

AN ASIAN CORE EXECUTIVE

Aspects of Contemporary Governance in Singapore

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I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for any degree in the same or other form to any other university.

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This thesis is dedicated to my mother and father,
to my 13 brothers and sisters,
and especially to my big brother Jeff who paid for the shoes and blazer.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis applies the concept of the core executive to answer the general questions posed by Rhodes and others about the real nature of the relationship between institutions and the internal dynamics of cabinet government, as opposed to constitutional theory or conventional wisdom – how does cabinet government actually operate? What does it do and, more importantly, how does it do it, particularly in Westminster-style political systems? The core executive literature is almost wholly European. This study applies the concept of the core executive to an empirical analysis of the contemporary Singapore government from 1991-1998.

The Singaporean political system is not a typical liberal democracy in the European tradition. It is a polity which has evolved a unique character under the long guidance of one political party and one premier. Most approaches to policy analysis have been developed in the context of pluralist liberal democracies and are inappropriate for a study of an illiberal democracy such as Singapore. An approach that will facilitate an empirical analysis of both the structure and dynamics of the policy system offers the best frame of analysis in this case.

The core executive approach, provides a framework which facilitates the study of the internal structure and dynamics of the system of governance by focusing on who controls and runs the system and the strategies they use. This thesis therefore analyses the Singaporean system of government using this framework while giving due weight to the historical and theoretical contexts. The study is however, essentially realist and empirical and attempts to deal with the Singaporean state as we find it, to assess its political functionality and its prospects. The study hopefully adds to the limited understanding of the inner workings of the Singaporean core executive developed to date and will, perhaps, provide additional insights particularly of the nature, internal dynamics and operations of contemporary strategies of governance in Singapore.

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Glossary & Abbreviations

ABBREVIATION	BOARD/COMMITTEE
ABLA	Appeals Board (Land Acquisition)
ACM	Asian Civilisations Museum Board
ADT	Ani-Dumping Tribunal
AGC	Attorney-General's Chambers
AMP	Association of Muslim Professionals
AO	Administrative Officer
AS	Administrative Service
AWARE	Association of Women for Action and Research
BCCS	Board of Commissioners of Currency Singapore
BG	Brigadier-General
BOA	Board of Architects
CAAS	Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore Board
CAD	Commercial Affairs Department
CDAC	Consultancy and Directorships Appointments Council
CDC	Community Development Council
CEC	Central Executive Committee
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIDB	Construction Industry Development Board
CIPC	Community Improvements Project Committee
CISCO	Commercial and industrial Security Corporation
CJ	Chief Justice
CLPB	Contact Lens Practitioners Board
CPA	Council of Presidential Advisers
CPF	Central Provident Fund Board
CPIB	Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
CTPE	Council on Technical and Professional Education
DBS	Development Bank of Singapore
DGLC	Directory of Government Linked Corporations
DS	Deputy Secretary
DSO	Defence Science Organisation
DSTA	Defence Science and Technology Agency
EDB	Economic Development Board
FAC	Film Appeal Committee
FUSP	Feedback Unit Supervisory Panel
GIC	Government of Singapore Investment Corporation
GLC	Government Linked Corporation
GRC	Group Representation Constituency
GSTBOR	GST Board of Review
HAB	Hindu Advisory Board
HCS	Health Corporation of Singapore
HDB	Housing and Development Board
HEB	Hindu Endowments Board
HLB	Hotels Licensing Board
IRAS	Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore
ISA	Internal Security Act
ISD	Internal Security Department
ISEAS	Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
IT	Information Technology
IT&T or ITT	Information Technology and Telecommunications
ITBOR	Income Tax Board of Review
ITEBOG	Institute of Technical Education Board of Governors
JTC	Jurong Town Corporation
LB	Laboratory Board

LLB	Liquors Licensing Board
LSB	Land Surveyors Board
LSC	Legal Services Commission
LTA	Land Transport Authority
MAS	Monetary Authority of Singapore
MCI	Ministry of Communications and Information
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MINDEF	Ministry of Defence
MinEnv	Ministry of the Environment
MinLaw	Ministry of Law
MITA	Ministry of Information and the Arts
MND	Ministry of National Development
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOL	Ministry of Labour
MOM	Ministry of Manpower
MPA	Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore
MTI	Ministry of Trade and Industry
MUIS	Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura
NAB	National Archives Board
NAC	National Arts Council
NAPC	Ngee Ann Polytechnic Council
NCB	National Computer Board
NCMP	Non-Constituency member of Parliament
NCSS	National Council of Social Service
NHB	National Heritage Board
NIE	National institute of Education Council
NLB	National Library Board
NMP	Nominated Member of Parliament
NMS	National Museum of Singapore
NOL	Neptune Orient Lines
NPB	National Parks Board
NPBOG	Nanyang Polytechnic Board of Governors
NPPA	Newspapers and Printing Presses Act
NSPB	National Science and Technology Board
NSS	Nature Society of Singapore
NTU	Nanyang Technological University Council
NTUC	National Trade Union Congress
NUH	National University Hospital
NUS	National University of Singapore Council
NYC	National Youth Council
OCBC	Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation
PA	Peoples Association
PAB	Public Accountants Board
PAC	Publications Appeal Committee
PAP	People's Action Party
PB	Pharmacy Board
PCMR	Presidential Council for Minority Rights
PCRH	Presidential Council for Religious Harmony
PEBS	Professional Engineers Board, Singapore
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
POSB	Post Office savings bank of Singapore Board
PS	Permanent Secretary
PSC	Public Service Commission
PSD	Public Service Division
S21	Singapore 21 Committee
SAB	Sikh Advisory Board

SAF	Singapore Armed Forces
SAM	Singapore Art Museum
SBA	Singapore Broadcasting Authority
SCB	Science Centre Board
SCV	Singapore Cable Vision
SCWO	Singapore Council of Women's Organisations
SHM	Singapore History Museum Board
SIA	Singapore International Airlines
SID	Security and Intelligence Division
SLF	Singapore Labour Foundation
SMC	Singapore Medical Council
SMRT	Singapore Mass Rapid Transit Corporation
SNB	Singapore Nursing Board
SPBOG	Singapore Polytechnic Board of Governors
SPF	Singapore Police Force
SPH	Singapore Press Holdings
SPSB	Singapore Productivity and Standards Board
SSC	Singapore Sports Council
ST	Singapore Technologies
STB	Singapore Tourism Board
STITB	Strata Titles Board
STOTB	Singapore Totalisator Board
STPL	Singapore Technologies Private Limited
TAS	Telecommunications Authority of Singapore
TDB	Trade Development Board
TPBOG	Temasek Polytechnic Board of Governors
UOB	United Overseas Bank
URA	Urban Redevelopment Authority
VRB	Valuation Review Board

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A MIRACLE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT?

Singapore is a small nation of almost four million people, which, in the course of 40 years, has built itself from a third world colony, albeit upon colonial foundations of an already successful economy and an efficient administration¹, into a wealthy independent nation without resort to military or civilian dictatorship, with an entrenched, though partial, democracy, a stable society and an economy that has averaged annual growth of 8.5 per cent each year since independence. Its per capita GNP in 1998 was higher than that of its previous colonial master, it is a net lender to the world, it has one of the world's highest levels of foreign reserves,² and, at the end of 1995 was classified by the OECD as having developed sufficiently to be removed from its register of developing countries, a decision confirmed by the IMF in 1997.³ It has a multicultural society which is well educated, stable, increasingly wealthy, and fully employed under the administration of a efficient and highly effective government. More than 80 per cent of families own or are buying their homes.⁴

Singapore has been classified as one of the four East Asian 'miracle' economies.⁵ It has been hugely successful at wealth creation and wealth distribution, although the equity of the latter has in recent years become more questionable. This is one of the most dramatic social and economic transitions undertaken in modern times, perhaps only surpassed by the transformation in South Korea. This has raised many questions as to how this transition was achieved and what processes have underpinned the public policy record that, in large part, produced it.

¹ Huff comments that the PAP "...inherited a successful economy and...a stable and efficiently functioning administration." See: W. G. Huff, *The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and development in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 357-358

² In June 1997, Singapore had official foreign reserves of US\$81 billion, ranked fifth internationally with Hong Kong and greater than the level of US foreign reserves.

³ "Resisting Promotion", *Newsweek*, 6 June 1997. Available at: <http://pathfinder.com/asiaweek/97/0718/newsmap/singapor.html>

⁴ See: *The Economist*, 13 January 1996, pp. 27-28. However, David Martin Jones states that "By 1995, Singapore had the highest rate of home ownership (91 per cent) in the OECD.", although Singapore is not an OECD member or associate state. See: David Martin Jones, *Political Development in Pacific Asia*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997, p. 97

⁵ A term used by Jon Woronoff. See: Jon Woronoff, *Asia's 'Miracle' Economies*, 2nd ed., Armonk (NY), M. E. Sharpe, 1992

But this is also a nation in which "...we may feel that something is not going well..."⁶. Despite the obvious economic progress of which the Singapore government and its people can be proud, some of the strategies adopted to support rapid economic development have been criticised as undermining the social and political integrity and maturing of the nation, allowing little space for political advances to match the economic. As Raymond Lim, founder of the political discussion group The Roundtable has commented: "In Singapore the state is extremely powerful. The Government calls the shots here. Civic organisations only test rather than determine the limits of the growth of civil society."⁷ Although since approximately 1991 under the first Goh Chok Tong government, some expansion in this space has been allowed, it is not with an intention to further democratise,⁸ but as a strategy to contain social discontent arising paradoxically from the success of the government's economic policies both from the increasingly affluent middle class⁹ and from its traditional working class supporters who are becoming aware of growing income inequalities.¹⁰ Singapore is a "managed" society;¹¹ the ruling political party is generally seen as synonymous with the state,¹² the government is proud that it is not a liberal democracy,¹³ the legitimacy of its tenure seems to rest substantially on an economic contract between the government and the electorate¹⁴ and economic development is the paramount policy area.¹⁵

This overwhelming presence of the state is reflected in the nature of state-society relations, both economic and social. The Singapore economy is a form of 'state-dependent capitalism'¹⁶ with the government's participation in the economy contributing in 1997 to more than 60 per cent of GDP¹⁷, belying the findings of some

⁶ Tan Beng Seng, *An Eye Opener*, Singapore, Livelihood Publications, 1992

⁷ Zuraidah Ibrahim, "What grows beneath the banyan tress?", *Straits Times*, 2 May 1998, p. 2

⁸ Chan Heng Chee, "Singapore: Coping with Vulnerability", in James W. Morley, (ed.), *Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1993, pp.219-41

⁹ Garry Rodan, "The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and its Political Significance", in Garry Rodan, (ed.), *Singapore Changes Guard: Social Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s*, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1993, pp. 58-59

¹⁰ Chiew Seen Kong and Ko Yiu Chung, "The Economic Dimension", in Stella R. Quah et al, *Social Class in Singapore*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1991, p. 136. See also: Garry Rodan, "Class transformations and political tensions in Singapore's development", in Richard Robinson and David S. G. Goodman, *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile phones, McDonalds and middle class revolution*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 38-39

¹¹ Cherian George and Kevin Tan, "Barriers to a web society", *ST Interactive*, 17 May 1998, 5 pages, <http://www.asial.com.sg/straitstimes>

¹² Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995, pp.34-35

¹³ George Yeo, "Young PAP - Recasting the Net", *Petir*, May/June 1993, p. 19

¹⁴ Goh Chok Tong in an interview with Raj Vasil in, Raj Vasil, *Governing Singapore: Interviews with the new leaders*, Singapore, Times International Press, 1984, pp. 198-199

¹⁵ Lee Kuan Yew, "What people want is good government", in Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko Tan, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas*, Singapore Times Editions, 1998, p. 380

¹⁶ Linda Y. C. Lim, "Singapore's Success: The Myth of the Free Market economy", *Asian Survey*, 23, 6, June 1983, pp. 263-275, p. 273

¹⁷ Embassy of the United States Singapore, *Country Commercial Guide FY1999: Singapore*, Singapore, Embassy of the United States, July 1998. Available at: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/1999/eastasia/sing99.html

that Singapore has the second freest economy in the world.¹⁸ In social terms, Singapore is a state in which citizenship is defined and statutorily enforced in terms of civic-republican codes of individual-state duty and reciprocity¹⁹ within a framework that uses state power to co-opt cultural, social and economic institutions, movements and forces to the purposes of the state²⁰ so that social and political developments are severely restricted.²¹ The penetration of the state into civil society is such that "Singapore is unique in East and Southeast Asia in the extent to which its managerial state is able effectively to engineer the economic, cultural and political behaviour of its society."²² This has resulted in a state which has been described as "...a curious cross between the Leninist cell system and the Confucian Chinese Mandarinate."²³

However, a description of society-state relations using the concept of hegemony seems more satisfactory. Terms such as ideological hegemony²⁴ an hegemonic program²⁵, PAP hegemony²⁶, and more specifically, "... a Gramscian ideological hegemony imposed by the political leadership over society ..."²⁷ have been used in recent years. Singapore is thus a complex polity, characterised by enormous economic and social achievements, equally large policy challenges and the hegemonic exercise of state power through both centralised and distributed power structures which attempt, paradoxically, to simultaneously combine both economic freedom and social and political oppression.

¹⁸ James D. Gwartney and Robert A. Lawson, *Economic Freedom of the World: 1997 Annual report*, Vancouver, The Fraser Institute, 1997, p. 3

¹⁹ Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995, pp.244-250

²⁰ Garry Rodan, "State-society relations and political opposition in Singapore", in Garry Rodan (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp.103-104

²¹ These limitations are illustrated in the continuing national debate on artistic freedom and censorship as recently detailed in: "Rocky road for S'pore artists in search of more freedom?", *ST Interactive*, 16 May 1998, 4 pages, <http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitsimes>

²² Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David Martin Jones, *Toward Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia*, Oxford, St. Martin's Press, 1995, p. vii

²³ Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the banyan tree*, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 50

²⁴ Chua Beng Huat, "Pragmatism of the Peoples Action Party Government in Singapore: A Critical Assessment", *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, 13, 1, 1985. In this study, Chua uses the concept of hegemony to examine the development of a pragmatic ideology by the PAP oriented almost wholly towards economic development. He later abandoned the concept of hegemony and relaced it with a communitarian based analysis. See: Chua Beng-Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 14 and p. 44. Chan Heng Chee had earlier described the PAP as an hegemonic party. See: Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass-Roots*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1976, p. 218

²⁵ Christopher Lingle, *Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions and Political Dependency*, Barcelona, Edicions Sirocco, 1996, p. 160;

²⁶ James Gomez, "Proportionalising Political Representation in Singapore: Problems and Prospects", *Commentary*, 13, 1997, pp. 118-130, p.128

²⁷ Choo-oon Khong, "Singapore: Political Legitimacy Through Managing Conformity", in, Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, pp. 108-135, p. 110

Four factors have been consistently identified as crucial to Singapore's achievements: a stable, efficient and corruption-free government and legal system; liberal trade and investment policies highly integrated with the international trading system; its developed human resources; and the effectiveness of the 'technocratic elite' in the state bureaucracies in developing and managing the policies on which these achievements are based. In respect of Singapore the consensus is that government has made a difference.²⁸ In a small island nation with only two resources, its geographical position and its people, both had to be developed to their greatest capacity. This task was not managed by the market or the state alone, but by a complex interaction of institutions and personalities with political, social and economic forces, through a unique policy system which has developed from the hegemonic political program of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), initially under Lee Kuan Yew and, since late 1990, under Prime Minister Goh Chock Tong.

There is no doubt that, in establishing the foundations for the nation's economic and social achievements and in building upon them, the public sector has played a crucial central role. The conventional wisdom regarding the foundations of Singapore's economic success is succinctly captured by the Head of the Civil Service:

"Singapore has succeeded because of clean and effective government, free of corruption, meritocratic, efficient and responsive, fair and impartial, able to offer Singaporeans continuous improvement in their quality of life with economic progress and a safe and secure environment. By being nimble and pragmatic, we have been able to spot dangers earlier than others and make good use of opportunities that have come our way. These characteristics will continue to be important in Singapore life. They form the fundamentals of good governance."²⁹

Government and its executive agencies are at the centre of the Singapore story. However, as Rhodes contends, there is much that we don't know about how government works; too much of the literature is based on assumptions about how government should work, is legalistic and distanced from the real dynamics and structures of systems of national governance. Is the prime minister really in charge of government? Do business interests actually participate in governing the nation? Do civil society actors have a genuine role in running the country? Are backbenchers just seatwarmers or do they have any authentic power within the system of governance?

²⁸ See: World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 180, pp. 347-368. In their report developed for the World Bank's East Asian Miracle project, Soon and Tan concluded that in Singapore's case, the government was "...integral to Singapore's rapid industrialisation." See: T. W. Soon and C. S. Tan, *Lessons of East Asia: Singapore: Public Policy and Economic Development*, Washington, World Bank, 1993. An analysis of the role of human capital development in Singapore's development is included in: Jong-Il Kim and Lawrence J. Lau, "The Role of Human Capital in the Economic Growth of the East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries", *Asia-Pacific Economic Review*, 1, 3, 1995, pp. 3-22

²⁹ Lim Siong Guan, "The Public Service", in Yeo Lay Hwee, ed., *Singapore: The year in review 1995*, Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1996, pp. 35-48, p. 35

The key question that core executive studies addresses is - how does government work in the real world?³⁰

This thesis is a study of the core executive in the context of the Singaporean hegemonic state. In particular, it examines the Singaporean core executive under the Goh Chock Tong administrations, 1991-1998 so as to enhance our understanding of how contemporary governance in Singapore has developed since the transition to power from Lee Kuan Yew in December 1990; a transition that was supposed to usher in a 'new' form of governance in Singapore. It does not, however, claim to be an holistic study, as the conditions for undertaking this type of research in Singapore are such that only certain aspects of the core executive, predominantly institutional structures are researchable, particularly by a non-Singaporean. The theoretical framework for the thesis is provided by the concept of state hegemony. However, because this concept is oriented predominantly to institutional analysis, it is supplemented by a policy community/networks approach where possible. The thesis therefore focuses predominantly on institutions operating under conditions of hegemony and secondly on those aspects of core executive dynamics which are accessible. It uses the Singapore case as a means of examining who are the central players in governing this hegemonic Westminster state and how they govern. It attempts to answer such questions as: Who is at the centre of government and policy making? How do they really govern? What are the roles of institutions? What non-institutional actors can be identified? What are the distinctive structural characteristics of the Singaporean public sector which determine the structure and dynamics of the Singaporean core executive? What is the nature of the relationship between the political executive, the bureaucratic elites and other elites? Are there any distinctive dynamics which characterise the Singaporean core executive? In particular, this thesis asserts that it is essential to examine Singapore as a Westminster state and the implications this has for its system of governance, an issue which has only been peripherally addressed in the literature. In addition to analysing the structure and dynamics of policy making, the thesis, in conclusion, also attempts to assess the durability of the current core executive arrangements under conditions of hegemony and its prospects for the future.

The study will add to the already complex picture of the Singaporean public policy system developed to date and will, hopefully, provide additional insights particularly of the nature, internal dynamics and operations of Singaporean public bureaucracies and the functions and roles of the political executive. In particular, it is hoped that this study will provide a core executive analysis which will complement those which have been done for European nations.

³⁰ R. A. W. Rhodes, "From prime ministerial power to core executive", in, R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, eds., *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 11-37

THE ANALYTICAL FRAME

The Singaporean political system is not a typical liberal democracy in the European tradition. It is a polity which has evolved a unique character under the long guidance of one political party and one premier. Most approaches to policy analysis have been developed in the context of pluralist liberal democracies and are inappropriate for a study of an illiberal democracy such as Singapore. An approach that will facilitate an atheoretical empirical analysis of both the structure and dynamics of the policy system offers the best frame of analysis in this case. Of the choices available, one which provides a frame that facilitates the study of the internal dynamics of the policy system, is required. For this reason, and also because of the basic Westminster nature of the Singaporean polity, a core executive analysis will be used so that structural components are given due consideration. However, the analytical framework should also take account of Singapore's post-colonial status as a relatively new nation and state as this has been a major determinant of the evolution of its political system. Therefore the historical context of the policy system will be strengthened to take account of these influences as well and, where appropriate and possible, comparisons will be made with other Asian nations.

Research Methodology

This research has been principally undertaken through interviews of senior policy makers in the upper echelons of the Singapore Civil Service, statutory boards and government linked corporations and, to a lesser degree, in the community, business and higher education sectors. This study is the first by a foreign researcher that has been permitted by the Singaporean government to include extensive interviews with large numbers of members of the elite Administrative Service and senior bureaucrats. Koh's excellent survey and sociological analysis provides a valuable complementary study.³¹

Two rounds of interviews were held with senior public sector executives; the first in 1995 and the second in 1998. The 1995 interviews were structured and aimed at collecting data on the major structural and process characteristics of the policy system. A structured approach was thought necessary, as the literature revealed little about these matters.³² The interviews conducted in 1998 were semi-structured and again involved senior executives in ministries and boards but also included government linked corporations and Members of Parliament. Although the latter two groups had

³¹ Gillian Koh, "A Sociological Analysis of the Singapore Administrative Elite: The Bureaucracy in an Evolving Developmentalist State", unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Sheffield, 1995

³² In 1995 Gillian Koh was completing her research which included the investigation of complementary issues, but the author was unaware of her research at that time. Koh's dissertation was finalised in late 1995. She now works in the Institute of Policy Studies.

been approached in 1995, they had refused to be involved in the study at that time. These interviews examined the dynamics of the policy system in greater detail than the 1995 interviews and, in particular, attempted to collect data on the dynamics of the core executive, particularly the interaction between senior bureaucrats and the political executive. Consequently, almost all these interviews were conducted on the basis that they not be attributable due to the sensitivity of these topics.

Note on Research Difficulties

Conducting empirical research on the Singaporean public sector is not an easy task. The problem stems from a desire by Singaporean authorities to keep the policy centre secret and, indeed, to keep government in general, as secret as possible. There is a particular sensitivity about relationships and dynamics; I was told *ad nauseam*, in on-the-record interviews that in reality, the Singapore political system, public sector management and policy dynamics mirrored without blemish, both Westminster constitutional legal theory and a linear, non-dynamic, model of policy making. The centre of government was as one, separate but complementary roles were clearly defined and universally adhered to between bureaucrats and politicians. Policy disputation, except for minor personal preferences, never spilt over into major policy disagreements, factionalism or schism; the only polity in history to be so blessed. This culture of secrecy and exclusion of inquiry is reinforced legally and institutionally. There is no Freedom of Information Act; instead there is the Official Secrets Act based on the eponymous British act, which is designed to suppress access to or release of government information; any government information.

The scope of this act, and its inhibiting effects on civil servants' disclosure of any information, should not be underestimated. In one memorable interview, when faced by a complete refusal by one senior official to divulge any information of interest to the study, the author, to test the limits of the act, asked whether the official could divulge the colour of the toilet paper used by that particular ministry – something which countless Singaporeans would have known. The official replied that this was impossible as it would infringe the act. When it was pointed out that this information could be gained by simply visiting the toilet in one of that ministry's buildings, the official replied that while that was so, nonetheless he could not divulge the information! While this is an extreme example of the power of the Official Secrets Act to suppress information, it is unfortunately also indicative of the wider effects of this legislation on the culture of the Singapore Civil Service; the legitimate protection of the interests of the state which the act seeks, is often reduced to bureaucratic inanity.

There is also no consistency in access by researchers to government information. A few examples will illustrate the difficulties. One example in relation to this study is that a Singaporean researcher, Gillian Koh, for her doctoral research was able to survey all members of the Administrative Service, I was not. While in 1995 I was provided with a breakdown of each division of the Singapore Civil Service by race; in 1998 this was refused. In 1995, I was provided access to the Civil Service Instruction Manuals; in 1998 this was refused. No reasons were given; access was denied, presumably because the information was secret. Yet access to the same information was provided to honours students at the National University of Singapore whose theses are publicly available. A more notable example is access to government statistics. While all ministries and boards compile copious statistics, these are deemed to be secret. The release of any statistics not published by the Department of Statistics requires approval by a Permanent Secretary or even a minister. The statistics published by the government are those which it is considered essential to make available for market consumption and political necessity; no more and no less.

This inconsistency also applies to access to ministries and boards. While in 1995, I was received with unfailing courtesy by all ministries and boards, in 1998, several were openly hostile; they would have served their government better by refusing to participate in the study. In 1995, the Parliamentary Library was accessible to foreign researchers by arrangement; in 1998 no access was allowed. In 1998, access to government information on-line was also restricted. For example, in October 1998, I applied for accounts with Singapore Telecommunications for a CommerceAsia on-line account, to access certain commercial databases which were being marketed by the government including the on-line inquiry service of the Registrar of Companies and Businesses. The account was never opened and neither SingTel, nor CommerceAsia returned my faxes or emails about the matter despite repeated requests. The online inquiry staff at the Registrar of Companies and Businesses pursued my application request when I continued to inquire as to its fate, but soon they too stopped answering my email and could apparently do nothing; somebody had decided I shouldn't have access. Similarly, in the same month I applied for an on-line account to use LawNet, the on-line legal database which includes legislation, cases and parliamentary records. I was refused an account although the regulations allowed a request for a personal (non-company) account to be made to the LawNet Management Committee. Despite my requests for such a submission to be made, the LawNet contact officer refused to answer my emails or, I assume, to forward my request. At approximately this time, the main Singapore database on the international legal database, Lexus, was suspended, thus stopping any on-line access to Singaporean legal databases except by law companies through LawNet.

In many of the 1995 interviews, ministries sent minders with the person I had requested to interview and in 1998 at least some of my ministry and board interviews, and possibly those in some GLCs, were recorded without my being told that this would be done.³³ These strategies had the desired effect of limiting the responses to questions. In one particular case, the person I had asked to interview was so intimidated by the minder who accompanied him, that he didn't answer any questions. The minder became so infuriated with him, that she began answering the questions and so I conducted the interview with her instead. Almost all those interviewed found it difficult that I was not an academic, but a fellow civil servant who could draw upon his own experience of government in pursuing this research. In 1998, my lack of access to certain information and officials threatened the viability of certain aspects of the study, so I had to resort to my own networks built up over 20 years and pursue those issues in a way that I had not planned or anticipated; particularly those concerned with coercive governance strategies.

The unfortunate conclusion that one must draw is that foreign researchers, at least those concerned with public sector management and public policy, are assumed to be hostile to Singapore while domestic researchers are generally not; although domestic researchers also face considerable difficulties. I was informed by a senior official in the Prime Minister's Office, in response to a question about local academics' work that domestic political science researchers were "not allowed to know what's going on – they know nothing!" This says little that is positive for Singapore and much about the public sector culture which is hardly flattering. Despite these difficulties, in general the senior executive of the Singapore Civil Service and the other public bureaucracies are a very impressive and talented group of people who manage a policy system of impressive achievements. In general they have a passion for Singapore and a considerable appreciation for both the strengths and weaknesses of what they call "the system". It is somewhat of a mystery why they wish to perpetuate a culture of paranoia and dysfunctional secrecy and why they think, in a small society like Singapore, those who wish to find out how they work, if determined, cannot do so. If it is true that only the paranoid survive, it is equally true that the quality of their survival is low, if measured in terms that are more than economic. This is unfortunate, because it is largely unnecessary.

STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The study comprises nine chapters.

³³ I was informed that certain meeting rooms in ministries and boards have hidden audio and video recording facilities and that these are used for interviews with outsiders, particularly foreigners. In one case, I interrupted

Chapter One provides a theoretical framework for the study and then examines how the Singaporean state and political system have historically developed in relation to this framework. In particular, it identifies determinants of the PAP's governance framework and its general approach to national governance.

Chapter Two extends the historical analysis to the Singaporean public sector, within which the core executive is principally located. This chapter identifies the major structural aspects of the public sector.

Chapter Three presents the concept of the core executive and how it can be applied to Singapore. It critically examines this concept in the context of the Westminster political system on which the Singaporean polity is based, examines the functional aspects of the core executive and then analyses the application of the concept to Singapore, including a discussion of who might comprise the Singaporean core executive.

Chapter Four examines the relationship between the core executive, the legislature and the political system in terms of both structure and dynamics in order to begin the process of mapping out the institutional base of the contemporary Singaporean core executive and how it governs the nation.

Chapter Five examines the relationship of the judiciary to the core executive by analysing its relationship with the political executive and other institutions of state.

Chapter Six examines the dynamics of the relationship between the political executive and the public sector executive, how these two groups contribute towards core executive membership and operationalise governance strategies.

Chapter Seven provides an analysis of the leadership of government linked corporations (GLCs) and statutory boards, examines how they might contribute to the membership of the core executive and discusses their role in national governance.

Chapter Eight provides two studies of particular strategies of governance used by the contemporary Singaporean core executive; one examining aspects of the consent building framework, the other of the coercive framework.

Chapter Nine presents the conclusions of the study.

1. GOVERNANCE, SINGAPORE AND THE HEGEMONIC STATE

GOVERNANCE IN SINGAPORE: A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This study attempts to understand how contemporary Singapore is governed by taking a realist, empirical approach to governance. To do this effectively it must take account of how the Singaporean state is organised. The major focus of the study is therefore on how the system of governance is structured and what its dynamics are; who governs and how they govern in Singapore. In practical terms, this is about who makes policy and how are those policies made. In addressing these issues, what perspectives on systems of governance and policy making provide the most appropriate approach for this particular study? This question is addressed in the first section of this chapter, an answer provided in the second section and a review of the development of the Singaporean state provided in the final section.

Singapore and the Research Paradigm

Singapore is a distinctive state and polity. It is a Westminster style post-colonial state in Southeast Asia, peopled principally by Chinese and Malays; peoples who have an historical tradition of strong monarchical political systems. The Singaporean state has been variously described as an 'extremely intrusive' authoritarian state¹, 'strong and paternalistic'², and a polity in which political discourse has been largely shaped by a single man; Lee Kuan Yew.³ The political system has been described as "effectively oligarchic, dominated by a technocratic elite who regard political debate as "dysfunctional", an obstacle to the achievement of rational solutions"⁴, where democratic politics is a "political perversion"⁵ and therefore has a government devoid of a 'competent opposition'.⁶ Instead, it has been claimed that politics has been

¹ Cal Clark and K. C. Roy, *Comparing Development Patterns in Asia*, Boulder, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1997, pp. 80 and 83

² Cal Clark and K. C. Roy, *Comparing Development Patterns in Asia*, Boulder, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1997, p. 144

³ James Cotton, "Political Innovation in Singapore: The Presidency, The Leadership and the Party", in, Garry Rodan, ed., *Singapore Changes Guard*, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1994, pp. 3-15, p. 3

⁴ Choo-On Khong, "Singapore", in, Muthiah Alagappa, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, pp. 108-135, p. 132

⁵ T. S. Selvan, *Singapore: The Ultimate Island*, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, p. 298

⁶ Michael Leiffer, "Triumph of the Will", *Far East Economic Review*, 15 November 1990, pp. 27-34, p. 28

replaced by economics⁷, government by administration⁸ and competitive political and social discourse by the political dominance of one party and an ideological hegemony which suppresses the full development of civil society thus severely limiting the development of mediating structures between state and society.

The resulting political system has escaped a consensual definition; its supporters proclaim that it "is not a one party state; it is a parliamentary democracy"⁹, and that the political system is characterised by both "representative and participatory democracy"¹⁰, or even, more blatantly echoing the government's own line, that it is a 'controlled democracy'¹¹ in which good governance should prevail over democracy and human rights and that the system of public administration is essentially the government.¹² More critical analysts have deemed it to be a "non-liberal communitarian democracy"¹³ or a "restricted Asian democracy"¹⁴ while others concluded that it is not a democracy but rather an "authoritarian-capitalist regime".¹⁵ At the extremes it has been termed the rule of a "technocrat emperor"¹⁶ which in the

⁷ Lee Kuan Yew has stated: "political problems ultimately mean the problem of how we make our living, how we can give everyone a fair and equal chance to study and work and have a full life." Lee Kuan Yew, *The Battle for Merger*, Singapore, Ministry of Culture, 1962, p. 83

⁸ Chan Heng Chee, "Politics in an administrative state: where has the politics gone?", in, Seah Chee Meow, *Trends in Singapore*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1975, pp. 51-68

⁹ Richard Clutterbuck, *Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia 1945-1983*, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1984, p. 347. Clutterbuck, a former Major-General in the British army, bases this assessment on the most basic level of institutional analysis. His comments on political openness ignores the almost total lack of accountability of the GLC sector and reveals a lack of understanding of the true functions of the GRO sector. Also, his comments on the secrecy of the ballot in Singapore reveals how little he understands of the administrative arrangements for vote processing and his cursory analysis of the legal system (less than one page) speaks for itself. These are indications that perhaps his general admiration for the economic and social order achievements of the PAP governments has limited his analysis of the political infrastructure. See: pp. 337-353

¹⁰ Jon S. T. Quah and Stella R. Quah, "The Limits of Government Intervention", in, Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 102-127, p. 123. The claim for participatory democracy by these authors is based on the existence of unelected Town Councils. This concept of participatory democracy is impossible to reconcile with others as it contains no element of participation; appointment to Town Councils is completely regulated by the government except in two constituencies controlled by opposition political parties and, even in these, all Town Council members are appointed. The Town Councils have a purely administrative function and do not serve to broaden political discourse.

¹¹ Jon S. T. Quah, "Public Administration in Singapore: Managing Success in a Multi-Racial City-State", in, Ahmed Shafiqul Haque, Jermain T. M. Lam and Jane C. Y. Lee, eds., *Public Administration in the NICs: Challenges and Accomplishments*, London, Macmillan, 1996, pp. 59-89, p. 61. Quah, a professor at the National University of Singapore, defines a 'controlled democracy' as "a republic with a parliamentary system based on the British Westminster model, but which has been adapted to suit local conditions". Quah defines the "local conditions" as principally fear of communal riots necessitating the government "restricting individuals, groups, organisations and the press from sensationalizing and exploiting issues of race, language and religion." In line with the PAP's ideology, no critical assessment of this argument is offered and no alternatives proposed. This is one example of the PAP ideological hegemony extended to the intellectual class.

¹² Linda Low, *The Political Economy of a City-State: Government-made Singapore*, Singapore, Oxford University press, 1998, p. 26

¹³ Chua Beng-Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 184. Chua comments that "the PAP government in Singapore is still far short of meeting the necessary conditions for a communitarian democracy to which it allegedly aspires." p. 201

¹⁴ Clark D. Neher and Ross Marlay, *Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds of Change*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1995, p. 134

¹⁵ Christopher Lingle, *Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian values, Free Markets Illusions, and Political Dependency*, Barcelona, Edicions Sirocco, 1996, p. 40

¹⁶ Joseph B. Tamney, *The Struggle Over Singapore's Soul: Western Modernization and Asian Culture*, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1995, p. 81

words of a former President of Singapore is acted out in a "loutish political style"¹⁷ resulting, according to others in a general state of fear in society because of political executive terror.¹⁸

In terms of state-society relations, it has been argued that in Singapore civil society has been depoliticised¹⁹, and that the government refuses to allow the institutions of civil society to have a political face, that:

... it has drawn up the limits of civil society by stating that interest groups are just that – groups representing special interests – and that they have to become political parties if they wish to extend their beliefs beyond those interests and push for change that affects society as a whole.²⁰

Rather, the PAP has proposed that an alternative to civil society, termed "civic society", a depoliticised civil society which is ideologically aligned to the PAP, as the model for Singapore. In acknowledging, in 1995, that the state was all pervasive, Brigadier-General George Yeo using the banyan tree as metaphor commented that:

The problem now is that under the banyan tree, very little else can grow. When state institutions are too pervasive, civic institutions cannot thrive. Therefore, it is necessary to prune the banyan tree so that other plants can grow.²¹

However, such new growth has to be 'controlled' growth, acceded to be a largely depoliticised citizenry. This was summarised by a *Straits Times* editorial:

It is important that emerging civic institutions do not overstep their mandate and adopt a politically adversarial role ... Conflict for the sake of civil society will not do ... By contrast, a questioning, but understanding, population working together with a responsible Government can create the kind of civic culture that will politically complement Singapore's economic success.²²

The de-politicisation thesis has not been accepted by all. Chua, while admitting that the government has reduced political debate and activity to a very low level, and even "been successful in convincing academics and intellectuals to accept this particular conception" comments that this does not mean "the end of ideology nor the end of politics."²³ Despite this assertion, in the face of a 'pervasive' state, Chua concludes at

¹⁷ C. V. Devan Nair, "Foreword" in, Francis T. Seow, *To Catch a Tartar: A dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison*, New Haven, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1994, p. xxx

¹⁸ Christopher Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore*, London, Macmillan, 1994, pp. 199-221

¹⁹ Stanley Bedlington, *Malaysia and Singapore: The Building of New States*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1978, pp. 241-243

²⁰ *Straits Times*, 30 December 1990, p. 18

²¹ The idea of "civic society" was proposed by the PAP's second generation ideologue (the first being S. Rajaratnam), Brigadier-General George Yeo.

²² *Straits Times*, 25 June 1991, p. 10

²³ Chua Beng Huat, 1995, op. cit., pp. 42-43

the end of his study of the possibility of communitarian democracy in Singapore that:

For the individual, being politically oppositional can be a perilous activity, to be taken on only after serious consideration of the existential conditions of living in a very small island city-state, where the state is pervasive in every sphere of social life. First, one's livelihood is directly or indirectly tied to some part of the functions of state agencies. Directly, one may be in the employ of either the civil service or one of the many large government-linked enterprises. Indirectly, as the private sector economy is highly regulated by licensing and other administrative processes, it is believed that one's professional practices may be jeopardised by difficulties in running the gauntlet of bureaucratic processes. The tendency is to avoid offending the political regime.²⁴

By 1998, the civil society debate had been rekindled, at the government's initiative, seemingly in response to the acceptance by the cabinet that under the increasingly complex conditions of modernity that are impacting on Singaporean society and economy, the state could no longer adequately rule alone. The banyan tree metaphor was replaced by the tembusu tree²⁵ at a national closed-door conference on civil society sponsored by the Institute of Policy Studies. Government participants at the conference spoke of a new government agenda which "will give more space to civil society and encourage Singaporeans to move beyond the achievements of the past" in which the government would trust civil society more.²⁶ This message was reinforced, again by George Yeo, who stated that civil society and the state had to work together in a new era in which 'state-society ties were undergoing a transformation.'²⁷ Stating that he refused to use the 'civil society' label, RAdm. Teo Chee Hean later in 1998, called for an active citizenry, "which takes an interest in community and national issues ... and which possesses the passion and commitment to contribute and participate."²⁸

Civil society groups were generally sceptical to this effort to re-define state-society relations. In reports from the civil society conference carried in the *Straits Times*, the overwhelming reaction was doubt of the government's ability to renegotiate this relationship as summarised by Constance Singam's comment that:

The Singapore experience – the experience of legal sanctions, the erosion of civil space and liberties, instills in people an often inexplicable fear and fosters a sense of uncertainty about the limits to people's freedom of action.²⁹

T. Sasitharan at the same conference, concluded that:

²⁴ Chua Beng Huat, 1995, op. cit., p. 207

²⁵ The tembusu tree is a deep-rooted tall tree with a small canopy under which other plants can grow.

²⁶ Statements by Professor Tommy Koh Thong Bee, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See: Koh Buck Song, "More space in tembusu tree era", *Straits Times*, 8 May 1998, p. 3

²⁷ Zuraidah Ibrahim, "Civic groups will have bigger role", *Straits Times*, 7 May 1998, p. 2

²⁸ "RAdm. Teo for people sector", *Sunday Times*, 21 June 1998, p. 28

I fear the reality of the reality beneath the rhetoric of these proceedings is still about the Government seeking to retain full and final control.³⁰

This was verified by BG. Yeo in his comments on the issue. Yeo's conception was that in contemporary Singapore, civil society "operated within the bounds of the state"³¹ and was inherently bounded by hegemonic parameters:

As our common consciousness grows, the bounds of debate will be relaxed but, realistically, we will always need an outer perimeter to hold our society together.³²

Such a common consciousness derives from ideological hegemony, not from a relationship between state and society which is negotiated and characterised by trust, mutuality and respect. The hollowness of the government's claim for the transformation of state-society relations in 1998 was confirmed by its failure to amend any of the legislative framework for political and social control and its continuation in 1999, to allow its bureaucrats to control such minor events as a speech at a book launch³³, a speech of thanks by an opposition member of parliament at an invitation only party dinner³⁴ and the dispatch of Internal Security Department operatives to openly video and monitor a meeting at the non-party aligned Open Singapore Centre.³⁵

If there is politics in Singapore, it is politics of a particularly limited and dangerous type. It is, most certainly, not a liberal democratic polity to which almost all our contemporary research frames in political science are oriented. Rodan concludes that "some very conditional independent political spaces" tenuously exist and that any expansion of political activity in recent years has through an "expansion of the state itself" through innovations in the co-option of civil society within the state sphere.³⁶ Hill and Lian in assessing the nature of civil society in Singapore interpret existing state-society relations as being evidence of "consensus politics" and argue that within the limitations imposed by the state that there "is indeed space in the interstices between the 'political', as defined by the state, and the 'legitimate' – albeit unobtrusively political – concerns of interest groups which have arisen ..."³⁷ Whether one argues for the existence of no politics or an 'unobtrusive' politics, it is obvious that the nature of state-society relations in Singapore does not conform to that

²⁹ Koh Buck Song, "What plants will grow under the tembusu tree?", *Straits Times*, 9 May 1998, p. 14

³⁰ *ibid.*

³¹ Zuraidah Ibrahim, *op. cit.*, 1998

³² *ibid.*

³³ "gagged author issues letter and beats the law". Available at <http://www.singapore-window.org/sw99/91106jg.htm>

³⁴ "SPP Annual Dinner 1999". Available at: <http://members.tripod.com/politics21/mainpage.net/>

³⁵ James Gomez, "Watching the watchers: A counter Surveillance Report". Available at: <http://www.gn.apc.org/sfd/Link%20pages/Link%20Folders/osc/140699.html>

³⁶ Garry Rodan, "State-society relations and political opposition in Singapore", in Garry Rodan, ed., *Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 95-127, pp. 120-121

³⁷ Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, *The Politics of nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 241

characteristic of liberal democracies but rather of an "authoritarian polity."³⁸

As the nature of state-society relations disclosed above suggests, the contemporary Singaporean state is characterised by a hegemonic framework facilitated by what Chua terms "an ideology of pragmatism"³⁹, administered by an elite "High technocracy in GLCs or civil service"⁴⁰ bent on maintaining these arrangements. Any meaningful analysis of Singapore's system of governance requires that account be taken of this hegemonic program and its character understood.

Hegemony and State-Society Relations

Gramsci drawing upon Marx, Engels and Lenin saw the state as essentially coercive and sought to develop a new revolutionary methodology for replacing it with a 'regulated society' that would be operationalised by democratic consensus. He distinguished between two types of social control; coercion, including control through rewards and punishments; and intellectual leadership, including the inculcation of moral values which underwrites the development of ideological and systemic consent. For Gramsci, the modern capitalist state has the historical potential to achieve an advanced form of social control exercised through 'hegemony' which is broadly defined as the ideological ascendancy of one class over society. The hegemonic order is the interrelated matrix of institutional and social arrangements and beliefs derived from the ruling class, preferably the proletariat, supported by coercive powers, the origins of which were concealed through a number of strategies, supported by the consent, either active or passive, of citizens facilitated by a civil society. For Gramsci, hegemony is the organisation of consent. This consent does not arise spontaneously, but is won through ideological struggle and material concessions which combine to unite the subordinated and the dominating classes as members of the same political community. The power through which the dominant class organises consent is both centralised in the coercive apparatus of the state and diffused across institutions co-opted into the hegemonic program including the church, the family and schools. Therefore, consent is not just organised through state institutions, but also within civil society.

Hegemony is therefore based on intellectual leadership exercised principally through civil society rather than the state. The consent to these arrangements is not necessarily exercised through formal consent activities such as voting, but rather through a psychological state of acceptance of the social and political order based on an active

³⁸ Jean-Louise Margolin, "Foreign Models in Singapore's Development and the Idea of a Singaporean Model", in Garry Rodan, ed., *Singapore Changes Guard: Social Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s*, PP. 84-100, p. 96

³⁹ Chua Beng Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995. p. 5

acceptance of core values and institutions. The advanced capitalist state could achieve hegemony by the incorporation of all classes within its own cultural and economic ethos, even to the point of the incorporation of trade unions into this order.⁴¹ This hegemonic project transforms the state, unifying and communalising it, with the state acting as 'educator' to achieve these aims, by imposing its own values and beliefs onto citizens,⁴² either through democratic or oligarchic means.⁴³ If oligarchy prevails within the hegemonic project and the 'educator' is bourgeois, Gramsci considered this detrimental to the interests of the working class. Additionally, the intellectual educative functions of the state cannot be treated as a unified force as it too is challenged by splits in the hegemonic structure, in this case "between bureaucracy and specialists on the one hand and political leaders on the other ..."⁴⁴

The hegemonic state can only be achieved by stages, but in its final evolutionary form, it becomes so inclusive across class boundaries that coercion becomes obsolete, politics is democratised and becomes an aspect of the everyday life of all citizens, civil society is highly developed and ideologically aligned with the hegemonic project, the party⁴⁵ is transformed into the state and in the process becomes non-political, dominating society through its technical functions of 'propaganda and public order, and moral and cultural influence' thus suppressing any pluralist tendency.⁴⁶ The degree of incorporation of civil society by the party and the state determines the degree of pluralism within society and indicates the democratic-oligarchic tendency of the state. The achievement of hegemony is therefore the 'highest historical development of a class' as it provides it with complete control of society, politics and economy.⁴⁷

Civil society according to Gramsci is a sphere in modern capitalist societies within which classes and class factions engage in political and ideological struggles which

⁴⁰ Linda Low, *The Political Economy of a City-State: Government-made Singapore*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1998, p.225. GLCs are government linked corporations; i.e. government owned businesses and trading enterprises.

⁴¹ Joseph Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980, p. 32

⁴² Miller defines hegemony as "A term used by Gramsci and his followers to refer to the non-coercive aspects of class rule, i.e. to the ability of a dominant class to use agencies of socialization to foist its own values and beliefs on to the remainder of the population." See: David Miller, ed., *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, p. 200

⁴³ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans., London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 260

⁴⁴ Anna Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 277

⁴⁵ In Gramsci's conception this is preferably the mass revolutionary party as exemplified in the communist parties of the early twentieth century. It may, however, also encompass other parties of the bourgeoisie, but this is a less desirable option, although possibly only a stage in the evolution toward a hegemony of the proletariat. See: Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. and trans., *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, New York, International Publishers, 1971, pp. 147-156; pp. 210-218; pp. 267-269

⁴⁶ Ann Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, 2nd ed., Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, pp. 222-226. For Gramsci's views of the role of the Party see: Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Des and trans., *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, New York, International Publishers, 1971, pp. 147-157

⁴⁷ Ann Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, 2nd ed., Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 116

create mass movements and complex organisations.⁴⁸ This concept differs from Hegel's in that he excludes economic organisations and relationships from civil society. Gramsci's most significant contributions include his conception of the state as central to politics and society, his idea of a Rousseau-like stateless self-governing consensual society and his understanding of hegemony; its hidden nature and its production through a sophisticated hegemonic program and its perpetuation through the consent mechanism of civil society which he saw as potentially being 'the same thing' as the state.⁴⁹ These concepts are useful in an examination of the mechanisms of governance in an illiberal democratic state such as Singapore

When placed in historical perspective, a Gramscian interpretation of the Singaporean state is not surprising. If Gramsci had still been with us, he could well have interpreted Singapore during the period 1959-65, as being at the point of a 'crisis of hegemony' in the context of the conditions surrounding the struggle between the PAP and its communist-aligned opposition, the Barisan Socialis; " a phase in the class struggle that precedes: either the conquest of power on the part of the revolutionary proletariat ... or a tremendous reaction on the part of the propertied classes and governing caste."⁵⁰ The Barisan Socialis were the voice of the proletariat with widespread popular support among the Chinese working class and the PAP quickly became the voice of the propertied classes and their allies and eventually prevailed.

In Singapore, hegemonic rule is achieved not through democratisation but through oligarchic means. The bureaucratic, political and business elites are integrated through a bourgeois party which uses meritocratic assessment based on educational⁵¹ and other achievements to select the public sector and political leadership. Because of the high degree of penetration of the state into the market and society, the party selected elite also penetrate these sectors thus perpetuating oligarchic control. The People's Action Party (PAP) has not yet achieved such a dominance of civil society that it is fully aligned to the hegemonic ideology and program of the party, but it has achieved a substantial degree of dominance. As civil society is the site of interest articulation it must be assumed that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for it to be fully integrated with the hegemonic program. Indeed, de Certeau suggests, correctly in my opinion, that

⁴⁸ Anne S. Sasso, *Gramsci's Politics*, London, Croom Helm, 1980, p. 200 and pp. 222-225

⁴⁹ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 160

⁵⁰ Gramsci, 1971, op. cit., p. 191

⁵¹ This meritocratic selection process into the party and the administrative elite should be assessed in the context of the proven linkage between social class and educational achievement. Meritocratic selection based upon achievement in a first university degree and the university of graduation, establishes a basis for a self-perpetuating administrative elite which admits members principally from the upper middle and upper classes. See: Hilary Metcalf, *Class and Higher Education: the participation of young people from lower social classes*, London, Council for Industry and Higher Education, 1997; Annette Larreau, *Home Advantage: Social Class and Parental Intercession in Elementary Education*, London, Taylor and Francis, 1989. The PAP government under Goh Chok Tong has attempted to overcome this problem of disproportional recruitment

this is impossible.⁵² The oligarchic hegemony that has evolved in Singapore has also taken account of the potential for conflict with the working class by designing the governance system and its policies so that this class also benefits from the hegemonic regime in at least economic terms. Singaporean hegemony is therefore neo-Gramscian as it has substantially de-fused the potential for class-based conflict within the political system. It has been even more successful in that it also appears to have substantially managed the social order so that the possibility of conflict among racial and religious minorities is negligible; an issue of state-society relations which transcends Gramsci's conception of social relations.⁵³

The exercise of hegemonic power has allowed the PAP to "create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to get other players to commit themselves to those rules, because these rules are now part of the self-understanding of the players ..."⁵⁴ This has resulted in a very strong state, a weak civil society, and an ideological hegemony that has even been adopted by many opposing political parties.⁵⁵ The party has been transformed into the state and the instruments of propaganda and hidden coercion have been developed and implemented for a considerable time. Any study of governance in Singapore must take account of this.

An Analytical Framework: Structure and Dynamics in Context

The Singaporean political system is obviously not a liberal democracy in contemporary terms. It is a polity which has evolved a unique character under the long guidance of one political party and one premier. Most of the assumptions underlying many current approaches to governance are inappropriate for this particular analysis; in particular, the liberal pluralist framework is incapable of including the authoritarian mechanisms of social, political and economic control and the problematical nature of consent to oppression characteristic of Singapore. An approach that will facilitate an empirical analysis of both the structure and dynamics within the policy system offers the best frame of analysis. In developing an approach which has the greatest explanatory

from the working class by providing uniform monetary transfers to all students under the Edusave scheme so that they can partially self-fund secondary and post-secondary education.

⁵² De Certeau identifies the "murmurings" of everyday life as a source of both hidden, almost unknowable, revolt against hegemonic forces, and a mechanism of self-subverting adaptation: "an uncodeable difference insinuates itself into the happy relation the system would like to have with the operations it claims to administer. Far from being a local, and thus classifiable revolt, it is a common and silent, almost sheeplike subversion – our own." See: Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, p. 200

⁵³ John Clammer concludes in his assessment of the PAP's management of racial and religious relations in Singaporean society that: "The pride of Singapore is not economic growth or public housing, important as these achievements are, but it is the stable multi-ethnicity that is the hallmark of society... (that Singapore) proves to the world that racialism ... in at least one society, (is) mastered and overcome." See: John Clammer, "The Politics of Memory: Rethinking Culture and Identity", *Commentary*, 14, 1997, pp. 40-49, p. 49

⁵⁴ Emmanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations", *Millennium*, 26, 2, 1997, pp. 249-277, p. 261

⁵⁵ Garry Rodan, "Elections without representation: The Singapore experience under the PAP", in R. H. Taylor, *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia*, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 61-89, p. 63

power for a particular case, Hogwood and Gunn recommend "... a 'contingency' approach (adjust policy-making methods to the circumstances and the issue in question). There is no 'one best way' of making decisions..."⁵⁶ Lindblom warns us not to have too great a faith in the scientific analysis of many policy issues; "Most people, even poets and ballet dancers, know a great deal about...aspects of policy making."⁵⁷ Thomas Dye perhaps provides one of the most realistic assessments: "Most public policies are a combination of rational planning, incrementalism, competition, group activity, elite preferences, systematic forces, and institutional influences."⁵⁸

Lindblom would have us focus on the participants in the political process, the "... ordinary citizens, interest-group leaders, legislators, legislative leaders, party activists, party leaders, judges, civil servants, technical experts, and business managers."⁵⁹ Hogwood takes a complementary approach and recommends that we focus on the problems of decision makers.⁶⁰ Rose maintains that we should take an holistic approach, examining institutions, social and economic contexts, the bureaucracy, the distribution of resources and the mix of policies and programs characteristic of western industrialised nations.⁶¹ Despite his reluctance in defining an analytical framework Wildavsky is equally holistic, suggesting that analysis focus on "... relationships between people...(the) tension between resources and objectives, planning and politics...What combination of social interaction and intellectual cognition, planning and politics, leads us to figure out what we should want to do and how to do it?"⁶²

All of these views of a practical approach to the study of policy systems and governance sensitize us to the essential characteristics the policy making process and state governance; it is very complex and no one approach to analysis is necessarily adequate. Policy making is bounded by political, socio-cultural and economic rationality; there is no absolutely objective analytical framework - personal values, priorities, emphases and interests determine the nature, focus and therefore outcomes of the research; the boundaries of policy making can rarely, if ever, be reached or mapped as it is a process the beginnings and ends of which are rarely obvious - even the best analyses are partial and, analytical approaches are tools which can be usefully employed to examine the nature of particular policy environments and policy issues, but they cannot be relied upon, or expected, to fully reflect reality. Research is

⁵⁶ op. cit. p. 62

⁵⁷ Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy making Process*, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1980, pp. 3-4

⁵⁸ See: Thomas R. Dye, *Understanding Public Policy*, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1975, p. xii

⁵⁹ Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process*, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1980, p. 3

⁶⁰ Hogwood, op. cit.

⁶¹ See; Richard Rose, *Understanding Big Government: The Program Approach*, London, Sage, 1984. Rose's analytical framework is particularly discussed on pp. 7-12.

⁶² Aaron Wildavsky, *Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis*, New Brunswick (NJ), Transaction Publishers, 1987, pp. 17-18

constrained by the possible, by what is actually researchable. A research agenda that may be possible in the United States or Japan, may be impossible in Indonesia or Singapore, or even dangerous. The prudent empirical researcher must fit his ambitions to the restraints of the world as he finds it in the belief that despite these restraints, hidden knowledges still exist within the research topic.

An approach which recognises the complexity of the policy environment and which provides a 'best fit' for a particular case is therefore most suitable. For this particular study, because the Singaporean political system is hegemonic, an institutional approach using the concept of the core executive provides a frame which facilitates the study of governance in this polity, although it does not adequately take account of the dynamics of the policy system. For this reason the research attempts to include policy community perspectives where possible so that the dynamics of the governance system can be considered. However, both of these components of the analytical framework fail to give consideration to the historical and ideological contexts within which the policy system operates, and so the analysis will be strengthened to take account of these influences as required, although a detailed analysis of the ideology of the core executive in Singapore is beyond the scope of this study.⁶³

This study will therefore principally use the core executive and to a lesser degree, policy community frameworks, to analyse governance in contemporary Singaporean while giving due weight to the historical and post-colonial context as appropriate. The issue of ideology will not be examined, except peripherally, although its importance is acknowledged. In particular, this study will examine the core executive under the Goh Chock Tong administrations, 1991-1998.

In the next section, the development of the PAP hegemonic state in Singapore is analysed. This is followed by an examination in Chapter Two of the major aspects of the development of the executive agencies of the PAP hegemonic system, the civil service and the broader public sector.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAP HEGEMONIC SYSTEM IN SINGAPORE

The People's Action Party (PAP) has ruled Singapore for 40 years and in November

⁶³ Several studies have addressed the issue of the ideology of the PAP. See: Chan Heng Chee and Hans-Deiter Evers, "National Identity and Nation Building in Southeast Asia", in Chan Heng Chee and Hans-Deiter Evers, *Studies in ASEAN Sociology*, Singapore, Chopmen, 1978; John Clammer, *Singapore: Ideology, Society, Culture*, Singapore, Chopmen Publishers, 1985; Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, *The politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995; Chua Beng Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995; John Clammer, *Values and Development in Southeast Asia*, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk Publications, 1996

1999 celebrated its 45th anniversary. It is one of the longest terms of continuous governance terms by any political party in any nation this century. To understand contemporary governance in Singapore, it is therefore essential to understand the historical determinants of the PAP's development and how these have contributed to its institutional framework, its political strategies and to the way this has shaped state-society relations. In this section, these determinants are identified and discussed and the key components of the PAP approach to governance identified. First a general background is provided and then the development of the PAP is discussed as comprising four phases; self-government, the Malaysia period, the independence period and the post-Lee period within which this study is located. Only the essential foundations of the contemporary political system are covered in the discussion of the first three phases, with most emphasis being on the development of the current political system.

The Colonial Background

Modern Singapore dates its founding from the establishment of a trading post of the British East India Company on the island by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819. In 1824 Singapore was ceded in perpetuity to the British East India Company and in 1826 was combined with Malacca and Penang to form the Straits Settlements. Singapore continued under the control of the British East India Company until the transfer of control to the Colonial Office in 1867, thus establishing it as a Crown Colony.

From its inception, colonial Singapore was prosperous and self sustaining, with this prosperity almost entirely dependent upon entrepôt trade. During the period to 1942, Singapore prospered, although suffering from occasional minor recessions and sharing the pain of the major world depressions of the time. Essential to the success of the colony was the strategic relationships forged between the colonial administration, the private British (and subsequently other Western) trading companies and Asian entrepreneurs and traders, particularly the Nanyang Chinese who had moved to Singapore, principally from southern China, in large numbers. These relationships of mutual interest between the colonial government, the private sector and the ethnic elites established a pattern which was to be institutionalised by the colonial administration but eventually rejected by the modern governments of Singapore as new forms of institutionalisation were established. The 'iron cage' of British civil administration was imposed on the colony. Singapore has therefore, always been a modern administrative state in the sense that it has had since its founding, a strong, authoritarian civil administration. It is very much a child of modernity.

Singapore was occupied by the Japanese from February 1942 to September 1945. The

Japanese administration could not be termed a highlight of public administration in Singapore but it did make its contribution by the simple fact that the Japanese administration could not run the island by itself. It lacked not only personnel, but personnel with any experience of public administration. It required that the local public service continue to administer the island under Japanese direction. This led to locals undertaking many of the tasks previously done by their colonial masters and exercising responsibilities which had previously been forbidden to them by the British. This developed in local civil servants a degree of independence and a belief in their own capabilities, not so evident under colonial rule. It also provided them with several years experience in running their own affairs under considerable hardship, an experience which proved invaluable in the push for independence after the war. Following the re-imposition of colonial administration in 1945 through a temporary British Military Administration, the Straits Settlements were dissolved and Singapore became a separate Crown Colony in April 1946.

The defeat of Japan and the return of the British to Singapore did not mean the resumption of business as usual. The British found, on their return in 1945, a Singapore which was substantially different from that which it had left in 1942. The population was still shocked by the brutality of its occupation, but was convinced of its capacity to survive and administer itself and was ready for change and greater control of its own destiny.

The push for indigenous control began through the development of political organisations. In September 1948 the Singapore Labour Party was founded. A large number of political parties were to be subsequently founded over the following years, but those of significance were the Singapore Progressive Party, Singapore Labour Party, the Workers' Party, the United Peoples' Party,⁶⁴ the Peoples' Action Party, the Barisan Socialis, the Singapore Democratic Party and the Singapore People's Party, as these are the only parties to achieve parliamentary representation. All of these parties were inter-racial.

In 1953 the British government appointed George Rendel to inquire into the constitutional status of the colony. The Rendel Commission consequentially recommended self-government through the establishment of a unicameral parliament of thirty-two members, twenty-five of whom were to be elected by universal franchise, four were to be nominated by the Governor and three were ex-officio.

⁶⁴ The United People's Party was however, essentially a one man, one constituency party and had no broad electoral support. It was founded by Ong Eng Guan after his ouster from the PAP. It was the vehicle with which he tried to challenge Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP in the early 1960s and to continue his own political career.

Under the new constitution the electorate was transformed. For example, women comprised approximately 50 per cent of the enrolled voters whereas previously only eight per cent of women had been enrolled. However, voting rights were still restricted to those with British citizenship, principally those born in Singapore. This still left many immigrant residents disenfranchised, particularly among the Chinese⁶⁵ and led to further demands for independence. This led to a second round of constitutional talks in March 1957, to which Lee Kuan Yew was a party, resulting in the establishment of a State of Singapore governed by a fully elected Legislative Assembly in 1959 under an expanded franchise underwritten by Singaporean citizenship rather than British citizenship.⁶⁶

The PAP Phase 1: Birth Pangs of an Hegemonic Party⁶⁷

In May 1959, elections were held under the new constitution resulting in a government dominated by the People's Action Party (PAP) which had won forty-three out of the fifty-one seats in the new Assembly. Before examining the development of the PAP government, it is necessary to briefly take stock of what kind of party the PAP was, how it developed and how it managed to resolve a number of difficulties to retain office, prosper and implement its unique governance system.

