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AMENDMENTS TO TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS

- Page 25 obstacle should read obstacles
- Page 28 eminent should read eminent
- Page 53 derivitively should read derivatively
- Page 68 'a social phenomena' should read 'a social phenomenon'
- Page 95 multilateralism should read multilateralism
- Page 96 tripartitism should read tripartition
- Page 130 delete comma after 'truths' in 'proposing as truths'
- Page 143 subterranean should read subterranean
- Page 179)  
Page 246) noticable should read noticeable
- Pages 297-8 Kingsley should read Martin
- (notes 268-71)

THE DETERMINANTS OF PLURALISM IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

by Norman Arthur Richards

Submitted for the degree of Master of Education,  
of the University of Durham,  
1980.

Research conducted in the School of Education.

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23. AUG. 1984

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THE DETERMINANTS OF PLURALISM IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATIONNorman A. RichardsABSTRACT

This study into the nature of pluralism aims to discern the possible determinants of pluralism in RE, and to test this hypothesis against the current practice of a sample of primary and secondary schools in rural, semi-rural and urban areas.

After noting the implicit pluralism of the 1944 Education Act, an analysis is made of the explicit pluralism of contemporary society, as brought into focus by industrialisation, science, the media and youth. A comparable analysis is then made of some aspects of educational pluralism, as brought to light by heurism, integrated studies, comprehensive-isation and moral education. The implications for RE of each of these eight areas are discussed. It is suggested that, as both society and education favour diversity but reject anarchy, the search for a framework for pluralism becomes an important consideration. The discussion indicates some major social and educational reference-points for RE, which might go towards providing a basis for the recognition of determinants. Religious reference-points are discussed here and later.

An examination of the Humanist critique of RE follows, leading into the heart of the argument, namely, that the nature of society, education and religion makes RE indispensable in the school-curriculum. It is submitted that a situation of pluralism strengthens this argument.

The findings of the research-scheme are then reported, with tabulation and comment, particular reference being made to those points of statistical significance. The findings are also related to the foregoing theoretical issues. The study then concludes with a résumé, which traces the course of the argument, and which summarises the correspondence between the research-project and the previous sections of the thesis.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### The 1944 Education Act: Latent Pluralism?

1.1 War<sup>(1)</sup> and religion have both had definable effects upon education in England and Wales. The retort, that religion's influence has usually been warring, possesses some truth. It might, however, have in mind only the Bell-Lancastrian type of rivalry of the nineteenth century. For, by contrast, the 1944 Education Act was not only a united attempt by church and state to redress some of the ravages of war, it was also a vote of confidence in religion as an aid to this task. The deprivations brought to light by war-time evacuation were a spur to proceed with educational reconstruction<sup>(2)</sup>, and the unifying tendencies brought about by the war phased with the growing ecumenicity of the churches to make desirable (at least in theory) a contribution from religion<sup>(3)</sup>.

1.2 Perhaps the point that religion was welcomed should be stressed at the outset. For RE has come under subsequent attack, from various quarters, and, when this attack concentrates on the legal clauses of the 1944 Act, the larger issues, relating to the mutual advantages that could be gained from a partnership between education and religion, might be obscured. Though a failure to secure a settlement on the religious front would have made impossible the general good-will and resulting co-operation accorded the





Act, it would be a misreading of the situation to see the religious provisions as a hastily patched-up truce to facilitate a passing of vital secular measures. Butler's<sup>(4)</sup> analysis of the religious difficulty showed that, although nineteenth century bitterness about RE had died down, the old issues were nevertheless still present. But the care with which he consulted the various religious bodies involved so as to reach an unhurried consensus, coupled with the degree of genuine interest in RE shown during the debates surrounding the Bill's passage, suggest a wide-spread desire for deep-seated agreement<sup>(5)</sup>.

Admittedly, the fact that the old issues did not boil up with the intensity of nineteenth century feeling can be seen as, at least partly, a sign of growing apathy towards religion<sup>(6)</sup>. Also the church fully realised that, in Cruickshank's<sup>(7)</sup> words, the choice was between ending or mending the dual system. But, nonetheless, the Bill became law with a country-wide support (notwithstanding the position of the Roman Catholics) that transcended political, social and religious divisions<sup>(8)</sup>.

There seemed to be shared assumptions, held by church-goer and non-church-goer alike, that school RE (then called, of course, religious instruction) was desirable, worthwhile and practicable.

1.3 This introduction will draw attention to two of these assumptions, to indicate the attitude of the framers of the 1944 Act towards religious plurality. This will

provide an appropriate starting point for an examination of the concept of pluralism in RE. As pluralism is a vague word, the general meaning in which it is employed throughout the thesis should be indicated at the outset. It is used, not primarily to refer to the fact of religious plurality (a somewhat trivial idea) but to the belief that plurality of belief- and value-systems is desirable. This definition will form a tool with which social and educational change can be investigated in chapters two and three, in the process of which the term itself will take on more specific meaning. Chapter four will throw further light on the concept, as a self-avowedly pluralistic stance to society and education is examined. Chapter five will then argue that the widespread acceptance of pluralism in society and education puts curriculum RE in a stronger position than it held when society was self-consciously monolithic, and RE was deemed a support for such monism. Research-findings will then be presented to suggest how teachers might regard such an argument.

1.4 The clauses of the Act specifically prescribing for religious education and school-worship were, of course, part of a larger religious settlement dealing with the church-sector and the maintained sector and their inter-relationships. The two assumptions which we must look at in some detail indicate the basis upon which this settlement rested. It was agreed that, one, education must be grounded upon religion to be true to its nature,

and, second, that such an education would be directed to enculturation. Looking back, it might be said that the Act was expecting more from the schools than was altogether practical, in investing RE with a crusading role and adopting the strong meaning of enculturation (that children be brought to accept, rather than just to appraise, a heritage that was assumed to be Christian). It is useful, therefore, to ask how such beliefs about religion and education had come about.

1.5 Their immediate origins appear to have arisen as the nation reflected upon the Nazi threat from which it had been delivered, upon the church as the traditional expression of Christian civilising influences from which it had benefitted, and upon the pressing social injustices that were calling for redress. Niblett<sup>(9)</sup> has identified two interesting features of the war years which put the church into a particularly favourable light, namely, the connection in men's minds between Christianity and democracy, and the demonstrable interest shown by the church in social questions of justice and welfare. Quoting an unpublished thesis by Strachan he has drawn attention to the thread running through the Parliamentary debates on the Education Bill to the effect that people had to be taught to be democrats, and that they had to know why they believed in democracy. He also indicated how William Temple's interest in, and involvement with, social problems gave a lead to the church, which the nation was quick to

realise and appreciate, and reinforced such gatherings as the Malvern 1941 Conference on "Industry and Daily Living", and such publications as the weekly "Christian News Letter". Lawson and Silver<sup>(10)</sup> have gone so far as to say that, during the war, the call for an explicit Christian commitment in education became more insistent than at any time before in the twentieth century. They cite both the Norwood Report, and the National Union of Teachers, as accepting that there was a genuine demand among the majority of the people and the teachers for religious instruction in state-schools. This demand apparently stemmed to some extent from the mood of idealism and religious sentiment in which the country felt itself to be fighting the Devil and all his works, both literally and ideologically.

1.6 Certain important results both for RE and the church accrued from this state of mind. First, the Archbishops' five points<sup>(11)</sup> were not seen so much as an imposition of ecclesiastical authority but rather as an implementation of the government's own 1943 White Paper, which spoke of a 'very general wish' that religious education should play its proper part in reviving personal and spiritual values, by being accorded a clearly defined role in the schools<sup>(12)</sup>. Second, the provision of money was made easier to bring the buildings and equipment of church-schools more nearly comparable to those of state-schools, which were usually superior in both respects. This disparity was a major

problem, for, as the Durham Report<sup>(13)</sup> concisely remarks, about half the schools at the time were voluntary, which the state could not afford to buy but scrupled to annex, but which the church could not afford to maintain according to the new standards laid down by the Ministry of Education. Third, the prevailing spirit of co-operation not only brought the anglican and nonconformist churches nearer towards each other in the provision of agreed syllabuses, but brought them both nearer to the LEAs, who were similarly represented and involved in the drawing up of these documents<sup>(14)</sup>. These three results, though gains for the churches, might just as cogently be seen as but a delaying process in the development of a fully secularised educational system. For, in the subsequent debate about RE, there has emerged an increasingly refined conception of the distinction between church-RE and school-RE. This refinement has, to a very large extent, grown out of the attempted implementation of the religious clauses of the Act on the basis of church-privilege, and the resulting difficulties. So it will be useful to glance at three crucial areas of major difficulty, namely, the agreed syllabuses, school-assembly and moral education. For, by doing so, the assumptions of the Act will take on greater clarity, and the decisive role of the church in fostering these assumptions will be evident.

1.7 The agreed syllabuses were no innovation in 1944. Hull<sup>(15)</sup> has shown that, by 1934, there were 224 out of the 316 LEAs which had adopted syllabuses of this sort,

with about forty different schemes in circulation. He claims that, by 1944, 'a tradition had already been well established and the syllabuses had reached a certain maturity and stability'. Their chief characteristic was that they were Bible-based, reflecting, as such, the long Protestant tradition in Britain, and the basic fact, that, despite differences of interpretation, the Bible was the one common element among the denominations from which a Christian form of RE could be shaped. This is not to say that what would now be termed "life-material" or "world-religions-material" was not included. It is to say, however, that such material tended to be included to aid understanding of, and, it was hoped, acceptance of Biblical teaching. They were Christian documents aiming to nurture school-children in the Christian Faith<sup>(16)</sup>.

1.8 Closely linked with the provision of agreed syllabuses was the requirement that each school-day should begin with 'collective worship on the part of all pupils'<sup>(17)</sup>, appropriate withdrawal provision being extended to teachers and pupils (on parental request for the latter). Clearly, however, worship cannot be produced just by parliamentary decree, for it necessitates some minimum of belief, or of a readiness to suspend belief, if only temporarily. An act of worship can also, in some measure, be an emotional, and even indoctrinatory, technique to induce belief. For, unlike classroom RE there can be no discussion, questioning or disagreement in a school-assembly. The equation of

school-assembly (for which there are good educational reasons) with a school-act of worship (for which the educational reasons may be rather meagre) is more a product of historical practice than strict logic. In an education system which originated almost entirely in church-provision (to say nothing of the influence of the public schools), assembly-cum-worship was a traditional procedure, and to make it statutory was only to legalise a universal practice. Even at the time of the passing of the Act, though, the desirability of compulsory school-worship was questioned<sup>(18)</sup>. It was written into the Act, however, on the assumption that schools were Christian communities part of whose function was to transmit the Christian Faith, both intellectually and experientially. Once that assumption was challenged, the logical basis of school worship became shaky.

1.9 Of all the various reasons that could be given to support RE, perhaps the strongest reason for school-RE persisting in British schools is the importance it is believed to have had in the moral education of young people. In 1944, when the long Christian heritage of this country was consciously appreciated by many, and the ethical dimension, at least, of Christianity was perceived as a civilising factor, it seemed self-evident that religious instruction in the schools would help to make pupils more moral. Where Hartshorne's and May's<sup>(19)</sup> studies were known it could nevertheless be argued that

there was no tested alternative to the traditional vehicle of moral education (religion), and so it could be said that the situation called for a strengthening of the religious base to morality rather than a search for an alternative. The efforts of the Moral Instruction League at the turn of the century to produce a syllabus of moral education to replace religious teaching had failed, and the researches of the Farmington Trust and the Schools' Council<sup>(20)</sup> were yet to come. So, also, was the co-operation between Christians and Humanists over moral education<sup>(21)</sup>. While religion has always been a means of social control<sup>(22)</sup>, to lean too heavily upon RE as a means of making people moral does raise problems in an age when religious sanctions have apparently lost much of their power in motivating the mass of the people.

1.10 The foregoing glance at three crucial areas illustrates the basic assumption made by many in 1944 that Britain was a Christian country. From this it followed that young people should be Christianised through the schools, that RE meant Christian religious instruction, that moral education meant training in Christian behaviour, and that schools should be Christian communities playing their part to complement the churches in preserving the Christian religion. In short, schools were there to give children a Christian upbringing<sup>(23)</sup>. So, it seems clear that, although the church had to relinquish some of its stake in the schools, it nevertheless took its opportunity and



succeeded in securing legal recognition of its view of RE. Education was to be grounded in religion, and, such grounding was not to be restricted to an academic understanding of the Christian Faith. Experiential induction was to feature as an indispensable part of Christian education. The mood of the nation and the acceptable standing of the church combined to put RE in an apparently strong position. It has been said that one can hardly read any part of the Act without coming across some reference to religion<sup>(24)</sup>.

1.11 With so much talk on every hand about Christian Britain, Christian civilisation and Christian values, it would seem a mistake to suggest that the compilers of the Act preferred the word "religious" to "Christian" in order to allow religious pluralism to make headway. It would seem more likely that the wording was chosen so as to avoid embarrassment to Jewish schools. Yet, though Christianity was assumed to be the rightful content of religious education, there was, nevertheless, an implicit pluralism surrounding, and even built into, the Act. The breadth of consultation sought by Mr. Butler, and the broad denominational platform upon which the agreed syllabuses were negotiated, indicate the surrounding pluralism. While the requirements for agreed syllabuses, and the inclusion of the conscience clause, indicate something of an inbuilt pluralism. If the former

pluralism was Christian pluralism, the latter - in the case of the conscience clause - was wider. Without realising it the framers of the Act were in fact forging a more flexible instrument than they consciously planned. Thirty years or so later, religiously plural RE can be not inconsistent with the wording of the Act. Nor, for that matter, can religiously plural assemblies. If plural RE is to be attacked, ( and it is of course no part of this thesis to do so), such an attack must be made on other than legal grounds.

The study will now embark on an examination of those aspects of social and educational pluralism, which seem particularly significant in providing reference-points for deciding on the social and educational determinants of pluralism in RE.

## CHAPTER TWO

### SOCIETAL CHANGE: PLURALISM BECOMES OVERT

2.1 The use of the word "plural" to describe society is becoming increasingly widespread. It often seems to imply, at least in the RE literature, a contrast between the present state of affairs and a former time when society was monolithic. It seems necessary, therefore, consciously to guard against the simplistic thinking that, until the 1960's or so, British society was monist, but that, at about this time, it ceased to be "Christian" and became "plural". However the very merest reflection on the matter would show that, in modern times, Britain has never been monolithic. There have always been various ideological groups, both political, social and religious. The term "Christian" would seem to have referred to the framework in which this pluralism was contained. RE, in 1944, was deemed to be closely associated with this framework. This explains the impression that might be gained about immediately post-war RE that it was conducted largely in a vacuum, Christian instruction being given in sublime disregard of other religions and in earnest endeavour to induct children into the only value-system of any weight in the country. But we have already seen in the Introduction how an implicit pluralism was present in the 1944 Act. Also it seems, on the face of it, that the diverse religious and social backgrounds of RE teachers

would not be completely reduced to uniformity by the agreed syllabuses: this diversity must have shown through to some extent, in the classroom. The individual RE teacher is a powerful determinant of the nature of RE.

2.2 Having made this point, however, it must still be recognised that those who made an appeal to the nature of society to justify their view of RE in 1944 were clearly appealing to what they believed to be a truth. Similarly, those who appeal to a "plural" society to justify their view of what they see modern RE to be also believe that they are invoking a truth. Yet it is easy to opine about society as if such opinions carried the weight of the backing that comes from hard evidence. But such evidence is hard to come by when analysing society. So, while this chapter must make an appraisal of societal change, it will do so, it is to be hoped, in the full awareness of the complexity of social phenomena, and of the corresponding difficulty of acquiring hard evidence as a basis for any conclusions emerging from such an analysis.

Statistics, for example, can be produced without much trouble to denote declining church-attendance. But there are formidable difficulties in devising units of measurement for the diffusion-effects of religious broadcasting, religious television, religious literature and school-RE. While an assessment of "implicit" religion, once the concept is granted, would be yet more elusive.

2.3 A further problem in the writing of this chapter lies in the inevitable selection that must be made of the various aspects of social change. The risk here is that over-selection will lead to over-simplification. So, it must be stressed that, in dealing with the four areas of industrialisation, science, the media and youth (as a phenomenon), the aim is to highlight areas which are of crucial importance to the argument. It is acknowledged that a fuller treatment could, and, if the study were about social issues only, should be made. Also, it is recognised that the areas of change to be dealt with are not exclusively post-war phenomena, although, for convenience, they are handled as such. They are, in fact, manifestations of on-going trends, whose origins stretch well back into the inter-war years, sometimes into the nineteenth century or even earlier. Furthermore, no simple theory of social determinism will be advanced to interpret the relationship between social and educational change, or even to ascertain this relationship. The connexions between the different aspects of education to each other, and between the total educational exercise (or even parts of it) to society as a whole are too intricate for simple theorising in a short compass.

2.4 So the aim of this chapter is to analyse four areas which seem highly significant to the concept of pluralism. The significance lies in their being points at which value-systems can be expected to be generated. So the

drive of the analysis will be directed to deciding whether the areas chosen would yield, or would point to, a national value-framework, as discernible as, yet alternate to, that assumed in the 1944 Act. This analysis will be conducted primarily with school-RE in mind. Such a bias is not only appropriate to the subject under study, but will serve the further useful function of giving more precise direction to the investigation.

#### INDUSTRIALISATION AND URBAN VALUES

2.5 Although the inferior position of the British economy to that of the U.S.A. and of Germany had been appreciated in this country from early in the century, it was not until the near-bankruptcy of the late 1940's that the urgent need to modernise industry and build up industrial strength became a wide-spread concern. From 1945 it became clear that economic growth depended upon the newer industries, such as aircraft, car, plastic and electronic engineering, which had, in fact, been stimulated by the war itself<sup>(25)</sup>. The growth of these industries depended upon investment in research to link technological development with industrial advance (a point with an equally important relevance to the next section also). It led, too, to changes in the structure of occupations, in the nature of work, and, consequent upon these two factors, in the nature of community. Industrialisation stimulated the growth of cities, and, although it would

be dangerously facile to eulogise an imagined pre-industrial utopia, city-life has brought problems of crime, alienation, pollution, bad housing, highly concentrated populations, violence, loneliness and urban sprawl which have had effects upon both education and religion, and, so, RE. Bantock has urged that 'the humanising of the technical is one of our most pressing educational problems'<sup>(26)</sup>. It might also be described as one of our pressing religious problems, as, no doubt, the Church's Industrial Mission would avow.

2.6 Urbanisation has been aptly called a runaway movement<sup>(27)</sup>. Though there has been a corresponding rural centrifugal movement, this has only served to fuse urban and rural values to the weakening of the latter. It is now, for example, almost a commonplace in Wales, Derbyshire and the Lake District, that country cottages have risen in price well above the resources of local villagers who must watch the property pass as second homes to wealthy town-dwellers. Wirth's<sup>(28)</sup> comparison of the city-dweller's relationships as secondary (indirect, little face-to-face, or physical, contact, rational) to the village-dweller's as primary (direct, face-to-face, emotional) would seem a useful generalisation. He suggests how division of labour and specialisation of work have been able so to permeate man's daily activities that their grip on his psyche has become almost total, with repercussions on man's sense of worth as a person, and his ability to invest work with any profound meaning. Hodgkinson<sup>(29)</sup> has drawn attention to

the weakening of the Protestant work-ethic, which in earlier days enabled man to see his occupation as the doing of God's will<sup>(30)</sup>. Although writing about America he would seem to be making a valid point also about that country from which the Protestant ethic moved to the U.S.A. Hummel and Nagle<sup>(31)</sup> have identified some key-features of urbanisation when they say that 'life in an urban milieu, shaped by anonymity and mobility and dominated by pragmatism and profanity, is characterised by considerable social and physical movement, freedom of ethical choice, and rapid change'.

2.7 The urbanisation attendant upon industrialisation throws up numerous problems for the schools, most important of which must be those associated with inner-city schools, in particular the difficulties of socialising children from the diverse cultural background that usually makes up an inner-city area. Some of the more obvious problems are the maintenance of community-standards, provision for working wives, counselling of parents who turn out to be the actual "problem-children", and the encouragement of stable social relationships when family-influence diminishes. But it would seem that Goslin<sup>(32)</sup> has gone to the heart of the matter when he says that 'Perhaps more than in any other social environment, the urban dweller must be his brother's keeper if our cities are not to turn into jungles where order is maintained only by force of arms'.



However, the aim of this section is to talk primarily about the implications of urbanisation for RE. So, while the existence of wider problems is recognised, the discussion at this point will concentrate upon the two main issues, of immigration, and of plurality of values, these being the implications of industrialisation for RE which seem most important to the theme.

2.8.i The post-war influx of immigrants can largely be accounted for by industry's need to fill lowly, unskilled jobs with cheap labour, at a time when British working-class aspirations for upward social mobility were never higher or more likely to be fulfilled. The immigrants brought with them both the makings of formidable social and political problems, and also their own religious beliefs and practices. By converting churches into temples, if they were Sikhs or Hindus, or by building impressive Mosques, if they were Muslims, they began to draw attention to the fact that non-Christian religions were alive and well, and, in some cases, appeared to be showing up the decline of Christianity. Although immigrants from the West Indies were usually of a Christian background, their preference tended to be for a Pentecostal form of Christianity, markedly different from much conventional church-life, and, in due course, tending to be self-consciously "black". Here was further material for Christian pluralism. But the essential point is that, whereas Judaism constituted the main element of religious

pluralism prior to 1945 (when considered alongside Christianity, of course) it was sufficiently close to the national religion for the common ground to be perceived. The incoming religions, by contrast, were alien to the British religious tradition, and contained some practices which some Christians might see as idolatry. The possibility of religio-ethnic disharmony became immediate. For British attitudes and feelings towards coloured immigration began to surface, with ugly incidents, such as those at Notting Hill, revealing the implicit disruption that immigration could bring.

2.8.ii The issue did not become visible until the late 1950's, as the keeping of records of coloured immigrants was not the practice of most local authorities and welfare agencies, in case this should be seen as discrimination. Most of the immigrants from the new commonwealth were white, up to the early 1950's. The Home Office released the following figures in December 1958: the estimated coloured population was 210,000, comprising 115,000 West Indians, 25,000 West Africans, 55,000 Indians and Pakistanis, with 15,000 others. But these may have been miscalculations. The first authoritative survey was the 1966 Census, showing 2,478,060 immigrants living in England and Wales, of whom only a third were coloured. This census has been criticised for its alleged under-enumeration, and the Institute of Race Relations Survey of 1969 estimated that the mid-1966 Commonwealth and British-born coloureds were slightly less

than two per cent of the total population of England and Wales. With the threat of immigration-control, the flow of immigrants accelerated, reaching a peak in 1961. By this time the "problem" of immigration had become visible, and the tensions and misunderstandings thrown up by an apparently rampant growth of the coloured community made themselves felt. In this situation, RE could become highly significant. RE as an aid to racial understanding might give the subject a greater importance than did its enshrining in an Act of Parliament. But to fulfil this role, changes of attitude would be necessary in how RE teachers see the relationship between Christianity and non-Christian religions. Mutual acceptance and respect, genuine dialogue and perception of each religion's good points would be the key-notes of such a changed attitude, rather than the insistence that RE should be used as a means of Christian evangelism of benighted foreigners. For questions are inevitably raised about the appropriateness of the term "Christian" to describe a society in which identifiable, if small, non-Christian groups must be accorded the full rights of citizenship.

2.9 Allied to this factor is the second main implication of industrialisation upon RE, namely the effect upon values caused by the decreasing role of the church in an increasingly urban society. The picture of the church sometimes painted by sociologists, as that of a peripheral, even deviant, group, takes on some credibility. Shipman<sup>(33)</sup>

has claimed that there is no evidence that church-influence has ever been extensive in industrial towns. The complex differentiated nature of urban societies, he would suggest, is such that individuals are faced with an unco-ordinated array of value-systems. Rapid change increases the difficulty of matching accumulated wisdom to contemporary situations, and values are continually being defined and redefined within social and professional associations and trade unions<sup>(34)</sup>. Hence, a shrinking area of human behaviour remains in which the clergy feel confident enough to lay down codes of conduct. It is also the case, that proliferation of organisations to help people solve the problems encountered in urban living, has meant that organisations designed for that purpose, but having a church-religious base, can be safely ignored by those who seek social help but are not disposed to seek it in the church. Furthermore, the improved coping strategies to deal with natural disasters have undercut the motivation towards religion that may have grown out of dread of physical injury or tragedy. The Russells<sup>(35)</sup> have speculated about the difficulty of combining religion in its traditional forms with industrialisation, pointing out that the welfare of industrial wage-earners is more dependent upon human agency now and less upon natural causes, and claiming that religion, at base, is a response to the uncertainties of climate and environment.

2.10 Accompanying the declining hold by the church upon value-systems, and therefore upon the nature of school-RE,

has gone a decreasing church-presence in the state-sector of education. The loss of so many village-schools<sup>(36)</sup>, while a blow to church-influence, is but part of its general loss in influence caused by the decline of village-life in competition with industrial urbanisation. But in the town-areas also the church has not been able to maintain a large school-presence, despite financial help from the 1959 Education Act and the strenuous efforts of the Roman Catholics. While prepared to make sacrifices for a stake in the educational system, the churches have found that the costs of education for an industrial society make the provision of more than a few schools a financial impossibility. Also, recent college-closures have hit church-colleges, although it seems that recruiting for remaining church-colleges is holding its own. The long historical trend of church-school provision has been the major single cause for the inclusion of RE in the state-school curriculum, although, as will be indicated later, there is a very valid educational base for RE quite apart from ecclesiastical considerations. With the church's decline in numbers and influence, RE has been obliged to examine this educational base with increasing urgency. There have been corresponding gains to its respectability as a subject, but losses to its role as a church-auxiliary. When RE syllabuses are now drawn up, they are usually called "Suggestions", and the major compiling influences come from professional educators, rather than from churchmen as such. There has therefore been a strong drive towards comprehensiveness, out of a

desire to review the diversity of value- and belief-systems found in society, be they Christian or not, ecclesiastical or not, explicitly religious or not<sup>(37)</sup>.

2.11 Expanding immigration and a shrinking church would certainly be justification enough to challenge the presumption of "Christian" in describing society. If these two factors are allied to the emergence of numerous uncoordinated value systems, then the challenge must surely be strengthened. But this may, in fact, be to say no more than that society now more obviously contains plural elements, without going on to determine the more difficult matter as to whether there remains a Christian framework in which these elements are enclosed. As has been pointed out, this seems to have been what has been meant when, in the past, Britain has been described as a Christian country. For, though the features in our national life which stem from industrialisation are a present fact, this is not to assert that they are considered by the population radically to alter our national self-consciousness. To take an obvious example, the dignity and worth of the individual would be generally regarded as a Christian, rather than an industrial, value. In fact, such a value might run against the implacable demand for profitability, endemic to industry. The legal framework of the country is, ostensibly, at any rate, committed to the principle of upholding the rights of the ordinary man<sup>(38)</sup>. To take another example, there seems to be a deep feeling among

the people that we should be continually reminded of our past, through the institutions of the monarchy and parliament. This, without doubt, is partly a look back at believed former greatness. But it could also be a desire to review values, and, where appropriate, to maintain those influences which have made us what we are. One of these influences, all will acknowledge, has been Christianity. It is perhaps the case that the people still regard such an influence (provided it remains general) favourably. The schools, certainly, are in an especially suitable position to assist such a review and valuation<sup>(39)</sup>. It might, therefore, be too easy to say that because plurality exists, the term Christian must be abandoned. Perhaps we should be trying to distinguish between content and framework, and be looking as much at the "ought" as the "is". The philosophical problems raised by this suggestion are, to put it mildly, immense, and can only be touched on here.

#### THE ASCENDENCY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

2.12.i During this century we have seen the gradual development, sometimes against great difficulty, of scientific and technical education, from its lowly position at the end of the nineteenth century to its present influential and prestigious status as a main contributor to the economic well-being of the country. Baron<sup>(40)</sup> has attributed the early location of scientific and technical subjects to the periphery of educational

thinking and policy to the strength of the concept of liberal education, originating in the older universities and the public schools. Such thinking might not always have had beneficial effects for science. The fact, that the industrial revolution in Britain was carried through by self-made men without recourse to the universities<sup>(41)</sup>, might have fostered a complacency in this country about the ability of industry to thrive independently of high-level scientific and technological research. Musgrave<sup>(42)</sup>, in contrasting the iron and steel industries of Britain and Germany, spoke of the tradition in Britain of the self-made man, in which the practical is preferred to the theoretical, and in which science and industry are not seen by the upper classes as fitting employment for their talents. Germany, by contrast, from very early days, gave science an important status, both in secondary schools and in higher education. Scientific research in Germany was therefore linked, almost from the outset, with top-level industrial management. The subsequent industrial expansion eventually became the envy of Britain.

2.12.ii Morant's<sup>(43)</sup> championing of classical education for the grammar schools, and his seeming opposition to technical education, were serious obstacle to the securing of adequate resources for scientific education. Although there was some development in this area during the wars, it was not until after 1945 that there occurred an extensive change of attitude to the status and importance of



science and technology. The pronouncements of the Percy and Barlow Committees, the accelerating applications for further education courses, and the devaluation of sterling facilitated the success of the LEAs' attempts to secure more money from the Ministry for technical education. Although it was not until 1955 that the government responded with appreciable resolve<sup>(44)</sup>, and despite some difficulties in filling all the places subsequently made available for technical courses, it can now be said that science is a prestigious occupation (with technology close in esteem), and that higher education and industry are both widely committed to its advancement. It can almost be claimed that science now occupies a place in our society comparable to that occupied by the church in the middle ages. It must be expected, then, that scientific values will take on an importance that will rank them higher than, or even cause them to be seen as replacements for, those values which the country has previously seen as the framework of its life.

2.13 It is necessary to make some probings, therefore, into the implications of scientific advance for religious education. Certainly an RE, which is regarded as a carrier for Christian culture, is obliged, as part of its *raison d'etre*, to define its relationship to science. It would be easy, however, in the process of such probings to arrive at facile answers. For the tensions between scientific and religious outlooks are obvious, these

being capable of interpretation at a crude level as contradictions. Yet, the existence of able scientists who are nevertheless religious men would indicate that, at a sophisticated level, such contradictions may not stand. On the other hand, there are many able scientists who find no reason to entertain a religious outlook, and so, whatever sophisticated rapprochement there may be between religion and science, this cannot be a totally convincing position.

2.14 The first question that must be decided is: which point has society reached in its understanding of scientific activity? It seems that we are past Dingle's<sup>(45)</sup> criticism that the average scientist understands what he is doing about as well as a centipede understands how he walks. The developments in science education, outlined in the previous paragraphs, coupled with the widely published successes of applied technology in the last few decades, would suggest this. Vick<sup>(46)</sup>, in the same article in which he makes reference to Dingle, claims that the distinctive standards of science are becoming more widely recognised, and are having more influence, as science and scientists play an increasing part in our lives. If this is the case, then one task for RE is to examine what over-lap, if any, there is between scientific and "traditional" values, and to work towards (if this is possible) a view of life in which the religious and the scientific viewpoints are seen as complementary. This

calls for patient explanation to erode prejudice and misunderstanding, and to suggest a way of synthesis.

2.15 This, however, would bring us to a further major problem, namely, whether such attempts at synthesis are too sophisticated - even in a simplified form - for most school-children. Pinion<sup>(47)</sup> has put the matter succinctly when he says that the adolescent thinker has learnt enough science to know that it is incompatible with some of the tenets of the church, but not enough to realise that science, by reason of its limitations and fallibility, as well as by its revelations of the wonder and mystery of creation, can do more to re-establish and strengthen religious faith than any other factor. Perhaps the last part of the statement claims too much, but the conclusion he reaches, that adolescents are often too immature to appreciate how much civilisation owes to Christian values, and how fundamental these values are to our modern social and economic problems, is suggestive and moderate. It is very relevant to the argument of this chapter. Certainly, Pinion gives the RE teacher positive encouragement to strive to make clear society's roots in the Christian ethic. Such an attempt might appear ham-strung at the outset by the debate about pollution, in which the charge is made that the root cause of the West's ravaging of nature is the encouragement to do so that has been given by Judaeo-Christian teaching that man is lord of nature. So it is good to see, in a recent book by an eminent

scientist<sup>(48)</sup>, that the responsibility for such ravages is placed squarely at the door of 'unmitigated materialism', with the suggestion that it is in so far as the Christian ethic has been ignored that pollution has taken place. The early chapters of Genesis give no mandate for spoliation of the environment.

2.16 While synthesis between religion and science does present problems in school-RE because of children's and young people's undeveloped understanding and thinking-powers, it must be noted that the difficulties do not always show a debit for RE. It seems as unrealistic to expect a general approval of science, because the fruits of technology are so dazzling (as in space exploration), or so delightful (as in electronic gadgetry), as to expect that surface contradictions between science and religion will make a synthesis in school incomprehensible. For, if we can say that there is a growing appreciation of the methods and nature of science (however slow this appreciation may be in coming), we can also say (with rather more certainty) that there is an accompanying suspicion that these methods and effects are as likely to be harmful as beneficial. Evidence for this can be found in the popular protests against such schemes as the provision of nuclear bases and the recycling of nuclear waste. Dixon<sup>(49)</sup> is not the only scientist to be sensitive to grassroots popular protest against science, but he typifies this sensitivity. He both gives instances

of this protest, and assigns a certain value to it as contributing to the health of science. He accepts Missen's misgivings about the desirability of everlasting economic growth, with its dependence on continued industrialisation and technological development, and refers to Toffler's 'roaring current of change'. This leads him to call for a thoughtful analysis 'of the ways in which our profound dependence on - indeed domination by - science and technology has changed the quality of human relationships and the texture of society',<sup>(50)</sup>. He reviews the Roszah/Monod disagreement, and, while not siding with the former, he criticises the latter for the fallacy of attaching cardinal importance to factual, scientific knowledge as against other experience, and for not allowing that there are perverse paradoxes in nature which scientists are compelled to accept (such as the behaviour of electrons as both waves and particles). 'Why, then,' he asks, 'should not a religious believer cheerfully accept the paradox posed by the apparent conflict between his own faith and Monod's capricious materialism?'<sup>(51)</sup>. He concludes his chapter by mentioning the 'first stirrings' of the scientific community against the domination of biology by reductionism<sup>(52)</sup>.

2.17 A further analysis (that of Bantock)<sup>(53)</sup> seems both to deal with a central issue in the religion/science debate, and to make a crucial point, of relevance to the argument of this section, when he talks about the industrialisation

of science. Taking Ellul's identification of the factors of consciousness and judgement operating in the field of technology, he suggests that the reduction of life to a succession of problems and solutions has produced its own reaction against the prominence of the rational and technical. His thesis is that scientific rationalism has sufficiently imposed its methods and procedures as to spawn a social system of industrial technology, with consequent neglect of the human characteristics of the people involved. People have sought an outlet in romanticism and the romantic movement, he claims. This reaction has led either to futile gesturing, as in the Dadaists, or to apathy, as in the hippies, or to violence, as in the student revolts. Vaisey<sup>(54)</sup> claims that the student revolts of the 60's were allegedly primarily concerned with the alienation of the individual from society caused by the post-industrial cash-nexus, but that, in educational terms, they were a reaction against the depersonalisation of the university and its close relationship, through man-power planning, to the industrial-scientific-military complex. These analyses are debatable, of course, but they do fit the common sense observation that man does not like being treated as anything other than a dignified human being, and will chose beliefs and actions consonant with this assumption though he may have to run counter to as prestigious (but, in his opinion, over-bearing) an activity as science.

They also mirror what seems an increasingly urgent current concern of science that industrialisation has destroyed the first fine careless rapture of a science devoted to truth and integrity. Ravetz<sup>(55)</sup> discusses the possible harmful effects of industrialisation upon science, the significant one surely being science's ethical uncertainty, especially as the 'ideal of truth has become obsolete'. Toulmin<sup>(56)</sup> talks of the move that science has made from the straightforward monolithic Newtonian ethic to a Baconian ethic which 'we do not yet fully comprehend'. It seems that the gulf is growing between the clear-cut ethic which Bronowski<sup>(57)</sup> could present in the name of science, and which related closely to the Christian ethic, and the state of ethical uncertainty in which the new "religion" (of science) cannot advance a unifying ethical system to serve as a national framework, as did the old religion of Christianity. If so, the suggestion, made at the end of the previous section (p.24), that, when examining and deciding upon the nature of society, we should give attention to the "ought" as well as the "is", is strengthened.

