TUAN GURU AND POLITICS IN SOUTH KALIMANTAN: ISLAM IN THE 2005 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is the result of my own research. Where I have drawn on the work of other scholars due acknowledgment has been made in the text.

Ung

Ahmad Muhajir February 25, 2009

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"Whoever fails to thank human being will not be fully grateful to Allah" (*al-hadist*)

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ABSTRACT

This study examines Islam, *tuan guru* (Islamic scholars) and politics in the 2005 gubernatorial election (*pilkada*) in South Kalimantan. During the *pilkada*, Islam and politics were closely intertwined. The candidates exhibited their Islamic attributes and courted Islamic leaders and institutions. On the other hand, *tuan guru* joined the campaigns of particular candidates, religious events become political forums to promote candidates, and campaign functions featured religious activities.

The common view of this *pilkada* emphasised influence of Islamic appeals in shaping the electoral outcome. The skilful use of Islamic symbols was seen as the key factor in explaining the success of the winning candidates. Other factors, such as party machinery and networks, public image, political finance and campaign time, while contributed, were seen as secondary.

This sub-thesis demonstrates that, while Islam was important, it was not the sole critical factor; it was, in fact, contingent on other factors mentioned above to determine the *pilkada* results. I argue that Islamic appeals were of limited help for those candidates with bad reputations and I show that the *pilkada* victors combined high public standing, effective political machines and good campaign funding and timing. Furthermore, this study finds that *tuan guru* were not crucial players in the election outcome.

This study also considers the larger trend of local elections in Indonesia and looks at the coalitions which nominated the candidates and at the motivations of *tuan guru* to be involved in the *pilkada*. It argues that both pragmatic and ideological or idealistic considerations existed and thus, the *pilkada* projected a more complex picture than what other local elections have generally shown.

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CHAPTER ONE

The 2005 gubernatorial *pilkada* (*pemilihan kepala daerah*, regional head elections or local elections) was an extraordinary time for Islam and politics in South Kalimantan. The relationship between politicians and *ulama* (ulema; generically referred to as *tuan guru* in South Kalimantan) intensified markedly during the campaign. It blurred the line between Islam and politics and tested the ability of the *ulama* to shape political outcomes.

This sub-thesis is a study of the *pilkada* and the relationship between Islam and politics in it. The *pilkada* was one of hundreds of local elections which have been held across Indonesia to directly elect regional heads (governors, regents and mayors) since 2005, a political process seen as crucial to consolidating Indonesia's democracy. On the other hand, Islam and politics have traditionally been interlinked in South Kalimantan as reflected in the strong support for political Islam and the importance of Islamic sentiments in politics in the region. Thus this study touches upon both current and older but still persistent issues regarding Islam and politics.

Study objective and literature review

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The objective of this sub-thesis is to scrutinize the role of Islam and *ulama* in the South Kalimantan *pilkada* and the extent to which these factors influenced the results. The sub-thesis also relates the trend found in the other local elections to the *pilkada*.

Political trends in Indonesian local elections

The trend that concerns this study most is what the observers have identified as the absence of ideological predilections and the supremacy of pragmatic considerations

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among political elites. Observers who have argued this include Rodd McGibbon (2006) and Anies Baswedan (2007). This trend is evident, they argue, in terms of both coalition building and the choosing of candidate. I shall review their arguments here.

In his assessment of Indonesian politics in 2006, McGibbon pointed out that in local elections, political parties tended to ignore ideology in building the coalitions that nominated the candidates.¹ Quoting research by the People's Voter Education Network (JPPR), he noted that this was a pervasive practice as broad based coalitions that included nationalist and Islamic parties were forged in most local elections. While winning the majority of *pilkada*, he continued, the coalitions often produced 'strange ideological bedfellows' as parties with a history of bitter competitions' teamed up and as an Islamist party joined forces with a Christian party.² The local elections thus showed a strong tendency towards what he labeled 'ideological promiscuity'.

According to McGibbon, this tendency of the teaming up of parties across ideologies came about primarily in an attempt to broaden their appeal. Parties with conservative religious platforms, he explained, have not performed well electorally since free and fair elections were introduced in 1999. In effect, the parties preferred to eschew exclusive and narrow religious issues and to build pragmatic alliances with other parties in local elections.

In a similar line of argumentation, Baswedan, who assessed the state of Indonesian politics in the following year (2007), confirmed the domination of political pragmatism at the local level. The local elections in fact, he argued, broke down the persistence of ideological polarization in national politics in which the reallocation of votes occurred within a group of parties in a similar political stream (i.e. secular or

 ¹ Rodd McGibbon, 'Indonesian Politics in 2006: stability, compromise and contest over ideology', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 42, vol. 3, 2006, pp. 331-2.
 ² Ibid

Islamic).³ He asserted that the coalitions emerging in local elections would have been 'unthinkable' at the national level.⁴ He cited the example of the alliance of the nationalist PDI-P (Partai Demokasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) and PKS (Partai KeadilanSejahtera, Justice and Prosperity Party) in nine district/ municipal pilkada.

The importance of pragmatism was also evident in the choosing of nominees. Parties, Baswedan noted, tended to endorse those with a high potential of electoral success even if they are not party members. On the other hand, they were also willing to support even underdog candidates if they had no suitable candidate because the chance of getting 'nomination fees' disappears if the parties do not participate in pilkada.5 Conversely, the aspiring candidates needed to negotiate with eligible political parties regardless of their ideological preferences.

In short, local elections, according to these observers, have shown the diminishing importance of ideological preference and the domination of political pragmatism. The question is then, did the *pilkada* in South Kalimantan demonstrate the same trend of pragmatism over ideology, and if not, how did it differ from other regions?

Islam as an electoral strategy and its influence on voting behaviour

A report by Asrori Karni (2006) entitled 'Belantara Simbol Agama' (The Jungle of Religious Symbols) was perhaps the first work that discussed Islam in relation to the political outcomes in the South Kalimantan *pilkada*. This article appeared in the national weekly magazine *Gatra* and relied on groups of people who watched the *pilkada* closely as sources, such as the province's electoral commission (KPU)

³ Anies Baswedan, 'Indonesian Politics in 2007: the presidency, local elections and the future of democracy', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 43, vol. 3, p. 336 ⁴ Ibid

⁵ Eligible candidates have to be nominated by a party or a coalition of parties that won at least 15% of the seats or of the votes in legislative elections in the area in question. This stipulation increases the bargaining power of parties in the *pilkada*. Thus candidates need to negotiate with the parties and the issue of how much money they are prepared to pay for the candidacy typically arises. See Marcus Mietzner, 'Local democracy, Old elites are still in power, but direct elections now give voters a choice', Inside Indonesia, Jan-March http://www.insideindonesia.org/content/yiew/110/29/ (viewed 12 October 2007)

members, the province's coordinator of JPPR, NGO activists and political commentators. The article brought together their views about the main features characterizing the South Kalimantan local elections in 2005. It was thus arguably a work that represented the local observers' perspective. It is instructive to review the main argument of this article as it touches on the core objective of this sub-thesis, namely the role of Islam in the *pilkada*.

The article argued that Islamic symbols or more precisely, Islamic appeals were the key in the electoral successes of the candidates. Setting out this argument, the opening paragraph reads,

There is no need to have a highly sophisticated vision and mission to be elected as political leader in South Kalimantan. A skilful play of Islamic symbols and sentiments will do it...There are many ways of doing this. It could be by claiming to be the adopted son of a charismatic *kiai*[Islamic scholars who usually lead Islamic learning institutions], by declaring oneself a descendant of a great *ulama* (it would be better if [one] could claim to be a descendant of the Prophet), by consistently wearing *baju koko* or *kupiah putih* [respectively, collar-less loose shirts, usually white and white skullcaps] (my translation).⁶

All the examples of playing with Islamic sentiments mentioned in the paragraph were in reference to three winners and one team that achieved an electoral surprise in 2005. They were Rudy Ariffin (the adopted son of Guru Zaini), the victor of the gubernatorial *pilkada*; Yudhi Wahyuni (a descendant of the famous Syeikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari), the winner of the mayoral *pilkada* in Banjarmasin; Gusti Khairul Saleh (*baju koko*), who won the Banjar district *pilkada*; and Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi (a prophet's descendant wearing a *kupiah putih*), a deputy gubernatorial candidate whose team was placed second behind Rudy Ariffin's team. The article strongly emphasized the correlations between the use of Islamic sentiments and political victory in the *pilkada*(s). It did mention in passing that effective party machines and networks also contributed to the victory of Rudy and Yudhi. However, its overall tone and line of argumentation were clearly favoring Islamic symbols over the other factors to explain the local election outcomes. Thus, it

⁶ The article is reprinted in Asrori Karni, 'Belantara Simbol Agama', in Asrori Karni (ed.), *Hajatan Demokrasi, potret jurnalistik pemilu lansung simpul Islam Indonesia, dari moderat hingga garis keras,* (Jakarta, Gatra-PT Era Media Informasi, 2006), pp. 347-362

contended that Islamic appeals played a determinant role in shaping the *pilkada* results.

This sub-thesis will examine the above argument by reassessing the *pilkada* results and analyzing the range of strategies applied by the gubernatorial candidates in their election campaigns. In turn, it seeks to offer an analysis of how, and the extent to which, Islam influenced the outcomes of the *pilkada*.

Ulama in local elections.

As part of studying the role of Islam in the *pilkada*, this sub-thesis closely looks at the involvement of *tuan guru* (local Islamic scholars). Two aspects of the involvement are of inportance: the role that *tuan guru* played, and their motivations. I shall discuss academic works on *ulama* and local elections outside South Kalimantan, as this is the first study of this kind on the province so far.

One early observation on local elections in Indonesia suggests that Islamic leaders acted as assistants to the candidates. Ben Hilman (2006) who wrote one of the first English articles on direct regional head elections noted, "Leaders from Muslim, student and other activist organizations are *useful assistants* because they can mobilize supporters at rallies and during campaigns."⁷ In other words, *ulama* were involved in the politics of *pilkada* but not as political leaders.

However, against this, in some areas *ulama* run as candidates competing for local executive offices. In 2005, Kebumen district in Central Java had two *kiais*, Nashiruddin al Masyur and Imam Muzani Bunyamin, as deputy regent candidates.⁸ In the same year, Tuan Guru Hatim Salman was elected deputy regent in Banjar

⁷ Ben Hillman, 'New Election, Old Politics', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan/Feb 2006; 169, 1, p. 28. (The italics are mine)

⁸ Nashiruddin is a sufi order (*tarekat*) *kiai* and the head of Pesantren at-Taqwa, Kutosari. He won the *pilkada* as the running mate of Rustriningsih, a female politician. Imam Muzani is the head of Pesantren Darussa'adah, Petanahan and the *ulama* leader of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) branch in Kebumen. Sidik Jatmika, *Kiai dan Politik Lokal, Studi Kasus Reposisi Politik Kiai NU Kebumen, Jawa Tengah Memanfaatkan Peluang Keterbukaan Partisipasi di Era Reformasi, Doctoral Thesis, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 2005, p. 1.*

district, South Kalimantan (KPUD Kalsel 2005). In 2008, Kiai Ali Maschan Musa ran as a deputy candidate in the East Java gubernatorial *pilkada*, but was defeated in its first round.⁹ In the same year, Tuan Guru 'Bajang' Muhammad Zainul Majdi won the gubernatorial *pilkada* in Nusa Tenggara Barat.¹⁰ The most notable case would be the 2005 district head election in Sumenep, Madura in which each of the five teams of candidates contained *kiai*.¹¹

With the reference to the *pilkada* in Sumenep in 2000 and 2005, Gaffar Karim (2008) argues that *kiai* controlled the political recruitment process. He demonstrates that since 1998, *kiai* and *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) in Sumenep have been 'the major playmakers' and effectively, controlled political recruitment. They were the ones who made important decisions about which candidate to support in the process, leaving political parties in a passive position.¹²

Moreover, I also question the motivation of *tuan guru* who become involved in the *pilkada*. In the absence of any such research on South Kalimantan, I will turn to studies on Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest traditionalist Muslim organisation in Indonesia. NU is relevant for this sub-thesis for three reasons. First, the organisation is led by *ulama* and thus there is an opportunity to find some answers to the question about motivation. Second, South Kalimantan is traditionally an outer Island stronghold of NU.¹³ Finally, all *tuan guru* interviewed for this study are *Nahdliyyin* (NU people).

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⁹ 'Peserta *Pilkada* Jatim Kampanye Perdana', *Liputan 6.com*,

http://www.liputan6.com/news/?id=161880&c_id=1 (viewed 19 February 2009); 'LSI: Kaji dan Karsa ke Putaran Kedua', Kompas,

http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/07/23/18471484/Isikarsa.dan.kaji.ke.putaran.kedua (viewed 19 February 2009). Ali Masehan used to be the executive chairman (*Ketua Tanfidziyyah*) of the East Java branch (provincial branch??) of Nahdlatul Ulama prior to the gubernatorial *pilkada*.

 ¹⁰ 'TGB M Zainul Majdi Memenangkan Pilgub NTB' <u>http://www.jppr.or.id/content/view/1479/86/</u> (viewed 19 February 2009). Zainul Majdi is the head of Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) of Pancor, NTB[spell out]. NW is the largest Muslim organization in NTB that split up into Pancor and Anjani NWs after the death of its founder, Tuan Guru Zainuddin Abdul Majid.

¹¹ Abdul Gaffar Karim, 'Pesantren in Power: religious institutions and Political recruitment in Sumenep, Madura', *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, v.42, no.1, 2008, pp. 179. ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 180

¹³ Just nine years after its establishment, Nahdlatul Ulama held its *Muktamar* (Congress) in Banjarmasin, the municipality of this province, in 1935. In the first general elections in 1955, NU was

In his study of NU's high age of politics (1952-1967), Fealy (1998) argued that religious principles informed NU's political decisions. He mentioned four main principles: *maslahat* (pursuit of benefit) and *mafsadah* (avoidance of harm), *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (enacting good and preventing evil) and *akhaffud-dararain* (choosing the lesser of two evils).¹⁴ He asserted that NU's application of these principles was manifest throughout the period of his study, the 1950s and 1960s. For the purpose of my study, Fealy's work demonstrates that religious considerations can be one explanation for the political involvement of *ulama*.

Economic benefits could also motivate the involvement of *ulama*. In the aforementioned article on *pesantren* and *kiai* in Madura (the overwhelming majority of whom are *nahdliyyin*), Gaffar Karim notes that

"It is very common for politicians and government officials to maintain regular visits to *pesantren* for political purposes (particularly prior to general elections), during which they also give some financial support, or promise to give some in return for the *pesantren*'s political support".¹⁵

Politicians and government officials then become one of the financial sources for *kiai* to maintain and develop their *pesantren*. This, Gaffar Karim argues, is one of the reasons why the majority of *kiai* in Sumenep are politically active.

And indeed, donations and patronage can drive a *kiai* to take a controversial political decision. In the 1973, Kiai Musta'in Romly of Jombang, East Java, who led Pesantren Darul Ulum and a Sufi order (*tarekat Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah*) joined Golkar when the other *kiais* all supported NU. Endang Turmudi (1996) explained that it was inconceivable and unacceptable at the time for a traditionalist *kiai* in Jombang to support other parties, especially Golkar which was hostile to

the victor in South Kalimantan. The long term serving chairman of this organisation (1956-1982), Kiai Idham Chalid is a Banjarese of South Kalimantan. More about Idham see Ahmad Muhajir, *Idham Chalid, guru politik orang NU* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2007) and Arief Mudatsir Mandan (ed.), *Napak Tilas Pengabdian Idham Chalid, tanggung jawab politik NU dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 2008)

¹⁴ Greg Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: a History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967, Doctoral Thesis, Monash University, 1998, p. 272

¹⁵ Abdul Gaffar Karim, 'Pesantren in Power, p. 164

NU.¹⁶ According to Martin van Bruinessen, in 1963, Kiai Musta'in received generous donations for his plan to erect a university in Jombang from politicians and military leaders in Jakarta with whom he cultivated relationships.¹⁷ Van Bruinessen also relates how during the transition to the New Order in the late 1960s, Kiai Musta'in maintained his close contacts with the political rulers in Jakarta, then was slowly dragged towards Golkar until, finally, he joined it in 1973.¹⁸ Golkar, the New Order regime's party, needed political support from the Muslim community and Kiai Musta'in provided it. I believe the patronage and the flow of donations from the regime were important in his joining Golkar.¹⁹

In this sub-thesis, I will evaluate whether *tuan guru* merely supported the candidates, or competed over the office, or indeed, became the political playmakers. I will also examine the influence of religious or idealistic considerations and material benefits in motivating the *tuan guru* who were involved in the *pilkada*.

Background Information

The gubernatorial pilkada and the candidates

Held on 30 June 2005, the *pilkada* was one of the first direct local elections in Indonesia. It ran smoothly, on schedule, was completed in one round only, and there was no violence between supporters of the candidates. Apart from the battle of claim and counter claim of the candidates in local newspapers about who supported whom (discussed in chapter three), there was few burning controversies. Two exceptions to that were first, the dispute between the electoral commission (KUPD) and the Panwas Pilkada, the committee that oversees the holding of the *pilkada*, over the

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¹⁶ Endang Turmudi, Struggling for the Umma: changing leadership roles of kiai in Jombang, East Java, Ph. D thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, pp. 90-2

 ¹⁷ Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa dan Pencarian Wacana Baru (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994), p. 172.
 ¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ In effect, I do not find the interpretation offered by Endang Turmudi about Kiai Musta'in's joining Golkar as the search for a 'new field' (*ladang baru*) of the Islamic struggle, convincing. See his interpretation in Endang Turmudi, *Struggling for the Umma*, pp. 92-6.

interpretation of when the campaign officially started.²⁰ This resulted only in the forced removal of around 136 candidates' electoral materials, such as hoardings and street banners, by the Panwas prior to the period of official campaign.²¹ There was no resistance from the candidates on this. Second, a complaint over the *pilkada* results was filed by the team who finished third, Gusti Iskandar and Hafiz Anshary, but was then withdrawn just two days later.²² In most cases, disputes were solved peacefully and reasonably quickly. Voter turnout reached 67%,²³ but as was the case in other areas, the practice of vote buying was said to be widespread although this was not proven legally.²⁴ In most respects, the South Kalimantan gubernatorial *pilkada* typified Indonesia's respectable record in holding direct regional head elections.

Five teams competed in the *pilkada*, with candidates for governor and deputy governor consisting of five career bureaucrats, three party politicians, one businessperson and one academic.²⁵ This means that there were more independent candidates than party cadres seeking nomination. This also indicates a better bargaining position of the parties vis-à-vis the candidates. Furthermore, most of the bureaucrats and the politicians were entrepreneurs as well, and had ties with a local coal-mining tycoon or a local logging magnate who had vested interests in their victories.²⁶ This explains the ability of candidates to fund their nomination and campaign. Moreover, 20 political parties nominated the candidates, 13 of which had no seat in the local assembly (DPRD) but their accumulated votes in the legislative

²⁵ See the pamphlet of South Kalimantan KPU and Mohammad Effendy, Potret Pemilihan Gubernur,

pp. 39-50²⁶ Marcus Mietzner, *Ibid.* 1005.

