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simulating the effect of congruence between the two  
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Ethnic identity, political identity and ethnic conflict: simulating the effect of  
congruence between the two identities on ethnic violence and conflict

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The department of Anthropology

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“The day science begins to study non-physical phenomena, it will make more progress in one decade than in all the previous centuries of its existence.” Nikola Tesla

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This thesis outlines and presents an alternative hypothetical process to the emergence of ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflicts, rather than being dependent upon pre-existing 'ancient hatreds', are instead the result of a congruence between ethnic and political identity which grants individuals the ability to use ethnicity to identify and eliminate political threats. This hypothesis is formed by the examination of three case studies of ethnic conflict: Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Croatia. This hypothesis is then formalised and tested using an agent based simulation in which agent interactions are dependent upon ethnic and political identity and the congruence between the two. As predicted there was a strong positive correlation between how accurately ethnic identity reflected political identity and the level of ethnically motivated violence in the simulation, although the relationship was not linear. Furthermore the effect of a shift in congruence was found to be roughly comparable to the effect of initialising agents with a moderate level of pre-existing ethnic antagonism.

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### On the memory stick

Simulation results, simulation code, graphical versions of the simulation and licence agreement.



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## 1.0 Introduction

This thesis constructs a model exploring the relationship between ethnic and political identity and ethnic conflict.

Originally the anthropological analysis of conflict was confined to sections of the holistic ethnographies that dominated early 20<sup>th</sup> century anthropology, such as Evans-Pritchard's passing analysis of Nuer warfare in his monograph of the Nuer (Ferguson, 1984: 5). However World War Two prompted a large degree of interest in the subject of the human nature of conflict and well known anthropological theorists such as Malinowski and Mead attempted to use existing studies to create a synthesis on the nature of human conflict (*ibid*: 6). By the 1960s the analysis of human conflict and violence had become a mainstream avenue of study within anthropology.

Due to anthropology's liminal position as a social science explanations of conflict by anthropologists have varied widely between biological and cultural paradigms. Theorists such as Wrangham and Peterson draw analogues between the raiding behaviour of certain groups of humans and the violent behaviour of primates (Wrangham and Peterson, 1996). Other theorists such as Harrison and Vayda have endorsed a systemic approach to analysing conflict, presenting conflict as a buffer and feedback system which allows for either ecological or intra-community stability (Harrison, 1973: 3; Vayda, 1968: 88-89). This functionalism also applies to more culturally minded anthropologists such as Gluckman and Turner who postulate that conflict maintains stability in a social system (LeVine, 1961: 3). Gluckman in his work *The Peace of the Feud* argues that customs that encourage conflict at the same time restrain these conflicts from destroying the wider social order (Gluckman, 1955: 1).

Since the 1980s anthropological focus on conflict has expanded not just to include socially isolated groups but complex states (Hinton, 2002: 1). In the 1990s large scale outbreaks of violence in the nation states of Rwanda and Yugoslavia stoked further anthropological interest and involvement in complex societal violence. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Yugoslavia utilised anthropologists as consultants for defining genocide and thus assisting in the prosecuting process (*ibid*: 5). Anthropologists also focussed on providing alternative explanations to the popular media narrative of 'ancient hatreds' among endogamous, clearly delineated groups (*ibid*: 28).

Anthropological discourse on ethnic conflict and genocide is logically informed by anthropological theories on ethnicity and identity. This subject is a familiar area of anthropological focus which has attracted the attention, sometimes the undivided attention, of anthropological heavyweights such as Barth, Geertz and Eriksen. Again theoretical interest and speculation concerning the nature of ethnicity and identity goes back to the early days of social science with Durkheim's theories on

totemism as a means of classifying clans and individuals within the Port Mackay tribe of Australia (Durkheim, 2008: 92-100).

Thus the conceptual focus of this thesis is in a well studied and researched area. However the manner in which the various facets of ethnic conflict will be explored and analysed is relatively new. Computer programs and simulations of social processes have since the 1970s allowed theorists to create artificial laboratories with which to carry out thought experiments and study the emergent properties of social interaction. This experimental ability allows computer modelling to act in relation to social science as mathematics acts in relation to the natural sciences, as a formalising entity that tests coherence and logic (Srbjlinovic and Skunca, 2003: 3). This novel and niche methodology will be used to examine previous theories of ethnic conflict while facilitating the construction of a new paradigm which can then be tested.

### 1.1 Layout of the thesis

This thesis will first examine previous anthropological and sociological simulations. Key to the idea of simulation and modelling is the idea of abstraction: the critical selection of relevant interactions and phenomena to ensure intellectual clarity. This section will aim to show that simulations with highly simplified and abstracted representations of humans and their interactions can still be of academic and theoretical value. The section will also study how the appropriate level of simplicity and abstraction is directly related to the aims of the model. Another important point of examination is how simulations are assigned different levels of 'virtualisation' or fidelity to the represented phenomenon not just by their complexity but the quality of their inputs as well. This section will be important for explaining and justifying certain decisions made for the simulations constructed for the thesis.

The next section examines the anthropological concept of ethnic identity. The different schools of thought concerning ethnicity will be evaluated and used to inform the way ethnicity will be used in the simulation. The relationship between ethnicity, nation and statehood will also be analysed as these relationships rather than showing a single ethnicity paradigm to be correct show that in practice a multitude of paradigms are relevant. This section will also compare ethnicity and political identity and highlight the key differences between these two forms of identity. It is the relationship between these two forms of identity which are at the heart of this thesis and its hypothesis.

Section four explores how ethnic identity is manifested in ethnic conflicts and how this can lead to ethnic conflicts supposedly possessing unique dynamics. Existing theories on ethnic conflicts will be examined, evaluated and lastly related to the primary hypothesis of this thesis.

Section five analyses three case studies of ethnic conflict in depth. The history and progression of the conflicts in Lebanon, Croatia and Northern Ireland will be examined and anthropologically analysed in order. Section six will then extract from the analysis common trends within the conflicts which will inform the rules of the simulation.

Section seven outlines the rules of the simulation and the justification of these rules based on the conclusions reached in section six and three. Furthermore this section will investigate what inputs to feed the simulation will be appropriate given the aim of the simulation and the information available.

Both sections eight and nine explain the methodology of running the simulation and collecting and analysing the data. The results will then be discussed and compared to the historical record and the case studies.

Section ten analyses proposed theoretical and practical solutions to ethnic conflict and its circular dynamics. Altered versions of the simulation will then be used to test the validity of these solutions.

In section eleven I reflect on the social dynamics that shaped the rules of the simulation. I discuss whether these common dynamics operate in non-ethnic contexts and how this may have influenced conflict. The reflective importance of this section is that it outlines not just the limits of scope in the model but also the limits of specificity in the simulation. This section will determine whether the conclusions drawn from the simulation are only relevant to ethnic conflicts.

In section twelve I explore potential future developments for the simulation. I reference anthropological phenomena witnessed in the case studies but not simulated and new methods of procuring input data as the two main avenues of future development.

## 1.2 Thesis statement

Much like the anthropological works of the 1990s on ethnic conflict, this thesis will aim to create a different narrative to the process of ethnic conflict from the dominant 'ancient hatreds' paradigm. Simulation will be used as a formalising and explanatory tool for this aim. This thesis will aim to prove that ethnic conflict can arise in the absence of pre-existing hatreds when an externally

discernable ethnic identity functions as an indicator of political allegiance and orientation, thus allowing political rivalries and antagonisms to be directed against individuals based on externally discernable features. This in turn can provoke interethnic hostility which motivates future violence.

2.0 Appropriate levels of abstraction and complexity in ABM applied to anthropology and social science

The process of creating computer models of social phenomena and culture requires some degree of abstraction. This requires the condensing of what Tylor refers to as “that complex whole” to a limited number of rules governed by a limited number of parameters (Tylor, 1903: 1; Gilbert, 2005: 17). Lyon argues that anthropologists are generally reluctant to reduce this complexity and isolate integrated systems of meanings (Lyon and Fischer, 2006: 46).

However abstraction and reduction which bears the brunt of academic criticism primarily applies to the construction of the inputs within a model while the output, which is meant to mirror some form of social reality, is generally left uncriticised. However numerous studies have shown that almost infinite complexity can arise from simple inputs. The study which best demonstrates the extent to which complexity can arise out of simplicity is Wolfram’s cellular automata experiments (Wolfram, 2002). The experiments were constructed on a grid in which each cell alters its colour, black or white, based upon the colours of its neighbours in the row above. Wolfram then created certain rules which would dictate how the cell would change. For example one rule states that if any neighbour in the row above was black then the cell should become black, this led to a predictable black pyramid (Wolfram, 2002: 24). Another rule was that if the above left or right neighbour, but not both, was black then the below cell would also become black (Wolfram, 2002: 25-26). This led to a more complex but equally predictable pattern:




Figure 13 Wolfram cellular automata

One of Wolfram's most famous rules perfectly demonstrates the power and unpredictability of emergence. Rule 30 dictated that if the centre and right cell are white then the new cell takes on the colour of its upper lefthand neighbour, if not it takes the opposite colour (Wolfram, 2002: 27). The result was an extremely irregular, unpredictable and chaotic pattern seen in figure 2.




Figure 14 Wolfram cellular automata – rule 30

When more generations are shown the true extent of the complexity becomes clear.




Figure 15 Wolfram cellular automata – rule 30 extended generations

Here the complexity was not programmed in but emerged from an initial simple rule. Wolfram states that mathematical analysis has been unable to find regularity in the pattern (Wolfram, 2002: 28). Rule 30 perfectly demonstrates the capability of agent based models (hereafter referred to as ABMs): even when the individual agents are incredibly simplistic and include highly abstracted versions of human behaviour, their interactions can cause complex social patterns to emerge that could not possibly be logically deduced or predicted. Wolfram believes that this emergence is “ultimately responsible for most of the complexity that we see in nature” (Wolfram, 2002: 28). Wolfram’s examples counter the criticism that ABMs reduce and belittle the complexity of culture. Rather by showing the process of emergence it seeks to reconcile both reductionalist and holistic analysis and chart how local behaviour leads to macro-patterns (Ponge, 2005: 404; Srbljinoic and Ognjen, 2003: 2).

Wolfram’s experiments also counter another primary criticism of ABMs in social simulation: that the process of simulation is a contrived and ad-hoc enterprise which produces planned results (Marney and Tarbert, 2000). The property of emergence as demonstrated by rule 30 means that the process of abstraction and the simplification of human behaviour does not necessarily create a more deterministic model. Instead highly simplified abstract models can identify how slight shifts on the micro-level have unpredictable effects on the macro-level (Lustick and Miodownik, 2009: 227; Srbljinoic and Ognjen, 2003: 2).

As a result the use of ABMs in studying anthropological and social phenomena has seen a rise in popularity with anthropologists using models and ABMs to study segregation, succession, the influencing of opinion, the formation of social complexity and hierarchy. Bhavnani, Cederman, Banks and Solowski cite the analytical and experimental bridge between micro and macro as their primary reason for creating an ABM of their particular social phenomenon (Bhavnani, 2006: 653; Banks and Sokolowski, 2010: 282-284; Cederman, 2006: 5). Banks and Sokolowski describe ABMs as “intrinsically social” as agents are constantly interacting and reacting, thus making ABMs appropriate for studying social and anthropological issues (Banks and Sokolowski, 2010: 282-284).

One of the earliest simulations was Schelling’s model of segregation which showed the emergence of ghettos from a very simple rule: if a cell of one colour was neighbouring more cells of a different colour than a specified threshold, then the cell would move (Schelling, 1971). The model showed that even when agents were made relatively tolerant of other colours, segregation would occur. This demonstrated an important social truth: that segregation could occur even if one race was tolerant of the other but wished not to be a minority (Schelling, 1971: 158).



Macy and Willer argue that “analysis of very simple and unrealistic models can reveal new theoretical ideas that have broad applicability” (Macy and Willer, 2002: 162). In an earlier article Schelling argues that the agents in the segregation model can be representative of people differentiated by race, religion and any other characteristic from which identity is derived (Schelling, 1969: 489). The abstract nature of the model means it is applicable to a wide array of contexts.

Marney and Tarbert argue that all theoretical investigation requires the “manipulation of the abstract” (Marney and Tarbert, 2000). In other words all theory, whether scientific or humanities-based, is developed by experimenting with highly simplified and abstracted conditions in which interfering variables (known as ‘noise’) are controlled. This process allows patterns and causal relationships to become more visible (Cederman, 2006: 5). Increasing the number of factors in the model and making the agents more complex increases the likelihood of important patterns and causal relationships being obscured in the expanded parameter space (Bennett, 2008). Lyon argues that the point of modelling is to reduce analytical complexity, and while the rules of emergence allow social scientists to deduce the cumulative effect of local action, the resulting complexity should not be so great that all patterns are obscured (Lyon, 2004: 194). This is the rationale behind Mesoudi and O’Brien’s claim that “A simulation that is as complex and messy as reality, however, is more or less useless” (Mesoudi and O’Brien, 2008: 24). If ABMs are designed to improve theoretical clarity then to create a model with as many interacting variables as the real world is self defeating as the ‘noise’ that obscures the pure theoretical relationships has been reintroduced. Zadeh’s incompatibility principle states that as the complexity of a system increases the ability to make a precise and significant statement decreases until the two characteristics become mutually exclusive (Zadeh, 1973). The role of theory in any discipline is to precisely describe a significant relationship or trait that explains any form of phenomena. To create agents with incredibly complex behaviour is to deprive the modeller of the ability to further theoretical development.

Wolfram’s cellular automata experiments have shown that increasing the complexity of the inputs in a model beyond a certain point ceases to increase the complexity of the output. Wolfram added a potential third colour to his cellular automata yet failed to produce more complex outputs (Wolfram, 2002: 62). This led Wolfram to conclude that “beyond a certain point, adding complexity to the underlying rules of a system does not ultimately lead to more complex behaviour” (Wolfram, 2002: 62). Thus creating increasingly complex agents may not lead to more complex behaviour akin to real social phenomena but rather reduce the clarity of the theoretical relationships under study with a cloud of interacting variables.

However some social modellers use ABMs as more than just platforms to test social theory. Lustick and Miodownik argue that certain models, coined virtualisations, can be used in risk analysis and the assessment of potential outcomes (Lustick and Miodownik, 2009: 237). This is a controversial claim because the complexity of real world social processes means that ABMs may be ill suited for predictive modelling. Davidson argues that because ABMs require the estimation of parameter values, creating a predictive model would require the estimation of a huge multitude of parameters (Davidson, 2002). Srbljinoic and Ognjen argue that causal relationships demonstrated in ABMs will not act in isolation in the real world but will be affected by interfering 'noise' (Srbljinoic and Ognjen, 2003: 3-5). This 'noise' is very factor many models try to eliminate in order to test theoretical relationships. Lustick and Miodownik counter Davidson's claim by arguing that ABMs can implement parameter values backed up by empirical data gathered from experts (Lustick and Miodownik, 2009: 236). Lustick and Miodownik agree with Srbljinoic and Ognjen position that ABMs should not be treated as replicas of the real world but reason that this merely means that ABM's will be unable to make 'point predictions', instead, they argue, predictions should be treated as probability distributions regarding certain types of outcome (Lustick and Miodownik, 2009: 237).

Lustick demonstrates the difference between abstract models and virtualisations using his own work. Lustick's Agent Based Identity Repertoire (ABIR) is a model in which agents have active identities and a cache of identities called repertoires, activated identities can be changed in response to the prevailing popularity of certain identities in the Moore neighbourhood of the agent and externally defined bias (Lustick, 2000). Lustick used the model to find general patterns in potential paths of identity politics, for example Lustick found that small variations in the size of repertoires had a dramatic macro effect on identity extinction (Lustick and Miodownik, 2009: 228). ABIR is a perfect example of a highly abstract model as it uses the process of emergence to see how slight variations on the micro-level have macro-level effects and its tests a general theoretical relationship by isolating the social factor of identity from other interfering factors that affect identity such as economics and politics.

Lustick altered ABIR to create what is termed an 'ensemble', a model crafted to address a certain class of problem. Lustick's ensemble looked at political volatility in a hypothetical authoritarian Middle Eastern country. Thus previously abstract identities were given labels corresponding to real identities in the Middle East such as Kurd, Shi'a and Sunni Muslim, etc. (Lustick, 2002). Furthermore certain agents had the rules of identity acquisition and interactions altered to become 'fanatics', 'innovators' and an authority network of 'bureaucrats' and 'enforcers' were created to represent the regime (Lustick, 2000). Lustick's ensemble found that a regime could withstand a loss of influence

and efficacy if conditions were calm but would lose its hold on identity in politically volatile conditions (increased pace of change in bias values) (Lustick, 2000).

Lastly Lustick created a virtualisation of Pakistan based on the ABIR engine called VirPak (Lustick, 2011). In this simulation the identities were labelled according to various groups in Pakistan: Pashtun, fundamentalist, Muhajir, military, etc. (Lustick, 2011). Furthermore initial conditions concerning identity influence, prevalence, and the extent of networks among bureaucrats, criminals and fundamentalists were based off extensive data gathered from Pakistan (Lustick, 2011). Agent properties, parameter values and initial conditions were all justified by expertise research. Perhaps even more than complexity, though in no way mutually exclusive from it, it is this trait that separates what is abstract from what is 'realistic'.

This distinction is seen again when Bennett's model is compared to Banks and Sokolowski's model. While the former is an ensemble and focussed on the grievance aspect of insurgency independent of any political, ethnic or religious factors, the latter uses a similar skeleton as the former and imposes parameter values based upon numerous international indexes used to describe qualitative problems: Human Rights Index, Polity Index, Insurgency Index and Counter-Insurgency Index. These values are based upon similar, if not the same, variables as the more abstract Bennett model: anger, anger increment per injury, police accuracy and effectiveness. Banks and Solowski's model is not noticeably more complex than Bennett's but comes closer to Lustick and Miodownik's definition of a virtualisation as the model implements its assumptions, relationships, parameter values and conditions corresponding to the work of experts (Lustick and Miodownik, 2009: 237).

Both highly abstract simple models and virtualisations have their methodological problems. Marney and Tarbert argue that ABMs are a way to study emergence from simple behaviour which is derived from complex assumptions (Marney and Tarbert, 2000). In short, the simpler the agents, the more assumptions must be made about which factors are essential and which are non-essential in the social phenomena under study. Conversely models which include more factors in their agents' behaviour are forced to make fewer assumptions of this type. However this also increases the number of parameter values that require justification. This can be achieved by using empirical data gathered from prolonged study, as Lustick did, or by the use of well researched indices, as done by Banks and Sokolowski.

Banks and Sokolowski argue that the level of abstraction in a computer model should be dependant entirely upon the aim of the model and the hypothesis that the model aims to prove or disprove (Banks and Sokolowski, 2010: 281). Schelling's model set out to look at neighbourhood dynamics and

the process of segregation. Though the majority of the observations were based on US data, the abstract nature of the model meant it exhibited a sociological process that could be applied to a wide range of real life contexts, not just the US. Lustick's VirPak aimed to test the probability of a secessionist movement in contemporary Pakistan and as a result required both highly specified parameter values and a higher degree of complexity in order to meet its task. Thus when deciding the level of abstraction and complexity in my model I will first refer to my hypothesis and my objectives.

### 3.0 Concepts of ethnic and political identity

#### 3.1 Development of the term 'ethnic group'

The precursor to the term 'ethnic group' is often said to be the word 'tribe' (Banks, 1996: 17; Cohen, 1969: 212). 'Tribe', much like the term 'ethnic group', is a term that functions as a label to categorise and order the large amount of qualitative data anthropologists are faced with when analysing groups of people (Cohen, 1969: 212; Barth, 1969: 10-11).

Eriksen suggests that the replacement of the word 'tribe' with 'ethnic group' may have taken place as 'tribe' implies primitivism which forms a boundary between anthropologist and subject, however the universal nature of ethnic groups mitigates this boundary and reduces ethnocentrism (Eriksen, 1993: 9-10).

Banks argues that it was Barth's seminal text which broke the paradigm of the 'tribe' (Banks, 1996: 17). Barth's text introduced the idea that 'ethnic groups', unlike tribes, cannot exist in isolation as they rely on interrelation and interaction for a sense of self identity and identification of the 'other' and that analysis should focus on the boundaries between the groups (Barth, 1969: 10-11; Cohen, 1969: 212). This position was later supported by Eriksen, Roosens and Epstein (Eriksen, 1991: 46; Roosens, 1989: 12; Epstein, 1978: xii).

Barth also introduced the idea that "socially relevant factors alone become diagnostic for membership, not the overt, 'objective' differences', thus giving the concept of ethnic group more dynamism than the 'tribe' (Barth, 1969: 15). These elements introduced by Barth's text allowed the term 'ethnic group' to be employed in a world where groups were being rapidly subjected to the forces of globalisation and development. In contrast the term 'tribe' implies a stasis imposed by isolation or limited technology (Cohen, 1969: 2012).

#### 3.2 Primordialism, instrumentalism, circumstantialism and situationalism

Primordialism is now treated as outdated and as a relic of the anthropological thought that accompanied the colonial era. Primordialism as a paradigm is often only cited so the author can distance him/herself from it (Eriksen, 2001: 45; Banks, 1996: 185). Fenton identifies the newer schools of thought which are often expressed in opposition to primordialism: circumstantialism claims that "ethnic identity is important in some contexts but not others; the identity is constant but the circumstances determine whether it matters"; situationalism claims that the identity deployed

changes based on the social situation of the individual; instrumentalism claims that political and material incentives govern the deployment of identity (Fenton, 2003: 84).

The current trend towards other schools of thought and the academic scorn directed at primordialism may be because modern reference to the concept distorts the original meaning of the term. Smith defines the difference between primordial and instrumentalist schools of thought as such: the former defines ethnic identity as rooted in socio-biological factors such as descent, race and custom, the latter sees ethnic identity as dependent on fleeting perceptions related to the individual/groups goals (Smith, 1991: 20). Banks gives a slightly different definition of primordialism and argues that analysing ethnicity as a permanent and essential condition is theoretically close to primordialist analysis (Banks, 1996: 13). In both definitions the key that separates primordialism from instrumentalism and other schools of thought is permanence, either of the prior socio-biological factors that founded the group or of the condition of ethnic identity itself, verses the temporal nature of instrumentalist or situationalist ethnic expression.

However the term 'primordialism' was developed by Shils and indeed had no connection to the issue of ethnicity but rather was used to describe ties which were "not just a function of interaction" but contained a "certain ineffable significance" (Fenton, 2003: 76; Shils, 1957: 142). Shils does not refer to any groups larger than immediate kin, such as linguistic or religious or descent based groups, when using the phrase 'primordial' (Shils, 1957). Geertz applied Shils concept of 'ineffable significance' to larger groups bonded by language, religion or custom:

"One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour, one's fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself." (Geertz, 1963: 109)

Geertz supplies evidence of the emotional attachment to so-called primordial ties throughout the globe: Tamil's in Sri Lanka often refuse to use automobile licence plates with Sinhalese characters; Bengali students in Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, rioted when West Pakistan tried to impose Urdu as the spoken language; disputes between Malay and Chinese teachers unions over whether Chinese schools in Malaysia should be taught in Malay (*ibid*: 125-127). These emotional, and in the face of violent government reactions non-rational, outbursts are responses to policies and actions which threaten not the individuals' interests but a common feature of their identity which binds them and is deemed significant.

It was also Geertz who introduced the temporal factor in primordial relations, describing them as the product of “centuries of gradual crystallisation” (*ibid*: 119). It was perhaps this introduction of timescale that began the trend of associating ‘primordialism’ with older, more ‘essentialist’ features such as descent, genetics, language or religion. This opinion would also have put primordialism in direct opposition to circumstantialism, situationalism and instrumentalism which imply, either directly or indirectly, that the expression of ethnic identity is continually changing.

Cohen’s study of the Hausa as a minority in the Yoruba dominated city of Ibadan portrays ethnicity as a means to political or economic gain and refers to ethnic groups as “informal interest groups” (Cohen, 1969: 5). Cohen uses the kola nut cattle trade as an example. Cattle cannot be reared in the forest belt zone in which Ibadan resides due to the tse-tse fly which eliminates them by disease, however kola nuts which are in high demand in the northern savannah zone can only be grown in the forest belt (*ibid*: 15-16). The trade relies heavily on trust: cattle dealers trust local commission agents, butchers buy and sell cattle on credit, herds are trusted to drovers and kola nuts to lorry drivers (*ibid*: 18-20). Pre-industrial conditions in Nigeria such as lack of instant communications and low literacy also affect the trade, especially when constant market and ecological fluctuations affect the trade (*ibid*). These problems are “overcome when men from one tribe control all or most of the stages of the trade in specific commodities”(*ibid*). The Hausa ensure this productive monopoly by the prevention of infiltration by non-Hausa into the trade, this is achieved by differentiation and vocalised by their popular proclamation: “our customs are different; we are Hausa” (*ibid*: 20-22).

An example of the importance of difference to the Hausa and the flexible approach by which it is attained is their en masse adoption of the Tijaniyya sect of Islam. During the colonial era the number of Muslim Yoruba in Ibadan had been negligible allowing the Hausa to differentiate themselves with Muslim dress and customs (*ibid*: 13). However the Yoruba began to rapidly Islamicize and thus to maintain difference the Hausa adopted Tijaniyya and by 1963 85% of men were Tijani (*ibid*: 150). This sect differentiates itself from orthodox Islam with a demand for collectivised ritual and the duty of the *wirds* which requires the reciting of three phrases one hundred times (*ibid*: 152). Adoption of this new sect reasserted Hausa identity and differentiated them from their Yoruba neighbours while simultaneously creating an effective centralised organisation capable of maintaining their interests (*ibid*: 23). Similarly the Hausa of Ibadan differ in their kinship arrangements, often seen as a primordial feature, from their relatives in Hausaland, though both function to maintain Hausa identity. While the Hausa in Hausaland are patrilineal and marry non-Hausa, the Ibadan Hausa are bilateral and strictly marry within their own ethnic group (*ibid*: 203-204). This difference stems from the fact that in the latter case the Hausa are a minority and are at risk to losing their children’s

identity to another group or a neutral status, whereas in the former case Hausa dominance means that their patrilineal tradition can be enforced with minimal risk (*Ibid*).

