid by researchers in the area to questions of validation and reliability. Also, they point out that due to the small number of subjects found using the higher stages of moral thought, there is only

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limited evidence for their characteristics. Similarly, research on transition and on the effects of attempts to 'accelerate' moral development concentrates on lower-stage individuals. A number of criticisms can be levelled at the coding procedures; over the last fifteen years, a number of quite substantial modifications have been made to the concept of the stages, and 'substages' have been added. The conceptualization of Stage 6, always problematic and made more so by the paucity of subjects manifesting Stage 6 thought, has remained confused and difficult. Yet at the same time Stage 6 has exercised fascination as the 'goal' of moral development and the definition of moral maturity. A number of writers have argued that the higher stages might be regarded as alternative, rather than sequential, modes of thought (e.g. Hogan, 1970, 1973, 1974).

There are also broader theoretical issues. There is a lack of proper *structural* analysis of the stages of moral thought. This is needed before the *process*, as opposed to the *contingencies*, of transition and growth can be examined fully. Further, the system as it stands at present does not adequately provide any basis for explaining the fact that so many individuals fail to reach the higher stages of moral thought (Weinreich, 1974).

The replication was designed as a cross-cultural comparison, but it also provided an opportunity to examine some of the theoretical and experimental problems of the system. Kohlberg's original study was conducted on eighty boys in Chicago, aged ten, thirteen and sixteen years. His interview consisted of nine stories posing moral dilemmas – dilemmas which are taxing to adult as well as adolescent judgment, and unlike some other research in this area, not drawn from typical adolescent experience. Each story was followed by a series of probe questions, which tapped the underlying reasoning of the subject, and tested the limits of their moral comprehension.

Kohlberg then broke down each interview into codeable statements, or 'thought units'. He analysed the clusters he found among these statements, and on the basis of these clusters, arrived at the six types of moral thought. The six types showed increasing complexity and sophistication of moral reasoning, and showed a clear relationship with age. Subsequently, research has provided evidence in support of the invariance of the sequence, and the legitimacy of regarding the developmental types as stages. He also developed a 'global' scoring method, which gave a single score to each story, and a number of subsequent studies have used this scoring method. In his delineation of the types of moral thought, he acknowledged the influence of writers such as Piaget and Macdougall, but the types he finally arrived at do have the authority of empirical derivation, and his system is an advance on that of previous writers because of the complexity and detail of the formulation of the higher stages of thought.

Method

In the replication the nine stories used by Kohlberg were anglicized, where necessary. No modification of the technique was made, with the exception of the addition of a number of probing questions, and a set of questions posed after the nine stories, concerning the nature of a 'good' and a 'bad' person, and the meaning of conscience. The interview lasted between one and two hours, depending on the subject. The interviews took place on school premises, in suitable accommodation. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed subsequently for analysis. The subjects were ninety boys in schools in Sussex, thirty each at ages ten, thirteen and fifteen. The intelligence quotients of the subjects were established by use of the Raven Progressive Matrices Test, deliberately chosen because as a non-verbal measure, it was free of possible overlap with verbal fluency. The subjects were classified as middle or working class. The sample was evenly divided according to age, class and intelligence.

The interview transcripts were analysed along the lines of Kohlberg's original method. The interview was broken down into statements or 'thought units' – a 'thought unit' being a single argument, varying in length from a sentence to a short paragraph. The interviews yielded between fifty and one hundred and twenty such statements or thought units. Each statement was coded according to the guidelines provided by Kohlberg's thesis, and a coding frame supplied by Kohlberg, which did not differ substantially from his thesis, although it contained more detail. A few modifications were made to the coding system, to take account of normative British knowledge (for example the existence of a Health Service in Britain affected some of the coding of Story III) (Weinreich, 1970). An independent rater checked the reliability of the coding.

Because of the number of statements which the interview yielded, and therefore the amount of data across all individuals (about 8,000 statements in all) it was possible to use parametric statistics. The use of the global scoring method, which yields discrete scores, does not permit this. Therefore each individual yielded two sorts of data, a distribution across stages, which indicated his *modal* stage, and a mean score. The mean score, with appropriate attention to variance, was used in the statistical analysis of group comparison. Because for almost all subjects the distribution of thought was unimodal, the mean score did not differ meaningfully from the modal score.

Results

The relationship between the variables (moral stage, intelligence, age and social class) was tested by analysis of variance. The strongest effect was with age, not surprisingly. Intelligence, but not social class, was also significant. The relationship between intelligence and moral score was also analysed by a Pearson product-moment correlation: r = 0.514.

Table 1: Analysis of variance

	SS	*df*	*V*	*F ratio*	*sig*
A Age	37.09	2	18.55	84.30	0.001
B IQ	8.70	2	4.35	19.77	0.001
C SES	0.73	1		3.32	-
A x B	1.75	4	0.44	2.0	-
A x C	1.23	2	0.62	2.81	-
B x C	0.33	2	0.11	0.5	-
A x B x C	1.18	4	0.29	1.32	-
Within cells	15.83	72	0.22		
Total	66.73	89			

On the basis of the statistical analysis alone, the progression through the stages as a function of age is confirmed, though this is not evidence for *stages* as such. The finding that intelligence is an important variable is in line with many other studies (e.g. Kohlberg, 1963, 1969). The relationship between cognitive processes and moral judgment development has been discussed and examined by a number of writers (Kuhn *et al.* 1972; Sullivan *et al.*, 1970; Tomlinson-Keasey and Keasey, 1972; Weinreich, 1975). The importance of intelligence is reflected in another finding: the teachers' ratings of the subjects' abilities and character traits showed no significant correlations between moral judgment score and resistance to temptation, obedience, independence of judgment, and so forth. The only significant correlation (r = 0.37) was between moral score and teachers' rating of intellectual achievement.

It would appear from this analysis that the major findings of Kohlberg's original study are replicable in a culture roughly comparable to that of the United States. A number of studies have been undertaken by Kohlberg and others on third world cultures (Kohlberg, 1964, 1969; Gorsuch and Barnes, 1973) which suggest that in industrialized societies individuals advance further in their moral judgment. There are however some differences between the original findings and the replication results. Kohlberg found a small but significant effect for social class, which he attributed to the 'functional utility' of lower levels of moral judgment for working class children. The lack of a social class effect in a less 'classless' society like Britain is therefore surprising; in a recent study by a student of the author, there was a small but still not significant effect for class (Scourse, 1975).

Age is in this study, as in all others reported, the most significant independent variable. The

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lower types of thought are lost, the higher types gained; this stands whether or not the 'types' are regarded as stages. Figure 1 illustrates the changing distribution of types of thought over the three age groups. Types 1 and 2, predominant at age ten, fall off to virtual extinction by age fifteen. Type 3, the overall most-frequent mode of thought, is particularly prevalent at age thirteen. Types 4 and 5 increase over the three ages sampled, and extrapolating, it would seem they were likely to increase in young adulthood. Type 6 is rare.

The British sample showed many similarities to Kohlberg's original sample, but there are some important cross-cultural differences. British ten-year-olds seem more 'advanced' in their thinking than American ten-year-olds, and British fifteen-year-olds more likely to use higher modes of thought than American sixteen-year-olds. However the reverse is true at age thirteen.

The main changes in mode of thought seem to occur in the British child between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, and in the American child between the ages of ten and thirteen. It may be of use to speculate on these differences, and to consider the possibility that the British culture emphasizes 'niceness' generally, whereas the American culture emphasizes the Golden Rule, which as Charles Kingsley pointed out in *The Water Babies*, can be interpreted in an instrumental as well as an altruistic way.[1] Niceness may help the British ten-year-old to transcend instrumental hedonism, but it may also inhibit – at thirteen – the development of the legalistic Type 4, which is evident in American thirteen-year-olds.

Discussion

The cross-cultural differences, interesting in their own right, do not bring into question major aspects of Kohlberg's system. On the other hand, detailed contact with the process of coding, and inspection of the individual interviews, highlighted problems both of the conceptualization of the stages, and of the developmental process. Some of these have been discussed elsewhere (Weinreich, 1970, 1974, 1975). A further question which has been discussed by Simpson (1974) is the danger of normative values interfering with interpretation. The measure, being essentially interpretive, is vulnerable, particularly because of the difficulties of scoring. The area itself is fraught with dangers of hidden value judgments on the part of the investigator, and cultural expectations. The enthusiasm with which a number of writers have developed the desirable qualities of Stage 6 as an endstate of moral, social and political values is just one of the possible pitfalls.

However, the main problems which the replication, like a number of other studies, threw up, concern the conceptualization of development as being stagewise. Kohlberg's system, although a considerable advance on previous developmental models of moral thought, was initially primarily a description. It was the description of six types of moral ideology, which followed a logical and chronological sequence, in which there was increasing sophistication of what is generally accepted as 'moral' understanding. That the sequence was discrete types (later, stages) not cumulative could be deduced from the differences between the types, indicating the necessity of a change in the basic reasoning, and frequently of a turn-about of opinion, in the process of transition from one stage to the next. Subsequently, of course, empirical studies have established the invariance of the sequence and the veridicality of the stages, but each stage can be seen to derive from a more or less coherent system of concepts about the function of law, the definition of justice, and rights, roles and duties.

However, what is the reality of a particular stage for the individual adolescent? To what extent can it be said that an individual is 'in' a particular stage? There is evidence, from the work of Turiel and Rest in particular, but also of others (Tracy and Cross, 1973; Lorimer, 1971; Turiel, 1966; Rest *et al.*, 1969) that the effectiveness of presenting material to subjects with the intention of changing their moral viewpoint depends on the current dominant stage of the individual – opinions reflecting thought which is of a stage below the current one is rejected; that one stage above is partly incorporated, that two stages above is not fully comprehended. At the same time,

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[1] 'Mrs Doasyouwouldbedoneby' *versus* 'Mrs Bedonebyasyoudid'.

Figure 1: Mean per cent use of each of six types (stages) of moral judgement at three ages: cross-cultural comparisons: USA and Taiwan (Kohlberg, from Kohlberg (1969)); England (Weinreich)



however, there are problems about modal type of thought. If a 'global' style of coding is used, to some extent (depending on the number of stories used) this reduces the variance, but the problems of this method have been indicated. In Kohlberg's original study, only ten of his subjects had more than 50 per cent of their responses in their modal stage, which puts some strain on the concept of modality. This compares with 29 of the replication sample (see Table 2). However, in both samples, there is evidence of a more or less normal distribution around the modal stage. Some of this spread may be due to coding error, some to random response, and some to genuine stage mixture (especially with adjoining stages).

Table 2: Number of children for whom each moral type is modal, distributed according to per cent usage of that type

Kohlberg (1958) %	Type					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
60 plus	5	2				
50 – 60	1		1	1		
40 – 50	4	2	7	8	2	
30 – 40	4	5	15	10	4	3
25 – 30	1	1	5	2		
Total	15	10	28	21	6	3

Weinreich (1970) %	Type					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
60 plus	2		2	2		
50 – 60	2	1	11	6	3	
40 – 50	2	2	22	6	8	1
30 – 40	1	1	6	9	3	
Total	7	4	41	23	14	1

There is difficulty in the *manner* of proof required to establish stagewise development. There are a number of recognized criteria for stage development, including irreversibility, invariance of sequence, hierarchical organization and evidence of longitudinal change. To some extent, other empirical studies have indicated that the system of moral stages fulfils these criteria. It was not the aim of the replication to test these aspects of stage development. It is in fact doubtful whether the system is falsifiable in its present form. One of the problems of definition is illuminated by a distinction which Langer made regarding types of developmental model (Langer, 1969). He identified a probabilistic model and a topographical mode. The latter is a global view of the whole of development, with emphasis on the 'goal' of development; each preceding stage is conceived in terms of its developmental relationship to, and its limitations when contrasted with, the final stage. It is essentially a descriptive model. The probabilistic model Langer considers to be epitomized by Piaget's work on cognitive development. Within this model the emphasis is not on overall, longitudinal description, but on the processes and dynamics of development between stages. The latter model obviously is more suited to the consideration of structure and process of development. While the topographical model may include elements of structure and have implications for structural change, it is more concerned with content.

Kohlberg's system in its original form is clearly more of a topographical model, although subsequent research on transition, invariance of sequence and so on is a movement in the direction of more probabilistic analysis. The primary interest of the original system was the classification of stages, and of the sequence. Within the system *as it stands*, the progression from one stage to the next can be considered as a) evidence of the invariance of the sequence, b) changes in the orientations and emphasis of beliefs which the subject holds. If the aim of research is to elucidate the *processes* of development, however, and to consider changes in structure between stage, the system needs to be re-conceived within a probabilistic framework (Weinreich, 1974). For example, while at the moment it is possible to postulate the kind of distribution of responses which might be termed evidence of transitionality in a subject, the concept of *décalage* is not meaningful within the system, except in observable tension between two conflicting opinions held by an individual.

Some final points concern general cross-cultural differences. In coding the responses of the British boys some modification of the coding system was necessary. This was slight, and has been noted earlier, some modifications arose from differences in the provision of health services between the two countries. Other modifications were minor, but there was one area where there seemed a marked difference. Many of the examples Kohlberg cited, and therefore built into the coding schedule available, referred to religious teaching, God, the Bible and the Church. Very few of the British sample made any such reference. The sample included (by chance) three boys of fundamentalist background, and only from these boys came quotations or citations of religious origin, or mentions of religious example or sanction.

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Kohlberg and Piaget: aspects of their relationship in the field of moral development.

Journal of Moral Education 4, 201-213, 1975

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Journal of Moral Education Vol 4, No 3, pp 201-213
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Kohlberg and Piaget: Aspects of their Relationship in the Field of Moral Development

Abstract:

Kohlberg's system of moral judgment development has some important links with Piaget's work on moral judgment, though Piaget's work is not the only influence on Kohlberg's ideas. Piaget's system of moral growth is briefly examined, and the extent to which subsequent research has validated it, is noted, thus placing Kohlberg in a historical context. The ways in which Kohlberg extends or departs from Piaget's system of moral growth are examined. The concept of stages and the nature and processes of stage development are discussed, and in this context the relationship between Kohlberg's *moral* development and Piaget's *cognitive* development is examined. It is concluded on the basis both of logic and evidence that the relationship, although complex rather than isomorphic, is likely to hold considerable potential for future research.

Key Words:

Moral. Stages. Structure. Process. Transition. Reciprocity. Organization. Heteronomous. Autonomous. Equity. Justice.

Kohlberg and his disciples stand at the current end of a line of research which was first begun by Piaget in 1932. Throughout the last forty years, research on moral judgment has not departed in any significant sense from the Piagetian framework, and has not challenged his fundamental assumptions nor his three stages of growth. Much criticism has been levelled at what are seen to be the deficiencies and limitations of the original study, both on the grounds of methodology and interpretation of causative factors, and also because he narrowly confined moral judgment development to intellectual processes. Some of these criticisms have more foundation than others. What is certainly clear is that Piaget was not concerned with the moral *behaviour* of the child, and the criticisms which accuse him of neglecting the social and emotional growth of the child, for example, seem somewhat less valid when it is apparent that the critic is concerned to take a total view of *character* development, than when the critic sees that by ignoring these factors, Piaget is impoverishing his view of the *conceptual* growth of the child. Later research has attempted to make good some of Piaget's supposed deficiencies by considering the effects of intelligence, sex, adult practice, social interaction and so on, and this has led to a modification of interpretation, though not of description, of the original Piagetian formulation. Furthermore, research has been undertaken on adolescents as well as on the primary age children of Piaget's sample, which has enabled the examination of the further development of Piaget's earlier stages, and a greater degree of detail in the description and interpretation of his final stage. Much of the work in the area has been concerned to examine or elaborate aspects of Piaget's work, but sometimes, as in the case of Kohlberg, this has led to the

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development of a more or less new system. One advantage of this is that it has facilitated, because of a more precise definition of the stages of development than was hitherto available, research such as that of Turiel *et al*, which tackles questions of the fundamental psychological processes in development, in particular in the transition from one stage to the next (Turiel 1966, 1969; Rest *et al*, 1969).

The Nature of Moral Judgment

Before discussing the history of this research in detail, it is useful to state clearly those attributes which define 'moral judgments'. Hare's three criteria, that they be prescriptive, and universalizable, and that it be possible for logical relations to exist between them, have been widely accepted in the area. This implies the full use of reason; from a psychological point of view, however, it is necessary to recognize the limitations of the cognitive functioning of the immature individual, and acknowledge the *intent* and the *formal structure* of a statement which may on the surface lack the full criteria that Hare implies. Kohlberg defines five characteristics of moral judgment:

1. Moral judgments are viewed by the judge as taking precedence over other value judgments.
2. Moral action and judgments are associated with judgments of the self as good or bad.
3. Moral judgments tend to be justified or based on reasons which are not limited to the consequences of that particular act or situation.
4. Moral judgments tend toward a high degree of generality, universality, consistency and inclusiveness.
5. Moral judgments tend to be viewed as objective by their makers, ie to be agreed to independently of differences of personality and interest (Kohlberg, 1958, p 8).

These five criteria are clearly an extension of Hare's definitions. The important thing is that these criteria distinguish moral judgments from other judgments, whether made by child or by adult, and whether or not these criteria are actually consciously *recognized* by the individual judge.

In the course of the development of the individual, it is possible to establish criteria which determine the degree of maturity of a particular judgment or series of judgments, but these criteria of maturity are *separate* from the criteria of whether the judgment is *moral* or not, except in the very limited sense that concomitant with cognitive growth comes an increasing recognition, either implicit or explicit, of the definitional criteria of a moral judgment, so that they themselves become a part of the range of factors taken into consideration by the individual in making a judgment — ie the individual becomes increasingly capable of carrying an argument to its logical conclusions. Therefore it is not true to say, for example, that increase in moral maturity is just a matter of becoming more 'moral' in one's judgment, *even though a sophisticated observer would evaluate more highly the moral reasoning manifested at the later stages of development.*

A major preoccupation of writers in the field of moral development has been the attempt to identify a fundamental principle under which everything can be logically subsumed, and which provides a continuous basis for comparison. The principle may or may not imply motivational or sanctional features as well. For example, Hume grounded morality in sympathy, a view echoed in some modern formulations, such as Swainson's (1949) of a 'love-morality', or Wilson's emphasis on empathy and consideration for others (1967). The Utilitarians cited the three principles of prudence, benevolence and justice. There are two main ways by which such philosophical principles can be applied to psychological discussion; they can either be indicated as waxing and waning at different levels, or can be regarded as the fundamental root which grows and in the course of growth, changes its form. Kohlberg elaborates the Piagetian notion, and considers *justice* to be the key principle, the four areas of development being the right and legitimate claims of justice and equality before the law, contract, distributive and retributive justice, and finally equity, defined as impartiality and respect for individual personality rather than in terms of concrete qualities.[1] It is the opinion of this writer that despite the global nature of the definition of justices used by Kohlberg, there are many aspects of moral development, *encompassed by his own scheme*, which can be more adequately conceptualized by other notions than justice, and furthermore, his apparent attempt to use 'the sense of justice' as a motivating force seems a concession to Piaget's view that the pressure of the peer-group acts as a causative agent in moral growth in later-childhood. This is a view to which Kohlberg does not wholly subscribe.

It is clear that whatever the logical and philosophical advantages of a 'unifying principle', the attempts to translate it into psychological development terms is fraught with difficulties.

The Basis of Piaget's Theory

Piaget was himself influenced by both sociological and philosophical thinkers, as well as psychologists, and their premises were incorporated into his theoretical framework. From Durkheim he seems to have derived his ideas of the *socially-based* nature of morality, and the conception of the heteronomous stage of morality, with its powerful ties to omnipotent and omniscient traditional elements. On the other hand Piaget clearly rejects the educational view which is implicit in Durkheim's thought, that the rules are society's and the role of the educator is to reveal these to the child, although he would argue that in the early stage of development the *child*, holding unilateral respect for his parents and educators, *perceives* society's rules in this fashion.

Piaget's idea of *mutual respect* comes from Bovet's view that the sense of moral obligation is socially derived, and that respect, the basis of moral obligation, is the consequence of social relations, rather than as in the Kantian view, the consequence of rational law. Respect opens the way to the development of *reciprocity*, which replaces the basic fear inherent in unilateral respect, and lays the foundation for *future* moral development on a rational basis.

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[1] 'The concept of justice then helps to concretize the concept of the moral by delimiting situations and attitudes to which our criteria of the moral may be applicable' and, following: 'We hope to offer evidence that such integration is achieved through the "sense of justice", through a realization like Aristotle's that "the whole content of that which it is incombent on us to do is described as arising from the nature of the situation, ie from the rights of the various persons affected"' (Kohlberg, 1958, p 15).

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A major concern of Piaget's, derived from Baldwin is the question of how the individual consciousness becomes differentiated from the collective consciousness. This occurs through both early imitation of others' behaviour, which leads to the child's developing a subjective awareness of himself, and, conversely, an awareness by projection, or 'ejection' as Piaget terms it, of the feelings of others. Moral consciousness develops as a result of the disharmony, or '*anomie*' which results from the clash between the subjective self and the commands of the parent, and it is these commands which generate an 'ideal self' against which acts are evaluated. During the first 'heteronomous' stage these commands or rules, are perceived *vis-à-vis* the self only; it is during the second autonomous stage that the child applies these rules to others; paradoxically, they retain the quality of the imperative even though at the same time the child is growing to recognize that the rules are not, in fact, generally obeyed, and they acquire an absolute quality which is above individuals. It is in the third, ethical, stage that through rational means or 'practical intelligence', the content of the law is elaborated along autonomous lines.

Examining the background to Piaget's thinking not only serves the purpose of drawing together the various strands of his thinking, but also makes it possible to place in perspective the nature of Piaget's influence on subsequent thinking and the kinds of criticisms which later writers made of his ideas. This is particularly necessary as Piaget's influence in this field is the result largely of one work, based on a single research project, and it is not often that reference is made when discussing moral development to the much more elaborated thinking of Piaget in other areas of cognitive growth, either in critiques or in attempts to formulate more advanced conceptions of moral growth. Kohlberg does to some extent consider some of the formal qualities of Piaget's general system, and he also returns to Baldwin in his conception of the early modes of thinking. More than Piaget, Kohlberg lays stress on the egocentric, the 'syntelic' aspects of the earlier stage of Baldwin's scheme, the inability of the child to differentiate between subject and object, or between ideas and the objects to which they refer, and secondly, the inability to differentiate the meaning of an object to the self from its meaning to others. The second stage he regards as 'instrumental thinking', the differentiation of means and ends, and of subject and object. This conception is closer to Piaget's general formulation of cognitive growth than it is to his work on moral growth.

Piaget investigated children's moral thinking in three areas, the formulation of rules (of the game of marbles), the relation of intention to the attribution of culpability, and the concepts of distributive and retributive justice. From these studies emerged a picture of four stages of moral thinking, three of which can be termed 'moral' in the usual sense. Piaget himself acknowledged that there was great variation between individuals, and within the types of answers given, making it more difficult to talk in terms of 'stages' than in the development of intellectual functioning. However, despite the difficulties, the four stages which emerge are the egocentric stage, the heteronomous or authoritarian stage, the autonomous or reciprocal stage, and the stage of equity, which represents 'mature' moral judgment. With regard to the latter, however, it should be remembered that Piaget's oldest subjects were only aged twelve.

Piaget's conceptualization and his stress on the importance of peer-group inter-

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action have had an influence on subsequent writers. Here again, it is clear that the formal classification, based on previous schemes of a social-philosophical rather than on empirical evidence, have strongly influenced the interpretation of aspects of the data. Although it is possible to *conceptualize* the three stages, the actual empirical evidence is not so neat as the conceptions might imply. However, there is no doubt that there is clear evidence both of the direction of development and of definite stages of thinking, even if these do not develop exactly in parallel in the different areas of thinking. This is not intended as a serious criticism of Piaget, who recognized the problems, but as a point for consideration in discussing research which derives from his approach and his conceptualizations.

Subsequent Research

Since 1932, a number of studies have confirmed most of the major *cognitive* aspects of Piaget's scheme, though other aspects of what Kohlberg terms a ' socio-emotional ' nature have not survived so well. Further, as in other studies on general moral development, there are questions about the age at which the stages manifest themselves, and the fact that immature modes of thought continue alongside the more mature forms. The other aspects seem to differ from those factors which are substantiated in being more *specific*, and therefore more prone to subcultural considerations such as parental practices and expectations. and the child's actual experience.

The criticisms which have been made of Piaget have been to a large extent concerned with the social aspects of his theory, and their causative relationships to the development process, but some of the criticism is concerned with the stages of cognitive growth. Isaacs (1957) attacked the stage-wise progression and considered that development was by means of gradual increase in complexity. Harrower (1934). despite a specific attempt to do so, found no clear evidence of developmental stages. MacRae (1954) considered that the methodology and the limitations of research area were responsible for the spurious demonstration of stages. Lerner (1937) found that change of belief in one area is not necessarily matched by change of belief in another.

From the point of view of the background to Kohlberg's work, as well as its relevance to the original Piagetian framework, it is the research on *adolescent* moral judgment which is of particular interest. Studies by Morris (1958) and Johnson (1962) supported the general *trends* of development as expressed by Piaget, but the evidence for psychological *stages* was not clear. Loughran (1967) did establish three levels of moral judgment, based on authority, equality and equity, but, significantly, found that authority-based judgments were still being made by a proportion of adolescents, and about half made judgments based on equality.

Breznitz and Kugelmass (1967) and Armsby (1971) investigated one aspect of Piaget's theory, namely intentionality. They distinguished the *use* of intention from the ability to verbalize it. Their findings are of interest not only because of the relevance they have to the development of moral judgment but also because they break down intentionality in such a way that the *cognitive growth processes* are clearer, and thus provide a close link with Piaget's more detailed and advanced studies of the development of intellectual growth in other areas. This is of

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importance in understanding the actual *development* of moral judgment, rather than those factors which inhibit or encourage it.

These are but a selection of studies deriving directly from Piaget's work. In general there has been little attempt to examine the *processes* of development until the last ten years, where in many cases it overlaps with post-Kohlberg studies and concepts. There have been a number of recent studies on transition or acceleration of moral growth, which though they may have used Piaget's concepts and stories rather than Kohlberg's, have related more to the kinds of questions raised by post-Kohlberg writers such as Turiel.

Kohlberg

Kohlberg's original study was with children aged ten to sixteen. He used stories which were not in most cases related to the type of moral conflict situations which would be likely to occur in the experience of his subjects, but which were of a more general nature and would be equally taxing to adults. In this he differs from the previous tradition. He found that his results could be classified into six types, which formed three development levels. There is considerable evidence from the work of Kohlberg and subsequent research that each type represents a *stage* of development, and this is how they have been subsequently termed. However in many ways his findings and interpretation depart considerably from Piaget, and it should be noted that Kohlberg was influenced by 'character development' theorists, in the tradition of McDougall, as well as by Piaget. His first two types do have some similarity to Piaget's heteronomous and autonomous stages, but depart from them in some important aspects. It is difficult to demonstrate the relationship of Piaget's third stage to Kohlberg's data: it is an oversimplification to say that the latter four types are subtypes of an equity-based morality because equity is firstly only one factor of many in each of the stages, and secondly equity is too general a term for the rather fine differentiations of different types of justice which were found to develop at the later stages. But it is clear that Kohlberg's work must be regarded as a *confirmation* and *extension* of Piaget's thinking, rather than a refutation of it.

Since the publication of Kohlberg's original study in 1963, a large body of research has been generated, most of which confirms the general parameters of the system. It does not, therefore, depart from the basic framework derived from Piaget in major respects. Certain basic questions and issues common to both systems remain unresolved.[2] Two of these will be discussed here. Research[3] has thrown light on both of them, but theoretical problems remain. The first is the conception of stage, the second is the relationship between moral and cognitive growth.

The Concept of Stages in the Development of Moral Judgment

For clarification in the discussion of stages it is necessary to make a distinction between *development type* and *structural stage*, even though as will be demonstrated, these may overlap. The structural stage is a Piagetian concept, crucial to the whole basis of his theory, and highly developed in the area of intellectual growth. The development type, on the other hand, is a more appropriate term for the different *levels* of attitude organization and judgmental functioning, because this does not carry the implication of necessarily *structural* differences in the different levels. Clearly there are important functional differences between one level and the other, but it is difficult to establish whether these are due to an overriding factor within the individual — for example a personality trait, or an over-punitive conscience — which may or may not disappear in time as a result of growth, or whether they are due to a more complex series of developmental stages than those formulated in the sphere of intellectual growth. A question which provides an example of this point is whether the authority-based stage through which young children pass is accompanied by strong conscience, so that the adult exemplar of this type is in some sense arrested at that *stage*, or whether it is more meaningful to say that the *separate* development of a strong conscience inhibits development in certain areas so that the individual is not able to develop a fully rational outlook, but remains bound emotionally *and* intellectually by certain authority pressures. A further point for consideration is the possibility that the philosophical basis of the interpretation and definition of developmental types may be entangled with value-judgments surrounding the desirable ' goals ' of development.

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[2] See Weinreich 1974 for fuller discussion.

[3] eg Crowley 1968, Le Furgy and Woloshin 1967, Turiel 1969, Kuhn *et al* 1972.

Piaget, on the other hand, has clearly defined criteria for his concepts of development stages. There are five such criteria. Firstly, the stages are *structural*. The structure is the *organizational* property of intelligence, and changes with development, each stage represents a separate *structural whole*. The second criterion of the stage is that the behaviour can be seen to break into *qualitative* differences in the course of development. Therefore the first essential is always to examine whether the behaviour can be so broken down. The third criterion is that the sequence of stages must be invariant. The fourth criterion is that the structures defining earlier stages become integrated or incorporated into those of the stages following. This implies that the latter stage could not develop without the existence of the former, because there is a logical as well as a psychological relationship between them. The fifth criterion is that the structural properties from an integrated whole. Each structure shows the attributes of a total system, in which the elements show interdependence — there is a logical consistency as well which can be shown to exist within a single stage. (Fuller discussions of the stage concept are to be found in Flavell 1963, Pinard and Laurendeau 1969, Langer 1969, Mischel 1971.)

Structural stages have been established in intellectual growth; the evidence for them is less clear in moral judgment, but there is an argument for the *logical* existence of stages of growth which does not depend on making out a case for moral judgments being largely a cognitive function.

The argument, in brief, runs thus. The evidence clearly shows that there are two major characteristics which distinguish mature judgments from immature; firstly they are more complex, secondly they are more *internalized*, ie less dependent on external sources of information and opinion. These two statements would be accepted by any theorist in the area whatever his orientation. The implications are that in the course of development there has occurred substantial increases in *information* available to the individual — eg about the consequences of acts — and in integration of this information. This implies *organization*. The manner of organization is not the present concern — it could be by essentially unconscious, emotional processes or by conscious cognitive processes, or any other means. But at any given point in time along the path of development there will exist a structure which consists of the accumulated information and experience of the individual which is to some degree organized to form a consistent, or a series of consistent, whole or wholes. Judgmental responses do *not* show complete randomness, nor complete situation specificity.

If one now imagines the impact of a piece of new information upon that individual's structure, one can see that one of two things could happen; either the information (which might be factual, or an emotional experience) is absorbed into the present structure causing only a slight disturbance in one small area, or else, if the information is very discrepant, it must cause reorganization of aspects of the structure of thinking which will inevitably have a direct or indirect effect on the whole structure. The third alternative is that it is rejected, and a good reason to suppose that it would be rejected is that it creates too great a threat to the existing framework. Thus development from immature to mature judgment must logically progress by a series of stages *of some sort.*

The fact that moral judgment is not defined as being a purely cognitive process strengthens rather than weakens the argument; the kind of affective pressures which inevitably must operate on the mainly attitudinal premises on which a moral judgment is based are more likely than ever to favour the survival of the existing structure; such 'affective' pressures do not operate in intellectual growth.

This indicates that the relationship of stages in cognitive growth to stages in moral growth is a separate question. The problem of whether moral judgments is to be regarded as cognitive process *plus*, or cognitive growth *attenuated by*, affective and social factors, cannot be solved on the basis of present evidence, but there is evidence that there is structural overlap between cognitive growth and moral growth and moral growth which goes beyond the observation that both can be shown to be stage-wise, at least in the sense defined above.[4] Therefore it will be fruitful to consider in this context the structural relationship between stages of cognitive growth and moral growth.

For present purposes, it is only necessary to consider in brief certain aspects of Piaget's later stages of cognitive growth, because 'moral' judgment does not appear to begin until the period corresponding to concrete operational thinking, although the type of thinking variously described as 'amoral' and 'pre-amoral' (including Kohlberg's Stage 1) has certain characteristics of preoperational thought, for example egocentricity, rigidity, and the centring on one, distorting, aspect of the situation. When concrete operations begin, real organization of the environment can occur, because then the logical functions of *grouping*, *classification*, and *seriation* can be performed. Relationships between events and observations can be perceived as being part of the whole structure, not merely on a haphazard trial-and-error basis. Further, the child is able to go beyond the actual and recognize the *potential.*

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[4] Recent studies indicate that the development of moral thought, particularly in the higher stages, depends on the previous development of certain cognitive levels (Tomlinson-Keasey and Keasey 1972; Kuhn *et al* 1972).

In comparing intellectual and moral functioning, it is clear that in the case of intellectual functions, such as mathematical relationships, the logical structures are *inherent in the thing itself*. The child's limited logical ability enables him to comprehend *part* of that structure in terms of his own internal organization of his perceptions, but the *nature* of those limitations is obvious to a more mature observer. In the case of moral or value functions, there is no external logical structure against which the immature functioning can be compared. Here it is a matter not of observing the degree to which the immature structure approximates to the mature, but the degree to which the *processes* which are characteristic of mature functioning are performed by the less mature.

The limitations of concrete functioning are that it is ' concrete ' related to the here-and-now. The primary task is the organization of the present: the future is a special case of the present, rather than *vice versa*. Thus, each cognitive structuring task must be performed separately, not concurrently, because the cognitive instruments are insufficiently ' formal ': they are not sufficiently detached and dissociated from the subject-matter to permit a content-free, once-for-all structuring. A further limitation is that during the concrete-operational period the various logical groupings form separate systems; they do not interlock one with another to form one overall system, so that complex tasks are beyond a child in this stage, because he cannot move easily from one subsystem to another.

These limitations are overcome in the formal operations period. The most important property of formal operations is that reality is conceived as a subset within the totality of the potential. Thus organization is not in terms of the present problem, but of the total possible, so that solving a problem is not a matter of trying to find a specific structure to account for the available data, but of using the available data to test a more general hypothesis which would *also* account for the present evidence. From this follow three things; firstly the strategy is *hypothetic-deductive*, secondly formal thinking is *propositional*, and thirdly formal thinking is *combinatorial* — ie not only are the present variables isolated, but all possible combinations of those variables are investigated in the process of reality testing.

In considering the relationship of cognitive and moral growth, it is not assumed that a one-to-one parallel would or could be found; that children who manifest concrete operations in the intellectual field at a particular age will also manifest parallel operations in the moral field. The aim is to use the cognitive growth scheme as a *paradigm*, and to see whether this furthers our understanding of the moral growth process. Clearly there are limitations in how far one can do this, because intellectual growth has two parts; the *degree* to which the child at any age is approximating to an understanding of a logical structure which can be deemed to exist externally ie can be termed ' knowledge ', and the *ways* in which the child is functioning in his attempts to solve the particular problem. In the case of moral growth it is not clear what constitutes ' knowledge '. Certain *processes* are limited in the concept ' moral maturity ', namely a particular level of reasoning, and it is in the development of that reasoning that the parallel can legitimately be sought.

One further point regarding the definition of ' stage ' must be made. It is clear from the research on moral judgment that in the discussion of the stages of moral growth the primary criterion of ' stage ' which has been applied, even by Piaget, is whether the behaviour can be broken down in a meaningful way. On the whole the evidence has been inconclusive. After this, the next step of the researchers has been to examine the nature of the general developmental trend to see whether it conforms to other trends. The concern with the structure and content of a particular stage has been largely in terms of deducing possible causal factors of movement from one stage to the next, not really in terms of *how* the individual is functioning in that stage. Kohlberg makes some advances in his definition of a moral ‘ ideology ’ of a particular stage, and it is in this particular that his conception is novel. Such a conception puts a different perspective on the *kind* of organization which is being made by the child of his experience and information at a particular stage.[5]

Cognitive Growth and Moral Judgment

On the basis of the Piagetian paradigm considered above, a major hypothesis is that there will be a break at some point corresponding to the transition from concrete to abstract functioning. Secondly, that within the ‘ concrete ’ period it will be possible to detect the kind of groupings, classifications and subsystems based on the organizational structuring of the immediate reality, and thirdly in the ‘ formal ’ period to demonstrate the *overall* organization, and the recognition of the potential should include the taking into consideration of all possible eventualities, rather than, as at the concrete level, relying on known cause and effect relationships or established rules. In terms of Piaget's own scheme, clearly both the heteronomous and the autonomous stages are concrete in functioning. It is difficult however to draw any conclusions about the state of equity because his subjects would not have been old enough to use the full formal operations even in intellectual functioning, and in any case there is limited information about the stage. Certainly the evidence from other research, especially Kohlberg's, indicates that when a distinction is made between various stages of equitable thinking, the formal ’ properties may be more fully explored. [Empirical evidence confirms the pre-requisite of formal operation for the attainment of the higher stages of moral thought. Though as yet no analysis exists to suggest why this is the case (Tomlinson-Keasey and Keasey 1972, Kuhn *et al* 1972).]

However it is possible to consider the logical status of the general findings in *terms* of the paradigm, without regarding it necessarily as *evidence for* the paradigm. The relationship between pro-operational thought and the ‘ amoral ’ and ‘ pre-moral ’ modes of thought has already been touched upon. The concensus of opinion is that this is followed by the authority-based mode of judgment. One factor in this transition may be the exposure of the child to the firm authority of the parents, but if one considers this just as the *source of the information* (in the widest sense, including the affective elements of experience) then one may concentrate on the child's own conceptual organization of his environment. The authority figure itself provides a ready-made organization of the world, by its apparent omniscience and perceived omnipotence, at least as far as the child is concerned. Because of the egocentricity of the child at this stage he will generalize the rules imposed on

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[5] There are other implications of this conception which the writer discusses elsewhere (Weinreich 1974).

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himself to others, even if this is inappropriate. The child is likely to search for other authority-figures appropriate for the individual in question if the parent-figure will not do — hence the beginnings of classification of police, government, God, etc as ' authority ', and to a large extent his experience of these figures is not discrepant with this structure, because they are the usual ones cited as the ' reason why ' of rules of various sorts. However it soon becomes apparent to the child that he and other non-authority figures have some power to organize and structure both their own perception of the world, and certain aspects of the world itself, eg modifying the rules of the games, avoiding of punishment by lying, manipulation of others by reward and so forth. In Piagetian terms this is the beginning of reciprocity; in Kohlberg's framework it is instrumental hedonism.

The reasons why this structure comes to be inadequate may be various; either the logical fallacies may become apparent to the child as a result of reasoning, or else the child may be forcibly made aware of its limitations as a result of social pressures. In Kohlberg's scheme this is replaced by conformity, and the defence of ' niceness ' and ' goodness ' in social relations, which also become generalized to a kind of low-level principle in all human relations. This is essentially still part of ' reciprocity '; the concept of ' fairness ' is very strong. So also is the recognition of the distinction between intentional and unintentional acts, particularly in the latter stage. These are clearly concrete stages; logically each of the various aspects exists separately rather than being integrated into a whole, although *psychologically* there is an internal consistency within each stage, a recurrent theme across all situations.

Stage 4 is a direct development from Stage 3, but involves certain abstractions which lead this writer to question Kohlberg's manner of linking it with the previous one to form a second level equivalent to Piaget's autonomous state. Kohlberg's reason for doing this is that the full development of the concept of justice and equity has not yet occurred, but it could well be argued that the *concept of ' society '*, and the hierarchical model of society's organization, typical of this stage,[6] is a major break from the much more person-centred view of societal structure involved in Stage 3. In Stage 4 it is recognized, and approved, that the function of law and order is to maintain morality beneficial to the community, and the function of authority *qua* legislature is a source of general moral and legal principle. The limitations of ' being nice ' (a concrete concept) presumably have been perceived by the child, and the child has a greater awareness of the actual state of the world and the way in which the community is organized. This awareness requires at least some abstract ability. The following stage, stage 5, is aptly termed ' social contract '. It departs from the intense legalism of the previous stage in the recognition of the fact that law is *the result of the democratic process*, and thus *changeable* by the proper means. The major consideration is the role of implicit or explicit *contract* between groups of individuals. This is combined with a concern for the whole community, for *whose benefit* laws exist, and the dominant principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. Here, clearly, full abstraction has occurred. The child is able to perform logical, formal operations in his organization of his concepts of the environment and to see any single situation as an instance of a whole range of possible situations, to generalize from one actual to many potential, and to see the implications. This is further developed in the last stage; in stage 6 is recognized fully the responsibility of every single individual in a decision-making situation and that ultimately the individual must be independent of conformity pressures in making them. This may be regarded as true moral independence, with its accompanying burden of moral responsibility.

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[6] I have referred to this elsewhere as ' Soames Forsyte ' type of thinking.

Kohlberg's scheme can be shown to subsume much of Piagetian and post-Piagetian evidence, though not necessarily overcoming the criticism to which Piaget was subject.[7] In the way in which each stage overcomes the deficiencies in the previous one, there can be seen a structural parallel between moral and cognitive growth. However the most significant fact may be that Kohlberg finds two or three sub-types within both 'concrete' and 'formal' levels, even though Piaget's own study, with a narrower range of age, does not clearly follow the pattern of pre-operational — concrete — formal thought. Although as stated before there cannot necessarily be assumed a one-to-one parallel between intellectual and moral growth, it is possible to argue that the processes are fundamentally the same, at least in terms of the functions operating in the organization of the environment. A test of this is not whether a one-to-one relationship can be found, but whether the criteria of stage-wise development and of logical functioning which is applied to intellectual functioning, can also be applied to moral growth. The tentative conclusion that emerges from examining the logic of Kohlberg's scheme, and the data derived from it, is that it seems possible and fruitful to do so.

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[7] See for example a recent methodological critique of Kohlberg by Kurtines and Greif (1974.)

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The structure of moral reason

Journal of Youth and Adolescence

3, 135-143, 1974.

Journal of Youth and Adolescence, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1974

The Structure of Moral Reason[1]

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Received February 20, 1974

This paper is a brief critical review of the present state of research and theory in the area of moral development. It poses a number of questions about the theoretical basis of Kohlberg's six stages and examines the nature of the evidence to date and the limitations of knowledge in the area. The writer argues for an extension of this theoretical approach to moral development, with a greater emphasis on structure, and a reexamination of the psychological implications of the definition of "moral" used in this area of research.

This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the present state of Kohlberg's system of moral development. Out of the assessment of current research and theory arise certain hypotheses about the nature of moral reasoning, some of which are being tested in the writer's present research. This research examines the relationship between moral and personal beliefs, and the effect of pressure from an alternative moral point of view.

The view is becoming increasingly widespread in social psychology that analysis of structure and process is likely to be more fruitful for the generation of theory and explanation than either topographical or taxonomic models. Kohlberg established the existence of six stages of moral thought some years before this view was current (Kohlberg, 1958, 1963), but it is clear that it is a structural system, though I shall argue that the full implications of this have not been exploited. It has the same properties as other stage theories of psychological development, such as Piaget's theory of cognitive growth (Piaget, 1953-1956; Flavell, 1963), Erikson's less well-developed "eight ages of man," and more recently Loevinger's theory of ego development (Loevinger, 1966), namely invariability of sequence, consistency within a stage, fundamental differ-

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[1] This paper is a revised version of a paper presented to the British Psychological Society Social Psychology Section Conference, Bristol, September 22, 1973.

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ences between stages, and increased differentiation and/or "maturity" of function the later the stage in the sequence.

Kohlberg's work has had a major impact and has generated a fair degree of research, first on the sequence itself, whereby its invariability has been confirmed and its cross-cultural applicability established, by both comparative and longitudinal studies. Some of these studies, such as those of Turiel and others (Turiel, 1969), which were designed primarily to test the invariability of the sequence, also throw light on the issue crucial to a structural analysis, the transition from one stage to the next. Second, the Kohlberg measure has been used in conjuction with a wide variety of other measures, yielding evidence of the relationship between moral judgment and a range of attitudinal, behavioral, and developmental factors. In attitude and development studies, moral judgment is frequently the dependent variable; in behavioral studies, it is usually the primary independent variable.

As in other stage theory investigations, the primary aim is to elicit the reasoning behind the answer the child gives rather than to establish his agreement or disagreement with attitudinal statements. This has prohibited the development of a satisfactory conventional standardized questionnaire measure (to the writer's knowledge). The usual technique of establishing the stage of moral thought is via the verbal administration of some or all of the nine "moral dilemmas" originally devised by Kohlberg. As a point of methodological interest, and possibly of comment, there are two ways of coding responses: one is by dividing them up into "classifiable thought units," each of which is separately coded and thus yields a mean score; the other is the more commonly used Global Rating method whereby each story is given a single overall score. The statistical implications of these two methods are obviously somewhat different.

The first type of research has confirmed the developmental sequence and the content of the six stages. Those individuals who progress right through to stage 6 go through a series of differentiated and distinct stages. The second type of research, correlating moral development with other modes of functioning, indicates that the rapidity and extent of progression through the sequence are highly related to intelligence, and to some extent to social class (Kohlberg, 1958; Weinreich, 1970a,b). The stage at which the individual finally arrives in adulthood is related to family environment (Hoffman and Salzstein, 1967; Hoffman, 1971), and there is a qualitative difference in the political and personal belief systems of people operating at different moral levels in adulthood (Haan *et al.*, 1968). Those individuals who arrive at the "higher" levels of moral thought are more likely to resist Milgram-type pressures to obedience (Milgram, 1965). During the course of development there is a definite relationship between the level of cognitive development as defined by Piagetian measures and moral stage, and similarly between moral stage and level of ego functioning, and type of ego-ideal.

From this brief summary of some of the large body of research which has been generated in the wake of Kohlberg over the last decade, it is clear that the theoretical system has good predictive power; however, it is my view that it does not at the moment have great explanatory strength. The research seems to have mapped out a broad *description* of moral growth, but the necessary steps for explanation have not been taken. The evidence of development and correlation is there, but they deserve an examination of the reasons for their existence, which has not been made. Moscovici (1972) has commented on the failure of social psychology to discover"dangerous truths." By its very nature, moral judgment is particularly an area in which dangerous truths ought to be uncovered by research. There have indeed been a few startling findings among the correlations, but the fundamental questions which they raise for the concept of moral reasoning have not, I feel, been carried through to theoretical discussion. It seems that while we now *know* the correlates of moral judgment development, and have some awareness of the causative preconditions of moral progression, we still lack an *understanding* of the *processes* of moral thought, and in particular the processes of development. For example, although we know that a bright and parentally well-endowed child will move faster and farther *through the stages as a whole,* we do not yet understand how, or why, he progresses *from one stage to the next.*

Rather than exploring the structural implications of the system, it is arguable that the emphasis of many studies has been on the traditional questions of psychology: the differences between individuals, the effects of demographic factors, the acquisition of the "skills" of higher moral reasoning, and the correlates of the *trait* of moral maturity — and just around the corner perhaps, even though this is disparaged by researchers in the field, the spectre of a "moral development quotient." Within the research on the six stages of moral judgment itself, there has been rather a concentration on the content of the stages, and in particular on the relationship of the previous stages to stage 6, which tends to be construed as being the "goal" of moral development, or "moral maturity." Kohlberg himself has concentrated recently on the idea of a "core concept" of justice running through the stages (Kohlberg, 1971), but this seems more related to a crystallization of content rather than structure.

The foregoing points could be regarded as rather academic criticisms if the system described by Kohlberg were found to be practically universal. If everyone reached stage 6, then questions about individual differences on various independent variables would tell us more about those variables than about moral development itself. If everyone moves through all the stages, as through a series of hurdles, then questions about transition would either help us to understand such educational issues as accelerating moral growth or else, as in the case of the studies by Turiel and others, validate the invariance of the sequence and the relationship between one stage and the next. However, the situation is very different in reality, and it would seem that here is a case in which an examination of the anomalies and lacunae in the evidence may be more fruitful of explanation than the evidence which confirms the system.

The first and major factor is that very few individuals, in fact, reach stage 6. There have been several studies of adults, and the estimates of stage 6 thought vary from 5% to 20%. Therefore, most people operate at a "lower" stage of thought. For instance, Haan *et al.* (1968), in their study of students at Berkeley, found 40% at stage 4 and 32% at stage 3.

The second factor is the relationship of moral development to other variables. It seems from the evidence that the relationships between, for example, moral stage and ego stage, moral stage and cognitive stage, and moral thought and personal and political ideology are close enough to suggest a complex relationship, which may lead us to question the definitions and nature of "moral" judgment and the traditional separation of moral thought from other forms of thought.

The third factor is the transition from one stage to the next. An examination of the qualitative differences between the stages indicates that transition may involve a more complex process even than the transition from one type of cognitive operation to another. The possible complexities indicated in the second point above may add to those already inherent in the system. A further result of this is that it cannot necessarily be assumed that transition from, for example, stage 2 to stage 3 involves the same *processes* as transition from stage 4 to stage 5.

There are many implications arising from the failure of most people to arrive at stage 6. The first is that it brings into question the teleological orientation of stage 6 being the "goal" of moral development. This emphasis has arisen because of the complex philosophical and educational questions associated with the concept and nature of "moral maturity" (e.g., see Peters, 1970, 1971). This has tended to obscure the issues of moral functioning at the previous levels. In particular, it has led to the assumption that the earlier levels of moral judgment are less morally adequate, and by implication less *functional.* While the former is largely a matter of definition, the widespread existence of stage 3 and 4 individuals leads one to question the latter. The functionality of the earlier stages of moral thinking not only as developmental stages but also as viable adult modes of thought needs to be examined. By "functional" is meant both functional in terms of a psychologically satisfactory system for the individual and socially viable within the culture inhabited by the individual.

An important question which arises out of this is whether the stage 3 child in the process of development is using the same operations as the adult who operates at stage 3. The answers to both this and the issue of the psychological functionality of the stage are best sought in a structural analysis of the stages. The degree to which a stage of moral thought is functional to society may indeed affect the personal viability of that mode of thought for the individual; a particular stage of thought may create discomfort in the individual's relations with his fellow men, or possibly, as in the preindustrial society of Taiwan where

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Kohlberg (1963) found practically no stage 5 or 6 thought, there may not exist the external stimulation to progress beyond a certain stage. It has been argued by Kohlberg and others that the institutionalized morality of modern industrial societies is stage 5 (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969). It could also be argued that stage 4, with its Soames Forsyte mentality, is functional to the businessman, and stage 3, with its concrete personal and family orientation, is functional to the housebound woman. However, a purely functionalist interpretation would definitely undermine any teleological argument, because stage 6 is clearly anomic to society – one illustration being that all of the stage 6 students of Haan *et al.* (1968) were active protesters. Furthermore, a functionalist analysis, while it may provide some general insights, fails to account for the wide variation of thought found in the relatively homogeneous population of the student body at Berkeley.

A further question arising out of the failure of most people to reach the higher stages is that of motivation and impetus to transition from one stage to the next. The question of motivation is a thorny one for all stage theories. If the system is conceptualized as being a natural progression with structural properties, then inherent in those properties must be the impetus to progression. If, however, a large proportion of the population fail to proceed, do we then assume that they are for some reason "arrested" at that stage? – in which case it would be necessary to adduce factors *extrinsic* to their moral thought to account for this, such as personality factors or lack of stimulation. In other words, do we ask the what *prevents* the individual from progressing? Or, alternatively, do we consider another possibility, counter to the teleological model, that motivation to progress is not necessarily intrinsic, so we do not ask why *don't* they progress, but rather ask why *do* they progress?

Either way, we are faced with the problem that for some individuals in the course of development a stage becomes nonfunctional; for others it does not. In order to understand this, it seems necessary not only to look at transition in terms of the limiting external factors, or the conditions under which transition occurs, but also to look at the psychological processes involved in transition. Examination of these processes demands a structural analysis. While exposure to material and arguments of a subsequent stage may lead to the transition to that stage in some cases, understanding of the transition demands an understanding of the nature of the current stage and the reason why the subsequent stage is more satisfactory to the individual. Content alone is not enough, because transition involves breaking down the present stage and rebuilding in terms of the structures of the new stage. Otherwise, the stages would be merely alternative, but equal, moral points of view.

If one takes a structural perspective of the stages of moral development, then certain properties of moral thought become apparent which lead one to question the unidimensionality of moral judgment. A structural perspective involves looking at the underlying processes of thought at each stage and the kinds of limitations which those processes impose on the possible range of moral views. The first of these limitations lies in the degree of differentiation in each stage. The second lies in the cognitive substratum of the stages, and the third, I will argue, lies in the implicit models of man and, by implication, of self, that accompany the stages.

Implicit in a structural perspective is the assumption that the structure has internal consistency and logic; thus each stage must have a *subjective* logic and a *subjective* consistency. These may indeed be questionable to the sophisticated observer, and just as the stage 6 moral philosopher sees the limitations of the earlier stages, so also have Turiel and others found that the child in the course of development rejects and sees through the stage through which he so recently passed (Turiel, 1969; Rest *et al.*, 1969). It is a characteristic of structural progression that increased differentiation takes place: the subjective consistency is possible because the individual does not have sufficient differentiation to detect the flaws in the system which are apparent to the more sophisticated. As he progresses, he becomes able to see a wider range of solutions, a greater number of possibilites, and also has available a wider set of *principles* on which to base his judgment. For example, because the stage 1 child has an undifferentiated structure in which authority is an immutable and omnipotent force, he will make simplistic judgments directly relating to authority as a concrete force and have only the sketchiest concept of justice or lawmaking. The stage 4 child, who on some issues may hold superficially the same *opinion* as the stage 1 child, has a much more differentiated conception of authority and a set of principles connected with individual's relationship to authority. Also, he has further sets of separate principles concerned with justice between people, rights and duties, maintenance of trust, and so on which coexist with, rather than arise directly from, his conception of authority. A further point arising from this is that the stage 1 child will interpret any other principle of information — which may, for example, be couched in stage 4 terms — in accordance with the structure already existing; that is, he will simplify it. Similarly, although far more differentiated, the stage 4 child will interpret stage 6 principles in terms of his own structure, modifying them to assimilate them to existing logic. This is because the concept of a *range* of possible principles is limited, and it is this *range* which differentiates one stage from another, not only their content.

The relationship between cognition and affect in moral thought is clearly a highly complex one, and it is probable that both are interwoven in the structure of the stages, in a way which has yet to be elucidated. It is therefore not productive to analyze the stages purely in terms of cognitive operations. However, Tomlinson-Keasey and Keasey (1972) have produced some evidence that achieving a particular moral stage is dependent on reaching certain Piagetian levels; the ability to perform certain logical operations seems to be a prerequisite of performing certain moral operations. This evidence would seem to support a structural analysis of the stages which strongly suggests that stage 1 has all the characteristics of preoperational thought – lack of reciprocity, lack of a concept of causality, and so forth. Stages 2 and 3 are basically concrete operations; certain logical operations can be performed but these are characterized by a lack of abstraction. Moral dilemmas are solved in terms of concrete person-to-person considerations. It seems that the concepts of law and of the individual's relation to it and to the community as an entity rather than an aggregate of individuals which are required by stage 4 thinking demand abstraction commensurate with the existence of formal operations. The initial emergence of stage 4 thinking in bright children at about 12 years of age would be in line with this view.

The third area of structural analysis is not at first sight apparently closely related to moral questions, yet an examination of the premises behind moral arguments reveals its relevance, and several correlational studies have supported this. This is the implicit theory held by the child about the nature of man – the nature of man's relationship to society and to his fellow men, and the nature of the individual, as revealed by those constructs deemed significant in the description of both the self and the "ideal man." It has long been recognized in moral philosophy that a view of the nature of man is the fundamental premise behind any moral system, but the implications of this for development have not been fully explored. However, by looking at the implicit premises behind each stage, qualitatively and structurally distinct views emerge which have both a limiting and an orienting effect on the resolution of moral dilemmas. Taking first the relationship between man and society, in stage 1 the child is highly egocentric and at the same time perceives authority as omnipotent and omnipresent, with the individual subject to forces beyond his control. By stage 3, this has moderated, but man is still seen at the center of a series of interpersonal interactions, within which good relations must be maintained. In stage 4, the abstraction places the individual at the base of a hierarchy, which must be maintained for the benefit of society. Man and community are in structural interrelationship – the deviant threatens that structure, whereas at stage 3 the deviant was a nasty person who upset other people on a face-to-face basis. In stages 5 and 6, the concept of hierarchy changes to a perception of interdependent functions and roles, in which lawmaker and policeman become the servants, not the masters, of society.

If we consider the second aspect, the nature of the individual, we are moving out of even the broadest definition of "moral thought," so if a relationship is found it would raise a number of far-reaching questions. In the broad area of studies related to the self, there has been a recent revival of interest in systematic or stagewise developmental models. Such models are not new, particularly in this area, but hitherto they have tended to be typological, or, if developmental, have been more in the nature of theoretical ideals than the result of investigation. Some recent models have been compared with moral judgment

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stages, in both adolescent and adult samples. Lambert (1971) found a relationship between the level of ego development according to Loevinger's model and moral judgment, on the basis of which he concluded that ego development at any stage *precedes* development to the equivalent moral stage. Van den Daele (1968), using a modification of the Ideal Person technique, developed a stagewise model of ego-ideal which he found to correlate highly (0.67) with level of moral judgment. There are other studies with similar results.

But insofar as these are developmental studies, in themselves they do little more than indicate common developmental features. These have implications for understanding moral development, but they are not definitive. For a more telling correlational study, we must return to Haan *et al.* (1968), who studied young adults, in whom we may assume moral development was at least partially complete. They had no stagewise model of self and ideal self evaluations to start from, but found some striking relationships between moral stage and ego evaluations. From examination of the adjectives which had the highest or lowest evaluative connotations for each stage, there emerge consistent clusters, which furthermore have a lot in common with the implicit assumptions of the stage. The most remarkable example of this is the almost complete negative relationship between the evaluations of stage 4 and stage 6; those adjectives rated as good at stage 4 are frequently those rated bad at stage 6, and vice versa.

The above findings raise two important questions which cannot be dealt with in this paper, but which should be stated because they are relevant to points made earlier. The first is that if there is an inherently close relationship between personal and moral ideology, then the functional autonomy of an apparently "morally inadequate" mode of thought becomes more comprehensible. The second is that the nature of the relationship bears considerable examination and may lead to questioning of the traditional view of treating moral thought as a distinct category. But the main issue for the purposes of the present argument is the implications which the relationship has for transition; if the relationship holds for the developing individual as well as the adult, then this means that transition from one stage to the next involves changes on many fronts, requiring possibly quite major reassessments of personal values and personal evaluations. The degree to which the individual is willing, or able, to make these changes may be an important variable in his impetus to transition.

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A Critique of Kohlberg

Paper read to the International Conference on
Moral Development and Moral Education,
University of Leicester, August, 1977.

I want to start off my reflections on some of the psychological implications of Professor Kohlberg's work with a somewhat personal comment. I think it is important that we recognise the extent to which the 'Kohlberg system' is still in the process of growth. This is not surprising; any theorist who remains within a particular chosen field for a number of years should, one hopes, develop the implications and ramifications of their ideas. However the area of moral development is a little different. More than in other areas of psychology, there is a degree of personal commitment, and inevitably the researcher becomes to a high degree reflective. To put it straightforwardly, where one is at, in both the moral and the colloquial sense, affects one's conception of morality and moral development. I think it is probably fair to say that Professor Kohlberg, at the age of 30 when he devised the system, was into Stage 6, and that this reached perhaps its full equilibration in his extensive analyses of the principle of justice as a primary and universal ethic. Professor Kohlberg has subsequently progressed not only in his analysis but in his conception of where things are at, morally, and there has been increasing reference to Stage 7. This is a 'post-rational' stage, which appears to develop as a consequence of life-crises and general maturity.

For a number of reasons I don't wish to dwell on Stage 7, though no doubt it will be a subject for discussion during this conference. However I would like to look briefly at the implications of the changing emphasis of Professor Kohlberg's ideas, particularly for the conception of adolescent development. Alongside reference to Stage 7, there has emerged a somewhat different perspective on Stages 5 and 6. Whereas before, the theoretical position was that these stages began to manifest themselves in some individuals in mid or late adolescence, recent writings indicate that they do not appear until early adulthood, if they appear at all. Furthermore, there was a strong emphasis on rational ethics, or ethical rationality, which pervaded the period when Professor Kohlberg was regarding Stage 6 as the endstate - even the 'goal' - of moral development.

This perspective I think has been modified by the increased evidence of the rarity of Stage 6, and the rational element I feel must inevitably be weakened, if Stage 6 loses its aura as the 'final' stage of moral thought. These reflections are important, I feel, because most people in Britain, and particularly most people who have come to Kohlberg's ideas through his early or more popular writings, will be operating with a concept of six stages of moral thought, and will tend to hold the view that all six have at least some relevance to the period of the adolescent's life in which she is engaged in some sort of educative process.

What I am going to say about the psychological implications of Professor Kohlberg's work concentrates mostly on issues concerned with development in adolescence and young adulthood. I am going to consider some of the gaps which I think still exist in the understanding of moral judgement development, and then look at some of the ways in which I think that the conceptualisation of moral judgement and the stages of its development, are unclear. Finally I will consider some of the educational implications of these psychological questions. I shall remain within the cognitive-developmental theoretical framework, and examine it in its own terms.

The first question I will consider is that of the developmental process, the transition from one stage of moral thought to the next. There is plenty of evidence that individuals do progress; longitudinal studies indicate this clearly. Several studies have succeeded in moving individuals some way towards changing their stage of moral thought, and progressing to the next stage. However it is still not understood how this progression occurs. Just what kind of information or input has the effect of unsettling the present mode of thought, and inducing the child, or adult, to reformulate her beliefs and judgement?. (In Piaget's terms, what is the impetus to décalage?). Experimentally-induced change, and the kinds of classroom activities widely used in moral education, usually are effective by pitting the arguments of adjoining stages against each other. Certainly this works for those individuals who are already in some state of disequilibrium, who are, as it were, responsive to a system of beliefs which makes coherent their uncertainties and conflicted understanding. However according to the tenets of stage theory, many individuals who have only recently entered the stage will find such arguments either irrelevant, or else will begin to consolidate their ideas into a more equilibrated form of the stage. In educational terms, therefore, the Socratic approach to stimulating a questioning and rational mode is quite effective, but at the level of psychological enquiry we are still left with a question as to how it happens.

The question of *what* is actually changing in the process of growth is one I will return to in my next section. There are however a number of other, more general issues concerning growth and development through the stages. The variables which over the long term beneficially affect progress through the stages, are well-known, and are common to most aspects of development and educationally relevant performance. They are, specifically, intelligence, social class (more in the United States than in Britain) and the kinds of child-rearing practices which stress individual autonomy, respect for persons and rational enquiry. The type of school philosophy may also have an effect. It is not surprising that a rich environment, combined with a degree of personal talent - itself probably not genetically unrelated to the rich environment - is conducive to faster and further development. This however does not of itself explain anything about the growth process. Does the presence of stimulating others generate, socratically, a constant questioning and seeking for even greater complexity? Or is it that in the richer environment, more people are likely to be around who hold the higher stage views, and thus the growing individual has access to them? This kind of question is also relevant to the findings of moral development in non-industrial societies. Alternatively, is the more intelligent person more *intrinsically* motivated to seek a more integrated and differentiated solution?

