

1 **Making Technological Innovation Work for Sustainable Development**

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19 **Abstract**

20 Sustainable development requires harnessing technological innovation to improve human well-being
21 in current and future generations. However, impoverished, marginalized, and unborn populations too
22 often lack the economic and political power to shape innovation systems to meet their needs. Issues
23 arise at all stages of innovation, from invention of a technology through its selection, production,
24 adaptation, adoption, and retirement. We argue that three insights should inform efforts to intervene in
25 innovation systems for sustainable development. First, innovation processes do not evolve linearly,
26 but rather emerge from complex adaptive systems involving many actors and institutions operating
27 simultaneously from local to global levels. Second, there has been significant experimentation in
28 mobilizing technology for sustainable development in the health, energy, and agriculture sectors,
29 among others, but learning from past experience requires structured cross-sectoral comparisons and
30 recognition of the socio-technical nature of innovation systems. Third, the current constellation of
31 rules, norms, and incentives shaping technological innovation is often not aligned towards sustainable
32 development. Past experience demonstrates that it is possible to reform these institutions to re-orient
33 innovation, and many actors have the power to do so through research, advocacy, training, convening,
34 policymaking, and financing. We offer three proposals to begin: establishing channels for regularized
35 learning across domains of practice, developing measures that systematically take into account the
36 interests of underserved populations throughout the innovation process, and reforming institutions to
37 re-orient innovation systems towards sustainable development in a manner that considers all
38 innovation stages and decision-making levels at the outset.

39 **Keywords:** sustainable development, technology, innovation systems, complex adaptive systems,
40 knowledge systems

41 **Significance Statement**

42 The 2015 Sustainable Development Goals and Paris Agreement on climate change heightened global
43 attention on sustainable development. Transitioning toward sustainable development will require
44 technological innovation in many areas, such as clean energy and water-saving agriculture. However,
45 unless the rules and incentives shaping innovation systems change, this transition will be impossible.
46 Barriers to overcome include inadequate investment in technologies that could help people living in
47 poverty, a lack of affordable and suitable technologies to address a wide range of sustainable
48 development goals, and overuse of technologies that place unfair burdens on future generations. In
49 this paper, we identify the fundamental reasons why current innovation systems fall short, describe
50 what needs to change, and offer several proposals to begin making such change.

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52 Technological innovation is at the heart of sustainable development. In September 2015, following an
53 extensive multi-year negotiation among governments, 193 countries of the United Nations committed
54 to 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Innovation itself is one of the SDGs (Goal 9) and also
55 a means to achieve the others.

56 Technology is the subset of knowledge that includes the full range of devices, methods, processes,
57 and practices that can be used “to fulfill certain human purposes in a specifiable and reproducible way
58 (1). Innovation is the “process by which technology is conceived, developed, codified, and deployed”
59 (1). The innovation process occurs in multi-faceted “innovation systems” comprised of socially
60 negotiated goals, the technologies needed to reach these goals, people and organizations, and the rules
61 and incentives that shape their decisions (2, 3). Many studies of innovation have focused on specific
62 nations (3), sectors (4), or technologies (5). However, learning across these approaches and
63 experiences is less common.

64 Sustainable development requires simultaneously advancing inter- and intra-generational equity.
65 However, innovation does not always advance equity. For example, global investment in research and
66 development (R&D) in medicines for “neglected diseases” is inadequate because the developing
67 country populations who bear the primary burden of such diseases lack the means to incentivize such
68 investment (6). Even when innovation does advance equity, it may not do so for both current and
69 future generations—rather, these goals may conflict (7). For example, current investment in low-
70 carbon energy does not fully reflect the interests of future generations who will be impacted by
71 climate change (8). These unborn populations cannot influence current innovation systems.

72 Making technologies work for sustainable development will require greater clarity in conceptualizing
73 the innovation process itself, identifying barriers to innovation, and learning from a wealth of
74 academic research and past experience. Innovation scholars have proposed several conceptual
75 frameworks for understanding how technologies emerge, change, and are adopted (3, 4, 9, 10). Yet
76 these literatures are not explicitly connected to the specific problems facing actors promoting
77 sustainable development (e.g., scientists conducting early-stage research, donors selecting particular
78 technologies for funding, or governments promoting technology cooperation (11)). In this paper, we
79 link a wide range of scholarship to empirical cases and real-world implementation challenges to
80 highlight ways of promoting technological innovation for sustainable development.

81 We present three insights: 1) innovation is a complex adaptive system with non-linearities and tipping
82 points; 2) the socio-technical nature of innovation enables deeper understanding of barriers to
83 innovation; and 3) the capacity of actors to promote innovation is restricted by institutions not
84 oriented towards sustainable development, but reform is possible. To illustrate these insights, we use a
85 common set of cases that concern physical artifacts and non-physical practices; technologies at
86 different levels of maturity; a range of geographic areas; and interventions to address various
87 sustainable development needs (this set of cases is presented in more detail in Table 1 and the
88 Supporting Information).