Cohen's text contains strong evidence for taking an extreme instrumentalist position on ethnic identity: customs and delimitation markers are consistently changed in order to retain distinctiveness for political and material gain. His analysis does stand in opposition to both Shils and Geertz as 'primordial markers', such as religion and ties with others within the ethnic group, are shown as having no significance beyond political and material gain. However Cohen's position on the meaning of socio-cultural anthropology as a whole may skew how he interprets this evidence.

"Social anthropology is thus essentially a branch of political science and is chiefly concerned with unfolding the political implications of custom under various structural conditions."  
(*ibid*: 213)

Under such a definition cultural customs and markers, important ethnic boundary markers, have no value of-themselves but rather because of what can be gained by their adoption. This is highly suspect due to the emotionally charged nature of many ethnic conflicts which is indicative of some psychological attachment. Instrumentalist approaches often argue that ethnic identity is created and manipulated ad-hoc by political entrepreneurs (Eriksen, 2001: 44). This interpretation still relies on the idea that ethnic identity and its markers elicit an emotional response of attachment in many people and thus restricts the constant alteration of traits. Eriksen critiques Cohen's emphasis on strategy and choice as being unable to explain the antagonism of ethnic identity politics because it neglects to examine the self that has been shaped by experience but rather the self that has been constructed (*ibid*: 47). Cohen's extreme instrumentalism ignores that there is often some non-material value to identity. His argument that the Hausa run a more efficient operation in the kola-cattle trade is sound but falls down in other areas where ethnic identity is not reliant on features, such as language, that restrict the clarity of communication and interaction such as Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. In these areas ethnic identity may be subject to the whims of entrepreneurs but to a large segment of those who are manipulated ethnic identity takes on a distinctively non-instrumentalist form of value.

Lastly just because the features which mark the boundaries are subject to change does not mean that the label itself is not inheritable. The proclamation "our customs are different; we are Hausa" suggests that markers change in order to retain the distinctiveness of the ethnic label so the label may be kept only by those in the current group and future descendents. Thus even under an extreme instrumentalist paradigm ethnic groups, at least in their name and self-identification,



maintain a degree of stability in their identity, not necessarily in what defines them but how they are identified by themselves and others.

### 3.3 Identity ascription, constrained change, visibility and how ethnic identity compares to political opinion

Many non-primordialist scholars argue that generally ethnic identities are ascribed rather than acquired but that context and situation determine the importance of that identity. Huddy suggests that some boundaries are less permeable and externally visible features that delimit these boundaries, such as colour, religion, clothing or public custom, encourage a higher incidence of external labelling and increase the likelihood that one will internalise group identity (Huddy, 2001: 140). Similarly Eriksen argues that ethnic and religious identity is ascribed as one is born to some degree with the label :

“These are aspects of identity that are not chosen, that are incorporated and implicit... People relate to them as reflexive agents, but they do so within limitations that are not chosen.” (Eriksen, 2001: 50)

A similar argument is given by Chandra who argues that what are often termed as ‘ethnic traits’ are actually subsets of ‘descent based traits’ (Chandra, 2006). Horowitz argues that “ethnic identity is established at birth for most group members...some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnic identity” (Horowitz, 1985: 52). Indeed this is why the language of ethnic relation is often the language of kinship as members of the group refer to each other as brothers or sisters (*ibid*: 57).

Eriksen uses the example of Fiji to showcase the meaning of this analysis. In Fiji a coup was launched by the indigenous Fijian military after a Fijian Prime Minister was voted in with a largely Indo-Fijian cabinet (Eriksen, 2001: 52). A new constitution was drafted giving 82% of arable land to the indigenous Fijians (Eriksen, 2001: 53). Indo-Fijians, descended from Indian bonded labourers, have historically been more economically successful than indigenous Fijians, who tend to dominate in government, the election result put stress on this arrangement (Eriksen, 2001: 53). Indigenous Fijians, unlike Indo-Fijians, have held onto more traditional forms of kin and caste organisation making them less adaptive in a modern capitalist economy (Eriksen, 2001: 53).

This example shows how an identity bound by biology and origin becomes politicised by temporal factors such as shifts in political power. The coup was accompanied by indigenous Fijians identifying

themselves as 'sons of the soil' and contrasting their indigenous identity to the alien origins of the Indo-Fijians (Eriksen, 2001: 53 and 58). The biological origin of Indo-Fijians was politicised by issues revolving around the distribution of power leading indigenous Fijians to act reflexively and assert the subjective 'purity' of their objective origin and biology.

The inherited nature of ethnic traits helps differentiate the attribute from political identity. Eriksen argues that while a person inherits language, surname, physiological features and gets labelled with their parents religion, political positions such as communist, unionist, republican etc. are acquired (Eriksen, 2001: 42). Intrinsic, but not unique, to these traits is fixidity, which constrains the pattern and extent of change in identity, and visibility, information pertaining to the individuals ethnic identity "can be obtained through superficial observation" (Chandra, 2006: 399).

The visibility of ethnic traits often stems from their hereditary nature as cultural practices and markers are often acquired and internalised during childhood. For example during ethnic riots in Nigeria, dress was used as a marker to target the Ibo (Horowitz, 1985: 45-46). In inter-communal riots in India circumcision is used to separate Hindu from Muslim (*ibid*). In Sri Lanka Sinhalese mobs force Sri Lankans to read a Sinhalese newspaper to identify them as either Sinhalese or Tamil (*ibid*). In Erikson's example hereditary genetics visually differentiates the Indo and native Fijians. Sometimes visible markers are acquired as is the case with the Hausa's adoption of Tijaniyya ritual, nevertheless the ritual then becomes a cultural marker that will be inherited by the next generation.

The fixidity of ethnic traits make the group less permeable and external labelling more intense, in contrast the boundaries of political groups are vague: is an American who is pro-choice but supports free markets and small government a liberal (Huddy, 2001: 140-141; Chandra, 2006)? Individuals with differing political positions often unite under the same political label and try to lay claim to the 'trueness' of their position while disputing the authenticity of others who claim the same label.

An example would be the term 'Nationalist' or 'Republican' in pre and post independence Ireland in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Before Irish independence different strains of Irish Republicanism were disputing the boundary conditions that defined the 'true Republican'. Sinn Fein founder Arthur Griffith was a multi-class, capitalist-orientated leader who saw the independence of Ireland from Britain as the primary objective of Republicanism (English, 1994: 32). In contrast, Sean Murray and Peadar O'Donnell, figures in the socialist wing of the Republican movement, criticised Griffith for going against the socialist revolutionary stance that defined who was "truly, reliably Republican (*ibid*: 32 & 38).

In the aftermath of Ireland's victory in the Anglo-Irish War disputes over what determined a 'nationalist' became contested. Britain offered in the Anglo-Irish Treaty to withdraw troops from Ireland and grant it a large degree of political autonomy, although it would remain part of the empire and still swear allegiance to an English monarch (English, 2003: 30-32). Griffith who signed the treaty argued "we have brought back the flag; we have brought back the evacuation of Ireland after 700 years by British troops and the formation of an Irish army" (*ibid*). In contrast figures such as Eamon de Valera and Austin Stack argued that it was "for complete freedom that they in Ireland were struggling", and that the requirement to take an oath to an English king and to accept membership of the empire was not what the nationalist movement, nor the numerous martyrs that preceded them, had fought for (*ibid*). This disagreement over whether the Anglo-Irish treaty satisfied the goals of Irish nationalism led to the Irish Civil War which pitted self-proclaimed nationalist against self-proclaimed nationalist.

A more recent example would be the debated conditions of 'conservatism' and 'liberalism' in modern America. Neo-conservatism was formed in the late 1960s by intellectuals such as Kristol and Podhoretz in reaction to the new left's more favourable stance to communism (Critchlow, 2007: 115). Kristol argued that "liberalism itself was crumbling before the resurgent left" (*ibid*). During this period 'liberalism', referring to individual rights to property and the right to free trade, became a term that helped define the conservative doctrine (*ibid*).

However in more recent times conservatism has again undergone change and the boundary conditions of what marks a true conservative are under dispute. In the 2012 GOP Republican nomination, the term 'liberal' is now used to define what is not conservative, with both Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum accusing each other of liberalism so as to cast doubt on each other's conservative credentials (Johnathan, 2012). Romney argues that Santorum is not fiscally responsible enough to be counted as a conservative (*ibid*). Santorum, in contrast, criticises the libertarian element of the Republican Party, notably Ron Paul who ran against him. Ron Paul argues that small government requires the state not to regulate or influence private or sexual matters, Santorum argues that this libertarianism is "not how traditional conservatives view the world" (Inkeep, 2005).

While the analysis of the likes of Cohen show that the defining qualities of ethnic groups can change, the hereditary nature of the label that confers their ethnic identity means that the boundary conditions of ethnic identity are considerably more stable than those of political identity which are often hotly contested. Thus the "sorting of individuals according to nonethnic identities is typically less likely in superficial interactions, even when such identities are salient" (Chandra, 2003: 48).

### 3.4 Ethnicity, nation and the state

Theories concerning ethnic identity and the nation state showcase the interaction between primordialism and other facets of ethnic identity. Primordialist ties are used to create what Anderson deems an 'imagined community', "imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 2006: 6). Smith argues that a nation is a demarcated territory to which members feel they belong, this can be fostered by common aspirations, culture and sentiments (Smith, 1991: 9-11). Thus ascribed traits judged by people such as Geertz to be 'primordial', such as religion, origin or custom, can be used as demarcation markers and utilised to legitimise sovereignty. Pakistan uses the ascribed identity of religion to differentiate itself from India by identifying itself as a Muslim state.

Smith argues it is only when these 'primordial' traits are diacritically interpreted as significant that they obtain 'objectivity' (*ibid*: 23). The significance to both parties will force them to codify the definition of the trait that allows for entry into the group thus objectifying the trait. This situationalist shifting in trait significance can mean that overtime old 'nations' are replaced with new imagined communities.

For example in Yugoslavia, Bosniak Muslims are descended from native peoples who converted during Ottoman occupation; these individuals would have more culturally in common with a neighbouring Serb than a Muslim in Belgrade (Eriksen, 2001: 49-50). Indeed the term 'bosniak' or 'Muslim' was not employed by the state until 1971 (Pratt, 2003: 145). Furthermore during the 19<sup>th</sup> century the main marker of the boundary was 'nacija', a term that corresponds to 'people' or 'nation' which often marked boundaries within religions (*ibid*: 140-141). However during the Bosnian conflict the violence directed across religious lines, due to the sectarian split between Bosniak Muslims/Serbs/Croat, ensured religious affiliation was of significance as a boundary marker and thus became objectified to function effectively as a test of group membership.

Further evidence for how situationalist shifts in identity translate into new criteria for 'ethnic nationals' are shown via schisms and splits in primordial and ascribed traits. The two great schisms of Christianity have created new boundaries, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant, which have been solidified through numerous conflicts through which these imagined communities try to lay claim to 'their' territory. Examples include the 30 Years War, the Northern Irish Troubles and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Evidence such as this supports Smith's conclusion that "the ethnic is anything but primordial despite the claims and rhetoric of nationalist ideologies" (Smith, 1991: 23).

Smith rather than skewing towards the primordial/instrumentalist approach argues that analysis of ethnic identity should be done from a historic and symbolic perspective (*ibid*: 25). Smith identifies

shared history and collective memory as fundamental constituents of both the nation and of ethnic identity: memories, history and myth bond people to territory as well as to each other (*ibid*: 14-23). However Roosens points out that these factors are vague in definition: which ancestors, what type of culture is transmitted and which parts of history are chosen (Roosens, 1989: 160)?

For example modern Greeks identify themselves as heirs to Greek Byzantium and Hellenic Greece, however Greek demographic was continuity interrupted in 6-8<sup>th</sup> century AD by Slav and Avar immigration thus modern Greeks are not of Classical descent (Smith, 2001: 28-29). Eriksen argues that nation states seek to glorify the traditions of their ancestors and precursors in order to reify them (Eriksen, 1993: 101). With the example of Greece, the factors that determine 'Greekness' in the Greek nation and attach the people to the land are indeed embellished but nonetheless ascribed by their birth. In a sense 'Greekness' has neither the timelessness of a 'primordial' trait but cannot be ditched and remoulded instantly as in Cohen's constantly adjusting politically driven ethnic identity.

Epstein agrees with Cohen that social transformation can erase or alter customs and other boundary markers but that subjective history ensures the continuity and maintenance of ethnic identity (Epstein, 1978: xxv). Much like the Hausas identity there is a stability to the label 'Greek', though it is achieved through a more conservative reverence and attempted reification of the past, rather than a constant cycle of adaptation to maintain difference.

#### 4.0 Ethnic Conflict: features and theories

##### 4.1 Unique features of ethnic conflict

Kaufmann argues that ethnic conflicts take on a unique character due to the fixity, a trait analysed by Chandra, of the identity which designates an individual an ally or an enemy (Chandra, 2006: 399; Kaufmann, 1996: 138). Kalyvas, in analysing the ideologically driven conflicts of the Spanish, Irish and Greek civil wars finds that often militias who had secured an area relied on information from the locals to determine which individuals were ideological enemies and thus security risks (Kalyvas, 2000: 9-16). Thus many people capitalised on the circumstances of conflict to denounce and accuse personal enemies of ideological disloyalty, a trait that is often impossible to prove or disprove, in order to settle personal grievances (Kalyvas, 2000). In contrast Horowitz's account of people using visual, linguistic and cultural markers to identify targets during ethnic riots and conflicts shows that the process of finding the 'enemy' is markedly easier in ethnic conflict (Horowitz, 1985: 45-46).

Thus ideological and ethnic wars seem to entail different goals. In ideological wars combatants try to win the population's support, often by rooting out political enemies, in order to gain control of the state and implement ideological alterations (Kaufmann, 1996: 139-140). In contrast in ethnic conflicts the transparent rigid criteria by which one is deemed an ally or enemy means that combatants seek only to win the support of their 'community' and redefine the state, often via secession or expulsion of other groups (*ibid*). This may explain why of the twenty-one civil wars since WWII which have resulted in partition, eighteen were ethnic conflicts while only three were ideological (Sambanis, 2000: 446).

##### 4.2 Ethnic identity in ethnic conflict

Though ethnic identities can be discerned by internal observers, individuals may not internally define themselves according to these identities. Kaufmann argues, however, that as cross-ethnic violence intensifies these ethnic identities harden (Kaufmann, 1996: 141). In times of conflict and ethnic violence individuals, including leaders, who attach little value or meaning to their ethnic identity are often sidelined or punished. During the Rwandan Genocide only 6,000-7,000 people responded to the original call for violence, thus the government put in sanctions ranging from fines to execution for those who sheltered Tutsi neighbours and refused to participate (Bhavnani, 2005: 656-657). Similarly both Yitzhak Rabin and Ghandi were assassinated by members of their own ethnic community for compromising, via the Oslo Accords and the Partition of India, with the interests of 'the enemy' (Kaufmann, 1996: 143). Furthermore the public nature of ethnic identity means that the

identity can be forced onto individuals who do not internalise the identity. A quote from a Bosniak refugee emphasises this imposition:

“We never, until the war, thought of ourselves as Muslims. We were Yugoslavs. But when we began to be murdered, because we are Muslims, things changed. The definition of who we are today has been determined by our killers” (Kaufmann, 1996: 144)

Chirot argues that one of the primary features of ethnic conflict is that whole communities take the collective blame for the actions of individuals inciting ‘collective revenge’ (Chirot, 2001: 23). It is in these cases, Liotta and Simmon reason, that the identity an individual is assigned becomes increasingly fixed as blame is cast upon those who “look alike, sound alike” (Liotta and Simmons, 1998: 3). Thus individuals who do not define themselves as any ethnicity are likely to still face security risks during an ethnic conflict.

In contrast Kalyvas argues that in fact ethnic identities can soften during an ethnic conflict, citing the examples of the Macedonian Struggle of 1904-1908 in which Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania were all trying to get Macedonia to assume their national identity (Kalyvas, 2008: 1048). A Macedonian peasant interviewed was quoted as saying “Our fathers were Greek and none mentioned the Bulgarians...We became Bulgarians, we won. If we have to be Serbs it is not a problem. But for the time being it is better for us to be Bulgarians” (*ibid*). However the mechanics of this conflict seem to match Kaufmann’s definition of a political conflict: people are treated as mouldable with malleable identities to be converted, rather than fixed identities to be accepted or expelled.

#### 4.3 Theories on ethnic conflicts and the mechanisms governing their emergence

Theories concerning the root cause of ethnic conflicts and how they progress are logically linked to the anthropological paradigm under which the phenomenon of ethnicity is interpreted. Kaplan famously interpreted the Balkan’s conflict as an expression of ‘ancient hatreds’ stemming from the historical aspirations of the respective nations and anger at past humiliations and suffering (Kaplan, 1993; Kaufman, 2001: 3-5). Kaplan describes the Balkans as being at the centre of “the ultimate historical and cultural conflict” which pitted “Catholicism against Orthodoxy, Rome against Constantinople, the legacy of Hapsburg Austria-Hungary against that of Ottoman Turkey – in other words, West against East, the ultimate historical and cultural conflict” (Kaplan, 1993: 7). Kaplan describes the mixed communities of rural Bosnia as “full of suspicions and hatreds” (*ibid*: 22). Such an interpretation is highly reliant on the primordial interpretation of ethnicity and puts the

emotional bonds formed by the essential condition of ethnicity at the root of ethnic conflict.

Kaplan's explanatory reliance on emotion and 'hatred' has similarities to Geertz and Shils' primordial interpretation of ethnicity, which is based on the emotional significance of the bonds connecting the ethnic group (Geertz, 1963; Shils, 1957). Under Kaplan's interpretation of ethnic conflict, the conflict between ethnic groups was never absent but merely repressed or released: just as ethnicity is an ever-present trait rather than an opportunistically used label, ethnic antagonism is a constant emotion rather than a feeling limited to circumstance.

Lake and Rothchild see ethnic war as distinctly security orientated. They argue that when the state fails to arbitrate between groups and ethnicity is linked to social insecurity, society tends to fracture along ethnic lines (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 44). Stable ethnic relations are reliant on a form of 'contract', official or unofficial, which specifies the rights and responsibilities of each group (*ibid*: 49). However these contracts change as the balance of power between the respective ethnic group's changes: ethnic groups which lose out may choose to fight rather than face a substantial loss in their power (*ibid*).

Such a state of affairs gives rise to a plethora of potential security issues which can result in one group attacking another. A lack of knowledge of another group's capability for destruction or actual aims makes mobilisation and arming a logical step (*ibid*: 47). Similarly this raises a security dilemma as each group does not know whether the other is arming for offensive or defensive reasons, fear of suffering a pre-emptive strike from enemy groups can in turn make a pre-emptive strike against potential rivals seem like a logical course of action (*ibid*: 52-53). Lake and Rothchild as security analysts treat ethnicity in an essentialist tradition in treating ethnic categories as stable markers and 'things-in-and-off-themselves' but also acknowledge the role of political entrepreneurs and ethnic activists in appealing to history and stirring up Kaplan's ancient hatreds (*ibid*: 53-54). However their analysis also contains a degree of circumstantialism in arguing that ethnicity only becomes a fault line under conditions when ethnic identity is a cause of insecurity.

Crawford in a similar circumstantialist vein argues that ethnic conflict is most severe and likely when ethnic identity becomes a political identity (Crawford, 1998: 515). State institutions, such as Yugoslavia's ethno-federalism or India's state linguistic federalism, can formally merge political and ethnic identity (*ibid*: 522-532). However it is when economic or political grievances fall disproportionately on certain groups and "undermine the legitimacy of political institutions, and lead to perceptions that the balance of political power is unfair that identity politics, like other forms of political competition, can escalate to cultural conflict and violence" (*ibid*: 546-566). Far from being reliant on the ethnicity itself and the emotion and significance attributed to the category, ethnic



conflict is a function of the political and state machinery, which politicise ethnicity. Crawford gives the example of Malaysia which has distributed the benefits of its sustained economic growth relatively evenly since 1945 and which has seen little post-war ethnic violence between its Malay and Chinese community (*ibid*: 546-547). In contrast, Hindu dominance over central government and commerce in the Punjab region of India has led to the emergence of nationalist and separatist Sikh politicians (*ibid*).

Economic and 'relative deprivation' based theories often rely on a synthesis of primordialist and situationalist theory. The condition of group membership is interpreted as 'primordial' but its salience is dependent on contextual factors. Of these factors economic/political disadvantage and discrimination is granted primacy (Gurr, 1993: 174). Gurr in studying 227 politically mobilised communal groups found that economic disadvantage was significantly correlated with communal protest while political discrimination drove separatist demands and movements (*ibid*: 188). Gurr argues that "objective conditions (poverty, discriminatory treatment, loss of autonomy) determine the issues around which leaders are able to mobilize collective action" (*ibid*: 189).

However other theorists argue that economic disparity on its own is neither a necessary or sufficient condition. Kaufman argues that "ethnic groups mobilize under virtually all economic circumstances" (Kaufman, 2001: 18). Connor gives a more in depth analysis and argues that inequalities only matter when they occur along group lines and compares the mobilisation of Maine residents in the US and Quebec residents in Canada (Connor, 1984: 346). The former are not ethnically distinct from the nation while the latter are genetically, culturally and linguistically distinct (*ibid*). Mainers suffer from a higher level of relative deprivation than the French-Canadian Quebec residents but have not mobilised around the issue (*ibid*). Connor from this data concludes: "Remove economic inequality or reverse it, and the conflict remains... Remove the ethnonational issue while maintaining economic inequality between regions, and the conflict dissolves." (*ibid*: 350). Thus, given Connor and Kaufman's criticism, it is prudent to see relative deprivation as a causative factor, albeit one that does not stand alone.

Fearon and Laitin present ethnic conflict and cooperation as a function of 'information asymmetry' arising from the fact that ethnic groups often have dense social networks but limited cross-ethnic social networks (Fearon and Laitin, 1996: 719). Thus in inter-group interactions an individual's group membership is the prime factor by which he or she is judged (*ibid*). This leads to conflict if a member of one group attacks or wrongs a member of another group as the offended groups lack of information concerning who committed the action leads to them holding the group itself responsible (*ibid*: 720).

Israel and Palestine form a prime example of this process: the Israelis are unable to ascertain who is individually responsible for a bomb or mortar attack and so visit their retribution upon the Palestinians as a whole (*ibid*: 727). However if a third party or the ethnic group itself punishes offending members then the retributive violence need not take place (*ibid*: 723-725).

Fearon and Laitin's analysis assumes a lack of cross ethnic social networks in all places beset with ethnic violence. This assumption falls down with the example of Bosnia, a prime case study of ethnic violence, which was often noted for its pre-war cosmopolitan social composition (Eriksen, 2001: 48-49; Ramet, 1996: 72; Kaufman, 2001: 4). However Fearon and Laitin's analysis does carry weight when the legitimacy of the state as a mediator and judicial authority breaks down. This could occur if the state is seen as being ethnically dominated or biased, causing communities to rely on their own defence groups or militias for justice. Such actions occurred in the aftermath of state police attacks on Catholic communities in Northern Ireland and Croat orientated practices by the Tudjman government in Krajina (Denich, 1994: 377-380; Stetler, 1970: 46-48). Thus Fearon and Laitin seem to form a cogent and relevant analysis of the process of ethnic conflict rather than its genesis.

Kaufman takes elements from many other theories while simultaneously critiquing them to form his own theory on the process and causes of ethnic conflict. He criticises Kaplan for assuming that the hatred ethnic groups feel for each other is continuous which relies on a primordial interpretation of a continual stable ethnic identity, Kaufman rightly asserts that merely because a group portrays themselves as a primordially linked ethnies does not mean that they are (Kaufman, 2001: 4). However Kaufman argues that this belief gives politicians a rich array of ethnically based symbols to draw upon to evoke emotion and garner support (*ibid*: 29). This is because "ethnic groups by definition have myths of shared history, common heroes, and common kinship, as well as symbols that evoke those myths" (*ibid*). Kaufman also criticises the security minded paradigm of the likes of Lake and Rothchild by arguing that their theory assumes that neither side wants conflict, which is rarely the case, but nevertheless acknowledges the paradigms usefulness in explaining the escalation of conflict (*ibid*: 19-20).

#### 4.4 Primary hypothesis

The primary hypothesis of this thesis corresponds with Crawford's: that ethnic conflict arises when political issues become ethnic issues. However Crawford's assertion that ethnic conflict is completely divorced from the significance attached to an ethnic identity by its members seems untenable. Furthermore Kaufman makes a persuasive case that ethnicity can have significant

emotional importance due to the rich array of symbols that bind the group. The primary hypothesis will be a synthesis of Kaufman and Crawford's theories: in multi-ethnic states, the different aspirations of each group and the degree to which each group will benefit or lose from political decisions leads to an 'ethno-political congruence' in which certain political positions are ascribed to an ethnic identity. Far from being purely materialist these political gains and losses can be symbolic and intangible, arising from the shared myths, symbols and history that bond ethnic groups. I would argue that the higher the etho-political congruence in a state in which a political polemic generates a degree of antagonism, the more likely that ethnically based conflict will arise.

