

**When foreign policy turns upon its self:  
The folding of national security discourse into  
domestic order and social control**

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

of The Australian National University

November 2009

## Declaration

This is to certify that:

- i. the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD;
- ii. the thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of footnotes and bibliography.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of several loops and a long horizontal stroke that tapers to a point on the right.

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01 November 2009

## Abstract

Foreign policy, seemingly by definition, has an exclusive concern with the 'foreign' or that which is outside the state. This thesis, however, seeks to demonstrate that foreign policy, like every other state apparatus, has significant, though often subtle, effects on its populace. This thesis seeks to investigate how these effects may be conceptualised, and maps the domestic influence of foreign policy in terms of discipline and social control. The degree to which the objectives of foreign policy and the practices obliged by national security shape those in whose name they operates is extensive. Given the priority attached to issues of national security in Western democratic states, the apparatus of foreign policy can be considered as pervasive as those orientated towards internal governance. Using case studies of the cold war and 'war on terror', this thesis argues that foreign policy affects its citizens through the formation of human agency, the securitisation of domestic space and the regulation of populations. This thesis demonstrates that these are all processes that link individual and national identity via foreign policy discourses.

## Acknowledgements

The researching and writing of this thesis has been a great experience and I'd like to thank all those who have joined me along the way. Principally I'd like to thank Katrina Lee Koo for her dedicated supervision of this thesis. Kate has been with this project since its inception as an honours thesis and I can't thank her enough for the work she has put in. I'd also like to thank Roland Bleiker, Tony Burke and Greg Fry who have offered me valuable advice and inspiration.

A number of universities have welcomed me during the course of my thesis. Principally ANU, in my formative years, was home to many fine minds and helpful guides particularly Kate, Kim Huynh and Jeremy Moses. The collegial atmosphere of the University of Queensland provided me with my most productive months and due credit goes to Mark Chou and Luke Glanville in 249 and the fine company of Charles Hunt, Sarah Teitt and Shannon Brincat.

The various intellectual fellow travellers who I have had the pleasure of engaging during the writing of this thesis – especially Luke Hennessey, Tim Aistroke and the Territory, Authority, Population (TAP) reading group at Melbourne Uni – deserve much credit for their challenging and inspiring thought.

Finally, thanks to my family and friends goes without saying. I couldn't want for better people.

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## Introduction

Alan, it's not just a few Middle Eastern bastards at the weekend, it's thousands. Cronulla is a very long beach and it's been taken over by this scum. It's not a few causing trouble. It's all of them.

-Alan Jones, Sydney radio host reading an email on-air, 2005<sup>1</sup>

On December 11, 2005 the southern Sydney beachside suburb of Cronulla was visited by an outburst of violence and a break-down in public order. The Australian public watched in surprised horror as the latent tensions within Sydney's communities flared into open conflict that was widely described in the media as the 'Cronulla riots'. Two groups who identified respectively as patriotic white Australians from the southern beaches and ethnic Lebanese Australians from the western suburbs targeted one another, in so doing drawing in unwilling bystanders who happened to bear passing physical resemblance to either group. The violence was triggered following the assault of two lifeguards by a group of men of 'middle-eastern appearance'. It was also argued that this violence was a product of many months of sexually demeaning insults directed against young white women at beaches by groups of youths who were of 'middle-eastern appearance'. As a result a mass demonstration of up to 5,000 people – mostly white males – gathered, brandishing

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in David Marr, "Alan Jones: I'm the Person That's Led This Charge", *The Age*, 13/12/05. Accessed from [www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/12/12/1134236003153.html](http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/12/12/1134236003153.html) on 9/10/2009.

Australian flags and chanting nationalist and racist slogans. The crowd violently assaulted a number of individuals, who in many cases were not even necessarily of 'middle-eastern appearance' but were identifiably 'non-white'. In retaliation, convoys of cars from the western suburbs sought to enter Cronulla forcing the police to set up road-blocks and check-points effectively locking down many southern suburbs of Sydney.

This was not a random outbreak of violence. It was a carefully staged cultural and media event that was given impetus by a range of stereotypes drawn from the wider foreign policy discourse of the war on terror. There was widespread coordination of the event. Widely circulated text messages encouraging people to take part in "Leb and wog bashing (sic)" were read out on radio and published in newspapers.<sup>2</sup> Right-wing media personalities encouraged a "community show of force" to reclaim southern beachside suburbs.<sup>3</sup> Beyond this, however, the wider international context of the war on terror played a vital role in precipitating the conflict. Since the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington (9/11), Australia had been subject to a range of measures designed to counter the threat of terrorism. These included expanded police powers, increased surveillance, restrictions on immigration and the granting of asylum, as well as a range of social awareness campaigns. This created throughout the Australian population a distinct image of a threatening terrorist other that was of 'middle-eastern appearance'. Five months prior to the violence in Cronulla, the threat of terrorism had been brought closer to home by the London bombings of July 7, 2005. The reorientation of the threat from 'terrorists abroad' to 'home-grown terrorists' added a national security dimension to tensions that already existed between Sydney's communities.

The representation of the terrorist threat through foreign policy seems to have played a role in precipitating the break-down of order that occurred in Cronulla. Stereotypes of white masculine patriotism and a Muslim threat to Western values that had been deployed throughout the war on terror coalesced with a range of existing local issues to generate an

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<sup>2</sup> Kenneth Nguyen, "Jones 'incited' Cronulla Violence On Air", *The Age*, 11/04/07. Accessed from [www.theage.com.au/news/national/jones-incited-cronulla-violence-on-air/2007/04/10/1175971098057.html](http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/jones-incited-cronulla-violence-on-air/2007/04/10/1175971098057.html) on 9/10/09; see also Scott Poynting, "Multiculturalism at the End of the Line?", paper presented at Everyday Multiculturalism Conference, Macquarie University, 28-29 September 2006, pp. 2-4. Accessed from [www.crsi.mq.edu.au/news\\_and\\_events/documents/scottpoynting\\_000.pdf](http://www.crsi.mq.edu.au/news_and_events/documents/scottpoynting_000.pdf) 9/10/09.

<sup>3</sup> Steve Price quoted in Scott Poynting, "What Caused the Cronulla Riot", *Race & Class*, vol. 48, no. 1, 2006, p. 86.



outburst of public violence. Foreign policy became entwined with domestic processes of identity, social regulation and order. It reinforced and produced social stereotypes and provided a rationale for public behaviour to which some groups adhered to, some rejected, but all were aware of. In this sense, foreign policy is no different from domestic policies and social forces that likewise inform cultural stereotypes that shape and regulate social order.

### *Research puzzle*

This thesis takes as its starting point the observation that foreign policy, like other state apparatuses, affects its own citizens. However, this thesis begins by recognising that the links between foreign policy and domestic order are rarely clear. Foreign policy is considered a cause of domestic politics only insofar as it responds to external threats – quite often imminent – to those within. Foreign policy seeks to counter these external threats for the well-being of the domestic population. Accordingly, foreign policy is an aspect of governance that differs – that is, is thought to differ – from all other functions of government insofar as it focuses on external relations rather than those that occur within the territorial borders of the state. Foreign policy is seen as being connected to those it seeks to represent only to the extent that it responsibly serves their best interests on the world stage. These foreign relations tangibly manifest in diplomatic, military and trade relations between states. Given this external orientation, foreign policy is often understood to operate on behalf of, but not upon, domestic populations.

Observations made throughout this thesis of both historical and contemporary politics suggest, however, that these assumptions are distinctly not the case. The goals of foreign policy are at any point in time clearly articulated in government policy, in political rhetoric, and represented widely in the media. In acute moments of foreign policy crisis these goals – indeed these obligations – are near impossible to avoid. Two instances of foreign policy crisis will be examined in this thesis to demonstrate this point. The first is the cold war threat of Soviet communism as it manifested in Britain throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, and the second instance that will be examined is the post-9/11 threat of terrorism as it emerged in recent United States politics. In each of these cases the external threat became very palpable and a number of governmental measures were put in place to try to halt the threat posed to the nation-state. Whether or not such ‘domestic’ counter-terrorism measures constitute a genuinely ‘foreign’ policy is of course up for debate. Regardless, however, of the outcome of such a debate, the effects of foreign policy are not

limited solely to the construction of instrumental policy. As with domestic governance, the effects of foreign policy are not limited to the impact of expected results on the intended audience. There are, to use an economic term, positive and negative externalities associated with foreign policy making. Thus, other than a long-standing tradition within International Relations for treating the 'foreign' and 'domestic', the 'internal' and 'external' as separate realms, in which there are different political modes of operation, there is no substantive reason why foreign policy will not affect domestic order.

Despite this, the effects of foreign policy on relations within the nation-state are absent from the disciplinary study and practice of International Relations. Herein lies the puzzle and the paradox. International Relations is ill-equipped to identify these effects of foreign policy, which manifest in the relations *within* states and requires an analytical inversion of the effects of foreign policy *inwards*. Foreign policy is of central importance to International Relations yet there is no systematic recognition or analysis of its effects on the citizens and the social order that it is mandated to preserve. Not only is foreign policy the enduring concern of International Relations but it also has the potential to enact significant domestic social effects. In a time of imminent threat foreign policy becomes quite possibly the most visible aspect of government policy-making. As well as reaching large cross-sections of the population, foreign policy also carries with it a great deal of gravity given the urgency of national security priorities. Foreign policy is thus a highly visible and pervasive element of governance. The question for this thesis is, how might these effects of foreign policy upon domestic populations in Western liberal democracies be conceptualised and what are the implications of these effects for domestic order?

### *Questions and outline*

The preceding discussion suggests that the analysis of foreign policy can be equally inverted in order for us to acknowledge and understand the connection between an 'external' foreign policy and an 'internal' social order. Thus the central proposition addressed in this thesis is: Foreign policy, like every other state apparatus, affects its own citizens. This is followed by the question: How might this be conceptualised and what are the effects of it on domestic order? Given that the effect of foreign policy on domestic order is a seemingly obvious proposition, as examined briefly in terms of the Cronulla riots, Chapter 1 seeks to grasp why it is that foreign policy is understood as being solely external in orientation. What it is about sovereignty that produces in International Relations, a divide so distinct

that the 'domestic' and 'international' realms are seen as intractable to the extent that they are thought to be mutually exclusive? Chapter 2 turns to the question of the constitution and control of individuals as they exist inside nation-states. How is the order and regulation of individuals and populations understood? This chapter asks to what extent are social theories of control, particularly the work of Foucault on discipline, biopolitics and governmentality, applicable to an understanding of foreign policy as a determinant of order and regulation? Chapter 3 seeks to bring the conclusions from chapter 1 and chapter 2 together in order to determine a theoretical framework for the thesis' case studies. In particular, Chapter 3 will ask, how can foreign policy be understood, across the boundaries of inside and outside, as an element of governance that engenders domestic regulation and control?

The second part of this thesis investigates the questions addressed in the preceding part of the thesis by applying this framework of foreign policy discipline and control to recent and contemporary foreign policy challenges faced by major Western nation-states. These chapters and the case studies they contain do not seek to provide full and comprehensive accounts of how foreign policy shapes domestic social order in any given place and time. Rather, these chapters offer a series of specific and detailed portrayals of the processes of regulation and control that function as minor parts of a much broader milieu of what this thesis refers to as foreign policy discipline. Chapter 4 investigates how anti-communist cold war foreign policy shaped and controlled individuals and the wider public in early cold war Britain. In particular, this chapter seeks to analyse the relationship between foreign policy and human agency. It does so by looking at the British Foreign Office's secret Information Research Department, which operated from 1947-77. It also highlights a particular individual, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, examining how foreign policy imperatives combined with a range of personal and political issues to shape his political agency.

Chapters five and six shift this examination of the effects of foreign policy on domestic order and control during the cold war towards contemporary case studies of the war on terror. These two chapters address the question of how war on terror foreign policy shapes and controls individuals and wider populations. In particular, they examine the social mechanisms of security and regulation that instil this national security obligation on a domestic audience. Chapter 5 explores how these changes regulate the movement of individuals and groups and construct territory. This chapter highlights what can be referred to as a discourse of 'superempowerment', which suggests that individual actors or small

groups can enact disproportional effects on the space around them. It examines the attempt by the popular television show 24 to conceptualise a way to respond in kind to the threat of superempowered terrorism and the subsequent influence of this show on the popular US debate over torture. The wider effects resulting from attempts to secure borders in light of 9/11 will also be addressed. Chapter 6 explores the socio-medical literature on the effects of 9/11 and subsequent responses, particularly as they affect overall health of the population. Particularly, it highlights the effects that occur within the home and upon children. It then examines the mediated psychological effects of terrorism and counter-terrorism on the wider population, addressing in particular the consequences stemming from the colour-coded terror alert system.

### *Argument and themes*

This thesis argues that the objectives of foreign policy extensively shape domestic social order. It suggests that foreign policy facilitates, both overtly and with subtlety, the organisation of domestic populations by linking individual and group identity to issues of national security. This is done in a way which is less explicit, but equally as pervasive, as governmental processes of internal governance. In making this argument this thesis draws on five major themes. The first is that of sovereignty. Modern practices of sovereignty produce a dichotomised view of global politics and an individualistic view of subjectivity defined with reference to the nation-state, wherein the effects of foreign policy on domestic populations is overlooked. Secondly, this thesis is concerned with the processes of regulation and control that occur within a liberal democratic order. Foreign policy needs to be understood in the context of social processes of restraint and self-governance that operate amidst a concern freedom and rationality. The third theme addressed in this thesis is agency. The processes of regulation and control enacted by foreign policy shape conceptions of agency according to salient national security obligations. The fourth theme of this thesis is that of space. It focuses on the influence of foreign policy objectives conceptualisation of spatial relations and the regulation of mobility. The final theme addressed in the thesis is population. Foreign policy will be articulated in terms of a biopolitical process that seeks to ensure the health and well-being of the population as a whole. Employing these themes, this thesis will argue that that foreign policy enacts an extensive range of processes that maintain everyday social order.

The first part of the thesis proceeds initially in conceptual terms, demonstrating why, in mainstream International Relations, foreign policy is not understood as being connected to domestic order. The study of politics has a long tradition of separating the domestic from the international realm, a practice that this thesis argues stems from modern understandings of sovereignty, and the relationship that this understanding engenders between the individual and the state. This inside/outside dichotomy not only obscures the domestic operation of foreign policy it also generates a much more subtle mode of social control. The regulatory effect of foreign policy discourse in this sense is not simply a process of information transfer but rather an active constitution of subjecthood. This process of the social constitution of individual and group identity can be understood using Foucault's ideas of control and regulation. Foucauldian concepts of discipline, biopolitics and governmentality are able to demonstrate the extent to which foreign policy pervades and is implicated in domestic order. These concepts will be used to highlight the way in which government policies enact wider social regulation and control throughout societies and indeed across geographical and jurisdictional borders.

The second part of the thesis engages case studies that demonstrate the implications foreign policy has for domestic order. These processes of control and order enacted by foreign policy can be understood in terms of effects on human and group agency, space and population. Foreign policy in cold war Britain fed into a politics of intrigue and intense personal scrutiny characterised by pervasive narratives of political agents and conspiratorial collusion. Foreign policy discourse creates linkages between pragmatic party political interests and global ideological conflicts, bracketing diverse and perhaps otherwise unrelated actors within a perceived collective consensus and intent. More recently, the post-9/11 perception of a foreign terrorist threat has altered processes of spatial regulation and control. Small groups of dedicated individuals are now perceived as being capable of enacting the kind of political effects associated with state actors, so long as they are willing to violate social and legal constraints that define 'normal' behaviour. In so doing, this changes the assumptions about what an individual can carry out in a given social space. In turn, policies designed to combat foreign terror give rise to highly regulated spaces that shape the formation of individuals and communities. As well as affecting space the war on terror foreign policy also shapes and regulates populations. Attempts to mediate the psychological effects of 9/11 and subsequent measures to prepare and protect populations against further foreign threat enact a range of wider social consequences. The threat of

terrorism and attempts to mediate it shapes individual identities, and when linked by the prerogatives of national security discourse, it can also shape populations as a whole. Overall, this thesis argues that foreign policy can be seen as a discourse that is a powerful source of knowledge and authority that, when connected to national security obligations, is very hard to challenge. Foreign policy in this sense informs and shapes a wide range of political and social practices in ways that are obvious and overt, but also in ways that are subtle and nearly unrecognisable.

### *Approach*

This thesis examines a point of coalescence between International Relations, political theory and sociology, specifically the intersection of foreign policy analysis with studies of social order and social control. Bringing together these connected approaches allows this thesis to focus on foreign policy, a key concern of International Relations, while also grasping those processes that lead to the creation and shaping of social order. In short, the approach this thesis takes allows an analysis of foreign policy within a conceptual framework that rejoins the formerly disparate realms of the foreign with the domestic, and the external with the internal. In doing so, it encourages a focus on the effects of foreign policy on the latter, rather than the former, of these binaries. The analysis of foreign policy undertaken here, therefore, is not a traditional study of foreign policy that examines the everyday politics and consequences of externally oriented programs on the relative standing of nation-states. Nor is it a study of foreign policy that examines the reception of these policies by specific countries, or by the international community generally. It is not strictly a study of how a foreign policy platform impacts upon world order. Instead, it examines the inverse effects of foreign policy upon the nation in whose name it acts. This, therefore, requires a different approach so as to grasp the connection between foreign policy and domestic social order.

Towards this end, this thesis draws from a number of approaches, given that there is not a clear and established methodology for analysing these inverted effects of foreign policy. There are, however, two central but related elements to this examination of foreign policy. Firstly, an analysis of discursive representations of threat, danger and risk to the nation-state and secondly, an investigation into the social effects of foreign policy discourse on individuals and the wider population. Given that the intended significant impact of foreign policy is on other states, the effects of foreign policy within the state are inherently subtle

and often not immediately obvious. Were they direct and starkly manifested, this effect would be more readily studied and accounted for in political analysis. Foreign policy sets out priorities in the pursuit of the best interests of the nation abroad. A key element of this articulation is determining imminent and possible threats to national security. Threats and concerns about the security of the state are more immediately visible and pressing than potential benefits such as economic gains from trade policy. Foreign policy and associated fields of national security discourse thus constitute a field of knowledge that carries great authority given its focus on the continued survival of the state. It is the social and political consequences resulting from the status of this knowledge, knowledge defining what is threatening to the nation-state, that this thesis suggests will have significant consequences for internal order.

The analysis of foreign policy undertaken in this thesis takes place within a political space defined and ruled by liberal democratic government. In this sense, foreign policy is not operating within the context of the presupposed anarchy – or at least strategic motivations – of state actors in International Relations. Nor is the state, for the most part, deliberately using foreign policy to intervene in domestic politics. Foreign policy thus does not operate in an unregulated political and social environment but neither is its operation characterised by authoritarian impulses. Rather, in this thesis foreign policy operates within the context of a liberal order, which entails a more complex social milieu than is often understood to exist in either the discipline of International Relations or the international anarchical realm. Michel Foucault's concern with knowledge, discourse and power and the ability for such relations to enact processes of production, regulation and control within a liberal order gives his ideas great purchase with regards to the aims of this thesis.

Accordingly this thesis engages with a range of theories from the continental philosophy tradition, particularly coming together around the work of Foucault. In order to grasp the entwining of foreign policy with processes of order and social regulation it is necessary to critically engage with the constitutive dynamics of liberal order. This is a long-standing concern of continental philosophy, which has long sought to understand the multitude of processes that give rise to governance both within and beyond the immediate jurisdiction of the sovereign state. In particular, the work of Foucault has sought to understand the subtle processes of production and social control that stem from mechanisms of governance. It is not simply, however, the direct effects stemming from formalised regulation and control that are of concern to Foucault. Policies and programs enacted by

government bureaucracies and other institutions take on wider cultural meanings and enable a range of social forces when distilled into a recognisable field of knowledge and expertise.

Foreign policy can thus be similarly understood in Foucauldian terms as a series of mediated effects that shape and regulate domestic order. In and around the work of Foucault this thesis not only finds a workable theoretical approach but also finds traction within the discipline of International Relations. Critical scholars within International Relations have employed Foucault in order to understand how various practices in global politics constitute identity. This thesis builds on this concern with the relationship between global practices and local identity by seeking to provide a concrete connection between foreign policy and the domestic processes of order. This connection between foreign policy and order is not simply a case of the former representing the interests of the latter, but rather a case of foreign policy actively producing domestic order. The framework developed in this thesis offers a way of understanding what is an indivisible connection between a nation's foreign policy and its internal social order.

### *Significance*

Anyone who travels through airports or via major transport hubs in cities like London, New York or Sydney is aware of the overt effects of foreign policy and national security on these highly regulated spaces of domestic order. This thesis highlights that these obvious manifestations of foreign policy and national security commitments are only very explicit parts of an extensive range of effects on domestic order. When considered in terms of the wider processes of order and social control, the effects of foreign policy are much more extensive than just the intensification of surveillance around certain strategic sites. There are subtle effects of foreign policy that pervade many facets of everyday life. This thesis offers a framework for understanding these effects, which implicate both global discourses of foreign policy and its localised effects on order. In short, this thesis articulates, conceptualises and demonstrates the effects of foreign policy on the social, physical, cultural and psychological dimensions that constitute domestic order. It does this by analysing the effects of foreign policy on human agency, the regulation of the movement of people, and the health and well-being of the population.



## **PART I**

### **Conceptualising foreign policy as domestic discipline and control**

## Chapter 1

### Sovereignty and the modern subject: theory as practice

This thesis is concerned with developing an understanding of the ways in which a state's foreign policy affects, and in particular contributes to the organization of, its own domestic sphere. This proposition may seem at first entirely self-contradictory. After all, as those schooled in the dominant traditions of International Relations (IR) would know, foreign policy, seemingly by definition, has an exclusive concern with the foreign, the international; that which is 'outside' the state. This chapter will challenge these perceived contradictions, by posing the question 'why is it understood that foreign policy does not affect domestic order?' In doing so, this chapter will highlight that the processes which demarcate foreign and domestic policies exist and thrive within the foundations and practices of traditional IR theory. By demonstrating that the separation of domestic and international realms is an ongoing process of partitioning, this chapter will render immediately suspect the proposition put forward by orthodox discourses of modern sovereignty that the domestic and international remain logically and naturally separate. Consequently, this chapter will

demonstrate that the seemingly clear-cut divisions between the domestic and international realms bewilder attempts to grasp the complex practices of modern sovereignty.

This chapter will highlight these contradictions through a critical engagement with mainstream accounts of the formation of modern state sovereignty and the emergence of domestic and international spheres. It will do so by engaging two critical processes: a genealogical investigation of sovereignty, and an investigation of the discursive practices which consolidate historical practices of sovereignty. An understanding of the operation of sovereignty here is vital. After all, it is the contemporary practice of sovereignty that continues to generate the inside/outside view of IR in which foreign policy is seen as exclusively externally focused, having no bearing on domestic order. The genealogical accounts of sovereignty will highlight that accounts of International Relations rely on sovereignty as a fixed ontological premise, when instead it should be regarded as being historically determined and contingent. By drawing attention to the role that this interpretation of sovereignty plays in establishing the international and domestic spheres, this chapter will highlight the need to question the accepted dynamics of International Relations, in particular that of foreign policy being a tool to mediate the domestic and the foreign.

The account of sovereignty presented here is not meant to be an account of the actual nature of sovereignty as such. Rather this chapter can be seen as an account of how the concept is used in understanding and interpreting politics. For as Jens Bartelson argues, “the concept of sovereignty is so firmly linked with the epistemic and ontological foundations of political enquiry, that it can hardly be touched without simultaneously evoking questions about these foundations.”<sup>1</sup> Before further exploring the nature of this claim it is important to evoke a sense of how this thesis will approach the questions of knowledge and discourse that Bartelson refers to. This is an important question in regards to the aims of this thesis, for when knowledge and discourse are seen in this way and modern sovereignty is re-examined in this light, many of the reoccurring tendencies within international politics can be attributed to these practices. These tendencies include the simplification and instilling of a superficial order onto ambiguity, so that black and white dichotomies and binary discourses are created where otherwise there might be a variety of shades of grey. A contemporary incidence of this can be seen in the politics of ‘us’ versus

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<sup>1</sup> Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 238.

'them' in pursuit of the objectives of the 'war on terror', a practice that relies on simplified and starkly oppositional notions of 'inside' and 'outside' that overwhelm the complexities of sovereignty's operation. It is such questions about the foundations of otherwise familiar practices that I wish to explore here in the analysis of sovereignty to establish an understanding of the logics that are at play when discussing international politics.

## **International Relations, global politics and discourse**

What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now only matter as metal, no longer as coins.

- Friedrich Nietzsche<sup>2</sup>

The study of international relations is understood to be a discipline that is concerned with politics that are predominantly external to the domain of the sovereign state.<sup>3</sup> Despite these seemingly clear-cut parameters, conceptual and cartographical difficulties abound when the entire globe has been claimed, mapped and placed under sovereign rule of one state or another. If the globe is divided spatially how are 'relations' between these entities to be understood? If it is spatial, exactly what space do these relations take place in? Where is the international and what location is occupied by its supposed anarchy? These are the foundational questions which we must ask if we are to begin to map international relations. However, if the study of international relations is limited to simply diplomatic relations and conflicts between states (the traditional concerns of high power politics), then this is a narrowly defined scope of relations. It is not one that is likely to provide a comprehensive account of global interactions. At the point where it attempts to give an account of global politics, the field of study moves beyond something that can no longer be accurately described as 'international relations'.

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<sup>2</sup> From "on Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. Walter Arnold Kaufman (New York: Viking Penguin, 1976), p. 47.

<sup>3</sup> For the purposes of Australia's *Anti-Terrorism Act 2005* (which as an Australian subject I intend to abide by throughout this thesis) "the term *international relations* means political, military and economic relations with foreign governments and international organizations", insofar as it draws on the definitions provided in section 9 of the *National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004*. For more information see the *Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005 – Bill Digest*, no. 64, 2005-06, accessed from [www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/Pubs/bd/2005-06/06bd064.pdf](http://www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/Pubs/bd/2005-06/06bd064.pdf) on 4/10/06.

International Relations, therefore, is better understood as a broad discourse on global politics, rather than a portrayal of the distinct reality of relations between nation-states.<sup>4</sup> At least that is how it will be treated in this thesis, given that the traditional approach is not the most encompassing description of the range of concerns that the discipline engages with. The traditional approach to International Relations also warrants the capitalized appellation as it is most commonly treated as a proper noun. Such accounts of international politics that are firmly rooted to the dichotomies of international and domestic elevate the study of this discourse such that it is seen as scientifically validated and sure. These accounts of International Relations suggest meaningful interactions between kindred nation-states and in this sense it at least privileges the status of states in global politics if it doesn't actually actively exclude various non-state actors. By treating International Relations as a field of discourse instead of a discrete reality, I am allowing these implicitly dispersed 'facts' of International Relations to be contested as well as allowing the overall coherence of its narrow reading of Western intellectual and historical experience – writ large across the globe, most noticeably in cartographic script – to be re-examined. Thus for one to write within the discipline of International Relations, having noted its discursive nature, does not require an acceptance that this appellation is unproblematic, or even to accept it at all.

Indeed many of the key assumptions of International Relations in this chapter will be highlighted as being part of a dominant discourse rather than 'reality' as such. This thesis recognizes that the theorisation of politics is hard to distinguish from how it 'is' in any kind of reality. Indeed political institutions and events can often be seen as acting according to, or on the basis of, knowledge that has sought to theorise similar institutions or events. In this way, many theories can be self-actualising, giving rise to the reality that they seek to describe. Many tenets of the pragmatic 'realist' school of thought, rather than being responses to reality, can be seen in this way to be as utopian and idealistic as those of the counter-posing 'naïve liberal' position. Viewed this way, liberalism and realism can be seen to constitute what can be broadly described as the traditional or foundational positions in International Relations.

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<sup>4</sup> When referring to discourse it means the formation of particular modes of speaking, subject positions, common concepts and objects of concern and the authority that each of these assumptions then carry with them. Thus it entails ontological and epistemological assumptions and endows the discourse with power/knowledge characteristics.

Approaching foundational positions from the perspective of discourse highlights that knowledge is constantly being produced and reproduced; it is never fixed and secure, nor can it claim to be born from an ahistorical truth. If this sounds as though it is overstating the size and concentration of the 'orthodox straw-man' that is about to be beaten with the linguistic turn stick, then some perspective on the intellectual position of these ideas should be briefly overviewed. Take sovereignty and foreign policy – two of the main concerns of this chapter – for example, which are traditionally understood respectively as the exclusive right of authority and as a series of prescriptions for how a country will deal with others outside its borders. These meanings are pretty much clear-cut and well-established. Examining both the process of construction and the discursive representation of knowledge of traditional accounts of International Relations will not destabilize meaning irreparably, but it does allow for some variation in the way that it may be thought about.

Defining discourse is not as simple as providing a definition. If it were the following offered by Jacob Torfing might suffice:

[d]iscourse is the relational totality of signifying sequences that together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and done. The notion of discourse cuts across the distinction between thought and reality, and includes both semantic and pragmatic aspects. It does not merely designate a linguistic region within the social, but is rather co-extensive with the social.<sup>5</sup>

While this definition contains the major elements of what discourse means in the sense that it will be used here, it clearly needs some elaboration and is perhaps understood best in relation to further definitions. What this definition of Torfing's suggests, however, is that discourse provides a coherent and meaningful context into which statements and actions can be understood and for them in turn to be seen as connected with what is real. This process of social contextualisation, however, is not objective, nor apolitical. According to William Connolly, discourse can be seen as a mechanism that prescribes, legitimises and empowers a particular understanding of the world over others.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, the nature of discourse is not as simple as a mere definition.

Discourse is something more complex than just forms of communication. According to Ernesto Laclau discourse includes not just speech and writing but any institutional process

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<sup>5</sup> Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 300.

<sup>6</sup> William E. Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse* (3<sup>rd</sup> edn.) (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 2.

“in and through which social production of meaning takes place.”<sup>7</sup> Discourse, in manifesting knowledge, inscribes the bodies and the actions of individuals who act within its field with certain routines and practices that become meaningful, often designating a place within an overall hierarchy. So while discourse directly manifests in speech and writing, it is more complex than this. Indeed discourse is potentially of boundless complexity when understood as being located within individuals’ bodies and social practices. The manifestation of discursive practices within such contexts may be evident even within the smallest minutiae. So while this may be the case, the philosophical task is not to reify the complexity of discourse but to explore it. Perhaps then, with a broader, more social understanding of discourse in mind, Jim George suggests that it can be seen as “a broader matrix of social practices that gives meaning to the way people understand themselves and their behaviour. [It] generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained.”<sup>8</sup> Further, “discourse makes ‘real’ that which it prescribes as meaningful.”<sup>9</sup>

Discourse is thus complex and multi-faceted. Vivienne Jabri suggests that the study of discourse reveals the way in which individuals employ “interpretative schemes and shared worlds of meaning in the reproduction of discursive structures of signification and legitimation.”<sup>10</sup> Discourse produces a context in which meaning can be interpreted and in this sense it is more than just processes of speech and writing for it manifests in the bodies and actions of individuals, actively constructing politics. Bradley Klein captures this, suggesting that

to be engaged in discourse is to be engaged in the making and remaking of meaningful conditions of existence. A discourse, then, is not a way of learning ‘about’ something out there in the ‘real world’; it is rather, a way of producing something as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, meaningful. Discourse create[s] the conditions of knowing.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Ernesto Laclau, ‘Populist Rupture and Discourse’ (transl. by Jim Grealy), *Screen Education* 34, pp. 87-93, cited in Diane MacDonnell, *Theories of Discourse: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 4.

<sup>8</sup> Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner), pp. 29-30.

<sup>9</sup> George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, p. 30 (emphasis original).

<sup>10</sup> Vivienne Jabri, *Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 94.

<sup>11</sup> Bradley Klein, “Strategic Discourse and Its Alternatives,” in *Center on Violence and Human Survival Occasional Paper* (New York: 1987), p.4, cited in George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, p. 30. See also Bradley Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1-12.

Discourse in this sense is implicated in the creation of the conditions of objects of knowledge and in what manner these are to be understood and valued.

Through its role in determining what has meaning and what is 'real', discourse intertwines itself with the notions of epistemology and ontology. Epistemology and ontology can be very briefly defined respectively as 'how we claim to know what we claim to be real'. While this may sound trite, epistemology and ontology are at their most fundamental about investigating claims to knowledge and reality. Epistemology relates to how knowledge comes to have authority and meaning, and which kinds of knowledge and logic is seen as valid. Perhaps oversimplifying slightly, it is the attempt to create an "overall correspondence or correlation between... words to things, or knowledge and reality."<sup>12</sup> Epistemology is what causes science, for example, to be deemed a more credible form of knowledge in comparison to fairy tales and myths. Ontology focuses on the foundational objects that are seen as the basis of the reality within that sphere of knowledge. Ontology designates the prime units of concern, in other words, the basic currency of knowledge. Epistemology and ontology are interrelated through discourse; the epistemological nature will play some part in determining the nature of the units of analysis that are privileged insofar as it is likely to provide the supporting logic that makes the focus of knowledge seem to be common sense. A secure ontological foundation is similarly required in order to base epistemological claims, as without a logical corresponding 'reality' the knowledge claim will seem baseless.<sup>13</sup> The relationship between discourse, epistemology and ontology will be more clearly demonstrated in the context of International Relations through a thorough-going analysis of the modern discourse of sovereignty.

International Relations has largely been dominated by a positivist approach to knowledge that has favoured states as the primary actors. The positivist approach to knowledge, a positivist epistemology, attempts to replicate scientific surety within social and interstate relations through an adherence to some combination of rationalism and empiricism. This, in turn, seeks to ground knowledge claims via reference to conceptually theorized or

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<sup>12</sup> McDonnell, *Theories of Discourse*, pp. 64-65.

<sup>13</sup> For further discussion of ontology and epistemology with particular reference to, and emphasis on the implications for, International Relations see Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond" in, Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: positivism and beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 11-43.



impartially observed trends within historical fact.<sup>14</sup> Viewed according to this positivist logic, the prime ontological unit, that is, the main actor in International Relations is seen to be the state whose utility and pre-eminence can be observed as far back as the Peloponnesian War, but also throughout the Enlightenment and, more recently, global modernity. The interdependence of ontology and epistemology within the discourse of International Relations will be more thoroughly demonstrated in the context of foreign policy in Chapter 3. The discussion to follow in the next section will demonstrate how sovereignty has come to be taken for granted, particularly within International Relations' theories of the state. It will do so by questioning the ontological grounds upon which these claims are based and the epistemological logic through which this assumption is generally taken to be 'common sense'. For now, it is sufficient to say that there is a complex and interwoven relationship between these terms, one in which a discourse will necessarily have an implicit and corresponding epistemological logic, grounded in certain ontological claims as to what constitutes the central subject.

These understandings of discourse as they relate to International Relations and social theory more generally draw from the thinking of Michel Foucault. This influence is particularly evident in the way that it is seen to function in a manner replete with social and political power. Discourse according to Foucault is "a form of power that circulates in the social field and can attach to strategies of domination as well as those of resistance."<sup>15</sup> Discourses in this sense are much more than

ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern.<sup>16</sup>

For Foucault, discourse or discursive fields are an intense site where conflicts over power and knowledge take place. The drive for an ascendant discourse, which he describes as the 'will to truth', "tends to exert a sort of pressure and something like a power of constraint"

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<sup>14</sup> For more on the influence of positivist-empiricism within international relations see Jim George, "The Study of International Relations and the Positivist/Empiricist Theory of Knowledge: Implications for the Australian Discipline" in Richard Higgott, (ed.), *New Directions in International Relations? Australian Perspectives* (Canberra: Canberra Studies in World Affairs, 1988), pp. 65-142.

<sup>15</sup> Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby, *Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance* (Boston: Northeastern University Press), p. 185.

<sup>16</sup> Chris Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 108.

in an attempt to utter a well-ordered and 'true' discourse.<sup>17</sup> The discursive field, in this sense, can be seen to be a warlike state where the victor emerges possessing legitimate knowledge or a claim to truth.

Consequently, power and knowledge are connected inextricably and is accordingly often written as power/knowledge. For Foucault, this is the case because "power and knowledge directly imply one another... there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge which does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations."<sup>18</sup> In addition to the symbiotic relationship between power/knowledge, Foucault eschews any objective or material conception of power. Power for Foucault, is not something that can be possessed, rather it is a relationship that is enacted in discourse and social interaction. Discourse can thus also be understood in terms of its relation to power. Power in this context is "a dynamic of control and lack of control between discourses and the subjects, constituted by discourses, who are their agents. Power is exercised within discourses in the ways in which they constitute and govern individual subjects."<sup>19</sup> Power, understood as a knowledge practice or claim to legitimate knowledge, can be exercised through discourse in order to shape and control individuals. The subject in this sense is created through the process of discourse. Crucial to grasping the nature of this relationship is to appreciate that this dynamic is not a form of sovereign violence or overt coercion but rather a highly modern practice, a subtle process of social normalization.

A number of different ways of understanding such modern techniques of social control, including those articulated by Foucault, will be discussed further in Chapter 2. For now, however, it is enough to say that in an attempt to elucidate some of the more finely insinuated consequences of modern sovereignty and foreign policy, this thesis will not just focus on these phenomena as mere objects of knowledge, but also on their surrounding discourses.

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<sup>17</sup> Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse" in Robert Young (ed.), *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader* (Boston Mass.: Routledge & Kegan, 1981), p. 55 [pp. 48-78].

<sup>18</sup> Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. (transl. by Alan French) (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 27.

<sup>19</sup> Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory*, p. 113.

## Construction of state sovereignty and the modern subject

The way in which sovereignty is thought about plays a pivotal role in determining the scope of political options and theoretical debates. That is, the long tradition of separating the domestic from the international in the study of politics continues to reinforce this division. This section will demonstrate that it would not be a major overstatement to say that modern sovereignty has come to determine the field of reality in which politics is practiced.<sup>20</sup> Further, this ascendancy defies simplistic explanations. The advent of modern sovereignty was not a singular foundational event; it is not enough, for example, to point to the Treaty of Westphalia in order to gain an understanding of modern sovereignty. The affirmation and reaffirmation of sovereignty is an ongoing process. Walker describes this process as a series of “spatiotemporal resolutions through which the early-modern accounts of political community were constituted, and then formalized by the principle of state sovereignty.”<sup>21</sup> Further, these processes have “become so firmly rooted in modern thought and practice” that they cannot be distanced from the way in which they are in turn being thought about.<sup>22</sup>

Whether one agrees with it or not, modern sovereignty and its manifestation within the confines of the state are unavoidable. Indeed, the notion of agreeing with it or not is redundant as its very principles are implicated in the way that knowledge and reality is understood. The question is rather to what extent this pervasive notion is comprehended. As Walker suggests,

[t]o understand the elegance of the resolution of all philosophical options by the principle of state sovereignty, at least to the satisfaction of the modern imagination, is to understand how we find it possible to think about the struggles for political identity that seem so pressing around us.<sup>23</sup>

This pervasiveness of the modern conception of sovereignty can be attributed to the way in which it has become ingrained into how key actors and units of analysis are thought about in political theory and International Relations and the manner in which the related histories are told. In the face of this intractable pervasiveness, this section will seek to highlight the flaws in the logic of sovereignty. These fundamental illogics can be seen in the constitution

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<sup>20</sup> R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 173.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 178.

and operation of sovereignty and in many of the seemingly intractable debates in politics that it gives rise to. Thus, this section will look “to destabilize seemingly opposed categories by showing how they are mutually constitutive and yet always in the process of dissolving into each other.”<sup>24</sup> This will highlight that some of the seemingly impermeable concepts, while pervasive, do not exist as given in global politics.

An extended focus on the question of sovereignty is warranted in order to understand the central foundations of the orthodox theorisation of international politics. For as Ashley argues, and as will be demonstrated here, (1) modern political life is dependent on the sovereignty of the state, and (2) knowledge is dependent on sovereign man.<sup>25</sup> For example, the predominant existing assumptions regarding sovereignty suggest that the international realm is to be characterized as anarchic. Consequently, that which is not subject to sovereign rule is subject to anarchy. Furthermore, in order to make this deduction – some realists would even suggest induction – from the assumption of sovereignty, a positivist theory of knowledge is required so that the logic of the binary equation ‘that which is not sovereignty is therefore anarchy’ can be followed. Analysis of modern sovereignty and the modern subject is thus essential for understanding the foundational ideas inherent in International Relations.

In his genealogy of sovereignty Bartelson highlights three stages in the way in which sovereignty has been understood; renaissance, classical and modern.<sup>26</sup> These three stages correspond with Comte’s articulation of the ‘Law of the Three Stages’ of the mind. Comte sought to trace the three main epistemological standpoints of the mind and its interpretation and interaction with the world.<sup>27</sup> In echoing these, presumably Bartelson is implicitly highlighting the interplay of an epistemological world-view and its interaction

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>25</sup> Richard K. Ashley, “Living on the Borderlines: Man, Post-structuralism and War”, in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (New York: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 259-321.

<sup>26</sup> It is important to emphasise here that Bartelson is not attempting to trace the actual history of what history is or has been but rather in true genealogical fashion he is seeking to identify the dominant ways in which it has been thought about. This said, it would not be correct to say that “any resemblance to reality is purely coincidental”, rather there a strong likelihood that actuality of sovereignty will resemble the way in which it is thought as the two are interrelated and interdependent. His genealogy by focusing on the way in which sovereignty has been thought about emphasizes the role that this thinking plays in its constitution and that it is not a fixed, foundational concept.

<sup>27</sup> Comte argued that there were three stages of the human mind; theological, in which primitive and supernatural explanations were provided for the origins and nature of things and society is ruled by priests; metaphysical, which is dominated by an Enlightenment appeal to universal truths, where hopes rule over empiricism and; the scientific or positivist stage where laws based on observation of the world are formulated and society is reshaped according to these principles.

with its ontological grounding in sovereignty. This interplay will be borne in the course of this chapter. The first stage of sovereignty, renaissance, sees no unified discourse on sovereignty, but rather a scattered array of superstitious paradigms of rulership that eventually formed together under the general theory of the state. The second stage, classical, sees states emerge as particular and indivisible units, governed under the general theory of the state and firmly overseen by the transcendent presence of the sovereign. Under the third conception man replaces the King/God figure as the source of knowledge and as the locus of sovereignty. In overthrowing the classical regime the modern stage sees the sovereignty of man bestowed unto the state under the 'general will' and in doing so, allegiance to the state assimilates the differences between all prior communities.<sup>28</sup> Some of the legacies of the second stage are relevant here, especially the emergence of the notion of a 'foreign' policy of the state, which will be explored in Chapter 3, in tracing the connections between foreign policy and Enlightenment thought. It is, however, the commentary on the third stage, modern sovereignty, that is most important here.

The constitution of sovereignty, in such a way that it is linked to the modern state, is one of the most powerful ordering principles in international politics. The emergence of the sovereignty of modern man was quickly divulged to the state under the guise of representation of the 'general will'. In this way the new secular state in many ways resembled the state as it was under the sovereign King/God figure. In contrast with the non-secular conception, however, modern sovereignty functions not simply as a way of understanding reality but as a tool that can be used to change it.<sup>29</sup> The advent of modernity heralded an application of science and reforms, rather than the fatalistic acceptance of providence, enabling sovereign power to actively work towards the betterment of man. Modern sovereignty accordingly emerged amongst the wave of Enlightenment rationality, a systemic attempt to expose myth and create order and knowledge. Sovereignty is not a recent phenomenon, but what is relevant here is the modern manifestation of sovereignty and associated implications it has, firstly, for the way that international politics is imagined and, secondly, the way in which the internal subject, or the self, is created.

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<sup>28</sup> Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 242.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

### *Construction of modern state sovereignty*

Theories of international relations tell us less about the character and consequences of state sovereignty than the principle of state sovereignty tells us about the categorical structures of international relations theory.

- R.B.J. Walker<sup>30</sup>

The construction of modern sovereignty gives rise to a series of enduring dichotomies in international politics. This stems from the contradictory or paradoxical foundational premises upon which sovereignty itself is based. These dichotomies not only inform the key debates in International Relations, but also define the discipline as distinct from other disciplines. The study of the effects of foreign policy is not seen to overlap with the study of the formation of domestic order. This is the case because sovereignty plays a contradictory role as the ontological foundation for orthodox accounts of both International Relations theory and political theory. International Relations theory sees sovereignty as a foundation, pre-existing within the states that make up the international system.<sup>31</sup> The contradiction is revealed, however, when accounts of the emergence of sovereignty within political theory suggest that sovereignty emerged as communities sought to protect themselves against the vicissitudes, violence and anarchy of the outside world.<sup>32</sup> This distinction is elaborated by Walker;

the claim to state sovereignty, is the crucial condition that both permits and encourages the constitutive distinction between two traditions of thought about, and analysis of, modern political life: (1) a tradition of properly political thought on the one side and (2) a tradition of international relations theory on the other.

This distinction between inside and outside, whether made explicitly, as it usually is in the theory of international relations, or tacitly, as it usually is in texts about political theory, continues to inform our understanding of how and where effective political practice can be advanced.

The sovereignty of state is, of course, often taken to be the most important fact of life in a world of more or less autonomous authorities. Indeed it is so important that it is usually taken for granted, left as an abstraction or a technical venue for legal squabbles.<sup>33</sup>

Thus two, at times overlapping, traditions of political thought can be discerned, particularly as relates to sovereignty. Far from suggesting the irreconcilability of the traditions of international and domestic politics; that one is 'right' and the other 'wrong', this hints at

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<sup>30</sup> Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p. 23.

<sup>31</sup> Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 21-35.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35-44.

<sup>33</sup> *Inside/Outside*, p. 13.

the arbitrariness of their construction and also that sovereignty may not be as fixed nor as foundational as is traditionally thought. This contradiction and paradox is something that Bartelson highlights as he explores the power/knowledge relationship that surrounds modern sovereignty.

This tension between political theory and International Relations theory points to the contestation over power and knowledge. This poses particular challenges and even disincentives for pursuits like the present one that seeks to investigate the accepted relations between international and domestic politics. This is particularly the case when one seeks to speak about sovereignty in a way that straddles both the international and domestic political disciplines. Further, it means that it is very hard to avoid the questions of the nature of sovereignty and knowledge. Bartelson's work is instructive in this regard. By tracing the interplay of different understandings of the notion of sovereignty, his analysis allows a series of reoccurring discursive practices to be highlighted as a distinct orthodoxy in the way it is understood in International Relations. He also highlights that this understanding has relied on sovereignty as an unproblematic ontological base for its analysis.

Bartelson highlights the complex interdependence between sovereignty and the power of knowledge which facilitates the ongoing constitution and reconstitution of the modern state. Firstly, the power of sovereignty to "organize political reality through a demarcation of inside from outside, same from other" is contingent upon a recognizable and authoritative knowledge form that renders it intelligible.<sup>34</sup> Without this "sovereignty cannot exist" for its status as a truth or reality would not be verifiable by those observing it if there were no common language through which it could be comprehended.<sup>35</sup> Secondly and quite paradoxically, the verifiability of knowledge requires a fixed foundation on which to base these claims, in short, sovereignty. "Without a proper form of sovereignty, knowledge loses its power to organize reality, and to constitute objects and fields of enquiry as well as criteria of validity and truth."<sup>36</sup> In establishing this paradox Bartelson demonstrates that there is an interplay of power and knowledge surrounding sovereignty, especially when it comes to its ongoing manifestation in the modern state. For Bartelson,

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<sup>34</sup> Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 244.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

“state sovereignty depends not on the presence of a foundational political community but on practices of power-knowledge which help constitute this apparent foundation.”<sup>37</sup>

This interdependence of modern sovereignty and power/knowledge can be expressed also in terms of the nature of the way in which it is thought about, that is, its reliance on a foundational epistemology. The emergence of modern sovereignty can be seen as a series of processes that tie together the epistemology and ontology of sovereignty in ways that make the concept of sovereignty as a foundational notion seem unproblematic. The first element of Bartelson’s argument described above – the need for a recognizable and authoritative knowledge form – is the power over the way in which sovereignty is known, the power to define its epistemology. The second of element of his argument – the need for a fixed foundation on which to base this knowledge – is the basis upon which knowledge claims are made, the power to define its ontology. The paradox that Bartelson identifies arises because the fixed ontological foundation that the knowledge claim requires is the one that was affirmed in making that claim. Expressed in these terms, the emergence of modern sovereignty is an epistemological shift that is accompanied by an ontological shift, the simultaneous movement of the two being what makes this manifestation of sovereignty on one hand intelligible and on the other seamlessly maintains it as a political foundation. This further affirms the point that Bartelson continually illustrates throughout his work; that the way in which sovereignty is understood is only made possible by accompanying knowledge practices that make sovereignty intelligible.

In a further layer of paradox, however, without the manifestation of modern sovereignty the epistemological and ontological shift would not be possible as the modern subject would not be able to emerge. With the shift from classical to modern sovereignty, language is no longer simply a means of representing a God-given reality but rather *is* reality. Language as it is wielded by the sovereign man – the modern subject – has the ability to bring reality into being, to shape reality and to create its place in history; knowledge becomes more constructible through the medium of language. As will be seen in the next section modern sovereignty gives rise to the modern subject, man as the creator (emancipator and enslaver) of his own reality. Under this conception, the sovereign state is

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<sup>37</sup> Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism” in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations* (London: MacMillan, 1996), p. 184.



no longer constituted by a metaphorical relationship between a sovereign King/God figure and an abstract space. With sovereignty transferred to the individual man, it becomes depersonalized and dispersed throughout the social body. This dispersal, however, does not leave the social body in a state of flux or anarchy as ideologies such as community, nation, race and even democracy can be used to relate each man to the state, giving form and shape to the dispersion of sovereignty. Particularly when united and shaped in this way toward a common purpose modern knowledge transforms sovereignty into an organizing principle of reality; nation states and political community are created, homogenized and defined against those who do not cede sovereignty to that state.

The paradox surrounding the constitution of modern sovereignty is important for this chapter as it allows a distinct way of thinking and speaking about international politics – an orthodoxy – to be identified. By showing that modern sovereignty relies on the simultaneous movement of epistemology and ontology it goes some way to untying the two concepts and highlighting that sovereignty is not a fixed foundational concept but rather subject to historical developments in the way in which it is thought about. The defining of distinct ways of thinking and fixed ontological foundations continues to give rise to quite a distinct body of knowledge surrounding International Relations. This orthodoxy encompasses the traditional theories of International Relations – Realism, Liberalism and Marxism – which all claim fixed foundations for their understanding of the world. This foundational orthodoxy can be captured under what is called the positivist approach to International Relations.

In order to articulate the positivist approach to politics it is worth briefly returning to the final of the three stages of human thought of Comte and Bartelson with which the section began. While he does not explicitly state it as such, Bartelson's use of the three stages of development as formulated by Comte shares many similarities. Ultimately what Bartelson is seeking to articulate in regards to the third stage can be described as the positivist epistemology of modern sovereignty. The term positivism was initially coined by Comte in what he described as the third and final, or 'scientific' stage of the human mind. Whilst positivism has developed since its initial articulation, Comte's articulation constitutes the first aspect of positivism, one that

is still an assumption that dominates the discipline of International Relations insofar as scholars search for the same kinds of laws and regularities in the international world as they assume characterise the natural world.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to this concern with the unity of science, positivism can be seen to have three additional main principles. Firstly, there is a distinction between facts and values; secondly, there are regularities in the social world that can be discovered and then theorized; and finally that truth can be determined by an adherence to an empiricist epistemology, that is by reference to 'facts' determined in the course of the pursuit of the second principle.<sup>39</sup>

Without probing too deeply into the limitations of positivism, problems can be seen initially in the paradoxical nature of the foundations of its knowledge claims. For any so-called 'object' to be observed it requires a particular kind of knowledge in order for it to be known but likewise knowledge requires a basis in some kind of foundation. Take for example the following paradox:

how do I know that an object is navy blue if I don't actually know what navy blue looks like without reference to an already existing navy blue object; is my navy blue the same as everyone else's navy blue?

This fact of navy blueness cannot be 'known' outside of a reference to a social reality. That is, any foundation of positivist knowledge is not neutral or objective but prone to the subjectivities of the observer. A claim to foundational truth is instead an adherence to a particular epistemology, which in turn simultaneously privileges and relies upon a foundational ontology. In this sense the limitation of positivism stems from it being a view that carries the very same inherent paradoxes as modern sovereignty. Indeed, this is because it is the practical manifestation of this very same mindset when it is applied to the pursuit of knowledge. The practical manifestations of the limitations of this kind of theorizing will be borne out through this thesis in the general account of International Relations and typified in specific examples of binary discourses such as the security-liberty and realist-liberal debates.<sup>40</sup> These debates will be highlighted in Chapter 3, however the general tendency is that while portrayed as occupying polar opposite positions these positions are in fact premised upon the same foundational assumptions.

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<sup>38</sup> Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond", p. 14.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>40</sup> Bartelson describes the tension of the realist-liberal debate as stemming from the foundational assumptions of the sovereign state within an international system, which gives rise to the contradictory "prophecy of anarchy" and the "promise of universal domestication" in *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 244.

Ashley is also alert to the contradictions inherent in the constitution of the sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy. In articulating what he describes as the ‘anarchy problematique’ Ashley highlights three crucial problems that result from the modern practice of creating a domestic space within the sovereign state. Firstly, given that the sovereign state is neither pre-existing, nor independent of historical experience, in order to “stabilize the sovereign grounds of legitimate violence in modern politics”, a domestic domain of ‘sovereign man’ needs to be enframed and order inscribed within it.<sup>41</sup> This practice of ordering and enframing leads to the second and more crucial point. In order to create a domestic society,

it is necessary to exclude or silence those [resistant] voices that would expose this rendering of ‘man in domestic society’ for what it is: a representation imposed in history and through arbitrary practices of exclusion.<sup>42</sup>

That is “differences, discontinuities, and conflicts that might be found *within* all places and times must be converted into an absolute difference *between* a domain of domestic society.”<sup>43</sup> Finally, Ashley highlights that the practice of representation involved in the creation of the domestic will reinforce such practices globally, which in turn further naturalize and dehistoricise this practice.<sup>44</sup> These problems stemming from the practice of modern statecraft have profound implications for the way in which the individual is understood and gives rise to a particular kind of citizen who is constructed along the dichotomies of sovereignty/anarchy, inside/outside and self/other that have been observed here. It is in this way that we see the emergence of the modern subject.

### *Construction of the modern subject*

The emergence of the modern subject is often linked to Kant’s epoch shifting theory of transcendental idealism. According to Bartelson, “from Vico and Kant onwards, man emerges as the sovereign creator of his representations and concepts; in short, of the world he – *the modern subject* – inhabits.”<sup>45</sup> This shift in the epistemic standpoint of man in relation to his world coincided with the shift in the location of sovereignty from the King to the secular state, via modern man. This powerful shift in the locus of sovereign power saw

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<sup>41</sup> Richard K. Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique”, *Millennium*, 1988, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 256.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 257.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, (emphasis original).

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 188.

a change in the relationship between the state and the individual. In what is a somewhat paradoxical figuration, on one hand, man became the rational and emancipated subject, capable of reconfiguring the world according to principles of knowledge. On the other hand, however, despite there being – to varying extents – a heralded move away from instances of overt state control and coercion, thinking man now subjected himself to a range of his own methods of restriction and control. Thus the work of Kant offers an insight into how the emergence of the modern subject opens the way for radically progressive outcomes but can also dramatically close down the perceived scope of reality and tend towards conservatism.

The implications of Kant's critique are extensive, as it "effectively pulled the rug out from under the mind's pretensions to certain knowledge of things in themselves, eliminating in principle any human cognition of the ground of the world."<sup>46</sup> For whilst human experience was "structured by largely unconscious principles, [these] principles were not absolute or timeless... [and] none could claim *a priori* access to the universe's intrinsic nature."<sup>47</sup> Tarnas describes the Kantian revolution as "awaken[ing] man to a new, more adventurous reality, yet also radically displacing man... from genuine cognition of that cosmos."<sup>48</sup> This latter feature can tend to function in a conservative manner when these man-made and subjective truths are portrayed as timeless and certain. In this sense it opened the way for, on the one hand, the self-critical and emancipatory potential, but also, on the other, the ability of the human mind to delimit itself in the process of the creation of its own reality.

This extremely potent mindset represents the creation of the modern subject, one who is simultaneously transcendent in their ability to reason, yet also limited by the powerful forces of specific interpretations of history, language, science and time. In short, the modern subject is now known and predicted through the same technologies that are designed to provide for emancipation.<sup>49</sup> In this sense then, modern man's transcendence – the will to power, as Nietzsche described it – is regulated by the pursuit and categorisation of knowledge. Bartelson suggests the perspective of the rational subject

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<sup>46</sup> Richard Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas that Have Shaped Our World View* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), p. 351.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 348.

<sup>49</sup> A range of ways through which to interpret this paradox of emancipation and limitation of modern man will be further explored in Chapter 2.

invites dreams of transcendence or emancipation: the state is the result of crime organized on a huge scale, propelled by massive violence. But so is the citizen-spectator himself, since he is a modality of the same historically determined subjectivity; his estrangement can only ever be partial, and he cannot be emancipated completely from this iron cage of modern sovereignty, without, as it were, simultaneously losing knowledge of himself.<sup>50</sup>

This account of the modern subject and its relation to modern sovereignty to some extent defines the individual as we know it, and thus ourselves today. The link between a foundational ontology and epistemology through modern sovereignty becomes even more integrated as it defines not only the geographical understanding of where one is, but it is also essential to how one is able to know oneself. White describes this mindset as the 'metanarrative of subjectivity'.<sup>51</sup> Grasping fully the logic of this mindset, it begins to emerge just

how strongly Western thought is oriented to the consciousness of a subject (singular or collective) who is faced with the task of surveying, subduing, and negotiating his way through a world of objects, other subjects, and his own body.<sup>52</sup>

The emergence of a modern subjectivity, and in so doing the reaffirmation of territorial sovereignty, has thus very powerfully enshrined the binary, dichotomised positivist worldview into the fundamental basis of global politics.

Accordingly, it becomes clear how the emergence of the brilliant rationalism of the modern subject can be quickly turned in upon itself. This account echoes what Foucault calls a technology of the self.<sup>53</sup> The emergence of a technology of the self sees the decline of identity known "through a system of signs denoting power over others [in favour of a] sovereignty that one exercises over oneself."<sup>54</sup> In this way, what begins to emerge with the advent of modern sovereignty is not just a broad state sovereignty over citizens but one that is also a far more specific kind of sovereignty that citizens exercise over themselves, a sovereignty of the self. Thus the sovereign processes by which the idea of a 'foreign' policy become intelligible equally construct the modern subjectivity of the individual.

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<sup>50</sup> Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 44.

<sup>51</sup> Stephen K. White, *Political Theory and Postmodernism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 6.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France, 1981-1982* (New York: Picador, 2005), p. 333; see also Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (eds.), *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault* (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988).

<sup>54</sup> Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: Care of the Self* (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 85: See also Toby Miller, *The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture and The Postmodern Subject* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 42.

## Sovereignty and the binary nature of things

In its original form, when it was given to men by God himself, language was an absolutely certain and transparent sign for things, because it resembled them. The names of things were lodged in the things they designated, just as strength is written into the body of the lion, regality in the eye of the eagle, just as the influence of the planets is marked upon the brows of men: the form of similitude.

But though language no longer bears an immediate resemblance to the things it means, this does not mean it is separate from the world; it still continues, in another form, to be the locus of revelations and to be included in the area where truth is both manifested and expressed.

Foucault, *The Order of Things*<sup>55</sup>

This chapter has sought to address why it is that the conduct of a state's foreign policy is not understood to affect its domestic order. Highlighting the role that sovereignty plays in obscuring the effects of foreign policy on internal domestic order goes to the conceptual core of International Relations. The idea that the operation of foreign policy would shape its own domestic sphere is anathema to International Relations, for it is a discourse that plays out in a number of starkly oppositional formations; inside and outside, domestic policy and foreign policy, self and other and many others.<sup>56</sup> This dualistic logic finds a secure basis in the modern sovereign state, from which it continues to authoritatively spring, weaving throughout much of everyday discourse. These dichotomies can be attributed to the positivist approach to knowledge, which as demonstrated in the preceding section, secured an ontological and epistemological foundation in modern sovereignty and its juridico-legal logic. Indeed, such a dichotomised world-view could be described as being inherent to the empirico-positivist metaphysic. This, however, is not a point worth making just in itself. What can be demonstrated by illustrating this metaphysical commitment to a dichotomised logic is that a particular pattern consistently emerges in the nature of discourses while ever they adhere to this epistemological standpoint.