2.18 Before concluding this section with a discussion of the implications of the foregoing for RE, some comments are called for about the impact of science and technology upon education in general, in particular those aspects of education which, in turn, have a direct impact upon RE. Two points especially must be mentioned, namely, the knowledge-explosion, and the place of the school as an

initiator of change. Both form part of the larger issue of the relationship of education to the economy. For a central dilemma for schools at the moment is that of reconciling their traditional function, the preservation of their cultural inheritance, with their modern function of adapting to and facilitating change. Banks<sup>(58)</sup> puts the point clearly when she says that 'schools may be expected to teach traditional values alongside a belief in the inevitability and desirability of technical change, as well as the skills and knowledge which make such a change possible'. At times of economic crisis, as in the mid-seventies, there is inevitably much talk about the importance of the schools in contributing to the needs of industry<sup>(59)</sup>. There seems to be uncertainty as to what this means, but apparently it comes down to the production of a literate, flexible and intelligent school-leaver, able to operate automatic and semi-automatic machines, the greater use of which have affected industry at all levels<sup>(60)</sup>. Short<sup>(61)</sup> speaks of the way in which the new technology demands a new man in place of the stamped-out nut-turner, premium being placed upon creativity, originality and perceptiveness, rather than upon manual skill and neat packages of factual knowledge. The clear fact is that the continually burgeoning growth of technical knowledge has made it unrealistic to expect today's packages of knowledge to fit into tomorrow's packages. Crowther<sup>(62)</sup> is quite specific in saying that the job which the school-leaver will hold when he is a grandfather may not exist



at all today: it will be concerned with processes not yet invented, using machinery still to be designed.

Sadly, we might now have to say that the school-leaver may never hold a job as a grandfather.

2.19.i In this context, the status of religious knowledge becomes critical<sup>(63)</sup>. Its relevance for industry becomes obscure, if not dubious. Its assumptions appear to be unthinkable to science. Shipman<sup>(64)</sup> points out that the natural sciences have not only come closer to industry in providing new ideas and processes, but have furnished secular explanations for events previously thought to be the subject of theology, most of this research being into sensitive areas near to the heart of, and sometimes opening up problems and experiences outside the scope of, existing morality. With the crumbling of the Christian world-outlook, and the apparent superiority of scientific knowledge as more "useful" and empirically demonstrable, hard blows may appear to be dealt to RE.

2.19.ii However, this section has tried to show, religion may be in a stronger position now that the limitations of science are more visible. So it may not be necessary for RE to see its continuance in the schools as dependent upon the continuing strength of the "liberal tradition" in education (Morant's policies can be set aside), although, naturally, RE would wish to retain, as an ally, any group which maintained that schools should have larger perspectives than industrial vocationalism. While the problem

of "packets of knowledge" (many neither utilitarian nor falsifiable) remains, the way ahead would seem to be along the following lines. It must be made clear exactly what is being claimed for religious knowledge, attention must be drawn to the mystery of the human spirit as a means of combating reductionism, examination must be made of the various meanings that can be attached to the word "truth". Religion need not be presented as the refuge to which fugitives from rationality can fly, even though there may be an anti-intellectual current present in society, and existentialism might foster such a flight from reason. More positively, RE is the means by which valid and rational desires for personal freedom, dignity, and meaningful living can be explored. Furthermore, it can be argued that rationality, by its very nature, implies morality. (65)

2.20 So far, this chapter has examined two social areas out of which an alternative national framework might arise to serve the same purposes of unification and integration as were deemed to be served by the construction of a "Christian" society. The picture that may be emerging is of a society, certainly with alternative value-systems, but apparently lacking the capacity to produce a single, unifying, integrating framework. Industrialisation and science seem at least as prone to internal disagreements, inconsistencies and conflicts as did protestant Christianity, while lacking the latter's ability to hold people to a

single, recognisable ethic transcending sectarian differences. Each, too, may have greater difficulties in generating acceptable personal and human values than did its religious predecessor. But, the areas of industrialisation and science have not been analysed merely with a view to gaining light on the nature of value-pluralism. A further major concern of this study is to seek out the implications for RE of the various social and educational matters treated. The picture emerging on this front, so far, is that RE continues to possess social significance and should be able to withstand the apparently heavy blows dealt it by science.

#### THE MEDIA AND THE FREE MARKET OF IDEAS

2.21 In trying to assess the effects of the media upon the values of society, the hen-egg nature of the problem dictates caution in trying to separate cause from effect, and the lack of research about the relationship of RE and the media makes any suggestions on this topic rather speculative. Nevertheless, it is necessary to focus attention upon how the media might have reacted to value-pluralism. If this section concentrates upon television, it is because the dominance of this medium justifies such concentration. Radio, the cinema, and even the press, have been forced into a measure of differentiation by this very dominance, but such differentiation is not so great as to make impossible extrapolations from television to the kindred vehicles.

2.22 Williams<sup>(66)</sup> has argued against a too easy acceptance of technological determinism by which television is seen as creating new societies or new human conditions, or as being available as a marginal element (by contrast) of the social change already taking place, although facilitating that change. Both these views, he contends, abstract technology from society, his own position being that there is an intentionality about technological research and development which is directly linked to known social needs and practices. Nevertheless, even if the present communications-systems are outcomes of developing industrial and military-systems, and though transmission may be conceived before content, there remains the possibility that mass-communications may have unintended effects on society distinct from those sought by the technologists, whose self-understanding may nevertheless have been that they were meeting specific social needs. Williams' reply<sup>(67)</sup> to this point would be found both in his recognition of the desire to use technology for personal creative ends, as well as in his repudiation of the notion of a technology flowing from determinism. Though such a reply does not seem to meet the objection, the reference to personal creativity does introduce some optimism into a topic which, under a McLuhan-type analysis, in which the media are seen as the 'massage' of a 'pseudo-environment', could be depressing. Groombridge<sup>(68)</sup> quotes Sir Robert Fraser's speech, on retiring as the first Director-General of

I.T.A. (24th September 1970), in which the claim was made that TV is 'theatre and newspaper in one'. Sir Robert drew attention to the development of television from being a fun-medium to being also an information-medium. He sees a third medium maturing, it is hoped, within these two, namely, an educational medium. These points should be borne in mind in any discussion of the effect of television upon society and upon schools. For it is tempting to indict television with causing many of the major ills of society, as in Wilson's<sup>(69)</sup> article, without demanding too much in the nature of scientific proof to support the accusation. The topic of violence is a case in point here, for, despite numbers of research studies (in one of which<sup>(70)</sup> the B.B.C. finds it difficult to arrive at a definition of violence), there does not seem to be any conclusive proof that there is a link between TV violence and violence in society<sup>(71)</sup>. Another factor that also should be borne in mind is that the model of man, as an atomised unit in a mass-society, responding in a straightforward fashion to media stimuli, does not allow for the filtering equipment an individual might bring to the media, compounded of his experience, his beliefs and his aspirations. It may be misleading to talk as if the media provide the main influence all individuals encounter as they acquire experience and come to their beliefs. While RE can hardly be realistically expected to mount a campaign to offset the supposedly harmful effects of the media, there may be ways in which RE can encourage the educational use of the media, from

the viewpoint of both producer and consumer.

2.23 Golding<sup>(72)</sup> has scanned the field of research into the media and concluded that a mixture of technique has produced a 'patchwork of structured information not always comparable, reconcilable, or even complementary'. Perhaps, though, one or two points may be made on the basis of this research which, while not directly related to RE, suggest implications. It seems that items of general, as distinct from specific, information are gleaned from the television by the population at large. 90% of the survey conducted by the University of Leicester<sup>(73)</sup> claimed that they obtained their information about national and world-affairs from television, newspapers or the radio. Eyre-Brook<sup>(74)</sup>, in an unpublished thesis, found that 85% of her sample of 11-15 year-olds named TV as the main source of their information about general matters of a particular nature, but specific political opinions seemed to come mainly from their parents<sup>(75)</sup>. Statistics as to the growth of TV set-ownership are relevant at this point: three million licences in 1954, fifteen million in 1968; ten percent of homes with a set in 1954, ten percent without in 1963; the disappearance of separate radio licences in 1971<sup>(76)</sup>. To these figures might be added the fact of, apparently, wide-spread licence evasion. Yet, against these statistics must be set the findings that suggest that TV is not particularly salient for teenagers<sup>(77)</sup>; adults and children, apparently, spending more time in

front of the set than adolescents<sup>(78)</sup>. However, the differences between adult and adolescent viewing (both in content and in frequency) may aggravate the gap between pupil and teacher<sup>(79)</sup>. An intriguing point which has emerged from research into politics and the media is the suggestion that the electorate shows low persuadability<sup>(80)</sup>.

2.24 The foregoing would indicate that a determination to place the media in their full social nexus leaves us with an untidy position, and one which offers no certain basis for deciding on the strength of media-influence on values. On the one hand, the possibility of considerable media influence upon children and young people (if less so, for the latter) would have to be acknowledged. Yet, on the other, wariness would have to be shown about deciding upon the exact nature of this influence, especially in the area of the supposed decline in moral standards<sup>(81)</sup>. Intentionality would have to be granted to the media-men (as distinct from seeing them as mere corks, carried along on the social torrent), but this intentionality extends both to the creation of wants and needs for monetary gain, as well as to the fostering of creative and educational goals. Cultural interaction through the media would have to be allowed, but one would be hard put to decide which view of "culture" was the one with which the viewers were interacting - whether the Arnold-Eliot-Leavis-Steiner plea for the defence of high culture, the Marxist claim that the media sustain a deliberate misrepresentation

of working-class culture, or Hoggart's 'common culture',<sup>(82)</sup>. It is difficult to see the media as supportive of an agreed view of culture. RE's position in this seems similarly inconclusive but there may be reason for hope. A key-factor might be found in the filtering equipment brought by viewers to the media. Another might be found in the positive use by RE of programmes (both religious and otherwise) put out on the media. But before developing these two points, a brief look must be taken at the media's history, so that the over-all investigation undertaken in this chapter can be carried forward, by seeing how far the media might have moved from the assumptions about society outlined in the Introduction.

2.25.i A declared intention of the B.B.C.<sup>(83)</sup> in its early days can be taken as crucial in this investigation: 'The B.B.C. is doing its best to prevent any decay of Christianity in a nominally Christian country',<sup>(84)</sup>. Under John Reith's leadership broadcasting was meant to do people good, and, in the pre-war years, there was a general acceptance of such high-minded aims. But Reith's resignation, the wartime necessity to use broadcasting on a mass-scale, the influence of continental commercial broadcasting, the growing desire for openness in post-war society, and the successful attack on B.B.C. monopoly eroded such intentions. Early television was, similarly, disposed to educate and improve - 'to nourish and expand the viewer's range of taste' as the 1928 Handbook put it.



But there were politicians, businessmen and broadcasters who saw other uses for television. The Popular Television Association, formed on the 23rd July 1953, with the promise of £20,000 from various sources, was victorious in its campaign for a competing alternative to the B.B.C. The bill to create the Independent Television Corporation was passed on the 30th July 1954. Wilson<sup>(85)</sup> questions this whole campaign as a reflection of the public-relations stress on manipulation and the use of gimmicks to sell a pre-packaged policy. There would seem to be truth in these accusations. If so, we have an example of commercial and political intention allying with a shrewd understanding of popular ideas to reshape an establishment institution. From being a medium aiming to uphold and elevate "good taste" (seen as inextricably linked with Christianity), it was reformed to being a medium appealing to the lowest common denominator of public taste. To gain viewers, TV operates on the rough, but effective, policy of giving them what they want.

2.25.ii The B.B.C. could not ignore this stark message of the new competitive situation. For financing such programmes, I.T.V. drew upon commercial advertising and secured an income far in excess of the B.B.C. Despite attempts to control advertising, and despite the banning of political and religious advertising, this fact must surely point to a further societal pressure in the

formation of values and attitudes. Booker<sup>(86)</sup> subsumes the social revolution he finds in English life in the fifties and sixties under the key interpretative principle of the craze for sensation, leading to fantasy. While there is more to England than a febrile sensationalism during this time, Booker's thesis does seem to unearth what he refers to as a 'nyktomorphis' which was operating to strike at, and, in some ways, to reverse traditional values. He seems to be quite fair in criticising the media for challenging traditional ways for commercial purposes. This challenge to traditional ways, once having been made, the course that the B.B.C. was to take became increasingly that mapped out by the I.T.V., in which viewer-ratings became vital determinants to the viability of programmes, and plurality of ethical and religious stances became the new value-ethos.

2.26 The capacity of the media to bring information to its audience from all parts of the world raises the question as to the relationship between the way this information is presented and the attitudes that are engendered in the recipient as a result of this presentation. At this juncture, two concerns of this chapter coalesce. At what points might media-attitudes to values directly relate to RE? Hartmann and Husband<sup>(87)</sup> have examined the way race-related material is handled by the media, for example, and claim that this handling serves both to perpetuate negative perceptions of blacks and to

define the situation as one of intergroup conflict. After claiming that research on the whole has shown that social attitudes, including prejudice, are relatively resistant to the media, they go on to argue that the British cultural tradition contains elements that are derogatory to foreigners, particularly blacks, and that the concept of "news-value" makes conflict as central to news as it is to drama and literature, as well as fostering an interpretation within a familiar framework of existing images, stereotypes and expectations. In such a situation the role of RE is clear. Teaching that runs counter to such stereotyping, and which seeks for a true understanding of the various racial groups within the country, is a contribution that becomes more vital as these groups become more visible. This may entail, for the more academic pupils at any rate, an analysis using Hartmann and Husband's criteria, and, for all pupils, an acquaintance with the major practices of at least Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism. It would seem necessary for RE to assume the role of appreciative critic of the media with a view to refining the filtering equipment which children and young people bring to the media. This stems partly from the fact that any value-system is, ipso facto, RE's concern, and partly because issues such as advertising-technique, programme-selection, and the processing of transmitted material must, for educational reasons, be probed and assessed. RE might not (indeed, should not) be the only curriculum-area in which this is done, but, certainly, if only because of

its intrinsic concern with both communication and ethics, it is the one area in which such appraisal must be found. But if, by so doing, it helps to form the filtering equipment of pupils, then the question must be raised as to what criteria are to govern such refining. The immediate answer is, of course, general educational criteria such as understanding <sup>(88)</sup>, truth, and aesthetic and moral worth. Pluralism would seem a necessary logical addition. But the further requirement that RE offer a religious critique must surely also be a logical necessity, for RE is more than general education. This would mean that the media's unashamed appeal to affluence and materialistic success must be set in a wider religious and philosophical context. By keeping alive consideration of, and interest in, the ultimate questions <sup>(89)</sup>, RE can show how religions offer an alternative, "spiritual" way to that of "this-worldly" materialism. Education sub specie aeternitatis, because a religious principle, cannot be the single base-line for modern educational systems, but it does not therefore cease to be a valid religious option.

2.27 In addition to criticism, RE is in a position to try to use the media for constructive ends <sup>(90)</sup>. McQuail <sup>(91)</sup> has discussed the foothold that television has gained in the educational system, and has made the point that television can produce learning results equal to those achieved by other methods <sup>(92)</sup>. Both television corporations make RE programmes for schools, as well as providing documentary,

news and current affairs material, all of which can supplement and provide illustration for classroom-work. A recent digest of B.B.C. school-broadcasts shows that explicit RE programmes are being widely used<sup>(93)</sup>, to say nothing of programmes in other areas (e.g. Humanities) which might be of implicit value to RE. It must be recognised, however, that the very quality of the technical aspects of such material can make the day-to-day classroom-approach of the RE teacher appear tedious. It is possible to come to rely too heavily upon visual material so that anything requiring intellectual struggle, or mastery of irksome detail, comes to appear less and less attractive to the pupil. But it must also be recognised that the more general religious programmes of radio and television might be diffusing religion in a way that the churches are not able to do so, and might be providing religious views direct to the people in a form far less influenced by religious institutions<sup>(94)</sup>. Certainly the companies make deliberate attempts to reach different types of audience with varied religious programmes, and would appear to reach non-church-goers rather better than church-based religion. Perhaps radio might be better here than television<sup>(95)</sup>. Local radio would seem to have possibilities for RE teachers, challenging them to produce material with their pupils, making use of the likely strengthening of pupil-motivation if this were attempted.

2.28 As a final consideration, it should be mentioned that the part played by the media (along with associated communications-systems and modern transport-systems) in breaking down insularity may be an aid as RE strives to solve the problems of relevance. RE need not be tucked away into a curriculum-slot which makes it appear an isolate from the realities of modern living. McLuhan's 'global village' can facilitate the imaginative entering into the circumstances and environments of people very different from ourselves. We are, perhaps, getting better at both allowing that there are many different life-styles around the world, & attempting to understand and feel with people of radically alternative ways of life. The readiness to examine non-Christian religions in RE lessons might bring pupils to see Christianity as "our religion" in a way that the exclusive preoccupation with it could never do. This may be a useful lead-up to an examination of the part played by Christianity in shaping the British nation. This will depend, first, upon the RE teacher knowing which media items his pupils are regularly exposed to, second, upon his ability to make use of these items in his own teaching programme, and, third, upon his taking steps to prevent his own viewing being so incongruent with that of his pupils as itself to set up communication-barriers unnecessarily.

2.29 The main point that must be taken from this section is that, whether passively following society's lead, or

actively setting the pace for society, the media are, in Schramm's<sup>(96)</sup> words 'built on the theory of a free market place of ideas ...(which)... will not work right unless all viewpoints on a controversial question are freely presented'. The days when the B.B.C. was deemed a bulwark for a Christian society are gone. The expectation that the media can become a bulwark for an educated society is an attractive replacement, even if it may be somewhat unrealistic in the hard reality of competition for viewers, though this possibility seems now about to be tested in I.T.V.2. Audience-ratings alone would pressure the media towards pluralism. There is reason to hope that the media will be true to the theory of the balanced presentation of all viewpoints, even if this might founder on the difficulties of preventing inevitable but insidious biases making their influences felt. An RE aware of these factors, however, might find a positive role in relation to the media.

#### YOUTH IS A PHENOMENON, IS IT A CULTURE?

2.30 Musgrove<sup>(97)</sup> has suggested that the adolescent was invented at the same time as the steam-engine, attributing the invention to Rousseau in 1762. Certainly it would seem that, until the eighteenth century, there was no marked differentiation between childhood and adolescence<sup>(98)</sup>, and that it was Hall's<sup>(99)</sup> monumental work in 1904 which identified the age-group and made the name a household-word.

There can be no doubt that children and adolescents have never been more clearly distinguished from each other and from adults, and never been more investigated as subjects of study and research<sup>(100)</sup>. The emergence of this group for close study has led to its taking on the appearance of a relatively autonomous sector of society. It is necessary, therefore, to ask the question how far this emergence constitutes another weakening of a central value-system by the competition arising from yet another alternative. How far, in other words, is it valid to talk about a youth-culture?<sup>(101)</sup>

2.31 Coleman<sup>(102)</sup> speaks of distinct social systems offering a united front to the overtures of adult society (although he allows that adolescents orientate towards fulfilling their parents' desires). He maintains that the American society 'has within its midst, a set of small teenage societies, which focus teenage interests and attitudes on things far removed from adult responsibilities, and may develop standards that lead away from these goals'<sup>(103)</sup>. Britain tends to reflect America in many societal features. So, allowing that Coleman may be right in what he says about America, do the same considerations apply to Britain? Stenhouse<sup>(104)</sup> goes further than Coleman and finds a homogenous teenage culture of shared understandings which is 'a kind of protest flung by those who consider themselves to be grown-up at a society which denies them full adult status'. This echoes the idea of a generation-gap.



However, such a notion, although carrying Mead's endorsement<sup>(105)</sup>, may be a misleading way of viewing adolescents. Simmons<sup>(106)</sup>, for example, states that 'the cumulative effect of empirical research has revealed disconcertingly little foundation for a fierce "conflict of generation"'. Musgrave<sup>(107)</sup> described the family as our most successful institution, making this claim at a time when the troublesome sixties were in full spate. The British National Child Development Study, 1974, found that 86% of their sixteen-year-olds got on well with their mothers, and the National Children's Bureau reported in 1976 that 80% of their sixteen-year-olds got on well with their fathers. It is necessary to pause, therefore, before regarding adolescents as a cultural alternative to society and to acknowledge that the majority may positively wish to shoulder the values of their parents as soon as possible<sup>(108)</sup>. Nevertheless, it may be said with certainty that adolescents show characteristics that help to demarcate them as a group. Three in particular will be looked at fairly closely in this section: attitudes to authority, to egalitarianism and to eclecticism. These are issues which directly and vitally affect RE, and so the implications of all three will be examined as they bear upon the RE teacher.

2.32.i A recent study by Musgrave<sup>(109)</sup>, in which he compares his findings with those of Eppels, is illuminating both for general interest and for particular guidance to RE teachers. He set a sentence-completion

test to a sample of boys and girls taken from a comprehensive school and a direct-grant school in the south-east, this test being in turn based on that set by the Eppels in the sixties. His aim was to discover whether the frameworks generated by the Eppels' analysis were still realistic in the seventies, although it must be noted that his sample was smaller, younger and more school-oriented than the Eppels', even though, in both cases, the samples were of teenagers living in the urban south-east of England. The Eppels used fifteen incomplete sentences to investigate the areas of personal relationships, concepts of justice, responsibility, authority and independence, goals and aspirations. Thirteen of the same sentences were applied to Musgrave's sample, with slight changes designed to throw light on the process of moral choice. The findings suggest a shift towards a more individualistic morality, with an increasing valuing of interpersonal relationships, a greater readiness to take a more considered view of moral problems, a greater tendency to be more critical of their peers and less so of their parents, a greater hostility to authority, and the apparent birth of a desire not to prejudge others by "labelling". Musgrave points out the correspondence of his research with that of Wright and Cox<sup>(110)</sup>, who report a shift from unequivocal condemnation of behaviour to a more qualified, lenient and undecided position. Worthy of note, also, is the growing similarity of opinion between

boys and girls, although perhaps of greatest relevance to RE is the rarity of mention of religion and the complete absence of seeing conscience in religious terms<sup>(111)</sup>.

2.32.ii Such a study points up, among other things, the continuing change of attitude to authority, which seems to have been a discernible trend for the last two centuries. The trend has accelerated in the post-world war through reaction against authoritarian dictatorships, the growing power of labour over management, and the growing reliance on rationality for legitimising authority-systems. The traditional wielders of authority, whether cleric, parent, employer, politician or teacher, have had to seek a renegotiated position of authority in a freely accepted human relationship. It is possible to argue, as does Short<sup>(112)</sup>, that, in so doing, they are reasserting the true Christian position, which bases religious authority upon a personal relationship with Christ, rather than upon an authoritarian command. This might lead, he claims, to a better understanding of Christianity. Though this optimism may be attractive, it might overlook the fact that, nevertheless, Christianity, along with other religions, possesses an area of "the given", and that what is given is based to some extent upon an authoritarian pronouncement. Marland<sup>(113)</sup>, too, has noted the changed attitudes to leaders and public figures, who are now treated with growing frankness in the press and on the TV. He draws attention to both the 1962 Carstairs Reith lectures, which spotlighted the current

challenge to the former concept of authority, and Musgrove's observations that schools now have to learn to operate without deference (made in the Opening Address to the 1973 A.C.E. Conference).

2.33 The rejection of a strict authority-structure in society seems linked with a growing egalitarianism in post-war Britain. There has been a move from the nineteenth century élitist view of society, and, derivitively, of education, and it has taken place within a mesh of social, economic and political forces making for egalitarianism. The chief of these have been improved urban facilities and communications, the rise of the Labour Party, increasing leisure for many more people, the economic need to develop all the nation's available talent to its maximum, the achievement of full political democracy and the influence of the more egalitarian U.S.A. The advocates of comprehensive education, especially among the Labour Party who, after 1950, regarded the common school as essential in their policy of social reconstruction<sup>(114)</sup>, see social equity as both a reason for, and a consequence of, educational reorganisation. While sociologists still talk about social class, and the Registrar-General has his stratification-stereotype, the former are aware of the difficulties of defining the term, and upward social mobility and rising wage levels among manual workers have weakened the rigidity of the latter's categories. It might now be fairly claimed that the crucial determinant of societal status is, quite simply, money, rather than professional affiliation.

Marland<sup>(115)</sup> has also claimed that pop music culture has helped to break down class-barriers, pointing out that pop groups are virtually classless in a way that no previous popular entertainment has been, seeing this as symptomatic of a virtually complete rejection of class and any associated privileges by the young. While this is a pertinent comment, it must be taken alongside the more detailed investigation by Murdock and Phelps<sup>(116)</sup> who found that the type of pop music listened to by young people was to some extent determined by their social background, even though the various forms of pop were presented in classless accents. The inadequacies of simplistic comparisons between "working-class" and "middle-class" culture are becoming clearer<sup>(117)</sup>. Also, the view of culture as a continuum from the "popular" to the "high", rather than as a contrast between the "high" and "barbarity", may be gaining influence. These considerations would suggest that egalitarianism will be a feature of young people coming into secondary schools, and a pressure upon children in primary schools.

2.34 Marland has, in addition, associated eclecticism with changed attitudes to authority<sup>(118)</sup>, averring that it is a product of the proliferation of personal lifestyle options, of the fragmentation of taste, of rapid change, and of "temporary" human relationships induced by unprecedented human mobility. Although there is no survey which has specifically tested eclecticism from

the standpoint of RE, it would seem reasonable to expect such a survey to produce similar findings to those of Goldman<sup>(119)</sup> and Loukes<sup>(120)</sup>. Simple classroom observation would suggest that young people can collect opinions about religion from the most bizarre sources (von Daniken was a hot favourite not so long ago). These opinions exist in something of a jumble of unexamined views. It seems perfectly clear that a successful media-entertainer has greater credibility, when he speaks about religion, than a theologically trained RE specialist. The Church of England's Board of Education Survey (1977), among 13-24 year-olds, showed that, if a belief is phrased in pseudo-scientific terms, then that belief, however outrageous, is likely to be accepted. There does seem to be some truth in the view that, as stories from the land of the faery were superseded by Christian mythology, so Christian mythology has given way to science-fiction. It might be a fair guess to say that a mixture of astrology, some form of spiritualism, and science-fiction is the basic "religion" of many people, as might be inferred from such factors as the increasing space given in popular journalism to astrology, the increasing interest in witchcraft, and the astounding popularity of "Star Wars".

2.35 Given that youth is rightly seen as an identifiable sector of our society, but perhaps wrongly as a sub-culture, and that young people do display, in general, the characteristics of resistance to authority-structures,

of egalitarianism and of eclecticism, what implications would these factors have upon the central themes of this chapter? A recent article by Hyde<sup>(121)</sup> is a useful indicator. After acknowledging the statistical decline in church-attendance, but pointing out the evidence for 'considerable vestiges' of religious belief, he goes on to discuss the influence of home, school and peer group upon the formation of religious attitudes. Not unexpectedly, he suggests that home is the strongest influence, citing Wright<sup>(122)</sup>, though stressing that there is no simple, single pattern in any correlation between parental attitudes to religion and subsequent off-spring attitudes. In considering the influence of school, it seems that this has little effect in promoting positive attitudes to religion, except when in reinforcement of parental attitudes. It might be added, however, that this gloomy conclusion may to some extent be offset by Alves'<sup>(123)</sup> survey, which suggested that the qualities and characteristics of the teacher have some bearing on successful teaching. The influence of peer-group is acknowledged to be considerable, but, as no significant study exists in this area as yet, Hyde draws upon general studies to support his conclusion that, for the most part, 'the general pressure of peer groups would seem to be opposed to church affiliation, and to discourage religious attitudes'. This influence, he says, is no other than that of society as a whole, and stresses the importance of the church-based youth group in providing positive

pressures for the formation of favourable religious attitudes.

2.36 It could be argued that the RE teacher's primary function is not to promote favourable attitudes to religion, so much as to promote favourable attitudes to its study. It would seem, though, at a practical level, that such a distinction might be costly. For, anyone who knows anything about the struggle to bring unmotivated pupils to become studious would, surely, be reluctant to throw away the benefits that favourable attitudes to the thing studied bring to motivation. If an over-rigorous critique of religion serves only to repel pupils who possess such attitudes, the teacher loses, at one stroke, the interest of those in his class most likely to take religion seriously, while, at the same time, confirming those, already not very interested, in the view that religion is best ignored. To encourage favourable attitudes to religion is not synonymous with nurturing pupils in religion, but it would necessitate taking pains not to offend the religious feelings of someone already committed to some extent to a religion.

2.37 The implications of the material of this section for the RE teacher would seem to lie in how he handles two issues: the place of rationality, and the problem of justification. If education is to a large extent about the development of rational thinking, then the RE teacher must be seen to be allowing reason a due place. The position that rationality decrees that no options be



excluded and no content be unexamined becomes a compelling base. There are, of course, bound to be practical time-table constraints upon the free working of this principle. Also, it is not synonymous with the "supermarket-approach", which seems only to present pupils with a mass of religious belief and practice. It is more an evaluative approach, which aims to establish valid criteria by which religion can be assessed as well as to encourage the formation of reasons for belief. It cannot be claimed, however, that there are agreed criteria by which religion can be evaluated. Hirst<sup>(124)</sup>, while arguing for religion as a form of knowledge with its own verification procedures, is aware of this problem, Elvin<sup>(125)</sup> appearing not to be aware of the extent of this awareness. It is possible, however, at least to adopt an objective approach, encouraging the pupils to acquire skills in objective analysis without seeming to be out to destroy the strength of a pupil's own religious belief. This is particularly feasible in the case of an RE teacher whose own religious beliefs are known. He ought then to be able to demonstrate that he can think objectively about his own convictions. But this cannot be the whole answer. For it has been truly said that religion dies under dissection. There is always the risk that the sort of rigorous analysis, appropriate to an adult understanding of religion, will result in an adolescent, with rather less developed analytical skills, assuming that to think rationally about religion must mean

to declare religion to be irrational. While pupils, who sincerely hold non-rational (perhaps, irrational) religious beliefs to be true, might well retreat still further into unexamined, but emotionally charged, opinion. An answer that is being made nowadays is that RE should aim to show the implications of taking a religion seriously<sup>(126)</sup>.

This, however, while appearing to offer an answer to the issues raised in this paragraph, may result in a fudging of the central issue of rationality. On the other hand, such a proposal is a way forward and could be a working basis for an RE which tried to bring together rational objectivity and subjective commitment.

2.38 The problem of justification hinges upon the place that is accorded to rationality. Yet, though there is a valid justification of RE to the academic community<sup>(127)</sup>, this is no guarantee that the RE teacher has any such justification which will be acceptable to the society-based youngster. Why do we have to do RE? was a question relatively easily answered at a time when a dominant ideology formed a recognisable framework for school and society. In a plural and eclectic situation, in which the main function of the school appears to most parents and pupils to be vocational, then such a question is difficult to handle. It is not widely appreciated, for example, that at least sixty-three professional bodies accept O and A level qualifications in Religious Studies, to say nothing of their acceptance in further and higher

education. Against this, however, is the rather long time in which the belief, that R.S. is an easy option, is taking to die. Also, the seemingly clear statement from present society is that "success" in no way crucially depends upon religion. Perhaps the point to stress with the young people themselves is that of toleration. Toleration is a valued attitude in this country. The depressing examples of religious intolerance around the world are not lost on our society, and the need to guard against such intolerances in Britain, by means of mutual understanding and acceptance of diverse religious communities, gives, as we have already seen, a prima facie reason to promote RE in the schools. A further point which generally seems to "reach" young people is to stress the social service aspects found in almost every religion. It may be that a society with no clear, single ideology may be a more tolerant society than one without, (although the rise in violence in our time may suggest the contrary), but tolerance can be a very passive virtue and can be a masquerade for indifference.

### CONCLUSION

2.39 This chapter has attempted three endeavours. First, an analysis has been made of four societal areas influencing the theory and practice of RE. Second, the implications for the RE teacher of this analysis have been indicated. But the chapter has also

been something in the nature of a search. Given a nationally unifying set of (Christian) values assumed by the 1944 Education Act, can this framework still be assumed, and, if not, what, if anything, has replaced it?

The resultant probing into this last question has yielded no conclusive answers, partly because of the implicit pluralism in the Act itself, and partly because of the seemingly inevitable multiplicity of value-systems in a modern, industrial, urban society. There does not appear, on the face of it, to be an over-arching religious framework to provide a nationally unifying value-system (though there are some thinkers at work on this point<sup>(128)</sup>). Certainly the media would not appear prepared to promote the concept of a single, unifying value-system, while youth, as a section of the public, although nothing like as "counter-culture" as sometimes presented, seems unlikely to generate the forces for either a new national ideology or the maintenance of the old. Perhaps the concept of democracy is the direction in which to look for a framework, for there must be a connection between pluralism and democracy. But (although a full length discussion is needed at this point) Wall's<sup>(129)</sup> comment, that we lack, in this century, a sufficiently sophisticated concept of democracy, should be noted, as should the argument of some older writers<sup>(130)</sup> that democracy draws its lifeblood from Christianity, and as also should Norman's<sup>(131)</sup> remarks on pluralism. Democracy can become

both a straightjacket and a china ornament, and, on both counts, can be disposed of. It may be that pluralism itself can be seen as a framework<sup>(132)</sup>, but the earlier analyses of industrialisation and science pointed so directly to the unco-ordinated nature of plural value-systems, and the term pluralism is so difficult to invest with specific meaning, that this course also seems unpromising.

2.40 The further question that this must raise, therefore, is whether "ought" should feature in the enquiry as well as "is". But this would lead the study away from objectivity into prescription, thus meeting philosophical problems, and away from selective social analysis into theology, and so running the risks of unwieldiness. On both counts, a study on this present scale would have to draw back. But to omit any reference to theology creates the question-begging impression that it is assumed that theology is the product of social determinants, rather than itself exercising some influence on society, as an independent variable. This matter is very much a subject for debate. In addition, the concept of a Christian society would have to contain more than a subscription to a code of values, (an impression that might have been given so far is that no more than a code is necessary), it would also have to carry an acceptance of a theological perspective, namely, a Christian understanding of the cosmos. The material of the chapter would suggest that, if such

an understanding was at one time nationally held, it no longer carries much weight today. So the chapter is incomplete without some outline, however brief, as to how theologians have reacted to this situation.

2.41 There are, as may be expected, a range of approaches. Mascall<sup>(133)</sup> would argue that theology must not be transformed to conform to the outlook of modern man: the gospel must judge rather than accommodate to its social context. Other theologians<sup>(134)</sup>, apparently as sure of the content of the gospel as Mascall, would wish to unwrap it from its first century context so that it can speak meaningfully to modern man. Others are not so confident that the content of the gospel can be readily discerned in its relevance to modern man, and either argue that certain aspects of modernity in fact fulfil the gospel<sup>(135)</sup>, or urge a restatement of Christianity in humanistic terms, which might not bear an obvious or even an intrinsic resemblance to the New Testament<sup>(136)</sup>. Underlying such theological disagreement is the fundamental issue of secularisation: whether, or not, or in what form, it has occurred<sup>(137)</sup>. An investigation along these lines would perhaps suggest that theology has currently lost much of its character as an independent variable (in its understandable desire to be relevant to and remain in dialogue with society). If so, this study would be justified in confining its attention to the social and philosophical determinants of pluralism in RE.

2.42 In addition, such an investigation would throw light on the further vital question as to how far the articulate elements in society (especially the intelligentsia) might obscure the actual self-understanding of the more inarticulate mass of the people. This is a variation on the old theme of "culture-gap" - a preferable term to "culture-lag" as being less question-begging. So, the chapter cannot close without looking at the possibility that there is a discernible, if amorphous, national self-consciousness which may still be more in keeping with the 1944 assumptions than with the assumptions of pluralism, making the latter the more prominent only because the more articulate.

2.43 Norman<sup>(138)</sup> has drawn attention to this possibility. He claims that there has been an exaggeration in the extent in which English society really is secularised, suggesting that the intelligentsia is not in close contact with the religious convictions of ordinary people, and is therefore likely to exaggerate the degree of irreligion in society. He quotes Wickham's view that the English people are the subjects, rather than the advocates, of secularisation, indicates the impressive audience-figures for some TV religious programmes (as brought to light by the 1973 Report of the Broadcasting Commission of the Church of England), and underlines the 1970 Chadwick Report's view that the Church is not the only organisation to discover a gulf between active and passive members. He specifically

disclaims that England fits Mundy's definition of a secular society by pointing out that, while legal restrictions have been removed in certain areas of "private" morality, the law has been called upon to enforce fair race-relations social welfare-benefits and comprehensive education<sup>(139)</sup>. Also, no one of real influence outside the circles of the intelligentsia has propogated genuinely secular principles of law. One might add at this point that, in the recent blasphemy case, judge, jury and appeal court all acted as if we were living in a Christian country.

It would have to be conceded that there are many explicit religious features in our society, almost all of which are Christian. Religious elements are built into our monarchy, parliament, legal and educational systems, and civic functions. There is also survey evidence both for considerable vestiges of Christian belief<sup>(140)</sup>, and for a general, diffused, inarticulate assent to Christianity<sup>(141)</sup>. While it may be argued that none of this amounts to any more than either empty formalism or vague good-will, it remains the case that there is no wide-spread clamour to expunge these elements in the interests of secularisation. The Church of England does not seek for disestablishment, nor does the country wish disestablishment upon it. May and Johnson have focused attention upon these features, and have concluded that, by defining the term "Christian" at two levels - in a general sense for the nation, and in a particular sense for individuals - Britain remains a Christian country<sup>(142)</sup>.