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²⁰ Mohammad Effendy, Potret Pemilihan Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Kalimantan Selatan, Upaya Membangun Demokrasi Lokal, (Banjarmasin: PT Grafika Wangi Kalimantan, 2006), pp. 149-160 ²¹ '136 Atribut Pilkada Ditertibkan', Radar Banjarmasin, 2 June 2005

²² Iskandar-Hafiz Ajukan Keberatan', Banjarmasin Post, 18 July 2005. Apparently, the complaint was to slow down the installment of the governor elect, as the last political 'bullet' of the defeated candidates. The complainants finished third place, over 159 thousand votes behind the winner. The chance to change the *pilkada* results was thus slim. The complainants certainly understood this and lobbying between elite politicians quickly terminated this complaint. See 'Iskandar-Hafiz Cabut Gugatan, Radar Banjarmasin, 20 July 2005.

²³ KPUD Kalsel, Tingkat Partisipasi Gubernur Kalsel 2005, as cited in Asrori Karni, 'Belantara

Simbol Agama', p. 360 ²⁴ 'Tim Sukses Adukan *Money Politics'*, *Banjarmasin Post*, 3 July 2005; Interview with Ilyas, the former PPP parliamentarian in Hulu Sungai Utara district, Amuntai, 2 June 2008; Marcus Mietzner, Local Election Briefing: South Kalimantan, 2005, uppublished paper.

elections were enough to provide a ticket. Golkar was the only party that could nominate candidates by itself, and the remaining six parties formed three coalitions. Two of the four coalitions combined secular and Islamic parties, and the other two coalitions were between Islamic parties only, indicating that both ideological promiscuity and ideological preferences existed in the *pilkada*. The pamphlet below was distributed by the South Kalimantan KPU and it contained photos and personal information about the candidates and their nominating parties.



Table 1

The total votes of the candidates in the 2005 gubernatorial pilkada

No.	Candidates	Total Votes	Percentage
1.	H. Gusti Iskandar and Prof. Dr. H. A. Hafiz A. AZ, MA	310,216	21.39
2.	H. M. Sjachriel Darham and Drs. H. Noor Aidi, MM, Msi	178,695	12.32
3.	H. M. Ramlan, S. Sos and Drs. H. Baderani	87,172	6.01
4.	Drs. H. Rudy Ariffin, MM and H. M. Rosehan NB, SH *)	469,362	32,36
5.	Prof. Dr. Ir. H. Ismet A., MSc and Habib Aboe Bakar	404,880	27.92

Source: South Kalimantan KPU

*) the winning team

Islam in South Kalimantan

Islam is professed by the overwhelming majority (97%) of South Kalimantan's population (2000 census).²⁷ This numerical significance is accompanied by demonstrations of religious piety, as indicated by the presence of mosques or *langgar* (a prayer house that does not hold the communal Friday prayers) in virtually every village, and by the importance of the hajj pilgrimage in the region.²⁸ It is thus not an exaggeration that the Banjarese, the native ethnic group of the province, as noted by Chalmers (2008), have a reputation within Indonesia of being observant Muslims. Moreover, Islam is, Hawkins (2000) observes, "of importance in Banjar life" and "at the heart of Banjar conception of their own identities".²⁹ Indeed, Islamic teachings "have now become an integral part of the norms and social life of the Banjarese",

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²⁷ As cited in Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia's Population, Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), table 4.2.2, p. 110

²⁸ By the 19th century, Banjarmasin, the capital of South Kalimantan, which has long been a major port of embarkation for hajj pilgrims, had the largest number of pilgrims in the Indies (Soeroto 1976, p. 173, fn. 18). In the early decades of the 20th century, about 10,000 people left for the holy land every year giving South Kalimantan 'the highest proportions of *hajis* in the entire Musim world" (Lindblad & Verhagen 1988, p. 70). In the present day, the province sends the third largest number of pilgrims every year (Hawkins 2000, p. 35, fn. 4). All information here was compiled by Ian Chalmer, 'The Islamisation of Southern Kalimantan: Sufi Spiritualism, Ethnic Identity, Political Activism ', *Studia Islamika* - Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 371-417.

²⁹ Mary Hawkins, 'Becoming Banjar', The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 1:1, 2000, pp. 30, 32

concluded Alfani Daud (1997),³⁰ an anthropologist who observed the communities of South Kalimantan for decades.

As in Indonesian Islam, there are traditionalist and modernist Muslims in South Kalimantan, commonly referred to as the *kaum tua* (old guard) and the *kaum muda* (young guard) respectively. Although we do not have any estimation of each group, it is widely believed that the traditionalists outnumber the modernists significantly. In the 1955 election for instance, the traditionalist NU received a 16 percent bigger share of votes than the modernist Masjumi. This made South Kalimantan an outer Island base of NU.³¹

Islam has also had political impacts in the province as it has provided a basis for various rebellions against the state. The armed rebellion in 1859 against the Dutch in Banjarmasin was said to be inspired by a spirit of *jihad fi sabilillah* (the holy war against the infidels) and drew support from the members of a local popular Sufi brotherhood, the Beratip Beamal.³² In the early 1950s, a group of guerillas led by

³⁰ Alfani Daud, Islam dan Masyarakat Banjar: deskripsi dan analisis kebudayaan Banjar (Jakarta, Rajawali Press, 1997), p. 189

³¹ This also means that South Kalimantan Muslims experienced bitter rivalry and conflicts among them in both doctrinal and political matters. The kaum muda denounced practices which the traditionalists believed to be part of Banjarese religious life, such as the common death rites and the veneration of saints, as heretic. Tensions mounted as the kaum tua defended their traditions, leading to conflicts and to establishing separate prayer houses. Saifuddin, who wrote an important study on the tension between the Kaum Tua and Kaum Muda in Alabio, a large town in upriver South Kalimantan, notes that in 1931 and 1940 armed conflict almost broke as the kaum tua people tried to prevent modernist preachers from delivering Friday sermons. The establishment of mass organizations representing each group, Sarekat Islam and Musyawaratuttalibin first, and then Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama later, added politics to the already sharp doctrinal conflict. According to Saifuddin, the local branch of Sarekat Islam in Alabio was established in the 1920s, but then its importance waned in 1930s. A Muhammadiyah local branch was opened in 1930 or around five years after the ulama of kaum muda returned from Saudi Arabia and started their reformist movement in Alabio. Musyawaratuttalibin, on the other hand, was the organization for kaum tua established in 1931 and later in 1950s it was dissolved into Nahdlatul Ulama. Achmad Fediyani Saifuddin, Konflik dan Integrasi, perbedaan faham keagamaan dalam agama Islam (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1986), pp. pp. 30, 37, 41-2, 58. Outside local parliament, the traditional sites of competition between modernists and traditionalists are the local branch of the religious affairs departments, the State Islamic Institute (IAIN), and mosques that receive government subsidies. ³² Soeri Soeroto, 'The Beratip Beamal movement in the Banjar War', in Sartono Kartodirdjo (ed.),

³² Soeri Soeroto, 'The Beratip Beamal movement in the Banjar War', in Sartono Kartodirdjo (ed.), *Profiles of Malay Culture, Historiography, Religion and Politics* (Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1976), pp. 167-77 and Helius Sjamsuddin, 'Islam and resistance in Central and South Kalimantan in the ninetieth and early twentieth centuries', in Merle C. Ricklefs (ed.), Islam in the

Ibnu Hajar joined Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam revolt that declared the establishment of an Indonesian Islamic state (*Negara Islam Indonesia*, NII) in 1948. This time the revolt was directed against the republic of Indonesia.

The majority of Muslims in the province, however, chose to support political Islam in its struggle within the republic's political system. They have shown strong support for Islamic parties, although in the New Order period, when the electoral system was tightly controlled Golkar was dominant. In the 1955 general elections, 633,170 voters gave NU and Masjumi, two major Islamic parties representing traditionalist and modernist Muslims respectively, an overwhelming 80.5 percent of the total votes.³³ In the second general elections of the New Order in 1977, South Kalimantan voters gave PPP, an amalgamation of four Islamic parties including NU, 49 percent votes, the biggest that it secured across Indonesia.³⁴ This was for the first and the only time that Golkar lost its electoral domination in the province throughout the New Order period. Islamic parties could again place their hopes on the voters in the post Suharto elections, as they received 49 percent of the total vote in 1999 and 54 percent in 2004 (KPUD Kalsel 1999 and 2004).

<u>Tuan guru</u>

Tuan guru are those men of Islamic knowledge who have dominant voice on religious matters. They are learned in the holy texts and usually have performed the hajj pilgrimage. Given the importance of religion in Banjarese life, as noted above, they achieve social prominence. People treat them reverentially more than ordinary members of a given community. In addition to their main functions of teaching and to leading rituals, they play an advisory role. People come to them with marriage problems, life issues and, sometimes, political choices. Their presence often shames

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Indonesian Social Context, (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1991), pp. 7-17

³³ Alfian, *Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat* (Jakarta: Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasjarakatan Nasional, 1974), p. 26

³⁴ Pemilu Indonesia dalam Angka dan Fakta Tahun 1955-1999 (Jakarta: Biro Humas Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2000), p. 86.

those who do things prohibited by religion such as drinking alcohol, gambling or eating in the day during the fasting month. This means that they are seen as moral guardians of the community. Most of them remain aloof from mundane activities, such as sports and entertainment to maintain their elevated status.

There are two learning institutions that *tuan guru* lead, namely *pesantren* and *pengajian*. The first are boarding schools where pupils study Islamic tenets and doctrines, progressing from level to level, and the second is a forum for religious sermons, usually for a broader audience and does not have a tied or specific curriculum. It is true that not all *tuan guru* have *pesantren* or *pengajian*, but certainly those who lead one or both institutions are more influential. Attendance at their institutions reflects their popularity as well as their influence.

Some *tuan guru* are political by either cultivating relationships with politicians or taking up positions in political parties. As discussed above, politicians and government can be generous donors. *Tuan guru*'s power is their influence over the pupils and followers. As *tuan guru* have their own public forum where they can say many things or even mobilize people, politicians and public officials face both challenges and opportunities. It is to their advantage if *tuan guru* applaud their works and policies, but conversely, it is a problem if *tuan guru* criticize them. In a way, this suggests that *tuan guru* have more power than politicians. However, as the authoritarian New Order has demonstrated, politicians can be harsh to *ulama*. They were capable of intimidating *ulama* and cutting off patronage that sustained *ulama* and their followers. Thus the bargaining power of *tuan guru* with politicians is very much dependant on the circumstances. Generally, however, their relations are of benefit to both sides and, importantly, not necessarily negative.

Primary sources and sub-thesis structure

This study relies on two types of information, namely documentary evidence and interview materials. The main source of documentary evidence for the *pilkada* related

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events is three local newspapers, *Banjarmasin Post, Radar Banjarmasin* and *Kalimantan Post*. The reports from January to July 2005 are essential, but I pay particular attention to the reports in June, the month of the *pilkada*. In addition, the South Kalimantan KPU produced two books about the process and the results of the *pilkada*. Finally, the few papers on the South Kalimantan *pilkada* by political observers are also a primary source of documentary evidence.

Oral evidence was gathered in interviews carried out in five districts of South Kalimantan between May and June 2008. Over thirty interviews were conducted with various informants, including ten *tuan guru*, eight local politicians and a few observers. The interviews are particularly important for the issue of *tuan guru*'s political motivation which were not discussed in the media reports. Furthermore, the *tuan guru* and politician informants were the supporters of four different teams in the *pilkada*, from which diverse, sometimes conflicting, information was obtained.

The sub-thesis is structured according to topics. In chapter two, I examine the role of Islam in the *pilkada*. By showing that all candidates used Islamic appeals in their electoral strategies, I argue that Islam was 'contingent' on other factors, not 'determinant', in shaping the *pilkada* outcomes as previously perceived by South Kalimantan observers. Chapter three discusses the motivations of *tuan guru* who were involved in the *pilkada*. I demonstrate that there were two groups of *tuan guru*: those who were motivated by pragmatic reasons and those who were driven by idealistic considerations. This shows that the South Kalimantan *pilkada* exhibited a more complex picture than what observers have thought about local elections. In chapter four, I explore the activities of *tuan guru* as campaigners and the rewards that they received from the candidates who hired them. This is an attempt to reveal the political calculations of *tuan guru* and to see whether their institutions also benefited from their involvement in the *pilkada*. Finally, Chapter Five contains my conclusions.

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CHAPTER TWO

Islam in the 2005 *Pilkada* in South Kalimantan: Crucial but Contingent

Introduction

repetition

What can politicians do to attract Muslim voters who have traditionally supported political Islam? What in particular, can they use to attract voters? These questions occupied five pairs of candidates of the 2005 gubernatorial *pilkada* in South Kalimantan. The candidates know that Islam is demographically significant in the province, and has been culturally and politically important. Ninety-seven percent of the population claim to profess Islam according to the 2000 census. For Banjarese, an ethnic group to which two third of the Muslim population belong, Islam is part of identity (Hawkins 2000, Chalmers 2008). In addition, the voters in this province have a strong allegiance to Islamic parties as pointed out in chapter one. Thus, the gubernatorial candidates had to come up with strategies informed by these realities. And they appear to have done so.

The candidates incorporated Islam into their electoral strategies. First, they demonstrated their Islamic credentials. In the ballots, all candidates' names are prefixed with 'Haji', the title acquired after a Muslim observes the fifth pillar of Islam, pilgrimage to Mecca. Some of them further emphasised specific 'credentials' such as being close to charismatic *ulama*, being a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (*habib*) or being a professor in a local Islamic institute. Second, they sought political support from *ulama*, locally called *tuan guru*, particularly those with lots of pupils and followers. Some *tuan guru* were even successfully recruited to join their campaign teams. In effect, the *tuan guru* gave campaign events an Islamic colour by reciting Qur'anic verses, giving Islamic lectures, delivering invocations

and reciting *salawat* (prayers of adoration to the Prophet Muhammad). Third, the candidates used religious occasions, such as *pengajian* (informal Islamic learning forums), *Yasinan* (a gathering in which recitation of the surah Qur'anic chapter Yasin is the main program), *Maulid-an* (the invocation of *salawat* and the life story of the Prophet), and common *Salat Hajat* (a prayer recommended for those in need) for political purposes. They used such occasions to introduce themselves and mobilise supporters. Finally, two candidates specifically promised to apply a regulation that makes Islamic observance in *Ramadhan* (fasting month) stricter. In short, Islamic appeals were pivotal in the way candidates presented themselves and in the style of their campaigns.

This situation has led some local observers to conclude that Islamic sentiments were the key to explain the achievement of candidates the *pilkada*.¹ For instance, they ascribe the electoral achievement of the team that came second, İsmet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar, to the fact that the candidate for deputy-governor is a habib (a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad) who wore a white cap. Habib are highly respected figures in South Kalimantan and thus, according to these observers, they have high electability.² In this respect, basically, they say if one wants to bolster his electioneering, one needs to bring in an Islamic charismatic figure to the team. Similarly, the observers attribute the victory of Rudy Ariffin mainly to his intimate relationship with the late Tuan Guru H. Muhammad Zaini whose pengajian attracted hundreds of thousands of people. They say that voters chose Rudy because he declared himself an adopted son of the tuan guru and because Rudy was perceived as someone who looked after him.³ They believe that loyalty and sympathy towards Guru Zaini moved people to deliver the victory to Rudy. In other words, they contend that if the candidates are not prominent Islamic figures such as a habib, close to *ulama* could also lead to victory in a *pilkada*. The observers admit that other factors, such as effective campaigns and sufficient political finance, were at play. However,

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¹ See this argument in Asrori Karni, 'Belantara Simbol Agama', in Asrori Karni (ed.), *Hajatan Demokrasi, potret jurnalistik pemilu lansung simpul Islam Indonesia, dari moderat hingga garis keras*, (Jakarta, Gatra-PT Era Media Informasi, 2006), pp. 347-362

² Mukhtar Sarman and Muhammad Ramly as quoted in Asrori Karni, Ibid., pp. 350-1

³ Mohammad Effendy and Hasanuddin as quoted in Asrori Karni, *Ibid.*, pp. 348-9

they imply that these factors come after or inferior to the Islamic factor. Islam, in their analysis, was the key to understanding the *pilkada* and more generally, the local politics.

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I would argue that the local observers overstate the role of Islam. I contend that Islam was contingent on the other factors mentioned above; that is, an effective campaign strategy and sufficient finance, and to one further factor: a clean public image. While it was prominent during the campaign, Islam *per se* had limitations in determining the result of *pilkada*. In this chapter, I will point out these limitations and offer a more exact analysis of the role of Islam in the *pilkada*. This will be accomplished by first showing that Islam is a standard strategy that every candidate applied, and second, by discussing case studies which examine the type of candidates Islam helps and does not help.

Islamic appeals as a strategy employed by all candidates

One important point that the local observers seem to ignore is the fact that every candidate used Islam, not only the winners. This made Islamic symbols so prominent during campaign. The analytical implications of this are that Islamic appeals cannot serve as the determinant factor for the *pilkada* results when everyone uses it.

This becomes clear if we look at the role of Islam in the campaign strategies of the candidates. Let us first take the example of Sjachriel Darham, the incumbent governor competing for a second term. Of all the candidates, he had the advantage of being a well-known figure throughout the province. While others needed to introduce themselves first to the public, he could focus his time and energy on other aspects of his campaign. Moreover, as the serving governor, Sjachriel had the resources and opportunities to cultivate good relationships with potential vote getters. During his term as governor, he frequently invited many *tuan guru* to deliver invocations or to give Islamic lectures in government sponsored events or on private occasions. The *tuan guru* of course received good money as honoraria for their services. He also

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made generous donations to some *pesantren* notably Ibnul Amin of Pemangkih and al-Mursyidul Amien of Gambut. He handpicked *tuan guru* to fill the positions for a religious establishment funded by the government. He had the same authority in choosing who would supervise the South Kalimantanese hajj candidates. *Tuan guru* who are appointed as supervisors get free hajj pilgrimage paid for out of the provincial budget, something seen as desirable by many.

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During his campaign, Sjachriel also applied strategies similar to those employed by the other candidates. One of them was to recruit *tuan guru* as campaigners. The recruited *tuan guru* were popular, with most of them holding regular *pengajian* attended by hundreds to thousands of people. Some of the *tuan guru* were heads of large *pesantren* which have thousands of students. Rudy Ariffin and the Ismet-Habib Aboe team put a heavy emphasis on this by inviting numerous *tuan guru* and *habib* to campaign events. Golkar-associated *tuan guru* attended the functions of the Iskandar-Hafiz team, Golkar's nominees. In this respect, Sjachriel had Guru Ahmad Bakeri (more on him in chapter three) speaking in all his open campaign functions.