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<sup>55</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994) p. 36.

<sup>56</sup> These others might include, but are not exhausted by the following; realism/liberalism, pragmatism/utopianism, domestic/international, political theory/international relations theory, good/evil, reason/irrationality, win/lose, fact/theory, practice/theory, USA/USSR, capitalism/communism, tradition/modernity, modernity/fundamentalism, West/East, orient/occident, developed/underdeveloped and core/periphery.

According to Hindess and Hirst, positivist discourse is commonly characterized by circular - and thus ultimately incoherent – binary logics.<sup>57</sup> This dichotomised logic is thus not unique to modern sovereignty; it has a lengthy tradition throughout Western philosophy, with major points of reference being the Platonic dualism of thought and the Cartesian rationality that characterized the mind/body distinction.<sup>58</sup> This tradition of dichotomised logic that is carried throughout Western philosophy can be seen as a vital forebear to modern positivist logic as it informs the understanding that there is an objective external reality that can be verified, understood and categorised according to scientifically rational and empirical methods. The modern understanding of sovereignty is significant in regards to the modern construction of knowledge because it both demonstrates this positivist characteristic, whilst further perpetuating it through its role as the ontological foundation of the current, primarily state-based order. Thus the commitment to the binary logic of positivism in the modern era is written into the seemingly natural order of things.

Only by analysing modern sovereignty in terms of the very logic that it stands for does the contingent and contradictory nature of sovereignty become apparent. Sovereignty is understood to stand in opposition to the anarchy of the international realm. In this hierarchical dichotomy it is normalised as a locus of order and legitimacy, while all that is considered ‘outside’ the state is disciplined as disorderly and threatening.<sup>59</sup> The process through which sovereignty is privileged is not a process of differentiating sovereignty and anarchy. It is a process through which sovereignty is recurrently constituted and constantly reaffirmed as part of the natural order, an ahistorical foundational underpinning. By viewing sovereignty instead as a product of historical and discursive construction, the tendency within much of modern International Relations discourse to form oppositional positions can similarly be seen as a result of these same historical processes. This does not make stepping out of the positivist outlook straightforward, but it does lessen the obligation to maintain a deferential attitude towards what might be otherwise seemingly clear-cut distinctions. Instead of seeing the dichotomous tendency as ‘how things are’, it can instead be treated as an orthodoxy. Thus, despite having not yet developed any clear

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<sup>57</sup> Barry Hindess & Paul Hirst, *Mode of Production and Social Formation* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 13-18, cited in McDonnell, *Theories of Discourse*, p. 65.

<sup>58</sup> Walker, *Inside/Outside*, pp. 127-130; George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, pp. 18-22 and 4-49; for more information on the concept of dualism in philosophy see “Dualism” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Accessed from [plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/) on 30/04/09.

<sup>59</sup> Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State”, pp. 229-230.

normative position, a post-positivist stance does not automatically entail following – or even rejecting in entirety – what is in essence an entrenched orthodoxy.

This entrenched conservatism is particularly evident within the discourses of International Relations. Indeed, some of the clearest manifestations of this dichotomised logic are evidenced in International Relations, which has prompted critical scholars to describe it as the 'backward discipline'.<sup>60</sup> Given the mutually reinforcing constitution of modern ontology and epistemology within the sovereign state, the sense of certainty it bestows is very strong within International Relations. Sovereignty acts as the basis and ensures the primacy of key bipartisan notions such as the territorial state. From the dichotomised logic of the sovereign state stem many of the key concepts, dynamics and debates within the discipline that were mentioned in the opening of this section. Furthermore, in most instances such binary discourses are formulated in terms of the opposition of an idealist or explicitly normative stance against a realistic, practical or even pessimistic conception of the world. This can be clearly seen in the structure of the great ideological and theoretical struggles mentioned above. Even with regards to spatially determined dichotomies this pattern tends to hold equally; within realist thinking there is the binary distinction between the internal and external world. The latter is founded in a state of nature which is starkly distinguished from the peaceful sovereign realm where there is a suspension of the harsh real world of politics. Similarly, within liberal internationalist thinking, the repressive climate of the domestic realm, characterized by the rule of the Leviathan is contrasted with global civil society or even the perpetual peace of global government.

Thus it becomes increasingly apparent that the discourses surrounding International Relations tend to be based upon fundamentally similar assumptions as a result of the formulation of state sovereignty according to dichotomised positivist logic. Despite the seemingly irresolvable differences between the various sides of the first 'great debate' of International Relations there are a number of common points of agreement that tend to give rise to familiar patterns of politics, patterns that many have been inclined to call 'laws'. The account offered in this chapter, however, seeks to highlight the historically-contingent nature of the discourses of state sovereignty, and those that stem from it, as well as the role that power and knowledge have played in excluding alternative narratives of global

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<sup>60</sup> Mervyn Frost, quoted in George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, p. 16.



politics. Indeed, such critical readings of the dynamics of this dichotomised discourse mean that its structural logic can be articulated.

This chapter has highlighted the contradictory nature of modern sovereignty and its production of dichotomized depictions of the international, the state and the subject. The study of International Relations has a foundational tradition of separating the domestic from the international realm, a practice stemming from a modern reading of state sovereignty and the formation of the individual subject within this internal order. Understanding the dualistic logic of International Relations and the sovereign foundations upon which these distinctions are based suggests that the formerly certain boundaries of inside/outside, domestic/foreign sovereignty/anarchy are rather more ambiguous and permeable. Indeed, the fundamental identity of the poles of each of these binary equations cannot be determined without reference to the other. This understanding of the production of boundaries provides an excellent basis from which to further explore key notions such as foreign policy and how it may be understood in terms of its ability to affect domestic populations.

## Chapter 2

### Conceptualizing foreign policy and social control

This chapter offers a number of ways in which the constitution and control of society can be understood. These frameworks are able to make the effects of foreign policy on domestic social order intelligible, foregrounding the approaches that will be employed throughout the thesis. In addition to highlighting the effects of foreign policy on social order, these approaches all shed light on the way that Enlightenment rationality and modernity act upon the self. As was detailed in the previous chapter, the advent of modern subjectivity enabled reason in individuals and productivity throughout society; an emancipation that was, however, subject to its own internal constraints and regulations. It is this other 'dark side', the dynamic of control and regulation within modern social processes that this chapter is concerned with.

It is the contention of this thesis that foreign policy equally has an 'other side'. It is not, however, the zero-sum costs that are exacted within the international arena that are of concern here but rather the attendant processes of constitution and regulation that occur domestically. Foreign policy can equally be understood in this light as a modern apparatus

of governance, designed to achieve security and prosperity for its constituents. In seeking to detail the way in which the alternative regulatory and control dimensions of Enlightenment rationality and modernity are thought to act upon the self, this chapter can be seen as offering a genealogy of sorts, which renders the other 'dark side' of modernity intelligible. Such accounts will equally enable this other side of foreign policy to be considered in subsequent chapters.

As the effects of foreign policy upon the self is likely to occur within the domestic political realm, the following accounts will draw from sociological traditions and from accounts of politics that describe the workings of internal politics. Insofar as democracy is portrayed as the apogee of Enlightenment reason and the highest stage of political freedom and emancipation, it seems apt that the first point of departure in this genealogy of sorts is an early study of a functioning republic, America.

## **Tocqueville and democracy**

The effect that modern technologies can exert upon a social body was observed and ominously described by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>1</sup> Whilst Tocqueville occupies a high place in the canon of conservative or libertarian accounts of the effectiveness and liberty of the American political system,<sup>2</sup> his observations offer poetic and sophisticated accounts of the machinations of control and dangers of tyranny within a liberal democracy. Tocqueville's initial journey to the United States in 1831 was undertaken in order to study the US prison system and assess its viability for France, which as we will see later in this chapter offers a thematic link with Foucault's studies of the prison system.<sup>3</sup> Tocqueville's earlier observations of the American prison system bears a resemblance to the broader observations he makes of the organization of American society in his later studies. Describing the order of a prison, Tocqueville's vivid recollection was that

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<sup>1</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. (ed. and transl. by Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop) (London: Folio Society, 2002).

<sup>2</sup> Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* is a key text in introductory political science courses in United States Universities. See also the website for the magazine *The Tocquevillian*, accessed from [www.tocquevillian.com/](http://www.tocquevillian.com/) on 11/09/05.

<sup>3</sup> Gustave de Beaumont & Alexis de Tocqueville, *On the Penitentiary System in the United States and Its Application in France* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964 [1831]). For further exploration of the link between these two French authors, Dominick Lacapra, *History and Reading: Tocqueville, Foucault, French Studies* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) and Sam Turner, *Discourse and Silence in Tocqueville's Study of American Penitentiaries*, 1998. Accessed from [xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/foucault/frnt.html](http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/foucault/frnt.html) on 08/09/2005.

the discipline is perfect... it is a *tour de force* which is reborn unceasingly and which has to be reproduced each day, under penalty of compromising the whole system of discipline.<sup>4</sup>

While the account of Tocqueville suggested that the threat of overt coercion and harsh punishment played an important part in maintaining the social order, he placed more emphasis on the fact that the inmates were restricted in their communications with one another and were subject to constant surveillance.<sup>5</sup> These observations of the technology of control clearly amazed Tocqueville but at the same time left him with a profound sense of disquiet that was more clearly articulated in his later study.

Tocqueville's 1835 study, *Democracy in America*, is a wide-ranging and widely read account of the workings of the liberal democracy of the United States. As well as thoroughly addressing the functioning of the various political and social institutions, he highlighted threats to American democracy that he felt had no precedence in history nor expressions to describe it.<sup>6</sup> For Tocqueville "old words [such as] despotism and tyranny" were not suitable, yet this threat was still a "kind of oppression."<sup>7</sup> In attempting to define it, he described "an innumerable crowd of like and equal men.... [e]ach of them withdrawn and apart."<sup>8</sup> Elevated above this crowd he saw "an immense tutelary power... absolute, detailed, regular, far-seeing and mild."<sup>9</sup> This power simultaneously sought to "prepare men for manhood", whilst "keep[ing] them fixed irrevocably in childhood," that is, it shaped their development in such a way that made them manageable.<sup>10</sup> This tutelary effect "little by little steals the very use of free will from each citizen."<sup>11</sup> In addition, Tocqueville saw the operation of this new social technology upon individuals as distinct from the despotism of absolute government.<sup>12</sup> Despotism was enacted crudely on the body, whereas "in democratic republics tyranny... leaves the body and goes straight for the soul."<sup>13</sup> Again, this is an attempt by Tocqueville to articulate an account of the more subtle technologies of social control.

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<sup>4</sup> Quoted in George Wilson Pierson, *Tocqueville in America* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 68.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>6</sup> Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, p. 662.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 663.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Thomas L. Dumm, *Democracy and Punishment: Disciplinary Origins of the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 134; see also Michael Rogin, "The Tranquilizing Text?", *Political Theory* 17(1), Feb 1989, pp. 141-148.

<sup>13</sup> Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, p. 244.

From his observations of the United States, Tocqueville ultimately observed that democracy could act in a very oppressive manner. Democracy had the potential to be “more centralized, powerful, and unanimous than any absolutist regime” especially in regards to those who were seen as deviant or non-citizens.<sup>14</sup> Tocqueville highlights the plight of groups against whom the weight of public opinion had turned. The first were those internal others who hold views that dissent from the majority. In a democracy like America, according to Tocqueville

the majority draws a formidable circle around thought. Inside those limits the writer is free; but unhappiness awaits him if he dares to leave them... [to the extent that] he finally bends under the effort of day and returns to silence as if he felt remorse for having spoken the truth.<sup>15</sup>

This highlights the impact that the majority has on thought and its role in constituting a “tyranny of the majority”.<sup>16</sup> The second were the ‘other two races’ who “are American without being democratic... in the midst of the [white] democratic people.”<sup>17</sup> One interpretation of Tocqueville’s view of democracy holds that “violence and coercion has been withdrawn from the centre of the polity, and sent to preside over the internal and external borders of the white man’s covenant.”<sup>18</sup> This remarkable account of the power a democracy can exert upon its citizens underlies the concern of this chapter to describe such additional aspects of enlightened thinking.

The observations by Tocqueville of the power of modern institutions of control are particularly valuable as he is able to avoid viewing them as ‘normal’. Many of the observations of Tocqueville seem to shock and astound him and appear genuinely alien to him. Ultimately, however, the intimidation or even reverence with which Tocqueville holds these technologies restricts the extent to which he is able to conceptualize this power in a broader context. As the power of modernity over its own citizens is further probed in this chapter it will become clear that the estrangement that Tocqueville experiences does not necessarily stem from an obvious difference between France and America. His insightful observations more likely stem from the fact that as a foreigner he is to some extent ‘other’ from the American system and is not a product of the identity that he describes and

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<sup>14</sup> Dario Melossi. *The State of Social Control: A Sociological Study of Concepts of State and Social Control in the Making of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 102.

<sup>15</sup> Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, p. 244.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 7.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 303.

<sup>18</sup> Ronald Takaki quoted in Melossi, *The State of Social Control*, p. 102.

accordingly is able to self-reflect upon it, given critical distance. This also suggests that the observations of Tocqueville were not entirely a sign of his immense prescience but rather were a result of his distance from it. This awareness of modern rationality as a mindset or even an ideology and the role it plays in social organisation is a central concern for this thesis and can be further seen in theories of alienation.

## **Alienation and the self**

Alienation has been used in a wide variety of contexts and with different intentions.<sup>19</sup> Alienation can refer to feelings of unease or hostility from or toward another person, loneliness, physical separation from an object, or even the legal transfer of property. Here there will be a shift away from these general descriptive usages toward the specific, older theoretical understanding of it, whereby it can offer an account of the way in which processes driven by modern rationality act upon individuals and social groups. In that context then alienation is best used in the various senses that it was employed by G.W.F. Hegel, in the early writings of Karl Marx and by such existentialist writers as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. The general usage amongst these writers depicts an alienation from the self as a result of rational practices or thought. According to these theorists, self-alienation manifests in a number of ways culminating in alienation from faith, labour or society more generally.

Hegel's initial concern with alienation stemmed from the break-down of an authentic connection between man and God. Hegel argued that understandings of God were being imposed by authority rather than the thought of the individual. He saw this as a situation where individuals were less likely to understand the ways in which they interrelated with, and were actively involved in, shaping the external world. This attempt to objectify what Hegel viewed as the projection of the thoughts and truths of the subject represented a symptom of man's self-alienation.<sup>20</sup> Hegel's observation offers an early concern with the implications that result from claims to knowledge and in this sense it can also be seen as a criticism of control exercised on an individual by an authority. He suggests that the acceptance of knowledge is determined by authority not by the reasons behind it, giving

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<sup>19</sup> Richard Schacht, *Alienation* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. lix-lxv.

<sup>20</sup> Richard Schacht, "Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and the Future of Self-Alienation" in Felix Geyer and Walter R. Heinz (eds.), *Alienation, Society and the Individual: Continuity and Change in Theory and Research* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1992), pp. 1-16.

rise to a status quo and undermining the critical capacity of philosophy to question and initiate change.<sup>21</sup> For Hegel “the objectivity of the deity increased in direct proportion to the increase in the corruption and slavery of man”, which brings about a world where men are passive onlookers alienated from their faith and from one another.<sup>22</sup>

Marx continued this concern of Hegel’s in his early writings, but shifted the concern of alienation from the broad issue of the objectification of man to the more applied separation of man’s labour from the end product. Marx describes how the alienation of man from his labour via money and the market allows the material production process to create social classes whereby control is limited to the elites. On one hand the alienation in the work of Marx attempts to move away from a grand theoretical explanation of mankind to a specific political mode of analysis. This focus not only provides an excellent insight into the effect of the rationality of the capitalist production process on the individual but also illustrates the role this process itself plays in individualising and controlling workers. On the other hand, however, this specific focus is fixed firmly within the sphere of labour relations. The strength of Marx’s analysis derives from his insights into the process of an individual’s alienation from labour and the application of this to the constitution of class structures. The question for this thesis is whether this analysis can be extended beyond the class analysis to the operation of foreign policy and consequent alienation of individuals, particularly insofar as Marx’s analysis of class allows him to connect individual alienation to a broader class analysis. In short, Marx offers significant insight into man’s alienation from labour but this class-based analysis is not as flexible as other perspectives on alienation.<sup>23</sup>

Heidegger’s concern is with man’s existence in the world, what he describes as ‘they-self’. The ‘they-self’ is a self that is not properly individual but rather made up of everyone and no-one in particular. For Heidegger this form of existence is “not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating.”<sup>24</sup> This conception of alienation is more concerned with the ontology of being, rather than class divisions and the control of labour. That is, his concern is explicitly with self-alienation at a fundamental level. Indeed, the Heideggerian state of alienation does not change the self into something else, but rather

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<sup>21</sup> Alvin W. Gouldner, *Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory*, ch. 6.

<sup>22</sup> Hegel quoted in Georg Lukacs, *The Young Hegel* (London: Merlin Press, 1975), p. 18.

<sup>23</sup> Schacht, *Alienation*, pp. 113-114.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 222.

into another form of self, one that is “entangled in itself.”<sup>25</sup> The alienation of the ‘they-self’ is seen as constantly tempting and requires ongoing self-reflection or ‘uncanniness’ in order to maintain an ‘authentic’ self. In Heidegger’s account of alienation, it is not so much an external force exerting control over the individual but rather a mindset that is relatively freely adopted by the individual under which they then unconsciously exert control over themselves. The power and uneasiness of Heidegger’s understanding of alienation is that, like the account provided by Tocqueville, the sense of alienation is as likely to be as prevalent within a democracy as in other, less enlightened, forms of political and social organization.

Sartre does not offer a very consistent understanding of alienation. Indeed his usage of it varies across his works.<sup>26</sup> Generally speaking his concern is more applied than Hegel or Heidegger and is often concerned with the effect that labour and capitalism has on the self. Sartre does, however, broaden its usage to include the totalizing processes that produce a generalised alienation “through the praxis of others, and through his own praxis as other, the domination of man by matter... and domination of matter by man.”<sup>27</sup> Der Derian offers a rationale for this broadening by Sartre, suggesting that

since all types of praxis are alienable or potentially hostile, the concept of alienation is expanded by Sartre to include other forms of domination through alienation. This means that there are multiple, often overlapping mediations at work in all sectors of society.<sup>28</sup>

Der Derian’s interpretation of Sartre suggests that alienation can be used in ways that are more flexible than Marx and perhaps more applied than Hegel or Heidegger. This ultimately rudimentary articulation suggests that Sartre’s discussion could potentially offer a broad-based understanding of control, which might be called an ‘alienated society’ along the lines of the ‘disciplinary society’ articulated by Foucault.

While the theory of alienation has been often used in political theory to describe domestic social processes, it has not been widely used to understand foreign policy. Der Derian is an exception to this. In his writings on diplomacy, he holds that the interrelations between

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 223.

<sup>26</sup> Schacht, *Alienation*, pp. 218-230.

<sup>27</sup> Jean Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason: Volume One*. (transl. by Alan Sheridan-Smith) (Verso, NY: 2004), p. 152.

<sup>28</sup> James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1987), p. 26.



nation-states are also evidence of a kind of alienation. Der Derian revises the English School of IR, particularly the work of Hedley Bull on diplomatic culture, suggesting that “it is difference, deviance and otherness which constitute and reveal the need for a diplomatic culture.”<sup>29</sup> While something of a progressive element within orthodox IR, the English School maintains a solely external focus to its accounts of international politics. The English School, like realists, see the international realm as anarchic in the sense described by Thomas Hobbes. Drawing, however, on the ideas of Immanuel Kant and Hugo Grotius anarchy is mediated by the practices and laws of a society of states. Deviating from the English School, Der Derian draws on the insights of Foucault, arguing that various historical and linguistic modes of diplomacy have in fact produced the estrangement of states from one another. Accordingly, Der Derian’s use of alienation begins to explore how external diplomacy may affect the self insofar as it is implicated in the historical construction of states as discrete inviolable entities. What is needed in turn is to be able to capture the effect of foreign policy upon the internal social order of the state.

### **Weber and the ‘iron cage’**

The Weberian understanding of the ‘iron cage’ highlights similar themes as the analyses of alienation, particularly as it relates to the power of rationality over society as it is enacted through human labour. In the context of this chapter, Weber’s concern with the effects of rationality is important. Weber confronts the restrictive elements of Enlightenment rationality, in particular the seemingly cold, inescapable efficiency and reason of bureaucracy that Weber describes as an ‘instrumental rationality’. According to one author, Weber viewed “bureaucratic organization [as] the animate machine that corresponded to the inanimate machine of the factory and fabricated the shell of bondage encasing the modern worker.”<sup>30</sup> It was this mindset of the capitalist work ethic that Weber felt would ultimately constrain the freedom of man and for which he coined the famous phrase ‘the iron cage’.<sup>31</sup> The iron cage is seen to represent the way in which the human body could become trapped as a result of the pursuit of instrumental rationality. This meant the human body would not be literally harmed or coercively punished by a controlling state,

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>30</sup> Martin Albrow, “The Application of the Weberian Concept of Rationalization to Contemporary Conditions” in Scott Lash & Sam Whimster (eds.), *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 179.

<sup>31</sup> Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. (transl. by Talcott Parsons) (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 181.

but rather that through the bureaucratic mindset man would become imprisoned by itself. In this sense his concern is similar to that of Marx but incorporating the effects of self-alienation that concerned Hegel and Heidegger.

Weber was also concerned over the effect that instrumental rationality would have on traditional values and practices. In accordance with the Hegelian concerns of an alienation from faith, Weber felt that the consequence of the rationalisation of society toward the goal of efficiency would be the secularisation and ultimately the 'disenchantment' of individuals. The attempt to either perfect or reject social traditions would give rise to a world devoid of meaning except that which would be provided by external goods. The Weberian iron cage provides a powerful and stark conception of the associated elements that attend the freedom and liberty of modern reason. His account describes the effect of this mentality upon the self-conception of the individual, and the subsequent implications for society more broadly. This Weberian analysis strongly informs the thinking of many important critics of the power of rationality over the self, particularly the theorists that framed what became known as the Frankfurt School. Before addressing these thinkers, however, it is important to touch upon the work of Gramsci, a political activist and thinker who was associated with these theorists.

### **Gramsci and hegemony**

Like alienation, hegemony has a wide and general usage. Unlike alienation, the more general usage of hegemony stills retains some of its specific political meaning relating to control and domination, although it often lacks the subtlety that its Gramscian meaning entails. Antonio Gramsci was a Marxist activist who was imprisoned in 1926 by the Italian Fascist government under laws enacted by a declared state of emergency. Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* have made a major contribution to both Marxism and Critical Theory. According to Gramsci, hegemony expands the understanding of class domination and brings it together with the idea of 'false consciousness', a concept associated with the Marxian understanding of alienation. False consciousness in that sense was a fixation on the accumulation of material goods, achieved through labour, at the expense of a broader political consciousness. For Gramsci, bringing together the two Marxian notions of class domination and false consciousness allowed two understandings of control to be reached;

coercive control and consensual control, or hegemony.<sup>32</sup> Coercive control is the more conventional understanding of literal power or force that can be exercised against individuals. Consensual control or hegemony focuses on the processes of control that lead an individual to “‘voluntarily’ assimilate that world-view... of the dominant group.”<sup>33</sup> Hegemony occurs as a result of broad social and ideological ascendancy that ultimately fashions the consent of individuals. This consensual process of control is thus seen to be produced and reproduced through a network of apparatuses, culture and discourse that are to some extent seen to be ‘outside’ of the political arena. In this context Gramsci describes the state as being “‘hegemony protected by the armour of coercion.’”<sup>34</sup> Thus the maintenance of control entails the interaction of force and consent.<sup>35</sup>

The Gramscian distinction between consensual and coercive methods of control offers a simple yet effective insight into the subtleties of control. While the distinction between consensual and coercive control can be drawn, they are fundamentally related. The consensual control requires processes of incentive and deterrence, while equally coercive regulation cannot be directed against every citizen at once and requires wider processes of consent to be effective. Having observed a potent nexus of political and social power, and indeed falling foul of it himself, Gramsci envisioned ways to resist it. The strength of Gramsci’s work lies in its ability to discern subtle methods of control but also to theorise ways in which they may be resisted. In seeking both to understand and to resist control “Gramsci de-emphasized the politico-military aspects of ‘class war’ and emphasized instead the politico-cultural aspects of hegemony building.”<sup>36</sup> Overcoming the power of coercive and consensual control was best pursued not by attempting to overcome the coercive powers through armed struggle but rather to shift the consent for the regime through ‘counter-hegemonic resistance’ waged via mediums such as cultural or social movements or forms of personal resistance. This was seen as best achieved through the very channels that hegemony itself was exercised; that is, through intellectual and social movements. Through cultural resistance Gramsci offered a path to social and political change that

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<sup>32</sup> Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (ed. & transl. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith) (New York: International Publisher, 1971), p. 218.

<sup>33</sup> Paul Ransome, *Antonio Gramsci: An Introduction* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1998), p. 150.

<sup>34</sup> Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 262.

<sup>35</sup> Roger Simon, *Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction* (revised edn.) (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991), p. 22.

<sup>36</sup> Dario Melossi, *The State of Social Control: A Sociological Study of Concepts of State and Social Control in the Making of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 88.

seemed less susceptible to the pitfalls of idealistic visions of change identified in the critiques of rationality addressed throughout this chapter.

## Frankfurt School, rationality and modernity

The Frankfurt School is a philosophical and sociological movement that is associated with the ideas of Critical Theory. Key thinkers include Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and to some extent Jürgen Habermas. Like Gramsci, the concerns of these thinkers stemmed from a desire to understand the reasons for the failure of the revolutionary theories of Marx and the rise of fascism in its stead.<sup>37</sup> This breakdown between theory and practice was not seen to represent absolute flaws in these theories but rather a narrow or one-sided understanding of them. Given such a narrow understanding, the project of critical theory was to critique theories that appeared to be one-sided in order to be aware of the side-effects that accompany notions like liberty and democracy.<sup>38</sup> This approach sought to avoid positivist theorising and instrumental rationality, believing it led toward absolutist conceptions, which regulated humans as equally as it freed them. They took particular issue “with any social theory which, under the cover of scientific objectivity, effectively conspires with the existing order.”<sup>39</sup> The Frankfurt School critiques were broad-ranging, however, in the context of the concern of this chapter it is the ability to discern widespread, yet subtle processes of control that is particularly of interest. With this in mind there are two central aspects of the work of the Frankfurt School that are relevant here.

### *Enlightenment rationality*

The very same rationality which provides for humankind’s emancipation from the bondage of mythic powers and allows for progressive domination over nature, engenders, through its intrinsic character, a return to myth and new, even more absolute forms of domination.<sup>40</sup>

The Enlightenment, particularly in the sense that it is used by Horkheimer and Adorno in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, refers not so much specifically to the philosophy of the 18<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> David West, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 193.

<sup>38</sup> This is captured well by West; “genuinely critical theory must identify human potentialities neglected within the existing social order, and so uncover the ‘negative’ moments of existing reality – that moment in other words, which promises further dialectical transformation. Needless to say, it is this negative dimension of present society which is invisible to positive science.” Ibid., p. 660.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>40</sup> J. M. Bernstein, ‘Introduction’ in Theodor W. Adorno, *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture* (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 4.

century, but to the processes of technological and scientific domination that ensued. *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* is an emblematic articulation of Frankfurt School concerns and to some extent the key concerns of this chapter. It sought to confront the Enlightenment, highlighting the workings of its internal logic and the tendency for this logic to produce the outcomes other than the objectives that, within modern liberal society, are held in such high esteem. In this way it “chart[ed] the *self*-destruction of Enlightenment.”<sup>41</sup> This very ambitious project is one that they describe as “nothing less than the discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition is sinking into a new kind of barbarism.”<sup>42</sup> The inspiration for turning this critical attention back on the Enlightenment can be traced to Friedrich Nietzsche and, like several of the other thinkers addressed in this chapter, Horkheimer and Adorno sought to critique the processes of domination inherent within instrumental rationality.<sup>43</sup>

For Horkheimer and Adorno it is this rationality that allows science to develop ways in which we can verifiably ‘know’ the natural world. Based on this knowledge it is possible to predict and control nature through processes of domination. In their writing, Horkheimer and Adorno describe subjective reality as ‘nature’ and in that context man’s attempt to create objective knowledge is seen as an attempt to remove itself from its nature.<sup>44</sup> This conception allows them to link and equate enlightened man’s domination of nature through science with the domination of individuals and society through instrumental rationality.<sup>45</sup> The result of this is that

[t]hinking objectifies itself to become an automatic, self-activating process; an impersonation of the machine that it produces itself so that ultimately the machine can replace it.<sup>46</sup>

Elsewhere, Horkheimer also states that Enlightenment pursuit of freedom is “identical with the control of nature in us and outside us through rational decision.”<sup>47</sup> For Habermas there is a similar concern to that of his earlier critical theorist counterpart when he argues that “[t]he permanent sign of Enlightenment is domination over an objectified external nature

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<sup>41</sup> Emphasis added, *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (transl. by John Cumming) (2<sup>nd</sup> edn.) (London: Verso, 1986), p. xi.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-42; for an account of the critiques of this formulation see Paul Connerton, *Tragedy of the Enlightenment: An Essay on the Frankfurt School* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 62-79.

<sup>46</sup> Horkheimer & Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 25.

<sup>47</sup> Horkheimer quoted in Connerton, *Tragedy of Enlightenment*, p. 63.

and a repressed internal nature.”<sup>48</sup> These accounts also maintain that positive interpretations of the Enlightenment are accompanied by the tendency for Enlightenment rationality to engender control of the processes of decision-making and identity creation as equally as it seeks to dominate the processes of nature through science.

The pursuit of instrumental rationality and its tendency toward control and categorisation creates what is described as an ‘administered society’.<sup>49</sup> The pursuit of the Enlightenment progress was seen to be best achieved through a commitment to expert and objective knowledge and by participating in the capitalist economy. Many individuals, however, lack the combination of time and expertise required to play a genuine part in understanding important political and social processes. Thus individuals become “subjected to the ‘technical apparatus’ originally designed to serve them.”<sup>50</sup> Whilst the organization of society on the basis of achieving efficiency has led to an unprecedented level of social and economic productivity, the totalising processes of the administered society has equally led to the breakdown of “individuality and particularity” within society.<sup>51</sup> According to Marcuse, the social implications of an administered society constitute a system of social control.<sup>52</sup> In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse shares the concerns of his Frankfurt School colleagues that the use of “technology rather than terror” suppresses social processes to the point where “the scope of society’s domination over the individual is greater than ever before.”<sup>53</sup> The influence of the early work of Marx and Hegel is evident in the importance he places on ‘alienation’ in the creation of the subject. According to Marcuse, “[a]lienation is the constant and essential element of identity, the objective side of the subject” that “isolates the individual from the one dimension where he could ‘find himself’: from his political existence.”<sup>54</sup> Marcuse’s account is similar to earlier articulations of alienation, highlighting that the instrumental rationalisation of most dimensions of everyday life

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<sup>48</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), quoted in West, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, p. 62.

<sup>49</sup> Craig Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 31.

<sup>50</sup> West, *Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, p. 62.

<sup>51</sup> Douglas Kellner, *Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989), p. 54.

<sup>52</sup> See Chapter 1, ‘The New Forms of Control’ in Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. x.

<sup>54</sup> Herbert Marcuse, ‘Repressive Tolerance’, in Paul Connerton (ed.), *Critical Sociology* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1976), p.323; see also Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore Jr & Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).

creates a range of material and identity concerns for the self that cause it to become increasingly depoliticised.

### *Enlightenment as mass deception*

These preliminary articulations by the Frankfurt School of the power of Enlightenment rationality over the self can be seen clearly in relation to culture. In a similar manner to Gramsci, Frankfurt School theorists viewed the political and social power of the Enlightenment logic to be proliferating in a way that was broader and more diffuse than would be the case through just 'political' means. The outline of what became known as the 'culture industry' was laid out by Horkheimer and Adorno in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The operation of control through cultural forms was seen by these authors as a project of "mass deception", one that operates both at the level of individual self-deception and at a general social level of cultural trends.<sup>55</sup> This process of deception through culture was not seen as an explicit project consciously waged by elites, but rather the diffusion of instrumentally rational approaches throughout everyday culture, which in turn shapes knowledge, identity and prioritisation of particular material goals, thus recreating the existing order. Exposure to, and participation in, mass culture is accordingly seen as a process whereby social groups subject themselves to the power of public and private forms of social control.<sup>56</sup>

This initial articulation prompted a number of more substantial accounts. Following on from his work with Horkheimer, Adorno argued that even for those who are able to see through the deception of the culture industry, they are not able to be free from it. If they act outside of the norms it purveys, Adorno argues, they will be exposed as outsiders and accordingly obliged to again submit to the same dominating culture.<sup>57</sup> As well as disputing the idea that the potent influence of culture can be avoided, Adorno warns against any perception that it can be apolitically consumed.

There is no immediacy of culture: wherever it allows itself to be consumed arbitrarily by a public as consumer goods, it manipulates people. The subject becomes the subject of culture only through the mediation of objective discipline.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Horkheimer & Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 120.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

<sup>57</sup> 'The Schema of Mass Culture' in Adorno, *The Culture Industry*, pp. 82-83.

<sup>58</sup> 'Culture and Administration', in Adorno, *The Culture Industry*, p. 112.

According to Adorno, culture can no longer be seen as just a sector of society but is rather a vastly pervasive system of administered norms that “impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves.”<sup>59</sup> Culture thus not only operates as a mechanism of social control, it has become the “very mechanism which ties the individual to his society.”<sup>60</sup>

The Frankfurt School critique offers a penetrating insight into Enlightenment rationality and culture. Their critique demonstrates that the “reason which was to be the means to satisfying human ends became its own end, and thereby turned against the true aims of Enlightenment: freedom and happiness.”<sup>61</sup> This articulation captures the sentiment of this chapter and is suggestive of how foreign policy might operate domestically via the culture industry. Indeed, evoking a ghastly apparition Adorno describes

the terror for which the people of every land are being prepared glares ever more threateningly from the rigid features of these culture-masks: in every peal of laughter we hear the menacing voice of extortion and the comic types are legible signs which represent the contorted bodies of revolutionaries.<sup>62</sup>

This powerful imagery is evocative and begins to capture the complex interweaving of culture with looming articulations of danger pervaded by foreign policy. This cultural process of control is instructive as to how subsequent chapters will seek to understand the effects of foreign policy. Perhaps, however, the Frankfurt School articulation is too severe. Furthermore, the concern of the Frankfurt School with the effects that material goods have on the organization of society is insightful but not entirely suited to describing foreign policy. The framework required to make the domestic effects of foreign policy intelligible needs to be both subtle and extensive given that the role of foreign policy in social control goes largely unnoticed.

## The ‘iron cage’ revisited

In light of the incisiveness of the Frankfurt School critique and their clear indebtedness to Weber it is necessary to briefly revisit the latter. Like the notions of alienation and hegemony, the Weberian ‘iron cage’ metaphor evokes powerful imagery and has

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<sup>59</sup> ‘The Culture Industry Revisited’, in Adorno, *The Culture Industry*, p. 92.

<sup>60</sup> Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, p. 9.

<sup>61</sup> Bernstein, ‘Introduction’, p. 4.

<sup>62</sup> Adorno, ‘The Schema of Mass Culture’, p. 82.



proliferated widely, achieving a wider audience and more general usage.<sup>63</sup> As a result it has been argued that something of the more specific understanding it stems from has been left behind. Peter Baehr suggests that the metaphor employed by Weber is far more sophisticated and modern than the original 'iron cage' translation implies and that the original author of the phrase 'iron cage' is the translator, Talcott Parsons.<sup>64</sup> The phrase Weber originally employed was *Stahlhartes Gehäuse* and in translating this it seems that Parsons may have sought to evoke a particular, emotionally-laden term from 17<sup>th</sup> century puritan Christian literature.<sup>65</sup> In doing this Parsons has substituted a meaning that carries far more negative connotations than a strict translation might. Literally translated Weber's phrase means 'shell as hard as steel'.<sup>66</sup> Whilst this does not have quite the same lyrical quality it offers some alternative dimensions to the Weberian analysis.

Baehr argues that Weber was trying to describe a much more ambivalent image of modernity. In comparison to the 'iron cage', the Weberian 'shell' represents not so much a denial of liberty as an organic transformation in which the processes of enclosure and restraint are part of the human body itself.<sup>67</sup> The idea of the cage represents a more overt imprisonment and conscious restriction of the individual, a situation whereby the imprisoned can see out of the cage and witness the life they are prohibited from. Contrary to this, the idea of the shell suggests more of a narrowing of the available space in which life could be lived, a state that man would unconsciously impose on itself in order to feel secure. Baehr also points out that steel is a man-made material whereas iron is a natural element, seeking to further support the idea that under the revisionist interpretation the form of control is something created and imposed by individuals upon themselves.<sup>68</sup> In another instance Baehr suggests that where the Parsons translation reads 'last stage', it should instead read 'last men', drawing on the Nietzschean 'Last Man', a much more

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<sup>63</sup> For example a 'Google Scholar' search retrieves many articles in the area of organizational management offering 'iron cage' puns. Accessed from [scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=iron+cage&btnG=Search](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=iron+cage&btnG=Search) on 2/3/2006.

<sup>64</sup> "The 'Iron Cage' and the 'Shell as Hard as Steel': Parsons, Weber, and the *Stahlhartes Gehäuse* metaphor in the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*", *History and Theory* 40, May 2001, p. 154.

<sup>65</sup> The 'iron cage' metaphor was employed by the 17<sup>th</sup> century Puritan preacher John Bunyan in *The Pilgrim's Progress* (1678), *Ibid.*, p. 158.

<sup>66</sup> Baehr suggest that if Weber had wanted to use a metaphor like that of the 'iron cage' there are German phrases that would better capture it than the one he used. The phrase was employed in a context where the cage or shell would be worn 'like a cloak', again suggesting that cage did not correspond with the overall concept, "The 'Iron Cage' and the 'Shell as Hard as Steel'", p. 163.

<sup>67</sup> David Chalcraft, 'Bringing the Text Back In: On Ways of Reading the Iron Cage Metaphor in the Two Editions of the Protestant Ethic' in Larry J Ray and Michael Reed (eds.), *Organizing Modernity: Weberian Perspectives on Work, Organization and Society* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 29-39.

<sup>68</sup> Baehr, "The 'Iron Cage' and the 'Shell as Hard as Steel'", p. 162.

“sated, mediocre and philistine” understanding of humanity.<sup>69</sup> This understanding of enlightened humanity as being suppressed, passive, managed, unaware yet content as a result of the modern technologies of organization and understanding brings Weber even closer to many of the established accounts of control.

## Theories of social control

Social Control is an established, although contested, sub-discipline of sociology and criminology. Broadly conceived in the 1960s it encompasses “virtually all of the human practices and arrangements that contribute to social order and, in particular, that influence people to conform.”<sup>70</sup> It has since taken on a narrower focus of social attempts to “define and respond to deviant behaviour.”<sup>71</sup> To some extent it is an attempt to formally enunciate many of the themes addressed so far in this chapter and accordingly it is necessary to briefly touch upon it here as it can articulate foreign policy’s ability to enact forms of social control. Whilst foreign policy has never been a primary concern, social control theorists have had a long-running interest in the modern techniques of control and regulation like many of the authors addressed here, and may be able to offer some insight into how foreign policy may be further explored.

The study of social control does not seek to necessarily condemn nor condone practices of control but rather better understand them. As suggested earlier, the idea of social control in its popular characterisations carries something of a pejorative or perhaps even dystopian connotation. The more sophisticated engagements with social control that have been highlighted so far in this chapter tend to portray it as an ambivalent or ambiguous process rather than something that is overly and necessarily negative. Ultimately, however theorists of social control tend to stop short of advocating it as a positive widespread social practice, largely because of concerns over domination that have been a central theme of this chapter. Gibbs for instance, a sociological theorist of social control, highlights that social control is far from the ideal where “benign social guidance or utilitarian principles came to prevail over the barbarous coercive regimes of the past,”<sup>72</sup> though he maintains

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 160.

<sup>70</sup> Donald Black, “Introduction” in Donald Black (ed.), *Toward A General Theory of Social Control: Selected Problems* (New York: Academic Press, 1984), p. 4.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>72</sup> Lewis A. Coser, ‘The Notion of Control in Sociological Theory’ in Jack P. Gibbs (ed.), *Social Control: The Views from the Social Sciences* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), p. 19.

that it still provides scope through which to work toward some kind of normative consensus to control deviancy without having to resort to brutal and coercive means.

The sociological approach to social control offers a range of sophisticated perspectives on social control, effectively drawn from familiar perspectives. While the study of social control is complex, it can be broken up into two main approaches, structural-functionalism and labelling/interactionism. The first perspective is most prominently represented by Talcott Parsons, whose original interpretation of Weber's 'Iron Cage' has already been discussed here. This structural-functionalist position sees society as being made-up of interrelated systems that have real effects on one another through flow-on effects and overspill. The processes of social control are seen as normal social phenomena that are "often unnoticed and not necessarily a conscious component of everyday social interaction."<sup>73</sup> Within these social systems individuals are seen to be determined largely by the norms and morals of the social structures of which they are a part, constituting a form of control. The structural-functionalist position, however, sees these shared morals and norms as "ontologically prior to and independent of the social relationships with a given society."<sup>74</sup> That is, morals and norms are not regarded as being constructed through social interaction; rather they are fixed structures that society will be formed around. Thus, having made insightful and useful articulations as to the role social structures play in enacting control and regulation in everyday society, this approach seeks to employ a method that can predict and quantify these processes. This logic suggests that because individual behaviour is largely determined by structures, these structures can be used to understand individuals scientifically. What this position forgoes is an understanding of the role that society plays in constituting these norms, in addition to also being themselves, in turn, constituted by them.

Interactionism/labelling perspectives on social control are not represented by any cohesive theory and are best seen as an approach that adopts less of a totalizing explanation for the actions of individuals. Drawing George Herbert Mead's notion of interactionism, Stanley Cohen examines the construction of the individual, particularly in relation to the effect that social engagements, social status and social symbols have in constructing the sense of

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<sup>73</sup> Anne R. Edwards, *Regulation and Repression: The Study of Social Control* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 16.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

self.<sup>75</sup> In this sense it is far more subjective and interpretive than the more scientific structural-functionalist theories.<sup>76</sup> There is a concern with how meaning and symbols are constructed and how these in turn construct the individual. The individual is not only shaped by social structures but also plays a part in shaping these structures. Cohen also develops the idea of 'moral panic' in which perceived deviant or threatening groups are labelled and ostracised as a danger to established order and through "linkages between the media, agents of social control and public opinion" amplify the standing of the issue far in excess of any actual threat they may pose.<sup>77</sup> Furthermore, Cohen suggests that moral panic can "produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way that society conceives itself."<sup>78</sup> Given that the construction of a foreign policy informs and labels what is perceived as threatening and an enemy to the collective society, this broad approach can be usefully employed in order to offer insights into the power that foreign policy has over its own citizens.

Each of these approaches has constructive observations as to how aspects of modernity other than liberty and freedom are integrated into individual behaviour. The structural-functionalist approach focuses on the social forces that shape the individual whereby the individual will "internalize the core values and norms of their society" and the role this plays in allowing individuals to fit into society.<sup>79</sup> The tendency to try to observe objectively real social forces and quantify the effects that they will have on individuals limits the scope for analysing foreign policy as a domestic social force as it is only assumed to be real in the international realm. Interactionism/labelling has the scope to offer very specific accounts of the construction of the self, but perhaps lacks a concern for how this may be linked back to the broad, totalising affects that social forces exert. These sociological interpretations of social control offer some insight into these processes but are ultimately set up to deal with domestic processes, whether they be domestic structures as in the case of the former or highly specific cases of control in the case of the latter. What is needed is an analysis that can link the highly specific practices of social control to the totalising practices of national or even global discourse.

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<sup>75</sup> Stanley Cohen, *Against Criminology* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1989).

<sup>76</sup> Edwards, *Regulation and Repression*, p. 23.

<sup>77</sup> Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (St Albans: Paladin, 1973); quotation from Dawn Rothe & Stephen L. Muzzati, "Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism, Moral Panic and US Civil Society", *Critical Criminology* 12, 2004, p. 328.

<sup>78</sup> Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, p. 9.

<sup>79</sup> Edwards, *Regulation and Repression*, p. 17.

The work of Foucault has significantly impacted the understanding of social control. Regardless of whether thinkers in this area are for, against or ambivalent to the ideas of discipline and governmentality, these insights have become something of a reference point for understanding control. Foucault was able to maintain both a broad-based societal focus like that of the structural-functionalists, whilst retaining the more narrow individual-focused concerns of the interactionist/labelling approach. The Foucauldian understanding of discipline in many ways resembles the approaches of the theorists that have been addressed so far. Foucault's work informs the broader themes of this chapter given his concern with modern practices that can be seen as unintended or perhaps overlooked offshoots of Enlightenment rationality. This sensibility can be seen clearly in his frequent reference to the techniques of discipline, biopolitics and governmentality as being forms of 'technology'. The strength of Foucault's approach is that his critiques don't suggest that these various practices should, or even can be done away with. His view of such forms of social action seems quite ambivalent as the coordination of action is not the point of his critique.

### **Foucault: discipline, biopolitics and governmentality**

Discipline was never more important or more valorized than at the moment when it became important to manage a population.

- Michel Foucault<sup>80</sup>

Like many of the other perspectives addressed in this chapter, Foucault is concerned with the tendency of modern techniques that are designed to make life better to also act as mechanisms of control. For Foucault, this is not so much a separate 'dark side' as an unobserved side-effect. Rather than being entirely negative, control and regulation is equally important to processes that make life better. This can be seen initially in the notion of discipline, which he employs in a manner that offers more subtlety than the literal interpretation that is commonly used. His concern is less with what impact the actions of others have on the individual, but rather the perception that the individual has of society and how this perception causes the individual to alter their behaviour in order to fit in with the norms and actions of that society. In this sense Foucault's use of discipline is closer to what is commonly referred to as exercising 'self-discipline' or being self-conscious.

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<sup>80</sup> Michel Foucault, "Governmentality", in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Harvester Wheatsheaf: London, 1991), p. 102.

In using the term in this way Foucault unearths forgotten meanings and hidden implications associated with discipline. In this sense his usage is entirely consistent with his broader genealogical approach that underlies much of his later work. The inspiration for this is quite apt because by revisiting the once-overlooked genealogies of Nietzsche, Foucault recovered the genealogical approach itself. The genealogical approach is not a history that attempts to trace origins or construct a linear historical narrative; rather it seeks to highlight historical contestations over power and knowledge, to observe the effect that power has on truth and offer counter-histories suppressed by dominant historical narratives. It also seeks to offer histories for that which "we tend to feel [are] without history", that which is seen as an accepted and constant truth throughout history.<sup>81</sup> Something of a genealogical approach has been employed throughout this chapter as it has sort to highlight the many instances where the 'dark side' of modernity has been engaged with incisively, and often by prominent theorists, but has still not been as widely heard as the orthodox accounts.

Whilst no rigid definition of what exactly discipline *is* will be offered here, there is an obligation to convey a sense of the usage of the term and the means through which it might operate. According to Foucault:

discipline may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a technology.<sup>82</sup>

The ideas of discipline are most prominently drawn from Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, or *Surveiller et punir* in its original French. The original French word for 'discipline' offers some indication of how discipline is understood in the Foucauldian context as it bears a clear resemblance to the English 'surveillance'. In this sense the Foucauldian understanding of discipline can perhaps be seen as something like a form of surveillance; an impassive yet ever-present force, as opposed to the more literal corporal action. This is not to suggest that the two senses in which it may be used are separate and entirely different, because the intended effect on the individuals is quite similar: a change in behaviour or thought. The means through which this might be achieved, however, diverge more distinctly as the

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<sup>81</sup> Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 76.

<sup>82</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 215.

Foucauldian sense concerns itself more with the operation of power, its manifestation through discourse and the implicating of the individual as part of the *modus operandi*.

The Foucauldian notion of discipline functions in a highly efficient manner, to the extent that it often goes unnoticed. This is the case because unlike literal discipline where the individual is forced into being the subject, the Foucauldian understanding sees the individual *subjecting themselves* to discipline. This is well illustrated using Foucault's analysis of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, the example in which he initially observed this phenomenon. The Panopticon

is an annular structure with a tower at the centre, which contains – or might not contain – a guard to observe and through this observation indirectly, non-violently control the behaviour of prisoners, schoolchildren, hospital patients, military trainees, whomever finds themselves on the other side of the one-way gaze.<sup>83</sup>

The technology of the Panopticon compels the individual to constantly discipline their behaviour, given that they could never be sure that they were free from surveillance. Accordingly, the Panopticon was said to “automatise and individualise power.”<sup>84</sup> The seemingly omnipotent gaze of the Panopticon places the individual in a position where they themselves are perpetuating the unbroken psychological effect of the surveillance process and their subjection to it.

Foucault's thesis based on his reading of the effects of the Panopticon was that society in general utilises techniques of panopticism.<sup>85</sup> In this sense, a relationship of asymmetry exists whereby the regime alters and normalises individual behaviour, yet the individual remains in turn largely powerless to influence the regime.<sup>86</sup> The individual, following regular subjection to this asymmetry, would of their own accord begin to act as though they were under constant supervision, monitoring their own thoughts and actions. Consequently, panopticism can be seen as “a model of human and/or technical organisation [that] is governed by three principles: clarity, docility and utility.”<sup>87</sup> In one sense this gives rise to a very reliable and well run society, a “system of certainty”, but in

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<sup>83</sup> James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War* (New York: Blackwell, 1992), p. 30.

<sup>84</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 202.

<sup>85</sup> See *Ibid.*, pp. 195-228.

<sup>86</sup> Alec McHoul & Wendy Grace, *A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject* (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1993), p. 71.

<sup>87</sup> François Debrix, “Space Quest: Surveillance, Governance, and the Panoptic Eye of the United Nations”, *Alternatives* 24, 1999, p. 269.

another it is one that can be stifling in its lack of plurality.<sup>88</sup> While the critiques made by Foucault tend not to extend their analysis of discipline outside the boundaries of the state or to foreign policy, his critique is nonetheless incisive as the disciplinary power of panopticism can be seen to “pervade modernity.”<sup>89</sup>

Foucault did not explicitly engage with International Relations or foreign policy. He did, however, address the contemporary practice of security, a central concern in International Relations. Foucault suggested the operation of security, the practice of *raison d'état*, stemmed from the parallel development of an external “military-diplomatic apparatus” designed to manage “the balance of Europe” and an internal policing apparatus designed to maintain good order and stability within a defined territory.<sup>90</sup> The development of these apparatuses, however, is linked. Foucault identifies the seventeenth century, in particular the Thirty Years War, as the point at which the modernisation of warfare and policing began to take place.<sup>91</sup> The maintenance of peace via the European balance of power required a new conception of war, professional diplomats and a permanent military.<sup>92</sup> The massive expansion of the state’s external security apparatus came at a great cost to its subjects, which according to Foucault, necessitated a police force in order to “increas[e] the state’s forces to the maximum while preserving the state’s good order.”<sup>93</sup> Thus both the operation of foreign policy and the maintenance of internal security entail a formal, externally orientated bureaucracy. It is in this respect the counterpart to internal police powers. The *effects* of security apparatuses, whether internally or externally orientated, however, are transversal, for they pervade ideas, norms and discourse regardless of state or territorial borders. Conceived in terms of discipline, the effects of foreign policy are not limited by the intended scope of, on one hand, foreign policy and police, on the other.

Discipline can accordingly be understood in terms of its relation to the fundamental political ideas of law and security. Nick Butler describes discipline as a form of positive or productive power:

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> James Der Derian, “The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance and Speed”, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 34, iss. 3, p. 304.

<sup>90</sup> Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 296-306, 314-315 and 323-326.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. 297, 313.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. 305.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 314.



Where law is understood as a *negative* power (it prevents, it forbids, it prohibits, etc.), and where discipline is understood as a *positive* power (it obliges, it prescribes, it incites, etc.), security is understood as neither a negative nor a positive power. Instead, Foucault argues, security 'lets things happen' and then reacts to this reality in a certain way in order to limit or even neutralize its more random, aleatory effects.<sup>94</sup>

This description of Foucauldian concepts somewhat parallels Isaiah Berlin's schematic of positive and negative liberty.<sup>95</sup> Employing Mill's distinction between 'freedom from' and 'freedom to', Berlin suggested the latter, described by him as positive liberty, could include self-mastery and the ability to realise personal goals.<sup>96</sup> Here Berlin suggests the productive potential of positive liberty, although unlike Foucault he does not envision it producing or controlling the subject.<sup>97</sup> Foucauldian discipline in this sense goes one step further, occupying dual roles as something like positive liberty while also a mechanism of control.<sup>98</sup> This may seem contradictory or paradoxical, for liberty is typically seen as incompatible with control. In Chapter 3, however, the interdependence of liberty and security will be demonstrated, the genesis of which can be traced back to the contradictions of state sovereignty and modern subjectivity outlined in Chapter 1.

The power exercised by the state and many of its institutions are ascribed a prominent position in Foucault's analysis. While this may seem like a weakness, his treatment of the state is instead a major strength of his work. In attempting to describe broad-based social processes authors inevitably come up against this issue of agency, that is, the force or actor

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<sup>94</sup> Nick Butler, "The Management of Populations", *ephemera*, vol. 7, no. 3, 2007, p. 475; see also Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, p. 47.

<sup>95</sup> Negative liberty – the 'freedom from' – is the core concept of liberalism as it safeguards the individual's right to not be interfered with by external power. Positive freedom is the 'freedom to', the freedom to determine one's own actions but it further suggests that these actions (given negative freedom) will be an objective representation of the desires of the individual. Further, against the occasions where 'liberty' suggests a paternal implication and 'freedom' one that is more essentialised, Berlin uses the terms interchangeably and this will be maintained here. See Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*; see also John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" (1859), in John Gray (ed.), *John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1991), pp. 16-17.

<sup>97</sup> The essential difference between positively conceived discipline and positive freedom is that the 'freedom to' compulsion in the case of Foucault is not seen to be an objective and unaffected judgment of the self, which it is in the case of positive freedom.

<sup>98</sup> There is some contestation stemming from Charles Taylor's liberal interpretation of Foucault over whether Foucault represents a negative or positive conception of freedom, and further whether this conception of freedom need be ineluctably opposed to that of power. See for example, Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", *Political Theory*, vol. 12, no. 2, 1984, pp. 152-183; William E Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault and Otherness" *Political Theory*, vol. 13, no. 3, 1985, pp. 365-376; Charles Taylor, "Connolly, Foucault and Truth", *Political Theory*, vol. 13, no. 3, 1985, pp. 377-385; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom", *Political Studies*, XXXVII, 1989, pp. 260-276; and Charles Taylor, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom: a Reply", *Political Studies*, XXXVII, 1989, pp. 277-281.

that causes this social change.<sup>99</sup> Yet the nature of agency is contested. For example, Marxist accounts attribute agency to class structure, while neoliberal accounts see agency in the functioning of the free market. Often this issue is not squarely addressed but rather alluded to as the result of an unquantifiable amalgam of social forces. Foucault refers to the role that the state plays in the creation and legitimation of disciplinary society, which seems to suggest that Foucault is ascribing agency to the state. As Ignatieff states, however, the strength of Foucault's understanding of agency is that it is

possible to work free of the various traps which the problem of agency has caused for historians – the conspiratorial all-seeing ruling classes of the Marxist account; the low rationality model of *ad hoc* responses to social crisis, and the hyper-idealist version of reform as a humanitarian crusade.<sup>100</sup>

The question that remains is 'how is Foucault able to ascribe minimal agency to state institutions, how are they not acting as agents of social organisation?' The answer to this stems from Foucault's suggestion that in the formation of the individual as subject it is the individual subjecting themselves to discipline rather than the state.

In describing these processes of control and the role that the state plays, Foucault is not ascribing a determining role to the state, but rather a legitimating role at the level of discourse. The state institutions are to some extent centrally controlled, but take on a discursive life of their own with the authority of the state adding an official legitimacy to the discourse, creating the asymmetric power relations of disciplinary regulation.<sup>101</sup> As Gordon states "the state has no essence... the nature of the institution of the state is... a function of changes in practices of government, rather than the converse."<sup>102</sup> In this sense "Foucault explicitly rejects any explanatory schema in which notions of central state power and the economic determination of action play any major role."<sup>103</sup> This can be seen by returning to the example of the legal system. The state is involved in the justice system, but it is not "the political apparatus of the modern state that controls the prison system" rather it has its own juridical discourse and practices which are officially legitimised and supported

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<sup>99</sup> The question of agency will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

<sup>100</sup> Michael Ignatieff, 'State, Civil Society and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent Social Histories of Punishment', in Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull (eds.), *Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 94.

<sup>101</sup> Foucault, "Governmentality", p. 103.

<sup>102</sup> Colin Gordon, "Government Rationality: An Introduction", in Burchell, Gordon & Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Harvester Wheatsheaf: London, 1991), p. 4.

<sup>103</sup> Stanley Cohen & Andrew Scull, 'Social Control in History and Sociology' in Stanley Cohen & Andrew Scull (eds.), *Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 3.

by the state.<sup>104</sup> If agency is to be ascribed in Foucault's analysis it would be to each individual insofar as they interpret and are implicated in discourse. The seemingly coordinated nature of individual actions, suggesting that agency should be ascribed to a higher level, stems from the totalising processes of biopolitics and governmentality.

There is some amount of interchangeability and overlap in a number of Foucauldian terms. Discipline is fairly clear in its usage. The terms disciplinary society, biopolitics and governmentality, however, overlap somewhat and need to be distinguished. Discipline in the Foucauldian sense, as we have seen, has to be based within a broader social context in order to function and thus a disciplinary society refers to those many people who are subjected to that particular mode of discipline, whether it be on the basis of, for example, sexuality, fashion or environmental ethics. Biopolitics is derived immediately from what Foucault referred to as biopower; that which defines collective subjects as a population and co-ordinates the operation of discipline. Biopolitics then are those political effects that result from the co-ordination of subjects at the level of the population. For example this may include those in the margins, exposed to social and economic danger as a result of not being within the specified demographic to attract welfare. Biopolitics is the operation of a medical logic (that is, the maintenance of health and the prevention or containment of disease) at the level of the population. In a similar way, governmentality is the logic of the state and bureaucratic apparatuses. Whilst it may be best characterised this way governmentality is not restricted solely to operating through these mechanisms. Foucault describes governmentality as the dual operation of individualising discipline and totalising biopower. In this way, biopower normalises and co-ordinates populations and within these populations individuals operate discipline to control themselves. Thus while all three of these terms refer to the operation of the subtle effects of control there is some variation amongst them.

Biopolitics can be understood initially in terms of its relation to geopolitics. In many ways biopolitics supplants geopolitics but it could also function to consolidate it. Geopolitics is the study of politics, geography and resources as they are defined by a particular geospatial territory. Geopolitics maintains a long and influential tradition within International Relations, Strategic Studies and policy-making because of its ability to analyse the boundaries of states and the features of those areas that may affect their relations. The

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<sup>104</sup> Ignatieff, 'State, Civil Society and Total Institutions', p. 92.

great limitation of geopolitics is that it can only really comprehend the effects created by geography and resources in relation to states and macro actors. It cannot understand the complexity of social dynamics and how they impact upon individuals. The concern of biopolitics, however, is with populations, their measurement and the formulation of policies towards the aim of normalising them according to statistical means. Insofar as it is not employed as a tactic deliberately, and it is largely based in statistical measures, it is somewhat detached and apolitical in its operation. The calculation of risk, whether in relation to insurance premiums, prescription of medicine or deviance stemming from illiteracy, for instance, is based on measures of the population. In this way, biopolitics is the corollary of drafting policy on the basis of statistics and averages. It is a rationale not a causal intent.

