



Australian
National
University

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Research School of Social Sciences

SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ADAM BENEDICT MASTERS

GLOBAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR


THE DEGREE OF THE

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

JANUARY, 2014

Declaration of Originality

I,  hereby declare that the thesis here presented is the outcome of the research project undertaken during my candidacy, that I am the sole author unless otherwise indicated, and that I have fully documented the source of ideas, references, quotations and paraphrases attributable to other authors.



Preface and Acknowledgements

The research for this thesis is not the result of idle curiosity. My *professional* curiosity evolved during an 18-year (1991-2009) career with the Australian Federal Police. In 1991, I became involved in the work of an international government organization. The Australian Federal Police hosts the Australian National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization – Interpol. The Bureau, known as Interpol Canberra, it serves as a point of contact for all Australian police to their counterparts around the world and vice versa. In my capacity as Archives Officer, I conducted an assessment of the records of Interpol Canberra dating back to 1948, when Australia joined Interpol. The assessment produced a classification system to enable better management of Interpol Canberra files. This was my introduction to the mechanics of police cooperation through an international government organization. For me, it was also international relations in action, not theory.

Between 1994 and 1998, I was Curator in the Police Museum, responsible for all operational aspects of this small institution. This included learning the basics of conservation and preservation of the artefacts in the collection. In this role, I befriended current and former members of the Federal Police. I listened to their stories, recording them for posterity and linking them to the objects that they had generously donated, or had a history with. I was, in effect, experiencing a meeting of two professional cultures – police and heritage conservation. As will be seen as the dissertation unfolds, this experience and understanding of professional cultures informs aspects of my analysis.

In 1998, I left the museum to become one of the first non-police members of Interpol Canberra. This was a period of change for the Bureau. A new police computer system necessitated closer integration of Interpol Canberra into the operations of its host. This substantially altered the relationship between the Bureau, which operated on behalf of all Australian police services, and the Federal Police. I played a key role in selling the idea of this role change to the other Australian police services. In effect, the Federal Police were able to expand the duties of the Bureau to include additional operational functions and move to a 24/7 mode of operation. A peer assessment at the time rated Interpol Canberra as one of the top five Bureaus in the world. By 2000, I was promoted to team leader, a position from which I acted as Head of the Bureau on several occasions – a very unusual situation for a non-police member.

Between 2003 and 2004, I was Project Officer at the Australian Federal Police College in the Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Centre. It was while performing this role I was asked to comment about a potential global public-private partnership between the Interpol Secretariat General and an American philanthropic organization. In essence, Interpol had applied for a million dollar grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation to fund a bio-terrorism training programme.

The request for comment had arrived in an indirect fashion. The foundation had contacted the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation asking for comment on the proposal. The FBI referred them on to the Australian Federal Police liaison officer in

Washington as a more independent source. The liaison officer, whom I knew well, asked me for a report based on my experience with the Australian National Central Bureau and counter-terrorism training. I prepared a short report pointing out the strengths and the weaknesses of the proposed programme. Ultimately, the Interpol Secretariat General was successful in its application, and a training programme sponsored by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation ran for several years.

But here was the thing – why would an international government organization seek non-public funding for a counter-terrorism programme? This question becomes more puzzling as the application was made in the years immediately following the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States. Law enforcement in the developed world was awash with additional funding for counter-terrorism. Unfortunately in those heady days, I had no time to delve into this puzzle.

In late 2004, I returned to Interpol Canberra. Having experienced teaching in an adult environment at the police college, I was determined to change my life and shift toward an academic career. Working and studying full-time strongly influenced the choice of my honours thesis, which explored the relationship between Australia and the International Criminal Police Organization. I left the AFP and Interpol Canberra in mid-2009 to finish my honours and commence this dissertation. The honours thesis was intended to double as my valedictory for the Australian Federal Police – providing them with a comprehensive history of the relationship with Interpol, which was subsequently published in a professional journal (Masters 2009, 2011).

For me, the puzzle of why international government organizations enter global public-private partnerships remained unanswered. However, after nearly two decades with the police, one of which had been within the National Central Bureau, plus an honours dissertation on Interpol I was determined to look at other organizations for answers. However, as will be seen in chapter three, my approach to case selection brought me back to my roots in more ways than one. Interpol proved to be an exceptional case in need of further research. Another case, the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property also occupied a field in which I had some familiarity – heritage conservation.

Now, almost a decade after my *professional* curiosity was aroused, I am able to contribute to an improved understanding of why international government organizations enter global public-private partnerships.

Acknowledgements: As with every PhD dissertation there are too many people to properly acknowledge, so my apologies to those of you who have supported me through this process not mentioned specifically below (you know who you are).

This project could not have been completed without the support of my wife (and part-time editor) Anne. She has indulged my efforts to change career focus and enabled me to spend much time away from her in fieldwork and other research pursuits. This part of the journey is now over and the exciting part begins.

Naturally the members of my panel deserve special recognition – John Wanna, Linda Botterill, Carsten Daugbjerg and Ben Wellings. In this group can be included Paul ‘t Hart, although not officially on the panel, he initially agreed to supervise me and gave me excellent direction in getting my research proposal prepared and submitted. In addition he has given me a good start in the world of academic publishing.

The other academic and close friend of mine I would like to thank is Ingrid Harrington. Ingrid inspired me to undertake a PhD, and offered support, criticism and gave me an insight into my potential as an academic on a conference trip to Florence in 2004. This trip, and our conversations opened my eyes and set me on the course I have been travelling. This dissertation is a passport to my future.

A key aspect of this research has been the fieldwork in both Europe and Canberra. The officials from the International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property who took the time to sit down with a researcher from Australia made this dissertation possible in its current form. Their dedication to their respective professions and organizations has informed the core thesis that follows. Those who wished to be named are listed in the interviewee list, but no less thanks are passed to the officials wishing to remain anonymous and those with whom I spoke with informally. Without the support of officials in Canberra I could not have gained access to their international counterparts. My original intent had been to include these officials as interviewees; however the research changed direction. In any event my thanks to Jason Ashurst at the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy and Rob Blount at the Australian Federal Police for their support.

The last (and most memorable) group to thank are my colleagues here at the Australian National University School of Politics and International Relations. There are too many people in my cohort who have transitioned the school while I have been here; but those who do need special mention are Fiona who has acted as reader to this work, her comments have forced me to think harder on what I have to say; Andrew with whom I have shared an office and many ideas with since 2010; and the rest of our group – Alison, Mhairi, Steve, Karen, Matt and Brendan with whom I have shared (too) many drinks with discussing various aspects of our research.

Abstract

Global public-private partnerships are part of the global governance framework and influence our daily lives – yet our understanding of them is incomplete. Research has attributed the existence of these partnerships between state, market and civil society actors variously to the influence of leaders, new management ideas, resource deficits and the proliferation of issues beyond the ability of any single sector to manage. Yet explorations of these themes primarily focuses on the United Nations core agencies, and overlooks the technical international government organizations; organizations which facilitate a multitude of transactions in various policy areas between nation-states, their agencies and administrations. Personal experience with such an organization – Interpol – indicated the answer to the puzzle was incomplete. Therefore, this study was undertaken to further explore the question of why international government organizations participate in global public-private partnerships.

Using case studies, this research set out to discover a better explanation for the phenomena of global public-private partnerships. Research was conducted with the International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. Between them, they represented a diverse section of international policy fields – communication; police cooperation and cultural conservation. This research found that beyond the themes in the literature, global public-private partnerships are shaped by the dominant professional culture of an international government organization, and the organizational culture also uniquely inherent in each. The use of theories of professional and organizational culture has therefore filled a gap in our knowledge about this global phenomenon. Furthermore, these cultural factors also influence how the other factors are perceived and then acted upon. The end results are partnerships that comfortably fit with the beliefs, values, norms and assumptions common the respective professional and organizational culture.

Contents

List of common abbreviations.....	ix
<i>List of tables.....</i>	<i>x</i>
<i>List of figures.....</i>	<i>xi</i>
<i>List of boxes.....</i>	<i>xi</i>
PART 1.....	1
1. Across the Public-Private Divide in the International Sphere.....	1
<i>Why revisit a settled question?.....</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Framing the research.....</i>	<i>6</i>
Global public-private partnerships – theoretical perspectives.....	7
Methodology.....	8
Introducing the cases.....	9
Cultures.....	10
Leaders.....	11
Ideas.....	12
Resources.....	13
Global issues.....	14
Concluding analysis and summary.....	15
2. Global Public-Private Partnerships.....	17
<i>Concepts.....</i>	<i>18</i>
Global public-private partnerships.....	18
International government organizations.....	21
Defining cultures.....	24
Culture in international government organizations.....	28
<i>Governance at the national and international level.....</i>	<i>39</i>
New public management: national frameworks with global relevance.....	39
Global governance.....	44
Relating the thesis to the themes in the literature.....	52
The significance of the literature and the key concepts of the thesis.....	53
3. Methodology.....	55
<i>Case studies.....</i>	<i>56</i>
Deep reading – documents, libraries and archives.....	57
Interviews – going beyond the record.....	58
Anonymity.....	60
Interview format.....	60
Triangulation.....	61
Observations from the field.....	62

<i>Case selection</i>	63
Problems with case selection.....	64
Identifying international government organizations.....	65
The United Nations dilemma.....	66
Narrowing the field.....	67
<i>Thematic analysis</i>	73
4. Three Organizations	76
<i>Communicating across borders and oceans</i>	76
Partnership evolution – from recognition to membership	77
Governance diffused in the International Telecommunication Union.....	80
Case Study: Telecommunication standards: Alternative Approval Process.....	83
<i>International law enforcement cooperation</i>	86
Partnership evolution – changing regulations and getting on with it.....	88
Governance delegated in the International Criminal Police Organization	90
Case Study: The threat of bio-terrorism	95
<i>International conservation</i>	96
Partnership evolution – old associates and new partners.....	97
Governance in the International Centre for Conservation	99
Case Study: Training conservators in Africa.....	102
<i>Comparative overview</i>	106
Evolution.....	106
Governance	107
Partnerships.....	108
PART 2	110
5. Cultures	110
<i>Macro-cultures</i>	111
Proximity and interference of the host nation culture.....	111
International civil service.....	112
Powerful states.....	112
Professions.....	113
<i>Studying their specific professional and organizational cultures</i>	113
‘Committed to a connected world’	114
‘Connecting police for a safer world’	120
‘Conserving culture, preserving dignity’	124
<i>Organizational cultures characteristics</i>	130
<i>The role of culture in global public-private partnerships</i>	133
6. Leaders	136
<i>Three Original Leaders as Organization Shapers</i>	137

Louis Curchod (1869-72; 1873-89) - private, public and national cultures.....	138
Oskar Dressler (1923-46) and the International Criminal Police Commission.....	140
Harold Plenderleith (1959-1971) – Always willing to share knowledge.....	141
<i>Leaders as Agents of Change or Stability.....</i>	<i>143</i>
Facilitating, but not leading change.....	143
An English idea and change from the top.....	144
Changing the Rome Centre from within.....	146
<i>Leaders and public-private partnerships today.....</i>	<i>147</i>
More partners, faster standards and direction by members.....	148
Change in police culture and support for diversity.....	149
Making a partnership montage.....	151
<i>Comparing leaders.....</i>	<i>153</i>
7. Ideology, Ideas and Implementation.....	156
The relationship between culture and ideas.....	157
<i>Ideological change – not a universal factor.....</i>	<i>157</i>
Probing for ‘ideology’ – method and madness.....	158
<i>New public management from the national to the international.....</i>	<i>159</i>
Changed ideas ... changed cultures.....	160
<i>Improving organizational effectiveness using market-based practices.....</i>	<i>163</i>
Market competition.....	165
More effective negotiation of Telecommunication Standards.....	166
Leveraging a global police network for partners’ benefits.....	168
Conservation – collaboration inside and outside the profession.....	170
<i>The role of ideas in global public-private partnerships.....</i>	<i>172</i>
8. Resources and Private Interests.....	175
<i>Different partnerships - different resources.....</i>	<i>175</i>
<i>Financial resources and budgetary pressures.....</i>	<i>177</i>
International Telecommunication Union – reliance on user pays resourcing.....	179
International Criminal Police Organization – partner contributions facilitating diversity and growth.....	182
International Centre for Conservation – partnerships mean survival.....	184
<i>Human resources – experts and volunteers.....</i>	<i>186</i>
Engineering expertise from academia in the ITU.....	186
Outside experts and volunteers in Interpol.....	188
Experts training experts in ICCROM.....	189
<i>Knowledge resources - research and development.....</i>	<i>191</i>
Associated benefits of telecommunication research and development.....	192
A changed organizational perspective toward research.....	192

Conservation research in two spheres.....	193
<i>Physical resources – facilities and equipment</i>	194
Provider not recipient.....	194
Free forensic technology.....	194
Classrooms and a library.....	195
<i>The influence of resources on organizational behaviour</i>	196
9. Perspectives on Global Issues	198
<i>The internet debate – new media and new actors</i>	200
Destroy, control or neither – the ITU and the internet.....	202
Analysis	204
<i>Transnational intellectual property crimes</i>	205
INTERPOL and IMPACT: Law enforcement and health.....	209
Analysis	212
<i>Privatizing cultural heritage</i>	213
The ICCROM forum on privatization.....	215
Analysis	216
<i>The influence of global issues on organizational behaviour</i>	218
10. Conclusion.....	220
<i>Applying the findings</i>	221
Modelling the influence of culture.....	231
Cultural motivation, maintenance and inhibition.....	233
<i>Overall findings and conclusion</i>	234
Applying the research findings	236
The scope for further research	237
Appendices	238
<i>Abbreviations</i>	238
ITU Acronyms	241
INTERPOL Acronyms	242
ICCROM Acronyms	243
<i>Interviews</i>	244
<i>Executive Duties</i>	248
International Telecommunication Union	248
International Criminal Police Organization.....	258
International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property	
.....	261
<i>Partner Information</i>	265
ITU Partners.....	265
INTERPOL Partners.....	266

ICCROM Partners.....	267
<i>The UN Bias in the Literature</i>	268
Bibliography	270
<i>International government organization websites</i>	298

List of common abbreviations

The following lists those commonly appearing in titles, references, tables, figures, boxes and quotes. A complete list of acronyms and abbreviations can be found at appendix 1.

AAP	Alternative Approval Process for International Telecommunication Standards
CHDA	Centre for Heritage Development Africa
EPA	<i>Ecole du Patrimoine Africain</i> (African School of Cultural Heritage)
ICCROM	International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property abbreviated form of International Centre for Conservation, Rome.
ICOM	International Council of Museums
ICPC	International Criminal Police Commission (1923-56)
ICPO	International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL (1956-)
IMPACT	International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL
IP	Intellectual Property
ITU	International Telegraph Union (1865-1932) International Telecommunication Union (1932-)
ITU-R	Radiocommunication Bureau/Sector of the ITU
ITU-D	Telecommunication Development Bureau/Sector of the ITU
ITU-T	Telecommunication Standardization Bureau/Sector of the ITU
NCB	National Central Bureau [of INTERPOL – e.g. the Italian National Central Bureau or INTERPOL Rome]
POA	Private Operating Agency
PREMA	Preventive Conservation for Technicians and Restorers Working in African Museums South of the Sahara. or Prevention Museums Africa
RPOA	Recognized Private Operating Agency
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
ZNG	Zero Nominal Growth budgets
ZRG	Zero Real Growth budgets

List of tables

Table 1-1 - Factors motivating UN public-private partnerships	6
Table 2-1 - Actors in global public-private partnerships	20
Table 2-2 - Partnership typology	21
Table 2-3 - Categories of culture	30
Table 2-4 - Features of engineering culture	33
Table 2-5 - Features of police culture	35
Table 2-6 - Features of conservator culture	38
Table 2-7 - National and international governance frames.....	42
Table 2-8 - Interest in global health partnerships	46
Table 3-1 - The United Nations system of agencies	66
Table 3-2 - Private financial support to formal IGOs	68
Table 3-3 - Private financial support to global IGOs.....	69
Table 3-4 - Selection criteria for case studies	72
Table 3-5 - Themes and factors driving global PPPs.....	74
Table 4-1 - ITU Sector membership distribution.....	82
Table 4-2 - ITU membership fees	85
Table 4-3 - Duties of the INTERPOL General Secretariat	92
Table 4-4 - Examples of INTERPOL partnerships	93
Table 4-5 - African museums programme resource providers 1986-88	104
Table 4-6 - Executive governance structures	108
Table 5-1 - Characteristics of organizational cultures	131
Table 6-1 - Founders of the ITU	138
Table 7-1 - Sample of the competitive market.....	165
Table 8-1 - Membership contribution and organizational budgets	179
Table 10-1 - Comparing three partnerships	222

List of figures

Figure 2-1 Professional and organizational culture as moderators	52
Figure 4-1 - Alternative Approval Process for Telecommunication Standards.....	84
Figure 8-1 - Meeting Schedule for the ITU – Morning of 2 Sept 2013	186
Figure 8-2 - Involvement in ICCROM’s activities since attending course.....	190
Figure 9-1 - A taxonomy of transnational crime.....	206
Figure 10-1 - Moderating influence of ITU cultures	231
Figure 10-2 - Moderating influence of INTERPOL cultures.....	232
Figure 10-3 - Moderating influence of ICCROM cultures	233

List of boxes

Box 2-1 - Kaul’s defining characteristics of global public-private partnerships	18
Box 2-2 - Driving factors behind new public management	41
Box 2-3 - Principles of the UN Global Compact	45
Box 4-1 - The purposes and structure of the ITU	81
Box 4-2 - Aims and structure of the INTERPOL	91
Box 4-3 - The purpose and functions of ICCROM.....	100
Box 5-1 - Case study: Listening to professionals and achieving consensus	119
Box 5-2 - Case study: Blue culture meets green culture.....	123
Box 5-3 - ICCROM strategic directions	127
Box 5-4 - Case study: The Catania Conclusions.....	130
Box 9-1 - A pocket history of the internet	200
Box 9-2 - International Telecommunication Regulations (1988); art. 9 (extract)	201
Box 9-3 - The Catania Conclusions	215

PART 1

1. Across the Public-Private Divide in the International Sphere

This research has taken a path that can be summarized as curiosity; research; reflection; realization; and reporting. My curiosity was sparked by a real-life experience with a global public-private partnership, the details of which are outlined both below and in the preface. This led to the initial research question: *why do international government organizations enter global public-private partnerships?* The first tranche of research provided a range of factor in the current literature to explain why these partnerships occurred more frequently in recent decades. The factors usually cited are: changes in leadership of an organization; ideological changes, with a shift from neo-Marxist to neoliberal outlooks; a migration of ideas about public management from the national to the international sphere; the implementation of market-based practices in international government organizations; financial stress caused by shrinking contributions from member-states; the need to access research and development from the private sphere; and the emergence of global issues beyond the capacity of state, market or civil society actors to resolve alone. The explanation attributed in this literature seemed somehow inadequate when weighed against my personal experience. Therefore, further research in the field was undertaken to assess these factors in three case organizations.

Reflecting on the information and observations gathered in the field, I realized that while all these factors have the potential to influence whether or not an international government organization enters a global public-private partnership, their potential is subject to interpretation through the lenses of professional and organizational cultures. Furthermore, I would suggest both professional and organizational cultures also have the potential to act as influential factors in their own right, pushing international government organizations toward partnerships or alternately retarding their development. With the fieldwork component behind me and two new factors added to the mix, it became more important to explain *how* professional and organizational culture influence global public-private partnerships overall. As a result, this thesis—the reporting—is more focused on *how* these partnerships operate, rather than simply why they occur. By including professional and organizational cultures, this thesis fills a gap in our knowledge of both why and how these partnerships occur and is the main contribution of this research to better understanding global public-private partnerships.

Chapter 1

International government organizations are a significant part of the policy environment – globally and domestically. For example, one provides a technical framework enabling people to have telephone conversations between any two (or more) points on the globe; another international government organization facilitates police cooperation across international borders; and a third works to ensure the preservation of cultural heritage. These are a few examples of nearly three hundred international government organizations created over the past two centuries as formalized mechanisms of cooperation between nations.

Starting in 1815, with the Commission for the Navigation on the Rhine, there are now international government organizations involved in issues ranging from the most basic of human needs to the furthest reaches of technology – from famine relief to satellite communications. Some international government organizations are tiny, with barely three member-states; whereas others are global, with more than 100, and often close to 200, member-states. These organizations are important parts of the machinery making the modern world tick. Although they are not the only type of transnational actor – multi-national corporations, international non-government organizations and other actors also occupy the international sphere – they are essentially public bodies representing a collective response by national governments to common problems and interests. In 1999, the United Nations announced a Global Compact with business. The Global Compact radically changed the nature of the relationship between the world's most important international government organization and the private sector.

For many scholars, the Global Compact raised the question of why international government organizations entered public-private partnerships. This chapter introduces my research that explores the various dimensions of this question. After extensive reviews of the relevant literatures and fieldwork undertaken with three international government organizations, I developed the proposition:

Professional and organizational cultures are factors motivating global public-private partnerships and these cultures can influence how other motivating factors are perceived and acted upon.

This thesis helps explain why international government organizations enter into partnerships by exploring when partnerships are formed, how they are formally or informally structured and how they change or shape subsequent partnership behaviour and outcomes. Professional and organizational cultures provide the *Weltanschauung*, or

Across the public-private divide world-view, through which all other factors influencing partnerships are interpreted. In some cases, professional and organizational cultures themselves have changed to accommodate public-private partnerships. Yet in other cases, public-private partnerships are long established parts of both professional culture and organizational culture.

The concept of a *global public-private partnership* is defined in this research as *a relatively institutionalized transboundary interaction, which includes at least one global international government organization and private actors*. The term global is emphasized in this definition to indicate a research focus on international government organizations with more than 100 member-states and no barriers¹ to nation-state membership. Chapter two details the development of this concept more fully.

This study principally explores the reasons why international government organizations enter public-private partnerships to explain how they occur, not why or how business or civil society actors do so. The motivations for private actors are covered by extensive literatures on corporate social responsibility in the case of business (for example Carroll and Shabana 2010; Frederick 2006; Frumkin 2003; Rumsey and White 2009; Schwartz and Carroll 2003), and philanthropy in the case of civil society (see Adam 2004; Berman 1983; Bolling and Smith 1982; Curti 1963; Moran 2010; and Murphy 1976). A third motivator for private involvement is the desire for civil society organizations to have a voice in international forums (see Nanz and Steffek 2004; Smith and Moran 2000; Tallberg 2010; Weir 2007; Woods and Narlikar 2001). These private motivating factors are not the same as those motivating the public partners as can be seen on Table 1-1. In this study the perspectives of three organizations – the International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property² – provide the main cases for comparison. The chapter proceeds with an explanation as to why the research question, apparently settled in the literature, requires re-visitation. It then moves on to outline the structure of this dissertation.

¹ Barriers to membership are often based on factors of geo-politics (e.g. the European Union), economics (e.g. the G20) or culture (e.g. Organization of the Islamic Culture). These organizations are often referred to as *universal* international government organizations. However, for the purposes of this study organizations with 100+ member states have a *global* characteristic. Universal international government organizations can be significantly smaller (e.g. the International Cotton Advisory Committee).

² ICCROM is the acronym for the International Centre for Conservation, Rome. The longer 'International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property' has always been the official name, but employees there have always referred to it as the Centre, the Rome Centre or ICCROM. The shorter forms - *International Centre for Conservation* or *Rome Centre* - shall be used forthwith.

Why revisit a settled question?

In 2004, I had been asked to comment on an application by the International Criminal Police Organization to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for a US\$1 million grant. The request was based on my experience as a counter-terrorism project officer with extensive knowledge of Interpol Canberra (see preface). The organization required funding for a bio-terrorism training programme for police. Curiously, in a world awash with public funds to fight terrorism after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, here was a public law enforcement body seeking support from a philanthropic organization. What sprang to mind was simply why was this occurring? This puzzle developed into the research question central to this dissertation – *why do international government organizations enter into partnerships with private actors?*

The question presented here is strikingly similar to the question asked by Christopher Paun (2013) in his doctoral dissertation – *why is this new institutional format of public-private partnership applied to law enforcement, a policy area where one would least expect it?* However, there are some distinct differences in our conclusions stemming from different methodological approaches. Paun focussed on public-private partnerships created to respond to the single policy area of intellectual property crime, a sub-set of international law enforcement. This approach turned his research toward cases where private partners had significant commercial interests in preventing the abuse of their intellectual property rights. In contrast, the research reported in this thesis looks at three policy areas – international telecommunication, law enforcement and conservation of cultural heritage – and a broader range of private partners. By using a broader range of policy fields and partner types, the complexity of the partnerships is better illustrated. This research also adds the factor of culture, which fills a gap in the literature on the formation of global public-private partnerships. As a result, my research can be considered complementary to Paun's work.

The initial work on this dissertation pointed to several influential factors that have gained currency in recent years. In 1999, Kofi Annan announced the Global Compact between the United Nations and business. The Global Compact called on transnational businesses to align themselves with ten principles of human and labour rights, environmental protection and anti-corruption (UN Global Compact 2012). This produced a flurry of research activity, which appeared to settle the question of why international government organizations were forming partnerships with private actors

Across the public-private divide (Bull *et al.* 2004; Bull and McNeill 2007; Buse and Walt 2000a; 2000b; Kaul 2006; Lee *et al.* 1997; Tesner and Kell 2000). Essentially it was reasoned United Nations organizations were driven by various factors, which changed their stance on dealing with private actors. These factors are:

1. Changes in leadership helped to drive international government organizations toward partnering with private actors (Bull *et al.* 2004, p.485; Bull and McNeill 2007, 2010; Tesner and Kell 2000, p.2)
2. The internal ideology of these organizations underwent a fundamental shift from a neo-Marxist outlook, to one of neo-liberalism (Bull *et al.* 2004, pp.484-486)
3. Changes in ideas about public management at national level had been elevated to the international arena (Kaul 2006, pp.219-220)
4. The benefits market-based practices and efficiencies bring into public organizations (Kaul 2006, pp.219-220)
5. The perpetual financial stress, particularly on budgets subjected to zero nominal, or zero real growth, required organizations to seek private funding (Buse and Walt 2000a; Jönsson 2010; Lee *et al.* 1997)
6. Scientific and technological research and development, which could positively influence operations, resided with private actors. Therefore partnerships provided a mechanism to tap into this knowledge (Buse and Walt 2000a; Buse and Walt 2000b; Kaul 2006)
7. Emerging global issues were too large, or moved too fast for the international bureaucracies to deal with on their own (Bull *et al.* 2004; Buse and Walt 2000a; 2000b; Kaul 2006; Lee *et al.* 1997; Tesner and Kell 2000).

These factors provided a plausible explanation within a broader framework of rationalist thought. In other words, international government organizations entered partnerships in the pursuit of self-interest. Alternately, it is an argument framed by principal/agent theory, whereby the organization as agent seeks to expand its authority/autonomy in relation to its member-states as principals (Hawkins *et al.* 2006). Table 1-1 summarizes these factors and adds those motivating private partners.

Despite the framework in Table 1-1 being broadly acceptable, this author remained somewhat sceptical based on real-world experience.³ On the surface, the scenario with the International Criminal Police Organization and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation

³ See preface.

Chapter 1

rested uneasily with three factors. There had been no radical change in the leadership of the organization, public finances were apparently available and the organization could never have been described as ideologically neo-Marxist. The sixth factor – a fast moving, emerging global issue, in this case transnational terrorism – was clearly at play, and carried more weight than the other motivators.

Table 1-1 - Factors motivating UN public-private partnerships

Internal Factors	External Factors
Change of leadership	Benefits of market-like practices
Ideological shift	Managerial ideas (new public management)
Financial stress (through zero growth budgets)	Research & development dominated by private sector (e.g. pharmaceutical industry)
	Global issues (e.g. HIV/AIDS) ⁴
Private partner motivations	
Philanthropic urge	Market access
Access and voice in forums	

Source: modified from the work of Bull *et al.* 2004; Bull and McNeill 2007, 2010; Buse and Walt 2000a; Buse and Walt 2000b; Kaul 2006; Lee *et al.* 1997; Tesner and Kell 2000

Furthermore, the framework in Table 1-1 relied almost exclusively on analysis of the United Nations system with a focus on the policy fields of health (Buse and Walt 2000a; Buse and Walt 2000b), and development (Kaul 2006). The International Criminal Police Organization is independent of the United Nations, thus a possibility existed that organizations outside the United Nations system had different motivations behind their partnerships. Therefore the question needed revisiting.

Framing the research

The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part frames the research and consists of this introductory chapter followed by chapter two, which presents the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical literature with bearing upon this research. Chapter three then provides the research design and methodology; and chapter four completes the first part by delving into the creation, development and operations of the International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for Conservation in Rome.

⁴ This study avoids the use of acronyms wherever possible, with the exception of tables, figures and boxes. A list of common abbreviations can be found after the table of contents, and a full list is at appendix 1.

The second part of the dissertation adopts a thematic approach to the empirical and concluding chapters. Ten factors have been identified that motivate international government organizations to enter public-private partnerships. Seven are found in Table 1-1. In addition to these are the factors of professional culture, organizational culture and macro-culture. All factors tend to interact to varying degrees in each public-private partnership. As a result, the motivating factors cannot be considered in complete isolation from one another. Furthermore, the main contribution of this research is the consideration of why, when and how professional and organizational cultures influence global public-private partnerships. Therefore the cultures become an overlying element of the empirical chapters. To resolve these issues, a thematic approach has enabled a comparative analysis of these factors. The themes of culture, leaders, ideas, resources and global issues group one or more factors into empirical chapters five through nine.

Global public-private partnerships – theoretical perspectives

Chapter two defines the concepts underpinning this research and then examines literature informing the analysis. The concepts inherent in the thesis are the *global public-private partnerships* themselves, *international government organizations*, *professional culture* and *organizational culture*. The first section of the chapter unpacks these concepts to form useful definitions for analysing the phenomena of global public-private partnerships.

The second section reviews the interrelated literature informing the scholarship on global public-private partnerships. At the national level the concept has been the focus of research for three decades or more (for example Brooks *et al.* 1984; Fosler and Berger 1982). Public-private partnerships are also a key element of the literature on new public management, where governments are now ‘steering rather than rowing’ the ship of state (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Peters and Pierre (2010, p.52) sum up public-private partnerships as being ‘in many ways the jewel in the crown of NPM’.

This ‘jewel’ of an idea has been transferred to the international sphere. However, as mentioned previously, academic interest in the phenomena at the international level was stimulated through the United Nations Global Compact with business in 1999 (for example Buse and Walt 2000a, 2000b) and the involvement of influential academics in

Chapter 1

the development of the Compact (Ruggie 2013). International Relations⁵ scholars of global governance have since taken to questioning the democratic credentials of these international public-private partnerships (see the edited volumes of Bexell and Mörth 2010; Erman and Uhlin 2010; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010), treating the *a priori* question of why they exist, described at the beginning of this chapter, as a settled matter.

In re-opening the question, this research draws in the literature on professional and organizational cultures as a component of the analysis. These cultures help explain differences in organizational structure (Hofstede 1997); they define what is a professional organization (Ott 1989); illustrate how leaders from professions shape organizational culture (Pettigrew 1979; Schein 1985, 2010); and how cultures can otherwise influence how partnerships are perceived, formed and acted upon.

Professional and organizational culture fills the gap in explanations of why global public-private partnerships exist. These cultures also help to maintain existing partnerships or alternatively inhibit new ones. Furthermore, these cultures have influence on the other motivating factors.

The final section looks at specific literature on the cultures of engineering (for example Bloch 1986; Florman 1987), police professionals (for example Prenzler 1997; Skolnick 1966) and the profession of conservation (for example ICOM 1984; Stout 1975). This section identifies the characteristics and traits of these professionals to provide a framework for analysing the behaviour of the case organizations.

Methodology

Chapter three describes the research design and case selection methodology. This research hinges on three comparative case studies. First is the International Telecommunication Union, which provides various international forums for: allocating the radio-spectrum for public and commercial purposes; negotiating standards for telecommunication equipment; and enabling the development of telecommunication⁶

⁵ The term *International Relations* is capitalized when referring to the academic study of the interactions between nations and the body of literature associated with this study. In lower case the term refers to the practices carried out between nations (see George 1994, p.34).

⁶ Telecommunication, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, was introduced to English from the French at the 1932 International Telecommunication Union plenipotentiary conference. It first appeared in the documents emanating from this meeting. To avoid confusion it is the broad term employed for all communication technology from this point on. Reference to the various media – telegraph, telephone, telex, radio, television etc. will be made when contextually appropriate.

Across the public-private divide technology. The second case is the International Criminal Police Organization,⁷ which facilitates international police cooperation in relation to ordinary law crime (murder, theft, fraud etc.). The third case is the International Centre for Conservation, which provides international research and training in the field of cultural conservation.

The cases illustrate the prevalence and particulars of public-private partnerships at the global level. In outlining the case selection, chapter three incorporates a broad analysis of the formal international global organizations identified by Volgy *et al.* (2008a), in particular those with a global scope. The research design relies on qualitative methods – including the case studies (and case-within-case studies), elite interviews and deep reading of organizational records – to discover why and how partnerships were formed and operate. Interviews and data gathering focus on how the factors in earlier literature – leadership change, new economic ideas, market efficiencies, financial pressures and global issues – affect the cases and their public-private partnerships.

Briefly, each case represents a different category of organization – one from the field of communication and transport, one from security / law enforcement and one from the socio-cultural sphere. The International Telecommunication Union and the International Criminal Police Organization receive more than ten per cent of their operating budget from private sources. In the case of the International Centre for Conservation, extra-budgetary funding is received from sub-national public partners in addition to significant private financial support. These organizations represent globalism with more than 100 member-states each and no restrictions barring national membership. Australian membership had been a selection criterion; however a change to the research design removed the necessity of this. The choice of different fields revealed the influence of different professional and organizational cultural features on global public-private partnerships.

Introducing the cases

Chapter four expands on the background and partnerships of the cases selected and introduced in the methods chapter. The chapter dedicates a section to each case – the International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for Conservation. These sections provide an important and in-depth description of the origins, purpose and structure of each organization. These

⁷ The official name is *The International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL*. The name “INTERPOL” originates from the telegraphic address of the organization and was incorporated into the official name in 1956. For easier reading the telegraphic name is omitted.

Chapter 1

sections also describe the evolution of the partnerships each organization has with the private sector. A case-within-a-case describes a sample partnership for each organization and provides an illustration of how global public-private partnerships form and operate. Other partnerships of the case organization are also discussed in later chapters. The fourth and final section of the chapter compares the three organizations.

Cultures

Chapter five is the first thematic chapter. It examines the cultural factors influencing global public-private partnerships. The cultural theme is examined first because this dissertation argues that global public-private partnerships are influenced by the professional and organizational cultures. These cultures form a unique combination for each organization. Furthermore, the cultures provide a lens through which the other factors are first viewed and then shaped. In essence these cultures can be a driving factor of partnerships, and at the same time moderators of the other driving factors. The chapter therefore provides a foundation for the subsequent chapters.

Chapter five is organized in three sections. Each section examines one of the cultural factors motivating global public-private partnerships – macro-cultures, professional cultures and organizational cultures. The first section briefly explores four identifiable macro-cultures– those of host nation, international civil service, powerful member-states and the dominant professions. It should be noted professional culture plays a dual role, both outside an organization as a macro-culture and within an organization as an occupational culture (Schein 2010, p.2). Professional culture is more deeply discussed in the second section.

The second section concentrates on the professional traits and characteristics and their influence on partnerships. On occasion these traits are discussed in terms of organizational culture. It is because the case studies are all professional organizations disentangling the cultural traits of profession and organization can be difficult (Bloor and Dawson 1995). At times, the two types of culture are inextricably mixed. In this section, a brief case study for each organization illustrates how culture has influenced one of their global public-private partnerships.

The final section unpacks the characteristics which are more closely aligned to the organizational culture. Again there is some cross-over with the traits and characteristics

Across the public-private divide of professional culture. However, this section is important as it distinguishes the cases from other organizations within the same professional sphere (Hofstede *et al.* 1990).

Leaders

The theme *leaders* for chapter six expands on the factor of leadership change. Leadership can set the tone for an organization and is typically linked to the professional culture affiliated with an international government organization. More often than not, the leaders in the three cases are drawn from the dominant professions of telecommunication engineers, police or conservators. Leaders from outside the dominant profession are rare, but even these are familiar with organizational culture through a long association in lower elected positions, or as member-state delegates. It is therefore logical to analyze the leadership factor immediately after the analysis of professional and organizational culture. The chapter explores leaders in three guises as organization shaper, as agents of change or stability and the contemporary leaders who influence public-private partnerships today. These guises also pinpoint where leaders influence organizational culture (Cox, 1969; Hofstede 1997; Schein 2010).

The leaders with the greatest power to shape an organization are those there at the beginning. These individuals are responsible for creating organizations to give effect to the will of the founding members; what these leaders do provides the foundations of distinctive organizational cultures (Schein 2010, pp.219-234). In two instances – the International Telecommunication Union and the International Centre for Conservation – the foundational leaders oversaw the first public-private partnerships of their organizations. In the case of the International Criminal Police Commission,⁸ cooperation with the private sector was briefly considered, but never acted upon in the formative years. The first section of chapter six therefore examines the role of professional cultures in facilitating or resisting public-private partnerships.

The second section responds to the literature which situates the growth of global public-private partnerships in the 1990s. Leaders in all three organizations at this time were confronted with external pressures to review and change the way in which they operated with the private sector. Unlike the organization shapers, this later generation of leaders had to contend with ‘the way things had always been done’ (Kille and Scully 2003). Therefore organizational culture becomes a more important factor in analysing how leaders acted as either agents of change or stability.

⁸ Later the International Criminal Police Organization.

Chapter 1

The final section rounds out chapter six by examining how contemporary leaders approach and perceive global public-private partnerships. This section relies on interview material with both leaders and employees of the case organizations. These interviews reveal how some leaders remain constrained by existing organizational culture, while others face greater difficulty from the profession. Leaders present an important theme because they are most responsible for maintaining or changing an organizational culture; and both maintenance and change present their own challenges.

Ideas

Three factors motivate global public-private partnerships are captured by the theme of ideas in chapter seven. First, is the claim in the literature a change occurred in organizational ideology from a neo-Marxist to a neo-liberal position (Bull *et al.* 2004, pp.484-486). Second, is the elevation of ideas associated with new public management from the national level to the international arena (Kaul 2006, p.219-220). The third factor is the attractiveness of market-like ideas and practices (Kaul 2006, p.219-220). The chapter therefore, explores the relationship between ideas and cultural factors in the specific context of global public-private partnerships.

As the research for this dissertation progressed, it became apparent the factor from of ideological change did not apply to the selected cases. The primary reason for this related to the self-perception within the organizations that they were 'technical' organizations. As such, questions of political ideology did not apply. Chapter seven discusses this self-perception and how this factor has less relevance in these technical organizations than those involved in economic development, the field analyzed by Bull *et al.* (2004).

The ideas of new public management were more relevant to the selected cases. These ideas shaped the way the International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for Conservation in Rome managed their mandates. All three changed their approach as a result of 'the wave of government re-engineering and market-state rebalancing that has swept across many countries in recent decades' (Kaul 2006, p.210). This is the elevation of public management ideas from national contexts to the international sphere. The changes have not been uniform across the cases in either application or in respect of how the organizations deal with private actors. The ideas all pass through the cultural lenses and are thus interpreted differently.

The third section of chapter seven considers how the factor of effective market-based practices applies to the different professional and organizational contexts. For partnerships to be effective with the International Telecommunication Union they need to conform to an engineered structure. Pragmatism is the cultural trait dictating what is or is not an effective partnership with the International Criminal Police Organization. Finally the International Centre for Conservation involves partnerships in all its activities, as a result, and in true academic style, efficiency and effectiveness prove to be contestable ideas.

Resources

Chapter eight builds on the theme of resources. This captures the factors of financial pressure and access to private sector research and development. The theme of resources goes beyond financial pressure to consider other resource types (i.e. human, knowledge and material resources). The chapter therefore explores the variety of resources contributing to successful public-private partnerships. This approach moves beyond purely financial resources, which is an important consideration because from the perspective of police professional culture, taking money can be seen as taboo.

The financial pressure on international government organizations originates in member-states. In recent decades, member-states have been under domestic financial pressures to relieve the burden on taxpayers. This pressure is easily externalized by reducing national spending in the international sphere. The result is permanent financial crisis within international government organizations. Added to this is how the expectations on international government organizations have grown, but not always commensurate with increased funding. This has been particularly relevant since the 1980s, when zero growth budgets forced the core United Nations agencies to look for alternative funding. However, there is a gap in the literature to explain why it took a decade for the organization to turn to private support. The professional culture of diplomacy inherent in the United Nations provides a frame for the hesitation, and the professional culture of policing helps to explain similar hesitancy in the International Criminal Police Organization.

The focus on outcome delivery has also led to some innovative approaches to non-financial resourcing through public-private partnerships. International government organizations also seek input from human resources they cannot otherwise muster. Chapter eight analyses the private human resources involved global public-private

Chapter 1

partnerships in terms of access to experts and volunteers. Both types of people are critical to the success of many partnerships.

Private knowledge resources, particularly research and development are central to many global public-private partnerships. Research and development, information or knowledge may only available from the private sphere. Partnerships may be the only means for an international government organization to access such resources. For example, information and data from the private sector about criminal enterprises may be volunteered through a partnership, but never for sale.

Chapter eight also considers the physical resources provided through global public-private partnerships. These range from the relatively simple, such as access to teaching facilities, to complicated computer systems. In all cases, the culture of each organization can influence what resources are considered acceptable and how they are to be used.

Global issues

Emerging global issues comprise the main theme for chapter nine. These issues are often beyond the ability of international government organization to deal with alone. Issues do not have to be new to be emerging, nor in fact do they have to be new to the policy agenda of the international government organization/s concerned. For example the ten principles agreed in the Global Compact all align to long standing norms of the United Nations, enshrined in various documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Emerging therefore refers to the growth of an issue in the international consciousness; the realization or understanding the issue is of international significance; and that it is beyond the scope of governments (as represented by their international organizations), market actors or civil society to solve alone.

A single issue for each organization, different to those in chapter four, has been selected as a case to examine the role of global public-private partnerships. The issues also illustrate how voices of dissent are an influence on the partnerships in two cases, thereby incorporating the factor of access and voice for private actors into the analysis. Dissenting voices are perceived differently by professions and their organizations. For the International Telecommunication Union, the issue is the debate over who controls the internet. While the organization has been at the heart of developments in transnational communications, the internet is not only a recent phenomenon, but one giving unprecedented voice to individuals who can now be heard on a global scale. Any

Across the public-private divide perceived threat to the freedom or independence of the internet gives rise to these voices. These individual protests present a challenge to the public and private partners involved in negotiating telecommunication regulations and standards, partners have not had to deal with such protests in relation to previous technological advances.

Intellectual property crime challenges the cultural values of policing because it is a civil law offence that has become criminalized in recent years. Overcoming the challenges associated with enforcing intellectual property crime eventually led to a sub-programme focussed on the dangers of counterfeit medical products, which in turn is generating its own sub-culture of health law enforcement. The resultant partnership – the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce – has come in for criticism from some civil society actors because its membership includes large pharmaceutical corporations. While the partnership was not formed to provide this type of voice to civil society actors it shows how even apparently altruistic moves to solve global issues can draw criticism.

The third case explores how the International Centre for Conservation has actively elevated privatization of cultural heritage to the global agenda, albeit targeted at the relatively small audience of heritage professionals. By hosting an international forum on the issue, the International Centre for Conservation actively sought the input of the private actors involved so they could contribute to the global discussion.

Concluding analysis and summary

The final chapter summarizes the empirical findings of the research and then applies the findings to the partnership cases described in chapter four. How culture motivates, maintains and inhibits partnerships is explored. In essence engineering and the organizational culture at the International Telecommunication Union have created a regime of maintenance for the public-private partnerships. The historical relationship between the Union and telecommunication industry has more or less settled into what works, and change is therefore unlikely. Historically, the policing culture has inhibited partnerships with outsiders. Even today this cultural trait still plays a factor, however other traits such as the organizational focus on providing services to operational police now overrides this inhibition. The professional culture of conservation, of which the International Centre for Conservation has been a key actor in developing, is a culture oriented toward cooperation and collaboration in all its activities. Therefore, conservation culture motivates partnerships.

Chapter 1

The conclusion offers some of the theoretical insights developed by this study. Key insights are those linked to the central thesis – cultures motivate partnerships and shape the way other motivating factors are perceived and acted upon. Another insight is that cultural alignment between partners is helpful, but not a key element to successful partnerships. This is illustrated by the diverse range of partners with different professional cultures working with the International Criminal Police Organization. These theoretical insights can inform practice within international government organizations. Those considering global public-private partnerships could benefit from a cultural analysis of their own organization and their potential partners.

2. Global Public-Private Partnerships

Chapter two develops the concepts used in this thesis and reviews the literature relevant to the research. The chapter begins with the concepts found in the thesis – global public-private partnerships, international government organizations, professional culture and organisational culture. This thesis fills a gap in this literature by adding professional and organisational cultures as key influences on the partnerships. Therefore, in addition to the global public-private partnership literature, the chapter discusses literature on these cultures, including a focus on the specific research related to the cultures within international government organizations and the professional cultures of engineers, police and conservators. Models outlining the characteristics of each of these cultures are developed as a basis for further analysis in the empirical chapters (Table 2-4, Table 2-5 and Table 2-6 below).

The chapter then develops an analytical framework from the literature. Global public-private partnerships are the subject of a new literature found in the research on global governance, which itself is part of the discipline of International Relations (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Bexell and Morth 2010b). Contributors to the new literature have used a number of factors (Table 1-1 on page 6) to explain why international government organizations have entered public-private partnerships (e.g. Buse and Walt 2000a, 2000b; Bull *et al.* 2004). Much of the explanation draws on the new public management literature (e.g. Hood 1991; Rhodes 1991, 1996; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). This is because public-private partnerships more generally have been a process associated with the way that states and markets have rebalanced their relationships in recent decades. From these literatures, four analytic themes are composed from the previously identified motivating factors. These themes are based on leaders, ideas, resources and global issues. In turn, these themes provide the basis for chapters six to nine respectively, and along with professional and organizational cultures (chapter five), comprise the overall analytical framework.

The chapter concludes by outlining a general model of the thesis. This model illustrates the influence of culture on the otherwise latent potential of the other factors which motivate global public-private partnerships; thereby providing a bridge between the theoretical and empirical work of this thesis.

Concepts

Concepts are eminently contestable. So for this dissertation the concepts central to the thesis – global public-private partnership, the international government organization, to the professional culture and finally the organizational culture – are defined below.

These definitions enable the dissertation to progress, leaving debates on the nuances within each concept for later research.

Global public-private partnerships

For this research a global public-private partnership is defined as *a relatively institutionalized transboundary interaction, which includes at least one global international government organization and private actors*. The categories of actors included in the definition are essential elements of a global public-private partnership, however other public actors such may also be involved. A partnership between the United Nations, Microsoft and the Danish Development Agency would therefore qualify.

The concept of global public-private partnership as defined above captures historic practices and arrangements not colloquially referred to as partnerships. This research accepts the consequential nature of the definition as it demonstrates these partnerships have a lineage beyond the recent academic interest. The definition has been developed after consideration of the various definitions available in the global public-private partnership literature. It is a modification of the definition articulated by Schäferhoff *et al.* (2009, p.453), which along with other definitions is discussed below.

Box 2-1 - Kaul's defining characteristics of global public-private partnerships

Voluntary - arising from the partners' self-interest.

Horizontally organized – maintaining partners' autonomy.

Participatory - with joint governance arrangements, which specifies issues that partners will consult or jointly decide on.

Multi-actor based - bringing together different actor groups, such as government and intergovernmental organizations, business, academia, civil society, and charitable philanthropic foundations.

Global - addressing issues or involving activities of worldwide reach and sometimes of multi-generational scope.

Source: Modified from Kaul 2006, p.222.

The concept of a *global public-private partnership* has been articulated in a number of ways. According to Kaul (2006, p.222) global public-private partnerships have five defining characteristics listed in Box 2-1 above.

A variation is the concept of *transnational* public-private partnerships. These arrangements are characterized as ‘relatively institutionalized transboundary interactions, which include public actors, such as governments and international organizations, and private actors’ (Schäferhoff *et al.* 2009, p.453). Alternately Doris Fuchs (2007) described the purpose of public-private partnerships as an instrument with which governmental actors could achieve public policy outcomes with the active cooperation of corporate and/or civil society organizations.

The problem for this research is how the broad use of the term *global* by Kaul and *transnational* by Schäferhoff *et al.* captures a swathe of partnership types. It is questionable whether such arrangements are truly global. For example, an arrangement between the governments of Eritrea and Mexico with the University of Arizona (see the list referred to by Kaul at UNDP 2006) is geographically dispersed, however it inadequately reflects the *global* element. Another closed definition comes from the significant work into the democratic aspects of global public-private partnerships published by the Transdemos Project. For this group, global public-private partnerships are:

Partnerships on public policy matters [which] are cooperative initiatives that expand the political authority of nonstate actors, whether profit oriented businesses or non-profit foundations and civil society organizations (Bexell and Mörth 2010a, p.6).

This definition provides a restriction to the examination of global public-private partnerships to those that ‘expand the political authority of non-state actors’. This then closes off analysis of partnerships that do not expand such ‘political authority’. Some of the partnerships described in the empirical part of this dissertation have political significance without expansion of private authority. To overcome the various definitional inadequacies, this research focuses on global public-private partnerships involving international government organizations with more than 100 member-states and no restrictions on membership.¹ This criterion is discussed further in chapter three.

¹ While often referred to as *universal* international government organizations, in this study those with 100+ member states have a *global* characteristic and are thus referred to as global international government organizations.

Chapter 2

The range of actors

At this point it becomes necessary to identify the range of actors in global public-private partnerships. Although it is not an exhaustive list, Table 2-1 incorporate all classes of actors discovered either in the literature or through the fieldwork component of this research. For clarity, the differentiation between a public and private individual as transnational actor can be seen in the manner Bill Clinton uses his role as a former United States President, whereas Bill Gates relies on the status he built as a businessman.

Table 2-1 - Actors in global public-private partnerships

Public Actors		Private Actors	
Actor Type	Example	Actor Type	Example
IGO		Business	
Global	United Nations	Multi-national corporations	Coca-Cola
Regional	Organization of American States	Local businesses	Domestic coffee growers
Inter-regional	Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization	Civil Society	
Governments		NGO	Greenpeace
National	Italian Government	Philanthropies	Ford Foundation
Sub-national	Government of Sicily	Faith based organizations	Catholic Church
Local	City of Rome	Associations	FIFA
Other		Other	
Academia	University of Oslo, Museum of Cultural History	Academia	Getty Research Institute
Individuals	Bill Clinton	Individuals	Bill Gates

Source: compiled from Cutler *et al.* (eds) 1999; Erman and Uhlin (eds) 2010; Karns and Mingst 2004; and UIA 2011.

Partnership types

The multitude of actor types involved in global public-private partnerships and the divergent issues they address has resulted in a variety of partnership types. Bull *et al.* (2004) describe five types of partnership including policy dialogue, advocacy, mobilizing private funds, information and learning partnerships and operations (Table 2-2). While the examples presented in Table 2-2 fit the dominant type, partnerships can include more than one category. For example, a partnership between the International

Centre for Conservation and the Getty Conservation Institute will include an advocacy role, information and learning through training programmes, as well as field operations.

Table 2-2 - Partnership typology

Partnership Type	Definition - Example
Resource mobilization	
(a) Multilateral fundraising (ongoing)	<i>Permanent fundraising partnership</i> – The World Food Programme receives more than US\$100 million via private donations annually. The US non-profit Friends of the WFP donated US\$26 million in 2011.
(b) Channelled private funds	<i>Targeted sponsorship for specific projects</i> – The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) effort to support microcredit for small to medium enterprises in the developing world.
Advocacy	<i>Partnerships raising awareness about global issues</i> – On-line campaigns (NetAid run by the UNDP and Cisco systems); prizes (UNESCO and L’Oreal’s Women in Science Prize); or international days, years or even decades linked to UN activities.
Policy Dialogue	<i>Partners working formally and informally to implement policy change in international organizations, government and corporations</i> – UN Global Compact aims to align policies and values with ten principles related to human rights, labour rights, the environment and anti-corruption.
Operational	<i>Partnerships designed to address problems that cannot be solved by market mechanisms, state intervention or civil society activity alone</i> –The World Health Organization partnership with the Gates Foundation and others to control the spread and effect of malaria.
Informational and learning	<i>Joint efforts to share research and learning</i> – The World Bank Business Partners for Development linking 120 business, civil society and government agencies in a global learning network.

Source: compiled from Bull *et al.* 2004, pp.482-483; Bull and McNeill 2007, pp.12-20; and WFP USA 2011.

The typology presented by Bull *et al.* (2004) is more robust than Paun’s (2013, pp.30-35), which described contractual arrangements as partnerships. As a result, this study will rely on Table 2-2 used in conjunction with the definition of global public-private partnership given above.

International government organizations

This thesis adopts the definition of international government organization outlined by Volgy *et al.* (2008a). The definition includes 11 characteristics (listed below) and represents the pinnacle thus far in efforts to develop a robust definition. The following outlines the development of the concept in International Relations.

Classical International Relations theory, commonly referred to as realism, dominated the investigation of international politics throughout the 20th century (George 1994).

Chapter 2

Central to realist thought is the privileged position of nation-states as the principal actor in international relations (For an account of realist thought, see Morgenthau 1967). Academic scrutiny of international government organizations in this era tended to limit itself to books and articles that simply reported the activities of the organizations (for example Anon. 1964a, 1964b, 1964c; Department of State 1958). The state-to-state focus ignored many transnational interactions occurring on a daily basis between individuals, corporations, multiple levels of government and civil society. In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars such as Cox (1969) and Keohane and Nye (1974, 1977) began to challenge the realist assumption that the study of relationships between nations should be limited to the study of state interactions. By broadening the discipline with alternatives to the realist approach, Keohane and Nye paved a way for closer scrutiny of non-state actors such as international government organizations. Thus with a wider scope, International Relations scholars began to theorize on what international government organizations were and how they operated within the global system (for example see the edited volume of Cox and Jacobson 1974).

Historically, international government organizations are a cooperative extension of member-states into the international arena. Since the Treaty of Vienna established the rules of diplomacy in 1815, international conferences provided a forum for nations to represent their interests in a focussed manner (Reinalda and Verbeek 2011, p.88). Conference outcomes, often a treaty or convention, were drafted to address the immediate concerns of participating nations. These *ad hoc* conferences ended once agreement was reached between parties (Amerasinghe 2005, pp. 1-2). While these arrangements suited issues of high politics – for example the termination of international hostilities (Westphalia 1648 or Vienna 1815) – they were less adequate to address low-level matters. Complex multi-state issues such as the rapid development of both transport and communication technology were beyond the scope or capabilities of traditional diplomacy, bilateral agreements or the *ad hoc* conferences (Mansbach *et al.* [1976] 2006). These issues necessitated the ongoing monitoring of convention outcomes. Thus from the early 19th century, international conferences began to establish permanent international secretariats to fulfil this function.

International government organizations concerned with inter-state communication and transport were typical of the 19th century organizations. From the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (1815) to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (1899), six of the nine oldest international government organizations deal with transport or

communication. The remaining three – the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875), the International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs (1890) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration – focused on trade related issues (UIA 2001a, 2001b). The establishment of the League of Nations (1919) marked the first international government organization with a political agenda (Reinalda and Verbeek 2011). Since then, international government organizations have developed to become an integral part of the international system (Keohane and Nye 1974, 40). By the early 21st century, more than 250 international government organizations provide member-states with forums to discuss issues as diverse as coffee production and pricing, telecommunication and patent standards, and global security. It can therefore be seen these organizations touch on our daily lives, often invisibly but always there. So, theoretically, what factors distinguish these organizations?

Recent International Relations theory has attempted to list international government organizations with a formalized typology of characteristics. A refined typology has been produced by Volgy *et al.* (2008a), who identify international government organizations as having the following characteristics:

1. A minimum of three member-states
2. Membership dominated by nation-states, non-state members have no veto
3. Member-state representation by central governments or their sub-units
4. Rules of governance specified by charter
5. Routine meetings held at regular intervals, at least every four years
6. A permanent headquarters or secretariat
7. At least two permanent headquarters/secretariat staff paid by the organizations
8. Secretariat staff independent of any other international government organization or single state
9. A sufficient budget to cover minimal staffing and operations
10. Routinely identifiable and regularly available funding
11. Majority funding not controlled by another international government organization or one state.

The Volgy *et al.* (2008a) typology is the definition used in this thesis as it provides a more robust set of criteria than those used elsewhere (see for example Amerasinghe 2005; Karns and Mingst 2004; Pevehouse *et al.* 2004; Wallace and Singer 1970; UIA 2011). The above criteria are used as a tool to identify the three subject organizations of this research, further discussion of the typology can be found in chapter three.

Defining cultures

The concept of culture features in many ways throughout this thesis. There is professional culture and organizational culture dealt with in detail below. To these analytical concepts – or motivating factors of global public-private partnerships – can be added multi-culturalism, cultural heritage, macro-cultures and so forth. In this thesis, culture is defined as *a collection of common beliefs, values, norms and assumptions that guide group behaviour*. This definition then forms the basis of the more specific forms of culture, which are discussed below.

The definition of culture used in this thesis draws from several sources. The subtitle of Hofstede's (1997) book provides possibly the briefest definition of culture – it is *the software of the mind*. In other words, culture is the operating system that programmes the way a person responds to problems in a specific context. The cultural software is made up of beliefs, values, norms of behaviour and basic assumptions pertinent to specific social groups, which provides the context (Hofstede 1997, 2001; Hofstede *et al.* 1990; Ott 1989; Schein 2010). These social groups include nations, ethnic communities, religious groups, organizations and professions (Schein 2010, p.6). The beliefs, values, norms and assumptions are transmitted to new members through processes of socialization – creating an institutional memory capable of both remembering and forgetting what is important to a social group (Douglas 1986). Transmission can be through both formal instruction or through informal means like observation and mimicry.

To the beliefs, values, norms and assumptions can be added the anthropological markers of culture – language, myths, heroes and symbols (Geertz 1973; Pettigrew 1979). Myths are the stories told of events with seminal meaning to the group as a vehicle to socialize members into the common beliefs and values (Martin *et al.* 1983; Pettigrew 1979). Heroes are members of the group who exemplarize the values and norms. Heroes can be living or dead, real or mythical whose common trait is that other group members aspire to emulate them – or at least be seen in their own eyes or those of other members of the group, as fitting into the heroic mould (Hofstede 1997, 2001; Pettigrew 1979). In essence, all these characteristics form the filter in which individuals perceive the world, these are perceptual controls, which introduce a cultural bias to the way everything is perceived (Douglas 1978, 1982, p.1). While this research did not set out as an in depth anthropological analysis of the cultures (see chapter three on the research design), these

features are used herein as observable cultural characteristics to help analyze beliefs and values.

A final note worth making here on culture is that conformity to one culture is not necessarily an exercise of exclusivity. People are often members of multiple social groups and the various cultures can have a layered effect, which Hofstede (1997, p.9) likened to an onion. For example, a person can be an Australian catholic-school teacher doing volunteer work on weekends. In this person is embedded the cultural influences of nation, profession, religion and local community. Dependent on the immediate context, the teacher can switch between culturally appropriate behaviours.

Professional culture

Building on the definition of culture above, professional culture is defined in this thesis as *the collection of common beliefs, values, norms and assumptions that guide the behaviour of members of a profession within their professional sphere*. To understand how professional culture is differentiated from other forms of culture we need to unpack the terms *profession* and *professional sphere*.

Professions are certain occupations or vocations with a socially elevated status and professionals are the practitioners. This elevation is achieved through professionalization, a term which describes how occupations gain the status of profession through a series of overlapping processes – socialization through the creation of professional organizations; autonomy as practitioners gaining control over the work they do; education and training through the development of standards and accreditation; developing a code of ethics (values and beliefs); and professional authority through ‘political agitation to gain public support for the claim of professional status and for affiliation with, and regulation by, the state (Bloor and Dawson 1995, p.281; Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933; Larson 1977; Wilensky 1964). At the heart of this process is the occupational specialty (for example medicine, engineering or law), which sets the profession apart from other occupations or related professions.

Once professional status is achieved, a level of trust usually then exists between the profession and broader society. Anyone making claim to a profession is technically proficient, endorsed by their peers and importantly, can be trusted to be an impartial practitioner dedicated to the correct exercise of their skills and knowledge. This dedication to profession should outweigh other concerns (Carr-Saunders and Wilson

Chapter 2

1933, pp.298-307; Wilensky 1964, p.138). The result of professionalizing an occupation, and then of new individuals choosing the profession, is the creation of a professional culture.

The *professional sphere* encompasses the areas in which professionals operate in relation to their profession. This includes places they carry out their profession, within their associations, where they advocate on behalf of themselves and their professional colleagues and within professional organizations. According to Ott (1989, p.80), 'many organizations are dominated by people from certain professions ... To the extent that an organization (or part of an organization) is dominated by a profession, its organizational culture will be shaped at least partially by that professional culture.' Schein (2010, p.2) also acknowledges how professional cultures can transcend organizations. This means organizational culture is not free of the influence of professional culture. Where the two cultures are deeply entwined, the self-perception becomes one of *professional organization*, a term used in later chapters by interviewees to describe their organizations. With this in mind, it is time to define and examine the concept of organizational culture.

Organizational culture

For this thesis, organizational culture is defined as *the collection of common beliefs, values, norms and assumptions that guide the collective behaviour of individuals within an organization.*

A certain degree of caution is needed when applying theories of organizational culture to international government organizations. Most work originates from American business schools like Stanford (Hatch 1993, 2010; Martin 1992, 2002; Martin et al. 1983; Siehl & Martin 1984) or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (van Maanen 1975; Schein 1985, 2010). While much of this work is applicable to public as well as private organizations, the business orientation and profit motive shades the culture of the organizations these schools have studied.

There are several typologies outlining what constitutes a feature, element, trait or characteristic of organizational culture. Pettigrew (1979) began with a series of anthropological features mentioned above, and a similar typology has been used by Hofstede (1997, 2001) and his colleagues (Hofstede *et al.* 1990). Ott (1989, p.53) goes much further, describing 73 elements of organizational culture. It would be difficult in

the context of a single PhD dissertation to properly analyse each of Ott's elements for three organizations. Furthermore, not all of Ott's elements were observed. Therefore, the definition above is influenced by reflections within this dissertation on actual observations, or from evidence based on the author's lived experience.² The definition used in this research links broad elements common throughout and is structured in a similar fashion to the definition of professional culture for consistency.

The definitions of professional and organizational cultures presented here are for the purpose of introducing and defining the concepts. Both professional and organizational culture within the context of the case international government organizations and their dominant profession are discussed in the following section.

Other uses of the term culture common to this thesis are cultural heritage and multiculturalism. In the adjectival form, cultural heritage is the description of the movable and immovable artefacts which are created by different cultural groups which reflect their collected beliefs, values and norms. According to Daifuku (1968, p.19), moveable cultural property consists of works of art including books, manuscripts and other objects of artistic, historic or archaeological origin, which includes scientific collections. Daifuku goes on to differentiate immovable cultural property, which includes monuments of architecture, art or history, archaeological sites and buildings of historic or artistic interest. Multiculturalism is used to describe spheres in which multiple national cultures operate together. The term multiculturalism in this research refers to the spheres where this works relatively successfully, although tensions, friction, conflicts and violence along national cultural lines are acknowledged.

Having outlined the abstract concepts of culture, and in particular professional and organizational culture, it is now necessary to go below these levels of abstraction. What follows is a review of the literature which considers professional and organizational cultures in international government organizations, including research which delves deeper into these organizations, rather than considering them as simple 'monoliths' (Weller and Xu 2010; Xu and Weller 2009). Going further still, the dominant professional cultures for the organizations selected as the case studies of this research – engineering, policing and conservation – are then outlined. The method to select these

² This experience is detailed in the preface. Conscious of these circumstances, balance has been pursued wherever possible. In some instances, no attempt has been made to detail even a well understood aspect of culture in the International Criminal Police Organization, as there is nothing known or found during the research to compare it to from the other organizations.

Chapter 2

cases from the hundreds in international government organizations is described in chapter three, and a detailed discussion of their origins, structure and governance is in chapter four. At this point though, it is both useful to describe these professional and organizational cultures as examples of the theoretical constructs outlined above and to also lay them down as foundations for the rest of this research.

Culture in international government organizations

There is a gap in the specific literature on global public-private partnerships, which this thesis fills. The gap is the paucity of consideration given to professional and organizational culture as factors motivating and shaping global public-private partnerships. There are exceptions to this. For example, Steffek (2010, p.67) asserts that little theorizing has been undertaken into why international government organizations are interacting more closely with the private sector. Most work ceases once it reaches hypotheses based in rational choice economics, particularly in regard to the resource needs of the international government organizations. Steffek (2010) focussed on how and why international government organizations have opened up to civil society in thirty-two cases. His work tested two hypotheses. Firstly, 'institutionalized cooperation between IOs³ and non-state actors is determined by the benefits that both sides, but in particular IOs, expect to reap from it' and secondly, 'cooperation is particularly likely to occur in policy fields where the [international government organizations] need for external resources are particularly urgent' (Steffek 2010, p.68).

Steffek's (2010) second hypothesis, using policy fields as a lens, views international government organizations beyond the way they are routinely classified as international bureaucracies with a relatively similar outlook (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Deflem 2000), or alternately as agent to state principals (Cortell and Peterson 2006; Martin 2006; Milner 2006). By comparing two international government organizations in each of four policy fields,⁴ Steffek analyzed the resource support civil society organizations could provide to the international government organizations. However, his analysis omits partnerships with the for-profit sector or the philanthropic arms of civil society. This leaves a rather incomplete picture.

³ IOs = international organizations, a term often confused with IGOs – international government organizations. In his chapter, Steffek clearly uses IO as a substitute for IGO.

⁴ The United Nations Environmental Programme and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in the field of environmental politics; the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the Council of Europe in human rights protection; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in security; and the International Monetary Fund and Bank of International Settlements in finance.

The use of policy fields as a focus for analysis highlights the differences between international government organizations. From this point of view they are not unitary actors or international bureaucracies operating in the same manner. This focus can be further sharpened by incorporating theories of professional culture. While policy fields may be the same, for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the International Criminal Police Organization are both in the field of security, the professional culture of the military is different to the culture of law enforcement (Skolnick 1966, 1994). This thesis argues such cultural differences help to explain why international government organizations approach partnerships in different ways. Before considering professional and organizational cultures in the literature, the factors and themes which emerged in the literature are considered in greater detail.

In the wider literature on international government organizations, the cultural factors are largely absent, again with exceptions (for example Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Weller and Xu 2010; Xu and Weller 2009). It is reasonable to deduce the reason for the gap is because these organizations represent a blending together of most, or potentially all known national cultures – professional and organizational cultures appear to have been, in the main, excluded from analysis along with the national cultures. Multi-lateral organizations such as the United Nations are literally in the business of recognizing new nations, which, among other things, are culturally different from the current group of countries.

Barnett and Finnemore (2004, pp.20-25) described how expert authority is important to the rule-setting behaviour of international government organizations. Expert authority refers to the trust placed in international government organizations to perform specialist tasks requiring commensurate skills – ‘we want nuclear proliferation monitored by physicists and engineers who know about nuclear weapons’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p.24). For the three cases herein, broader society entrusts telecommunication in the hands of engineers who understand the complexities of global communications; criminal law enforcement to police professionals; and the restoration of cultural property in the hands of conservators. Thus we can see a strong parallel between expert authority and professional culture.

Another insight offered on expert authority is ‘professional training, norms and occupational cultures strongly shape the way experts view the world’ and expertise ‘shapes the way these organizations behave’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p.24). This

Chapter 2

recognizes how after creation, international government organizations take on characteristics of their own – characteristics beyond being simply tools of the states which created them. Over time specific organizational cultures emerge. These cultures are unique to each organization, even when they operate in the same policy fields. Similar findings in private enterprise have been noted by Geert Hofstede *et al.* (1990) in their sociological studies of organizations.

There are many more types and layers of culture in an organization and no two international government organizations are alike. The layers of culture found in an international government organization include particular cultural traits of an individual such as their religion, ethnic background, gender or ideological outlook (Weiss 1975, p. 60); the national cultures of employees (Lemoine 1995, p.44); to a greater or lesser extent the local culture of where the secretariat is physically located (I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011); the culture associated with the international civil service (Lemoine 1995; Weiss 1975); the professional culture affiliated with the policy field in which the organization operates (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Steffek 2010); and the culture unique to an organization itself (Hofstede *et al.* 1990; Hofstede 1997, 2001; Schein 2010). Researchers have recognized cultural traits are also shaped to one degree or another by the historical environment in which the organization has evolved.

Table 2-3 - Categories of culture

Culture	Category
Macro-cultures	Nations, ethnic and religious groups, <i>occupations that exist globally</i>
Organizational cultures	Private, public, non-profit, government organizations
Sub-cultures	Occupational groups within organizations
Micro-cultures	Microsystems within or outside organizations

Source: Schein 2010, p.2 - emphasis added.

Schein (2010, pp.1-5) categorizes culture in four levels: macro-cultures, organizational cultures, sub-cultures and micro-cultures. Table 2-3 shows Schein's typology. While Schein's work concentrates on occupations as sub-cultures, his recognition of certain global occupations as macro-cultures provides an analytical perspective for this dissertation.

In contrast to the differences found by Hofstede *et al.* (1990), institutional isomorphism helps explain similarities in organizations. Theories of institutional isomorphism indicate distinct similarities can be drawn from different organizations when examining different criteria at different levels (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Park (2012, 2013)

used institutional isomorphism to explain similarities in the accountability mechanisms in the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the Asian Development Bank. The latter has a formal structure similar to the World Bank and other development banks. The accountability mechanisms within the Asian Development Bank are more closely aligned to the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the source of many of senior staff of the Asian Development Bank. This analysis demonstrates the additional importance of macro-cultures in determining the how an international government organization operates. Macro-cultures influence on global public-private partnerships is analyzed in chapter five.

Professional culture provides for similarities in organizations within the same field of activity – telecommunication, law enforcement and those found in the academic disciplines associated with conservation and preservation practices. Layered over this is the professional culture associated with the international civil service. Weiss argues that ‘the characteristics of the international civil service as envisioned by its theoreticians included international loyalty, independence, impartiality, and the ability and commitment to serve the global community. These qualities make up what [has been] called an “international outlook”’ (Weiss 1975, pp.41-42). This layering of international civil service culture creates differences between professional culture at the national and international levels. It marks the difference between civil servants working in a mono-cultural environment with national interests at heart and those working in a multi-cultural environment seeking consensus among clientele and constituents, maintaining relevance in a changing global environment and developing the poorer nations to enable them to better represent their own needs in the international arena.

While organizational culture and professional culture are related, they are different things. Bloch (1986, p.260) describes organizational culture as ‘the ideology of an organization: a collection of ideas and beliefs which motivate, guide, and inform the actions of individuals within an organization.’ A more detailed definition describes organizational culture as ‘a set of shared norms, values and perceptions, which develop when the members of an organization interact with each other and the surroundings. It is holistic, historically determined, socially constructed, and difficult to change’ (Bloors and Dawson 1995; Glomseth *et al.* 2007; Hofstede *et al.* 1990).

These can then be used to differentiate the way organizations operate within the same field. For example, IBM has a distinctly different organizational culture to Hewlett

Chapter 2

Packard, even though both are in the field of producing computers (Hofstede *et al.* 1990; Hofstede 1997, 2001). The tools of organizational cultural analysis could therefore be used to distinguish between international government organizations within the same field (for example comparing the operation of the United Nations Development Programme to the International Fund for Agricultural Development).

Professional culture, as defined previously, enables mobility within a sector. For example, a police officer seconded to the International Criminal Police Organization will find familiarity in the cultural norms and values of the organization, despite changes in environment and processes. The same can be said for an academic moving from university to university where they need to adjust to the *organizational* culture, but their *professional* culture remains familiar (Bourdieu 1988, p.36-7; Clark 1987, pp.109-122; Parsons and Platt 1973, p.113). Professional culture therefore penetrates organizations, seeking similarity along professional lines in different organizations while highlighting difference between international government organizations previously characterized as international bureaucracies. This is not to claim professional culture has a greater influence on individuals than their own macro-cultural origins drawn from their native nation, history or socialization. What professional culture does is provide common ground for those in the policy field or professional sphere.

Engineers – a culture of science and society

The profession of engineering has a long history. It is well known engineers helped create and sustain the Roman Empire, and craft practices developed then are still in use today (Florman 1987, p.46). During the European Renaissance, engineering became married to principles of scientific enquiry such as observation and experimentation, which helped to reinforce engineering practice and extend its scope, thereby contributing to the modern world (Florman 1987, p.47). Recent literature has painted the profession of engineering as male dominated (Leonardi 2003; Robinson and McIlwee 1991), although this is challenged in both reality and the literature (Zavrel 2011). What we are left with are three viewpoints of what engineers are: the science practitioner (as opposed to theorists or those constrained to lab experimentation only), the contributor to society and the ‘macho’ individual. Each of these versions has its own cultural features, with some overlap. These are detailed in Table 2-4.

It is clear that a commitment to principles of science and technology cuts across all viewpoints of what it is to be an engineer. This cultural feature provides a strong link

between the public and private sectors. Engineering culture has a commitment to science and technology and is therefore a natural fit for research and development partnerships.