These questions are particularly relevant to adolescence and the school situation, but one of the interesting mysteries of moral development is why people stop developing, and why they stop at different points in growth. There seems to be evidence that some of the people who have a college education may subsequently develop Stage 6 thought in post-college years. Otherwise it would appear that formal education has an important role; people appear to crystallise their moral judgements at the stage they have reached around the time they cease full-time education. This of course means that most adults are operating with Stage 2, 3 or 4 moral judgement. However it also raises the interesting question of whether there is a possibility of further moral growth in adulthood. What kinds of stimuli, what kinds of life events, would stimulate further growth? Surely the experiences of an ordinary life and exposure to the usual media, present as much first-hand moral variability to the adult, as do the second-hand experience of moral dilamma stories with which we stimulate the adolescent mind? Yet it seems from the admittedly tenuous evidence that only crises, or spiritual or political conversion experiences, create stage change in later life - and I am here referring to the earlier stages, not to the recondite Stage 7.

I raise these questions for consideration, not because I think they can necessarily be answered. However there are other questions about the psychology of moral judgement which I think may be nearer to solution. My second question concerns the difficult, and I think central, issue of the relationship between the content of the moral judgement and the structure of moral thought. In dealing with my earlier point, I referred to the question of what actually does change between stages. Clearly, as both theory and evidence indicate, it is more than simply the opinion which the individual holds. The way in which the individual looks at the issue, the kinds of variables which she considers relevant, and indeed the kinds of variables which she is able to conceive of, change between stages, and it is as a *consequence* of this that opinions change. The content is only an indication therefore of the structure. It is quite possible to have two kinds of content with the same structure; one person may consider that Heinz should steal the medicine, and another that he should not, yet both invoke the same *sort* of reason, and the same basic underlying principle, for their different opinion. For example, individuals operating with Stage 3 thought may come to either conclusion about Heinz. Similarly of course, the same opinion can be held from quite different underlying structural positions; it has for example been a notorious problem in the history of the research, to separate Stage 2 cynics from Stage 5 cynics.

For a long time, I feel, the problem of separating content and structure, and understanding what structure really was, was impeded by the tradition that moral judgement and moral thought are a special category of thought, distinct and separate from other kinds of thought. The problem with such a view is that it is based on a philosophical definition, and assumes, without necessarily investigating, that the psychological operations differ from those in other kinds of judgement. One way of examining this issue is to look at what *goes with* moral judgement development; what kinds of variables seem to affect moral judgement development; of what constellation of development is moral judgement a part? A number of things seem to be necessary preconditions for moral development to occur; other kinds of development seem to have to take place before moral judgement can develop.

For example, we know that the development of particular levels of cognitive operations is necessary - but not sufficient - for the development of moral stages; it is necessary to have attained formal operational thought in order to reach Stage 5 moral thought, but *by no means* everyone who operates with formal operations operates with Stage 5 thought. Does this mean that cognitive operations are a *component* of moral thought? Or possibly that moral thought is a component of cognitive operations? Or does it mean that the two areas are different, but the development of moral thought requires a basis or substrate of cognitivie conceptualisation? There are other areas of development which also have a similar relationship to moral thought. One such area is ego development, namely the conception of the relationships between the self and the social world, and the same questions apply here also.

The essential argument of cognitive-developmental theory is that the individual progresses through stages, each stage structurally different, and increasingly complex. This means that each stage is qualitatively, not simply quantitatively, different from the previous one, and each stage involved the reformulation and re-integration of the basic concepts and principles upon which reasoning is based. Therefore, in order to understand development within a cognitive-developmental framework, it is necessary to understand what is the underlying structure, the basic assumptions, the limits of conceptualisation, which are characteristic of each stage. In the area of cognitive operations this has, of course, been very thoroughly examined. We know exactly what all the ramifications of, say, concrete operations are, and we know what is meant by conservation, and so forth. This is not the case with the development of moral judgement. The basic orientation of each stage is certainly clear, but the underlying conceptions are not. The recent version of the manual has made considerable advances in formulating the structure, but there is still a long way to go. The difficulty is that a skilled and experienced researcher knows - certainly intuitively and frequently systematically - when she has reached the limits of the subject's conceptual possibilities, and experience builds up a very clear picture of how the 'Stage 3 mind' or the 'Stage 5 mind' works.

What has been lacking to date, I feel, is a systematic formulation of this in structural terms, and a theoretical analysis which places the changes in structure in some developmental framework, analogous to the kind of framework which exists in the field of cognition. In some earlier papers, Kohlberg experimented with the concept of role-taking as being a crucial element in moral thought. This was an attempt to look beneath the content, and consider both process and structure. However while role-taking is clearly a component of moral decision-making, it is only one. Furthermore, subsequent research, by Selman, seems to indicate that role-taking ability is really in the same kind of category as cognitive operations or ego functions; it is a necessary condition for moral development, but not a sufficient condition, and there is a sense in which it exists separately from moral judgement. It should also be pointed out, I feel, that there are a number of confusions about the concept of role-taking. Does role-taking mean empathy, which has strong affective overtomes, or does it mean an extension of the cognitive concept of reciprocity, in other words the capacity to conceive of and integrate a number of different points of view, and elements in the situation? In the latter case it is basically a cognitive capacity, and it is in this sense that I think Selman is using it. Although such a capacity does have obvious applications to affect, these are essentially additional to the cognitive activity.

I would personally argue that the most useful development in the direction of understanding the structure of moral reason is the recognition of the role of social perception in moral thought. Social perception, or social cognition, is the understanding of the workings of society, and the perception of the relationship between the individual and society. A number of people seem to have independently come to the conclusion that this is a central issue of moral reasoning. Central not in the sense that it is a preoccupation or theme of the responses given - it is not - but central in the sense of being the base from which moral conceptions and reasoning arise. I shall spell out the implications of this, but first think it is useful to point out that this is in contrast to some traditional conceptions of moral judgement. Traditionally, at least for many people, moral concepts and judgement has tended to imply matters connected with the relationship between persons, between the person and the rule, or the person and her conscience. These relationships are of course very important, and certainly figure prominently in the content of moral reasoning, but in examining the underlying premises behind the reasoning about these relationships, and in understanding what makes a coherence between the sentiment, the rule, the sanction and the obligation, what we find behind it all is a wider conceptualisation of relationships and organisation of society.

In the most recent version of the coding manual, the development of social perception is described as a precondition for moral reasoning. Like other variables which are relevant to moral development and cognition, there is a clear stage progression, and clear levels of comprehension. Social perception, or social cognition, is the understanding of relations between people, and therefore includes understanding of order and organisation. No prescriptive or connotative element is involved; it is the application of logical reasoning to the sphere of society and social relations. The development of social cognition therefore follows along lines determined by the development of logical reasoning. Cognitive operations are applied to social data, and the stages of social cognition can be clearly demonstrated to have analogy to cognitive stages. In other words, as in all other spheres of comprehension in which the cognitive-developmental approach is applied, we do not think of the growing child as simply acquiring more and more information, passively, and storing it cumulatively; the child is actively seeking to understand and make sense of the world around her, and develops 'theories' about the data she perceives, which become increasingly complex and adaptive at each stage of comprehension.

There are therefore three factors; cognitive operations, social cognition and moral judgement. Of moral judgement content we know a great deal; of cognitive development structure we know a great deal. We can deduce social cognition from moral judgement and by the application of analogy, establish the cognitive processes operating in it. There seems to be little difficulty about the relationship between social cognition and moral judgement, but there have been problems about the relationship between cognitive stages and moral stages. At various times in Professor Kohlberg's writings, or those of his close associates, it has been argued that formal operations are first involved in the development of Stage 3, Stage 4 and Stage 5. The clearest evidence is that formal operational thought is necessary for the transition from Stage 4 to Stage 5, but the extent to which it is involved in the development from Stage 3 to Stage 4 is less resolved. I will present my own interpretation of the relationship between cognitive operations, social cognition and moral judgement, as a basis for possible discussion.

It seems to me that the cognitive basis for Stage 1 moral thought is preoperational. The child's conception of the world is from a completely egocentric position. Impotent and impinged upon by forces natural, legal and in some cases supernatural, the individual is further limited by a complete lack of relativism. Therefore the dictates of these omnipotent forces are accepted, even when to rational observation they conflict. The forces themselves are conceived in concrete terms; the 'law' equals the bobby on the corner, god has a long white beard, and so forth. The following two stages are, in my view, concrete-operational. The primary characteristic of concrete operations is the perception that the possible is a subcategory of the actual. This is important in understanding the limitations of social perception in these stages; what is possible can only be extrapolated from the individual's own experience of the actual.

Stage 2 perceives a conflict between the individual and the other, whether the other is person or institution. Therefore conceptually, there is the possibility of alternatives. However because power is still conceived of as largely immutable, the compromise or accommodation must be at the individual level by deviousness, or ad hoc negotiation. Stage 3 is still concrete, but there is a more sophisticated conception. At this stage the full implications of the actual/possible relationship are understood - in other words, here we have the fully equilibrated form of concrete operations. The basis for conceptualising society is the group with which the individual is most familiar, and the dynamics of which she fully understands, including the implications and complications. Usually, this is the family or the dyad. Thus society is conceived of as being composed of an infinite extrapolation of family groups - with all the implications of normative status and role - and societal interaction is an infinite number of dyads - hence stress upon the virtues and rules which are most successful in sustaining effective dyad interaction. The kind judge will let Heinz off; the person who steals is letting down his family and friends; do unto others ... etc.

I think the significant break comes with Stage 4. Formal operational thought is specifically characterised by the beginnings of inductive reasoning, and by the recognition that the actual is a subcategory of the possible. Relativism at the abstract as well as the concrete level is possible. Many of the implications of formal operations are not utilised in Stage 4 thought, but the significant shifts from Stage 3 are two. Firstly, the individual is no longer egocentric; she can see the social system as a whole, and recognises her own locus within that - as one of many exactly equivalent in terms of status and role. Therefore she can see the role of institutions and institutional values in the total social system, not simply in personal terms. Secondly, she can distinguish legal from moral.

There is a recent paper by Chandler, which argues that the development of formal operations, and the consequent realisation of the possibility of relativism, produces a state of shock or vertigo. Whether or not this is accurate in terms of cognitive operations, I think there is a case for considering it in relation to Stage 4. A characteristic of Stage 4 thought is a preoccupation with law and order, and a quite overt dread of chaos. Unrealistically anarchic consequences are anticipated if people are allowed to 'get away' with misdeeds. Not surprisingly, therefore, in a conflict between legal and moral issues, the legal always takes precedence. You know where you are with the law; "morality", on the other hand, is liable to be relative and individualistic.

Obviously, with Stages 5 and 6 there develop more abstract and relativistic conceptions of society, including the recognition of the possibility and the processes of social change, and the possibility of an infinite variety of social systems. Interestingly, in Stage 5 the legal and moral are given equal weight, and the final choice made depends on the situation. In Stage 6 the moral is always pre-eminent, reflecting a full awareness of the ultimate relativism of any legal system, and the need for guiding ethical principles which are always superordinate.

In this brief descriptive outline of the social cognitions underlying moral reasoning I have attempted to indicate some of the structural issues. The essence of structure is that it sets limits on what can be considered. The social cognitions underlying the moral reasoning of each stage, determine those limits. When an individual makes a 'moral' decision, presumably she makes a choice between a number of alternatives, and invokes in making that choice a number of variables which she considers relevant. But what the nature of the dilemma is that she actually perceives, is dependent in the extent of her comprehension of the situation, and the variables which she invokes in making her choice are drawn from the range of variables which she is conceptually able to perceive as being relevant.

For this reason, I personally would argue that social cognition is not simply a precondition of moral development, in the same way that cognitive operations are; I would argue that social cognition is in fact as essential feature of the structure of moral reason. However before I elaborate that point, I think there are one or two other implications of this analysis which may be relevant to more general issues. Throughout the history of the Kohlberg system, the six stages have been grouped into three levels. The basis for this grouping has as I understand it, been the content of the stages, the predominant moral themes. If the significant conceptual and structural breaks are between Stage 1 and 2, and between 3 and 4, the logic of these levels as developmental (as opposed to thematic) divisions is lost, and may in fact be misleading. A further support for this line of argument is the parallel which many writers have observed between the content of the first three stages and the content of the last three; in many ways Stages 4, 5 and 6 are rational reworkings of what has been termed the 'naturalistic' modes of Stages 1, 2 and 3. In other words, the progression through legalism, relativism to humanism is repeated at concrete and then at abstract levels.

In my third question I want to elaborate my earlier point about the socio-cognitive basis of moral reasoning. I think the best way to do this is to ask a provocative question. What is moral about moral reasoning? To answer this, I want to examine the kinds of definitions which are implicitly and explicitly used in the area, and to consider the implications of some of the correlates of moral judgement development.

It is easy to say that the kinds of answers which respondents give to the moral dilemmas do conform at least superficially to the usual philosophical criteria of 'moral', but if our interest is in the psychological processes, are we perhaps making an artificial, semantic distinction? The definition of moral, as I understand it, implicitly assumes that there are categories other than moral, such as the category of fact, and the category of non-moral value. When one speaks of a moral judgement, one implicitly assumes that the person making it is aware that it is a special category of judgement, if one is talking about a philosophical level of debate. From the point of view of the psychologist , however, most of the subjects in our experiments neither know nor care about these distinctions and happily confuse fact, value, prescriptiveness and causality, and move easily and promiscuously between exemplar and principle and back again. In the real world, there is no need to justify the movement from is to ought, because for most people that distinction does not exist. If most people operate with a mixture of fact and value, then perhaps that is what we want to study. The evidence clearly indicates that what moral judgement correlates most with is not moral conduct, but with other areas of judgement, namely cognition, social perception, political attitudes and concepts, conceptions of the role of the ego and its relations with the social world. These correlations are so good that we can practically predict in individual cases from one variable to another.

Just on the correlational evidence alone, without even considering any analysis of structure or underlying reasons, or whatever - in other words, simply on normative psychological criteria - moral reasoning seems to be about social cognition, logical comprehension of social and political systems, political understanding and political reasoning, comprehension of ego function and of their relationship between ego and other. Moral reasoning therefore, is about the understanding, conceptually, of the relationship between the self and the social world. Prescriptive judgements in this case are part of that conceptual understanding, just as much as the 'facts' are, or the beliefs about what is fact. If we assume that the child (or adult) is, in the process of development, building up a theory about the nature of things, then this theory includes a prescriptive element, because a concept of the good is an important anchor in focussing on what is actually happening in the world. This is tied in with the question of causality. A lot of social cognition is about hypotheses about causality - what causes unhappiness, what brings chaos, or punishment, what makes for good, and so forth. In our separation of fact and value, is and ought, we may be forgetting that there is a very real logical process involved in forming a causal link between the good, and the ought which might lead to the good. If, as I am arguing, the good is treated not only in moral but in all forms of social and political reasoning, as a fact, then the processes of arriving at the ought-good link is straightforward logic.

A further element which again applies not only to moral judgement but to ego, social and political judgements is a degree of anxiety. This anxiety is closely associated with cognitive activity. It is an anxiety about order and organisation. Obviously the assumptions of causality affect the kind and degree of anxiety - will chaos follow certain transgressions, will I and others suffer if we impose too strong rules, and so on. It is also associated with the good, because there is tremendous individual commitment to the good at a personal level, whether it is a moral or social or political good. I am not in this example getting into the affect-cognition debate; that is a very important issue, which I cannot address in sufficient detail now. I am using this example to illustrate the commonality of element and process across many areas, which I think makes us look at the usefulness of the distinction we make between moral and other judgement.

However having said all that I want to look briefly at one area which is conventionally regarded as 'moral' and with which moral judgement does seem to correlate. This is guilt. Although the stage of moral thought may not affect behaviour directly, the kind of guilt aroused by transgressions does seem to be linked to moral stages. I asked my samples of school children what conscience feels like - in other words, a subjective account. The answers they gave were quite commensurate with the rest of their moral reasoning. In other words, Stage 2 anticipates social or physical retribution, Stage 3 feels regret or shame, Stage 4 debates with her alter ego, Stage 5 feels a loss of self-respect. Stage 6, I like to believe, suffers Sartrian mauvais foi, which as we all know is very painful..

Finally, I want to consider the educational implications of the psychological evidence. The first issue I want to raise concerns the 'morally mature person'. I don't think that Stage 6 exists realistically as a goal of moral education, but I think it has had rather a lot of influence in a teleogical sense; other forms of thought are somehow less mature, by virtue of its existence, however rarely it is found. I wonder about this. Obviously it is virtually impossible to create Stage 6 people through education, if only because Stage 6 thought does not develop until many years after schooling is complete. But is Stage 6 so desirable? All the evidence indicates that Stage 6 is anomic, both to the individual and to society. Society certainly needs Stage 6 people, but how many? In educational terms, is it the function of education to produce a few suffering geniuses, or to foster individual potential and general social good?

If we assume that moral education is, however, supposed to stimulate development to the next moral stage, then obviously socratic teaching methods, and appropriate climate in the school, and so forth, may be beneficial in achieving this. But this exercise is based on the assumption that the higher stages are somehow better than the lower stages. Also, it is not very easy to promote moral development through to the next stage, and may be noble educational efforts might be better deployed. Furthermore, taking a broad societal view, are we generally better off with more Stage 3 conventionals than with Stage 2 relativists? Morally there may be a case in that Stage 3 is a more sophisticated morality, but we might also bear in mind that Stage 2 individuals are more likely, on balance, to kick against petty injustice, even if only for selfish reasons, than are conforming Stage 3s. Might we not be better off, and more effective, if we concentrated on improving the quality of Stage 3 reasoning, or whatever; in other words, accepting the sad reality of structural limitations, and working on the possibly malleable content.

A number of writers have argued that Kohlberg is ultimately pessimistic, at both a personal and political level. If so few people do reach the later stages of moral thought, if accelerating moral development is so chancy a business, and if political orientation does tend to be associated with stage of moral thought, is there any hope at all for moral or social change? Are we in fact bound forever in an elitist world, in which the few moral and political innovators who have attained post-conventional reasoning, are supported in their struggles by a band of the rebellious but fundamentally morally immature, and resisted by the massed array of solidly conventional, law-abiding conservatives? Certainly, this was the image which came out of the studies in the late sixties on the relationship between political and moral thought.

Personally I think there is hope, and I think there is a perspective for moral educational goals. Increased understanding of the structure of moral reason may be leading to an awareness that maybe the content of moral thought is not immutable, that within the same structure, different opinions can be formulated. At the moment, the development of the British and American child is associated with rebelliousness at Stage 2, and conservatism at Stages 3 and 4. Is there necessarily something inherent in the structure of these stages which leads to quite this orientation? Or can moral education do something to increase awareness, and innovate ideas within the existing structure?

It may be machiavellian, but it would seem to me that if social change is to occur, the propagandist has to pitch her message to the level her audience is at. A modification of the content, but not the structure, in other words. I say it may be machiavellian, but of course that is what the professionals do all the time; open any medium of communication and work out the moral stage within which the message is expressed. I would like to finish with two examples which in their own way illustrate my point. One is serious but hypothetical. The other is more whimsical, but true.

One country in which Kohlberg has not done a cross-cultural study is China. In Britain, to come to a serious appreciation of Maoist thought probably requires Stage 5 thought, because of the relativism and conceptualisation of alternatives which is required. In China there are many, many millions of Stage 2, 3, and 4 people who think Maoist all the time, and for whom a conceptualisation of bourgeois democracy would require Stage 5. It may be a further salutary thought to consider that the grandparents of these people, in their own Stage 2, 3 or 4 way, held neither of these philosophies.

My second vignette concerns the 1970 election. At that time I was totally immersed, and dreamt, lived and walked in stages. One of my targets for categorisation in an idle moment was the pre-election addresses. I came to some interesting conclusions about British politics, but the significant thing was the pre-election-day comments. Wilson at the time was regaling us with the more technical implications of his wonderful six years, at probably Stage 4 or 5 level of complexity. Edward Heath gave a straight-down-the-line, pure Stage 3 appeal to shopping-basket economy. Need I remind you who was elected?

Piaget on morality: a critical perspective

In: Modgil, S. and C. Modgil. *Jean Piaget: consensus and controversy*, London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982.

Piaget on Morality: A Critical Perspective

HELEN WEINREICH-HASTE

INTRODUCTION

Longevity presents problems to the critic. Because Piaget was until very recently still active and still developing his theory, it is usual to refer to his latest work in a particular area. Most of his studies of forty or fifty years ago on thought and language have been expanded or subsumed by later writings. *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, however, was not followed up; it remained an aside. Some of the issues raised by the studies, for example, egocentrism, were explored in other contexts, but Piaget never developed the main theoretical issues. In the monograph he hypothesized a parallel relationship between moral and conceptual development, which his later studies could have elaborated, but he never integrated his moral and his conceptual studies. It has been left to others to do this.

The monograph has been very influential and has generated many replications and critical studies. As Wright (1982) has pointed out, 'it is a relatively easy task to point out the obscurities, inconsistencies and idiosyncrasies in Piaget's thinking'. While this is true, it is surprising that the majority of criticisms have concentrated on selected issues and methodology; few have taken the theory as a whole and critically explored its implications. Therefore, in this chapter I intend to review the major criticisms, but my main focus will be on three issues, two of which have received relatively little attention. Firstly, I shall consider Piaget's main thesis, which is essentially social-psychological, and which has largely been ignored by subsequent writers. Secondly, I shall consider the implications of Piaget's definition of morality. Thirdly, I shall consider the empirical and theoretical material in the monograph which relates to the development of moral judgment. In my final section I shall consider how later theoretical work in the area has moderated or expanded Piaget's work.

It is worth locating the historical context of *The Moral Judgment of the Child* by reference to its contemporaries. It was published two years after Freud's *Civilization*

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and Its Discontents. In America, the prominent psychologists were Terman, Gesell and Lashley; the full tide of learning theory had barely begun. Hartshorne and May had just published their character study. The dominant interest of many psychologists was the development of quantitative assessment techniques of personality and intelligence. Simultaneously, on both sides of the Atlantic, there was lively interest in psychoanalytic theory and research. The implications of both approaches were being explored in educational practice and theory. It was a period of practical experiments in non-authoritarian education, based on a variety of interpretations of Rousseau and Freud. Piaget refers with favour to French examples, the 'Activity Schools' (Hilgard, 1958; Flugel, 1964).

One area where the historical context merits examination is methodology. Piaget's attitude to methodology strikes the present-day psychologist as odd. Today we feel obliged to justify the use of qualitative methods, and implicitly or explicitly validate them by reference to some form of quantification. Piaget constantly apologises for using any quantitative data at all, on the grounds that only through qualitative techniques can we understand the processes of the child's thinking. It is not surprising that a major criticism of Piaget's work has come from American and British psychologists trained in the positivistic, statistical tradition. It is only relatively recently that anglophone psychologists have rediscovered process and structure, and the limitations of positivistic methods for examining these.

Piaget's orientation to methodology arises from his attitude to the importance of epistemology, and the close relationship between psychology and philosophy—a relationship which behaviourist psychologists explicitly severed. Yet, at the time he was writing the monograph, dogmatic empiricism was not entrenched even in America; clinical and statistical techniques, later brought into confrontation (Meehl, 1954; Miller, 1962), largely existed side by side as alternative, if debated, methods.

To criticize with historical awareness, therefore, demands some circumspection. The temptation is to take a present-day perspective and criticize the writer in terms of that. Disciples as well as critics may be selective in this way. It is a salutary experience to return to the original and attempt to work within its own parameters, and to find things that were taken for granted at time of writing, but which have recently been *rediscovered* in psychology.

PIAGET'S THESIS: A SUMMARY

Piaget's prime concern in the monograph was an examination of the psychological implications of the theories of the sociologists, Durkheim, Fauconnet and Bovet, about societal morality and its transmission to the next generation. He was engaging in a social psychological exercise: the description of developmental change was an integral part of his social psychological explanation, but the implications of the evidence for a theory of developmental processes were largely incidental to his main purpose.

The main argument of the monograph concerns one paradox: how can individual, autonomous morality develop out of the necessarily imposed morality of the 'adult' world? This is the paradox which Piaget argues that Durkheim had failed to solve, and which he himself attempts to solve by reference to developmental and social psychological explanation. His primary explanation is in terms of the interaction between the child, the parent and peers, and developmental changes which are manifested in 'the two moralities of the child'; the morality of constraint and the morality of co-operation. Piaget's main thesis is that the form of 'respect' changes, from a unilateral respect for authority to a mutual respect for peers, and that this change is consequent upon peer interaction, and upon the changing cognitive perspectives which this interaction facilitates. Fauconnet's work on objective and subjective responsibility, and Bovet's work on respect, are invoked as explanations of the processes involved in the developmental changes which Piaget demonstrated.

Central to the thesis and its exegesis is Piaget's implicit moral theory, which he shared with Durkheim. Both are part of the rationalist tradition of Kant and Rousseau. To quote a later Kantian: 'moral learning is not so much a matter of supplying missing motives as one of the free development of our innate intellectual and emotional capacities according to their natural bent. Once the powers of understanding mature and persons come to recognize their place in society and are able to take up the standpoint of others, they appreciate the mutual benefits of establishing fair terms of social co-operation . . . natural sympathy for other persons and innate susceptibility to the pleasures of fellow feeling and self-mastery . . . provide the affective basis for the moral sentiments once we have a clear grasp of our relations to our associates from an appropriately general perspective. Thus this tradition regards moral feelings as a natural outgrowth of a full appreciation of our social nature' (Rawls, 1971, pp. 459—460). Rawls relies quite heavily on Piaget in elaborating his own model for the development of a sense of justice. Rawls contrasted the Kantian, rationalist model with the Humean model that moral development is about the development of appropriate *motives*. His preference for the former is explicit: '(it) presents a happier picture, since it holds that the principles of right and justice spring from our nature and are not at odds with our good, whereas the other account would seem to hold no such guarantee' (op. cit., p. 461). This viewpoint is implicit in Piaget's work, and, indeed, the monograph is directed towards demonstrating how those principles evolve.

SUBSEQUENT RESEARCH AND THE MAJOR CRITIQUES

Subsequent research has largely ignored Piaget's main thesis. Researchers have, on the whole, concentrated on the account of developmental changes in moral thinking, and have focused upon particular aspects of the original study. The areas which have had particular attention are the absolute versus relative nature of moral judgment, the belief in immanent justice, and intentionality (the development of subjective responsibility), (Lickona, 1976; Modgil and Modgil, 1976). Most of the research replicating or extending Piaget's study has confirmed his general findings, though there have been differences in the rate of growth found.

The monograph has been heavily criticized, particularly on empirical grounds. These criticisms, to some extent, reflect changing preoccupations and models in developmental psychology. In 1969 Lickona enumerated the various 'misinterpretations' which characterized much of the criticism of the monograph. These misinterpretations arise in several cases from a conceptual gap between the critic and the framework within which Piaget was working. In the 1950s, certain fundamental differences in assumptions made Piaget's work essentially incomprehensible to the anglophone psychologist of the positivist tradition. 'Intelligence', for example, for most anglophone psychologists of the period meant 'a hereditary potential for intellectual growth which experience can develop, but only within genetically set limits' (Lickona, 1969). Intelligence, therefore, was a *measurable, independent variable*. Piaget, in contrast, regarded intelligence as a *process*.

Criticisms that Piaget ignored demographic factors such as sex, culture and social class reflect different approaches to explanation, and different models of the person.

Implicit in Piaget's work is a model of the person as active, seeking to comprehend, learning through experimentation and through the development of increasingly complex categorization and organization of experience. In learning theory, the implicit model of the person is passive. One of the rationales for the individual differences approach is that, by isolating all the variables involved in a phenomenon, one eventually arrives at a valid construct and, at the same time, identifies the determining characteristics. The tradition within which Piaget operated, emphasizes structure and process, and starts, therefore, with the phenomenon itself; not with its contingencies and antecedents. An example of the learning theory perspective is the criticism of Bandura and Macdonald, who attempted to demonstrate that the order of stages of development could be inverted by reinforced role-modelling. In a sense they succeeded, in that some subjects did conform to the adult model. However, their theoretical assumption was that the malleability of the child's thinking in this social situation was evidence that the *whole* of the child's thinking originated from reward and punishment. An alternative to Bandura and Macdonald's conclusions is that the child behaved entirely in accordance with known characteristics of conformity behaviour. Le Furgy and Woloshin (1969) and Cowan et al (1969) replicated Bandura and Macdonald's study and argued that only situational, not developmental, conclusions could be drawn from their findings.

Many psychologists have had difficulties with the concept of an invariant sequence of stages. The concept of maturation, a biological phenomenon translated into child psychology, particularly by Gesell, has frequently been invoked as the explanation of Piaget's stages. A number of psychologists, including Bandura and Macdonald, pitted a social learning theory model against Piaget because they regarded him as a hereditarian. For psychologists who accept the evidence of the invariant sequence and prefer to interpret it in terms of maturation, there remains the problem of accounting for a 'biological' basis of morality. Wilson has recently attempted a socio-biological analysis of stages of moral reasoning (1978).

Criticism of the sequence or nature of *stages* of moral development is also in several senses a misinterpretation. Relatively few studies have failed to replicate the order and form of the change in moral thinking, but many have found differences in the rate of development. Others have also demonstrated inconsistency; the child appears to be at a heteronomous 'stage' in one area but show autonomous thought elsewhere. However, Piaget never claimed consistency or other 'stage' properties of moral thinking: he explicitly refers to 'phases'. While he argued for qualitative changes between the two moralities, he did not consider that development in this area had the same characteristics as cognitive development.

The social-psychological questions which are Piaget's main thesis have virtually been ignored; the majority of studies have focused on the developmental changes in specific areas of moral reasoning—especially intentionality, immanent justice, objective responsibility. Researchers have not tested the wide range of moral thought, nor examined the theoretical basis. The conception of rules is fundamental to Piaget's theory and is certainly the most adequately documented area in the monograph, yet it has hardly been studied by subsequent researchers. Lickona cites one unpublished paper in the area, Modgil and Modgil cite none. I have been unable to trace any work. Some studies have tackled the developmental hypotheses, egocentrism and decentration, for example (Ugurel-Semin, 1952; Stuart, 1967), and some attention has been paid to the relationship between cognitive processes and moral reasoning (Lee, 1971; Hardeman, 1972). The central hypothesis about the effect of social and authority relations has, however, been tested only by indirect measures. Some researchers have examined the effect of authoritarian versus non-authoritarian environments—either parental or school—on the level of moral reasoning (Macrae, 1954; Johnson, 1962).

Others have examined the effect of peer interaction—frequently via an indirect measure of the child's sociability and popularity (e.g. Kohlberg, 1958). One variation is the work of Breznitz and Kugelmass, who investigated the differences between kibbutz versus urban children in intentionality judgments (1967); they found none.

The methodological critiques of the monograph have on occasion been used to dismiss the findings and by implication the whole theoretical framework. Recently, Kurtines and Greif (1974) wrote a substantial methodological critique of Kohlberg's research which they dismissed on the grounds that it used unsound 'projective' techniques. This is an inaccurate description of Kohlberg's and Piaget's methods, and reflects again a misunderstanding arising from positivistic assumptions (Broughton, 1978). On the whole, however, it is recognized that there is no adequate alternative to the open-ended method of eliciting the processes of moral reasoning (Pittel and Mendelsohn, 1966; Rest, 1974).

A further critique which reflects basic differences in assumptions is that moral judgment fails to correlate with moral behaviour. This critique is best considered in the wider context of the relationship between attitudes and behaviour. One theoretical assumption is that attitudes are interesting to psychologists primarily as a mediation between stimulus and behaviour; if attitudes do not predict behaviour, their functions are unclear and the methodological problems attached to their measurement not worth overcoming. While this criticism is rarely expressed in such crude terms in social psychology, it does appear in the area of moral development. If moral judgments do not predict moral behaviour, of what interest can they possibly be? Yet the argument that attitudes predict behaviour has long been questioned. Mainstream social psychology has for a long time focused on situational factors in behaviour and attitudes as post-hoc reflections upon behaviour, as cognitions, explanations or justifications (Festinger, 1957; Moscovici, 1978; Semin and Manstead, 1979).

These criticisms arise from a tradition of psychology which also equates moral development with the acquisition of habits and the inculcation into the child of the conventional beliefs and habits of her culture. If socialization is successful, according to this view the articulated belief must be validated by behaviour. This model of morality and socialization is a combination of the Humean model of morality and the social-learning model of development. The acquisition of guilt, in particular pre-transgression anxiety, is the prime focus of this approach. Guilt is a motive which (1) can be seen as classically conditioned, and (2) as a prevention, therefore a predictive contingency of anti-social or immoral action (Eysenck, 1976). The one area in which a clear correlation between behaviour and moral reasoning has been established is conformity. Using Kohlberg's measures, several studies have demonstrated that the highest and lowest stages of moral reasoning correlate with non-conformity—though only the highest stages correlate with refusing to conform on matters of principle. It is the middle stages of moral thinking which correlate with conformity to conventional behaviour (Milgram, 1965; Salzstein, Diamond and Belenky, 1972; McNamee, 1977). Traditional socialization models cannot adequately account for these results. (See Weinreich-Haste 1979(b).)

THE PRESENT CRITIQUE

I shall consider three areas, which have, in my view, been overlooked in the existing critiques. First, I shall consider the main thesis of Piaget which has largely been ignored. Second, I shall consider the definition of morality which is implicit in Piaget's work, and the limitations which this definition places on analysis and theory. Third, I shall consider the research which Piaget described in the monograph, and examine the evidence and arguments for developmental stages of moral thinking. Finally, I shall consider the implications for Piaget's work of the subsequent work of Kohlberg, Damon and Selman.

Piaget's Thesis

Subsequent fragmentation of the themes which Piaget investigated has tended to obscure the wholeness of the original. Piaget's main purpose was to criticize Durkheim's basic position, that morality is always 'imposed by the group upon the individual and by the adult upon the child'. Therefore, in the monograph, Piaget was less interested in the actual moral development of the *child*, and more interested in the social-psychological question: What are the mechanisms operating between individual and society in the transmission of morality? He utilized the developmental material as a means of pursuing this thesis. My argument is that he failed in this, but that he made a contribution to developmental psychology almost by default. The emphasis of subsequent research, of course, reflects the success of his developmental material. However, it is arguable that developmental social psychology has been impoverished by its failure to attend to Piaget's social psychological insights, incomplete though they were.

Authority was the central concept of Durkheim's sociological perspective. Another commentator has written that Durkheim was 'engrossed in the problem of authority—that is, social authority—and its relation to state, economy, and other major spheres. It is not extreme to say that Durkheim was obsessed by authority. His entire approach to the understanding of religion, of morality, of reason itself, stems from his profound sense of the role of social authority in human lives. Each of these is, in its most imposing form, itself a type of authority; each emanates from that larger authority which is the social bond' (Nisbet, 1974, p. 438).

Piaget criticized Durkheim's perspective on a number of points, concerned with social-psychological issues involved in the processes of moral transmission. For example, he picked up an important and unresolved paradox inherent in Durkheim's position. If all morality is imposed, there is an inevitable confusion of the morality of constraint and the morality of co-operation. Further, there can be no distinction between 'is' and 'ought'. If what is transmitted is the orthodoxy, there can be no gap between the actual and the ideal; the 'good' must be that which is established. This paradox involves the distinction between duty and the good. If morality is constrained, then the good must of necessity be identical to duty.

Piaget argued that the solution is to look at the developmental change in the understanding of morality, a change which he claimed is from the simple acceptance of the voice of power to a morality of respect and co-operation. The consequence of this change is the development of 'true' morality, and morality which is autonomous but functional to individual and society. The *definition* of morality is therefore of great importance. Morality is a *method of reasoning*. 'In the midst of the network of groupings which constitute our present society, individuals agree, not so much to preserve a set of dogmas and rites, as to apply a "method" or set of methods. What we affirm is verified by the others; what is done is tried out and tested by the others. The essence of experimental behaviour—whether scientific, technical or moral—consists, not in a common belief, but in rules of mutual control. Everyone is free to bring in innovations, but only in so far as he succeeds in making himself understood by others and understanding them' (Piaget, 1932, p. 347).

The method 'implies that certain provisional truths have been established but above all . . there is more to discover'. He criticized Durkheim for conceiving of morality as consisting of givens, and argued that '"common morality" does not consist in a "thing" given to individuals from without, but in a sum of relations between individuals. Common morality would thus be defined by the system of laws of perspective enabling one to pass from one point of view to the other, and allowing in consequence the making of a map . . . in this case each individual perspective could be different from the others and at the same time adequate' (p. 352).

This definition of the method of morality integrates a social psychology of interaction with a cognitive model of social construction. Morality becomes not the rules as such, but the *understanding* of rules, roles and relations. Co-operation, therefore, is the *manifestation* of morality, but for Piaget, co-operative *behaviour* was also a necessary precursor and antecedent of articulated, conscious cognition of rules.

The process which, according to Piaget, links morality of constraint and morality of co-operation is *respect*, and here again Piaget departed from Durkheim in his definitions. The essence of the authority relationship is the respect which the child has for the adult or the powerful peer. Piaget accepted Bovet's much more individualized notion of respect, which allows for mutual, (not simply unilateral) respect, born of equality and co-operation; 'it is sufficient in (Bovet's) view that there should be contact between two individuals for one to respect the other, and for those moral values to appear which are born of this respect' (p. 375). Respect, and the developmental changes in its form, was thus the central issue in Piaget's developmental study. His developmental material did indeed demonstrate just such changes; the child orientates initially to the voice of authority at least in *justification* and *explanation* of the rule (even though she may not actually *obey* the adult).

The evidence of forms of respect is substantial ammunition against Durkheim's position. Unfortunately, Piaget's thesis was that changes in the form of respect and in the reasoning of the child with regard to rules arise from the *social situation* surrounding the transmission of values, that unilateral respect is the consequence of constraint exercised by adults, and that mutual respect is the consequence of peer interaction. For this Piaget produced no evidence. His developmental material demonstrated that the implications of Durkheim's position are not tenable, but he failed to demonstrate the social psychological mechanisms which were presented as alternatives to those of Durkheim. His social psychological thesis depends on an analysis of the role of the parent or authority figure, firstly in imposing a constraint, and secondly in creating the psychological environment in which the child may be free to develop a morality of co-operation. The interaction processes which instigate the development of a morality of co-operation require analysis of the peer relationships. Despite the centrality of this to his thesis, Piaget in fact made no attempt to test it. He frequently *asserted* the importance of both parent and peer behaviour, and cited exemplars of the kind of regime which he considered conducive to development, but nowhere did he test this. Most subsequent research has been within a developmental psychological framework, treating the relevant variables as determinants of individual development, rather than as manifestations of the wider social-psychological question of the transmission of morality. Some studies do bear indirectly on the social-psychological hypotheses. Researchers have demonstrated that authoritarian environments are on the whole more likely than 'progressive' ones to slow down the movement from heteronomous to autonomous thinking, but the evidence suggests that this is particularly due to the strong emphasis on the values of rule-following and obedience, rather than on limitations on the opportunities for peer interaction (Boehm and Nass, 1962; Breznitz and Kugelmass, 1967; Baumrind and Black, 1967). Two studies, however, have been of value in illuminating the *processes* involved.

The work of Hoffman on the effects of parental techniques on the form of moral reasoning and motivation in young people provides indirect support for Piaget's propositions. The subjects in the study were considerably older than Piaget's, and under investigation was the *type*, not the *stage*, of moral reasoning. Hoffman found evidence that inductive techniques produced more rational, independent and autonomous morality, and techniques involving either physical or psychological power relationship were more conducive to an immature, affect-bound form of morality. These findings have some relevance for the social-psychological variables involved in the transmission of morality (Hoffman, 1963, 1970).

Bronfenbrenner's well-known studies of the contrasts between US and Soviet methods of 'character education' did highlight the theoretical approach of Makarenko which has much in common with Piaget's conception of the importance of peer relations (Bronfenbrenner, 1962; Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner, 1976). Bronfenbrenner found striking evidence in the Russian system of the effectiveness of peer allegiance, even against adult pressures, and of the way in which teachers utilized this, in fact, to transmit effectively the 'adult-approved' value system. The children in his studies had a powerful conception of ingroup allegiance and intergroup competition, and strong shame reactions associated with 'letting the side down'. This data is, of itself, demonstration of the significance of peer interaction at the relevant age, but not specifically of the developmental processes which Piaget postulated in association with peer interaction. As Piaget himself noted, there is little difference between power-asserted constraint by parents and by peers, and it is possible to argue that co-operation is easily confused with constraint in the setting Bronfenbrenner described. A further objection has subsequently been put forward by Bronfenbrenner (Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner, 1976), that the Soviet system is *monolithic*; although the peer group is the agent for instilling and maintaining co-operation, the message is identical to that which the adults would choose to put over, if they were acting as constraints; Western society in contrast is *pluralistic*; the child receives conflicting messages from various sources, and the growth process is facilitated by the child learning to negotiate these conflicts. In view of Piaget's avowedly dialectical model, it is likely that he would agree with the spirit if not the letter of Bronfenbrenner's later, revised ideas.

It is perhaps unfortunate that Piaget invested so much of his theoretical resource in the monograph in the sociological and social-psychological theory. He spent relatively little time extending the theoretical—as opposed to the descriptive—aspects of development. The interesting theoretical issues are scattered in the monograph. He reiterated a number of points, for example, on respect, throughout the monograph, but in terms of their social rather than their developmental implications. For example, the most complete of his studies, both empirically and theoretically, is the first section on the rules of games. It is also the one area where there is actually some evidence of the effect of experience and peer interaction. Yet it is not until the last pages of the monograph that the significance of the inclusion of rules in his definitions of morality becomes explicit: 'As for sympathy, it has of itself nothing moral in the eyes of conscience. To be sensitive alone is not to be good: sympathy must be canalized and steadied . . . sympathy is natural to the self. But before this sympathy can acquire a moral character there must be a common law, a system of rules' (p. 395). These sentiments are virtually identical to Rawls' position, quoted earlier: the rule defines the good and the moral.

It is essential to Piaget's position *vis-à-vis* Durkheim that the rule is not simply a reflection of adult morality, but something which develops of itself, changing with the child's changing consciousness and conceptualization. Following Baldwin, he identified three phases of rule consciousness: firstly, the law is the voice of command within the self—the adualistic, egocentric parent internalized, but not differentiated from the self; secondly, the law is generalized to others, and thirdly, the content of the law is elaborated through practical intelligence and autonomous reasoning. The egocentrism of the first phase has parallels in logical thinking: 'In the psychology of the intellect it is this egocentrism that seems to us to explain the logic and the causality peculiar to the child: his difficulty in handling relations and in forming objective causal series, etc. From the social and moral point of view, it is this egocentrism which explains why, though he is so absorbed in others, that he conforms to examples and commands received from without, yet the child introduces into every piece of collective behaviour an irreducible element of individual interpretation and unconscious deformation. Hence, the *sui generis* attitude found among the smaller children with regard both to rules of games and to their parents' commands—an attitude of respect for the letter of the law and of waywardness in its application' (p. 399).

The above is an example of the tantalizing way in which Piaget introduced major insights about the relationship between cognitive and moral processes. Instead of pursuing the precise developmental analysis which he began, and for which he undoubtedly had the data and material available, he returned to invoking his vaguer and more limited social-psychological perspective. Subsequent development beyond the externality and imperativeness of the law, he said, must depend on something more 'than a mere ratification on the part of individual intelligence: there must be relations of a new type between individuals who meet as equals, relations founded on reciprocity, relations that will suppress egocentrism' (p. 401). In contrast, in a brief analysis of the egocentrism of the child's early rule conception, he did not invoke the parental variable, instead he concentrated on the processes of the child's thinking, and this analysis has a clarity and richness which is provocatively brief—a mere couple of pages.

Another exciting aspect of his developmental theory which was only fragmentarily examined, in several different parts of the monograph, is the notion of *conscious realization*. This process is fundamental to the cognitive theory. Action upon the world occurs first developmentally, and only after the passage of time does this become articulated conceptually. Sensorimotor action precedes and is the foundation for symbolic action.

Table 10.1 demonstrates clearly the parallel but sequential development of *motor*, or *habit* rules and their conscious realization. But it is only again at the end of the monograph that Piaget explored some of the theoretical issues in the process of conscious realization, in this case of the development of self-consciousness, and the progress out of egocentrism. It is really the only place in which he explored the processes of conscious realization, and it is particularly interesting that his account is a clear statement of a *dialectical* process: 'as the shuttle flies backwards and forwards between ejection and imitation, equilibrium is maintained between consciousness of self and awareness of others. "Moral consciousness" appears when the self is no longer in a state of harmony, when there is opposition between the various tendencies that constitute it' (p. 394). And later: 'In order to discover oneself as a particular individual, what is needed is a continuous comparison, the outcome of opposition, of discussion, and of mutual control, and indeed consciousness of the individual self appears far later than consciousness of the more general features in our psychological make-up. That is why a child can remain egocentric for a very long time . . . while participating on all points in the minds of others' (p. 410).

This brief exploration encapsulates many concepts which were to become central to Piaget's main cognitive thesis, and which have perhaps had their most recent elaboration in *The Grasp of Consciousness* (1977) in which Piaget elaborated in great detail the processes by which consciousness (or 'cognizance') of motor actions comes

Table 10.1 *Summary of the data presented by Piaget and*

	Rules of the Game					Lying	
Age [N.B.: ages in the data are frequently *approximate*][a]	Marbles (boys)	Consciousness of Rule	Hide-and-seek (girls)	Responsibility	Immanent Justice	What are 'lies'	
<5 N.B. Only in the Rules of the Game and Lying were children under 5 studied.	Motor behaviour: individual, ritualized.	Rules not coercive in character—motoric, or, later, exemplary.	Egocentric, imitative.				
5	Play is egocentric, imitative, not co-operative. Child is aware of set of codified rules.	Rules respected as sacred and untouchable, emanating from adults and lasting forever. Alternatives seen as transgression.	Rules change but ritual is important. Similar view as boys regarding origin of rules.	Objective responsibility, culpability = amount of damage, etc.		Confusion of oaths and lies.	
6					86%		
7	Co-operative play. Tries to win. Shows concern with mutual control and unitary set of rules.		Co-operative and competitive. New rules acceptable if practicable and agreed by group.		73%	Awareness of difference between lies and mistakes, but both 'lies'.	Average age for 'objective' response for lies: the bigger and less credible, the 'worse'.
8						Distinction between lies and mistakes made explicitly.	
9	Groups of players agree on the rules of the game, but appreciate variations in rules.				54%		
10		Rules as laws arising from mutual consent. Respected through loyalty, but changeable through negotiation.		Subjective responsibility, intention taken into account.			
11	Rules codified. Procedure fixed and observed by whole group.				34%	Intention to deceive as criterion of 'lie' made explicitly.	Average age for 'subjective' lie: blatant lies less bad because less credible. Distinction between lie and joke or exaggeration.
12+							

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[a] A line across the column indicates that Piaget divided his sample into groups

his associates in 'The Moral Judgment of the Child', 1932.

Lying		Punishment and Retributive Justice				Distributive and Retributive Justice		
Punishment for Lying								
Lies naughtier if punished at once: punishment *defines* naughtiness. Lies naughty because they break *rule*.	81% believe it is worse to lie to an adult than a child.	30% mentioned reciprocity in punishment; general view that 'severest is best'.	Unanimously in favour of punishment as deterrent	(Where offender in class is known to group.) Everyone should be punished because by not owning up/telling everyone is guilty.	(Where offender is not known to group.) Everyone should be punished because wrong-doing requires punishment, even if innocent suffer.	70% believe it fair to reward 'good' child at expense of bad.	Should report miscreant	Justice subordinated to adult authority.
	51%—equally bad to lie to adult and child 17%—worse to lie to companion.	49% mentioned reciprocity punishment as simple reciprocity. *Lex talionis*, emphasis on *equality*.	Increasingly in favour of reasoning as more effective than punishment *per se*.	Everyone should accept punishment as an act of solidarity by group.	No-one should be punished because more unjust to punish innocent than to let guilty go.	40% believe it fair to reward virtue (older children also perceive instrumental advantage of equality: no revenge, better behaviour in response to love, etc.)	Should not report miscreant — even lie to parent or teacher to avoid 'sneaking'.	Progressive egalitarianism.
Deceipt destroys trust, so worse to lie to friend than to adult.		82% mentioned reciprocity punishment should be suitable, connected to, and proportional to, fault. Emphasis on *equity*				25% believe it fair to reward virtue		Equity

divided at that age. No line indicates that ages represented are approximate.

(Table 10.1 continues on p. 192)

Table 10.1 *(Continued)*

Age [N.B.: ages in the data are frequently *approximate*][a]	Justice and Fairness																	
	'What is unfair'				Treatment for Accidental Loss			Response to Unfair Order				Talion for Injustice			Cheating			
N.B. Only in the Rules of the Game and Lying were children under 5 studied.	[Acts which are 'forbidden']	[Going against rules of game]	[Inequality of treatment]	[Social injustice]	[Punish child for loss]	[Give child another to equal with siblings]	[Give child another because smallest (equity)]	[Just: should obey]	[Unjust: child defends equality (Rambert's study)]	[Just (Piaget's study)]	[Unjust]	[(Paying back a bully) right (Rambert's study)]	[Reasons based on authority]	[Reasons based on equality]	[Naughty because forbidden]	[Against rules of game]	[Makes co-operation impossible]	[Against equality]
<5																		
5																		
6																		
	64%	9%	27%	0%	48%	35%	17%	95%	5%	75%	25%	19%	100%	0%	64%	6%	0%	30%
7								55%	45%			33%						
										15%	85%							
8								33%	66%			65%						
													84%	16%				
	7%	9%	73%	11%	3%	55%	42%											
9								16%	83%			72%						
10								10%	90%			87%						
													68%	26%	8%	24%	20%	48%
11								5%	95%			91%	32%	62%				
12+								0%	100%			95%	15%	62%				
					0%	5%	95%											

about. The essence of the concepts of assimilation and accommodation are there, though expressed in different form, and Piaget was already exploring the notion of equilibration and its essentially dialectical nature.

As has been noted, subsequent research has selected and extracted, not taken Piaget's package as a whole. To understand what Piaget was trying to do, it is necessary to consider the logic of his package and, additionally, his implicit definition of morality. It is not immediately obvious why he chose the range of elements which he reported in the monograph, and why he excluded others. Apart from the centrality of rules, which, as we have seen, is a legacy of Piaget's Kantian inheritance, the rest of the package appears to be largely a collection of conventional moral precepts and avoidances. It can be argued that 'moral' is an arbitrary criterion. Piaget has, for example, used an essentially non-moral example to make substantial social and developmental points about rules. The rules of the game of marbles turn out to be an excellent means of investigating how children relate in a collaborative activity, and how the child comes to comprehend these relationships and the criteria by which they may be regulated. In many ways this is a straightforward extension of the earlier work, *The Child's Conception of the World*, in which Piaget explored the child's understanding of social and physical phenomena.

In other areas of the moral 'package', such as lying and causing damage, Piaget treated it as implicit that the *rules* governing them are transmitted from the adult culture to the child in the same way that the rules of marbles are transmitted from older to younger children. He demonstrated that the *attitude* of the child to these rules is similar to her attitude to the rules of marbles or hopscotch. His primary interest in these areas of 'morality' lay in the changing conception of 'fairness' or 'wrongness'.

Immanent justice, intentionality and responsibility have subsequently been investigated both as aspects of moral thinking and as examples of social and attribution processes. The findings do not, in fact, substantiate a change of morality from a morality of *constraint* to a morality of *co-operation*. They do, however, demonstrate a change from a morality of egocentric absolutism to a morality based on a relativistic conception, in which the child is able to take the perspective of others. In other words, the social-psychological thesis is not demonstrated, but the developmental-cognitive thesis is.

Piaget's failure to answer his own social-psychological questions should not blind us to the vital importance of the questions he did raise in trying to bridge sociology and psychology. These questions have not been adequately answered since. Indeed it is only recently that social psychologists have again begun to ask them: how does individual consciousness arise from collective or social consciousness and how does the reciprocal relationship between these two develop and change? The study of social or collective consciousness has been, and still is, the province of sociologists and political scientists. The study of individual consciousness has largely been the province of the psychologists, but in largely isolation from sociological issues. This narrowness of perspective has come under considerable criticism recently (e.g. Riegel, 1978).

For the 'passive' model in psychology there is no problem; the individual belief system reflects an increasingly 'accurate' absorption of the collective consciousness. For the 'active' model of the person, the problem is: How does the individual develop a differentiated mode of consciousness which is both a translation and an individualization of the collective mode? The individual initially has access to the collective consciousness via authority figures and later additionally through her own experience. But reception and comprehension of the collective knowledge is limited and distorted by the limitations of the individual's cognitive capacities. Piaget's work in the cognitive field examines just this process; the stages represent increasing comprehension of the physical world and by implication the individual ultimately arrives at a 'true' and accurate capacity for perceiving and conceiving. The parallel questions in the moral sphere are how the individual translates and develops an increasingly sophisticated conception of morality. As I shall later discuss, to some extent Kohlberg's work does just this, with specific reference to justice.

However, this is *not* the question which Piaget asks, but to some extent it is the question which he answers. His questions are: How does morality in society change and develop, and how does the individual come to understand ('respect') the rules of morality? This is explicit in the very first page of the monograph; 'All morality consists in a system of rules and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules . . . the doctrines begin to diverge only from the moment that it has to be explained how the mind comes to respect these rules' (p. 1). This is why Piaget talks about the moralities of *constraint and co-operation*, and not, as subsequent writers in the field have done, of heteronomous and autonomous morality. The former has social-psychological connotations implying something about interpersonal interaction. The latter focuses on the child's cognitive frame of reference and cognitive organization; the developmental change is from an undifferentiated self and other to a self differentiated from others but cognizant of interaction with them.

Although Piaget failed to answer his social-psychological questions, his research generated a great deal of valuable data and a mass of insights and concepts which are significant contributions to developmental psychology. Many have been brought to full fruition in his cognitive work, but not reapplied to social and interpersonal areas. He failed to take up the questions about 'social cognition' which the moral research generated, apparently because he regarded those as a mere postscript to his work reported in *The Child's Conception of the World*. It is perhaps a moot point as to whether the logical operations of moral and social cognition could ever be expressed with the *precision* that physical and mathematical reasoning can be, but subsequent researchers have elaborated more fully the structure and processes of moral reasoning and interpersonal cognition. They have done so, however, largely by selecting specific elements for investigation, rather than taking the 'package' as a whole, and they have been far more interested in the developmental than the social issues.

The Implicit Definition of Morality

Piaget's 'package' reflected a particular view of morality, determined largely by his dominant preoccupation with the processes involved in the change from constraint to co-operation. Many of the elements are only tenuously related via this main theme. Intentionality, for example, has very little relevance to the understanding of rules, but it is central to notions of responsibility and culpability. The elements of Piaget's moral package were (1) rules, (2) the nature of responsibility, (3) retributive justice, and (4) distributive justice. Under these general headings, he investigated the understanding of various forms of conventional 'wrongness'—lying, cheating, causing damage, disobedience—and various aspects of 'fairness'. 'Fairness' encompasses retributive and distributive justice in adult—peer relations, and rules of interaction in the game situation.

It is easy to argue that, even within the Kantian paradigm, this is a curiously narrow definition of morality. Although Kohlberg, for example, ignores both rules and distributive justice, he does include a large area of morality which Piaget ignores, namely rights and obligations. Piaget spoke of 'duty versus good', but confined this to the issue of obedience to adults. He restricted the concept of obligation to conformity to mutually agreed rules in the game. Kohlberg, but not Piaget, investigated contract and the conditions of its application, not merely contract as an alternative form of rule.

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Piaget also ignored the contractual element of affect-based relations such as friendship and love, which both Kohlberg and Damon have subsequently found to be central to the child's reasoning about social and moral issues (Kohlberg, 1976; Damon, 1977). Peer-group relations were defined solely in terms of the criteria for negotiation of the rules of play and the distribution of rules and favours. Damon (1977) argues that *friendship* is a psychologically separate category from justice and of considerable importance in children's judgments.

There have, of course, been innumerable criticisms of Piaget's moral perspective simply because it is based on justice and roles. Other perspectives, which place greater emphasis on the development of motive, have had considerable influence on moral psychology in both social-learning and psychoanalytic paradigms. Philosophers of education as well as psychologists have argued that morality should be grounded in sympathy, love or empathy (Wilson, Williams and Sugarman, 1967; Peters, 1978). Piaget, as has been noted, specifically rejected sympathy as the source of *moral* principle. Some psychologists have moved towards something of a compromise between the two positions. Hoffman argues that there is a case for empathy as the *origin* of impulses which, when formalized through increased cognitive sophistication, become the respect for rules that Piaget and other justice-oriented psychologists concentrate on (Hoffman, 1976).

Possibly it is more salient to ask whether the definition of morality with which Piaget was working, was adequate for its main purpose, the critique of Durkheim's position. My conclusion is that neither the definition, nor the ways that Piaget used it, were adequate. For example, let us consider rules. To study the rules of a child's game has certain great advantages. The child, within the span of a few years, moves from being the receiver and obeyer to being the giver and maker of rules. Further, the creation of, as well as the obedience to, rules is a peer activity, and it can be studied in action. However, Piaget failed to ask *why* rules should be obeyed or not; he asked only what rules were, and *whether* they should be obeyed. This is a striking omission and Kohlberg's later studies have demonstrated the usefulness of this question. In measures of fairness, Piaget asked only whether punishment was fair or not, not what its purpose was—thus failing to elicit the underlying reasoning about the nature of 'fair'. He took it for granted that the child would regard punishment as an *inevitable* consequence of naughtiness. In asking about the deterrent effect of various forms of punishment, which implies a purpose, he asked only about the efficacy, not the rationale.

While it may be valid to begin with the *child's* view of normality, it is limiting to take for granted only one definition of naughtiness. Breaking the rules is a primary category of immorality because Piaget's model emphasizes the priority of the rule in the definition of morality: the restoration of order is a return to rule-following. If punishment is perceived as a means to this end—by the theorist as well as the child—it will, not surprisingly, form a dominant part of the discourse. The consequence of this emphasis on punishment for 'wrongness' has prevented Piaget from examining other forms of sanction besides those imposed by adult power or, to a lesser extent, by peer pressure. For example, while negotiation is considered within the context of rule-creation or change, it is not considered in the context of retributive justice, yet both Kohlberg and Damon have subsequently shown that this is a lively area of debate among children.

Another striking omission is the analysis of any *positive* aspects of morality. Piaget concentrated on what is wrong and what is unfair—he did not consider even the positive distributive justice of sharing. Justice is the central implicit tenet of the Kantian model, but this implies a positive as well as a negative element. Piaget's preoccupation with the power relations between adult and child obscured these broader issues of morality.

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Let us consider in detail one issue, 'fairness', which has different definitions at different points in the monograph. It has often been pointed out that the inconsistencies and obscurities in the monograph are an easy target, but in view of the centrality of this concept to the dominant theme of justice, it is worth examining the variations in detail. 'Fair' is a catch-word which seems to be used as an implicit universal criterion for justice; in the interrogatory, 'fair' is the testing-point for the child's judgment of 'right' or 'morally OK'. In a sense this is quite legitimate; 'fair' is a powerfully rhetorical word and universally used by children in just this way (Breakwell, 1982).

However, Piaget seemed to have taken it for granted that the universality of the rhetoric precludes the necessity for defining it. In my view this is a critical mistake, because to understand the child's definition of 'fairness' and its applications would be a considerable advance in understanding the child's conception of justice. In fact, the material for analysing 'fairness' is present in the data, but Piaget ignored its significance, in particular he ignored the importance of the disparate and sometimes contradictory definitions which the concept yielded.

Fairness is first introduced in the monograph in the context of innovating rules in the game of marbles. It is clear that fairness here simply means a 'better game', without any implications of justice or egalitarianism. For the child at the egocentric stage, fair means *accurate* and *right*. At the next stage, fair means that skill and not simply luck is involved—equal opportunities for competition exist. However, the 'fairest' rules are those best known among the peer group, and familiarity, along with long-establishment, of rules is fair because it diminishes cheating. For girls, *practicability* of rules is also a criterion of fairness.

A shift in the concept of fairness is clear; the young child identifies fair with accuracy, a good game is one which conforms to the official rules. Later, fairness is whatever facilitates the most effective interaction between players. Piaget rightly stressed that this is evidence of a powerful principle of *reciprocity*. But what he did not stress is that there is no 'moral' implication in the second stage of fairness. It is not even distributive justice; it is simply pragmatism. Only the possibility of cheating, in that one person may gain disproportionately, suggests a remote connection with distributive justice.

Fairness is also examined in relation to retributive justice. The younger child considers the fairest punishment to be the most severe. For the youngest children, in fact, punishment is seen to be *fairer* than leniency or 'sportingness'. By about eight years old the child comes to think of the effectiveness of punishment as contributing to its fairness, but only at about thirteen does the child come to consider distributive justice—that the punishment should be proportional to the fault. Fairness is also legitimacy; to the young child the adult is seen as having an absolute right to inflict punishment. This changes to the right to engage in simple retaliation for pragmatic reasons. There is plenty of evidence that fairness is confused with 'authority'. For the young child it is 'fair' that the bridge should fall under the wrongdoer, and 'fair' to tell on the naughty brother. This equation of fairness with 'rightness' echoes the equation of fairness with accuracy reported earlier.

Piaget did ask children to give examples of what was 'not fair', and found a relationship with age. For younger children, overwhelmingly, 'not fair' meant engaging in forbidden acts; only a quarter mentioned inequality, which was the main criterion for the older children. (See Table 10.1.) Piaget interpreted this as 'justice subordinated to adult authority'; in my view, it is better interpreted as a lack of a concept of *distributive* justice altogether, and an equation of *retributive* justice with adult authority. It is clear that the child does not differentiate 'rightness' from 'fairness'; to me this demonstrates a lack of conception of fairness rather than a

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different use of the term. Clearly, Piaget did not choose to recognize the different *kind* of justice indicated by the children's responses.

While my main concern is with conceptual issues rather than empirical refutations, it is worth noting that other researchers have subsequently found that children do operate with a concept of fairness, both in action and in justification and explanation of action. Ugurel-Semin (op. cit.) found that children did engage in distribution of goods (nuts) in ways which increasingly manifested equality and equity. Damon (op. cit.) also studied sharing behaviour and found that children over four years old did justify their distribution according to some recognizable criterion of 'fairness'.

Responsibility is also a central issue in Piaget's moral definition, and some similar problems exist here. Piaget's interest in the concept of responsibility was kindled by Fauconnet's anthropological analysis of differences between 'primitive' and 'modern' conceptions. Fauconnet identified a historical shift from collective or 'objective' responsibility to individual, 'subjective' responsibility. Piaget found in this close parallels with the change from authority-based to peer-based morality. He identified the unilateral respect of the child for the adult with a conception of objective responsibility; if damage or hurt has been done, it must be *assuaged* and *punished* (not specifically *made good*, but *expiated*). Crime is pollution or infection. The collective effect of the act is of greater importance than the individual's culpability in a moral sense.

Piaget saw the link as being via obedience, a necessary component of constraint morality; 'under the effect of adult constraint the child cannot conceive the laws of the physical universe except in the guise of a certain obedience rendered by things to rules' (p. 340). Thus the child attributes causality *and* obligation to natural phenomena, such as the wind, the sun and the clouds. The distinction between moral obligation and social causality, and physical causality and the regularity of events, is not apparent to the child who holds a morality of constraint.