While biopolitics has less of an international focus, often analysing subsets within states, it is bound ultimately not by geography but rather what can be determined as a population. By focusing on the population, biopolitics surpasses the limitations of the geographical state as a field of analysis. This does not spell the end of geopolitics as biopolitics could even enhance the coherence of geopolitical analysis. For if in the course of its analysis of populations its target focused on those populations that are bounded by the state it would likely make that population more predictable and more uniform, accentuating what might seem to be its geopolitical characteristics. Thus the transition from a primary focus on geopolitics to biopolitics, but also the subsequent interaction between them is likely to be somewhat obscured as biopolitical normalisation replicates and strengthens already existing norms. As will be seen, foreign policy and the norms and obligations it places on its citizens give rise to competitive state-based ideologies, in particular nationalism and patriotism. These geo-political formations are biopolitical processes as they bring together individuals as a population, whose virtue of sharing common practices and values become normalised, even to the extent that they become akin to race or a scientific classification. The relevance of a biopolitical analysis in the context of this thesis is to identify broad unifying tendencies such as the manifestations of ideology and patriotism, which function as macro-political counterparts to the micro-politics of discipline. The interaction of discipline and biopolitics can in turn be located within a wider governmental logic, or governmentality.

Like biopower, governmentality has risen to prominence posthumously as a key element of Foucauldian thought. These broader schematics of social production, power and control

were touched upon in books and collected works but extensive articulations of these machinations have only emerged in recently published lectures given at the *College de France* in the later years of his life.<sup>105</sup> Governmentality was the closest Foucault came to offering a broad explanatory schema of politics. Some interpretations of governmentality, for instance those by Mitchell Dean, parallel Habermasian theories of rational communicative action.<sup>106</sup> Others, such as Nikolas Rose, maintain radical articulations of contemporary regulatory techniques.<sup>107</sup> While there are perceived differences in its operation, the definitions of both the normative and radical reconstructions of governmentality ultimately have plenty in common. According to Dean, governmentality is “how we think about governing ourselves and others.”<sup>108</sup> Governmentality is most commonly articulated in terms of the twin operations of individual discipline and the biopolitics of the population. This can be seen in Agamben’s description of governmentality as that “which gives form to the life of the people.”<sup>109</sup> Michael Dillon describes a sophisticated system of logic that is able “to regulate and evaluate itself according to its changing understanding of the emergent natural processes that it [seeks] to govern.”<sup>110</sup> Governmentality in this sense is the form of governance that has long-characterised modern life but is articulated in a manner that captures the subtle processes of control more effectively than familiar state-based explanations.

This chapter has outlined how processes through which foreign policy enacts domestic control may be understood. Employing these frameworks for understanding modern techniques of social control renders the ‘other side’ of foreign policy intelligible. These approaches share a common concern for the constitution and control of individuals as a result of a commitment to individual rationality and the development of modern apparatuses of governance. In particular, Foucault’s account of control exercised at the level of the individual and at various levels of society is instructive as to how formal apparatuses may feed into highly diffuse and subtle processes of social control. Chapter 3

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<sup>105</sup> See in particular Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976* (New York: Picador, 2003) and *Security, Territory, Population*.

<sup>106</sup> Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (London: Sage Productions, 1999).

<sup>107</sup> Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

<sup>108</sup> Dean, *Governmentality*, p. 209.

<sup>109</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (transl. by Kevin Attell) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 151.

<sup>110</sup> Michael Dillon, “Governing Through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance”, *Political Geography* vol. 26, no. 1, 2007, p. 42.

will expand on Foucault's analysis of discipline, biopolitics and governmentality applying it specifically to foreign policy as an apparatus of domestic discipline and control.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Foreign policy as domestic discipline and control**

This chapter aims to demonstrate how the effects of foreign policy can be understood not only between countries but also within. The initial section will highlight the nature of foreign policy and its limitations when understood according to an 'either foreign or domestic' conception of global politics. This either/or conception of politics relies on the dichotomized understanding of sovereignty detailed in Chapter 1. Creating foreign policy within the confines of an 'either/or' mentality, where political space is either foreign or domestic, not only ensures that foreign policy takes on a bridging or protecting role but continually affirms its function as a specific instrumental tool within orthodox IR. In doing so, foreign policy practice perpetuates this potent figuration of IR.

Taking this insight as a provocation, remaining sections will reconceptualise foreign policy. The first of these will highlight hidden or excluded narratives within this account of foreign policy, in order to think beyond the confinement of cartographical and intellectual boundary lines that are continually being imposed. This chapter will subsequently highlight that foreign policy is a modern apparatus of government, which in navigating international

diplomacy extensively shapes domestic identity and the structure of domestic society. Finally, the creation of foreign policy on the premise of a clear-cut liberty versus security distinction will be shown to be a practice that gives rise to a detailed and minute, yet highly prolific regulation process by which the domestic population is controlled.

## **Foreign policy and the international state system**

The concept of interest defined as power...provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible rational continuum.

- Hans J. Morgenthau, 1948<sup>1</sup>

The territorially defined sovereign state is what makes the notion of an inside and outside, domestic and foreign plausible. The instrumental function of foreign policy within this array of traditional 'high politics' bears the very distinctive mark of the sovereign commitment to exclusive oppositions. Foreign policy is one of the foremost tools of the state directed towards this end as its primary function is to mediate the foreign and domestic realms. The concern of this thesis is to add an additional dimension of analysis to this understanding, which questions the inherited orthodoxy of dichotomous understandings of IR. Instead, it proposes to offer an account of the role that a state's foreign policy plays in organising its domestic politics. This section will briefly outline the orthodox location of foreign policy within IR and then highlight the limitations of this position, opening the way for a more wide-ranging interpretation of the influence of foreign policy and national security prerogatives in shaping global politics.

Traditional principles of IR give rise to typically limited accounts of foreign policy. This can be seen in the words of Morgenthau above, in which he lauds the consistency of foreign policy across time and space, when founded upon the self interested pursuit of state power. This orthodox understanding of foreign policy sees it as a state response to an external necessity, something outside the state that requires a response. External necessity is seen to pre-exist the state's interaction with it. Thus, external necessity may be generated by a series of disparate or related threats, and they are most likely threats as this is the underlying nature of the anarchy in the international realm. Implicit in this then,

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<sup>1</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (5<sup>th</sup> edn.) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973 [1948]), p. 5.



is the inherited presumption, derived from the modern understanding of sovereignty, of a relatively uncontested and ordered domestic realm contrasted with a seemingly uncertain and disordered external realm. It is this domestic/external, order/disorder dichotomy that foreign policy is seen to mediate.

Under this dichotomized conception, foreign policy occupies the space in-between the foreign and the domestic. As equally as it is a 'wall' or 'boundary' that separates the inside from outside, it also connects states, either through diplomacy or through war. In this sense, foreign policy is seen to act as a 'bridge' in IR. Given that foreign policy is largely concerned with protecting and mediating external threats from the anarchical realm, its primary concern has tended to be military security and war. International legislation and interpersonal communication take secondary concern in foreign policy. Such civilities are deemed to be a concern of the law-abiding and orderly domestic realm, whereas the anarchical realm cannot be realistically expected to abide by sovereign concessions if there is no centralised sovereign power to enforce them. Thus, a series of principles that adhere to the dichotomies of IR shape the nature of conventional understandings of foreign policy. As with the self-perpetuating and mutually reinforcing dichotomies of modern sovereignty and the modern subject examined in Chapter 1, so long as the practice of foreign policy adheres to the traditional principles of IR it also perpetuates and reinforces particular trends in knowledge and practice. In this respect foreign policy is not entirely static but rather a reflection of particular ways of understanding IR and as such it has histories in which it has operated in a number of different guises.

### *Aporias of foreign policy and the self*

The accounts of classical and modern sovereignty provided in Chapter 1 depicted an interpretation of foreign policy concerned solely with that which is located geographically outside the state. According to Campbell it "is this historical narrative of the rise of the state in Western Europe which... has been pivotal in making it possible to talk about foreign policy as the external orientation of a pre-established state."<sup>2</sup> These cartographic representations of inside and outside, however, have been shown to have a history, one in which meanings have been contested and binaries have been actively created and maintained, in so doing, defining a clear identity for those who constitute that state. Thus,

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<sup>2</sup> David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1992), p. 41-42.

as a result of the nature of state sovereignty, Bartelson suggests that “we are left with a general theory of the state whose coherence is constantly threatened by its efforts to cope with that which is alien and new to it.”<sup>3</sup> This threat to coherence comes as much from within the state as it does from without, for the modern state is after all understood as a relatively cohesive social body. Internal difference within the state poses a threat to the state as difference is meant to be found outside of the state, a threat foreign policy is designed to mediate. The way in which the state does this is, on one hand, through its obvious foreign policy actions and policies, but then also through the opposition of contrasting identities both inside and out, which allows ambiguity to be assimilated or sharply distinguished. In this regard the histories offered by Shapiro, Burke and Campbell are of great use in highlighting the limitations and contradictions - or aporias - within cartographic representation of inside and outside, self and other.

Shapiro’s discussion of US foreign policy towards Central America problematises the orthodox renderings of sharply distinguished categories of inside/outside and self/other, exposing it instead as discourses of representation. Shapiro presents an account that

resists absorption into traditional modes of analysing foreign policy, it attempts to engage a critical mode, one that treats a discourse in terms of the discursive economies in which it participates rather than on the basis of what are ordinarily taken as the referents of its statements.<sup>4</sup>

This approach does not take foreign policy to be a simple response to external necessity between states. Instead it regards foreign policy as a discourse, processes of representation that construct the nature of the foreign other according to historically conceived notions.

Thus

foreign policy discourse is governed by a historically developed representational practice which is primarily geopolitical and this has been combined with a way of constituting the Other, which places that other in a lesser moral space.<sup>5</sup>

In this way foreign policy is self-serving in the sense that it reinforces domestic identity and “construct[s] a world at the expense of others” inasmuch as it is the pursuit of the rational

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<sup>3</sup> Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 136.

<sup>4</sup> Michael J. Shapiro, “The Constitution of the Central American Other: The Case of ‘Guatemala’” in *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography and Policy Analysis* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 122.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.

external interests of the state.<sup>6</sup> This approach, however, does not simply seek to “point to the moral failings... and simply state as a moral imperative that we should treat the other as an equally worthy self” but also highlights the role that foreign policy plays in creating the nature of its “subjects, objects and relationships.”<sup>7</sup> Viewed in this way foreign policy is not just a process of mediation between two pre-existing political identities but rather a discourse in which the two political realms are distinguished and each respective identity is made distinct from one another.

Drawing from the Australian colonial experience, Burke offers a history of the creation of the Australian subject by presenting it as a series of attempts to externalise internal difference. This is initially done through analysing the policies that defined convicts as literally foreign to the British.<sup>8</sup> The operation of the familiar sovereign logic can be seen from the outset in

the British government’s desire to rid their island of an entire ‘criminal class’, to cocoon their security behind an apartheid of sea and unfathomable distance, [which] conformed to the liberal ontology of Hobbes, Locke and Bentham, [positing] a healthy ‘Commonwealth’ upon the virulent Other of the criminal, who could it seemed, be excised from the social body like a cancer.<sup>9</sup>

By dividing and categorising according to the contrasting characteristics of civility and criminality, the British attempted to preserve a cohesive image of the well-mannered and urbane British identity in contrast to the external expelled criminal convicts. In this attempt to secure the domestic British realm, a commitment can be seen to the binaries of inside/outside and self/other in the expulsion of those who were seen as ‘other’ to a separate, geographically external location in what later became Australia. When viewed this way the early colonisation of Australia can be seen as not so much a voyage of discovery as the creation or invention of a political space.<sup>10</sup> What’s more, it was an entirely literal attempt to enact a ‘foreign policy’ against those within the state who were outside of the norm and needed to be controlled.

Having claimed the new sovereign realm for the convicts, the formation of a cohesive self was at the same time both challenged and yet further propelled by the indigenous

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 122-123.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>8</sup> Anthony Burke, *In Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety* (Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press, 2001), pp. 1-26.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

populations. Soon after landing, the convicts and the colonial overseers became engaged in fighting with the Aborigines, who were in time to become the black other with the emergence of a more unified white European settler identity. "Thus the colony's first serious strategic threats, and its first attempts to assert a strategic control of space and economic resources, were made and encountered within the struggle for the nation's very *interior*."<sup>11</sup> That is, the foreign threat came not from outside the island continent but from within the cartographical boundaries that had been claimed as British sovereign land. Having claimed the land as sovereign British territory, the Aborigines were treated as foreign to this new territory. Despite being 'internal' to the emerging colony and taken up as a problem that needed to be managed, the Aborigines were nonetheless treated with the detached disdain reserved for those considered foreign or threatening. In so doing, however, this Aboriginal other, which was at once internal yet foreign created the possibilities for the "foundations of the Australian national identity" to emerge by providing a common opposition to the colonialists and convicts.<sup>12</sup> These oppositional practices were further perpetuated by the willingness to enter into colonial wars in New Zealand against the Maori and throughout the African continent.

In describing the colonisation of America, Campbell frames the policies of the settlers towards the American Indians as an antecedent of foreign policy.<sup>13</sup> The early colonial policies toward the American Indians by the English sought to create a domestic identity, a self that was familiar to the European experience.<sup>14</sup> This familiar identity was in turn reinforced in its definition against the otherness of the American Indian, which inevitably conformed to the preconceptions stemming from the European imagination of the savage world 'out there'.<sup>15</sup> In attempting to create a sense of social and political security they

went beyond the dichotomy of enslavement and colonization... the interpretation of the difference between self and other that the English construed was so complete that even the hierarchical power relations of enslavement did not sufficiently mark a clear boundary between the English and the Amerindians. Extermination, rather than colonization or enslavement,

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>13</sup> Campbell, *Writing Security*, Chapter 5. For more on the role of violence and the American identity during the frontier wars see Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000) and *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth Century America* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998)

<sup>14</sup> Campbell, *Writing Security*, pp. 109-116.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97-105.

was the early English response to otherness. When this could not be achieved, physical separation was employed.<sup>16</sup>

These colonial policy practices of trying to create a physically and geographically homogenous political body, however, did not cease after the initial establishment of a familiar European colony. Encounters with the otherness of the Africans and with religious and political difference also saw the emerging American image challenged by those that were defined as being foreign to the self.<sup>17</sup> Similar colonial policies of either elimination or integration of these identities were instrumental in defining colonial America. Described in this way, Campbell frames these colonial policies as a prototypical manifestation of foreign policy. As policies that defined the self and created a distinct cartography, the continuities between colonial and foreign policy draws attention to the role that foreign policy plays in the production and reproduction of the domestic self.

Campbell describes the process of the emergence of modern practices of foreign policy as 'discourses of danger'. Prior to the emergence of the secular state, during the ascendancy of Christendom, it was the church that offered the promise of epistemological, ontological and material security. In order to achieve this "the church relied heavily on discourses of danger to establish its authority, discipline its followers, and ward off its enemies."<sup>18</sup> The advent of colonial policies witnessed a transition in the nature of the discourses of danger. Whilst informed by inherited notions of the colonized other as pagan or barbarian, the policies were increasingly aimed at providing security for a particular colonial identity within geographically defined political boundaries. This creation of uniform colonial identity required the forced assimilation of indigenous groups. With the emergence of the aforementioned modern sovereignty, there emerged a process whereby "the state project of security replicates the church project of salvation."<sup>19</sup> The practices or policies, which under Christendom sought to mediate difference *within* a particular geography or polity, subsequently sought under state sovereignty to mediate difference *between* geographical polities, with drastic consequences for identities of the non-colonial 'other' within.

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 111-112.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 107-109, 116-130.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

In offering this account Campbell turns away from the image of foreign policy as a 'bridge'. Campbell instead locates foreign policy as a modern manifestation of a tradition in which identity is fashioned in response to a "discourse of danger."<sup>20</sup>

[I]nstead of regarding foreign policy as the external view and rationalist orientation of a pre-established state, the identity of which is secure before it enters into relations with others, we can consider foreign policy as an integral part of the discourses of danger that serve to discipline the state. The state, and the identity of 'man' located within the state, can therefore be regarded as the effects of the discourses of danger that more often than not employ strategies of otherness. Foreign policy thus needs to be understood as giving rise to a boundary rather than acting as a bridge.<sup>21</sup>

Thus Campbell challenges the conventional understanding of foreign policy. What is commonly understood unproblematically as 'foreign' policy is instead seen as decisive in creating the contours of domestic identity by inscribing the lines between self and other.

By offering this account, Campbell has rearticulated the relationship between the state and foreign policy. Given that the state's *raison d'être* is to provide security for the self, its existence would be made redundant if security were actually accomplished.<sup>22</sup> "The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state's identity or existence; it is its condition of possibility."<sup>23</sup> Foreign policy thus has the ability to "instantiate a fictive self that has meaning principally as the negation of difference, and which performs a regulative ideal by which contingency can be domesticated and identity enframed."<sup>24</sup> Thus individuals will assimilate aspects of the state's identity, particularly the notion of security from external threats within specific cartographic bounds, into their fundamental identity. According to Campbell, the role that foreign policy plays in creating the boundaries within IR has significant and under-theorized implications for its domestic population. Towards this end, the current chapter will seek to further elucidate the suggestion that "[f]oreign policy is thus to be understood as a boundary-producing practice central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates."<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 48-51.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>25</sup> David Campbell, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States", *Alternatives XV*, 1990, p. 266.

Given the accounts offered by Shapiro, Burke and Campbell it is hard to unproblematically affirm the conventional accounts of foreign policy. These critical accounts of the operation of foreign policy and its antecedents make it hard to separate foreign policy from processes through which the domestic identity and society are shaped. Indeed, the clearly demarcated binaries of inside/outside, foreign/domestic and self/other seem hard to sustain in light of the preceding accounts and given the role that each side of these equations plays in constructing and reinforcing the identity of the other. However, in the context of the orthodox thinking in IR, based on the state-based sovereign ontology and positivist epistemological world-view, this is a provocative and even 'dangerous' claim.<sup>26</sup> For in addition to going against the grain of established theory, it would also be construed as being tied to a normative position that would seek to deflect attention away from the most pressing contemporary dangers. While such a critical position does not automatically entail a particular normative stance, such an accusation is unhelpful to an endeavour that seeks to understand the too often ambiguous or contradictory dynamics of contemporary global politics. In the interests of a fuller account and to avoid building a 'straw man' out of conventional explanations, it is necessary to briefly touch on some of the conventional IR perspectives on this phenomenon before further exploring foreign policy's role within the domestic setting.

Foreign policy as a domestic tool is not without some theorisation within orthodox accounts of IR. Indeed, the seminal realist antecedent, Thucydides, observed that "Greek leaders frequently concentrated their efforts on influencing the political climate within their own polities rather than managing relations with other Greek city-states."<sup>27</sup> Similarly, de Tocqueville's 1835 study of American democracy held that this democratic nature meant that it was inclined to "impulse rather than prudence" as misinterpretation of the actual nature of danger often led to overreaction.<sup>28</sup> Kegley and Wittkopf describe such accounts as illustrating a scape-goat phenomenon, or in more technical terms, the 'diversionary theory of war'.<sup>29</sup> The diversionary theory of war is the "contention that leaders initiate conflict abroad as a way of increasing national cohesion at home by

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<sup>26</sup> Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 2, 1991, p. 213, 229.

<sup>27</sup> Charles W. Kegley Jnr & Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformation* (9<sup>th</sup> edn.) (Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thompson, 2004), p. 70.

<sup>28</sup> Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70, see also Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique" in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed), *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

diverting national public opinion away from controversial domestic issues.”<sup>30</sup> For example, the declaration of war by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher upon the Falkland Islands in 1982 revived sagging domestic opinion polls and opened the way for an election win.<sup>31</sup> In some respects this is nothing ‘new’ and is simply highlighting a tendency toward totalitarian interventionism or a fascist police state, in which there is a desire for a “state capable of looking after itself in foreign affairs, based on a society which was strong, cohesive and disciplined.”<sup>32</sup> Under such a system the national goals of “mobilization of the nation, of economic development and of national self-discipline” are subjected to the ambitions, whether they be domestic or foreign, of a single directing political will.<sup>33</sup> Regardless of whether this is a new dynamic or a different take on an old one, the orthodox response to this would be: that this is not how good democratic politics works and that it should not be done. In short, it is an exception to good, normal politics and undermines the foreign policy presumption of a properly ordered polity.

The tendency to avoid or simplistically resolve the instances of the ambiguity in global politics stems from an inability to accord with conventional assumptions of IR. The accounts offered by Shapiro, Burke and Campbell suggest that the relationship between inside and outside, the lines between foreign policy and domestic policy and the shaping of internal order, is not as clear cut as it is often presented to be. Whilst Kegley and Wittkopf might reply that these accounts fall into the category of phenomena that would qualify as an instance of ‘intermestic’ politics, issues they describe as being simultaneously international and domestic,<sup>34</sup> the contention here is that they pose a more thoroughgoing challenge. Rather than prompting a proper re-examination of foreign policy and its relation to the domestic character of democracies, these are seen within the orthodoxy as one-off curiosities within the broader canon of IR. These curiosities are seen as momentary exceptions to the norm, instances where accepted laws of IR have broken down rather than an indication of something systemic. Such responses to the ambiguity of global politics do not sufficiently consider the observation that much of the evolution in IR thought can be

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<sup>30</sup> Kegley & Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 70.

<sup>31</sup> Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, *Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 117.

<sup>32</sup> Brian Chapman, *Police State* (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 54. See also pp. 106-116.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>34</sup> Kegley & Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 64.



seen as responses to the inadequacies of the orthodox explanatory schema.<sup>35</sup> Rather than seriously engaging the role of foreign policy in shaping domestic politics, fusions of existing orthodoxies – such as the ‘intermestic’ – continue to affirm existing dichotomies. Responding in this way ensures that momentary lapses in the normal course of foreign policy do not disturb the broader narratives.

In instances where more thorough accounts are given they are relegated to political theory or incorporated so as to reinforce the orthodox position. One such account can be seen in the work of Carl Schmitt. Similarly grounding his insight upon the observation that much of modern politics is connected to theological antecedents, Schmitt arrives at a far more conservative position than Campbell, Burke and Shapiro.<sup>36</sup> Schmitt seeks to powerfully reinforce certain tendencies within the status quo. The defining characteristic of a state, according to Schmitt, is the ability to delineate self and other: “the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”<sup>37</sup> While this initially seems to adhere to the familiar dichotomies that have been extensively discussed, there are some extra dimensions to Schmitt’s view of oppositional politics. Along with his awareness of these oppositions comes a greater sensitivity to such politics, leading Schmitt to go much further than traditional accounts of IR. The creation of this distinction necessarily requires the presence of a mortal enemy, one that “must not only be defeated but also entirely destroyed” in order to more firmly establish the political community.<sup>38</sup> Such suggestion begins to blur the domestic/international boundary, at which point Schmitt’s account can still fit somewhere in the realist mould, read as a kind of Machiavellian exception from the democratic processes or disregarded altogether as a political theory curio. What Schmitt seems to be suggesting, however, is rather a more permanent proposal of how to effectively govern within what he sees as limitations of the liberal democratic system. In this sense, Schmitt offers not only a damning conservative critique of liberal democracy but also a somewhat authoritarian series of options for circumventing its machinations.

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<sup>35</sup> For example see Andrew Moravcsik, “Theory Synthesis in International Relations: Real Not Metaphysical” in Forum: Are Dialogues and Synthesis Possible International Relations? *International Studies Review*, 5 (2003), pp. 131-136.

<sup>36</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984).

<sup>37</sup> Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1976 [1934]), p. 26.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

For Schmitt, the friend/enemy dynamic is crucial in order to define the character of the state, for without this the state may lack coherence. Indeed the very character of the state as an “organized political entity, internally peaceful, territorially enclosed and impenetrable to aliens” requires this existential threat.<sup>39</sup> Schmitt argues:

The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly... [h]e is nonetheless the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specifically intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.<sup>40</sup>

Schmitt’s account of the friend/enemy distinction thus goes beyond the realm of what might be considered comfortable within the conventional scope of IR. But this is not all he offers on the subject. Further to this prescription of the necessity of an external enemy for the identity of the state, Schmitt also sees the potential for an internal enemy in certain circumstances in order to maintain the normal functioning of the state.

The endeavour of a normal state consists above all in assuring total peace within the state and its territory. To create tranquillity, security and order and thereby establish the normal situation is the prerequisite for legal norms to be valid.... As long as a state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy. Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy.<sup>41</sup>

While Schmitt does not explicitly link the necessity of an external and internal enemy through the discourse of foreign policy, he clearly connects them through a discourse that seeks to ensure the security of the state both internally and externally.

This question of security inside and outside of the state, the costs of this pursuit for liberty, and the connection that this pursuit has to foreign policy, will be further addressed in the final sections of this chapter. What has become clear in this section is that foreign policy operates according to a particular instrumental logic, that of *raison d’état*, or national interest. Foreign policy in this sense is a specialised tool in the management of the national interest of the state. Conceived as an apparatus of rule, foreign policy can be shown to have a range of subtle social effects upon its constituent population.

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

### *Foreign policy as Enlightenment rationality*

The common logic linking modern foreign policy with its antecedent and alternate variations is the use of instrumental techniques to deal with those who are different. This logic can be clearly seen in the influence of the Enlightenment upon the ideas of John Stuart Mill, whose doctrine of liberty articulated key attributes of those who could be considered civilised. Liberty for the civilised was two-fold. The inward domain of liberty is the freedom and responsibility of individuals to govern themselves through rational decision-making, self-improvement and self-discipline.<sup>42</sup> Exterior liberty is the freedom from governmental constraint, so long as one's actions do not cause harm to others.<sup>43</sup> These are connected insofar as the right to the freedom from constraint assumes the presence of rational self-government.<sup>44</sup> Mill holds that those who are uncivilised, such as children, lunatics and barbarians, do not have a right to such liberties. Over the latter Mill suggests that despotism is an acceptable form of government so long as it is their best interest.<sup>45</sup> Evident in Mill's formulation is the importance of Enlightenment notions of rationality in the self-governing of those who are considered civilised members of society and the government of others both within and without who are incapable of such conduct. On this basis, both the pragmatism of realism, the civilising missions of colonialism and later liberal humanitarianism can equally be justified. This integration of Enlightenment logic within antecedents of foreign policy has an extensive tradition.

Prior to the emergence of the modern sovereign state, a distinct body of knowledge and discourse emerged surrounding *raison d'état*. Bartelson describes this development as the emergence of *mathesis*, an early form of positivist logic, which "enabled an analysis and tabulation of state interest."<sup>46</sup> Management of state affairs was limited to weighing relative state power, rather than the day-to-day affairs of the populace. The initial administration of the state was thus a forebear to the contemporary practice of foreign policy. This largely externally-orientated mode of political management was succeeded by a more modern and scientific form of political community. This new array of apparatuses managed specific individual elements within the state by developing specialties in order to streamline and develop expertise within government. At this point, now one of many rationalities of

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<sup>42</sup> Mill, *On Liberty* (Newton Abbot, Dover: Dover Thrift Editions, 2002 [1859]), p. 10.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8, 10.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>46</sup> Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 187.

government, foreign policy took on an exclusively diplomatic role, acting as a mediator 'between' states. No longer the foremost tool in the management of the state, foreign policy became the domain of those who excelled in the art of diplomacy, negotiating the best interests of the state within the vicissitudes of the European state system. In this sense foreign policy can be seen as having emerged from an application of Enlightenment principles to the practice of state management.

The legacy of foreign policy is that of a tool fashioned from Enlightenment thinking; it is a political technology with national security as its objective. Foreign policy is the external diplomatic component amongst a range of instrumentally rational apparatuses of domestic political management. Like other tools of government, such as the health system, education system and welfare, foreign policy pursues a range of specific policies in-line with the general remit of the elected government. Like other bureaucracies it is designed to bring together the efforts of a large number of people in a way that is co-ordinated, accountable, and productive. In short, it aims to employ Enlightenment principles of rationality in ways that benefit the interests of the state that it serves. As highlighted in Chapter 2, such highly effective instrumental tools also control and regulate in the attempt emancipate and liberate. This can be seen in the ultimate goal of foreign policy, for instance, which is the emancipation of members of the state through the attainment of peace, an aim which is sought via the pursuit of security. The role of foreign policy as a political technology is to represent and defend the subjects of the sovereign state by weighing state interests and rationally calculating the benefits that may be won from waging war or maintaining peace. In short, the basic premise of foreign policy is that the best way to make subjects free is by making them secure.

The point of departure at this stage of the chapter is the question: 'can the provocations raised in this chapter be made intelligible?' This is a question that faces challenges on at least two fronts. Firstly, in order to answer this question an approach needs to be developed that is able to cut through the boundaries of power/knowledge and observe politics that can work outside of the binaries of inside/outside, self/other and also move amongst less recognised political dynamics and actors. Secondly the provocations on the nature of modern and perhaps even more contemporary manifestations of sovereignty call for a more sophisticated analysis, one that keeps up to date and up to speed with challenging and complex politics. In this sense, both these points reinforce the need for an approach that can work within and outside of accepted political methodologies and

realities. To these ends, and in-line with the notion that foreign policy can be seen as an instrumentally rational political technology, the next section examines the Foucauldian modes of control addressed in Chapter 2 and the insight they provide with regard to the aporias of foreign policy. The final section will then demonstrate exactly how foreign policy can be understood in terms of domestic discipline and control.

## Foucault, foreign policy and discipline

My problem is to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth.<sup>47</sup>

- Michel Foucault

A critical analysis of foreign policy informed by the Foucauldian notion of discipline would not hold modern disciplinary techniques to be without merit. Instead, and this is the case with the modernity project generally, it would seek to highlight that there are processes – good, bad and many ambiguous – of which we should be aware. George captures this in relation to IR:

a celebration of the age of rational science and modern technological society cannot simply be disconnected from the weapons of mass slaughter and techniques of genocide. Nor can the language and logic of liberty and emancipation be easily detached from the terror waged in their name by, for example, the major cold war foes, each claiming itself the natural systemic heir of the Enlightenment dream.<sup>48</sup>

This sentiment reflects that of Foucault, for whom “the ‘Enlightenment’, which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines.”<sup>49</sup> Foucault elaborates, suggesting it is “the development and generalization of disciplinary measures, [which] constituted the other, dark side” of this new found freedom and rationality.<sup>50</sup> In this vein, it is this other, dark side of foreign policy that this thesis seeks to highlight, via a reconnection of the pursuit of liberty through foreign policy to the discipline it engenders domestically.

The functioning of a modern disciplinary regime may be identified when a complex social organisation takes on the appearance of an efficient machine. The role of discipline in such a context is to provide, without the overt use of violence, a set of routines and practices

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<sup>47</sup> Michael Foucault, ‘Questions of Method’, in Burchell, Gordon & Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect*, p. 79.

<sup>48</sup> George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, p. 141.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 222.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

that become natural to individuals. Foucault cites the modern soldier as an exemplar subject of disciplinary techniques.<sup>51</sup> During the seventeenth century, soldiers were selected according to physical and mental suitability. By the eighteenth century the ideal soldier was something that could “be made; out of formless clay, an inapt body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit.”<sup>52</sup> Citizens in this sense can be shaped according to the exigencies of foreign policy and national security. This power, however, is not tyrannical. Foucault draws a distinction between the modern usage of discipline and earlier coercive examples such as slavery.<sup>53</sup> The modern forms of discipline can be seen to differ from the practice of slavery, insofar as they do not rely on the ownership of the individual body. Indeed should even the need for violent forms of discipline arise it is a sign that the techniques of modern discipline have become frustrated or broken down.<sup>54</sup> The disciplinary processes instead rely on the psychological processes of modern rationality, developed according to Enlightenment thinking, which are far more efficient in their operation.

The role of discipline is not so much to explicitly control individuals but to shape and produce the way in which they ‘know’. This involves the construction of what is described as a ‘regime of truth’, a discursive reality or script, whereby rules, codes and procedures are written into everyday life. In regards to foreign policy this pertains to external threats to the state, the designation of those who are ‘other’. This regime of truth forms the perceptual milieu of the society in which individuals are imbedded, and thus continually reshaped and recreated according to the discourse of external threat and contrasting norms of domestic identity. These discursive processes have a panoptic effect, providing ever-present ‘truths’, ‘reality’, or ‘common sense’ that the individual is constantly subjected to. The individual is thus in an asymmetrical relationship with this discursive regime and is in this sense under ‘surveillance’ from these social norms and expectations of the ideal self identity, according to which they subject themselves to discipline. The modern individual functions in any number of relationships with various disciplinary regimes and whilst they are not ‘owned’ in any sovereign sense by any one of these

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 135.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 137.

<sup>54</sup> McHoul & Grace, *A Foucault Primer*, p. 67.

regimes, these individuals can become “subjected and practiced bodies” or “docile bodies.”<sup>55</sup>

If these descriptions of discipline seem somewhat negative, this need not necessarily be the case. As equally as discipline can be seen to reduce human freedom of thought and action it generates a remarkable normative consensus and a predictable social environment. Conflict and anxiety are reduced greatly and often without individuals being aware that regulative technologies have been put in place. There is more to this, however, than the concerns of the civil liberties perspectives, which highlight the tensions between balancing the competing aims of liberty and freedom with the security and control of paternal institutions. Whilst discipline enacts broad and diffuse control, it also allows a great level of social efficiency. This control is also enacted in a way that is instilled into everyday practices and norms, which are required to be considered and can just be acted upon as part of the normal everyday. An institution of paternal control – such as the social welfare system – in its intervention is relatively inefficient, whereas disciplinary regimes operate at the level of norms and morals. Thus, as equally as discipline can be characterised as suppressing human freedom and diversity it can also be seen as brilliantly and efficiently preventing deviancy and abnormal behaviour. The development of this modern technology of power relations can even be seen as a more ‘positive’ or productive form of power,<sup>56</sup> as opposed to earlier juridical forms of negative power, the kind that Foucault described as “power that says no.”<sup>57</sup>

Externally-orientated institutions, while lacking a formal domestic policy mandate, equally shape domestic order. The apparatuses of foreign relations, trade, the military, customs and foreign intelligence agencies all have foreign mandates to secure the state by identifying and mediating external threats. The designation of those deemed threatening to the state – and consequently those normatively contrasted as patriotic – equally enables regulation. Indeed, the lack of a clear governance mandate means that the discipline engendered by the designation and mediation of foreign threats remains politically invisible. The operation of discipline is more effective when it is not seen as a rule or technology of the state but rather something normal. As was demonstrated in Chapter 1,

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<sup>55</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 138.

<sup>56</sup> West, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, pp. 172-3.

<sup>57</sup> Michel Foucault in Colin Gordon (ed.), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977* (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 139.

the operation of sovereignty constitutes the foreign/domestic, the inside/outside structure of IR. It is the apparent 'naturalness' of these binary distinctions that render the domestic operation of foreign policy invisible, and it is this very invisibility that enables it to operate effectively.

### *Governmentality as control*

Governmentality links Foucault's notion of individual discipline with the broader techniques of social control that function at the level of the population. Governmentality is Foucault's neologism of what can be called 'governmental rationality'. He views modern governmentality as the modern manifestation of the classic notions of the 'art of government'. For Foucault, the techniques of governmentality have gone beyond *raison d'état*, diplomacy and generally seeking to maintain or advance one's political position. Governmental practices are no longer a process of superficial or macro-level management, they have become highly specific and scientific technologies that penetrate deep into the everyday of society. Foreign policy can equally be seen in this light. It is the broad logic of government that has emerged in place of an outmoded *raison d'état*; where previously, governmental logic schemed and calculated, it now relies on bureaucratic processes that ensure rational and detached judgement.

Foucault's work on governmentality extends the concern with rationality that was seen in the work of Weber and the Frankfurt School theorists in Chapter 2. The modern manifestations of governmentality in society suggest that power is no longer centralised and instead individual citizens play a major role in their own self-governance. In addition, however, to the specific instances of discipline, there are unifying practices, referred to as biopolitics, which links and 'regularizes' these individual practices at the level of the population such that it appears natural.<sup>58</sup> To this end, biopolitical practices survey society in biological or scientific terms, rather than as a political or social community. This concern can be seen in the development of "the globalizing statistical disciplines of economics, demography, epidemiology and eventually sociology."<sup>59</sup> Governmentality can thus be seen as the overarching logic that interacts between specific instances of discipline and human sciences to create a dense and interpenetrating web.

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<sup>58</sup> Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, p. 253.

<sup>59</sup> West, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, p. 174.



These highly efficient series of techniques cause the individual to become simultaneously “individualized” and “totalized”.<sup>60</sup> That is, the processes of control occur in an interrelated manner at the individual level of discipline but are coordinated and unified by the practices that seek to monitor and observe the population as a whole. Foucault argues that in addition to the training provided by disciplinary measures, biopolitical processes seek “to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass... by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers.”<sup>61</sup> This comprehensive attempt to describe the internal processes of control should equally extend to foreign policy discourse, which informs national, racial, cultural and religious identity, whilst coordinating action at the level of national security. Foucault elaborates this governmental control of the population in his examination of the link between war and internal social control.

### *War as a means of control*

If we look beneath peace, order, wealth and authority, beneath the calm order of subordination, beneath the State and State apparatuses, beneath the laws, and so on, will we hear and discover a sort of primitive and permanent war?<sup>62</sup>

- Michel Foucault

In the ‘Society Must Be Defended’ lecture series of 1975-76, Foucault adopted the premise that war could be used as a way of understanding and analysing power relations. Given the flexibility and insight of the disciplinary mode of analysis offered by Foucault and the prominent concern with war in IR, this suggests a potentially useful extension to his existing analyses of power relations. As with discipline, Foucault’s analysis of war is not a straightforward concern with war in its literal sense, although as with discipline the metaphorical usage of the term is closely tied to the traditional usage. War in the Foucauldian sense inverts war in its ‘battle form’ or actual physical combat; instead it sees ongoing warlike tensions or contests between various ruptures within society.<sup>63</sup> Foucault suggests that “peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another: a battlefield runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently.”<sup>64</sup> Deploying

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<sup>60</sup> Foucault, Michel, “The Subject and Power”, in Dreyfus & Rabinow (eds.), *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1983) pp. 216-221.

<sup>61</sup> Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, p. 249.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 156-165.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

such an argument in conjunction with the disciplinary analysis is suggestive of how foreign policy discipline might be understood in the domestic context.

Foucault argues that the broader notion of war has been historically purged from normal ordered domestic society. In line with the dichotomised understanding of modern sovereignty, war is relegated to an external realm where there is an exception from the social contract. According to Foucault,

[t]he State acquired a monopoly on war. [The effect of this] was that what might be called day-to-day warfare, and what was actually called 'private warfare,' was eradicated from the social body, and from relations among men and relations among groups. Increasingly, wars, the practices of war, and the institutions of war tended to exist... only on the frontiers, on the outer limits of the great state units.<sup>65</sup>

Foucault's point is that this process can be seen to have occurred both in literal and discursive terms. Within the sovereign state, literal acts of war were eradicated through cessation of the practice due to internal controls that sought to monopolise violence. The everyday forms of war were eradicated discursively from what was commonly understood as war despite its continuing in practice. The question is, however, what form has this 'permanent war' taken under the seemingly peaceful edifice of sovereignty?

Foucault's answer to this is a radical and provocative revisioning of sovereign power and war. "The war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode is, basically, a race war."<sup>66</sup> Foucault's re-reading of sovereignty, using his notion of war, suggests that what we now know as war has shifted dramatically. Foucault's genealogy of war in 'Society Must Be Defended' argues that the main tensions had previously been felt not between states, but within society between the ruler and the ruled. This social rupture at the time, it was argued, was the main source of tension and most common form of war. Whilst it is said that sovereignty put an end to war within a geographically defined space, Foucault suggests that this internal war has not ceased; it is just that it is no longer seen or heard. Inverting Clausewitz's famous dictum, Foucault suggests that if

politics is the continuation of war by other means... [then the internal] role of political power is to perpetually use a sort of silent war to reinscribe that

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

relationship of force, and to reinscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, language and even the bodies of individuals.<sup>67</sup>

In the same way that foreign policy and war in its 'battle form' seek to protect the sovereign from external threats, there are more subtle forms of war being waged within geographically bounded political communities. The Foucauldian conception of war functions as "an internal war that defends society against threats born of and in its own body."<sup>68</sup> This war adopts a biopolitical rather than militaristic strategy, which seeks to eliminate "foreigners [that] have infiltrated this society... [and] deviants that are this society's by-products."<sup>69</sup> This end is pursued via an extension, or indeed subtraction of biopolitical management.

Foucault sees not only the management of the society, but also an ongoing war designed to preserve the self. This resonates strongly with the earlier accounts of colonialism as a foreign policy practice. The permanent war articulated by Foucault seeks to defend society against threats originating both from within and without of the state. Foucault is suggesting that the protection of the population carries such potency because the construction of populations is akin to that of race. Foucault has previously argued that racism "was used to provide an internal social defence against abnormals."<sup>70</sup> In an attempt to protect against threats (both internal and external) Foucault sees the emergence of state racism, "a racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own products. This is the racism of permanent purification... one of the basic dimensions of social normalization."<sup>71</sup>

This can be seen through the use of the biopolitical methods of managing a population. Traditionally, the key power of the sovereign state is what Foucault describes as the 'right to kill', a monopoly over the use of force within and in order to protect a given territory.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 216.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>70</sup> Foucault, *The Abnormals: Lectures at the College de France, 1974-75*, quoted in Stuart Elden, "The Constitution of the Normal: Monsters and Masturbation at the College de France", *boundary 2*, Iss. 28, No. 1, 2001, p. 102.

<sup>71</sup> Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, p. 62.

<sup>72</sup> Appropriated from Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in Michael L. Morgan (ed.), *Classics of Moral and Political Theory* (4<sup>th</sup> edn.) (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2005), p. 1213; see also Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (transl. by A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 154.

The biopolitical variant of the 'right to kill' is the 'right to make live'.<sup>73</sup> Practices such as health care and welfare are designed to extend the average duration of life and decrease unnecessary mortality rates. These systems for the maintenance of the population are an expression of the 'right to make live'. The withholding of these mechanisms of the 'right to make live' facilitates this war against undesirables. While it stops well short of the state employing its 'right to kill', it removes 'others' by exposing to greater health, social and economic risk those who don't conform to the norms of the population. Through such practices, institutions eliminate external and internal threats that are seen to weaken the population in question. Thus, conceived biopolitically, war can "function as a principle of exclusion and segregation and, ultimately a way of normalizing society."<sup>74</sup>

As well as drawing distinctions between different conceptions of war Foucault suggests they continue to be linked. In his general discussion of war he describes how war is an ongoing phenomenon on a number of levels from the 'battle form' to the "distribution of weapons, the nature of the weapons, fighting techniques, the recruitment and payment of soldiers, the taxes earmarked for the army; *war as an internal institution*."<sup>75</sup> It is this latter point where war in its more familiar sense shifts to something more subtle and typically Foucauldian. His genealogy highlights that a modern and sophisticated "relationship of force, which has been revealed by the battle and the invasion, was gradually and for obscure reasons inverted."<sup>76</sup> This conception of permanent war in the way that it turns against itself is seen by Foucault as "something resembling colonization, or an internal colonization, on itself."<sup>77</sup> This is similar to what Virillio describes as 'endo-colonization' or a colonisation of the self.<sup>78</sup> These various articulations suggest that both the 'battle form' of war and the more subtle biological counterpart turn back upon the self in ways that are in some senses literal, but are increasingly in subtle forms that are not generally recognisable.

Foucault's account of war is not an alternative to discipline but rather an attempt to expand and apply his disciplinary analysis. Biopolitical war offers a genealogical account of internal social wars against threats that manifest within the state and the way they can

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<sup>73</sup> Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, p. 241; see also See Foucault, "Right of Death and Power over Life", in Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader*, pp. 261-262.

<sup>74</sup> Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, p. 61.

<sup>75</sup> Emphasis added, *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>78</sup> Paul Virillio, "Critical Space" in James Der Derian (ed.), *The Virillio Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), p. 64.

rend cleavages within society. This offers some insight into how the 'external' foreign policy can become inverted against the self, enacting discipline and forming powerful social cleavages. Read in this way, it can be seen in the kind of analysis offered in this thesis that continues Foucault's broad theme of his disciplinary accounts. Here, however, it inverts established IR binaries in order to deconstruct them.<sup>79</sup> Foucault's analysis of biopolitical war as a means of control demonstrates how his notion of discipline might be applied to the power of foreign policy over the self.

The analysis of foreign policy in this thesis therefore suggests that the common understanding in IR is too limited. The interpretation of the effects of foreign policy is generally confined solely to the international realm. In a step toward a broader and more comprehensive understanding the following section inverts the traditional analysis of foreign policy in order to analyse its domestic implications within its constituent state. This is necessary because if these effects were immediately clear they would be more readily observed. The following section will offer an analysis that can observe modes of power that "remain invisible so long as we treat [them] as sovereignty."<sup>80</sup> This is the value of Foucault's disciplinary analysis as it can be used in order to observe the effects that foreign policy has on the norms and values which continually reconstitute the identity of the self and by which individuals discipline both themselves and others.

## Liberty and security inside/outside the state

Though the weapons maybe pointing out, the effects are clearly felt within.

- R.B.J. Walker<sup>81</sup>

This section suggests that the pursuit of security through foreign policy affects domestic liberty. While contemporary political practice renders this statement less and less remarkable – as will be shown in later chapters – this connection remains under-theorised or even disregarded. Given the continued dichotomisation of inside and outside in IR, the

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<sup>79</sup> See, for example, his earlier inversion of the Clausewitzian dictum above and also his "functional inversion of disciplines" in Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 210. In the case of the latter, the literal discipline of the individual depends on the legitimacy of the regime, whilst the subtle or Foucauldian discipline inverts this disciplinary relationship, such that the self-discipline by individuals who subject themselves to the regime acts to constitute and reconstitute its legitimacy.

<sup>80</sup> Dana R. Villa, "Postmodernism and the Public Sphere" in, Frederick M. Dolan & Thomas L. Dumm (eds.), *Rhetorical Republic: Governing Representations in American Politics* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1993), p. 234 (pp. 226-248).

<sup>81</sup> *Inside/Outside*, p. 170.

effects of foreign policy are not seen to permeate domestic order. The impact of knowledge and practices stemming from foreign policy, however, enacts processes of regulation throughout society that needs to be considered in the context of civil liberties. Furthermore, to the extent that the opposition of foreign and domestic can be brought in question, so can that of security and liberty. Thus this section challenges both the oppositions of inside/outside and liberty/security, highlighting that they are produced as a result of the intractability of modern sovereignty. Furthermore, it is these oppositions which obscure the effects of foreign policy as a form of security upon what can be narrowly described as liberties, or more generally, as social order.

This notion of a balance between liberty and security can be traced to the initial utility of the state as the basis for constituting modern sovereignty within its territorial bounds. The liberty/security trade-off finds its roots in the initial relinquishing of the sovereignty of individual subjects to the state as a representation of the 'general will'. Security/liberty then can be seen as a fundamental expression of the social contract, in which individual liberty is encroached upon in order to secure some amount of individual and collective security.

In domestic politics the pursuit of security is generally seen to come at the expense of liberty. The clearest example of this security/liberty dichotomy can be seen in regards to police powers but equally in regards to law. Thus the key element of this debate is the perceived benefits of regulations that provide order and, presumably, some sense of security, contrasted with the value of avoiding the paternal care of the state and an accompanying sense of personal freedom and liberty. In this sense, however, the security/liberty dichotomy is readily evident also in debates over government regulation in regards to welfare and tax. The seeming permanence of this binary gives rise to concern over civil liberties, the extent of domestic surveillance and the scope of laws. These legalistic and liberalist concerns are valuable in the face of the encroaching state in times of war and perceived danger. By limiting the focus to the confines of the state, however, civil liberties groups, the traditional left and other progressive concerns overlook those dynamics that don't entirely adhere to the bounds of the state.

Before moving on to examine security/liberty beyond the confines of the inside/outside dynamic, it is worth briefly examining some of the limitations of this conception within its regular setting. Viewed in terms of its own logic, the attempt to preserve liberty against the

encroaching pursuit of state-centric security is flawed, for there can be no essential notion of either security or liberty. Take the position of extreme liberty. Viewed in terms of the paradigm of sovereignty, this would be a condition in which there was no state imposition, no restricting regulations; it would be approaching anarchy – a condition devoid of any formal order – the very thing that security rallies against. Liberty then can only be comprehended in the context of a sovereign order, an order which itself amounts to some measure of security.

Thus there cannot be liberty without security. This is not some Orwellian or neoconservative formulation; rather it suggests that the notion of liberty can be seen as part of a construct of the world-view of subjects created through the processes of security. In this sense neither security nor liberty are objective conditions, both rely on the conception of the opposite pole conceived in essential terms to give meaning to the other. According to Hindess, this amounts to Foucault's critique of liberty.<sup>82</sup> Read in this way, the work of Foucault "show[s] how such governmental concern for security can result in a commitment to individual liberty."<sup>83</sup> Whilst liberty may be implicated in the pursuit of security, it is not equated with security but neither is it a politics of pure freedom.

Indeed Foucault's account not only problematises the dynamics of the security/liberty dichotomy but also that of modern sovereignty. His position suggests that modern rational government requires subjects to be free from domination in the traditional sense of liberty, but only in order so that they may then regulate *themselves*. In this way Foucault's explanation of liberty and security implicates both sides in such a way that neither is seen as objective nor essential, in fact within this figuration they are quite hard to separate. Not only has Foucault suggested that these seemingly intractable categories are actually conversely in the process of constituting one another, he also suggests that the practice of social forms of regulation, the provision of security, takes place most efficiently within a liberal conception of politics. That is, he has offered an account of politics in which regulation occurs in the manner of, and no doubt in tandem with, modern sovereignty but yet also quite independently from it.

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<sup>82</sup> Barry Hindess, *Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 123-131.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

A key element in the regulation of individuals outside of the purview of modern sovereignty is the determination of social norms. Rendering problematic the security/liberty dynamic suggests that liberty is determined by the processes of security. The confluence of liberty with underlying practices of security can be seen in the commitment of individuals to liberal norms. For instance, the political doctrine of liberalism aims to create

a nation of free, responsible, law-abiding, and self-reliant men and women... with healthy bodies and alert and trained minds; enjoying a real equality of opportunity to make the most and best of their powers for their own advantage and that of the community, and to choose the way of life for which they are best fitted.<sup>84</sup>

Clearly evident in this account are commitments to particular norms, norms that are seemingly 'natural' and for the most part not the sole domain of security as ensured by the sovereign state. These norms are, however, derived from subjects created and continually shaped within the context of the ongoing pursuit of security.

The problematisation of the security/liberty relationship further suggests that security is most efficiently sought via a commitment to the principles of liberty. The commitment to the pursuit of liberty, a liberty defined in terms of the commitment to certain 'natural' norms, ensures that there is an ideal notion of the individual that is to be pursued. The pursuit of this notion of liberty ensures that while on the one hand intrusive state regulation is minimized, there will be more 'natural' norms or social regulation by which certain characteristics of individuals and groups can be measured.<sup>85</sup> "Under a liberal regime," according to Hindess, "we can expect to find attempts at indirect regulation."<sup>86</sup> The prominence of social regulations means that security can be achieved within the context of the desire for individual liberty. As Foucault describes it, this commitment to security in the pursuit of liberty entails the setting in place of

mechanisms or modes of state intervention whose function is to ensure the function of those natural phenomena, economic processes and the intrinsic processes of population: this is what becomes the basic objective of governmental rationality. Hence liberty is registered not only as the right of individuals legitimately to oppose the power, the abuses and usurpations of

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<sup>84</sup> National Liberal Federation, *The Liberal Way: A Survey of Liberal Policy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1934), pp. 221-222. Quotation originally cited in Robert Eccleshall, "Liberalism" in Robert Eccleshall et al, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (London: Hutchison, 1984), pp. 37-78.

<sup>85</sup> Hindess, *Discourses of Power*, p. 126.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p.130.



the sovereign, but also now as an indispensable element of governmental rationality itself.<sup>87</sup>

The role of social norms and regulations, in short social control, allows governmental rationality to function with less recourse to overt state control. This critique of the domestic conception of the security/liberty debate allows sovereignty to also be problematised.

In IR the external security of the state is seen to either come at the expense of other international actors, or through international cooperation, depending on whether security is conceived within the realist or liberal tradition. As mentioned in the initial section of this chapter, underlying these traditions is the assumption that the effects of the pursuit of security in the external realm will be realised outside of the bounds of the state and mediated through the machinations of the state's foreign policy. The diverging currents of liberal and realist traditions, however, manifest when considering the capacity of states to act collectively according to internationally agreed norms; realists are eternally pessimistic, while liberals hold out some optimism. Thus IR is either characterised by the insecurity of the security dilemma or the potentiality of collective security. Despite this variation, it is clear that the theorisation of security within the international setting, as equally as it did in the domestic, follows the general contours inherited from modern sovereignty. The inherited assumption is that within IR there exists no social contract and no articulation of general will. Given that there is no formal means of regulation, security outside of the state can only be sought through foreign policy, if not outright war.

The pursuit of security in the international sphere is not generally seen to be connected to concerns of domestic liberty and security. At least this is the case within 'normal' politics.<sup>88</sup> Under a normal conception of politics, underpinned by the principles of modern sovereignty, the state is constituted as a territorially secure sovereign body. Foreign policy is seen to mediate the interests of the state, acting as a mediator between domestic and international politics. Working in terms of the binary model of inside/outside, under the realist zero-sum gain logic of the security dilemma, any security gained would be at the expense of the national security of other states. Alternatively, under a neoliberal model of

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<sup>87</sup> Quoted in Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction", in Burchill et al (eds.), *The Foucault Effect*, pp. 1-52, cited in Hindess, *Discourses of Power*, p. 125.

<sup>88</sup> The domestic operation of foreign policy outside of 'normal' politics will be addressed in the subsequent section.

interdependence and cooperation, in the course of the pursuit of security there is the likelihood of mutual benefit if free market trade and comparative advantage are allowed to occur. Under either conception, however, the pursuit of the state's security within the international realm is not understood to negatively impact on liberties.

In the same way that Foucault highlighted the interplay of liberty and security beyond the conception of modern sovereignty, the pursuit of security through foreign policy can equally be connected to liberty within the state. Foreign policy, as with domestic manifestations of laws and regulations, can be seen as a governmental technique in the pursuit of security. It is this instrumental rationality that seeks to achieve certain ends. Foreign policy, both conceptually and in terms of its instrumental cartographic orientation, is seen to be outside of regular domestic apparatuses that are understood to operate according to the consent of the general will to sovereign rule. Given Foucault's concern for articulating politics beyond the bounds of sovereign logic, foreign policy can equally be seen in this light.

The pursuit of security through foreign policy can be reconnected with the domestic implications for liberty. Conceived in this way, this suggests a role that is played by a state's foreign policy that has not been previously theorised. The power of foreign policy within the domestic context can be seen in terms of its ability to influence, determine and disseminate social norms. If foreign policy's power within the domestic context may sound immaterial and weak, we need only consider the tremendous extent of the coverage of foreign policy and the extent to which the norms it propels pervade society. If the exposure of foreign policy is broad, then consider also the depth of its penetration. Foreign policy objectives and the norms that are both implicit and explicit within these goals determine fundamental facets of identity by articulating how one should act towards those who are different from us.

Indeed, foreign policy has the potential to act as one of the preeminent organising principles of the state, even transcending the concerns of the state as dictated by domestic modes of governance. As suggested earlier by Schmitt; what could have greater determining influence over social norms and the cohesion of the state than the ability to ascribe what is and isn't an existential threat? The role of foreign policy to ascertain and mediate threats to national security epitomises the ability to determine such existential

threats. In this context the ability of foreign policy to affect social control is potentially commanding and extensive.

*Liberty/security, foreign policy and the state of exception*

The previous section demonstrated the way in which foreign policy can shape the domestic population, operating beyond the bounds of modern sovereignty. There is, however, a more literal sense in which foreign policy can become connected with the domestic population. Given the strict divide between domestic and international, foreign policy could only exert sovereign power over its own citizens in the event that it contravened the parameters laid out by modern sovereignty. This would require a sovereign act that breaks the principle of sovereignty. This is precisely what happens in the instance of an act that could be described as an 'act of exception'. Indeed, according to Schmitt it is on this basis that the sovereign is determined, for the "Sovereign is he who decides upon the exception."<sup>89</sup>

This sovereign exception can be seen in relation to periods of crisis for the state. Total war, martial law, modern police states, totalitarian police states and states of national emergency exhibit elements whereby the power of the sovereign rule of law can be used in order to except itself from the rule of law that exists under normal circumstances. The emergence of exceptional politics can be seen in times of war or national emergency. For instance, the state of 'total war' that characterised World War I and World War II demonstrated an exceptional politics. Laws were passed in order to suspend laws, and much of the state's resources were directed towards combating an external threat. The need to relinquish liberties in exchange for the pursuit of national security abroad became recognised, indeed formally demanded, through laws against sedition and treason. A state of exception can therefore be understood as a sovereign act of law that enables the suspension of the rule of law.

Viewed in this way, the flawed and contradictory logic of modern sovereignty gives rise to a fundamental legal paradox that can devastate democratic politics. As Agamben suggests

if exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, as such, must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional grounds, then they find themselves in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures

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<sup>89</sup> Schmitt, *Political Theology*, p. 5.

that cannot be understood in legal terms, and the state of exception appears as the legal form of what can have no legal form.<sup>90</sup>

While Agamben's concern over the paradoxes of sovereignty demonstrates the rise of a serious phenomenon, he casts the scope of his analysis too narrowly. He adopts a largely legal-philosophical perspective, which not only obscures some of its more pervasive effects it also restricts the ways in which it can be challenged. As we have seen, sovereignty was effectively presupposed in order to give rise to that very sovereignty, making it foundationally paradoxical in nature. To regard it then as a complete and all-encompassing system would be to buy into the illogical paradox that sustains it.

This is not to dismiss Agamben's analysis. His genealogy of the state of exception and his analysis of its manifestation within contemporary politics is highly compelling as it exposes an extensive but obscured tradition of exceptional politics.<sup>91</sup> Additionally his coverage of the debate between Schmitt and Benjamin prompts the re-emergence of Benjamin's observation that "the 'state of exception' in which we live is the rule."<sup>92</sup> The state of exception is generally conceived as being a pragmatic, emergency situation that requires the temporary suspension of laws and procedures in order to re-establish normal order. Agamben's reinterpretation of the contemporary state of exception using the insights of Benjamin suggests that it is not a pragmatic situation, and indeed that the state of exception may have become the rule. Agamben even goes so far as to say that it is now a paradigm of government.<sup>93</sup> Accordingly, he argues that the state of exception needs to be rethought and theories need to be developed in order to better understand the dynamic between the state of exception and the modern legal conception of sovereignty.<sup>94</sup> In that context, the relationship between foreign policy and the domestic population will be addressed in relation to the state of exception as it was in relation to the more subtle determination of social norms.

As with the more subtle articulation of foreign policy control, the implications of the state of exception can be conceived with reference to the relationship between security and liberty, and in terms of the inside/outside dichotomy. Under the conditions of the state of exception, the pursuit of security is given clear precedence over the maintenance of liberty.

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<sup>90</sup> Agamben, *State of Exception*, p. 1.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 1.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 1.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 6.

The pursuit of security, under the state of exception, however, is not normal state regulation, through regular policing and welfare. Nor is it the security achieved through the social norms that are pervaded as a result of a commitment to liberty. Rather, this pursuit of security is against a threat that, regardless of whether it originates from outside or within, is deemed significant enough that it is privileged over the pursuit of security under 'normal' conditions. While this threat could be something that threatens the coherence or existence of the state, it could also be a cynical ploy, akin to the 'diversionary theory of war' mentioned earlier, that seeks to undermine the principles of democratic governance.

The link between foreign policy and its domestic population becomes manifest in times of exceptional politics. Where the state of exception is a result of an internal threat, this exceptional security would come at the expense of liberties. The role of foreign policy, both within the domestic and international setting would be minimal as the external pursuit of security would come second to the internal concerns. Given that the state of exception presupposes a properly functioning system of modern sovereignty so that it may enact the exception, the threat is unlikely to originate within the state. After all, properly functioning state sovereignty requires a relatively ordered and homogenous political system. Even if the threat were to originate within, it would be quickly eliminated within a normal state of affairs, most likely as a result of being linked to an external threat. Thus the state of exception is most likely to occur in response to the perception of an external threat.

In the case of a state of emergency in response to an external threat, the mediation of this threat through foreign policy will take utmost priority within the affairs of the state. As it will take precedence over the pursuit of regular domestic security, the consequences of foreign policy will be clearly felt inside the state. Furthermore, foreign policy will be brought into the domestic, in which the pursuit of security comes at the expense of liberty. In short, the pursuit of foreign policy will come at the expense of concerns for individual liberty in a state of exception. Relocated in this way, concerns over personal freedoms in the face of encroaching state foreign policy are less likely to be heard and neither will accompanying trends of social change be well attended to. Domestic society will be drawn together behind consuming foreign policy goals, whether they are at war or in ideological conflict.