89 **1. Understanding Innovation as a Complex Adaptive System**

90 An “innovation system” is the connected set of actors and institutions that shape the process of
91 technological change. Understanding how innovation systems work requires analyzing the actors and
92 institutions that contribute to innovation in a geographic region (3), sector (4), or technological area
93 (9). Actors typically include individuals and organizations, public and private, operating at multiple

94 scales (e.g., central governments, local authorities, universities, private firms, non-profits, and
95 technology users). Institutions include the set of formal and informal rules, norms, decision-making
96 procedures, beliefs, incentives and expectations that guide the interactions and behavior of actors in
97 an innovation system (12–15). The connections of actors and institutions across the many stages of
98 the innovation process, which occur in multiple sectors and at different decision-making levels, make
99 innovation systems complex and adaptive.

100 **1.1. Innovation Systems Operate at Multiple Stages, Sectors, and Levels**

101 Innovation happens in multiple stages that are tightly linked, often overlap, and do not necessarily
102 occur in a specific order. By “innovation stage” we refer to the variety of activities that occur during
103 the innovation process to shape technological change. There are a number of different ways
104 innovation systems and activities can be conceptualized (4, 9, 16). For clarity of exposition, we group
105 different types of innovation activities into seven stages: invention (the process leading to the initial
106 discovery of a technology), selection (the choice of a technology for a given setting), early adoption
107 (the use of a selected technology in a specific context), production (the manufacturing of a
108 technology), adaptation (efforts by users or inventors to modify a technology to better serve the needs
109 of individual users), widespread use (the broad adoption of a technology in different communities of
110 users), and retirement (the replacement of a technology by a new, more effective technology).

111 The types of activities that occur in different innovation stages often require distinct modes of
112 thinking, the engagement of diverse actors (3), and the mobilization of many physical and intangible
113 resources. Hence, the performance of this set of interconnected and non-linear innovation stages
114 requires the broader system to perform specific “functions” (9). Further, innovation stages often occur
115 simultaneously, involving multiple actors at different decision-making levels, from individuals to
116 multinational governance bodies. Actors and their activities are embedded in social systems, which
117 are governed by institutions that shape innovation processes (17). We return to this in Section 2,
118 where we explore the interlinked socio-technical dimensions of innovation systems, and in Section 3,
119 where we explore the reciprocal relationship between actors and institutions.

120 The range of actors, decision-making levels, and resources relevant to a single technology is
121 illustrated by the case of artemisinin combination therapy (ACT) for malaria (Table 1). In the 1990s
122 and 2000s, R&D for new drugs to replace those whose efficacy had been eroded by resistance was
123 taking place in China (in government-supported labs) and Switzerland (at a private firm), leading
124 to the invention of ACTs. Following a proposal by a panel of US Institute of Medicine experts, the
125 technology was subsidized by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and
126 UNITAID to make these drugs more affordable in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
127 Simultaneously, governments at the World Health Assembly were negotiating international norms to
128 protect existing drugs from antimicrobial resistance.

129 Due to the pervasiveness of linkages in the innovation system across stages, sectors, and decision-
130 making levels, intervening in any one part of an innovation system can create negative and positive
131 externalities that act as “ripple effects” throughout the system. On the negative side, innovation can
132 cause unintended consequences, particularly as technologies gain more widespread use, such as
133 the impact of local incentives for biofuel development on global food prices (18). On the positive
134 side, innovation in one technology area can lead to “spillovers” that enable more rapid improvements
135 and new applications in other areas (19). In this sense, when new knowledge becomes broadly
136 accessible, it can act as global public good by laying the foundation for further innovation (20). For
137 example, global positioning system technology was developed for defense applications but has

138 opened up other applications, including improved approaches for targeting disaster relief. The socially
139 optimal level of investment in technological innovation requires consideration of positive and
140 negative externalities that can have ripple effects and create spillovers across multiple stages, sectors
141 and levels.

142 **1.2. Innovation is Non-Linear**

143 Innovation does not happen linearly nor is it a random process. Rather, activities in different
144 innovation stages can occur in various chronological sequences throughout a technology's lifecycle.
145 A well-functioning innovation system has deep connections between and a degree of co-dependence
146 among innovation stages, making the innovation system non-linear (21). Technological change nearly
147 always involves various feedback loops across the stages of innovation, unfolding in a chronological
148 order that rarely traces out a linear development pathway.

149 The existence of feedback loops connecting activities in different innovation stages implies that
150 overcoming barriers (or "blocking mechanisms" (22)) to innovation in any one stage often requires
151 looking beyond that particular stage. For example, ceramic pot filters (CPFs) offer a means for users
152 to treat available water sources in their homes and reduce the incidence of water-borne diseases. CPFs
153 have apparent benefits, as they can be manufactured with local materials and labor. However, CPFs
154 often lack rigorous quality control during the production process and many areas where CPFs may be
155 deployed do not have access to an adequate supply chain for replacement parts (Table 1).
156 Interventions to increase CPF adoption without addressing issues in the production stages are likely to
157 deliver limited benefits.

158 Actors that fail to recognize the importance of feedback loops often select and promote unsuitable
159 technologies for adoption. This problem is more prevalent when outside actors are insufficiently
160 familiar with local settings and are passionate about specific technologies (23). Where decision-
161 making over technology selection is split among actors, a so-called "principal-agent problem" can
162 arise. For example, if non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aid agencies do not adequately
163 engage local communities, they may select inappropriate water treatment technologies on behalf of
164 the intended users, hindering adoption.