Moreover, Sjachriel paid visits to several large *pesantren* and made donations. This was also done by the other candidates. Rudy Ariffin and his deputy governor candidate, Rosehan, in particular went to not only big *pesantren* but also smaller ones and to numerous Islamic kindergartens (TK Al-Qur-an).⁴ In each of these visit, they made donations. In some cases, candidates also visited the *pesantren* that their competitors had previously visited in order to be seen as being as generous and concerned about Islamic education as their competitors.

In addition to visiting *pesantren* and various communities, Sjachriel made pilgrimages to the tombs of local holy people. One example of this took place in the tomb of Datu Kelampayan or Syeikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjary, as reported by a

⁴ Interview with Rosehan NB, Banjarmasin, 2 May 2008; with Prof. Dr. Gazali, Banjar District, 30 April and 9 June 2008; with Jamhuri, Banjarmasin, 3 May 2008. '2R Kunjungi Pesantren-pesantren', *Radar Banjamasin online*, 1 February 2005.

local newspaper.⁵ Syeikh Arsyad is perhaps the greatest *ulama* in the history of the Banjarese and more importantly, his tomb is the most popular destination of local pilgrimage in South Kalimantan. Sjachriel did not let the opportunity pass to take advantage of the symbolic value of Syeikh Arsyad's tomb.

The final campaign strategy using Islam employed by all candidates was performing the common salat hajat.⁶ This took place the night before election day with hundreds in attendance. Candidates invited their neighbours and sympathisers to pray for their success the following day. This ritual was led by *tuan guru*. From a political perspective, this event was a kind of mobilisation and show of power just like a campaign function. It was also allegedly a last minute chance for the candidates to distribute money to potential voters. It is a custom in South Kalimantan especially for better off people to give money, in envelopes, to the participants of common salat hajat to show their gratitude. During a campaign, this custom could be manipulated for money politics practices.⁷

All these examples of using Islam for campaign purposes were employed by all candidates. Yet, only one pair of candidates won the *pilkada*, namely Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan NB. The central argument of the observers is that the key factor in the success of the candidates was because they played out Islamic sentiments. The victory of Rudy Ariffin and the achievement of the Ismet Ahmad-Habib Aboe team in finishing second, mentioned above, seemingly fit this analysis. Such an analysis however, cannot explain why other candidates who also employed Islamic symbols performed badly. Sjachriel, despite all his strategies to shore up Islamic support, bitterly finished second last, and Golkar's nominees only achieved one level better than him, i.e. number three. Thus, if we accept the explanation that Islam is the key factor to explain the *pilkada*, we are left with a big hole in the analysis.

⁵ 'Warga Kelampayan dan Kotabaru Sambut A'A', Kalimantan Post, 27 May 2005

⁶ 'Sjahriel-Ramlan Gelar Salat Hajat, ungkapan rasa syukur dan permohonan doa', *Radar Banjarmasin*, 30 June 2005

⁷ See for instance *Banjarmasin Post*, 3 and 5 June 2005

Islam works better for clean candidates

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Among other things, what the above discussion suggests is that Islam works better for some candidates than for others. An inquiry into the kind of candidates whom Islam helped most or did not help would give us an idea of a limitation of Islam factor. It is the candidates with clean public images who find Islam politically beneficial for them. Thus, the usefulness depends on the reputation of the candidates.

There are no better candidates to illustrate this argument than the Ismet Ahmad-Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi team and Sjachriel Darham. In the first case, Islamic appeals boosted the vote share, and in the second case, they did not seem to help at all.

The Ismet-Habib Aboe team were an electoral surprise. Political analysts prior to the *pilkada* put them in an underdog position for several reasons. The first reason relates to the nominating parties, PAN (Partai Amanat National, National Mandate Party) and PKS. These Islamic parties are widely believed to have an association with the modernist Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah. In South Kalimantan which has been a strong base for Nahdlatul Ulama, these parties only secured a joint vote of 17.9 percent votes in the 2004 general elections. The second reason relates to the candidates. Ismet Ahmad was a bureaucrat and an academic who did not have real mass support, although he was able to finance his political ambition. Furthermore, Habib Aboe is not a Banjarese, which according to many observers should have made him 'unelectable'.⁸ In the same vein, a poll conducted by a local newspaper put this pair second last eight weeks prior to election day.⁹ But surprisingly, Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi finished second with 28 percent of the votes. This pair was ahead in the first day of vote counting and was worrying other

³ Marcus Mietzner, Local Election Briefing: South Kalimantan, 2005, unpublished paper, p. 1

⁹ Mohammad Effendy, Potret Pemilihan Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Kalimantan Selatan, Upaya Membangun Demokrasi Lokal, (Banjarmasin: PT Grafika Wangi Kalimantan, 2006), pp. 172-174

candidates.¹⁰ If we compare the actual votes of PKS and PAN in the 2004 general elections to that of Ismet - Habib Aboe in 2005, the result is more remarkable. In 2004, the parties won 277,863 votes while in 2005 their governor-deputy governor nominees secured 404,880 votes.¹¹ In other words, there was an increase of over 45 percent. Thus, the argument that in the elections of executives (President, Governor and Bupati), voters tend to see the individual candidates, not the nominating parties, proves to be true again in this case.¹²

While one could assume that a portion of the total votes for the Ismet-Habib Aboe team came from the loyal PAN and PKS voters, the remaining votes should be attributed to the 'skill' of the two candidates. During the campaign, they tried to project an image of clean and capable leaders guided by Islam. Here we can see the combination of Islam and probity. The pair presented themselves as ulama and umara, meaning respectively religious and worldly leaders, teaming up to lead South Kalimantan. In this team, Ismet represented the clean umara and Habib Aboe acted as ulama.

Whereas the 'umara-ness' of Ismet was explained by the fact that he was an experienced career bureaucrat, the 'ulama-ness' of Habib Aboe was shown primarily through his choice of dress. First, he wore a thobe (a collar-less long and lose shirt covering the body to ankles) with a turban draped over his shoulder. Most of the time he held a rosary, and he carried a small Qur'an with him everywhere. He combined this outfit with a coat when he went to parliament or government offices. In this Arabic attire, he delivered religious speeches and led the recitation of salawat (prayers of adoration to the Prophet Muhammad) during and outside of campaign

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¹⁰ 'Ismet Di atas Angin', Banjarmasin Post, 1 July 2005 and 'Sementara 2U unggul', Radar Banjarmasin, 1 July 2005. Rudy Ariffin was worried about the first day vote counting, as were the other candidates. Interview with Guru Khalilurrahman, an adviser to Rudy, Martapura, 19 May 2008; and with Hasanuddin, the former coordinator of JPPR in South Kalimantan, Banjarmasin, 2 May 2008. ¹¹ The numbers here are also recorded in Mohammad Effendy, Potret Pemilihan Gubernur, pp. 113-4 ¹² The argument was put forward, for instance, by Rodd McGibbon, 'Indonesian Politics in 2006: stability, compromise and contest over ideology', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 42, vol. 3, 2006, p. 331. Also in Michael Buehler's report on direct elections in South Sulawesi, 'The Rise of the clans', Inside Indonesia, 90, October-November 2007.

events. Second, he wore a white cap (*kupiah haji*) which later became his trademark and featured in the slogan of the pair: *cucuk nang bekupiah haji* (Banjarese, meaning pierce the picture of the one with the white cap). The slogan served two functions; a manual for the correct way of voting, that is, making a hole in the picture of one candidate, and a reminder of Habib Aboe. It is worth noting that the other candidates wore black caps, although all of them are *hajis*, making the picture of Habib Aboe eye catching. (See the picture below.)



This pair was also unique because the candidate for deputy governor was more popular than the candidate for governor. Whenever the *ulama-umara* pair was mentioned, most people automatically thought of Habib Aboe with his *kupiah haji*.¹³ In their campaign functions, Habib Aboe was the celebrity. Because Aboe Bakar was

¹³ The evidence for this is mostly anecdotal but it was commonplace. I observed this in 2005, and when I conducted my fieldwork in 2008, people still remembered the *kupiah haji* and Habib Aboe Bakar very clearly.

a *habib*, many people especially in rural areas ran after him to get his blessing.¹⁴ Personally, Habib Aboe is colorful person who makes people round him entertained. Ismet on the other hand, appears to be drier. A local political analyst labeled this as 'an anomaly' as normally people tend to remember the first man, and then they recall his deputy (Sarman 2005).¹⁵ However, I think this is a logical consequence of putting emphasis on Habib Aboe. First, in their platform, the cooperation of *ulama* and *umara*, *ulama*, as represented by Habib Aboe, is mentioned first. Second, roughly in two third of the tens of campaign pictures of this pair published in local papers, Habib Aboe was the target of the cameras, leaving Ismet in the background. Even in the televised political advertisements for this pair, Habib Aboe was more conspicuous. A PKS member of the campaign team appears to confirm this analysis. He said that everything about Habib Aboe during the *pilkada* was purposefully designed.¹⁶

In general, the good showing of the Ismet-Habib Aboe team can be attributed to their success at building an image, in which Islam was central. In only three months prior to the *pilkada*, this campaign successfully popularized Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar. The winning pair, Rudy and Rosehan, in comparison, started their 'campaign' over six months before the *pilkada*.¹⁷ Yet the voting margin between the winners and the Ismet-Habib Aboe team was only 4.3 percent. Specifically, this shows that the PKS faction in the campaign team dominated the marketing by focusing on Habib Aboe, who is a PKS cadre, more than Ismet. Now, even after this pair lost the *pilkada* race, Habib Aboe himself appears to realize this and continues to appear in his trademark clothing in South Kalimantan. According to another PKS activist, although Ismet-Habib Aboe were defeated in 2005, Habib Aboe is now famous and that is

¹⁴ Interview with Ibnu Sina, Banjarmasin, 6 May 2008. He mentions that the *thobe* of Habib Aboe often became dirty after campaign functions because people touched it while he was standing on stage. Sometime he saw lipstick marks on the *thobe* from females who kissed it.

¹⁵ See 'Kupiah Haji Yang Fenomenal', *Banjarmasin Post*, 5 July 2005.

¹⁶ Interview with Ibnu Sina, Banjarmasin, 6 May 2008.

¹⁷ Hairansyah, *Potret Pemilu Langsung Dalam Konteks Demokrasi Di Kalimantan Selatan*, a paper presented in Banjarmasin in 2005 around three months after the *Pilkada*. Hairansyah was a member of the provincial KPUD.

good for the next political race.¹⁸ On the other hand, his visibility is also a constraint since people tend to be surprised or even shocked to see Habib Aboe not in his trademark costume, like a Banjarese *tuan guru* who met him in Jakarta wearing jeans and a shirt.¹⁹ In other words, fame is both rewarding and demanding.

However, although Islamic symbols featured prominently in the campaign, this is not the whole story. The 'ulama-ness' of Habib Aboe and his memorable white cap were combined with the clean reputation of both Habib Aboe and Ismet, at least until the pilkada. Prior to the pilkada, Ismet was not reported in media to have been involved in any corruption. Moreover, local commentators generally saw him as relatively clean. As a bureaucrat, he was well known more for his collection of academic titles: Professor, Doctor, Engineer (Ir.) and Master of Science (MSc), leaving an impression that he was very clever. What became hot news was his ouster from Sekretaris Daerah Provinsi (the Provincial Secretary) by Governor Sjachriel Darham. This ousting, however, turned out to be to his advantage because the public understood this incident as an example of unethical politics on the part of Sjachriel. That is, Sjachriel felt threatened by Ismet who opposed him in the *pilkada* and thus sacked him while he was still in office. Ismet's mistreatment reminded some people of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when he as a minister was treated badly by Megawati after he decided to run as a presidential candidate.²⁰ Ismet was therefore seen as a political victim. Habib Aboe Bakar on the other hand, was new to the political scene in South Kalimantan. He grew up in Jakarta, had never held any political position in the province before, and not even a Banjarese. Before the *pilkada*, he was unknown except among PKS cadres and sympathizers. People knew him only as a PKS national representative for the South Kalimantan electorate. In this situation, it was easy for him to build whatever image was most politically beneficial for him.

¹⁸ Interview with Faqih Jurjani, Barabai, 29 May 2008

¹⁹ Interview with with Guru Hamdan Khalid, Amuntai, 3 July 2008

²⁰ Interview with Norhalis Majid, the head of Banjarmasin KPU, Banjarmasin, 7 and 11 May 2008; and with Hasanuddin, Banjarmasin, 2 May 2008.

The history of both candidates, as people knew it then, made it easy for their team to construct them as clean and pious people. The central theme repeatedly raised by this pair in the media and campaign functions was the need for leaders with such qualities. This again indicates the strong influence of PKS, which was successful in Ke 2004 general elections in part because of their clean image,²¹ in this pair's marketing strategy. In the statement of support made by Guru Muhammad Bakhit of Barabai, it was emphasized that the Ismet-Habib Aboe team possessed such qualities.²² Another the headline appearing in the following week reads 'Fit in the Category of Pious Leaders, 'N Ismet Ahmad-Habib Aboe Bakar in the Eyes of Prominent *ulama*'.²³ 'South Kalimantan needs pious leaders', read another headline two days after that.²⁴ The team could not have used this issue had the candidates had a corrupt or bad reputation. And, as it turned out, this worked very well for Ismet and Habib Aboe.

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In contrast, Islam did not seem to work at all for Sjachriel Darham who, as mentioned above, brought along Guru Ahmad Bakeri in his campaign, donated generously to several big *pesantren*, and so on. In addition, all the advantages he had as the incumbent, from fame and networking, to a financial surplus, were seemingly washed away. He even had trouble finding political parties to nominate him in the *pilkada* before the coalition of PDI-P and PBR (Partai Bintang Reformasi, Star Reform Party) agreed to be his political vehicle. PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party) which nominated him in 2000 for his first gubernatorial term had chosen Rudy Ariffin as its candidate. Golkar was the traditional political enemy of Sjachriel, and although he tried to approach it, the party leaders decided to support Gusti Iskandar as the gubernatorial candidate. PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party) played around with Sjachriel: its leader, Yudhi Wahyuni once said that Sjachriel had a very bad credibility and PAN was closed for him but then, the party accepted Sjachriel's proposal for candidacy along with eight other

²¹ See for instance in, Edward Aspinal, Elections and the normalization of politics in Indonesia', *South East Asia Research*, 13, 2, 2005, pp. 117-156

²² 'Guru Bakhit dan Guru Pamangkih Sukung Penuh Ismet-Habib', Banjarmasin Post, 6 June 2005.

The report also appeared in Radar Banjarmasin and the Kalimantan Post on the same day.

²³ 'Memenuhi Kriteria Pemimpin Saleh', Kalimantan Post, 13 June 2005

²⁴ 'Kalsel Memerlukan Pemimpin yang Saleh' Radar Banjarmasin, 15 June 2008

aspiring candidates' proposals²⁵ and in the end, it turned him down by choosing Ismet Ahmad.

As a politician, Sjachriel appeared to like political controversies and journalists loved interviewing him because everything about him was likely to make headlines.²⁶ He had irrepressible confidence that some people thought was arrogance. His statements were sound bites. In addition to being high profile, he was also cunning at playing the political game. Sjachriel came to office in 2000, Mietzner (2005) notes, basically by buying enough votes from the local MPs to defeat Golkar's candidates.²⁷ In 2002, he was impeached over a controversy concerning a maintenance project (pengerukan alur Barito, the dredging of Barito canal) by the same DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, regional assembly) that elected him. Golkar was the political force behind this. However, there was then uncertainty about who had the authority to discharge a governor: the DPRD or the Minister of Internal Affairs.²⁸ Sjachriel spent a few weeks in Jakarta lobbying the Ministry and then came back to South Kalimantan victorious. He continued to be the governor until his term lapsed in 2005. Here, he proved to be politically astute by taking advantage of a hole in the law. His case became national news and later a reference when the lawmakers modified the Law on Decentralization. Praising himself, Sjachriel was reported to have said that he was politically more astute than President Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) who failed to escape impeachment in 2001.

Another controversy involving Sjachriel and the DPRD over two projects (the exchange of state assets [*ruislag*] and the construction of Martapura river flood plain) surfaced again at the end of 2004 beginning of 2005. The press recorded the exchanging of arguments and comments of Sjachriel and the opponent factions in the DPRD, but by then most parties had begun to shift their attentions to the *pilkada*. In each of the cases, Sjachriel was allegedly corrupt and using money to mollify the

²⁵ 'Hari ini Sjachriel diuji', Banjarmasin Post, 23 January 2005

²⁶ The numbers here are also recorded in Mohammad Effendy, Potret Pemilihan Gubernur, pp. 78-9

²⁷ Marcus Mietzner, *Local Election Briefing*, p. 1

²⁸ See for instance in 'Pemberhentian Gubernur Kalsel Belum Sah', *Tempo Interaktif*, 22 August 2002 http://www.infoanda.com/linksfollow.php?lh=UQcECQUDBwYG (viewed December 2008)

controversies. This damaged his reputation and he must have realized it. He was not convicted, however, until the KPK investigated an allegation of corruption in the usage of the provincial budget, after the *pilkada*, which finally put him behind bars.²⁹ Moreover, his reputation within the bureaucracy had not been good either. He was reported to have extorted money from his subordinates, the heads of regional government agencies. ³⁰ Although the local media did not pick up on this practice, which only circulated as rumors and gossip among local public servant, the press did expose his dismissal of Ismet Ahmad and, as mentioned above, that created another controversy which did more damage to him. It is worth noting that the critical tone of the press towards Sjachriel was not unbiased. The leading local paper in South Kalimantan, the *Banjarmasin Post*, is managed by Gusti Rusdi Effendy, a leader of the Golkar party which in 2002 mobilized Sjachriel's impeachment. Since then, the two figures have become political enemies. This is of course not to suggest that every report about Sjachriel by this daily must have been biased. But it is reasonable to assume that some of them were politically motivated.

Despite this, Sjachriel was very confident about his candidacy. He stayed cool when PPP, Golkar and PAN refused to nominate him as their gubernatorial candidate. After loosing some time trying to find a nominating party, he said calmly that a good runner knows when to start. With regard to Rudy Ariffin who had begun his campaign much earlier, he commented mockingly that Rudy would run out of puff.³¹ His confidence appeared justifiable because until around two months before the *pilkada* he still seemed to be ahead of other candidates whose campaigns were yet to bare fruit. When asked whether he was prepared to lose, he answered boldly that there is no such thing as being prepared to lose; he was only prepared to win.³² And

'Sjachriel Darham Akui Pakai Dana 902 Juta', Tempo Interaktif, 16 Agustus 2007,

²⁹ 'Mantan Gubernur Kalsel Divonis 4 Tahun Penjara', Antara, 24 Agustus 2007

http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2007/08/16/brk,20070816-105756,id.html (viewed, 17 January 2009); 'Aset Lebih dari Rp 1,7 Miliar Milik Sjachriel Disita KPK', *Sinar Harapan*, 19 Juni 2008

³⁰ Afraid of being sacked, most of them provided the money reluctantly. A discussion with an officer of a regional agency, Banjarmasin, Agustus 2005

³¹ See in 'Rudy Ngaku All Out', Radar Banjarmasin, 24 December 2004

³² See in 'Tolak Bujuk DPC-DPC PDI-P', Banjarmasin Post, 12 June 2005

even after he was defeated in the gubernatorial election he still made news. Not appearing to lose self-esteem, he said that he had profited from the *pilkada* because he only used two thirds of the total funds he had raised to finance his campaign.³³ Apparently, it was not until he was imprisoned that he looked sorry, saying to a journalist who interviewed him in jail, 'this is how I am now'.³⁴



Sjachriel Darham. Photos are taken from www.indomedia.com

Sjachriel was a 'sinking' politician whose reputation could not be rescued. Political observers cite him as an example of corrupt punished leaders.³⁵ Guru Ahmad Bakeri failed to help him in the *pilkada*. Donations Sjachriel made to big *pesantren* and numerous communities did not seem to work to his advantage. His best *pilkada* result was in Kabupaten (district) Hulu Sungai Utara in which he finished third. In Kabupaten Kotabaru and Hulu Sungai Tengah he was last, while in the ten remaining Kabupaten he was second last, just like his overall ranking.