The only way of settling the matter of the nation's self-understanding, of course, is by way of survey, and none exists that can be appealed to as definitive. However, the considerations mentioned in these last three paragraphs would caution against a hasty assumption of the word "plural". It would therefore be proper to ask how far such caution has been shown by those to the fore in recommending changes in RE. Norman's chilling remark that pluralist societies are unstable - 'caught in transition from one orthodoxy to another'<sup>(143)</sup> - awaiting a minority with clear and hard opinions to impose a new ideology, is realistic. It would suggest that we cannot label a society until it has self-consciously set aside the old and positively defined itself in terms of the new<sup>(144)</sup>. This can hardly be said to be the case at the moment, so the position "plural-within-Christian" might be a truer assessment of society. But, even if this is granted, we would yet have to say that, on the evidence that has been discussed in this chapter, the "plural" is of a different nature now from the "plural" that existed in 1944<sup>(145)</sup>.

The point has been reached, therefore, at which the possible sources of social determinants for RE have been identified. The study now moves on to examine the direction in which educational determinants may be found.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### Educational Change: Towards Contained Pluralism?

3.1.i The aim of the previous chapter was to compare the assumptions about society which undergirded 1944 RE with those currently made. "Plural" was found to be a meaningful, but not conclusive, term. It does not point with clarity to the social framework within which relatively unco-ordinated value-systems might be contained.

3.1.ii The aim of this chapter is to look in some detail at selected aspects of education, to see, first, how a modern understanding of that area might differ from the 1944 outlook, and, second, how such changes might relate to pluralism. Four aspects of education will be examined, namely, the growth of heurism, the move towards integrated studies, the development of comprehensive schools, and the growing differentiation between religious and moral education. That four aspects are to be analysed is not intended as a direct correspondence with the four societal areas examined in the last chapter. They are selected for investigation because change, whether as cause or function or both, has undeniably taken place in these areas and because the changes relate closely to two areas of plurality: individuality and knowledge. Again, partly to prevent a piece-meal treatment, and partly because a bias to RE is appropriate to the study, a prime concern of the chapter will be to probe the implications of such change for school-

RE. In addition, to give further coherence to the analysis, the examination will be set within the context of the growing refinement that has occurred in the concepts of childhood and adolescence. This context will not be a mere elaboration of the section of the previous chapter which dealt with youth as a social phenomena. There, the point at issue was whether youth had generated a sufficiently representative and distinctive value-system as to be seen as a "culture". Here, the point is how the greater sophistication of the concepts may have given stimulus, and, at times, direction to the change that has been indicated earlier in the paragraph.

3.1.iii Perhaps it is also necessary to stress that no all-embracing theory as to the precise relationship between educational and social change will be offered. The working assumption is the common sense one that they operate on each other. It seems that in this country educational change has often been, in the first instance, a response to social, economic and political change, though subsequent educational change has gone on to foster and accelerate those trends in society to which it was responding<sup>(146)</sup>.

#### THE CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

3.2 Blyth<sup>(147)</sup> has a useful summary of the shaping influences upon what he calls 'the midlands of childhood'. In the middle ages, he maintains, childhood was ill-

defined, because most of the years from five onwards were overshadowed by adult life and its preamble. From the sixteenth century onwards, the fragmentation of former religious uniformity, the advent of renaissance humanism and the expansion of trade and commerce, encouraged a readiness to see childhood as something more than an interval between birth and work. More definite sex-typing and the growth of hygiene added to this increasing tendency to see people as individuals. An ideology of childhood became necessary to replace the obsolescent idea of primogeniture. Such an ideology was at hand, claims Blyth<sup>(148)</sup>, in the Christian doctrine of the unique significance of all individuals. He goes on to show that, during the nineteenth century, because industrialisation encouraged the viewing of children as an economic asset rather than as individuals in their own right, there was a certain amount of mistrust shown towards the education of children and adolescents. However, the interrelation between the importance of formal qualifications, the rising costs of education, and the spread of knowledge about contraceptives, while leading to smaller families, led also to greater attention being given to all the children of a family who survived childbirth. By the 1930's the fall in the birthrate was causing considerable alarm and giving further encouragement to the view that children were the hope of the future and should be treated with ever

more care and attention. Child-study became highly important, and the expanding psychological and social sciences provided the conceptual equipment to conduct this research.

3.3 The view that children should be seen as individuals in their own right, rather than as economic potential or embryonic adults (and, it might be added, as cementers of a marriage) received a substantial endorsement in the Plowden Report<sup>(149)</sup>. In this it was following the Hadow Report<sup>(150)</sup> which laid emphasis upon the child-centred curriculum and upon the need to understand the emotional and family influences which might affect the learning and growth-processes of the child. The key-paragraph here is Plowden 504, which asserts that 'A school is not a teaching shop, it must transmit values and attitudes. It is a community in which children learn to live first and foremost as children and not as future adults'. The implications of such a view are that children are active agents in their own learning as they interact with the environment, and that teachers are not primarily purveyors of traditional knowledge, nor producers of exact replicas of themselves, but are primarily organisers of an educational environment so as to suit it to the children's individual potentials.

3.4 The Plowden Report can be justifiably called the "progressives' charter", though such labelling is not very satisfactory as it encourages a polarity between

"progressive" and "traditional", which might misrepresent the actual position in many primary schools, and which might suggest that to favour one automatically involves denigrating the other. Blackie<sup>(151)</sup> seems alive to this danger, in his advocacy of progressive education, for he emphasises that the virtues of hard work, accuracy, tidiness, carefulness and punctuality, often associated with the traditional school, are real virtues. He maintains that the progressive school which rejects them is betraying the cause that it claims to uphold. But he also insists that they are relative, rather than absolute virtues, and contends that traditional schools tend to neglect qualities such as happiness, curiosity and co-operation, and that progressive schools try to take into account the whole nature of the child and look for results over the whole. His book calls for a change away from the prepackaged, mandatory programme, the fixed subdivided timetable or schedule, the assumption that children are unwilling learners, and authoritarian teacher-pupil relationships. He would advocate a move towards informality, choice, initiative and discovery - towards the qualities that foster individuality, in other words.

3.5 But Plowden and progressive education has not gone uncriticised. Peters<sup>(152)</sup> refers to paragraph 504 and claims that it proliferates in half-truths that are paraded as educational panaceas. He separates out the

components of the Plowden ideology as, first, the assumption that the child has a nature which will develop, given the right environment, into a mature adult who can be himself and be critical of society; second, the importance of self-direction; third, the indivisibility of knowledge; and, fourth, the assumption that the teacher is a guide rather than an instructor. His critique penetrates to the valuative overtones collected by "development" as soon as it passes from referring to the purely physical, to the dangers of seeing autonomy as an absolute, and to a rejection of an either-or view of teaching method, with an explicit (and characteristic) plea for education to be seen as initiation into what is worthwhile, with a recognition of the logic of differentiating the forms of knowledge. Dearden<sup>(153)</sup> makes a similar critique, uncovering the implicit assumptions about aim, and working for a positive statement as to how state-schools can aid the appreciation of what is valuable in human life. This, he suggests, means moving away from a religious base to one of societal consensus about personal and social competence, and to one in which informed autonomous choice is a reality of central importance. For the latter to be the case necessitates a grounding in the historic forms of knowledge which are 'the basic ingredients in one's understanding of one's situation in the world'<sup>(154)</sup>.

3.6 These critiques from two eminent educationists, while

valuable correctives against a superficially considered implementation of Plowden, do not destroy the basic Plowden position of seeing children as individuals in their own right. Dearden, in particular, sees autonomy, independence and freedom of choice as crucial to education, and views the prime educational task as being to help children attain these qualities. Although he finds the term "growth" deficient in its application to education, he does, in fact, stand with Plowden (despite the latter's fondness for growth-metaphors) as seeing certain essential human qualities as necessarily to be developed for their own sake. Children are emphatically not to be the objects of economic, social or political manipulation. Peters seems rather more removed from Plowden in his suggestion that "child-development", as a concept to be divided into physical, intellectual, social, moral and emotional aspects, should be scrapped in favour of a new approach which relates the logical aspects and values of the forms of awareness to the facts about the learning-processes of young children. But, in recognising that young children may undergo learning-processes peculiar to themselves, he, too, sees children as subjects of study within an identifiable group, and so stands with Plowden in its stress on children meriting individual attention.

3.7 Hence, the developmentalist tradition in education has helped to define the concept of childhood with increasing precision in the direction of individuality. This



tradition is the product of work by both philosophers and psychologists. Rooted in Rousseau, Froebel, Pestalozzi, Fellenberg and Kay-Shuttleworth, and consolidated in Holmes, Dewey and Gesell, it has made a major impact upon the theory and practice of primary education. In addition, there have been reverberations within the secondary sector. The refinement of the concept of childhood necessarily puts the concept of adolescence in a clearer light anyway. Also, teaching procedures found successful in primary schools have come to be examined for their usefulness in secondary schools. A more informal teacher-pupil relationship, a readiness to experiment with small-group as distinct from whole-class teaching, a preference for co-operation rather than competition, a stress on activity and experience, education through the senses rather than the intellect, have all come to be tried out in the secondary sector. This has been particularly the case with the former secondary modern school, which, at its inception, drew to itself a certain amount of "progressive" theorising<sup>(155)</sup>, even though, in practice, much of the theorising was sidestepped. With the coming of the middle school and the comprehensive school there is continuing interest in making use of progressive methods among children of secondary age, with more than lip-service being paid to the "child-centred" curriculum. Some would even argue for an end to compulsory schooling and for a curriculum decided entirely by the pupils themselves<sup>(156)</sup>. Inevitably, however, a secondary school must possess something

of the atmosphere of a waiting room for man or womanhood, if only because of its proximity to adult life. This fact would put more constraints upon a child-centred approach than would be found in a primary school. But it need not undermine the viewing of adolescence, as of childhood, as an identifiable and distinct phase, peopled by individuals rather than by work-fodder. The Newsom Report<sup>(157)</sup>, for example, asserts that work in a secondary school becomes secondary in character whenever it is concerned first with self-conscious thought and judgement. Leaving aside the implication (surely wrong?) that children are somehow not capable of self-conscious thought and judgement, the point is underlined that adolescents possess demarcating mental qualities which should be taken into account when deciding the pattern of their education. Psychologists would appear unanimous on this issue, whether they adopt a psycho-biological or socio-cultural theoretical framework<sup>(158)</sup>. The universal repudiation of "Norwood" psychology by professional psychologists is perhaps the most telling illustration of the point being made. For this repudiation led to replacement by psychological categories deemed more reliable in depicting the actual characteristics of adolescents. Although there are individual differences of opinion among the psychologists it does seem very possible to construct an all-round theory of child-development<sup>(159)</sup>.

3.8 In the course of indicating the refinement that has taken place in the concepts of childhood and adolescence, certain implications, relating both to educational theory and practice and to pluralism have, throughout, been on the point of surfacing. These would stem largely from the idea of "need", which, perhaps, is the psychologists' chief contribution to the exercise. If a child or young person is seen as an individual with rights<sup>(160)</sup>, then it follows that education must, at least partly, perhaps mainly, be tailored to his needs rather than dictated by society's authority figures. Such a view must be too simple, of course, because need becomes a slippery term unless restricted to the physical. But it can, nevertheless, be regarded as expressing a principle upon which both theory and practice turns. The rest of this chapter will be, to a large extent, about how education has responded to the complexity and plurality of this principle. But, as it cannot be claimed that education has uniformly or totally responded to the idea of a need - or child - centred curriculum, it is necessary (however regrettably) to make a broad, general distinction between straightforward academic teaching for G.C.E. and eventual university-qualifications, and the rather less straightforward teaching of academically not so able pupils for C.S.E. and eventual low-level qualifications, or for no qualifications at all. To make such a nettle-picking distinction at the outset is to recognise that child- and subject- centred education remain major differences of

emphasis in the one system. While it could be argued that rigorous academic courses meet the needs of pupils pursuing academic qualifications for their eventual positions in society, it must still be allowed that the determinants of such courses are subject-knowledge and university-requirement rather than pupil-preference. This distinction seems very much in evidence in RE. For G.C.E. courses and methods seem much the same as ever (with a certain extension of subject matter) while general RE has changed a great deal to match its approach to the alleged needs of the pupils. C.S.E. appears to come somewhere in the middle. So, although the remainder of the chapter will be taken up with the needs-approach, it is recognised that this must only be part of the total educational story. A fuller educational picture will have been gained by chapter five. It is sufficient, at the moment, to note that both subject- and child- centred approaches raise issues relevant to pluralism, in that each has to handle the plurality of knowledge and has to come to some conclusion about the nature and extent of plurality of individual need.

#### THE GROWTH OF HEURISM

3.9 Heuristic methods would seem to epitomise the general child-centred movement in primary education, for they imply activity, experience, interaction with the environment, co-operation, individual learning and investigation,

all of which being the hall-marks of the child-centred approach. While schools vary in the rate at which new educational theory and methodology are accepted into their ethoses, it would probably be true to say that all primary schools have to a large extent shifted from seeing children as passive recipients of teacher-imparted knowledge to seeing them as active in their own learning. Whereas at the end of the first world war primary children would be seated in formal rows and expected to imbibe the three R's according to a rigid timetable and strict discipline, today the usual seating arrangements are likely to be less formal, the atmosphere of the classroom more flexible, relaxed and permissive, and the teacher more varied in his approach, less hemmed by subject boundaries and more inclined to encourage children to find out answers for themselves than to provide them by dictation<sup>(161)</sup>. As always, the danger of concentrating upon one aspect, in this case, the distinction between instruction and discovery, paves the way for polarisation. For, as Bassett<sup>(162)</sup> points out, the line between imparting knowledge and learning by discovery may be quite fine. He rightly says that 'Active participation by the teacher may block the child's route to discovery; non-intervention may leave the child confused and aimless'<sup>(163)</sup>. Dearden's<sup>(164)</sup> critique of such methods is characteristically perceptive, but this is more a tidying-up operation than a work of demolition.

3.10 Discovery-learning fits both with developmental psychological theories<sup>(165)</sup> and with the philosophy which sees children as, in principle, rational, autonomous individuals. Hence, although Dearden is an arch-critic of both Plowden and of discovery-learning in general, his educational plea for 'personal autonomy based on reason' does in fact give a philosophical underpinning to discovery methods<sup>(166)</sup>. He specifically says that independence of authority involves testing things for oneself and choosing what should be done against a scale of values that can be personally and individually appreciated<sup>(167)</sup>. This, it should be noted, amounts not only to an acceptance of the fact of plurality, but also to an acceptance that plurality must be contained. The individual must think his own way to his own conclusion, but his subsequent action must be directed by reference to an over-riding value-system. The problem as to which value-system is one which Dearden cannot pronounce on with any finality in the value-plurality of the present situation. He insists that reason must be given an essential place by the individual as he comes to his conclusions about values. In this he adopts a comparable position when handling the problems of the plurality of knowledge. For we have noted how, like Hirst, he would advocate that such plurality be contained under logical forms, children being initiated into these forms. He would contrast with Holt<sup>(168)</sup>, who holds that no such

containment be placed upon knowledge in school, being prepared to present the plurality of knowledge in as wide a measure as possible, leaving the children to pick and choose what they want. Both writers would therefore agree as to the desirability of the individual forming his own synthesis of knowledge. But Dearden would give greater attention to the possibility of necessary constraints upon the individual, especially the constraint of rationality. Rationality would also place constraints upon the presentation of knowledge. Thus, it would seem that there may be grounds for seeing the trend in some educationists' thinking towards 'personal autonomy based on reason' as, in part, a response to the diversification of value-systems and the burgeoning of knowledge by bringing these aspects under some form of rational control, in which the role of the individual becomes paramount. Society can no longer provide a satisfactory unifying framework, so the individual must be his own chief reference-point<sup>(169)</sup>. As human need and individual make-up come to be seen to be increasingly complex and plural, the individual must be supported in his struggle to become his own framework for plurality, rather than being squeezed into (and/or retarded by) an imposed monolithic system. But individuality cannot thereby be allowed merely to exist in all its diversity, nor can knowledge be made solely dependent upon individual preferences: there is a logical structure to which it must be subjected, and its regulation must be allowed.

The constraints of rationality are properly imposed by education.

3.11 The question as to how discovery-learning relates to RE must be viewed in this light. There is little doubt that the handing on of a body of doctrine called religious knowledge fits the older pattern of instructional learning better than it does discovery-learning. This is not to say that discovery-methods cannot effectively be used to enable pupils to learn religious doctrine. It is to say that the whole idea of a body of belief to be learned, because the authorities deem this the only belief of importance, is out of keeping with the child-centred philosophy underlying discovery-learning, and the ideal of rational autonomy which forms part of this philosophy<sup>(170)</sup>. To use discovery-methods in such an authoritarian context might be a device to conceal the denial of the philosophy appropriate to such methods: it would not allow for Dearden's criteria of testing and choosing.

3.12 Alves<sup>(171)</sup> has tackled this point as it bears upon a Christian's position in view of Christianity's claims to revelation. He asks whether the only valid form of education (from a Christian standpoint) is one which transmits the contents of revelation on the grounds of authority. Quoting Temple's view that the scriptures are neither the only, nor an infallible, source of truth, that tolerance is therefore an essential implication of



this position, and that every individual has the right to be himself, Alves points out in his reply that, in fact, both Dearden and Temple are close to each other in that each is advocating a qualified, rather than an absolute, autonomy. He finds that Dearden's stress on reason, integrity, truth, responsibility and fairness compares with Temple's view of man's destiny as 'fellowship with the eternal God', each implying that man has the responsibility to make the best of himself. While not wishing to denigrate Alves' attempt at synthesis, one would have to ask whether he has not assumed that an agreement between the two writers, about the necessity for a qualified autonomy, is equivalent to an agreement about the nature of what is qualified. Dearden would not see 'fellowship with God' as part of any educational aim, and it is debatable if Christians generally (and Alves himself, for that matter) would see this as characterised essentially by (though certainly resulting in) reason, integrity, truth and responsibility. Alves' further point, however, would seem to be very valuable, for he goes on to argue that the implication of qualified freedom is that there must be a broad curriculum which would, on the one hand, facilitate choice, and, on the other, prevent choice being made without self-discipline and self-knowledge. When he says that, in this respect, Dearden is in agreement with the Durham Report, he seems to be making a more valid comparison than in comparing Dearden with Temple. For the Report<sup>(172)</sup>

calls for education in the arts and sciences, in religion and morals, and in physical and practical abilities, while Dearden regards the fundamental concern of education to be the understanding of the basic constituents of the elements in rational choice, namely, the mathematical, scientific, historical, aesthetic and ethical. Alves refrains from commenting upon Dearden's omission of the religious from his list<sup>(173)</sup>. This is, no doubt, due to a desire to point out the common ground, and to the fact that he is discussing education in general at this point, rather than RE in particular. This issue is important, however, although at this stage it is necessary only to point out that Hirst argues for the inclusion of religion as a form of knowledge.

3.13 More serious is Dearden's assertion<sup>(174)</sup> that he would exclude RE from the primary school on the grounds that 'religious indoctrination is incompatible with respect for personal autonomy, in that it positively encourages dependence upon authority for what one is to believe'. If one puts aside the fact that Dearden seems to see no alternatives other than teaching about religion and indoctrinating into religion, his charge that RE strikes at personal autonomy represents a fundamental attack in the name of liberal education upon state-school RE. Alves' reply is that freedom is a qualified attribute, and that, as in other subjects, there must be an element of presenting material on authority until a pupil is in a

position to test such material for himself<sup>(175)</sup>. But he seems to be attempting no more at this point than to offer a Christian teacher a justification for remaining within the system, with a tacit agreement that the concept of Christian education is no longer valid within this context. He is not really meeting Dearden's charge of indoctrination, because this in turn is based on the view that there are excellent grounds for doubting religion, and that there are so many difficulties attached to religion's verification that it is better out of the primary schools. Holley<sup>(176)</sup> would seem to be necessary as a strengthener to Alves when the former points out that religion's validation is no more difficult than that of aesthetics, history and morals, which Dearden has no great difficulty in accepting.

3.14 The crucial point in the relationship between heurism and RE, then, is not whether heuristic methods can be used as aids to acquiring knowledge about religion. They can. The point is whether such methods imply (as they seem to) an underlying philosophy which would recommend their use as an aid in rejecting authority-based knowledge in favour of self-tested and self-chosen knowledge. Such use would seem to be a threat only to a form of RE which saw the schools as repositories of a given body of doctrine pertaining to one religion. Where RE is concerned that religious doctrine is to be accepted only as understood in experience (the classic distinction between "head" and "heart" knowledge), discovery-methods might in fact be

more true to the nature of religion's experiential dimension than passive reception of verbal propositions. But where RE is concerned to review a range of options, so that an individual can come to an informed choice, the underlying philosophy of independence and autonomy, found in general educational theory, would coincide with educational theory specific to RE. Even if informed choice is deemed too optimistic an aim, the point would still be applicable to an aim couched in terms of the gaining of insight into other thought-forms than one's own. Discovery-methods, though no doubt effective, would be appropriate only as method to an RE which aimed to induct all children into one faith. Discovery would be appropriate as both method and philosophy to an RE which aimed at an evaluation of a plural religious dimension. An RE operating on these latter aims would seem, then, to be responding to philosophical determinants which in turn are a response (though not necessarily a conditioned response) to a lengthy process of "child-centred" theorising, in which both psychology and philosophy have played a major part, and in which the plurality of individuality (if the pleonasm may be forgiven) is both recognised and contained.

### THE MOVE TOWARDS INTEGRATED STUDIES

3.15 Related to the move to informal discovery-learning is the move towards integrated studies. While the former advocates a breaking out of rigid methods, the latter advocates a breaking out of rigid subject-divisions. This is based sometimes upon the educational plea, stemming, at least from the middle ages, that truth is a unity, and sometimes upon the practical grounds that by integration pupils' interests can be more effectively harnessed to facilitate co-operation in learning<sup>(177)</sup>. While some secondary schools will not give a place to integrated studies, they are near-universal in primary schools in the form of integrated days and thematic work, and feature in, probably, most middle schools and many comprehensive schools. The detailed criticisms of "traditional" curriculum-organisation, which have accelerated the acceptance of integrated studies, are directed to areas such as the suddenness of the hiatus between primary and secondary education, the isolationism of individual subject-teachers, the learning-difficulties occasioned by the continual necessity to switch from one subject to another, the disregard by subject-teachers of some sources of pupil-motivation, the inefficient, if not wasteful, use of resources, time and expertise caused by rigid and inflexible timetabling, the failure to encourage pupil-initiative, the failure to make use of the environ-

ment and the community, the depersonalised relationships of much subject-teaching, and the stress laid by subject-teaching upon instruction in fragmented and pre-digested information. Although these are trenchant criticisms it may be doubted if they can be translated into a convincing philosophical underpinning for integration in the face of Hirst and Peters' case for a liberal education which places the development of knowledge and understanding in a central place, but in such a way as to reconcile the differences between subject-centred and child-centred approaches to education<sup>(178)</sup>. There is, however, respectable philosophical support for a holistic approach to truth<sup>(179)</sup>, but it does appear that the pragmatic advantages of integrated studies are generally the reasons advanced for their implementation<sup>(180)</sup>. However, there are theorists to whom philosophical appeal can be made for support of integration<sup>(181)</sup>.

3.16.i Perhaps one of the most penetrating analyses of integrated studies is to be found in Pring<sup>(182)</sup>. His concern is with problems about the nature of knowledge. He indicates how much of the talk on integration assumes a strong thesis, namely, that knowledge is a unity, (Working Papers 2, 11, 22; Plowden, Newsom; Crowther, Dewey) and points out the problems such a view would encounter in philosophical analysis, hinting that there is a strong admixture of emotional attachment to unity for unity's sake. He goes on to look at the weaker

theory of integration, namely, that subjects can be grouped into broad 'fields of experience' (Newsom) or 'cores' (Lawton), and probes some of the lack of clarity of this position. He points out the ambiguity of, on the one hand, seeking a unifying principle to give structure to an "integrated" study, and, on the other, of denying that a new subject of doubtful parentage is thereby being created. He moves on to pointing out the distinction between "integrated" and "interdisciplinary" studies stressing that the latter has none of the philosophical difficulties of the former, for it does not claim that there are conceptual structures that defy precise analysis into distinct forms of knowledge but which are vital to a fully balanced education. After an examination of the location of integration in the pupil's own enquiry and problem-solving activities, with the consequent necessity to defend an instrumentalist view of knowledge, Pring moves in on Hirst's statement that educationists must 'hang on to the complex connections between the different domains' but, disappointingly, refrains from his own analysis of these interconnections, admitting that much work has to be done in this area. His final paragraph makes the interesting suggestion that curriculum integration might be but a grandiose way of talking about interdisciplinary enquiry. This could be expected. For if philosophers have to admit that much work has to be done on the interconnections between the forms of know-

ledge, it is unrealistic to expect school-teachers to go in the van in this area. Yet it is predictable that subject-teachers would wish to guard their position in their new liaisons and would therefore be likely to press for major contributions from their own disciplines.

3.16.ii So, the answer that Pring gives to the question of the plurality of knowledge might be somewhat different from that given by many integrationists. He moves towards Hirst, Peters and Dearden in seeking a logical framework within which to contain the diversity of knowledge<sup>(183)</sup>. The integrationists might well be saying that fragmentation of knowledge can be avoided by trusting to pragmatic and instrumental factors to bring about a meaningful unity for the individual. It is tempting to draw a parallel here with those who would see societal pluralism as best contained in some over-arching value-system, and those who would trust that tolerance and openness, on a national scale, would render societal pluralism of benefit to, rather than destructive of, the individual<sup>(184)</sup>.

Whether or not such a comparison is valid, it remains the case that the advocates of integration often argue from the "need" of children to appreciate the assumed unity of knowledge. They therefore *prima facie* place themselves within the developmentalist tradition discussed earlier, and disclose an attitude to pluralism (or, at least, to the plurality of knowledge) that is egalitarian



and eclectic.

3.17 Before probing the implications for RE of integrated studies, it is necessary to look at the chapter devoted to this in Working Paper 36<sup>(185)</sup>. After pointing out the place that explicit religion holds in literature, music, art and history, a brief review is made of the plea for a sense of unity in learning as exemplified in Comenius, Whitehead, Plumb and (more specifically from the standpoint of RE) Loukes and Acland. The Working Paper's conclusion is to support both integration and subject-study, while insisting that what is distinctive of an academic discipline is the 'form of thought, the way of interpreting experience, and the dialogue that flows from this' rather than the corpus of knowledge<sup>(186)</sup>. The writers of the Paper believe that, where such distinctions are clearly recognised, then the "thematic" approach may be used to develop mental skills in a number of subject-disciplines without making artificial divisions in the subject-matter. Such a conclusion seems to reveal uneasiness about the lack of a convincing theory of knowledge to undergird integration, and would seem to suggest a closer identification between subjects and forms of knowledge than would satisfy Hirst<sup>(187)</sup>. It also seems to deny that thematic teaching can stand in its own right (seeing its existence as for the benefit of the subjects). It is difficult therefore not to see

the Paper's position as that of facing both ways, but with a bias to subject-teaching. Perhaps this is why it does not tackle two issues thrown up by integration, of importance to RE. First, does RE have to omit much essential teachable material in coming into alliances with other subject areas? Second, does the fashionable distinction between explicit and implicit religion become too subtle to be grasped by many pupils who can see the redeployment of RE into integrated studies only as its disappearance?

3.18 The suspicion that essential teachable material might have to be surrendered by RE teachers in return for the minor role of servicing other subject-areas deemed more important, is both real and understandable. It is also, apparently, justified<sup>(188)</sup>. Biblical material might be especially at risk here<sup>(189)</sup>. It may be argued that integration gives RE its great opportunity to demonstrate that religion is not something to be tucked away into an isolated corner of the curriculum, but is in fact in the centre of life. Unfortunately the matter is not so simple<sup>(190)</sup>. However, an argument could be made that RE must lose itself to find itself. Integration might then be seen as the freeing of RE from traditional biblical content in order to develop the idea of implicit religion and hidden theology. For Holm this hidden theology is one of the main criteria by which we can

judge whether there is a religious element in integrated studies<sup>(191)</sup>. She gives as an example the topic of "water", in which the RE contribution, under the guise of hidden theology, is man's stewardship of natural resources and man's responsibility to his fellows.

These, she claims, are religious values, which are not made more religious by reference to the biblical concept of man's dominion over nature or to the parables of the Good Samaritan and the Sheep and Goats. It might be added, however, that to link these religious values with specific biblical illustration might help to identify them as religious in the minds of some pupils.

3.19 Hull<sup>(192)</sup> has probed the theology of thematic teaching and his conclusion is to say that themes are probably more faithful to themselves if they do not contain specific biblical material. He cautions<sup>(193)</sup> against allowing a theme to run to seed, commenting that a theme which is consistent with almost anything contains almost nothing. He advocates<sup>(194)</sup> that opportunities to present biblical material in RE must be found in ways other than through thematic work. But such a suggestion is no real help to RE teachers who have been integrated and have no such opportunity for straight RE teaching in a subject-lesson. Whatever may have been the weaknesses of biblical RE, at least such content was unmistakable. The high hopes vested in the

distinction between explicit and implicit RE may not have been justified in the eventual realities of the integrated situation. It seems that integrated RE might have to fight to have its RE content retained and discernible<sup>(195)</sup>. Given equal rights with other colleagues on the team, suitable topics and themes can be suggested in which RE avoids the appearance of a hazy, disappearing irrelevance<sup>(196)</sup>. An inclusion of the explicit, provided this is not artificial, would seem to be at all times desirable<sup>(197)</sup>.

3.20 On the positive side, it can be said that RE is versatile enough to slot into any of the usual categories associated with integration (environmental studies, social studies, expressive studies, humanities, etc.), and can benefit from any resulting increase in pupil-interest. Some of the problems of relevance are solved, relevance here referring to the pupil's perception as to what is directly connected to his current experience of life outside the school-premises. Pupils may become better motivated. The RE teacher avoids becoming an educational isolate. He might even become an appropriate leader of an integrated-studies team. But such practical advantages must be seen in the context of the perhaps inadequate theory of knowledge upon which integrated studies may be based, and of the broad distinction<sup>(198)</sup> made at the outset of this section between G.C.E. RE, and general and C.S.E. RE.

3.21 We can say with some certainty that integrated studies, like heurism with which it is linked, have received stimulus from the child-centred theories, both philosophical and psychological, which have become increasingly influential as the developmentalist tradition in education has grown. In their attitude towards the individual, as he is confronted with plurality, they appear to mirror the attitude of those who maintain that societal pluralism is best handled, not by seeking a communal, unifying value-framework, but by leaving the individual to work out his own synthesis. It is assumed that such a synthesis will, in the long run, prove valuable both to the individual and to society.

#### THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOLS

3.22 It is tempting to see a parallel between the developmentalist tradition in primary schools, reaching an apex in Plowden, and a comparable move towards recognising the value of individuality in the secondary schools, reaching an apex in comprehensive reorganisation. Certainly developmentalist and comprehensivist theory both home on a common central feature, namely, that education should help each pupil to reach the furthest point of development of which he is capable. Both could, therefore, be expected to set store by the teaching-techniques previously discussed. Two cautions, however, would have to be made before letting this comparison go forward. First, it would have to be

pointed out that there may be a difference between the common school and common education, with the suggestion that the former does not ensure the latter. Second, the impression would have to be avoided that comprehensive education is based upon "pure" educational theory, untrammelled by political and economic profit-motives. Each of these points can be clarified in a general review of the move towards comprehensive schooling that has taken place in this country.

3.23 Although the call for common schooling was first heard some considerable time previously, the debate came to a head in the post-second world war decades, focusing at first upon the apparent merits of grammar school education. It seems that, in the immediate post-war years, the advocates of multilateralism (especially Herbison, Cove and Manning), and those of tripartism (especially Wilkinson and Tomlinson) both argued their cases from the desirability of grammar school education<sup>(199)</sup>. The multilateralists saw it as so desirable that it must be made available to many more children, while the tripartists saw it as so desirable that on no account must it suffer erosion by coming into too close a liaison with technical and modern education. It would, however, be simplistic to see the concern that both sides expressed for the maintenance of grammar school standards as stemming solely from educational considerations. There can be no doubt that the grammar schools were valued as a means of

access to the socially prestigious jobs. Banks<sup>(200)</sup> has argued that the grass-roots Labour demand for comprehensive education rested essentially upon the social effects of tripartitism and the social advantages of the common school. Her explanation of the wide-spread acceptance by teachers of the tripartite system is that the teachers themselves wished to conserve the social benefits that the inequitable system conferred on them. For the grammar school teachers this was the prestige of teaching in schools with "tone", for the modern teachers this was the freedom from having to play second fiddle to the grammar school stream<sup>(201)</sup>. Creech Jones<sup>(202)</sup> argued that to build up the grammar schools would help to reduce the hold upon job-opportunities exerted by the public schools, while parliament<sup>(203)</sup> openly asserted that to cater for clever children was nationally desirable as a means of filling key posts.

3.24 It is, perhaps, in the various attitudes taken by the two major political parties towards comprehensive education that the social and political grounds for the common school are most clearly seen. Cole<sup>(204)</sup> traces socialist theory, including educational theory, to three sources: the desire for social equity and justice, the belief in the influence of environment upon character, and the attempt to interpret history in terms of what Marx called 'the powers of production'. The last named source, Cole argues, has not been very influential in

Britain, but the first two sources have led to a rejection of segregation in any form as contradictory to a socialist theory of education. By abolishing segregation the comprehensive school would encourage a co-operative, rather than a competitive, social pattern, and so help to soften class-antagonisms, forming part of a 'general policy making for social equality in every part of the structure of communal life' (205). The Labour Party in the 1950's, it might be noted, was not, however, an egalitarian party, though it included egalitarians within its ranks (206), and Harold Wilson is reputed to have said that the abolition of the grammar schools would occur over his dead body. The Parliamentary Labour Party was more conservative than either the National Executive, or the Party Conference, or the T.U.C., for there was within the government a firm acceptance of the principle of "parity of esteem", which amounted to a rationale (albeit, rough and ready) of tripartitism. But, by 1956, Labour was saying unambiguously that 'a classless society and our present pattern of education cannot be reconciled' (207). The Conservative Party, by contrast, were unashamedly in favour of the tripartite system (208). Their arguments employed the familiar "educational" plea that grammar school standards must not be eroded, but it is difficult, in view of the points made in the previous paragraph, to see this as educational rather than political theory. There seems to be truth in Taylor's (209) inference that the official aims



of the secondary modern schools were euphemistic statements designed to conceal the fact that the function of these schools was to assign large numbers of working-class children to low status jobs - to keep them in their place, in other words.

3.25 Despite the considerable evidence for social and political factors being prominent in the move to comprehensive education, it must be stressed that the fifties also produced grounds for multilateralism that could validly be called educational. These are to be found in the onslaught by psychologists upon the intelligence test, and in the researches by sociologists into the idea of equality of educational opportunity. The Norwood psychology had always been challenged by psychologists, but there were many Socialists as well as Conservatives who had been prepared to accept the 'evidence in experience' for the tripartite classification. Vernon's research in Southampton and, later, in a wider field, for the British Psychological Society, established that intelligence could rise and fall. The N.F.E.R. investigation of 1957 cast serious doubts on the credibility of allocation at eleven. Social intricacies are introduced by Vernon's conclusion that intelligence may be class-based, but his evidence is sufficient to show that the 11+ might hinder the development of intelligence, especially when it is remembered that this examination reached down into the primary schools which were geared to its arrangements. While arguments

could be advanced that the intelligent needed defending<sup>(210)</sup>, it could be equally argued that the less intelligent could be made more intelligent by contact with their brighter fellows<sup>(211)</sup>, although the inevitable divide between those of high and those of low intelligence might be made more serious if accentuated by close proximity under one roof<sup>(212)</sup>.

3.26 In the debate about equality of opportunity we find further strong educational grounds for comprehensive education. The term itself does not yield a straightforward definition. Coleman<sup>(213)</sup>, for example, speaks of stages of development of the concept. Apparently, the first stage in the concept's development in the U.S.A. is the one at which Britain has only just arrived! This is the stage at which free education is given to all children of a given locality at one school offering a common curriculum. Possibly the common-usage definition of the term would place us in the position in which every child receives equivalent educational treatment. But equivalent educational treatment might work out to the detriment of the socially disadvantaged. It seems that a distinction should be drawn between flat equality, i.e. everyone receiving the same education, irrespective of their handicaps or talents, and treating people equally unless there is good reason for doing otherwise<sup>(214)</sup>. This seems to mean that equality of opportunity must include the provision of tailor-made courses to match the different potentials of all pupils. Equality of opportunity

as a fully developed ideal may indeed be the pursuit of the unattainable<sup>(215)</sup>, but this should not prevent our striving to eliminate as many damaging inequalities as we can. Comprehensive education, it could be argued, is a major step in this direction.

3.27 Comprehensive education, then, is the product of a number of intermingling social, political and educational forces. Two of these can be picked out as of special relevance to this study. Those who argue the importance of comprehensive schools in reducing social division are reacting to social plurality. Those who argue their importance in handling different rates of development, and different levels of ability and potential, are reacting to the plurality of individuality. It is interesting to note that the former is a plea for social monism while the latter is a plea for educational pluralism, comprehensive education apparently satisfying both requirements! The 1944 Education Act may have established the ideal of secondary education for all, but it did not anticipate the possibility that selection procedures and the tripartite system might not be the appropriate provision for mass-education. Yet, in so far as the distinction between "academic" and "non-academic" courses exist in the same school, the old tripartite divisions might be intensified by being housed under one roof. It is only fair to say, however, that advocates of comprehensive education would look for

a genuine moral and educational unity to arise out of the administrative reordering of the educational system. The point to be stressed is that any search for a framework for plurality in education would have to be in a direction other than the mere fact of comprehensivisation.