Table 2-4 - Features of engineering culture

Viewpoint	Cultural Features
Science practitioner (Bloch; Sharp <i>et al.</i>)	Application of science; Working within structure; Predictability; Permanent anticipation of technological advances and solution; Passion for creating artefacts that help shape and sustain a world full of the complexity and richness of human life.
Contributor to society (Florman)	Commitment to science and to the values that science demands - independence and originality, dissent and freedom and tolerance; A comfortable familiarity with the forces that prevail in the physical universe; A belief in hard work, not for its own sake, but in the quest for knowledge and understanding and in the pursuit of excellence; Willingness to forego perfection, recognizing that we have to get real and useful products "out the door"; Willingness to accept responsibility and risk failure; Resolve to be dependable; Commitment to social order, along with a strong affinity for democracy; Seriousness that we hope will not become glumness; Passion for creativity, a compulsion to tinker, and a zest for change.
'Macho' individual (Hacker; Leonardi; Robinson & McIlwee)	An ideology that stresses the centrality of technology, and of engineers as producers of technology; The acquisition of organizational power as the base of engineering success; a self-centered "macho" belief in the value of engineers; Highly regulated/bureaucratic when working for government; Less regulated/bureaucratic in private enterprise.

Source: compiled from Bloch 1986; Florman 1987, p.76; Leonardi 2003, p.2; Robinson and McIlwee 1991, pp.409-410; Sharp *et al.* 2000, p.40-1.

Pragmatic creativity is the second most common theme. Florman (1987, p.76), a civil engineer, describes a 'passion for creativity', which is matched by Sharp *et al.* (2000, pp.40-41), who are software engineers. Yet the 'passion' is tempered by the need to 'get real and useful products "out the door"' in the form of 'artefacts' which ultimately benefit society (Florman 1987, p.76). This pragmatic approach to creativity ensures the engineering system in place balances the creativity of new technologies with the practical need to get them to where they will do the most benefit for society.

Chapter 2

Interestingly, Florman's description of engineers having a 'compulsion to tinker' is reflected in the seemingly endless reviews and re-writes of the Convention and Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union discussed in chapter four. Carr and Saunders (1933, pp.159) noted 'many constitutional changes' within Constitution of the Institution of Civil Engineers – a peak body from which other engineering associations have developed. However, such a compulsion is noted elsewhere in the literature on international government organizations by Farley, who stated 'the urge to tinker with organizational structures has been carried over to the realm of international organizations with a vengeance' (Farley 1981, p.137). Comparing the number of significant constitutional alterations in the Telecommunication Union with the other two organizations illustrates even within the realm of international government organizations, the engineers make many more changes to their organization. Of course these changes are also linked to the numerous technological developments in telecommunication.

There is one final note before exploring police culture. The literature focussed on the male domination of engineering (Hacker 1981; Leonardi 2003; Robinson and McIlwee 1991; Zavrel 2011) noted engineers working on government projects either directly, or through contracted firms had limited scope in their freedom to research and experiment. A similar regulatory environment exists at the international level. So an underlying cultural assumption for engineers attracted to public service is that they are comfortable working within regulatory confines.

Police culture – good cop and bad cop

Police culture is slightly more problematic than either engineering (above) or conservation (below). This is because the term 'police culture' is often used to describe negative aspects of police activity such as corruption, excessive use of force, racism, secrecy, unaccountability, sexism and other problems (Chan 2009; Glomseth *et al.* 2007; Kiely and Peek 2002; Metz and Kulik 2008; Prenzler 1997). While neither engineering or conservators have spotless records – for examples the thousands of engineers in the weapons industry; or conservators described as 'brutal' in their approach by art historians (Beck and Daley 1993) – police culture is often considered synonymous with negativity. These aspects cannot be ignored, particularly as they are often related to other aspects of a broader police culture. As a consequence of this, Table 2-5 incorporates a moral divide between what can be perceived as 'good' aspects of police culture, the 'bad' aspects and those cutting across this divide.

Table 2-5 - Features of police culture

Positive features	Contested features	Negative features
Rule of law	Pragmatism	Bias
Fighting crime	Masculinism	Brutality
Problem solving	Solidarity	Anti-intellectualism
Task orientation	Para militarism	Racism
Team Culture	Insider/outsider	Sexism
Autonomy		Self-protection / closed ranks
<i>Esprit de corps</i>		Excessive violence
Maintenance of authority		Secrecy
Tradition		Corruption
Bureaucracy		Politicization

Source: compiled from Bevir 2010; Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010, pp.187-190, 200, 203-4; Deflem 2000, 2002b; Fielding 1988, p.45; Glomseth *et al.* 2007, pp.101, 103; Metz and Kulik 2008; and Prenzler 1997.

The range of negative cultural features is part of a literature on police culture dating back to the civil unrest of the 1960s, particularly in the United States, (see Skolnick 1966). Academics, judicial and executive bodies have closely scrutinized the negative features of police culture both nationally (Prenzler 1997) and internationally (Chan 2009; Sheptycki 1998). This scrutiny has led to a better understanding of how some of the more positive and contested features – such as the para-militaristic socialization of recruits during police training – could lead to a positive outcome (*esprit de corps*); a contested outcome (insider/outsider worldview); or a negative outcome (closure of ranks against external scrutiny) (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010, pp.189-200; Monjardet 1994). It is therefore necessary to acknowledge the full range of features of police culture when determining which have an impact on global public-private partnerships.

Police in a Western (or global north) context are sufficiently autonomous from the military organizations in which many have their roots. This separation is incomplete, as exemplified by the French *Gendarmerie* or the Italian *Carabinieri*. However, in the context of this work, police culture is the culture of organizations concerned primarily with the internal (domestic) monopoly on the use of force for the state, whereas the military are concerned with the external (international) monopoly (Weber 1947, pp.146-147; Anderson 1989, pp.13-14). Police culture has inherited many of the cultural values and habits found in military culture – such as rank structures and training procedures (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010; Fielding 1988; Monjardet 1994). However, the key difference is the focus on the rule of law.

Chapter 2

Although there are universal cultural similarities between police services, the degree to which they are applicable changes with national, regional or even local contexts. While themes such as ‘insider/outsider’ are apparently universal, in some contexts they are being altered by concepts such as community oriented policing (Bevir 2010; Fielding 1988; Kiely and Peek 2002) However, this change is unevenly applied. For example, in the Anglo-American context there is a vast gulf between the inclusiveness expressed by an English police officer in a rural location toward his community and a tactical response officer in a major American city (Fielding 1988).

While difficult for cultures to change, it is possible. The aforementioned reviews of the negative aspects of police culture drove cultural change in many police services. Concepts such as teams instead of bureaucratic hierarchies, problem solving approaches to communities and task orientation began to complement the traditional and paramilitaristic approach to policing, particularly in the Anglo-American context (Bevir 2010; Deflem 2000; Kiely and Peek 2002; Metz and Kulik 2008). In Britain, new public management reforms were applied to police (Bevir 2010, p.234), which in turn provided the catalyst for the International Criminal Police Organization to change. This is detailed in later chapters.

Conservation culture – both inside and outside the ivory tower

Conservation of cultural heritage combines features of academic disciplines and a practical profession. Over the years conservation has developed its own professional culture (see ICOM 1984). The professional culture of the conservator draws aspects of academic culture from a multitude of academic disciplines (Keck 1964, 1978; Stout 1975). Conservation culture is founded on the belief that the conservators’ work must be done in a scientific manner that does not adversely impact the cultural significance of the object being treated (ICOM 1984; Keck 1964, 1978; Stout 1975). All other considerations are secondary to this goal.

Academic culture has developed a strong set of values over the centuries. Adams (1998, p.427) listed the values of autonomy, freedom of inquiry, an opportunity to contribute to knowledge, flexibility and the prestige of being an academic. This broadens earlier work by Dill (1982, pp.308-310) who broached the subject with an organizational cultural approach. Dill included academic cultural traits of shared traditions within specific institutions, collegiality, tenure and the effect of disciplinary cultures breaking down barriers existing between institutions. This changes the

emphasis on an academic's self-perception. For example, a member of the Harvard faculty (institutional emphasis), now perceives themselves as a sociologist (disciplinary emphasis) who is currently at Harvard (Dill 1982, p.311). Such ties to discipline are important in creating academic and professional communities with unique cultural traits.

The rise of discipline-specific culture has been noted outside the Anglo-American context demonstrating its ability to cross other cultural barriers. Examples include medical students from Iran sharing the same traditions and values as their counter-parts in other parts of the world (Bikmoradi *et al.* 2009); or the language of science enabling Chinese trained academics to function well in the UK (Jiang *et al.* 2010). Outside the hard sciences, there are dangers of cultural hegemony, as social scientists in Hong Kong are pressured to conform to Western approaches to their research (Lin 2009). Of course, whether viewed through an institutional or disciplinary lens, the academy is subjected to the culture of 'publish or perish' (Lin 2009), which imposes time restrictions on the values of freedom, flexibility and autonomy outlined above.

Due to the relatively small size of the profession, much of the specific literature on what makes a conservator is directly or indirectly linked to the International Centre for Conservation. This literature can be divided into two specific periods, pre and post 1984. Before 1984, members of the profession asked themselves what it meant to be a conservator. George Stout, one of the 'Fogg Founding Fathers' of scientific conservation described their position thus:

we conservators of art are a strange company, an odd assortment, difficult to define. Scientists who wear the standard brands must look upon us as mavericks, mongrels. Art historians obviously regard us as heavy handed meddlers. Here and there are left a few collectors and curators that treat us as if we were extortioners who've got to be bribed in order to avoid scandal. They push us into dingy corners where nobody else is willing to work, and they let out a mournful howl if we ask for enough equipment to do a decent job (Stout 1975, p.3).

Similar sentiments were repeated by another long-term conservator, Caroline K. Keck, who noted a divide between the conservation scientist buried in research and the conservation practitioner with their hands on approach (Keck 1978). Furthermore Keck observed the lack of a vocational identity and how until conservators resolved the dichotomy between scientists and practitioners, they could 'not lay claim to professional authority' (Keck 1978, p.4). Notably both Stout and Keck were members of the

Chapter 2

International Institute for Conservation – a long-term partner of the International Centre for Conservation.

Conservators heeded Keck's appeal. In 1984, the International Council of Museums issued *The Conservator-Restorer: A Definition of the Profession* (ICOM 1984). The document, based on initial work done by the International Centre for Conservation, distinguished the conservator from related professions – like curators or art historians – and outlined the professional standards. Since 1984, aside from the contribution of some art historians who still regard conservators as Stout's 'heavy-handed meddlers' (see Beck and Daley 1993), the conservation literature has remained silent on what it means to be conservator. Therefore Table 2-6 maps the features of conservation culture drawing from academic culture and the professional definition.

Table 2-6 - Features of conservator culture

From academia	From the profession
Research orientation	Focus on the cultural objects
Freedom of inquiry	Interdisciplinary profession
Contribution to knowledge	Cooperation / collaboration in every project
Prestige of being an academic	
Publish or perish	

Source: compiled from Adams 1998; Clark 1987; Dill 1982; ICOM 1984; and Lin 2009.

The focus on the cultural object is highlighted by the fact that six of the eight professional activities listed in *The Conservator/Restorer* relate directly to the cultural object. The conservator must be responsible for the way objects are treated; preserve the physical integrity of the object to retain its documentary value; be aware of what the documentary value is; intervene in the object only in accordance with a scientific methodology; consider the consequences of each manipulation of the object; and apply manual skills coupled with theoretical knowledge when working directly on the object. The remaining activities frame the necessity to collaborate closely with curator and other professionals as well as across disciplines (ICOM 1984, art. 3). Almost a generation has passed since the International Council of Museums issued the definition of a conservator. Thus it is reasonable to accept the formalized requirements have been accepted by the profession and now form the professional cultural understanding of who a conservator is.

Both professional and organizational cultures are not static. As Farley (1981, p.113) described, change to international organizations come from without, and this includes

their cultures. Therefore, in addition to the existing literature, we need to consider the literature on new public management and global governance. Changes associated with new public management at the national level have informed the way governments have behaved in recent decades. These changes have gone on to influence the manner in which international government organizations have themselves changed as well.

Governance at the national and international level

Global public-private partnerships are a mechanism of what is rather loosely termed global governance. Attention to the phenomena at an international level is at least a decade behind research into public-private partnerships at the national level, which have been the subject of serious academic scrutiny for more than two decades (Oliver 1990). Research on public-private partnerships at the national level is included in the literature on the new public management, which is the study of the rebalancing of the roles of the market and the state (see Hodge and Greve 2008, 2010; Hood 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Rhodes 1996). This section will therefore look at the older literature on new public management and public-private partnerships before exploring how the concept has translated into the study of global governance. The final section of this chapter will then examine the analytical themes of this research drawn from these literatures.

New public management: national frameworks with global relevance

The precise role of government in the management and delivery of services to society remains a changing and flexible concept. In Britain particularly, government assumed greater responsibility in a range of areas throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Examples of this included the nationalization of the British telegraph network in 1870 (Hurdeman 2003, p.106), or the usurpation of welfare functions from philanthropic organizations in the late 1800s (Kirkman Gray 1908), which led to the creation of a cradle-to-grave welfare state in the first half of the 20th century (Allport 2009; Lloyd George 2005). These ideas of government became embedded around the world through the British Imperial and Commonwealth models of government, with the dominions and colonies looking to London and Westminster for inspiration in political institutions and policy management (Bevir *et al.* 2003, p.12; Hood 1991, p.6; Siegfried 1992; Wanna and Weller 2003, pp.65-66). Following the election of the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher (1979-90) and John Major (1990-97), serious questions began to be asked about the role of government in the daily lives of citizens.

Chapter 2

Under the Thatcher government, inroads were made into shedding the government burden of nationalized industries and welfare through a series of neo-liberal reforms. Similar reforms occurred in the United States, Australia and other advanced economies (Bevir 2010, p.67; Hood 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992, pp.328-331). However, for reasons of space, and because British reforms had a direct impact on the case of the International Criminal Police Organization, the focus here will be on the United Kingdom reforms.

New public management became a catchall term to describe changes to the fundamental role of government. According to Bevir *et al.* (2003, p.1) new public management:

refers to a focus on management, not policy, and on performance appraisal and efficiency; disaggregating public bureaucracies into agencies which deal with each other on a user pay basis; the use of quasi-markets and of contracting out to foster competition; cost-cutting; and a style of management that emphasizes, among other things, output targets, limited term contracts, monetary incentives and freedom to manage.

Paraphrased from Hood (1991), their list grew to become inclusive of all types of public sector reforms (Bevir *et al.* 2003, p.1). Although a Conservative government introduced these reforms, the New Labour governments of Tony Blair (1997-2007) and Gordon Brown (2007-10) retained them, replicating a pattern seen in other European nations at the time (Wright 1994). The Labour governments did inject additional resources into their priority policy areas of health, education and welfare, but no moves were made to re-nationalize infrastructure (Bevir and Rhodes 2003b, p.55-6; Seldon 2004). Reforms to delivery mechanisms accompanied the Labour re-injection of state capital. Networks of individuals, civil society organizations, local government and community organizations joined together to deliver services (Bevir and Rhodes 2003b). Thus we can see how the ideas of new public management crossed the domestic political divide in the United Kingdom.

While the free-market thinking of neo-liberalism provided the ideological drive for new public management, other factors were also at play. Wright (1994) listed six driving factors for Western Europe, including the United Kingdom as outlined in Box 2-2. These drivers are not uniform in influence or by nature, nor are they necessarily temporally congruent. Yet put together, they provide a basis for a framework of understanding the closer interaction between state and private actors. While useful for national level analysis, there are significant differences in trying to transpose these drivers to the international level.

Box 2-2 - Driving factors behind new public management

1. Economic depression and fiscal pressures leading to budget deficits.
2. The 'New Right's' ideological distrust of 'big government' and accompanying determination to redraw the boundaries of the state.
3. International interdependence, especially Europeanization, which further increased regulation and introduced new administrative pressures (for example, regionalization).
4. Public expectations about, and disenchantment with, government performance.
5. International management fashions.
6. Information technology, which made it easier to introduce changes.

Source: Wright 1994, pp.104-108.

Before continuing to the international sphere it is time to reflect on the 'newness' of new public management. As Hughes (2012, p.316) pointed out, 'if there ever was an NPM era, it has now passed, while public management continues'. The changes in the role of government have been underway for more than a generation. Therefore, according to Hughes, *new* is no longer warranted. This may be true in certain national contexts such as Australia, Britain and the United States; however it is not a universal approach in all nations. From the perspective of international government organizations, which often draw their workforce from national administrations of developing countries, ideas of public management remain 'new'. Furthermore, the Global Compact and subsequent research coincided with a time such ideas were relatively new to public administrators. Therefore this work recognizes the contemporary novelty of public management ideas and will continue to refer to *new* public management.

Differences between national and global governance

Directly transferring nationally developed models of new public management to the international sphere is problematic. National and international frames are fundamentally different in three key dimensions – law, culture and democratic credentials (see Table 2-7)

Each dimension has sufficiently broad scope to warrant ongoing research in its own right. For the purposes of this research they are briefly discussed to acknowledge the underlying differences between national/local level governance and global governance. Firstly, there is a premise 'hard' law has 'legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law' (Abbott and Snidal 2000, p.421). International law is seen as 'soft' because it is weak in one or more of the

dimensions of obligation, precision or delegation (Abbott and Snidal 2000, pp.421-423). In practice, this view requires actors entering a global public-private partnership or other formal or quasi-formal transnational governance arrangement to consider what mechanisms can strengthen their obligations to one another; add precision to minimize confusion; and delegate dispute resolution to a third party. Simple awareness of this issue of 'soft' law is insufficient. For example a partnership between various actors in the tourism industry, governments and the World Tourism Organization addressed these issues. However the agreed dispute resolution mechanism required both parties to any dispute to agree on the arbiter. This clause effectively dead-locked any dispute resolution (Beisheim and Kaan 2010, p.137). Such an outcome is less likely at the national or local levels where existing courts are in place to resolve disputes.

Table 2-7 - National and international governance frames

Dimension	National	International
Law	Operates under an umbrella framework of clearly identifiable legal obligations that are precisely defined and with delegated powers of arbitration	The international governance framework is weaker in one or more aspects of obligation, precision and often lacking a delegated arbiter to settle disputes
Culture	Essentially mono-cultural, or at minimum a dominant national macro-culture	Multicultural by nature
Democracy	Identifiable demos in the national citizenry	No identifiable global demos

Source: compiled from Abbott and Snidal 2000; Erman and Uhlin (eds) 2010; Hofstede 2001; and Norris 2011.

Another aspect of soft law makes the direct transfer the concept of partnerships from the national to the international problematic. Public partners, particularly in respect of infrastructure partnerships, deliver on legislation or regulation as their key contribution (Haylar and Wettenhall 2010; Hodge and Greve 2008). For example, the construction of a toll road from which the private partner will profit may depend on legislation to secure a right of way or regulation to underwrite the financial risk being taken. International government organizations, as public partners, lack the ability to legislate or regulate in the international sphere. Therefore different partnerships are formed in this arena, which cannot always be analysed in the same manner as those at the national level.

The cultural dimension is not as clear-cut. In countries such as Australia and the United States there is a diverse mix of inhabitants forming multicultural societies, yet for the purposes of governance essentially a monoculture exists. Actors at the national level (presumably) have knowledge and understanding of the applicable societal expectations,

laws, rules and norms. At the global level matters are more complex. A partnership to train museum professionals in Africa illustrates this complexity (see chapter four). Both Public and private partner organizations took into account cultural issues including race, religion, gender attitudes, linguistic differences, the local, national, regional and global political environment, the complexities of the cultural economics as well as the cultural orientation of other partners and potential partners (ICCRROM 1998b, 2003b; Serageldin 1999). Governance at the international level therefore requires a greater level of cultural inclusiveness to be successful.

Democracy at the international level is problematic. Many national frameworks are undemocratic, yet these actors participate in international affairs. There is, however, an expectation that aspects of democracy – such as participation, transparency, accountability and representation – feature in international government organizations. This expectation is further vexed by the underlying problematic of identifying an international demos legitimately in place to enact, enforce or benefit from democracy. As Eva Erman (2010, p.176) points out:

a democracy consists of two parts a political authority and a demos (a people), i.e. a group of people subject to this authority. To say that, for example, a state has authority is to say that the state and its subject have a certain kind of normative relationship.

The lack of an identifiable demos participating in, or represented by global governance mechanisms raises legitimacy questions over the organizations and partnerships at the global level (Bartelson 2010; Bexell and Mörth 2010b; Erman and Uhlin 2010; Peters and Pierre 2010; Uhlin 2010). This lack of legitimacy may extend to other aspects of democracy, such as transparency (Grigorescu 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010; Norris 2011), accountability (Helgesson 2010; Steets and Blattner 2010), representation (Peruzotti 2010), democratic values (Erman and Uhlin 2010), and equality (Näsström 2010). However as Julia Steets and Laura Blattner (2010) point out, if organizations and partnerships have no regulatory or binding power over citizens, it is unclear why they have to be held to a democratic standard. Steets and Blattner's position reflects the dynamic of 'soft' international law at play.

The following section focuses on the recent literature on global public-private partnerships within the broader International Relations sub-field of global governance.

Global governance

The debate over global governance remains unsettled. Both concepts *global* and *governance* are contested and contestable. As Rosenau (1995, p.13) explained, ‘global governance refers to more than the formal institutions and organizations through which the management of international affairs is or is not sustained.’ The Commission for Global Governance (1995, pp.2-3) provided a much more detailed definition to link the two concepts:

Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions have either agreed to or perceive to be in their interest ... At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it now must be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence.

Although this conceptualization of global governance is criticized for being so inclusive of every aspect of social organization as to be meaningless and without utility (Finkelstein 1995; Müller and Lederer 2005; Späth 2005), it does provide a broad lens, which is precisely what is needed for the study of global public-private partnerships.

The significance of the 1999 Global Compact

Global public-private partnerships came to the fore of academic research in 1999 when Secretary-General Kofi Anan announced the Global Compact between the United Nations, civil society organizations (non-government organizations, philanthropic bodies etc.) and corporations. The Global Compact provided a framework for corporations to commit themselves to ten principles related to human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption (see Box 2-3).

The United Nations purpose was to convince business to commit to a global normative framework. For business, the advantage was the prestige, publicity and legitimacy gained through association with the United Nations (Fuchs 2007, p.112). The compact used three instruments to deliver the above principles – creating learning networks for companies to communicate results; ‘policy dialogues’ to generate shared understanding; and public-private partnerships, particularly in developing countries (Ruggie 2004, p.515).

Box 2-3 - Principles of the UN Global Compact**Human Rights**

Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and

Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.

Labour

Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;

Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;

Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and

Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

Environment

Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;

Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and

Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.

Anti-Corruption

Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.

Source: UN Global Compact 1999

The Global Compact has been subjected to criticism claiming the United Nations has sold out its name to corporations ('bluwashing') who are not subject to any sanctions or enforcement mechanisms (Hale 2011; TRAC 2000). Both the compact and its critics raised the profile of interaction between the private sector and the United Nations and its agencies, spawning a literature of its own. Buse and Walt (2000a; 2000b) provided early insight into the impact of the proliferation of health-based global public-private partnerships involving the World Health Organization. Their work categorized the interests of both the United Nations and business achieved through public-private partnerships (Table 2-8). Buse and Walt's (2000a, p.550) work outlined the relatively limited nature of global health public-private partnerships until the 1970s. In the early 1980s, public policy and agencies were influenced by the neo-liberal agenda, which pushed for a greater role for the private sector in the delivery of public policy objectives (Wright 1994, p.107). This shows there is a link between changes at the national and international levels.

The United Nations interests in global health partnerships, is an incomplete picture. Inge Kaul from the United Nations Development Programme brought an economic lens to the growth in global public-private partnerships, arguing 'partnerships capitalize on the differences between public and private actors – differences in incentive structures, competencies, and assets' (Kaul 2006, p. 229). In short, the public actors (i.e. international government organizations) could improve their performance through the adoption of market mechanisms to address global problems beyond the scope of any single actor or sector to deal with effectively – the same thinking that drives new public

Chapter 2

management at the national level. Furthermore, much was made of Kofi Annan's leadership in driving the United Nations into partnership with business (Bull *et al.* 2004; Bull and McNeill 2007, 2010; Fuchs 2007; Tesner and Kell 2000).

Table 2-8 - Interest in global health partnerships

United Nations	Business
<i>Harness private sector for human development</i> - perception that public sector alone cannot bring about successful sustainable development	<i>Increased influence in the global arena</i> - opportunity to articulate, interpret or implement global rules governing trade, health standards etc.
<i>Bestow legitimacy on the United Nations</i> – by involving industry, the United Nations may win support (e.g. from the American Congress)	<i>Increased influence at the national level</i> - use of the United Nations to gain access to policy-makers, institutions, etc.
<i>Bestow authority on the United Nations</i> – public-private partnerships fit closely with third-way politics	<i>Direct financial benefits</i> - tax breaks; market identification, development, penetration and manipulation
<i>Enable the United Nations to fulfill its functions and mandates</i> - with zero real growth budgets, any private financial, material, or technical assistance helps	<i>Brand and image promotion</i> - increased global recognition; improved image via United Nations affiliation
<i>Enable United Nations agencies to leverage financing and advice from the private sector</i>	<i>Increased authority and added legitimacy through the United Nations</i>
	<i>Enhanced corporate citizenship</i>

Source: Modified from Buse and Walt 2000a, p.553, 556.

To summarize, the combined post-Global Compact research provides a range of factors to explain the why of global public-private partnerships exist (see Table 1-1 on page 6). These factors can be grouped into a framework consisting of themes related to leadership change, ideological changes, financial crises/stress, and emergent global issues. Related to all these themes is the presence and influence of the professional and organizational cultures embedded within each organization. The influence of culture in relation to the factors in each case is more fully explored and discussed in chapters five through nine.

Leaders

It is rare for International Relations scholars to consider the role of individual leaders of international government organizations as actors within the international system. This gap is the result of the focus on nation-states as unitary actors, recently complemented by literature on international government organizations and other transnational organizations, which retain the unitary focus on an organizational level (see the volume by Jönsson and Tallberg 2010). Getting down to the personal level is messy,

complicated and not easily theorizable, particularly as leaders come and go and have remarkably diverse individual traits. An important point drawn from research using organizations as the unit of analysis is how environmental constraints on an organization are also constraints on the individual performing the role of executive head (Barnett and Coleman 2005). However, dependent on the amount of autonomy granted by member-states, it can be a leader's decision to go with the global flow or to lead change.

The small literature that does focus on leaders in international government organizations is instructive. Cox (1969) compared the personality traits of Albert Thomas, the first Director-General (1919-32) of the International Labour Organization with those of Sir Eric Drummond, the first Secretary-General (1920-33) of the League of Nations. History tells us the International Labour Organization grew and prospered under Thomas' guidance, whereas the League eventually proved ineffectual and was replaced by the United Nations. Cox attributes some of the success of the International Labour Organization to the charismatic leadership of Thomas, and the demise of the League to Drummond's bureaucratic nature. Xu and Weller (2009) interviewed more than 50 country directors of the World Bank to demonstrate the organization is far from a monolithic enterprise with a singular approach. Kille and Scully (2003) employed political psychology to analyze former Secretaries-General of the United Nations and Presidents of the European Union. Their results determined whether leaders had expansionist traits balanced in the historical context. The concept of an expansionist or non-expansionist executive head is useful in analysing organizations that have changed to accept public-private partnerships, like the International Criminal Police Organization and the United Nations.

Leadership may be an over-rated factor in motivating global public-private partnerships. Farley (1981, p.127) attributed leadership change as an intuitive model to explain changes in international organizations. Credit for Annan's influence in shifting the United Nations from anti- to pro-business was first articulated by Tesner and Kell (2000, p.2), who claimed Annan's 'business education constitutes in and of itself, a radical departure from the traditional government and diplomatic background of every United Nations Secretary-General before him'. Kell himself was appointed by Annan to head up the office of the United Nations Global Compact. Tesner and Kell's standpoint has been restated on several occasions by Bull *et al.* (2004, p.485; Bull and McNeill

Chapter 2

2007, p.8; 2010, p.108-9), although they did not attribute his appointment as the only factor for the United Nations move into global public-private partnerships.

In truth, Annan was an insider, joining the World Health Organization in 1962. He later gained his Master of Science from the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1972, and soon after spent two years as Director of Tourism in Ghana (UN 2012c). The rest of the time, Annan worked within the United Nations system, amassing nearly three decades experience there before becoming Secretary-General. As for the 'radical departure' from his predecessors, Dag Hammarskjöld had (1953-61) had an economics degree and a PhD thesis entitled, "*Konjunkturspridningen*" (The Spread of the Business Cycle); U Thant (1961-71) had been a freelance journalist; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-96) earned among other qualifications a diploma in economics (UN 2012a, 2012b, 2012d). This is hardly a dearth of private sector knowledge or experience. Undoubtedly Annan dealt with the private sector on many occasions, but he did so as a United Nations employee, not the implied private sector entrepreneur who had infiltrated the United Nations. The real difference with Annan may therefore be that he came from within the United Nations system, rather than being an outsider appointed as a political compromise among the member-states.

Ideas

In terms of the time and place, Kaul (2006, p.210) attributed the advent of global public-private partnerships to 'the wave of government re-engineering and market-state rebalancing that has swept across many countries in recent decades [which] has now reached the arena of international cooperation.' This wave has been discussed above in the context of new public management. Global public-private partnerships therefore functioned as an equivalent expression of a neo-liberal approach at the international level. Taken from the perspective of professional culture, it is unsurprising the change to a neo-liberal agenda was delayed in the United Nations. The United Nations in many ways is the ultimate expression of diplomacy, and diplomats engaged directly with nation-states in matters of high politics would not have seen a place for neo-liberal ideas such as privatization or outsourcing of day-to-day operations, performance indicators, competition and the like.

Bull *et al.* (2004, p.485) characterized the growth of neo-liberal ideals within the United Nations as a shift from a neo-Marxist ideology. This may be true in the case of the

United Nations Commission on Trade and Development they cited, however a neo-Marxist starting point is far from the case with organizations like the International Telecommunication Union or the International Criminal Police Organization. This said, the research showed how the prevalence of new public management ideas in Britain had a direct impact on the International Criminal Police Organization (Bevir 2010; AFP 1997-98). As a result the police organization opened up to public-private partnerships, to which chapter seven gives due consideration along with the other cases.

International government organizations, like other public bodies see an advantage in adopting market-like practices. This was articulated by Kaul (2006), and recognizes partnerships as one of these factors. Furthermore, when a global public-private partnership has a management structure which is relatively separate from either partner, the management structure is based on best-practice with input from both the public and the private actors involved (Kaul 2006). In turn, these practices feed back into the international government organization, altering internal processes into (hopefully) a more efficient mode. The need for international government organizations to be more efficient in their practices was reinforced by the relative reduction in core funding from member-states through the policies of zero nominal and zero real growth budgets discussed above.

This pursuit of market style practices in public organizations originated at the national level as evidenced in the discussion of new public management above. Rhodes summarized the drive for change as ‘a determined effort to implement the three “Es” – economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ (Rhodes 1991). Wright is explicit when he described ‘international management fashions’ as a driver toward new public management (Wright 1994). There are signs of these management practices being implemented during the 1990s in the International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for Conservation. The changes are described in chapter four, which presents the history and function of the three organizations. The relative merits of Rhodes (1991) three “Es” as a driving factor of global public-private partnerships are also the subject of chapter seven.

Resources

Since the Reagan era, international government organizations have been under increasing financial stress. During this time, the United States imposed budget principles of zero nominal growth or zero real growth on their contributions to

Chapter 2

international government organizations. Respectively this meant the United States contribution (generally the largest contributor of all member-states) was locked at a dollar figure year-to-year (zero nominal growth), or at best matched inflation rates (zero real growth) (Jönsson 2010, p.174; Sikkink 1986, p.132; Vaubel *et al.* 2007, p.287). As other countries followed the United States lead, greater strain was placed on the financial resources of international government organizations, especially those heretofore solely reliant on member-state contributions (Buse and Walt 2000a, p.553; Lee *et al.* 1997, p.342). Tapping into financial support from private actors provided some measure of relief to this pressure.

Finances are not the only resource available to international government organizations from private actors. For example civil society organizations (which usually have their own financial pressures) can provide (1) intellectual support through policy advice and expertise; (2) alternate resources such as volunteers; (3) notification of operational changes simply by being proximate to situations; (4) support to international government organization policy implementation; or (5) on-the-ground monitoring of policy success or failure (Steffek 2010).

The for-profit sector can also provide valuable non-financial support through access to technology, research and development. This support has been particularly salient in countering the spread of disease (ACHAP 2010; Bull *et al.* 2004; Buse and Walt 2000a; 2000b; Frumkin 2003; Jönsson 2010; Kaul 2006). It could be expected international government organizations seeking support from private actors is neatly explained by rational choice arguments – whereby organizations make choices in their best interests. However the research discovered the police culture of the International Criminal Police Organization, was a strong factor *resisting* closer ties to private actors for many years. This resistance still exists in significant sectors of policing. These issues surrounding resources form the basis for chapter six.

Global issues

The final factor attributed to the move to global public-private partnerships was the emergence of new issues with global impact. Global issues are central to the concept of global governance (Commission for Global Governance 1995, pp.2-3). Bevir (2009, p.85) goes as far as to define global governance as ‘the ways in which a variety of actors come together to address global problems.’ By placing issues in the sphere of global governance to resolve, International Relations scholars avoid using much more

'threatening' terms such as 'world government' as the authority tasked with the resolution of the issues (Finkelstein 1995; Slaughter 2004, p.9). This in turn makes partnerships less threatening as a solution to global issues.

Going back further in the literature, it is clear that the resolution of global issues is central to the concept of global governance. In the early 1990s, German Chancellor Willy Brandt established The Commission on Global Governance. The Commission tasked itself to 'analyze the main forces of global change, examine the major issues facing the world community, assess the adequacy of global institutional arrangements and suggest how they should be reformed or strengthened' (Commission on Global Governance 1995, p.368). In the preface to their report, the Commission (1995, pp.2-3) defined governance in a global context in such a way as to include 'individuals and institutions, public and private'.⁵ Thus the model linking partnerships to resolve global issues to governance was established.

The issue central to most analysis of global public-private partnerships has been the spread of HIV/AIDS and its impact on international government organizations in the fields of aid, development and health (ACHAP 2010; Bull *et al.* 2004; Buse and Walt 2000a; 2000b; Jönsson 2010; Kaul 2006). Global public-private partnerships were viewed as a means to access resources from the private sector – particularly access to expensive pharmaceuticals, and to bypass bureaucratic impediments built into international government organization processes. Other global issues such as control of the internet (Salter 1999), transnational crime (Madsen 2002; Madsen 2009; White 2008), and privatization of cultural heritage (Benedikter 2004; Pataro 2007), all cross the public-private divide in the international sphere. These issues directly align with the cases study organizations and form the basis of chapter nine where they are discussed and analyzed in detail.

The above themes formed the basis for the fieldwork of this thesis, which is described in chapter three. One or more of the factors or themes mentioned above has motivated global public-private partnerships. However, a gap exists. Very little literature considers the role of professional or organizational cultures as factors influencing these partnerships. The next section models how professional and organizational cultures interact with other motivating factors in the formation and operation of global public-private partnerships.


⁵ See page 48 for the full definition given by the Commission for Global Governance.

Relating the thesis to the themes in the literature

The main thesis of this study was developed in the wake of fieldwork which explored why international government organizations entered global public-private partnerships. The thesis resulted from the broad case study approach, not vice-versa. While curiosity as to *why* the phenomena of global public-private partnerships occurred sparked the research, the realization that culture had a significant affect on the other factors made it more important to explain *how* they all interacted. This interaction illuminates *how* these partnerships are structured and *when* they occur. Furthermore, the main thesis of this study provides a focal point for organizations to reflect, and better structure their approach to global public-private partnerships.

Were we to think of professional and organizational culture as an independent variable affecting the way in which global public-private partnerships are formed and operate, then their critical influence can be visualized with a simple model indicated below.

Figure 2-1 Professional and organizational culture as moderators



Professional and organizational cultures are influential factors motivating global public-private partnerships. These cultures also influence the significance of other motivating factors such as leadership, resources ideas etc. Figure 2-1 indicates how this can be visualized with a group of potentially motivating factors on the left filtered through the lenses of professional and organizational culture to influence global public-private partnerships. The extent to which professional and organizational cultures are independent variables as distinct from intermediate variables is an empirical question requiring a diagnosis of specific cases. Furthermore, professional culture and

organizational culture overlap each other with shared characteristics. This can create internal tension when an independent characteristic of one culture may exert a strong influence, effectively over-riding the imperative of characteristics of the other culture. An organizational culture of compliance and an engineer's desire for freedom of scientific inquiry (see Table 2-4 on page 33) presents an example of this tension.

With a single case study, it would be difficult to demonstrate the effect of professional and organizational cultures on the partnerships. This problem is alleviated by the use of comparative methods. By using the evidence gathered in the exploratory phase of the research, this dissertation shows how culture moderates the way in which all motivating factors are perceived and acted upon. The end result is that cultures can act to maintain, inhibit or motivate global public-private partnerships. The relief of financial stress provided by partnerships is a simple illustration. For the International Telecommunication Union, receipt of such support is a non-issue. This is because, as explained in chapter five, a user-pays principle is a cultural trait of the organization. In contrast, the police culture of the International Criminal Police Organization is averse to accepting private money. The police aversion relates to the perception that private money could be purchasing some unlawful advantage – i.e. a bribe. Chapter eight discusses the different cultural perceptions of partnership resources.

The significance of the literature and the key concepts of the thesis

This chapter has introduced the key concepts of this research – international government organizations and global public-private partnerships. The former provides the point of departure (or perspective) for investigating the latter.

This thesis contributes to the literature on global public-private partnerships. It expands our understanding of *why* these partnerships are formed in the way they are, and *how* they operate, by bringing the perspectives of professional and organizational culture to the analysis. This chapter has explored the current literature and the theoretical contributions made by the new public management scholars and the global governance literature specific to public-private partnerships. The contribution is all the more valuable because it focuses attention away from the well-researched and documented United Nations family of programmes, agencies and specialized organizations. As a result, new insights have evolved.

Chapter 2

Discussions in this chapter on distinct professional cultures – engineers, police and conservators – show each profession has its own mix of features and characteristics. These features have a bearing on global public-private partnerships. Examples include the highly structured approach of engineers in the International Telecommunication Union helped to define a strictly defined membership structure for private actors; the deep suspicion of ‘outsiders’ resulted in the International Criminal Police Organization avoiding private entanglements for decades; and the inclusive cooperative and collaborative nature of conservators.

The final part of this chapter sets the analytical framework for this research. This is a thematic framework based on factors driving global public-private partnerships drawn from the existing research, supplemented with due consideration given to the role of professional and organizational culture. Leaders have a better chance of success when they are familiar with, and take account of the organizational and professional culture of an international government organization – whether they are there to maintain the operational status quo, or to change the way things are done. Despite financial and resource pressures, professional culture can resist public-private partnerships, irrespective of potential benefits. Professional and new public management ideas need to find common ground for successful interaction. Similarly, market-based practices need to be reconcilable with professional practice. Finally, there are the global issues spanning international and public-private divisions, as do the professional cultures themselves. To determine how professional and organizational cultures came to be a consideration it is time to turn to the research methodology in chapter three, which explains why and how cases were chosen.

3. Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodological approaches chosen to research why and how international government organizations are partnering with the private sector. Selecting an appropriate methodology to determining an answer is not straightforward; therefore a mixed methods approach has been adopted. The research utilizes qualitative and comparative methods to build a broad and deep picture of global public-private partnerships. The analysis primarily rests on comparative case studies of three organizations – the International Telecommunications Union, the International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property. The comparative analysis is broken into five themes – cultures, leaders, ideas, resources and global issues – to illustrate more directly the difference between organizational approaches to the public-private partnerships and the influence of professional and organizational cultures.

Three sections comprise this chapter. The first discusses the utility of case studies in exploratory research and then outlines the main methods employed – documentary research and semi-structured interviews. The core of the second section is the case selection methodology, which is based on a broad analysis of a defined population of international government organizations. This work further enables the imposition of a new classification structure for international government organizations. The broad analysis illustrates the scope of global public-private partnerships. By applying a number of specific criteria, three organizations emerged as ideal choices for case study research and comparative analysis.

The third section presents the thematic framework for analysing why international government organizations enter public-private partnerships. The thematic framework is adapted from the existing literature on this phenomenon discussed in the previous chapters and incorporates the factors of professional and organizational culture that became apparent after the fieldwork component. In closing, this chapter will briefly explore the three chosen case studies and how they fit in the analytical frame.

The post Global Compact literature presented a number of factors (Table 1-1 on page 6) to explain why international government organizations entered public-private partnerships. However, much of this research focussed on the United Nations system, in particular those agencies involved in development or global health. Bull *et al.* (2004)

Chapter 3

acknowledge that certain types of agencies within the United Nations system, particularly the multilateral development banks, have long advocated private sector engagement to achieve United Nations desired outcomes. These partnerships often involved engaging local private actors in development projects or straightforward contractual arrangements. These arrangements fall within the definition of global public-private partnership outlined in the previous chapter. The explanatory factors for partnerships, however, seemed implausible in the case of the International Criminal Police Organization. This then raised new questions concerning the prior research – Do existing explanations apply only to the United Nations? Do they only describe what has occurred in the policy fields of health, development and environment? Answering these questions requires an understanding of the nature and extent of the global public-private partnership phenomena – how many international government organizations are in partnerships; what type of international government organizations these are; and how these partnerships operate. Once these issues were addressed, the International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Organization, and the International Centre for Conservation stood out as cases for comparative work.

Case studies

If the reasons explaining global public-private partnerships are unsettled, further exploration of the phenomena is required. Comparative case studies present a method for both broad and deep investigation of international government organizations and their partnerships. A case study approach is ‘the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events’ (George and Bennett 2004, P.5). John Gerring (2007, p.37) describes case studies as ‘an intensive study of a single unit or a small number of units (the cases) for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units (a population of cases)’. While the literature contains a sizable number of prior case studies of the global public-private partnership phenomena, the case of the International Criminal Police Organization highlights the difficulties in generalizing prior factors to explain partner motivations beyond the United Nations system. Furthermore, the motivating factors may not be applicable to all United Nations agencies either, particularly those outside the development, health or environment agendas. Reliance on the factors identified above also ignores the possibility of other causal factors (George and Bennett 2004, P.21). This therefore necessitated further exploratory work. A detailed examination of carefully selected cases, framed by the reasons given, will help to understand the

processes leading to global public-private partnerships and the global governance framework of which they are part.

The use of comparative case studies as the primary instrument for this research offers advantages over a single case study. Within the population of international government organizations there are several systems of classification and hierarchy requiring consideration. These divisions can rest on whether an organization is inside or outside the United Nations system; whether it has a policy (political) or technical focus; which broad policy or agenda field the organization is situated in; what geographical issues shape the formation of the organization; and of course whether an organization can or cannot engage private sector partners in its administration or operations. These are just a few of the issues at the organizational level of analysis.

Within the organizations themselves, partnerships are not uniform in nature. As previously discussed, partnerships can occupy a range of types (Table 2-2 on page 21). These include policy dialogue; advocacy; partnerships to mobilize private funds; information and learning partnerships; and those of an operational nature (Bull *et al.* 2004; Bull and McNeill 2010). However, while the partnership types vary, there are certain characteristics expected in all such arrangements. Kaul's (2006) defining characteristics – voluntariness; horizontal organization; participation through shared governance; multi-actor based; and global in nature – provide a common link between the partnerships each organization is involved with. Thus the use of case comparisons addresses the complex multi-dimensional nature of international government organizations and global public-private partnerships.

Deep reading – documents, libraries and archives

An organization's historical records contain all sorts of invaluable information about organizational culture. (Ott 1989, p.109)

Unravelling the institutional features of an international government organization requires more than a casual reading of available material. Their constitutions and statutory material contained on official websites represent the final output of discussion and deliberation between nations that has occurred over decades. On-site archives for all three organizations hold information on deliberations before, during and after their involvement with global public-private partnerships. Access to archives is recognized as crucial to this type of study (Ott 1989, 109). Examining this material is therefore critical to investigating the organizations and their partnerships.

Chapter 3

There are four types of documentary evidence available with respect to international government organizations. The first three are primary source materials and the fourth is secondary material in the existing literature produced by external sources. The primary material can be categorized as:

1. *Open source* publicly available materials, including websites, organizational publications, annual reports, journals and the like
2. *Open access* to international government organization records. This material is distinctly different from open source because it is held in the archives of the organization or by the member-states. Access requires administrative assistance from the organization and/or a researcher's physical presence, and
3. *Closed material* requiring carefully negotiated access, which is often subject to specified conditions of use.

The research for this thesis required access to closed material, because recent records reflect the ongoing deliberations of the organizations in question. These documents are particularly relevant as current literature suggests global public-private partnerships are a recent development. All three organizations granted access to records in the closed category. The fact access was granted illustrated a conscious effort by the international government organizations under investigation to be transparent in their processes. This was further reinforced by access to staff for interviews.

Interviews – going beyond the record

The cure for ignorance about how something gets done is to talk with those who do it ... (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974)

Interviews provide a key to discovering how practitioners and elites in international government organizations deal with public-private partnerships. According to Goldstein (2002, p.669), there are four principle purposes of elite interviews:

1. *To gather information from a sample of officials in order to make generalizable claims about all such officials' characteristics or decisions,*
2. *to discover a particular piece of information or to obtain a particular document,*
3. *to inform or guide work which uses other sources of data, and*
4. *elite interviews can provide context or colour to academic output.*

The aim of the interview process in this research is to reach beyond the public façade and the documentary record of the case organizations and speak to the officials who managed or operated global public-private partnerships. In the context of this research, these officials form a cadre of elites, knowledgeable about the philosophy and operation of these partnerships. In the multi-tasking environment of international government organizations, those responsible for the management of the partnerships were often the same people who provided operational input. Thus these elites form a broader cross section of international government organization staff than simply the elected leaders.

Interviewing staff provided an insight into the way the mechanisms of partnerships develop and function. As Kvale (2007, p.5) notes ‘conversations are an old way of obtaining systematic knowledge.’ Interviewing is not a search for a positivistic ‘truth’, rather the interview enables the research to delve into ‘an interviewee’s subjective analysis of a particular episode or situation’ (Richards 1996, p.200). Key figures in international government organizations are often long-serving international civil servants; therefore interviews are an effective means to tap into their institutional memory. Importantly, the interviews shed light on how documentation of an organization is interpreted and policies implemented by those responsible for their execution. What is a matter of record can easily be misinterpreted by the most experienced researcher, who can overlook the nuances and situational realities faced by those at the front line of international government organization operations.

Interviewing elites elicits what is unwritten and how public-private partnerships operate in practice. For example, some partnerships may be unsuccessful. It is natural for an organization not to project or publicize such failings. As time moves on, sensitivity to such knowledge becoming public diminishes, and only interviews can garner opinions on what failed and why; particularly if such opinion is not in accord with the official record. The negotiations, internal politics and interactions between secretariat staff, partners, member-state representatives and executive councils may never become subject to an official record. Even complete records still require interpretation beyond the written word, as illustrated by the uncensored opinions recorded in the diplomatic cables released through WikiLeaks. The re-interpretation and spin applied in such cases fills newspaper columns, airwaves and the internet; providing a salutary lesson for the researcher about the amount of self-censorship, conscious or unconscious, applied by an interviewee.

Anonymity

Don't quote me on that (anon.)

All interviewees were allowed to choose the level of anonymity they were comfortable with. Some elected to be identified by their position or organization, but not by name, while others did not want to be identified even by their organization. One official prohibited digital recording of the interview. In the case of the International Criminal Police Organization, their Office of Legal Affairs imposed a condition of anonymity on interviewees, even though some officials openly expressed that they had no issue with being identified. This overarching condition has been respected. Those choosing to remain off the record provided useful background information, and several leads for further investigation, allowing matters to be explored with data obtained through other avenues. The limitation anonymity imposed necessitates a thematic approach in places, which enables information from these respondents to be compared without compromising their anonymity.

In total, 34 interviews were scheduled in Europe and Australia. As a result of a change in the research plan, a major component to analyze Australian attitudes was excluded, reasons for which are discussed below. As a result only 17 interviews were conducted. Four interviews were conducted at the International Telecommunication Union, nine at the International Criminal Police Organization and four at the International Centre for Conservation. Interviews at the larger Telecommunication Union focussed on staff with strategic responsibilities for managing literally hundreds of formulaic partnerships with the Sector Members (described below). At the International Criminal Police Organization partnerships have taken many varied forms. As a result interviews were conducted with officers who formed and/or managed partnerships with the private sector in different areas of the organization, which had different partnership requirements. The small size of the International Centre for Conservation enabled access to the entire management team, including a retired senior officer still actively involved in supporting other international conservation institutions born of partnerships he had instigated.

Interview format

Interviewees were provided with an information sheet outlining the purpose of the research and expected format of the interview. The information sheet was accompanied by a consent form, which ensured interviewees were able to nominate a level of

anonymity, recording methods, consultation prior to publication and whether they wanted a copy of the final research results.¹ In most instances the interviews were conducted one-on-one at the relevant secretariat. There were four exceptions to this. One interview was conducted by telephone, one at the premises of a partner agency and twice officials asked to be interviewed in pairs. The respondent pairs requested this ostensibly to save duplication of responses. In both cases the pairs worked with each other to flesh out responses, give examples and negotiate an agreed or contested perspective. This provided invaluable data as the recordings captured the evolution of these perceptions.

Triangulation

The veracity of the interviews has been strengthened by triangulating the data gleaned from respondents. In any qualitative investigation of organizations, triangulation from multiple sources adds validity to the observations and analysis (Ott, 1989, pp.103-104). Interviews with multiple respondents provided different perspectives on the same issues. While the interviews were structured around the themes identified in the literature, respondents were encouraged to provide their own perspective. On occasion discussions developed on related issues the interviewees felt were important. These discussions were allowed to proceed as they often elicited useful information. Open-ended questions were used in combination with a semi-structured approach. In some instances, interviewees had read the information sheet and volunteered information on a theme without a prompt. In one instance, an interviewee spoke for more than 25 minutes before a question was necessary. This open ended approach allowed for interviewees to follow their own train of thought on a theme and reflect, in some instances for the first time, on the significance of the public-private partnerships in which they were involved. Reflective and probing questions were inserted where necessary to clarify meaning or illicit further information. In all but two cases, the interview was terminated by the interviewer when exploration of the various themes had been exhausted. The two interviews cut short were with senior elected officials whose time was at a premium. In both cases, the majority of themes were discussed, albeit in an abbreviated fashion.

Several interviewees provided triangulating reference material published by and outside their organizations to support what they had said. As a result, multiple perspectives on

¹ Copies of the Information Sheet and Consent Form are at appendix 2.

the same activities were obtained and then compared and verified against each other and/or documentary research. Further verification was also achieved in one case through an interview of a retired official, who proved to be more frank and fearless in his responses than those who have an ongoing interest in the organization.

Observations from the field

To access documents, archives, libraries and personnel it was necessary to spend a significant amount of time at each secretariat. Four week blocks at each enabled sufficient time to conduct archival and library research and allowed interviews to be scheduled around the interviewees' schedules. A single month with each organization was perhaps insufficient time to 'sink-in' to the organization and really understand it. Furthermore, there is the danger any subsequent analysis will suffer from cultural relativism, the theory arguing a culture can only be properly understood on its own terms and by its own standards (Benedict 1934).² Nevertheless, some observations made at the time are useful, but it cannot be said this was close to a true application of the ethnographic methods outlined by Geertz (1973), Rhodes *et al.* (2007) or Hendriks (2007). The need to conduct research in the organizational libraries and archives also limited the available contact with staff involved in partnerships to the arranged interviews.

The following is a reflection on the experience received in each organization during fieldwork. It is a personal reflection based on observation, contemporary notes, conversations and formal interviews. Essentially part of the cultural orientation of each organization studied was reflected in the way this researcher was treated. The staff of the International Criminal Police Organization welcomed me with open arms, and the head of Police Training and Development said that I was 'one of us'.³ I was then given full and open access to documents and staff, with the only limitation being a prohibition by their legal office from identifying by name the personnel interviewed during the research. Support included copies of publications given to me to keep, office space, an intern assigned to me to arrange interviews, access to document and guide me through the range of the facilities in Lyon. This support resulted in more interviews conducted in Lyon than the other locales combined.

² This danger is further mitigated by the author's experience in both museum and police settings – see preface.

³ I spent 18 years working for the Australian Federal Police. More than a decade of this time was with the Australian NCB for INTERPOL. See preface.

At the International Centre for Conservation in Rome the welcome was slightly cooler. As an academic (in training) I was welcomed. However, there was a slight disconnect to the purpose of my role as the discipline of political science/international relations has little in common with conservation research and practice – even though international relations is the day-to-day practice of the Centre as an international government organization. Once staff became aware of my experience in running an archive and small museum,⁴ and my understanding of conservation practice, the reception noticeably improved – not that it was poor. In both of these organizations it was a distinct advantage to be able to speak the ‘professional language’. The underlying academic culture was also reflected when it came to present some of my research findings. More than half of the organization, including the entire management team, turned up to listen to a report on the comparative differences between the Conservation Centre and the other two institutions. The half hour presentation was followed by a 45 minute question and answers session.

Things were different at the International Telecommunication Union. While I was welcomed and given access to all records of the Union, the personal experience was slightly more isolated. Those staff I interviewed were open in their discussions with me, however a significant proportion of interview time was spent explaining technical matters on both international telecommunication practice as well as the internal workings of the organization. This is not a negative critique of the International Telecommunication Union, simply the organizational culture was the most alien to me as I have limited understanding of telecommunications technology and the negotiations required to ensure the system works internationally; nor did I speak the language of telecommunication engineering.

The experience in these organizations proved critical to forming the final thesis of this research after my return to Australia. However, my experiences in the field were guided by the way the cases were selected, which is described in the following section.

Case selection

A robust case selection method is important. This research systematically reduced a broad field of international government organizations to three cases from different policy fields for comparative analysis. This section begins with an examination of the

⁴ Prior to the time in INTERPOL, I worked six years in government archives and was curator of the Australian Federal Police Museum for two years.

deficiencies of case selection methods used elsewhere before describing a more robust method used herein. The method focuses attention on understudied agencies in understudied policy fields. A series of filters identified organizations constitutionally or statutorily able to receive private support; without restrictions on membership such as political allegiance or geography; and those in receipt of significant non-core contributions to their budget. From this reduced number, case studies were selected from different organizational categories to represent one organization involved in transport and communication; one from the security sphere and a social / environmental type of organization.

Problems with case selection

The dominance of single-case studies in the literature on international government organizations hides a methodological deficiency in case selection. Case selection is often based simply upon a researcher's curiosity about an organization or the international institution it represents (Green 2010, p.159). King *et al.* in George and Bennett (2004, p.24) advise 'the standard protection against bias in statistical studies is random selection, but ... in studies of small numbers of cases, random selection can be more likely to result in bias than intentional selection'. The existing approaches to case selection seem to explain the large amount of academic attention to single case studies of relatively few organizations.

A second deficiency is the lack of large-N studies of global international government organizations, let alone their public-private partnerships. Those which do exist are usually structured on necessarily narrow lines, such as Grigorescu's (2007) survey of democratic characteristics of transparency and accountability in 72 international government organizations, or Green's (2010) policy situated study of transnational actor access to international environmental institutions. Steffek (2010) has broadened the approach with his exceptional work exploring civil society organization access across six policy fields in 32 international government organizations. While broadening the policy fields, Steffek's (2010) work narrows the type of private transnational actor by excluding the input of the for-profit sector. While useful, these studies do not map the full extent of partnerships between international government organizations and private actors. To do this, a survey of the field of international government organizations is required.

Identifying international government organizations

The term ‘international government organization’ can be loosely or tightly applied to those agencies established to facilitate transnational activity of governments. Karns and Mingst (2004) describe the Union of International Associations as the definitive source for data on international organizations – both public and private. Compiled annually since 1910, the Union of International Associations *Yearbook of International Organizations* (2011) adopted a definition of international government organizations as:

- being based on a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of nation-states
- including three or more nation-states as parties to the agreement
- possessing a permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks

According to Karns and Mingst (2004, pp.9-10) the *Yearbook* for 2003/04 listed 238 international government organizations. By 2010, the *Yearbook* had a webpage *IGO Search*, which enabled subscribers to access ‘all intergovernmental organizations,⁵ comprising over 3000 bodies’ (UIA 2010). It is highly improbable 2700 formal instruments were ratified in less than a decade. Therefore what has occurred is likely to be either a more accurate application of the broad definition to the on-line dataset; or the Union of International Associations has made a commercial decision to market their *IGO search* webpage as a more useful tool (i.e. commercial users are led to believe they have greater access to international government organizations). In either case this minor puzzle is beyond the scope of this research. To resolve the large discrepancy, this research turned to Volgy *et al.*’s (2008a, p.839) work which;

... define[s] intergovernmental organizations as entities created with sufficient organizational structure and autonomy to provide formal, ongoing, multilateral processes of decision making between states, along with the capacity to execute the collective will of their members (states)...

This definition is achieved by application of eleven criteria described in chapter two (page 34) to the Union of International Associations dataset. By applying their criteria, Volgy *et al.* (2008a, p.843) identified 265 organizations, which they described as formal international government organizations. This dataset provided the universe of international government organizations from which the cases were selected.

⁵ The acronym IGO is used for the terms ‘international government organization’ in the literature or ‘inter-governmental organization’ used by the Union of International Associations. Both terms mean the same thing, as described by the three point definition cited above.

The United Nations dilemma

Overshadowing case selection was a conscious decision to research organizations outside the United Nations family (Table 3-1) as far as possible. The logic behind this was twofold. A large part of the existing literature revolves around the United Nations. For example, the United Nations accounts for nine of the eleven empirical chapters in a recent series of edited volumes exploring the legitimacy of transnational actors and partnerships (see Bexell and Mörth 2010b; Erman and Uhlin 2010; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010). Hedley Bull (1977, p.xxxv) noted this United Nations-centric approach decades ago. The United Nations is not the archetype of all international government organizations. Diversity exists among international government organizations, which warrants further study and investigation.

Table 3-1 - The United Nations system of agencies

<u>Specialized Agencies</u>	<u>Programmes & Funds</u>
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)	International Trade Centre (ITC)
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	UN Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD)
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)	UN Office of Drugs & Crime (UNODC)
International Labour Organization (ILO)	UN Development Programme (UNDP)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	UN Environment Programme (UNEP)
International Maritime Organization (IMO)	UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)	UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat)
UN Education, Scientific & Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
UN Industrial Development Org. (UNIDO)	UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)	UN Relief & Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
Universal Postal Union (UPU)	World Food Programme (WFP)
World Health Organization (WHO)	
World Intellectual Property Org. (WIPO)	
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)	
<u>World Bank Group</u>	<u>Related Organizations</u>
International Bank for Reconstruction & Development (IBRD)	Preparatory Commission for the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
International Development Association (IDA)	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Finance Corporation (IFC)	World Trade Organization (WTO)
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)	

Source: modified from UN 2011.

Another reason for future researchers to explore outside the United Nations became apparent after the fieldwork. This is the likelihood of similarities in the organizational cultures of its core agencies. The organizational culture of these agencies is built on the foundational influences of its earliest appointees – most often drawn from the diplomatic corps of member-states (Lemoine 1995). The shedding of national loyalties has created a professional culture of international civil service common across all international government organizations (see Lemoine 1995; Weiss 1975, 2008). The culture of international civil service may be considered at the heart of the professional and organizational culture of diplomatically established international government organizations; however it is secondary to technical organizations founded and administered by non-diplomats (See Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Ott 1989; Pettigrew 1979; Schein 2010). Thus exploring organizations with diverse professional origins is more informative about the development of global public-private partnerships.

It should be noted here the operational agencies of the United Nations have all been excluded from the Volgy *et al.* (2008b) dataset. This is because the directors or secretaries-general of the *operational* agencies (i.e. United Nations programmes and funds - Table 3-1) are appointed by the Secretary-General and their appointment is approved by the General Assembly. Furthermore, these operational agencies report to the General Assembly (UN 2011). Effectively these agencies fail to meet criteria eight of Volgy *et al.*'s (2008a) typology, which requires the secretariat to be independent of any other international government organization or a single state.

On the other hand the United Nations *specialized* agencies all met the stringent criteria, with the exception of the World Bank Group, the President of which is appointed by the United States President. Many of the specialized agencies pre-date the creation of the United Nations in 1945, or were later added to the United Nations family through processes of negotiation. This process will be described in greater detail in the case of the International Telecommunication Union, which is a specialized agency; and the International Criminal Police Organization, which considered but rejected United Nations affiliation and remains outside that system.

Narrowing the field

The organizations identified by the Volgy *et al.* (2008a) process range in size from the 194 members of the United Nations down to the three countries of the East African Community. The purpose for which each international government organization was

Chapter 3

created covers a multitude of global issues stretching from tiny commodities based organizations like the International Copper Study Group, to the fiscally and militarily powerful North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To narrow the field of this large number of organizations, a series of additional filters were applied .The first filtering process determined an organizations ability to enter partnerships. A website search of all organizations discovered whether they did in fact receive financial support for their operations from the private sector; or if the organizations were statutorily able to access such support.⁶

Table 3-2 - Private financial support to formal IGOs

Policy Arena	Example	Receipt of private funds	Total IGOs in Class	%
Political - broad base IGOs with multiple functions	UN	2	29	6.9%
Military / Security - a clear military or security type mandate	INTERPOL	2	13	15.4%
Economic - banks, development funds, common markets	APEC	22	83	26.5%
Social / Environment	ICCROM	15	41	36.6%
Commodity based - functions and information sharing on specific commodities	IWC	9	35	25.7%
Scientific / Standards - IGOs with a greater focus on progress in the name of science	WIPO	14	34	41.2%
Communication / Transport - provide an international framework for communications / transport	ITU	13	30	43.3%
Total		77	265	29.1%

Source: Own research on 265 IGO websites. For a list see Volgy *et al.* 2008b.

Alternative methodologies such as surveying the organizations were considered and rejected. This decision was based on the experience of Grigorescu (2007, p.639), whose survey emails often resulted in no more than an automated reply, referring the inquirer to a website. Two points here are worth mentioning, firstly, the private sector was broadly deemed to include for-profit corporations, philanthropic organizations and civil society organizations. Secondly, finance was used as a benchmark for partnerships in line with the analytic factor attributing international government organizations entering partnerships because of financial crises. Table 3-2 presents the results of the web search categorized within broad policy arenas.

⁶ For those organizations not discussed directly in this study, see appendix 1 on page 237 and the bibliography of IGOs on page 294.

The website search relied on clear indicators of private support. Indicators included: specific reference/s on the website to partnership arrangements, data from annual and financial report, or organizational statutes (the constitution, convention, financial regulations etc.), which indicated an ability to entertain partnerships, receive private funding or other financial support beyond member-state contributions.

The process of web searching also enabled a re-classification of the organizations across seven broad policy arenas. A completely clean classification process was not possible. For example, the International Committee of Military Medicine has a primary goal of sharing scientific knowledge, not providing a security function (ICMM 2010). Table 3-2 above indicates extensive private financial support in arenas beyond the well explored environment, health and development agendas.

Table 3-3 - Private financial support to global IGOs

Policy Arena	Global IGOs with ability to receive private funds	Able to receive private funds	Total IGOs in Class	%
Political	UN	1	4	25.0%
Military / Security	INTERPOL, IOM	2	5	40.0%
Economic	BIE, CFC, FAO, IFAD, IFC, UNIDO	6	15	40.0%
Social / Environment	ICCROM, UNESCO, UNWTO, WHO	4	12	33.3%
Commodity based	AVRDC, IRSG, IWC	3	17	17.6%
Scientific / Standards	IIR, IMO, ISTC, WIPO, WMO	5	11	45.5%
Communication / Transport	IMSO, ITU, PIANC, Intersputnik	4	7	57.1%
Total		25	71	35.2%

Source: Own research on 265 IGO websites – for list of IGOs see Volgy *et al.* 2008b.

It would be tempting here to apply a second filter based on the size of the international government organizations. However selection of cases on this basis presents two conflicting problems. Firstly, if smaller organizations are filtered out, innovative practices achieved by smaller international bureaucracies fall from the final analysis. On the other hand, retaining them can lead to cultural bias, especially where organizations have been formed regionally between countries with a similar macro-cultural outlook such as the Nordic Council. The second filter therefore removed all organizations imposing geographically restrictive rules concerning membership, leaving only *Universal* international government organizations. Table 3-3 applies this filter and

Chapter 3

shows a marked increase in the proportion of the private funding accessible by political, military/security, economic, scientific/standards and communications/transport categories of organizations. Social/environmental organizations registered a small proportional drop at the international level, while there was a more significant fall for the commodities based classification.

Overall, a significant proportion of all universal international government organizations are engaged in partnerships. Over a third can or do receive financial support from the private sector. This may be indicative of an aversion by regional international government organizations to engage so directly with private organizations. The orientation toward public-private partnerships is an Anglo-Saxon approach that does not necessarily sit well in other cultures (Bevir *et al.* 2003). The low level in commodities based international government organizations is suggestive these organizations are averse to partnerships to avoid any perceived conflict of interest which could arise from favouring one or more large multi-national corporations over others, or smaller national industries in producer countries. This raises the equally valid research question of why some organizations do *not* engage with the private sector. However, this question must be left for later research.

The third filter simply applied a pre-determined level of private support. Six organizations receive more than 10% of their operating budget from various private means. These organizations are the International Centre for Conservation in Rome (36.88%), the International Rubber Study Group (33.48%), the International Criminal Police Organizations (15.13%), the International Science and Technology Centre (11.75%), the International Telecommunication Union (11.4%) and finally the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (10.24%).

The final filter for case selection was Australian membership. This filter later became redundant. Australian membership *had* been considered an important element of the original research design, which incorporated analysis of a member-states position and attitude toward global public-private partnerships. Following data gathering in Europe, a decision was made to exclude this element for two reasons. To begin with, Australian opinion can be assumed to be biased toward partnerships due to its embrace of the principles of new public management since the seventies (Curnow and Saunders 1983; Hughes 2012; Wanna 2008). As a result the current generation of Australian public servants, who would have been potential data sources, have known no alternative

(Hughes 2012). The second reason is that data gathered from the organizations under study presented a richer source of multiple, and often conflicting opinions of member-states toward the partnership phenomena. These opinions are well documented by member-state representatives in submissions to general assemblies or executive councils.

Although the criterion of Australian membership was later excluded, its presence at the case selection phase eliminated the International Rubber Studies Group and International Science and Technology Centre from consideration. The former would have provided insight into a commodity based organization and the latter a snapshot of post-Cold-War efforts of both the public and private sector to secure the weapons knowledge developed by the now defunct Soviet bloc. These may prove useful examples for future research.

Two of the four remaining organizations – the International Centre for Conservation and the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization – represent the social / environmental policy arena, and both are heavily focussed on culture. Within the limited resources of a PhD project a choice between the two was necessary. The International Centre for Conservation presents a more interesting case because of the perceived level of external support it received as well as being representational of the smaller organizations. The intent of the project was to explore as much as possible the phenomena outside the United Nations system, therefore the International Centre for Conservation proves a more suitable choice under the circumstances. The selection of cases is summarized on Table 3-4 below.

Other factors outside the structured analysis undertaken above were taken into account during the selection process. Firstly, the International Criminal Police Organization was formed in 1923 by police and law enforcement officials, and is one of the few international government organizations not created by diplomatic processes; it exists without a treaty to this day (Anderson 1989; Martha 2010; Masters 2009, P.10-14). This lack of a governance document crafted by statesmen or diplomats has a bearing on the research, particularly as the member-state forum is populated by law enforcement officials, not the more traditional diplomats. The choice of the police organization is further reinforced by the rapid increase in reliance on private funding in recent years. Between 2007 and 2008, their operational budget sourced from corporate or philanthropic organizations increased from 7% to 15% (INTERPOL 2008, 2009a). The

Chapter 3

recent and rapid growth of private sector support to police and law enforcement internationally is a useful contrast to other organizations.

The International Centre for Conservation is heavily reliant on extraordinary funding to carry out its mission. Nearly 37% of the operating budget of the Rome Centre is derived from non-core sources (ICCROM 2009, 44), which, in percentage terms, is more than twice as much as the International Criminal Police Organization. Considering there are 127 member-states including all but two members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (ICCROM 2010b), private sector funding should be unnecessary. Therefore discovering why this organization is heavily reliant on external funding, and the role of professional and organizational cultures in this reliance is one of the cornerstones of this study.

Table 3-4 - Selection criteria for case studies

		ITU	INTERPOL	ICCROM
United Nations family		Yes	No	No
Organization Type		Transport / Communication	Security	Social / Environmental
<u>Partnership Types</u>	Policy Dialogue	Yes	No	No
	Advocacy	No	Yes	Yes
	Informational & learning	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Mobilizing private funds	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Operational	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>Partners</u>	For profit corporations	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Philanthropic organizations	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Non-Government Organizations	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Individuals	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Private Academia	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Public Academia*	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Other public institutions*	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>Drivers</u>	Financial stress	No	Yes	Yes
	Ideological change	No	No	No
	Leadership change	No	No	No
	Market efficiencies	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Emerging issues	Yes	Yes	Yes

* These are state bodies that do not represent the member-state in the organizations forum. They are included as they are often part of the ‘public’ representation in the global public-private partnerships.

Source: Own research and analysis of ICCROM 2011b; INTERPOL 2010b; and ITU2010b.

Although the main focus of this work is on organizations outside the United Nations, the International Telecommunication Union provides its own reasons for inclusion. Firstly, it is the only global international government organization in the communication / transport category to receive more than 10% of its budget from non-state sources. Second, the organization is one of the oldest international government organizations and pre-dates the United Nations by 80 years. Thirdly, while it has 192 state members, there are more than 700 telecommunication sector-members. Finally, the nature of international communications has always had a public-private nature, unlike development or health related organizations. Therefore a historical affinity and understanding exists within the Union for working with private actors.

Case selection for this study moved beyond choices based on curiosity, experience, media presence or random choice. The International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for Conservation in Rome represent: the refinement of a large dataset; a broad spectrum of policy spheres; financial engagement with the private sector; a United Nations agency, one with United Nations origins and a non-United Nations agency; a broad base of international membership with more than 100 member-states⁷ each; and three understudied classes of international government organizations.

The case selection process has produced a broader understanding of global public-private partnerships. To begin with, the partnerships are far from a universal phenomenon, with under a third of all international government organizations engaged in them. Secondly, all international policy arenas include public-private partnerships, thereby providing scope for continued expansion of the practice. Finally, global public-private partnerships are not unique to, or universal within the United Nations family.

Thematic analysis

This study is structured on a thematic analysis of the reasons why global public-private partnerships are formed. Four of the five analytical themes are drawn from the post-Global Compact literature – leadership, ideas, resources and global issues. Chapter one described how factors in these themes did not gel with personal experience and therefore an exploratory approach was adopted to re-examine why international

⁷ The *universal* aspect of these IGOs takes a *global* aspect because each case has more than half the nations of the world as members. As previously noted, some universal IGOs have relatively low membership.

Chapter 3

government organizations entered public-private partnerships. As a result of the exploratory approach, a fifth theme – cultures – became apparent after the data gathering phase of the research.

Between the literature review and data gathering phases of this research, 13 factors were identified as contributory to global public-private partnerships. Singular analysis of each factor proved inappropriate, particularly as some factors had little or no influence in the cases examined. For example, the factor claiming international government organizations changed from a neo-Marxist to a neo-liberal outlook may have currency in development agencies, but little or none in the cases explored herein. Furthermore, three factors related to the motivations of private actors, who are not the focus of this research. Therefore factors are grouped into umbrella themes. While the research focus is on the factors motivating public organizations, the thematic approach enables consideration of private-partner motivations where necessary.

Table 3-5 - Themes and factors driving global PPPs

Theme	Factors ¹
Cultures	Professional Cultures Organizational Cultures Macro-Cultures
Leaders	Change of leadership
Ideas	Ideological shift Managerial ideas (new public management)
Resources	Financial stress (through zero growth budgets) Market efficiencies Research & development dominated by private sector (e.g. pharmaceuticals)
Issues	Global issues (e.g. HIV/AIDS)

¹ excluding motivating factors of private partners.

Sources: modified from the work of Bull, *et al.* 2004; Bull and McNeill 2007, 2010; Buse and Walt 2000a; Buse and Walt 2000b; Kaul 2006; Lee *et al.* 1997; Tesner and Kell 2000.

The grouping of individual factors under each of the themes is discussed in detail in chapter one and does not warrant re-iteration here. The order in which the themes are presented in the empirical chapter begins at the most internal theme – the inherent cultures of an organization, and works its way to the most external – the global issues and desire for access by actors who are outsiders from the private sphere. The themes and the internal/external classification are not hard and fast barriers in which each

partnership neatly slots. Therefore the analysis is often required to consider factors across themes. For example when ideas influence cultures, or *vice versa*.

The discussion now moves to the empirical findings of my research. The following chapter explores each of the three cases in detail. The origins of each organization, their purpose, structures, membership and an example of their global public-private partnerships. Chapter four is presented as a foundation for the subsequent thematic analysis.

4. Three Organizations

An analysis of professional and organizational cultures and their influence on partnerships requires an understanding of the organizations in question. As Schein (2010, p.17) notes ‘any social unit that has some kind of shared history will have evolved a culture.’ This chapter will therefore examine the origins, evolution and structure of these ‘social units’ to further our understanding of their individual cultures. While professional and organizational cultures are discussed, the main purpose of this chapter is to provide a descriptive introduction to the case organizations, including examples of their global public-private partnerships.

In this chapter and throughout the study, the cases are discussed in the order that the organizations were founded – The International Telecommunication Union (1865), the International Criminal Police Organization (1923) and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (1959). A section for each organization considers in greater detail their origins, evolution of partnerships, governance structure and a detailed example of a global public-private partnership. The chapter compares the different features of the organizations and how these influenced their partnerships past and present. In essence, this chapter sets the scene for the subsequent chapters which frame the themes explaining why international government organizations participate in global public-private partnerships and the influence of professional and organizational cultures.