The damaged reputation of Sjachriel might, in fact, contribute to a temporary decrease in Guru Bakeri's charisma. One indication of this was the decreasing attendance at his *pengajian* as reported by some congregation of the provincial mosque, Mesjid Raya Sabilal Muhtadin. Guru Bakeri's association with a controversial politician who faced many corruption allegations and was finally convicted rebounded on him. Some of his congregation chose to attend the *pengajian*

http://www.insideindonesia.org/content/view/110/29/ (viewed 12 October 2007)

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³³ However, in the report of the campaign fund usage that Sjachriel submitted to the South Kalimantan KPU, there was no mention of this remaining fund (*sisa dana*). See Mohammad Effendy, *Potret Pemilihan Gubernur*, pp. 188-9

³⁴ http://www.banjarmasinpost.co.id/content/view/29259/288 (viewed September 2008)

³⁵ For example, Marcus Mietzner, 'Local democracy, Old elites are still in power, but direct elections now give voters a choice', *Inside Indonesia*, Jan-March 2006

of another *tuan guru*, Guru Juhdi, who avoided politics. But there are several other reasons why people prefer Guru Juhdi. First, he does not make indecent jokes as often as Guru Bakeri does.³⁶ Second, Guru Juhdi explains sophisticated Islamic concepts in simple language, whereas Guru Bakeri sometimes uses complicated terminology.³⁷ Guru Bakeri, however, is still popular and his *pengajian* in Mesjid Raya and in many other places is still attracting hundreds or even thousands of attendees. This may indicate that people are quick to 'forgive' him and accept that his involvement with Sjachriel was mainly motivated by the urge to maintain his *pesantren*. Besides, people come to him mainly for his deep understanding of Islam, so when he talks politics, they turn off.

Conclusion

The prominence of Islam during the *pilkada* campaign could be deceiving. It has led some observers to think that Islam is the key factor determining the performance of the candidates. The case studies discussed above show us the multi-causal relationship between Islam and other factors to explain the *pilkada*. By considering multi-causal relationship, the performance of the candidates, from excellent to poor, could be better understood. Islam without reference to a shrewd campaign and importantly, good reputation, does not explain the achievement of Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi. The same analysis more obviously works regarding the poor performance of Sjachriel Darham who had Islamic elements in his campaign but lacked other factors such as a clean name and enough preparation. If we check the winning candidates' secret formula, not only did they possess what the Ismet-Habib Aboe team had i.e. heavy Islamic elements and a good image, they also had a longer preparation and sufficient funds to endure the long campaign (compare with Hairansyah 2005, Effendy 2006). In all cases, Islam serves as the basic ingredient but success is contingent upon the presence of other qualities to help enlarge the candidates' share of votes.

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³⁶ Interview with four attendants of *pengajian* of Mesjid Raya Sabilal Muhatadin, Banjarmasin, 15 May and 2 June 2008. My field observations Banjarmasin, 9, 15 and 16 May 2008

³⁷ Interview with Pak No, 13 May 2008; My field observations Banjarmasin, 9, 15 and 16 May 2008

This contingency is a reflection of people's voting behavior. That is, voters consider multiple reasons, from a candidate's Islamic credentials, to their capability and to their record of accomplishments. Voters may not be very critical of what the candidates presented and promised. Yet they respond according to what they know, and they voted out a leader like Sjachriel. Unfortunately, the image that the candidates constructed during the campaign might belie the reality. Thus, voters gave a big share to a clean-image candidate like Ismet Ahmad who turned out not to be that clean. In 2007, he was investigated for a corruption allegation and became defendant but his case has not been tried until now. Had this happened prior to the *pilkada*, the story would have been different. But of course, the voters of South Kalimantan would not deliver victory to non Muslim candidates even if they have good and clean reputations. That is to say, Islam is still an important consideration.

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CHAPTER THREE

PRAGMATIC OR IDEALISTIC:

Tuan Guru's Motivation to Campaign for Candidates

Sjachriel has done a lot, here. He bought [this pesantren] a tractor... and put me in charge of the managing board of Mesjid Raya. When he asked for help [in the campaign], I had to lend a hand.

- Guru Ahmad Bakeri, the head of Pesantren al-Mursyidul Amin, Gambut¹

They did not donate to this *pesantren*. In fact, I spent my own money when hosting them in my home and accompanying them to socialize their candidacy in Barabai. The other candidates donated, but I supported Ismet-Habib Aboe because they are clean and pious.

- Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, the head of Pesantren Nurul Muhibbien, Barabai²

Introduction

One consequence of being a popular *tuan guru* is attracting politicians. The thousands of people attending *tuan guru's pesantren* and *pengajian* (Islamic learning forums) are potential voters. No serious politician can afford to leave this bulk of voters untouched without trying to win them over. Making contacts and cultivating good relationships with the men who lead the masses is one way of doing it. In effect, popular *tuan guru* often find themselves collaborating with politicians. Some like it because the contacts potentially lead to mutual relations or even political careers for them or their families. Others dislike it as they avoid politics and because most of the politicians come to exploit them for political gain, not for religious consultation. In principle, the politicians want *tuan guru* to help them getting votes.

¹ Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008

² Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, Barabai, 31 May 2008

This is not something new. During the New Order period, many *ulama* delivered votes to the regime's party, Golkar, in exchange for patronage and protection of their communities (Bruinessen 1994).³ They abandoned the call to channel Muslim votes to the only Islamic party then, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party) because they found it not only unprofitable but also harmful. The 'stick and carrot' method of the New Order regime made them side with the government. Rather than face oppression and intimidation, they chose limited political and economic advancement. Political Islam and Muslim solidarity, although desirable and laudable in hardship for some Muslims, came at too high a price.

The fall of Suharto in 1998 changed Indonesia's political environment significantly. Politics was freed from state intimidation and has opened up, leading to the proliferation of political parties, roughly half of which are Islamic. Two free and fair elections were held in 1999 and 2004. Golkar no longer has the single majority and has to compete equally with other parties, without state support as in the New Order period. More recent changes mean that political executives from president to bupati are elected directly by the people. Under these new circumstances, the political role of *ulama* as a source for support mobilisation appears to continue. The indications for this include the fact that *pesantren* and *pengajian* are visited by candidates at the election time and *ulama*, as discussed in the previous chapter, are recruited as campaigners. There is furthermore,/a new trend that suggests the expansion of the ulama's political role: they compete for political power. Some ulama run as candidates, and several of them successfully come to power: Abdurrahman Wahid, who became president (1999-2001) is the prime example of this trend; but other ulama have served as governors, as in West Nusa Tenggara, or bupatis (regency or district heads) or deputy *bupati*, as in Kebumen and Madura.⁴ Many have also been

³ Bruinessen, Martin van. (1990) 'Indonesia's ulama and politics: caught between legitimising the status quo and searching for alternatives', *Prisma — The Indonesian Indicator* (Jakarta), No. 49, 52-69.

⁴ For a study on Kiai and Politics in Kebumen see, Sidik Jatmika, Kiai dan Politik Lokal, Studi Kasus Reposisi Politik Kiai NU Kebumen, Jawa Tengah Memanfaatkan Peluang Keterbukaan Partisipasi di Era Reformasi, Doctoral Thesis in the Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, unpublished. The recent study on Madurese Kiai see, Abdul Gaffar Karim, 'Pesantren in Power: religious

elected as members of parliament at both local and national levels, although this is not entirely new because in the 1950s this had occurred. \Box_{ii} $\Box_{$

The opening up of politics can explain why *ulama* compete for political power: as members of a religious elite, they, like members of other elites, may have political aspirations that they can now seek to fulfil. But what of those *ulama* who do not seek political office and confine themselves mainly to education but find themselves being approached by politicians to secure their votes? What does this new political situation mean for them? Does it change the way they see politics and politicians? With the absence of tight state control and intimidation (the New Order's stick), what seems to remain is the incentive: political and economic advancement. What one could conclude from that is that the motivation of *ulama* now to support aspiring politicians is mainly advancement, either personal or of their communities.

In this chapter, I examine the extent to which this conclusion is true. On the whole, I think the argument carries some truth but it reflects only one side of the reality. There are some *tuan guru* primarily motivated by the hope of advancement. However, the other side of the new reality is that as a result of greater political freedom, those *tuan guru* with particular visions of politics or who are associated with cultural and religious sentiment can freely support whomever they want regardless of the rewards they get in return. In other words, economic and political advancement are not only *tuan guru's* driving motivations. With reference to the 2005 South Kalimantan gubernatorial *pilkada*, I will demonstrate that these two groupings of *tuan guru* exist side by side: those who choose to support candidates for idealistic reasons, and those who base their decisions on calculations of future gain.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to examining the *tuan guru* who were involved in the campaigns of gubernatorial candidates. The first section discusses *tuan guru* who are motivated by service exchange. The following section studies

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institutions and Political recruitment in Sumenep, Madura', Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, v.42, no.1, 2008: (157)-184.

those motivated by non-material rewards or exchange. In the conclusion, I offer some implications of these findings to the political role of *ulama* as vote getters.

Exchanging Service

As was true during the New Order period, the exchanging of services was an important motivation for *tuan guru* to support politicians in the 2005 *pilkada*. While this exchange works similarly in all places, namely each party gives something or service for the other, some variations may not exist outside South Kalimantan. I discovered two kinds of service exchange, both of which were marked by tacit negotiations. First, politicians and *tuan guru* cultivated good relationships prior to the *pilkada* involving donations, facilities and positions in religious establishments given by the former to the latter. Such actions created a sense of indebtedness on the part of the *tuan guru*, and when the election arrived and the politicians asked them to help campaign, the *tuan guru* found it morally difficult to deny them. Some *tuan guru* predicted this beforehand and answered the call positively when the request came. Others took advantage of the obscurity of the donor's intention and opened their doors to other candidates as well, although in the end they still delivered the votes to the first candidate.

Second, *tuan guru* received honoraria for campaigning for the candidates, and when the candidates won, they received bonuses in various forms. Candidates often did not make it clear what *tuan guru* were going to gain if they helped with the campaigning. This was particularly the case with *tuan guru* who did not have *pesantren*. Such *tuan guru*, although popular, have more difficulties securing the votes of their followers than those heads of *pesantren* who exert more influence over their students. Politicians still counted on the *tuan guru* because voters outside the *pesantren* community outnumbered that of the *pesantren* community. But without specific promises, politicians have flexibility when they need to pay back the *tuan guru*.

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Sense of indebtedness: the case of Guru Ahmad Bakeri

Guru Ahmad Bakeri (born 1959) is a *tuan guru* who became political to develop his *pesantren*.⁵ He joined Golkar in the New Order period expecting road building and electricity installation to reach his *pesantren*'s area. He correctly identified that only the government, which was controlled by Golkar, could provide such infrastructure. The road and electricity improve the quality and accessibility of his *pesantren* and in turn, attract more students to come. The price he had to pay was his removal from the list of Friday sermon deliverers in a Banjarmasin based mosque whose manager was a PPP ideological supporter. It is worth noting that until 1982 voters in Banjarmasin city always favored of PPP over Golkar.⁶

Guru Bakeri started his career by holding a regular *pengajian* in a village expounding his knowledge of Islamic teachings to the community. He married the daughter of a *Penghulu* (a person in charge of conducting marriage ceremonies and, at the same time, a person of Islamic knowledge in a village) who was a rich landowner.⁷ Having enough support and sufficient resources, he opened Pesantren al-Mursyidul Amin in the early 1980s. Over time, the number of *pengajian* he gave increased, reflecting the growth of his popularity. In 2008, he had 21 regular *pengajian* every week; three of them were attended by 1000 to 5000 people.⁸ He is invited to neighboring



⁵ Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008

⁶ Kevin Evans, Sejarah Pemilu dan Parpol di Indonesia (Jakarta: PT. Arise Consultancies, 2003), p. 92

⁷ Interview with Saifuddin (pseudonym), a villager living close to Guru Bakeri's *Pesantren*, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008

⁸ Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008

provinces as well to give talks. Furthermore, his *pesantren* accommodates over 800 students, male and female; around half of them live in the *pesantren* complex.⁹ This has all been achieved before reaching 50 years of age.

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The more popular he has become, the easier it is for him to collect donations of cash, land and building materials for the *pesantren*.¹⁰ The list of donors ranges from ordinary people to the rich composed mainly of landowners, traders and government officials. Since the year of 2000, one government official who generously provided facilities for this *pesantren* was Governor Sjachriel Darham. As discussed below, Governor Sjachriel's donations were the motivation for Guru Bakeri's political support of Sjachriel. However, Guru Bakeri is also notable for having an independent source of income, namely hectares of paddy fields. He keeps accumulating *pesantren* wealth by trading and providing services from leasing to hajj supervision (*bimbingan ibadah haji*) the profits of which are returned to the *pesantren* community.¹¹ Thus, he supports his *pesantren* by combining service exchange with politicians and independent societal fund raising, as well as other types of economic activity.

In the 2005 gubernatorial *pilkada*, Guru Bakeri campaigned for Sjachriel Darham. The story of the relationship between these two is an excellent illustration of *ulama* and politicians exchanging services. Governor Sjachriel bought a tractor and a water tanker for Guru Bakeri's *pesantren*.¹² The tractor was to make the cultivation of his vast paddy fields efficient, while the tanker was to transport clean water for the *pesantren* community which is even today still not connected to the state-owned water supply. When this *pesantren* was building a new *musalla* (a house of prayer

¹² Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008 and my field observation,

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⁹ Interview with Fakhriadi, a junior teacher in al-Mursyidul Amin, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008

¹⁰ Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008

¹¹ This *pesantren* charges low student fees (300,000 rupiah a year exclusive of meals and 7,000 rupiah each month for electricity). It pays the salaries of its teachers annually (from five million rupiah) in advance. It also provides free food during Ramadan for students who wish to remain in the *pesantren* and a package of basic needs (*sembako*) for every teacher. It has built new classrooms, *musalla* and dormitories, established a radio station and, recently, provides all teachers with health insurance, something never before heard of in any *pesantren* in South Kalimantan. (Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, his brother and a junior teacher named Fakhriadi, Gambut, Banjar District 24 May 2008)

which does not hold Friday prayers), Sjachriel donated over 25 million rupiah.¹³ Governor Sjachriel also appointed Guru Bakeri to manage the provincial mosque, which is subsidized by the government. This appointment, although not rewarding financially, improved his profile and gave him elevated status. He, a village man, *pesantren* educated only, holding no single formal academic title, now manages the provincial mosque.¹⁴ Moreover, talking to Sjachriel was easy for Guru Bakeri, creating a solution for others who needed help to lobby the governor, as was the case of the head of the South Kalimantan Religious Affairs Department (DEPAG) who wanted to build a mosque in the province's Asrama Haji¹⁵. Overall, Guru Bakeri was impressed by Sjachriel's way of treating him and he felt indebted. All of these took place before the *pilkada* period.

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Participation in Sjachriel's campaign functions in June 2005 was Guru Bakeri's repayment. Citing a Qur'anic verse, "Shall the reward of good' be anything but good",¹⁶ Guru Bakeri sees his involvement as an observance of a moral obligation, which is to help a person who had done him favors.¹⁷ "Sjachriel wanted the second term so, I helped him, mindless of the final outcome as it was up to the people to decide", says Guru Bakeri in retrospect.¹⁸ As evidence of his participation as payback, he claims to have returned a 10 million rupiah honorarium delivered by Sjachriel's assistant to him.¹⁹

¹³ Interview with Fakhriadi, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008


¹⁴ Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008

 ¹⁵ Asrama Haji is the facility to train and to accommodate hajj pilgrims before departing to and upon their return from Mecca. Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008
 ¹⁶ Al-Qur'an, Chapter (*surah*) ar-Rahman, verse 60. The translation is from Abdel Haleem, *The Qur'an* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 355.

¹⁷ Interview with Ustadz Abdurrahman, a colleague of Guru Bakeri, Banjarbaru, 22 May 2008; with Ustadz Husni Nurin, a preacher, Banjarmasin, 8 May 2008.

¹⁸ Interview with Guru Bakeri, Gambut, Kabupaten Banjar, 24 May 2008

¹⁹ Interview with Guru Bakeri, Gambut, Kabupaten Banjar, 24 May 2008



Built on paddy fields a). classrooms and b). dormitory of pesantren al-Mursyidul Amin, Gambut, Banjar district, South Kalimantan

c). Students of al Mursyidul Amin are bathing and taking ablutions in the river in front of the pesantren complex. Clean water is used for drinking and cooking only.d). The newly built *musalla* of Pesantren al-Mursyidul Amin.

Tacit negotiation

The negotiation between Sjachriel and Guru Bakeri on exchanging services was tacit, not clearly expressed. Sjachriel did not mention that he wanted political support when he provided facilities and made donations. He did not want to leave an impression that he was not sincere. However, Guru Bakeri did not seem surprised when Sjachriel asked for his participation in the campaign, as if he had predicted this in advance. Apparently, he was aware that nothing is free in politics and he played this straight.

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In comparison, the head of another large *pesantren* played with the unspoken interest behind donations made by politicians. He understood that politicians must have hidden interests when they show generosity, especially during election time. His policy was that he would not accept any donation tied to a commitment to support a particular candidate. The candidates who visited the *pesantren* usually said vaguely that they sought support, blessing or prayers, and the tuan guru diplomatically answered, "Insya Allah, we'll support you and pray for you".²⁰ But, so long as the politicians did not state clearly that they expected his students' votes, which was often the case, he would pretend that they were sincere and did not want anything in return. He also refused to have voting booths inside the *pesantren* complex, avoiding the revelation of the community's political choice. Rather than being trapped in politicians' games, this tuan guru played the politicians. In effect, his pesantren benefited from four gubernatorial candidates. Sjachriel funded the construction of a new wing of the dormitory and another floor of pesantren library. Rudy Ariffin, Ismet Ahmad and Gusti Iskandar made donations when they visited this pesantren prior to the pilkada. A student of this pesantren was awarded a travel grant to the Hadramaut,²¹ Yemen, a scheme initiated by Rudy Ariffin to attract pesantren communities' support. At the end, however, the head of this pesantren advised their students to allocate their votes to the four candidates who had donated.²² This was the quid pro quo for the politicians' efforts from this tuan guru. We do not know if the students obeyed this and neither does the tuan guru, because they voted in the same poll station as the voters from the neighboring area, but that did not matter to him.