3.28 The implications of comprehensivisation for RE are not, in essence, different from those for other subjects. The role of the teacher, course-"relevance", mixed-ability teaching, ROSLA, resources and discipline-problems are prime concerns for all teachers in the secondary sector. In some ways RE might lose out in status in the move to comprehensives, for in the old grammar school, especially where links with the church were strong, Divinity possessed an adequate, sometimes high, status. Divinity teachers would probably have been as well, if not better, qualified than their colleagues. This status may be not so assured in a comprehensive school, especially in a society in which religion is ceasing to be a means of social control and in which it has ceased to be a public referant. Yet, in so far as large comprehensives have several full-time members of staff in the RE department, this makes for status and for an adequate supply of resources. In common with other subjects RE has been challenged to provide relevant and attractive courses for a range of abilities, ages and backgrounds, in which "need"-based material and project-work have figured prominently. RE has become more open and more diverse<sup>(216)</sup>



and more conscious of societal pluralism<sup>(217)</sup>. It does not seem, however, that the reasons for this are to be found, except fortuitously, in comprehensive education. It is more than likely that the factors mentioned in the previous chapter, especially the multiplicity of value-systems, have penetrated the notice of teachers, who have adopted coping strategies and applied these to whatever schools they happen to have found themselves in. In general, the main strategies have been to see the schools, not as religious communities, but as places to encourage rational thought about a range of value- and belief- systems; to match teaching material to what is reasonably certainly known about child-development; and to teach for understanding of rather than for commitment to any particular viewpoint. Yet the ideology of comprehensive education would commend the very same strategies. So there does seem to be prima facie evidence that there are areas in which both RE and comprehensive education are responding to societal change in much the same way. Bernstein's<sup>(218)</sup> belief is that the changes implicit in comprehensive education are a reflection of the wider social move from solidary integration based on shared value-systems and clear-cut regulations, to a functional integration based on specialised roles which allow for personal autonomy and flexibility in relationships<sup>(219)</sup>. Such a statement seems to satisfy the evidence and lends support to the view that educational change, since the war, is linked with pluralism.

DIFFERENTIATION OF RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION

3.29 Enough was said in the Introduction to indicate that the national self-understanding in 1944 was of a country with plural elements but bound together in a Christian framework. Moral education could be, therefore, and was, seen as induction in the Christian ethic. It is probable that, for many people at the time and since, the worth of RE was to be measured by its contribution to the christianising of youthful behaviour. 'But the growing multiplicity of value-systems, and the inability to construct a framework to replace Christianity in which those systems could be co-ordinated, have raised fundamental problems for ME. Lacking a clear, over-arching value system into which children can be inducted, what are the appropriate aims and methods for ME<sup>(220)</sup>? This problem has attracted increasing attention from educationists, and it is necessary to review the main features of the debate and of the curriculum-development in this area.

3.30 A starting point is to be found in Hirst<sup>(221)</sup>, as he addresses himself to the question of whether man's moral understanding necessarily depends upon his religious knowledge or beliefs, the answer he arrives at being that it does not. His argument begins by examining the 'strong' thesis that, for something to be right is for it to be the command or will of God, and that man only knows what is right by coming to know the will of God (the 'weaker'

thesis being to subscribe only to the latter proposition). He argues on three grounds that this thesis cannot hold. First, the weaker thesis (implicit also in the strong thesis) is contrary to empirical facts for men do know that lying, promiscuity, colour-bar and war are wrong independently of religious revelation. Second, the weaker thesis is inconsistent with Biblical teaching which, in Romans 2; 14, 15 categorically states that the Gentiles have a knowledge of the moral law quite independently of the law of Moses. Third, both theses are unsound philosophically. For, to say something is right voices a judgement, whereas to say that God wills describes a state of affairs. The logical status of terms like "ought" is different from that of a phrase like "the will of God", and to confuse the two is to be guilty of one form of the naturalistic fallacy, which confuses statements or judgements of fact with statements or judgements of value. In addition, Hirst maintains, to equate right with what is commanded by God has disastrous results for Christian doctrine, in that God's moral excellence becomes a trivial truism (necessarily true by definition), and moral judgement is superfluous to the Christian's moral life, for which no more than simple obedience is required. His conclusion is that there is nothing in his criticisms which is inconsistent with maintaining that what is right is also willed by God, but that, as man knows the laws of the physical world by the exercise of reason, so he

can also similarly know what is right and wrong. Hence, 'there is no reason why moral education must necessarily be given via religious education' (222).

3.31 This separation of moral from religious education satisfies a number of objections. Quite apart from reflecting the differentiation that has taken place between moral philosophy and religious studies, it handles the practical problem as to whether morality risks being abandoned with the abandonment of religion, if such is based on a religious foundation (223). It also encourages more promising co-operation between Christians and non-Christians in the promotion of ME, than when ME was seen as the induction of children into a religious ethic. Perhaps most importantly of all, the way is opened up to the formation of a morality that does not depend upon an authoritarian method (224). In this last point there is evident an immediate link with what has already been said about the place that individual autonomy now holds in educational thinking. To conduct ME as if the crucial aspect is to bring children to accept a set of rules, because they are told them on authority, can hardly be reconciled with the philosophy that the individual has the right to think everything out for himself, rejecting and accepting only what he deems to be right. This would seem to take us to the heart of the recent research into moral education that has taken place at Oxford (225) and at the Schools Council (226).



3.32 Wilson's work for the Farmington Trust was directed towards deciding on the marks of a morally educated person, drawing upon the disciplines of psychology and sociology as well as philosophy to do this. Throughout there has been an emphasis upon rationality, the concern being not to pass on to pupils the "right" answers to moral issues but to encourage the individual pupil to work out his own answers to moral problems according to rational criteria. He stresses the difference between "form" and "content" in morality, and advocates the use of moral logic to arrive at correct moral judgements. In identifying the components of moral behaviour he prefers the use of Greek terms so as to avoid the clutter surrounding common usage phraseology<sup>(227)</sup>. The components are, in brief: phil, the ability to identify with others and to treat them with consideration; emp, the ability to feel with others; gig, the ability to foresee consequences, based upon a mastery of the facts; dik, the ability to formulate social rules; phron, the ability to formulate personal rules; and krat, the ability to translate dik and phron into action<sup>(228)</sup>. He is convinced that ME can be taught in the classroom.

3.33 McPhail's work through the Schools Council was not directly dependent upon Wilson although in his stress upon autonomy and his avoidance of producing "right" answers there is certainly an overlap, although at some

crucial points there is a distinction. His central aim is to help pupils adopt a considerate style of life, believing that an exclusively philosophical approach to ME is deficient in that it does not grapple with the practical aspects of how people can become motivated towards actual behaviour<sup>(229)</sup>. His method is empirical, in that he conducted research among both teachers and pupils, claiming to have identified adolescent needs and to have based his teaching-material upon actual adolescent (in the case of Startline, upon children's) concerns. His work, therefore, might complement Wilson's, being slanted more towards outcomes whereas the latter is slanted towards the sort of reasoning which leads to moral behaviour<sup>(230)</sup>. Both, however, would see ME as validly differentiated from RE, each being an autonomous exercise, but both would also see ME as closely linked to the full range of school curricular activities<sup>(231)</sup>.

3.34 These projects have helped to bring a certain amount of clarity to an area which, especially since its severance from an authority-based ethic, could be vague in the extreme. The stress upon rationality in ME does help to handle, on the one hand, the uncertainties of societal relativity, and on the other, the dogmatics of religious authoritarianism, even though it does not satisfactorily answer the question as to which set of principles an individual ought to adopt<sup>(232)</sup>. But a stress upon

reason and autonomy is still only a partial solution to the problems of teaching ME in the classroom of today's schools. Perhaps even more crucial is the question as to what psychological conceptual framework is available for a teacher who would attempt this task, in full awareness of the weight of thinking about child-psychology that features in education at the moment. Freudianism, for example, would not seem to provide a very hopeful framework for ME in that super-ego theory, which sees the conscience and the ego-ideal as forming a fixed structure with little chance of major reorganisation from the end of the oedipus-stage onwards, leaves the teacher with little room to manoeuvre in the face of parental upbringing<sup>(233)</sup>. Again, while Social Learning theory has certain utility in moral training (McPhail's work seems to draw upon this concept) it seems that Wright is correct in saying that, in this framework, 'the child is trained into morality in much the same way as circus animals are trained to do tricks'<sup>(234)</sup>. While it would be as unwise to ignore what Skinner has to say about conditioning as it would be to ignore Freud's work on irrationality, both these psychological approaches leave little room, apparently, for genuine moral development, seen as the active part played by an individual in his own moral maturation.

3.35 Fortunately, the cognitive-developmental conceptual framework is available to teachers, with a growing body of empirical research to suggest that this framework is

valid as well as attractive. At one time there was considerable doubt as to whether moral behaviour was more than situation-specific<sup>(235)</sup>; but we can now be rather more confident that there is a general factor in morality and that this factor can be subject to development<sup>(236)</sup>. Kohlberg's refinement of Piaget's developmental scheme seems to be a promising piece of research for the concept of moral development<sup>(237)</sup>. It goes some way to establishing a sequence, in the development of moral judgement, which appears to be cross-cultural. It seems to show a correlation between developed moral judgement and developed moral behaviour, the actual course of development relating so well to what such development should be that Kohlberg has been emboldened to claim that he has committed the naturalistic fallacy and got away with it<sup>(238)</sup>. He also did not ignore the affective areas of morality and has something to say about the development of the morally significant emotions such as love, fear and guilt, although, primarily, his scheme is cognitive and intellectual. Perhaps the significant implications for schools of Kohlberg's work can be summarised as, first, the place of cognitive conflict in the development of moral judgement<sup>(239)</sup>, second, the importance of social participation and role-taking to foster this conflict, and, third, the recognition that stages are invariant, with the necessity, therefore, to hold the next stage before the attention of the pupil

rather than the ultimate stage<sup>(240)</sup>.

3.36 This section has traversed a highly complex field rather quickly, the aim being not to devote a comprehensive investigation to the nature of ME, but to indicate the major shifts of emphasis that have been recommended since 1944. These are the move from an authoritarian base in the Christian ethic to a less clearly defined base in rationality, and the separation of ME from RE. There is therefore at least a prima facie case for seeing these shifts as a response to the plurality of value-systems now current in society, and for seeing the accompanying stress on individual autonomy as a response to the growing appreciation of the complexity, as well as the desirability, of individuality, especially among children and young people. These are the significant points for this study, providing further grounds for linking educational change with pluralism. If so, we have a reference-point when the time comes to discuss the factors that might make for determinants for pluralism in RE. Meanwhile the more immediate question, as to the implication of the issues dealt with in this section for RE, can be dealt with fairly briefly.

3.37 For there seems to be no threat to RE as such in the differentiation between it and ME. There might, in fact, be gain, for there has always been a tendency to see RE as really ME, to the detriment of the former.

Although it is unlikely that money will be found for L.E.A.s to set up ME departments alongside RE departments on a wide scale, it seems reasonable to expect this to happen occasionally in individual schools. In this case RE can, as it were, be released to concentrate upon its central concern, education in religion. The fact that McPhail's curriculum suggestions were not intended to be the exclusive preserve of any one subject on the timetable, makes it easier for RE both to make use of these materials, and to gear in with a neighbouring ME department. Certainly there is threat in a situation which might arise when ME is looked upon as a displacement for RE, the money and resources previously set aside for the latter being switched to forming a new ME department out of the closure of the RE department. Such a situation is likely to come about only in a school in which RE has been disguised ME anyway, and so the new move would probably be only a formalising of what was taking place already. In a situation where there was a genuine choice between an ME or an RE department, the educational rationale for both is strong enough to maintain a very compelling case to have the two areas represented rather than to shunt one or other off the curriculum. There seems to be a fruitful future awaiting RE and ME in which the two can be equal partners<sup>(241)</sup>.

## CONCLUSION

3.38 The heartland of the previous chapter was a pursuit of the question as to what now constitutes the framework within which societal pluralism might be enclosed. If such a framework were identifiable, then this would serve at least as a reference-point, if not a determinant, for deciding upon the nature of pluralism in RE. This, however, was not the sole concern of that chapter, for, throughout, an attempt was made to assess the implications of social change for RE. Similarly, this chapter has also probed the implications for RE of the four areas of educational change selected for analysis. But the heartland has been a pursuit of the question as to whether there is anything in current educational thought and practice to suggest a framework for educational pluralism.

3.39 Perhaps an explanation should be offered as to how exactly the term educational pluralism has been employed. Its use would seem permissible in that a valid aim of this study would be to see how far the changes analysed might be interpreted under the principle of pluralism. This might give to the term a different slant than its more straightforward function as a label to designate the plurality of educational theories. This, however, would seem desirable. For such labelling would seem to be as trivial, conceptually, as the use of the term social pluralism merely to denote the fact of social plurality.

This chapter has tried out, as it were, a meaning for pluralism which would make it refer to the way in which education comes to terms with some of its intrinsic plural elements. So, attention has been concentrated upon individuality and knowledge. It is in the process of coming to terms with elements such as these, it might be suggested, that the plurality of educational theories arise. As it would be grandiose to attempt a review of these theories, this suggestion has not been developed. However, a review of the place of rationality has been attempted, if only in its relation to individuality and knowledge. For there is a prima facie reason to predict that such an examination would yield results in the pursuit of a framework for pluralism. It is the one area in which agreement about a framework might be expected. An educationist who subscribed to irrationality would have a hard life indeed!

3.40 A summary of the main points of the chapter would show individuality and knowledge working upon each in a plural situation, but this situation prevented from becoming a loose atomised plurality by the constraining presence of reason. Heurism as a method would place importance upon the individual learning by his own active discovery and at his own pace. But heurism is more than a technique: it links with an underlying child-centred philosophy and this philosophy must grapple with the



existence and nature of knowledge as well as the nature of the child. Integrated studies would also value such features as the recognition of a pupil's individual interests and his capacity to make his own synthesis of knowledge. But integrated studies must also come to a theory of knowledge that is philosophically convincing as well as useful instrumentally. Yearnings for monism must not be allowed to minimise the difficulties of deciding on whether a logical structure of knowledge exists. Comprehensive education could be presented as a more flexible and more effective provision for individual need than the previous tripartite system. Yet the actualities of the situation would show that the former grammar school inclination to a Hirstian view of knowledge remains within comprehensive schools, but for academic pupils usually, so, perhaps, intensifying the very divisions that were the product of the former system. Furthermore the social rationale of comprehensive education could be seen as an attempt to reverse social plurality, just as the view that it would compensate for individual disadvantage could be seen as a belief that individuality is not so plural after all. Comprehensive education seems to point beyond itself to other less ambiguous and more basic educational principles. Moral education now seems anxiously to accept the consequences and implications of seeing an individual as an autonomous moral agent, yet it cannot be happy with the position that anything goes

in morality provided thought and choice have been exercised. Rationality becomes a vital component. If the previous chapter could conclude only very tentatively with the suggestion that "plural-within-Christian" might be a valid picture of societal pluralism, this chapter can close with a much firmer claim that "plural-within-rationality" is an accurate picture of educational pluralism.

3.41 This study has, so far, been mainly directed towards clarifying the notion of pluralism as it relates to RE. At the outset a distinction was made between the unremarkable position that plurality is a current fact of social existence, and the more promising concept of pluralism as a belief in the desirability of plurality. Subsequent analysis of some relevant aspects of social and educational change has fulfilled this early promise, that the concept of pluralism, though prone to truism and vagueness, has yet a distinctiveness, even sophistication, to make it an interesting and rewarding topic for in-depth examination. Social pluralism and educational pluralism can be meaningful terms, which are not only satisfying areas of investigation in themselves, but cannot fail to yield some relevant, even important, considerations for an RE located in a social and educational nexus. School-RE must define itself socially and educationally, as well as religiously. In doing so, the plurality of modern, urban value-systems and of religious belief-systems are crucial reference-

points in social pluralism, while the plurality of knowledge and of individual need and make-up are crucial reference-points in educational pluralism. But, while RE must take into account these factors, as it defines itself, due regard would also have to be given to the possibility of a framework for pluralism. This latter point has been probed, with somewhat inconclusive results for social pluralism but with rather more definite results for educational pluralism. In addition, due regard would also have to be given to how RE defines itself religiously. This must now be the direction that the investigation takes. A suitable point from which to develop this line of enquiry would be an examination of a self-consciously plural stance to society and to religion. Such an examination would serve both to illustrate the analysis of the previous chapters and to pave the way for a specific examination of the central argument of this thesis, that pluralism strengthens the case for the inclusion of RE in the school-curriculum.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE HUMANIST CRITIQUE: PLURALISM ASCENDENT

4.1 Although only a small group of people located among the intelligentsia, the Secular Humanists might well exert an influence upon society out of proportion to their small numbers. Ehrenfeld<sup>(242)</sup> claims that Humanism is at the heart of our present world culture, refraining to quote from self-confessed Humanists because he sees the phenomenon as far more extensive than a small group of philosophers and intellectuals who call themselves Humanists. He would surely agree with Blackham<sup>(243)</sup> when the latter claims that many people are Humanists without realising it. Hence, the forthright views about RE which have been articulated for some time by Humanists may have exerted a telling influence upon the course that RE has taken in recent years. For Humanists have sustained a steady pressure, both towards the abolition of the religious clauses of the 1944 Education Act, and towards the reshaping of RE in the direction of diversity and pluralism. While the chief advocates of change have come from within the ranks of RE itself, there have been strong voices from the Humanist camp. It would be difficult, therefore, and sometimes, perhaps, even churlish, to accord to the latter advocates only a marginal influence. Some account must be taken of the Humanist position, in any enquiry into

determinants, quite apart from the usefulness of such an exercise in linking the analyses of the early chapters with the argument and research-findings which follow. The aim of this present chapter, then, is to examine the attitudes of Humanists to RE. As attitudes usually stem from beliefs, investigation will first be made of Humanist presuppositions, prior to appreciating the implications of these for Humanist interpretations of religion. An assessment can then be made of the latest proposals of Humanists for RE. It will be found that pluralism has been given a fundamental place in their thinking on this topic.

#### SECULAR HUMANIST BELIEF

4.2 As Humanists prefer to see their viewpoint in terms more of free thought than of adoption of a set of propositions, they might fight shy of accepting that they have beliefs at all. Mitchell<sup>(244)</sup> comments on the difficulty of providing a clear-cut definition of Humanism, quoting Humanist Hector Hawton who claims that a Humanist creed would be a contradiction in terms, the unity between the various schools of thought making up contemporary Humanism being found in a common perspective. Humanism would then be more a rational and empirical approach to life than a set of conclusions about it. Mitchell, however, points out that such a definition is altogether

too wide, as there is no guarantee that an open-minded and reasonable man who attended carefully to all the evidence available would not in the end be persuaded to accept the claims of religion. Modern Humanist writers do, in fact, seem prepared to use the terms "belief" and "faith" to characterise their outlook. For example, Blackham<sup>(245)</sup> quotes Carl Becker's criticism that the Humanists of the Enlightenment reacted against religion only to move to a secular faith in a revealed body of knowledge. While seeing such criticism as sometimes unkind, Blackham<sup>(246)</sup> nevertheless concedes that modern humanists need not disavow these beliefs of their predecessors. The beliefs in question are (1) man is not natively depraved, (2) the end of life is life itself, (3) man is capable solely by reason and experience to perfect the good life on earth, and (4) the first essential of the good life is to free men's minds from the bonds of ignorance and superstition.

4.3 A symposium of recent Humanist writers<sup>(247)</sup> might almost be said to have taken up Blackham's cue. It seems that Guinness<sup>(248)</sup> is fair when he writes of the 'Four Pillars of Optimistic Humanism', these being belief in reason, belief in progress, belief in science and belief in human self-sufficiency. Each of these pillars can be illustrated from the symposium, where they are acknowledged to be beliefs. For example,

Ayer<sup>(249)</sup> describes present-day Humanists as the intellectual heirs of the nineteenth-century free-thinkers. He says of these people: that though they had confidence in the power of human reason, they did not believe that reason alone, unaided by observation, could discover how the world worked. They put their trust in scientific method, with its implications that every theory is liable to revision. This open, critical spirit, he claims, has continued to be a distinctive mark of Humanism. He gives it as his belief that despite the wars, dictatorships, violence and persecutions of this century the average man is more humane, pacific and concerned with social justice than he was a century ago. He also claims<sup>(250)</sup> that belief in social progress is still empirically defensible. Bibby<sup>(251)</sup> spells out the contrast between the religious man and the Humanist as a difference of faith. 'The humanist has faith that he can in some way influence the future. Without such a faith, he could well be a rationalist and philosophical materialist, but he would scarcely be a humanist. With such a faith (and the word is justified, for the belief it expresses has not been and probably never can be proved) the humanist has something in common with the religious man. It is not so much that the latter is a believer and the former an unbeliever, but rather that the one puts his faith in a deity and the other in humanity'. This faith in humanity

turns out, in the remainder of the article<sup>(252)</sup>, to be in a large measure a faith in science to produce a unified culture which will achieve material wealth, sensual delight, aesthetic sensitivity and moral grandeur. But it is when Humanists extol the powers of man that we come to bed-rock belief. In describing 'full-blooded humanism', Blackham<sup>(253)</sup> says that this goes beyond a mere plea for rationality, but recognises and accepts all sides of human nature, and acknowledges that all resources should be employed on human development. This is not to say that Humanists see man as infallible. It is to say, however, that they see him as having the capacity to solve his problems and achieve happiness without dependence upon any power other than his reason and his science. If Swinburne's 'Hymn of Man' might seem today a trifle absurd, (and Humanists repudiate man-worship), President Kennedy's dictum 'All men's problems were created by man, and can be solved by man' would epitomise modern Humanist belief, even though some Humanists are to the fore in warning of the imminent tragic end to the human race that could overtake mankind within decades.

4.4.i With such a central stress upon the importance and worth of man it is to be expected that Humanists would have a clear and developed view of man's nature. Perhaps an apt place at which to seek for material on this topic is the study-unit entitled 'Humanism' in the Birmingham



LEA's RE Handbook<sup>(254)</sup>. Although intended for school use, it is nevertheless a fairly full outline, written by Humanists, and is presented as something of a definitive statement. The unit summarises Humanism in an epigram and two propositions. The epigram states that 'Humanism' is an aspiration to man's fulfilment by human effort alone', and the propositions are, one, 'This world is all we have; and it can produce all we need,' and, two, 'The value of human life lies in the actual retained sense of fulfilment achieved and happiness found by each and every individual, now and to come.' In the elaboration of these propositions importance is attached to man's potential for love, and to man's capacity for creating meaning and purpose in human life. Happiness is seen to depend on good personal relationships, which are fostered by understanding, sympathy, reasonableness, open-mindedness and responsible action. As in all Humanist publications, there is in this unit, a pervading sense of respect for man, with a sincere concern for his well-being. Humanist rejection of God is often linked with the belief that the notion of God is not only unnecessary for the achievement of happiness but can be prone to prevent such an outcome. So; much emphasis is given to the beliefs that people matter, the value of individuality being fully acknowledged, and that the goal of life is to achieve a happy and fruitful existence for everyone, this being achieved through education and the use of reason and science. Man is seen as the

product of biological and psycho-social evolution, which is, apparently, sufficient as a total explanation of reason, purposes, values and a sense of right and wrong, as well as of his physical characteristics. Survival after death is deemed an impossibility if man depends on his brain and his body to support himself as a 'person'.

4.4.ii These points can be taken as fundamental to the Humanist position on the nature of Man, and may well represent a widespread populist attitude which could fairly be called humanistic without carrying the technical Secular Humanist label, although it is perhaps unlikely that belief in survival after death is rejected on a wide scale. Objections could be made to these beliefs on the grounds that Humanist Man is too simplistic a picture to account for the heights and depths which reality has shown to exist in man's nature, that reason and morality are not credibly explained as merely the product of evolution, and that a closed view of life which sees man on his own in a Godless universe is a recipe for anarchy as well as a dogma that goes beyond the evidence. But the aim here is not to engage in a critique of Humanism as to seek out the implications for RE of Humanist beliefs. This can be done by spotlighting two areas of Humanist concern, and then proceeding to examine how these concerns help to shape Humanist attitudes to religion.

4.5 First, it cannot be doubted that Humanists feel deeply about the threats posed to man's growth and fulfilment. A recent booklet<sup>(255)</sup> opens with a stark warning that time may well be running out for the world to solve its immense problems, goes on to survey with succinct analysis and supporting statistics the nature of some of these problems, and concludes with a call to all people of good-will to work for a more humane world. The chief instrument by which a more humane world could come about is education, and another B.H.A. publication<sup>(256)</sup> lays great stress upon personal fulfilment, social vitality and social responsibility as values which would make the quality of life enhancing to every individual, and which can be fostered by a non-authoritarian educational system. Humanists generally are active in voluntary work and social reform, never, apparently, failing to point out that such activities are undertaken because it is right to do so, not for any hope of reward in a supposed hereafter. Causes which attract their active support are conservation, contraception, abortion, euthanasia, women's rights, minority rights, and law-reform on matters such as homosexuality, cannabis, divorce and censorship<sup>(257)</sup>.

4.6 Second, they feel deeply about morals, and are especially concerned to show that a rejection of God and religion does not necessitate a rejection of moral

behaviour. Blackham<sup>(258)</sup> argues for the necessity for social rules on the grounds that man becomes human in becoming socialised, but insists that social order is independent of ultimate beliefs and will regard rules as binding only in so far as they are provisional, as scientific propositions are certain in so far as they are provisional. Mitchell<sup>(259)</sup> comments upon this by saying that it highlights what he sees as a tension between the romantic and the rationalist strains in Humanism, the rationalist strain being found in the humdrum foundation of common social rules as 'an agreed common syllabus', the romantic in the allowance of individual and group ideals as 'optional further subjects'. This, suggests Mitchell, can hardly be more than a marriage of convenience between two fundamentally opposed conceptions of human life, making a seemingly devastating comment<sup>(260)</sup> that the humanist is able to include such philosophies of life as religions in his scheme only by assigning them a role which they must decline to play. Humanism usually comes out in favour of relativism in morals. Yet in doing so, an admission must be made to a certain ambivalence and inconsistency in this position. For, alongside protestations that all moral rules are relative, we encounter from the same source an acceptance of moral principles which, by the very nature of these principles, cannot lightly be dismissed as merely

parochial. C.S. Lewis<sup>(261)</sup> captures this anomaly, with his usual astuteness and penetration, when talking about Naturalism.

4.7 It is now possible to see how the above beliefs might colour a Humanist's attitudes to religion. Before doing so, however, it might be well to glance at what Guinness<sup>(262)</sup> has called 'pessimistic humanism', as this puts a rather different gloss upon Humanism than the one with which we are most familiar<sup>(263)</sup>. Guinness would see a reverse side of the coin to the Humanism which has been dealt with so far, this latter being, in his terminology, 'optimistic humanism'. As most of the Humanists who write about school RE seem to be of the optimistic variety, it is not necessary to go very fully into this 'subterranean stream', which is, in Guinness' opinion, threatening to surface and usurp the dignity and dominance of optimistic Humanism. It is that attitude which sees man as trapped in an absurd situation in which he can only despair. Russell, actually, advocated unyielding despair as a firm foundation for the soul's habitation to be safely built upon, while Blackham recommends a positive acceptance of the natural world and a glad gathering of the perishable fruits of happiness while they are to be had and enjoyed. But it should be noted, there are other possible attitudes than these to adopt towards despair. If, as our century continues, it becomes

more and more difficult to substantiate the Humanist belief in man (on Humanist presuppositions), then we may well find the subterranean stream of pessimism proving too much even for the Humanists. Guinness<sup>(264)</sup> makes a telling comparison between the positivism of Ayer's 'Language, Truth and Logic' of 1936 and the concluding scepticism of his John Dewey lecture of 1970. In Platt's<sup>(265)</sup> cold words, 'The world has now become too dangerous a place for anything less than Utopia'. And Platt seemingly was calling for instant Utopia!

#### SECULAR HUMANISM AND RELIGION

4.8 A Humanist's attitudes to religion are coloured by a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, in Bibby's<sup>(266)</sup> words, he has an intellectual interest in everything relating to humanity and a conviction that humanity is worth caring for; yet, on the other, he must conclude that any system which makes reference to a transcendent God (or gods) must be, to that extent, a fantasy. Hence, he must recognise that religion, as a human phenomenon, is extensive, significant and, to some extent at least, helpful to its adherents. But at the same time he must maintain that, where transcendence is a central tenet, this must give religion a false base which must be destroyed even though such demolition might mean that many religious people would be destroyed in the process.

Such a dilemma means that there is no one Humanist attitude to religion. It is possible to detect at least three main views. The first, and simplest, would be the more populist view that, where man achieves happiness and joy from practices which do not bring direct misery to his fellows, then he should be left to pursue his individual happiness in his own way. If this means religion, then let him go ahead and be religious. The second view would stem from a tough-minded stress on empirical truth and dogmatic atheism. Such advocates would rejoice that religion is, at last, seemingly fading away, would tend to see Christianity as a dark interlude in history from which the West is at last recovering and would heartily deplore the closeness with which ethics have come to be linked with religion. The third view would be to see much good in religion, and to seek for a reconstruction in naturalistic terms.

4.9 The first view-point is in keeping with a utilitarian approach to life. It must therefore come under the criticism of superficiality that can be levelled at the "happy man" approach to values. It is certainly cold comfort to the religious person, for who could glimpse the depths of religion from the inside and yet feel content with such a rationale? But Kingsley Martin<sup>(267)</sup> has repudiated the more naive forms of humanistic utilitarianism (James Mill's claim, that the majority must always govern better than

the minority, he finds laughable<sup>(268)</sup>), and allows that, in the case of people who have nervous breakdowns through loss of faith the rationalists might tend too often to throw out the baby with the bath-water<sup>(269)</sup>. He even goes on to suggest<sup>(270)</sup> that prayer might have uses, even though in his opinion it is rationally indefensible, and thinks that many people would be happier if an understanding of these uses rescued their prayer from mere hypocrisy. Although he himself is no religion-lover, he recognises the relative weakness of rationalism and strength of religion in the face of people's need for ritual and traditional words on the occasions of birth, marriage, and death<sup>(271)</sup>. Religion, in other words, has its uses, even to the extent of compensating for the inadequacies of reason.

4.10 But it is at a point such as this that the issue of truth must be raised, for it would be a sickness indeed to persist in the forms of, say the Christian burial service, if irrefutable proof existed of the utter falsehood of its assumptions. As soon as the question of truth is raised, the second possible attitude to religion by Humanists becomes apparent. Put simply it is: where there is no scientific evidence for a belief it must be decisively rejected. Brophy<sup>(272)</sup> has found it necessary to tilt at both the "Happy Man" image of the Humanists, and at Christianity, for similar reasons. She maintains



that psychological grounds for belief (or non-belief) are all very well until the belief in question is so fundamental and all-embracing as to raise questions of truth. A Humanist might speak of the liberation he feels at the rejection of the supernatural, and at the consequent happiness, but if there is a God such happiness is as delusory as that of a Christian who finds "perfect freedom" as a result of believing in a non-existent God. Brophy does not put the matter in quite such comparable terms, preferring to turn the argument against the Christians. She suggests<sup>(273)</sup> the Humanists have been scared or lured into competing with Christians on their own ground, the Christians proposing as truths, doctrines they have no better authority for requiring belief in than that believing makes people happy. She claims<sup>(274)</sup> that atheism might still be correct, and would therefore have to be accepted even if the result were utter misery for everyone. She does not see it to be necessary to examine the Biblical view that God's supreme intention for man is for him to live in righteousness and truth, happiness being contingent upon this first state. Nor does she attempt an answer to the sort of point that Mitchell<sup>(275)</sup> has pressed with such acumen that the more sensitive an investigation of religion becomes the more insistent becomes the question as to whether religion is merely a human phenomenon.

4.11 Brophy's is the tough-minded approach that would finally have done with religion. Yet she realises that such a drastic course presents a problem. This becomes clearer as she goes on to answer the question as to what is to be put in the place of religion? Her conclusion is that the exercise of scientific imagination has destroyed belief in fairies, but that the fairies can legitimately reappear in aesthetic imagination. No doubt space-limitations necessitated her assuming, rather than arguing, that belief in God is to be equated with belief in the fairies. However, her plea for an austere plinth in rigorous rationalism would place her in the company of Humanists such as Margaret Knight<sup>(276)</sup> and David Tribe<sup>(277)</sup> who are convinced, not only of the falsehood of Christianity, but of the harm it has caused. But her further plea for a baroque statue to stand on the plinth would, in turn, link her with the third group of Humanists who press for a reconstruction of religion on naturalistic premises.

4.12 Perhaps Huxley<sup>(278)</sup> is the most distinguished example of this outlook, and Hepburn's<sup>(279)</sup> critique the most succinct Humanist review of it. Hepburn starts by quoting Huxley's<sup>(280)</sup> claim that what the world needs is not merely a rational denial of the old but a religious affirmation of something new, and indicates that the desire for such reconstruction is evident in people who

have undergone religious experiences which cannot be interpreted in the manner of the historical faiths. He answers the objection that, if God does not exist, then no other object can properly take his place, by suggesting that the Christian concept of God, though probably suffering a downfall through excessive richness, can yield strands which can function individually as foci of religious aspiration. The element of mystery is an example, suggests Huxley. But, as Hepburn points out, the sense of mystery at the natural world, and its evocation of awe, is not the same as the active, holy mystery of Judaism and Christianity. However, the 'slipperiness' of the relation between the beliefs about religious objects, and particular experiences legitimising these beliefs, is seen by Hepburn as embarrassment not only for the reconstructor but also for his critic. The middle section of his article deals with criteria by which reconstructions can be assessed, these being first, (in the area of ideals) consistency in definition combined with a measure of concreteness in detail, and, second, (in the area of natural events) developed religious consciousness. Much attention is given to the relation of man to his world, and Hepburn freely acknowledges that a Christian doctrine of creation can readily be made to give an account of evolutionary history in terms of God's purpose, while the Humanist vision of the

single sweep of development runs into the difficulties of mindlessness producing mind and of non-morality producing morality. Both Christian and Humanist views, however, are open to misgivings because of the complexities of the process, and the presence of conflicting interpretations. The traditional faiths provide controls for conflicting interpretations and so lead to stable religious attitudes, but reverence and wonder to the Humanist are full of ambiguities and qualifications, unless his outlook works only on the level of ideals and aspirations. Hepburn's final section is a call to combine sympathetic understanding of religion with a searching but informed critique which recognises the complexity of religious claims and attitudes. By so doing the Humanist might meet enriching moral concepts, and ways of seeing humanity which can haunt, trouble and goad his imagination.

4.13 An interesting point that emerges from this summary of Hepburn is that the lines of reconstruction which he suggests, have correspondence with the lines of theological reconstruction suggested by some twentieth century and, in particular, some post-world war theologians<sup>(281)</sup>.

For, if it is possible to make a valid generalisation about post-war theology, it would be to say that theologians have all become ever more sensitive to secular knowledge. This has led them to query whether traditional

language and concepts used of God can be meaningful to twentieth century man. Barth's response to this problem was basically to call man to repent and change his ideas. Increasingly, however, theologians are wondering whether they should change their ideas so that traditional Christian concepts are rephrased to become meaningful to moderns. Wiles<sup>(282)</sup>, for instance, would see the creeds as in need of restatement, in particular as they bear on the Incarnation. The need to start with the secular world and work towards an appropriate theology, rather than to start with biblical exposition, was popularised by Robinson<sup>(283)</sup> and pioneered by Tillich<sup>(284)</sup>. Justification of Christian statements, by specifying the empirical conditions they must satisfy, is typified by Ramsay's work on religious language. While radical positions such as the "Death of God" school, or, to a lesser extent, the Christian Agnostics, leave one wondering whether the term Christian, in its traditional sense, can justifiably be applied to them. There would seem to be comparable processes going on: secularisation of theology by many theologians and theologisation of Secular Humanism by some Humanists. How far these two lines converge or influence each other is outside the scope of this thesis and is at present a matter for speculation only. But to note the existence of these trends raises the question as to how far they seep into school religious

education, and leads into a detailed examination of Humanist attitudes to and recommendations for school-religion.

#### SECULAR HUMANISM AND RE

4.14 Humanists maintain three main lines of objection to RE. First, they would castigate the inculcation of Christian belief as indoctrination. Second, they would contend that the 1944 Act makes assumptions about God which can no longer justifiably carry parliamentary authority. Third, they would argue that the equation of religious education with moral education is morally unjustifiable, and likely to lead to, at best, confusion about morals, and, at worse, rejection of morality consequent upon rejection of religious belief.