Communicating across borders and oceans

The International Telecommunication Union was created in 1865 as the International *Telegraph* Union¹ to bring order to the growing telegraph network in Europe. Invented in 1844, the telegraph brought unprecedented speed to long distance communication. Networks rapidly developed in and between European nations, as a result a number of questions of international significance arose: What was to be the technical equipment standards for cross border communication? What rate could be charged by public and private carriers? What rate could be applied by transit countries (for example a message from The Netherlands to Switzerland must transit either Belgian and French or German lines)? What code standard was to be used for message transmission? And what was to be standard language for international communications?

¹ For ease of reference, both the International Telegraph Union and the International Telecommunications Union – will both be referred to as the ITU.

These were just a few of the questions facing governments of the time. To resolve matters, the French government hosted the *Conférence télégraphique internationale* in Paris in 1865. The conference was arranged and run in accordance with the diplomatic norms of the day.

Twenty nations² attended the conference and signed the *Convention télégraphique internationale de Paris* (1865) (hereafter the Telegraph Convention). The Telegraph Convention adopted a regulatory tone with respect to private companies, calling on the contracting parties (i.e. member-states) to impose the regulations of the Telegraph Convention upon private companies (*compagnie privée*) (ITU 1865, art.61). Publicly owned telegraph networks prevailed in the signatory countries with some private networks. Notable exceptions from the Telegraph Convention signatories were Great Britain and the United States, excluded because of their wholly private telegraph networks (Hurdeman 2002, pp.106, 220-221). The absence of Britain excluded both its empire, which spanned much of the globe, and the privately owned Transatlantic Cable, which linked North America to the growing global telegraph network in 1866. At the second conference (Vienna 1868), rules concerning private companies were altered enabling Britain to accede to the convention (ITU 1868), thus establishing the partnership between the Telegraph Union and the private sector.³ The 1868 Convention also established a permanent secretariat in Bern, the International Bureau of Telegraph Administrations (ITU 1868, art.61). By the third conference (Rome 1871-2), private telegraph companies were represented in a non-voting capacity (ITU 2010d) and they have had a presence ever since.

Partnership evolution – from recognition to membership

The relationship between the International Telegraph Union and the private sector is a global public-private partnership as defined by this study. The inclusion of private companies and admittance of nations with private telegraph networks created the *relatively institutionalized* status which continues to this day. As technology developed, so did the Union and its partnership with the private sector.

² Signatories to the Convention were the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, the Free City of Hamburg, Hanover, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, the Russian Empire, Saxony, Sweden and Norway, the Swiss Confederation, the Ottoman Empire and Württemberg.

³ Soon afterwards Britain nationalized the telegraph network, but not the transatlantic cable.

Chapter 4

Since 1865, there have been 18 plenipotentiary conferences and many changes to the statutory documents of the Union. The rapid change in information communication technology over the years has historically necessitated major overhauls of the Convention and Regulations. At an extraordinary plenipotentiary in 1992, a permanent Constitution for the Union was signed. This Constitution complemented the Convention and Regulations and achieved some stability (ITU 2010d). However, the historic need for nations to continuously revise the statutes persists.

The need to adjust the Telegraph Convention was often due to technological developments. The telephone was patented in 1876, and within a decade the Union added the telephone to the Regulations (Berlin 1885). In 1903, the London Plenipotentiary Conference made the telephone a major part of Union work (ITU 1903, 2010d). The next major technological development was radio (1895). Berlin hosted two radiotelegraph conferences (1903 and 1906), which created the International Radiotelegraph Convention, and the International Bureau in Bern was tasked with administering this new convention (ITU 2010d). Between 1925 and 1927, the Union created three International Consultative Committees to provide ongoing forums in which member-states could discuss and resolve technical issues related to telegraphy, telephony and radiocommunication. Significantly, the radiocommunication committee allowed submissions from private operators, and the committee structure allowed for private representation (ITU 1929). Records in the Union archives indicate a representative of AT&T held an executive position on the International Consultative Committee on Radiocommunication (ITU 1930). The other committees later replicated the radio committee structure which facilitated private enterprise contribution to their work.

Matters were simplified in 1932, when the Telegraph Convention and Radiotelegraph Convention amalgamated to form the International Telecommunication Convention, which also renamed the Union as the International *Telecommunication* Union (ITU 1933). In 1947, the new Union became a United Nations specialized agency and the International Frequency Registration Board was established to manage the global allocation of the radio spectrum (ITU 1947). Technical innovations like radar, high-frequency broadcasting and television had changed spectrum usage. Without an orderly allocation of frequencies cross border transmissions could create radio interference, which presented a commercial problem affecting radio or television broadcasting and a safety issue for aircraft navigation or rescue coordination

(see Huurdeman 2003 for technical details on radiocommunication). Poor spectrum allocation could also interfere with military communications, making spectrum allocation an issue for government control, despite significant commercial interests.

The year 1947 also saw private actors further embedded in the statutes of the Union. Commercial enterprises were categorized as *Private Operating Agencies* defined as:

Any individual or company or corporation other than a governmental establishment or agency, which operates a telecommunication installation intended for an international telecommunication service or which is capable of causing harmful, interference with such a service (ITU 1947, p.53).

or *Recognized Private Operating Agencies*:

Any private operating agency, as defined above, which operates a service of public correspondence or of broadcasting and upon which the obligations provided for in Article 20 are imposed by the Member or Associate Member in whose territory the head office of the agency is situated (ITU 1947, p.53).

To illustrate the distinction, a corporation headquartered in New York and operating a transmitter in Canada is a *Recognized Private Operating Agency* in a United States delegation to a Union conference or committee; and a *Private Operating Agency* in a Canadian delegation to the same conference or committee. Participation in administrative conferences and the consultative committees was contingent on the *Recognized Private Operating Agency* contributing to the cost (ITU 1947, art.8). The main distinction between the two was within the consultative committees – *Recognized Private Operating Agencies* were able to vote in the absence of their member country, whereas *Private Operating Agencies* lacked this authority (ITU 1947, p.74). This mechanism was limited to a single vote per member-state irrespective of how many *Recognized Private Operating Agencies* from the member-state were in attendance. Despite these limitations, the Convention thus provided a mechanism for private authority to exercise power on behalf of a member-state.

Declining use of telegrams led to the International Telegraph Regulations and International Telephone Regulations being replaced by the International Telecommunication Regulations in 1988, with two major consequences. The new regulations helped facilitate privatization across the global telecommunication sector, and allowed private companies to lease lines for the transmission of data, enabling the rapid growth of the internet (ITU 2010d). These developments pushed the Union to change the nature of its relationship with the private sector.

Chapter 4

In 1992, the Union re-organized into three sectors, each with its own bureau: the Radiocommunication Bureau; Telecommunication Standardization Bureau; and Telecommunication Development Bureau. Each sector created an advisory group of representing member-states and the private sector, thus placing private operators in a more formal setting close to the decision making of the Union (ITU 1993). Private actors also actively participated in sector study groups. In 1998, the Union introduced *Sector Membership* for private actors, replacing the Recognized Private Operating Agency and Private Operating Agency concepts. Sector Membership brought wider rights and obligations to private actors. Later, an additional status of *Associate* enabled smaller entities with a particular interest to participate in specific sector study-groups (ITU 1999). Finally in 2010, the Union broadened its base and opened up to research and development institutions by creating a low cost form of membership called *Academia* (ITU 2010b). These three groups – Sector Members, Associates and Academia – are dominated by the private sphere and for the purposes of this study constitute the private partners of the International Telecommunication Union.

Governance diffused in the International Telecommunication Union

The Constitution, Convention and International Telecommunication Regulations underpin the current governance structure of the Union. The structure of the International Telecommunication Union created by the Constitution (Box 4-1, art.7) indicates the place the General Secretariat holds within the organization; last in a list of seven organs. This diminution is furthered through the constitutional role of the General Secretariat being described in a single article, whereas a chapter is dedicated to each Bureau. Harold Jacobson (1974, pp.62, 77) described the Union as being ‘almost a federation of four separate parts’, the creation and endorsement of which by the member-states ‘exacerbates the conflicts stemming from the lack of a clear-cut hierarchy on all issues and a consequent confusion in authority relationships’. In the intervening years, the names of the parts have changed, yet the confusion remains – at least to the outside observer.

Box 4-1 - The purposes and structure of the ITU**Article 1 The purposes of the Union are:**

2 1 The purposes of the Union are:

3 PP-98 a) to maintain and extend international cooperation among all its Member States for the improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds;

3A PP-98 a bis⁴) to promote and enhance participation of entities and organizations in the activities of the Union and foster fruitful cooperation and partnership between them and Member States for the fulfilment of the overall objectives as embodied in the purposes of the Union;

4 PP-98 b) to promote and to offer technical assistance to developing countries in the field of telecommunications, and also to promote the mobilization of the material, human and financial resources needed for its implementation, as well as access to information;

5 c) to promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunication services, increasing their usefulness and making them, so far as possible, generally available to the public;

6 d) to promote the extension of the benefits of the new telecommunication technologies to all the world's inhabitants;

7 e) to promote the use of telecommunication services with the objective of facilitating peaceful relations;

8 PP-98 f) to harmonize the actions of Member States and promote fruitful and constructive cooperation and partnership between Member States and Sector Members in the attainment of those ends;

9 g) to promote, at the international level, the adoption of a broader approach to the issues of telecommunications in the global information economy and society, by cooperating with other world and regional intergovernmental organizations and those non-governmental organizations concerned with telecommunications.

10 2 To this end, the Union shall in particular:

11 PP-98 a) effect allocation of bands of the radio-frequency spectrum, the allotment of radio frequencies and the registration of radiofrequency assignments and, for space services, of any associated orbital position in the geostationary-satellite orbit or of any associated characteristics of satellites in other orbits, in order to avoid harmful interference between radio stations of different countries;

12 PP-98 b) coordinate efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio stations of different countries and to improve the use made of the radio-frequency spectrum for radiocommunication services and of the geostationary-satellite and other satellite orbits;

13 c) facilitate the worldwide standardization of telecommunications, with a satisfactory quality of service;

14 PP-98 d) foster international cooperation and solidarity in the delivery of technical assistance to the developing countries and the creation, development and improvement of telecommunication equipment and networks in developing countries by every means at its disposal, including through its participation in the relevant programmes of the United Nations and the use of its own resources, as appropriate;

15 e) coordinate efforts to harmonize the development of telecommunication facilities, notably those using space techniques, with a view to full advantage being taken of their possibilities;

16 PP-98 f) foster collaboration among Member States and Sector Members with a view to the establishment of rates at levels as low as possible consistent with an efficient service and taking into account the necessity for maintaining independent financial administration of telecommunications on a sound basis;

17 g) promote the adoption of measures for ensuring the safety of life through the cooperation of telecommunication services;

18 h) undertake studies, make regulations, adopt resolutions, formulate recommendations and opinions, and collect and publish information concerning telecommunication matters;

19 i) promote, with international financial and development organizations, the establishment of preferential and favourable lines of credit to be used for the development of social projects aimed, *inter alia*, at extending telecommunication services to the most isolated areas in countries.

19A PP-98 j) promote participation of concerned entities in the activities of the Union and cooperation with regional and other organizations for the fulfilment of the purposes of the Union.

ARTICLE 7 Structure of the Union

The Union shall comprise:

- a) the Plenipotentiary Conference, which is the supreme organ of the Union;
- b) the Council, which acts on behalf of the Plenipotentiary Conference;

⁴ Paragraph numbering is per the original text. Bold paragraph numbers 2-19 were introduced by the Union for ease of reference; PP-98 refers to when amendments were made, in this case by the 1998 Plenipotentiary. The number *a bis*) is the French form; the English style would be *a ii*).

- c) world conferences on international telecommunications;
- d) the Radiocommunication Sector, including world and regional radiocommunication conferences, radiocommunication assemblies and the Radio Regulations Board;
- e) the Telecommunication Standardization Sector, including world telecommunication standardization assemblies;
- f) the Telecommunication Development Sector, including world and regional telecommunication development conferences;
- g) the General Secretariat.

Source: ITU 2011

The degree of complexity and precision the International Telecommunication Union has in its statutes is notable compared to the other cases. The basic texts issued at the end of the latest plenipotentiary amounted to more than 700 pages of Constitution, Convention, Regulations, resolutions etc. (ITU 2011). Three pages alone were required to explain the paragraph and margin numbering methodology for the Constitution and Convention. This precision becomes understandable when contextualized with the professional culture of engineers for whom highly technical documents are par for the course.

A complex governance structure

Jacobson’s (1974) observations above still hold true. Today, there are 63 executive or committee positions up for regular renewal and a good deal of effort is dedicated to electoral rules and elections within the organization (see Table 4-6 on page 108). Structurally, the Secretary-General and the Bureau Directors are independent in the running of the Secretariat and Bureaus. This can still lead to tension at the executive level (I.2 Anon. 2011; I.15 Anon. 2011). Much of the complexity has been generated over the years as successive plenipotentiary meetings have sought to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Bureaus.

Table 4-1 - ITU Sector membership distribution

	Development	Radiocommunication	Telecommunication Standardization	Total
Sector Members	320	250	272	580
Associates	8	23	144	169
Academia	11	13	27	37
Total	339	286	443	

Note: Totals are lower than the sum because private entities can belong to more than one Sector.

Source: ITU 2013 accessed 23 February 2012.

The structural complexity translates into the Union relationship with the private sector. Table 4-1 shows the spread of Sector Members, Associates and Academia across the

organization. While the secretariat manages membership, private actors instigate membership with one or more bureaus of their choosing. Therefore to examine a partnership, we need to look beyond the Secretariat and into a Bureau.

Case Study: Telecommunication standards: Alternative Approval Process

The Telecommunication Standardization Bureau has the most Sector, Associate and Academia members. Furthermore the negotiation of standards is closely linked to the private research and development, and finally, the approval process for standards described below represents a 'retreat of the state' (Czempiel 1989; Strange 1996) in the international sphere into a regulatory role, where the Alternative Approval Process for telecommunication standards is essentially run by private actors, and the outcomes endorsed by member-states. Therefore this Bureau and its standards approval process provide an insight into the partnerships of the Union.

In a world of liberalized market-places some order is necessary to ensure the most efficient outcomes are achieved. A key aspect of order is the technological standards to enable international communications. To illustrate, a failure to achieve a single standard is apparent to any international traveller with a mobile telephone. European and Australian travellers have encountered difficulties on arrival in the United States, which uses 850 and 1900Mhz as the standard phone frequency; whereas Europe and Australia operate on 900 and 1800Mhz (Huurdeman 2003). While the United States is one of the largest mobile telephone markets in the world, the lack of a global standard presents a frustrating situation and illustrates the importance of the issue.


This example is offset by the many successes of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau in achieving global standards, despite complications. The International Telecommunication Union has always provided a forum to negotiate standards for communication technology. This forum developed into the consultative committees, later evolving into the advisory and study groups outlined above. In the 21st century, the goal of standardization is complicated by the greater number of corporations and research institutions now involved in the profitable information communication technology market. Herein lies a dilemma – choice of one standard over another can mean millions, if not billions, in revenue for a corporation, as well as the flow on effect for the economies of nations hosting corporate headquarters, offices or manufacturing facilities.

Chapter 4

Another complication is the normally slow speed of bureaucratic decision-making. Slow bureaucratic decisions entail additional costs (Friedman 1970; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Delays in communication standards decisions can impose massive impediments on an economy. In the United States, the fractious nature of telecommunication provision and internet standards saw it fall behind Japan in terms of the digital access (Bleha 2005). If slow decision making in one jurisdiction is problematic, one could expect progress to be glacial at the international level, particularly in a forum such as the International Telecommunication Union, which comprises representation by 193 national governments and over 700 Sector Members, Associates and Academia. This however, is not the case.

The mechanism for dealing with decisions on standards evolved from the long involvement of the private sector with the International Telecommunication Union. As outlined in the previous section, private actors – be they Private Operating Agencies, Recognized Private Operating Agencies, Sector Members, Associates or Academia – have been given a voice in the standards process since the 1930s. The current system is called the Alternative Approval Process. The process provides a negotiating forum for the private sector, hosted by the International Telecommunication Union with their imprimatur on the standards decisions agreed by consensus. A corporate Sector Member of the Union can effectively propose a telecommunication standard, negotiate the details with research and development bodies and other concerned actors, and have it endorsed in 193 jurisdictions in a matter of weeks. Figure 4-1 illustrates the different actors and their involvement in the decision making continuum.

Figure 4-1 - Alternative Approval Process for Telecommunication Standards



Source: Conversations and personal communications with ITU staff during fieldwork.

Private actor access to the different levels of decision making in the Alternative Approval Process is on a user pays basis. Academia is the lowest cost form of access to

the process, set at one sixteenth of the sector member contributory unit and half again for academic institutions from developing countries. Table 4-2 below illustrates the structure of membership fees for both state and non-state actors. For their contribution, Academia may participate in the Study Group negotiation phase of the Alternative Approval Process. The next level is Associate status, which has been designed for smaller enterprises with an interest in a single aspect of telecommunications via the relevant Study Group. The cost for Associates is one third of the Sector Member contributory unit. For this Associates have full access to the negotiations for standards within their Study Group.

Table 4-2 - ITU membership fees

	Minimum contribution (CHF) ⁵	Developing Countries (per capita income <US\$2000) (CHF)
<u>Member-States</u>		
40 units (e.g. USA)	12,720,000	-
15 units (e.g. Australia)	4,770,000	-
1	318,000	-
1/2	159,000	-
1/4	79,500	-
1/8	-	39,750
1/16	-	19,875
<u>Sector Member</u>		
ITU-T & ITU-R	31,800	3,975
ITU-D	7,950	3,975
<u>Associates</u>		
ITU-T & ITU-R	10,600	10,600
ITU-D	3,975	1,987.50
<u>Academia</u>		
All sectors	3,975	1,987.50

1 Member-State contributory unit = CHF 318,000

1 Sector Member contributory unit = CHF 63,600

Source: ITU 2012c.

The final decisions in the Alternative Approval Process exclude Associates and Academia. Sector Members and member-states have final authority. In the majority of cases, member-state governments have limited interest in the process, consequently they are often absent from the proceedings. However member-state absence should not imply

⁵ The ITU uses the Swiss franc (CHF) as its operating currency. INTERPOL and ICCROM rely on euros (€). On 31 December 2011 the exchange rate €:CHF was 1.00:1.25.

their ignorance of proceedings – the Alternative Approval Process protects state interests through a system of notifications. The Bureau provides all member-states, Sector Members and Associates with a ‘Last Call’ notice inviting comment prior to final approval (Johnson 2011). Therefore a member-state can intervene to protect their real or perceived interests.

So how does the Alternative Approval Process affect the world? An example is the negotiations for a standard on ‘converged web browsing services on the next generation networks’. To summarize a complex technical document, the standard aims ‘to provide users with a consistent web environment which spans multiple network environments and multiple devices (PC, laptop, PDA, cell phone, etc.)’ (ITU 2008). While highly technical, the standard was approved within three months of the interested parties reaching consensus. Effectively 193 member-states recognized this outcome of the Alternative Approval Process as a global communication standard.

While the innovations in information communication technologies are increasingly complex and technical in nature, the Alternative Approval process illustrates how an administrative system has evolved to meet the needs of interested parties from the public and private spheres. The Alternative Approval Process caters primarily to commercial interests while allowing for policy and regulatory interventions by member-states.

International law enforcement cooperation

In contrast to the diplomatic origins of the International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Commission⁶ was formed by police and judicial officials. In 1923, the Viennese police commissioner invited police and law enforcement officials from around the world to the Second International Police Congress. The Viennese commissioner chose police officers and judicial officials because the congress followed nearly thirty years of aborted attempts by diplomats (including the first Congress in 1914) to establish a formalized means of international police cooperation (Anderson 1989; Deflem 2000, 2002b, 2002c; Masters 2011). The problems underlying the diplomatic attempts to organize international police cooperation can be linked to the issues of sovereignty. As Malcolm Anderson (1989, p.4) argued, policing can be seen as ‘the last bastion of the doctrine of sovereignty’. While the state holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, police are the traditional wielders of the domestic monopoly

⁶ Renamed in 1956 as the International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL.

Three organizations (Weber 1947, pp.146-147). Therefore negotiations at a political level continually stalled because delegates feared international police cooperation would impinge national sovereignty.

The congress delegates overcame the issues of high politics by focusing on the practical questions. How should police cooperate internationally? What standards should be used to communicate information about criminals? How should police avoid diplomatic entanglements on issues of state sovereignty? And what language should be used? Within five days the delegates had drawn up the first constitution for the organization (ICPC 1923). This document addressed many of the practical elements mentioned. The conference agreed to establish an international bureau in Vienna and the delegates from 19 countries⁷ undertook to cooperate with each other to the extent of their respective national laws (ICPC 1923). In this way police professionals established their own network and organization for international cooperation.

Cooperation between police internationally showed how police institutions in developed countries had achieved a level of autonomy from their political masters (Deflem 2000). However, looking to cooperate outside national boundaries did not extend to the private sphere. In the early records of the Commission there is a single reference to indicate police considered cooperation with the private sphere at an international level. In 1934, the agenda of the tenth meeting of the International Criminal Police Commission listed cooperation with private security companies (Dressler 1942, p.112).⁸ However this did not mean the Commission considered public-private partnerships in its early years. The agenda item refers to *police* cooperation - the precise nature of the handbook in which the reference is found (Dressler 1942) means it would have referred specifically to cooperation by the *International Criminal Police Commission* with private security companies. Furthermore the handbook, which details the manner in which the commission operated, makes no further reference to cooperation with the private sector and no other records indicate pre-war cooperation.

⁷ The International Criminal Police Commission, later renamed the International Criminal Police Organization refer to member-countries, not member-states. The original signatories were Austria, Belgium, China, Denmark, Egypt, Fiume, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and the United States of America.

⁸ The reference in the original German reads: *Zusammenarbeit der Polizei mit privaten Bewachungsgesellschaften*.

Partnership evolution – changing regulations and getting on with it

For more than half a century the concept of public-private partnerships failed to take hold with the International Criminal Police Organization. The organization itself went through several significant changes in this period. In 1938, the organization fell under Nazi domination following the *Anschluss* of Austria by the Third Reich. The headquarters relocated to Berlin and the organization came under control of the Gestapo (see chapter six for details of the Nazi leadership at this time). The period of Nazification lasted until the end of the Second World War (Deflem 2002a). Following the war, the organization was re-constituted in Europe. To prevent further abuse by a dominant power, the constitution was re-written to geographically diversify the executive structure, and importantly it became ‘strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character’ (INTERPOL 1956, art.3). These changes had no effect on partnerships as they were non-existent at the time.

Change came at the General Assembly in 1997. During budget committee discussions, the delegate from the United Kingdom suggested the appointment of a fundraising officer, in line with practices in his country (INTERPOL 1997a, p.9). Fundraising, he argued, could supplement the operations of the organization. It was acknowledged such a move ‘gave rise to hesitation and reservation’ (INTERPOL 1997a, p.9) – unsurprising considering the cultural reluctance of police to trust outsiders (See Table 2-5 on page 35). The organization appointed a fundraiser despite objections from Saudi Arabia and India, both these police delegates were concerned about easy money resulting in a loss of reputation (INTERPOL 1998b). The following year the financial regulations were altered by the General Assembly to provide an appropriate structure to account for the expected incoming private funds (INTERPOL 1998b).

The financial regulations changed to enable the Secretary General to ‘recover other income’ and for the ‘acceptance of donations and sponsorship’ (INTERPOL 2009b, regs 3.6 and 3.7). This represents the first structural evolution of the organization to facilitate its involvement in public-private partnerships. The wording of the regulations reflects the ongoing distrust of outsiders and is formulated to protect the reputation of the organization. This ensures the activities of any partner financially involved with the organization are ‘compatible with the principles, aims and activities’ of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL 2009b, reg. 3.7). How this applies in practice is examined below.

The first partnership – payment cards

The payment card industry, which started in America, globalized during the late 1990s. Card holders could be confident major cards would be accepted in most foreign destinations. However, theft and fraud emerged as problems for the industry, particularly when an international element was added (Madsen 2009, p.38-9). The transnational nature of payment card related crimes raised a multitude of jurisdictional and enforcement issues for all parties. Questions such as who was the victim – the payment card company, the card holder or the merchant? Where did the offence occur – at the point of sale, where the card was physically located or at the premises of company? Even who should take the report? Local police were often unsure of their jurisdiction in these matters. These factors were further compounded when merchants were presented with, or police seized a card from another country. Beyond the familiar logo (Amex, Mastercard, Visa etc), there was no simple way to determine if the financial institution purportedly issuing the card even existed, let alone the account in question.⁹

In 1999, the International Criminal Police Organization entered its first public-private partnership with five payment card companies - American Express, Discover Card, Europay International, Mastercard International and Visa International (INTERPOL 2000b). Prior to this formal arrangement, the companies had been meeting regularly with the police organization (Kendall 1995). These companies financially supported the development of a database detailing the forensic features of fraudulent and genuine payment cards (INTERPOL 2000b, p.21). Support for the database would have been impossible without the changes to the financial regulations outlined above. The database allowed police around the world to check seized cards to ascertain whether they were a genuine card, reported lost or stolen to the issuing company, or a fraudulent card. This proved to be a useful tool for police investigating large-scale organized criminal activity.

It could be argued that payment card fraud was a new issue triggering the partnership. To a certain extent this is true. However, companies like Amex developed payment cards on top of existing systems of consumer based international finance like their travellers' cheques. The fraud problem existed with these as well. Even though the fraud existed, no record of cooperation between the industry and the International Criminal

⁹ During my career (see preface), I dealt with dozens of payment card crimes with these problems.

Chapter 4

Police Organization prior to 1995 could be found. Inquiries about such fraud up to that point were handled through the network of National Central Bureaus. This system is described in detail below. Therefore the organization was aware of such transnational fraud, but made no move to partner with outsiders to resolve the problem until the partnership evolved.

The partnership with the payment card industry responded to both public and private needs in the international sphere. The card companies needed a transnational police response to stem financial losses, and police needed a reliable source of information and intelligence related to payment cards. More importantly, moves to cooperate with the payment card sector opened the possibility for further partnerships.

Since the partnership with the payment card industry, an interesting phenomenon has resulted from the broad scope of the organizations aims – once partnerships became an acceptable practice there has been no uniform approach. Partnerships are created and structured around existing problems using willing and appropriate partners and partnership types (see Table 4-4 on page 93). The variation in partnerships can be attributed in part to police culture and the organizational culture – this is discussed in detail in the next chapter. Meanwhile, the variety of partnerships led to a second structural change.

Immediately prior to the fieldwork for this research at the Secretariat General in Lyon, the International Criminal Police Organization created a Strategic Partnership Team. The organization created the team to coordinate and bring some semblance of order to the diverse partnerships initiated by the various administrative and operational units of the organization. The effectiveness and impact of this change cannot be assessed at this stage. However, considering the organization was provided with the research proposal and initial questions (see appendix 2), it is possible the organization was stimulated by this research to review its own internal practices.

Governance delegated in the International Criminal Police Organization

The International Criminal Police Organization has a simpler governance structure than the International Telecommunication Union. This reflects a pragmatic approach to international police cooperation, arguably a more complex undertaking than cross border telecommunications. The complexity is compounded by issues of sovereignty as well as the myriad types of transnational crime which the organization has to deal with.

By keeping the aims of the organization broad and the structure relatively simple, police retained their ability to act autonomously in their role, while remaining within the rule of law – two important characteristics of police culture.

To understand how the International Criminal Police Organization operates with partners, it is necessary to see how the organization performs the international functions laid out in Box 4-2. The governance arrangements are multi-levelled. At the top is the General Assembly, comprised of delegations from the member-countries. The members themselves are 'official police bodies whose functions come within the activities of the Organization' (Constitution, art.4), technically not the actual countries. Delegations each have a single vote in the General Assembly (art. 13). Beneath the General Assembly is the Executive Council, members of which are drawn from different geographic regions to prevent any single country or bloc taking control of the organization, as happened when Nazi Germany took control of the organization in the 1930s (Deflem 2002a). The Executive Committee is made up of the President, three Vice-Presidents and nine Delegates elected by the General Assembly. The day-to-day running of the organization is in the hands of the General Secretariat, its seven Regional Offices and the National Central Bureaus.

Box 4-2 - Aims and structure of the INTERPOL

Article 2

Its aims are:

- (1) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights';
- (2) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes.

Article 5

The International Criminal Police Organization - INTERPOL shall comprise:

- The General Assembly
- The Executive Committee
- The General Secretariat
- The National Central Bureaus
- The Advisers
- The Commission for the Control of Files

Source: INTERPOL 1956

The National Central Bureaus serve as a single point of contact in their respective member-countries for local law enforcement to access the network and the Secretariat

Chapter 4

General. Data concerning ordinary criminal matters¹⁰ and other policing issues are communicated via a secure web-based network. For example, police requiring information concerning an arrested foreign national communicate a request to their National Central Bureau, providing details such as fingerprints, photographs, particulars of the alleged offence and other information for inquiries overseas. The request is then sent to the relevant National Central Bureaus in member-countries, who arrange for local inquiries; results are then returned via the same route. In practice, thousands of messages are communicated daily on behalf of police services. Each National Central Bureau is staffed and funded by its own government and operates according to domestic laws. Requests are refused if they fall within the prohibitions outlined in the Constitution (INTERPOL 1956, art.3), or they contradict the law of the requested country. This research has not examined partnerships between National Central Bureaus and the private sector as these domestic arrangements occur outside the international sphere. Therefore we move to the international arm of International Criminal Police Organization – the General Secretariat.

Table 4-3 - Duties of the INTERPOL General Secretariat

- (a) Put into application the decisions of the General Assembly and the Executive Committee;
 - (b) Serve as an international centre in the fight against ordinary crime;
 - (c) Serve as a technical and information centre;
 - (d) Ensure the efficient administration of the Organization;
 - (e) Maintain contact with national and international authorities, whereas questions relative to the search for criminals shall be dealt with through the National Central Bureaus;
 - (f) Produce any publications which may be considered useful;
 - (g) Organize and perform secretariat work at the sessions of the General Assembly, the Executive Committee and any other body of the Organization;
 - (h) Draw up a draft programme of work for the coming year for the consideration and approval of the General Assembly and the Executive Committee;
 - (i) Maintain as far as is possible direct and constant contact with the President of the Organization.
-

Source: INTERPOL 1956

The General Secretariat has nine duties in the constitution (Table 4-3), which translate into tangible action through four core functions. First, providing secure global communication services for police. Second, providing operational data services and databases for police; these include fingerprints, lost and stolen travel documents,

¹⁰ An entire legal treatise is possible on what constitutes *ordinary law crime*. The distinction is made in the communication between NCBs – a description of the offence is required before a response is made. This description is judged by the requested NCB as to whether or not the offence under investigation is 'ordinary law crime'. Offences of a political, religious, racial or military nature are routinely refused in accordance with Art.3 of the Constitution (INTERPOL 1956).

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profiles, stolen vehicles databases and more (INTERPOL 2011e). Member-countries provide data at their own discretion (for example Australian police are prohibited by law from uploading DNA data to a foreign database (*Crimes Act (Cth) 1914*)).

International police operations and the private sector

Table 4-4 - Examples of INTERPOL partnerships

Year	Private Partners	Partnership details	Partnership Type/s
1995	Payment card industry	Intelligence provision and funding for a database to collate and disseminate information about valid payment cards and those reported as lost/stolen/fraudulent	Operational Resource mobilization: channelled private funding
2004	Sloan Foundation	Philanthropic funding for an international police anti-bio-terrorism training programme	Operational Information and Learning Resource mobilization: channelled private funding
2005	Various philanthropic organizations	Funding provided for a dedicated environmental crime officer	Operational Advocacy Resource mobilization: channelled private funding
2008	Pharmaceutical industry	IMPACT – International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce – multi-agency public-private concern addressing the issue of counterfeit medical products.	Advocacy Policy Dialogue Operational
2009	Crime Stoppers International	Operation Infra-Red – internationally coordinated intelligence on fugitives gathered by nationally based crime-stoppers groups	Operational
2010	High security printing industry	Project S-Print – intelligence provision for the monitoring of high-security printing hardware and software; process to confirm of validity of orders for high security print products (e.g. currency or passports)	Operational
2011	Underwriter's Laboratories University	International Intellectual Property Crime Investigators College – Standardized training of public officials and private investigators	Informational and Learning
2011	Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA)	Sponsorship for a ten year programme to train police in anticorruption investigations with a focus on corruption in football (soccer).	Operational Resource mobilization: channelled private funding

Source: Interviews and INTERPOL website

Chapter 4

The third core function is operational police support services including a Command and Control Centre to support national police services when required in emergencies or to coordinate international expert teams, for example forensics, from one country to assist another. The final core function is police training and development, which was added in response to member needs. The four core functions therefore fall within duties (a) to (e) and partially (f) of the General Secretariat.

With its much shorter history of partnerships with private actors the International Criminal Police Organization has not, as pointed out above, developed a uniform approach to public-private partnerships. This is compounded by the broad spectrum of criminal activity to which the organization responds on a global scale. With this in mind, this dissertation examines a series of divergent areas from both the operational and more administrative aspects of the organization. Table 4-4 above maps out this approach and highlights the range of private partners.

The only partnership type (see Table 2-2, page 21) not listed here are those involving the mobilization of resources through ongoing fundraising. The Organizational statutes changed to allow donations, however, these must be approved by the Executive Committee, thereby making this type of partnership bureaucratically cumbersome (INTERPOL 2009b, financial reg. 3.7). The approval process was designed in accord with a police culture concerned that funds should only come from donors whose ‘activities are compatible with the principles, aims and activities of the Organization’ (INTERPOL 2009b, financial reg. 3.7). The result is that the police culture and organizational culture have an impact on how partnerships are structured.

Different examples will be highlighted in this study to illustrate the partnerships of the International Criminal Police Organizations. This chapter already examined the payment card industry partnership, and below describes the case which sparked my curiosity—the Sloan Foundation sponsorship of bio-terrorism training. Chapter five explores some of the cultural friction which occurred when police and the environmental movement formed a partnership. Then chapter six revisits the payment card industry partnership to highlight how police culture influenced its leadership to champion private sector contributions. Chapter seven looks at how Project S-Print leverages organizational assets in a competitive market place of international police cooperation. Chapter eight explores the human resource support made available to Operation Infra-Red; and the tangible €20 million sponsorship from the world of

football. The global issue of counterfeit medical products and the partnership with the World Health Organization and the pharmaceutical industry provides an interesting juxtaposition of how two professional cultures are working together, but differently to address the same issue. Combined these cases show how the International Criminal Police Organization has a culture which shapes a diverse range of partnership types with a diverse range of partners on an *ad hoc* basis. The next chapter will unpack how both police culture and the organizational culture have influenced this diversity.

Case Study: The threat of bio-terrorism

Attacks using weapons of mass destruction have been the nightmare scenario for governments and law enforcement for a long time. Terrorist organizations have twice used bio-weapons in recent decades. In Japan, the Aum Shinrikyo religious sect used sarin gas to attack the Tokyo subway in 1995, killing 12 people and injuring 6000 more. Prior to this the sect attempted to use weaponized anthrax, which had proven so ineffective it was not detected by authorities until the investigations into the sarin attacks (Williams 2004). A transnational element was added to the Aum Shinrikyo attacks through their purchase of a property in Western Australia. At this property, the organization developed and tested their biological weapons. Anthrax was also the notorious bio-weapon used in attacks on Washington DC in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These genuine attacks, in combination with a wave of copycat incidents throughout the world have had an impact which resulted in billions expended by governments in response (Williams 2004). Bio-terrorism was clearly an emergent global issue requiring attention.

The partner

General Motors President and Chief Executive Officer Alfred P. Sloan established a foundation in his name in 1934 to make 'grants in support of original research and education in science, technology, engineering, mathematics and economic performance' (Sloan Foundation 2011). In 2000, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation established a \$US20 million bio-security programme. While predominantly focussed on grant-making in the United States, the Sloan Foundation accepted an application for funding from International Criminal Police Organization in 2003-04.¹¹ The application was approved and the International Criminal Police Organization entered its second major partnership

¹¹ See preface for details of the author's involvement.

Chapter 4

with a private actor, accepting US\$943,000 over two years to fund a bio-terrorism training programme (INTERPOL 2004). With the aforementioned billions being spent by governments at this time, it is one of the research puzzles as to why the police organization did not simply approach their richer member-states – particularly Japan and the United States who had suffered genuine attacks, with transnational elements – for additional funding.

The partnership solution

The answer to this lies in the historical context of the time. In 2003-04, when the International Criminal Police Organization applied for the grant from the Sloan Foundation, debates in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council were still in progress over whether or not Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. The issue was internationally divisive; therefore it would have been a far riskier strategy for an organization, with declared political neutrality such as the International Criminal Police Organization, to approach the United States or its allies directly for funding. By going to a philanthropic organization with an established presence in bio-security research, the General Secretariat avoided drawing these debates into its own General Assembly. From this perspective we can see the advantages of a global public-private funding arrangement under these circumstances, particularly for an organizational culture averse to political and diplomatic entanglements.

International conservation

In many ways, the origin and development of the International Centre for Conservation align with the development of the conservation profession. Before the Second World War, several international conferences arranged by professional associations enabled conservators from both public and private institutions to meet and discuss common problems (Jokilehto 2011, p.6). Progress was interrupted by the war which saw the destruction of historic sites in Europe and Asia, as well as the systematic pillaging of European patrimony by the Nazi regime (Edsel and Witter 2009). In the 50th anniversary history of the Rome Centre, conservator Jukka Jokilehto (2011, p.1) explained ‘the Second World War undoubtedly represented a watershed, raising heritage awareness definitively to international consciousness. Together with the loss of millions of lives and the immense destruction of property all over the world, there was also a vast destruction of art, ancient monuments, and historic towns and villages.’ In 1950, conservators established the International Institute for the Conservation of

Historic and Artistic Work (Jokilehto 2011, p.6). The following year, 1951, the Swiss delegation to the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization proposed to the General Conference an ‘international centre to encourage the study and the diffusion of technical methods of conservation and restoration’ be established (Daifuku 1969; UNESCO 1955). This was the first formal move to create the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. After several years of negotiation, the statutes came into force in 1958, with the adherence of its fifth member-state (Daifuku 1969).¹²

From the outset the Rome Centre had close ties with the private sector. The first Director – Harold Plenderleith – had been recruited from the British Museum, a public institution, but he had also been the first treasurer of the International Institute for the Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works, where he had worked closely with its President George Stout from Harvard, a private university and other professionals from the private sphere (Jokilehto 2011, p.6). In 1958, the first year of operation, Plenderleith accepted a commission from the Rockefeller Foundation to assess the state of their art collection at the Rockefeller training centre in Bellagio, Italy (ICCROM 1958-86). This act, one of the first for a public organization, helped to establish an organizational culture which would always embrace a collegial approach to conservation, irrespective of public or private status.

Partnership evolution – old associates and new partners

From the beginning, the International Centre for Conservation had partners embedded in its organizational structure. Although they are not mentioned in the purpose and function of the organization, private partners are important. Permanent seats on the Council have been reserved for representatives of the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Italian Government, the *Istituto Superiore per la Conservazione ed il Restauro* (Institute for Conservation and Restoration)¹³, the International Council of Museums and the International Council of Monuments and Sites. The latter two are private professional organizations and their representative sit on the Council in a non-voting capacity (ICCROM 2005, art. 5). This structure means the Council represents a broad cross section of public and private conservation

¹² The five founding states were Austria, the Dominican Republic, Spain, Morocco and Poland. By the end of the 1950s this had grown to 17 states.

¹³ The Italian Government and the *Istituto Superiore* have permanent seats as part of the host nation arrangements. The Italian government maintains the premises at the Rome Centre, and the *Istituto* are collocated in the same building. The *Istituto* is an agency of the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Activities.

Chapter 4

organizations and reflects the inherently collegial approach associated with conservation culture.

While it has a significantly shorter history than the International Telecommunication Union, the evolutionary process has also influenced why the International Centre for Conservation deals with non-member-state actors the way it does. As mentioned, the Rome Centre has enjoyed a collegial relationship with private actors from its earliest days. Beside the work for the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rome Centre benefitted from a donation by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation¹⁴ to seed a professional library of conservation and preservation texts (Jokilehto 2011, pp.20-21). These early interactions demonstrate the structure and statutes of the International Centre for Conservation were designed to enable the organization to access support beyond the confines of member-states alone.

The openness to non-state actors was further formalized in 1967, when the Centre introduced the concept of Associate Members to its statutes. By 1969, there were eight Associate members, including two foundations, a non-government organization and five state cultural institutions (ICCRUM 1969, p.46). Over the next two decades, this number increased rapidly, peaking at 125 in 1992. Associate Membership benefitted the organization in two ways. It helped to broaden the professional network into non-member countries and Associate Membership often preceded national membership, particularly when an institution such as a national museum lobbied their government to join. A modest fee of US\$100 applied for Associate Membership. However, the administrative costs of managing these members easily swallowed up this revenue.

By 1990, the role of Associate Members in the organization had become a topic of discussion at the General Assembly. Following a meeting of Associate Members in Ferrara, a decision was made to develop a long-term policy regarding their role in organizational activities (ICCRUM 1992). Associate Members were invited to participate further in the review process, and were surveyed for this purpose. The most critical result of the survey was the low response rate. It highlighted 'the difficulties in implementing a co-operation policy between ICCROM and a sizable number of widespread institutions often operating in very different socio-economical conditions' (ICCRUM 1993b). By 1992, the Council decided the burden of managing Associate

¹⁴ The Armenian oil merchant Calouste Gulbenkian, amassed a fortune in the first half of the 20th century. Much of this fortune he invested in one of the world's greatest private collections of art, which can now be seen in the museum named for him in Lisbon (See Yergin 1991).

Members had become too much for the small international government organization and placed a moratorium on new Associate Members. The decision was intended to enable the Centre 'during its strategic review process, to clarify and better define [the Associate Members'] role in the organization' (ICCROM 1993c).

By 1994, the organization distinguished between *passive* and *active* Associate Members. The former simply being on the books and the latter involved in the activities of the organization (ICCROM 1995b). The Director, Council and General Assembly also recognized a number of other organizations who were not Associate Members, yet actively supported conservation programmes. By 1996, all Associate Membership was discontinued (ICCROM 1997b). By this stage, a concept of partnerships was taking hold in the organization.

The transition from Associate Members to partners proved to be a lengthy process. Even though Associate Membership had been discontinued in 1996, the Director-General described Associate Members as 'being reinterpreted to mean ICCROM's operational partners' (ICCROM 1997a, p.40). In 1999, the Director-General was forced to clarify his use of the term *partners* as actually meaning Associate Members (ICCROM 1999). The confusion resulted from the term Associate Members remaining on the statutes and recognised by member-states in the General Assembly as a valid component of the organization. In 2001, the organization commenced listing *partners* in its annual newsletter (ICCROM 2001), which helped to push the Council into a resolution amending the legal structure of the organization, although this still took another two years. In 2003, the planned revival of Associate Membership was finally discarded and the concept removed from the statutes (ICCROM 2003a). Today, every programme run by the International Centre for Conservation involves the participation of active partners (I.27 King 2011).

Governance in the International Centre for Conservation

The Council of the International Centre for Conservation is smaller than the International Telecommunication Union, but larger than the International Criminal Police Organization. Box 4-3 lists both the purpose and functions of the Rome Centre (art. 1) and its organs (art.3). In terms of governance, the Secretariat plays the most important role day-to-day, followed by the Council and the General Assembly, the latter only meeting bi-annually. The Council has a minimum of twelve positions elected by the General Assembly. For every five member-states after the first thirty, another

Chapter 4

Council position is created, up to 25 in total (ICCROM 2005). Thus with 127 member-states, there is a full complement of 25 elected Council members. Beside member-state representatives in the Council, there are five *ex-officio* members, three voting and two non-voting described above. The Council provides the International Centre for Conservation with guidance on behalf of the member-states between general assemblies, which are held biannually.

Box 4-3 - The purpose and functions of ICCROM

Article 1 – Purpose and functions

- a. Collect, study and circulate information concerned with scientific, technical and ethical issues relating to the conservation and restoration of cultural property;
- b. Coordinate, stimulate or institute research in this domain by means, in particular, of assignments entrusted to bodies or experts, international meetings, publications and the exchange of specialists;
- c. Give advice and make recommendations on general or specific questions relating to the conservation and restoration of cultural property;
- d. Promote, develop and provide training relating to the conservation and restoration of cultural property and raise the standards and practice of conservation and restoration work;
- e. Encourage initiatives that create a better understanding of the conservation and restoration of cultural property.

Article 3 - Organs

ICCROM shall comprise: a General Assembly, a Council and a Secretariat.

Source: ICCROM 2005

Council members are ‘are chosen from amongst the best-qualified experts in the field of conservation and restoration of cultural property’ (ICCROM 2010a). These experts, however, are elected from those present at the General Assembly, and are therefore the endorsed representatives of the member-states. In most instances these are public employees from either a ministry or a cultural institution. In one instance, national representation was by two private conservation consultants,¹⁵ one of whom was subsequently elected to the Council (ICCROM 1999). Therefore the governing bodies of the Rome Centre have included the private actors.

In practice, the Council has not always proved expeditious in reaching decisions. Examples of this include the first Council taking four years to consider the finances of the organization (Daifuku 1969, p.15). This was not so much a delay by Council, but the lack of action by states who had promised to join, yet did not do so, frustrating the ability of Council to create financial stability (Jokilehto 2011, pp. 23-24). As described

¹⁵ The Australian delegation in 1999 was Jane Lennon, of Jane Lennon and Associates and Joan Domicelj, of Domicelj Consultants – the addresses of both were listed as their private firms in the ICCROM minutes.

above, the Council spent over a decade considering the status of Associate Members. One interviewee cited the case of Associate Members as illustrative of where the governance in the organization lay – with the Director-General and staff, not the member-states (I.25 de Güichen 2011). These examples of delay and inefficiency at the Council and General Assembly are in contrast to the more dynamic approach of the Director-General.

The International Centre for Conservation sees itself as reasonably autonomous of the member-states. The concept and inception of a programme to train museum professionals in sub-Saharan Africa described below is an example of this. Another is how the Director-General proposes the strategic direction for the organization to the General-Assembly, which is then subject to debate (I.17 Antomarchi 2011; I.19 Bouchenaki 2011; I.25 de Güichen 2011; I.27 King 2011). This is unlike the International Telecommunication Union where (particularly powerful) member-states attend with their own agenda in tow. For example, in 1988, the Director-General and senior staff changed the way the Rome Centre engaged in public-private partnerships over objections by a powerful member-state. The United States delegate, which provides over 20% of member-state contributions, raised concerns ‘private sector participation [should not] be considered as a replacement of funds from the governments’ (ICCROM 1988). While this may seem a surprising position from the nation usually championing free-market ideals, the objection did not change the progress toward partnerships as an alternative to the passive involvement of Associate Members.

The power to over-ride, alter or ignore the Director-General’s proposals statutorily rests with the General Assembly and Council, but in practice strategic direction for the Centre is set in Rome by the Director-General and senior managers. As one senior manager expressed it:

We are a small and professional organization, and most of our partners are also professional organizations. So we are able to start and develop activities as long as it is within the scope of the organization. But I feel that we have a certain freedom to act (I.17 Antomarchi 2011).

By setting the agenda, the professionals who run the organization continue to pursue a variant of the academic desire to have freedom of research. Whether this involves public or private actors is immaterial from the conservator perspective. The need for

conservation research and teaching sets the course of action. The following example of a long term partnership highlights how priorities are put into practice.

Case Study: Training conservators in Africa

The International Centre for Conservation has managed long term, multi-partnered activities that run for decades. Initiated in the mid-1980s, the clumsily titled *Preventive Conservation for Technicians and Restorers Working in African Museums South of the Sahara* (hereafter the African museums programme)¹⁶ responded to the threat to cultural heritage in the region and relied almost exclusively on external support (ICCROM 1986-1994a). Saving African heritage presented two over-riding problems. The size of the project itself was daunting. Sub-Saharan Africa consists of almost fifty nations between Chad and Cape Town, including many of the world's poorest countries. The second problem related to the number of preservation and conservation approaches needed in Africa. A large portion of the moveable cultural heritage of the region consists of objects made from wood, feathers, fur, leather and the like. Such objects are susceptible to rapid deterioration in poor environments or from pest infestations (UNESCO and ICCROM 1968). These issues raised fundamental planning questions such as where were resources to be allocated? Should resources be concentrated in key museums and historic sites? And what would work? Above all it meant conservation practice needed to be tailored for the African environment.

The Rome Centre was familiar with both African students and working in Africa. Conservation professionals from the Centre had delivered museum conservation training to students through European based courses, provided in-situ training and co-produced an edited volume on conservation techniques suitable for tropical conditions (UNESCO and ICCROM 1968). Assistant Director Gaël de Güichen – who had delivered training in Africa on numerous occasions – realized whenever he returned to a museum or cultural institution, the people he had trained were no longer there. In effect, there was no embedding of professional knowledge in African museums (I.25 de Güichen 2011). Following a meeting in 1985 with his Director General, de Güichen and his assistant Catherine Antomarchi were given free rein to develop a pilot for a sustainable training programme for African conservators.

¹⁶ In-house, the programme was referred to as PREMA, short for Prevention Museums Africa. For those unfamiliar with the programme, the official title is cumbersome, and the short title can leave one asking 'preventing what?' For this study, I will refer to it as the African museums programme.

De Güichen and Antomarchi set the strategic goals of the Programme to ensure they aligned with the strategic aims of the Centre and potential partners. One of the first things de Güichen did was to note the map in his office showed a large blank space occupied by sub-Saharan Africa, graphically illustrating where training was most needed (I.25 de Güichen 2011). This region was to be the targeted recipient of the pilot programme. With this in mind, the strategic goals for the pilot programme were articulated as:

Long Term Objectives:

(a) To ensure the conservation of the collections in the museums of sub-Saharan Africa

(b) To establish a network of African professionals who can take charge of training related to the conservation of cultural and movable heritage in sub-Saharan Africa (ICCROM 1986-1994b).

The first objective outlined the core mission of the programme, whereas the second spelt out the need for the programme to ‘stick’ once delivered. Similarly the short term objectives addressed skills transfer and overall sustainability.

Short Term Objectives:

(a) To teach the fundamental principles of conservation (prevention and maintenance) adapted to the conditions in the museums of sub-Saharan Africa

(b) To teach the basic procedures necessary for the long-term preservation of the collections:

- the detection and analysis of environmental problems (climate and pests, for example)

- the prevention, the stoppage and the treatment of deterioration of objects in the museum

(c) To develop the communication skills of participants such that they be able to transmit effectively the knowledge they have acquired to their colleagues (ICCROM 1986-1994b).

In 1985, the total revenue for the Centre from member-state contributions was US\$1.28 million (ICCROM 1986). By comparison, the pilot phase (1986-89) of the Africa programme cost \$US1.11 million (ICCROM 1986-1994b). Covering this cost would have resulted in significant cuts to other activities; making internal financing out of the question. Therefore, the programme was 100 percent externally financed with 38 percent from private sources (Table 4-5). Partnership support for the African

Chapter 4

museums programme also came from the Universities and other institutions, whose contribution in time and expertise are not financially quantified.

Table 4-5 - African museums programme resource providers 1986-88

Partner Type	Supporters	Value of support
International Government Organizations	UNESCO European Economic Community	12%
Governments (Museums, Aid Agencies)	France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the UK	50%
Corporations	The Airline UTA	3%
Philanthropic Foundations	Dapper Foundation, Ford Foundation, Skaggs Foundation, Getty Trust Getty Grant Programme	35%

Source: ICCROM 1986-1994b.

University support added prestige to the African museums programme. The International Centre for Conservation secured the cooperation of the University College London Institute of Archaeology and the University of Paris I *Panthéon-Sorbonne*. These universities helped the Africa programme to run in both English and French. Each academic institution supported a series of the ten-month long *International University Course in Conservation Management for Museum Personnel of sub-Saharan African Countries* on a biennial basis. Students from French speaking nations in Western Africa attended Paris, and those from the English speaking East attended London. Within five years, the University course was physically delivered in Africa, still under the imprimatur of the *Panthéon-Sorbonne* and University College London and in cooperation with host academic institutions (ICCROM 1986-1994a, 1986-1994b).

Two national courses also ran each year, one in Francophone West African and the other in Anglophone East Africa. The national courses were three months in duration and provided basic training in preventive conservation. A different African museum hosted each course, with their own staff and those from regional museums in attendance. The national courses imparted skills and knowledge to participants and underpinned the development of a strong cadre network of African conservation professionals (ICCROM 1986-1994a, 1986-1994b).

The pilot programme ended in 1988, and was succeeded by an ongoing programme which continued until 2000. The success of the pilot meant many of the financial

supporters stayed on board for the longer term (ICCROM 1986-1994b). The funding structure continued to rely on extra-budgetary funding from both public and private bodies. This entailed ongoing close liaison with partners to ensure the inward flow of financial support and feedback to ensure they were aware of progress and developments. Clear programme objectives and activities for African museums programme proved integral to the value of the feedback. Reports to partners linked their funding to the outcomes, expressed in terms of completed university or national courses and the number of successful participants. The reports were enriched with details of how the sub-Saharan nations and institutions benefitted from the training, the improvements to conditions within the institutions and what the course meant in terms of progress toward achieving the strategic goals of the programme (ICCROM 1986-1994a, 1986-1994b). Feedback in the form of radio and television coverage was important. Donors were regularly advised of, and provided with copies of media articles and transcripts. In real terms for the programme, de Güichen believed every newspaper article was 'worth \$25,000' for the programme (I.25 de Güichen 2011). In essence, the continuous feedback loop ensured on-going support.

By 1998, conservation practice had deep roots in the cultural institutions of the sub-Saharan region. Instructors were drawn from the ranks of graduates, achieving the goal of a 'network of African professionals who can take charge of training related to the conservation of cultural and movable heritage in sub-Saharan Africa' (ICCROM 1986-1994b). There was 'an active network of nearly more than 400 museum workers from 46 African countries sharing knowledge and experience ... with a focus on preventive conservation' (ICCROM 1998b). Despite these numbers and the successes to date, the ongoing lack of domestic resources within African nations threatened the sustainability of the programme. Therefore the Rome Centre conducted a workshop series on partnerships and fundraising for conservation professionals. Each workshop addressed various practical aspects of conservation and preservation practice. Topics included financial evaluation of projects; funding through partnerships; presentation of projects to potential sponsors; fund management; communication with sponsors and the media; and establishing long term partnerships (ICCROM 1998a). These themes matched closely the way the International Centre for Conservation managed the overall programme at a macro-level, and reflected the increasing need for cultural institutions to look to external support for continued operation.

Chapter 4

The Sixth Review Meeting, at the end of the African museums programme, resolved to create two institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, one to serve the French and Portuguese speaking nations and the other to serve the English speakers. In Porto Nuovo, Benin, the *Ecole du Patrimoine Africain* (School of African Cultural Heritage) was established with a teaching faculty of programme graduates. In Kenya, the Programme for Museum Development Africa was established. Both were self-funded non-government organizations focussed on teaching professionals and increasing awareness of cultural heritage, particularly among African children (ICCROM 2000, p.24). The self-funding modelled itself on the African museums programme thus carrying over the model of public and private funding.

Comparative overview

This chapter has illustrated how the origins, evolution and structure of each organization influenced the manner in which they engaged in global public-private partnerships. Historically, both the International Telecommunication Union and the International Centre for Conservation have always participated in public-private partnerships. These historical experiences can be understood as an integral part of the organizational culture of both. The International Criminal Police Organization has a comparatively shorter history of involvement in public-private partnerships. This organization has met, and on occasion continues to meet, resistance from police culture, which is averse to the concept of cooperation with non-police actors in law enforcement.

Evolution

Global public-private partnerships are an evolving and emerging phenomenon. From an evolutionary perspective, the dominance of commercial and technical input from the private sector into telecommunications has shaped the highly structured manner in which the International Telecommunication Union has formalized its public-private partnerships. In contrast, the policing culture of the International Criminal Police Organization blocked the evolution of partnerships with the private sector for decades. However, once this cultural impediment dissipated, a plethora of partnerships emerged – albeit tempered by ongoing suspicion of outsiders. At the International Centre for Conservation, the academic culture of conservation professionals resulted in the creation of an organization transcending any conceptualization of a public-private divide.

It is clear the structural arrangements of all three organizations have been altered to accommodate their evolving partnerships. These changes have been minimal in the International Criminal Police Organization, which altered its financial regulations to achieve a basis for partnerships. Similarly the International Centre for Conservation made a minor change, however their change removed private actors from the statutes, while in reality the organization strengthened its partnership formula. In the case of the International Telecommunication Union, there have been many changes to the organizational statutes relating to how it deals with private actors. However, a careful look reveals while much has changed on paper, little has changed in practice. Since the 1930s private actors have contributed in market-dominated areas of international telecommunication, and have their voice filtered through member-states in other areas.

These changes have been administrative in nature, to facilitate the legal basis for public-private partnerships as approved by the member-states. This in turn removes some of the legal ambiguity inherent in the 'soft law' of the international arena (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Furthermore the structural and administrative changes are negotiated and approved by the member-state forums of each organization, thereby lending some credibility to the multi-cultural requirements, which need to be accounted for (albeit with disproportionate weight often given to powerful states). Finally, and in one sense, part of the democratic deficit critique is addressed through the representatives of member polities giving voice to constituent concerns. The resultant decisions are transparently available in their final form, and in many cases the decision making process is equally transparent with private actors participating in the deliberation in at least the International Telecommunication Union and the International Centre for Conservation.

Governance

Ideally the executive head of an international government organization would have a free hand to manage his or her organization in the most effective way to meet organizational goals. However, these global public bodies are constrained to varying degrees by their member-states. Sometimes these organizations and their leaders are 'dutiful agents' of the states (Cortell and Peterson 2006), sometimes they are autonomous actors (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The level of agency or autonomy varies between organizations and with fluctuations in temporal and environmental context.

Chapter 4

Essentially, the executive governance framework in each case is endorsed by member-states. In each of the three cases, the framework reflects the desire of member-states to retain control on the activities of the international government organizations. This control varies between organizations as it is balanced with a number of practical measures to prevent daily activity becoming bogged down through a constant need to refer strategic decisions to 100+ member-states for ratification. The practical measures include appointment of an executive head, whose activities are oversights by an Executive Council or Committee. Table 4-6 gives an overview of the executive governance structure in the three organizations to illustrate the complex governance structures. Council / Committee members are usually technical experts elected by their peers from the general assemblies, as are the executive heads.

Table 4-6 - Executive governance structures

Elected Positions	ITU	INTERPOL	ICCROM
Executive Head	Secretary-General	Secretary-General	Director-General
Other Elected Officials	Deputy Secretary-General 3 Directors of the Bureaus	President 3 Vice-Presidents	
Council / Executive Committee	ITU Council 46 states	INTERPOL Executive Committee The President and Vice-Presidents and 9 delegates (13 members)	ICCROM Council 25 expert members 5 unelected ex-officio members (30 members)
Other Committees	12 members of the Radio Regulation Board	Commission for the Control of INTERPOL Files 5 independent expert members	ICCROM Council Bureau 3 members elected from the Council
Total elected positions:	5 Executives 58 Committee positions	5 Executives 14 Committee positions	1 Executive 25 Committee Positions

Source: ICCROM 2005; INTERPOL 1956; ITU 2010b.

Partnerships

The International Telecommunication Union, International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for Conservation all have strong relationships with the private sector. However, these relationships are different in their nature. For the International Telecommunication Union, the role of Sector Members, Associates and Academia in the approval process for telecommunication standards illustrated how

member-state governments have retreated from international processes where they have declining interest. The Union, through its Sector Members ensures the process remains relatively smooth for the benefit of the global telecommunication market and its customers. A much broader range of partnerships is employed by the International Criminal Police Organization despite a deceptively simple mandate. Criminal law enforcement requires a broad range of operations and programmes to tackle transnational crime; as a result the organization needs to take an equally broad approach to public-private partnerships. The ability of the International Centre for Conservation to deliver programmes spanning decades in association with a multitude of partners can be seen in their African museums programme. However, because of the strong academic nature of the International Centre for Conservation, its partnerships are essentially a mix of information and learning partnerships supported through resource mobilization.

The origins, evolution and structure of each organization have influenced their approach to global public-private partnerships. Yet there is more to the partnerships than this. With a better understanding of each, the research now turns to the thematic chapters to see how professional and organizational cultures within these cases influence their global public-private partnerships.

PART 2

5. Cultures

Culture influences how international government organizations initiate, structure and operate global public-private partnerships. The founding professionals imprinted many of their guiding beliefs, values norms and assumptions onto the cultures of the organizations they created. In turn, every decision and action of the organizations became subjected to the lenses of their specific cultural biases (Douglas 1978, 1982). In two organizations – the International Telegraph Union and the International Centre for Conservation – the professional and organizational cultures were open to working closely with private actors. In these organizations the cultures operated both as independent variables, motivating the early partnerships, and also as intermediate variables, influencing how other motivating factors were interpreted and acted upon. For many years, police culture in the International Criminal Police Organization operated with the opposite effect, preventing the formation of global public-private partnerships for that organization. This cultural inhibition effectively contained the influence of other motivating factors for decades. Yet in recent years, a shift in the organizational culture has enabled partnerships despite the continuing reticence of police culture. To understand how this happened, this chapter will examine the various forms of cultural influence in the case organizations. This explains the different cultural bias in each case, which in turn shines a different light on the other motivating factors analysed in the subsequent chapters.

Professionals built the organizations involved in the case studies of this thesis. They are all professional organizations (Ott 1989). After the diplomats signed the *International Telegraph Convention* in 1865, engineers took responsibility for its implementation. In 1923, senior police bypassed the diplomats altogether to create the International Criminal Police Commission and in 1955, museum and conservation professionals were tasked by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization to lay the foundations of the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. It is true more than one professional culture may exist within an organization (Schein 2010, pp.2-5); however, engineering, police and conservation cultures were those of the founding professionals, providing the *raison d'être* for each case study.

Schein (2010, pp.2-5) identified four categories of culture that influence organizations. These are macro-cultures such as nations, ethnic or religious groups and certain occupations that exist globally like doctors or lawyers; organizational cultures; sub-cultures of occupational groups within organizations (professional cultures) and micro-cultures within or outside organizations. This chapter discusses three of Schein's categories of culture. Macro-cultures are briefly considered in the following section. The bulk of the chapter focuses on professional and organizational cultures, which are central to the thesis developed by this study. Micro-cultures must remain unexamined because proper analysis would require additional fieldwork beyond the resource limitations of this research.

Macro-cultures

Macro-cultures influence how an international government organization operates. Four macro-cultures have been identified in the literature or observed during fieldwork for the cases – those of the host nation, international civil service, powerful member-states and professions. These macro-cultures differ from organization to organization, however the typology is consistent.

Proximity and interference of the host nation culture

The influence of national macro-cultures is mostly negated through the case selection. Each organization has more than 100 members, thus presenting a multi-nation cultural environment in each, although this neutralizing effect is somewhat diminished by the influence of the culture of the host nation. The international atmosphere of Geneva and Switzerland has an influence on the operation of the International Telecommunication Union. The French culture in Lyon dictated the working conditions in the International Criminal Police Organization for decades (Forrest 1955, p.32; Nelson 1999). Finally, Italy and the historic surrounds of Rome influence the training provided through the International Centre for Conservation. This proximity often aids partnerships. For example, of the 546 Associate Members and Partners the Centre had between 1968 and 2010, 93 were Italian (see appendix 4). These host influences are important on occasion and will be analyzed where necessary. Otherwise, the focus of this study is on the influence of the professional and organizational cultures.

International civil service

The second macro-culture is the culture of international civil service. Both the International Telecommunication Union and the International Centre for Conservation have employment and pension conditions aligned to those of the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC 2013; I.27 King 2011). Proximity to other international government organizations reinforces the culture of international civil service. Geneva is an international city and has been since the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919. In addition to the International Telecommunication Union, a broad range of international government organizations¹ and international non-government organizations like the Red Cross are present in the city. In Rome, there are five international government organizations,² which cooperate in areas of common interest such as security and facilities. For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization allows the International Centre for Conservation to use its conference facilities for General-Assemblies. This is because the Via San Michelle headquarters of the Rome Centre is too small to host the 129 member-countries (I.19 Bouchenaki 2011). Only the International Criminal Police Organization and the World Health Organization International Agency for Research on Cancer are located in Lyon. Therefore, staff at the police organization have fewer opportunities to directly interact with or be influenced by other international civil servants. The police organization has its own regulations for employment, which incorporates the international civil service principle of service to international needs and not the interests of their nation (INTERPOL 2009b).

Powerful states

The third macro-culture is less tangible – the influence of powerful state actors within an international government organization. These can include the host nations. These states often provide large portions of the budget. The United States contribution – usually the largest – is often tied to their domestic political agenda. Recently, the United States withdrew its funding from the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (22% of member-state contributions) after the organization recognized Palestinian membership (Lynch *et al.* 2011). However, such influence is often negated through the democratic processes inherent in the organizations, whereby smaller states working together can exert their own influence (see Cortell and Peterson 2006). The

¹ Geneva hosts the secretariats of WIPO, ILO, IOM, IPU, UNHCR, UNHCHR, WHO, WMO, UNAIDS, WEF, WTO as well as the UN Palace of Nations.

² Rome hosts the FAO, IFAD, WFP, UNIDROIT and ICCROM. See appendix 1 for full names.

politics and power games within international government organizations are well covered in the global governance literature (for example Hawkins *et al.* 2006; Mattli and Woods 2009), therefore this macro-culture will only be considered when it directly impacts on global public-private partnerships.

Professions

The final macro-culture is of professions. Professional cultures serve two roles, firstly as a sub-culture within an organization, and secondly by presenting a set of common values and beliefs applicable to most practitioners worldwide (Schein 2010, pp.2-5). Professional culture is dealt with throughout this study. At times it is in the role of a macro-culture, such as the professional influence exerted at the establishment of each organization. At other times professional culture is the dominant sub-culture within an organization as it exists today. Professional cultures often transcend organizational and international boundaries. Features of professional cultures, such as engineers' commitment to science (Florman 1987); police *esprit de corps* (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010); or academic freedom of inquiry (Adams 1998) represent examples of the transcending nature of professional cultures. International government organizations are effectively a platform for the reinforcement and transmission of professional cultural traits around the globe. Furthermore, the prevalence of partnerships helps professional culture span the public and private spheres. As a result, professional values, norms, accreditation, training, rules and decision-making processes are embedded in each organizational culture (Hofstede 1997, 2001; Ott 1989; Schein 2010). These in turn are important in shaping the different way each international government organization creates formal and informal partnerships with the private sector.

Studying their specific professional and organizational cultures

Professional culture can dominate an organizational culture. The founders of the case organizations came from their respective professions and therefore imbued the organizational cultures with the traits of their professions (Ott 1989; Schein 2010). The role of founders is discussed further in the next chapter, but this factor is relevant herein. According to Bloor and Dawson (1985, p.281), an organization can be made up of predominantly one profession – they classify these as professional organizations. The fact that the three cases are professional organizations dominated by engineering, police and conservators means separating what is a trait of professional culture from one of organizational culture is problematic. In any given situation a cultural characteristic may

be applicable to the profession, the organization, or both. Therefore while this section focuses on the professional cultures, on occasion it includes aspects of organizational cultures of the International Telecommunication Union, the International Criminal Police Organization and the International Centre for Conservation in Rome. The following sections discuss the formal and informal influence of professional and organizational cultures on partnerships for each organization. The influence of culture on public-private partnerships is further illuminated by a case-within-case study for each organization. Thus showing how professional and organizational cultures are important factors of difference for determining how partnerships are approached and formed. With a selection of the traits examined, the final section will turn to the specific characteristics of the organizational cultures identified in the research.

'Committed to a connected world'

The motto of the International Telecommunication Union (above) is proudly displayed on the Union homepage (ITU 2010c) and reflects the values of the organization. This commitment aligns with many of the characteristics of engineering culture - *a passion for creating artefacts that help shape and sustain a world full of the complexity and richness of human life* (Sharp *et al.* 2000, p.40); *an ideology that stresses the centrality of technology, and of engineers as producers of technology* (Hacker 1981; Leonardi 2003, p.2; Robinson and McIlwee 1991, pp.403-404); *a commitment to science and to the values that science demands* (Florman 1987, p.76); and the *willingness to forego perfection, recognizing that we have to get real and useful products "out the door"* (Florman 1987, p.76). As detailed in chapter four, the Union has been working closely with the private sector for well over a century; private capital finances international telecommunication infrastructure, and most of the significant technologies have been developed by scientists and engineers conducting research and development outside government circles (Hurdeman 2003, pp. 601-605; I.10 Johnson 2011). Engineering has a culture committed to science and technology which is a natural fit for the public-private partnerships of the Union. Thus we see, from this seemingly simple statement, engineering culture suffuses this international organization; an unsurprising circumstance considering the organization has been developed over nearly a century and a half by engineers. So how does this engineering culture influence partnerships with the private sector?

Engineering influence on the Union

Other professional cultural features of engineering effect how the public-private partnerships operate. A selection of examples illustrate how broad cultural characteristics like ritual, and more specific features such as the desire for predictability shape the way the International Telecommunication Union interacts with its private sector members.

Hofstede *et al.* (1990, p.8) argued rituals are ‘cultural activities that are technically superfluous in reaching desired ends, but which, within a culture, are considered as socially essential: they are therefore carried out for their own sake.’ In the International Telecommunication Union, certain organizational rituals are essential to the conduct of meetings and the management of delicate issues. These are conducted outside the formal meetings of the organization:

Negotiations are always done in side meetings ... and then the solutions brought back into the formal meeting. The chairman always uses the same words – now probably as in 1865 – when it is a delicate compromise, where every word, any slight change and the whole thing will collapse, [he then asks] “Can you accept this text?” (I.10 Johnson 2011).

The negotiation rituals held outside the room opens space for private actors to enter or contribute to debates where they may otherwise be voiceless in the formal sessions. This reflects a practice born of 19th century diplomatic norms combined with the practical nature of engineers to resolve impasses. For example an informal committee was appointed to meet separately and consider key questions on private company responsibilities for archiving material at the second conference (ITU 1868, pp.260-1). Similar ad hoc groups still operate at Union meetings, working to clarify wording and achieve consensus before presenting material to formal sessions (see ITU 2010a, document PP-10/12(Add.1)-E, pp.33-34). The composition of such side groups is known to all and those with an interest are able to contribute. These meeting rituals are embedded within the organizational culture of the Union and align with the cultural norms of engineering described below – creative pragmatism and a desire for structure and predictability. These examples show the ritual behaviours, although aligned with norms more familiar to diplomats, works because it does not compete with or contradict the expectations of engineers.

Another feature of engineering culture identified by Florman (1987, p.76) and Sharp *et al.* (2000, pp.40-41) is the creative pragmatism reflected in the process used by

Chapter 5

public and private actors to approve telecommunication standards (see chapter four). Essentially, a general consensus on the standard is sought rather than unanimity. This feature balances the creativity associated with new technologies and the practical need to get them to where they will be of the greatest benefit.

A desire for structure and predictability is linked to the scientific nature of engineering culture (Bloch 1986; Florman 1987; Sharp *et al.* 2000). This desire is strongly reflected in the membership arrangements for private actors as well as the limitations placed on their involvement in administering and contributing to the work of the Union.

Partnership in the form of sector membership comes at a price and the price 'buys' the amount of access a private actor can have (see Table 4-2 for the scale).

Recent research into engineering culture explored the male domination of the profession (Hacker 1981; Leonardi 2003; Robinson and McIlwee 1991) and changes in the gender perceptions of the sector (Zavrel 2011). This male domination of the profession exists in the International Telecommunication Union. While the organization employs 372 women compared to 337 men, in the 'professional and higher' category men outnumber women by more than two to one (222 men and 103 women) (ITU 2010a, document PP-10/20-E, p.39). A side theme of the gender-based research noted how engineers working on government projects (directly, or through contracted firms) had less freedom to research and experiment. Restrictions on research and development often stemmed from a requirement to comply with a high level of regulation and procedures (Robinson and McIlwee 1991). As a public organization, the International Telecommunication Union is heavy on rules and regulations. Its *Basic Texts*, issued after the last Plenipotentiary Meeting, ran to more than 700 pages (ITU 2011). Such a concise and restrictive document blended an engineer's desire for working within structure and predictability with a public engineer's desire for regulation. This may not be compatible with private enterprise pushing for freedom of inquiry, but it is a cultural factor helping shape when and how the International Telecommunication Union engages with private actors. These features are now embedded in the organizational culture.

The Weltanschauung of the International Telecommunication Union

At the managerial level, the perception of the Union was one of an organization composed of all its parts with the most important being the members. To understand this it is worthwhile quoting one of the Directors at length:

Well a mistake that's often made is that people refer to the secretariat as the ITU, and seem to forget that ITU is 192 member-states – 192 governments and all the sector members and associates, over 700 private sector entities and other organizations. So, I mean, when you refer to ITU, that's what you're referring to as the organization with its membership. Its membership far outweighs the secretariat in terms of rights and obligations ... it's the membership that produces the output with the assistance of the secretariat. We facilitate the work, we provide excellent facilities and the latest technology to ensure the work is carried out efficiently and we can make suggestions on how to improve the work, how to make things more efficient. We can also make suggestions on improvements to procedures. We might make suggestions on new areas of work and we try to be proactive, but it's the membership that takes the decisions. We can suggest something, but if the members don't agree then that's it (I.10 Johnson 2011).

Similar attitudes were found among other interviewees at the International Telecommunication Union. Although these attitudes reflect a culture of international civil service, they also closely aligned with features of engineering culture – working within structure (Bloch 1986); being highly regulated and bureaucratic when working for government[s] (Robinson and McIlwee 1991); and a commitment to social order (Florman 1987). While the private sector has a place within the Union, it is a well-defined place.

Working in partnership with the private sector has been a feature of the International Telecommunication Union for such a long time it is now a part of the organizational culture. The historical development of Union partnerships with the private sector was discussed in chapter four and the contemporary formal arrangements are analyzed below.