The circumstances into which the first PAP government was borne would have been an enormous challenge to any political party, in any country at any time. The main features of these circumstances are set out below.

A political party less than five years old, founded principally by English educated and speaking Chinese, with limited political experience and no experience of the exercise of state power, attempts at the end of colonial rule, to appeal to a predominantly Chinese dialect speaking electorate. It must also ensure that it appeals to at least a significant proportion of the Malay population recently empowered by a sense of nationalism and cultural pride by coming end of colonialism. The electorate has little

⁶⁵ Lam, Lin Jenny, ed., *Voices and Choices The Women's Movement in Singapore*, Singapore, Singapore Council of Women's Organisations, 1993, p. 116

⁶⁶ This agreement also included a compromise on control of internal security through the establishment of an Internal Security Council with British, Singaporean and minority Malayan representation; and, retention of external security powers by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also retained the right to suspend the Singapore constitution and re-impose colonial rule, as the ultimate safeguard against a possible communist ascendancy. These changes were implemented through the passing of the *State of Singapore Act* in the British parliament in August 1958 and the subsequent proclamation of the Singapore Constitution Order in Council by the Governor of Singapore in November 1958.

⁶⁷ An hegemonic party system is postulated as a more accurate definition of the status of the PAP by Chan Heng Chee after the analysis of Giovanni Satori. See: Chan Heng Chee, "Political Parties", in Jon S. T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, eds., *Government and Politics of Singapore*, (rev. ed.), Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 146-147. Also: Giovanni Satori, *Parties and Party Systems*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976. Although Chan in her own work had previously used the term 'dominant party system' to describe the position of the PAP in the Singaporean political landscape, she here agrees with his definition of the PAP as an hegemonic party.

affinity with the British concept of government and no cultural tradition of democracy, has no history of political participation except for partial participation in the previous ten years. The majority Chinese population are imbued with pride for the recent independence their motherland has found under the new communist government of Mao Zse Dong⁶⁸, and want independence for themselves as soon as possible.

Additionally, the dominant Chinese community is split, in power terms, between the minority English educated and the majority Chinese educated. The former have access to power, money and prestige through their ability to actively participate in the management of government and business most of which is conducted in English. The mass of the Chinese educated, without easy access to an economy dominated by the English language, harbour a deep resentment of the English educated "running dogs" and did not identify with them.⁶⁹ Also, communism, as the mother of the 'new' China, has a broad general appeal to the working class majority of the Chinese population, although most of the Chinese business class were politically conservative and supporters of the Guomindang rather than the communists. The latter were a small but important reservoir of support for the moderate PAP leaders.

Most of the inexperienced leaders of this new party cannot speak Chinese, so they cannot communicate effectively with the masses whose votes and support they need. They have little affinity with Chinese culture or with the Islam and traditions of the Malay community. They have a poor organisational base; only an affiliation with some trade unions and professional bodies although relatively strong contacts with the English educated professional class. Unfortunately, they are suspected of being extremists by this latter group and have little political support from them.

To expand their contacts with the mass of Chinese voters the leaders act on several fronts; the Chinese leaders begin to learn Chinese dialects and Mandarin, they recruit as many Chinese speakers to their ranks as they can and, most importantly, they forge an alliance with a pro-communist group with a large mass support base which requires a cover to achieve its own political goals - an alliance of convenience with substantial inherent conflicts of interests, goals and means. The pro-communist group is aligned to an armed faction, is highly disciplined, has a clear political agenda and has substantial resources at its disposal through its affiliations with unions, Chinese educational institutions and Chinese cultural organisations.

⁶⁸ The pride of Singaporean Chinese in the restoration of Chinese sovereignty by the Chinese Communist Party after a century of European imperialist dominance and invasion by Japan was incalculable. The Communist Party was seen as synonymous with Chinese national and cultural pride. Pang Cheng Lian reported: "Any man in Singapore who wants to carry the Chinese speaking people with him cannot afford to be anti-communist. The Chinese are very proud of China." *Straits Times*, 5 May 1955 cited in: Pang Cheng Lian, *Singapore's Action Party Its History, Organisation and Leadership*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 2

Not only must the party battle for support against other political parties, manage the numerous policy challenges that face every government, particularly in the already difficult period of nation building, but it must constantly struggle for its internal survival by managing the conflicts inherent in the factionalism which resulted from this alliance.⁷⁰

In the first years of government, the challenges became even more complex as both domestic and external factors threatened the viability of both government and nation. Peter Chen summarises the challenges thus:

Between 1960 and 1980, the Singaporean government had to overcome a daunting series of political, social and economic threats to the nation: rising population and unemployment, a national housing shortage linked to poor living standards, the internal communist political threat with its armed wing in Malaysia and its internal union power promoting labour unrest and union confrontation, the Indonesian confrontation, the integration (upon which the PAP's initial national development program depended) and subsequent expulsion from Malaysia, racial conflict and the closure of British bases.⁷¹

T. S. Selvan catalogues the starting point for the first PAP government:

When Lee and the PAP came to power the kitty was empty, worse, they had inherited a \$44 million deficit. Unemployment was a chronic disease with politician-inspired labour strikes eating into the body politic. The worse year was 1955, with 275 strikes and lockouts, the highest for a decade. The number of man-days lost in strikes was 152,005 in 1960, 410,889 in 1961, 165,124 in 1962 and 388,219 in 1963. It was a strike happy trade union movement, and naturally investors stayed away from the island. Illiteracy was widespread, the people were breeding too fast. The public health was deteriorating rapidly with tuberculosis...smallpox, cholera, diphtheria, dysentery and filth tearing away the nation's heart. The crime rate was astronomical, with Chinese secret society members terrorising the country. In short, Singapore was adrift; an island betrayed; a fine mess.⁷²

How did the PAP as a party and government cope with these challenges, what lessons did it learn and how have these been incorporated into its governing style and approach to policy making?

Survival, Consolidation and Institutionalisation

The most basic tasks for the PAP moderates to ensure their survival were:

⁶⁹ Jackie Sam, *The First Twenty Years of the People's Association*, Singapore, People's Association, 1980, pp. 23-24

⁷⁰ Lee Kuan Yew, *The Battle for Merger*, Singapore Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 16

⁷¹ Chen, Peter S. J. "Sociological Studies on Singapore Society", in Basant K Kapur (Ed.) *Singapore Studies: Critical Surveys of the Humanities and the Social Sciences*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1986, p. 33 (Check page number)

⁷² T. S. Selvan, *Singapore The Ultimate Island (Lee Kuan Yew's Untold Story)*, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, pp. 26-27

1. To develop their own strong support base particularly among the Chinese population, equal or superior to the pro-communist affiliated organisations in attracting mass support;
2. Gain control over the trade unions, moderate their political activities and establish an industrial relations climate conducive to rapid economic development;
3. Introduce policies and programs which would rapidly address the most pressing domestic policy issues - housing, unemployment, industrial development, population control and education and to have the electorate give it credit for these;
4. Develop an electoral platform which would appeal to the majority of the electorate by addressing the practical 'bread and butter' political issues as well as presenting a strongly anti-colonialist position; and,
5. Abandon the alliance with the pro-communist faction as soon as feasible so the moderate's program could be clearly differentiated from that of the pro-communists.

This program was implemented by the new PAP government and was successfully carried out.⁷³ The path to the entrenchment of control by Lee's moderate democratic socialist faction within the PAP over the party and its governments was the bedrock on which the party developed to take its present form.⁷⁴ In some ways it is a classic political tale of the struggles undertaken in many countries at this time between democratic moderates and communists. It is complicated however by an environment of post-colonialism, the political volatility of the community, the constant potential for inter-racial and inter-religious violence, suspicion of the nature and political intentions of the PAP by the major political parties in Malaya and the willingness of the colonial power to intervene militarily in the case of what it would define as a communist victory; a definition which could have included the moderate wing of the PAP, in addition to its pro-communist faction, had the latter won domination of the party.

Winning Control of the Party and the Government

The broad pattern of events which led to the victory of the democratic socialist (hereafter termed the 'moderates') under Lee Kuan Yew set the pattern for Lee's and

⁷³ Of course, the struggles which ensued over this program to establish moderate dominance of the PAP and to oust the communist affiliated group were complex and full of political drama. The detailed analysis of this struggle does not form part of this study and would detract from its focus on the major characteristics of the policy environment and the general discussion of its origins. There are many detailed works on this period and the emergence of the PAP as the dominant party in Singapore. Refer to: Thomas J Bellows, *The People's Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System*, Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, New Haven, 1970; Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance The PAP at the Grassroots*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1976; Lee Kuan Yew, *The Battle for Merger*, Singapore, Singapore Government Printing Office, 1961; *Our First Ten Years: PAP Tenth Anniversary Souvenir*, Singapore, PAP Centre Editorial Board, n.d.; Pang Cheng Lian, *Singapore's People's Action Party Its History, Organisation and Leadership*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971; Shee Poon Kim, *The People's Action Party of Singapore 1954-1970: A Study in Survivalism of a Single Dominant Party*, Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, 1971

⁷⁴ Thomas Bellows commented that: "From the time it came to office a decade ago, the PAP leadership has had two paramount political objectives, the first of which was achieved by the end of 1965: (1) to survive and not to be removed from, or maneuvered out of, office by either the British or the Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur; (2) to maintain a qualifiedly open and pluralistic political system while making certain that the probable winner (between 1961 and 1964) in an open electoral contest - the Communist-supported Barisan Socialis - would come off second best." Bellows, op. cit., p. 5

the party's attitude to party control, control of the nation and the management of relationships with their political opponents thereafter.

The alliance between the pro-communist faction and the moderates was principally forged during the period of extremist political activity by the pro-communists during the period 1954-56. This period was characterised by pro-communist instigated riots and disturbances which mobilised large sections of the Chinese community in objection to national service, labour and educational issues. These tactics did not work to progress the communist political agenda due to the effectiveness of the internal security arrangements and the determination of the British to suppress them. The pro-communist then changed their tactics and determined to work within the developing political system to achieve their ends of establishing a pro-communist state in Singapore. The PAP was perceived as the appropriate vehicle for mainstream political participation. The pro-communists were thus involved in the PAP from its founding as it provided a more moderate cover for their activities. For the moderates it gave them access to the mass of the Chinese population and greater access to the trade union movement with which they already had some links. An alliance of convenience, it was never an easy partnership.

In the beginning, the PAP party structure was typical of a mass party structure. Branches were established throughout the island in each electorate. These elected representatives to the annual party conference which elected the Central Executive Committee (CEC) which exercised executive power over the party organisation. Membership criteria were not restrictive, characteristic of a party wanting to expand its membership and power base. In the beginning there was an informal agreement between the moderates and the pro-communists that the latter would limit their CEC membership to a minority of positions; initially a limit of three seats. However, the moderates were unable to enforce this agreement as the pro-communists were well organised and were able to effectively take control of most branches. Thus, under a constitution in which CEC membership was determined by the degree of branch control exercised by any one faction, the moderates, without strong control of the branches were at a severe disadvantage. Realising their advantage, the pro-communists made two attempts to wrest control of the CEC from the moderates by using the annual party conference.

At the 1956 Third Annual Party Conference, the pro-communists succeeded in increasing their CEC membership from three to four. This seems to have been the precursor to taking control of the CEC at the Fourth Annual Party Conference in

August 1957, which they did, taking six of twelve seats,⁷⁵ allegedly though manipulation of branch representation at the conference.⁷⁶ However, shortly after this, five of the six were detained under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance by the Lim Yew Hock government and three were expelled to China. This allowed Lee Kuan Yew and the moderates to again control the party. This temporary loss of control of the CEC by the moderates galvanised them, on regaining control of the executive in October 1957, to change the party management structure so that the power of the branches over the election of CEC members would be removed.

Four categories of members were established: probationary member, ordinary member, probationary cadre member and full cadre member. The CEC was to be elected only by full cadre members. This change was a key tactic in maintaining control of the CEC and of the party in moderate hands. A Board of Selection was also established to manage membership promotions between the various rankings and party appointments. The board was also controlled by the moderates. This provided effective mechanisms for control of the party's central structure, but provided no guarantees for control of the branches. This move changed the fundamental nature of the PAP. It became in effect a cadre party masquerading as a mass party,⁷⁷ although I contend that under contemporary arrangements, it eventually became a party of the executive. It also further alienated the pro-communists from the moderates, although the partnership endured out of political necessity. Bellows sums up the nature of the party after this restructure thus:

In terms of actual location of power, the PAP was at best a dichotomous structure, at worst an inverted hierarchy. Discipline emanating from the CEC was sporadic and tenuous and very much dependent on the threat of actual implementation of security measures by the Labour Front Government.⁷⁸

Although the new structure assured the moderates control of the party centre, efforts were continued to retain the pro-communists in the PAP as they were required to ensure mass support for the party through branch and affiliation networks. In this way both the moderates and the pro-communists were playing a dangerous game of brinkmanship each trying to maintain a position from which they could, at the appropriate moment, wrest control of the party from the opposing faction. If the communist front organisations (including the PAP pro-communists) and their leaders were too obvious or radical, the probability of detention (or expulsion to China for many) under the Internal Security Ordinance was high. They were therefore forced to

⁷⁵ Bellows (p. 22) and Pang agree on this.

⁷⁶ Bellows, *op. cit.* p. 23; Pang, *op. cit.* p.7

⁷⁷ Chan Heng Chee comments that; "It would only be honest to describe the PAP as a cadre party in a mass party guise." Chan Heng Chee, "Political Parties", in Jon S. T. Quah et al, *Government and Politics of Singapore*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 159

remain within the fold of the PAP which provided some interim protection until the time was right to act more independently.

This time soon came. Following the election of the first PAP government in May 1959 under the new constitution providing for full self-government, the strains between the moderates and pro-communists began to show. The new constitution was to be reviewed by 1964, holding out the promise of full independence shortly thereafter. The possibility, for the pro-communists, of forming an independent communist state was therefore on the horizon. With the power of the state at their disposal, the moderates were anxious to implement their policy agenda. This had never been fully endorsed by the pro-communists and, its implementation was to cause considerable friction. Chan summarises the sources of this friction:

After the 1959 elections the pro-communist wing of the party grew increasingly disenchanted with Lee and the moderate leadership over a number of issues such as the continued detention of certain political detainees, the new amendment to the Citizenship Bill which deprived some left wing leaders of their citizenship, the Government's failure to unify the labour movement, and the attempts to control the Singapore Trade Union Congress, obvious signs that Lee and his associates were determined to contain the leftist elements. The pivotal issue which eventually precipitated the split was merger with the Federation of Malaya.⁷⁹

The merger issue was crucial for the pro-communists as incorporation within the Federation, and especially through internal security matters being controlled from Kuala Lumpur, would almost certainly constrain their political ambitions and could possibly lead to any pro-communist political party being proscribed and its leaders detained. If merger could be avoided, the 1964 post-review constitution might still provide the mechanism for implementing the communist political agenda. For the pro-communists, merger with Malaya had to be defeated in order for their political agenda to be achievable. The conflict between the pro-communists and the moderates became an open war in mid-1961.

The split culminated after two by-election losses by the government (one orchestrated by the pro-communists while supposedly supporting the moderate PAP candidate) and a vote of confidence in the legislative Assembly over the merger issue. The PAP pro-communists abstained from the vote of confidence, were subsequently expelled by the PAP and shortly after crossed the floor of the Parliament and formed their own political party the Barisan Socialis. At the same time, the PAP lost an estimated 70 per cent of its members and 35 of its 51 branches to the new party, including branch finances.⁸⁰ It also lost most of the community centre managers from the People's

⁷⁸ Bellows, op. cit. p.27

⁷⁹ Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance The PAP at the Grassroots*, Singapore, University of Singapore Press, 1976, pp. 194-195

⁸⁰ Pang Cheng Lian, op. cit. p. 15

Association, a government, not party, organisation which it had established in July 1960 as a means of establishing an alternative community network independent of the unions and Chinese cultural associations.⁸¹

Realising that it was in danger of political defeat resulting from the massive support provided to the Barisan Socialis from its branch network, union affiliations and strong community network, the PAP government responded on several fronts. To appeal to the electorate at large, but particularly the working class, it accelerated the implementation of State Development Plan projects aimed at developing economic and social infrastructure and particularly at increasing housing stock and employment opportunities.⁸² It began to rebuild the party branch network, commenced the development of an enhanced community centres network as a base for building community support for countering the Barisan Socialis and attacked its opponents through tough new legislation to remove their sources of funding and support.

The moderates tried to rebuild the branches through their own members of parliament, but realised that the urgency of the situation required measures that could more effectively deliver increased political support. Turning to the most powerful mechanism available to them, the civil service, the government decided to use the recently established People's Association within the civil service as its prime points of community contact and through it enlarged the community centre network throughout the island. By September 1963, 103 community centres had been built.⁸³ Staffed and paid for by the government, these centres provided the PAP government with a network which could rival or even surpass that of the new opposition. The centre staff were drawn from PAP cadres and civil servants mainly from the Social Welfare Department who had been provided with PAP political training. The role of the community centres was:

... to ensure the survival of a non-communist state by providing the necessary "bridge" between government and masses. The hangers, trusses and decks of this bridge would be made up of civil servants and party cadres.⁸⁴

The community centres had the promise of replacing the secondary affiliation mechanisms through which many voters had identified with the PAP - the unions and Chinese education and cultural organisations now more clearly associated with the Barisan Socialis. Using the community centres and all the other mechanisms available

⁸¹ Lee Kuan Yew, "Nation Building and the People's Association", in Jackie Sam (ed.), *The First Twenty Years of the People's Association*, Singapore, People's Association, 1980, p.7

⁸² See: Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Office, *First Development Plan 1961-1964, Review of Progress for the Three Years Ending 31st December 1963*, Singapore, Government printer, 1964

⁸³ Seah Chee Meow, *Community Centres in Singapore. Their Political Involvement*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1973, p. 31

⁸⁴ Jackie Sam, op. cit. p.33

to government, the PAP government.

...inaugurated a policy of information saturation to educate, convert, give shape to and guide public opinion.It became an organiser of programs, policies and opinion, focusing and sharpening the discontinuities between itself and its opponents in order to distinguish the PAP from all varieties of opposition and promote it as the one feasible alternative.⁸⁵

This experience of using the bureaucratic mechanisms of state power to provide effective and direct political links between the government and the community was an enduring lesson for the moderate PAP leaders and one upon which they were to build. The associated widespread use of television (each community centre was provided with a television set), over which the government had monopoly access, also taught them the power of media control.

In addition to using the bureaucracy, the PAP used that other more powerful instrument of government - legislation - to change the rules by which the conflict was being fought, so as to advantage itself and disadvantage its opponents. It accelerated its control over the trade union movement, a major power base of the Barisan Socialis. The Trade Union Act, enacted in May 1960 had led to an open struggle between the moderate and pro-communist trade union leaders in the Singapore Trade Union Congress (STUC) over control of the unions. The PAP subsequently de-registered the pro-communist controlled STUC, after losing the initial struggle, and established the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) as an alternative. The pro-communists then established the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU), thus splitting the union movement and somewhat weakening the Barisan Socialis grip on it. The PAP then used the resources of the state once again, providing funding and seconding civil servants to work with the NTUC to further entrench it and to make it a more attractive alternative to STUC affiliation.

The struggle between the two parties continued to centre on the issue of merger with Malaysia. The PAP, using the resources of government available to it, staged a very astute and highly focussed campaign. It augmented this with skilful political maneuvering through its control of Parliament, especially in the drafting of a referendum motion to be put before the electorate.

The referendum provided no option to vote against merger, included two of three alternatives which were obviously unpalatable and allowed the government to count blank votes as votes in support of the proposal that received the most votes. The preferred option was also placed at the top of the choices on the ballot. This was a ruthless exercise in political maneuvering which the PAP were to become masters of. It

was justified in those terms which many political parties use in the same circumstances - it was a matter of survival, in this case survival against a doctrinaire and demonstrably powerful communist front organisation capable of extreme violence which also had the potential for exacerbating any existing ethnic tensions as the opposition movement was almost wholly Chinese.⁸⁶ This perception that the extreme left was becoming a vehicle for Chinese cultural aggression in the island is one of the major reasons C. V. Devan Nair, one of its most prominent early Indian leaders deserted it for the more moderate faction of Lee Kuan Yew.⁸⁷ Devan Nair was to become a prominent PAP cadre, head of the NTUC, minister and eventually President.

The government's efforts were also assisted by the ineptness of the Barisan Socialis in handling this issue and especially by its inability to provide a convincing alternative to the merger proposal. Following an agreement in August 1964 between Lee Kuan Yew and Tunku Abdul Rahman on the principles on which a merger would be based, the Barisan Socialis had stated in September that while it agreed to the proposed merger, it did not agree in total to the principles on which the merger was to be based.⁸⁸

This agreement in principle to the merger by the Opposition allowed Lee Kuan Yew to develop a strategy by which he could state that merger could be taken for granted; the real debate was over how it was to be achieved. This effectively deprived the Barisan of any policy options which would clearly differentiate their views from the government. This was compounded by the fact that in reality, the Barisan Socialist were actually violently opposed to any merger. It also allowed the government to argue in parliament that as all parties had agreed to the merger in principle, the referendum could be worded so as to provide options on the conditions of merger only.

Now that its constituency network through the community centres allowed it to be clearly differentiated from the Barisan Socialis, the PAP had an avenue for separating its pro-active policy on merger from the oppositions confusion over the issue. These centres facilitated an island-wide campaign by the Prime Minister which was to

⁸⁵ Bellows, op. cit. pp. 46-47

⁸⁶ This is one of the reasons for the PAP's sensitivity to Chinese cultural chauvinism in Singapore. The dominance of the Chinese has always to be carefully managed under the PAP and open Chinese cultural aggression blunted as much as possible. According to Clutterbuck, even Lim Chin Siong had mis-read the crowds supporting the pro-communist rallies and strikes. While he had originally thought that the masses were pro-communist, rather they were pro-Chinese and their support was issues based rather than ideologically based. This indicates the considerable potential for using ethnicity to promote violence in Singapore. See: Richard Clutterbuck, *Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia 1945-1983*, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1985, p. 137

⁸⁷ T. S. Selvan, *Singapore The Ultimate Island (Lee Kuan Yew's Untold Story)*, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, p. 30

⁸⁸ See: Thomas J. Bellows, *The people's Action Party of Singapore: The Emergence of a Dominant Party System*, New Haven (Conn.), Yale University, Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 14, 1973, p.48

substantially enlarge support for the PAP's merger proposal.⁸⁹ These new links with the electorate, provided through use of civil servants and public facilities and resources, greatly enlarged the PAP support base and assisted in differentiating in the minds of voters the differences between the two camps. Other, more sinister steps were also taken to support the merger. The Malayan Prime Minister threatened to close the causeway (and by implication cut off the island's water supply) if merger was rejected, and a whispering campaign that the government could identify votes, was conducted. The referendum, held on 1 September 1962, supported the PAP's position with 70.8 per cent of the vote, not counting the blank ballots cast by Barisan Socialist supporters.⁹⁰

This win greatly boosted the PAP's confidence in its ability to succeed electorally against the Barisan Socialist. The government was, however, well aware that the referendum results, because of a number of factors peculiar to it, could not necessarily be replicated in a general election.⁹¹ However, the prospects were looking much better for the PAP government. Its performance in implementing its 'bread and butter' programs contained in the State Development Plan 1961-64 - public housing, schools, water and power upgradings, the introduction of television, capital works and infrastructure - had begun to have a widespread impact. It was obvious to most citizens that the PAP government was delivering on its promises. The government's 'can do' reputation for administrative efficiency was being established and gaining it the reciprocal political support it required.

These victories by the PAP were further augmented when the Internal Security Council, comprised wholly of PAP, British and Malayan members, instigated Operation Cold Storage on 27 February 1963 which substantially undermined the organisational and parliamentary capacity of the Barisan Socialist. It essentially removed the capacity of the Opposition to be any political threat of significance by imprisoning or deporting almost all of its leadership. Two explanations have been given for this action; (1) that

⁸⁹ The role of the People's Association and its community centres in supporting the Government's referendum option is explained by Jackie Sam: "The People's Association, its staff depleted, was given the task of explaining the issues involved. The official campaign lasted only three weeks in August. From operation headquarters at Kallang and 20 community centres, the organisation's staff of 100, with 122 Government officers and 60 volunteers went out every morning in 77 jeeps, station wagons, lorries and vans - all equipped with tape recorders and loud-speakers - to explain the Government's viewpoint and the mechanics of the referendum. The thrust of this campaign was in the rural areas; in four days these 282 officers, divided into teams of two to four, held 4,352 street or village meetings." See: Jackie Sam, *op. cit.* pp. 60-61

⁹⁰ Bellows, *op. cit.* p. 49

⁹¹ Bellows, *op. cit.* p. 50 comments: "The feeling of optimism was, however, restrained by realistic self-doubts. Some who had voted for the government alternative on merger had been intimidated, others were confused by the constitutional complexities of the issue and the vicissitudinous quality of Barisan arguments. The PAP was well aware that it could not hope to win 71 per cent of the popular vote in a not too distant Assembly election." The intimidation Bellows speaks of alludes to the allegation that a whispering campaign had been undertaken by the PAP warning voters that it could identify those people casting blank (i.e. pro-Barisan Socialist) votes. By its very nature such an allegation could never be either substantiated or disproven.

it was taken as a precautionary measure to stop pro-communists from organising violent, possibly armed, opposition to the Malaysian merger, and (2) to arrest and detain pro-communists thought to have been involved in or supportive of a communist inspired revolt in Brunei.⁹² Those arrested and detained under this operation included the Secretary-General of the opposition party, its Vice-Chairman, the Secretary-General of its trade union affiliate, the Singapore Association of Trade Unions, and several members of the Barisan Socialist Executive Committee.⁹³

The next elections were held five days after the official merger with Malaysia, and seven months after the decimation of the opposition's leadership by Operation Cold Storage, on 21 September 1963. The PAP won 46.9 per cent of the vote but 72.5 per cent of the seats in the Legislative Assembly. The Barisan Socialist had polled 32.1 per cent, a reasonable result that translated into 13 seats. However, the PAP had won its first general election without the support of the pro-communists. Following the elections, the federal Malaysian and the Singaporean governments also instigated several security operations against the Barisan Socialist and other left-wing organisations, arresting and detaining senior members, deregistered their affiliated trade unions and community organisations.

The Barisan Socialist never developed an adequate response to the use by the government of its internal security or legislative powers which became a principal means of controlling the development and operations of the opposition. Its response was doctrinaire; it never publicly changed its long term policy stance by attempting to take the middle ground politically, or to develop an approach to contesting national politics which could seriously challenge the ingenuity of Lee Kuan Yew and was probably incapable of it.⁹⁴ This allowed the PAP the opportunity to consolidate its power and to present itself as the only party capable of government.

From October 1963, the remaining 8 Barisan Socialist MPs in the Singapore Parliament began a boycott of the Parliament, thinking that they could continue their struggle against the PAP from the streets. However, they were to find that without the support of unions and community organisations, and in the face of a PAP government intent on using all means at its disposal to contain them, this struggle was to translate into

⁹² This is the explanation given by Lee Kuan Yew. Lee Kuan Yew, "Nation Building and the People's Association", in Jackie Sam (ed.), *The First Twenty Years of the People's Association*, Singapore, People's Association, 1980, p. 13. A more comprehensive explanation is provided by Minchin, *op. cit.* pp. 127-128

⁹³ Chan, *op. cit.* p. 196

⁹⁴ James Minchin comments that in establishing a new party to fight the PAP, the opposition fomented the seeds of its own destruction because of considerable organisational weaknesses, internal ideological differences and inexperience in high level politics. It did not have the discipline, capacity or experience to counter the PAP effectively. Minchin believes that a more effective strategy would have been to force multiple by-elections or a general election which would have had a considerable chance of destroying the PAP's credibility. See: James Minchin, *No Man is an Island A Portrait of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1990, pp. 118-119

political oblivion. In October 1965, shortly after Singapore separated from Malaysia, the remaining Barisan Socialis parliamentarians resigned their seats, leaving the political field open to PAP domination. Lee Kuan Yew and his associates could now establish the PAP as the natural party of government and commence their path to hegemonic control.

A detailed analysis of the evolution of the PAP government after this period is dealt with in considerable detail elsewhere.⁹⁵ However, it is necessary that we examine a critical period which helped fashion the PAP as it is today; Singapore's inclusion in the Malaysian Federation. Singapore joined the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 and left the federation on 9 August 1965.

The PAP Phase 2: Singapore in Malaysia 1963-65

The period of merger with Malaysia was a pivotal experience for the PAP and its leaders. While it does not need to be examined in detail for the purposes of this study, it is necessary, because of its effects on the PAP's governing style, to understand the essentials of merger, the reasons for its failure and its longer term effects in shaping the PAP as a hegemonic party.

The PAP had sought merger with Malaysia for a number of reasons and it was, at that time, the cornerstone of their political and economic strategy for the island. Merger would provide Singaporean industry with a large domestic market and integrate it into the physical infrastructure of the Malayan Peninsula, assuring it of a continual water supply and a supplementary electricity supply. Further, it would remove any reason for the Malaysian government to develop ports, airports and other infrastructure to compete with that already existing in Singapore.

Prior to merger, and in its early months, the PAP was confident that it could be accepted into the Alliance party coalition which controlled the federal Malaysian government, and take an active part in government. When it became obvious that the Alliance was determined to not allow the PAP a role in federal government, the already uneasy climate between the Singaporean leaders and Kuala Lumpur broke into open conflict, to the point where Malay leaders were calling for the detention of the

⁹⁵ Space limitations require this historical background to be truncated. For detailed analyses of the development of the PAP and its evolution into an hegemonic party which has dominated Singapore for more than 30 years see: Thomas Bellows, *The Peoples' Action Party: The Emergence of a Dominant Party System*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970; Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grassroots*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1976; Chan Heng Chee, *Singapore the Politics of Survival*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1971; Lee Kuan Yew, *The Battle for Merger*, Singapore, Singapore Government Printing Office, 1961; Pang Cheng Lian, *The People's Action Party: Its History, Organisation and Leadership*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971; Lee Kuan Yew, *The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew*, Singapore, Times Editions, 1998

PAP leaders and the Secretary-General of UMNO was proposing to imprison Lee Kuan Yew and rule Singapore directly from Kuala Lumpur.⁹⁶ For the merger not to succeed was initially inconceivable for the PAP leadership, but soon after merger, that leadership commenced a strategy, substantially of its own doing when seen in the context of the conditions of merger,⁹⁷ to undo the merger after only two years.

Despite a number of substantive policy differences, the most important source of conflict was the refusal of the Alliance to accept the PAP into its ranks, thus forcing it into the opposition and leaving it powerless in federal affairs. This was particularly unacceptable to Lee Kuan Yew and some other PAP leaders, although it seems to have caused no difficulties for Goh Keng Swee and Toh Chin Chye who were not as married to the Malaysian concept as Lee. The possibility of a PAP coalition with other opposition parties (known as the Malaysian Solidarity Convention) removing the Alliance Party from office was equally unacceptable to the federal government, which had the power, by military force if necessary, to ensure that it did not occur. This it did through the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman informing Lee Kuan Yew on 1 August 1965 that Singapore was to be expelled from Malaysia. Lee announced it, tearfully, to the nation on 9 August 1965.⁹⁸

This was not a legal separation based on a gentlemanly understanding of irreconcilable differences. It was a bitter ousting of Singapore by a Malay-dominated federal government determined to continue its dominance of the Malaysian Federation and equally determined not to provide any possibility for the PAP to challenge it. This was reciprocated by a PAP determination not to play second fiddle to a federal government to which it was opposed in ideological and power terms. There was no continuation of economic policies which could support Singapore's attempts to be the industrial centre of the federation. Singapore was not only out, but out with all gates barred to its political re-integration in any way.

While some among the PAP leadership, particularly Toh Chin Chye and Goh Keng

⁹⁶ Minchin, op. cit. p. 157. Minchin provides an insightful analysis of the political and personal imbroglio that was to result in separation. See Minchin, op. cit. pp. 141-161

⁹⁷ The conditions under which Singapore was included in the federation were such that the Singapore Chinese would never have been able to exercise any substantial direct political control over the federation; Singapore's role was to be an economic, not a political engine. This is illustrated by the way in which the federal constitution made allowance for two types of citizenship within the federation; citizens who were Singapore citizens and citizens who were not. This reflected the complementary constitutional arrangements that left Singapore with almost total control of its domestic affairs. In effect it was politically cordoned off from the federation in most matters except representation in the federal legislature and even there its representation was, by agreement, proportionally smaller than its entitlement. See: Michael Leiffer, "Singapore in Malaysia: the Politics of Federation", *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, 6, 2, 1965, pp. 54-70. For a more recent re-assessment of the failure of merger from a Singaporean perspective see: Albert Lau, *A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1998

⁹⁸ Minchin comments that the medication which had been prescribed for Lee at this time gave him severe mood swings, often making him uncharacteristically tearful. See: Minchin, op. cit. p. 156

Swee, were not particularly worried about separation,⁹⁹ for Lee and most probably for the Chinese majority, it came both as a shock as well as a relief from the incessant conflict between the federal and Singapore governments. The Malay community on the other hand saw themselves change overnight from being a majority group nationally (if not regionally in Singapore), to a minority in another nation. This perception has had a significant effect on the attitudes of the Malay community to the PAP government and, in turn, on the policies implemented by the PAP in its relationship with that community, particularly its attempts at developing a sense of national identity across ethnic lines. Singapore was now on its own.

The PAP Phase 3: Entrenching PAP Control in Independent Singapore

Following its departure from Malaysia in 1965, the PAP government was faced with a range of challenges; the Indonesian confrontation disrupted trade with that country, the possibility of Indonesian attacks on Singapore itself could not be discounted, Malaysia had to be persuaded to remove its troops from Singapore, there was no effective national defence force and threats of forced re-integration were being made against Singapore by UMNO 'ultras'¹⁰⁰; and the economic policy challenges were so great as to almost make these issues of minor concern.¹⁰¹ The government felt surrounded by enemies and, within this context, an ideology of survivalism was seized upon as a mobilising concept for the economy, society and politics.¹⁰² This concept arose from a crisis mentality in government, the civil service and the party based on the issue of how Singapore was to survive.¹⁰³ This survivalist approach was subsequently reinforced by a government value framework requiring 'pragmatic' decisions, 'discipline and sacrifice',¹⁰⁴ and an increased emphasis on the virtues pushed by Lee Kuan Yew; 'orderliness, cleanliness, discipline, intensity, virility'.¹⁰⁵

Economic and security policies were made a priority. Singaporean troops were repatriated from Brunei, the two battalions of the SAF were supplemented by the volunteer People's Defence Force. The Vigilante Corps¹⁰⁶ and the Special Volunteer

⁹⁹ Minchin, *op. cit.* p. 157

¹⁰⁰ R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Singapore: The Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1990, p. 64

¹⁰¹ See: John Drysdale, *Singapore: Struggle for Success*, Singapore, Times Books International, 1984, pp. 395-403

¹⁰² Chan Heng Chee, *Singapore: The Politics of Survival*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971

¹⁰³ Drysdale, *op. cit.*, p. 404

¹⁰⁴ Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, *The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam*, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1987, p. 269

¹⁰⁵ Minchin, *op. cit.*, p. 3

¹⁰⁶ The Vigilante Corps, which still exists as part of the Singapore Police Force (SPF), was established as an emergency citizen force to counteract Indonesian attacks on Singapore under the *confrontasi* policy of Sukarno. It is interesting that almost all the people I interviewed for this study, including regular SAF officers, did not

Constabulary were established and in March 1967 compulsory military service was introduced. Israeli military advisers were contracted to establish a new Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) based on a small core of regular forces, a training command and compulsory national service and to advise on redevelopment of intelligence and internal security mechanisms. The trade unions were brought under even greater control, with strikes outlawed, secret ballots introduced, working conditions reduced and placed largely in the hands of employers.¹⁰⁷ Albert Winsemius, a Dutch economic consultant, was flown in under United Nations auspices to assist further with economic planning and a new export oriented economic policy introduced aimed at world, not regional markets and dependent upon large foreign investment by transnational corporations.¹⁰⁸ A number of economic and trade agreements were negotiated with Malaysia and in June 1967 the currencies of the two nations were separated, thus normalising relations and substantially reducing tensions. Singapore was now, indisputably, mistress of her own destiny.

In the period after independence the PAP's experience of politics and government over the previous 16 years began to coalesce around a number of strategies through which the PAP's hegemonic framework began to consolidate. In the next section, we will examine the principal strategies through which the PAP consolidated its control of Singapore from 1965 and which became hallmarks of its style of governance.

Winning Elections and Consolidating Government

With the Barisan Socialis having departed from the parliament almost completely by 1965, either voluntarily or under threat of possible arrest, the PAP won all the subsequent 11 by-elections in 1966-67 giving it absolute control of the legislature. The last Barisan politician, Chia Thye Poh, was arrested and imprisoned in 1966 under the Internal Security Act (ISA) and was not released until 1995. He was under ISA restriction orders until November 1998.¹⁰⁹ The Barisan subsequently boycotted the 1968 elections, although Lee warned of an opposition resurgence if the economy turned bad or young voters became disenchanted.¹¹⁰ From 1968 to 1980 the PAP won all seats in each general election; gaining 84.4% of the votes in 1968, 69% in 1972, 72.4% in 1976 and 75.5% in 1980. This record was assisted by the PAP's determination to use all means available to undermine the development of an effective opposition. For

know of the continued existence of this force. It is constituted under the Vigilante Corps Act and is an almost wholly volunteer force staff by Police National Servicemen. In 1998, their training has special components, different from regular police training, within the Police Training Command.

¹⁰⁷ Rodan, *op. cit.*, 1989, p. 91-92

¹⁰⁸ Margolin, *op. cit.*, 1989, pp. 147-148

¹⁰⁹ Chia Thye Poh has the dubious honour of being the world's longest political detainee, having been detained from 1963-1995 without trial or any charges being laid or proven.

¹¹⁰ Drysdale, *op. cit.*, p. 403

example, following the 1972 elections, two opposition candidates were imprisoned; Leong Mun Kwai¹¹¹ on charges of inciting assassination and Harbans Singh Sindhu¹¹² for defamation of Lee Kuan Yew.¹¹³ In 1976, the government again took legal action against opposition candidates; Shamsuddin Tung Tao Chang, a united Front candidate was arrested under the ISA on ethnic disturbance charges and Leong Mun Kwai was found guilty of defamation against Lee Kuan Yew. J. B. Jeyaratnam was also charged with libel against Lee Kuan Yew.¹¹⁴ An opposition presence arrived only in 1981 as the result of a by-election when J. B. Jeyaratnam of the Workers Party won the seat of Anson. This win was the result of a happy confluence of circumstances for the opposition parties. The new PAP political leadership were inexperienced and ran a poor campaign, Jeyaratnam was supported by many younger voters and was also able to capitalise on a number of unpopular government decisions¹¹⁵ which were compounded by the PAP government breaking its rule of allowing one year to lapse between the introduction of controversial policies and an election, due to pressures to introduce the new generation of leaders. This kept recent unpopular policies in the minds of the electorate.

The 1984 general election was held in the aftermath of a rapid re-alignment of the party to usher in a new generation of MPs and executive leaders. It saw another seat won by an opposition party - the Singapore Democratic Party's (SDP) Chiam See Tong - and Anson retained by the Workers Party - and the PAP's vote decline by 12.6% to 62.9%, giving the opposition almost 40% of the vote. This led to speculation that this was the beginning of the end of PAP dominance.¹¹⁶ A level of voting below 60% begins the process of converting votes to seats, so this was approaching a critical level for the PAP, as the single member first-past-the-post system is an all-or-nothing voting strategy - governments can lose or win on 1% of the vote, unlike preferential voting systems. In this election 215,000 new voters participated representing 13% of the electorate and bringing a better educated general voter to the polls than in the past. From this election onward, young voters would increasingly be involved, a point not lost on Lee's determination to develop the next generation of leaders. Following this election, Lee questioned whether the voting system should be changed to provide votes

¹¹¹ Leong Mun Kwai was a People's Front candidate.

¹¹² Harbans Singh Sindhu, a lawyer, was a veteran Barisan Socialist member who had broken away in 1975 and formed the United People's Front. It was supposed to be an amalgamation of several parties, but appears to have been based more on personal animosity to other opposition groups than a coherent political grouping.

¹¹³ Choo, op. cit., p. 52

¹¹⁴ Choo, op. cit., p. 64

¹¹⁵ For example; the decision to demolish blocks of flats in the electorate to make way for a Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) container terminal, the PAP candidate being a relative of the head of the PSA; delays in housing supply; the attack on dialects by the Speak Mandarin campaign. See: Milne and Mauzy, 1990, p.65-66

¹¹⁶ Bilveer Singh, *Whither PAP's Dominance: An Analysis of Singapore's 1991 General Elections*, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk Publications, 1992, p. 15

of different value based on age, although the proposal was not pursued.¹¹⁷ Instead, the government introduced Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), ostensibly to ensure ethnic minority representation in the legislature, but with the intention of making it more difficult for the opposition to win seats. Each GRC was formed by combining three single member constituencies into one and fielding a team of three candidates, one of whom had to be from a minority race. As part of this strategy, the Anson constituency held by the Workers Party was abolished. In the 1988 general election, Jeyaratnam was banned from standing because of defamation action taken against him by the Prime Minister and the only opposition seat retained was by Chiam See Tong for the SDP.

Goh called elections early, in August 1991. The opposition, on the initiative of Chiam See Tong, introduced its 'by-election strategy', guaranteeing that it would not contest every seat and so ensure the return of a PAP government, in the hope that it would garner greater support in the constituencies it contested. The government again changed the electoral boundaries and the nature of the GRCs, shortly prior to the election. Fifteen GRCs were created, only 21 single member constituencies retained,¹¹⁸ and teams were increased to four candidates, ostensibly to force young voters to change as they were "preferring candidates who were best suited to their own needs without being sufficiently aware of the need to return a racially balanced party slate."¹¹⁹ This would seem to be an indictment of the quality of PAP candidates and an indication of the lack of support for the government more than a fault with voters.

The election of four opposition members and a further fall in PAP votes sent shock waves through the PAP, even though it represented only 5% of the seats and swings of approximately 6% against it in key electorates. Chiam See Tong and Low Thia Khian were joined by two additional SDP members; Cheo Chai Chen and Ling How Doong, the later defeating the only woman PAP minister, Dr. Seet Ai Mee. This has been the highest opposition representation since 1963. It is even more revealing that in four other single member seats¹²⁰ the opposition receive 47% of the votes or above, and in the Eunos GRC it received 47.6% of votes, putting it within striking distance of 13 seats in the legislature; a return to the 1963 balance of power. These numbers were not lost on the government which threw additional people and resources into these marginal electorates and increased attacks on the opposition. The government particularly attempted to portray the opposition as incompetent – its usual strategy –

¹¹⁷ *The Straits Times*, 24 December 1984, p. 1

¹¹⁸ *The Report of the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee, 1991*, Cmd. 12 of 1991, 8 August 1991

¹¹⁹ Goh Chok Tong speaking to the second reading of the Parliamentary Elections Bill 1988. See: *Singapore Parliamentary Debates*, 50, 11 January 1988, col. 178

¹²⁰ These were in the electorates of Braddell Heights (Sin Kek Tong for the SDP); Bukit Batok (Kwan Yue Keng for the SDP); Changi (Tan Bin Seng for the Workers Party); and Nee Soon South (Low Yong Nguan for the SDP).

but in pursuing this, was assisted by the opposition itself. In by-elections held in his own seat of Marine Parade in December 1992, Goh Chok Tong's team received 72.9 per cent of the vote in what had been billed a test of his leadership style. This boosted Goh's standing in the party and parliament and helped overcome some of the damage done from the 1991 general election.¹²¹

During the period 1991-1997, the SDP split because of policy, strategy and personality differences between Chiam See Tong, Chee Soon Juan and Ling How Doong, resulting in several court cases and libel suits. Chiam left the SDP and joined the newly established Singapore People's Party (SPP)¹²² and Chee and Ling¹²³ took control of the SDP and initiated a policy of greater confrontation with the government. Unfortunately, in doing so, the SDP was to find that part-time politicians with little administrative support are at a severe disadvantage to a government with the full support of the public bureaucracies at its disposal. The SDP attacked the government on the issue of increases in the cost of living including the cost of health and hospital charges and argued that government health subsidies were very low. Before and during a parliamentary select committee inquiry on the issue, the government, which has access to many statistics that are not published, demonstrated that the SDP's arguments were wrong and the SDP itself made a number of basic arithmetical errors in presenting its case.¹²⁴ The government controlled media made much of Chee's and Ling's incompetence in not presenting factually correct arguments and threatened to call Chee before the bar of parliament and try him for contempt. Chiam's SPP continued with a non-confrontational policy to opposition politics.

These successes against the opposition were offset by a scandal involving the discounted sale of apartments to Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong which were heavily defended by Goh and the state controlled media even though the transactions were a *prima facie* breach of the ministerial code of conduct issued under Lee's premiership¹²⁵ and possibly of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The government's

¹²¹ Goh's vote actually dropped from 77.2 % in the 1991 general election to 72.9 % in the by-election.

However, as this by-election had been fought as a personal battle between Goh, the Singapore Democratic Party and the Workers Party, Goh considered it a substantial victory, which it was. The Worker's Party failed to field a team as one of the nominees did not register on time. See: *The Straits Times*, 20 December 1992, p. 1

¹²² The Singapore People's Party was established by that faction of the SDP which agreed with Chiam's non-confrontational approach to opposition politics.

¹²³ Ling was an MP and so was made Chairman of the party. Chee was appointed Secretary-General.

¹²⁴ *Asiaweek*, 16 August 1996. Available at: <http://pathfinder.com/asiaweek/96/0823/newsmap/singapor.html>

¹²⁵ The 1979 Code of Conduct for Ministers states in Article 3(vi) "A Minister ought not to enter into transactions whereby his private pecuniary interests might, even conceivably, come into conflict with his public duty." Further, the final article of the code (Article 5) contains provision for the extension of the code in terms of uncodified "rules of prudence" which would appear to forbid the acceptance of gifts such as discounted real estate purchases. This article states: "... Ministers should carefully avoid all transactions such as the acceptance of gifts of substantial value from members of the public which can give colour or countenance to the belief that they are doing anything which the "rules of obligation" forbid." See: *Code of Conduct for Ministers*, Cmd 2 of 1979, Singapore, Parliament of the Republic of Singapore, 15 January 1979.

legislation regulating home and public internet access, while allowing free access by businesses, was also a negative factor in 1996, particularly with the middle class.

In the 1997 general elections, the PAP played an even harder form of politics than usual, managing thereby to reduce the opposition presence in parliament to two seats; Chiam See Tong (SDP) and Low Thia Khiang (WP) retained their seats. J.B. Jeyaratnam accepted a Non-Constituency seat, thus increasing the opposition presence to three in a legislature of 83 members. The government admitted using blatant pork barrel tactics¹²⁶ by linking HDB upgrading and other expenditure programs to electoral support for the government. Constituencies were warned that the HDB upgrading programs would not proceed in those electorates that voted against the government with the Prime Minister threatening that they would “become slums.”¹²⁷ In the opposition held electorates, this loss of government support was expanded to include denying the Pasir Potong constituency a station on the new North-East Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) line being constructed.¹²⁸ This was despite the opposition parties agreeing to again use the ‘by-election strategy’ that had proven so successful in 1991. A guarantee of power was not enough for the PAP; its philosophy of total control could not accept even a minimal opposition representation. It therefore developed a ‘local election’ strategy to counter the opposition’s ‘by-election’ tactic.

The ‘local election’ strategy called for the development of detailed development and improvement plans for each GRC and single member constituency.¹²⁹ At election time, these plans, at the heart of which was highly subsidized enhancement of most Singaporeans prize possession – the HDB flat – would be provided in great detail to the electorate as an inducement to support the government; essentially a simplistic pork barreling approach. This strategy worked; the PAP increased its vote from 61% in 1991 to 65% in 1997, thus reversing the decline that had continued since 1981. It must be said, however, that this approach was greatly assisted by a number of other factors; the amendments to the GRC boundaries, thus reducing the number of single member constituencies and making it more difficult for the opposition to field large teams; mistakes by the opposition, the lack of detailed policy programs by opposition parties, media speculation about the possibility of the opposition winning the Cheng

¹²⁶ Brigadier-General George Yeo commented, in reply to an accusation of using pork barrel politics by the United States’ State Department, “Very strange ... pork barrel politics has a long tradition in America.” *Asiaweek*, 10 January 1997. Available at: <http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek/97/1226/newsmap/singapor.html>

¹²⁷ *Asiaweek*, 10 January 1997. Available at: <http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek/97/1226/newsmap/singapor.html>

¹²⁸ Personal communication with Chiam See Tong.

¹²⁹ Derek de Cunha, *The Price of Victory: The 1997 Singapore General Election and Beyond*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1997, p. 2

San GRC which led to a feeling that the opposition would win additional seats;¹³⁰ and intimidatory tactics by the government.

But did this signal a beginning of greater electoral support for the PAP? The leader of the Singapore Democratic Party, Dr. Chee Soon Juan thinks not; the choice for many was an economic, not a political choice – they succumbed to electoral bribery.¹³¹ Derek de Cunha agrees; that the increased support reflected a choice by the electorate to have their homes improved at government expense. Rather than gather the country behind it, the PAP's tactics may in the long run, turn against it. In particular, the defamation actions taken against Tang Liang Hong and J. B. Jeyaratnam, but Tang in particular, caused wide-spread concern. This was exacerbated by the apparent vindictiveness of also laying charges against Tang's wife for assisting her husband's defence. Tang and his wife had to subsequently flee to Australia. These social divisions, particularly the discontent of the Chinese-educated, were admitted to by Goh Chock Tong in a post-election address,¹³² and even justified by Lee Kuan Yew as "a risk we had to take."¹³³ To any objective observer, Singaporean or not, there was no threat to the PAP whether it lost five seats in Cheng San or 20 seats in a legislature of 83 in which it was guaranteed an absolute majority and in which a two-thirds majority is required to change the constitution. The risk only exists within an obsession with absolute control and an intolerance for even the mildest form of legislative accountability; which actually cannot be forced upon the government unless the opposition controls more than one-third of the legislature; 24 seats.

The electoral performance of the PAP from 1959-1997 is shown in Table 1.2 below.

TABLE 1.2: The PAP's Electoral Record 1959 - 1996

Year	Total Seats	Seats Contested	Seats Won by Opposition	Seats Won by PAP	PAP % of Total Votes
1959	51	51	8	43	53.4
1963	51	51	14	37	46.6
1968*	58	7	0	58	84.4
1972	65	57	0	65	69
1976	69	53	0	69	72.4
1980	75	38	0	75	75.5
1984	79	49	2	77	62.9

¹³⁰ Derek de Cunha provides a perceptive analysis of the effect of the media's speculation about the Worker's Party winning the Cheng San GRC. He believes that most voters began to believe that the opposition would win this GRC and that their representation would automatically increase as this one win would provide five seats. This then assuage a general desire to have an opposition voice in parliament, but without having the opposition come from 'my back yard'. Therefore voters felt free to vote for the PAP in the certainty that the opposition would win Cheng San. The statistics partially support this proposition as the PAP vote in Cheng San was the lowest among the GRCs at 54.8%. See: Derek de Cunha, op. cit., pp. 56-57

¹³¹ "Chee: HK will suffer if it emulates S'pore's system", *Straits Times*, 21 December 1996, p. 33

¹³² "PM Goh: Time to close the cracks after GE", *Straits Times*, 6 February 1997, p. 1

¹³³ Quoted in: "Why PM dramatised Cheng San battle", *Straits Times*, 8 January 1997, p. 1

1988	81	70	1	80	61.8
1991	81	40	4	77	61
1992*	81	4	0	4	72.9
1997	83	36	2	81	65

* by-election

Removing Sources of Social Dissatisfaction

The top-down policy making process of the PAP governments, devoid of community consultation and developed within a technocratic rather than a political framework, often generated considerable social hostility to the government. In response, the government has found the flexibility to change policy in response to feedback on large scale general public dissatisfaction, despite its avowed resistance to 'popular' policies. This was the case in liberalising the use of Central Provident Fund (CPF) funds to allow people to use these forced savings for purchasing a first property, education expenses, purchasing shares in GLCs as they are privatised and for some other limited purposes. The government also discontinued the educational and taxation preferences provided under the graduate mothers scheme¹³⁴, moderated the steaming and language policies in schools, introduced the Edusave scheme to provide family based education funding for all children, provided direct payments to citizens to increase CPF and Medisave account balances to partially offset cost increases, enhanced training initiatives for workers and the unemployed, extended the housing program to sell small HDB flats at highly subsidized prices to low income families to promote home ownership,¹³⁵ expanded the MRT system, funded intra-township light rail systems to avoid liberalising its car ownership restrictions, increased subsidies and support for the small and medium enterprise business sector, provided tax breaks for small business and individuals and expanded the housing upgrading programs for both HDB estates and private estates.

Of all these measures, the direct subsidy of housing upgrading in HDB estates and direct payments to citizens have had the greatest impact on maintaining electoral support for the PAP. They are, however, very obvious vote purchasing policies. They do not indicate an increased respect for the PAP's ideas, approach to governance or guarantee a long term mandate. They actually make the economic policy for political support trade off between the government and society so obvious as to increase its vulnerability, not enhance its strength.

¹³⁴ Provided to families in which a graduate woman married a graduate man; a simple eugenics policy aimed at producing children of higher intelligence, despite the psychological evidence that there is no basis to such a policy. It is simply based on one of Lee Kuan Yew's core personal beliefs, despite the fact that neither of his parents were from a higher education background. See: "Breeding the Brightest", *Asiaweek*, 2 March 1984, pp. 23-26

In terms of ethnic relations policies, the PAP government had been aware for many years of the general low socio-economic status of the Malay community. In 1981, with increasing wealth and a trend in income inequality being perceived, Mendaki, a Malay community development organisation was established under government sponsorship and the control of Malay PAP MPs. The government made a \$10 million donation and encouraged GLCs and others to also donate to build an endowment trust, aimed principally at providing educational enrichment and support programs for Malay students. In 1989 A similar organisation, SINDA,¹³⁶ was established for the Indian community. Despite some concern about its appropriateness, a third organisation of this type, the Chinese Development Assistance Council, was established in 1992 to assist poor Chinese families with education programs. The organisations are funded by "voluntary" deductions from all workers salaries and transferred to the organisation of the workers racial group. Although one can choose not to have the small monthly deduction made, there appears to be few who do. Support for the Malay community was further increased when the government co-opted in 1991 of the Association of Muslim Professionals, an independent community organisations originally established to compete with MENDAKI in providing education and training support to the Malay community, by offering it generous subsidies for its activities and accepting government direction in the development of its programs.¹³⁷

Controlling Social Dissent

By November 1966 due to the withdrawal of the Barisan Socialis from parliament, the PAP was totally in charge of the nation. The government made it known that tight social discipline was required for economic survival and that no substantial form of dissent would be tolerated. It's jailing of Chia Thye Poh under the ISA, its harsh suppression of Barisan street protests in 1967, its domination of the unions and its uncompromising stand on most policy issues drove this message home.

There were few significant acts of resistance to the government between 1967 and the 1980s, except for the continuation of Jehovah's Witnesses and members of the Unification Church, both banned organisations, to proselytize. Members of these organisations continued to be prosecuted and jailed by the government.¹³⁸ In 1974, a confrontation between the government and the University of Singapore Students Union

¹³⁵ This is probably the only housing subsidy actually provided by the government, despite its claim that HDB housing is heavily subsidised.

¹³⁶ SINDA: Singapore Indian Development Association

¹³⁷ Chua Beng Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 196

¹³⁸ The Jehovah's Witnesses are proscribed because of their resistance to compulsory military conscription. The Unification Church (Moonies) is seen as a dangerous cult which destroys families and teaches obedience to its leader over loyalty to nation and family and is banned on those grounds. These arrests still continue; between November 1995 and July 1996, more than 60 Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted and most jailed. See: "Fighting faith of stoic witnesses to repression", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 April 1998, p. 6

over the treatment of redundant workers and the union's right to challenge government policy was resolved by jailing the student leaders led by Tan Wah Piow and changing the University of Singapore Act to ensure that student organisations had no political role.¹³⁹

In May and June 1987, the ISA was used to detain 22 young social activists, many of whom were members of Roman Catholic social organisations,¹⁴⁰ and charge them with being members of a "Marxist conspiracy" affiliated with Tan Wah Piow. Confessions were forced from those arrested and were broadcast on national television. However, nine of the detainees later refuted them in April 1988 following their release. These were then forced to sign statutory declarations re-confirming their original statements or face continued detention under the ISA – on which there exists no limit. In association with this case, Francis Seow was arrested in May 1988, presumably to stop him representing the detainees. Seow, while on release from detention, fled Singapore for the United States. This deprived the detainees of their first choice in legal representation and removed an opposition member from parliament in one blow. This case was also intimately linked with warning religious organisations, specifically the Catholic Church, not to transgress on political issues. Subsequently, the maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, drafted with the advise of the ISD, was enacted. This legislation forbade religious organisations or their officials from being involved in political matters.

Within the legal profession, any tendency to dissent individually or collectively, has been minimised by two strategies: (a) the government's economic power through its control of a large part of the legal market through government departments, statutory boards and GLCs;¹⁴¹ and (b) legislative changes which have removed the right of the Law Society to comment on legislation and subsumed its position within the profession to the government controlled Academy of Law.

These restrictions on the Law Society arose from its criticism, under the leadership of Francis Seow, of another social control mechanism, changes to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act in May 1986. These legislative amendments were aimed at imposing greater government control of the print media. Radio¹⁴² and television were a government monopoly and so were already under tight control. The government

¹³⁹ Tan Wah Piow's version of this confrontation is expounded in: Tan Wah Piow, *Frame-Up: A Singapore Court on Trial*, Oxford, TWP Publishing, 1987. Tan is now a lawyer in London.

¹⁴⁰ The organisations these people were associated with included Young Catholic Workers, the Catholic Centre for Foreign Workers, the Catholic Peace and Social Justice Commission and an amateur drama group called "Third Stage".

¹⁴¹ Beatrice S. Frank et al, *The Decline of the Rule of Law in Singapore and Malaysia*, New York, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1991, pp. 77-78

directly criticised the Law Society, threatened to change its legislation and called Seow and other Law Society officers (including Teo Soh Lung, arrested as one of the 'Marxist conspirators' above)¹⁴³ before a Select Committee of parliament and televised the proceedings including vehement attacks by Lee Kuan Yew, Prof. S. Jayakumar Wong Kan Seng and others on the Law Society officials. A very clear message was sent to society about the limits of political activity and debate; that commentary on legislation outside a political party environment would not be tolerated as it is the act of "an enemy" of the government.¹⁴⁴

Weakening Political Opposition

The PAP government enjoys a solid record in destroying the personal reputations and careers of its opponents, unless those opponents accept the system as it is and obviously work within it. The international credibility of these attacks is so low that no nation to whom a Singaporean opposition politician has fled has agreed to repatriate him to Singapore to face outstanding charges, including Malaysia, Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. J. B. Jeyaratnam has been charged with fraud, disbarred from practicing as an attorney, found guilty of defamation three times (twice with multiple suits), has been bankrupted twice, disbarred from standing for parliamentary elections, fined and reprimanded by the Parliamentary Privileges Committee on at least two occasions and expelled from the parliament, all on charges which seem to have little if any credibility and whose roots are political rather than legal. In response to the findings of the Privy Council that exonerated Jeyaratnam of charges leading to his disbarment, the government removed the Privy Council as Singapore's final court of appeal. Despite his consistent opposition to the PAP, it is true, but unfortunate, to conclude that Jeyaratnam has served the PAP well; his life under the PAP is a lesson to all Singaporeans of what outspoken consistent opposition to the PAP will bring; professional ruination and poverty.

Shortly before the 1988 elections, Francis Seow, president of the Law Society and candidate for the Workers party who had been attempting to recruit a slate of lawyers to run as opposition candidates, was arrested under the ISA. No additional candidates from the legal profession stood, but Seow was allowed to contest the elections. He was later arrested, charged with taxation fraud, and subsequently sought political asylum in the United States. He has never returned to Singapore.

¹⁴² The exception being the Redifusion service, a cable radio service which provided no programming which could be critical of the government.

¹⁴³ Both Teo and Tang Fong Har, another attorney active in the social justice activities of the Law Society, were later arrested as part of the 'Marxist conspiracy' plot. Teo was also a member of the Workers Party, which was a further incitement for the government to attack her.