Furthermore from this political genesis, a self sustaining cycle of retaliation along ethnic lines perpetuates the conflict. This dynamic was noted by Gurr:

"Once a group is committed to a particular strategy, self-sustaining conflict dynamics tend to develop: fighting groups and their opponents get locked in to action-reaction sequences from which it is difficult to escape" (Gurr, 1993: 189).

This is not to suggest that this is the only process which guides ethnic conflict but merely that such a process can occur without a high degree of initial ethnic antagonism or the presence of Kaplan's 'ancient hatreds'.

## 5.0 The Three Case Studies

### 5.1 Lebanon

#### 5.1.1 Background to conflict

The civil war in Lebanon raged from 1975 till 1990. In the opening years of the war before the Syrian invasion and Israeli response in 1977, the war was primarily fought by volunteers motivated by perceived communal threat, whereas in later years the war was fought between professional armies and militia fighters receiving salaries (El Khazen, 2003: 610).

The primary focus of my model is on the aspects of communal fear and antagonism in conflict and thus I chose to analyse this section of the conflict as issues of financial advantage and international power play were reduced. This section will give an account of Lebanon and the events leading up to the conflict followed by an anthropological analysis on the main drivers of the conflict.

Lebanon has long been one of the most religiously mixed areas of the Middle East. The population includes Sunni and Shiite Muslims, Maronite Catholics, Greek and Armenian Orthodox Christians and Druze, a sect within Islam. The nation has a history stretching back to antiquity when it was a Phoenician settlement and part of a civilization that gave birth to Mediterranean culture (Kaufman, 2004: 3). With the Islamic conquests came the influence of Sunni Islam, however Lebanon became a popular refuge for religious minorities: the Shiite migrated to the area to escape Sunni Mamluk persecution while the Maronite Christians migrated to the area in the 7<sup>th</sup> century to escape Jacobite persecution (Kliot, 1986: 200-201). During the Ottoman period, the Druze gained a favoured position as the local rulers for the imperial power (Crighton and Abele McIver, 1991: 129-130; Johnson, 2001: 177). However in the 1800s the Maronite community increased its economic power and threatened the Druze's hegemony leading to a Druze led massacre of Maronites in 1860 (*ibid*).

During the 20<sup>th</sup> century with the post WWI decline of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon passed to the French who helped the Maronites achieve political supremacy in the region (Crighton and Abele McIver, 1991: 130). The country was conferred independence in 1943 and it was in this year that the 'National Pact', a political arrangement that divided political power according to confessional identity, was agreed (Hagopian, 1989: 103). In this agreement it was outlined that political representation in parliament would have a 6:5 ratio favouring Christians, that the President would always be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni and the Speaker of the House a Shiite Muslim (*ibid*). It was also agreed that the Maronites would not to seek foreign protection, as they had in the past from France, nor allow Lebanon to serve as a base for Western imperialism into the Arab interior (*ibid*). The Muslims conceded that Lebanon was to remain a separate, sovereign state which

would not be forced to unite with other Arab states as a pan-Arab nation (*ibid*). The pact was informed by a 1932 census which showed a Christian majority in the nation, however the pact was to remain unchanged until the Taif Agreement which ended the civil war (Crighton and Abele McIver, 1991: 131; Krayem, 2003).

The first major post independence civil disturbance occurred during the '1958 Crisis'. In 1958 Lebanon briefly merged with Syria and Egypt to form the United Arab Republic, a Pan-Arab nation headed by Egyptian leader and Pan-Arabist Nasser (Calame and Charlesworth, 2001: 43). This move was opposed by president Chamoun who wanted to remain aligned with the anti-Nasser West but supported by PM Karami (*ibid*). In Beirut, Muslim anti-Chamoun militants barricaded themselves into the Sunni quarters of al-Basta, Akkar and Wadi al Taym while Christians defended East Beirut and the Mount, the fighting came to a stop with a US intervention by which time 2000-4000 people had died (Calame and Charlesworth, 2001: 48-49; Klot, 1986: 207). Many parties such as the Progressive Socialist Party, the National Liberal Party and Arab Nationalist Party had been created post independence and fought during the 1958 Crisis (El Khazen, 2003: 608).

In the aftermath of the war army commander Shihab was elected president. Shihab, in a policy of reconciliation, brought down the barricades that split Beirut during the 1958 crisis (Calame and Charlesworth, 2001: 48-49). Shihab also gave more political and economic equality to the Muslim population and created new centres of state power such as state schools, water, sanitation and social security which had previously been supplied by the traditional confessionalist za'im patronage structure (Zamir, 1980: 52; Johnson, 2001: 59-60).

Lebanon also had a large population of Palestinians, many of whom migrated north during the early Arab-Israeli wars, with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) having a large presence in Southern Lebanon and often using the region as a base to conduct raids into Israel which provoked Israeli retaliation. In 1968 an Israeli retaliatory strike destroyed thirteen airliners at Beirut airport, during this time parliamentary elections showed a resurgence in conservative anti-Palestinian Maronite candidates (Hudson, 1978: 262-263).

On 14 April 1969 Palestinian guerrillas clashed with the army when the state tried to relocate the Palestinian population further away from the border, sparking pro-Palestinian riots in major cities leading to twelve deaths (*ibid*). Further clashes later in the year led to Arafat and the Lebanese state signing the Cairo Agreement which regulated guerrilla presence in Lebanon but gave them autonomy in the camps and the border regions to the south (Hudson, 1978: 264-265). It was during this time that many Maronite militias formed: the Phalange as the armed wing of Gemeyal's Kataeb

Party; the Tigers militia as part of Chamoun's National Liberal Party and Franjeh's Marada Movement (*ibid*). Conservative Maronite membership also increased, for example Kataeb Party membership jumped from 36000 in 1964 to 65000 in 1971 (*ibid*). It was also during this period that the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a bloc of parties representing socialist, Arabist, anti-confessional and pro-Palestinian sentiments, was created by Kamal Jumblatt (Odeh, 1985: 112-113). The movement would go on to be a major combatant in the civil war. While the right wing Maronite parties militarised the LNM put itself under the PLO's military umbrella (*ibid*).

In 1970 the monarchy of Jordan fought PLO guerrillas, an event known as Black September, which prompted a mass migration of armed Palestinians to Lebanon, at the same time anti-Shihabist and conservative president Franjeh was voted in (Hudson, 1978: 265; Zamir, 1980: 60). 1971-73 saw an increase in terrorist acts which led to an Israeli raid in Beirut that killed nine civilians and three PLO leaders, the funeral brought down a crowd of 250,000 and was attended by Gemayel and Chamoun (Hudson, 1978: 265). Again the state tried to break guerrilla power in the camps and this time were aided by militias (*ibid*). 1974 saw a further escalation of hostilities: on 29-30 July Phalangists clashed with Palestinian resistance; on 21 August a policeman killed a guerrilla; on 22 September the Phalange and SPP (of the LMN bloc) clashed (Odeh, 1985: 119).

On the 27 February 1975, during a demonstration by fishermen against the Proteine Company's monopoly over fishing, a gunshot was fired and fatally hit Sa'd, a Sunni politician (El Khazen, 2000: 267-268). In the aftermath PLO and Sidon gunmen fired at army jeeps, while the company's HQ were bombed by the Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Movement (*ibid*). Leftist parties accused the army of Sa'd's death and to further complicate matters Chamoun was chairman of the board of the Proteine Company (*ibid*: 272-278). Sa'd's funeral became the second largest gathering of PLO support in Lebanon, in spite of Sa'd's previous criticism of the organisation (*ibid*). This 'Palestinianised' a previously socio-economic issue (*ibid*).

The start of the conflict proper was the Al-Rummaneh confrontation (El Khazen, 2000: 260; Johnson, 2001: 60-61). On 13 April 1975 Gemayel was attending a consecration at a Catholic Church in Al-Rummaneh, an area it was agreed Palestinian convoys would not pass through, soon after a car with two Palestinian men had refused to stop at a Kataeb checkpoint causing the Phalange to fire at the car (El Khazen, 2000: 287). An hour later a car with Palestinian slogans over the number plate drove through the check point and fired shots at the crowd killing Gemayel's body guard and three others (*ibid*). A bus carrying Palestinians going through the neighbourhood was boarded and twenty seven of the occupants killed by the Phalangists (*ibid*). Accounts vary over whether the bus carried armed or unarmed Palestinians (El Khazen, 2000: 287; Odeh, 1985: 132-133; Hudson, 1978: 270).

The result was a breakdown in government: nine National Dialogue Councils, which included the right wing, LNM and confessional leaders, were attempted and all failed due to fighting between right wing forces and the LNM and because of the right-wing's opposition to reform (Odeh, 1985: 145-148). The Battle of the Hotels began in autumn 1975 further sabotaging negotiations (Fregonese, 2009). The Green Line, which demarcated the Christian and Muslim sections of Beirut, was built by militias in the aftermath of these battles (Fregonese, 2009; Calame and Charlesworth, 2009: 38-39).

On 6 December the Phalangists committed the Black Saturday massacres in response to the murder of four Phalangist militiamen: Muslims were stopped, identified by their ID cards and killed in East Beirut which led to between 70-200 deaths, sections of the LNM responded in kind slaughtering Christians in mixed districts (Farsoun, 1976: 17; Odeh, 1985: 149-150; Hage, 1996: 134). On 16 January 1976 various Maronite militias overran the Muslim slum of Karantina in East Beirut and massacred approximately 1000 individuals, similar evictions and atrocities happened in other Muslim areas under Maronite control such as Maslakh and Naba (Odeh, 1985: 152; Kliot, 1986: 210). On 19 of January the Christian town of Damour was overran by LNM and Palestinian militias, a massacre took place in which 350 died (Odeh, 1985: 152; Johnson, 2001: 11-12; Hudson, 1978: 271-272). On 12 of August Christians attacked the Tal al-Zaatar Palestinian refugee camp, an area they have blockaded since January (Johnson, 2001: 11-12; Kliot, 1986: 210).

During this period Syria had been mediating between the various factions. On 22 January 1976 the LNM and the Maronite parties agreed on a Syrian solution: the PM would remain Sunni but would be elected rather than chosen by the president and parliamentary seats would be equally divided between Muslims and Christians (Odeh, 1985: 153). However the agreement was soon rejected by the LNM as it did not abolish confessionalism and the movement restarted its assault against the Maronite forces and claimed that there would be no ceasefire unless the Maronites agreed to their reforms (Odeh, 1985: 162; Hudson, 1978: 272-273). Syria opposed an abolition of confessionalism as it would bring democratic pressure onto its own doorstep and threaten its Aliwite rulers (Odeh, 1985: 167-168). To check LNM advances Syria invaded Lebanon in June 1976 (*ibid*).

### 5.1.2 Anthropological analysis

My focus is on ethnic and political identity in conflict rather than the economic factors, though I recognise that these are not entirely separable. Scholars such as Zamir have argued that the conflict can be seen as an economic conflict between rich and poor, the disparities often being reflected in

sectarian division (Zamir, 1980: 62). Though there were economic disparities between the confessions, with the Shiite being particularly deprived, inequality had decreased markedly since independence and the share of national wealth among the lowest income groups did not differ much from figures seen in countries such as Denmark and West Germany (Johnson, 2001: 56-57; El Khazen, 2000: 259-259). The manifesto of the LNM, and even Sadr's Movement of the Deprived, though espousing socialist rhetoric focussed on the abolishment of confessionalism and Palestinian support (El Khazen, 2000: 261-262). The only explicitly socio-economic clash was the Sidon disturbance that was quickly 'Palestinianized' (*ibid*). Thus I will focus on the identity aspects of the Lebanese Civil War.

Scholars argue that the conflict in Lebanon cannot be interpreted as a simple Christian/Muslim conflict (Odeh, 1985: 20-24). The LNM, far from being purely Muslim, was multi-confessional and included Christians, Druze, Sunni and Shiite Muslims as members (Rowayhed, 2006). The LNM did not argue for more power to Muslims but rather an abolition of the confessionalist politics that ensured the Maronite's dominance and support of the Palestinian cause (Jumblatt, 1977: 7). These goals relate rather to the identity of Lebanon itself, either as an Arab or Western/Mediterranean nation.

The Kataeb Party was established in 1936 to promote Lebanon's identity as distinct from its Arab neighbours and saw Lebanon's Christian element as a core trait of the nation's identity (Rowayhed, 2006). In contrast Walid Jumblatt, son of the founder of the LNM, argued that "At present the main danger is the threat against the unity of Lebanon and the identity of Lebanon as an Arab state" (Jumblatt, 1977: 7). This contestation of national identity is why both militarised blocs claimed to fight for the nation as a whole, rather than particular social or ethnic groups (Beiber, 2000: 278-279).

The Palestinian element of the conflict was instrumental in deciding whether Lebanon was part of the pro-Israel West or part of the pro-Palestine pan-Arabist cause (Huson, 1978: 264; Johnson, 2001: 184). Odeh describes the Palestinians as "living proof of the organic link between Lebanon and the Arab world" (Odeh, 1985: 108). Indeed this may be why Palestinians were so viciously targeted by right-wing Christian forces in Tal al-Zaatar and later the Sabra and Shatila Massacres. In short the Palestinian problem reified the question of national identity in Lebanon that had caused the 1958 Crisis. In addition the socialist demands of the LNM would further separate Lebanon from the capitalist West and closer to the socialist/communist Nasser, the de-facto leader of the Pan-Arabist movement (Zamir, 1980: 60).



A further analysis on the makeup of the Lebanese state is required to see exactly why these differing conceptions of Lebanese identity became imbued with sectarianism. Lebanon as a nation was not secular but institutionally sectarian: “religion is inscribed as the citizens’ most important public attribute-stamped prominently on his or her identification and voter registration card” (Makdisi, 1996: 24). While during the 19<sup>th</sup> century intra-confessional and inter-class divisions had been prevalent and the basis for conflicts such as the 1858 Maronite peasant revolt, the National Pact formalised confessional cleavages and stabilised religion as the primary boundary marker of ‘otherness’ (Makdisi, 1996: 24; Hage, 1996: 133).

Rural-urban migration due to Lebanon’s booming urban economy meant that many individuals left rural clan support networks for the urban confessional *za’im*, a political grouping along confessional lines in which political support is traded for services (Johnson, 2001: 25 and 160-161). This confessionally based political patronage network provided both material support and identity in the urban environment by forming an imagined community that functioned “as a replication and, in some sense, an actual extension of the family” (Johnson, 2001: 162).

The configuration of the Lebanese State allowed for the incorporation of religious identity with political position and opinion. Such a combination constrained the political choice of many leaders. For example traditional Sunni bourgeoisie were wary of the LNM’s anti-confessional stance which threatened their power base, but were prevented from taking the Maronite anti-PLO stance as it would alienate them from the pro-PLO Lebanese that formed the base of their *za’im*, they thus found themselves in a shaky alliance with the LNM (Odeh, 1985: 112-113). This constrained choice thus allowed people to perceive political identity and opinion as a function of ethnic/religious identity. Further actions by the Palestinians increased this mergence of political and sectarian identities: when Sa’d, the Sunni political leader shot, supposedly by the Maronite dominated army, in the Sidon disturbances was wrapped in a Palestinian flag at his funeral, thus aligning Islam and leftist pro-worker sentiments with the Palestinian cause (Johnson, 2001: 196; El Khazen, 2000: 268-278).

This relationship between political and ethnic identity is shown in various statements, for example Karim Pakradouni of the Kataeb Party asserted that ‘Christians by their nature are more Lebanese while Muslims are more Arab’ (Rowayhed, 2006). This statement interprets Islam as a marker that provides sufficient evidence to ally an individual with the Pan-Arabist and Palestinian cause and thus against Lebanon’s ‘true identity’. The leader of Guardians of the Cedar, a Maronite militia, asserted a similar link between ethnicity and politics and publically said: “If you feel compassion for the Palestinian women and children, remember they are Communists and will bear more Communists”

(Johnson, 2001: 12). In this statement the Palestinian identity is associated with the anti-Western and pro-Communist agendas of pan-Arabism. To the right-wing Maronite forces all of these political positions threaten their concept of Lebanon's identity.

Such opinions led to the targeting of people due to their confession and implicit political opinion. A prime example is Black Saturday, a massacre in which Maronite militias targeted all Muslims as political threats and justifiable victims. Maronite militias often used Christian symbolism highlighting the sectarian nature of their attacks. Franjeh named his militia the 'Mardaite Brigade' who functioned as Christendom's bulwark against the Umayyad Caliphate (Johnson, 2001: 144 and 187). Other examples include the Christian crucifixes that were carved into the bodies of victims (*ibid*: 10).

The leadership of the LNM emphasise the bloc's mixed confessional makeup: Walid Jumblatt in an interview would only refer to his military opponents as 'rightists' never 'Christians' while Hafez of the Independent Nasserite Movement within the bloc claims "We prefer to stick to Right versus Left nomenclature, rather than Christian-Muslim, although the central forces of the right wing are Christians" (Jumblatt, 1977: 7; Hafez, 1977: 11). However the actions of militias who did not utilise such categorisation of the enemy served to encourage revenge attacks such as Damour in which Christian graves were dug up and desecrated (Johnson, 2001: 60). Hafez talked of the operation of Damour as a strategic matter as the town cut the LNM's supply lines, he adds "we never wanted this war to be a sectarian business", a tacit admission of what the conflict had become (Hafez, 1977: 11-12).

Furthermore while the LNM's leadership may have had secular designs, the rank and file of those who committed atrocities were motivated by more confessional concerns. In Kreidi and Munroe's interviews with retired militiamen Assad, a Druze, switched from the Communist Party to the SPP because he wanted to fight as a Druze, even though he agreed more with the former's ideology (Kreidi and Munroe, 2002: 20-24). Similarly Marwan, a Muslim, joined the Murabutin Movement for its confessional membership rather than its ideology (*ibid*). This phenomenon seems to stem primarily from the need to avenge wrongs done against their confession in order to maintain 'communal honour'. Assad justified his participation in a massacre thus:

"It was an emotional reaction...If you'd heard what happened to our people, then for sure you would believe that killing these...could be justified" (Kreidi and Munroe, 2002: 30).

Haugbolle's interviews with militiamen finds a similar pattern: Hussain from the Amal Party militia chose to join the militia after Kataeb soldiers humiliated his father and Fadi of the PSP became a militia man after Israelis killed his father to get even with "enemy, the army of betrayers, the

Christian stranger” (Haugbolle, 2012). These motivational processes in the conflict meant that after the preliminary atrocities it became “impossible to talk of a political left and right in Lebanon when most extreme forms of communalism motivated the vast majority of fighters and many of their leaders” (Johnson, 2001: 67; Krayem, 2003).

## 5.2 Croatia

### 5.2.1 Background to the conflict

The wars that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia are generally known as the Balkan Conflicts and refer to four particular wars: the Slovene War of Independence; the Croatian War of Independence; the Bosnian Conflict and the Kosovo Conflict. In order not to spread my analysis too thinly I will focus on the Croatian War of Independence as the inter-ethnic conflict and persecution within the Krajina region serves as a suitable example of the politicisation of ethnic identity and the resulting targeted violence.

The area known as Yugoslavia has been conquered by the Byzantine, Roman, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires resulting in a confessional makeup of three religions: Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism and Islam. Croatia especially since the 11<sup>th</sup> century had been split between Ottoman, Venetian and Austro-Hungarian rule (Denich, 1994: 373).

During the 19<sup>th</sup> century different intellectual traditions regarding the identity of the various Yugoslav peoples emerged. Exclusivist philosophies emanated from nationalist thinkers such as Starcevic, a Croat, who formulated the ideal of ‘Greater Croatia’, a state that would include geographical areas of Serbia but exclude the Serbian people (Denich, 1994: 373). Similarly a ‘Greater Serbia’ was idealised in 1844 (Wood, 2001: 63). However the Illyrian Movement tried to create a linguistic unity for south Slavs (Serbs and Croats) by creating a Slavic Esperanto (Greenberg, 1996: 6). This idea was a legacy from the administration of Napoleonic France, which had rejected its own regionalism during its revolution, and sought to treat the Yugoslavs as one people (Lampe, 1996: 41-43).

Early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Serbs successfully liberated themselves from the Ottomans and turned their attention to freeing themselves from Austro-Hungary, triggering WWI with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand (Prp-Jovanovic, 2000: 48). In the aftermath of WWI and the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the South Slavic area came under the control of the Serbian monarchy as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (*ibid*: 49). Ethnic issues arose as Croats and Slovenes felt disaffected with the arrangement and complained that they were politically underrepresented in

spite of supplying 75-80% of the kingdom's industry (*ibid*: 53-55). Violence reached a crisis point when three Croat politicians were murdered in Parliament causing the Serbian King Aleksandar to dissolve parliament and install himself as dictator and rename the kingdom 'Kingdom of Yugoslavia' (*ibid*). The King was later assassinated by Croatian and Macedonian extremists and an attempt was made to turn the kingdom into a federation but it was too late: the Nazi conquest of 1941 gave Croatia independence from the Kingdom, which had to operate in exile (Denich, 1994: 374-375; Prp-Jovanovic, 2000; 56-58).

The resulting Nazi puppet state designated as the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was responsible for a policy of ethnic cleansing against the Serbs during WWII, primarily carried out by the paramilitary unit known as the Ustashe with Muslim accomplices, in an attempt to realise 'Greater Croatia' (Cushman, 2004: 11; Pratt, 2003: 135; Denich, 1994: 368). Serbian rebel fighters called the Chetnik's in turn committed atrocities against Croats in an attempt to create a 'Greater Serbia' (Pratt, 2003: 135).

WWII ended with Tito's communist partisans obtaining victory over both the Ustashe and the Chetniks. Under Tito's regime a compromise was reached: a federation of republics under an overarching communist government based on the values of 'brotherhood and unity' (Denich, 1994: 371). Each of these republics was formed with an ethnic majority, with the notable exception of Bosnia (Batovic, 2009). By the mid 1960s the centralism of the federation had become associated by non-Serbs with 'Greater Serbia' due to Serbian domination of state positions, excluding leadership which was representational, by Serbs, thus greater autonomy was granted to the republics (Bertsch, 1977: 90-97; Eriksen, 2001: 49).

An economic crisis in the 1960s, the desire to trade with the West and plans for sustained economic growth meant that reduced state economic interference was demanded (Batovic, 2009; Bertsch, 1977: 90). Furthermore issues of inequality between the wealth of the Federations states created conflicts of interest. Slovenia's income was twice the state average while Croatia was above the state average, these two states supplied 50% of the Federations tax revenues in spite of only constituting 30% of the population, Serbia was on par while Kosovo was just 27% of the state average (Herman and Peterson, 2007). The richer regions pushed for decentralisation while the poorer regions wanted to maintain the status quo to facilitate redistribution (Pratt, 2003: 136). This was accompanied by general decentralisation and greater power to regional authorities, Croatia was the most determined republic in pursuing this policy (*ibid*).

It was during this period that nationalist stirrings in the various states began. In the 1970s Croat politicians argued that Serbo-Croatian should become two separate languages and that not nationalism but chauvinism should be repressed, this movement became known as the Croatian Spring (Batovic, 2009). Serbians in Croatia meanwhile formed the Serbian Cultural Society, which included in its membership former Chetniks, to demand a Serbian autonomous province in Croatia (*ibid*). Tito eventually purged the Croatian leadership of nationalist politicians in 1971 and the liberal Serbian leadership of Serbian Cultural Society members in 1972 (Denich, 1994: 371; Bertsch, 1977: 91).

However in 1974 Tito signed a constitution giving significantly more power to the republics while leaving foreign and military affairs centralised (Pratt, 2003: 136). More importantly, the constitution publically acknowledged that the different republics were made up of different peoples or *narod*, which merged the interests of the republics “with those of the narod, who represented the majority” (*ibid*: 139). Instead of consolidating civic conceptions of citizenship, territorial borders were used as boundaries delimiting different cultural status quos. “Yugoslavia became a patchwork of majorities and minorities” (*ibid*). Tito, the creator of Yugoslavia died on the 4<sup>th</sup> May 1980 (Sell, 2002: 27).

During the 1980s nationalist stirrings became confrontations. The dominance of the Albanian majority in local politics in Kosovo was resented by the Serbian minority (Ramet, 1996: 77). Inflammatory events concerning the Kosovar-Serbs occurred throughout the 1980s : a petition signed by 2000 Kosovar-Serbs outlined alleged abuses including rape, violence and forced eviction suffered by them at the hands of the Albanian majority; protests by Kosovar-Serbs occurred outside the Assembly building in Belgrade in 1987; a memorandum published by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences argued that Kosovar-Serbs were suffering from ‘physical, political, legal and cultural genocide’ and that Yugoslavia had intentionally kept Serbia weak to keep the Federation strong, a situation that could only be reversed by increasing Belgrade’s control over the provinces and a reversal of republicanism (*ibid*: 45-47).

Milosevic gave this ethnic resentment a voice in Belgrade and the memorandum was incorporated into his political platform, although he initially publically criticised the document (Ramet, 1996: 77; Sell, 2002: 47 & 108). Milosevic while publically criticising nationalism and acknowledging his wish to retain the Federation argued that if the republics were to seek independence, the borders would need to be redrawn (Sell, 2002: 110). The slogan that was associated with his presidency was “All Serbs in one state” (*ibid*: 5; Herman and Peterson, 2007). This policy became a basis of the coming conflicts as other republics strove for independence.

In 1990 multiparty elections in Slovenia resulted in the victory of the DEMOS bloc and in 1991 Slovenia announced its succession citing its Catholic homogeneity as a legitimate reason for separation, a brief engagement with the Yugoslav army (JNA) left fifty dead but the country attained independence (Pratt, 2003: 149; Herman and Peterson, 2007).