Rules of the International Telecommunication Union

Underpinning an organizational culture are the written rules of an organization; and these effectively shape the formalized norms. In many international organizations these rules and how they are acted upon are subject to staff interpretation in line with their perceived notions of what these rules actually mean (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p.5). It is therefore to be expected, the more ambiguous the mission statement of an international organization, the greater the scope for interpretation and flexibility – and as argued by most observers of international organizations, the greater the opportunity for expansion and growth (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hawkins *et al.* 2006). However, in the case of the International Telecommunication Union the opposite story applies – it is an organization with little scope for interpretation and is more tightly bound than either the International Criminal Police Organization or the International

Chapter 5

Centre for Conservation to the wishes of its membership constituency, both public and private.

The International Telecommunication Union has a long history of amending its complex and specific set of rules to be followed by both staff and members. These rules have developed and changed over time. Until the Constitution was endorsed in 1992, each Plenipotentiary session of the Union would revisit and refine all aspects of the various conventions within its ambit. Even following the adoption of a ‘permanent’ Constitution there have been regular amendments to both it and the Convention. In 2010, the Guadalajara Plenipotentiary issued the aforementioned 700+ page tome of basic texts which set the parameters for how the organization operates. These complex rules frame the manner in which the union forms its partnerships with private actors.

Space limitations preclude a detailed analysis of the whole document and the myriad other policy documents generated by the union, therefore a select sample will suffice. The text of what is discussed here can be found in Box 4-1 on page 81. Article 1 of the constitution details the purpose of the International Telecommunication Union; the opening paragraph outlines cooperation between member-states – the key actors in the organization. This is followed by a call to ‘promote and enhance participation of entities and organizations in the activities of the Union and foster fruitful cooperation and partnership between them and Member States for the fulfilment of the overall objectives in the purposes of the Union’ (ITU 2011, par. 3A). Later paragraphs discuss the promotion of ‘constructive cooperation and partnership between Member States and Sector Members’ and cooperation with non-government organizations (ITU 2011, par. 8, 9). This demonstrates how the organizational culture of close cooperation with the private sector has manifested itself into the formal rules of this organization.

Furthermore, Article 1 illustrates the priorities of the Union and how they align with the membership. The various purposes of the Union are detailed in paragraphs 1 through 9, and the more restrictive directions of paragraphs 10 to 19. The ordering of the latter half of article one shows the priorities member-states place on the activities of the organization. First and foremost is the control of the radio frequency spectrum. This sector of Union operations is a priority for states as it is closely linked to national interests of security and commerce (paragraphs 11 and 12). Next are telecommunication standards. This sector is of less concern to nation-states as technological development is

dominated by the private sector (paragraph 13). The provision of technical assistance to developing countries (paragraph 14) comes third.

We can now see the rules of the Union underpin an organizational culture placing nation-states as the first priority, the interests of private-sector commercial entities second and telecommunication development third. This ordination does not match the historical development of relations with the private sector. Terrestrial telecommunication was developed first – the telegraph in 1844 and the telephone in 1876. Whereas radiocommunication – wireless telegraphy (1895) and radiotelephony (1907) – soon overtook terrestrial technologies as the more important means of communication for state military and political purposes (Hurdeman 2003, pp.89, 275). The close interest of member-states in controlling the radio-spectrum has changed little over the years. As noted by Jacobson (1974, p.75), the reluctance of member-states to empower the International Telecommunication Union to either monitor or enforce rules in this regard is long established. The development of all telecommunication technology is dominated by private interests, but states retain veto power over all areas of Union activity including telecommunication standardization. An example of how this works is detailed in the case study in Box 5-1.

Box 5-1 - Case study: Listening to professionals and achieving consensus

Member governments have the most interest in radiocommunication. They reserve the right to over-rule decisions made in relation to telecommunication standardization, but otherwise leave it up to the private sector to develop new communication technology. Governmental interest in telecommunication development is aimed at closing the gap between the haves and the have-nots in respect of information communication technology. These are the formal arrangements of the Union; however the informal arrangements reveal a much greater role of the private sector even in the field of radiocommunication.

Inspection of the attendance list of the World Radiocommunication Conference in 2007 shows 2,546 people attended as part of member-state delegations and only 95 as representatives of recognized operating agencies (i.e. private companies) (ITU 2007). These figures disguise the fact many of the national delegations included private companies. For example the United States, the bastion of free enterprise, included 67 advisors and observers from the private sector in their delegation of 158. Even Venezuela included two private representatives in their smaller delegation of 19 (ITU 2007). This shows the private sector has been given a voice even in this predominantly public controlled sector of the International Telecommunication Union.

The voice given to the private sector is, however, muted. This is due to the fact these representatives of private enterprise are in effect working for their respective governments when appointed to the delegation. Their role is to ensure any potential impact on the commercial life of the nation is not overlooked by the delegation when it agrees to new rules for international radiocommunication (I.15 Anon. 2011). This changed role for the private partners is in line with the attributes of the professional culture of engineers – i.e. innovative in private enterprise, compliant in public service. Furthermore the backroom negotiations between public and private members of member-state delegations are another level of the organizational tradition of achieving consensus, as outlined above.

Chapter 5

The International Telecommunication Union has a long and close relationship with the private sector on the back of the shared values and world-view of telecommunication engineers. The engineering perspective in both the formal and informal sense has shaped the organization, and shapes the highly structured manner the Union approaches partnerships. Later chapters will show how the professional culture frames all other factors attributed to public-private partnerships of which this organization is engaged.

‘Connecting police for a safer world’

The motto for the International Criminal Police Organization captures the dominant cultural feature of policing – an insider/outsider worldview (INTERPOL 2011e). The motto only mentions police, irrespective of their partnerships with many other organizations. The organizational culture has changed to accept partnerships, while many police professionals remain sceptical. The motto reflects an espoused value of organizational culture, which sees police as the main constituency of the organization.

The International Criminal Police Organization is the latest of the three cases to form partnerships with the private sector. The rule changes of the late 1990s, outlined in chapter four, came about because of both external and internal pressures and are discussed in chapters six, seven and eight. This section discusses police culture and the organizational culture of the International Criminal Police Organization and their influence on global public-private partnerships.

Changing the ground rules for police

The cultural distrust of outsiders by police manifested as a norm in the International Criminal Police Organization for almost seven decades. This cultural aversion to outsiders meant private sector interaction was marginal at best and partnerships were non-existent. One interviewee recalled early private sector input in the form of donated equipment and technology – not partnerships. Now funds are also provided along with the equipment through formalized partnerships (I.20 Fingerprint Coordinator). This reflected how far the behaviour of the organization has changed with only minor changes to the formal rules.

The rules applicable to the International Criminal Police Organization are set in the Constitution and regulations. This Constitution has undergone changes over the years, but not nearly to the same extent as the International Telecommunication Union. The first iteration of the Constitution was laid down at the formation of the International

Criminal Police Commission in 1923. This remained little changed until an update in 1939 to relocate the headquarters to Berlin and formalize control by the Nazi regime (Deflem 2002a; Martha 2010). A further amendment was made at the post-war re-constitution of the organization in 1946. The final significant amendment occurred in 1956, when the name was changed to the International Criminal Police Organization (Martha 2010).

These early versions of the Constitution did not envisage partnerships with the private sector. Police perceived themselves then, and now, as an instrument to exercise the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Weber 1947, pp.146-147; Anderson 1989, pp.13-14), thus differentiating themselves from the broader community (Skolnick 1966, 1994). As a result the early Constitutions reflected the professional distrust of any outsiders. For example, the first Congress in 1923 declared ‘that [the Congress] is indispensable for an efficacious functioning of the Criminal Police, that the Authorities of Public Safety in all countries should be in direct relation, and that all mediation, particularly diplomatic, should be avoided’ (ICPC 1923). As police did not want the intervention of their own government representatives, they were even less likely to seek private input.

In the 1990s, the organization changed its rules to accept private funding (see the previous chapter). Despite the change from a norm suspicious of outsiders to rules enabling public-private partnerships, police culture remains a factor in inhibiting a constitutional embrace of public-private partnerships. Even now, the facilitating rules for public-private partnerships are found in the financial regulations of the Organization (INTERPOL 2009b, pt 2, Ch.3, pp.15-17) and not the Constitution. Unlike the Telecommunication Union and the International Centre for Conservation, private partners are not seen as part of the constituency of the International Criminal Police Organization. In effect, they will probably always be viewed as outsiders irrespective of their partner status.

Values of International Policing

Like the other organizations, the International Criminal Police Organization has its organizational vision – *connecting police for a safer world* and mission – *preventing and fighting crime through enhanced international police cooperation*, posted on its website (INTERPOL 2011e). Both the vision and mission reflect first and foremost the organizational commitment to its core constituency – operational police officers and law

Chapter 5

enforcement agencies. Further investigation of the official website soon turns up multiple references to private partners working with police in a diverse range of law enforcement activities such as protecting intellectual property or enforcement laws to protect the environment (INTERPOL 2011e). This indicates a change in the organizational culture, however the insider/outsider feature of professional culture is still a strong influence on the manner in which partnerships are undertaken.

An insider/outsider Weltanschauung

While the literature on policing has identified many aspects of police culture (see Table 2-5 on page 35) not all have an immediate impact on the public-private partnerships of the organization. The negative features of police culture like bias, brutality, sexism or racism (Barker 2011; Prenzler 1997; Sherman 1978; Skolnick 1966, 1994), do not lend themselves to the creation and maintenance of legitimate partnerships. In fact, it is police self-awareness of the negative cultural factors imposing a high level of scepticism and caution when approaching private actors – private money is too easily connected with bribery and corruption (I.7 INTERPOL Official). This is a reflection of the cultural feature of the organization historically favouring ‘insider’ partners (i.e. public law enforcement agencies) over ‘outsiders’ (i.e. everyone else).

The insider/outsider worldview developed by police provides a plausible explanation as to why the International Criminal Police Organization kept the private sector at arms-length for more than seven decades. Through training and experience, police learn (rightly or wrongly) to place their trust and reliance in *each other* (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010, pp.187-190; Monjardet 1994). This feature manifests first within individual police organizations, making it a common feature across organizations within the same field (Hofstede *et al.* 1990; Hofstede 1997), in this case law enforcement. Insider status is then extended across the profession of policing, enabling international police cooperation in the first place (chapter four and Deflem 2000, 2002b). This strong sense of reliance on one-another promoted a sense of distrust in outsiders who were seen generally as unreliable and ignorant of the requirements of ‘the job’ (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010; Kiely and Peek 2002; Monjardet 1994; Prenzler 1997). With this embedded attitude to the outside world it can be seen how the International Criminal Police Organization would have found it difficult to open up to public-private partnerships.

When change did come, it was linked to a public and political backlash against the negative features of police culture. A series of reviews and inquiries about police behaviour around the globe were held in response to incidents which made the public and politicians question their respective police services (For an overview of the major inquiries see Prenzler 2009). In Britain, many reforms came under the banner of new public management practices for police (Bevir 2010; Hanney 1995), which in turn provided the catalyst for changes in the International Criminal Police Organization's approach to private partnerships (see chapters four, seven and eight for details). In the United States, post-war changes in society – the spread of suburbs and the decay of inner-city environs – were not always matched by changes in police practice. Reform in America resulted from efforts to create greater public value in all areas of public service (Moore 1995, pp.200-206; 2013, pp.19-69). Creating greater public value necessitated greater interaction between police and the society they served, thus helping to break down the dominance of the insider/outsider culture.

Box 5-2 - Case study: Blue culture meets green culture

Since the 1960s, civil society organizations have raised awareness of the ecological cost of industrialization and the damage to bio-diversity through over-exploitation and loss of natural habitat. A concept of *environmental crime* has emerged (Robinson 1993), which resulted in international treaties criminalized polluting behaviour, the trade in endangered wildlife (Brack 2002; White 2008), and illegal logging (Graycar and Felson 2010; Madsen 2009). All told, international environmental crime is estimated to be worth \$US20-40 billion annually, equivalent to five to ten per cent of the value of the illegal global drug trade (Brack 2002). Yet the effort to enforce environmental law is disproportionately small, although everyone is potentially imperilled by environmental crime.

Police culture is not always immediately compatible with civil society activism. In the field of environmental crime, many civil society partners have a confrontational history with law enforcement. The environmental movement is renowned for civil disobedience, and the police are often brought into conflict with these movements (I.11 Environmental Crime Manager 2011). What has resulted is an ingrained wariness in the cultures of both sides of the equation. One official described how even the language of policing – law enforcement; investigation; arrest; prosecution; and criminality – is confrontational to potential civil society partners, who see this as a 'hard core' approach. To partners it is unsettling to think their funding may lead to a person's incarceration. To them this is a breach of criminals' human rights, irrespective of what they have done to another creature or the environment. Here it must be remembered countries such as China have imposed the death penalty for environmental crimes. However terms such as rule-of-law and good governance are more acceptable and enable progression of partnerships (I.11 Environmental Crime Manager 2011).

Police also find partnerships with the environmental movement disconcerting. An official imitated the attitude he had heard from other police 'Urrgh, the green element – I remember them when I was a young officer, and now we've got to work with them' (I.11 Environmental Crime Manager 2011). These tensions between the two cultures have contributed to shaping a relationship in constant need of maintenance and attention. Unlike the International Telecommunication Union and engineers, the cultural differences in the newer partnerships between the 'thin blue line' and the green movement means nothing in the partnership can be taken for granted.

Chapter 5

The change to the insider/outsider aspect of police culture is a slow, developing process. The case study above (Box 5-2) illustrates the effectiveness of changes when police accept private partnership and also the difficulties of accepting a new conceptualization of how the policing profession operates.

Despite opening up, police culture remains a powerful force in shaping relationships with the private sector in several ways. The insider/outsider attitude meant early partnerships were developed via former police who had gone into the private sector as security consultants (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011; I.11 Environmental Crime Manager 2011; I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011). The task-oriented nature of policing socializes police into brief interactions (I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011). Even (relatively) long-term relationships established over extended investigations are limited by the processes of law enforcement—once judicial processes are complete, no professional reason requires police to maintain a relationship. Therefore, extended contact with ‘outsiders’ is, generally speaking, unfamiliar territory for police. (Fielding 1988; I.11 Environmental Crime Manager 2011). It is also true the managerial reforms are not yet universally accepted (I.3 Anon. 2011). Even where they are, these reforms can be resisted or subverted by police practitioners (Bevir 2010; Moore 1995, 2013), or managers fearful of corrupting influences or conflicts of interest (Bevir 2010; I.3 Anon. 2011; I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011). Police culture has therefore been an influence on the timing and formation of the International Criminal Police Organization’s public-private partnerships.

‘Conserving culture, preserving dignity’

The motto of the International Centre for Conservation reflects how culture is at the core of their operations (ICCRUM 2010a). Even the formal name – the International Centre for the Study of the Restoration and Preservation of *Cultural* Property – further underscores this focus on culture. The operation of the Rome Centre is dominated by the professional culture of conservators – a culture drawing many characteristics from academia including the academic values of freedom to conduct research and teaching, autonomy, flexibility and the opportunity to contribute to knowledge (Adams 1998). These professional values are further reflected in the autonomous nature of the organizational culture at International Centre for Conservation. The point here is the organization is self-aware of its professional and organizational cultures. This awareness is evidenced in the way change was managed in the 1990s (chapter four and six). Furthermore, this section shows how the Rome Centre played a central role in the

formulation of the written values for conservation professionals (see chapter two and ICOM 1984).

Conservation culture and the private sector

Conservation culture is a hybrid culture for a profession sitting between multiple academic disciplines and hands on practice. Kagan (2009) describes three academic cultures: the study of the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities. All three have a place in the research and teaching of conservation practice. To the academic aspects of research and teaching, hands-on practice and application of skills forms an integral part of conservation (ICOM 1984; Keck 1978; Stout 1975). The International Centre for Conservation has had from the outset, and continues to have, culture at the heart of the organization and in the minds of those who work there. The organization came into being from a resolution of the United Nations Educational Scientific and *Cultural* Organization, and *cultural* is part of the official title of the Rome Centre. However, this is *what* the organization does, not *who* it is.

As a teaching and research institution, the International Centre for Conservation is an academic organization with an academic culture. More specifically the Centre has a culture aligned with the multi-disciplinary profession of conservation. Looking at academia more broadly, Clark (1987) demonstrated academic culture can be divided many ways – by discipline and sub-discipline, by institution and by status. However, he also pointed out many of these divides are fluid with overlaps like scales on a fish. The profession of conservation overlaps many academic disciplines. Taking those disciplines listed by Clark (1987, pp.39-40) many are related to the work of the International Centre for Conservation. In the physical sciences there is physics, chemistry and earth sciences; in the biological sciences bacteriology applies; the social sciences like sociology, anthropology and archaeology all have a place; the humanities contributes to conservation through languages, literature, history and even music; the study of the ‘hard’ professions like engineering, industrial arts, architecture and design are important; and the ‘soft’ professions including education, arts, religion, theology, and library work are also important. Thus the profession of conservation is a hybrid drawing elements from any or all of these disciplines and more as required. What brings together the various disciplines involved in conservation is their shared value of preserving and restoring cultural artefacts; a value cutting across both the public and the private spheres.

Chapter 5

The Rome Centre has somewhat of a curious relationship between its organizational and professional cultures. The influence of conservation professionals established the culture of the organization (see chapter two), yet for many years the profession itself remained transfixed between scientific study and conservation practice. In 1978, Keck lamented on this issue as had Stout (1975) a few years earlier. Both believed the profession of conservation needed to be defined to gain the respect they felt was needed among museum curators and other art professionals (Keck 1978; Stout 1975). The issue clearly had the attention of the profession because later in 1978, the International Centre for Conservation's committee of Training and Standards considered the first draft of what would become *The Conservator-Restorer: A Definition of a Profession* – a statement of professional values and practices. The International Council of Museums, a partner organization with a permanent seat on the Rome Centre's Council, eventually issued *The Conservator Restorer* (ICOM 1984). What it means to be a conservator has therefore been settled for a generation, and new practitioners have a solid professional culture into which they are socialized and to build their careers upon. In effect, the professional culture influenced the organization and the Rome Centre in turn heavily influenced the professional culture.

Conservation values

The Conservator/Restorer lists eight activities related to the profession. Six of the eight professional activities relate directly to the cultural object. The conservator must be responsible for the way objects are treated; preserve the physical integrity of the object to retain its documentary value; be aware of what the objects' documentary value is; intervene in the object only in accordance with a scientific methodology; consider the consequences of each manipulation of the object; and apply manual skills coupled with theoretical knowledge when working directly on the object. The remaining activities frame the necessity to collaborate closely with curators and other museum professionals as well as across disciplines (ICOM 1984, art. 3). Accordingly, the professional culture gives primacy to cultural objects above concerns related to public or private ownership. In addition, conservation culture is one of collaboration, further diminishing the public-private distinction.

Box 5-3 - ICCROM strategic directions**Training**

To ensure the quality and relevance of ICCROM training

Research

To reintegrate and re-emphasize the important role of materials science, scientific methodologies, and conservation science in ICCROM's programmes and activities;

to ensure that ICCROM continues to take an interdisciplinary approach and integrate the results of research in conservation-related fields.

Communication, information, and advice

To ensure that ICCROM remains a reliable and up-to-date source of information and advice for Member States.

Source: ICCROM 2010d

The formal values of the International Centre for Conservation are outlined in its strategic direction on its official website and reproduced in Box 5-3 above. Like the other cases, the priority order reflects the organizational culture. Training and research are the dominant values of academic cultures and sub-cultures. The research strategy also reflects the interdisciplinary nature of conservation culture. While member-state interests are included in this brief set of strategies, they take a comparatively lower priority than those of the member-states of the International Telecommunication Union (see Box 4-1, page 81), whereas member-states do not feature at all for the International Criminal Police Organization (see Box 4-2, page 91). Informally, at least one interviewee spoke of how he felt the organization was held back by the member-states in formal settings and real progress was made when the organization operated autonomously (I.25 de Güichen 2011). He cited the African museums programme and the change of status for Associate Members. Hence, it is evident the International Centre for Conservation values its academic autonomy.

Conservation culture mixing public and private

The exchange between public and private in the conservation profession has a long and enduring history. Although records indicate conservation work occurred during the Renaissance period – examples include the early cleaning of Michelangelo's frescoes in the Sistine Chapel or the re-touching of Da Vinci's *Last Supper* – conservation took on greater scientific rigour and focus over the last two centuries (Jokilehto 2010; Stoner 2005). Scientific luminaries including Michael Faraday and Louis Pasteur conducted analytical studies of paint in the 19th century and the first museum laboratory was established in Germany at the *Staatliche Museen* in 1888 (Stoner 2005, p.41). In Italy,

Chapter 5

the *Opificio delle Pietre Dure* (Workshop of semi-precious stones), which the Medici family established as a jewellery workshop, transformed into a conservation laboratory at the end of the 19th century. In the early 20th century this organization shifted from being a private enterprise into a public institution (Acidini 2012). Throughout the 20th century conservation developed a more professional disposition.

The professional culture of conservators developed through the middle of the 20th century through professional training. It moved from an apprenticeship to more formal education and training programmes in both Europe and the United States (Stoner 2005, p.50). This aligned with the process of professionalization in other occupations (Bloor and Dawson 1994; Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933; Wilensky 1964). Today, the profession exists with all the markers of other cultures; it has its norms, perceptions, symbols, heroes, beliefs, behaviour and rituals, and stated and implied values (Bloch 1986; Gibson *et al.* 2009; Hofstede *et al.* 1990; Pettigrew 1979). Many of these were instigated by the pioneers in the field, who themselves have become the heroes of the profession.

For example, Stout is referred to in the profession as one of ‘the Fogg founding fathers’ (Stoner 2005, p.41). The title refers not only to where he and his colleagues worked – the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard University – but sets them up as heroes by linking them to the American archetype of founding father. Stout spent five decades at the Fogg, which is essentially a private institution – although he took time out for public service during the Second World War in an army unit responsible for protecting Europe’s cultural heritage from wartime damage (Edsel and Witter 2009).³ Before and after the war, Stout developed scientific techniques including rudiments (understanding raw materials), degradation (understanding the causes of deterioration), and reparations (stopping and then repairing damage). This development of scientific techniques helped to shift conservation from an art practice into a more scientific one (Edsel and Witter 2009, pp. 25-26; Stoner 2005, p.41) making conservation more a profession than a trade.

Stout’s equivalent in Britain was Harold Plenderleith who headed the conservation laboratory at the British Museum – a public institution. Plenderleith was later the first

³ Coincidentally, Stout’s war service is to be depicted by George Clooney in an upcoming feature film, *The Monuments Men* based on Edsel and Witter’s (2009) study of the same name. It could be expected Clooney’s depiction in *popular* culture will have a positive effect on the *professional* culture of conservation.

Director of the International Centre for Conservation (ICCRUM 2012).⁴ The published research of the Fogg founding fathers and Plenderleith provided the classic technical texts for the profession, which are still in regular use (Stoner 2005). Thus the culture of conservation always spanned the public-private divide and continued to do so in the work of the International Centre for Conservation.

How does professional culture shape the organizational culture?

The core value of conservation is preserving and restoring cultural artefacts irrespective of ownership. This value was evidenced in one of the first tasks of the Rome Centre. Staff carried out an examination of the conditions of storage and display for the Rockefeller Foundation collection at Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio (ICCRUM 1958-86). Despite being ostensibly an international public body, there was no hesitation in aiding and cooperating with a private organization; thus demonstrating the values of the conservation profession are focussed on the object, not the ownership. This focus, and the pursuit of the most appropriate scientific or technical solution to conserving objects for future generations forms the world-view of the International Centre for Conservation.

This world-view has translated itself into a permanent reliance on partnerships to give effect to the organizational goals. The number of partners engaged with the International Centre for Conservation reflects the embedded nature of partnerships in the organizational culture. The 2007/08 *ICCRUM Newsletter* listed 148 partners, 38 of which came from the private sphere (ICCRUM 2008, 25). Overall, this research found that the organization has had more than 550 Associate Members or partners since the late 1960s (See appendix 4). As one interviewee expressed it, '[we] have always partnered and we've always realized...we really do realize how important that is' (I.27 King 2011). This quote sums up how the International Centre for Conservation views the way the world of conservation operates.

The professional culture of conservation and the organizational culture of the Rome Centre downplay the divide between public and private spheres. However, this professional and organizational diminution of the divide does not mean it is an issue completely devoid of meaning and impact on both the profession and organization. The following case study (Box 5-4) illustrates how the International Centre for Conservation

⁴ Plenderleith's role as founding Director is discussed in chapter six.

has recently dealt with the changing nature of public or private ownership and the management of cultural heritage.

Box 5-4 - Case study: The Catania Conclusions

The importance of conservation culture crossing the public-private divide is an issue the Rome Centre is mindful of. So much so that in 2007, the centre arranged an international forum to explore privatization and cultural heritage (ICCROM 2007b). This forum brought together conservation experts from around the world to consider the changes in public sector management of cultural heritage and the increasing role of the private sector.

The forum produced the *Catania Conclusions*, which acknowledged some of the important factors which needed deeper consideration by the profession in a changing global environment. Important among these was the recognition 'The share of state-owned cultural heritage versus privately owned cultural heritage varies from country to country and therefore no single approach is advisable. Any approach developed for partnerships between public and private should be flexible and adapted to specific situations in the world' (ICCROM 2007b, p.5). This conclusion – along with the others discussed more fully in chapter nine – formally expresses the circumstances shaping the practice of the International Centre for Conservation of engaging both sectors throughout the organizations history.

Unlike the International Criminal Police Organization, the International Centre for Conservation in Rome has no difficulty matching its professional culture to its private partners – in the majority of cases their cultures are precisely the same. Although the worldview of the conservator crosses the public-private divide it is not the same as the engineering *Weltanschauung*. Conservators on both sides of the fence operate autonomously in a similar manner to each other, whereas engineers adopt different levels of autonomy of action dependent on whether they are public or private employees (Robinson and McIlwee 1991).⁵ This is evidence of how professional cultures differentiate the ways global public-private partnerships are approached.

Organizational cultures characteristics

The discussion on organizational culture and partnerships so far has focussed on professional cultures and how their influence blended with organizational cultures. The following short section compares the differences in the three organizational cultures. Hofstede *et al.* (1990) demonstrated how organizations involved in the same field differ significantly because of their culture. This is important because there are organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization, Europol and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, as well as numerous regional international government organizations sharing the international policy spaces of the three case study organizations. These organizations have different histories and

⁵ Police professionals cannot be compared here, as they are public officials.

structures and will therefore have different organizational cultures (Hofstede 1997; Hofstede *et al.* 1990; Ott 1989; Pettigrew 1979; Schein 2010).

Table 5-1 - Characteristics of organizational cultures

International Telecommunication Union	International Criminal Police Organization	International Centre for Conservation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International civil service • Technical organization • Non-autonomous • Union as a sum of its membership • Consensus oriented decisions • Diffused authority 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International civil service • Technical organization • Autonomous • Operational police as primary constituency • Service to police, not member-countries • Apolitical • Avoid diplomatic entanglements • Highly protective of name and reputation • Bureaucratic hierarchy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International civil service • Technical organization • Autonomous • Focus on cultural objects above everything else • Cooperation in all things • Balance between research and practice

Source: Fieldwork and own research.

Even though the organizations come from disparate policy arenas there are similarities in the organizational cultures. Table 5-1 compares the organizational cultures, showing commonalities such as how the organizations see themselves as part of the international civil service. This is reflected in the official employment conditions of each. The International Telecommunication Union and the International Centre for Conservation have conditions dictated by the International Civil Service Commission (I.19 Bouchenaki 2011; ICSC 2013). The International Criminal Police Organization has its own conditions included in its *vade mecum* (INTERPOL 2009b). This includes an expectation contracted and seconded personnel are there to serve internationally, not the interests of their member-country or parent police service (INTERPOL 1956, 2009b). The other main similarity is the view the organizations are all technical. Several interviewees espoused this viewpoint and no evidence was found to contradict it.

A gap between international civil service and police culture exists. For seconded personnel at the International Criminal Police Commission, operating internationally often requires a change to a more strategic perspective. The task focus of police, in part created by police work-patterns – investigate a crime, take it to court, onto the next one – differs from the strategic approach required for large-scale international projects. The difference between the approach required at two levels was summarized by one official: ‘I run now [*sic*] a 10 million euro project ... before I had to sign for 20 bucks if I wanted to have something, and I now run the world’ (I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011).

Chapter 5

This difference demonstrates how the professional culture and the organizational culture, while closely aligned can differ.

Table 5-1 also illustrates the differences between organizational cultures. Autonomy marks a clear point of difference between the three cases. The Union sees itself as a sum of its membership, therefore non-autonomous with staff considering themselves as part of a secretariat, not an executive (I.10 Johnson 2011). Consequently, authority is diffused in the organization. The other organizations have embraced autonomy commensurate with their professional cultures. The International Criminal Police Organization prefers to maintain authority or lead status in its partnerships. This is slightly incongruent with Kaul's (2006, p.222) definition of a global public-private partnership in that the participatory characteristic is skewed toward police control. However, private partners remain sufficiently autonomous to accept or reject the authoritative conditions as they will (see Box 2-1). The autonomy of the International Centre for Conservation balances the academic autonomy associated with freedom of research and teaching with the conservation characteristic of cooperation with all. There is a less authoritative and more cooperative perception of autonomy.

The three organizational cultures have three different points of focus. The Union focuses on the needs of its members, whether it is the allocation of the radio spectrum for member-states, telecommunication standards for sector members or a combination of the two in the Development Bureau. The point of focus for the International Criminal Police Organization is providing service to operational police. The Organization will, wherever possible, bypass any other organs of states which could stand in the way of police getting immediate access to mechanisms and instruments of international police cooperation.⁶ The International Centre for Conservation shares its point of focus with the profession – the cultural objects in need of attention. This focus is central to both the teaching and research of the organization, as well as the advocacy role to promote the conservation of cultural heritage objects.

The culture of the organizations rests upon their historic experiences. The development of separate bodies to deal with new technological innovations resulted in a diffused authority structure in the Telecommunication Union or a federal structure as Jacobson

⁶ In the author's experience, once diplomats and lawyers are involved, the exchange of police information internationally becomes comparatively glacial in most instances. Timeframes for exchange measured in hours and days stretch into weeks and months. This is necessary if the information is required as evidence in court proceedings.

(1974) describes it. The wartime take-over of the International Criminal Police Commission by the Nazis and post-war re-building of the organization embedded the non-political nature of the organization into its statutes. This built upon their previous aversion to diplomacy as an avenue for police cooperation. The International Centre for Conservation has developed in parallel to the maturation of conservation as a profession. The organization has been at the forefront of defining what it is to be a conservator and as a result key characteristics of the profession – focus on the cultural object, cooperative spirit and balancing research and practice – are more prominent in the organizational culture at the Rome Centre than in the other cases.

The role of culture in global public-private partnerships

This chapter analyzed how professional cultures have shaped three organizational cultures and have created distinct differences in global public-private partnerships. In the case of the International Criminal Police Organization the professional culture of policing has traditionally been tightly embedded with the role of the state. Therefore, even the thought of close interaction with the private sector meant a surrender of state authority. This is indicative of Hofstede *et al.*'s (1990) and Schein's (2010) admonition that organizational culture is difficult to change – police culture locking out the private sector from partnerships for over half a century. Change in the *organizational* culture was triggered by ideas from new public management. The move to global public-private partnerships has gained further footing as the organization realizes it is not beholden to the state (I.28 INTERPOL Official), and partnerships provide a mechanism to support the core constituency – operational police.

International government organizations with a professional culture embedded in both the public and private sectors are more interactive. The International Telecommunication Union shares an engineering culture with the private sphere and has never had any major problem spanning this divide. Similarly, the International Centre for Conservation was influenced by, and itself influenced, a burgeoning profession spanning both public and private spheres as cultural objects are found in both public galleries and private collections. In both instances, cultural objects are in need of the best possible care and attention due to their aesthetic value, intrinsic cultural worth and financial value. In many ways the Rome Centre has been engaged in both nurturing and being nurtured by the disciplinary culture of conservation. The cases of the International Telecommunication Union and the Rome Centre illustrate how for them the public-

Chapter 5

private divide is an illusionary construct with little impact on their day-to-day operations.

Police culture is an exception to the rule of interaction between public and private professionals. As shown above, public conservators form partnerships with private conservators as do public telecommunication engineers with private telecommunication engineers. Yet the International Criminal Police Organization now appears to be prepared to partner with any law-abiding entities from society at large, with one noticeable absence – private security firms. The subject of cooperation with such firms was canvassed as early as 1934 (Dressler 1942, p.112), but nothing came of it then or since. Perhaps it is the case these firms represent the ultimate outsider, those in direct competition with the operational policing constituency of the International Criminal Police Organization.

This study found culture played a significant role in motivating, maintaining and even inhibiting partnerships. These roles are apparent to differing degrees in the three case organizations. Motivation toward partnerships is strongest in the Rome Centre. Conservation culture with its focus on cooperation and collaboration in all things has resulted in an enormous number of partners over the years. A survey of the newsletters and reports of the organization show between 1968 and 2010, the International Centre for Conservation worked with 563 other organizations.⁷ For such a small organization, there is a strong drive to create new partnerships.

The long history between the International Telecommunication Union and the private sector has established a cultural norm of partnership maintenance. The role allocated to private sector companies, lobby groups and research institutes is essentially unchanged, with only minor variations over the years. In 1947, the roles of Recognized Private Operating Agency and Private Operating Agency formalized existing arrangements. The rights and obligations of private partners in the latest iteration of the organizational statutes reflect a change of names – Sector Member, Associate and Academia – but little else. The existing arrangements work, therefore substantive change is perceived as unnecessary, which fits well with the engineers' desire for stability and predictability.

Police culture inhibited partnerships for the International Criminal Police Organization. For more than seven decades the organization was culturally averse to partnering with

⁷ This figure includes Associate Members, partners and organizations sitting on the Council. See appendix 4.

outsiders. Even though partnerships supporting international police cooperation exist, the organizational and professional cultures still play an inhibiting role. In Lyon, the organizational culture relies on police officers seconded from their member-country. Many successful partnerships in global law enforcement are developed and delivered by these seconded officers. Yet secondees have proven less than enthusiastic in other instances. Partnerships in both the Environmental Crime and the Intellectual Property Crime Programmes have been adversely impacted in the past by secondees (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011; I.11 Environmental Crime Manager 2011). Both programmes withered at different points before being reinvigorated by contracted staff. This can be attributed to combination of factors in the individual – a lack of interest in the programme; the police aversion to outsiders; or even a poor work attitude – an attitude viewing a secondment to Lyon as a holiday, not work (I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011). So despite the organization being involved in partnerships, professional culture can still have an inhibiting role.

This chapter has contributed to the overall thesis by analysing the direct influence of professional and organizational cultures on global public-private partnerships. Furthermore, the chapter has shown how cultural perception translates in three sub-cases. Of all the factors motivating global public-private partnerships, professional and organizational cultures play the dominant roles. These cultures can be viewed as powerful independent variables, motivating, maintaining or inhibiting the partnerships.

The following chapters explore the themes of leaders, ideas, resources and global issues. Under the umbrella of each theme are related factors, which also play a role in motivating the global public-private partnerships. These chapters also reinforce the dominant role of professional and organizational cultures, which act as intermediate variables, influencing how the other factors are perceived and acted upon in different ways by the case organizations. Professional and organizational cultures can make the difference between the latent potential of the other factors coming into play and motivating partnerships, or not. Leaders are the logical theme to follow this chapter, because these individuals have had a great deal of influence in forming the cultures of their organizations. In addition, these leaders are always practitioners of the dominant professional culture within each organization. Thus their worldview is important in finding a solution to the puzzle of global public-private partnerships.

6. Leaders

Leaders can influence organizational culture and organizational culture can influence leaders. The relationship between them is well established (Farley 1981; Ott, 1989; Pettigrew 1979; Schein 1985, 2010). This thesis argues that factors of cultures influence partnerships, and have an influence on other factors contributing to global public-private partnerships. Chapter six contributes to the thesis by using Schein's (1985, 2010) model for analyzing leaders in the case studies. Schein (2010) argues organizational cultures have three sources – the beliefs, values and assumptions of founders; the learning experiences of members as organizations evolve; and new beliefs, values and assumptions introduced by new members and leaders (Schein 2010, p.219). Leadership influence on organizational change is shaped and constrained by the experience and professional culture of the leader and those they lead. Furthermore, the culture developed within an organization also shapes and constrains what leaders can do. Culture is therefore an intermediate variable influencing leaders and their role in global public-private partnerships. Examining leaders in this chapter forms an important component of this research overall.

Changes in leadership can bring change to organizations and organizational culture. The appointment Kofi Annan (1997-2006) did change the relationship of the United Nations with private actors (Bull *et al.* 2004, p.485; Bull and McNeill 2010, p.104; Tesner and Kell 2000, p.2). As noted in chapter two, the reasons attributed to Annan being an agent of change are debatable. Also, Annan's appointment did not mark a fundamental change to the United Nations specialized agencies. The International Telecommunication Union continued with its own form of partnerships that had evolved since the 1860s; and at the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property there is little evidence the changes in the United Nations altered the way the Rome Centre operated with their private partners. Outside the United Nations, Annan's activities lent weight to change. Deliberations within the International Criminal Police Organization about public-private partnerships included discussion of the change in the United Nations (AFP 1997-98). So, while Annan was an undoubtedly an important factor in the broad shift in the United Nations, the question begs how important have executive leaders been elsewhere in shifting international government organizations into global public-private partnerships?

Analysis in this chapter will examine three perspectives of leadership for each case. The first perspective considers the role foundational leaders played in shaping their respective organizational cultures and attitudes toward the private sector (see Hofstede 1997; Ott 1989; Pettigrew 1979; Schein 2010). In all three cases, the foundational leaders are important figures; each spent more than a decade at the helm of the then new organizations. During their tenure, these leaders imparted much of their professional culture and experience into the culture of their organizations.

The second perspective takes a snapshot of how leaders were agents of change and stability throughout the 1990s when a ‘wave of government re-engineering and market-state rebalancing ... swept across many countries [and] reached the arena of international cooperation’ (Kaul 2006, p.220). Comparing the three during this period holds constant the time and global environment these organizations operated in. Thus allowing a comparison of how the leaders of this time responded, and how the organizational and professional cultures influenced their response.

The final perspective examines how contemporary leaders in the case organizations approach global public-private partnerships. These executives are heirs to the cultural legacy of the founders and shapers of the organization. As will be seen, some these leaders have been shaped *by*, rather than being shapers *of* the organization they serve.

Three Original Leaders as Organization Shapers

In this section the research turns to the first executive heads of each organization. The three leaders – Louis Curchod in the International Telegraph Union, Oskar Dressler at the International Criminal Police Commission and Harold Plenderleith at the International Centre for Conservation – occupied their roles at different times in history. Curchod in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Dressler for most of the inter-war years and throughout the Second World War, and Plenderleith from the late 1950s through to the early 1970s. While these historic periods are different, the common factor is international concord on the need for cooperation in a technical area; telecommunication, police cooperation and cultural conservation.

Curchod, Dressler and Plenderleith all had technical expertise in their respective professions prior to their appointments. These professionals occupied their respective positions as founding executives for more than a decade each, which helped shape the cultural tone in each organization. During their respective tenures, these original leaders

Chapter 6

helped to embed a lasting influence on their organizations and their successors. Despite the intervening decades since the appointment of these executives, it is necessary to examine them and their influence on the culture of their organizations and subsequent public-private partnerships.

Louis Curchod (1869-72; 1873-89) - private, public and national cultures

The *Conférence télégraphique internationale* of 1865 did not result in the establishment of a permanent body to administer the resultant Telegraph Convention. However, the conference delegates established a pattern whereby engineering technicians and telegraph administrators took control of international relations within their field of expertise. Table 6-1 profiles the participants at Paris and the second *Conférence télégraphique internationale* held in Vienna three years later.

Table 6-1 - Founders of the ITU

	Paris 1865	Vienna 1868
Diplomats	24	3
Telegraph Administrators or Engineers	22	27

Source: ITU 1865, 1868.

The table shows that once the original convention was negotiated and signed, diplomatic presence and input became less important. A closer look at these and subsequent meetings, indicates member-states such as Greece and Japan persisted with diplomatic representation, while other nations left it to their engineers and telegraph administrators (ITU 1868, 1871, 1875). Present in the Swiss delegation at both meetings was Louis Curchod, the future director of the International Bureau of Telegraph Administrations, the precursor to the current Secretariat of the International Telecommunication Union.

From the beginning, Curchod had an interesting profile. His activities set the environment for a close relationship between the public body of the International Telegraph Union and the private companies involved in transnational telegraphy. Curchod attended the Paris conference as the Swiss special delegate (ITU 1865). He and the other special delegates were responsible for the technical detail of the convention. At the time Curchod held the post of Director of the Central Telegraph for the Swiss government. In 1868, he attended the second congress as the Swiss delegate (ITU 1868), however by this point in time most of the delegates were technicians (Table 6-1). The 1868 conference delegates decided to create a permanent International Bureau for

Telegraph Administration in Berne, Switzerland to which Curchod was appointed as the first director. Curchod held the role of Director from 1869 until his death in 1889, with only a short break in 1872/3 for the reasons detailed below. Private companies became regular attendees at Union meetings under his administration.

The third *Conférence télégraphique internationale* (Rome 1871), admitted private companies in an official capacity for the first time. Interestingly, the conference records listed Curchod as representative for the Anglo-American Telegraph Company and the Society for the French Transatlantic Cable – both private concerns (ITU 1871, p.262). To further confuse matters, when the Swiss government's delegate became ill, Curchod resigned his role as Director of the International Telegraph Bureau to fulfil the role of Swiss delegate (ITU 1871, pp. 217, 241). This is unsurprising as the concept of an international civil service, loyal to no nation, was in its infancy, if it existed at all. Curchod would have seen himself as Swiss first and therefore answered the need of his nation. The final result was that within the parameters of one conference, Curchod occupied the roles of an international bureaucrat, a representative of private interests and a delegate for a member-state. From the perspective of the twenty-first century the conflicts of interest are glaring – yet no objection is noted in the conference documents (ITU 1871). So, in a golden age of European diplomacy, Curchod's multi-tasking was accepted under a presumption he would act honourably, dependent on whichever role he was fulfilling at the immediate time.

Other delegates to conferences in this early period similarly held public and private roles. During Curchod's tenure, these included a number of British members of parliament who attended conferences as directors of private telegraph companies (ITU 1871, 1875, 1890). In another case, an officer of the British Royal Engineers attended a conference representing the Indo-European Telegraph Company, a government concern, and the next conference as representative of the China Submarine Telegraph Company, a private entity (ITU 1868, 1871). Irrespective of values past and present, Curchod and these actors set the scene for the close relationship the Union and the private sector have enjoyed for nearly a century and a half. Thanks to these early leaders, the culture of telecommunication engineers has always operated on both sides of the public-private divide and continues to do so.

Oskar Dressler (1923-46) and the International Criminal Police Commission

Headquartered in Vienna, the International Criminal Police Commission was an entity created without diplomatic input. The Viennese Police Commissioner was the first President and Oskar Dressler was the first Secretary (later Secretary-General) of the Commission. Although in early years, the President of the International Criminal Police Commission was seen as the most important and prestigious post, Dressler represents continuity in two respects. Firstly, during Dressler's tenure between 1923 and 1946, the post of President was held by eight men. For these men, the International Criminal Police Commission was secondary to other positions; either Viennese Police Commissioner or, after the organization relocated to Berlin, Chief of the German Security Police (Deflem 2002b, p.179).¹ Secondly, Dressler wrote the handbook for the Organization in 1934, which he later updated (Dressler 1942).² These represent his influence on the organization in the pre- and post Nazification periods.

During Dressler's tenure the bureau established strong foundations for international police cooperation. Dressler edited the journal of the Commission – *International Public Safety*, later renamed *Internationale Kriminalpolizei (International Criminal Police)*. In the introduction to the first issue, Dressler summarized the purpose of *International Public Safety* as:

... an international medium of police news, giving detailed information about criminals or suspected criminals that are being sought by the police authorities of various countries. On the other hand, it will contain official communications from the International Criminal Police Commission, as well as articles by experts on police matters. It will also serve as a central organ for publishing experiences of police forces the world over, and be the means of distributing information as to any new ideas and methods which may benefit the criminal police service of all nations ... (Dressler 1924).

This statement is indicative of the Commission's desire, through its journal, to create and reinforce an international police culture. The dissemination of expert articles and police experiences reflects one of the key elements of police culture – learning through swapping war stories (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010). The President, Hans Schober contributed the opening article entitled 'Do we need an International Police Magazine',³

¹ Known as the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA)*, which was the *Schutzstaffel (SS)* organization responsible for the *Sicherheitsdienst (SD)* and the *Sicherheitspolizei (SiPo)*. SiPo had two arms – the *Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo)* and the *Kriminalpolizei (KriPo)* (Carr 1969, p.385).

² I have a copy of the 1942 handbook, which mentions the 1934 edition in the foreword.

³ The English version of the article used the term 'police magazine' in the title, whereas the German, French and Italian referred to a *Polizeiblatt*, *Journal internationale de police* and *giornale internazionale di polizia*.

in which he described the commission and the journal as ‘a genuine cultural work’ with the aim of ‘serving the common good’ (Schober 1924). Furthermore Schober proposed a motto for the journal, *saluti publicae*, (safety of the state), founded on ‘[t]hat first principle of a police official cognizant of his high moral responsibility’. This is evidence of the police culture being impressed upon the organization by its leaders from its earliest days.

Despite this positive work, Dressler’s time as Secretary-General will always be overshadowed by the period of Nazi domination of the Commission. After 1938, *International Criminal Police* published articles linking racial inferiority and crime as well as material praiseworthy of racial laws (Bresler 1992, p.53; Deflem 2002a, p.29). For decades after the war, critics of the organization claimed continuing Nazi influence on the culture of the organization (see Garrison 1977 or Meldal-Johnsen and Young 1979). Dressler’s affiliation with the Nazi regime made it impossible for him to continue in the re-constituted organization. However, many of the positive traits of the organizational culture developed during his tenure – a focus on public safety, learning through story telling and the journal – continued in the post-war version of the International Criminal Police Commission.

Harold Plenderleith (1959-1971) – Always willing to share knowledge

Of the three cases, the International Centre for Conservation is unique in having relationships with the private sector built into the original statutes of the organization. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization committee which created the structure and decided the location of the International Centre for Conservation included representatives with private roles (see chapter four). Chairman of the committee was George Salles, who represented the International Council of Museums, an international non-government organization, of which he was also president. Importantly, the committee recommended the new organization have ‘other members’ beside member-states (UNESCO 1955). These ‘other members’ became the Associate Members discussed in chapter four and were defined by the committee as ‘*international non-government organizations* and – in non-member countries – national authorities and public or *private* institutions, admitted on the decision of the Council’ (UNESCO 1955, p.6 - emphasis added). It should be noted Salles was the Director of the French Museums, and other senior figures in the International Council of Museums were predominantly officials from national institutions. Irrespective of this, the Rome Centre was structured by museum professionals with public-private relations in mind.

Chapter 6

The first Executive head of the Rome Centre, Harold Plenderleith, had been Director of the British Museums Research Laboratory for more than thirty years prior to his appointment as Director of the Rome Centre (UNESCO 1959). Plenderleith embraced the structural relationship with the private sector, which is reflected by the friendly and personal nature of his correspondence with private organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation (ICCROM, 1958-86). In a private professional capacity, Plenderleith had served as the first treasurer of the International Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works (Jokilehto 2011, p.6). The inaugural president was George Stout from the Fogg Museum, mentioned previously in chapter five. Plenderleith's *Conservation of Antiquities and Works of Art: Treatment, Repair and Restoration* (1956) was once considered the 'Bible' of conservation (Stoner 2005, p.46). His authorship of this work was also influential in his securing the directorship of the Rome Centre (Bouchenaki and Jokilehto 2009, p.2). Accordingly, we can see how Plenderleith helped set the tone for close operations with conservation professionals from both public and private spheres.

Within a month of his appointment, Plenderleith provided advice to the Rockefeller Foundation on funding applications made to the foundation by other institutions (ICCROM 1958-86). Later the same year, he and his assistant (and future Director) Paul Philippot, gave direct technical assistance and advice to the Rockefeller Foundation on the condition and housing of its art collections in Northern Italy (ICCROM 1958-86). Besides providing services to Rockefeller, Plenderleith also accepted a large donation from the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation to establish a professional library at the Rome Centre; sponsorship from the John D. Rockefeller III Foundation for scholarships to support international conservation trainees in Rome; and worked closely with private institutions formed to rescue and restore the millions of items of cultural property damaged by flooding in Rome and Venice in 1966 (Daifuku 1969, pp.15-16, 18). By the end of 1969, three of the seven Associate Members were from the private sphere (ICCROM 1969, p.6). Clearly Plenderleith was not cut from the same bureaucratic cloth as another Englishman, Sir Eric Drummond at the League of Nations (See chapter two and Cox 1969). Had he been, it is likely the International Centre for Conservation would have had a slower start.

It is clear from the above that the first executive heads left their mark on the three organizations. Curchod's experience meant he understood the perspective and role of both public and private telecommunication organizations. During his tenure, private

companies became a permanent presence at Union meetings. Dressler developed an instrument for cooperation between police, a task made more difficult during the period of Nazification. As a career civil servant in an organization focussed on the exercise of state power, Dressler rarely considered a role for the private sphere in law enforcement. Plenderleith brought his research and professional experience working with academics and conservators from both the public and private sphere. Like other conservators, there was no distinction between the spheres when focussed on the object in need of attention. Thus the organizational culture in the Rome Centre always proved more flexible in its partnerships with the private sphere than either of the other cases.

From these experiences, two of the three organizations developed with cultures open to public-private partnerships and one did not. This matches with Schein's (2010) model of foundational leaders shaping organizational culture. The next section examines later changes in the organizations and the role of the executive heads at that time.

Leaders as Agents of Change or Stability

None of the case organizations have marked the passage of time since their creation unchanged themselves, or in the way their partnerships operate. The questions here are, whether or not, the leaders at the time had any significant influence on changes affecting global public-private partnerships; and how the professional and organizational cultures shaped the actions and decisions of leaders.

Facilitating, but not leading change

Between 1988 and 1992, the International Telecommunication Union substantially changed its structure and management practices. However, the executive heads had little input into leading the change, mainly fulfilling the role of facilitators. At the 1988 World Administrative Telegraph and Telecommunication Conference, Secretary-General Richard Butler (1983-89) advised the member-states 'may wish to give some consideration to the need to recognize changes to the operating environment' of the Union. Traditional references in the Convention to 'administrations'⁴ and private operating agencies no longer sufficed. Member-states now had multiple government agencies involved in various aspects of telecommunication – telegraph, telephones, radio, television and mobile telephony (ITU 1988, document TT-88/28-E). Butler used relatively mild language to convey the need for change and framed his argument with

⁴ The ITU refer to the single ministry or department in each country providing a point of contact or representation for the governments of member-states as 'administrations'.

Chapter 6

resolutions from past Union conferences. The Conference resolved the issue of a changing telecommunication environment be explored, and Butler was tasked with creating an advisory group to examine the issue.

The issue gained greater prominence at the Nice Plenipotentiary (1989), which appointed a high level committee comprised of member-states to consider the environmental changes. The resolution creating the high level committee *instructed* new elected Secretary-General Pekka Tarjanne (1989-99) ‘to support fully the work of the Committee’ (ITU 1990, resolution 55). The final report of the high level committee, *Tomorrow's ITU: The Challenges of Change*, noted because of ‘the accelerating trend towards liberalization and privatization, the ITU family is growing to include many new actors with important telecommunications interests’ (ITU 1992, document APP-92/5-E). The major outcome of the report was the re-arrangement of the Union into three Bureaus – Telecommunication Standards, Radiocommunication, and Telecommunication Development. The plenipotentiary documents show Tarjanne having little input into the debate.

A review of the documents of the Additional Plenipotentiary (Geneva 1992), which implemented the restructure, reveals no separate submission by the Secretary-General. Furthermore, there are no signs of opinions on the changes by Tarjanne or his staff (ITU 1992). Even Tarjanne’s editorial in the journal of the Union barely acknowledged any role for his Secretariat, instead giving praise to the Plenipotentiary Conference and its chair for the reforms (Tarjanne 1993). When Tarjanne finished as Secretary-General, he and the management team were acknowledged as a group which ‘left a legacy of outstanding leaders and reformists of the 20th century. Together they revamped the ITU by introducing new working methods and structures, making it the modern organization it is today’ (Anon. 1999). However, this described the work of a team *implementing* changes developed and approved by the member-states. The Secretary-General is clearly there to serve the interests of the members, be they states or private actors. This is reflected in the official records and is the view of its current executive, explored in the third part of this chapter.

An English idea and change from the top

The International Criminal Police Organization existed for nearly seven decades before they entered a partnership with the private sector. The first move toward this was the arrangement they entered into with the payment card industry, as outlined in chapter

four. At the time the Secretary-General of the organization was Raymond Kendall (1985-2000) from the United Kingdom. Kendall was the ultimate insider, a British police officer who had worked with the organization since the early 1970s. The links with the payment card industry were initiated during Kendall's tenure in the early 1990s (Kendall 1995), which were formalized by the General Assembly by 1997 (AFP 1997-98; INTERPOL 1999, p.21). While this was the first significant change in the relationship with the private sector it certainly was not the last.

The changes during Kendall's tenure were not rushed. As mentioned, he had been with the organization for a long period, and in the role of the Secretary-General for a decade before the payment card industry partnership was formalized. The second major step arose from a suggestion by the delegate from the United Kingdom to the General Assembly in 1997. During discussions in committee about the budget, the British delegate suggested the appointment of a fundraising officer, in line with practices in his country (INTERPOL 1997a, p.9).

In hindsight, it is unsurprising the idea originated from the Britain. The delegate reported how practices instigated under Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government, remained unchanged under the administration of Tony Blair's New Labour (INTERPOL 1997a, p.9). A fundraiser was appointed the following year and the financial regulations were altered by the General Assembly to provide an appropriate structure to account for the expected influx of private funds from corporations and philanthropic organizations (INTERPOL 1998b).

Kendall was heavily involved in ensuring the General Assembly accepted the recommended changes to the financial structure. During the debate, Saudi Arabia objected to the use of private funds, and the Indian delegate, while supporting the change in principle, 'called for considerable caution since INTERPOL was embarking on a project whereby it could perhaps earn easy money, but also risked losing its respectability' (INTERPOL 1998a, p.9). In defending the proposed changes, Kendall cited the recent donation by CNN proprietor Ted Turner of US\$10 million to the United Nations, and made reassurances all necessary precautions would be put in place (INTERPOL 1998a). The matter was put to a vote and passed 84 to 6, with 8 abstentions. Kendall had successfully brokered change in the organization. As a result, the organizational culture began to change toward one more open to public-private partnerships.

Chapter 6

Despite this change, it was still a few years before significant funds began to flow to the organization from private sources. The first major contribution following the payment card industry partnership was from the Sloan Foundation, who contributed US\$1 million for anti-bio-terrorism training, received by Kendall's successor, Ronald K. Noble (2000-2015).⁵ As current Secretary-General, Noble's role is discussed in greater detail below.

It can now be seen how Kendall led a substantive change in the way the International Criminal Police Organization operated with the private sphere. While Kendall's appointment was not the same catalyst Annan's was for the United Nations, he was clearly more receptive to a changing environment than his predecessors. His successor has also inspired and led further change, enabling some unexpected and innovative relationships to develop (see Table 4-4, page 93). Change under Noble is even described as radical by his officers (I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011). Between them, Kendall and Noble have gone a long way to changing the long held cultural mistrust police have of outsiders. This could only have been achieved with the assistance of two other police cultural traits – the high level of pragmatism police have toward finding solutions (Bevir 2010; Chappell-Lanza And Kaduce 2010) and the strong hierarchical arrangements (Skolnick 1966, 1994) allowing cultural change to be led from the top.

Changing the Rome Centre from within

The biggest single change in the relationship between the International Centre for Conservation and the private sector was the removal of Associate Members from the statutes. At the heart of this change was a top-to-bottom review of the way the organization functioned, led by the Director General Marc Laenen (1992-2000). The review of the Rome Centre commenced in June 1993 and was conducted in a way similar to organizational reviews being implemented across the world in a wave of managerialist reform (ICCRUM 1994; Kaul 1996). This in effect meant all stakeholders – including member-states, staff, Associate Members and partner institutions – were consulted during the review process, and their opinions, ideas and other inputs were considered in the organizational shakeup (ICCRUM 1994, p.5). The review, according to Laenen 'was not meant as a short, technical administrative intervention but rather a progressive change of *the very culture of the Organization* based on a re-examination of

⁵ Noble has been appointed for his third and final term, which is due to end in 2015.

its role. It was a gradual evolution of the way in which ICCROM thinks and works' (Laenen 2000, emphasis added).

Informed by the meeting of Associate Members in Ferrara the previous year, the review helped to re-orient the organization to focus on relationships with active 'partners' as opposed to the numerous 'passive' Associate Members (ICCROM 1995b, p.11; see also chapter four). In the new model Laenen recognized 'a clear need for [the Rome Centre] to work in close cooperation and partnership with other conservation bodies. It must continue to survey available resources, actors and their programmes in order to define policy and strategy' (ICCROM 1994, p.5). In his report to the General Assembly 1993 session, Laenen told those assembled 'partners should be identified, as should the criteria for selecting organizations as partners' (ICCROM 1993a, p.23). A moratorium on Associate Membership followed, approved by the Council after consultation with Laenen (ICCROM 1993c, p.2). This clearly shows Laenen not only leading the organization, but setting the strategic direction of the International Centre for Conservation.

The documentary evidence and informal discussions with staff in Rome show how Laenen played an active role in promoting the review process to both staff and member-states, as well as ensuring the results came to fruition. He pushed to expand a partner network, seeking 'synergetic collaboration' and 'more cost effective and efficient use of resources' (ICCROM 1997c, p.1). His peers in the General Assembly re-appointed Laenen for a second term, thereby endorsing his style of leadership. This enabled Laenen to see the changes he had instigated through to the end. What Laenen left behind was a more effective and dynamic organization. In doing so, he proved himself an excellent leader by recruiting the staff of the Rome Centre into the process and giving them ownership of the change process.

Leaders and public-private partnerships today

The interviews conducted between April and July 2011 form a key component of this research. Scheduling issues made it impossible to speak directly with the Secretaries-General of the International Telecommunication Union and the International Criminal Police Organization. However, leadership was one of the main points of focus of interviews with other managers and staff. In addition to this, the Director-General of the International Centre for Conservation and the Director of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau were interviewed. From the interviews, conversations with staff,

organizational records and public material, a picture emerges of the contemporary leadership, their vision for public-private partnerships, how these differ between organizations, and the influence of professional and organizational cultures on leaders.

More partners, faster standards and direction by members

The leadership team elected in Guadalajara (2010) represents a group deeply imbued with both the professional culture of telecommunication engineers and the organizational culture of the Union. These strong cultural traits apply to those elected as well as most other candidates nominated by their member-states for election. The Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General and the three Bureau Directors who were elected each had more than 20 years' experience in the field or policy arena and had been affiliated in some way with the International Telecommunication Union for at least the same time (ITU 2010a, documents PP-10/4-E, PP-10/5-E, PP-10/7-E, PP-10/11-E, PP-10/63-E).

Malcolm Johnson was re-elected in Guadalajara for a second term as Director of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau. In our interview, Johnson pointed to a common mistake among commentators – the International Telecommunication Union is not the secretariat in Geneva, but a union of 193 member-states, the Bureaus, the Secretariat, over 700 Sector Members, Associates and universities, and the Council (I.10 Johnson 2011). As a result, none of the major changes to the public-private partnerships of the Union can be attributed to actions of the executive head. When it came to telecommunication standards, Johnson stated 'decisions are taken by the membership, not the Secretariat. I mean we're not an executive, we're a secretariat' (I.10 Johnson 2011), a point he repeated twice. He went on to describe how in the Union 'the membership far outweighs the secretariat in terms of rights and obligations ... it's the membership that produces the output with the assistance of the secretariat. We facilitate the work' (I.10 Johnson 2011). This is reflective of the cultural traits of a professional engineer in public service and how leaders perceive the Union.

There is a strong organizational trait of stability within the Union. This is reflected by Johnson's faith in existing standardization procedures which 'have been developed over almost centuries' (I.10 Johnson 2011). The incessant changes in the statutes reflect tinkering, substantial change is exceptionally rare, such as the introduction of a Constitution in 1992. In other words the organization is not inclined to fix what is not broken. This is not to say the Union is stagnant. Under Johnson's leadership the

timeframe for issuing standards has reduced significantly from months to weeks (Huurdean 2003, p.599; I.10 Johnson 2011). Furthermore, under his leadership the Bureau has increased the number of Sector Members in line with his stated goals (ITU 2006, document PP-06/7-4-E; ITU 2010a, document PP-10/4-E). These improvements are a positive reflection on how the organization continues to develop its partnerships with the private sector; however they are incremental and not radical changes. The leaders of the International Telecommunication Union are thus constrained to be facilitators by the long history of the organization, the underlying belief the organization is a sum of its parts, and acceptance that direction of the Union is set by the membership.

Change in police culture and support for diversity

The current Secretary-General of the International Criminal Police Commission, Ronald K. Noble, is in his third 5-year term. Prior to his election in 2000, he had been a member of the Executive Committee of the Organization (INTERPOL 2000c). Noble had a mixed professional career prior to his appointment. This included seven years as chief law enforcement officer in the US Treasury, overseeing the Secret Service, the US Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service (INTERPOL 2000c). He had also worked as an Assistant US Attorney and Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and remains a tenured law professor at New York University School of Law. Importantly for the public-private partnerships, Noble like Annan, holds a business degree (INTERPOL 2000c). With such a broad background – business, law, economics, academia and law enforcement – Noble appears to be a natural at supporting opportunities for the organization through global public-private partnerships. Furthermore, Noble is the first non-European, non-Caucasian to hold the post of Secretary-General, which is a change to the Eurocentric nature of the role, which up until then had been part of the organizational culture.

In an interview with the *Los Angeles Times* in 1999, Noble flagged a number of radical changes he intended to implement as Secretary-General. These addressed some of the core cultural features of the organization developed over the decades. Noble described how ‘[he] was at Interpol headquarters when the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya occurred. And in [his] view, Interpol was not staffed or funded to give Tanzania and Kenya, as well as the U.S. government, the kind of support they

Chapter 6

needed' (Nelson 1999). He observed how the organization 'operates essentially from 9 to 5, five days a week at headquarters in Lyon ... So, I ask myself, why have we allowed Interpol to be structured in a way where it doesn't service police officers around the world, 24 hours a day fully? It doesn't make any sense' and the leisurely pace was better suited to the French civil service rather than an international organization with operational responsibilities (Nelson 1999). The characteristics of French civil service had been observed decades earlier (Forrest 1955, p.32), illustrating just how embedded it was in the Secretariat. Noble noted other changes like the growing number of women in the profession and the need for police to become technically savvy to counter criminal use of technology. He also indicated he felt the private sector was important to operations. A position he repeated in his first address to the General Assembly (Noble 2001). His conclusion was the International Criminal Police Organization needed to change to meet these new challenges. These changes marked Noble as a transformational leader (Ott 1989; Pettigrew 1979; Schein 2010) and also reflected a macro-cultural influence from the United States.

All the changes flagged by Noble have since come to pass. The Lyon Secretariat now operates around the clock and is supported by a network of regional offices; in 2011, staff represented 98 member-states, up from 67 in 2001; 41% were women, an increase from 37% a decade earlier; all staff now have computers on their desks and the Secretariat provide computer training to member-states (I.20 Fingerprint Coordinator 2011; INTERPOL 2002, 2012b). Furthermore the organization has broadened and deepened its public-private partnership (See Appendix 4 and Table 4-4, page 93).

Partnership success is often linked directly to personal intervention by Noble. One officer summarized the Secretary-General's input for the organization as a whole:

Yeah we need more money, we need more stuff, that's why we work on that ... in my opinion [Noble] is addressing everything. The man is not sleeping, he is working 24 hours for this organization. And like I said, he does not have to any more – he is re-elected, after this time it is done! So what? He could now lay back, enjoy life, make some nice missions and finish his time ... a person once told me it's not a question of how you enter here, it's a question of how you leave. This was [Noble], he told me that, and it is true, he is doing exactly that (I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011).

Other officials noted 'the Secretary-General has been behind me in a lot of stuff [related to partnerships]' (I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011); that 'he is a visionary guy ... he knows where it is good to go, where it's not good to go' and he 'believed' in a

partnership which would not have existed without Noble's belief (I.6 INTERPOL Official 2011); the 'Secretary-General always wants us to raise income' (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011); and 'he opened up the door to private sector engagement ... he's trying to look at it from an organization point of view. So he's looking for significantly linked private sector or NGOs' (I.11 Environmental Crime Manager 2011). These quotes are but a few garnered in the interviews and they reflect Noble's importance in instigating radical change in the culture of the organization to one accepting of public-private partnerships as a means to improve law enforcement globally.

Making a partnership montage

Doctor Mounir Bouchenaki was appointed Director General of the Rome Centre in 2005. This appointment followed a 25-year career in the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Since being interviewed in mid-2011, Bouchenaki has been succeeded by Stefano di Caro. While not technically the 'current' leader of the International Centre for Conservation, Bouchenaki is the focus of this section.

A trained archaeologist, Bouchenaki has been involved in conservation his entire professional life; and has also been involved with the International Centre for Conservation throughout his career:

As a young archaeologist in Algeria, I excavated a necropolis of the early paleochristian site of Tipasa, now on the World Heritage List. In so doing, I discovered a tomb with frescoes and mosaics, which dated from the 4th to 5th century AD. Faced with the problem of how to deal with its conservation, my first reaction was to call the Rome Centre. To my utter surprise, both Harold Plenderleith and Giorgio Torraca⁶ came to visit the site. I was struck that such high-level specialists came to see me. This was in the late 1960s, and my experience as an archaeologist was profoundly touched by this encounter ... Throughout my professional life I have been in contact with ICCROM experts through my work with UNESCO (Bouchenaki 2009a).

Bouchenaki's history and experience with both the profession and the Rome Centre included representing the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization at Council meetings. This meant he knew the cultures of both his profession and the organization.

Being familiar with the importance of partners to conservation training, Bouchenaki spent a great deal of his tenure nurturing existing relationships and creating new ones.

⁶ Torraca was head of the Rome Centre's didactic laboratory.

Chapter 6

Between 2006 and 2010, he signed twenty memoranda of understanding with significant partners (Jokilehto 2011, p.142). In a single article, aptly titled *Developing Partnerships: The Key to ICCROM's Future*, he mentioned 28 individuals and 44 organizations who supported the activities of the International Centre for Conservation (Bouchenaki 2007a). Placement of the article on the first page of the annual newsletter reflected the importance of partnerships to the organization; and the personal touch reflected the collegiality of the conservation profession.

Bouchenaki also applied the personal touch by creating 'one euro contracts' with retired professional staff. These contracts gave emeritus status to experts in the field enabling them to operate as private consultants to the International Centre for Conservation at a cost to the organization of only a single euro. Such a contract, supported by a partnership with the Tsinghua University in China, resulted in the production of a detailed history of the International Centre for Conservation (Jokilehto 2011) to mark its 50th Anniversary (Bouchenaki 2009b; Jokilehto 2011; Stanley-Price and King 2009). Other retired staff, like Gael de Güichen, remain active in the partnership sphere of the Rome Centre (I.25 de Güichen 2011). Thus Bouchenaki introduced a subtle change to formalize the relationship between his organization and former staff. These retirees, as private citizens, had often continued their involvement with projects of the Rome Centre. This arrangement had long been a part of the organizational and professional culture.

On a larger stage, Bouchenaki made privatization and cultural heritage the topic of an international forum in 2007 (I.19 Bouchenaki 2011; ICCROM 2007b). While this forum is discussed in greater detail in chapter nine, Bouchenaki's reasons for organizing the forum are of relevance:

I organized an international seminar on public-private partnerships for conservation of cultural heritage because my constituency, the board and the General Assembly is, you know, very well aware that there is a decrease in the funding from the public domain – the governments – and therefore we have to go towards looking at the private sector (I.19 Bouchenaki 2011).

Like Bouchenaki, the Board members and national representatives who attend the General Assembly are conservation professionals, predominantly in public service. These professionals have all felt the resource squeeze, particularly in recent years. With their support and through the forum, Bouchenaki led not only the organization, but the profession to explore new ways to manage conservation.

An important consequence of the forum re-examining privatization and conservation has been a reconsideration of what organizations can be partners to the International Centre for Conservation. Historically, partners have been government or public institutions in the field of culture or development. Bouchenaki described approaching banks ‘to see where it is possible to have the support we don’t have from the governments’ (I.19 Bouchenaki 2011). This was supported by a presentation at the forum on a partnership between the Bahrain Ministry of Culture and a major bank to create a museum. Bouchenaki had visited the museum and found ‘it has been done entirely in line with the principles and the criteria [the Rome Centre is] using in [its] work. Therefore we think this is a way to approach donors’ (I.19 Bouchenaki 2011). The partnerships of the Centre involve actors from various spheres. Bouchenaki describes them as ‘a montage we are making between public and private sector for this activity’ (I.19 Bouchenaki 2011). Thus there is greater diversity in the public-private partnerships of the International Centre for Conservation.

Comparing leaders

The above is not intended to question the personal characteristics of individuals in their role of executive head, but to illustrate the constraints and the environment in which they operate. Leadership can come from an executive council representing the member-states, as is predominantly the case in the International Telecommunication Union. Alternatively, it can emanate from an individual, such as Kendall or Noble at the International Criminal Police Organization, or Laenen or Bouchenaki at the International Centre for Conservation.

The executive heads who had the most scope to shape global public-private partnerships were clearly the founders in each role. These leaders are the first source of organizational culture (Schein 2010, p.219). Curchod, Dressler and Plenderleith established different organizations, with relationships matching the environment in which they operated, as well as being in accordance with their own professional culture. For Curchod, the private sector was an integral part of international communications and therefore had to be an integral part of the Union. Dressler was an agent of the state, and the adventurism it took for police to cooperate with their international counterparts (and without diplomatic endorsement) could not – in their worldview – extend to breaching the public-private divide. Finally, Plenderleith actively developed the collegial relationship with specialists in his field, aided greatly by the structural freedom

Chapter 6

built into the statutes by conservation professionals whose culture always spanned both the public and the private spheres.

Leaders at the time new public management practices were transferring to the international sphere had less influence on how public-private partnerships operated than the founding leaders. Changes to public-private partnerships occurred under leaders whose actions were informed by both professional cultural values and those had become embedded in the respective organizations, as per Schein's (2010, p.219) model.

Tarjanne at the International Telecommunication Union operated in the manner expected of him by the member-states. His role was to support and implement the decisions made by the members of the Union, nothing more. Laenen at the Rome Centre and Kendall at the International Criminal Police Organization were structurally freer to develop their own strategies and take a front foot in the changes. Even though the approval of the member-states was required in all cases, the latter pair clearly had greater scope in the manner public-private partnerships were formed and managed.

The contemporary leaders – Johnson, Noble and Bouchenaki – work in organizations actively participating in global public-private partnerships. However the professional and organizational cultures mean this is done in distinctly different ways. In the International Telecommunication Union, organizational culture has developed to a point where the leadership team appears constrained by the underlying assumptions they are the instruments of the members – both public and private. These leaders therefore seem unable to innovate in the same manner of their counterparts in the other organizations. For the International Criminal Police Organization, Noble's dynamism has led his officers to explore partnerships with a broad range of actors⁷ and to think outside the professional constraints of police culture. His approach has endeared Noble to the officers who have broken out of the binding aspects of their professional culture. The International Centre for Conservation under Bouchenaki has undergone subtler changes than Noble's organization. However, if these changes continue the partnerships once dominated by other conservation organizations will open to a broader field of private actors. Noble and Bouchenaki's influence on their organizations represent Schein's (2010, p.219) third source of organizational culture.

The three cases have shown leadership is not a universally a causal factor in explaining the formation of global public-private partnerships; nor is it consistent as a causal factor

⁷ See appendix 4.

for partnership change. Leadership must be viewed through the lens of its respective professional and organizational culture to understand its real and potential effect on to global public-private partnerships. These observations are important contributions to this thesis. They show that professional culture has a mediating effect on leaders as a factor influencing global public-private partnerships.

The second group of leaders examined in this chapter ran their organizations during a period of change in the roles of market and state. The ideology and ideas of this time and how they have been implemented in the case organizations is examined in the next chapter. In particular, it will be shown how two of these three factors have influenced global public-private partnerships.

7. Ideology, Ideas and Implementation

*I don't get a sense of ideology really...we focus on what is practical (I.16 Anon. 2011).*¹

It's private, it's money coming from the private sector, but it's the government that makes the decisions with them – not by itself, but with them. But [the private sector] need the government too. They cannot work without each other (I.15 Anon. 2011).

Economics makes the world go round; this is a fact. Every decision that is made everywhere is not only based on politics, but is based on economics. You have the best idea in the world, but if you don't have any money to develop it – it's not going anywhere (I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011).

The environment of this institution is a very favourable environment, and what you need is to put it to the organization the dynamism that exists in the private sector (I.19 Bouchenaki 2011).

This chapter contributes to the overall thesis by linking factors driving global public-private partnerships present in the literature with the professional and organizational cultures of the case organizations. Ideas are an element of culture. Culture shapes how ideas are internally formulated to fit within the existing cultural framework. Culture also shapes how external ideas are perceived, received, adopted and adapted to similarly fit within the existing cultural framework.

Three factors attributed to the growth of global public-private partnerships form the ideas based theme of this chapter. These factors are the changed ideologies of international government organizations (Bull and McNeill 2007), the migration of new public management for the national to the international sphere (Kaul 2006), and the benefits associated with applying market-based ideas and practices into the international public sphere (Buse and Walt 2000a). The quotes above reflect the research findings: ideological change had little impact; new public management ideas related to private financing of public goods were in place; and these public organizations saw themselves as part of a marketplace. Overlying the analysis in this chapter is consideration of how professional and organizational cultures affected the perception and interpretation of each factor.