4.15 In an article putting the Humanist position on RE, Elvin<sup>(285)</sup> accepts that if our schools engaged in militant propaganda for atheism there would be a very proper outcry from Christian believers, but goes on to point out that the latter find it difficult to understand that Humanist parents may suffer a similar offence, from the same situation in reverse. His point is that in view of the mixed nature of society (in terms of religious belief), and of his belief that many people now find the Resurrection to be pretty improbable, the question should be

asked, on what grounds is it right to inculcate one set of beliefs (especially if the evidence points to their being minority-beliefs) and deny the right of inculcation to those holding different beliefs? Having the question in the context of a mixed-belief society and having gone on to examine its tendency to provoke semi-hypocrisy among teachers, Elvin then quotes with approval a statement<sup>(286)</sup> disavowing an inducting type of RE and calling for a more open approach. Such an approach, Elvin points out, would entail the teaching about, rather than the teaching of, religion, and make a statement of aims, in terms of achieving in each person a sense of the reality of God and some experience of worship as 'indoctrination pure and simple'. He dwells on the problems associated with the truth or otherwise of Christianity, and upon the results for classroom-advocates of Christianity in applying the same critical criteria (based on logic and experience) to religious instruction, as is recommended for handling advertisers and propagandists. Much the same ground is covered by the same writer in an introduction to Tribe's<sup>(287)</sup> pamphlet. In this latter publication we encounter militant Humanism. Tribe makes much of the charge of indoctrination, but his pamphlet is a polemic and leaves the impression that the charge rests upon a highly selective group of Biblical texts, "punched" in old-style revivalist manner.

Nevertheless his point is clear enough that, if children are induced to believe in the crudities which Tribe sees as Biblical teaching, then the process could hardly be called education, and the term indoctrination could be a way of describing such a practice.

4.16.i But indoctrination is one of those terms which must be rigorously defined before they can be of much use in educational debate. It is possible, for example, for it to be no more than a loose term of abuse to be hurled at any RE teachers who handle doctrines. As religions do have doctrines, this use must be dismissed as inept, if not perverse. It is possible, also, for the many examples round the world of political manipulation to produce a near-hysterical reaction. At the sight of millions of people being drilled into a particular ideology, to the rigid exclusion of other viewpoints, in the name of education (or re-education), anything that remotely resembles such manipulation is abhorred. An RE teacher striving to clarify a point of Christian doctrine, with a lively class of young adolescents he sees only forty minutes a week, might be castigated as an indoctrinator. But this is very far removed from parading children around a school-yard with model guns over their shoulders making them chant political slogans. A look at the writings on indoctrination indicates the elusiveness of this term. May and Johnston examine Dewey's



views about indoctrination, pointing out that he both repudiates and accepts indoctrination as part of education. His eventual theory of indoctrination is horrific, the authors claim, in the sense that he advocates a process by which indoctrination is to take place without the subjects being aware that such a process is occurring. The Humanists would seek to avoid falling into such a snare by renouncing indoctrination in Humanism as a contradiction in terms. Brophy<sup>(288)</sup>, for example, stresses that Humanism is about freethinking, and to freethinkers 'it is an abhorrent idea that you should hold a child in ignorance of other beliefs while you pump him full of your own'. This remark gives the impression, as do Elvin and Tribe, that indoctrination is a straightforward issue which can easily be recognised and suitably dealt with. Mitchell<sup>(289)</sup>, however, seems more aware of the complexities. He acknowledges that it is usually the critic of religious education who uses the term and, then, in the sense of the inculcation of religious doctrines in an objectionable manner. He then points out that, in the literature, attempts have been made to locate the exact nature of the objection either to method, to content, or to aim. If located in method, the objection would be that belief is required without understanding. But on such a definition, indoctrination is unavoidable because there are times when for everyone it is necessary to accept

views on authority. Citing Moore<sup>(290)</sup>, who sees indoctrination as part of a continuum of teaching method 'along which teaching may move in keeping with the requirements of the situation', Mitchell finds it impossible to dispense with indoctrination conceived as a teaching method.

4.16.ii If located in content the objection would be, in Flew's words, to the presentation of reasonably disputations doctrines as if they were known facts. In reply, Mitchell again quotes Moore, this time in his portrayal of liberal and authoritarian education as two philosophies (with consequent teaching methods) as different in degree only. He then presses the point that the entire liberal approach to education, like the authoritarian approach, rests upon a disputatious position. Democracy, similarly, rests on a disputatious base. Yet the liberal educationist will construct a school environment which fosters the acceptance of liberal and democratic beliefs which can only be justified at a comparatively late stage in the educational process. To refuse to do so, because this is indoctrination, makes it improbable that he will produce the sort of democratic personality he deems desirable. This dilemma seems inescapable, and leads to the attempt to locate indoctrination in terms of aims.

4.16.iii If belief is so presented as to make unbelief impossible, then this could be seen as indoctrination to produce a closed mind. While not unknown in religious education, it is most common among fanatical nationalists or communists, and might seem therefore to deserve unre-served condemnation. But Mitchell picks up Burke's argument for 'prejudice with reason involved', pointing out that (1) because everyone grows up in a cultural tradition and is incapable of producing a national "philosophy" of his own from scratch, the liberal ideal of the wholly autonomous rational individual is not fully realisable, (2) it is dangerous for the individual to think himself capable of achieving this ideal, as society depends for its proper functioning upon shared beliefs, values and attitudes, and (3) in so far as shared beliefs are eroded their place will be taken by other beliefs perhaps less rational and more the product of current fashions.

4.16.iv Mitchell's conclusion is to place the 'sensible' educator in an intermediate position between the extreme liberal and the extreme authoritarian, using indoctrinatory procedures as little as possible, but not being afraid to use them when necessary. 'He will not expect or intend to produce an educated adult who has no beliefs, values, or attitudes, which he cannot rationally defend against all comers and who is incapable of settled convictions,

deep-seated virtues or profound loyalties. But neither will he treat his pupils in such a way as to leave them with closed minds and restricted sympathies' (291). It seems unfortunate that Mitchell's article has gone apparently unnoticed by those most vocal about the wickedness of indoctrination. It would appear that the Humanists have yet to reply to two charges. First, their view of indoctrination seems too simple, based, as it is, upon the dogmatic presupposition that there is no God. From this (closed?) viewpoint they must refer to all church-education as indoctrination. Brophy (292) does so with apparent relish, but without allowing that there may be refinements of definition for that word which might make Humanist fulminations on the point appear a trifle simplistic. Second, just what is the relationship between Christianity and democracy? (293) Also, does the encouraging of moral behaviour make inevitable a certain minimum of moral indoctrination at an early age? (294) If this possibility must be taken seriously where does it leave the matter of assuming some aspects of Christian belief? Does it necessitate a certain amount of indoctrination as a temporary measure? Or, as I think the question might be better phrased, does it justify the assumption of the Christian doctrine of Creation as a valid aid (in the infants' and primary schools) for both education in

religion and education in democracy? It might not be claiming too much, to add, as also a valid aid in fostering creativity?

4.17.i The second prong of Humanist attack is upon the 1944 Act, on the grounds either that it no longer prescribes for the sort of religious education now taking place in the schools, or that belief in God is not an issue which parliament has the right to make mandatory. Elvin<sup>(295)</sup> asks the question as to whether the open-ended RE advocated by Wainwright necessitates a change in the Act and concludes that logically it does, because the Act, in its requirements for worship, begs the crucial issues which "open" RE would be questioning. Brophy<sup>(296)</sup> spotlights the same clauses about worship and goes on to make two further points. First, she points out that the Act does not name the recipient of worship, only that worship must not be distinctive of any particular denomination. It does not even stipulate Christian worship. Hence, its provisions can easily be reduced to absurdity: bead-telling on Monday, polygamy on Tuesday, the forbidding of pork on Wednesday, forbidding of blood transfusions on Thursday and polygamy on Friday, on the grounds that each of these beliefs is shared by two religions! Second, she says that "undenominational" worship will probably be taken to mean "least common denominator" of worship, distinctive

of nothing in particular: an elfin worship likely to unite atheists, religious fanatics and admirers of clear prose in concerted distaste. Later in the pamphlet she asserts<sup>(297)</sup> that an 'Act of Parliament which decrees that all our schools must worship a god is giving our children a guarantee that a god exists to receive worship. Parliament has no authority to issue such a guarantee. What's more, Parliament knows perfectly well it hasn't. It is quite simply imposing on our children.' She then calls for a neutral and tolerant state which ensures that children are told in a factual way, 'the content of the myths and doctrines of as many religions and objections to all religions as the teacher's general knowledge will run to'.

4.17.ii This pamphlet however might strengthen the suspicion that dogmatic atheism as a presupposition might encourage over-simplification on a number of issues relevant to RE. Brophy does not consider it necessary to reflect on how a parliamentary stand for atheism might serve at least two purposes. It might fit the religious feelings of the people, in so far as they can be ascertained<sup>(298)</sup>, and it might help to hold in check Guinness' subterranean pessimism, with its chilling, destructive and quite logical implications. As we have seen, she advocates the acceptance of misery, if this is contingent upon atheism being true. But, in the

absence of proof of its truth, it would seem to be masochism, bordering on lunacy, to accept misery on the grounds of dogma alone. Maybe this is putting the matter too strongly, but, nevertheless, the point remains that, because for her the question of God's existence is virtually a closed issue, she may have rendered herself incapable of examining, sympathetically, that, on grounds of general desirability, there may be a case for retaining theistic assumptions in education. The possibility must be faced, that schools which operate on atheistic assumptions might, for that reason, be undermining attempts to provide pupils with a meaningful educational experience which will help them to become meaningful, purposeful people. Perhaps this is why the study unit previously examined<sup>(299)</sup> urges that, in handling Humanism teachers should stress to their pupils 'that in rejecting the idea of God the Humanist does not abandon moral values or lose a sense of purpose in life'. What seems needed, therefore, is a study as to whether there is a serious gap between technically-labelled Humanists and those who are Humanists without realising it, on these issues. For this statement could turn out to be the language of faith and hope, rather than the language of reality. Such a study is not available, although the absence of public outcry against school assemblies might suggest that there is a gap between Humanists and people on this issue.

4.18.i A further implication of the 1944 Act which gives Humanists what they see as valid complaint is that the conscience clauses, though apparently giving parents and teachers their opportunity to retain an uncompromised conscience, in fact do nothing of the sort, so it would be claimed. For there may be such inadequate provision for children who withdraw from religious instruction and school worship, that children would only be miserable if they had to stand out in such a marked way from their fellows. Similarly teachers might incur disapproval by withdrawing from practices that must be regarded as central to the life of the school. To quote Brophy<sup>(300)</sup> again, 'In practice, the right promised to parents by the Act does not exist. All that exists is a right to expose your children to embarrassment and misery'. The implications for promotion as far as teachers are concerned is that 'The Act is making pretty certain that for the headmasters and headmistresses of our state schools we shall always get either good Christians or good hypocrites'.

4.18.ii While the validity of these objections would have to be allowed, at least to some extent, it seems that they now have an air of the passé. As has been pointed out, the 1944 Act is more flexible an instrument than may be supposed, and the most recent legal testing of the religious clauses<sup>(301)</sup> was directed to ensuring that RE remained religious, not to ensuring that it remained Christian.



Although open, plural RE may not be in keeping with the intentions of the framers of the Act, nevertheless it is not inconsistent with the actual wording of the clauses. Furthermore, there seems to be in RE a growing confidence that the subject does not depend for its existence upon legal backing but can stand up firmly with an educational rationale. Once taught on this basis, the relevance of conscience clauses loses much of its significance and necessity. So, it seems that fulminations such as that of Brophy have lost much of their force as the Act has come to be re-interpreted, although how far such re-interpretation has been hastened by such fulminations is a matter for speculation.

4.19 If the two points so far dealt with tend to lead into arid polemic, the area of moral education seems to be producing something of a fruitful alliance between Humanists and their debating opponents. Elvin<sup>(302)</sup> made a plea in his article that a common basis must be found for moral education, among Christians and non-Christians, arguing that moral education should be recognised as existing in its own right and not as virtually identical with RE. This was written after a group of Humanists and Christians had met to formulate some sort of common policy towards religious and moral education and to make 'Some proposals for County Schools' in a paper published in 1965. They were moderates, rejecting both a full

defence of or a rejection of the religious clauses of the 1944 Act, and accepting that pupils should be taught Christianity and given the opportunity to experience it as part of their total education. The paper called for an open approach to R. and ME.

4.20 However, though the liaison between Christians and Humanists over moral education is to be applauded, for it aims at a national rather than a sectional provision, two vital questions must be raised. The first concerns the place of the school in the total moral education of the child, and would stress that the school exercises only a partial, perhaps a minimal role, in a process in which parents, peers and society at large play an influential part. How then, can school ME best relate to the ME which a child encounters from these other sources? The second concerns the place of moral behaviour in the over-all concept of moral education, and would query whether a totally cognitive approach, aimed only at developing moral judgement and moral knowledge, must be deemed deficient in so far as it fails to produce the affective motivation to moral behaviour. How then does emotion relate to rationality in ME? Both questions, of course, are subjects for separate studies and research, but a general point can be made at this juncture. That is, RE and ME teachers must proceed with caution, in differentiating religion and morals, for it is likely that

some home-based ME will lean heavily upon religious feeling in motivation and sanction. Critical objectivity must be seen as only one in a range of several available techniques, and its use with young children must be carefully monitored. Humanists, because they have apparently no need to rely on religious feeling to motivate them to action, could develop a blind spot here. Blackham<sup>(303)</sup>, in rejecting the Plowden position of teaching belief before doubt, nevertheless does go on to speak about taking into account the 'pattern of thought' of a neighbourhood. He would seem, therefore, to be aware of the issue and not prone to this particular blind spot. But there would seem to be a risk, implicit in a situation in which strenuous attempts are made not to ground morals on religion, to damage the motivation of children whose background causes them to see a strong link between religion and morals and who do not intend to abandon their religion.

#### CONCLUSION

4.21 This chapter has examined those beliefs which underlie Secular Humanist attitudes to religion. The attitudes are rather more difficult to pin down than the beliefs. For it can be said fairly confidently that Humanists would all share a belief in the sufficiency of reason, science and human resource to bring about

human progress. But it cannot be so confidently claimed that all would share a common attitude to religion. However, in so far as it is a cardinal tenet of Humanism fully to accept mankind in all his diversity, it would not be unfair to expect of Humanists that they accept mankind's underlying interest in religion as a significant feature of his history, his relationships, his aspirations and his values. Many would, in fact, accept religion (though deploring superstition) as a profound influence in the direction of goodness, purpose and happiness, even though some seem to show an unremitting hostility to Christian theology. This hostility, however, serves to highlight the pluralist nature of Humanist attitudes to religion. Man has produced many religions, which have exerted and continue to exert an influence on his life. They must therefore be understood and their study be admitted, if not encouraged. The ensuing study would entail a width of content appropriate to the pluralist nature of religion, and an openness of approach to ensure that pupils become religiously educated, rather than indoctrinated into a particular religious ideology, under the guise of education<sup>(304)</sup>.

This chapter has aimed to show the likelihood and the nature of the influence which the Humanist critique has exerted upon RE, without pronouncing upon the strength or otherwise of that influence. It has also served to

illustrate what has been said earlier about the social and educational factors bearing upon pluralism in RE. In addition, it has focused upon religion and religious plurality, and so paved the way for an examination of the philosophical factors that must be considered in an examination of RE's pluralism. We are now, therefore, approaching the heart of this thesis, as attention is directed more specifically to the nature of religion and to the relationship that religion might have with the philosophy of education. The next chapter, therefore, will gather up the main significant points made so far, and move firmly onto philosophical ground as these points are related to the central issue of religion.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### RE, Pluralism and Educational Propriety

5.1 The stage has now been set to move out from analysis, search and tentativeness towards positive conclusions upon the specific presentation of the basic thesis. While the fact of plurality in society, education and religion may be a somewhat truistic concept, the questions about pluralism which have so far been raised and discussed can hardly be seen as such. How far the social and educational phenomena which have been analysed can be interpreted as explicit pluralism, to what extent this pluralism (if it is that) is contained within a framework, and what implications it may have for RE are topics of some importance. It is to be hoped that the study so far has clarified to some extent the concept of pluralism, and has identified some significant social and educational-reference points for RE. It should now be possible to show how the considerations of the first part of the thesis furnish material for the answering of two further questions, namely, how far do these reference-points turn out to be determinants for RE, and, secondly, how far, if they are applied as such, do they establish a strong case for the maintenance of RE as indispensable to contemporary schooling? These are

core-questions to the thesis. Although they can be distinguished, they are very much related to each other and can, in fact, be handled together. This chapter will attempt to do so by arguing that the nature of society, the nature of education and the nature of religion are such as to give RE something amounting to a right to be in the schools.

5.2 As the bulk of this chapter will be occupied with examining the relationship of religion to education, it would seem desirable to devote a short section at the outset to summarising the sociological points that have so far been established. This will serve to off-set any impression that, because the societal must now be subsumed under the educational, it has therefore ceased to have so much salience to the argument. This is not the case. The point to be stressed here is that it is only for theoretical purposes that the social and educational can be separated in a clear-cut fashion. In a normal school situation these two issues merge, sometimes inextricably. School RE is a case in point. As the study moves more and more to the actual schools and, more particularly, to the teachers themselves, it will become more difficult to hold apart the various theoretical strands that have formed the major concerns so far.

5.3.i We have seen how, despite the monist assumptions

and comment about the nature of society surrounding the 1944 Education Act, there was, nevertheless, an implicit pluralism within the wording of the Act as indicated by the preference for the term "religious" to "Christian". We have also seen how that implicit pluralism has become more explicit in society at large, as the diversity of value-and belief-systems has become more visible and more acceptable. Although it would seem that RE is weakened socially by the lack of an over-arching belief/value-framework into which it could properly induct children and young people, there are aspects of the present social situation which would more than compensate for any such weakening. Chief of these is the need (dire, might sometimes not be too strong or too emotive a description of this need) for members of the various belief-and value-systems in the country to understand, appreciate and tolerate each other. This is to say much more than that diverse systems should be allowed to co-exist. It is to say that, once society has reached the point of its acceptance of co-existence, education is obliged to make the further step and ensure accurate understanding of these systems. The schools are the obvious place in which an attempt at understanding can be mounted. RE would by no means be the only vehicle to be used in the enterprise, for the many forms of relevant social interaction available to schools are valuable at this point.



But there must be, among these forms of social interaction, a place for the calm, fair-minded and empathic study of the range of belief- and value-systems present in society, so that a mature understanding of one's own and of others' can be encouraged. While this could be conducted at various possible places in the curriculum, there can be little doubt that RE is the most obvious point for its location. Societal pluralism thus ceases to be a reference-point for RE and becomes a determinant.

5.3.ii The need to understand the main belief- and value-systems of society is not, however, the only socially significant aspect of RE. There is also a similar need to understand the beliefs and values that have gone into the making of the nation. A country such as Britain cannot be understood without some understanding of its past. This, the cultural argument, as it is sometimes called, cannot, however, be employed to support the practice of Christian evangelism through school RE. Here, again, a reference-point for RE becomes a determinant. For the social analysis of chapter one leaves no room for doubt that a christianising RE, while valid in 1944, cannot, on social grounds, be valid in 1980. Yet the same analysis gives reason to hesitate before the label "plural" is accepted as a fully accurate description of society, if attention is directed away from the plural elements towards the possible framework

in which these elements might be contained. The continuation of Christian ceremonial in civic life, the principles upon which law, parliament and monarchy operate, and the vaguely Christian self-awareness that may exist among the people at large might amount to a case for regarding the framework as Christian. So, it could be argued, an understanding of the influences that have gone into the making of modern society would require a more than incidental reference to the Christian religion. While, again, a study of Christianity could be conducted at various points in the curriculum, RE is the most obvious location. But, again consequent upon societal pluralism, such teaching would be within the context of world-religions rather than in the setting of privileged (and isolated?) Christian absolutism.

5.3.iii These are the two most important points for the question of the present social significance of RE in a situation of pluralism. There are other relevant considerations, such as the social dimension of religion and the human dimension of education, which must be noted. But these are so closely bound up either with the nature of religion or of its relationship to education, that they can be left to crop up naturally as the chapter now moves on to grapple with these two vital issues. The social determinants of RE, regarded as a separate study, can now be left until the next chapter in which they are

reviewed in the light of the findings from the research-project.

#### RELIGION, KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

5.4 Reference has already been made to the attempt to bring order to the plurality of knowledge by its differentiation into logically distinct parts<sup>(305)</sup>. So, also, has reference been made to the problem of arriving at truth in religion. It is now necessary to deal with these two issues in greater depth, for, if religion can validly and summarily be denied knowledge- and truth-status, then there would seem to be little point in arguing for its value to education. Enough has already been said to show that such a summary treatment of religion is not easy to sustain. While writers of the calibre of Hirst argue for religion as a form of knowledge, there is much point in examining the matter further.

5.5.i Hirst's concern is with the nature of knowledge, and his preference is for the term 'liberal education' rather than 'general education'. He<sup>(306)</sup> traces the origins of liberal education to the Greeks, claiming that there were two related philosophical doctrines - about the significance of knowledge for the mind, and about the relationship between knowledge and reality -

which underlay Greek education. The first doctrine taught that it is of the very nature of mind to pursue knowledge, and, therefore, by doing so, the good of the mind and the good life are both realised. The second doctrine taught that, as the mind develops, so it comes to know the essential nature of things, apprehending what is truly real and immutable. 'From these doctrines there emerged the idea of liberal education as a process concerned simply and directly with the pursuit of knowledge ..... The definition is stated strictly in terms of man's knowledge of what is the case'<sup>(307)</sup>. This gives three characteristics of a liberal education. It is based on truth, it is valuable to the person as development of the mind, it is essential to an understanding of how life ought to be lived. The ground of values is to be located in man's conception of the diverse forms of knowledge he has achieved.

5.5.ii From this starting point Professor Hirst goes on<sup>(308)</sup> to criticise the Harvard Report<sup>(309)</sup> which he finds weakens the classical view of the significance of knowledge for the mind, and ignores the metaphysical belief that man can have knowledge of ultimate reality. The Report distinguishes three areas of knowledge, namely, the natural sciences, the humanities and social studies, and goes on to say that these elements are to be used to develop four aptitudes or attitudes of mind,

namely, to think effectively, to communicate thought, to make relevant judgements, and to discriminate among values. Hirst brings his fire to bear upon these four characteristics, maintaining that they do not specify the (logically prior) public criteria for deciding what the mental abilities stated are, that the use of broad general concepts serves only to blur essential distinctions, that such terminology encourages the assumption that unitary abilities and transfer of learning can be developed (this is a matter for empirical investigation), and that liberal education characterised in the terms of the Report has been broadened into a much wider, more generalised notion of education which in turn needs independent justification.

5.5.iii In his criticism of the Report along these lines, the logical grounds of Hirst's preference for the concept of liberal education in terms of the forms of knowledge become more evident. These forms are not 'collections of information, but the complex ways of understanding experience which man has achieved, which are publicly specifiable and which are gained through learning' (310). He commends Peterson's four modes of thinking (logical, empirical, moral and aesthetic) outlined in the Gulbenkian Foundation Report (311) because they seem to him to be in sight of a modern equivalent of the traditional conception of liberal education.

That is, there is again stated a harmony of some kind between knowledge and the mind, this time in terms of a logical rather than a metaphysical relationship. The achievement of knowledge is necessarily the development of the self-conscious rational mind of man in its most fundamental aspect. Such development implies experience structured under conceptual schemes, objectified by symbols, according to commonly accepted criteria by which their validity can be tested. 'To have a mind basically involves coming to have experience articulated by means of various conceptual schemata' (312). The justification of liberal education, as so re-stated, is therefore to be found in a justification of the development of rational mind. Justification is possible because there is some prior commitment to what one is seeking to justify. Rational pursuits have an in-built justification. If this appears circular it is only because of the inter-relation between the concepts of rational justification and the pursuit of knowledge.

5.5.iv The forms of knowledge can be identified in low-level developments within the common area of our knowledge of the everyday world, but it is in the more fully developed forms of knowledge that the really distinctive features can be seen. There are four:- (1) each involves central key-concepts peculiar to the form (2) each has a distinctive logical structure (3) each has particular

criteria by which the form's expressions and statements are testable by experience (4) each has particular techniques and skills for exploring experience. These characteristics do not make the dividing lines distinct enough to embrace the whole world of knowledge. Some areas (called by Hirst 'fields') draw upon the forms, not to structure experience, but to contribute to their subject-matter (e.g. Geography), while other fields contain distinct moral elements (e.g. Political, Legal and Educational Studies), while a third area can be called second-order forms of knowledge in that they depend for their existence upon primary areas (e.g. scientific studies of grammar and philology, and philosophical studies of meaning and justification).

5.5.v Hirst's final summary<sup>(313)</sup> is as follows:

1. Distinct disciplines and forms of knowledge (subdivisible): mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts, philosophy.

2. Fields of knowledge: theoretical, practical (these may or may not include elements of moral knowledge).

His concluding caution, though, is to emphasise that the forms of knowledge are rooted in the common world of persons and 'into this they take back in subtle as well as simple ways the understanding they have achieved'<sup>(314)</sup>. He quotes with approval the view of

Professor Oakshott that civilised man is the inheritor, not of an enquiry about himself and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries.

Education, according to Oakshott, is an initiation into this conversation.

5.6 Although Hirst has met criticism of this thesis<sup>(315)</sup> it must be acknowledged that he has made a deep impact upon the present educational scene. In the process he has, of course, strengthened RE's claim to be handling valid knowledge which, on the one hand, cannot be seen as totally the product of cultural conditioning<sup>(316)</sup> and yet, on the other, as not above the cultural continuum. Such strengthening however may be at the expense of RE's desire to break free of pressures which would contain it within a corner of the curriculum and so prevent it from being seen to be relevant to the whole of life. But it must also be recognised that Hirst's case is not proven, in the sense that it commands universal agreement among philosophers of education, and, additionally, although religion may be included in Hirst's list, it still remains necessary for this point to be argued<sup>(317)</sup>.

There appears to be no conclusive answer from current writers as to whether religion qualifies as a form of knowledge, so it behoves this study to examine the



ingredients of the problem, in order that, where a school curriculum is built upon Hirstian principles, a sound evaluation can be made of the role of RE in that context. The essential points, upon which all else turns, are the nature of religion and the nature of truth.

5.7 No attempt will be made to reduce so complex a phenomenon as religion to its 'essence'. The approach will be to pick out two distinctive characteristics of religion, one of them being a characteristic which prima facie would militate against religion's inclusion among the forms of knowledge, and to see whether either would tip the balance in one direction or the other. The choice of these characteristics is governed by the fact that they appear to be those aspects most crucially related to the question of truth: religion as non-physical<sup>(318)</sup> and religion as meaning-construction<sup>(319)</sup>. The former will be handled in this section, the latter will be dealt with later in the chapter.

5.8 When confronted with the phenomenon of religion, it is immediately obvious that an appreciable amount of its material is grounded in physical reality and is therefore subject to empirical and historical examination. Religious buildings, books, people, clothes, ceremonials and artefacts can all come under a rational appraisal. But it is also obvious that in religion there is an area of the

non-physical which cannot, by its very nature be subject to rational investigation in the same way as can the physical. Holley<sup>(320)</sup>, in seeking to describe the nature of the religious dimension of the personal life, says it is 'through and through spiritual'. By this he means that it is (a) other than physical, (b) not encountered by a purely mental process, and (c) has peculiar power, dynamic activity and restless energy. In making this assertion, Holley<sup>(321)</sup> does not deny the valid application of rational criteria to religion, but is instead drawing attention to the limitations of this method of understanding and validating the spiritual, which is beyond accurate conceptualisation and beyond rational demonstration and logical proof and disproof<sup>(322)</sup>. The same point might (and has) been made in somewhat more earthy terms by saying that a kiss is not to be understood by a rational analysis of the physical composition of two pairs of lips.

5.9 But the use of the term spiritual raises formidable difficulties for the acceptance of religion as a form of knowledge. For, on Hirst's analysis<sup>(323)</sup>, it is essential that each form has truth-criteria peculiar to itself. While there is overlap between the forms this must not mean the taking by one form of the truth criteria of another as the chief means of verifying its own propositions. So, to verify the physical aspects of religion

by empirical and historical means, while perhaps a valuable exercise in rational thought, would totally miss the point if such means were advanced as grounds for raising religious knowledge to the status of "form"<sup>(324)</sup>. While Hirst's position enables an unsuccessful attempt to establish the existence of the spiritual by empirical evidence from the physical world to be deemed inappropriate (for truth-criteria from one form cannot be pressed into service in another form), it nonetheless raises an urgent question. Just what are the truth-criteria appropriate to religion if the latter is to be deemed a form of knowledge? This would seem to involve more than the ability to give religious answers (as distinct from, say, scientific) answers to religious questions<sup>(325)</sup>. It must surely entail the verification or falsification of these answers by valid criteria.

5.10 For some, this requirement makes the quest a non-starter. But, it should be noted, it becomes a non-starter only when a prior decision has been made about the nature of truth, which debars by definition the possibility of religious knowledge (purporting to be true statements about the non-physical) being true knowledge. Someone, for example, who has decided in advance that knowledge is true only if it can be demonstrated empirically, must deny the validity of religious knowledge, because the latter will not easily fit the selected criterion<sup>(326)</sup>.

This can be done, of course, but not without running the risks of being criticised as absolutist, arrogant and narrow-minded. It can also fairly be said that, even in the empirical sphere, knowledge has outgrown certainty in the recent knowledge-explosion<sup>(327)</sup>. So, unless refuge is taken in the position that RE is concerned merely with the fact of religious interpretations of life, not with the truth or falsity of these interpretations, the problem of validity cannot but be a major difficulty. But it is here that the argument of this thesis may have an important bearing on easing the problem of truth-criteria. For the tighter and the more exclusive the concept of truth becomes, the more difficult is it, not only to regard religion as a form of knowledge, but to retain the variety and number of forms suggested by Hirst<sup>(328)</sup>. Yet how can such a course be justified in a situation of pluralism? If it is that society has decided that plurality is desirable, how can a public educational system set its face against this and operate on presuppositions which strike at the plurality of knowledge in favour of excluding from serious consideration those truth-claims that will not fit monist (and, perhaps, thoroughly inappropriate) criteria? It was argued in chapter two that educational pluralism is a meaningful term and must include an acceptance of the plurality of knowledge<sup>(329)</sup>. While there is disagreement

among philosophers about the nature of truth, it would seem that educational pluralism would require that the schools operate on a concept of truth which is broad, plural and socially significant<sup>(330)</sup>. It makes very good sense in a plural situation to claim for religion that it is a form of knowledge on conceptual, logical and historical grounds, while at the same time to admit that more work needs to be done on its truth-criteria<sup>(331)</sup>. This avoids on the one hand, debasing the word truth to the point at which "anything goes", and, on the other, guarding against the situation in which the schools are torn by the view that there is no such thing as truth.

5.11 But while it seems we must be prepared to admit that the claims for religion as a form of knowledge do not constitute a water-tight case, it does not follow that the appropriateness of the term knowledge, as applied to religious knowledge, must rest on these claims being allowed. For, although empirical and historical tests are not sufficient to raise religion to the status of form, nevertheless these tests have a currency in education quite apart from their relevance to Hirst's argument. RE has access to empirical and historical religious facts which can be verified empirically and historically and can therefore be legitimately taught as valid and true knowledge<sup>(332)</sup>. This would extend both to knowledge about religious propositions

as well as to knowledge about buildings, ceremonies, festivals, etc.<sup>(333)</sup>. It surely is better that such knowledge is gained through planned consideration of religion under expert teacher-guidance, than that pupils are left to pick up this knowledge in a haphazard fashion from peers and media. RE implies understanding of religion. It is designed to make pupils "religiate". The acquisition of sound knowledge, is an educational determinant for any subject. Even if the matter of religion as a form of knowledge has to be left open, RE, nevertheless, can claim to be presenting sound knowledge. Some is open both to verification and falsification. If some is not yet subject to such stringent tests at least the problem is recognised and is being given attention. In a situation of pluralism, knowledge must operate on a broad basis, both as far as content and as truth-claims are concerned. It must embrace the religions, and must allow the possibility that the non-physical aspect of religions will yet yield criteria appropriate to its investigation.

#### RELIGION AS MEANING-CONSTRUCTION

5.12 This last sentence has suggested that religion is a unitary phenomenon. Such a suggestion could only be made after a lengthy discussion of the nature of religion, so it is perhaps necessary to point out again what this

chapter is attempting. The aim is to select two aspects of religion that can fairly be claimed to run across the phenomenon, these aspects being closely related to education's commitment to rationality. A decision about the nature of knowledge (as seen from an educational standpoint) must be of prime importance, not only in determining whether religious knowledge is a valid term, but in determining the content of that knowledge. But also of prime importance is the nature of meaning. For it seems fair to claim that rationality would be concerned with, at least, the perception of meanings, if not their construction. Reason would seem in part to be an imposition upon the natural, bringing orderliness and systemitisation to randomness<sup>(334)</sup>. A rational education would impose discipline upon the natural reluctance of children to concentrate, to think with care and with precision, and to display socially acceptable behaviour. If so, it can be said that education into meaninglessness is an irrational occupation. While the view that reality is basically meaningless and absurd is explored in the media, and could be examined in the schools, as part of the pluralism of both society and education, the evidence examined by this thesis, so far, suggests that a search for a framework for societal and educational pluralism, though perhaps not producing very conclusive results, would certainly not establish meaninglessness as such a

framework. The evidence points in the other direction, towards an ordering of society on general principles of tolerance, restraint, mutual dependence, self-worth and democratic intent and towards the ordering of education on principles of rational purpose, individual significance, meaningful discovery.

5.13.i If religion is basically the construction of meanings (see below), thereby making religious education the exercise in understanding and appraising these meanings, it becomes a relatively straightforward matter to relate such a view to the concept of general education, if general education is itself to be in essence about meaning-construction. Phenix<sup>(335)</sup> is an educational philosopher who has built up a model for general education from the premise that it is 'a process of engendering essential meanings'. He modifies<sup>(336)</sup> the classic formula that man is a rational animal 'to read that man is an animal that can have meanings', and underlines that meaningfulness does not just come naturally but must be facilitated by a curriculum 'deliberately designed to overcome the prevalent forces of meaninglessness'<sup>(337)</sup>. It does hardly seem to be necessary to argue for the desirability of a general education directed towards meaningfulness. The alternative - education in meaningless self-interest - seems too obviously a contradiction in terms that seemingly it can be dismissed from further



consideration. There seems, also, to be no half-way house. In fact we tread much common ground among educationists when we talk about the desirability of meanings. Even those who believe the universe to be basically meaningless would usually be concerned that school children be helped to impose meaning and purpose on their reality. Those who believe there to be a built-in meaning and purpose to the universe, awaiting discovery, are very much on speaking terms with them.

5.13.ii Phenix's system is developed from the supposition<sup>(338)</sup> that there are 'six fundamental patterns of meaning (which) emerge from the analysis of the possible distinctive modes of human understanding'. These six realms are symbolics, empirics, aesthetics, synnoetics, ethics and synoptics and are deemed to be the foundations for all the meanings that enter into human experience in the sense that 'they cover the pure and archetypal kinds of meaning that determine the quality of every/significant <sup>humanly</sup> experience'<sup>(339)</sup>. They comprise the basic competences that general education should develop in the process of producing 'whole persons'. To Phenix, general education is more than intellectual development, it is concerned also with emotional development, with creativity and with moral development, and should counter those trends in western society which tend to promote meaninglessness (such as scepticism, destructive criticism, depersonali-

sation, over-abundance of knowledge, and the insecurity stemming from rapid social change). Meaning, to him, has four dimensions. There is, first, inner experience, which includes reflectiveness, self-awareness, and self-transcendence. Second, there is the dimension of rule, logic and principle, each type of meaning having its own appropriate logic and structure. Third, there is the dimension of selective elaboration by which, through disciplined scholarship, the limitless range of possible meanings are narrowed down to those that are significant and have an inherent power of growth and elaboration, the most significant being assumed to be the ones that have actually demonstrated their fecundity. Fourth, there is the dimension of expression, communication being through symbols which are objects that stand for meaning.

In order to harness the various scholarly disciplines to facilitate meaning, Phenix would group them according to their various logical structures, finding there to be nine generic classes. He maintains that every cognitive meaning has two logical aspects, quantity and quality, (the knower is related to a range of things known and that each such relation is of some kind), that quantity is singular, general or comprehensive (knowledge is either of one, of a selected plurality or of a totality), and that quality is either fact, form or norm (meaning may refer to what is, to imagined possibilities or to

what ought to be). By pairing the elements of quantity and quality, nine generic classes of meaning emerge, although Phenix, in his book, has restricted himself to six realms, giving the following classification

Generic classes		Realms of meaning	Disciplines
Quantity	Quality		
General	Form	Symbolics	Ordinary language, mathematics, nondiscursive symbolic forms.
General	Fact	Empirics	Physical sciences, life sciences, psychology, social sciences.
Singular	Form	Aesthetics	Music, visual arts, arts of movement, literature.
Singular	Fact	Synnoetics	Philosophy, psychology, literature, religion, in their existential aspects.
Singular	Norm	Ethics	The varied special areas of moral and ethical concern.
General	Norm		
Comprehensive	Fact		History
Comprehensive	Norm	Synoptics	Religion
Comprehensive	Norm		Philosophy.

These six realms of meaning represent a hierarchy in complexity and are necessary for a person to realise his essential humanness in eventual integrated selfhood.