Responsibility was studied in several ways. Immanent justice, the idea that natural justice is in some way equivalent to divine justice, is a manifestation of 'objective' responsibility. However, the main investigation of the changing conception of responsibility was through intentionality. The shift from judgments in terms of objective criteria (the amount of damage done) to the subjective criterion of the individual's moral culpability is amply demonstrated by Piaget's and by subsequent findings. It is of note that neither Piaget nor subsequent researchers found such a clear relationship in the case of immanent justice; though immanent justice does decline with age, it is not a sudden conceptual transformation as is manifest in the case of intentionality (Medinnus, 1959; Gutkin, 1973).

However, intentionality is only partly a 'moral' question. Piaget focused on the moral because of his concern with his critique of Durkheim. The evidence cited above also suggests that there are wider implications also for the child's conception of causality, and that the changing conception of causality—responsibility is a precondition for awareness of the implications of retributive justice. The child who holds an egocentric perspective of the world attributes animistic characteristics to her environment, and she also holds absolutist and generalized conceptions of punishment, whether divine or parental. 'It is wrong because it is punished', or 'it is wrong because it comes into the category of things forbidden', are conceptually no different from the conception that a bicycle is alive because it moves, or that the sun 'has to' rise or the moon to set when the day comes. Obligation confuses moral and physical regularity and cause.

An interesting final irony is that Piaget's implicit model of morality focuses very much on 'conventional' moral behaviour, rules and duties. The rationalist tradition in which Piaget was working is basically in opposition to the view that moral psychology is about socialization and the acquisition of correct habits. Despite the implications that the morality of co-operation is about autonomy Piaget's emphasis on the understanding of punishment and wrongness can be seen as a rationalist perspective on the socialization of impulse control. Perhaps this is not surprising; Durkheim was concerned with the transmission of moral rules and the moral code, by implication a monolithic and restrictive notion. In so far as Piaget tried to question this, he was inevitably drawn into the same assumptions about the *content* of morality arising from such a conception. Possibly it is only the subsequent evidence from Kohlberg's work demonstrating that mature moral reasoning is frequently in conflict with 'conventional' morality which makes us surprised when we examine Piaget's implicit model of morality.

The Developmental Sequence

The developmental sequence of moral reasoning has received the most attention from subsequent researchers, and it is my contention that it is the most successful, but least theoretically explored, aspect of the monograph. It has, however, been much misunderstood. The enthusiasm of empirical psychologists has been for piecemeal replication, not for analysis of the theoretical implications of the original evidence. A notable lack in nearly fifty years of research has been serious efforts to link Piaget's cognitive and moral theories. Despite the overlapping processes (e.g. centration, decalage, etc.) only a handful of studies have concentrated on these, the majority of researchers confining themselves to elaborating the description of the developmental sequence and the effects of independent variables (Ugurel-Semin, 1952; Stuart, 1967; Lee, 1971).

However, Piaget produced a considerable amount of empirical evidence scattered through the monograph, and this evidence can be presented in orthodox tabular form (see Table 10.1). In this form certain patterns emerge. For example, it is immediately apparent from the Table that the age range of subjects in the study of rules of the game is exceptional; in most studies the age range was six to twelve. In most of the studies, the subject group was arbitrarily divided by Piaget into 'younger' and 'older' at age nine. This is misleading because in the qualitative material that Piaget presents, it is frequently apparent that changes take place at seven to eight, rather than nine; in other words, roughly contemporaneous with the movement into concrete operational thinking. The difficulties, therefore, of making theoretical statements about the *order* or significance of the changes reported in quantitative form are considerable.

It is clear from the Table that, in the heteronomous phase, or the morality of constraint, there is a unity of conceptualization; objective conceptions dominate all areas of thinking and limit the definition of morality narrowly. The characteristic of the morality of co-operation, or autonomous morality, is *diversity*. One major criticism of Piaget, in my view, is that he did not appear to appreciate the significance of this change from unity to diversity; by concentrating on the type of morality, i.e. 'co-operation', he ignored the subtleties of the second phase, which have considerable implication for the reasoning processes of moral judgment. Subsequent researchers, because they tend to concentrate on only one area of morality, on the whole also miss the significance.

Firstly, let us consider *reciprocity*, which Piaget argues is the central principle of the second phase of morality. Peer orientation and mutuality may be manifested in two ways; through behavioural co-operation with others and through egalitarian attitudes expressed in reasoning. The child *behaves* co-operatively in a game-playing situation, demonstrating an implicit understanding of the need for a common set of rules. Later,

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she becomes able to negotiate changes in the rules, not merely able to negotiate between disputed interpretations of the rule. These behavioural abilities become explicit as *cognitions* some two years after they are apparent as behaviours.

The expression of reciprocity as a principle (or rhetoric) of egalitarianism is evident in both distributive and retributive justice. However, Piaget concentrated solely on the perception of justice *vis-à-vis* parents' treatment of children, especially in relation to punishment. He said very little about reciprocity and the relationship between peers.

In my view, peer orientation can be considered separately from reciprocity. It is part of Piaget's thesis that peer orientation is the origin of mutual respect and the morality of co-operation. The evidence for peer orientation as such, is somewhat fragmented. In the middle childhood period—about nine to ten—the child is powerfully oriented towards her peers, demonstrating group solidarity in opposition to the adult world. You should not give your friend away, even if this means the whole class is punished; you should protect your sibling against your parent, even if you have to lie. Lying to a peer is worse than lying to an adult. These responses have an interesting quality; in contrast with many other areas, it is clear that here the child is speaking from commitment, not theory or analysis. Rhetoric is rampant; solidarity *is* a categorical imperative. Clearly, a distinction can be made between developmental change in rhetorical moral statements and in conceptual comprehension. It is not at all apparent that they are the same thing.

Secondly, let us consider conceptual changes. Piaget argues that the *volte-face* from adult to peer is the consequence of interaction and the development of mutual respect. But an alternative interpretation is that changes in moral *conceptualization* are demonstrably cognitive. An increase in cognitive complexity is clearly evident in the case of rules. In addition to a marked decrease in *behavioural* egocentricity, the child becomes increasingly aware of alternative rules, and is able to handle the relativism involved in this consciousness. In judgments about lying, there are two, parallel developments, increasing understanding of subjective responsibility (intention), and increasing capacity to differentiate between swear-words, lies, mistakes and exaggeration. Perceiving the intentions of the actor is one important aspect of this, but it is also evident that the child is demonstrating increased capacity for cognitive differentiation and logical exclusion.

Thirdly, tabular representation of the whole range of Piaget's findings, as in Table 10.1, scotches a frequently perpetuated myth. Reviewers of Piaget's work tend to discuss Piaget's *three stages of moral reasoning*, the third stage being 'equity'. Reference to equity is to be found only, in passing, with regard to one study of retributive justice and one study of distributive justice. The study of rules refers to a parallel development in the codification of rules, which implies sophisticated relativism. Piaget did not actually discuss the possibility of an 'equity' stage until three-quarters of the way through the book. He considered it simply as a more relativistic extension of equality; it really does not have the status of a 'stage' or 'phase' at all.

This is interesting, because, in fact, Piaget's own evidence *does* suggest some significant changes; a close analysis of the justice material indicates that equitable thinking is in *opposition to*, not merely an extension of, egalitarian thinking. The material on older children's understanding rules demonstrates a very sophisticated legislative and judicial skill, and with it a shrewd and complex understanding of the processes of group negotiation and co-operation. Piaget himself noted that, in the rules of the game of marbles, the person of fourteen has considerably more subtlety and complexity of thought than the average adult has about the broader social and political issues. The child in her early teens, in relation to childhood games, is child-as-adult, and precocious in the comprehension of rules because she is the law-giver, not simply because the rules of marbles are somewhat less complex than political rules. Piaget

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reflected briefly upon this interesting developmental question, but perhaps because, in his view, it was not central to his main thesis about the morality of constraint and co-operation he did not pursue its theoretical importance.

Fourthly, *respect* is a central issue in the change from the morality of constraint to that of co-operation. Piaget, Bovet and Durkheim all argue that respect is initially for the individual, and only consequently for the law which the individual represents. It was Piaget's position that the child's early unilateral respect for authority gives way to mutual respect, especially for peers, as a consequence of interaction. Consequent upon this change develop reciprocity, relativity of justice and subjective responsibility. Piaget expressed his perspective on respect in a somewhat circular fashion: 'The mere fact of individuals living in groups is sufficient to give rise to new features of obligation and regularity in their lives. The pressure of the group upon the individual would thus explain the appearance of this *sui generis* feeling which we call respect and which is the source of all religion and morality . . . A rule is, therefore, nothing but the condition for the existence of a social group; and if to the individual conscience rules seem to be charged with obligation, this is because communal life alters the very structure of consciousness by inculcating into it the feeling of respect' (p. 96).

A number of difficulties are apparent in this conception. 'Unilateral respect', for example, has connotations of obedience and unquestioning acceptance of the parental point of view, which are certainly not evident in the *behaviour* of the young child. An alternative interpretation has been suggested by Lickona (1976); 'the child's early obedience orientation in moral thinking appears to be based less on respect for the moral status of adults than on simple recognition of their superior powers' (p. 240). This would be a more parsimonious interpretation; it would fit the notion that the child accepts the authority perspective because she is not aware of having any *choice*. But *if* authority is omnipotent, 'respect' is an irrelevant or inappropriate concept.

If we focus on Piaget's original implication that respect is a dynamic of cognitive organization, then an examination of the cognitive changes illuminates some of the issues. It becomes clear that a rejection of adult authority is only an element of the second phase of thinking. It is more that the child has learned to attend to more than one version of events, and to do this requires social and conceptual negotiation. The development of mutual respect is coincidental with increased relativism in other areas of thinking. Decreasing egocentricity, both social and cognitive, increases the capacity of the individual to perceive what alternatives are available and also to be more open to influences and channels of information.

The case of lying provides an interesting illustration because the changes are well documented in Piaget's evidence. Lying is a conceptually sophisticated concept; to comprehend it, the child must establish several new categories in addition to relaxing her unilateral respect. Initially the child has a very general concept that all 'bad' utterances are lies—bad being defined as 'punishable'. Then she becomes aware that there is a difference between a lie and a mistake, but still contends that both are 'lies'. Concurrently, the child has a simple, objective view that the bigger the lie, the more it is punished and the greater the sin is perceived to be. Then the child begins to distinguish between lies and mistakes, but still regards lies as wrong because they break a *rule*. Later, lies are defined as an explicit intention to deceive (that being the locus of the sin), and about the same time the child begins to distinguish between 'credible' lies and non-credible lies and exaggerations. The latter are not so bad because no-one would be deceived; they have the status of a 'joke'. It seems that only later still does the child perceive consciously the *social* implications of lying, that it destroys trust between people. This appears to develop somewhat later than the view that you should not lie to a companion because it is counter to the ethos of solidarity.

It is difficult to interpret these findings simply in terms of lessening of unilateral

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respect, if by respect we mean a reaction to power or authority. An alternative is to look at the cognitive implications of unilateral respect. One way of looking at unilateral respect is that it is a failure to differentiate superordinate and subordinate categories, a lack of decentration. The child focuses on one aspect of the problem only and cannot incorporate any other. This means that the child does not perceive a moral *dilemma*. This is clearer in Kohlberg's data than in Piaget's, because Kohlberg set 'dilemmas' with genuinely alternative answers. Piaget set problems which do not have alternative 'correct' answers; in most of Piaget's stories, the 'wrong' answer denoted heteronomous thinking *per se*.

A final aspect of development to be derived from the data is *egocentrism*. Piaget stresses that egocentrism is essentially *social*. It is not that the child is solely wrapped up in her own thoughts, it is that she does not differentiate between her own thoughts and those of others. She is unable to distinguish between internal and external sources of knowledge. In the chapter on rules, Piaget describes the paradox that the child cannot distinguish between what she has always known, and new knowledge. Even apparently spontaneous ideas appear to the child to be coming from somewhere, being part of a collective wisdom to which she already has access. The Elders of Neuchâtel, guardians of wisdom to Piaget's subjects, were able to put ideas into the child's mind. It is as though the child cannot conceive of the non-existence of knowledge: everything is known, everything has rules. As soon as the child is given access to that knowledge, it is absorbed and undifferentiated from other, longer established knowledge. The source and justification of knowledge is authority; even if the child creates something new in a game, the child will invoke authority to support the innovation. Authority 'must have known about it'. It is as though the child regards her new insight as simply another *access* to the vast cornucopia of Knowledge. She is like St. Joan, whose imagination was not differentiated from a hot-line to the saints (Shaw, 1958).

The development of both behavioural and conceptual egocentrism is most evident in the study of rules. It is only in this study that evidence of the parallels between motor and conscious activity are available. Initially the child does play egocentrically, with no reference even to rules. She manifests ritual only. By about five she behaves imitatively with regard to the rules, but it is some time later that she begins to behave in a way which indicates that she understands the compelling nature of the rule, which is the full manifestation of social play. Later still, co-operative negotiation becomes possible.

Several researchers have criticized the implications of Piaget's views on egocentrism. A number of researchers have noted that non-egocentric behaviour precedes the expression of non-egocentric concepts. Others have argued that Piaget's theoretical view should logically extend to *affective* egocentricity. If the child cannot take the role of the other, then sympathy and altruism should not be possible. Yet there are many studies which do indicate that the child as young as fifteen months will manifest empathic and altruistic acts in the presence of another's distress (Borke, 1971, 1978; Hoffman, 1976).

Secondly for Piaget the issue of egocentricity has closely related the change from unilateral to mutual respect; mutual respect can only develop as egocentricity wanes (though the causal direction is not at all clear). What then is going on in the transition from one form of morality to the other? Is the ability to take the perspective of the other necessary to conceptualize (1) alternative perspectives and models, (2) the behaviour and interactions of others in a co-operative situation, or (3) to generate conclusions from these about the nature of rules, roles and relationships? It seems from the evidence that (2) clearly develops first. The child develops 'empathic' behaviour which, however, seems not to be formally co-operative.

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RECENT THEORY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The foregoing has concentrated on criticisms of the monograph which, in my view, have been ignored or underexplored. I have examined these criticisms, especially those with theoretical relevance, rather than attempting to make the connections and fill in the gaps in Piaget's thesis, though to some extent this can be done utilizing his own data. I have also engaged in a critique within the terms of Piaget's own perspective, that of cognitive-developmental theory. It is, of course, possible to criticize every stage of Piaget's theoretical and empirical work, if one starts from completely different theoretical premises. The extent to which this is useful can perhaps be judged from the evidence presented of social learning theorists' attempts. I have confined myself to taking Piaget's basic problem and asking whether he succeeded in solving it. My contention is that he has not. Furthermore, he focused on a social-psychological problem and consequently ignored the implications and many interesting questions which his developmental material generated. Ultimately, he left his social-psychological thesis unfinished because he could not test his primary hypothesis, ignoring some exciting developmental psychological questions because of his social-psychological focus.

As has been discussed, subsequent research has been very selective. Some of this research has considerably modified Piaget's conclusions about the age at which the child develops certain concepts, and the rate of growth generally (e.g. Borke, 1971, 1978; Donaldson, 1978). Other research has added considerably to an understanding of the variables associated with development. However, relatively few researchers have taken the *whole* thesis, nor have they examined the conceptual problems associated with 'moral' development.

I shall now consider three researchers who have made some attempt to tackle the theoretical issues. Each has been selective, and none has come to terms with Piaget's social-psychological questions, but each has made a significant contribution to the developmental aspects of the thesis, and by doing so has underlined some of the conceptual problems of the original. The three are Selman, Damon and Kohlberg.

Selman's studies have taken up the difficult question of role-taking and its relation to moral thought. Although he worked with children contemporary in age to Piaget's subjects, he nevertheless makes comparison with Kohlberg's rather than Piaget's theoretical model. He regards himself as an ego development theorist and as such is not particularly concerned with cognitive processes or problem-solving. His definition of role-taking is social perspective; 'the child's structuring of his understanding of the relation between the perspectives of self and others' (1976).

His studies demonstrate unequivocally that social perspective-taking is a prerequisite for moral reasoning. He has, therefore, separated out two variables which Piaget consistently confused, and demonstrated their sequential relationship. This does not necessarily imply a causal relationship—it may mean that role-taking is a *key element* in moral reasoning which must develop before further progress on moral issues is possible. It is not, however, evidence for Piaget's main hypothesis because Selman does not really tackle the issue of a social interactive origin of role-taking skills. He has concentrated on breaking down analytically the role-taking process (Selman, 1980).

Damon's studies are extensive investigations of social understanding, in particular the child's perceptions of interrelationships. Moral issues arise in two ways, in the context of obligations between persons, and in the central concept of justice. His studies indicate clearly defined *separate* categories of justice, obedience and authority relations, friendship and the understanding of social convention.

His work on obedience and authority is particularly relevant to Piaget's thesis. He concluded from his findings that the development of justice 'bypassed any subservient reliance on the moral commands of authority'. 'In children's early justice reasoning and conduct we found a set of moral principles entirely different from the authority-obeying values that the predominant theories present as characterizing primitive morality' (p. 169). In contrast with Piaget, Damon proposes 'a rather simple developmental hypothesis: that a person's moral knowledge (assumed to be a justice function) grows out of his early reflections on common justice problems, rather than solely out of his early experience with adult constraint . . . in this perspective, authority becomes but one of the many social relations with which the child must learn to deal. It is not, as has been assumed by many, a general starting-point for all moral principles' (p. 171).

The implications of Damon's work are considerable. If social understanding and moral principles derive from social interaction and experience *per se* and not as a consequence of a shift away from authority constraints, then Piaget's whole social psychological thesis is brought into question. Damon's evidence reveals a much more complex and differentiated range of reasoning about social and moral issues than Piaget's somewhat arbitrary definition of morality would imply. His findings elaborate considerably the developmental theory of Piaget in this area by demonstrating interrelationships, as well as important distinctions, between concepts.

Kohlberg's studies have been with older children and adults. This imposes some limitations as to their direct relevance to Piaget's theory. However, there is undoubted overlap—some would say unity—between Kohlberg's first two stages and Piaget's heteronomous and autonomous stages. There is some significance in the fact that Kohlberg found children up to fourteen using stage 1 thinking, and many adults still operate with stage 2 thinking. Kohlberg's stages 3 to 6 can be seen as an elaboration and extension of Piaget's very sketchy stage of equity, but the developmental importance of Kohlberg's work is that it demonstrates the *ongoing* nature of moral development, that it is a life-span process, not a matter of significant changes at the age of about eight. Like Damon, Kohlberg's studies extend and substantiate the developmental aspects of Piaget's thesis, but then pay little attention to the social-psychological ones.

Kohlberg, furthermore, has a different implicit definition of morality from Piaget. Piaget's concentration on 'justice' was largely in terms of the differences in reasoning between an authority-based morality of constraint, and the mutual respect basis of morality of co-operation. His definition was tied closely to the conception of 'wrongness' and fairness really only insofar as it related to wrongness and retributive justice. Kohlberg's conception of justice as a core concept in moral development differs from Piaget's. Kohlberg is largely uninterested in the concept of the *rule*, except in terms of law. In this he differs fundamentally from Piaget. On the other hand, Kohlberg pays much more attention than Piaget to *contractual* rights and obligations, based on affect or civil relations. Whereas Piaget appeared to have conceived of moral development as increased understanding of the rule and its applications, Kohlberg is more concerned with the development of principles and the conflict between legal and moral definitions of duty and right.

These three theorists have various implications for Piaget's position. Each has extended the developmental perspective well beyond Piaget's description, and each is a theoretical advance. Their evidence of a wide range of separate functions and areas of reasoning which have been loosely linked by the global term 'moral', has both extended the definition of morality and facilitated the understanding of the processes involved in moral reasoning. Studies of the correlates of moral reasoning, as well as of the components of moral and social reasoning, confirm the interlocking relationship between moral thinking and social reasoning—both in the sense of understanding social conventions and understanding the relationship between individuals, and individuals and wider society (Haan, Smith and Block, 1968; Weinreich-Haste, 1982). This evidence has considerable implication for social as well as developmental psychology, particularly the issue of how the child acquires rules, and the processes by which the child comes to construe and order her understanding of the world.

However, to date, subsequent theoretical development has not tackled Piaget's social-psychological thesis adequately. The cognitively based, active model of the person represented by the three researchers cited emphasizes the processes of individual judgment and the way in which judgments are organized and reorganized in the course of development. This approach is highly individualistic and ignores the social psychological processes which are implicitly present in Piaget's social-psychological analysis. There remains a need to return to the social psychological questions which Piaget posed.

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In: Weinreich-Haste, H. and D. Locke (eds.).
Morality in the Making: judgement, action and the
social context. Chichester: Wiley, 1983

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Morality in the Making
Edited by H. Weinreich-Haste and D. Locke
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CHAPTER 5

Social and Moral Cognition

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Morality has always been a popular issue. Until relatively recently, however, the dominant ethos of psychological science limited the discussion of morality to motivation and learning associated with the control of anti-social behaviour. With the general resurgence of interest in reasoning and cognition, judgment processes and moral reasoning have become a legitimate area of investigation. There is now an extensive body of evidence on the development and correlates of moral reasoning. A major effect of this activity has been to reintroduce into psychology most of the debates which have preoccupied moral philosophers for a couple of millenia; it is clear that psychologists and philosophers can no longer afford to ignore each other in this area. Many of the products of this cross-fertilization will undoubtedly enrich psychological explanation; as other chapters in this book illustrate, psychologists are being forced to consider the implications of such issues as thought vs. action, the relationship between ideology and theory, and the fact that 'morality' is not a unitary concept.

In this chapter, however, I want to argue that a too easy acceptance of what are perceived to be philosophical criteria of 'moral' reasoning has obscured some of the important conclusions for both social and developmental psychology which can be drawn from the evidence. I shall argue, firstly, that the evidence indicates considerable overlap between 'moral' and other forms of 'social' reasoning—by which I mean reasoning about the relationship between individuals and between the individual and society. This overlap has considerable implications for the psychological use of the category, 'moral', and for the development of 'social' cognition generally. Secondly, I shall argue that the emphasis on a theory of *morality* has led to a lot of attention being paid, especially by critics, to the *content* of stages of moral development, and less to the processes by which development between the stages occurs. My general thesis is that we should look more closely at what is actually going on in 'moral' reasoning studies, and consider the implications of this for an understanding of developmental processes.

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The primary source of material which I shall use in pursuing these arguments is the theoretical and empirical work of Kohlberg and his followers. Kohlberg's is not the only rationalist model of moral development, nor are the general problems which I shall consider only to be found in cognitive-developmental theory. But in cognitive-developmental theory on the whole the concepts are well-articulated, the research is extensive and follows a consistent pattern, and the limitations of the perspective are therefore apparent. Kohlberg (1969, 1971) has made explicit his assumptions about the nature and development of morality, and about the kinds of questions that psychologists should be asking about development.

In Chapter 2, Vine defined Piaget as a 'moderate constructivist'. Although he argued that Kohlberg departed from this approach in the way he deals with *ethics*, I will work with the premise that Kohlberg's developmental theory does conform to the 'moderate constructivist' position. It also applies to a wide range of current perspectives in social and developmental psychology, especially approaches to various aspects of social reasoning. The general principle is that the individual *constructs* her social and conceptual world. Individual construal is the outcome of interaction between the individual's own implicit theory about the situation, collective representations shared by others, and group dynamics which affect what emphasis or elements of those representations will be deemed relevant at any one point in time (Weinreich-Haste, 1981). This approach focuses on *processes* of the formation, development, and change in constructions and representations.

Social and developmental psychologists have somewhat different orientations within this general framework. The social psychologist seeks structural explanations in the interaction between individual and social, preferring to analyse the group and situational context rather than individual variables. Developmental psychologists focus on individual cognitive structure, how this limits the construal processes, and how the structure changes through growth. Social psychologists tend to criticize the orthodox cognitive-developmental model as too rigidly structuralist, and too tied up with individual processes at the expense of the social, cultural, and situational factors which may affect the child's construal.

According to the constructivist position, development is not a matter of the acquisition of more knowledge, but of increasing differentiation and integration in the construal process. Development means increasing ability to comprehend what is relevant, what should be taken into consideration, and increasing capacity to organize and reorganize conceptualization and construal to take account of this comprehension. Changes in the course of development are qualitative. The argument for 'stages' is that the organization of construal forms a 'structured whole'. The underlying structure of thinking within a 'stage' is the *common principle* of construal, the common set of criteria for organization and interpretation. Developmental change from stage to stage involves the breakdown of this structure and the development of a new, more complex and more differentiated structure.

Each stage is characterized by *limitations* of thinking which prevent the individual from (a) perceiving all the possible parameters and variables which may be relevant to the situation, (b) perceiving contradictions inherent in her existing mode of reasoning, and (c) dealing with such contradictions or alternatives if they are pointed out to her. The evidence in all areas of reasoning indicates that these limitations are overcome only when the dominant mode of reasoning, the dominant organization of criteria for judgment, is broken down and replaced by more complex structures. In the interim, novel or more complex material is interpreted in terms of the existing categories and criteria.

The Nature of 'Morality'

My first argument is that the research area current labelled 'moral' judgment is a misleading categorization. The 'moral' category reflects the place which the study of moral development has had in psychology, and the way in which psychologists' implicit theories of morality have remained largely unquestioned, their philosophical roots unexamined. From being an unacceptable topic in the heyday of behaviourism, the study of moral development gradually crept back into the literature of social-learning theory, via the socialization of values and social constraints. In psychoanalytic theory the concept of morality has always had a central, if sometimes implicit, position (Freud, 1930; Rieff, 1960).

Hogan *et al.* (1978) argue that the social-learning perspective represents a form of extreme moral relativism, because 'moral' values and constraints are defined by arbitrary cultural or subcultural contingencies. Eysenck and Skinner, for example, in different ways express extreme forms of the conditioning model. Both define 'moral' explicitly in terms of conformity to or deviation from the current social code; both consider this to be the only way in which a 'scientific' psychologist can use the term (Eysenck, 1976; Skinner, 1971). In this relativistic perspective, there is no *a priori* differentiation between moral, social, and conventional values; any differentiation arises only insofar as the labels have some meaning within the culture. The model is explicitly normative, the goal of socialization must be conformity to the currently accepted social values and behaviours.

Cognitive-developmental models of moral development, in contrast, have adopted a more objective moral perspective, which several critics have argued leads to a form of moral absolutism (see Vine, Chapter 2). The assumption held by Kohlberg, and also by Piaget, is that there are universal moral principles, held by any *rational* person, which pertain across time and culture. Moral development is the increasing comprehension of these principles, and increasing capacity to organize moral cognitions in accordance with them. In this perspective a strong distinction is made between 'moral' and other kinds of reasoning. This in part arises from their acceptance of formalist criteria of morality, in particular the criteria of prescriptiveness and universalizability. In the cognitive-developmental model these general criteria are translated into specific principles of justice and equity; these are the core concepts of morality from which, it is argued, all else is derived (Kohlberg, 1971). This is explicit in Kohlberg's theory, but only implicit in Piaget's. Piaget was much more preoccupied with the mechanism by which the child generates a rational, autonomous understanding of the rule, and mutual respect: conceptions of justice and equity may be constitutive of autonomous morality, but this was largely incidental to Piaget's main concerns (Piaget, 1932; Weinreich-Haste, 1982: see Wright, Chapter 8).

One of the major objections levelled at the cognitive-developmental model is that it focuses on rational processes and ignores both motive and action. The basic position of both rationalist psychologists (e.g. Kohlberg, 1971) and philosophers (e.g. Rawls, 1971) is that actions, however commendable in their consequences or their motives of sympathy, are morally meaningless unless springing from moral reasoning.

It happens that the traditional distinctions between a Kantian, reason-based definition of reality and a Humean, virtue-based definition of morality have become aligned with two contrasting psychological theories of moral development, which also, for historical reasons, happen to coincide with the relativist vs. absolutist distinction. The accident of this dual dichotomy leads to some confusions and a complex range of criticisms. Kohlberg's theory, for example, has been subject to criticism for both its rationalist *and* its absolutist orientations, and the two criticisms are frequently confused. Interestingly, relatively little attention has been paid to the relativist *or* motivational assumptions of the social-learning perspective, except by cognitive-developmental psychologists. An enduring exception is Peters, who has consistently criticized both schools of thought (Peters, 1963, 1971, 1974, 1978). Kohlberg's narrowly rational conception of morality has been criticized by psychologists and philosophers (e.g. Hogan, 1970, 1973; Alston, 1971). His absolutism has been attacked on both theoretical and empirical grounds. While the evidence for the earlier stages of moral reasoning is good, that supporting the post-conventional Stages 5 and 6 is sketchy. Several writers have argued that there are possibly several 'final' forms of moral thinking (Gibbs, 1977; Locke, 1980). If this is the case, then the moral absolutism supposedly inherent in the present conceptualization of Stage 6 thought need not necessarily be the *logical* corolloary of the cognitive-developmental position.

There are, therefore, several possible objections to the theories of morality implicit in psychological models. My position is that much of the problem derives from a false premise, the premise that there is a real difference between the processes of reasoning applied to 'moral' questions and those applied to other social issues. It is undoubtedly the case that the philosopher is trained to make a valid distinction between moral and other categories, which she is capable of applying to her own actions; it is evident also that post-conventional reasoners are at least *aware* of the distinction. It is however a dangerous assumption in my view that there is, *for most people most of the time*, anything

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special or separate about the kinds of reasoning employed in discussing moral issues. There are three premises on which I shall base my defence of this position. Firstly, the methods employed by researchers to tap moral judgment are in fact accessing a wide range of social reasoning. Secondly, the stages of moral reasoning are manifestations of development over a broad range of social cognition. Thirdly, the current view, which separates reasoning development into a sequence which starts from intellectual-logical areas and progresses to social, moral, and then political domains, is a distorted perception and an artefactual consequence of methodology.

The Evidence

The data on moral reasoning development and its correlates is now substantial (see Chapter 1). It can be divided broadly into (1) material which bears directly on developmental processes, and (2) material on the correlates of level of moral reasoning:

1(a) The ways in which the moral dilemmas are resolved change significantly with age. There are substantial shifts in the basis of reasoning utilized. These changes include the kind and range of factors which are considered to be relevant to the issue.

(b) Development is manifested by increased complexity of thinking on both social and moral issues, and increase in the number and subtlety of the variables taken into account and integrated into the reasoning process.

(c) The changes are qualitative, and at any point in time the individual demonstrates a consistency in the kind of reasoning utilized across several issues or problems; the same criteria for judgment are invoked, and the same dominant themes occur. The concept of 'stage' reflects this consistency. Additionally, the invariant sequence of stages meets the criterion of hierarchization proposed by Pinard and Laurendeau (1969). (Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969; Holstein, 1976; Davison *et al.*, 1978.)

(d) The hierarchical nature of the stages, and the increasing complexity, differentiation, and organization of later forms of thinking are demonstrated by the fact that individuals reject the arguments of a lower stage of thinking, when they are presented, and reinterpret arguments presented in the concepts of stages higher than their own, in terms of the reasoning of their own stage (Rest, 1973, 1979; Rest *et al.*, 1969; Turiel, 1966, 1972.)

2(a) The development of logical-cognitive operations, as represented by Piaget's stages, is a prerequisite for the development of moral stages. It is, however, not a sufficient condition.

(b) Moral judgment stages appear to depend on the stages of 'social perspective-taking' which itself follows upon the development of the parallel logical stages. Social perspective-taking, therefore, would seem to be the intervening variable between logical and moral operations. (Selman, 1980; Walker, 1980.)

(c) There is a relationship between moral reasoning, political reasoning, and political action. Moral reasoning level is predictive of direct political action, and there is also evidence of considerable overlap between the dominant themes expressed in the two areas (Haan *et al.*, 1968; Fishkin *et al.*, 1973; Haan, 1975). Studies of the development of political understanding and reasoning show similar kinds of changes in criteria, factors considered significant, and dominant themes, to those found in moral judgment development (Adelson and O'Neil, 1966, 1969; Adelson, 1971).

(d) Evidence from a number of studies using 'self' and 'ego' measures of various kinds indicate a relationship between moral reasoning and ego functions. Some of these studies concern the integrative processes of the ego (e.g. Podd, 1972); others concern the parallels between organizing functions of the ego (cognitions about the self and others in the social world) and moral reasoning (Loevinger, 1976; Lambert, 1971; Haan *et al.*, 1968; Candee, 1974; Haan, 1978; Erickson, 1980).

Three issues are raised by this evidence. Firstly, it is obvious that moral judgment does not exist in isolation; it is closely related to several other aspects of development. The current interpretation of the data is that these relationships are causal. Secondly, given that movement through the stage is *qualitative* change, what is the *meaning* of the consistency found at each stage? By what *processes* does the individual progress to greater integration and differentiation; by what processes does reorganization and restructuring take place? Thirdly, what is actually the nature of the decision-making process? In order to understand what is going on when *this* person at *this* stage of moral reasoning tackles a moral dilemma, we must understand, (a) what are the limits of her conceptual capacities; (b) what factors does she consider relevant to the situation a she perceives it, and (c) how has she *categorized* and *organized* the elements of the situation. We need to know the elements involved in the decision-making process in order to comprehend how they are changed by reorganization.

These questions relate to two distinct problem areas. Firstly, they each apply to the issue of *construal*, and cognitive organization. Secondly, they each have implications for the theory of how construal and organization develops and changes.

'Moral' and 'Social' Reasoning

The usual interpretation of the relationship between reasoning on moral dilemmas and other areas of reasoning is that there is a *series*; the individual's reasoning about physical and logical phenomena matures first. Through the application of role-taking skills to social interaction and taking the perspective of others, the individual develops comprehension of the social situation and its implications, which enables her to generate prescriptive judgments about the moral and social order (see Thornton and Thornton, Chapter 4).

However, role-taking, as Vine has argued in Chapter 2, is a very confused concept. It is used in the literature to mean both the affective process of sympathy and the cognitive process of empathy. In his early writings Kohlberg, in common with other writers, confused the two kinds of role-taking, and, in effect, argued that moral reasoning sprang from sympathy. He attempted to test this by correlating moral judgment level and degree of peer-group involvement, which he used as an indirect measure of role-taking skills (Kohlberg, 1958). Latterly, through Selman's work, role-taking has been defined more precisely as 'social perspective-taking' (Selman, 1980). In the early stages social perspective-taking is very limited and egoistic. Smith's evidence that stage 1 moral thought is in many ways an expression of pre-operational thinking is consistent with this: Stage 1 thinkers characteristically focus on only one aspect of the situation—usually Heinz's rule-breaking—demonstrating limited capacity for decentration and no capacity for social reciprocity (Smith, 1978). Stage 2 thinking represents a simple dyadic reciprocity; 'if I were her' means just that, with no account taken of 'her' different experience and situation. A more reflexive perspective-taking is found in Stage 3 thought, where the individual can perceive the situation as the other would. With the acquisition of formal operational thought the individual is able to take a perspective which begins to include 'society' as well as the individual, and to see the symbolic effect of actions upon the social system as well as on the person. This perspective also permits the observer to include the role of the impartial judge. In Stage 5 the capacity extends further, to include not only all points of view *within* the situation, but all possible points of view on the issue. Selman and Kohlberg refer to this as the 'prior to society' perspective; in logical terms it is the capacity to see the actual as a subcategory of the possible, a capacity which marks formal operational thinking in contrast to the concrete operational tendency to see the possible as a subcategory of the actual (Kohlberg, 1976; Selman, 1980).

The argument is that social perspective delineates the individual's understanding of the social order, and this provides the reference points for judging what is 'fair' and 'right'. The principle of justice is central to Kohlberg's theory of morality, consequently, the capacity to judge 'fair' is sufficient to define 'right', and therefore to define 'moral' reasoning. Kohlberg identifies as 'sociomoral' perspectives the perception of social *facts* and the *prescription* of right and good. In Kohlberg's theory of morality there are four components: normative order, utility, ideal self, and justice—but justice is the core component. Social perspective-taking is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral thinking, because of itself it does not include justice, though justice will follow from social perspective-taking.

I want to propose an alternative interpretation of the evidence, which argues against a sequential model of the different kinds of reasoning. The distinction between 'moral' and other kinds of reasoning about interpersonal and social issues has its origin in certain philosophical positions which have been accepted uncritically by psychologists. This acceptance creates a number of problems. Philosophers argue on the assumption that the agent or judge is an adult, usually a rational adult with a capacity for reflective consciousness. Although this necessarily implies some preceding period of development, it has been left to psychologists to establish how the individual arrives at the adult moral position postulated. The developmental psychologist is not dealing with a rational, self-conscious adult, yet it is remarkable that there has been little recognition of the implications of this. The main implication is that the psychologist ultimately has to account for the 'specialness' of moral function in the child or adolescent by appeal to psychological, rather than philosophical, criteria.

There is some evidence which supports a psychological distinction between moral and other forms of reasoning. It comes from studies which compare children's reasoning on social conventions and their reasoning on rules of right and wrong (Turiel, 1974, 1979; Much and Schweder, 1978; Damon, 1977). Rules which concern issues which an adult would deem 'moral' are seen by the child as having an *intrinsic* quality, and are less likely than conventions to be subject to negotiation or exception. This indicates that, at the very least, the child has picked up the *notion* that moral rules are 'special', that their observance is mandatory in the way that other rules are not. But the same studies show that the processes of reasoning about all rules, whether moral or conventional or instructional, are the same; the same *kinds* of justifications, and the same underlying conceptions of social order, are invoked for all kinds of rules in the 'social' domain. Damon found that friendship and justice are confused, as criteria for judgment, up to the equivalent of Kohlberg's Stage 4 moral reasoning. Turiel found that in the *early* stages of reasoning, the child does distinguish between 'moral' and 'conventional' rules, but in Stages 3 and 4 she gives the same kinds of justifications for both—namely that they serve social cohesiveness. The common feature of reasoning in all areas concerned with social and interpersonal rules is the interrelationship of fact and value, the failure to distinguish between what *is* and *should be*, and the lack of distinction between what is right and what is desirable. This confusion of fact and value is a *psychological* reality, despite the categorization which philosophers might wish to apply.

My argument is that the moral dilemma is much more usefully conceived as a very effective technique for eliciting the much broader processes of social cognition and social reasoning. In resolving the dilemma the individual is made to consider evaluative and prescriptive criteria to justify her decision about what is the 'right' action, and these arguments and reasons reveal the processes by which social reasoning in general is organized. It is by no means the only technique for eliciting such reasoning; in many ways it is a very restricted tool, but my argument is that because researchers have focused on 'morality', as defined by criteria extrinsic to psychology, the depth and range of the data already collected have not been fully appreciated. One reason why the

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technique is effective, is common to all hypothetical or projective methods. However remote from one's own experience the situation presented may be the only reasoning available to the individual is that which does derive from her own experience. Her construals and representations of the world have developed out of the organization of that experience: in resolving the hypothetical moral dilemma, she must invoke a *real* world view of proper and necessary rules and roles, and of interrelationships between the individual and society. The overt conflict in the Heinz dilemma (Figure 1, Chapter 1) is between life and law, but to resolve the dilemma the individual will take into account the conflicts between personal and social demands portrayed in the situation, and the ideal versus the immediate instrumental consequence—all of this construed in terms of her ordinary social cognitions, and limited by them. Thus the resolution and its arguments exposes the *ordinary* reasoning of the individual.

My major contention is that in deciding whether Heinz should steal the medicine the individual is utilizing a much wider conception of 'the good' than that encompassed by a narrowly formalistic definition of 'the moral'. It is undoubtedly the case that individuals of all ages engage in moral rhetoric and moral indignation, and make distinctive certain rules which they subjectively sense as mandatory (see Breakwell, Chapter 13). In response to a moral dilemma, the individual will frequently make quite simple moral-rhetorical statements, which are heavily prescriptive, but the processes of reasoning behind that rhetoric are extensive and complex. The wider 'good' includes outcomes which are desirable because of their consequences for interpersonal relations and the social world in general. Role performance, for example, may be good *in itself*, either because it is seen to be *of itself* a virtue, or because it is seen as functional to the maintenance of social order. A justification such as that is made in terms of beliefs about the consequences of events and these are seen by the individual to be *factual* beliefs, even though to the sophisticated observer they are indistinguishable from values. The interesting questions about the judgmental process therefore concern the conception of the wider 'good', how it is justified and what factors contribute to that justification.

Let us consider the changes which take place in the conception of 'the good' at different stages of reasoning, and see in what way they represent an implicit theory, not of morality, but of society, which has wider implications. We shall see that the implicit 'good' of each stage of thought effectively delineates the dominant criteria of judgment in the stage. The theory of society reflected in the conceptualization of the good reveals the limitations of the world-view at that particular stage, but more important, it reflects the way in which the individual has organized her construal within those limitations.

In Stage 1 thought, the implicit good elicited in response to the Heinz dilemma is unequivocal; it is defined by the rule in most cases, though some individuals focus on the material good, and speculate on whether Heinz's wife should be saved if she is an especially important or rich person. In this case, the rule is a *self-evident* good, and obedience follows from this. The simplicity of the 'good' at this stage—combined with the tendency to focus on only one aspect of the situation—means that for the Stage 1 thinker there is no conflict, no dilemma.

In Stage 2 thinking, the wider 'good' is easily hidden in the general moral rhetoric which attaches to the broadly instrumental perspective; 'fairness' is the rallying cry—but this is not a sophisticated plea for justice. The Stage 2 thinker construes the world in terms of conflict—between persons and between groups. At the purely instrumental level, the good is defined in personal terms, the survival of one's own rights and goals. In the context of the wider community this is a perception of the legitimacy of everyone's right to a 'fair' distribution of rewards and assets. Individuals have the right to attempt to gain these, within certain limits which are defined by the concept of 'fairness'. This conceptualization gives Heinz the right to steal, but it also gives the chemist the right to charge what he wants. In one study of an adult population, the real-life situation of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement sit-in in 1964 was construed by Stage 2 thinkers as a power struggle between 'we' the students and 'they' the unfair establishment (Haan, 1975).

For the Stage 3 thinker, the good is social and interpersonal harmony. It is implicitly understood that roles and rules evolved through law and custom as a means of maintaining this harmony, therefore the maintenance of both is regarded as desirable, and is a criterion for judgment. The primary categorization is in terms of the 'good person'—the person who fulfils role and rule expectations. The codification of the good person is in terms of traits and virtues: if everyone was nice, kind, honest, etc., social harmony would be automatic. The Heinz story is a particular problem for Stage 3 thinkers, because of the conflict of rule and role. The conflict between Heinz and the chemist is between the *good* husband and the *greedy* chemist; if Heinz is unable to persuade the chemist to become *generous*, he will be forced to act as a *bad* citizen, and steal the medicine. The conceptions of 'good' applied here to people have only indirectly 'moral' connotations; they apply to *effective role performance*, and reflect an essentially *gemeinschaft* conception of social order as the interrelationship of roles and functional reciprocity.

The 'good' for Stage 4 is *order*, rather than harmony. The shift from concrete to formal operations facilitates a much more complex, holistic conception of the social system than the Stage 3 communalistic extrapolations from the face-to-face group. The capacity to conceive of society as a whole enables the individual to be aware of the wider effects of individual action, and also of the limited efficacy of mere norms as constraints. Rules and a system of sanctions are necessary not simply to sustain norms—and keep order—but also to establish some impartial basis for the distribution of goods and rights, and to provide means to redress inequalities. An impartial justice system is necessary to control offenders, but also to prevent the escalation of interpersonal strife or conflict of interest. Justice must be *seen* to be done, because of its deterrent and exemplary function; it is not a moral ideal, but an efficient means of maintaining social order. The conflict between Heinz and the chemist reflects these processes. Both have rights and obligations within the law, but their conflict of interests has led to a possibility that social order may be disturbed.

The conception of the good is also reflected in the personality traits considered desirable by Stage 4 thinkers. These are apparent from analysis of responses to moral dilemmas, but they also emerged in an independent study of self and ideal-self by Haan *et al.* (1968). For the Stage 3 thinker, qualities associated with virtue and interpersonal skills—such as niceness—are valid. The Stage 4 thinker rates highly those characteristics likely to ensure effective performance of *institutional* roles, and the maintenance of social order, such as reliability and trustworthiness. A view of virtue which is societal, rather than a dyadic, values symbolic and publicly identifiable characteristics which predict the continued performance of obligations, even in private.

For the Stage 5 thinker there are four kinds of 'good' to be balanced: the personal, the societal, the legal, and the moral. The overriding good is the protection of the rights and goals of the individual while at the same time maintaining the institutions of society for the benefit of the majority. An act has immediate personal implications and consequences, and symbolic effects upon the wider social system. If Heinz steals (the personal-moral choice), what effect will this have in terms of setting precedents? If the respondent decides he should not steal (the legal good) is this denying the purpose of the law, namely to provide impartial support for the rights of all and to codify moral principles? The chemist is not legally wrong, but he may be seen as morally wrong. This has implications for the legal system: should it be able to control his actions? Furthermore, Heinz's moral rightness in stealing has as much implication for wider society as his legal wrongness. The Stage 5 thinker juggles with all these factors in her construal of the situation; the overriding good does not in fact offer easy criteria for prioritization of the variables. The solution tends to be pragmatic in this case; the single event of Heinz's theft is hardly likely to bring the social system tumbling down, and Heinz's problem is a very immediate one, with moral if not legal right on his side.

The foregoing has outlined the changes in the conception of 'the good', and the way in which it is utilized in reasoning on moral dilemmas. The moral dilemma, although itself narrow and specific, brings out the way in which the respondent sees 'the good', and how several 'goods' may be seen to be in conflict or in interrelationship. The process of construal of 'the good' is part of the organization of perceptions of the social world, and of existing values and beliefs. At each stage of thinking, there are *pre-eminent* categories and criteria for construing the situation. These criteria and categories reflect implicit 'theories' which the individual has about the desirable basis for human interaction, the resolution of conflict, and the attainment of various forms of the 'good'. The conception of 'the good' itself is both a factor in the organization, and a reflection of the organization, of the individual's conceptual world.

The Implications of Political Reasoning Correlates

The relationship between moral and political reasoning which has been empirically demonstrated by a number of studies provides a case-history of the problems arising from undue focus on the narrow definition of 'moral' reasoning. The question raised by these studies is how far is 'political' thinking *confused* with 'moral' thinking, and how far is 'moral' thinking *applied* to 'political' issues?

There is good documentation of a relationship between the development of moral thought, and action and reasoning in the broadly defined 'political' domain. Extensive research in the restive campuses of the last two decades has demonstrated a powerful and complex relationship between political beliefs, practical action, and moral reasoning (Haan *et al.*, 1968; Fishkin *et al.*, 1973, *inter alia*). Secondly, Adelson and his associates have studied the interesting parallels with the development of social and moral reasoning (Adelson and O'Neil, 1966; Adelson *et al.*, 1969; Adelson, 1971). There is an important sampling difference between the studies of student activists and the Adelson studies. In the former, the correlations between reasoning and action were found in a population of heterogeneous *stage* but homogeneous age; Adelson's subjects were adolescents of different ages.

Haan *et al.* (1968), and others, have produced evidence suggestive of the effect of different family environments (which may be causal), and of differences in ego-ideal and in political thought (whose causal direction is not clear) (Candee, 1974; Haan, 1978). Other research suggests that the organization of social and moral reasoning becomes 'set' in a particular stage, around the age at which formal education finishes, and is only shaken into disequilibrium by a major life experience (Turiel, 1974; Podd, 1972; Kohlberg, 1976; Gilligan, 1977, 1982). Because of these theoretical problems, there are some difficulties in taking the correlates of moral reasoning in an age-homogeneous sample as being indicative of *developmental* relationships. However, despite these caveats, it is clear that the kind of moral reasoning used by the students was associated with a whole range of attitudinal and behavioural variables. Firstly, individuals using post-conventional reasoning were more likely to support action and ideologies associated with reform or even revolution than were conventional (Stage 3 and 4) reasoners. Individuals using Stage 2 reasoning were instrumental and quixotic: they supported whichever mode of action was perceived to serve their immediate interests. Secondly, these relationships predicted both direct political action and wider community action (e.g. Peace Corps activity).

Some commentators have argued that these results are evidence of an inherent political conservatism in conventional-level thinking, and of radicalism in post-conventional thinking (Hampden-Turner and Whitten, 1971). It may be, however, that this is a *zeitgeist* effect; the sophisticated moral rhetoric of the period favoured the Left rather than the Right. At any point in time, the capacity to see beyond the current dominant social and political paradigm requires a capacity for complex sociopolitical reasoning. It would follow from my position that more complex *social* reasoning is an integral aspect of the higher stages of *moral* thinking, that post-conventional moral reasoners by definition comprehend the wider social and political implications of what is going on in the situation, and then also bring more complex and sophisticated theoretical viewpoint to the issues. It is not necessarily the case that the thecries of the Left are more complex in their analysis of the social order than those of the Right (though some would certainly argue this), but for historical and sociological reasons these were the arguments advanced most vociferously at the time, and attracted the most attention amongst those capable of post-conventional sociomoral reasoning.

It is also arguable that the conventional terms 'political' and 'moral' are only loosely applicable to the situation on the campuses. In later writings Haan talked not about *political* thinking, but about actual vs. hypothetical *moral* thinking; the moral dilemma is an example of hypothetical moral reasoning, the campus situation an actual case of moral reasoning (and action). According to her evidence and analysis, the lack of involvement of the students whose thinking was Stage 3 or 4 can partly be accounted for by their failure to see the issues as being *moral* issues—rather than that their general ideology was opposed to direct action, which would be the Hampden-Turner interpretation. This interpretation places much more emphasis on structural factors—the overall construal of the situation and the limitations of what is perceived to be relevant—than on content factors of ideology and attitude. Commensurate with this is the evidence that Stage 2 thinkers construed the situation in considerably more simplistic terms than did post-conventional thinkers, although their *actions*, and to some extent their superficial expression of opinion, were similar.

A study by Candee further illuminates the relationship between 'political' thinking and construal of the social world (Candee, 1974). He investigated the relationship between ego stages (according to Loevinger's model) and ideology (Loevinger, 1976). He found that at different ego stages the students viewed their left-wing activities in very different ways. At the lower ego stages, students construed the situation and the issues in terms of self-other relations; increasingly, through the stages, they demonstrated wider social and societal perspectives.

In a study of women contemplating abortion, Gilligan identified a number of levels of reasoning which overlap with Kohlberg's moral stages, but differ from them in important details (Gilligan, 1977, 1980, 1982). Gilligan argues, as others have (e.g. Holstein, 1976), that the moral stages which Kohlberg originally identified in adolescent boys do not take into account the much greater part which interpersonal caring and responsibility play in women's moral reasoning. The real-life issue of abortion provided a focus for drawing out a wide range of reasoning on interpersonal and role obligations. The main departures from Kohlberg's scheme are in the differential emphases placed on justice and caring. According to Kohlberg's data—and in line with his moral theory—justice does have an imperative quality for males. For females, however, the moral imperative takes the form of injunction to care, to alleviate suffering, and to prevent violence.

Gilligan's levels reflect, like the other studies, changes in integration, organization, and construal of the social world. Her findings on changes in the concept of 'the good' are particularly interesting; for women, the 'good' is defined in terms of various kinds of self-sacrifice, even of self-abnegation, which are perceived as necessary for fulfilling the moral imperative of responsibility for others. The significant developmental change which Gilligan identifies is the realization that 'responsibility' also included responsibility for the self and for the autonomy of one's own actions.

In Adelson's developmental studies the term 'political' has a somewhat different meaning. Adelson and his co-workers asked children to devise and justify an ideal political system for a hypothetical population of a thousand people on an isolated island. Development was manifested by increasing awareness of historical perspective, of possible alternatives, of social variables to be considered, and, ultimately, in the use of general principles for evaluating rules and institutions. The kind of changes in reasoning which Adelson found are very similar to the change found in other areas of social reasoning, the same increasing awareness of the wider implications of individual and social events and their consequences, and of the function of rules and roles (Adelson and O'Neil, 1966; Adelson *et al.*, 1969; Adelson, 1971).

Tomlinson (1975) has argued that 'the political constitutes a specification and extension of the moral'—in other words, political thinking develops later than, and is consequent upon, moral reasoning. He also argued that the values under consideration in studies of political reasoning are 'procedural', in contrast with moral values, which are 'terminal'. As a consequence, he argued, the processes in political reasoning are more *apparent* than those involved in moral reasoning. This, in my view, is an imposed criterion; the foregoing analysis has on the whole indicated that most of the values involved in the social and moral construal processes are in fact procedural. The explicit organization of terminal values only really occurs in post-conventional reasoning, and, as we have seen, this organization occurs as much in the sphere deemed 'political' by researchers as it does in the sphere deemed 'moral'.

The overlap between the different areas of reasoning becomes even more obvious when we take into account the constraints imposed by methodology. In a 'real-life' situation, where the individual's own actions and appraisals are currently and practically involved in the event, the experimenter does not impose the criteria by which the event shall be judged; she interprets the categories used by the respondents. Although this is what in fact should be happening in any open-ended technique, it is my contention that the categories of 'moral' and 'political' imposed on the data by the experimenters have distorted and limited the interpretation of the material. From Haan's later analysis of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement data, it is clear that the distinction between 'moral' and 'political' was not made in the minds of the majority of students. Social, personal, moral, and political arguments were all invoked in their construal of the situation. Haan, in fact, found that nearly half of the sample reasoned about the 'real' (i.e. 'political') situation at a *higher* stage than they did about the hypothetical (i.e. 'moral') situation of the dilemma. This of itself is counter-evidence for the argument that political development is consequent upon moral development, but more important for the present discussion, it is evidence of considerable overlap in reasoning. The conclusion which Haan draws is that, for these students at least, the actuality of the event created a general state of disequilibrium which focused their thinking and effected a greater organization and integration of *all* the construals in the situation (Haan, 1975).

The same overlap and interaction between various kinds of reasoning, and lack of subjective distinction between them, is found in all the studies which looked at 'real-life' situations (e.g. Candee, 1974; Gilligan, 1977, 1980). From these studies it is clear that some arguments do have an imperative quality, but this quality cannot be satisfactorily labelled as 'moral' or 'political'—for Gilligan's subjects it was role obligations, attached to a particular ideal image of 'womanhood'. As we have seen, in hypothetical situations, the experimenter may impose parameters which delineate the situation, but irrespective of the label that is hung on the task, the technique effectively picks up a very wide range of 'social' reasoning. On the basis of all the foregoing, it would seem that there is now a need for research which examines the interrelationship *within* the broad area of social cognition, as opposed to research which looks at the correlations *between* areas of social cognition.

The Developmental Process

In the foregoing, I have spelt out what I see to be the limitations of applying a *moral* theory to what is in fact the development of social reasoning. I now shall look at the effect of the emphasis on the *moral* aspect of the theory, on analysis of developmental processes. Firstly, it has enforced a teleological perspective on supporters and critics of Kohlberg alike; the role of Stage 6 in the *moral* theory has been exaggerated out of all proportion to its distribution in the population. Secondly, it has focused attention on the specific contingencies of development relating to those areas which fit the definition of 'moral'—including moral action—at the cost of attention to the general processes of reasoning and changes in reasoning. Thirdly, the preoccupation with the ideological consistency of the *moral* stages has led to a somewhat static picture, which tends to focus on content rather than structure, and consequently underplays the essentially dynamic model of development which is inherent in cognitive-developmental theory. Fourthly, emphasis on the narrow ideology of morality has limited the attention paid to interaction between the individual and society,

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in particular, the individual in her own social world. This interaction is important in the developmental process partly because of its role in *what* the individual learns about construal—in other words, what categories are offered to her by her immediate environment. However, it is also important because interpersonal discussion, conflict, and dissonance affects the restructuring process.

The kinds of change which occur developmentally have been discussed in detail in the first part of this chapter. Let us for example consider what happens to decision-making about a *rule*: (a) it is comprehended with increasing complexity; (b) it is perceived as being applicable to different people and different individuals; (c) it is seen as serving the interests of different groups of people; (d) different immediate and long-term effects are seen to accrue from obeying (or failing to obey) the rule. A developmental explanation requires explication of the mechanisms involved in these changes. Required for this is analysis of the transition processes, and the dynamic interactions between the individual's existing construals, and between the individual and the construals of other individuals. The extent to which this explication would be better served by a model of social reasoning rather than moral reasoning can best be examined by seeing in detail how the 'moral theory' approach impedes analysis.

A substantial part of the debate on moral development has been caught in the trap which arises from the teleological model. This takes the form of discussion about the *moral* validity of the ideologies manifested at various stages, or else about the explicit *telos* of the developmental sequence—the content of Stage 6 thought. Supporters of the Kohlberg model argue that the later stages are more 'moral' because they approximate more closely to the thinking of certain moral philosophers, and in particular because the sequence indicates progress towards a justice-based liberal ethic (Kohlberg, 1971, 1973). Critics of the model have also shown the same preoccupation with the definition of morality; they argue that Kohlberg's stages are culturally or politically biased because Stage 6 reflects the dominant ideological perspective of a liberal Western culture (Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977; Trainer, 1977; see Emler, Chapter 3). *Both* sides in this debate are preoccupied with the same issue, namely moral 'maturity'.

By any criterion, the later stages of reasoning are more complex, more subtle, and invoke more factors for consideration, but these characteristics refer to the *reasoning processes*. They are not an evaluation of the moral content. In other words, the criticisms are valid as objections to the implicit theory of *morality*, but they are not valid as objections to the implicit theory of *development*. Hierarchical stage models are particularly vulnerable to teleological, evaluative, fallacies; Piaget has been criticized for using an implicit *telos* which reflects only one, ahistorical view of science. His natural science paradigm of formal operational thinking carries the implication that knowledge *equals* science, rather than that science equals one *form* of knowledge (Riegel, 1972; Wilden, 1975; Wozniak, 1975). However, the developmental theory of both Piaget and

Kohlberg is about the explanation of *progression* and *transformation*. These processes are of psychological significance irrespective of whether or not the individual completes the sequence of development—in the case of moral reasoning, of course, the vast majority of people do not.

These problems reflect the recurrent issue of 'structure vs. content'. The structure of thinking is the underlying organization of beliefs, which is only partly manifested in the content, i.e. the expressed opinion. There are two approaches to structure, and it is these two approaches which reflect the kinds of confusions above. One approach is to look at the *moral* structure, that is those consistent *moral* principles and themes which underlie the attitudes expressed, and represent the moral origin of the reasoning. It this type of structure which has predominated in many discussions of the moral theory. A second approach to structure, which is consistent with my argument in this chapter, is to see the structure of reasoning as the organization of cognitions about the social world, *some* of which may be expressed in moral opinions. A structural view based on social cognition includes a wide understanding of society, and social relations, norms, conventions, and obligations, which is only partly relevant to any specific 'moral' issue. This structure also includes the ways in which the individual construes causal relations between social events and individual attributes.

The focus of a developmental theory should be upon the growth process: in the case of stage theory, in particular on the transition process from stage to stage. Undue focus on the *telos* distracts from this analysis, especially if that focus is on description. The growth or transition process, according to the tenets of cognitive-developmental theory, is a process of increased disequilibrium which creates reconstruction and restructuring (Langer, 1969). Disequilibrium arises from a disjunction between assimilative and accommodative processes. The origins of disequilibrium must be sought, therefore, not only in the relationships within the existing construal system, but also in the relationship between the individual and other individuals, and the relationship between the individual and the values and construal processes of the wider society. The constant interaction between the self and the environment, and the process of conscious realization of action in thought, is explicit in Piaget's cognitive theory (see Wright, Chapter 8). It is barely touched upon in moral development theory.

Research on development has focused largely on the independent variables associated with developmental change. Some evidence of the effects of group dynamics and social interaction has been collected, but this has been primarily designed to test the hierarchical criterion of the moral stages—to demonstrate that the reasoning of stages higher than the individual's own are seen as more effective and attractive arguments. The relationship between the individual and the wider values, rhetoric, and construals of society is virtually unresearched. Two pieces of research, however, are illuminating on the transition processes. Both pieces of research concentrate on the development of moral thought, but in fact demonstrate a complex interaction between construals of the social situation, and the organization of beliefs about social relations.

The first, by Turiel, studied the transition between Stages 4 and 5. This particular transition originally aroused interest because in the longitudinal study, Kohlberg and Kramer found that students who came to university with well-established Stage 4 thought appeared to regress to a form of Stage 2 thinking, especially if they became exposed to 'radical' ideologies (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969). Subsequently they moved on to Stage 5. Turiel identified this 'regression' as a transitional 'Stage 4½'. The décalage process involved in moving out of Stage 4 thought is manifested by increased awareness of relativistic possibilities, and in particular by the realization of the possibility of more than one viable form of social system. The transition phase is marked by the rejection of the well-ordered system of rules which has characterized Stage 4 thinking, and a temporary period of anarchic relativism. Eventually this becomes organized into the characteristically non-rigid, dynamically structured, conception of individual-societal interdependence of Stage 5. The anarchy found in Stage 4½ has interesting parallels with the 'epistemological loneliness' which Chandler found in intellectual development, following the initial shock of realizing a relativistic perspective at the beginning of formal operations (Chandler, 1975).

The second area of research is the various practical applications of the concept of the 'just community' in prison and school settings. By restructuring the social system in the prison or school to establish a 'just community' based on cooperation and egalitarian roles, the researchers and teachers created a setting in which the implicit moral atmosphere is that of Stage 3, rather than Stage 1 or 2—the normal implicit moral ideology of many institutions (Scharf and Hickey, 1976; Mosher, 1980). In these just communities, there is continual reflection upon the community needs, and on the decision-making processes involved in moral and group norm issues. This is demonstrably effective in stimulating moral development. In the work on just communities there are a number of interesting factors. Real-life construals are the basis of discussion, and real-life crises of organization, in developing norms and in deciding how to deal with deviance. The data also illustrate richly the interpersonal dynamics involved. Finally it is very apparent that reconstrual and developmental change involve changes in conceptions of roles and of interpersonal interaction. It is these conceptions which are the origin of any sense of rule *or* role obligation.

If we wish to progress in our understanding of the processes of development of moral, social, and political reasoning then perhaps we should be addressing two issues in detail: the social psychological processes which contribute to disequilibrium in the individual's present structure, and the consequences of this, in other words the processes by which the disequilibrium is resolved. The now extensive material on the school 'just communities' is adequate to document the way in which *negotiated social meaning* is generated by the discussion of moral issues and the democracy-building events which are part of the ongoing life of the just community (Mosher, 1980). There is also a considerable amount of material in Gilligan's and Erickson's work, and in Kohlberg's own longitudinal data, on the ways in which life crises act as a catalyst for disequilibrium, and for restructuring of the individual's understanding and organization of roles, relationships, and rules (Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Erickson, 1980).

In this chapter I have been exploring two related issues. The first is that Kohlberg's theory of moral development is not one, but two theories, a theory of development and a theory of morality. The former is an orthodox extension of cognitive-developmental theory, and is substantively supported by the empirical data on stages of reasoning. The latter is a definition of morality derived from a particular philosophical position, which places great emphasis upon rationality and upon justice as the core and essence of 'morality'. Kohlberg's argument that the evidence of the one supports the other has led, in my view, to a number of important and in some ways misleading conclusions. It has led critics of the theory to confuse the two, to criticize the theory of morality (particularly the hypothetical *telos* of Stage 6) and in doing so to also reject the more solidly founded and practically-relevant material on the first four stages of reasoning. Supporters of the theory have made the same mistake, filtering their perceptions of the earlier stages through a view that they are less adequate insofar as they do not approximate to the Stage 6 form.