¹ A number of interviewees chose not to be identified by organization – see appendix 2.

The relationship between culture and ideas

Culture arguably first shapes the way an idea is perceived and then shapes the activities inspired or guided by the idea. For example, the idea *a public administration should be a meritocracy* appears straightforward. However, leaders in 18th Century Prussia intended to use meritocracy as a tool to remove the landed gentry from the civil service, whereas 19th century Britain used meritocracy to ensure their landed gentry retained control of the nation's civil service (Hood 1995, p.109). An example of differently perceived ideas for global public-private partnerships can be built on the concept of resource needs when seen through the lens of cultures. The International Telecommunication Union has a culture that perceives membership fees as a straightforward fee for service (i.e. access to Union forums). In contrast to this, the culture of the International Criminal Police Organization is always concerned private funding may adversely impact their reputation. These brief examples illustrate how one idea – *our organization needs resources* – seen through different cultural lenses results in different outcomes.

Powerful ideas can change cultures, although this is often a slow process that can be resisted by practitioners set in their ways. For example, the worldwide shift from public administration models to those of new public management discussed below illustrate this. While still an ongoing process, managerialist ideas such as outsourcing and performance management are now part of many public service cultures. In countries like Australia, most civil servants have never experienced any alternative (Hughes 2012, p.vii). However, to get to this state of affairs has taken Australia more than three decades. Thus the culture of many civil services has changed by the imposition of new ideas. Of the three case organizations, the organizational culture of the International Criminal Police Organization is most affected by the changes. The adoption of partnerships, even warily so, is a significant change for an organizational culture which placed a high level of trust in fellow law enforcement officers and is suspicious of everyone else.

Ideological change – not a universal factor

Recent scholarship on global public-private partnerships attributed an ideological shift as a factor driving global public-private partnerships. Bull *et al.* (2004, p.486) noted how international government organizations shifted from a neo-Marxist outlook toward a neo-liberal economic position. This shift is most noticeable in organizations tasked

with development (Bull *et al.* 2004; Gregoratti 2010; Karliner *et al.* 1999), health (Buse and Walt 2000a, 2000b) and the environment (Casula Vifell 2010; Green 2010). This author's experience contradicted the underlying premise of this factor. In more than a decade working in the Australian National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization there was no sign the organization was either neo-Marxist, or neo-liberal for that matter. If anything, the organization operated on the assumption it was politically neutral in all its dealings through the self-imposed constraints of article three of the Constitution (INTERPOL 1956). This article specifically prohibits the organization undertaking 'any intervention or activities of a *political*, military, religious or racial character' (emphasis added) and all new staff were constantly reminded of the importance of this article. However, the experience of an individual in a National Central Bureau thousands of miles from the General-Secretariat were insufficient reasons to discard this line of inquiry from the research, particularly as the International Criminal Police Organization may have proved to be the only exception to this factor. As a result, ideological change remained a part of the research.

Probing for 'ideology' – method and madness

Observing ideology at the individual and organizational level proved a challenge. The interviewees consistently found it difficult to reflect clearly what they perceived as the ideological positions of their respective organizations. This is not a negative criticism of the interviewees who were on the whole, more than cooperative and open with their answers. The problem lay squarely with the approach taken to the line of questioning on ideology by this researcher. Having set in my own mind the neo-Marxist to neo-liberal transition was one of *political* ideology, the questions put to the interviewees confused them, particularly because multi-lateral organizations with such broad member bases work hard to be as apolitical as possible – or at least project an apolitical position to the outside world. Essentially none of the interviewees had observed a change in their organization's *political* ideology. When used, the term *ideology* generally caused confusion with the interviewees – 'I don't get a sense of ideology really' and 'What do you mean?' were typical of the responses to this line of interview questions (I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011; I.16 Anon. 2011). A clue to the response also lay in a perception held by staff. They believed they worked for technical organizations, not political ones (I.6 INTERPOL Official 2011; I.10 Johnson 2011; I.19 Bouchenaki 2011). This self-perception aligns with the dichotomy offered by Cox and Jacobson (1974, pp.5-6) of international government organizations divided into providing a

‘forum’ or a ‘service’ – service organizations being technical organizations. While it is true the International Telecommunication Union provides many forums for discussion used for political purposes,² it also provides services to the members. Union staff perceive themselves as providing a service, not entering any political debate of member-states.

The line of inquiry further proved a dead end as two of the case organizations – the International Telecommunication Union and the International Centre for Conservation – had always been in partnership with the private sector. Therefore even if an ideological change had occurred in these organizations, it would not have been a driver toward the already existing partnerships. Therefore this chapter now moves on to the changes in economic ideas associated with new public management and the factor of market-based benefits rather than pursuing the elusive (lack of) change in ideology.

New public management from the national to the international

The 1980s saw major changes to the economic ideas informing the relationship between the market and the state at the national level. Scholars have collectively named these changes as economic rationalism or the new public management (Bevir *et al.* 2003; de Vries 2010; Hood 1991; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). Governments embraced the new public management as a package which would resolve both managerial and financial issues by shifting public sector bureaucracies toward a more market oriented approach to the delivery of public goods. Rhodes summarized the drive for change in public administration as ‘a determined effort to implement the three “Es” – economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ (Rhodes 1991). The key to the attractiveness of new public management in its various guises were the additional resources available to governments from the private sector – including the non-profit sector – and reduced costs through the adoption of practices developed by private enterprise.

Although some scholars challenge the claims these changes represented a new global paradigm, their effect on public sector management is undeniable, yet uneven from country to country. The principle challenge is the difficulty in identifying the old global paradigm (See Hood 1995; Hughes 2012, ch.15). As Bevir *et al.* (2003, p.2) pointed out, this shift to new public management was neither evenly applied globally, nor necessarily as effective as its proponents had hoped. Furthermore, they argue the labels

² Cuba often uses Union forums to chastise the United States for broadcasting interference which affects the island’s own services. The United States tends to ignore their exhortations.

given to different components of the new public management – including public-private partnerships – do not necessarily translate across international boundaries. Dunleavy *et al.* (2006, p.471) goes as far as to tabulate where the various components of the new public management have stalled or failed in various national contexts. Hughes (2012, p.316) even argues ‘if there ever was an NPM era, it has now passed, while public management continues’. Despite these problems, one of the effects of new public management was its influence on international government organizations (Kaul 2006, p.220). Many of the countries adopting new public management policies domestically were key donors or otherwise powerful actors within international government organizations. There was a natural transfer of the ideas operating in public institutions at the national level to their international counterparts. This economic reasoning has been central to most of the recent literature (for example Paun 2013) as to why international government organizations are partnering more closely with the private sector.

Changed ideas ... changed cultures

The transfer of ideas from the national sphere to the international sphere is marked by specific occurrences in each of the cases. The idea of public-private partnerships represented a new concept to all three organizations. However, the concept of public-private partnership was translated differently through each organization’s cultural lens. At the International Telecommunication Union the idea of partnerships resulted in the re-badging of existing arrangements with no significant change to the way the organization operated with its private partners, reflecting the rigidity of an organization culture developed over a century and their desire to maintain a status quo. For the International Criminal Police Organization public-private partnerships represented a new way of operating, which met resistance from a professional culture inclined to distrust outsiders. At the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property, the concept of partnership shifted the way the organization perceived the other actors already involved in conservation activities.

For the International Telecommunication Union, the wave of privatization and liberalization in the telecommunication sector helped to prompt the biggest restructure of the Union since the end of the Second World War. Liberalization, privatization and deregulation increased the number of private actors in telecommunications as incumbent government providers were fully or partially privatized, broken up, or introduced to greater competition (Hall *et al.* 2000, pp.3-4; Huurdeman 2003, pp.548-549). At the Additional Plenipotentiary Conference in 1992, a permanent Constitution was adopted

in which the private operating agencies were renamed Sector Members and the fundamental structure of the Union was overhauled (ITU 1992). This appeared to mark the most significant change for the organization's relationship with private actors since the Madrid Plenipotentiary Conference in 1932.

On closer inspection however, the name change did little to alter the relationship between the Union and the private sphere. The formalization of existing practices enabled the now privatized and liberalized telecommunication incumbents to retain a place at the table; often remaining part of the formal delegation to conferences (for example see ITU 2010a, final list of participants). As the telecommunications industry diversified among a larger number of private equipment manufacturers and carriers the fundamental position of private actors did not change. While there are numerically more private actors, there is little difference between the access granted to them now than the informal access granted to their counterparts before the Madrid Plenipotentiary and the formal access granted thereafter (see chapter four). Thus the organizational culture developed over a century in which private actors had a specific place remained substantially unchanged.

The acceptance of new managerial ideas did not pose a challenge to the professional culture of the organization. The changes did not substantively alter the relationship with the private sector other than to increase the number of private partners involved in Union activities. This acceptance aligned with the culture of public engineers who expected guidance and parameters from governments (Robinson and McIlwee 1991, pp.409-410). Furthermore, the Union's self-image of an organization with limited autonomy from its members (I.10 Johnson 2011) made the transition relatively smooth. Of course, as the organization had historically close links with the telecommunication sector, the managerial ideas derived from the private sector were already familiar concepts.

For the International Criminal Police Organization, the idea of participating in public-private partnerships came from the United Kingdom, a country long embracing practices of the new public management. It was the delegate from the United Kingdom who, in a 1997 meeting of Finance Committee of the Organization, raised the possibility of appointing a fundraiser to tap into private resources.³ The delegate argued 'the

³ The UK Delegate was *not* the then Secretary General Raymond Kendall. Chapter 6 details Kendall's involvement.

Chapter 7

experience of the United Kingdom, where 1% of the police budget came from such methods of finance, showed that it was possible to proceed in that way' (INTERPOL 1997a, p.9). This presented an entirely new approach by this organization to the private sector and meant the idea seeded a change in the organizational culture. The culture of the International Criminal Police Organization underwent and, at the time of writing, is still undergoing, radical change.

Opening up to outsiders and treating them as equals has been problematic for the organization to say the least. This is exacerbated and continued through the large number of police officers from member-countries rotating through the organization on three to six year secondments. Many of these officers have to be socialized into the ideas of the free-market on arrival (I.11 Environmental Crime Manager 2011; I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011; Van Maanen 1975). The International Criminal Police Organization does not sit at the top of a hierarchy, dictating to police services globally on how they should operate. Therefore, the transitional workforce, imbued as it is with police culture, often needs to adjust itself to work in an organizational culture somewhat antithetical to the professional culture of policing.

Like the Telecommunication Union, the International Centre for Conservation's long-standing association with the private sector changed at this time. During 1993 and 1994, the Rome Centre undertook a review process to 'to improve its activities and operational capacities within a changing socio-cultural context' (ICCROM 1994, p.3). This process changed the way the Rome Centre operated, and in particular it led to the 'reinterpretation' of associate membership as 'operational partnerships' in the Centre's projects (Laenen 2000, p.5). The review process and associated changes aimed at 'a "gradual evolution of the way in which ICCROM thinks and works", [aimed to] not only improve [technical operations] but also to change attitudes within the staff and governing bodies' (Laenen quoted in Jokilehto 2011, p.103).

The Rome Centre's long relationship with private partners is built on a collegial and professional network in the small world of conservation and museum practice. Like many academic organizations – particularly in countries embracing the new public management project (Adams 1998, p.429) – the Centre re-organized along managerial lines (Laenen 2000, p.2). The small size of the organization helped with the transition,

as ideas could be communicated directly among the staff.⁴ Yet the changes saw long standing formality of having ‘Associate Members’ jettisoned in the search for more effective partnership arrangements. While the collegial and professional network remained, it adopted greater formality to align the Rome Centre with the practices of its public and private partners. This represented a change in the organizational culture.

The ideas of new public management have now been a part of each organization for more than a decade and it shows. The language now used by the staff reflects much that is familiar to market actors. In the International Telecommunication Union, *recognized private operating agencies* have become *sector members* and *clients* (ITU 1992). Yet even this change is incomplete as the old term *Recognized Operating Agency* remains a classification for Sector Members and Associates to distinguish these more traditional partners from the new breed of *manufacturers, regulators, consultants* and the ubiquitous *other* (ITU 2013). Staff at the International Criminal Police Organization talk of *business cases* and *social responsibility* in relation to their activities, and speak of the organization being ‘like the private company, you grow or you die’ (I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011). Similar sentiment was expressed at the International Centre for Conservation – ‘Today an institution like ICCROM cannot survive if it works only by itself’ (I.19 Bouchenaki 2011). These latter sentiments recognize how the international government organizations are operating in a competitive environment and market forces can apply to extinguish their existence if they do not change with the times. This is a different cultural outlook to one of international civil servants seeing their place and the place of their organization in the world as secure. So, we can see organizational cultures have changed to adopt and adapt to the practices of new public management in their own distinctive ways.

Improving organizational effectiveness using market-based practices

International government organizations were originally an effective solution to ongoing matters beyond the scope of traditional diplomacy to handle. Complex, ongoing multi-state issues necessitated the emergence of international government organizations as a better approach to transnational interactions (Mansbach *et al.* 1976). Early international government organizations often adopted the characteristics of the public administrations

⁴ The closeness among staff at the Centre was observed during the fieldwork phase of this research. It is an organization in which the Director General and Unit Directors operate an open door policy.

Chapter 7

of their host nations, or at least the most powerful states involved in their creation (Lemoine 1995, ch.2). Examples of this include the International Telecommunication Union and the International Criminal Police Commission, whose original secretariat staff were civil servants drawn from the Swiss telegraph administration and Austrian police respectively. These public officials created organizations which functioned in close approximation to their worldview as civil servants from their respective countries.

Over the years there have been incremental changes. These changes, such as the post-war internationalization of the Telecommunication Union's Secretariat and the relocation of the International Criminal Police Commission to France, resulted in cultural shifts. The Union's workforce grew rapidly and took on more non-Swiss officials (ITU 1948-2009b) creating an organizational culture more aligned with international civil service, whereas the Commission's organizational culture now reflected the work practices of the French civil service (Forrest 1955, p.32; Nelson 1989). With the changes to public administration practices at a national level in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the influential Anglo-American countries (Hughes 2012, p.331), international government organizations came under pressure to modernize their practices and adopt more effective means of achieving their ends.

A general expectation arose that changes in public organizations to market-based practices would generate more effective public organizations (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Although in practice this has not always proven to be the case (see the table at Dunleavy *et al.* 2006, p.471). Examples of these new practices include: *trading comparative advantage*, *contracting out* or *outsourcing* – having other (private) actors deliver services at a lower cost (Kaul 2006, p.259). This can be achieved through *flexibility* – particularly when public organizations have contracted in the service providers and are not required to pay on-going, sunk-costs in their own human resources (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). This allows for greater responsiveness in organizations whose policy fields have peaks and troughs in their workload. The removal of public monopolies creates markets and quasi-markets where *competition* should lead to best value for money and cost saving innovations (Kaul 2006; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Finally – although this list is not exhaustive – there are *partnerships*, which are designed to achieve outputs greater than the combined individual outputs of the parties involved (Brooks *et al.* 1984). Partnerships enabled activities undertaken jointly between public and private actors to take advantage of the others' efficiencies without

having to challenge or alter the existing structure, management or core-funding of the international government organization.

The above represents examples of the market-like practices associated with the new public management. Space limitations prohibit a detailed examination of each in relation to the three case organizations. Therefore, market competition has been selected as an example to illustrate how cultures have influenced the way in which market advantages are interpreted and implemented differently.

Market competition

Like it or not, all three case organizations now find themselves in a competitive market. None of the organizations have exclusivity in their policy field in the international arena. While the Radiocommunication Bureau of the International Telecommunication Union can claim exclusivity in the allocation of the radio spectrum, it has been deliberately kept weak in this sphere by the member-states who refuse to grant the organization regulatory or enforcement power (Jacobson 1974). The other two bureaus – Telecommunication Standardization and Telecommunication Development – have a freer hand to operate in their policy fields, but both face competition from other players. For example, the International Standards Organization works with both state and market actors, and there are a plethora of international government organizations and civil society actors in the development field who could add telecommunication development to their portfolio.

Table 7-1 - Sample of the competitive market

Case Organization	Potential Competitors
International Telecommunication Union	International Standards Organization (ISO) International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
International Criminal Police Organization	European Police Agency (EUROPOL) Association of South East Asian Nations Police (ASEANAPOL) United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
International Centre for Conservation	International Council of Museums (ICOM) International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

Source: interviews and own research.

A prominent difference between these international government organizations and market-based actors is the higher level of collaboration. The actors listed above all have cooperation agreements with each other. This gives a different tone than one would find say between corporations like Ford and Honda, where one would likely revel at the collapse of the other as they could then access a greater share of the car market. Therefore, while ideas of the free market are being promulgated, the reality is the market of international organizations is a different one to a commercial free market. So how do the three cases operate partnerships in their respective markets, what market-based ideas do they apply and what is the influence of professional and organizational cultures?

More effective negotiation of Telecommunication Standards

They come here because they can get the standard conducted in ITU much faster than any other standards body (I.10 Johnson 2011).

The speed with which the world of information communication technology is changing dictates that the International Telecommunication Union must present itself to its partners as the pinnacle of efficiency and effectiveness. The Telecommunication Standards approval process outlined in chapter four is an example of where this public actor has worked hard within the bounds of public engineering culture to meet this challenge. In 1988, the approval process for telecommunication standards took as long as four years. Changes in 1992 reduced this timeframe to two years. Further reductions brought the time down to 6 months in 1997 and today the process takes a matter of weeks from beginning to end (Huurdean 2003, p.599). The longest delay in the current processing time is the four weeks allowed for comment after the negotiating process (I.10 Johnson 2011). Coinciding with the reduced timeframe for processing, the number of standards approved has also increased (Huurdean 2003, p.599). These more effective methods – faster processing and more standards approved – have been achieved by ceding much of the process to the private sector members. The Director of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau explains it:

This is a technical organization – most of the technical output of the organization is produced by our private sector members. They have in effect the right to approve our technical specifications in this sector. It's different to the [radiocommunication and telecommunication development] sectors, but this sector, the standards sector, it's basically the private Sector Members that develop and approve our standards. Except for those that have some regulatory or policy implications, but that's only about five per cent of our total standards, which is over 3000. So they have a significant role (I.10 Johnson 2011).

By placing control of the standards approval in the hands of private Sector Members, the process in this public organization is more economic, efficient and effective than it would otherwise be under either total public or private control. If left in either sphere, separate negotiations would be required among literally hundreds of parties.

Accordingly, the International Telecommunication Union's forums prove to be the most effective means of gaining standards approval.

Providing forums and frameworks for discussion and negotiation are the core function of the International Telecommunication Union (Jacobson 1974, pp.60-61). The way in which meetings are conducted in the Union have changed with technology as new ideas and practices familiar to the private sector have been introduced. An example of this stems from the digital divide between North and South, which means delegates to meetings are often on an uneven footing. Therefore communication technology itself is also deployed to increase the organization's effectiveness. Johnson (I.10) described the measures his Bureau has taken to bring these ideas into practice:

We're trying to use the technology as far as we can here to help with our efficiency ... this bureau has a paperless policy, I mean trying reduce the amount of paper. I call it not paperless, but less paper policy [laughs] ... we have paperless meetings, all the delegates use laptops. If they come without a laptop, we have to give them a laptop because they can't work without one.

Johnson and other interviewees at the Union also described how they provided for remote participation using technology. He thought they were 'probably quite different to many of the other UN organizations, that remote participation in meetings is becoming the norm' (I.10 Johnson 2011). From Johnson's perspective it is clear the Union is dedicated to engineering's 'permanent anticipation of technological advances and solution' and 'passion for creating artefacts that help shape and sustain a world full of the complexity and richness of human life' (Sharp *et al.* 2000, pp.40-41). What can be seen is a picture of structured, predictable and technological innovation in the Union – a vision of effectiveness suitable for the worldview of engineering professionals.

Also from an engineering perspective, the Union's standards approval process conforms closely with the cultural norms of the profession and organization. The tight knit arrangements mean public and private partners are working within a structured and predictable environment familiar to engineering culture (Bloch, 1986). The structure has been designed in effect to meet the needs of engineering culture from both the public and the private sphere. A regulatory presence in the structure provides familiarity and

satisfies the desire of the public body; yet it has been designed to place few impediments on private actors seeking to have telecommunication standards approved. With around five per cent of standards subjected to member-state intervention (I.10 Johnson 2011), the majority of the process provides an efficient environment making it a desirable and effective choice for partners from the highly competitive information and communication technology market. The telecommunication standards approval process can ensure their products are available as soon as possible; or as Florman (1987) put it, “out the door”.

Leveraging a global police network for partners’ benefits

The world has changed and INTERPOL is in a good place because it is the only international secure communication network for law enforcement
(I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011).

This quote reflects the International Criminal Police Organization self-perception of being in a unique position to provide services to their constituency – operational police. However, the above quote is not entirely true – there are other such networks, but these are regional like the EUROPOL network, and they do not have the same global reach as the network of 190 National Central Bureaus. The secure network provides both communication facilities and databases which can be leveraged to advantage the organization’s public-private partnerships. Project S-Print is one such partnership.

Counterfeiting currency and other secure documents, like passports, present a criminal threat to national security. Counterfeit currency can undermine an economy and forged passports reduce the integrity of border control. In today’s outsourced world, secure printing is no longer a government preserve. Globally, there are a limited number of companies who supply the hardware such as the intaglio printers, which produce the raised effect one can feel on banknotes and passports; and software including inks and currency substrate with high-security features (I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011). Since 1987, the International Criminal Police Organization has called for control of the trade in second-hand intaglio printers (INTERPOL 1987, 1997b). An organized criminal group with an intaglio printing machine would be able to produce high-quality forgeries such as the US \$100 ‘supernotes’ (Jacobson 2009), which could critically damage or destroy a small economy.

The International Criminal Police Organization’s Counterfeit and Secure Documents Branch created a partnership called Project S-Print. The partnership is with high-

security printing firms and is designed for the industry to protect their products and to increase security for member-countries. Project S-Print has enabled companies to use the organization's secure communication network to ensure orders they receive for currency or other secure documents originate from the appropriate government agencies. The printing firms register with Project S-Print, which allows the Counterfeit and Secure Documents Branch to confirm their bona fides through checks conducted with the appropriate National Central Bureaus. Once registered, companies are able to use the S-Print logo to assure customers they are taking responsible steps to safeguard client interests (I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011; INTERPOL 2011h). When an order is received for secure inks, substrate, currency etc., the partner can make enquiries direct to the Secretariat-General in Lyon, requesting authentication of the order. Checks are conducted through the network and assurance is given – or not, as the case may be (I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011).

S-Print has gone further with control of second-hand intaglio printers. The 1987 resolution had little effect, recommending 'appropriate control systems be set up in the countries concerned' (INTERPOL 1987). Despite this resolution, member countries undertook very little substantive action. By incorporating the relatively few intaglio printer manufacturers into Project S-Print, the International Criminal Police Organization achieved greater success. Manufacturers agreed to include a clause in their sales contracts to ensure they would be offered first option to purchase second hand machines (I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011). This public-private partnership has therefore created controls on the resale of intaglio printers – controls that the member-countries proved incapable of achieving. This shows how, with the right tool for leverage, an international government organization can create partnerships that out-perform the capabilities of their member-states.

Project S-Print leveraged a key advantage the International Criminal Police Organization has over other organizations – its secure global network. Even though many of the high-security printing firms are located in the developed world, their national clients are mostly from the developing world. Therefore organizations such as EUROPOL and ASEANAPOL have limited ability to replicate S-Print, they simply do not have the scope or the infrastructure.

The use of the INTERPOL name and logo by Project S-Print partners is carefully controlled. The *Vade Mecum* – the Handbook for the International Criminal Police

Organization – lays down precise guidelines through financial regulations to control donations and sponsorship. Donations and contributions must be compatible with the organization's principles, aims and activities and the donors must 'fulfil criteria concerning morality, reputation and reliability' (INTERPOL 2009b, p.38). These qualifiers extend to all organizations wishing for formal or informal association with the Organization. The organizational culture is one acutely aware of the value of the INTERPOL name and reputation.

Several traits of police culture influenced the formation of Project S-Print. Most prominently has been the trait of police to operate autonomously in the international sphere (Deflem 2002b). Without the drive to operate autonomously, key features of project S-Print, such as the tracing of intaglio printers, would never have materialized. By approaching firms involved in high-security printing, the cultural traits of pragmatism and problem solving were also evident (Bevir 2010; Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010; Glomseth *et al.* 2007). The sensitivity over the appropriate use of the International Criminal Police Organization's name and logo and the tight control over who can use it illustrate the police trait to maintain authority in their activities (Crank 2003). Naturally enough, fighting crime (Prenzler 1997) features in all activities of the organization.

Conservation – collaboration inside and outside the profession

We are a small and professional organization, and most of our partners are also professional organizations (I.17 Antomarchi 2011).

The International Centre for Conservation is most antithetical to the concept of market competition in their field of activity. The 'competitors' listed (See Table 7-1, page 165) all have a seat on the Council of the Rome Centre. Furthermore, the organization is a creation of the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization. In this case, the idea of market competition has failed to gain traction. Other aspects of public management ideas like partnerships have been adopted, so what explains this apparent lack of a market competition perspective?

Foremost is the observation that a focus on cultural objects is the overwhelming trait of conservation culture. Conservators acknowledge the work they do is completed by and on behalf of the 'short-term custodians'⁵ of the items and any work they do on a

⁵ That is, a person can only 'own' a work of art for their lifetime at most, before it transfers to the new 'custodian.'

significant object is likely to be repeated (Keck 1964). Their work is also done in the context of more objects in need of conservator attention than can ever be attended to (Benedikter 2004). In effect this is a conservation gap. In this context, there is always more work than those capable of competently attending it and as a result, the conservation profession has been expanding since before the inception of the Rome Centre.

All the training conducted by the International Centre for Conservation is done with an aim to reducing the conservation gap. The example of the African museums programme (chapter four) not only contributed more than 400 new professionals in sub-Saharan Africa, but resulted in the creation of two new institutions – the *Ecole du Patrimoine Africain* (EPA) and the Centre for Heritage Development in Africa (CHDA) – to teach and develop even more conservators in the region (ICCRUM 1986-1994b). Were there a genuine atmosphere of competition in the field, then it is doubtful the Rome Centre itself would have been founded, let alone going on to establish and support two potential rivals.

Another aspect of the organizational culture is the academic perspective that contributing to knowledge is important (Adams 1998). This underpins the professional trait to cooperate or collaborate in everything (ICOM 1984). Developing a competitive environment in conservation training and practice is incompatible with the traits of sharing, cooperating and collaborating.

A joint interview with the International Centre for Conservation's two unit directors – Catherine Antomarchi (Collections) and Joseph King (Sites) – highlighted the cooperative approach and lack of competition:

I.27 King: *We partnered in AFRICA 2009,⁶ in the beginning with the World Heritage Centre at UNESCO and CRATERRE.⁷ ... ICCROM had the programme management experience and had just come off a fifteen year museum training programme in sub-Saharan Africa. So we had a strength in that sense. But we don't operate on site very much ... CRATERRE operates on projects on sites ... and UNESCO, because it has ... a much more strategic role ... So when you put those three things together, what do you get? You get one organization that's not going to do implementation – and that's UNESCO, but is able to reach the governments in a way that even we can't do ... and you've also got them bringing in world heritage aspects. Then you've got ICCROM that has*

⁶ AFRICA 2009 (Conservation of Immovable Cultural Heritage in sub-Saharan Africa) was an ICCROM partnership programme that followed the PREMA programme described in chapter four. AFRICA 2009 ran between 1998 and 2009, again demonstrating the viability of long term partnerships.

⁷ A French non-government organization that deals with conservation of earthen architecture.

the project management experience, but is weak on site-based work. And you've got CRATERRE, which is strong on site-based work but weak on larger project management. So you put all those things together and you wind up with a programme ... then we add into that mix the two regional institutions, EPA and CHDA, and that brought in essentially the missing link on that because they had the base on the ground in the region for us to do the training there ... but again I am not sure efficiency is the right word.

I.17 - Antomarchi: Well, yes. Because you succeed better, it is a result that you have. So you are more efficient in the sense that you are, you are ... for example its very interesting to say that "I have some capacity but I don't know how to reach out", or "I don't know how to learn from the field work because I don't do any fieldwork." So actually you grow into a more knowledgeable, something. For me we are more efficient.

Antomarchi also 'felt that sometimes what has hampered good projects is the different cultures of organizations' (I.17 Antomarchi 2011), demonstrating that not all partnerships run so smoothly. She explained:

There is difference between private and governmental organization. At ICCROM, we are paid by the member-states, so for us it is obvious in a sense that we serve people. So we give our material, we put it on the web if we have it, we are generous because ... it is mandatory to be generous. We are nothing if we are not like that.

Other organizations are not. The private organizations have other objectives. They are not made to serve ... Some partner will be very keen to control everything, even the way you write a letter, even the way you formulate an agreement, even the way everything will have to be ... So in this way I find the partnership ... less genuine.

Although partners were not named, the interview revealed some public partners had their own expectations based on their own organizational culture (for example excessive financial accountability mechanisms – see Busuioc 2010), which were beyond the capacity of the Rome Centre to manage. Therefore, these partnership projects were not pursued. However, these conflicting interests are not signs of a competitive market, they are issues of project management and control. Thus the lens of conservation, focussed on cultural objects filters out the concept of market competition. This is reinforced by the perception among conservators that the task in front of them far outstrips the number of conservators in the world. Therefore there is room in the market of international conservator training for more actors.

The role of ideas in global public-private partnerships

The three factors driving global public-private partnerships examined in this chapter provide a different insight into the phenomena when viewed through the case studies

and their cultural lenses. The first, attributing the growth in public-private partnerships to an ideological shift proved difficult to ascertain across the three cases. Interviewees in each organization expressed a strong belief their work was technical by nature. This belief is a strong characteristic of all three organizational cultures. Without any evidence from these organizations, it is clear the ideology factor can only be selectively applied to explain the expansion of the global public-private partnership phenomena.

The factor of new public management ideas migrating to the international sphere has more credence. All three organizations incorporated the ideas associated with new public management in their own time, own ways and for their own reasons. In part, the varied take up rates and approaches can be attributed to the professional organizational cultures of each. For the International Telecommunication Union, the entire sector underwent radical change in the period of liberalization, privatization and deregulation as the operating environment for the Union shifted from a majority of public incumbents to a majority of private actors. Yet the structure of the relationship with partners changed in name only – although there were more private partners – their collective voice was no more powerful in Union forums than it had been in the 1930s. The International Criminal Police Organization was culturally averse to partnerships with any outsiders. However, the idea of partnerships was transferred into the heart of the police organization from the United Kingdom, a country that had imposed new public management throughout its public sector. While the International Centre for Conservation was also subject to change in the management of the heritage conservation sector, the organization took the conscious decision to review and change the way it operated *and* its organizational culture. This decision pre-empted any external imposition and enabled the organization to change without compromising its core focus on the preservation of cultural heritage.

Finally, there is no uniformity between the organizations as to how the practice of market competition applies. The International Standards Association and the International Electrotechnical Commission are alternative sources of international standards for the telecommunication sector. The International Telecommunication Union responded with more effective and efficient standards processing times with an aim to remain ‘relevant’ to their members. The International Criminal Police Organization looked to leverage their network and infrastructure to provide a unique and effective partnership with the high security printing industry. Their unique capacity for secure global communication between police cannot be matched by their regionally

Chapter 7

based rivals. For the two older organizations, their professional and organizational cultures influenced the partnerships as described above and how market competition was perceived or interpreted in their partnerships. Conservation culture, however, drives collaboration and cooperation, not competition. The other organizations sharing the policy space of conservation and culture are, more often than not, partners in the projects and programmes of the Rome Centre. This chapter therefore demonstrates how professional and organizational cultures affect how market-based ideas and practices are applied, or not, as the case may be.

The differences in the way ideas are taken up, implemented, interpreted and developed by organizations has led to different types of partnership approaches. This is also true for the resources international organizations bring to, and draw from, their partnerships. The next chapter will examine how professional culture can shape perceptions and realities of resourcing partnerships from both the public and private sides of the equation.

8. Resources and Private Interests

This chapter examines the resources accessible through global public-private partnerships and how the resource needs vary from organization to organization. This analysis links resource related motivations to the thesis that professional and organizational cultures influence partnerships and these cultures differentiate the way private resources are perceived and accessed. The influence of professional culture on the way a resource is perceived can make the difference between a partnership proceeding, or not. Private resources are not always viewed as advantageous or even desirable for an organization.

Different partnerships - different resources

There are four broad categories of resources available through global public-private partnerships – financial, human, knowledge and physical resources. These resources are not mutually exclusive in the partnerships. A partnership can involve one or more types of resources. For example knowledge resources may come in the form of an expert in a particular field. The ability to access external finances was a characteristic used to select the three cases and is common to most partnership types to one degree or another. Finances are most common in resource mobilization type partnerships (see Table 2-2, page 21), but funds are also required to meet expenses like travel costs to enable advocacy or policy dialogue partnerships to occur and operational partnerships often need significant sponsorship to be effective. Even informational and learning partnerships regularly require substantive financial input. As a resource, money is an almost universal requirement for partnerships. However, money is not the only resource made available to international government organizations through public-private partnerships, nor is it an element of every global public-private partnership. In Chapter three, this research showed how fewer than 30% of international government organizations are structured to receive financial contribution from the private sector (Table 3-2, page 68). Yet many of international government organizations have partnerships with the private sector. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency has partnerships with non-government organizations involving no financial interaction (IAEA 2010).

People form the second category of resources. Human resources include highly skilled experts like the research scientists and engineers who provide input into telecommunication standards. Less skilled, but no less important, are the networks of

Chapter 8

volunteers critical to the success of many fundraising programmes. These human resources – both experts and volunteers – can be engaged in short-term or long-term partnerships. For example an engineer may only work short-term with the International Telecommunication Union when reviewing a standard of specific interest to them (see chapter four). On the other hand, many cultural institutions have maintained long-term expert partnerships with the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property for years or even decades (see appendix 4). Similarly, volunteer networks may partner with an international government organization to provide ongoing fundraising – such as the EPA Foundation established to support the *Ecole du Patrimoine Africain*, which was established to train African conservators (see chapter four). Volunteer network contributions can also be short sharp campaigns such as Crime Stoppers International providing support to Operation Infra-Red, a campaign to trace international criminal fugitives (INTERPOL 2011b).

Knowledge comprising information, intelligence or research and development is the third resource category. These intellectual resources include general knowledge and ideas shared between the developed and developing world – for example the in-country work of the World Bank (Weller and Xu 2010; Woods 2006; Xu and Weller 2009). Alternately, they can be specific intelligence targeted for a purpose like data on fugitives supplied by the payment card industry (I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011). For technically oriented international government organizations – like the cases studied – innovation in the field through research and development occurs mainly in the private sector. The partnership to address the problems of counterfeit medication, detailed in the next chapter, are reliant on private sector research and development (di Giorigio and Gramazio 2011). While this example is apparently a positive development, critics claim the resultant research and development unequally benefits the for-profit partners in the pharmaceutical industry (MSF 2011; TWN 2008). These criticisms aim to keep partnerships accountable. Despite these concerns, intellectual resources remain a part of global public-private partnerships.

The final resources category incorporates the facilities and equipment provided by private partners. These often to facilitate operational partnerships. Like the other categories, facilities and equipment can range from the large and complex to the small and simple. The supply of equipment to analyse fingerprints is an example of a large and complex provision of resources through a partnership (I.20 Fingerprints Coordinator 2011). This is discussed in detail below. On the simpler side, the provision

of fuel for vehicles in an operational setting can make the difference between a partnership succeeding or failing to deliver on its goals (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011). Enabling small partners to participate in supplying non-monetary support through facilities and equipment allows for broader partnerships, and a feeling of ownership to those who live in the operational environment. Thus even small contributions are significant in their own way.

The various categories of resources are unevenly distributed among the partnership types (Table 2-2, page 21) and they are unequally adopted by the three case studies. The uneven distribution means there is more to say about some resources than others. Finances are the dominant resource, however human resources, intellectual resources and physical resources are also examined within a cultural frame of reference. Having described the resources, it is now time to examine how they are perceived and accessed by each of the organizations.

Financial resources and budgetary pressures

Access to private financial resources guided the selection of the cases for this research. All three have a budgetary gap between the core funding provided by member-states and their organizational aspirations (Table 8-1). Yet these similarities have not resulted in a common approach to seeking financial resources from the private sector. The cultural perspective of each organization shapes how this common resource is perceived in different ways. The perceptions of financial resources differ along professional lines, as well as organizational ones.

The needs of most international government organizations have evolved over the years, however these needs often exceed funding from member-states. Since the mid-1980s, member-states have imposed greater financial restraints on the multi-lateral organizations. Zero nominal growth and zero real-growth budgets epitomize this squeeze. Zero nominal growth budgets freeze member-state contributions at a fixed rate, which in an inflationary environment effectively reduces the value of funds available to an organization. Under zero real-growth, member-state funding only grows in line with inflation – thus limiting an international organization's ability to expand its role or respond to a changing environment (Lee *et al.* 1997). Zero growth budgets have a continuous impact on the case organizations.

Chapter 8

As a result of these budgetary restraints, international government organizations have been under constant financial stress. This stress is exacerbated when member-state expectations outstrip the fiscal means to meet them. Expectations articulated in statutory documents and treaties can be deceptively simple. Or, as is more often the case, they take on new and greater meaning with the passage of time. An example of this is the International Criminal Police Organization, which aims:

(1) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights';

(2) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes (INTERPOL 1956).

When drafted in 1956, these aims translated into a relatively simple network of National Central Bureaus communicating details of suspects, offenders, victims, missing persons and criminal methodology with one another either by post or telegraph. These activities were primarily aimed at criminal investigation. Domestic changes placed a greater emphasis on police to engage in crime prevention (Felson and Clarke 1998) and created a need to deploy more sophisticated approaches by law enforcement through tools such as computer databases and new forensic techniques (Skolnick 1966, 1994). Additionally there has been an expansion of sophisticated and highly technical criminal activity like internet fraud (Albanese 2011). These all impact the bottom line for domestic police forces engaged in crime prevention, detection and investigation, as well as the International Criminal Police Organization's ability to maintain and improve the level of service to their constituency of operational police in member-countries.

Table 8-1 outlines how member-state contributions have grown as has the gap between contributions and budgets. It should be noted the International Telecommunication Union derives a large income from 'other operating revenue', which is not member-state, Sector Member, Associate or Academia contributions. For example, this additional revenue was €36 million in 2011 and €20 million in 2010 (ITU 2012a). This is discussed in the next section.

Table 8-1 - Membership contribution and organizational budgets

Year	International Telecommunication Union (€'000s) [*]		International Criminal Police Organization (€ '000s)		International Centre for Conservation ^{**} (€ '000s)	
	Member-state contributions	Budget	Member-state contributions	Budget	Member-state contributions	Budget
2006	67,798	111,322	38,370	46,728	3,897	7,355
2007	65,885	108,180	41,398	48,128	3,897	7,355
2008	73,885	112,728	45,128	54,621	3,584	6,806
2009	73,974	112,864	47,440	58,815	3,584	6,806
2010	88,411	146,679	48,615	61,137	3,587	5,289
2011	91,072	161,220	49,636	58,318	3,587	5,289
Gap	38.8%		17.4%		43.1%	

Source: ICCROM 2007a, 2009, 2011b; INTERPOL 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2010b, 2011f, 2012b; ITU 1948-2009a; Jokilehto 2011, p. 121.

^{*} Converted from Swiss francs to euro at the rate valid on 31 December for each year.

^{**} ICCROM has a biennial budget and the total has been divided equally over both years.

Percentage wise, the International Centre for Conservation is clearly the least well-funded of the three organizations. The budget includes 43% in extra-budgetary contributions. Much of the difference between member-state contributions and the budget is sourced through voluntary contributions from public agencies and organizations within member-states. These include development agencies, museums, galleries and the like (see appendix 4). Support from these sources is in addition to their assessed contribution provided through the relevant ministry of the member-state (ICCROM 2009, 2010c, 2011a). These voluntary contributions are, however, much more vulnerable to issues such as the recent global credit crunch. Irrespective of the source of additional revenue, the table illustrates a large discrepancy between assessed member-state contributions and budgetary realities.

International Telecommunication Union – reliance on user pays resourcing

We have over 700 private sector entities that are members of ITU and now we're having universities and research institutes also becoming members of ITU and they have quite significant rights and obligations. And they contribute significantly to the budget of the ITU (I.10 Johnson 2011).

The International Telecommunication Union is the oldest organization in the United Nations family and has been working closely with the private sector for the majority of its existence. It was not member-induced budgetary restraints, nor a specific financial crisis leading the Union to seek funds from the private sector. Rather, the Union

recognized the private company involvement entailed costs which were not the responsibility of the member-states to meet. The Union had accepted contributions from private actors for many years before they formalized the arrangement in 1947 in article 14 of the Convention:

Private operating agencies and international organizations shall contribute to the extraordinary expenses of the administrative conferences and the meetings of the International Consultative Committees in which they participate (ITU 1947).

This formalized arrangement meets the criteria set for a global public-private partnership defined in chapter two. Working closely with the private sector and accepting their financial contributions became ingrained in the organizational culture of the Union. The rates the Union charges to Sector Members, Associates and Academia have consistently reflected a contribution to the running of the Union, not a commercial arrangement subject to market prices or profit for the organization.

The principle applied to the financial contributions made by private organizations to the International Telecommunication Union is essentially user-pays. Even the structural changes of 1992 did not change this underlying perception of private contributions. In effect, the principle of charging a fee to recover costs (or less) is now part of the organizational culture. Sector membership and other service fees detailed below only subsidized what the Union provided. The charges do not equate to a profitable area of activity for the Secretariat and Bureaus.

The user-pays principle has proven remarkably sticky and difficult to change. At the last plenipotentiary the Secretariat attempted – with support from some member-states – to increase the rate charged to Sector Members, Associates and Academia. The increase would have moved Sector Member contributions from one-fifth to one-quarter of a member-state contributory unit. The increase would mean revenue from membership would meet the expenditure associated with membership (ITU 2010a). In practice this would amount to an increase in contributions from CHF63,600¹ to CHF79,500. These attempts proved ineffective. The move required the consensus of the majority of member-states, but powerful states including the United States and Japan refused to endorse changes to the formula used to calculate private sector contributions (ITU 2010a, document PP-10/95-E). The United States expressed concern an increased fee would result in a decreased number of Sector Members, harming the overall effectiveness of the Union (ITU 2010a, document PP-10/15(Add.4)-E). This attitude

¹ Sector Members from developing countries pay half this amount – see Table 4-2 on page 84.

prevailed despite the relatively low cost to many large corporate Sector Members who received commercial benefits such as having their proprietary technology written into global standards (Ruggie 2004).

The International Telecommunication Union receives other financial resources from the private sector. These include satellite network filings – these filings are necessary if someone wishes to operate a satellite communication network such as television, radio or telephone without interference by or from other transmission sources. The fees associated with the filings are worth between CHF 14 and CHF 16 million annually (ITU 1948-2009a). However like the Sector Member fees, they are charged on a cost recovery basis only (ITU 2010a, p.188). This is indicative of a basic assumption of the organizational culture – that the Union is there in the service of its membership, not to exploit commercial advantages available through governmental control of the radio-waves.

The sale of Union publications is another source of income. However, like satellite filings and membership, publication sales only subsidize the costs. In 2012, the Secretariat reported to Council the cost of production, marketing, sales and distribution exceeded the revenue from this source (ITU 2012a, p.22). Furthermore, the Guadalajara plenipotentiary decided to provide a range of free on-line publications for all members – whether they be public or private entities – and to the general public (ITU 2010b, p.198). Printed copies remained for sale. The decision to provide publications for free followed a trial period, which resulted in large increase in the number of publications downloaded by member-states. Therefore the decision was made in an effort to strike a balance between greater transparency for the Union and any potential loss of revenue.

Of the three sectors, the Union's Development Sector has the most Sector Members, Associates and Academia. Tasked with the promotion of information communication technology in developing countries, the Sector mainly partners with the United Nations Development Programme. The global financial crisis of recent years affected the Union and the Sector in pursuing these goals. Furthermore, the financial crisis negatively impacted on broader investment in developing countries (ITU 2010b). As a result, the Plenipotentiary decided to seek more innovative approaches to financing the Union's development projects, including greater use of public-private partnerships. This idea was promoted by the United States along with 'enhanced mobilization of extra-budgetary resources' to counter the fall in donor funding (ITU 2010a, document

PP-10/15(add.4)-E). Therefore, it can be seen in the case of the International Telecommunication Union how financial crises and stress directly correlate to some of the changes in the way the Union operates. Yet these changes are not driven internally. This is due to the self-perception of the organization as being non-autonomous and essentially beholden to serving the needs of the member-states. A position closely equated to the culture of engineers in public service.

International Criminal Police Organization – partner contributions facilitating diversity and growth

I'm a policeman. I don't want to ask you for money, you know it's not a natural thing for me (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011).

You just have to be realistic with that ... you couldn't really operate without some public-private partnerships (I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011).

As described above, the International Criminal Police Organization did not involve the private sphere in its operations until the late 1990s. Central to this reluctance was the strength of police culture in the organization – a hesitancy to open up to outsiders and an aversion among (most) police to taking money from outside sources. This organizational reluctance has clearly changed with more than 17% of operating revenue received from private actors between 2006 and 2011 (Table 8-1). Furthermore, there may not be a limit to the growth in private support.

The size and profile of the financial partnerships of the International Criminal Police Organization is increasing. A recent example is the partnership with the *Fédération Internationale de Football Association*. Under the terms of this partnership, the *Fédération* will provide €20 million to fund a ten-year, dedicated anti-corruption training programme at the International Criminal Police Organization Global Centre for Innovation in Singapore, due to open in 2014 (Noble 2011). The head of security for the *Fédération* brokered the deal – he was a former police officer with a dozen years of experience in the International Criminal Police Organization and over thirty years total in policing (Kelso 2012).² This provided a connection between two international organizations with different organizational and professional cultures.

² It should be noted here the FIFA head of security also illustrates how professional and organizational cultures can clash. The Kelso article describes this former police officer's 'methods, particularly his introduction of a robust law-enforcement approach into the usually diplomatic "football family", and his

The level of funding received from *Fédération* raises some obvious questions. What is the appropriate level of private support for a police organization and does private financial support shape the activities and priorities of the International Criminal Police Organization? The first question is important when the role of policing is so close to – and representative of – the concept of national sovereignty (Anderson 1989, p.4; Weber 1947, pp.146-147). However, the International Criminal Police Organization is not representative of any single national sovereignty and it perceives its core constituents to be police officers, served through the network of National Central Bureaus – not necessarily its member-countries. This perception of a global role for the Organization reflects the close-knit nature of police culture and its support for ‘insiders’ across national boundaries. Furthermore, the organizational culture changed and moved away from the police aversion to private money. Police within the organization have opened their thinking to new ways of sourcing funds and to reconsider what is an appropriate level.

To answer the second question, the *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* funding created an organizational focus on the issue of gambling in sport, particularly football. The integrity in sport programme focuses on detecting and investigating match fixing (INTERPOL 2012b). Match-fixing represents a new crime-type to receive this level of global attention. Although some interpreted the timing of this partnership as a cynical attempt by the football organization to divert attention from allegations of corruption within their executive (Anon. 2011; INTERPOL 2011d), this was not the case. The International Criminal Police Organization has no power to investigate or prosecute the *Fédération Internationale de Football Association*. So interpreting the donation as an attempt to divert the actions of the organization would be a mistake; although the partnership is an exercise in improving the global image of the *Fédération*.

The *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* partnership targeted corruption in sport through specialized police training. Several interviewees spoke of the lack of basic resources and training in numerous member-countries (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011; I.20 Fingerprints Coordinator 2011; I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011).

Transnational criminal groups exploit the weaknesses in the law-enforcement capabilities of any country, particularly less developed countries (Madsen 2009).

Furthermore, the transnational nature of these criminal groups means a weakness in one

outspokenness on the subject have been something of a culture shock to FIFA’. The head of security left FIFA in February 2012, after being frustrated in his attempts to investigate FIFA’s executive committee.

state can produce vulnerability in another. Examples of this are trafficking in people or illicit commodities. What can be (relatively) safely arranged and prepared in one jurisdiction (for example illicit drugs) then becomes a drain on the resources and undermines the effectiveness of policing in another. It is therefore imperative for police capabilities to be raised to enable adequate investigation and prosecution of transnational criminal enterprises.

To train all police in the developing world to first world standards would take far greater resources for the International Criminal Police Organization than its richer member-states would be willing to directly contribute – irrespective of the security risks brought on by transnational crime. One interviewee saw potential for the Organization to obtain financial resources from the private sector well beyond current core member-state funding. He compared the funding model of the International Criminal Police Organization with that of the International Organization for Migration (I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011). The migration organization has an administrative budget of US\$44.3 million provided through assessed contributions of member-states; and an operational programme of US\$1.2604 *billion*. The operational programmes of the International Organization for Migration are mainly funded by additional contributions from member-states, however these pay for targeted programmes. States use this model to facilitate domestic and international policy through targeted funding using the international government organization as an intermediary or service provider. In addition, private contributions and sponsorship are also a significant component of the budget (IOM 2012). It is clear from the interview the International Criminal Police Organization perceives a way to access even greater resources through partnership. In effect, the professional culture of police with its aversion to private money is in conflict with an organizational culture seeking to expand the ability to support police through global public-private partnerships. These partnerships may necessitate further change to the dominance of police culture in the Organization.

International Centre for Conservation – partnerships mean survival

Today, an institution like ICCROM cannot survive if it works only by itself
(I.19 Bouchenaki 2011).

Compared to the other organizations, the International Centre for Conservation operates on a shoestring budget. This helped to create an organizational culture which seeks partnerships to support the Rome Centre and all its activities. Compounding the low level of member-state contributions is the requirement, like other international

organizations, to operate with zero-nominal or zero-real growth budgets (I.19 Bouchenaki 2011). The small size of the organization makes it more vulnerable than its larger counterparts to small budget cuts. To balance this the Rome Centre, like the International Organization for Migration, receives a large portion of its non-core budget to pay for programmes via voluntary contributions from member-states. Furthermore, the infrastructure and facilities costs for the Rome Centre are paid by the Italian government. Most contributions outside the budgetary process are targeted at specific programmes like the African museums programme discussed in chapter four. This programme received extra-budgetary funds from a range of development agencies, particularly those in Scandinavia (ICCROM 1986-1994a, 1986-1994b). Other funding for the Africa programme arrived via other international government organizations like the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization – funds which mainly originated with the member-states of those partner organizations. These equate to state-sanctioned and funded philanthropy. Yet a significant portion still comes from the private sphere. Table 8-1 shows the Centre's budget for the 2008-09 biennium was nearly double what it had received via assessed contributions from member-states. These additional resources enabled the organization to continue to operate. As the Director of the Sites Unit explained:

There are almost no activities that we do in this building that we don't do with partners now. Those partners may be, they're probably more likely to be governmental partners as opposed to the private sector, but they may also be foundations, and they may also be private sector. But I think it's worth pointing out that we almost could not do anything if we didn't have partnerships (I.27 King 2011).

This belief in partnerships forms an underlying assumption in the organizational culture. King's assertion is matched by the organization's annual newsletter, which doubles as an annual report. Over the past decade, both private and public partners are listed next to the narrative reports of every significant activity the International Centre for Conservation has undertaken. In essence the work of the Centre relies on the goodwill of its partners. King (I.27 2011) further noted a distinction between *financial* partners and *operational* partners. The latter representing the partners bringing something other than money to a partnership. On this point, the discussion now turns to the non-financial resource arrangements.

Human resources – experts and volunteers

Engineering expertise from academia in the ITU

As an organization with a high level of technical output, the International Telecommunication Union is focussed more on expertise as a human resource in its partnerships than volunteer resources. Therefore this sub-section will likewise focus on expert human resources.

Figure 8-1 - Meeting Schedule for the ITU – Morning of 2 Sept 2013

Today's events
ITU-D SYMPOSIA
 Apr 1 2013 - Sep 30 2013 Costa Rica [San José]
 Symposium
ITU-T SG17
 Aug 26 2013 - Sep 4 2013 Switzerland [Geneva]
 Security
ITU-D WORKSHOPS
 Aug 26 2013 - Aug 28 2013 Uruguay [Montevideo]
 Workshop
ITU-T JCA.IDM
 Aug 27 2013 - Aug 27 2013 Switzerland [Geneva]
 Joint Coordination Activity for Identity Management

Sector	Meeting	Meeting	Room	Start	End	Agenda
ITU-T	ITU-T meetings Registration	Montbrillant	0	08:30	12:00	
ITU-T	Joint session of Q4/17 and Q11/17 on CAP	Tower	C 2	09:30	10:45	
ITU-T	Q5/17 - Spam countermeasures	Montbrillant	M 04b	09:30	12:30	
ITU-T	Q2/17 - Security Architecture	Montbrillant	M1	09:30	12:30	
ITU-T	Q3/17 - TISM	Montbrillant	M2	09:30	12:30	
ITU-T	Q8/17 - Cloud computing security	Tower	C 1	09:30	12:30	
ITU-T	Q7/17 - Secure application services	Montbrillant	H2	09:30	12:30	
ITU-T	Q6/17 - Ubiquitous services security	Montbrillant	K1	09:30	12:30	
ITU-T	Q10/17 - IdM	Montbrillant	K2	09:30	12:30	
ITU-T	Q9/17 - Telebiometrics	Montbrillant	L1	09:30	12:30	
ITU-T	Q4/17 - Cybersecurity	Tower	C 2	11:15	12:30	
ITU-T	Q11/17 - PKI, PMI, X.500, ASN.1, OID, ODP, OSI	Montbrillant	H1	11:15	12:30	

Source: <http://www.itu.int/en/events/Pages/Today-Sessions.aspx> accessed 27 Aug 2013

Much of the day-to-day work of the International Telecommunication Union is achieved in the advisory groups, working groups and study groups. The Secretariat and the Bureaus are represented in each of these groups (ITU 2011), however they are there to support the work done by telecommunication experts from member-state administrations and the private sector. On entering the Union’s headquarters in Geneva, visitors are met with large television monitors listing where the various groups are meeting, both in Geneva and around the world. Figure 8-1 presents a snapshot of a morning schedule for these expert groups, another dozen meetings were scheduled for that afternoon. These groups focus on the complex and technical questions assigned to them. Participation of private sector experts is dependent on Sector Membership,

Associate or Academia status. The ongoing activities of these groups reflect the organizational culture of close cooperation between public and private actors focussed on jointly solving technical problems.

In 2010, the Plenipotentiary conference of the Union expanded the scope of union membership to include the new category of Academia. The need to open up to academia was expressed thus in one of the several submissions on the subject:

a) that academia and relevant universities have a pioneering role in research and development of new technologies and applications and their participations in the work of the ITU is a necessity for adopting new work items in the Standardization process at an early stage in particular for emerging technologies;

b) that academia and relevant universities are interested in the activities of the ITU, in particular in the standardization work of the ITU and are willing to join the ITU if more favorable financial conditions existed for their participation in the work of the ITU.

(ITU 2010a, document PP-10/12 (Add.1)-E, pp.41-43)

This rationale provided the professional and operational basis for the inclusion of Academia. However, in his address to the Plenipotentiary, the Secretary-General also recognized the admission of Academia would broaden the potential membership base of the Union and provide additional income from the new members (ITU 2010a, document PP-10/95-E, p.13). The issue of additional financial resources was a consideration, but not a key factor –membership fees for Academia was set at a fraction of the cost of Sector Members and Associates (see Table 4-2, page 85). The change resulted in more than 50 academic institutions becoming part of the Union, with 38 joining the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau as intended (ITU 2013) and enabled access to a broad field of expertise.

From a cultural perspective, the inclusion of Academia opened the Union to more engineers who were on the cutting edge of technological developments, thus reinforcing the professional relevance of the organization. Furthermore, Figure 4-1 on page 84 illustrated how Academia members participated in study group negotiations for the Alternative Approval Process for telecommunication standards, but were then excluded from the negotiation and decision phases of the process. The abbreviated role allocated to Academia reflected the organizational cultural trait of user-pays for private members.

Outside experts and volunteers in Interpol

The International Criminal Police Organization supplements its own human resources with expert and volunteers contributing through partnerships. Expertise in law enforcement usually resides with public authorities, therefore private experts – unless they are former police – are subjected to the cultural mistrust among police of outsiders. However, experts in support roles such as forensics or computing are more welcome as they are not seen as impinging on police turf. For example, the fingerprints section of the International Criminal Police Organization negotiated not only the supply of automated fingerprint identification system hardware and software, but also a technician to provide ongoing systems support (I.20 Fingerprints Coordinator 2011).

Volunteer resources have also supported operational partnerships. In 2010, the organization signed a two-year memorandum of understanding with Crime Stoppers International, a non-profit organization linking national crime stoppers programmes and organizations around the world (INTERPOL 2010a). Crime Stoppers forms a large network of volunteers who gather criminal intelligence to assist police. The agreement followed Operation Infra-Red (2009), which publicized through the volunteer networks and media outlets details of some select fugitive cases wanted by various countries.³ The operation encouraged the public to contact their local Crime Stoppers organization if they had information. Crime Stoppers International set up an operations centre in London to collate and refer information to the International Criminal Police Organization, where experienced officers assessed the information and forwarded it to the countries concerned. As a result of the operation, police located more than 170 internationally wanted fugitives and a number of arrests followed (INTERPOL 2011b).

The success of the 2009 operation did not manifest itself in a change of police culture more welcoming to outsiders. In 2010, the two organizations signed a formal memorandum. This memorandum outlined a one-way flow of information from Crime

³ Red is significant and links to operation to INTERPOL's system for notices used for criminal and humanitarian inquiries. The system includes:

Red Notices: To seek the arrest or provisional arrest of wanted persons with a view to extradition.

Blue Notices: To collect additional information about a person's identity or activities in relation to a crime.

Green Notices: To provide warnings and criminal intelligence about persons who have committed criminal offences and are likely to repeat these crimes in other countries.

Yellow Notices: To help locate missing persons, often minors, or to help identify persons who are unable to identify themselves.

Orange Notices: To warn police, public entities and other international organizations about potential threats from disguised weapons, parcel bombs and other dangerous materials.

Black Notices: To seek information on unidentified bodies. (Interpol 2011i)

Stoppers International to the International Criminal Police Organization, and did not oblige the latter to acknowledge CSI as the information source in subsequent police actions (INTERPOL 2010a). Furthermore, crime stoppers is considered an Anglo-Saxon concept (CSI 2011) and not fully embraced by police in civil law jurisdictions. As one officer put it:

I come from Greece, they don't know and they don't recognize this kind of tool ... we are not that close to the private sector. So there are many countries all over the world that they find it a bit inconvenient and uncomfortable working so closely with the private sector. When it comes to the Anglo-Saxons they take it for granted ... but you see the difference in the mentality, in the background, how they approach things – it's a mentality thing – how you have been trained (I.3 Anon. 2011).

He then described how officers from certain countries see civilian involvement in fugitive investigations as a police failure. Thus we can see how police culture, when focussed on operational effectiveness, is prepared to use experts and volunteers, however the distrust of outsiders prevents experts and volunteers being embraced as full and equal partners.

Experts training experts in ICCROM

The most important contribution to ICCROM has certainly been the further training of professionals (Gertrude Tripp, in Jokilehto 2011, p.122).

Gertrude Tripp was a member of the first Council for the International Centre for Conservation. Her comment underlines the critical role the organization has played in developing the profession, from which it then draws to enhance conservation internationally. From the beginning the Rome Centre aimed to train experts and to then use them for training others. This goal was articulated in their first newsletter:


A new generation of experts, who will contribute to solve the growing problems of teaching should be trained by the Centre. This implies the Centre's individual assistance to the best candidates, including its endeavours to obtain the means that might improve their formation (field training, scholarships, travel, assistant responsibility, missions and so on). It should be pointed out that this policy has started to show good results. In fact a number of former students of the Centre hold today important positions in the field of education (ICCROM 1973, p.2).

The approach taken by the International Centre for Conservation is different to the other cases. Both the Telecommunication Union and the International Criminal Police Organization conduct training in their respective fields, however the Rome Centre produces graduates with university level qualifications through programmes such as

Chapter 8

African museums programme. In 1994, the organization surveyed over 2000 former students who had attended courses since 1966. Of the 972 responses, many indicated they had contributed their expertise toward the activities of the Centre (ICCROM 1994, pp.8-10; Jokilehto 2011, p.109). Figure 8-2 below indicates the scope of activities these conservation experts contributed to. Almost one in ten course graduates had lectured at subsequent courses, others contributed to the research and administration of the organization, and some had gone on to become employees at the Rome Centre.

Figure 8-2 - Involvement in ICCROM's activities since attending course



Source: Copied from ICCROM 1994, p.10.

To this day, the International Centre for Conservation continues to rely on external experts to deliver training. When interviewed, the Sites and Collections Unit Directors described these experts as operational partners; distinct from the financial partners who contributed to programme funding. The value of operational partners who participated in the delivery of training and provided additional expertise for the benefit of students was understood and appreciated by the unit directors:

It's true that our operational partners don't bring money necessarily. But, for example, your risk course⁴ that you are doing right now [comment directed to

⁴ King is referring to the seventh International Training Course on Disaster Risk Management of Cultural Heritage.

Catherine Antomarchi, the Collections Unit Director] – you couldn't do that without the Canadian Conservation Institute. I mean they don't bring money in the sense that they don't give you dollars, but without their expertise, their time and things like that. We have such a small amount of money to do that course that if we had to pay for the work that they're doing as teachers, the work that they are doing organizing groups, whatever the various things they're doing on-line, we would have to pay for that ... The in-kind makes a big difference, because it actually does become a significant part of your budget, even though you don't actually put it in your budget (I.27 King 2011).

The use of experts – who themselves have experienced conservation training – as a resource is now part of the organizational culture of the International Centre for Conservation. These experts, and those in the other organizations, contribute to the next type of resource – knowledge, which also includes research and development, information and intelligence that can be inaccessible except through partnerships.

Knowledge resources - research and development

This is a technical organization – most of the technical output of the organization is produced by our private sector members (I.10 Johnson 2011).

The research and development is all done by private companies, not by the police departments. So we work hand-in-hand (I.14 Assistant Director CSDB 2011).

The three organizations see themselves as technical organizations (Table 5-1 on page 131). As such, they are close to the research communities in the private sector relevant to their respective fields. Both quotes, one from the International Telecommunication Union and the other from International Criminal Police Organization reflect their current worldviews – scientific and technical research and development is a field dominated by the private sphere. Although the police organization is a recent convert to this position. Even the International Centre for Conservation, whose core function includes a research agenda and its own laboratory, has involved itself with both public and private partners in pursuit of its research aims. A recurring theme in the interviews was how private research and development represented a resource needed by international organizations to pursue their respective mandates. Below are examples of the different ways each organization benefitted from the knowledge resources of private research and development, and how their worldviews vary.

Associated benefits of telecommunication research and development

The technology associated with telecommunications has long been in the private domain. Most of the significant developments occurred, and continue to occur in private research laboratories. These include the telegraph, telephone, radio, television and the more recent developments in wireless technology (Huurdean 2003; ITU 2010d). By providing a forum for private corporations and other research institutions to work together, the International Telecommunication Union has placed itself in a symbiotic relationship with its Sector, Associate and Academic members. This relationship does not necessarily benefit the Union directly with the results of the research and development from the private sphere. However, the telecommunication standardization process enables the organization to maintain its relevance in the face of competition from other international standards organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the International Standards Organization (ISO) (I.10 Johnson 2011). The standards are a major knowledge resource for the Union – they are produced by the members, thereby achieving a shared outcome for the collective that forms the Union. In effect, the manner in which research and development outcomes are achieved by the Union matches the organizational cultural perspective of product coming from the working of all the parts of the Union.

A changed organizational perspective toward research

At the time it was established, the International Criminal Police Organization (then Commission) involved itself in research and development to facilitate international police cooperation. This included developing a telegraph code for police (Dressler 1924, 1942) and the dissemination among members of identification techniques developed by police in member-countries, including the Jorgensen system of identification developed by the Danish delegate to the Commission, Hakon Jorgensen (ICPC 1923, art.VIII). In more recent years, the Organization has coordinated expert groups on DNA and disaster victim identification (INTERPOL 2002, 2003).⁵ These expert groups brought the results of research and development in both fields together with real-world experience of police to produce handbooks and best-practice procedures (INTERPOL 1997c, 2001). Most experts involved in these developments were either scientists from government forensic laboratories or police with post-disaster experience. These examples reflect the past reticence of police culture to the involvement of outsiders.

⁵ The author helped coordinate Australian input into both groups.

Nowadays, the organizational culture has changed to reflect the above quote. This change recognized that the International Criminal Police Organization can provide better services to operational officers by casting more widely. A recent example is a partnership between the International Criminal Police Organization and the Underwriter's Laboratories University. Investigating intellectual property crime requires skills common to police and private investigators employed by the owners of the intellectual property rights. The partnership created the International Intellectual Property Crime Investigators College (IIPCIC), which provides on-line interactive training modules developed by police and the University (IIPCIC 2011). The training is free to police, customs and other regulators. A small fee (c. US\$150) per module is charged to private investigators. This relatively cheap training ensures corporations are attracted, and any income subsidizes training for public officials (I.7 INTERPOL Official). The partnership meets several strategic needs. Firstly, training and a common approach means investigators from both sectors will effectively speak the same professional language. Secondly, training needs created by high employee turnover can be met. Finally, the partnership provides a means to develop specialized training for industry sectors with specific needs (for example the motion picture industry) (I.7 INTERPOL Official). Thus shared knowledge meets the needs of both partner groups. This demonstrates how the organizational culture at the General Secretariat has changed its view to accommodate partnerships.

Conservation research in two spheres

Research is one of the key activities of the International Centre for Conservation. It forms part of the professional culture and organizational culture. The Rome Centre has a didactic laboratory for conducting teaching and independent research and development in conservation practice; however it does not do so in isolation. The laboratory is part of a network including both public and private institutions – such as the Getty Conservation Institute – involved in conservation research and development (ICCRUM 1983-98). Like all the organization's activities, research and development cannot be done without partners (I.27 King 2011). In line with academic and disciplinary norms, the results of the Centre's research are regularly published for use by both public and private conservation practitioners. Edited volumes published by the Rome Institute contain contributions from public and private practitioners (Lambert and Rockwell 2012). This type of collaboration is the norm for conservators

and reflects the two-way traffic of research and development in conservation between the public and private spheres.

Physical resources – facilities and equipment

Provider not recipient

When it comes to facilities and equipment, the International Telecommunication Union is the usually the providing partner. Much of the floor space in the five buildings of its Geneva headquarters is devoted to meeting rooms and facilities for the various working and study groups involved in the business of the Union (see Figure 8-1 on page 186). Delegates to meetings are also provided with laptops if they do not have their own. Otherwise they would be unable to effectively participate in the work of the meetings (I.10 Johnson 2011). However, both the other cases receive different kinds of physical resources in material support for their activities.

Free forensic technology

The International Criminal Police Organization has been more innovative than the other organizations when it comes to sourcing equipment from the private sector. In the specialized field of forensic identification, there is competition between private actors to market both established and new technologies. The organization's fingerprint coordinator explained in interview how they took advantage of this competition:

We've got this AFIS [Automated Fingerprint Identification System] technology and we've had it since 2000. We got to about 2005-2006 and we wanted to upgrade, but no money, no budget at all. So the company we use – the French company called Morpho – came to us and said 'look, we'd like to enter into a partnership with you'. So basically we signed a three-year partnership ... we always pay the annual maintenance – but they then upgrade the system and give us new sort of tools as required ... So we've got the latest AFIS system with their paying for it. Obviously in exchange they want something from it as well. So what they've got is: a booth at the General Assembly; they can use the name of INTERPOL when marketing; when they visit possible countries for future AFIS systems they say 'Well INTERPOL has our AFIS technology'; they use us as a reference. So it's a win-win (I.20 Fingerprints Coordinator 2011).

This approach has been taken one step further. The replacement for the AFIS system will be done through a donor/tender process. Whoever is assessed as having the best product will be enabled to partner with the police organization and donate equipment and technical support (I.20 Fingerprints Coordinator 2011). This type of endorsement of a technology company would not be appropriate for the International

Telecommunication Union – receiving donations from one Sector Member when the others are their business rivals. For the International Criminal Police Organization, however, their core business is law enforcement. Therefore they are better able to accept this type of commercial support. Although the Organization now trades its name and reputation, it is done within the system described in chapter four to afford the maximum protection of both in accord with the organizational culture.

Classrooms and a library

Since inception, the International Centre for Conservation has been tapping into private resources for facilities and equipment. This practice is so common in the Rome Centre it has become an underlying belief within the organization, which determines the thinking toward their programmes – who can contribute what? This began in 1961, and later in 1962, when the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation donated US\$10,000 to the Rome Centre for a professional library (Jokilehto 2011, p.35). While this was financial assistance, the main purpose was to provide library equipment and reference material for the organization. The Gulbenkian Foundation then became one of the first Associate Members of the organization in 1969 (Jokilehto 2011, p.26). The library also benefitted from a partnership with the Getty Conservation Institute to create a common recording system for technical literature shared by other institutions (Jokilehto 2011, p.82). Thus partnerships to provide physical resources can also incorporate financial and knowledge based resources. Observations in Rome indicated the library is a well-used resource for staff, course participants, university students, visiting professionals associated with the International Centre for Conservation; as well as users from the other conservation institutions located in Rome.

The main physical resources used by the Rome Centre are the teaching facilities of its partners located outside the Eternal City. Programmes like the African museums programme and the Prevention Museums Oceania (PREMO) programme conducted most of their training in-situ (ICCRROM 1995a, 1998b). In the 2010-11 biennium, the organization conducted training in Helsinki, Riga, Vilnius, Beijing, Suzhou, Tokyo, Nara, Kyushu, Phrae, Bangkok, Brunei, Singapore, New Delhi, Sharjah, Tyre, Istanbul, Recife and Quito (ICCRROM 2011a, p.2). None of these courses would have been possible without the contribution of teaching facilities by the organization's partners (I.17 Antomarchi 2011; I.27 King 2011). Like the library, the physical resources for

training programmes are also supplemented by knowledge based resources and financial resources where necessary.

The influence of resources on organizational behaviour

This chapter has outlined the different approaches each organization has taken to the resources available through global public-private partnerships. These resource requirements are shaped by the activities of each organization, as well as the way they are perceived by the professionals within them. The budgetary disconnect, zero nominal growth and zero real growth imposed on each organization makes the fulfilment of their mandated and adopted roles difficult. Despite the almost universal need for additional funds, there remain differences shaped by organizational and cultural perspectives on how the organizations tap into financial resources. The historically embedded attitude of user-pays within the International Telecommunication Union has prevented the organization from imposing even minor increases on their Sector Members. Police at the International Criminal Police Organization are conflicted over private money. Their organization remains in a state of flux as some officers are culturally averse to private funds, while others see nearly endless opportunities to improve law enforcement globally with private financial support. Contrasting both these cases, the International Centre for Conservation obtains most of its financial support from government development agencies. While keen to tap into other financial support, the organization generally prefers to operate within established networks of conservators and development agencies, rather than cold-call for funds.

The potential to exploit human resources through partnerships is similarly diverse. The Telecommunication Union's relies on experts, but closely controls by the partnerships with rules and regulations. The cultural aversion to trusting outsiders means the International Criminal Police Organization either works with former police now in the private sphere, or otherwise trusts outside experts from support spheres such as forensics. The use of volunteers by police is also limited by the cultural mistrust of outsiders. The partnerships of the International Centre for Conservation use many experts who have benefitted from their own experience as students at the Rome Centre. The freedom to research and teach in academic culture demonstrated by conservation professionals is distinctly different to the approach of engineers and police when it comes to exploiting external human resources.

There is no uniform approach to intellectual resources. The technical output of telecommunication standards is almost entirely the work of Sector Members through their commercial research and development activities. Whereas the research and development the International Criminal Police Organization accesses via partnerships is often tailored to police needs such as AFIS. Police are also the only organization reliant on intelligence information from their partnerships, demonstrating the cultural attribute of task orientation in this and their research and development requirements. For the International Centre for Conservation intellectual resources are shared in an academic profession which does not require commercial considerations in the exchange of ideas between the public and the private spheres.

The range of physical resources gained from partnerships can be non-existent in the case of the International Telecommunication Union, or critical to operations, like the AFIS hardware and software provided to the International Criminal Police Organization. The difference in physical resource requirements is uninfluenced by professional or organizational culture. Rather these requirements are shaped by organizational functions and operating patterns established within each.

This chapter has contributed to the thesis by demonstrating the intermediate nature of professional and organizational cultures which shape the way resource needs are perceived and the solutions to these needs are implemented. The next chapter looks at the final external variable which motivates global public-private partnerships – the global issues that arise to challenge the capabilities of international government organizations and private actors alike.

9. Perspectives on Global Issues

The emergence of global issues beyond the capacity of international government organizations to deal with is the factor explored in this penultimate chapter. Although Farley (1981, p.113) claims ‘the ultimate source of all organizational change lies outside in the environment’, the partnerships discussed below demonstrate cultural resistance needs to be overcome for change to take effect. This chapter examines the impact of a different global issue for each case organization. These issues have emerged (or re-emerged) onto the international scene since 2005. The discussion in this chapter will show that the culture of each organisation resulted in a different response to a global issue – in the case of the International Telecommunication Union, to effectively ignore it; for the International Criminal Police Organization, to engage on an existing global public-private partnership; and for the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property, to use a partnership as a tool to create a new platform and raise an issue in the global consciousness. So while global issues come and go, professional and organizational cultures influence the manner in which an organization responds.

Global issues do not have to affect every country to be of global significance, nor do their effects have to be evenly spread among affected countries. For this research, the term *global* in global public-private partnership hinges on at least one of the public actors involved being a *global* international government organization, as defined in chapter two. However, to avoid confusion, the issues and the public-private partnerships analyzed below all have the potential to impact on most, if not all, nations. They also demonstrate the growing demand from civil society to have a voice in the governance of global issues.