Phenix claims that 'Human beings are characterised by a few basic types of functioning. They use symbols, they abstract and generalise, they create and perceive interesting objects, they relate to each other personally, they

make judgements about good and evil, they re-enact the past, they seek the ultimate, and they comprehensively analyse, evaluate and synthesize. These are the universal, pervasive and perennial forms of distinctively human behaviour. They are the foundation for all civilized existence. All of them are deeply woven into the texture of life whenever it transcends the level of biological and social survival' (340).

5.14.i Phenix's scheme has not gone uncriticised. In particular, Professor Hirst<sup>(341)</sup> has attacked it on the grounds that it is unclear as to the nature of knowledge and therefore runs into logical difficulties. Hirst's thrust is along the lines that there are only two valid classifications of knowledge - 'knowledge-that' (knowledge of what is the case) and 'knowledge-how' (procedural knowledge as to how and when a thing is done). He does not accept that existential knowledge (knowledge with the direct object) is a distinct type of knowledge in that it requires a direct personal experience of the person or object which is not always expressible in propositions. Phenix categorises existential knowledge as valid precisely because of this personal element, but Hirst sees this as a confusion between knowledge as such and states of perception, awareness, and feeling. For Hirst existential knowledge must be reduced to 'knowledge-that' plus an occurrent state of awareness,

not to demote its significance but to make more explicit its real nature. He concedes that Phenix is right to hold that types of meaning are classified by first looking at types of knowledge, but he goes on to say that Phenix is mistaken in thinking that knowledge must then be taken as a category wide enough to cover existential awareness and other intelligible states. Hirst's basic criticism is that Phenix has introduced into the dimension of knowledge elements that belong to another dimension, thus confusing the operation. 'The thesis that the categories of meaning are fundamentally distinguishable as categories of knowledge is true only if it is 'knowledge-that' which is being considered' (342).

5.14.ii Hirst follows up this ground-attack by questioning Phenix's distinction between fact, norm and form from the same criterion of truth. Hirst maintains that the term fact should be applicable both to form and norm, and, if Phenix would see fact as distinguishable from form and norm, then 'what is meant by these three qualitative aspects is too unclear for them to be used as a classificatory device, and in particular it is not obvious that they are mutually exclusive categories' (343). He goes on to ask why the two features of quantity and quality should be used as the bases for classification of knowledge, pointing out that Phenix gives no reason for his choice of these particular bases, and arguing

that the only valid classification must be according to logically necessary features, i.e. according to the 'nature' of the 'objects' not according to other non-defining properties. His own suggestion for classification of knowledge—that is according to (1) conceptual system and (2) truth-criteria, the latter presupposing the former. In the light of these criteria, he maintains, Phenix's criterion of quantity is irrelevant, and his criterion of quality needs much more detailed elucidation. This leads him to the conclusion that Phenix's scheme is acceptable only if the objects of knowledge are taken to be objects in the every-day, non-philosophical sense. In particular, symbolics picks out no logically distinct type of knowledge in the philosophical sense; nor does synnoetics. 'Only if the objects of knowledge are not taken as true propositions but as objects in the everyday sense and 'singular' is taken to mean 'unique' or 'non-communicable' can the domain of 'singular fact' be equated with what Phenix calls synnoetics'<sup>(344)</sup>.

5.15 All of Professor Hirst's criticisms, (as he himself points out), rest upon the assumption that Phenix equates types of meaning with types of knowledge, and it must be admitted that, lacking a clear statement from Phenix as to the exact relation of the two in his system, Hirst is justified in assuming by implication that this is what Phenix has done. Under Hirst's rigorous analysis Phenix's

scheme begins to appear shaky in the realms of symbolics, synnoetics and synoptics - areas of vital importance for religion and religious education. But two points can be made in reply. The first is a carry-over from the previous section and refers to the discussion there about the truth-criteria relevant to testing religious knowledge. We saw how Hirst was persuaded that such criteria (distinguishable from the empirical, the historic and the philosophical) did exist, but that they were still in the process of formulation. It would seem that, if Hirst is prepared to allow a situation to occur in which religion can be put forward as a form of knowledge, while the truth-criteria are being hammered out, then he may be a little inconsistent to deny Phenix a similar "benefit of the doubt" when the latter puts forward existential knowledge as true knowledge. The remarks made earlier about pluralism making necessary a broad approach to truth apply with similar relevance here as before.

5.16 The second point is rather more practical. Granted that Phenix's scheme is logically looser than Hirst's, does this make it less useful in curriculum-planning? Does Phenix's very width and concern for all the dimensions of meaning make it a better basis for education in a situation of pluralism than Hirst's narrower if more logical perspective? Again the question rears its head, is it desirable to initiate children into meanings, when

there are no publicly accepted criteria for determining the truthfulness of such meanings? Whitfield<sup>(345)</sup> comes out decisively in favour of Phenix. His answer is that meaning is primary, and he sees the logically looser nature of Phenix's scheme as a positive merit in curriculum-planning. He has argued that new forms of knowledge might be stifled by Hirstian logic, and the Phenix demarcations, though less well substantiated than Hirst's forms of knowledge, are more attractive for an organic, growing and evolving curriculum. As he says<sup>(346)</sup>, pithily, 'Philosophical rigour is praiseworthy provided that it does not lead to rigor mortis'.

5.17 In spite of the differences in logic between Hirst and Phenix, there remains a considerable area of agreement and a strong similarity between the two schemes. It may well be that Whitfield is right when he suggests that Phenix's scheme is of more use for an education which specifically sets out on the development of whole people. Hirst, of course, would rebut the charge that his proposals fail to set out on this too, but it must be admitted that his point about the contribution the forms have towards the common world of persons is not very fully developed, and it would be proper to ask whether in his scheme it can carry the weight that it should. For the common world of persons might need much more than the provision of a logically faultless conceptual framework for a liberal



education. Alves<sup>(347)</sup> has suggested that there may be situations in which relationships and care for persons take primacy over intellectual integrity. While it would be intolerable to criticise Hirst because he is too preoccupied with truth, it must surely be allowed that truth and meaning are inter-connected, comparable to the chicken and the egg<sup>(348)</sup>. Motivation towards learning is probably not, except for the few highly gifted intellectuals, aroused merely by the inner logic of the material to be learned, and it does seem that Phenix has good grounds for his claim<sup>(349)</sup> that 'the fundamental human motivation is the search for meaning'.

5.18 Religion relates very well to this last statement. For, without claiming either to be penetrating to the essence of religion or to be presenting an exhaustive definition, it is possible to say that a central concern of religion is the construction of meanings. Yinger<sup>(350)</sup>, for example, distinguished between substantive (or descriptive) and functional definitions, finding the former useful in the study of religions as historical and cultural facts, but not so useful in their study as panhuman phenomena. He believes that a functional definition is of more use in the context of societal change, for it concentrates on process and takes account of religion as a manifestation of character and as an aspect of society, rather than seeing it just as a

cultural fact. He is impressed that religion is a human activity, seeing its distinguishing function (acknowledging Tillich) as such to be the provision of answers to ultimate questions<sup>(351)</sup>. These questions are concerned with the facts of death, suffering, frustration, tragedy and personal and social disruption, these facts posing the problem as to whether life has any central meaning among such negative forces. Religion can therefore functionally be defined as 'a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with these ultimate problems of human life'<sup>(352)</sup>.

One of the most noticable features of the present RE literature is the extent to which this functional definition of religion is seen to have positive usefulness in the current situation. For a word of so many possible definitions, religion appears to be reaching some sort of consensus-definition contingent upon its preoccupation with the raising and answering of ultimate questions. The Durham Report<sup>(353)</sup> parallels Yinger in a memorable paragraph. Its view is shared by the Humanists<sup>(354)</sup>, suggesting that the churchmen of the Durham Report have not latched on to a definition which happens to be convenient to them but which does not go to the heart of the matter, if they can secure endorsement from atheists. Some years earlier Cox<sup>(355)</sup> had identified the religious outlook with a pursuit of

meaning and purpose in the universe, allowing the assumption that there was an overall purpose to be found, and that its discovery would help practical decision-making and lead to the adoption of a moral code. The Schools Council Working Paper 36<sup>(356)</sup> says that religions claim to discern the meaning and purpose of life, committing their adherents to appropriate action. Such quotations could be multiplied, and they point up two related characteristics of religion which are very relevant in any assessment of its relation to education. Religion is not only a universal human activity, it is also a highly desirable activity in so far as - to quote the Humanists' booklet<sup>(357)</sup> again - 'Many adults lead fuller and more satisfying lives if they have found some sense of purpose in life, if they have found a concern which relates them positively to their fellows'. To say that religion is universal is not, of course, to say that each religion says the same thing in the end. Smart<sup>(358)</sup> helps to clarify this point by identifying six dimensions found across the religions, while noting that there may be differentiation within the dimensions. It is to say, though, that there is something intrinsically human and desirable about constructing meanings from the raw material of observation. If these constructions are to do with 'ultimate' questions it is but a step to argue that RE, in the sense

of exploration of these meanings, contributes to our development as human beings (a basic contention of the Durham Report). It seems probable that we are the only beings on this planet capable of considering the reason for our existence; it would, therefore, be a denial of our essential humanity if we failed to do so.

5.19 At this point we are confronted with a fundamental paradox, the means of resolution of which are by no means clear. On the one hand rationality would seem to be unable to confront reality without attempting to order and systematise. It would seem a valid inference that it would also attempt to bring meaning and purpose to human life. Yet, on the other, the conferment upon individuals of the right to personal autonomy (this, too, being a requirement of rationality) means that even the view that there is no meaning or purpose to human life must be allowed to individuals, if this is their preferred perspective. It would seem inconsistent for rationality to decree 'personal autonomy based upon reason' and then to forbid the individual the right to say 'my reason forces me to conclude that life is meaningless and to live by that belief'. But such a lifestyle may result in the destruction of reason. This paradox presents educationists with an inescapable choice. Must a rational educational system strive to remain neutral in its attitude to meaning-construction?

Or, must other factors, based on the grounds of general social desirability, bias the system towards the pre-supposition that life is, or can be, a meaningful and positively fulfilling occupation? The presence of socially destructive forces that might feed upon chaos, aimlessness and vulnerability would furnish arguments for such a bias. However, although Phenix's position is attractive as he argues for education based upon meaning, it is sufficient for this thesis to point out, merely, that whichever answer is given to this paradox, the place of RE would seem, at least necessary, if not indispensable, in the schools. If the system is to strive for neutrality, it becomes essential that provision is made in the curriculum for a comprehensive review of meaning-systems. If there is to be an encouragement of pupils to arrive at their own meaningful synthesis of the diverse elements of their experience, then help must be given in this direction. Again, pluralism would seem to strengthen RE's position, provided, of course, that the content of RE is itself religiously plural.

#### CONCLUSION

5.20 This chapter has looked at two principles upon which the school curriculum can be reared. These are rationality, as manifested in the logical differentiation of knowledge into distinctive forms and as championed by

Hirst, and meaningfulness, as manifested in Phenix's postulated realms of meaning. These two philosophers have been chosen because they exert a powerful contemporary influence, not because they are thought to be the only available. While the two principles of rationality and meaningfulness are not seen as identical, enough has been said in this chapter to show that they are sufficiently similar as to be bracketed together. Insofar as rationality would order reality into a meaningful synthesis then the two principles can be said to operate on each other. So, the demand that curriculum-planners must choose between the two schemes may be an unnecessary stringency. If, however, the choice has to be made, then Whitfield's position, that the greater rigour of Hirst's analysis is sufficiently a drawback to the construction of a flexible and dynamic curriculum as to push planners in the direction of Phenix, has some force. The further comment might also be added that, if Phenix is preferred, then this preference might make more likely that return, both simple and subtle, into 'the common world of persons' which Hirst seems to consider to be an inevitable result of the acquisition of the forms of knowledge. Such inevitability, surely, cannot be assumed, and it is, perhaps, made less likely by a repudiation of existential knowledge as valid knowledge.

The chapter, however, did not set out to argue the merits of the two philosophers. The aim was to demonstrate an affinity between RE and both their systems. It is submitted that, not only is such an affinity possible to demonstrate, but that it is also unforced and convincing. However, merely to demonstrate a fit must surely be a somewhat emasculated approach to RE's justification. Throughout the study full allowance has, it is hoped, been made for those chief social and educational factors which would render RE a dependent variable. But, it is submitted, a stronger claim can now be made. It is no part of the intention of this thesis to conclude by saying (in effect): "Look, if we, as RE practitioners, get our method right and agree not to proselytise for a single religious position to the exclusion of all others, may we please remain in the system?" On the contrary, the conclusion to which the study has been heading is this: "Religion has something relevant and valuable to contribute to a situation of social and educational pluralism: you cannot be true to either society or to education and refuse RE a fully accredited place in the curriculum."

The main evidence that such a remark can be made without presumption has been reviewed in this study. There is good reason for believing that RE teachers can repudiate all tendencies to run to mouse-holes, brought on by a

daunting situation, and say with increasing confidence that they perform an indispensable social and educational service. But the question remains: how far do RE teachers themselves appreciate this point<sup>(359)</sup>? So, the final stage of this study must now be entered. What do the teachers themselves say? They are, perhaps, the most important determinants of all.



## CHAPTER SIX

### RESEARCH FINDINGS

#### AIM AND METHOD OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

6.1 The main aim of the research project was to put some of the principal theoretical issues treated in the previous part of the thesis through a teacher-filter, to discover how far the teacher-opinion of the sample accorded with or diverged from the points made. In addition, there would be, it was hoped, a possible supplementary aim, in that the findings, perhaps the whole thesis, might prove useful to those involved in curriculum-development in RE and in RE teacher-education in the Durham area. In the compilation of the questionnaire, a consideration that was continuously borne in mind was the possible reluctance of busy teachers to devote their hard-pressed time to completing a form, which, though very important to the present study, may have been of only minor priority in a particular teacher's daily round. Hence, a guide line, which seemed to suggest itself as crucial, was that the production of the questionnaire should aim at a balance of sophistication and economy, in such a way as to elicit the desired information without taxing the teachers too heavily by asking

for the completion of a lengthy document. The inclusion of a letter from the Head of the Durham School of Education would, it was hoped, add encouragement to teacher-participation. So, the material was kept within the limits of a single sheet of A4 size, the method of measurement selected was a three-point scale, and the number of questions was restricted to three, although containing sufficient sub-divisions to avoid superficiality and crudity. A pilot survey was conducted in the Derby/Sheffield area as a preliminary indicator of the usefulness or otherwise of the questionnaire.

6.2 As the sampling was not to be on a national scale, attempts were made to keep it, nevertheless, validly representative. So, while the main drive was towards the Durham area, additional material was collected from Derby in order to preserve a balance between rural, semi-rural and urban schools. While the Derby schools were not fully comparable to the inner-city schools of somewhere like London, Liverpool or Birmingham, they were still located in a city which has felt at first-hand all of the effects of the changes discussed earlier in the thesis, especially the growth of the multicultural. Again, although some church schools were circulated, these formed no more than 14% of the Durham and 10% of the Derby circulation, all of them being in

the maintained sector as either controlled or aided institutions. It was not possible to ascertain how many of the subsequent replies came from church-schools, for anonymity was considered a further important determinant as to whether teachers would respond or not to the questionnaire. A few respondents, however, were happy to admit to being church-school-teachers. It was possible to collate the replies according to area by the process of allowing time to elapse between the Durham and the Derby surveys, the postmark on each letter providing a further check on the source of the replies. Both primary and secondary schools were circulated, the attention of the headteacher being sought in the former and that of the head of RE in the latter. Occasionally a reply was returned from an assistant teacher (holding a position other than that of either of the above) from both types of school. Thus, the drive of the survey was to RE teachers, or to those with a responsibility for RE though perhaps not having training in that direction. To have secured the opinions of non-RE teachers would have been a useful addition, but, again, it seems likely that, to secure a valid return, it would be necessary to establish personal links over a period of time with a large number of teachers over a range of subject-disciplines. The number of replies showed that there was nearly a 50%

better response from Durham secondary schools than from Durham primary schools, which suggests that Mr. Greener's established position in the area may have been a significant factor in securing this response. In Derby the returns were exactly the same from both primary and secondary sectors. The tables indicate a breakdown between the Durham and Derby schemes, with a further breakdown between primary and secondary schools. However, there are final composite tables giving a straight, across-the-board report.

6.3 The approach to the Durham schools was made with the full approval of both Director of Education and RE Adviser, as well as with the valued assistance of the Durham School of Education. It is likely that the return of 58.1% from the Durham schools would not have been as high were it not for the endorsement of the School of Education through Professor Batho's letter, and for the already mentioned established position of Mr. Tom Greener in both the School of Education and among the area's RE teachers. The approach to Derby schools was conducted with the sponsorship of the Derby RE Adviser, Mr. Ian Wragg, and of the Derby Area Education Officer, Mr. Anthony Watkins. Mr. Wragg included the questionnaire in his own mailing to secondary schools and paved the way for a circulation among selected primary schools with the

approval of Mr. Watkins. The circulation was among city-schools almost exclusively, although I was able to add a further six urban secondary schools from other parts of the county. Returns from secondary schools were just under 61%, and, because I wrote a personal letter with each questionnaire to the primary schools, returns from this sector amounted to 95%. In general, the returns were not high, but the initial circulation was sufficiently wide to provide an adequate response for the compilation of valid statistics. In addition, the pilot survey showed that the questionnaire did not need any major revision, and so it seems justifiable to include in the tables a composite report of both pilot, Durham and Derby schemes. As the following report will show, there is a consistency in the replies overall.

6.4 The results of the project will be reported both statistically in tabular form and by description of teacher-comment. The tables will provide a detailed breakdown of the three schemes, the pilot survey showing overall results across the primary/secondary divisions, the Durham and Derby schemes showing both primary and secondary breakdown, with composite tables revealing the complete picture. Percentages have usually been included in brackets after the specific number of replies, as the numbers in the individual schemes were small, but the composite tables are in percentages only,

as the response was sufficiently large to produce the figures of  $l = 1.1\%$  (combined Durham and Derby) and  $l = 0.8\%$  (combined pilot, Durham and Derby).

## TABULATION OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

### 6.5 THE PILOT SURVEY

This was conducted in the Derby and Sheffield areas with a view to checking the relevance, comprehensibility and acceptability of the questionnaire. On each count there was a favourable showing. The only alteration that seemed necessary was a slight re-wording of question two as one of the subjects wrote 'which assumptions?' in the space provided for comment. The final form of the question was therefore made to point explicitly to the alternatives of question one, but it did not specifically restrict the subject to one alternative (i.e. the alternative of his choice). The reason behind this was to encourage each subject to include personal comment, which necessitated a degree of imprecision in the wording in the hope that this would prompt more detailed clarification on the part of the person replying. Unfortunately the pilot scheme did not bring to light an uncertainty which emerged (though not extensively) in the main surveys, namely that statement three of question three was not understood by some receiving the questionnaire.

It is, of course, revealing if a teacher responsible for RE does not understand the meaning of a 'differentiated' ME, and this in itself has value as an indicator of some teacher awareness (or lack of it!) about a central issue in RE. But it would have been preferable had alternative three been so phrased as to be readily understood by all. The pilot scheme questionnaire and the replies are as follows.

TEACHERS' QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Which of the following assumptions about the nature of society would you consider right? Please tick the appropriate box.

- Britain is: a Christian society
- a plural, religious society but within a Christian framework
- a plural, secular society, but within a Christian framework
- a plural, religious society within a secular framework
- a plural, secular society within a democratic framework
- a loose amalgam of localised but distinct ideologies
- a society in transition from a Christian to an alternative single ideology yet to be imposed
- in none of the above categories but might be classified as
- .....
- .....

2. How far should assumptions about the nature of society shape the nature and content of R.E.? Please tick the appropriate box.

Considerably  Moderately  Not at all

Please give reasons for your answer

.....  
.....  
.....

3. How important do you consider the following statements in justifying R.E.? Please comment on all six statements by ticking the boxes of your choice.

Considerably Moderately Not at all

- |  |                          |                          |                          |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. R.E. should handle all the major world religions  | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. R.E. should be critical and objective   | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. R.E. should be differentiated from M.E.   | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. R.E. should try and present religions 'from the inside', especially the affective parts | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. R.E. should try to help pupils make sense of the world                                  | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. R.E. should concentrate on Christianity as this is the major religion of Britain        | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Please add any preferred statements of your own

.....  
.....  
.....



4. Please specify:

primary school teacher

secondary school teacher

Date: Spring, 1979.

Circulation: 56 questionnaires to a mix of primary and secondary teachers in the Derby and Sheffield areas, including one adviser from another authority.

Return: 11 Sheffield primary teachers  
 12 Sheffield secondary teachers  
 13 Derbyshire secondary teachers  
 1 adviser  
 Total, 37 replies.

Percentage return. 66%

Note: Some answers were left blank, so introducing an apparent discrepancy in the tables.

TABLE P1 Replies to question one.

Alternative	Response
1	-
2	1 (2.7%)
3	22 (59.5%)
4	2 (5.4%)
5	5 (13.5%)
6	-
7	1 (2.7%)
8	6 (16.2%)

TABLE P2 Replies to question two.

Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
8 (21.6%)	26 (70.3%)	1 (2.7%)

TABLE P3 Relationship between replies to questions one and two.

Alternative	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	-	-	-
2	-	1 (2.7%)	-
3	4 (10.8%)	16 (43.2%)	-
4	-	2 (5.4%)	-
5	1 (2.7%)	4 (10.8%)	-
6	-	-	-
7	1 (2.7%)	-	-
8	2 (5.4%)	3 (8.1%)	2 (5.4%)

TABLE P4 Replies to question three.

Statement	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	6 (16.2%)	26 (70.2%)	4 (10.8%)
2	18 (48.6%)	16 (43.2%)	1 (2.7%)
3	11 (29.7%)	21 (56.7%)	5 (13.5%)
4	12 (32.4%)	21 (56.7%)	2 (5.4%)
5	34 (91.8%)	3 (8.1%)	-
6	23 (62.1%)	14 (37.8%)	-

## 6.6 COMMENT ON PILOT SCHEME

The majority of replies to question one chose the alternative that Britain is a plural, secular society, but within a Christian framework, although most of the sample thought that assumptions about the nature of society should bear only a moderate influence upon RE. It should be noted that, although 35 subjects circulated were attending a conference sponsored by the Association of Christian Teachers at the time of circulation, none of those replying opted for the alternative that Britain was a Christian society. The remaining 21 subjects were RE teachers attending a probationers' conference organised by the RE adviser. The high percentage of those opting for statement six of question three - that RE should concentrate upon Christianity as this is the major religion of Britain - could be explained at this stage by the number of known Christian sympathisers in the sample. But it should be said that subsequent results showed a consistency with the findings of this pilot survey, at this point, despite the 6.4 percentage drop on the 'considerably' scale and the 8.0 percentage rise on the 'not at all' scale.

6.7 FINAL FORM OF THE TEACHERS' QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Which of the following assumptions about the nature of society would you consider right? Please tick the appropriate box.

- Britain is: a Christian society
- a plural, religious society but within a Christian framework
- a plural, secular society, but within a Christian framework
- a plural, religious society within a secular framework
- a plural, secular society within a democratic framework
- a loose amalgam of localised but distinct ideologies
- a society in transition from a Christian to an alternative single ideology yet to be imposed
- in none of the above categories but might be classified as
- .....
- .....

2. How far should the above assumptions about society shape the nature and content of R.E.? Please tick the appropriate box.

Considerably  Moderately  Not at all

Please give reasons for your answer

.....  
.....  
.....

3. How important do you consider the following statements in justifying R.E.? Please comment on all six statements by ticking the boxes of your choice.

Considerably Moderately Not at all

- 1. R.E. should handle all the major world religions
- 2. R.E. should be critical and objective
- 3. R.E. should be differentiated from M.E.
- 4. R.E. should try and present religions 'from the inside', especially the affective parts
- 5. R.E. should try to help pupils make sense of the world
- 6. R.E. should concentrate on Christianity as this is the major religion of Britain

Please add any preferred statements of your own

.....  
.....  
.....

4. Please specify:

primary school Head  secondary school Head   
of R.E.

6.8 THE DURHAM TEACHER SURVEY

Date: Autumn, 1979.

Circulation: 86 questionnaires to a mix of 34 primary  
and 52 secondary schools in the Durham area.

Return: 17 primary headteachers

33 secondary RE teachers

Total, 50 replies

Percentage return: primary, 50%

secondary, 63.5%

Total, 58.1%

- Notes: 1. Percentages in all tables refer to the proportion of the total return.
2. Some answers were left blank, so explaining the occasional apparent discrepancy in the overall figures.

TABLE DuP 1 Primary teacher replies to question one.

Alternative	Response
1	3 (17.6%)
2	1 (5.9%)
3	12 (70.6%)
4	-
5	-
6	-
7	-
8	1 (5.9%)

TABLE DuP 2 Primary teacher replies to question two

Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
11 (64.7%)	5 (29.4%)	1 (5.9%)

TABLE DuP 3 Relationship between replies to questions one and two.

Alternative	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	3 (17.6%)	-	-
2	1 (5.9%)	-	-
3	7 (41.2%)	4 (23.5%)	1 (5.9%)
4	-	-	-
5	-	-	-
6	-	-	-
7	-	-	-
8	-	1 (5.9%)	-

TABLE DuP 4 Primary teacher replies to question three.

Statement	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	2 (11.8%)	14 (82.4%)	-
2	8 (47.1%)	6 (35.3%)	4 (23.5%)
3	6 (35.3%)	5 (29.4%)	2 (11.8%)
4	7 (41.2%)	-	2 (11.8%)
5	16 (94.1%)	-	1 (5.9%)
6	14 (82.4%)	3 (17.6%)	-

TABLE DuS 1 Secondary teacher replies to question one.

Alternative	Response
1	-
2	2 (6.1%)
3	25 (75.8%)
4	1 (3.0%)
5	3 (9.1%)
6	-
7	1 (3.0%)
8	1 (3.0%)

TABLE DuS 2 Secondary teacher replies to question two.

Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
24 (72.7%)	6 (18.2%)	3 (9.1%)

TABLE DuS 3 Relationship between replies to questions one and two.

Alternative	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	-	-	-
2	1 (3.0%)	1 (3.0%)	-
3	18 (54.5%)	5 (15.2%)	2 (6.1%)
4	1 (3.0%)	-	-
5	3 (9.1%)	-	-
6	-	-	-
7	1 (3.0%)	-	-
8	-	-	1 (3.0%)



TABLE DuS 4 Secondary teacher replies to question three.

Statement	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	16 (48.5%)	14 (42.4%)	2 (6.1%)
2	20 (60.6%)	13 (39.4%)	1 (3.0%)
3	18 (54.5%)	7 (21.2%)	5 (15.2%)
4	23 (69.7%)	5 (15.2%)	3 (9.1%)
5	29 (87.9%)	4 (12.1%)	-
6	19 (57.6%)	14 (42.4%)	-

TABLE DuC 1 Composite replies to question one.

Alternative	Responses
1	3 (6.0%)
2	3 (6.0%)
3	37 (74.0%)
4	1 (2.0%)
5	3 (6.0%)
6	-
7	1 (2.0%)
8	2 (4.0%)

TABLE DuC 2 Composite replies to question two.

Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
35 (70.0%)	11 (22.0%)	4 (8.0%)

TABLE DuC 3 Relationship between composite replies to questions one and two.

Alternative	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	3 (6.0%)	-	-
2	2 (4.0%)	1 (2.0%)	-
3	25 (50.0%)	9 (18.0%)	3 (6.0%)
4	1 (2.0%)	-	-
5	3 (6.0%)	-	-
6	-	-	-
7	1 (2.0%)	-	-
8	-	1 (2.0%)	1 (2.0%)

TABLE DuC 4 Composite replies to question three.

Statement	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	19 (38.0%)	28 (56.0%)	2 (4.0%)
2	28 (56.0%)	19 (38.0%)	3 (6.0%)
3	24 (48.0%)	12 (24.0%)	9 (18.0%)
4	30 (60.0%)	11 (22.0%)	5 (10.0%)
5	45 (90.0%)	4 (8.0%)	1 (2.0%)
6	33 (66.0%)	17 (34.0%)	-

## 6.9 COMMENT ON THE DURHAM TEACHER SURVEY

It will be seen that the return was strongly of the opinion (74%) that, though society was plural and secular, nevertheless it could still be described as contained within a Christian framework. Of those who settled for this alternative 67.6% (50% of the total return) rated it as of considerable importance as a social determinant of RE. Primary headteachers showed a tendency to rate social determinants as of lesser importance than did their secondary RE colleagues. The ratings given to the statements in the question dealing with the justification of RE (i.e. question 3) showed a roughly similar pattern between primary and secondary, in the differing proportion of the sample-return accorded to each measurement. The exception was the high proportion of primary headteachers who rated statement 1 only moderately (82.4%). This, perhaps, reflects the demands which the teaching of world-religions places upon primary school, and so was predictable. What was perhaps not so predictable was the quite high proportion of secondary teachers (42.4%) who rated this statement 1 only on a moderate scale. The overwhelmingly high percentage of the total return (90%) who rated statement 5 of question 3 on the considerable scale was appreciable support for the section of the thesis dealing with RE as a contribution to meaning-construction.

6.10 THE DERBY TEACHER SURVEY

Date: January, 1980.

Circulation: 52 questionnaires to a mix of 20 primary  
and 32 secondary schools in the city of  
Derby.

Return: 19 primary headteachers  
19 secondary RE teachers  
Total, 38 replies.

Percentage return: primary, 95%  
secondary, 59.4%  
Total, 73.1%

TABLE DeP 1 Primary teacher replies to question one.

Alternative	Response
1	-
2	4 (21.1%)
3	6 (31.6%)
4	2 (10.5%)
5	2 (10.5%)
6	-
7	-
8	5 (26.3%)

TABLE DeP 2 Primary teacher replies to question two.

Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
15 (78.9%)	3 (15.8%)	-

TABLE DeP 3 Relationship between replies to questions one and two.

Alternative	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	-	-	-
2	3 (15.8%)	1 (5.3%)	-
3	5 (26.3%)	1 (5.3%)	-
4	2 (10.5%)	-	-
5	1 (5.3%)	1 (5.3%)	-
6	-	-	-
7	-	-	-
8	4 (21.1%)	-	-

TABLE DeP 4 Primary teacher replies to question three.

Statement	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	3 (15.8%)	13 (68.4%)	3 (15.8%)
2	10 (52.6%)	8 (42.1%)	1 (5.3%)
3	3 (15.8%)	7 (36.8%)	7 (36.8%)
4	5 (26.3%)	4 (21.1%)	5 (26.3%)
5	16 (84.2%)	3 (15.8%)	-
6	9 (47.4%)	8 (42.1%)	2 (10.5%)

TABLE DeS 1 Secondary teacher replies to question one.

Alternative	Response
1	-
2	1 (5.3%)
3	11 (57.9%)
4	2 (10.5%)
5	1 (5.3%)
6	1 (5.3%)
7	1 (5.3%)
8	2 (10.5%)

TABLE DeS 2 Secondary teacher replies to question two.

Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
11 (57.9%)	6 (31.6%)	2 (10.5%)

TABLE DeS 3 Relationship between replies to questions one and two.

Alternative	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	-	-	-
2	1 (5.3%)	-	-
3	5 (26.3%)	5 (26.3%)	1 (5.3%)
4	2 (10.5%)	-	-
5	-	1 (5.3%)	-
6	1 (5.3%)	-	-
7	-	-	1 (5.3%)
8	2 (10.5%)	-	-

TABLE DeS 4 Secondary teacher replies to question three.

Statement	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	8 (42.1%)	11 (57.9%)	-
2	13 (68.4%)	5 (26.3%)	-
3	5 (26.3%)	7 (36.8%)	5 (26.3%)
4	10 (52.6%)	4 (21.1%)	2 (10.5%)
5	15 (78.9%)	3 (15.8%)	1 (5.3%)
6	7 (36.8%)	7 (36.8%)	5 (26.3%)

TABLE DeC 1 Composite replies to question one.

Alternative	Response
1	-
2	5 (13.2%)
3	17 (44.7%)
4	4 (10.5%)
5	3 (7.9%)
6	1 (2.6%)
7	1 (2.6%)
8	7 (18.4%)

TABLE DeC 2 Composite replies to question two.

Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
26 (68.4%)	9 (23.7%)	2 (5.3%)

TABLE DeC 3 Relationship between replies to questions one and two.

Alternative	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	-	-	-
2	4 (10.5%)	1 (2.6%)	-
3	10 (26.3%)	6 (15.8%)	1 (2.6%)
4	4 (10.5%)	-	-
5	1 (2.6%)	2 (5.3%)	-
6	1 (2.6%)	-	-
7	-	-	1 (2.6%)
8	6 (15.8%)	-	-

TABLE DeC 4 Composite replies to question three.

Statement	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	11 (28.9%)	24 (63.2%)	3 (7.9%)
2	23 (60.5%)	13 (34.2%)	1 (2.6%)
3	8 (21.1%)	14 (36.8%)	12 (31.6%)
4	15 (39.5%)	8 (21.1%)	7 (18.4%)
5	31 (81.6%)	6 (15.8%)	1 (2.6%)
6	16 (42.1%)	15 (39.5%)	7 (18.4%)



#### 6.11 COMMENT ON THE DERBY TEACHER SURVEY

The Derby returns showed a similarity with those of Durham. Again there was a strong preference for alternative 3 of question 1 (44.7% of the total return), but no-one from Derby opted for alternative 1 of this question, and there was a greater preference for alternative 8. Derby teachers attached greater weight to social determinants than did those of Durham, though there was a tendency to attach comparatively less importance to alternative 3 of question 1 as a social determinant (58.8% of those opting for this alternative placed it on the 'considerably' scale, as compared with the 64.8% of Durham subjects). Again there was a strong preference for statement 5 of question 3, but 81.6% of the total return as distinct from Durham's 90%. There was also a weaker support for statement 4 of question 3 (Derby's 39.5% on the 'considerably' scale compared with Durham's 60%). This might suggest that city-schools encounter more problems than do their more rural equivalents when dealing with the affective areas of religion, although an explanation could also be found in that Derby teachers might value critical objectivity more highly than their Durham counterparts on grounds of educational desirability. Despite these variations, however, there is an appreciable consistency between the two sets of findings.

6.12 THE COMBINED DURHAM/DERBY TEACHER SURVEY

Date: Autumn, 1979, to Spring, 1980.

Circulation: 138 questionnaires to a mix of 54 primary  
and 84 secondary schools.

Return: 36 primary headteachers  
52 secondary RE teachers  
Total, 88 replies

Percentage return: 63.8%.

Note: the figures in brackets refer to the number of  
replies; otherwise the figures refer to percentages.

TABLE CS 1 Replies to question one.

Alternative	Response
1	(3) 3.4%
2	(8) 9.1%
3	(54) 61.4%
4	(5) 5.7%
5	(4) 4.5%
6	(1) 1.1%
7	(2) 2.3%
8	(9) 10.2%

TABLE CS 2 Replies to question two.

Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
(61) 69.3%	(20) 22.7%	(6) 6.8%

TABLE CS 3 Relationship between replies to questions  
one and two.

Alternative	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	(3) 3.4%	-	-
2	(6) 6.8%	(2) 2.3%	-
3	(35) 39.8%	(15) 17.0%	(4) 4.5%
4	(5) 5.7%	-	-
5	(4) 4.5%	(2) 2.3%	-
6	(1) 1.1%	-	-
7	(1) 1.1%	-	(1) 1.1%
8	(6) 6.8%	(1) 1.1%	(1) 1.1%

TABLE CS 4 Replies to question three.

Statement	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	(30) 34.1%	(52) 59.1%	(5) 5.7%
2	(51) 58.0%	(32) 36.4%	(4) 4.5%
3	(32) 36.4%	(26) 29.5%	(21) 23.9%
4	(45) 51.1%	(19) 21.6%	(12) 13.6%
5	(76) 86.4%	(10) 11.4%	(2) 2.3%
6	(49) 55.7%	(32) 36.4%	(7) 8.0%

### 6.13 COMMENT ON THE COMBINED DURHAM/DERBY TEACHER SURVEY

It would seem that comment upon the survey should concentrate upon four areas. These are the sections of each question which attracted the largest proportion of support and the relationship between answers to questions one and two. The response to alternative 3 of question 1 was not predicted. The course of events, both in the RE world and in the country generally, since the second world war, to say nothing of the earlier analysis of this thesis, would have suggested a much weaker subscription to the view that there remained a Christian framework to the national life. It is noteworthy that, on this point, there was a consistency between the Durham and Derby surveys. Again, the response to question two was not altogether predictable. For, with the schools apparently becoming more open to society and with the steady pressure of sociologists of education for an influential place in teacher-education, one might reasonably predict a higher proportion of the respondents rating social considerations as of considerable importance to RE. In examining the relationship between the replies to questions one and two, it is necessary to look at a further breakdown of the figure of 39.8%. This is reported in the tables as a straight percentage of the total response, but when the figure is transcribed into a percentage of those opting for alternative 3 of

question 1 then it is 64.8%. In the first case the figure seems higher than might be expected (for reasons given above), but in the latter, lower, for once having subscribed to a Christian framework it seems reasonable to expect subscribers to see this as very important. In the response to statement 5 of question 3, the predicted response could reasonably have been higher than 86.4%, in view of the fact that RE teachers must be aware of the meaning-construction element of religion, and could be expected to see this as a particularly valuable part of their work. In view of the apparently significant differences between prediction and result in these areas, it seems a useful exercise to convert these into statistics.