The domestic manifestation of foreign policy under a state of exception takes on a literal form. Rather than operating via a governmental rationality such as biopolitics it is based on

the operation of overt sovereign power which is much less efficient in its methods of control and only under very extreme manifestations could it achieve the pervasiveness and scope of foreign policy when dispersed through norms. Given that the operation of sovereignty lacks subtlety, enacting pervasive social control would have major domestic social consequences. Domination would be common and at that point the sovereign state would be approaching something akin to a fascist regime or a totalitarian police state.

From the analysis of foreign policy in relation to the security/liberty dichotomy, this section has established two senses in which foreign policy can have an effect on, and even control over, the domestic society in whose name it acts. The first is a more subtle articulation that is ongoing and operates through norms. The second articulation is a more material conception that operates through direct sovereign rule of law, in order to suspend the rule of law. When this state of exception occurs in relation to an external threat, the mediation of this threat surmounts the regular pursuit of security and takes precedence over the maintenance of liberty. In this sense then, this pursuit of external security will come at a major cost to individual liberty. Whilst these two articulations of foreign policy can be seen to be working concurrently up to a point, any intense or extended state of exception is likely to have severe effects on liberty and disrupt governmental efficiency, breaking down the dispersal of foreign policy norms. Thus the contemporary question of 'whether the exception has become the rule' has important implications for the analysis undertaken in later chapters. For the most part, however, foreign policy operates domestically via subtle mechanisms of control.

In conclusion, this chapter demonstrated that foreign policy can be understood as an apparatus that operates across the conceptual boundaries separating inside and outside as equally as it operates across boundaries separating states. Framed in subtle terms, a disciplinary analysis can comprehend the extent to which foreign policy pervades and is intimately implicated in domestic politics. Employing the insights of Foucault into rationality and modernity in order to critique orthodox accounts of IR suggests another 'dark side' to foreign policy that manifests as domestic social control. Having articulated how this other side of foreign policy can be understood, subsequent chapters will apply this disciplinary analysis to historical and contemporary case studies. The proceeding chapter addresses the onset of the cold war in Britain, in which foreign policy against Soviet communism abroad came to pervade Western societies as a rampant anti-communism within.

## **PART II**

### **Case Studies of foreign policy as domestic discipline and control**

## Chapter 4

### Cold war foreign policy as discipline and social control

This thesis seeks to examine how foreign policy pervades and structures domestic politics. Viewed in such terms, foreign policy cannot simply be seen as the external actions of states as agents of International Relations. It needs to be recognised equally as a discourse that both constrains and enables the actions of those within the state. Foreign policy creates structures within the state, which accordingly shape the behaviour of each citizen, in both overt and subtle ways. This can be seen in a number of ways. For instance, foreign policy determines what kind of actions are seen as acceptable in a particular national security environment, and what kind of language is acceptable as part of public discourse. Consequently, foreign policy infuses thoughts and actions; it exists as a generalised discourse of national security obligations, subtly informing the decisions and actions of each citizen. The goal of this chapter is to map the way in which foreign policy shapes and influences domestic politics and society. In particular, this chapter seeks to articulate the way in which foreign policy discourse shapes human agency within the state. Understood as a process and a discourse which suffuses individuals, groups and structures, human



agency will be analysed to reveal both the subtle and overt relationships that exist between citizens and their foreign policy. To this end, the operation of foreign policy discourse in the British political scene during formative stages of the cold war will be examined.

The case studies of the early cold war period in Britain offered in this chapter seek to highlight the role of foreign policy discourse in the formation of agency. In particular two case studies will be offered. The first is an analysis of the Information Research Department (IRD) which was a secret British cold war intelligence agency that operated out of the Foreign Office from 1948 to 1977. Ostensibly a 'foreign policy' organisation, its subtle forms of propaganda shaped and disciplined human agency inside Britain in ways that are still not fully understood by most of the British public. The second case study offered in this chapter is an account of British Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson (1964-1970; 1974-1976). This analysis will demonstrate the ways in which an individual's human agency may be shaped and disciplined by a foreign policy discourse. Indeed, Wilson himself developed a paranoid world-view, giving rise to a self-fulfilling cycle of conspiracy amongst both his supporters and detractors alike. The limitation of this conspiratorial approach is that in trying to find – or perhaps more accurately construct – complex and obscured plots, it ignores other modes of political agency. It is these, more subtle relationships between human agency and foreign policy that this chapter seeks to explore.

Accounts of the cold war, in particular, are susceptible to a conspiratorial approach to explanation. The cold war was an era suffused with narratives of espionage and intrigue, narratives that arose in response to the presence of an external threat and the perception that it may manifest internally. The conspiratorial style of explaining politics seems to be based on the sense that there is 'something else going on' in political narratives. Rather than embracing this uncertainty, and recognising that events are highly contingent, the attempt to ascribe collective intent and direct causality seems to be couched in a fear that no one is in control, manifesting in an insecurity that there is no conspiracy out there. In this way perhaps the conspiratorial approach can be seen as symptomatic of an ontological anxiety, a kind of intellectual 'comfort food'. To ascribe intent to complex institutions or nebulous associations is an attempt to code and classify something that is itself not necessarily rational or coherent. The underlying shadowy motivations assumed to be linking these actors together as part of a coherent agenda, in many instances do not exist.

For example, key book length studies of the Information Research Department and Harold Wilson refer extensively to “the British state”<sup>1</sup> or “the secret state”<sup>2</sup>, conferring to these organisations the status of actors.<sup>3</sup> While these case studies do feature secret organisations and hidden plots, they are not unified or straightforward in terms of causal effect.

While this period of history may be replete with ‘spies, secrets, and espionage’, it is not enough to simply determine which groups did what and why. This chapter does not seek to uncover – or indeed construct – new conspiracies from this era. Instead, this chapter seeks to highlight the role that these discourses of security (particularly that of anti-communism) had in shaping and disciplining human agency. In this sense, it consciously deviates both in substantive focus and method from what has been portrayed as shadowy conspiracies in British politics. Within the context of the United States, a number of studies have highlighted the potent anti-communist rhetoric that operated during the 1950s and ‘60s.<sup>4</sup> This chapter seeks to demonstrate the transatlantic operation of this cold war foreign policy discourse within British politics and society, highlighting its presence throughout the Western democratic landscape. In this sense foreign policy was at once a global discourse (evidenced in the foreign policies of Western states) with localised effects on agency (seen in the disciplinary effects on the respective domestic societies).

### **Towards a discursive conception of agency**

In order to track the discipline and control enacted by cold war foreign policy it is necessary to develop a conception of agency that can interpret these processes in discursive terms. Such a conception of agency means that despite the latent conspiratorial tropes evident in the case studies, they can be understood in terms of wider political discourses and everyday social interactions. Existing accounts of these case studies tend to explain political agency by materialising shadowy subterfuge between political groups in a manner that

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<sup>1</sup> Paul Lashmar & James Oliver, *Britain’s Secret Propaganda War* (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Dorrill & Robin Ramsay, *Smear! Wilson and the Secret State* (London: Grafton, 1992).

<sup>3</sup> Stafford highlights this “conspiratorial mindset” in his review of Lashmar & Oliver; David Stafford, “Book Review”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3, 2000, p. 148.

<sup>4</sup> Athan Theoharis & Robert Griffith (eds.), *The Spectre: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974); Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Michael Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse* (New York: Random House, 1969); Michael Paul Rogin, *The Intellectual and McCarthy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967); Alan Wolfe, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat: Domestic Sources of the Cold War* (Boston: South End Press, 1984) and; Martin J. Medhurst, et al. (eds.), *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990).

employs a frame of reference drawn from the genre of spy fiction and spy movies.<sup>5</sup> In many respects this is understandable; the cold war saw the prospect of the external threat of communism manifest domestically. The anti-communist discourse of the early cold war began to pervade the Western democratic landscape, blurring the perceived lines between foreign and domestic as fears of foreign communist aggression increasingly informed the parameters of domestic political rivalry. This, however, is not simply a case of the covert encroachment of state power upon domestic freedoms, but an intensification of national security prerogatives within wider social discourse. Everyday politics in this sense takes on the contours of the emerging global conflict. The disparity between the domestic socialist left and the capitalist right became an insurmountable gulf as the global rivalry between socialism and capitalism increasingly became an issue of national security.

These are the dynamics that a discursive conception of agency and foreign policy discipline are able to demonstrate. This section will draw from the work of two authors – one academic, one a novelist – whose work coalesces into a revealing conception of human agency whereby wider discourses shape and influence people's thoughts and actions. First, Roland Bleiker examines various forms of political dissent preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Bleiker highlights, on the one hand, mass political protest, but then also demonstrates a range of other cultural forms that while not formally 'political', were equally important in these events. This account suggests that agency is highly fluid. Following that the work of novelist Don DeLillo will be examined as another insight into the operation of human agency. Fiction is of relevance to a discursive account of cold war Britain, as the lines often blur between fictional and political narratives. For instance, the case studies in this chapter demonstrate that the British literary scene was very much intertwined with the London political scene. As well as associating with one another authors such as the novels of authors such as Orwell were used as accessible frameworks for understanding the cold war. Similarly, for the purpose of this and subsequent chapters, the novels of DeLillo offer a way of understanding how the wider processes influence and even shape the actions of individuals. A re-occurring theme in the novels of DeLillo is the attempt by characters to unravel conspiracy and paranoia. The attempt to do so, however, tends to reveal little by way of actual conspiracy, only more rumour and conjecture.

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<sup>5</sup> I am thinking here of the spy films of Alfred Hitchcock and Fritz Lang and the novels of Ian Fleming but also earlier pulp novels and films that precede the cold war.

DeLillo's concern with fluid notions of agency is made explicit in the dialogue of his novels as characters seek to explain conspiracies that become ever more elusive.

*'Constantly becoming something else': Roland Bleiker and human agency*

Bleiker draws his discursive conception of human agency from case studies of popular dissent in East Germany in the lead up to the collapse of the regime in 1989.<sup>6</sup> He suggests that there are multiple ways of understanding politics and agency in the cold war but stresses the importance of the discursive dimension. This discursive conception sees extensive overlap and integration between international and domestic politics and seeks to highlight the way in which the global cold war fed into domestic politics and society. Indeed, for Bleiker, such cartographical distinctions are largely irrelevant insofar as they have little influence on the movement of discourse. Consequently, political explanation should not be constrained by the spatial limitations placed by borders, nor should agency be necessarily understood only in terms of individuals consciously participating in mass political movements.

Towards this end Bleiker offers a number of accounts, all important to understanding the collapse of East Germany. The first is a traditional account, highlighting the role of mass rallies where individuals are understood to be exercising popular consent as part of a unified political protest.<sup>7</sup> While Bleiker does not dispute this account, he suggests it is not a sufficient explanation of the agency involved, and indeed that no single over-arching framework can capture the complexity of the events of 1989.<sup>8</sup> Bleiker offers further explanations that were equally instrumental in political change, explanations grounded in a wider social and cultural context.<sup>9</sup> These include the influence of the West German media, the bases of resistance found in Protestant churches, the cultural influence of East German refugees and the importance of East German underground bohemian poets who upset traditional modes of thought using new linguistic forms. Present in each of these accounts is a 'transversal' dissent that is not constrained by spatial limitations of the modern sovereign state or by notions of individual agency grounded in informed popular consent. It was these practices of transversal dissent that were able "to challenge the spatial givenness

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<sup>6</sup> Roland Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 146-184.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122-127.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 146-184.

of cold war politics.”<sup>10</sup> Accordingly the conceptual distinctions between the foreign and domestic are not useful in grasping the fluid movement of discourse. In-line with this, and contrary to most conceptions of agency in global politics, this chapter does not seek to ground its conception of agency or structures firmly in either national or international realms.

Orthodox accounts of international politics locate agency within the spectrum of what is referred to as the ‘structure/agency debate’. This debate maps the discussion of how agency operates within IR and to what extent it resides within individuals or within determining structural mechanisms. Given the lack of formal powerful mechanisms of governance in the international realm, structure in IR generally refers to, as Olav Knudsen puts it, “recurrent patterns of behaviour in social settings.”<sup>11</sup> For instance, neorealists assert that the structures of International Relations determine action and that the agency of individual states has little importance. Contrarily, neoliberal internationalists suggest that states and certain non-state actors exercise a high level of individual agency and there is little if any constraint by the structures of International Relations. Under the influence of constructivist thinking, the structure/agency debate moves beyond these binaries suggesting that there is some balance of individual rational agency exercised by actors and some measures of constraint by structural, institutional or moral forces. Such accounts suggest the emergence of sophisticated models of agency within IR.

This conception of international agency closely mirrors that of the domestic conception of individual agency offered by Bhaskar or Giddens.<sup>12</sup> Bhaskar’s scientific realist ‘stratified depth ontology’ conception argues that while not empirically observable, structures are able to exert determining influence to the point that they can be declared ‘real’.<sup>13</sup> Agency in this structural context is exercised strategically. Those actors that benefit from the structures possess greater power, while those disadvantaged have greater incentive. In more socially constituted terms, Giddens suggests that while individuals “are intrinsically involved with society and actively enter into its constitution”, they cannot be ‘outside of’

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>11</sup> Olav Knudsen, “Context and Action in the Collapse of the Cold War European System: An Exploratory Application of the Agency-Structure Perspective” in Walter Carlsnaes & Steve Smith, *European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe* (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1994) p. 208.

<sup>12</sup> Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, p. 10.

<sup>13</sup> Jonathan Joseph, “Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem in IR”, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1, 2008, p. 115.

social structures.<sup>14</sup> Society therefore is not simply a maelstrom of chaotic individual acts, nor is it determined solely by macro-level social forces; there is interaction between individual agents and structures. As Giddens and Pierson suggest, “society only has form, and that form only has effects on people, in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people do.”<sup>15</sup> Giddens in this way offers a model of individual action that is mediated but not entirely controlled or determined by the context of wider social forces. As equally as individuals are constrained by social forces, they are also aware of social rules and norms, shaping their actions accordingly; neither agency nor structure predominates.<sup>16</sup>

Despite the subtlety of this sociological approach, by ‘internationalising’ Giddens’ conception, the structure/agency debate in IR essentially transposes individuals with states. Where individuals are seen to function within a society of social forces and norms, constructivists such as Wendt equally see states operating in the same manner within International Relations.<sup>17</sup> The justification for this level of analysis shift is on the basis that “as long as states are dominant actors in international politics, it is appropriate to focus on the identity and agency of the state rather than, for example, a transnational social movement.”<sup>18</sup> Echoing within this observation is an implication that seems entirely at odds with the fundamental constructivist insight.<sup>19</sup> While the continued focus on the core ontological units of traditional IR is based on the seemingly astute logic of the empirical observation, it seems to belie the core constructivist premise. This premise is that the theorising, policy-making, or description of international politics within a particular intellectual framework reinforces this way of knowing IR. In short, a so-called objective empirical observation is being made in regards to something that is said to be socially constituted, to say nothing of the fact that this observation in turn reconstitutes this supposed empirically factual object. As Hollis and Smith suggest, any attempt to theorise

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<sup>14</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), p. 120.

<sup>15</sup> Anthony Giddens & Christopher Pierson, *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 77.

<sup>16</sup> Giddens’ theory of structuration is similar to Foucault’s model of governmentality, although the latter would deny both the distinction between, and the attempt to balance, individual agency and social structure. For Foucault they are inseparably fluid.

<sup>17</sup> Take for instance the claim that “states are people too”, Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 215-224; see also Alexander Wendt, “The State as Person in International Theory”, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 30, no. 1, 2004, pp. 289-316.

<sup>18</sup> Mlada Bukovansky, “Identity and Agency in the International System”, quoted in Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, p. 10.

<sup>19</sup> For instance, Wendt suggests that world-systems structural approaches and neorealist state-based positions produce mutually constituted accounts of structure and agency, see Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, *International Organization*, vol. 41, no. 3, 1987, p. 339.

the nature of international politics – in this instance the question of structure and agency – cannot be separated from the kinds of assumptions that underlie these observations.<sup>20</sup> The continued commitment to this ontology of the sovereign nation-state ensures that there is a continued recreation of an inside/outside view of politics at the expense of the nuanced elements that are present within global politics.<sup>21</sup>

A discursive conception of agency can avoid this continued construction of inside/outside. According to Bleiker, agency beyond the constrictive bounds of the state can be understood in terms of movement and dissent. Agency is by definition something that is not fixed or static; it suggests a change in place or state.<sup>22</sup> Movement is normally conceptualised in terms of movement within or across borders, domestic movement or international movement. Movement conceived in these terms recreates the sovereign logic of the modern state and the modern individual. It reinforces the notion of movement as something an individual - who is a citizen of a particular state - does in relation to their state or that of another. In so doing, it discourages, or even actively disallows, attempts to grasp the subtleties of human agency and interaction. Indeed, Chapter 5 of this thesis highlights the operation of modes of control that are essential to this spatial logic. Perhaps the link between movement and dissent can be better understood in terms of the movement and transfer of ideas and practices, movement can thus also entail shifts in thinking and action. This, no doubt, may entail spatial movement of ideas or people within or across borders but it need not be subordinated to this conceptual interpretive framework. Movement is the becoming of what it is not, regardless of whether it results in definitive change. To the extent that these processes evade, challenge or are incompatible with the interpretative frameworks of modern sovereignty, these conceptions can be understood as a form of popular dissent.

As may already be clear, discursive agency by virtue of its lack of fixity cannot be firmly defined. Agency in this way is not ontologically grounded. Rather, agency can be found in the way in which “we think about human action and its potential to shape political and social practices.” According to Bleiker, the “mutually constituted and constantly shifting relationship between agents and discourses thus undermines the possibility of observing

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<sup>20</sup> Martin Hollis & Steve Smith, “Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations”, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1991, p. 395.

<sup>21</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1997, pp. 372-375.

<sup>22</sup> Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, p. 278.

social dynamics in a value-free way.”<sup>23</sup> While this may seem to point one off in the path of a nihilistic oblivion, where power is ubiquitous and avenues for political change indistinct, it is simply a recognition of the fact that “a conceptualisation of human agency can never be complete [and] that the very power of human agency is based in a constant process of becoming something else than what it is.”<sup>24</sup> It is these movements, whether they are between, across or without the spatial lines of modern sovereignty that Bleiker, like Campbell, refers to as ‘transversal’ politics.<sup>25</sup> These transversal flows can be found in the contests over knowledge and dissenting political forms, which challenge the modern reading of the sovereign state and sovereign individual. Global politics in this sense can also be seen as a multitude of intertwined and criss-crossing transversal movements. Viewed in this way, the question of inside and outside in global politics becomes increasingly irrelevant if an analysis is to keep up with these discursive flows.

*‘Everything is connected in the end’: Don DeLillo and discursive agency*

Happiness is taking part in the struggle, where there is no borderline between one’s own personal world, and the world in general.

Lee Harvey Oswald, quoted in the preface to DeLillo, *Libra* (1988).

As equally as the line between reality and fiction was earlier shown to have the potential to blur, fiction can also shed light on subtle conceptions of political agency. From the narratives of Don DeLillo we can arrive at an account of agency that operates via discourse as much as it does through the clearly articulated actions and intents of individuals. This American novelist is instructive when considering a diffuse conception of agency, particularly in regards to paranoia and conspiracy. In an interview, DeLillo suggests that the impact of the JFK assassination “invented” him as an author.<sup>26</sup> He suggests his first eight novels all “collect around the dark center of the assassination” and grapple with the question of explanation in light of this event.<sup>27</sup> Not only was it a defining event in his own life as a writer, DeLillo suggests the assassination in Dallas has been a defining moment in the explanatory world-view of Americans. According to DeLillo, “what’s been missing over the last twenty-five years is a sense of manageable reality. Much of that feeling can be

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 278.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 2; and David Campbell, “Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics and the Anarchical World”, in Michael J. Shapiro & Hayward R. Alker (eds.), *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 7-31.

<sup>26</sup> Quoted in Anthony DeCurtis, “An Outsider in This Society: An Interview with Don DeLillo” in Thomas Pietro (ed.), *Conversations with Don DeLillo* (Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2005) p. 56.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.



traced back to that day in Dallas. We seem more aware of elements like randomness and ambiguity and chaos since then.”<sup>28</sup> Thus the link between conspiracy and explanation in his work stems from “the shattering randomness of the event, the missing motive, [and the] violence that people not only commit but also seem to watch simultaneously from a disinterested distance.”<sup>29</sup> For DeLillo, the telling of American narratives in this sense has been “engineered” by this moment.<sup>30</sup>

The JFK assassination is demonstrative of the discursive construction of meaning, even beyond the influence of this event that is suggested by DeLillo. The interpretative framework of this event was itself to some extent shaped by both fiction and the cold war context. For instance, the geopolitical superpower conflict provided fertile discursive ground for *The Manchurian Candidate*, the 1958 novel by Richard Condon and subsequent film adaptation. Featuring a plotline in which the brain-washed protagonist shoots an American politician, *The Manchurian Candidate* consolidated and indeed pre-empted many cold war tropes of “alien communist conspiracies... political assassinations, red-baiting, mind control and espionage.”<sup>31</sup> Indeed it eerily prophesied elements of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and only added to the confusion and conspiracies surrounding attempts to understand what actually transpired that day in Dallas. The assassination of JFK highlights how both fiction and the wider geopolitical context are interwoven into attempts to interpret events and construct political narratives.

DeLillo’s ninth novel, *Libra* (1988), speculates in fictional form upon the events in the lead-up to the JFK assassination. The impact of the assassination on the American psyche is captured in the novel when a retired CIA agent describes it as “an aberration in the heartland of the real.”<sup>32</sup> In the same way that narratives of history have been shaped by the social resonance of this event, people’s motivations are also tied to wider discourses. According to Helyer, DeLillo displaces “the individual agency [of his characters] onto outside forces” and whilst there are esoteric discussions of paranoia, conspiracy and astrology throughout his novels, such red herrings are merely a playful attempt to obscure his placement of individual decision making within a much broader socio-political

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> DeLillo interviewed in Adam Begley, “The Art of Fiction CXXXV: An Interview with Don DeLillo”, *Paris Review* 35, p. 299.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 303.

<sup>31</sup> Tony Shaw, “Book Review”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 10, no. 3, 2008, p. 186.

<sup>32</sup> Don DeLillo, *Libra* (New York: Viking, 1988), p. 15.

tapestry.<sup>33</sup> Agency is not located discretely within the actions of individuals or institutions, but rather is embedded within a common social discourse.

This conception of agency is a common thread woven throughout the work of DeLillo. It can be seen both in the explanation of the underlying motivations of characters and vocalised in their attempts to understand the world. In *Libra*, for instance, a paranoid Army General struggles to defend America against what he describes as the 'Real Control Apparatus'. 'The Apparatus' has "paralysed not only our armed forces but our individual lives, frustrating every normal American ambition, infiltrating our minds and bodies."<sup>34</sup> This attempt to articulate the threat to American society could equally function as a characterisation of the fluidity of a discursive conception of agency. The paranoid General continues, suggesting that any attempt to describe 'The Apparatus'

is like naming particles in the air, naming molecules or cells. The Apparatus is precisely what we can't see or name. We can't measure it, gentlemen, or take its photograph. It's the mystery we can't get hold of, the plot we can't uncover. This does not mean there are no plotters. They are elected officials of our government, Cabinet members, philanthropists, men who know each other by secret signs, who work in the shadows to control our lives.<sup>35</sup>

This is reminiscent of a passage from *Great Jones Street* (1973) in which DeLillo juxtaposes the radicalism of underground groups with the esotericism of political discourse. In this exchange, a misanthropic counter-cultural rock star in the mould of Mick Jagger or Bob Dylan is told,

[t]he true underground is the place where power flows. That's the best kept secret of our time. You're not the underground. You're people aren't underground people. The Presidents and Prime Ministers are the ones who make the underground deals and speak the true underground idiom.... This is the underground network. This is where it happens. Power flows under the surface, far beneath the level that you and I live on.<sup>36</sup>

The suggestion in both cases is that social and political power is concentrated in a familiar conspiratorial fashion amongst political elites. The actual nature of agency offered in this context, however, is radically different from traditional conceptions. As best one can determine through the layers of irony, DeLillo here moves away from material notions of

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<sup>33</sup> Ruth Helyer, "Refuse Heaped Many Stories High: DeLillo, Dirt and Disorder", *Modern Fiction Studies* 45:4, 1999, p. 987.

<sup>34</sup> DeLillo, *Libra*, p. 282.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 282.

<sup>36</sup> Don DeLillo, *Great Jones Street* (Boston M.A.: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 231-232.

individual and institutional agency, offering instead one that is highly fluid and diffuse. If agency is in any way centred in this conception, it is anchored in political discourse, 'the true underground idiom'.

Evident also in the writing of DeLillo is the importance of discourse in creating people's worldviews. The central section of the novel *White Noise* (1984) is shaped by what is termed 'the airborne toxic event', during which students and staff are evacuated as a cloud of toxic gas approaches their campus.<sup>37</sup> While the toxic cloud remains distant, it gains a threatening force of its own and "the more characters talk the more it begins to loom."<sup>38</sup> From the perspective of both reader and the central characters the airborne toxic event becomes a powerful phenomenon and irrespective of whether or not there is any threat, its meaning has been entirely socially constructed. Thus for a significant part of the novel, all the main characters are embedded within a general air of threat, a threat that is only ever realised through discourse, never manifesting in any material sense. The extent to which it is real is largely irrelevant as the effects are not dispersed by it directly.

Similarly, Don DeLillo's epic novel *Underworld* (1997) offers a counter-cultural secret history of the cold war, describing in particular the way in which the logic of its politics infuses everyday life in a multiplicity of ways. Knight describes it as a "post-paranoid epic" that "strategically hacks into the [late-90s] resurgence of conspiracy thinking... rewiring and upgrading that popular epistemology."<sup>39</sup> *Underworld* follows the lives of a range of people from the '50s through to the '80s, some who intersect, some that never connect with any central element of the narrative except the overarching cold war logic that defined the era. This cold war logic imbues many characters with an anxious paranoia, although rarely does it manifest in overt panic. Rather it is a fundamental element of the identity of the characters and as such presents as banal everyday rather than psychopathology. For many characters the attempt to rationalise the highly complex events of the cold war results in an overriding concern with conspiracy theory. Take for instance the following exchange between Nick and Sims:

Nick: There's this word in Italian. Dietrologia. It means the science of what is behind something. A suspicious event. The science of what is behind an event.

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<sup>37</sup> Don DeLillo, *White Noise* (New York: Picador, 1984), pp. 109-164.

<sup>38</sup> John Freeman, "Lurking Around Society's Edges", *The Age*, 22/02/06. Accessed from [www.theage.com.au/news/books/around-societys-edges/2006/02/21/1140284064551.html](http://www.theage.com.au/news/books/around-societys-edges/2006/02/21/1140284064551.html) on 20/01/09.

<sup>39</sup> Peter Knight, "Everything is Connected: Underworld's Secret History of Paranoia", *Modern Fiction Studies* 45:3, 1999, p. 832.

Sims: They need this science. I don't need it.

N: I don't need it either, I'm just telling you.

S: I'm an American. I go to ball games.

N: The science of dark forces. Evidently they feel this science is legitimate enough to require a name.

S: People who need this science, I would make an effort to tell them we have real sciences, hard sciences, we don't need imaginary ones.

N: I'm just telling you the word. I agree with you, Sims. But the word exists.

S: There's always a word. There's probably a museum too. The Museum of Dark Forces. They have ten thousand blurry photographs. Or did the Mafia blow it up?<sup>40</sup>

Here Nick attempts to classify his paranoia as something akin to a science. Sims resists and it later emerges that rather than rejecting conspiracy and paranoia, he views it as so pervasive and all-encompassing that nothing can ever really be known – everything is connected thus connections are ever-present and arbitrary, even absurd.<sup>41</sup> Paradoxically Nick's paranoia manifests in more than just a conspiracy theory but expands into an impossible attempt to definitively map the multiplicity of connections. DeLillo seems to be suggesting that Nick's rationality is illogical and Sims' irrationality is sensible in the face of such complexity. For Sims there is a comfort in knowing that the complexity of social relations can never be fully quantified but that this should not obscure attempts at understanding. What it does reveal is that knowledge and understanding will never be final, "everything is connected in the end."<sup>42</sup>

## **Foreign policy discipline and the Information Research Department**

I have chosen the historiography surrounding the Information Research Department (IRD) intentionally and somewhat provocatively. The subject matter, it will become clear, is the very stuff of conspiracy theories, a shadowy secret organisation whose explicit remit – at least amongst those who knew of its existence – was a campaign of disinformation designed to deceive enemies both at home and abroad. Seemingly an organisation straight out of a narrative of spies and cold war conspiracy, this account will instead demonstrate that outright collusion and direct causal linkages are not required to offer an explanation for the way in which the IRD propelled British politics. Agency in this context need not be

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<sup>40</sup> Don DeLillo, *Underworld: A Novel* (New York: Scribner, 1997), p. 280.

<sup>41</sup> Knight, "Everything is Connected", pp. 820-821.

<sup>42</sup> DeLillo, *Underworld*, p. 826.

grounded solely in the policies of the IRD and its agents, nor does it need to be described in terms of a superstructure of the cold war conflict. Agency here is linked to a range of competing discourses, particularly those of foreign policy and national security, which put in place various social imperatives that shape human agency. Thus, this explanation will avoid crossing the line into conspiracy theory, but will also deliver on the sense that 'there is something else going on' by suggesting that it is not a hidden conspiracy waiting to become uncovered, but rather a constitutive dynamic of discourse that is embedded in the familiarity of the everyday and accordingly is easily overlooked.

The IRD was a cold war intelligence agency that was established with the exclusive aim of combating the foreign threat of Soviet communism. It operated under the auspices of the Foreign Office from 1948 until 1977 and employed up to 300 staff.<sup>43</sup> The perceived need for the IRD was identified shortly after World War II, at which point the cold war had not really been coined as such, nor had the grip of anti-communist sentiment taken hold throughout the Western democratic landscape. Britain felt that the Soviets had been undermining the newly formed United Nations (UN), using it as a public forum to proclaim the virtues of communism and the vices of capitalism. Such dispersions were viewed by the British as misrepresentations of global politics and an exploitation of the intended function of the UN. The IRD was designed as a response to counter this sub-diplomatic sparring. The stated (although not publicly) goals of the IRD was to present a positive image of the "vital ideas of social democracy and Western civilisation" and to downplay the attraction of communism so as to support the national security goals of Britain particularly in regards to the threat of communism.<sup>44</sup> In this way the intentions of the IRD were to subtly yet deceptively manipulate the politics of other countries, so as to present a positive image of British democracy. Framed in Clausewitzian terms, this strategy could be seen as a cultural 'war by other means'.

Despite the 30 years since details began to emerge, many Britons are unlikely to know much about the IRD.<sup>45</sup> This is in no small part due to the fact that regardless of the 30 year rule for releasing classified files to the public, many of its files remain classified.<sup>46</sup> It is safe

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<sup>43</sup> David Leigh, "Death of the Department that Never Was", *The Guardian*, 27/01/78, p. 13; and Scott Lucas, "British Ministry of Propaganda", *Independent on Sunday*, 26/02/95, p. 20.

<sup>44</sup> Paul Lashmar, "Covert in Glory", *New Statesmen and Society*, 3/3/95, p. 14.

<sup>45</sup> Scott Lucas, "British Ministry of Propaganda", *Independent on Sunday*, 26/02/95, p. 20.

<sup>46</sup> Andrew Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945-1958: The Information Research Department* (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2004), p. 14.

to say that the IRD was a highly secretive organization in its time, for there are relatively few details available even now. Given this lack of immediate public visibility it would seem that any effect it had on British domestic politics would be covert interventions, the stuff of brazen conspiracy theories. Such accounts are evident throughout many of the media accounts of the IRD. For instance, sounding much like a spy film, *The Observer* reported that the IRD “covertly planted material in Britain” as part of a “secret propaganda war” waged by the Foreign Office.<sup>47</sup> Such narratives suggest that there was a government conspiracy aimed at misleading the domestic populace. The effects of any direct measures, however, are greatly outweighed by the subtle but panoptic disciplining enacted by the foreign policy agenda of the IRD. For while the IRD was not a highly visible institution – indeed it was an invisible institution – it was in a position to generate and contribute to knowledge that was not only highly visible but also influential in generating political culture and social norms. Indeed it will become clear here that its very *invisibility* as an institution further contributed to the effectiveness of its panoptic discipline.

The IRD was not alone in its operations; late in World War II Britain developed a department to counter the cultural programs propagated by the Soviets. The Cultural Relations Department (CRD) preceded the IRD by a number of years and exists now as an office to distribute scholarships to foreign students. Like the IRD, the CRD was based in the Foreign Office but ultimately less is known of the details of its operations.<sup>48</sup> Defty suggests that it sought to “combat communist domination of international youth groups, most notably the National Union of Students (NUS).”<sup>49</sup> Towards this end, it had a significant role in British domestic affairs, liaising with anti-communist student organisations and “brief[ing] them on communist tactics.”<sup>50</sup> It also organised a rival International Youth Conference that was held in London during August 1948 to counter the Soviet-run World Federation of Democratic Youth.<sup>51</sup> These operations undertaken by the CRD sound rather benign in comparison with the dramatic narratives of cold war espionage and intrigue. The Foreign Office, however, placed a great deal of value in the information-based strategies

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<sup>47</sup> Richard Fletcher, George Brock & Phil Kelly, “How the FO waged Secret Propaganda War in Britain”, *The Observer*, 29/6/78, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> The most comprehensive account is Richard J. Aldrich, “Putting Culture into the Cold War: The Cultural Relations Department and British Covert Information Warfare”, *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 18, no. 2, 2003, pp. 109-133.

<sup>49</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda*, p. 49.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Aldrich, “Putting Culture into the Cold War”, p. 112.

and while such approaches do not involve the same level of secret conspiracy and subterfuge as other programs, they can be equally as effective in influencing norms and practices at home and abroad.<sup>52</sup> By developing information based strategies “the Cultural Relations Department and the Foreign Office had developed tactics for countering communist control of international organisations which laid the foundations for the work of the IRD.”<sup>53</sup> With its wider scope of operations, the IRD consolidated these *ad-hoc* measures into an institutionalised global campaign.<sup>54</sup>

The Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Christopher Mayhew, was the principle architect of the IRD. According to Mayhew, the British attempt to counter the international image of Soviet communism should comprise

a small section in the Foreign Office to collect information about communist policy, tactics and propaganda [in order] to produce material for our anti-communist publicity through our Missions and services abroad.<sup>55</sup>

Despite being the architect of Britain’s cold war information/propaganda campaign, Mayhew was hardly a secretive figure. Mayhew was the public face of the Labour party on the BBC broadcasts and in 1955 infamously took mescaline as part of the BBC’s *Panorama* program.<sup>56</sup> Despite his public persona Mayhew was the “driving force behind the establishment of the [IRD] at the British Foreign Office in 1948.”<sup>57</sup> Mayhew’s media background in many ways complemented the goals of the IRD, which while secretive were designed to use the powers of mass media to create a very public message praising a particular British way life, contrasted with the flaws of Soviet communism.

Proposals for the IRD were initially based heavily on wartime propaganda models of covert manipulation. Ivone Kirkpatrick, a diplomat with experience in wartime propaganda who had been in charge of the European services of the BBC, outlined a number of key elements for effective counter-propaganda. These included “the cooperation of Government Ministers; the support of the BBC and domestic media; and the closest coordination of

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid., pp. 128-129.

<sup>53</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda*, p. 53.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> CP (48)8, CAB 129/23, quoted in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “IRD: Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research Department 1946-48”, *Historians in Library and Records Department*, No. 9, Aug 1995, p. 7.

<sup>56</sup> “Past Faces of Panorama – Christopher Mayhew”, *BBC News*, 4/02/09. Accessed from [news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/pop\\_ups/08/programmes\\_past\\_faces\\_of\\_panorama/html/7.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/08/programmes_past_faces_of_panorama/html/7.stm) 6/03/09. *Panorama* transcript available from [web.ukonline.co.uk/sotcaa/sotcaa.html?/sotcaa/hidden/mayhew01.htm](http://web.ukonline.co.uk/sotcaa/sotcaa.html?/sotcaa/hidden/mayhew01.htm), accessed on 6/03/09.

<sup>57</sup> Tony Shaw, “Politics of Cold War Culture”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 3, no. 3, Fall 2001, p. 63.

domestic and foreign propaganda.”<sup>58</sup> This initial proposal received negative responses from a number of ministers, in particular Foreign Office Secretary Ernest Bevin and Under-Secretary Mayhew, for whom a campaign based around an “appeal to unite the forces of social democracy was somewhat more palatable than [a] reversion to wartime tactics.”<sup>59</sup> According to Lucas and Morris, Mayhew’s position on the IRD was not entirely one of principle, rather it was determined by the pragmatic concerns of the Labour politics.<sup>60</sup> Any aggressive campaign directed solely at socialist tenets would prove unpalatable to left-wing factions. Accordingly Mayhew advised Bevin to “balance anti-communist [positions] with anti-capitalist arguments so as to reassure the parliamentary Labour Party.”<sup>61</sup> Accordingly, initial IRD proposals sought to describe British social democracy as a ‘Third Force’ alternative to both Soviet communism and American capitalism.<sup>62</sup> While the ‘Third Force’ ideas may have reflected some idealism, it was more likely “a clever Foreign Office response to Truman’s anti-communist crusade.”<sup>63</sup>

The IRD sought maximum mass popular influence rather than direct control of politics. Part of the inspiration for the IRD being a covert organisation stems from its chosen method, which was distinctively panoptic in terms of its subtlety and pervasiveness. The IRD wished to be heard, not seen; it wished its message to be pervasive, not by virtue of being state-sanctioned but rather as a result of the social influence of those who dispersed it. Accordingly the IRD messages were directed towards opinion-makers such as journalists, novelists and politicians, “the principle being that it is better to influence those who can influence others than attempt a direct appeal to the mass of the population.”<sup>64</sup> In his book on the IRD and its methods, Defty concludes that “the most effective propaganda was the truth and that propaganda of any kind was more likely to be believed if it was not seen to emanate from an official source.”<sup>65</sup> In this sense the power and influence of the information was seen to be more effective and more pervasive if it was spread through

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<sup>58</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945-1958*, p. 41.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>60</sup> W Scott Lucas & CJ Morris, “A Very British Crusade: The Information Research Department and the Beginnings of the Cold War”, in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), *British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 92.

<sup>61</sup> Letter from Christopher Mayhew to Ernest Bevin quoted in Lucas & Morris, “A Very British Crusade”, p. 92.

<sup>62</sup> For a discussion of the “Third Force” idea in IRD see Chapter 2 of Hugh Wilford, *The CIA, The British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?* (Southgate, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), pp. 48-81.

<sup>63</sup> Dianne Kirby, “Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo-American Cold War Alliance and the Defence of Western Civilization and Christianity, 1945-48”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 35, no.3, 2000, p. 397.

<sup>64</sup> Sir Claude Schuster, permanent secretary to the Lord Chancellor’s Office quoted in Phillip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century: Selling Democracy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 27.

<sup>65</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda*, p. 248.



established social and cultural lines of communication rather than official state-sanctioned notices. Defty's account thus moves away from conspiratorial explanations of the IRD's methods suggesting that "while the IRD sought to counter reactionary views, there is no evidence of a coordinated campaign primarily directed at the manufacture of public opinion in Britain."<sup>66</sup>

Thus despite being based within the Foreign Office, the IRD was not simply an externally orientated organisation. Speaking in 1946, however, Prime Minister Clement Atlee confirmed in non-specific terms the principle that propaganda should be externally orientated, stating that "any matter of propaganda, or anything of that kind is a matter for the Foreign Office."<sup>67</sup> Here Atlee is affirming the theory and practice of the divide between domestic and international politics as it is defined by sovereign boundaries. Aldrich, however, highlights that while the IRD and other information projects sort to maintain an exclusive external focus, they quickly found their work "was [being] conducted in a global arena without clear boundaries, rather than an international arena clearly separated into domestic and foreign constituencies."<sup>68</sup> The attempt to counter communism was not just a war by other means that could be fought abroad; fronts were rapidly emerging within Britain. Socialist discourse in Britain, despite a tradition of "non-insurrectionary socialist politics",<sup>69</sup> became linked with the prospect of Soviet influenced communism manifesting domestically. In order to thwart the potential traction of revolutionary communism at home, the anti-communist information campaign of the IRD turned inwards, occupying a grey area between providing information and managing domestic public opinion, at least during in its early campaigns. Revisionist critics suggest that the IRD conspired to manipulate domestic politics.<sup>70</sup> Defty, as mentioned, suggests there was no coordinated campaign directed at the manipulation of domestic British public opinion.<sup>71</sup> This chapter holds that to suggest there is no conspiracy is not to suggest that the IRD did not influence

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<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 249.

<sup>67</sup> Address to the House of Commons, 7 March 1946, quoted in John Tulloch, "Policing the Public Sphere – The British Machinery of News Management", *Media, Culture and Society*, vol. 15, 1993, p. 378.

<sup>68</sup> Aldrich, "Putting Culture into the Cold War", p. 111.

<sup>69</sup> See Hindess' chapter "The Labour Party and Socialist Strategy" on Barry Hindess, *Parliamentary Democracy and Socialist Politics* (Routledge & Kegan Paul Plc: London, 1983) pp. 85-117.

<sup>70</sup> See for instance, Scott Lucas, "The Dirty Tricks That Were Made in England", *The Independent on Sunday*, 20/08/95. Accessed from [findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qn4158/is\\_19950820/ai\\_n14001405](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_19950820/ai_n14001405) on 16/03/09; Paul Lashmar & James Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War* (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998); and Bernard Porter, *Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain: 1790-1988* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 175-196.

<sup>71</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda*, pp. 35-53.

domestic politics and public opinion. Neither, however, would the existence of conspiracy explain the scope of the effects. One must take a different view of agency in the cold war, recognising the scope for the IRD information campaigns to influence discourse and accordingly to shape political action and society.

Why is it that the domestic operations of the IRD have been so controversial, represented in terms of conspiracy and errant government? The foreign operations of the IRD and even foreign policy in general equally involve manipulation and conspiracy. Departments and bureaucracies are organised around a particular strategic aim, individuals exposed to levels of classified secrets, all in aid of serving the national interest. The nature of modern sovereignty, which divides states and gives rise to national interests means that foreign and domestic action is considered to be intractably distinct. A Machiavellian *modus operandi* is the norm of International Relations between states, necessitated and perpetuated by the territorial structures on modern international politics. Indeed, were a foreign policy not to operate according to these principles, it would seem naive or even a threat to the national interest. Within the domestic realm, however, this conspiratorial bureaucratic mindset is considered exceptional and therefore a lack of transparency is seen as a threat to the democratic processes of the state. For instance, when Lyn Smith's breakthrough article on the IRD suggested that covert propaganda was "used covertly as part of the government's mechanism for conducting relations with other states as well as influencing opinion on the domestic scene", it was the latter part of this statement that was exceptional.<sup>72</sup> Revelations of the external propaganda operations of the IRD were not greeted with the same level of surprise and outrage, given that it ultimately serves the broad existing remit of British foreign policy. This is not the case with regards to the domestic operations of the IRD. As a secret section of the Foreign Office, intervening within Britain, it affected its own citizens. This is remarkable insofar as it goes against the established theory and practice of politics, in which a state's foreign policies are directed towards foreign states rather than its own citizens.

The means by which the IRD operated were not outright lies and conspiracy, at least in the beginning. Its information campaigns are often described as 'grey' propaganda, as opposed to untruths and clear misinformation, i.e. 'black' propaganda. The IRD exaggerated cases of

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<sup>72</sup> Lyn Smith, "Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department: 1947-77", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1980, p. 67.

anti-British plots and ensured full political capital was gained from incidences of Soviet atrocity. As well as generating politically advantageous information abroad it also offered speaker's notes to politicians, businessman and journalists, which contained beneficial information that the IRD wished to be publicly disseminated. The secrecy of the IRD had as much to do with the effectiveness of its information operation as it did with being in possession of highly classified information. The secrecy of the IRD allowed it to function in a panoptic manner, insofar as the general public would access information they believed and trusted, unaware it was government information. The contacts that it selected to be given information were to be credible amongst the public audience and well-known. The information that the IRD distributed was given on the condition that it was to be non-attributed and on a condition of anonymity. By operating in this way the IRD was able to effectively generate public mass knowledge that was both credible, and highly visible. Upon being briefed of the early achievements of the IRD, George Kennan "remarked that [it] represented a sophisticated and mature program, ahead of what the US had to offer."<sup>73</sup> Indeed, the model of informational and cultural contest constituted part of what Kennan had originally envisioned in his articulation of containment, rather than the narrow and military-backed version of containment that became the central plank of US cold war foreign policy.<sup>74</sup>

British propaganda methods were more discrete than those of the US. Focussing on the Western world the IRD sort to influence opinion-makers in contrast to overt CIA-sponsored interventions and broadcasting operations such as Radio Free Europe. As a 1950 Foreign Office review of the two approaches described it:

It seems our general approach is often somewhat different from that of the Americans and, on the whole, the discreet and personal approach of our Information Officers get more material effectively placed than the American reliance on volume of output. The rather aggressive portrayal of the American way of life is not always welcome and may be self-defeating. In any case it is preferable to maintain two independent lines of approach, since both together cover more ground than either could hope to do working alone.<sup>75</sup>

The propaganda techniques of the US were much more overt and prominent but because of this they were also able to be directly targeted at overseas audiences. Operating through its 'Radio Free Europe' the CIA was able to achieve much greater overseas coverage,

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<sup>73</sup> Aldrich, "Putting Culture into the Cold War", p. 110.

<sup>74</sup> George F. Kennan, "Containment Then and Now", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 65, iss. 4, spring 1987, pp. 885-890.

<sup>75</sup> Adam Watson quoted in Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda*, p. 252.

however, the tremendous “scale of [its] output did not necessarily guarantee its impact.”<sup>76</sup> For the Americans the “concept of influencing public opinion” was a new one and by the early 1950s, British liaison to the US intelligence services, Adam Watson, reported that Americans were beginning to accept that “the struggle for men’s minds [was] a major feature of their general struggle with the Kremlin.”<sup>77</sup> In contrast to the Americans’ megaphone propaganda, the effectiveness of the British approach to cold war propaganda was not measured by the size of the audience and the power of the message but rather its reception amongst those with influence and the subsequent effect of this information on the public discourse of the day.

In the pursuit of its mandate of countering communism, the IRD was employed domestically against the left-wing of the Labour movement. Examining the interventions within the Labour movement, Wilford declares that the “IRD played [an important] part in the postwar history of the British left.”<sup>78</sup> These interventions were still grounded in the information strategies rather than direct manipulation of politics. Under-Secretary Mayhew suggested to Foreign Secretary Bevin “that IRD material should be sent to Cabinet ministers regularly and that it should be included in their speeches.”<sup>79</sup> Ministers were also asked to present anti-communist speeches to the IRD so that they may be distributed through the BBC.<sup>80</sup> These talking points and speakers’ notes were also distributed to ‘friendly’ MPs to help them in “combating communist-inspired opposition in the Labour party and the Trade Union movement.”<sup>81</sup> The role of the IRD in regards to the Labour movement was not straight-forwardly partisan; rather it was driven by the pragmatic foreign policy doctrine of countering the communist threat. Rather than denouncing the Labour movement *en masse* the information strategy of the IRD sort influence within the Labour movement, seeking to drive a wedge between those who might harbour socialist aspirations and those for whom such aspirations might be seen as a threat to the state.

Through its operations within the Labour movement, the IRD directly intervened in British domestic politics despite being part of the Foreign Office. Accordingly, Peter Weiler, like

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<sup>76</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda*, p. 249.

<sup>77</sup> Adam Watson quoted in Andrew Defty, “‘Close and Continuous Liaison’: British Anti-Communist Propaganda and Cooperation with the United States, 1950-51”, *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 17, no. 4, 2002, p. 117.

<sup>78</sup> Wilford, “The Information Research Department”, p. 355.

<sup>79</sup> Smith, “Covert British Propaganda”, p. 70.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> Mayhew quoted in *Ibid.*

other revisionist scholars, has taken a strong position in regards to the domestic role of the IRD.<sup>82</sup> He suggests that IRD propaganda facilitated political manipulation within the British Labour movement in order to prop up right-wing elements and ostracise the left, regardless of whether they were communist or not.<sup>83</sup> Weiler's account is somewhat conspiratorial in its tenor and ascription of causal intent, suggesting there was a clear and determined effort to construct consensus around an anti-communist sentiment. To the extent that there was such a concerted effort, however, it was ultimately only conducted in a coordinated manner by a relatively small group of people. Despite this, however, his accusation of collusion is ultimately hard to refute. In this respect the IRD was subject to partisan manoeuvring, which saw the right-wing of the Labour party smear socialist members of the left.<sup>84</sup> As is the case with many bureaucratic institutions across the political spectrum, the official goals of the IRD in a number of instances were subverted in order to serve the pragmatic goals of personal and partisan interest. This, however, is quite different from the institution being conspiratorial. Conceptions of agency here are important insofar as such partisan collusion could not alone explain this broad affect. There has to be a wider resonance throughout the discourses of the Labour movement, suggestive of an existing support for anti-communist ideas. Ultimately the determining role of the IRD was one of influence, quite possibly very subtle, rather than one of control.

Writers and journalists contributed to the dispersion of the IRD information amongst the public in its most subtle manifestation. There are, however, instances when the IRD is reported to have directly intervened in the media. For instance, in March 1946, Bevin asked the editor of *The Times* to adopt a more definite position on foreign policy issues, particularly in regards to the position of E.H. Carr, who had been writing pro-Soviet pieces.<sup>85</sup> Hugh Greene, BBC Director-General from 1960-69, suggested that there was an understanding that the BBC was to "pillory the communist regime and display it as being ridiculous as well as cynical and evil."<sup>86</sup> The IRD also had contacts with a large number of journalists, indeed by 1977 it is suggested that more than 100 journalists had wittingly or

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<sup>82</sup> See for instance, Lucas, "The Dirty Tricks That Were Made in England"; Lashmar & Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War*; and Porter, *Plots and Paranoia*, pp. 175-196.

<sup>83</sup> Peter Weiler, *British Labour and the Cold War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 189-229.

<sup>84</sup> Stephen Dorrill & Robin Ramsay, *Smear! Wilson and the Secret State* (London: Grafton, 1992).

<sup>85</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda*, p. 49; see also Martin Kitchen, "British Foreign Policy Toward the Soviet Union", in Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.), *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-91: A Retrospective* (London: Frank Cass and Co, 1994), p. 115 and p. 132, n 17.

<sup>86</sup> Quoted in Lucas, "British Ministry of Propaganda".

unwittingly assisted the IRD by using its material.<sup>87</sup> The effectiveness of the IRD operations within the media, however, did not rely on direct intervention, and only in part relies on its sheer number of contacts. Unlike politicians, who are seen to be party political and not legitimate sources of information, the news media was more readily trusted by the public, particularly if it appeared factually based. Compared with government statements, the written output of journalists is more likely circulated amongst private social networks, amongst family, friends and co-workers, in so doing becoming a potent and trusted form of knowledge. The idea was not to mass broadcast falsity through whatever means possible but rather to provide beneficial but believable information to influential and trusted sources. The IRD in this sense was not designed to punish dissenters but rather to strategically contribute to a consensus based on a particular image of British social democracy and a sense of mission in regards to the threat from communism.

In the first scholarly publication on the IRD, Lyn Smith focuses on a number of the publications released under its direction. While “the vast majority dealt with subject-matter relating to the merits of social democracy and the demerits of communism”, the tone of these 80 or more books, by and large, is barely propagandistic and does not seem a worthy result of clandestine intrigue. Taken individually they constitute anti-communist opinion pieces. For instance the edited collection, *Why Communism Must Fail*, contained chapters by philosopher Bertrand Russell, trade union leader Vic Feather and biographer Leonard Shapiro.<sup>88</sup> While the opinions of these authors are certainly influential, it does not in any functional way constitute a substantial undermining of the democratic independence of the public by the state. What it may have played a part in was to contribute to a broad developing discourse and consensus around an anti-communist sentiment. This, however, is somewhat more indirect in its effect, hardly warranting being called propaganda given the negative connotations of the term. The irony of the IRD information campaign was that in attempting to paint the privation of Soviet life under Stalin it did not have access to the relevant facts and accordingly underestimated the extent of the suffering that occurred. Mayhew reflects that “when IRD set out to tell the brutal truth about the Soviet Union, it actually understated the horrors and the number of political prisoners and so on. And this was simply because we didn’t *know*.”<sup>89</sup> Furthermore,

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Smith, “Covert British Propaganda”, p. 77.

<sup>89</sup> Mayhew interview quoted in Ibid., p. 78.

as Guy Burgess – a Soviet asset who later defected to Moscow – was a member of the IRD staff in early 1948, it is quite likely that the Russians knew about its operations from the start.<sup>90</sup>

The IRD also operated through the journal *Socialist Commentary*.<sup>91</sup> *Socialist Commentary* was the journal of the Socialist Vanguard Group, a militant organisation active prior to WWII that denounced the Soviet Union in 1939 and from this point emerged “as the principle intellectual voice of the Labour Party’s right wing.”<sup>92</sup> The title is in this sense apt, for at first glance it suggests a forum for discussion or even promotion of socialism. After condemning Soviet socialism, however, the commentary it published was much more critical. Through this journal anti-communist sentiment could be consolidated and a process of subtle self-surveillance enacted upon those with left-wing socialist leanings, particularly in the Labour Party. An overt instance of foreign policy discipline occurred in 1961 when *Socialist Commentary* published a list of fifteen individuals who it suspected of being ‘crypto-communists’. Describing this fifteen, it announced that

(t)he hard-core is made up – let us face it as there is no point in mincing words – of many who would, almost certainly belong to the Communist Party, if communism had any chance of political success in this country. Not only are the political attitudes identical with the communists in that they are perpetually fighting the cold war on the side of the Soviet Union, but they pursue the same strategy and use the same methods.<sup>93</sup>

Prominently included in this list were two Labour politicians, Tom Driberg and Kolli Ziliacus. In many ways neither of these inclusions are particularly surprising or controversial; the latter having been expelled from the Labour Party and later readmitted, was a vocal left-wing critic of government policy, while the former was rumoured to have been an occultist as well as a homosexual and Soviet asset.<sup>94</sup>

Driberg was an extremely colourful character in British politics, who may well have been blackmailed by the Soviets. The politics of this, however, are by no means clear-cut. The life

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<sup>90</sup> Smith, “Covert British Propaganda”, p. 80.

<sup>91</sup> For information on a number of other publications through which IRD was able to exert domestic influence, see Lashmar & Oliver, *Britain’s Secret Propaganda War*, pp. 105-115.

<sup>92</sup> Peter Barberis, John McHugh & Mike Tyldesley (eds.), *Encyclopedia of British and Irish Political Organisations* (London: Continuum, 2000), p. 293.

<sup>93</sup> Dorrill & Ramsay, *Smear!*, p. 29.

<sup>94</sup> The accusation of occultism is based on Driberg having had an affair with occultist Aleister Crowley. See William G. Stewart, “Tom Driberg and Me: A Personal Portrait by William G. Stewart”, *BBC Four*, 19/03/09. Accessed from [www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/search/?q=tom%20driberg](http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/search/?q=tom%20driberg) on 20/03/09.

and politics of Driberg was the subject of a 2009 BBC documentary that highlighted the ongoing battle to balance his socialist leanings with his prominent position within the London establishment and the dictates of a cold war against communism.<sup>95</sup> Driberg was a close friend of Evelyn Waugh at Oxford and was part of the same elite social circle. Like Waugh he left Oxford without taking a degree and under the guidance of Edith Sitwell became a gossip columnist on Fleet Street. Driberg's societal and political prowess stemmed his ability to embed himself deeply in London high society. Driberg's personal politics were complex; he proclaimed himself a life-long Catholic, socialist and homosexual. He was a member of the Great Britain Communist Party but was expelled in 1941 when Anthony Blunt (himself later revealed as a Soviet agent) exposed him as an MI5 informer.<sup>96</sup> Driberg also had friends amongst the Royal family, including Lord Mountbatten for whom he spread a rumour amongst the left that Prince Phillip was a devoted socialist following an outcry over his lavish wedding in the post-WWII years of hardship.<sup>97</sup> As longstanding parliamentary whip, Tom Driberg was influential in ensuring Labour had the numbers in its legislative votes. The suggested blackmail of Driberg occurred while he spent a month in Moscow conducting interviews with Guy Burgess, a British intelligence agent who had defected. According to Soviet defector, Vasili Mitrokhin, Driberg was photographed in a 'honeytrap' operation and blackmailed into providing both societal and political information to the Soviets, although no official proof ever emerged at the time.<sup>98</sup>

Evident here are the kinds of rhetorical and discursive strategies that equate support for British socialism with Soviet communism, understood one-dimensionally as an external threat. The simple statement that the 'hard-core' of the 15 would join an effective Communist Party is largely correct, for many within the left sought after an effective manifestation of socialism. The unstated implication, when understood in the wider discursive context of the cold war, was that communism would embody a threat to the sovereignty of the state by functioning as a proxy of the USSR. This seemingly simple statement about communist party membership is thus impossible to dissociate from its

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<sup>95</sup> Stewart, "Tom Driberg and Me".

<sup>96</sup> "Among Orwell's Suspects", *The Guardian*, 21/06/03. Accessed from [www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/jun/21/books.artsandhumanities1](http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/jun/21/books.artsandhumanities1) on 20/03/09; see also Peter Levenda, *Unholy Alliance: A History of Nazi Involvement with the Occult* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn.) (New York: Continuum, 2002), p. 247.

<sup>97</sup> Stewart, "Tom Driberg and Me".

<sup>98</sup> Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (London: Allen Lane, 1999), pp. 522-526. This allegation was supported by former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Paul Lever who was interviewed in Stewart, "Tom Driberg and Me".



foreign policy context of defending against the Soviet threat. Accordingly it begins to develop a discursive taint. Further, this rhetorical strategy relies, whether consciously or unwittingly, on the simplistic portrayal of domestic politics and International Relations. It simplifies the account of domestic politics, falling back on the popular understanding of socialism and communism as it is understood in relation to the USSR in an international setting, drawing from a caricatured amalgam of Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism. In relation to the portrayal of International Relations, it relies entirely on a not particularly nuanced realist account that places strong emphasis on the danger that the Soviet Union poses. The world-view implicit in the statement by *Socialist Commentary* carries with it a commitment to the ontology of states/nations as the primary international actors. As such there is a continuous state of tension between the UK and the USSR, and given the ideological conflict and mutual security and strategic interests in mainland Europe, conflict is seen as unavoidable. Thus actions by the Soviets and by association, socialists, are seen as stemming from a calculation of interests in favour of acting aggressively and seeking to expand at the expense of Britain.

Thus a zero-sum interpretation of the Soviet Union as a militarily aggressive and expansionist international actor coalesces with that of the subversive socialist who poses a challenge to the established political orthodoxy. The domestic political intentions and personal allegiances of eccentrics such as Driberg are simplistically connected through a foreign policy 'discourse of danger' to the internationalisation of the Soviet threat. The national security prerogatives of defending against external threat amalgamate with domestic notions of deviance and disorder, in so doing becoming incorporated within domestic mechanisms of regulating social order. The foreign policy consensus in this sense informs what is to be politically correct. To suggest, however, that the British government or even the IRD are exploiting foreign policy discipline domestically is to over-ascribe the extent to which these institutions are unified actors. The operation of this foreign policy discourse occurred at many diffuse levels throughout society. For instance, critics of the domestic operations of the IRD point to the right wing focus of its political interventions.<sup>99</sup> That there was a "right wing complexion [to] some of IRD's approved contacts" need not

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<sup>99</sup> Richard Fletcher, George Brock & Phil Kelly, "How the FO waged Secret Propaganda War in Britain", *The Observer*, 29/6/78, p. 2; Lashmar, "Covert in Glory; Leigh, "Death of the Department that Never Was"; and Lucas, "British Ministry of Propaganda".

suggest that there is anything more at play than normal partisan politics.<sup>100</sup> Rather than being an exceptional incident, suggestive of a right-wing conspiracy, it is rather the everyday of domestic politics in which pragmatic actors employ available discourses as wedge politics against political rivals. This, however, would not be possible without a broader discursive consensus around the notion of external threat. Hence there emerges a combination of pragmatic party politics, social regulation and foreign policy. The weaving of foreign policy into domestic mechanisms of order gives rise to domestic actors seeking to encourage a particular image of normal behaviour and patriotism within the state in an attempt secure the state from external threat; i.e. social control in aid of *raison d'état*.