The Croatian bid for independence was much more problematic due to its significant Serbian minority. Franco Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won the April/May 1990 election, with 41-42% of the total vote but 70% of the Croat vote (Pratt, 2002: 148; Herman and Peterson, 2007; European Election Database). The HDZ's election victory was followed by numerous symbolic gestures empowering Croat identity at the expense of the Serb identity: the reintroduction of the Sahovnica, the Croat chess-board flag worn by the Ustashe regime, as the nation's symbol; the relegation of Serbian Cyrillic script to a minority language; attempts to cleanse the Croatian dialect of Serbo-Croatian or Serbian similarities (Marko-Stockl, 2004: 29; Cushman, 2004: 12; Greenberg, 1996: 6). Serbs in state positions were fired or forced to sign declarations of loyalty to the new government in Zagreb (Trifkovic, 2010: 212-214). A new constitution, passed in December 1990, removed the Serbs previous status as a constituent nation of the Republic of Croatia and deemed them a minority (*ibid*).

Two weeks after the HDZ's election, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) suspended contact with parliament, during this time a football riot erupted between the Croatian Dynamo Zagreb fans and Serbian Crvena Zvezda fans, while a few days later there was an attempted assassination of a SDS politician in the mixed town of Benkovac (Grandits and Leutloff, 2003: 23-24).

In the Eastern regions of Croatia around Knin, Kordun and Banija Serbs constituted around 76% of the population (Marko-Stockl, 2004: 25). Babic, the SDS mayor of Knin, proposed the creation of an administration unit containing all Serb populated villages (Grandits and Leutloff, 2003: 27). In August/September 1990 a referendum concerning the autonomy of the Serbian people in Croatia occurred in all Serb populated settlements: it was mostly Serbs who voted and the result was 97.7% in favour of autonomy, Babic's project also incorporated other villages in the Krajina region that chose to join by referendum (ICTY, 2004). The Croat government declared the referendum illegal on the 17 August 1990, in response Serbs blockaded the region surrounding Knin to prevent the government from entering the area in what would be known as 'The Log Revolution' (*ibid*).

In February 1991, five months before Croatia's declaration of independence, the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) was proclaimed and included a population that was 61% Serb (Marko-Stockl, 2004: 25-26). In Plitvice a clash between Croatian and Serbian Krajina forces resulted in the first death of the

conflict in late March (Sibler and Little, 1995: 148-155). This event was followed by HDZ affiliated extremists firing rockets into the Serb dominated town of Borovo Selo (*ibid*). The first major engagement of the conflict was in Borovo Selo where Croat authorities were prevented from entering the village without permission (*ibid*). Two policemen entered in disguise and were apprehended, the Croatian government's attempt to rescue them resulting in twelve Croatian fatalities and three Serb fatalities (*ibid*).

The referendum in May concerning Croatian independence was boycotted by Krajina Serbs and resulted in over 90% being in favour of independence (*ibid*: 161-162). In early August the JNA with Serb paramilitaries started shelling and assaulting the towns of Vukovar and Dubrovnik (Sibler and Little, 1995: 201-204; Stitkovac, 2000: 165). Instances of Serbs massacring Croats occurred in Dalj, Lovas with the assistance of the JNA, Saborsko, Skabrnja and Vukovar after the town fell, where again the JNA assisted (ICTY, 2011; ICTY, 2007). Meanwhile Serbs were killed by Croat paramilitaries in Gospic, Daruvar, Karlovac, Virovitica and Sisak (Stitkovac, 2000: 165-170). These massacres led to the wholesale flight of Serbs and Croats into their respective areas each side of the unofficial border (ICTY, 2011; ICTY, 2004; ICTY, 2007; Stitkovac, 2000: 165-170).

In November Milosevic agreed to allow the deployment of peacekeepers on his terms achieving his aim of separating Croatia into Croat and Serb entities, with the dividing line came into effect in January 1992 (Sibler and Little, 1995: 207-208; Stitkovac, 2000: 167). The border stayed until Operation Storm was launched in mid-1995 by Croatia to reclaim lost territory, during this operation many Serbs fled to Bosnia or Serbia as refugees (Stitkovac, 2000: 169-170; Marko-Stockl, 2004: 26-27).

### 5.2.2 Anthropological analysis

A basic commonality in language, with dialectical differences, and a common Slavic genetic origin means that cultural distinction between Croats and Serbs is achieved via identification of one's religion (Denich, 2004: 373; Powers, 1996; Greenberg, 1996: 4-5). Croatia and Serbia meet at the demarcation line of the great schism between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity. Smith and Kaufman both argue that a shared sense of history and collective memory is fundamental to the formation of ethnic identity and territorial bonds (Smith, 2001: 14-23; Kaufman, 2006: 204-205). The religious schism thus means that the two groups have different collective historical memories and a differing interpretation of historical events.

The best example is the contrasting histories of WWII. Croatia had been separated from the Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empire, for which it had fought in WWI, by external powers in the Treaty of Versailles (Prp-Jovanovic, 2000: 43-58). Croatia had been forced under the yoke of an Orthodox monarchy that had become a dictatorship and removed all non-Serb influences from government, WWII had allowed them independence from such repression (*ibid*). Meanwhile for Serbs the period was a time when Serbs were persecuted barbarically for their religion and often forced to abandon the religious identity that defined them (Powers, 1996; Cushman, 2004: 11-12).

During Tito's reign there had been a 'de-ethnicisation' of history: literature focussing on the sufferings endured by particular groups in WWII was banned; memorials to the victims of the ethnic violence of WWII neglected to mention the ethnicity of the perpetrators and victims and a new Yugoslav identity was forged on the concepts of socialist struggle and anti-fascism (Denich, 1994: 371; Bertsch, 1977: 89). Tito later purged the government of Serbian centralists who were led by Rankovic (Batovic, 2009). Centralists aimed to preserve the power of the administrative centre of the federation, Serbia, over the republics (*ibid*). However this spread fear among non-Serbs of Serbian hegemony and a resurrection of the Serbian autocratic rule of the Pre-WWII kingdom (*ibid*).

The Croatian Spring of the 1970s threatened the Yugoslav identity by highlighting linguistic differences in Serbo-Croatian and demanding the exclusion of the Serb nation from the Croatian constitution, this in turn caused the Serbian Cultural Society in Croatia to demand an autonomous Serbian province or for areas of Croatia to be merged with Serbia (*ibid*). These demands show that ethnic identities, each with their own aspirations still continued, in spite of 'Yugoslavism'.

The struggle for the Croatian State in the 1990s was accompanied with a revised Croat-orientated version of history. Tudjman described the NDH as "not only a quisling organisation and a Fascist crime, but was also an expression of the Croatian nation's historic desire for an independent homeland" (Marko-Stockl, 2004: 28). This sentiment explains Tudjman's choice of the Sahovnica for the flag of Croatia: while to Serbs it is a symbol of genocide and persecution, to the Croats it is the symbol of the successful Croatian independence movement which freed the land from Serbian autocracy. This broke from the 'de-ethnicised' Yugoslav history of communist struggle and created a history of nationalist struggle specific to the Croats. This in turn put Croatian history in opposition to the Serbian collective memory of genocide.

The May 1990 football riot between Serb and Croat hooligans, people who would soon form the recruitment base of the ethnic paramilitaries, brought to the surface the ethnic split in opinion over Tudjman and his plans for independence (Sack and Zeljan, 2000: 312). During the riot Croatian fans



chanted 'Franjo, Franjo, HDZ' while Serbs chanted 'We will kill Tudjman' (*ibid*: 311). Furthermore the riot divided opinion between the Croatian and Serbian media. The Croatian media argued that the Serb dominated Yugoslav police force had been over aggressive against the Croatian fans while not sufficiently suppressing the Serbian hooligans (*ibid*: 312). The Serbian media argued that the riot had been organised as a pretext for the subsequent purge of Serbs from the police force (*ibid*).

Thus topics previously taboo in the media began to enter the public consciousness and ethnically based arguments over the past began to rage in the media. Tudjman in his book *Bespuca* greatly revised the amount of Serbs killed by the Ustashe in WWII (Milosevic, 2000: 112). In response the Belgrade media started unearthing Serbian graves of Ustashe victims (*ibid*). During the initial clashes between Krajina irregulars and Croat forces, Croat and Serbian media repeatedly used terms such as 'Ustashe' and 'Chetnik' to demonise the other ethnic group (Pavkovic, 2000: 142). These terms would later be used by individuals taking part in massacres and ethnic cleansing actions as a term of abuse for their victims (ICTY, 2007). Such labelling allowed leaders to remind their respective ethnic 'brothers' of their precarious position in the face of their enemies and to transform the political struggles for independence, autonomy or the retention of federalism into the ethnically exclusive goals of 'Greater Croatia' or 'Greater Serbia'.

The 1974 constitution reified the ethnic difference between Croats and Serbs by formally grouping peoples or 'narod' by religion. In doing so the constitution made religion the main marker of difference and smothered other more local forms of identification such as descent or the Bosnian nacija (Pratt, 2003: 140-141). Pratt argues that the "politicisation of difference" is the formation of ethnogenesis (*ibid*). The constitution by allowing these republics the option of secession and acknowledging the resulting religious majorities and minorities politicised religious difference. After the introduction of the constitution and the death of Tito, the symbol of Yugoslavism, political discourse became ethnicised: the republics were not full of Yugoslav citizens with politicians representing the civil resident but majority and minority residents with different ethnic politicians representing their interests. Sell argues that "after Tito there was no such thing as a Yugoslav politician" (Sell, 2002: 38).

In Croatia the symbolic link between nation, history and religion means that issues of political autonomy instantly became a sectarian issue. The independence orientated HDZ party was endorsed by the Catholic Church and the prominent cardinal Kuharic described the church's role thus: "The Church among the Croats has always represented the rights of the Croatian nation" (Powers, 1996). Church and confession became the basis of one's membership of the nation, replacing Tito's civic nationalism with a purely ethnic definition. This shift in citizenship was formalised when the Croatian

constitution defined Croatia as a 'nation of Croats' while Tudjman in a post-election press conference exclaimed 'Croatia was for the Croats', a statement that was virtually identical to those made by the Ustashe leaders in 1941 (Marko-Stockl, 2004: 28-29; Sack and Zeljan, 2000: 310). Serbs were legally labelled a minority and did not gain a legal framework to protect their rights until December 1991 when the ceasefire was due to be enforced (Marko-Stockl, 2004: 28-29; Grandits and Leutloff, 2003: 27). Croatia in effect became a 'nation-state' with more than one 'nation' within it: the 'imagined community' included within its limited territory those who were outside the community.

In contrast the Serbian element of the war often seemed to publically fight for 'Yugoslavia' as shown by the raising of the Yugoslav flag in the siege of Dubrovnik and the Serbian cry of 'Yugoslavia' in initial Croat-Serb clashes (Trifkovic, 2010: 214; Sibling and Little, 1995: 201-204). While the border for Croats was seen as historical and inviolable, a way for Croats to realise what Tudjman deemed a "historic desire for an independent homeland", for Serbs the borders were administrative and the union of Yugoslavia had finally allowed Serbs to exist united in a single state (Powers, 1996; Marko-Stockl, 2004: 28). The dissolution of Yugoslavia threatened the unity of the Serbs but also meant a Serb beyond the 'administrative' border of Serbia could not rely on his\her dual identity as a Yugoslav and a Serb (Marko-Stockl, 2004: 28). Such a shift informed Milosevic's support of retaining the federation, and failing that establishing a Serbia which encompassed all Serbs (Sell, 2002: 110; Powers, 1996).

The Serbian Orthodox church in particular argued that Serbs cannot be partitioned and that 'Serbianess' is derived from the Orthodox faith (Powers, 1996). The history of forced conversion in the fascist NDH meant that Croatia's desire for independence both violated the Orthodoxy's view of the importance of Serbian unity but also posed a threat to the very identities of Serbs within its borders. Such threats were manifested in the HDZ's policy of using the Sahovnica, the insignia of Ustashe who had physically and symbolically destroyed Serbs through massacre and conversion (Marko-Stockl, 2004: 29). Latin script, the writing system of Catholicism, was adopted as the national script while Cyrillic script, the script of the Orthodox Church, was deemed a minority language (Cushman, 2004: 12; Powers, 1996). Thus the churches that defined the two communities became actively involved in the political issue of independence.

Massacres and invasions at the hands of Serb militias in Croatia were often accompanied by the destruction of the local Catholic church and numerous Serb paramilitaries used Cyrillic script on their uniform (ICTY, 2007). This indicates the Serbian effort to reassert their Orthodox identity while removing potential symbolic threats. Such actions, much the like Croatian constitution, also

succeeded in merging 'Serbianess' with the territory of Krajina and thus creating an ethnically exclusive nation-state.

### 5.3 Northern Ireland

#### 5.3.1 Background to the conflict

The Troubles refers to a low intensity conflict that started in 1969 and continued until 1998, although a few armed groups persist in carrying out acts of violence. Such a time span is double that of the Lebanese Civil War and six times that of the Croatian War of Independence. Therefore I have decided to focus on the period from 1969, the official beginning of the conflict, to 1972, the deadliest year in the conflict in terms of casualties.

Ireland has been subject to invasion from Britain since the 11<sup>th</sup> century, but it was under the rule of Elizabeth I that the policy of plantation was introduced in which native land was given to Scottish Presbyterians and English Anglicans, this policy was especially focussed in Ulster (White, 2007: 22; Galliher and Degregory, 1985: 2). In 1641 there was a Catholic rebellion leading to the slaughter and expulsion of thousands of Protestants and in Jan 1649 Cromwell arrived in Ireland to avenge the earlier massacre, he also extended English dominion in Ireland (Galliher and Degregory, 1985: 3).

In 1685 Catholic James II became king of England and, against current laws, appointed Catholics into office and dissolved the Protestant government (*ibid*: 4-5). In response elements in England sought to get Protestant William of Orange to usurp the throne causing James to flee to France (*ibid*). James then sought to retake the throne with French and Irish assistance, when he landed in Ireland in 1689 he created an Irish parliament dominated by Catholics and enacted laws returning land from the Protestants to the Catholics and laid siege to the Protestant settlement of Derry (*ibid*). In 1690 William of Orange defeated James and his armies at the Battle of the Boyne (*ibid*).

During the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries the United Irishmen, composed of both Catholics and Presbyterians, fought for an independent Ireland (White, 2007: 24). In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century the successful Irish War of Independence led to the partition of Ireland, formalised in the Anglo-Irish Treaty, as Ulster wished to remain part of the Kingdom and a civil war then erupted between the pro-treaty and anti-treaty IRA (*ibid*).

During the 1950s and 1960s the anti-treaty IRA launched 'The Border Campaign', a series of skirmishes against the Northern Irish state on the border. However it was also during this time that Northern Ireland began a series of welfare state reforms that were available to all regardless of

confession and the quality of life in the province surpassed that of the Irish Republic (O'Leary and McGarry, 1996: 157). This decreased support for the IRA in the Catholic community (O'Leary and McGarry, 1996: 157-161; English, 2009: 85). Whether Republicanism was still in the forefront of the Catholic community's mind during the early 1960 is in dispute: a Belfast Times survey found that <30% of Catholics favoured reunification while Hewitt argues that the 1962 and 1965 elections showed a rise in anti-partition sentiment in the Catholic community (O'Leary and McGarry, 1996: 157-161; Hewitt, 1981: 370).

However Catholics in interacting with the state began to demand that the state grant them the same rights as British citizens (O'Leary and McGarry, 1996: 157). The Cameron Commission in 1969 found evidence of many civil abuses against the Catholic minority. The Catholic minority saw themselves as politically disenfranchised: many towns in Northern Ireland had a Protestant majority in the local government wards in spite of large Catholic electoral majorities caused by the manipulation of electoral ward boundaries (Cameron, 1969). This led Lord Cameron to conclude: "In each of the areas with Unionist majorities on their council the majority was far greater than the adult population balance would justify" (*ibid*). Furthermore issues of sectarian prejudice concerning state employment, private employment and public housing allocation arose (*ibid*).

In response the civil rights groups formed to fight against perceived discrimination against the Catholic community. This began with the formation of Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) in 1964 and in 1967 the largest civil rights group, Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), was founded (Cameron, 1969; Melaugh, 2012). The movement as a whole enjoyed strong backing from the Catholic community (Cameron, 1969). Civil rights demands were: Local government elections in line with the rest of the UK instead of Ulster's proprietary voting system; redrawing of electoral boundaries to ensure fair representation; legislation against discrimination in employment; a points system for housing to ensure fair allocation; repeal of the Special Powers Act (which allowed corporal punishment such as whippings and the hearing of public order crimes in a court with no jury); the disbandment of the B-Special Police Reserve Force which was notorious for abuses of force against the catholic community; and the withdrawal of the Public Order Bill (Stetler, 1970: 41).

The Cameron report cites that the civil rights groups had no interest in changing the Northern Ireland constitution or its border (Cameron, 1969). However marches, including the first march from Coalisland to Dungannon in 1968, were accompanied by the singing of Republican songs such as 'Who Fears to Speak of '98', a song that praises the united Irishmen who rebelled in 1798 and 'A Nation Once Again' (Hewitt, 1981: 375). The Cameron report also concedes that the civil rights movement attracted support from prominent Republican and nationalist individuals (Cameron,

1969). Austin Currie, a prominent figure in NIRCRA, when he ran for Stormont MP stated that his ultimate goal was reunification while dealing with discrimination was listed fourth of seven goals (English, 2009: 88).

During this time of Catholic political awareness, Protestant reactionism against perceived threats increased: Protestants formed the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1966, in reference to the unionist militia which opposed Irish home rule during the Irish War in Independence, and in 1967 all Republican clubs were banned (Stetler, 1970: 39; Guelke, 1986: 92).

Reactionary Loyalist marches were planned and the government responded by banning all marches causing civil rights demonstrators to clash with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) (Stetler, 1970: 40). A Derry civil rights march in January 1969 was ambushed by armed Loyalists and the RUC refused to intervene, it emerged that the attack had been orchestrated by the Orange Order with some elements of the RUC who were tasked with protecting the marchers (*ibid*: 46-48). PM Terrence O'Neil launched an enquiry which concluded that two RUC members should be subject to arrest, however O'Neil was voted out of office and Chichester-Clarke voted in who subsequently dropped the charges and refused to release the enquiry report (*ibid*: 48-49).

During this time the Catholic residents of Derry created Free Derry: an autonomous Republican and Catholic area from which the police and state forces were forbidden to enter (*ibid*). In April civil rights campaigners stoned the RUC barracks leading to a confrontation and then a riot in which petrol bombs were used (*ibid*). Some youths involved in the violence fled through Samuel Devenney's, a Catholic civilian, house and when the RUC forcibly entered the building Mr Devenney was beaten and later died of his injuries (*ibid*: 52-53). Two days after the riots a wave of bombings occurred for which the government blamed the IRA and the IRA blamed Loyalists, during this time Chichester-Clarke opposed universal franchise, a prime goal for the civil rights movements, for fear of Loyalist violence (*ibid*: 54-55).

On 12 July 40,000 Orangemen marched in Belfast to celebrate the anniversary of Protestant victory at the Battle of the Boyne, which inspired serious rioting and in some places Orange Halls were burnt down by Catholics, riots began in Derry on the night of the 12<sup>th</sup>, accompanied by sectarian fighting and attacks on the RUC barracks (*ibid*: 56).

The Troubles officially started with the Battle of Bogside. This confrontation started with a march by the Loyalist apprentice boys commemorating Derry's resistance against Catholic King James II, which unlike many civil rights marches, was allowed to go ahead (*ibid*: 68-92). A series of incidents led to a full scale clash between the Catholics of Derry and the understaffed and underequipped RUC who

were assisted by Protestant mobs (*ibid*). By 13 August British troops had arrived in Northern Ireland (*ibid*: 97).

Reforms aimed to increase the rights of the Catholic minority such as the disbanding of the B-Special and universal suffrage were implemented immediately after the dispatch of the British Army, which led to Protestant loyalist riots and a policeman was shot (Bew and Gillespie, 1993: 21-24). During this time the first 'peace lines', walls separating Catholic and Protestant communities, were built (*ibid*). On 28 December 1969 the IRA split into Provisional and Official wings, with the former refusing to interact with the Government and promoting a return to the IRA's "traditional military role" (*ibid*: 24).

In 1970 the first riots between the Catholic community and army occurred on 3 April (*ibid*: 25-26). On 27 June the first sustained military action was carried out by PIRA leading to six deaths, five of which were Protestant, in retaliation 500 Catholics were evicted from East Belfast by Protestant mobs (*ibid*: 28). On 3 July the army enforced a curfew on the Catholic Falls area of Belfast which led to gun battles between the army and IRA factions (*ibid*: 28-29). In the latter half of the year there were two Catholic/army riots and one sectarian riot in September, the total list of fatalities from political violence for the year was 25 (*ibid*: 30-32).

In 1971 the first British Army soldier died after being shot by the PIRA on 6 February (*ibid*: 32). During the first third of the year the PIRA and OIRA feuded and Scottish soldiers were killed by PIRA leading to Loyalists forming Tartan gangs and attacking Catholic youth (*ibid*: 33-34). IRA gunmen attacked Orange Order members leading to Protestant riots (*ibid*). During the summer the army clashed with Orangemen who refused to call off their march, there were riots in Derry after two people are shot by the army and the IRA set off multiple bombs in Belfast leading to PM Faulkner requesting the British government introduce internment without trial which was granted on 9 August (*ibid*: 35-36). In September PIRA bombed a bar in Protestant Shankill, this act is condemned by the OIRA and sectarian clashes followed, and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) formed in the aftermath (*ibid*: 39; Guelke, 1986: 96-97). In late October the army shot more suspects and in retaliation IRA activity increases in early November, then on 4 December the UVF bomb a Catholic bar prompting two retaliatory bombs by the IRA and the assassination of Unionist senator Jack Barnhill by OIRA (Bew and Gillespie, 1986: 40-43). By the end of 1971 174 people had died due to 'The Troubles' (*ibid*).

On 30 January 1972 Bloody Sunday occurred in which the army fatally shot thirteen men during a civil rights rally, on 22 February the OIRA bombed a barracks in retaliation and an attempted

assassination of the Stormont Home secretary and two IRA bombs followed (*ibid*: 44-47). On 24 March direct rule from Westminster was imposed and Stormont was dissolved, William Craig's Loyalist Vanguard movement opposed the policy and organised a strike (*ibid*: 47-48).

On 14 April 23 bombs rocked Northern Ireland (*ibid*: 41). A deluge of retaliatory violence ensued: on 13 May loyalists bombed a Catholic bar; on 17 May PIRA shot at Protestant workers leaving a factory; on the 21 May eight people died in cross-fire between Catholic and Protestant council estates (*ibid*: 52).

On the 25<sup>th</sup> May the OIRA ceased their campaign after killing an Irish member of the army (*ibid*). In June the PIRA invites the Government to talk, the government conversed with the group via the SDLP, during these talks a fearful UDA create its own barricades and no-go areas (*ibid*: 53). In July the government refused to meet PIRA demands and the PIRA responded by killing six soldiers and setting off twenty six bombs on 12 July in Belfast and Oxford street in an event dubbed 'Bloody Friday' and in retaliation a Catholic was tortured and killed by the Loyalist 'Shankill Butchers' paramilitary (*ibid*: 53-54). The army then launched an offensive to tear down the barricades to no-go areas and through July/August there were riots on the anniversary of internment and four PIRA bombs (*ibid*: 55). On 16 October an army vehicle killed a Protestant boy leading to the UDA to declare the army its enemy and UDA members later fired upon the army (*ibid*: 56). 1972 ended as the most violent year of the Troubles with 467 deaths attributed to political violence (*ibid*: 57).

### 5.3.2 Anthropological analysis

Much like Yugoslavia and Lebanon, in Northern Ireland religion defines a person's identity regarding history, self and nation.

Protestants were a majority within the Northern Irish state but a minority in Ireland. The Protestant community's history as agents of British rule and as a regional minority means that the community has seen itself as insecure in the region but protected by a state in which it is a majority, however this current state of affairs is seen as constantly under threat (Galliher and Degregory, 1985: 134). Historical events such as the Siege of Derry and the 1641 massacre have stuck in the Protestant consciousness. This is shown by the slogan 'No Surrender', which references Derry's siege by King James, which is utilised by numerous Loyalist paramilitaries and the subject of numerous murals of Protestant neighbourhoods (Stetler, 1970: 68-69; Galliher and Degregory, 1985: 4-5). These historical events have been utilised by politicians such as Paisley to remind the community of their precarious position (Crighton and Abele MacIver, 1991: 129). Catholics have a separate history of

domination by a minority of foreign origin, of the loss of land and independence and of massacres at the hands of the British (Galliher and Degregory, 1985: 1-5; White, 2007: 24). In a similar manner to the Protestants, religion has helped define their insecure status: under English rulers bishops and priests were executed for their religious identity, Gerry Adam's thus described the Church as part of "the peoples struggle" (Mitchell, 2006: 107).

These separate histories are institutionalised in Northern Ireland's education system: the vast majority of Catholics go to a Catholic education school where they learn their own history thus making state schools Protestant by default (Rose, 1971: 335; Mitchell, 2006: 60). Thus the two histories of Northern Ireland were solidified and separated by the state.

These two histories come into conflict during parades. The Battle of Bogside, the official start of the conflict, occurred during a march by the Apprentice Boys of Derry commemorating the apprentices who sealed the gates of Derry and repelled Catholic James II (Stetler, 1970: 63-97; Galliher and Degregory, 1985: 4-5). For the Catholic community the march signifies the failure of a ruler who reinstated their rights and overthrew their oppressors but for the Protestant community the march signifies a successful resistance to an attack that could have led to their extinction. Orange Order marches were both suppressed by the authorities and targeted by Republican militias (Bew and Gillespie, 1985: 34-35). William of Orange, the figure central to Orangism, defeated James II and ensured the Protestants continued existence in Ireland and as a result is revered as a saviour among hardliner Loyalist Protestants. While for the Catholic community William of Orange is the man who ensured continued Protestant domination and Catholic subjugation.