Global public-private partnerships often address new issues. Well-explored examples of these partnerships include the multitude of new diseases that do not stop at borders (Buse and Walt 2000a, 2000b; Newton 2010; Newton *et al.* 2008) and environmental degradation including climate change (Clapp 1998; Forman and Segaar 2006; Ivanova 2010). Naturally there are many other transnational issues that emerge onto the global scene on a regular basis. Some of these result in the creation of new international government organizations – a recent example is the International Renewable Energy Agency, created in 2009 with 75 signatory states (now 160) (IRENA 2013). Other issues stimulate the creation of global public-private partnerships.

The pace at which an issue emerges in the international consciousness is variable. For example, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the political landscape and altered the way the United States and its allies approached the issue of international terrorism within a matter of days. In contrast, climate change has taken decades to embed itself in the global agenda, and is an issue likely to take further decades for political and economic responses to take effect. These examples also illustrate that different issues have different impacts in international government organizations. The International Criminal Police Organization changed the way it operated overnight following the 9/11 attacks – shifting to a 24 hour a day, seven day a week operation that very day (Noble 2001). In contrast the same event changed little at the International Centre for Conservation in Rome; yet this organization is concerned about the effects of climate change on cultural heritage sites such as Venice (ICCROM 2011a). Thus, different professions and organizations have different perspectives on the relative importance of global issues.

Each issue is viewed by the case organizations through the lens of their respective professional and organizational culture. The emerging issues selected for analysis are the control of the internet, intellectual property crime and the privatization of cultural heritage. While not having the same impact as HIV/Aids or climate change, each issue is globally significant within the parameters of the relevant international policy field of the case organizations. The first issue represents the newest issue and its impact on the partnerships of the oldest organization. Who controls the internet is an issue which waxes and wanes in the global societal consciousness; in this instance waxing when the International Telecommunication Union hosted the World Conference on Information Technology, and waning shortly thereafter.

The second issue is intellectual property crime, which is as old as the concept of intellectual property itself. The crime, however, was perceived as one effecting corporations and therefore of low priority for police. In recent years it has been recast as an issue with an impact on public safety, thereby raising its priority in the eyes of the International Criminal Police Organization.

Finally, privatizing cultural heritage is an issue with differing degrees of salience around the world. Historically, cultural property has often moved between public and private ownership, creating an issue dependent on the national context., However the Rome Centre is working to keep professionals focussed on the object, not the

ownership. To achieve this, the International Centre for Conservation raised heritage ownership and management in a global context through a partnership created specifically for this purpose – the International Forum on Privatization and Cultural Heritage. Overall, these examples illustrate how the professional and organizational cultures associated with international government organizations influence partnerships in the face of these global challenges.

The internet debate – new media and new actors

Box 9-1 - A pocket history of the internet

While the history of the internet can be traced back to the late 1950s, it was not until three decades later that the International Telecommunication Union took significant steps that would help transform what had been an instrument of scientific research into today's information super-highway. In 1957, the launch of *Sputnik* prompted the United States President to appoint a presidential assistant of science and the Department of Defense to establish the Advanced Research Project Agency.¹ This agency would be the first to establish computer-to-computer communication a little over a decade later. Developments in the field followed in swift succession. The first long distance connection occurred in 1969; email using the @ symbol in 1972; an international connection to the United Kingdom and communication between different networks in 1973; a computer science research network linking most American universities in 1980; domain names in 1983; and a host of new countries connected in the early 1990s.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Tim Berner-Lee contributed to four important developments that made the internet what it is today. He designed the hypertext markup language (HTML); the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP); a uniform resource locator (URL); and software to browse the world-wide web – a term coined by Berners-Lee. Together these could combine words, images and sound and connect them with hypertext and link them to anywhere on the internet. An improved web-browser was developed and commercialized in 1994, leading to the rapid adoption of the technology. Within four years, there were over 50 million subscribers to the internet.

Source: Hurdeman 2003, pp.585-587

One of the most significant developments in the international system in recent years has been the development of the internet. Events from the Arab Spring to the new style politics such as Barack Obama's presidential campaign have been influenced by the information revolution and accelerated by internet access. Yet this influence could not occur without the telecommunication backbone connecting communication networks within and across borders. Most histories of the internet concentrate on the computer and software developments and pay little attention to the infrastructure provided by the network and the standards that enable voice, images and data to be transmitted between different locations (for example see Leiner *et al.* 2009). All of the ground-breaking connections mentioned in Box 9-1 were made over existing telephone cables or via telecommunication satellites. This places the International Telecommunication Union in a curious position of having achieved a significant public good – i.e. international

¹ Later the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

telecommunication underpinning the internet – through public-private partnerships, yet finding itself under attack from sectors of commerce and civil society ostensibly for doing their job.

What enabled the rapid growth of the internet in the early 1990s were the International Telecommunication Regulations negotiated during the Union's 1988 World Telegraph and Telecommunication Conference in Melbourne (ITU 2010d). The regulations responded to the declining use of telegraph technology by replacing existing telegraph and telephone regulations. As with all Union negotiations, the regulations were a compromise. However, as the Union acknowledges (ITU 2010d) there were unintended consequences that rose from the wording of Article 9 on special provisions (Box 9-2).

Box 9-2 - International Telecommunication Regulations (1988); art. 9 (extract)

9.1 a) ... special arrangements may be entered into on telecommunication matters which do not concern Members in general. Subject to national laws, Members may allow administrations* or other organizations or persons to enter into such special mutual arrangements with Members, administrations* or other organizations or persons that are so allowed in another country for the establishment, operation, and use of special telecommunication networks, systems and services, in order to meet specialized international telecommunication needs within and/or between the territories of the Members concerned, and including, as necessary, those financial, technical, or operating conditions to be observed...

* or recognized private operating agency(ies)

Effectively this regulation enabled private operators to deal directly with each other within and across national borders. These arrangements enabled the leasing of lines to carry voice *and data* (ITU 2010d). The consequences were twofold. Firstly, the privatization and the liberalization of telecommunication service accelerated; and second the new regulations 'facilitated the expansion of IP-based networks and the services popularly referred to as the internet' (ITU 2010d). In the spirit of public-private partnerships, the regulations provided a principled framework approved by member governments (with reservations) and allowed the market to develop technical standards, equipment, software and infrastructure in its search for profits.

The International Telecommunication Regulations remained substantively unchanged until 2012. However, when the Union and its members planned to re-negotiate the regulations, they found that the world had substantially changed.

Destroy, control or neither – the ITU and the internet

Who controls the internet is an issue for many of its users, and it is also an issue for the members of the International Telecommunication Union. Internet control became an issue impacting at the World Conference on Information Technology (Dubai 2012) organized by the Union to re-assess the International Telecommunication Regulations, which, as described above, provided a framework for the internet to exist and grow. Changes to the regulations were taken by some to be a threat to the internet as we currently know it.

There are some people in the internet community who have this impression of the ITU as being some type of secret organization, like some Al Qaeda, living in the caves of the Swiss Alps intent on destroying the internet. You have some fundamentalists that have got this idea that ITU is something completely different to an organization of 192 governments (I.10 Johnson 2011).

In interview, Malcolm Johnson, the Director of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau spent considerable time discussing what the Union was, and what it was not. From the management perspective of the organization, the Union is, and always has been ‘governments and all the sector members and associates, over 700 private sector entities and other organizations ... When you refer to ITU, that’s what you’re referring to as the organization’ (I.10 Johnson 2011). This perspective reflects the organizational culture that is focussed on dealing directly with those within the Union, while telecommunication users and clients are, in the main, further removed, or on the periphery.

However, what the internet has done is given connectivity and voice to users and clients. The number of Union members both public and private is dwarfed when it comes to the internet. Before the World Conference on Information Technology commenced, more than 3 million people signed a petition protesting to the censorship and regulation of the internet (Google 2012). The protest was led by Google and Vint Cerf, the ‘founder of the internet’ (Hurdeman 2003, p.587). Cerf claimed that a:

closed-door meeting of the world’s governments is taking place in Dubai, and regulation of the internet is on the agenda. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is convening a conference from December 3-14 to revise a decades-old treaty, in which only governments have a vote. Some proposals could allow governments to justify the censorship of legitimate speech, or even cut off internet access in their countries (Cerf 2012).

Technically Cerf's claims were correct. In accordance with the detailed structure for administering conferences, attendance of the private sphere, including civil society, was limited to those invited by member-states or international organizations (ITU 2012a, document adm/2-E, p.2). As a result only 25 people attended from civil society organizations in any official capacity.² This compares with 199 participants from business and 1250 representing government authorities (ITU 2012a, document 81-E). Furthermore, submissions from Russia appeared to incorporate some level of control of the internet into the regulations (ITU 2012a, document 27-E). This had been tried previously and has been resisted by the United States and others, who prefer to see control remain within the private sphere (Cukier 2005). The media picked up Google and Cerf's claims and as a result the Secretary-General and his staff found themselves having to defend the Union and the conference.

Like Johnson's earlier remarks in interview, Secretary-General Hamadoun Touré's press briefings to dispel concerns about who controls the internet were bemused and slightly incredulous at the very thought that was the goal of the organization. While the language was not as colourful as Cerf's, Touré described press reports as 'unproductive scaremongering and rhetoric,' before focusing on the technical achievements achieved under the framework of the 1988 regulations (Touré 2012). He went on to state he firmly believed 'that WCIT-12 will create the right conditions for a "broadband miracle", and will set us on the road to the knowledge society of tomorrow' (Touré 2012). The Secretary-General also pointed to numerous measures taken to ensure the processes of the conference were publicly available. However, the level of detail provided by the Union would have been confusing to most observers. For example Google, who are a major corporate actor in the internet, claimed they had not been invited to the conference – yet at least four representatives from Google were part of the United States Delegation (ITU 2012a, document 81-E). Although of course, this was possibly a case of the left-hand of the corporation not knowing what the right was up to.

As spokesman for a Union representing hundreds of countries and corporations, the Secretary-General framed control of the internet as a non-issue. Any decision taken by the World Conference on Information Technology would have to be done in accordance with the organizational culture of consensus. By making documentation available to all,

² Three as part of the Indian delegation; two from Kenya; four from Switzerland; one from the United Kingdom; five from the United States; and ten at the invitation of a regional or international organization.

Touré hoped to defuse the issue, rather than allow it to gain momentum and damage the reputation of the Union. It is likely, however, Touré and the others were aware such monumental changes in international telecommunication were rare because of the necessity for consensus to be achieved. Therefore the response to civil society protests from Cerf and others remained relatively low-key.

Analysis

The World Conference on Information Technology was a policy dialogue partnership shaped by the organizational culture of the Union. Like past conferences member-states remained the key actors. However, many member-states chose to include private actors from telecommunication corporations as part of their delegations and a few member-states provided credentials for civil society organizations.³ These arrangements are enshrined in the formal rules of the organization and despite the external pressure, they have been in place so long they are unlikely to change. Those actors participating in the activities of the Union, whether representing member-states, corporations or academia know their respective roles. Any single one of them is unlikely to affect significant change in the existing culture. The example of Russia failing to inject greater control on the internet shows how even powerful nation-states are only a single voice in the larger Union.

The focus by Touré on the outcomes of the conference in his press briefings reflected an engineer's faith in their role as a contributor to society (Florman 1987, pp. 69-76).

Whereas the incredulity and bemusement could be derived from an engineering mentality, which in Hayek's (1952) view according to Gambetta and Herzog (2009) resulted from an '[engineering] education which does not train them to understand individuals and their world as the outcome of a social process in which spontaneous behaviours and interactions play a significant part.' Three million internet users (mis)informed by social organizations from civil society and corporate players and acting in accord to protest against the Union would likely present a conundrum to Touré; particularly when all the facts about the Union's role were freely available to these protesters.

Culture can shape how an issue is perceived and responded to by an organization. From the International Telecommunication Union's cultural perspective, they are an open and

³ Credentials were provided to civil society actors by India, Kenya, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. Only a single civil society organization was invited in its own right as an international organization – the Internet Society.

inclusive organization, where anyone can participate *for a fee* (Table 4-2, page 85). This provides one of the major disconnects between civil society actors opposed to the proposals put at the World Conference on Information Technology. Although Union perceives its door as an open one, the fee and structure is not conducive to individuals who at once feel empowered by the internet that gives them voice, and at the same time threatened by the thought that the conference outcomes could diminish their access and voice.

The fee structure and organizational culture has resulted in forums such as the World Conference on Information Technology being effectively a modified policy dialogue partnership in which the voices of non-state partners are filtered through member-states. In a few instances, these voices made it to the final acts of the conference, notably through the official reservations of Sweden. On the subject of resolution three, which dealt with the growth of the internet, Sweden declared that the resolution did 'not do justice to all stakeholders involved in internet related matters, and that it does not recognize the fully working, self-developing, bottom-up multi-stakeholder formats that work and evolve today on the internet' (ITU 2012b, declaration 33, pp.58-59). Sweden, along with most developed countries, did not sign the final acts of the conference. Thus the voice of civil society partners is hidden among the 100 official declarations and reservations of member-states.

Ultimately, the debate arising over control of the internet underscored that the organizational culture of the International Telecommunication Union is resistant to change. Despite the desire of some member-states to increase the involvement of the organization in the running of the internet, consensus is unlikely on this issue, now or in the future. Who controls the internet may be a new issue on the global agenda, however the partnership form used by the International Telecommunication Union remains the old, tried and tested formula.


Transnational intellectual property crimes

In a sense, it is difficult to classify any crime as 'new'. This section will examine intellectual property crime and the counterfeiting of medical products, which represent a breach of international laws on intellectual property and a direct threat to the health of the users of such products. Intellectual property crime is conducted by criminal enterprises operating in multiple jurisdictions necessitating international police

cooperation in response. This crime presents a global issue that is beyond the scope of public authorities to confront, thereby requiring global public-private partnerships.

To understand how intellectual property crime has become an international issue it is necessary to understand how it is perceived. There are distinctions between crime at a national level, which is clearly the responsibility of domestic authorities to police; then there is international law, breaches of which constitute an *international crime*, which differs from *transnational crime* and *organized crime*. In figure 9-1 Madsen (2009) explains the differences and convergences between these concepts. The perception held by the International Criminal Police Organization and police in many member-states, of intellectual property crime had to change before this type of crime could receive the attention it required.

Figure 9-1 - A taxonomy of transnational crime



According to Naím (2005, p.116), ‘intellectual property law governs the right to use or benefit from anything that is an original idea: drug compounds ... feature films ... sneaker models ... as well as the symbols used to identify them. Nike’s “swoosh” and McDonald’s golden arches ... In short, intellectual property is the “idea that ideas can be owned”’. It follows that intellectual property crime offends against the corporations who own these ideas. In an age of globalization, intellectual property crime is now a transnational enterprise (Albanese 2011; Madsen 2009; Naim 2005). Therefore police need to cooperate at an international level with rights owners if they want to be effective in this field.

Intellectual property crime affects all areas of commerce. Most readers would be familiar with counterfeit entertainment media – music, film and television. However, as Naím (2005) points out, this type of crime also involves products as simple as cement to high tech industrial material including critical aircraft parts. Despite the billions in estimated commercial losses (Naím 2005), police paid little attention to intellectual property crime. Historically police viewed intellectual property crime as a civil or commercial matter and in many places this remains the view (I.6 INTERPOL Official 2011). Police culture focussed on the criminal law and avoided becoming a party to what they viewed as commercial disputes. In 1994, Secretary-General Kendall raised the issue at the General Assembly and recommended that ‘there must be more co-operation and sharing of information between Interpol, national police forces, the appropriate international organizations and *private industry*’ (INTERPOL 1994, p.1 - emphasis added). A working group was established, yet their recommendation did not even mention the private sector (AFP 1993-94). Kendall’s successor also wanted the organization to focus on protecting property rights:

The theft of intellectual property, the counterfeiting of films and music, CDs, is an extraordinary area that is right for Interpol to assist not only in investigating and prosecuting the people who do this, but in sharing information about how the counterfeiting occurs, what counterfeiting networks are used and getting that information out on the internet to police agencies (Noble quoted in Nelson 1999).

In 2000, the General Assembly again recommended action about intellectual property crime (INTERPOL 2000a), yet even with this resolve, the organization did not dedicate specific resources to coordinating international efforts until 2002 (I.7 INTERPOL

Official 2011). It appeared the organization had little motivation to engage with a crime type so heavily reliant on cooperation with private companies.

Eventually, the police perspective of intellectual property crime shifted. Police realized that although intellectual property crime had long been codified under international law, its transnational nature had expanded as part of the darker side of globalization and evidence showed strong links with organized crime (Albanese 2011; Madsen 2009, pp.32-33; Naím 2005). Thus intellectual property crime was firmly based in sector three of the taxonomy in Figure 9-1 and this shift in perspective translated into more tangible action. Furthermore, public safety was also an issue. Counterfeit products such as cement have led to building collapse and counterfeit aircraft parts pose a serious threat to the travelling public and counterfeit food and alcohol can be poisonous (Ambraseys and Bilham 2011; INTERPOL 2013a; Madsen 2002, p.3). This change of perception led to a changed approach.

In 2002, Eric Madsen, a Danish police officer seconded to the General Secretariat became ‘the first person to get involved in intellectual property crime as a central point of reference [in the organization]...for member countries’ (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011). The first private actors involved ‘tended to be – and still tend to be – industries that have a more practical approach to brand protection, and it is no coincidence that most of [them] have people in their security that have a police profile as previous background’ (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011).

When former police were not involved, cooperation between the International Criminal Police Organization and private industry proved problematic. A plan devised to create a ‘clearing house for information’ gathered by corporations in their civil actions against counterfeiters failed to reach its potential:

Industry has all the information ... they're taking all the civil actions to protect their copyright and trademarks and try and counter infringements ... The idea was we wanted to collect information from lots of different companies, we'd do our analysis on it and then we'd identify common denominators, because criminals who attacked one company were inevitably attacking another company. But because [corporations] work in isolation they don't know ... say we had a load of information, and we had entity 'A' and entity 'B' and [if] there was a common denominator, we'd go back to entity 'A' and say "The info you gave us reference 'X', we had a hit on that, first of all do you want us to disclose that there's been a hit on your information?"

If they say, "Yes we are interested in working with other people."

I'd say "OK, there's somebody else I want to speak to." And I'd have the same conversation ... "If you both agree, I'll put you two guys in touch with each other ... " So we'd never actually disclose the information. We'd manage the process, we'd do referrals and then any exchange of information takes place on a bilateral basis (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011).

About 20 industry sectors contributed 7000 bits of historical information. A figure well short of the 200-300 thousand needed for live comparisons that could be converted to operational intelligence for police on the ground.

I put a lot of time and effort into these organizations, these companies – essentially the lawyer based IP crime people – and I was getting nothing back. So, we made a strategic decision that that was a waste of time and energy. I got fed up with people coming to meetings, "Yes, yes we ought to do something", but nothing was [happening]. We couldn't get any momentum going (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011).

This statement highlights one of the key difficulties in cross cultural partnerships – the contacts in industry were 'lawyer based IP crime people', and not former police officers, with whom greater success had been achieved in areas like the payment card industry. Essentially, there is a cultural disconnect between commercial lawyers and criminal police, despite both being involved in law enforcement. As a consequence, the organization sidelined the database to concentrate on more fruitful partnerships associated with intellectual property crime (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011). These other partnerships focussed on operational outcomes and included involvement in the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT).

INTERPOL and IMPACT: Law enforcement and health

An issue that has gained international attention in recent years is the growing prevalence of counterfeit medical products. Ranging from items as simple as drip lines to faked pharmaceuticals, counterfeit medical products can exacerbate health problems for the users to the point of death (Naím 2005, pp.123-125). In 1988, the World Health Assembly – the World Health Organization governing body – requested that governments and pharmaceutical corporations cooperate to address the issue. By 1992, the International Criminal Police Organization was directly involved, attending multi-lateral and multi-agency meetings on the problem; but it was not until 2006 that the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce was formed. The Taskforce is 'a voluntary coalition of stakeholders that coordinate international activities aimed at combating counterfeit medical products for the purpose of protecting public health' (di Giorgio and Gramazio 2011, p.20). It is open to all

member-states of the World Health Organization, other international government organizations, government health and regulatory agencies, representatives of patients, health providers, pharmaceutical manufacturers and wholesalers. Since 2008, an official from the International Criminal Police Organization has been posted to the Taskforce secretariat located at the World Health Organization in Geneva.

Counterfeit medical products pose a serious health risk to users. Fake pharmaceuticals seized in operations coordinated by IMPACT have been found to contain too little, too much or no active ingredient at all, thereby making safe dosages impossible to monitor (I.6 INTERPOL Official). Globalized trade has compounded the problem, with many items such as fake Viagra being traded freely over the internet (INTERPOL 2013b) and fake anti-malarial drugs in South East Asia being traced back to manufacturers in China (Newton *et al.* 2008). Medical products include equipment as well as pharmaceuticals. For example, industrial grade plastic tubing can be simply repackaged and sold as sterile intravenous drip lines, thereby generating a profit for the counterfeiters and a threat to the health of a patient (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011). The international scope of the illegal trade and the serious risks it creates is a global issue.

The Taskforce is where two professional cultures have met and are determining the best way to work with each other.

Clearly between INTERPOL and the police world and health professionals, there is a long way to go before they can interact. But thanks to IMPACT, we've been able to start knowing one another and familiarizing with our respective worlds, and actually respecting it and finding some common path in which we can move on and develop. And the common path for us being the counterfeiting issue and all that is related to pharmaceutical crime
(I.6 INTERPOL Official 2011).

Unlike the police, the world of health professionals is spread across both the public and private sector. Therefore, learning on the side of the police also requires acceptance of industry and other private actors in the Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce. Besides law enforcement and health care providers the Taskforce includes: the pharmaceutical industry – as intellectual property holders; the internet community – because it is used to market counterfeit products; the transport industry; national regulatory bodies; non-government organizations; and more. As a result of the diversity of actors the officer seconded to IMPACT describes themselves as having ‘bubbles of partnerships’ (I.6 INTERPOL Official 2011). In other words there is no single model, but a series of adaptations to ensure partnerships within the Taskforce suit the needs of participants.

The diversity of partners required an approach that ensured the message about the problems of counterfeit medical products would be understood by actors with different professional cultures. This is illustrated by two DVDs the taskforce produced (Besenval 2010a, 2010b). Both use similar styles and footage, however one is targeted at preventing medical professionals from using counterfeit products and the second is aimed at raising awareness and action by law enforcement officers. Both DVDs encourage their target audiences to speak to the other profession.⁴ Included in the packaging are fact sheets targeted at different actors – legislators, regulators, manufacturers, police and healthcare providers – demonstrating that IMPACT is an advocacy type partnership designed to raise awareness of the issue.

Another advocacy partnership involved two of Africa's leading entertainers Yvonne Chaka Chaka and Youssou N'dour, both recruited to record and perform a song *Proud to Be* to support the work of the Taskforce in Africa (INTERPOL 2011a). The importance of the partnership is twofold. First, the partnership promotes engagement at the individual level – Chaka Chaka, N'dour and their audience. Secondly, the African culture relies on songs and singing to communicate important messages, particularly when illiteracy rates are high. This partnership is therefore a more effective means of communicating the message than more familiar methods used in the developed world (1.6 INTERPOL Official 2011). This is an example of culture as an important element at the macro, organizational, professional and individual level of a partnership.

While the above paints a picture of international cooperation across borders – the public/private divide and industry sectors – there are those opposed to the inclusion of the pharmaceutical industry in the Taskforce. Opponents are concerned the Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce protects the proprietary rights of the pharmaceutical industry, which increase the cost of brand name medication, placing them out of reach of citizens in less developed countries. Critics at the most recent World Health Assembly included countries such as India and Sri Lanka, who argue that large corporation partners, such as Pfizer, simply use the task-force as another tool to enforce proprietary rights and 'create a barrier to generic medicines' (TWN 2008; WHO 2011). Domestic pharmaceutical industries that manufacture generic medications reinforce this message, as do respected non-government organizations such as *Médecins sans Frontières*. These actors see the involvement of pharmaceutical corporations as a

⁴ The DVDs are 2:38 minutes and can be viewed online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKSb_uANweY

conflict of interest (MSF 2011). However, if the exclusionary views were adopted, it is argued that much intelligence and information concerning counterfeit products from the industry would be less readily available for regulatory and enforcement bodies (I.6 INTERPOL Official 2011; I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011). Balancing the requirements of critics and supporters is not an easy task, however allowing the private sector into the tent at least opens space for negotiated settlements over difficult issues such as legally defining counterfeits, establishing safety standards and broader legal access to generic products.

Analysis

Four aspects of police culture (see Table 2-5, page 35) have been influential on the public-private partnerships to combat intellectual property crime. First of all is *crime-fighting*. This may appear to be a given, however viewing breaches of intellectual property rights as commercial rather than criminal activity meant direct engagement with corporations was delayed rather than embraced. This cultural inhibitor existed despite the organization's leadership support for engagement with corporations to protect property rights. Once past this barrier, the partnerships developed through a network of former police working for the corporations, and later involvement in the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce. This reflected the ever-present *insider/outsider Weltanschauung* and the more successful partnerships relied on working through this network rather than the network of intellectual property lawyers. Thirdly, *task orientation* for police favoured an operational focus and desire for operational outcomes. When outcomes were not forthcoming, the database partnership was placed on the backburner to enable a focus on more operationally successful partnerships. Finally, *problem solving* meant that even an unsuccessful attempt, such as the database did not mean an end to efforts to find solutions for the problem of intellectual property crime. Different approaches were developed to keep the momentum up.

The relative newness of intellectual property crime partnerships has led to an experimental approach for the organization. While operational public-private partnerships represent a common approach, they are not unique. The failure of the database informational and learning partnership did not prevent the organization seeking another partnership. While the *insider/outsider* worldview contributed to a lack of common ground between police and intellectual property lawyers, it also laid the foundations for operational partnership types through the network of former police.

Furthermore, officers are aware of the cultural hindrances to partnerships and seem determined to overcome them. This attitude is evidenced by the officers involved wishing to see a culture of health and law enforcement evolve to tackle the problem. This desire is triggered by concerns for public safety and law enforcement, which are deeply embedded in both police culture and the organizational culture of the International Criminal Police Organization.

Privatizing cultural heritage

When focussed on the cultural object, a conservator is blind to the delineation between public and private ownership. However, no culture exists in isolation. Conservators operate within the confines of their organizational culture and national culture. Thus privatization is an issue in some contexts, even though the profession as a whole is less concerned.

The issue of privatization and cultural heritage was elevated to the international sphere by the International Centre for Conservation. Like all international issues, privatization and cultural heritage is complicated by many factors. Nation-states have different views on what is, or is not, cultural heritage; what objects form part of the national patrimony; whether the objects are in public or private hands; the level of regulation that limits the property rights of private owners; and who is responsible for the management and upkeep of culturally significant property and places. It would be nice to think that these problems were sovereign issues, however one only has to look back at the destruction of the statues of Buddha at Bamiyan to realize concern for the cultural heritage of mankind is an issue that crosses borders. Furthermore some cultural objects have disputed patrimony – are the Elgin Marbles part of Greece's ancient heritage, Britain's imperial past or the property of humanity at large? The issue of privatization has entered the debate about the Elgin Marbles as Britain now intimates that a return of these objects to cash strapped Greece may see them end up in the hands of private collectors – a scenario that has occurred when other culturally significant items have been returned to their country of origin (Waxman 2008). As more sites and objects are declared part of world heritage, privatization and cultural heritage gains greater importance as a global issue.

The concept of privatization goes beyond simply the sale of cultural property to non-state parties. Privatization also determines who manages (and can profit) from state

Chapter 9

owned cultural property. This can range from the café or gift shop at a museum or historical site, to ownership of the site itself. In some instances, a heritage site has never been public property – George Washington’s home in the United States has been owned and operated as a tourist site since the mid-19th century by the Mount Vernon Ladies Association (Cliver 2007, p.150). Privatization can also refer to the outsourcing of conservation processes for objects and sites that otherwise remain publicly owned and managed. For example, a Sri Lankan conservation project engaged private architectural firms to manage their conservation sites. At the conclusion of the project, management of the sites had moved back to state-employed architects (Wijesuriya 2007, pp.140-141). These two examples demonstrate divergent national approaches of private involvement in cultural heritage management. No matter how privatization is interpreted, it has an impact on conservation practices. Ownership determines who is responsible for conservation, and management has to balance public and private needs for access with conservation practice to ensure access for future generations.

Ownership, management and conservation of cultural property by the private sector are neither new nor unusual. In historical terms, the national ownership of cultural property is the more recent phenomena – in many instances cultural property was nationalized first. Privatization can therefore be seen as a reversal of the nationalization process (Wijesuriya 2007, p.142). The greatest single bequest of private property to the state occurred in 1743, when Anna Maria Ludovica Medici, the last of her line, left the family’s wealth to the State of Tuscany, ‘on condition that none of it should ever be removed from Florence, and that it should be for the benefit of the public of all nations’ (Young 1933, p.740).⁵ The preservation and display of the Medici treasures created a tourism industry that continues to this day, but it has created a burden for the state.

In 2004, it was estimated that the Italian state was responsible for ‘over 3,000 museums, more than 2,000 archaeological sites, 20,000 historical centres, 45,000 historical parks and gardens, 30,000 palaces and villas, churches and monasteries, and innumerable castles’, thus creating a patrimony that ‘is Italy’s wealth but also its burden’ (Benedikter 2004, p. 384). A law passed in 2002 enabled the Italian state to sell, or privatize, ownership of part of its heritage. While some saw this as a path that would lead to the

⁵ This bequest included the pictures and statues of the Uffizi Gallery, Royal Palace, Villa Medici in Rome, the Palazzo Pitti and collections of jewels, cameos, coins, bronze statues, antiquities, libraries, ceramics, tapestries, precious furniture, gold, silver and porcelain tableware, the Boboli Gardens, reliquaries and religious items and Medici Chapel. The works included masterpieces from every significant contributor to the Italian Renaissance and beyond. Young (1933, p.740-745) provides a brief description.

sale of icons such as the Colosseum in Rome, others saw it as a pragmatic way to reduce the burden on the state (Benedikter 2004, p. 385; Ponzini 2010). The Italian case sparked a broader debate in Europe about privatization and cultural heritage (Ponzini 2010). Italy is not alone in this position, but it is the home of the International Centre for Conservation, whose partners include many Italian public and private organizations (93 were identified when compiling appendix 4). It seems apparent that this proximity meant that there was a macro-cultural (i.e. Italian) influence on the organization to do something. So in 2007, *Privatization and Cultural Heritage* became the topic for the Centre's biennial forum.

The ICCROM forum on privatization

Within the analytical frame of this dissertation, the International Forum on Privatization and Cultural Heritage was in essence an advocacy partnership designed to raise not only the issues surrounding privatization, but to draw in the importance on conservation as a consideration in all such cases. Although advocacy is not an unusual activity for the International Centre for Conservation – public advocacy was added as a fifth mandate to the organization's statutes in 1991 – the organization has a greater focus on informational and learning partnerships through its regular programme of courses and resource motivating partnerships to fund the training and research. Previous iterations of the forum had also been vehicles for advocating the importance of conservation – one examined living religious heritage (2003) and the other explored issues of cultural heritage in post-war recovery (2005).

Box 9-3 - The Catania Conclusions

* All participants agreed that the study of the topic 'Privatization and Cultural Heritage' is coming at a moment when the phenomena of globalization and the evolution of cultural policies in all regions of the world are testifying changes with respect to the evolving role of the public and private in the safeguarding, conservation, management and presentation of cultural heritage. At the same time, they all concurred that the notion of cultural heritage has broadened and expanded since the mid-twentieth century. It now includes a wide range of notions and subdivisions such as movable and immovable heritage, tangible and intangible heritage, underwater heritage and the challenge of its sustainability.

The concept of privatization was explored during the Forum and it was noted that it represents a series of complex situations and numerous meanings. It was acknowledged that in some regions of the world successful mechanisms are operating. The important distinction between private for profit and private for non-profit sectors was noted and also the emergence of some hybrid institutions and needs.

It was also observed that further understanding of normative actions and legislative frameworks is an essential condition for establishing a proper framework for suitable partnerships between the public and private parties. The group insisted that the public and private joint contribution is more complementary than antagonistic.

The share of state-owned cultural heritage versus privately-owned cultural heritage varies from country to country and therefore no single approach is advisable. Any approaches developed for partnerships between public and private should be flexible and adapted to specific situations in the world. The experts

concluded that this matter cannot be seen in one way with a single vision and many noted that even the Charter of Venice is under discussion, notably after the Nara declaration of authenticity.

All participants stressed the fact that, beyond its intrinsic cultural values, cultural heritage also has an economic dimension and this is considered today as a tool that contributes to economic growth and social-economic development in different ways everywhere.

Tourism can be an important factor but is a double-edged sword: it can contribute to the development process but can also have a negative impact on the conservation of heritage. It merits careful attention.

The essential role of community participation was emphasized. Communities and public participation should be central to development strategies and policy and help ensure the integration of cultural heritage into daily life.

It was recognized that there could be no real conservation and management of heritage without the contribution of competent specialists in all fields related to this protection. The participants invited all public and private parties to pay great attention to the educational and training needs with an interdisciplinary perspective, as well as furthering scientific research.

Efficient public policies have been considered as fundamental for proper partnerships with the private sector. It was concluded that the private sector intervention cannot be a total substitute of the public sector which should remain as the guarantor for maintaining values and ensuring continuity and the transmission of cultural heritage values to future generations.

Catania, 15th September 2007

* The introductory paragraphs describing the conference proceedings have been omitted.

Source: ICCROM 2007b

The forum was held in the Sicilian city of Catania (13-15 September 2007). The public partners were the *Regione Siciliana Assessorato dei Beni Culturali ed Ambientali e della Pubblica Istruzione* (Regional Councillorship of Cultural and Environmental Heritage, and Public Education of the Sicilian Autonomous Region); the Italian National Commission for the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization; and the International Centre for Conservation. Private sector support came from the *Fondazione Banco di Sicilia*. At least ten of the presenters to the forum came from the private sector. Five sub-themes were explored: the state of the art [i.e. the conservation profession and heritage management]; sustainability; norms and professions; management and development; and cultural heritage values. What emerged from the forum were a set of conclusions (Box 9-3) that summarized the problematic nature of privatization and cultural heritage.

Analysis

The forum presented a strategic examination of the management of cultural heritage. Therefore the forum did not have the singular *focus on cultural objects* – a key feature of conservator culture. However, unless strategic issues such as the impact of privatization are considered, the conservation profession, like any other, leaves itself vulnerable to unwanted or unexpected change. In this, the forum provided an advocacy role through the Catania Conclusions to the profession at large. While the conference

and many conservators view the public / private divide in cultural heritage as a ‘false problem’ (ICCROM 2007b, panel III, p.146) it is not a universal position. Sri Lanka, for example, is ‘a country that was influenced by socialist systems of having a faith on government activities, [therefore] any private sector activity is being looked at critically by the public’ (Wijesuriya 2007, p.141). Therefore the concept of a universal archetype conservator includes some variance based on the context in which a professional works.

However, as observed in chapter two, the International Centre for Conservation has been a key actor⁶ in defining the professional requirements of a conservator (ICOM 1984). With this observation added to the equation, it becomes apparent that the forum and the Catania Conclusions contribute to the broader agenda of evolving the profession of the conservator and the associated professional culture. The conclusions speak to the professionals and provide a framework for conservators from different national cultures to at least consider the ramifications of greater private involvement in cultural heritage management.

Taking a less strategic view, the International Forum on Privatization and Cultural Heritage and the Catania Conclusion reflect many aspects of conservation culture. To begin with, the forum featured all the traits of conservation culture drawn from academic culture (Table 2-6, page 38). The forum was *research oriented* examining the question of how the function of public institutions is changing and can the private sector assume a different position in the management of cultural heritage (Bouchenaki 2007b). *Freedom of inquiry* enabled contributions from architects, tax experts, conservators, economists, political economists, students and even a particle physicist who owned a large tract of culturally significant property (ICCROM 2007b). The broad range of contributors illustrated the *interdisciplinary* nature of conservation and the ability to *cooperate and collaborate* in every project. More broadly, cooperation and collaboration with the private sector was encouraged – one delegate reminded the forum to ‘not solely consider “private” as market forces but also as patronage, philanthropy, community action and contributions from those stakeholders, including conservation professionals, who do not deliver tangible financial assets’ (Thompson 2007, p.131).

The Catania Conclusion made no specific policy recommendations for conservators or governments. The variety in the balance of state/private ownership and management of

⁶ Along with partners including ICOM and UNESCO - both permanently represented on the ICCROM Council.

Chapter 9

cultural heritage made universal policy recommendations impossible. Overall, the International Forum of Privatization and Cultural Heritage represented a global public-private partnership that advocated a broader understanding of the role of the private sector in relation to cultural heritage. The forum also showed how a partnership is influenced by the professional culture, taking the form of an academic conference; and it showed through the conclusions that the partnership can influence a professional culture to broaden the scope of its inclusive nature.

The influence of global issues on organizational behaviour

Chapter nine presented a discussion of how the case organizations responded to global issues within their fields. In essence the culturally driven responses to the three were to effectively ignore the issue and the demand for voice; engage the issue and those seeking an international platform; or to create a platform to address an issue. This represents an important element of the overall thesis by illustrating the influence of professional and organizational culture on how global issues are perceived and acted upon.

Ignore

The issue over who controls the internet is essentially ignored by the International Telecommunication Union. Despite the effort of civil society to participate in the World Conference on Information Technology, the issue garnered little attention for delegates. The belief embedded in the organizational culture of the Union that it is a sum of its membership made the issue a non-starter in the minds of the executives who, in response to external demands, made publicly available all information relevant to the issue and related to the conference. This response matched the professional cultural viewpoint of engineers as contributors to society. In the end, the consensus of the conference left the existing arrangements unchanged. The issue, as far as the Union is concerned, has receded into the background for the time being.

Engage

The issue of intellectual property crime and in particular counterfeit medical products is one the International Criminal Police Organization chose to engage with. Police culture needed a fresh perspective on this type of crime before engaging, but once the issue was framed as one of a threat to public safety – through sub-standard products – the partnership became a viable prospect. In the narrower field of combating counterfeit

medical products, civil society actors have voiced concern about the involvement of private partners in the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce. This is not a new criticism for policing, which is often portrayed as a defender of capital interests (Anderson 1989; Skolnick 1966; Meldal-Johnson and Young 1979). However it remains a concern in a field where police and health professionals are trying to build a new culture of enforcement and health (I.6 INTERPOL Official 2011).

Create

It is unusual for an international government organization to create its own global issue. However, it appears this is the case when examining the issue of privatization and cultural heritage. This research found many conservators are culturally blind to the public-private divide because of their primary focus on the cultural object irrespective of ownership, and secondly on their professional inclination to cooperate and collaborate with everyone. The International Forum on Privatization and Cultural Heritage through the Catania Conclusions recognized ‘there could be no real conservation...without the contribution of competent specialists’ who needed ‘to pay great attention to [their] educational and training needs’ (ICCROM 2007b, p.5). Thus we can see the forum as an attempt to use privatization as an issue to elevate the profession and the role of the International Centre for Conservation and its partners.

This chapter, and the preceding three on themes of leaders, ideas and resources all underscore the second part of the thesis – cultures can influence how motivating factors are perceived and acted upon. Having examined each of the themes in relative isolation, the concluding chapter brings everything together and shows that no partnership is premised entirely on any single factor or theme.

10. Conclusion

Global public-private partnerships are a significant part of global governance. These partnerships facilitate a range of activities to effectively address issues at the international level in a cooperative manner. By utilizing a broad definition of ‘private partners’ and an inclusive description of what constitutes a global public-private partnership, this research has advanced our understanding of the complex answer behind the research question *why have international government organizations entered public-private partnerships* by analysing *how* professional and organizational culture influence a range of other factors. The wider definition of ‘private partner’ enabled a comparison of international government organization partnerships with both civil society and corporate actors. The broader perspective provided a platform to move beyond explanatory factors accepted in the current literature and added a group of factors centered on the cultures associated with international government organizations. The central finding of the research is therefore: *professional and organizational cultures are factors motivating global public-private partnerships and these cultures can influence how other motivating factors are perceived and acted upon.*

Throughout the research I have had an iterative relationship with the literature on global public-private partnerships, consistently returning to it as the findings developed. This continual referral to the literature was necessary to reconsider what implications professional and organizational cultures bear upon what has been said about global public-private partnerships to date.

This study showed these cultural factors have their own influences on partnerships and often influenced the other factors. This chapter focuses on the partnerships described in chapter four: the Alternative Approval Process – used by the International Telecommunication Union to facilitate faster approval of new telecommunication standards; the bio-terrorism training programme – introduced by the International Criminal Police Organization to prepare police for such an eventuality; and the African museums programme – designed to address the lack of conservation skills in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter four presented these partnerships in a straightforward and descriptive manner. In this chapter, they are analyzed and modelled to the framework of the themes and factors discussed in chapters five through nine, which motivate global public-private partnerships. Where necessary the analysis draws comparison with other

partnerships described throughout this study to highlight how partnerships differ even within the same organization.

The chapter concludes with observations on how cultural analysis informs theory on global public-private partnerships and how theory can in turn inform practice in future partnerships. Overall the research found cultural factors play an important role in global public-private partnerships. Culture can be an enabling factor, as exemplified by the core trait of conservation culture of cooperation and collaboration in all things. In contrast, culture can play an inhibiting role – as seen by the delay by police in adopting public-private partnership models. In between, culture can provide stability to partnerships. This stability can provide the International Telecommunication Union with the certainty and predictability desired by engineers, as evidenced by their ongoing partnership with industry.

Applying the findings

The various partnerships described in chapter four cannot be said to be typical, even for the organizations involved in them. The Alternative Approval Process applies to one part of the federal structure of the International Telecommunication Union. Throughout this dissertation, variety has been a feature of the partnerships of the International Criminal Police Organization. Even in the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property, where cooperation and collaboration occurs in all things, the African museums programme is distinctly different from the partnership that published *ICCROM and the Conservation of Cultural Heritage* (Jokilehto 2011). This analysis illustrates how each factor can be differently emphasized, how they interact, and the role played by culture both as a motivator and influence on the other factors.

Ten factors motivating global international government organizations to participate in global public-private partnerships were identified (Table 1-1, page 6). These factors include three related to culture – macro-cultures, professional cultures and organizational cultures. All ten factors are listed in the first column of Table 10-1 table below, which gives a comparative snapshot of how the factors motivating international government organizations apply to the partnerships from chapter four. The table highlights some of the key elements (indicated by dot points) of these factors at work and the differences in how they apply.

Table 10-1 - Comparing three partnerships

Partnerships and Elements of Motivating Factors			
Partnership Type/s¹	Alternative Approval Process	Bio-Terrorism Training	African museums programme
	Operational Policy dialogue	Operational Information and learning Resource mobilization • Channelled private funds	Informational and learning Resource mobilization • Multilateral fundraising • Channelled private funds Advocacy
Motivating Factors			
Professional culture (as macro and sub-culture)	Influenced by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working in structure • Predictability • Beneficial artefacts • Get products out • Highly regulated in government 	Influenced by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fighting crime • Pragmatism • Problem solving • Task focus • Maintain authority 	Influenced by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on cultural objects • Contribution to knowledge • Cooperation and collaboration in all things
Organizational Culture	Influenced by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Historic links to sector • Consensus orientation • Perception of Union as sum of membership 	Influenced by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service to police not member-countries • Avoid diplomatic entanglements • Apolitical • Protection of name and reputation 	Influenced by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnership history • Professional expansion
Macro-cultures ²	No influence	Influenced by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Influential members (Anglo-American) 	No influence
Leaders	No influence	Influenced by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SG endorsement 	Influenced by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG support
Ideology change	No influence	No influence	No influence
Managerial ideas ³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective • Economic • Efficient 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective • Economic • Efficient 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective • Economic • Decentralization
Market-based practices ⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnership • Competition • Quasi-markets • User-pays • Output targets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnership • Freedom to manage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnership • Performance appraisal • Output targets • Outsourcing • Freedom to manage
Finance pressure	No influence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • user pays 	Influenced by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No core budget 	Influenced by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No core budget
Research and Development	Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forum to standardize private R&D 	No influence	Partial influence: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • teaching focus, but used private sector experts
Global Issues	No influence	Yes	Yes

¹ *Partnership types* – resource mobilization, advocacy, policy dialogue, operational, informational and learning.

² *Macro-cultures* – host nation, influential member-states, professional culture, international civil service

³ *Managerial ideas* – economy, effectiveness, efficiency, competition, decentralization

⁴ *Market-based practices* – contracts, cost cutting, flexibility, freedom to manage, management not policy, output targets, outsourcing, partnerships, performance appraisal, quasi-markets, user-pays, monetary incentives.

Source: Own research.

One factor and three elements of factors are uniform across the cases, so I will deal with these before moving on to analysing the individual partnerships. Chapter seven described the lack of evidence supporting an ideological shift from neo-Marxism to

neo-liberalism in the three cases. The common self-perception is that they are technical organizations and apolitical, thereby making the factor a moot point. Two elements of managerial ideas align with Rhodes' (1991) three 'Es' – effectiveness and economy. All partnerships produced effective outcomes – swift international approval of standards, enhanced police skills and better conservation practice in sub-Saharan Africa. The partnerships further benefited from financial contribution by partners, thus economising expenditure from their core budgets. Interestingly, the other 'E' – efficiency – is a contested concept for the African museums programme, illustrated in chapter seven by the debate between the two unit directors in the Rome Centre.

The final common feature is the concept of partnerships as an element of the motivating factor *market-based practices*. Although the term 'partnership' is a buzzword in the language of the new public management, the arrangements between the telecommunication industry and the International Telecommunication Union by far pre-date this usage, yet these arrangements still align to the broad definition of global public-private partnerships developed in chapter two. In this case, as with the International Centre for Conservation, the advantages of partnership described existing arrangements, rather than motivating them.

The Alternative Approval Process

Two types of global public-private partnership describe the telecommunication standardization Alternative Approval Process – it is an operational partnership and a policy dialogue partnership (Table 2-2, page 21). The partnership is operational in the sense that if left to its own devices, the telecommunication market acting in direct competition with one another would result in a fragmented mess. Therefore, the operational partnership solves the problem of providing international telecommunication standards – a problem beyond the ability of states, markets or civil societies to solve alone. The partnership is also policy dialogue, with partners working together to approve standards affecting the policies of governments and corporations. For example a new broadcast standard for television allowing more channels within a specific bandwidth can shape media policy for government and advertising policy for a corporation. The study and working groups provide a forum for cooperative consideration of such issues.

Standardization has been a key activity of the International Telecommunication Union since its creation. The Union brought public and private actors together to share

Chapter 10

research and development that would enable cross-border telecommunication.

Determining whether economic factors opened the door to private actors or their research and development is a bit of a chicken and egg game. However, as early standards such as the Union selecting Hughes telegraph (1868) for international traffic are evident (Hurdeman 2003, pp.220-221), it is safe to say access to private research and development underpins this long standing global public-private partnership.

As a result of this long association, many of the factors motivating global public-private partnerships have little or no effect on the current arrangements. As with all international government organizations, financial pressures exists. However, the user-pays approach established in the 1930s negates this to a certain extent. The structure of authority in the Union, whereby Secretariat and Bureaus have little autonomy, means attempts to increase the contribution of Sector Members has been frustrated – thus the leaders who supported an increase are shown to have little influence on changing the fundamental manner in which the Alternative Approval Process is financed. The limited scope for change reflects traits of both the professional and organizational culture. Professionally engineers working for government are highly regulated (Sharp *et al.* 2000) and work within structure (Bloch 1986). The approval process also delivers the predictability desired by engineers (Bloch 1986; Hayek 1952). Organizationally consensus is required to achieve significant changes – a difficult outcome to achieve as illustrated by the failed attempts to alter the fixed Sector Member fees. The culture of consensus within the organization negates the influence of national macro-cultures on the partnership, as we saw in the previous chapter with Russia's inability to change the status quo arrangements for controlling the internet.

Other motivating factors have had a positive effect on the Alternative Approval Process. The Union's role as the imprimatur of telecommunication standards is part of a quasi-market, in competition with the International Standards Organization and the International Electrotechnical Commission. The interview with the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau Director Malcolm Johnson in chapter seven illustrated how the Union is aware its Sector Members have at least two alternatives when seeking international recognition of their product. By minimizing the bureaucratic requirements in the Alternative Approval Process and setting output targets (i.e. the shortest possible timeframe for approval), the Union has adopted market-like practices to meet this challenge. This also meets the cultural desires of engineers to fulfil their 'passion for creating artefacts that help shape and sustain a world full of the complexity and richness

of human life' (Sharp *et al.* 2000, pp.40-41) and 'their resolve to be dependable [and] to get real and useful products "out the door"' (Florman 1987, p.76).

Five traits of professional culture influence the Alternative Approval Process and three from the Union's organizational culture. The process appears to be uninfluenced by the macro-cultures of nations or international civil service. The cultural traits associated with the engineers' desire to work in structure; to work in a predictable environment; and to be highly regulated and bureaucratic when working for government are closely associated with one another. Predictability and structure translate into the regulations and bureaucratic processes involved in all of the Union's activities. It could be argued the desire for predictability underpins the consensus orientation of the Union – consensus to change non-technical areas (i.e. process and structure) is difficult to achieve, thereby ensuring a certain level of continuity. Predictability and stability also result in little attempt at substantive change by leaders to processes with a long history. While the standards approval is appreciably swifter than before the underlying steps in the process remain – transition through study and work groups and agreement by member-states (albeit this final step is now almost perfunctory).

The professional trait related to the creation of beneficial artefacts refers more to the engineers in the private sector who perform research and development. However, the Union's *Weltanschauung* is that the organization is a sum of its membership. Therefore, engineers contributing to the Union's work are viewed as insiders in a very large tent. The Union's self-perception plays an important role in the Alternative Approval Process. The process is designed to give voice to members from the private sphere. While governments retain the right to over-ride decisions, the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau is in essence the home for private sphere members within the Union.

Bio-Terrorism Training

The sponsored bio-terrorism training programme was ground-breaking for the International Criminal Police Organization. By contributing \$US1 million, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation became one of the first partners to make a substantial monetary contribution under the updated finance regulations. The programme can be categorized under three types of global public-private partnership. It is a resource mobilization partnership with private funds channelled into a targeted programme. The training provided to police for bio-terror incidents makes it an informational and learning type

partnership, and finally it is an operational partnership – not in the sense staff from the International Criminal Police Organization physically responded to bio-terror incidents, but that the training addressed an issue beyond the ability of the market, state or civil society to deal with alone. Police lacked the resources to respond rapidly enough to the international need and although the skills exist in the private sector, such training is better received if delivered by police insiders. Overall the bio-terrorism training programme represented a mix of partnership types more complicated than the aforementioned Alternative Approval Process. Other partnerships of the International Criminal Police Organization are less complex. Table 4-4 on page 93 illustrated how public-private partnerships range from the relatively straightforward operational type – like *Operation Infra-Red*, the partnership designed to locate criminal fugitives described in chapter eight – to those with a complex typology like the bio-terrorism training or the environmental crime programme, the latter including elements of advocacy partnerships.

Seeking private funding signalled a significant change in the organizational culture and an adjustment to reconcile with the conflicting characteristics of professional culture. The mistrust of outsider money, and of outsiders in general, represented two professional characteristics opposing involvement by the Sloan Foundation. The discussion of resources in chapter eight included two interviewees with negative views on external money. One interviewee's opinion was 'I'm a policeman, I don't want to ask you for money, you know it's not a natural thing for me' (I.7 INTERPOL Official 2011), and another stated police in his country 'are not that close to the private sector' (I.3 Anon. 2011). These cultural characteristics took a back seat, however, to the stronger traits of the police desire to fight crime, pragmatism, problem solving and task-focus. The pragmatic approach to private sector funding for International Criminal Police Organization operations and training has gained strength among staff. An official envisioned a day when the organization received more from private sources than member-countries (I.28 INTERPOL Official 2011). In isolation the bio-terrorism training operated in this fashion, as the Sloan contribution exceeded the financial input of member-countries.

Once partnerships were accepted, police maintained an authoritative hand in their operation. Sloan provided funding, but training design and delivery remained under the control of the International Criminal Police Organization. Other partnerships reflect this professional trait of maintaining authority. Paun observed how the International

Criminal Police Organization ‘has become an increasingly strong actor in the enforcement working group’ of the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce, thereby ‘making this group increasingly independent from the overall IMPACT PPP network’ (Paun 2013, p.182). Paun’s observation is interesting because the Taskforce is hosted by the larger World Health Organization, yet police exert greater authority in their own sphere of interest within the IMPACT network.

Four traits of their organizational culture influenced the public-private partnerships of the International Criminal Police Organization. First, is the focus on meeting the needs of operational police before all else. Second is the inherent desire to avoid diplomatic entanglements. The desire to remain apolitical is the third trait; and finally, the importance of protecting the name and reputation of the organization. The organizational characteristics are historically informed. The first and second originated from the frustration generated by decades of diplomatic failure to deliver a framework for international police cooperation. As outlined in chapters four and six, diplomats had their national interest at heart during their negotiations, rather than the needs of operational police. The third and fourth characteristics stem from the period of Nazification of the organization, also detailed in chapters four and six. The frustration at diplomatic and political processes continues. This is exemplified by the lack of progress in creating an international mechanism to control the second-hand intaglio printer market until the organization took a supranational approach, bypassing member-countries to deal directly with the industry. The organizational culture also influenced the Sloan partnership.

Bio-terrorism training represented an urgent international issue in need of a pragmatic solution. In terms of timing, the need to address bio-terrorism training coincided with debates over the Iraq war and their alleged weapons of mass destruction. Waiting for member-country action through diplomatic means could prove disastrous. Therefore, a public-private partnership represented a more viable alternative, as opposed to waiting on national action, or drawing the Iraq war debates into the General Assembly. By seeking a financial partner, rather than an operational one the organization remained in control of the training delivery and effectively protected the organizational name and reputation – even enhancing it among training recipients. Thus, the partnership took a pragmatic approach to address the gap in police knowledge on bio-terrorism issues; avoided diplomatic and political entanglements; maintained control on the partnership;

and avoided risking the name or reputation of the International Criminal Police Organization.

Leadership played an important factor in the bio-terrorism training programme and other international police partnerships. Chapter six showed how Secretary-General Kendall supported the structural changes to enable partnerships and the work continued under his successor. This reflects the macro-cultural influence of Anglo-American thinking toward partnerships – thinking associated with the ideas of new public management (Bevir *et al.* 2003, p.2; Hughes 2012, p.331). This leadership and ideas changed the organizational culture from an insular perspective, to one seeking partnerships to improve the organizational ability to support police.

The bio-terrorism training programme is one example on the spectrum of the International Criminal Police Organization's public-private partnerships. Motivating elements of police culture pushed the partnership past its inhibiting characteristics, and the motivating features the partnership into a practical solution to a complex problem.

African museums programme

The African museums programme represented three types of global public-private partnership. The training focus made information and learning the dominant partnership type. To achieve the programme objectives, financial partners provided both targeted sponsorship and ongoing multilateral fundraising in the form of an endowment fund to support the *Ecole du Patrimoine Africain* in Benin established at the end of the programme. A key element of the endowment was the notable personalities on its honorary committee. Committee members included the former United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar; the former French President, Jacques Chirac; the president of the Pro-Dignitaire Foundation for Human Rights and former First Lady of Portugal, Maria Barrosos Soares; the American jazz musician, Quincy Jones; and other dignitaries (EPA 2011; ICCROM 2000). Their association created an advocacy partnership; their interest and action on the committee raised awareness (and money) to address African heritage conservation.

The Africa programme evidenced three characteristics of conservation culture. The focus of conservation culture on the importance of cultural objects is foremost of these characteristics. When he conceived the programme, Assistant Director Gael de Güichen knew how fragile many of the artefacts were and that the region required many more

professionals to safeguard them for the future (I.25 de Güichen 2011). Secondly, the programme represented a two way flow of knowledge – it contributed skills to conservators in sub-Saharan Africa while at the same time it enabled the teaching staff to learn more about the region and issues associated with materials used in objects precious to the multitude of cultures in the region. The partner universities in London and Paris benefitted professionally from hosting the ten-month long university course in their cities (ICCROM 1991, p.25).

The final characteristic of professional cultures exhibited by the African programme is the propensity to cooperate and collaborate in all things. The programme drew its entire funding from extra-budgetary sources, which were additional contributions from other international government organizations, member-states, philanthropic organizations and corporations. Intellectual and human resources were supplemented by university partners, host institutions and private sector conservators from organizations such as the Getty Conservation Institute. The universities and host institutions also provided material support with their facilities and of course the objects in need of conservation (ICCROM 1986-1994a, 1986-1994b, 1998b). This aspect of conservation culture means that a greater proportion of the International Centre for Conservation's partnerships are multi-actored by comparison to the other organizations. The examples of the Alternative Approval Process and bio-terrorism training represent partnerships with a limited scope. The Alternative Approval Process is limited to the variety of actors bounded within the telecommunication field and the bio-terrorism training had a single partner, whereas the Africa programme benefitted from support beyond the conservation and museum field.

In terms of macro-culture, it is tempting to imagine an Africa-bloc within the International Centre for Conservation drove the development of the Prevention Museums programme for the region. However, only five sub-Saharan nations of a total 67 member-states were part of the organization when the programme began. A further 21 sub-Saharan countries joined during the period of the programme and its successors. This may tempt a further analysis to indicate the Rome Centre ran the programme as an expansive measure in line with principal-agent theory (discussed briefly in chapters one and two - see Hawkins *et al.* 2006). However, the sub-Saharan nations are minor financial contributors to international government organizations (ICCROM 2011b),¹ thereby weakening a principal-agent analysis. Furthermore the creation of a bloc can

¹ The top ten contributing member-states provide 78% of the core budget of ICCROM, leaving only 22% sourced from the remaining 119 countries. None of the top ten contributors are from Africa (ICCROM 2011b).

disrupt powerful member interests (as experienced in the WHO - see Cortell and Peterson 2006). Increased membership is therefore a by-product of the focussed efforts to address a regional shortage of skilled professionals.


The Africa programme would never have existed without the leadership team in place at the International Centre for Conservation. The proposal was developed by the Assistant Director, the second highest position in the organization, and approved by the Director without the explicit authorization of either the Council or General Assembly (I.25 de Güichen 2011; ICCROM 1988). Furthermore the Director facilitated the programme by providing de Güichen with a 'loan' of US\$50,000 from the core budget, which was subsequently repaid when extra-budgetary funds were secured (I.25 de Güichen 2011). In this, as in all other partnerships of the Rome Centre, leaders play an active role. Therefore leaders are a motivating factor in conservation based global public-private partnerships.

The ideas and practices of new public management were evident in the Africa programme. From an organizational perspective, the programme being fully funded from external sources was clearly economic. The partners agreed to support the output targets articulated in the long and short term goals of the project and received regular feedback which appraised the performance of the programme as time progressed (I.25 de Güichen 2011; ICCROM 1998b). The practice of outsourcing, although not in a paid contractual sense, occurred through experts from universities and the Getty Conservation Institute contributing to the programme. The creation of two permanent institutions – the *Ecole du Patrimoine Africain* and Centre for Heritage Development in Africa – to continue the programmes work showed the idea of decentralization also applied to the programme. From a temporal perspective the African museums programme occurred over the period the organization struggled with re-conceptualizing Associate Members as partners, and then concentrating on partnerships with those actively involved in the activities of the Rome Centre. Although working with the private sphere had always been part of the organizational culture, the African museums programme represented a new way of achieving this. Thus, the ideas and practices of new public management and the market, shaped by the pre-existing organizational and professional cultures, influenced a change in the manner in which the International Centre for Conservation operated its partnerships.

Modelling the influence of culture


Revisiting the model proposed in chapter two (Figure 2-1, page 52), the effect of culture on the three partnerships is clearly illustrated by Figure 10-1 for the International Telecommunication Union Alternative Approval Process, Figure 10-2 for the International Criminal Police Organization anti-bio-terrorism partnership, and Figure 10-3 for the programme run by the International Centre for Conservation to train museum professionals in sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 10-1 - Moderating influence of ITU cultures



For the International Telecommunication Union, only three of the original seven motivating factors apply to the Alternative Approval Process. The factors with no apparent influence upon this ongoing global public-private partnership are unlikely to change. While these factors retain a latent potential to influence this particular partnership, the organizational culture remains a barrier, as demonstrated by the attempt by the Secretary-General to increase the scale of Sector Member contributions failing to achieve consensus as discussed in chapter eight and the non-autonomous perspective within the organization.


Figure 10-2 - Moderating influence of INTERPOL cultures



In contrast, the professional and organizational cultures within the International Criminal Police Organization shape the perceptions and behaviours toward most of the other motivating factors. The cultures only filter out ideological change and private research and development for this partnership – although research and development does play a role in other partnerships such as Project S-Print (chapter seven) and the partnership with Morpho to provide the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (Chapter eight). The Morpho partnership also demonstrated how financial stress filtered through the lens of police culture resulted in an innovative solution via equipment donation and technical support, rather than a direct injection of monetary resources.

Finally, the organizational culture of the Rome Centre also filters out ideological change and alters, but does not eliminate, the need for outside research and development – hence the dashed line transitioning the cultural lenses (Figure 10-3). The diminished need for external research and development is influenced by the presence of a didactic laboratory and the academic nature of an organization able to conduct its own research, and then share the results with all partners.

Figure 10-3 - Moderating influence of ICCROM cultures



Taken together, these models show that any motivating factor has a latent potential to motivate a global public-private partnership, however this potential is only realized if it does not greatly conflict with the intermediating effect of the relevant professional or organizational culture.

Cultural motivation, maintenance and inhibition

The cases above show how culture and the other factors interacted differently in each global public-private partnership. Much of the study has focussed on factors as motivators; however, culture has two other roles in relation to partnerships – as a maintenance factor and as an inhibiting factor. The case organizations and their professional cultures align closely to the three roles culture plays in global public-private partnerships – engineering and partnership maintenance, police inhibited and cautious about partnerships, and conservators motivated to partner in all things.

The characteristics of engineering culture lean toward a maintenance role for partnerships. These characteristics include the engineers' desire to work within structure, have predictability, their resolve to be dependable and the tendency toward

Chapter 10

regulation and bureaucracy in a public role. The partnerships with Sector Members, Associates and Academia are also framed by the organizational culture built on the long history of the organization and its consensus orientation, which limit change. This change limitation can act as an inhibitor as well, as seen in the previous chapter where the International Telecommunication Union failed to see the need to open further to civil society concerned about the freedom of the internet.

Culture as an inhibitor plays a greater role in the International Criminal Police Organization. The cultural features of an insider / outsider mentality, tradition and bureaucracy inhibited police public-private partnerships for decades. These features continue to shape a cautious approach to partnerships. The concept of partnership is no longer alien, police focus shifted to stronger cultural motivations like fighting crime, pragmatism, problem solving and focus on the task at hand (i.e. transnational crime). These are reinforced with an organizational culture focussed on doing everything to support a constituency of operational police above all things.

The greatest motivation for partnerships is found in conservation culture. The multi-disciplinary nature of conservation and its embrace of research and practice have combined with a focus on cultural objects and their significance to create a culture open to cooperation and collaboration in all things. This is reflected by a proportionately high number of partners. Between 1968 and 2010, the International Centre for Conservation worked with 563 other organizations (see appendix 4). Some of these organizations, such as the Getty Conservation Institute have worked with the Rome Centre for decades, illustrating an organizational culture that also values partnership maintenance. Inhibitions to partnerships only occur along practical lines, like excessive partner accountability requirements, not cultural ones.

Overall findings and conclusion

The study of global public-private partnerships is a growing field within International Relations and global governance studies. The Transdemos project (Bexell and Mörth 2010b; Erman and Uhlin 2010; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010) and the recent contribution by Paun (2013) reflect the growth of interest in governance between the public and the private outside the bounds of the nation state. These governance arrangements – the global public-private partnerships – have a direct and indirect impact on everyone, as can be seen in the work conducted by the three case organizations. The remaining

questions for this research are what are the theoretical insights generated by this study and how does the thesis contribute to the literature?

The theoretical contribution of this study lies in the analysis of the relative factors explaining why international government organizations engage in global public-private partnerships:

Professional and organizational cultures are factors motivating global public-private partnerships and these cultures can influence how other motivating factors are perceived and acted upon.

The claim professional and organizational cultures are factors motivating the partnerships, provides a partial answer to the overall research question. The research set out to answer the question why international government organizations are involved in global public-private partnerships. During the process, professional and organizational cultures have been revealed as previously unconsidered motivating factors. Therefore, explaining how these factors worked became the focus of the study., Culture has proven to be a more complicated factor than simply a motivational one. Organizational culture can lock long-standing partnerships into a framework, which is less than compatible within a changing global environment – maintaining a status quo in the ‘sticky’ manner attributed to them by Hofstede (1997). Professional culture can also represent an inhibitor to partnerships – particularly in the professions dominated by state actors such as policing or diplomacy. Thus, *global public-private partnerships are motivated, maintained and inhibited by their inherent professional and organizational cultures.*

The second insight offered by the thesis is *cultures can influence how other motivating factors are perceived and acted upon.* The first part of this chapter showed how the influence of culture varied from factor to factor, and from case to case. Furthermore, the different characteristics and traits of the professional and organizational cultures had dissimilar influence. A comparison of Table 10-1 with the tables in chapter three which describe the cultural traits of professions and organizations² shows many gaps, yet no single motivating factor is completely free of the influence of cultures, nor are any of the partnerships.

Remaining focussed on culture, but more generally it was found *cultural alignment between partners helps, but is an unnecessary requirement.* For both the International

² See Table 2-4 - Features of engineering culture on page 32; Table 2-5 - Features of police culture on page 34; Table 2-6 - Features of conservator culture on page 37; and Table 5-1 - Characteristics of organizational cultures on page 130.

Telecommunication Union and the International Centre for Conservation, partners are dominated by those with a pre-existing telecommunication engineering or conservation profile. Thus cultural alignment is clearly of benefit to their partnerships. Yet the partners of the International Criminal Police Organization are drawn from all sectors of society. Admittedly cultural incompatibility has proved problematic at times – the early partnerships of the Environmental Crime and Intellectual Property Crime Programmes are examples of this. However, the numerous partnership types and different categories of partners the police have had in recent years give a clear indication cultural compatibility is not a necessary element of successful partnerships.

Applying the research findings

In the broader study of global public-private partnerships several lessons from this research have salience. First, smaller organizations should not be discounted from future research on the basis of size or (seemingly) insignificance of their field. Comparing the tiny International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property with two significantly larger organizations gave insight into a professional culture little considered by non-practitioners. There are more than 250 international government organizations occupying the international sphere in a wide range of policy and professional areas. Individually many are small, but collectively they provide the building blocks of the architecture of global governance. This is a lesson my research presents for students of global public-private partnerships.

A second methodological insight is the danger of imposing national models into the international sphere. The factors which differentiate these levels were described in chapter two and can be summarized as ‘soft’ law, multiculturalism and the democratic deficit. The first and third factors are well considered in the literature, particularly the democratic deficit which has the attention of the Transdemos project (Bexall and Mörth 2010; Jönsson and Tallberg 2011; Erman and Uhlin 2010). This study has begun to explore some of the features and problems associated with the multicultural environment which exists at the international level. However the focus has been on differences between, and created by, professional culture and organizational culture. Further work is required to analyze the influence of macro-cultures on global public-private partnerships.

At an organizational level, cultural analysis should be used by international government organizations looking to public-private partnerships as a mechanism to help fulfil their

mandates. Alternately, organizations may be looking to change existing partnerships models. Understanding the cultural distrust of outsiders as an impediment to partnerships may have accelerated the change in the International Criminal Police Organization. Whereas the International Centre for Conservation underwent a managed process of change which consciously used the conservators' desire to cooperate and collaborate to re-focus the organization on active partners rather than the passive Associate Members. An analysis of the dominant professional cultures in an organization and reflection on the traits of its organizational cultures could provide insights to smooth any future transition or change to global public-private partnerships.

The scope for further research

My study is not the final word on the research agenda for global public-private partnerships. I have shown that considering professional and organizational cultures in the context of global public-private partnerships provides a rich field for future research and analysis. Four largely unexplored aspects of this field have been touched upon in this thesis. Firstly, the cultural perspective of the private partners is a substantially unknown factor. While profit and philanthropic urges seem apparent for motivating private actors, their organizational and professional cultures may have significance worth exploring. Secondly, more work is required on a macro-cultural analysis of global public-private partnerships. While these partnerships are created in an international space, much of their operation is within a national or regional contexts, which imparts its own cultural nuances. Thirdly, scholars in current research projects – like the Transdemos project mentioned above, who are considering questions about the democratic credentials of global public-private partnerships – could benefit by viewing their questions through the lenses of professional and organizational cultures. Such questions would then focus on how legitimate, transparent, accountable and so forth. international government organizations perceive their partnerships with the private sector to be. From this perspective, the value and legitimacy of such partnerships may be cast in a different light. Finally, a broader study of the organizations that do not participate in public-private partnerships is needed. Such a study could help determine whether cultural factors impede involvement in global public-private partnerships and whether these organizations may, or may not, benefit from reconsidering how they approach their role in the broader global governance framework.

Appendices

Abbreviations

Use of abbreviations and acronyms has been limited as much as possible in the body of this study. However there have been many occasions where this has been impractical. The following list incorporates all abbreviations and acronyms used during the research.

AIF	<i>Agence Intergouvernementale de la Francophonie</i> (Intergovernmental Agency for French Speaking Countries)
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASEANAPOL	ASEAN Chiefs of Police
AT&T	American Telegraph and Telephone
AVRDC	The World Vegetable Centre (originally called the Asian Vegetable Research and Development Centre)
BIE	Bureau of International Expositions
BIPM	<i>Bureau International des Poids et Mesures</i> (International Bureau of Weights and Measures)
BIS	Bank for International Settlements
CFC	Common Fund for Commodities
CHF	Swiss francs
CIIA	<i>Commission Internationale des Industries Agricoles et Alimentaires</i> (International Commission for Food Industries)
COMSEC	Commonwealth Secretariat
CONFESJES	<i>Conférence des Ministres de la Jeunesse et des Sports des Etats et Gouvernements ayant le Français en Partage</i> (Conference of Ministers for Youth in Sport of French Speaking Countries)
CSO	Civil society organization
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic acid
Europol	European law enforcement agency
FAO	UN Food and Agricultural Organization
FBO	faith based organization
FIFA	<i>Fédération Internationale de Football Associations</i> (International Federation of Football Associations)
G-15	Group of 15
GA	general assembly
GPPP	Global public-private partnership
HCCH	<i>Conférence de la Haye de Droit International Privé</i> (Hague Conference on Private International Law)

IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAC	International Cotton Advisory Committee
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICCAT	International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
ICCO	International Cocoa Organization
ICCROM	International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property
ICDO	International Civil Defence Organization
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICMM	International Committee of Military Medicine
ICO	International Coffee Organization
ICPC	International Criminal Police Commission (1923-56) became ICPO-INTERPOL in 1956
ICPO- INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization - Interpol
ICSG	International Copper Study Group
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IFAD	International Fund for Agriculture and Development
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IGC	International Grains Council
IGO	international government organization
IHO	International Hydrographic Organization
IIDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IIR	International Institute on Refrigeration
IR	international relations (the academic discipline)
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILZSG	International Lead and Zinc Study Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IMSO	International Mobile Satellite Organization
INSG	International Nickel Study Group
Intersputnik	<i>Международная организация космической связи</i> (International Organization of Space Communications)
IP	intellectual property

Appendix 1

IPR	intellectual property rights
IO	international organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IOOC	International Olive Oil Council
IOPC Funds	International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds
IPC	International Pepper Community
IRCA	International Railway Congress Association
IRSG	International Rubber Study Group
ISA	International Seabed Authority
ISO	International Sugar Organization
ISTC	International Science and Technology Center
ITTO	International Tropical Timber Organization
ITU	International Telegraph Union (1865-1932) International Telecommunication Union (1932-)
IUPCT	International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs
IWC	International Whaling Commission
MSF	<i>Medicins sans frontiers</i> (Doctors Without Borders)
NGO	non-government organization
NPM	new public management
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OIE	<i>Office International des Epizooties</i> now called the World Organization for Animal Health
OIML	<i>Organisation Internationale de Métrologie Légale</i> (International Organization of Legal Metrology)
OIV	International Organization of Vine and Wine
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PC	Personal Computer
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration
PDA	Personal Digital Assistant
PIANC	Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses Now called the World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure
PPP	public-private partnership (private-public partnership)
TRAC	Transnational Resource & Action Center

TWN	Third World Network
UIA	Union of International Associations
UN	United Nations
UNCCD	UN Convention to Combat Desertification
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNEP	UN Environment Programme
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNIDO	UN Industrial Development Organization
UNIDROIT	<i>Institut International pour l'Unification du Droit Prive</i> (International Institute for the Unification of Private Law)
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WA	Wassenaar Arrangement
WB	World Bank
WCO	World Customs Organization
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZNG	zero nominal growth
ZRG	zero real growth

ITU Acronyms

As outlined in chapter four, the International Telecommunication Union was originally styled the International Telegraph Union. With the advent of newer technologies, the name was changed in 1938 to reflect the multiple means of telecommunication under the organizations ambit.