The emphasis on the theory of morality has also, I have argued, led to greater attention to the question of how people become more 'moral', rather than upon what is actually going on when they *develop*—i.e. change and transform their reasoning. But my most extensive criticism comes from the biases I see arising from the definition of the moral domain itself. A main consequence of recognizing the distinction between the theory of morality and the theory of development is that it permits modification of one without rejection of the other. Gilligan's research has had an important effect upon the theory of morality. Her findings that women focus on the interpersonal, on negotiation, and on mutual responsibility are a contradiction to Kohlberg's position that morality reflects the delineation of rights and obligations, and the understanding of justice in terms of rational 'fairness'. The stages of development which she is currently working on parallel Kohlberg's in their conceptual structure; her work in other words is firmly within the cognitive-developmental paradigm. This work is an extension of Kohlberg's, but its implications are that one may take a broader view of moral reasoning which allows for several styles of thought within a single cognitive structure.

In this chapter I have tried to go further than this, and explore the argument that the tools of moral reasoning research set their own artefactual boundaries of a 'moral domain', and that, however valid the measures are of the development of a specific sort of reasoning, the data do not support the view that there is a 'moral domain' with special characteristics. The specialness arises from the coding of only prescriptive statements. I have argued that what is being elicited from the individual is a broad understanding of social and political relationships and systems which *facilitate* the making of moral judgments in both hypothetical and real-life situations.

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Why does Political Party Affiliation relate to Stage of Moral Reasoning?

Paper presented to the annual conference of
the International Society for Political Psychology,
St. Catherines College, Oxford, July 1983.

There was a rash of research in the late Sixties and early Seventies on the relationship between political action and ideology, and stage of moral reasoning as defined by Kohlberg's model of moral development.[1] These studies tended to demonstrate a curvilinear relationship between moral stage and political orientation and activism; people who reasoned at the lower and highest stages (namely stages 2, 5 and 6) tended to hold left-radical beliefs and to be involved in activism. Thinkers at stages 3 and 4 were politically more conservative.

These findings raised a number of questions. Firstly, many of the studies were in fact of political activism and ideology in very specific situations, such as campus unrest over issues at least partly concerned with internal university administration and policy. Even though the issues under discussion may have had a wider implication - for example concerning the Vietnam war - there was an element of parochialism about the events themselves. Secondly, the studies used an earlier form of the Kohlberg coding system, which did not distinguish effectively between stage 2 anti-authority reasoning and the cognitively more complex 'stage 4½', or 4/5, which is expressed as radical relativism. When some of the studies were recoded using the later and more adequate coding system, there emerged a monotonic relationship between moral stage, political reasoning and political action; the higher the moral stage, the more liberal and the more likely were people to be activists.[2]

These findings lead to the third and most central question; how does one interpret the relationship between moral reasoning

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1. Fishkin, J., Keniston, K. & C. Mackinnon (1973). Moral reasoning and political ideology, J. Personality & Social Psychology 27, 109-119; Candee, D. (1976). Structure and Choice in Moral Reasoning, J. Personality & Social Psychology, 34, 1293-1301; Haan, N., Smith, M.B. & J. Block (1968). Moral reasoning of young adults. J. Personality & Social Psychology 10, 183-201.
2. see Kohlberg, L. & D. Candee, In Gewirtz, J. & W. Kurtines (1984). Morality, Moral Behaviour and Development, New York: Wiley.

and political orientation? Researchers are understandably reluctant to draw the bald and highly-charged conclusion that those who endorse leftwing political arguments are morally more 'mature' or 'advanced' than those of a conservative persuasion. Certainly critics of both the right and the left have argued that there is an inherent liberal bias in the stages of moral reasoning as described by Kohlberg.[3] The exact nature of this bias is still a matter for debate; but given the relative consistency of the findings, it does behove the researcher to try to find some explanation of the relationship.

Candee explored the relationship between moral stage, political affiliation[4] and tendency to favour a response focussing on human rights v. a response oriented to maintaining social institutions on a series of public issues. He presented respondents with questions about the My Lai incident and about Watergate. He found a clear relationship between higher moral stage and a greater tendency to endorse a human rights response, and he also found that there were fewer stage 4 and stage 5 thinkers amongst the Nixon supporters than amongst McGovern supporters.[5]

So the theme of rights may be one key link; given alternatives, conservatives are more likely to support the maintenance of institutions than the maintenance of individual rights. But there still remains the basic question; which is prior? Does moral stage determine political preference and set the scene for the resolution of the political dilemma - in which case the individual should become progressively more liberal as she or he progresses through the moral stages? Or does political ideology, rooted in some enduring value system, set the brake or the accelerator on progression through the moral stage? Obviously, only a longitudinal study can answer that question.

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[3] Kohlberg, L. Moral stages and moralisation; the cognitive-developmental approach. In T. Lickona (ed.) Moral Development and Behaviour (1976). New York: Holt; Simpson, E.L. (1974). Moral development research; a case of scientific cultural bias. Human Development 17, 81-106; Sullivan, E.V. (1977). A study of Kohlberg's structural theory of moral development; a critique of liberal science ideology. Human Development 20, 352-376; Trainer, F.E. (1977). A critical analysis of Kohlberg's contribution to the study of moral thought. J. for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 7,41-63.

[4] Support for Nixon or McGovern in 1972.

[5] Candee, D. (1976) op. cit.

However there are other questions which can be asked about the nature of the relationship. Today I want to present some data from a study looking at the relationship between political party affiliation, reasoning on political, social and economic issues, and level of moral reasoning. This research is part of a study by Cotgrove, Weinreich-Haste and Duff on the values of late adolescents in Britain.[6] The sample consisted of 900 seventeen year olds at the top end of the ability range, and 800 undergraduates, drawn from across the range of disciplines. The sexes were equally represented.

The political measures were party affiliation, policy aims the respondent would like his or her chosen party to endorse, and the perception of one's own position on a left-right scale. The measures of social and economic reasoning included a scale of 'post-material' v. 'material' values devised by Cotgrove and Duff, a measure of attributions about the origins of social order devised by ourselves, and a measure of attributions about the causes of unemployment devised by Furnham.[7] The two attribution measures tapped the dimension of an individualistic v. collectivist explanation; does the respondent explain social disorder and unemployment in terms of individual weakness, laziness or vice,

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6. Cotgrove, S.F. & H.E. Weinreich-Haste (1982). Career choice, with special reference to engineering. Report to SSRC on Grant F/0023/007/1. 1980-82.
7. Furnham, A. (1982). Explanations for unemployment in Britain. European J. Social Psychology 12, 335-353; Cotgrove, S.F. Catastrophe or Cornucopia? (1982). Wiley.

or in terms of government policies and institutional mismanagement? The measure of moral reasoning was a questionnaire, similar in conception, but not form, to Rest's Defining Issues Test;[8] this derives a score of moral reasoning based upon the pattern of preference for, and rejection of, statements representing different stages of moral reasoning (Figure 1).

The first finding I want to present is the distribution of political party affiliation (Figure 2). As you can see, the majority of undergraduates supported the Conservative party, especially if they were engineers or economists. The Alliance at that time had a considerable following, with Labour a poor third. We found the predictable relationship between policy aims, political party affiliation and perceived personal position on the left-right spectrum.

We found a striking relationship between score on the moral measure and party support (Figure 3). This held good at both ages, and it is interesting that the older group clearly show a higher moral score. When we looked closely at the nature of this relationship, on a number of dimensions, it was clearly monotonic; the more liberal/radical, the higher the moral score. For example, let us look at the relationship between desired policy aims and moral score (Figure 4).

On the other measures we also found a consistent relationship with moral score, and in the predicted direction. Let us consider first the scale, Goals for an Ideal Society. It is clear that higher moral score goes with endorsement of postmaterial values (Figure 5). On the measures of attribution about the origins of social order, and on the origins of unemployment, higher moral score is associated with explanations rooted in appreciation of social and institutional factors, rather than in attributions

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8. Rest, J. (1979). Development in Judging Moral Issues, Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press.

Figure 1. Measure of moral reasoning   Key: A = stage 1; B = stage 4; C = stage 2; D = stage 5; E = stage 3.

			agree	very important 1	2	3	not important 4	5
1.								
	A	Heinz should steal because his wife may be an important or rich person	___	___	___	___	___	___
		Heinz should not steal because if he steals he will be a thief and a criminal	___					
	B	Heinz should steal because he has a duty to care for his wife	___	___	___	___	___	___
		Heinz should not steal because breaking the law leads to chaos and disorder	___					
	C	Heinz should not steal because he would probably get caught and put in prison, which would not help his wife	___	___	___	___	___	___
		Heinz should steal because there might come a time when his wife could do something equivalent for him	___					
	D	Heinz should steal because his moral obligations to his wife are greater than his obligations to the law	___	___	___	___	___	___
		Heinz should not steal because whether or not the law is fair it should be obeyed until changed by democratic means	___					
	E	Heinz should steal because he has offered the chemist money and the chemist is being greedy	___	___	___	___	___	___
		Heinz should not steal because if everyone stole it would lead to the end of good neighbourliness	___					
2.								
	A	The chemist does not have the right because he may get into trouble with the authorities	___	___	___	___	___	___
		The chemist does have the right because chemists can charge what they like for things they sell	___					
	B	The chemist does have the right because he is free to set his own price if the law allows it	___	___	___	___	___	___
		The chemist does not have the right because he is exploiting people and being irresponsible	___					
	C	The chemist does have the right because he invented the medicine and can do what he likes with it	___	___	___	___	___	___
		The chemist does not have the right because if he overcharges he may lose customers						
	D	The chemist does not have the right because goods which serve human needs should be under state not individual control	___	___	___	___	___	___
		The chemist does have the right because free enterprise should be protected in a free society	___					
	E	The chemist does not have the right because he should not cause hardship to people who can't afford things	___	___	___	___	___	___
		The chemist does have the right because it is his property and people should respect other people's property	___					
3.								
	A	Heinz should be punished because he stole something that didn't belong to him	___	___	___	___	___	___
		Heinz should not be punished because the chemist was more wrong than Heinz	___					
	B	Heinz should be punished because otherwise it might set a dangerous legal precedent	___	___	___	___	___	___
		Heinz should not be punished because he was responding to a higher law, that of saving life	___					
	C	Heinz should not be punished because if the judge were in the same position he would steal	___	___	___	___	___	___
		Heinz should be punished because if he gets away with it he may steal again	___					
	D	Heinz should be punished because he should be willing to take the consequences if he knowingly breaks the law, even if he is morally right	___	___	___	___	___	___
		Heinz should not be punished because the laws should serve morality, and if they don't they shouldn't be put into effect	___					
	E	Heinz should be punished otherwise what he did may be seen as an example to others	___	___	___	___	___	___
		Heinz should not be punished because the judge should consider the pressures Heinz was under when he stole						

Figure 2. Political Party Affiliation of Undergraduate Sample, by Discipline and Sex (percentages)

			Alliance					
	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	Social Democratic	Ecology	Other		N
Biological Sciences	35	21	6	35	3	0	Male	37
	35	15	15	29	4	4	Female	61
Economics	42	19	22	14	3	0	Male	40
	38	6	27	27	3	0	Female	37
Engineering	55	10	12	19	2	4	Male	149
	56	4	19	19	0	4	Female	31
History	28	22	6	33	6	6	Male	19
	28	13	19	28	6	6	Female	37
Mathematics	36	16	18	28	0	2	Male	57
	35	13	18	28	8	0	Female	43
Modern Languages	39	23	4	31	4	0	Male	26
	46	11	11	29	1	1	Female	85
Physics	38	15	19	17	11	2	Male	51
	36	3	30	27	3	0	Female	35
Sociology	10	24	5	43	0	19	Male	21
	12	37	5	32	4	11	Female	66
								799

Figure 3



* based on preferences for statements of different moral stages.

Figure 4. Relationship between Policy Aims and Moral Score

Positive correlation: higher Moral Score is more likely to endorse:

increased spending on social services
unilateral nuclear disarmament.
increased taxation of the rich
increasing opportunities for women
abolition of the House of Lords

Negative correlation: lower Moral Score is more likely to endorse:

restriction of the power of the unions
increasing the power of the police
restricting immigration

Figure 5. Relationships between 'Goals for an Ideal Society' and Moral Score

Individuals with HIGHER Moral Scores tended to endorse:

individual has a lot of say at work
individual job satisfaction more important than economy
social provision of welfare
public interests and controlled market
attempts to overcome inequalities
less importance attached to defence
similarity in work and family roles between the sexes
people judged on the basis of personal qualities

(postmaterial values)

Individuals with LOWER Moral Scores tended to endorse:

strong law and order
needs of economy take precedence over individuals
individual encouraged to look after self
decisions left to elected government
incomes and rewards recognise different abilities
recognition that many inequalities are inevitable
strong defence forces
different, but equally important, sex roles
market forces and private interests predominate

(material values)

of strength and weakness on the part of the individual (Figure 6).

We have some measure of comparison with Candee's findings. In our measure of moral reasoning (see Figure 1), we gave the choice of steal v. not steal, chemist has v. chemist has not the right to charge, and Heinz should v. Heinz should not be punished, at each stage of moral reasoning. The respondents were asked to make a choice overall on the issues. We found that Labour supporters were on the whole most likely, and Conservative supporters least likely, to say that a) Heinz should steal, b) the chemist does not have the right to charge what he likes, and c) Heinz should not be punished (Figure 7).

What can we conclude from these findings? The most superficial conclusion would be that the morally more sophisticated individual is politically more liberal and more likely to support collectivist explanations of social issues and to hold postmaterial values. But that, as I said before, begs the question of what the moral score means. Ostensibly, Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning reflect the development of an increasing understanding of justice and universal principles of human rights.[9] The person who demonstrates a higher stage of moral reasoning is showing a capacity to argue from the basis of generalisable principles, to understand the moral basis of the law, and to endorse the rights of individuals where these come into conflict with arbitrary authority. Moral reasoning is measured through the prescriptive responses given on moral dilemmas concerning rights, justice, authority and responsibility. Prescriptivity and universalisability are the essential characteristics of moral reasoning.

However, another way of interpreting the stages of moral reasoning is to argue that they reflect increasing cognitive

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[9] Kohlberg, L. op. cit.

Figure 6(a) What do you think is important in helping to cause unemployment?

Correlates negatively with Moral Score

Unemployed people can earn more money on social security
Sickness and physical handicap among unemployed people
Lack of effort and laziness among unemployed people
Just bad luck
Unemployed people do not try hard enough to get available jobs
Lack of intelligence or ability among unemployed people
Unemployed people are too fussy and proud to accept certain jobs
Poor education and qualifications among unemployed people
Unwillingness of unemployed people to move place to places of work
An influx of immigrants have taken up all available jobs
Inability of unemployed people to adapt to new conditions
Trade Unions have priced their members out of a job
Weak Trade Unions that do not fight to keep jobs

Correlates positively with Moral Score

The policies and strategies of the present government
Inefficient and less competitive industries that go bankrupt
Incompetent industrial management with poor planning
Widespread automation

Figure 6 (b). What do you think is important in helping to maintain social order?

Correlates positively with Moral Score

People having a sense of individual worth
Tolerance on the part of individuals
People being concerned for others in their community
Individual conscience
Social provision to prevent deprivation
Good material conditions, housing etcetera
Proper planning of resources and amenities
People feeling free to work out their own moral principles
People feeling in control of their lives
Individuals being satisfied and not greedy

Correlates negatively with Moral Score

Effective police force and law enforcement
Clear rules, norms and guidelines
People wanting to conform and be accepted
Most people leading ordinary, conventional lives

Figure 7. Judgement of Stealing, Chemist's Rights and Punishment of Heinz by Political Party

	University students	School pupils
"Should Heinz steal the medicine?" - should steal (%)		
Conservative	52	55
Alliance	70	63
Labour	84	69
"Has the Chemist the right to charge what he likes for the medicine?" - no (%)		
Conservative	59	63
Alliance	78	74
Labour	94	79
"Should Heinz be punished if he is caught?" - No (%)		
Conservative	39	69
Alliance	61	63
Labour	72	70

complexity in what the individual takes into account; the lower stage individual has a limited view of justice because she only focusses upon the immediate people in the situation - the husband, the wife, the authority figure - and does not take into account the wider community, let alone wider society. So moral stages reflect also different kinds of descriptions of the social world, as well as different kinds of prescriptions derived from those descriptions. This would be consistent with the relationship between individualistic explanations of social issues and lower stage moral reasoning; the respondent who blames the individual for his unemployed state may only be able to see the situation in terms of the individual, whereas higher stage moral reasoning reflects an understanding of social processes which can take into account economic and social forces beyond the power of the individual. Such a person will be able to use collectivist arguments, and will also be able to see the functions which the institutions of society serve in providing for individual needs.

Such a recasting of moral reasoning in more cognitive terms may get away from the connotations of certain kinds of values and attributions being more 'moral' than others, but it raises the questions - perhaps equally evaluative - of whether some values require more cognitive complexity. In this paper I started by considering whether the results really suggested that conservative thinkers were in some sense less 'morally sophisticated'. I have ended by suggesting that perhaps they may be less complex. This is ultimately no more satisfactory. This is an area where the findings are highly provocative; they point to the need for more research, and for more hard thinking about what constitutes the developmental processes of social and political understanding.[10]

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[10] Weinreich-Haste, H.E. (1984). Political, moral and social reasoning. In A. Regenbogen (ed.) Moral und Politik - soziales Bewusstein als Lernprozess, Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein.; Weinreich-Haste, H.E. & D. Locke (1983). Morality in the Making: Judgement, Action and Social Context. Chichester; Wiley.

Political, Moral and Social Reasoning

Appears as: Politische, moralische und soziale Urteilsbildung. In: A. Regenbogen (Hrsg.) Moral und Politik - soziales Bewusstsein als Lernprozess, Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1984.

Commonsense experience would lead us to expect a relationship between the individual's moral point of view and her political and social beliefs, and indeed there is plenty of psychological evidence that 'conservatism' is more than simply a matter of which party the individual supports. It is commonsense also that people apply *moral* prescriptions to political issues and the actions of politicians, trade unionists and political activists of all sorts, and that people explain the origins of evil in the world, and the means and ends involved in attaining a better world, fairly consistently across a vastly disparate range of issues. Greed, for example, may be given as the primary cause, equally, of bad relations between neighbours, the failure of the national economy, and the French Revolution. However, I want to argue that psychological exploration of the relationship between moral, social and political reasoning has been somewhat impeded by two stumbling blocks. The first of these is that there have grown up different approaches to moral and political thinking, with different theoretical and methodological assumptions. The second is that researchers in the field of moral development have adopted the traditional philosophical distinction between descriptive and prescriptive reasoning and have applied it, I would argue too rigorously, to analysing how people ordinarily think about moral issues.

In this chapter I am going to explore the relationship between the explanations which people give in support of moral judgements, and their explanations of social issues, social order and politics. I will present some preliminary findings and discuss some existing data, and offer a tentative model of an overview, which suggests that the reasoning which is classified as 'moral' by cognitive-developmentalists is in fact a *subset* of *social* reasoning. According to this proposition, the individual is able to make *moral* judgements because she has an *implicit social theory*. Her implicit social theory reflects the way she constructs her immediate social world and the wider world of interpersonal and intergroup relations, and her understanding of the social system. First, however, I will expand on the two stumbling blocks.

Morality and politics: the disparate traditions

Until recently, psychologists investigating thinking about political and social issues have tended, with a few notable exceptions, to focus either on the sources of individual differences in values, or else upon belief systems or ideology - the systematic correlation of beliefs and values. Developmental psychologists translated this into investigating the antecedent socialisation conditions which produce different belief systems. In contrast, the study of moral thinking has focussed little upon individual differences in moral values, and much more upon the underlying reasons and explanations which people offer to support a moral point of view; it is in the study of moral motivation and behaviour that individual differences have been regarded as interesting.

This difference in approaches to political and moral thinking arose partly because the latter has mainly been the province of developmental psychologists, and the former of social psychologists. Research on moral thinking has been dominated by the cognitive-developmental approach of Piaget and Kohlberg. So, research which looks at the relationship between political and moral thought has tended to graft one approach on to the other; for example, there is a body of research, particularly studies of student radicalism, which looked at the relationship between moral *stage* and political *typology* (Haan et al., 1968; Fishkin and Keniston, 1973).

The exceptions referred to earlier are work within a cognitive-developmental framework, on stages in political and economic thought amongst children and adolescents.

Adelson and his colleagues looked at the development of political concepts including ideas of community, law and government, in adolescents. (Adelson et al., 1966, 1969. Adelson 1971). Furth has looked at the development of societal concepts in children (Furth, 1978). Adelson and his associates found an age-related progression in political conceptualisation; the youngest adolescents held concrete conceptions of government and had a preference for power and control centred in one person, the eldest had philosophical arguments for different forms of government, and appreciated the utilitarian advantages of participatory democracy as a protection for individual rights.

In the last decade there has been considerable expansion in cognitive social psychology, in particular reflected in the popularity of attribution studies. Where formerly the social psychologist might have looked at the characteristics of ideological typology, she now looks instead at how people make sense of their world, and offer lay explanations of their own experience and of the wider social, political and economic environment. One example of this approach is the work of Furnham, on lay explanations of unemployment. Furnham found that there were three types of explanation; individualistic (blaming the unemployed person), societal (blaming the institutions of society) and fatalistic (blaming fate or other external source). Individuals were consistent in their type of explanation, and there was also a relationship between explanations of unemployment, and explanations of other aspects of wealth, poverty and the work ethic. (Furnham, 1982).

The present situation, therefore, is that cognitivist models of social and political thinking now exist in both social and developmental psychology; in both the focus is on how the individual makes sense of the world, how she constructs 'lay theories'. The difference between them is that the social psychologist is mainly interested in the cognitive response to a specific situation or phenomenon, and how this represents an organised explanation; the developmental psychologist is interested in how such organised explanations become more complex, more integrated and more differentiated, during the course of development.

In the light of these recent theoretical developments, let us now return to the results showing a relationship between moral reasoning stage and type of political reasoning. We can interpret these results in several ways. Firstly, we may argue that political values are consistent "quasi-traits"; they endure and we may explain their origins in the individual's socialisation conditions. We may argue that such traits act as inhibitors (or stimulants) to moral development; perhaps certain ideologies suppress any tendency to more complex reasoning. Alternatively, a certain kind of upbringing may produce certain values, and in addition affect the speed of moral reasoning development. (Hoffman and Salzstein, 1967). A third interpretation, however, is that what is common ground is how one perceives the world; the individual's moral stage reflects a more general orientation to the situation, and political ideology is a part of, or a reflection of, that orientation. Haan's later interpretations of the data from the Berkeley F.S.M. sit-in in 1964 suggest that individuals of different moral stage perceived and construed the political events and arguments differently. (Haan, 1975). Evidence from other types of studies also suggests stage differences in perception; in a study of 'bystander apathy', McNamee found that whether people actually *perceived* the situation as being one in which they had a personal responsibility to help, as well as whether they actually did help the distressed person, varied according to their moral stage (McNamee, 1977).

Such evidence would support the position that how the individual construes her social experience and political events is not a fixed entity determined by a stable ideological position. And while a particular value orientation may endure over time, the interpretation of its implications would appear to differ according to the individual's moral stage; one may *remain* generally 'conservative' or 'radical', but 'conservatism' has different implications if it is associated with stage two moral thinking than if it is associated with stage five moral thinking.

The definition of the moral domain

Researchers in moral development have taken on board the philosophical distinction between "moral" and other kinds of reasoning: according to this distinction, moral reasoning is marked by prescriptiveness, universalisability and a particular obligation to act. *Descriptions* are not therefore "moral", nor are context or time-bound *prescriptions* "moral".

Let us first consider what happens in the process of making a moral judgement. The use of the hypothetical moral dilemma, by both Piaget and Kohlberg, is designed to a) elicit prescriptive, rather than descriptive, reasoning and b) by using unfamiliar situations, to force the respondent to engage in detailed explicit resolutions, rather than produce clichés or formula responses.

The integral assumption of this method is that resolving the hypothetical dilemma makes explicit the ordinary ongoing moral reasoning processes of the individual. In order to resolve any moral dilemma in the manner demanded by the methodology, the individual has not only to make a prescriptive statement about what is the 'right' action - to make, in other words, an affirmation of a moral position or opinion - she has also to present a justification and explanatory account of that position. This explication reveals the individual's underlying reasoning, the structure and complexity of her current cognitive-moral processing capacity.

Consider for example one of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas, the story of Heinz, whose wife is dying, and needs medicine invented by a local druggist, but who cannot raise the high cost of the drug, nor persuade the chemist to reduce the price. He contemplates stealing the medicine. On the surface, this is a story about theft to save a life - the conflict of life versus law. There are other elements in the story; the rights of inventors of life-supporting commodities, the obligations of the marital role, the function of punishment, the role of law. This story is comprehensible to ten-year-olds, who see the main issues clearly but in very simple terms, but it also challenges the middle-aged moral philosopher, who sees all the subtle ramifications. The story is effective as a measure of moral reasoning development because of the variety of integration, differentiation and complexity which is revealed as the individual struggles to justify her resolution of the dilemma.

But to what extent in fact, is this reasoning wholly *prescriptive?* In order to say whether or not Heinz *should* steal, the individual must draw upon her conceptions of rules about stealing, the possible social and legal consequences of stealing, of relationships and obligations between husband and wife, and of her understanding of the role of inventors of medicine. These are conceptions about the nature of relationships between persons, about the relationship between individual and society, and about how social order is maintained. They are not, *prima facie*, *prescriptive* conceptions; they are descriptions and explanations. Understanding how interpersonal relations operate and how the social system works is a matter of the cognitive organisation of *social* knowledge. As the individual's cognitive capacity develops, this organisation becomes more complex. I want to argue that in order to make *prescriptive* statements, whether moral or political or simply normative, the individual must draw upon a loosely organised *description* of the social world, constructed by her from her secondhand knowledge and first hand experience. I want to call this her *'implicit social theory'*.*

The coding system of Kohlberg's theory builds this 'social' reasoning into the *moral* theory. The essence of Kohlberg's theory, as expressed in his classic 'From Is to Ought' paper of 1971, is that justice is the core of morality, and the cognitive development of moral reasoning is expressed in increasingly integrated, differentiated *and* morally more 'adequate' accounts of *justice*. So the coding system breaks down the components of moral reasoning into categories of value, and elements or themes of justice reasoning, and prescriptive statements are coded according to this framework. (Colby et al., 1983).

However, the prescriptive statement, 'you should not steal because you will get caught' is a consequence of the description. 'if people steal, they get caught'. Reasoning which in fact expresses a description of the social world is defined in terms of its prescriptive consequences A more sophisticated version of that descriptive statement is; 'the social system depends on the maintenance of effective laws'.

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* These arguments have been explored more fully in Weinreich-Haste and Locke (1983).

While this is an expression of *opinion*, in the sense that it could be disputed, it has factual status for the individual; her personal "implicit social theory" holds it to be a self evident truth. These particular descriptions generate several prescriptive conclusions: 'you should obey the law because otherwise we would have chaos'; 'lawbreakers should be punished to set an example'; 'as a good citizen, you should keep the laws which serve community interests'. So, the coding of moral statements generated by the Kohlberg dilemmas gets at the structure and level of complexity of the underlying social explanation through the analysis of the prescriptive statements. But because, traditionally, the determining characteristic of moral judgement is that it must be prescriptive, the theory does not make it explicit that the individual's underlying theory, or structure, of reasoning is in essence explanatory and *descriptive.*

The relationship between moral reasoning and other kinds of reasoning

There is now a massive body of evidence for at least the first four stages of increasing integration and differentiation in reasoning used to resolve moral dilemmas. According to the prevailing model, the relationship between moral and other fields of reasoning is as follows, (Figure 1): *logical operations* develop, and this makes possible the development of *social perspective taking*, the cognitive capacity to take the position of the others, actual or hypothetical, who are involved in the situation. This is a *necessary* but not *sufficient* condition for the individual to develop a moral perspective, i.e. a capacity to weigh up the relative claims and positions of the significant persons or groups, and to arrive at a 'just' resolution. The stages of social-perspective-taking, and therefore eventually the stages of moral reasoning, reflect an increasing range of significant

Figures 1 and 2

Presumed sequence of necessary and sufficient conditions for development in several fields of reasoning

1 - the current model

logical operations (Piaget)
↓
social perspective-taking (Selman, Walker)
↓
*[ego-development] (Loevinger, Erickson)
↓
moral reasoning (Kohlberg)
↓
political reasoning (Haan et al.)

* The location of ego development stages in relation to moral stages is not established.

2 - proposed model


Logical operations
social perspective taking
moral - social - political reasoning

rules)
roles)
responsibility)
relationships) "implicit social theory"
causes of action)
concepts of "the good")
explanations of social order, etcetera)

others who are brought into the conceptualisation of the situation. (Kuhn et al., 1977; Walker, 1980; Colby et al., 1983).

Figures 1 and 2 about here

As I discussed earlier, research on political attitudes and political conceptualisation demonstrated a relationship between the dominant moral themes of particular stages and the arguments and behaviour of different political factions. The interpretation of these results tended to presuppose that moral reasoning is *applied* to the political arena; the development of political reasoning is therefore in some sense *consequent* upon the development of moral reasoning. Such an interpretation assumes that moral reasoning and moral processes are a part of a definably separate domain, defined by the prescriptive judgement and its accompanying justifications. Moral development has its own distinctive parameters and developmental processes. There are certain empirically established antecedent conditions, necessary for development to take place, and there are certain correlates of moral judgement level, which *may* imply that moral judgement development must take place prior to the development or manifestation of these correlative attributes.

But suppose we explore an alternative possible theoretical position, based upon my earlier argument that the moral dilemma is in fact a very effective tool for eliciting the individual's *implicit social theory;* the prescriptive responses reveal an underlying descriptive organisation of the individual's construction of her social world. The implicit social theory is an organised system of construal, a description of rules, roles and relationships from which the individual is able to generate prescriptive reasoning in response to the demands of the situation. These prescriptions may be 'moral', 'social-normative' or 'political' depending on the context in which they are elicited. This model is represented in Figure 2.

On the basis of the evidence currently available from the structure of moral reasoning, and from the evidence of the correlates of moral reasoning, it is clear that the development of the individual's *implicit social theory* must depend upon the development of logical operation and social perspective-taking, and also upon the formation of schema to interpret the interrelationship between individual action and the social system.

In order to explore the possibility of an implicit social theory which is superordinate to moral reasoning, we must find evidence of a consistent constructivist process which is not bound by the prescriptive demands of reasoning on hypothetical moral dilemmas. Some preliminary evidence comes from our British study* on the relationship between social, moral and political reasoning.

The British Study

The study was in two parts. Firstly, we conducted an interview study with forty seventeen to twenty-one year olds in school and university. Secondly, we constructed a questionnaire form of the same areas of reasoning, which was presented to 1,700 students in school and university. The first study produced a qualitative analysis of the processes of reasoning on social, moral and political issues;the second acted as a quantitative test of the relationship between reasoning on the issues.

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* S.F. Cotgrove, H. Weinreich-Haste and A. Duff, supported by grant from Social Science Research Council 1980-82.

The interview presented the respondents with two structured hypothetical problems, and a series of questions about personal moral crises, concerns about social issues and suggested remedies for social crises. The interview explored how the individual construed her relations with others, and how she construed the social system. The two structured measures were Kohlberg's Heinz dilemmas, and a version of Adelson's measure of political comprehension. In this, the respondent was asked to consider the kinds of problems which might arise from a thousand people being marooned on an island, what kind of political system would be desirable for the islanders to develop, and what issues an emergent governing council should address. In the questionnaire forms of these measures, the options which emerged from the interviews were presented as scale items. In addition, similar format scales were used for more general issues of social values and social order; attributions about what factors maintain social order, a scale of goals for an 'ideal' society, devised by Cotgrove and Duff (Cotgrove, 1982) and Furnham's measure of attributions about the causes of unemployment.

A coding frame was developed in the following manner; a selection of the interviews were divided up according to themes covering social and political reasoning, and within each theme, responses were clustered according to the main criteria used in discussing the issue. Four levels of "social-cognitive complexity" emerged from this analysis (see Figure 3). Subsequently, each respondent was coded on each theme, the intertheme correlations established, and the correlation between the mean score on the themes and the score on the Heinz dilemmas established.

Figure 3 about here

Figure 3. Levels of Social Reasoning

	Social Order		Social change	Personal Responsibility/ Personal qualities	Islanders' problems
	Maintenance	Origins of disorder			
Level I Concrete Individual	Control of individual Strong law and order, constraints, police system and punishment.	Individual deviance, failings, weakness, Lack of strong controls.	No real understanding of social change	Physical or trait focus. Avoidance of sin or crime. Orientation to own survival and fitness.	Problems due to individual deviance or selfishness. Need for self reform and strong controls, authority.
Level II Interpersonal-dyadic	Clear rules and guidelines Interpersonal sanctions, pressure to and desire for conformity, acceptance by peers	Lack of concern for others, lack of 'interpersonal' virtues. Lack of conformity to social rules	Individual change (eg in virtue, personality) leads to social change. Small scale collective action in the form of appeal to authority.	Interpersonal qualities and fulfilment of roles and expectations set by peers Improvement of personal virtues. Concern for others in immediate circle.	Lack of concern for others, need for good neighbourliness. Negotiation between individuals to attain harmony
Level III Community-collective	Normative rules and consensual codes. Fair, just and concerned community and social institutions. People aware of community and their role in it. Cooperation.	Lack of community ties, disorganised social system. Lack of incentive or mechanisms for cooperation and mutuality.	Collective action, organised pressure groups. Appreciation of role of institutions and consensual social forces in affecting change.	Interpersonal responsibility Responsibility for being part of the community. Need for adaptability to social conditions. Trust and other qualities which make transaction possible.	Community needs, community policy and action to create and sustain consensual community.
Level IV. Systemic	Systemic organisation of legal system, provision of welfare, education etcetera. Importance of individual freedom, rights.	Social and economic inequality, deprivation. Lack of sense of personal worth. Breakdown of social order.	Appreciation of social economic, historical factors in social change.	Recognition of interrelationship between self and wider society. Importance of making commitment to principles and to others. Self-determination.	Need for system with future orientation, Superordinate goals; organisation of resources, provision of welfare etc. Protection of individual rights and autonomy.

Let us first consider two examples of the kinds of consistency in implicit social theory which emerged from the interviews. First, here is Robert, who scored low on all the coding:

> (Is there anything that worries you about the future of the country as a whole). Well I think about it but don't worry about it. It just is going down hill. I am not that worried about it.
> (What would you say are the worst evils of society today)
> Violence, I suppose. Wars, things like that. I don't worry about them, but it's not a very nice thought.
> (What would you say causes violence)
> I think its just human nature really. Animal instincts. From when we had to kill for our living.
>
> I think violence is part of keeping order. I think if the police were not violent sometimes they would be totally overrun. When kings were setting up their kingdoms years ago they did use violence.
> (What would you say were the main causes of crime)
> Its all down to human nature I suppose. Greed I suppose or it could be mental deficiency, people that turn to crime.
>
> The Islanders
> (what kinds of things do you think were happening)
> Crimes and stealing. One farmer might need things and can't get them so he steals them from some other farm. Probably by violence as well. Arguments would crop up and bring violence into it.
> (how should the islanders best deal with the situation)
> They would have to set up a government and makes laws so everyone on the island is living to the same sort of standard - I mean one person might think stealing is right and another thinks it's wrong. So they should all stick to the same thing.

Now, in contrast, here are extracts from Colin, who scored high;

> (can you tell me what worries you most about the future of this country)
> The economic prospects don't look particularly appealing at the moment. I think there is great danger of disharmony within the country if the recession continues. At the moment it doesn't appear to be too dangerous but if it continues there could be a great deal of civil unrest. There could be problems with various factions.
> (What would you say were the causes)
> I think as in any cultures, if you class the West as a whole as a form of culture, when it reaches some kind of apex it begins to decline. With any great empire, the Roman Empire for example, it reached a peak and then it tended to degenerate somewhat. I think that may have happened in the West.

(How important do you think individual conscience is in maintaining social order)
It's very important, the law can't govern individual actions ... If you are going to have some kind of social order then there must be a degree of co-operation between people, and for that they must have some kind of morality which is common to most people.

The Islanders
(What kinds of things do you think were happening)
Well if people are producing different kinds of goods then presumably there must be some degree of co-operation to share those goods because I imagine people could not produce everything they need. People all have different specialist skills to provide different services and presumably they would barter those things for different goods so you need to establish some kind of degree of value for various goods ... Some kind of impartial committee I think would be necessary.

One important difference between these two sets of extracts is of course the level of vocabulary, but the differences I want to focus on concern the complexity of conceptual organisation, and the range of understanding of the social system which this reveals. Robert ascribes most of the causes of problems, and their solutions, to individual characteristics and the constraint and control of individuals. He thinks that the Islanders would experience interpersonal strife arising from the conflict of individual needs. Robert does not see the community as a whole; he sees individuals. The government must make laws to control individual wrongdoing. In contrast, Colin has a broader social view which includes a historical perspective. Economic, societal and historical forces contribute to the origins of problems, and their solution. The individual is seen as part of the social system. So he sees that the Islanders need a co-operative *system*, not merely co-operative *behaviour*, to ensure effective distribution of goods and resources.

The distinction between conceptions based on labelling and conceptions based on interpersonal community interaction was also evident in the two young men's attitudes to responsibility for others:

> (Robert) I don't think you should interfere with them that much, or hurt them physically or mentally. I think you should be responsible for your own actions first, not worry about other people. If you are too worried about them and forget about yourself, it's not on really.
>
> (Colin) If your (parents and friends) propose to do something and you don't agree with it, if you think they are going to suffer because of the consequences then I think you have a responsibility to put forward your view and say perhaps they are doing the wrong thing, or taking the wrong course of action.

Robert scored stage 2/3 on the Heinz dilemmas, and Colin, stage 4 (5). The following extract gives some sense of the differences in their conceptualisations of the law and punishment, and how these can be seen to relate to the social-cognitive reasoning described above:

> Robert
>
> (Do you think people ought to obey the law)
> Yes, usually. If no one obeyed the law there would be no use having the law in the first place.
> (Should Heinz be punished)
> Yes. Because he has broken the law. He has done something wrong. Even though it does not actually appear it. If someone had just gone in there and stolen the drug to sell it it's no worse than actually stealing it and using it. It's the same thing.
> (Why should he be punished)
> Because it's stopping people committing crime in the first place.
>
> Colin
>
> (Do you think people ought to obey the law)
> If the law is correct, yes. Yes I think the law is made for the general benefit of society. Obviously we can't have a law which helps everyone all the time. You have to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people. I think people should obey the law or at least try to change it by democratic means.
> (Should Heinz be punished)
> Yes, perhaps a token punishment to show that the law has been upheld, but won't inflict any great hardship.

Robert focusses upon the controlling, rule function of the law, and the consequence to the individual wrongdoer, of transgression. Colin perceives the function of the law as a code or set of guidelines which are part of the social fabric, and punishment as an integral part of the legal process, rather than as simply a deterrent to the individual.

There were fifteen questions in the interview on personal, social and political issues, including the questions about the Islanders, and it was from these that four levels of social-cognitive reasoning were derived. These are outlined in Figure 3. The four levels demonstrate progressive complexity in the conception of the social world. The first level represents a conception of the social system which extrapolates from individual characteristics and individual forms of change and constraint; it is basically concrete and non-reciprocal. The final level is a conception which can take into account interpersonal and inter-societal relations, comprehend the reciprocal relations between them, and has some conception of a broad sociological and historical metatheory. It also reflects the capacity of the individual to conceptualise beyond the bounds of her immediate cultural experience. The levels follow the same general developmental sequences as those expressed in the structural scoring methods of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas, in Adelson's stages of political reasoning, and in Habermas' integration of moral and ego developmental stages within the framework of a model of communicative action. (Habermas, 1979).

The correlations between scores on the Kohlberg dilemmas, and scores on the social-cognitive reasoning measures in the interview material, was 0.45. We regard this study as a pilot: considerably more work needs to be done to refine both the measures and the analysis. In addition, the homogeniety of age amongst the respondents makes it dubious to talk at this stage about evidence for 'developmental' variation. But the results do suggest a strong consistency in stage/structure even with a homogeneous age group.

Let us now turn to the quantitiative measures, the questionnaires used with 900 school students aged 17. The measures of moral reasoning were three sets of scales using the Heinz dilemma, on stealing, punishment and the chemist's position. These scales used a similiar but not identical format to the kinds of measures used in Rest's Defining Issues Test.* There were five sets of scales on issues of social beliefs and values. These scales were; (1) a measure of aims for an 'ideal' society, (2) the perceived seriousness of problems the Islanders might encounter (3) the desirable aims for the Islanders' Council, (4) the factors perceived as important in maintaining social order, and (5) the perceived causes of unemployment. Also the respondents were asked which political party was most consistent with their own desired political aims for Britain.

The scales were constructed to differentiate the dimension of *individualism versus collectivism:* in other words, the attribution of social problems, social change and social improvement to origins located in individual characteristics, *versus* locating the causes in institutional or societal origins. An example of this distinction is the attribution of unemployment to the laziness or nonadaptability of the unemployed, versus attributing it problems of world recession of inefficient management practices. In the case of the Islanders' council, the distinction is between the importance of controlling individual wrongdoers, versus the importance of setting up central planning committees, and so forth. The dimension of individualism *versus* collectivism was confirmed by factor analysis of the scales.

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*While there are problems of using a measure which relies on preference for, and agreement with, moral stage arguments, rather than a measure of elicited moral reasoning, Rest has shown that *relative* scores on the D.I.T. correlate with *relative* scores on open-ended measures of moral reasoning. (Rest, 1979). Fuller details of the method we used to measure moral stage preferences may be found in Weinreich-Haste et al., (in preparation).

There was a total of 84 items on the five scales. On 58 of these items, there were significant correlations with the moral reasoning measures. (Figure 4). *Almost without exception*, the direction of these correlations indicates that the higher the moral stage preferred, the more likely it was that the respondents would endorse beliefs or values which reflected explanations in terms of society or institutions. The lower the moral stage, the more likely was endorsement of concrete explanations located in individual attributes or actions.*

Figure 4 about here

In addition, respondents who preferred higher stage arguments also placed greater emphasis on individual rights and freedom, whereas lower stage respondents placed more weight on external controls such as a police force and strong defence, and on the "Ideal Society" measure, they showed a preference for strong, authority-based government. In other words, although the tendency was for lower stage respondents to explain and account for social issues in concrete and individualistic terms, they were not supporters of a system which gave much space for individual autonomy or decision-making; they preferred control and external constraints which restrained individual deviance. The higher the stage of the respondent, the broader the spectrum of society she could conceptualise *and* the greater need she perceived for safeguards for individual rights and autonomy.

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* For more detailed account of methods, statistical analysis etcetera, of this study see Weinreich-Haste, Cotgrove and Duff (in preparation)

Figure 4. Correlation between Moral Reasoning Scales and Social Reasoning Scales. Correlation significant at 0.01 level

A positive correlation indicates agreement by respondents who preferred lower stage moral statements; a negative correlation, agreement by respondents who preferred higher moral stage statements.

positive correlation	negative correlation
SCALE 1. Things which might have been happening to the Islanders: "How serious do you consider each problem to be?"	
	some people were beginning to take over and order others about
	lawlessness and violence
	people were concerned with their own needs, not those of the community.
SCALE 2. "What do you think the aims of the Council should be?"	
controlling individual workers	establishing social services
setting up a police system	establishing education
	ensuring individual rights and freedom
	setting up a system to deal with disputes between people
	ensuring that policy makers are responsive to the needs of all
	setting up an effective system for mutual cooperation and distribution of resources.
SCALE 3. "What do you think is important in helping to maintain social order?"	
effective policy force and law enforcement	people having a sense of individual worth
clear rules, norms and guidelines	a stable society
people wanting to conform and be accepted	tolerance on the part of individuals
most people leading ordinary, conventional lives	people being concerned for others in their community
	individual conscience
	social provision to prevent deprivation
	good material conditions, housing etcetera
	proper planning of resources and amenities
	people feeling free to work out their own moral principles
	people feeling in control of their lives
	individuals being satisfied and not greedy

Figure 4 (contd.)

positive correlation

negative correlation

SCALE 4 "What do you think is important in helping to cause unemployment?"

positive correlation

unemployed people can earn more money on social security

sickness and physical handicap among unemployed people

just bad luck

unemployed people don't try hard enough to get available jobs

lack of intelligence or ability among unemployed people

unemployed people are too fussy and proud to accept certain jobs

poor education and qualifications among unemployed people

unwillingness of unemployed people to move place to places of work

an influx of immigrants have taken up all available jobs

inability of unemployed people to adapt to new conditions

Trade Unions have priced their members out of a job

weak Trade Unions that do not fight to keep jobs

negative correlation

the policies and strategies of the present government

inefficient and less competitive industries that go bankrupt

incompetent industrial anagement with poor planning

the introduction of widespread automation

Figure 4 (contd)

SCALE 5 "How would you describe the ideal society?"

This scale was a set of bipolar statements: the pole correlating with *lower* moral stage score is printed in italics

strong law and order versus less emphasis on law and order

decisions mostly left to management versus individual has a lot to say in decisions at work

needs of the economy take precedence over individual versus individual job satisfaction more important than needs of economy

individual encouraged to look after self versus social provision of welfare

market forces and private interests predominate versus public interests and a controlled market predominate

decisions left to elected government versus individual has a say in government

experts strongly influential in complex government decisions versus ordinary citizens participating in complex government decisions

income and rewards recognise different abilities and skills versus similar incomes and rewards for everyone

restrictions on risk-taking in business versus business allowed freehand to take risks

emphasis on hard work and making money versus emphasis on living a pleasant life

recognition that many inequalities are inevitable versus attempts to overcome inequalities

strong defence forces versus attaching less importance to defence

decision-making and planning centralised versus local level decisions and planning

different, but equally important, roles for men and women versus similarity between the sexes in work and family roles

people judged on merit and achievement versus people judged on the basis of personal qualities

There was also a relationship between political party affiliation and moral stage (Figure 5). Those who supported the Conservative Party tended to have lower scores on the moral questionnaire than those who supported the Labour Party or Social Democratic/Liberal Alliance. However, the study was undertaken during the height of the popularity of the Alliance;* the current pattern may be different. Figure 5 also shows that the moral stage scores were consistently higher for the university sample, but the pattern of stage/party relationship was similar. These findings are consistent with previous studies.

Figure 5 about here

Conclusions

The two studies here presented use different methodologies, but both have produced similar results; *eliciting* reasoning about moral, social and political issues, and examining the *patterns of preference* for beliefs and explanations about these issues, both produce a consistent picture, that moral stage correlates with measures of the cognitive complexity of the individual's implicit soical theory. These are not solely measures of a logical-operational process; they are measures of the organised conceptualisati of social and interpersonal relations. These results can be interpreted as support for the model that individual generating a consistent 'theory' Such a theory describes, explains, and also generates *prescriptive* beliefs, about the ordering of one's own life and the life of the community.

This chapter has discussed two approaches. The first argued that moral reasoning is a *generic domain* of reasoning: the phenomenon under investigation is prescriptive reasoning in the moral domain. This model implicitly allows for the existence of a descriptive domain of reasoning about

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* Winter-Spring, 1981-82

Figure 5

Moral stage score and political party



* based on preferences for statements of different moral stages.

the social world. However, the focus of explanation concentrates upon how *prescriptive* reasoning is possible, and how it develops from social perspective-taking. In this model, the individual's reasoning on social and political issues and is a subcategory of, or a basic element of, moral reasoning.

The second alternative reverses this relationship, and assumes that moral reasoning is a subcategory of social reasoning. The individual develops a descriptive *and* prescriptive theory of social and interpersonal relations, and prescriptive reasoning is applied to a variety of areas without being categorised as necessarily 'moral' Much prescriptive reasoning in interpersonal relations and in more broadly political terms is instrumental: it is about the achievement of desirable ends, such as maintaining friendship, social order or attaining particular functional goals. While such instrumental reasons can be used to justify moral points, they are not *necessarily* moral in the way that perhaps deontological reasons (keeping faith, serving rights and duties, maintaining equity) are.

The data I have presented does not so far conclusively support either position; considerable developmental research needs to be done in this field. What the data does do is to demonstrate conclusively a strong relationship between stages of moral reasoning and levels of complexity in the organisation of an implicit social theory.

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Helen Weinreich-Haste

POLITISCHE, MORALISCHE UND SOZIALE URTEILSBILDUNG

Nach einer verbreiteten Erfahrung gehen wir davon aus, daß für ein Individuum der moralische Standpunkt mit dessen politischen und sozialen Überzeugungen zusammenhängt. In der Tat spricht psychologisch gesehen viel dafür, "Konservatismus" für mehr denn bloß für eine Sache der individuellen Unterstützung einer Partei zu betrachten. Verbreitet sind ferner folgende Ansichten:

- Menschen wenden **moralische** Vorschriften auf politische Zielvorstellungen sowie auf Handlungen von Politikern, Gewerkschaftlern und politisch Aktiven aller Art an,
- Menschen machen sich auf die Ursprünge des Übels in der Welt und auf die erforderlichen Mittel und Ziele zur Erreichung einer besseren Welt einen ziemlich konsistenten Reim kreuz und quer über die sehr disparaten Handlungsbereiche hinweg. Gier z.B. kann man gleichermaßen für die Primärursache für schlechte Beziehungen zwischen Nachbarn, für das Versagen der Volkswirtschaft wie für die Französische Revolution halten.

Dagegen möchte ich betonen, daß die psychologische Forschung über die Beziehungen zwischen moralischer, sozialer und politischer Urteilsbildung durch zwei Hindernisse erheblich beschränkt gewesen ist:

1. Es haben sich unterschiedliche Zugänge zur sozialen und zur politischen Urteilsbildung mit unterschiedlichen theoretischen und methodologischen Annahmnen entwickelt.
2. Forscher auf dem Gebiet der Moralentwicklung haben die traditionelle philosophische Unterscheidung zwischen deskriptiver und präskriptiver Urteilsbildung übernommen. Sie wenden diese bei der Analyse des menschlichen Denkens über moralische Urteile - m.E. allzu rigoros - an.

In diesem Aufsatz werde ich dem Zusammenhang nachgehen zwischen den Erklärungen, die Leute zur Stützung ihrer Moralurteile abgeben, und deren Erklärungen für soziale Zielvorstellungen, gesellschaftliche Ordnung sowie Bereiche der Politik. Dazu möchte ich einige Vorab-Überlegungen anstellen, einige bereits vorliegende Daten diskutieren sowie eine vorläufige modellhafte Skizze vorstellen, welche nahelegt, daß das Urteilen, das von Vertretern der kognitivistischen Entwicklungstheorie als "moralisch" klassifiziert wird, tatsächlich eine **Nebenfolge** des **sozialen** Urteilens ist. Nach dieser These ist das Individuum imstande, **moralische** Urteile abzugeben, weil es über eine **implizite soziale Theorie** verfügt. Seine implizite Sozialtheorie reflektiert die Weise, in der es sich seine unmittelbare soziale Welt, die weiteren Bereiche der Beziehungen zwischen Personen und zwischen Gruppen sowie sein Verständnis des sozialen Systems aufbaut. Zunächst möchte ich jedoch etwas zu den beiden Hindernissen ausführen.

Moral und Politik: unterschiedliche Traditionslinien

Bis vor kurzer Zeit konzentrierten sich Psychologen bei der Erforschung des Denkens über politische und soziale Handlungsbereiche (mit wenigen bemerkenswerten Ausnahmen) vorzugsweise entweder auf die Ursachen individueller Differenzen bei Wertungen oder aber auf Überzeugungssysteme bzw. Ideologien - systematisch auf die Korrelation zwischen Überzeugungen und Werthaltungen. Entwicklungspsychologen haben diese Fragestellungen in ihre Forschungen über vorgängige Sozialisationsbedingungen, die unterschiedliche Überzeugungssysteme hervorrufen, übernommen. Dagegen hat sich die Moralurteilsforschung wenig um die individuellen Differenzen bei der moralischen Bewertung und weitaus mehr um die unterstellten Begründungen und Erklärungen gekümmert, die Leute zur Unterstützung einer moralischen Ansicht einbringen. Nur bei der Untersuchung von moralischer Motivation und von Verhalten sind individuelle Differenzen als auffällig bemerkt worden.

Dieser Unterschied im Zugang zum politischen und zum moralischen Denken rührte zum Teil daher, daß das letztere hauptsächlich in das Gebiet der Entwicklungspsychologen und das erstere in das der Sozialpsychologen fiel. Die Moralurteilsforschung stand unter der Herrschaft der Theorie der kognitiven Entwicklung von Piaget und Kohlberg. Daher tendierte eine Forschung, welche die Beziehung zwischen politischem und moralischem Denken im Blick hat, dazu, eine Theorie auf die andere aufzupfropfen, so zum Beispiel bei einer Fülle von Forschungen, insbesondere in den Studien über studentischen Radikalismus, wo die Beziehungen zwischen moralischer **Stufe** und politischer **Typologie** untersucht wurden (Haan u.a. 1968; Fishkin und Keniston 1973).

Die oben erwähnten Ausnahmen sind Arbeiten im Rahmen kognitiver Entwicklungsforschung über Stufen des politischen und ökonomischen Denkens bei Kindern und Jugendlichen. Adelson und seine Kollegen wandten sich der Entwicklung von politischen Vorstellungen - damit auch von Ideen wie Gemeinschaft, Gesetz und Herrschaft - bei Jugendlichen zu (Adelson u.a. 1966, 1969; Adelson 1971). Furth hat sich die Entwicklung von Gesellschaftsvorstellungen bei Kindern vorgenommen (Furth 1978). Adelson und seine Mitarbeiter stellten einen altersspezifischen Fortschritt in der Konzeptualisierung politischer Bereiche fest. Die jüngeren Jugendlichen hielten sich an konkrete Vorstellungen über Herrschaft und bevorzugten Machtausübung und Kontrolle, konzentriert in einer Person. Die älteren verfügten über philosophische Argumente für unterschiedliche Herrschaftsformen und würdigten den Nutzen und Vorteil von partizipatorischer Demokratie als Garant für Individualrechte.

In den letzten 10 Jahren gab es eine beachtliche Expansion der kognitiven Sozialpsychologie, was besonders sichtbar wurde in der Verbreitung der Attributionsforschung. Während früher der Sozialpsychologe die Merkmale ideologischer Typologie im Blick haben mochte, beachtet er jetzt

stattdessen die Art und Weise, wie Menschen ihrer Lebenswelt einen Sinn geben und Situationserklärungen für ihre eigene Erfahrung und für die weitere soziale, politische und ökonomische Umgebung liefern. Als Beispiel für diesen Zugang sei auf die Arbeit von Furnham über Situationserklärungen für Arbeitslosigkeit verwiesen. Furnham fand drei Erklärungstypen vor: individualistische (schuld sei die arbeitslose Person), gesellschaftliche (schuld seien die gesellschaftlichen Institutionen) und fatalistische (schuld sei das Schicksal oder eine andere externe Ursache). Individuen bleiben danach konsistent bei ihrem Erklärungstyp. Außerdem wurde ein Zusammenhang zwischen Erklärungen für Arbeitslosigkeit sowie Erklärungen für andere Aspekte wie Wohlstand, Armut und Arbeitsmoral festgestellt (Furnham 1982).
In der jetzigen Situation gibt es daher kognitivistische Modelle für das soziale und politische Denken sowohl in der Sozial- als auch in der Entwicklungspsychologie. In beiden liegt der Schwerpunkt darauf, wie Individuen der Lebenswelt einen Sinn verleihen, wie sie also Situationstheorien ("lay theories") konstruieren. Ein Unterschied besteht in folgendem: der Sozialpsychologe ist hauptsächlich an der kognitiven Reaktion auf einen spezifischen Zustand bzw. auf ein Phänomen interessiert sowie daran, wieweit diese schon eine strukturierte Erklärung darstellt. Der Entwicklungspsychologe ist daran interessiert, wie derart strukturierte Erklärungen während des Verlaufs der Entwicklung zunehmend komplexer, integrierter und differenzierter werden.
Im Hinblick auf diese jüngsten theoretischen Entwicklungen können wir uns nun solchen Resultaten zuwenden, bei denen ein Zusammenhang zwischen moralischer Urteilsstufe und politischem Urteilstypus belegt wird. Wir können diese Resultate auf verschiedene Weise interpretieren:

- Zunächst könnte man meinen, daß politische Werte konsistente "Quasi-Charakterzüge" seien. Sie sind beständig und für uns von ihren Ursprüngen aus den individuellen Sozialisationsbedingungen her erklärbar. Wir können dann behaupten, daß solche Charakterzüge als Verbotsinstanzen (oder Stimuli) für moralische Entwicklung funktionieren. Allenfalls unterdrücken dann gewisse Ideologien jede Tendenz zu zunehmend komplexer Urteilsbildung.
- Im Unterschied dazu mag vielleicht eine bestimmte Weise von Erziehung gewisse Werte hervorbringen und zusätzlich die Geschwindigkeit der Entwicklung der moralischen Urteilsfähigkeit beeinflussen (Hoffman und Salzstein 1967).
- Eine dritte Interpretation fragt dagegen nach dem gemeinsamen Grund dafür, wie ein Mensch die Welt wahrnimmt: Die Moralstufe eines Individuums spiegelt dann eine eher allgemeine Orientierung über die jeweilige Situation wider, und die politische Ideologie ist dann ein Teil bzw. eine Widerspiegelung dieser Orientierung. Haans spätere Interpretation der beim sit-in der free speech movement (Berkeley im Jahre 1964) ermittelten Daten

unterstellt, daß Individuen auf unterschiedlichen moralischen Stufen die politischen Ereignisse und Argumente auch unterschiedlich wahrnehmen und auslegen (Haan 1975). Befunde aus Forschungen anderer Art legen ebenfalls Stufenunterschiede in Bezug auf Wahrnehmung nahe. In einer Studie über "Zuschauerapathie" fand McNamee folgendes heraus: Ob Leute eine Situation tatsächlich so **wahrgenommen** hatten, daß sie für Hilfe persönlich verantwortlich seien, ferner, ob sie tatsächlich der bedrängten Person geholfen hatten, hing jeweils von ihrer Moralstufe ab (McNamee 1977).

Solche Befunde würden die Position unterstützen, daß die Weise, wie ein Individuum seine sozialen Erfahrungen sowie politische Ereignisse auslegt, keineswegs von einer stabilen ideologischen Position festgelegt und bestimmt wird. Auch wenn eine bestimmte Wertorientierung über längere Zeit dauert, so könnte sich doch die Interpretation von deren Implikationen sichtlich davon unterscheiden, je nach der Moralstufe eines Individuums. Jemand mag im allgemeinen "konservativ" oder "radikal" **bleiben**, aber "Konservatismus" z.B. schließt Unterschiedliches ein, je nachdem, ob er mit einer moralischen Denkweise auf Stufe 2 oder mit einer auf Stufe 5 verbunden auftritt.

Definition des Bereichs des Moralischen

Moralentwicklungsforscher haben im ganzen die philosophische Unterscheidung zwischen "Moral"-Urteil und anderen Urteilstypen übernommen: Entsprechend dieser Unterscheidung ist das Moralurteil gekennzeichnet durch Präskriptivität, Universalisierbarkeit und ausdrückliche Verpflichtung zum Handeln. Weder **Deskriptionen** noch kontext- oder zeitgebundene **Präskriptionen** gelten daher als moralisch.

Wir wollen zunächst überlegen, was sich im Prozeß der Bildung eines Moralurteils abspielt. Der Gebrauch der hypothetischen Moraldilemmata durch Piaget und Kohlberg ist gekennzeichnet

a) durch hervorgelocktes, eher präskriptives als deskriptives Urteilen sowie

b) durch Einführung unbekannter Situationen, um so den Befragten zu zwingen, sich eher auf detaillierte und explizierte Lösungsvorschläge einzulassen als darauf, Klischees oder formelhafte Antworten zu produzieren.

Die allumfassende Voraussetzung dieser Methode besteht darin, daß die Auflösung von hypothetischen Dilemmata den üblicherweise fortschreitenden Prozeß der moralischen Urteilsbildung eines Individuums sichtbar macht. Statt ein beliebiges Moraldilemma in der von der Methodologie vorgeschriebenen Weise einfach aufzulösen, muß das Individuum zunächst ein präskriptives statement darüber abgeben, was das "richtige" Handeln ist, anders gesagt, eine moralische Position oder Meinung bestätigen. Ferner muß es für diese Position eine Rechtfertigung liefern und darüber Rechenschaft ablegen. Diese Explikation enthüllt die für ein

Individuum kennzeichnende Urteilsbildung sowie die Struktur und Komplexität von dessen gegenwärtiger kognitiv-moralischer Entwicklungsfähigkeit.
Man denke z.B. an eines der Moraldilemmata von Kohlberg: die Geschichte von Heinz, dessen Ehefrau im Sterben lag und ein Medikament benötigte, welches von einem Apotheker am gleichen Ort erfunden worden war. Heinz kann weder die hohen Kosten für die Medizin aufbringen noch den Apotheker dazu bewegen, mit dem Preis herunterzugehen. Er überlegt, ob er die Medizin stehlen soll. Oberflächlich gesehen, handelt diese Geschichte von einem Diebstahl, um ein Menschenleben zu retten - vom Konflikt Leben versus Gesetz. Es gibt auch andere Elemente in der Geschichte: die Verfügungsrechte eines Erfinders über lebensrettende Produkte, die Verpflichtung aus der Ehegattenrolle, die Funktion der Bestrafung, die Rolle des Gesetzes. Diese Geschichte ist verständlich für Zehnjährige, welche die hauptsächlichen Zielvorstellungen deutlich unterscheiden können, wenn auch in sehr einfachen Begriffen. Es fordert ebenso einen Moralphilosophen mittleren Alters heraus, welcher all die subtilen Verästelungen bemerkt. Die Geschichte erweist sich für die Messung der moralischen Urteilsentwicklung als effektiv, wegen der Variationsbreite in bezug auf Integration, Differenzierung und Komplexität, wie es sich einem beim Ringen um die Rechtfertigung für eine Lösung des Dilemmas darstellt.
Aber in welchem Umfang ist diese Urteilsbildung tatsächlich vollständig **präskriptiv**? Statt zu sagen, ob Heinz stehlen **soll** oder nicht, muß das Individuum seine Vorstellungen von Regeln über das Stehlen, die möglichen sozialen und rechtlichen Konsequenzen aus dem Diebstahl sowie aus den Beziehungen und Verpflichtungen zwischen Mann und Frau, schließlich seine Vorstellung von der Rolle eines Heilmittelerfinders darlegen. Dies sind Vorstellungen über die Beschaffenheit der Beziehungen zwischen Personen, über die Beziehung zwischen Individuum und Gesellschaft sowie über die Aufrechterhaltung der sozialen Ordnung. Es sind zunächst nicht **präskriptive** Vorstellungen, sondern Deskriptionen und Erklärungen. Das Verständnis dafür, wie interpersonelle Beziehungen funktionieren, und wie das soziale System arbeitet, ist eine Sache der kognitiven Strukturierung des **sozialen** Bewußtseins. Entsprechend der Entwicklung der kognitiven Fähigkeit eines Individuums nimmt die Komplexität der Strukturierung zu. Meines Erachtens muß von einem Individuum kein **präskriptives** statement (ganz gleich, ob moralischer, politischer oder einfach normativer Art), sondern eine locker strukturierte **Beschreibung** der sozialen Welt von der Art gefordert werden, wie sie sich aus seinem Wissen aus zweiter und seiner Erfahrung aus erster Hand zusammensetzt. Ich möchte dies die individuelle "implizite Sozialtheorie" nennen. (1)
Das Klassifikationssystem der Theorie Kohlbergs baut diese "soziale" Urteilsbildung in die **Moraltheorie** ein. Kohlbergs

Theorie, wie sie in seinem klassischen Aufsatz "From Is to Ought" (1971) formuliert wurde, besteht wesentlich darin, daß Gerechtigkeit das Herzstück der Moralität ist, und daß sich die kognitive Entwicklung des moralischen Urteilens in zunehmend integrierten, differenzierten **und** moralisch eher "adäquaten" Geltungen von **Gerechtigkeit** ausdrückt. So löst das Klassifikationssystem die Bestandteile der moralischen Urteilsbildung in Wertkategorien sowie in Elemente oder Themen der Urteilsbildung über Gerechtigkeit auf. Präskriptive statements werden entsprechend diesen Rahmenbedingungen codiert (Colby u.a. 1983).
Das präskriptive statement "du sollst nicht stehlen, weil du sonst eingesperrt wirst" ist jedoch eine Konsequenz der Deskription "wenn man stiehlt, wird man eingesperrt".
Urteile, welche faktisch eine Deskription der sozialen Welt ausdrücken, werden bestimmt in Begriffen ihrer präskriptiven Konsequenzen. Eine gescheitere Version dieses präskriptiven statements ist die folgende: "Das soziale System hängt ab von der Aufrechterhaltung effektiver Gesetze". Während dies der Ausdruck einer **Meinung** ist, und zwar in dem Sinne, daß es auch angefochten werden kann, hat es jedoch faktischen Status für das Individuum. Dessen persönliche "implizite Sozialtheorie" hält dies für selbstverständlich wahr. Solche partikulären Deskriptionen erzeugen unterschiedliche präskriptive Konklusionen: "Man sollte dem Gesetz folgen, weil wir sonst ein Chaos bekommen"; "Gesetzesbrecher sollten bestraft werden, um ein Exempel zu statuieren"; "Als guter Bürger sollte man die Gesetze einhalten, welche den gemeinsamen Interessen dienen". So erhält die Klassifizierung von moralischen statements, welche durch die Kohlberg-Dilemmata erzeugt werden, Struktur und Niveau der Komplexität in bezug auf die zugrundeliegende soziale Erklärung dadurch, daß die präskriptiven statements analysiert werden. Weil jedoch herkömmlicherweise die bestimmenden Merkmale des Moralurteils präskriptiv sein müssen, legt die Theorie nicht offen, daß die zugrundeliegende Theorie oder Struktur des Denkens eines Individuums wesentlich erklärend und **deskriptiv** ist.