Thus religion ties directly into the issues of unionism and republicanism. For Catholics the UK has historically been a persecutor while for the Protestants it has been a protector. Symbolic gestures such as granting IRA members Catholic funerals and the sprinkling of holy water upon Republican paramilitary members links the Republican cause and the Catholic faith (Dillon, 1998: 173; Galliher and Degregory, 1985: 76-77). For Protestants actions by the Catholic hierarchy formalised this symbiosis: Cardinal Conway, in spite of criticising PIRA, described Republicanism as a 'noble cause' and the clergy began to endorse PIRA in the wake of internment (Davis, 1989: 41-47).

White's interviews with IRA members found that many accepted a sectarian dimension to the conflict but did not see their militia as sectarian, nevertheless PIRA publication *Republican News* routinely published lists of 'unpatriotic' Catholic prelates (White, 2007: 25-29; Davis, 1989: 48). Thus Catholicism was portrayed as a sufficient condition for Republican patriotism. Cardinal McRoy in the aftermath of Irish independence claimed that no Protestant would survive 50 years in a united



Ireland (*ibid*: 38-39). The statement was essentially a vocalisation of the Protestant community's rationale in supporting Unionism and merged Catholicism with the threat Republicanism posed to the Protestant community.

As a result of these actions the Protestant paramilitaries designated all Catholics as potential enemies. When the UDA formed it released this statement:

“Roman Catholics do not regard themselves as part of Ulster. They regard themselves as part of the Republic of Ireland. They are on the side of murder, terrorism, intimidation, and the total destruction of all loyalists. The exceptions are so very, very few that we simply cannot trust them.” (Guelke, 1986: 99)

Similarly Billy Hanna, head of the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) argued “If you're brought up in the Catholic faith, you'll lean towards Irish nationalism...You can't leave faith out of the equation” (Dillon, 1998: 77). Thus Catholic, as well as explicitly Republican, symbols and individuals were targeted. The Clonard monastery during the late 1960s was threatened with burnings and was targeted by Protestant mobs during the 1969 riots (Easthope, 1976: 440-441; Dillon, 1998: 170). Acts of Republican terrorism were instantly met by violence directed by Protestants against Catholics such as the expulsion of Catholics from East Belfast in the aftermath of the PIRA's first military actions on 27 June 1970 and the strategy of sectarian assassination adopted by the UVF/UDA (Bew and Gillespie, 1993: 28 & 39; Guelke, 1986: 99).

In contrast Republican paramilitaries were focussed on military and state targets. Between 1969 and 1993 PIRA and OIRA killed 1804 individuals, 19% of these were Protestant civilians and 41% of these were army or RUC personnel (White, 2007: 36). In contrast Catholic civilians were 67% of the casualties attributed to Protestant militias (*ibid*). Des O'Hagan who was part of the IRA prior to the split argued that the IRA had no wish to target Protestants as they did not wish to sectarianise the issue, similarly one of White's IRA interviewees asserted that: “no one can call themselves a Republican and a sectarian at the same time” (White, 2007: 29; Dillon, 1998: 163). Most notably Gerry Adams made an address to the Protestant community reassuring them that Sinn Fein's goal was not a sectarian state and called Protestants to remember that the roots of the Republican movement lay in the Presbyterian community (White, 2007: 29).

The threat to Irish Republicanism came from first Stormont and its enforcement apparatus, the RUC and B-Specials, and then from Britain and the army. In comparison the main threat to Unionism and the 'Britishness' of Northern Ireland came from Republicanism which was admitted by Sinn Fein to be a struggle fought almost entirely by Catholic civilians/irregulars (White, 2007: 33). The UVF

argued that should Irish Republicanism win and the British be forced out of Ireland, this would entail the exodus of Protestants as Protestants generally identified themselves as British while Irish Republicans tried to convince the public of their non-sectarian character (Bruce, 2001: 30; White, 2007). Thus it seems that Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries had differing conceptions of the nature of the conflict (Guelke, 1986: 100).

However Republican militias during the period under study and throughout the Troubles routinely engaged in sectarian attacks. Prior to the split within the IRA in 1969, the IRA had refused to intervene in the sectarian riots so as to avoid 'sectarianising' their cause (White, 2007: 25-26; Bew and Gillespie, 1993: 24). In a written statement the PIRA, who chose to intervene during the riots, argued that they split in protest at the IRA's willingness to interact with the Government which resulted in the "undermining of the basic military role of the Irish Republican Army" and "the failure to provide the maximum defence possible of our people in Belfast is ample evidence of this neglect" (Bew and Gillespie, 1993: 24). PIRA's founder, Jimmy Steele, protested that the Marxist leanings of the IRA were against Catholicism and defined the Republican cause as a Holy War (Dillon, 1998: 162). PIRA's willingness to engage in sectarianism was evident early on in the conflict: it was PIRA who bombed Protestant Shankill in retaliation for the McGurke's bar bombing by the UVF in December 1971 and it was PIRA who fired upon Protestant workers after Loyalists bombed Catholic West Belfast in May 1972 (Bew and Gillespie, 1993: 43 & 52). In comparison OIRA engaged in retaliation against the British army and Unionist MPs and condemned PIRA's bombing of a Shankill bar in September 1971 (*ibid*: 39-47).

PIRA through its sectarian role of protector of the Catholics, who they deemed 'our people', gained significantly more popularity than its rival, which refused to take part in sectarian violence. This was shown during the 1971 anniversary march of the Easter Rising, in which the PIRA attracted double the numbers of the OIRA (*ibid*: 34). Nevertheless White's interviews still found that PIRA members saw the Protestant community as responsible for the sectarian dimension of the conflict, with PIRA sectarian actions being interpreted as purely reactionary (White, 2007: 28).

It is important to remember that though the war was fought between Republicans, Loyalists and army personnel, IRA military action concerning the border had occurred during the 1950s and 1960s without Northern Ireland erupting into civil war. It was Catholic demands for civil rights rather than reunification that prompted the inter-communal violence that marked the beginning of the troubles.

The singing of Republican songs during the marches and the presence of republican figures in the movement helped Protestants see NICRA as the Republican wolf in sheep's clothing, but it was the

demands themselves which attacked the foundations by which the Protestants maintained their 'uneasy majority'. For Catholics, the disbandment of the B-Specials meant the disbandment of an abusive force but for Loyalist Protestants it meant the end of "locally controlled undiluted Protestant police power" (Galliher and Degregory, 1985: 93). A 1908 papal decree required children of mixed confessional marriages to be brought up Catholic, thus demands to end prejudice in employment and housing allocation which would encourage intermixing and mixed marriages would result in children that would be identified as Catholic (*ibid*: 72-83). This in turn threatened the Protestants majority. This in turn made the demands to end gerrymandering and for universal franchise even more of a threat to the Protestants hegemony.

In the wake of the Battle of Bogside and following inter-communal violence, Government concessions to civil rights demands such as the Electoral Law Act which instigated universal suffrage and the disbandment of the B-Specials failed to prevent further violence (Bew and Gillespie, 1993). By this point much of the Catholic community had sought protection from PIRA which was engaged in a sectarian war with Loyalist militias and a war of resistance against the army (White, 1989: 1283-1294). Similarly the RUC's inability to deal with the disturbances in Bogside prompted Protestants to seek security in vigilantes and militias (Guelke, 1986: 93-94). What had started as a political demonstration for rights which had included members of both confessions became a full blown sectarian conflict (Mitchell, 2006: 66).

## 6.0 Common trends in the three cases

### 6.1 Externally verifiable ethnic identity

Ethnic identity traits such as descent or religion may not always be instantly externally visible but in all three cases they were externally verifiable. In most interactions people are more likely to be sorted according to ethnic identities than non-ethnic identities (Chandra, 2003: 48). In both Lebanon and Yugoslavia, this order was internalised by the state which set the categories, via identification cards in Lebanon or the 1974 constitution in Yugoslavia.

In the case of Lebanon, state-issued identification and voter registration cards would announce the carrier's religion (Makdisi, 1996: 24). These cards were often used by militias to identify people as legitimate targets of violence (Hage, 1996: 134; Johnson, 2001: 61). Beirut and Lebanon generally were a patchwork of homogenous enclaves within a mixed society, although there were some mixed areas (Silver, 2010: 350; Stork, 1983: 9). This 'geoconfessionalism' meant that confessional enclaves could be identified and cleansed if deemed a risk. The Damour, Karantina and Tal al-Zaatar massacres are all examples of the identification and elimination of confessional enclaves (Kliot, 1986: 210; Hafez, 1977: 11-12; Johnson, 2001: 11-12).

The 1974 constitution in Yugoslavia designated each republic in the Federation as being dominated by a 'narod' or people who had a right to secede from the Federation (Pratt, 2003: 139). These classifications were religiously based and overpowered local lineage or linguistic categories such as the Bosnian *nacija*, and created entirely new categories such as 'Bosniak' to include all Slavic Muslims (*ibid*: 140-145). Religion became the main mark of difference for the Yugoslav citizen. Though church attendance dipped among Serbs during socialist times, Orthodox festivals in the Krajina region such as the 'village/house-slava' celebrating village and household saints continued (Leutloff, 2000: 7-10). Though these festivals had lost their 'religious character', they still functioned as an expression of the Orthodox faith and a "symbol of belonging to the Serb nation" (*ibid*). Further points of differentiation include language: Serbo-Croatian though officially one language was affected by dialectical differences which split the Serb and Croat populations (Greengerg, 1996: 4-5). While the Belgrade government aimed to unify the language, dialectical differences were sufficient for movements in the Croatian Spring to push for the language to be separated into Serb and Croatian (Batovic; 2009).

Ireland, unlike Lebanon or Yugoslavia, did not have religious difference explicitly formalised by the state. However implicit separations formed in the state architecture, most notably state schools by default became 'Protestant schools' due to Catholic attendance at Catholic schools (Rose, 1971:

335). Easthope in his ethnography of Northern Ireland found that the direct question ‘what is your religion?’ was exclusively asked of English or other overseas nationals as clues such as place of work, sports played and followed, newspapers read and surname would identify the confession of a Northern Irish national (Easthope, 1976: 431-433; Rose, 1971: 328 & 344). Much like Lebanon, in Northern Ireland confessional fissures are mirrored in the geography. Segregation had previously occurred in the wake of the ethnic violence during Ireland’s partition (Boal, 2002). Segregation became either officially formalised by peace lines at interface areas or unofficially by ethnically homogenous ‘no-go areas’ such as Free Derry.

## 6.2 Political identity imposed on externally verifiable ethnic identity

In all three cases a person’s religion/ethnicity caused political categories to be imposed upon them by others. Chandra argues that “in the impersonal environment of mass politics, however, the ethnic identity of each becomes the principal means that external observers have of ascertaining group affiliation” (Chandra, 2003: 76).

In Northern Ireland “the presumption is made that to be a Catholic is to be a Republican, and to be a Protestant is to be a Loyalist” (Easthope, 1976: 430). This is echoed in the UDA’s statement which directly ties a citizen’s ethnic identity as Catholic to the republican political identity:

“Roman Catholics do not regard themselves as part of Ulster. They regard themselves as part of the Republic of Ireland. They are on the side of murder, terrorism, intimidation, and the total destruction of all loyalists. The exceptions are so very, very few that we simply cannot trust them” (Guelke, 1986: 99).

As such associations are externally imposed even if they are not internally accepted: they are incredibly hard to break. Often such associations rest on the fact that a history particular to an ethnic group will make individuals more likely to identify with a certain political opinion. Mitchell cites the example of Simon, a middle class Protestant, who supported the Republican SDLP yet was not accepted by the movement he supported because he was a Protestant and thus had not lived the ‘Catholic experience’ of subjugation in Northern Ireland (Mitchell, 2006: 66). As a result Simon was not seen to be a ‘true republican’. Conversely loyalists militants argue “if you take out of the equation the faith and the culture and hold only to politics, then you are no longer a loyalist” (Dillon, 1998: 85). Organisations such as the Orange Order merge loyalty and affinity to the British crown with the Protestant identity and marches such as the Apprentice Boys of Derry March encapsulate the siege mentality of the Protestant community feels against a wider Catholic Ireland.

Chandra argues that in patronage democracies people “invest in an identity because it offers them the best available means by which to obtain desired benefits” (Chandra, 2003: 12). In Lebanon the confessionalist political system and the *zai'im* patronage structure meant that often both leaders and followers had to conform to the political agendas that dominated in their general sect. Conservative Muslim leaders were forced by the support base of their *za'im* to support the LNM as the bloc's position on the Palestinian presence mirrored that of their followers (Odeh, 1985: 112-113; Zamir, 1980: 63). Furthermore the economic dimension to the predominantly Muslim Sidon disturbances pushed Muslim and Leftist leaders into an alliance (*ibid*). Conversely in order to access material benefits voters were pressured to vote for their leader regardless of policies, thus imposing the political identity of their leader onto their confession.

Such a system means that it is unlikely that it was a coincidence that the Civil War broke out when Franjeh, an anti-Shihabist who sought to strengthen the power of these largely confessionalist and exclusive *za'im's*, was elected (Zamir, 1980: 60). The 1958 Crisis, during which the national identity was under contestation in a similar manner, had split the country along largely confessional lines and formed a precursor to the ethno-political congruence witnessed during the civil war. President Chamoun's conflict with PM Karami was a war primarily between Maronite pro-government militias and largely Muslim Nasserite's (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009: 43-49). Under such political circumstances political positions were instantly imposed upon individuals based on their ethnicity leading to purely sectarian attacks and retaliations such as Black Saturday and Damour.

In the Croatian War of Independence the political positions of both sides could be described as secessionism: secession from Yugoslavia for the Croats and secession from the new Croatian State for the Serbs. The revision during the 1974 constitution in Yugoslavia defined each administrative area as being dominated by a different *narod*, a term which merged a person's nation with religion (Pratt, 2003: 139-142). Tudjman's policies threatened to change these administrative boundaries to borders defining a 'Croatian nation' thus instantly making secession an ethnic issue (Grandits and Leutloff, 2003: 27).

The endorsement by the Catholic Church, the main marker which differentiates the Croat from the Serb minority, of an independent Croatia further established the idea that to be a Croat was to be pro-independence (Powers, 1996). Similarly the Orthodox clergy supported the retention of the federation or, failing that, incorporation of all Serbs in one state (Powers, 1996). Thus the Serb identity was symbolically linked to the political identity of partitionist. Later on in the conflict the blessing of Serb militias in Krajina by Orthodox priests and the Orthodox clergy's opposition to

Milosevic's 1992 peace and the Dayton Agreement associated the Serb identity with warmongering (Powers, 1996; Liotta and Simmons, 1998: 5).

Ideas for an independent Croatia had been expressed during the 1970s by strictly ethnic movements during the Croatian Spring and similarly counter-ideas of an autonomous Serb entity in Croatia had been expressed by the ethnically exclusive Serbian Cultural Society (Batovic, 2009). Further back in history Yugoslavism had been associated with ensuring Serbian domination via the Serbian monarchy while Croatian independence had been associated with violent ethnic exclusivism due to the NDH (Prp-Jovanovic, 2000: 43-58). Given this history, ethnic identity was easily imposed upon the intrinsically political question of secession from Yugoslavia and Croatia's partition.

Religion, unlike race, descent group or physiological identity traits, is not necessarily inherited or 'ascribed' and can be subject to rejection by the individual, in many cases limiting the 'fixidity' intrinsic to ethnic identity (Kachan, 2006: 420). However as conflict increases "fingers are pointed at people who look alike, sound alike...during moments of conflict choices about identity are invariably frozen while how one is identified becomes increasingly fixed" (Liotta and Simmons, 1998: 3). Thus in many cases personal identification becomes irrelevant as increasingly fixed categories are imposed upon individuals by others. In all cases actual adherence to the religion which was used to identify political enemies and allies is a non-issue.

In Yugoslavia, the 'religious war' was fought "largely by irreligious people who wear religion as a distinguishing badge but do not know what the badge stands for" and "given the insane logic of ethnic cleansing, their life might depend on whether they are Muslim atheists, Orthodox atheists, or Catholic atheists" (Powers, 1996). In Northern Ireland "a non-believer must be either a Protestant atheist or a lapsed Catholic" (Rose, 1971: 328). While in Lebanon the confessionalist political system and state issued identification cards, which were used to identify targets in numerous massacres, meant that a person could not escape the religious category ascribed to them, regardless of personal belief.

This is because regardless of whether the person believes the religion, their ethnic identity is still of political consequence. A Protestant and Catholic, whether they believe the religion or not, will still be a regional or national minority which will affect their political opinion regarding republicanism or unionism. A Croat or Serb similarly will either be defined as the 'narod' of the nation or an unprotected minority in an independent Croatia regardless of their adherence to the Catholic or Orthodox faith. A Lebanese citizen will always be constrained by their za'im and thus religious

identity, whether the person adheres to it or not, is a good indication of what policies they shall politically support.

### 6.3 Political violence as an instigator of ethnic antagonism and violence

Johnson argues that attacks on ethnic groups affect a sense of 'communal honour' independent of personal or family honour (Johnson, 2001: 14). Violations of such honour invite collective revenge. Chirot argues that what distinguishes ethnic conflict is that "whole communities are blamed, rather than individuals" (Chirot, 2001: 23). In all three cases attacks, even those that were politically motivated, resulted in retaliatory attacks against the community that was supposedly politically represented by the perpetrators or shared the perpetrators ethnic identity.

In the case of Lebanon, interviews with those who participated in massacres often did so in retaliation for a previous attack which was viewed as an attack against their community (Kreidi and Monroe, 2002). One Druze militiaman explained the rationale behind his participation in ethnic massacres as an "emotional reaction...If you'd heard what happened to our people, then for sure you would believe that killing...could be justified" (Kreidi and Monroe, 2002: 30). The fact that the majority of those interviewed by Kreidi and Monroe and Haugbolle both chose to align themselves with a militia that matched their confession, rather than their political opinions, and mainly joined militias to avenge wrongs committed against their community by other sects suggests that acts of violence were generally committed and interpreted through an ethnic paradigm (Kreidi and Monroe, 2002; Haugbolle, 2012). Black Saturday stands out as an example of this process: Maronite's militias reacted to the political assassination of four Phalangist militiamen with a frenzy of sectarian assassination directed at the Muslim and Palestinian population (Farsoun, 1976: 17).

In Northern Ireland attacks by the IRA were usually met with retaliatory strikes against the Catholic community from which they supposedly drew support: the first sustained military action by PIRA led to the forced eviction of 500 Catholics from east Belfast (Bew and Gillespie, 1993: 28). Even attacks against the British Army, which to most IRA activists was seen as a purely political enemy, were met with a sectarian response: when three Scottish soldiers were killed by the IRA, Protestant youth formed 'tartan gangs' in remembrance and attacked Catholic youth (*ibid*: 33-34; White, 2007). While targeting the British Army for the IRA was a political act, for much of the Protestant community it was interpreted as sectarian. The Protestant community identified themselves as British, and in killing British servicemen the Catholic community was attacking their community (Gallagher and Degregory, 1985: 102; Bruce, 2001: 30).



An important similarity between Northern Ireland and Lebanon is that in both conflicts one side of the war saw itself as fighting a political battle against a political foe. Both the LMN and the PIRA/OIRA claimed to be non-sectarian organisations and stick to either Republicanism versus Unionism or left versus right definition of the conflict (Jumblatt, 1977: 7; Hafez, 1977: 11; White, 2007). However both groups had elements which engaged in sectarian attacks such as the Damour Massacre or bombings in exclusively Protestant Shankill.

Both groups accused other paramilitaries of 'sectarianising' the conflict by targeting victims based on ethnicity which make up part of 'their' people thus inviting sectarian retaliation (Jumblatt, 1977; White, 2007: 28). One of the most notorious actions by PIRA during the 1970s was the Kingsmill massacre which occurred in the wake of a series of assassinations carried out by loyalists in Armagh: ten Protestants and a Catholic were stopped at a checkpoint, the Catholic was let go while the Protestants were shot, the PIRA spokesman justified the actions with 'Why not? It stopped the sectarian killings in the area didn't it?' (White, 2007: 21).

In Yugoslavia a high proportion, >90%, of the Croat population in Croatia voted for independence while a 97.9% of those in the Krajina region, mostly Serb, voted for an independent Serbian region (ICTY, 2004; Sibling and Little, 1995: 160-161). The first village to be cleansed, Kijevo, was assaulted by Krajina Serb irregulars as it was a majority Croat village and deemed by Babic a security risk, and within a month Croats had started assembling 'security groups' to rid their villages of Serbs (Sibling and Little, 1995: 188-189; ICTY, 2004). The extremely high correlation between ethnic identity and political position meant that as attacks rose, people perceived the ethnic 'others' in their villages as potential allies of the militias and armies seeking to destroy them. Killings directed at one community meant that militias would form to take revenge against the community that wronged them and to restore 'ethnic honour' (ICTY, 2007). Furthermore the Belgrade and Zagreb media referred to the militants who carried out attacks as 'Ustashe' or 'Chetniks' rather than pro-independence or pro-Yugoslav/pro-Krajina (Grandits and Leutloff, 2003: 37). Thus attacks were presented to the public as similar to the etho-nationalistic cleansing which took place during WWII rather than as stemming from political disagreement.

## 7.0 The Basic Model

The basic model will attempt to utilise the three common trends identified in section six to examine how the congruence between political and ethnic identity affects the scale and escalation of ethnically motivated violence between the simulation agents. The simulation will be used to test the primary hypothesis of this thesis: can ethnic conflict arise in the absence of pre-existing hatreds when an externally discernable ethnic identity functions as an indicator of political allegiance and orientation?

### 7.1 Model mechanics


Before the simulation runs, agents are given both an ethnic identity (numerical: 1, 2, 3, etc.) and political identity (alphabetical: A, B, C, etc.). The agents are split according to their ethnic identity and then are granted a particular set of political identities granted by pre-prescribed percentages: for example 30% of group 1 will have political identity A, 70% political identity B and 0% political identity C. Agents are also assigned antagonism ratings relevant to their political and ethnic identity which comes into play when agents of different groups interact.

During a run, agents are randomly placed on a board in which they move randomly. When agents are next to each other in a Moore neighbourhood they can only perceive each other's ethnic identity. However each agent can assess the likelihood of its neighbour's political identity based on its ethnic identity ( $K$ ), to quote an earlier example there is a 70% chance that a 1 is a B ( $K_B = 0.7$ ) and a 30% chance that a 1 is an A ( $K_A = 0.3$ ).

If agent X is adjacent to agent Y, X will calculate its ethnic antagonism for Y, if Y is of the same group this is guaranteed to be zero. X will then take the  $K_A$  and  $K_B$  of Y and multiply both of them against its own political antagonism against A ( $P_A$ ) and B ( $P_B$ ) respectively. The larger of the two results ( $Res_1$ ) is chosen and compared against the ethnic antagonism X has for Y ( $E_{XY}$ ). The larger of these two ( $Res_2$ ) is then compared against a randomly rolled number ( $Rand$ ) between 0 and 10. If  $Rand < Res_2$  then X will attack Y, else X will amicably interact with Y.

After an interethnic attack, regardless of motivation the ethnic antagonism of the victim's ethnic group against the aggressors group increases by 1. After an interethnic assist, the opposite occurs with the recipient's ethnic group decreasing its antagonism against the assister's ethnic group.

The flowchart describing the decision and interaction process of the agents describes the mechanics of the simulation with more clarity.



The main aim of this model is to examine the progression from political antagonism to ethnic conflict. Differences in initial antagonism values and the initial set up of ethnic/political affiliation will be compared to see how the conflict differs in progression.

### 7.2 Key Questions:

- The main question, which is a catechism of the primary hypothesis, is: can a conflict consisting of mainly ethnically motivated attacks occur in the absence of initial ethnic antagonism?
- In addition a number of sub questions will be addressed:
- Can a single group sectarianise a conflict?
- Is initial ethnic antagonism more important than a shift in ethno-political congruence?
- Is there are particular initial setup or a set of alterations to the model which result in relations stay stable and sustained ethnic conflict not arising?

### 7.3 Model justification

Analysis carried out in the previous section found three major trends in the three cases provided, all of which are internalised by this model: the visibility of ethnic identity (refer to section 6.1); the imposition of political identity onto an ethnicity based on general trends (refer to section 6.2); the interpretation of violence as ethnically based and the resulting ethnic antagonism (refer to section 6.3).

Surveys in both Northern Ireland and Croatia have shown that amicable interaction between groups lowers antagonism. Shirlow in surveying the residents of the divided Northern Irish town of Ardoyne found that it was the elderly who had the least antagonism towards the opposing sectarian community as they had maintained cross-communal friendships that predated The Troubles (Shirlow, 2003: 80-85). Sekulic et al's survey of ethnic intolerance found that those in mixed marriages and of mixed parentage were the most tolerant and had the lowest levels of antagonism (Sekulic et al, 2006).

Ethnic identities remain static throughout the run of the simulation. The conclusions drawn from a review of studies of differing notions of ethnicity suggest (refer to section 3.2 and 3.4) that even under situationalist interpretations, the criteria for entry may change but the label (such as

'Catholic', 'Hausa', etc.) persists over a longer timescale. The focus of my model is not on the content of ethnic groups but on their interactions and thus the label, used as a public acknowledgement of difference, is most important. Furthermore the time-space in each conflict under study does not exceed 3-4 years, a short time for an entirely new group to form via ethnogenesis. The one example that could be cited as having a definite shift in ethnic identity is Yugoslavia with the disappearance of the 'Yugoslav' identity. However scholars have argued that the identity began to fade after the 1974 constitution (Bertsch, 1977; Sell, 2002: 45).