As well as direct attacks on the opposition, the government has used the analysis of voting patterns and electoral boundary changes to influence the distribution of opposition votes in particular constituencies. For example, after an analysis of voting patterns in the 1988 election revealed that Malay enclaves in particular housing estates may have increased the anti-government vote, the government began a more rigid enforcement of its racial composition rules for HDB and Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) housing estates. These stipulate that in any particular apartment building or estate that the Chinese proportion of residents cannot exceed 80% or Malay 22%.¹⁴⁵ This then slightly redistributed the Malay vote among several electorates. This manipulation of electoral boundaries continues to be a key PAP governance strategy. In 1997, Tan calculated that on a two party basis, "under the GRC scheme, you can secure 75% of all seats in Parliament by winning only 37% of all the votes cast ... It is possible to secure 90% of all seats in Parliament through the GRC by winning only 45% of the votes."¹⁴⁶

Co-opting and Controlling the Media

In its fight for political supremacy, the PAP developed an appreciation of the power of the media to influence the population and to mould social and political opinion. The state controlled television and radio, but not the print media. Although the PAP had acted against the press from 1959,¹⁴⁷ it began a concerted attack from May 1971 with the detention of the proprietor of the Chinese language *Nanyang Siang Pau*. A series of attacks on the print media culminated in all the Singaporean domestic print media being forcibly amalgamated into Singapore Press Holdings which is state controlled through the government's ownership of special "management shares", although normal shares are traded on the stock exchange under special government reporting regulations. The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act has been successively amended since May 1977 to control all print media through censorship and indirect state control.

The foreign print media have often been attacked by the Singaporean government, sued and their circulation terminated or restricted for criticising the government. This has included the *Asian Wall Street Journal*, the *Far East Economic Review*, the *International*

¹⁴⁴ Giam Chin Toon, President of the Law Society in 1990 stated that the consequences of the society commenting on legislation is that the government "would treat us as an enemy and harm us." See: Frank et al., op. cit. 1991, p. 82

¹⁴⁵ "Singapore", *Asia 1990 Yearbook*, Hong Kong, Far East Economic Review, p. 214

¹⁴⁶ Kevin Y. L. Tan, "Is Singapore's Electoral System in Need of Reform?", *Commentary*, 14, 1997, pp. 109-117, p. 115

¹⁴⁷ After the PAP won office in 1959, Leslie Hoffman, the editor of the *Straits Times*, fled Singapore for Kuala Lumpur fearing arrest because of Lee Kuan Yew's hostility to his editorial policies. See: T. J. S. George, *Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore*, rev. ed., Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 1984, pp.144-147

Herald Tribune, *Time*, and the *Economist*.¹⁴⁸ The government has also restricted the entry of certain journalists to Singapore because of their corporate affiliation, particularly Dow Jones affiliates, and amended legislation so that all foreign publications with a circulation of at least 300 copies and weekly or more frequent publication (i.e. all foreign publications) to apply for an annual licence which is granted or revoked at ministerial discretion.¹⁴⁹ All these media companies have bowed to government pressure in the face of loss of circulation in Singapore. In terms of foreign television and news reporting, ordinary citizens are not allowed to purchase or install satellite dishes for receiving foreign satellite signals, although business applications are allowed. The single domestic cable television service carries foreign news, but it is government owned through a consortium of GLCs. There is therefore no independent sources of radio, print or television commentary of any type available to the ordinary citizen which does not risk the possibility of government censorship, except for the internet. Aspects of this governance strategy are examined further in Chapter Eight.

In silencing its critics, since the inauguration of the first Goh Chock Tong government the PAP political executive has tried both the carrot and stick approach, perhaps indicative of a conflict in temper and style between the new premier and the old who remains within the cabinet. Goh Chock Tong's open and consultative style led to what was seen in some quarters in 1991 as an opening up of political dialogue; what one commentator called a new "speak up" culture:

Some samples can be given ... of this new "speak up" culture: Russell Heng's commentary that the PAP government erred in its charges and arrest of the "Marxist conspirators"; Cherian George's criticism of the constrictive rules and regulations which govern what newspapers can write and what they cannot; Hussin Mutalib's criticisms about certain key aspects of the PAP school policy and the Bill on "Religious Harmony"; Bilveer Singh's comment that Singapore's modernization drive will not work if there is a feudal political system; Vivian Balakrishnan's challenge to the government to openly and unobtrusively declare that it does not discriminate against the minorities; Chua Beng Huat's suggestion that racial issues could have been played up during the Election to prevent the emergence of class antagonism; and senior law lecturer Walter Woon's publicly-expressed view that Singapore does not have a Constitution given the ease with which changes are made to the Constitution.¹⁵⁰

This tolerant style, mild by the standards of liberal democracy, was however, soon gone. In a review of the domestic politics in 1994, Cherian George commented:

"In the discussion of many issues of national interest in the past year and preceding years, I detect certain modes of thinking within the Government. ... it has become virtually

¹⁴⁸ Frank et. al., op. cit., p. 103

¹⁴⁹ Frank et. al., op. cit., p. 105-106

¹⁵⁰ Hussin Mutalib, "Domestic Politics", in, Lee Tsao Yuan, *Singapore: The Year in Review 1991*, Singapore IPS, 1992, pp. 69-105, p. 73

impossible for Singaporeans to contribute to the discussion of issues of public interest without their motives being questioned and their ideas labelled and caricatured by those in authority. ... if Singaporeans point out areas where more public action can help improve the lives of some of their disadvantages countrymen, this will invariably earn long lectures from the government about the ills of the Western welfare state. ... Singaporeans wanting to expand the space for public discussion are labelled as trying to pressure for American style press freedom. ... such comments are not only unfounded, but also smack somewhat of paranoid delusions. There are positive examples, but these are rare."¹⁵¹

The government also acts to quieten individual critics. In response to a comment by Devan Nair on BBC radio in June 1988, that he and Lee Kuan Yew had consorted with American diplomats to a greater degree than had Francis Seow, Lee Kuan Yew sued Devan Nair for libel in an attempt to blunt the comments.¹⁵² Dr. Chee Soon Juan, a NUS academic and member of the SDP, was dismissed from his position at the university and subsequently sued by three PAP members (including his immediate superior at the university) and had very large damages made against him in 1992 after standing against Goh Chock Tong in the 1992 elections. In 1994, Lee Kuan Yew sued the *International Herald Tribune* and instigated action against Christopher Lingle, then an NUS academic, for publishing suggestions of a Lee family dynastic succession in Singapore.¹⁵³ Also in 1994, a more significant government attack was made on a critic who was not an opposition supporter but a member of the upper-class intelligentsia. In reaction to two articles from author Dr. Catherine Lim in the *Straits Times*, proposing that the style of government was still a contest between Lee Kuan Yew's dictatorial style and Goh's consultative style, both Goh and Lee severely attacked Lim, a mild mannered ex-academic with no interest in politics, and demanded that she enter politics if she wished to comment on the government. This attack indicated a number of things; the government's lack of understanding of those elites outside its co-opted circle, its low awareness of the rejection by these elites of the PAP's co-option mechanisms and their acceptance that citizens could pass general non-party political comments on the government, and the government's continued sensitivity and inability to handle criticism in a what in a genuine democracy would be seen as a mature way.

Strengthening Institutional Controls

The constitution adopted in 1967 as the institutional framework for an independent Singapore has been carefully designed to provide the government with complete control of the institutions of the state with no sources of independent review of the executive. Various changes have been made to the constitution since 1981 to further strengthen the government's institutional controls. In 1981, C. V. Devan Nair was appointed as

¹⁵¹ Cherian George, "Domestic Politics", in, Yap Mui Teng, *Singapore: The Year in Review 1994*, Singapore, IPS, 1995, pp. 52-60, p. 58

¹⁵² Frank et al, op. cit., p. 83

¹⁵³ Christopher Lingle, *Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions and Political Dependency*, Fairfax (Va.), The Locke Institute, 1996

the first politician to become president. This was seen as a precedent that could prepare the way for Lee Kuan Yew or some other politician to become head of state; a change from the appointments previously made which were from non-political candidates. This politicisation of the presidency drew it into the sphere of political control and closer to the political executive, thus depriving it of any likelihood of being a source of alternative power. This process was finalised by the introduction of the elected presidency in 1994.

The government has also taken a number of steps to amend the constitution in other ways, to amend legislation, introduce additional legislation and further regulate society through delegated legislation so as to minimise political dissent and maximise the penalties for it. An analysis of the place of these institutional arrangements with respect to the hegemonic program is the focus of Chapter Four.

Succession Planning and Regime Reproduction

Underlying these strategies for consolidating control of the nation, the PAP was very concerned about its longevity and under the direction of Lee Kuan Yew, took a comprehensive approach to planning its leadership and cadre successions as the core step in entrenching long term PAP control of Singapore.

Since the late 1960s, Lee Kuan Yew had begun designing a system of succession planning to ensure the continuation of the PAP as a party and a government. In managing the transition to a younger generation of leaders, Lee was principally concerned with regime reproduction. He did not want a new type of politics, but a continuation and consolidation of the system he had established. It was therefore necessary to ensure that this was understood by the party, the parliament, the civil service and society; the process was generational renewal not political renewal except, possibly, at the margins. A difference in the style, but not the substance of governance, could be tolerated. Lee's control of the political discourse was not to be terminated with his retirement.¹⁵⁴ Maintaining control and social discipline during the transition period was therefore essential; social and political discipline was not to waver – the second generation leadership was to be as tough as the first. This resulting in a number of actions being taken to control social dissent, further weaken the opposition and ensure that the mechanisms of control over the party, the government, the legislature and key institutions were maintained or strengthened. Additionally, the government took a number of steps to remove possible sources of social dissatisfaction, among Malay and Indian communities in respect of their socio-economic performance, in

terms of education and labour policy and access to CPF funds for purposes other than retirement benefits and the provision of welfare through enhancements to the HDB housing program. In concert with these transitional control measures, many of which have been covered earlier in this chapter, Lee Kuan Yew took personal responsibility for succession planning and regime reproduction.

In November 1990, Lee Kuan Yew stepped down as Prime Minister after holding the premiership since 1959. The new prime minister, Goh Chock Tong, an economist, had been selected and groomed by Lee for the position over a period of 14 years, although not necessarily as his first choice of successor.¹⁵⁵ The change of premiership was the culmination of a process of finding a replacement political executive that had begun in 1968 and accelerated from just prior to the 1976 general election. Open speculation about a generational change was being made by 1973 when Chan Heng Chee speculated that the new leadership would include Ong Pang Boon, Jek Yuen Thong, Chua Sian Chin and Dr. Lee Chiaw Meng.¹⁵⁶ Chan was wrong only in respect of the durability of her candidates – none survived to be included in the final handover by Lee Kuan Yew.

Remaking the Party Leadership: Culling the Elite

The retirement of the first generation post-independence PAP leadership was substantially controlled and managed by Lee Kuan Yew. He even forced the pace of retirement of Goh Keng Swee (1984)¹⁵⁷, Rajaratnam (1985) and Toh Chin Chye (1988) his closest political colleagues but, even moreso, he changed the backbench with some rapidity, overriding any objections from the party, cadres or MPs themselves, so absolute was his personal control of the political centre and so obsessed was he with the leadership renewal project. This left, for many years, a residue of passive hostility in many party branches to the younger leaders and among many cadres and former MPs towards Lee.¹⁵⁸

Lee sought for the next generation of the PAP Leadership, which is synonymous with the political executive, young (less than 40 years of age), highly educated leaders with proven management skills who would continue the authoritarian political and

¹⁵⁴ James Cotton contends that political discourse in Singapore has always been moulded by Lee Kuan Yew. See: James Cotton, "Political Innovation", Garry Rodan, ed., *Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s*, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1993, pp. 3-15, p. 3

¹⁵⁵ Alan Chong, *Goh Chock Tong: Singapore's New Premier*, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk Publications, 1991, p. 3

¹⁵⁶ Chan Heng Chee, *Succession and Generational Change in Singapore*, University of Singapore, Department of Political Science Occasional Paper No. 3, p. 2

¹⁵⁷ Goh Keng Swee stepped down in 1984 to become a consultant, initially to the Chinese government. At the same time two other Old Guard leaders also retired; Howe Yoon Chong and Chua Sian Chin. Chua, then Minister for Home Affairs retired from the ministry but remained on the backbench.

technocratic administrative systems he had established. Technocrats, not politicians were required; politics was under control. Although the main push for a new generation of leaders began in the mid 1970s, the renewal process had begun with 18 new MPs in 1968,¹⁵⁹ the replacement of five more in by-elections in 1970 which allowed, among others, Hon Sui Sen later Finance Minister, to enter parliament.¹⁶⁰

In 1972 eleven new members were inducted including Ong Teng Cheong, an architect; Dr. Ahmad Mattar, a polytechnic lecturer; Chin Han Tong, a trade unionist; and Dr. Tan Eng Lian, Singapore's first Rhodes Scholar and a medical practitioner. Another 11 new candidates were inducted in the 1976 elections, including Goh Chok Tong Managing Director of Neptune Orient Lines,¹⁶¹ Suppiah Dhanabalan Executive Vice President of the Development Bank of Singapore,¹⁶² and Dr. Ow Chin Hock an academic economist. In two 1977 by-elections, Bernard Chen Tien Lap, concurrently Deputy Secretary in the PMO¹⁶³ and MOF¹⁶⁴ and Lim Chee Onn, a Harvard educated economist, were recruited. Chen was immediately promoted to Minister of State for Defence. In February 1979 seven by-elections were held, one because of the death of the incumbent and six forced by Lee's renewal program to both recruit new people and train the new leaders in electioneering skills. At these polls Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam, Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation,¹⁶⁵ and Howe Yoon Chong, Head of the Civil Service¹⁶⁶ and Teh Chang Wan, Chief Executive of the Housing Development Board entered parliament. Howe was immediately made Minister for Defence and Teh Minister for National Development. In 1980 two new leadership recruits entered the scene; Professor S. Jayakumar from the Law Faculty at the National University of Singapore (NUS) and Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, a research scientist from the pharmaceutical company, Beechams. In 1984, 26 new PAP

¹⁵⁸ Carolyn Choo, *Singapore: The PAP and the Problem of Political Succession*, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk Publications, 1985, p. 105

¹⁵⁹ The most eminent among the 1968 intake was Chua Sian Chin, party treasurer 1970-1984 and a minister. He left the cabinet and resigned from the party's CEC in 1984 and remained a backbencher until the 1991 elections.

¹⁶⁰ Hon was a talented man, former chairman of the Economic Development Board and a star recruit. He unfortunately died of a heart attack in October 1983.

¹⁶¹ Neptune Orient Lines and its associated companies is the government owned shipping company. Goh Chok Tong was formerly its Managing Director.

¹⁶² Dhanabalan was an Administrative Service officer and from 1975 also a member of the board of the powerful Economic Development Board. He had previously worked in the Ministry of Finance's Economic Development Division and the Economic Planning Unit in the Prime Minister's Office before joining the EDB as a divisional director in the Projects Division. Prior to that he was assistant to Dr. Goh Keng Swee, the Minister for Finance and Deputy Prime Minister. He left the EDB to join the DBS when it was created from the EDB in 1968.

¹⁶³ Prime Minister's Office

¹⁶⁴ Ministry of Finance

¹⁶⁵ Tan is probably the most intellectually gifted of all the current political leadership, with the possible exception of George Yeo, which itself is very talented. He has a first class honours degree in physics from the University of Singapore, a masters degree in operations research from MIT and a Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the University of Adelaide. He is also from a wealthy family and therefore has a degree of independence that his colleagues from more modest backgrounds may lack.

candidates, all graduates, entered the elections. Of this new crop, six were identified as having the potential to join the new leadership team: Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong (Lee Kuan Yew's eldest son)¹⁶⁷, Dr. Richard Hu Tsu Tau¹⁶⁸, Wong Kan Seng¹⁶⁹, Yeo Cheow Tong¹⁷⁰, Mah Bow Tan,¹⁷¹ and Ng Pock Too¹⁷². Mah and Ng were defeated in this election, but were elected in 1988.

Lee successively retired Goh Keng Swee, the second most powerful of the first generation leaders and Howe Yoong Chong in 1984; Toh Chin Chye and Ong Pang Boon from cabinet also in 1984, Rajaratnam, E. (Eddie) W. Barker, Toh and Ong from the parliament in 1988.¹⁷³ C. V. Devan Nair had been retired through the mechanism of elevating him to the presidency in 1981 from which he was ignominiously dismissed in 1985 through a combination of Lee's ruthlessness, his own weaknesses and for advising the opposition on political tactics to attack Lee.¹⁷⁴ Toh and Ong remained in

¹⁶⁶ Howe Yoon Chong, in addition to being Head of the Civil Service, was also chairman of the Development Bank of Singapore and Chairman of the Port of Singapore Authority.

¹⁶⁷ Lee Kuan Yew's second son, Brigadier-General (NS) Lee Hsien Yang, is now CEO of Singapore Telecom, the nation's largest company and the largest and most profitable of the government linked corporations. There was obvious sensitivity to Lee Hsien Loong's entry to political life both because of his father and his being a professional soldier; at this time he was a Brigadier-General in the SAF. However, he was not the first officer of this rank to be called into public service; although the first to enter politics. In September 1982, Brigadier-General Tan Chin Tiong reluctantly accepted a transfer to become Second Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs and has continued his career in the civil service where he eventually became Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs from which he retired in 1998. Rajaratnam wrote a lengthy defence of having professional soldiers in the party and the parliament and this was reproduced in the *Straits Times*. Lee Hsien Loong was the second professional soldier, but the first of general staff rank, to enter politics in Singapore; in 1976 Major Abbas Abu Amin, a career SAF officer of Malay origin, had been elected to parliament. It is instructive that in association with the younger Lee's candidature, the PAP at last publicly revealed its selection methods for candidates in a series in the *Straits Times* running from 3 June to 1 July 1984.

¹⁶⁸ Hu's selection into the next generation broke the rule on recruitment of young candidates. In 1984, Hu was 58 years old. His selection was based on perceived talent and stability and has been proven correct. Prior to entering the ministry he was Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and of the Singapore Government Investment Corporation and had in these capacities worked closely with both Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee.

¹⁶⁹ Wong was a former Public Service Commission scholar and an officer in the elite Administrative Service within the civil service, which he entered in 1970, eventually rising to Deputy Secretary in the ministry of Defence before taking an executive position with Hewlett-Packard in 1981.

¹⁷⁰ Yeo was formerly managing director of engineering firm Le Blond Makino Asia, but had previously been a director in the Economic Development Board for three years. He is a former scholar.

¹⁷¹ Mah was an officer in the Administrative Service and had been CEO of Singapore Bus Services, deputy chairman of the *Singapore Monitor* newspaper, chairman of NTUC Comfort, the trade unions' taxi and transport co-operative, chair of two GLCs and a member of the Vocational and Industrial Training Board and the Singapore Polytechnic Council.

¹⁷² Ng Pock Too was an Administrative Service officer who had been a divisional director in the Economic Development Board.

¹⁷³ Barker retired to become Deputy Chairman of the Singapore Totalisator Board, where Goh Keng Swee was chairman, as well as chairman of Sembawang Indonesia Pte. Ltd., a subsidiary company of the large GLC Sembawang Holdings, now SembCorp Holdings. Rajaratnam, in poor health, became the Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. He is now totally retired from public life.

¹⁷⁴ The dismissal of Devan Nair from the presidency was an ugly confrontation between Lee Kuan Yew and his former colleague who had run the trade union movement as Secretary-General of the NTUC from 1966 – 1979. The facts surrounding the case are shrouded by innuendo, political propaganda and Devan Nair's own inconsistency in putting his side of the story. It seems, however, that Devan Nair had been advising Francis Seow, former Attorney-General turned Workers Party politician, on political tactics for attacking Lee and the PAP and on how Seow could find support from the United States embassy in Singapore. Lee took advantage of Devan Nair's alleged alcoholism and indiscretions while on a visit to Sarawak, as grounds for dismissing him as president and then muddying his name further through a parliamentary investigation that was serialised in the *Straits Times*. This matter had consequences in the 'Hendrickson affair' in 1988 in which United States diplomat E. Mason "Hank" Hendrickson was accused of colluding with Seow and interfering in Singapore's internal

parliament until 1988 and were both critical of Lee's approach to recruiting the successor generation.¹⁷⁵ Toh in particular became somewhat of a disenchanted internal critic while retaining his seat in the parliament but not in the cabinet. Ong was critical while inside the cabinet and the parliament, but the press control in Singapore was such that the views of neither got a substantial public airing.¹⁷⁶ Both Toh and Ong were given an additional impetus to retire by their seats being abolished in preparation for the 1988 elections.¹⁷⁷

Of this inner circle, only Goh had any substantial power base; in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and the public bureaucracies, where he was widely admired and had a large personal following. Toh's power rested in the party and was more easily subverted, although he had a substantial following in the branches and among the older cadres resulting in residual resentment of the political renewal process lingering for some years. Rajaratnam's influence was almost purely personal. There was, however, only a minor power struggle over the transition from within the inner group, except for Toh's objections to what he saw as Lee's increasing authoritarianism, but this was generally tolerated as it did not threaten Lee's transition program and actually demonstrated a toleration of alternative views.

Lee's approach was typically methodical and followed his maxim of 'leave nothing to chance'. He had the bureaucracy identify the top 500 people in the nation who met his criteria within the 35-40 year age group and then went searching for those interested or able to be persuaded to enter political life.¹⁷⁸ Lists were compiled, dossiers developed, background checks made by the ISD and government departments until as full a picture as possible was developed of possible candidates. By the early 1980s the second generation leaders had taken over the selection, with Goh Chock Tong as chair of a selection committee in his capacity as First Organising Secretary of the PAP, although Lee still had the final control over selection. Yeo and Jayakumar were the other members.¹⁷⁹ Mattar was chair of a complementary committee, including Sidek

affairs. Hendrickson was required to leave the country within 48 hours of receiving a government notice that his activities were incompatible with his diplomatic status. This issue is discussed further in Chapter Four.

¹⁷⁵ Toh was a founding member and chairman of the PAP. Ong Pang Boon was also an early member. Both were ministers from 1959-1984 and Toh was also at one time vice-chancellor of the University of Singapore. Ong, Chinese educated and fluent in dialects, was a key link to the Chinese community for Lee after the split with the Barisan Socialis. He was Assistant Secretary-General of the PAP for many years. Toh was for almost his entire career one of the five at the centre of the political executive with Lee, Goh Keng Swee, S. Rajaratnam and C. V. Devan Nair.

¹⁷⁶ Ong made attacks against Lee in constituency speeches from 1984-1988 when he retired. See: Selvan, op. cit. pp. 183-184. Toh's most public criticisms, other than in the parliament, were made in *Asiaweek* in 1984. See: "We're all ball-bearings, Quality-Controlled", *Asiaweek*, 7 September 1984, pp. 36-38; "Breeding the Brightest", *Asiaweek*, 2 March 1984, pp. 23-26, p. 25

¹⁷⁷ "Singapore prepares for elections", *Far East Economic Review*, 4 August 1988, p. 22

¹⁷⁸ Lee actually admitted that 500 possible candidates were screened. See: T. S. Selvan, op. cit., p. 52

¹⁷⁹ Choo, op. cit. p. 90

bin Saniff¹⁸⁰ and Wan Hussin Zohri,¹⁸¹ tasked with identifying candidates from the Malay community.¹⁸² The selection of Indian candidates was the responsibility of the main selection committee. During preparations for the 1997 general elections, the selection process included the CEC chaired by Goh Chok Tong, a General-Secretary's Committee chaired by Goh Chok Tong and on which Lee Kuan Yew, Lee Hsien Loong, Tony Tan, Wong Kan Seng and George Yeo served,¹⁸³ a general selection committee chaired by Yeo Ning Hong and comprising four to five ministers, and a series of lunch and afternoon tea interview sessions with prospective candidates chaired by ministers appointed by Goh Chok Tong.¹⁸⁴ In 1996, the Malay candidates selection committee was chaired by Abdullah Tarmugi and reportedly included all Malay MPs who split the work of initial interviewing of Malay candidates among three groups; public sector, including the universities and polytechnics, GROs and Malay community and religious organisations.¹⁸⁵ It appears that since 1988, the psychological tests which Lee Kuan Yew had insisted on under his governments have been dispensed with, although medical records are still apparently checked by a party appointed medical panel.¹⁸⁶

Following the successful completion of the rigorous selection process¹⁸⁷ –probably the

180 Sidek bin Saniff is now Senior Minister of state in the Ministry of the Environment and an MP for Aljunied GRC.

181 Wan Hussin bin Hj Zohri was a PAP backbencher

182 Choo, op. cit. p. 91

183 According to interviews, these were the key people on this committee. Wong Kan Seng was then Second Organising Secretary and George Yeo was Chairman, Young PAP.

184 "4 rounds in selection process", *The Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 19 October 1996, p. 14

185 I sought confirmation of this information from Malay MPs but was not able to do so.

186 Informants commented that there was considerable resistance by the younger generation to psychological testing and some medical professionals who were invited for interviews directly questioned its relevance.

187 The selection process, which still operates, is quintessentially Singaporean; a mixture of colonial and Chinese social habits mixed with technocratic exactitude and caution. It is an eight stage process. Candidates on the 'large' list are invited to afternoon tea with the selection committee. On being invited candidates who are not interested in political participation politely but insistently refuse, or devise a strategy for interview which would lead them to being excluded from further consideration. These meetings, held every three weeks on a Saturday, went for three hours, usually 5pm-8pm. The first meeting is rather like a medical triage session; the candidate is classified into PAP MP material, PAP non-MP material or not suitable for PAP purposes. Choo reports that only 45% proceeded to the second stage. At this stage the candidate faces another committee for a 'dialogue session' on general issues and attitudes. One member from the first meeting with the candidate would also attend this second round. At the third stage the successful candidate attends another dialogue session with the stage two committee during which discussion would focus more on PAP policies and the candidates attitudes and approach to them. At this stage the full background and security check on candidates are available to the committee, so one assumes that any perceived difficulties with the candidates background are discussed at this stage. Only 21% pass this stage. The fourth stage is the candidates meeting with the First Organising Secretary of the PAP – in the 1980s, Goh Chock Tong. The third stage committee will have recommended a particular role for the candidate and the chair would have briefed the PM. The candidates future role is therefore discussed, whether as a backbencher, junior minister or some other role. If the candidate accepts this offer, and considerable pressure is bought to bear so that they do, the fifth stage is an interview with a party committee. In the 1980s this was chaired by Lim Kim San, former cabinet minister, now chairman of Singapore Press Holdings and the Council of Presidential Advisers. Kim does not perform this function now and it is thought that the chair rotates among the political executive. On passing this stage, those selected for ministerial appointments and those about whom there are still some doubts, were sent for psychological testing and an intensive psychiatric assessment as the sixth stage. This psychological testing is intensive, lasting 1.5 days and included tests of intelligence, personality, values and decision making ability. Three intensive interviews are also included. This testing program aimed at analysing the same candidate abilities as used in the civil service for Administrative Service officers, known by the acronym HAIR: Helicopter view (i.e. see issues in broad context), Analytical abilities, Imaginativeness and ability to relate to Reality. The seventh stage is a

most thorough in any country – the new PAP candidates had to become involved in constituency or ‘grassroots’ organisations (GROs), as their selection was based on technocratic competence, not political skills or knowledge. This was complemented by appointment to party committees so that renewal of the management of the party organisation would proceed in unison with political leadership renewal. In order to test the capabilities of the new leadership in the absence of an opposition that would be able to pressure them politically in both the parliament and the constituencies, the first generation leadership developed a training regime that would place the second generation leaders under enormous working pressure.

This regime had two components: multiple simultaneous appointments in the ministry, the party and GROs for each potential leader and rapid rotation through ministerial portfolios to test adaptability and policy making ability and coherence. It has also been suggested that a third component – testing in by-elections for the ability to communicate and identify with the electorate – formed a part of this process and that MPs were retired on purpose to provide by-election opportunities for the new leaders to practice electioneering skills.¹⁸⁸ The first large scale test of the new generation’s electioneering skills was the 1984 general elections which they managed, including the recruitment of new candidates for one-third of the parliamentary seats.¹⁸⁹ This practice was maintained until the membership of the second generation leadership was decided and the transition of Goh Chock Tong to the premiership was finalised.

In 1980 Lee announced that his preferred second generation leadership team comprised seven people: Goh Chock Tong, Ong Teng Cheong, Dr. Ahmad Mattar, Bernard Chen, Lim Chee Onn, S. Dhanabalan, and Dr. Tony Tan. Lim and Chen were subsequently replaced by Dr. Yeo Ning Hong and Professor S. Jayakumar. Many of these had a public sector background. Mattar was a polytechnic lecturer, Goh was an officer in the Administrative Service, Ong an architect with good links to grassroots organisations, Dhanabalan from the Administrative Service (Development Bank of Singapore and the Ministry of Finance), Chen and Lim had been from the Administrative Service, Jayakumar from NUS and Yeo from Beechams. Below this leadership group was a second team comprising Dr. Wong Kwei Cheong, Lee Yock

meeting with the Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers at which the Prime Minister decides whether he can work with the candidate. The final stage is a meeting with the full Central Executive Committee of the PAP, which includes all the senior cabinet ministers. Even at this stage the candidate can be rejected and Choo reports that this has happened based on “sheer gut feeling”. After entry into politics, the new members chosen for ministerial positions then faced a rigorous learning process supervised by the Prime Minister and under the mentorship of a senior cabinet minister. Candidates who were not judged successful after two years at this level were relegated to backbench positions or left as junior ministers, or even asked to resign. This is probably the most exacting process of political selection in the world. See: Carolyn Choo, *op. cit.* pp. 89-98

¹⁸⁸ Choo, *op. cit.* p. 102

¹⁸⁹ This included the recruitment of three women candidates; Dr. Aline Wong, a university lecturer, Madam Yu-Foo Yee Shoon, a trade union official; and Dr. Dixie Tan a medical practitioner. Tan left parliament at the 1991 elections; the other two are still MPs.

Suan¹⁹⁰, Dr. Wan Soon Bee and Dr. Tay Eng Soon. Their backgrounds were a balance of public and private sector; Wong from Aiwa Electronics, Lee from the Administrative Service (Economic Development Board-EDB), Wan from Olivetti and Tay from the Defence Science Organisation (DSO).

All, however, had not gone smoothly for the transition. While many of the new ministers succeeded, some failed the test. Of Chan Heng Chee's nominated successor group, Ong Pang Boon was seen as a direct threat to Lee because of his high level of support in both the community and among the Chinese educated, including those who were PAP cadres.¹⁹¹ Ong's wife, Chan Choy Siong, a PAP backbencher was also very popular. Both were sent overseas after Ong was deprived of his cabinet position and Chan of her seat.¹⁹² Of the 1972 intake, Dr. Lee Chiaw Meng, was appointed Minister of Education and Minister of Science and Technology in 1976 but fell out of favour in 1978, was relieved of his cabinet post in early 1979 and subsequently left parliament.¹⁹³ Dr. Tan Eng Liang, Singapore's first Rhodes Scholar,¹⁹⁴ was inducted in 1972, was appointed as Senior Minister of State for National Development in 1975, the first Senior Minister of State for Finance in 1978 and was tipped initially as Lee's successor. However, he was dismissed from cabinet in 1976 and also left politics. In 1986, Teh Cheang Wan, then Minister for National Development, committed suicide while being investigated for corruption. Dr. Augustine Tan, an economics lecturer at NUS, was elected in 1972 and appointed as political secretary to Lee Kuan Yew following his election. By the late 1970s he had been relieved of this position and moved out of the potential leadership group and left parliament at the 1991 elections.¹⁹⁵ Dr. Ow Chin Hock, also an economist, was recruited in 1976 as a potential member of the leadership team but rose no higher than Parliamentary Secretary¹⁹⁶ in the Ministry of Culture, then the Ministry of Education. He resigned from this position in 1981, staying on the backbench where he sits today. A number of other academics also didn't make it to the leadership group; Associate Professor Lau

¹⁹⁰ Lee Yock Suan was an Administrative Service officer who was a divisional director in the Economic Development Board.

¹⁹¹ At a meeting of PAP cadres in 1971, Ong had more support than Lee and was an obvious threat.

¹⁹² Ong was the Minister of Education. Toh Chin Chye was tasked with removing these threats to Lee's continued premiership. See: T. J. S. George, *Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore*, rev. ed., Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 1984, pp. 180-181

¹⁹³ Lee had a Ph.D. in engineering and had also been made Vice Chancellor of Nanyang University, the Chinese medium university in Singapore later amalgamated with the University of Singapore to produce the National University of Singapore (NUS).

¹⁹⁴ Tan received the D.Phil. in chemistry from Oxford University, lectured briefly at the University of Singapore and then worked as chief chemist, an executive position, for a multinational corporation in Singapore before entering politics.

¹⁹⁵ Tan is now an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Arts and Science at NUS. A practicing Christian, he may have had a habit of being too free with the truth, such as his revelation in 1981 that there was no government subsidy for HDB flats, contrary to the official government line. See: *Straits Times*, 15 August, 1981, p. 5

¹⁹⁶ Parliamentary Secretary is the lowest rank above an ordinary Member of Parliament, not counting the position of chairman of a Government Parliamentary Committee which has no constitutional status.

Teik Soon¹⁹⁷ remained a backbencher; Dr. Wong Kwei Cheong resigned from the ministry in 1984, remaining as a backbencher until the 1997 elections at which he retired;¹⁹⁸ and Dr. Wan Soon Bee was dropped from the ministry after the 1988 elections but remains as a backbencher.¹⁹⁹

Some failures were quite spectacular. In 1976, Minister of State Wee Toon Boon was imprisoned for corruption. Bernard Chen, although appointed Minister of State for Defence on his election in 1977, was eased out of the ministry by 1981.²⁰⁰ Lim Chee Onn, appointed Secretary-General of the NTUC and Minister without Portfolio²⁰¹ in 1979 and vice-chairman of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the PAP in 1982, was dismissed from all his posts in 1983 by Lee amidst a display of public animosity.²⁰² Lim's dismissal could be interpreted as evidence of the power of those under a new appointee to undermine a poor performer through direct appeal to Lee Kuan Yew or conversely, of Lee being able to generate hostility from within an organisation against an appointee whom he no longer finds acceptable. Chua explains some of these failures, especially of the brightest and those with academic backgrounds, as being based on personality issues, especially an inability for them to work with Lee Kuan Yew. By using the case of Tan Eng Liang, Chua argues that these dismissals are made to fit into an framework based on the PAP's ideology of pragmatism so that those dismissed are classified as either incompetent, impractical or as having personality difficulties. In the case of Tan the first two labels are falsifiable given his acknowledged academic brilliance and his successful career as a senior company executive.²⁰³ It is more probable that, in general, the constant personality problems suffered by political recruits were those of the prime minister rather than the

197 Then head of the political science department at NUS. His replacement at NUS was Professor Chan Heng Chee who undertook a number of government positions; Ambassador to the United Nations, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Director of the Singapore International Foundation, Ambassador to the United States.

198 Wong remains on good terms with the current political executive, being mentioned with sympathy in the Prime Ministers National Day speech in August 1998 in respect of the misfortunes which have befallen his business interests in Indonesia. He has been a director of several GLCs.

199 Dr. Wan Soon Bee is now managing Director of a logistics firm, having left academia.

200 Chen now sits as an ordinary backbencher for the West Coast GRC and is now managing director of the GLC, Intraco. It is assumed that, in some way, he did not meet Lee's standards for ministers.

201 The Secretary-General of the NTUC is traditionally appointed to the cabinet as Minister Without Portfolio, the duties of which are to manage the union movement, maintain a general responsibility for all industrial relations issues not directly under the Minister for Manpower, as well as oversight the NTUC's business and investment activities (including the Singapore Labour Foundation) within the quasi-state sector and their interaction with the government linked corporate sector. This in itself is a very demanding position

202 Lim was publicly disgraced by Lee with Lee's letter dismissing him and Lim's response being published in the *Straits Times*. Lim Chee Onn was subsequently appointed as managing director of the Keppel Shipyard and is now managing director and deputy chairman of Keppel Land. Both of these companies are GLCs. Selvan is of the opinion that the official reasons for his removal – "lack of communication skills" – was a cover for Lim's incapacity to handle the pressures of such fast promotions and enormous responsibility combined with a tendency for "harebrained schemes and unlimited dreams". Another version, is that Lim appeared too ambitious in developing an NTUC company sector and businesses that would make it too autonomous. See: T. S. Selvan, *Singapore the Ultimate Island*, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, pp. 50-52

203 Chua Beng Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*. London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 53-54

recruits themselves.

What resulted from this selection process was actually two generations of leaders; a largely interim second generation, many of whom have now departed from legislative if not public functions, and a third generation who now form the PAP leadership and control the party's CEC and the cabinet, although they are usually called the 'second generation' leaders or the 'New Guard'. Lim Chee Onn and others could best be termed the 'lost generation' of leaders. Following this process, the Singaporean elite was littered with the metaphorical corpses of political discards and a heightened degree of passive hostility to involvement in government by much of the nation's elite.

By 1984 the younger generation held 11 of the 12 positions on the PAP's CEC, Lee remaining as the Secretary-General. Only three of the Old Guard ministers remained in the cabinet; Rajaratnam, Barker and Lee as Prime Minister. After the 1984 elections, the cabinet included a younger generation comprised of Goh Chock Tong (First Deputy Prime Minister), Ong Teng Cheong (Second Deputy Prime Minister), Suppiah Dhanabalan, Tony Tan, Teh Cheang Wan, Ahmad Mattar, Yeo Ning Hong, S. Jayakumar, Richard Hu and Lee Yock Suan. Following the next general election in 1988, Rajaratnam and Barker had retired and only Lee remained from the Old Guard.

While remaining as Prime Minister, the day to day management of the government was handed over to Goh Chock Tong as First Deputy Prime Minister and the new cabinet of 11 which was now comprised of Ong Teng Cheong as Second Deputy Prime Minister, Dhanabalan, Tony Tan, Ahmad Mattar, Yeo Ning Hong, Jayakumar, Hu, Lee Yock Suan, Wong Kan Seng, Yeo Cheow Tong and Lee Hsien Loong. Following the 1991 elections, minor changes were made to the cabinet line-up of 16 which now included Goh and Lee as Prime Minister and Senior Minister respectively, Ong Teng Cheong (Deputy Prime Minister), Lee Hsien Loong (Deputy Prime Minister), Dhanabalan, Tony Tan, Mattar, Yeo Ning Hong, Jayakumar, Hu, Lee Yock Suan, Wong Kan Seng, Yeo Cheow Tong, George Yong-Boon Yeo, Lee Boon Yang and Mah Bow Tan.

Supposedly, in response to internal discord within the cabinet, reportedly instigated by Lee Hsien Loong, in December 1991 Tony Tan resigned his portfolio to return to banking, followed by Dhanabalan's departure in August 1992, also for the private sector. In November 1992, Goh revealed publicly that both Deputy Prime Ministers were suffering from cancer and would take leave from their duties for treatment. Dhanabalan subsequently returned to the cabinet in December 1992 and Tan in 1996. However in the period 1992-94, the government lost five cabinet ministers and a Senior

Minister of State.²⁰⁴ In the face of his son's cancer and possible removal from the political system, Lee Kuan Yew transferred the secretary-generalship of the PAP to Goh Chok Tong in 1992. The transition from the founding father of the PAP was substantially complete, although Lee continued to have considerable personal power within the party and government. This new executive has followed Lee's strategy and has been planning party and government succession since the 1991 elections, a process which now seems to be institutionalised within both the party and the government,²⁰⁵ as it is the bureaucracy that tracks potential candidates for consideration in this process.²⁰⁶

CONCLUSIONS

From the above, we can conclude that historically and in contemporary Singapore the PAP governments are hegemonic and that the institutional structure of the state is central to the system of hegemonic control and the mediation of relations between state and society. The strategies of governance we have identified, and the careful succession planning undertaken by the party, have consolidated PAP power and provided the foundations on which the hegemonic political system has been built. This system operates on the following principles:

1. Integration of the Singapore Civil Service and other public bureaucracies into the political program as the executive instruments of both hegemonic control and nation building;
2. The careful design of the constitutional and legal framework of the state so that the PAP's control of the institutions of state is absolute and political and policy actions have a *prima facie* legality regardless of the moral, ethical or democratic dimensions of these actions;
3. The direct control of the instruments of state coercion by the political executive through bureaucratic and quasi-state structures to maintain the threat of state action against opponents;
4. The development of a repertoire of consent building strategies which operate through PAP control of the media and special bureaucratic mechanisms, such as the People's Association and the HDB which assist in restructuring and controlling social dynamics;

²⁰⁴ Cherian George, "Domestic Politics", in *Singapore: The Year in Review 1994*. Singapore, IPS, 1995, pp. 52-60, p. 52

²⁰⁵ For the view of Lee Hsien l

Loong on this strategy see: Nigel Holloway and Lawrence Minard, "Singapore's big chance", *Forbes*, 29 November 1999, pp. 44-46, p. 46. For brief comments from Goh Chok Tong see: "Finally, being His Own Man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia - and himself", *Asiaweek*, 25 November 1999. Available at: <http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/interview/goh.chok.tong/index.htm>

²⁰⁶ Under Lee Kuan Yew, it was reported that the Ministry of Education tracked the top 500 students in the nation and that after their graduation from university, the records for this cohort were transferred to the Internal Security Department to continue tracking as their careers advanced. This information was shared in summary form with the prime minister's personal office. Under Goh Chok Tong, the cohort is now reported to be 2000. The Directorships and Consultancy Appointments Council is also reported to track private sector and GLC business executives for appointment to boards and GLCs, with this database being maintained by Temasek Management Services. Data from interviews, 1995 and 1998.

5. The production of an hegemonic framework, with social, economic and political dimensions, so that the PAP's control of the nation is not just retained but is reproducible through a number of inter-locking consent building strategies.

In Singapore, the PAP has moved a considerable way towards establishing a hegemonic system that substantially mirrors, and in some ways surpasses, Gramsci's model, although it is an oligarchic, not democratic hegemony. Gramsci, of course, was not able to develop his intellectual project further, but in terms of what he has bequeathed us, the PAP has surpassed his understanding of how hegemony might operate. Probably because of its small size and the possibility of substantial social, economic and geographical control, the PAP has developed and implemented strategies to overcome divisions among the political leadership, intellectuals and the bureaucracy. It has done this by incorporating the bureaucratic leadership in a close partnership with the political leadership and recruiting politicians from the bureaucracy. It has adopted a similar strategy with intellectuals by making them all state employees and incorporating them into the bureaucracy. It has subverted potential conflict between the working class and the ruling class by ensuring that the rewards of economic development are also provided to the working class and that the ability of this class to organise through unions and other civil society structures is severely compromised by state control of these mechanisms and their co-option into the hegemonic program. The PAP also provides a route of transition from the working class to the middle class based on meritocratic recruitment to the bureaucracies, GLCs and even the political leadership, which provides a seemingly objective and equitable class transfer system. These strategies are underwritten by a number of powerful coercive and consent building mechanisms.

The political system is not, however, fully hegemonic and weak pockets of resistance remain active in civil society and the political opposition. Although there appears to be general agreement on the strength of the PAP's ideological hegemony, the legitimacy of the PAP government remains questionable, as its legislative minority is based on a gerrymandered electoral system through which in 1997, 35 per cent of citizens voted against the party. Majority support in this election was influenced by the PAP's threat to reduce government expenditure in electorates that voted against it. Under these conditions, it can be concluded that the PAP hegemonic project is still unfinished, although its framework is firmly established and the party is unquestionably in control of government.

In the following chapters, this framework will be examined so as to provide an understanding of the structure and dynamics of contemporary PAP governance and how it acts to design, implement and maintain its political program.

2. THE PUBLIC SECTOR: DEVELOPMENT, STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS

It is generally agreed that "... one of the key factors contributing to Singapore's political stability and economic prosperity is the quality of its public service."¹ The development of public sector bureaucracies that identify with and partner its political program has been instrumental in the development and maintenance of PAP control of Singapore and form a distinctive group within the Singaporean core executive. This chapter examines the development of the public sector in Singapore under the PAP governments and especially its relationship with the political executive, in order to facilitate an understanding of the contribution the public bureaucracies make to the membership of the core executive as well as the structure and dynamics of the executive agencies through which the core executive functions.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Following the control of the Straits Settlements passing from the British East India Company to the Crown in 1867, a Straits Civil Service was established in Singapore on the traditional British colonial pattern. This remained separate from the Federated Malay States' Civil Service until 1920, when the FMS Civil Service and the Straits Civil Service were combined to form the Malayan Civil Service. This was subsequently incorporated into the Colonial Unified Services² with the elite managerial stream incorporated into the Colonial Administrative Service in 1932. This service was racially divided and controlled by British colonial administrators; locals were relegated to lower positions attracting lower salaries and poorer conditions, although in the Federated Malay States after 1924, a small number of positions in the Administrative Service were held by aristocratic Malays who were given preferential treatment by the British.³

Few Asians applied for positions in the civil service.⁴ The Straits Medical Service was

¹ Jon S. T. Quah, "Public Administration in Singapore: Managing Success in a Multi-racial City-State", in Ahmed Shafiqul Huque et al. eds., *Public Administration in the NICs: Challenges and Accomplishments*, New York, St. Martins Press, 1996, pp. 59-89, p. 59

²In 1945, the Colonial Unified Services comprised: the Colonial Agricultural service, Audit Service, Administrative Service, Legal service, Chemical Service, Civil Aviation Service, Customs Service, Education Service, Forest Service, Geological Survey Service, Medical service, Mines Service, Nursing Service, Police Service, Postal Service, Research Service, Survey Service and Veterinary Service. See: Yeo Kim Wah, *Political Development in Singapore 1945-55*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1973, p. 71

³Yeo, *ibid.*, p. 70

⁴The exclusion of non-Europeans from public administration is demonstrated by the 1931 census which revealed that of those working in public administration and defence, the Chinese comprised 0.2 per cent, Malays 2.5 per cent, Indians 3.6 per cent and others (principally Europeans and Eurasians) 20.2 per cent. See: Chiew Seen-Kong, "The

opened to Asians in 1932 and in 1934 a Straits Settlements Civil Service was again formed separate from the Malayan Civil Service. This was followed in 1937 by the establishment of a Straits Legal Service. From this period onwards, the orientation of the civil service was one of "... establishing the writ of the colonial regime and creation of an environment favourable to economic modernization."⁵

After the war, Singapore was declared a Crown Colony separate from the Federation of Malaya, and a separate Singapore Civil Service was established. Following agitation for change by local officers who had demonstrated that they could manage the public sector during the Japanese occupation, and in line with British de-colonialisation policy, the subordinate services were abolished.⁶

The Trusted Commission, established to investigate and report on the structure and function of the Straits Civil Service in 1947, recommended new classification, salary, recruitment and promotion systems and the establishment of a Public Service Commission to promote the recruitment of locals to senior positions. The major recommendations were based on reforms that had been instituted in the British Civil Service and today still "... provides the basis for determining the various points of entry into the Singapore Civil Service, the salary scales and fringe benefits."⁷ The new divisional structure and salary scales were introduced following the presentation of the report, but a Public Service Commission (PSC) for Singapore was not established until 1951. The objective of the new PSC was to "... keep politics out of the SCS by rejecting the spoils system and to accelerate the pace of localization in the SCS."⁸

Further changes were made from 1955 based on the recommendations of the Rendel Commission to restructure the civil service; the establishment of ministries to be controlled by elected ministers,⁹ the creation of Permanent Secretary positions and the centralisation of financial administration¹⁰, legal¹¹ and core security and public

Socio-Cultural Framework of Politics', in Quah, J. S. T. et al *Government and Politics in Singapore*, rev. ed., Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987. pp. 45-67, p. 53.

⁵ Seah Chee Meow, "Bureaucratic Evolution and Political Change in an Emergent Nation: A Case Study of Singapore, Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University of Manchester, 1971, p. 20

⁶ Yeo comments that with respect to the white dominance of the post-war civil service in Singapore, that "Singaporeans emerged from the war with a hypersensitive revulsion against any form of racial discrimination. This came to be focussed on the public service where, apart from the all-white clubs, racial discrimination had its most concrete and visible manifestations." This attitude resulted in a number of confrontations between local officers and the British administrators on a number of issues including pay, conditions, access to the higher civil service and payment for war-time internment. See: Yeo, op. cit., p. 72

⁷ H. H. Teo, "Singapore Civil Service: General Trends in Civil Service Reforms" in, *Trends in Civil Service Reforms in ASEAN Countries*, Bangkok, Office of the Civil Service Commission, 1985, pp. 311-332, p. 312

⁸ Jon S. T. Quah, "The Public Bureaucracy and National Development in Singapore", in K. K. Tummala, ed., *Administrative Systems Abroad*, Washington D. C., University Press of America, 1982, pp. 42-75, p. 50

⁹ Five ministries were established to be headed by local elected ministers - Commerce and Industry; Education; Health; Housing, Lands and Local Government; and Labour and Welfare.

¹⁰ All revenue raising activities were centralised under the Ministry of Finance headed by a colonial appointed Financial Secretary.

administration functions.¹² This was the initial step in preparing the civil service for cabinet government, experience of which no local civil servants had and of which many if not most expatriate civil servants had little substantial experience.

From the introduction of these reforms, the pressure for localisation gained momentum with the establishment of the Sreenivasan Commission in 1956, a special commission established to advise on the localisation process.¹³ The Sreenivasan Commission outline in its Interim Report a process of localisation by the various government departments and, by 1957 the most senior positions of permanent secretary had been localised.¹⁴ The outcomes of the localisation process were the bedrock on which the civil service of self-governing Singapore had to build its own national civil service.

With the election of a fully self-governing Parliament in 1959 and the ascent of the PAP government under Lee Kuan Yew, the civil service was still experiencing considerable turmoil as a result of the Rendel reforms and the localisation program as well as from the domestic political turmoil of the times. The new PAP government restructured the civil service to conform to its portfolio structure. The most significant of these changes was the abolition of the local government administration, the creation of new ministries of national development and culture and the establishment of statutory boards to undertake the more urgent policies associated with enhancing political control and developing the nation's economic and social infrastructure. The Public Utilities Board was established in 1959, the Housing Development Board and the Economic Development Board in 1961. As a principal mechanism for enhancing political control, the People's Association was established within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) in 1960 as a propaganda, social intelligence and control organisation.

This period of rapid change and subsequent weakness in the capacity of the indigenous civil service to meet the needs of the newly elected PAP administration, left a lasting impression on the government and its leader who understood only too well the need to have a highly effective and efficient public administration on which to

¹¹ All legal matters were centralised under the Attorney-General who remained a colonial appointed officer.

¹² Defence, internal security, external affairs, broadcasting, public affairs and civil service establishment matters were centralised under the Colonial Secretary's Office, headed by a colonial appointee. In association with the finance function, these still form the core areas of control by the inner political and public sector executive in Singapore.

¹³ The fact that the commission was established, and particularly established under its chair, Dr. B. R. Sreenivasan, was quite significant. Sreenivasan had been a senior officer of the Straits Medical Service, a component service of the Straits Civil Service, and had resigned in disillusionment at what he saw as the purposeful curtailment of his career advancement, through use of the 'colour bar' by less competent British administrators. Under Sreenivasan's chairmanship, the commission's work could hardly have been unbiased, but in appointing him to chair the commission, the Governor would have been well aware of what the possible outcomes of the commission's report would be. One can therefore conclude that the appointment of the commission under Sreenivasan was tacit admission by the colonial administration that it should commit itself fully to the localisation process. See: *Interim Report of the Malayisation Commission*, (B. R. Sreenivasan, Chairman), Singapore, Government Publications Bureau, 1956

build political legitimacy. In fact, the PAP leadership saw very clearly an intimate link between the civil service and the government. It wanted a civil service which not only provided advice, in the traditional Westminster sense, but which worked collaboratively with the government in a national partnership to implement a specific political program on which the government had been elected, as in the traditions of the senior appointed political ranks of the United States Civil Service. While such a link is perhaps obvious, it must be remembered that the new government had been expected by the colonial administration and the local elites to operate very much in the traditional Westminster mould, despite the unicameral nature of its legislature, and thus to support the concept of a neutral civil service.

The PAP administration was not particularly enamoured of the artificial distinctions inherent in the theoretical positioning of the civil service vis a vis the government in the Westminster system.¹⁵ This is a not surprising view given that there had been considerable overlap between the colonial executive, the senior offices of its civil service, its advisory legislature and its Executive Council. This was the model most immediately available to the PAP and one which it understandably adopted: the integration of the party, political and bureaucratic leadership. Thus colonial political hegemony provided the building blocks for a more comprehensive neo-Gramscian hegemonic system. It had been an effective model of colonial administration, making Singapore a relatively wealthy and advanced polity within its region and had provided well over a hundred years of stable government. Although not bereft of problems, including those of conflict of interest, reinforcing elite cohesion particularly among the Chinese, oligarchic control of society and a potential for encouraging corrupt behaviour, it was a model that worked and which could be reasonably expected to continue to work until some pressing requirement that it be changed emerged.

The desirability of the integration of sectional leadership cohorts was clearly captured by Lee Kuan Yew in his address to senior civil servants at the newly established Civil Service Political Study Centre in 1959.¹⁶ Having established the Centre to prepare local senior civil servants more fully for their role in national administration, particularly through developing a greater understanding of the broad political environment, the

¹⁴ Seah Chee Meow, "The Civil Service", in Jon S. T. Quah, *Government and Politics of Singapore*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.99

¹⁵ Changes in public administration in Britain and New Zealand since the 1980s have reflected this concern that the traditional Westminster model is insufficiently responsive to the needs of government. This has led to major public sector administrative reforms aimed at making, in particular, the senior executive ranks of the civil services, operate much more collaboratively with incumbent governments. See: Mark Evans, *Charter 88: a successful challenge to the British political tradition?*, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1995

¹⁶ The correct, original name for what is usually referred to as the Political Study Centre. See: Lee Kuan Yew, "The trouble with the civil service", in, Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko Tan, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas*, Singapore, Times Edition, 1998, pp. 317-320, p. 317

Prime Minister commented:

You (the civil servants) and I (the political leadership) have a vested interest in the maintenance of the system. Should democracy and its framework fail to survive, you and I have an equally important responsibility ... for its failure.¹⁷

In addition to basing administrative expectations on the prevailing model of colonial administration, Seah places the development of the political-administrative relationship in the context of the contemporary political situation:

...the government had come to a fundamental reconciliation with harsh realities, namely, that the sentiments that fired the nationalistic imagination were not sufficient to sustain the workings of an orderly administration. Expertise as opposed to blind political loyalty or enthusiasm was to predominate, although ideally it would be best to have civil servants who were both politically loyal and competent. It was this attitude, coupled with the separation of mainly Chinese-educated radicals from the ruling party, which helped establish the basis for a strong relationship between the civil service and the ruling leadership.¹⁸

Following the implementation of the Sreenivasan Commission's Report, all was not plain sailing. The civil service had many young and untried managers, it did not have the experience or training to develop and implement the range of economic and social policies required for post-colonial national development; its top management was inimical to local politicians, it purported to adhere strictly to the Westminster ideal of a neutral civil service, it was plagued by petty corruption and it was a civil service unaccustomed to the discipline of cabinet government.¹⁹ Additionally, it was a service in which the leadership, in particular, was comfortable with the colonial system and did not identify with the anti-colonial attitudes of the new political parties, nor with the notion of nation-building²⁰ which formed the policy framework for the new PAP government. The PAP was therefore faced with a situation whereby;

... the nature of the civil service and the voluntary organisations at the time when the PAP assumed power made it imperative for its leaders to concentrate all power and authority in their own hands. ... The civil service had been the creation of the British colonial rulers whose objectives and purposes were entirely different from that of the PAP.²¹

This control of the civil service was seen as fitting within a more general hegemonic strategy of social, political and economic control by the new government; a more genuinely neo-Gramscian hegemony that supplanted the political colonial hegemony:

¹⁷ "Text of a Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the Official Opening of the Civil Service Study Centre", (mimeo), Singapore Government press statement, 15 August 1959, p.2

¹⁸ Seah Chee Meow, "The Civil Service", in Jon S. T. Quah, *Government and Politics of Singapore*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 92-119, p. 101

¹⁹ Quah, op. cit., 1996, pp. 64-65

²⁰ Raj Vasil, *Governing Singapore*, Singapore, Times International, 1988, p. 127

²¹ Vasil, *ibid.*, p. 126

Central to the PAP thinking on the role of government was its view that the compulsions of economic progress and ethnic harmony in multi-racial developing societies made it imperative that the government controlled all instruments and centres of power. ...The civil service, trade unions, organisations of ethnic segments and trade and industry, all had to be totally subordinated to the government.²²

The development of an effective, efficient and technically superior public sector has been a major goal of the PAP since it took office. Following independence, the need to have a civil service which could identify with and support its political program and provide the best possible public management and in particular, the need to have the best minds available in the civil service's elite administrative corps, the Administrative Service, has received even greater emphasis.

This was initially a formidable task. The civil service which the PAP inherited was still recovering from the localisation program, it was 'inexperienced and over-strained'²³ and many of its leaders were hostile towards and afraid of the PAP.²⁴ On assuming office, the PAP implemented a number of structural, procedural and cultural reforms within the civil service were aimed at producing a civil service which would work with the government and be obedient to it in carrying out its program. The reforms included:

1. Establishment of a Political Study Centre to politically re-educate civil servants to the PAP's view of the national situation and to bring their attitudes in line with the government's;²⁵
2. Political socialisation of the civil service to re-orient them as servants of the people through such activities as week-end mass participation of civil servants in civic projects;
3. Introduction of a results oriented culture strongly linked to the government's policy goals;
4. Creation of several new ministries to facilitate the government's policy program;²⁶
5. Rationalisation of statutory boards and creation of new boards to allow rapid implementation of policies without bureaucratic hindrance by freeing boards of many civil service accountability and procedural constraints;

²²Vasil, op. cit., p. 123-124

²³ Seah Chee Meow, "The Singapore Bureaucracy and Issues of Transition", *Occasional Paper Series*, No. 12, Department of Political Science, University of Singapore, February 1975, p. 7

²⁴ Jon S. T. Quah, *Administrative Reform and Development Administration in Singapore: A Comparative Study of the Singapore Improvement Trust and the Housing and Development Board*, Ph.D. thesis, Florida State University, 1975, p. 325

²⁵ The PAP did not accept that the colonial service had been neutral, but was an instrument of colonial rule. Therefore its re-education program could be justified as necessary to eradicate the colonial mindset seen as prevalent in the civil service. Seah, op. cit., 1975, p. 8

²⁶ At this time, the Civil Service comprised nine ministries and five statutory boards. See: Teo, op. cit., 1985, p. 311

6. Reduction of public sector salaries through withdrawal of the variable allowances, part of the salary package, although this was later reversed;
7. Recruitment to the civil service of Chinese-educated graduates to balance the predominance of the English educated;
8. Selectively retaining competent older civil servants beyond retirement age and retiring incompetent civil servants below retirement age in association with recruitment to senior positions based on ability and merit instead of seniority;
9. Introduction of a harsher disciplinary regime for civil servants breaking regulations.²⁷

To explain the PAP's program and to ensure that civil servants understood what the PAP government would attempt to achieve, The new prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, visited every government department personally, so that civil servants could both hear his views directly and question him about the new government.²⁸

Building on the political success it had experienced through the use of community centres operated by the People's Association, the PAP also began to use them as a conduit for complaints about the civil service and the implementation of various policies. In addition, a Central Complaints Bureau was established in 1961 to receive complaints about bureaucratic misbehaviour.²⁹

The PAP government clearly saw the civil service as an arm of the executive - it was to be a partner with the government in delivery policy to the electorate. In opening the Political Study Centre in August 1959, Lee Kuan Yew commented:

... at the end of your course in this Study Centre, if you do not share our impatience, you will at least understand it. You will at least appreciate why we consider it so vital, if the democratic state is to survive, for the machinery to be in tune with the temper of the people and the tempo of political change in the rest of Asia. ... It is in our interest to show that there can be an honest and efficient government which works through an efficient administration in the interests of the people.³⁰

The PAP wanted a committed, politically aligned service which could work closely with ministers to achieve policy goals. Whether there was a cultural mindset that "he who is not with me is against me", or whether this attitude was driven by the simple

²⁷ Quah, op. cit., 1975, pp. 345-346; S. C. Meow, "Bureaucratic Evolution and Political Change in an Emergent Nation: A Case Study of Singapore, Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University of Manchester, 1971, pp. 86-89; Jon S. T. Quah, "Public Bureaucracy, Social Change and National Development", in, Peter S. J. Chen, ed., *Singapore Development Policies and Trends*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 197-224

²⁸ Chan Heng Chee, "Political Development, 1965-1979", in Ernest C. T. Chew and Edwin Lee, eds., *A History of Singapore*. Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 162

²⁹ L. B. Hiok, "Personnel Relations in the Public Services of Singapore", in A. Rakasataya and H. Siedentopf, eds., *Asian Civil Service Technical Papers*, 8. Kuala Lumpur, Asian and Pacific Development Administration Centre, 1980, pp. 91-145p. 105

practicality of policy demands is difficult to say. In addition it wanted a service in which selection and promotion was based, within the broad concept of alignment to the government's policies, on merit and which had the technical capacity to develop and implement policies.³¹

To achieve a politically aligned service staffed by bright young officers, the government began attracting bright graduates through a scholarship scheme and providing them with challenging and rewarding work, especially in the Administrative Service. This new elite were to work with ministers and the government as partners - they were to share the tasks of policy formulation as well as implementation, so that all the best resources of the nation could be brought to bear on the task of nation building. Lee Kuan Yew made this approach abundantly clear in telling senior public servants:

We the elected Ministers have to work through you and with you to translate our plans and policies into reality. You should give of your best in the service of our people.³²

Once the new government started to work with the civil service on a daily basis, a good relationship between the two was quickly established. The pragmatism and incorruptibility of the new government impressed the service as a whole. In turn, the initial hostility of the PAP to the Civil Service quickly passed as they realised that the vast majority of civil servants could easily identify with their policy goals and were generally willing to surrender the doctrine and practices of political neutrality. With the departure of the senior civil servants who were vehemently opposed to the PAP, the PAP's reinstatement of salary cuts, its implementation of procedural and structural reforms and its obvious incorruptibility and nationalism, the relationship between the PAP government and the civil service became positive.³³

Particularly as a result of the policy and political challenges the PAP faced in the early 1960's in its struggle with the Barisan Socialis, this relationship, in a relatively short period, became more than symbiotic; it became conjugal.³⁴ In this struggle, as has been previously discussed, the civil service was a strong and willing instrument in the

³⁰ Alex Jossey. *Lee Kuan Yew*, Singapore, Donald Moore Press, 1968, pp. 111-112

³¹ Lee Kuan Yew noted: "I am in favour of an efficient service. The bright chap goes up and I don't care how many years he's been or hasn't been in. If he's the best man for the job, put him there." See: Meow, op. cit., 1971, p. 88

³² Cited in: Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grassroots*, Singapore, University of Singapore Press, 1974, p. 22

³³ Seah, op. cit., 1975, pp. 7-13

³⁴ The civil service-PAP relationship is often described as symbiotic. However, all public bureaucracies have a symbiotic relationship with their controlling political institutions if one uses this biological metaphor - each is dependent on the other for certain essential functions. A more accurate description in the Singapore case uses the mathematical term "conjugal" whether from optics or geometry. If one takes a geometrical meaning, two points are conjugal if they are so related as to be interchangeable in the enunciation of certain properties. So too, in many ways, is the senior civil service in Singapore interchangeable with the political executive in relation to certain activities.

hands of the PAP in its defeat of the Barisan and its relationship with the government developed such that; "... today is totally committed to the PAP government and regards it as a national government, a custodian of the nation's interests."³⁵

This realignment of the Civil Service with the PAP, has been largely attributed to the political re-education conducted by the Political Study Centre³⁶ and the incorporation of this attitudinal 'training' within the public sector culture.³⁷ This has been credited with being the principal reason for the public service being able to design and implement policies quickly and efficiently.³⁸ In Singapore, a professional civil service works in partnership with a professional political service, both of which are based on recruitment of an intellectual and managerial elite. In many ways, the political leadership and the civil service leadership comprise the same types of people, with the obvious exception that there are many more senior women in the civil service than in the political stream. In return for its support, the government has developed the civil service as a national institution, provided it with excellent salaries, conditions, training, professional infrastructure and high social prestige. The distinction between the two parts of the executive government became, in many parts, blurred. Under successive Lee Kuan Yew governments, particularly as the first generation leaders retired and more civil servants entered politics, some civil servants became more influential than some ministers, or at least as influential. One indicator of this is that Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister had a habit of dealing directly with Permanent Secretaries on both administrative and policy issues, would write memos and telephone them rather than go through the relevant minister,³⁹ a habit which has not even now been entirely curbed.⁴⁰ The development of this conjugal relationship has been explained by S. Rajaratnam:

We moved up people very quickly on the basis of merit. Furthermore, we involved them in something far more challenging and satisfying than just being a civil servant - building houses, roads, keep the city clean. They were being stretched. It did not take long before we established a close link between us and the civil service. In fact, after the first two elections, the PAP became really an administration. It was no longer a party. And the civil service became a part of that.⁴¹

³⁵ Vasil, op. cit., p. 133

³⁶ Jon S. T. Quah, "Public Bureaucracy, Social Change and National Development", in, Peter S. J. Chen, ed., *Singapore Development Policies and Trends*. Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 197-224, p. 201

³⁷ Jon S. T. Quah, "Administrative reform: Singapore Style", *International Review of Administrative Science*, 57, 1991, pp. 85-100, p. 98

³⁸ In 1986, it was noted that civil servants "... were politicised to align their interests with those of the PAP and such success has enabled speedy and efficient implementation of many policies." See: "Replacing Top Officials May Upset Stability, Says Report", *Business Times*, 11 September 1986

³⁹ Interview with Dr. Hiew Siew Nam, former Director, Public Works Department, 1995

⁴⁰ Confirmed in several interviews with civil service officers.