Zum Zusammenhang zwischen moralischer Urteilsbildung und anderen Urteilsformen

Nun gibt es eine Fülle von Nachweisen, wenigstens in bezug auf die ersten vier Stufen, für zunehmende Integration und Differenzierung bei solchen Urteilen, welche der Auflösung moralischer Dilemmata dienen. Entsprechend dem herrschenden Modell verhält sich die moralische Urteilsbildung zur außermoralischen wie folgt (vgl. Schema 1): Es entwickeln sich **logische Operationen**, und das ermöglicht die Entwicklung von **sozialer Rollenübernahme**, also die kognitive Fähigkeit, die Position der Anderen aktuell oder hypothetisch einzunehmen, die an der Situation beteiligt sind. Dies ist eine **notwendige**, jedoch nicht **hinreichende** Bedingung für das Individuum zur Entwicklung einer moralischen Perspektive, d.h. einer Fähigkeit, die relativen Ansprüche und Positionen von signifikanten Personen oder Gruppen gegeneinander abzuwägen, um zu einer "gerechten" Lösung zu kommen. Die Stufen der Übernahme einer sozialen Perspektive, daher auch möglicherweise die Stufen der moralischen Urteilsbildung, spiegeln den zunehmenden Stellenwert von signifikanten Anderen wider, welche in die Konzeptualisierung der Situation einbezogen werden (Kuhn u.a. 1977; Walker 1980; Colby u.a. 1983).

Angenommene Sequenz von notwendigen und hinreichenden Bedingungen für Entwicklung in einzelnen Bereichen der Urteilsbildung

SCHEMA 1: Das geläufige Modell

logische Operationen (Piaget)
↓
soziale Perspektivenübernahme (Selman, Walker)
↓
(Ich-Entwicklung)* (Loevinger,Erickson)
↓
moralische Urteilsbildung (Kohlberg)
↓
politische Urteilsbildung (Haan u.a.)

* Die Zuordnung von Stufen der Ich-Entwicklung zu Moralstufen gilt allerdings nicht als gesichert

SCHEMA 2: Modellvorschlag

logische Operationen

↓

soziale Perspektivenübernahme

↓

moralische/soziale/politische Urteilsbildung
- Regeln
- Rollen
- Verantwortlichkeit
- Sozialbeziehungen
- Handlungsgründe
- Begriffe des "Guten"
- Erklärungen für soziale Ordnung etc.

} "implizite Sozialtheorie"

Wie schon erörtert, wurde in Forschungen über politisches Verhalten und über die Konzeptualisierung des Politischen ein Zusammenhang nachgewiesen zwischen den dominanten moralischen Themen auf besonderen Stufen und dem je nach politischer Richtung unterschiedlichen Argumentieren und Verhalten. Die Interpretation dieser Ergebnisse legt die Annahme nahe, daß moralische Urteilsbildung im Feld des politischen Kampfes **Anwendung** findet. Die Entwicklung der politischen Urteilsbildung ist danach gewissermaßen eine **Folge** der Entwicklung der moralischen Urteilsbildung. Solch eine Interpretation setzt voraus, daß moralisches Urteilen und moralische Prozesse nur Teile eines zu definierenden besonderen Bereichs sind (definiert durch das präskriptive Urteil und dessen begleitende Rechtfertigungen). Moralentwicklung hat ihre eigenen unterscheidbaren Parameter und Entwicklungsprozesse. Es gibt gewisse empirisch begründete vorgängige Bedingungen, die dafür notwendig sind, daß Entwicklung überhaupt stattfindet. Es kommen auch bestimmte Korrelate zur Ebene des moralischen Urteils vor, welche die Schlußfolgerung möglich machen, daß die Entwicklung moralischen Urteilens eher stattfinden muß als die Entwicklung oder Äußerung dieser korrelativen Attribute. Aber angenommen, wir suchen eine mögliche alternative theoretische Position, die sich auf mein obengenanntes Argument gründet, daß das Moraldilemma tatsächlich ein sehr effektives Instrument ist, um aus einem Individuum dessen **implizite Sozialtheorie** hervorzulocken, dann enthüllen die präskriptiven Antworten eine zugrundeliegende deskriptive Strukturierung beim individuellen Aufbau der eigenen sozialen Welt. Die implizite Sozialtheorie ist ein strukturiertes Auslegungssystem, bestehend aus einer Deskription von Regeln, Rollen sowie Sozialbeziehungen, wodurch ein Individuum zur Bildung präskriptiver Urteile befähigt wird.

wenn es auf Situationserfordernisse antwortet. Diese Präskriptionen kann man "moralisch", "sozio-normativ" oder "politisch" nennen, je nach Kontextabhängigkeit, in der sie herausgelockt werden (dieses Modell ist dargestellt in Schema 2).

Gehen wir aus vom gegenwärtig verfügbaren gesicherten Wissen über den Aufbau der moralischen Urteilsbildung und über deren Korrelate, so wird klar, daß die Entwicklung der individuellen **impliziten Sozialtheorie** von der Entwicklung logischen Operierens und sozialer Rollenübernahme abhängen muß, aber auch von der Bildung von Interpretationsschemata für die inneren Zusammenhänge zwischen individuellem Handeln und sozialem System.

Statt nun die Möglichkeit einer der moralischen Urteilsbildung übergeordneten impliziten Sozialtheorie zu untersuchen, müssen wir die Konsistenz eines konstruktivistischen Vorgehens nachweisen, das nicht an präskriptive Beurteilungsfragen bei hypothetischen Moraldilemmata gebunden ist. Ein paar vorläufige Nachweise stammen aus unserem britischen Projekt über die Beziehungen zwischen sozialer, moralischer und politischer Urteilsbildung (2).

Das britische Forschungsprojekt

Das Vorhaben war in zwei Teile gegliedert. Zunächst führten wir ein Interview mit vierzig 17 - 21 Jahre alten Schülern und Studenten durch. Sodann konstruierten wir eine Fragebogenliste mit den gleichen Beurteilungsbereichen, mit denen 1700 Schüler und Studenten konfrontiert wurden. Die erste Teilstudie erbrachte eine qualitative Analyse des Prozesses der Urteilsbildung über soziale, moralische und politische Zielvorstellungen. Die zweite diente als quantitativer Test für das Verhältnis zwischen den einzelnen bereichsspezifischen Urteilstypen.

Im Interview wurden den Befragten zwei hypothetisch konstruierte Probleme präsentiert, ferner eine Reihe von Fragen über persönliche moralische Krisen, über Interessen an sozialen Problemen sowie über vorgeschlagene Lösungsversuche für soziale Krisen. Das Interview ermittelte, wie ein Individuum seine Beziehungen mit anderen sowie das soziale System auslegt. Als derart konstruierte Maßstäbe dienten neben Kohlbergs Heinz-Dilemmata auch eine Version von Adelsons Meßinstrument für politisches Verständnis. Hierbei wurden die Befragten aufgefordert, sich Probleme zu überlegen, die sich für ca. 1000 Menschen ergeben könnten, welche auf einer Insel ausgesetzt werden, und zwar folgender Art: Was für ein politisches System wäre für die Inselbewohner erstrebenswert? Mit was für Problemen sollte sich ein einflußreiches Regierungsgremium beschäftigen? In der Fragebogenform für diese Meßinstrumente wurden Punkt für Punkt auf einer Skala Optionen präsentiert, welche aus den Interviews hervorgegangen waren. Zusätzlich wurden ähnlich konstruierte Skalen für allgemeinere Zielvorstellungen in bezug auf soziale Wertung und gesellschaftliche

Ordnung verwendet: Eine Skala bezog sich auf Attributionen zu Faktoren, welche die gesellschaftliche Ordnung aufrechterhalten, eine andere auf Ziele einer "idealen" Gesellschaft (entwickelt von Cotgrove und Duff - Cotgrove 1982), eine dritte diente als Meßinstrument nach Furnham für Attributionen zu Ursachen von Arbeitslosigkeit.

Die Entwicklung eines Klassifikationsrahmens lief so: ausgewählte Interviews wurden themenspezifisch, je nachdem, ob sie die soziale und politische Urteilsbildung berühren, sortiert. Innerhalb eines Themas wurden die Antworten klassifiziert nach den wesentlichen Kriterien, welche bei der Zieldiskussion verwendet wurden. Vier Ebenen von "sozial-kognitiver Komplexität" gingen aus dieser Analyse hervor (vgl. Tabelle 2 im Anhang dieses Bandes). Anschließend wurde jeder Befragte klassifiziert in bezug auf jedes Thema. Dann wurden die interthematischen Korrelationen sowie die Korrelation zwischen den durchschnittlichen Punktzahlen zu den Themen und der Punktzahl aus den Heinz-Dilemmata ermittelt.

Beachten wir zunächst zwei Beispiele für die Art der Konsistenz einer impliziten Sozialtheorie, wie sie in den Interviews auftaucht. Zunächst Robert, welcher bei allen Einstufungen weit unten lag:

(Gibt es etwas, was dich in bezug auf die Zukunft des gesamten Landes sorgt?)

Nun, ich denk' daruber nach, aber hab' eigentlich keine Sorge. Das rollt doch alles von selbst ab. Ich bin deswegen doch kein Angsthase.

(Was sind nach deiner Meinung die schlimmsten Übel der heutigen Gesellschaft?)

Ich meine: Gewalt, Kriege und so was. Darum mach' ich mir keine Sorgen, aber wenn man daran denkt, ist das nicht sehr schön.

(Was führt nach deiner Meinung zur Gewalt?)

Da meine ich, daß es echt die Natur des Menschen ist. Tierische Instinkte. Daher kommt's, daß wir töten müssen, um selbst zu leben... Ich meine, Gewalt gehört dazu, um Ordnung zu halten. Ich meine, wenn die Polizei nicht manchmal mit Gewalt vorgeht, würden sie total überrannt. Als vor vielen Jahren die Könige ihre Reiche errichteten, haben sie Gewalt angewendet.

(Was sind nach deiner Meinung die Hauptursachen für Verbrechen?)

Das kommt alles aus der menschlichen Natur, meine ich. Gier, meine ich, es kann auch eine Geisteskrankheit sein, die die Menschen verbrecherisch macht.

- Zu den Inselbewohnern:

(Was würde alles nach deiner Meinung passieren?)

Verbrechen und Diebstahl. Ein Bauer braucht vieleicht Dinge und kann sie nicht kriegen, also klaut er sie von irgendeinem anderen Hof. Vieleicht auch mit Gewalt. Streitigkeiten würden entstehen und Gewalt da reinbringen.

(Wie sollten die Inselbewohner am besten mit der Situation

fertig werden?)
Sie müßten eine Regierung einsetzen und Gesetze machen, so daß jeder auf der Insel nach einem gleichmäßigen Standard lebt - ich meine, eine Person denkt vielleicht, Stehlen ist richtig, und eine andere denkt, daß das falsch ist. Darum sollten sie sich alle an das Gleiche halten.

Im Gegensatz dazu nun Auszüge aus einem Interview mit Colin, einem Befragten mit jeweils hoher Punktzahl:

(Kannst du mir sagen, was dir über die Zukunft dieses Landes am meisten Sorgen macht?)
Die ökonomischen Aussichten sehen nicht besonders rosig aus im Moment. Ich meine, da gibt es eine große Gefahr von Disharmonie in unserem Lande, wenn die Rezession weiter anhält. Für den Moment scheint es nicht allzu gefährlich zu sein, aber wenn das so anhält, dann kann es mächtige soziale Unruhen geben. Es könnte Probleme geben mit den verschiedenen Richtungen.
(Was sind nach deiner Meinung Ursachen dafür?)
Ich meine, in jeder Kultur, wenn man den Westen als Ganzes als eine Form von Kultur nimmt, gibt's so etwas: wenn sie eine Art Gipfel erreicht, fängt auch schon der Verfall an. Mit jedem großen Reich, z.B. dem Römischen Reich, war es so, es erreichte eine Höhe und dann tendierte es irgendwie dazu, zu degenerieren. Das kann ebenso im Westen, meine ich, schon passiert sein.
(Wie wichtig ist nach deiner Meinung das individuelle Gewissen, um die soziale Ordnung aufrechtzuerhalten?)
Das ist sehr wichtig, das Gesetz kann nicht die individuellen Handlungen lenken... Wenn man sich so eine Art sozialer Ordnung zulegt, dann muß es so etwas wie einen Grad von Kooperation zwischen Leuten geben, und daher müssen sie so eine Art Moralität haben, die den meisten Menschen geläufig ist.

- Zu den Inselbewohnern:
(Was würde alles nach deiner Meinung passieren?)
Gut, wenn die Leute unterschiedliche Sorten von Gütern produzieren, dann, nehmen wir an, muß es so einen Grad von Kooperation geben, um diese Güter aufzuteilen, weil meines Erachtens die Leute nicht alles, was sie brauchen, selbst produzieren können. Alle Leute haben unterschiedliche spezielle Fähigkeiten, um unterschiedliche Leistungen zu bringen, und angenommen, sie würden solche Sachen gegen andere Güter tauschen, dann muß so eine Art Werteinheit für verschiedene Güter eingeführt werden... So eine Art unparteiisches Komitee würde, meine ich, nötig sein.

Ein bedeutender Unterschied zwischen diesen beiden Auszügen aus Gesprächsabläufen ist gewiß das Niveau der Wortwahl. Die Unterschiede, die ich betonen möchte, betreffen jedoch die Komplexität bei der Strukturierung von Vorstellungen und den Grad des Verständnisses vom sozialen System, wie es hier ausgelegt wird. Robert ordnet zumeist die Ursachen für Probleme sowie die Lösungen den individu-

ellen Charakterzügen zu und beschreibt Lösungen durch Zwang und Kontrolle über Individuen. Er nimmt an, daß die Inselbewohner interpersonelle Streitereien erleiden würden, die aus dem Widerstreit der individuellen Bedürfnisse entstehen. Robert sieht nicht die Gemeinschaft als ganze; er sieht nur Individuen. Die Regierung muß Gesetze zur Kontrolle individueller Übergriffe erlassen. Im Gegensatz dazu hat Colin einen breiteren sozialen Überblick, der eine historische Perspektive einschließt. Ökonomische, gesellschaftliche und geschichtliche Kräfte tragen zu den Ursachen und Lösungen von Problemen bei. Das Individuum wird gesehen als Teil des sozialen Systems. So sieht er, daß die Inselbewohner ein kooperatives **System** benötigen, nicht bloß ein kooperatives **Verhalten**, um eine effektive Verteilung von Gütern und Ressourcen sicherzustellen.
Die Unterscheidung zwischen einer Vorstellung, die auf Etikette beruht, und solchen, die in interpersonaler Zusammenarbeit der Gemeinschaft gründen, war auch auffällig bei den Stellungnahmen der beiden jungen Männer zum Thema "Verantwortlichkeit für andere":

(Robert) Ich meine nicht, daß man sich bei denen allzu sehr einmischen oder ihnen körperlich oder geistig wehtun sollte. Ich meine, man sollte für seine eigenen Handlungen zuerst verantwortlich sein, sich nicht um andere Leute Sorgen machen. Wenn du dich zu sehr um sie sorgst und darüber dich selbst vergißt, das geht nicht, echt.

(Colin) Wenn dir deine (Eltern und Freunde) vorschlagen, irgendwas zu machen, und du bist damit nicht einverstanden, wenn du meinst, sie hätten an den Konsequenzen schwer zu tragen, dann, meine ich, liegt die Verantwortlichkeit bei dir, deine Ansicht durchzusetzen und unter Umständen zu sagen, daß sie sich falsch verhalten oder den falschen Weg gehen.

Robert erreichte Stufe 2 bis 3 in den Heinz-Dilemmata, Colin Stufe 4 (mit Tendenz nach 5). Der folgende Auszug macht die Unterschiede in bezug auf die Konzeptualisierung von Gesetz und Strafe spürbar und legt offen, wie diese in Beziehung gesehen werden können zur oben beschriebenen sozial-kognitiven Urteilsbildung:

Robert
(Meinst du, daß die Leute dem Gesetz gehorchen sollen?)
Ja, gewöhnlich schon. Wenn keiner dem Gesetz gehorchen würde, dann hätte es keinen Zweck, das Gesetz so hoch zu halten.
(Sollte Heinz bestraft werden?)
Ja, weil er das Gesetz verletzt hat. Er hat etwas falsch gemacht. Auch wenn das wirklich nicht so zu sein scheint. Wenn irgend jemand da rein geht und das Medikament stiehlt, um es zu verkaufen, dann ist das überhaupt nicht schlechter als es momentan zu stehlen, um es gleich zu gebrauchen. Das ist dasselbe.

(Warum sollte er bestraft werden?)
Weil damit die Leute zunächst einmal gehindert werden, Verbrechen zu begehen.

Colin
(Meinst du, daß die Leute dem Gesetz gehorchen sollen?)
Wenn das Gesetz korrekt ist, ja. Ja, ich meine, das Gesetz ist zum Allgemeinwohl der Gesellschaft gemacht. Offensichtlich können wir mit einem Gesetz, das jedem zu jeder Zeit nützt, gar nichts anfangen. Man muß möglichst das Beste für eine möglichst große Zahl von Leuten erreichen. Ich meine, die Leute sollten dem Gesetz gehorchen oder zumindest versuchen, es mit demokratischen Mitteln zu ändern.
(Sollte Heinz bestraft werden?)
Ja, vielleicht eine symbolische Strafe, um zu zeigen, daß das Gesetz aufrechterhalten worden ist. Aber das würde keine große Härte bedeuten.

Robert konzentriert sich auf die kontrollierende, reguläre Funktion des Gesetzes sowie auf die Konsequenz für den individuellen Übeltäter bei Überschreitung. Colin erfaßt die Funktion des Gesetzes als einen Kodex oder eine Abfolge von Richtlinien, welche Teil des sozialen Gefüges sind, und Strafen eher als Bestandteil des juristischen Verfahrens und nicht so sehr als simples Abschreckungsmittel für Individuen.
Es wurden im Interview 15 Fragen über persönliche, soziale und politische Zielvorstellungen gestellt, dabei auch die Fragen über die Inselbewohner. Daraus wurden die vier Ebenen der sozial-kognitiven Urteilsbildung abgeleitet (vgl. Tabelle 2 im Anhang dieses Bandes). Die vier Ebenen demonstrieren eine zunehmende Komplexität in der Konzeptualisierung der sozialen Welt. Die erste Ebene stellt eine Vorstellung vom sozialen System dar, welches sich von individuellen Charakterzügen sowie individuellen Formen des Sich-Änderns und des Sich-Zusammennehmens ableitet; diese bleibt grundlegend konkret und nicht reziprok. Die abschließende Ebene bildet eine Vorstellung, welche Beziehungen sowohl zwischen Menschen als auch zwischen Gesellschaften in Betracht zieht, Beziehungen zwischen diesen als reziprok begreift. Diese Ebene enthält ansatzweise die Vorstellung von einer umfassenden soziologisch-historischen Metatheorie und reflektiert gleichermaßen die Fähigkeit des Individuums, sich auch außerhalb der Grenzen der eigenen unmittelbaren kulturellen Erfahrung Gedanken zu machen. Die Ebenen folgen den gleichen allgemeinen Entwicklungssequenzen, wie sie in den strukturellen Einstufungsmethoden von Kohlbergs Moraldilemmata, in Adelsons Stufen der politischen Urteilsbildung und in Habermas' Stufenintegration für die Moral- und Ich-Entwicklung im Rahmen eines Modells kommunikativen Handelns Ausdruck finden (Habermas 1979).
Die Korrelationsberechnung zwischen Einstufungen mit Kohl-

berg-Dilemmata und Einstufungen nach den Maßen sozialkognitiver Urteilsbildung im Interviewmaterial ergab r=.45. Unseres Erachtens handelt es sich hier noch um eine Pilotstudie: Beträchtlich mehr muß geleistet werden, um sowohl die Meßinstrumente wie auch die Analyse noch zu verfeinern. Im übrigen läßt die Altershomogenität unter den Befragten den Zweifel zu, ob wir auf dieser Stufe schon vom Nachweis der Veränderung durch "Entwicklung" reden können. Hingegen legen die Ergebnisse eine strenge Stufen-Struktur-Konsistenz sogar innerhalb einer homogenen Altersgruppe nahe.

Beschäftigen wir uns nun mit den quantitativen Ergebnissen des Fragebogens, der 900 Schülern im Alter von 17 Jahren vorgelegt wurde. Als Meßinstrumente für moralische Urteilsbildung dienten drei Abfolgen von Skalen, welche das Heinz-Dilemma auf die Probleme Diebstahl, Bestrafung sowie auf die Position des Apothekers beziehen. Diese Skalen wurden auf ähnliche, aber nicht gleiche Weise gestaltet wie die Meßinstrumente in Rests Defining Issues Test (3). Es gab fünf aufgelistete Skalen über Zielvorstellungen von gesellschaftlichen Überzeugungen und Werten. Diese Skalen umfaßten:

(1) einen Maßstab für Ziele einer "idealen" Gesellschaft

(2) die wahrgenommene Dringlichkeit von Problemen, die sich den Inselbewohnern stellen könnten

(3) die wünschbaren Aufgaben für ein Gremium der Inselbewohner

(4) die Faktoren, welche als wichtig für die Aufrechterhaltung der sozialen Ordnung wahrgenommen wurden, und

(5) die wahrgenommenen Gründe für Arbeitslosigkeit.

Außerdem wurde bei den Befragten ermittelt, welche politische Partei den von ihnen für Britannien erwünschten Zielsetzungen am nächsten kommt.

Die Skalen wurden zur Ausdifferenzierung der Dimension **"Individualismus versus Kollektivismus"** konstruiert: m.a.W., die Zuschreibung von sozialen Problemen, sozialem Wandel und sozialem Fortschritt zu Ursprüngen, die in individuellen Charakterzügen angesiedelt sind **versus** Zuordnung der Gründe zu institutionellen oder gesellschaftlichen Ursachen. Zum Beispiel unterscheidet sich die Zuschreibung von Arbeitslosigkeit zur Faulheit bzw. Unangepaßtheit der Arbeitslosen einerseits von deren Zuordnung zu Problemen wie weltweite Rezession bzw. ineffektive Praktiken des Managements andererseits. Im Beispiel des Gremiums für die Inselbewohner besteht die Unterscheidung in folgendem: Relevanz der Kontrolle von individuellen Übeltätern versus Relevanz der Errichtung zentraler Planungskomitees, usw. Die Dimension Individualismus **versus** Kollektivismus bewährte sich auch bei der Faktorenanalyse der Skalen.

Es gab insgesamt 84 items auf den fünf Skalen. Bei 58 dieser items gab es signifikante Korrelationen mit den Maßstäben für moralische Urteilsbildung (vgl. Tabelle 3 im Anhang dieses Bandes). **Fast ausnahmslos** indiziert die

Tendenz dieser Korrelationen folgendes: Je höher die Präferenz für eine Moralstufe liegt, desto wahrscheinlicher ist es, daß die Befragten solche Überzeugungen oder Werte unterstützen, die auch Erklärungen in Begriffen von Gesellschaft oder Institutionen widerspiegeln. Je niedriger die Moralstufe ist, desto wahrscheinlicher ist die Unterstützung für konkrete Erklärungen, die in individuellen Merkmalen oder Handlungen angesiedelt sind (4).

Im übrigen betonten Befragte, welche Argumente höherer Stufen bevorzugten, auch stärker individuelle Rechte und Freiheiten, während Befragte auf niedriger Stufe ein größeres Gewicht auf externe Kontrollen (Polizeikräfte, strenge Bewachung) legten. Am Maßstab "ideale Gesellschaft" zeigte sich auch eine Präferenz für strenge, auf Autorität gegründete Regierung. Anders gesagt, obgleich Befragte auf niedriger Stufe soziale Zielvorstellungen tendenziell in konkreten und individualistischen Begriffen erklärten und rechtfertigten, befürworteten sie jedoch nicht ein System, welches individueller Autonomie oder Entscheidung einen großen Spielraum gewährt. Sie bevorzugten Kontrolle und externe Zwänge zur Einschränkung von individuellem Verstoß. Je höher eine (ein) Befragte(r) eingestuft wurde, desto umfassender war sie/er imstande, das gesellschaftliche Spektrum zu konzeptualisieren, und desto stärker zeigte sich das von ihr/ihm wahrgenommene Bedürfnis nach Garantien für individuelle Rechte und Autonomie.

Ebenso gibt es einen Zusammenhang zwischen parteipolitischer Präferenz und Moralstufe (vgl. Schema 3). Diejenigen, welche die konservative Partei unterstützten, erreichten tendenziell niedrigere Ergebnisse beim Moral-Fragebogen als diejenigen, welche die Labour Party oder die sozialdemokratisch/liberale Allianz unterstützten. Das Forschungsprojekt wurde allerdings auf dem Gipfel der Popularität der Allianz (Winter/Frühjahr 1981/1982) durchgeführt. Vielleicht würde eine gegenwärtig erstellte Tabelle davon abweichen. Schema 3 zeigt, daß die Punktergebnisse bei der Moraleinstufung in der Universitätsbefragung konsistent höher lagen. Dennoch erwies sich das Verhältnis zwischen Stufe und Parteipräferenz in beiden Fällen als ähnlich. Diese Ergebnisse stimmen mit früheren Studien überein.

SCHEMA 3: Punktwert nach Moralstufe je nach parteipolitischer Präferenz



*ermittelt nach Präferenzen für statements auf unterschiedlichen Moralstufen

Ergebnisse
Die beiden hier vorgestellten Projekte verwenden unterschiedliche Methodologien, sind jedoch zu ähnlichen Resultaten gelangt. Sowohl die Hervorlockung von Urteilen über moralische, soziale und politische Zielvorstellungen als auch die Ermittlung von Präferenzmodellen für Überzeugungen und Erklärungen in bezug auf diese Zielvorstellungen sind Methoden, die beide konsistent den Anschein erwecken, als ob die Moralstufe mit dem Maßstab für die kognitive Komplexität der impliziten Sozialtheorie eines Individuums korreliert. Es handelt sich hier um Maßstäbe nicht nur für Prozesse logischer Operationen, sondern auch für strukturierte Konzeptualisierung von sozialen und interpersonellen Beziehungen. Diese Resultate können als Beleg für das

Modell interpretiert werden, daß ein Individuum eine konsistente "Theorie" erzeugt. Solch eine Theorie beschreibt, erklärt und erzeugt auch **präskriptive** Überzeugungen davon, was jemand in seinem eigenen Leben und im Gemeinschaftsleben zu regeln hat.

In diesem Aufsatz wurden zwei Herangehensweisen diskutiert. Bei der ersten wurde ausgeführt, daß moralisches Urteilen einen **generellen Bereich** von Urteilsbildung ausmacht: Das zu erforschende Phänomen ist das der präskriptiven Urteilsbildung im Bereich des Moralischen. Dieses Modell berücksichtigt implizit die Existenz eines deskriptiven Bereiches von Urteilsbildung über die soziale Welt. Der Schwerpunkt der Erklärung konzentriert sich jedoch darauf, wie **präskriptive** Urteilsbildung möglich ist, und wie diese sich mit der Übernahme einer sozialen Perspektive entwickelt. In diesem Modell ist das individuelle Urteilen über soziale und politische Zielvorstellungen eine Unterkategorie oder ein Basiselement von moralischer Urteilsbildung.
Die zweite Alternative kehrt dieses Verhältnis um und setzt voraus, daß moralisches Urteilen eine Unterkategorie von sozialer Urteilsbildung ist. Das Individuum entwickelt eine deskriptive **und** präskriptive Theorie von sozialen und interpersonellen Beziehungen. Und präskriptives Urteilen findet bei einer Vielzahl von Bereichen Anwendung, ohne notwendigerweise als "moralisch" kategorisiert zu werden. Viele präskriptive Urteile über interpersonelle Beziehungen und über umfassendere politische Verhältnisse vollziehen sich instrumentell: Sie dienen der Erreichung wünschbarer Ziele, wie z.B. der Aufrechterhaltung von Freundschaft, sozialer Ordnung oder der Verwirklichung von dafür besonders dienlichen Vorsätzen. Während solche instrumentelle Begründungen zwar benutzt werden können, um moralische Standpunkte zu rechtfertigen, sind sie doch nicht **notwendigerweise** so moralisch wie vielleicht deontologische Begründungen (Einhaltung von Versprechen, Beachtung von Rechten und Pflichten, Wahrung des Fairneßprinzips).
Die Daten, die ich vorgestellt habe, unterstützen keineswegs ausschließlich eine der beiden Positionen; es müssen noch beträchtliche Untersuchungen zum Problem von Entwicklung in diesem Bereich durchgeführt werden. Allerdings belegen die Daten ohne jeden Zweifel eine enge Beziehung zwischen den Stufen des moralischen Urteilens und den Ebenen der Komplexität bei der Strukturierung einer impliziten Sozialtheorie.

Anmerkungen

1) Diese Erörterungen sind weiter ausgeführt worden in: Weinreich-Haste/Locke 1983

2) S.F. Cotgrove, H. Weinreich-Haste und A. Duff, mit

Unterstützung des Social Science Research Council 1980-82

3) Es gibt zwar mehr Probleme bei der Verwendung eines Meßinstrumentes, das sich auf die Präferenz für bzw. auf die Zustimmung zu stufenspezifischen Moralargumenten stützt, als bei der Verwendung eines Meßinstrumentes für hervorgelockte Moralbeurteilung. Gleichwohl hat Rest gezeigt, daß die **relativen** D.I.T.-Einstufungen mit den **relativen** Einstufungen in Meßinstrumenten für Moralbeurteilung mit offenen Interviews korrelieren (Rest 1979). Weitere Einzelheiten über die von uns verwendete Methode zur Messung von Präferenzen für Moralstufen in: Weinreich-Haste u.a. (in Vorbereitung)

4) Weitere genauere Ausführungen über Methoden, statistische Auswertung etc. dieses Projekts vgl. Weinreich-Haste, Cotgrove und Duff (in Vorbereitung)

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Tabelle 2 - Ebenen der sozialen Urteilsbildung (nach Weinreich-Haste)

Ebene	gesellschaftliche Ordnung		sozialer Wandel	persönl. Verantwortung Persönlichkeitsmerkmale	Problem im "Inselbeispiel"
	Erhaltung	Störungsursachen			
Ebene I konkret individuell	Kontrolle des Individuums, Recht und Ordnung streng, Zwänge, Polizeisystem, Bestrafung	individueller Verstoß, Fehlverhalten, Schwäche, Ausfall strenger Kontrollen	kein echtes Verständnis für sozialen Wandel	physische und charakterliche Konzentration, Vermeidung von Sünden, Verbrechen Orientierung an eigenem Überleben und Wohlergehen	Problembezug auf individuelle Abweichung oder Selbstsucht, Wunsch nach eigener Besserung und nach strengen Kontrollen, Autorität
Ebene II interpersonell-dyadisch	klare Regeln und Richtlinien, interpersonelle Sanktionen, Konformitätsdruck und Verlangen nach Konformität, Akzeptiertwerden von Gleichgestellten	Mangel an Interesse an anderen, Fehlen von "interpersonellen" Werten, Mangel an Konformität mit sozialen Regeln	Individuelle Änderung (z.B. Willenskraft, Persönlichkeit) führt zu sozialem Wandel, geringer Grad kollektiver Aktion in Form von Appell an Autorität	interpersonelle Qualitäten, Übernahme von Rollen und Erwartungen, die von Gleichgestellten aufgesetzt werden, Vervollkommnung persönlicher Werte, Interesse an anderen in unmittelbarer Bekanntschaft	Fehlendes Interesse an anderen, Bedürfnis nach guter Nachbarschaftlichkeit, Stiftung von Harmonie zwischen Individuen durch Verhandlung
Ebene III gemeinschaftlich - kollektiv	normative Regeln und konsensuelle Ehrenkodices, Gemeinschaft und soziale Institutionen fair, gerecht und partizipatorisch, verbreitetes Bewußtsein von Gemeinschaftlichkeit, einschl. der eigenen Rollenbestimmung, Kooperation	fehlende Gemeinschaftsbindungen, desorganisiertes soziales System, Fehlen von Anreizen oder Mechanismen für Kooperation und Wechselseitigkeit	Kollektives Handeln, organisierte pressure groups, Einsicht in die Rolle von Institutionen und konsensuellen sozialen Kräften bei der Bewirkung sozialen Wandels	Interpersonelle Verantwortung als Teil der Gemeinschaft, Bedürfnis nach Anpassungsfähigkeit an soziale Bedingungen, Vertrauen bzw. andere Qualitäten, die eine Veränderungspraxis möglich machen	Gemeinschaftsbedürfnisse, gemeinsame Politik und Aktion, um eine konsensuelle Gemeinschaft zu stiften und zu erhalten
Ebene IV systemisch	systematische Organisation eines Rechtssystems, Vorsorge für Wohlfahrt, Erziehung etc., Bedeutung individueller Freiheit und Grundrechte	soziale und ökonomische Ungleichheit, Deprivation, fehlende Bedeutung des Werts der Persönlichkeit, Zusammenbruch der sozialen Ordnung	Berücksichtigung des sozio-ökonomischen Faktors beim sozialen Wandel	Anerkennung wechselseitiger Abhängigkeit zwischen einem selbst und der Gesamtgesellschaft, Bedeutung des Eingehens von Verpflichtungen gegenüber Prinzipien und anderen Menschen, Selbstbestimmung	Bedürfnis nach System mit Zukunftsorientierung, übergeordneten Zielen, Organisierung von Ressourcen, Vorsorge für Wohlfahrt etc., Schutz von individuellen Rechten und von Autonomie

(vgl. Weinreich-Haste: in diesem Band)

Tabelle 3: Korrelation zwischen Skalen moralischen Urteils und Skalen sozialen Urteilens

(nach Weinreich-Haste; Korrelationen signifikant auf einem .01 level)

SKALA 1: "Wie würdest Du die ideale Gesellschaft beschreiben?" (Insel-Beispiel nach Adelson)
(Diese Skala besteht aus einem set von bipolaren statements: Der Pol, der mit einer niedrigeren moralischen Stufe korreliert, ist jeweils zuerst genannt)

- "Gesetz und Ordnung streng" vs. "geringere Betonung von Gesetz und Ordnung"
- "Entscheidungen zumeist dem Management überlassen" vs. "Individuum hat bei anstehenden Entscheidungen viel zu sagen"
- "ökonomische Zwänge vorrangig gegenüber individuellen Bedürfnissen" vs. "individuelle Berufszufriedenheit wichtiger als ökonomische Zwänge"
- "Anreiz für das Individuum, sich um sich selbst zu kümmern" vs. "soziale Vorsorge für Wohlfahrt"
- "Kräfte des Marktes und Privatinteressen vorherrschend" vs. "öffentliches Interesse und ein kontrollierter Markt vorherrschend"
- "Entscheidungen der gewählten Regierung überlassen" vs. "Individuum hat Einfluß auf die Regierung"
- "großer Experteneinfluß bei komplexen Regierungsentscheidungen" vs. "Partizipation einfacher Bürger bei komplexen Regierungsentscheidungen"
- "durch Einkommen und Entschädigungen werden unterschiedliche Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten anerkannt" vs. "untereinander angeglichene Einkommen und Entschädigungen für jeden"
- "Einschränkungen bei der Übernahme geschäftlicher Risiken" vs. "freie Hand für geschäftliches Risiko"
- "Betonung von harter Arbeit und Geldverdienen" vs. "Betonung auf angenehmem Leben"
- "Anerkennung, daß viele Ungleichheiten unvermeidbar sind" vs. "Versuche zur Überwindung von Ungleichheit"
- "starke Sicherheitskräfte" vs. "öffentliche Sicherheit für weniger bedeutend halten"
- "Entscheidung und Planung zentralisiert" vs. "Entscheidungen und Planungen auf lokaler Ebene"

- "unterschiedliche, wenn auch gleichermaßen wichtige, Rollen für Mann und Frau" vs. "Angleichung unter den Geschlechtern in Berufs- und Familienrollen"

- "Ansehen nach Verdienst und Leistung" vs. "Ansehen je nach persönlichen Qualitäten"

SKALEN 2-5:

Eine positive Korrelation indiziert Zustimmung von Befragten mit Präferenz für moralische statements auf niedriger Stufe; eine negative Korrelation indiziert Zustimmung von Befragten mit Präferenz für höherstufige moralische statements.

Positive Korrelationen:	Negative Korrelationen:
SKALA 2: Mögliche Störungen bei den Inselbewohnern (Insel-Beispiel, s.o.): "Für wie schwerwiegend hältst Du jedes der Probleme?"	
	- einige könnten anfangen, die Macht zu übernehmen und andere zu kommandieren
	- Gesetzlosigkeit und Gewalt
	- Menschen könnten mit eigenen Bedürfnissen statt mit denen der Gemeinschaft beschäftigt sein
SKALA 3: "Was sollten nach Deiner Meinung die Ziele des Gremiums sein?" (Insel-Beispiel, s.o.)	
- Kontrolle individueller Übeltäter	- Einrichtung sozialer Dienste
	- Einrichtung eines Ausbildungswesens
	- Absicherung von individuellen Rechten und Freiheiten
	- Einrichtung eines Systems zur Schlichtung von Streitigkeiten unter den Menschen
	- Versicherung, daß Politiker den Forderungen aller gegenüber verantwortlich sind
	- Einrichtung eines wirksamen Systems für wechselseitige Kooperation und für die Verteilung von Ressourcen

SKALA 4: "Was ist nach Deiner Meinung wichtig für die Erhaltung der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung?"

Positive Korrelationen:	Negative Korrelationen:
- effektive Polizeikräfte und Verschärfung von Gesetzen	- Menschen mit Sinn für individuellen Wert
- klare Regeln, Normen und Richtlinien	- Toleranz seitens der Individuen
- Menschen, die sich anpassen und akzeptiert werden wollen	- Menschen mit Interesse an anderen in ihrer Gemeinschaft
- übliche konventionelle Lebensführung bei den meisten	- individuelles Gewissen
	- gesellschaftliche Vorkehrung, um Deprivation zu verhindern
	- gute materielle Voraussetzungen, Wohnungen etc.
	- selbständige Planung der Befriedigung von Bedürfnissen und Genüssen
	- Gefühl der Freiheit zur Aufstellung eigener Moralprinzipien
	- Gefühl der Selbstkontrolle über eigenes Leben
	- Individuum befriedigt und neidlos

SKALA 5: "Was hältst Du für wichtig, was zur Entstehung von Arbeitslosigkeit beiträgt?"

Positive Korrelationen:	Negative Korrelationen:
- Arbeitslose können durch Sozialversicherung mehr verdienen	- politische Maßnahmen und Strategien der gegenwärtigen Regierung
- Krankheit und körperliche Handicaps bei Arbeitslosen	- ineffiziente und nicht konkurrenzfähige Industrien, die bankgehen
- Antriebsschwäche und Faulheit bei Arbeitslosen	- inkompetentes industrielles Management mit einem Mangel an Planung
- Pech	- Einführung der flächendeckenden Automation
- Arbeitslose versuchen nicht beharrlich genug, an freie Stellen zu kommen	
- Fehlen von Intelligenz und Fähigkeit unter Arbeitslosen	
- Arbeitslose sind zu eingebildet und stolz, gewisse Jobs zu akzeptieren	
- schlechte Ausbildung und Qualifikation unter Arbeitslosen	
- Weigerung von Arbeitslosen, in die Nähe von Arbeitsplätzen umzuziehen	
- Zufluß von Ausländern, die alle verfügbaren Jobs übernommen haben	
- Unfähigkeit der Arbeitslosen, sich an neue Bedingungen anzupassen	
- Gewerkschaften haben (mit Lohnforderungen) ihre Mitglieder aus den Arbeitsplätzen herausgepokert	
- schwache Gewerkschaften, die für Arbeitsplatzerhaltung nicht kämpfen	

Sex Differences in Style of Moral Reasoning

Grant application and end-of-grant report.
Andrew Mellon Foundation Grant held at the
Henry Murray Center for the Study of Lives,
Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Mass,
August-October 1981

Application

I wish to apply for funds from the above program to support about eight weeks of research at the Murray Center, during August and September 1981. I shall be consulting the data from Kohlberg's longitudinal study of the moral reasoning of males, and the data which I understand will be available at the Murray Center by the summer, from Erickson's longitudinal study of moral and ego development, and life events, of females.

The proposed research is a continuation of work I was engaged in while a Visiting Research Associate at the Center for Moral Education, Harvard Graduate School of Education, during the Fall of 1980. This work involved a detailed re-analysis of some of Kohlberg's longitudinal material in order to examine the preposition that there may be more than one kind of orientation within moral and social reasoning. The aim of my project this summer is to develop this analytical framework and to apply it to the material on girls and women. It is hoped that this analysis will make a contribution to resolving the current problems surrounding the understanding of female moral and social reasoning, which have emerged from several empirical and theoretical studies. In particular, these issues are the subject of current debate between Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan.

The large body of research now extant within the 'Kohlbergian paradigm', from different cultures, social classes and both sexes, has provided substantial support for the developmental sequence of stages of moral reasoning, as defined by the theoretical system of Kohlberg, and the coding system developed by him and his co-workers. Attitudinal and behavioural correlates of moral stage also attest to validity of the developmental sequence and of the distinctiveness of the stages also. This is true for both sexes, however certain anomalies in the apparent rate of development have emerged. This is especially true of the transition from stage 3 to stage 4 moral reasoning; several studies have demonstrated a greater representation of females at stage 3 and males at stage 4 (e.g. Haan et al., 1968, inter alia) and longitudinal studies have shown differences in the rate of development itself (e.g. Holstein, 1976). Sex differences however have by no means always been found, and Rest noted that in material using the Defining Issues Test, sex differences are not found (Rest, 1979). Certainly it appears that production techniques - where the subject's reasoning is elicited through hypothetical dilemmas in an interview or open-ended written method - are much more likely to generate sex differences.

Attempts to explain these differences have been of three kinds. Firstly, it has been suggested that the differences between the sexes are due to the general social and professional inequality of men and women, and that therefore all samples, particularly of adults, must be very carefully matched. Secondly, that there are important sex differences in moral reasoning of a qualitative sort. Thirdly, that the differences which emerge are a methodological artifact, arising from the fact that the original scoring methods, and the theory itself, were validated on boys and men, and are therefore not valid for girls and women. There is obviously an overlap between these; if females consistently respond in a way which is 'mis-coded' according to a male-derived scoring system, this is prima facie evidence of a sex difference of some sort.

The effect of 'mis-coding' is to cluster many female scores in stage 3. It has been argued that this arises from a consistent sex difference which is the tendency of females to respond to moral dilemmas with a focus on interpersonal consequences and an orientation to interactions between people. In contrast, males seem to move from a concrete preoccupation with the interpersonal to an abstract conceptual framework, focussing on rules, rights and obligations and their relation to the social system. This is the mode of reasoning which has become encapsulated in earlier forms of the Kohlberg scoring system. Experience with coding female protocols has led several coders to observe that there is a more sophisticated understanding of 'relationships' evident in the material, which is not allowed for in the content of stage 4 reasoning in earlier scoring systems, but is clearly beyond the usual stage 3 conceptualisation.

The present scoring system taps the structure of reasoning, rather than focussing on content. In principle, this should therefore overcome the problem, because the complex social perspective-taking and understanding of the social system underlying the superficial content of the reasoning, should be equally apparent whether the individual responds in terms of interpersonal relations or rights and contracts (Colby *et al.*, 1979).

Gilligan however argues that the issue is more fundamental. On the basis of her own work on women's moral reasoning on real-life dilemmas as well as hypothetical dilemmas, she contends that there is a basic difference in the ways that men and women understand the social world, and that this is not taken into account in either Kohlberg's definition of morality or in the coding system. Her main contention is that women conceive of the social world in terms of interdependence, that they see themselves as *embedded* in the interpersonal world. In contrast, men see themselves as separate from others, isolated and engaging in confrontation and uneasy contractual negotiation with others. This is reflected in the way they handle both actual and hypothetical moral dilemmas. The male focusses on justice, rights and the contractual rule; the female focusses on mutual responsibility and the creation of compromises through negotiation and adaptation (Gilligan, 1978, 1979, 1980).

The criticism which Gilligan is making of Kohlberg, that his theory of morality (i.e. what constitutes the 'moral') is too narrow has been widely voiced among philosophers and psychologists. Frequently these criticisms are confused; objection for example to Kohlberg's description of the later stages on the grounds that they express a moral *telos* too wedded to a justice theory of morality, is not an argument against a developmental sequence of stages of moral reasoning which *can be measured* through the use of material primarily grounded in issues of justice. Gilligan's argument is that this works for boys, but not for girls. The emphasis on justice, rules and rights is evident in the methodology and in coding. The question 'does he have the right', is a frequently used probe which steers the respondent in the direction of answers based on rights, rather than, say, on mutual responsibility.

My own position on the theoretical questions starts from a somewhat different premise. I argue that the material elicited in moral judgement interviews, although it is *applied* to the task of resolving hypothetical dilemmas, in the moral domain, in fact reflects the whole organisation of social and interpersonal cognition. The basic principles of cognition upon which the essentially rhetorical moral, prescriptive, decisions are made reflect the individual's basic comprehension of relationships, roles and the function that rules, rights and responsibilities serve in maintaining them. This perspective differs from that of Kohlberg and his associates in that they argue that moral development is dependent upon and sequential to the development of social perspective-taking. My position is that 'the moral domain' is a largely artifically-defined subset of reasons within social cognition. I have presented these arguments in detail in a recent paper (Weinreich-Haste, forthcoming).

From both Gilligan's and my own perspectives, therefore, it is meaningful to look for a wider range of orientation to moral reasoning than one based primarily on rights and justice - in particular, to investigate how the individual understands the question of relationships between people. To do this, it is valuable to examine material which reflects moral and social reasoning more extensively than that which has been utilised in the traditional Kohlberg dilemmas. Kohlberg's longitudinal data contains considerably more material on social and moral reasoning, on images of self, on career ambitions and on conceptions of society. Much of this has been as yet unanalysed.

Erickson's data includes moral reasoning, ego-developmental stages, career ambitions, self-reports and reflections upon critical life events; much of this kind of material can be gleaned in a less systematic way from the Kohlberg data also. In addition, Erickson has recently coded the ego-developmental material which is available in some of the Kohlberg sample.

Hypotheses and Method

Gilligan's hypothesis is that there is a basic difference between male and female construal of the world which is systematically reflected in how they perceive and resolve moral questions. My hypothesis, which is not at variance with Gilligan's but which asks the question from a somewhat different starting point, is that there are some systematic differences, *per se*, in how social and moral cognitions are organised. The testing of my hypothesis, and the explorations of sex as well as individual differences, is also a testing of Gilligan's hypothesis.

During my period at the Center for Moral Education I approached these questions by returning to Kohlberg's longitudinal data. Using two subjects in detail, I developed, *ab intio*, a thematic framework, from the material available over twenty years. This included all the material available, not only those sections utilised in the usual Kohlbergian analysis. This means that I used sections of data which were new, and also I utilised descriptive as well as prescriptive statements - the coding of moral judgement uses only prescriptive statements. The thematic framework facilitated separation of material on relationships, rules, rights, responsibility, the maintenance of social order, and roles. The analysis revealed consistent patterns over the whole period, within each subject. Subject 42, for example, had throughout his teens and twenties an orientation to interpersonal relationships, and had apparent difficulty in arriving at an abstract conception of rights and roles and contracts within the wider social system. In other words, he appeared very similar - throughout his interviews - to Gilligan's female subjects. Subject 2, on the other hand, was more a 'classic' male respondent, able to deal quite early on with rights and obligations, but only in his twenties beginning to develop an understanding of the function of rights etc. in _serving_ relationships. Subject 2 scored, overall, marginally higher in moral reasoning. It is of great interest however that on the Loevinger ego development scores of Erickson, Subject 42 scored considerably higher than Subject 2. This is consistent with Erickson's findings that girls tend to score relatively higher on ego than on moral stage measures, whereas boys do the reverse.

It is clear even from the analysis of two subjects that the thematic framework I developed is a useful tool for re-analysing the material, and for incorporating material hitherto unused. Because my analytical method was derived independently from Gilligan's, _and_ from material gathered within the Kohlberg methodology, it provides a validation of her distinction between different orientations, which retains it within the existing paradigm. However, because I was investigating a difference in orientation amongst boys, not sex differences, I have at least the beginnings of a methodology which detects genuine differences in orientation, which may subsequently be useful for identifying both within and between-sex variation, in addition to elaborating our understanding of the cognitive processes involved in moral and social reasoning.

The next step in the research is to investigate whether this method of analysis can be extended to girls' reasoning, and to establish whether sex differences are parallel to, or different from, the kinds of differences I found between the two male subjects. To do this, I need first to perfect the analytical method on the material on both males and females available at the Murray Center. In the space of the summer period I expect to be able to validate the measure on some of Kohlberg's male sample and on Erickson's female sample. I hope to be able to analyse in detail most of the female sample also.

Conclusions

The project will clearly have considerable implications for understanding the development of girls' moral and social reasoning, the integration of their conceptions of self into their organisation and construal of the wider social world. Erickson's data set is one of the very few available providing detailed longitudinal material on girls' reasoning. By analysing it in conjunction with parallel data from boys, from the paradigmatic sample on moral reasoning development, it should ultimately be possible to discover the overlaps and discrepancies in processes of reasoning between the sexes, not merely in the progress through stages of moral reasoning. In the short term, this analysis will be an independent test of Gilligan's hypothesis. In the long run it should be the basis of testing my own more general hypotheses of the relationship between moral and social reasoning. Additionally, by attending to material which to date has been unanalysed in Kohlberg's data, but which is parallel to data already analysed in Erickson's data, it should elaborate the understanding of Kohlberg's own system.

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Report

This project was a preliminary investigation of sex and style differences in moral reasoning. It utilised two data sets at the Murray Center; the longitudinal study of males' moral reasoning conducted by Kohlberg and his associates, 1956-1976 (sample size; 58), and the longitudinal study of young women's moral judgement, ego development and self ratings conducted by Erickson, 1973-1977 (sample size 21).

The purpose of the project was to begin to develop a method of analysis of open-ended material to test some hypotheses arising from Gilligan's findings that there is a sex difference in style of moral reasoning, and from the researcher's previous work in Britain, and using some of the Kohlberg longitudinal material. Gilligan's main findings (Gilligan, 1982) are that women's moral reasoning, their resolution of both hypothetical and real-life moral dilemmas, tends to be in terms which emphasise responsibility to others and the mutuality of relationships between people. This contrasts, she argues, with the style of moral reasoning reflected in Kohlberg's male sample, and in the coding frame derived for use with that sample; males emphasise rights, contracts and the principles of equity. Gilligan's study therefore constitutes a critique of Kohlberg's definition of the nature of moral reasoning, though not of the theory of stages of moral reasoning, and her own work has developed parallel stages of reasoning which focus on responsibility judgements.

However the Researcher's own work on moral reasoning in Britain, and her preliminary analysis of some of the Kohlberg longitudinal material in the Fall of 1980, suggested that even within an all male sample, matching for moral stage, there were differences in style of moral reasoning, with some males using 'responsibility'-based judgement consistently over several successive interviews. Her preliminary studies also suggested that there were possibly several different 'dominant themes' which characterized different individuals' thinking about moral issues, and that, furthermore, these themes became even more apparent if material on life plans, personal goals and self definition were included, as well as material on political and social beliefs, and if both prescriptive and descriptive material was included. Much of this material has remained largely uncoded in the Kohlberg data, though it is available. The existence of a range of different orientations or themes is acknowledged by Kohlberg and his associates, and appears as 'Elements' divided according to 'Orientation' in the Standard Scoring Manual. The aim of this project, however, was to identify categories which emerged from the data as described above, and the Researcher did not utilise this classification as a starting point.

Method

The first stage of the research involved selecting four of the male sets of protocols and four of the female sets of protocols, each protocol being the complete set of interviews (or, in the case of the female data, written materials) over the longitudinal period. All the material in the protocol was considered. The preliminary analysis of this material yielded a number of categories which appeared to be conceptually distinct. These are laid out in Table 1. Table 2 illustrates some of the subcategories which elaborate the concepts, and would provide the basis of a more detailed coding frame. Table 3 gives some examples of items in the text which illustrate some of the dominant themes.

Deriving the range of distinct categories and exemplars of them from the eight protocols took most of the available time. The second stage of the research was to attempt to quantify the distribution of the categories in order to establish the extent to which individuals were consistent in their use of themes, modes of explanation and argument, and the functions they saw rules, roles etc. as performing. Only part of this stage could be completed, but sufficient work was done to indicate that the coding system was workable, and the very preliminary results of this exercise did appear to demonstrate that there was individual consistency across situations and across time, and that there were differences between people. The analysis at this stage did not identify sex differences, but further work on a larger sample than eight would be necessary to establish this.

Discussion

The development of the categorisation system on eight respondents, and the preliminary efforts to use this system as a means of quantification, appears to have been successful, and has the following implications;

a) the division into a 'masculine' style of reasoning focussing on rights, and a 'feminine' style of reasoning focussing on responsibility, as proposed by Gilligan, does not appear to exhaust the possible range of distinctive styles of moral reasoning which can be identified within two sets of longitudinal data;

b) however, considering this preliminary study in conjunction with Gilligan's findings, it would seem a reasonable conclusion that Kohlberg's tendency to focus more on rights and justice as the basis of moral reasoning, and to include other orientations within his coding system but not to differentiate them, does not do justice to his own data;

c) the differences in style of moral reasoning are found within the male and within the female sample and do not appear to be attributable to sex differences alone. The extent to which there may be a general trend marking sex differences cannot as yet be established without further analysis.

The use of prescriptive as well as descriptive reasoning, and the use of the whole range of responses across moral, self-definitional, and sociopolitical areas has enlarged the scope for looking at consistencies in thought and reasoning across several domains of reasoning, but it also would be possible to analyse the precise nature of the relationship between domains. Methods of coding stages of moral reasoning and of ego development are well established and are, of course, extensively available for both the samples used; other material which was included in the present project, such as future orientation and life plans, social and political attitudes, and reflections upon life crises, has not been analysed in terms of stages of development. With further refinements, the categories which the present project has identified may be the basis of one way of making such comparisons.

Overview of the Project

The Researcher set herself the task of devising a category system which would identify consistent differences in orientation to moral, social and personal issues, and to lay the foundation for testing sex differences and the implications of differences in orientation for understanding the relationship between reasoning in the moral domain and reasoning in other areas. The Project was successful in creating a set of categories, and in testing that they could be used as the beginnings of a coding frame. Further work on this, and extensive further work on validating the system on the rest of the two samples, is necessary, but the preliminary study would indicate that such further work is feasible and worthwhile.

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Table 1.

Dominant themes - main response category of answer

Relationships
Roles
Rules
Rights, fairness
Rhetoric - appeal to dominant cultural values, e.g. democracy
Responsibility
Conscience and self-definition
Maintaining/explaining social order

Explanatory response mode - what the respondent is doing

Giving an account of causality
Giving an account of processes
Justifying
Negotiating or resolving conflict
Invoking rhetoric and social and cultural values
Defining self
Empathising
Labelling, categorising

Primary mode of argument

Aretaic - definition in terms of good person
Other-oriented
Interpersonal relations
Self-protective
Pragmatic-rational
Legalistic
Political - power social relations
Descriptive only

Perceived functions (goals of behaviour)

Keeping relationships
Personal growth
Maintaining personal honour and respect
Rule following, performance of duty
Improving society
Normative role performance
Resolving social conflict
Resolving interpersonal conflict
Resolving personal conflict
Personal desires, personal goals
Maintaining social order
Maintaining rights and justice
Helping others

Table 1 continued

Perceived Motives (origins of behaviour)

Self definition
Being a good, nice person
Rule following, duty
Constraint by sanctions
Constraint by norms
Constraint by power
Loving, caring
Avoidance of hurt to others
Instrumental, purposive ends
Personal conflict resolution
Personal rewards, success
Conflict between emotion and rational, legal or instrumental aims, or duty
Personal desires
Avoidance of guilt
Helping others
Being fair

Table 2. Sub-classification of dominant themes

Relationships:	maintenance
	expressing love, kindness
	reciprocity
	relationship expressed by the act
	obligations
	empathic
	contractual
	mutual respect
Roles:	normative role (does)
	functional role (ought)
	expression of role
	reciprocal role
Rules:	norms
	laws
	mores - explicitly defined
	moral rules
Responsibility:	between persons
	as an aretaic concept
	to self
	for own actions
	to others
	for others
	to wider society
	to specific ingroup - e.g. sex
Self-definition:	labelling
	ideal self
	wishing, wanting, personal desires as self
	conscience
	self as female/male
	personal skills and attributes
	self as aware person

Table 3. Examples of dominant themes K = male sample; E = female sample

Relationships:

Hurting the honest man was unpayable no matter how much money he could have offered back. E7.

Only love and human respect should make him steal it. K65

I think the one who lied to the old man is doing worse because I think it is better to just break into the store and steal money than it is to deceive people. Maybe the old man respected the boy - and then he skipped town. K65

When a promise is made it is an assurance and an agreement of something that should be kept because it was agreed on. I feel it was equally bad no matter who is breaking the promise because there was a mutual agreement and everyone should be able to stick to what they say. E22

The father should not use his authority in this case he can lose his son's respect and have problems in the future. E5

First I would try to convince the druggist how in need I was and would try to get him to lower the price. E5.

Rules:

No I don't think Heinz should have stolen the drug. It's a law not to steal and he was taking the risk of getting arrested, which was wrong. E7

What's legally right is accepted, well it's written law actually, and morally right....it's been accepted in a general way but morals aren't defined rigidly... It's a worse offence of you break the law instead of a moral or mores, or a folkway. K23

He's right but I don't know really how you can express the type of right he's doing when he does it. I don't think it's moral or legal because I definitely think that's wrong, but I don't know, self-conscious right. I think it's right that most people would do in his particular case. K23

Wrong as hell. Slaves were chattel property under the legal and logical system. They should punish this 'helper'. K65

I would say clearly legally he should be found guilty and given the life sentence and I think morally he's blameless. K65

A light prison sentence. It should be enough to make him remember in the future he should consult the law in such a case but not a lot because he was complying with his patient's wishes. E22

Table 3 continued

Roles:

The father should have authority but should not use his authority out of turn. E5.

Not a duty but a wish, if he desired his wife enough to steal for her to live than you would say he was a 'good' husband. E5

He might be wrong. Just because a man is a captain doesn't mean he will always be correct in his assumption of what is right or wrong. E22.

Alex should treat them equally as persons here, not as father and brother. E22.

I think a good druggist would have the welfare of sick people over his personal pocket. The rights of the druggist should take in his feeling for the welfare of the people. K65

He'd feel sort of obligated to do it, well, being his father and everything. K23.

Well it just goes along with the idea of the family that he's head of the house and what he says, goes, rules and everything.... just from tradition. K23.

The captain has to establish authority because of that fact that he was the leader of that particular group. In order to continue to establish this authority he would have to go back and blow up the bridge himself. K23.

Maintaining/Explaining Social Order:

We had established in the Constitution or by laws passed in Congress ... he should be brought back as legally he was wrong.K23.

Besides being written down in legal codes and everything, if we did we'd just have utter chaos - once people knew they could steal from someone else, all we'd have would be pilfering. K23.

It is obvious that the druggist is just a participant in that type of society, and hopefully Heinz would be outside that... outside the basic liberal norm that dominats both Europe and America... the sense that private property is sanctified. K23.

I think if he did let his story be known through the local paper the town would clamp down on that person - rather than his fighting the whole war himself, could join forces with other people. K65.

No, because they had a better economic life and it was 'right' for our Southern economic needs at the time.K65.

Responsibility:

For the safety of the other men he should order another man to go who may have a chance to get out. He did it for the others. E5.

I think he would always feel guilty if he hadn't tried to do something. I know you might call him selfish but his wife is lying there on the brink of death and if he didn't do anything, I think he would feel guilty. K65.

If you don't have fathers breaking promises to sons you're never going to have sons breaking promises to anybody. K65.

Now the troublemaker deserves to die. I'd sure love to see him get shot in battle. But that's not my decision, and I can't play God and send him just because I don't like him. K65.

Considering the fact that I had accepted that position in society, I would do the same thing. That is part of the responsibility that goes with it, if he didn't want to do it, don't do it. K23.

Someone has got to run the show or nothing would get done. E7.

Morality, social meaning and rhetoric: the social context of moral reasoning

In: Kurtines, W.B. and J.L. Gewirtz, Morality, Moral Behaviour and Moral Development, New York: Wiley, 1984.