#### 7.4 Conceptual problems

Ethnic and political hatred are subject to individual values and opinion and are probably never monolithically expressed across a community as in my model. However there are distinct difficulties in making each agent a fully fledged individual and retaining the analytical clarity that the simulation is meant to provide. Providing each agent with individual characteristics and initial values would merely increase the 'noise' by forcing the different simulation runs to be separated by distributive properties. Whereas creating monolithic populations means that the results analysis is dealing with categorical differences.

The visibility of major assaults to respective communities is shown by the actions of the Belgrade and Zagreb media, Damour and Karatina and the retaliatory communal riots to paramilitary action in Northern Ireland. However individual actions of kindness are unlikely to garner similar attention on as wider scale. Lang et al's study found that people showed higher level of arousal when viewing negative news stories than neutral or positive news (Lang et al, 1996: 471). Furthermore negative news stories were more easily recalled in memory (*ibid*: 472). But a model eschewing a method that counters the universal acknowledgement of attacks would lack a buffer against the effects of rising antagonism. In such a model, a single attack would provoke an escalation leading to the complete dominance of ethnically motivated attacks. Such a model is not realistic.

#### 7.5 Parameters and initial values

In trying to find appropriate values to input into the simulation, the modeller affects the status of the model and whether the simulation takes the role of abstraction, ensemble or virtualisation. As my model has a very limited number of parameters that require assessable inputs, namely the level of congruence between political and ethnic cleavages and the initial antagonism values, it lacks the

necessary complexity to be a virtualisation. Lustick's progression in his ABIR model from abstract to ensemble to virtualisation exhibited not only a shift in how the initial values for the inputs were decided but also an increase in the general complexity, especially in the shift from ensemble to virtualisation (Lustick, 2000; Lustick, 2002; Lustick, 2011).

Both inputs have qualitative elements but the issue of ethno-political cleavage is more quantitative than antagonism variables because opinions can be officially tallied in questionnaires or elections, though both have issues with regards to reliability. The former is largely limited in sample size while the latter can be subjected to tampering, boycotts and absenteeism. Furthermore in some cases a particular political position may not be formalised by a political party. The issue of antagonism is almost entirely a qualitative judgement. This can be dealt with in two ways: a standardised freezing of the initial antagonism values for all models based on the case studies, or comparative estimation that draws some sort of comparative meaning between the three models.

#### 7.5.1 Lebanon

Election data from the 1970s does not give a clear indication of the ethno-political congruence of the population as the leaders of the different za'im's often act not to further their political agenda but their power during elections. This results in political figures sometimes supporting candidates that oppose the political agenda of their za'im or themselves. A prime example would be Jumblatt's actions during the 1970 presidential elections. Jumblatt, who would come to lead the LNM, put his support behind the conservative Franjeh who was also supported by right-wing Maronite za'im leaders such as Gemeyal, Chamoun and Edde (Zamir, 1980: 57-59). This is because the more liberal and left-wing Sarkis would likely contain the growing leftism and Pan-Arabism in Lebanon and thus deprive Jumblatt of future supporters (*ibid*).

Similarly some Muslim's supported Franjeh in spite of his association with the Maronite status-quo (*ibid*). This could be because Sarkis was a Shihabist who may have weakened the za'im through state reforms and thus threatened the authority of traditional Muslim leaders. With such Byzantine politics, election data from the various za'ims do not provide a sufficient picture of the ethno-political congruence of Lebanon.

Furthermore the National Pact meant that political leaders would always have to support a candidate from a different confession who would face different pressures from their own za'im and confessional electorate. Thus political issues in Lebanon and the ethnic makeup of the varying sides

of the polemic cannot be clearly determined by the political manoeuvrings of various political/confessional leaders during elections.

Another way to determine the ethno-political congruence of Lebanon would be surveys. However the 1960s and 1970s seemed to lack surveys as comprehensive as Rose's Northern Ireland loyalty survey. A potential reason for this might be the Maronite reluctance to conduct any form of census that may reveal that the Maronites had become a minority. The National Pact which favoured the Maronites relied on demographic information from a 1932 census (Crighton and Abele McIver, 1991: 131). Therefore any revealed shifts in Lebanese confessional demographics would threaten Maronite hegemony. Limited surveys instead were carried out by newspapers over issues that had confessional overtones. A prime example would be Al-Nahar's questionnaire concerning the presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon (Hudson, 1978: 264). Unfortunately the size of the sample or the confession of the respondents was not mentioned making it worthless as an indicator of congruence.

Lastly examining the confessional makeup of the two primary warring factions, the LNM and LF, could give an indication of ethno-political congruence. McDowell's breakdown of the confessional makeup of the two parties gives an indication of which ethnic groups dominated which faction, but provides no numeric data (McDowell, 1986). Furthermore if such data was included, the assumption that the militias are merely a microcosm of larger Lebanese society would be a difficult assumption to justify. Finally McDowell's data comes from 1986 after a prolonged period of conflict in which Syria and Israel had both invaded and intra-confessional conflicts had broken out among militias. In previous sections I argued that as the conflict progressed it took on a more confessional character and as a result McDowell's data is not suitable to use as initial inputs.

### 7.5.2 Croatia

In the case of Croatia, certain political parties used either independence or federalism as part of their platform meaning that election data is a viable resource, up to a point. Furthermore the pre-existing use of the 'narod' classification in the Yugoslavian State apparatus means that information concerning ethnic allegiance to parties and their platforms is readily available.

In the 1990 elections the main contest was between the HDZ, which focused on the issue of independence and a Croatian nation, and the SKH-SDP (the Communist Party of Croatia) which focussed on federalism, Yugoslavism and issues of ethnic equality (Sibler, 1992: 147). Other parties such as the federalist JSDS and the Greens attempted to attract supporters who were not motivated

by ethnic issues (*ibid*: 142). However both the SKH-SDP and SKS were communist and gained significant support from the Serb minority (*ibid*). Ethnic allegiances to the differing parties were divided as such:

	Croat	Serb	'Yugoslav'	Other
HDZ	41	0.5	1	14
SKH-SDP	20	46	52	34
KNS		16	14	12
SKS		23		
JSDS		13	8	8
Greens	4	34	13	2
Socialist Alliance		9	11	2
Other	17	11	28	28

Table 5Croat party allegiance by ethnicity

(Sibler, 1992: 143)

In the election the HDZ got 41.61% of the vote while the SKH-SDP got 35.34%, the Serbian centred SDS (not included in above table) got only 1% (European Election Database, 1990). However of the total electorate only 84.35% voted, of which only 81.1% were valid, implying some degree of boycotting or absenteeism (*ibid*).

In actual referendum regarding independence which occurred in May 1991, >90% of Croats voted for the motion, however by this point the inhabitants of Krajina had boycotted the referendum (Sibler and Little, 1995: 161-162). Previously, in August/September 1990, the Krajina authority held a referendum regarding whether the region should secede from Croatia and become independent, the vast majority of those who voted were Serbs and the result was 97.7% for succession (ICTY, 2004).

Issues regarding this data include the fact that the two referendums which would have best described the ethno-political congruence in Yugoslavia were subject to manipulation or boycott. Krajina residents boycotted the HDZ's referendum for secession (Sibler and Little, 1995: 161-162). Furthermore the referendum was not held in Serb dominated areas, which combined with the boycott means that the >90% in favour is not reliable (ICTY, 2007). With regards to the Krajina referendum of secession the referendum for autonomy took place in a region in which Serbs dominated: in the regions around Knin, Kordun and Banija Serbs constituted 76% of the population (Marko-Stockl, 2004: 25).



It could be argued that because the two referendums were practically ethnically exclusive, that the results would make a good template for setting the initial ethno-political congruence in a simulation. However it should be remembered that the Krajina referendum was extremely localised and did not include Serb populations outside of the area. Marko-Stockl points out that Krajina only came to house 61% of Croatia's Serb population (*ibid*).

### 7.5.3 Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland it appears prudent to put the civil rights movement at the locus of the political polemic at the very start of the conflict. The issue of reunification had been ever present in Northern Ireland since its conception due to its large Catholic population and the continuous low intensity actions of the IRA during the Border Campaign (O'Leary and McGarry, 1996: 157-161; English, 2009: 85). Furthermore the first clearly inter-communal violence broke out during civil rights marches and the height of the movement coincides with the outbreak of the conflict (Stetler, 1970; Bew and Gillespie, 1993).

As the issue of civil rights was not incorporated into the primary political platform of any party, including the republican Nationalist Party, it is unsuitable to assess the political split between the communities via their votes (Rose, 1971: 234). Instead it would be better to use Rose's survey conducted in the late 1960s consisting of 1,291 respondents, 757 Protestants and 534 Catholics (*ibid*: 474). Though the sample is small compared to the contemporary population, the date of its implementation grants the survey unprecedented access to the opinions of a population on the eve of civil ethno-political conflict.

Rose's questions regarding civil rights issues to Protestant recipients reveal a trend of conservatism and a wish to retain the status quo:

68% of Protestants disapproved of implementing a law that would render refusing a job or house to a Catholic based on religion illegal, while only 23% approved and 7% did not know (*ibid*: 481). 57% of Protestants would approve if formal Protestant Catholic relations remained the same while 32% would disapprove and 11% did not know (*ibid*).

In contrast the majority of Catholics seemed to seek some form of change or at least recognition that change needed to occur. 71% of Catholics would disapprove if the Protestant community proclaimed that there was no issue regarding religious discrimination in the province while only 14% would approve and 15% did not know (*ibid*: 483-484). 74% of Catholics thought that the Catholic

community was treated unfairly by the state, while 74% of Protestants thought this not to be true (*ibid*). 55% of Catholics would approve if the community started protesting very strongly against cases of religious discrimination, while 27% would disapprove and 18% did not know (*ibid*).

While Rose's survey gives vital information about the Protestant/Catholic split regarding the political opinions of reform and conservatism the number of those questioned is small and thus doubt can be cast on whether it is a true representation.

### 7.6 Conclusions concerning the status of simulation inputs

The issue of casting an initial value on the political and ethnic antagonism variables cannot be solved. Antagonism is no doubt a personal attribute and each scholarly text which addressed the level of antagonism between ethnic or political factions would no doubt rely on personal testimony of a few individuals. Robert Kaplan's book *Balkan Ghosts*, Haugbolle's interviews with Lebanese militia members and Dillon's interviews with Northern Irish Loyalists are all good examples of this process and its inherent limitations for the task of modelling (Kaplan, 1994; Haugbolle, 2012; Dillon, 1998). Furthermore while political inclinations can be covered in a questionnaire or referendum, referendums or questionnaires concerning one group's ethnic antagonism to another would be deemed inflammatory and therefore unlikely to be conducted.

However in two of the three cases studied, Yugoslavia and Northern Ireland, referendums and surveys gave some indication of the ethno-political congruence in those nations: in Northern Ireland it seems that >70% of Protestants are in favour of maintaining the status-quo while 60-70% of Catholics are in favour of changing it, leading to an initial congruence ratio of 70:30; in Croatia it seems that approximately 90% of Croats were in favour of independence while approximately 90% of Serbs favoured secession leading to a congruence ratio of 90:10. However the issue of reliability concerning the Croatian referendums and the small sample for the loyalty survey does cast doubt on whether these values are usable as inputs. Furthermore if these values are separated from correct initial political and ethnic antagonism values, the simulation may not effectively simulate the process of political and ethnic conflict for these two cases.

As a result I doubt that I would be able to generate the necessary inputs to create a virtualisation, or even an ensemble, of the sociological processes that happened in any of the three cases. Instead I consider it prudent to use my model as an abstraction that aims to examine how shifts in the ethno-political congruence of a population can lead to a high level of ethnic antagonism and violence. Thus instead of constructing model runs with inputs that are meant to reflect the case studies, different

input variables for the model will be changed incrementally. The results of these different runs, rather than being interpreted as a holistic output that can be perceived as direct representations of the different case studies, will emphasise different facets of ethnic conflict and these facets will be contrasted against their analogues in the case studies.

## 8.0 Ethno-political congruence: methodology, results and analysis

### 8.1 Methodology

#### 8.1.1 Procedure

A hundred runs were conducted for each ratio of ethno-political congruence. In congruence ratio 100:0, 100% of Group 1 believes political position A while 100% of Group 2 believes political position B. In ratio 90:10 90% of Group 1 and 10% of Group 2 believes political position A and vice versa. A hundred runs would be completed on congruence ratios of 80:20, 70:30, 60:40 and finally 50:50.

Each run consisted of 1000 turns in which the agents (40 in total, 20 in Group 1 and 20 in Group 2) moved within a 20x20 board and interacted with each other. This decision was made on the basis that at no point before the thousandth time step did the proportion of ethnic to political attacks enter a stable state. Furthermore a stable state did not seem to be reached even if the simulation was allowed to reach 3000 turns. Thus a thousand turns was seen as a rounded, if arbitrary, number which would be large enough to provide a stream of data in which real change and contrast could be shown between the different categories of congruence.

Finally a separate program was used to average the results of the hundred runs of each of the time steps and write the averaged results onto an Excel file. The simulation and all accompanying programs were written in python.

#### 8.1.2 Statistical tests

Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on the data under analysis (percentage of ethnic attacks in turn, ethnic antagonism and total attacks in turn) revealed that in all cases the distribution of data was non-normal. Thus non-parametric tests needed to be used. A Kruskal-Wallis test was used on a particular data point across all congruence ratios to test whether there was a significant difference. Post-hoc Mann-Whitney tests were used to measure what magnitude of effect a shift in ethno-political congruence had on the data. Multiple Mann-Whitney tests will inflate the incidence of Type I error and so a Bonferroni correction was used to combat this effect (Field, 2009: 565). Lastly a Jonckheere-Terpstra test was used to determinewhether the medians of the data decreased or increased with the shifts in congruence (*ibid*: 568-570)

## 8.2 Results

### 8.2.1 *Can ethnically based violence become dominant in the absence of initial ethnic antagonism?*

Summary: Yes, ethnic attacks could form the bulk percentage of total attacks in a turn in spite of initial ethnic antagonism variables being zero for both sides. Ethno-political congruence was routinely seen to have a large effect on this occurrence.

Details: All runs in this batch began with an ethnic antagonism value of zero for both sides while each political side had their antagonism frozen at five. A Kruskal-Wallis test examining the difference between the 'Percent of ethnic attacks in total attacks', hereafter referred to as PE, variable across congruence ratios procured the result  $H(5) = 5402.871$ ,  $P < 0.0001$ . Thus it seems that PE varied significantly across congruence ratios, inferring that congruence may be responsible. Post-hoc Mann-Whitney tests allowed the effect a shift in ethno-political congruence had on the PE to be discerned by calculating Pearson's r value. In order to prevent a massive inflation of type I error only five post-hoc tests were done.

Post hoc test number	Congruence ratio's compared	Effect(r)	Mean Rank
1	100:0 and 90:10	-0.89	5465.30
2	90:10 and 80:20	-0.82	4473.48
3	80:20 and 70:30	-0.57	3311.23
4	70:30 and 60:40	-0.82	635.29
5	60:40 and 50:50	-0.71	1576.19

Table 6 Congruence set Mann-Whitney test results

Pearson's r goes from 0, no effect, to 1, perfect effect. 0.1 means that the effect accounts for 1% of variance while 0.3 equals 9% and 0.5 equals 25%, Cohen judges the respective effect values as small, medium and large (Field, 2009: 56-57). In all tests the r value was over (-) 0.5. Thus in all post-hoc tests congruence had a large effect on PE.

### 8.2.2 *Does a higher ethno-political congruence lead to a higher proportion of ethnic attacks?*

Summary: Yes, but the relationship was not strictly linear. Ethnic attacks formed the majority of all attacks overall for all congruence levels except 60:40. An ethno-political congruence ratio of 50:50 was found to result in a higher ethnic attack percentage than a ratio of 60:40.

Details: Non-parametric tests work by ranking data points and so the variance between groups can be expressed by the mean rank of each group. The mean ranks of each congruence set are shown in table 2 and show a non-linear relationship between congruence and PE. This is illustrated by figure 4 below:




Figure 16 Congruence set box plot- ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks

Figure 4 illustrates the non-linear relationship as an anomalously large shift is seen between the 70:30 and 60:40 ratios and an unexpected upwards shift is seen between the 60:40 and 50:50 ratios. Until the occurrence of this shift, all the upper whisker of all box plots are above 80, however a reduction in the dominance of ethnic attacks is shown by a lengthening of the box representing an increase in the inter-quartile range. The 50:50 box plot may have a higher median and upper whisker than the 60:40 plot, but it also has a large inter-quartile range suggesting a wide spread of the PE value around the mean, a contrast to the 80:20, 90:10 and 100:0 ratios.

This may be because, unlike higher ratios, the dominance of ethnic attacks in an environment where ethnicity is not a reliable method of ascertaining political affiliation is a long process: after

approximately 800 turns, ethnic attacks seem to dominate in the 50:50 simulations, compared to less than 100 turns in the 90:10 simulations. This contrast is illustrated by the visual dissimilarities between figure 5 and figure 6.




Figure 17 Congruence ratio 50:50 - ethnic and political attacks as a percentage of total attacks




Figure 18 Congruence ratio 90:10 - ethnic and political attacks as a percentage of total attacks

The Jonckheere-Terpstra test is used to find if the order of the coded groups is meaningful by analysing whether the medians of the groups ascend or descend in the order specified by the coding variable (Field, 2009: 568-570). In the SPSS file holding the runs the coding variables are thus: 1 = 100:0; 2 = 90:10; 3 = 80:20; 4 = 70:30; 5 = 60:40; 6 = 50:50. If the Std. J-T Statistic is negative, it reveals a negative correlation and vice-versa (*ibid*). The Std. J-T Statistic for the PE score across groups is -80.495, revealing a very strong negative correlation between a decrease in congruence and the PE score. The relationship would probably be stronger if not for the unexpected increase in the PE score between the 60:40 and 50:50 simulations.

### 8.2.3 Is there an initial congruence ratio that can prevent the escalation of ethnically motivated violence and violence in general?

Summary: The congruence ratio of 60:40 kept total attacks at a comparatively stable and low level resulting in a very slight increase in ethnically motivated attacks which then stabilise.

Details: Figure 7 and figure 8 show that ratios 100:0, 90:10 and 80:20 produced a stable but high level of total attacks while the 50:50 and 70:30 seem to have both ethnic and total attacks increasing even by the 1000<sup>th</sup> generation.






Figure 19 All congruence ratios - total attacks in turn




Figure 20 All congruence ratios - ethnic attacks in turn

Both graphs also show that while there is an initial increase in ethnic attacks and total attacks for congruence ratio 60:40, this upward gradient is severely reduced if not eliminated around the 300 generation mark resulting in the ratio with the most stable and lowest level of violence.

### 8.3 Discussion

One of the main differences between the different congruence ratios is the length of time it takes for ethnically motivated attacks to dominate. Whereas figure 3 hints at these discrepancies due to the lengths of the inter-quartile range boxes, figure 9 overtly illustrates these contrasts.




Figure 21 All congruence ratios - ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks

These contrasts in the time-scale of 'sectarianization' in the model are reflected in the literature. In previous sections I estimated, with the limited available information, the ethno-political congruence ratios of the Croatian conflict (90:10) and the Troubles (70:30).

In the Croatian War of Independence the date of the first politically violent actions by either side is debatable. The first fatality of the war occurred during the Plitvice Lakes incident on 31<sup>st</sup> March 1991 when Krajina and Croatian forces fought over control of the Plitvice National Park (Sibler and Little, 1995: 148-155). However sporadic acts of violence had been occurring in the months before this incident. The first violent political clash was a football riot between Serbian and Croatian fans in May 1990 (Sack and Suster, 2000: 311). The first act of 'ethnic cleansing' occurred on the 26<sup>th</sup> August 1991 when the Croat village of Kijevo was deemed a security risk by Martić and laid siege to by Krajina paramilitaries (Sibler and Little, 1995: 188-189). Similar cleansing actions by both Croat and Serb paramilitaries and the JNA followed with ethnically motivated attacks becoming the norm in August/September and dominating the conflict until the ceasefire (ICTY, 2011; ICTY, 2004; ICTY, 2007; Stitkovac, 2000: 165-170).

ICTY investigation found that massacres were often committed by those motivated by revenge (ICTY, 2007). The progression from the largely political chants of the two football fans to the ethnic cleansing actions of the paramilitaries, dressed in ethnically exclusive symbols, took approximately eleven months. If the Plitvice Lakes incident is considered the first act of political violence during the war, then the time-span drops to approximately four months.

In contrast the transition from violent political action to sectarian violence in Northern Ireland took markedly longer. It is arguable that a low level of violent political action had been present in Northern Ireland since the inception of the IRA's border campaign in 1956, which failed to elicit much communal support or much of a Protestant reaction and as a result was abandoned in 1962 (English, 2009: 85).

It was the emergence of the civil rights movement with the formation of CSJ that prompted the formation of the sectarian UVF in 1966 (Guelke, 1986: 92, Cameron, 1969). It was during this year that the UVF carried out the first sectarian assassinations against Catholic civilians (Melaugh, 2012). However it was not until the riots of 1969 that full blown communal violence broke out. It was also the Battle of Bogside, also in 1969, that prompted the dominance of the more communally orientated PIRA and the decline in popularity of the more politically orientated OIRA (Dillon, 1998: 170; Bew and Gillespie, 1986: 34).

In contrast to the Croatian War of Independence, the progression from political to sectarian warfare in Northern Ireland can be measured in years not months. If the IRA's border campaign is used to mark to start of political hostilities and the Battle of Bogside is used to mark the dominance of sectarian violence in the conflict the progression takes approximately thirteen years. However in

previous sections I argued that the issue of civil rights rather than reunification dominated the political schism in Northern Ireland. Thus if the emergence of the civil rights movement in 1964 is marked as the beginning of the political conflict the time-span of the progression from political to ethnic conflict is still approximately five years.

When ethnicity is not a decent predictor of political opinion, it is difficult to deem an individual a political security risk purely because of his/her ethnicity. This would explain why there was an absence of sectarian violence during the IRA's Border Campaign: the Catholic public did not support the IRA's campaign and thus were not a threat to the Protestants political hegemony in the Northern Irish state (Melaugh, 2012; English, 2009: 85). In contrast Croatian public support for an independent Croatian nation meant that any Croats left in Krajina would be a security risk because, as the election and referendum data indicate, they would still likely harbour aspirations of being part of Croatia. As a result Martić had the village of Kijevo cleansed before the residents had the opportunity to challenge Krajina's autonomy.

In both cases when these political assassinations and attacks became sustained enough a progression to ethnic tit-for-tat violence occurs due to increased ethnic antagonism. In the wake of ethnically targeted but politically-motivated attacks feelings of violated 'communal honour' arise with the need for collective vengeance (Ascher, 1986: 413; Johnson, 2001: 14).

In the simulation the dominance of ethnic violence unsurprisingly corresponds with the levels of ethnic antagonism between the groups. Figure 10 illustrates the progression of group 1's ethnic antagonism towards group 2.




Figure 22 All congruence ratios - group 1 antagonism against group 2

The cleansing of Kijevo was followed by a massacre of 20-50 Serbs in Gospić by Croat paramilitaries (ICTY, 2004). These two actions were the start of a cycle of massacre and counter-massacre. The fear of ethnically targeted retaliation to assuage ‘communal honour’ explains why 330,000 Croats fled Vukovar and 500,000 Serbs fled to Krajina to escape Croat retaliation (Marko-Stockl, 2004: 26; Stitkovic, 2000: 167).

In Northern Ireland, though the UVF started a policy of sectarian assassination in 1966, the movement was small, declared illegal by the Protestant dominated state and did not seem to represent the will of a large portion of Protestants (Melaugh, 2012). However during 1969, large scale violent Protestant mobilisation against civil rights protesters began, often with assistance from the RUC (Stetler, 1970: 44-48). These events gave Catholics the impression that bigotry and violence did not emanate from a minuscule segment but from a significant group within the Protestant community. Furthermore they were assisted by members of a sectarian state which represented the Protestant community. In the wake of these attacks Catholic mobs started to attack RUC barracks

and Orange Order halls, eventually civilian sectarian clashes occurred in the aftermath of the Apprentice Boys of Derry March (*ibid*: 50-94).

What was an unexpected outcome in the simulation was the surprisingly high level of ethnic antagonism and the percentage of attacks that were ethnically motivated during the 50:50 ethno-political congruence runs. What is more surprising still is that the 50:50 runs resulted in significantly higher scores for both factors than the 60:40 runs. A potential explanation for this phenomenon comes from Kalyvas' analysis of non-ethnic conflicts. Kalyvas argues that: "Selective violence is difficult to achieve because it requires information – typically private information" (Kalyvas, 2000: 9). Incidents such as Black Saturday, the cleansing of Gospic and Kijevo and the expulsion of the Catholics from Protestant East Belfast show that often publically available or visible information could be used to select targets for violence. However when the source of antagonism is purely political and visible/public information is insufficient to target political foes violence becomes more chaotic and less selective.

During both the Greek and Spanish civil wars, conflicts between politically right and left leaning militants, political enemies and security risks were primarily identified using local knowledge and denunciations (*ibid*: 10-11). These circumstances, however, allowed locals to settle personal vendettas with the political militias bearing the cost of the violent acts committed, thus the violence remained chaotic and undirected. For example in Cosco during the Spanish Civil War the main cleavage was not political but centred on a dispute between two doctors who had competed for dominance (*ibid*: 12).