165 Development of technologies in protected "niche spaces" can allow for important experimentation
166 and early-stage user interaction to build in necessary feedback (24, 25). For example, engaging users
167 when designing clean biomass cookstoves for Darfur has resulted in fourteen iterations of the stove,
168 leading to more suitable designs for local cooking practices (26). To design interventions in
169 innovation systems that build in feedback, actors must process large amounts of information
170 concerning technologies that can address particular needs, possible policy interventions, types of
171 financing arrangements, and input from local users.

172 **1.3. Innovation Systems have Tipping Points**

173 Like other complex adaptive systems, innovation systems can demonstrate punctuated equilibria
174 whereby thresholds create irregular bursts of explosive technological change*. These "tipping points"
175 in innovation systems are exemplified by past inventions, such as the steam engine, high-yield staple
176 crops, antibiotics, the printing press, and the internet. Each example featured rapid utilization of a new
177 invention, rich follow-on innovation, and broad societal change. Tipping points create dynamics in

* Mass species extinctions, the possibility of rapid sea level rise after a certain level of climate warming, sudden outbreaks of infectious disease, and rapid economic collapse of the global financial system are examples of observed and predicted tipping points of complex adaptive systems (27).

178 innovation systems that are characterized by “thresholds” that create time lags and other forms of
179 irregular technological evolution.

180 In some cases, innovation systems can become path-dependent or “locked-in,” whereby relatively
181 small differences in prior stages of innovation lead to large and persistent differences in which
182 technologies achieve widespread use. Lock-in occurs through reciprocal feedback loops, such as
183 increasing returns to an initially adopted technology through continuous adaptation and refinement
184 (28). Lock-in can also occur when powerful actors, who may have the most to lose from changes to
185 the status quo, bias the institutions governing innovation systems to meet their preferences and
186 reinforce their positions of power. Lock-in poses a challenge often faced by new technologies in
187 capital-intensive and infrastructure-dependent sectors. One example is the challenge of replacing
188 fossil fuels with renewable energy, in which economies of scale, powerful incumbent firms, a long
189 history of incremental process technology improvement, and the long life of physical and institutional
190 supporting infrastructure give economic and political advantages to incumbent technologies (29). The
191 possibility of lock-in suggests that innovation systems may reach temporarily stable equilibria of
192 relatively static “technological regimes” (30). Lock-in builds longer time lags into the innovation
193 system, resisting change until tipping points reorient the system and technological regimes change
194 (30).

195 Meeting this challenge includes designing interventions that intentionally cross some technological
196 tipping points (e.g. escaping from “poverty traps”), managing tipping points that have already
197 “tipped” (e.g. increasing access to the technological outcomes of the Green Revolution), and raising
198 barriers to avoid other tipping points altogether (e.g. catastrophic climate change).

199 **2. Understanding the Socio-Technical Nature of Innovation Systems**

200 Understanding innovation systems requires the integration of social and technical considerations. In
201 innovation systems, society and technology are inextricably linked—actors shaped by institutions in
202 society produce knowledge just as knowledge modifies and legitimizes the institutions of society.
203 This reciprocal process is referred to as “co-production.” (31–33). Co-production sheds light on the
204 ways that technologies and innovation systems reflect broader social, political, and moral
205 commitments of the societies in which they are embedded. Co-production also helps explain why
206 diverse societies privilege different outcomes or forms of scientific evidence relating to technological
207 risks and benefits over others. For example, South Korea and the United States have taken profoundly
208 approaches to the regulation and use of nuclear energy. In the US, the perceived risk of catastrophic
209 damage from a potential meltdown and the challenges of long-term waste disposal proved to be
210 insurmountable challenges to the proponents of nuclear energy. In contrast, South Korean decision
211 makers saw nuclear energy as a potential solution to what was viewed as an even bigger risk, namely
212 failing to catch up with the living standards of the developed world. While decision makers in both
213 countries believed that nuclear energy, in principle, could meet common goals related to energy
214 security and economic development, the distinct socio-technical systems led to different long-term
215 innovation pathways (33, 34).

216 To understand the full range of factors influencing technological change, actors intervening in
217 innovation systems must grapple with the inextricable linkage of technology and society. As
218 illustrated in the literature on socio-technical systems (9, 17, 30, 33), technological systems can be
219 understood in terms of their “socio-technical characteristics” (STCs), which serve as an analytic tool
220 to structure comparisons across the many dimensions of innovation systems. Innovation systems can

221 be viewed through the lens of STCs to help diagnose barriers to innovation, increase the likelihood of
222 the ex-ante identification of problems, and support learning from previous experiences.

223 **2.1. Socio-technical Characteristics Diagnose Barriers to Innovation**

224 STCs are a useful analytical tool for understanding and diagnosing possible barriers to innovation that
225 may emerge when attempting to advance sustainable development in particular innovation systems. A
226 focus on developing insights inductively through cases spanning multiple sectors with common STCs,
227 rather than drawing strictly from one sector, location, or for certain actor groups, has great potential
228 for developing useful generalizations.

229 The STC perspective can be used analytically to develop hypotheses about general conditions under
230 which innovation systems are likely to work rather than result in barriers. The usefulness of STCs
231 emerges from the ability of scholars and practitioners to incorporate new observations from a variety
232 of different contexts into their knowledge base and leverage those insights to make thoughtful
233 comparisons about potential pathways or barriers for other technologies with similar STCs.