⁴¹ Vasil, op. cit., p. 134

MAJOR FEATURES OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 1959-98

Although a distinctly Singaporean bureaucracy has emerged since 1959, the trends in public sector development have taken place within a public management framework that in many ways has not changed since the end of the colonial administration, particularly in the way that the political and public sector leadership is integrated. A colonial model has simply been adapted and modernised, changed in appearance but not substance, to suit the framework of independence. However, a number of major trends can be identified as characterising the development of the Singaporean public sector:

1. The development of an hexadical public sector comprising: (1) the Singapore Civil Service (SCS), (2) statutory boards, (3) government linked corporations (GLCs), (4) quasi-autonomous agencies, (5) the Singapore Armed Forces and, (6) quasi-institutional bodies.
2. Development of the elite Administrative Service so as to recruit and retain officers within this service as a key part of the core executive.
3. The introduction of a generic strategic planning framework for the public sector to assist in policy planning and governance;
4. Introduction of information technology and the development of a high capacity public service communications and information system, through which public sector business processes have been redesigned and, more strategically, advanced surveillance capabilities developed;
5. Strengthening of anti-corruption mechanisms and the anti-corruption regime;
6. Adoption of a policy learning framework in policy development and implementation;
7. Introduction of contemporary management and business methods including the introduction of reforms in human resource management (HRM), productivity, information technology, financial administration, strategic and corporate planning and the structure of the public sector through commercialisation, corporatisation and outsourcing; and
8. Introduction of a comprehensive public sector reform program through PS21.

While all of these features are important and play key roles in defining how the public sector operates as part of the governance system, for the purposes of this study only the first four will be examined as they are the areas which have been given most attention by the contemporary political executive in responding to social and political pressures over the past 10 years.

An Hexadical Public Sector

Under the colonial administration a bifurcated system of government ministries and

statutory boards had already developed in Singapore, derived from the British domestic model of public administration. Ministries were essentially policy bodies with some program management functions, while boards were responsible for the administration of particular enterprises such as ports, hospitals, airports and utilities. Under successive PAP administrations, the executive functions of government were increasingly transferred to boards, new boards created, a third public sector group, government linked corporations (GLCs)⁴² established and the Singapore Armed Forces established. In addition, two other categories of organisations have been developed. The first are largely publicly funded and indirectly controlled organisations, ostensibly independent, which act as peripheral policy boards. The number in this category is small; the Institute of Policy Studies, the Singapore International Foundation and the Institute of International Affairs. The second category consists of quasi-institutional bodies created by cabinet directive and largely secretive in their functions. Most of these bodies are unknown by the general Singaporean public and some, such as the Defence Council, are supposed to be state secrets. This group includes the Defence Council,⁴³ the Security and Intelligence Committee, the Coordinating Board, the Consultancy and Directorships Appointments Council and could arguably include the Committee on Technical and Professional Education which has overseen education and manpower policies for more than 20 years. In this study, it is inappropriate to include an analysis of the development of the SAF and so the major focus will be on ministries, boards and GLCs. The other two types of public sector bodies will be considered as appropriate.

In developing the public sector over the past 40 years, the PAP government has not generally been guided by contemporary public management theory (except where it served higher purposes), but by the principles which have already been noted as comprising its style of governance; maintaining political control, politicisation of the public sector leadership, integration of all ministries, boards, GLCs and other public sector organisations within the hegemonic framework through corporatist and other structures and establishing organisations to replace civil society functions which have been purposefully weakened. This has been achieved through a variety of strategies; restructuring ministries, creating new ministries, boards and GLCs, and the commercialisation, corporatisation or outsourcing of public sector functions or operations. Control of entities outside the civil service has been maintained by their senior management and boards being appointed under the oversight of either the Coordinating Board, chaired by the prime minister, or the Consultancy and Directorships Appointment Council (CDAC).

⁴² Until recently called Government Linked Companies, but since 1996 the term Government Linked Corporations has been used.

⁴³ Also called the Council on Defence (COD).

For the purpose of brevity, it is perhaps illustrative to take an example from the economic policy sector, the evolution of the EDB, to demonstrate the way in which the three core parts of the public sector, ministries, boards and GLCs have developed. Executive program management has been achieved through two forms; statutory boards and GLCs. Boards were used to provide greater administrative flexibility unhindered by civil service regulations and practices⁴⁴, while still having a rigorous accountability framework⁴⁵ while GLCs provided even greater freedom for government action as they were incorporated as private companies and therefore had to provide information only to the political executive as the shareholder.

The EDB: Incubator of Public Sector Complexity

The EDB was established by the inclusion of the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister's Office and the Economic Development Division in the Ministry of Finance with the Singapore Industrial Promotion Board in 1961 as a 'one-stop shop' for industrial development. Although it was ostensibly an industrial promotion agency, Singapore was so dependent upon this single economic strategy that the responsibilities of the EDB grew until it was involved in almost every aspect of economic policy except for some aspects of macro-economic policy still retained by the Ministry of Finance and the political executive, particularly the Prime Minister's Office.

This resulted, early in its history in a cycle of acquiring and divesting itself of particular functions so that it could continue to focus on its core business. However, the history of the EDB indicates that it followed a two pronged core business strategy until approximately 1986; its 'inner core of industrial development' and its 'outer core' or incubator for associated functions that required nurturing and development until they could be turned over to another organisation – whether by design or accident – usually by corporatisation of the EDB function.

In 1968, in response to recommendations in a review conducted by Dr. Albert Winsemius, the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS), a GLC, was created from the EDB's Finance Division and the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC), a statutory board, was created from the Industrial Facilities Division so as to refocus the EDB on investment promotion. A GLC trading company, the International Trading Company (INTRACO) was also established in 1968 by the privatisation of the EDB's Export Promotion Centre to facilitate the sale of Singaporean manufactured products,

⁴⁴ Seah, op. cit., 1987, p. 104

⁴⁵ Linda Low, *The Political Economy of Privatisation in Singapore: Analysis, Interpretation and Evaluation*, Singapore, McGraw Hill, 1991, p. 73

particularly to the communist centrally planned economies. Earlier in 1962 it had already established its first GLC, the National Iron and Steel Mills which still operates as the NatSteel Group, a transnational GLC based in Singapore.

From 1963 to 1968, the EDB had promoted technical education as a necessary adjunct to industrial development and in 1968 transferred a director, Lim Ho Hup, to the Ministry of Education (MOE) to head its Technical Education Department (TED) and direct further development in this area, while retaining control of the central policy committee, the Committee on Technical and Professional Education (CTPE), within the EDB. The CTPE was transferred to the Ministry of Trade and Industry on its establishment in 1979. Under this arrangement, the policy responsibilities for technical education remained substantially within EDB, but were shared with MOE. However, in 1973, the TED was itself replaced by the Industrial Training Board (ITB) and in 1979 this was merged with the Adult Education Board to form the Vocational and Industrial Training Board (VITB). The VITB board included representation from the MOE, EDB, NPB, HDB, the NTUC and the private sector, with its principal policy inputs coming from EDB, MOE and NPB. In 1992, the VITB was replaced by the Institute of Technical Education (ITE) with a board of similar composition to the VITB and the same policy framework. In November 1964, the Management Development Unit of the EDB had already been transferred to the Singapore Institute of Management (SIM) which in 1998 is being prepared to become the Singapore Management University.⁴⁶ The EDB was thus began a number of technical education initiatives, nurtured and corporatised them, but retained policy and program input to them as it moved increasingly from an in-house to a networked policy management system.

Industrial standards and productivity were also originally core EDB responsibilities. The Engineering Industry Development Agency (EIDA) and the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research (SISIR), which replaced the Technical Consultant Services Division of the EDB, were established in 1972 and provided with independent boards of management, but still under the control of the EDB. In 1973 the SISIR was established as an independent board and the EIDA commercialised. Previously, in 1972, the National Productivity Centre within EDB which had its roots in an agreement among the NTUC, the Singapore Association of Manufacturers (SMA) and the Singapore National Employers Federation (SNEF) in January 1965 and was jointly managed by these groups and the EDB, had been corporatised as the National Productivity Board independent of EDB under the Ministry of Labour. Also in 1972, the secretariat of the National Wages Council was formed within EDB, thus giving it a direct role in industrial relations and wages policy.

⁴⁶ SIM was initially funded by the Ford Foundation with a \$300,000 grant and donations from the EDB and local corporations but staffed with EDB officers as well as others from government and the private sector.

In 1979, the general economic policy functions of the Ministry of Finance were transferred to a new Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) under which the boards responsible for economic development programs were eventually gathered; the EDB in 1979, the TDB in 1982, the NPB and SISIR in 1986, SISIR (and the amalgamation of these two, the National Productivity and Standards Board – NPSB – in 1996) the Public Utilities Board (PUB) in , the JTC in , the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board (now the Singapore Tourism Board – STB) in , and the National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) in 1991.

In 1979, the Skills Development Fund was established to fund industrial training for the employed and unemployed to promote the development of a higher skilled technical workforce. The secretariat for the SDF was established within the EDB until it was transferred to the NPB in 1986. The trade programs of the EDB, together with most functions of the Department of Trade within the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) were combined to form the Trade Development Board in 1982. In 1988 the TDB began establishing its own GLC family through a holding company known as TDB Holdings Pte Ltd.⁴⁷

Science and technology policy and program management is another area which the EDB eventually divested itself of. The EDB's Research and Development Assistance Scheme (RDAS), established in 1981 and administered by the Science Council, was the core of the new National Science and Technology Board's (NSTB) activities when it was created from the Science Council in 1991. Under the NSTB, RDAS was transformed into the National Technology Plan and funding increased to \$2 billion in order to promote the rapid development of a high technology economic sector.

Through this plan the NSTB created a number of national research centres which are, in effect, boards at a lower level than the major statutory boards. These research institutes and centres are affiliated with a university and, in some cases, also with GLCs, private companies and the NCB.⁴⁸ The NSTB, in addition to being a program management agency also seems to have a science and technology policy advisory function, which was substantially missing after the abolition of the Ministry of Science and Technology in 1981, although the Science Council, the EDB and the Ministry of

⁴⁷ TDB Holdings has at least five subsidiaries: Singapore Kokubu Corporation, Iwataya-Singapore Trading Company Ltd., S*port (Japan) Ltd., International Merchandise Mart, and Singapore Showcase. See: Lee Tsao Yuan, "Economic Restructuring Policies in the 1980s", in Linda Low and Toh Mun Heng, *Public Policies in Singapore: Changes in the 1980s and Future Signposts*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1992, pp. 30-54, p. 38

⁴⁸ These include the Gintec Institute of Manufacturing Technology, the Kent Ridge Digital Labs (in association with NUS), the Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology and the National Supercomputing Research Centre, among others. The other research institutes and centres created under the NSTB are: Institute of Microelectronics, Institute of Molecular Agrobiolgy, Bioprocessing Technology Centre, Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing, Centre for Wireless Communication, and the Magnetics Technology Centre. In 1998, the Institute of Systems

Communications all fulfilled this function to some degree with selected input from the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF).⁴⁹

Following the report of the Economic Committee in 1985, an Economic Planning Committee (EPC) was established in December 1989 with the task of building on the recommendations of that report and developing a national Strategic Economic Plan (SEP).⁵⁰ While the overall policy responsibilities for the SEP were delegated to MTI, the policy ministry, the secretariat for the EPC resided in the EDB.⁵¹ This indicates that the policy/program management divide is not always clear between MTI and the EDB. For example, in the resolutions adopted from its 1991 Strategic Planning Meeting, the EDB has accepted the task of making Singapore a developed nation by the year 2020. This reflects the responsibilities placed on the EDB by the SEP. For example, of the 14 industry clusters identified in the plan, the EDB is the lead agency for the development of six. This would imply the development and implementation of a range of social and economic policies beyond the brief of industrial and service industry development, an ambit claim that seems to have been accepted by government, within the context of the EDB working as part of a team of boards and ministries to achieve this goal as both a policy initiator and program manager. Thus, from 1986, the specialist policy and program infrastructure had developed to such a stage that the EDB's operational strategy began to focus on a policy networking approach rather than in-house management of the economic development policy agenda.⁵² This growth of other economic policy agencies has also been credited with moving the EDB and other economic policy actors in recent years into relationships based more on technocratic affiliations than the personal affiliations more common in the 1960s and 1970s.⁵³

Development of the Administrative Service

The Administrative service is the 'premier service' in the Civil Service, based on and developed from the colonial Administrative Service (AS). It has been known as the 'mandarinate' and its officers designated as the 'heavenborn'.⁵⁴ The Prime Minister has defined the Administrative Service as "... the apex of the Civil Service pyramid. Its job

Science and the Information Technology institute were amalgamated to form Kent Ridge Digital Labs in association with NUS.

⁴⁹ Interview with Vijaykumar Mehta, Chief Executive NSTB, 1995.

⁵⁰ The Economic Planning Committee, *The Strategic Economic Plan: Towards a Developed Nation*, Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1991

⁵¹ Linda Low, "The Economic Development Board", in Linda Low et al., eds., *Challenge and Response: Thirty Years of the Economic Development Board*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1993, pp. 61-120, p. 106

⁵² Economic Development Board, *Economic Development Board Yearbook 1988/98*, Singapore, Economic Development Board, 1989, p. 19

⁵³ Linda Low, "Conclusion", in Linda Low et al., *Challenge and Response: Thirty Years of the Economic Development Board*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1993, p. 327

⁵⁴ Thomas J. Bellows, "Bureaucracy and Development in Singapore", *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, 7, 1, June 1985, p. 61

is to help the political leadership spot trends, meet needs, maintain standards, and formulate and implement policies for the security and success of the country."⁵⁵ Yet this elite, except for several high profile Permanent Secretaries and Board CEOs is virtually unknown by the public:

"... Administrative Officers are often in the background, assisting the Ministers in policy formulation, fine-tuning policies for execution and seeing through their implementation. Administrative Officers form the interface between the political leadership and the machinery of government. Filling many key positions in the public sector. (they) play a vital role in the development of the country, yet very often what you do is away from the public eye. ... the nature of an Administrative Officer's job is not easily defined and his contributions are less apparent."⁵⁶

As the cabinet rules the legislature, the Administrative Service rules the public sector. It has two components; the Administrative Service and the Administrative Service (Foreign Service), the latter limited to officers serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is the career stream for the elite management group; recruitment is purposely elitist, the career structure stresses early and increasing administrative, policy and political responsibility with officers working closely with ministers and the government. The top management of the public service is dominated by the Administrative Service; all permanent secretaries, deputy secretaries and chief executives of boards are members of the AS.⁵⁷ It is from the AS that the civil service partners of the political/bureaucratic team are predominantly drawn; they are policy makers as well as policy implementers. The AS is a small service, never having had more than 300 officers. By the late 1980s, because of both its small size and elitist composition, the government was experiencing difficulties with the AS principally due to the large numbers of officers that were leaving the AS for the private sector. This loss of officers was supposedly as a result of salary and benefits being better in the private sector, but in many cases it was reported that officers were disenchanted with the political system and the nature of their work with ministers.⁵⁸

In response to this, the government instituted a number of initiatives to enhance the size, attractiveness, career and remuneration prospects of the AS:

1. Creation of a Corps of Senior Administrators (CSA);⁵⁹
2. Changes in personnel management in the AS, including staff appraisal, training

⁵⁵ *Administrative Service*. Available at: http://www.gov.sg/pmo/adminsvc/service_content.html

⁵⁶ Finance Minister Dr. Richard Hu Tsu Tau, "Recognising the contribution of Administrative Officers", *Speeches: A Bimonthly Selection of Ministerial speeches*, 16, 4, July-August 1992, pp. 54-57, pp. 54-55

⁵⁷ *Straits Times*, 2 March 1996, p. 12

⁵⁸ These concerns were acknowledged in interviews with present and former Administrative Officers.

⁵⁹ Announced by the prime minister in his address to the Administrative Service annual dinner dance in 1991. See: "Corps team to take on top government jobs", *Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 16 July 1991, p. 24

- and development and remuneration;
3. Increasing the annual intake to the AS;
 4. Introduction of the dual career scheme;
 5. Creating the rank of Permanent Secretary as a rank as well as an office;
 6. Improving training and career development opportunities;
 7. Attaching younger officers to grassroots organisations to provide political and policy orientation.

The Corps of Senior Administrators (CAS) was created in July 1990 in order to 'harness the best talent in the public sector'⁶⁰ and was apparently supposed to be secret.⁶¹ The CAS included officers in the AS, but also senior officers in the Professional Services (such as the Accounting Service and the Legal Service), the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) at colonel rank and above, statutory boards and even government linked companies. The CAS did not replace the existing separate services, but was supposed to integrate their best talent into a coordinated and supervised pool of the public sector's best management and policy talent.⁶² The creation of the CAS was supposed to add up to an additional 50 officers to the top pool of public sector managers, taking it from 242 in 1991 to approximately 300, thus overcoming the problem of declining recruitment to the AS⁶³ as well as providing a mechanism by which senior administrators can be moved throughout the public sector while retaining their original substantive position. It was not possible to get details of the composition and numbers in the CAS in 1998 as PMO officers advised that the CAS scheme had been discontinued.⁶⁴ If the scheme has been discontinued, it is most probably because GLCs and statutory boards resisted the incorporation of their senior management into the CSA. These officers could not have been compelled to serve in the civil service; many, if not most, would have responded by moving to the private sector. It is most probable that the CSA ceased in 1994 when the Dual Career Scheme was extended to include the

⁶⁰ *Straits Times*, 6 July 1991, p. 17

⁶¹ Interview with Lim Soo Hoon, Deputy Secretary PMO September 1998. Why an organisation of senior public sector officers should be secret, especially in a nation as small and prone to rumour as Singapore, beggars the imagination. However, this is indicative of the common mindset among the political and public sector leadership; that because of their policy performance they are essentially unaccountable except in the most shallow of ways and they have a right to keep the core of the public policy and control system secret. It is commonly thought by this group that independent external scrutiny of such 'honourable officials' would waste time and resources and achieve nothing; competition is only good in certain circumstances, not in the realm of ideas.

⁶² Oversight of the Corps was provided by a Supervisory Committee comprising two Deputy Chairmen of the PSC, two Permanent Secretaries and two chief executives of statutory boards and was chaired by the Chairman of the PSC, all of whom were current or previous members of the AS. In 1991 this included Lee Hee Seng, PSC chairman, Dr. Wong Heck Sing and Dr. Cheong Siew Keong, PSC deputy chairmen, Dr. Andrew Chew, Lim Siong Guan and J. Y. Pillay. It included only one statutory board head, Pillay, who also represented the GLCs as chairman of Singapore International Airlines. See: "Corps team to take on top government jobs", *Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 16 July 1991, p. 24. In 1998, it is believed to include; Lee Hee Seng and Dr. Cheong Siew Keong from the PSC, Lim Siong Guan, Eddie Teo both permanent secretaries, Ho Meng Kit, managing director of the EDB, Lim Chin Beng from Singapore Technologies Aerospace and Peter Ho Hak Ean, Permanent Secretary (Defence Development) in MINDEF.

⁶³ Interview with PMO (PSD) officer 1995.

AS, as another attempt to boost recruitment.

In association with the November 1994 AS recruitment exercise, the Dual Career Scheme was extended to the AS from other services in which it had been operating since 1982. The original scheme had been aimed at facilitating the transfer of Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) officers to the civil service and boards for two year secondments or in preparation for post-SAF retirement postings.⁶⁵ It was now extended to encourage officers from other services to enter the Administrative Service and, in particular, SAF officers of Lt. Colonel rank and above.⁶⁶ Following an application for admission to the AS, these officers are rigorously screened through a review of their annual appraisals and through interviews with the Permanent Secretary PMO, and members of the PSC board. Once admitted, officers continue to work in their current positions until a suitable vacancy in the Administrative Service is available. Whether filling an AS position or not, these officers are treated otherwise as part of the AS through participation in training and the AS social activities (e.g. the Alpha Society), by having a permanent secretary as a mentor and by receiving the AS additional one month salary. The Dual Career Scheme is supposed to provide a reservoir of talent for the AS, freeing up existing officers to move beyond the Civil Service as required into boards, GLCs and quasi-government positions, thus providing much needed flexibility in the use of these elite officers. In the first intake of Dual Career Officers in 1995, 26 officers were selected, although whether they were eventually admitted to the AS is unknown.⁶⁷

In 1996, a policy complementary to the Dual Career Scheme was introduced to accept applicants to the AS from mid-career private sector executives. Although the stated rationale was that "Such an inward flow will help the Civil Service stay continuously attuned to outside trends and private sector needs,"⁶⁸ it is generally believed that the policy had the same basis as the Dual Career Scheme - to increase AS numbers, to provide a greater reservoir of talent and to free-up the more senior AS officers so that they could be used more flexibly for priority policy tasks. This initiative received a positive response of 700 applications. However only two appointments were made.

⁶⁴ The list of CSA officers maintained by the PMO/PSD is apparently supposed to be secret. See: Bertha Henson, "Testing time for Mandarins", *The Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 20 July 1991, pp. 14-15, p. 15

⁶⁵ "Who Wields the Real Power", *Singapore Business*, November 1990, p. 52

⁶⁶ In three interviews I asked about the large number of SAF officers at Lt. Colonel and Colonel rank who seem to leave the SAF annually, as indicated through data analyses of SAF appointees to boards and public service committees. All three respondents stated that while there are large numbers of SAF positions up to the rank of major, from that rank onwards (i.e. Lt. Colonel), the number decreased dramatically and there were simply not enough positions to which to promote officers. This is a purposeful strategy by the government to attract large numbers of university educated officers onto a dual public sector career, first in the SAF followed by a second career in the public sector bureaucracies or in a GLC. The Ministry of Defence refused all requests for meetings, so this could not be officially confirmed.

⁶⁷ *Straits Times*, 9 March 1995, p. 10

⁶⁸ As stated by the Deputy Prime Minister BG. Lee Hsien Loong. *Straits Times*, 1 April 1997, p. 2

This initiative was supplemented by a proposal to attach AS officers to private sector companies so that they could gain experience of the private sector both in Singapore and abroad,⁶⁹ to provide overseas experience so that officers can see Singapore in an international context, better understand the global business environment and the international political environment.⁷⁰ In 1998, the PMO advised that no AS officers were seconded under this scheme.

Major changes were made to the conditions of service in the AS in late 1994, particularly in regard to recruitment, retention, promotion and remuneration. Recruitment standards were raised to include both higher educational standards and the specification of person abilities which would indicate high potential. For those serving AS officers, only those with the Currently Estimated Potential (CEP) to reach Superscale E grade or higher (i.e. Deputy Secretary level) were to be retained in the AS. Those failing to reach this CEP would be counselled on other options within the Civil Service or were allowed to retire from the service. For those officers reaching this CEP, their remuneration was increased by the payment of an additional one month's salary. In addition to these changes, the rate of promotion in the service has also been increased, so that officers will reach senior positions and high remuneration levels relatively quickly. The benchmark for rate of promotion in the AS was set at officers achieving Superscale G by the age of 32 years.⁷¹ The impact of these changes on introduction in 1994 was the assessment of 30 AS officers as having an inadequate CEP and they subsequently left the service.⁷² In fact, research indicates that remuneration levels which are competitive with the private sector by and of themselves are insufficient to retain officers in the Administrative Service and that job satisfaction, motivation and loyalty are also important factors.⁷³ This obviously reflect the quality of the relationship between the AS and the political executive.

In association with these changes to personnel management, the remuneration and promotional structure for the AS was also revised in 1994. The major aspects of these reforms were provided for in amendments made to the Constitution in March 1994 and consequent administrative action by the government and included; salary

⁶⁹ Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Tony Tan, *Straits Times*, 29 March 1996, p. 1

⁷⁰ *Straits Times*, 29 March 1996, p. 2

⁷¹ This provide a 32 year old officer after approximately 7 years service with an annual salary of \$162,200 per annum exclusive of bonuses but including the AS one month additional salary. In addition officers receive an employer paid contribution to their CPF account of \$33,440. Thus total remuneration at this level is approximately \$194,640

⁷² *Straits Times*, 21 November 1994, p. 2

⁷³ Matthew Lee Khai Wah, *Competing for the Best and Brightest: The Strategic Use of Compensation in the Singapore Administrative Service*, honours thesis, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 1995; Modh Aminuddin Bin Buang, *Attracting and Retaining Personnel in the Administrative Service*, honours thesis, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 1991

increases on the same scale as for political office holders,⁷⁴ the creation of permanent secretary positions as a rank as well as a dedicated position, the introduction of additional bonuses,⁷⁵ and the annual intake to the Administrative Service was raised from approximately 12 to 30 in late 1994, including an allowance for 15 additional officers from the Dual Career Scheme.⁷⁶

Training and career development opportunities for Administrative Officers were also expanded. It was apparent that younger AOs required greater training in policy development and a support structure so that the policy knowledge of more experienced AOs could be shared with new and younger recruits - the old approach of development through a "baptism of fire" was becoming inadequate.⁷⁷ After studying European and Asian institutions, a study team recommended that a Civil Service College be established.⁷⁸ In 1992 the Minister for Finance, Dr. Richard Hu Tsu Tau announced the government's decision to establish the Civil Service College for "... developing senior officers in policy and strategic planning as well as in managerial and leadership skills. ... the College will also aim at building *esprit de corps* of top civil servants, imbuing in them a strong sense of public service and inculcating a practical approach to public administration"⁷⁹ The college functions also to socialise and acculturalise new entrants to the AS and, partly to this end, a number of core courses are compulsory for confirmation and promotion.⁸⁰ Initially this compulsion was resisted by some AOs on the basis of job-demand. However, the political support for the CSC was of such strength that the First Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, commanded the attendance of these officers.⁸¹ In 1997, the original CSC was renamed the Institute for Policy Development (IPD) within an expanded CSC. As with the Political Study Centre of the 1960s, certain ministers and top civil servants are key speakers at some CSC courses run by the IPD and one of its programs brings officers and ministers together in a casual setting for discussion.⁸² Since commencing operations in 1993, the CSC in association with the Alpha Society, the Administrative Service's social club, have been key institutions in building *esprit de corps*,

⁷⁴ See statement by the prime minister, Goh Chock Tong in: *Parliamentary Debates Singapore, Official Report*, 63, 7, 31 October 1994, 646

⁷⁵ *Parliamentary Debates Singapore, Official Report*, 62, 16, 21 March 1994, 1431-1445

⁷⁶ *Straits Times*, 21 November 1994, p. 13

⁷⁷ Comments from an interview with Mr. Tan Boon Huat, Deputy Secretary (Policy), PMO(PSD), 1996. See: Tony Lai Ming Thung, *Administrative Training in the Singapore Civil Service: An evaluation*, honours thesis, Department of Political science, national University of Singapore, 1996, p. 33

⁷⁸ Interview with Deputy Dean, Civil Service College, 1995. The study team comprised Mr. Tan Boon Huat, PMO (PSD) and Madam Teo Hee Lian, then Director of the Civil Service Institute.

⁷⁹ Finance Minister Dr. Richard Hu Tsu Tau, "Recognising the contribution of Administrative Officers", *Speeches: A Bimonthly Selection of Ministerial Speeches*, 16, 4, July-August 1992, pp. 54-57, p. 56

⁸⁰ *Care (NS) Teo Chee Hean*, "The Establishment of the Civil Service College", *Speeches*, April-June 1994, 18, 2, pp.

⁸¹ Tony Lai Ming Thung, *Administrative Training in the Singapore Civil Service: An evaluation*, honours thesis, Department of Political science, national University of Singapore, 1996, p. 37

professionalism and personal networks in the Administrative Service the broader core executive.

In mid-1996 was the creation of the Community Immersion Scheme for AS officers which is aimed at providing them with direct experience of the impact of policy on ordinary citizens, their needs and problems as part of the political socialisation process within the AS. This scheme, jointly coordinated by the Prime Minister's Office (Public Service Division) and the People's Association, offers AS officers with two to three years experience a placement in a grassroots organisation for four months to one year. In addition to their placement, these officers attend meetings of Resident's Committees, Citizen's Consultative Committees and Community Centre Management Committees, accompany local MPs on constituency walk-about and meet-the-people sessions. Since 1996, approximately 10 officers are placed in the CIS each year.⁸³

These enhancements to the Administrative Service appear to have greatly improved the career structure for Administrative Officers. The job possibilities are such that:

All top public sector jobs, plus chairman, CEO and directorship positions of statutory boards, chairman and directorship positions in government-linked corporations, as well as ambassadorships, will, in principle, be open to assignment of Administrative Service officers.⁸⁴

However, there appears to have been a backlash against this obviously elitist program. In interviews with a number of civil servants, Lai reports that there is a perception that these changes within the AS are seen as "entrenching elitism" without providing some complementary enhancements to the other services within the SCS.⁸⁵ It also appears that despite the effort made to enhance the attractiveness of the Administrative Service, it has failed to attract greater numbers of recruits; the service had 242 officers in 1990 and only 247 in 1997.⁸⁶ In 1998, the PMO advised that there were "about 270" officers in the AS, but could only locate the appointment of 195 of them, raising doubts about the actual strength of the service and indicating a continuing failure to recruit the numbers required. In interviews, several Administrative Service officers ascribed this failure to the unwillingness of many new graduates to be involved in government, irregardless of issues such as remuneration. The one area which was identified as attracting new recruits was the Foreign Service. If this is correct, this means that the number of Administrative Service officers available for other ministries

⁸² *ibid.*, p. 36

⁸³ Data provided by the PMO/PSD, 1998.

⁸⁴ Lim Siong Guan, *op. cit.*, 1996, pp. 35-48, p. 43

⁸⁵ Tony Lai Ming Thung, *op. cit.*, p. 43. When questioned on this in 1998, the PMO was unable to provide information on this issue. It is most probable that accusations of elitism are meaningless to the AS and the political executive because the service is designed to be elitist.

⁸⁶ Data from Public Service Division PMO.

and boards is actually declining. This may be the major reason why the CSA framework is being used to bring SAF officers into positions formerly filled by Administrative Officers. This would indicate that recruitment to the public sector executive is in decline, a trend that will impact on the number and quality of the members of the core executive.

INTRODUCTION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY⁸⁷

The Singapore Civil Service has been an aggressive pioneer in the systemic use of information technology (IT) in its operations and is possibly the most computerised public service in the world – a factor of size as well as resources. This approach has been closely linked with the government's economic development strategy which is strongly oriented to developing the domestic capacity for IT innovation and design in both software and hardware across all aspects of IT from PC and telecommunications software to chip design and manufacturing. The Civil Service has been used as a 'stalking horse' for the implementation of IT in business and industry in Singapore, providing best practice cases of IT usage and concurrently developing a large number of technical personnel as a national IT resource, as many have moved from the Civil Service to the private sector to manage business IT implementation.

In addition to its economic development function, this program has also been promoted by MINDEF and the internal security agencies as an essential tool in political and social surveillance; a strategy which has allowed the core executive to adopt more open communications and other policies as the capacity of the information technology and telecommunications (IT&T) infrastructure has become greater and more sophisticated. This aspect of the development of the national IT&T infrastructure will be examined later in this study.

The systemic introduction of IT into the Civil Service began in September 1981 with the establishment of the National Computer Board (NCB) charged with promoting, implementing and guiding the development of information systems in the civil service⁸⁸ through the Civil Service Computerisation Programme (CSCP). The NCB came under the management of Philip Yeo Liat Kok who had earlier established the Systems and Computers Organisation in MINDEF.

⁸⁷ Much of this section is based on interviews with officers of the National Computer Board, Telecommunications Authority of Singapore, National Science and Technology Board, Singapore Telecommunications Academy, and professorial staff in science and engineering at the National University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological University in July-August 1995 and, in some cases, follow-up interviews in 1998.

⁸⁸ Jon S. T. Quah, "Sustaining Quality in the Singapore Civil Service", in Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management, ed., *Government in Transition*. London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995, pp. 147-157, p. 151

As the CSCP was implemented, it was supplemented by service-wide telecommunications and office automation systems as the need for these technologies for improving efficiency became apparent. On-line transactions with some ministries are now possible for such transactions as Work Permit applications for maids, child care registration and general information inquiries.⁸⁹ By 1996, the government had spent more than \$1 billion on IT and associated infrastructure and training and was continuing to spend approximately \$200 million per year on IT related initiatives,⁹⁰ with expenditure on desktop and notebook computers alone in 1997-98 amounting to approximately \$34 million.⁹¹

Since 1995, with the implementation of the second phase of the National Information Infrastructure (NII), a high capacity Civil Service Information Infrastructure (CSII) has been implemented. A new government central telecommunications centre was established on Sentosa, and the processing capacity of all ministries and boards was upgraded through the acquisition of high performance mainframe and distributed networks using a new optic fibre based telecommunications network. Some of this infrastructure is dedicated to the data analysis and planning strategies underlying the core executive's new approach to political strategy. New software standards were established so that ministries and boards could develop not only a compatible desktop applications environment, but also compatible central databases which would facilitate inter-agency data interchange, particularly for data on citizens, property and financial transactions.

A government intranet was also implemented in association with Lotus Notes. This provides email and document exchange facilities to all Division 1 and II officers and internet access to all Division I officers. The AS has its own intranet domain within the government information infrastructure, the Alpha domain and associated internal email system on Lotus Notes which is accessible by the political executive including ministers, but not by MPs. This contains details of the activities and publications of the Institute of Policy Development of the Civil Service College (the development body for Division I and AS officers), the AS in-house society, the Alpha Society and its newsletter, memoranda from the Head of Civil Service and the higher civil service management bodies. The Alpha domain also has its own closed email system with bulletin boards and discussion groups limited to AS officers, ministers and associated non-AS officers in the SAF, boards and other quasi-state bodies (e.g. NTUC) on a need to know basis. This is an important resource for the core executive in policy planning and political strategy development.

⁸⁹ *Straits Times*, 4 December 1996, p. 17

⁹⁰ *Business Times*, 29-30 June, 1996, p. 4

⁹¹ *Straits Times*, 19 January 1997, p. 3

ADOPTION OF STRATEGIC AND CORPORATE PLANNING

Under the present political executive, the use of various planning methodologies has become an important tool in the development of policies and political strategies. These tools are used in association with a number of sophisticated quantitative and qualitative approaches for the analysis of social, political, strategic and economic trends. These analyses are used by public sector agencies, but particularly by the political executive in identifying policy and political problems and developing appropriate responses.

Before 1991, the Singapore public sector, with the exceptions of MINDEF, MHA and the EDB, was not characterised by long-term strategic planning. Most ministries and boards had planning units and developed plans which reflected budget cycles and particular project cycles, such as the construction of Changi airport and the introduction of the MRT rail system.⁹² Before 1983⁹³ there is no indication of a concern for organisational strategic planning or for developing a planning infrastructure across the public sector. However, the push to do so would come from MINDEF with support from the EDB.

Planning had been a key function in MINDEF from its creation.⁹⁴ However it was to receive a boost after the appointment of Lim Siong Guan as Permanent Secretary in 1981. Lim, an engineer by training and with a keen intellect, has a passion for management, efficiency and productivity.⁹⁵ Under his leadership, strategic planning was restructured to use more contemporary methodologies and, most importantly, scenario planning, a technique pioneered and adopted from Royal Dutch Shell, was also introduced shortly after Lim arrived at MINDEF, possibly in 1983. In the EDB, strategic planning was introduced by Ngiam Tong Dow, following his appointment as chairman in 1975, but it was not an entrenched as a formal corporate function until

⁹² MTI, for example, used medium term planning for predicting and planning for human resource development through the Committee on Technical and Professional Education (CTPE), but this was not part of any national human resource planning integrated across those public agencies represented on Council on Technical and Professional Education (CTPE). Interview with Dr. Cham Tao Soon, President, Nanyang Technological Institute, January 1991

⁹³ By 1983 the Singapore Police Force had established a Contingency Planning Division and a Security Planning Division which were eventually transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs through several restructures. In 1988, the only ministries with explicit planning groups included the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of National Development (MEnv), the HDB, The Urban Redevelopment Authority, MTI had an economic planning group and the Jurong Town Corporation. Of this group, almost all had planning groups concerned with infrastructure development; only MFA and MTI had more general planning functions.

⁹⁴ Interview with former MINDEF officer, August 1998.

⁹⁵ Lim is reported to have used the defence sector GLCs in particular as models from which private sector planning and management practices were trialled and adopted in MINDEF and the SAF, if appropriate. As a member of many of the boards of these companies Lim both contributed to and learnt much from their adoption of management innovations. One example is the introduction of the Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP2), an early form of enterprise resource planning methodology to the Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS) group in 1982. "CIS scores top marks with planning concept", *Straits Times*, 3 November 1984, p. 16

1986 after Philip Yeo, the current chairman was appointed.⁹⁶

By 1991, the cabinet had several members who had experience of MINDEF's planning approach and were convinced of its applicability to the entire public sector; Goh Chok Tong, Lee Hsien Loong and Yeo Ning Hong. Goh Chok Tong, in particular was enthusiastic about using scenario planning as a major tool in policy and political strategy development. In 1991, scenario based planning was accepted as the major strategic planning tool for the public sector and, indeed, for national policy planning. In adopting this approach, the more traditional approaches of political risk analysis, econometric analysis, geopolitical and strategic analysis were not replaced or ignored. Rather they were incorporated into a long term forecasting strategy based on scenario planning, principally controlled by MINDEF. A Scenario Planning Unit was established in the Prime Minister's Office and the staff sent from training in this technique in Australia.⁹⁷

Although scenario planning began to be used in MINDEF in the late 1980s, it was reported that the first national scenarios were developed between 1992-93 and since then two scenario planning cycles have taken place; 1995-96 and the most recent cycle in 1998. The full scenarios are confidential to a group within the core executive comprising a select number of Administrative Service officers, SAF senior staff, GLC and board senior executives and ministers. These are developed within MINDEF by the Defence Planning Group with input from the SAF planning departments in the three services, the external intelligence service (the Security and Intelligence Division - SID), the internal security service (the Internal Security Department - ISD), commercial and other external data used in economic, social and political risk analyses as well as selected data from government ministries and the Department of Statistics.⁹⁸ Truncated scenarios are made public and provided to the press while more complete versions are provided to ministries, statutory authorities and GLCs for their planning purposes.⁹⁹ Usually four scenarios are developed, but it is not usual to release the most positive and the most negative outside the core executive; the two mid-range scenarios are usually released and discussed. For example, in 1998 the two scenarios released were termed "Home Divided" and "Hotel Singapore", the first focussing on social divisiveness based on income inequality, ethnicity and religion, the latter on a more positive socio-economic outcomes but with low national identity and loyalty by most

⁹⁶ Edgar H. Schein, *Strategic Pragmatism: The Culture of Singapore's Economic Development Board*, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, 1997, p. 106

⁹⁷ Interview with PMO staff, 1995

⁹⁸ This information was provided in confidential interviews. The scenario and defence planning system are classified processes.

⁹⁹ The scenario documentation provided to the public service by MINDEF is severely edited and is considered insecure documentation.

citizens.

Although the profile of this planning effort is very low in the public mind, it is at the centre of the core executive's medium to long-term policy planning strategy. This has been verified by Lim Siong Guan, Permanent Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office in 1998:

Scenario-based planning ... lies at the heart of anticipating change. Change is taking place in the world at a dizzying pace. ... The Public Service has decided to adopt the techniques of scenario-based planning. ... The idea is to test proposed plans and policies for attractiveness and robustness against each of these scenarios, and in that way to be better able to decide what would be the "best" way forward after taking into account the uncertainties of the future.¹⁰⁰

There was initially not great enthusiasm from most ministries for this approach, which is probably predictable for administrators who generally have scientific academic training, a preference for quantitative data and a suspicion of anything which seem 'soft' in planning terms.¹⁰¹ However, by 1995, it could be reported that acceptance was growing under pressure from the PMO and support from ministers.¹⁰² There seems to be continuing support from the political leadership for the scenario-based planning approach which is seen as having proven itself in the defence planning environment where it had been first used¹⁰³ – a touchstone for broader implementation. This is demonstrated by the inclusion of brief scenarios in the Strategic Economic Plan published in 1991¹⁰⁴ and the continued pressure on ministries, boards and GLCs by ministers and the PMO to use the PMO Scenario Planning Office's scenarios as part of strategic planning activities. In 1999, the subordinate courts were using the 1998 scenarios as a central part of their corporate and strategic planning.¹⁰⁵ Most ministries and boards now use a three year strategic planning cycle and a one year corporate/business planning cycle with varying degrees of sophistication among these organisations. Some, such as MINDEF, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the EDB, NCB TDB, STB and the subordinate courts¹⁰⁶ have highly structured planning process that use sophisticated tools such as Balanced Scorecard planning¹⁰⁷, value chain analysis, strategic partnerships and strategic conversations. The latter is a key term among Administrative Service officers and strategic conversation forms the framework for the consultation mechanisms characteristic of the core executive.

¹⁰⁰ Lim Siong Guan, "The Public Service", in, Yeo Lay Hwee, ed., *Singapore: The Year in Review 1995*, Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1996, pp. 35-48, p. 40

¹⁰¹ Interview with PMO staff, 1995

¹⁰² Lim Siong Guan, op. cit., p. 41

¹⁰³ It seems that scenario planning was first used in the Ministry of Defence from at least 1986.

¹⁰⁴ Economic Planning Committee, *The Strategic Economic Plan: Towards a Developed Nation*, Singapore, The Economic Planning Committee, 1991, pp. 30-37

¹⁰⁵ Yong Pung Howe, *Justice 21@ Subordinate Courts: Administering Justice in the Knowledge Society*, The Honourable Chief Justice's Keynote Address *The Subordinate Courts Workplan Saturday 10th April 1999, p. 11

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*

THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND THE CORE EXECUTIVE

As can be seen, the PAP political executive has developed much of its governance capability through aligning itself with the public sector executive and, over the course of the past 40 years, integrating that executive into its own ranks. There is no sense of a dichotomy between the two executives; merely a partial separation of functions. The public sector provides the executive agencies for the political executive, which in turn draws members of the core executive from the management elite of these agencies; ministries, statutory boards and GLCs. In particular, the core executive draws upon the Administrative Service officers working in ministry and boards, who control the public sector. In 1998, of the 15 cabinet ministers with portfolio responsibilities,¹⁰⁸ seven came from the Administrative Service including the prime minister,¹⁰⁹ three came from the SAF general staff and were equivalent to senior Administrative Service officers, two came from major GLCs and one came from the NUS, a statutory board. Only two of the cabinet, Tony Tan and Abdullah Tarmugi did not come from the public sector, although Tarmugi was drawn from the print media, a quasi-state company.

The PAP has been hugely successful in its political socialisation of the civil service in particular and the public service in general. It has reinforced this through policy programs which have led to rapid economic development, social stability and maintained the public sector as a highly autonomous institution. This, in turn, has been assisted by maintaining an "iron rice bowl" approach to public sector employment, relatively high salaries and benefits, a generous pension scheme, excellent working conditions and facilities and, in recent years, high levels of training support. These strategies have not, however, attracted a higher level of recruits to the elite Administrative Service which appears to be in relative decline; a direct threat to core executive recruitment. The full implications of this are not yet evident, but it is probable that the present response of relying on SAF officers to fill gaps in this service is not viable in the long term.

The autonomy of the public service has been somewhat reduced through the introduction of management reforms, particularly the PS21 program, to make it more conform to citizens' demands for a more responsive executive arm of government and

¹⁰⁷ Some of these agencies have implemented these approaches through different software products. Although Oracle products are used by many agencies, the emphasis is on compatibility not uniformity.

¹⁰⁸ This excludes Lee Kuan Yew who is Senior Minister.

¹⁰⁹ The former Administrative Service officers were: Goh Chok Tong, Lee Yock Suan, Wong Kan Seng, Yeo Cheow Tong, Dr. Lee Boon Yang, Mah Bow Tan and Lim Hng Kiang. The SAF general staff officers are: BG (NS) Lee Hsien Loong, BG (NS) George Yeo Yong-Boon and RAdm. (NS) Teo Chee Hean. S. Jayakumar came from NUS. Richard Hu Tsu Tau came from the Government of Singapore investment Corporation (GIC), Lin Boon Heng came from Neptune Orient Line (NOL), both companies being GLCs.

to reinforce a positive image for the political executive. These reforms have also, under the Goh Chok Tong governments, provided the core executive with two major parts of the contemporary governance framework; an integrated national planning framework based on scenario and strategic planning with their concomitant analytical systems, and a comprehensive IT&T based national surveillance capacity located within a secretive and well disciplined civil service.

As can be seen from the EDB case study, in the Singapore public sector there is no substantial differentiation between boards and GLCs in policy or program management terms and there is also no clear differentiation among the three major sectors in policy development. While program management is quite clearly defined, ministries, boards and the holding company GLCs seem to share policy development responsibilities, although this is coordinated, to varying degrees, by ministries. – some boards especially have considerable autonomy, especially the EDB. In respect of the accountability of boards and GLCs, neither is necessarily more distant from the control of the political executive than ministries; each offers the advantage of a different form of policy development, implementation and review, a different form of accountability and more importantly, is a strategy of control for the core executive, whether it be social control through the People's Association or substantial control of the domestic economy through the GLC sector. Although the implementation of these strategies seems to distance the political executive from boards and GLCs in particular, in reality this distance is an illusion; strong political control is maintained no matter what the form of public sector organisation. This is an issue which is further examined in Chapter Eight. The hexadical structure of the Singaporean public sector does not necessarily separate policy and executive functions, although there is a nominal separation, but operates on the same principles of pragmatism and personal contacts among the state management elite that drives the political system. This structure is also mutually supportive. Boards and ministries regularly 'spin-off' GLCs as an economic development as well as a political control policy. How this effects the dynamics of the core executive and functions within the hegemonic governance framework is examined more closely in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine.

3. THE CORE EXECUTIVE: SINGAPORE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In previous chapters the development of the contemporary political and bureaucratic structures and leadership of the political and public sector executives were outlined. This chapter begins the analysis of how those structures operate at the centre of policy making in Singapore using the concept of the core executive. It examines the roots of the Singaporean core executive in the Westminster political system, what we mean by the core executive in Westminster systems and critically reviews the debate on what might comprise the Singaporean core executive.

The core executive concept has considerable heuristic utility for a study of how a policy system actually works, the major focus of this study, especially within a political system based on the Westminster model from which the core executive concept is derived. In attempting to define and understand the structure and dynamics of the core executive in Singapore, it is instructive to understand its derivation from the British Westminster system and its particular utility in studying policy making in political systems characterised by cabinet government. These systems have particular institutional arrangements and dynamics which have encouraged the development of core executives and therefore policy systems distinguished by particular coordination and control arrangements. This chapter will look at the origins and definition of the term in the Westminster context, what it does and how it operates within the policy system and its application to Singapore by defining and examining the Singaporean core executive.

WHY A CORE EXECUTIVE? COORDINATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN WESTMINSTER DEMOCRACIES

We have already noted that, in common with other former British colonies, the Singaporean state is based on the British Westminster model. In particular, it should be noted at the outset, that Singapore, perhaps more than any other Westminster based system, has looked to the Palace of Westminster for its institutional practices and precedents, rather than develop its own indigenous practices. This is probably at least partly due to Lee Kuan Yew's personal experience of British politics and his long-term links with many senior political figures in Britain,¹ but is principally due to the inherently anti-democratic tendencies of the Westminster constitutional model.

¹ During Lee's student days he became acquainted with many figures in the British Labour Party and actually campaigned for one of his friends in a general election. Among those people with whom he maintained contact was Harold Wilson, prime minister from 1964-70.

The Westminster model is treated here as a particular set of institutional arrangements based on the British practice of parliamentary democracy. It is debatable whether a pure Westminster system now exists in any of the nations following this tradition, including Britain, and whether its traditional form is now relevant to those nations whose political systems are derived from it.² However, two nations are still identifiable as being close adherents to the Westminster model, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.³ The broad characteristics of this tradition are: a head of state with mainly ceremonial powers and some very limited reserve powers;⁴ the allocation of the principal powers of the state to the cabinet; the fusion of executive and legislative roles through the executive being drawn from the legislature; ministers answerable to the legislature for their policy actions; a tradition of cabinet solidarity on policy decisions; a legislature answerable to the electorate; and an accountability framework which follows this hierarchy. This system is also characterised by a strong state, strong governments, a legal system based on a combination of codified and judge-made law (the common law) which incorporates a certain level of protection of citizen's rights and specifies their obligations to the state within a liberal political culture. In examining this system of government, it is instructive to bear in mind Walker's comments on the historical development of the Westminster system:

"...the Westminster constitution, which took its basic form in 1689, was designed mainly as a check on royal power. It has never intended to be a democratic system of government. It later became one, but only grudgingly, incompletely..."⁵

This view was supported by commentators of the Left and Right in post-war assessments of the utility of the British constitution. Amery noted that the Westminster system was "one of democracy, but of democracy by consent and not, by delegation, of government of the people, for the people, with, but not by the people."⁶ Laski, from a Left perspective, supported this view, noting that the post-war Labor government had no constitutional difficulties introducing its reform agenda and taking the view that

² See: Parker, R. S., "The Public Service Inquiries and Responsible Government", in Smith, R. F. I. and Weller, P., *Public Service Inquiries in Australia*, St. Lucia, Queensland University Press, 1978, pp. 334-359; and, Thompson, E., "The Westminster Mutation", in Weller, P. and Jaensch, D, eds., *Responsible Government in Australia*, Melbourne, Drummond, 1980, pp. 32-40

³ In this discussion I exclude the Westminster-derived systems of Australia and Canada as these political systems have had to substantially compromise their constitutional arrangements to account for a federated state structure. It could also be argued that both these nations have amended their institutional arrangements under the influence of the United States' congressional practices over the past 30 years.

⁴ In all Westminster democracies the role of the head of state is essentially ceremonial, except for the power to appoint or dismiss the prime minister, as the person who is believed to be able to form a workable government in the parliament, or in the case of a dismissal, the person who has lost the ability to continue government. Those countries classified as Westminster style democracies and on which significant research is available are: Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

⁵ See: Geoffrey Walker, "Some Democratic Principles For Constitutional Reform in the 1990s", in Bruce D. Gray and Robert B. McClintock, eds., *Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance*, Wellington, Legal Research Foundation/Brookers, 1995, pp. 183-205, p. 204

⁶ L. Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 20-21

they most important function of the electorate was to elect a strong, stable executive which could control the legislature and implement its program.⁷ This idea of the strong executive as the "efficient secret" of the Westminster constitution was acknowledged as recently as 1989 by Wright,⁸ although it has been identified by others as a cause for concern in its ability to frustrate greater democratisation of the British political system.⁹

In such systems, civil servants are theoretically non-partisan, are responsible to ministers not the legislature, and serve all elected governments with equal loyalty. The separation of legislative and executive branches, as in the United States is not part of this tradition, nor is the artificial dichotomy between ministers as policy makers and civil servants as policy implementers, despite the literature supporting it.¹⁰ The traditional Westminster relationship between ministers and their ministry officials is one of temporary partnership for the minister's term of office, but a partnership in which the minister takes ultimate responsibility for policy decisions.¹¹ Officials may make policy; politicians approve its implementation; the Westminster model accepts that the policy process in complex, that power relations within it are not simple and generally leaves it to the participants to work out the balance.

The legislature is supreme as the maker of laws and laws cannot be struck down by the courts, although there is provision through the common law for the courts to make law on the margins through interpretation. Laws can be changed by subsequent legislation at the discretion of the legislature. Laws usually cannot be ruled invalid by the courts because there is no absolute reference point which can be used to assess laws against, such as a Bill of Rights or a written constitution as in the United States. The parliament is the sole body for determining what will be law and what won't be and the validation mechanism for the general acceptability of its judgement to the electorate is the ballot box. Elections are based on single member constituencies, decided by a simple plurality system with candidates usually drawn from a two party system resulting in simple majoritarian governments.

⁷ Harold Laski, *Reflections on the Constitution*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1951, pp. 55-56, 58

⁸ A Wright, "The Constitution", in, L. Tivey and A. Wright, eds., *Party Ideology in Britain*, London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 41-57

⁹ For example, see: B. Jones and M. Keating, *Labour and the British State*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989; I. Jowell and D. Oliver, eds., *The Changing Constitution*, 2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989; I. Budge and D. McKay, eds., *The Developing British Political System: The 1990s*, 3rd ed., London, Longman, 1993

¹⁰ Dunshire explains the American origins of this concept and its inapplicability to the Westminster system. The separation of powers in the political system of the United States is quite different from that existing in Britain. See: Andrew Dunshire, *Administration: The Word and the Science*, London, Martin and Robertson, 1973, pp. 87-91

¹¹ See: Peter Hennessy, *Whitehall*, London, Secker and Warburg, 1989; Norman Fowler, *Ministers Decide: A Personal Memoir of the Thatcher Years*, London, Chapman's, 1991; Rob Eaddy, "The Structure and Operations of the Executive", in Hyam Gold (ed.), *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 3rd ed., Auckland, Longman Paul, 1992, pp.163-173

In the Westminster system, power is distributed not only between the three branches of government, but within those branches, in a way so as to make control of the legislative and executive branches, and to some degree, the judiciary, relatively easy for the head of the executive subject to conventions that govern these relationships, rather than formal constitutional provisions. This would not be possible, for example, in the United States, where there is no formal avenue for the President as head of the executive wing to directly participate in the legislature. But in all Westminster type systems, the executive is drawn from and is part of the legislature, resulting in what has been called cabinet government being the norm in these democracies.¹² The exercise of power by the executive depends on four major factors; the role and powers of the head of state, the relationship between the prime minister and cabinet, the relationship between the cabinet and the legislature and the nature of the political party which has formed the government.

What then are the characteristics of cabinet government in these nations?

Cabinet Government in the Westminster Tradition

Cabinet government, as the term implies, means that the real power to make policy resides in the hands of the prime minister and his ministers, not in the legislature or other organs of state. Cabinet government is made possible by the existence of disciplined political parties whose members have an allegiance to a core set of values and beliefs and who have a pragmatic interest in winning and keeping government. The parties may be formally factionalised, as is the British Labour Party,¹³ have informal factions as has the British Conservative Party or be made up of loose coalitions of interest or belief as is the New Zealand National Party. Regardless of internal party organisation, parties are highly disciplined and when in government, within the bounds of intra-party dynamics, strongly influenced by their leadership which, in the case of the party forming government, is the cabinet. The prime minister can therefore, except in exceptional circumstances, rest assured that the policy decisions of the cabinet will not be defeated in the parliament. This is particularly so in

¹² See: Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics An Introduction*, 2nd ed., London, Macmillan, 1987, p.223. The term 'cabinet government' while widely used does not still have universal support. George Jones has commented that in Britain the term 'ministerial government' not cabinet government should be used. Cited in John Summers et. al, *Government Politics and Power in Australia An Introductory Reader*, 4th ed., Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1990. p. 37

¹³ The factionalisation in the British Labour Party is formalised in a way fundamentally different to other such parties, such as the Australian Labor Party. Nonetheless its membership comprises many formally established groups, some of them with significant histories. For example, Tribune, founded in 1964, publishes its own newspaper and has its own organisational structure spread throughout the party. Other formally structured groups include the Manifesto Group established in 1974, the Campaign Group formed in 1982 and others. See: John Kingdon, *Government and Politics in Britain*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, pp. 232-233

Britain, where the powers of the House of Lords are now insufficient to stop legislation and in Singapore which, like New Zealand, has a unicameral parliament.

Cabinet government is, therefore, a dictatorship of the executive, as the parliament is a captured house. Increasingly, it is also argued that the cabinet is itself captured by the prime minister, thus suggesting that cabinet government is government by prime minister. This proposition is not particularly new, being proposed almost 40 years ago in Britain.¹⁴ However, it reached renewed prominence following the ascent of Margaret Thatcher in Britain. However, even taking her prime ministership into account, there are those that contend that the argument over whether British premierships are presidential (government by prime minister) or follow the chairman of the board style (government by cabinet) is not yet settled.¹⁵ In a recent study, Anthony King describes the British prime minister, the model Westminster premier thus:

" The British Prime Minister is, within his own domestic sphere, one of the most powerful heads of government in the Western world, far more powerful than most prime ministers in Europe. He owes his power to his position as the leader of the majority party, to the historic prestige of his office, to the fact that he chairs the cabinet and its major committees, and his control over the structure of government (he can at will create and destroy government departments). Above all, the prime minister owes his power to two circumstances that bear directly on the question of the autonomy of cabinet ministers. One is the prime minister's virtual control...over ministerial appointments...he and he alone decides...The second circumstance bearing on ministerial autonomy is the British prime minister's position as the person who is almost universally identified with the government of the day (it is "his" or "her" government), who is held responsible for almost all the government's actions..."¹⁶

King concludes; "British politicians ... know that their future depends on the prime minister."¹⁷

Despite this dominance of the prime minister, the incumbent of that office cannot take his power for granted. Certainly, prime ministers cannot be dictators, or at least not for long – ministers and a united backbench will over-ride them when required. The cabinet, described as "a clearinghouse, an exchange market where different interdepartmental clashes are sorted out"¹⁸, has an obligation to retain government, not to always agree with the prime minister.¹⁹ We can therefore conclude that in Westminster systems the prime minister can exercise enormous control over the policy

¹⁴ Brian Smith discusses this issue in reference to several papers dating from 1960. See: Brian Smith, *Policy Making in British Government An Analysis of Power and Rationality*, London, Martin Robertson, 1976, pp. 93-99. See also; George W. Jones, "The Prime Minister's Power", in Richard Rose, ed., *Policy Making in Britain A Reader in Government*, London, Macmillan, 1969, pp. 307-328. Jones dismissed the arguments for a 'presidential' prime minister, at that time.