Kalyvas' text provides valuable examples of the chaotic nature of violence in purely political conflicts. However in the provided examples of the Greek and Spanish civil wars no ethnic cleavage or differentiation is mentioned. Thus violence cannot be interpreted as a function of ethnicity and ethnic honour or revenge cannot become a motive of violence, whereas in the 50:50 simulation, though ethnicity is not a predictor of political alliance violence is still interpreted as being ethnically motivated. As a result it is likely that ethnic antagonism is likely to emerge after a long period of unselective violence. In contrast the 60:40 simulation provides some direction to violence, therefore preventing a deluge of unselective politically motivated violence, but provides low enough probabilities to discourage ethnically motivated attacks. Figure 11 and figure 12 contrast these differing progressions in group antagonism.




Figure 23 Congruence ratio 60:40 – intergroup antagonism




Figure 24 Congruence ratio 50:50 – intergroup antagonism

Another non-intuitive result was that a congruence ratio of 60:40 was the ratio that ensured the lowest number of ethnic attacks and total attacks. A notable real world analogue of these conditions is Malaysia, a country noted for managing to contain ethnic violence in a state composed of Malays and comparatively wealthier Chinese (Jesudason, 2001).

Malaysia has since independence been dominated by a coalition called the Alliance, or since 1973, Barisan Nasional (BN) which comprises the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) with the UMNO being treated as the first among equals (Brown, 2005: 3). The BN's prolonged incumbency has been due to dubious electoral practices such as gerrymandering and disallowing the challenging of electoral rolls (*ibid*: 7).

The last time severe ethnic violence broke out was in 1969 when the coalition parties failed to garner a significant support leaving more exclusivist opposition parties to utilise ethnically chauvinistic rhetoric to build an ethnically exclusive political base, in the resulting riots 196 died (Jesudason, 2001: 80-81). Before the 1980s BN appealed primarily to Malays and fixed electoral legislation to ensure Malays were over-enfranchised (Brown, 2005: 8-9). However 'ethnic voting' has consistently decreased with BN now gaining most votes in areas with a Malay/Non-Malay split of 60/40 (*ibid*: 10). Thus a reduction in Chinese underrepresentation and Malay overrepresentation has followed (*ibid*: 8-9).

Since 1969 ethnic relations have been notably free from violence and not reached the savagery and scale of the 1969 riots, as the 'de-ethnicisation' of political allegiance has continued (Crawford, 1998: 8). There are of course other credited reasons, such as the expansion of a Malay middle class empowered by affirmative action (Jesudason, 2001: 89). However as BN, the ultimate policy maker since independence, has managed to include a more equitable ratio of Malay and Chinese support, ethnic conflict has ceased to serve a political agenda.

What was predicted in the results was the general positive correlation between ethno-political congruence and the dominance of ethnic violence. In Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Croatia ethnicity could be used to predict political opinion and different communities perceived each other as political threats. The harder it becomes to extrapolate political opinion from ethnicity, the harder it is to perceive others as a political threat based on their ethnicity.

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia provides an excellent example of how the absence of ethno-political congruence and ethno-political threat can avert ethnic conflict. Furthermore Czechoslovakia provides a good comparison to Yugoslavia due to numerous similarities: both Yugoslavia and



Czechoslovakia were born out of the ruins of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, both were federations with administrative boundaries based on ethnicity and both had economic disparities between these republics (Bookman, 1994: 183). However whereas in Croatia the secessionist movements enjoyed a significant degree of support, as shown by the popularity of Tudjman's HDZ, in Czechoslovakia only 37 percent of Slovaks and 36 percent of Czechs said they would vote for a split in a referendum (EED, 1990; Kamm, 1992). More importantly, while the secessionist movements in Kosovo, Krajina, Bosnia and Croatia held referendums, in Czechoslovakia the decision was imposed by the Slovakian parliament without Slovak consensus (Bookman, 1994: 178). As a result the general population of the Slovaks lacked political agency and did not in themselves present a political threat to the Czech's. In attacking Slovaks the Czech's would not be subduing or eliminating political rivals. Both ethnicities had zero ethno-political congruence as the decisions being made were out of the hands of the populace.

Of course other factors cannot be discounted: Czechoslovakia generally had more ethnically homogenous republics with the Slovaks in Czech lands making up only 3% of the total population and 1% vice-versa (*ibid*: 183). Nevertheless these minorities still totalled 300,000 and 50,000 individuals respectively (Kamm, 1992). In pre-war Croatia the Serb population constituted 12% of the population with a total population of 581,663 (ICTY, 2002). Thus the total population that could be targeted for ethnic violence is not equal, but comparable.

Lastly what is important to take from these results is that there is a significant relationship between ethno-political congruence and the dominance of ethnically motivated attacks. What is even more important is that this situation can arise when initial ethnic antagonism is absent. In Rose's loyalty survey the late 1960's, the eve of the Trouble's, only 13% of respondents to the survey said that they were discouraged from intermixing with individuals from the 'other' confession (Rose, 1971: 328). Furthermore the last serious bout of sectarian rioting in Northern Ireland had happened in the 1920s, just after the partition (Boal, 2002).

In a survey of 2510 individuals in Croatia in 1989, the average score on a five point scale for the question 'is Nationality is important in picking a marital partner' was 2.06 with a standard deviation of 1.55 (Sekulic, 2006: 806). For the question 'can a man only feel safe when the majority belong to his nationality' the score was 2.13 with a standard deviation of 1.51 (*ibid*). Both studies show that while interethnic antagonism was not completely absent, it was not dominant either.

But as a conflict progresses and ethnic identity becomes a determining factor in assessing threats and discerning potential victims, communal distrust and antagonism forms. This transformation is

seen in comparing pre and post conflict surveys concerning interethnic relations. A survey in Ardoyne in 2003, five years after the Good Friday Agreement officially ended the conflict, found that 86% of those surveyed said that they would not enter an area dominated by the opposing sect and 79% said they would not drive through the 'other's' area at night (Shirlow, 2003: 83).

Similarly Sekulic et al's later survey in Croatia in 1996, after Croatia reclaimed Krajina in Operation Storm, found that the scores for the two previously quoted questions had shifted from 2.06 to 3.40 and 2.13 to 3.44 respectively (Sekulic, 2006: 806). After analysing other potential reasons for this shift in opinion, including education and demographic shifts, Sekulic et al concluded "that war itself is at the heart of ethnic hatred, hostility, and intolerance" (*ibid*: 819).

That is not to say that ethnic conflicts always or indeed ever occur in the absence of ill feeling. It could be argued that in Rwanda ethnic rather than political antagonism was what provoked the first attacks. Many of those who joined the murderous Interahamwe militia had been Hutu refugees from Burundi (Scherrer, 2002 : 190). A Tutsi led military coup had caused the death of the elected Hutu Burundian president which provoked a spate of anti-Tutsi violence, in retaliation the now Tutsi government had carried out a brutal crackdown on the Burundian Hutu population which caused many Hutu's to flee to Rwanda (*ibid*: 48). As a result many of the killers had already suffered at the hands of their ethnic rivals and were ready to take part in collective revenge.

The invocation of past crimes by ethno-political entrepreneurs as a means of prompting ethnic antagonism is seen in Ian Paisley's comparison between the actions of the IRA and the 1641 massacre of Protestants and in Milosevic's claim that the new Croatian state was merely a plot "to restore the NDH and cart the Serbs off to another Jasenovac (a notorious Ustashe concentration camp)" (Crighton and Abele Mac Iver, 1991: 129-130; Marko-Stockl, 2004: 29). These statements aim not to alert co-ethnics of the potential political threat but instead to arouse feelings of violated communal honour and to incite collective revenge. However it may be that such invocations are significantly more effective after initial hostilities have begun. Answering such a question would require the rigorouslyness of a separate investigation.

## 9.0 Measuring the effect of different initial values of ethnic antagonism: methodology, results and discussion

### 9.1 Methodology

#### 9.1.1 Procedure

In an identical procedure to the previous group of tests, each set consisted of 100 runs with 1000 time steps. The values of each time step from each of the runs were averaged and then subjected to statistical testing. Testing all possible ethnic antagonism values on all possible congruence would create an unwieldy amount of data. To reduce the amount of data requiring analysis the congruence with the lowest averaged PE score, 60:40, was chosen. This is because if initial ethnic antagonism did increase the PE score, it would be most noticeable if contrasted against a control with a low score. Runs were done with varying initial ethnic antagonism values of two, five and ten. These runs were then contrasted against the control set of congruence ratio 60:40 with zero initial ethnic antagonism and the 70:30 ratio with zero initial ethnic antagonism, which were generated in the previous set of runs.

#### 9.1.2 Statistical tests

Again Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were used to test whether non-parametric tests were necessary and Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to see if there was a significant contrast between the sets. Box plots and pyplot generated graphs were used to visually represent the data. Also Mann-Whitney post-hoc tests were used to determine the magnitude of the effect on the PE score that increasing the initial ethnic antagonism values or shifting congruence would have.

### 9.2. Results

#### *9.2.1 Can a single side turn a politically motivated conflict into an ethnically motivated conflict?*

Summary: Yes, but only at the maximum level of initial antagonism.

Details: The Kruskal-Wallis test on the PE score across the groups found that the mean rank for the 60:40 EthAnt 0 set of runs had a mean rank of 1362.99. While increasing the ethnic antagonism five points put the mean rank to 2359.35, increasing the congruence to 70:30 increases the mean rank further to 3474.89. Thus it seems that a moderate increase in initial ethnic antagonism for a single

group had markedly less impact in ‘ethnicing’ the conflict than a shift in congruence. This is illustrated by figure 13. The highest mean rank, 4438.20, belonged to the set in which the initial ethnic antagonism value for group 1 was 10 and the congruence ratio was 60:40. Thus one group was able to turn a conflict entirely ethnic if the group had the maximum possible level of antagonism. These ranks are illustrated in figure 13:




Figure 13 Ethnic Antagonism sets - ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks

Figure 13 also shows that in the 60:40EthAnt10 set of runs there was very little deviation from the mean as the box plot has an almost invisible box and short whiskers, showing that group 1 managed to make the conflict a predominantly ethnic matter in a very short space of time. In contrast the large variation from the median for the 70:30 box plot, especially from the lower whisker shows that the absence of pre-existing ethnic antagonism means that a longer time period is needed until the conflict becomes predominantly motivated by ethnic antagonism. A comparison of figure 14 and figure 15 shows the difference in how quickly ethnic attacks begin to dominate. Nevertheless after about 600 generations the 70:30 set seems to have a relative stable PE score similar to the 60:40EthAnt10 set. This would explain the relatively similar medians on the box plot.




Figure 14 Congruence ratio 70:30 – ethnic and political attacks as a percentage of total attacks




Figure 15 Congruence ratio 60:40, group 1 ethnic antagonism 10 – ethnic and political attacks as a percentage of total attacks

In comparing the ethnic antagonism of group 2 towards group 1, the degree to which the present antagonism of group 1 has radicalised group 2 is illustrated. Figure 16 shows that both the 60:40EthAnt5 and 60:40EthAnt2 ended up with medians and inter-quartile ranges way below the initial starting value indicating that far from group 1 radicalising group 2, group 2 had moderated group 1. In contrast group 2 in the 60:40EthAnt10 set has barely any variation around the median of approximately 10, suggesting that not only was group 2 successfully radicalised but that radicalisation happened in a very short space of time.

The contrast between the 60:40EthAnt10 set and the 70:30 set is similar to the contrast between the two groups PE score: similar medians but the latter has a larger inter-quartile range showing a longer process of radicalisation. What is interesting is how the 60:40EthAnt0 set has slightly higher PE and two to one antagonism medians than the 60:40EthAnt2 set. This result was unexpected. This could be due to unsystematic variation in which the random nature of the agent's movements could have reduced the number of interactions an agent has. However the process of conducting 100 runs and averaging them was used to minimise unsystematic variance.




Figure 16 All sets – group 2 to group 1 ethnic antagonism

What is also important to note is that the majority of the runs in which a single group is given an ethnic antagonism value >0 are not significantly different from the runs in which both groups are given an ethnic antagonism value >0.

Implicit in the argument that a single side can sectarianise a conflict is the assertion that there is not a significant difference between one side possessing ethnic bigotry and both sides possessing ethnic bigotry as a single side can instigate a similar cycle of ethnic violence. Therefore it is also worth testing whether there is a statistically significant difference between a single side possessing an initial antagonism value and both sides possessing one. Figure 17 illustrates the results of runs in which both sides start with an initial antagonism value:




Figure 17 Two sided ethnic Antagonism sets - ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks

The results for the Mann-Whitney tests were:

Post-hoc test number	Sets compared	Results
1	60:40EthAnt2 and 60:40BothEthAnt2	U = 1.5000, r = 0.019, P = 0.571
2	60:40EthAnt5 and 60:40BothEthAnt5	U = 1.000, r = 0.866, P < 0.0001
3	60:40EthAnt10 and 60:40BothEthAnt10	U = 1.500, r = 0.027, P = 0.400

Table 7 Mann-Whitney comparative tests: single and double sided initial ethnic antagonism

It was only when the initial ethnic antagonism value was five that adding initial ethnic antagonism to the second group had a large effect.

### 9.2.2 What has a larger effect: initial ethnic antagonism or ethno-political congruence?

Summary: Post-hoc Mann-Whitney tests found that the highest level of ethnic antagonism tested, ten, was needed to have a larger effect than the congruence shift from 60:40 to 70:30 if only one group was given the respective antagonism value. However if both groups were given the initial antagonism value, a middle value of five was needed to surpass the congruence shift.

Details: Here is a list of all the post-hoc tests taken which compares the effect size of all shifts in ethno-political congruence and initial ethnic antagonism.

Post-hoc test number	Sets compared	Results
1	100:0 and 90:10	U = 15430.00, r = -0.89, P < 0.0001
2	90:10 and 80:20	U = 27948.00, r = -0.82, P < 0.0001
3	80:20 and 70:30	U = 173635.50, r = -0.57, P < 0.0001
4	70:30 and 60:40	U = 28334.50, r = -0.82, P < 0.0001
5	60:40 and 50:50	U = 90131.50, r = -0.71, P < 0.0001
6	60:40EthAnt0 and 60:40EthAnt2	U = 306877.00, r = 0.34, P < 0.0001
7	60:40EthAnt0 and 60:40EthAnt5	U = 139390.00, r = -0.62, P < 0.0001
8	60:40EthAnt0 and 60:40EthAnt10	U = 501501.00, r = -0.87, P < 0.0001
9	60:40BothEthAnt0 and 60:40BothEthAnt2	U = 443585.50, r = -0.098, P < 0.0001



10	60:40BothEthAnt0 and 60:40BothEthAnt5	U = 501501.00, r = -0.87, P < 0.0001
11	60:40BothEthAnt0 and 60:40BothEthAnt10	U = 501501.00, r = -0.87, P < 0.0001

Table 8 Mann-Whitney comparative tests: no initial antagonism, single sided antagonism, double sided antagonism

While increasing the initial antagonism value to five for a single group fails to create as large an effect as all congruence shifts, with the exception 80:20 to 70:30, having both groups start with an initial ethnic antagonism value of five creates an effect larger than the majority of congruence shifts. It is important to note that because non-parametric tests rely on ranks rather than actual values, two separate tests with different values but a similar distribution in ranks can generate the same results, as seen in tests Ten and Eleven. If only one group starts with an initial ethnic antagonism above zero, a value of ten is needed to have a larger effect than the majority of congruence shifts.

Contrasting figure 13 and figure 17 illustrates the difference having both groups effected by ethnic antagonism achieves. When both groups have an initial ethnic antagonism value of five, the PE score is markedly higher. This is true to a much lesser degree when comparing the two EthAnt2 sets. In both cases the median is lower than the 60:40 set, but in the 60:40BothEthAnt2 set, the inter-quartile box and upper whisker are slightly higher. This may be because there is no ethnically passive group to moderate the more antagonistic group.

### 9.3 Discussion

What is evident is that a low level of ethnically motivated violence without a high level of ethno-political congruence will generally fail to produce a conflict dominated by ethnic violence. Northern Ireland in the two decades leading up to the Troubles provides excellent evidence of how a low level of ethno-political congruence can avoid escalation while a higher degree of congruence can heighten interethnic conflict.

The UVF's initial campaign of sectarian assassination in mid-1966 resulted in two Catholic civilian deaths, two Catholic civilians wounded and the accidental death of one Protestant pensioner (Melaugh, 2012). These actions did not provoke a violently sectarian response from the Catholic community. This may be because the Protestant state opted to declare the UVF illegal thus distancing itself, and the Protestant community it represented, from the actions of the UVF (*ibid*). It was not until the RUC and large groups of Protestant civilians started to attack Catholic civil rights protesters that a high level of ethno-political congruence was perceived (Stetler, 1970: 44-48). These

actions were far more effective at provoking sectarian conflict than the low level sectarian violence carried out by a few isolated individuals.

The Battle of Bogside further increased the perceived ethno-political congruence of the anti-reform Orange state and the Protestant masses when the RUC was supported by loyalist Protestant mobs and youth gangs (*ibid*: 79-80). The Battle of Bogside helped legitimise Catholic/Protestant vigilante groups which increased the hold paramilitaries had over their respective communities (Dillon, 1998: 168; Guelke, 1986: 97).

Similarly the small scale skirmishes in Croatia escalated quickly as the actions were not carried out by isolated actors but sections of the Croatian and Krajina government which claimed to represent the Croats/Serbo-Croats at large. In Plitvice, the site of the first fatality of the conflict, the clash was between Martić's militiamen and the Croatian police (Sibler and Little, 1995: 148-150). In Borovo-Selo, three HDZ activists fired rockets into the town prompting the Krajina Serbs to detain two Croat policemen as suspected security threats (Grandits and Leutloff, 2003: 37). These actions provoked the Croatian armed police to mount a rescue mission resulting in the deaths of twelve policemen, marking the first major engagement of the war (*ibid*). The fact that the individuals who fired the rockets were HDZ activists allowed the Krajina militias to reason that all servants of the Croatian state were security threats, thus providing the basis of the escalation between the two sides. This high level of congruence eventually allowed Babic to begin his cleansing campaign as a means to increase security.

Lebanon does provide a good example of how even in situations of lower congruence, extreme episodes of sectarian violence can provoke cycles of ethnically motivated violence. The multi-confessional nature of the pro-Palestinian pro-reform Lebanese National Movement clouded the link between ethnicity and political identity. However extreme actions such as the Bus Massacre of Palestinians incited responses such as the massacre of fifty Christians by the Muslim Knights of Ali a month later (Johnson, 2001: 11). The Karantina massacre prompted retaliation at Damour which in turn motivated Christian militants to storm and massacre the Palestinians in Tel al-Zaatar (*ibid*).

The savagery and magnitude of these massacres encouraged people to join militias that matched their confession rather than their politics and class motivated political actions, such as the Sidon demonstrations, gave way to intra-class collective communal revenge (Johnson, 2001:198; El Khazen, 2000: 268-279; Kreidi et al, 2002: 23-24). The force and scale of these massacres quickly eliminated political idealism leaving ethnic honour and antagonism as the dominant force for mass action and conflict (Johnson, 2001: 67).

It is also significant that in two cases, Lebanon and Northern Ireland, one side accused the opposing community of sectarianising the conflict (Hafez, 1977: 11-12; White, 2007: 28). In the case of Lebanon, where the high level of initial ethnically motivated violence by the Maronite's was exhibited by the Bus massacre, is reflected by the results: a quick escalation. But perhaps the IRA's claim is not reflected by the model nor the historical record: adding a low level of antagonism to a single group does not lead to a dominance of ethnic attacks, just as the UVF's initial low intensity campaign of sectarian assassination failed to provoke a significant response. What is significant however is that in the majority of cases in the simulation there is no significant difference in the results whether a single or both sides start with initial antagonism values, lending weight to the claims of the LNM and IRA.

## 10.0 Potential solutions explored through alterations to the basic model

### 10.1 Partition

Kaufman argues that in ethnic conflicts the transparent and rigid criteria by which one is deemed an ally or enemy means that combatants seek to win only the support of their 'community' and redefine the state, often via secession or the expulsion of other groups (Kaufmann, 1996: 139-140). Furthermore issues of security arise in ethnically mixed areas. Firstly any individual from another ethnicity could be an extremist. Secondly ethnic rivals or minorities could prompt their co-ethnics to invade in order to protect them if they are deemed under threat (*ibid*: 148). This phenomenon occurred in Croatia when the JNA intervened on the behalf of the Serbs of the Krajina region (Grandits and Leutloff 2003: 34-35). Then when Croat forces retook the Krajina region in Operation Storm columns of Serb refugees and Serb settlements were bombed (Stitkovac, 2000: 169-170). Tudjman perhaps realising the security risk a Serb minority would pose if it remained was recorded saying "we have to inflict such blows that the Serbs will to all practical purposes disappear" (Trifkovic, 2010: 219-221).

Kaufman argues that these issues disappear when homogenous areas of antagonistic ethnic groups are separated by an organised force (Kaufmann, 1996: 149-151. Kaufman cites Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus as examples of areas where a homogenisation and partition of areas has eliminated the violence (*ibid*).

Kaufman's proposed solution has historically been favoured as a resolution of ethnic conflict: of the twenty-one civil wars since WWII which have resulted in partition, eighteen were ethnic conflicts while only three were ideological (Sambanis, 2000: 446). Of the few cases that were not resolved by de facto partition, military defeat or third party intervention/occupation, one of the belligerent groups was highly localised and granted a degree of autonomy (Kaufmann, 1996: 159-161). An example of this would be the Basque insurgency in Spain.

#### 10.1.1 The Partition model

The model testing the effectiveness of partition is identical to the basic model up until generation 500. At this point agents cease to move randomly and start to migrate to an ethnic enclave: agents with a group identity of 1 migrate to the left side and agents with a group identity of 2 migrate to the right side. Each enclave takes up the entire y-axis of the board and nearly half the x axis, though

there is a space of two x co-ordinates separating the enclaves to prevent cross enclave attacks. Agents can move freely within their respective enclaves.

### 10.1.2 Procedure

The simulations are conducted and collated in an identical fashion to the congruence runs.

### 10.1.3 Results

Predictably the enforcement of an impassable partition causes the total ethnic attacks to drop to zero, as shown by figure 18.




Figure 18 Partition model all congruence ratios – ethnic attacks in turn

What was not predicted however was the spike in ethnic attacks that precedes the cessation of all ethnic attacks. This is probably due to the concentrated directed movements of each ethnic group.

As each group enclave is at opposite areas of the grid, streams of agents of differing ethnicities come into contact

However it is important to note that a cessation in ethnic attacks does not necessarily mean fewer attacks overall. Figure 19 shows that, in fact, at lower ratios of ethno-political congruence, 50:50 and 60:40, total attacks per turn actually increase, while at a 70:30 ratio the general level of total attacks per turn remains static.




Figure 19 Partition model all congruence ratios – total attacks in turn

Figure 20 illustrates that this is due to a marked increase in political attacks in all ratios apart from 100:0.




Figure 20 Partition model all congruence ratios – political attacks in turn

#### 10.1.4 Discussion

Throughout this dissertation ethnic conflict has been portrayed as a symptom of political cleavage between groups rather than the re-emergence of a timeless antagonism. Thus the model itself infers that even when the ethnic cleavage are resolved by partition the political schism, in all but one set of tests, will remain as a potential source of conflict.

There are numerous examples of political disagreement becoming a new source, or indeed re-emerging as the original source, of a conflict after a large degree of ethnic homogeneity has been accomplished. Lebanon provides numerous examples, most notably the political split between the nations Shiites. Amal was a Shiite group formed as an armed wing of al-Sadr's Movement of the Deprived in the Shiite enclave of South Lebanon (Stork, 1985: 4). The militia was initially aligned with the LMN, however, unlike the anti-confessionalist LNM, Amal sought merely to increase the Shiite's

power in the Lebanese government to what they deemed a fair share (*ibid*: 4-6). Shiites had suffered disproportionately from Israel's retaliatory strikes against Palestinian guerrilla activity (who were confined to their own enclaves within South Lebanon) and as a result Amal also politically disagreed with the LNM's unconditional support of the Palestinians (*ibid*). Nevertheless the LNM retained support from a large section of South Lebanon Shiites (*ibid*). In 1976 members of Amal orchestrated, with help from the Phalangists, the invasion of a Shiite neighbourhood which was politically supportive of the LNM (*ibid*).

Amal would later clash with Hezbollah, another Shiite militia which was supportive of the Palestinian cause, in a set of skirmishes known as the War of the Camps (Usher, 1997: 63). As Amal laid siege to the camps Hezbollah helped Palestinian guerrillas defend their territory and provided humanitarian assistance (Gambil and Abdelnour, 2002). Hezbollah, since its creation, had been siphoning off Shiite political support from Amal and eventually the movement came to dominate Shiite enclaves in South Lebanon and Southern Beirut (*ibid*). Amal in 1988 would try to reassert its political dominance by invading Shiite enclaves loyal to Hezbollah (*ibid*).

Although generally non-violent, political disunity crippled Krajina in Croatia. By 1992 plans and agreements prepared by the international community were being floated to Krajina leaders to resolve the conflict with the Croat government (Caspersen, 2010: 103). These opportunities for accommodation and concession invariably caused political conflict between moderates willing to compromise and hardliners.

Two members of the RSK government were tried for treason and imprisoned for negotiating the return of some Croat refugees to their homes in Slavonia with the Croatian government (*ibid*: 103-104). Furthermore when Martić was offered the 'Z-4 Plan' by Croatia in 1995, which proposed an autonomous police force, and separate currency and parliament from Croatia, Martić rejected it as he feared rebellion and violence from more hawkish members of the RSK elite (*ibid*: 109).