In exchanging services, politicians and *tuan guru* negotiated but, many times, tacitly. They did not really talk about the price that should be paid for political support. They did not even directly mention the delivering of votes when donations were handed in. In a way, this is a kind of 'gentle politics' involving unspoken messages from both

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²⁰ Confidential interview, Barabai, 30 May 2008

²¹ Hadramaut is a new destination for traditionalist Muslims to study and make pilgrimage to. / Interview with Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008

²² Confidential interview, Barabai, 30 May 2008

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parties. Politicians do not wish to impress that they want to buy votes with the donations; they want to show concern to get sympathy. On the other hand, *tuan guru* do not mind helping if politicians show some efforts. But, the unspoken messages also mean obscure messages. The discussion above suggests that it would be disadvantageous for politicians if *tuan guru* chose to play out the obscurity. But, as suggested below, the obscurity can also give politicians greater flexibility when it comes to rewarding *tuan guru*. This usually happens to popular *tuan guru* who do not have *pesantren* and have cemented a relationship with the politician before the election.

Campaigning for honoraria and other rewards

Tuan guru generally receive honoraria for their 'religious services' such as delivering Islamic lectures and leading various rites. For some of them, 'honoraria are a secondary source of income, which is morally acceptable and legally permissible.²³ Thus, when the practice of giving honoraria was brought into the campaign, some *tuan guru* may have been after the money when they agreed to participate. Besides, it would have occurred to them that politicians who had resources to run in an election must have had deep pockets.

In line with the tacit negotiation practice, candidates did not state the actual amount of the honoraria when they asked *tuan guru* to give talks. There is a practical explanation for this: most popular *tuan guru* in South Kalimantan do not have managers that negotiate such things as honoraria, transportation and so on. In addition, the local culture still considers it taboo to negotiate amounts when the matter is seen as being more about helping each other than doing pure business.

²³ However, there are Sufi teachers who teach their pupils to be economically self-sufficient, if not rich, before they start teaching and preaching. Guru Muhammad Zaini; my personal notes when I attended his *pengajian* in the late 1990s. Guru Bakeri also quotes Guru Zaini's argument to legitimize himself as being a rich *Tuan Guru*. Interview with Guru Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar district, 24 May 2008. Although receiving honoraria does not necessarily denote insincerity, they argue that sincerity (*ikhlas*) is easier to achieve if one is self-sufficient. One substantial sign of sincerity, another *tuan guru* argues, is calmness: those who grumble are not sincere. Guru Zuhdi in his weekly lecture in Mesjid Raya Sabilal Muhtadin. My field notes on 15 May 2008.

Besides, it would appear materialistic if a *tuan guru* put a price tag on his time and services. Thus, it was entirely up to the candidates to decide how much they wished to compensate the *tuan guru*, which in turn led to variations in the amounts. Nevertheless, there seemed to be a loose guideline: the honoraria should not be less than what a *tuan guru* usually got from giving a sermon. Thus the more popular a *tuan guru*, the larger the amount a candidate must pay. Evidence suggests that the range is between a hundred thousand and one million rupiah per session.²⁴

I would argue that while honoraria are important in some cases, in general they cannot satisfactorily explain the motivations of Tuan Guru. First, popular *tuan guru* could generate the same amount of money without getting involved in any campaigning. We would find at most a few not-so-popular-*tuan guru* who might be driven by honoraria, because the candidates preferred those with big names who in fact had alternative sources of income. Second, if honoraria had been a significant driving force, one would have seen *tuan guru* rushing to support the financially strongest candidates, such as Sjachriel Darham, which they did not in fact do. That is to say, honoraria explain some but not all of the behavior of *tuan guru*. However, because receiving honoraria was standard and the money was reasonably good, we also cannot discount the importance of the payment of honoraria as a motivation for some *tuan guru*. One *tuan guru*, for instance, told me of his disappointment in only getting two 'envelopes' (i.e. honoraria) for speaking in three different campaign events.²⁵

Moreover, there were clearly *tuan guru* who looked for longer term rewards beyond honoraria. They, while also accepting the money, had a personal agenda with the candidates. They wanted to improve their personal relations with important politicians, in the hope this would lead to economic and political opportunities. This motivation was strong enough to make them work hard during the campaign, perhaps harder than the activists of the nominating parties. Thus, candidates got serious and

²⁴ Calculated based on the information given by various *Tuan Guru* campaigners.

²⁵ Confidential interview 9 June 2008

hardworking *tuan guru* who campaigned in exchange for future rewards. Since the ability of the politicians to deliver their promises was still dependent on the *pilkada* results, essentially, this kind of *tuan guru* was wagering on the fate of the candidates. But when the candidates won, the *tuan guru* found themselves rewarded.

Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff (b. 1979) is the prime example of this type of tuan guru.²⁶ He is a young and talented *ulama* with ambition and, perhaps, luck because he supported the would-be winning candidates, Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan NB. Born into an *ulama* family, he was sent to study Islam in the Hadramaut, Yemen. As a fresh graduate, he started up a promising pengajian in his parent's house in Banjarmasin city, attracting mainly young people. He also organized weekly local pilgrimages to the graves of holy figures with a group of Banjarmasin youth. He and his family later attracted the attention of the city's PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Prosperity Party) branch which was broadening its political base to face the 2004 general elections. Habib Ali was included in the party's advisory board, and PKS nominated three of his cousins as legislative candidates in Banjarmasin municipality electorate. This was the first major political experience of the family, which unfortunately turned sour, leading to the termination of their relationship with PKS. In 2004, Habib Ali's cousins were not elected as parliamentarians although they gained larger votes, three to five times more than those of the top list party candidates. Apparently, their votes did not exceed the minimum number of votes that allowed any candidate to win a seat. In such case, the election law stipulated that the votes were added to the votes of the first listed candidates, who then took the seats in the DPRD Banjarmasin. Moreover, the party activists did not show up again in Habib Ali's pengajian, and then Habib Ali was removed from the party's advisory board, making it clear that the party had used the family for electoral purposes only. Feeling very disappointed, the family eventually decided to announce publicly that they no longer had any association with PKS. Surprised with this response, PKS politicians approached the family but it was too late.

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²⁶ The information in this section is based on my interview with Habib Ali Haidar Al-Kaff, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008 and Arridla Armawan, a local journalist, Banjarmasin, 14 May 2008.

Habib Ali's second chance to enter the world of politics came from his relationship with Rudy Ariffin in 2005. Rudy met Habib Ali in January when he was recruiting campaigners.²⁷ Impressed by this young *tuan guru*, Rudy added Habib Ali to his 'army' of campaigners, which was mainly composed of PPP and PKB activists and *tuan guru* who were affiliated with the parties. The late Guru Zaini Sekumpul, the spiritual father and teacher of Rudy, supported Habib Ali's entry on to Rudy's team. Thus Habib Ali was a non-aligned individual working with party activists. When Rudy traveled across the province to meet potential voters, Habib Ali was always with him.²⁸ He proposed the travel grant program to Hadramaut, mentioned above. He was also involved in lobbied some *tuan guru* and overtly supported Rudy. Moreover, he participated in all campaign functions held by the Rudy-Rosehan team in June 2005. In short, he was an important member of Rudy's team.



After Rudy won the *pilkada*, Habib Ali was well rewarded. He was one of two people who got a car from Rudy, creating jealousy among the members of the Rudy-Rosehan team.²⁹ Here, 'the tacit negotiation' gives flexibility to Rudy. That is, while there were other members of the team who also deserved the reward because of their hard work, Rudy only gave the cars to Habib Ali and one other *tuan guru*. In the same vein, Rudy rewarded still another *tuan guru* who actually spoke only in two informal campaign events with

²⁷ Interview with Habib Ali, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008

²⁸ Interview with Habib Ali, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008; with Jamhuri, a member of Rudy-Rosehan team, Banjarmasin, 3 May 2008; with Ustadz Husni Nurin, a PKB local parliamentarian, Banjarmasin, 8 May 2008.

²⁹ Interview with Guru Hamdan Khalid, Amuntai, 3 June 2008; with Ahmad Syazali, an activist in a Banjarmasin based NGO, LK3 [spell this out here if not previously mentioned], Banjarmasin, 2 and 3 May 2008

a free hajj pilgrimage.³⁰ Moreover, when Rudy assumed the leadership of the South Kalimantan PPP in 2007, he appointed Habib Ali a deputy with a newly created portfolio on Youth and Religion. Finally, Habib Ali also joined the trips to the annual commemoration of the death (*haulan*) of Guru Syarwani Abdan Bangil, in East Java and of Habib Anis, Solo, in Central Java. Rudy and Rosehan funded the trips to reward Nahdlatul Ulama *tuan guru* and their supporters.

Non-service exchange

Candidate identification

The motivation to support politicians is not limited to the attraction of exchanging services or expecting material rewards. There are other factors that are rather more intangible like identification with the candidates, and membership in ⁽ the parties that nominate the candidates. The term candidate identification is used here to mean that *tuan guru* think that particular candidates project their political ideals. The term also entails the belief that the candidate would be best in realizing his expectations. In the following case study, Tuan Guru Muhammad Bakhiet maintains that qualities such as probity and piousness are more important in a candidate than generosity, especially when it is politically motivated.



Like Guru Bakeri, Guru Muhammad Bakhiet is young and popular. Born in 1966, he is the head of Nurul Muhibbin, a complex encompassing a *pesantren*, an orphanage and a *pengajian* in Barabai, Hulu Sungai Tengah (HST) district.³¹ While the *pesantren* hosts

 ³⁰ Interview with Guru Supian, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008
 ³¹ Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet and Haris Fadilah, a junior staff in *pesantren* Nurul Muhibbien, Barabai, 31 May 2008

only around 900 students, his popularity is clearly demonstrated by his Monday night *pengajian*, to which approximately 5000 people come every week.³² Unlike Guru Bakeri however, Guru Bakhiet is not political. He does mix with politicians and advise his followers to vote for Islamic parties, but he does not do this for service exchange.³³ In his teens he was an ideological supporter of PPP³⁴, the only Islamic party then, but recently his sympathy falls to PKS. He says that PKS now reminds him of PPP in the 1980s when ordinary people were willing to donate something for the party.³⁵ He also shares the impression that many Indonesians have about PKS, that its parliamentarians are relatively 'clean' and more educated than the other parties'. In HST, PKS increased its seats in the district's parliament from 1 in 1999 to 6 in 2004.³⁶

It was not a surprise that in 2005 Guru Bakhiet supported the gubernatorial candidates nominated by PKS in coalition with PAN, Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi. The avowed reason, as stated in a news report that was very likely prepared by the candidates' team, was that Ismet and Habib Aboe were a combination of



professionalism and morality.³⁷ The two, he argued, would bring a better life for

³² Interview with Haris Fadilah, Barabai, 31 May 2008. The compact disks sold every week by the students of Nurul Muhibbien shows that the number is not an exaggeration.

³³ Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008; with Faqih Jurjani, the former chairman of PKS in HST district, Barabai, 29 May 2008; with Ilyas, the former chairman of PPP on HST district, Barabai, 2 June 2008

³⁴ In his second year of junior high school, Bakhiet decided to leave the school because a teacher frequently made jokes about PPP, for example, referring to it as the 'toilet party' not the 'ka'bah party'. Young Bakhiet took it as humiliating, so he went home and studied with his father in Barabai. He did not care that he only needed a year to finish his studies at that school. Apparently developments in the late 1970s, when pro-Islamic party people faced so much political pressure in various ways, influenced his thinking.

³⁵ Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet Nurul Muhibbien, Barabai, 31 May 2008.

³⁶ Interview with Faqih Jurjani, Barabai, 29 May 2008.

³⁷ 'Guru Bakhit dan Guru Pamangkih Dukung Penuh Ismet-Habib', *Banjarmasin Post, Kalimantan Post, Radar Banjarmasin,* 6 June 2005.

South Kalimantan society and piousness in every aspect of life.³⁸ In my interview with him, he mentioned two other things. First, he believed that both candidates had clean reputations. "I know both of them, in public and private life," he stated, "as I know Rudy Ariffin".³⁹ This implies that he contended that Ismet was cleaner than Rudy. Second, he admitted that his deep respect for the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad⁴⁰ was also at play. He supported the candidates because Aboe Bakar is a habib, and more importantly, a pious one. "I have known Habib Aboe since the 1999 general elections, and I have observed closely how he performs his daily worship", said Guru Bakhiet.⁴¹ Guru Bakhiet, in other words, appreciates the probity and piousness of his candidates.

One could ask the extent to which Guru Bakhiet knows the candidates and whether his comments reflect the reality or rather the images for electoral purposes. As mentioned in chapter two, in 2007, Ismet was charged with doing mark up in a construction project (the development of South Kalimantan hajj embarkation) but has not been tried. This project dates back to 2001, or four years before the gubernatorial *pilkada* was held, implicating several provincial officials. Moreover, there is a rumor among Banjarmasin journalists that would question the piousness of Habib Aboe. This *habib* has reportedly invited journalists to go to nightclubs,⁴² which, if it is true, does not fit with the image of pious Muslims, at least in South Kalimantan. My own impression is that Guru Bakhiet indeed believed what he saw then in Ismet and Habib Aboe prior to the *pilkada*. He also said that he did not regret his decision to support the candidates back then in 2005.43

³⁸ Ibid.

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³⁹ Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008

⁴⁰ Guru Bakhiet is well known as close to the descendants of Prophet Muhammad (Habaib). In his pengajian, there are always some habaib sitting beside him! He practices the Alawiyyin 'tarekat' with his jemaah, that is wirid/ ratib (holy sentences consist of prayers, Qur'anic verses, and salawat) composed by habaib from the Alawy clan. Teachers who gave him the ijazah (an official permit) to practice it are habaib, some from Martapura and others from Surabaya. Young habaib studying in his pesantren enjoy the privilege of free tuition and book fees, the same as the orphans. It is not an exaggeration to say that the descendants of Prophet have a special place in Guru Bakhiet's Nurul the Muhibbien.

⁴¹ Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008

⁴² Confidential interview with a journalist, Banjarmasin, 14 May 2008

⁴³ Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008

There is one important point that would appear to rule out money as Guru Bakhiet's primary motivation. Ismet and Habib Aboe did not give Nurul Muhibbin any donations during the *pilkada* campaign.⁴⁴ In fact, Guru Bakhiet spent some of his own money on hosting and accompanying the candidates to meet some communities in Barabai.⁴⁵ Golkar's candidates and Sjachriel Darham did donate five million rupiah each,⁴⁶ but Guru Bakhiet did not change his mind about supporting Ismet and Habib Aboe.



Guru Bakhiet's *pengajian* overflowed (*meluber*) with so many h). Male and i). Female attendees [or participants] that many of them had to sit outside *langgar* Nurul Muhibbien.

Membership in the nominating parties

With the exception of Guru Bakeri, none of the *tuan guru* we have discussed are affiliated with political parties. In analyzing them, I contend that the judgments of *tuan guru* of the candidates are more important than the nominating parties. Even Guru Bakeri who had been affiliated with Golkar did not support the party's candidates because Sjachriel Darham was more generous than Golkar to his *pesantren*. However, in the 2005 gubernatorial elections, there were *tuan guru* whose membership in the nominating parties was important in driving their political choice.

⁴⁴ Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008

⁴⁵ Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008

⁴⁶ Interview with Guru Bakhiet, Barabai, 30 May 2008

Here it is assumed that a *tuan guru*'s choice to follow the decision of his party regarding the nomination of particular candidates is because of his membership in that party. For the purpose of our discussion, I use case studies of Golkar and PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party) *tuan guru*.

Golkar tuan guru: the case of Guru Abdussyukur

Golkar in South Kalimantan provides influential *tuan guru* positions in the Council of Advisers (*Badan Penasehat*) whose role is largely symbolic. Historically, Golkar was a vehicle designed by the New Order regime to co-opt different functional groups and to support the regime. *Ulama* were one of its targets especially those associated with Nahdlatul Ulama which remained politically oppositionist at least until the late 1970s. Many *ulama* became Golkar supporters to avoid political intimidation and to gain economic and political advantages. While it was open to members from many different professional groups, Golkar consistently maintained its secular nature. *Ulama* in this party served as vote getters, not ideologues.

Guru Abdussyukur (died March 2007) of Martapura was a good example of a Golkar *tuan guru*. Popularly known as Guru Syukur, he was a director of Pesantren Darussalam of Martapura, one of the oldest and most populous *pesantren* in South Kalimantan. Darussalam is the reason why Martapura has been known as the city of *santri* and *ulama*. Guru Syukur's siding with Golkar in the New Order period, together with some other *tuan guru* of Darussalam outraged Martapura society, most of whom were traditional PPP voters.⁴⁷ Golkar, in return, rewarded the *pesantren* with easy access to government resources.⁴⁸ Guru Syukur remained affiliated with this party until his death. He was clearly a loyal supporter of Golkar, unlike Guru Khalilurrahman, his colleague in Darussalam, who joined PKB in 1998, or Guru Bakeri who switched allegiance to Sjachriel.

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⁴⁷ Interview with Gusti Jazuli, an adopted son of Guru Syukur and a PKB activist, Martapura, 20 May 2008; with Guru Khalilurrahman, a colleague of Guru Syukur, Martapura, 19 May 2008; with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, 24 May 2008.

⁴⁸ Interview with Guru Khalilurrahman, a colleague of Guru Syukur, Martapura, 19 May 2008.

Guru Syukur's loyalty to Golkar was further demonstrated in a 'claim battle' in local newspapers. Rudy's team attempted to use Guru Syukur to improve Rudy's popularity prior to the pilkada. The facts are as follow, Rudy Ariffin was the former bupati in Banjar district who ran as the PPP gubernatorial candidate. In June 2005, the month of the pilkada, Rudy's team claimed in a local paper that Guru Syukur had declared his support for Rudy and called on others to do so. According to the news report, Guru Syukur had stated this, at the opening ceremony of Mesjid al-Karomah after its 24-billion-rupiah renovation, on 24 March 2005.⁴⁹ Three days later, a picture of Guru Syukur with Rudy, as the then Bupati of Banjar district, appeared in a report about Rudy's policy to provide free health insurance for *ulama*.⁵⁰ In this report, Guru Syukur's supposed declaration of support was mentioned again. A few days later, Guru Syukur 'struck back', stating it was not true that he had pledged political support for Rudy, and that the free health insurance policy was implemented a very long time ago.⁵¹ Importantly, he also said that he had been with Golkar since the period of its establishment in the late 1960s and thus, in the 2005 *pilkada*, he would support Golkar's candidates. Guru Syukur made this clarification to show which side he took, and that was Golkar, not Rudy or PPP.