One of the most surprising actions by the IRD within British literary and social circles was the recruitment of well-known novelist and essayist George Orwell. In 1948, the IRD approached Orwell, who was at the time terminally ill at the Cranham sanatorium, asking if he could in any way assist in countering the threat posed by Soviet communism.<sup>101</sup> Overseeing this recruitment of Orwell was Adam Watson – later a scholar of International Relations and interlocutor of Hedley Bull – who, being friendly with many members of the 'literary left', was in charge of finding suitable "left-of-centre intellectuals" for IRD operations.<sup>102</sup> A member of Watson's staff was Celia Kirwan, a friend of Orwell's, to whom the writer had once proposed marriage.<sup>103</sup> Accordingly, the request at the Cranham sanatorium came not from an anonymous agent but rather Orwell's friend-cum-femme fatale, Kirwan. She was able to obtain from Orwell a list of those who in his "opinion [were] crypto-communists, fellow travellers, or inclined that way and should not be trusted as [potential British] propagandists."<sup>104</sup> Orwell's list of those not to be trusted included a surprising array of names. Many lesser-known writers and journalists populated the list, yet it also included amongst these founding International Relations scholar E.H. Carr, historian AJP Taylor, Labour parliamentary whip Tom Driberg, Soviet expert (and critic of Orwell) Isaac Deutscher, editor of the *New Statesman*, Kingsley Martin and actor Charlie Chaplin.<sup>105</sup> Orwell further granted that his novels *1984* and *Animal Farm* could be widely translated

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<sup>100</sup> Smith, "Covert British Propaganda", p. 67.

<sup>101</sup> Phillip Deery, "Countering the Cominform: George Orwell and the Cold War Offensive of the Information Research Department, 1948-50", *Labour History*, No. 73, Nov 1997, p. 219.

<sup>102</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda*, p. 87.

<sup>103</sup> Bernard Crick, *George Orwell: A Life* (Hardmonsworth: Penguin, 1982), p. 484.

<sup>104</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, "Orwell's List", *New York Review of Books*, vol. 50, no. 14, 25/09/03. Accessed from [www.nybooks.com/articles/16550](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16550) on 11/03/09.

<sup>105</sup> Garton Ash, "Orwell's List".

and distributed abroad as part of the IRD information operations to warn people of the dangers of totalitarianism.<sup>106</sup>

The decision by Orwell to cooperate with the state seems to represent a major rupture in his personal politics. Furthermore, he must have been aware that the list he provided would not only be used in determining those who were unsuitable for IRD operations but may also be used to subject these individuals to further scrutiny. Surely he connected discussions of the IRD information campaign with the Ministry of Truth 'newspeak' from 1984? The extent to which Orwell was swayed by the principle of protecting the British way of life or by the influence of his former flame is impossible to determine, although something dramatically shifted his personal principles.<sup>107</sup> Take for instance a statement made shortly before he was recruited by the IRD.

Specifically, the danger lies in the structure imposed on socialist and on liberal capitalist communities by the necessity to prepare for total war with the USSR and the new weapons, of which of course the atomic bomb is the most powerful and the most publicized. But danger also lies in the acceptance of a totalitarian outlook by intellectuals of all colours.<sup>108</sup>

Trying to reconcile this statement with his decision to collaborate with the IRD would require a great deal more space, but it certainly suggests that the foreign policy obligations of defending a British way of life against totalitarian communism profoundly impacted and played a part in shaping Orwell, causing him to compromise or at least modify a core principle that resonates through much of his work. The *Daily Telegraph* witheringly suggested the Orwell revelation was "as if Winston Smith had willingly cooperated with the Thought Police in 1984."<sup>109</sup> This dynamic, the effect of foreign policy on an individual, is explored in the second case study in relation to the discipline enacted upon British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. This next section suggests that as equally as it operates through an institution such as IRD, this same cold war discourse also shapes and controls individuals, each in a specific and detailed way.

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<sup>106</sup> Deery, "Countering the Cominform", p. 222.

<sup>107</sup> Celia Kirwan died in and the released documents do not detail all the specifics of their meeting.

<sup>108</sup> Quoted in Bernard Crick, "Nineteen Eighty-Four: Context and Controversy" in John Rodden (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 154.

<sup>109</sup> "Orwell is Revealed in Role as State Informer, *Daily Telegraph*, 12/07/96 quoted in Lashmar & Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War*, p. 95.

## The public and private disciplining of Harold Wilson

British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was a brilliant mind and a crafty politician. He was, however, seemingly overwhelmed with paranoia, making him less and less effective as a politician, a process which was only accentuated as he surrounded himself with a close-knit group of advisors who shared his suspicions. It is worth noting that revisionist accounts have since suggested that he might have been right to hold the suspicions that he did.<sup>110</sup> Indeed, a 2006 BBC documentary suggested that there was a conspiratorial plot against Wilson that in 1974 very nearly resulted in a coup against the Labour government.<sup>111</sup> Despite suggestions of a web of conspiracy surrounding Wilson, however, there is equally a complex process of foreign policy discipline enacted upon Wilson, both in terms of his own discipline through self-surveillance and also through coercive instances of overt discipline enacted by others. An analysis of the complex politics of Harold Wilson's turbulent leadership demonstrates that human agency is shaped by broader social discourses and practices. More specifically, the agency of Wilson was shaped by the foreign policy and national security discourses of cold war Britain. Thus, this discursive account of cold war agency suggests that it was foreign policy discipline that shaped Wilson rather than a web of conspiracy.

Wilson's political trajectory rose fast and burned bright. He was a brilliant student with a reputation for having the most impressively detailed memory and he subsequently became the youngest Oxford Don in 1937 at the age of 21. Likewise his political career followed a similar steep trajectory serving as the youngest member of cabinet at the age of 31. He was associated with the radical 'Bevanites', initially following Aneurin Bevan into the factional left of the Labour Party. This alignment, which saw him go against the grain of the more powerful right of the party did not stop him from later ascending to the leadership in 1964. Despite this apparent allegiance to the party left, his politics remained complex, defying simple characterisation.

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<sup>110</sup> David Leigh, *The Wilson Plot: How the Spycatchers and Their American Allies Tried to Overthrow the Government* (London: Pantheon, 1988); John Ware (Director), *The Wilson Plot* [Panorama television documentary, 13/10/88] (London: British Broadcasting Commission, 1988); Dorrill & Ramsay, *Smear!*; Robin Ramsay, *Politics and Paranoia* (Hove: Picnic Publishing, 2008), pp. 151-169; and Porter, *Plots and Paranoia*, pp. 210-227.

<sup>111</sup> Paul Dwyer (Director), *The Plot Against Harold Wilson* [BBC2 television documentary, 16/03/06] (London: British Broadcasting Commission, 2006).

The death of Labour Party Leader Hugh Gaitskell in 1963 was hard to separate from foreign policy concerns and the subsequent rise of Harold Wilson. Foreign policy discipline thus became intertwined with the more familiar internal party politics. Gaitskell was aligned with the stronger right-wing of the party. Following a visit to the USSR where he met with Khrushchev, Gaitskell died suddenly from an otherwise not note-worthy immune-related problem.<sup>112</sup> In the subsequent three-way leadership contest, Wilson ran against two candidates from the right. With the conservative vote split Wilson, the former leftist was elected to the party leadership. This remarkable chain of events set off rumours that the sudden death of Gaitskell was an assassination by the KGB in order to make way for Wilson who supposedly held greater sympathies with the Soviet cause.<sup>113</sup> Other than a pragmatic and convenient 'confirmation' by Soviet defector Anatoliy Golitsyn, there was little ever to suggest there was any veracity to this rumour, although it certainly gave credence to Wilson's paranoia that there were enemies who wished to end his political career.<sup>114</sup> Evident here is the way in which the politics of gossip and scandal associated with partisan party politics was permeated by stereotypes of external communist threat propagated by cold war foreign policy. Competing leadership aspirations is the petty everyday of politics; assassinations by a foreign power in order to gain influence and subvert a sovereign state is another thing altogether.

As far as Wilson was concerned the plots gathering against him were more than just rumours and mud-slinging; a possible coup was brewing. This belief that members of the intelligence services, the royal family, the military and the political right were conspiring against him have been subsequently supported in a 2006 BBC documentary. It suggests that in the wake of Watergate, Wilson wished to make the plot public and approached two journalists suggesting,

[d]emocracy as we know it is in grave danger. Prominent people are coming under attack. I think you journalists should investigate the forces which are threatening countries like Britain, the dirty tricks that have been going on against myself and also my government.<sup>115</sup>

Despite the Prime Minister effectively offering himself as 'Deep Throat' the plot against him never broke into the public arena as had the Watergate scandal. As well as making the case

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<sup>112</sup> Leigh, *The Wilson Plot*, p. 83.

<sup>113</sup> Peter Wright, *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer* (Richmond, Victoria: Heinemann Australia, 1987) p. 362.

<sup>114</sup> Dorrill & Ramsay, *Smear!*, p. 36.

<sup>115</sup> Dwyer, *The Plot Against Harold Wilson*.

that Wilson feared the forces working against him, the documentary also suggested that his suspicions were justified. In an interview with Lord Hunt, the former cabinet secretary under Wilson candidly suggests

I don't think [the security services] were people who were in any sense evil. They were people who on the whole followed a train of thought that Russians used to try and entrap everybody. They must have tried with [Wilson], they must have succeeded.<sup>116</sup>

Lord Waldegrave, who later entered Parliament in 1979 described the social malaise and great discontent under Wilson suggesting that amidst a collapsing economy and tensions surrounding Vietnam, “[t]here were people talking about coup d’états. Lord Mountbatten [a colonial viceroy and royal] was going to become head of some kind of junta.” British general Sir Walter Walker reportedly drafted an address for the Queen to read that would transfer power to the army and when asked if the army might rule Britain replied, “[p]erhaps the country might choose to rule by the gun in preference to anarchy.”<sup>117</sup> To date MI-5 denies such a plot ever existed and beyond Wilson’s own paranoia it is hard to determine to what extent such plans transpired.<sup>118</sup>

A prominent figure in the movement to discredit Wilson was the CIA ‘spy catcher’ James Jesus Angleton. Angleton had headed CIA counter-intelligence since 1954 when he was appointed at the age of 37. Angleton was later to be dismissed from his post in 1975 due to alcoholism and paranoia regarding Soviet influence that was long an obsession in his work. The dedication of Angleton to unearthing a KGB “monster plot” designed to bring down Western governments can be traced to the betrayal by his mentor, British spy Kim Philby, a double agent who defected to the Soviets.<sup>119</sup> From this longstanding pivotal position within US intelligence, Angleton was in a unique position to disseminate a state of mind that favoured suspicion and paranoia as a defining *modus operandi*. Angleton acted as a go-between amongst members of the intelligence services, and the political right in order to undermine Wilson.<sup>120</sup> Angleton’s key source was his trusted Soviet defector, Anatoliy

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Andy Beckett, *Pinochet in Piccadilly: Britain and Chile's Hidden History* (London: Faber and Faber, 2003), p. 196.

<sup>118</sup> MI5, “The Wilson Plot”. Accessed from [www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-wilson-plot.html](http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-wilson-plot.html) on 20/01/09.

<sup>119</sup> Tom Mangold, *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton – The CIA's Master Spy Hunter* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 81-94.

<sup>120</sup> In particular Angleton approached Conservative minister Jonathan Aitken and senior MI5 agent Peter Wright. ‘Wright has been described as a protégé of Angleton’s and later wrote the controversial tell-all, *Spycatcher*’, which was published in Australia after being banned in the UK; see Ibid., p. 280.

Golitsyn, who first suggested the Soviet 'master plan' to deceive the West and suggested that all future Soviet defectors would be KGB plants.<sup>121</sup> Acting on accounts provided by Golitsyn, Angleton believed that Gaitskell had been assassinated and further suspected many international figures were Soviet agents, a list that extended to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme, Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson and US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.<sup>122</sup>

Angleton's intense paranoia highlights an important insight into the politics of conspiracy and the wider effects of paranoia. Zizek highlights that Angleton's paranoia had a self-fulfilling tendency as his belief was so strong that he could only act as if there was a 'monster plot'.<sup>123</sup> From his paranoid point of view the only seemingly rational thing to do was to trust those who confirmed the existence of the plot. This caused him to send back Soviet defectors – no doubt to imprisonment or death – who were unable to confirm the details of this plot.<sup>124</sup> Ironically this did "grievous harm" to effective intelligence gathering under Angleton and "all but crippled the agency['s]" ability to unearth actual Soviet moles.<sup>125</sup>

The ultimate condemnation of Angleton's paranoia is that it doesn't matter if Angleton was sincerely duped by the idea of the Monster Plot... in both cases the result is exactly the same. Therein resides the truth of the paranoid stance: it is itself the threat, the destructive plot against which it is fighting.<sup>126</sup>

What Zizek is suggesting of Angleton, and is equally applicable to Wilson, is his belief in a 'monster plot' was itself a worthy 'monster plot' and that his search for Soviet moles was more destructive than if he himself had been a mole. He himself had become as great an internal threat as that which he feared to be coming from abroad. In short then, Zizek

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<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 81-94.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.* 280-283.

<sup>123</sup> Slavoj Zizek, *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn.) (London: Verso, 2002), p. xxxvi.

<sup>124</sup> Tom Mangold, "CIA Expert says Damon Too Fat for Film", *Daily Mail*, 24/02/07. Accessed from [www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-438274/CIA-expert-says-Damon-fat-spy-film.html](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-438274/CIA-expert-says-Damon-fat-spy-film.html) on 20/01/09; and Harold Jackson, "David Blee: CIA Chief Who Rescued the Agency from Paranoia", *The Guardian*, 22/08/00. Accessed from [www.guardian.co.uk/news/2000/aug/22/guardianobituaries.haroldjackson](http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2000/aug/22/guardianobituaries.haroldjackson) on 20/01/09.

<sup>125</sup> Gregory F. Treverton, "Book Review: Cold Warrior by Tom Mangold", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 5, winter 1991/92, p. 183; and Joseph Finder, "The Life and Strange Career of a Mole Hunter", *New York Times*, 30/06/91. Accessed from [//query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE4D9103EF933A05755C0A967958260](http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE4D9103EF933A05755C0A967958260) on 20/01/09.

<sup>126</sup> Slavoj Zizek, "Philosophy, the 'Unknown Knowns' and the Public Use of Reason", *Topoi*, 25, 2006, p. 138.

suggests the very idea of suspicion needs to be put under suspicion.<sup>127</sup> Thus, the actual existence of a conspiracy or plot is to a point irrelevant insofar as its debilitating effects of paranoia may indeed outweigh it. Instead, it is the extent to which people subject themselves to a belief in a plot and condition their actions accordingly that enacts the political effect. In short, it is the self-discipline in response to the perceived conspiratorial plot rather than the mechanics of any actual plot that creates the political effects.<sup>128</sup>

The discipline imposed upon Wilson did not stem simply from external sources. To whatever extent that there were conspiratorial plots by shadowy groups surrounding Wilson, however immanent the prospects of a coup may have been, ultimately it was as a result of a belief in these plots against him that Wilson enacted discipline upon himself. The available scope of realistic political action in Wilson's worldview had been shrunken-down; the political agency of Wilson was constrained. It was not, however, that his agency had been taken away by another actor (a zero sum conception of individual agency), nor was it the alignment of political events and bureaucratic machinations (a structural conception) that constrained Wilson's actions. Rather, Wilson had become implicated in a discourse of a foreign communist threat, a discourse that resonated throughout much of the Western democratic landscape, which allowed those that opposed him to attempt to further consolidate this linkage with an image of external others. Wilson was painfully aware of this convergence of pragmatic personal politics with the discourse of foreign threat, causing him to refashion his personal and political outlook to avoid this scrutiny and to adhere to the normative image of a prime minister as a rational statesman serving the national interest. The powerful linkage between discursive structures of foreign threat and processes of self-discipline were enacted, consciously and unconsciously, by Wilson himself. While the external processes of discipline forces Wilson to act, it is Wilson who creates this discursive linkage by enacting self-discipline upon himself. Of course, no man may remain an island, isolated hermetically from these social forces but the extent to which these forces act either as constraints or as process of productive self-fashioning agency depends on the interaction of an individual with this wider discourse.

Wilson trusted few. Or at the very least he did not accord to any great extent with his cabinet, most of whom had served under the previous Gaitskell leadership. Indeed, the

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<sup>127</sup> Zizek, *For They Know Not What They Do*, p. xxxvi.

<sup>128</sup> In this formulation of the disciplinary or psychological effects of paranoia, ever the psychoanalyst, Zizek seems to be positioning this paranoid tendency as the externalised self-judging character of the super-ego.



everyday machinations of party politics, for Wilson, were hard to separate from the plots and political conspiracy that – were they to eventuate – would have constituted a highly exceptional state of affairs. Accordingly, Wilson’s political methods were highly secretive and insular.<sup>129</sup> In an attempt to insulate himself from these plots, Wilson surrounded himself with a small number of loyal staff, a ‘kitchen cabinet’ that handled many key aspects of the business of government.<sup>130</sup> Central amongst these advisors was Lady Falkender – then Marcia Williams – who functioned in a similar manner to a US Presidential Chief of Staff and was said to have been the most powerful woman in English politics.<sup>131</sup> With the benefit of hindsight, Williams and the kitchen cabinet were a prototype for the mechanics of modern political management that emerged under the leadership of Tony Blair.<sup>132</sup> At the time, however, it appeared a highly defensive manoeuvre seen by his detractors as an “odd assortment of acolytes” that supported or even fuelled his suspicions.<sup>133</sup> Evident here is the contrary consequences of a conspiratorial mindset, for insofar as Wilson and his inner circle sought to counter potential plots, they effectively created one and only further subjected Wilson to a greater level of scrutiny and suspicion.

Wilson was further disciplined through allegations of indiscriminate sexual activities that were rhetorically connected to the politics of external threat. An affair between Wilson and Ms Williams, for instance, was alleged to have occurred whilst on a trip to the Soviet Union in 1956.<sup>134</sup> In a clever spin that absolved the allegation of low-blow moral politics, it was suggested, however, that the problem was not the sexual activity as such, which had

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<sup>129</sup> Dorrill & Ramsay, *Smear!* p. 74.

<sup>130</sup> David Childs, *Britain Since 1945: A Political History* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1979), pp. 162-163.

<sup>131</sup> Williams had previously been a secretary in the office of the Labour General Secretary, Morgan Phillips and asserts she warned Wilson of plots against him in 1956, Marcia Williams, *Inside No. 10* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp. 103-104. See also Andy McSmith, “Baroness Falkender: The Lavender Lady”, *The Independent*, 21/05/06. Accessed from [www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/baroness-falkender-the-lavender-lady-479040.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/baroness-falkender-the-lavender-lady-479040.html) on 12/02/09; Simon Walters, “Harold Wilson’s Doctor Plotted to Murder Marcia Falkender”, *The Mail on Sunday*, 29/9/02. Accessed from [www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-140440/Harold-Wilsons-doctor-plotted-murder-Marcia-Falkender.html](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-140440/Harold-Wilsons-doctor-plotted-murder-Marcia-Falkender.html) on 12/02/09.

<sup>132</sup> Dominic Wring, “Selling Socialism: Marketing the Early Labour Party”, *History Today*, vol. 55, iss. 5, 2005, p. 41.

<sup>133</sup> Wilson’s press secretary, Joe Haines, suggests that Williams exploited his weakness and insecurity stemming from a fear of plots being waged against him, see Joe Haines, *The Politics of Power* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), p. 160; quotation taken from James Margach, *The Abuse of Power: The War Between Downing Street and the Media* (London: W.H. Allen, 1978), p. 141.

<sup>134</sup> This was leveled, for instance, by Wilson’s former press secretary Joe Haines, *Glimmers of Twilight: Harold Wilson in Decline* (London: Methuen, 2004). See also Dorrill & Ramsay, *Smear!* p. 44-48 and Leigh, *The Wilson Plot*, pp. 67-69.

otherwise made for such intriguing gossip during the 1964 election.<sup>135</sup> Rather the allegation was that the affair was not simply a moral affront, but an Achilles' heel in the security of the nation at the highest level as the indiscretion was photographed and used in order to blackmail Wilson, subverting him towards the Soviet cause.<sup>136</sup> Thus it was implied that Wilson had become compromised above and beyond his own ideological leanings and alleged sexual impropriety. Thus it was not just matter of the sleazy politics of character assassination. The allegations of sexual indiscretions and blackmail were intertwined with foreign policy discipline, implying that Wilson had been made a tool of the communist threat to the state.

Wilson's intensification of self-discipline can also be seen at a minute physical level. His wariness of being perceived as left-wing or possessing Soviet associations was subtly integrated into the self-conscious actions of his body language. For instance, in 1963 on one of his 12 trips to Moscow, Wilson posed for impromptu photos with a Soviet General Malinovski. Amidst a tense cold war backdrop that demanded of its leaders a robust foreign policy stance, Wilson "was well aware whom not to be seen smiling with."<sup>137</sup> Indeed images of him in Moscow happily smiling with Soviet officials would no doubt further play to domestic rumours that he was under the sway of the Soviets. To avoid this Wilson ensured he exercised self-surveillance over the most minute of body actions and following the photos made a point of remarking to a by-standing media person, "you notice that I didn't smile".<sup>138</sup> In moments such as this Wilson's sense that he was under close public scrutiny and perhaps conspiratorial persecution became physically manifest, highlighting an ongoing self-discipline imposed upon himself.

The links between Wilson and the discourse of Soviet threat were not the only way in which foreign policy obligations enacted discipline. Wilson was also subject to the foreign policy discipline that is imposed on all statesmen and leaders. This, however, is not a suggestion that is original to this analysis. It can be seen in Machiavelli's suggestions to the Prince and is intrinsic to the practice of state diplomacy in an international realm that is

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<sup>135</sup> The intrigue into a possible affair was common within the media at the time and was in particular a key intrigue of the 1964 election, Colin Seymour-Ure, "Review: Glimmers of Twilight – Harold Wilson in Decline", *Public Administration*, vol. 82, iss. 2, 2004, p. 540.

<sup>136</sup> After circulating as rumour in London it was alleged by Auberon Waugh in *Private Eye* (19/9/75) and *The Spectator* (19/6/76), quoted in Dorrill & Ramsay, *Smear!*, p. 45.

<sup>137</sup> Anthony Howard & Richard West, *The Making of a Prime Minister* (London: Quality Book Club, 1965), p. 47.

<sup>138</sup> Wilson quoted in *Ibid.*

governed by the principles of *realpolitik*. As the Prime Minister, the international political figurehead of Britain, Wilson was ultimately responsible for foreign policy decisions, made on behalf of his domestic constituency. In as much as foreign policy is an instrumental policy that acts as a bridge/barrier between inside and outside, the Prime Minister with the help of his foreign minister is the figure that embodies this role. For instance, Wilson's decision in 1964 to purchase the *Polaris* submarine from the US reduced the independence of Britain's nuclear arsenal, making Britain a strategic port of US global power projection, or as Duncan Campbell suggests, an "unsinkable aircraft carrier."<sup>139</sup> Faced with having to make a decision between two imperfect options, Wilson was forced to decide according to a calculated zero-sum game rationale, that is, Wilson was forced to act within a stringently performative set of realist foreign policy conventions. For him no doubt this became a procedure that was normalised, it appeared simply as the 'way things are', the reality of International Relations. In this way International Relations realism can be seen as disciplinary as it imposes the norms and constraints of foreign policy on those members of the state within which it is practiced. This discipline was only intensified by the foreign policy discipline imposed on him by domestic detractors.

Wilson was also subjected to the limitations of trying to balance the competing obligations of security and liberty. As was suggested in Chapter 1, the nature of modern sovereignty produces various dichotomies in contemporary politics. In particular is the attempt to balance the national interests of the state against the forms of authority according to which the individual is subject. Chapter 3 further suggested that the attempt to balance the obligations of liberty and security was a false dichotomy, which functioned by operationalising the obligations of foreign policy in such a way that it is seen as logical to extend to the purview of the state further into the lives of citizens. Shortly after to coming to power in 1964 Wilson was told a number of ministers were under MI-5 surveillance for possible Soviet links.<sup>140</sup> Tapping the phones of serving politicians was objectionable to Wilson and in making an argument against this practice he acknowledged the ineluctable tensions between liberty and security, stating:

there can only be complete security within a police state, and perhaps not even then, and there is always a difficult balance between the requirements of democracy in a free society and the requirements of security.... I reviewed the

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<sup>139</sup> Duncan Campbell, *Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier* (London: Paladin, 1986), p. 17; see also Stuart Croft, "Continuity and Change in British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons", *Political Studies*, XLII, 1996, pp. 228-242.

<sup>140</sup> Dorrill & Ramsay, *Smearl!* p. 65.

practice when we came to office and decided on balance - and the arguments were very fine - that the balance should be tipped the other way and that I should give this instruction that there was to be no tapping of the telephones of Members of Parliament.<sup>141</sup>

Despite the pressure of the pragmatic demands of security, Wilson felt it necessary to uphold the privacy of ministers. It is clear, however, that he felt the obligation to prevent possible links being established with an external threat. In short, he was disciplined by the tension between liberty and security.

Wilson's suspicion of secret cabals and political plots was not limited to those that he saw as gathering in the wings of the political right. Wilson also staunchly and publicly opposed those of the left. Nor was he scared about dealing out discipline, implicating the actions of others within a foreign policy context in order to achieve his aims. For instance, Wilson had long-favoured a national wage system that would ensure fair incomes but also remove the ability for strikes to occur. In this respect Wilson was not a traditional left-winger and as such this brought him into conflict with the unions. Wilson opposed a bold wage claim by the powerful National Union of Seaman. A consequence was that a strike was called. Not willing to be held to ransom over this wage claim Wilson went on the offensive. On 20 June 1966, Wilson claimed in Parliament that the strikers were being manipulated by a "tightly knit group of politically motivated men who... are now saying very blatantly that they are more concerned with harming the nation than with getting the justice we all want to see."<sup>142</sup> The barely hidden subtext of these accusations was that the Communist Party was directly interfering and organizing the unions. In this sense, Wilson's allegations of conspiracy were not limited just to the political right but also extended to those who were certainly not part of any plot to overthrow him.

Wilson's concern for conspiracy suggests he employed a conspiratorial framework of understanding, or at least was willing to use it to justify his ends. Expressed differently, did Wilson see political conspiracy, both left and right, as something exceptional or rather as normal everyday politics? Viewed through these schemas of exception and norm this provides two possible accounts of Wilson's politics. In the case of the former, his criticisms of the NUS strike from this perspective could reflect an awareness of the pressure exerted

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<sup>141</sup> Harold Wilson, "Telephone Tapping Debate" in House of Commons, *Hansard*, 17/11/66, vol. 736, col. 639. Accessed from [hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1966/nov/17/telephone-tapping](https://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1966/nov/17/telephone-tapping) on 16/02/09.

<sup>142</sup> Harold Wilson, "Seaman's Strike" in House of Commons, *Hansard*, 20/06/66, vol. 730, col. 42 & 46. Accessed from [hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1966/jun/20/seamens-strike](https://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1966/jun/20/seamens-strike) on 16/02/09.

by the political right and being forced to employ a *realpolitick* in order to overcome the wage claim of the unions. However distasteful such an action might be, it is the burden of a leader. The latter suggests that a process of overt discipline and paranoid group think likely took place and Wilson may have genuinely believed there was a leftist communist conspiracy within the NUS. The condemnation of the NUS could have been a broader rejection of the politics of persecution and character assassination, both left and right. Either way, Wilson's playing of the anti-communist card should not be seen as incompatible with his politics or his desire to avoid partaking in the anti-communist hysteria that characterised the Western democratic landscape of the cold war. As to which it was, drawing a clear distinction may not be entirely possible. The explanation of politics in the language of conspiracy theory misses the broader explanatory point, but then to ignore conspiracies entirely avoids the question of why they arise at all. In this sense, it can be seen as a non-conspiratorial combination of both normal and exceptional politics; the observed collusion being not conspiracy but a pragmatic emergence of mutual interest that is better described in terms of a social trend or common cultural practice.

Ultimately, the various manifestations of discipline took its toll on the political career of Wilson. His failure to adhere to the statesmanlike image required of him in his position of public office and to cope with the deliberate discipline that was enacted by his critics and their interlocutors led to a combination of his political and personal undoing. The somewhat unorthodox and at times paranoid leadership of Wilson, the deviation from the expected norms of prime minister-ship, can be seen as a neurotic form of resistance. As Prime Minister, Wilson was tasked trying to maintain a balanced and principled leadership during the cold war, a time that demanded clear support for tradition, decisive patriotism and unequivocal acquiescence to the requirements demanded by the 'permanent government': those powerful figures that rotated amongst the corridors of Cabinet, the civil services, party factions and the intelligence services. While foreign policy discipline is enacted on all leaders, statesmen and diplomats, that is, the discipline required of a political actor in the realist tradition, Wilson however, was subjected to particularly intense discipline given the heightened national security atmosphere and its discursive connection to his own personal politics. Given this, perhaps it is understandable that after a mixed record of two separate, yet relatively short terms in office, and a record number of Labour election victories, he resigned in 1976 fearing the early onset of Alzheimer's disease.

Wilson was inescapably hemmed in; he was torn between personal principle and the pragmatic politics of the cold war. Wilson was not, however, simply constrained by the actions of external conspirators who sought to end his political career. The account offered here suggests that it was much more complex. Wilson was constrained by a world-view that circumscribed his political reality in terms of a cold war spy-thriller in which the manoeuvrings of external superpower conflict was matched only by the shadowy intrigue and deception of his domestic enemies. While there was no simple way to escape this popular narrative that was pervaded throughout the media and political gossip circles, Wilson's own self-discipline of paranoiac insularity certainly served to substantiate such slander and indeed create conspiracy where previously there may not have been such distinctly formed plots. In short, the only framework of understanding he had was that of those who were the source of his own torment. As a result of these suspicions against him the disciplinary language of national security and foreign policy interests of the state were being deployed at the highest level against the Prime Minister; the language of the state was turning on its premier statesman.

The anti-communism of the early cold war demonstrated that politics and agency is unconstrained by the distinctions between domestic and international politics; pragmatic political party goals shape overseas engagements while foreign policy disciplines and controls those at home. In particular, this chapter has examined the politics of intrigue and intense personal scrutiny in Britain that gave rise to pervasive narratives of political agents, spies and conspiratorial collusion. This chapter sought to describe these narratives in terms of a fluid conception of agency, in which wider social and political discourses shape people's thoughts and actions. These cold war narratives enact personal and social discipline through discourses that demand an unambiguous anti-communism in the face of an external Soviet threat. The mandate of the IRD to counter communist influence wherever it emerged saw this secret Foreign Office department disperse information campaigns that acted – both inadvertently and deliberately – against British citizens, embedding them in a transatlantic discourse of communist threat. The pressures of office placed upon Prime Minister Harold Wilson amassed around his ability to confront the spread of communism, bringing his left-wing socialism into sharp focus, associating him with the external Soviet threat and seemingly pitting all those with a claim to a non-socialist brand of British nationalism – both within the Labour Party and British politics generally – against him. Foreign policy, in this sense is no different from any other

government apparatus insofar as it disciplines and controls those on whose behalf it operates. If anything, the pervasive social effects of foreign policy upon its citizens are greater than domestic-oriented bureaucracies, given the paramount importance placed on issues of national security. Subsequent chapters will take up this argument further in relation to the contemporary practice of the war on terror in the United States.

## Chapter 5

### **Bodies, space, politics: Post-9/11 intensification of spatial control**

The Western democratic landscape of post-September 11, 2001 politics has featured highly politicised debates over how best to respond to the threat of terrorism.<sup>1</sup> The approach favoured by the US Administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009) and its allies has been framed in terms of the traditional domestic and international separation, a commitment to the inside/outside dichotomy, favouring conventional warfare abroad against Afghanistan and Iraq, paralleled at home by a reorganisation and intensification of domestic intelligence and surveillance methods. The implementation and effects of this inside/outside approach, however does not so clearly reflect this dichotomy.

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this chapter I will be referring to September 11, 2001 as '9/11' insofar as it is a convenient shorthand for the date and, more importantly, captures the onset of a general emergency mentality that predominates in contemporary politics. This is also in line how it is used in politics and popular culture more broadly. For more on this emergency mentality see Robin W. Cameron, "Self-discipline in a Time of Terror: US Foreign Policy and the US Self", *Theoria*, 114, 2007, pp. 74-101.



The fluid nature of contemporary politics challenges the established distinctions between inside and outside. As Shapiro suggests, “the current security and intelligence policies dissolve many of the former distinctions between domestic crime-fighting and global warfare.”<sup>2</sup> The inability to secure an effective post-conflict peace situation in Afghanistan and Iraq has given cause for many to question the effectiveness of conventional war-fighting tactics in the war on terror. It has also seen the emergence of a greater focus on policing and order abroad. The Iraq war in particular has raised a much wider level of dissent within US politics over the motivations behind the decision to go to war and the appropriateness of the invasion in effectively countering terrorism. The extra-legal detention and abuse of prisoners held at the US controlled Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay detention facilities have received wide condemnation. Within domestic politics there has been fierce debate within the media and political pundits over the balance between security and civil liberties and the appropriateness of torture as a tool of interrogation.<sup>3</sup> The Bush Administration passed legislation – whose legality was supported by sympathetic intellectuals – that facilitated greater presidential powers. At the other end of the spectrum, citizens were also called upon to act out national security prerogatives.

These exceptional measures are accompanied by an intensification of less overt mechanisms of control that are equally justified according to principles of national security. For instance, surveillance – albeit for the most part passive – has moved into many aspects of our day-to-day lives. Indeed, most of our technologically assisted communications and interactions with the world by those who are integrated with advanced technological society are now surveilled. Within the US surveillance has become widespread and immersive: telephone records, telephone conversations, internet usage, electronic funds transfers, cash withdrawals, overall consumption and spending patterns, even library borrowing records are all either passively surveilled or are able to be checked. As data-mining become more extensively employed this surveillance will become largely passive but will nonetheless be constant. Similar systems are employed throughout most

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<sup>2</sup> Michael Shapiro, “Every Move You Make: Bodies, Surveillance and the Media”, *Social Text* 83, vol.23, no.2, 2005, p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> This has continued into the current Obama administration, seen particularly in the criticisms offered by former Vice-President Dick Cheney that investigations into CIA interrogation procedures will damage national security. See Stephen F. Hayes, “Cheney Statement on CIA Documents/Investigation”, *Weekly Standard*, 24/08/09. Accessed from [www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/08/cheney\\_statement\\_on\\_cia\\_docume.asp](http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/08/cheney_statement_on_cia_docume.asp) on 25/09/09 and; John Cochran, “Cheney vs. Obama: CIA Abuse Probe ‘Political’”, *ABC News*, 30/08/09. Accessed from [abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=8448550](http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=8448550) on 25/09/09.

developed states. In the immediate proximity of strategic sites – whether it is a transport hub, government or corporate building, state monument or any populated public area – surveillance is carried out to counter possible threats, whether general or specifically related to terrorism. Thus, in many densely populated areas bodies move within space that is highly controlled by processes of passive or active surveillance. While terrorism is not the sole risk this pervasive surveillance seeks to negate, it is the predominant threat paradigm against which such measures are seen as necessary and are accordingly justified.

The emergence of instances of overt discipline and pervasive surveillance cannot occur in a discursive or contextual vacuum. The adoption of wider executive or wartime powers is not only the result of a particular genesis of extraordinary events but also of processes through which the political space throughout the Western political landscape has become securitised. 9/11 has given rise to an exceptional state of politics although this is not necessarily the result of a formal suspension of the law or an out-and-out declared state of emergency. The response to the threat of terrorism has imbued politics with a general tenor of national security, which has derived a measure of support for practices that would otherwise be unacceptable within the Western democratic landscape. The presence of divergent perspectives within Western nations has ensured that these developments have been far from uncontested and that there has been much resistance. This, however, has not stopped the emergence of these measures, which given the tenor of the national security discourse, takes a significant amount of courage and fortitude to refuse. This was particularly the case in the initial years following 9/11 when such refusal would be to equate oneself with the nation's enemies, in what is a clear demonstration of the operation of foreign policy discipline upon domestic citizens.<sup>4</sup>

Contemporary politics thus poses some very stark questions to observers of US, and by extension, international politics about the effect of war and the external threat of terrorism upon domestic democratic practice. These questions directly concern the central thematic of this thesis and the substance of these questions is the central concern of this chapter. This chapter seeks to address these challenges that could be described as an attempt to create security by regulating bodies and the space in which they interact. The initial discussion examines the notions of exceptionality, securitisation and spatial understandings

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<sup>4</sup> For a detailed account of the nature of the war on terror discourse see Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).

of control and then uses them to analyse contemporary responses to the threat of terrorism and its subsequent effects. Having outlined this basic framework, through which the spatial processes of control are enacted on bodies and space according to dictates of foreign policy, this chapter will then turn to contemporary case studies.

The first case study examines the discourse of 'super-empowerment'. This term was coined by Thomas Friedman to capture the disproportionate effects that highly motivated actors were able to exert, to the point of becoming significant actors in global politics. This discourse became more potent after 9/11, capturing the tenor of the times and resonating within academia, emergent military doctrine and popular culture. This chapter suggests that in response to the exceptional super-empowered actions of 9/11, a form of discipline has been operationalised that compels everyday individuals to consider themselves in exceptional circumstances and in turn validates the perceived necessity for 'super-empowered' extra-judicial action, such as torture and abuse. The 'normal' individual thus becomes securitised and embedded within spatial relations that take on the characteristics of exceptionality. These processes of spatial control will be demonstrated in terms of effects that can be described as topological in nature. Topology is a relational form of spatial representation based not around linear cartography but rather the dynamic relations between moving or changing objects. In this sense it is useful for understanding the processes of control and effects of securitisation on bodies as they move within particular spaces. The final case studies will use this notion of topology to examine the effects of security procedures on cities and the attempt to regulate mobility across borders.

### **Securing bodies and space after 9/11**

Space is a crucial concept in International Relations, both for orthodox accounts and for those that challenge this orthodoxy. Orthodox IR presupposes a series of spatial configurations that are literally the manifestation of a relationship between power and knowledge, inscribed into political space. For instance, the knowledge practices of foreign policy reinforce both the borders of, and differences between states in such a way that difference is demarcated by political spaces. Similarly, this chapter suggests that foreign policy is a practice that delineates space but also shapes the social and political order within these spatial boundaries. In this sense, the emergence of any foreign policy response instils that policy's values within the space that it defines. Consequently, foreign policy can feed into spatial processes of control and regulation within a domestic space. The process

of securitisation whereby foreign threats demand a concerted domestic response is not a direct or linear process. Subtle understandings of how foreign policy feeds into spatial mechanisms of control are required in order to understand this effect.

### *Exception, securitisation and space*

The rise of an exceptional state of affairs following 9/11 suggests the presence of a politics in the manner described by Schmitt. This can be seen in the potent reassertions of sovereign authority that occurred during the Bush Administration, particularly in regards to the extension of executive presidential wartime powers. Schmitt defined sovereignty not in legal terms but in terms of the ability to act, and the ability to decide, especially in times of emergency. According to Schmitt, the “[s]overeign is he who decides upon the exception.”<sup>5</sup> The Bush Administration drafted legal opinions conferring wide-ranging wartime presidential powers, including the potential for the military to be employed domestically against terror suspects.<sup>6</sup> The drafting of such memos authorising greater domestic power and willingness to act unilaterally abroad was an attempt by the Bush Administration to act decisively in the face of the 9/11 attacks, demonstrating it would not be held hostage to acts of terrorism or wait for the tide of public opinion to determine its course of action. Such actions, understood in Schmittian terms, were an attempt to reassert the coherence of the state in the face of actions that undermined its authority. The integrity of the state became paramount, elevated above established practices of international law and normal rules and procedures – some constitutional – designed to protect domestic liberty.

Schmitt thus advocated what could be described as a radical variant of *realpolitik*. Under this conception not only would the national interest of the state be placed above that of other states but above also its own liberal democracy. Such a position arose out of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism, which he felt was unable to address the harsh realities of politics, suggesting that it has “attempted to transform the enemy from the viewpoint of economics into a competitor and from an intellectual point into a debating adversary.”<sup>7</sup> Schmitt’s withering disdain for the weak-willed politics of liberalism in many ways captures

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<sup>5</sup> Schmitt, *Political Theology*, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Neil A. Lewis, “Bush Administration Memos Claimed Vast War Powers”, *New York Times*, 03/03/09. Accessed from [www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/world/americas/03iht-terror.1.20553923.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/world/americas/03iht-terror.1.20553923.html) on 22/08/09; David G. Savage, “Bush Administration Memos on Presidential Powers Stun Legal Experts”, *LA Times*, 04/03/09. Accessed from [articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/04/nation/na-bush-memos4](http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/04/nation/na-bush-memos4) on 22/08/09.

<sup>7</sup> Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, p. 28.

the way in which calls for a more robust politics in the face of an emergent terrorist security threat prevailed over progressive voices in the post-9/11 political landscape. In the face of the threat of terrorism the friend/enemy distinction had become a potent force within US politics. As Schmitt suggests, “every concrete antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping.”<sup>8</sup> Other concerns, whether they be economic, legal, intellectual or ethical, become subsumed by expressly political demands as the distinction between friend and enemy grow more stark.<sup>9</sup>

The exceptional politics of Schmitt is captured by the literature on securitisation, emerging largely from the Copenhagen School. This school of thought seeks to add a further theoretical dimension to security studies, drawing on the constructivist agenda within International Relations.<sup>10</sup> Within securitisation theory, security is not understood as an objective process but as the outcome of a process whereby notions of security are socially constructed by what these authors describe as ‘speech acts’, essentially a narrowly defined notion of discourse. Ole Wæver, a key proponent of securitisation theory, suggests that “(i)t is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one.”<sup>11</sup> Securitisation theory can thus be understood as “the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.”<sup>12</sup> While Schmitt did not employ explicitly constructivist terms, securitisation theory “mirrors the intense condition of existential division, of friendship and enmity that constitutes Schmitt’s concept of the political,” so as to consolidate the state in order to face the threat.<sup>13</sup> Michael C. Williams seeks to expand the scope of securitisation, suggesting that the processes whereby enemies are identified and threats are constructed is not limited just to words or ‘speech acts’.<sup>14</sup> Williams instead locates securitisation within “a broader vision of communicative action”, in which images play an equally important role.<sup>15</sup> Drawing on the provocation of

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>10</sup> For the key thinkers and key text in this school of thought see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan & Jaape de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Rita Taureck, “Securitization Theory and Security Studies”, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2006, p. 54.

<sup>12</sup> Carsten Bagge Lausten & Ole Wæver, “In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 29, no. 3, 2000, p. 708.

<sup>13</sup> Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 47, no. 4, 2003, p. 516.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 511-531.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 524.

Williams it can be suggested that securitisation implicates a wider range of discursive processes than simply speech *per se*, or for that matter, images. Security as we have seen is intimately bound to the creation of identity and domestic processes of discipline.<sup>16</sup> Securitisation should thus be seen as a highly fluid process that cannot be separated from the constitution of social order. Indeed this chapter will highlight its role in the spatial mechanisms of control.

Critical geographers concerned with spatial relations of control draw from the work of Foucault on discipline and panopticism. As is the case with this thesis there is a concern for subtle processes of power and control. Rather than examining foreign policy, however, they examine how similar effects are operationalised within particular contemporary spaces.<sup>17</sup> This chapter seeks to bring together the focus of this thesis on foreign policy with those who are concerned with spatial control. Foucault's concern was to demonstrate "how power is exercised in particular sites and settings."<sup>18</sup> Spatiality is important within these accounts insofar as they involve regulation that occurs when individuals are subject to relations of visibility within space.<sup>19</sup> It is this awareness of visibility within a specific spatial context that internalises discipline within bodies, memorably typified in Foucault's figuration of control in the Panopticon.<sup>20</sup> Discipline, in this sense, "is above all an analysis of space."<sup>21</sup> Processes of control for Foucault are fluid and unbounded; it is not externally enforced but rather embodied within subjects. Given that as configurations of space for present purposes are only important insofar as they produce processes of regulation and control, it follows that the conception of space will not be bounded or linear but rather relational. For an explicit formulation of spatial regulation we should briefly turn to Deleuze who responds directly to Foucault's disciplinary model. Deleuze describes these processes of discipline in more fluid terms, suggesting there is constant movement through multiple "spaces of enclosure."<sup>22</sup> Given the lack a single over-arching space, bodies are not so much

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<sup>16</sup> Campbell, *Writing Security*.

<sup>17</sup> For an overview of the critical geography that draws from the work of Foucault see Matthew Hannah, "Space and the Structuring of Disciplinary Power: An Interpretive Review", *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, vol. 79, no. 3, 1997, pp. 171-180.

<sup>18</sup> Felix Driver, "Bodies in Space: Foucault's Account of Disciplinary Power" in Colin Powers & Roy Porter (eds.), *Reassessing Foucault: Power, Medicine and the Body* (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 117.

<sup>19</sup> John Allen, "Spatial Assemblages of Power: From Domination to Empowerment", in Doreen Massey, John Allen & Phillip Sarre (eds.), *Human Geography Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 201-204.

<sup>20</sup> Hannah, "Space and the Structuring of Disciplinary Power", p. 171.

<sup>21</sup> Foucault, quoted in Stuart Elden, "Plague, Panopticon, Police", *Surveillance & Society*, vol. 1, no. 3, 2003, p. 245.

<sup>22</sup> Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", *October*, vol. 59, 1992, pp. 3-7.

'moulded' according to one form of discipline but rather 'modulated' by variable processes of control that constantly shift through time and space.<sup>23</sup>

A number of scholars have engaged with the intensification of control in the post-9/11 environment, particularly as it relates to the operation of these processes within cities and urban spaces. This field of research seeks to understand the complex relations within cities rather than viewing them as bounded entities, no more than the sum of fixed addresses and street names. Stephen Graham and Patsy Healey challenge the reliance on "'containered' views of space and time" pointing instead to the need for a "relational understanding of time, space and cities."<sup>24</sup> Stephen Graham suggests the war on terror discourse creates

imaginative geographies of US cities... as 'homeland' spaces which must be reengineered to address supposed imperatives of 'national security' [while on the other hand] Arab cities have been imaginatively constructed as little more than 'terrorist nest' targets to soak up US military firepower.<sup>25</sup>

Graham highlights the operation of foreign policy in such a way that it folds foreign policy and national security obligations into the very space in which bodies interact. Gregory suggests that this spatial ordering process is not a straight forward linear geography, rather it "folds distance into difference through a series of spatializations."<sup>26</sup> The folding of discourses has the effect of stretching and compressing time and space, calling for a "topology... that overwhelms the fictions of boundaries, limits, fixity, permanence [and] embedment."<sup>27</sup> These perspectives from within critical geography suggest that in the post-9/11 landscape, foreign policy discourses have given rise to an altered spatiality, of which the associated processes of control warrant further examination in this chapter.

Bringing these analyses together this chapter will suggest that the very space of Western democracies and the way that bodies move within it have been shaped by the process of securitisation. In this sense the responses to 9/11 have given rise to the creation of exceptional laws, the suspension of normal ones and a process of securitisation that alter spatial mechanisms of control. The threat of terrorism means that bodies are now

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<sup>23</sup> Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", p. 4.

<sup>24</sup> Stephen Graham & Patsy Healey, "Relational Concepts of Space and Place: Issues for Planning and Practice", *European Planning Studies*, vol. 7, no. 5, 1999, p. 623.

<sup>25</sup> Stephen Graham, "Cities and the 'War on Terror'", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 30, no. 2, 2006, p. 255.

<sup>26</sup> Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 18, quoted in *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> Richard G. Smith, "World City Topologies", *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 27, no. 5, 2003, p. 565.

understood as possessing the potential to be super-empowered, of being able to act in an exceptional manner with effects far beyond what is expected of normal individuals. The space in which these bodies act has also been affected by the foreign policy attempt to counter the threat of terrorism. When viewed in terms of a 'topology' – a relational rather than geographical perspective – we can see that it is not only spaces such as Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib that is subject to an exceptional politics but also that much of the underlying order of urban space throughout the Western democratic landscape is being shaped by these national security prerogatives.

### *9/11 and terrorist super-empowerment*

The terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, Bali and London between 2001-2005 heralded the advent of those who are willing enact destruction on a level disproportionate to that of 'normal' bodies. The incidence of terrorist violence dramatically upsets not only the regular movement of people – as will be shown later in the chapter – but also the assumptions of what they are capable of. This is not just a moral threshold that has been crossed but the fundamental understanding of each individual's ability to act and the scope of subsequent effects. In this sense, terrorism challenges the orthodox ontological assumptions of the power of individuals to act on the world stage. The topographical logic that underpins our understanding of populations assumes a collection of average individuals, who have a regular and proportional ability to affect the space around them. That is, they are 'normally empowered' in terms of intelligence, abilities and motivations. The ability and willingness of the perpetrators of terrorist actions to enact violence that is disproportionate or asymmetrical to scale upsets the regular topology of populations in terms of affect but also undermines the prior assumption of 'normally empowered' individuals.

Thomas L. Friedman picked up on this theme prior to 9/11, pioneering the emergence of those he describes as "super-empowered angry men."<sup>28</sup> Friedman tapped the late-20<sup>th</sup> century pop-IR zeitgeist, depicting a Francis Fukuyama-style post-cold war liberal ideological triumphalism, tempered by a Robert Kaplan-esque 'present anarchy' of dissatisfied individuals on the wrong end of venture capitalism, played out along the lines of rupture outlined in Samuel Huntington's civilisational clash.<sup>29</sup> In this new post-cold war

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<sup>28</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "Angry, Wired and Deadly", *New York Times*, 22/08/98, p. 15.

<sup>29</sup> Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *The National Interest*, Vol. 16 (Summer), 1989, pp .3-18; Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994. Accessed from



world order Friedman describes in his usual catchy gloss a situation of “states bumping up against states, states bumping up against supermarkets and states bumping up against super-empowered individuals.”<sup>30</sup> Super-empowered individuals in this formulation are those who are able to act on the international stage with a high degree of influence and impact “directly on the world stage without the traditional mediation of governments, corporations or any other public or private institutions.”<sup>31</sup> Thus for Friedman, globalisation is giving rise to an interdependent relationship between the state, neoliberal capitalism and those individuals he has labelled ‘super-empowered’. Friedman maps this three-way dynamic in terms of a triangulated relationship in which conflict stems from competition between states and high finance over economic control, the attempt by states to reign-in illegitimate violence by super-empowered individuals, and the accordant discontent of super-empowered individuals incensed by inequality that stems from the ruthless profligacy of high finance.<sup>32</sup> While somewhat trite, Friedman’s formulation suggests three interrelated challenges that question contemporary global governance. In the first instance, what is the relationship between high finance and the state and can the state retain control over the speculative drive of the market? Secondly, how can the state mediate, manage or defend against the discontents of perturbed dissenters and religious fundamentalists? Finally, can the source of this initial discontent be assuaged, or is it inevitable that supermarkets and those who are super-empowered are going to come into conflict?

In light of 9/11, Friedman’s notion of super-empowerment seems quite prescient. This is particularly the case upon returning to one of his earliest formulations of the concept in the introduction to *Lexus and the Olive Tree*. Suggesting that “[s]ome of these super-empowered individuals are quite angry, some of them quite wonderful”, Friedman then goes on to cite the example of

Osama bin Laden, a Saudi millionaire with his own global network, declared war on the United States in the late 1990s, and the U.S. Air Force had to

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[www.theatlantic.com/doc/199402/anarchy](http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199402/anarchy) on 17/04/08 and; Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, 1993, pp. 22-49.

<sup>30</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), p. 13.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14. On the new post-cold war world, see Thomas L. Friedman and Ignacio Ramonet, “Duelling Globalizations: A Debate Between Thomas L. Friedman & Ignacio Ramonet”, *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 116 (Fall), 1999, pp. 110-127.

<sup>32</sup> Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, p.192.

launch a cruise missile attack on him as though he were another nation-state. We fired cruise missiles at an individual!<sup>33</sup>

Here Friedman pre-empts not only the agent of the 9/11 attacks but also offers a theoretical framework through which to interpret the attacks. Underlying his triangulated schematic of contemporary conflict is a relatively sophisticated grasp of the ontological dimension of these encounters. Accentuating the distinctive motives of these three actors are diverging assumptions of what constitutes the essential agent of global politics: the state, the free market and the individual. Here, Friedman seeks to update the array of international actors. Rather than fundamentally altering the realist ontology of the state, Friedman's understanding of globalisation simply expands the register of actors who are able to act in the manner of states. This ambitious attempt to merge the ontological paradigm of realism with his interpretation of the neoliberal present, in this way seems to have been both salvaged and also vindicated by the 9/11 attacks.

Writing two days after 9/11 Friedman highlights the way in which the super-empowered terrorists struck out at the symbols of both supermarket and state, the other actors in his triangular formulation.

What makes them super-empowered, though, is their genius at using the networked world, the Internet and the very high technology they hate, to attack us... And think of what they hit: The World Trade Center - the beacon of American-led capitalism that both tempts and repels them, and the Pentagon - the embodiment of American military superiority.<sup>34</sup>

While Friedman's notion of super-empowered individuals seems well suited to the ambiguous terrain of post-cold war contemporary politics, such figures in the highly politicised 'with or against us' post-9/11 landscape are more readily being labelled in contrasting terms as 'terrorists' or 'heroes', depending on their aims. The parochial demand for unity, infamously defined by the logic of the presidential statement 'you're with us or you're with the terrorists', calls for black and white certainty and unequivocal patriotism.<sup>35</sup> By suggesting that there are super-empowered individuals, some evil, some

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>34</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "World War III", *New York Times*, 13/9/01. Accessed from [www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/opinion/13FRIE.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/opinion/13FRIE.html) 22/08/09.

<sup>35</sup> George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01", *White House: President George W. Bush*. Accessed from [georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html](http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html) on 22/08/09; see also Dawn Rothe & Stephen L. Muzzatti, "Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism, Moral Panic, and US Civil Society", *Critical Criminology*, vol. 12, no. 3, 2004, pp. 327-350.

good and no doubt some relatively ambivalent is to place these individuals on a continuum from one another, to map a relation between them.

Indeed, as a highly regarded and nationally syndicated opinion columnist, prominently situated within this parochially-charged environment, Friedman himself has made little mention of the positive notion of super-empowerment, focussing solely on the threat of super-empowerment. As he suggests,

in a networked universe, with widely diffused technologies, open borders and a highly integrated global financial and internet system, very small groups of people can amass huge amounts of power to disrupt the World of Order. Individuals can become super-empowered. In many ways, 9/11 marked the first full-scale battle between a superpower and a small band of super-empowered angry men from the World of Disorder.<sup>36</sup>

That the writing of Friedman has taken on a more pessimistic tone since 9/11 is understandable. The demands of US foreign policy, I would suggest, is enacting more than just a steely resolve in the work of Friedman. Since 9/11 Friedman has not promoted, nor even mentioned a positive conception of super-empowerment.<sup>37</sup> The emergence of this somewhat less sophisticated and highly polarised view of the world in the work of Friedman is understandable given the demand for unequivocal patriotism since 9/11. It also suggests a level of self-discipline. For Friedman to continue to suggest that the clear polarisation between heroes and terrorists can be represented in the dialectically synthesised form and common terminology of super-empowerment would likely make many uncomfortable. This discipline, whether enacted by a parochial public, his publisher or by Friedman himself emerges because his initial formulation of super-empowerment tacitly admits, if not to the Janus-face of super-empowered heroism, then at least to a mutually generative relationship between heroism and popular representations of terrorism.

This interconnected, generative relationship that Friedman has shied away from is exactly what I am going to argue below. In short, I will argue that the representation of super-

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<sup>36</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "Peking Duct Tape", *New York Times*, 16/02/03. Accessed from [www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/opinion/peking-duct-tape.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/opinion/peking-duct-tape.html) on 22/08/09.

<sup>37</sup> Friedman only employs the negative connotation in each of the following, Thomas L. Friedman, *Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World After September 11* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), p. 30, 80, 211; Friedman, "World War III"; Friedman, "Peking Duct Tape"; Thomas L. Friedman, "Under the Arab Street", *New York Times*, 23/10/02. Accessed from [www.nytimes.com/2002/10/23/opinion/23FRIE.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/23/opinion/23FRIE.html) on 22/08/09; and Thomas L. Friedman, "No Mere Terrorist", *New York Times*, 24/03/02. Accessed from [www.nytimes.com/2002/03/24/opinion/no-mere-terrorist.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/24/opinion/no-mere-terrorist.html) on 22/08/09.

empowered terrorists demands and enacts instances of super-empowered heroism. The advent of terrorism, understood to have been ushered in by 9/11, has witnessed relatively small groups of individuals inflict major damage in terms of casualties, destruction of buildings and wider social effects.<sup>38</sup> That such devastating attacks were carried out by a small number of individuals has suggested for many a new style of combat, an intensification of guerrilla tactics, has emerged. Non-state actors are able to inflict the kind of damage normally associated with states. Given the ineffectiveness of conventional military force against something as elusive as terrorism, given the limitations the law places on the kind of action deemed acceptable and given that domestic policing doesn't in either practical or symbolic terms address the sheer magnitude of attacks such as 9/11, an equivalent actor to the terrorist may seem, to some, necessary.

Friedman's prescient argument that Western states will be forced to deal with those who are 'super-empowered' suggests the likelihood that these ideas will penetrate widely amongst mainstream narratives of International Relations. Indeed, Michael Ignatieff has taken up this notion in his commentary on, and utilitarian justification for, the use of torture in the interrogation of those with suspected terrorist links, a commentary that I will take up later in the context of an engagement with the torture debate. The deployment of the notion of super-empowered terrorism, I'll suggest shortly, bears distinct parallels with a number of popular culture representations that are not easily dismissed. Within these parallels there is evidence to suggest that Friedman, Ignatieff and others who have taken up this notion have been influenced by the interpretive framework of popular culture portrayals of fictional characters who possess 'super-powers'. The influence of these popular portrayals goes well beyond what was consciously intended by these authors. They certainly go further than is intended by Ignatieff, who does not usually employ turns of popular phraseology as extensively as Friedman. As well as unwittingly drawing from this popular discourse of exceptional actors, Friedman and Ignatieff have further propelled and ascribed a measure of academic authenticity to it.

This terminology of super-empowerment has been echoed in areas of emerging popular military theory. Military theory on the evolution of war-fighting holds that there are a number of identifiable generations of technologies and tactics that are instrumental to the development of modern armies.

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<sup>38</sup> The latter will be examined in Chapter 6.

The first generation of modern war was dominated by massed manpower and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation, which was quickly adopted by the world's major powers, was dominated by firepower and ended in World War I. In relatively short order, during World War II the Germans introduced third-generation warfare, characterized by maneuver. That type of combat is still largely the focus of U.S. forces. [Fourth-generation war is an] evolved form of insurgency us[ing] all available networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince the enemy's decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.<sup>39</sup>

Thus fourth-generation warfare can be seen as the *modus operandi* behind guerrilla warfare and informs the initial interpretations of terrorism. Viewed in these terms, terrorists are seen as a series of individuals, organisations and tactics that are highly fluid and indistinguishable from the wider society.<sup>40</sup> It is thus not a conventional 'hard' military force. The emergent generation of warfare is likewise a variation on the unconventional force but with greater exactable destructive yield.

This notion of super-empowerment is argued to be the key premise informing what is known as 'fifth-generation warfare' or a new stage of warfare.<sup>41</sup> In contrast with that of the fourth-generation, fifth-generation warfare, it is suggested, is characterised by the emergence of the 'super-empowered' individual.<sup>42</sup> The emergence of super-empowerment is suggested to be seen as an extension or multiplication of the offensive yield of fourth-generation tactics as way of countering asymmetry of conventional military forces, in the case of suicide bombing.<sup>43</sup> Those who suggest we are seeing the emergence of fifth-

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<sup>39</sup> Thomas X. Hammes, "4<sup>th</sup>-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths," *Armed Forces Journal*, November 2004, pp. 40-44. Accessed from [www.armedforcesjournal.com/2004/11](http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2004/11) on 14/03/2008.