AAP	Alternative Approval Process
CCI	International Consultative Committee
CCIR	International Consultative Committee Radiocommunication
CCIT	International Consultative Committee Telegraph

Appendix 1

CCITT	International Consultative Committee Telephone & Telegraph
ICT	information communication technology
IFRB	International Frequency Registration Board
IRC	International Radiotelegraph Convention
ITC	International Telegraph Convention
ITR	International Telecommunication Regulations
ITU-R	Radiocommunication Bureau/Sector of the ITU
ITU-S	Telecommunication Development Bureau/Sector of the ITU
ITU-T	Telecommunication Standardization Bureau/Sector of the ITU
POA	private operating agency
RB	Radiocommunication Bureau
RPOA	recognized private operating agency
TB	Telecommunication Standardization Bureau
TDB	Telecommunication Development Bureau
WARC	World Administrative Radio Conference
WCIT	World Conference on Information Technology

INTERPOL Acronyms

The full name for INTERPOL is the International Criminal Police Organization – INTERPOL. Its proper acronym is ICPO-INTERPOL. The word INTERPOL is the original telegraphic address for its predecessor – the International Criminal Police Commission.

In the age of telegraphic communication National Central Bureaus were known as, ‘INTERPOL Washington’, ‘INTERPOL London’, ‘INTERPOL Canberra’ etc. The proper name for INTERPOL Canberra is in fact International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL, Australian National Central Bureau, with appropriate acronyms such as ANCB or USNCB. Of course, INTERPOL [location] was and is still commonly used both inside and outside the organization.

COFEE	Computer Online Forensic Evidence Extractor
CSDB	Counterfeit and Secure Documents Branch
CSI	Crime Stoppers International
EDPS	Executive Directorate Police Services
FHT	Financial & High Tech Crime Sub-Directorate
FIS	Fugitive Investigation Support Sub-Directorate
ICPC	International Criminal Police Commission
IIPCIC	International IP Crime Investigators College

IMPACT	International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce
IP	intellectual property
NCB	National Central Bureau
OS	Operational Police Support Directorate
SCA	Specialized Crime and Analysis Directorate
SP	Strategic Planning Directorate
SPP	Strategic Partnerships
THB	Trafficking in Human Beings

ICCROM Acronyms

The acronym ICCROM has always been used for the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property, which is the official name of the organization. ICCROM abbreviates ‘International Centre for Conservation, Rome’, the more common name used by staff of the organization when not simply using the acronym.

CHDA	Centre for Heritage Development Africa
EPA	<i>Ecole du Patrimoine Africain</i> (African School of Cultural Heritage)
PMDA	Programme for Museum Development Africa
PREMA	Preventive Conservation for Technicians and Restorers Working in African Museums South of the Sahara. or Prevention Museums Africa – referred to as the African museums programme in this study
PREMO	Prevention Museums Oceania

Interviews

The following list contains data on each interviewee in accordance with the level of identifying information each person consented to be included. Five interviewees chose not to be identified even by the organization in which they work. One individual agreed to be interviewed, but refused to consent to the use of any material provided other than background.

The Legal Adviser for the International Criminal Police Organization requested no official be named. All interviewees from INTERPOL were advised accordingly at time of interview. Several expressed no concern with being named, however the organizational requirement has been respected in accordance with conditions of access.

This list is produced in accordance with the ethical requirements agreed to in ANU Research Ethics Proposal no. 2010_452. Numbers are incomplete due to planned interviews with Australian and international government organizations officials not being conducted. This further acts as an aid for anonymity for those who requested it.

Interview	Name	Position	Organization
2	All identifying information withheld at interviewee request		
3	All identifying information withheld at interviewee request		
5	All identifying information withheld at interviewee request		
6	Withheld	Withheld	INTERPOL
7	Withheld	Withheld	INTERPOL
8	Refused consent – interview conducted but not used		
10	Malcolm Johnson	Director Telecommunication Standardization Bureau	ITU
11	Withheld	Coordinator – Environmental Crime Programme	INTERPOL
14	Withheld	Director Counterfeit and Secure Documents Branch	INTERPOL
15	All identifying information withheld at interviewee request		
16	All identifying information withheld at interviewee request		
17	Catherine Antomarchi	Director Collections Unit	ICCROM
19	Mounir Bouchenaki	Director General	ICCROM
20	Withheld	Coordinator Fingerprints	INTERPOL
25	Gael de Guichen	Former Deputy Director	ICCROM
27	Joseph King	Director Sites Unit	ICCROM
28	Withheld	Withheld	INTERPOL

Governing Global Public-Private Partnerships - Information for Interviewees

Research Objective

The objective of this research is to explore the reasons intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) form partnerships with the private sector outside of the United Nations (UN) system.

This research focuses on two intergovernmental organisations that are outside the UN system, and despite one being part of the UN system, it pre-dates the parent body by 80 years. To explore the research objective, data will be collected from the *International Criminal Police Organisation* (Interpol), the *International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property* (ICCROM), and the *International Telecommunications Union* (ITU). Government agencies responsible for managing Australia's relationship with these IGOs will also be subject of this research. All three IGOs have a global scope of 100+ member-states and have partnered with non-state actors in the form of for-profit and/or philanthropic private organisations.

Background

Global public-private partnerships (GPPPs) between IGOs and private organisations are not new, but beyond the UN family they are relatively under researched. Studies to-date of UN agencies identified several factors that led to GPPPs. These factors included financial crises, leadership change, ideological change, private sector efficiencies and specific issues such as HIV/AIDS. Despite these factors, they do not apply universally to IGOs in or out of the UN.

Nearly 40% of global IGOs now can, or do, supplement their budget from non-state sources, some receiving a greater private budget than funds from any individual country. These partnerships are even further removed from citizens in terms of accountability and transparency than their domestic counterparts. Citizen participation in the organisation and conduct of these partnerships is also severely limited.

The research asks why are IGOs entering into these public-private governance arrangements and how existing member-state and IGO governance arrangements affected by partnerships with corporations and philanthropic organisations. Governance and accountability arrangements between organisations, and member state attitudes is also considered.

The Interview

Interviews will be approximately one hour and digitally recorded, with your consent, for accuracy. The interviews will cover the following themes:

- The autonomy of IGOs and their freedom to engage in partnerships
- The impact of financial crises and budgetary restrictions on IGOs
- The role of leaders in setting or changing IGOs strategic directions
- Changes to institutional ideology and organisational culture associated with partnerships
- Real and perceived market efficiencies gained through partnerships
- Global issues that necessitated IGOs to partner with private organisations

You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time, and you do not need to provide any reason. If you decide to withdraw from the any of the information you have provided will not be used.

Results of the research will be shared with participating organisations. They will be published in a PhD dissertation, and may form part of future research publications in academic journals, or presented at relevant conferences.

Contact Names and Phone Numbers.

<p>If you have any questions or complaints about the study please feel free to contact:</p> <p>Professor John Wanna, College of Arts & Social Sciences Australian National University Tel: +61-2-6125-2134; Email: john.wanna@anu.edu.au</p>	<p>If you have concerns regarding the way the research was conducted you can also contact the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee:</p> <p>Human Ethics Officer Human Research Ethics Committee Australian National University Tel: +61-2-6125-7945 Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au</p>
---	--

Thank you for your time and help with my research project. If you have any queries about the research, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Kind regards

Adam Masters
Doctoral Candidate
School of Politics and International Relations
Research School of Social Sciences
College of Arts and Social Sciences
Haydon Allen Building - Room 1172
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia

P: +61-2-6125-8396
F: +61-2-6125-2222
M: +61-412-377-811
E: adam.masters@anu.edu.au
W: <http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/>

CRICOS Provider #00120c

Governing Global Public-Private Partnerships

Interview Consent Form

I, [_____] (please print) consent to take part in the doctoral research project *Governing Global Public -Private Partnerships*. I have read the information sheet for this project (over) and understand its contents. I have had the nature of the research project, so far as it affects me, fully explained to my satisfaction by the researcher. My consent is freely given.

I understand that *information I provide may be published* in academic journals or books.

I understand that *unless I explicitly indicate that I am willing to be identified* when quoted, my name and position title will not be used in relation to any of the information I have provided.

I understand that *any information I disclose will be kept confidential* so far as the law allows. Interview data will be stored on a password protected computer at the Australian National University for five years.

I understand that *I may choose to remain unidentified*, although any comments I make will not be attributed to me in any publication, it is possible that others may guess the source of information, and I should avoid disclosing sensitive information or information which is defamatory of any person or organisation.

I understand that *I may withdraw* from the research project at any stage, without providing any reason and that this will not have any adverse consequences for me. If I withdraw, the information I provide will not be used.

In any publications produced as a result of this research, I consent to be identified by (check one):

- My full name, position and organisation
 My position and organisation
 My organisation
 None of the above (remain unidentified)
 Other, please specify _____

I consent to a digital audio recording being made of this interview

- Yes
 No

Prior to publication, I would like to approve quotations attributed to me, and the context in which they appears

- Yes
 No

I would like to receive a copy of the research findings after publication (electronic)

- Yes
 No

Signed: _____ Date: _____

Researcher to complete

I, Adam Masters, certify that I have explained the nature and procedures of the research project to _____ and consider that he/she understands what is involved.

Signed: _____ Date: _____

Researcher Contact Details: Adam Masters,

School of Politics and International Relations

The Australian National University

P: +61 (0)2 6125 8396

M: +61 (0)412 377 811

E: adam.masters@anu.edu.au

W: <http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/>

Executive Duties

Below are extracts from the respective constitutions and conventions of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU 2011), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL [1956] 2008) and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM 2005).

International Telecommunication Union

Paragraph numbers and reference to which plenipotentiary session adjusted the text for the ITU have been removed for easier reading. The text is otherwise unchanged from what was published following the 2010 plenipotentiary in Guadalajara, Mexico.

The Council

ITU Constitution - Article 10 - The Council

- 1 1) The Council shall be composed of Member States elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference in accordance with the provisions of No. 61 of this Constitution.

 2) Each Member State of the Council shall appoint a person to serve on the Council who may be assisted by one or more advisers.
- 2 (deleted in 2002)
- 3 In the interval between Plenipotentiary Conferences, the Council shall act, as governing body of the Union, on behalf of the Plenipotentiary Conference within the limits of the powers delegated to it by the latter.
- 4 1) The Council shall take all steps to facilitate the implementation by the Member States of the provisions of this Constitution, of the Convention, of the Administrative Regulations, of the decisions of the Plenipotentiary Conference, and, where appropriate, of the decisions of other conferences and meetings of the Union, and perform any duties assigned to it by the Plenipotentiary Conference.

 2) The Council shall consider broad telecommunication policy issues in accordance with the guidelines given by the Plenipotentiary Conference to ensure that the Union's policies and strategy fully respond to changes in the telecommunication environment.

 2 *bis*) The Council shall prepare a report on the policy and strategic planning recommended for the Union, together with their financial implications, using the specific data prepared by the Secretary-General under No. 74A below.

 3) It shall ensure the efficient coordination of the work of the Union and exercise effective financial control over the General Secretariat and the three Sectors.

 4) It shall contribute, in accordance with the purposes of the Union, to the development of telecommunications in the developing countries by every means at its disposal, including through the participation of the Union in the appropriate programmes of the United Nations.

ITU Convention - Article 4 - The Council

- 1) The number of Member States of the Council shall be determined by the Plenipotentiary Conference which is held every four years.
- 2) This number shall not exceed 25% of the total number of Member States.
- 2) 1) The Council shall hold an ordinary session annually at the seat of the Union.
- 2) 2) During this session it may decide to hold, exceptionally, an additional session.
- 2) 3) Between ordinary sessions, it may be convened, as a general rule at the seat of the Union, by the Chairman at the request of a majority of its Member States, or on the initiative of the Chairman under the conditions provided for in No. 18 of this Convention.
- 3) The Council shall take decisions only in session. Exceptionally, the Council in session may agree that any specific issue shall be decided by correspondence.
- 4) At the beginning of each ordinary session, the Council shall elect its own Chairman and Vice-Chairman from among the representatives of its Member States, taking into account the principle of rotation between the regions. They shall serve until the opening of the next ordinary session and shall not be eligible for re-election. The Vice-Chairman shall serve as Chairman in the absence of the latter.
- 5) The person appointed to serve on the Council by a Member State of the Council shall, so far as possible, be an official serving in, or directly responsible to, or for, their telecommunication administration and qualified in the field of telecommunication services.
- 6) Only the travelling, subsistence and insurance expenses incurred by the representative of each Member State of the Council, belonging to the category of developing countries, the list of which is established by the United Nations Development Programme, in that capacity at Council sessions, shall be borne by the Union.

Secretary General

ITU Constitution - Article 11 - General Secretariat

- 1) 1) The General Secretariat shall be directed by a Secretary-General, assisted by one Deputy Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General shall act as the legal representative of the Union.

- 2) The functions of the Secretary-General are specified in the Convention. In addition, the Secretary-General shall:

- a) coordinate the Union's activities, with the assistance of the Coordination Committee;

- b) prepare, with the assistance of the Coordination Committee, and provide to the Member States and Sector Members, such specific information as may be required for the preparation of a report on the policies and strategic plan for the Union, and coordinate the implementation of the plan; this report shall be communicated to the Member States and Sector Members for review during the last two regularly scheduled sessions of the Council before a plenipotentiary conference;
- c) take all the actions required to ensure economic use of the Union's resources and be responsible to the Council for all the administrative and financial aspects of the Union's activities;
- 3) The Secretary-General may act as depositary of special arrangements established in conformity with Article 42 of this Constitution.

2 The Deputy Secretary-General shall be responsible to the Secretary-General; he shall assist the Secretary-General in the performance of his duties and undertake such specific tasks as may be entrusted to him by the Secretary-General. He shall perform the duties of the Secretary-General in the absence of the latter.

ITU Convention – Article 5 – General Secretariat

1 The Secretary-General shall:

- a) be responsible for the overall management of the Union's resources; he may delegate the management of part of these resources to the Deputy Secretary-General and the Directors of the Bureaux, in consultation as necessary with the Coordination Committee;
- b) coordinate the activities of the General Secretariat and the Sectors of the Union, taking into account the views of the Coordination Committee, with a view to assuring the most effective and economical use of the resources of the Union;
- c) prepare, with the assistance of the Coordination Committee, and submit to the Council a report indicating changes in the telecommunication environment since the last plenipotentiary conference and containing recommended action relating to the Union's future policies and strategy, together with their financial implications;
- c *bis*) coordinate implementation of the strategic plan adopted by the Plenipotentiary Conference and prepare an annual report on this implementation for review by the Council;
- d) organize the work of the General Secretariat and appoint the staff of that Secretariat in accordance with the directives of the Plenipotentiary Conference and the rules established by the Council;
- d *bis*) prepare annually a four-year rolling operational plan of activities to be undertaken by the staff of the General Secretariat consistent with the strategic plan, covering the subsequent year and the following three-year period, including financial implications, taking due account of the financial plan as approved by the plenipotentiary conference; this four-year operational plan shall be reviewed by the advisory groups of all three Sectors, and shall be reviewed and approved annually by the Council;

- e) undertake administrative arrangements for the Bureaux of the Sectors of the Union and appoint their staff on the basis of the choice and proposals of the Director of the Bureau concerned, although the final decision for appointment or dismissal shall rest with the Secretary-General;
- f) report to the Council any decisions taken by the United Nations and the specialized agencies which affect common system conditions of service, allowances and pensions;
- g) ensure the application of any regulations adopted by the Council;
- h) provide legal advice to the Union;
- i) supervise, for administrative management purposes, the staff of the Union with a view to assuring the most effective use of personnel and the application of the common system conditions of employment for the staff of the Union. The staff appointed to assist directly the Directors of the Bureaux shall be under the administrative control of the Secretary-General and shall work under the direct orders of the Directors concerned but in accordance with administrative guidelines given by the Council;
- j) in the interest of the Union as a whole and in consultation with the Directors of the Bureaux concerned, temporarily reassign staff members from their appointed position as necessary to meet fluctuating work requirements at headquarters;
- k) make, in agreement with the Director of the Bureau concerned, the necessary administrative and financial arrangements for the conferences and meetings of each Sector;
- l) taking into account the responsibilities of the Sectors, undertake appropriate secretariat work preparatory to and following conferences of the Union;
- m) prepare recommendations for the first meeting of the heads of delegation referred to in No. 49 of the General Rules of conferences, assemblies and meetings of the Union, taking into account the results of any regional consultation;
- n) provide, where appropriate in cooperation with the inviting government, the secretariat of conferences of the Union, and provide the facilities and services for meetings of the Union, in collaboration, as appropriate, with the Director concerned, drawing from the Union's staff as he deems necessary in accordance with No. 93 above. The Secretary-General may also, when so requested, provide the secretariat of other telecommunication meetings on a contractual basis;
- o) take necessary action for the timely publication and distribution of service documents, information bulletins, and other documents and records prepared by the General Secretariat and the Sectors, communicated to the Union or whose publication is requested by conferences or the Council; the list of documents to be published shall be maintained by the Council, following consultation with the conference concerned, with respect to service documents and other documents whose publication is requested by conferences;
- p) publish periodically, with the help of information put at his disposal or which he may collect, including that which he may obtain from other

international organizations, a journal of general information and documentation concerning telecommunication;

- q) after consultation with the Coordination Committee and making all possible economies, prepare and submit to the Council a biennial draft budget covering the expenditures of the Union, taking account of the financial limits laid down by the Plenipotentiary Conference. This draft shall consist of a consolidated budget, including cost-based and results-based budget information for the Union, prepared in accordance with the budget guidelines issued by the Secretary-General, and comprising two versions. One version shall be for zero growth of the contributory unit, the other for a growth less than or equal to any limit fixed by the Plenipotentiary Conference, after any drawing on the Reserve Account. The budget resolution, after approval by the Council, shall be sent for information to all Member States;
- r) with the assistance of the Coordination Committee, prepare an annual financial operating report in accordance with the Financial Regulations and submit it to the Council. A recapitulative financial operating report and accounts shall be prepared and submitted to the next Plenipotentiary Conference for examination and final approval;
- s) with the assistance of the Coordination Committee, prepare an annual report on the activities of the Union which, after approval by the Council, shall be sent to all Member States;
- s bis) manage the special arrangements referred to in No. 76A of the Constitution, the cost of this management being borne by the signatories of the arrangement in a manner agreed between them and the Secretary-General.
- t) perform all other secretarial functions of the Union;
- u) perform any other functions entrusted to him by the Council.

Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau

ITU Convention - Article 12 - Radiocommunication Bureau

1 The Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau shall organize and coordinate the work of the Radiocommunication Sector. The duties of the Bureau are supplemented by those specified in provisions of the Radio Regulations.

2 The Director shall, in particular,

- 1) in relation to radiocommunication conferences:
 - a) coordinate the preparatory work of the study groups and other groups and the Bureau, communicate to the Member States and Sector Members the results of this preparatory work, collect their comments and submit a consolidated report to the conference which may include proposals of a regulatory nature;
 - b) participate as of right, but in an advisory capacity, in the deliberations of radiocommunication conferences, of the radiocommunication assembly and of

the radiocommunication study groups and other groups. The Director shall make all necessary preparations for radiocommunication conferences and meetings of the Radiocommunication Sector in consultation with the General Secretariat in accordance with No. 94 of this Convention and, as appropriate, with the other Sectors of the Union, and with due regard for the directives of the Council in carrying out these preparations;

- c) provide assistance to the developing countries in their preparations for radiocommunication conferences.
 - 2) in relation to the Radio Regulations Board:
 - a) prepare and submit draft Rules of Procedure for approval by the Radio Regulations Board; they shall include, inter alia, calculation methods and data required for the application of the provisions of the Radio Regulations;
 - b) distribute to all Member States the Rules of Procedure of the Board, collect comments thereon received from administrations and submit them to the Board;
 - c) process information received from administrations in application of the relevant provisions of the Radio Regulations and regional agreements and their associated Rules of Procedure and prepare it, as appropriate, in a form suitable for publication;
 - d) apply the Rules of Procedure approved by the Board, prepare and publish findings based on those Rules, and submit to the Board any review of a finding which is requested by an administration and which cannot be resolved by the use of those Rules of Procedure;
 - e) in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Radio Regulations, effect an orderly recording and registration of frequency assignments and, where appropriate, the associated orbital characteristics, and keep up to date the Master International Frequency Register; review entries in that Register with a view to amending or eliminating, as appropriate, those which do not reflect actual frequency usage, in agreement with the administration concerned;
 - f) assist in the resolution of cases of harmful interference, at the request of one or more of the interested administrations, and where necessary, make investigations and prepare, for consideration by the Board, a report including draft recommendations to the administrations concerned;
 - g) act as executive secretary to the Board;
 - 3) coordinate the work of the radiocommunication study groups and other groups and be responsible for the organization of that work;

Appendix 3

3 bis) provide the necessary support for the radiocommunication advisory group, and report each year to Member States and Sector Members and to the Council on the results of the work of the advisory group.

3 ter) take practical measures to facilitate the participation of developing countries in the radiocommunication study groups and other groups.

4) also undertake the following:

- a) carry out studies to furnish advice with a view to the operation of the maximum practicable number of radio channels in those portions of the spectrum where harmful interference may occur, and with a view to the equitable, effective and economical use of the geostationary-satellite and other satellite orbits, taking into account the needs of Member States requiring assistance, the specific needs of developing countries, as well as the special geographical situation of particular countries;
- b) exchange with Member States and Sector Members data in machine-readable and other forms, prepare and keep up to date any documents and databases of the Radiocommunication Sector, and arrange with the Secretary-General, as appropriate, for their publication in the languages of the Union in accordance with No. 172 of the Constitution;
- c) maintain such essential records as may be required;
- d) submit to the world radiocommunication conference a report on the activities of the Radiocommunication Sector since the last conference; if a world radiocommunication conference is not planned, a report on the activities of the Sector covering the period since the last conference shall be submitted to the Council and, for information, to Member States and Sector Members;
- e) prepare a cost-based budget estimate for the requirements of the Radiocommunication Sector and transmit it to the Secretary-General for consideration by the Coordination Committee and inclusion in the Union's budget.
- f) prepare annually a rolling four-year operational plan that covers the subsequent year and the following three-year period, including financial implications of activities to be undertaken by the Bureau in support of the Sector as a whole; this four-year operational plan shall be reviewed by the radiocommunication advisory group in accordance with Article 11A of this Convention, and shall be reviewed and approved annually by the Council;

3 The Director shall choose the technical and administrative personnel of the Bureau within the framework of the budget as approved by the Council. The appointment of the technical and administrative personnel is made by the Secretary-

General in agreement with the Director. The final decision for appointment or dismissal rests with the Secretary-General.

4 The Director shall provide technical support, as necessary, to the Telecommunication Development Sector within the framework of the Constitution and this Convention

Director of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau

ITU Convention - Article 15 - Telecommunication Standardization Bureau

1 The Director of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau shall organize and coordinate the work of the Telecommunication Standardization Sector.

2 The Director shall, in particular:

- a) update annually the work programme approved by the world telecommunication standardization assembly, in consultation with the chairmen of the telecommunication standardization study groups and other groups;
- b) participate, as of right, but in an advisory capacity, in the deliberations of world telecommunication standardization assemblies and of the telecommunication standardization study groups and other groups. The Director shall make all necessary preparations for assemblies and meetings of the Telecommunication Standardization Sector in consultation with the General Secretariat in accordance with No. 94 of this Convention and, as appropriate, with the other Sectors of the Union, and with due regard for the directives of the Council concerning these preparations;
- c) process information received from administrations in application of the relevant provisions of the International Telecommunication Regulations or decisions of the world telecommunication standardization assembly and prepare it, where appropriate, in a suitable form for publication;
- d) exchange with Member States and Sector Members data in machine-readable and other forms, prepare and, as necessary, keep up to date any documents and databases of the Telecommunication Standardization Sector, and arrange with the Secretary-General, as appropriate, for their publication in the languages of the Union in accordance with No. 172 of the Constitution;
- e) submit to the world telecommunication standardization assembly a report on the activities of the Sector since the last assembly; the Director shall also submit to the Council and to the Member States and Sector Members such a report covering the two-year period since the last assembly, unless a second assembly is convened;
- f) prepare a cost-based budget estimate for the requirements of the Telecommunication Standardization Sector and transmit it to the Secretary-General for consideration by the Coordination Committee and inclusion in the Union's budget.
- g) prepare annually a rolling four-year operational plan that covers the subsequent year and the following three-year period, including financial implications of activities to be undertaken by the Bureau in support of the Sector as a whole; this four-year operational plan shall be reviewed by the telecommunication

Appendix 3

standardization advisory group in accordance with Article 14A of this Convention, and shall be reviewed and approved annually by the Council;

- h) provide the necessary support for the telecommunication standardization advisory group, and report each year to Member States and Sector Members and to the Council on the results of its work;
- i) provide assistance to developing countries in the preparatory work for world standardization assemblies, particularly with regard to matters of a priority nature for those countries.

3 The Director shall choose the technical and administrative personnel of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau within the framework of the budget as approved by the Council. The appointment of the technical and administrative personnel is made by the Secretary-General in agreement with the Director. The final decision on appointment or dismissal rests with the Secretary-General.

4 The Director shall provide technical support, as necessary, to the Telecommunication Development Sector within the framework of the Constitution and this Convention.

Director of the Telecommunication Development Bureau

ITU Convention - Article 18 - Telecommunication Development Bureau

1 The Director of the Telecommunication Development Bureau shall organize and coordinate the work of the Telecommunication Development Sector.

2 The Director shall, in particular:

- a) participate as of right, but in an advisory capacity, in the deliberations of the telecommunication development conferences and of the telecommunication development study groups and other groups. The Director shall make all necessary preparations for conferences and meetings of the Telecommunication Development Sector in consultation with the General Secretariat in accordance with No. 94 of this Convention and, as appropriate, with the other Sectors of the Union, and with due regard for the directives of the Council in carrying out these preparations;
- b) process information received from administrations in application of the relevant resolutions and decisions of the Plenipotentiary Conference and telecommunication development conferences and prepare it, where appropriate, in a suitable form for publication;
- c) exchange with members data in machine-readable and other forms, prepare and, as necessary, keep up to date any documents and databases of the Telecommunication Development Sector, and arrange with the Secretary-General, as appropriate, for their publication in the languages of the Union in accordance with No. 172 of the Constitution;
- d) assemble and prepare for publication, in cooperation with the General Secretariat and the other Sectors of the Union, both technical and administrative information that might be especially useful to developing countries in order to help them to improve their telecommunication networks. Their attention shall

also be drawn to the possibilities offered by the international programmes under the auspices of the United Nations;

- e) submit to the world telecommunication development conference a report on the activities of the Sector since the last conference; the Director shall also submit to the Council and to the Member States and Sector Members such a report covering the two-year period since the last conference;
- f) prepare a cost-based budget estimate for the requirements of the Telecommunication Development Sector and transmit it to the Secretary-General for consideration by the Coordination Committee and inclusion in the Union's budget;
- g) prepare annually a rolling four-year operational plan that covers the subsequent year and the following three-year period, including financial implications of activities to be undertaken by the Bureau in support of the Sector as a whole; this four-year operational plan shall be reviewed by the telecommunication development advisory group in accordance with Article 17A of this Convention, and shall be reviewed and approved annually by the Council;
- h) provide the necessary support for the telecommunication development advisory group, and report each year to the Member States and Sector Members and to the Council on the results of its work.

3 The Director shall work collegially with the other elected officials in order to ensure that the Union's catalytic role in stimulating telecommunication development is strengthened and shall make the necessary arrangements with the Director of the Bureau concerned for initiating suitable action, including the convening of information meetings on the activities of the Sector concerned.

4 At the request of the Member States concerned, the Director, with the assistance of the Directors of the other Bureaux and, where appropriate, the Secretary-General, shall study and offer advice concerning their national telecommunication problems; where a comparison of technical alternatives is involved, economic factors may be taken into consideration.

5 The Director shall choose the technical and administrative personnel of the Telecommunication Development Bureau within the framework of the budget as approved by the Council. The appointment of the personnel is made by the Secretary-General in agreement with the Director. The final decision for appointment or dismissal rests with the Secretary-General.

International Criminal Police Organization

The Executive Committee

Interpol Constitution - Articles 15-24 – The Executive Committee

Article 15

The Executive Committee shall be composed of the President of the Organization, the three Vice-Presidents and nine Delegates.

The thirteen members of the Executive Committee shall belong to different countries, due weight having been given to geographical distribution.

Article 16

The General Assembly shall elect, from among the delegates, the President and three Vice-Presidents of the Organization.

A two-thirds majority shall be required for the election of the President; should this majority not be obtained after the second ballot, a simple majority shall suffice.

The President and Vice-Presidents shall be from different continents.

Article 17

The President shall be elected for four years. The Vice-Presidents shall be elected for three years.

They shall not be immediately eligible for re-election either to the same posts or as Delegates on the Executive Committee.

If, following the election of a President, the provisions of Article 15 (paragraph 2) or Article 16 (paragraph 3) cannot be applied or are incompatible, a fourth Vice-President shall be elected so that all four continents are represented at the Presidency level.

If this occurs, the Executive Committee will, for a temporary period, have fourteen members. The temporary period shall come to an end as soon as circumstances make it possible to apply the provisions of Articles 15 and 16.

Article 18

The President of the Organization shall:

- (a) Preside at meetings of the Assembly and the Executive Committee and direct the discussions;
- (b) Ensure that the activities of the Organization are in conformity with the decisions of the General Assembly and the Executive Committee;
- (c) Maintain as far as is possible direct and constant contact with the Secretary General of the Organization.

Article 19

The nine Delegates on the Executive Committee shall be elected by the General Assembly for a period of three years. They shall not be immediately eligible for re-election to the same posts.

Article 20

The Executive Committee shall meet at least once each year on being convened by the President of the Organization.

Article 21

In the exercise of their duties, all members of the Executive Committee shall conduct themselves as representatives of the Organization and not as representatives of their respective countries.

Article 22

The Executive Committee shall:

- (a) Supervise the execution of the decisions of the General Assembly;
- (b) Prepare the agenda for sessions of the General Assembly;
- (c) Submit to the General Assembly any programme of work or project which it considers useful;
- (d) Supervise the administration and work of the Secretary General;
- (e) Exercise all the powers delegated to it by the Assembly.

Article 23

In case of resignation or death of any of the members of the Executive Committee, the General Assembly shall elect another member to replace him and whose term of office shall end on the same date as his predecessor's. No member of the Executive Committee may remain in office should he cease to be a delegate to the Organization.

Article 24

Executive Committee members shall remain in office until the end of the session of the General Assembly held in the year in which their term of office expires.

Secretary-General

Interpol Constitution – Articles 25-30 – The General-Secretariat

Article 25

The permanent departments of the Organization shall constitute the General Secretariat.

Article 26

The General Secretariat shall:

- (a) Put into application the decisions of the General Assembly and the Executive Committee;
- (b) Serve as an international centre in the fight against ordinary crime;
- (c) Serve as a technical and information centre;
- (d) Ensure the efficient administration of the Organization;
- (e) Maintain contact with national and international authorities, whereas questions relative to the search for criminals shall be dealt with through the National Central Bureaus;
- (f) Produce any publications which may be considered useful;
- (g) Organize and perform secretariat work at the sessions of the General Assembly, the Executive Committee and any other body of the Organization;
- (h) Draw up a draft programme of work for the coming year for the consideration and approval of the General Assembly and the Executive Committee;
- (i) Maintain as far as is possible direct and constant contact with the President of the Organization.

Article 27

The General Secretariat shall consist of the Secretary General and a technical and administrative staff entrusted with the work of the Organization.

Appendix 3

Article 28

The appointment of the Secretary General shall be proposed by the Executive Committee and approved by the General Assembly for a period of five years. He may be re-appointed for other terms but must lay down office on reaching the age of sixty-five, although he may be allowed to complete his term of office on reaching this age.

He must be chosen from among persons highly competent in police matters.

In exceptional circumstances, the Executive Committee may propose at a meeting of the General Assembly that the Secretary General be removed from office.

Article 29

The Secretary General shall engage and direct the staff, administer the budget, and organize and direct the permanent departments, according to the directives decided upon by the General Assembly or Executive Committee.

He shall submit to the Executive Committee or the General Assembly any propositions or projects concerning the work of the Organization.

He shall be responsible to the Executive Committee and the General Assembly.

He shall have the right to take part in the discussions of the General Assembly, the Executive Committee and all other dependent bodies.

In the exercise of his duties, he shall represent the Organization and not any particular country.

Article 30

In the exercise of their duties, the Secretary General and the staff shall neither solicit nor accept instructions from any government or authority outside the Organization. They shall abstain from any action which might be prejudicial to their international task.

Each Member of the Organization shall undertake to respect the exclusively international character of the duties of the Secretary General and the staff, and abstain from influencing them in the discharge of their duties.

All Members of the Organization shall do their best to assist the Secretary General and the staff in the discharge of their functions.

***International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of
Cultural Property***

The Council

ICCROM Statutes – Article 5 – The Council

1. Composition
 - a. The Council shall consist of members elected by the General Assembly, a representative of the Director-General of UNESCO, a representative of the Italian Government, a representative of the *Istituto Centrale per il Restauro* and non-voting members referred to in sub-paragraph (i) below.
 - b. There shall be twelve elected members plus one elected member for every five Member States after the first 30. The total number of elected members shall not, however, exceed twenty-five.
 - c. The members elected by the General Assembly shall be chosen from amongst the best qualified experts concerned with the conservation and restoration of cultural property, taking into consideration the desirability of achieving equitable representation of the major cultural regions of the world and an appropriate coverage of the different fields of specialization relevant to the work of ICCROM. The General Assembly shall also take into account the capacity of such persons to fulfil the administrative and executive functions of the Council.
 - d. Members of the Council who are elected by the General Assembly shall serve for a term of office of four years. However, at the first ordinary session of the General Assembly at which the present provision is in force, half the members elected by the General Assembly shall serve for a term of office of four years and half shall serve for a term of office of two years. If at that session the number of members to be elected is uneven, one half of the members plus one shall be elected for a term of office of four years.
 - e. Elected members of the Council shall serve from the closure of the session of the General Assembly at which they were elected until the closure of the session held in the year in which their term of office expires.
 - f. Members of the Council shall be eligible for re-election, except that they may not serve for more than two consecutive terms.
 - g. In the event of the death, permanent incapacity or resignation of an elected member of the Council, the seat thus falling vacant shall be filled for the remainder of the term of office, by the candidate who, at the last election held by the General Assembly, without being elected, received the highest number of votes. If this candidate is not available to serve, the seat shall be filled by the candidate with the next highest number of votes and so on until exhaustion of the candidates at the said election. If the seat cannot be filled by a candidate who sought membership at the previous election, the seat shall remain vacant until an election is held at the next session of the General Assembly.

Appendix 3

- h. Members of the Council elected by the General Assembly are elected in their personal capacity. They shall perform their function in the interests of ICCROM and not as representatives of States.
- i. Non-voting members of the Council shall be a representative of the International Council of Museums and a representative of the International Council on Monuments and Sites.
- j. Non-voting members of the Council may participate in the discussions of the Council.

2. Functions

The functions of the Council shall be to:

- a. under the authority of the General Assembly oversee the execution of the programme of activities and budget adopted by the latter;
- b. in accordance with the decisions and directives of the General Assembly and having regard to circumstances arising between two ordinary sessions, take all necessary measures on behalf of the General Assembly, and in close cooperation with the Director-General, to ensure the effective and rational execution of the approved programme of activities by the Director-General;
- c. formulate policies, in close cooperation with the Director-General, and submit them, as appropriate, to the General Assembly for approval;
- d. review and adjust, where necessary, a draft programme of activities and budget drawn up by the Director-General and approve it for submission to the General Assembly;
- e. consider applications for admission to membership of ICCROM in accordance with Article 2.3;
- f. make recommendations to the General Assembly on the appointment of the Director-General and on the latter's terms and conditions of appointment, and, as appropriate, extend the Director-General's appointment in accordance with Article 6 (d);
- g. appoint the Director-General in the circumstances envisaged in Article 6 (e);
- h. approve the structure of the Secretariat proposed by the Director-General;
- i. approve the Staff Regulations;
- j. make recommendations to the General Assembly on the adoption of Financial Regulations;
- k. appoint the External Auditor;
- l. supervise the financial operations of ICCROM;
- m. prepare a report on its activities for consideration by the General Assembly at its ordinary sessions;
- n. exercise such other functions as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

3. Procedure

The Council shall:

- a. meet:
 - i. immediately after an ordinary session of the General Assembly;
 - ii. immediately before the following ordinary session of the General Assembly; and
 - iii. once in the interval between its sessions referred to in (i) and (ii) above;
- b. meet in Rome, Italy, unless the General Assembly or the Council itself decides otherwise;
- c. adopt its own Rules of Procedure;
- d. at the beginning of the first session following an ordinary session of the General Assembly, elect a Chairperson and other officers who shall hold office until the closure of the following ordinary session of the General Assembly;
- e. establish such committees as may be necessary for it to carry out its functions.

4. Voting

Each elected member of the Council, the representative of the Director-General of UNESCO, the representative of the Italian Government and the representative of the *Istituto Centrale per il Restauro* shall have one vote. Decisions shall be taken by a simple majority of such members present and voting, unless otherwise provided in these Statutes or in the Rules of Procedure of the Council.

Director-General

ICCROM Statutes - Article 6 – The Secretariat

The Secretariat

- a. The Secretariat of ICCROM shall consist of the Director-General and such staff as may be required.
- b. The responsibilities of the Director-General and the staff shall be international in character. In the discharge of their duties they shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any government or authority external to ICCROM. They shall refrain from any action which might prejudice their positions as international officials. Each Member State undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General and the staff, and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.
- c. The staff shall be appointed in accordance with Staff Regulations approved by the Council. All members of the staff shall be responsible to the Director-General.
- d. The Director-General shall be nominated by the Council and, except as provided in sub-paragraph (e) below, shall be appointed by the General Assembly. The

Appendix 3

General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Council, shall fix the duration of the appointment and approve the terms and conditions under which the Director-General shall serve. The Director-General's appointment by the General Assembly may be extended by the Council not more than twice and for a term of up to two years on each occasion, provided, however, that the duration of the Director-General's appointment and any extension thereof by the Council shall, in no case, exceed a total of six years. The Director-General shall be eligible for re-appointment by the General Assembly.

- e. If the office of Director-General falls vacant in the interval between two sessions of the General Assembly, a new Director-General may be appointed by the Council for a period ending on the day of the closure of the next ordinary session of the General Assembly. The Council shall also determine the terms and conditions of appointment of the Director-General to be contained in a contract signed by the Chairperson of the Council and the new Director-General.
- f. The Director-General shall formulate proposals for appropriate action by the General Assembly and the Council, and shall prepare, for submission to the Council, draft programme of activities and budget. In accordance with the decisions of the General Assembly and the Council, the Director-General shall be responsible for the effective and rational execution of the approved programme of activities. He/she shall prepare and communicate to Member States, periodic reports on ICCROM's activities.

Partner Information

Appendix 4 has been compiled by the author. All errors and mistakes are mine.

ITU Partners

Compiling a list of every organization that has ever partnered with the International Telecommunication Union is well beyond the scope of this research. A snapshot of the current membership gives an idea of the current divide between partners from the public and private spheres. On 18 December 2013, the profile of ITU membership was thus:

	ITU-R	ITU-T	ITU-D
Sector	259	285	347
Associates	3	9	1
University	15	47	16

Source: (ITU 2013) accessed 18 December 2013.

It should be noted that organizations can belong to one, two or all three Bureaus of the Union. For this reason, the totals apparently exceed the number of members (646). A closer examination of the membership gives a better profile of membership divided between the public and private spheres.

Sector Member / Associate / University type	Total
Public sphere partners	
Other entity / regulators (public)	9
Satellite organization (public)	6
Regional organization (public)	20
Sub-total - Public	35
Private sphere partners (incl. semi-privatized)	
University / research institute (public & private)	67
Recognized operating agency / operator (semi-privatized)	64
Financial or development institution (private)	1
Other entity / consultants (private)	4
Recognized operating agency (private)	183
Recognized operating agency (private)	2
Recognized operating agency / mobile operator (private)	6
Recognized operating agency / service provider (private)	5
Regional organization (private)	93
Scientific / industrial organization (private)	131
Scientific / industrial organization / manufacturer (private)	4
Scientific / industrial organization / operator (private)	1
Scientific / industrial organization / research and development institution (private)	2
Other entity (unknown)	37
Associate (unknown)	11
Sub-total – private or semi-private	611
Total Membership (excluding member-states)	646

Source: (ITU 2013) accessed 18 December 2013

INTERPOL Partners

The International Criminal Police Organization does not list publicly all its partners. During interviews it was apparent some private partners prefer not to have their association with the organization publicized. For reasons that are entirely understandable, no information on the partners involved in Project S-Print (see chapters four and seven) is readily available. Such information could adversely impact on the effectiveness of the project. In addition, partner organizations include those associated with entities such as the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT), where the law enforcement activities of the Taskforce heavily involve INTERPOL's cooperation with private actors, but do not necessarily formally reflect a direct partnership other than through IMPACT.

At the beginning of this research, information about INTERPOL's global public-private partnerships was found in annual reports, web-pages and press releases. By the time fieldwork was undertaken in mid-2011, a surprising number of changes had occurred and detailed information about the partnerships flowed from interviewees. Now the project is closing, a plethora of macro-data is now available about INTERPOL partnerships. Details are not always available due to security reasons (e.g. the partners of Project S-Print are not named). Compiled in December 2013, the table below shows how much data is now available. The table include the agreements the organization has entered with international organizations. Although these agreements represent a heavy slant toward public, rather than private organizations, later partnerships listed in various pages on the organization's website shows the changing profile.

Partner Type	Total
Public sphere partners	
International government organisations	57
Public academic institution	1
Government	9
Public organization	18
Sub-total - Public	85
Private sphere partners	
For-profit organisation	40
International non-government organisation	44
Philanthropic organisation	5
Non-government organisation	2
Public-private partnership	1
Individual	2
Sub-total - Private	94
Total	179

Source: compiled from various INTERPOL webpages accessed on 19 December 2013.

ICCROM Partners

Between 1969 and 2011, the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property worked with over 560 partners and Associate Members. Data in the table below aggregates a complete list of ICCROM partners compiled from ICCROM Annual Reports, Minutes of Council, Newsletters, Reports to Council, General Assembly records and the publications of Daifuku (1969) and Jokilehto (2011). The partners have a five year association with the organization on average, ranging from a single collaboration to multi-decade partnerships.

Partner Type	Total
Public sphere partners	
Council members (not otherwise listed)	1
International government organisation	41
Public academic institution	73
Government backed association	7
Public organization (Museums, libraries, archives, galleries etc. including state backed corporations)	267
Sub-total public	388
Private sphere partners	
Council members (not otherwise listed)	1
For-profit organisation	8
Private association of non-profit organisations	9
Private academic institution	68
International non-government organisation	20
Philanthropic organisation	35
Non-government organisation	12
Non-profit organisation	20
Public-private partnership	1
Individual	0
Sub-total private	173
Total	563

Source: ICCROM Annual Reports, Minutes of Council, Newsletters, Reports to Council, General Assembly records, Daifuku (1969) and Jokilehto (2011).

The UN Bias in the Literature

A review of the broader literature on IGOs ensured that quantitative, multi-case and broad theoretical approaches were considered. This review incorporated literature on non-global IGOs, such as the European Union (EU), as key theoretical insights have been applied to these organizations. The second phase was directed toward literature on specific IGOs, where authors have completed in depth analysis of organizations. The final phase was a search of formal title of each IGO on the ISI Web of Science database. The search was limited to full articles where the IGO appears as the topic in political science, international relations and social science journals. The results were then winnowed with a scan of the titles and abstracts for relevance to key features of this research: public/private partnerships, governance issues, autonomy and accountability. The scan was supplemented by key word searches for auton*, private, partner* and account*¹. The resulting articles were then read and synthesised into a coherent overview for each IGO cluster.

A brief look at the results from the search of journal articles gives a clear indication of where the attention of political scientists, social scientists and international relations scholars is focused. Of the seventy-eight IGOs searched, only seven were the subject of more than 100 journal articles, whereas 39 IGOs had no relevant journal articles at all. Table A5-1 illustrates the focus is heavily on economic IGOs:

Table A5-1 – Number of Political/Social Science and IR Journal Articles on IGOs

IGO Type	IGO's with 100+ articles	No. of Articles	Total articles in class
1. Political	UN	668	707
2. Military / security	-	-	7
3. Economic	OECD	497	1240
	World Bank	288	
	WTO	235	
	IMF	122	
4. Social / Conservation / Environment	ICJ	134	213
5. Commodity based	OPEC	122	144
6. Scientific / Technical / Standards	-	-	62
7. Communications / Transport	-	-	11
Total		2056	2384

¹ * denotes that wild card searches were used to capture autonomy, autonomous, partners, partnership, partnering etc.

A subject search of the ANU library catalogue produced similar results, with 500+ entries for the UN, 176 for the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 144 each for the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and World Trade Organization (WTO); 121 for the World Bank; and fifty-three for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). These statistics pose an interesting question of the academy: Why is the bulk of research focused on economic IGOs? One could hypothesize it is because the big end of town is where the action is. Even if this is so, it does not necessarily follow that the theoretical work on large IGOs has universal applicability to smaller, but still global, organizations. A possible explanation comes from Fuchs – ‘In a globalizing world, money clearly is much more mobile than people’ (Fuchs 2007, 17). This account is still insufficient to explain the above. A better explanation may lie in the exercise of power. In a world where the democratic peace² is holding – economic power is the next most powerful regime after the military.

² Democratic peace is the premise that democratic nations do not go to war with each other.

Bibliography

- Abbott, K.W. and D. Snidal. 2000. 'Hard and Soft law in International Governance.' *International Organization* 54(3) Summer: 421-456.
- Abrahamsen, R. 2004. 'The Power of Partnerships in Global Governance.' *Third World Quarterly* 25(8): 1453-1467.
- ACHAP. 2010. *African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership - Homepage*. ACHAP. Accessed at (<http://www.achap.org>) on 29 Sep 2010.
- Acidini, C. 2012. *Opificio delle Pietre Dure - Firenze*. Opificio delle Pietre Dure Accessed at (http://www.opificio.arti.beniculturali.it/eng/cenni_storici/storia.htm) on 4 Dec 2012.
- Adam, T. 2004. 'Introduction.' In *Philanthropy, Patronage, and Civil Society: Experiences from Germany, Great Britain, and North America*, ed. T. Adam. 1-12.
- Adams, D. 1998. 'Examining the Fabric of Academic Life: An Analysis of three decades of Research on the Perceptions of Australian Academics about their Roles.' *Higher Education* 36(4) Dec: 421-435.
- AFP. 1993-94. INTERPOL 63rd General Assembly. Australian Federal Police; A1533, Correspondence Files, annual single number series, 1954-, Canberra.
- _____. 1997-98. INTERPOL 66th and 67th General Assembly. Australian Federal Police; A1533, Correspondence Files, annual single number series, 1954-, Canberra.
- Albanese, J.S. 2011. *Transnational Crime and the 21st Century: Criminal Enterprise, Corruption and Opportunity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Allport, A. 2009. *Gordon Brown*. New York: Chelsea House.
- Ambraseys, N. and R Bilham. 2011. 'Corruption Kills.' *Nature* 469: 153-155.
- Amerasinghe, C.F. 2005. *Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Anderson, M. 1989. *Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Police Cooperation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Anon. 1964a. 'Bank for International Settlements.' *International Organization* 18(3): 660-665.
- _____. 1964b. 'United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.' *International Organization* 18(3): 621-626.
- _____. 1964c. 'Universal Postal Union.' *International Organization* 18(3): 626-628.
- _____. 1984. 'Getty Museum Getting Richer.' *International Herald Tribune*. 7-8 January.
- _____. 1999. 'Great Expectations in 1999' ITU News. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union.
- _____. 2011. 'FIFA Corruption and Bribery Allegations: A Timeline.' *The Telegraph*. 30 May.

- AT&T. 2013. *AT&T Homepage - Search Results on "ITU"*. AT&T. Accessed at (<http://www.att.com/global-search/search.jsp?q=ITU&x=0&y=0#!/All/>) on 7 May 2013.
- Bailey, J.L. 2008. 'Arrested Development: The Fight to END Commercial Whaling as a Case of Failed Norm Change.' *European Journal of International Relations* 14(2) Jun: 289-318.
- Banerjee, S.B. 2007. *Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Barker, T. 2011. *Police Ethics: Crisis in Law Enforcement*. Springfield: Charles C Thomas Publisher Ltd.
- Barnett, M. and L. Coleman. 2005. 'Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations.' *International Studies Quarterly* 49(4) Dec: 593-619.
- Barnett, M.N. and M. Finnemore. 2004. *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- _____. 2006. 'The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organization.' In *Classic Reading and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, eds P. Williams, D.M. Goldstein and J.M. Shafritz. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 221-244.
- Bartelson, J. 2010. 'Beyond Democratic Legitimacy: Global Governance and the Promotion of Liberty.' In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*, eds J. Tallberg and C. Jönsson. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 218-236.
- Beck, J. and M. Daley. 1993. *Art Restoration: The Culture, the Business and the Scandal*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Beisheim, M. and C. Kaan. 2010. 'Trans-national Standard Setting Partnerships in the Field of Social Rights: The Interplay of Legitimacy, Institutional Design, and Process Management.' In *Democracy and Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance*, eds M. Bexell and U. Mörth. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 122-143.
- Bell, S. and A. Hindmoor. 2009. *Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of the State in Modern Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Benedict, R. 1946. *Patterns of Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Benedikter, R. 2004. 'Privatisation of Italian Cultural Heritage.' *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 10(4): 369-389.
- Berman, E.H. 1983. *The Ideology of Philanthropy: the Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Besenal, J.M. 2010a. 'All Together: Winning the Race, Saving Lives. (Video 1: Law Enforcement Professionals)'. Geneva: International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce, 2:38.
- _____. 2010b. 'All Together: Winning the Race, Saving Lives. (Video 2: Healthcare Professionals)'. Geneva: International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce, 2:38.
- Bevir, M. 2010. *Democratic Governance*. Princeton University Press: Princeton.

Bibliography

- Bevir, M. and R.A.W. Rhodes. 2003a. *Interpreting British Governance*. London: Routledge.
- _____. 2003b. 'Searching for Civil Society: Changing Patterns of Governance in Britain.' *Public Administration* 81(1): 41-62.
- Bevir, M., R.A.W. Rhodes, and P. Weller. 2003. 'Traditions of Governance: Interpreting the Changing Role of the Public Sector.' *Public Administration* 81(1): 1-17.
- Bexell, M. and U. Mörth. 2010a. 'Introduction: Partnerships, Democracy and Governance.' In *Democracy and Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance*, eds M. Bexell and U. Mörth. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 3-23.
- _____. (eds). 2010b. *Democracy and Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance*. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Bhagat, R.S. and R.M. Steers (eds). 2009. *Cambridge Handbook of Culture, Organizations and Work*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bikmoradi, A., M. Brommels, A. Shoghli, D.K. Zavareh, and I. Masiello. 2009. 'Organizational Culture, Values, and Routines in Iranian Medical Schools.' *Higher Education* 57(4) Apr: 417-427.
- Bleha, T. 2005. 'Down to the Wire.' *Foreign Affairs* 84(3) May-June: 111-124.
- Bloch, E. 1986. 'Organizational Culture and Individual Responsibility for Scientists and Engineers.' *Technology in Society* 8(4): 259-261.
- Bloor, G. and P. Dawson. 1994. 'Understanding Professional Culture in Organizational Context.' *Organization Studies* 15(2): 275-295.
- Bolling, L.R. and C. Smith. 1982. *Private Foreign Aid: U.S. Philanthropy for Relief and Development*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Bouchenaki, M. 2007a. 'Developing Partnerships: The Key to ICCROM's Future.' *ICCROM Newsletter* 33: 1.
- _____. 2007b. 'Introduction.' *International Forum on Privatization and Conservation of Cultural Heritage* Catania, (13-15 September 2007), 3.
- _____. 2009a. 'As We Move Forward: A Note from the Director-General.' *ICCROM Newsletter* 35: 7.
- _____. 2009b. 'Foreword.' In *Conserving the Authentic: Essays in Honour of Jukka Jokilehto*, eds N. Stanley-Price and J. King. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property, vi.
- Bouchenaki, M. and J. Jokilehto. 2009. 'From Rome Centre to ICCROM: Milestones on the Path of an International Centre.' *ICCROM Newsletter* 35: 1-6.
- Bovaird, T. 2004. 'Public-Private Partnerships: from Contested Concepts to Prevalent Practice.' *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 70(2) June 1, 2004: 199-215.
- Brack, D. 2002. 'Combatting International Environmental Crime.' *Global Environmental Change-Human and Policy Dimensions* 12(2) Jul: 143-147.
- Bresler, F. 1992. *Interpol*. London: Sinclair-Stevenson.
- Brooks, H., L. Liebman, and C.S. Schelling (eds). 1984. *Public-Private Partnership: New Opportunities for Meeting Social Needs*. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company.

- Bull, B., M. Bøås, and D. McNeill. 2004. 'Private Sector Influence in the Multilateral System: A Changing Structure of World Governance?' *Global Governance* 10(4) Oct-Dec: 481-498.
- Bull, B. and D. McNeill. 2007. *Development Issues in Global Governance: Public-Private Partnerships and Market Multilateralism*. Warwick Studies in Globalisation. Abingdon: Routledge.
- _____. 2010. 'From Business Unusual to Business as Usual: The Future Legitimacy of Public-Private Partnerships with Multilateral Organizations.' In *Democracy and Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance*, eds M. Bexell and U. Mörrth. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 103-120.
- Bull, H. 1977. *The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Order*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Buse, K. and S. Tanaka. 2011. 'Global Public-Private Health Partnerships: Lessons Learned from Ten Years of Experience and Evaluation.' *International Dental Journal* 61 Aug: 2-10.
- Buse, K. and G. Walt. 2000a. 'Global Public-Private Partnerships: Part I - A New Development in Health?' *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 78(4): 549-561.
- Buse, K. and G. Walt. 2000b. 'Global Public-Private Partnerships: Part II - What are the Health Issues for Global Governance?' *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 78(5): 699-709.
- Buse, K. and A. Waxman. 2001. 'Public-Private Health Partnerships: A Strategy for WHO.' *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 79(8): 748-754.
- Busuioac, M. 2010. *The Accountability of European Agencies: Legal Provisions and Ongoing Practices*. Delft: Eburon.
- Cannadine, D. 2006. *Mellon: An American Life*. London: Penguin Books.
- Carr, W. 1969. *A History of Germany 1815-1945*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Carr-Saunders, A.M. and P.A. Wilson. 1933. *The Professions*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Carroll, A.B. 1991. 'The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders.' *Business Horizons* July/August: 39-48.
- _____. 1999. 'Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct.' *Business & Society* 38(3): 268-295.
- Carroll, A.B. and K.M. Shabana. 2010. 'The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice.' *International Journal of Management Reviews* 12(1) Mar: 85-105.
- Casula Vifell, Å. 2010. 'WTO and the Environmental Movement: On the Path to Participatory Governance?' In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*, eds J. Tallberg and C. Jönsson. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 110-133.
- Cerf, V. 2012. *Keep the Internet Free and Open*. Google. Accessed at (<http://googleblog.blogspot.com.au/2012/12/keep-internet-free-and-open.html>) on 10 Jul 2013.

Bibliography

- Chan, J. 2009. 'Culture.' In *The Sage Dictionary of Policing*, eds A. Wakefield and J. Fleming. Los Angeles: Sage, 72-74.
- Chappell, A.T. and L. Lanza-Kaduce. 2010. 'Police Academy Socialization: Understanding the Lessons Learned in a Paramilitary-Bureaucratic Organization.' *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 39(2) Apr: 187-214.
- Cheah, A.S.B. 2002. 'Some Dimensions of Religious Giving.' In *A Giving Society?: The State of Philanthropy in Malaysia*, eds M.F. Josie and A.R. Ibrahim. Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia for the Philanthropy Initiative of Malaysia, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 43-74.
- Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (eds). 2002. *New Public Management: The Transformation of Ideas and Practice*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Clark, B.R. 1987. *The Academic Life: Small Worlds, Different Worlds*. Princeton: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Cliver, B.E. 2007. 'Tax Incentives for Privately Owned Historic Buildings: a Public/Private Partnership.' *International Forum on Privatization and Conservation of Cultural Heritage* Catania, (13-15 Sep 2007), 150-156.
- Cortell, A.P. and S. Peterson. 2006. 'Dutiful Agents, Rogue Actors, or Both? Staffing, Voting Rules, and Slack in the WHO and WTO.' In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, eds D.G. Hawkins, D.A. Lake, D.L. Nielson and M.J. Tierney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 255-280.
- Cox, R.W. 1969. 'The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization.' *International Organization* 23(2): 205-230.
- Cox, R.W. and H.K. Jacobson. 1974. 'The Framework for Inquiry.' In *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization*, eds R.W. Cox and H.K. Jacobson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1-36.
- Crank, J.P. 2003. 'Institutional theory of police: a review of the state of the art.' *Policing-an International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 26(2): 186-207.
- CSI. 2011. *Crime Stoppers International - Home*. Crime Stoppers International. Accessed at (<http://www.c-s-i.org/>) on 16 Jun 2011.
- Cukier, K.N. 2005. 'Who Will Control the Internet? Washington Battles the World.' *Foreign Affairs* 84(6): 7-13.
- Curnow, G.R. and C.A. Saunders (eds). 1983. *Quangos: The Australian Experience*. Marrickville: Hale & Iremonger.
- Curti, M.E. 1963. *American Philanthropy Abroad: A History*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Czempiel, E-O. 1989. 'Internationalizing Politics: Some Answers to the Question of Who Does What to Whom.' In *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges. Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*, eds E-O. Czempiel and J.N. Rosenau. Lexington: Lexington Books, 117-135.
- Daifuku, H. 1969. 'Historical: The Rome Centre - Ten Years After.' In *The First Decade 1959-1969*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.

- Daifuku, H. 1968. 'The Significance of Cultural Property.' In *The Conservation of Cultural Property: With Special Reference to Tropical Conditions*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations, 19-26.
- DAISY Consortium. 2013. *About Us*. The Daisy Consortium. Accessed at (http://www.daisy.org/about_us) on 2 May 2013.
- de Vries, J. 2010. 'Is New Public Management Really Dead?' *OECD Journal on Budgeting* (1): 1-5.
- Deflem, M. 2000. 'Bureaucratization and Social Control: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation.' *Law & Society Review* 34(3): 739-778.
- _____. 2002a. 'The Logic of Nazification: The Case of the International Criminal Police Commission ("Interpol").' *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43(1): 21-44.
- _____. 2002b. *Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 2002c. "'Wild Beasts Without Nationality": The uncertain origins of Interpol, 1898-1910.' In *The Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice*, ed. P. Reichel. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 275-285.
- Dennis, B.S., A.K. Buchholtz, and M.M. Butts. 2009. 'The Nature of Giving A Theory of Planned Behavior Examination of Corporate Philanthropy.' *Business & Society* 48(3) Sep: 360-384.
- Department of State. 1958. 'The 1st 10 Years of the World Health Organization.' *Department of State Bulletin* 38(990): 987-992.
- di Giorgio, D. and M. Gramazio (eds). 2011. *IMPACT: International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce: Facts | Activities | Documents Developed by the Assembly and the Working Groups 2006-2010*. Milan: IMPACT Secretariat.
- Dill, D.D. 1982. 'The Management of Academic Culture - Notes on the Management of Meaning and Social Integration.' *Higher Education* 11(3): 303-320.
- DiMaggio, P.J. and W.W. Powell. 1983. 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.' *American Sociological Review* 48(2): 147-160.
- Ditkoff, S.W. and S.J. Colby. 2009. 'Galvanizing Philanthropy.' *Harvard Business Review* 87(11) Nov: 108-134.
- Douglas, M. 1978. 'Cultural Bias' Occasional Paper No.35. London: Royal Anthropological Institute.
- _____. 1982. 'Introduction to Grid/Group Analysis.' In *Essays in the Sociology of Perception*, ed. M. Douglas. London: Routledge, 1-8.
- _____. 1986. *How Institutions Think*. The Frank W. Abrams Lectures, Volume 5. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Dressler, O. 1924. 'Subscription Invitation.' *International Public Safety: Official Journal of the International Criminal Police Commission* (1) Nov.
- _____. 1942. *Die Internationale Kriminalpolizeiliche Kommission und Ihr Werk*. Berlin-Wansee: Internationalen Kriminalpolizeilichen Kommission.

Bibliography

- Dunleavy, P., H. Margetts, S. Bastow, and J. Tinkler. 2006. 'New Public Management Is Dead – Long Live Digital-Era Governance.' *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 16(3) Jul: 467-494.
- Edsel, R.M. and B. Winter. 2009. *The Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi Thieves and the Greatest Treasure Hunt in History*. New York: Center Street.
- EPA. 2011. *Ecole du Patrimoine Africain; At the Service of Development*. Ecole du Patrimoine Africain. Accessed at (http://www.iccrom.org/eng/news_en/2011_en/various_en/10_12_EPAbrochure_en.pdf) on 1 Nov 2011.
- Erman, E. 2010. 'Why Adding Democratic Values is Not Enough for Global Democracy.' In *Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-examining the Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors*, ed. E. Erman. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 173-193.
- Erman, E. and A. Uhlin (eds). 2010. *Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-examining the Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Farley, L.T. 1981. *Change Processes in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company.
- Felson, M. and R.V. Clarke. 1998. 'Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention'. London: Home Office.
- Fielding, N. 1988. 'Competence and Culture in Police.' *Sociology-the Journal of the British Sociological Association* 22(1) Feb: 45-64.
- Finkelstein, L.S. 1995. 'What is Global Governance?' *Global Governance* 1(3): 367-372.
- Florman, S.C. 1987. *The Civilized Engineer*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Forman, S. and D. Segaar. 2006. 'New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism.' *Global Governance* 12(2) Apr-Jun: 205-225.
- Forrest, A.J. 1955. *Interpol*. London: Allan Wingate.
- Fosler, R.S. and R.A. Berger (eds). 1982. *Public-Private Partnership in American Cities: Seven Case Studies*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Forsyth, P.B. and T.J. Danisiewicz. 1985 'Toward a Theory of Professionalization.' *Work and Occupations* 12(59).
- Fратиanni, M. 2006. 'Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930-1973.' *Journal of Economic History* 66(1) Mar: 268-270.
- Frederick, W.C. 2006. *Corporation, Be Good! The Story of Corporate Social Responsibility*. Indianapolis: Dog Ear Publishing.
- Friedman, M. 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. 13 Sep.
- Friedman, T. 2000. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. London: Harper Collins.
- Frumkin, P. 2003. 'Inside Venture Philanthropy.' *Society* 40(4) May-Jun: 7-15.
- Fuchs, D. 2007. *Business Power in Global Governance*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Gambetta, D. and S. Hertog. 2009. 'Why are there so many Engineers among Islamic Radicals.' *European Journal of Sociology* 50(2): 201-230.

- Garrison, O.G. 1977. *The Secret World of Interpol*. Glasgow: William MacLellan.
- Geertz, C. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books.
- George, A.L. and A. Bennett. 2004. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- George, J. 1994. *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) Introduction to International Relations* Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers.
- Gerring, J. 2007. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
- Gibson, C.B., M.L. Maznevski, and B.L. Kirkman. 2009. 'When Does Culture Matter?' In *Cambridge Handbook of Culture, Organizations and Work*, eds R.S. Bhagat and R.M. Steers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 46-68.
- Glomseth, R., P. Gottschalk, and H. Solli-Saether. 2007. 'Occupational Culture as Determinant of Knowledge Sharing and Performance in Police Investigations.' *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 35(2) Jun: 96-107.
- Goldstein, K. 2002. 'Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews.' *PS-Political Science & Politics* 35(4) Dec: 669-672.
- Google. 2012. *Take Action*. Google. Accessed at (<http://www.google.com/intl/en/takeaction/>) on 10 Jul 2013.
- Graycar, A. and M. Felson. 2010. 'Situational Prevention of Organised Timber Theft and Related Corruption.' In *Situational Prevention of Organised Crimes*, eds K. Bullock, R.V. Clarke and N. Tilley. Cullompton: Willan.
- Green, J.F. 2010. 'Private Authority on the Rise: A Century of Delegation in Multilateral Environmental Agreements.' In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*, eds J. Tallberg and C. Jönsson. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 155-176.
- Gregoratti, C. 2010. 'UNDP, Business Partnerships and the (UN)Democratic Governance of Development.' In *Democracy and Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance*, eds M. Bexell and U. Mörth. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 190-210.
- Grigorescu, A. 2003. 'International Organizations and Government Transparency: Linking the International and Domestic Realms.' *International Studies Quarterly* 47: 643-667.
- _____. 2007. 'Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations: The Roles of Member States, International Bureaucracies and Nongovernmental Organizations.' *International Studies Quarterly* 51(3) Sep: 625-648.
- _____. 2008. 'Horizontal Accountability in Intergovernmental Organizations.' *Ethics and International Affairs* 22(3) Fall: 285-308.
- _____. 2010. 'The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms across Intergovernmental Organizations.' *International Studies Quarterly* 54: 871-886.
- Grills, N. 2009. 'The Paradox of Multilateral Organizations Engaging with Faith-Based Organizations.' *Global Governance* 15(4) Oct-Dec: 505-520.
- Guruge, A.W.P. and G.D. Bond. 1998. 'Generosity and Service in Therevāda Buddhism' In *Philanthropy in the World's Traditions*, eds W.F. Ilchman, S.N. Katz and E.L.Q. II. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 79-96.

Bibliography

- Hacker, S.L. 1981. 'The Culture of Engineering: Woman, Workplace and Machine.' *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 4: 341-353.
- Hale, T. 2011. 'United Nations Global Compact.' In *Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions and Innovations*, eds T. Hale and D. Held. Cambridge: Polity Press, 350-356.
- Hall, C., C. Scott, and C. Hood. 2000. *Telecommunications Regulation: Culture, Chaos, and Interdependence Inside the Regulatory Process*. London: Routledge.
- Hanney, S. 1995. 'Enhancing Quality in the Police Service: Leicestershire Constabulary.' In *Quality Improvement in European Public Services: Concepts, Cases and Commentary*, eds C. Pollitt and G. Bouckaert. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 121-128.
- Haslam, A., S. Reicher, and M. Platow. 2011. *The New Psychology of Leadership : Identity, Influence, and Power*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Hatch, M.J. 1993. 'The Dynamics of Organizational Culture.' *Academy of Management Review* 18(4): 657-693.
- _____. 2010. 'Culture Stanford's Way.' In *Stanford's Organization Theory Renaissance, 1970-2000*, eds F. Dobbin and C.B. Schoonhoven. Bingley: Emerald Group, 71-96.
- Hawkins, D.G., D.A. Lake, D.L. Nielson, and M.J. Tierney (eds). 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hayek, F. 1952. *The Counter-Revolution of Science*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Hayllar, M.R. and R. Wettenhall. 2010. 'Public-Private Partnerships: Promises, Politics and Pitfalls.' *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 69: 1-7.
- Heclo, H. and A. Wildavsky. 1974. *The Private Government of Public Money: Community and Policy inside British Politics*. London: Macmillan.
- Helgesson, K.S. 2010. 'Partnership Boundary Blurring, and Accountable Actorhood.' In *Democracy and Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance*, eds M. Bexell and U. Mörth. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 24-40.
- Hendriks, C.M. 2007. 'Praxis Stories: Experiencing Interpretive Policy Research.' *Critical Policy Analysis* 1(3): 278-300.
- Hodge, G. and C. Greve. 2010. 'Public-Private Partnerships: Governance Scheme or Language Game?' *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 69: 8-22.
- Hofstede, G., B. Neuijen, D.D. Ohayv, and G. Sanders. 1990. 'Measuring Organizational Cultures: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study Across Twenty Cases.' *Administrative Science Quarterly* 35(2): 286-316.
- Hofstede, G.H. 1997. *Cultures and Organizations : Software of the Mind*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- _____. 2001. *Cultural Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations - Second Edition*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Hood, C. 1991. 'A Public Management for All Seasons?' *Public Administration* 69(1): 3-19.
- _____. 1995. 'Contemporary Public Management: A New Global Paradigm?' *Public Policy and Administration* 10(2) Summer: 104-117.

- Hughes, O.E. 2012. *Public Management and Administration: An Introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Huurdeman, A.A. 2003. *The Worldwide History of Telecommunications*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
- I.2 Anon. 2011. 'Interview with unnamed official - Apr-Jul'.
- I.3 Anon. 2011. 'Interview with unnamed official - Apr-Jul'.
- I.6 INTERPOL Official. 2011. 'Interview with unnamed INTERPOL Official - Jun'.
- I.7 INTERPOL Official. 2011. 'Interview with unnamed INTERPOL Official - Jun'.
- I.10 Johnson, M. 2011. 'Interview with the Director Telecommunication Standardization Bureau - ITU - 20 May'.
- I.11 Environmental Crime Manager. 2011. 'Interview with the Environmental Crime Programme Manager INTERPOL - Jun'.
- I.14 Assistant Director CSDB. 2011. 'Interview with the Assistant Director, Counterfeit and Secure Documents Branch, INTERPOL - Jun'.
- I.15 Anon. 2011. 'Interview with unnamed official - Apr-Jul'.
- I.16 Anon. 2011. 'Interview with unnamed official - Apr-Jul'.
- I.17 Antomarchi, C. 2011. 'Interview with the Director Collections Unit, ICCROM, Jul 20'.
- I.19 Bouchenaki, M. 2011. 'Interview with the Director General ICCROM, Jul 19'.
- I.20 Fingerprints Coordinator. 2011. 'Interview with the Fingerprints Coordinator, INTERPOL - Jun'.
- I.25 de Güichen, G. 2011. 'Interview with a retired Assistant Director, ICCROM - Jul 22'.
- I.27 King, J. 2011. 'Interview with the Director, Sites Unit, ICCROM - Jul 20'.
- I.28 INTERPOL Official. 2011. 'Interview with unnamed INTERPOL Official - Jun'.
- IAEA. 2010. *About IAEA*. International Atomic Energy Agency. Accessed at (<http://www.iaea.org/>) on 20 May 2010.
- ICCROM. 1958-86. *Rockefeller Foundation*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1969. *The First Decade 1959-1969*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1973. *ICCROM Newsletter 1*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1978-1993. *J Paul Getty Museum*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1983-98. *The Getty Institution*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1986. *General Assembly: 14th Session: Rome 5-7 May 1986: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property Financial Statement at 31 December 1985*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.

Bibliography

- _____. 1986-1994a. *PREMA - Australia, Belgium, Canada*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1986-1994b. *PREMA - Ford and Skaggs*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1988. *General Assembly: 15th Session: Rome 9-11 May 1988: Minutes*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1991. *General Assembly: 16th Session: Rome 7-9 May 1990: Minutes*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1992. *General Assembly: 17th Session: Rome 7-9 May 1992: Report of the Council Activities 1991*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1993a. *General Assembly: 18th Session: Rome 20-22 October 1993: Minutes*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1993b. *General Assembly: 18th Session: Rome 20-22 October 1993: Report of the Council Activities 1992*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1993c. *General Assembly: 18th Session: Rome 20-22 October 1993: Report of the Council Activities January-June 1993*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1994. *ICCROM Newsletter 20 English Edition*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1995a. *General Assembly: 19th Session: Rome 29 November - 1 December 1995: Report of the Council Activities July 1993 - June 1994*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1995b. *General Assembly: 19th Session: Rome 29 November - 1 December 1995: Report of the Council Activities July 1994 - June 1995*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1997a. *General Assembly: 20th Session: Rome 10-12 December 1997: Minutes*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1997b. *General Assembly: 20th Session: Rome 10-12 December 1997: Report of the Council Activities July 1995 - December 1996*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1997c. *ICCROM Newsletter 23 English Edition*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1998a. *ICCROM Newsletter 24 English Edition*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property.

- _____. 1998b. *PREMA Workshops 1998 - Partnership and Fundaising Nairobi, Kenya - 30 November - 11 December*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 1999. *General Assembly: 21st Session: Rome 5-7 April 2000: Minutes*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2000. *ICCROM Newsletter 26 English Edition*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2001. *ICCROM Newsletter 27 English Edition*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2003a. *General Assembly: 23rd Session: Rome 19-21 November 2003: Minutes*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2003b. *General Assembly: 23rd Session: Rome 19-21 November 2003: Report on Implementation of the Approved Programme for the Biennium 2002-2003 (to October 30, 2003)*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2005. *ICCROM Statutes: as revised by the XXIV session of the General Assembly, on 11 November 2005*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2007a. *Approved Programme and Budget: 2008-2009 Biennium*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2007b. *International Forum on Privatization and Conservation of Cultural Heritage, 13-15 September 2007, Catania*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2008. *ICCROM Newsletter 34 English Edition*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2009. *Programme and Budget: 2010-2011 Biennium: Draft*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2010a. *ICCROM - Homepage*. International Centre for the Study of the Conservation and Restoration of Cultural Heritage. Accessed at (<http://www.iccrom.org/>) on 31 May 2010.
- _____. 2010b. *ICCROM - What is ICCROM?* International Centre for the Study of the Conservation and Restoration of Cultural Heritage. Accessed at (http://www.iccrom.org/eng/00about_en/00_00whats_en.shtml/eng/00about_en/00_00whats_en.shtml) on 4 Jun 2010.
- _____. 2010c. *ICCROM Annual Report / Newsletter 36 English Edition*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2010d. *Strategic Directions 2010-2011*. International Centre for the Study of the Conservation and Restoration of Cultural Heritage. Accessed at (http://www.iccrom.org/eng/00about_en/00_02strategic_en.shtml) on 28 Mar 2013.