234 We illustrate the STC perspective with three STCs and their associations with specific barriers to
235 innovation that emerge from a broad range of literatures and cases: the presence of positive network
236 externalities, perceptions of mundaneness, and modularity. These three STCs exemplify a broad range
237 of potentially useful diagnostic STCs and are thoroughly supported by evidence in the literature.
238 Because STCs are a guiding concept for inductive investigation, no comprehensive list of relevant
239 STCs exists[†]. These three demonstrative STCs are certainly not the only ones that have analytic value
240 or even the most important ones; rather, they highlight the utility of an STC-focused approach to
241 diagnosing barriers to innovation.

242 **2.1.1.STC: Presence of Positive Network Externalities**

243 “The presence of positive network externalities” is an STC that describes the degree to which the
244 adoption of a particular technology by some increases the benefits from using the technology for
245 others (36). Users of technologies with network externalities benefit more from their use of the
246 technology as the total number of users increases. This is exemplified by the case of industrial
247 symbiosis, a practice to configure industrial technologies in a manner that reduces the overall impact
248 of manufacturing by linking wastes and byproducts in one process to the input needs of another (37).
249 The EcoTEDA industrial symbiosis program in Tianjin, China is a model where increasing the
250 number of users has greatly expanded the value of the network by enlarging the number and
251 robustness of possible resource exchanges between participating firms (Table 1). The role of network
252 externalities in accelerating technology adoption suggests the importance of strategic information
253 transmission and marketing to complement peer-to-peer information sharing.

254 Network externalities also suggest that technologies may be locked-in when network effects are
255 strong and social learning is an important factor in adoption and effective utilization (28). However,
256 developing self-sustaining networks of peers that reinforce social learning *de novo* is difficult. This
257 dynamic is a major challenge for EcoTEDA, which has struggled to retain enough users to keep their
258 industrial symbiosis program viable. Barriers to adoption arise unless powerful actors are able to spur
259 the formation of self-sustaining networks. The presence of network externalities also suggests that
260 barriers to the timely retirement of technologies are high, as users find switching to other technologies
261 without established networks less attractive.

[†] A more extensive list of STCs is proposed in Anadon, et al., 2014 (35).

262 **2.1.2. STC: Perceptions of Mundaneness**

263 “Perceptions of the mundaneness of a technology” is an STC that describes the degree to which a
264 technology fails to hold the attention of key actors in an innovation system, especially actors who play
265 important roles in technology invention and selection. Perceptions of mundaneness tend to shift the
266 mobilization of resources away from these options, guiding priorities towards other less appropriate or
267 effective options (38). Technologies that draw on simpler scientific principles or approaches tend to
268 be perceived as mundane. However, mundaneness is fundamentally determined by social perceptions,
269 including whether a technology is considered novel or fits into pre-existing conceptions of a valuable
270 technology.

271 The role of mundaneness is exemplified by the development of the system of rice intensification
272 (SRI) in Madagascar. In the case of SRI, established research centers working on high-yield drought-
273 tolerant seed varieties were initially skeptical of the benefits of the SRI technology, which they
274 perceived to be a mundane, practice-based approach for improving rice yields. Instead, they preferred
275 modern laboratory techniques for developing new hybrid and genetically-modified crops. This bias
276 against mundane technologies led the established research community to ignore a potentially useful
277 technology for helping small farmers (Table 1). The mundaneness STC cautions practitioners to be
278 self-aware of institutional influences and social expectations that create perceptions unduly restricting
279 the solution set of technologies they consider.

280 **2.1.3. STC: Level of Modularity**

281 “The level of modularity” is an STC that describes the degree to which a technology is comprised of
282 design elements that are easily disaggregated and organized according to a formal architecture or plan
283 (39). Modularity may be a direct consequence of technological design, but it may also be more
284 directly socially constructed (e.g. in modular software design). A modular technology can therefore
285 change via innovation in a subset of its components that are later reintegrated into the whole without
286 complete redesign of the technology’s architecture. More modular technologies have lower barriers to
287 adaptation because the separability of components allows actors to improve one component without
288 the architectural knowledge of the entire technology (40). This expands the range of actors who can
289 engage in adapting a technology. Because adaptation costs are lower with increasing modularity,
290 skilled entrepreneurial actors may be able to expand the settings in which a modular technology is
291 suitable, thus serving a wider array of human needs.

292 The relationship between modularity and the expansion of suitable contexts for a technology through
293 adaption is exemplified by the case of cookstoves (Table 1). After some success in supporting the
294 adoption of the Berkeley Darfur Cookstove (BDS) in Darfur, Sudan, the Berkeley cookstove team
295 sought to expand deployment of cookstoves to Ethiopia. The adaptation to accommodate different
296 cooking practices was facilitated by the modularity of the technology: while a common shell was
297 mass produced in India, the bulk of local adaptation was possible through the use of different pot
298 supports.

299 **2.2. Socio-Technical Characteristics Facilitate Learning across Innovation Systems**

300 Practitioners with a stake in advancing sustainable development usually have direct access to only a
301 limited set of experiences from which to develop evidence-based policy and action strategies. Too
302 often, practitioners struggle to make innovation work for a particular need because they fail to benefit
303 from the experience of others. This failure stems from a lack of interactions with actors working in

304 other fields and settings, together with siloes of narrowed expertise (41). This is a lost opportunity that
305 the identification of STCs can help address.