In analyzing the claim and its clarification, one might ask, who was wrong: Guru Syukur or Rudy's team? The news report indicated that it quoted Guru Syukur's own words, not a paraphrased sentence, let alone someone else's statement. A member of Rudy's team, Habib Ali, said that Guru Syukur did state his political support for Rudy but because Golkar put political pressure on him, he made the clarification.⁵² I could not confirm whether Habib Ali was present at that time or not, nor could I confirm the existence of political pressure by Golkar. However, it is reasonable to think that Habib Ali might be biased given the fact that he was an overt supporter of

^{49 &#}x27;Rudy Ariffin dan Sejarah Mesjid al-Karomah Martapura', Kalimantan Post, 3 June 2005

⁵⁰ 'Rudy Berikan Asuransi Kesehatan Gratis kepada Ulama', Kalimantan Post and Radar Banjarmasin, 6 June 2005

⁵¹ This means that he admitted that the free health insurance was true, not a lie while implying the giver, namely Rudy Ariffin, was not sincere (*ikhlas*) because he exploited it for political purposes. ⁵² Interview with Habib Ali, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008

Rudy.⁵³ Another source, who can justifiably act as a character witness, Gusti Jazuli, an adopted son of Guru Syukur, disputed Habib Ali's statement. He said that Guru Syukur would have not made such a public statement because it was not his style.⁵⁴ He was not there, however, when Guru Syukur was said to have made such a statement. Interestingly, he was the chairman of PKB in the Banjar district which nominated Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan. Finally, Guru Khalilurrahman, a senior PKB ulama, a colleague of Guru Syukur in Pesantren Darussalam, and who attended the opening ceremony the news report referred to, testified that Guru Syukur did not make such a statement.⁵⁵ What he did say, according to Guru Khalil, was to express gratitude to Rudy for the renovation of Mesjid al-Karomah which would have not been accomplished without his willingness to use the district budget (Anggaran Daerah) in his capacity as Bupati (district head). I tend to believe Guru Khalil's testimony as the truth because not only he was present in the ceremony but also because of the fact that he was from PKB.

However, the question as to who told the truth or who fabricated a story cannot change one undisputable fact: Guru Syukur supported Golkar and its candidates, as he had consistently in the past. And, if we want to find out his motivation for supporting the Gusti Iskandar-Hafiz Anshari team, Golkar's nominees in the gubernatorial elections, it is reasonable to argue that it was his affiliation with Golkar that motivated him.

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⁵³ During my interview with him, Habib Ali made some statements that make me cautious in judging the truth of what he states.

 ⁵⁴ Interview with Gusti Jazuli, Martapura, 20 May 2008.
 ⁵⁵ Interview with Guru Khalilurrahman, Martapura, 19 May 2008



PKB tuan guru: the case of Guru Khalilurrahman

In 2005, Guru Khalilurrahman was the chairman of the Dewan Syura in the South Kalimantan PKB, a person with the highest authority within the party.⁵⁶ He is the colleague of Guru Abdussyukur mentioned above. He has a long political career and has been affiliated with three different parties: Nahdlatul Ulama, Golkar and PKB. In

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⁵⁶ All information in this paragraph is based on my interview with Guru Khalilurrahman in Martapura, Banjar district, on 19 May 2008.

the 1971 general elections, he campaigned for NU and became a candidate for Pe regional assembly in Banjar district. However, being an NU activist and, at the same time, a public servant, in the 1970s was not easy, especially because of the imposition of the 'mono-loyalty' ideology. That is, a public servant had to be loyal to the government which was controlled by Golkar. Affiliation with other political parties was considered as breaking this loyalty, and therefore a public servant had to choose between continuing to work for the government, or resigning and working for his preferred party. The amalgamation of NU and other Islamic parties to form PPP in 1973 gave Guru Khalilurrahman a second reason to join Golkar, the same decision taken by his colleagues in Pesantren Darussalam. He said that their intention to join Golkar was to develop the *pesantren*. He then served as a district parliamentarian for Golkar for two periods (1982-1992) but had no position in the Golkar board. In 1992, Guru Khalilurrahman he retired early from the public service, after which he felt free from any obligation to support Golkar. In 1998, he helped to establish PKB in Martapura, which he then represented in the DPR (1999-2004). He did not specifically mention his reasons for joining PKB. However, I believe there are two main reasons. First, he felt that PKB as a party fitted his politics as a *nahdliyyin* more than Golkar, because Nahdlatul Ulama facilitated the creation of PKB. Second, since PKB was newly created in 1998, joining it guaranteed him an important position within the party. If he have joined PPP, which also appealed to NU followers, he

would have had to compete with the older activists there, and his association in the past with Golkar, the traditional enemy of PPP in Martapura and South Kalimantan, would have made this challenging for him. Thus the reasons appear to be both ideological and political.



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What clearly motivated Guru Khalilurrahman during the *pilkada* was the intention to support PKB's choice of candidate. Rosehan NB, the candidate, was the party's chairman and he had good relations with the rest of the board. There was no divisive friction in the provincial board of PKB: Rosehan's team was solid. Politically, pairing the candidates of PKB and PPP was promising since both the parties were closely associated with NU followers who comprised a very large portion of the voters. It was logical for them to support Rosehan and his running mate.

Conclusion

In the age of political freedom, *ulama* engage in political activity to seek advancement as well as to manifest political ideals. Their popularity and influence over their pupils and followers are commodities for trading with politicians, if they wish to use them. *Ulama* can benefit from donations and various facilities offered by the candidates in exchange for their masses' votes. "Why reject opportunities when they come to you", is perhaps the question beating around in their minds. Indeed, some of the *ulama* are self-sufficient and can manage to provide facilities on their own, but gaining them without so much effort is seen by many as not a bad idea. Making a statement of support or speaking in a couple of campaign events is not that difficult. Besides, the community at large may also benefit either directly or indirectly from this 'cooperation'. *Ulama* deal with politicians who desperately need popular support without which they can forget their ambitions. *Ulama* understand this and act accordingly. The case studies above show us that *tuan guru* campaigned for the gubernatorial candidates who bought their *pesantren* a tractor or a water tank, or who would could offer the chance of a promising career in the future.

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However, some *tuan guru* put material rewards to the side and stood up for their political ideals. They supported those candidates whom they believed possessed the qualities needed to be good and successful leaders, but who did not necessarily have abundant money. The *tuan guru* spent their own money, not to mention their precious time, to help boost the electability of these candidates. They regarded their

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contribution to society as not limited to teaching and preaching only, but to help elect responsible and committed leaders as well. They were able to withstand the temptation of easy funds, and maybe positions, offered by other candidates.

Looking at the big picture, the trends are more of continuity rather than of change from the practices in the New Order period. Kiai Musta'in Romly of Jombang sided with Golkar in the mid 1970s for similar reason as Guru Bakeri, namely exchanging services.⁵⁷ On the other hand, many NU kiais endured political intimidation and kept supporting PPP at least until the early 1980s. The only difference is perhaps that political freedom makes the second attitude, i.e. supporting politicians who fit with *tuan guru's* political ideals, more common. Now, with the absence of state intimidation, the choices are between pragmatism and idealism. The 2005 gubernatorial *pilkada* in South Kalimantan suggests that idealism can motivate *tuan guru*, if they are self-sufficient (that is, not reliant on honoraria from political candidates) and do not have political ambitions. The *tuan guru* might be wrong about their candidates. They could also be disappointed if the candidates are unable to realize their ideals after being in power. Nevertheless, their appreciation of values is a precious possession that could inspire the society or next generation.

With the continued importance of *ulama* as vote getters, we will see the two motivations and political attitudes prevailing. Only the extent to which each of them move *ulama* will fluctuate according to the political environment.

⁵⁷ For more on Kiai Musta'in Romly and his *pesantren, tarekat* and politics in the 1970s and 1980s, see Endang Turmudi, *Struggling for the Ummah, changing leadership roles of Kiai in Jombang, East Java,* Doctoral Thesis at the Department of Sociology, the Australian National University, (Canberra: ANU E Press 1996); Sukamto, *Kepemimpinan Kiai dalam Pesantren,* (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES, 1999); and Chapter 5 of Martin van Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa dan Pencarian Wacana Baru,* (Yogyakarta: LKiS dan Pustaka Pelajar, 1994).

CHAPTER FOUR

Political Players and Self Interested Leaders? Tuan Guru as Campaigners

The role of *ulama* in elections for regional heads varies from place to place. In the 2005 gubernatorial *pilkada* in South Kalimantan, *tuan guru* acted as campaigners, not as candidates or political playmakers. Ben Hillman's observation (2005) succinctly describes their function as 'useful assistants' to mobilise support and to make the candidates' political performances lively.¹ *Tuan guru*, of course, were not the only people the candidates counted on for mobilisation.

This chapter discusses the various activities of *tuan guru* to help the campaigns of their candidates. It shows the differences in terms of the timing and frequency of *tuan guru* involvement. I conclude that the *tuan guru* are rational and active political players who calculate the benefit and harm of participating in campaigns.

Further, I look at the rewards given to *tuan guru* by the candidates and then question who are the ultimate beneficiaries : the *tuan guru* and their families or the broaden Muslim community. In effect, I seek to evaluate whether the *tuan guru* act primarily out of self interest, or in the interests of the communities they represent, as they themselves would argue.

Nahdlatul Ulama provides examples of *kiai* who enriched themselves and also *kiai* who used the wealth gained from politics for advancement of the institutions or communities that they led. In his discussion about corruption within NU in the 1950s, Fealy (1998) cited the example of Kiai Munir Abisudjak, who lived a lavish lifestyle while responsible for managing many of NU's assets. According to Fealy, Kiai Munir later sold off many of the organisation's assets or transferred them into his private possessions, which led NU members to depict him as 'the

¹ Ben Hillman, 'New Election, Old Politics', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan/Feb 2006; 169, 1, p. 28.

kiai who was ruined by money'.² The Kiai Munir case shows that Islamic scholars can act in a self-interested way. In contrast, other accounts suggest that *kiai* distribute money that they raise for scholarships,³ for their students who establish new *pesantren*,⁴ and primarily, for their *pesantren*'s development.⁵ In such cases, *ulama* are community-oriented people.

In this chapter, I argue that the rewards resulting from *tuan guru* involvement in the *pilkada* campaign benefited both *tuan guru* and their institutions. Thus, the *tuan guru* do not act purely out of self interest. I must also say that this study represents a preliminary examination of these issues, and therefore, it is not comprehensive. Nonetheless, I believe that the data provided does offer some initial information that will hopefully spur deeper research on this issue.

The activities of tuan guru in campaign

In general, *tuan guru* engaged in three types of activities to help their candidates. To begin with, they participated actively in campaign events by leading prayers or giving talks. Secondly, they encouraged their pupils, outside official campaign events, to vote for their candidates. Finally, they supported the candidates by making statements of support or by lobbying other leaders to join the effort.

However, not every *tuan guru* undertook all three activities during the *pilkada* campaign. Some participated in campaign events but did not make any statement of support in newspapers, for instance. Others supported particular candidates personally, but at the same time, recommended their neighbours elect candidates whom they perceived to be the most decent and generous, even if that was someone different from the candidate of the *tuan guru*. Moreover, some *tuan guru*

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² Greg Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: a History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967, Ph. D Thesis, Department of History, Monash University, 1998, pp. 197-8

³ A Banjarese *tuan guru* who serves in the South Kalimantan regional assembly allocates around 40 million rupiah to support an Islamic school in his neighbourhood. Interview with Guru Husni Nurin, Banjarmasin, 8 May 2008

⁴ A Tasikmalayan kiai for instance, practices this. A discussion with Greg Fealy, Canberra, 4 February 2009

⁵ A discussion with Nabiela Naily whose family owns a *pesantren* in East Java, June 2008. The case of Kiai Musta'in Romly who used donations from Jakarta politicians in 1963 for erecting a university in his *pesantren* discussed in chapter one is also a good example.

limited the campaign events that they attended, for example, to only those in their own locality. Furthermore, some *tuan guru* declined to appear in 'open' campaign functions such as large rallies or parades, although they diligently participated in the 'closed' campaign.

The 'open' campaign refers to the campaign held between the 13th and 26th June 2005. The 'closed' campaign refers to the campaign events before that. The official term for the open campaign was 'the campaign' (kampanye) and for the closed campaign, 'the socialisation' (sosialisasi). Both periods consisted of announcing candidacies, making promises and attracting the voters through various means. What made sosialisasi different from kampanye, according to the electoral commission in South Kalimantan, was the absence of any mention of a candidate's number on the ballot (nomor urut calon) and of any invitation to vote (see SK KPUD No: 008 2005; Effendy 2006, p. 151). Another difference is in the number of people involved: in the *kampanye*, thousands of people were mobilised to attend campaign events, which were thus often a show of power, while sosialisasi events consisted of small gatherings with particular communities or groups of people. I use 'closed' and 'open' campaigns interchangeably with 'sosialisasi' and 'kampanye' because some tuan guru used them when explaining their involvement. In reality, the candidates used every chance to invite people to vote for them although in the sosialisasi phase they would employ indirect language. Thus, instead of saying 'please, vote for us', they would say 'please, remember us when you make your vote'.⁶ In practice, there was little substantial difference between the sosialisasi and kampanye periods of the campaign.

In order to illustrate how individual *tuan guru had* their own particular ways of supporting the candidates, I give below a number of examples from campaigns of four teams of candidates. After that, I will explain the reasons behind the different approaches in a separate section.

⁶ Interview with two members of the Rudy and Rosehan campaign team, Banjarmasin, 3 and 17 May 2008. This was a typical way of avoiding the sanction from the Panitia Pengawas Daerah (Panwasda, an official but ad hoc committee that monitored the conduct of the *pilkada*).

The supporters of Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan NB (the 2R team)

Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff represents a highly active *tuan guru* campaigner. Not only did he participate throughout Rudy and Rosehan's open campaign in June 2005, he also accompanied Rudy for four months of *sosialisasi* in thirteen districts.⁷ He gave speeches containing a combination of religious and social concerns such as the widespread nature of corruption, while slipping in praise for Rudy and Rosehan, who were known as the 2R team because of the combination of their first initials.⁸ For instance, he said jokingly that '2R' also stands for *Rahman* and *Rahiem*, two names of God meaning respectively the Lord of Mercy and the Giver of Mercy.⁹

Importantly, Habib Ali served as a counter balance to the Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe team (the 2U team) who, as discussed in chapter two, invited many *habaib* to their campaign events or to join their campaign team. The physical appearance of Habib Ali in Rudy's campaigns was a statement: support from the descendants of Prophet Muhammad was not the monopoly of the 2U team.

Guru Supian, the then Rais Syuriah (head of the *ulama* council) of the Banjarmasin branch of Nahdlatul Ulama, was another campaigner for Rudy and Rosehan. In contrast to Habib Ali, he is an example of a *tuan guru* who was cautious in his involvement in the *pilkada* campaign. He rejected three other campaign teams that approached him and his participation in Rudy's campaign was very limited. He talked only at two *pengajian* intended as *sosialisasi* events for the 2R team in Tambarangan (Tapin district) and Gadung (HST district)¹⁰, both of which were far away from his home. He claimed, however, that he had several friends in those areas,¹¹ which means that he did not speak to an audience

⁷ Interview with Habib Ali Haidar, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008; also, with Jamhuri, 3 May 2008. Habib Ali's active participation is recorded for example in 'Kampanye Pertama Rudy Ariffin-Rosehan NB di Amuntai, Ribuan Massa Mengelu-elukannya', *Banjarmasin Post*, 16 June 2005; '2R 'Goncang' Batola, Siap Membawa Perubahan di Kalsel', *Kalimantan Post*, 17 June 2005; 'Rudy-Rosehan Bawa Kalsel Berakhlak Qur'ani', *Kalimantan Post*, 18 June 2005.

⁸ Interview with Habib Ali Haidar, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008

⁹ '2R Hadirkan Ungu Band, pagi ini di stadion mini Banjarbaru', *Radar Banjarmasin*, 23 June 2005

¹⁰ Interview with Guru Supian, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008

¹¹ Interview with Guru Supian, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008

of complete strangers. Finally, for someone whose nominees won the *pilkada*, he did not look very enthusiastic when recounting his part in the victorious story to me.

The supporter of Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar

Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, the head of Nurul Muhibbin, Barabai, is a very good example of a tuan guru who was involved in many aspects of the closed campaign but did not participate in the open campaign. He accompanied Ismet and Habib Aboe socializing their candidacies in his own town.¹² This means he showed up with his candidates in the area where his pupils resided. He warmly hosted the candidates in his home while they were in Barabai. This was not a new practice as Habib Aboe Bakar had, since 1999, always stayed there if he had a campaign function in Barabai.¹³ This consistent gesture carried an important message for Guru Bakhiet's followers: their tuan guru continued to support the 2U team despite the approaches of other candidates. Moreover, Guru Bakhiet gave an interview to a journalist who then reported him swearing before God to 'fully support the *ulama-umara* team' and giving justifications for that.¹⁴ In addition, before this interview took place, he lobbied the head of Pesantren Ibnul Amin, where he had studied three years previously, to support his candidates. Confident of getting his teacher's support, he mentioned in the interview that the tuan guru joined him in backing the Ismet-Habib Aboe team.¹⁵

Despite all of his supportive gestures, Guru Bakhiet did not participate in the open campaign of the 2U team in Barabai. He was neither cautious like Guru Supian, nor was he fully involved like Habib Ali. Guru Bakhiet's place was somewhere in

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¹² Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, Barabai, 31 May 2008

¹³ That is, when Habib Aboe Bakar ran as a national legislative candidate for PKS. Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, Barabai, 31 May 2008. Although other pairs of candidates also visited Guru Bakhiet, the fact that Habib Aboe kept coming and sometimes stayed over night in Nurul Muhibbien speaks something. That is, Habib Aboe has a prior cultivated relationship with this *tuan guru* and maintained it very well to the 2005 gubernatorial *pilkada*.

¹⁴ The report appeared in three different papers on the same day indicating that the space containing it had been bought. See *Kalimantan Post, Banjarmasin Post, and Radar Banjarmasin,* 'Guru Bakhit dan Guru Pamangkih Dukung Ismet-Habib', 6 June 2005.

¹⁵ The *tuan guru* of Ibnul Amin did not confirm this claim but he did not rebut it publicly either. It is likely that the teacher-student relationship prevented the controversy from becoming public. Interview with Guru H. Mukhtar Salman of Pemangkih, HST district, 30 May 2008.

between those tuan guru.