$z$  = statistically significant figure

$r$  = actual response

$p$  = predicted response

$n$  = sample

$$z = \frac{r - p}{\sqrt{\frac{p(1-p)}{n}}}$$

Using this formula, the following figures result.

(1) Alternative 3, question 1  $z = +7.28$

(where  $p = 25\%$ )

(2) 'Considerably' rating, question 2  $z = -1.4$

(where  $p = 75\%$ )

(3) Relationship between questions 1 and 2,  
focusing on 'considerably' rating

(a) percentage of total response  $z = +3.0$   
(where  $p = 25\%$ )

(b) percentage of restricted response  $z = -2.5$   
(where  $p = 75\%$ )

(4) Statement 5, question 3, 'considerably' rating  
 $z = -1.3$  (where  $p = 90\%$ )

Taking the appropriate reading from the  $z$  tables, any figure greater or lesser than 1.96 is said to be statistically significant. (1), (3a), (3b) are therefore of some importance, as conclusions which outran expectations, though, of course, there is a degree of subjectivity in arriving at the  $p$  quantity. While (2) and (4) do not give significance-showings, because they could reasonably be predicted, they are nonetheless important in general terms to the argument of the thesis. In summary, therefore, one can say that the survey produced two statistically significant findings. One, that, of those who replied to the questionnaire, an appreciable majority supported the view that Britain can be deemed a plural, secular society, within a Christian framework, and, two, that this assumption should exert a considerable influence upon the nature and content of RE. In addition, important figures outside the range of the statistically significant indicated that the respondents considered that social

assumptions, though important, should not exert too great an influence upon the nature and content of RE. Also, in any consideration of the justification of RE within the curriculum, considerable attention, it was deemed, should be paid to the connection between religion and the process of helping pupils to make sense of the world. Furthermore, in the same connection, Christianity was regarded as validly occupying a considerable place in RE teaching, while the teaching of world-religions was rated only moderately. Major consideration should also be given to a critical and objective approach, and also to the attempt to handle religions from the inside, the two approaches, presumably, not being seen as mutually exclusive. The figures relating to the differentiation of RE and ME suggest both uncertainty about the desirability of this procedure and confusion as to what is meant by the suggestion. Some teachers, both primary and secondary, found the question incomprehensible.

6.14 TOTAL SURVEY

As indicated earlier, the pilot and main schemes had such a similar questionnaire, that, for interest sake, it seems justifiable to include tables covering the total response. Figures refer to percentages.

TABLE TS 1 Replies to question one.

Alternative	Response
1	2.4%
2	7.2%
3	60.8%
4	5.6%
5	8.8%
6	0.8%
7	2.4%
8	12.0%

TABLE TS 2 Replies to question two.

Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
55.2%	36.8%	5.6%



TABLE TS 3 Relationship between replies to questions one and two.

Alternative	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	2.4%	-	-
2	4.8%	2.4%	-
3	31.2%	24.8%	3.2%
4	4.0%	1.6%	-
5	4.0%	3.2%	-
6	0.8%	-	-
7	1.6%	-	0.8%
8	-	0.8%	0.8%

TABLE TS 4 Replies to question three.

Statement	Considerably	Moderately	Not at all
1	28.8%	62.4%	7.2%
2	55.2%	38.4%	4.0%
3	34.4%	37.6%	20.8%
4	45.6%	32.0%	11.2%
5	88.0%	10.4%	2.6%
6	49.6%	36.8%	5.6%

RECORD OF TEACHER COMMENT

6.15 Question 1 (a) Durham Primary

- a plural religious/secular society within a democratic framework

(b) Durham Secondary

- an amalgam of the two marked categories (i.e. alternatives 3 and 5)

(c) Derby Primary

- (alternative 2) but with a significant secular element
- number 3 is an adequate alternative without writing an essay
- a plural secular society, in transition from within a Christian framework
- I wish I understood the question, but definitely not number 1
- a plural secular society within a framework of state subsidised Christianity
- a plural secular society within a Christian democratic framework
- a plural secular society with plural religious minorities within a democratic framework

(d) Derby Secondary

- a plural capitalist society where most religious institutions support establishment ideologies
- a materialistic capitalist multi-racial and cultural society with illusions of democracy based on a vague understanding of religious truth

6.16 Question 2 (a) Durham Primary

- even though over recent years there has been an influx of 'foreigners' with their various religions this is still basically a Christian society. RE should be taught keeping this fundamental reason in mind
- without a Christian base RE teaching + history of theology is of no purpose
- all people who are content to live in our society should be made aware of its Christian tradition
- RE should be aware of the secular society and its misgivings and attempt as far as possible to develop upon the Christian framework
- RE should be relevant to children and their environment, e.g. Christian principles should be related to everyday events
- to help pupils to understand that British law and culture are founded in Christianity and to encourage a critical evaluation of this fact and its consequences
- assuming the assumptions themselves are correct, then obviously they must affect the nature and content of RE because teaching RE involves teaching "how to live"
- RE teaching should try to influence society rather than have society determine the nature of RE

- it is no longer reasonable to assume that children have been given a basic RE teaching at home, therefore RE teachers have to cover more ground
- to teach RE without taking this (i.e. question 1, alternative 3) into account would be a nonsense
- our system of democracy and concept of morality are based on the Christian ethic. It is necessary to show that this is still relevant to modern society and still very much an essential and vital force for the good of society as a whole
- I feel that RE will gradually disappear as a school subject, except for Assemblies and Festivals, and that the responsibility will devolve upon the various Christian, Moslem, Jewish, Buddhist churches according to parental wishes
- recent developments particularly in the T.V. field have made one think again about Christ and the Church. The 'myths' are no longer acceptable and the 'establishment' is weaker than it was
- an RE scheme should include teaching about the other major religions in the world (a) to accommodate non-Christian children and (b) to encourage Christian children to view other religions with understanding and tolerance

(b) Durham Secondary

- a child cannot be fully educated unless he is given some information/knowledge of the part that the various religions have played/are playing in the formation of British society

- must relate to society and its nature, demands and necessities
- an important aim in RE today is to enable pupils to understand what it means to believe (whatever!) but a believer cannot exist in isolation but has an important part to play in society
- you cannot completely detach the teaching of Religious Education from the society in which you live. Children must start from their own situation and this must be realised by the teacher
- Religious Education should be concerned with teaching the moral and ethical aspects of society showing that these two aspects have as their basis the beliefs of Christianity. Hence RE has some relevance in society
- all education ought to prepare pupils to understand and integrate into present day society and RE in particular has an especial role which must reflect upon the basis of human society within a religious context
- most pupils come from a secular environment, however it ought to be the aim of the RE teacher to show that (a) many of the social benefits we enjoy originated because of religious beliefs (b) the Christian ethics are the basis of societies (sic) laws controlling civilised behaviour

- a nation which repudiates its heritage is surely in danger of destroying itself. I think its heritage is tarnished but still superior to any presently available alternative. Therefore I must work in a liberal way to preserve it
- social environment influences all subjects; RE is not immune to this influence and should help in preparing pupils for life in society and its various beliefs and cultures
- for certain classes RE can be a study of set literature e.g. 'O' level syllabus E. Within this framework a great deal of valuable discussion can arise naturally, discussion which is of great relevance to the way we live, although it may veer away from our examination syllabus. Although such discussion is valuable and should be encouraged, for examination classes the main object remains a study and understanding of set books
- emphasis on particular aspects of Christianity needs to be made in the light of the present needs of society, particularly to produce a healthy balance between "secular" and "spiritual" religion
- education is characterised by conservatism. I would suggest that there is always a time lag before schools (and the curriculum) reflect the society in which they operate

- I feel RE is needed as this in many cases is the pupil's only link with religion, and the content should deal not only with Christianity and major religions but to (sic) look at Christian principles
- I believe RE is necessary to provide pupils with opportunity to evaluate and hopefully retain these Christian values which have shaped our society
- our society has both good and bad points. One aim of RE would be to build for a better society, not be moulded by what already is. If Christianity is to be considered, then it must be independent of society. We teach what we feel is needful, not what is dictated by society
- Religious Education must be concerned with the child in society and attempt to give an opportunity for him/her to become aware of the "spiritual dimension" within his environment
- as teachers of Religious Studies in a catholic school we teach the doctrines and outlook of our own faith
- RE should reflect some of the growth of religious awareness in such a society, exploring the different ideologies, differing practices and the problems of a multi-religious society
- if Religious Education involves a search for the meaning of life then it will be severely handicapped if it does not try to give meaning within the society

- in which people actually live - to ignore society in RE is to fail totally
- if society is not to deteriorate there must be a religious element in society. The values of Christian society are essential to the well-being of the whole society - a religious society, though plural, must encourage this
  - determinant factor in both religious and moral questions is that of the Christian ethos despite the ingrained lack of serious commitment to that ethos
  - most 'outsiders' consider RE to be the subject most isolated from 'real' life; on the contrary, it must be intensely concerned with all aspects of life if it is to be relevant to the needs of modern society
  - I am a convinced and practising Christian believing that Jesus is the Son of God and that he died for each person. Despite the fact that many are of no belief in our country that very thing should result in Christianity being centred upon as it has contributed in so many ways for so long in our society
  - Christianity being taught in schools is difficult to children without the background
  - the content of a religious ideology, especially Christianity, is found always over and above any temporal political system of thought. RE is inseparably linked with the changeless and its



content is not shaped by man if it is to remain valid

- we are teaching agnostics, sceptics, atheists - in the main. We have to present Religious Beliefs as simply as possible - belief in the highest points of Revelation of God and of Christ without any presuppositions of existing religious beliefs in our scholars
- the majority of children today know little about Christianity, the religious influences on their culture/society and religions in general
- if I assume the above, then the structure and content of RE should have some reality for the child and not be outmoded regurgitations of religious dogma (respondent opted for alternative 5)
- RE is a subject in which students are encouraged to think for themselves and make decisions in later life based on knowledge of their world, therefore it must contain elements about the nature of society, and the people in it, past and present
- if one has allied oneself with a particular ideology (the Christian) because one thinks that it embodies truth, then one wishes to present that view as a viable alternative without neglecting to take account of others (i.e. Buddhist, etc. or Communism)
- the education of a person's religious awareness is not dependent at all upon the society of Britain but is purely individualistic

(c) Derby Primary

- I consider RE to (be) highly important and of necessity should be related to our concept of society. RE teaching, however, could well have different emphases in different geographical areas
- so that all denominations and ideologies are satisfied and able to be involved
- I believe a large percentage of the population are still seeking a real meaning for their own existence and RE can help the child sort out the problems, give an awareness of the needs of others, and how Christianity can fulfil these needs
- impossible to ignore 'public opinion' but by no means always advisable to follow it
- the reasons are utterly manifest and surely require no elucidation
- in seeking to influence children's attitudes I think it is very important to attempt to assess all of the social and moral pressures at work on them
- with the mixed races all content of RE needs now to be carefully widened to include comparative approaches. Our methods in school now need to be far wider and much more dynamic in approach
- if RE were divorced from the society within which

- schools operate it would become meaningless - indoctrination not education. The word EDUCATION would have to be omitted
- the "social" and religious principles we hold should underlie everything we do in schools
  - children need to have a firm basis from which to make their own choice regarding Christianity and other religions
  - society is multi-racial multi-religious and our RE teaching must provide for the results of our national composition. With Sikh, Muslim, Hindu children in our schools we must allow for the validity of their cultures and beliefs in our teaching and can no longer claim that ours is a Christian society
  - organised Christianity is a declining force unlikely to affect deeply the lives of many children in adult life
  - the syllabus must be relevant to the area and catchment of each individual school
  - common themes underlying all major religions would seem to have more relevance than teaching specific dogmas
  - schools are agents of society and must interpret, re-interpret and be influenced by societal framework and attitudes

- it is to have any relevance for the pupils at all  
 - RE must take account of the state of society if  
 be grappling with change then it is a dead religion  
 cannot stand up to the challenge or be seen to  
 society. If a religious interpretation of life  
 such need to stand the tests of change in our  
 - religions claim to know "ultimate truths" and as  
 'host' tradition  
 groups, secular and immigrant, are shaped by the  
 - because the assumptions even of the more Christian  
 of children within their community  
 therefore be relevant to the needs and experiences  
 point that it is a very "personal" subject, must  
 subjects on the curriculum, with reference to the  
 - RE, to some extent segregated from the academic  
 is the "best" or "right" religion for us  
 ences between the religions and decision of which  
 on the Bible. Problem - how to discuss the differ-  
 are Christian the majority of RE should be based  
 ever, as the majority of people in this country  
 other religions really need to be discussed. How-  
 - we are living in a multi-racial society. Therefore

(c) Derby Secondary

- religious education cannot effectively operate  
 if it divorces itself from the realities of the  
 communities in its immediate environment

not only is Christianity the 'established' religion of the country and I believe the only true religion, but all members of society need to understand it to understand the meaning and purpose of the structure and laws of society in Britain

- because our society has its roots in Christianity and still operates with a broad Christian framework it should use Christianity as a starting point to discover what religion is about

- this assumption serves only as an approximate position from which most pupils themselves start/ come, in this respect it serves a purpose. It should not unduly effect the teaching methods or content of RE

- to inform pupils of traditions and restrictions enclosed (sic) upon us

- RE is about life, and it is to help the individual to relate to and understand his world. Therefore it is essential that a realistic approach to the religious life of Britain be taken - honest, objective and fair, rather than the teacher labouring under an obviously outmoded concept of religion and society. Pupils will easily see through this, but will respond to openness and honesty

- Christianity is our heritage in today's society where more and more emphasis is on secular aspects.

Children need to be made aware of the Christian connotations

- the condition of society at any given time should not affect the philosophical bases of RE since education is charged with helping to shape that society

- as the society is a plural one comparative religion should be taught though Christianity may be given more emphasis. An academic subject - not a way of life for all

- because it is the teacher's job partly to help pupils to know more of his society and be able to fit into it and also to know what he wants to try and alter

- because the child and family background is a vital part of society and live within the walls of society therefore is influenced by society to a large extent therefore RE teaching to the child should be relevant to the child's background

- make NO assumptions about religious knowledge of children - assume hostility or boredom to traditional religious ideas as they grow older and especially from anti-authoritarian children

- 'is' does not mean 'should be'

- RE must search for truth and truth only exists in reality - religion must be of the living not the

6.17 Question 3 (a) Durham Primary

- if RE does not return to a firm Christian platform teaching of the subject will be a perfunctory exercise

- it is time we stopped being afraid of 'indoctrination' and stressed to all our strong Christian foundation and traditions

- in or answer 3.3 we are doubtful. In general terms, in our school the moral framework relates quite closely to the Christian framework

- RE should try to bring an awareness of the spiritual dimension in human life

- it is not possible to generalise over RE teaching. The syllabus must be constructed to cater for the children it teaches i.e. committed Christians or non-committed

dead, it must be significant and relate wholly to life. The past is an aid to understanding and not the ultimate as many followers of religion prefer to see it

- one of the major roles of education is to prepare children for the adult world they are about to enter and they should be given a Religious Education that will give them an accurate picture of religion in Britain and the world today

- in our country the Bible teaching is embedded in the law of the land. Also there are expressions e.g. "being a Jeremiah" which cannot be understood without some knowledge of the Bible

- chief attention should be paid to Christianity as it is the religion of the country. Very necessary in these times for children to have a faith

- RE is the only way in which many children and young people will come to know and understand the Christian way of life

- RE should be basically Christian, with some reference to other world religions, and at secondary stage to Spiritualism. We must be wide in our approach, though I feel that eventually the Churches will accept responsibility for RE, according to parents' wishes. I see the time when, perhaps, the first hour of some school day(s) will be spent by children at a church of their parents' choice, if Britain is to continue as a Christian country

- I have to answer 6 in this way as I am a member of the Church. To make 'sense' means that children must have needs relevant to their age. I do not know how one can offer solutions adequately to a 16 year old by teaching RE



- since many children meet religion only in their  
 RE lessons it should be taught to them in as  
 unbiased way as possible, making them aware of  
 the different religious choices open to them  
 - there is a danger in holding up Christianity and  
 then comparing other religions with it - this is  
 wrong and especially wrong if one is aiming to  
 lead pupils into an understanding of what it  
 means to be (a) believer BUT Christianity requires  
 an importance because it has shaped our society  
 and thus the heritage and culture of our pupils  
 - RE should be in touch with worldly concepts and  
 aware of all religious beliefs, all of which are  
 individuals' methods of understanding God  
 - re 3.6 the time factor alone will determine the  
 greater amount of time being spent on Christianity  
 but this should not be seen as implying a Christian  
 bias  
 - the "world-denying" religions need to be taught  
 but only to a limited degree. Of the "world-  
 affirming" religions Christianity seems intellect-  
 ually superior so it should have special attention.  
 Marxism also needs to be taught. But in this  
 country teaching is about teachers, so everything  
 depends upon the particular Head of Department

(b) Durham Secondary

item 4: not sure what is meant by "from the inside" but I think there is some difficulty in this area

country/population

items 1 & 6: obviously dependent on area of the

worship, celebration, history, etc.

when teaching RE there are also the elements of

I consider RE has no other function, although

- item 5: if by "the world", you mean "life" then

Report 1938)

of a religious interpretation of life" 'Spens

has been made aware of the fact of the existence

be counted as properly educated unless he or she

- RE should be taught because "no boy or girl can

of Christ is the sure route to heaven

knowledge of them but we stress that the teaching

there are other world religions and to have some

- we like our pupils to know and appreciate that

tionally-based environment

culties in "reaching-out" beyond his materials-

teacher and an awareness of the child's diffi-

- basic need for sincerity on the part of the

Christian religions is not great

comparative religion. Thus, interest in non-

area there is no immigrant population and no

the area in which one teaches, e.g. in my own

- the answer to q.6 would depend to some extent on

if the idea of commitment is involved since I consider that RE can only be taught from a position of commitment and therefore world religions can provide some problems

- if society is not to decline the stress must be on Christianity. The world's major religions, if they are to be made sense of, must be taught as the religion of other people - in many parts of this country there are no practitioners
- particular emphasis required on the need to empathise with many moral and religious concepts within a loosely Christian basis
- the RE teacher should be 'committed' to some religion because any other attitude surely makes it impossible to take the subject seriously (consequently the RE teacher must be very self-aware of the inevitable bias of 'commitment' in order to control it)
- Christianity should be concentrated on to give pupils guidance and stability in an aimless society
- RE in some ways should facilitate the "living out" of a faith - especially Christianity - as well as being a merely academic and critical discipline. Children should be helped to know God not merely about Him

- Religious Education should be exclusively practical, showing how belief in God is the only way to happiness in the individual's experience, in social living and in our hopes for the life beyond the grave
- if RE has any validity do we need the 1944 Act to 'prop' it up? A more healthy attitude may be promoted if RE was not compulsory
- statement 5 above in my opinion is a main aim for RE

(c) Derby Primary

- (alternative) 3: there is a place for ME
- (alternative) 6: would consider "emphasis" rather than "concentration"
- the above assessments (especially no.1) only relate to Junior schools, not necessarily to later stages of education (this contributor's ratings were: (1) not at all, (2) not at all, (3) not at all, (4) moderately, (5) considerably, (6) considerably.)
- I am not sure that I understand statement 4 above. My underlying principle at assembly is that choice and decisions are very difficult but that decisions based on unselfishness and moral correctness nearly always bring lasting happiness
- the method must be meaningful and fit the "seeing eye" of our youngsters. It has to give them a

- balanced view of life, it has to be understandable and "full of life". Will it help them daily?
- no.1: as this is a church school I feel that major world religions should be left until later. We have no children of other faiths in the school
  - in primary schools I experience some difficulty in presenting a balance between Christian teachings and those of other religions which seem to lack suitable 'stories' for the pupils. There is a need to emphasise the humanity of man: all men, and their right to their beliefs
  - RE should continue to occupy only a short time in school
  - the questions were a little erudite for a 'simple' Christian like myself. I apologise for my inability to complete the form but will restate that in my school our Christian Education (as opposed to RE) is a reflection of our daily values and is not confined to the limits of a 'weekly' lesson. We try to practice as well as preach
  - (alternative) 4 I am unable to answer this as I am unsure of the meaning of this statement
  - RE should aim to provide the pupil (by his late 'teens) with sufficient understanding of the fundamental religious ideas to enable him to think out his own standpoint

(d) Derby Secondary

- with reference to this (alternative 6) RE must place an emphasis on some religion or area of study, because it is vital not to leave students at the end of the course in a "confused whirl" of experience of many different religions, but rather to place emphasis on the religion which is most relevant to the society
- (alternative 3): depends on what is meant by 'ME': not the Farmington brand which was well intentioned by the trustees but has miscarried  
 (alternative 4): as in any disclosure of one's personality  
 (alternative 6): you beg the question by assuming Christianity to be 'the major' religion
- in answering "considerably" for question 6 I would suggest that Christianity provides a way into the subject because for many of our pupils in a secular society their lives are organised around a very loose Christian framework
- RE should help pupils understand why people are religious. RE should indicate areas of human need to which religion supplies answers
- there is far too much said today about many religions basically being various ways to the same Lord - a false statement, and yet RE in

schools seems to be encouraging this attitude.  
RE should show how much each religion has to offer and where they fall short.

The main religion should be Christianity - biblically-based - because this is the most important religion and it does offer very good moral teaching which can lead to a discussion of how relevant these values are in England today and why they should be aimed at, even apart from religion

- RE should try and show that religion and science do not always differ
- RE should enlighten the child's experience of living in some kind of "spiritual" sphere to add a special (unique) quality to the child's experience of life
- it is important today as most children come from homes where there is no great religious commitment that they should be aware of the way Christianity has and is influencing the world and how other religions e.g. Islam also have an impact on our lives and what these religions involve

## CONCLUSION

6.18.i It must be acknowledged that the wide range of response, both in the tables and in the teacher-comment, makes the drawing of firm conclusions about the survey a difficult exercise. This difficulty, however, is counter-balanced by the existence of some significantly large responses in a few key-areas. Comment has already been made upon this fact, but it is, perhaps, necessary, nevertheless, to amplify the reasons for arriving at the p quantity in the statistics, before going on to relate the findings to the previous course of the study.

6.18.ii A prediction was made for a lower subscription to the concept of a Christian framework for society on the grounds of reduced church influence, the almost complete disappearance of Christianity as an explicit public referant in the political, social and educational decision-making process, and the impossibility of being now able to apply a simple Christian ethic to many areas of current moral dilemma (such as abortion, contraception, marital breakdown, the politics/sport frontier). Prediction was for a higher subscription to the importance of social considerations in shaping the nature and content of RE on the grounds that schools have seemingly never been so open to society as they are now, and that sociology of education not only figures in teacher-education



but is apparently all the while increasing its conceptual refinement and its research-output. The prediction was for a lower proportion of the total response opting for the 'considerably' measurement, in assessing the influence that the assumption of secular and plural within a Christian framework was deemed to merit, on the same general grounds as are outlined in the first sentence of this paragraph. However, it was predicted that, once a subscriber had reached the point of opting for a Christian framework, then he would be likely to see this as of considerable importance. Such a prediction, of course, betrays an assumption on the part of the researcher, in that he presumed that the selection of this particular alternative would be made because the respondent himself was favourably disposed to Christianity and would wish society to be so constructed. Such an assumption may not be too wide of the mark when one remembers that until quite recently (perhaps even remaining so) the body of RE teachers was predominantly Christian. On this basis a figure of 75% seemed a reasonable prediction. In the event, however, this was a higher figure than the eventual statistic denoting the proportion of those opting for the alternative, that Britain is a secular plural society within a Christian framework, and then rating this assumption on the 'considerably' scale. It is worth noting that this

statistic, of 64.8%, is exactly the same as that denoting the proportion of those opting for alternative 3, question 1 who rated statement 6 of question 3 on the 'considerably' scale. But it should also be noted that there was not an exact correspondence between those who opted for alternative 3, question 1, and those of this number who rated question 2 on the 'considerably' scale and who rated statement 6, question 3, on the 'considerably' scale. It might also be noted, en passant, that the reason why tables, giving these more refined measurements, but across the whole spread of the relationships between questions 1, 2 and 3, were not included, is that the numbers involved were not really large enough to warrant such an exercise. What seem to be the significant statistics are included in this section. Finally, the prediction for statement 5, question 3, could, it would seem, have been as high as 100% on the grounds that it is inconceivable for an RE teacher, who has done any thinking at all about the educational justification of his subject, to be unaware of his contribution to meaning-construction. However, allowance would have to be made for this possibility - in this case a 10% ratio. There were, in the event, only two respondents who opted for the 'not at all' scale on this issue. The figure of 10%, however, would seem realistic. Neither 90% nor 100%, as a p quantity, would have given a statistically significant result.

6.19 Although the diversity of the replies would dictate caution when relating findings to argument, in view of the only moderate size of the sample, nevertheless this diversity does make more valuable those areas in which the size of the response does make conclusions possible. Unfortunately the diversity was also accompanied, at times, by unclear expression of teacher-comment, and by inability on the part of the subjects to understand the point of some of the questions. The former is, no doubt, explained by the fact that teachers are busy, and that those who did complete the questionnaire would, in all likelihood, have done so hastily. This explanation can also serve to account for the lack of understanding of the point of some of the questions, if it is assumed that teachers are too busy to read around their subject. If so, this must be seen as serious, in view of the considerably increased output of RE literature since the beginning of the sixties, and of the growing body of research into RE, both as funded projects and for higher degrees. It is apt, therefore, to include at this point an endorsement of the call for increased in-service training for RE teachers. This call is now widespread, but is staggering somewhat under the (it is to be hoped) temporary effect of spending cuts.

6.20 A point of some importance to emerge from the survey is the absence of any appeal to the religious

clauses of the 1944 Education Act. Admittedly, this point was not specifically tested in the questionnaire, but the opportunity to comment was made available, should a teacher feel strongly about the matter. The only reference made to the Act was by a teacher querying whether there was now any need for legal support for RE. Perhaps the absence of comment as to whether plural RE was legal or not could be taken as evidence that the point made in the Introduction, about the flexible working of the Act, was appreciated by the sample. Perhaps, though, it just betokened that the sample deemed the Act an anachronism, to be dismissed from serious consideration (despite the Birmingham controversy of the mid-seventies). But perhaps, too, the absence of comment was just part of the pervasive sense of self-confidence that could be discerned in the replies. With a few exceptions, the respondents showed a belief in RE as having value in itself, in themselves as rendering a service to society, and in the future as offering continuing opportunities for the practice of this educational exercise. There would therefore be much (perhaps predictable!) support for the point to which the study headed, namely, that religious determinants must feature with social and educational determinants, both as having something validly prescriptive to say about RE, and yet as interacting with

the social and the educational to endorse a conclusion to which the latter were already pointing.

6.21 A further point that became overwhelmingly clear was the importance attached to the Christian cultural heritage of Britain - the 'host' tradition. Numerous comments were made about the desirability of bringing pupils, whether indigenous or immigrant, to appreciate these cultural roots. Such comments link directly with the relatively high subscription to the belief that society possesses a Christian framework. There would undoubtedly be sympathy for the discussion in chapter two in which it was urged, as a strategy for handling the science/religion tensions, that persistent efforts be made to show the continuing relevance to a scientific culture of Christian ethical values. It was, however, also noticeable that, with one or two exceptions, there was a recognition that any attempt to bring about an understanding of these values should be sensitive to the current nature of society. The full societal analysis of chapter two would, it seems, be appreciated, and the suggestion that society is enclosed within a Christian framework would be preferred.

6.22 It is rather difficult to relate the findings to chapter three, as the questionnaire did not directly test for the issues dealt with in that part of the study,

except in the area of the differentiation of RE and ME. The response to this last point would suggest that the sample was running true to the stereotype of teachers, as primarily concerned with the mechanics of teaching rather than with reflection upon theory. But the response to question 3 would belie such an explanation, and so it may be better to conclude that issues such as integration, heurism, comprehensivisation, individuality, and knowledge would need further specific testing to secure a response. A mere invitation to comment may not be sufficient to draw out teacher-opinion on these matters. The conclusion of that chapter, however, in which rationality was seen as the crucial framework for educational pluralism, would be likely to gain approval from the sample as a whole, in view of the response to question 3, statement 2. This same response would also suggest an acquaintance with the humanist critique, as discussed in chapter four, while some of the comments made about the nature of society would further indicate that the humanistic approach to religion and morals was recognised.

6.23 It is very clear that the discussion about the meaning-giving characteristics of religion would win resounding approval, as would the range of points made in chapter five of the study. There was a 100 per cent response to statement 5 of question 3 and the majority

of respondents settled for the 'considerably' rating. Yet the statement asking about whether RE should present religions 'from the inside', especially the affective parts, was accorded blank replies by nearly 14% of the returns. It is tempting to speculate that there may here be some link with the absence of comment about the issues of chapter three, particularly that of individuality and the concept of "need", indicating either a disinclination to think very fully on such matters, or a disinclination to comment without being presented with a more sophisticated test. Interestingly, the response to question 3 would suggest that, once the full weight of meaning-giving had been allowed, there was a desire not to permit any one factor to predominate in the issue of giving RE an educational rationale. Both the teaching of world-religions and the concentration upon Christianity drew sizable 'moderately' ratings and attracted even some 'not at all' scores. This, perhaps, links with the fairly high 'moderately' rating given to social determinants. Perhaps the general conclusion can be drawn, that this particular sample was not infected by any loss of nerve, which might drive them to a panic seizure of anything that would give some veneer of respectability to a subject of uncertain status.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSION

7.1 The question has often been asked in the RE world: what is the future of the subject in our changed society? The implication that sometimes pervades the question is that a plural society puts the future of school-RE in jeopardy. At times, the 1944 Act is quoted, either as a reason for pressing on with RE, or as a condemnation of what are seen as undesirable trends within RE teaching in schools. Similarly, the answers given to this question can sometimes convey a sense of desparation, the impression given being that RE is mournfully casting around for a role - whatever it may be - by which its presence in the schools can still be justified - however scantily. This study, however, has sought to avoid any such impression. The basic thesis has been that, far from the concept of a plural society making RE an embarrassing anachronism, it has, to the contrary, made it a positive requirement.

7.2 Pluralism has been taken to mean the belief that plurality of belief-and value-systems is desirable but containable, thus demarcating it from the merely factually plural on the one hand, and from anarchy on the other. As the nature and implications of pluralism



are explored, so force is given to the necessity for education actively to foster understanding both between and among diverse belief-systems. A plural society depends for its stability much more heavily upon such understanding than does a monist society, which considers a single major ideology to be the only one worthy of consideration by and of commendation to the young. In a situation of growing diversity of value-and belief-systems, mutual understanding and tolerance cannot be left optimistically to develop out of whatever social, political and industrial intercourse that may fortuitously occur between the various systems. Hostility, misrepresentation, polarisation and violence may just as naturally be the eventual outcomes. While education is not the only force making for understanding and tolerance, it is probably (or should be) a major influence. Also, while RE is not the only area in education which can foster understanding and tolerance towards and between the religions, it surely can be a major influence to this end. Criticisms that religious knowledge, religious truth and religious values are dubious concepts lose some of their sting in a pluralist situation, for pluralism requires a width of definition for such terms. Pluralism would seem to decree an honourable place for RE in the school curriculum.

7.3.i This conclusion has been reached in the thesis by the following route. The study opened with an examination of the religious provisions of the 1944 Education Act, concentrating upon the socio-religious assumptions which surrounded their acceptance. The implicit pluralism of the wording of the Act was noted. There followed an analysis of some major social and educational changes that subsequently occurred in England and Wales, in order to clarify what might be meant by the terms social and educational pluralism, and to see how these changes might bear upon RE. Attention was particularly directed to the question of containment, pluralism being distinguished from fragmentation. Some evidence exists to suggest that social pluralism may be still contained within a (loose) Christian framework, and the survey results showed that some teachers are hospitable to this reading of the situation. Changes in education were examined as a setting for the term educational pluralism. This examination focused particularly upon the plurality of knowledge and of individuality and their place in the changing scene, with an acceptance of the seemingly inevitable necessity for education to submit to the constraints of rationality. A continued assessment was also maintained of how RE might relate to the changes analysed.

7.3.ii As something of a link chapter, the Humanist critique of RE was then investigated, partly to identify a persistent plea for pluralistic RE, argued on the grounds of educational desirability, partly to throw further light upon the nature of pluralistic RE, and partly to appreciate the possibility that such a critique might amount to, at least, a near-determinant of pluralism in RE.

It was therefore now open to look closely at the philosophical case for a curriculum constructed on the basis of rational knowledge and meaning-construction. Although the view that religion is a form of knowledge might not yet be conclusively proven, the case seems strong that RE handles valid knowledge. It also contributes appreciably to an education directed towards the fostering of meanings. It is at this point that the argument that the nature of education and the nature of religion both require RE in the curriculum was particularly relevant. For religion, too, is very much involved in the practice of engendering meanings. Moreover, the concept of a plural society is a further undergirding of the argument in that the representation, within the schools, of the diversity of belief-systems, within the community, is a very proper educational priority in such a society.

7.3.iii RE's strength and continuance, however, do not depend, in the last resort, upon the calm deliberations of the theorists. It is the actual classroom-situation and the ways in which RE teachers handle this situation which count. No one with experience of teacher-education can fail to notice the disparity that often occurs between what is said and recommended for the classroom by the theorists, and what is actually done. So, an attempt was made to investigate teacher-reaction to some of the main issues handled in this study. Though the sample was only of a moderate size, it was representative in that there was an adequate mix of rural, semi-rural and urban schools, and of primary and secondary teachers. Initial doubts about the number of replies that might actually be returned, and the possibility that they might be too inadequate to be valid, were unfounded.

7.4 While there was both confusion and lack of clarity in the replies to the questionnaire, certain points stand out for comment. First, there was substantial support for the view that Britain is a secular plural society within a Christian framework. It could therefore be inferred that the social analysis of chapter two would be accepted by most of the respondents, and that Christianity would be allowed a place of continuing social significance in contemporary society. However, it was noticeable that a sizable number of the respondents

thought that social considerations should exert only a moderate, rather than a considerable, influence upon the nature and content of RE. Also, the response to question 3, statement 6 showed that nearly half the return considered that a concentration upon Christianity in RE was of only moderate or of no importance. Worthy of note, too, was the absence of reference to the religious clauses of the 1944 Education Act, either as justification for RE or of justification for resisting more modern trends in RE. In the section dealing with the educational justification of RE there was overwhelming support for the view that the meaning-giving characteristics of religions were of considerable importance, implying an understanding and acceptance of the corresponding section of the thesis dealing with this topic in chapter five. There was also quite strong support for the view that critical objectivity was a consideration of considerable importance, implying that there would be an appreciation of those parts of the thesis discussing the possibility of rationality being a determinant for plural RE, and of the bearing of the humanist critique (chapter four) upon this issue. But, there was nevertheless a significant number of respondents (many from the secondary sector) who rated the teaching of world-religions as only moderately important. There were two disappointing returns in this section, in that between 11 and 14 per cent of the respondents failed to

include replies to points 3 and 4. The difficulty in understanding an ME differentiated from RE was revealing, as could also be said of the fairly high percentage of the respondents who thought that a differentiated ME was not important. The parts of the study dealing with this would meet resistance! While just over half the respondents thought that religion should be presented 'from the inside', especially handling the affective parts, there was sufficient indication, from both statistics and comment, that the discussion of educational change in chapter three might also meet with a diversity of reception, although, without further more sophisticated testing, comment would have to be guarded on this point. The final point to stand out from the replies was the sense of self-confidence that teachers showed in their subject. Although there were a few exceptions, most of the respondents considered that RE was a worthwhile activity, of service to society. For a very few, this apparently entailed a major subordination of society to religion. But for most, self-confidence in the subject was combined with a striving for a sympathetic awareness of the present state of British society. It is a fitting conclusion to the whole study, therefore, to include a quote from a Durham secondary teacher. For the thesis has examined three basic determinants for pluralism in RE, namely, the individual in society,

current educational theory and practice, and the proper role of religion to clarify and foster values by challenging materialism and posing the possibility of the spiritual and eternal as well as bettering the physical. Provided each is given due consideration, it is not inappropriate to say with this respondent: 'The content of a religious ideology, especially Christianity, is found always over and above any temporal political system of thought. RE is inseparably linked with the changeless and its content is not shaped by man if it is to remain valid.'

APPENDIXTEACHERS' QUESTIONNAIRE



TEACHERS' QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Which of the following assumptions about the nature of society would you consider right? Please tick the appropriate box.

- Britain is: a Christian society
- a plural, religious society but within a Christian framework
- a plural, secular society, but within a Christian framework
- a plural, religious society within a secular framework
- a plural, secular society within a democratic framework
- a loose amalgam of localised but distinct ideologies
- a society in transition from a Christian to an alternative single ideology yet to be imposed
- in none of the above categories but might be classified as

2. How far should the above assumptions about society shape the nature and content of R.E? Please tick the appropriate box.

Considerably  Moderately  Not at all

Please give reasons for your answer

.....

.....

.....