¹⁵ See: James Barber, *The Prime Minister Since 1945*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991, pp. 131-134

¹⁶ Anthony King, "Ministerial Autonomy in Britain", in Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 203-225, p. 210-211

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 224

¹⁸ David Howell, cited in: Christopher Brady and Peter Catterall, "Managing the Core Executive", *Public Administration*, 75, 1997, pp. 509-529, p. 510

¹⁹ For example, Thatcher was often over-ruled by her cabinet, even on such crucial issues as major budget initiatives such as public spending cuts in 1981, the review of public expenditure in 1982 and the exchange rate mechanism. See: Simon James, "Relations Between Prime Minister and Cabinet: From Wilson to Thatcher", in R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, eds., *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 63-86, p. 85

process and that in general the policy system is centred on the prime minister and his cabinet.²⁰ This power structure is not, however, merely bi-directional; it is a complex mix of actors linked by policy, political obligations, ideology, resource and other exchanges both within the cabinet and among the prime minister, cabinet, individual ministers and other policy actors outside the cabinet.

Power Over Policy: Cabinet vs Other Policy Actors

While the prime minister and the cabinet dominate the policy system, they do not have exclusive control over it at all times; institutions and politics still count, to varying degrees, depending on the policy issue. The concentration of power in the hands of the executive has substantially deprived the legislature of its most powerful theoretical function; that of being the principal accountability mechanism for the executive,²¹ such that

“It is now widely accepted that parliament’s power in policy making is more real in a legal and constitutional sense than in terms of practical politics. Any control the parliament might be said to exercise over the executive is largely indirect...This concept of parliamentary power has been formulated as a response to the political reality of executive dominance, an historical principle reinforced by the party system.”²²

Executive dominance and the party system have also colluded to reduced the role of legislators as well, so that;

“The policy-makers, therefore, usually have little to fear in the way of parliamentary harassment, though the influence of individual MPs as representatives of particular interests may well be noticeable on occasion.”²³

This is not to say that the parliament or its backbenchers are absolutely without policy making power or influence. In Westminster systems it is required that all laws pass through the parliament; the executive cannot govern in secret - its policies must be publicly scrutinised. Ministers must appear and they must answer questions and explain policy decisions; except by convention, those relating directly to national security.²⁴ While this process may not make policy it does influence it and it does

²⁰ This tendency to prime ministerial control reached its zenith during the Thatcher years and may now be seen to be entrenched, with the possible caveat that it must to a substantial degree depend upon the personality of the incumbent and the malleability of the cabinet.

²¹ In New Zealand, the traditional powers of the parliament to undertake legislative tasks independent of the executive have been formally compromised through the provisions of the Constitution Act 1986. In particular, the power of the parliament to pass bills involving the expenditure of public funds without the approval of the executive has been withdrawn. Section 21 of the *Constitution Act 1986*, and Standing Order 297 of the House of Representatives define this limitation. (See: Skenes, op. cit. pp. 248-249). Additionally, only the government can initiate legislation involving expenditure, thus depriving the Opposition of any possibility of initiating legislation independently of the government. This is also the case in Singapore. See: Richard G. Mulgan, *Politics in New Zealand*, Auckland, Auckland University Press, 1994, p. 97

²² Smith, op. cit. pp. 82-83

²³ Francis M. Willson, “Policy-Making and the Policy Makers”, in, Richard Rose, ed., *Policy Making in Britain: A Reader in Government*, London, Macmillan, 1969, pp. 355-368, p. 365

²⁴ Although even in some Westminster derived systems, such as Australia’s, the legislature maintains bipartisan legislative oversight of military and intelligence issues in addition to the executive, but under the same secrecy

allow, if not necessitate, debate. Importantly, parliamentary process allows access by the media and the community to the thinking and actions of the executive. In Britain during the Thatcher administrations, several government policy proposals were defeated in the parliament despite the large majorities enjoyed by the government.²⁵ But these cases are the exception rather than the rule and may equally indicate poor consultation on the part of an arrogant executive more than parliament exerting its constitutional prerogatives.

The parliament can also influence policy through its examination of policy decisions using parliamentary committees. The recommendations of these committees will be examined by both ministers and officials and will often, at least in part, be adopted; capable executives act on the assumption that they do not have a monopoly on truth or policy ideas. However, the influence of committees on policy seems to be minimal.²⁶ In Britain standing committees remain in the control of the executive²⁷ and select committees which focus on policy delivery²⁸ are no more effective. Despite their widening the policy discourse, it seems that committees are still "...largely creature of the government of the day."²⁹ Thus, while avenues are available through the parliament to widen and occasionally influence policy, the initiative and control of the policy process remains an executive prerogative. What committees may not be able to directly achieve in terms of policy influence, they may achieve indirectly by providing access to the media and the community to analysis, counter-argument and policy options other than those of the executive through public access to committee meetings. This extends parliamentary scrutiny of the executive to the media and the community.

principles. In Singapore, the legislature has no role in maintaining a watch on defence or national security policy, the responsibility for which comes under quasi-institutional, executive created organs such as the Council on Defence and the Intelligence and Security Committee on which there is no opposition representation.

²⁵ Martin Burch and Bruce Wood, *Public Policy in Britain*, 2nd ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1990 p. 35

²⁶ In New Zealand, the committee system has been indirectly influential, through its scrutiny process, based on the requirement for all legislation to be referred to it. Mulgan concludes; "The question is not whether the committees can necessarily confront and ultimately defeat the cabinet or the governing majority. It is rather whether they facilitate the process of public scrutiny through which governments must pass on the way to enacting their policies and thereby help to make governments more accountable. In this respect there is no doubt that the committee process, particularly in the review of intended legislation, does provide a valuable adjunct to parliamentary scrutiny...The discussions behind the scenes between ministers, caucus and the government members of committees, particularly chairpersons, far from undermining the committee process, provide a useful and flexible channel for adjusting government policy in the light of public criticism and thus making governments more responsive to public opinion." See: Mulgan op. cit., 1994, p. 120

²⁷ Brian W. Hogwood, *From Crisis to Complacency? Shaping Public Policy in Britain*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 108-110

²⁸ Hogwood comments in relation to select committees that: "Committees are, however, often concerned with the efficiency of delivery of policies (i.e. monitoring) rather than with the evaluation of policy designs. Committees are especially important for spotting failure rather than successes. The reports of committees are rarely debated on the floor of the House of Commons, but may have an indirect impact through press coverage and because civil servants appear to treat their committee appearances with some apprehension. The monitoring and evaluative roles of parliamentary committees would be enhanced if periodically but systematically they reviewed policies (or their replacements) which had been the subject of previous reviews." See: Hogwood, *ibid.*, pp. 238-239

²⁹ Geoff Skene, "Parliament: Reassessing its Role", in Hyam Gold, ed., *New Zealand Politics in Perspective*, 3rd ed., Auckland, Longman Paul, 1992, pp. 247-261, p. 254

Backbenchers fare little better in the policy system stakes. In their text on public policy in Britain, Burch and Wood barely discuss backbenchers except in passing and usually in association with secondary or tertiary channels into the core executive. The only role of any substance occurs when ministers, the real policy makers, require support when cabinet is divided on an issue.³⁰ Backbenchers are thus troops to be marshalled as a last resort in fighting the policy battles conducted within the executive or, in a minor way, may act as advocates on particular policy issues for groups. In New Zealand, "... MPs rarely act independently and are prevented from performing their representative functions by a party lash which has debilitated debating and made voting a sham."³¹ In Britain, there is no mechanism for the cabinet or ministers collectively to meet with backbenchers outside the parliamentary chamber although ministers may individually attend meetings of the 1922 Committee on the rare occasions they are requested by backbenchers to do so. The executive therefore inhabits a world substantially different to backbenchers and the two rarely intersect, except when backbench feedback from electorate reaction to a policy proposal is particularly uniform and negative.³²

The parliamentary backbench is usually nowhere to be seen in the policy panorama, certainly, not at the centre of policy making. The parliament itself, and its non-ministerial members are relegated to the nether lands of the policy process. Legislatures in Westminster systems are therefore not active at the core of policymaking, but rather at the periphery. Indeed:

"... it is arguable whether the main function of parliament is to pass legislation at all. In fact parliament clearly has three functions. Firstly it scrutinises and, if appropriate, criticises government administration. Secondly, it legitimates, though rarely initiates, legislation. Finally, it provides training and socialisation for potential recruits to the executive. It is perhaps the greatest indictment of the partisan parliamentary system that the third function, in practice, though not in theory, is the most important."³³

Although in a majoritarian two party system, "... Opposition must be regarded as being no less legitimate than power."³⁴ the constitutional strength of the executive is such that in association with its neglect of parliament, it can equally ignore the opposition. In Westminster systems, the opposition undertakes the major accountability function of the parliament and also provides a fail-safe mechanism for society in the event that the government fails. However, the effectiveness of the opposition is heavily dependent on a number of factors controlled by the executive:

³⁰ Burch and Wood, *op. cit.* p. 162

³¹ Skene, *op. cit.*, p. 248

³² This is not the case in New Zealand, Canada and Australia where ministers and backbenchers do have formal regular party meetings. However, as mentioned, Singapore tends to follow the more illiberal, unreformed, traditional Westminster approach to such matters.

³³ Ian Budge, David McKay, Rod Rhodes, David Robertson, David Sanders, Martin Slater and Graham Wilson, *The Changing British Political System: Into the 1990s*, 2nd ed., London, Longman, 1988, p. 46

³⁴ Dorothy M. Pickles, *Democracy*, London, Methuen, 1971, p.13

access to information about the government's proposed policies; representation in the parliamentary committee system to ensure that alternative policy views are heard; familiarity with the bureaucracy; the existence of well developed, rational opposition policies; and leadership ability.³⁵

Oppositions are governments in waiting and government changes sufficiently frequently to verify that this is how they are seen by the electorate. However, their influence on the policy processes of government appears to be poorly documented.³⁶ Mulgan concludes that the opposition is most effective in influencing policy through parliamentary debates and committee work, although this is principally influence on the policy margins.³⁷ When a government is itself divided on a policy issue and strong opposition is displayed in parliament, the legislation may be postponed,³⁸ or the government may accept technical amendments to legislation which are proposed by the opposition.³⁹

The third and weakest branch of government, the judicial, rarely has a presence at the core of the policy system, although it may on occasion exert considerable influence from the periphery. The courts have no influence on the major issue of financial allocation and the budgets which drive the policy system. The judiciary's Westminster constitutional role is subsidiary to that of the parliament under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty; the parliament is the sole law making body.⁴⁰ In Westminster jurisdictions such as Britain and New Zealand with no justiciable constitution, it is the few judges of the higher appellate courts who have the greatest opportunity for policy making and who are responsible for decisions with substantial policy implications. But these decisions are rarely about 'who gets what, when and how' in a substantive sense, but more about 'why' resources are allocated; issues of equity, rights and responsibilities. Also, judicial decisions on these matters can be overridden by legislation, even retrospective legislation, if necessary.

³⁵ In both Britain and New Zealand, substantial histories of parliamentary government have developed oppositions with these characteristics, although in Britain the opposition was, until 1996, excluded from any significant contact with the civil service, and so had little familiarity with bureaucrats with whom they may have to work on assuming office. The Code of Conduct for the Civil Service introduced in 1996 allowed permanent secretaries to meet with the opposition to discuss any matter raised by them prior to elections in case the opposition is elected. The Singapore government continues the previous practice of not allowing contact between bureaucrats and the opposition.

³⁶ For example, the term "opposition" is not indexed in Mulgan (1994), Barber (1991), Grant (1995), Burch and Wood (1989), or Hogwood (1992), *op. cit.* However, Griffiths empirical study of legislation in Britain does include opposition voting and influence patterns on legislation. See: John A. G. Griffith, *Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1974

³⁷ Mulgan, 1994, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-121

³⁸ Hogwood, 1987, *op. cit.* p. 106

³⁹ *ibid.*, p. 109

⁴⁰ For a detailed discussion of the development of the doctrine see: David Lieberman, *The Province of Legislation Determined*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. In Britain and New Zealand, the courts have no power to unmake law and no constitutional court, such as the Australian High Court which can overturn legislation and make substantial law, exists. For a concise overview of the New Zealand legal system, its Westminster framework and its political role see: Mulgan, 1994, *op. cit.* pp. 155-175.

There is no consensus, either within or among particular Westminster jurisdictions, about the constitutional balance to be struck between the courts and the parliament.⁴¹ Lord McClusky placed this issue in the context of a changing political culture⁴² which has, even now, not resolved the tensions implicit in the changing nature of public policy and the role of the courts:

“In the hard cases - those in which, because the law is ambiguous or silent, judges frequently disagree both as to the law and the result - the choice of the result, the formulation of the law is a policy choice. Sometimes the judge will consciously make and declare that he is making, a policy choice.”⁴³

In doing so, they are playing the role of provocateur to the parliament which, in exercising its constitutional duties, should respond through legislating and thus relieving the courts of this policy burden. Atiyah's answer to this is to suggest that the courts will always be marginal to the policy process, as they are essentially powerless in the face of executive or parliamentary power: “the total effect of judicial decisions on public policy is so small, the whole exercise would seem futile to most judges.”⁴⁴

While Atiyah's comparison of the relative strengths of the judiciary and the executive cannot be disputed, it is an observation based on a rather naked concept of the exercise of power. The executive, through parliament, can in a Westminster framework in which the judiciary have no role of constitutional protector, strike down any judgement of the courts. The real question is; do executives wish to do this and do it consistently? Do they want a war with the courts over some rather grey areas of constitutional jurisdiction?

The answer is resoundingly ‘no’. What executives and courts actually do is to use their respective powers tacitly in working out policy solutions to issues which both jurisdictions find difficult to resolve by themselves; they play policy games. In such games, the courts are obviously subsidiary to the executive in finding a lasting solution to such issues, but their influence should not be underrated. They play a crucial role in the resultant policy dialogues, drawing to the attention of the executive the practical deficiencies in its legislation and, usually, suggesting remedies. Much of this dialogue is carried on, not between the judiciary and the executive, but between the legal profession and the executive, as the judiciary, by convention, does not participate in

⁴¹ J. A. Smillie, “Introduction” in Michael Taggart, *Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects*, Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. xi-xx

⁴² Waltman makes the point that slow change characterises English political culture: “...the English judiciary is embedded in a political culture and institutional structure that prizes gradual change.” See: Jerold L. Waltman, “The Courts in England”, in Jerold L. Waltman, *The Political Role of Law Courts in Modern Democracies*, London, Macmillan, 1988, p. 21

⁴³ Lord McClusky, *Law, Justice and Democracy*, BBC Books, 1987, p. 32

⁴⁴ See: Patrick Atiyah, “Judicial-Legislative Relations in Britain”, in Robert A. Katzmann, ed., *Judges and Legislators: Towards Institutional Comity*, Washington DC, Brookings Institute, 1988, p. 36

public discussion of the policy implications of its judgements. The legal profession therefore plays a role in policy development as a proxy for the judiciary.

While many of these remedies may be 'nudges' because they are associated with micro-policy or policy implementation issues, they occasionally have substantial macro-policy implications. As such, the influence of the courts is not uniform and it should not be dismissed as uniformly minor; there will be occasions when their influence is considerable. In both respects, they are important, though minor, actors in the policy process, a position supported by Drewry⁴⁵ who contends that "... judges do play a small but significant part in patrolling the boundaries of government."⁴⁶ Occasionally shots from the boundaries can produce very significant policy changes at the centre, such as in the case of judgements by the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand courts on aboriginal land rights. However, despite their occasional significance, the courts remain boundary riders, not bosses in the policy system.

If in Westminster systems, the executive is so clearly constitutionally superior to the other two branches of government, does this mean that the centre of the policy system, only ministers wield constitutionally sanctioned power? No. Two other groups cohabit the policy centre with ministers; political parties and bureaucrats.

In Westminster countries there is a distinction between the extra-parliamentary party and the parliamentary party. The former is the party of all members, including parliamentarians. The latter includes only parliamentarians and it is dominated by their concerns, usually considered in the context of the broader objectives of the extra-parliamentary party, but more immediately on winning the next election. The extra-parliamentary party is the forum for development and authorisation of the party's policy platform for government and is usually controlled by the same executive as constitutes the cabinet, although this control is diluted by other, non-parliamentary, executive members. It therefore has access to, and can exert influence upon, the parliamentary party, but cannot in most cases direct the latter in policy terms.⁴⁷ What the New Zealand experience from 1983-94 has demonstrated, however, is that the parliamentary parties can adopt a policy stance which is at great variance from the extra-parliamentary platform, essentially ignoring the latter. The result, as the New Zealand Labour Party discovered, may in the case of extreme differences, be schism.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Gavin Drewry, "Judicial Politics in Britain. Patrolling the Boundaries", in Mary L. Volcansek, ed., *Judicial Politics and Policy-Making in Western Europe*, London, Cass, 1992, pp. 9-28, p. 25

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁴⁷ For example, in New Zealand, the Parliamentary National Party is less influenced than the Parliamentary Labour Party by its extra-parliamentary wing, although in both cases it is usual practice for the extra-parliamentary party to be consulted on major policy issues. See: Richard Mulgan, *Democracy and Power in New Zealand: A Study of New Zealand Politics*. Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 60-63

⁴⁸ See: Mulgan, 1994, *op. cit.* pp. 226-227

As in other democratic systems, it is the bureaucracy which shares most in the exercise of executive power.⁴⁹ The function of the public bureaucracy in all states is to serve the administrative requirements of executive government, although it has been argued that it is also a trustee of the public good.⁵⁰ In Westminster states, civil servants are supposedly non-partisan, but it is perhaps more accurate to say that they become 'thought colonised' by successive administrations, perhaps a necessary condition to be able to work in a political environment that regularly changes.⁵¹ The bureaucracy is not accountable to the parliament⁵² or to the people in any direct sense; its accountability is through the executive, resulting in its reputation for "inwardness and secrecy."⁵³ Major policy activity is coordinated by a group of political offices (such as the prime minister's personal advisers) and central ministries, especially by those which control resource allocation, those which provide policy advice directly to the prime minister and the ministry responsible for the allocation of human resources. All ministries are administered by a minister to whom a career bureaucrat, the permanent secretary, answers as the administrative head of a ministry. In institutional terms, the mechanisms of public administration are therefore firmly under the control of the executive. The nature of the relationship between civil servants and their ministers is elucidated in comments by ex-ministers on the topic:

"Ministers may bring with them broad ideas of how future policy should develop. But in the transformation of policy goals into realistic plans, in the execution of those plans, and still more, in policy responses to new and unexpected developments, ministers are largely, if not wholly, dependant on their official [civil service] advisers."⁵⁴

This finding is borne out in Davis' recent study of executive coordination in Britain, Canada and Australia.⁵⁵ Senior bureaucrats see themselves as policy makers and some

⁴⁹ B. Guy Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, 4th ed., White Plains (NY), Longman, 1995, p. 179

⁵⁰ C. T. Goodsell, *The Case for Bureaucracy*, 2nd ed., Chatham (NJ), Chatham House, 1985 Goodsell comments that the civil service bureaucracy stands as a bulwark against the short-term partisan interests of governments as a "... repository of specialized knowledge, historical experience, time-tested wisdom and ... to some degree as counterweight to short-term political expediency and opportunism." (p. 155)

⁵¹ Ian Beasley, Chief of Staff of Thatcher's Efficiency Unit commented with regard to the possible politicisation of the bureaucracy: "The Civil Service is dedicated to the status quo. It only changes with a tremendous breath of air; a war, probably the Thatcher period. It's not politicization in the party sense - it's 'thought colonization'." See: Peter Hennessy, *Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in Postwar Britain*, London, Indigo, 1996, p. 59

⁵² Although British civil servants can be called to appear before parliamentary committees, under the Osmotherly rules which govern their appearance, they may only answer questions of fact and cannot give opinions on the quality of policies or advice. For a variety of perspectives on contemporary Westminster accountability issues see: P. Giddings, ed., *Parliamentary Accountability. A Study of Parliament and Executive Agencies*, London, Macmillan, 1995

⁵³ Spencer Zifcak, *New Managerialism: Administrative Reform in Whitehall and Canberra*, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1994, p. 197

⁵⁴ Peter Shore cited in: Richard Rose, "The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique", *Political Studies*, 17, 1969, p. 428

⁵⁵ Glyn Davis, "Executive Coordination Mechanisms", in Patrick Weller, Herman Bakvis and R. A. W. Rhodes, eds., *The Hollow Crown: Countervailing Trends in Core Executives*, London, Macmillan, 1997, pp. 126-147, pp. 138-141

view them as being at least as influential as the political executive in the policy process, while others disagree.⁵⁶

Given the nature of the public policy environment, particularly its complexity, the number of actors involved and the core role of the bureaucracy in the policy system, the bureaucracy assumes a number of functions in relation to its various constituencies. In addition to advising the executive, it operates as a central component of policy communities and a member of various policy networks.⁵⁷ This is demonstrated through the use of formal and informal advisory groups, consultative mechanisms and the corporatisation of public sector functions which allow the civil service to colonise the private sector, extending the boundaries of policy making and blurring the patterns of responsibility and accountability beyond their formal constitutional limits.⁵⁸ For example, despite the separation of policy advising and service delivery functions since 1989 in Britain, the policy advising function appears to be shared by both service delivery agencies and ministries.⁵⁹

This separation has also led to greater decentralisation of authority within the public sector, greater fragmentation and conflict⁶⁰ and a consequent demand for increased coordinating and reporting arrangements.⁶¹ There is no unitary civil service, but rather a large number of agencies managing competing policy agendas, producing a number of smaller public sector cores.⁶² All of these cores must interface with the political executive as part of the core executive to ensure policy coordination and cohesion.

⁵⁶ Fry (1985, p. 21) calls civil servants a "permanent government", while Greenwood and Wilson (1989, p. 97) comment that; "... civil servants have more influence, and ministers less, than constitutional theory suggests is undeniable." Goodin (1982, pp. 37-38) rejects the power of officials over public policy as greater than that of ministers because of a lack of convincing consistent evidence. See: Geoffrey K. Fry, *The Changing Civil Service*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1985; J. Greenwood and D. Wilson, *Public Administration in Britain Today*, London, Unwin Hyman, 1989; and, Robert E. Goodin, *Political Theory and Public Policy*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982.

⁵⁷ See: Brian W. Hogwood and T. T. Mackie, "The United Kingdom: decision sifting in a secret garden", in T. T. Mackie and Brian W. Hogwood, *Unlocking the Cabinet: Cabinet Structure in Comparative Perspective*, London, Sage, 1985, pp. 36-60, p. 7.

⁵⁸ D. Pitt and B. Smith, *Government Departments*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 39.

⁵⁹ Price Waterhouse, *Executive Agencies: Facts and Trends*, Edition 8, London, Price Waterhouse, 1994, pp. 7-8.

⁶⁰ The author found that when interviewing senior executives in the British Department of Social Security and the Benefits Agency in 1992 while on a short secondment in London, that both organisations admitted a significant level of inter-agency conflict over roles, responsibilities and access to the minister. The Efficiency Unit has reported that some chief executives complain of excessive operational interference by ministries. See: Efficiency Unit, *Next Steps: Moving On*, London, HMSO, 1994.

⁶¹ Dynes and Walker, in analysing the post 1979 reforms have concluded that civil service and policy coordination are so bad that "the British state has a hole at its heart – machinery to coordinate 'difficult' policy seems weak." See: M. Dynes and D. Walker, *The New British State*, London, Times Books, 1995, p. 28.

⁶² Kemp comments that the recent changes to Whitehall structures is of such a magnitude that it is effectively dismantling the Westminster concept of a monolithic and unified bureaucracy and replacing it with a system in which a "loose federation of many smaller agencies, units and cores predominates." See: P. Kemp, *Beyond the Next Steps: a civil service for the 21st century*, London, Social Market Foundation, 1993, p. 8.

The Executive, Policy Legitimation and Coordination in Westminster Democracies

As can be seen from the above discussion, the Westminster system has a number of distinct characteristics. Despite Rod Rhodes' (correct) assertion that "There are enormous gaps in our knowledge of the key actors and institutions in British government,"⁶³ when considering the real-world operations of Westminster systems as exemplified by Britain, New Zealand and Singapore, there is much that we do know. The Westminster system is cabinet government, a negotiated dictatorship of the elected political party leadership which "... has proved particularly susceptible to capture by elites..."⁶⁴ The executive is prone itself to capture by the prime minister who, depending upon his electoral record, control of the legislature and standing in the non-parliamentary party, can exercise enormous, but not monopolistic, power over policy and the state. The legislature is the captive of the executive and, through a combination of party discipline and the divisions enforced by the adversarial basis of the system, is usually capable of challenging, but rarely of overturning, executive policies and generally changes policy only at the margins. The parliament, in those jurisdictions without a written constitution, is sovereign and its laws cannot be overturned except by itself. The judicial branch is not a substantial impediment to the executive or legislature although it can make policy not only on the margins or in relation to technical issues, but occasionally in relation to key issues.

Through the use of a simple plurality voting system, resulting in majoritarian governments, the state is strong and can act decisively and quickly on policy if required. This provides the state with the capacity to resist populist demands and, when necessary, to implement pragmatic and unpopular policies. However, the power of the state has been restrained by convention and the development of a political culture which limits power abuse by governments.⁶⁵ This is reinforced by the development of political parties characterised by mass membership, strong discipline and a constituency based party structure. The tradition of single party majoritarian governments has simplified political accountability (as compared to coalition systems) so that the electorate could clearly judge each political party forming government on its performance. Accountability in terms of the relationships between financial inputs and policy outcomes, has been a consideration secondary to broad responsibility for

⁶³ R. A. W. Rhodes, "Preface", in, Patrick Weller, Herman Bakvis and R. A. W. Rhodes, eds., *The Hollow Crown: Countervailing Trends in Core Executives*, London, Macmillan, 1997, p. x

⁶⁴ See: Richard Mulgan, "The Westminster System and the Erosion of Democratic Legitimacy", in Bruce D. Gray and Robert B. McClintock, eds., *Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance*, Wellington, Legal Research Foundation/Brookers, 1995, pp. 265-282, p. 268

⁶⁵ Mulgan has commented: "In Westminster systems the democratic legitimacy of governments has depended ultimately on political conventions of government accountability." See: Mulgan, 1995, op. cit. p. 270

the operation of the political system in Westminster systems, linked as it is to the concept of ministerial responsibility.⁶⁶

The conventions upon which the legitimacy of Westminster systems are based rest quite explicitly on the maintenance of a political culture based on trust between political parties, the government and the electorate. This trust comprises an understanding that the electorate will allow strong government, with almost unrestricted powers between elections, on the basis that governments are seen to exercise this power in the general interest of the state, within a broad informal framework of consultation and negotiation and that no one group in society is explicitly and consistently advantaged, or disadvantaged, by the exercise of this power. The perpetuation of majoritarian government rests on this narrow base.

The principal of trust implicit in this legitimacy framework, extends to all institution of the state and most importantly to the judicial wing, the civil service and the armed forces. The powers and privileges of these institutions are held in trust for the people, albeit to an unspecified and probably incalculable degree, independently of that trust given to the parliament. There is an implicit expectation that, in the face of a government which betrays its trust and consistently breaks the framework of convention, these other institutions will act to maintain their responsibilities within the framework, resulting in a conflict between institutions which the electorate would have to resolve. While such inter-institutional conflict is extremely difficult to initiate, given the power of the executive under the Westminster system, it appears to be the popular expectation.⁶⁷ Thus the power of the executive is tempered by the necessity to maintain these conventions and to be seen to do so.

The legitimization framework of the Westminster state is maintained and strengthened by a continuous, broad interaction between the electorate and the institutions of power, whether constitutional (government and opposition) or extra-constitutional (political

⁶⁶ See: Bruce Stone, "Administrative Accountability in the 'Westminster' Democracies: Towards a New Conceptual Framework", *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, 8, 4, 1995, pp. 505-526, p.507

⁶⁷ This argument is implicit in Mulgan's analysis of the crisis of legitimacy in New Zealand politics. See: Mulgan, 1995 op. cit.. Jane Kelsey's analysis of the impact of a decade of neo-liberalist policy on perceptions of democracy also seem to support this analysis: "The 1993 knife-edge election result...reflected unhappiness with National and continued distrust of Labour. Both governments had been equally guilty of breaking election promises and shown contempt for democratic process and the electorate. Both were seen as captives of the Treasury, the Business Roundtable and their clones. Some people continued voting for either Labour or National...Increased support for...third parties...showed that others wanted to break the two party monopoly on power. The vote in favour of electoral reform in 1992 and for MMP in 1993, despite a big-business campaign, confirmed that a majority trusted neither party and wanted the electoral system itself changed." See: Jane Kelsey, *The New Zealand Experiment: A World Model for Structural Adjustment?*, Auckland, Auckland University Press, 1995, p. 301. That the electorate in Britain has an expectation that such breaches of convention and poor administration will be resolved politically, rather than through other mechanisms, such as the courts, is acknowledged by Ridley: "...the idea of 'political' rather than 'legal' protection of citizens against administration is deeply embedded in British political traditions and has imprinted itself on British ways of thought." See: F. F. Ridley, "The Citizen Against Authority: British Approaches to the Redress of Grievances", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 37, 1984, pp. 1-32, p. 4

parties). This interaction has formal elements (such as structured relationships between power groups, business, unions and others; participation by the public in inquiries, select committee proceedings) and informal elements (constituency work by parliamentarians, policy research, opinion polls). The framework is strengthened by the government making explicit its policy reasoning through parliament and the media and especially by acknowledging the limitations on its powers and abilities in the face of such forces as globalisation.

Westminster Democracy: A Summation

The core activities of policymaking in Westminster style democracies comprises a complex network of institutions, conventions and practices which revolve around the cabinet, the prime minister and their principal, usually civil service, advisers who interact variously with party, party factions and interest groups in negotiating the policy agenda of the state. These networks, of which there are many, include the formal structures of government; meetings of the cabinet, cabinet committees, interdepartmental committees, meetings of the major coordinating departments involved in intradepartmental deliberation or 'bilaterals'; meetings of party and caucus committees; and, a range of less formal, but nonetheless important components - informal ministerial gatherings, social events, meetings of formal factions or informal cliques of the like-minded all of which may involve policymakers from the government, the party, the bureaucracy or civil society groups. Despite the spread of these networks, the breadth of the Westminster institutions and the inclusiveness of the conventions upon which the system rests, the centre is small but power fragmented and the institutional structure strong and centralised. It is this institutional smallness of the centre, the multiple roles such size imposes on its inhabitants, the increasing fragmentation of the policy system and the lack of substantial empirical analyses of the contemporary Westminster state that has led to the definition and investigation of a 'core executive' as a tool for helping us focus beyond the legalistic framework on how such systems actually work.

THE CORE EXECUTIVE AND WESTMINSTER DEMOCRACY

In his analysis of who really makes policy in British governments, Willson identified the following groups; cabinet ministers; the Law Officers, but only as "expert legal consultants"; junior ministers, including ministers of State and parliamentary Secretaries, although they are essentially trainee ministers; and, officials, principally those in the Administrative Class, the "most senior of the executive Class", and a very few specialist civil servants such as military advisers.

Willson concludes that, at least in 1969, that " The policymaking centre of British government thus consists of a group at the most 3,500 strong, of whom only 100 are politicians or in any sense at all 'party political' appointees. These figures can be reduced to a nucleus of some 350, of whom not more than 50- and probably nearer 30 - are 'party political'."⁶⁸ But this information is now 30 years old! Is this still the case and if not, what has changed? This lack of contemporary empirical research on the British political system is what has led Dunleavy and Rhodes to propose the 'core executive' as a unit of analysis for contemporary systems of cabinet government, Westminster or otherwise, in order to overcome what they see as a lack of empirical research on what governments actually do within systems characterised by cabinet government.⁶⁹

What do we Mean by Core Executive?

As the analysis of the Westminster system above indicates, constitutionally the centre of policy making in these systems is the government's political executive, the cabinet presided over by the prime minister. Although the political executive is supreme, it is not omnipotent; it cannot do everything nor anything it wishes. Embedded in an institutional, social, cultural and economic matrix, the political executive operates through a range of relationships which dynamically facilitate or inhibit its policy program in relationship to the relative strength of institutions and the personal power of the executive. Some of these relationships are of its own choice, but many are specified by the arrangements imposed by formal institutional structures and conventions and by informal political, social, economic and cultural conventions. If the political executive exists at the centre of the policy system, it is a centre that must be shared with the others in these many relationships and it is this combination of actors at the centre that has been deemed by Dunleavy and Rhodes to be the 'core executive':

"The term 'executive' is used here to refer to the *centre of political authority which take policy decisions*. In other words, the executive institutions are not limited to prime minister and cabinet but also include ministers and their departments. The term 'core executive refers to *all those organisations and procedures which coordinate central government policies, and act as final arbiters of conflict between different parts of the government machine*. In brief, the 'core executive' is the heart of the machine, covering the complex web of institutions, networks and practices surrounding the prime minister, cabinet, cabinet committees and their official counterparts, less formalised ministerial 'clubs' or meetings, bilateral negotiations and interdepartmental committees. It also includes coordinating departments, chiefly the cabinet Office, the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the law officers and the security and intelligence services."⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Willson, op. cit. pp. 360-361

⁶⁹ The core executive concept was first proposed in: Patrick Dunleavy and R. A. W. Rhodes, "Core Executive Studies in Britain", *Public Administration*, 68, 1, 1990, pp. 3-28. See also: R. A. W. Rhodes, "From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive", in, R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, eds., *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive*. London, St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 11-37, p. 35

⁷⁰ Rhodes, 1995, op. cit., p. 12

In the United Kingdom, at least, the core executive is therefore "a moveable feast"⁷¹ not a static group and may change from one policy issue to another and from one government or prime minister to another.

Rhodes argues that the description of the work of the Westminster political executive as 'cabinet government' is no longer completely accurate. While enormous institutional power resides with the political executive and it still forms the centre of the policy system, the complexity of government is now such that power over the policy system is fragmented and the major challenge to the political executive is coordination and the resolution of conflicts between different parts of the policy system so as to ensure policy coherence. The notion of government has had to be complemented with ideas and methods of governance; making institutions work under conditions of increasingly complex modernity in which hierarchy becomes less important and the state is required to work with private and sub-national institutions within the market and civil society in order to achieve its policy goals.

The 'core executive' concept "directs attention to the extent and efficacy of, and the various mechanisms for, coordination."⁷² It is defined by its location at the centre of the policy system, its variability over time and its ability to substantially control policy choices. It asserts that there is not necessarily one constant political executive as captured by the 'cabinet government' concept, with relatively constant powers and influences over all policy areas. Rather, the 'core executive' is a concept characterised by institutional, power and temporal dispersion comprising "multiple actors whose relative power shifts over time and between policy areas."⁷³ The term does not necessarily define how the policy centre works, but redescribes it so that the focus is on the multiplicity of actors, roles and functions at the centre and methods of governance and is not distorted by an inappropriate focus on the prime minister, the cabinet or legalistic institutional arrangements which are not empirically reflected in the reality of how the policy system functions.⁷⁴

The core executive is defined by its location at the centre of the policy system, its variability over time and its ability to substantially control policy choices. Rhodes contends that the functions of the core executive are coordination and the resolution of conflicts within the policy system.⁷⁵ Andeweg finds this to be too narrow a focus and suggests that "functions such as the provision of democratic legitimation to government, or the creation of a channel for political accountability, or simply decision

⁷¹ Glyn Davis, "The core executive", in Brian Galligan, Ian McAllister and John Ravenhill, eds., *New Developments in Australian Politics*, Melbourne, Macmillan, 1997, pp. 85-101, p. 99

⁷² Rhodes, 1995, op. cit., p. 12

⁷³ Rhodes, 1995, op. cit., p. 26

⁷⁴ Martin J. Smith, "Reconceptualizing the British State: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges to Central Government", *Public Administration*, 76, 1998, pp. 45-72, pp. 46-51

⁷⁵ Rhodes, 1995, op. cit., p. 12

making: the “authoritative allocation of values” are equally valid functions.⁷⁶ Andeweg seems to equate cabinet government with a core executive and, in amending Rhodes’ functional approach, has instead analysed cabinet government on two dimensions of decision making; collegiality and collectivity. This has provided a typology of three types of cabinet government; collective, segmented and fragmented which form a continuum based on the success with which they integrate multiple interests within the policy discourse.⁷⁷

What Does the Core Executive Do?

Whichever approach one takes to examining the core executive, what it does is simply defined: it governs. Above all, the core executive concept seeks to empirically define the centre of government, to clarify what are the actual relations among institutions and other actors in the governance system. Within government, political power is not based solely on legalistic institutional position, but substantially on resource dependencies.⁷⁸ Thus ministers, senior civil servants and others in a position to influence policy choices interact through the exchange of resources which “take the form of games in which actors seek to realise their objectives and manoeuvre for advantage, deploying their resources to maximise their advantage while minimising their dependence on other actors.”⁷⁹ These resource exchanges do not follow hierarchical paths, but take place across networks within which resources are being constantly bargained for and exchanged in return for support for policy related goods. Thus the policy system is not characterised only by hierarchy, but by also by fragmentation across policy networks requiring considerable resources to coordinate and shape coherent policy goals and options. To govern effectively, the core executive undertakes this coordination function. According to Burch and Holliday, British cabinet government does this through the coordination of policy networks which “have almost uniformly become more coordinated, more regularised and more focused on the cabinet system.”⁸⁰ The cabinet becomes the centre of the policy network web and in effect is “the network that polices the functional policy networks.”⁸¹, resulting in the observation that the relationship structure of the British core executive is :

...like a dance, a quadrille in which the participating groups exercise figures in the middle of the floor but never entirely give up their independent identities. British government is a competition in which, one side never finally gaining complete mastery, the contending forces advance and retreat.⁸²

⁷⁶ Rudy Andeweg, “Collegiality and Collectivity: Cabinets, Cabinet Committees, and Cabinet Ministers”, in, Patrick Weller, Herman Bakvis and R. A. W. Rhodes, *The Hollow Crown: Countervailing Trends in Core Executives*, London, Macmillan, 1997, pp.58-83, p. 59

⁷⁷ Andeweg, 1997, op. cit., p79-83

⁷⁸ R. A. W Rhodes, *Control and Power in Central-Local Government Relations*, Farnborough, Gower, 1981

⁷⁹ Rhodes, 1997, op. cit., p. 203

⁸⁰ Martin Burch and Ian Holliday, *The British Cabinet System*, New York, Prentice Hall, 1996, p. 106

⁸¹ Rhodes, 1997, op. cit., p. 203

⁸² M. Dynes and D. Walker, *The New British State*, London, Times Books, 1995, p. 15

Under Westminster arrangements, this 'network of networks' has both a stable centre in the form of institutional arrangements for political and bureaucratic leadership, as outlined above, and a more flexible outer core, which as Burch and Holliday note, cannot escape the orbit of the cabinet system residing at the centre. While arguably, the inner core may once have been peopled by a mix of politicians and non-partisan bureaucrats, it has now been somewhat politicised. Key bureaucrats are increasingly political appointees, whether it be in Britain⁸³ or Australia⁸⁴ and whether the bureaucrat be a ministerial adviser,⁸⁵ a contracted consultant⁸⁶, a technical expert from a think tank⁸⁷, or a departmental secretary as under the Howard government in Australia. In Singapore, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, former Senior Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, contends that both the British colonial civil service and its successor within an independent Singapore, were both political in nature and to assert otherwise is to ignore public administration realities.⁸⁸

The outer core is less institutionalised than the inner core and changes more over time than the inner core according to policy issue and who inhabits the inner core. Aucoin, in a Canadian study has demonstrated that this outer core in particular is shaped by prime ministers so as to reflect their "personal philosophies of leadership, management styles, and political objectives."⁸⁹ although Smith rejects the application of such a notion to the British core executive.⁹⁰ It is inhabited by a variety of people representing a wide range of interests, some more consistent than others. These include bureaucrats involved in topical policy issues, political party officials, government advisory bodies, task forces and official commissions, interest group representatives, think tank staff, consultants, ministerial political advisers (other than the prime minister's) and kitchen cabinets whether the prime minister's or those of individual ministers.⁹¹

⁸³ Peter Aucoin, "Politicians, Public Servants and Public Management: Getting Government Right", in B. Guy Peters, and D. J. Savoie, eds., *Governance in a Changing Environment*, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 1995

⁸⁴ Richard Alaba, *Inside Bureaucratic Power: The Wilenski Review of New South Wales Government Administration*, Sydney, Hale and Iremonger, 1994, pp. 206-209

⁸⁵ See: D. Willetts, "The Role of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit", *Public Administration*, 65, 1987, pp. 443-454; and, D. D. Dunn, "Ministerial Staff in Australian Commonwealth Government", *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 54, 4, pp. 507-519

⁸⁶ For a study of the role of private sector consultants as ministerial advisers see: Denis Saint-Martin, "The New Managerialism and the Policy Influence of Consultants in Government: An Historical-Institutionalist Analysis of Britain, Canada and France", *Governance*, 11, 3, 1998, pp. 319-356

⁸⁷ For an analysis of the role of various forms of political consultants including think tanks in Britain, Australia and Canada, see: Herman Bakvis, "Advising the Executive: Think Tanks, Consultants, Political Staff and Kitchen Cabinets", in, Weller, Bakvis and Rhodes, op. cit., 1997, pp. 84-125, specifically pp. 97-106

⁸⁸ Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, "The Bureaucracy", in Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, eds., *The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam*, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1987, pp. 181-189, p. 184

⁸⁹ Peter Aucoin, "Organisational Change in Canadian Machinery of Government: from rational management to brokerage politics", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 19, 1, 1986, pp. 3-27, p.

⁹⁰ Martin Smith, *The Core Executive in Britain*, ESRC Whitehall Programme, brochure, undated, p. 2

⁹¹ Adapted from Bakvis, 1997, op. cit., pp. 92-95. Bakvis focuses in his study on non-bureaucratic sources of advice to the inner core executive.

These groups, while analytically distinct, are generally not mutually exclusive and there is a significant degree of overlap. Interest group officials may be members of the governing political party, sit on party committees, government commissions, act as consultants and be members of one or more kitchen cabinet; multiple roles are common. The inner core is principally concerned with major policy priorities, macro resource management (budget development), international relations, defence and security issues, maintaining control of the party and the image of the government in the electorate. Occasionally maintaining control of the parliament may be an issue of concern to the inner core, but usually not in unicameral Westminster systems such as New Zealand and Singapore where achieving government means complete control of the legislature.

The roles played by groups in the outer core complement the more institutionalised roles carried by the inner core: assisting the development of the party policy platform; assisting with the transition to government and policy implementation; undertaking partisan political tasks of which the bureaucracy is incapable; evaluating bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic policy advice; providing vision and ideas to develop and support the government's program; providing information of public opinion of policies and the government's performance, mobilising the bureaucracy and providing an environment for reflection and rejuvenation for the inner leadership.⁹²

However, the core executive is not a jumble of people and groups embroiled in coordination meetings revolving around an unstable centre fragmented by power distribution and game playing. Its principal task is to administer the state effectively and it establishes political, administrative and policy routines which incorporate all principal policy actors - ministers, bureaucrats, parliament, party, opposition and interest groups among others - to produce a stable government. Governing is eminently practical and stability essential to it.⁹³

The core executive uses constitutional and bureaucratic structures, rules and conventions to impose patterns of coordination, consultation and problem solving on political issues in which both institutions and networks are principal components. Policy preferences are set out by governments in platform statements. Administrative instructions including statements of specific policy programs, ideology and administrative arrangements for policy implementation and administration are issued and implemented. Methods for mediating among competing policy preferences are set in place. Formal institutional power is allocated by the appointments of ministers,

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 95-97

⁹³ A recent exposition of the way in which politics becomes a 'government of routines' is found in: Glynn Davis, *A Government of Routines: Executive Coordination in One Australian State*, Melbourne, Macmillan, 1996

advisers, bureaucrats and others which become linked to informal power arrangements through resource exchange games and bargaining. The system inherently stabilises as the practicalities of government are met by these arrangements; policy is made, implemented, assessed and changed. The cycle of bargaining, resource sharing and rare displays of naked prime ministerial power continues.

Westminster, the Core Executive and Singapore

Having considered the structure and dynamics characteristic of Westminster political systems and the nature, roles and dynamics of the core executive in such systems, how useful are these concepts for analysing how contemporary Singapore is governed?

Singapore is indisputably a democracy based on the Westminster model,⁹⁴ albeit, one that has been imposed in the context of post-colonial independence onto a cultural setting which is Asian, multi-ethnic, with no previous tradition of democracy and which has had to adapt itself to this society in order to operate effectively.⁹⁵ Although it is also a city-state – it is small, not the type of “large, modern nation state” within which Dunleavy and Rhodes conceive their view of a core executive⁹⁶ – it has a Westminster-style constitutional framework, its legal system is firmly within the English law community⁹⁷ and its public administration is founded and operates upon Whitehall principals.⁹⁸ In this environment, the concept of the core executive is a useful tool for the examination of both the structure and dynamics of governance, whether it be located in Europe or Asia. If, in such an environment, the core executive comprises “all those organisations and procedures which coordinate central government policies, and act as final arbiters of conflict between different parts of the government machine.”⁹⁹ what, then can be expect a Singaporean core executive to be? This issue is examined in the next section.

⁹⁴ Philip N. Pillai and Kevin Tan Yew Lee, “Constitutional Development”, in, Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 647-668, p. 655

⁹⁵ Thio Li-ann, “Choosing Representatives: Singapore Does it Her Way”, in, Graham Hassall and Cheryl Saunders, eds., *The People's Representatives: Electoral Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1997, pp. 38-58, p. 38

⁹⁶ Patrick Dunleavy and R. A. W. Rhodes, “Core Executive Studies in Britain”, *Public Administration*, 68, 1990, pp. 29-60, p. 9

⁹⁷ Andrew B. L. Phang, “Convergence and Divergence - A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of the Singapore and Hong Kong Legal Systems”, *Hong Kong Law Journal*, 23, 1, 1993, pp.1-30, p.4. Phang argued that by maintaining a legal system that was almost identical to the United Kingdom was a functional possibility in Singapore.

⁹⁸ Lee Boon Hiock, “The Bureaucracy”, in, Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 90-101

⁹⁹ R. A. W. Rhodes, “From Prime Ministerial power to Core Executive”, in, R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, eds., *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive*, London, Macmillan, 1995, pp. 11-37, p. 12

THE SINGAPOREAN CORE EXECUTIVE

Examination of the literature on the participants at the centre of the political process in Singapore is relatively sparse. In general, we have to resort to the broader literature on elites, the bureaucracy and aspects of government administration to identify those who may comprise the Singaporean core executive. With this constraint in mind, in this section we review the Singaporean literature in order to identify who might comprise the core executive in Singapore.

Political and Bureaucratic Components in the Core Executive

In his 1978 work, Peter Chen identified Singapore's power elites as being made up of three groups: civil bureaucrats, a political elite and a select professional elite.¹⁰⁰ The core of this elite is small comprising "professionals, intellectuals and trade union leaders" and excludes two-thirds of the members of members of parliament as well as the military and business elites, although leaders in the GLC sector were seen as being part of the civil bureaucratic elite which formed part of the core. Members of this core group are almost wholly drawn from the bureaucracy and the political executive with the professional elite "on the periphery". Members of the professional elite only enter the core group if they are sponsored and co-opted by the political elite; they have no power to demand or negotiate entry within their own resources.¹⁰¹ This core group, what Chen terms the "power elite", has a number of distinctive characteristics. This group was seen as being strong, cohesive and homogenous in terms of "political ideologies, interests and objectives regardless of their socio-economic background"; highly qualified in terms of "achievement, expertise, leadership ability, education and social recognition."; development oriented; exclusive in that it limited power sharing and acted to co-opt expertise while excluding members of the professional elite from acquiring political power separate from the power elite; and to be free of corruption as the political leadership and the bureaucrats do not "share the same interests and help each other to achieve their objectives".¹⁰²

All of these characteristics appear, at least at this time, to be defensible except for the last. As we saw in Chapter One, unity between the political and bureaucratic elites was purposely fostered by the PAP from the beginning of it taking power in 1959 leading to a commonality of values "of economic rationality, i.e. efficiency, competitiveness and achievement orientation."¹⁰³ Chen differentiated strongly between the bureaucratic elite and the political elite, whereas in an earlier work, Chan Heng Chee was already

¹⁰⁰ Peter S. J. Chen, "The Power Elite in Singapore", in Ong Jin Hui, Tong Chee Kiong and Tan Ern Ser, eds., *Understanding Singapore Society*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1997, pp. 7-16, p. 13

¹⁰¹ *ibid*

¹⁰² *ibid*, p. 14

¹⁰³ Shee Poon Kim, "Domestic Politics", in Arun Mahizhnan, ed., *Singapore: The Year in Review*, Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1991, pp. 26-41, p. 33

warning that 'meaningful' political power was already shifting from the political executive to the bureaucracy and such divisions were blurring.¹⁰⁴ Minchin indicates that this was unavoidable; the PAP on assuming office had, through Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee and Kenny (K. M.) Byrne sealed a power sharing pact with the higher civil service which was the foundation of their social control and policy capacity.¹⁰⁵ They had no other basis of power independent of the radical wing of the PAP which eventually formed the radically socialist Barisan Socialis. This dependency, and the significant degree of autonomy achieved by the higher civil service, was readily acknowledged by the first generation leaders such as Sinnathamby Rajaratnam¹⁰⁶ and Hon Siu Sen who had assisted in its politicisation.¹⁰⁷ The corollary of this relationship was that the roles and powers of the parliamentarian and the party officials and workers was drastically reduced, and by 1975 a new political leadership drawn from the university educated professional class was being recognised.¹⁰⁸

The role and influence of these intellectuals within the political leadership is disputed by Chen, Chan and Quah. Chen maintained that it was part of the core political leadership but Chan noted in 1975 that "The views of an independent intellectual receive no favour and if his views are critical of government power his function is not recognised as legitimate."¹⁰⁹ Quah, writing in 1984, maintained that this group of intellectuals participated in the policy system through their representation on statutory boards and government committees, but it is questionable that this representation was other than as individuals, given the PAP's then firm stance against sponsoring sectoral interests and its specific rejection of the notion of entrenching intellectual interests by reserving a certain number of seats for university staff in the parliament.¹¹⁰ However, Quah specifically rejects the concept of intellectuals serving in their individual capacity, a stance which seems decidedly at odds with the facts.¹¹¹ As the group of Singaporean academic grew, they were co-opted into the political system, as members of the party or in other ways, a route that Chan herself eventually adopted. Thus, from

¹⁰⁴ Chan Heng Chee, "Politics in an Administrative State: Where has the Politics Gone", in, Seah Chee Meow, ed., *Trends in Singapore: Proceedings and Background Paper*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1975, pp. 51-68, p. 51

¹⁰⁵ James Minchin, *No Man is an Island: A Portrait of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1990, p. 118

¹⁰⁶ S. Rajaratnam, "Mandarins of a New Order," *The Mirror*, 7 September, 1970, p. 1

¹⁰⁷ Hon Sui Sen, "Speech at the Official Opening of the Staff Training Institute", Singapore, Ministry of Culture, 1974, p. 1

¹⁰⁸ Seah Chee Meow, "Whither the City-State", in, Seah Chee Meow, ed., *Trends in Singapore: Proceedings and Background paper*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1975, pp. 3-38, p. 31

¹⁰⁹ Chan Heng Chee, "The Role of Intellectuals in Singapore Politics", in Wee Teong-Boo, ed., *The Future of Singapore - the Global City*, Singapore, Singapore, University Education Press, 1977, pp. 39-51, p. 46. This publication was a collection of papers originally given at a seminar organised in December 1975 by the Democratic Socialist Club of the University of Singapore.

¹¹⁰ Jon S. T. Quah, "The Public Policy-Making Process in Singapore", *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, 6, 2, 1986, pp. 108-126, p. 115

¹¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 117. The analysis of NUS and NTU staff representation on statutory boards and GLC boards undertaken in Chapter 7 refutes Quah's assertion.

the 1970s, significant numbers of academics became, directly or indirectly, drawn into the government and the bureaucracy.

The growing power of the bureaucracy was problematical. For Chan, the "increased role and importance of the bureaucrat in Singapore is staggering" and bureaucratic influence, if not control, over the core executive was cause for concern, principally because of the lack of accountability.¹¹² She was particularly concerned that the control of the GLC sector by bureaucrats was highly autonomous and particularly problematical, although Quah, the major writer on public administration in Singapore, seems not to have shared these concerns. Although generally ignoring intra-executive dynamics in his studies, he concluded in a 1989 paper that "Most, if not all, of the public policies in Singapore are formulated by the Cabinet..."¹¹³ and that "instances of policy formulation by senior civil servants are rare and constitute the exception rather than the rule."¹¹⁴ This naïve view is placed in perspective by the Public Service Commission which notes in its recruitment handbook that "Administrative Officers"¹¹⁵ ... are responsible for formulating and implementing Government policies."¹¹⁶

Studies of statutory boards, by Ow Chin Hock,¹¹⁷ Ker Sin Tze¹¹⁸ and Quah¹¹⁹ are problematical, as Ow and Ker are PAP cadres and became PAP MPs and Quah's study was descriptive and avoided an analysis of the obvious dominance of the boards by civil servants (and therefore had a policy making function) and the interactions between these two public sector groups.¹²⁰ This is somewhat rectified in Seah's analysis of the civil service in which he notes the close relationship between the higher civil service and the political executive, the role of civil servants in managing parastatal bodies, but clearly is not convinced of Chan's concerns about the institutionalisation of

¹¹² Chan, 1975, op. cit, p. 65

¹¹³ Jon S. T. Quah and Stella R. Quah, "The Limits of Government Intervention", in Kernial Singh Sandhu and Peter Wheatley, eds., *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 102-127, p. 109. This reflected the same view expressed in a 1984 paper by Jon S. T. Quah. See: Jon S. T. Quah, "The Public Policy-Making Process in Singapore", *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, 6, 1986, pp. 108-126, p. 117

¹¹⁴ Quah and Quah, 1989, op. cit, p. 108

¹¹⁵ These are members of the elite Administrative Service within the Singapore Civil Service which manages the public sector and from which the public sector leadership is almost wholly drawn.

¹¹⁶ Public Service Commission, *Your First Choice in Careers*, 5th ed., Singapore, Public Service Commission, 1994, p. 16

¹¹⁷ Ow Chin Hock, "Singapore", in Nguyen Truong, ed., *The Role of Public Enterprise in National Development in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects*, Singapore, RIHED, 1976, pp. 153-156

¹¹⁸ Ker Sin Tze, *Public Enterprises in ASEAN*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1978

¹¹⁹ Jon S. T. Quah, "Statutory Boards", in John S. T. Quah Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, *Government and Politics of Singapore*, rev. ed., Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 120, 145

¹²⁰ Jon Quah Siew Tien is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at NUS and is believed to have political control responsibilities within NUS, as exemplified in his involvement in the Christopher Lingle case. It is doubtful that he is a cadre member of the PAP however. He is arguably the most prolific contemporary author on public administration in Singapore, but his works have consistently ignored any critical examination of the public sector in depth. I was informed by two senior Administrative Service officers that Quah and all other political scientists have very limited access to the civil service, which would partly explain the paucity of literature on public sector elite dynamics in Singapore.

an 'administrative state'.¹²¹ He is subsequently persuaded by Chan's analysis, asserting in a 1999 paper that not only was Chan correct in her original hypothesis, but that the administrative state has grown beyond her predictions,¹²² with the bureaucracy becoming fused with the political and economic elites,¹²³ less accountable¹²⁴ although accepted by the people¹²⁵ but, under the Goh Chok Tong governments, more consultative.¹²⁶

The foundation of Chan's concerns, the nature of intra-executive dynamics and their reflection in state-society relations, were acknowledged within the political leadership itself, but as a strength, not a potential weakness. In 1978, Mansour Sukaimi, former Administrative Officer and freshly elected member of parliament noted that the politicisation of the higher civil service was necessary and should be institutionalised,¹²⁷ an approach supported by fellow MP and also former Administrative Officer, Bernard Chen Tien Lap¹²⁸ in his calling for an continued "intimate relationship between the next generation political leadership and the new generation civil servants."¹²⁹ In the same publication, Goh Chok Tong acknowledged the "tremendous power of these bureaucrats" in the "inner fortress", noting their autonomy and power.¹³⁰ Goh went on to equate backbenchers, one assumes descriptively rather than normatively, with counter-clerks in the civil service, both part of the "outer circle" of power with the MPs having even less power than the lowest bureaucrats.¹³¹ This supported Chan's earlier conclusion that "the bureaucracy is a close handmaiden of the party",¹³² a view reinforced by the then Deputy Prime Minister S. Rajaratnam in 1982 when he defined "the political leadership and the bureaucracy ... (constituting) the ruling establishment."¹³³ Rajaratnam, however, included MPs within the political establishment.¹³⁴ This role for the bureaucracy following its transfer from colonial to PAP control is not surprising; it is in accordance with British civil service tradition, albeit exaggerated in comparison to the British

¹²¹ Seah Chee Meow, "The Civil Service", in John S. T. Quah Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, *Government and Politics of Singapore*, rev. ed., Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp.92-119, particularly pp. 109-110

¹²² David Chee-Meow Seah, "The Administrative State: Quo Vadis?", in Linda Low, ed., *Singapore: Towards a Developed Status*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 250-270, p. 253

¹²³ *ibid.*

¹²⁴ *ibid.*, p. 260

¹²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 258

¹²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 269

¹²⁷ Mansour Hj Sukaimi, "Our Leadership Style is Elitist", *Petir*, 1, July 1978, p. 47

¹²⁸ Bernard Chen Tien Lap was also an officer in the Administrative Service, a former Deputy Secretary in the PMO and the Ministry of Finance before being elected to parliament.

¹²⁹ Bernard Chen, "Co-operation Amongst Civil Servants and MPs", *Petir*, 1, July 1978, p. 47

¹³⁰ Goh Chok Tong, "An MP and a Civil Servant", *Petir*, 1, July 1978, p. 45

¹³¹ *ibid.*

¹³² Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass-Roots*, Singapore, University of Singapore Press, 1976, p. 224

¹³³ Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, "The Bureaucracy", in Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, eds., *The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam*, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1987, pp. 181-189, p. 189

¹³⁴ Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, "Leadership Succession (1978)", in Chan and Obaid, 1987, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-181, p. 180

context.¹³⁵ Clearly, backbenchers are not considered to be part of the inner core executive, although they may be considered part of an outer core, whilst ministers and the higher civil service are.

The Military and the Core Executive

In his analysis, Chen excluded the military from the elite. While this may have been justifiable in 1975, only 8 years after the Singapore Armed Forces were established, it has certainly not been the case since the early 1980s when the officer corps began penetrating the military oriented GLCs¹³⁶ and from the mid-1980s when the corps, now beginning to mature, started to transfer officers to the civilian public sector and the legislature. Chan had identified the beginnings of a "military-industrial-administrative complex"¹³⁷ but did not proceed to later analyse its development except in 1985 to rather disingenuously assert that the SAF officer corps lacked "political consciousness".¹³⁸ Chan, however, did comment during the question and answer session at the end of a seminar on 24 November 1974, that if civilian rule failed in Singapore it could be replaced through a coup d'état by military rule.¹³⁹ A similar assessment was made by Shee in 1983, when he noted the "possibility of the military elites entering the political arena to compete with the civilian politicians." and even noted the possibility of the military sponsoring a non-PAP government should the PAP fail.¹⁴⁰

The possibility of the military participating in government in Singapore was dismissed by Crouch as late as 1988,¹⁴¹ although by then large numbers of the first generation of SAF officer-scholars¹⁴² had already been transferred into the public sector and some, such as Abbas bin Abu Amin,¹⁴³ Lee Hsien Loong, George Yeo and Teo Chee Hean, to

¹³⁵ For a candid analysis of the British civil service as a pressure group, see: James Michael, *The Politics of Secrecy*. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1983, pp. 11-35

¹³⁶ Initially to Intraco and its subsidiaries and then to Sheng-Li Holdings, the defence industries holding company created by the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) in 1974. Only small numbers from the officer corps actually went to Sheng-Li Holdings prior to the mid-1980s as the emphasis was on building military manpower and capability. However, civilian officers from MINDEF were transferred to these companies.

¹³⁷ Chan, 1975, op. cit., p. 61

¹³⁸ Chan Heng Chee, "Singapore", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia*. Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1985pp. 136-156, p. 153

¹³⁹ "Comments on Current and Future Trends", in Seah Chee Meow, ed., *Trends in Singapore: Proceedings and Background Paper*. Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1975, pp. 121-151, p. 136

¹⁴⁰ Shee Poon Kim, "Political Leadership and Succession in Singapore", in Peter S. J. Chen, eds., *Singapore Development Policies and Trends*. Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 173-196, p. 195

¹⁴¹ Harold Crouch, "The Military Mind and Economic Development", in J. Soedjati Djwandono and Yong Mun Cheong, eds., *Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia*. Singapore, ISEAS, 1988, pp. 49-72, p. 64

¹⁴² Those inducted through the scholarship scheme from 1971. Between 1971-1977, 149 SAF scholars were funded. From 1974 under the Wrangler Project, 10 per cent of the officer corps, approximately 250 men, those identified as having the potential for command and staff appointments, were provided with scholarship and other opportunities for development. The first Wrangler intake began to assume the most senior positions in the mid-1980s, including Lee Hsien Loong and George Yeo. See: Lee Kuan Yew, "Top Talent Flows into the SAF", in, *Defend What's Ours*. Singapore, Ministry of Culture, 1984, pp. 1-5

¹⁴³ Major Abbas was not a scholar. A graduate of the Teacher's Training College, he was Commanding Officer, School of Methods of Instruction and Commanding Officer, SAF Boys School before his retirement in 1979. He was

the legislature in 1980, 1984, 1988 and 1992 respectively.¹⁴⁴ However, Crouch's assessment that Singaporeans would have little tolerance for military government is undoubtedly correct and clarifies the debate; it is not the role of the military in governance *per se* that is at issue, it is the role of the officer corps and, in particular its senior ranks. Since this time, only two substantive studies have been made of the SAF's role in government; by Singh and Huxley respectively. Huxley's study is the only to date which has specifically examined the political role of the SAF officer corps.