<sup>40</sup> See William S. Lind *et al*, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation", *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989, pp. 22-26. Accessed from [www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/4th\\_gen\\_war\\_gazette.htm](http://www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm) on 14/03/2008; Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Op-Ed: The Problem with Fourth-Generation Warfare", *Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College Newsletter*, February 2005. Accessed from [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub674.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub674.pdf) on 14/03/08; and Jason Vest, "Fourth-generation Warfare", *Atlantic Monthly*, December 2001. Accessed from [www.theatlantic.com/doc/200112/vest](http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200112/vest) on 14/03/2008.

<sup>41</sup> Thomas X. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges", *Military Review*, May-June 2007, p. 21; see also Matthew B. Stannard, "Hezbollah Wages a New Generation of Warfare", *San Francisco Chronicle*, 06/08/06. Accessed from [www.sfgate.com](http://www.sfgate.com) on 14/03/2008.

<sup>42</sup> Thomas X. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges", *Military Review*, May-June 2007, pp. 14-23; Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (St Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2004), pp. 274-275, 289, 290-291; John Robb, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fifth Generation (5GW)", *Global Guerrillas: An Open Notebook on the First Epochal War of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 16/10/2006. Accessed from [globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/10/](http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/10/) on 14/03/2008; and John Robb, "On Superempowerment and 5<sup>th</sup> Generation Warfare" *Global Guerrillas: An Open Notebook on the First Epochal War of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 20/02/2008. Accessed from [globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2008/02/](http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2008/02/) on 14/03/2008.

<sup>43</sup> Thomas P. Barnett & Bradd C. Hayes, "System Perturbation: Conflict in the Age of Globalisation" in Raymond W. Westphal Jr. (ed.), *War and Virtual War: The Challenges to Communities* (Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2003), pp. 5-18; William S. Lind, "Fifth Generation Warfare?", *Military.com*, 03/02/2008. Accessed from

generation warfare envisage clandestine wars by, or even between, small groups of individuals utilising a combination of superior acumen, advanced technological know-how, conspiratorial planning or simply a willingness to die for the cause. Accordingly, technologies such as biological weapons, 'dirty bombs' and even, at some stage, nanotechnology could be used in order to wage a new form of war. Complex political schemes such as deep-cover 'sleeper cells', double agents like cold war spies Kim Philby and the Cambridge Five, or perhaps even some kind of secret society or cult movement could also be employed to co-ordinate or enhance the political effect of these strategies. Further, it is argued that in the development of tactics to counter super-empowered terrorists

the application of [US] military power will mirror the dominant threat to a significant degree. In other words, we will morph into a military of super-empowered individuals (e.g., special operations-like forces) fighting wars against super-empowered individuals (e.g., transnational actors).<sup>44</sup>

Thus we begin to arrive at a model of war-fighting in which highly independent and mobile actors will at once slip the net of conventional offensive and defensive strategies whilst exacting maximum impact. John Robb even goes so far as to suggest that the ultimate trajectory of the super-empowered war-fighting will be "the ability of one man to declare war on the world and win."<sup>45</sup>

What is emerging here, and what will be further demonstrated, is that in the process of contingency planning these military theorists have constructed an image of future wars that resembles the vigilante heroism of the battles fought by super-heroes or action-adventure television series in which exceptionally talented super-agents battle the messianic evil genius of their enemies. This may, at this stage, seem the exclusive domain of military transformation planners and war theorists engaging in collective wish-fulfilment to an audience of over-zealous military academy students. This may to some extent be true. However, writing in *Esquire* magazine, Thomas Barnett reiterated the following to a decidedly larger and more mainstream audience.

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[www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Lind\\_020304,00.html](http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Lind_020304,00.html) on 14/03/2008; and William S. Lind, "War or Not War?" *Defense and National Interest - On War #251*, 19/02/2008. Accessed from [dni2.wordpress.com/2008/02/19/on-war-251-war-or-not-war/](http://dni2.wordpress.com/2008/02/19/on-war-251-war-or-not-war/) on 14/03/2008.

<sup>44</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett & Arthur K. Cebrowski, "The American Way of War", *Transformation Trends*, January 2003, p. 4. Accessed from [www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/transformation/trends\\_165\\_transformation\\_trends\\_13\\_january\\_2003\\_issue.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/transformation/trends_165_transformation_trends_13_january_2003_issue.pdf) on 14/03/2008.

<sup>45</sup> John Robb, *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), p. 8.

So if the United States is in the process of "transforming" its military to meet the threats of tomorrow, what should it end up looking like? In my mind, we fight fire with fire. If we live in a world increasingly populated by Super-Empowered Individuals, we field a military of Super-Empowered Individuals.<sup>46</sup>

This article has since been expanded into a popular book, *The Pentagon's New Map* and a follow-up, *Blueprint for Action*.<sup>47</sup> Beyond the expanding influence of the idea of super-empowerment and the pervasion of military jargon and political pop phraseology, however, is the reflection of a broader social phenomenon. This phenomenon is the tendency since 9/11 to interpret events through the context of an embedded American exceptionalism, such that extraordinary events, challenging politics and social complexity continue to fuel a demand for exceptional personalities and exceptional politics.

Complementing the 'super-empowerment' of terrorists, I'd suggest are a number of other 'powers' that are present in contemporary narratives of terrorism. As well as the disproportionate motivations and means that are exercised by terrorists, popular representations in news reporting, government policy and fiction have bestowed upon Islamic terrorists a number of other 'super-powers' that are drawn from, or at least parallel, those of super-villains. Firstly, terrorists are invisible. Or at the very least they are able to change their form. This power is exercised through the suggestion that terrorists blend into society, burying themselves deeply through ' sleeper cells'. The terrorist threat, further, may not even be external, it might emerge 'home grown' from within. While still 'other', they are said to be indistinguishable from a neighbour or any other everyday man or woman. In the second instance, they are immortal. Or at least as Butler suggests, have been portrayed as exceptional post-humans because "they are effectively reducible to a desire to kill."<sup>48</sup> Because Islamic terrorists are said to fervently believe they will be taken to paradise upon death, whereupon they are said to be bestowed with virgins, this then allows them to take on the characteristics of one who is immortal as they are not subject to the same existential fears and restraints as a secular liberal whose humanist views leave them afraid of death. Finally, terrorists are paralleled particularly with super-villains insofar as they are co-ordinated by a criminal mastermind. As with all good arch-villains, terrorists

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<sup>46</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map", *Esquire*, 1/03/03. Accessed from [www.esquire.com/ESQ0303-MAR\\_WARPRIMER](http://www.esquire.com/ESQ0303-MAR_WARPRIMER) on 18/04/08.

<sup>47</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Putnam Publishing, 2004) and *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating*. (New York: Putnam Publishing, 2005).

<sup>48</sup> Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004), p. 78.

are led by an evil genius. In the post-9/11 narrative, this is Osama bin Laden who himself is super-empowered through his Machiavellian genius and evil scheming, rather than as a result of his ability to directly enact disproportional asymmetrical effects. Once bestowed with such traits, this invites, nay demands, sufficient exceptional responses to counter such super-villainy. The demand for such a response can be seen in the public debate over torture and the particular contribution to this debate by the television show, *24*.

#### *24 and the super-empowerment of citizens*

If the narrative of 9/11 represents the actions of a small number of super-empowered individuals, extraordinary rendition, indefinite imprisonment and 'enhanced interrogation' represent the proportionate response to such acts. The justificatory rationale for these actions is widely dispersed through a combination of two channels. Firstly, the public debates on the validity of torture methods in exceptional circumstances suggest a direct channel through which this logic and moral stance is dispersed.<sup>49</sup> In the second instance, the operation of discipline is more subtle, pervaded through popular culture representations of torture. An example of this is the post-9/11 US television action series *24*. While recognising that there is nominally a distinction here, this section argues that this highly politicised TV show morphed with the high profile but low-rent nature of much of popular news-media reporting which dominated public debate on terrorism. In short, news and debate become entertainment, entertainment becomes debate and an ethical compass. The 'real-time' and 'real-life' representations of *24*'s super-hero Jack Bauer provided the road map by which US citizens would discipline their beliefs in accordance with US foreign policy priorities.

This foreign policy disciplining of domestic audiences through media entertainment can be seen particularly in regards to debates surrounding the use of torture as a strategy of anti-terrorism. The intensification of one's obligations as a citizen due to foreign policy discipline occurs when individuals are asked to consider themselves in hypothetical situations in which the torture is the heroic course of action. The ethical dilemma posed in such debates over the use of torture asks individuals to consider 'what would I do?' Deploying ethical debate in this way asks people to consider themselves, in the first

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<sup>49</sup> Matthew Hannah. "Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a Geographical Imagination of Power/Knowledge", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 96:3, 2006, pp. 622-640; see also, Sanford Levinson (ed.), *Torture: A Collection* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), in particular Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands", pp. 61-76.



instance, as objects that need to be protected from terrorism. Beyond this, however, it has the effect of asking individuals to consider themselves as agents of security. Society is not just what is secured from terrorism by the state but also the active agent that must take action against terrorists. Society in this sense is not fixed as civilian; it occupies simultaneous roles alternating fluidly between citizen and soldier. Thus the portrayals found in both entertainment and informative accounts feed into the notion of super-empowerment. Narratives of vigilante heroism, as portrayed on shows such as *24*, asks everyday citizens to consider the demand for an intensification of the agency of everyday political actors on one hand, and acts of interrogation carried out by secret agents played by Hollywood actors on the other.

Amidst the fall-out from the revelations of torture and prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, it began to emerge that the Bush Administration had given such tactics a measure of approval and legitimacy, if not a legal standing.<sup>50</sup> This prompted a highly visible and long-running debate over the legitimacy of such 'enhanced interrogation' tactics in the war on terror.<sup>51</sup> Throughout 2007-2008, the inescapable saturation reporting by the US news-media of the macabre ins and outs of water-boarding ensured that this idea remained highly pervasive.<sup>52</sup> In this chapter I suggest it has been the simple presence, rather than any particular element of this debate, which has operationalised a virulent mode of foreign

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<sup>50</sup> Dana Priest & R Jeffrey Smith, "Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture", *Washington Post*, 8/06/04, p. A01 and Dana Priest, "Justice Department Memo Says Torture May Be Justified", *Washington Post*, 13/06/04. Accessed from [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13.html) on 28/04/08. Specifically in the case of Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush see Arthur Kane, "Guardman: CIA Beat Iraqis with Hammer Handles", *Denver Post*, 27/07/05. Accessed from [www.denverpost.com/news/ci\\_289219](http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_289219) on 28/04/08; and Josh White, "Documents Tell of Brutal Improvisation by GIs", *Washington Post*, 3/08/05. Accessed from [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080201941.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080201941.html) on 22/08/09; in the case of Canadian Maher Arar see Jane Mayer, "Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's Extraordinary Rendition Program", *New Yorker*, 14/02/05. Accessed [www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa\\_fact6](http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6) on 28/04/08; in the case of British citizen Martin Mubanga see David Rose, "How I Entered the Hellish World of Guantanamo Bay", *Observer*, 6/02/05. Accessed [www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/06/world.guantanamo](http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/06/world.guantanamo) on 22/08/09; a collection of these papers can be found in Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel (eds.), *The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>51</sup> See Karen J. Greenberg (ed.), *The Torture Debate in America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Alan Dershowitz and Ken Roth interviewed in Wolf Blitzer "Dershowitz: Torture Could Be Justified", *CNN.com*, 4/03/03. Accessed from [edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/03/cnna.Dershowitz/](http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/03/cnna.Dershowitz/) on 28/04/08; Associated Press, "Poll Finds Broad Approval of Terrorist Torture", *MSNBC*, 9/12/05. Accessed from [www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10345320](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10345320) on 28/04/08;

<sup>52</sup> Bill O'Reilly, "Telling the Truth about Torture", *Talking Points – Fox News*, 9/10/07. Accessed from [www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,300359,00.html](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,300359,00.html) on 24/04/08; Bill O'Reilly, "Blocking War on Terror Tools", *Talking Points – Fox News*, 15/02/08. Accessed from [www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,330782,00.html](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,330782,00.html) on 24/04/08; Keith Olbermann, "Special Comment: On Waterboarding and Torture" *Countdown – MSNBC*, 5/11/07. Accessed from [www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21644133](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21644133) on 24/04/08; CBS, "Waterboarding: Interrogation or Torture?", *CBS News*, 1/11/07. Accessed from [www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/01/national/main3441363.shtml](http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/01/national/main3441363.shtml) on 28/04/08.

policy discipline. Accordingly, I will not be outlining all of the many facets and varying subtleties of the debate nor offering a unique argument of my own. Suffice to say, however, that a position corresponding with the argument of this chapter is offered initially by Slavoj Zizek and has since been more carefully enunciated by Alex Bellamy.<sup>53</sup> This position is that a decision to undertake torture and the implicit ethics involved in such an undertaking cannot be properly made except in the moment of actually making it.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, the likelihood of such a scenario arising and the possibilities for variability are so great that any debate is essentially conjecture.<sup>55</sup> On this basis torture is not something that cannot be legislated for, in which case the moral integrity of the legal artifice may as well stay intact.

The implications of the use of the 'enhanced interrogation' by the Bush Administration should not be solely defined by the question of whether or not it employs legal violence on terror suspects or violates civil liberties at home. Were this to be the case it would be excluding the possibility of levelling a range of other important questions. For instance, the very consideration of torture as a tactic to be used in the war on terror highlights the operation of foreign policy discipline. While it may seem that to debate the issue of torture is the responsible and ethical path to pursue, the very fact that it is perceived as necessary suggests that the imperatives of national security and the contemporary foreign policy stance is enacting domestic discipline. By entering into this debate people are embedded within a social context where torture is already considered a legitimate option. Even if stated in purely hypothetical terms, even if portrayals of torture are for purely entertainment purposes, this discourse still presumes the presence of an emergent malevolent threat in an undefined realm 'out there', growing steadily closer to the ultimate aim of a massively destructive attack. That the depiction of an external threat demands of its citizens that they consider partaking in such scenarios that they may otherwise find repugnant means that once firmly held ethical positions placed into question by the pressures of foreign policy discourse.

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<sup>53</sup> Alex Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain? Torture and Ethics in the War on Terror", *International Affairs*, 82:1, 2006, pp. 121-148.

<sup>54</sup> Slavoj Zizek, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Similar Dates* (London: Verso, 2002), p. 103.

<sup>55</sup> Given the utilitarian nature of arguments deployed that suggest the necessity of torture, that is the slippery slope position, given sufficient hypothetical threat the most brutal hypothetical acts of torture can be justified.

Engaging with this debate, Michael Ignatieff argues for the necessity of extra-legal violence in order to counter the threat of super-empowered terrorism; he describes this as the logic of the 'lesser evil'.<sup>56</sup> Like a number of other humanitarian advocates of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Ignatieff in recent years found himself in an unholy alliance with the Bush Administration in his willingness to countenance illiberal means towards liberal ends.<sup>57</sup> Ignatieff's work on ethics in the war on terror takes a similar, although more measured turn, advocating that Western democracies adopt what he calls an ethic of the 'lesser evil', which is essentially a utilitarian justification for the decision of the state to commit illiberal acts in order to protect its freedom and democracy in a time of emergency. Ignatieff's position suggests that "necessity may require us to take actions in defense of democracy which will stray from democracy's own foundational commitments to dignity."<sup>58</sup> In particular he directs this argument toward the prospect of "a new world, in which terrorism might transmute from an eternal but manageable challenge to liberal democracy into a potentially lethal foe" and ultimately the question of whether "democracies are strong enough to cope with these dangers."<sup>59</sup> Following a discussion of the necessity for methods that occupy a grey area between "permissible and impermissible interrogation, between coercion and torture," Ignatieff engages the concept of super-empowered individuals.<sup>60</sup> Such individuals for Ignatieff are the greatest threat to liberal democracy and while not necessarily Islamic, they are nihilists who cannot be deterred as they do not fear death.<sup>61</sup> Ignatieff makes the argument that if such individuals deployed weapons of mass destruction, they could take on a state and end its system of liberal democracy.<sup>62</sup> In such a context, what could be considered the 'lesser evil' could extend very far.

The TV action series *24* most directly captures this kind of disciplinary pressure. The hero/protagonist Jack Bauer optimises the everyday man being forced to deal with a range of gritty and immediate threats, which the audience view in 'real time'. In this show Jack

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<sup>56</sup> Michael Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror* (Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 150.

<sup>57</sup> While not strictly of a through and through IR pedigree, Ignatieff's later career has offered firm engagements with the ethics surrounding the liberal humanitarian cases for and against war. More recently, Ignatieff has advocated a position that could be seen as a robust interpretation of the 'responsibility to protect' doctrine. Other such advocates of the 2003 Iraq War included Jean Bethke Elshtain, Lee Feinstein, Francis Fukuyama, Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Shawcross. See Anthony Burke, "Security" in Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke & Jim George (eds.), *An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives* (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 151.

<sup>58</sup> Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil*, p. 8.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. x-xi, see also pp. 145-170.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.

Bauer's daughter and the US President are equally likely to come under direct attack. By the same token, or at least the other side of it, Jack Bauer is also forced to torture his own brother in order to protect America from Islamic extremism. These threats are constant and so immediate that they don't bear reflection; they must be acted upon immediately and instinctively. This is accentuated by the show being filmed in 'real time'. The events of each one hour episode take place as one hour in the narrative of the show. Each 24-episode season supposedly represents one day's worth of action. The thesis of Paul Virillio regarding the condensing of space into time lives large in this show, as it presents the world as an impossibly dangerous and action packed series of events that condense space into time while the show's re-occurring motif – a ticking clock – literally ticks.<sup>63</sup> The re-occurring motif of the ticking clock in *24* and its concern with acting out the super-empowered hero manifests what has been described as the 'ticking bomb' scenario. This hypothetical scenario provides the foundational logic for the use of torture in order to extract information.<sup>64</sup> It acts to provide an exaggeratedly exceptional scenario that exponentially magnifies the discipline enacted by foreign policy by forcing individuals "to countenance [the] potential use [of torture] in extreme cases."<sup>65</sup> According to such logic there can always be a hypothetical scenario in which torture can be justified.

This theme of super-empowerment and the ethics of an indefinitely escalating response resonates throughout representations of torture. This diffuse disciplinary pressure blends and overlaps the lines between what ought to be a studied ethical debate and what purports to be entertainment. Thus, rather than being posed as a direct ethical conundrum in the news-meets-entertainment media, it operates via a number of media platforms and popular discourses to inform a general ethic of obligation in the American tradition of patriotic heroism. This ethic compels exceptional actions be undertaken in order to combat those who are understood to be super-empowered individuals. This notion of super-empowerment informs the obligation that one has when faced with such a scenario. This logic is essentially an inversion of the dictum made famous by the *Spider-Man* super-hero franchise; "with great power comes great responsibility."<sup>66</sup> This logic can be observed here, *writ large* across the debate on terror; when faced with the responsibility of protecting a

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<sup>63</sup> Paul Virillio, *Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1977).

<sup>64</sup> Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain?", pp. 121-148

<sup>65</sup> Hannah. "The Ticking Bomb Scenario", p. 624.

<sup>66</sup> See also Chris Brown, "Do Great Powers Have Great Responsibility? Great Powers and Moral Agency", *Global Society*, vol. 18, no. 1, 2004, pp. 5-19.

vast number of individuals one – whether it be the state or an individual – is faced with the ethical problematic of whether or not to exercise the great power of torture. This theme of heroic exceptionalism and the disciplinary compulsions it places on citizens informs the parameters of the debate on extraordinary rendition, coercive interrogation and torture, where when faced with the ability to obtain life-saving intelligence there is little scope but to act as a super-empowered individual. This tradition of patriotism can itself be seen as stemming from a long-standing tradition of American exceptionalism.

In addressing this ethical problem of torture, former US President Bill Clinton in 2007 suggested that despite the unenviable burden of responsibility to act there should be no formal exception to the use of torture. This means “if you happen to be the actor... if you actually happen to have the Jack Bauer moment – that’s what I call it - you should be willing to live with the consequences.”<sup>67</sup> Here Clinton nominally enunciates a similar position to that of Žižek and Bellamy described earlier; that if one were to find themselves in such a position there may be a duty to act, but given the unlikelihood, he suggests, it should not be legislatively condoned. In doing so, however, it seems clear in his language that his mind is already made up in favour of the need to undertake torture in exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, in addition to undermining the basic premise of this position, it is evident that in making this decision he is influenced by 24 protagonist, Jack Bauer. This influence goes beyond the unintended irony of his play on the ‘actor’. His conceptualisation of the ethical dilemma is informed by the macho hip-thrust drive of super-empowered patriotic heroism and American exceptionalism. Further to the right of the political spectrum, conservative radio talk show presenter, Laura Ingraham makes this interplay more explicit in advocating the use of torture. “The average American out there loves the show 24, OK? They love Jack Bauer, they love 24. In my mind that’s as close to a national referendum that it is OK to use tough tactics.”<sup>68</sup> Thus, it could be suggested that despite the vast width and varying depth of the public debate on torture, within the broad population it has been 24 that has defined the parameters of this debate.

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<sup>67</sup> Bill Clinton interviewed by Tim Russert, “Meet the Press”, *MSNBC*, 30/09/07. Transcript available from [www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21065954/](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21065954/). Accessed from [www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvoFmvcV1ug](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvoFmvcV1ug) on 28/04/08.

<sup>68</sup> Laura Ingraham interviewed on Bill O’Reilly, “The O’Reilly Factor”, *Fox News*, 13/09/06. Accessed from [www.youtube.com/watch?v=LrsQPK-GrDw](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LrsQPK-GrDw) on 28/04/08.

24 was created by self-confessed “right-wing nut job”, Joel Surnow.<sup>69</sup> 24 was first aired two months after 9/11 and quickly captured the general sentiment of the post-9/11 political landscape. The show consistently averaged well over 10 million viewers per episode across seven seasons and has received widespread critical acclaim.<sup>70</sup> Like many neoconservative Republicans, Surnow believes in the use of hard force and torture in interrogation because it is seen to achieve necessary ends. “I think torture does work. It would work on me! I believe torture has been around since the beginning of time because it works.”<sup>71</sup> This ethos informs what would have to be 24’s central credo: ‘everyone breaks, eventually’.<sup>72</sup> Tasers, defibrillators, electric wires, hot scalpels, syringes filled with sodium pentathol pain serum, knives, drills, shooting people, beating people to within an inch of their lives, denying medical help to a woman with a gunshot wound, extreme sensory overload, complete sensory deprivation, etcetera are all torture tactics that you will see used on 24. While the creators of the show may argue that it bestows the show with a measure of authenticity, some suggestions will be offered shortly as to how the show, equally, gives torture its own measure of authenticity. Each of these scenarios is the same; the problem-solving protagonist is faced with an individual who either possesses crucial information relating to potential terror attacks, or even is an unfortunate innocent on the wrong end of a bad situation. This starkly posed and purportedly ethical question faced by the protagonist inevitably ended badly for the suspect, who is subjected to far less than due process in a grim show of pop-torture fetish.<sup>73</sup>

Former Department of Homeland Security head, Michael Chertoff, believes he understands the attraction to the show. “I think people are attracted to [it] because frankly it reflects real life. That is what we do everyday. That is what we do in the government, that is what we do in our private lives.”<sup>74</sup> Chertoff made these comments at a Heritage Institute forum entitled, ‘24 and America’s Image in Fighting Terrorism: Fact, Fiction or Does it Matter?’

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<sup>69</sup> John Patterson, “We’re Trafficking in Fear: Interview with Joel Surnow”, *The Guardian*, 22/01/07. Accessed from [www.guardian.co.uk/media/2007/jan/22/television.mondaymediasection](http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2007/jan/22/television.mondaymediasection) on 28/04/08.

<sup>70</sup> Ratings peaked at 16 million in 2007 during the airing of season 6 and its key demographic is 18-49 year old men. 24 was listed as the 6<sup>th</sup> greatest TV show ever by Empire. Viewer ratings for each seasons available from [24.wikia.com/wiki/24](http://24.wikia.com/wiki/24); see also [www.empireonline.com/50greatesttv/default.asp?tv=6](http://www.empireonline.com/50greatesttv/default.asp?tv=6) accessed on 21/08/09.

<sup>71</sup> Patterson, “We’re Trafficking in Fear”.

<sup>72</sup> Jane Mayer, “Whatever it Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind ‘24’”, *The New Yorker*, 19/02/07. Accessed from [www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219fa\\_fact\\_mayer](http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219fa_fact_mayer) on 28/04/08.

<sup>73</sup> See for instance Keith Olberman, “Special Comment: On Waterboarding and Torture”, *Countdown – MSNBC.Com*, accessed from [www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/21645654#21645654](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/21645654#21645654) on 14/03/2008.

<sup>74</sup> Speech given at a Heritage Institute forum ‘24 and America’s Image in Fighting Terrorism: Fact, Fiction or Does it Matter?’, 23/06/2003. Broadcast on “The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer”, *CNN*, accessed from [www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNKG2a7JDgM](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNKG2a7JDgM) on 28/04/08.

which roundly extolled the virtues of 24. Also invited were conservative radio-host Rush Limbaugh and Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. The Heritage Institute forum organizer, James Carafano, suggests that “Jack Bauer is a metaphor for all the great people that we have out there everyday that really are working hard to make us safe.”<sup>75</sup> In describing the ‘everyday’ function of the government employee and of the private individual, Chertoff and Carafano re-emphasize the show’s two central themes: that of the compression of the events portrayed into a day and that of the role of the ‘everyday’ person. What is dispersed through this show and what has been captured by Chertoff is the constant and inescapable nature of the terrorist threat and the corresponding everyday duty of the citizen, a duty that pervades the public and the private realm. This vision of everyday danger and duty has seen 24 fittingly described as “either a neocon sex fantasy or the collective id of our nation unleashed” depending on the respective political perspective one takes.<sup>76</sup>

What we are witnessing in public debate and in elements of popular culture after 9/11 is interplay between national security, moral equations crossed with the narratives of superheroes and evil villains to create a discourse of super-empowerment, exceptional circumstances, and extra-legal vigilante action. The influence of 24 in the debate fits into the broader terrain of the culture wars and wider neoconservative strategies. George suggests a neoconservative cultural agenda is based around

the re-invocation of strong nationalism and cultural unity in modern Western societies; the value of a simple religious and philosophical morality, and (ultimately) of a ‘war culture’ as the basis for maintaining such unity; the use of maximum force by the Western democracies in the face of endemic threat...<sup>77</sup>

This agenda is essentially a checklist of the contributions that 24 has made to the torture debate, and within post-9/11 politics more generally. Furthermore, the widespread support it has found amongst influential conservatives is indicative that this contribution is not just one of passive resonance with contemporary politics but rather an active attempt to shape it. Neoconservative culture war strategies draw foreign policy prerogatives into domestic

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<sup>75</sup> Interview on “The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer”, CNN, accessed from [www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNKG2a7JDgM](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNKG2a7JDgM) on 28/04/08.

<sup>76</sup> Devin Gordon, “Die Another Day”, *Newsweek*, 12/01/2008. Accessed from [www.newsweek.com/id/52582](http://www.newsweek.com/id/52582) on 16/03/2008.

<sup>77</sup> Jim George, “Leo Strauss, Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: Esoteric Nihilism and the Bush Doctrine”, *International Politics*, vol. 42, no. 1, 2005, p. 174. [pp. 174-202]

culture, a potent process that reshapes political space and at once securitises and super-empowers bodies.

The effects of 24 are not limited solely to diffuse disciplinary effects on politics and culture. The operation of the discourse enacted by 24 can result in a direct transfer of these tactics onto the actions of soldiers or other public officials. This 'worrying trend' was identified in a CNN report on 24 by reporter Carol Costello, who, presumably unschooled in Baudrillardian notion of 'simulacra' in which the simulation becomes the reality that it seeks to portray, could only offer the following. "It's hard to wrap your mind around it; a TV show influencing professional soldiers?"<sup>78</sup> The CNN report highlighted a study by the Centre of Strategic Intelligence Research, an intelligence think-tank overseen by the Defense Intelligence Agency. This study highlighted that

[m]ost observers, even those within professional circles, have unfortunately been influenced by the media's colorful (and artificial) view of interrogation as almost always involving hostility and the employment of force – be it physical or psychological – by the interrogator.<sup>79</sup>

Furthermore, this report also found that "there may be no value to coercive techniques."<sup>80</sup> The findings of this study were not coincidental nor directed solely at the news media. In direct reference to the plot-line of 24 it suggested that

Prime-time television increasingly offers up plot lines involving the incineration of metropolitan Los Angeles by an atomic weapon or its depopulation by an aerosol nerve toxin. The characters do not have the time to reflect upon, much less to utilize, what real professionals know to be the "science and art" of "educing information." They want results. Now. The public thinks the same way. They want, and rightly expect, precisely the kind of "protection" that only a skilled intelligence professional can provide. Unfortunately, they have no idea how such a person is supposed to act 'in real life'.<sup>81</sup>

Such accounts suggest that 24 is not so much reflecting a tendency within the military community but actively shaping it.

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<sup>78</sup> Carol Costello reporting on Wolf Blitzer, "The Situation Room", *CNN*, 14/02/2007. Accessed from [transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/070214/sitroom.03.html](http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/070214/sitroom.03.html) on 16/02/2008.

<sup>79</sup> Centre for Strategic Intelligence Research, "Educating Information – Interrogation: Science and Art (Phase One Report)", *Intelligence Science Board* (Washington: National Defense Intelligence College, 2006) p. 95. Accessed from [www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf) on 28/04/08.

<sup>80</sup> Josh White, "Interrogation Research is Lacking: Report Says", *The Washington Post*, 16/01/07. Accessed from [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/15/AR2007011501204.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/15/AR2007011501204.html) on 22/08/09.

<sup>81</sup> Quoted in Jane Mayer, "Whatever it Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind '24'", *The New Yorker*, 19/02/07. Accessed from [www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219fa\\_fact\\_mayer](http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219fa_fact_mayer) on 28/04/08.



The Dean of West Point, Brigadier-General Patrick Finnegan, was so concerned over the negative effect that the show was having on his students that he felt obliged to visit the set of *24* to protest its portrayal of torture. "I'd like them to stop. They should do a show where torture backfires. The kids see it and say, 'if torture is wrong, what about *24*?' " Finnegan, elaborates this effect saying, "the disturbing thing is that although torture may cause Jack Bauer some angst, it is always the patriotic thing to do."<sup>82</sup> Brigadier-General Finnegan suggests that *24* presents emotionally effective, one-sided arguments on the question of torture that has made it harder for him to have his students obey the law. Indeed in the context of super-empowered unconventional non-state actors, *24* offers a convincing tactic of responding in kind, a tactic that manifests the demand for super-empowered heroism in the war against terrorism. Somewhat ironically, upon hearing for the first time of the Brigadier-General's plea, Kiefer Sutherland, the actor who plays Jack Bauer exclaimed,

The US army are worried about the sequences in our show? They should be a lot more worried about their behaviour in Abu Ghraib than they should about our television show. What happened in Abu Ghraib was criminal. As a nation, we're trying to tell people that democracy and freedom are the way to go, and then we go and behave like that. Inexcusable. But the army complaining? That's ludicrous.<sup>83</sup>

For Sutherland and the producers of *24*, they are in the business of entertainment. Sutherland, a Hollywood actor with a strong liberal pedigree, seems unwilling to countenance that he might be involved in producing individuals who commit acts of torture. The unfortunate irony of Sutherland's statement is that the military's use of coercive interrogation in Guantanamo can be directly linked to his acting role.

In the book *Torture Team*, Philippe Sands, a Queen's Council from England investigates the legal implications of the breach of the Geneva conventions. In particular Sands examines the potential culpability of senior members of the Bush Administration and the potential for them to be charged with war crimes under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.<sup>84</sup> According to Sands, there is a distinct possibility that personal responsibility can be attributed to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice-President Dick

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<sup>82</sup> Andrew Buncombe, "US Military tells Jack Bauer: Cut the Torture Scenes... or else!", *The Independent*, 13/02/07. Accessed from [www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-military-tells-jack-bauer-cut-out-the-torture-scenes-or-else-436143.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-military-tells-jack-bauer-cut-out-the-torture-scenes-or-else-436143.html) on 28/04/08.

<sup>83</sup> Steven Armstrong, "Rough Justice: Interview with Kiefer Sutherland", *New Statesman*, 19/03/07. Accessed from [www.newstatesman.com/200703190032](http://www.newstatesman.com/200703190032) on 28/04/08.

<sup>84</sup> Philippe Sands, *Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty and The Compromise of Law* (London: Allen Lane, 2008).

Cheney and the staff lawyers whose role was to provide legal counsel. Sands offered this opinion on the basis of two factors having been satisfied. Firstly, in the case of *Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld*, a five-to-three partial ruling handed down by the Supreme Court in July 2006 determined that, contrary to the legal position offered by the Bush Administration, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention applies in the case of Guantanamo. This ruling is in line with directives of the US Army Field Manual. This application of these guidelines suggests that suspected al-Qaeda detainees are not regarded as being participants in 'wars of an international character' and thus do not have rights as prisoners of war. Common Article 3 and the US Army Field Manual, however, does ensure that detainees have the right to humane treatment, which many have not received. The second factor that has to be satisfied in order to prove culpability concerns evidence of a traceable chain of causality stemming from members of the Bush Administration. That is, there must be evidence of a 'top-down' command structure that authorised abuse or torture. Such a suggestion would be contrary to the position of the Bush Administration, which views this abuse as the actions of a few 'bad apples' and a 'bottom-up' structure. It was in the course of the investigation into the chain of causality that Sands came across the presence of 24 within Guantanamo.

Sands found evidence that suggests 24 played a role in creating the highly exceptional space of Guantanamo. It further suggests that the operation of foreign policy discipline is not confined just to the territorial space of the US. In order to prove causality Sands undertook interviews with many figures throughout all levels of the US military command structure at Guantanamo. Following an interview with Dianne Beaver, the lawyer at Guantanamo, Sands was puzzled by reference to '24' and 'Bauer'. Following a Google search, Sands became aware of the influence of 24 within Guantanamo. The interviews with Beaver confirmed that 24 was not only amongst the programming broadcast at the facility but that it was watched by large groups of soldiers and staff. According to Beaver, "24 had many friends at Guantanamo."<sup>85</sup> The timing is also telling. The second season of 24 went to air at the end of October 2002, just as the coercive interrogation methods were taking place. Furthermore, the second season of 24 opens with a scene in which torture is used to effectively elicit information; that is, circumstantially there seems to be a direct link between the show and the implementation of these techniques.

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<sup>85</sup> Sands, "I Googled 24 and Jack Bauer".

Thus there is circumstantial evidence unearthed by Sands to suggest *24* played a direct role in prisoner abuse, or at least was part of a wider discourse that imbued the exceptional space of Guantanamo with the logic of super-empowerment. Indeed, Sands suggests “you can see in this way how popular culture... played into individual decision-making directly on the ground in Guantanamo.”<sup>86</sup> This revelation about the influence of *24*, however, seems to undermine the argument by Sands that the decision to undertake new, more forceful measures in the attempt to elicit information was a top-down generated directive. Sands does go on to say he later found “that individuals like Michael Chertoff, [head of Homeland Security and then in the criminal justice division at the Department of Justice] was also a great fan of *24*.”<sup>87</sup> Returning to the Supreme Court ruling of July 2006, Sands suggests that of the three dissenting rulings against the enforcement of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, two of the judges – Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas are also great fans *24*, creating a remarkable circle of influence that linked through one television show. “What *24* did was create an environment in which popular culture basically said, ‘there’s no problem doing this stuff, it works, you’re part of this whole system so proceed.”<sup>88</sup> Thus, Sands’ argument is that the influence of *24* upon the space of Guantanamo is not simply specific but systemic.

Abu Ghraib is another space of US exceptionality carved into the international realm. A great amount of media attention has been paid to the abusive interrogation techniques and general de-humanisation carried about by US and British soldiers within Abu Ghraib. Here again, as with Guantanamo, the demands of the war on terror have created an exceptional zone in which securitisation has shaped the bodies within this space to the point where the obligation to respond to foreign policy becomes normalised and banal. The demand for super-empowered bodies in this context is the rule. That these events occurred during the course of the third season of *24* does not prove a direct linkage as there is no evidence to suggest a direct connection. That there is no direct link, however, is not to suggest that it did not play a role as it is implicated in a much wider discourse. The prisoner abuse in Guantanamo can be seen as an ill-deployed and somewhat deformed version of the wider logic of super-empowered heroism that was succinctly captured and effectively popularised by *24*. The foreign policy discipline of super-empowerment which manifests

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

the instrumental use of violence toward strategic ends in this sense has broken down, in giving way to a debauched and incompetent brutality. Implicating a misguided logic of super-empowerment suggests that while 24 may not have caused the infamous abuse photos at Abu Ghraib, its logic may have been influential.

The ill-deployment of super-empowerment can be seen in stark terms in the case of US Army Reservist Lynndie England and the prisoner abuse photos in which she featured. Conservative radio and TV host Glenn Beck captures this ill-deployment, describing the ineffectuality of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse in relation to 24. "Now me, I'm for more Jack Bauers. The Jack Bauer that has to extract information, that's one thing, but Lynndie England taking pictures of, you know, a naked pyramid? That was just stupid and pointless."<sup>89</sup> So while denying the practical applicability and usefulness of England's naked human pyramids, he does demonstrate the operational logic of super-empowerment at play and its miscalculated deployment. Such actions according to this logic were unnecessary because in this case there was no cause, no parochial responsibility, to use one's super-empowerment. The prisoners were not an imminent threat, they were subdued by virtue of being imprisoned. These grotesque and blatantly dehumanising actions, represent the operationalisation of notions of super-empowerment by those who, subject to its influence and unable to think critically for themselves, literalise its ugly evocation. In this sense it is a ghoulish manifestation of the patriotic heroism demanded and deployed by the logic of interplay between the torture debate and 24.

A comparison of Lynndie and Jack Bauer in this context is telling. What is it that makes one right and one wrong? Why is it that the application of the logic of torture generates pride and admiration amongst many fans, whereas the other causes widespread revulsion and condemnation? Jack Bauer is a lone agent, operating outside of any formal chain of command in an environment that rapidly changes hour by hour. Bauer moves so rapidly through various recognisable domestic settings that notions of space and time fundamentally collapse; a day in the life of Jack Bauer feels like months. Furthermore, Bauer is responding to real and present dangers to American soil. Contrarily, Lynndie England was part of a formal chain of command, subject to prescribed rules and procedures. England existed within a highly regulated space, in which time is stretched, perhaps determined only by routine duty. Within this highly controlled environment there

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<sup>89</sup> Accessed from [transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0611/30/gb.01.html](http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0611/30/gb.01.html) on 24/04/08.

is little threat, particularly to American soil. Bauer, it is clear, has no choice other than what he determines for himself; there is no structure, only threat. He is a corporeally embodied archetype of pure pragmatic *realpolitick*. England is represented as bored and uneducated; unable to follow the most banal instructions or exercise even base restraint. Her actions don't enter into any kind of utilitarian calculus, rather they seem a form of perverse expression. Acting as a selfless hero on behalf of a nation, defenceless in the face of new and exceptional threats, Jack Bauer exists in an ethical framework where torture is justified and offers a normative ideal for citizens to aspire toward.

Thus whether deployed domestically or abroad, torture debates discipline individuals simply by posing a question along the lines, 'would you allow torture to be carried out against someone if it meant that it would prevent a foreign threat to the state and its citizens?' While framed as an ethical problematic, it is ultimately a contest over both the retrospective and ongoing justification of the US government's practice of extraordinary rendition, indefinite imprisonment, and 'enhanced interrogation' of persons who are suspected of involvement in, or possessing knowledge of, terrorist groups. The pervasive debate on torture within the US is one manifestation of foreign policy obligations, obligations which demonstrates the transferral of foreign policy norms into domestic politics. This is not to suggest that an easy solution can be found in re-imposing a separation of foreign and domestic politics but as has been suggested this very dichotomy is one that is ultimately not sustained upon closer examination.

The disciplinary effects in this case are those stemming from the expectation that an individual ought to be willing to act exceptionally and extra-judicially in order to prevent a threat to the nation. Presented this way in a moral utilitarian schema, one would have to seem cowardly and unpatriotic to refuse this duty. Framed more realistically, however, this demand should be seen as a highly improbable demand – to the point of being hypothetical – for an act of heroic patriotism necessitated by a threat to the nation that is statistically unlikely. This moral/ethical question of individuals as super-empowered saviours-cum-torturers is so unlikely it should not bear thinking about. This discourse warrants critical reflection for it seems to stem from the pusillanimous will-to-power of unfulfilled Nietzschean uber-mensch/supermen who, in their day-to-day lives as armchair (or in some cases, tenured) political ethicists, are politically impotent. Perhaps more alarming is the wider function of this torture debate, which plays to subliminal super-hero narratives and

public discourse fantasies that affirm those who see themselves as soldier-citizens and obliges those who don't.

What I am suggesting is that the securitizing effects of the torture debate have intensified the perceived threat of terrorism. As this debate became more widely propagated, increasing its social and political pervasion, citizens become implicated in the process of security. In this process of securitization the wider population is positioned as the referent object that needs to be guarded against in particular threat scenarios, such as the foundational justification for torture, the ticking bomb scenario. The substantive claim that have been addressed in the above sections, in short, is that by placing the population as the referent object of security, acts of torture can be justified in a utilitarian framework of understanding if there is a threat to the population. There are many arguments based on a range of contingent factors that suggest that this should or should not be the case.<sup>90</sup> Beyond this, however, this chapter has made the argument that the debate on torture had a broader, diffuse effect; an effect informed by the norms of foreign policy and the dictates of national security. This effect is one that is disciplinary in its effects upon the individual, and biopolitical in its effects on the population at large.

In short, the effect of the torture debate is to implicate citizens in the process of securitisation; not only as objects of security but as agents. As was suggested in the arguments relating to portrayals of terrorists and heroes on television shows such as *24*, the effect is to instil a demand for patriotic heroism, as a counter-super-empowerment of citizens in response to the representation of super-empowered terrorists.<sup>91</sup> The demand for vigilante acts by citizens against terrorists is one that for the most part is not carried out, at least against terrorists. It does, however, embed citizens within a context of external terrorist threat and patriotic duty, giving rise to citizens who are shaped according to this demand for super-empowered heroism. The shaping of the citizenry by foreign policy interconnects the construction of individual identity with the normalisation of the population. Individuals are shaped by foreign policy as a result of being embedded in an ever-present national security discourse. The collective influence of the foreign policy threats and national security priorities on the population as a whole serves to reinforce, and in turn mutually constitute, the construction of the individual. The level of

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<sup>90</sup> The best of these are Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain?" and Hannah, "Torture and the Ticking Bomb".

<sup>91</sup> *24* is not the sole example in this regard. Television shows such as *Alias* and *Sleeper Cell* also contain scenes in which torture is an ethically justifiable measure against the threat posed by terrorists.

pervasiveness and impact of this discourse will vary across certain cross-sections of the population, with the trends of its impact ultimately reflecting the respective influence within groups of individuals. In the post-9/11 landscape, this discourse poses the stark choice between a particular image of heroic masculinity of the homeland contrasted with the externalised terrorist threat. Because of the high-profile nature and the priority accorded to issues of national security or foreign policy threat, the space of the Western democratic landscape is effectively embedded in this discourse.

## **Terror, topology and biopolitical bodies**

A normal social order can be defined in spatial terms by uniform and predictable patterns of movement, or what could be described as a consistent topology. Such a topology occurs when a particular geographically bounded population such as the nation state is subject to regular and expected patterns of movement, density and numbers. Topology is a representational way of viewing or understanding, in this case, movement and order. Topology is drawn from geometry and cartography and seeks to represent the continuous essential relation between points amongst broader complexity or even as they move.<sup>92</sup> For example, perhaps the most famous example of topological cartography would be the map of the London underground. It captures the relational essence of movement and connections without all of the complexity that would obscure these relational characteristics. Further complexity could be created by adding information regarding the direction and size of flows of people and the location of high-flow hubs or nodes. Accordingly, a topological perspective is not viewable in literal terms and in this sense differs from the more familiar topographical cartography of maps. Rather, topology should be seen as a conceptual representation that presupposes some kind of regulation or order.

The movement of people within the state, while ostensibly random and chaotic when viewed from the perspective of an individual, form an ordered and predictable order when viewed according to a topological logic. What I am suggesting is that a topological logic informs and orders public space and is a manifestation of a biopolitical regulation of a population. The movement of people for the most part involves transit from designated residential housing zones to commercial, industrial or public areas for the purposes of work or leisure. While there may be some amount of overlap between residential and

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<sup>92</sup> I am drawing the idea of topology from Hannah, "Torture and the Ticking Bomb".

commercial areas such as mixed use residential/commercial zones, these movements are largely predictable from this topological perspective. Within highly-populated areas these movements are compressed and intensified. Within busy public spaces, such as a mall for instance, one can deduce points of high-flow thoroughfare versus quieter locations with lower rates of pedestrian transit. This can be deduced without resort to specific labelling of these points, by simply observing the movement of individuals. The relevant information relating to each individual – such as who they are, where they are going and why – can be excluded when assessing the movement of people in public space. Such simple assessments are made possible by employing a topological logic. Similarly, when viewed in this way the everyday chaos of transit can be seen as normal. Further, however, a common understanding of this logic suggests why certain kinds of disruptions cause unease amongst the population and in particular amongst authorities that manage transit and general public order.

Rapid changes to this regular and expected spatial order will dramatically upset normal topology and likely trigger emergency state responses. For instance, a radical shift in the in patterns of movement within densely populated centres stemming from a protest march, even if it receives prior planning approval, will mobilise an extensive logistical police operation to control anything other than regular and orderly even-paced marching. Likewise, a sudden influx of people through borders as a result of a large amount of displaced peoples resulting from a humanitarian crisis triggers action by the border customs services and police, perhaps even by the military. With terrorism being the most highly anticipated threat to domestic order within most Western states, extraordinary or unanticipated movements of people are likely to be seen in terms of potential terrorist incidents.<sup>93</sup>

The APEC meeting of heads of government in Sydney, in August 2007, witnessed a lock-down of major parts of the city, a range of temporary exceptional powers and a security operation that cost approximately \$170 million.<sup>94</sup> On one level these operations by the New South Wales state police authorities was a literalisation of foreign policy discipline upon the citizens of Sydney. This was particularly the case for those who ventured into the

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<sup>93</sup> Ray J. Dezzani and TR Lakshmanan, "Recreating Secure Spaces" in Susan L. Cutter, Douglas B. Richardson & Thomas J. Wilbanks (eds.), *Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 169-178.

<sup>94</sup> Tim Johnston, "APEC meeting fizzles to an inconclusive end", *International Herald Tribune*, 9/09/2007. Accessed from [www.ihf.com/articles/2007/09/09/news/apec.php](http://www.ihf.com/articles/2007/09/09/news/apec.php) on 18/03/2008.



'core declared areas' of the central city, for within these areas they were removed of many normal rights; visitors could only travel within specific cordons; workers needed official permission to enter buildings and individuals could be searched or even removed at a whim if deemed necessary.<sup>95</sup> Further, an undisclosed list of 'excluded persons' detailed those who were to be prohibited entirely from entering the 'declared areas'.<sup>96</sup> These measures were undertaken in order that heads of state could continue the ongoing APEC trade discussions and to extend the purview of the forum to discuss the topical threat of international terrorism. Australia also hoped, as a result of the conference, to boost its international profile. In this sense there was an extraordinary level of discipline exacted on domestic citizens in order to further the aims of foreign policy.

From a broader biopolitical perspective, what was being attempted was the complete disruption of the city as a public space. It would be too simplistic to suggest that in this way it parallels terrorist actions, which also acts to disrupt the topology of public space. Rather, what was being attempted was to neutralise the city as a terrorist target. By reducing, diverting and generally controlling the flow of people, planning measures effectively sought to reduce or negate the topology of risk, to insure against the contingency of the public space. Given the heightened attractiveness of an APEC conference, risk could never be reduced to nil. These measures were an attempt to exert as much control over the risk as possible. This attempt to phase out the basic level of contingency meant that in two senses terrorism would be much harder to perpetrate. Most obviously, because of the intense security that accompanies international leaders such as former US President George W. Bush, terrorist actions would be logistically very challenging. Furthermore, however, because the city was already of an atypical topology, the scope for effective terrorist violence that would upset the topological order would be reduced. With key sites in the city either empty or effectively fortified, an attack would appear more like an assassination on a prominent figure rather than a public act of terror. In essence, the tactic was to place the city under something like a state of siege or state of exception and temporarily disrupt it as a normal public space.

The extraordinary measures undertaken to ensure protection at APEC also reveals the coalescence of protests groups and terror threats. This can be seen in the proceedings of a

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<sup>95</sup> Jane Sanders, "Special Police Powers During APEC Conference" *Shopfront Legal Centre*, July 2007. Accessed from [www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/data/portal/00000005/public/02603001186532890034.doc](http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/data/portal/00000005/public/02603001186532890034.doc) on 18/03/2008.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

December 2006 press conference given by then Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Director-General, Paul O'Sullivan, in which he outlined the expected security environment and potential security threats that would be faced at the APEC conference. The list of the five most likely planning scenarios was as follows:

- politically motivated violence in the form of protest violence or terrorism;
- violence between elements of various communities, generally in response to conflicts in their ancestral countries;
- hoaxes against a range of targets including visitors, venues, and transport modes;
- chemical, biological and radiological attacks; or
- maverick acts on the part of individuals or small groups without any previous record of taking action or coming to notice in a security sense.<sup>97</sup>

In this list the first point covers both protest and terrorist violence. The second refers to something like that of the inter-ethnic urban conflict or between rival sporting fans.<sup>98</sup> The third points to the potential for a stunt, like that which was carried out by the Australian comedy sketch show, *The Chaser*.<sup>99</sup> The fourth and fifth relate to extreme or entirely unexpected acts. Thus, in a list of five somewhat haphazard potentialities, terrorism and protests are co-associated with one another.<sup>100</sup>

This intersection of the measures against terrorism and those designed to prevent violent protest represents an intensification of the operation of both literal and subtle discipline. The binding link between protesters and terrorists is their ability, indeed their goal of disrupting the normal topology of public space. Protesters, like terrorists are sometimes even willing to use violence to achieve this disruptive end. This is not to suggest they are the same. Indeed, except for very extreme cases there is little else common between them. This topological linkage is not just an obscure linkage, for it has implications for how both

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<sup>97</sup> Paul O'Sullivan, "Intelligence and the APEC 2007 Threat Environment", transcript of speech given at *APEC Australia Security Conference*, 11/12/2006. Accessed from [www.asio.gov.au/Media/Contents/APEC\\_security\\_conference\\_2006.aspx](http://www.asio.gov.au/Media/Contents/APEC_security_conference_2006.aspx) on 20/03/2008.

<sup>98</sup> Ethnic-related violence has occurred most notably in the 2005 'Cronulla Riots' and between fans in soccer, rugby league and even tennis: See "Mob Violence Envelops Cronulla", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 11/12/05. Accessed from [www.smh.com.au/news/national/mob-violence-envelops-cronulla/2005/12/11/1134235936223.html](http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/mob-violence-envelops-cronulla/2005/12/11/1134235936223.html) on 20/08/09; "Soccer Club Suspended Over Fan Violence", *The Age*, 4/05/2005. Accessed from [www.theage.com.au/news/Soccer/Soccer-club-suspended-over-fan-violence/2005/05/04/1115092540653.html](http://www.theage.com.au/news/Soccer/Soccer-club-suspended-over-fan-violence/2005/05/04/1115092540653.html) on 20/03/2008; *ABC Sport*, "League Fan Segregation an Option to End Violence", 19/03/2006. Accessed from [www.abc.net.au/sport/content/200603/s1595419.htm](http://www.abc.net.au/sport/content/200603/s1595419.htm) on 20/03/2008; *The Age*, "World's Media Pounce on Melbourne's Hooligans", 17/01/2007. Accessed from [www.theage.com.au/news/tennis/worlds-media-pounce-on-melbournes-hooligans/2007/01/16/1168709752635.html](http://www.theage.com.au/news/tennis/worlds-media-pounce-on-melbournes-hooligans/2007/01/16/1168709752635.html) on 20/03/2008.

<sup>99</sup> *ABC News*, "11 Charged over APEC Stunt", 6/09/2007. Accessed from [www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/09/06/2026372.htm](http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/09/06/2026372.htm) on 20/03/2008.

<sup>100</sup> O'Sullivan, "Intelligence and the APEC 2007 Threat Environment".

are sought to be mitigated by state authorities and apparatuses. Indeed, it is the reason why protesters have been mentioned alongside terrorists. The surveillance methods employed to track both protestors and terrorists alike rely on the tracking of social linkages, which to some extent is a reasonable predictor of potential crime. When mapped out, these social linkages offer a topology of possible threats or even the elements of what could be a terror cell. This mapping of data can be done through traditional cross-referencing and field surveillance or as is increasingly the case, through phone records and data-mining techniques.

## Smart borders and the regulation of mobility

The US is now seeking to cancel out the contingent topology of the constant stream of citizens and foreigners entering its borders. It is seeking to do this by rendering the movement of all people across its borders governable according to the principles of risk management. In 2004 the US government contracted Accenture, the largest global consultancy firm, to develop a \$10 billion program called the 'United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology' (US VISIT). The Department of Homeland Security website describes

US-VISIT [as] part of a continuum of biometrically-enhanced security measures that begins outside U.S. borders and continues through a visitor's arrival in and departure from the United States. It incorporates eligibility determinations made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State.<sup>101</sup>

It employs 10-digit fingerprinting and/or facial scans at each point of entry, which are cross-matched with residency status, visa validity and relevant watch lists. This allows the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State to plot a clear, biologically verified map of who is leaving and entering the country. In the three years following its inception in January 2004, the US-VISIT program processed more than 76 million visitors to the US.<sup>102</sup> In many ways, however, this is only an updated, technologically and biometrically enhanced version of the existing physical passport regime. It is in this sense only a '2-dimensional' topology, insofar as it maps those who enter and leave the US, using only data

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<sup>101</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Fact Sheet: US-VISIT", 5/06/06. Accessed from [www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr\\_1160495895724.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1160495895724.shtm) on 10/04/08.

<sup>102</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Testimony of Robert Moczny, Acting Director, US-VISIT Program Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security", 31/01/2007. Accessed from [www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony\\_1170348170488.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1170348170488.shtm) on 10/04/08.

taken at the physical entrance and departure point of the territorial border. These measures, however, are the measures that were in place as of the end of 2005; they aim to secure the territorial borders. These logistical fence-building measures, however, are only the basic foundation of the overall program.<sup>103</sup>

The broader ambition of the 10 year project, according to Accenture, is to create a 'virtual border'. This conceptually radical and logistically ambitious aspiration is described in the Accenture media release:

The end vision for the Smart Border Alliance solution is built around the concept of a virtual border. The virtual border is designed to operate far beyond U.S. boundaries to help DHS assess the security risks of all U.S.-bound travelers and prevent potential threats from reaching U.S. borders. It helps DHS locate and remove U.S. travel violators without increasing waiting times at the border. Most important, the virtual border makes U.S. border inspectors the last line of defense, not the first, in identifying potential threats.<sup>104</sup>

This will expand upon the currently implemented combination that sees the DHS biometric border screening system interact with the Department of State's 'BioVisa' program, a program that gathers biographical data on visa applicants and checks them against watch lists. This expansion aims to institute the 'virtual border' by supplementing these programs with the Automated Targeting System (ATS), an extensive data-mining of information on potential entrants to the United States.<sup>105</sup>

By processing vast amounts of data, the virtual border will be put in place by the automatic generation of a series of entrant risk profiles or scores, prior to their encounter with the physical border.<sup>106</sup> Louise Amore quotes an Accenture official who describes advantages of the new system over the previous one:

There may be 20 passengers that are just barely in the risky range, and if they are on 20 different planes you wouldn't worry about it. But put them together on the same flight, and they could be a risk. CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System) can really only check the single person who is walking out to the plane. [Accenture's] system will check your associates. Plus

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<sup>103</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Press Room: DHS Completes Foundation of Biometric Entry System", 30/12/05. Accessed from [www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press\\_release\\_0823.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0823.shtm) on 10/04/08.

<sup>104</sup> Accenture Newsroom, "US Department of Homeland Security Awards Accenture-led Smart Border Alliance the Contract to Develop and Implement US-VISIT Program", 1/06/04. Accessed from [newsroom.accenture.com/article\\_display.cfm?article\\_id=4112](http://newsroom.accenture.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=4112) on 10/04/2008.

<sup>105</sup> Ryan Singel, "US Airport Screeners Are Watching What You Read", *Wired – Online Edition*, 20/09/07. Accessed from [www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/09/flight\\_tracking](http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/09/flight_tracking) on 11/04/08.

<sup>106</sup> Ryan Singel, "DHS Passenger Scoring Illegal?", *Wired – Online Edition*, 7/12/06. Accessed from [www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/12/72250](http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/12/72250) on 11/04/08.

it will not just go on flight data. It will ask if you have made international phone calls to Afghanistan, taken flying lessons, or purchased 1,000 pounds of fertilizer.<sup>107</sup>

By mapping individuals prior to reaching the border, prior to boarding their flights, US-VISIT provides something of a '3-dimensional' topology of those who are seeking to enter the US. It does not simply map them at a single point of entry but rather through multiple trajectories prior to undertaking travel, prior to even planning to undertake travel. It maps a clearer picture of possible associations between individuals and highlights potentially suspicious or irregular behaviour, which is then integrated with risk assessment data. These risk profiles of individuals are then assigned colour-coded representations of risk.<sup>108</sup> Under this system, as suggested in the Accenture sales pitch above, the physical border will become the last line of defence, not the first.

US VISIT is an attempt to create a biopolitical border that categorises and maps individuals, essentially assigning them an identity before arriving at the border. Essentially this process disembodies individuals from their identity. By obtaining an identity prior to the corporeal body arriving – as far as the US surveillance apparatus is concerned – it creates a virtual space between the individual's identity and their potential ability to manifest physical violence. Thus, US VISIT represents an attempt to implement massive border surveillance and institutionalise "new ways of visualizing and governing deviant populations" according to a topological rationale and pre-allocated risk factors.<sup>109</sup> In this sense it is not just a matter of the operation of micro-political discipline according to foreign policy goals; there is an overarching system of categorising and ordering of those who travel in and out of the US. The border under this new system is defined not by geography but by destination or even of travellers. Developments such as these necessitate the topological viewpoints as spatial conceptions of borders are radically redefined. This, however, does not necessarily supplant or diminish the operation of individualised foreign policy discipline. Indeed, in the

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<sup>107</sup> Quoted in "The Price of Protecting the Airways, *Business Week Online*, 04/12/2001. Accessed from [www.businessweek.com/print/technology/content/dec2001/tc2001124\\_0865.htm](http://www.businessweek.com/print/technology/content/dec2001/tc2001124_0865.htm) on 24/4/08, originally cited in Louise Amoore, "Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror", *Political Geography*, 25, 2006, p. 340.

<sup>108</sup> Kim Rygiel, "Protecting and Proving Identity: The Biopolitics of Waging War through Citizenship in the Post-9/11 Era" in Krista Hunt & Kim Rygiel (eds.), *(En)Gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged Politics* (Burlington Vt.: Ashgate, 2006), p. 155.

<sup>109</sup> Mariana Valverde & Michael Mopas, "Insecurity and Dream of Targeted Governance" in Wendy Larner & William Walters (eds.), *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 240.

context of international travel, the self-awareness and foreign policy discipline exercised by each traveller is greatly intensified.

The various stages of security screening involved in international travel impose a strict dressage of corporeal performativity. Since 9/11 this is particularly so in the case of air travel. Throughout the flight a strict seriousness is imposed, security related issues are to be treated by travellers with utmost earnest diligence. Joking can be punishable by imprisonment and hefty fines. One must prove their identity, verify that they packed their own luggage and declare that they have no flammable or sharp objects. Any liquids larger than tiny vials are often not allowed on international flights, and even those tiny portions must be collected and sealed into transparent bags that are to be displayed as one approaches the metal detectors and x-ray bag screening. Once again each body and its belongings are subjected to inspection and scrutiny. Physical bodily searches are carried out if initial scans are inconclusive. Random individuals can also be selected for personal searches to check for explosive residues on hands, pockets and zips. Once the plane is boarded – orderly and single-file – passengers are asked to observe instructions on safety and emergency protocols. Through the duration of the flight a particular decorum is enforced. Upon approaching the border entrants form orderly queues, categorising and dividing themselves as residents and aliens. In order to pass through customs each individual must pass a three-fold identity verification procedure. Bodies must be visually and biometrically verified against their accompanying documents, documents that may have been pre-assigned a risk assessment rating. These bodies and documents must then be matched, in what is quite an interpretative exercise, with the answer to the question, ‘what is the purpose of your travel?’ in order to be granted entry.