CHAPTER 18

Morality, Social Meaning, and Rhetoric: The Social Context of Moral Reasoning

HELEN WEINREICH-HASTE

This chapter examines the different assumptions of the developmental model of moral reasoning as exemplified by Kohlberg's theory and social psychological and sociological approaches to moral and social reasoning and considers the extent to which they can be reconciled. The chapter takes as basic assumptions two premises:

1. *The individual's moral reasoning and judgmental behavior depends on his or her* implicit social theory, *which is a set of implicit explanations and assumptions about how the social system works and about individual relations within the social system.*
2. *Most reasoning on moral, social, and political issues is* rhetorical, *in the sense that it is essentially an act of persuasive communication, asserting prescriptions that derive from the individual's implicit social theory.*

This chapter explores the relationship between the social origins and the individual ontogenesis of moral meaning, explanation, and rhetoric and argues that a satisfactory psychological approach must integrate *the social and the individual factors, in theory and in empirical research. Hitherto there has been something of a latent conflict between the two approaches. In this chapter I describe three "territories" in which meaning, explanation, and rhetoric are generated, negotiated, and interpreted: the sociocultural, the interpersonal, and the intrapersonal. I explore ways in which these are interrelated, and I consider the implications of these interrelationships for future research.*

This chapter concentrates on the expressive, the evaluative, and the linguistic forms of moral behavior. Human beings spend a great deal of their time engaging in this sort of behavior. To most of us, actual temptation and the need to make decisions about practical moral action occur relatively infrequently, but we daily engage in judging others, imposing sanctions on our fellows and dependents, and responding with censure or approval to public events. We behave as moralists, moral and social philosophers, moral apologists, and social theorists. In doing so, we are, as individuals, expressing a set of beliefs about what constitutes desirable behavior in ourselves and others. The beliefs reflect implicit theories we hold about the maintenance of social order, the necessary forms of relationship between persons, and the consequences for individuals and society of undesirable behavior. As individuals, we comment prescriptively and descriptively on the action of ourselves and others, and possibly, as a consequence of that comment, we make certain behaviors more likely or less likely to occur. As members of society, we reflect the cultural norms, values, and assumptions of the society in which we grow up and affirm and perpetuate them. We are thus engaging in both an individual and a social process.

There are two substantively different ways of explaining this behavior. Cognitive-developmental psychologists have concentrated on the processes involved in the development of individual judgment, the ontogenesis of reasoning, and the factors that affect restructuring and transformation of individual thought. Sociologists and some social psychologists offer the basis for an alternative explanatory approach that focuses on social processes. In its most extreme form, this approach explains individual moral action and expression as a response determined primarily by the demands of the social situation. The main orientation of this approach is the social situation as the crucible of specific, here-and-now meaning, and second, how the individual expression of moral ideas and moral conclusions reflects the social system and the dominant ideologies of the culture. Increasingly, those who are interested in social processes are paying attention to the role of language and symbol in the generation and transmission of social meaning and also to the role of the small group and dyad in the formulation and expression of that meaning.

Furthermore, the two approaches have different assumptions about why we are interested in morality. For the "individual" orientation, the interesting question is, How does the individual develop an autonomous ethical system and understanding of moral philosophy? For the "social" orientation, the interesting questions are about the role that moral expression and moral language play in affirming the individual in the social group, the maintaining of group identity, and the perpetuating of cultural mores.

There is at the present time a gap between the two models. The cognitive-developmental approach has been primarily concerned with *individual* processes; in this approach, social events and social experience are catalysts for the stimulation of individual thinking. Alternatively, the social event is a manifestation of individual reasoning in action. In contrast, for the theorist who is interested in social and cultural determinants and social processes, there is little space for considering the individual's own generation of meaning. In this chapter, I explore a model that may offer the possibility of synthesis. To do this, I shall, first, examine aspects of the interrelationship of the social and individual and, second, explore the idea of *rhetoric*.

I will divide the arenas of the *origin* and *operation* of moral meaning into three: the *sociocultural meaning system,* the *interpersonal meaning system,* and the *intrapersonal meaning system.* By sociocultural meaning system, I refer to the corpus of beliefs and explanations available to the individual through his or her cultural experience. The sociocultural meaning system also sets limitations and constraints on what the individual can know, on what the individual *should* know, and on the terms he or she should use in expressing and communicating that knowledge. The arena of interpersonal meaning is dyadic and small-group interaction, the most common situation of communicative experience. The many analyses of small-group discourse illustrate the great complexity of the negotiation process and the vast repertoire of rules, decoding skills, nonverbal communicative techniques, and so forth, which even very young children can use. It is the arena of intrapersonal meaning that is currently the focus of the cognitive-developmental approach. This is the area of individual cognitive organization, the individual making a coherent and meaningful personal theory out of knowledge and experience, a theory that is limited by, and reflects the limitations of, the individual's current level of cognitive complexity.

This chapter will explore the idea of *rhetoric* in three ways. First, in the field of moral reasoning, there is inevitably interfusion of fact and value. Second, any moral conclusion or act of moral reasoning, however private, has a didactic, communicative quality: If I have the conviction that I have attained the "right" solution, I have the desire to persuade others to share my meaning. Third, the knowledge and theories available in the culture, which are the sources of individual reasoning and judgments on moral, social, and political issues, are never neutral; like individual reasoning, public cultural orthodoxies confuse fact and value. They have a strong didactic purpose, and the individual learns, therefore, not only competing moral theories but also that these theories have their own built-in assertion of rectitude, truth, and universality. In this chapter, I want to show that an appreciation of the essentially rhetorical nature of moral reasoning gives us a framework for relating intrapersonal, interpersonal, and sociocultural processes.

THE CRITICAL ARENA

Much of the essence of the debate between "individual" and "social" approaches is encapsulated in the dialogues between Lawrence Kohlberg and some of his critics. Kohlberg's theory of moral development focuses mainly on the ontogenesis of individual reasoning about justice; as such, it offers an explanation of how the individual interprets moral and social events, resolves moral dilemmas, and, to some degree, acts in problematic situations (Kohlberg, 1971, 1976). Some of the objectors to Kohlberg's theory argue that he has ignored, or underestimated, the social and cultural variables that may influence or even determine the phenomena he explains in terms of a theory of the development of individual conceptions of justice. There are three main strands of such "social" objections:

1. The method of investigation is itself a social situation and, as such, has demand characteristics that make interpretation of the individual responses difficult and possibly dubious.
2. The whole exercise is culturally biased, taking as central a concept of justice that, the critics argue, is an essentially Western bourgeois concept.
3. The method and theory take no account of the social psychological work on the role of small-group interaction in the creation and negotiation of meaning and the role of language and forms of expression in maintaining the individual's membership in the group.

As a prelude to considering each of these criticisms in detail, let us look at the method by which cognitive-developmental psychologists collect data about moral reasoning. We ask our respondents to make evaluations and judgments about "moral" issues or events that conventionally are seen to be deviant or problematic. From these responses, we seek to establish the underlying reasoning and justification that the individual will give for his or her opinion. We probe, we press, and we try to take the respondent to the limits of his or her thinking (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, Speicher-Dubin, Candee, Hewer, & Power, 1983).

There are certain interesting characteristics of this situation. First, it is a social situation, an interaction between the researcher and the respondent. Second, what is occurring is not a report on an action, nor is it the prediction of an action (however much the setting of the questions may seem to be in these terms). It is *reflection on* action, one's own or someone else's past or hypothetical future action. It is a commentary on the respondent's *reaction* to an action, a commentary involving explanation and evaluation. Third, it is usually the case that the situations the respondent is considering are entirely novel to him or her; the individual has no firsthand, and possibly no secondhand, experience of anything like them. To respond, the individual must draw on his or her ongoing *implicit theories* about social relationships and moral norms and functions and apply them to this novel, hypothetical situation. We are not surprised that 10-year-olds can tell us about sharing, tattling on others, the rules of games, and the logic of fair punishment; we should perhaps be more surprised that they can deal equally well with a man stealing medicine to save his wife's life, a captain's responsibilities to his company, and a doctor's decision about euthanasia. In other words, in this social situation we find that the respondent is able to react to the researcher's request to engage in a rational discourse on the proper action for a hypothetical third person. Furthermore, we find that he or she will be able to produce a set of justifications for the "properness" of the actions he or she advocates that are consistent across several diverse story dilemma situations (Weinreich-Haste, 1983).

For the cognitive-developmental psychologist, however, the interesting products of this situation are prescriptive judgments and reasons, which can be coded according to their moral and cognitive complexity. Each developmental stage of moral reasoning is a more integrated and more differentiated representation of moral thinking. The sequence of stages reflects the changing and increasing understanding of the relationship between the individual and other individuals, groups, the community, and, ultimately, society. The core moral concept that Kohlberg's moral dilemmas tap is justice, the understanding of rights, obligations, fairness, and roles. Few people familiar with the research would question that the evidence from longitudinal and cross-sectional studies does indeed demonstrate developmental change and cognitive restructuring. The objections of "social" critics concern the role of social factors in that process and the role of cultural factors in defining what is the appropriate definition of a "morally adequate" response.

The first objection is that the reasoning elicited is *situationally determined.* There are a number of versions of this. One I will call the naive positivistic; it is usually expressed as, How can we be sure that the respondent isn't just telling the researcher what he or she thinks is expected of him or her?—which means, effectively, How can we find out what he or she "really" thinks?

The naive positivist objection assumes that the individual is in some kind of negotiation with the researcher to deduce and then to produce the "right" stage or style of response. A more complex version of this objection argues that the individual is, in all social intercourse, engaged in the presentation of self fitting the cultural requirements of his or her social role in general. These requirements may be a demand for rationality, pliancy, or a display of reflective doubt, knowledge of rules, or whatever. So the individual will produce the high-flown arguments of Stage 5 if necessary, if that is what is demanded of the "rational" public self, or the instrumentalism of Stage 2, if a more Machiavellian style is required. The basis of this criticism is that "inner" individual thought processes are irrelevant to what is *really* going on in a complex social situation (Gergen, 1977; Harré, 1977, 1979).

Perhaps the most extreme form of the "social" position is expressed in the poststructuralist perspective. To quote Lodge (1981), "In the post-structuralist perspective, individual man is not to be conceived of as a unique, substantial self, existing outside language and social relations, through which he expresses himself, but as the subject who is 'produced' by the entry into language and social relations." In other words, according to such a perspective, it is never meaningful to ask such questions as, What does the respondent "really" think? The here-and-now moral discourse between the respondent and the researcher *defines* the universe of the individual's moral discourse.

The second general category of objection is that the model has *cultural* *biases*. Most of these objections are directed at Kohlberg's definition of justice as the central principle of morality, and *therefore* as the central issue of moral development. These criticisms are, first, anthropological: The emphasis on justice reflects a particular and specific version of Western bourgeois morality, as other cultures have moral systems based, for instance, on honor, kin-group (or other group) affiliation, or loving-kindness (Chazan, 1980; Simpson, 1974). Second, they are political: The definition of Stage 6, the telos of development, emphasizes the individual's understanding of principles of justice. It assumes that the individual is a member of a class of society that conceives of justice as a matter of civilized debate between intelligent people. It ignores that "justice" is unattainable and probably irrelevant for most people, who in reality are subject to entrenched forces of privilege and oppression (Broughton, 1978; Sullivan, 1977; Trainer, 1977).

The objection to a theory of morality that reflects only justice is not, however, confined to those who see the issues in broad cultural and political terms. There are many critics who are happy with the concept of "the child as moral philosopher" but would prefer him or her to be an ethically more eclectic creature (Locke, 1980; Peters, 1978). This position is certainly not necessarily in conflict with a cognitive-developmental model of development. Gilligan (1982), for example, has demonstrated in her work on young women's moral reasoning that there are at least two forms of morality firmly within the cognitive-developmental paradigm. One form of morality, the "original" Kohlberg model, is based on justice as defined by rights and obligations. The implicit premise of this "rights" model is that the dilemma must be conceived in terms of conflict and confrontation, and the means of resolution is to weigh the relative rights and obligations of each party. A second form of morality, which Gilligan found to be more prevalent among women, has a dominant theme of relationships and mutual responsibility. The implicit premise is that the individual is *embedded* in the social unit; individuals are bound together by mutual concern and interrelatedness. Resolution of the moral problem therefore involves the negotiating of the space between persons, not the affirmation of equity, rights, and separateness.

This sex difference in *style* of moral reasoning is an argument for taking more notice of subcultural differences in how meaning is given and utilized. The argument Gilligan proposes is that the female role emphasizes mutuality and the central role of interpersonal relations, whereas the male role emphasizes competition and laying down ground rules for establishing contractual relations to "manage" conflict.

The third category of objection concerns the role of the *small group*, dyadic interaction and peer interaction, in the development of morality. There is now an enormous amount of research in social psychology that demonstrates the importance of small-group processes in the generation of meaning and in the interpretation of social events. Traditionally, developmental psychology has looked at the peer group as a *source* of values, beliefs, and rules; the peer group is one of the channels that gives the individual access to the culture. Additionally, the peer group is a *socializing agent*, molding the individual

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through rewards and punishment. The relationship between the individual and the peer group is, in other words, largely a one-way channel. The work in recent social psychology has been on the *interpersonal* processes in the construction of meaning. Through group communication, a common meaning is negotiated: How does the group generate a consensual definition of the situation, and what is the individual's role in this process (Doise, 1976; Moscovici, 1976; Tajfel, 1981)?

Much moral development research has treated the small group in the traditional manner of developmental psychology. Several studies have looked at the effect of participation in "Socratic" dialogue or mixed-stage small groups on individual moral reasoning. In other words, how does the group operate as a catalyst in individual growth? (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975; Kuhmerker, Mentkowski, & Erickson, 1980; Rest, 1979). Different from this approach is the more recent work on "moral atmosphere" and the "just community" studies. These look at the actual ongoing social processes within natural discussion groups experiencing real-life social, moral, and institutional crises and change, as well as observe the effects on individual moral reasoning (Mosher, 1980; Power, 1980).

We can summarize the fundamental differences between the "individual developmental" and the "social" approaches by considering the implicit statement "I can't accept that explanation because. . . ." For the "social" camp, the sticking point is that all forms of social reasoning, and moral reasoning in particular, serve sociological and interpersonal social functions; therefore, it is not credible to offer a model that treats the social context as virtually incidental to the developmental process and the individual as somehow an autonomous moral agent. For the cognitive-developmentalist, there is overwhelming evidence of structural-developmental changes in individual moral reasoning. This is a powerful argument against any explanation that tries to reduce moral judgment purely to socially determined reactions.

Common to both, however, is the shared assumption that what we are talking about is *meaning*. Both approaches recognize that the individual acts as commentator, imposer of sanctions, definer of group norms, presenter of self as morally acceptable, maker of moral decisions, and socializing agent of his or her dependents, all on the basis of a cognitive appreciation of what "being moral" means. The differences lie in explaining the origins and determinants of that cognitive appreciation.

MODELS OF MEANING AND RHETORIC

The common assumption is that *meaning systems* embody *theories* about the nature and function of morality and its role in the social system and in individual lives. These meaning systems are the symbolic context that makes possible expressive behaviors, communicative acts, and the interpretation of the behavior of others. They reflect explanations of cultural, or even cosmological, order.

Berger and Luckmann (1967) demonstrated that the institutions of society and the ways in which people behave normatively to one another are *legitimated* and *explained* by "theories" (expressed as "common knowledge"). These are part of the cognitive stock-in-trade of all members of society, not only those privileged to be professional theory-builders. Individual socialization is the transmission of these theories, and the "knowledge" embedded in these theories is what constitutes an enormous amount of ordinary thinking and the content of interpersonal communication. Moscovici and his associates have developed the concept of "social representation" and examined the ways in which communities and groups engage in sustaining meaning and categorizations that offer an explanatory or classificatory framework, enabling people to familiarize the unfamiliar, legitimate the status quo, and so forth (Moscovici, 1981). Therefore, "social meaning systems" are the stories people make up to explain the social and physical world. These stories have embedded in them "moral" or prescriptive assumptions and consequences. The main requirement of these stories is that they are culturally acceptable in the individual's milieu. It is, of course, highly probable that most people's stories will be culturally acceptable, because they largely derive from the culture in the first place, and "alien" stories are subject to social sanction (if only the sanction of incomprehensibility).

The two orientations I have outlined differ in assumptions about the *origins* of these meaning systems and in the way they operate in the social context. The argument I propose attempts to find a way of incorporating each orientation. Earlier, I discussed three areas of the origin and operation of meaning: sociocultural, interpersonal, and intrapersonal. I now explore how they are interrelated, rather than competing, forms of explanation. To explain the processes, I shall explore the role of rhetoric in social meaning.

When earlier in this chapter I referred to the concept of rhetoric, one of my arguments was that in most forms of reasoning on moral, social and political questions, people confuse fact and value, "is" and "ought," descriptive and prescriptive. Durkheim and Mauss (1963) identified two functions of a belief system. The first is a *speculative* function, an attempt to make the relation between things intelligible, an *explanation*. The second is a *moral* function, to regulate the conduct of human beings. In other words, a belief system embodies both descriptive and prescriptive elements, fact and value. Durkheim and Mauss were particularly interested in quasi-religious belief systems, but it is possible to generalize and consider the extent to which any system of meaning is inevitably an amalgam of explanation and prescription.

Let us look at examples of rhetoric and social theory in a standard moral judgment interview. When we ask a respondent whether Heinz should steal the medicine, we frequently receive the reply that he should not steal—a prescriptive statement. If we then probe a little, we get a justification, expressed as an explanation, such as if everyone stole, no one would be able to trust anyone else. This statement reflects the individual's understanding of the basis of social relations, his or her theory of what makes the social system work. If we ask questions that presume beliefs about "facts," such as what is necessary to maintain friendship, or what are the causes of crime, or even what X political party has achieved for the country, we will quickly find that the respondent slides into a moral conclusion: *"therefore* you shouldn't tell lies, give people too much freedom in childhood, vote for the other lot." This is the way people normally verbalize their reasoning about moral and social issues: As I have argued elsewhere, it is probably only in university seminars, with difficulty, that we can prevent people confusing fact and value.

The first element of my definition of rhetoric is that the inevitable interweaving of fact and value makes most statements about the social world into *assertions,* that is, couched implicitly in the terms "X *must* be true and Y *must* follow from X being true." The greater the pluralism of the culture, the more explicit this becomes, because where there are more explicitly conflicting "theories," there is a correspondingly greater need to justify the rightness of one's own particular point of view.

The second element of my definition of rhetoric is *communication.* Formulating moral reasons, engaging in moral judgments, or fulminating on political and social prescription is rarely an isolated, purely personal exercise. It is something to be communicated and shared. We are engaged in persuasion of one another. In order to do this, we must have a set of shared codes of communication and at least a common pool of shared theories, even if we do not necessarily agree on which is the "correct" theory. Let us consider as an example two pieces of propaganda from the First World War, recruiting posters from the United States and Great Britain. The two make quite different assumptions about what will galvanize men into action, and these assumptions reflect quite different perceptions about what the war is about and what the role of each nation is in the world (see Figures 18.1 and 18.2). The British poster appeals to a common belief (1) that the nation is directly under threat, and (2) that the individual man can do something about this. This message would in fact have been quite effective in the United States, and there was an Uncle Sam "I want you" poster (see Figure 18.3). The American serviceman poster, however, would have cut no ice in Britain. It makes two important assumptions: first, that *democracy* is a hurrah word that has a whole set of meanings and symbols associated with it, and second, that it is America's responsibility to preserve democracy in the world at large. Britons did not and do not feel that way either about democracy or about their world role; other British posters at that time appealed to the *honorable* man's duty to stop the imperialistic goals of the frightful and inhumane Hun, words that stirred the British breast quite well because they reflected British theories about their world roles and British rhetoric about "honor" (Haste, 1977).

Let us look at another example, in the domain of interpersonal persuasion. If you are about to engage on a course of action that I think is likely to be disastrous, I am likely to urge you to "be rational." This concern assumes that you and I *share* a common assumption that rationality matters. In developing my theme, I will exhort you to preserve your image of being a rational person, to behave in such a way as to preserve, by your example, a general rational mode of behavior, which we both believe is beneficial to wider society, and so forth.

In doing this, in this way, I am doing two things. I am assuming a shared *theory*, and I am also assuming a shared *level of complexity*. You are my peer; intuitively I will address you at the same moral stage as myself. If, however, you are my child, I will naturally wish to foster in you this rhetoric of rationality, this particular theory about social relations. I will therefore stress the issue of rationality to you in various ways; I will try to behave in a rational way, and I will try to elicit from you rational styles of talking and deter you from using other rhetorics, such as a rhetoric of anger, revenge, or pride. But additionally, I shall attune my level of discourse for your benefit; I shall intuitively use a Stage 2 or Stage 3 level of complexity. In doing this I am simultaneously transmitting a meaning system that both explains and admonishes and also engaging in a Socratic dialogue that I hope will stimulate you, as my child, to a more complex stage of understanding and conceptualization.

In these examples, I have illustrated the way that a public body, the recruiting office propagandists, can assume that the general public will respond to a few key words and symbols that evoke a whole symbolic meaning system. In the case of the "democracy" poster, that public body can make that assumption, because they know that American schools attempt to inculcate in children a theory about the conduct of relations among small groups and


He is keeping the World safe for Democracy
Enlist and help him

Figure 18.1. World War I American recruiting poster (reproduced with permission of the National Archives, Washington, D.C.).


BRITONS
"WANTS
YOU"
JOIN YOUR COUNTRY'S ARMY!
GOD SAVE THE KING
Reproduced by permission of LONDON OPINION

Figure 18.2. World War I British recruiting poster (reproduced with permission of the Imperial War Museum).


I WANT YOU
FOR U.S. ARMY
NEAREST RECRUITING STATION

Figure 18.3. Uncle Sam recruiting poster (reproduced with permission of the Imperial War Museum).

communities based on a central idea of democracy. No American child can escape knowledge of that theory, any more than he or she can escape knowledge of other theories that define stealing, lying, and breaking promises as undesirable. In the second example, I illustrated one kind of interpersonal interaction. In the example of two adults talking, two people of the same level of cognitive complexity are engaging in a debate. In this debate, a meaning system, rationality, is shared, is understood by both, but is not necessarily endorsed by both. In the example of adult versus child, the advantage of superiority of age and greater cognitive complexity gives the adult access to a larger range of theories about social relations and greater familiarity with the usual counterarguments. Nevertheless, the child is quite capable of an impassioned defense of a theory that honorable existence as a member of the third grade depends on taking revenge on the child who deliberately sabotaged her bike. The adult could, if she chose, offer the child a good Stage 5/level defense of her theory of honor; she chooses, however, to give the child a Stage 3 rundown on rationality.

In the preceding, I have demonstrated two separate dimensions: first, the variation in the rhetorical and theoretical meaning systems available within a culture, and second, the way in which any rhetoric or theory can operate at different levels of complexity. My examples show the way in which institutions and individuals intuitively adjust both the *content* and *structure* of their message to make effective communication possible.

TERRITORIES OF MEANING: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL

Sociocultural and Intrapersonal

Let us now consider the ways in which the concept of rhetoric can provide a link between sociocultural, interpersonal, and intrapersonal meaning systems. In the earlier recruiting example, I described a relationship between sociocultural and intrapersonal meaning. The sociocultural meaning system offers a range of available theories, explanations, rhetorical positions, and language. The rhetorical effectiveness of any theory, explanation, or linguistic form of communication depends on its being shared by the sender and the receiver. "Shared" means mutually comprehensible. The individual will be familiar with many different theories and explanations; hence everyone within the shared cultural milieu is able to show at least a moderate competence when asked to engage in discourse couched in a common rhetoric—for example, a rhetoric of justice. The characteristics of the individual's *intrapersonal* meaning system, however, will moderate the communication process. First, the individual's level of complexity will moderate his or her interpretation of sociocultural meaning. The volunteers who rushed to save the world for democracy would have expressed their common cause in very different terms, depending

3 13

on their level of cognitive complexity. In a recent study, we asked young people to explain the basis of social order; following are three different examples of their answers, which reflect different levels of complexity of reasoning (the figures in parentheses are the stages of moral reasoning as coded overall for these respondents on the Kohlberg measure of moral judgment), (Weinreich-Haste, Duff, & Cotgrove, Note 1):

> "If they break the rules they are put in jail. A lot of people think it's not worth it. Once you have a record, you have no chance of getting a job." (3A).
>
> "I think everyone is trying to conform, because if you didn't you would have people doing their own thing. But it's the law nowadays to conform, to work to earn money, have a family. So I think everyone's trying to conform to a law." (3/4).
>
> "Disorder, unemployment, lack of education, ignorance, bad housing, bad standard of living, poverty—tends to lead to breakdown of social order." (4/5).

Second, the individual's own experiences will cause him or her to give different weight to different theories and rhetorics. In the example of the discussion between the adult and the child, one of the differences was that the adult was invoking rationality, the child, honor. Gilligan's women respondents were invoking responsibility and mutuality, in contrast with many of the male subjects in Kohlberg's longitudinal sample, who more frequently talked in terms of rights. Even within the longitudinal sample of males, however, there were variations in their preferred "dominant theory," which remained consistent over time. Let us consider two contrasting individuals from Kohlberg's longitudinal study, Cases 23 and 42 (Figures 18.4 and 18.5). These two young men had a similar pattern of *stage* development throughout the period, yet they differed considerably in their basic values and implicit social theories. Case 23 as a teenager was politically and socially conservative. He swung to an extreme radicalism while in Britain as a graduate student, and this mellowed into a liberal humanism in his late 20s. But throughout he remained preoccupied with the relationship between legal and moral *rules;* his personal theory expressed a search for a rational system based on law. At several ages he reiterated, not a means by which justice can be attained, but a means by which decisions about moral and legal rules can be made—this kind of reasoning remained consistent despite the extreme changes in his social and political assumptions. Case 42, in contrast, concentrated on relationships and responsibility through the whole period of his teens and young adult years. For him, assuming personal responsibility for one's actions was the key issue in maintaining a good social system. His personal theory of morality and of social relations depended throughout on the responsible and concerned enactment of roles and the maintenance of mutual trust and respect.

Stage 4 (3) (age 16) What's legally right is accepted, well it's written law actually, and morally right, . . . it's been accepted in a general way but morals aren't defined rigidly. . . . It's a worse offense if you break the law instead of a moral or mores, or a folkway.

Well a promise is something . . . while it isn't written, it helps more or less to keep the peace and keep ties between factions. Without it, nobody would be able to trust anyone; without this sort of agreement we wouldn't be able to live very long without warring factions.

Stage 4 (3) (age 20) He's [Heinz] right, but I don't know really how you can express the type of right he's doing when he does it. I don't think it's moral or legal because I definitely think that's wrong, but I don't know, self-conscious right. I think it's right that most people would do in this particular case.

[Stealing versus obtaining money by lying] I think they both did equally poorly. In one case he's robbing a store and breaking the law, and that's wrong, and in the other he's defrauding a sick old man and he has if not a legal obligation, a moral obligation to pay him back later.

Stage 4 (5) (age 24) [Heinz] is violating property rights in the light of a higher law . . . human passion.

The whole idea of a promise, and the whole idea of consent is something that is based on the whole idea of private property and the liberal norm. Because you have to in some way establish a right to property and the only way you can do this is through some kind of contract.

[Should Bob tell on his brother?] I don't think he necessarily has a moral obligation to his brother not to tell his father. At the same time, I don't necessarily think he has a moral obligation to his brother not to tell his father. I think the obligation he'd have is simply in terms of what he could resolve, his own conscience.

The father had made a commitment and because of that he had assumed a sense of responsibility.

Stage 5 (4) (age 28) It is important that there is a proper means of punishment so there is effective rehabilitation so that people recognise that there are certain limits to freedom, certain responsibilities that one has to have in society, as being a member of society . . . allowing him to see somehow the relationship between freedom and security and the trade-off in terms of existing in society.

What we have done is to turn any moral situation into a verdict of whatever the nine judges of the Supreme Court decide the issue is going to be . . . a concept of being born equal going extremely wild so you are very pragmatic in a very rational situation, in which men no longer control what is going to be the limitation, but in effect it is a law that people are going by. . . . I think that the law really lies in the core of philosophy in the moral situation in America and that has to do with the fact that America has very little moral tradition.

Figure 18.4 Kohlberg's longitudinal study, Case 23.

Stage 3 (2) (age 13) [Should the brother tell the father that Joe lied?] I think that would be the right thing to do because he knows he's doing wrong and since he's an older brother he should feel some responsibility to try to help him and make him grow up right.

I would tell what he had done to try to straighten things out, because the father was wrong in the first place.

Don't think it's right to steal—definitely wrong—could have pleaded with the doctor or some high person in the state to get the druggist to lower the price.

Stage 3 (4) (age 16) His father was definitely breaking a promise and refusing the boy to do as he wished, and treating the boy more as an infant than as a young teenager. . . . If I was in his position I'd talk it over with my dad and try to explain it to him.

[Should brother tell?] I think he probably should tell his father, but he should also tell him why Joe did what he did. Try to make their father understand the reasons for it and look at it from their point ofview. If he makes his father realise this so that they could reach some kind of understanding.

[What would the judge think?] It depends on the judge's feelings and attitudes. If he is a strict observer of laws and everything he would feel that [Heinz shouldn't steal], but if he is a man who has a good education and a fairly responsible person who could be counted on to make wise decisions. I think he might be able to put himself in the man's place, or at least see his position.

Stage 4 (age 23) [Stealing the medicine] I'm not sure whether I'd have the nerve to do it, but in a situation where your wife is dying, I think I'd feel more personal emotional and logical responsibility to my wife than to this guy whose behaviour is rather anti-social in the sense that he is trying to make a lot of money on it.

[Has Joe a duty to his father?] I don't think being a good son involves that kind of duty. I know his father is supporting him, but I think that is a responsibility his father took on the moment he was conceived.

> [What should the judge do in Heinz's case?] I think the judge could suspend the sentence and work out or act as a sort of intermediary and work out a financial settlement between [the druggist and Heinz], I think this would probably be the more responsible solution.

Stage 4 (5) (age 28) [Father's authority over son] I think it is a limited kind of authority. It doesn't include the right to treat the son as a nonperson, someone without feeling. I think the son owes the father some sense of obedience, but I think the father at the same time owes the son a great deal of responsibility or commitment to responsible action.

> I am unwilling to condone a situation where the value of the druggist's profit gets in the way of someone's life.

> I think all of us ought to be concerned with everyone else's behaviour and improving it, but this goes deeper because they are brothers.

Figure 18.5 Kohlberg's longitudinal study, Case 42.

In terms of level of moral reasoning, these two young men scored similarly. They differed in their implicit theories and the rhetoric they invoked to deal with the hypothetical dilemmas presented to them and with the real-life dilemmas they personally encountered. Cases 23 and 42 can only utilize the implicit theory and the rhetorical system that they do because they are products of a culture in which these are available—for example, Case 23 describes vividly how he was exposed in another country to an alternative radical system quite outside the experience of his Republican upbringing. Yet he incorporated that radicalism at a level consistent with his current level of cognitive complexity, and, as we have noted, this experience of radicalism modified his way of thinking but did not alter his fundamental legalistic preoccupation.

Interpersonal and Intrapersonal

Earlier I described imaginary discussions between two adults and between an adult and a child on the desirability of rationality. These imaginary situations can be seen as an example of the relationship between intrapersonal and interpersonal areas of meaning. The individual brings to the interaction in dyad and group his or her own limited capacity for conceptualization and his or her own preferred theories. In the group situation, however, what he or she uses of this is regulated by the normative context, and he or she moderates, verbally and nonverbally, his or her behavior. Some flavor of this process can be gleaned from some quotations from Damon's (1977) study of the negotiations of sharing.

The setting is three 10-year-olds who are deciding how to allocate candy bars among a group of themselves plus one other, Dennis, who have been making bracelets.

E [Experimenter]: We talked with you all and couldn't decide, so *we thought you should decide together.* (1) What do you think is the *best way to give it out?* (2)

CRAIG: Would Dennis get some?

E: *If you think so.* (3)

NORMAN: He has to be here too.

E: *Well, you all decide among you.* (4)

BONNIE: I was thinking, we could give it out one a bracelet, because Dennis did one and we all did three. Or give two and a half to everybody. *That way everybody gets the same thing.* (5)

CRAIG: Maybe Dennis should get one and we get three.

NORMAN: No, *it isn't fair.* (6)

BONNIE: Also, *Dennis is younger* (7) and he left earlier.

E: Well, what do you think? Is that the best way? (8)

NORMAN: No.

E: Why not, Norman?

NORMAN: Because if he were here too, *and he's a child too* (9), so *he should get even* (10) [material omitted].

E: *So far you've got one for Dennis, three for you Craig, three for Norman and three for you Bonnie.* (11)

BONNIE: (mumbles something) That's what Dennis should get.

NORMAN: No. He's not, that's what I'm getting at. *That's what I'm putting in your mind, in your mind, in his mind* (pointing to each member in group). (12)

BONNIE: Well, let's split these in half. Everybody gets two and a half.

NORMAN: *Right. . . . It's the best way, everyone gets the same amount.* (13)

BONNIE: *Craig's is the prettiest, Norman's is the neatest, and I did the most.* (14)

NORMAN: *I was the most well behaved* (15) [material omitted].

NORMAN: *You're not putting Dennis' mind into your little mind. . . . I know how he would feel. . . . Well, you're not reasoning about him. If we did that he would* say (whiny voice) *"Come, you guys got this and I only got that," and he'd start bawling.* (16) (Damon, 1977, pp. 128–130, italics added throughout)

This extract shows decision making that relies on various forms of justice and fairness. But also it reveals several different theories about relationships, and it demonstrates the assertion of various rhetorics for the purpose of persuasion, which reflect the way each child is trying to define the social situation. The experimenter, for instance, in pieces 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8, sets the scene not only for negotiation but also for negotiation based on rational discourse and decision making. The language he uses, and the nonverbal cues (inflection, use of query) indicate this. Additionally, it is clear that he is setting some concept of "best" way, which the children pick up in different ways. For Norman, "best" means equal shares (6, 10, 13). For Bonnie, "best" has connotations of performance, and she constantly refers to the criteria that for her denote excellence or worth (14). She is, however, willing to waver under the pressure of Norman's egalitarianism (5 and later). Norman, however, also makes an explicit statement of his theory of the negotiation process (12) and the way people should be reacting to one another in the situation (16).

The extract is also very illuminating for what it reveals of the appropriate criteria for making "best" and "fair" judgments, such as "prettiest," "neatest," and "well behaved." This is obviously a rhetoric that is not specific to the justice-fairness task at hand. The kind of language a child uses as a *generic* "good" label reflects underlying theories about the conduct of human relationships. "Fair" is obviously a widespread term, because justice is a common rhetoric. "Nice," which implies concern with style, traits, and manner, is frequently used by Damon's respondents.

As Breakwell (1983) has argued, another role of rhetorical language is to define and maintain group identity. The individual acquires a culturally appropriate set of terms of abuse and approval that he or she learns, through experience of interpersonal situations, to use to establish his or her own membership of the group and the identity of his or her group vis-à-vis others. In that extract, Norman made reference to Dennis's status as a child (9), affirming therefore that he is a member of the group, despite his absence. The acquisition of this language also provides the individual with the wherewithal to demonstrate his or her own worth and legitimacy as a person—in general and in specific contexts. Terms such as *nice, fair, polite,* and *well behaved* are reflections of the individual's personal theory of "proper" self-presentation (Harré, 1979).

Berger and Luckmann (1967) illustrate this process:

> It is language that must be internalised above all. With language, and by means of it, various motivations and interpretative schemes are internalised as institutionally defined—wanting to act like a brave little boy, for instance, and assuming little boys to be naturally divided into the brave and the cowardly. These schemes provide the child with institutionalised programmes for everyday life, some immediately applicable to him, others anticipating conduct socially defined for later biographical stages. . . . These programmes, both the immediately applicable and the anticipatory, differentiate one's identity from that of others, such as girls, slave boys, or boys from another clan. Finally, there is internalisation of at least the rudiments of the legitimating

> apparatus; the child learns "why" the programmes are what they are. One must be brave because one wants to become a real man, one must perform the rituals because otherwise the gods will be angry; one must be loyal to the chief because only if one does will the gods support one in times of danger; and so on. [p. 155]

Berger and Luckmann were looking at how the child learns the language and the implicit explanatory justifications of appropriate roles and virtues. The work on sex-role development in particular has shown how important the peer group and play interaction are for the child's learning of the language of sex-roles and the explanations to support them. Even if parents may wish to offer an alternative rhetoric of sex roles, they find themselves in conflict with the powerful rhetoric of the peer group, learned in a social situation where the child is acquiring the skills of social negotiation and consensual meaning and simultaneously learning how to be effective in self-definition and self-presentation as a "proper" boy or girl.

The relationship between interpersonal and intrapersonal is two-way. There is constant interaction between individual and social construction of meaning, between the *individual's* intrapersonal cognitive organization, the *group's* generation of meaning and frames of reference and negotiation, and the individual's *interpretation* of group meaning.

Habermas (1979) has offered a model of the relationship between intrapersonal and interpersonal that focuses on the development of individual competence and its relationship to social experience. In the course of development, the child increases his or her competence in what Habermas terms "communicative action." The child's *interaction* with others is the source of his or her own symbolic universe. Competence in communicative action expands, through the development of reciprocity with single others, the group, and the community, and finally with the expansion of competence the individual's symbolic universe expands. Habermas argues that moral reasoning stages reflect the changes in the symbolic universe and in the levels of communicative action. In his model, the relationship is of action *upon* and *within* the social world; it is not simply a matter of change in capacity to conceptualize the social world.

Sociocultural and Interpersonal

The final relationship I want to consider is between sociocultural and the interpersonal. The group exists within a culture that provides categories of meaning; each group is constrained and limited by the options the culture makes available. In addition, as we have noted, each group is constrained and limited by the intrapersonal characteristics, the cognitive limitations, of its members. But as well, each group generates its own interpersonally negotiated meaning. In the example quoted earlier, the children in Damon's study acquiesced happily enough to the definition by one group member, the adult, that (1) the group task was about sharing, and (2) the exercise would be conducted according to culturally defined "rational discourse." On another occasion, it is quite possible that the group may have chosen to decide the issue of fairness by a show of physical strength or of abuse—behaviors that would have probably redefined the group into "winners" and "losers" and thus redefined the boundary of who was entitled to the candy bars. Some of the differences between the groups might be attributable to the moral stage of the individual group members. In the discussions of moral dilemmas and moral issues in the school community situations studied by Higgins, Power, and Kohlberg (Chap. 5) and the kibbutzim studied by Reimer and Power (1980), it was clear that the general level of moral reasoning of the individuals in the group does affect the negotiated consensus; these are examples of the intrapersonal constraints operating within the group.

There are several options of moral theory and moral rhetoric, however, that are equally acceptable to the culture. The research in the field of intergroup relations demonstrates the vast range of possible rhetorics available for groups within the culture, any one of which can be used to affirm the "in-group" or "out-group" status of individuals; for example, compare the entirely acceptable rhetoric of justice and fairness, which is used for dealing with friends, and the equally acceptable rhetoric of honor, which is used for dealing with foes.

The sociocultural meaning system therefore defines the universe of possibilities for interpersonal meaning, as it does for intrapersonal meaning. But it is not solely a one-way process. It is not uncommon for powerful or influential groups to generate new rhetorics, explanations, and definitions that eventually become incorporated into the broader cultural meaning system. Over the last decade there has been intensive interpersonal discourse on the issue of sexism, much of it in the form of consciousness-raising groups. This has had a noticeable impact on concepts and use of language. In periods of rapid social change, new ideas, new explanations, and new rhetoric are frequently generated among a small group of people, and these become incorporated and disseminated quickly within the culture. This process is an integral part of social change.

CONCLUSION

In this discussion I have tried to depart from the dichotomous representation of individualistic structuralism, which focuses on the processes of individual construction and the development of individual understanding, and social structuralism, which sees individual meaning solely as a functional reflection of public language, cultural determinants, or the requirements of public self-presentation. I have tried to take a fresh look at the social context of moral reasoning, to look aslant at what have been, effectively, two opposing models of determinism. In this, I have looked at both the "what" and the "how" of

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moral reasoning and tried to see the ways in which these two are interwoven. My main argument has been that moral reasoning and social explanation are constructed *through* the social interaction processes by which they are communicated to others. The explanations, and associated rhetoric, which are elicited through the hypothetical dilemma resolution, are also the basic discourse of ordinary, real situations, the ordinary thinking of individuals about their personal life, about their relationships with significant others and with the institutions of society. They are part of the individual's "theory" about wider social and moral issues. These explanations and rhetorics are available to the individual through cultural and interpersonal experience; people do not, usually, think and theorize in isolation. The process of negotiating one's definition of oneself and one's world takes place in small groups and dyads, where one learns to negotiate meaning *with* others and *for* oneself; the two processses are integrally related. The one cannot exist without the other.

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KOHLBERG'S CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY: A POSITIVE VIEW

In S. Modgil and C. Modgil (Eds.)
Kohlberg: Consensus and Controversy.
BRIGHTON, Falmer Press
1985

I have in my possession a pledge dated October 1969, drawn up by students and faculty at an Eastern U.S. University: 'I will oppose any unjust war my country may undertake. I consider it my right and duty to judge the morality of my government's actions. I commit my personal energy to the creation of a peaceful and humane society'. This pledge expresses three things: a statement of moral principles about a political issue, a statement about the relationship between the individual's moral position and government policy and a statement of intended moral action within a political context. It is typical of North American campus rhetoric in the period of the Vietnam War.

Analysed from the perspective of Kohlberg's theory, the pledge reflects at least stage 5 moral reasoning; lower stage thought does not include the idea that it is a person's right and duty to question the government. The key rhetorical issues in the pledge, justice, rights and humanitarianism, are central concepts of American liberal democracy; they are also central to Kohlberg's theory of morality.

The flowering of political radicalism in the nineteen-sixties and early seventies produced a rich harvest of research on the relationship between moral reasoning, political ideology and political action; indeed, Kohlberg's theory of moral development virtually supplanted personality models in the explanation of youth dissent. But the relationship between moral development and politics is not confined to cataloguing the moral stage of campus dissenters. In this chapter, I will consider five areas in which I consider that Kohlberg's work on moral development has made a major contribution to the study of politics. Some of these contributions are direct, some are indirect. I shall first consider the criticisms of Kohlberg's political assumptions, his explicit identification of his theory of moral development with liberalism, and his relative lack of attention to social and historical factors in the construction of individual moral perspectives. I shall argue that this particular critique has brought into sharp focus a much broader debate about the way developmental psychology deals with values, and that on balance, Kohlberg's explicit affirmation of a link between ideology and morality is a positive not a negative.

I shall then look at empirical studies of the relationship between moral reasoning and political ideology and action. Thirdly, I shall look at parallel work on cognitive-developmental approaches to the growth of social, political and economic thought. Fourthly, I shall consider the ways in which the work of Kohlberg and his associates on participatory democracy and "just communities" in schools and prisons can be seen as studies of the micro-political environment. Finally I will consider the wider social and political context, and the relationship between individual reasoning and social and cultural experience, and how work stemming from Kohlberg's theory illuminates this.

THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM

Bias-hunters come in two forms. The first kind want their science value-free, and their accusations identify forms of subjectivism in theory and methodology; the second kind recognise that social science cannot (and should not) be value-free, but want an explicit and sophisticated exposition of the sources of value and of the influences of culture and history on theory building and interpretation. Kohlberg originally threw down a gauntlet in 1971 in his paper 'From Is to Ought' in which he affirmed that the psychological development of individual moral reasoning paralleled the philosophical progression towards universal ideas of justice and liberal democracy; he has subsequently written further elaborations of this viewpoint. In doing this, he upset both kinds of bias-hunterl

Kohlberg argued that liberalism implies social evolution in parallel with moral evolution; this means progression towards greater justice, to relations based on social contract, and towards individual autonomy in rights and decision-making. He argued that history confirms this view; 'The agonisingly slow but relatively consistent trend towards greater justice, civil rights and racial equality is one of the many historical indicators of the directionality of a democratic system towards carrying its original premises of justice beyond the boundaries accepted by the founders of the system. Indeed, the major moral crises of the past 20 years have represented conflicts between universal justice and the boundary-maintaining demands of the society-sustaining morality'.[2]

This quotation clearly links moral judgements about justice with social and political policies concerned with the establishment of justice. Applying a moral judgement to a social situation becomes translated into policies and laws which effect justice: the polity is by implication therefore the aggregate of individual moral concern. This position is stated even more explicitly by one of his followers:

> 'The importance of Kohlberg's sequence lies in the fact that morality is at the very crux of political philosophy. While Kohlberg avoids an exact definition of morality, he does characterise it by the concept of justice, loosely defined as "giving each person his due". But this is also the main purpose of political systems. Their existence ideally serves the function of distributing the goods and services of society in a just manner.' (Candee)[3]

Kohlberg is avowedly expressing a liberal point of view which makes very explicit assumptions about the primacy of a justice-based democracy not only as a form of government, or as one ideology amongst many, but as a historical necessity (at least in Western society). According to Kohlberg's theory, individual moral development represents the gradual cognitive appreciation of the full implications of liberal thought. Democracy is the system in which the practice of justice is most likely to develop, and in which the idea of justice is most likely to predominate. Much of Kohlberg's thinking about practical democracy he acknowledges to have been influenced by George Herbert Mead. Mead defined the successful practice of democracy individualistically, as the ability to absorb information from others, to listen before forming judgements and to take the role of the 'generalised other' as a precondition for action. Kohlberg has translated this into the "ideal" stage 6 situation of 'moral musical chairs' in which the judge role-takes the perspective of all interested parties in the situation. This also is consistent with Rawls' 'original position'.[4]

The critique of Kohlberg's liberal idealism take several forms. The first of these is addressed not only to Kohlberg, but to cognitive-developmental theory in general. This is the cult of progressivism, or the perfectibility of the human being; this concept owes much to the philosophy of Dewey. Central to American liberalism is the notion that government and education and individual cognitive development are all moving towards improvement. Sullivan argues that the popularity of Kohlberg's theory in the United States is at least in part due to the fact that his theory is consistent with the dominant cultural ethos of progression towards moral perfectibility, particularly as he also stresses the concepts of justice, rights and humanitarianism enshrined in the Constitution and therefore close to the hearts of American liberals.[5] And indeed, liberals in the early nineteen-seventies were on the whole pleased with the findings that the radical young, although somewhat of a nuisance, were nevertheless showing a high level of moral reasoning and humanitarian concern. Adelson argued:

> 'We do like to think of our young as possessing exemplary moral vision; it speaks so well of them and especially well of ourselves. What has not been sufficiently understood is that the moralism of the [student] Movement draws upon and continues the cursed American habit of pursuing moral uplift in the realm of politics'[6]

The second objection to Kohlberg's particular expression of liberalism is that he ignores structural aspects of the social system. Some critics regard his theory as a rather dangerous perpetration of the liberal myth of individual efficacy in making moral and political change. Reid and Yanerella for example, argue that moral education packages and practices are relatively easy to derive from Kohlberg's method, and they are apparently effective in making people mouth democratic sentiments. But such piecemeal educational efforts do little to disturb the existing social system, and indeed shore it up. Individual ethical reform, and even local grass-roots democracy, do not, they argue, begin to tackle the fundamentally structural problems of American society; it is an illusion that making people 'better' in the sense of more morally critical has any effect on social change.[7]

The third objection is that Kohlberg is theory has too narrow an ideological base. This criticism has several forms. The most common is that the claim that moral developmental stages are universal ignores the very different social and political conditions even within Western Societies, but particularly outside the West. Although the adolescent in a different culture may be able to respond to the Heinz dilemma, it is by no means certain that the issues of rights and justice are necessarily central to her thinking, nor that these issues correspond to what is most salient in the social system in which the individual lives. Many societies do not have social institutions which reify the world-view of post-stage 3 thought; the dominant mode of social organisation is the community, rather than society at large. Indeed this may be an explanation for the general failure to find post stage 3 thinking outside the West. In contrast, in Israel the kibbutz system does quite explicitly practise and preach collectivist socialism and democratic procedure; kibbutz respondents consistently score higher than their age-mates in the U.S. on moral reasoning measures.[8]

The objection therefore is that the themes of justice and democracy, as emphasised in Kohlberg's formulation of the moral stages, are neither universal values, nor more particularly, are they universally practised. The emphasis on justice and democracy ignores the possibility that other values and other forms of social and political praxis may exist, and be reflected in different kinds of thinking. Harre, for example, has argued that in many societies personal morality is based on the maintenance of honour rather than on the negotiation of contracts or rights. Even within American culture, Gilligan has argued that women tend to operate with a morality based on responsibility and mutuality rather than on rights and justice.[9] Other critics have argued that the development of increasing abstraction and articulation may itself be culturally determined; educational practice in advanced industrial societies encourages a move from the concrete to the abstract. Quite apart from its status as a dominant cultural value, justice lends itself to formalism and ultra-rational analysis, and may for that reason be particularly attractive in cultures which value formalistic procedures of thought.[10]

A fourth objection is that Kohlberg is caught in a liberal paradox. Part of the problem is inherent in the philosophy of liberalism, part comes from Kohlberg's attempts to link liberalism to development of individual thought. According to Fishkin, the paradox of liberalism is that it contains within it an uneasy tension between relativism and absolutism.[11] In practice, both are inconsistent with liberalism. The absolutist view, that one position may provide the ultimate ethical or political solution, is inconsistent with the idea that there should be individual liberty to choose between many points of view, and it is also inconsistent with the idea of continual change and improvement. Relativism is inconsistent with liberalism because it may imply subjectivism and arbitrariness; true liberalism requires that there be objective criteria for the acceptance of ethical or political positions, but these criteria may legitimate more than one position. The paradox of Kohlberg's position arises from the progressivist assumptions behind the developmental sequence; progressivism implies a goal, a telos. Kohlberg's theory accords justice a special status, explicitly associated with democracy, and furthermore he argues that because all stage 6 thinkers would accept a common set of principles based on justice and democracy, and would all argue from Rawls' 'original position', they must come to a common conclusion.

The final criticisms which I will consider comes from the critical theory perspective. Broadly, these criticisms argue that neither individual ideological development nor dominant political ideologies such as democracy or liberalism can be looked at separately from the social and historical conditions in which they occur. So the individual does not invent or construct her world in isolation, as a consequence of self-reflection. Instead, the individual's developing conceptualisation is in a dialectical relationship with the available social representations, dominant ideologies and paradigms of common explanation[12]. These ideas themselves reflect the cultural and historical context. Kohlberg's theory itself is a product of the liberal tradition in which he lives and works.

In summary, the underlying theme of all the criticisms of Kohlberg's implicit and explicit political perspective is that he espouses the liberal position uncritically and does not consider any other possible perspective. The faults of his theory are the faults of this position; too much weight given to the individual as an effective political agent, too little appreciation of historical, cultural and economic factors in social change, and too great an emphasis on the analysis of individual behaviour. One major manifestation of this is the failure to make a distinction between democratic interaction at the interpersonal level, and democratic relations between the social group and the state.

In principle, I would accept that most of these criticisms are valid. At the very least, Kohlberg's working definition of democracy is located firmly within the framework of North American commonsense ideals and values, which reflect a different history even from that of European democracy. However my defence of Kohlberg's contribution to political psychology is that by making his liberal position explicit, and by trying to make explicit parallels between individual development and political ideology, he has made a very important contribution to a number of debates.

Firstly, he has demonstrated the vacuity of "value-free" psychology of development; his affirmation that his theory reflects his own liberalism is a part of this, but his detailed analysis of a particular form of moral liberalism has effectively made his theory a case-history in the more general debate about psychological theories as cultural and historical products. Secondly, the application of his theory to current political and social issues has provided valuable data for the study of relations between cultural belief systems, political theory and moral rhetoric. Thirdly, the work of his critics has begun to piece together the relationship between moral development processes and the social processes involved in the development of political thought, in particular through the study of discourse and communicative action. Amongst his own research group, the work on just communities, 'moral atmosphere', and work democracy marks a shift from individualistic developmental psychology to a social psychological examination of moral and political interaction in small groups.[13]

In the remainder of this chapter I will consider how different kinds of empirical work on the relationship between moral development and politics elaborate some of these issues. The work which demonstrates a relationship between political ideology, action, and moral thinking illustrates the overlap between cognitive explanations of moral and of political events, and between moral and political rhetorics. Work on the development of political thought shows parallels between the structure of thinking on political and social issues, and thinking on moral issues. The work on the "just community" focusses firstly on discourse and communication, and secondly, it illustrates the micro-political context in which young people learn about conflicts of interest and power relations. Finally, in the last section I will look at the ways in which moral development research has enlarged our understanding of the transmission of cultural and political norms.

MORAL STAGE AND POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ACTION

One of the first reports of a clear relationship between political behaviour and moral stage was by Haan, Smith and Block; they studied the Free Speech Movement Sit-in at Berkeley in 1964.[14] Concurrently, Kohlberg and his associates were beginning to report a relationship between moral stage and the way in which the longitudinal sample were thinking about political issues - particularly the Vietnam War and the Draft.[15] In the following few years there were many studies of student activism. A consistent picture emerged from these studies; activism, and support for radical political positions in general, was associated either with stage 2 or with post-conventional reasoning. The conclusion drawn from these studies - at least by those who popularised them - was that the activists were liberal gilded youth; they perceived the political in terms of the moral, and had the courage of their convictions to act upon the moral imperative. In reality, of course the picture was more complicated.[16]

There are two kinds of question one can ask about the relationships between moral development and activism. The first question is 'who are the activists?'; the second question is 'what correlates with moral stage?' There are obvious differences in methodology and interpretation, and in choice of dependent and independent variables, depending on which question is asked. Questions about the characteristics of activists imply a typological model; the activist is a different kind of person from the non-activist. The question presupposes a search for a constellation of differentiating attributes. Questions about the correlates of moral stages assume developmental change; when a person moves from the present stage of moral reasoning to the next, she will change in other ways also. In other words, attributes are presumed to correlate with the stage rather than the person. Most of the campus activist studies were implicitly typological.

The studies of protest took several forms. Some research focussed on behaviour specifically - on action and protest. Other studies looked at political beliefs. (Many of course covered both). A third type of study looked at broader social, economic and political ideology; the content of what people believed rather than the labels they endorsed. Direct action, in the form of demonstrations, sit-ins, marches and so forth was widespread fifteen years ago on campuses throughout the world, but it was by no means directed to a single issue. According to Fendrich and Tarleau: 'During the nineteen-sixties hundreds of thousands of black and white students became involved as the direct action and rights protests mushroomed. Later, segments of the movement redirected their demands to ending the Vietnam War, reforming universities, stopping environmental pollution and a host of local issues.' *Pace* liberal democracy, this was a dangerous game: 'For their efforts, students were killed, beaten, tear-gassed, arrested, suspended from school and generally harassed as they used the tactics of political confrontation to reform or radically change major institutional sectors of the United States'.[17] The goals of protesters were heterogeneous; their common theme was the belief that certain means were legitimate, appropriate and effective.

Whatever the limitations of Haan, Smith and Block's study (and it has been criticised on many counts) it did at least try to obtain a reasonable sample of activists and a reasonable control group. It still remains the richest study, of student politics and moral reasoning. It was an early example of campus protest; in 1964 direct action was still relatively unusual and associated mainly with civil rights and race issues. Haan's 'activists' were a) those students who had been arrested at the FMS sit-in at Berkeley and b) a group from San Francisco State College who belonged to organisations which supported direct action. The 'control' group were non-activist students from a variety of organisations at colleges in the Bay Area. 54% produced written moral reasoning protocols which could be assigned to a 'pure' stage. The relationship between activism and moral stage was very clear; 48% of the activists were operating with stage 5 or 6 thought, compared with only 23% of the remainder; 41% of activists were operating with stage 3 or 4 thought, compared with 73% of the rest.*

Other studies of activism and moral stage were conducted by Fishkin, Keniston and Mackinnon, Fontana and Noel, and Leming. Fishkin et al's study took place at the time of the Kent State incident, perhaps the peak of political consciousness and radical enthusiasm. Their study measured endorsement of slogans proposing respectively, violent action, peaceful radicalism and conservatism. They found that support for "violent" slogans correlated strongly only with stage 2 reasoning; stage 4 reasoners significantly rejected violent slogans.[19] In a study of students, faculty and adminstrators at Yale, Fontana and Noel defined activism broadly, including attending meetings, working for political candidates, serving on committees, soliciting support and distributing literature, as well as forms of protest. They found that activism correlated with moral stage differently according to role; activist and non-activist students did not differ much in moral stage, faculty activists however used more stage 5 and 6, and less stage 2, reasoning than non-activists.[20]

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* One of the problems of the Haan et al. study, which in fact applies to all the early studies, was the coding of stage 2 and stage 6 reasoning. In the longitudinal study, Kohlberg discovered what at first he thought was 'regression to stage 2', after the development of stage 4 understanding of social order and institutions. The regression was manifested by an extreme relativism and apparent instrumentalist view, which looked like stage 2 thinking. However, it became clear eventually that this was a decalage consequent upon people realising the limitations of the ordered world of stage 4 thought, and was followed in time by movement to stage 5. The later coding methods, which focussed more on structure rather than content of reasoning, accommodated this transitional phase. In fact when the Haan et al data was recoded by Kohlberg and Candee, stage 2 reasoning disappeared, and most stage 6 reasoning was reclassified as stage 5. The effect of this was to reveal a monotonic relationship between activism and moral stage: however most of the early data on politics and moral reasoning has not been recoded.18

Leming, studying high school students, also identified two kinds of activism, community involvement in pressure groups and participation in a specific demonstration on school premises about the invasion of Cambodia; the latter resulted in temporary suspension from school. He found that stage 5 reasoners were likely to be activists in either community or direct action, stage 4 reasoners were not direct action supporters, stage 3 reasoners were not differentiated, and stage 2 reasoners were more likely to be involved in community action.[21]

These studies tend to confirm

a) the rejection of direct action by stage 4 reasoners

b) the high involvement by post-conventional reasoners with action in general, but the wide variation in definition of 'activism' is an important caveat to any generalisations.

Conservatism was unfashionable during this period: even the most 'conservative' students were quite liberal. However, Fontana and Noel found that stage 4 reasoning correlated with Right orientation, and Left orientation correlated with stage 2, 5, and 6 reasoning. Haan et al also found that stage 2, 5 and 6 reasoning correlated with radical political ideology.

In Fishkin et al's study of slogan endorsement, stage 4 thinkers rejected radical slogans and endorsed conservative slogans; conservative slogans were rejected by stage 5 and 6 thinkers. Alker and Poppen measured ideology using Tomkins' measure of humanism versus normativism. They found a clear relationship between humanism and principled moral thought. Sullivan and Quarter studied only stage 4 and post-conventional reasoners and their degree of political radicalism in the context of parochial University of Toronto isses; they found a monotonic relationship between radicalism and moral stage.[22]

Latterly, leftwing radicalism has gone out of fashion; three recent studies in Europe show a definite shift to the right. But the same kind of overall relationship between political beliefs and moral stage remains. Lind et al. studied eighteen year old West Germans; he used Tomkins scale of humanism and scales of egalitarianism, democratisation and participation. His measure of moral reasoning was a questionnaire, similar in format to Rest's Defining Issues Test; he found that the more "democratic" their orientation, the more respondents endorsed higher stage items on the moral scale. In a similar study with British youth, Weinreich-Haste found a clear relationship between endorsement of high stage items and rejection of lower stage items, and support for the Labour rather than Conservative party. High stage endorsement was also associated with support for liberal social policies. Emler, Renwick and Malone used Rest's DIT in a study of Scottish undergraduates; they found that endorsement of stage 4 reasons was associated with right wing orientation, and endorsement of principled reasons, with a left wing orientation.[23]

The pattern which emerges from these studies is consistent; it appears even in different political climates, and whether the measures of moral development are open-ended or by the endoresement of questionnaire items. Prima facie, Kohlberg's argument that moral development reflects the development of a liberal ideology is confirmed by these studies. But a number of caveats are in order; the strong evidence is for a relationship between the production of stage 4 moral thought and the endorsement of conservative beliefs and actions, and the *production* of principled moral thought and the *endorsement* of liberal beliefs and actions. The political ideology correlates of the earlier stages of thought are more problematic. This is an important gap because a high proportion of respondents do not produce stage 4 or higher reasoning, so the "strong" relationship only applies to a proportion of respondents.

As it stands, the main questions which the data raise concern the interpretation of the relationship between a *type* of ideology and a *developmental stage* of moral reasoning. Because stage 3 thinkers are not more conservative than stage 4 thinkers, as far as we can see from the data, we must perhaps conclude that stage 4 represents some kind of consolidation of conservatism, possibly consequent upon the increasing appreciation of the wider social implications of order and social institutions. But what happens next? Do individuals become less conservative as they progress in their moral thiking? In which case we would have to conclude that conservatism is a morally less 'mature' form of reasoning. The evidence is sketchy; some of the longitudinal data, and some of the data on the effects of political ordeal-by-fire, indicate that for *some* people this may be true, but it is unlikely to be universally the case.

Further evidence that the arguments of stage 4 are *perceived* as conservative and postconventional arguements are *perceived* as liberal, is provided by Emler and his associates. They tested this in two studies; in the first they asked respondents to complete the DIT firstly as themselves, secondly, as if they were of an extreme left, or an extreme right, political orientation. They found that a) leftwingers showed greater endorsement of Principled items, than rightwingers b) 'fake' left wing scores were higher than 'fake' right wing scores , and c) faking produced more extreme scores than did answering 'as oneself', *except* that leftwingers faking left produced a *lower* P score. The reverse was true of the pattern for stage 4 endorsement, but the polarisation of scores in the faking condition was even greater. In a second study they asked respondents to identify the politics of responses, supposedly 'written' by stage 4 or stage 5 respondents and found that again, the stage 4 responses were perceived as rightwing, the stage 5 as leftwing.24

These findings confirm an overlap between ideology and stage content, and casts some doubts on the efficacy of questionnaire methods of measuring moral stage. In a study designed to extend Emler's hypothesis, Weinreich-Haste, Adams and Clay asked respondents to produce "fake" left or right wing responses to a moral dilemma. We found that individuals "faking left" were no more likely to produce higher scores on their "fake" responses than on their "real" responses, than individuals "faking right", but that overall, there was a tendency for "left" responses - real or fake - to be scored somewhat higher than "right" responses.25

These studies confirm a relationship between political ideology and moral stage, but its exact nature remains unclear. In the rest of this chapter I will look at other features of political development and the effects of political experience which illuminate some of the process of moral and political development.

DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING

Studies of the development of political thought are not concerned with the origin of different ideological positions but with the growth of understanding of social, political and economic institutions. In the previous section I reviewed research on the endorsement of particular political positions; in this section, the material is primarily the production of political cognitions.

Adelson et. al. studied the concepts of community and law, amongst adolescents aged 11 to 18. They found a progression from concrete thought, focussing on individuals and present concerns, towards a more abstract and integrated general understanding of the social system, in which there was a focus on the community rather than on the individual.26 As the thinking of the individual develops, she becomes less authoritarian, more able to realise that rule and law are modifiable, and more appreciative of the beneficial, as opposed to the restrictive, functions of social institutions. Connell studied 5 to 16 year olds and identified four phases of political thought; intuitive, primitive realism, construction of a political order, and ideological thought. Furth and McConville presented a series of isues to adolescents in which the interests of different groups conflicted, or in which there was a conflict between individual interests and those of the community. They noted a shift from a 'no compromise' response to a recognition of alternative perspectives and the possibility of realistic compromise. Their study also showed progression from personalistic views of society to a more societal view and a recognition of community functions and responsibility.[27]

In a ten nation study, Torney et al. identified five levels in political thinking;

1) vague inarticulate notions with emergent images of one or two institutions such as the police

2) primarily the harmonising values and process; a 'sheltered' view

3) intermediate stage of growing awareness of social conflict, economic forces and multiple institutional roles

4) understanding of the cohesive and divisive functions of many institutions, and overlap between institutional functions

5) skepticism, general contempt for institutions, lack of belief in their efficacy, emphasis on discordant functions, unfairness and class bias.