The supporters of Gusti Iskandar and Hafiz Anshary (Golkar's nominees)

Guru Abdussyukur was a typical elderly *tuan guru* who was affiliated with a political party. He participated only in the functions held in his district, Banjar. As reported by the *Kalimantan Post*, Guru Syukur led the opening prayer signaling the start of the open campaign.¹⁶ In the other field reports of the Iskandar-Hafiz team's campaign, there was no mention of him.¹⁷ It is highly unlikely that a journalist would omit a big name like his from a report should he have been present. Guru Khalilurrahman and Guru Hamdan Khalid of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) took a similar approach to him on this matter; they only attended the open campaign conducted in their respective areas, Martapura and Amuntai.¹⁸

As a Golkar affiliated *tuan guru*, Guru Syukur participated in Golkar's general meetings and supported its political decisions regarding the *pilkada*. For example, prior to the open campaign period, on 5 June he delivered a speech at a large Golkar convention urging the consolidation of the party machinery in the run-up to the *pilkada*.¹⁹ In the speech, he asserted his ongoing loyalty to Golkar and urged the party officials and cadres to work together so that Golkar's nominees would achieve victory.²⁰ On another occasion, Guru Syukur spoke out about the side he took in this *pilkada*. The event I refer to here is the one in which Guru Syukur called a press conference to clarify news reports depicting him giving backing to other candidates, and therefore, walking away from Golkar's nominees. I have described this controversy at length in the chapter three. Suffice

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¹⁶ 'Massa Kampanye Iskandar-Hafiz Lampaui Target, Tampil Sepanggung Cabup Banjar', Kalimantan Post, 16 June 2005

¹⁷ For instance, 'Kampanye Hari Pertama: Iskandar-Hafiz 'Gebrak' Banjarmasin', *Kalimantan Post*, 15 June 2005; 'Pendidikan Tak Gratis, Iskandar akan Mundur', *Kalimantan Post*, 17 June 2005 on campaign functions in HSS and Tapin districts; 'Gusti Iskandar dan Hadad Alwi Pukau Hulu Sungai', *Banjarmasin Post*, 24 June 2005 and 'Puluhan Ribu Massa Iskandar-Hafiz Bershalawat, Hadad Alwi Doakan Pendidikan Gratis Bisa Terkabul', *Barito Post*, 24 June 2005 on functions in three other districts: HSU, Balangan and Tabalong.

¹⁸ Interview with Guru Khalilurrahman, Martapura, 19 May 2008; Interview with Guru Hamdan Khalid, Amuntai, 3 June 2008. Guru Hamdan's participation in the Amuntai 2R open campaign was recorded in 'Kampanye Pertama Rudy Ariffin-Rosehan NB di Amuntai, Ribuan Massa Mengelu-elukannya', *Banjarmasin Post*, 16 June 2005.

¹⁹ As reported in 'Sejumlah Ulama Banjar Imbau Dukung Calon Golkar, Ribuan Kader di Tanbu Bertekad Menangkan Pilkada', *Kalimantan Post*, 6 June 2005.

²⁰ 'Sejumlah Ulama Banjar Imbau Dukung Calon Golkar', Kalimantan Post, 6 June 2005

to say here that Guru Syukur was consistent in his political choices and denied the claim made by the other candidates that he had supported them. The fact that he made this public is a form of supportive activities. While the public had known about Guru Syukur's siding with Golkar for a long time, the controversy provided him with an opportunity to renew, or rather, reassert his political consistency.

Another campaigner for the Iskandar and Hafiz team was Guru Nanang Gayam (pseudonym). Guru Nanang was a contrast to Guru Syukur, even though they supposedly supported the same gubernatorial candidates. He was not a Golkar activist, although as a public servant working in the New Order period he used to vote for Golkar.²¹ His involvement in the *pilkada* campaign was more in terms of providing services rather than being driven by party identification like Guru Syukur. One indication of this was that he felt disappointed when receiving only two envelopes, containing his honoraria, for talking on three occasions at *sosialisasi* events.²²

Guru Nanang advised his neighbors to support the Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan team. This is definitely not the kind of attitude one would expect from a supporter, or someone who owed a debt of gratitude. He argued that the 2R candidates made a real contribution, in the form of donations, to the *langgar* and the Islamic kindergarten (TK Al-Qur'an) in the neighborhood.²³ It is wrong however, to conclude that this *tuan guru* was inconsistent or had no principles. In fact, he had and that was 'voting for those who did real favors or made contributions to you'.²⁴ As the Golkar nominees did nothing in particular for this neighborhood, he felt it was wrong to ask the residents to vote for them.²⁵

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²¹ Interview with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 9 June, 2008

²² His disappointment was understandable since normally every speaker at such a campaign event was given a honorarium for each 'service'. However, he claimed that he helped Iskandar and Hafiz, not the other candidates, because Hafiz had shared information with him about a small grant from Golkar for his study, many years earlier. In other words, Guru Nanang felt indebted to Hafiz. This claim, in my opinion, is weak. Unlike Guru Supian who was approached by four teams, Guru Nanang was only invited by the Iskandar and Hafiz team. Thus Guru Nanang was not in a position to select the most favorite team, but only whether he wanted to participate or not. Interview with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 30 April and 9 June 2008

²³ Guru Nanang told me that Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan donated 2.5 million rupiah each. Interview with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 9 June, 2008

²⁴ Interview with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 9 June, 2008

²⁵ Interview with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 9 June, 2008

The supporters of Sjachriel Darham

Guru Ahmad Bakeri was the most widely known *tuan guru* supporter of Sjachriel Darham. He left Golkar, in which he used to be a member of the council of advisers, after the party refused to nominate Sjachriel as its gubernatorial candidate. As discussed in chapter three, Sjachriel had done a lot for his Pesantren and Guru Bakeri appeared to understand that his interests would be better served by Sjachriel than Golkar. Guru Bakeri also thought that his position in Golkar as an adviser was useless, because his attempt to lobby the Golkar leader, H. Sulaiman HB to nominate Sjachriel was denied.²⁶

Guru Bakeri acted as the official campaigner attending all of Sjachriel's eight open campaign functions in June 2005. He delivered religious sermons just as Habib Ali did for Rudy and Rosehan's campaign.²⁷ Sjachriel's functions put a heavy emphasis on Guru Bakeri's sermons, which invariably contained messages to vote for Sjachriel. Moreover, Guru Bakeri also sent similar messages when he lectured in his weekly *pengajian*. This demonstrated his staunch support for Sjachriel. Angered by this, the other teams reported him to the Panwas *pilkada* (the official but ad hoe committee monitoring the conduct of the *pilkada*) for violating a rule, i.e. campaigning outside the official schedule.²⁸ Guru Bakeri was reprimanded by the head of the Panwas *pilkada*.²⁹ There were no further protests after that, but his students in al-Mursyidul Amin knew very well that their kiai wanted them to vote for Sjachriel. He told them to do so.³⁰

²⁶ Interview with Guru Bakeri, Banjar District, 24 May 2008.

²⁷ Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Banjar District, 24 May 2008. News reports which mentioned Guru Bakeri's participation in Sjahriel campaign functions include 'Guru Bakeri 'Blakblakan'Dukung Sjahriel', *Kalimantan Post*, 15 June 2005; 'Iskandar di Banjarmasin, Sjachriel di Banjarbaru, Rudy di Amuntai, Ismet di Kotabaru, Menghadirkan H Leman dan Kustan Basri', *Radar Banjarmasin*, 15 June 2005; 'Sjahriel-Iskandar di Dua Tempat, Menurunkan KH Akhmad Bakri', *Radar Banjarmasin*, 15 June 2005; and 'Orasi dan Hiburan', *Banjarmasin Post*, 18 June 2005.

²⁸ This is one of a number of violations committed by the Sjahriel-Aidi team during the *pilkada* campaign. See 'Iskandar-Hafiz Paling Rajin Kampanye, Sjahriel-Aidi Paling 'Malas' Kampanye', *Radar Banjarmasin*, 28 June 2005

²⁹ Interview with Hadin Muhjad, the head of South Kalimantan Panwasda in 2005, Banjarmasin, 14 May 2008

³⁰ Interview with Fakhriadi, Banjar District, 24 May 2008.

Tuan guru calculations

The above examples clearly show that *tuan guru* differed when helping their candidates. They all participated in election campaigns, but their enthusiasm and the commitment, as shown by how often they participated and the way they promoted the candidates, varied markedly. Here, I offer some explanations for the different approaches of tuan guru.

First, *tuan guru* were aware of the uneasiness and to a lesser extent, disapproval, of some Muslims regarding the involvement of the *ulama* in politics. They personally were probably aware of the arguments against their becoming involved. However, since the involvement of tuan guru in electoral campaigns was not unprecedented, and because some *tuan guru* saw the *pilkada* as a political or economic opportunity, they jumped in anyway. However, to deal with the fallout of this disapproval, they limited the kind of events they participated in and thus, minimized the exposure of their involvement. The best example of this is Guru Supian who agreed to speak only in the closed campaign of the Rudy and Rosehan team held out of town. To a lesser degree, we can also see this in the case of Guru Bakhiet who did not attend the open campaign of the Ismet and Habib Aboe team, although he made supportive efforts in the closed campaign before that. The open campaign allows a greater exposure because thousands of people attend it and it gets media coverage. It would be very difficult to control what people think or what media say about the appearance of a *tuan guru*.

On the other hand, if *tuan guru* thought that their involvement was entirely justifiable,³¹ they did not mind the exposure. It is even possible that they were happy with the media coverage. Guru Bakeri, as discussed in chapter three, felt that his participation in Sjachriel's campaign was an observance of a moral

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³¹ Concerning the criticism towards the involvement of the *ulama* in politics, the *tuan guru* try to be patient but sometimes they complain too. Guru Bakeri said, for instance, "Many people did not know how difficult was it to develop a pesantren in the 1980s when electricity and the road had not reached this village". This was regarding his decision to join Golkar, which controlled the government, that he expected to provide the infrastructure, back in the eighties. Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Banjar District, 24 May 2008

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obligation, which is to help a person who had done him favours.³² This explanation also applies for Guru Syukur whose affiliation with Golkar was foremost for the development of Pesantren Darussalam.³³ For them, participating in the open campaign was not something to be avoided. They were not afraid of making bold statements in such events either. For instance, Guru Bakeri once stated, "unlike some other *ulama* who concealed their choices in the *pilkada* or were hypocrites, I am frank about mine and that is to vote for Sjachriel".³⁴ Guru Syukur, on the other hand, repeatedly declared his loyalty to Golkar on various occasions during *pilkada* time.

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Moreover, if the *tuan guru* were natural politicians or wanted to have political careers in the future, their involvement was more than just attending the open campaign. Habib Ali Haidar al-Kaff, the above noted most diligent *tuan guru* campaigner, was a good example of this. He and another *tuan guru*, Guru Husni Nurin who is a rising PKB politician, hardly missed any *sosialisasi* function of the Rudy and Rosehan team as well. The motivation of Habib Ali to support Rudy, I argued in chapter three, was in expectation of political advancements that he did not get from PKS. On the other hand, Guru Husni took over the position of Rosehan in the provincial parliament when the latter was elected as the deputy governor.³⁵

But if the *tuan guru* were elderly and had no more political ambition, they would not be bothered to become involved too much in the campaign. Attending the open campaign of their candidates in their respective areas was enough to show their support. Guru Hamdan Khalid of Amuntai and Guru Khalilurrahman of Martapura are examples of this. In 2005, Guru Hamdan was 69 years old, the Rais Syuriah of the South Kalimantan branch of Nahdlatul Ulama, and was not

³² He cites a Qur'anic verse reads, "Shall the reward of good be anything but good". Interview with Ustadz Abdurrahman, a colleague of Guru Bakeri, Banjarbaru, 22 May 2008; with Ustadz Husni Nurin, a preacher, Banjarmasin, 8 May 2008.

 ³³ Interview with Guru Khalilurrahman, Martapura, 19 May 2008; with Gusti Jazuli, Martapura, 20 June 2008

³⁴ Guru Bakeri 'Blak-blakan' Dukung Sjachriel', *Kalimantan Post*, 15 June 2005. What he meant by hypocrisy, seemingly, was the warm response of *tuan guru* to every candidate approaching them, as if they supported the candidate.

³⁵ Interview with Ustadz Husni Nurin, a preacher, Banjarmasin, 8 May 2008.

interested in becoming an MP.³⁶ Similarly, Guru Khalilurrahman was in his midsixties, had just finished his service as a PKB national parliamentarian in 2004 and was in charge of the Dewan Syuriah of the South Kalimantan branch of PKB until 2007.³⁷ These *tuan guru* had occupied the positions that many *ulama* politicians would like to reach. Victory in the *pilkada* was not like a big fish that they would work hard to catch.

Finally, when a *tuan guru* campaigned for honoraria and thought that his candidates did not appreciate his work, it was not surprising that his personal choice contradicted his advice to his community, as in the case of Guru Nanang Gayam. He, to recap, campaigned for Iskandar and Hafiz but told his neighbours to vote for Rudy and Rosehan – a good example of pragmatism.

Tuan guru campaigners had their own ideals and ambitions and they acted accordingly. They agreed to become involved in the *pilkada* ćampaign to help particular candidates but set their own boundaries. They made conscious choices about how and when they showed political support. They made calculations just like their candidates.

Who benefited?

What, then, did *tuan guru* get out of their involvement in the *pilkada* campaign? Were *tuan guru* the only beneficiaries of the gains or did the institutions that they led, *pesantren* or *pengajian*, enjoy the benefits as well? I seek to answer these questions here, in the final part of this chapter.

Before proceeding to the issue of gains, a brief discussion of contrasting pictures of *ulama* is necessary. Some scholars are skeptical that , when *ulama* generate money from politicians or political involvement, they would use it for their communities. According to this view, *ulama* would enrich themselves and spend the money on a opulent lifestyle. Indeed, as the case of Kiai Munir Abisudjak mentioned earlier suggests, *ulama* could be self-interested. However, one can also

³⁶ Interview with Guru Hamdan Khalid, Amuntai, 3 June 2008

³⁷ Interview with Guru Khalilurrahman, Martapura, 19 May 2008

proves

find abundant evidence which says otherwise.³⁸ That is, *ulama* are communityoriented, channeling the money they receive from various sources, including politics, to the needy or to the improvement of the quality of the *ummah*, in general.

The limited scope of this study prevents me from generalizing whether *tuan guru* properly use or abuse the money they receive from politicians. What this study does do, however, is illustrate that the involvement of *tuan guru* in the *pilkada* campaign benefited themselves as well as their institutions. We can see this from the rewards given by the candidates. In other words, this study suggests that *tuan guru*, as shown in the 2005 *pilkada*, cannot be categorised simply as self-interested people. However, it is also clear that the money given to them, as honoraria, very likely went into their own pockets because it was intended that this be so. On the other hand, we do not know for sure what they did with it in their own private arrangements.

During the 2005 gubernatorial *pilkada* campaign, the candidates rewarded both the individual *tuan guru* and their institutions, if they had one. Rewards for the individuals were two in kind: honoraria and 'bonuses'. The bonuses I mean here are additional gifts donated by candidates after they won the *pilkada*. It is worth noting that some rewards were of an individualistic nature so that they could not be directly enjoyed by others. Moreover, the rewards for institutions were normally either untied donations or specific development assistance.

<u>Honoraria</u>

Candidates provided honoraria for *tuan guru* campaigners as they did for other groups of people who helped their campaign, such as the entertainers. This, as noted in chapter three, was simply following a normal practice when inviting a *tuan guru* for religious services. The honoraria may not be intended as direct payment for the time, the popularity and the skills of *tuan guru*. Nonetheless,

³⁸ Generally, *ulama* who have Islamic schools and seek funding from politics fall into this category. For example, Kiai Musta'in Romli of Darul Ulum, Jombang who aligned with Golkar in the 1970s that generously donated for his *pesantren*. Many other NU kiai resembled him in siding with particular politicians or parties in return for some donations or facilities for their *pesantren*.

giving honoraria is a practical way of appreciating people's service, which has an economic element.

The amount of honoraria varied and it seemed that the fame of the *tuan guru* was taken into consideration to determine it. A-not-so-popular-preacher like Guru Nanang Gayam, for instance, only received a hundred thousand rupiah per event.³⁹ In contrast, Sjachriel's team, which held eight functions⁴⁰ during the official campaign period, provided ten million rupiah for the famous Guru Ahmad Bakeri.⁴¹ That means a per function honorarium to Guru Bakeri of one and a quarter million rupiah or twelve times the honorarium of Guru Nanang.

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Having mentioned this, there is nothing wrong with tuan guru receiving honoraria for religious services, let alone from political involvement. There is no teaching that obliges or recommends them to reject payment for dispensing religious services. In fact, they are allowed to use portions of endowment (wagaf), if they are trusted to manage it, for basic and dissent spending especially when they cannot work because of taking care of the endowment. They would consider that as God's blessing (barakah) upon them for carrying out the propagation of His commands. In other words, making money out of religious service is acceptable, not condemned.

This notion of the acceptability of taking money from religious activities is truer in the case of those *ulama* who prioritise religious education. They believe that religious education is part of the struggle in God's path (jihad fi sabilillah). They spend their own money or families' wealth to build schools and struggle to find financial sources to maintain them. Similarly, those pengajian tuan guru, although they do not have financial burdens as much as those heads of *pesantren*, would spend their time to come to different places to give religious sermons. Certainly, one can understand even appreciate their taking money from such activities. That is important for the sustainability of a long-term religious

³⁹ Interview with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 9 June, 2008

⁴⁰ As reported in 'Iskandar-Hafiz Paling Rajin Kampanye, Sjachriel-Aidi Paling 'Malas' Kampanye', Radar Banjarmasin, 28 June 2005

⁴¹ Guru Bakeri claimed that he returned the honorarium, arguing that Sjachriel himself needed the money more than he did to finance the campaign. Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar District, 24 May 2008.

education.

Finally, as *ulama* are symbols of religion, they believe it is important for them to be strong financially to show the strength of religious messages they spread. For ulama, being rich is therefore, a necessity. A *tuan guru*'s remark substantially captures this point: "Would the followers believe that an *ulama*'s prayers were being heard if they were poor?!"⁴² All these points are to show that an *ulama*'s taking of the money for themselves is not necessarily wrong or bad.

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Rewards for institutions

One good example of rewards for a *tuan guru's* institution was the donation made by Sjachriel to help build a new *musalla* (a prayer house but also a centre of activities) in Guru Bakeri's *pesantren*. The donation was larger than that which Sjachriel and other candidates made to other *pesantren* or houses of worship. As mentioned in chapter three, Sjachriel gave over 25 million rupiah for the construction of the new *musalla*. This took place close to *pilkada* time and it did not seem to be intended to attract Guru Bakeri's sympathy. Guru Bakeri had already agreed to support Sjachriel in the *pilkada* before the donation was made. Thus it was more a reward for a committed supporter.

Another kind of donation served as a means to win the support of those who might have not made up their minds about the preferred candidates.⁴³ Examples of this nature were the donations of Sjachriel and of Golkar's candidates to Guru Bakhiet's Nurul Muhibbin, or of Rudy and Rosehan to the Islamic kindergarten in Guru Nanang Gayam's neighborhood. Guru Bakhiet told me that Sjachriel and Iskandar donated five million rupiah each, and Guru Nanang informed me that Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan donated 2.5 million rupiah each.⁴⁴ The donations were not intended as rewards, as the recipient communities made no commitment to vote for them. The money was an example of the gains that could accrue through

⁴² Interview with Guru Ahmad Bakeri, Gambut, Banjar District, 24 May 2008.

⁴³ Most of the time, a supporting *tuan guru* would stick to their choice if they had made one regardless of offerings from other candidates.

⁴⁴ Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, Barabai, 31 May 2008; with Guru Nanang Gayam, Banjar District, 9 June, 2008

a willingness to open the door for politicians.