At each stage of the security process each individual must check and re-check themselves, their body and their possessions and reaffirm that there is nothing to construe them as an external threat. In the post-9/11 era, the foreign policy objective of countering the threat of Islamic terrorism means that each individual must, at each point, revise and enact upon themselves all the ways in which they are not a terrorist. For many this performance is easy. Those, however, who bare signifiers of Islamic terrorism may be subjected to further security screenings or at least become somewhat of a spectacle of public scrutiny and intrigue. Mark Salter describes this security process as a ‘confessional complex’, in which a

strict decorum of earnest truth-telling is imposed and signs of guilt are “written on the body in terms of embodied anxiety and signs of untruth.”<sup>110</sup> Incorporated in this way, through each individual’s self-awareness and their very bodily actions, the ordering effect of the biopolitical and increasingly virtual border is enacted in a manner that is at once specific to each individual yet coordinated through a common surveillance apparatus.

The biopolitical border seeks to alleviate the contingency and insecurity of the outside by virtually displacing it from the physical state. In seeking to ensure a risk assessed and readily categorised inflow into the US, the US-VISIT system aims to buttress the security and order of the inside. In short these measures seek to maintain a biopolitical consistency and topological order. Terrorist actions in the contemporary context define what is perceived to be the most likely threat to this vision of domestic order. Measures undertaken ‘outside’ the border to mediate this threat, like the vast waves of international travellers, are no longer confined to the inside or outside. Indeed, the measures undertaken through these border programs are subtly inscribed upon the bodies of those who cross the borders, citizen and alien, self and other alike. Each carries an individualised inscription, writing them (perhaps inconclusively) into or out of the expected domestic norm. This collective movement of people across borders, itself a temporary liminal population, carry this instilled order further supplementing an existing and demanded regulation. The diffusion of this co-ordinated foreign policy discipline is not limited just to the movement of people. These measures to create and recreate an inside coalesce with those supposedly domestic discourses that, informed by foreign policy images of threat, seek to maintain order.

The earlier examples of disturbance to the regularly ordered movements of people highlighted the way in which the topological logic of populations, when defined spatially, can be disrupted by factors other than terrorism. Protests, ethnic or social conflict, environmental disasters even sport can also disrupt the flow of everyday order and cohesion, upsetting the normalcy of life. Foreign policy goals and national security prerogatives fuse and merge with the ebb and flow of everyday life. Not only do these obligations inform popular culture and the construction of identity, as suggested in the initial sections of the chapter, it informs the daily movement of people in public spaces. It

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<sup>110</sup> Mark B. Salter, “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies and Biopolitics”, *Alternatives*, 31, 2006, p. 181.

has been demonstrated through this chapter that instances where order breaks down, whether it be cultural, social or even topological order, invites the enactment of discipline. As the effectiveness of biopolitical coordination is challenged, the subtle control that foreign policy and national security engender begins to break down, inviting parochialism or even overt state discipline.

This is not to suggest that a strengthening or a broadening of biopolitical measures, say for instance a 'hearts and minds' campaign, would necessarily halt terrorism. The immediate terrorist threat, in the short-term, is likely to be halted mainly through security-based measures, although these are not themselves without risk. In the medium-to-long term the importance of how effective governmental measures are in working against terrorist actions is vital to understand. Measures that act to bridge the way in which people think, creating a common logic, may act to quell the social angst felt amongst some disenfranchised groups, potentially averting the emergence internally of what is being called 'home-grown terrorism'.<sup>111</sup> This, however, is not a clear-cut issue as such efforts have greater or less traction within target communities, to some extent it is a question of marketing the message correctly. Depending on the extent to which it would be carried out in a spirit of ingenuousness or as Derrida describes it, hospitality, would largely determine its effectiveness.<sup>112</sup> Framed in terms of a shallow tolerance it is more likely to be taken in the spirit of integration, perhaps even further exacerbating the social tensions.

This chapter has suggested that contemporary social order cannot be understood solely by recourse to laws, rights and sovereignty. These alone are not enough to explain the continued reproduction of social order post-9/11. The explanation offered here employs a range of methods that highlight both the subtle and sometimes overt mechanisms of control that imbue bodies and space with the language of securitisation and exception that has resulted from the perceived external threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 landscape. Post-9/11 national security obligations have generated a discourse in which terrorist others are understood as being super-empowered, as being as able to disproportionately affect the space around them and in turn justifies exceptional super-empowered vigilantism to be acted out upon associated others. By employing a non-linear, relational interpretation of

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<sup>111</sup> Matt McDonald, "Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies", *European Political Science*, vol. 6, 2007, pp. 252-259.

<sup>112</sup> Jacques Derrida, "On Cosmopolitanism" in *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 1-24; see also *Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida to Respond* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000).



space, this chapter subsequently highlighted the way in which cities are imbued with processes of control that regulate flow and mobility of people according to principles of foreign policy. Thus by analysing the spatial processes of control enacted by foreign policy this chapter has demonstrated that the war on terror has produced highly regulated domestic spaces that discipline those within both subtly and overtly according to foreign policy priorities.

## Chapter 6

### Health, terror, population: Post-9/11 mass psychological effects

This chapter articulates the wider social effects of the Bush Administration's US foreign policy stance throughout war on terror upon the population at large. This chapter begins by highlighting the gendered nature of the post-9/11 medical discourses that address the effects of terror on children and families. It then turns to the psychological effects on the population at large, exploring the literature on the mediated and secondary effects of terrorism. The chapter concludes by examining the effects of public management mechanisms such as the colour-coded terror alert warning system. This engagement will highlight that this socio-medical discourse is a broad-based logic that shapes and manages populations in order to maintain the health of the nation in the face of an external terror threat. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates the role of foreign policy in the biopolitical processes that are designed to maximise the health and productivity of society. It will suggest that national security prerogatives play a role in determining what is considered healthy and productive in the face of the threat of terrorism.

This first section aims to reconcile critical gendered perspectives with those that claim to offer apolitical and objective studies of the psychological effects of 9/11. Narratives of 9/11 focus on the men who died, making them heroes. Women are to an extent written out of the political action of the 9/11 narrative, represented as neither heroes nor villains. Consequently, women are not seen as 'actors' but rather identified as passive and submissive recipients of the effects of 9/11 violence.<sup>1</sup> Women in this context may even be resented or seen as 'lucky' for being in a social position in which they didn't overwhelmingly die in 9/11.<sup>2</sup> Despite their perceived passivity, however, women were subjected to very subtle forms of political disciplining. After all, such narratives of women's domesticity accentuate the pre-existing demand – even a duty – to maintain the home and to honour the heroism of dead husbands and fathers. This gendered dimension can be seen particularly in regards to the attempt to ameliorate the psychological effects of 9/11. In attempting to create 'resilience' as a familial coping strategy, psychology and financial support was designed to reinforce the discipline of the home. Nationalism and patriotism in light of 9/11 consolidated the institution of the home. Patriarchy becomes a national security imperative. Further, this tends to suppress potentially innovative community-based coping strategies that might emphasise solidarity and mutually co-operative opportunities for caring for children.

The home plays a vital productive role in society. Alongside schools, it is the institution that has the greatest formative influence on the shaping of identity. This chapter seeks to show that this space is not a neutral space of freedom but rather a productive, but nonetheless politicised space that enables a range of disciplinary processes vital to processes of order and control in society including, as I will suggest, that of foreign policy and national security. While the link between foreign policy and the home may seem a distant

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<sup>1</sup> This chapter seeks to locate itself amongst a range of accounts that seek to critically engage with the gendered effects of 9/11 and the war on terror. See Gillian Youngs, "Feminist International Relations in the Age of the War on Terror: Ideologies, Religions, and Conflicts", *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, vol. no. 1, 2006, pp. 3-18; Laura J. Shepherd, "Veiled References: Constructions of Gender in the Bush Administration Discourse on the Attacks on Afghanistan Post 9/11", *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, vol. no. 1, 2006, pp. 19-41; L.H.M. Ling, "Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire From September 11", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 48, no. 4, 2004, 517-538; Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, "Sex, Gender and September 11", *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 96, no. 3, 2002, pp. 600-605.

<sup>2</sup> As will be highlighted in this chapter, statistics highlight rate of mortality in the 9/11 attacks was three times greater than that of women. Beyond the proportion of men of killed in the attacks, it is also their position within society which has caused great impact. For an overview of statistics see '9/11 by the Numbers', *New York Magazine*, 5/09/02. Accessed from [nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm](http://nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm) on 9/04/09.

connection to draw, it is these boundaries between foreign and domestic that this thesis seeks to challenge. According to Foucault,

[p]erhaps our life is still governed by a certain number of oppositions that remain inviolable, that our institutions and practices have not yet dared to break down. These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example between public space and private space, between family space and social space, between cultural space and useful space, between space of leisure and that of work.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter examines the effects of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror on the psychological well-being in the United States. In doing so it demonstrates how foreign policy feeds into biopolitical processes that shape and regulate the health of the population.

Discourses of foreign threat are not insulated from the lives and homes of individuals. The colour-coded alert system announces current terror threat levels as it trails along the bottom of morning breakfast entertainment shows. Post-9/11 victim compensation funds sought to reconstruct the family unit following the loss of a spouse in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre. Meanwhile, critical voices within psychology warn against the politicisation of the private sphere, at the same time as they try to reconstruct it as a place of sanctuary.<sup>4</sup> Here a foundational image of the home as a space of neutrality is reinforced by certain practices that are seen as normal, while at the same time it is buttressed against others seen as political. According to Dumm,

Home, in our contemporary democracy, is comprehended as a private place, a place of withdrawal from the demands of common life, a place of fixed meaning where one is protected from disorientation, but also from the possibility of democratic involvement.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, the attempt to defend oneself against the external threat of terrorism by reinforcing the image of the home as a place of sanctuary socially isolates people, restraining them within the domestic space as they seek to escape a confusing, uncertain and threatening outside world. Thus the operation of foreign policy reinforces the normalisation of such domestic institutions ensuring that the level of political opposition remains within the

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<sup>3</sup> Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces", in Joanne Morra & Marquard Smith (eds.), *Visual Culture: Spaces of Visual Culture* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 94.

<sup>4</sup> Roxie L. Foster, "Editorial – Assessing Children's Response to Terrorism", *Journal for Specialists in Paediatric Nursing*, vol. 6 no. 4, October-December 2001, pp. 159-160.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas L. Dumm, *United States* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 155.

bounds of familiar political discourse. Furthermore the coalescence of disciplinary effects stemming from the home and foreign policy remain largely invisible.

The operation of such discipline, both those of foreign policy and domestic institutions, is not without resistance. The medical and psychiatric discourses, in seeking to counter the effects of 9/11, offer critical insights while also in many respects further instantiate these social mores of patriarchy and the discipline of home. The nature of the critical insights varies in both type and form. For instance a range statistics drawn from psychological surveys suggest that forms of secondary social mediation, in particular via the media, plays a significant role on perpetuating the trauma of 9/11. Likewise in the professional, and arguably political, opinion of a number of psychologists, the terror alert warning system is in many senses ineffective and arguably politically motivated. A subsequent issue stems from conceptualising how to respond to these insights, in many instances the suggestion is that the sanctuary of the home should be further re-instantiated. In this sense, critical insights or resistances momentarily escape disciplinary modes or suggest a criticism of them, but are then recaptured and assimilated within orthodox knowledge forms.<sup>6</sup> Such tracing of these instances of resistance highlights contested knowledge in the struggles over the place of critical events and social movements within a political narrative. It is this interplay between orthodox psychological perspectives on the effects of 9/11 and a more critical or reflective stance that this section seeks to reconcile.

### **‘Won’t somebody think of the children?’ Psychological effects of terrorism on the home**

This section seeks to explore the prospect that a generation of children will grow up potentially surrounded by the ambient threat of terrorism. Inasmuch as any adult is even able to, children are less able to undertake an accurate assessment of potential risks of terror upon themselves, or even fully conceptualise what it is. Children are not able to thoughtfully engage with the discourse of terrorist threat and deploy their own utilitarian cost-benefit weighed personalised security outlook. In this sense, children may be shaped according to the discourse of the terrorist threat; they will be developmentally disciplined by foreign policy. This, however, is nothing new. There have been many generations of

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<sup>6</sup> This is a common theme throughout their work, see for instance Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (London: Continuum, 1987), p. 62, 178.

children subject to the looming prospect of nuclear annihilation across the world. As has been seen in the classic archival footage, US children were trained in school to 'duck and cover' under desks and avoid windows, each child painstakingly drilled to respond in the event of a nuclear attack for fear of being turned into a burnt husk or a shadow on a wall.<sup>7</sup> In this sense, the logic of the 'balance of terror' did not only predominate cold war grand strategy, it also structured domestic social order. The presence of nuclear and terrorist survival drills in schools represents a literal convergence of foreign policy discipline with this key disciplinary institution of education. In order to understand the effects of terrorism on children it is important to understand the function of another important disciplinary institution in the shaping of social order; the home.

### *The discipline of home*

The spirit and tone of your home will have great influence on your children. If it is what it ought to be, it will fasten conviction on their minds, however wicked they may become.

Richard Cecil, 1850<sup>8</sup>

The question of children takes the inversion of the high politics concern to its logical conclusion, focussing on those who are seen to act almost entirely apolitically and remain literally within a child-like innocence. The orthodox liberal theorisation of children as apolitical non-actors leaves them solely within a domestic confine. Indeed, they are embedded deeper within the domestic, kept indoors within the domestic household. Children are kept further inside the 'inside' of international politics; inside the home. State sovereignty and the modern subjectivity it produces is replicated inside the home and thus the inside/outside of the state and the international system is doubled with the subjectivity of the domestic abode. The protective borders of the state and the home are seen to provide dual protection for children. The discourse of terrorism, however, is not limited by these borders, indeed these representations of inside the home and inside the state define and create individuals within this context. Brocklehurst critiques the orthodox view of children's apolitical status, who in this doubly domestic context, "are denied causality, and by extension a place in the political and so in International Relations."<sup>9</sup> In light of this, Brocklehurst draws attention to the ongoing presence of children in strategic practices and

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<sup>7</sup> See the "Duck and Cover" instructional video. Accessed from [www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixy5FBLnh7o](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixy5FBLnh7o) on 14/04/09.

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in Jabez Burns, *Mothers of the Wise and Good* (Boston: Gould, Kendall and Lincoln, 1850), p. 123.

<sup>9</sup> Helen Brocklehurst, *Who's Afraid of Children?: Children Conflict and International Relations* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 142.

IR generally, suggesting that “the categorization of such social groups as non-political... is politically disabling, and as the politicization of children’s bodies shows, incorrect.”<sup>10</sup> Inasmuch as such views of children by an IR orthodoxy denies the political status of children, it follows that it will be similarly unaware of the role that a nation’s foreign policy can enact upon children. The permeation of foreign policy can be felt even here, even within this realm of domesticity within the domestic. Indeed within this doubly domestic, sub-civic realm the resonance takes on its most protectively virulent form, an unhomey transmogrification of what could be termed the maternal and paternal impulses of protection and nurture.

The typical representation of the home is as a neutral space, free from outside politics. Classic literary quotations bring to mind this image, in particular the well-known and almost definitive homely lyrical adaptation by Payne, ‘be it ever so humble, there’s no place like home.’ Analysing the provision and design of housing for the lower class, Lee Rainwater describes the house as “a refuge from the noxious elements of the outside world... as a locale where [one] can regroup their energies for interaction with the outside world.”<sup>11</sup> Rainwater’s analysis of public housing resonates with something of the traditional view of the home. This is particularly evident when he describes the house as “the place of maximum exercise of individual autonomy, minimum conformity to the formal and complex rules of public demeanour,” that is, a sanctuary or haven free from politics; the foundational premises of negative freedom.<sup>12</sup> This view of the autonomy and freedom of the home is bound to a world that is structured by a particular world view, one that can be conditioned by factors such as time, place and class. Indeed, the prevailing view of the home, it is suggested by traditionalist historian John Lukacs, is not something natural but rather specific to the enduring greatness of the upper class. “Domesticity, privacy, comfort, and the concept of the home and of the family: these are, literally, principal achievements of the Bourgeois Age.”<sup>13</sup> Lukacs in this sense whole-heartedly embraces what might otherwise be seen as a critique of the notion of home, stemming from the view of it as a politicised and historicised institution.

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>11</sup> Lee Rainwater, “Fear and House-as-Haven in the Lower Class”, *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 32:1, 1966, p. 23.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> John Lukacs, *The Passing of the Modern Age* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 200; quotation drawn from David L. Klubal, “Our Last Literary Gentlemen: the Bourgeois Imagination”, in Harry R. Garvin, *Twentieth Century Poetry, Fiction and Theory* (New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1977), p. 29.

The political neutrality of the home is far from the case. The home is the dwelling – or perhaps even institution – that enshrines a nuclear familial organisation of society in the West. Household settings are synonymous with the everyday normality of the nuclear family, ascribing a teleological expectation to the status of each individual's living arrangements. The predominant social expectation and norm within the West is that individuals will work towards a point at which they reside within a domestic situation with a consensual heterosexual partner and one or more children. Even as this becomes less and less the reality of everyday living arrangements it is still held by many, including often the state, as the ideal.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, the notion of the normality of the domestic is something of an ontological core of the West. The domestic domicile parallels the image of safety that the domestic realm of the state conveys, contrasted with the anarchy of the international outside. Within the home, individuals in this sense are seen to be sovereign; as the old saying goes, 'a man's house is his castle'. It is suggested that many of the early references to 'home' refer to country or land then became domesticated as it increasingly referred to the local village, before referring to a family dwelling or house.<sup>15</sup> The origins of the home can thus be seen as highly political and the modern home a key political institution.

Thus, the home cannot be simply seen as a neutral, domestic space. For instance, the imaging of the safety and security of the domestic home is undermined by a dark shadow of domination and domestic violence. As early as 1924, Eleanor Rathbone argued that the cost of a wife's financial dependence on her spouse was borne out in the form of "violence and sexual exploitation."<sup>16</sup> Further, The National Centre for Children Exposed to Violence (NCCEV) documents that as many as 10 million children in the US witness violence in the family, 60% of which is directed against children.<sup>17</sup> David Sibley suggests that the happy phenomenology of the home is a shallow interpretation of this site, an impression that is altogether "too cosy."<sup>18</sup> What is lacking from 'the house as haven' thesis, Sibley suggests, "is a recognition of the [dichotomised] tensions surrounding the use of domestic space,

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<sup>14</sup> Brian Williams, Stacey Sawyer & Carl Wahlstrom, *Marriages, Families and Intimate Relationships* (Boston, Massachusetts: Pearson Press, 2005), p. 120; Amy Benfer, "The Nuclear Family Takes a Hit: Census Data Deals a Blow to an American Icon", *Salon*, 7/06/2001. Accessed from [archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/06/07/family\\_values/](http://archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/06/07/family_values/) on 6/06/2008.

<sup>15</sup> Jeanne Moore, "Placing Home in Context", *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 20, 2000, p. 208-209.

<sup>16</sup> Eleanor Rathbone, *The Disinherited Family: A Plea For the Endowment of the Family* (London: E. Arnold, 1924), p. 71.

<sup>17</sup> Press Release, "Forum Slated to Focus on Children and Violence", *The National Centre for Children Exposed to Violence*, 6/9/02. Accessed from [www.nccev.org/us/press-releases/pr2002\\_0906.pdf](http://www.nccev.org/us/press-releases/pr2002_0906.pdf) on 20/9/08.

<sup>18</sup> David Sibley, *Geographies of Exclusion: Society and Difference in the West* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 94.



tensions which become part of the problem of domination within families.”<sup>19</sup> Within such critiques of the home as a neutral space there is a tendency to portray it, on the other hand, as inherently dangerous and threatening. While this can certainly be the case, this is something of a moot point as homes can equally be a site for familial care and productive creation of individuals, and on the whole, society. What should be taken from these critiques is that the home is an intense site of political rendering, a process, which without due care may result in violence and an unnecessary and even exploitative domination. Thus, accounts of the home should “avoid any romanticised image of the domestic which fails to recognise its darker sides, which are normally screened out in conventional ideals of the home.”<sup>20</sup> In this sense, these two images of the domestic – that of a safe sanctuary of freedom and that of a site of domination and violence – ultimately coalesce into something more pervasive and benign. The home is a site of social control and regulation, in which individuals are explicitly formed and disciplined by their parent(s) and through this proxy subjected to a range of more subtle disciplinary measures.

The apolitical portrayal of the home as a quaint domicile is undermined by the extent to which it is permeated by wider social forces. David Morley characterises the modern home as

a ‘phantasmagoric’ place, to the extent that electronic media of various kinds allow the intrusion of distant events into the space of domesticity. In Zygmunt Bauman’s terms, this represents the problematic invasion of the ‘realm of the far’ (that which is strange and potentially troubling) into the ‘realm of the near’ (the traditional arena of ontological security). Thus, the ‘far away’ is now irredeemably mixed in with the space of the near, as processes of migration and of media representation bring actual and virtual forms of alterity into jealously guarded ‘home territories’ of various sorts.<sup>21</sup>

In this sense, Morley moves beyond images of the home as either a sealed space of nurture or a site of domestic violence. In Morley’s depiction, the familiarity of the home – its homeliness – becomes inextricably bound with the *unheimliche* – the unhomely – a sense of estrangement or of the uncanny. The *unheimliche* is the feeling of strangeness and unease that stems from a displacement or reflection upon the familiar. The uncanny nature of the home and the penetration of foreign policy discipline was literalised in the infamous

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> David Morley, *Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 60.

<sup>21</sup> David Morley, “Belongings: Place, Space and Identity in a Mediated World”, *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, vol. 4, no. 4, 2001, p. 428.

'kitchen debate' between President Richard Nixon and Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The leaders of the cold war superpower states met at a Moscow homewares fair in 1959, in a highly staged attempt to demonstrate the commitment of each side to the principle of dialogue and early attempts at detente. After debating the relative merits of American versus Soviet kitchen appliances the two leaders stood together in a mock-up everyday American kitchen and through translators smilingly threatened one another with mutually assured destruction. This surreal event thus placed the high politics of diplomacy and deterrence within the domestic setting, in so doing bringing home the balance of terror that at that time held much of the world's populace to ransom.

Reflecting on the cold war, however, suggest that the effects of this foreign policy discipline on children are ambiguous. The operation of the most overt cold war discipline within the US perhaps reached its peak during the McCarthy era of the 1950s and the heyday of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). The palpable sense of fear and suspicion that predominated in America during this time was equally reflected in schools. Civil defence was a key concept that sought to unite communities and employ everyday citizens to ensure a sense of security within local neighbourhoods. Children in this sense could not escape the threat of communism both within and from outside of America, nor could they escape the duties and responsibilities it demanded of them. Observing this generation 10-20 years later, however, the children raised during an era of entrenched cold war discipline and immanent fear of death were known later as a generation of protesting hippy students and bohemians rather than well-formed, staunch patriots. Accordingly, it is important to consider not only the way in which foreign policy produces a homogeneous domestic population but also the sites of resistance it provokes, both within academic literature and the population at large.

The following account of the psychological effects of the 9/11 attacks seeks to reconcile these critical insights with the orthodox medical literature. As equally as feminist informed positions might question the way in which masculinist institutions have prevaricated to isolate women and children within the home, resistance to the operation of foreign policy can also be seen in psychological literature that seeks to offer somewhat apolitical and empirical studies. The argument presented so far sought to show the limitations of the view that children are apolitical and that locked in homes and schools they will invariably be fine. In an age of pervasive and sensationalised media, representations of danger readily pervade the home. Similarly, such representations of danger generate a fear of danger,

seen perhaps in the rise of household security systems and even gated communities. The argument made here suggests that it is more likely that children will be harmed or at least developmentally influenced by the representations or fear of danger and that this constitutes a more significant effect than the marginal chance of actual real danger. In short the intense will to familial and household security could be seen as a particular form of psychopathology based in phobia or neurosis.

### *Psychological effects of terrorism on children*

There is an extensive literature on the effects of terrorism on children. Much is drawn from studies on trauma and disaster management,<sup>22</sup> some is based on data from previous terror attacks,<sup>23</sup> and more recently there has emerged studies of the impact of 9/11.<sup>24</sup> Understandably, the most immediate concern for the medical profession is to shape appropriate responses for those children who are directly affected by the loss of a family member. This fits with the logic of a triage approach to dealing with psychological trauma. The 'pattern of loss' as a result of 9/11 would initially seem to radically challenge the security and the confidence in the home as a social unit, particularly in those New York and New Jersey communities most directly affected. For instance 98.6% of victims were over 18 years, with a modal age category of 35-39; males made up 75.6% of victims; and 79.9% of victims were white.<sup>25</sup> Combining the cross-sections of race and gender reveals that at 62.6% the overwhelming category of those killed in the attacks were white males followed next by white females who made up 17.3%.<sup>26</sup> Statistics of marital status were not initially available but emerged with data provided for financial remuneration of victims' families. In

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<sup>22</sup> Limor Aharonson-Daniel, Yehezkel Waisman, Yehuda L. Dannon & Kobi Peleg, "Epidemiology of Terror-Related Versus Non-Terror-Related Traumatic Injury in Children", *Paediatrics*, vol. 112 no. 4, October 2003, p. 280.

<sup>23</sup> Jon A. Shaw, "Children Exposed to War/Terrorism", *Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review*, vol 6 no 4. 2003, pp. 237-246; Avi Sadeh, Shai Hen-Gal & Liot Tikotzky, "Young Children's Reaction to War-related Stress: A Survey and Assessment of an Innovative Intervention", *Paediatrics*, vol. 121 no. 1, January 2008, pp. 46-53; Wanda P. Fremont, "Childhood Reactions to Terrorism-Induced Trauma: A Review of the Past 10 Years", *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, vol. 43, no. 4, April 2004, p.381; and Mark Brandenburg & James L. Regens, "Terrorist Attacks Against Children: Vulnerabilities, Management Principles and Capability Gaps", *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*, vol.3 iss. 4, 2006. Available from [www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol3/iss4/1](http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol3/iss4/1).

<sup>24</sup> Mark D. Seery, Roxanne Cohen Silver, Alison E. Holman, Whitney A. Ence & Thai Q. Chu, "Expressing Thoughts and Feelings Following a Collective Trauma: Immediate Responses to 9/11 Predict Negative Outcomes in a National Sample", *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, vol. 76 no. 4, August 2008, pp. 657-667; and Robin H. Gurwitsch & Betty Pfefferbaum, "Impact of Terrorism on Children: Considerations for a New Era", *Journal of Trauma Practice*, vol. 1, iss. 3/4, 2002, p. 101-124.

<sup>25</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Crime in the United States 2001: Uniform Crime Reports* (United States Department of Justice, 2002), p. 303. Accessed from [http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius\\_01/01crime5.pdf](http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/01crime5.pdf) on 20/9/08.

<sup>26</sup> FBI, *Crime in the United States 2001*, p. 303.

a report detailing the disbursement of compensation funds, 64% of victims were listed as married with the remaining 36% assumed to be single; 72% of victims left at least one dependant; and nearly all victims lived and worked in the United States, although a small number of these were citizens from abroad.<sup>27</sup> Overall, when viewed in terms of the population breakdowns of age, gender and race it emerges that the victims of 9/11 were overwhelmingly middle-aged, white males.

This cross-section of the victims of 9/11 was reflected in initial strategies for managing ongoing trauma effects in children. The predominantly affected groups were found to be Caucasian families who had experienced the loss of a husband/father.<sup>28</sup> The immediate response to the pattern of effects of the 9/11 attacks was to attempt to recreate the normality of the familial unit and the home. Strategies such as the GOALS (Going On After Loss) program sought to avoid pathologising 9/11 and instead encourage normalisation and resilience amongst families. The family home in this context was treated as a 'wider ecology' that can either exacerbate or diminish the affects of trauma rather than focussing solely on individuals.<sup>29</sup> Mothers were encouraged to recreate the familial home environment and avoid transmitting grief to children through over-memorialising the event or being over-protective; children are likely to be highly influenced by parents' reactions.<sup>30</sup> This strategy thus reflects the discipline of the home, witnessed here in a positive or productive context, as a central political institution that can create and recreate patterns of behaviour considered normal within society. Similarly the financial imbursements paid by the *September 11 Victims' Compensation Fund 2001* sought to negate the financial loss incurred by families to the extent that they may continue as a regular nuclear family. The overwhelming amount of the fund (80%) was paid to households in which there was a dependant spouse or minor child of the victim.<sup>31</sup> The consolidation and normalisation of the home was in this instance an explicit government policy goal.<sup>32</sup> Thus the key social

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<sup>27</sup> Kenneth R. Feinberg, Camille S. Biros, Jordana Harris Freedman, Deborah E. Greenspan & Jacqueline E. Zins, *Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 – Volume 1* (United States Department of Justice, 2002), p. 54. Accessed from [www.usdoj.gov/final\\_report.pdf](http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf) on 20/9/08.

<sup>28</sup> Maureen Underwood, John Kalafat & Nicci Spinazzola, "Children and Terrorism: A Family Psychoeducational Approach", Bruce Bongar, et al (eds.), *Psychology of Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 311-337.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 312.

<sup>30</sup> Ragnhild Dybdahl, "Children and Mothers in War: An Outcome Study of a Psychosocial Intervention Program", *Child Development*, vol. 72, no. 4, 2001, pp. 1214-1230.

<sup>31</sup> Feinberg et al, *Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001*, p. 54.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 56-62.

priority response to the pattern of loss due to the 9/11 terror attacks focussed largely on the families who had lost husbands/fathers and sought to preserve the status of the traditional home and familial structure.

The provision of public information for children and families in light of 9/11 similarly reinforces the importance of home and re-affirms its imagery of security discussed previously. For instance, children searching for advice on terrorism will be directed to the website of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Here FEMA's 'spokescrab', Herman the Hermit, provides advice for children, emphasising the importance of the 'perfect shell' that is "windproof, waterproof, earthquake proof and fireproof".<sup>33</sup> Here the message, while mixing slightly unclear metaphors of home, emergency shelter and psychological strength, seems to be the importance of a secure and impenetrable home. The use of the shell metaphor to denote the security of home recalls the cold war-era 'duck and cover' public information campaigns in which a cartoon turtle is seen to draw into the safety of his shell in the event of a nuclear explosion. The public/private distinction is reinforced by contemporary school drills to teach children safety in the face of terror threats. In the public sphere of the school, rather than emphasising the safety of homely domesticity, the importance of order within a larger group instead becomes paramount. For instance, schools in and around New York City have conducted 'terror drills' in which students are gathered "into windowless or sealed rooms as a rehearsal for possible chemical or biological attacks".<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, an instance was reported in which children were instructed to walk out of the school, through the woods and stand in the middle of parking lot as practice should "something worse than a fire occur."<sup>35</sup> Children generally are not said to display immediate signs of stress or anxiety during the drills, indeed it is suggested that most seemed to be accustomed to them and "they've gotten used to living with threat".<sup>36</sup> This does not, however, exclude the incidence of indirect symptoms occurring.

Immediately following 9/11 an editorial in the *Journal for Specialists in Paediatric Medicine* foreshadowed these emerging concerns. The editorial casts its concerns for children much wider than those who are immediately affected by the New York attacks, suggesting that

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<sup>33</sup> FEMA, "Herman and the Hunt for a Disaster-Proof Shell", *FEMA for Kids Website*. Accessed from [www.fema.gov/kids/herman/hermanstory1.htm](http://www.fema.gov/kids/herman/hermanstory1.htm) on 18/8/08.

<sup>34</sup> "Children on Heightened Alert", *USA Today*, 24/03/03, p. 6d.

<sup>35</sup> Marek Fuchs, "Duck and Cover, Redux", *New York Times*, 24/10/04, p. A1.

<sup>36</sup> Harold Koplewicz quoted in "Children on Heightened Alert", *USA Today*, 24/03/03, p. 6d.

"[n]ews of real and potential terrorism now permeates our daily lives as we struggle to cope with the tangible and intangible threats."<sup>37</sup> Thus the editorial is concerned with the effects that have been put into place and, importantly, continue to be mediated by secondary means such as the media. The editorial cites a 1990 study by Terr that stresses the importance of what is described as "indirect exposure through media coverage of the events and through exposure to people more directly involved."<sup>38</sup> It highlighted interviews undertaken with children across the country who had viewed the 1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster that determined nearly all children "developed new fear or exaggerated an old one."<sup>39</sup> This opinion was supported by the findings from initial surveys conducted in the months after the 9/11 attacks. For instance a study by Phillips and Schiebelhut examined the responses of elementary school children in Washington, DC, to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Parents (primarily mothers) of children in kindergarten through to Grade 6 and children in Grades 4 to 6, including 47 matched parent-child pairs, completed questionnaires regarding exposure, stress reactions, and constructive actions taken 3 months after the attacks. Parent reports and, to an even greater extent children's self-reports, revealed a high level of negative reactions in response to the attacks.<sup>40</sup> These reactions were said to be best understood in the context of their exposure to the attacks, primarily through television news, and the reactions of, and coping assistance provided, by their parents.

The clearest quantitative data on the effects of terrorism on children is drawn from surveys that seek to understand the effects on wide samples drawn from the population more broadly. In a survey conducted between November 9 and 28, 2001 on 395 parents across the country, Stein *et al.* found that 30% percent of parents reported "more than four terrorism related emotional or behavioural reactions in their child."<sup>41</sup> As with the vast majority of reactions, these are secondary reactions that have been mediated through familial, educational, media or other social means. For instance, of these parents surveyed, nearly 40% reported having had discussed terrorism with their children for more than an

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<sup>37</sup> Roxie L. Foster, "Editorial – Assessing Children's Response to Terrorism", *Journal for Specialists in Paediatric Nursing*, vol. 6 no. 4, October-December 2001, pp. 159-160.

<sup>38</sup> Lenore Terr cited in Foster, "Editorial", p. 159.

<sup>39</sup> Lenore Terr, *Too Scared to Cry: Psychic Trauma in Childhood* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 327.

<sup>40</sup> Phillips D, Prince S & Schiebelhut L, "Elementary school children's responses 3 months after the September 11 terrorist attacks: a study in Washington, DC.", *American Journal Orthopsychiatry*, 2004, 74:4, pp. 509-28.

<sup>41</sup> Bradley D. Stein, Lisa H. Jaycox, Mark N. Elliot, Rebecca L. Collins, Sandra Berry, Grant N. Marshall, *et al.*, "Emotional and Behavioural Impact of Terrorism on Children: Results from a National Survey", *Applied Developmental Science*, 8:4, 2004, pp. 184-194.

hour. Of those discussions, the three most common themes were children's fears for their safety, precautions against anthrax, and avoiding heavily populated areas.<sup>42</sup> Beyond the family setting, two-thirds of parents reported their children being involved in terrorism-related school activities such as class-room activities or assemblies, counselling, or being provided with materials to give to parents.<sup>43</sup> While this survey did not analyse media effects other studies have. In a similar national study by Schuster *et al.*, interviews with parents were conducted in order to gauge the effects of terrorism on children. From these surveys one-third of parents reported that their children demonstrated at least one of five stress reactions and more than half reported that children worried about their safety or that of family members.<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, however, in seeking to discern the way in which these effects are mediated this study found a positive correlation between television exposure and stress reactions. In addition, a study by Galea *et al.* found that distance from the attacks was not so significant a factor in the incidence of effects stemming from terrorism, as individuals relied on television, internet and radio to learn about what happened on 9/11. Accordingly, they also found a positive correlation between media exposure and the degree of stress symptoms demonstrated.<sup>45</sup>

The effects of terrorism on children are not necessary limited to terrorism *per se*, rather they can be connected to other foreign policy decisions. As mentioned above children that have "proximal contact with terrorism" such as 9/11 are prone to a range of symptoms such as PTSD, while research also suggests that children both "proximal and distal to the attack are exposed to a vast amount of attack-related media coverage and exposure to such media coverage is associated with post-attack post-traumatic stress disorder symptomology."<sup>46</sup> Gurwitsch *et al* found that two years after the Oklahoma bombing of 1995 "16% of children and adolescents presented with symptoms of PTSD despite the fact that they were not directly exposed to the incident and were not related to anybody who

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Mark A. Schuster, Bradley D. Stein, Lisa H. Jaycox, Rebecca L. Collins, Grant N. Marshall, Mark N. Elliot, *et al.*, "A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks", *New England Journal of Medicine*, 345, 2001, pp. 1507-1512.

<sup>45</sup> Sandro Galea, Jennifer Ahern, Heidi Resnick, Dean Kilpatrick, Michael Bucuvalas, Joel Gold *et al.*, "Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York City", *New England Journal of Medicine*, 346, 2002, pp. 982-987.

<sup>46</sup> Jonathan S. Corner & Phillip C. Kendall, "Terrorism: The Psychological Impact on Youth", *Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice*, vol 14 iss 3, 2007, pp. 179-212.

had been killed in that incident.”<sup>47</sup> In short, symptoms of trauma amongst children are associated with exposure to ‘attack-related’ media coverage regardless of whether or not they were close to an attack. Indeed, child psychologists are reported to have observed an upsurge of children’s anxiety and stress resulting from the 2003 Iraq War following a decline as the memory of 9/11 began to fade.<sup>48</sup> The effects resulting from terrorism at this point become harder to track as the psychological effects of 9/11 coalesce with, and are sustained by, media coverage of the Iraq War and its association with fears that further attacks may occur.<sup>49</sup> The fear of external threats according to these accounts seems to feed into symptoms of trauma amongst children and could account for a range of stress reactions. Ultimately, however, the exact cause of the effects observed is inconclusive as there are a number of correlative relationships whether they are direct exposure, secondary mediated exposure to the terrorist event, or simply a more general although highly pervasive mediated fear of external threats.

What emerges is a combination of professional opinions and statistical surveys suggesting that terrorism has a much wider effect on children than simply those who have witnessed terrorism or have experienced the loss of a parent. While not clearly supported by scientific data, a number of practice-orientated health professionals have expressed a concern with the effects of media portrayals of the war on terror and its effects on children based on their own initial observations and encounters.<sup>50</sup> Accordingly many suggest that further research is required in order to fully understand the wider effects of terrorism on children.<sup>51</sup> Determinative research towards this end may be hard to fully realise as surveys highlight correlative relationships but not necessarily clear causation or the best way in which to counter these effects. Given that it is hard to establish clear quantitative

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<sup>47</sup> Betty Pfefferbaum, Robin H Gurwitch *et al*, “Posttraumatic Stress Among Children After the Death of a Friend or Acquaintance in a Terrorist Bombing”, *Psychiatric Services* 51, pp. 386-388.

<sup>48</sup> Sucheta Connolly quoted in “Children on Heightened Alert”.

<sup>49</sup> “Parents’ Guide for Talking to their Children about War”, *National Centre for Children Exposed to Violence*. Accessed from [www.ncccev.org/docs/children\\_war.pdf](http://www.ncccev.org/docs/children_war.pdf) on 20/09/08.

<sup>50</sup> Juliette H. Walma van der Molen, “Violence and Suffering in Television News: Toward a Broader Conception of Harmful Television Content for Children”, *Paediatrics*, vol. 113 no. 6, June 2004, pp. 1771-1775; Katy Clark, “Emotional Effects of Terrorism on Children”, *Annals of the American Psychotherapy Association*, vol. 5, 2002. Accessed from [www.questia.com/googleScholar.gst?docId=5002509973](http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.gst?docId=5002509973) on 20/10/08; Caroly Pataki, “Psychological Effects of Terrorism on Our Children: An Expert Perspective”, *New York Post*, 26/9/2001. Accessed from [newyorkpost.healthology.com/mental-health/mental-health-news/article1169.htm](http://newyorkpost.healthology.com/mental-health/mental-health-news/article1169.htm) on 20/10/08; and Vincent Iannelli, “Terror Threat Advisory and Your Kids”, *About.com – Paediatrics*, 6/03/08. Accessed from [pediatrics.about.com/cs/weeklyquestion/a/122103\\_ask.htm](http://pediatrics.about.com/cs/weeklyquestion/a/122103_ask.htm) on 20/10/08.

<sup>51</sup> Jonathan S. Comer and Phillip C. Kendall, “Terrorism: The Psychological Impact on Youth”, *Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice*, vol. 14 iss. 3, 2007, pp. 179-212; and Wanda P. Fremont, “Childhood Reactions to Terrorism-Induced Trauma: A Review of the Past 10 Years”, *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, vol. 43, no. 4, April 2004, p.384.



information on the matter, the opinions of medical practitioners should still be seen as important but they can no longer be considered fully objective for, like everyone else, their opinions are influenced by the contemporary politics and debates surrounding the domestic impacts of the war on terror. In short, the discipline of the war on terror comes into effect within the study of psychological effects of terrorism, whether it be for or against, supporting or resisting the contemporary norms of foreign policy. To this end, professional suggestions or policy positions designed to ameliorate these effects upon the population will become part of the wider social formation and control processes stemming from foreign policy discipline and should be understood as such.

Children are subject to many of the indirectly mediated psychological effects of the wider adult population, but are less able to rationally evaluate risk or reconstruct a sense of normality. At an American Psychiatry Association panel discussion on the mental health effects of terrorism, panellist David Spiegel suggested that 9/11 could be seen as an “overwhelming sensory input” which affects an individual’s cognitive ability to carry on everyday routine, it was an attack on each individual’s sense of social order.<sup>52</sup> Responding to these comments David J. Schonfeld concurred, suggesting the same can be said of children, as they too have a sense of social order albeit one that is tied more to the home and the strength of familial bonds rather than social relations and discourse. Children, Schonfeld suggests, have a harder time reweaving the social fabric than adults because they have not fully developed their social skills.<sup>53</sup> To this end, he suggests it is important to create environments where children feel it is safe to ask questions, to learn, understand, and make meaning out of the events of 9/11. Drawing from this line of argument it can be suggested that children are not as firmly embedded in the disciplinary apparatuses that constitute everyday order. Depending on age and scholastic level they may be aware of some disciplines, such as basic manners and etiquette; others may come as fleeting impressions, for instance basic understanding of popular culture and political events such as wars and terrorism; whereas others will escape them completely such as the discipline of productive labour and fiscal responsibility. It is in this sense, when Schonfeld refers to the underdeveloped social skills of children he is suggesting that we can understand them as having only fragmentary and illogical glances of external threats. Accordingly the threat

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<sup>52</sup> David J. Schonfeld quoted in Jim Rosack, “Mental Health Effects of Terrorism Focus of APA-Sponsored Panel”, *Psychiatric News*, 37:1, 2002, p. 4. Accessed from [pn.psychiatryonline.org/Cgi/content/full/37/1/4-a](http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/Cgi/content/full/37/1/4-a) on 18/8/08.

<sup>53</sup> Rosack, “Mental Health Effects of Terrorism Focus of APA-Sponsored Panel”.

of terrorism may seem to children dangerously confusing or overwhelmingly exaggerated. Thus children are subject to the same disciplinary and psychological effects of terrorism but they may be experienced in a socially disconnected or phantasmagorical way.

Within the context of the comments made above, David Spiegel further suggests that the breakdown of social fabric and everyday order can be seen at the wider level of the population. This effect is not necessarily one that is entirely negative as it can foster collective resilience amongst people who can identify with the event as a group. According to Spiegel,

[o]ne of the rather odd advantages of this terrorist attack is that it was an attack on all of us. It was an attack on our social fabric. In the aftermath, building social connections – talking about it – really helped many people to weave the social fabric back together.<sup>54</sup>

What Spiegel is describing here is the operation of a collective solidarity amongst national and sub-national communities, but also a form of biopolitics. Biopolitics is operating here in the attempt to reconsolidate the social body in response to the attacks of 9/11 and is akin to a biological logic operating at the level of a group or a population. In order to function effectively an effective biopolitics also requires some measures of resilience, or discipline amongst individuals. This collective solidarity and individual resilience in the community and family are strategies emphasised in many of the leading psychological approaches to post-trauma situations, in particular that of the GOALS program mentioned previously. Biopolitical and disciplinary strategies of solidarity and resilience in this context are positive forms of social production and control in that they act to unite communities and overcome the negative effects of terror attacks. This is not to suggest it is without critique, indeed it will be suggested in the following sections that it closes off opportunities for reflection and innovative solutions. Furthermore it fosters a sense of solidarity at the expense of and in opposition to, others.

The study of the mediated effects of terrorism and its impact on children can be understood in the broader context of its effect on the wider population. Given the lack of specific research on the effects of these mediated representations of terrorism on children, this chapter will take up this question in regards to the wider population. In doing so, it will rely upon the literature on the mediated psychological effects of terrorism. Within such

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<sup>54</sup> Quoted in Ibid.

analysis the psychological effects on children can be understood in terms of the ambient presence of a threat of terrorism insofar as they are either themselves aware of this threat or perceive fear in parents or authority figures. While children may not be in a position to fully comprehend global events and potential external threats they are no less subject to the simplistic warnings and discourse that seeks to securitise people against a terrorist threat. This research can also be further and more clearly reconciled with the ideas of construction and control of populations that can be drawn from Foucault's notions of biopolitics and governmentality. In this wider context, the effects of terrorism and medical and policy responses to it can be understood in terms of a process of social production, ordering and control.

### **Terrorising the masses: Psychological effects of terrorism on the population-at-large**

The direct effects of terror on members of the public that witness attacks and first responders can be understood in terms of the psychological effects of disasters. Yet, there is a much wider occurrence of psychological effects that are mediated socially and through the media, making it much harder to measure and respond to. Furthermore, there doesn't currently seem to be a clear way of describing these effects within the medical or psychological literature. Understanding these wider effects seems to implicate each, but is not fully explained by the combination of critical social theory, psychology, psychiatry and medical practice. This section seeks to explore these issues in relation to the broad psychological effect of terrorism on populations. To what extent is the population seen as being actively shaped by terrorism and counter-terrorism? Or is it understood *en masse* as being static, a device by which to determine what is normal? It will also examine a number of existing possible diagnoses, examining to what extent they accurately capture the psychological affliction upon the wider population and to what extent they may be reconciled with critical social theories. In short this section seeks to map those effects of terrorism on the margins of the both medical and critical social literature.

The literature on the psychological effects of terrorism is complex and varied, even within single works. One important dynamic – which is at times not recognised or perhaps ignored – is the interplay between the direct effects of terrorism and the indirect effects of the threat or fear of terrorism. For instance, in “Psychological Consequences of Actual or Threatened CBRNE Terrorism”, Sullivan and Bongar fuse the analysis of the effects of actual

terrorism with the mass fear of terrorism regardless of whether an event has actually occurred.<sup>55</sup> Initially this seems to correspond with Goodin's definitional and effects-based argument that terrorism does not require violence, only the creation of fear, an argument that in turn prompts Goodin to suggest that terrorism does not even require terrorists per se, but can be deliberately or inadvertently created by states.<sup>56</sup> Sullivan and Bongar, however, from the outset ground their analysis in the definitive (yet unsupported) statement that "[t]he acquisition of biological, radiological and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons remains a priority of several terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda."<sup>57</sup> Bongar and Sullivan are not simply stating the less-problematic, although somewhat contested, objective fact of the existence of a terrorist threat but are also ascribing to them an intent. Regardless of the actual intent of individuals who may or may not be intending to commit terrorism, what should be of foremost concern when exploring psychological effects of terrorism are the psychological effects insofar as they may occur regardless of whether they are objectively real or not. Indeed, such an approach would be more consistent with the claim that "[f]or every physical injury, [one should] expect 10-100 times as many psychological categories."<sup>58</sup> This is not to simply suggest it is 'all in our heads' but rather that there is a complex but not necessarily direct relationship between the fear that we feel and the threat 'out there'.

Populations are a crucial element of understanding the psychological and medical effects of terrorism. Analysis of populations allows data to be obtained relating to the incidence of various health effects. Despite the centrality of an analysis of population there is, perhaps quite paradoxically, little understanding of how terrorism affects the wider population. The population in this instance is not the object of study but rather a statistical device to determine a norm by which individuals may be compared and an overall incidence may be determined. What has become clear in light of 9/11 is that the effects of the terror attacks are pervasive and pose serious challenges for how the wider effects can be determined. This is not to suggest that this wider effect is unknown or ignored within the literature. For instance, a number of studies describe terrorism as a "pervasive generator" of

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<sup>55</sup> Glenn R. Sullivan & Bruce Bongar, "Psychological Consequences of Actual or Threatened CBRNE Terrorism" in Bruce Bongar, *et al* (eds.), *Psychology of Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 153-163.

<sup>56</sup> Robert E. Goodin, *What's Wrong with Terrorism?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), pp. 2, 49.

<sup>57</sup> Sullivan & Bongar, "Psychological Consequences of Actual or Threatened CBRNE Terrorism", p. 153.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161.

psychopathological symptomology, suggesting that it has a range of indirect effects beyond those seen amongst people directly affected by the terror attacks.<sup>59</sup>

The Oklahoma City bombings of 1995 provide both the clearest comparison and clearest data sets. Studies into the Oklahoma City bombings to some extent have captured the wider social and psychological fallout events. The key study on the Oklahoma City bombing surveys those directly affected, finding the expected predictors of PTSD in women and those with pre-existing conditions.<sup>60</sup> What was interesting was that in comparison with other disasters it found slightly lower rates of the incidence of PTSD (34%), which is referred to as “increased resilience” given that it bucks the expected rate of affliction.<sup>61</sup> What was more interesting for this section was that while PTSD diagnoses were low, the presence of one or more of its symptoms was very high, virtually ubiquitous at 96%. This suggests that while direct effects evidenced by PTSD were not as great as expected they were highly pervasive.<sup>62</sup> Another study also observed that following the attacks there were higher rates of smoking, alcohol consumption and stress within the city compared with outside the city.<sup>63</sup> A study examining the impact of the bombing on the Oklahoma City middle and senior school student population sort to measure the extent to which students had been psychologically affected and the means through they were exposed, including direct proximity, knowing someone injured or killed or, importantly, television. As it was a school day when the attacks occurred, very few were themselves directly exposed, although all experienced it in some manner. Amongst the school population over 60% reported hearing and/or feeling the explosion, more than 20% reported knowing someone killed or injured, 11% had a friend or relative killed or injured and more than two-thirds

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<sup>59</sup> Carol S. Fullerton, Robert J. Ursano & Ann E. Norwood, “Planning for the Psychological Effects of Bioterrorism” in Robert J. Ursano, Carol S. Fullerton & Ann E. Norwood (eds), *Bioterrorism: Psychological and Public Health Interventions* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 4; see also Harry C. Holloway, Ann E. Norwood, Carol S. Fullerton *et al*, “The Threat of Biological Weapons: Prophylaxis and the Mitigation of Psychological and Social Consequences”, *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 278, no. 5, 1997, pp. 425-427; Carol S. North, Sara Jo Nixon, Sheryll Shariat *et al*, “Psychiatric Disorders Among Survivors of the Oklahoma City Bombing”, *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 282, no. 8, 1999, pp. 755-762; and Carol S. North & Betty Pfefferbaum, “Research on the Mental Health Effects of Terrorism”, *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 288, no. 6, 2002, pp. 633-636.

<sup>60</sup> North, Nixon, Shariat *et al*, “Psychiatric Disorders Among Survivors of the Oklahoma City Bombing”, pp. 755-762.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>63</sup> David W. Smith, Elaine H. Christensen, Robert Vincent & Neil E. Hann, “Population Effects of the Bombing of Oklahoma City”, *Journal of the Oklahoma State Medical Association*, vol. 92, no. 4, 1999, pp. 193-198.

reported that most or all of their television watching was bomb related.<sup>64</sup> Post-traumatic stress symptoms amongst those whose television exposure was mostly or all bomb-related was at a similar or higher level than those who had a friend, relative or someone else they new killed or injured. Furthermore, the primary predictor for ongoing symptoms was television exposure rather than knowledge of someone killed or injured.

There are limitations in using the Oklahoma City bombings as a psychological descriptor of the possible effects that are likely to occur as a result of the 9/11 terror attacks and subsequent war on terror. The key focus in post-disaster situations is on the incidence of PTSD. The results from the Oklahoma City bombing suggested that while the incidence of PTSD was lower than expected, the incidence of psychological symptoms was extensive. Furthermore, the study of the school students employed a methodology that examined the psychological effects in contrast with a control group. While this may be possible in an isolated event, assuming a reasonable demographic, cultural and social contiguity within the two comparison populations, it becomes hard to determine a 'normal' control group following a highly pervasive mass mediated event such as 9/11, or even to a lesser extent, the Oklahoma City bombings. For instance, the most recent edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-IV) has widened the definition of PTSD from that of the previous edition (DSM-III) in line with common clinical practice, albeit not without some controversy.<sup>65</sup> The included traumatic stressors for PTSD have been expanded beyond the previous experiences such as near-death, witnessing death, rape, torture or internment and now include a range of stressful but not potentially fatal experiences.<sup>66</sup> Given the nature of the results and the extent to which post-traumatic symptoms were associated with high levels of television exposure, it is reasonable to expect that various psychological effects, if not actual PTSD, could be widespread and long-lasting.

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<sup>64</sup> The remaining students were exposed to lesser amounts of television coverage or less directly knew someone injured. Betty Pfefferbaum, Sara Jo Nixon, Ronald S Krug *et al*, "Clinical Needs Assessment of Middle and High School Students Following the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing", *American Journal of Psychiatry* 156, July 1999, pp. 1069-1074.

<sup>65</sup> Naomi Breslau and Richard J. McNally, "Epidemiology of 9/11: Technological Advances and Conceptual Conundrums" in Yuval Neria, Raz Gross, Randall Marshall, Beverley Raphael, Ezra S. Susser (eds.), *9/11: Mental Health in the Wake of Terrorist Attacks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 523.

<sup>66</sup> "309.81 – Post-traumatic Stress Disorder" in American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (4<sup>th</sup> edn.) (Washington DC: APA, 1994). Criteria also available at "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder DSM-IV Criteria", *Mental Health Today*. Accessed from [www.mental-health-today.com/ptsd/dsm.htm](http://www.mental-health-today.com/ptsd/dsm.htm) on 12/12/08.

Media representations of terrorist danger are not an accurate measure of potential threats and are particularly prone to being inaccurately and disproportionately characterised. Take for instance the anthrax attacks that followed 9/11. While the level of public discourse surrounding the potential threat of anthrax attacks has all but subsided, the tenor of public concern peaked when anthrax was mailed to media outlets and the Democratic Senate offices of Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, killing five and infecting as many as 17 others.<sup>67</sup> As a result 32,000 people who felt they may have been potentially exposed to anthrax were given the post-exposure prophylaxis antibiotic, Cipro.<sup>68</sup> Emphasising that this was a limited precautionary measure, the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) warned of the potential for negative medical side-effects and suggested prescribing doctors be judicious in responding to requests for Cipro and also consider other antibiotics.<sup>69</sup> Despite these Federal statements, the potent post-9/11 media-storm surrounding the anthrax attack fatalities ensured the demand for Cipro leapt dramatically.<sup>70</sup> Accounts from many of the 32,000 people who were administered with the drug suggest, however, that little information was provided to them by their employers or the CDC and their main source of information was the media, which influenced decisions to obtain Cipro.<sup>71</sup> There are estimated to be thousands of further cases unreported to the CDC in which individuals treated themselves with Cipro and many more where it has been purchased.<sup>72</sup> Responding to this panic, an editorial in the *British Medical Journal* argues that chemical and biological weapons have limited actual destructive potential; rather the threatened or actual use of such weapons is designed to “wreak destruction via

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<sup>67</sup> Eric Lichtblau & Eric Wade, “F.B.I. Details Anthrax Case but Doubts Remain”, *New York Times*, 18/8/08, p. A1;

<sup>68</sup> Associated Press, “Anthrax Antibiotic Used by 32,000”, *The Michigan Daily*, 9/11/2008. Accessed from [www.michigandaily.com/content/anthrax-antibiotic-used-32000](http://www.michigandaily.com/content/anthrax-antibiotic-used-32000) on 24/11/2008; Lemer suggests that “the vast majority of the roughly 30,000 people who took Cipro in the Anthrax scare were treating fear rather than exposure [and that due to anthrax mutation] the effectiveness of the best-selling drug was undermined even as its sales were skyrocketing.” See Sharon Lemer, “Risky Chickens: Bayer Refuses to Withdraw Animal Antibiotic that Cause Resistance in Humans”, *Village Voice*, 4 December 2001, p. 45.

<sup>69</sup> Mary Ellen Buller, “Thousands Taking Antibiotics”, *US Medicine*, December 2001. Accessed from [www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articleID=317&issueID=33](http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articleID=317&issueID=33) on 24/11/2008.

<sup>70</sup> News reports tended to over-report and sensationalise the incidence of the attacks and the prescription Cipro but under-report government public safety instructions, and specific details such as anthrax not being transferable, that Cipro is a post-exposure rather than preventative antibiotic and the availability of alternative post-exposure antibiotics. See Felicia Mebane, Sarah Temin & Claudia F. Parvanta, “Communicating Anthrax in 2001: A Comparison of CDC Information and Print Media Accounts”, *Journal of Health Communication* 8, 2003, pp. 50-82.

<sup>71</sup> Katherine A. Cornely, *Biological Terrorism: The Anthrax Scare of 2001*, *National Centre for Case Study Teaching in Science*, 2005. Accessed from [www.sciencecases.org/anthrax/anthrax.pdf](http://www.sciencecases.org/anthrax/anthrax.pdf) on 24/11/2008; Janice Blanchard & Yolanda Haywood *et al*, “In Their Own Words: Lessons Learned From Those Exposed to Anthrax”, *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 95, no. 3, March 2005, pp. 489-495.

<sup>72</sup> Dworkin quoted in Daniel L. Friedlin, “Just Say No: The Cipro Craze and Managed Care – Applying the Hand Formula to Managed Care Decisions”, *Hofstra Law Review* 30, 2001, p. 1356.

psychological means, by inducing fear, confusion and uncertainty into everyday life.”<sup>73</sup> Accordingly, the predominant affliction was not the limited casualties from anthrax but the widespread public fear and media hype in the wake of 9/11.<sup>74</sup>

Managing the effects of the anthrax attacks has as much to do with understanding the wider psychological effects of terrorism. Examining the communication of risk during the anthrax attacks, Chess and Clarke suggest that social and professional networks are as important to effective communication as centralised government responses because they are more readily trusted.<sup>75</sup> The dispersal of positive information through social networks can also function in reverse, transmitting suboptimal information and ineffective reactions amongst social groups.<sup>76</sup> The effects of terror alerts are biopolitical insofar as they shape the overall health of the population. Regardless of the extent to which these effects are positive or negative, the role of wider social networks in perpetuating psychological effects is thus of vital importance. In seeking to offer advice on how to approach the issue of terrorism Dr Katona emphasised the importance of ‘taming terror’ or gaining a sense of perspective on future terrorist attacks. This, he argues, would minimise the psychological damage. Katona suggests that “bioterror is best fought through perspective. Taking a bath or eating your dinner is statistically more lethal than the chances of dying from anthrax.”<sup>77</sup> The point being made is that the incidence of psychological damage stemming from the fear of future attacks far outweighs the risks of attacks actually occurring. This sense of perspective is supported by prominent member of the AMA, Dr Nielson, whose concern was that “[l]ong after the physical damage is cleaned up and rebuilt, long after the medical aspects of anthrax are dealt with, we physicians will continue to deal with the enormous aspects of the mental health implications” of the anthrax letter attacks.<sup>78</sup> This is supported by the leading experts on mass sociogenic illness (which will be discussed shortly) who suggest that media effects amplify immediate acute psychological effects, increasing the likelihood of social fears, anxiety and long-term psychological effects. It is these mediated

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<sup>73</sup> Simon Wessely, Kenneth Craig Hyams & Robert Bartholomew, “Psychological Implications of Chemical and Biological Weapons”, *British Medical Journal*, 2001, p. 323.

<sup>74</sup> Vadim V. Demidov, “Anthrax-related Panic is More Dangerous than the Disease”, *Trends in Biotechnology*, vol.20, iss. 3, 2002, p. 97.