306 STCs can serve to identify barriers to innovation ex-ante and to facilitate learning. For example, the
307 mundaneness STC can explain the degree of attention paid by actors to a technology in several of the
308 cases in Table 1. In contrast to the case of SRI discussed above, in the case of ceramic filters, funders
309 sometimes promoted the CPF technology because they were attracted by the idea of having local
310 potters build low-cost water filters with local materials; in other words, the technology was not
311 perceived as mundane because it was connected to an appealing story. However, this attention to
312 ceramic filters at times caused other water treatment technologies to be overlooked, such as those that
313 were already sold in the market and known by local actors.

314 An example of potential learning across sectors from an STC perspective is the experience from
315 efforts to make the price of artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) for malaria treatment
316 affordable for rural populations in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. A group of global health
317 funding organizations created a global subsidy called the Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria
318 (AFMm) which reduced the price of ACTs to end-users. Manufacturers received the global subsidy
319 directly and then shipped reduced-price drugs to countries. They were then supplied into informal
320 village-level supply chains at a cost competitive with less desirable treatment options (Table 1). Here
321 we highlight a different set of STCs that are important in this case: end-users who have limited
322 financing and information, high prices of the technology relative to inferior alternatives, and lengthy
323 transnational supply chains between manufacturers and end-users. The case of ACT shares similar
324 STCs to efforts to make drought-tolerant seed varieties. Both ACT and drought-tolerant seeds are
325 meant to be used by small-scale end-users, have high relative prices, and involve lengthy transnational
326 supply chains. These shared STCs suggest that a similar intervention to provide a global subsidy
327 could be considered to address the need for more affordable drought-tolerant seed varieties for
328 farmers in developing countries.

329 We conclude that the community of scholars and practitioners seeking to make innovation work for
330 sustainable development would be well served by an effort to build up a larger set of STCs along with
331 insights derived from their application.

332 **3. Understanding Institutional Change in Innovation Systems**

333 Institutions shape the functioning of innovation systems by guiding and constraining the activities of
334 actors at multiple levels, ranging from customs that extend no further than a particular village, to
335 regional or national laws, to codified norms in international treaties (11). These institutions are often
336 not aligned to meet sustainable development goals. Fortunately, institutions can be changed by actors
337 who thus have the ability to reorient innovation systems towards sustainable development.

338 **3.1. Institutions are Not Necessarily Aligned towards Sustainable Development**

339 The complex web of existing institutions governing innovation systems reflects existing power
340 structures. Often, such institutions are not aligned with sustainable development due primarily to three
341 factors. First, existing institutions tend to drive innovative activity toward the areas of greatest
342 financial prospect, not the greatest human needs. Economic incentives propel much innovation to
343 meet the needs of those who can exert “market” or “demand pull” (42), but not those with few
344 financial resources. The problems of neglected diseases and neglected crops, for which few new
345 technologies have been developed, exemplify such gaps.

346 Second, existing institutions do not adequately govern activities producing negative externalities
347 mediated over environmental systems or over long time-horizons. For example, private actors can
348 often degrade the ecosystems on which human wellbeing depends without consequence. In the case of
349 industrial symbiosis, private incentives were insufficient to drive firms to participate in an industrial
350 symbiosis network that would have lowered overall environmental impacts in Tianjin in the short
351 term; additional financial and regulatory incentives to reduce waste and emissions were required
352 (Table 1).

353 Third, the public-good nature of knowledge, in general and of technology in particular (see Section
354 1.1), raises questions about the possibility for institutions to restrict the dissemination of knowledge or
355 otherwise affect technological innovation for sustainable development. The intellectual property (IP)
356 regime is an institution that aims to incentivize innovation by allowing inventors to exclude others
357 from using patented technology for a fixed period of time, during which they can charge monopoly
358 prices for patented products or earn revenues from licensing. While the IP regime strengthens
359 incentives to invest resources in invention, it also restricts the use of new knowledge by raising prices
360 or blocking follow-on innovation (43, 44). It has been argued that the increasingly globalized IP
361 regime will diminish prospects for technology transfer and competition in developing countries,
362 particularly for several important technology areas related to meeting sustainable development needs
363 (45).

364 These three shortcomings of innovation systems highlight the need for institutional reform. At a
365 national level, policy makers regularly reshape institutions to meet national interests, such as
366 increasing domestic economic growth, improving national security, or enhancing their citizens'
367 wellbeing. National actors may develop public policies to promote innovation to advance these
368 interests, such as subsidizing R&D or creating publicly-funded research labs. However, many
369 sustainable development challenges and their potential solutions have important transnational
370 dimensions. The control of carbon emissions, the spread of infectious diseases, and the depletion of
371 shared water resources are examples in which both problems and solutions involve multiple nation-
372 states. Yet, transnational institutions to drive technological innovation to address these problems
373 remain relatively weak or absent altogether, and national policies offer only patchwork solutions. To
374 meet key sustainable development challenges, greater alignment of institutions with sustainable
375 development goals is needed at all decision making levels.