In his study of the defence industries in 1990, Singh does not differentiate between the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the SAF, but concludes that MINDEF controls the defence industry sector through Singapore Technology Holdings, the GLC then responsible for this sector.¹⁴⁵ This provides the defence establishment with considerable control of a large part of the public sector. Huxley concludes in his study that Lee Hsien Loong was the principal minister in charge of MINDEF in the second half of the 1980s,¹⁴⁶ that MINDEF is increasingly controlled by the SAF and not the Administrative Service,¹⁴⁷ that Singapore Technologies "was effectively controlled by SAF retirees,"¹⁴⁸ that civilian control over MINDEF and the SAF had been 'significantly eroded' since the mid-1980s,¹⁴⁹ although "in the medium term at least, the SAF scholars in politics will remain the clients of the civilian political leadership.", although in the longer term they could become autonomous.¹⁵⁰ Huxley even raises the spectre of the 'hardline' leaders¹⁵¹ of the PAP using the SAF to support a martial law regime, although speculatively.¹⁵² Huxley concludes that the positioning of the SAF officer corps within the core executive is such that:

By the early 1990s, transfers of SAF officers into the civil service and statutory boards had arguably laid the basis for the transformation of what Chan Heng Chee referred to as an 'administrative state' into a military-administrative state.¹⁵³

Although Huxley's analysis is compelling, there is no consensus on the nature of the relationship between the military, civilian and bureaucratic components of the core

asked to stand for parliament as a Malay candidate because of a dearth of acceptable candidates from this ethnic group. He served from 1980-1991.

¹⁴⁴ Crouch was not alone in ignoring the entry of SAF officers and ex-officers to the bureaucracy and politics. In an article on political institutionalisation in Singapore in 1986, Lee Boon Hiok made no mention of this. See: Lee Boon Hiok, "Political Institutionalisation in Singapore", in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato and Jusuf Wanandi, eds., *Asian Political Socialization*, Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies University of California, 1986, pp. 201-220

¹⁴⁵ Bilveer Singh, "Singapore's Defence Industries", *Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence*, 70, 1990, p. 50

¹⁴⁶ Tim Huxley, "The Political Role of the Singapore Armed Forces' Officer Corps: Towards a Military-Administrative State?", *SDSC Working Paper*, 279, December 1993, p. 9

¹⁴⁷ Huxley doesn't mention the Administrative Service, but it is obvious that it is these officers that he asserts have been supplanted by SAF or ex-SAF officers. See: Huxley, *op. cit.* p. 10

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.* p. 12

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.* p. 14

¹⁵⁰ *ibid.* p. 16

¹⁵¹ One can only speculate what Huxley means by 'hardline', but one would suppose that he means those closely aligned to Lee Kuan Yew.

¹⁵² *ibid.* p. 17

¹⁵³ *ibid.* p. 19

executive.¹⁵⁴ Chan Heng Chee for example in her 1985 paper contends that "... contacts between top ranking military leaders and the civilian political leaders will take place on budget allocations and discussions of strategic matters, but the distinction between 'political' and 'military' areas of responsibility will be maintained."¹⁵⁵ This, as with Huxley's analysis, ignores the complexity of the relationship, the way in which the Administrative Service and the SAF officer corps are integrated through National Service and informal social networks, the role of the MINDEF permanent secretary and ministers in supervising the officer corps and the ways in which the political executive can maintain covert control over all significant people in the country through use of the ISD and its covert surveillance capabilities. Similarly, in 1988, Zakaria contends that the military "is not involved in any economic development function.", although it directly controls one of the largest domestic industrial-manufacturing corporations,¹⁵⁶ a stance explicitly contested by Yong who places the role of the officer corps in the perspective of the Total Defence paradigm which includes economic defence.¹⁵⁷

The SAF leadership obviously forms part of the core executive in Singapore, but the exact nature its dynamics within the executive remains largely hidden and requires further analysis. This group is probably not unitary, with the top leadership of the SAF General Staff probably residing within the inner core and other officers either in the outer core or intermittently form part of the core executive in relation to particular issues.

In addition to the public service bureaucracy and the SAF, three other PAP controlled bureaucracies were being developed as the regime flourished and consolidated; Government Linked Corporations (GLC), statutory boards and the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC).

GLCs and Statutory Boards Within the Core Executive

The development of a large number of government owned business enterprises, established either as private state-owned companies (the GLCs) or as statutory boards

¹⁵⁴ I do not agree with Huxley's assessment that Lee Hsien Loong was the paramount minister in the defence portfolio from 1985-91. Such an assessment undervalues the degree of control exercised by two other key figures; Goh Chok Tong as Minister for Defence and Lim Siang Guan as Permanent Secretary of MINDEF; both were more in control of the officer corps than Huxley either knew or acknowledges.¹⁵⁴ I also suspect that Huxley has over-subscribed to the general belief in Singapore that Lee Hsien Loong was destined for the prime ministership; the conventional wisdom in Singapore consistently underestimates Goh Chok Tong's political prowess and ability to manage his relationship with the Lees without great detriment to his own authority.

¹⁵⁵ Chan Heng Chee, "Singapore", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 136-156, p. 154

¹⁵⁶ Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "The Military and Development in Malaysia and Brunei, with a Short Survey on Singapore", in J. Soedjati Djihadono and Yong Mun Cheong, eds., *Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1988, pp. 231-254, p. 246

¹⁵⁷ Yong Mun Cheong, "The Military and Development in Singapore", in J. Soedjati Djihadono and Yong Mun Cheong, eds., *Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1988, pp. 279-290, p. 289

which operate on a commercial rather than a subsidised basis, has been frequently noted as a distinctive feature of the Singaporean public sector.¹⁵⁸ This network of companies and boards has developed since the late 1950s, originally under colonial guidance through statutory boards and defence facilities, expanded following independence until, by 1991 the GLCs and the 15 largest statutory boards accounted for 74.7 per cent of the total profits of domestic (i. e. non-MNC) companies¹⁵⁹ and the GLCs alone for half of the capitalisation of the Singapore Stock Exchange.¹⁶⁰ By 1997, boards and GLCs combined accounted for over 60 per cent of Singapore's GDP.¹⁶¹

Described by Huff as "state directed capitalism .. resembling socialist central planning more than private free market capitalism",¹⁶² it was justified by successive governments as an essential feature of rapid sustainable economic development.¹⁶³ So intrusive is this sector in the local economy that Lim has questioned Singapore's economy as being a free market economy except for the MNC sector.¹⁶⁴ Singh and Siah note, for example, that GLCs are major players in the manufacturing, transportation and engineering sectors, that the entire marine and shipping sector in Singapore should be considered government controlled¹⁶⁵ as is the telecommunications sector despite the introduction of "guided competition" to the former wholly state-owned monopoly provider.¹⁶⁶ The GLC sector, which has assets of approximately \$S170 billion, is completely under executive control despite minority public shareholdings in some companies such as Singapore Telecom and Singapore International Airlines. As an indication of the almost complete autonomy of this sector, until 1998, the government even refused to disclose the reserves of government owned banks¹⁶⁷ and it

¹⁵⁸ See: Lawrence B. Krause, "Government as Entrepreneur", in Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 436-451. A more recent work which examines how the Economic Development Board acted as an state entrepreneur is: Edgar H. Schein, *Strategic Pragmatism: The Culture of Singapore's Economic Development Board*, Cambridge (Mass.), The MIT Press, 1997

¹⁵⁹ Werner Vennewald, "Technocrats in the State Enterprise System of Singapore", *Asia Research Centre Working Paper*, 32, November 1994, p. 25

¹⁶⁰ "Half of SES capitalisation comes from Govt-linked firms", *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 30 November 1991, p. 20. Temasek Holdings, the holding company for domestic GLCs as opposed to those associated with the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, had a market capitalisation of \$S88.2 billion in June 1999 and accounted for a quarter of the total market capitalisation of the stock exchange. See: Conrad Raj and Patrick Daniel, "Temasek fine-tunes stewardship of its companies", *Business Times*, 25 June 1999

¹⁶¹ Embassy of the United States Singapore, *Country Commercial Guide FY 1999: Singapore*, Singapore, Embassy of the United States, July 1998, p. 6

¹⁶² W. G. Huff, *The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth century*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 336

¹⁶³ Goh Keng Swee, "A Socialist Economy That Works", in Goh Keng Swee, *The Practice of Economic Growth*, Singapore, Federal Publications, 1995, pp. 94-106, p. 103

¹⁶⁴ Linda Y. C. Lim, "Singapore's Success: The Myth of the Free Market Economy", *Asian Survey*, 23, 6, 1983, pp. 263-275

¹⁶⁵ Kulwant Singh and Siah Hwee Ang, "The Strategies and Success of Government Linked Corporations in Singapore", *Faculty of Business Administration Research Paper Series*, National University of Singapore, 98-06, February 1998, p. 12

¹⁶⁶ Kulwant Singh. *Guided Competition in Singapore's Telecommunications Industry*. Paper presented at the Fourth Annual Conference of the Consortium for Research on Telecommunications Policy and Strategy, University of Michigan, 1998.

¹⁶⁷ Lee Hsien Loong, *Speech by DPM Lee Hsien Loong at the 25th Anniversary Dinner of the Association of Banks in Singapore on 8 June 1998*. Available at: http://www.mas.gov.sg/newspeeches/sp_080698-c.html, 2 November 1998

will still not publish annual reports of the major holding companies except those which have been partially privatised, including those of the republic's largest state investment company, the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) or Temasek Holdings.¹⁶⁸ The executive consistently refuses to provide any significant disclosure on the actual performance of its holding companies, even under parliamentary questioning.¹⁶⁹ The executive also allocates a proportion of the state's official reserves to Singapore Technology Holdings and Temasek Holdings to invest and manage, thus assigning to them a role well beyond that of the usual type of state-owned enterprise.¹⁷⁰ The government has though, only in recent years, begun to answer some questions about the holding companies in response to widespread public suspicion as to why the government is so secret about them.¹⁷¹

Despite what seems to be a greater degree of management autonomy than the statutory board sector, the GLC sector is integrated with the rest of the public sector, principally through the appointment of senior public servants to GLC boards.¹⁷² This integration is reinforced by a Singaporean form of *amakudari*¹⁷³ in which former civil servants are appointed to a position in a GLC on retirement.¹⁷⁴ A number of prominent *amakudari* appointments include those detailed in Table 3.1 below.

In managing these sectors, the political executive integrates them through the civil service, principally using key appointees from the Administrative Service and the party.¹⁷⁵ This integration of the civil service, statutory boards and GLC bureaucracies

¹⁶⁸ See: Lawrence B. Krause, "The Government as an Entrepreneur", in Lawrence B. Krause, Koh Ai Tee and Lee Tsao Yuan, *The Singapore Economy Reconsidered*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1987, pp. 107-127, p. 122

¹⁶⁹ For example, in parliament in 1994, Finance Minister Richard Hu refused to reveal the amount of national reserves managed by any government agency or how the companies' investments performed. See: "Investment of Official Reserves", *Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report*, 63, 5, 25 August 1994, p. 489

¹⁷⁰ "Investment of Official Reserves", *Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report*, 63, 5, 25 August 1994, p. 489

¹⁷¹ For example, see: "GIC credit limit breaches totalled S\$7m", *Straits Times*, 2 October 1996; "GIC incurred losses on investments", *Straits Times*, 3 December 1996

¹⁷² There are also transfers of staff to the GLC sector from the civil service and statutory boards. Examples of transfers from the civil service to GLCs include the transfer of Ho Ching from an engineering research management position in the Defence Science Organisation to a similar position in Chartered Industries of Singapore in 1985¹⁷² and, in late 1990, of Quek Chee Hoon from General Manager, Singapore Totalisator Board to a position as Senior Vice-President, Temasek Holdings. In 1998, Peter Ong Boon Kwee, Deputy Secretary in MTI, was posted to Temasek Holdings as Executive Vice-President for a two year appointment and Dileep Nair, Deputy Secretary in MOF, was CEO of POSBank before its merger with DBS Bank.

¹⁷³ *Amakudari* is the practice in the Japanese civil service of senior executives being appointed to quasi-government or private sector companies with close links to the government, on retirement. Many of these positions have executive responsibilities, but equally, many are sinecures or lowly paid jobs to provide additional retirement income.

¹⁷⁴ They may also be appointed to an executive position in the NTUC or a private company strongly affiliated with the government. These positions are not usually sinecures in the way that many Japanese *amakudari* appointments are made, nor are they viewed as low paying retirement income supplements; they are genuine appointments and carry full responsibilities. In the case of the appointment of retiring SAF officers, *amakudari* appointments are a major strategy in retaining civilian control of the SAF officer corps through the institutionalisation of a structured early retirement and career succession strategy integrated with a high recruitment level to the SAF officer corps and early retirement. This effectively emasculates its development into a national interest group, while retaining experienced, highly educated officers as key players in non-military roles after retirement from the SAF.

¹⁷⁵ Vennwald provides one recent analysis of this integration. See: Vennwald, op. cit.

created what Heyzer terms the "(new) government-industrial bureaucratic network"¹⁷⁶ which obviously lies within the core executive. It is the nature of this network in an expanded form which will be examined in Chapter Seven.

¹⁷⁶ Noeleen Heyzer, "International Production and Social Change: An Analysis of the State, Employment and Trade Unions in Singapore", in Peter S. J. Chen, ed., *Singapore Development Policies and Trends*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 105-128, p. 113

Table 3.1: Examples of *amakudari* Appointments in the Singapore Public Sector

Person	Original Position	Amakudari Position
Herman Hochstadt	Permanent Secretary, MOF	Executive Chairman, ECICS
Sim Kee Boon	Permanent Secretary, PMO	Executive Chairman, SembCorp
Hsu Tse-Kwang	Commissioner of Inland Revenue	Executive Chairman, Sembawang Holdings
Kemel Siddique	Deputy Secretary and Ambassador to Germany, MFA	Managing Director, Sembawang Business International
Hiew Siew Nam	Director-General, Public Works Department, MND	Director (Project Completion), Marina Centre Holdings – POSB subsidiary.
BG Boey Tak Hap	Chief of Army	Deputy Chief Executive (Operations) PUB then President & CEO, Singapore Power
BG Lee Hsien Yang	Director, Joint Operations and planning Division, MINDEF	President and CEO, Singapore Telecommunications Ltd.
MG Goh Yong Siang	Chief of Air Force	Executive Vice-President (International Marketing), ST Industrial Corporation
Col. Lim Poh Seng	Assistant Chief of General Staff (Training) MINDEF	Director, Central Emergency Planning Office, MHA
Lt-Gen. Ng Jui Ping	Chief of Defence Force	Deputy Chairman, CPF; Chairman, Chartered Industries of Singapore
Tan Chok Kian	Permanent Secretary	Singapore Trade Representative, Taiwan and now independent director on several GLC boards
Col. Michael Low Oon Hoe	Assistant Chief of General Staff (Logistics)	Vice-President, Human Resources, Times Publishing
Dr. Kwa Soon Bee	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health	MD, Jurong Bird Park (Pte.) Ltd
RAdm (ret.) James Leo Chin Lian	Chief of Navy	Executive Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering
Lim Jit Poh	Executive Director, National Productivity Board	Executive Director, Lum Chang Holdings Limited
BG Lim Meng Kin	Commander, Singapore Medical Corps, SAF	MD, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd
MG Lim Neo Chian	Chief of Defence Force	CEO, Jurong Town Corporation
Lim Hock San	Director-General, CAAS	President and CEO, United Industrial Corporation
RAdm Kwek Siew Jin	Chief of Navy	Managing Director, Singapore MRT Ltd
Bernard Chen Tien Lap	Deputy Secretary, PMO	First Fraser and Neave and then CEO, Intraco (Following appointment as an MP)
BG Tan Yong Soon	Regular SAF & Deputy Secretary (Policy) MINDEF	Deputy Secretary (Policy) MOF
BG Lam Joon Khoi	JID & Commander 3 rd Division SAF	Deputy Secretary (Services) MOF
Col. Ho Meng Kit	Director, Resource Plans, MINDEF	Deputy Secretary (Services) MITA
BG Yam Ah Mee	Commander Air Defence Systems Division & former Head, Air Plans Department	Deputy Secretary (Development), PMO ¹⁷⁷
BG Patrick Choy Choong Tow	Director, JID, MINDEF	Ambassador to Myanmar, MFA
BG Michael Teo Eng Cheng	Chief of Air Force	High Commissioner to New Zealand, Ambassador to Korea, MFA
BG Chin Siat Yoon	Director, JID, MINDEF	Ambassador to Germany & China
Ngiam Tong Dow	Permanent Secretary, MOF	Chairman, CPF and HDB

¹⁷⁷ The Scenario Planning Office within the Public Service Division of the PMO reports to BG Yam.

Unions as a Component of the Core Executive

After creating the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), the relationship between the party and the unions became such that it went beyond what is even now termed a symbiotic relationship,¹⁷⁸ to one in which the NTUC is incorporated within a government-party nexus,¹⁷⁹ which was then extended beyond government into the development of an "integral society" which the NTUC has endeavoured to establish through its own business enterprises and entrepreneurial activities¹⁸⁰ and a reconceptualisation of itself from an advocate of anti-colonial politics and class struggle to a "co-owner" of society.¹⁸¹ This has resulted in the creation within the NTUC domain of a series of private investment and holding companies and cooperative societies, including the Singapore Labour Foundation (now incorporated within the Ministry of Community Development) and a number of wealthy co-operatives which operate supermarkets, travel agencies, pharmacies, dental clinics, medical services, an insurance company, financial services, construction, personal care services, childcare, a taxi and general transport company,¹⁸² radio and media businesses, a residential building cooperative, sports clubs, resorts and nightclubs.¹⁸³ The NTUC also funds and operates the national industrial relations training institute which offers courses to unionists, private sector executives and government officials; the Singapore Institute of Labour Studies (SILS).

The reality of this incorporation at the bureaucratic level was confirmed in interviews with senior civil servants in the Ministry of Labour in 1995, one of whom had been transferred three times to and from the ministry to the NTUC in order to supervise a group of unions, work on special research projects and assist the NTUC design and implement government policies.¹⁸⁴ This interchange at the bureaucratic level is

¹⁷⁸ Venkatraman Anantaraman, *Singapore Industrial Relations System*, Singapore, McGraw-Hill, 1990, p. 173. An historical explanation of this 'symbiosis' is provided in: Ong Teng Cheong, "PAP-NTUC Symbiosis", in *Petir*, 30th anniversary edition, 1984, pp. 68-73,

¹⁷⁹ Frederic C. Deyo, *Dependent Development and Industrial Order: An Asian Case Study*, New York, Praeger, 1981, p. 42. Deyo interprets this incorporation as part of a general strategy of authoritarian state corporatism. See: *ibid.*, pp. 1-21

¹⁸⁰ Noeleen Heyzer, "International Production and Social Change: An Analysis of the State, Employment and Trade Unions in Singapore", in Peter S. J. Chen, ed., *Singapore Development Policies and Trends*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 105-128, p. 122

¹⁸¹ Lim Chee Onn, "The Relationship between Political Parties and Trade Unions in the Context of Economic Development", in Saw Swee Hock and R. S. Bhatia, eds., *Singapore Towards the Year 2000*, Singapore, Singapore University Press 1981, p. 62

¹⁸² The original Comfort Taxi Cooperative was privatised in 1993 and formed the Comfort Group which is made up of several transport related companies and a residential property development company. Ong indicated that such transfers were normal and widespread, based on providing assistance to the NTUC when needed and on educating Division 1 and Administrative Service officers on the realities of industrial relations, particularly in the Ministry of Manpower.

¹⁸³ A recent paper that details the components of the tripartite system and other NTUC related domains is: Evelyn S. Wong, "Socio-Economic Projects: Strengthening the Trade Union Movement in Singapore", in Arnold Wehmhoner, ed., *NICs in Asia: A Challenge to Trade Unions*, Singapore, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1993, pp. 31-45,

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Ong Yen Her, Divisional Director, Labour Relations Division. Ong indicated that such transfers were normal and widespread, based on providing assistance to the NTUC when needed and on educating Division 1 and Administrative Service officers on the realities of industrial relations, particularly in the Ministry of Manpower.

accompanied by the appointment of PAP MPs as advisers to unions, including MPs not previously associated with the union movement, although this role is not one of regular, but political, supervision of unions.¹⁸⁵ Despite the integrated nature of this relationship, including since 1972 the central role of the National Wages Council in labour policy¹⁸⁶, the consistent recruitment of PAP MPs from the NTUC and the appointment of NTUC officers such as S. R. Nathan,¹⁸⁷ C. V. Devan Nair¹⁸⁸ to public and political office, Quah insisted in 1984 that "... trade unions ... do not play an active role in the formulation of public policies in Singapore."¹⁸⁹ The true role of the NTUC within the policy system, already entrenched by 1984, was identified by Vasil in 1989 when he described the "special relationship between the second-generation leaders of the government and the union movement..."¹⁹⁰

In June 1980, the Central Committee of the NTUC approved an institutional arrangement devised ... by Devan Nair. It included participation by the Secretary-General of the NTUC in cabinet meetings and the creation of a special liaison committee of the PAP and NTUC. On 15 September, NTUC Secretary-General Lim Chee Onn was appointed Minister without (sic) Portfolio. Soon afterwards, the NTUC-PAP Liaison Committee was constituted. It consisted of four second-generation leaders of government - Goh Chok Tong, Ong Teng Cheong, S. Dhanabalan, and Ahmad Mattar, and four NTUC representatives headed by Devan Nair.¹⁹¹

These NTUC based strategies did not empower workers, unions or employer groups themselves as loci of political influence; rather, it allowed the political and bureaucratic executives to be projected into and assume control over the unions thus removing workers from any control over policy.¹⁹² This is exemplified by the increased appointment of NTUC executives to statutory boards commencing in 1984, of Administrative Officers' appointments to unions and the supervision of unions by the Ministry of Manpower.¹⁹³ Although Tan argues that this incorporation has empowered workers through an emphasis on citizenship rather than a class basis of state-union relationships, he acknowledges that this does not include direct political power and trade unions remain subordinated by the state.¹⁹⁴ This is therefore, the incorporation of

¹⁸⁵ "Back-up support", *Petir*, May/June 1994, pp. 19-21

¹⁸⁶ The NTUC has statutory representation on the NWC.

¹⁸⁷ Appointed President of Singapore in 1999, former NTUC official, civil servant, foundation director of the Security and Intelligence Division (the external security service), managing director of Singapore Press Holdings, ambassador and director of the Institute of Strategic and Defence Studies.

¹⁸⁸ Former Secretary-General of the NTUC, MP and president of Singapore.

¹⁸⁹ Jon S. T. Quah, "The Public Policy-Making Process in Singapore", *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, 6, 2, 1984, pp. 108-126, p. 117

¹⁹⁰ Raj Vasil, "Trade Unions", in Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *The Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 144-170, p. 167

¹⁹¹ *ibid.*, p. 167

¹⁹² Deyo's comments on this strategy of alienation of workers from political influence in Singapore and East Asia in general. See: Frederic C. Deyo, *Beneath the Miracle: Labour Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989, p. 1

¹⁹³ "Younger NTUC men for stat boards: Officers to look out for workers' interests", *The Straits Times*, 8 November 1984, p. 14

¹⁹⁴ Tan Ern Ser, "Theorizing the Dynamics of Industrial Relations and Trade Unionism: Lessons from the Singapore Case", in Lee Boon Hiok and Susan Orjitham, eds., *Malaysia and Singapore: Experiences in Industrialization and Urban Development*, Kuala Lumpur, The Faculty of Arts and Sciences University of Malaya, 1993, pp. 188-209, p. 206

a technocratic union leadership within the core executive, not a representation of the working class or genuine representatives of rank and file unionists as one would find in a British Labour government.

The Judiciary Within the Core Executive

Nowhere in the Singaporean literature do we find the judiciary within the core executive. It is not that the judiciary is specifically excluded from discussions of the centre of political power; it is simply not mentioned. This may be, as Catherine Lim noted in 1998, because discussion of the judiciary in publications is a “no-no”.¹⁹⁵ It is only since the increased use of legal action rather than the ISA against political opponents from the late 1980s onwards that the political role of the judiciary has been widely considered, but it has been ignored by domestic political analysts.¹⁹⁶ Its prior neglect can probably be explained by the inherited habits of British legal culture and the longevity in office of the first Chief Justice who had no obvious allegiance to the PAP or to Lee Kuan Yew, although he had a general allegiance to the regime. In this study, the judiciary will be considered as part of the core executive and is examined in detail in Chapter Five.

The Party and the Core Executive

The party has not generally been seen as being part of the core executive except for the party's Central Executive Committee which is largely synonymous with the cabinet. Pang's 1971 analysis revealed a party which was disenfranchised from policy making with branches being supplanted in importance by the development of a number of grassroots organisations (GROs) such as the Residents' Committees established in 1965 and Citizen's Consultative Committees.¹⁹⁷ The party has no external affiliates, such as trade unions, and so cannot use this route to mediate its entry to the core executive.¹⁹⁸ The party is dominated by a CEC that is autonomous and autocratic, allowing the party machine no political power,¹⁹⁹ restricts the size of the party bureaucracy so that it cannot develop any autonomy,²⁰⁰ has total control over parliamentary pre-selection,²⁰¹

¹⁹⁵ Koh Buck Song, “What plants will grow under the tembusu tree?”, *Straits Times*, 9 May 1998, p. 14

¹⁹⁶ On discussing the lack of political commentary on this issue with a senior lawyer, I was informed that any domestic comment which mirrored foreign criticisms of the judiciary would be met by civil action by the government, the least of which charges would be scandalising the judiciary. If an academic were to publish such material, the government through the employer would almost certainly also press administrative charges and it was even possible for a state or quasi-state employee to be dismissed for being critical of the government. This is a very sensitive political issue and one cannot expect domestic political analysts to deal with it.

¹⁹⁷ Pang Cheng Lian, *Singapore's People's Action Party Its History, Organisation and Leadership*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 27

¹⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 56

¹⁹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 26

²⁰⁰ *ibid.*, p. 34

²⁰¹ *ibid.*, p. 42

restricts party MPs from organising as a group,²⁰² in which party service is subsidiary to the quality of a person's relationship to the political executive and in which policy discourse and political struggle have been moved from the party arena and internalised within the political executive.²⁰³ Pang summarised power relations within the party as:

The leaders of the PAP may be divided into three categories. At the apex are the policymakers who form the CEC, within which another inner circle may be detected. At the base are the executives - the members of the branch committees who are also expected to act as intermediaries between the policy-makers and the Party members. Between these two groups are the MPs. Being appointed by the CEC they cannot be regarded as belonging to the group of decision makers though the views of some are sought in the policy-making process. At the same time they cannot be classified as branch activists because many of them have very little to do with their branches and most of the work is done by the committee members. The party's paid officials wield little power.²⁰⁴

This was still the case in 1975 when Chan's study provided an analysis of the PAP party organisation and its community roots, describing it as being kept intentionally "dormant and underdeveloped",²⁰⁵ and remained so until approximately 1985 when, under Goh Chok Tong, the, initially unsuccessful, re-development of the party as an integral part of political discourse and experience slowly re-commenced.²⁰⁶ However, this re-development emphasised the recruitment of new members, a renewal of the cadre membership, the development of the PAP Community Foundation (PCF) and, most importantly, the role of the party in providing grassroots experience and training for potential political candidates, particularly those selected for possible membership of the political executive. The political socialisation of new ministers by MPs and branch secretaries is a particularly important task for the party organisation. Speaking in 1994, Loh Meng See, MP for Kampong Glam GPC commented that;

New leaders like BG George Yeo, Lim Hng Kiang and RAdm Teo have been brought into the ranks. They need to be filled in on the political background of our constituencies. Only our Branches can do that.²⁰⁷

This is achieved by ministers, acting as adviser to branches or in their capacity as chairmen of district executive committees, undertaking bi-monthly 'walkabouts' in constituencies, meeting with GROs, Young PAP, Women's Wing and PCF branches, and taking responsibility as advisers to community centres, CCCs and RCs. An outline of the organisation of the PAP in 1996 is provided in Appendix 1.

²⁰² *ibid.*, 38. There has never been a party caucus or any way in which party MPs can meet as a group, not even within the parliament, except within the parliamentary chamber and during parliamentary refreshment breaks. MPs in group representation constituencies meet amongst themselves on a regular basis, but this is only in small groups.

²⁰³ Pang, 1971, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-36

²⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p. 34

²⁰⁵ Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass-Roots*, Singapore, University of Singapore Press, 1976, p. 225-226

²⁰⁶ Chan Heng Chee, "The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System", in Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *The Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 70-89, p. 83

²⁰⁷ "Learning from change", *Petir*, July/August 1994, pp. 37, p. 37

The idea of having a small camarilla at the party's, and government's, centre of power, as suggested by Pang, has remained popular, although its continuation was questioned in 1985 by Bellows in light of the change to the current leadership.²⁰⁸ In 1994 it continued to draw support from well informed domestic commentators Cherian George²⁰⁹ and Chia Shi Teck,²¹⁰ the latter a PAP cadre who described the camarilla of Goh Chok Tong, Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong as the "Holy Trinity".²¹¹ This interpretation was supported by my 1995 interviews, but only partially by my 1998 series as will be further discussed in later chapters.

Particularly since 1992 when Lee Kuan Yew handed the PAP secretary-generalship to Goh Chok Tong, Goh has reshaped the party and developed within it a strong personal base. Prior to this, Goh had already been rebuilding the party base in association with Lee Hsien Loong, Tony Tan and the other second generation leaders. Party restructuring had not had much success before this and the loss of four seats in the 1991 general election combined with the transfer of the prime ministership to Goh provided an incentive to get party reform back on track. In this task, Goh has been assisted in developing the party as his strongest personal base by a number of MPs and former MPs who have informally coalesced into the core of his party support group. Of this group, some have obvious affiliations to Goh, such as his old school friend, Tan Cheng Bock, and ministers such as George Yeo and Matthias Yao Chih, while others have worked more quietly in the background such as Lim Chee Onn, Wan Soon Bee and Ow Chin Hock.

By 1995, under Goh's guidance, the party had been substantially reformed and invigorated, was under his control with the branch executives incorporated into the outer circle of the political executive. They have been given responsibility for a number of specific political intelligence and political socialisation tasks; selling government policies at the grassroots, controlling GROs and the PCF network, the political socialisation of MPs and ministers, recruitment of members, the initial testing of ministerial candidates and political intelligence feedback and feed-forward to MPs, ministers and government agencies. However the party remains firmly under the control of the political executive, the party bureaucracy remains substantially powerless and the pattern of participation of party officials in the core executive is probably intermittent.

²⁰⁸ Thomas J. Bellows, "Bureaucracy and Development in Singapore", *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, 7,1, June 1985, pp. 55-69, p. 58

²⁰⁹ Cherian George, "Domestic Politics" in, Yap Mui Teng, *Singapore: The Year in Review 1994*, Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1995, pp. 52-60, p.53

²¹⁰ Chia Shi Teck, "Commentary", in, Yap Mui Teng, *Singapore: The Year in Review 1994*, Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1995, pp. 61-66, p.5361

²¹¹ This is probably a pun on a common Singaporean expression asserting that the three form the secular equivalent of the Christian godhead: Father, Son and the Holy Goh.

Backbenchers as a Component

The greater involvement of MPs and ministers in party activities has been accompanied by the introduction of Government Parliamentary Committees (GPCs) within the parliamentary party in 1987. Although the PAP does not recognise a parliamentary party distinct from the party as a whole, the GPCs are perhaps the beginning of building a greater role for the parliamentary wing. Another Goh innovation, they form an essential part of his plan to widen consultation and broaden policy input while avoiding any significant erosion of executive power. The GPCs, of which there are now 11²¹², comprise four to five backbenchers, are chaired by senior backbenchers and are assigned to shadow the policy domains of one or at most two ministries. However the GPCs cannot actually do this; they usually limit themselves to two to three policy issues which they investigate through consultation with GROs, party branches and their resource panels.²¹³ The relevant ministries provide policy briefings at least every three months to each GPC and, at least in some ministries, consult with the GPC prior to new legislation being introduced.²¹⁴

The relationship between the GPCs and ministries is, however, biased in power terms towards the ministries; they do not see the GPCs as having power within the policy system and the GPCs accept this, despite the theoretical constitutional power they could bring to bear if the legislature had any genuine autonomy.²¹⁵ Peter Sung, then a junior minister, commented that within the policy system "... the contribution (of GPCs) to policy formulation consists mainly of inputs and views on the political consequences of policies."²¹⁶ The GPCs are assisted by resource panels, made up of approximately 10 interested or expert members many of whom are believed to be party members or affiliates. In 1994 for example, the GPC for Health had members from the NTUC, the pharmaceutical industry, the People's Association Senior Citizens' group, employers, academics, a general practitioner and the matron of an aged persons' home.²¹⁷ According to Bernard Chen Tien Lap, an former Deputy Secretary in the civil service and then a minister;

Without a GPC, a MP is limited in only a superficial understanding of how the various policies come about. But with an area of concentration, like education or health, members now have an

²¹² The GPCs are: Communications, Community Development, Defence and foreign Affairs, Education, Environment, Finance, Trade and Industry, Health, Home Affairs and Law, Information and the Arts and Manpower and National Development.

²¹³ See the comments from the 1995 GPC chairmen, all of whom indicated that their committees could pay attention to no more than three policy issues in their three year terms of office. See: "Our plans are... The five new GPC chairmen talk about what they intend to do during their term of office.", *Petir*, July/August 1995, pp. 49-55

²¹⁴ "A political formula for the next century", *Petir*, March/April 1994, pp. 13-17, p. 14. John Chen, Chairman of the GPC on the Environment commented that the Ministry for the Environment consulted his GPC before introducing new legislation.

²¹⁵ "A political formula for the next century", *Petir*, March/April 1994, pp. 13-17, p. 16

²¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 15

²¹⁷ *ibid.*

in-depth knowledge and are in a better position to recommend feasible alternatives.²¹⁸

While PAP backbenchers may be considered to be on the periphery of the core executive by virtue of their parliamentary office, the implementation of the GPC scheme and the involvement of all PAP MPs in it, has brought backbenchers closer to the inner core, at least intermittently, although they remain secondary to the political executive in institutional terms. This relationship is further explored in Chapter Four.

Grassroots Organisations and the Core Executive

The role of the GROs is also problematical when one analyses the Singaporean core executive. The GROs are quite a distinct sector and must be differentiated from civil society in Singapore as they are directly under government control and supervision through the People's Association and have a direct reporting relationship to the People's Association through the Constituency Secretariats, the Feedback Unit, MPs and to various government agencies²¹⁹ through their office bearers and particularly their advisers.²²⁰ The place of GROs within the policy system is exemplified by a direction from the prime minister's Principal Private Secretary in February 1992 which directed that "... Government organisations will only consider representations from Members of Parliament or Advisers to grassroots organisations on behalf of their own constituents."²²¹ Advisers are PAP cadres or MPs.

As noted earlier by Goh Chok Tong, most MPs are on the periphery of the core executive. Much of the work undertaken by these MPs is with GROs, as is the GROs that provide the constituency liaison and political intelligence which the MPs relay to the core, either directly or through institutional channels such as the Feedback Unit. Chan concluded in 1975 that the community leaders, particularly those with wealth and high social status associated with GROs, were important in the political process, although the PAP was attempting to displace and disempower them with its own appointees.²²² GROs have been developed by the government to be local managers of community issues, to help manage the consequences of government policy and its

²¹⁸ *ibid.* p. 13

²¹⁹ Vasoo, a PAP MP and cadre and head of the Department of Social Work and Psychology at NUS, has commented on the implications of government sponsorship and control of the GROs. See: S. Vasoo, *Neighbourhood Leaders' Participation in Community Development*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1994, 127-137

²²⁰ The People's Association within the Ministry of Community Development appoints advisers to all Community Centre Management Committees, Community Consultative Committees, Residents Committees, Town Councils and Community Development Councils in consultation with the prime minister's personal office. These advisers must be "persons who understand and support the Government's policies ..." See: "Adviser to Community Centre", *Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report*, 63, 4, 27 July 1994, p. 317. Advisers are invariably either PAP MPs, PAP members being groomed for political office or other cadres.

²²¹ *Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report*, 11 July 1997, p. 469

²²² Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass-Roots*, Singapore, University of Singapore Press, 1976, p. 227

implementation with a particular focus on housing, social, cultural and sporting organisations.

The centrality of the GROs to the political process, as political socialisers not power centres, was acknowledged in 1981 when Goh Chok Tong called for Administrative Service officers to be associated with Residents' Committees to increase their political awareness and broaden their policy perspectives.²²³ However this, as with the party organisation, was not to transfer any political power to the GROs, but rather to use them as information feeders to the core and as agents of political socialisation for the political leadership in concert with party branches. Individually, GRO leaders may be able to directly exert personal influence through building relationships with individual members of the core executive, but the GROs themselves do so indirectly. This forms part of a strategy to have a diverse, interlocking periphery of government organised community bodies which penetrate, subvert and diffuse civil society pressures but which are ultimately devoid of political autonomy. The GROs can therefore be excluded from the core executive.

Business Interests and the Core Executive

In respect of broader civil society groups outside the GRO domain, Stella Quah has identified the elite professions as being involved in some aspects of policy making, but not to the point where their professional associations could be considered as part of the core executive.²²⁴ Professional associations have increasingly been co-opted under the supervision of the People's Association's through the Singapore Professional Centre which has reduced their autonomy and integrated into the hegemonic structure any policy functions they might have. In a recent study, Low indicates that in interest group terms, the elite professions were silent in respect of policy making, are generally not trusted by government and viewed as potentially autonomous power centres thus excluding them from the core executive.²²⁵

While Stella Quah's study mentioned some business groups (eg. the Singapore Manufacturers Association), there is little research on their policymaking role, and my attempts to interview executives of these groups in both 1995 and 1998 for this study were not successful. For example, works by Chong and others on business in Singapore,²²⁶ Low on the political economy of Singapore's development,²²⁷ Chua on

²²³ Seah Chee Meow, "Grassroots Political Participation in Singapore", *Petir: 25th Anniversary Edition*, November 1979, pp. 276-281, p. 281

²²⁴ Stella R. Quah, *Balancing Autonomy and Control: The Case of Professionals in Singapore*. Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Centre for International Studies, 1984

²²⁵ Linda Low, *Professionals at the Crossroads*, Singapore, Time Academic Press, 1996, p. 154

²²⁶ Chong Li Choy, Tan Chwee Huat, Wong Kwei Cheong and Caroline Yeoh, *Business, Society and Development in Singapore*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1990

communitarian ideology in Singapore²²⁸ do not mention the policy role of business associations and even Huff's substantial work on economic development in Singapore makes no mention of the role of these groups under PAP governments.²²⁹ Although some business groups have participated in the policy system through representation on statutory boards, Lee and Low's 1990 study indicates that the SME sector was alienated from government policy making and that local entrepreneurs had no power within the policy system.²³⁰

Low's 1993 study of changes to public sector dynamics mentions the government's use of extensive consultation with the private sector, but no more substantive analysis is attempted.²³¹ In this study, Low notes that despite the heightened importance of the private sector in policy formulation, "The government sector, however, appears still to be the custodian of macroeconomic management policies..."²³² The most comprehensive contemporary analysis of the role of the private sector in policy making has been Chalmers, although he did not specifically focus on business interest groups.²³³ Chambers notes the increasing role played within the policy system by local, as opposed to MNC, businesses after the 1985 recession, concluding that "state autonomy from business pressure ... has diminished"²³⁴ and that a 'new form of policy making' had developed.²³⁵ However, while this may be so, this new form of policy making was limited to the economic policy domain. Social policy, and to a lesser degree education policy, had since 1968 and more so after the 1981 Anson by-election, been largely autonomous although somewhat influenced by the GRO sector while education policy has been oriented to the demands of the MNC sector. Since Chalmers' study, the degree of involvement of the business sector in policy making has increased. The trend was evident from 1986 when a number of economic policy agencies led by the Ministry of Trade and Industry initiated regular consultation rounds with private sector association such as the Singapore Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Singapore Contractor Association, Association of Consulting Engineers and other business groups.²³⁶

²²⁷ Linda Low, *The Political Economy of a City-State: Government-made Singapore*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1998; and, Linda Low, ed., *Singapore: Towards a Developed Status*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1999

²²⁸ Chua Beng Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995

²²⁹ W. G. Huff, *Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1994.

²³⁰ Lee Tsao Yuan and Linda Low, "Entrepreneurship Policy" in Lee Tsao Yuan and Linda Low, eds., *Local Entrepreneurship in Singapore: Private and State*, Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies, 1990, pp. 4-19

²³¹ Linda Low, "The Public Sector in Singapore", in Garry Rodan, ed., *Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s*, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1993, p. 177

²³² Low, 1993, op. cit., pp. 177-178

²³³ Ian Chalmers, "Loosening State Control in Singapore: The Emergence of Local Capital as a Political Force", *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, 20, 2, 1992, pp. 57-84

²³⁴ Chalmers, 1992, op. cit., p. 67

²³⁵ *ibid.*

²³⁶ Anne Koh, "Govt in new dialogue with chambers: MTI in regular talks to help solve problems", *Straits Times*, 18 April 1986, p. 6; and, "Government to meet business groups", *Business Times*, 18 April 1986, p. 4

Following the successful completion of the Next Lap policy agenda in which this many industry and business organisations played a significant role,²³⁷ the development of a raft of economic policies has been informed by private sector input under the corporate notion of 'Singapore Incorporated',²³⁸ principally through the cluster strategy initiated by the EDB and reflected in the policy development strategies of the NCB, NSTB and the TDB. The cluster strategy is based on a group of bureaucrats case managing an industry sector and involving them in frequent consultation on policy matters, either informally or through formal committees and working parties.²³⁹ This was well exemplified by the development of the National Information Technology Plan (IT2000) in 1991, when the IT2000 Steering Committee involved 250 people in 11 economic sectors to advise on the plan.²⁴⁰ In 1991, MTI also instigated a policy consultation forum, the MTI Economic Panel, comprising public sector, academic and private sector representation.²⁴¹ The reform of the financial sector, under the direction of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), is the most obvious area in which the private sector has influenced policy in recent years, being driven by the need for "a closer partnership between government and the industry."²⁴²

The MAS approach, which until 1997 despite pleas from the banks,²⁴³ paid little attention to financial sector institutions and associations in policy formulation, now is very much industry focussed and "involves the sector in most areas of policy development."²⁴⁴ This has not, however, transferred significant political power to finance sector business associations, although particular individuals may be influential because of their knowledge and experience.²⁴⁵ The government does exercise care in how it structures policy consultation with the private sector, to ensure that it maintains political control of the policy agenda. For example, in the case of the Cost Review Committee in 1993, the membership was overwhelmingly PAP cadres or affiliates²⁴⁶, although its consultations involved the Real Estate Developers' Association of

²³⁷ Government of Singapore, *Singapore: The Next Lap*, Singapore, Times Editions, 1991. This book set out the medium to long term policy framework for the Goh Chok Tong government. More than 1000 people were reported to be involved in this exercise with over 200 coming from non-G.I.C. businesses.

²³⁸ For a discussion of the nature and implications of this corporate metaphor see: Usha C. V. Haley, Linda Low and Toh Mun-Heng, "Singapore Incorporated: reinterpreting Singapore's business environment through a corporate metaphor", *Management Decision*, 34, 9, 1996, pp. 17-28. The EDB uses the nomenclature "Singapore Unlimited" in its documentation to give this notion of a national corporation.

²³⁹ Interview with Ms Anna Chan Hock Cheng and Miss Judy Tan, EDB, 1995.

²⁴⁰ The eleven sectors or clusters, were: finance, manufacturing, leisure and tourist services, construction, retail, publishing and media, transportation, health care and education. See: "National IT masterplan gets off the ground with 11 economic sector groups", *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 16 February 1991, p. 19

²⁴¹ "Ministry will set up high-powered economic panel", *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 19 October 1991, p. 18

²⁴² Lee Hsien Loong, *Strategic Shift for the Financial Sector, Speech at the SESDAQ's 10th anniversary*. Singapore, Ministry of information and the Arts, 4 November 1997, p. 13

²⁴³ "Banks need to strengthen ties with MAS", *Singapore Monitor*, 28 June 1985

²⁴⁴ Interview with Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Deputy Managing Director, MAS, September 1998.

²⁴⁵ *ibid.*

²⁴⁶ *Report of the Cost Review Committee*, Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1993, pp. 131-132

Singapore (whose president was a PAP MP),²⁴⁷ the Singapore International Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Singapore National Employers' Federation, the Association of Small and Medium Enterprises, the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Federation of Merchant's Associations and an opposition party, the Singapore National Front.²⁴⁸

The Committee to Promote Enterprises Overseas was similarly structured, but also had a resource (i.e. advisory and oversight) panel totally made up of senior public sector officers.²⁴⁹ This degree of control seems to have been relaxed by the push to rapidly reform the financial sector and, given the total control already exercised by MAS, provides little risk of the bureaucratic or political leadership losing control of the policy agenda. For example, the comprehensive review of regulations and structure of the securities industry, commenced in late 1997, was largely facilitated by the Stock Exchange of Singapore.²⁵⁰ The Financial Sector Review Group, especially its working parties, are predominantly private sector,²⁵¹ and the Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness involved large numbers of private sector members, albeit with considerable public sector supervision. Most recently, the Committee on Banking Disclosure established by MAS was chaired and dominated by private sector bankers²⁵² and the Consultative Committees on Singapore's Big Bang had almost wholly private sector membership.²⁵³ This degree of industry empowerment in the policy system was not reflect elsewhere in economic policy making. For example, the E-Commerce Policy Committee, established by the National Computer Board in January 1997, had no member from the private sector, except an observer from Netrust Pte Ltd which is a GLC and so government controlled.²⁵⁴

Two recent indications of the government's willingness to give serious consideration to policy proposals by the business associations are the allocation of the retail sector to the TDB for policy development following a robust presentation to Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in July 1998 on the sector's problems²⁵⁵ and the government's willingness to listen to quite severe criticisms of its business cost reduction strategy in

²⁴⁷ REDAS was at that time headed by a PAP cadre and MP, Heng Chiang Meng

²⁴⁸ *Report of the Cost Review Committee*, pp. 134-136

²⁴⁹ *Final Report of the Committee to Promote Enterprises Overseas*, Singapore, Ministry of Finance, 1993

²⁵⁰ Interview with Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Deputy Managing Director, MAS, September 1998.

²⁵¹ For example, these have included the Investment Management Association of Singapore, the Stock Exchange of Singapore and a large number of fund managers. See: Lee Hsien Loong, *Strategies to Improve Fund Management in Singapore*, *Speech at the Investment Management Association of Singapore*, 26 February 1998. Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore, 27 February 1998, p. 2

²⁵² *Report on Banking Disclosure*, Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore, May 1998

²⁵³ Basskaran Nair, "Disclosure and the Media: making Singapore a Financial Hub", *The Sunday Times*, 2 August 1998, pp. 28-29

²⁵⁴ National Computer Board, *Program Information: ECH Organisation*. Available at: <http://www.ec.gov.sg/view/ech/schorg.html#2.2.4>, 30 April 1998

²⁵⁵ "TDB given the task of nurturing retail industry", *Business Times*, 11-12 July 1998, p. 3

response to the 1997 recession.²⁵⁶ However, by 1998, a large number of private sector groups had been drawn into the government's formal consultative framework, either through the Feedback Unit,²⁵⁷ or directly with ministries and statutory boards. These cases indicate a continuing determination by the core executive to control the policy system, internalise policy disputation within it, a greater willingness to be consultative and a probably healthy, lack of consistency in the means by which the executive's interests are protected. It does not appear, however, provide any substantial position within the core executive for business interests, although this is difficult to discern. This issues will therefore be further examined in Chapter Seven.

Civil Society Groups and the Core Executive

The lack of engagement between civil society and the state is witnessed by the need in 1998 for the Institute of Policy Studies to hold a closed-door conference on the issue. At this conference, BG George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, commented that "Singapore society was largely created by the state", a reflection on the degree of hegemonic control exercised over civil society by successive PAP governments. Yeo went on to call for greater engagement between the state and civil society and promised greater freedom for civil society organisations to operate.²⁵⁸ This commitment was linked to the activities of the government's Singapore 21 Committee (S21) which had responsibility for developing a broad future social and cultural framework for the nation and which had involved many civil society organisations in its subcommittees and through consultations. The general reaction to these initiatives by the political executive were generally met with negative responses with the *Straits Times* reporting that at the conference "The 20 papers presented ... suggest that an undergrowth of frustration, suspicion, scepticism and distrust still exists."²⁵⁹ between state and civil society.

This relationship of distrust is based on the way in which the PAP has successively co-opted or marginalised major civil society groups which attempt to engage the government in policy debate.²⁶⁰ In recent years the most prominent of these groups, the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE), the Singapore Nature

²⁵⁶ "Off-budget measures didn't help us, say companies", *Business Times*, 15 July 1998, p. 1

²⁵⁷ In interviews with the directors of the Feedback Unit in 1995 and 1998, it was revealed that the unit maintained regular contact with a core group of approximately 50 key organisations, including about 20 private sector groups, which it regularly consulted on policy and political issues as required. For an example of contemporary arrangements for more formal consultation between the Feedback Unit and the Singapore Confederation of Industry, see: "SCI says it'll present workable proposal on helping industry", *Business Times*, 22 July 1998, p. 2

²⁵⁸ Zuraidah Ibrahim, "Civil groups will have a 'bigger role'", *Straits Times*, 7 May 1998, p. 2

²⁵⁹ Koh Buck Song, "What plants will grow under the tembusu tress?", *Straits Times*, 9 may 1998, p. 14

²⁶⁰ For a more complete discussion of state-society relations in Singapore see: Garry Rodan, "State-society relations and political opposition in Singapore", in, Garry Rodan, ed., *Political oppositions in Industrialising Asia*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 95-127

Society and the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP), have all been either neutralised or co-opted by the government. Although a president of AWARE was a Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) from 1992-1994, the interests of this group have generally to be made to the government through the Singapore Association of Women's Organisations which is a government controlled organisation, although AWARE also attempts to consult the government directly on issues.²⁶¹ The Nature Society of Singapore (NSS), after some initial successes in challenging government environmental planning, and policies on land clearing and drainage construction,²⁶² since 1995 has been co-opted into the Singapore Environment Council.²⁶³ The AMP, which through some of its objectives directly challenged the role of MENDAKI, the government's Malay community development organisation, was co-opted by the government in 1991 and is now substantially under its direction through the PAP Malay MPs.²⁶⁴

This tendency for the government to co-opt civil society organisations, in what Tay calls the "fourth stage of state-civil society relations"²⁶⁵ does not draw these groups into the core executive. Instead it places them in consultative organisations which may, on limited and particular policy issues, have limited input to core executive deliberations. Tay concludes that the establishment of a genuine discourse between state and society is still "an open question", but other are more certain of the present state of the relationship:

In Singapore, the state is extremely powerful. The Government calls the shots here. Civic organisations only test rather than determine the limits of the growth of civil society.²⁶⁶

Non-governmental community organisations remain marginalised in Singapore and excluded from the core executive.

²⁶¹ information from interviews with AWARE and SAWO office holders, 1995 and 1998. SAWO's office accommodation is provided by the government. Details of other possible subsidies could not be obtained.

²⁶² Garry Rodan, "The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and its Political Significance", in, Garry Rodan, ed., *Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s*, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1993, pp. 52-71, p. 65. Information also obtained from correspondence with the Nature Society of Singapore.

²⁶³ The SEC was registered as a company by Dr. Cham Tao Soon, president of NTU, Kwa Chong Seng, president of the GLC, Singapore International Media and Dr. Tan Wee Kiat, CEO of the National Parks Board. It is chaired by Ms. Kay Kuok, a director of the family company Kuok (Singapore) Ltd. Several members of this family sit on GLC or statutory boards and are believed to be either PAP cadres or proto-cadres. Of the 15 members of the SEC in 1999, 9 were public sector appointees, 1 was an MP, three were from the private sector and the NSS had 2 representatives. Information available at: http://www.sec.org.sg/our_people/founder.html

²⁶⁴ Chua Beng Huat, "Singapore in 1991: celebrating the end of an era", *Southeast Asian Affairs 1991*, Singapore, ISEAS, pp. 253-266

²⁶⁵ Simon S. C. Tay, "Towards a Singaporean Civil Society", *Southeast Asian Affairs 1998*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1998, pp. 244-261, p. 247

²⁶⁶ Raymond Lim, founder of the political discussion group, The Roundtable. Cited in: Zuraidah Ibrahim, op. cit., 1998

CONCLUSIONS

The early analyses of the who might inhabit a core executive in Singapore (although not expressed in these terms) have been confirmed by the most recent analytical studies, except for Huxley's analysis of the military elite which stands alone. Chen's 1975 assertion that the military and the business elite, except for the leadership of the GLCs, are excluded from the core executive can no longer be sustained.

In a speech on 28 April 1971, Lee Kuan Yew commented that Singapore's fate depended upon 300 key people:

The main burden of present planning and implementation rests on the shoulders of some 300 key persons. They include key men in the PAP, MPs and cadres who mobilise mass support and explain the need for policies even when they are temporarily inconvenient or against sectoral interests. Outstanding men in civil service, the police, the armed forces, chairman of statutory boards and their top administrators... Together they are a close knit and coordinated hard core. If all the 300 were to crash in one Jumbo jet, then Singapore will disintegrate. That shows how small the base is for our leadership in politics, economics and security. We have to, and we will, enlarge this base, enlarging the number of key digits.²⁶⁷

Silcock made an even smaller estimate of the size of the core executive in earlier days:

The number of those who made the difference and enabled Singapore to make so much of a not very obvious opportunity was probably not above fifty. They have meant far more to Singapore than any spreading of economic doctrine among the population in general or even among the educated parts of the population.²⁶⁸

It is doubtful whether the numbers within the core executive have fallen below 50 or risen above 300 since 1971 and certainly, its members are sourced from the same positions and organisations, with the exception, as noted by Chambers, that there now appears to be a greater co-option of members from the private sector. We do know that older cadres such as Michael Fam Yue Onn and Sat Pal Khattar are still active and may be within the core executive. What is of interest is whether relatively recent private sector actors, such as Ho Kwong Ping and Peter Seah Lim Huat, are now within the core executive. This is an issue which will be investigated in Chapter Seven. The military elite, non-existent in 1971, are now also a substantial component. Recent research on Singaporean social structures, such as that of social class by Quah and others,²⁶⁹ has done nothing to inform our knowledge of elites in Singapore; perhaps as already noted, there is an assumption that they are well known and that an examination of intra-

²⁶⁷ Lee Kuan Yew, "Singapore's fate depends on 300 men", in Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko Tan, eds., *Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas*, Singapore, Times Editions, 1998, pp. 313-316, p. 315

²⁶⁸ Thomas H. Silcock, *A History of Economics Teaching and Graduates: Raffles College and the University of Malaya in Singapore 1934-1960*, Singapore, Department of Economics and Statistics, National University of Singapore, 1985, p. 293

²⁶⁹ Stella R. Quah, Chiew Seen Kong, Ko Yiu Chung and Sharon Mengchee Lee, *Social Class in Singapore*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1991

elite dynamics would be unwelcome.²⁷⁰ Certainly, in conducting this study, I was frequently told that it was unwelcome. Perhaps, as Chua mentions, the meritocratic system based on educational achievement enforced by the government is so powerful that it overrides other considerations of elite structures and dynamics, including political leadership.²⁷¹ Certainly Lee's observation that the core executive is close and closed remains true, as noted by Ho in 1995, who also noted the importance of informal consultation and coordination mechanisms within the core.²⁷²

In a study in April 1998, the *Straits Times* identified what it termed the PS100 list, an analysis of who ran the country. This study noted that:

... of the top 100-plus positions reveals that while some changes were lateral moves, about one-third of the office-holders are new faces who were not at the apex of the administration in 1993. But although the faces may have changed, the personality of the administrative elite remains as stable as ever: High-achieving scholars dominate; they have little private sector experience; and are overwhelmingly male. The PS 100 list is a snapshot of the individuals holding full-time office in the executive, the civil service, the uniformed services, statutory boards, and government-owned corporations on Jan 1, 1998.²⁷³

This indicates the continuing perception that the Singaporean core executive is drawn from the public sector exclusively with the only private sector figures with power being those inducted into a concurrent or alternative public sector position such as Michael Fam Yue Onn, Ho Kwon Ping and Tony Tan. It is very much a core executive that has largely been created by government intervention and design rather than by corporatist other forms of resource exchange.²⁷⁴ A study of the core executive in Singapore can therefore be restricted to an analysis of the public sector leadership which can be defined as comprising the cabinet and ministry, the parliament, the judiciary, the senior ranks of the Administrative Service, the major statutory boards, the major GLCs, the SAF, the NTUC, and the GROs. This study will examine all of these groups with the exception of the GROs, the NTUC and the SAF none of whom would cooperate in this study.²⁷⁵ In the following chapters we examine the

²⁷⁰ As several academics and civil servants commented, they themselves were members of one or more elites and it is not particularly pleasant to have one's relationships, including personal and professional connections held up for public examination in a small society such as Singapore's. Some even contended that such studies could exacerbate social tensions, perhaps with some justification. In conducting this study, the author was frequently informed that no substantial studies of Singaporean elites which involved the political elite would be tolerated.

²⁷¹ Chau Beng Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 63-64 and 157

²⁷² Ho Khai Leong, "The Politics of Problem Definition and Agenda Setting in Singapore", *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 3, 2, December 1995, pp. 66-89, p. 75

²⁷³ Cherian George and Jason Lee, "Who Runs Singapore", *Straits Times*, 26 April 1998

²⁷⁴ Sumiko Tan, "Why there is a political elite: 'Select group created to form the best government'", *Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 23 November 1991, p. 7

²⁷⁵ Efforts to meet with GRO representatives were uniformly unsuccessful, although the People's Association officers were helpful and frank in their discussion of GRO and related social policy issues. Several NTUC affiliated officials originally agreed to take part in the study but all but one eventually withdrew.

Singaporean core executive in terms of its structural functions and governance operations in relation to these groups.

4. THE CORE EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURES AND DYNAMICS

This chapter examines the structure of the legislative system in Singapore, how it interacts with the core executive, particularly the political executive which resides at the centre of the core executive, and how the political executive designs and uses the legislative system to implement institutional based strategies of governance. We also examine in this chapter whether certain people, offices or institutions reside within the core executive and, if not, attempt to determine the nature of their relationship to that executive.

As we have seen from the first two chapters, Singapore has a parliamentary system of government and public sector based on the Westminster model both of which the PAP political leadership have "modified ... according to their needs to fit into the local situation."¹ These modifications had led to the development of an unreformed Westminster style state into an illiberal authoritarian democracy under one party rule through which the PAP is pursuing a neo-Gramscian hegemonic program in order to perpetuate its rule. These modifications have been designed not to change the institutional macro-structure which serves an important legitimation function,² but rather to discard the conventions of cross-institutional and state-society trust, resource and power distribution and sharing implicit within the Westminster model. In association with the substitution of these conventions with its particular ideological program and hegemonic conventions, the PAP has also actively undermined civil society and maintains an intense program of co-optation of it so as to discourage the development of political pluralism and of power centres outside its hegemonic grasp.³ The rules of the game are different in Singapore; they are the old colonial rules onto which has been grafted an hegemonic game plan which has made the most of the unreformed Westminster tendency of maintaining social and political control, limiting political opposition and maintaining the prerogatives of state secrecy, executive dominance and responsibility over accountability. These rules and the game plan

¹ Shee Poon Kim, "The Evolution of the Political System", in, Jon S. T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, eds., *Government and Politics of Singapore*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 3-24, p. 18

² At the most basic level, consent is developed and maintained through the existence, election of and the regular meeting of, the parliament and the effective functioning of the executive, as found by Packenham; the simple existence and apparently normal functioning of the legislature in particular, whether highly democratic or not, provides latent legitimation of the state's institutions and generates consent. See: Robert Packenham, "Legislatures and Political Development", in, A. Kornberg and L. D. Musolf, eds., *Legislatures in Developmental Perspective*, Durham (NC), Duke University Press, 1970. For a contemporary discussion of Packenham's findings, see: Philip Norton, *Does Parliament Matter?*, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993

³ Cherian George, "Chia Shi Teck factor no match for PAP's politics of co-optation", *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 14 December 1996, p. 13

revolve around a 'core executive', the origins and nature of which were examined previously.