<sup>75</sup> Caron Chess & Lee Clark, “Facilitation of Risk Communication During the Anthrax Attacks of 2001: The Organizational Backstory”, *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 97, no. 9, September 2007, pp. 1578-1583.

<sup>76</sup> Eric A. Posner, “Fear and the Regulatory Model Counterterrorism”, *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy* 25, 2001-2002, pp. 681-698.

<sup>77</sup> Quoted in Rosack, “Mental Health Effects of Terrorism Focus of APA-Sponsored Panel”.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*



effects that may ultimately be more detrimental to the overall population than the actual or even suspected terrorist incident itself.<sup>79</sup>

While the 9/11 attacks were understood to be an attack on the United States as a national whole, the effects are somewhat ambiguous insofar as it creates unity within the wider population. According to Schuster *et al*:

[The] television coverage was immediate, graphic and pervasive. Newscasts included remarkable video footage showing two airplanes crashing into the World Trade Center and the aftermath of four airplane crashes. People who are present at a traumatic event often have symptoms of stress, but there is evidence that adults and children need not be present to have stress symptoms, especially if they consider themselves to be similar to the victims. The events of September 11 were widely described as attacks on America, and most or all Americans may have identified with the victims or perceived the attacks as directed against themselves.<sup>80</sup>

Terrorism, particularly insofar as it has been associated with al-Qaeda since 9/11, is understood to be an indiscriminate attack on a non-specific cross-section of society and as suggested by Schuster *et al* accordingly is understood widely as an attack on the nation as a whole. Because it is portrayed and responded to as an external threat upon the national population, post-9/11 terrorism has much in common with the kind of fear that stems from the long-standing tradition of inter-state threats. It is akin to the threats that characterized the cold war more than terrorism, which specifically targets particular political or social cross-sections of the population. While on one hand this means that the effect of 9/11 is extensive throughout the majority of the population, it also acts to bind a diverse range of groups and world-views toward this common foreign policy goal. Addressing the post-9/11 AMA meeting, Psychiatrist David Spiegel describes the psychiatric dimensions of this effect: "one of the rather odd advantages of this terrorist attack was that it was an attack on all of us, it was an attack on our social fabric."<sup>81</sup> Again here, we see that the psychological effects of terrorism, even at the level of the individual need to be understood within the context of the wider population.

The effects of the 9/11 attacks can be seen in the presence of a homogenising tendency within public opinion. For instance there has been a rather clear bifurcation of the

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<sup>79</sup> Simon, Wessely, Kenneth Craig Hyams & Robert Bartholomew, "Psychological Implications of Chemical and Biological Weapons", *British Medical Journal* 323, October 2001, pp. 878-879.

<sup>80</sup> Schuster *et al*, "A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks" p. 1508.

<sup>81</sup> Rosack, "Mental Health Effects of Terrorism Focus of APA-Sponsored Panel".

American political landscape not necessarily along partisan line but according to one's position on the perceived success of contemporary foreign policy and domestic counter-terrorism policies. For instance, support for and against the Iraq War, torture, exceptional rendition and even attempts to uncover foreign threats through illegal government wiretapping strongly divided Americans as to whether they considered these actions legitimate or necessary tactics in the post-9/11 war on terror. The psychological effects of 9/11 and their continued perpetuation through media representations and debates over foreign policy positions are best understood in this context as a psychological effect that is 'environmental'. In this sense, it is not experienced solely by an individual but rather acts upon a wide population. It is the psychology of, as Vice President Dick Cheney described it, a "new normalcy" of terrorism; a psychological effect that is not abnormal or exceptional within national populations.<sup>82</sup> In order to gain insight on mass psychological effects and attempt to reconcile them with social theory approaches, it is necessary to examine medical diagnoses in which the symptomology was either mass-mediated or occurring within the context of effects seen across a wider population. Such diagnoses include post-traumatic stress disorder and mass sociogenic illness.<sup>83</sup>

Studies into the psychological effects of terrorism focus overwhelmingly, indeed almost exclusively, on the incidence of PTSD within populations. PTSD, according to the DSM-IV, is the development of a particular range of symptoms as a result of the following criteria:

- (1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others
- (2) the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.<sup>84</sup>

There is some controversy surrounding the definition of PTSD, particularly in regards to the breadth of the DSM definition, which since its inception has become more expansive. There are those such as Alexander Bodkin who suggest that there is "a lack of solid evidence that post-traumatic stress is biologically different from depression not triggered by a specific event", a suggestion that effectively questions whether PTSD as a discrete

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<sup>82</sup> Dick Cheney, 25/10/2001, quoted in James W. Cortada & Edward Wálin, "The Bumpy Road to a New Normalcy" in *Betting on America: Why the US Can Be Stronger After September 11* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 3.

<sup>83</sup> The later is also known as mass psychogenic illness, somatisation, somatoform disorder, generalised anxiety disorder or medically unexplained symptoms.

<sup>84</sup> "309.81 – Post-traumatic Stress Disorder".

condition exists at all.<sup>85</sup> PTSD was first recognised by the medical profession in 1980 with the publication of the DSM-III following the Vietnam War. Despite similar symptoms to other conditions, it was considered distinct because it was triggered by the traumatic events of war or violent events which undermine the victim's sense of social order and create a breakdown in meaning.<sup>86</sup> PTSD is unique in that it is defined by what causes the symptoms rather than the symptoms themselves. PTSD in this way is *the* attempt to understand the psychological effects of war, disasters, terrorism and other potentially traumatic events.

Despite the status of PTSD as the key trauma-related disorder, it does not capture the wider, pervasive effects of a mediated event such as terrorism. The incidence and severity of PTSD as a result of 9/11, for instance, has a very strong geographical correlation, being most concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Manhattan and decreasing further outside of New York City.<sup>87</sup> At its highest, in the area south of Canal St, PTSD was diagnosed in 20 percent of respondents taken from a random sample, whereas amongst all of Manhattan it occurred amongst 7.5 percent of respondents.<sup>88</sup> The key hindrance to capturing the wider effects of terrorism using the category of PTSD is that it requires exposure to a traumatic stressor; it is not transmitted through social interaction. It is only recently that clinical practice has begun to consider television exposure a traumatic stressor, although despite this PTSD still primarily concerns those who are directly affected. It is now recognised that 'environmental' or 'ecological' factors – that is, the social context – can influence the severity and duration of PTSD.<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, as mentioned previously studies suggest that exposure to television or a major breakdown in social order can also give rise to PTSD. The widening of the definition of what counts as a traumatic stressor in the incidence of PTSD is quite controversial. Given that the symptoms of PTSD occur widely throughout normal society, a widened definition may dilute the usefulness of PTSD as a category and as a way

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<sup>85</sup> Quoted in Roxanne Khamsi, "Doubt Cast on Definition of PTSD", *New Scientist*, 21/03/07. Accessed from [www.newscientist.com/article/dn11423-doubt-cast-on-definition-of-ptsd-.html](http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11423-doubt-cast-on-definition-of-ptsd-.html) on 20/12/08; see also Derek Summerfield, "The Invention of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and the Social Usefulness of a Psychiatric Category", *British Medical Journal* 322, 2001, pp. 95-98.

<sup>86</sup> Margaret S. Gibbs, "Factors in the Victim that Mediate Between Disaster and Psychopathology: A Review", *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, vol. 2, iss. 4, 2006, pp. 489-514.

<sup>87</sup> Galea, Ahern, Resnick, Kilpatrick, Bucuvalas, Gold *et al.*, "Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York City", pp. 982-987.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 982.

<sup>89</sup> Fran H. Norris, "Community and Ecological Approaches to Understanding and Alleviating Postdisaster Distress" in Yuval Neria, Raz Gross, Randall Marshall, Beverley Raphael, Ezra S. Susser (eds.), *9/11: Mental Health in the Wake of Terrorist Attacks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 141-156.

of responding to those severely affected by trauma. Tension lies in determining what constitutes 'exposure' to trauma and the extent to which the mental health problems for those directly exposed are substantively different to the wider population that has been indirectly exposed.<sup>90</sup>

There are two contradictory dynamics that stem from the shock that 9/11 caused to the national social order and individuals' perception of reality and meaning. The incidence of trauma and the onset of PTSD stems from an event that powerfully shocks and undermines an individual's sense of social meaning and order.<sup>91</sup> Accordingly, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, health experts predicted that there would be a national mental illness 'epidemic' and accordingly the US federal government mobilised massive resources to combat this potential mental health crisis.<sup>92</sup> On the other hand, however, an individual's perception of social order and meaning is embedded within a wider social context, a broader social environment or 'ecology' that mediates one's world-view.<sup>93</sup>

This suggests that the implications for mental health in the wake of 9/11 and throughout the ongoing war on terror may be ambiguous, complex and may not conform to previous studies of PTSD in the wake of disasters. Whilst the sheer scale of 9/11 affects a huge portion of the population this also suggests a wide commonality of experience and lays the foundations for community resilience; social order and meaning shifts for everyone and relative to the rest of the population the effect for each individual may not be as great. What it does suggest is that the focus of PTSD upon direct exposure limits its ability to comprehend the complex and varied effects of 9/11 on populations. This should not be seen as an argument for the wholesale widening of the category of PTSD to all those affected by 9/11. Indeed, there is weight to the criticisms against widening the definition of PTSD to encompass a range of even at times everyday experiences such as work disputes or medical misdiagnoses. Furthermore the increased focus on PTSD seems also to be

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<sup>90</sup> Naomi Breslau and Richard J. McNally, "Epidemiology of 9/11: Technological Advances and Conceptual Conundrums" in Yuval Neria, Raz Gross, Randall Marshall, Beverley Raphael, Ezra S. Susser (eds.), *9/11: Mental Health in the Wake of Terrorist Attacks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 522-525.

<sup>91</sup> Elana Newman, David S. Riggs & Susan Roth, "Thematic Resolution, PTSD, and Complex PTSD: The Relationship Between Meaning and Trauma-Related Diagnoses", *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, vol. 10, no. 2, 1997, pp. 197-213.

<sup>92</sup> Christina Hoff Sommers & Sally Satel, *One Nation Under Therapy: How the Helping Culture is Eroding Self-Reliance* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2005), pp. 177-214.

<sup>93</sup> Fran H. Norris, "Community and Ecological Approaches to Understanding and Alleviating Postdisaster Distress" in Yuval Neria, Raz Gross, Randall Marshall, Beverley Raphael, Ezra S. Susser (eds.), *9/11: Mental Health in the Wake of Terrorist Attacks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 141-156.

constructing experiences of trauma throughout the population, medicalising the everyday.<sup>94</sup> Medicalisation will be further addressed later in this section, but it is symptomatic of the inability of PTSD to address the broader psychological effects of terrorism given its focus on individual psychopathology rather than that of a social or group dynamic.

Mass sociogenic illness can be found in multiple occurrences of acute physical symptoms of illness amongst a population stemming from no direct obvious cause. MSI falls under the diagnostic category of 'somatoform disorders', that is, a condition brought on by the mind. A definition offered by two leading authorities describe it as

[t]he rapid spread of illness signs and symptoms affecting members of a cohesive group, originating from a nervous system disturbance involving excitation, loss or alteration of function whereby physical complaints that are exhibited unconsciously have no corresponding organic aetiology.<sup>95</sup>

Mass sociogenic illness is a psychiatric condition that in many ways eludes rational explanations of individual actors and material causation. It relies on some combination of pre-existing stress, community fears, and interpersonal or mediated social transmission, although this transmission is largely discursive rather than physical. Many documented cases reflect such non-rational elements. For instance, Japan's 'Pokemon panic' of 1997 saw hundreds of children admitted to hospital as a result of watching a particular episode of a children's cartoon. In the highest rating program for its time-slot – watched by millions – Pikachu seeks to counteract a "virus bomb" deployed by his nemesis Polygon using his lightning powers, which were represented using a series of screen flashes. Within forty minutes 618 children were taken to hospital presenting symptoms ranging from "trance-like hypnosis" to "vomiting and convulsions".<sup>96</sup> Subsequent media reporting of the illnesses, which replayed the flashing sequence, led to up to a reported 12,000 children being admitted to hospital, 7,000 presenting seizures. While initial 'index cases' were diagnosed as rare cases of photosensitive epilepsy, ultimately the many thousands that subsequently became affected can only be explained by transmission via the media

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<sup>94</sup> Peter Conrad, "Medicalization and Social Control", *Annual Review of Sociology* 18, 1992, pp. 209-232.

<sup>95</sup> Robert E. Bartholomew and Simon Wessely, "Protean Nature of Mass Psychogenic Illness: From Possessed Nuns to Clinical and Biological Terrorism Fears", *British Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 180, no. 2, 2002, pp. 300-306.

<sup>96</sup> Benjamin Radford, "The Pokemon Panic of 1997", *Skeptical Inquirer Magazine*, May/June 2001. Accessed from [www.csicop.org/si/2001-05/pokemon.html](http://www.csicop.org/si/2001-05/pokemon.html) on 24/11/08.

frenzy.<sup>97</sup> Similarly an outbreak of severe illness amongst nearly one-third of a class of 48 Taiwanese students was attributed to mass hysteria or MSI despite, or perhaps because of, the belief amongst many of the students that they were affected by supernatural evil forces.<sup>98</sup> The illness was so great that six cases continued to present symptoms for a week or longer. These cases both highlight clear physical symptoms that in the overwhelming majority of cases stem as a result of a complex group psychology.

In the post-9/11 Western psychological landscape, collective fears regarding terrorism have been reflected in identified cases of MSI. In 2005 there was a mass evacuation of Melbourne airport, in which a triage unit was set up and medical staff donned protective clothing as a result of a suspected outbreak of toxic poisoning. The chain of events was as follows.<sup>99</sup> Three airport services workers in and around a newsagency collapsed citing dizziness, nausea and trouble breathing. A security guard was also taken ill and after reporting it to his union all members were asked to present to health services to be checked. Four more security guards reported ill, although two were suggested to have checked in only as per instructions from the union. An outdoors triage unit was set up by the health services and a further two check-in staff, located above the newsagent reported to triage complaining of symptoms. At this point the southern domestic terminal was closed and evacuated and air sample testing conducted. In total 57 were treated at the triage centre, the majority of which were taken to hospital presenting very minor symptoms.<sup>100</sup> *The Esplin Report* subsequently conducted into the incident suggested that there was no causal agent and that food, water and air poisoning were not responsible, in many instances heat stroke was suggested to be a factor. Ultimately, however, the *Esplin Report* determined the event to be a mystery with no ascertainable cause. Bartholomew suggests, however, that mass hysteria or mass sociogenic illness was most likely responsible on the basis that the “outbreak began with a dramatic singular incident (an index case) and was primarily spread by line-of-sight and sound, and later

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<sup>97</sup> Benjamin Radford & Robert Bartholomew, “Pokemon Contagion: Photosensitive Epilepsy or Mass Psychogenic Illness?”, *Southern Medical Journal*, vol. 94, no. 2, 2001, pp. 197-204.

<sup>98</sup> Cheng-Shen Chen, Cheng-Fan Yen, Hsui-Fen Lin & Pingchen Yang, “Mass Hysteria and Perceptions of the Supernatural Among Adolescent Girl Students in Taiwan”, *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, vol. 191 no. 2, 2003, pp. 122-3.

<sup>99</sup> Chronology of events outlined in the Esplin report.

<sup>100</sup> AAP, “Melbourne Airport Sickness Baffles Inquiry”, *The Age*, 4/4/05. Accessed from [www.theage.com.au/news/National/Melbourne-airport-sickness-baffles-inquiry/2005/04/04/1112489396342.html](http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Melbourne-airport-sickness-baffles-inquiry/2005/04/04/1112489396342.html) on 24/11/08.

telecommunications. Symptoms were transient and benign, with a rapid onset and recovery, and were consistent with anxiety.”<sup>101</sup>

Post-9/11 there have been many overreactions to real or perceived terrorist threats. This can be seen in the accounts of the Anthrax scare detailed above and no doubt everyone living in the Western world could offer at least one story in which a suspicious person, event or thing was construed as a terrorist threat – in all likelihood because of its foreignness or being out of place – causing widespread overreaction and anxiety. Mass sociogenic illness, according to Bartholomew and Wessely exists on this same spectrum of overreaction but is on the extreme end in which it is accompanied by acute psychological and physical symptoms and can be considered a psychopathology.<sup>102</sup> Indeed these psychological disturbances are not only likely associated with the threat of terrorism but are also likely to “amplify” the popular perception of it.<sup>103</sup> MSI is also most likely to mirror prominent social concerns of the times and in this way reflects societies’ ability to “construct reality” as the “perceived danger needs only to be plausible in order to gain acceptance within a particular group and generate anxiety.”<sup>104</sup> MSI, like PTSD, seems to capture many of the psychological effects of terrorism. Yet in maintaining a strict focus on mental illness and individuals or population groups that deviate from accepted psychological normalcy, MSI does not address the effects throughout society more generally. The analysis offered by Bartholomew and Wessely, as with attempts to broaden the definition of PTSD mentioned earlier, seek to keep pace with the suggestions within the medical community that there are broad effects on populations, although ultimately these categories are not designed in diagnostic, methodological or prescriptive terms suited to subtle and pervasive psychological effects.

What emerges from this survey of the literature on the psychological effects of 9/11 is the sense that there is a wider, pervasive, and indirect effect on the wider population. This, however, emerges as much from the opinion of the experts within this field as it does from their research. Depending on who one reads there is either insufficient research or methodological limitations that prevent these wider effects being demonstrated. There is

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<sup>101</sup> Robert E. Bartholomew, “‘Mystery Illness’ at Melbourne Airport: Toxic Poisoning or Mass Hysteria?”, *Medical Journal of Australia*, vol. 183, no. 11, 2005, pp. 564-566.

<sup>102</sup> Robert E. Bartholomew & Simon Wessely, “The Protean Nature of Mass Sociogenic Illness: From Possessed Nuns to Chemical and Biological Terrorism Fears”, *British Journal of Psychiatry* 180, 2002, pp. 300-306.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 303.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 304.

also disagreement as to whether this effect is 'real' in psychological terms, or perhaps is something from the domain of social analysis. This is precisely the line of rupture between social and psychological disciplines that this chapter seeks to engage. Frequently political opinion emerges from psychological studies, for instance Vernberg suggests that "as a nation, we have invested in deterrence, surveillance, and revenge rather than addressing the profound psychological costs of terrorism."<sup>105</sup> This is not limited exclusively to the concerns of liberals, progressives and the left, although conservative positions tend to be more implicit emphasising the importance of the status quo and patriotic duty of psychological resilience in the face of terror. For instance, Sullivan and Bongar suggest the promotion of "psychological resilience and minimizing psychological trauma in the wake of terrorist attacks has therefore become a matter not only of individual health but also of national security."<sup>106</sup> Therefore by way of recommendation they suggest that "civilians are not merely the potential victims or indirect agents of terrorists but also combatants in the war against terrorism." Here we see an attempt to implicate the entire population in national security, suggesting it should rally together in the face of a foreign and abnormal threat.

The creation of medical categories such as PTSD and MSI is not an objective process of observation whereby static and discrete etiologies or symptoms are labelled. Instead it is a constantly shifting process subject to social, political and cultural dynamics.<sup>107</sup> Indeed, the origins of PTSD in the immediate aftermath of the war in Vietnam highlights the attempt to address not only the psychological sequelae of war but also to achieve a measure of social, medical and financial support for individuals and communities suffering the effects brought home from war.<sup>108</sup> The complexity surrounding psychological categories and the accompanying treatment of such afflictions is thus not simply limited to trying to classify medical phenomena that are in a constant state of flux, as these categories are in turn also shaping and influencing the society that experts seek to classify. As Breslau and McNally suggest, one does not want to assume that classification of trauma occurs in a 'cultural vacuum', rather

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<sup>105</sup> Eric M. Vernberg, "Psychological Science and Terrorism: Making Psychological Issues Part of our Planning and Technology" in *Science at a Time of National Emergency* (Merrill Advanced Studies Center) no. 106, June 2002. Accessed from [merrill.ku.edu/publications/2002whitepaper/vernberg.html](http://merrill.ku.edu/publications/2002whitepaper/vernberg.html) on 8/12/08.

<sup>106</sup> Sullivan & Bongar, "Psychological Consequences of Actual or Threatened CBRNE Terrorism", p. 153.

<sup>107</sup> Peter Conrad, "Medicalization and Social Control", *Annual Review of Sociology* 18, 1992, pp. 209-232.

<sup>108</sup> W J Scott, "PTSD in DSM-III: A Case of the Politics, Diagnosis and Disease", *Sociological Problems*, 37, pp. 294-310.



the concept of trauma and its close link to psychological disease has leaked into the discourse of everyday life, encouraging people to interpret the vicissitudes of everyday life through the lens of trauma. Emotional responses to life's misfortunes are increasingly experienced as symptoms of disease.<sup>109</sup>

It is in this sense that psychological categories such as PTSD can be said to be socially constructed; not only are these attempts to label a fluid and indistinct population group but also a process in which subjects may be increasingly shaped in this mould.<sup>110</sup> As has been seen in the discussion of PTSD, the complex interaction between medical classificatory regimes and the population has given rise to a growing number that are included in the definition of PTSD, an expansion that can be attributed to both definitional 'bracket creep' and social adaptation to such categories.

As discussed in Chapter 2 there are a range of social and political approaches that can shed light on the way in which foreign policy operationalises mechanisms of social control outside of the diplomatic arena of interstate relations. As has been reviewed in this chapter 9/11, terrorist threats and the wider war on terror give rise to a range of direct psychological effects, particularly PTSD as well as indirect effects such as MSI. The medical literature, however, was not able shed sufficient light on the more pervasive (indeed more social) psychological effects that occur throughout normal society. As suggested by many in the medical and psychological field, the post-9/11 landscape has given rise to something of a 'new normal'. The widespread incidence of PTSD symptomology amongst those indirectly affected by terrorism and the potential for MSI that accompanies a general mood of terrorism-related anxiety suggests that there is a subtle undercurrent of disquiet and unease throughout the wider population. While this may not and should not be considered a disease there are psychological effects present.

### **A central nervousness system: Psychological effects of terror alerts on the population**

To conclude this chapter, this section overviews the psychological effects of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) colour-coded terror alert warning system. This chapter has sought to highlight the psychological effects of terrorism at the level of the population. The discussion of the psychological effects of terrorism and the subsequent

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<sup>109</sup> Breslau & McNally, "Epidemiology of 9/11", pp. 523-524.

<sup>110</sup> C E Rosenberg, "Disease and Social Order in America: Perceptions and Expectations" in E Fee & D M Fox (eds.), *AIDS: The Burdens of History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 12-31.

effects stemming from attempts to mediate foreign threat has taken place at the intersection of the medical and socio-political discourses. From this discussion it has emerged that these effects are not limited just to the direct effects of terror attacks but are also connected to contemporary counter-terrorism measures and foreign policy positions. In this sense the psychological effects are also highly pervasive and play a role in shaping and ordering society. This discussion will seek to draw on the preceding discussions and highlight in particular the way in which the colour-coded terror alert system enacts mechanisms and processes of social ordering that operate at the level of the population but affect each individual specifically.

The colour-coded terrorist alert system, or the Homeland Security Advisory System, has from its inception been highly controversial. There have been many critiques within security studies literature and the alerts have been subject to much popular ridicule.<sup>111</sup> This section will not delve into such criticisms nor focus in detail on the chronology of the threat level indicators. This section will focus instead on the psychological effects and the role alerts play in shaping domestic order, although such criticisms may, however, draw from or make implicit criticisms in seeking to understand the psychological and social effects.

Even if it were possible to effectively utilise the full spectrum of the colour-coded alert system, it has insecurity built into its very architecture. The lowest possible threat level – which has not yet been employed – would indicate that there is a ‘low’ (green) likelihood of a terrorist attack. Even if judged to be ‘low’ (green) there still exists some level of threat, a level of insecurity.<sup>112</sup> Furthermore, within this colour-coded vocabulary there are no words (no such colour) for ‘no threat’ or for an end to insecurity. The notion of an end to insecurity, in this sense, has been deemed irrelevant to our immediate future. While ultimate security may remain ever ephemeral and unreachable, at the very least its prospect would offer some kind of hope for the future, something for individuals to work

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<sup>111</sup> Lawrence Freedman, “The Politics of Warning: Terrorism and Risk Communication”, *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 20, no. 3, 2005, pp. 379-418; Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara Kay Cohen, “Color Blind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security Advisory System”, *International Security*, vol. 32 no. 2, 2007, pp. 121-154; George M. Gray and David P. Ropiek, “Dealing with the Dangers of Fear: The Role of Risk Communication”, *Health Affairs*, vol. 21, no. 6, 2002, pp. 106-117; John Mueller, *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them* (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 1-12; John Brigham, “Anti-Anti Terror: Color-Coding and the Joke of ‘Homeland Security’”, *New Political Science*, vol. 27, no. 4, 2005, pp. 481-496.

<sup>112</sup> At this lowest level the government recommends developing a family emergency plan, an emergency supply kit and locating a place of shelter. See Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Citizen Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory System”, 30/05/08. Accessed from [www.fema.gov/areyouready/homeland\\_security\\_advisory\\_system.shtm](http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/homeland_security_advisory_system.shtm) on 20/12/08.

towards. It simply seems overly pessimistic not to include a colour that represents 'safe' or 'secure' or better yet; 'safe *and* secure'. Without this colour of safety and security, it enshrines the notion that the war on terror is in fact 'the new normalcy' that Dick Cheney referred to.<sup>113</sup>

In practice the system has been even less effective. The functionality of the five-tiered system is ham-strung by the negative effects it is likely to have on the wider populace, which is an unfortunate irony given that it is a mechanism designed precisely to have a beneficial effect on the population. The terrorist threat level has consistently hovered at levels of yellow or orange and on occasions in specific areas in New York, been increased to red ('severe'). For the most part 'severe' is not used as it suggests that either an attack is taking place or is extremely imminent. Blue ('guarded') and green ('low') have never been used for fear that an unpredicted (or indeed an unpredictable) attack might occur. This means that the possibility of a terrorist attack has been judged to be consistently at a yellow ('elevated') or orange ('high') level, making it effectively a vague and inflexible two-tiered system. Thus the terror alert system is functionally only able to inform the population of a continuing somewhat high level of vague and undefined threat.

The absence of a substantial attack taking place since September 11 suggests that a 'guarded' (blue) threat level must have at some point been justified. Terror attacks are by nature hard to predict; if, however, the logic for the continued level of 'elevated' (yellow) or 'high' (orange) alert levels is based on the argument that threats are hard to predict and that it is easier to criticise with the benefit of hindsight, then this seems to undermine the very case for even having an alert system at all. Indeed, the fundamental role of the alert system is to inform and prepare populations based on available knowledge to facilitate effective self-management based on individual perceptions of risk. A lack of detailed knowledge of the security environment should not necessarily be construed as indicating threat, particularly as it overexposes the population to undue perceptions of danger, causing effective risk management within the population to break down.

Given the sensitivity surrounding the issue of terrorism and the purposeful high visibility of the terror alert system, any flaws are likely to have accompanying psychological affects. Furthermore, the psychological effects will be inherently broad and pervasive in nature

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<sup>113</sup> Graham, "Cities and the War on Terror", p. 262.

given that the terror alerts are designed to facilitate mass communication. Unlike most of the post-9/11 studies into illness such as PTSD, the direct effects of the terror alert system will inherently be indirect. As was evident in general research into the psychological effects of terrorism, methodologies and quantifications of mental illness associated with terrorism tend to focus on PTSD. While there are some studies with data relating to terror alerts, the psychological literature relating to broader, 'normal' people employs theories of social psychology in order to understand widespread effects. According to Zimbardo, "social psychology seeks to understand human behaviour within its broader human context; it looks at all the ways in which people are influenced by other people."<sup>114</sup> McDermott and Zimbardo suggest three main effects are taking place.<sup>115</sup> Firstly, shifts in the terror alert level produces negative outcomes amongst individuals with existing PTSD or anxiety issues. Second, the designation of a constant threat to the nation produces what is described as 'heightened in-group bias' and 'mortality salience', which in turn greatly increases political support for incumbent rule. This also gives rise to, finally, a process of social and cultural homogenisation.

As with psychological studies examined in the previous section clear data on psychological effects has only been obtained in relation to the direct effects of terrorism. The key study to this point was undertaken by Kramer *et al* and obtained data from nearly 2,000 World Trade Center disaster-relief workers, 28% of whom had prior diagnoses of PTSD or major associated symptoms.<sup>116</sup> The study sought to observe the effects of changes in the terror alert status amongst both those with and without existing psychopathology, measured in terms of PTSD, general anxiety or depression. During the course of the study there were nine shifts between 'elevated' (yellow) and 'high' (orange). The first two changes (10/9/02 and 7/2/03) produced no significant change in reported symptoms. The next two elevations, however, gave rise to "increased symptoms of physiological arousal, general and phobic anxiety and depression" amongst both those who were and were not already

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<sup>114</sup> Previous social psychology work by Zimbardo includes the infamous 'Stanford Prison Experiment'. Philip G. Zimbardo, "Episode 19 – The Power of the Situation", *Discovering Psychology* (Updated Edition), 2001 (1990). Accessed from [www.learner.org/vod/login.html?pid=1516](http://www.learner.org/vod/login.html?pid=1516) on 20/12/08.

<sup>115</sup> Rose McDermott & Philip G. Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts" in Yuval Neria, Raz Gross, Randall Marshall, Beverley Raphael, Ezra S. Susser (eds.), *9/11: Mental Health in the Wake of Terrorist Attacks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 358.

<sup>116</sup> Michael E. Kramer, Adam D. Brown, Lisa Spielman, Cezar Giosan & Michelanne Rothrock, "Psychological Reactions to the National Terror-Alert System", *The Id: Graduate Faculty Psychology Society Bulletin*, vol. 1, no.1, 2003, p. 68. Accessed from [www.newschool.edu/nssr/bulletin/pdfs/vol01no01/Kramer03.pdf](http://www.newschool.edu/nssr/bulletin/pdfs/vol01no01/Kramer03.pdf) on 20/12/08.

anxious.<sup>117</sup> A follow-up study found that following the first two rises, anxiety levels also increased when threat levels were lowered.<sup>118</sup> These findings are consistent with a ‘habituation effect’, in which “people cease to take such notices seriously, as calls to action, after the first three or four times.”<sup>119</sup> Furthermore, a sense of frustration, anxiety and helplessness is likely to have emerged in light of the “violation of an effective alarm principle” in which threat indicators are meant to be tied to credible information.<sup>120</sup> Instead the “tacit message [is] that the system is arbitrary and is not linked to actual threats.”<sup>121</sup>

The results gleaned from this study may have been affected by the nature of the second raise in the terror alert level, which was either badly handled or cynically motivated. On 7 February 2003, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge announced that the terror threat level would be raised to ‘high’ (orange) on the basis of specific information pertaining to credible threats from al-Qaeda. In a follow-up interview on ABC News, when asked about the so-called ‘specific information’ Ridge offered the following obfuscatory and contradictory statement: “we get general information and specific information but none of the specific information talks about time, place, method or means.”<sup>122</sup> Information containing no detailed facts must go a long way to satisfying the definition of ‘general’ as opposed to ‘specific’. Two days later, David Paulison, fire department administrator and later director of FEMA, intensified the sense that citizens were directly under threat within their homes. By advising Americans to stock up on “plastic sheeting and duct tape” to protect themselves from radiological or biological attack, Paulison created a widespread rush on hardware stores by worried citizens seeking to protect themselves.<sup>123</sup> Such alarmist sentiments seemed to contradict the continued reassurance that individuals should go about business as usual, whilst also finding time to “take some time to prepare for emergencies.”<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>118</sup> Kramer *et al*, quoted in McDermott & Zimbardo, “The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts”, p. 363.

<sup>119</sup> McDermott & Zimbardo, “The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts”, p. 360.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 359-360.

<sup>121</sup> Shapiro & Cohen, “Color Blind”, p. 132.

<sup>122</sup> Tom Ridge quoted in Jon Stewart, *The Daily Show*, 10/02/03. Accessed from [www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.html?videoid=111995](http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.html?videoid=111995) on 20/12/08.

<sup>123</sup> Jeanne Meserve, “Duct Tape Sales Rise Amid Terror Fears”, *CNN*, 11/02/03. Accessed from [edition.cnn.com/2003/US/02/11/emergency.supplies](http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/02/11/emergency.supplies) on 20/12/08; See also, Keith Olbermann, “The Nexus of Politics and Terror”, *Countdown*, 12/10/05. Accessed from [www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/9677220](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/9677220) on 20/12/08.

<sup>124</sup> Fox News, “Terror Threat Level Raised to Orange”, 07/02/03. Accessed from [www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,77885,00.html](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,77885,00.html) on 20/12/08

The second way in which terror alerts engender psychological effects is through social psychological notions of increased 'in-group bias' and a heightened 'mortality salience'. McDermott and Zimbardo suggest that in light of 9/11 and the continued threat of terror attacks, most prominently signified by the terror alerts, there has been an "increase in-group identification among Americans... and simultaneous out-group denigration or hatred of foreign groups perceived to be responsible for the violent acts", in short, nationalism and racism.<sup>125</sup> A number of studies have been conducted in this area using terror management theory (TMT), the central proposition of which suggests "that awareness of the inevitability of death is a core human problem that lies at the root of a broad range of superficially unrelated forms of human behaviour."<sup>126</sup> Despite the title, TMT is not a theory of terrorism but rather the examination of the effects of the threat or fear of death on individuals and their cultural worldview. The terror alerts, however, act as constant a reminder of the potential for apocalyptic terrorism. Insofar as TMT holds that "human behaviour is significantly affected by anything that makes people aware of their own potential death or sensitizes them to their mortality," the continued scrolling of terror alerts across of the bottom of television screens ensures mortality salience will remain a permanent feature of the political landscape.<sup>127</sup>

The psychological effect of the mortality salience created by terror alerts can be extrapolated from a number of TMT studies. Initial TMT studies established the central proposition that "reminding people of their mortality increases attraction to those who consensually validate their beliefs and decreases attraction to those who threaten their beliefs."<sup>128</sup> Mortality salience also gives rise to a tendency towards cultural solidarity and political homogenisation. Pyszczynski *et al* suggest once an

individual has become committed to a particular worldview as a basis for security, he or she becomes motivated to maintain faith in it. Thus, information consistent with that worldview is sought and information inconsistent with it is avoided or explained away.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> McDermott & Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts", p. 363.

<sup>126</sup> Jeff Greenberg, Jamie Arndt *et al*, "Proximal and Distal Defenses in Response to Reminders of One's Mortality: Evidence of a Temporal Sequence", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, vol. 26, no. 1, 2000, p. 91.

<sup>127</sup> McDermott & Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts", p. 363.

<sup>128</sup> Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski *et al*, "Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 58, no. 2, 1990, p. 308.

<sup>129</sup> Tom Pyszczynski, Jeff Greenberg *et al*, "Why Do We Need What We Need? A Terror Management Perspective on the Roots of Human Social Motivation", *Psychological Inquiry*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1997, p. 9.

Predominant cultural worldviews are further consolidated in the face of threats as individuals faced with mortality salience tend to “increase stereotypic thinking and [demonstrate] preferences for stereotype-confirming individuals.”<sup>130</sup> In relation to political leadership, individuals were offered a choice between a strong, charismatic political leader and an understanding, relationship-oriented leader. In a situation in which death was salient individuals showed increased preference for the stronger leader, whereas free of this they chose the relationship-oriented leader.<sup>131</sup> Mortality salience was also shown to incline a group to vote for Republican George W. Bush in the 2004 election when they would otherwise have voted for Democratic candidate John Kerry.<sup>132</sup> Specifically in relation to the policies of the Bush presidency, mortality salience was shown to increase support for the administration’s counter-terrorism policies and reminders of 9/11 increased support for the presidency of Bush.<sup>133</sup> Particularly interesting for the purposes of this section was a sub-section of this research that established that “subliminal exposure to 9/11-related material brought death-related thoughts closer to consciousness.”<sup>134</sup> It assessed this association by asking subjects to complete words such as ‘coff..’, which could be completed as death-related (eg coffin), or a range of neutral terms (eg coffee, coffer etc). On some of the completion tasks ‘WTC’ or ‘911’ was flashed for a consciously imperceptible 26 milliseconds and in such instances subjects tended towards death-related responses. This aspect of the study thus found that “the increased accessibility of death-related thoughts outside of focal attention – the condition shown to engender symbolic defences – occurs at an unconscious level” suggesting the psychological effect of terror alerts would be subtle and pervasive.<sup>135</sup> Furthermore, while this test assessed the political effects associated with death salience, such reminders are also shown to have significant social effects. In conjunction with social identity theory, mortality salience is shown to increase a bias

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<sup>130</sup> Jeff Schimel, Linda Simon *et al*, “Stereotypes and Terror Management: Evidence that Mortality Salience Enhances Stereotypic Thinking and Preferences”, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 77, no. 5, 1999, p. 905.

<sup>131</sup> Florette Cohen, Sheldon Solomon *et al*, “Fatal Attraction: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Evaluations of Charismatic, Task-Oriented and Relationship-Oriented Leaders”, *Psychological Science*, vol. 15, no. 2, 2004, pp. 846-852.

<sup>132</sup> Florette Cohen, Daniel O’gilvie *et al*, “American Roulette: The Effects of Reminders of Death on Support for George W. Bush in the 2004 Election”, *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, pp. 177-187.

<sup>133</sup> Mark J. Landau, Solomon Sheldon *et al*, “Deliver Us From Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush”, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30, 2004, pp. 1136-1150.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1141-1142.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1141.

towards those individuals they consider as similar (in-group) and unfavourable judgements they consider different (out-group).<sup>136</sup>

There are certainly limitations to TMT research. A review of this body of work describes it as “experiments [that] manipulate the subjects’ mental reactions... the results [of which] are extrapolated to world political conflicts between diverse cultures of peoples.”<sup>137</sup> In short, insights into highly complex inter-cultural social and political relations are being extrapolated from highly staged and controlled experiments on small groups of American students. Again, the methodological limitations of social psychology – as was the case with statistical surveys of mental illness – prevent a clear, scientifically verifiable understanding of the wider psychological effects of terrorism on the wider population being obtained. Critics of TMT and Zimbardo’s work on terrorism suggest that statistics obtained by these studies are not able to unambiguously speak for themselves and conclusions reflect the beliefs of the authors rather than the results of their work.<sup>138</sup> Indeed, within the bounds of their research, an individual’s fear of death in this way can be used to explain almost any kind of action; it is a broad and general catch-all explanation of human behaviour.<sup>139</sup> Once again, the wider psychological effects of terrorism remain illusively between medical and socio-political discourses.

The third and final psychological effect suggested by McDermott and Zimbardo only further affirms this intellectual and academic limbo. Indeed the final psychological effect highlighted is not so much psychological as it is political in its effects on public perception, although this only serves to further highlight the overlap between these effects. McDermott and Zimbardo ponder the question of why the colour-coded terror alert system is so ineffective; is it political manipulation or incompetency? The drawn conclusion is that evidence points to both but importantly wider public perception and accompanying psychological effects overwhelmingly suggest the former, seen in public cynicism and conspiracy theorising. There is a great level of scepticism amongst critics of the terror-alert

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<sup>136</sup> Eddie Harmon Jones, Jeff Greenberg *et al*, “The Effects of Mortality Salience on Intergroup Bias Between Minimal Groups”, *European Journal of Social Psychology* 26, 1996, pp. 677-681.

<sup>137</sup> Lynne DeLisi, “Book Forum: In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror”, *American Journal of Psychiatry* 160, 2003, p. 1019.

<sup>138</sup> DeLisi, “Book Forum: In the Wake of 9/11” and for a rebuttal to Philip Zimbardo see Bob Nichols, “Invited Response from Dr Bob Nichols” in “Political Psychology of Terrorist Alarms”, *APA Online*, 28/02/08. Accessed from [www.apa.org/about/division/terrorism.htm](http://www.apa.org/about/division/terrorism.htm) on 20/12/08.

<sup>139</sup> Delroy L. Paulhus & Paul D. Trapnell, Terror management Theory: Extended or Overextended”, *Psychological Inquiry*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1997, pp. 40-43; Mark R. Leary and Lisa S. Schreindorfer, “Unresolved Issues With Terror Management Theory”, *Psychological Inquiry*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1997, pp. 26-29.



system regarding the extent to which the upgrading of alerts respond to objective threats and verifiable intelligence information leading them to suggest they are part of deliberate ploy to politically intervene and unduly control individuals.<sup>140</sup> Indeed, the extent of the correlation – as opposed to coincidence – of terror alert status upgrades with significant political events suggests it would be unreasonable to think that there is not some level of political opportunism taking place. Regardless, however, of the balance between the benefits and ineffectiveness of terror alerts, and the extent to which political manipulation may be occurring, the overview by McDermott and Zimbardo suggest the cumulative psychological effects of colour-coded system has been to create fear and anxiety amongst those directly affected by 9/11, cynicism amongst critics and unthinking political support amongst supporters.<sup>141</sup>

Before concluding this chapter, I'd like to suggest that the kind of analysis offered throughout this thesis can offer some refinement to the argument offered above. Such an account concerns the question posed previously regarding ineffectiveness and manipulation. This is in many ways a false opposition, the presence of manipulation is unlikely to be total as individuals are exposed to terror alerts – whether manipulated, ineffective or beneficial – within a socio-political discursive context. Above and beyond any attempt to directly control individuals directly, the terror alert system has a far greater and more subtle control and regulatory effect. The terror alert system acts as a hub for the dissemination of discourse in a much broader sense than simply the communication of information and/or disinformation. Furthermore this discourse is interpreted specifically by each individual in light of their own perspective and world-view. The terror alert system is individualising yet coordinating, not unlike the panoptic system Foucault detailed, which operationalises discipline amongst the population; ordering without directly controlling.

Brian Massumi's analysis of the terror alert system sets out these diffuse mechanisms of control. The effects of the terror alerts are not likely to be clearly observable in the emergence of psychopathology. According to Massumi, the effects of the terror alerts is to link individuals as a population, to create psychological connections where social

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<sup>140</sup> See for instance, R. Willer, "The Effects of Government-Issued Terror Warnings on Presidential Approval Ratings", *Current Research in Social Psychology*, vol. 10, no. 1, 2004. Accessed from [www.uiowa.edu/~grpproc/crisp/crisp.html](http://www.uiowa.edu/~grpproc/crisp/crisp.html) on 20/12/08 and; Keith Olbermann, "The Nexus of Politics and Terror", *Countdown*, 12/10/05. Accessed from [www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/9677220](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/9677220) on 20/12/08.

<sup>141</sup> McDermott & Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts", pp. 357-370.

connections don't otherwise exist through the normative influence of these security prerogatives. In this sense the alerts are

perceptual cues... designed to train into the population wirelessly jacked central government functioning directly into each individual's nervous system. The whole population became a networked jumpiness, a distributed neuronal network registering en masse quantum shifts in the nation's global state of discomfiture.<sup>142</sup>

Despite an analysis of the psychological effects of the terror alerts that calls to mind science fiction, Massumi resists the impulse toward a dystopian diagnosis of an authoritarian uniformity. Rather, control in a diffuse sense operates through common logic – governmentality – impelled by the threat to national security. Control is not total, indeed it is unpredictable.

Jacked into the same modulation of feeling, bodies reacted in unison without necessarily acting alike. Their responses could, and did, take many forms. What they shared was the central nervousness. How it translated somatically varied from body to body.<sup>143</sup>

This 'central nervousness system' suffuses non-specific information pertaining to threats from outsiders. Whether they be foreign threats or threats from deviant groups, individuals are left to make their own decisions according to a generalised but parochially insistent logic of war on terror and national foreign policy. In this way "the object of power [has become] correspondingly formless and contentless: post 9/11, governmentality has molded itself to *threat*. A threat is unknowable. If it were known in its specifics, it wouldn't be a threat. It would be a situation."<sup>144</sup>

Terror alerts can thus be seen as security provided through non-obligatory recommendations. This is referred to as responsabilisation of citizens who also interpret such recommendations as is relevant to their scenario. This positions the state as if it were a supplier or provider of security and is an attempt to create some measure of transparency. The attempt at openness or transparency seeks to transfer part of the decision-making process relating to one's provision of security to the individual. Towards this end, publicising terror alerts aims to allow individuals to interpret necessary security measures according to their own condition and thus to achieve a more efficient outcome. It

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<sup>142</sup> Brian Massumi, "Fear (The Spectrum Said)", *positions* 13:1, Spring 2003, p. 32.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

also allows this more effective and specialised security to be transferred to each individual – effectively ‘in-sourced’ – thus achieving a theoretically more effective and lower cost security than if security sought to more comprehensively cover a broader range of aspects of each individual’s life. In this sense, it is a clear demonstration of how state bureaucracies that are charged with managing or protecting against external threat, through providing this security, are able to structure and organise society without directly interfering or intervening in the political process. Furthermore, it does so in such a way that it allows individuals to continue to exercise free choice – freedom, narrowly defined – while in the pursuit of security. This governmental freedom of the citizen-cum-consumer allows them to make choices relating to some issues of risk.

The operation of a subtle mode of foreign policy discipline can thus be seen in the attempt to oblige citizens to make informed choices. What these terror alert systems do – with varying levels of intrusiveness and effectiveness – is to securitize the rational decision-making process of individuals; the notion of the individual decision-making process being the essential premise of the free liberal individual.<sup>145</sup> This premise frames the individual as the consumer but what is being consumed, or at least is subject to consumer choice, is security. In this sense security and liberty are bound together in the process of deploying the citizen as someone who exercises rational free-choice in determining some measure of their own security in relation to external threats, although these threats are conceived as penetrating the domestic realm through acts of terrorism. The freedom and rationality within this individual decision-making is constrained by the influence of the discursive background in which such decisions are made. The prevalence of foreign policy norms and the steady background noise of national security ensure that such choices are instead made in reference to, with or against, contemporary policy positions.<sup>146</sup> This undermines the scope for such an approach to enact a genuine and effective system of individual choice and the logic of self-determined security fails to gain traction with individuals, causing them to become cynical or apathetic. In short, the governmental effectiveness of individual choice within a broad over-arching discursive logic is breaking down. Perhaps then, as much as this governmental freedom resembles traditional negative freedom where one is notionally free to choose, it is also the kind of freedom that one might find in a shopping mall; nominally free, but ultimately constrained.

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<sup>145</sup> See the arguments regarding positive and negative freedom presented in Chapter 3.

<sup>146</sup> Individuals are forced to adopt to the model of security rather adopting to model of security to individuals.

This chapter demonstrated that the combination of the psychological and social effects of 9/11 are massive, constituting a wholesale reorganisation of the USA. The war on terror has not only extended overseas into faraway lands, it has been ingrained throughout the internal social and political landscape. As equally as US-led wars disrupted global politics these actions have reshaped its own political order. This calls to mind the argument made by Vivienne Jabri, who demonstrates that global conceptions of war act as a transformative project both within societies as well as throughout global relations.<sup>147</sup> Attempting to capture the psychological scar of 9/11 on the national psyche, Irwin Redlener and Stephen S. Morse compare the effects of 9/11 with those of Pearl Harbour. They suggest it entailed

a transformation of the country and its citizens from a heterogeneous, though internationally isolated, nation still recovering from the great economic depression of a decade or so earlier to a suddenly united, invigorated protagonist in one of the greatest wars in all of history.<sup>148</sup>

The parallels eluded to here are not simply to the oft-cited moral justifications for a retaliatory call to war but rather the panoply of accompanying psychological effects and social change it engenders domestically in the pursuit of this foreign policy face-saving mission. 9/11, however, represents a much greater and indeed more pervasive psychological effect. Americans were not only required to respond abroad to the 9/11 attacks as they had after Pearl Harbour; they also had to recover at home.

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<sup>147</sup> Vivienne Jabri, *War and the Transformation of Global Politics* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), see in particular Chapters one and two.

<sup>148</sup> Irwin Redlener & Stephen S. Morse, "Life Under the 'New Normal': Notes on the Future of Preparedness" in Neria *et al.* (eds.), *9/11: Mental Health in the Wake of Terrorist Attacks*, p. 594.

## Conclusion

This thesis has argued that foreign policy affects its own citizens and populations. The primary argument of this thesis is that these effects can be understood as a form of discipline that shapes domestic order and engenders processes of social control. This thesis demonstrated this argument in two parts. The first established a theoretical framework through which International Relations scholars can better identify, conceptualise, and analyse the disciplinary effects of foreign policy. This has involved engaging in a critique of current conceptualisations of the international system as well as imagining a new framework through which we can re-connect the flows of power and knowledge between the international and domestic realm. The second part of this thesis demonstrated the primary argument through a number of case studies from Western liberal democratic states. The case studies were chosen to show that foreign policy can be understood as a form of discipline that shapes domestic order and engenders processes of social control. Sometimes this is done in ways which are explicit and obvious, even to the most unobservant citizen travelling between cities or countries. In other cases, however, this thesis demonstrates that there does need to be an explicit conceptual framework that challenges us to search for the links, and to evaluate their consequences.

In addition to, and indeed connecting, the two parts of this thesis there has been an additional process undertaken which focuses on five central themes. These five thematic

concerns connect the conceptual framework of part one with the case studies of part two. The central focus of this thesis has been to describe foreign policy as a mechanism of order and control. To actualise this argument a number of key themes have sought in specific ways to demonstrate the operation of discipline, order, and control in the domestic context. These themes include the constitutive role of sovereignty, an analysis of the regulative processes within liberal democracy, human agency, and the biopolitical processes of order and control stemming from spatial regulation and the maintenance of the health of the population. These processes, and this is not an exhaustive list, work as conduits through which foreign policy, both subtly and overtly, directs, disciplines, and controls the opportunities, behaviours, practices, and experiences of citizens within liberal democratic states.

The first major theme that was examined in this way was sovereignty. The particular focus of this thesis was the way in which sovereignty constitutes the individual and the state. This was the central focus of Chapter 1, where it was argued that modern processes of sovereignty give rise to an inside/outside view of International Relations. Consequently, the state and the international realm are seen as distinct, the former being ordered by a range of governmental processes and the latter subject to the foreign policy prerogatives of state actors. Foreign policy has been presented as the 'mediator', between a domestic, ordered internal realm, and an anarchical international state-based system. This thesis, however, has actively demonstrated that this distinction should in fact be considered as mutually constituting. Furthermore, the investigation of modern processes of sovereignty reveal global politics to be far more interconnected, particularly in regards to the effects of foreign policy. Similarly, the sovereign realm of the state is conceived of as a space where the individual is both protected and bounded by external practice. This thesis, however, has suggested that these same external practices regulate and produce individuals within. In short, foreign policy shapes the internal in ways beyond those that are immediately obvious.

These processes were demonstrated through a number of case studies in the second part of this thesis. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the spatial and interpretive designation of inside/outside was compromised in order to connect British socialism with the cold war foreign policy discourse of Soviet communist threat. Chapter 5 specifically examined the politicised and securitised nature of space within the bounds of the state. Rather than being simply a site for domestic political issues, the movement of bodies and the regulation

of space within the state were shown to be heavily pervaded by foreign policy discourse and the obligations of national security. Chapter 6 examined the psychological consequences of, and governmental attempts at responding to, the transgression of inside/outside that 9/11 has represented. Attempts to restore normality to the domestic population become increasingly infused with the external objectives of foreign policy. In this sense, these case studies highlight that the production of boundaries of inside/outside by modern sovereignty obscures the operation of foreign policy within the state.

Furthermore, the boundaries of inside/outside obscure the folding of foreign policy into domestic processes of liberal democracy, the second key theme of this thesis. Chapter 2 surveyed a range of approaches that sought to understand the regulatory processes inherent within liberalism or what was described as the 'dark side' of a liberal politics of freedom. Within these approaches was consistent concern for how rationality gives rise to efficiency and productivity as equally as it does an 'iron cage' that produces and restrains individuals. Thus, as liberalism frees individuals from the direct regulation of the state, a range of social mechanisms operate in its stead. Processes of mass cultural production, for instance, create widespread passivity. Drawing from Foucault, it was argued that government policies enact a wider range of disciplinary effects upon social order. It was in this wider context of social control that this thesis sought to understand the domestic effects of foreign policy. Chapter 4 highlighted the synergy between culture and discipline, which was created by the politics of media spectacle, paranoia and conspiracy surrounding former British Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Similarly, the British Foreign Office's Information Research Department sought to produce a culture that supported national security objectives in order to enact a range of wider social and political effects. Chapter 5 demonstrated how the US television program *24* both responded to and then in turn proliferated the idea that individuals can act with 'super-empowered' purpose. The plotlines of *24* feature an individual undertaking whatever is necessary to further the goals of national security and in so doing has shaped popular debate on torture and provided a metric by which the commitment of everyday individuals can be contrasted. Chapter 6 highlighted the wider social and disciplinary effects that result from government policies designed to recreate healthy and normal populations in the face of a perceived terrorist threat.

The third major theme of this thesis was agency. Agency, it was argued, is a way of understanding how foreign policy can discipline and control domestic order. Chapter 4

explored the politics of agency and the way in which foreign policy discourse shapes actions at both a group and individual level. Chapter 4 overviewed debates regarding the question of individual agency versus the wider structures – such as states and governments – that determine people’s actions. Drawing from Roland Bleiker’s work a discursive model of human agency was expounded, in which wider discourses shape but don’t ultimately determine human action. This model of agency was used to understand the role of cold war foreign policy in British politics and society. Furthermore, this approach was contrasted with existing explanations of role of the IRD and of the politics surrounding British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, which relied on conspiracy and intrigue by way of explanation. The case study of the IRD highlights how the foreign policy objectives of this department with regard to Soviet communism was initially focussed abroad, however its mandate turned inward as it sought to limit the influence of, and in turn discipline, socialist elements within the British Labour Party. Likewise, an intensified mode of foreign policy discipline was brought to bear on Harold Wilson, who as Prime Minister felt very keenly not only the obligations of national security but also his perceived association with Soviet communism as a result of past socialist sympathies. The question of agency was also evident in Chapter 5, in which popular representations of national security in regards to the threat of terrorism influenced people’s individual agency. In particular, the debate over the use of torture had the effect of asking each citizen whether they would torture in order to counter the threat of terrorism. As with Chapter 4, this demonstrated that foreign policy discourse was disciplining how people were willing to exercise agency.

Chapter 5 investigates the broad theme of spatial modes of regulation and how this can be understood in the context of foreign policy. It suggests that the war on terror has imbued a range of sites throughout the Western democratic landscape with an exceptional politics. This is not simply strategic sites such as airports or government buildings but many urban spaces which have been highly regulated since 9/11. The effects of this include but are not limited to the regulation of the mobility of bodies. Chapter 5 furthermore suggested that a key factor in the attempt to regulate space was the changed calculus of affect that was ushered in by 9/11 when a small number of hijackers were able to kill thousands and completely disrupt a city of millions. The war on terror effectively securitised terrorism as an existential and omnipotent threat to national security and given the spatial effects of terrorism, the operationalisation of this foreign policy has had the consequent effect of securitising the urban centres of many large Western cities. Spatial modes of control are



also demonstrated in Chapter 6 in the discussion of the effects of terrorism on the home. This 'doubly domestic' space was actively re-affirmed and strengthened by policies designed to help affected populations recover from 9/11. Thus attempts to normalise and secure society against external threats engender a range of effects on domestic spatial order.

Chapter 6 investigated the mediated effects of terrorism and counter-terrorism on the overall health of the population. In this sense this chapter sought to consolidate the theme that was addressed throughout the thesis regarding the wider effects of foreign policy on domestic order and control. Using the concept of biopolitics it investigated the regulation of the health of populations as a thematic by which the domestic effects of foreign policy can be understood. The major focus of this thematic was on the psychological effects of 9/11, subsequent attempts to remedy these mental health effects, and counter-terrorism measures designed to organise and inform populations in the face of possible threats. Examining the psychological effects of terrorism on the home and financial remunerations for affected families, Chapter 6 addressed the gendered dimension of responses to terrorism, which sought to resecure the home of as a site of sanctuary and domesticity. Chapter 6 surveyed the psychological literature on the psychological effects of terrorism in an attempt to understand the secondary or mediated social effects of terrorism. These mediated effects were addressed specifically in relation to the governmental effectiveness – or lack thereof – of the colour-coded terror alert system. Foreign policy and national security obligations were shown in Chapter 6 to regulate and manage the health of the wider domestic population. In this regard foreign policy very much functions as a mechanism of social control.

This thesis has demonstrated the effects of foreign policy on domestic politics and social order. Foreign policy in this domestic context can be understood in terms of shaping domestic order and as a mode of social control. Such an 'inverted' analysis of foreign policy has not been previously undertaken in International Relations, nor for that matter has the effects of foreign policy been systematically analysed in terms of domestic order and social control respectively within either sociology or criminology. Accordingly, in order to address this gap within – or perhaps between – these disciplines this thesis provided a framework that can conceptualise and demonstrate the effects of foreign policy on the social, physical, cultural and psychological dimensions that constitute domestic order. Moreover, by employing a Foucauldian approach, this framework for analysing the domestic effect of

foreign policy finds traction within and indeed provides a linkage between the critical studies of foreign policy in IR, critical social theories in sociology and political theory and elements of critical criminology. The case studies examined in this thesis are only very initial explorations of how foreign policy shapes internal order; the inverted or internalised dimensions of foreign policy suggest a complex and extensive future area of research.

The conceptual framework for analysing the effects of foreign policy on domestic order and control is not only new and original but also vital and significant. As was suggested in the brief account of the break-down of order in Cronulla that introduced this thesis, there is a distinct but not always immediately recognisable presence of foreign policy discourse that further inflames or polarises domestic tensions over racial difference and nationalism. Chapter 4, for instance, examined the way in which foreign policy intensified factional divides within the British Labour Party. As equally as this thesis can bring to the fore subtle under-currents of foreign policy that inform 'normal' domestic politics, it can also be used to analyse the use of foreign policy in cynical and deliberate attempts to manipulate domestic constituencies. This thesis, for instance, examined in Chapter 5 the emergence of an exceptional politics that has been generated by deliberate attempts to bring policy obligations to bear on everyday citizens. Similarly Chapter 6 examined suggestions that elements within the Bush administration were deliberately exploiting for political gain the fear resulting from an increased threat of terrorism. The framework articulated here can address both the subtle and the direct modes in which foreign policy functions domestically.

The contention made in this thesis is simply that foreign policy affects domestic populations in ways that traditional approaches to International Relations do not readily recognise, acknowledge, or often understand. Broadly speaking this thesis does not make a claim to whether this is necessarily a good, bad, pernicious, conspiratorial, underhanded, or even an avoidable process. The case studies in this thesis, however, have addressed respective eras in which foreign policy has become particularly politicised and enacted a wide range of quite often negative effects. Within the context of the cold war and the war on terror this thesis has sought to show that the effects are not limited simply to direct foreign policy effects and overt interference but also enacts a range of subtle processes of regulation that are ingrained in domestic order and control. In this sense, foreign policy discipline does not arise simply in instances of 'exceptional' politics but is equally a constitutive element of 'normal' politics and everyday order.

The understanding of foreign policy as discipline and control offered in this thesis suggests that we should be aware of these processes, and have at our disposal the tools to understand it. In this sense, this thesis has been an understated advocate of multidisciplinary approaches to International Relations and has sought to break down barriers between disciplinary understandings rather than reinforce them. Consequently, this thesis has borrowed from the work of political theorists, philosophers, sociologists, cultural theorists, feminists, criminologists and historians in order to construct a comprehensive argument. It has also delved into the sub-areas of socio-medical politics, social control theory, discourse analysis, and cultural studies in addition to the more familiar terrorism studies and traditional and critical International Relations theory. While considering this ultimately a piece of International Relations scholarship, this thesis has also tried to work beyond and across disciplinary boundaries in order to reconnect themes and politics that have hitherto been isolated from one another.

This thesis has offered an account of foreign policy that seeks to keep pace with a contemporary politics that is increasingly less unconstrained by boundaries of knowledge or territory. As the boundaries between inside/outside, war/peace, public/private, security/liberty become increasingly indistinct this thesis has offered a way of understanding foreign policy as a broad process of governmental control. The instrumental functioning of foreign policy abroad is accompanied by a range of largely unintended domestic effects. The accounts offered in this thesis have demonstrated that while overt processes of domestic state control are far from absolute, beyond sovereign power liberal democratic order is constituted by a range of secondary and mediated regulations, regulations in which foreign policy plays a significant role. In this sense, the value and importance of this thesis, is to be able to conceptualise and demonstrate the constitutive role that foreign policy plays in the maintenance of everyday social order.

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