Pesantren Darussalam of Martapura is a good example of a *pesantren* which benefited because one of its leaders supported the winning candidates, Rudy and Rosehan. Guru Khalilurrahman, in addition to being a PKB leader, was second in charge of Darussalam in 2005. After the 2R team won the *pilkada*, the *pesantren* got easy approval for funding proposals submitted to the governor and deputy governor's offices.⁴⁵ This, perhaps, was also because Rudy Ariffin had a prior relationship with the *pesantren* 's leaders before he assumed the governorship. He used to be a district head (*bupati*) in Martapura, the city where Darussalam is situated.

The South Kalimantan Nahdlatul Ulama also benefited from the victory of the Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan team. NU was quietly involved in the *pilkada* campaign and many individual NU *tuan guru* and officials joined the 2R campaign team.⁴⁶ For the organization, Rudy, as the governor, approved a monthly subsidy amounting to five million rupiah⁴⁷ or five times the size of the subsidy given to NU by the previous governor.⁴⁸ Getting money from the government to finance the organization is one of the reasons why it is so difficult for NU to give up partisan politics.⁴⁹ NU *tuan guru*, moreover, were treated favourably by the winning candidates. Every year Rudy and Rosehan would pay for their trips to the *haul* events in East and Central Java, including the *uang saku*

⁴⁵ He did not specifically mention what the proposals were about. But, judging from the usual grounds for proposal submitted by the *pesantren* community in South Kalimantan, they would be for annual celebrations of Islamic festivities such as *Maulid Nabi* or *Isra Mi*'raj.

⁴⁶ The then chairman of South Kalimantan NU, Rusydiansyah Asnawi, indeed supported the 2R team by confidentially issuing a support letter on behalf of NU and campaigning for them. The letter became public two years after the 2005 *pilkada* following the dynamics of a Bupati *pilkada* in 2007. See 'NU Dukung Fakhruddin, diberikan lewat surat resmi', *Radar Banjarmasin*, 11 January 2007 and 'Surat NU di-PBNU-kan, Perseteruan Syaifullah-Syarbaini Meruncing', *Radar Banjarmasin*, 19 January 2007. For the support from individual NU *tuan guru*, see 'Rudy Ariffin Didukung Personal NU', *Radar Banjarmasin*, 9 June 2005; 'Petinggi NU Turun Gunung', *Banjarmasin Post*, 2 June 2005.

⁴⁷ Interview with Guru Supian, the serving *rais syuriah*, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008.

⁴⁸ As stated by Rusydiansyah Asnawie, the former executive chairman of South Kalimantan NU in 'Rudy Ariffin Dapat Dukungan Personal NU', *Kalimantan Post*, 9 June 2005

⁴⁹ Eunsook Jung, "Giving up partisan politics? Indonesia's biggest Muslim organizations are having second thoughts about partisan politics", *Inside Indonesia*, no. 94, October-December 2008,

http://insideindonesia.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1147&Itemid=47 (accessed 9 November 2008)

(money for food and incidentals during the trip).⁵⁰ To my knowledge, previous governors did not provide this kind of free service for a group of *tuan guru*, although a future one may imitate it.

Bonuses

As noted above, only the winning candidates gave bonuses; the defeated had obviously no incentive to do so. Many of *tuan guru* supporters of Rudy and Rosehan did not lead *pesantren*. They were preachers, some more popular than others, who routinely gave Islamic sermons in their areas. Unsurprisingly, the nature of the rewards given to them was individualistic.

Habib Ali Haidar received a car from Rudy Ariffin, a gift given only to him and Guru Bahran Jamil.⁵¹ Then, in 2007, Habib Ali was appointed a deputy in the Rudy-led PPP, with a newly created portfolio to handle, namely youth and religion.⁵² Rusydiansyah Asnawie, then the executive chairman of South Kalimantan NU, was appointed deputy as well, at the same time.

Furthermore, Habib Ali became a close associate of Rudy. Two instances make this point apparent. First, Habib Ali told me that Guru Bakeri once offered him a position on the Mesjid Sabilal Muhtadin managing board as his attempt, in Habib Ali's opinion, to keep his own position there after the defeat of Sjachriel, Guru Bakeri's patron. Habib Ali politely rejected this offer but promised to talk with Rudy about the future of Guru Bakeri in Mesjid Sabilal.⁵³ If this story is true, it indicates that Guru Bakeri considered Habib Ali a close associate of Rudy. Second, Rudy agreed to join the routine pilgrimage to the tomb of Guru Zaini Sekumpul organised by Habib Ali Haidar with a group of spirited youth.⁵⁴ Guru Zaini's tomb in Martapura is usually visited every second month as part of Habib

⁵⁰ Interview with Habib Ali Haidar, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008.

⁵¹ Interview with Guru Hamdan Khalid, Amuntai, 3 June 2008 and Ahmad Syazali, Banjarmasin, 3 May 2008.

⁵² According to Habib Ali, this portfolio does not exist within the structure of the PPP in other provinces. This implies that the portfolio was created to accommodate his entrance to the South Kalimantan PPP structure. Interview with Habib Ali Haidar, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008.

⁵³ Interview with Habib Ali, 17 May 2008

⁵⁴ Interview with Habib Ali, 17 May 2008.

Ali's program to visit holy sites around the province. While Rudy can certainly choose to do this pilgrimage whenever he wants, he decided to join Habib Ali's group. This is another sign of the good relationship between them.

Guru Supian was given a free hajj pilgrimage in 2006. He was sent as a regional supervisor for hajj pilgrims whose expenses were paid by the regional government.⁵⁵ The authority to appoint the provincial supervisors rests with the governor and his deputy.⁵⁶ In addition, Supian's son was an awardee of the travel grant to Yemen, a program initiated by Habib Ali and applied by the Rudy administration. The grant, as received by Guru Supian, amounted to a generous twenty eight million rupiah⁵⁷ and was given by the provincial government to seven students.58

The other two tuan guru supporters of 2R, Guru Khalilurrahman and Guru Hamdan Khalid received nothing notable, so far as I could discover. They would however, highly likely be invited to join the haul trips as they are prominent NU tuan guru.

The individualistic nature of the rewards reflects an acknowledgment on the part of the candidates that they feel indebted to tuan guru personally. It may also indicate their attempt to entertain tuan guru for the purposes of future elections. Tuan guru will have vested interests in continuing to support those 'kind and generous' politicians. This was the case with Guru Bakeri, for instance. However, there is room to believe that the politicians do respect *ulama*, and the special treatment of them is simply a reflection of the social status of *ulama*. There were



⁵⁵ Interview with Guru Supian, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008

⁵⁶ H. Anwar Hadimi, the director of hajj affairs at the South Kalimantan department of religious affairs, 11 May 2008. Every year, regional heads, namely gubernur and bupatis, appoint some prominent tuan guru to supervise pilgrims of their respective regions. These pilgrims' supervisors are called Tim Pembimbing Haji Daerah (the team for supervising regional pilgrims, TPHD) and the regional governments, at the province or kabupaten levels, pay the trip expenses and some amount of money as salary. The TPHD is not the only group that provides supervision, because the ministry of religious affairs in every province also establishes its own supervising team. The difference is that the authority of selecting who go as TPHD lies exclusively on the hand of / regional heads, i.e. Governor and *bupatis*, while those who use the ministry of religious affair channel have to compete, sometimes openly, with other applicants. The TPHD becomes a means of politicians to cultivate good relationship with *ulama*, and in this case as a means of rewarding supporters. ⁵⁷ Interview with Guru Supian, Banjarmasin, 13 May 2008

⁵⁸ Interview with Habib Ali, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008.

a couple of *tuan guru*, who reportedly supported other candidates, but were invited by Rudy and Rosehan to join the *haul* trips, for example.⁵⁹

The individualistic nature of the rewards also means that the community hardly enjoys any benefit from them. The trips to *haul* events to Java or free pilgrimage could not be shared. Similarly, the car and the position in a party were possessed by the *tuan guru*. However, outcomes of the rewards such as the experiences gained during the trips and the use of positions and facilities could benefit the community of *tuan guru*. *Tuan guru* need to make that the case if they want to hold on to the respect and allegiance of their followers.

excove 2.

I have discussed the campaign activities of *tuan guru* and the gains generated out of their involvement in the *pilkada*. I have argued that *tuan guru* calculated their steps in showing support for the candidates. This means that they chose the type of campaign functions they wanted to attend, i.e. open or closed campaign, and how frequent they could participate. I have suggested that *tuan guru* based their calculations on reasons such as the disapproval of some Muslims to the political participation of *ulama*, *tuan guru*'s individual ambitions and their views on how politics should serve their interests.

Furthermore, *tuan guru* were rewarded for their participation in campaign both as individuals and as the leaders of particular institutions. I have pointed out that *tuan guru* received honoraria intended for them as individuals. I also have illustrated that the organizations or institutions that *tuan guru* lead also got facilitations or donations from the candidates. As such, the involvement in the *pilkada* generally serves *tuan guru*'s interests and benefited their institutions. Therefore, the picture of *ulama* as acting entirely out of self-interest does not match with the experience of the *tuan guru*.

⁵⁹ Interview with Habib Ali, Banjarmasin, 17 May 2008.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Where Interpenetration Was Met by Contingency.

The 2005 gubernatorial pilkada in South Kalimantan presented the interpenetration of Islam and politics. The gubernatorial candidates felt it necessary to demonstrate their Islamic credentials before the electorate and to show their closeness to *ulama*. On the other hand, *ulama* opened their doors for the candidates and were willing to participate in their campaigns. It was common, then, to see politicians in *pengajian* and *ulama* in the campaign. Campaign functions often had religious sermons in the program list. Conversely, regular *pengajian* often contained messages to vote for particular candidates. Outside the campaign period, an intensified interpenetration of Islam and politics such as this would be very rare to witness. For instance, *pengajian* generally focus on religious themes with almost no political content, and politicians rarely attend them unless they are religiously enthusiastic. The interpenetration of Islam and politics does not vanish completely between elections, as South Kalimantan is an overwhelmingly Muslim province, but it occurs to a much lesser degree.

In this study, I have examined the role of Islam and the *tuan guru* who were involved in the *pilkada*. I also have asked how this political event in South Kalimantan compares with the general trend in local elections elsewhere in Indonesia.

The pilkada shows a more complex picture than what political observers have painted regarding local elections in Indonesia. A dearth of ideological preferences and the domination of pragmatic considerations (McGibbon 2006 and Baswedan 2007)¹ were only one side of the story in South Kalimantan. The gubernatorial pilkada did

¹ Rodd McGibbon, 'Indonesian Politics in 2006: stability, compromise and contest over ideology', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, No. 42, vol. 3, 2006, p. 331 and Anies Baswedan, 'Indonesian Politics in 2007: the presidency, local elections and the future of democracy', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, No. 43, vol. 3, p. 339

witness two coalitions of nominating parties that followed the 'pragmatic and nonideological' trend identified by McGibbon and Baswedan. These were the coalition of the nationalist PDI-P and the Islamic PBR (Partai Bintang Reformasi) that nominated Sjachriel Darham and Noor Aidi, and the coalition of 13 parties across ideologies (nationalist, Islamic and Christian) with no seat in the local parliament that provided the nomination ticket for Ramlan and Baderani. In addition, some candidates such as Sjachriel Darham, Ismet Ahmad and Baderani approached both Islamic and nationalist parties before settling with their eventual nominating parties. In those cases, as long as a party or a coalition of parties was able to secure the nomination, the ideological preference of each party did not matter. The pilkada, however, also saw coalitions of Islamic parties that associated with largely traditionalist Islam such as PPP and PKB which supported Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan, and parties associated with modernist Muslim like PAN and PKS which nominated Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar al-Habsyi. The evidence shows an old-fashioned coalition built between parties with a close ideological preference. The last two pairs of candidates finished respectively as the victor and in the second place.

Both pragmatic and idealistic considerations can also be found in the motivations of *tuan guru* to support the gubernatorial candidates. As demonstrated in chapter three, service exchange was the driving motivation in many cases. *Tuan guru* felt it necessary to support gubernatorial candidates because the latter donated or provided facilities for their institutions. Some *tuan guru* did campaign with an expectation of getting future rewards. This is not uncommon at all. Writing on NU *kiai*, Martin van Bruinessen notes that they expected politicians 'to provide them and their business partners with facilities, access to decision-makers...' in exchange for their follower's votes.² However, my examination of other *tuan guru* suggests that their political support arose from something intangible, such as political ideals and party

² In Martin van Bruinessen and Farid Wajidi, Syu'un Ijtima'iyah: *Traditionalist Islam, civil society* and social concerns, p. 6. Retrieved from

http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Bruinessen_Wajidi_Traditionalist_I slam_and_civil_society.pdf (17 October 2008)

membership. The first reason, political ideals, accounts for *tuan guru* who supported candidates who did not give their institutions a cent while other candidates came to them with millions of rupiah. The second reason, party membership, was apparent in the case of some *tuan guru* who refused to support a candidate, who provided them free health insurance, because of their affiliation with a party which nominated other candidates. Thus, while important, pragmatic considerations did not motivate all *tuan guru* to support particular candidates.

Another concern of this study has been the role of *tuan guru* and Islamic sentiments in the pilkada. *Tuan guru* played a limited political role in the pilkada compared to other *ulama* in numerous regions in Indonesia. They acted as campaigners in campaign events, newspaper columns and, sometimes, regular *pengajian*. They promoted the candidates and gave justifications as to why the voters should elect them. Furthermore, their presence strengthened the 'Islamic aurá' in the political theatre that already featured candidates with Islamic credentials. This was part of the candidates' strategies for appealing to the voters who respected *tuan guru* as teachers or informal leaders. However, *tuan guru* neither controlled the process of political nomination like their Madurese counterparts in Sampang,³ nor did they run as candidates as *ulama* did in Nusa Tenggara Barat and East Java. Indeed, the pilkada did not facilitate a drastic change in the role of *tuan guru* as local leaders.

It is hard to know whether the voters chose particular candidates because they followed their *tuan guru* or for other reasons. The fact that all candidates sought support from *tuan guru* suggests that *tuan guru* are still important. Indeed, in three out of five districts that I visited, the candidates supported by particular *tuan guru* won in the places where those *tuan guru* live.⁴ On the other hand, the candidates also

³ See Abdul Gaffar Karim, 'Pesantren in Power: religious institutions and political recruitment in

Sumenep Madura', *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, vol. 42, no. 1 (2008), pp. 157-184 ⁴ Interview with Guru Muhammad Bakhiet, Barabai, Barabai, 31 May 2008. Statistical evidence from three districts, Banjar, Banjarmasin and Hulu Sungai Tengah, shows a similar pattern. However, the places in question are also the residence of the candidates or the bases of the nominating parties. Thus, it is difficult to attribute the domination of particular candidates in the places only to the influence of *tuan guru*. See KPU Kotamadya Banjarmasin, KPU Kabupaten Banjar, and KPU Kabupaten Hulu

applied other strategies, including financial inducement by distributing money directly to the voters⁵ or television sets to local village heads⁶, and by financing small infrastructure construction projects, such as complex roads (*jalan di kompleks*), mosques and schools.⁷ Apparently, they realised that support from *tuan guru per se* would not be enough to attract the voters, especially when every team had a *tuan guru*.

This was part of a broader picture of Islam's role in the pilkada. This study finds that Islam was not the determining factor in the pilkada results exactly *because* all candidates made use of it. The role of Islam was in fact contingent on a number of other factors notwithstanding its prominence in the campaign. This conclusion goes in concert with the limitation of Islam in Indonesian politics as argued by Greg Fealy (2003). Fealy concluded that 'Islam has seldom acted as an independent, cohesive or determining force in Indonesian politics'.⁸ Thus the trend in national politics is mirrored at the local level.

My argument, as presented in chapter two, about this contingency challenges the general view of the local observers who argued that Islam was the key to explaining the pilkada. I also believe in the crucial role of Islam in the pilkada, as the voters would vote out any non-Muslim candidate for instance. However, I suggest that a multi-causal relationship that interconnects Islam and factors such as a clean public image, enough time to campaign and sufficient political funds, and effective campaign teams work better in explaining the pilkada results. The local observers, for instance, failed to explain why the incumbent Sjachriel Darham performed poorly

Sungai Tengah, Laporan Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Provinsi Kalimantan Selatan Tahun 2005.

⁵ Banjarmasin Post, *Tim Sukses Adukan Money Politics*, 3 July 2005; Kalimantan Post, *Iskandar Asuransikan 3.500 Anggota BPK (Badan Pemadam Kebakaran)*, 8 Juni 2005. 'Money Politics di Kandangan Tertangkap Tangan', *Kalimantan Post*, 30 Juni 2005

⁶ Marcus Mietzner, Local Elections Briefing: South Kalimantan, 2005, unpublished, p. 3

⁷ Banjarmasin Post, *Ketika Kandidat Rame-rame Beri Sumbangan, Siapa Yang lebih Gede, Ya Dipilih,* 11 June 2005

⁸ Greg Fealy, 'Divided Majority: The Limits of Indonesian Political Islam', in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (eds), *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, RoutledgeCurzon, London and New York, 2003, p. 166.

despite his generous donations to some *pesantren* and the support he received from the popular Guru Ahmad Bakeri. By applying a multi-causal relationship analysis, this failure can be overcome: I have demonstrated that Islam worked better for the candidates who were seen to have clean reputations, which Ismet Ahmad and Habib Aboe Bakar possessed, and which Sjachriel did not. Here, Islamic appeals in fact were a boomerang for unpopular candidates who had a history of corruption allegations because such images are not Islamic. Islamic teachings condemn public officials who steal from the state or misuse their power to enrich themselves beyond the confines of law. With regard to the multi-causal analysis, I also suggest that the victors, Rudy Ariffin and Rosehan, possessed the combination of all the factors previously mentioned.

The contingency of the role of Islam also indicates that religious sentiment as a motivation for to vote now has 'competitors'. The pilkada results ^treflect this: Islam was not the sole consideration. Back in the 1950s and 1960s when ideological and religious divisions were prominent, religious sentiment contributed significantly to the support secured by Islamic parties. In 2005, the gubernatorial candidates offered financial inducement and promises of real change, not simply Islamic appeals. As a result, voters had several factors, apart from Islamic sentiment, to consider before making their votes.

In the 2005 gubernatorial pilkada, the interpenetration of Islam and politics was met by the contingency of Islam on other factors in determining the outcome of the political race. The pilkada showed the incorporation of Islamic sentiments and Islamic leaders (*tuan guru*) as part of the campaign strategy of all candidates. It also revealed that Islam by itself was not enough to achieve electoral victory. The pilkada also indicated that the use of appeals to Islamic sentiments could damage those whose character and behaviour contradicted religious teachings. In addition, *tuan guru* were, by and large, supporters and campaigners in the pilkada. The pilkada did not expand their political role beyond the realm of the campaign. *Tuan guru* barely intervened in the nomination process and none of them ran as nominees in the gubernatorial pilkada. Finally, the trend in local elections towards the triumph of pragmatic considerations was mirrored only partially in the pilkada. Ideological promiscuity was not the only language of the day, as idealistic reasoning and ideological preferences still made their presence felt.

Wallahu a'lam bi as shawab

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