376 **3.2. Innovation Systems Involve Many Actors Operating at Different Stages and Levels**

377 Reforming institutions to better align innovation systems with sustainable development requires
378 mobilizing collective action across a complex and large set of actors, who work at many levels and
379 who engage in activities that overlap and sometimes conflict (46, 47). As highlighted in Section 1,
380 innovation system complexity arises because actors in the innovation system operate across different
381 innovation stages and decision-making levels through interconnected activities. The
382 interdependencies of actors may be explicit, such as through technology commercialization licensing
383 agreements that involve a formal contract transferring intellectual property (48). Alternatively,
384 linkages connecting actors may be implicit, such as the underemphasized dependence of new product
385 development by many computer hardware and pharmaceutical firms on prior government-funded
386 R&D (49, 50). Collective action problems arise because actors operating across different stages and
387 decision-making levels vary in their interests and incentives, which are not necessarily driven by the
388 goal of sustainable development. In some cases, actors are strongly driven by market forces. In other
389 cases, a centralized authority, such as a single state or private firm, creates rules that govern the
390 behavior of actors across all (or many) stages and decision-making levels of the innovation system.

391 For example, a national government usually has little motivation to take into account the needs of
392 citizens beyond its borders, a profit-maximizing firm has insufficient incentive to invent technologies
393 for people who cannot afford its products, and consumers lack the impetus to consider how their
394 decisions impact other communities distant in time or space.

395 Aligning actors working at different decision-making levels of the innovation system is challenging.
396 The problem is particularly relevant when needs that vary at the local level are not fully incorporated
397 into decision-making elsewhere. In efforts over the past few decades to promote the development and
398 adoption of cleaner and more efficient cookstoves, inventors and selectors of technologies were often
399 not fully engaged in local contexts and lacked an adequate understanding of the needs of end-users.
400 Many stove designs promoted by transnational actors proved unsuitable for the preparation of local
401 dishes, which led to significant barriers in achieving widespread adoption and achieving impact
402 (Table 1) (51).

403 **3.3. Actors Can Change Institutions to Re-orient Innovation Systems towards Sustainable** 404 **Development**

405 The cases discussed throughout this paper illustrate how the preexisting rules and norms that shape
406 innovation systems are not necessarily aligned towards sustainable development. However, while
407 institutions constrain actor behavior in the short term, institutions are not immutable. The incentives,
408 capabilities, and needs of actors that comprise innovation systems co-evolve with governing
409 institutions (4, 52, 53). So although the capacity and power of actors depend on institutions,
410 institutions themselves are shaped by actors and can change in both incremental and radical ways
411 (13). For example, in the early 2000s, efforts to expand access to treatment for HIV/AIDS were
412 hindered by stringent international IP rules that blocked developing countries from using lower-cost
413 generic versions of HIV drugs. A global network of civil society, developing country governments,
414 and health experts challenged the moral acceptability of these IP rules and succeeded in changing
415 norms to allow for much greater flexibility in how patents on medicines were managed in resource-
416 poor settings (54).

417 Institutions are inherently “sticky.” Changing innovation systems is a daunting task that requires
418 leveraging multiple types of power, such as normative power to challenge the ethical acceptability of
419 existing institutions; convening power to bring actors together to establish new goals, priorities, and
420 agendas; legal power to negotiate and revise norms, binding rules, and standards; informational power
421 to identify alternatives and to assess their feasibility; and financial power to create incentives,
422 implement costly new policies, and reduce the risk or cost of doing so (35).

423 Here, we provide three additional examples drawn from Table 1, of how actors have induced
424 institutional change to promote sustainable development. In the case of drip irrigation, government
425 officials in Andhra Pradesh (AP), India designed a subsidy that reduced costs and incentivized private
426 companies to market and disseminate knowledge of drip irrigation, a technology that could improve
427 yields but was too expensive for most farmers in AP. Utilizing its legal power to change the rules
428 shaping the behavior of private firms and its financial power via a subsidy to implement the new
429 rules, the government reshaped institutions to spur widespread use of drip irrigation. In contrast, in the
430 case of SRI, a loose network of activists, lacking both legal and financial power, relied upon
431 informational and convening power to build a coalition of support for SRI. Finally, in the case of
432 ACT, NGOs and academics exercised normative power through a public advocacy campaign to
433 challenge the then-prevailing norm that donors should not subsidize relatively expensive medicines
434 for lower-income populations.

435 In sum, sustainable development is not yet a strong enough organizing principle to align actor
436 behavior in most innovation systems to systematically take into account the interests of low-income
437 populations and future generations. Realigning innovation systems towards sustainable development
438 requires changing institutions at all stages of the innovation process, from invention through
439 widespread use and retirement, and at multiple decision-making levels, from local to global. While
440 such changes may be difficult, committed actors who strategically mobilize the multiple types of
441 power available to them have achieved significant reforms.

442 **4. Conclusion**

443 Technological innovation has played a central role in achieving important societal objectives, such as
444 economic growth and improved human well-being. But innovation systems, driven primarily by
445 markets and the most highly-resourced states, are characterized by pervasive power imbalances. As a
446 result, the needs of marginalized populations and future generations are not met as well as they could
447 be. Re-orienting innovation systems towards sustainable development will require addressing power
448 imbalances and transforming many of the deeply embedded institutions that limit innovation systems
449 from delivering on their potential. We offer three recommendations for action derived from the
450 insights on innovation presented here, deepening and extending recommendations regarding
451 knowledge systems more generally (55).