Smith recommends that in examining the core executive we need "... to take account of structure, context and agents."⁴ In this chapter, we examine the 'modified' institutional structures within which the Singaporean core executive operates. Further, complementary analyses which examine the core executive in relation to the judiciary and public sector agencies are presented in subsequent chapters. These analyses, in providing details of structure, context and some details of agency where this has been researchable, form the framework of the Singapore political system and provides the foundations upon which the Singaporean core executive has built its peculiar style of government. It is necessary therefore to understand these foundations in some detail as they differ from the liberal democratic norm of contemporary Westminster nations.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SINGAPOREAN CORE EXECUTIVE

According to Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's institutional arrangements had to be "... adapted and adjusted to suit the practical realities of our position."⁵ a sentiment shared by his successor, Goh Chok Tong and his colleagues. What these 'realities' are how they justify the adaptations forms a substantial part of PAP ideology. The adaptations that have shaped the nature of government in Singapore are comprehensive, complex and focussed on locating almost total control of the nation in the hands of the political executive. To understand this system, it must not only be examined in terms of its surface characteristics, but more importantly, in terms of its deeper structure. It is only through an analysis of this deep structure that the true nature of the Singaporean core executive's relationship with Singapore's institutional framework can be understood.

A surface examination of how Singapore is governed will reveal an ostensibly democratic nation equipped with all the standard accoutrements of liberal democracy. The head of state, the President, has been popularly elected since 1993 and has some executive powers. The parliament is unicameral, elected for a five year term. The electoral system comprises 15 group representation constituencies (GLCs) which elect 89 per cent of legislators as a guarantee of minority representation, although nine single member constituencies remain. Electoral boundaries are controlled by the Elections Department in the Prime Minister's Office, not by an independent electoral

⁴ Martin J. Smith, "Reconceptualizing the British State: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges to Central Government", *Public Administration*, 76, 1998, pp. 45-72, p. 68

⁵ Cited in Alex Josey, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Struggle for Singapore*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1974, p. 229

commission, and the government controls the electoral redistribution process.⁶ Voting is based on a universal adult franchise and the simple plurality system. However, unlike Britain and in imitation of Australia, voting is compulsory as well as secret. The British tradition of having a highly disciplined party system which can compete in an highly adversarial political system is also replicated in Singapore, with 23 registered political parties of which seven are active.⁷ While under the colonial system both national and local governments existed, Singapore is now administered as an integrated city-state with only one elected national legislature. Non-elected town councils were created in 1986 and appointed regional community development councils (CDCs), covering several town councils in 1997. The nation is governed in accord with a written constitution which includes fundamental liberties for citizens. The judiciary "... administers the law with complete independence from the Executive and Legislative branches of Government."⁸

This picture of the cloning of an Asian democracy from its colonial parent is deceptive. A deeper analysis reveals that almost every aspect of the institutional framework mentioned above is conditional on executive approval either directly or indirectly. Singapore is governed and managed by rigorously selected, smart, highly educated people who understand the nuances of maintaining political, social and economic control in a complex modern society, although from my experience, they are masters of their own system rather than being capable of a broader, more cosmopolitan conception of what a modern multicultural society can be. This mastery of their domestic arrangements doesn't mean that they are always right or don't make mistakes, but it does mean that when the system was designed, they generally got the fundamentals right for achieving their basic aim; maintaining and entrenching the PAP's hegemonic program as the basic element of national security; economic, social and military. As the system has been adapted and hegemony advanced, they have only occasionally got it badly wrong; spectacularly in the case of the 1988 "Marxist conspiracy", although there is plenty of evidence of poor policy development and implementation.

We should also note that this political program was not initially hegemonic by design; it developed into hegemony by growing out of an obsessive need to leave nothing to

⁶ In the redrawing of electoral boundaries prior to the 1997 general election for example, the prime minister instructed the Elections Department to redraw the electoral boundaries so that in the single member constituency of McPherson, his promise that the leader of the Singapore Democratic Party, Chee Juan Soon could contest Matthias Yao, a junior government minister, could be fulfilled. Obviously, the boundary re-drawing was done under directions issued by the executive. See: Warren Fernandez, "15 GRCs, 9 single seats for polls: Most constituencies changed in major redrawing of electoral boundaries", *The Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 23 November 1996, p. 24

⁷ Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS), The Workers Party, People's Action Party, Singapore Democratic Party, National Solidarity Party, Singapore Democratic Party and the Singapore People's Party.

⁸ Foo Siang Luen, ed., *Singapore Facts and Pictures 1998*, Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1998, p. 25

chance in the PAP's, and particularly Lee Kuan Yew's, ruthless determination to have total control of any resource or function which mattered in the running of the nation. The historical role of Lee Kuan Yew in shaping the political system to conform to his personal desire to rule and his personal ruling style should not be underestimated. Cotton, for one, has pointed out that Lee has moulded political discourse in Singapore from its independent beginnings;⁹ he has a "special, higher and overriding mandate from the people"¹⁰ which he has used to this end. Thus the desire of one man for near-absolute power and his idea of national governance also mark the deep structure of Singaporean institutional arrangements and the nature of the core executive. However, in the contemporary setting, we should not over-estimate Lee's power and influence as it is in decline.

Partly because of the profound contradiction between surface and deep political structures Singapore has been described as a state in which "... you have the forms of democracy, but the reality is dictatorship."¹¹ However, Castells disputes the label of dictatorship and classifies Singapore as a "hegemonic state, in the Gramscian sense ... namely, it is based not simply on coercion, but also on consensus."¹² Crone sees the Singaporean state as highly autonomous,¹³ a status reflected in Chan's description of it as an administrative state,¹⁴ while Rodan, Brown and Khong all classify Singapore as a corporatist state.¹⁵ All of these labels point to an institutional framework which facilitates an highly autonomous core executive which does not conform to the liberal democratic ideal pursued by other, contemporary, Westminster states.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEMONIC EXECUTIVE AGENCY

In Singapore there is no such thing as a balance of power between the three branches of government and as has been outlined elsewhere, the Westminster tradition is

⁹ James Cotton, "Political Innovation in Singapore: The Presidency, the Leadership and the Party", in Garry Rodan, ed., *Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s*, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1993, p. 3

¹⁰ This is how Raj Vasil has described Lee's position in the political system. See: Raj Vasil, *Governing Singapore: Interviews with the new leaders*, Singapore, Times Books International, 1988, p. 155

¹¹ Milton Friedman cited in: Walden Bello and Stephanie Rosenfeld, *Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle Economies in Crisis*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990, p. 327

¹² Manuel Castells, "The Developmental City-State in an Open World Economy: The Singapore Experience", *Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy Working Paper*, 31, 1988, p. 78

¹³ Donald Crone, "The Growth and Equity Experience in Southeast Asia", *Centre for the Advanced Study of International Development, University of Michigan Occasional Paper*, 8, 1985, p. 258

¹⁴ Chan Heng Chee, "The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System", in K. S. Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 70-89, p. 81

¹⁵ Garry Rodan, *The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialization: Nation, State and International Capital*, London, Macmillan, 1989, p. 29; David Brown, *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia*, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 78; Cho-Oon Khong, "Singapore: Political Legitimacy Through Managing Conformity", in, Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, pp. 108-135, p. 135

inherently weak in this regard. But this systemic weakness has been exploited by the core executive in Singapore to produce a political and policy system which, with very few exceptions, is completely under the total control of this executive, particularly the political executive. One of the keystones to this control is careful constitutional design complemented by a body of legislation designed to provide multiple levers for executive control over all institutional arrangements. In this section we will examine the aspects of constitutional design and legislation that provide the power base and nominal legitimacy for executive control.

The Singaporean state, in keeping with British decolonisation policy and unlike its Westminster mother, has always had a written constitution, the current one being adopted in 1967 following separation from Malaysia. This constitution contains a provision that it can be changed by the support of two-thirds of the members of parliament in all matters other than the surrender of national sovereignty, which must go to referendum. The legitimacy of a constitutional framework is usually seen to be based on "... its delivery of rights protection for individual citizens, the limitation of state powers within the rule of law, and the operation of an independent and impartial judiciary. A strong and vibrant democracy, premised on some notion of "civil society" is another essential component of the constitutional process."¹⁶ This liberal democratic perspective is supplemented in many East Asian nations with the incorporation within written constitutions of the notion of civic responsibility and duty to the state, for example in the constitutions of the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Thailand.¹⁷

Singapore's constitution draws upon the English constitutional tradition and the Malaysian Constitution (which drew heavily on the Indian Constitution), but has been sufficiently adapted to produce an instrument that, while demonstrating some Westminster traits, has many non-Westminster components which were designed into the 1967 constitution and since reinforced. The 1967 constitution is itself principally derived from the 1963 State of Singapore constitution by which Singapore was incorporated into Malaysia. Kishore Mahbubani, then Permanent Secretary in the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs,¹⁸ has suggested that an Asian constitutional framework should be premised on the ideas of the protection of the interests of the community by the state and on duties owed by citizens to the state, a restatement of

¹⁶ Graham Hassall, "Democracy in Asia Revisited", *Asian Studies Review*, 21, 2-3, 1997, pp. 1-18

¹⁷ For example; Chapter II of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea - "Rights and Duties of Citizens"; Chapter III of the Constitution of Japan - "Rights and Duties of the People"; Chapter II of the Constitution of the Republic of China - "Rights and Duties of the People"; Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand "Duties of the Thai People"; Article 2 s.4 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

¹⁸ Kishore Mahbubani is one of the most articulate prominent apologues for the PAP regime, a position that under traditional Westminster constitutional arrangements would have been incompatible with his career as an Administrative Service officer. Since 1998 he has been Singapore's Ambassador to the United Nations.

the civic republican ideal.¹⁹ This stance has been supported by a plethora of PAP figures including Lee Kuan Yew, legal academics at the National University of Singapore (NUS), civil servants and parliamentarians. The general PAP view of institutional arrangements is perhaps best summarised by the Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Law at the NUS who is also a PAP cadre member and Minister of State for Law, Ho Peng Kee:

"I look at democracy as a basket of rights and a list of freedoms, at the top of which you can put the freedom to express your choice of the group of people you want to put in power, who will, after that, have the authority and the power to circumscribe the other freedoms that you have."²⁰

This a restatement of the Hobbesian notion of electoral representation as the authority to act upon, rather than the authority to serve, the electorate, although it fails to acknowledge Hobbes' concern for moderation and for the development of a "civil society in the commonwealth that protects people from subjugation by relentless power seekers and allows them to develop their own capabilities as they wish."²¹ This interpretation of a Westminster style constitution was explicitly rejected by the Privy Council in one of its first cases involving Singapore constitutional law; *Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor* (1981).²² In this case, the council found that an act of the Singapore parliament could not override a citizen's fundamental human rights. In an earlier case, *Teh Chenh Poh v Public Prosecutor Malaysia* (1980) involving the Malaysian Internal Security Act, the Privy Council found that the principle of judicial review of the executive branch was also inherent in the Westminster system as the protection of fundamental human rights is inherent within that system and cannot be removed by the executive or the parliament.²³ The findings in this case also apply to Singapore but have yet to be applied in that jurisdiction.

Is the Singapore Constitution therefore a constitution in the same sense as those of other modern states, particularly its contemporaries in East Asia? No. The Singapore constitution is essentially an instrument of "rule by law" rather than "rule of law", which when combined with the complete dominance of the legislature by one party has produced a "rule of State law" regime.²⁴ Walter Woon Cheong Ming, a Vice-Dean of the NUS Law Faculty and a one-time Nominated MP has commented:

¹⁹ Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Way", *Foreign Affairs*, 74,1,1995, pp. 100-110

²⁰ "Democracy East or West?", *Straits Times*, 25 May 1992, p. 2

²¹ Peter Hayes, "Hobbes' Bourgeois Moderation", *Polity*, 31, 1, 1988, pp. 75-105, p. 75

²² Anthony Lester QC, "Note on Constitutional Law", in, Singapore Association of Women Lawyers, *You and the Law*. Singapore, Singapore Association of Women Lawyers, 1989, pp. 40-42, p. 41

²³ sup. p. 41-42

²⁴ As defined by Cooter. See: Robert D. Cooter, "The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State: Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development", *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996*, pp. 191-217

"We effectively don't have a Constitution. We have a law that can be easily changed by parliament, and by the party in power, because the party is the parliament ... it is unsettling how flexible the Constitution is ..."²⁵

But this flexibility is essential argues Professor Jayakumar, PAP Minister for Law, former Dean of the Law Faculty at NUS and one of Singapore's most eminent constitutional scholars:

Parliamentary system, parliamentary procedures, sophisticated election systems, bills of rights, rights to counsel - do you find these in our histories? ... all these are alien concepts. But overnight they've been put in a constitution ... given to us at the birth of our nation. And we're supposed to use that constitution and work it and run the nation without any departures from these Western notions. But can it work? Will it always work? Will it be the recipe for growth? Not necessarily. ... our short history since independence has been replete with all sorts of special problems, special circumstances. So, in the ultimate analysis, we will have to devise our own solutions to deal effectively with our own peculiar threats and problems.²⁶

Rather than a constitution that acts as a supreme standard against which the validity of parliamentary and executive actions can be measured in terms of national progress, institutional integrity and the welfare of citizens, the Singapore constitution is essentially a plaything of executive whim; a rule book for running the school which the council of prefects, with the connivance of the headmaster, may change at will. An examination of the major provisions of the constitution will provide sufficient evidence of just how 'flexible' and 'rule by law' oriented the Singapore constitution is. Harding contends that the notion of constitutional supremacy in Singapore "is an illusion which rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of Singapore's constitutional history."²⁷ Rather, in Singapore, "legislative supremacy" holds sway.²⁸ Within a Westminster state, this is merely a restatement of executive supremacy; the legislature has little if any substantial independence from the executive.

The Constitution

Examination of the constitutional foundations of PAP control is not greatly assisted by an analysis of the literature. While non-Singaporean researchers note the inherent weakness and imbalance of the Singapore constitution,²⁹ and the political control

²⁵ "Stand up and be quoted", *Straits Times*, 6 July 1991, p. 12

²⁶ Professor Jayakumar, Minister for Home Affairs. Speech to PAP Youth Wing seminar, 5 July 1987. This speech was made in justification of the detention of 22 citizens on charges of participation in a Marxist conspiracy against the government. Jayakumar is a professor of law at NUS and has authored works on the Singapore constitution.

²⁷ A. J. Harding, "Parliament and the Grundnorm in Singapore", *Malaya Law Review*, 25, 1983, pp. 351-367, p. 367

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 354

²⁹ Choo-Oon Khong, "Singapore: Political legitimacy Through Managing Conformity", in, Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, pp. 108-135; Laurentia Magchilina van Lotrum-van Leeuwen, *From Source to Scourge: Drugs and Legislation in Singapore 1819-1992*, Rotterdam, Universiteit Erasmus, 1992, pp. 145-158; Walden Bello and Stehania Rosenfeld, *Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle Economies in Crisis*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990, pp. 318-319; David Martin Jones, *Political Development in Pacific Asia*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997, p. 49

rationale underlying its structure³⁰ domestic commentators are restricted in what can be said as highly critical comments attack the legal foundations of the state which is not tolerated. Speculation on the effectiveness of particular provisions by students writing for the *Singapore Law Review*³¹ are tolerated as is debate in the small circles of the legal profession, the Faculty of Law and the Academy of Law, but not within the Law Society except on narrow technical issues.

Broader public debate and the publication of highly critical comment is not tolerated, particularly in the Chinese press.³² We are thus left with a literature in which foreign commentators, generally lacking in any detailed knowledge of the constitution, attack it generally while knowledgeable domestic commentators, only too aware of its structure, provisions and intent, are largely quiet on the political and social ramifications. Even well informed foreign academics, such as Gordon Means, assume that in Singapore, English constitutional arrangements "survive with relatively slight modifications."³³ We are therefore forced to examine the constitutional framework in some detail to draw our own conclusions.

The constitution has 14 parts and, excluding preamble and transitional arrangements provisions, 192 effective articles.³⁴ These address the following areas:

Table 4.1: Analysis of Constitutional Provisions

CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER	%	CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER	%
The Republic and the Constitution	3.1	The Legislature	15.1
Fundamental Liberties	4.2	The Judiciary	5.2
President	10.9	The Public Service	10.9
Executive	7.3	Citizenship	11.5
Council of Presidential Advisers	6.8	Financial Provisions	9.9

³⁰ Lily Rahim, "Singapore: Consent, Coercion and Constitutional Engineering", *Current Affairs Bulletin*, 70, 7, 1993, pp. 20-26

³¹ The *Singapore Law Review* is overseen by a board which is controlled by the Law Faculty of NUS and the judiciary. The Law Faculty is under the control of PAP cadres, including, indirectly, two ministers, Professor Jayakumar and Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee. The current dean, Associate Professor Chin Tet Yung is probably a PAP cadre. Professor Tommy Koh, a senior PAP cadre still holds his appointment as a member of the Law Faculty. The Vice-Chancellor of NUS, Professor Lim Pin, is a senior PAP cadre.

³² English language commentary is tolerated more than Chinese language criticism as the political executive does not mind the largely English educated middle classes "letting off steam", but is concerned about the effect of such criticism in the HDB heartlands where there are large populations of Chinese educated who rely more on the Chinese language press and magazines, including those originating in Hong Kong. For example, the English language journal *Commentary*, published by the National University of Singapore Society, was allowed to publish a mildly critical edition in 1998 after initial objections from MITA, but it was only published in English. Two articles in this edition of the journal raised the need for electoral and constitutional reform respectively. See: *Commentary: In Different Voices*, 14, 1997

³³ Gordon P. Means, "Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore", *Journal of Democracy*, 7, 4, 1996, pp. 103-117, p. 103. Means, an emeritus professor at McMaster University in Canada is a long time scholar of Malaysia and Singapore.

³⁴ In December 1998, the constitution as amended to November 1996 actually had articles numbered to 163. However, some sections of the constitution have articles which are divided in multiple articles each of which has a separate though complementary effect. For example, Part Va, Council of Presidential Advisers, comprises just one article – article 37. However, this article actually comprises articles 37a – 37m, none of which is subsidiary to article 37, but all of which contain specific provisions relating to the Council of Presidential Advisers. This section has therefore been counted as comprising, in effect, 13 articles. This provides a more accurate measure of the composition of the constitution.

PCMR	13	Special Provisions	2.1
		TOTAL	100%

Even a surface analysis reveals that this constitution has some peculiar components and weightings. For example, if the constitution is an instrument of principles of governance combined with an outline of institutional functions, relationships and limitations, methods for resolving institutional and state-society conflict including mechanisms for constitutional change and development, why include detailed provisions for citizenship, the public service or financial management which could be dealt with more adequately in legislation framed within constitutional constraints? The answer to this question lies in an analysis of the deep structure of the constitution and its concomitant legal framework which are oriented to executive control of all institutional arrangements. These macro-institutional arrangements have been reinforced by a carefully designed legal system which only partially conforms to the expectation that modern industrialised states are characterised by rights-based, normative legal systems.³⁵

INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AND STRATEGIES OF CONTROL

In Singapore, the prime minister is head of the executive arm of government, the cabinet, is an elected member of the parliament and is head of the political party forming the government as is usual in the Westminster system. The constitution, under Chapter 2 makes specific provision for the executive, including the cabinet (Article 24), the prime minister and ministers (Articles 25-33), allows for the validity of cabinet decisions even when a non-cabinet member is involved in voting on or participating in them (Article 29) and includes Permanent Secretaries (Article 34), the Attorney-General (Article 35) and the Secretary of Cabinet (Article 36) as part of the executive. Article 24(2) specifically provides for the cabinet to "...have the general direction and control of the Government" and for it to be "...collectively responsible to parliament."³⁶

Cabinet members are elected Members of Parliament (MPs), although Nominated Members of Parliament (NMPs) also qualify, and are appointed by the president on the recommendation of the prime minister; a recommendation which the president must follow. The cabinet can only meet by the authority of the prime minister although he is not compelled to attend cabinet meetings. Any other meetings of ministers have no legal authority.³⁷ The prime minister may appoint ministers to be in charge of any

³⁵ Roberto Unger, *Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory*, New York, Free Press, 1976, pp. 84-85

³⁶ Article 24(2)

³⁷ Article 28(1)

department (ministry) or subject.³⁸ Ministers may be assisted by parliamentary secretaries.³⁹ The prime minister may also appoint one or more permanent secretaries to a department or departments under the general supervision of the relevant minister.⁴⁰ In practice, only full ministers form the cabinet; senior ministers of state and ministers of state are not included although they may be invited to participate, sometimes on a regular basis, at the discretion of the prime minister.⁴¹ In Singapore the cabinet has no committee system; all executive committees are overseen by individual ministers or the prime minister in the context of portfolio administration.

The executive is given certain other specific powers under the constitution. The Minister for Finance is empowered, in the absence of a supply bill being assented to by the president by the first day of a financial year for which that supply bill applies, to authorise expenditure from any government fund, not exceeding one-quarter of the amount contained in the relevant estimate, for "...the continuance of the public services or for any purpose of development shown in the estimates..."⁴² This provides the executive with spending powers independent of the parliament's approval. The Attorney-General is also provided with considerable powers conditional on executive direction as "referred or assigned to him by the President or the Cabinet and to discharge the functions conferred on him by or under this constitution or any other written law."⁴³ The Attorney-General is provided with immense discretion in respect to state prosecution, being able to "have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence."⁴⁴ The Attorney-General also takes precedence over any other person appearing before a court and has an automatic entitlement to a hearing by a court on his own request.

Cabinet ministers oversee the civil service including departments of state and statutory boards. They also have oversight of the GLCs which are responsible for the myriad government private sector investments and activities. Government companies are specifically mentioned in the constitution.⁴⁵ However, responsibility for this task is shared by a limited number of ministers, principally the ministers for Defence, Finance, Trade and Industry, Communications and Information and the Arts. In late 1998 there were 16 cabinet ministers including two deputy prime ministers and Lee Kuan Yew

³⁸ Article 30. By 'subject' is meant any particular administrative task or area of responsibility.

³⁹ Article 31 of the Constitution

⁴⁰ Article 34 of the Constitution

⁴¹ Although Senior Ministers of State were involved in cabinet meetings from 1984-1991 under Lee Kuan Yew, this was to test the new generation of leaders. Under Goh Chok Tong, a Senior Minister of State may regularly attend cabinet meetings if he is being considered for promotion.

⁴² Article 148(b)(4) of the Constitution

⁴³ Article 35(7)

⁴⁴ Article 35(8)

⁴⁵ (Articles 22(c), (d) and (f))

whose position as Senior minister is essentially a Special Minister of State without portfolio, equivalent to a deputy prime minister.

The office of the Auditor-General established under Article 148(f) can also be considered as part of the executive, given the extensive powers of the office and its direct relationship to the president. The Auditor-General is appointed and removed by the president on the recommendation of the prime minister, but may withhold assent at his personal discretion as this is one of the designated protected offices. The constitution makes no specific provision for the Auditor-General to be an officer of the parliament.

The scope of the Auditor-General's powers of inquiry are constitutionally defined in that "... it shall be the duty of the Auditor-General to audit and report on the accounts of all departments and offices of the Government, the Public Service Commission, the Legal Service Commission, the Supreme Court, all subordinate courts and parliament."⁴⁶ The legislature may also require the Auditor-General to "perform such other duties and exercise such other powers" as it sees fit to legislate for.⁴⁷

As can be seen, as in all Westminster systems, the Singaporean political executive has substantial powers. These powers are enhanced to provide enormous control over the instruments of government through careful constitutional design aimed at maintaining control in the hands of the core executive. What these powers are and how they relate to each major institutional policy actor is examined below.

The Political Executive and the Presidency

The major mechanisms for executive control of the presidency are the constitutional provisions for presidential candidature, the curtailment of presidential power by the parliament and special presidential advisory bodies under the total control of the executive, the administrative powers of the executive under various Acts and recourse to the Internal Security Act.

Eligibility for election to the office of President is limited. Candidates must meet the qualifications for members of parliament as established in Article 45 of the constitution⁴⁸ and have held one of the following offices for at least three years:

⁴⁶ Article 148(f)(3)

⁴⁷ Article 148(f)(4)

⁴⁸ As provided for by Article 19(1)(d), this provision states that candidates must not be of unsound mind, an undischarged bankrupt or have been convicted and jailed for more than a year or fined \$2000 or more.

1. A cabinet minister, Chief Justice, Speaker of Parliament, Attorney-General, Auditor-General, Accountant-General, Permanent Secretary, chairman of the Public Service Commission;
2. Chairman or chief executive officer of a company registered under the Companies Act with a paid-up capital of at least \$100 million;⁴⁹
3. Chairman or chief executive officer of a statutory board to which Article 22A of the Constitution applies;⁵⁰ or
4. In any other comparable position of responsibility in any other organisation of equivalent size or complexity in the public or private sector which, in the opinion of the Presidential Elections Committee, has provided equivalent experience in managing financial affairs so as to enable the candidate to effectively carry out the functions and duties of the office of President.⁵¹

All candidates who would qualify under conditions (1) and (3) above are PAP cadres or affiliates. Of those who would qualify under condition (2), the majority would be employees of GLCs and therefore PAP affiliated, if not cadres. Of those who would qualify under condition (4), selection is purely at the discretion of the Presidential Elections Committee (PEC) which is composed entirely of PAP appointed bureaucrats, politicians or trade union officials.⁵² It is virtually impossible for a non-PAP candidate to stand for president. If any such candidate did stand and was demonstrably anti-PAP, he would then have to contend with the PAP's complete control of the domestic media in any election campaign, not to mention the possibility of administrative action being taken to disqualify the candidature such as a tax audit or a possibility of the government releasing details of covert surveillance by the ISD to reveal information damaging to the candidate.⁵³

These, clearly undemocratic, conditions have been imposed as the role of the elected presidency, as introduced in November 1991, is supposedly one of national guardian

⁴⁹ In Singapore most companies with this amount of capitalisation are GLCs with the exception of the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, Overseas Union Bank, Asia Pacific Breweries, Creative Corporation, ???

⁵⁰ Article 22A of the Constitution provides the President with veto powers over appointments to statutory boards at his personal discretion.

⁵¹ Article 19(2)(g) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore

⁵² Under article 18 of the constitution, the Presidential Elections Commission (PEC) comprises: The Chairman of the Public Service Commission as chairman and two members; the chairman of the Public Accountants Board (who is usually the Commissioner of Internal Revenue – a Permanent Secretary level bureaucrat) and a member of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, the members of which are all PAP affiliates except for the Roman Catholic Archbishop who would be unlikely to be appointed to the PEC.

⁵³ In 1988, just before a general election, a tax audit was done of Francis Seow, former Solicitor-General and opposition candidate, resulting in criminal charges of tax evasion, thus disqualifying his candidature as an MP, although without the conviction he would have been offered a Non-Constituency MP position. A tax audit was also undertaken of opposition candidate Tang Liang Hong in 1997 after he was sued for libel by 13 PAP members including Goh Chock Tong, Lee Hsien Loong and Lee Kuan Yew. Tang was subsequently charged with 33 taxation offences and a warrant issued for his arrest. Seow's case raised accusations from opposition parties that such administrative action was undertaken to 'frame' Seow. Of course, it is impossible to objectively know the truth of this situation, but the PAP's track record on persecution of its political opponents adds credibility to the opposition accusations. Seow's account of the tax charges is provided in: Francis T. Seow, *To catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison*, New Haven, Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, pp. 243-256. Tang's taxation charges are revealed in: Chris Lydgate, "Amid black robes, a flash of colour". Available: <http://www.ozemail.com.au/~tangtalk/kelly.html>, 3 February 1999.

of last resort. These changes to the presidency were apparently made with the intention of Lee Kuan Yew assuming the position on relinquishing the prime ministership. The notion was floated initially by Lee Kuan Yew in 1984 but linked directly to Lee's exit from the parliament by Rajaratnam in 1988.⁵⁴ This linkage was subsequently dropped because of negative voter response, demonstrating that the regime, in certain cases, is responsive to public opinion. The importance of the elected president centres on his exercise of certain reserve powers of veto over: appointments to supreme statutory positions of senior personnel in the civil service, major statutory boards, and government controlled business enterprises;⁵⁵ expenditure of national reserves accumulated by the government and its various boards and business enterprises, not accumulated during the term of a current government; and detentions under the Internal Security Act, corruption investigations and administrative orders assuring the maintenance of religious harmony. It was justified as an insurance policy taken out by the PAP government to ensure that the wealth of the nation and the power of its highest offices is not lost to a possibly, 'irresponsible' future government or executive, presumably a non-PAP government.

In fact, these constitutional changes were also implemented to provide the PAP with a continued hold on the presidency in the event of a change of government, so that it would continue to have power over many aspects of government as long as a non-PAP government did not control two-thirds of the seats in parliament, the proportion required to amend most provisions of the constitution. Given the all-or-nothing nature of single plurality voting in a legislature chosen principally from multiple candidate constituencies,⁵⁶ the strategy of having an elected president with these veto powers is revealed as a massive game of bluff with the electorate; it either overwhelming supports the PAP or the opposition - balance and moderation are not allowed; as Chan notes, it reduces Singaporean politics to a zero-sum game.⁵⁷ This is an approach to electoral control which goes directly against the spirit of the Westminster constitutional framework because it is so divisive and potentially destructive; the national good should not be subservient to the Party's good. This is the lesson of democratic transition in South Korea and Taiwan.

The ability of the President to exercise his powers at his own discretion is limited by a variety of constitutional provisions. For example, although the executive power of Singapore is vested in the President, it is not exercisable by him alone, but under

⁵⁴ "Raja: PM Lee may be elected Executive President this year", *Straits Times*, 23 July 1988, p. 1

⁵⁵ Chief Justice, Chief of the Armed Forces and the Commissioner of Police among others.

⁵⁶ The weaknesses of the single plurality system and its suitability for one-party control has been noted by Chan previously. See: Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass-Roots*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1976, p. 189

⁵⁷ Chan Heng Chee, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass-Roots*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1976, p. 203

Article 21(1), can only be exercised by the President, except in those areas where he has discretionary power, "... in accordance with the advice of the cabinet or of a minister acting under the general authority of the cabinet." Thus the cabinet has the general exercise of executive power, a fact reinforced by Article 24(2).⁵⁸ The President's executive power is further eroded by the powers of the Presidential Council on Minority Rights which has the power to vet all legislation, including subsidiary legislation and the decisions of which can only be overturned by a two-thirds majority vote of all elected members of parliament.⁵⁹ Members of this Council, half of whom can be appointed as life members, cannot have their membership terminated at the discretion of the President.⁶⁰

Further erosion of the president's powers is provided by article 21(3) which requires the President to consult the Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA), dominated by the executive and its nominees⁶¹, before exercising powers under Articles 22, 22a(1), 22b(2) and (7), 22c(1), 22d(2) and (6) – appointments to public offices – and 144 (restrictions on loans and guarantees by the state), 148a (withholding assent to supply bills), 148b (authorisation of expenditure for unspecified purposes) and 148g (the duty of the Auditor-General and Accountant-General to advise the president of certain transactions which will draw upon the national reserves). Under amendments introduced in November 1996, if the president acts against the advice of the CPA in respect of appointments to the restricted public offices, the parliament can overturn the president's decision by a two-thirds majority vote.⁶² Members of the CPA continue to hold office for the term of their appointment even if the president changes.⁶³ The council provides advice to the prime minister and the speaker of its advice or recommendations to the president.⁶⁴ Thus the CPA acts both as a control mechanism and as an early warning system for the executive in case a president might take any action in relation to these matters which would be unacceptable to the executive.

The parliament may also curtail the president's powers. Article 148d allows the parliament to overrule the President's withholding of assent to a supply bill by a vote of two-thirds or more of members. Additionally, article 21(5) allows the parliament to

⁵⁸ Article 24(2) states: "Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the cabinet shall have the general direction and control of the Government and shall be collectively responsible to parliament."

⁵⁹ Articles 68-92

⁶⁰ Articles 72 and 73

⁶¹ The Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA) consists of two persons nominated by the president, two nominated by the president on the advice of the prime minister and one appointed on the advice of the Chairman of the Public Service Board. The latter office is itself subject to agreement by the CPA and is certain to be under the control of the Prime Minister and occupied by a PAP cadre or equivalent. Thus the nomination of the majority of nominees on the council rests, indirectly as usual, with the prime minister.

⁶² "Elected President: Laws on his powers amended", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 2 November 1996, p. 3

⁶³ On the assumption of office by a new president, the Chairman of the CPA must resign as chairman, but not from the council, as the chairman's appointment is at the discretion of the president.

⁶⁴ Article 37(k)

make laws requiring the President to consult with bodies other than the cabinet as specified in those laws and if necessary to act only on the recommendations of those bodies except in respect of those powers that can be exercised as a personal discretion or which do not conflict with other constitutional provisions. This requirement is so broad that it could require the president to follow the orders of the Chief of Staff of the SAF, the Commissioner of Police or the Chairman of the PAP.

Article 22(j) which provides for the Civil List, does not guarantee the office of the president a level of resourcing of staff or funding which would allow the president to fully exercise his functions under the constitution. Rather, the level of resourcing is at the discretion of the legislature, the prime minister and the Public Service Commission. Between 1990 when the president had no executive powers and 1998, only two additional staff were appointed to assist the president with his non-ceremonial duties, and both were administrative appointments incapable of assisting the president with his executive responsibilities.⁶⁵

The president's apparent executive powers, already limited by constitutional provisions that allow the parliament to over-ride a presidential veto in many circumstances, were further eroded by an April 1995 High Court decision that found that the President has no veto power over constitutional bills and that the parliament can amend presidential powers without presidential consent.⁶⁶ As a result of this referral, the government introduced three constitutional amendments to clarify what legislation the president could veto or refer to a referendum. The prime minister explained these changes by stating that the intention of the original Article 22H had not been to grant the president extensive veto powers over legislation and the provision was "premature", indicating that the government had made the changes originally in case a PAP aligned president required them in a dispute with a legislature in which the PAP did not have a two-thirds majority.⁶⁷

These amendments to articles 5(2A), 5(A) and 22(H) further restricted the president's powers. The new article 5(2A) restricts the president's power to refer legislation to a referendum to bills concerned with fundamental liberties and elections. Bills concerned with management of the nation's fiscal reserves and appointments to presidentially controlled positions are now dealt with under article 5(A), a new

⁶⁵ These additional appointments were clerical and could not provide the president with any support for his prudential supervision responsibilities. The only source for this support would be the secondment of civil service officers to the Istana; an option that would provide the president with no statutorily independent capability to carry out the particular duties of the elected president.

⁶⁶ "Constitutional Reference No. 1 of 1995", *Singapore Law Reports*, 2, 1995, pp. 210-213. See also: "Elected President: Laws on his powers amended", *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 2 November 1996, p. 3

⁶⁷ "Elected President: Laws on his powers amended", *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 2 November 1996, p. 3

provision. This article now governs all bills seeking to amend the constitution except for those specified in article 5(2A) and those concerned with safeguarding the sovereignty of Singapore. Under its provisions, if the president withholds assent to a bill which he thinks curtails his powers and the cabinet disagrees, the bill is referred to a constitutional tribunal composed of supreme court judges. If the tribunal decides that a bill does not curtail the president's powers, the president is deemed to have assented to it. If the tribunal supports the president's position, the cabinet may refer the legislation to a national referendum. Article 22(H) refers to the procedure to be used in disputes between cabinet and the president over non-constitutional bills, such as supply bills. As for article 5(2A), if the president withholds assent, the matter is referred to the constitutional tribunal. In this case, the tribunal's decision is final; no matter may be referred to a referendum.

The current provision requires the parliament to challenge what few presidential veto rights that remain through resort to a referendum. Given the PAP's control of the media, its considerable power to mobilise large numbers of supporters for an election, the likelihood that it would use public funding in such a case and the lack of legal guidelines on how a referendum would be organised to present both alternatives fairly to the electorate, such a strategy clearly favours the government.

Administrative mechanisms are also available to limit the president's power. For example, the government in 1998 decided to change the definition of national reserves so that its earnings from investments of existing reserves would not be accumulated as part of the reserves protected by the president, but would be defined as "net investment income" and counted as part of current assets. This gave the government an additional income stream, decreased the president's power to control the reserves and in fact circumvented the president's constitutional control over a significant part of the reserves. The president was not consulted on this definitional change and its implications.⁶⁸ At his resignation press conference, President Ong Teng Cheong commented that he had struggled for most of his six year term to convince the government to take his office seriously and to put administrative procedures in place to facilitate the president's powers. He also had to deal, alone and without any bureaucratic support independent of the civil service, with the opposition of the Council of Presidential Advisers which has the constitutional power to advise and act against the president if required.⁶⁹ A compromise eventually resulted in the

⁶⁸ "and this was one of them" (sic), *Straits Times*, 17 July 1999, p. 17

⁶⁹ Ong himself did not mention or criticise the CPA; to do so would have been to criticise the inner core executive. However, the role of the CPA in devising the White Paper and particularly its resistance to Ong's interpretation of presidential powers, is implied by Goh Chok Tong in his farewell address to the president. See: Goh Chok Tong, *Speech By Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Farewell Reception for President Ong Teng Cheong on Monday, 30 August 1999, at the Istana at 6.30 pm*, Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1999

parliamentary white paper on *The Principles for Determining and Safeguarding the Accumulated Reserves of the Government and the Fifth Schedule Statutory Boards and Government Companies*, released in June 1999 and tabled in the parliament on 2 July 1999. To have any effect this must now be translated into legislation.

Despite these limitations, the president does have some powers which are protected from executive override. For example, under Article 22(i), the president has absolute discretion in respect of orders made under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, in those cases where the advice of the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (PCRH) conflicts with the advice of cabinet. As the PCRH is always dominated by executive appointees, such conflict is unlikely. In 1998, of the nine members of the council, six were PAP cadres or have demonstrated long term loyalty to the PAP.⁷⁰ Also, under Article 5(2)(a), the constitutional provisions relating to the powers of the President cannot be changed except through a national referendum supported by two-thirds of the voters. Despite this, the office of president is still substantially powerless in the face of executive authority and control.

In addition to the legislative and constitutional controls available to the executive to control the presidency, other more direct means are available: the use of executive power over the parliament, the public service and the media to attack and, if necessary severely discredit the president and force his resignation as was done in the case of President C. V. Devan Nair in March 1985.⁷¹ In this case Lee Kuan Yew, after ousting Devan Nair from office on charges of alcoholism, eventually in 1988, issued a parliamentary White Paper⁷² which graphically detailed a number of charges, several of which were unsubstantiated, against the former president.⁷³ These charges included

⁷⁰ *Singapore Government Directory January 1998*, Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1998, p. 471. In January 1998, the council comprised: Wee Chong Jin, former Chief Justice, chairman; Venerable Seck Kwang Phing, President of the Singapore Buddhist Welfare Services; Dr. Choong Chee Pang, lecturer, Trinity Theological College; Archbishop Gregory Yong, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Singapore; Haji Syed Isa Semait, Mufti of Singapore; V. R. Nathan, a retired banking inspector and chairman of the Hindu Endowments Board since 1991; Bhajan Singh, President of the Sikh Advisory Board; Chua Gim Siong, Managing Director, Singardo Trading Company, member of the National Arts Council, member of the council of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and secretary of the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations; and Tan Chok Kian, former permanent secretary in the civil service, former Executive Chairman of the Singapore Stock Exchange, former chairman of both the POSB board and CPF board. The following are assumed to be PAP cadres: Dr. Choong, Bhajan Singh, V. R. Nathan, Chua Gim Siong and Tan Chok Kian. Wee Chong Jin is probably not a cadre, but has a demonstrated history of strong loyalty to the PAP in his career as Chief Justice. Archbishop Yong demonstrated in the "marxist conspiracy" case that he is intimidated by Lee Kuan Yew's direct threat to introduce harsh legislative restrictions on his church by forcing the resignations of four of his priests in conformity with government directions and not criticising the jailing of several leading lay members of the Roman Catholic Church under the ISA. See: "First religious harmony body appointed", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 8 August 1992, p. 2; *Singapore Human Rights Alert*, Update No. 5. Available at: http://www.pactok.net/docs/singapore/txt_1/spore_txt/shra_txt/upd5.htm. For a succinct analysis of Lee Kuan Yew's treatment of Archbishop Yong, see: Bernard Levin, "New martyrs to Lee's tyranny", *The Times*, 12 April 1990

⁷¹ Devan Nair's case also illustrates the political use which can be made of the mental health provisions of the Health Act.

⁷² Command No. 8 of 1988

⁷³ Details of this bizarre episode in Singaporean politics is provided in: T. S. Selvan, *Singapore: The Ultimate Island*, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, pp. 187-194. C. V. Devan Nair's full response can be found in: Francis T. Seow,

alcoholism, wife beating, adultery and sexual harassment, details provided by security surveillance, the acceptance of hearsay and possibly invention. As the White Paper attracted parliamentary privilege, it could be quoted in the press without fear of legal action and it was, including details of the ex-president's personal medical records provided to the government by medical practitioners. When Devan Nair rebutted the White Paper through the *Straits Times*,⁷⁴ the political executive realised that continued debate of the matter would blacken it as much as its former president and refused to reply, despite having promised to do so.⁷⁵ This case demonstrated in a most potent and frightening way, the power the Singaporean executive can bring to bear on any person in the nation, even if it be the president. Additionally, the president has limited immunity from civil or criminal action⁷⁶ and, in particular, has no immunity from the Internal Security Act. The latter is particularly important given the role ISD officers played in the executive's dismissal of President Devan Nair. Lee Kuan Yew himself admitted the hold that the executive, and he personally, holds over the presidency when, in the parliamentary debate on the constitutional amendment to directly elect the president, he commented:

Given me and my links with so many people, all I have to do is stay Secretary-General of the PAP. I don't have to be president.⁷⁷

The harsh realities of the difficulties of the presidential office were revealed in statements by the first elected president⁷⁸ Ong Teng Cheong, formerly Second Deputy Prime Minister, in July 1999. In stating that he had no intention to run for a second term, Ong, who had a history of conflict with Goh Chok Tong before his elevation to the presidency, criticised the political executive and the Administrative Service for their attitude and behaviour towards his office. In particular, he cited their failure to treat his office in accordance with its constitutional role, with taking four years to provide him with an estimate of the reserves which he is supposed to protect, with changing the definition of reserves so as to restrict his powers, concluding that; "I suspect that they consider the Elected President a nuisance ... checking on them, looking over their shoulder."⁷⁹ This indicates that the president is not part of the core executive, that the office is still considered peripheral, its powers easily compromised and the core executive as being hostile to it. As Thio points out, since the office was

To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison. New Haven, Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, pp. 273-282

⁷⁴ *Straits Times*, 10 July 1988

⁷⁵ Lee Hsien Loong promised a response to Nair's letter on 11 July, the day after its publication, but Goh Chok Tong seems to have exercised greater political restraint and wisdom by closing the debate on 12 July. The government had nothing to gain from this debate except embarrassment and ridicule. See: *Straits Times*, 11 and 12 July 1988

⁷⁶ Article 22(k)

⁷⁷ *Asiaweek*, 26 August 1988, p. 43

⁷⁸ Although President Wee Kim Wee exercised the powers of the elected president under transitional provisions, Ong Teng Cheong was actually the first elected president.

⁷⁹ "A heavyweight or a maintenance person?", *Straits Times*, 17 July 1999, p. 17

instituted, the political executive has made "steady attempts to ensure that his powers are contained."⁸⁰

The true rationale for the establishment of an elected president with limited executive powers is not to protect national financial reserves nor the integrity of the civil service; the civil service is more than capable of protecting itself and there have been no indications by any political party that has gained legislative representation that they intend to follow a program that would severely reduce the reserves. Ong Pang Boon, party co-founder and former PAP minister from 1959-1988, in objecting to the elected presidency rightly identified the genuine reason for the creation of the office;

In a parliamentary democracy, peaceful transfer of power, whether intra-party or inter-party, is fundamental to the system, and must be seen to be so. Once this possibility appears to be closed, then violent revolutionary means would loom large. I do not know if this is what we want.⁸¹

Ong's concern was that the elected presidency was being erected as a barrier that would purposefully block the peaceful transition from a PAP regime to a non-PAP regime, bringing with it the possibility of severe social discord, possibly on a revolutionary scale. These thoughts echo the objections of the Singapore Democratic Party in also opposing the constitutional provisions for the elected president which it interpreted as being designed to "bring about the fall of an opposition government."⁸² The original intent for the office of the elected president may have been to stop the peaceful transfer of power should the PAP lose office by having Lee Kuan Yew or another PAP luminary elected. However, given the experience of its first incumbent, the political executive may have acted to make it largely irrelevant, at least while the PAP retains power.

Executive and Parliament: From Tokenism to Dialogue?

In Singapore, as in other unicameral Westminster style parliaments, the legislature is a captured house as it is completely controlled by the executive which is formed from the legislature and is part of it. In Singapore, the legislature has three types of members: 83 ordinary elected members, up to six non-constituency members (NCMPs) and up to nine nominated members (NMPs), the latter two categories being appointed at the discretion of the executive.

Control of the election of members is arranged through the executive's use of the paucity of constitutional provisions for guaranteeing fair and equitable elections. There is no

⁸⁰ Chua Lee Hoong, "Containing powers of the EP: Cabinet has 'two arrows'", *Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 26 October 1996, p. 15

⁸¹ Cited in: T. S. Selvan, *Singapore: The Ultimate Island*, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, pp. 172-173

⁸² Chan Eng Cheng, "SDP's stand on elected President", *Straits Times*, 14 November 1984, p. 15

constitutional provision for an independent electoral commission to oversee electoral boundaries and distributions; this is done by the Elections Department within the Prime Minister's Office. There is a constitutional guarantee of the equal value of votes in Article 12, but this has been ignored in introducing Group Representative Constituencies which elect five or six legislators per district. Thio has pointed out the GRC system probably breaches Article 12.⁸³

The two non-elected categories have been introduced to provide a non-government voice, although initially against the opposition of ordinary members who saw the nominated members in particular as an adverse reflection on their ability to criticise the executive.⁸⁴ It was also seen by MPs as providing a backdoor to cabinet for people with required specialist talents who did not want to go through the election process; an Americanisation of the cabinet.⁸⁵ NMPs may belong to a political party, but preferably should not, so as they are seen to be independent critics of the government. However, there is no requirement that an NMP resign from a political party on appointment.⁸⁶ Nominations for NMP positions are accepted from the public, screened by a parliamentary select committee, approved by the prime minister and appointed by the president.

In 1997 selection for NMPs was changed from being on an individual basis to being on the basis of 'functional groups' which they might represent, although this too met opposition from some MPs.⁸⁷ There is no constitutional requirement for the parliament to appoint NMPs; it is discretionary.

Only three NCMP positions have become available; after the 1984 elections M.P.D. Nair was offered an NCMP position but refused it,⁸⁸ after the 1988 elections, Dr. Lee Siow-Choh accepted one and after the 1997 elections, J. B. Jeyaratnam accepted one. However, the government has stated that no role exists for NCMPs outside the parliamentary chamber, so their role is very limited. This was clarified by the Minister for Home Affairs, Wong Kan Seng in 1997 when he explained that government organisations will not answer letters written by NCMP J. B. Jeyaratnam as; "An NCMP does not represent any constituent and

⁸³ Thio Li-ann, "Choosing Representatives: Singapore Does it Her Way," in Graham Hassall and Cheryl Saunders, eds., *The People's Representatives: Electoral Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1997, pp. 38-58, p. 49

⁸⁴ Garry Rodan, "Singapore's leadership in transition: erosion or refinement of authoritarian rule?", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 1992, 24, pp. 3-17, pp. 8-9

⁸⁵ *The Straits Times*, 30 May 1992

⁸⁶ Kevin Tan, Yeo Toing Ming and Lee Kiat Seng, *Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore*, Singapore, Butterworths, 1991, p. 210

⁸⁷ In this debate in parliament, despite opposition from the backbench, the party whip was imposed and so this change in policy for selecting NMPs was passed. See: *Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report*, 67, 15, 31 July 1997, 1498-1514

⁸⁸ "Non-constituency MP: Nair elected", *Straits Times*, 25 December 1984, p. 1

therefore ... the NCMP's letters will not be answered because he does not represent any constituent."⁸⁹

In Singapore there is no constitutional provision for an opposition and the PAP categorically rejects the concept of a loyal opposition; Goh Chok Tong has stated that he does not believe in opposition politics; "certainly not the type we have in Singapore."⁹⁰, although in an early statement he had invited the opposition parties to play "a positive role in Singapore's development." and was seemingly willing to accept genuine, but limited, political contestation.⁹¹ The stance of the PAP is that one-party government can be democratic without an opposition.⁹² In Westminster tradition, the parliament is controlled through the strong party discipline of the PAP. There is also a constitutional provision that if a member is expelled from the party in which he was elected, he must resign from the parliament, a provision not found in any other Westminster style polity, not even Malaysia.⁹³ Government members therefore rarely oppose any substantive executive action, either legislative or administrative.⁹⁴ As Carey⁹⁵ and Weldon⁹⁶ point out, such party discipline, electoral rules and bans on re-election act as a considerable disincentive for legislators to question the executive or to highly value the executive review role of the legislature. This does not, however, totally prevent backbenchers from voting against the government, although in recent times it is extremely rare. In 1967, for example, NTUC affiliated PAP MPs voted against amendments to the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act as they thought that it would erode union rights.⁹⁷

In addition to these party and constitutional controls, members can be disqualified for breaching any constitutional provision relating to their position or may be removed from parliament by expulsion⁹⁸ or for not attending sittings without the permission of the Speaker for two consecutive months.⁹⁹ They can also be removed through libel or defamation action in the civil courts as members' parliamentary immunity has been

⁸⁹ *Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report*, 67, 4, 11 July 1997, p. 469

⁹⁰ "Chee-style politics 'will sink' Singapore", *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 2 November 1996, p. 2

⁹¹ *Parliamentary Debates Singapore. Official Reports*, 59, 5, 16 January 1992, p. 374

⁹² Lim Hng Kiang, "No Need for Opposition Checks and Balances", *Petir*, November/December 1992, pp. 74-77

⁹³ Article 46(2)(b). This provision exists in the constitution of the Malaysian state of Sabah, but not in the national Malaysian constitution.

⁹⁴ Opposition on minor issues sometimes arises from PAP backbenchers, but opposition to major policy is not tolerated. For example, in 1989 when backbencher Heng Chiang Meng voiced his objections to the extension of mandatory caning for many offences, he was criticised by Lee Hsien Loong, but he is still a PAP MP. See: *Time*, 13 March 1989

⁹⁵ John Carey, *Term Limits and Legislative Representation*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996

⁹⁶ Jeffrey Weldon, "Political Sources of Presidentialism in Mexico", in, Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 225-258

⁹⁷ Raj Vasil, "Trade Unions" in Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *Management of Success: the Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 144-170, p. 156

⁹⁸ Article 46(2)(f). The power of expulsion is stated but not defined in the Constitution.

⁹⁹ Article 46(2)(d)

severely compromised by changes to the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985.

This act was substantially weakened by amendments in 1986 in response to continued criticism of the government and the judiciary by opposition member J. B. Jeyaratnam under parliamentary privilege. The act was amended to increase the penalties that could be imposed by the Parliamentary Privileges Committee so as to allow the parliament to imprison, suspend, reprimand or impose a fine of up to \$50,000 on a member for "... any dishonourable conduct, abuse of privilege or contempt..." or remove the members immunity from civil action.¹⁰⁰ The definition of any alleged misconduct is at the discretion of the Parliamentary Privileges Committee. In addition, the power to summarily deal with contempt charges was extended from the Parliamentary Privileges Committee to the Speaker and the chairman of any committee, all of whom are government members.¹⁰¹ This provided power to the chairmen of committees to arbitrarily charge MPs appearing before committees with contempt and possible prosecution in the civil courts.

In association with these amendments, the constitution was also amended so as to remove the right to counsel for any member charged with contempt, thus transferring such costs to the member,¹⁰² to remove the guarantee that members so charged would be brought before a magistrate within 48 hours and, if expelled from the parliament for the respective seat to become vacant, thus doing away with the need for a by-election.¹⁰³

The standing orders of the parliament have also been designed to ensure that the Speaker¹⁰⁴ has almost total control of all parliamentary powers and that ministers cannot be compelled to answer questions. The speaker has considerable influence over committee appointments except to GPCs,¹⁰⁵ (which are party, not parliamentary, committees) although committee appointments are recommended by a parliamentary

¹⁰⁰ Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985 s.20

¹⁰¹ Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985 s.21(3), (4) and (5)

¹⁰² *Time*, 8 September 1986, p. 17

¹⁰³ Article 9(4) and (5) of the Constitution now state: (4) Where a person is arrested and not released, he shall, without unreasonable delay, and in any case within 48 hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey), be produced before a magistrate and shall not be further detained in custody without the magistrate's authority. (5) Clauses (3) and (4) shall not apply to an enemy alien or to any person arrested for contempt of parliament pursuant to a warrant issued under the hand of the Speaker.

¹⁰⁴ The constitution provides for the Speaker and Deputy Speakers, of which there are two, to be appointed from non-parliamentary ranks. The candidates must, however, meet the qualifications to stand for parliamentary office. This provides the government with a means of slightly increasing the number of voting members should this ever be required, by replacing a non-voting Speaker elected from parliamentary ranks with a non-parliamentarian. See: Articles 40 and 42. Regardless of whether the appointee is a parliamentarian or not, the Speaker has no deciding vote in the case of a tied vote. Tied votes are lost. See: Article 57

¹⁰⁵ In interviews with the author, parliamentarians commented that the Speaker has considerable influence on these appointments, but the Cabinet makes the final decision.

committee. The Speaker has no genuine independence of the political executive.¹⁰⁶ Opposition members are appointed to committees in proportion to their representation, but in reality are slightly over-represented because of the number of committees and their small number. Opposition MPs comment that this does not increase their power or influence.¹⁰⁷ The Standing Orders also require all questions to be put to ministers to be provided at least 48 hours before a sitting and the Speaker has discretion to allow or disallow questions and supplementary questions asked during a sitting. Questions without notice are not usually allowed. MPs also cannot raise the inadmissibility of a question as a matter of debate.¹⁰⁸

Parliament's traditional Westminster powers as a court within its own jurisdiction, against which no appeals may be heard, may also be used to intimidate opposition witnesses appearing before parliamentary committees. This constitutional provision¹⁰⁹ has only been used twice, both times against opposition members.¹¹⁰ In 1996, four members of the Singapore Democratic party were fined a total of \$51,000 by the Committee on Privileges for "perjury, wilfully giving false answers, prevaricating and misconducting themselves as witnesses" before the Select Committee on Health Care Costs.¹¹¹ As the parliament is not required to place charges or to prove a case on any legal standard of evidence, either civil or criminal, and no appeals can be made against such a decision, this provides the political executive with another convenient weapon in its arsenal against criticism and political opposition.¹¹² In this particular case, although the SDP leader Dr. Chee Soon Juan apologised for errors in the party's evidence before the committee, there existed no *prima facie* case that he or the others fined intentionally or deliberately provided false answers to the committee; they were simply incompetent.

The executive also exercises direct control over the legislature through its role in selecting candidates for election through the party organisation. As shown in Table 4.2, the legislature is dominated by members who come from the public sector; whose employment at the time of recruitment or after, is directly or indirectly dependent on

¹⁰⁶ For example, following the 1997 elections, the prime minister, Goh Chok Tong, comments that he "had asked the Speaker of Parliament to give all MPs, particularly new ones, ample opportunity and latitude to speak in their first year of Parliament." See: "Help Govt Refute Coffeshop Talk", *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 11 January 1997, p. 3

¹⁰⁷ In interviews with the author, July-October 1998

¹⁰⁸ For example, see the exchange between J. B. Jeyaratnam and the Speaker on the Speaker's decision not to admit a question: *Parliamentary Debates Singapore*, 76, 5, 5 June 1997, col. 332

¹⁰⁹ The Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act is constituted under s.63 of the constitution.

¹¹⁰ Once, though Standing Orders, against J. B. Jeyaratnam as previously discussed and once against the four SDP members as discussed in the present case.

¹¹¹ The charges were laid under The Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act. See: Koh Buck Song, "17 types of offences covered under contempt of Parliament", *Straits Times*, 21 September 1996, p. 14

¹¹² "Punishment needed to uphold Parliament's dignity", *Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 14 December 1996, p. 24 and, "Four SDP members pay contempt fines hours before deadline", *Straits Times Overseas Weekly Edition*, 21 December 1996, p. 5. The four fined were: Dr. Chee Soon Juan, Wong Hong Toy, S. Kunalen and Kwan Yue Keng.

the government. Although the quality of the data in Table 4.2 improves from 1963 onwards, it seems apparent that the political executive attempts to ensure that the two-thirds majority required to pass constitutional amendments can be totally depended upon by drawing this proportion of members from the public sector. This is almost certainly the case from 1976 onwards, although the Eighth Parliament in 1991 seems to have been more dependent on members from the private sector if one assumes that the four members in the unknown category did not come from the public sector. If we ignore the requirement to ensure constitutional changes and examine those legislators drawn from the public sector in terms of the PAP's own members, they tend to be the majority of members. From 1984 when Goh Chok Tong began to take executive responsibility for the government, MPs drawn from the GLCs, the civil service, statutory boards or the SAF comprised 48 per cent of PAP members in 1984, and 53 per cent from 1988 to 1997. In terms of the total parliament, they comprised 47 per cent in 1984, 52 per cent in 1988, 51 per cent in 1991 and 52 per cent in 1997. This conforms to Chan's earlier findings that "the political leaderships ... see the civil service as an appropriate training ground for politicians"¹¹³ This data also lends credence to Rodan's assertion that the working class and small business sector is substantially excluded from political participation.¹¹⁴

This combination of party discipline, constitutional provisions and parliamentary standing orders makes the Singapore parliament an easily controlled creature of the executive. It should be noted however, that given that all members of parliament understand the limitations on their power and freedom to challenge the executive, the legislature has become hegemonised; it is self-regulating and does not challenge the constitutional and ideological framework which frames it.

This extraordinary degree of control does not however produce a parliament which is simply a rubber stamp, as in the case of the New Order Indonesian or Vietnamese legislatures, although it cannot at the ultimate test overthrow the executive without splitting the party and probably the nation. The current PAP executive, particularly the prime minister, is aware that the backbench is talented, capable of making significant contributions to policy debates and is one of its most important links to the electorate, particularly because of the extra-parliamentary consultative mechanisms which they preside over in their constituencies and ethnic communities.¹¹⁵ As illustrated in Table

¹¹³ Chan Heng Chee, "Legislature and Legislators", in Jon S. T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, eds., *Government and Politics of Singapore*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 72-91, p. 85

¹¹⁴ Garry Rodan, "Preserving the one-party state in contemporary Singapore", in Kevin Hewitson, Richard Robinson and Garry Rodan, eds., *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1993, pp. 75-108, p. 104

¹¹⁵ Cabinet ministers often refer to the importance of the role of MPs in the policy system. For example, Lee Hsien Loong has stated the political leadership is not made up of just the Cabinet; grassroots leaders and Members of Parliament also played a part, and their views were taken seriously. See: Wang Hui Ling, "Opposition exerts 'barely any pressure' on Govt, says BG Lee", *Straits Times Weekly*, 15 April 1995, p.2

4.3, the educational levels of PAP legislators is very high. While until 1984, some MPs lacked tertiary education, by 1988 all were graduates. While from 1963-1997 on average 39 per cent had a bachelors degree, 14 per cent a master's degree and 19 per cent a doctoral degree, from 1984-1997, the comparative figures are 44 per cent, 21 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. The backbench provides intellectual resources and is also one of the executive's most important links to the broader middle class, particularly its non-PAP aligned members.

The executive is also cognisant of generally being in control of the backbench, so it risks little and gains much by being more consultative and by using backbenchers as active, though somewhat removed, participants in policy making. This is a distinctive change in executive attitude towards backbenchers from the Lee administrations even though later Lee administrations could boast talented backbenches. It is also a partial change in the role of legislators from the total domination by the executive, as noted by Chan in 1975¹¹⁶ and perhaps, at least partly supports her contention in 1989 of a repoliticisation of Singaporean society, "increased political cognition and personal efficacy",¹¹⁷ albeit still within well controlled parameters. It also adds another dimension to Chua's assertion that the political system has been restructured since 1984 in three ways: the introduction of NMPs, GRCs and the elected presidency.¹¹⁸ Under Goh Chok Tong, since 1984 and particularly since 1991, the relationship between the parliament and the executive has also shown signs of a slow but steady restructuring through the broadening of policy dialogue to include greater discourse within the legislative chamber and outside it through the use of Government Parliamentary Committees (GPCs) and their resource panels.