3. How important do you consider the following statements in justifying R.E? Please comment on all six statements by ticking the boxes of your choice.

Considerably   Moderately   Not at all

- |  |                          |                          |                          |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. R.E. should handle all the major world religions  | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. R.E. should be critical and objective   | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. R.E. should be differentiated from M.E.   | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. R.E. should try and present religions 'from the inside', especially the affective parts | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. R.E. should try to help pupils make sense of the world                                  | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. R.E. should concentrate on Christianity as this is the major religion of Britain        | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Please add any preferred statements of your own

.....

.....

.....

4. Please specify:      primary school Head       secondary school Head of R.E.

NOTES, REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations used in this section

B.B.C.	British Broadcasting Corporation.
G.A.U.	George, Allen and Unwin.
H.M.S.O.	Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
H.S.	Hodder and Stoughton.
L.E.A.	Local Education Authority.
N.F.E.R.	National Foundation for Educational Research.
N.S.	National Society.
O.U.P.	Oxford University Press.
R.K.P.	Routledge and Kegan Paul.
S.C.M.	Student Christian Movement.
S.P.C.K.	Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.

1. Butler, Richard A. The Art of the Possible, 1st. ed., London: Hamilton, 1972, p.91.

'It is remarkable how in England educational planning and advance have coincided with wars. In the earlier years of the twentieth century the Boer War and the First World War had both provided an impulse.'

Butler proceeds to show how the Second World War provided an impulse to the reforms that were embodied in the 1944 Education Act.

Also, Gosden, Peter H.J.H. Education in the Second World War, 1st. ed., London: Methuen, 1976, pp.87 f., 431-3.

2. Bernbaum, Gerald. Social Change and the Schools 1918 - 1944, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1967. p.98 f.

3. Cruickshank, Marjorie. Church and State in English Education, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1963, pp. 137, 142.

4. Butler, op. cit., p.93 f.

5. Cannon, Charmian. The Influence of Religion on Educational Policy 1902 - 1944. British Journal of Educational Studies, May, 1964, Vol. 12, No.2, pp. 149 - 152.

6. Cannon, ibid., p.356 f.

7. Cruickshank, op. cit., p.139.

8. Murphy, James. Church, State and Schools in Britain, 1800 - 1970, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1971.

Murphy has suggested that Butler's difficulties have been exaggerated, the position from which he operated in fact being a position of strength. But he also pointed out that scarcely any schools had availed themselves of the freedom allowed since 1870 to dispense with religious

instruction, and indicated the desire for close co-operation between church and state to bring to an end the long struggle to confine state-supported education to secular subjects. Pp. 113-5.

9. Niblett, W. Roy. The Religious Clauses of the 1944 Act. Wedderspoon, Alexander G., (ed.). Religious Education 1944 - 1984, 1st. ed., London: G.A.U., 1966, p.19 f.

10. Lawson, John and Silver, Harold. A Social History of Education in England, 1st. ed., London: Methuen, 1973, p.417.

11. These five points were as follows:

- (i) religious instruction should be given in schools to all children, subject to a conscience clause;
- (ii) the school day should begin with a collective act of worship;
- (iii) religious instruction should not be confined to particular periods of the school day;
- (iv) agreed syllabus instruction should be open to inspection;
- (v) religious knowledge should be included as a subject for the Teacher's Certificate.

12. Educational Reconstruction, 1st. ed., London: H.M.S.O., 1943.
13. The Fourth R, London: N.S. and S.P.C.K., 1970, p.12.
14. Section 29.2 of the 1944 Act declared that the L.E.A.s should have power to constitute standing advisory councils on religious education.
15. Hull, John, M. Agreed Syllabuses, Past, Present and Future. Smart, Ninian, and Horder, Donald, (eds.). New Movements in Religious Education, 1st. ed., London: Temple Smith, 1975, p.99.
16. Hull, John, M. School Worship, an Obituary, 1st. ed., London: S.C.M., 1975, p.78 f.
17. 1944 Education Act, Pt.2, Sec.25.1.
18. But, as Hull points out, it was generally welcomed (op. cit., p.24).
19. These studies, conducted in the U.S.A. in 1928 and 1929, showed, inter alia, a weak correlation between church attendance and moral behaviour.
20. See references 225, 226 below.
21. Hemming, James, and Marratt, Howard. Humanism and Christianity: The Common Ground of Moral Education, 1st. ed., London: (then) Borough Road College, 1969.

22. It was a common 19th century belief that religious instruction should aim to produce biblical knowledge and moral behaviour, without, at the same time, giving people ideas above their station. Hannah More, perhaps, is a prime exemplar of this belief.

23. Hull, op. cit., pp.23-4, has summarised the philosophy of RE that held sway from 1920 - 1965 as follows:

1. The school was recognised as a Christian community.
2. The task of Christian education (which was not distinguished from religious education and which was an attitude towards the whole curriculum as well as belonging to specific periods) was to bring this community to self-consciousness, that is to create Christian discipleship.
3. Religious education can as a consequence only be taught by Christians.
4. In assembly, the school affirmed explicitly what was implicit in all its work, namely its aspiration towards the divine society of which it was the image. The school would lift its heart in worship of God.

24. Free Church Federal Council, Religious Education in County Schools, London: The Council, 1977.

This comment, of course, not to be taken literally!

25. Marwick, Arthur. Britain in the Century of Total War, 1st. ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970, p.323.  
The Explosion of British Society 1914 - 1970, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1971, pp.107-8.
26. Bantock, Geoffrey H. Education in an Industrial Society, 1st. ed., London: Faber, 1963, pp.198, 334 f.
27. Hummel, Raymond C., and Nagle, John M. Urban Education in America, 1st. ed., New York: O.U.P., 1973, p.55.
28. Wirth, Louis. Urbanism as a Way of Life. American Journal of Sociology, 1938, vol.44, pp.1-24.
29. Hodgkinson, Harold L. Education, Interaction and Social Change, 1st. ed., Hemel Hempstead: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
30. Hodgkinson. ibid., p.141.
31. Hummel and Nagle, op. cit., p.71.
32. Goslin, David A. The School in Contemporary Society, 1st. ed., Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1965, p.56.
33. Shipman, Marten D. Education and Modernisation, 1st. ed., London: Faber, 1971, p.175.
34. Shipman. ibid., p.182.

35. Russell, Bertrand, and Russell, Dora. The Prospects of Industrial Civilization, 2nd. ed., London: G.A.U., 1959, p.46 f.

36. Cruickshank, Marjorie. Church and State in English Education, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1963, p.171.

'..... within a decade of the passing of the Act over a thousand village schools, the majority of them Anglican, had disappeared completely.'

37. e.g. Birmingham L.E.A., Living Together, 1975.

38. This has been Lord Denning's repeated assertion when rebutting criticism that he has been anti-Trade Unions.

39. cf. Reeder, David. A Recurring Debate: Education and Industrialisation. Bernbaum, Gerald, (ed.). Schooling in Decline, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1979, pp.115 f., 145.

40. Baron, George. Society, Schools and Progress in England, 1st. ed., London: Pergamon, 1968, p.191.

41. Ashby, Eric. Technology and the Academics, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1958, p.50 f.



42. Musgrave, Peter W. Technical Change, the Labour Force and Education, 1st. ed., London: Pergamon, 1967.

43. More, apparently, out of a desire to destroy the school boards than out of a failure to appreciate its possible worth.

Banks, Olive. Parity and Prestige in English Secondary Education, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1955, p.22 f.

44. Lowndes, George A.N. The Silent Social Revolution, 2nd. ed., London: O.U.P., 1969, p.334.

45. Vick, F.A. Science and its Standards. Niblett, W. Roy, (ed.). Moral Education in a Changing Society, 1st. ed., London: Faber, 1963, p.67.

46. Vick. ibid., p.77.

47. Pinion, Francis B. Educational Values in an Age of Technology, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1964, pp.136-7.

48. Waddington, Conard H. Tools for Thought, 1st. ed., London: Cape, 1977, pp.27-9.

49. Dixon, Bernard. What Is Science For? 1st. ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, chapter 8, p.157 f.

50. Dixon, ibid, p.182.

51. Dixon. ibid, p.197.

52. Dixon. ibid, p.197 f.
53. Bantock, Geoffrey H. Education for the 70's. Garforth, Francis W., (ed.). Aspects of Education - Nine, Journal of the Hull Institute of Education, 1969, p.18 f.
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55. Ravetz, Jerome R. Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems, 1st. ed., London: O.U.P., 1971, p.66.
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57. Bronowski, Jacob. Science and Human Values, 1st. ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964.
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59. This seemed at the heart of Mr. Callaghan's intention in initiating the "Great Debate" of the mid-70's.
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61. Short, Edward. Education in a Changing World, 1st. ed., London: Pitman, 1971, p.15.
62. Ministry of Education Report, 15-18, London: H.M.S.O., Vol.1, 1959, p.52, para.78.
63. However adaptable religions may become to modern knowledge it is difficult to see how the idea of the "given" can ever be completely abandoned.
64. Shipman, op. cit., p.173.
65. Hirst, Paul. Moral Education in a Secular Society, 1st. ed., London: University of London, 1973.
66. Williams, Raymond. Television: Technology and Cultural Form, 1st. ed., London: Fontana, 1974.
67. Williams, ibid., p.130.
68. Groombridge, Brian. Television and the People, 1st. ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, p.19.
69. Wilson, Criminal Law Review, June, 1961.
70. B.B.C., Violence on Television, 1972, p.126.
71. It would seem, however, that the safest assumption on which to operate is that there is a link. Recent evidence for such a link is provided by Belson, William A. Television Violence and the Adolescent Boy, 1st. ed.,

Farnborough: Saxon House, 1978. The B.B.C. has seemed reluctant to move to Belson's position. The 1972 Report (see ref. 70, above) maintained that there was no basis for concluding that criticism of there being too much violence was justified, while nevertheless displaying concern.

72. Golding, Peter. The Mass Media, 1st. ed., London: Longman, 1974, p.8.

73. University of Leicester. The Future of Broadcasting, Preliminary Report, 1973. Quoted in Golding, op. cit., p.106.

74. Eyre-Brook, Elizabeth. Political Socialisation and the Mass Media, unpublished thesis, Leicester: Centre for Mass Communication Research, 1973.

Quoted in Golding. op. cit., p.85.

Also in Howitt, Dennis. The Effects of Television on Children. Brown, J. Raymond, (ed.). Children and Television, 1st. ed., London: Collier-Macmillan, 1976, chap.15, p.320 f.

75. This finding may apply equally to religious opinions.

76. Britain 1980, 1st. ed., London: H.M.S.O., 1980, p.414.

..... some 98 per cent of the population have

access to television. It is estimated that about 10 per cent of households have two or more receivers. Average viewing time per person is over 17½ hours a week.'

77. Smith, D.M. Some Uses of Mass Media by 14-year Olds, Journal of Broadcasting, Vol.16., No.1, Winter, 1971-2, p.90.

(Quoted in Golding, op. cit., p.90).

78. cf. Bugler, John. Radio Times, 3-9 Nov., 1979, p.102.

79. Murdock, Graham, and Phelps, Guy. Mass Media and the Secondary School, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1973, p.9.

80. See ref.73, above.

81. Dunn, Gwen. The Box in the Corner, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1977, p.149.

'Very little evidence about the effects of TV on children of any age could be offered to this (i.e. the Annan) committee.'

82. Hoggart, Richard. Culture: Dead and Alive. Speaking to Each Other, 1st. ed., London: Chatto and Windus, 1970, Vol.1, pp.121-134.

83. B.B.C., Handbook, 1928.

84. Quoted in Quickie, Andrew. Tomorrow's Television, 1st. ed., Berkhamstead: Lion, 1976.

85. Quickie, ibid., p.42.

86. Booker, Christopher. The Neophiliacs, 1st. ed., London: Collins, 1969.

87. Hartmann, Paul, and Husband, Charles. Racism and the Mass Media, 1st. ed., London: Davis-Poynter, 1973.

88. McQuail, Denis. Towards a Sociology of Mass Communications, 1st. ed., London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969, p.12.

89. See chapter 5, below.

90. Gordon, George N. Classroom Television, 1st. ed., New York: Hastings House, 1970.

Firth, Brian. Mass Media in the Classroom, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1968.

Although writing generally, these authors should be of interest to RE teachers.

91. McQuail, Denis. Television and Education. Halloran, James D., (ed.). The Effects of Television, 1st. ed., London: Panther, 1970.

92. McQuail, ibid., p.201.

93. B.B.C. School Broadcasts, Research and Evaluation Report No.6, London: B.B.C., 1979, pp.27-30.

94. McQuail, op. cit., p.12.

95. Quickie, op. cit., p.125.

96. Schramm, Wilbur, (ed.). Mass Communications, 2nd. ed., Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960, p.654.

This comment is equally relevant to the U.K.

97. Musgrove, Frank, Youth and the Social Order, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1964, p.33.

98. See chap. 3, below.

99. Hall, G. Stanley. Adolescence: Its Psychology and its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education, 1st. ed., New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1904.

100. Murray, Christopher, (ed.). Youth in Contemporary Society, 1st. ed., Windsor: N.F.E.R., 1978, especially chap. 3 and sec. 2.

101. "Culture" is a word with a number of possible meanings. Here it is used in the straightforward sense of describing a group with a relatively developed, shared value-system different from that of its neighbours.

The investigation of this study is into values, rather than life-styles.

102. Coleman, James. The Adolescent Society, 1st. ed., New York: Free Press, 1961.

103. Coleman. ibid., p.9.

104. Stenhouse, Lawrence. Culture and Education, 1st. ed., London: Nelson, 1967, pp.130-1.

105. Mead, Margaret. Culture and Commitment, 1st. ed., New York: Doubleday, 1970.

106. Simmons, Luiz R. The Real Generation Gap. Gottlieb, David, (ed.). Youth in Contemporary Society, 1st. ed., Beverley Hills: Sage, 1973, p.347.

107. Musgrove, Frank. The Family, Education and Society, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1966, p.31.

108. Hargreaves, David H. Interpersonal Relations and Education, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1973, chap. 10, p.337 f.

109. Musgrave, Peter W. The Moral Curriculum: a Sociological Analysis, 1st. ed., London: Methuen, 1978.

110. Wright, Derek, and Cox, Edwin. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 1971, vol.10, No.4, pp.332-41, (quoted, Musgrave. op. cit., p.51).



111. Musgrave, op. cit., p.50.
112. Short, Edward. Education in a Changing World, 1st. ed., London: Pitman, 1971, p.33 (citing Jeffreys).
113. Marland, Michael, et. alia. Pastoral Care, 1st. ed., London: Heinemann, 1974, chap. 3, p.23 f.
114. Barker, Rodney. Education and Politics 1900 - 1951, 1st. ed., London: O.U.P., 1972, p.82 f.
115. Marland, op. cit., p.43.
116. Murdock and Phelps. op. cit., p.109 f.
117. Davies, Brian. Social Control and Education, 1st. ed., London: Methuen, 1976, p.154 f.
118. Marland, op. cit., pp.26-7.
119. Goldman, Ronald. Religious Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1964.
120. Loukes, Harold. Teenage Religion, 1st. ed., London: S.C.M., 1961.
121. Hyde, Kenneth E. The Home, The Community and the Peer Group.
- Smart, Ninian, and Horder, Donald, (eds.). New Movements in Religious Education, 1st. ed., London: Temple Smith, 1975, p.33 f.

122. Wright, Derek. Problems of Religious Education in Grammar Schools, M.A. Thesis, University of Birmingham.
123. Alves, Colin. Religion and the Secondary School, 1st. ed., London: S.C.M., 1968, chap. 5, p.91 f.
124. Hirst, Paul. Knowledge and the Curriculum, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1974, p.184 f.
125. Elvin, Lionel. The Place of Common Sense in Educational Thought, 1st. ed., London: G.A.U., 1977.
126. Holm, Jean. Teaching Religion in School, 1st. ed., London: O.U.P., 1975, p.140.
127. See chap. 5, below.
128. Luckmann, Thomas. The Invisible Religion, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1967, p.40.

'What are the dominant values over-arching contemporary culture? ..... The survival of traditional forms of church religion, the absence, in the West, of an institutionalized antichurch, and the overwhelming significance of Christianity in the shaping of the modern western world have combined in obscuring the possibility that a new religion is in the making.'

129. Wall, William D. Constructive Education for Children, 1st. ed., London: Harrop/Paris: Unesco, 1975, p.25.
130. Brubacher, John S. Modern Philosophies of Education, 3rd. ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, p.132.
131. Norman, Edward R. Church and Society in England 1770 - 1970, 1st. ed., London: O.U.P., 1976, p.424 f.  
See ref. 143, below.
132. Musgrove, Frank. Power and the Integrated Curriculum. Taylor, Philip, and Tye, Kenneth A., (eds.). Curriculum School and Society, 1st. ed., Windsor: N.F.E.R., 1975, p.37 f.  
Musgrove seems to regard this possibility as feasible.
133. Mascall, Edward L. The Secularisation of Christianity, 1st. ed., London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1965.
134. e.g. Bultmann, Rudolf. Jesus Christ and Mythology, 1st. ed., New York: Scribner, 1958.
135. Cox, Harvey G. The Secular City, 1st. ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.
136. Robinson, John A.T. Honest to God, 1st. ed., London: S.C.M., 1963.
137. The concept of secularisation would require a fairly

extensive analysis before settling for a particular meaning. Modern theologians seem usually to accept that secularisation has occurred, but the possible meanings for the term are fairly numerous. (e.g. the critique of Shiner's six meanings in Hill, Michael. A Sociology of Religion, 1st. ed., London: Heinemann, 1973, p.228 f.). Much depends on the prior definition of religion (if man is defined as intrinsically religious then secularisation cannot take place: there will be only changes in the way that religion is expressed). It may be possible to be pushed into an uncritical acceptance of the secularist analysis of society because of the sheer size of its advocacy.

138. Norman. op. cit., p.424.

139. Norman. op. cit., p.426.

140. Hyde. op. cit., p.35.

141. Church and State, Report of the Archbishop's Commission, London, 1970.

142. May, Philip R., and Johnston, O. Raymond. Religion in our Schools, 1st. ed., London: H.S., 1968, pp.18, 32 f.

143. Norman. op. cit., p.427.

144. As T.S. Eliot claimed (quoted in May and Johnston. op. cit., p.32).

145. Perhaps this chapter has insufficiently examined the position that society is not, despite many protestations affirming pluralism, in fact a pluralist society, as David Martin has argued - The Secularisation Question, Theology, Feb., 1973, Vol.76, No.630. In so far as the aim has been to indicate the multiplicity of value-systems, this possible inadequacy is justified, for plurality of value-systems cannot be denied, and, for the purposes of this study, must be examined for their implications for RE. In so far as the chapter has framed the question: What, if anything, now constitutes the framework by which such plurality is contained? the answer must at least recognise the possibility that some over-arching system (maybe religious) is emerging which could be deemed pluralism's framework (cf. ref.128, above). The difficulty here, though, would be that the same evidence can be taken in opposite ways (cf. Gill, Robin. The Social Context of Theology, 1st. ed., London: Mowbray, 1975, chap.9, p.119 f.). It can be argued that the evidence from current religious activity betokens both a secularisation process and an increasingly religious society. To handle this situation would require an analysis at least as extensive as the total length of this current

study. Even were it proved that society was monist, it would still not follow that school RE should abandon plurality. So the prima facie position has been accepted as a basis from which the study can properly start, this position being that even when society was widely recognised to be Christian there were nevertheless plural elements, and that these plural elements are of a different nature now than in 1944. This also leaves open the possibility that a reshaped Christianity might yet serve again as framework (cf. Edwards, David L. Religion and Change, 1st. ed., London: H.S., 1969, p.269 f.).

146. It appears, for example, that industrialisation necessitated a literate and adaptable work-force, and so education widened to meet this need. Also, progress towards a political democracy necessitated an educated electorate, which, in turn, gave rise to a more democratic educational system.

cf. Banks, Olive. The Sociology of Education. 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1968, p.210 f.

cf. Bantock, Geoffrey H. Education and Values, 1st. ed., London: Faber, 1965, p.119 f.

Banks' tentativeness links with Bantock's caution against too simple a causal connection.

147. Blyth, William A.L. English Primary Education, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1967, Vol.2, chap.1, p.3 f.

Blyth acknowledges his debt to Aries, Philippe. Centuries of Childhood, 1st. ed., London: Cape, 1962. Hence, the critiques of Aries in Tucker, Nicholas. What is a Child?, 1st. ed., London: Fontana/Open Books, 1977, p.13 f., and in de Mause, Lloyd, (ed.). The History of Childhood, 1st. ed., London: Souvenir, 1976, chap.1, p. are of relevance at this point.

148. Blyth. op. cit., p.7.

149. Children and Their Primary School, London: H.M.S.O., 1967.

150. Report of the Consultative Committee on the Primary School, London: H.M.S.O., 1931.

151. Blackie, John. Changing the Primary School, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1974, p.49.

152. Peters, Richard S., (ed.). Perspectives on Plowden, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1969, p.3 f.

153. Dearden, Robert F. The Aims of Primary Education. Peters, ibid., p.21 f.

154. Dearden, ibid., p.37.

155. Ministry of Education Pamphlet 9, The New Secondary Education, 1st. ed., London: H.M.S.O., 1947.

Traditional subjects, it is stated, are to make way for courses growing out of the interests of the children: freedom and flexibility were key words, examinations were suspect. Yet the secondary modern schools have been particularly zealous, and often successful, in developing G.C.E. as well as C.S.E. courses in a bid for the prestige surrounding such developments (Taylor, ref.209, below).

156. Holt, John. How Children Fail, 1st. ed., London: Pitman, 1964, p.165 f.

157. Department of Education and Science, Half Our Future, 1st. ed., London: H.M.S.O., p.112, para.313.

158. Biehler, Robert F. Child Development: an Introduction, 1st. ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976, p.84 f., for an indication both of the variety of theories and of the basic agreement about the point here being made.

159. e.g. Stone, L. Joseph, and Church, Joseph. Childhood and Adolescence, 2nd. ed., New York: Random House, 1968, chap.4, p.164 f.

160. As, for example, laid out in the 1930 Children's Charter's 19 provision, which arose from the 3rd. White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. A further remark may be noted in Gesell, Arnold, et alia. The Child



From Five to Ten, 1st. ed., London: Hamilton, 1965,  
p.452.

'Developmentalism is the very opposite of fascism,  
for it acknowledges the individuality of the child.'

161. These methods do not always work, as the William  
Tyndale affair has tragically shown.

162. Bassett, George, W. Innovation in Primary Education,  
1st. ed., London: Wiley-Interscience, 1970.

163. Bassett. ibid., p.44.

164. Dearden, Robert F. Instruction and Learning by  
Discovery. Peters, Richard S. (ed.). The Concept of  
Education, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1967, p.135 f.

165. Dearden, Robert F. The Philosophy of Primary  
Education, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1968, p.45.

166. Dearden. ibid., p.46.

167. Dearden. ibid., p.46.

168. Holt. op. cit., pp.171-5.

169. This principle is perhaps most clearly illustrated  
in the Schools Council Integrated Humanities Scheme, in  
which Lawrence Stenhouse advocates the concept of  
'teacher neutrality' as the way to help a pupil reach  
his own conclusions about an issue.

170. Dearden, op. cit., p.54 f.
171. Alves, Colin. The Christian in Education, 1st. ed., London: S.C.M., 1972, p.28 f.
172. The Fourth R, 1st. ed., London: N.S. and S.P.C.K., 1970, p.276, para.575.
173. Alves. op. cit., p.56.
174. Dearden. op. cit., chap.2, p.54 f.
175. cf. Peters, Richard S. Ethics and Education, 2nd. ed., London: G.A.U., 1970, p.251.
176. Holley, Raymond. Learning for Living, May, 1970, Vol.9, No.5, pp.17-20.
177. Warwick, David. Teaching Methods and Strategies: the Current Situation. Birnie, Ian H., (ed.). Religious Education in Integrated Studies, 1st. ed., London: S.C.M., 1972, p.45 f.
178. Pring, Richard. Curriculum Integration. Golby, Michael, et alia, (eds.). Curriculum Design, 1st. ed., London: Croom Helm/Open University, 1975, p.272 f.
- Pring has indicated the lines of a defence that would have to be made against Hirst's advocacy of logically distinct modes of understanding, with their own procedures of validation and enquiry, by which reality can

be interpreted and intelligibly comprehended. The defence would be either to claim that Hirst's view of knowledge is false or to claim that it is incomplete. If the latter course is adopted, at least two possibilities present themselves. It might be argued that many problems, particularly personal ones, cannot be raised, let alone answered, within any cognitive structure. Or it might be argued that the disciplines represent the worked-out structures of knowledge, without representing the pupil's present level of understanding, and that integrated studies would help him to work out the route by which he eventually arrives at the differentiated conceptual structures. If, however, the differentiated structures are illusory, then it could be argued that enquiry is to be equated with problem-solving, and integrated studies would therefore facilitate enquiry by stimulating the pupil to set out in any direction into new experiences and fresh connections of ideas. This would make the method of enquiry itself unitary, rather than the subsequent knowledge.

179. Sadler, John E. Concepts in Primary Education, 1st. ed., London: G.A.U., 1974, p.139 f.

180. See ref. 177, above.

181. Dewey, John. How We Think, 1st. ed., Boston: Heath, 1910.

Kilpatrick, William H. Philosophy of Education, 1st. ed., New York: Macmillan, 1951.

James, Charity. Young Lives at Stake, 1st. ed., London: Collins, 1968.

182. Pring, Richard. Curriculum Integration. Peters, Richard S. (ed.). The Philosophy of Education, 1st. ed., London: O.U.P., 1973, chap.6, p.123 f.

183. But he calls for 'a generous definition of knowledge, not confining it to propositional knowledge', stressing the importance of practical knowledge.

Pring, Richard. Knowledge and Schooling, 1st. ed., London: Open Books, 1976, chap.2, p.25 f.

184. See ref. 132, above.

185. Schools Council. Religious Education in Secondary Schools, Working Paper 36, 1st. ed., London: Evans/Methuen, 1971, chap. 6, p.53 f.

186. Schools Council. ibid., p.58.

187. Hirst, Paul H. Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge. Archambault, Reginald D. Philosophical Analysis and Education, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1965, p.135 f.

188. Schools Council. op. cit., p.58.

189. Brian Gates refers to biblical material as 'something of an erratic boulder on the landscape of contemporary curriculum development' in Religion, Spring, 1973, Vol.3, No.1.

190. There do not seem to be in practice any straightforward ways of making the centrality of religion unmistakable to all pupils. Loose links, such as "Trees of the Bible" in a scheme on "Timber", or quaint analogies, such as "Angels" in a scheme on "Flight", do not achieve much. Nor does the adding of material about "The Good Shepherd" to a theme on sheep farming. Furthermore, the implicit-religion concept is highly sophisticated.

191. Holm, Jean. Life-Themes: What are They? Learning for Living, Nov., 1969, Vol.9, No.2, p.15 f.

192. Hull, John M. The Theology of Themes, Scottish Journal of Theology, Feb., 1972, Vol.25, No.1, p.20 f.

193. Hull. ibid., p.23.

The theme, entitled "All Work and no Play" contained thirty-two topics 'ranging from the advantages of midweek travel, through places Jesus visited, to holidays in space, and including how to avoid travel sickness, words which have entered the

English language from other languages, a map of Palestine two thousand years ago, how people celebrate Christmas, the earth's atmosphere, the Egyptian myth of the creation of the world, Darwinian evolution, horoscopes, bank holidays and how to make an electric map of Palestine complete with wiring diagram'.

194. Hull. ibid., p.30.

195. Richards, Norman A. Religious Education in Secondary Schools (1), 1st. ed., London: Association of Christian Teachers, 1978, p.20 f.

196. Richards. ibid., p.23 f.

197. "Integration" of RE can lead to extinction.

198. It should be stressed that this distinction is seen as harmful by some educationists (e.g. James. op. cit., p.134).

199. Barker, Rodney. Education and Politics 1900 - 1951, 1st. ed., London: O.U.P., 1972, p.84 f.

200. Banks, Olive. Parity and Prestige in English Secondary Education, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1955, p.136.

201. Banks. ibid., pp.143-5.

202. Barker. op. cit., p.85.
203. Education (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1947.
204. Cole, George D.H. Education and Politics: a Socialist View. Year Book of Education, 1952.
205. Cole. ibid., p.63.
206. Pedley, Robin. The Comprehensive School, 1st. ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963, p.38.
207. Labour Party. Towards Equality, 1956.
208. Barker. op. cit., p.95.
209. Taylor, William. The Secondary Modern School, 1st. ed., London: Faber, 1963.
210. Butler, Richard A. Education, the View of a Conservative, Yearbook of Education, 1952.
211. Labour Party. Challenge to Britain, 1953.
212. This, of course, lies behind the advocacy of mixed-ability teaching.
213. Coleman, James. The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity. Open University Reader, School and Society, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., 1971, chap.40, p.233 f.

214. There was a distinct shift in the debate about equality of opportunity in the 1960's to the idea of compensatory education, as the sociologists produced research-results seeming to prove a link between poor home-background and poor school-performance. Even in the 1940's and 1950's the idea of compensatory maintenance grants was operational. The emphasis now is more on equality of outcomes (Halsey) than equality of opportunity.

215. Lynn, Richard. Comprehensives and Equality: the Quest for the Unattainable. Siler, Harold, (ed.). Equal Opportunity in Education, 1st. ed., London: Methuen, 1973.

216. Schools Council, Humanities for the Young School Leaver: an Approach through Religious Education, 1st. ed., London: Evans/Methuen, 1969, p.11.

217. Hull, John M. Religious Education in a Pluralist Society. Taylor, Monica J., (ed.). Progress and Problems in Moral Education, Windsor: N.F.E.R., 1975, p.195 f.

218. Bernstein, Basil. Open Schools - Open Society. Class, Codes and Control, 1st. ed., London: R.K.P., Vol.3, Pt.1, chap.3, p.67 f.



219. Holly's critique of Bernstein, in that he is too elegant and neat and so does not allow for the contradictions that are thrown up in the process of change, is worth noting. Holly, Douglas. Society, Schools and Humanity, 1st. ed., London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1971, p.47 f.

220. Hirst, Paul H. Morals, Religion and the Maintained School. Knowledge and the Curriculum, London: R.K.P., 1974, p.173.

221. Hirst, ibid., p.180.

222. Hirst, ibid., p.180.

223. The Fourth R, London: N.S. and S.P.C.K., 1970, p.75, para.145, and footnotes.

224. Downey, Meriel, and Kelly, Albert V. Moral Education, Theory and Practice, 1st. ed., London: Harper and Row, 1978, p.6 f.

225. The Farmington Trust research unit was set up in Oxford in October, 1965, to investigate the topic of moral education. Its work is documented as follows: Wilson, John, Williams, Norman, and Sugarman, Barry, Introduction to Moral Education, 1st. ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967.

Wilson, John. The Assessment of Morality, 1st. ed., Windsor: N.F.E.R., 1973.

Wilson, John. Practical Methods of Moral Education,  
1st. ed., London: Heineman, 1972.

Wilson, John. A Teacher's Guide to Moral Education,  
1st. ed., London: Chapman, 1973.

226. The Schools Council project Lifeline was aimed towards the 13-18 year-olds and directed by P. McPhail. Preliminary work was empirical, with three major pilot studies to ascertain four objectives: (1) to establish a basic criterion of relevance of approach and materials to meet the needs of adolescents; (2) to find out from pupils what these needs are; (3) to decide what adolescents mean by "good" and "bad" when considering behaviour and personal relationships with a view to establishing what ought to be done; (4) to investigate pupil motivation towards the moral with a view to producing appropriate teaching material and methods. McPhail sees the crucial aim as helping pupils to adopt a considerate style of life, but does not advocate the teaching of ME as a curriculum subject. The project is documented as follows:

McPhail, Peter, Ungeod-Thomas, Jasper R., Chapman, Hilary. Moral Education in the Secondary School,  
1st. ed., London: Longman, 1972.

McPhail, Peter, Ungeod-Thomas, Jasper R. Moral Education in the Secondary School: A Reply to the

Review by R.S. Peters. Journal of Moral Education,  
Feb., Vol.3, No.2, pp.181-4.

Startline was a comparable project among 8 - 13 year-olds. It was meant to continue the work of Lifeline, and so the same general rationale is applicable, and the method of national survey followed by the production of teaching materials is again followed. The survey was designed to establish the salient features of the children's moral culture, the method being to pose concrete questions with a view to discovering children's perceptions of considerate and inconsiderate treatment and of areas of uncertainty as to how to behave. The bias was towards interpersonal behaviour and individual happiness. McPhail sees as crucial in ME the way children are treated and the role of social conditioning. The project is documented as follows:

Ungoed-Thomas, Jasper R. The Moral Situation of Children,  
1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1978.

McPhail, Peter. Moral Education in the Middle Years,  
1st. ed., London: Longman, 1978.

227. But, as Hemming warns, when the sparkling newness wears off these terms may become less precise and more difficult.

Hemming, James. Correspondence. Learning for Living,  
May, 1970, Vol.9, No.5, p.30.

228. It would seem important that this scheme is not translated on a simple one-to-one basis into corresponding psychological characteristics. For, as well as being an assorted group of cognitive abilities, social skills and attitudes, these components (especially emp) each presuppose a network of psychological features. The Williams caution against seeing morality distributed along a continuum, preferring to view it as multi-dimensional and orthogonal (Williams, Norman, and Williams, Sheila. The Moral Development of Children, 1st. ed., London: Macmillan, 1970, p.24 f.). While this complicates the issue, it seems there is no alternative if one is attempting to acquire a global view, by which not only are the various dimensions of morality appreciated, but also the scale of their likely interaction.

Special note, too, should be taken of the particular relevance of RE to Krat.

Also is noteworthy, Graham's suggestion that alit (guilt) be added because of the importance of this in motivation to right wrongs.

Graham, Douglas. Moral Learning and Development, 1st. ed., London: Batsford, 1972, p.285.

229. McPhail, et alia. op. cit., pp.19, 48 f.

230. But the differences are nevertheless quite clear-cut. Taylor. op. cit., p.16.

231. McPhail, et alia. op. cit., p.20.

cf. May, Philip R. Moral Education in School, 1st. ed., London: Methuen, 1971, chap.8, p.80 f.

Wilson, John. Practical Methods of Moral Education, 1st. ed., London: Heinemann, 1972, p.17.

232. See above, p.61.

233. Wright, Derek. The Psychology of Moral Behaviour, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971, p.31 f.

234. Wright, ibid., p.43.

235. But situation-specific behaviour does offer possibilities for the moral educator.

Morrison, Arnold, and Macintyre, Donald. Schools and Socialisation, 1st. ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971, p.91 f.

236. This is not, however, established.

237. Hersh, Richard H., Paolitto, Diana P., Reimer, Joseph. Promoting Moral Growth, 1st. ed., New York: Longman, 1979.

238. Kohlberg, Lawrence. From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It.

Mischel, Theodore, (ed.). Cognitive Development and Epistemology, 1st. ed., New York: Academic, 1971, p.131 f.

But Alston's critique should be noted.

Alston, William P. Comments on Kohlberg's "From Is to Ought". Mischel, op. cit., p.269 f.

239. Kohlberg's research method, named the 'Moral Judgment Interview', employed three hypothetical moral dilemmas in order to oblige the subject to choose between conflicting moral judgements.

240. Turiel, Elliot. An Experimental Test of the Sequentiality of Developmental Stages in the Child's Moral Judgments. As reported in Hersch, et alia, op. cit., p.104.

241. Hirst, Paul H. Moral Education in a Secular Society, 1st. ed., London: University of London, 1974, p.115.

242. Ehrenfeld, David W. The Arrogance of Humanism, 1st. ed., New York: O.U.P., 1978, p.20.

243. Blackham, Harold J. Humanism, 2nd. ed., Hassocks: Harvester, 1976, p.19 f.

244. Mitchell, Basil G. Humanism, 1st. ed., London: S.P.C.K., 1965, p.4.

245. Blackham, Harold J., (ed.). The Subject of the Objections. Objections to Humanism, 1st. ed., London: Constable, 1965, p.10.
246. Blackham. ibid., p.11 f.
247. Ayer, Alfred J. (ed.). The Humanist Outlook, 1st. ed., London: Pemberton, 1968.
248. Guinness, Os. The Dust of Death, 1st. ed., London: Inter-Varsity Press, 1973, p.14 f.
249. Ayer. op. cit., p.4.
250. Ayer. op. cit., p.8.
251. Bibby, Cyril. Towards a Scientific Humanist Culture. Ayer. op. cit., p.14.
252. Bibby. op. cit., p.27.
253. Blackham, Harold J. Humanism, 2nd. ed., Hassocks: Harvester, 1976, p.22.
254. Humanism. Living Together, Birmingham L.E.A., 1975, p.c189 f.
255. People First, A Humanist Manifesto, 1st. ed., London: British Humanist Association, 1972.
256. Education for the Open Society, 1st. ed., London: British Humanist Association, 1971.

257. Birmingham L.E.A., op. cit., p.16.
258. Blackham, Harold J. The Subject of the Objections. Objections to Humanism, 1st. ed., London: Constable, 1965, p.16.
259. Mitchell. op. cit., p.16.
260. Mitchell. op. cit., p.17.
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