These latter are interesting; like the other studies they show positive growth towards a more sophisticated conception of democracy, but they also indicate some negative aspects of increasing understanding of conflict and inequality.[28]

Several other studies have found very similar patterns of conceptual progression through adolescence. To my knowledge, no studies have looked at the correlation between moral stage and political stage, but some have found a relationship between the development of formal operations and the development of a 'societal' perspective. None of these studies make formal claims for structured wholes in the description of the stages, but there is remarkable consistency in the general pattern of progressive cognitive change. All find movement from a personal, individualistic, authoritarian and controlling view of the world, through a period in which the individual has worked out some concrete functional understanding of norms, codes and procedures for regulating and explaining interpersonal relations, to an ultimate conception of social structure and the capacity to apply general principles and meta-perspectives to the situation.29 Two studies however do make an conceptual link between social and moral cognition. Tapp and Kohlberg studied the development of legal reasoning, and identified three levels; authoritarian control and fiat; rules and laws as normative means of control and guidance; and perception of the social utility of laws and of the rational principles underlying lawmaking. Tapp argues for a close connection between legal and moral thought; 'These concepts [obligation, authority and justice] intimately related to the institution of law and legal process are also core aspects in moral thought. This correspondence suggests a consistency in moral and legal development. The law is the central human rule system, albeit the most venerable and specialised institutionalised expression of rule - or norm-guided behaviour, to which basic moral categories may apply'.

Torney studied children's conceptions of social welfare and justice; such issues as slavery, enforced residence, voting opportunity and economic privation. She explicitly commented on the interconnectedness of political and moral thinking; 'Faced with human rights issues, young people refer them to the social institutions. Moral justice appears to be closely tied to policy in the minds of young people'.30

These studies show a clear parallel between the structural changes which occur in the development of political thinking, and the stage structure of moral thinking. One of the main underlying themes in the development of moral thought is the growing understanding of the social system and of relations between the individual and the structure of social institutions; the difference between stage 3 and stage 4 moral thought, for example, is the shift from a generalised aggregate of the experiential 'community' to an appreciation of the abstract concept, "society".[31] Although the work in political concept development is as yet less rigorous than that in the moral domain, it is apparent that similar qualitative differences in cognition mark the transitions in political development.

There are a number of ways of interpreting the similarity. The first is that there is common underlying growth in cognitive ability; logical operations, and their social-cognitive manifestation as 'social perspective-taking', are cognitive processes applied to both domains. A second explanation is in terms of the common content of justice, as expressed by Tapp and Kohlberg, by Candee, and to some degree by Torney, in the quotations presented earlier. According to this explanation, both moral and political reasoning are concerned with justice, and in both domains of development we are witnessing the gradual unfolding of justice-in-liberal-democracy. This of course raises again all the questions about the role of justice as the central theme of development which were discussed in the first section.

Another interpretation however, is that the two fields of research are picking up the same phenomenon, namely the development of a broad conception of the social world, a set of schema for making sense of relations between persons and between the individual and social institutions. Elsewhere I have described this as the individual's 'implicit social theory'.[32] The implicit social theory is primarily descriptive; it reflects the way that the individual understands things to be; there are policemen, there are rules and conventions, there are forms of legal redress for injustices, there are normative methods of dealing with conflict. Both political and moral thought are prescriptive as well as descriptive; one generates an 'ought' statement from how one believes things should be, but that 'ought' also depends on how one believes things actually to be. By focussing only on prescriptive statements in developingthe coding system, Kohlberg has made the descriptive underpinnings implicit, apparent only at the level of the structure of reasoning. According to the model of a common implicit social theory, the actual manifestation of prescriptive reasoning depends on the kind of questions asked; if the issue is couched in moral terms, the language of moral prescription is invoked, if in political terms, then political rhetoric emerges.

THE MICRO-POLITICAL CONTEXT AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

So far I have considered the correlates of moral stage, and material which illustrates the structural changes in the development of individual reasoning. While this chapter is not concerned with the issues of growth and transition, in the work on stage transition and on the conditions which stimulate processes of moral growth we find important material on what I shall term the 'micro-political context'.

There are two ways of looking at the process of moral development. One may focus on individual thought, and how it becomes restructured as a consequence of cognitive disequilibruim. According to this approach, external events or experiences are catalysts in creating constructive disturbance in the structure of current thought. This is might be termed the 'developmental psychology' approach. It is characteristic of the early work of Turiel, Blatt and others; they sought the intervening variables in moral transition, looking at the effect of classroom "socratic discussion", or of major life events, on individual cognitive structures.[33] Alternatively one may focus on social processes, the actual social context in which disequilibrium takes place. This might be termed the 'social psychology' approach, and is characteristic of the later work on the 'just community' and 'moral atmosphere'. These studies looked at the interaction between people in an environment which was explicitly a self-governing participatory democracy; they focussed on the ways in which discussion of moral issues changed over time, within the group. Although the change in individual reasoning was an important variable in these studies, they were much more studies of a community in action.

One explanation of the development of political consciousness is that it arises from the child's experience of social interaction, and later from her experience of dealing - at first or second hand -with institutions. She learns at first hand how to deal with power relations and negotiations at the interpersonal level, and she learns also the nature of power structures in the school and the family. At second-hand, she learns about the relations between the social group to which her family belongs and the world of employers, bureaucrats and the police. Extensive sociological research, particularly in Britain, has looked at the 'hidden curriculum' of power relations in the school and the social world which the child inhabits. However, very little attention has been paid to the thinking of individual children; the analysis has primarily focussed on sociological processes and the reproduction of power and class relations.[34]

Kohlberg's shift to looking at just communities rather than only at individual reasoning is a natural extension of the influence of Dewey and Mead, and their belief in the dominant role of participatory democracy in the development of ideas of justice. Practical participatory democracy has an important role in North American cultural and political history; the 'town meeting' had a real role in local government within folk, if not living, memory. The emphasis on participatory democracy in American life is not merely an echo of the ideals of the Constitution; it is a powerful myth even in the days of hierarchical corporations and dollar-rich presidential campaigns. Participatory democracy becomes equated with representational democracy. In Europe, the long tradition of caste-or class-based power have provided little role, even at local level, for any equivalent of the 'town meeting'. The history of democracy in Europe has largely been the development - sometimes slow, sometimes swift and bloody - of representational democracy; the right to the ballot box rather than the right to negotiatied consensus rising from the grass-roots. Kohlberg acknowledges the importance to his thinking of the 'town meeting' model. However, the specific impetus to creating just communities with participatory democracy was his realisation that institutions have an 'implicit stage'. This is reflected in the structure of authority relations, the normative ways of interacting, the mechanisms by which members of the institution have to operate in order to manipulate the situation to their own advantage. So the authoritarian regime of a traditional prison, for example, embodies a stage 1 or stage 2 world; at most the prisoners are constrained to a stage 2 instrumental relativism in their attempt to circumvent the system. Such an environment, Kohlberg argues, provides no opportunity for the individual to develop more complex thinking.35

Over a period of years, Kohlberg and his associates were involved in setting up a number of 'just communities' in prisons and schools. Though most of them had a fairly brief life of a few years,* they provided rich material on the micro-political environment. The purpose of a just community is to provide an environment in which 'justice' is practised in the form of participatory democracy; everyone is involved equally in the decision-making process. The "implicit stage" of such a community is 4 or 5. In the case of the prisons, the just communities were formed by a volunteer group of prisoners and staff, who reorganised their roles under the direction of the researchers and set up regular community meetings for the discussion of policy and grievances. In the case of the schools, students and staff spent a proportion of the school week in the 'alternative' school environment, which included some lessons and community meetings.36

The structure of relationships within the just community embodies stage 4 or 5 reasoning but that does not imply that the reasoning which went on in discourse within the community was at that level, or even that the aim was for everyone to reach that level. At the beginning of the life of the school just communities, the pupils were mostly operating with stage 2 or 3 reasoning and the staff with stage 3 and 4 reasoning. The purpose of a just community is to provide a) a norm of participatory democracy and self-government, and b) the opportunity for members to encounter situations in which the consequences of their decisions and actions become apparent to them. Initially, the dominant stage 2 mode of self-interest was apparent in discussions; members showed little conception of either community obligations or community interests. Over time, the concept of community became increasingly salient in discussions.[37]

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* Kohlberg has described them as 'a successful operation in which the patient died'.

As micro-political environments, just communities have the following characteristics:

1) they involve the individual in taking responsibility for her decision-making processes in a group situation.
2) they provide first-hand experience of political and conceptual conflict and confrontation with others in the group; this exposes the members to alternative perspectives on the issues, and encourages discourse skills.
3) they provide experience of conflict between the group's desires and intentions and the power structure of the outside world; for example, attempts to legislate within the communities about the use of drugs, or attendance in class, were constrained by the legal responsibilities of the teachers and the school.
4) they provide a situation in which the group develops its own normative definition of 'appropriate' behaviour, values, goals, methods of interaction and power relations within the group.

Kohlberg and his associates - notably Higgins, Power and Reimer[38]-developed measures to identify some of the characteristics of just community interaction. Their measures define the group's 'moral atmosphere' and the development of a 'collective norm'. "Moral atmosphere" means the shared values of the group (as expressed as a consensual norm in group discussion), the extent to which the group is operating as a community in its discussions and shared actions, and the moral stage structure of the shared perceptions held by the group. "Collective norms" are the values-in-practice concerning community-oriented behaviour, and they develop during the group's lifetime. Collective norms concern what is done, not what the group thinks ought to be done. Reimer and Power postulate eight phases in the development of collective norms, which are divided into four main periods; collective norm proposal, collective norm acceptance, collective norm expectation and collective norm enforcement.

Classical social psychology of small group behaviour describes many of these phenomena: the difference is that Kohlberg's associates incorporate individual cognition, social communication and discourse, action and reflection on action into their analysis. In addition, the method incorporates measures of group and individual cognitive restructuring.

These studies provide insight into the role of the community as the crucible of political development. The norms which emerged concerned power relations between individuals and between the community and the wider world, and the maintenance of the community as a functioning unit. The 'meta-norm' of both prison and school communities was survival; it was clear that the experience was valued, enjoyable, and seen to have a number of pay-offs. Power and Reimer identified collective norms of property (concerning stealing), attendance at class, racial integration and drug use. The first two developed to a high degree; the norm of racial integration became 'expected' but never 'enforced', and the issue of marijuana use remained problematic. All aspects of norm development were associated with conflict; changes in shared perceptions were gradual and there were clashes between interest groups within the community. In the case of property and attendance norms, once the idea of community responsibility was consensually established, the collective norms consolidated. In the case of racial integration, however, the issue was that a high proportion of the pupils (and one staff member) were black; there were differences in style and values between the black and white groups, and this caused difficulty in created a unified community loyalty. The virtual failure to establish a collective norm about drug use is explained by Reimer and Power as due to lack of consensus about the deleterious effects to the community of drug use. Indeed at that time it was a tenet of the adolescent sub-culture that marijuana facilitated interaction, and good interaction was highly valued within the community. Although the reports of just communities tend to concentrate on the benefits and effectivenss of participatory democracy, researchers did acknowledge the limitations of 'equality' amongst students or prisoners and staff in decision-making, and also the constraints arising from the power of the wider institution to close down the experiment if it did not conform to acceptable standards. The issues of escaping (for prisoners), attendance (for students) and drug use for both, placed the staff in a compromised position in which they had to invoke the threat of external sanctions. In addition, the school staff had the advantage of superior age and level of moral reasoning.

A strong criticism of the prison community democracy, comes from Feldman.[39] He analysed tapes of the community meetings in the prison experiments. He argues that in practice, very few decisions were made in the group discussions, and decision making was constrained by the knowledge that any decisions had to be acceptable to prison authorities. As far as the prison authorities were concerned, the effectiveness of the experiment was measured in terms of how far the community was self-sanctioning, so in order to fulfil the meta-norm of survival, the groups operated to maintain the appearance of being self-sanctioning.

Feldman argues that contrary to Kohlberg's model, the discussions rarely focussed on issues of justice and fairness; at least in the women's prison, the most salient issue was the maintenance of emotional warmth between staff and inmates, which was seen as the primary benefit of the community. But perhaps most sweeping is Feldman's criticism of Kohlberg's 'naive' equation of justice and democracy. In the prison community, he argues, there were no checks and balances against the tyranny of the majority, especially in sanctioning fellow inmates. Traditional hierarchical authority, he argues, was replaced by peer conformity pressure, a situation exacerbated by the fact that the deviant acts of individuals could cause the termination of the experiment if the prison authorities chose to act.

As before, I argue that the criticisms serve to highlight political processes in what was, ostensibly, a moral education experiment. In the just community, reflecting explicitly upon the process of decision-making is an essential part of the interaction and communication process: this also brings out into the open political processes which are implicit in any group. Firstly, the group confronts power conflicts within itself, and develops ways of handling or manipulating them. Secondly, the limitations of democracy become sharply apparent when pre-existing group loyalties and identities intrude on the situation, or when the limits of effective power are set by a stronger external institutions. This is the nature of the real world; it is clear that this lesson was learnt within the just community, as well as lessons in interpersonal democratic interaction.

Not all just communities are artifically created: the kibbutz is an established collectivist system, and Kohlberg, Snarey and Reimer have investigated moral reasoning development longitudinally amongst kibbutznik youth. As we have already noted, kibbutzniks score higher on moral reasoning measures than their U.S. agemates. But a particularly interesting aspect of this study concerned the development of a group of city-born adolescents who were educated within the kibbutz system. They had therefore experienced a change in their lifestyle and values, in some ways comparable to the members of the school just communities in the United States. These adolescents came from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, and from Arab countries; they therefore had different cultural roots from the kibbutz -born youth whose parents and grandparents had emigrated to Israel from Western cultures. Kohlberg, Snarey and Reimer do not report sufficient data about interactions or individual reasoning to faciliate the kind of analysis discussed earlier, but they do report individual moral reasoning changes, which are a measure of the effectiveness of the community in promoting individual moral growth. The city-born adolescents started off with lower stage scores than the kibbutz-born peers but by the final interview they had virtually caught up with them; the city-born youth gained an average of 79 mms points over the period, the kibbutz-born, 61 points.[40]

The effect of experiencing a challenging micro-political environment is clearly to alter consciousness and create disequilibruim in individual thought structure. This is also described in some of the studies of activist youth. Haan compared level of moral reasoning on 'hypothetical' (Kohlberg) dilemmas with moral reasoning on the 'real-life' moral-political issue of the Free Speech Movement sit-in.[41] She found that higher stage students who were activists reasoned at a higher stage on the real-life situation than on the hypothetical dilemmas, whereas higher stage students who were supporters, but not activists, showed higher stage reasoning on the hypothetical dilemmas. There was no difference between hypothetical and actual reasoning amongst neutral or opposed-to-FSM students. However lower stage reasoners tended to reason at a higher stage the on real-life situation whether thev were supporters of FSM or not. This finding strongly suggests that significant first-hand political experience is a growth-inducing - or at least a decalage-inducing - process. But why the difference between higher and lower stage thinkers? One possibility is the degree of surprise and shock: for higher stage reasoners, who have some conception of social change and the structure of society, political engagement or disturbance is within their frame of reference. So for them it is personal engagement that induces decalage. However, for more conventional and concrete reasoners, merely witnessing disruptive events would be significant experience in itself, for it disturbs their normative assumptions about social order and social control that such events should occur at all.

In another study, Haan looked at the effects of Peace Corps experience.[42] A sample of Peace Corps trainees were part of the original FSM study. Compared to other students, female trainees were relatively conservative and tended to demonstrate conventional level of moral reasoning. Male trainees had a high level of moral reasoning and were not so conservative. The effect of Peace Corps service was to increase moral reasoning scores - especially amongst women - and to increase political liberalism. Both sexes also altered their self descriptions, in particular abandoning their former conventionally sex-stereotyped self-images.

THE TRANSMISSION OF POLITICAL NORMS

We have established that the individual is active, not passive, in making sense of her moral and political world, and that first hand experience of explicit political process and moral conflict is a powerful learning situation. But all this takes place within a broader cultural context; ultimately, both the structure of individual political cognition, and the norms for negotiating interpersonal conflicts, are mediators of the political socialisation process.

In this final section I will explore the relationship between cultural factors and individuals political development. There are a number of salient points in this:

1) the individual does not exist in a cultural vacuum; she is not free to construct _ab initio_ an explanation of the social and political world. Pre-existing 'theories', explanations and ideologies abound in the culture into which she is born.

2) by virtue of her parentage, locality and socio-economic status she will be socialised within a fairly narrow range of value and beliefs, but there exists also a wider range that she may come into contact with through education, peer contacts, etcetera. These are still culture-bound, however; the European child is much more likely to come into contact with Socialism than the North American child.

3) The individual's cognitive structures are in _dialectical relation_ with these external culturally-defined conditions. She does not wholly construct her own implicit theory, but, nor does she merely absorb the external world wholesale and passively; the nature of her interpretation of the external world itself depends upon the limitations of her existing cognitive structures.

First let us consider the effect of parents and family. Most studies of political socialisation show a fairly close parallel between the political views of parent and offspring. Some studies also show a relationship between parental politics and offspring's moral stage. The (somewhat limited) evidence suggests that this relationship arises from the way that parental _behaviour_ conveys values and expectations. For example, Hoffman and Salzstein demonstrated the effect of parental practices on the moral response style in young adults; _inductive_ child-rearing methods produced the most reason-orientated offspring. Holstein looked at the relationship between parental moral stage, child's moral stage and parental behaviour in interactive discussion with the child. She found that principled level parents encouraged the child's participation in discussion more than did conventional level parents, and that the children of principled parents were more likely than the children of conventional level parents to have reached conventional level reasoning.[43]

Leftwing offspring report more conflict with their parents even when the actual reported degree of difference in beliefs between parents and offspring is not large. Kraut and Lewis' leftwing student respondents reported family conflicts about independence, domestic responsibilities, and career plans, as well as on political issues. Haan et al's radical, postconventional respondents reported conflict with their parents, though little difference in their beliefs: in contrast, stage 4 conservatives perceived practically no conflict between their own views and those of their parents. Given the *prima facie* lack of a real difference in political views within leftwing families, one conclusion which could be drawn is that not only do leftwing parents pass on certain political values and beliefs, but they also value - and encourage - dissent. The child growing up in a leftwing household learns to value, and be adept at, confrontational discourse, and to question received assumptions.[44]

The effect of subcultural norms is illustrated by the kibbutz studies. Kibbutz adolescents consistently scored higher on moral reasoning measures than did their age-mates in the United States or Turkey. One explanation of this is that the kibbutz is an ongoing 'just community', continually stimulating reflection upon political and moral processes. Another dimension is the dominant socialistic ethos of the kibbutz system; the explanations of social institutions, the implicit social theory, is based on collectivism rather than individualism. In the Kohlberg, Snarey and Reimer study, higher-stage respondents very explicitly referred to the ideology of the kibbutz as a democratic, collectivist community. 'Kibbutzniks typically brought much more of a communal emphasis to solving the dilemmas than did North Americans'.

They explicitly referred to a 'socialist utopia'; for North Americans the just society is an ideal, for the kibbutzniks the democractic ideal exists already. The authors say; 'for some young adult kibbutzniks the very concept of 'kibbutz' is based on the idea of commitment, a social contract, between all the members who share a consensus regarding the equal social rights and the equal democractic participation responsibilities of all persons.[45]

This represents the operation in action of a dominant social rhetoric; the young kibbutzniks are exposed to a set of social explanations, expected forms of interaction and values about social and political life which are ideals rather than practice in North America. Similarly but to a lesser extent, in Britain the existence of a Welfare State means that certain forms of collectivist thinking are part of the stock-in-trade, or social representations, of everyone irrespective of their moral stage; even stage 2 reasoners think there should be a National Health Service to help Heinz's wife.

These findings illustrate the importance of action and the practical experience of operating within particular context and set of norms (whether at the level of the family, the community of the social representations of society at large), in the development of political cognition. But they also raise questions about Kohlberg's conception of the ontogenesis of liberal democracy. It is clear from the theory of moral development that the higher stages of thought reflect a more complex view of society; it is also specifically demonstrated in the work on the development of political understanding that progression is from an individualistic conceptualisation of the world to a conceptualisation which focusses on societal and institutional structures. The kibbutz data do clearly indicate that experience of collectivist rhetoric and social representations within society, and experience of collectivist action at the level of the community, are reflected in the moral and political cognitions of developing youth.

There are important cross cultural differences in the extent to which collectivism is the dominant rhetoric. Studies which illustrate this were performed in Britain, Australia and the United States by Feather and Furnham.[46] They investigated the explanations offered for poverty and unemployment, distinguishing between 'individualistic' explanations which blame individuals or groups for misfortune - lack of effort, fecklessness etcetera - and 'societal' explanations which lay the blame at the door of social policy or the structure of society. On these measures, North Americans rate as more individualistic than Europeans or Australians.

Even though these and other Western societies subscribe to a broadly similar 'liberal' ideology, therefore, there is a considerable difference in a) the explanations of inequality - and by implication, the cure, and b) the actual operation of liberal democracy within the institutions of society. An important distinction is between whether the higher more collectivist or 'just' stages are reflected in the institutions of society, or whether they exist only as shared ideals. The United States is not a particualarly just society, so the individual who expresses stage 5 reasoning reflects the formulation of an ideal world, the ex trapolation of culturally available principles. It is post-normative in the sense that the world of stage 5 principles does not exist, but the principles are normative, derived from theConstitution and a history of democratic ideals. In other societies certain aspects of justice and democracy, which in the United States are ideal norms, are practical norms; as I have indicated, these include the social contract world of the kibbutz, and the welfare stage of some European countries. Longitudinal data only exists for Israeli society: I would predict that in "socialist" societies the pattern of collectivist rhetoric and developmental progression would tend to approximate more to the Israeli than the United States pattern.

The foregoing describes broad cultural differences, and their effect on individual development, but as we have seen, there are powerful subcultural effects as manifested in the difference in reasoning between individuals reared as conservatives, and individuals reared as liberals. Furnham, and Lewis, have demonstrated that in Britain, Conservative and Labour supporters differ in their attributions of the causes of poverty and unemployment, with Conservatives endorsing more individualistic explanations.[47]

Weinreich-Haste, Cotgrove and Duff found a similar pattern in the explanation of unemployment and in the explanations of the origins of social order, and they also found that moral stage, as measured by the endorsement of high stage, and the rejection of low stage, statements correlated with individualistic versus societal explanations.[48]

So if we adopt the position that prevailing normative explanations and implicit theories are an important source of how the growing individual comes to make sense of the world, then we can argue that the child who grows up in a liberal household or sub-culture will have greater access to collectivist explanations and explanations which focus on social institutions, than the child who grows up in a conservative environment. It will therefore be easier for her to use these assumptive explanations as a basis for thinking.

These findings and interpretations indicate a plurality within liberal democracy, different assumptions about how to implement justice and different ways of dealing with the continuing paradox of liberty and equality. I will now return to another issue of the plurality of rhetorics, and the enduring critique that Kohlberg places too much emphasis on justice as the dominant theme of moral and political development. These are two pieces of research which illustrate the limitations of a monolithic definition of morality as justice-based, and which also illustrate clearly the effects of sub-cultural norms on rhetoric.

In a study of hippies, a self-consciously "anti-establishment" subculture, Haan, Stroud and Holstein found an ideology which emphasised communality and love, and which specifically rejected abstraction and objectification. This is a counter-normative ideology, not only because of the expressed values but because the norms of liberal democracy -as mirrored in Kohlberg's stages

- imply cognitive progression and increasing generalisation and abstraction. Haan scored the hippies as stage 3 thinkers.[49] More extensive and more problematic for Kohlberg's theory is Gilligan's work on the 'different voice' of women's moral thought. According to Gilligan, males do tend to think in terms of rights and obligations, in accordance with Kohlberg's model. Males have implicit model of social relations in which there are conflicts between rights, a situation which is resolved by formulating balances and equity-producing contracts. For females, Gilligan argues, the implicit model of social relations is based on mutuality and interpersonal attachment and responsiblity. So women, she argues do not reason in terms of rights but in terms of responsibilities; they do not weigh up the relative claims of Heinz and the chemist but suggest negotiation and persuasion so that the common responsibility to Heinz's wife can be met.[50]

Gilligan argues that these sex differences originate in the different childhood experience of women and men. Family roles, as well as the cultural stereotypes and expectations, direct the little girl towards responsibility and mutuality; the sexes, grow up with a different set of norms about how to make sense of the social world, and emerge with a different dominant rhetoric of social relations. Her position is consistent with certain expressions of feminism that argue that women have a particular role to play in peace movements and the promotion of non-violence.* Whether or not Gilligan is right to identify the two styles of morality as sex-linked, her work is of great importance in underlining the limitations of a monolithic interpretation of the rhetoric of liberal democracy based on rights and justice.

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* This argument is the rationale of the longstanding, women-only protest at the Greenham Common Airbase in England, which has deliberately affirmed a "female rhetoric" in its behaviour, symbols and organisation.

CONCLUSION

Kohlberg made his own connections between moral and political development when he asserted that the development of moral reasoning reflected the ontogenesis of liberal democracy and the conception of justice. Supporters endorsed his position because it confirmed a common American ideal that history reflected progress towards moral improvement within the individual and the state, and because in the optimistic mood of the Kennedy era, it seemed that all kinds of social reform were possible, and the ideals of the Constitution might at last be realised. The Age of Aquarius was dawning. Even the subsequent disillusionments - the moral crises of My Lai and Watergate, the slow realisation that the revolution was not at hand, and the political inertia consequent upon economic recession and conservative backlash - did not erode the optimism because it was obvious that the protesters and objectors (those on the side of the angels) were demonstrating the kind of thinking, and the level of reasoning, consistent with the model.[51]

The critics attacked the parochialism of Kohlberg's assertion - especially when he claimed its universality; liberalism is not a universal value, democracy is not practised, even nominally, across wide sections of the globe, and the oppressed and deprived even in the United States have no reason to believe in a just world. They attacked the narrow assumptions of the theory - that justice was the dominant or superordinate virtue, and that democracy (and by implication morality) was expressed most fully in a certain kind of socialistic liberalism, placing even good libertarian conservatives a poor second. They attacked his lack of attention to the role of historical and economic factors, not only in the conditions of the political situation at any point in time, but also in the kind of ideas which gain currency and fire people's hearts. Generally, they accused him of being a politically naive idealist.

From the perspective of the conservative Eighties, caught in economic recession, there still apears to be right on both sides. The research data, whatevers its limitations, still does demonstrate a consistent relationship between certain kinds of political thinking and level of moral reasoning. Even more, it demonstrates a relationship between moral reasoning and political commitment. These findings need to be explained, and as yet they have not been. There is no a priori reason why conservative ideology is necessarily inconsistent with the structure of stage 5 thought; sophisticated understanding of social institutions and th epossibility of going beyond the social system as presently constituted, which are the conceptual substrates of stage 5 thinking, are not lacking in the writings of conservative thinkers. What is clearly needed is a more subtle analysis of the development of political and moral thought, to disentangle the real nature of the relationship.

It is difficult (for a liberal) to see the present time as a continuation of the inexorable march of progress, and it is obvious that the critics are right in their identification of the limitations of Kohlberg's unitary view. At best, it can be said that his conception of the overlap between the moral and political probably does apply to the educated middle class youth in a country where the dominant rhetoric is one of democracy, rights and social contract. The critics who argue that Kohlberg ignores the kind of consciousness which would arise in other political milieu (for example in a Marxist state) may be right, but in the absence of such data, it can be said that he presents a reasonable map of the trans-mission of liberal-democratic consciousness to the elite members of a society whom such a consciousness serves reasonably well.

In this chapter I have also tried to show that Kohlberg's departure from the traditional methodology of cognitive-developmental psychology has far-reaching implications for a rapprochement between the individualism of developmental psychology and its emphasis on what goes on inside the individual head, and social psychological and sociological approaches. The latter tend to see the immediate situation or the broad social context as the determinants of individual thought, particularly in the domain of political development. They generally ignore the developmental dimension, in particular allowing no space for the concept that individuals at different stages of cognitive development might interpret the situation differently. The work on just communities, and the other work by followers of Kohlberg on the processes of discourse and communication may lead eventually to a significant breakthrough in understanding the dialectical relationship between individual and social constructions of meaning. Kohlberg's own dialogue with critical theorists in particular Habermas, are a vital part of this theoretical development, which regrettably there has not been space to do justice to in this chapter.[52]

NOTES

1. Kohlberg, 1971; Kohlberg, 1980a; Kohlberg, 1981
2. Kohlberg, 1980a p. 64
3. Candee, 1974; p. 621
4. Kohlberg, 1973; 1980a; Rawls, 1971
5. Sullivan, 1977a; 1977b
6. Adelson, 1971a
7. Reid and Yanarella, 1980
8. Simpson, 1974; Kitwood, 1983; Kohlberg, Snarey and Reimer, 1983; and see Vine in this Volume.
9. Harre, 1979; 1983; Gilligan, 1983; Weinreich-Haste, 1984b
10. Buck-Morss, 1975; Braun and Baribeau, 1978
11. Fishkin, 1980, 1984
12. Buck-Morss, 1975; Braun and Baribeau, 1978; Habermas, 1979; Youniss,1983; Chilton, 1983
13. Mosher, 1980; Wasserman, 1980; Power, 1980; Reimer and Power, 1980; Higgins, 1984
14. Haan, Smith and Block, 1968
15. Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969
16. Adelson, 1971a; Keniston, 1968
17. Fendrich and Tarleau, 1973; page 245
18. Kohlberg and Candee, 1984
19. Fishkin, Keniston and Mackinnon, 1973
20. Fontana and Noel, 1973
21. Leming, 1974
22. Alker and Poppen, 1973; Sullivan and Quarter, 1972
23. Lind, Sandberger and Bargel, 1981/82; Emler, Renwick and Malone,1983; Weinreich-Haste, 1984a: Rest, 1979
24. Emler, 1983; Emler, Renwick and Malone, 1983; Emler and Reicher (in press)
25. Weinreich-Haste, Adams and Clay (in preparation)

26. Adelson and O'Neil, 1966; Adelson, Green and O'Neil, 1969; Adelson 1971b
27. Connell, 1971; Furth and McConville, 1981
28. Torney, Oppenheim and Farnen, 1975; Torney-Purta, 1981
29. Easton and Dennis, 1969; Stradling and Zureik, 1973; Merelman and McCabe, 1974; Mussen, Sullivan and Eisenberg-Berg, 1977
30. Tapp and Kohlberg, 1971, p.65-66; Torney-Purta, 1983 p. 296
31. Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, Candee, Speicher-Dubin, Kauffman, Hewer and Power, 1984
32. Weinreich-Haste, 1983, 1984a
33. Turiel, 1966; Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975
34. See for example, Rutter, Maughan, Mortimore and Ouston, 1979; Willis, 1977; Tyler, 1977
35. Kohlberg, 1972, 1975, 1978, 1979, 1980b
36. See Mosher, 1980 and Fenton 1976 for collection of papers.
37. Higgins, 1980; Kohlberg, 1980b
38. Power, 1980; Reimer and Power, 1980; Higgins, 1984
39. Feldman, 1980
40. Kohlberg, Snarey and Reimer, 1983
41. Haan, 1975
42. Haan, 1974
43. Hoffman and Salzstein, 1967; Hoffman, 1973; Holstein, 1972
44. Haan, Smith and Block, 1968; Kraut and Lewis, 1975
45. Kohlberg, Snarey and Reimer, 1983
46. Feather, 1974; Furnham, 1982a, 1982b, 1983
47. Furnham, 1982a; 1982b; 1983; Lewis, 1981
48. Cotgrove and Weinreich-Haste, 1982; Weinreich-Haste, 1984a
49. Haan, Stroud and Holstein, 1973
50. Gilligan, 1983
51. Candee, 1975; Kohlberg and Scharf, 1972
52. Habermas, 1979; Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer, 1983

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Moral action, moral responsibility and extraordinary moral responsibility

Paper presented to the 2nd Ringberg Conference on
Moral Development, Ringberg Castle, Bavaria, July 1984.

Affect, action and responsibility

The real difference between a 'hypothetical' and a'real-life' moral dilemma is the role of affect. This is an obvious point with some non-obvious implications, which I shall explore in this paper. In a hypothetical situation, the respondent is not engaged; she is reflecting cognitively upon an issue. She is drawing upon her reflections, her organisation of meaning, her general 'implicit social theory'. The exercise of discourse upon the hypothetical situation may arouse affect, and it is certainly the case that the issues which constitute the core of the moral response which the individual makes may have been associated in the past with strong affect; however the action of making a moral decision in a hypothetical situation is almost purely cognitive. The hypothetical dilemma is thus an excellent method of eliciting the cognitive structure underlying the individual's view of the world, the baseline state of the meaning system which she brings to interpretation of the world. It is real but it is cognitive; it is reflection upon action and affect, it is distillation and dis-engagement.

In contrast, real-life moral dilemmma per se involve affect. The individual is engaged emotionally in the situation. By definition, the situation is some kind of crisis, some resolution of it is required, and it impinges on the individual cognitively and affectively until that resolution is achieved. Even if the 'resolution' is to shelve or postpone the decision, the very action of making the dilemma non-salient is designed to achieve detachment or disengagement.

Attempts to find a predictive relationship between moral reasoning and action have tended on the whole, to treat affect as an intervening variable. Affect (whether as moral outrage or empathy) energises the cognition and predisposes to action; alternatively, affect impedes the link between reasoning (I ought to...) and action (...but I don't feel like it and/or I fear the consequences to myself). Cognitivist models, however, have virtually pushed affect off the centre of the stage. Cognitivist models treat affective aspects of moral experience as if they were the same as any other aspects of experience; they are significant events which involve the individual in some kind of action, which later through the 'prise de conscience' or grasp of consciousness become incorporated through reflection into the structure of cognitive organisation.

According to this model, the individual's cognitive stage will make certain affects more likely than others - for example a stage 5 anger at unfairness is likely to be qualitatively different from a stage 2 response, because it is based on a different perception of the situation and a different understanding of what 'justice' means. Similarly, when an individual has an affectively-loaded experience, her subsequent explanation or account of the experience will differ according to her stage; she is likely to interpret herself to herself differently, and eventually to incorporate the event into her reflections in different ways, depending on her moral stage. So affect becomes separated from the dynamics of cognition.

The full extent of this cognitivisation of experience is evident in Kohlberg's[1] (and Rest's different but parallel[2]) recent statements of the relationship between cognition and action in which the intervening variable is responsibility. According to this model, the higher the individual's moral stage, the more she perceives that the key individual in the hypothetical situation (or herself in a real-life situation) has a responsibility to perform actions consistent with the 'deontic choice' that she has made regarding the moral issue in the situation. Thus the individual a) progressively through the stages sees herself as being more involved in the situation, and b) progressively integrates her perception of the moral issue and her perception of action necessary to deal with it. This model conforms to the cognitive-developmental theoretical framework closely in its delineation of greater differentiation of cognitive understanding (the appreciation that one is an agent in a situation in which one is involved) and greater integration (coming together of deontic judgements and judgements about the responsibility for action). Kohlberg does, however, add an additional intervening variable; non-moral skills (or 'character' elements, to use an archaic term) such as ego controls or capacity for delayed gratification, which mediate the actual execution of action. As far as I can see, there is no space in this model for dealing with affect as a significant factor in the equation.

In the rest of this paper I am going to explore the concept of 'moral responsibility' and present a tentative model of moral crisis resolution, which tries to look at the role of affect in the dynamics of action, cognition and reflection upon action and cognition. I am not defining 'moral responsibility' quite in the way that Kohlberg does, as a cognitive intervening variable between judgement and action - though I would argue that my tentative model is in fact an elaboration of Kohlberg's position. Nor am I using 'responsibility' in quite the sense that Gilligan does[3], as an alternative dominant theme underlying the basis of making moral judgements, contrasting with the 'ethic of rights and justice' of Kohlberg's original formulation; a way of thinking about morality in terms of mutuality and negotiation rather than in terms of rights, conflict and contractual equity. However because my exemplary case studies contain material where the respondents talk about their feelings of responsibility and the role of these feelings in raising their consciousness about the moral issue, I acknowledge kinship with much of Gilligan's theoretical position.

In order to clarify the concept of 'moral responsibility', let us look at its extreme manifestation - 'extraordinary moral responsibility'. This is supererogatory moral behaviour, but of a particular sort; it is behaviour in which the concerns of others rather than the self, are involved. There are certain kinds of exceptional morality which involve the individual in a private struggle with his or her conscience; resistance to temptation, acting with integrity in regard to a principle etc., which require exceptional moral 'strength', but which do not imply responsibility. Extraordinary moral responsibility involves public rather than private morality. The individual exercising it is taking upon herself the task of alleviating a social problem (as for example Mother Theresa of Calcutta), or of campaigning for social change (as for example Gandhi or Bertrand Russell). The individual has perceived a need, injustice, or threat, and has acted in the face of often immense obstacles to attempt to deal with this.

That is extraordinary moral responsibility; ordinary moral responsibility requires perhaps less saintly qualities, but shows similar psychological components. These are three; vision, efficacy and commitment. The individual must, firstly, perceive the situation to be one in which there are problems involving moral issues. This may require a fairly sophisticated appreciation of the implications of a particular situation; anyone can see that a man beating a horse is causing suffering to the animal, but to see the broader moral implications of a repressive regime or to question the legitimacy of an authority figure requires a cognitive leap. The evidence from several studies does seem to indicate that this kind of perception is stage-linked. Efficacy has two parts; believing one can be effective, and knowing how to be effective. The latter is mainly knowledge-based, and again has a strong cognitive element of appreciating how things get done to effect change within a particular community. Believing that one can be efficacious is more than knowing the political ropes, however. It requires both a habitual response of personal involvement - the opposite, as it were, of Seligman's concept of 'learned helplessness' - and also an appreciation of the legitimacy of one's personal action, not only that the action is right, but that one's own action is both right and necessary, because if one does not act it is not likely that the action will get done. In a study of political participation, for example, Marsh found that a sense of personal efficacy only led to political action amongst individuals who are cynical about the effectiveness of politicians; if people had faith in politicians, they did not get involved themselves.[4]

Commitment varies. Those who demonstrate extraordinary moral responsibility show maximum commitment. They give up much in their lives in order to direct all their energies to the Cause. They believe themselves to be personally responsible for the cause, and responsible for putting themselves wholly to the service of those aims; only they could do it. Commitment is thus the action extension of efficacy. In lesser situations of ordinary moral responsibility, the commitment is briefer and more limited; the action is contributory rather than structurally central to the attainment of the perceived goals, and the investment of personal efficacy is circumscribed - the voice raised in protest at the appropriate moment, the regular contribution of time or money, the consistent intermittent pressing action to keep consciousness raised.

The experimental evidence and some comments on Kohlberg's interpretation

The above outlined the concept of moral responsibility as I shall use it in developing the arguments of this paper. The first evidence I will examine of the relationship between cognition, action and affect is the set of studies which Kohlberg has cited in his review, with Candee, of the role of responsibility as the mediating variable between cognition and action. These are the studies by Haan, Smith and Block, by McNamee and by Milgram.[5] The first is an 'open' situation; where people were only individually involved in the events insofar as they chose to be. The second and third studies were experimental manipulations on the lines of bystander apathy studies; the participants had some choices of action but were constrained at least to attend to the variables under investigation. These two studies also included some data on how the individual perceived the event immediately during and after it; the Haan *et al*. study, of the FSM sit-in at Berkeley, provided only indirect data on perceptions of the situation.

All three studies produced clear evidence of a relationship between moral stage and action - in the case of the Haan _et_ _al_. study, action meant participating in, and being arrested at, the Free Speech Movement Sit-In, which was a protest against the policies and actions of the Board of Regents of the University of California in 1964. In the case of the McNamee study, action meant assisting a 'distressed drug-user'* who 'interrupted' an experiment. In the Milgram study, action meant resisting the pressure of the experimenter to inflict electric shocks. The data on respondents' perceptions of the situation differed; in the Haan _et_ _al_. study, the data comes from a dilemma on the free speech issue which was administered to the respondents; in the Milgram study, the data comes from quotations from the responses made _during_ the crisis of pressure to administer shocks, and in a subsequent debriefing interview. However the McNamee study did _specifically_ ask about the respondents' responsibility to help the drug-user. As with action,perception of personal responsibility increased with moral stage, though more people perceived themselves to be responsible than actually acted upon it.

The three situations, therefore, are somewhat different. 'Responsibility' in the Haan study meant a _public_ responsibility, a perception of events 'out there' having some call upon one's own obligations. In the absence of data on the actual social context of the events, it is difficult to say with confidence how much individual students were in personal contact with the key people, core events or interactions, but from general experience, it would be reasonable to deduce that the contact was mainly at the level of public discourse amongst peers, rather than instense individual confrontations. Yet curiously, it was in the Haan situation that the greatest proportion of individuals 'acted' (see Table 1). In the McNamee situation there was closer personal confrontation; the respondent was in the same room as the 'drug-user', and was being appealed to as a member of the group of persons present. Although less than 10% of the respondents actually helped in the sense of personally intervening, over 40% did at least refer to the drug-user to a source of help, and nearly three quarters thought they should help. The Milgram situation was direct and personal confrontation between a (supposedly) suffering victim, an authority figure and the hapless respondent. Objectively, the respondent in this situation was most clearly 'responsible' of all; manifestly s/he was 'causing' the pain by her actions. From Milgram's accounts of these experiments it is clear that the majority of respondents did feel responsible and did feel extremely disturbed by what they were doing, yet only about a quarter of the undergraduate sample to whom Kohlberg refers, and about a third of Milgram's original sample, did in fact quit the experiment.

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* really an accomplice of the experimenter.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Table 1

Relationship between Responsibility and Action

Stage

		2	3	3/4	4	4/5	5
Haan, Smith & Block							
Belief that Sitting In was right (dilemma)	%		33	48	57	78	
Students arrested	%		10	31	44	73	
stage	N		39	138	125	37	
Milgram study							
Number quitting	%		50	6	87		
stage	N		4	17	6		
McNamee study							
Thought they were responsible for helping	%	36	77		69		83
Helped by referral	%	9	27		38		73
Personally helped	%	0	0		0		20
stage	N	11	29		17		29

From: Kohlberg & Candee 1984

Kohlberg's argument that action probability, perceived responsibility in the situation, and consistency between responsibility judgement and action all increase with moral stage is conclusively supported by these studies. However, taken together, they raise an interesting paradox. The further-removed, and therefore presumably the less affectively charged for the individual the situation is, the more likely she seems to be to engage in 'morally responsible action' - so it would seem that in situations where she is less likely to see herself as personally responsible, she is more likely to act on that responsibility when perceived. The conventional social psychological explanation of this is that in face-to - face situations the social pressures are strongest and most difficult to resist - in McNamee's experiment these pressures came from the experimenter, and from the other people present in the room, in the Milgram experiment the pressures came, very strongly, from the authority figure in the white coat. But significantly, these results do not demonstrate "functions" of affect, to energise cognition and thus to precipitate action; the stronger the affect, in these cases, the less likely is action.

These studies concentrated on the cognitive component of moral decision-making, moral perception, and intervening action in a variety of crisis situations. They are, also, studies of a specific and isolated response; in the McNamee and the Milgram studies, there is no information at all as to whether the experience of specific responsibility in the experimental situation is generalised to wider issues. The Haan studies were followed up for a small sample, and it does seem that political and moral consciousness, once raised, did extend beyond the immediate FSM context for some people. But we do not know whether McNamee's respondents became more generally concerned about the plight of drug-users, and more active in therapeutic activities, or whether Milgram's subjects saw a wider implication of the experiment for understanding social control and the parallels with Nazi practice that Milgram himself did. All we know is that those who were cognitively able to take a broader view of the moral situation, and to understand the wider implications of individual moral, social and political action,were more likely to perceive themselves as having a personal responsibility to act in that crisis situation.

As innumerable critics have pointed out, the conclusion from such a concentration on the cognitive is that moral philosophers should be the moral giantsof our culture. Without in any way impugning moral philosophers, such a conclusion does not wholly accord with commonsense observation. What can be said about the evidence of cognitive processes is that it indicates the importance of perception - what I earlier called 'vision' - in the way that a problem or situation is conceived as a moral (or political) issue. But perception by itself does not constitute moral responsibility

- even of the ordinary kind; what is missing is engagement, efficacy and commitment.

If we look at the biographies of people who have demonstrated even 'ordinary' moral responsibility, certain common themes emerge, which are indicative of the processes involved in the development of moral responsibility in the sense that I am using the term. It is on the basis of these common themes that I will build up my tentative model of process. The model appears as Figure 1. The biographies trace through the various phases of the sequence.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

A model of moral responsibility: Sandra the vegetarian

The first common theme is a crisis or triggering event. Importantly, this is not necessarily a moral crisis, it is an event which changes the role of the individual from being a bystander, an observer, to being a participant, personally touched by the situation. Let us consider the first biography; Sandra's brief account of her conversion to vegetarianism appears in Figure 2. The triggering event for Sandra was being suddenly in close proximity to the slaughtering of meat while on a French exchange trip. Now obviously Sandra was aware that the meat on the table at home had once been living flesh, but the knowledge had never touched her personally; she had no affective reaction to this knowledge.

FIGURE 1 (a) Flow diagram of Proposed Model.


Pre-existing cognitive structures
[mediate perception]
Triggering event
Non-moral affect
Diffusion catharsis
Action facilitating cognitive reflection
[reflection leads to legitimation]
[reflection leads to legitimation]
[Reflection_legitimation of reconstruction of affect]
Moral affect
Moral outrage only
Efficacy, Responsibility
Action, Involvement
Continued "plateau" or habit of protest
[frustration, escalation leads to transformative reconstruction of cognition]
Extraordinary moral responsibility, efficacy and commitment

Figure 1. The Proposed Model·


External variables
Cognition
Affect
Action
Responsibility
TRIGGERING EVENT
Perception of situation mediated by existing moral/ social cognition
Immediate non moral affect: anger fear etc.
Denial, diffusion
Carthartic diffusion
Reflection on affect
Attachment to "fellow sufferers"
Location of affective response in existing world view: cognitive reconstructural
Legitimation of affect
Moral affect Efficacy
Sense that one should make voice heard, support existing institutions designed to achieve change
EITHER
OR
EITHER
OR
Perception that action is effective: consideration of reconstructed and elaborated cognition
Involvement with action and protest
Seeking out further information
Continuing 'plateau' of moral affect, responsibility and action
Perception that action is ineffective, extended reconstruction of cognition (stage change)
FURTHER FRUSTRATION/ ESCALATING EVENT
Moral affect at level of commitment. Increased efficacy
Escalation of action/ involvement
Conviction of personal responsibility and efficacy "Only I can do this"
Consolidation of cognitive structures recognising moral/political imperatives and personal responsibility
Wholesale commitment and life change: "dedication"

FIGURE 2 Sandra

S. (talking about conscience) I'm a vegetarian. It started when I went to France. I lived in a butcher's for two weeks. It was then that I realised how you kill things and cook things and that was a matter of conscience whether I should eat meat or not. I don't eat any at all now. That's the biggest conscience thing I've ever done.

I What was the situation that made you change your mind?

S First of all, as I say I was in France; the fact that they cooked meat on the outside and it's burnt andyou cut it open and it just sort of bleeds. That put me off for a start and that wasn't really anything to do with conscience it was the actual idea of it.

When I came back to England I still couldn't eat meat because I just couldn't think of actually eating an animal, especially the way in which they are killed. If you're in a survival position than it's slightly different. But like farmers in industry where it just goes through and they're just killing all those animals, then I think that's wrong.

I Why do you think it's wrong?

S Because the animals themselves haven't really had a life. We're just breeding them to kill them. I just can't face eating something like that which has been killed in that way and hasn't had its own life.

It is significant that Sandra's response was *aesthetic*. She felt revolted by what she had seen of the slaughtering process, and she was sickened by the French method of cooking meat which leaves the blood still evident after cooking. This aroused strong affect, but it was not at that point a *moral* affect. But the importance of this reaction is that it led to *engagement*; through her affective response Sandra became involved in the issue of killing animals for meat.

At this point a number of options were open to her. Many girls in her situation could have responded with a form of *denial* - the French have nasty ways of preparing food, we do things so much better in Britain (a common attitude of the British tourist). That way she could have compartmentalised her reaction, put it in the category of unpleasant foreign experiences, and continued eating meat in England. Or she could have engaged in *affective catharsis* - made a joke or horror story out of it, suitably embroidered, to relate to her friends at home. Instead she began to think. She began to *reflect cognitively* upon her affect; she allowed the triggering event and her affective engagement to begin to create a little disequilibrium in her cognition. She began to see it as a) a moral issue,and b) an issue on which *she* could exercise some personal responsibility.

The consequence of this was that the *nature of her affect* changed. She began to experience *moral affect*. Her reaction, expressed as 'I just can't face eating something like that which has been killed in that way and hasn't had its own life', is no longer an aesthetic response, it is a moral feeling, which has clearly a substantive element of moral cognition behind it; she has coordinated the general issues of the right of humans to kill animals, the quality of life and even the exception of the survival situation, in her cognitions about the situation. Out of this has arisen some action; she has consciously decided to take the responsibility not to eat meat herself. As yet, this is a small step; she has not as yet begun to proselytise, nor to become part of any public protest. Nor as yet does she express any appreciation of the wider implications of her own moral response, except to realise that she is objecting to the farming industry's practices - but only as an individual, privately. However, if the opportunity offered, it is predictable that she might support a mild protest organised by someone else.

Sandra's current moral stage of thought is 3/4. This is an important part of the equation; I am arguing that becoming affectively engaged in the situation is a significant process in the progression to action, but it can do so because she could exercise a certain level of moral cognition upon the issue. But without that engagement, I argue that she would not have perceived the situation as one in which she had any responsibility at all, even though she did possess all along the knowledge about both the facts and the moral dimensions of meat production. What we are witnessing in Sandra is a classic 'grasp of consciousness' process; cognition mediated by engagement.

Sandra's situation is relatively ordinary; it has produced some mild inconvenience in her own life (possibly somewhat more in her mother's) but it does not represent a major life change. Other biographies demonstrate more dramatic transformations in thought and action, and further progression through the phases of the model. A classic paradigm is the moral career of the feminist. Carol Gilligan's work offers some important insights on the effect of moral crisis on women's moral and sex role development, but to illustrate the general issues I am going to present the story of 'Jane'. Variations of Jane's story turn up in the political and psychological literature on feminism and consciousness-raising; "Jane" is a composite of many of the women who became involved in the women's movement in the nineteen seventies.

Jane the Feminist

Jane is a mother of two children in middle childhood. She is quite happily married. She gave up her professional job when she had the children, but has begun part-time work again, and is also doing some studying which she hopes will give her better qualifications and increase her job prospects. During this period her husband (who began with the same qualifications as she did) has forged ahead in his career and is beginning to be successful. She is aware of the growing support for the Woman's Movement amongst some of her acquaintances, but she feels quite content with her life, and although she agrees with the general aims, feels that many supporters are unhappy and neurotic. Politically she is liberal, and canvasses for elections sometimes, but is not very active.

Suddenly she finds herself pregnant. She realises that if she carries the baby full term she will set back her career prospects by another five years. She and her husband had always agreed on two children - initially because of overpopulation concerns, but subsequently Jane has found two children quite enough to handle. She decides to have an abortion, and is surprised that her husband is less keen on the idea, and seems not to understand that having another baby will conflict with her growing independence and work-orientation; he talks of the fulfilment that motherhood brings and comments on her enjoyment of the previous pregnancies. Jane seeks an abortion through her own doctor, but quickly discovers that although abortion is legal, a married woman in good health does not qualify for abortion on 'social' grounds. It is made clear that she will have to demonstrate a degree of "mental instability". She is referred to a private clinic where she has to put on an act of being mildly hysterical and unable to cope - a pattern of behaviour alien to her usual self, and effectively a lie.

After the abortion she feels distressed and humiliated, and because of his ambivalence, finds her husband less than sympathetic. A friend suggests she join a support group of women who have shared the same experinece. Initially this group works through their personal confusions, but gradually they extend their discussions to broader questions of their family role, their fertility and their frustrations. Through this Jane begins to see her private experience as part of a wider pattern of gender role, and also to see how her own family relationships reflect and perpetuate traditional gender roles - her pattern of interaction with her husband, and the way that they treat their son and daughter. Already distanced by the abortion issue, she and her husband become increasingly at odds with each other as she tries to articulate her new conceptions of role in the face of his non-comprehension and resistance. She becomes increasingly aware of the difficulty of making change, and becomes more involved in organised protests, local support groups - and also becomes more determined to gain the qualifications which will give her less economic dependence on her husband. Her increasing understanding of practical politics has led to her appreciation of wider social issues, and she joins the socialist party. Most of her social life is now spent in the company of other feminist women.

The story of Jane is one with which most concerned people with liberal-left connections have first hand experience; there are several versions of the next stage of the saga which can be imagined, and arenot the concern of this paper.

For my present purposes I want to analyse the sequence of events in terms of the model I began to propose with Sandra; Jane's case extends it a little further. As with Sandra, Jane had a pre-existing cognitive stucture which would enable her to develop a complex moral and political argument about gender role, abortion rights and so forth, but it ~~is~~ was not a *salient issue* for her. The triggering event is her abortion, which gives rise to a number of affects, none of which, again, is strictly 'moral'. Following from Carol Gilligan's findings we will say that the fictional Jane is in the category of women who feel that they have acted responsibly to all concerned in having their abortion. *But* it has caused a) doubt and anxiety in her relations with her husband, and b) anger at the doctor who demanded a charade to conform to the letter of the law, and at her husband for not comprehending her needs, and c) shame at betraying herself in acting out the charade. Despite her belief that what she did was right, she probably also feels a sense of loss. Jane could deal with this affect in several ways, and so diffuse it; in particular she could try to be a 'good wife' again, submerge her ambitions somewhat and build up her relationship on its former basis - possibly even deciding to get pregnant again consciously.

But the support group gives her the basis for reflecting on her affect and *legitimating* it, so that she comes to see her private experience and response as part of an unequal system of sex roles. So she begins to see the issue in moral and political terms; her anger at the medical profession and her husband becomes more moral affect. She sees them as (albeit unwitting) agents in the system. At the same time, she is beginning to realise that she must take responsibility for her moral and political affect; she begins to be an agent of objection, at an interpersonal level, and gradually to extend her support for collective actions which may lead eventually to social change. She is also beginning to take more responsibility for her own life, putting more energy in to acquiring the means of economic support which will free her from dependence on her husband - whether or not she eventually decides to separate from him, that economic freedom is a keystone in her autonomy.

Already she has gone somewhat further than Sandra did in her progress towards responsibility, commitment and action. But if we follow the story through we can perceive other changes. She is restructuring her cognitions about the moral and political world, not only using her cognitions to inform her moral affect. Gradually, her raised political consciousness is altering her view of the parameters involved in the situation. Her cognitive structures are expanding and décalage is occurring. As she becomes involved in more forms of action - political or pressure group activities, interpersonal style change, paying attention to different sources and kinds of information in her environment - she both applies and tests the expansion of her cognitive appreciation.

The extent of her cognitive transformation, and the extent to which she comes to make a total commitment which begins to approximate to 'extraordinary' moral responsibility, depends on several things. Commonly in political situations, actions entered into in a spirit of enthusiasm inspired by moral or political affect yield less in terms of output than the actor desires. The activist makes a variety of cognitive adjustments to this, most of which consist of developing an account or theory of the change process which locates the individual's activities validly and legitimately within the wider context - how does one rationally justify, for example, spending money and time attending a march or rally in a distant town where one is amongst ten thousand others? It is only explicable if one argues that the actor's cognitive understanding of social change processes, and her level of moral/political affect arising from that cognition, puts upon her the responsibility to be involved in that action.

But what of disillusion? It seems to me, that, for many people, a plateau of moral/political affect, and a level of cognitive appraisal in which the situation and its desired outcomes can be made to make sense to the individual, is reached. Then responsibility and its consequent action implications becomes habitual - maybe even for a lifetime. This seems to have been what happened to the Berkeley activists; ten years after the triggering events of 1964, and the consciousness raising of both cognition and affect that these induced, the activists were continuing their pattern of general political involvement, but they did seem not to show further development or extension of their responsibility; one significant finding was that the activists had tended to enter community-oriented or service work, whereas non-activists had gone into the business world, the market sector.[6] However for some people the effect of frustration and the limitations on achievable goals does not lead to a plateau, but to a further redefinition, a further transformation of cognitions and a significant change in the kind of responsibility that the individual feels. It is this transformation that constitutes 'extraordinary' moral responsibility, and it is at this point that the individual feels not only 'I must act' but 'only I can do this thing.' This represents a shift in efficacy, the belief that one is peculiarily able (or "chosen") to perform the necessary task. It is at this point that people make major changes in their lives.

The composite picture of 'Jane the feminist' is true in the sense of being drawn from dozens of parallel case histories, but fictional in that I cannot draw on specific quotations. To support my hypothesis about moral stage change amongst feminists I must draw on partial data from several sources, because there is relatively little material on the development of feminist thinking in relation to crises and moral stage.

Lois Erickson has studied a number of young women over a five year period, and her work clearly does demonstrate that development of moral and ego stage is associated with an increase in the appreciation of the parameters of gender role and the ways in which both interpersonal behaviours and the social system operate to maintain traditional sex roles. As Erickson's young women show, an increasing appreciation of the social processes in the creation and maintenance of gender roles is matched by development of moral reasoning, and also by an increasing realisation of one's responsibility for making one's own decisions. These young women reported significant or triggering events in their lives, which were associated with subsequent changes in moral or ego stage scores.[7]

Carol Gilligan's studies of abortion decision-making are very specific analyses of a crisis situation.[8] Her main findings were that the ways in which women changed in their thinking, and the ways in which they acted, depended not so much on their actual moral stage as on the disjunction between their stage of thinking about the real-life dilemma and their stage on the hypothetical dilemmas. Significant developmental change between the first time of testing (the period of the crisis itself) and the follow-up testing one year later, were associated with having a higher stage of reasoning about the real-life dilemma than the hypothetical dilemma. Gilligan concludes that this is a consequence of thinking-in-action being translated into reflection upon action, and consequent upon that, extension and generalisation of cognition. It corresponds, I think, to the post-affect redefinition in my model. In contrast, respondents who showed no discrepancy between their scores were less likely to change over the period of a year; my interpretation of this is that they already had the cognitive framework to 'make sense' of the experience and it was not therefore disequilibrating.

The accounts of affect which Gilligan quotes from her abortion study are particularly interesting because they show a) the 'naked' affect of fear, shame, anger and despair and b) the ways in which these feelings become translated into a moral affect - concern about hurting others, concern about personal integrity - when the women began to reflect on their reactions. There is in these quotations, which are posthoc accounts, a constant movement between the two.

A central core of Gilligan's thesis is that these women were preoccupied with responsibility as the basis for making their moral decisions, rather than with rights and justice. However, I would argue that pregnancy is a special case, one in which all three concepts of responsibility - Gilligan's, Kohlberg's and mine - converge (This in no way undermines Gilligan's general hypothesis that there are distinct styles of ethical reasoning, because it is confirmed in their reasoning on other dilemmas which do not have the special qualities of the crisis of pregnancy). Firstly, sexual behaviour in general is an area where responsibility is highly salient. Both sexes grow up exposed to the strong cultural rhetoric that sexuality has responsibilities - emotional as well as practical. So all sexual behaviour (except the auto-erotic) involves an awareness that one is acting in a way which imposes upon one some kind of responsibility.

Unwanted pregnancy creates a crisis of responsibility; firstly one cannot avoid action of some sort, secondly, as a woman particularly but not exclusively, one must carry out this responsibility oneself - one cannot be an apathetic bystander in one's own procreation; to do so merely postpones one's responsibility to lasting eighteen years rather than a few weeks. It is a no-choice situation; one has to act fast. To elaborate my point about the three types of 'responsibility'; the 'Gilligan dimension' is that the key moral issues are decided in terms of an ethic of considering one's responsibility to others - the potential child, the father of the child, and one's own personal future. The 'Kohlberg dimension' is that deciding on the ethical basis for what is right in this situation will converge with acting upon that decision, the higher one's moral stage, or the more one perceives at an intuitive level what is the right situation (what Kohlberg calls Type B thinking). Given that no-action is impossible in this situation, the prediction from Kohlberg's position would be that higher stage respondents are more likely to come to a decision about having or not having an abortion on the basis of some kind of moral argument, and more likely to see consistency between their cognition and their action. The 'Weinreich-Haste dimension' is that higher stage respondents AND those whohave translated their affect into moral terms through reflection, are more likely to see themselves as having to take personal responsibility for the decision, and more likely to see themselves as efficacious, able to take that responsibility. Higher stage respondents are also more likely to perceive the wider implications of their experience for women's role in general, and subsequently to generalise their responsibility to other areas relevant to this issue.

Lenny the ex-Republican

Gilligan has thus made significant contributions to understanding aspects of responsibility and of the effect of crisis on moral development in this particular field. But she also identified a phenomenon which has both theoretical and methodological implications. Those respondents who did change in their level of moral reasoning over time also reconstructed their perceptions of the events differently, whereas those who did not change gave similar accounts at Time 1 and Time 2. The reconstructed higher stage 'memory' incorporated the insights and constructions of the higher stage. This is important theoretically because it confirms the importance of the cognitive reconstruction process on perceptions of cognition, affect and action, and, I would argue, also confirms that affect and action do act as an impetus to the cognitive reconstruction process itself. But it is important methodologically because so much material on life crises must inevitably be retrospective; rarely can the psychologist be present at the crucial decision-making moment - and even more rarely, except in longitudinal studies, can the psychologist be present before the event. At the very best, if one is studying crisis, one can intervene at the clinic or in the early stages of political or social action, when the individual is already involved.[9]

One longitudinal study which does permit access to all phases of the consciousness - raising process is Kohlberg's own study.[10] This twenty-year data covered a period of American history when there were considerable political and social upheavals, and in particular covered the period of the Vietnam War - something which touched the lives of all the young men in the sample. Even if they did not face the Draft, the possibility of it was an ever-present threat. In the later interviews, questions about broader political issues were included. For the present purposes I am going to consider the development of political awareness by looking at part of the material from Case 23, whom I call 'Lenny' for convenience. This material is relevant to several aspects of the model, and also demonstrates in part Gilligan's point about reconstructed memory.

Let us consider Lenny first when he was about seventeen, still in high school, when he subscribed to the conservative views of his background, but was beginning to experience an awareness of changing values. On the death sentence question, his values were conservative and traditional:

I ...if somebody kills why should society take his life?

L ...society's not actually committing a wrong I mean they don't consider it a wrong, they rationalise it. Someone's got to force something somewhere along the line, and they should be the means to do that. In a way they're all-powerful for a time, and they're actually the superstructure ... it's permissible in this case because they're not actually violating against the law they're enforcing it.

I ... do you think the death penalty should be given for treason?