In all the ratios there is a decrease in politically motivated attacks and a corresponding increase in ethnically motivated attacks up until the 500 generation mark. Thus as ethnically based retaliations become more prevalent the political nature of the conflict is sidelined.

Gagnon argues that in ethnic conflicts elites use ethnic violence to politically demobilise the population and cast focus upon a potential 'ethnic threat' (Gagnon, 2004: 8). This analysis can certainly apply to the Serbian conservatives who controlled the government in the early 1990s. Milošević and the conservative wing faced threats from economic reformist PM Marković who had successfully lowered inflation and was pushing for legislation allowing for the privatisation of state



owned firms and multi-party elections (*ibid*: 91). In 1990 Markovic formed his own party to implement these reforms and in June 1990 mass rallies were held in protest to force the Belgrade government to allow a multi-party system (*ibid*). The resulting war against Croatia and the issue of the plight of the Krajina Serbs effectively buried these issues and ensured Milosevic’s continual control of the government and retention of the status quo (*ibid*: 87-88). In effect, political conflict and antagonism, often intra-ethnic, had been sidelined by ethnic conflict in process similar to that shown in the outputs of the basic model. Thus the creation of enclaves to some degree removes the politically demobilising effect of potential ethnic violence or the threat of extinction which allows for a resumption of political conflicts.

A cessation in inter-ethnic interactions enforced by partition eliminates the possibility of future amicable interactions that could reduce interethnic antagonism. Figure 21 which represents group 1’s ethnic antagonism against group 2 illustrates this:




Figure 21 Partition model all congruence ratios – group 1 ethnic antagonism to group 2

Ethnic antagonism rates are predictably frozen. This is not just a quirk of the model but a phenomenon observed in partitioned communities. Shirlow studied the lingering antagonisms in

Ardoyne, a Northern Irish ward in which the Catholic and Protestant sides of town are separated by a 'peace line' (Shirlow, 2003: 81). A survey found that pensioners were the least likely to possess extreme sectarian opinions as most had amicable relationships with members of the opposite sect that predated The Troubles or the construction of the peace line (*ibid*: 85). In contrast the 18-55 year olds, who were either born after or were young when the conflict began and the peace line was built, were more likely to be antagonistic to the other sect (*ibid*).

Similar findings were reported in Massey et al's survey of 13,422 adults in post war Yugoslavia (Massey et al, 1999: 678). Individuals living in ethnic enclaves were found to be more intolerant of other ethnic groups than those in more cosmopolitan areas (*ibid*).

Thus while partition can resolve interethnic violence it does not resolve interethnic intolerance and antagonism. This has serious policy implications. Northern Ireland which has intra-state partitions is planning to remove the peace lines (BBC, 2012). However if antagonism remains high there will be a high likelihood of renewed sectarian violence. Furthermore, if partitioned enclaves become new states, interethnic antagonism merely becomes interstate antagonism. India and Pakistan remain the most prominent example of this.

Even disregarding the model's result's Kaufman's proposed tactic of partition is highly idealised. There are numerous examples of partitions resulting in the creation of ethnic minorities. Tudjman and the HDZ, in trying to create a nation for the Croats, also created a sizable Serbian minority which could be easily radicalised by political entrepreneurs such as Babic and Martic. More importantly, it was this Serbian minority in the new Croat state that prompted Milosevic to adopt the policy of including all the Serbs in one state (Sell, 2002: 110). This ultimately legitimised the JNA's intervention on behalf of the Serbs in Krajina.

Similarly in Ireland the partition created a Protestant majority who could only maintain political hegemony if the partition remained in place and were thus suspicious of the Catholic minority who would become a majority if the partition was lifted. The existence of the Catholic minority inspired the IRA to launch the Border Campaign from the Irish Republic to eliminate the partition that marginalised their fellow Catholics.

Secondly, the ethnic homogenisation of space only occurs after violence has broken out. Boal found that segregation in Belfast increased significantly after episodes of violence and experienced jolts during the sectarian violence of the 1920s and late 1960s (Boal, 2002). East Beirut became 'Christian Beirut' due to actions such as Black Saturday, the Karantina massacre and the assault of Tel-Zaatar which prompted Muslims to flee from the area (Kliot, 1986: 210). Christians in turn fled to East

Beirut from Tripoli and West Beirut to escape reprisals and violence from Muslims (*ibid*). Thus partition is not a preventative solution but rather a crude curative resolution that can only be adopted after the conflict has become intractable.

Lastly figure 19 shows a spike in all attacks just after the 500 generation mark for all ratios. Figure 18 shows that there is also a spike at the same time for ethnically motivated attacks before all ethnic attacks cease. This is probably because the move-to-enclave function that comes into effect at 500 time-steps leading to agents of different ethnic identity coming into contact as they migrate to their respective enclaves. This is reinforced by the fact that the spike in ethnic attacks is highest for the ratios that ensured a dominance of ethnic violence before the 500 time-step and agent migration (100:0, 90:10, 80:20), while the spike is smallest for the 60:40 ratio which had the lowest prevalence of ethnic violence prior to migration.

These results bring up an important point concerning the danger of partition: it requires a population transfer of people, often in diametrically opposed trajectories, who may have been radicalised by previous episodes of interethnic violence. The best example of such a population transfer is the Partition of India in which six million Muslims and four and a half million Hindus and Sikhs became refugees trying to get into Muslim dominated Pakistan or Hindu/Sikh dominated India (Sarkar, 1983: 434). During this period refugees fleeing violence from one confession would find refugees of that same confession travelling to an enclave where they could dominate. Such encounters often sparked extreme episodes of violence. For example in mid-September 1947 between 121,000 and 164,000 Muslim refugees were preparing to leave Delhi and at the same time 150,000 Hindu/Sikh refugees were arriving in Delhi (Pandey, 2001: 122-124). The subsequent clashes between these two groups caused 20-25,000 deaths (*ibid*).

### 10.2 Targeted violence and a removal of communal 'guilt' and blame

One of the main defining features of ethnic conflict is that entire groups are held accountable for the actions of a few individuals and deemed as threat. The Karantina massacre was carried out as a way of removing a Muslim threat in a Christian region and then, during the Damour massacre, Muslims and Palestinians got their revenge against the Christian community, who they deemed responsible (Kliot, 1986, 210; Johnson, 2001: 11-12). In Northern Ireland actions by Republican paramilitaries were met with Protestant violence against the Catholic population which turn prompted Irish Republican paramilitaries to start a campaign of collective punishment against the Protestant population (Guelke, 1986: 99-107).

It is this collective blame that turns ethnic identity, regardless of whether the individual identifies him/herself as such, into a security liability. This insecurity forces individuals to seek protection from and support organisations that condone ethnic violence. For example during the Croatian War of Independence thousands of Serbs flooded into Krajina to escape the threat of retaliation from their Croat neighbours (Stitkovac, 2000: 167). PIRA gained Catholic support when they intervened during the sectarian riots of 1969 and later maintained support by indulging in sectarian assassination in retaliation for Loyalist paramilitary actions (Bew and Gillespie, 1993: 34; Guelke, 1986: 107). Chirot argues that this mechanic of collective blame ensures the continuation of ethnic conflict:

“In every case of ethnic conflict, it is when whole communities are blamed, rather than individuals, that escalation or continuation of the conflict becomes almost inevitable. It is when individuals are blamed and distinctions made within ethnic communities that reconciliation becomes possible.” (Chirot, 2001: 23).

Fearon and Laitin postulate that if two groups interact (A and B) and an A cannot identify a B by any means other than its group, nor access its history, then A1 cannot punish B1 (Fearon and Laitin, 1996: 721-722). Instead if A1 wants to punish B1 for the defection he must either punish the whole group or members selected at random (*ibid*). This course of action leads to the group based reprisals which characterise ethnic conflict. Fearon and Laitin cite the example of Israel and Palestine in which Israel responds to mortar attacks carried out by unknown individuals with bombing raids in Palestine (*ibid*: 727).

#### 10.2.1 The non-collective blame model

Again the model is practically identical to the basic model. However if an interethnic attack occurs, the victim's group does not increase its antagonism towards the aggressors group as a whole but rather the aggressor individually. Thus the victims group takes part in collective revenge but the aggressors group is not burdened with collective blame.

#### 10.2.2 Procedure

The simulations are conducted and collated in an identical fashion to the to the basic model runs.

### 10.2.3 Results

A comparison between the outputs of the augmented non-collective blame model (hereafter referred to as the NCB model) and the basic model indicates that while stripping away collective blame slows the progression to ethnic conflict, at higher ratios of ethno-political congruence it does not eliminate the eventual dominance of ethnic violence.

In comparing figure 22 and 23 below it becomes clear that for ratios 70:30 to 100:0 ethnic attacks still dominate, although dominance is reached at a slower pace. What is interesting is that at in the NCB model (illustrated by figure 22) at the ratios of 60:40 and 50:50 ethnic attacks remain a very low percentage (close to zero) of total attacks throughout the whole run. However in the basic model, illustrated by figure 23, a general trend of communal tit-for-tat emerges so that by the end >50% of attacks in the 50:50 runs and almost 20% of attacks in the 60:40 runs are ethnically motivated.




Figure 22 Non-collective blame model all congruence ratios -ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks




Figure 23 Basic model all congruence ratios -ethnic attacks as a percent of total attacks

A comparison between the total number of ethnically motivated attacks of the NBC model (figure 24) and the basic model (figure 25) yields an almost identical result. Again higher congruence ratios reach a similar level of violence albeit at a slower rate. Only at the lower ratios do ethnic attacks remain virtually non-existent.

It is probable that at higher congruence ratios, the prevalence of cross ethnic attacks, though executed for political reasons, creates a situation in which most group-individual relationships across group boundaries are antagonistic. In comparison at lower congruence ratios attacks are less likely to be directed across boundaries, therefore causing fewer antagonistic inter-group relationships. In the basic model a single inter-group attack caused a souring of inter-group relations which affected all agents creating a snowball effect. However the NCB model is more limited and contains the emergence of directed ethnic conflict out of undirected chaotic political conflict.




Figure 24 Non-collective blame model all congruence ratios – ethnic attacks in turn




Figure 25 Basic model all congruence ratios – ethnic attacks in turn

#### 10.2.4 Discussion

Unlike partition, the abandonment of collective blame cannot be imposed by outside forces. Instead its adoption is due to individual choice rather than imposed policy. As a result there is no real reliable record of individuals all conforming to this mental process meaning that, unlike the previous alteration, the results cannot be compared to the historical record.

However what these results do illuminate is that merely removing collective blame is insufficient to prevent the emergence of ethnic conflict in instances where the ethno-political congruence of communities encourages interethnic killing. The gentler gradient of the 100:0, 90:10 and 80:20 lines infer that over time the number of interethnic killings provokes a degree of ethnically motivated violence that would occur, albeit more rapidly, under the basic model.

This is probably due to the collective offense and antagonism the victims group feels against the offender. If communal honour remains, an interethnic attack may invite a violent response by any member of the victims group, this response in turn may provoke another violent response. Thus at high congruence ratios there are still mechanics that allow for a marked escalation in ethnically motivated attacks.

What is worth noting is the non-existent ethnic violence in the 50:50 and 60:40 ratios which present a significant contrast to the analogous results of the basic model, which show a slow but consistent escalation in ethnic violence. Thus what can be concluded is that removing collective blame prevents the presence of a low level of interethnic violence from escalating into an ethnic conflict. This can perhaps be seen in the failure of the IRA's Border Campaign or the UVF's sectarian assassination campaign: both campaigns were not collectively blamed upon the respective community the IRA/UVF claimed to represent and both failed to provoke wide scale interethnic violence.



### 11.0 Are the traits of the simulation unique to ethnicity?

Visibility of political affiliation is, in the case of the three cases examined, a potentially strong causative factor in ethnic conflict, however it is not a unique factor. Visibility, fixidity and inheritance can be analysed as intrinsic traits of ethnic identity (Chandra, 2006: 399; Erikisen, 2001: 42; Horowitz, 1985: 45-46). But again they are not unique and certain ideological conflicts, even in ethnically homogenous environments, exhibit similar processes to those described in the model.

In Jamaica during the 1970s and 80s, a political conflict raged in the urban centres between people who shared the same racial identity and culture but were divided into hostile camps by their political support: one supporting the Peoples National Party (PNP) and the other supporting the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) (Eyre, 1984: 26). JLP supporters tended to view the PNP and their supporters as communist threats while PNP supporters labelled the JLP fascists (*ibid*: 34-35; Clarke, 2006: 426). With both parties competing for candidates, a system of clientelism emerged.

In 1962 the JLP created the wards of Tivoli Gardens and Wilton Gardens and filled the houses of these wards with JLP voters, in short material resources were traded for votes (Clarke, 2006: 427-428). These wards were protected and kept homogenous by local street dons (Eyre, 1984: 27). As a result inner-city Kingston was formed of tiny politically homogenous blocks (*ibid*).

Jamaica's system of political patronage mirrors Lebanon's za'im system, except instead of being based on confession it is based purely on political support. However while the visible identifier of religion is required to enter the za'im, those who enter a political patronage system in Jamaica are designated areas to live acquiring a visible geographical-political identity. This visible geographic identity provides information on an individual's political allegiance in much the same way the za'im system allows political orientation to be superimposed on top of confession. Much as the Green Line, Krajina border and Peace Lines formalised confessional cleavages in Lebanon, Croatia and Northern Ireland, the political patronage and ward system formalises and makes visible political schisms.

Eyre, in questioning locals from either side of a JLP/PNP frontier, found that both sides hoped to annex the adjacent area while evicting the 'socialists' or 'fascists' on the other side (*ibid*: 34-35). These statements mirror the nationalist ideals of Starcevic's Greater Croatia, or Milosevic's goal of 'all Serbs in one state' or the eviction of Catholics from Protestant neighbourhoods during the Troubles. Kaufmann argues that a unique feature of ethnic war is that the different sides draw their mobilisation base purely from their own community and that areas are homogenised to reduce security risks (Kaufmann, 1996: 139-141). However a similar pattern is exhibited in the aspirations of

the wards to expand their territory and fill the empty houses with individuals within their respective political patronage-networks.

Similar mechanics occurred during the Spanish Civil War, a conflict often interpreted as an ideological polarization between the Republican government and Nationalist military rebels (Kalyvas, 2008: 1047). Before the outbreak of the war in 1936 the Republican government had made its anti-clerical leanings clear and during the early sections of the war itself the church was seen as naturally inclined to support Franco's rebels who wanted to "restore the full confessionality of the State" (De la Cueva, 1998: 360). Thus in 1931 the Church was regarded as an enemy of the Republic and in 1936 it was seen as a potential ally of fascism. As a result 6832 members of the Catholic clergy were massacred by Republicans and "killing the cleric became a sort of revolutionary obligation" (*ibid*: 355-360). The political link between clergy and Spanish Nationalism was further enhanced by the Pope expressing sympathy to the Nationalist cause (*ibid*). Therefore political allegiance could be extrapolated or merely imposed upon a trait that due to tradition was highly visible.

## 12.0 Future developments for the model

The simulation constructed for this thesis is rather simplistic as it aims to be an abstraction rather than a virtualisation of social processes. However, as seen in section ten, this simplicity allows modules to be put on top of the basic model to alter agent behaviour while the same mechanics of political and ethnic identity continue to be applied. There are numerous additions and slight alterations that could be used to study more specific phenomena.

For example in Northern Ireland, Croatia and Lebanon the state was seen as incapable of administering justice. In Northern Ireland the RUC was seen as inherently sectarian and the Government unwilling to punish members of the state who engaged in communal violence (Enloe, 1978: 251; Stetler, 1970: 48-49). In Croatia during the aftermath of the soccer riot between Croatian and Serbian fans, the Yugoslav police were accused of disproportionate violence towards the Croats (Sack and Suster, 2000: 311). Later the Croatian HDZ government lost legitimacy in its capacity for justice as it used purges to create a mono-ethnic police force and allowed radicals affiliated with its party to fire rockets into Serb dominated Borovo Selo (Kaufman, 2001: 186; Marko-Stockl, 2004: 32). In Lebanon Maronite dominance of the military and the army's acceptance of assistance from Christian militias discredited it as a non-sectarian arbiter of peace (Hudson, 1978: 265; El Khazen, 2000: 364).

Potential additions to the simulation could be arbiter agents that reduce interethnic hostility by administering justice via punishment that would initially be left up to the agents themselves. The legitimacy of the arbiters could be altered by the bias they exhibit to the punishing of different groups, thus leaving the agents of the offended group with unresolved antagonism. This model could examine the effect of bias in the judicial and security apparatus in an ethnically charged environment.

Another example could be examining how symbolic collapses of ethnic and political identity affect the prevalence of ethnic violence. In Northern Ireland, Croatia and Lebanon there were instances in which a particular ethnic marker and a particular political position were merged via a symbolic action, and these actions themselves often provoked violence.

In Northern Ireland marches and parades crystallize the link between ethnicity and politics. The Orange Order's namesake, William III of England, ensured the Protestants continued domination and a continued link to a Protestant monarch on the English throne. It was marches such as this which started the inter-communal rioting that marked the official beginning of The Troubles (Stetler, 1970: 68-92). Jonathan Powell, a key player in the organisation of the Good Friday Agreement,

stated that parades stood as one of the largest obstacles to peace as they were flashpoints for violence (Powell, 2012).

In Croatia the use of the Sahovnica, the Croatian coat of arms and flag of the Ustashe, symbolically unified the pro-independence and pro-republican political orientation with the Catholic exclusivist state of the Ustashe regime. Images of Tudjman kissing the symbol further united these two discreet categories, as did the Catholic Church's endorsement of the new state (Marko-Stockle, 2005: 29; Powers, 1996). One of the earliest fatally violent exchanges between the two ethnic communities occurred in Brovo Selo when two Croat policemen were detained for trying to replace the Yugoslav flag on the town hall with the Sahovnica (Fabijacic, 2003: 82-83).

To model these processes the agents of the simulation could have their political and ethnic identity rendered unambiguously linked, rather than implicitly linked via a probability, during certain periods to examine whether violence increases.

As argued in sections two and seven, the level of accuracy and research put into the inputs of a simulation is often what dictates the realism and level of 'virtualisation' in a model. Well researched initial parameter values were used for Lustick's VirPak virtualisation and Banks and Solowski's ensemble (Lustick;Banks and Sokolowski, 2010). During this thesis I opted not to attempt to replicate each situation as I was unable to find sufficient data to justify all the parameters and thus chose to do perform runs on a select range of hypothetical situations.

But certain programs may allow inputs to be gathered in real time from the web and applied to simulations such as mine. One of the most recent is Gloor et al's CONDOR. CONDOR is a semantic social network analysis tool: using text retrieval algorithms it can mine the web, analyse the social network position of the author of the texts and group texts according to the similarity of opinion (Gloor et al, 2009: 216).

Media has often been used as an instrument in ethnic conflict: radio was used to encourage violence during the Rwandan genocide and leaflets were used to organise and recruit Hindu's into anti-Muslim militias during India's partition (Scherrer, 2002: 130; Pandey, 2001: 35). The present dominance of the internet as a medium to display dissatisfaction and organise collective action was shown in the 2011 revolution against Mubarak in Egypt in which "Social media helped the Egyptian youth in holding online discussions and meetings, organizing protests and staying updated" (Chebib and Sohail, 2011: 156). Programs such as CONDOR could hypothetically mine web traffic from nations under study, assess the importance of those expressing certain opinions and the level of consensus to estimate initial variables such as ethnic and political antagonism.

### 13.0 Conclusion

The main aim of this research was to develop an alternative theory to the emergence of ethnic conflict that was not reliant on the 'ancient hatreds' narrative of Kaplan, but rather the intertwining of ethnic and political identity through shared memory and symbolic affinity. This congruence ethnicises political antagonisms and allows political disputes to turn into ethnically motivated violence.

Anthropology, generally, functions as a comparative and analytical discipline, but rarely as an experimental one (Lyon and Fischer, 2006: 48). As a result although the traditional narrative of ethnic conflicts and genocide, which is reliant on pre-existing antagonisms or 'ancient hatreds', has been extensively critiqued, it has generally been done so in a comparative manner (Kaufman, 2001; Crawford, 1998). The use of simulation has allowed the argument for alternative social processes to enter the experimental sphere and enabled the exposition of these proposed alternative processes through clear and formalised logic. This is where the thesis breaks new ground, taking the analysis of social processes leading to ethnic conflict out of the theoretical or comparative and into experimental sphere.

The polemic nature of the relevant anthropological concepts demanded a comparative analysis and evaluation of the anthropological concepts of ethnic and political identity. The concept of ethnicity itself has been subject to controversy, critique and contrasting interpretations. The comparative analysis of different theories and case studies led to the conclusion that while the boundary conditions and content of ethnic groups may alter, the label these groups adopt to proclaim their own identity remains stable. This stability is often ensured by selective shared historical memory and myth.

Furthermore ethnicity fundamentally differs from political identity due to its visual or externally verifiable nature, less permeable boundaries and inherited ascription. The conclusions reached in this section allowed me to justify the ethnic and political identity dynamics of the simulation: ethnic identity as externally verifiable and stable throughout the simulation, political identity as private and inferred.

An exploration of pre-existing anthropological theories on ethnic conflict allowed me to present which theoretical paradigms my hypothesis challenges: Kaplan and his essentialist theory of 'ancient hatreds'. The section also highlighted which paradigms my hypothesis borrowed from: the symbolic approach of Kaufman and the political approach of Crawford. Lastly I used the opportunity to

analyse theoretical paradigms not addressed in my simulation and hypothesis: the security and economically orientated paradigms.

The breadth of the anthropological phenomenon under study similarly required a comparative approach, but the expansive knowledge and analysis needed to understand the historical and symbolic motivations that link ethnic and political identity. This meant that the number of cases studied in depth would have to be limited. However, a wider range of conflicts both ethnic and non-ethnic, could be studied and referenced in a reduced level of depth.

An in depth analysis of the wars in Lebanon, Croatia and Northern Ireland revealed common trends that could be represented in an agent based model.

Firstly, in all three cases political polemics were ethnicised. This was due to the potential outcomes of the relevant polemics containing a symbolic significance for all ethnic groups concerned. As the relevant ethnic groups differed in their history and collective memory, political outcomes that would function as a symbol of triumph or emancipation for one group would often be interpreted as a symbol of defeat or repression by another.

Secondly, in all three cases ethnicity functioned as a relatively stable and externally verifiable trait allowing groups to discern potential political threats based on ethnic characteristics.

Lastly all interethnic attacks, regardless of intention, were interpreted as ethnically motivated thus prompting an escalation in interethnic antagonism.

The initial section, which analysed former anthropological simulations, their aims, complexity and the rationale behind their necessity, laid the foundation for how to construct a relevant simulation in light of the aim of the thesis and the availability of information for simulation inputs. Given the direction of the thesis towards theoretical formalisation rather than prediction, an ensemble or abstraction model was deemed appropriate. Further limitations due to difficulties in the reliability, scope and granularity of available information for the relevant inputs (congruence, political and ethnic antagonisms) for the three cases meant that constructing credible recreations of the initial conditions to the conflicts was an impossibility.

Discrepancies in the available input information between the three cases studies meant that the case studies could not be comparatively analysed holistically. Rather the congruence and ethnic antagonism inputs would have to be isolated and altered. This would allow for comparisons between the results of the simulation and facets of the three separate cases as a non-holistic model is not meant to perfectly virtualise the historical record. Rather selected runs which emphasise different

facets of an ethnic conflict procured results analogous to the historical records of the conflicts that informed the model.

In all the different models tested, both the historical record of the three case studies and the simulation corroborated the main findings:

- A situation in which ethnically motivated violence persists and dominates between two groups can arise in the absence of prior interethnic antagonism. When ethnic identity functions as an accurate indicator of political identity, cross ethnic attacks will occur prompting the creation of interethnic hostility and violence.
- A higher congruence in ethnic and political identity did logically lead to a dominance of ethnically motivated attacks. Furthermore a higher congruence would accelerate the process by which politically motivated violence became sidelined by ethnically motivated violence. However this relationship is not entirely linear and when ethnic and political identities are completely divorced, a chaotic pattern of violence will emerge which counter-intuitively can prompt a higher degree of ethnic violence.
- A single ethnic group can create, through violence, the insecurity and interethnic antagonism necessary to prompt a spiral of ethnic violence. However this process will only occur if the antagonistic group is highly antagonistic, exhibiting a high frequency and lethality in their attacks. A low frequency of attacks, especially when low levels of congruence mean that the offending party is not perceived as representative of their ethnic group, will fail to spark a cycle of ethnic violence.
- Partition as a means of breaking the cycle of violence can lead to a surge in violence as the migration paths of individuals of opposing ethnicities, radicalised by prior violence, are likely to cross. Furthermore partition allows the intra-ethnic political disunity suppressed by interethnic hostility to re-emerge and cause further violence.

Some findings could not be found in the historical record due to their experimental nature but rather must be treated as theoretically plausible but non-empirical results:

- A shift in ethno-political congruence will generally be more effective at either encouraging or circumventing the dominance of ethnically motivated violence in a conflict than a corresponding shift in initial interethnic antagonism of a single group. However this relationship was reversed if both groups were initially antagonistic.
- A removal of the 'communal blame' deemed essential to the promulgation of ethnic conflict by Chirot and Fearon and Laitin could prevent ethnically motivated violence from

dominating, but only at the lower levels of congruence (Chirot, 2001: 23; Fearon and Laitin, 1996: 721-722). At higher levels of congruence, politically motivated but interethnic attacks are high enough in volume to mean that most individuals of one group are targeted by the opposing group. Indeed it seems that the collective offense all members of an ethnic group feel when a member of their group is attacked can also prompt a deluge of ethnically motivated violence, even when the blame rests only upon the individual responsible.



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