452 First, measures are needed to *regularize learning across spheres of practice* to improve understanding
453 of how to re-orient innovation systems towards sustainable development. Understanding innovation
454 systems and their socio-technical nature is a necessary precondition for the development of carefully
455 targeted interventions that realize the full potential of innovation for sustainable development. Many
456 potential lessons are available (41), but drawing appropriate conclusions requires analytical rigor,
457 which can be facilitated by the use of STCs. Actors with convening power should facilitate learning
458 across disparate communities of practice, for example, by organizing conferences that purposefully
459 bring together practitioners, policymakers, and scholars working in more than one sector. Research
460 funders should support comparative analyses that draw from the experience of more than one sector
461 or location. Universities should teach students across disciplines to think broadly about technological
462 innovation, and not only innovation in a single sector, region, or technology area. More broadly,
463 actors can use STCs as heuristics to identify possible barriers to innovation that could emerge when
464 selecting particular technologies or interventions.

465 Second, power disparities can be mitigated by identifying ways to *systematically take into account the*
466 *interests of underserved populations* throughout the innovation process. Since impoverished and
467 future populations often lack the power needed to influence innovation systems, problems arise such
468 as when third parties select technologies poorly suited for end-users. There is also untapped potential
469 for end-users to adapt technologies for use in new settings (25). Building in channels of
470 communication between underserved populations and powerful actors would help alleviate power
471 disparities and strengthen the feedback loops that characterize well-functioning innovation systems.
472 We propose that actors with convening power and normative authority identify ways to more
473 meaningfully engage marginalized populations in innovation systems (56). For example, international
474 NGOs and United Nations agencies can directly engage marginalized populations when negotiating
475 norms and establishing priorities, rather than speaking on behalf of directly-affected populations. We
476 also argue for capacity-building among less-powerful populations to represent their interests in global
477 forums. The gradual shift in the multilateral climate regime to policies that more deeply engage
478 developing country governments and firms in how to innovative for climate change demonstrates that
479 such change is possible. Previously, international organizations primarily focused on technology

480 transfer, often through financing arrangements to export technology from more advanced countries to
481 developing countries. However, newer forms of cooperation seek to more deeply engage developing
482 country actors in the process of technology invention and selection by reducing information
483 asymmetries, decreasing social distance between actors with expertise and skills, and fostering new
484 collaborative R&D arrangements (57).

485 Finally, we argue that actors should *reform institutions to re-orient innovation systems towards*
486 *sustainable development*, leveraging various forms of power to do so. Due to the complex-adaptive
487 nature of innovation systems, such reforms will be more effective if all stages of innovation and all
488 relevant decision-making levels are considered at the outset. To illustrate: reform efforts in the
489 biomedical innovation system previously focused on just one stage, such as driving invention for
490 neglected diseases, adapting vaccines to be heat-stable, or decreasing the price of HIV/AIDS
491 medicines. More recently, institutional reforms under consideration involve using publicly-financed
492 “push” and “pull” incentives that simultaneously steer invention towards socially negotiated goals and
493 facilitate widespread adoption by building affordability measures into R&D processes from their
494 inception. Governments of both industrialized and developing countries are being asked to contribute
495 to a global biomedical R&D fund for this purpose (58), an illustration of reforming institutions
496 simultaneously at both national and global levels.

497 In the context of climate change mitigation, institutional reform to create a carbon price through
498 regional, national, and sub-national carbon markets has shifted the incentives facing consumers and
499 producers towards low-carbon forms of energy at all stages of innovation. For example, carbon
500 pricing increases the profitability of private action to invest in renewable energy invention, select
501 more energy-efficient appliances, and hasten the retirement of greenhouse gas-intensive power plants.
502 Yet carbon pricing alone may be inadequate for addressing climate change in a cost-effective manner.
503 Doing so also requires further strengthening incentives for private energy R&D and concerted public
504 R&D investment (59).

505 Many types of interventions are needed to realign innovation systems for sustainable development,
506 requiring actors to leverage the types of power available to them. Altering the institutions governing
507 innovation systems may appear politically or practically impossible in the short-run. Yet without
508 institutional change, certain populations will remain excluded from the benefits of innovation, and the
509 interests of present generations will continue to unfairly outweigh those of the future. Making
510 technological innovation work for sustainable development requires making fundamental changes to
511 the rules of the game.

512

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752

753 **Figure Legends**

754 **Figure 1.** Summaries of six case studies of technologies and innovation systems to promote
 755 sustainable development. The cases are detailed further in the Supporting Information.