Bibliography

- _____. 2011a. *ICCROM Annual Report / Newsletter 37 English Edition*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Conservation of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2011b. *Programme and Budget: 2012-2013 Biennium: Draft*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- _____. 2012. *ICCROM Directors*. International Centre for the Study of the Conservation and Restoration of Cultural Heritage. Accessed at (http://www.iccrom.org/eng/00about_en/00_03history_en/directors_en.shtml) on 5 Dec 2012.
- ICMM [International Committee of Military Medicine]. 2010. *Homepage - International Committee of Military Medicine*. Accessed at (<http://www.cimm-icmm.org/>) on 21 May 2010.
- ICOM. 1984. *The Conservator-Restorer - Definition of a Profession*. International Council of Museums - Committee for Conservation. Accessed at (<http://www.icom-cc.org/47/about-icom-cc/definition-of-profession/#.UeZHwoJac3n>) on 17 Jul 2013.
- ICPC. 1923. 'Resolutions.' *International Police Congress Vienna, (3-7 Sep)*.
- ICSC. 2013. *Common System Members*. International Civil Service Commission. Accessed at (<http://icsc.un.org/about/members.asp>) on 16 Oct 2013.
- Idowu, S.O. and W.L. Filho (eds). 2009. *Global Practices of Corporate Social Responsibility*. London: Springer.
- IIPCIC. 2011. *International IP Crime Investigators College - Frequently Asked Questions*. Accessed at (<http://www.iipic.org/FAQ.html>) on 28 June 2011.
- Ilchman, W.F., S.N. Katz, and E.L.Q. II (eds). 1998. *Philanthropy in the world's traditions*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- INTERPOL. 1956. *Constitution & General Regulations as amended to 2008*. ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/constitution/constitutionGenReg/constitution.asp#>) on 9 Sep 2010.
- _____. 1987. 'Resolution No.4 - Second-Hand Intaglio Printing Presses.' &th *International Counterfeit Currency Conference Lyon, (22-26 Jun)*.
- _____. 1994. 'AGN/63/RAP. No.17 - Product Counterfeiting and Piracy: Report submitted by the General Secretariat.' *General Assembly - 63rd Session Rome, (28 Sep-4 Oct)*.
- _____. 1997a. 'AGN/66/COM/FIN - Financial Committee Report to the 66th General Assembly Session.' *General Assembly - 66th Session New Delhi, (15-21 Oct)*.
- _____. 1997b. 'AGN/67/RES/11 - Techniques and Procedures for Manufacturing Banknotes and other Security Documents.' *General Assembly - 67th Session Cairo, (22-27 October 1998)*.
- _____. 1997c. *Disaster Victim Identification Guide*. Lyon: International Criminal Police Organization: Interpol.
- _____. 1998a. 'AGN/67/PV/4 - 4th Plenary Session.' *General Assembly - 67th Session Cairo, (22-28 Oct)*.

- _____. 1998b. 'AGN/67/RES/5 - Establishment of a Special Allocations Fund to receive donations from foundations.' *General Assembly - 67th Session* Cairo, (22nd-28th October 1998).
- _____. 1999. 'Interpol Annual Activity Report 1998'. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2000a. 'AGN/69/RES/6 - Intellectual Property Rights.' *General Assembly - 69th Session* Rhodes, (30 Oct - 4 Nov).
- _____. 2000b. 'Interpol Annual Activity Report 1999'. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2000c. *New Leaders for INTERPOL*. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2000/PR010>) on 18 Jun 2013.
- _____. 2001. *Interpol Handbook on DNA Data Exchange and Practice: Recommendations from the Interpol DNA Monitoring Expert Group*. Lyon: International Criminal Police Organization: Interpol.
- _____. 2002. 'Interpol At Work 2001'. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2003. 'Interpol At Work: General Secretariat 2002 Activity Report'. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2004. *INTERPOL Launches Police Training Programme on Bio-Terrorism – Major Grant from Sloan Foundation to Fund Global Initiative*. ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.com/Public/ICPO/PressReleases/PR2004/PR200425.asp>) on 26 Jul 2004.
- _____. 2007. 'Interpol Annual Report 2006'. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2008. 'Interpol Annual Report 2007'. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2009a. 'Interpol Annual Report 2008'. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2009b. *Vade Mecum*. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2010a. 'AG-2010-RAP-09 - Cooperation Agreement Between the International Criminal Police Organization and Crime Stoppers International.' *General Assembly 79th Session* Doha, Qatar, (8-11 Nov).
- _____. 2010b. 'Interpol Annual Report 2009'. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2010c. *INTERPOL Initiative with Microsoft Aims to Raise Global Standards against Cybercrime through Strategic Partnership with IT Sector*. ICPO - Interpol. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/public/ICPO/PressReleases/PR2009/PR200937.asp>) on 8 Sep 2010.
- _____. 2011a. *African Artists give Voice to Global Fight against Fake Medicines in INTERPOL-Supported Campaign*. International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/en/Internet/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2011/PR086>) on 9 Jul 2013.

Bibliography

- _____. 2011b. *Arrest of FBI Most Wanted and INTERPOL Target Praised by World Police Body*. International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2011/PR053>) on 2 Dec 2012.
- _____. 2011c. *Environmental Crime - Partners and Acknowledgements*. ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/Public/EnvironmentalCrime/Partners.asp>) on 1 Jun 2011.
- _____. 2011d. *FIFA Makes Historic Contribution to INTERPOL in Long-Term Fight Against Match-Fixing*. International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2011/PR035>) on 23 Aug 2013.
- _____. 2011e. *Homepage*. ICPO - Interpol. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/default.asp>) on 25 May 2011.
- _____. 2011f. 'Interpol Annual Report 2010'. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2011g. *Payment Cards*. ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/Recruitment/seconded.asp>) on 31 May 2011.
- _____. 2011h. *Project S-Print*. ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/CounterfeitCurrency/ProjectS-Print/Default.asp>) on 31 May 2011.
- _____. 2011i. *Notices*. ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/Public/Notices/default.asp>) on 16 Jun 2011.
- _____. 2012a. *Fugitive Investigations - War Crimes*. ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Fugitive-investigations/War-crimes/Links>) on 13 Oct 2012.
- _____. 2012b. 'Interpol Annual Report 2011'. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General.
- _____. 2013a. *Fakes Worth Millions Seized in INTERPOL-Led Operation across Americas*. ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/news-and-media/News-media-release/2012/PR037>) on 8 Jul 2013.
- _____. 2013b. *International Operation Targets Online Sale of Illicit Medicines*. ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2013/PR077>) on 27 Sep 2013.
- _____. 2013c. *INTERPOL and Morpho sign Strategic Biometric Partnership*. ICPO-Interpol Secretariat General. Accessed at (<http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2013/PR083>) on 27 Sep 2013.
- IOM. 2012. *Financial report for the year ended 31 December 2011*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- IRENA. 2013. *Creation of IRENA*. International Renewable Energy Agency. Accessed at (<http://www.irena.org/menu/index.aspx?mnu=cat&PriMenuID=13&CatID=30>) on 18 Apr 2013.
- ITU. 1865. 'Documents diplomatiques.' *Conférence télégraphique internationale* Paris.

- _____. 1868. 'Documents.' *Conférence télégraphique internationale* Vienna.
- _____. 1871. 'Documents.' *Conférence télégraphique internationale* Rome.
- _____. 1875. 'Documents.' *Conférence télégraphique internationale* St. Petersburg, (20 May - 7 Jul).
- _____. 1890. 'Documents.' *Conférence télégraphique Internationale* Paris, (16 May - 21 Jun).
- _____. 1903. 'Documents.' *Conférence Télégraphique Internationale* London, (26 May - 10 Jul).
- _____. 1929. *International Radiotelegraph Convention of Washington, 1927*. London: H.M. Stationery Office.
- _____. 1930. 'Documents.' *La Première Réunion du Comité Consultatif International Technique des Communications Radioélectriques (Septembre/Octobre 1929)* The Hague, (Sep / Oct 1929).
- _____. 1933. *International Telecommunication Convention - Madrid 1932*. London: H.M. Stationery Office.
- _____. 1947. *International Telecommunication Convention Atlantic City, 1947: Final Protocol to the Convention, Additional Protocols to the Convention, Resolutions, Recommendations and Opinions*. Berne: Bureau of the International Telecommunication Union.
- _____. 1948-2009a. *Financial Operating Report for the International Telecommunication Union*. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union.
- _____. 1948-2009b. *Report on the Activities of the International Telecommunication Union*. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union.
- _____. 1988. 'Documents.' *International Telecommunication Union - 1988 World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference* Melbourne, (November-December).
- _____. 1990. *Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Nice 1989 - Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Optional Protocol, Decisions, Resolutions, Recommendations and Opinions*. Geneva: General Secretariat of the International Telecommunication Union.
- _____. 1992. 'Documents.' *International Telecommunication Union Additional Plenipotentiary Conference* Geneva, (7-23 Dec).
- _____. 1993. *Final Acts of the Additional Plenipotentiary Conference (Geneva 1992) - Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Optional Protocol, Resolutions, Recommendations*. Geneva: General Secretariat of the International Telecommunication Union.
- _____. 1999. *Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference (Minneapolis, 1998): Instrument Amending the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (Geneva 1992); As amended by the Plenipotentiary Conference (Kyoto, 1994): Rules of Procedure, Decisions, Resolutions*. Geneva: General Secretariat of the International Telecommunication Union.
- _____. 2006. 'Documents.' *International Telecommunication Union - 2006 Plenipotentiary Conference* Antalya, (6 Nov).
- _____. 2007. 'Documents.' *International Telecommunication Union - 2007 World Radiocommunication Conference* Geneva, (23 Nov).

Bibliography

- _____. 2008. *Draft Recommendation ITU-T Y.2235 (Y.cwbs) Converged Web-Browsing Service Scenarios in NGN*. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union.
- _____. 2010a. 'Documents.' *International Telecommunication Union Plenipotentiary Conference* Guadalajara, (4-22 October 2010).
- _____. 2010b. 'Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference.' *International Telecommunication Union Plenipotentiary Conference* Guadalajara, (4-22 October 2010).
- _____. 2010c. *International Telecommunication Union*. International Telecommunication Union. Accessed at (<http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- _____. 2010d. *International Telecommunication Union History Portal*. International Telecommunication Union. Accessed at (<http://www.itu.int/en/history/Pages/default.aspx>) on 4 Feb 2010.
- _____. 2011. *Collection of the Basic Texts of the International Telecommunication Union Adopted by the Plenipotentiary Conference*. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union.
- _____. 2012a. 'Documents.' *World Conference on International Telecommunications* Dubai, (3-14 Dec).
- _____. 2012b. 'Final Acts.' *World Conference on International Telecommunications* Dubai, (3-14 Dec).
- _____. 2012c. *Report by the Secretary General, Financial Operating Report for the Financial Year 2011*. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union.
- _____. 2013. *ITU Global Directory*. International Telecommunication Union. Accessed at (http://www.itu.int/online/mm/scripts/mm.list?_search=UNIV&_languageid=1) on 30 Apr, 1 Jul and 18 December 2013.
- Ivanova, M. 2010. 'UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, Location.' *Global Environmental Politics* 10(1) Feb: 30-59.
- Jabour, J. and M. Iliff. 2009. 'Theatre sports in the Southern Ocean: engagement options for Australia in whale research protest action.' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 63(2): 268-289.
- Jackson, J.H. 2008. 'The Case of the World Trade Organization.' *International Affairs* 84(3) May: 437-454.
- Jacobson, H.K. 1974. 'ITU: A Potpourri of Bureaucrats and Industrialists.' In *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization*, eds R.W. Cox and H.K. Jacobson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 59-101.
- Jacobson, P. 2009. 'Forging Ahead: The Rise of the Dodgy Euro.' *Sunday Times*. 30 August.
- Jiang, X.L., R. Di Napoli, M. Borg, R. Maunder, H. Fry, and E. Walsh. 2010. 'Becoming and Being an Academic: The Perspectives of Chinese Staff in Two Research-Intensive UK Universities.' *Studies in Higher Education* 35(2): 155-170.
- Johnson, M. 2011. *Situation concerning Recommendations under the Alternative Approval Process (AAP)*. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union.

- Jokilehto, J. 2011. *ICCROM and the Conservation of Cultural Heritage: A History of the Organization's First 50 Years, 1959-2009*. ICCROM Conservation Studies, Volume 11. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- Jönsson, C. 2010. 'Coordinating Actors in the Fight against HIV/AIDS: From "Lead Agency" to Public-Private Partnerships.' In *Democracy and Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance*, eds M. Bexell and U. Mörth. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 167-188.
- Jönsson, C. and J. Tallberg (eds). 2010. *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Josie, M.F. and A.R. Ibrahim (eds). 2002. *A Giving Society?: The State of Philanthropy in Malaysia*. Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia for the Philanthropy Initiative of Malaysia, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia.
- Kagan, J. 2009. *The Three Cultures: Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and the Humanities in the 21st Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kapoor, I. 2004. 'Deliberative Democracy and the WTO.' *Review of International Political Economy* 11(3) Aug: 522-541.
- Karliner, J., A. Srivastava, and K. Bruno. 1999. 'United Nations Development Program Solicits Funds from Corporations.' *International Journal of Health Services* 29(4): 813-819.
- Karns, M.P. and K.A. Mingst. 2004. *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Kaul, I. 2006. 'Exploring the Policy Space Between Markets and States: Global Public-Private Partnerships.' In *The New Public Finance: Responding to Global Challenges*, eds I. Kaul and P. Conceição. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 217-268.
- Kaul, I. and P. Conceição (eds). 2006. *The New Public Finance: Responding to Global Challenges*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keck, C.K. 1964. 'History and Philosophy of Conservation.' *Bulletin of the American Group. International Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works* 5(1) Oct: 1-3.
- _____. 1978. 'The Position of the Conservator in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century.' *Journal of the American Institute for Conservation* 18(1): 3-7.
- Kelso, P. 2012. 'FIFA Head of Security Set to Resign Dealing a Blow to Governing Body's Attempt to Stamp Out Match-Fixing in Football.' *The Telegraph*. 16 Feb.
- Kemp, I. 2011. 'Top 500 Telecom Brand Rankings.' *Total Telecom: Business Analysis for Telecoms Professionals*: 6-10.
- Kendall, R. 1995. 'International Police Cooperation: The Role of the ICPO-INTERPOL.' *Frank Dawtry Memorial Lecture Centre for Criminal Justice Studies*, Leeds University.
- Keohane, R.O. 1989. *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Keohane, R.O. and J.S. Nye. 1974. 'Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations.' *World Politics* 27(1) Oct: 39-62.

Bibliography

- _____. 1977. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little Brown.
- _____. 1989. *Power and Interdependence*. Glenview: Scott, Foresman.
- Kiely, J.A. and G.S. Peek. 2002. 'The Culture of the British Police: Views of Police Officers.' *Service Industries Journal* 22(1) Jan: 167-183.
- Kille, K.J. and R.M. Scully. 2003. 'Executive Heads and the Role of Intergovernmental Organizations: Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and the European Union.' *Political Psychology* 24(1) Mar: 175-198.
- Kirkman Gray, B. 1908. *Philanthropy and the State or Social Politics*. Westminster: PS King & Son.
- Kvale, S. 2007. *Doing Interviews*. The Sage Qualitative Research Kit, Volume 2. London: Sage.
- Laenen, M. 2000. 'Report of Out-going Director-General 1992-2000 Marc Laenen.' *ICCROM Newsletter English Edition* 26 Oct.
- Lagemann, E.C. 1989. *The Politics of Knowledge: the Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
- Lambert, S. and C. Rockwell (eds). 2012. *Protecting Cultural Heritage in Times of Conflict: Contributions from the Participants of the International Course on First Aid to Cultural Heritage in Times of Conflict*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- Larson, S.M. 1977. *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Lee, K., D. Humphreys, and M. Pugh. 1997. "'Privatisation" in the United Nations System: Patterns of Influence in Three Intergovernmental Organisations.' *Global Society* 11(3): 339-357.
- Leiner, B.M., V.G. Cerf, D.D. Clark, R.E. Kahn, L. Kleirock, D.C. Lynch, J. Postel, L.G. Roberts, and S. Wolff. 2009. 'A Brief History of the Internet.' *Computer Communications Review* 39(5) Oct: 22-31.
- Lemoine, J. 1995. *The International Civil Servant: An Endangered Species*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Leonardi, P.M. 2003. *The Mythos of Engineering Culture: A Study of Communicative Performance and Interaction*. Master of Arts, University of Colorado.
- Liese, A. 2010. 'Explaining Varying Degrees of Openness in the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO).' In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*, eds J. Tallberg and C. Jönsson. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 88-109.
- Lin, A. 2009. 'Local Interpretation of Global Management Discourses in Higher Education in Hong Kong: Potential Impact on Academic Culture.' *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 10(2): 260-274.
- Lloyd George, R. 2005. *David & Winston: How a Friendship Changed History*. London: John Murray.
- Lynch, C., W. Branigin, and J. Greenberg 2011. 'UNESCO Votes to Admit Palestine; U.S. Cuts Off Funding.' *Washington Post*. 1 Nov.

- Madsen, E. 2002. 'WIPO/IPR/JU/MOW/02/06 - International Police Measures Designed to Prevent Infringement of IPRs.' *National Workshop on the Role of Customs, Police, Antimonopoly and Judiciary in Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights* Moscow, (6-7 February).
- Madsen, F.G. 2009. *Transnational Organized Crime*. Routledge Global Institutions, Volume 34. London: Routledge.
- Mansbach, R., Y.H. Fergusson, and D.E. Lampert. [1976] 2006. 'Towards a New Conception of Global Politics.' In *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*, eds P. Williams, D.M. Goldstein and J.M. Shafritz. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 209-221.
- Martha, R.S.J. 2010. *The Legal Foundations of Interpol*. Portland: Hart Publishing.
- Martin, L.L. 2006. 'Distribution, Information and Delegation to International Organizations: the Case of IMF Conditionality.' In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, eds D.G. Hawkins, D.A. Lake, D.L. Nielson and M.J. Tierney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 140-164.
- Martin, J. 1992. *Cultures in organizations: Three perspectives*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Martin, J. 2002. *Organizational culture: Mapping the Terrain*. Newberry Park: Sage.
- Martin, J., M. Feldman, M.J. Hatch, and S. Sitkin. 1983. 'The uniqueness paradox in organizational stories.' *Administrative Science Quarterly* 28: 438-453.
- Masters, A. 2009. *Interpol: An Australian Perspective*. Bachelor of Arts (honours) in International Relations, Australian National University.
- _____. 2011. 'INTERPOL: From Vienna to Canberra - The Evolution of Australia's Relationship with INTERPOL (1923-1975).' *Australian Police Journal* 65(2) June: 58-67.
- Mattli, W. and N. Woods (eds). 2009. *The Politics of Global Regulation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Meldal-Johnsen, T. and V. Young. 1979. *The Interpol Connection*. New York: The Dial Press.
- Metz, I. and C.T. Kulik. 2008. 'Making Public Organizations More Inclusive: A Case Study of the Victoria Police Force.' *Human Resource Management* 47(2) Sum: 369-387.
- Milner, H.V. 2006. 'Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems.' In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, eds D.G. Hawkins, D.A. Lake, D.L. Nielson and M.J. Tierney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 107-139.
- Monjardet, D. 1994. 'La culture professionnelle des policiers (Professional Culture in the Police Force).' *Revue française de sociologie* 35(3) Jul-Sep: 393-411.
- Moore, M.H. 1995. *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- _____. 2013. *Recognizing Public Value*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Moran, M. 2010. 'Private Foundations and Public-Private Partnerships: Philanthropy, Collaboration and Norm Diffusion in Global Governance.' *Australian Political Studies Association Conference* Melbourne.

Bibliography

- Morgenthau, H.J. 1967. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- MSF. 2011. *Time to Focus on Quality*. Geneva: Médecins sans Frontières - Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines.
- Müller, P.S. and M. Lederer. 2005. 'Introduction.' In *Criticizing Global Governance*, eds M. Lederer and P.S. Müller. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1-19.
- Murphy, E.J. 1976. *Creative Philanthropy: Carnegie Corporation and Africa, 1953-1973*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Nadarajah, M. 2002. 'Making Sense of Philanthropy.' In *A Giving Society?: The State of Philanthropy in Malaysia*, eds M.F. Josie and A.R. Ibrahim. Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia for the Philanthropy Initiative of Malaysia, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 21-42.
- Naím, M. 2005. *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Nanz, P. and J. Steffek. 2004. 'Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere.' *Government and Opposition* 39(2) Apr: 314-335.
- Näsström, S. 2010. 'Democracy Counts: Problems of Equality in Transnational Democracy.' In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*, eds J. Tallberg and C. Jönsson. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 197-217.
- Nelson, J. 1999. 'Ronald Noble; The New Man From Interpol Brings a '90s Touch to Global Crime Fighting.' *Los Angeles Times*. 12 Sep.
- Newton, J. 2011. 'Integrated Training and Operations: The Model for Successful Interventions into Transnational Organised IP Crime.' *Anti-Counterfeiting 2011 - A Global Guide*: 13-16.
- Newton, Paul N., Facundo M. Fernandez, Aline Palnçon, Dallas C. Mildenhall, Michael D. Green, Li Ziyong, Eva Maria Christophel, Souly Phanouvong, Stephen Howells, Eric McIntosh, Paul Laurin, Nancy Blum, Christina Y Hampton, Kevin Faure, Leonard Nyadong, C.W. Ray Soong, Budiano Santoso, Wang Zhiguang, John Newton, Kevin Palmer. 2008. 'A Collaborative Epidemiological Investigation into the Criminal Fake Artensuante Trade in South East Asia.' *PLoS Med* 5(2): e32.
- Noble, R.K. 2001. 'Speech.' *70th INTERPOL General Assembly Budapest*, (24-28 Sep).
- _____. 2011. 'Remarks by Ronald K. Noble, INTERPOL Secretary General.' *40th INTERPOL European Regional Conference Malta*, (11 May).
- Norris, P. 2011. *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- NTT. 2013. *NTT Homepage - Search for "ITU"*. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone. Accessed at (<http://nttcommunications.search.goo.ne.jp/search.php?from=ntt-c&PT=ntt-c&LANG=1&MT=ITU&web=%A0>) on 7 May 2013.
- Oliver, C. 1990. 'Determinants of Interorganizational Relationships: Integration and Future Directions.' *Academy of Management Review* 15(2): 241-265.
- Orange. 2012. *Cross Currents: Energy, Climate Warming and Telecommunications*. Orange. Accessed at (<http://www.orange.com/en/responsibility/towards-a>

- greener-world/Folder/cross-currents-energy-climate-warming-and-telecommunications) on 7 May 2013.
- Osborne, D. and T. Gaebler. 1992. *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Inc.
- Ott, J.S. 1989. *The Organizational Culture Perspective*. Chicago: Dorsey Press.
- Park, S. 2012. Something Old, Something New; Something Borrowed, Something Blue? Institutional Isomorphism and the Asian Development Bank's Accountability Mechanism. *School of Politics and International Relations Seminar Series*. Canberra: Australian National University. 15 May.
- _____. 2013. 'Institutional Isomorphism and the Asian Development Bank's Accountability Mechanism: Something Old, Something New; Something Borrowed, Something Blue?' *The Pacific Review* (forthcoming).
- Parsons, T. and G.M. Platt. 1968. *The American Academic Profession: A Pilot Study*: The National Science Foundation.
- _____. 1973. *The American University*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Pataro, M.S. 2007. 'Keynote II - Cooperation/Partnership in Cultural Heritage Management for Sustainable Development - Criteria and Perspectives.' *International Forum on Privatization and Conservation of Cultural Heritage Catania*, (13-15 September 2007), 29-37.
- Paun, C. 2013. *Globalization of Law Enforcement: A Study of Transnational Public-Private Partnerships Against Intellectual Property Crimes*. Doctor rerum politicarum, University of Bremen / Jacobs University.
- Peruzotti, E. 2010. 'Democratic Credentials or Bridging Mechanisms? Constituents, Representatives, and the Dual Politics of Democratic Representation.' In *Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-examining the Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors*, eds E. Erman and A. Uhlin. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 153-172.
- Peters, B.G. and J. Pierre. 2010. 'Public-Private Partnerships and the Democratic Deficit: Is Performance Based Legitimacy the Answer?' In *Democracy and Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance*, eds M. Bexell and U. Mörth. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 41-54.
- Pettigrew, A.M. 1979. 'On Studying Organizational Cultures.' *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24(4): 570-581.
- Pevehouse, J.C., T. Nordstrom and K. Warnke. 2004. 'The COW-2 International Organizations Dataset Version 2.0.' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21(2): 101-119.
- Pollitt, C. and G. Bouckaert (eds). 1995. *Quality Improvement in European Public Services: Concepts, Cases and Commentary*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- _____. 2000. *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ponzini, D. 2010. 'The Process of Privatisation of Cultural Heritage and the Arts in Italy: Analysis and Perspectives.' *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 16(6): 508-521.

Bibliography

- Prenzler, T. 1997. 'Is there a Police Culture?' *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 56(4) Dec: 47-56.
- _____. 2009. *Police Corruption: Preventing Misconduct and Maintaining Integrity*. Advances in Police Theory and Practices. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
- Reinalda, B. and B. Verbeek. 2011. 'Policy Autonomy of Intergovernmental Organizations: A Challenge to International Relations Theory?' In *International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the International Legal Order*, eds R. Collins and N.D. White. London: Routledge, 87-103.
- Rhodes, R.A.W. 1991. 'Introduction.' *Public Administration* 69(1): 1-2.
- _____. 1996. 'The New Governance: Governing Without Government.' *Political Studies* 44(4) Sep: 652-667.
- Rhodes, R.A.W., P. 't Hart, and M. Noordegraaf (eds). 2007. *Observing Government Elites Up Close and Personal*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Richard, P. 1984. 'Museum of the Big Bucks.' *Washington Post*. 13 April.
- Richards, D. 1996. 'Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls.' *Politics* 16(3): 199-204.
- Rijksmuseum. 2013. *Phillips - Founder*. Rijksmuseum. Accessed at (<https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/join-us/our-sponsors/philips>) on 7 May 2013.
- Robinson, B. 1993. 'The Nature of Environmental Crime.' in N. Gunningham, J. Norberry and S. McKillop (eds) *Environmental Crime* Hobart, 9-17.
- Robinson, J.G. and J.S. McIlwee. 1991. 'Men, Women, and the Culture of Engineering.' *The Sociological Quarterly* 32(3) Autumn: 403-421.
- Ross, D.A. 2008. *Making a Meal of It: The World Food Programme and Legitimacy in Global Politics*. PhD, University of Melbourne.
- Ruggie, J.G. 2004. 'Reconstituting the Global Public Domain - Issues, Actors, and Practices.' *European Journal of International Relations* 10(4) Dec: 499-531.
- _____. *John Ruggie: Homepage*. Harvard University. Accessed at (<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/johnruggie/index.html>) on 6 Nov 2013.
- Rumsey, G.G. and C. White. 2009. 'Strategic Corporate Philanthropic Relationships: Nonprofits' Perceptions of Benefits and Corporate Motives.' *Public Relations Review* 35(3) Sep: 301-303.
- Russell, J. 1982. 'Getty Museum to Build Three New Institutions.' *New York Times*. 27 May.
- Sadran, P. 2007. 'Public-Private Partnership' *Encyclopedia of Governance*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 773-775.
- Sahlin-Andersson, K. 2002. 'National, International and Transnational Constructions of New Public Management.' In *New Public Management: The Transformation of Ideas and Practice*, eds T. Christensen and P. Lægreid. Aldershot: Ashgate, 43-72.
- Salter, L. 1999. 'The Standards Regimes for Communications and Information Technologies.' In *Private Authority and International Affairs*, eds A.C. Cutler, V. Haufler and T. Porter. Albany: SUNY Press, 97-128.

- Samii, R., L.N. Van Wassenhove, and S. Bhattacharya. 2002. 'An Innovative Public-Private Partnership: New Approach to Development.' *World Development* 30(6) Jun: 991-1008.
- Schäferhoff, M., S. Campe, and C. Kaan. 2009. 'Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relations: Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks, and Results.' *International Studies Review* 11: 451-474.
- Schein, E.H. 1985. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- _____. 2010. *Organizational Culture and Leadership – Fourth Edition*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Scheinman, L. 1974. 'IAEA: Atomic Condominium?' In *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization*, eds R.W. Cox and H.K. Jacobson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 216-262.
- Schober, H. 1924. 'Do we need an International Police Magazine?' *International Public Safety: Official Journal of the International Criminal Police Commission* (1) November: 1.
- Schwartz, M.S. and A.B. Carroll. 2003. 'Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain Approach.' *Business Ethics Quarterly* 13(4) Oct: 503-530.
- Scullard, H.H. 1982. *From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133BC to AD68*. London: Routledge.
- Seldon, A. 2004. *Blair*. London: The Free press.
- Serageldin, I. 1999. 'Cultural Heritage as Public Good: Economic Analysis Applied to Historic Cities.' In *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century*, eds I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern. New York: Oxford University Press, 240-263.
- Sharp, H., H. Robinson, and M. Woodman. 2000. 'Software Engineering: Community and Culture.' *IEEE Software* 17(1): 40-47.
- Sheptycki, J.W.E. 1998. 'The Global Cops Cometh: Reflections on Transnationalization, Knowledge Work and Policing Subculture.' *British Journal of Sociology* 49(1): 57-74.
- Sherman, L.W. 1978. *Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Siegfried, A. 1992. 'Party Politics in Canada.' In *Canadian Party Political Systems: A Reader*, ed. R.K. Carty. Ontario: Broadview, 18-44.
- Siehl, C. and J. Martin. 1984. 'The Role of Symbolic Management: How can Managers effectively Transmit Organizational Culture?' In *Leaders and Managers: International Perspectives on Managerial Behavior and Leadership* eds J.G. Hunt, D. Hosking, C. Schriesheim and R. Stewart. Elmsford: Pergamon Press, 227-239.
- Sikkink, K. 1986. 'Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the WHO/UNICEF Code.' *International Organization* 40(4) Fal: 815-840.
- Sintesis Foundation. 2013. *About Us*. Sintesis Foundation. Accessed at (<http://www.sintesis.org/>) on 2 May 2013.
- Skolnick, J.H. 1966. *Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society*. New York: Wiley.

Bibliography

- _____. 1994. *Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society – Third Edition*. New York: Macmillan College Publishing Company.
- Slaughter, A. 2004a. *A New World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 2004b. 'Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order.' *Stanford Journal of International Law* 40: 283-327.
- Sloan Foundation. 2011. *About the Foundation*. Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Accessed at (<http://www.sloan.org/pages/1/about-the-foundation>) on 2 Nov 2011.
- Smith, J. and T.P. Moran. 2000. 'WTO 101: Myths about the World Trade Organization.' *Dissent* 47(2) Spr: 66-70.
- Späth, K. 2005. 'Inside Global Governance: New Borders of a Concept.' In *Criticizing Global Governance*, eds M. Lederer and P.S. Müller. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 21-44.
- Stanley-Price, N. and J. King (eds). 2009. *Conserving the Authentic: Essays in Honour of Jukka Jokilehto*. Rome: International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.
- Steets, J. and L. Blattner. 2010. 'Partnership Accountability need not be Democratic Accountability.' In *Democracy and Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance*, eds M. Bexell and U. Mörth. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 55-80.
- Steffek, J. 2010. 'Explaining Patterns of Transnational Participation: The Role of Policy Fields.' In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*, eds J. Tallberg and C. Jönsson. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 67-87.
- Stoner, J.H. 2005. 'Changing Approaches in Art Conservation: 1925 to the Present.' (*Sackler NAS Colloquium*) *Scientific Examination of Art: Modern Techniques in Conservation and Analysis* Washington, (19-21 Mar).
- Stout, G. 1975. 'Speech.' *Bulletin of the American Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works* 16(1): 3-4.
- Strange, S. 1996. *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tallberg, J. 2010. 'Transnational Access to International Institutions: Three Approaches.' In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*, eds J. Tallberg and C. Jönsson. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 45-66.
- Tallberg, J. and C. Jönsson. 2010. 'Transnational Actor Participation in International Institutions: Where, Why and with What Consequences.' In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications*, eds J. Tallberg and C. Jönsson. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan, 1-21.
- Tarjanne, P. 1993. 'Historic Decisions.' *Telecommunication Journal* 60(2): 53.
- Telecom Italia. 2013. *Telecom Italia - Search Results on "ITU"*. Telecom Italia. Accessed at (http://www.telecomitalia.com/tit/en/cogito.html?pn=1&_charset_=UTF-8&ps=10&l=ENG&q=ITU) on 7 May 2013.
- Telefonica. 2013. *Telefonica Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability - Search Results on ITU*. Telefonica. Accessed at

- (http://search.telefonica.com/search?btnG=Buscar&client=Inf_Telefonica&output=xml_no_dtd&proxystylesheet=Inf_Telefonica&sort=date%3AD%3AL%3Ad1&entqr=3&oe=UTF-8&ie=UTF-8&ud=1&site=CR_S&hl=en&lr=lang_en&filter=0&q=ITU) on 7 May 2013.
- Tesner, S. and G. Kell. 2000. *The United Nations and Business: A Partnership Recovered*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Thompson, J. 2007. 'Engagement in Public-Private Partnerships for Cultural Heritage: The Case of Herculaneum, Italy.' *International Forum on Privatization and Conservation of Cultural Heritage* Catania, (13-15 Sep), 120-134.
- Touré, H. 2012. *Public Briefing Session on WCIT-12: Opening Remarks*. International Telecommunication Union. Accessed at (<http://www.itu.int/en/osg/speeches/Pages/2012-10-09.aspx>) on 10 Jul 2013.
- TRAC. 2000. *Tangled Up in Blue: Corporate Partnerships at the United Nations*. San Francisco: Transnational Resource and Action Centre.
- TWN. 2008. *Third World Network Info Service on Intellectual Property Issues*. Third World Network. Accessed at (http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_property/info.service/2008/twn.ipr.info.081107.htm) on 12 Nov 2011.
- Uhlin, A. 2010. 'Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational Actors: Mapping out the Conceptual Terrain.' In *Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-examining the Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors*, eds E. Erman and A. Uhlin. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 16-37.
- UIA. 2001a. *Union of International Associations: Yearbook of International Organizations 2000/2001: Guide to Global Civil Society Networks*, Volume Vol 1B (Int-Z). Munich: K G Sauer.
- _____. 2001b. *Union of International Associations: Yearbook of International Organizations 2000/2001: Guide to Global Civil Society Networks*, Volume Vol 1A (A-Ins). Munich: K G Sauer.
- _____. 2010. *IGO Search*. Union of International Associations. Accessed at (<http://www.uia.be/igo>) on 14 Apr 2010.
- _____. 2011. *Types of International Organizations*. Union of International Associations. Accessed at (<http://www.uia.be/types-international-organization>) on 22 Aug 2011.
- UN. 2011. *Structure and Organization*. United Nations. Accessed at (<http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/index.shtml#Others>) on 7 September 2011.
- _____. 2012a. *Former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali*. United Nations. Accessed at (<http://www.un.org/sg/formersg/ghali.shtml>) on 21 Feb 2012.
- _____. 2012b. *Former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld*. United Nations. Accessed at (<http://www.un.org/sg/formersg/hammarskjold.shtml>) on 21 Feb 2012.
- _____. 2012c. *Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan*. United Nations. Accessed at (<http://www.un.org/sg/formersg/annan.shtml>) on Feb 21 February 2012.

Bibliography

- _____. 2012d. *Former United Nations Secretary-General U Thant*. United Nations. Accessed at (<http://www.un.org/sg/formersg/thant.shtml>) on 21 Feb 2012.
- UN Global Compact. 1999. *The Ten Principles*. United Nations Global Compact. Accessed at (<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html>) on 12 Apr 2012.
- UNDP. 2006. *Seawater Forest Initiative*. United Nations Development Program. Accessed at (<http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/partnerships/1024.html>) on 16 Sep 2010.
- UNESCO 1955. Location of the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. *UNESCO Executive Board*. Document 41 EX/11. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 4 Mar 1955.
- _____. 1959. *Report of the Director General on the Activities of the Organization in 1958*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
- UNESCO and ICCROM (eds). 1968. *The Conservation of Cultural Property: With Special Reference to Tropical Conditions*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
- UNICEF. 2009. 'UNICEF strategic framework for partnerships and collaborative relationships.' In UNICEF Executive Board (ed.) *UNICEF Executive Board Annual Session 2009* New York.
- Vaubel, R., A. Dreher, and U. Soylu. 2007. 'Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis.' *Public Choice* 133(3-4) Dec: 275-295.
- Van Maanen, J. 1975. 'Police Socialization.' *Administrative Science Quarterly* 20(3): 207-228.
- Verizon. 2012. *Annual Report - Corporate Responsibility Supplement*. Verizon.
- Vodafone. 2013. *About Us*. Vodafone. Accessed at (http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/advance_search/search.html?q=ITU&SearchBox%24btnImageButton.x=0&SearchBox%24btnImageButton.y=0) on 7 May 2013.
- Vogel, A. 2010. 'Democratic Legitimacy of Philanthropic Foundations: US Grant-Making in the Middle East.' In *Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-examining the Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors*, eds E. Erman and A. Uhlin. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 64-84.
- Volgy, T.J., E. Fausett, K.A. Grant, and S. Rodgers. 2008a. 'Identifying Formal Intergovernmental Organizations.' *Journal of Peace Research* 45(6) Nov: 837-850.
- _____. 2008b. Identifying Formal Intergovernmental Organizations - Datasets. *Journal of Peace Research*. Accessed at (<http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets>) on 22 April 2010.
- Walt, G. and K. Buse. 2000. 'Partnership and Fragmentation in International Health: Threat or Opportunity?' *Tropical Medicine & International Health* 5(7) Jul: 467-471.

- Wallace, M. and J.D. Singer. 1970. 'Intergovernmental Organizations in the Global System, 1816-1964: A Quantitative Description.' *International Organization* 24(2): 239-257.
- Wanna, J. 2008. 'Collaborative Government: Meaning, Dimensions Drivers and Outcomes.' In *Collaborative Governance: A New Era of Public Policy in Australia*, eds J. O'Flynn and J. Wanna. Canberra: ANU E Press.
- Wanna, J. and P. Weller. 2003. 'Traditions of Australian Governance.' *Public Administration* 81(1): 63-94.
- Waxman, S. 2008. *Loot: The Battle over the Stolen Treasures of the Ancient World*. New York: Times Books.
- Weber, M. 1947. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. London: William Hodge and Company Limited.
- Weir, K.A. 2007. 'The State Sovereignty Battle in Seattle.' *International Politics* 44: 596-622.
- Weiss, T.G. 1975. *International Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Operation of Functional and Global International Secretariats*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Weiss, T.G. 2008. *What's wrong with the United Nations and how to fix it*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Weller, P. and Y.C. Xu. 2010. 'Agents of Influence: Country Directors at the World Bank.' *Public Administration* 88(1): 211-231.
- WFP. 2009. *Contributions to WFP 2009 | WFP | United Nations World Food Programme - Fighting Hunger Worldwide* World Food Programme. Accessed at (<http://www.wfp.org/about/donors/wfp-donors/2009>) on 30 Apr 2010.
- WFP USA. 2011. *Annual Report*. New York: World Food Programme USA.
- White, R. 2008. *Crimes Against Nature*. Portland: Willan Publishing.
- WHO. 2011. *Sixty-Fourth World Health Assembly - Committee A 10th Meeting, Saturday 21 May 2011*. Geneva: World Health Organization.
- Wijesuriya, G. 2007. 'Is Outsourcing a Myth or Reality - The Need to Contextualize Conservation Services.' *International Forum on Privatization and Conservation of Cultural Heritage* Catania, (13-15 Sep), 136-142.
- Wilensky, H.L. 1964. 'The Professionalization of Everyone?' *American Journal of Sociology* 70(2) Sep.: 137-158.
- Williams, C. 2004. *Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups*. Sydney: New Holland.
- Woods, N. 2006. *The Globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Woods, N. and A. Narlikar. 2001. 'Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank.' *International Social Science Journal* 53(4) Dec: 569-583.
- Wright, V. 1994. 'Reshaping the State: Implications for Public Administration.' *West European Politics* 17(4): 102-137.
- Xu, Y.C. and P. Weller. 2009. *Inside the World Bank: Exploding the Myth of the Monolithic Bank*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Bibliography

- Yergin, D. 1991. *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power*. New York: Free Press.
- Young, G.F. 1933. *The Medici*. New York: The Modern Library.
- Zampetti, A.B. 2003. 'Democratic Legitimacy in the World Trade Organization: The Justice Dimension.' *Journal of World Trade* 37(1) Feb: 105-126.
- Zavrel, E.A. 2011. 'How the Discovery Channel Television Show Mythbusters Accurately Depicts Science and Engineering Culture.' *Journal of Science Education and Technology* 20(2) Apr: 201-207.

International government organization websites

- AAID. 2011. *Homepage*. Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development. Accessed at (<http://www.aaaid.org/>). On 2 Sep 2011.
- AAEA. 2011. *Homepage*. Arab Atomic Energy Agency. Accessed http://www.aaea.org.tn/index_en.htm. on 2 Sep 2011.
- AALCO. 2011. *About AALCO*. Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.aalco.int/content/about-aalco>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- AARDO. 2011. *Homepage*. Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization - Rural Development. Accessed at (<http://www.aardo.org/>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- ACAC . 2011. *Homepage*. Arab Civil Aviation Commission. Accessed at (<http://www.acac.org.ma/INDEX3.HTM>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- ACP Group. 2011. *Homepage*. African, Caribbean Pacific Group of States. Accessed at (<http://www.acpsec.org/en>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- ACS. 2011. *Homepage*. Association of Caribbean States. Accessed at (www.acs-aec.org) on 2 Sep 2011.
- ACU. 2011. *Homepage*. Asian Clearing Union. Accessed at (<http://www.asianclearingunion.org/>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- ADB. 2011. *Partners*. Asian Development Bank Accessed at (<http://beta.adb.org/about/partners>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- AEI. 2011. *Homepage*. African Export Import Bank. Accessed at (<http://www.afreximbank.com/afrexim/en/Home.aspx>.) on 5 Sep 2011.
- AFDB. 2011. *Homepage*. African Development Bank. Accessed at (<http://www.afdb.org/>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- AFESD. 2011. *Homepage*. Arab Fund for Social/Economic Development. Accessed at (<http://www.arabfund.org/>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- AfricaRice. 2011. *Homepage*. Africa Rice Center. Accessed at (<http://www.africarice.org/>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- AFRISTAT. 2011. *Homepage*. African Statistics. Accessed at (<http://www.afristat.org/>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- AGC. 2011. *Homepage*. African Groundnut Council. Accessed at (<http://www.afgroundnutcouncil.org/>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- AIBD. 2010. *Homepage*. Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development. Accessed at (<http://www.aibd.org.my/>) on 20 May 2010.

- AIF. 2010. *Homepage*. Intergovernmental Agency of French Speaking Countries (*Agence Intergouvernementale de la Francophonie*). Accessed at (<http://www.francophonie.org/>) on 20 May 2010.
- AIPU. 2011. *Homepage*. Arab Interparliamentary Union. Accessed at (<http://www.arab-ipu.org/english/>) on 20 May 2010.
- ALADI. 2011. *Homepage*. Association for Latin American Integration (*Associação Latino-Americana De Integração*). Accessed at (<http://www.aladi.org/nsfweb/sitioIng/>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- ALO. 2011. *Homepage*. Arab Labor Organization (العربية العمل منظمة). Accessed at (<http://www.alolabor.org/final/index.php?lang=en>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- AMF. 2011. *Annual Reports*. Arab Monetary Fund. Accessed at (<http://www.amf.org.ae/annualrep>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- Andean Community. 2010. *Homepage*. Andean Community. Accessed at (<http://www.comunidadandina.org/endex.htm>) on 20 May 2010.
- ANRPC. 2011. *FAQ*. The Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries. Accessed at (<http://www.anrpc.org/html/faq.aspx>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- AOAD. 2011. *Homepage*. Arab Organization for Agricultural Development. Accessed at (http://www.aoad.org/activity_en.htm) on 2 Sep 2011.
- APCC. 2011. *Homepage*. APCC - Asian and Pacific Coconut Community. Accessed at (<http://www.apccsec.org/linkages.html>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- APEC. 2011. *Stakeholder Participation*. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Accessed at (<http://www.apec.org/About-Us/How-APEC-Operates/Stakeholder-Participation.aspx>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- APO. 2011. *Milestones in the APOs History*. Asian Productivity Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.apo-tokyo.org/about/history.html>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- APPA. 2011. *Homepage*. African Petroleum Producers Association. Accessed at (<http://www.appa.int/en/pres/index.html>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- APPU. 2011. *Homepage*. Asia Pacific Postal Union homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.appu-bureau.org/>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- APTSEC. 2010. *APTSEC Homepage*. Asia-Pacific Telecommunity Secretariat. Accessed at (<http://www.aptsec.org/>) on 20 May 2010.
- Arabsat. 2011. *Partners*. Arab Satellite Communications Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.arabsat.com/pages/Partners.aspx>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- ARADO. 2011. *Homepage*. The Arab Administrative Development Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.arado.org.eg/en/index.asp>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- ARC. 2011. *Homepage*. Asian Reinsurance Corporation. Accessed at (<http://www.asianrecorp.com/>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- ARIPO. 2011. *Legal Framework*. African Regional Intellectual Property Organization. Accessed at (http://www.aripo.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18&Itemid=55) on 5 Sep 2011.
- ASBA. 2011. *By-Laws*. Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas. Accessed at ([299](http://www.asba-</p>
</div>
<div data-bbox=)

Bibliography

supervision.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7&Itemid=35&lang=us&limitstart=5) on 6 Sep 2011.

ASEAN. 2010. *Homepage*. Association of South East Asian Nations homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.aseansec.org/>) on 20 May 2010.

ASECNA. 2010. *Partners*. Agency for Safety of Aerial Navigation in Africa and Madagascar. Accessed at (http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.asecna.aero/&ei=an70S_PPJcyOkQWa4JW6DQ&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCQq7gEwAQ&prev=/search%3Fq%3DASECNA%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26hs%3DJfE%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-GB:official%26prmd%3Dn) on 20 May 2010.

ASEF. 2010. *Homepage*. Asia-Europe Foundation homepage. Accessed at <http://www.asef.org/> on 20 May 2011.

AU. 2010. *Homepage*. Africa Union Homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.africa-union.org/>) on 19 May 2010.

AVRDC. 2010. *Homepage*. World Vegetable Center: Home. Accessed at (<http://www.avrdc.org/>) on 4 August 2010.

BADEA. 2010. *Homepage*. Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa. Accessed at (<http://www.badea.org/en/map.html>) on 29 May 2010.

BIE. 2010. *Homepage*. Bureau International des Expositions. Accessed at (<http://www.bie-paris.org/site/en.html>) on 30 July 2010.

BIPM. 2010. *Homepage*. Bureau International Des Poids et Mesures. Accessed at (<http://www.bipm.org/>) on 4 August 2010.

BIS. 2010. *BIS History - Overview*. Bank of International Settlements. Accessed at (<http://www.bis.org/about/history.htm>) on 30 Jul 2010.

BSEC. 2011. *Member States*. Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.bsec-organization.org/member/Pages/member.aspx>) on 2 Sep 2011.

CAB. 2010. *Homepage*. Organización del Convenio Andrés Bello. Accessed at (<http://www.convenioandresbello.info/>) on 2 Jun 2011.

CAEU. 2010. *Homepage*. Council of Arab Economic Unity. Accessed at (<http://www.caeu.org.eg/>) on 29 May 2010.

CAIS. 2010. *Homepage*. Central American Integration System Accessed at (<http://www.sica.int/>) on 29 May 2010.

CAMES. 2010. *Homepage*. African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education. Accessed at (<http://www.cames.bf.refer.org/>) on 2 Jun 2010.

CARICOM. 2010. *Homepage*. Caribbean Community Accessed at (<http://www.caricom.org/>) on 29 May 2010.

CBSS. 2010. *Homepage*. Council of Baltic Sea States Accessed at (<http://www.cbss.org/>) on 29 May 2010.

CCNR. 2011. *Partners*. Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine. Accessed at (<http://www.ccr-zkr.org/>) on 5 Sep 2011.

CD. 2010. *Homepage*. Danube Commission Accessed at (http://www.danubecommission.org/index.php/en_US/index) on 29 May 2010.

- CDB. 2011. *Homepage*. Caribbean Development Bank. Accessed at (<http://www.caribank.org/>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- CE. 2010. *Homepage*. Council of Europe. Accessed at <http://www.coe.int/>) on 21 May 2010.
- CEI. 2010. *Homepage*. Central European Initiative. Accessed at (<http://www.ceinet.org/>) on 20 May 2010.
- CEMAC. 2011. *Financing of the Community*. Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa. Accessed September 6. <http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cemac.int%2F>) on 6 Sep 2011.
- CEPT. 2010. *Homepage*. European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations Accessed at (<http://www.cept.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- CERN. 2010. *Homepage*. European Organisation for Nuclear Research. Accessed at (<http://public.web.cern.ch/public/>) on 29 May 2010.
- CFAC. 2010. *Homepage*. Conference of the Central American Armed Forces (*Conferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas*) Accessed at (<http://www.cfac.gob.sv/>) on 29 May 2010.
- CFATF. 2011. *Downloads/Descargas: Annual Reports - English*. Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. Accessed at (http://www.cfatf-gafic.org/reports-a-documents/cat_view/22-english/23-annual-reports.html) on 2 Sep 2011.
- CFC. 2010. *Welcome*. Common Fund for Commodities. Accessed at (<http://www.common-fund.org/>) on 30 Jul 2010.
- CIC. 2010. *Homepage*. Intergovernmental Coordinating Committee of the Countries of the Plata Basin (*Comité Intergubernamental Coordinador de los Países de la Cuenca del Plata*). Accessed (<http://www.cicplata.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- CIEC. 2010. *Homepage*. International Commission on Civil Status (*La Commission Internationale de l'Etat Civil*) Accessed at (<http://www.ciecl.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- CIESM. 2010. *Homepage*. The Mediterranean Science Commission Accessed at (<http://www.ciesm.org/index.htm>) on 29 May 2010.
- CIIA. 2010. *Homepage*. International Commission For Food Industries. Accessed at (http://www.cii-a.com/ENG_index.html) on 30 Jul 2010.
- CILSS. 2011. *Homepage*. Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (*Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte Contre La Sécheresse Dans Le Sahel*) Accessed at (<http://www.cilss.bf/spip.php?breve44>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- CIMA. 2011. *Homepage* Inter-African Conference on Insurance Markets (*Conference Interafricaine des marches d'Assurances*). Accessed at (<http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.cima-afrique.org/&ei=rWdlTtroIOqaiQe-4OW2Ag&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCMQ7gEwAA&prev=/search%3Fq%3DConf%25C3%25A9rence%2BInterafricaine%2Bdes%2Bmarches%2Bd%25E2%2580%2599assurances%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26hs%3DNPk%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-GB:official%26prmd%3Ddivns>) on 2 Sep 2011.

Bibliography

- CIPMS. 2010. *Homepage*. International Commission for the Protection of the Moselle and the Sarre (*Commissions Internales Pour La Protection de La Moselle et de La Sarre*). Accessed at (<http://213.139.159.34/servlet/is/398/0> on 31 May 2010.
- CIS. 2010. *Homepage*. Commonwealth of Independent States Accessed at (<http://www.cis.minsk.by/>) on 29 May 2010.
- CISS. 2010. *Homepage*. Inter-American Conference on Social Security. Accessed at (http://www.ciss.org.mx/index_en.php?mod=home_en) on 2 Jun 2010.
- CLAF. 2010. *Homepage*. Latin America Centre for Physics Accessed at (<http://152.84.50.40/>) on 29 May 2010.
- CPA. 2010. *Homepage*. Cocoa Producers Alliance Accessed at (<http://www.copal-cpa.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- Colombo Plan. 2011. *For Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific*. The Colombo Plan Secretariat. Accessed at (<http://www.colombo-plan.org/>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- COMESA. 2011. *Homepage*. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. Accessed at (<http://www.comesa.int/>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- CONFESJES. 2010. *Homepage*. Conference of Ministers for Youth in Sport of French Speaking Countries (*Conference Des Ministres de la Leunesse et des Sports des etats et gouvernements ayant le francais en partage*). Accessed at (<http://www.confesjes.org/>) on 31 May 2010.
- COSAVE. 2010. *Homepage*. Plant Health Committee of the Southern Zone. Accessed at (<http://www.cosave.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- CPLP. 2010. *Homepage*. Community of Portuguese Language Countries (*Comunidade dos Paises de lingua Portuguesa*). Accessed at (<http://www.cplp.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- CPU. 2010. *Homepage*. Caribbean Postal Union. Accessed at (<http://cpuslu.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- CREAA. 2010. *Homepage*. Regional Council for Adult Education and Literacy in Africa Accessed at (<http://www.creaa.net/creaa/index.html>) on 29 May 2010.
- CSTO. 2010. *Homepage*. Collective Security Treaty Organization. Accessed at <http://www.dkb.gov.ru/> on 29 May 2010.
- CTO. 2011. *Consitution*. Commonwealth Telecommunication Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.cto.int/Default.aspx?tabid=191>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- CTU. 2011. *About the CTU- Shaping Caribbean Communications*. Caribbean Telecommunications Union. Accessed at (<http://www.ctu.int/about-the-ctu>) on 02 Sep 2011.
- CWGC. 2010. *Homepage*. - Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Accessed at (<http://www.cwgc.org/>) on 3 Jun 2010.
- DLCOEA. 2011. partners. Desert Locust Control Organization for Eastern Africa. Accessed September 5. <http://www.dlcoea.org.et/Partners.htm>.
- EAC. 2011. *EAC Partnerships - Consultative Meetings*. East African Community. Accessed at (<http://www.eac.int/about-eac/strategic-partnerships.html?start=1>) on 2 Sep 2011.

- EADB. 2010. *Homepage*. East African Development Bank Accessed at (<http://www.eadb.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- EAMAU. 2010. *Homepage*. African School of Architecture and Town Planning. Accessed at (<http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.eamau.org/&ei=RHf0S7K0DpiekQWars3EDQ&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCIQ7gEwAA&prev=/search%3Fq%3DEcole%2Bafricaine%2Bdes%2Bm%25C3%25A9tiers%2Bde%2B1%2527architecture%2Bet%2Bde%2B1%2527urbanisme%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26hs%3DnBE%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-GB:official>) on 19 May 2010.
- EAPO. 2010. *Homepage*. Eurasian Patent Organisation. Accessed at (http://www.eapo.org/index_eng.html) on 29 May 2010.
- EC. 2010. *Homepage*. European Community Accessed at (<http://europa.eu/>) on 29 May 2010.
- ECB. 2010. *Homepage*. European Central Bank homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.ecb.int/home/html/index.en.html>) on 29 May 2010.
- ECCB. 2010. *Homepage*. Eastern Caribbean Central Bank homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.eccb-centralbank.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- ECO. 2011. *Welcome*. Economic Cooperation Organization. Accessed at (http://www.ecosecretariat.org/Fist_pag.htm) on 2 Sep 2011.
- ECOWAS. 2011. *The Ecowas Commission*. Economic Community of West African States. Accessed at (<http://www.ecowas.int/>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- EFTA. 2010. *Homepage*. European Free Trade Association. Accessed at (<http://www.efta.int/>) on 29 May 2010.
- EMBC. 2010. *Homepage*. European Molecular Biology Conference. Accessed at (<http://embc.embo.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- EMBL. 2010. *Homepage*. European Molecular Biology Laboratory. Accessed at (<http://www.embl.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- EPO. 2010. *Homepage*. European Patent Organisation homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.epo.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- EPPO. 2010. *Homepage*. European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.eppo.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- ESA. 2010. *Homepage*. European Space Agency homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.esa.int/esaCP/index.html>) on 29 May 2010.
- ESO. 2010. *Homepage*. European Southern Observatory. Accessed at (<http://www.eso.org/public/>) on 31 May 2010.
- EUN. 2010. *Homepage*. European SchoolNet homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.eun.org/web/guest>) on 29 May 2010.
- EurAseC. 2010. Eurasian Economic Community homepage. Accessed) on (<http://www.evrazes.com/>) on 29 May 2010.
- EUROCONTROL. 2011. *Homepage*. Central Route Charges Office Extranet for Airspace Users (CEFA) | EUROCONTROL. Accessed at (<http://www.eurocontrol.int/services/central-route-charges-office-extranet-airspace-users-cefa>) on 5 Sep 2011.

Bibliography

- EUROFIMA. 2010. *Homepage*. European Company for the Financing of Railroad Rolling Stock homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.eurofima.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- FAGACE. 2010. *Homepage*. African Fund Guarantee & Economic Cooperation homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.le-fagace.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- FAO. 2010. *FAO Private Sector*. Food and Agricultural Organization Accessed at (http://www.fao.org/tc/private/principles_en.asp) on 30 Jul 2010.
- FOPREL. 2010. *Homepage*. Forum of Presidents of Legislative Branches in Central America and the Caribbean homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.foprel.org/english.htm>) on 29 May 2010.
- G-15. 2010. *Homepage*. Group of 15. Accessed at (<http://www.g15.org/index.html>) on 30 Jul 2010.
- GCC. 2010. *Homepage*. Gulf Cooperation Council. Accessed at (<http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php>) on 31 May 2010.
- GOIC. 2011. *Homepage*. Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting (GOIC). Accessed September 2. (<http://www.goic.org.qa/AllianceAssociations.html>).
- HCCH. 2010. *Homepage*. Hague Convention on Private International Law. Accessed at (http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=1) on 20 May 2010.
- IACO. 2010. *Homepage*. InterAfrican Coffee Organization homepage. Accessed at (http://www.iaco-oiac.org/index_en.php) on 29 May 2010.
- IAEA. 2010. *Homepage*. International Atomic Energy Agency. Accessed at (<http://www.iaea.org/>) on 20 May 2010.
- IAI. 2010. *Welcome to the IAI*. Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research. Accessed at (<http://www.iai.int/>) on 2 Jun 2010.
- IAIGC. 2011. *Dhaman Home*. The Arab Investment & Export Credit Guarantee Corporation. Accessed at (<http://www.iaigc.net/>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- IATTC. 2010. *Homepage*. Inter-American-Tropical-Tuna-Commission. Accessed at (<http://www.iattc.org/HomeENG.htm>) on 21 May 2010.
- ICAC. 2010. *Homepage*. International Cotton Advisory Committee. Accessed at (<http://www.icac.org/index.html>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- ICAO. 2010. *Homepage*. International Civil Aviation Organization homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.icao.int/>) on 29 May 2010.
- ICCAT. 2010. *Homepage*. International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna. Accessed at (<http://www.iccat.int/en/>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- ICCO. 2010. *Homepage*. International Cocoa Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.icco.org/>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- ICDO. 2010. *Homepage*. International Civil Defence Organisation. Accessed at (<http://www.icdo.org/index.htm>) on 31 May 2010.
- ICES. 2010. *Homepage*. International Council for the Exploration of the Sea - Index Page. Accessed at (<http://www.ices.dk/indexfla.asp>) on 21 May 2010.
- ICMM. 2010. *Homepage*. International Committee of Military Medicine. Accessed at (<http://www.cimm-icmm.org/>) on 21 May 2010.
- ICMPD. 2010. *Homepage*. International Centre for Migration Policy Development homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.icmpd.org/>) on 29 May 2010.

- ICPR. 2010. *Homepage*. Commission for the Protection of the Rhine. Accessed at (<http://www.iksr.org/index.php?id=58&L=3>) on 20 May 2010.
- ICO. 2010. *Homepage*. International Coffee Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.ico.org/>) on 3 Aug 2010.
- ICSG. 2010. *Homepage*. International Copper Study Group. Accessed at (<http://www.icsg.org/>) on 3 Aug 2010.
- ICSTI. 2011. *About ICSTI: Associated Partners*. International Centre for Scientific and Technical Information. Accessed on (<http://www.icsti.su/portal/eng/partners/index.php>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- IDB. 2011. *About IDB*. InterAmerican Development Bank. Accessed at (<http://www.isdb.org/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl://24de0d5f10da906da85e96ac356b7af0>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- IEA. 2010. *Homepage*. International Energy Agency homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.iea.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- IFAD. 2010. *Homepage*. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Accessed at (<http://www.ifad.org/>) on 28 Jul 2010.
- IFC. 2010. *About IFC -> Foundations*. International Finance Corporation Accessed at (<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/about.nsf/Content/Foundations>) on 28 Jul 2010.
- IGAD. 2011. *IGAD Portal*. Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Accessed at (<http://igad.int/>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- IGC. 2010. *Homepage*. International Grains Council. Accessed at (<http://www.igc.int/en/Default.aspx>) on 3 Aug 2010.
- IHO. 2010. *Homepage*. International Hydrographic Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.iho.int/english/home/>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- IICA. 2011. *Agribusiness*. Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture. Accessed at (<http://www.iica.int/eng/Programs/Agribusiness/Pages/default.aspx>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- IIDEA. 2010. *Homepage*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance homepage. Accessed May 29. (<http://www.idea.int>) on 29 May 2010.
- IIR. 2010. *Homepage*. International Institute of Refrigeration. Accessed at (<http://www.iifiir.org/en/>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- ILO. 2010. *Homepage*. International Labour Organization. International Labour Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.ilo.org/global/lang--en/index.htm>) on 20 May 2010.
- ILZSG. 2010. *Homepage*. International Lead & Zinc Study Group. Accessed at (<http://www.ilzsg.org/static/home.aspx>) on 3 Aug 2010.
- IMF. 2010. *Homepage*. International Monetary Fund homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>) on 29 May 2010.
- IMO. 2010. *Homepage*. International Maritime Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.imo.org/>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- IMSO. 2010. *Homepage*. International Mobile Satellite Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.imso.org/>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- InfoFish. 2010. *Homepage*. Infofish. Accessed at (<http://www.infofish.org/>) on 29 May 2010.

Bibliography

- INSG. 2010. *Homepage*. International Nickel Study Group. Accessed at (<http://www.insg.org/secretar.aspx>) on 3 Aug 2010.
- intersputnik. 2010. *Homepage*. Intersputnik. Accessed at (<http://www.intersputnik.com/>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- IOC. 2011. *Partenaires - Commission de l'Océan Indien*. Accessed at (<http://www.coi-ioc.org/index.php?id=43>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- IOM. 2010. *IOM - Private Sector*. International Organization for Migration. Accessed at (<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/partnerships/private-sector/lang/en>) on 29 May 2011.
- IOM. 2010. *Homepage*. Interoceanmetal Joint Organization homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.iom.gov.pl/welcome.htm>) on 29 May 2010.
- IOOC. 2010. *Homepage*. International Olive Council. Accessed at (<http://www.internationaloliveoil.org/>) on 3 Aug 2010.
- IOPC Funds. 2010. *Homepage*. International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.iopcfund.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- IOR-ARC. 2010. *Homepage*. Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.iornet.com/>) on 29 May 2010.
- IPC. 2010. *Homepage*. International Pepper Community. Accessed at (<http://www.ipcnet.org/>) on 3 Aug 2010.
- IRSG. 2010. *Homepage*. International Rubber Study Group - Home Page. Accessed at (<http://www.rubberstudy.com/>) on 3 Aug 2010.
- ISA. 2010. *Homepage*. International Seabed Authority homepage. Accessed at www.isa.org) on 29 May 2010.
- ISDB. 2011. *About IDB*. Accessed September 5. (<http://www.isdb.org/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl://24de0d5f10da906da85e96ac356b7af0>) on
- ISESCO. 2010. *Homepage*. Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.isesco.org.ma/>) on 31 May 2010.
- ISO. 2010a. *Homepage*. International Sugar Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.isosugar.org/default.aspx>) on 3 Aug 2010.
- . 2010b. *ISO - About ISO*. International Sugar Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm>) on 28 Sep 2011.
- ISTC. 2010. *Homepage*. International Science and Technology Center homepage. Accessed at (http://www.istc.ru/istc/istc.nsf/fa_MainPageMultiLang?OpenForm&lang=Eng) on 29 May 2010.
- ITTO. 2010. *Homepage*. International Tropical Timber Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.itto.int/>) on 2 Aug 2010.
- IWC. 2010. *Homepage*. International Whaling Commission. Accessed at (<http://iwcoffice.org/index.htm>) on 2 Aug 2010.
- JINR. 2011. *About JINR*. Joint Institute for Nuclear Research. Accessed at (http://www.jinr.ru/section.asp?sd_id=39) on 5 Sep 2011.
- LakeChadBC. 2011. *Partners — Portal*. Lake Chad Basin Commission. Accessed at (<http://lakechad.iwlearn.org/about/partners>) on 5 Sep 2011.

- LAS. 2010. *Homepage*. League of Arab States. Accessed at (<http://www.arableagueonline.org>) on 29 May 2010.
- LGA. 2011. *Technical & Financial Partners*. Accessed at (http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=fr&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&layout=2&eotf=1&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.liptakogourma.org%2F) on 6 Sep 2011.
- Mercosur. 2011. *About Mercosur*. Market of the South. Accessed at (http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=es&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&layout=2&eotf=1&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mercosur.int%2F) on 5 Sep 2011.
- MOWCA. 2011. *Homepage*. Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa. Accessed at (<http://www.mowca.org/new%20design/partners.html>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- MRU. 2010. *Homepage*. Moano River Union homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.manoriverunion.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- NACA. 2010. *Homepage*. Network of Aquaculture Centers in Asia-Pacific homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.enaca.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- NAFO. 2010. *Homepage*. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization homepage. Accessed at (www.nafo.int) on 29 May 2010.
- NAFTA. 2011. *The NAFTA Secretariat - Welcome*. North American Free Trade Agreement. Accessed at (<http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- NAMMCO. 2010. *Homepage*. North American Marine Mammal Commission homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.nammco.no/>) on 29 May 2010.
- NAPPO. 2011. *Nappo.org - Sustaining Associate Members*. North American Plant Protection Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.nappo.org/en/?sv=&category=Industry%20Info&title=Sustaining%20Associate%20Members>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- NASCO. 2011. *Homepage*. The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization. Accessed at (http://www.nasco.int/ngo_conditions.html) on 5 Sep 2011.
- NATO. 2010. *Homepage*. North Atlantic Treaty Organization homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.nato.int>) on 29 May 2010.
- NBA. 2010. *Homepage*. Niger Basin Authority homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.abn.ne/>) on 29 May 2010.
- NEAFC. 2010. *Homepage*. North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.neafc.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- NIB. 2011. *Cooperation*. Nordic Investment Bank - Accessed at (http://www.nib.int/about_nib/cooperation) on 5 Sep 2011.
- NMR/PMN. 2010. *Homepage*. Nordic Council of Ministers (*Nordiska Ministerradet* (NMR) - *Pohjoismaiden Ministerineuvosto*) homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.norden.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- NORDEN. 2010. *Homepage*. Nordic Council. Accessed at (<http://www.norden.org/en>) on 21 May 2010.
- OAPI. 2010. *Homepage*. African Intellectual Property Organisation homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.oapi.wipo.net/en/OAPI/index.htm>) on 29 May 2010.

Bibliography

- OAS. 2010. *Homepage*. Organization of American States. Accessed at (<http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp>) on 20 May 2010.
- OCCAR. 2010. *Homepage*. Organization for Joint Cooperation in Materiel and Armaments (*Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement*). Accessed at (<http://www.occar-ea.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- OCEAC. 2010. *Homepage*. Coordination Organization for the fight against Endemic Diseases in Central Africa. Accessed at (<http://www.oceac.org/>) on 31 May 2010.
- OECD. 2010. *Homepage*. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development homepage. Accessed at (http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html) on 29 May 2010.
- OECS. 2010. *Homepage*. Organization of Eastern Caribbean States homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.oecs.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- OEI. 2010. *Homepage*. Organization of Iberian States - Google Translation. Accessed at (<http://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.oei.es/&ei=qij2S-aiJMGPccuCqfcL&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBwQ7gEwAA&prev=/search%3Fq%3Doei.es%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26hs%3DK3g%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-GB:official>) on 21 May 2010.
- OIC. 2010. *Homepage*. Permanent Mission of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Accessed at (<http://www.oic-un.org/index.asp>) on 2 June 2010.
- OIE. 2010. *Homepage*. World Organisation for Animal Health. Accessed at (http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm) on 21 May 2010.
- OIML. 2010. *Homepage*. International Organization of Legal Metrology homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.oiml.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- OIV. 2010. *Homepage*. International Organisation of Vine and Wine. Accessed at (<http://www.oiv.int/uk/accueil/index.php>) on 30 Jul 2010.
- OLADE. 2010. *Homepage*. Latinamerican Energy Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.olade.org/indexEn.html>) on 31 May 2010.
- OLDPESCA. 2010. *Homepage*. Fisheries Committee for the East Central Atlantic homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.oldepesca.com/>) on 29 May 2010.
- OMVS. 2011. *Financial Partners of OMVS*. Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (*Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Sénégal*). Accessed at (<http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.omvs.org%2Ffr%2Factualites%2Findex.php>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- OPANAL. 2010. *Homepage*. Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.opanal.org/index-i.html>) on 29 May 2010.
- OPEC. 2010. *Homepage*. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Accessed at (http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/index.htm) on 30 Jul 2010.
- OSCE. 2010. *Homepage*. Organization for Security Cooperation Europe homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.osce.org/>) on 29 May 2010.

- OSJD. 2010. *Homepage*. Organization of Railways Cooperation homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.osjd.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- OSPAR. 2010. *Homepage*. Commission for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the North-East homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.ospar.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- OTIF. 2010. *Homepage*. Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail homepage. Accessed at (<http://www.otif.org/index.php?L=2>) on 29 May 2010.
- PAHO. 2010. *Homepage*. Pan American Health Organization homepage. Accessed at (<http://new.paho.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- PAIGH. 2010. *Homepage*. Pan American Institute of Geography and History. Accessed at (<http://www.ipgh.org/english/>) on 20 May 2010.
- PCA. 2010. *Homepage*. Permanent Court of Arbitration. Accessed at (http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=363) on 29 May 2010.
- PIANC. 2010. *Homepage*. World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure. Accessed at (<http://www.pianc.org/>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- PICES. 2010. *Homepage*. North Pacific Marine Science Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.pices.int/>) on 2 Jun 2010.
- PMAESA. 2010. *Homepage*. Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa. Accessed at (<http://www.pmaesa.org/welcome.htm>) on 29 May 2010.
- PUASP. 2010. *Homepage*. Postal Union of the Americas, Spain and Portugal. Accessed at (<http://www.upaep.com.uy/>) on 29 May 2010.
- RCC. 2010. *Homepage*. Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications. Accessed at (<http://www.en.rcc.org.ru/>) on 29 May 2010.
- SAARC. 2010. *Homepage*. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Accessed at (<http://www.saarc-sec.org>) on 29 May 2010.
- SADC. 2010. *Homepage*. South African Development Community. Accessed at (<http://www.sadc.int/>) on 29 May 2010.
- SCM/MERCUSOR. 2010. *Homepage*. Common Market of the South (*Mercado Común del Sur*). Accessed at (<http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/Portal%20Intermediario/>) on 29 May 2010.
- SCO. 2010. *Homepage*. Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.sectsco.org/EN/>) on 29 May 2010.
- SEAMEO. 2010. *Homepage*. South East Asian Ministers of Education Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.seameo.org>) on 29 May 2010.
- SELA. 2011. 'SELA - What Is SELA?' Latin American Economic System. Accessed at (<http://www.sela.org/view/index.asp?ms=258&pageMs=26475>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- SICA. 2011. *Homepage*. Secretariat for the Central American Economic Integration (*Sistema de La Integración Centroamericana*). Accessed at (http://www.sica.int/index_en.aspx?Idm=2&IdmStyle=2) on 2 Sep 2011.
- SPC. 2010. *Homepage*. Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Accessed at (<http://www.spc.int/>) on 29 May 2010.

Bibliography

- TURKSOY. 2010. *Homepage*. Turksoy. Accessed at (<http://www.turksoy.org.tr/EN/Genel/Default.aspx?17A16AE30572D313AC302172C9058B83B40CE59E171C629F>) on 29 May 2010.
- UEB. 2010. *Homepage*. Benelux Economic Union. Accessed at (http://www.benelux.be/en/home_intro.asp) on 29 May 2010.
- UL. 2010. *Homepage*. Latin Union. Accessed at (<http://www.unilat.org>) on 29 May 2010.
- UMA. 2011. *Homepage*. Maghreb Arab Union (*L'Union Du Maghreb Arabe*). Accessed at (<http://www.maghrebarabe.org/en/announcements.cfm>) on 2 Sep 2011.
- UN. 2011. *Collaboration* The United Nations. Accessed at (<http://business.un.org/en/browse/collaboration>) on 24 Aug 2011.
- UNDP. 2010. *Strategic Partnership Among Benin, Bhutan and Costa Rica for Co-Operation on Sustainable Development (Program for South-South Cooperation)*. United Nations Development Program. Accessed September 17. (<http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/partnerships/1493.html>) on 17 Sep 2010.
- UNEP. 2010. *UNEP Annual Report 2009: UNEP Funding in 2009*. United Nations Environment Programme. Accessed at (<http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/annual-report09/Content.aspx?id=ID0EQB4444444>) on 21 Jun 2010.
- UNESCO. 2010. *Homepage*. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Accessed at (www.unesco.org) on 29 May 2010.
- UNIDO. 2010. *Homepage*. United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.unido.org/>) on 29 May 2010.
- UNIDROIT. 2010. *Homepage*. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. Accessed at (<http://www.unidroit.org>) on 29 May 2010.
- UNWTO. 2010. World Tourism Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.unwto.org/aboutwto/man/en/man.php?op=3#>) on 30 Jul 2010.
- UPU. 2010. *Homepage*. Universal Postal Union. Accessed at (<http://www.upu.int/>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- WA. 2010. *Homepage*. Wassenaar Arrangement. Accessed at (<http://www.wassenaar.org/index.html>) on 29 May 2010.
- WAEC. 2011. *Homepage*. West African Economic Community. Accessed at (<http://www.ghanawaec.org/>) on 5 Sep 2011.
- WCO. 2010. *Homepage*. World Customs Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.wcoomd.org/home.htm>) on 29 May 2010.
- WEU. 2010. *Homepage*. Western European Union. Accessed at (<http://www.weu.int/>) on 29 May 2010.
- WHO. 2010. *Homepage*. World Health Organization. Accessed at (www.who.org) on 29 May 2010.
- WIPO. 2010. *Homepage*. World Intellectual Property Organization. Accessed at (<http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en>) on 4 Aug 2010.
- WMO. 2010. *Homepage*. World Meteorological Organization. Accessed at (http://www.wmo.int/pages/index_en.html) on 4 August 2010.

World Bank. 2010. *Homepage*. The World Bank. Accessed at (<http://www.worldbank.org/>) on 21 Jun 2010.