L Yes definitely. Of course it once again would depend on the case but in most cases I'd say yes, because if you go against the basic values of your country and everything you should be given the death sentence.

This is certainly 'hypothetical' reasoning, where he holds strong views on the issues but not touched by personal experience or involvement. Later in the same interview he talks about his changing views on fairness and civil rights, with more reflection on his own experience, and the beginnings of a less conservative perspective:

L I know before I came to high school I sort of was prejudiced towards the Negro but now I think I've sort of shifted my attitude, and I think now I'm more fair toward everything.

I What do you think has changed you, made you change?

L Well I don't know, I suppose it is as a result of education... as you get more and more educated you get more and more tolerance. I don't know, your mind becomes bigger, you're not small-minded, you don't only consider (home suburb) the only area. It broadens your perspective.

Three years later Lenny has progressed further in his political thought; he describes it initially in terms of a rational, objective progression:

L I believe in the Republican standpoint, but you have to look at the particular leader that is saying it. I mean, I don't believe any longer, I used to; in the beginning I was a Republican more or less [as a result of] indoctrination and I was gung ho Goldwater and all this in '64 [the year of the previous interview]. I went to the Convention and all this, but since then I've changed to moderately liberal, and I would say I'm more the Javits, Rockefeller type.

I What changed you from Goldwater?

L The fact that once I started taking some college courses in economics and you can actually see that some of his policies were just completely ridiculous, and as soon as you get away from this one set opinion that dominated our area, as soon as you get professors in the college, they gave you another side...

He is describing a process of cognitive reconstruction, but there is an affective side of Lenny's questioning of his conservative values, which emerges later in the interview. Lenny had indicated that, of a list of possible jobs to consider, he would least like to be an army private;

L I want to stay as far as possible from the army, especially since that is all I've had for 20 years now.

I What do you mean?

L O my father you know was in World War II and he wears his medals and everything. That's all he has been doing for 20 years, going over World War II, the battles and everything. Maybe just the drawback against this, that's all you've heard for so long, but it gets kind of sickening and you get to hate the military trade.

I So your father was in the war and ....

L I've seen what it has done to a person and I don't think it has been very favourable ... it has more or less moulded him into a person that is very dogmatic,very rigid and you know something has to be done in a certain way or else and everyone is treated more or less as subordinates in the Army. He is the general and everyone else is a private.

On this issue Lenny's response is strongly affective, and he is only beginning to translate this into moral affect - by judging the personal effects of a militaristic background on his father, not as yet seeing it in the wider context. Lenny is at this point in his development scored overall stage 4(3) in his moral reasoning.

In his next interview, three years later, Lenny has reached 4(5) reasoning, and has experienced a series of major life events, each of which was in its way a triggering event. It is in this interview that we can see most clearly the processes of affect, reconstruction and moral affect, and his increasingly taking responsibility for his beliefs and actions. Lenny has experienced a transformation in his political thinking and it is also reflected in the ways that he feels committed and responsible for taking action.

Because of its length, the final interview extract is in Figure 3, annotated to indicate the key points . It is particularly interesting to note the way that Lenny reconstructs the material which appeared in the previous interview when he was twenty, so the same event appears but seen through a more complex and radicalised lens. Also it is significant that he is still intensely wrapped up in unreconstructed affect towards his father - verging on hatred - which remains powerful even though he has translated many of the issues into broader moral and political ones.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

Figure 3

Lenny

I started to come out of the [home suburb] conservative environment and gradually by the time I was a senior I'd become what you would call a contemporary liberal American and before that time I had been a Goldwaterite and very conservative, exhibiting the effects of the community. ..... when I went away to London ... I really became radicalised, it was a very turbulent year there. LSE[1] was closed for 25 days, and the British authorities blamed it on American students.

TRIGGERING EVENT

I started to do some work under Professor X in political sociology and all of a sudden I saw things not in terms of being harmonious, but I saw a lot of conflict going on in soiety and I started to think about it in that perspective.

COGNITIVE RECONSTRUCTION

What was violent and what was in terms of being quieter. And then I came back and taught in the inner city for a year, and I was further radicalised.

MORAL ACTION

COGNITIVE RECONSTRUCTION

My father has practically all the evils of American society wrapped up in one person...... he is involved in medicine and medicine is a conservative structure of soicety, but he is also on this heavy military trip... when we were growing up most of the time we spent our summers going to military conventions.... it was just incredible, the whole idea of the service and the military and the whole idea of capitalism, the military representing one part and the business and eventually the nursing home representing the capitalist part of his character and along with it the whole racial bit and the idea of preserving what he had maintained.... in college we started questioning and we knew what kind of reaction we would get.

COGNITIVE RECONSTRUCTION

... and then I got ... more passionately committed to a position, one I thought I really realised when I was in London and when I got back I grew long hair and a beard, and my father did not know about the transformation, and .. he was at a military convention when I got back, and .. I figured I could at least prepare him via my sister for something of

MORAL AFFECT

Figure 3 continued

a transition. He came home unexpectedly early and I was sitting back on a couch and he just stood there with a gaping expression and then launched into a tirade about my being a nogood hippie and he was a super patriot and... he physically threw me out of the house and I was completely shocked. I was just frozen against the bed because I had never seen him like that. I was really worried about my own life...

TRIGGERING EVENT

AFFECT

In September I was thrown out of the house and I started teaching in October and I was living in Y and I went to a a Vietnam rally in Washington in November '69 and I marched in the rain for two days and then I went to a football game in zero degree weather and two days later I collapsed in class and they took me to hospital. [He was extremely ill and eventually went home to hisfather's care, but although his father treated him, they never communicated.]

ACTION / EFFICACY

I got my sixth notice of [draft] induction and my father wanted me to serve, and previously I had recieved four notices in January and February and I was in London. Technically I should not have left the country anyway, I was classified 1A and went on the understanding that if they wanted me I would have to come back and they wanted me in January and February, and I didn't want to come back. My father through his contacts... was able to arrange a delay in induction until I finished the degree in October on the understanding that I would go into Officers Training School and from February on I was supposed to be going through various procedures for the interview and examination, and I viewed the whole thing as a military campaign. I wanted to stay there and I wanted to finish what I was doing, so when I refused to serve at the end of September, and this was already after I had broken relations with my father, then even angered my father more, because this was a commitment on my part.

COGNITIVE RECONSTRUCTION

ACTION

MORAL AFFECT

I decided when I got back that since I wanted to take some time off and since I didn't want to serve in the army, I

Figure 3 continued

could effectively serve both objectives by becoming a teacher. I did. At that time, Y had a deficit of teachers, and I didn't have any educational courses but I went down to the board of education and I was assigned to the inner city schools. I got the teaching job and my appeal was denied the beginning of November and finally I got a sixth induction notice beginning of January and they told me this was the definitive notice and that if I didn't show up January 20 they would send the FBI out..... eventually on the date of the induction I flunked the physical and I never had to worry about it.

ACTION

.... what I would have done had I not failed the physical, I would have refused induction and taken legal action, but I dismissed running away.

(But you would have ended up in jail if you had refused induction ?)

Well no, I would not have, the backload of cases..... most cases were not being heard for about a year, and you could appeal to the state court and that could take two or three years, so I figured I had at least that much time to resolve my own conflict of conscience and what I would do about fleeing the country upon conviction or going to jail or actually serving.

ACTION TO
CREATE POSSIBILITY
OF REFLECTION

Lenny - up to this point - is not demonstrating extraordinary moral responsibility; he is a relatively typical example of the processes by which some middle class youth develop in their political thinking, though exacerbated in his case by the exceptionally powerful affective interaction with his father. I now want to move on to the first of my case histories of people who do show extraordinary moral responsibility and commitment. Both of these are retrospective, though in the case of Helen John she is reflecting on a period of the last three years, whereas in the case of Gandhi the reflection took place several decades after the events.

Helen - the Peace campaigner

Helen John is one of the pioneers of the Greenham Common protest against the siting of American Cruise missiles on British soil. This encampment on the perimeter of the airbase first came into existence in autumn 1981. It is a women-only protest, and the women explicitly argue that their action is feminist as well as anti-missile. Normally there are about thirty women living on the site, but these numbers are swelled from time to time by visitors, and there are occasional very large one-day demonstrations - for example when many thousands of women encircle the entire nine mile fence. Some women who occupy Greenham Common have given up family and/or professional life for the protest; others make brief visits.

In a television interview in November 1983, Helen John talked at length to an interviewer about the sequence of events in her own life which had led to the change from being a professional midwife, married with five children, to making a total commitment to the Greenham Common protest. Despite the methodological limitations of using edited television material, I consider that sufficient detail was given in the interview to illustrate aspects of the model I am proposing.

The Greenham Common protest began with a march, planned to last ten days, from Cardiff to the airbase. However, the indifference and trivialisation by the Press led to escalation of the final protest at the base, and to the decision by some of the women to make a long-term protest by remaining. The protest camp has subsequently been continually harassed by police and bailiffs.[11]

Helen John had long been a supporter of the Labour Party, and had attended Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament demonstrations in the early 1960s, but her involvement had long since lapsed. The 'triggering event' for her was a sudden insight, accompanied by strong emotion:

> 'I was driving on my way through beautiful scenery in Wales where I live and it suddenly occurred to me how this would all be altered in a nuclear war. And it just stopped me dead in my tracks. I couldn't keep driving. I had to stop and I felt really physically very unwell. And I was crying. I sat for about three quarters of an hour before I could continue the journey. I was scared sick, really scared. And then I felt terriby angry that any lunatic could put so much fear and pressure on people. And I knew that the fear I was experiencing was minute compared to so many other people's fears.'

Her experience altered her perception of the nuclear issue; she found she could no longer believe in the myth of deterrence. She perceived that the 'defensive' stockpiling of nuclear weapons was in fact preparation for war. This was the immediate effect of her cognitive reconstruction, but she also changed her perception of the role of protest and of efficacy;

> 'I think it was on that particular day that I realised you could actually stop this happening if you put some effort into it. And I think that day changed me a lot.'

The process began then continued;

> 'My own understanding of the situation grew daily and my determination to make my contribution to stop it grew daily.' 'You make a decision that you will no longer cooperative with a system that is designed to kill other people'.

As a nurse and midwife, her whole professional life had been geared to the saving, not the taking, of life, and she saw this increasing personal engagement as an extension of this rather than a new goal.

When she read about the proposed Greenham march she decided to join it: she saw this as part of her increasing sense of personal efficacy;

> 'Prior to that I had never seen the value of marching anywhere. It didn't seem to achieve anything. But I was sufficiently worried on this particular issue to go on the march, and make my own personal statement. And it was during the course of this march that I changed.'

The situation accelerated when the marchers decided, after arriving at Greenham, to stay there indefinitely. This was a qualitative leap for Helen, but by then she had begun to experience a sense of commitment and personal responsibility;

> 'The moment it was suggested (to stay on) I knew that I wanted to take that initiative. It was completely right for me. And it was also really the very first totally independent decision I had made for myself in twenty years. Because I wasn't going to consult my husband or any other person. It had to be my own decision.'

Her conviction of personal responsibility is evident in that quotation, but she elaborated it;

> 'I remember Douglas (husband) saying to me very clearly, there must be other women who haven't got five children who can do what you're doing. But it's not true; there's only one of me. Nobody can do exactly what I'm doing in the way I'm doing it. Only I can do that. Every individual has their own contribution to make in the way they uniquely can make it.'

This is a statement of a commitment involving her, not merely a statement of what ought, impartially, to be done. We can see, from even these brief extracts from the interview, a progression from affect in response to the triggering event - fear and then anger. Then she begins to reflect upon her affect and on the situation, which has precipitated that effect, and her perception is reconstructed. This leads to a strong moral affect - that the situation is wrong. She also begins to believe that not only has she personally some responsibility to try to do something about it, but that she can be efficacious in doing so. So she joins a collective protest - action initiated by others but to which she can add her voice. This is of course the point which many people reach, the impetus to legitimated action which provides an expression of moral affect, and which contributes to the possible achievement of some goal. But the responsibility here is to make one's voice heard, to express one's moral objection; it is not at this stage the burden of responsibility to personally make change.

It is that important transformation which occurred in Helen at Greenham itself. Suddenly it became her own responsibility to continue the protest; she saw herself as particularly efficacious and significantly, she appreciated that this autonomous decision had something to do with herself as a woman making a change in her own role; for the composite 'Jane', a crisis in her gender role relationships eventually generalised, on reflection, to wider political issues, for Helen the political issue eventually generalised to wider issues concerning her gender role. She has carried through that responsibility for action over the years, including accepting a prison sentence. She is now divorced, feeling that it is unfair to expect her husband to wait around in the expectation that life might return to 'normal'.

Her perceptions of her changing values also indicate reconstruction rather than complete change: 'I was very apprehensive about breaking the law because I believe in upholding the law;

that's why I'm trying to uphold a moral law.' Consequently, she regards serving a prison sentence as an inevitable part of the protest. She does not see herself as making sacrifices, nor does she see herself as a heroine: 'I do not think the word sacrifice is a good one because I haven't sacrificed anything. I'm safeguarding a lot. I am defending the life of my children. Very selfishly. (Interviewer: But you've cut yourself off from a family life that you obviously enjoyed?) I have cut myself off from one way of life in order to preserve the very things I care a but.' So what has changed is Helen's perception of her responsibility to those things. It is this recognition that she must do the preserving, the safeguarding, that makes Helen a person of extraordinary moral responsibility.

There is not really enough data in the interview to make confident statements about Helen's stages of moral reasoning, and especially with the problem of retrospective reconstruction. It is difficult to know how she did in fact think before the triggering event. There is much in her current thinking about responsibility, morality, and principles which is clearly stage 5 reasoning; her memory of how she thought before, particularly about the mechanisms of social change, the role of law, and the principles that governed her family and professional life, sound like stage 4 or even stage 3/4. But we can see even in the reconstructed memory, clear evidence of change in affect, cognition and action; in Helen John we can see the interaction between non-moral affect, cognitive reflection, moral affect arising from that, and eventual cognitive transformation which places her own responsibility for action at the centre rather than the periphery, of the situation.

Gandhi - the Reformer

The final case history I will consider is someone who has himself written so much, and has been so much written about, that it would be an impossible task to do justice to the detail. I am selecting therefore one event in the life of Gandhi which is generally regarded as having significance in his development, and which is particularly relevant to my current argument. I would also wish to admit that I am relying wholly on Erik Erikson's account as a source.[12]

Gandhi was trained as a lawyer in England, after a childhood and youth in India. His adolescence was, according to his later accounts, filled with confrontations with temptation, a striving for asceticism and setting himself strict guidelines for his own behaviour - particularly concerning cleanliness and vegetarianism. He was therefore, very preoccupoied with personal morality, and with the pursuit of purity. When he went to South Africa after his training in Britain to become a practising barrister, he had the expectation of an 'establishment' professional life. However he already had an image of himself as a reformer, arising from his religious convictions and his quest for personal virtue.

The incident with which I am concerned is the well-known train journey through Natal. As a professional he travelled first class on the train - and encountered racism; a white fellow-traveller demanded that Gandhi be ejected from the first class carriage. The conductor told Gandhi to travel in third class, he refused, and was put off the train. Later in the same trip he was again to experience racism; he was in fact assaulted for refusing to accept the South African definition of his place in the racial hierarchy.

Accounts indicate that Gandhi's response to these events was, understandably, anger and shock - not at first a moral response, but straightforward ego-related affect. However, he soon turned to a concern for the conditions of Indians in Africa, and he spent the following year organising the Indians of southern Africa into an effective political pressure group, using his lawyer's skills.

Thus I would argue that the initial triggering events on the Natal journey aroused affect, which on reflection, rapidly turned into a political and moral perception of the situation of Indians in Africa, accompanied by strong moral affect.
But what distinguished Gandhi from other reformers and activists, even at the age of twenty three, was that he was convinced tha he was the only person equipped to deal with the situation.
It was this extraordinary conviction of both personal efficacy and personal responsibility for action that guided his whole

life; it is remarkable that he made such a transformation in his thinking at so early an age. The transformation in his case seems to have been from a preoccupation with highly individual and essentially selfish paths to salvation, to a concern for public issues of justice - but sparked off by, initially, a blow to his own pride.

Conclusions

In this paper I have used a number of case histories to illustrate some tentative hypotheses about the role of affect in the engagement of the individual in a moral situation, and the importance of this engagement process in stimulating reconstruction of cognition. I have proposed a model which can incorporate this material into the developmental process, and which also tries to find a rationale for the relationship between perceived responsibility for action, action itself, and the consequence of engaging in action for making possible the extension of affective experience and enlargement of the potential for cognitive appraisal. I consider this tentative model to be within the framework of cognitive-developmental theory, as exemplified by Kohlberg's work on the stages of cognitive moral reasoning, Habermas' extension of this to stages in the development of communicative action, and also by the developmental model of empathy proposed by Hoffman, in which empathic distress becomes integrated into an increasingly complex appreciation of the states of others.[13] I have tried, however, to give attention to the role of affect as a reaction to experience, in engaging the individual, capturing her attention, and creating a stage of disequilibrium which, when reflected upon, both makes the cognitions about the situation more salient to the individual, and more integrated into her personal experiences. Moral affect (as opposed to reactive affect) is thus the consequence of cognition, and of reactive affect upon which there has been reflective cognition. According to the proposed model, therefore, affect is an energising intervening variable, but it is energising cognition as well as, potentially, action.

Moral responsibility, as I have used it in the model, is, as with Kohlberg's view, an intervening variable between cognition and action. I have tried to explore the ways in which moral responsibility is a cognitive process, because as Kohlberg shows even to perceive one's own responsibility requires a certain level of moral complexity. But it is also an affective process because it arises out of the engagement of the individual in the situation, a personal involvement consequent upon the individual affectively responding, and because it depends also on the individual feeling efficacious. Efficacy is a cognitive process also - knowing how I can, and believing that I can - but to feel responsible, to be impelled to act, requires a sense of engagement which is essentially, I argue, an affective consequence of the engagement process.

Finally, what of action? Critics of the cognitivist approach tend to say, 'But what of sophisticated thinking, if no action results?' This pushes the relationship of cognition and action into the mould,[cognition → action]- a commonsense notion which is concordant neither with current social nor developmental psychological perspectives. Yet Blasi in his comprehensive review, and Kohlberg and Candee in their theoretical formulations[14], have both attempted to demonstrate that cognition can be seen to predict action, and in the latter case, to demonstrate how that might come about. Their conclusions are valuable and interesting, but even more interesting are the findings of the way that action is the expression of cognitions and affects, and how it becomes meaningful in terms of those cognitions and affects. At the same time engaging in action is itself the means by which cognitions are 'tested' in practice and their limitations exposed. By action I do not of course only mean such extended acts as joining a demonstration or helping a sufferer; action also includes engaging in discussion with others, seeking further information, or even, I would argue, formulating a plan of possible action even if that does not come to fruition. The point about action in this context is that it reflects a change of state, to be doing something different from what one might have done had the events not occurred, the affect been aroused, the cognitions been reconstructed. Other papers in this conference explore these issues in greater detail that I can here, but I do wish to indicate that the models;[(adventitious) action → affect → cognitive reconstruction] and [affect → action → cognitive reflection/reconstruction] are equally as important as the [cognition (→ affect) → action] equation .

In order to elaborate some of these issues I will now recap on the model I presented in Figure 1, drawing together the material from the biographies.

The first element in the model is the pre-existing moral stage of the individual, her cognitive structures within which she constructs meaning for her experience. (Elsewhere I have argued that the evidence from the development of political concepts and the development of ideas about society, parallel so closely the development of moral concepts as elaborated by Kohlberg's model, that what is evident in development is the progression of the individual's implicit social theory[15]. The details of this theoretical formulation are relevant to the present paper only in that they enable us to look at moral and political thought without the conventional distinction of separating the 'moral domain' from other domains of thought.). The relevance of stage of thinking to the situation of moral crisis emerges clearly from all the available data; a situation is perceived differently depending on one's moral stage. This applies to both hypothetical and real-life situations. Thus the features of the situation perceived as salient will differ, according to one's stage, and mediate the affective outcome of the triggering event. Other 'baseline' variables which become significant at later stages of the model are the individuals'general sense of efficacy; as we have seen earlier, although efficacy exists as measurable cognitive orientation, its effect on action depends on whether the individual trusts authority figures or not. So for two of the main components of the model, vision and efficacy, pre-existing characteristics of the individual's view of her relationship to others and the world in general are important pre-conditions.

The triggering event sets the process in motion. Usually outside the individual's control, it is the catalyst of the individual's engagement. It is the fact that the event touches the individual in some way that is significant; the individual does not even have to be directly involved. Sandra observed the slaughtering of animals; her personal experience of seeing the bloody meat on her plate was an additional factor that further 'brought it home to her'. Helen experienced a powerful insight, apparently 'out of the blue' - but initially it was the countryside that she loved which she saw threatened, rather than the thought of her own childrens' death. Lenny was not particularly active in the LSE sit-in - for example he was not arrested - but witnessing it made salient the teaching of the radical professor. The important thing about the triggering event is that it makes what is external into an internal experience, it impinges.

The response to the triggering event is, as we have seen, affect, and I have stressed that this affect is not necessarily moral. The importance of the affect is its role in engaging the individual, in making the individual see herself as a part of the situation. It is reactive affect, a response to the events. While it may be mediated by some cognitive appraisal, and subject therefore to the limitations of one's cognitive structures, it is not its 'cognitiveness' which is important. So Sandra felt disgust, Helen felt fear and anger, Lenny (in response to his father) felt shock, Gandhi felt anger and hurt pride.

The way that this affect is dealt with depends on various factors, but most importantly, it is the action taken which affects the next phase of the sequence. Firstly, the individual may diffuse the affect in various ways, choosing perhaps to regard it as unwarranted , an outburst, an 'emotional reaction' to be controlled or defended against. All these are forms of denial. Or the individual may engage in catharsis of some sort - deflect the affect through humour, or through finding a scapegoat. As I indicated, many women find ways of dealing with gender-related situations without seeing them in political terms, and as many feminist writers have pointed out, blaming onself or turning to one's role responsibilities ('My children need me even more now my husband has left me') are common reactions.

The process of translating affecting into cognition, making it possible to reflect on the situation and reconstruct one's view of its, depends on some action. It may be fortuitous that - as for Helen - an occasion arises which makes this process easy. Jane joined a group in order to heal her wounds, Gandhi quickly came into contact with an unorganised group of Indians. The point about such 'reactive action', designed to deal with the reactive affect is that it makes the affect legitimate, and it is also the beginning of efficacy. Sandra felt that she *could* stop eating meat - so far, that is the only action Sandra has taken. Helen felt it was possible to do something about her fear and anger through objecting. Lenny felt he could begin to surrender his Republican orthodoxy.

It is then that the processes of *cognitive reflection* begin, and they change the way the affect is experienced, *but* cognition is also changed because now the issue is salient, and the individual needs to make sense of her reaction, needs to give it meaning and validity; if one is not going to think oneself 'silly' for reacting in that way, one must legitimate the origin of the affect. At this point, it is not necessarily the case that cognitive disequilibrium is serious; change in cognitive structure is a slow process, and as I said earlier, what is likely to be happening here is 'grasp of consciousness'; the individual extends her existing cognitions to incorporate her actual experience into her understanding of the hypothetical, and she begins to see new hypothetical and extended implications from this.

The consequence of this process is that new affect arises, a *moral* affect deriving from the individual's understanding that what made her disturbed is worth being disturbed about, that it is a general issue not simply a personal one. But she is also personally involved, engaged by the initial affect and also now by the legitimation of the affect. She feels responsible; should she not act when a situation arises, she must now make some kind of excuse to herself for not acting. It seems that at this point people become involved in collective activity, supporting action, rather than initiating action.This may be no more than a monitoring brief, noting significant events in the media, seeking out relevant information, 'opening one's mind' to perspectives hitherto unconsidered. This is the path of some of the hypothetical 'Janes' who settle into a routine of regular support for mild forms of feminist protest, it is the path of Lenny as he became involved in teaching in an inner city school, it is the phase of Helen's life that took her on the Greenham march in the first place. It is the path of many of the FSM arrestees after they left Berkeley.

If the actions performed satisfy the level of engagement and appear, on reflection, to achieve a level of consequence commensurate with one's cognitive appreciation of the situation and its implications, and if these actions accord with one's sense of personal efficacy, then one might expect little further change. But if there is a disjunction between what is seen to be achieved, or if further events occur which change the situation then a further process of transformation occurs. In the case of Lenny, the unexpected confrontation with his father created a violent reaction and consolidated Lenny's commitment to radicalism, already well-established through his LSE experiences. The fact of the draft being a threat also made him confront his own radicalism and think it through, to the point of recognising not only his own responsibility but his beliefs about the responsibilities of others working within the system. It is clear from this interview, not all of which I have quoted, that his level of cognitive structure became as a result of this appreciation, clearly stage 5 thinking. But it is also clear that this arises from his *own* experiences and the appreciation of the consequences ofhis *own* actions; it does not result from a sophisticated philosophical argument which any intelligent well-trained political scientist could produce.

Lenny is not really, in my terms, a person showing *extraordinary* moral responsibility. He never really made the jump that Helen John and Gandhi made of feeling that *they* were personally responsible for making changes. For Helen John, the transformation in her perspective came when she saw the limitations of an action which she had made a considerable investment in - the ten-day march from Cardiff - and for her this led to a conviction that the *task* was paramount, and that *she* must make a total commitment to it. For Gandhi, his transformation to personal commitment may have owed something to his lifelong concern with reform, which may have given him an unusual belief in his own potential efficacy.One of the points about extraordinary moral responsibility, apart from it being a commitment to action which is an imperative rather than merely an obligation, is that there is no going back. While one can rebuild, perhaps (as Helen John may eventually do, if she leaves the peace campaign), things cannot 'return' to normal; too much is changed. So the transformation is not only a more personally-centred view of the situation and the necessary action, but also a change in one's view of oneself as agent. By acting in accordance with that kind of commitment, one may not change the world, but one changes onself, one's affect and one's cognition.

In this paper I have proposed a model which tries to bring affect into the cognition-action equation in a way which does not submerge it into being only an experience upon which cognition operates, nor as an energising intervening variable between cognition and action. I have tried to present a model in which affect is the link between the hypothetical and the actual, the catalyst by which cognition becomes as much about the self as about the outside world. I have also argued that responsibility is not an affective response of empathy or attachment, nor is it a particular sophisticated cognitive perspective in which the individual 'sees' her role as an agent simply because she understands a prior-to-society perspective on the issues - though this may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the kind of responsibility I am talking about. Responsibility is a cognitive appreciation, but one which arises from personal engagement in the situation, itself consequent upon the individual reacting affectively and becoming involved.

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Review of:

Meyer, J.R. (ed.) Reflections on Values Education,

Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 1976

In: Journal of Moral Education, 6, 209-10, 1977.

Reflections on Values Education

J.R. Meyer (Ed), Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1976, 222 pp., ISBN 0 88920 030 0, $4.50

Values education is a topic surrounded by a *cordon sanitaire*. Despite the growing interest particularly in moral development, and the increasing research output, there is still an air of reverence, a self-consciousness about the 'special responsibilities' which the topic imposes on both researcher and practitioner. This is particularly true of writings directed at policy-makers and teachers. Yet in this collection as in others, a preoccupation with the dangers of indoctrination goes hand-in-hand with a hard-headed realization of the existence of hidden curricula in all institutions, whose messages are picked up by even the least sophisticated member of the institution. This in essence is the classic dilemma of liberal education.

It is currently fashionable to argue, as one contributor to this book does, that we live in an age of uncertainty, including moral uncertainty. It would I feel be useful to distinguish a number of types of uncertainty. Once upon a time the liberal educator could, with a clear conscience, paradoxically admonish her charges to think for themselves, in the reasonable certainty that those who did would come to more or less the same conclusions as she and others had done. While in fact this is probably still the case, the teacher and researcher now feel uncertain of the ethics of offering a set of cut-and-dried values to the child, even indirectly. They are uncertain also of the extent to which an awareness of relativism does (or should) undermine conviction. Finally, they are uncertain about the developmental processes by which values are acquired.

Some of this uncertainty is, from a practical point of view, unnecessary. There is sufficient evidence on developmental processes to alert the teacher to both the possibilities and limitations of children's value concepts. (In this collection there are articles not only on Kohlberg's work on moral development, but also on the development of social perspectives.) Such knowledge suggests that the teacher's role may be twofold; to act as a catalyst in classroom discussion, and to work towards change or modification of the hidden curriculum of the school. As a *person*, a teacher may benefit from reflection upon her own values and ideals, both moral and educational, and this hopefully will lead to an awareness of what she is doing, implicitly as well as explicitly, in the classroom. In her role as teacher, however, the important variables are surely an understanding of the psychological and sociological mileux of the child; a knowledge of what can reasonably be expected from a child at any given age, and an awareness of what other influences are currently impinging. The article by Puka forcefully expresses arguments along these lines. He appeals for realism, for a clear-headed perception of what is *possible*, for teacher and for pupil.

The preoccupation of many reasearchers and educational advisers with the problems of relative ethics leads frequently to a concern with hypothetical rather than with practicable morality. For the majority of people practically concerned with moral development, in social research or in schools, the message of Kohlberg's findings is *not* that Stage 5 or Stage 6 moral thought may be achieved through better moral education; all the studies clearly demonstrate the rarity of the last two stages of moral thought, and the predominance of Stages 3 and 4 in even the educated adult population. It is very rarely, if ever, pointed out that the logical conclusion of this is not the stimulation of moral growth, but the improvement of the quality and range of Stage 3 and 4 reasoning. Beck's article, for example, while not directly addressed to this issue, argues that Kohlberg is ultimately pessimistic rather than optimistic, and Beck considers that a useful *educational* goal is simply *reflectivity*, in cognitive and affective spheres.

There are a number of acute insights in this collection, which are likely to be thought-provoking; however, overall it is somewhat uneven. The level of linguistic and conceptual complexity varies considerably, and many readers interested in the practical applications which are spelt out by one or two of the contributors, are likely to feel frustrated by the technicalities of the more discursive theoretical chapters. The concern with the legitimacy, as well as the efficacy, of values education is a theme common to all the contributions, but this theme does not provide any real unity. As a collection of working documents in an ongoing discussion, it is interesting, but the discussants seem as yet too immersed in the problem to be particularly useful to those who may seek guidance in the practice of values education.

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Review of

Mosher, R.L. (ed.) *Moral Education: a first generation of research and development*. New York: Praeger 1980.
In *Current Reviews in Psychology* *1*, 304-5. 1982.

At times of social crisis there tends to swell up a demand for 'moral education', which usually means some programme of intervention in the school curriculum to provide a counterpoint to the current perceived problems. In the nineteen seventies this was seen as a lack of direction in the young, a rejection of traditional values and the work ethic. In the nineteen eighties, when not working is likely to be a non-voluntary option, the demand is more for control of impulse, the reduction of violence and public nuisance . Relatively little has been done in Britain systematically, though there have been a several efforts to lay out the parameters of what moral education should look like. These have tended to be eclectic, combining efforts to increase the child's appreciation of the feelings of others with attempts at what the Americans would call 'values clarification'. In contrast to polemicists, however, educators and researchers do show an appreciation of how difficult moral education is in practice, and how extensive are the human and time resources required to have any effect at all.

In the United States there has grown up a coherent body of theory of moral development, and a number of quite long-term projects have been undertaken in schools to implement this theory in moral educational practice. This book reports the successes and failures of the projects in which Ralph Mosher and Lawrence Kohlberg (the major theorist) have been involved. It is a valuable collection of articles by ex-teachers and researchers, which succeeds in integrating comments and reflections upon the theory-in-practice and specific details of the practice itself. It is therefore a genuine contribution to theory as well as providing a manual for practical classroom activities.

Kohlberg's theory of moral development has two main elements. Firstly, it is a cognitive-developmental theory, focussing upon reasoning processes. Kohlberg's empirical work has demonstrated that the individual progresses in adolescence and young adulthood through a series of stages of moral reasoning. Each stage marks progressively more complex reasoning about moral issues, moving from a simple individualistic rule•observance,through an awareness of community,to an appreciation of the broader societal issues involved in rights and obligations. The second major element of the theory is Kohlberg's conception of the central core of morality, which for him is justice. The stages reflect increased appreciation of justice as the basis of morality. Most of the criticism of the theory has been directed to this second issue, Kohlberg's conception of morality.

There are a number of implications for moral education which might be drawn from this theory of moral development. The one which underscores all the chapters of this book is that development is the purpose - the essence - of education, and that moral education should stimulate moral development. For most of the authors, the index of the success of moral education is a shift in moral maturity score, as manifested by Kohlberg's standard measure of moral reasoning. This raises some interesting questions, to which I shall return. The means used to achieve this are basically two forms of intervention or curriculum strategy. The first derives from the findings of one of Kohlberg's students, Moshe Blatt, that 'socratic methods' - the pointing-up of inconsistency - induce stage change over a period of time. The second is more wide-ranging, and derives in part from the limitations of the socratic method. Kohlberg found that there was little effect if the individuals exposed to socratic techniques were living in an environment which reflected, and thus constantly endorsed, a lower stage of moral reasoning. At the same time, research on kibbutzim showed that communities whose norms and operation reflected a higher stage of reasoning promoted a higher stage of reasoning in its members. He therefore began experimenting with 'just communities' in prisons and schools; self-governing groups within the normal school system, who met for certain curricular and extra-curricular activities.

In this volume are reported both kinds of intervention programmes; work by teachers using variations of the socratic discussion methods in history, literature and on specific historical and social issues such as the Holocaust, and work on the several 'schools-within-schools' which Mosher and Kohlberg have been involved with.

There is no doubt, from the evidence presented in this volume, that both these methods are effective within their terms of reference, in inducing moral development. It is also clear that both methods are demanding on teacher resources, and that the impetus of a research or consultancy team seems necessary to maintain an ongoing programme. But the interesting questions seem to me to be in what is actually going on, and what the important factors are. Mosher and Kohlberg differ somewhat in their goals and their assumptions, although the projects take a similar form. Kohlberg's perspective may be summarised as seeing the just community as a means to stimulating individual moral growth, and the manifestation of that moral growth in group interaction and decision-making about rules, roles and contractual relations - the moral elements of self-government. Mosher's original model is not the kibbutz, but the 'town meetings' of New England, the participatory democracy which still survives in many places. Although he acknowledged the value of moral developmental measures as an indicant of the effect of the just community, his own purposes are to increase the capacity of the individual to be effective in participatory democracy; his goals, in other words, are social rather than individual.

The difference between these two approaches may in practice be small, but it underlines a fairly basic division. Obviously, personal growth has spin-offs in social and interpersonal behaviour, and equally obviously, personal growth attempted in isolation from the social context is limited. However, setting a goal of personal growth has the ultimate telos of autonomy, the capacity to make an individual moral decision. Setting a goal of effective cooperation and participatory democracy may be an effective way of developing collusive conformity to majority decisions. The paradox - or perhaps the crunch of reality - of this volume is that all the intervention work was conducted with children whose modal moral stage was 2 - instrumental hedonism - and the progression induced was towards stage 3 - a measure of community orientation and a focus on roles and norms established by common agreement. This transition produces an increased appreciation of the function and value of cooperative rule-making, with the desirable consequence that many forms of deviance are reduced. But not all; the communities on the whole failed to resolve the issue of smoking marijuana, which was seen by many as non-detrimental to the individual or the community. It was on this issue that the conflict between the adult-desired norms and the pupil-desired norms became explicit.

How transferable is this appraoch to moral education across the Atlantic? Europeans lack the folk-memory (and, largely, the folk myth) of participatory democracy on any scale, and Britons in particular have somewhat less faith in the power of individual reason to effect social change. There is a stronger tradition in Britain of taking affect into account. However there is a limit on what the school can do to promote affective development; promoting a greater appreciation of decision-making and role development in the small democratic group is manifestly desirable, and, on the basis of this volume, manifestly possible provided the resources are there.

Review of:
Peters, R.S. Moral Development and Moral Education,
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981

In: Harvard Educational Review, 53, 465-469, 1983.

MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL EDUCATION

by R. S. Peters.

Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981. 187 pp. $8.95.

R. S. Peters, with Paul Hirst, founded modern philosophy of education in Britain; their influence on the present generation of British teachers is enormous. Peters's stance is that of critical commentator, but he also attempts a synthesis of current psychological perspectives on moral development. From this synthesis he addresses the practical concerns of the moral educator—how *can* we teach children to be good, given what we know about moral development processes?

Moral Development and Moral Education is a collection of Peters's writings from 1960 to 1978. Each article has been published previously either in a journal or as a book chapter, and all but one have already appeared in a much larger collection, *Psychology and Ethical Development* (1974). The rationale for producing this volume is to provide an accessible book for teachers and others with an interest in moral education. The writings span a highly productive period in the development of psychological research on moral development. The volume is a chronicle of the development of one man's thinking over twenty years, but it is also a fascinating reflection of an exciting period of scientific history.

Any theory of moral development contains assumptions about what constitutes the moral domain, what the ideal outcome of moral development should be, and how moral development actually takes place. For example, shall the focus of research be on the acquisition of guilt and good habits or on the development of rational moral judgment? Shall the goal of moral development be socially acceptable behavior or the capacity to be morally autonomous? Is moral development the result of conditioning or the promotion of reasoning?

In practice, however, psychologists frequently do not examine their basic assumptions but take them for granted. Moral educators often present a somewhat confused eclectic ragbag of moral curricula geared to what they believe is possible within the confines of the school structure. Yet, educators neither spell out their concept of moral development nor their definition of the moral domain. Philosophers, in contrast, are excellent at pointing out the conceptual confusions within the field, but they tend to regard empirical studies of real-life moral development as peripheral. As Peters argues, "there has been a great deal of investigation by psychologists, such as the Hartshorne and May [1930] *Character Investigation Inquiry*, without adequate conceptual distinctions being made; on the other hand moral philosophers have developed many conceptual schemes which seldom get much concrete filling from empirical facts" (p. 11).

Peters's great strength is that he combines the skills of psychologist, philosopher, and educator, creating a constructive eclecticism. A recurrent theme, for example, is his critique of the narrowness of some psychologists' conceptions of what constitutes "the moral" and their wholesale and uncritical adoption of some of philosophy's ethical models:

> Much of moral philosophy in the past has been unconvincing because it has not dwelt sufficiently on the different views that can be taken about what is morally important. It has been bedevilled by monistic theories such as Utilitarianism, or some version of Kant's theory, in which the attempt is made to demonstrate that one type of justification can be given for everything. . . . There is a danger of a similar fate befalling theories of moral development. (p. 83)

It is on these grounds that he criticizes Kohlberg's (1976) theory of the development of moral reasoning, which he believes is too wedded to cognitive processes and too tied to defining morality in terms of reasoning about justice. Throughout the second half of the collection, Peters's recurrent theme is the integration of Kohlberg's theory with his own more eclectic synthesis of reason and affect.

Peters believes that virtue, habits, and affect—particularly caring and what he calls the "rational passions"—are as essential to moral development as the development of a rational morality that makes autonomous judgment possible. He wants a theory of moral *development* which is not simply a ragbag of different moral content but one that includes affective, cognitive, and behavioral features. The essence of his developmental model is the Aristotelian position that the child must enter the "Palace of Reason" through the "Courtyard of Habit": the young child cannot reason and must, therefore, be constrained by rules and prescriptions, but these constraints must not inhibit the development of the child's future rationality. For Peters, it is in Kohlberg's conventional period that the foundation is laid for good habits, the knowledge of necessary rules, and the motivations which will lead the individual to pursue worthwhile activities and be intrinsically, rather than extrinsically, directed.

Peters values developmental theory because he sees in Piaget's and especially Kohlberg's stage models a way of reconciling this developmental paradox—stage models show how the performance of habits makes possible the reflection upon which later autonomy of reason is based. He is, however, highly critical of Kohlberg's own interpretation of the stages and of what he considers to be Kohlberg's restricted definition of morality.

Peters argues that moral development includes the differentiation of four separate kinds of "virtue." The first kind of virtue constitutes acts which are sometimes considered to be character traits, such as punctuality, honesty, and tidiness. The second kind of virtue includes motives for action, such as compassion. Peters terms the third kind more "artificial" because it concerns abstract concepts; these are the virtues concerned with rights and institutions—for example, justice and tolerance. The fourth kind, "higher order" virtues, reflects resistance to pressure and includes courage, perseverance, and integrity (pp. 94-110). Kohlberg and Piaget, he argues, focus entirely on the third type of virtue, the "artificial." Not only do they have no space in their theory for the other categories of virtue—indeed, Kohlberg (1971) has specifically rejected what he terms the "bag of virtues" approach to morality—but Peters also asserts that they do not consider what role the other virtues may play in the development and promotion of reasoned morality.

Peters's reading of the cognitive developmental literature leads him to the conclusion that there are particular developmental "tasks" for each level of moral development. Without these developmental tasks (which, for Peters, include affective [feeling] and conative [will], as well as cognitive elements), the growth of reasoning is not possible, for reason is reflection upon earlier habit and rule. He sees the conventional level—Kohlberg's stages 3 and 4—as a foundation for the good habits and knowledge of rules necessary for later autonomous reasoning based upon principles. This foundation itself owes much to the earlier morality of constraint, which in Peters's view is essential for controlling the destructive impulses of the preconventional child at stages 1 and 2.

It is clear from this collection of essays that Peters's discovery of Kohlberg's work in the late 1960s was crucial to the development of his own theoretical insights. In the earlier part of the book, he explores the relationship between affect and cognition, reason and passion, searching explicitly for a means of giving his model a developmental framework. Kohlberg's cognitive developmental model provides Peters with this framework. In developing a critique of Kohlberg, Peters develops his own thinking.

Ultimately, Peters's interests are in the means and goals of moral education; his formulation of a framework for a theory of moral development contributes to an understanding of how to implement moral education. But, he does not propose specific curricular plans. Instead, he repeatedly states that a goal of education is to foster the development of people who are motivated to engage in "worthwhile" activities rather than in trivialities: people whose moral motivation is intrinsic rather than extrinsic and people who can make free choices and be rational and autonomous. However, his recurrent exemplar of this is distinctively British and in the present climate of moral education, curiously old-fashioned: the colonial official, working alone and far from home without the support of peers, having to make just decisions and resist the pressures of bribery and threat. This "man of integrity" is characterized essentially by individual qualities; his morality is that of someone who can stand alone. It is not a morality in which interpersonal relations play a large part, except in the sense of meting out equity to dependent others.

It is my observation that the present preoccupation in moral education, at least as evidenced by some writings from the United States, is with the development of participatory democracy and with the child's capacity to be an effective member of that democracy. These writers also stress that it is through the experience of participatory democracy that the child may come to greater moral maturity. The work of researchers who have accepted the tenets of cognitive developmental theory has focused on the "just community" as a moral education environment. In a just community, members take an equal and democratic share in policymaking, and there is explicit discussion and resolution of conflicts of rights and obligations among community members. Such just communities have been set up within some East Coast schools and prisons (for example, see Mosher, 1980).

Perhaps the closest thing to the just community within the British educational system is the progressive school, the best known of which is probably Summerhill (Neill, 1968). The explicit goal of the progressive school has been to develop self-determination and autonomy through collective community involvement and democratic decisionmaking. But Peters is skeptical of both the goals and methods of such schools. In particular, he finds the lack of a constraining influence on the younger child antithetical to his own view that early moral education must restrict the basic destructiveness of the young.

It is perhaps unfair to criticize Peters for failing to take into consideration the more recent experimental work on participatory democracy. It was, after all, not widely available even at the time he wrote the last essay in this collection. He does quote Makarenko's Russian work, which demonstrates—as did the just community studies—that individuals operating with egocentric thinking will progress to what looks like Kohlberg's stage 3 reasoning as a consequence of focusing on collective goals within the ongoing peer-group activity.

For Peters, this data is a confirmation of his view that, if progress through the conventional period is necessary for development, educators should take into account the need to provide a rule-based, conformist system rather than expect autonomy. He advocates the traditional British Public School, a private boarding school system which prepares upper-middle-class youth for positions of responsibility and leadership in the community. Peters writes,

> The Public Schools, who specialised in character-training implicitly acknowledged this; for they combined an appeal to team spirit and to authority-based rule-conformity for all, with an emphasis on independence of mind and sticking to principles for those more senior boys who were singled out to command rather than simply to obey. It is questionable whether progressive educators have been sufficiently aware of the importance of this second level of development. They have, on the one hand, been reluctant for the staff to impose the rule of law but have been embarrassed by the fact that, if this is withdrawn, bullying and peer-group pressures take its place. (p. 130)

Perhaps Peters is simply presenting rules and peer pressure as rhetorical opposites in order to make a point which may be theoretically valid, but it is a gross misrepresentation of the Public School system to imply that bullying does not take place there, as many accounts, both fictional and factual, since *Tom Brown's Schooldays* (Hughes, 1857), have pointed out. Secondly, he ignores the fact that, for seventy years, British progressive schools, like those in other countries, have experimented with many forms of democracy, collective decisionmaking, and self-regulation. To focus on a rather superficial image of undirected freedom of expression and absence of training in good habits does not do justice to a multifaceted and long-standing series of educational experiments.

Finally, Peters noticeably fails to mention the "normal" school environment of the average British child—the comprehensive grammar or secondary schools which are the equivalent of American public high schools. The day school does not provide quite the scope for experimentation that the boarding school does, but most moral education takes place in such schools. Indeed, the exercises in just communities in the United States occupy a relatively small part of the working week of day school attenders (Mosher, 1980). Recent work by Rutter and his colleagues in twelve British day schools (Rutter, Maughan, Mortimore, & Ouston, 1979) examines the relationship between school atmosphere and various indices of effectiveness and achievement. Although not specifically directed to the issue of moral education, this work illustrates very clearly the ways in which the total environment of the school—including authority and peer relationships, "hidden" social curricula and norms, and the institutional mechanisms of decision-making—affects the morale of the individual and the quality of her or his performance. This study has obvious implications for many of the questions which Peters addresses.

In the final analysis, then, Peters's book is not in any sense a manual of practical moral education. It is valuable as an incisive clarification of some of the conceptual confusions which have tended to abound within much writing on moral education over the last few decades—confusions about goals, definitions of the "moral," and hidden assumptions about how development takes place. Peters's deliberately pluralist perspective is particularly important at a time when psychologists are tending to develop rigorous but essentially unitary theories of human growth. His attempt to integrate cognition, conation, and affect within a genuinely developmental framework is a definite advance over previous "ragbag" models. His work is not presented as a formal psychological theory, and indeed it is not sufficiently detailed for that, but it is a salutary critique, alerting us to what is left out by others.

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Can we, and even if we can, should we? Some reflections on the relationship between developmental psychology and moral education

Paper presented to Annual Conference of the British
Psychological Society, University of Warwick, April 1984.

Moral education has existed for many thousands of years without the benefit of formal developmental psychology. Parents have raised their children according to the practical precepts of their culture - precepts which contain buried but identifiable implicit models of human nature and of human development. Even more basically, children have learned to survive and thrive in the peer social group, acquiring the necessary social skills to absorb and negotiate group norms, sanction deviants, and take responsibility for younger peers and siblings. In contrast, the forces of established religion and education have tended to make their models of development more explicit, and to have expressed a rather more definite idea about the fundamental goodness or otherwise of human nature - and consequently to have tailored their educational practices with some fairly well-defined goals in mind.

The common term is 'character'. It is a concept which we all understand, because we share a common cultural background. It has meaning to us, and it has meaning to the many generations of educators who tried to instil it, most explicitly perhaps in the Public (and later grammar) schools. This meant the education for leadership, integrity, team spirit, honesty and so forth, mainly through the use of competitive games and a hierarchy of responsibility. In a somewhat different form, the progressive school system instilled a more cooperative version of 'character' through participatory democracy and the encouragement of self-determination. Youth movements of all colours have tried to do the same thing. All that differs are the defined goals and the desired virtues; that the school and the youth leader should have some responsibility for moral education is an ancient concept.

But 'character' is a diffuse concept. Its constituent elements are weighted differently by different political and social perspectives, and by different social classes and subcultures. It does not survive the philosopher's scalpel; the philosopher wishes to differentiate morality based on reasoning and justice from morality based on virtue or affect. It does not survive empirical psychology either; as everyone knows, Hartshorne and May failed to find much of a predictable relationship between different moral traits and behaviours, nor between moral behaviour and membership of character-building youth movements like Sunday School or Scouts.[1] While Hartshorne and May can be criticised both for using essentially Mickey Mouse cheating tasks (like most psychologists who have subsequently studied cheating) and for drawing an over-pessimistic picture of the inconsistency of moral psychology, nevertheless subsequent psychological research has probably been on fairly safe ground in focussing on very specific and narrowly defined patches of the 'moral domain'.[2]

We must remember that developmental psychologists interested in the field of morality have inherited all this cultural baggage, and an appreciation, however untutored, of the various philosophical positions on what constitutes the 'moral'. In an effort to do manageable and relatively rigorous research, developmental psychologists have firmly delineated their terms of reference, and there have emerged several distinguishable positions. While it is probably unfortunate that these distinctions look sometimes like battle lines, and that a certain amount of bristling and rhetorical exchanges go on about what counts as 'proper' scientific method and 'good theory', nevertheless the effect has been a valuable clarification of developmental processes and different aspects of 'morality'. We can now say with a certain amount of confidence that we know something about moral development, and we can also make some statements, albeit tentative, about what is likely to be possible within the context of school-based moral education.

It has turned out that the distinctions and lines of delineation within 'moral psychology', as I shall call it for convenience, unsurprisingly follow the major lines of current psychological theory. But they also follow the main lines of philosophical debate about morality, which raises interesting questions for those who would like to make psychologists more aware of the close relationship between philosophy and psychology. In brief, there are four dimensions along which one might differentiate the dominant themes, or in educational terms the ideal goals, of moral development, and there are four theoretical traditions in psychology, each of which offers somewhat different explanations of the development of morality.

To understand something of the incompatibility,even of conflict, between the various dimensions and explanations let us first consider some lay definitions of the 'virtuous person' - the kinds of definitions which one might encounter in policy discussions of moral education, in fact; 'someone who is concerned for others', 'someone who acts according to what they believe', 'someone who doesn't break the rules', 'someone who is honest and trustworthy', 'someone who is concerned about rights and justice'. On reflection, these are not the same animal; the rule-follower may not be capable of autonomous, principled action; the person who can analyse an injustice may be relatively unfeeling in interpersonal relations. And, of course, vice versa.[3]

The four dimensions of moral psychology are autonomy v. conformity, thinking v. feeling, prosocial behaviour v. antisocial behaviour and individual v. social. For the psychologist, these dimensions reflect dominant research preoccupations. But they also contain different assumptions about methodological and theoretical questions. It is a matter of emphasis, for example, the psychologist interested in moral thought does not deny the importance of developing good habits; she regards it as only a partial explanation. But these dimensions do represent in practice somewhat different implicit theories of morality, and for the educationalist this may matter; can one simultaneously teach moral autonomy and moral conformity?

The main differences between autonomy and conformity approaches are as follows: the autonomy model assumes that the outcome of moral development, and therefore the 'goal' of effective moral education, will be a person who can make independent moral decisions and act upon them; this may involve countering group and normative pressures. In contrast, the conformity model assumes that development and education result in proper knowledge of social norms, good behavioural habits and a tendency to avoid sin. Clearly the developmental mechanisms are different; the autonomy model emphasises cognition, judgement and an appreciation of responsibility for one's own actions; the conformity model emphasises the development of appropriate guilt anxiety, the acquisition of certain kinds of social skills and habits, and a receptivity to the approval of others. To cite but one study, Hoffman and Salzstein found that young adults who showed signs of 'autonomy' had parents who were not particularly affective in interaction with them, but had stressed *induction*; the child had been encouraged to consider the consequences of her actions and to draw her own conclusions about the wrongness of them. Young adults who were equipped with strong consciences and who tended to be conscientiously law-abiding, had parents who practised affective techniques, such as love-withdrawal, when they transgressed.[4]

The second dimension is *thinking v. feeling*. Should we attempt to educate the emotions as well as, or even instead of, the intellect? Is the morally educated person someone who has a sound set of ethical principles, or someone who is sensitive, empathic and loving? The two are not necessarily incompatible; the person whose principles are affronted can also feel anger or compassion on behalf of those who suffer, and the person whose feelings well up at a particular situation can subsequently reflect, and generalise from that response into a well-articulated principle - indeed, many people become 'converted' to a moral cause as a consequence of an emotive response to an isolated incident. But developmental psychologists and moral educationalists have tended in their research and writings to concentrate either on the cognitive *or* the affective mechanisms.

The developmental of moral thought involves cognition about rules, roles and relationships. Most of the work on moral thinking has been conducted within a cognitive developmental framework, and has a) focussed fairly heavily on the child's understanding of rules, rights and justice, and b) much of it has looked at moral development in terms of stages of thought - the child's understanding is seen as a *structured theory* of how the world works, and development involves *transformations* of these structures into more complicated forms of reasoning. Such transformations occur within the ordinary course of events, or else they can be stimulated through cognitive conflict. The main work in this field has of course been done initially by Piaget, and subsequently in considerably greater detail by Kohlberg, who has empirically identified five stages of moral reasoning.[5]

The development of feeling, in contrast, concerns the ways in which the person becomes sensitised to others. This involves interpretation of the emotions of others, and the ability to respond empathically to those cues and to moderate one's own behaviour so as to avoid hurting. Much of this kind of development can be seen as a form of social skills learning.[6]

The third dimension is prosocial v. antisocial behaviour. Shall the psychologist and the educator be more concerned with the avoidance of sin or with the development of altruism? Both pro and anti-social behaviour depend upon social norms and expectations; much of what is called juvenile delinquency,for example, once one has parcelled out broad variables like social deprivation, can be seen as conformity to subcultural norms and social identity. Similarly, altruism is subject to normative effects, as the studies of bystander apathy and intervention demonstrate.[7]

The approaches have normative factors in common, but otherwise they diverge conceptually. The avoidance of sin is seen by lay persons and psychologists alike as being a matter of impulse control. Impulse control stems from properly learned good habits and behaviour patterns, and from a reasonable level of guilt anxiety and internalised prohibitions and controls. But it also involves a more complex set of skills, associated with dealing with one's own internal conflicts; it is not enough to know that aggression will be punished, or that one will feel guilty if one aggresses against others, it is also necessary to know how to handle one's aggression and direct it into acceptable outlets.[8]

Prosocial behaviour has had rather less attention from the researcher. It involves empathy, the skills of cooperative behaviour and consideration for others, and the capacity to take responsibility within the community; very much in fact those skills we considered under the heading of 'feeling'. But there are certain kinds of supererogatory forms of altruism which go beyond mere concern for others, and involve going against what appears to be a norm of non-interference. A number of researchers have concluded from looking at studies of bystander intervention, and at the Milgram studies of obedience, that going out on a limb against group or authority pressures requires the individual to take a perspective of the situation in which she sees herself as personally involved, and personally responsible for taking action. This has been termed 'moral competence', and it appears to correlate strongly with level of moral reasoning.[9]

But from this research there emerges clearly the importance of social psychological variables. The media and on occasion politicians tend to present a view that the purpose of moral education is to prevent antisocial behaviour; in practice the running of any organisation and in particular the running of a school, requires the establishment of a whole structure of prosocial expectations and norms; the actual restraint of antisocial behaviour is a relatively small part of the process of maintaining order in an institution.[10]

The fourth and final dimension I will consider is the focus on individual v. the focus on social processes. Research on the development of predominantly individual processes emphasises the individual's acquisition of good habits, guilt anxiety and the internalisation of parental and social norms. Within such an approach, social interactions with parents, peers and school are catalysts in the individual's development; they act upon the individual and mould or facilitate the acquisition of morality. In the case of moral reasoning development, an individual approach emphasises the changes which go on inside the individual's head, in the structure of moral reasoning; 'social' factors, such as stimulating or disequilibrating cognitive conflicts, are intervening variables in the individual developmental process.

In contrast, a social approach regards the social context as causal rather than catalytic, and moral development and action as a matter of social relations rather than of individual values, traits or reasoning. The social approach include a wide range of psychological theory; Skinnerian behaviourism, for example, treats the individual not as a 'moral' being but as the product of a social process which moulds acceptable or unacceptable social behaviours through reinforcement.[11] From a quite different theoretical perspective comes the idea of a 'moral career'; the task of individual development is to learn to manage one's role, persona and reputation in order to obtain acceptability within the social group. 'Morality' in this sense is simply a matter of expressive behaviours or rhetorics which demonstrate one's worth as a group member - or, as Breakwell has argued, as a means of establishing one's own group's legitimacy vis-a-vis another, less 'morally worthy' group.[12]

This brief sketch of what I see as being the four main dimensions of moral psychology incorporates aspects of cognitive-developmental, psychoanalytic, and social learning approaches to developmental psychology, and some important contributions from social psychology. The question arising from this review is, what is possible within school-based moral education? By differentiating four dimensions and unpacking the ragbag eclecticism of traditional notions of 'character', I have tried to indicate that not all approaches are compatible with one another.

Firstly, let us state the obvious. School does not begin till the age of five, and although it occupies many hours of the day, powerful affective relationships with parents and peers happen outside. The school itself is a complex institution in which a wide variety of norms exist, to govern the organisation of authority and cooperative relationships, the expectation of types of behaviour and standards of aspiration, and the acquisition of a variety of work and social skills. So we can make the reasonable assumption that under normal conditions most of the groundwork of developing guilt anxiety happens in the home, and it is parental expectations that will have set up norms for a whole range of domestic and sibling responsibilities and behaviours. In addition, by the time she reaches school age, the child will have established basic peer relations in the neighbourhood.

So the school's role is confined to the transmission of specific skills, the stimulation of certain kinds of cognitive conflict, and the establishment of certain kinds of norms about behaviour. To illustrate these, let us consider some specific findings. For example Rutter and his colleagues found that there were differences between schools in behavioural norms and expectations; from this they concluded that the school does have an effect on the collective behaviour of its pupils in a number of areas loosely classifiable as 'moral'.[13] On a somewhat different scale, studies of Israeli adolescents tend to show that kibbutz-reared adolescents are more community-oriented and less likely to show signs of 'delinquent' behaviour than city adolescents; one explanation of this is that the kibbutz presents the growing child from an early age with a powerful norm of collective responsibility; the urban child coming into a kibbutz school is exposed to this norm also.[14]

One set of experiments in moral education is particularly interesting because it began as an exercise in what I described above as a 'thinking' and 'individual' approach to education, and eventually turned into a much more 'social' approach. Focussing on the education of moral reasoning in the classroom, Blatt, one of Kohlberg's students, found that if children were exposed to the moral arguments one stage in advance of their present mode of thinking, they came gradually to see the discrepancies between their own thinking and the more complex form, and they eventually showed more complex moral reasoning. It did not work if the stage of reasoning presented was much higher than their current one, nor if it was lower. This in itself provided the basis for some curriculum development; it is relatively easy to provide discussion fora along those lines in the classroom.[15] However, subsequently Kohlberg's view of this work shifted to a more 'social' perspective; he argued that institutions have a 'hidden structure' in that the form of interaction and authority relationships are an enactment of stages of moral reasoning. A prison, for example, with its absolute hierarchical authority and summary retribution for deviance, is an expression of a stage 1 view of the world; it is unsurprising if the inmates operate with a stage 1 structure of thinking - at least with regard to their prison life. In contrast, a stage 4 or 5 community would be based on principles of justice in which individual members had democratic rights and their collective decisions would determine rule-making and organisation.[16]

He initially set up 'just communities' in prisons, and then in schools. In the case of the school projects, the pupils and volunteer staff spent part of the week in the 'alternative' just community and the rest in the normal school. Most of the pupils came into the alternative school with stage 2 or 3 reasoning - which in effect means a 'we v.they' attitude to authority, and 'every person for themselves' view of responsibility. They gradually came to understand the processes of rule-making and the role of contracts in rule-keeping, and to see the function of collective responsibility in the maintenance of the group. After 2 or 3 years most had progressed considerably further towards the next stage of reasoning, showing more accelerated moral development than controls. Participatory democracy has been used by many educators as a way of assisting moral development; Kohlberg's experiment and conceptual framework provides one way of assessing its effects.

In Britain, the emphasis of what is termed 'personal, social and moral education' tends to be more on the development of social skills - on the 'feeling' dimension. MacPhail's Lifeline and Startline projects explicitly are defined as 'moral education'; Button's Developmental Groupwork is not so defined, but it covers similar ground. Both approaches use role-playing and social-skills-training methods to improve the child's capacity for interpersonal relations and for understanding the other person. MacPhail explicitly considers this to be the primary goal of moral education. His aim is to sensitise the individual child and equip her with greater concern for others and a capacity for empathy. Button's methods focus on changing the whole school to create a more effective interacting group at the organisational level; in such an environment children can develop social and caring skills more easily. Neither approach has as yet been systematically evaluated for effectiveness in attaining their goals, but they are both widely used in British schools and are perceived by teachers to be useful curriculum techniques.[17]

I have not touched upon the Humanities Curriculum Project of Stenhouse, nor upon the growth of Peace Education, but both of these approaches conform broadly to the criteria of moral education that have been used in this paper. To quote briefly from the Avon County Council's guidelines on Peace Education, for example; 'An indication of the personal qualities which any programme of personal and social education supporting Peace Education might seek to develop; cooperation, trust, self-awareness, desire and ability to participate, sense of responsibility, tolerance, ability to communicate, empathy and understanding and ability to discriminate.'[18]

Earlier in this paper I asked what is possible; I have tried to set down some criteria for answering that question by drawing on the findings of developmental and social psychology. I also asked 'should we?' The obvious response is that, like sex education, moral education goes on whether or not the school chooses to intervene formally in the process. Indeed, all schools do intervene formally through the various structures by which pupils are given responsibility, by the ways in which they are rewarded for meeting the schools expectations and norms, and by the patterns of interpersonal relations between staff and pupils. The question is therefore whether there should be some formal curriculum slot for 'moral education' - under whatever name. The milder objections to this are that it then becomes something that happens on Tuesdays between ten and eleven, and gets forgotten outside that time, as a consequence, other lessons in which moral education could take place - and indeed does - will have less incentive to consider the implications of their curriculum. The stronger objections have been firstly, that it may lead to 'moral assessment', or even a 'moral development quotient', which might have pernicious implications, and secondly, that moral education means teaching one set of values rather than another.

The objection to moral assessment might have some basis; it is unfortunately the case that the more psychologists know about something, the easier it is to draw up a measure of it, and the likelier that such a measure might be misused. However some valid measure of particular aspects of moral development might have value for remedial purposes, or for evaluating the broad effectiveness of a curriculum. In practice, of course, teachers are constantly asked to write comments on pupils which are quite explicitly morally evaluative. The new profiling methods of assessment build this into the assessment system.[19]

I think the final objection, that teaching of moral education means teaching one set of values rather than another, is met by the review of the developmental research; whatever the theoretical orientation or the dominant theme of the research, all the research studies address the question of how the person grows into a 'moral being' - whether this is a matter of moral or social skills, complexity of moral thought, sensitivity of feeling, capacity to manage one's reputation or whatever. None of this is value-free, of course, but it all focusses on the processes of moral development, rather than on its content. Presumably a curriculum based on principles derived from the findings of developmental psychology would aim to do the same thing.

But my final comment is that the model of one period per week of 'moral education' is likely to be ineffective; all the research tends to show that effective moral education only happens when the conventional organisation of the school is fairly substantially modified, and when pupils are involved long term and explicitly consciously in reflection on their own and other people's experience.

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