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<p>Artemisinin Combination Therapy for Treating Malaria</p> <p>Artemisinin combination therapy (ACT) is an important drug for treating malaria. The efficacy of artemisinin against malaria, first recorded in the 4th century AD, was rediscovered and developed into a modern drug in the 1970s by scientist Youyou Tu, after the Chinese government prioritized combating malaria during the Vietnam War. Using artemisinin alone renders it vulnerable to the emergence of resistance, so a Chinese and Swiss pharmaceutical firm, Novartis, collaborated to develop a pill in 1992 that combined artemisinin with an older anti-malarial, inventing the first ACT. Novartis initially launched its ACT for the European traveler market in 1998, but by 2001, NGOs and academics were fiercely criticizing both industry and donors because this effective drug was neither affordable nor available in the poorer countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia where drug-resistant malaria was most prevalent (67). Soon after, WHO recommended that governments adopt ACTs for the treatment of malaria. Novartis and WHO agreed to a price for developing countries significantly below the European level, and the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) agreed to provide funding for these drugs. Drug suppliers in many developing countries began procuring these drugs, but because they were still more expensive than the older, less-effective anti-malarials, uptake was slow. Several years later the Affordable Medicines for Malaria (AMFm) mechanism was created by UNITAID and GFATM to subsidize ACTs to reach more patients and to counteract the emergence of resistance. In the countries where AMFm was tested, end-user uptake of ACTs quickly and significantly increased.</p>	<p>Industrial Symbiosis</p> <p>Industrial symbiosis (IS) is an approach to establishing and building relationships among businesses to optimize resource use and reduce burdens on the environment and human health. Based on a biological systems metaphor, IS redefines waste as a resource and shifts industrial production towards a circular economy. An IS network links a variety of different firms, usually in close geographical proximity. Businesses in an industrial cluster share and exchange waste materials, energy, and water and often collaborate on business services such as technical expertise, cleaning, security, and transportation. Through a number of social and technological innovations, these linkages improve the environmental and social impacts of manufacturing activity. The waste, idle time, and abandoned byproducts from one company becomes raw material for another company, increasing resource and energy use, and minimizing waste discharge, ideally by diverting waste from landfill. The practice of IS has been growing around the world including in Kwinana (Australia), Ulsan (South Korea) and EcotEDA (Tianjin, China) and in the UK with the National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP-UK). In all of these cases, the development of social bonds among participants was crucial for the growth of the program. NISP-UK created a standardized set of procedures, particularly for linking small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and supports NISP efforts in more than 20 countries. The modularity of IS approaches, its adaptation to local contexts, the support of facilitative bodies such as NISP, and the development of favorable policies, such as an increased cost of waste disposal, are contributing to the spread of IS in various locations around the world.</p>
<p>Cookstoves for Darfur and Ethiopia</p> <p>The Berkeley-Darfur Cookstove (BDS), a biomass-fueled cookstove, was developed by a team of researchers at the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab and the University of California Berkeley (largely through in-kind contributions) as a more fuel-efficient alternative to the three-stone open fires used for cooking in the Darfur region of Sudan. The BDS relied on an institutional arrangement in which the entities in charge of stove design and testing, the manufacturer in India, and the NGO managing assembly and distribution on the ground in Darfur, were linked and coordinated through a single organization: the Darfur Stoves Project (DSP). Transnational institutions (Oxfam America, Impact Carbon, and USAID) have played key roles by acting as the boots on the ground in Darfur, coordinating local distribution, and providing funding for stove development and adoption. DSP has also adapted the technology for use in Ethiopia (29).</p>	<p>Ceramic Pot Water Filters for Household Water Treatment</p> <p>Ceramic pot filters (CPFs) are a Household Water Treatment and Storage (HWTS) technology designed to treat contaminated water at home. The CPF is a porous ceramic pot that allows water but not bacteria and parasites to pass through to a container below. CPFs are a cost-effective and simple-to-use treatment option, especially for water with medium to high turbidity. They do not require power or chemicals and can be produced locally, which can provide additional benefits to the community. The production of CPFs, however, faces barriers related to the lack of capacity, production standards, and physical infrastructure. Sustained use is challenged by barriers related to the access to information, behavioral change, maintenance, cost and commercial appeal. Key insights include the need to develop generalizable production standards, to promote more user-friendly products, and to assess the actual impact of HWTS interventions, including those that rely on CPFs.</p>
<p>Drip Irrigation</p> <p>Drip irrigation is a technology for irrigating plants that reduces water requirements and improves the water use efficiency of many crops. In addition, drip irrigation has been found to improve yields and decrease labor requirements, raising incomes for farmers and potentially helping poor farmers escape poverty (97). Modern drip irrigation methods were invented in Israel in the 1950s. In Israel as well as other developed countries like Spain, Italy and the United States adoption of drip irrigation has been widespread (99). However, adoption of drip irrigation amongst developing countries especially in Sub-Saharan Africa remains very low and faces many barriers including lack of water storage facilities and destruction of drip equipment by wildlife (100). In spite of the challenges for drip irrigation in much of the developing world, in the past 12 years certain states in India, including Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, have achieved remarkable success in farmer adoption of the technology (99, 101). The case shows how the success of drip irrigation in India was built on a unique subsidy policy first designed by government bureaucrats in Andhra Pradesh and later modified across many states in India, which aligned the incentives of private sector actors with public goals while lowering the cost of the technology to end-users.</p>	<p>System of Rice Intensification for Rice Growing</p> <p>The System of Rice Intensification (SRI), a practice-based technology for improving rice yields and decreasing seed and fertilizer inputs, was developed in Madagascar in the 1980s by a French Jesuit priest working in close collaboration with local NGOs and farmers (75). In the mid-1990s, Norman Uphoff, a professor at Cornell University, learned about SRI in Madagascar, and after three years of on-farm evaluations, he began championing SRI as a promising technology for improving rice yields for small farmers (76). Uphoff fostered a global network of academics and civil-society partners who have promoted the technology. Initially, SRI met significant pushback from the established rice research community, who called the practice "agronomic UFOs," or unconfirmed field observations (77). While tensions over the efficacy of SRI persist, many actors including Oxfam and the World Bank as well as government programs and policies in India, China, Indonesia and Vietnam promote SRI as an important technology for helping small farmers increase yields and decrease their input costs. SRI has been tried by farmers in 60 countries and has achieved more widespread farmer adoption and some countries including Cambodia, India and Vietnam. The case highlights the role and challenge of technology selection where end-user needs are complex, varied, and often hard to translate into research settings.</p>

757