Women and the Political Executive

One issue of note, is that the both the backbench and the frontbench are almost exclusively male domains; no more than one woman has held ministerial rank at any one time to 1998. While the executive is aware of this, and Goh Chok Tong has made commitments to recruit more women into politics, this has not happened, despite the existence and activities of the PAP Women's Wing. In interviewing women in elite professions about this issue, it is obvious that many of those women who have been involved in politics and have subsequently withdrawn, have said little to their friends and colleagues that would recommend being a member of parliament. I encountered constant mildly derogatory remarks about the cabinet being a "private school boy's

¹¹⁶ Chan Heng Chee, "The Role of parliamentary Politicians in Singapore", *Occasional Paper Series Department of Political Science University of Singapore*, 19, 1975, p. 6

¹¹⁷ Chan Heng Chee, "The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System", in Kernial S. Sandhu and Peter Wheatley, eds., *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 70-89, p. 87

¹¹⁸ Chua Beng Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 175-178

club", and the inability of many ministers and many male MPs to relate to women as their intellectual and professional equals.¹¹⁹ Equally, none amongst this group had any interest in opposition politics; they simply wanted to be heard free of intimidation and without the requirement to join a political party unless self-motivated to do so. It was also made obvious that Lee Kuan Yew's trawling through the ranks of the elite for a replacement executive in the 1980's has left enduring antagonism among many of those women most qualified to serve politically, although subsequent recruitments under Goh Chok Tong have been more positively assessed. This view was most strongly reflected by the comment of one highly qualified woman with a long association with the government that Lee "... cannot be trusted and nor can a government in which he continues to play a leading role." This seems principally because Lee's influence is seen as negative in that he encourages an approach that over-values pragmatism, undervalues the potential contribution of those outside the core and is seen as overbearingly arrogant. Put simply, the executive, particularly under Lee, was seen to frequently change its mind, contradict itself too often, push his personal views in too many areas and to treat others as intellectual inferiors. This considerable, but passive, antagonism to the government was usually accompanied by the contradictory observation that almost all cabinet ministers had wives in the professions, many of whom were independently wealthy and obviously intellectually and professionally capable.¹²⁰ While Goh Chok Tong's recruitment campaigns for the 1991 and 1997 elections were more targeted and less divisive than those of the 1980s, there is obviously a substantial negative legacy to overcome in the political recruitment process, as those most capable of assuming political office are simply withdrawing their labour from that particular market.

The other issue which arose in discussing this issue with Administrative Service officers is an underlying concern that women in general are perceived to lack the defence and security perspective in policy making and public sector management seen as essential to effective ministerial performance, certainly at cabinet level. All Singaporean men go through National Service which provides political socialisation

¹¹⁹ Although I interviewed women in AWARE, Singapore's foremost feminist organisation on this issue, I also interviewed women academics, doctors, lawyers, businesswomen and civil servants, including the Singapore Council of Women's Organisations and the Singapore Association of Women Lawyers. What was surprising about the uniformly negative view of women entering politics was that even those obviously affiliated with the PAP had a poor view of the government's commitment to recruiting women, particularly into the executive. Of the two women NMPs interviewed, only one would comment on this issue and she too was sceptical of the present executive's commitment to this issue. The scepticism is not hard to understand. In 1996, prior to the 1997 elections, Lee Hsien Loong stated that divorced women were stigmatised and would not be preselected, that single women could be but did not specify the characteristics of the type of single women preferred and restated the PAP position that it preferred married women with children, who "have got to be suitable politically as well as meet all the other requirements. Then you must have your own careers, and your family sufficiently settled, to be able to come in. Your husband has to be comfortable with it – that's important. Not easy." See: Koh Buck Song, "PAP ready to accept single women as candidates: BG Lee", *The Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 19 October 1996, p. 5

¹²⁰ For example, Goh Chock Tong, George Yeo and Wong Kan Seng all have wives who are successful lawyers. Lee Hsien Loong's wife, Ho Ping is one of the most senior GLC technocrats as president of Singapore Technologies and Lim Hng Kiang's wife is an accountant.

focussed on these issues which is then reinforced by 20 years of part-time military service. Women are excluded from this process and therefore seen as somehow lacking.¹²¹ One could postulate from this that the first woman cabinet minister will probably be someone with a background in the Administrative Service, followed by postings to MINDEF, MHA or MFA and a second career in a defence related GLC within the Singapore Technologies Group. There has been speculation for some time that Ho Ching, the wife of Lee Hsien Loong fits this profile, but that her ascension to ministerial office is politically unacceptable both to many PAP MPs and electorally. As senior civil service women are too few and valuable, it is unlikely that a woman deputy secretary will be recruited as directly from the civil service to the ministry as have some current ministers such as Lim Hng Kiang. The representation of women in the parliament since self-government is shown in Table 4.4. It is notable that, in forty years there has only been one non-Chinese woman member of parliament, two women of junior ministerial rank, one women acting cabinet minister¹²² and that as the PAP regime has continued, the number of women in parliament has declined.

Backbenchers: From Sounding Box to Sounding Board?

The relationship between backbenchers and the executive is also influenced by party arrangements. In Singapore, as in Westminster, there is no provision for regular meetings between the executive and the backbench. The party room meetings characteristic of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan and South Korea, do not exist in Singapore. There are no party room nominations, votes or discussions between backbenchers and ministers on promotions to the ministry; this is a prime ministerial prerogative and even senior backbenchers can be surprised when appointments to or promotions within the executive are made.¹²³

There is no sense of a Parliamentary PAP as distinct from the PAP; the party is one under executive and cadre control. Unlike many parties, the PAP does not necessarily

¹²¹ There are some women officers in the SAF, the SCDF and the SPF. Whether these have an interest in, or aptitude for political life, is yet to be tested.

¹²² Seet Ai Mee who lost her seat in the 1991 general election and, reportedly, subsequently questioned why, as the only woman cabinet minister, she was not given a more secure seat. Seet declined to re-enter politics.

¹²³ For example, Goh Chok Tong's second cabinet reshuffle in July 1991 took many backbenchers by surprise. See: "PM reshuffles Cabinet", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 6 July 1991, p. 1. Goh had previously reshuffled portfolios shortly prior to officially assuming office as Prime Minister in November 1990.

TABLE 4.2
SOURCES OF PAP MEMBERS IN THE SINGAPORE PARLIAMENT AT TIME OF ELECTION: 1963-1997 ¹²⁴

Source	Year	1963 ¹²⁵	1968 ¹²⁶	1972	1976 ¹²⁷	1980 ¹²⁸	1984	1988 ¹²⁹	1991 ¹³⁰	1997	TOTAL	% of TOTAL
Unions		5	8	12	10	7	5	3	4	3	57	9.2%
GLCs		0	1	1	3	6	8	11	9	6	45	7.3%
Civil Service or Boards		4	8	10	16	21	14	15	15	20	123	19.8%
Higher Education		1	7	10	13	12	12	13	12	14	94	15.2%
Journalists		4	5	5	6	4	7	5	5	8	49	7.9%
SAF		0	0	0	0	1	2	3	2	3	11	1.8%
TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR		14	29	38	48	51	48	50	47	54	379	61.1%
		27%	50%	58%	70%	67%	61%	62%	58%	65%	-	
Private Sector		7	10	11	14	19	23	26	25	25	160	25.8%
Other		1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	7	1.1%
Unknown		16	18	15	6	4	5	4	4	2	74	11.9%
TOTAL PAP MPs		38	58	65	69	75	77	80	77	81	620	100
Opposition MPs		13	0	0	0	1	2	1	4	2	23	
No. MPs		51	58	65	69	76 ¹³¹	79	81	81	83	643	

¹²⁴ Based on the MP's occupation on election to parliament if a minister or the MP's current occupation as revealed in either the *Singapore Government Directory*, or other source documents. The 1979 by-election is not included; data is derived only from the outcomes of general elections.

¹²⁵ Includes members elected before 1963.

¹²⁶ Includes 1970 by-election.

¹²⁷ Includes by-elections in 1977 and 1979.

¹²⁸ Includes 1981 by-election.

¹²⁹ Includes 1989 by-election.

¹³⁰ Includes 1992 by-election.

¹³¹ There were only 75 parliamentary seats, but because of the resignation of Devan Nair to accept the presidency resulting in a by-election, the total number of MPs was 76 during the period of this parliament, including J. B. Jeyaratnam, an opposition member elected in the 1976 by-election.

TABLE 4.3: EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF PAP MPs AT TIME OF RECRUITMENT TO PARLIAMENT: 1963-1997

Source	YEAR	1963 ¹³²	1968 ¹³³	1972	1976 ¹³⁴	1980 ¹³⁵	1984	1988 ¹³⁶	1991 ¹³⁷	1997	TOTAL	% of TOTAL
< Tertiary education ¹³⁸		7	11	10	8	9	3				48	7.7%
Tertiary education < degree level ¹³⁹		4	5	6	6	6	4	4	2	1	38	6.1%
Bachelor's degree ¹⁴⁰		9	20	18	28	31	35	36	35	32	244	39.4%
Masters degree ¹⁴¹			1	3	6	9	10	13	17	27	86	13.9%
Doctoral degree		2	6	9	13	15	19	21	18	17	120	19.4%
Unknown		16	15	19	8	5	6	6	5	4	84	13.5%
TOTAL PAP MPs		38	58	65	69	75	77	80	77	81	620	100
Opposition MPs		13	0	0	0	1	2	1	4	2	23	
No. MPs		51	58	65	69	76 ¹⁴²	79	81	81	83	643	

¹³² Includes members elected before 1963.

¹³³ Includes 1970 by-election.

¹³⁴ Includes by-elections in 1977 and 1979.

¹³⁵ Includes 1981 by-election.

¹³⁶ Includes 1989 by-election.

¹³⁷ Includes 1992 by-election.

¹³⁸ This category is reserved for those with only primary and secondary education.

¹³⁹ This category is used for graduates of a teachers' training college and post-secondary technical institutions.

¹⁴⁰ The medical degrees MBBS are included as bachelor's degrees as are graduates from Raffles College, although the later awarded a diploma rather than a degree because of colonial educational bias against the institution awarded qualifications equivalent to British domestic qualifications.

¹⁴¹ This includes medical specialist with postgraduate certification by professional registering bodies, where this could be identified.

¹⁴² There were only 75 parliamentary seats, but because of the resignation of Devan Nair to accept the presidency resulting in a by-election, the total number of MPs was 76 during the period of this parliament, including J. B. Jeyaratnam, an opposition member elected in the 1976 by-election.

reward party workers with parliamentary nominations; the linkage between ordinary members and their parliamentary members is tenuous because of the recruitment methods used to appoint highly educated, technocratically oriented MPs who, prior to selection, may not even have been party members.¹⁴³ In this way, the party is irrelevant to a political career. Therefore the parliamentary chamber in effect becomes both the PAP party room and the legislature.¹⁴⁴ For example, in budget sittings, there is no formal pre-budget meetings between ministers and the backbench, nor ministers and NMPs.¹⁴⁵ Ministers and civil servants in the Ministry of Finance's Budget Division and other ministries will sometimes consult with selected backbenchers, particularly the chairmen of GPCs¹⁴⁶, the chairman of the Feedback Unit Supervisory Panel¹⁴⁷, the chairmen of any select committees if necessary and individual MPs seen as playing a leading role in addressing the concerns of particular groups, if there is any particularly sensitive issue.¹⁴⁸ However there is no general consultation with PAP MPs; they are seen as having only a peripheral role. This leads to the budget sitting of parliament also being the Parliamentary PAP budget party meeting; it is the major opportunity for the backbench to influence the executive's policy program in each year.

An analysis of the parliament's role in the annual budget process provides the best indication of the power of the legislature in influencing the executive's policy program. Schattschneider noted that the most important determinant of a political issue is the scope of debate.¹⁴⁹ In commenting on the French policy system which, like Singapore, is completely dominated by the executive and the higher civil service, Baumgartner comments that while parliamentary power may be low in such a system, participation in legislative review and the budget process expands participation beyond specialised policy communities and raises awareness of issues that may be treated as technical issues by the executive, but be considered as more fundamentally political by others.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴³ "SM: We must pay to get the best in govt", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 15 January 1994, pp. 1 and 24, p. 24

¹⁴⁴ In the present, original, parliamentary building there is no actual provision for party meeting rooms as such, although a large room is used for breaks during sittings. In the new parliamentary complex provision has been made for more meeting rooms, particularly committee rooms, but not for exclusive party rooms.

¹⁴⁵ Interviews with Ministry of Finance officers; Lorna Wu in 1995 and Chen Shian Jan in 1998 and

¹⁴⁶ Interviews with Ministry of Finance officers revealed that not all GPC chairmen will necessarily be consulted in pre-budget discussions. This was confirmed in an interview with Dr. S. Vasoo, chairman of the GPC on Community Development, in September 1998

¹⁴⁷ Interviews with Head of the Feedback Unit in 1995 and 1998; Zee Yoong Kang and Goh Chye Boon respectively.

¹⁴⁸ For example, in respect of the Chinese community, its parliamentary champions in the period 1991-1997 were seen as being Dr. Ow Chin Hock, Peh Chin Hua and Choo Wee Kiang. See: "New PAP voices grab attention", *The Straits Times*, 28 March 1998, p. 14. MPs who are perceived as being spokespersons for the business community include Chandra Das, Arthur Beng Kian Lam and Wong Kwei Cheong, all of whom retired from parliament in 1997. See: "MPs praise budget but still find it lacking in several areas", *The Straits Times*, 12 March 1996. Current members of the pro-business group of MPs includes Chew Heng Ching, Leong Horn Kee, Heng Chiang Meng and Wan Soon Bee. See: "Pro-business MPs object to higher CPF rate for bosses", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 16 March 1991, p. 4 and "All will benefit from incentives to venture abroad", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 13 March 1993, p. 5

¹⁴⁹ E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, p. 4

¹⁵⁰ Frank R. Baumgartner, *Conflict and Rhetoric in French Policymaking*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989, pp. 162-165

Table 4.4: Women In Singapore Parliament 1959-1998¹⁵¹

Date	Women MPs	No.	Women NMPs	No.	Total
1959	Mdm Chan Choy Siong, Mdm Ho Puay Choo, Ms Fung Yin Ching, Che Sahorah bte Ahmat, Ms Seow Peck Leng, Ms Chua Seng Kim	6	Not Applicable No constitutional provision for NMPs	-	6
1963	Mdm Chan Choy Siong, Mrs. Devan Nair, Ms Low Miaw Gong	3	Not Applicable	-	3
1968	Mdm Chan Choy Siong	1	Not Applicable	-	1
1972-1983	No women members	0	Not Applicable	-	0
1984	Dr. Aline Wong Kan Lai- Chung, Mrs., Yu-foo Yee Shoon, Dr. Dixie Tan	3		-	3
1988	Dr. Aline Wong Kan Lai- Chung, Mrs., Yu-foo Yee Shoon, Dr. Dixie Tan, Dr. Seet Ai Mee	4	Not Applicable	-	4
1991	Dr. Aline Wong Kan Lai- Chung, Mrs., Yu-foo Yee Shoon	3		-	2
1992	Dr. Aline Wong Kan Lai- Chung, Mrs., Yu-foo Yee Shoon,	2	Dr. Kanwaljit Soin	1	3
1997	Dr. Aline Wong Kan Lai- Chung, Mrs. Yu-Foo Yee Shoon, Dr. Lily Neo,	3	Dr. Lee Tsao Yuan, Mdm Claire Chang	2	5
TOTAL 1959-1997		13		3	16

The questioning of executive policy preferences in the budget debate is somewhat influenced by the size of the executive in comparison to the parliament as a whole. As illustrated in Table 4.5, the executive comprises slightly more than one-third of MPs since at least 1988 and if one includes members who were previously members of the executive, the proportion is much higher, averaging 46 per cent over the period 1988-1998 with peaks of 51 per cent in 1988 and 1996-97. This obviously enhances executive influence over the legislature.

The budget sitting of the Singapore parliament is divided into two sections; the budget speech by the Minister for Finance which includes a general house response and the detailed review of estimates by the parliament sitting as a Committee of the Whole. Although the budget sitting undoubtedly includes some pre-set pieces and Dorothy Dixers, and is additionally inhibited by the self-regulating behaviour of MPs in relation to core political issues, it is a surprisingly open forum. The speaker is now generous in

¹⁵¹ See: "Women's place in the House", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 18 December 1993, P. 14

allowing debate and time constraints are minimal; in 1997, 40 hours of debate was allowed and in 1998, 60 hours.¹⁵² This is, however, a recent trend. Previous budget debates under Goh Chok Tong governments were much shorter; 7 hours in 1991,¹⁵³ and 1992,¹⁵⁴ 12 hours in 1994,¹⁵⁵ but approximately 30 hours in 1993 when a goods and services tax was introduced and major changes made to CPF arrangements¹⁵⁶. In the 1998 budget sitting 465 questions-on-notice were received by ministers, 93 of these from NMPs. This is also a recent phenomena. In 1991, 27 MPs placed questions on notice¹⁵⁷; in 1992, 15¹⁵⁸; in 1993, 15¹⁵⁹; in 1994, 34.¹⁶⁰ Data for more recent sittings is not available.

In the course of the budget debate, ministers will agree to some policy changes from MPs usually on technical issues, will commit to the establishment of new committees to investigate policy issues and will offer committee memberships to MPs on ministry committees; there is considerable debate characteristic of intra-party dialogues in other

¹⁵² "Relief for some, anxiety for others", *The Straits Times*, 28 March 1998, p. 14

¹⁵³ "Finance minister warns against overheating of economy", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 16 March 1991, p. 1

¹⁵⁴ "Slowdown no cause for alarm: Dr Hu", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 14 March 1992, p. 1

¹⁵⁵ "Who's that talking? That's Hu", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 12 March 1994, p. 4

¹⁵⁶ See: "93 Budget Debate", *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 13 March 1993, pp. 1, 4-6; *Straits Times Overseas Weekly Edition*, 20 March 1993, pp. 4-5. As the budget sittings were shared with several pieces of non-budget legislation, it is estimated that the maximum time allowed for budget debate was 30 hours.

¹⁵⁷ "Finance minister warns against overheating of economy", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 16 March 1991, p. 1

¹⁵⁸ "Affordable health care package unveiled", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 21 March 1992, p. 1

¹⁵⁹ "93 Budget Debate", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 20 March 1993, p. 4

¹⁶⁰ "Budget surpluses 'attract investments'", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 12 March 1994, p. 1

Table 4.5: Number of Sitting Singaporean MPs with Executive Service: 1988-1998¹⁶¹

Year	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Mean
CATEGORY OF MINISTER												
Cabinet Minister ¹⁶²	15	13	13	14	15	15	14	14	16	16	16	15
Senior Minister of State	-	2	2	2	3	3	1	1	2	3	3	2
Minister of State	4	5	5	5	4	5	7	4	2	1	5	5
Senior	5	4	4	3	2	2	2	3	3	5	2	3
Parliamentary Secretary												
Parliamentary Secretary	3	2	2	2	4	4	4	3	4	2	3	3
Political Secretary	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
TOTAL	27	26	26	26	30	31	30	27	29	29	30	28
TOTAL ELECTED MPs¹⁶³	76	82	81	81	81	81	79	79	79	79	83	80
% MPs IN CURRENT EXECUTIVE	36%	32%	32%	32%	37%	38%	38%	34%	37%	37%	36%	35%
Number of Current MPs with Service in Previous Executives	12	7	7	7	8	6	9	11	11	11	5	9
% OF MPs IN PARLIAMENT WITH EXECUTIVE SERVICE	51%	40%	41%	41%	47%	46%	49%	48%	51%	51%	42%	46%

¹⁶¹ Data has been collated from the January edition of the *Singapore Government Directory* in each year from 1988-1998

¹⁶² Includes Acting Ministers

¹⁶³ NMPs and NCMPs are not included as they cannot vote on money bills.

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jurisdictions.¹⁶⁴ In 1993¹⁶⁵, 1996 and 1998, MPs, including NTUC affiliated MPs criticised the government over the inadequacy of taxation measures and retraining, with the government agreeing to reconsider retraining policy.¹⁶⁶ However, on key policies the executive is usually unyielding, agreeing at most to consult further. For example, in 1998 there was considerable pressure from some backbenchers for the government to pump-prime the economy¹⁶⁷, but the Minister for Finance would not agree, although the government later supplemented the budget with several such measures. In 1996, the Minister for Law rejected a request from NMP Walter Woon Cheong Ming to allow the courts to award costs to defendants acquitted in criminal cases.¹⁶⁸ This is a time for careful and good-natured criticism of the executive, an opportunity for MPs to broaden the executive's view of particular issues of concern to the electorate and for PAP MPs to demonstrate to particular constituencies that they are aware of bread and butter issues and will champion these to a limited degree. Although in Singapore the legislature is not a forum for deliberation and compromise among diverse political forces as is general in liberal democracies,¹⁶⁹ the legislature is beginning to have some influence. It may achieve many small changes at the margin, raise executive awareness of some issues and maintain pressure on policy issues between particular interest groups and the executive, such as business taxes. But it does not have a role in the substantive review of executive performance or core policy preferences which are pre-determined by the PAP's ideological and hegemonic framework, but principally by executive preference.

This parliamentary review of the budget has, since 1995 been supplemented by non-parliamentary fora. The Minister for Finance appears on a special one-hour television interview to review the major aspects of the budget and to react to questions from a panel, and reactions to the budget, following its receiving presidential assent, are assessed by the Feedback Unit in closed door sessions with its resource panels and several selected focus groups and the outcomes reported to cabinet, with selected outcomes, usually dominated by positive responses, reported to the media. Given the constant surpluses, the fact that budgets contain many welfare benefits and that

¹⁶⁴ Insight column, *The Straits Times*, 28 March 1998, p. 14

¹⁶⁵ "Dr Hu rejects MPs calls for tax concessions", *Straits Times Weekly*, 13 March 1993, p. 4

¹⁶⁶ See: "Reduction in personal income tax 'disappointing'" and "Govt urged to do more to retrain those retrenched", *The Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 14 March 1998, p. 5; "MPs praise budget but still find it lacking in several areas", *The Straits Times*, 12 March 1996

¹⁶⁷ "Dr Hu praised for not spending more of the surplus now", *The Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 14 March 1998, p. 5

¹⁶⁸ "No costs for those acquitted of crime", *The Straits Times*, 13 March 1996

¹⁶⁹ For example, as revealed by the work of Lijphart and Przeworski. See: Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984; Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991

**Table 4.6: Goh Chok Tong
and Lee Kuan Yew Governments
Hours Of Debate in Budget Sitings 1980-82 And 1988-1999¹⁷⁰**

Year	Time taken (Hrs) ¹⁷¹	% Change per session from 1980 ¹⁷²
1998	55.5	+29
1997	46.5	+8
1996	51.5	+20
1995	45	+5
1994	45.5	+6
1993	43.5	+1
1992	39.75	-8
1991	35	-19
1990	48	+12
1989	47	+9
1988	50.75	+18
1982	45.25	+5
1981	42.5	-1
1980	43	-

**Table 4.7: Goh Chok Tong
and Lee Kuan Yew Governments
Questions-On-Notice in Budget Sitings
1991-1999¹⁷³**

Year	Total Questions-On-Notice
1998	465
1997	300
1996	417
1995	330
1994	34
1993	15
1992	15
1991	27

at least 74 per cent of Singaporeans pay no income tax,¹⁷⁴ a positive response to budgets is not surprising.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁰ Newslink database search, *Straits Times, Business Times and New Paper*, supplemented by data from the *Singapore Parliamentary Debates*.

¹⁷¹ All sitings hours calculated directly from the relevant Hansards, except 1997 and 1998 which were taken from the SPH's Newslink database.

¹⁷² Using 1980 as the baseline.

¹⁷³ Newslink database search, *Straits Times, Business Times and New Paper*

¹⁷⁴ "No income tax for 74% of Singaporeans", *Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 13 March 1993, p. 24. All Singaporeans pay tax through a 5 per cent GST and must also pay between 10-20 per cent of gross income to the Central Provident Fund.

¹⁷⁵ "State welfarism, S'pore style", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 24 September 1994, p. 6

The budget debate, while the major forum for backbenchers putting views on policy priorities, is not the only opportunity for ordinary MPs to make their views known. Although prominent backbench dissenters, such as Dr. Toh Chin Chye, have received coverage in the press, many MPs hold strong views on some issues and are not concerned about minor conflicts with the executive. For example, some PAP backbenchers, such as Dr. Arthur Beng Kian Lam disapproved of the NMP scheme and continued to voice opposition to it after its introduction.¹⁷⁶

Parliamentary Committees and the Executive

Parliamentary committees in Westminster systems are not a major impediment to executive power, particularly in unicameral legislatures. The Singaporean parliament has no standing committees other than the Public Accounts Committee, a number of procedural select committees and also uses ad hoc select committees for particular legislative or policy inquiries. The constitution makes no provision for parliamentary committees which are constituted under Standing Orders as the parliament sees fit to determine.

The chairmen of committees, other than the GPCs, have extensive powers under standing orders and the Parliamentary Privileges Act to act against dissent or attacks on the government. Opposition members of select committees reported in interviews that the outcomes of select committees, on which the government necessarily has majority membership, are often presented at the beginning of meetings, with papers already printed and motions decided.¹⁷⁷ Committee discussion revolves around minor aspects of committee business and marginal issues, not core issues on which executive direction has already been given.¹⁷⁸

The only standing committee, other than those concerned with parliamentary business¹⁷⁹, is the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) which has a brief to review executive action, particularly in terms of the drafting of the annual budget. This committee is usually chaired by a senior PAP backbencher and includes no members of the opposition. In interviews with civil servants and MPs, there was uniform agreement that between budgets the PAC is dormant.¹⁸⁰ Although the PAC conducts hearings in association with the budget, no civil servant interviewed either in 1995 or 1998, considered the PAC to play a significant part in policy determination or in setting budget priorities. Unlike Britain, the PAC actually conducts its limited hearings in the

¹⁷⁶ "Six new NMPs for Parliament", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 5 September 1992, p. 2

¹⁷⁷ Interviews with opposition MPs and politicians August-September 1998

¹⁷⁸ Interviews with Low Thia Kiang and Chiam See Tong, 1998

¹⁷⁹ The parliamentary business committees are: Standing Orders Committee, House Committee, Public Petitions Committee, and the Committee of Privileges, all chaired by the Speaker.

¹⁸⁰ This was confirmed in both the 1995 and 1998 interviews.

ministry buildings, not in the parliament building and only a very few, very senior civil servants appear before it.¹⁸¹ The most positive role played by the PAC was to be an advocate for particular minor policy issues and to make senior civil servants aware of the policy concerns of particular policy communities and constituency grassroots issues. There was, among those civil servants interviewed, no sense of them being accountable to the PAC or the parliament in any way.

Although the parliamentary committee system may not directly lead to substantive change in executive policies, the PAP governments have used select committees as a validation and feedback mechanism on selected legislation and have accepted amendments from these committees.¹⁸² However, this practice has not been uniform, as is illustrated in Table 4.8 below and Chart 4.1.

As can be seen from Table 4.8, the PAP government has used select committees consistently to review major legislation that is seen as being politically, economically or socially sensitive. It has not generally referred public sector, internal security, police, armed forces, foreign policy or core economic policies for review by select committees. For example, only five public sector management bills have been referred, all for statutory bodies, the most recent of which was in 1979.¹⁸³ This did not include referral of the legislation for the Economic Development Board, the National Science and Technology Board, the Productivity and Standards Board or any major boards except for the Housing and Development Board (colonial era legislation), the Urban Redevelopment Authority (1973) and for amendments to the Singapore Broadcasting Authority Act in 1979. Rather, select committees have been used as a community consultation mechanism to solicit the views of particular groups on limited pieces of legislation, mainly economic and social legislation, changes to the constitution and regulation of particular professions. This has not, however, followed a consistent pattern, as illustrated in Chart 4.1 below.

Under successive Lee Kuan Yew governments, select committee review of legislation declined continuously from 1959-1984, during which year only two pieces of legislation were referred for review. However, the widespread accusations of the lack of consultation with the private sector made against the government following the 1985

¹⁸¹ The building in which the Singapore parliament is housed is a small colonial era building which is more like the town hall of a small town than a national parliament. Moreover, it is hidden away in a side street between the Victoria Concert Hall and the far more imposing Supreme Court and City Hall buildings. The building has no facilities for committee meetings, public or closed hearings and lacks all of the amenities normally associated with a national parliament. The new parliament complex, due for completion in 2000, will remedy this.

¹⁸² One recent case of policy making in which a select committee played a prominent role is detailed in: Ho Khai Leong, "The Politics of Problem Definition and Agenda Setting in Singapore", *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 3, 2, December 1995, pp. 66-89, particularly pp. 70-75

¹⁸³ Report of the Select Committee on the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation Bill [Bill no.31/79 79] : presented to Parliament on 28th November, 1979

economic recession, which the above figures substantiate, combined with other factors, appears to have led to a resurgence in the use of select committees since then.¹⁸⁴

The other factors influencing a greater use of parliamentary committees, and through them greater citizen consultation, were almost certainly the 13 per cent drop in PAP votes and the loss of two seats in the 1984 general elections due, at least in part to proposals to introduce policies to reduce the retirement age,¹⁸⁵ increase streaming and mandatory ethnic language instruction¹⁸⁶ in schools, to provide highly discriminatory tax, educational and housing advantages to graduate women who had two or more

¹⁸⁴ There has, until relatively recently, been a poor relationship between the PAP, the civil service and local business, particularly small to medium enterprises (SMEs). Many business men, including foreign executives, criticised the PAP government for contributing towards the 1985 recession by allowing unit labour costs to increase by 40 per cent from 1980-85, maintaining CPF contributions at too high a level, maintaining a strong currency regardless of general economic circumstances, not providing sufficient resources for manpower development particularly in post-secondary education and continuing to ignore SMEs as a potential contributor to economic growth. All of these policies were challenged by the government's own analysis of the causes of the recession. See: V. G. Kulkarni, "Singapore's Ills are Mostly Its Own Work", *Far East Economic Review*, 26 September, 1985, pp. 104-105; Robert Cottrell, "The Alter of Change", *Far East Economic Review*, 16 January, 1986, p. 82; Philip Bowring, "New market Road", *Far East Economic Review*, 27 March, 1986, pp. 72-77; Nigel Holloway, "Guidelines for Flexibility", *Far East Economic Review*, 1 January 1987, p. 55

¹⁸⁵ This policy was proposed by the Committee on the Problems of the Aged, chaired by Health Minister How Yoon Chang. The sensitivity of this issue was that the traditional retirement age, to which access to CPF funds was linked, was 55 years. Many people were suspicious that the government's real rationale for increasing the retirement age was to stop access to CPF funds so that these could continue to be directed to infrastructure development.

¹⁸⁶ Following the implementation of the Goh Committee report on educational reform in 1978, a national streaming system was introduced to replace the previous British Eleven Plus style curriculum structure. Associated with this was a policy of forcing children to learn both a mandated mother tongue and English, the mother tongue being mandated as the language of the ethnic group of the father. All Chinese, regardless of dialect, were mandated as having to learn Mandarin and a policy of actively suppressing dialects was pursued. None of these policies were popular.

children¹⁸⁷ and concomitant large increases in HDB flat prices in 1981.¹⁸⁸ This was also probably influenced in part by considerable backbench criticism of executive arrogance and failure to consult, albeit muted criticism, at the same time that similar criticisms were being made by the private sector. This coincided with the rise of the current leadership generation dominated by Administrative Service and SAF officers, which in its early policy choices acted as autonomous bureaucrats rather than politicians. It has since adopted a more consultative approach. Despite the increase in the use of select committees since 1985, their activity does not approach that evident under the colonial regime, 1956-1963, although the amount of legislation is now considerably greater.

Rather than use standing committees of the parliament to monitor particular policy areas, the PAP government has resorted to its preferred technique of relying upon an extra-parliamentary mechanism which can be more readily controlled; the Government Parliamentary Committee (GPC), established in 1987 as an initiative by Goh Chok

¹⁸⁷ The graduate mothers policy was a eugenically oriented program to supposedly encourage an increase in highly intelligent children. It was always very unpopular, particularly given that over 40 per cent of the population had not completed secondary school, let alone attended university, and therefore resented any further special favours being provided to those whom they saw as already being highly advantaged.

¹⁸⁸ HDB flat prices increased three times between 1980-1981, impacting adversely on new home buyers. These policies were introduced seemingly in ignorance of their political and social impact.

Table 4.8: Singapore Parliament – Select Committees 1955-1997
Analysis of Business

Period	Total Citees	Total Legislation Considered	Economic and Business Legislation	Social Legislation ¹⁸⁹	Political Legislation	Regulation of Professions/ Employment	Criminal Law and Policing	Others	Public Sector Management
1993-1996	11	11	5	4	2				
1989-1992	9	9	2	1	4	1	1		
1985-1988	10	10	5	1	2	1	1		
1981-1984	2	2	2						
1977-1980	6	6	2	2		1			1 ¹⁹⁰
1973-1976	11	11	3	1		2	3	1	1 ¹⁹¹
1969-1972	10	10	3	2	1	3	1		
1965-1968	14	14	9	5					
1960-1963 ¹⁹²	20 ¹⁹³	24	3	7	4	3	3	2	2 ¹⁹⁴
1956-1959 ¹⁹⁵	25	25	5	6	4	4	1	4	1 ¹⁹⁶
TOTALS	118	122	39	29	17	15	10	7	5
% of legislation		100%	32%	24%	14%	12%	8%	6%	4%

¹⁸⁹ Includes the regulation of religious activity, education, health, housing, media and general social control.

¹⁹⁰ Singapore Broadcasting Corporation Bill

¹⁹¹ Urban Redevelopment Authority Bill

¹⁹² In 1964, when Singapore was a state in the Federation of Malaysia, no select committees were appointed.


¹⁹³ In 1962, a single select committee considered five pieces of legislation: Public Utilities, Local Government integration, Planning (Amendment), Pensions (amendment) and the Housing Development (Amendment) bills. The totals of the business considered is therefore four more than the number of committees listed.

¹⁹⁴ Tariff Advisory Commission (Amendment) Bill and the Housing Development (Amendment) Bill

¹⁹⁵ One select committee was appointed in 1955, the first year of representative government.

¹⁹⁶ Housing Development Bill

Chart 4.1
Singapore Parliament - Select Committees 1956-1996¹⁹⁷



Tong.¹⁹⁸ The GPCs have three principal roles; training new executive recruits in particular policy areas, policy networking with co-opted hegemonic components of civil society, (mainly GROs) and maintaining backbench participation in policy issues through liaison with ministries and statutory boards as a backbench co-optation and education strategy.¹⁹⁹ The GPCs are not allowed to work with the GLC sector which is an exclusively executive domain. These committees are placed under the control of senior backbenchers, ex-ministers or trainee ministers.

When the executive wishes to ensure absolute control of a policy issue, it usually chooses to establish extra-parliamentary committees to do so. It does this so as to provide such committees with an aura of not being totally PAP controlled and to also allow non-parliamentary experts and interest group representatives to be appointed,

¹⁹⁷ In 1955, the first year of representative government, the Legislative Assembly established one Select Committee. Previously, only two Select Committees had been established by the Legislative Council, in 1950 and 1954. In 1964, during the period in which Singapore was a state within Malaysia, no Select Committees were established by the Singapore parliament. For a full list of the select committee reports refer to Appendix 2.

¹⁹⁸ Initially nine GPCs were established, expanded to 10 in 1989 and by 1995 had stabilised at 11. All MPs are members of at least one GPC which are headed by senior backbenchers as chairman and deputy chairman and assisted by resource panels comprising people chosen from academic, business and community organisations. The GPC's roughly conform to the ministries they are supposed to shadow. In 1998 they comprised the GPCs for Communications, Community Development, Defence and Foreign Affairs, Education, Environment, Finance, Trade and Industry, Health, Home Affairs and Law, Information and the Arts, Labour and National Development. Until June 1995, GPC chairman were appointed by the prime minister, but since that time have been elected by the committee members themselves. Members nominate up to six committees on which they wish to serve and may be appointed to two. Initial allocation is done by the PAP executive committee and approved by the prime minister. See: "Changes made to GPCs", *Straits Times*, 16 July 1995, p. 3

¹⁹⁹ Chun Tsung Mien, "Cheng Bock: GPCs seek change to make things better", *Straits Times*, 22 July 1995, p 33

usually from co-opted organisations under cadre or proto-cadre control. Such committees have included the Economic Committee, established in 1985 to address the recession, the Review Committee on National Health Policies in 1991, the Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas in 1993, the Cost Review Committee, the National Information Technology Committee and the Singapore 21 Committee in 1996 and the Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness in 1997. These major committees usually have a cabinet minister chairing them and may have the prime minister or a deputy prime minister as an adviser. For example, Rear Admiral (NS) Teo Chee Hean chairs the National IT Committee, which since November 1998 comprises three ministers, four permanent secretaries, the CEO of the EDB and has Lee Hsien Loong as adviser. In a limited number of cases, standing committee, based in the ministries, chaired by a minister and including other ministers and permanent secretaries, such as the Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Aging Population, are established.²⁰⁰ Of course, many committees internal to the civil service are also established and conduct no public consultations until firm policy positions are approved by the political executive, if ever. Two such contemporary committees are the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Energy which monitors energy supply policy in particular and the Inter-Ministerial Committee on National Education which oversees implementation of the National Education program.²⁰¹ In recent years in the economic policy domain, industry based committees have been increasingly used because of the necessity of having experienced talented business people dominate them. This has been the case with the Finance Sector Review Group and its committees.²⁰²

Equally, there is a reluctance to establish standing committees of the parliament which may develop a power base and agenda of their own. These have been replaced by advisory councils under the chairmanship of ministers, such as the Advisory Councils on Culture and the Arts, Youth and on Family and the Aged,²⁰³ all established by Goh Chok Tong when he was still First Deputy Prime Minister in 1988. The need for standing committees is also reduced by the existence of a network of statutory advisory bodies established throughout the public service and directly under civil service control, such as the National Council of Social Service, Singapore Sports Council, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) and others.

²⁰⁰ This committee is based in the Ministry of Community Development and has its own civil service secretariat. However, because of the political sensitivities of its terms of reference, in late 1998 it was chaired by the Minister for Communications rather than the Minister for Community Development, who was only a member.

²⁰¹ These internal committees are rarely mentioned in the press as the civil service places great emphasis on secrecy, although there is no apparent need for it in most cases.

²⁰² Corporate Finance Committee, "Consultative Paper on the Securities Market", *SES Journal*, June 1998, pp. 15-22

²⁰³ Originally established as the Advisory Council on the Aged, but replaced by the National Advisory Council on the Family and the Aged. Aging policy issues, in 1998-1999 were being addressed by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Ageing Population.

The only house committee that is required to consult with the electorate is the committee established to consider and make recommendations on Nominated Members of Parliament. These committees call for nominations from the general public, but the response is usually small and dominated by nominations by organisations. For example, in 1992, only 10 nominations for NMP positions were received from the public.²⁰⁴

The Singapore parliament is not a particularly active legislature, although it appears to have become much more so under Goh Chok Tong, and with the completion of the new parliament building, may become even moreso. Minchin describes it, between 1961-1981 when there were no opposition members, as being virtually irrelevant and he is undoubtedly largely correct, although one should not underrate the value of the legitimisation function exercised merely by the legislature's existence and the exercise of regular elections.²⁰⁵ However, even after the election of opposition members, the parliament was of marginal significance in the governance of the state.

Under Goh, its significance appears to be growing as it is within the party organisation and the legislature that he has his strongest support base. The number of sittings of the legislature since 1990 has grown and the time allocated to debate is longer as demonstrated in Table 4.9 below, although 1997, the year following the last elections, saw a significant decrease in legislative sessions.

It would seem that under Goh Chok Tong, the parliament is gaining increased importance or, at the very least, increased exposure and political participation. However, it is still not the dominant forum for policy debate, although it has certainly become more vocal in debating at least the more administrative aspects of government. This indicates that the parliament is still seen as only one of many mechanisms for policy consultation and validation by the executive, albeit in its contemporary form, one that is increasingly consulted.

The contemporary Singaporean legislature is different from those of the Lee years, in terms of activity and influence, and it has the potential to contribute much more to the governance of Singapore if the political executive allows. Compared to other Westminster style legislatures, even Malaysia's, the Singaporean legislature is only a shadow of its institutional potential. Without an effective opposition, the Singapore parliament functions more like a party caucus than a legislature and backbenchers remain on the fringes of the core executive.

²⁰⁴ "Six new NMPs for Parliament", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 5 September 1992, p. 2

²⁰⁵ James Minchin, *No Man is an Island: A Portrait of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1990, pp. 218-219

**Table 4.9: Singapore Governments
Total Parliamentary Sittings 1990-1998**

YEAR	Sittings Per Calendar Month												TOTAL
	Jan	Feb	Mar ²⁰⁶	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	
1998	2	2	10	1		2	1	1	1	1	4		25
1997 ²⁰⁷					1	4	10						15
1996	2	2	9		4		1	1		3	1	2	24
1995	1		10		2		1	1	1		3	1	20
1994	5	1	10		1		3	2		1	2	1	26
1993				2	1		1	2		3	3	1	13
1992	5	2	10										17
1991	3	4	10										17
1990						5		1		2	1	1	10

The Executive and Legislation

Macro-control of the parliament does not necessarily guarantee full control of the legislature to the executive however. The executive has also implemented control over legislation in two ways: through control of the governing party as discussed above, and through particular constitutional, legislative and parliamentary procedural provisions which emasculate the ability of the legislature to effectively challenge legislation or review its implementation.

All bills approved by the parliament, must under article 78(1) be 'immediately' sent to the Presidential Council for Minority Rights (PCMR) for the certification of the council before being sent to the president for assent. Administratively this is a simple matter as the Clerk of the Parliament is the secretary to the PCMR, so he effectively sends the bill to himself in another capacity.

The PCMR, established in 1973,²⁰⁸ is a review body ostensibly charged with ensuring that no legislation discriminates unfairly against any minority ethnic or religious group. Its function is to "...consider and report on such matters affecting persons of any racial or religious community as may be referred to the Council by parliament or the Government."²⁰⁹ This is done by the council certifying whether or not particular legislation is or is not a 'differentiating measure' as defined in Article 68²¹⁰ or required

²⁰⁶ Budget sittings are traditionally in March as the financial year conforms to that of the United States and Japan; 1 April-30 March, rather than the British financial year, 1 July-30 June. Thus the March sittings are usually the longest in the parliamentary year.

²⁰⁷ New parliament following elections.

²⁰⁸ Act No. 3 of 1973. This act abolished the Presidential Council which had previously existed and which had a broad charter to review legislation. As three cabinet ministers sat on this council, it did nothing to review executive action. The PCMR replaced the Presidential Council.

²⁰⁹ Article 76(1) of the Constitution

²¹⁰ Article 68 defines a 'differentiating measure' as "...any measure which is, or is likely in its practical application to be, disadvantageous to persons of any racial or religious community and not equally disadvantageous to persons of

by Article 77, although under Article 80(5), if the council provides no response within 30 days, it is automatically assumed that it has no objections. PCMR membership is controlled by the executive and dominated by the political executive. In July 1998 of the 17 members (including the chair), 14 were present or past PAP parliamentarians or ministers, present or serving bureaucrats or NTUC officials and of the members for life, PAP affiliates form a majority, including the present and past prime ministers²¹¹ Questions of membership of the council may be heard by a tribunal, in private without recourse to appeal, thus ensuring continued executive control of membership.²¹² Members of the council must take the oaths of allegiance and secrecy before assuming office.²¹³

The PCMR is supposed to consider all legislation, including subsidiary legislation, except money bills, those concerned with the defence and security of Singapore and those certified as urgent by the prime minister. Bills designated as urgent by the prime minister must be forwarded to the council for its consideration as soon as practicable.²¹⁴ However, although the council is not compelled to meet it regularly does so as shown in Table 4.10. If the council fails to respond to legislation provided to it, within 30 days for bills and 14 days²¹⁵ for subsidiary legislation²¹⁶, the parliament or the referring minister may assume that there are no objections with the legislation and it is automatically forwarded to the president for assent.²¹⁷

other such communities, either directly by prejudicing persons of that community or indirectly by giving advantage to persons of another community.”

²¹¹ The PCMR comprises a chairman appointed for three years, a maximum of 10 members appointed for life, a maximum of 10 members appointed for three years, based on qualifications and restrictions identical to those applying to members of the Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA). Members appointed for three years may be re-appointed. Members temporarily incapable of participating in the council may be replaced for the period of the incapacity (Article 70 of the Constitution). The 10 life members include Goh Chock Tong, Prof. S. Jayakumar (Minister for Law), S. Dhanabalan (ex-minister), Lee Kuan Yew, Dr, Goh Keng Swee, Othman bin Wok, H. R. Hochstadt, (chairman of a GLC) Prof. Lim Chong Yah (Vice-Chancellor, NUS), Oscar Oliveiro (ex-NTUC), Dr. Andrew Chew (ex-Head of Civil Service and now Chairman, Public Service Board). All are PAP cadre members except Dr. Chew who has no need to be a cadre as his status within the PAP establishment is much higher than most PAP cadres. See: *Singapore Government Directory July 1998*, Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1998, p. 848-9; and *Republic of Singapore Government Gazette*, 40, 32, 10 July 1998, p. 4331 and p. 4337

²¹² Article 75 of the Constitution

²¹³ Singapore Association of Women Lawyers, *You and the Law*, Singapore, Singapore Association of Women Lawyers, 1989, p. 31

²¹⁴ Article 79 of the Constitution

²¹⁵ Articles 77 and 80(1) of the Constitution require all subsidiary legislation to be referred to the council and must be sent by the relevant minister within 14 days of publication. The fact that the minister can actually publish the subsidiary legislation in the Government Gazette before it receives PCMR approval indicates the irrelevance of the council.

²¹⁶ The government may also make referrals to the council. Such referrals must be made by a minister. (Article 76(2) of the Constitution)

²¹⁷ The council must report back to the Speaker within 30 days (Article 78(2)) unless an extension has been granted by the Speaker (Article 78(4)), or in the case of a government referral of subsidiary legislation, to the minister within 14 days. If the council fails to provide such a report, it may be assumed that the council “is of the opinion that no provision of the bill would, if enacted, be a differentiating measure.” (Article 78(5) for legislation and Article 80(5) for subsidiary legislation); the Speaker must table all reports from the PCMR in the parliament for the information and consideration of members (Article 78(5)); an adverse report by the PCMR may be over-ridden by a two-thirds majority vote of the parliament and the relevant bill sent to the President for assent without the Speaker’s certification that it has not been found to be a differentiating measure by the PCMR.

If the council does respond with an adverse report, a vote by two-thirds of the parliament can override it.²¹⁸ However, given that the council is controlled by the executive, the only way in which a conflict between it and the legislature could arise is if the parliament is under the control of a non-PAP government. Following assent, the legislation still has no force until the date it is published in the Government Gazette, or some other date stipulated within that particular legislation or some other over-riding legislation.²¹⁹ The executive can withhold the legislation from becoming law simply by not publishing it in the Government Gazette and there is no way for them to be compelled to publish it, even by the legislature, except through a vote of no confidence and resort to the polls to decide the issue.

The council's meetings are convened by the chairman only,²²⁰ operate on rules of procedure developed by the council and approved by the President²²¹, are conducted in private²²², and decisions are made by simple majority voting in which the chairman cannot exercise a casting vote. Tied votes are lost.²²³ Members are paid an honorarium, the rate of which the council itself establishes.²²⁴

The prime minister, ministers, ministers of State and parliamentary secretaries authorised by the prime minister may attend and participate in council meetings, but may not vote, thus providing an avenue for direct executive influence on the council, in addition to that already exerted.²²⁵ This provision also allows the executive representatives on the council to exercise a proxy if they cannot attend a meeting, by substituting another executive member. The council must annually provide a report on its activities to the president who must table that report in the parliament.²²⁶ Since its establishment in 1973 the Council has made no adverse findings on legislation referred to it.²²⁷

²¹⁸ Article 78 (6)(c). If an adverse report is provided by the Council, the minister must amend or revoke the offending provision within six months and publish the change in the gazette (Article 80(4))

²¹⁹ Following assent and gazetting, all legislation is kept under constant technical review by the Law Revision Commissioners who ensure that acts are regularly updated and published to reflect all amendments. The government pays particular attention to ensuring that legislation is current and accurately documented in both print and electronic form.

²²⁰ Article 82

²²¹ Article 88. Article 92 also allows the President in his own discretion to make rules "for the conduct of business between the Council and the parliament and between the Council and an authority empowered to make subsidiary legislation..."

²²² Article 84

²²³ Article 83

²²⁴ In 1999 the honorarium was \$200 per month for the chairman and \$120 per month for each member. This data was based on confidential interviews with civil servants.

²²⁵ Article 87

²²⁶ Article 89

²²⁷ As revealed in an analysis of reports. See also: Helena H. M. Chan, *The Legal System of Singapore*, Singapore, Butterworths, 1995, p.39

In June 1988, the Parliamentary Elections Act was amended to provide the PCMR with an additional function; to nominate the members of the Malay Community Committee and the Indian and Other Minority Communities Committee which are responsible for certifying the suitability of any member of their communities standing for election as a member of a Group Representative Constituency team.²²⁸ The PCMR has absolute discretion on whom it consults with on such nominations, thus ensuring that these committees remain firmly under executive and PAP control. A similar responsibility for the appointment of members of the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony was placed upon the PSMR by the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in 1991.²²⁹ Details of the council's activities are provided in Table 4.10 below.

Discussions with those familiar with the PCMR has revealed that the council meets regularly, although its meetings are not long, the longest in recent years having been 90 minutes; that many members do not regularly attend and executive substitutions are not unusual.²³⁰ Most meetings of the council last approximately 30 minutes. The members of the council do not peruse the mass of legislation with which they are supposed to deal, but are provided with a list of legislation and rely upon the advice of the Clerk of the Parliament who is the secretary to the council. The council has no staff to assist it in assessing legislation or advising it on legislation. The council's meetings are usually organised as part of a series of meetings of senior government members. As the quorum is eight members, the non-government members are not required to appear for meetings to be convened and it is reported that they often do not. It is obvious from the table above, that the PCMR in all likelihood does not discuss legislation at its meetings except in a superficial fashion. For example, in 1998, in considering 372 pieces of legislation, the council would have allocated approximately 1.1 minutes per piece on average.

In reality, the PCMR is two files in the office of the Clerk of Parliament; one marked "Referrals to PCMR" and one marked "Reports from the PCMR"; until a non-PAP government takes power, the later will always remain supportive of all legislation referred to the council which has no reason to consider or deliberate on legislation. The PCMR is a paper tiger, albeit a symbolically important one, whose only real role may be to provide a semblance of institutional support for minority rights to meet international treaty obligations and domestic political realities and to maintain additional PAP control over legislation, especially its racial integration, housing, language, education and labour market policies in the event of it losing power or at

²²⁸ Parliamentary Elections Act, ss.27(B)(C)

²²⁹ Chapter 167(A) of the Maintenance of Religious harmony Act

²³⁰ Interview April 1999. The informant cannot be named as this information may breach the Official Secrets Act.

Table 4.10: Presidential Council For Minority Rights
Analysis Of Meetings 1981-1998²³¹

Year	No. Meetings	Total Time Taken by PCMR ²³²	Amount of Legislation Referred	Amount of Subsidiary Legislation Referred	s.76 Referrals ²³³	Adverse Reports
1998	11	5.5 hours	65 ²³⁴	307	0	0
1997	6	3 hours	15	267	0	0
1996	9	4.5 hours	35	223	0	0
1995	9	4.5 hours	41	223	0	0
1994	8	4 hours	18	Not Reported ²³⁵	0	0
1993	7	3.5 hours	29	Not Reported	0	0
1992	7	3.5 hours	21	Not Reported	0	0
1991	8	4 hours	33	Not Reported	0	0
1990	5	2.5 hours	19	Not Reported	0	0
1989	5	2.5 hours	28	Not Reported	0	0
1988	7	3.5 hours	23	Not Reported	0	0
1987	8	4 hours	23	Not Reported	0	0
1986	5	2.5 hours	19	Not Reported	0	0
1985	4	2 hours	14	Not Reported	0	0
1984	5	2.5 hours	27	Not Reported	0	0
1983	4	2 hours	19	Not Reported	0	0
1982	5	2.5 hours	25	Not Reported	0	0
1981	4	2 hours	26	Not Reported	0	0
TOTALS	117	58.5 hours	480	-	NIL	NIL

least the two-thirds majority necessary to change the constitution. It is yet another reserve safety mechanism. It plays no genuine role in safeguarding the rights of minorities as the political need to do this is so obvious and compelling that no political party could ignore it and survive in government without considerable social upheaval. The council otherwise has no particular function; it is barely mentioned in studies of ethnicity in Singapore²³⁶ and conclusions about its functions are often erroneous; even Minchin, a particularly well informed commentator, assumed that the council had a genuine review function.²³⁷ Hill and Lian for example, concluded that "The Council is a

²³¹ Data is derived from the *Report of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, 1981-1998*

²³² Based on an average meeting of 30 minutes.

²³³ These are referrals, other than legislation or subsidiary legislation, that are made to the council by the Speaker on behalf of the parliament, or a minister on behalf of the government, as provided for by s.76 of the constitution. The possibility of the parliament or the government referring a government or parliamentary measure to the council to which it objects is a logical absurdity under the parliamentary arrangements which have existed for 34 years, amounting to the parliament or the government objecting to its own policy and then asking itself to resolve it. Perhaps *Alice in Wonderland* is compulsory reading for potential PAP parliamentary candidates or the Parliamentary Counsel?

²³⁴ 27 of these acts comprised a body of legislation that was still in force on 9 January 1970 as permitted, but not required, by Article 81(1) of the constitution.

²³⁵ It can be assumed through a review of the *Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation*, that several hundred pieces of subsidiary legislation have been referred to the council each year.

²³⁶ For example, the following studies of ethnicity in Singapore either do not mention the council or do not discuss or analyse its role in any detail: Chew Sock Foon, *Ethnicity and Nationality in Singapore*, Athens (Ohio), International Centre for International Studies Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1987; Ong Jin Hui, Tong Chee Kiong and Tan Ern Ser, eds., *Understanding Singapore Society*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1997; Wan Hussin Zoonh, *The Singapore Malays: The Dilemma of Development*, Singapore, Singapore Malay Teachers Union, 1990; Ooi Giok Ling, Sharon Siddique and Soh Kay Cheng, *The Management of Ethnic Relations in Public Housing Estates*, Singapore, The Institute of Policy Studies, 1993.

²³⁷ See: James Minchin, *No man is an Island: A portrait of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1990, p. 218

non-elected advisory body of eminent citizens who can debate policies affecting a minority and act as a check on new legislation."²³⁸ And Quah, the most prolific Singaporean writer on public administration also assumes that it actually examines bills.²³⁹ Tham asserts that the council has powers that "add force" to the governments social cohesion policy framework.²⁴⁰ Many of the eminent citizens don't even attend meetings regularly and to be deemed eminent, it is helpful if one was at one time, or is, an eminent member of the PAP or at least a PAP proto-cadre. The membership is substantially PAP controlled and aligned, it has no desire or freedom to contest legislation and there is no evidence that it debates any policy issues; its genuine function lies within the group of institutional reserve control strategies.

Executive Autonomy and Law Making: Subsidiary Legislation²⁴¹

As in all other jurisdictions, public management in Singapore is heavily dependent on subsidiary legislation; indeed in the case of Singapore it has been termed pervasive.²⁴² Subsidiary legislation is so voluminous that it has its own gazette.²⁴³ The general rationale for the use of subsidiary legislation is that by empowering ministers and others to make regulations and rules within the general constraints of an act in force, it saves times, allows for trial and error in the practical implementation of policy, increases administrative flexibility and does not waste the time of the legislature in having it consider procedural matters with which it has already dealt with in the greater substance of the parent legislation. While this may be the administrative reality, the political reality is that subsidiary legislation allows the executive to make laws without having to seek the approval of the parliament or the president in any meaningful way.

Ministers have substantial power to make and administer subordinated or delegated legislation. In Singapore, the general legislative approach is for the minister, board or authority to have the power to make subsidiary legislation, but notification of such regulations is done by the relevant permanent secretary,²⁴⁴ or chief executive in the case

²³⁸ Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 64

²³⁹ Jon S. T. Quah, "Singapore's model of development. Is it transferable?" in Henry S. Rowen, ed., *Behind East Asian Growth: The political and social foundations of prosperity*, London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 105-125, p. 113

²⁴⁰ Tham Seong Chee, "Values and National Development in Singapore", *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 3, 2, 1995, pp. 1-14, p. 4

²⁴¹ For a general discussion of subsidiary legislation in Singapore, see: M. P. Jain, *Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore*, 2nd ed., Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 1989, Chapters V, VI and VII

²⁴² M. P. Jain, *Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore*, 2nd ed., Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 1989, p.60

²⁴³ Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement.

²⁴⁴ As allowed for under s.35 of the Interpretation Act 1985 and the Delegation of Powers (Consolidation) Notification 1990

of a board, although the minister cannot transfer his delegation to make regulations to the permanent secretary.²⁴⁵

Regulations are usually, but not in all cases, required to be published only after being made,²⁴⁶ there are few statutory requirements to consult on regulations with those affected²⁴⁷, and regulations come into force on the day of publication - thus providing no warning to those affected and for which people can be charged.²⁴⁸ There also appears to be a general principle in Singapore that ministers can make regulations retrospectively under the provisions of the Interpretation Act, regardless of whether this power is incorporated in the relevant parent act.²⁴⁹ It is not unusual for this power to legislate retrospectively, either through legislation or subsidiary regulation, to be used.²⁵⁰

One significant example of subsidiary legislation is provided in the *Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1997*, first submitted to the parliament on 11 July 1997 and subsequently enacted. This act empowers ministers to make subsidiary legislation in relation to 31 different pieces of existing legislation including: The Bills of Exchange Act, The Civil Law Act, The Companies Act, The Criminal Procedure Code, The Economic Development Board Act, the Evidence Act, The Official Secrets Act, The Planning Act, and The Prison Act among others.²⁵¹ Virtually all significant legislation in Singapore includes a provision for the responsible minister to make subsidiary legislation.

The use of subsidiary legislation has been criticised in many jurisdictions as being undemocratic and a key factor in the bureaucratisation of the state,²⁵² particularly when

²⁴⁵ Under s.36(1) of the Interpretation Act 1985

²⁴⁶ Regulations are usually published in the Government Gazette, Subsidiary Legislation Supplement each Friday.

²⁴⁷ Consultation requirements in Singapore are usually in relation to professional associations (e.g. The Dental Board in the case of the Dental Registration Act 1985) or statutory organisations, e.g. with the Economic Development Board under s.28, Economic Development Board Act 1992. In contrast to the latter, there is no requirement for the minister to consult the Trade Development Board, the National Science and Technology Board or the Productivity and Standards Board under their respective legislation before making regulations.

²⁴⁸ See: Jain, *op. cit.*, pp.137-140.

²⁴⁹ See the discussion of the case of *Attorney-General v Cold Storage (Singapore) Pte Ltd*, in Jain, *op. cit.* p.94. The relevant provisions of the Interpretation Act 1985 are ss.23(2) and 28(2).

²⁵⁰ The *Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 1988*, contained provisions which applied retrospectively, including to a dead person found guilty of corruption, reflecting to some degree provisions in Australian and British legislation aimed at the confiscation of the proceeds of illicit drug sales. The Singapore legislation, however, does not allow the courts to exercise discretion in reversing the onus of proof inherent in these provisions, as does the English legislation. See: "The Government States its Case", *Asiaweek*, 15 April 1988, p.19. Likewise, regulations are also made with retrospective provisions e.g., the public service Board (Personnel Boards) (Amendment) Order 1998. This Order was made on 9 April 1998, but contained provisions for certain parts of the order to have effect from 1 April 1998, 1 April 1997, 1 July 1996 and 1 September 1995. See: *Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation*, 27 February 1998, p.851

²⁵¹ *The Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act*, No. 6 of 1997, Singapore, Government Printers

²⁵² See: Carleton Kemp Allen, *Bureaucracy Triumphant*, London, Oxford University Press, 1931; William W. Boyer, *Bureaucracy on trial: policy making by government agencies*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1964; William A. Niskanen, *Bureaucracy - servant or master: lessons from America*, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1973

used in association with 'skeleton' legislation.²⁵³ Although these arguments have increasingly been weakened by strategies to strengthen legislative oversight of subsidiary delegation in many jurisdictions,²⁵⁴ the potential for subsidiary legislation to reinforce the autonomy of the executive is often a matter of concern, although this needs to be balanced with the valid needs of executive management of the state. In Singapore, although subsidiary legislation is subject to the *ultra vires* rule²⁵⁵ and other technical constraints, there are few avenues for oversight or mechanisms for ensuring that subsidiary legislation does not infringe constitutional, individual and commercial rights. There is no constitutional provision for subsidiary legislation to lie before the parliament, although there are legislative requirements, depending on particular legislation. In Singapore, the technical oversight of subsidiary legislation generally rests with the courts and is provided by, among others the:

1. Test of constitutional validity of the parent legislation or the subsidiary legislation;
2. Provision in the Interpretation Act 1985 that subsidiary legislation cannot be inconsistent with the provisions of the parent act,²⁵⁶ and is not invalid if it cites an incorrect provision of the parent act as its derivation,²⁵⁷
3. Requirement in the Interpretation Act 1985 that the courts take note of all relevant subsidiary legislation in making judgements;²⁵⁸
4. Implied right of the courts to review subsidiary legislation except in those cases where a statute clearly removes this right.²⁵⁹

²⁵³ Skeleton legislation is legislation that consists of only the most essential principles and procedures for achieving a policy goal and contains provisions which delegate extensive rule making powers to a person or body other than the legislature to the extent that the rule making power delegated equals or exceeds what would normally be included in legislation. In an extreme form, skeleton legislation can be so sparse in its provisions that policy making is effectively done by the party exercising the powers delegated by the legislation, thus removing the legislature totally from its policy making role.

²⁵⁴ For example, see the arguments in defence of modern regulatory practice, particularly in Chapter 9 in: Donald Wittman, *The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1995. In Britain and Australia for example, the national legislatures have been resourced and reformed to provide more effective oversight of subsidiary legislation. In the United Kingdom, all subsidiary legislation is reviewed by both the Delegated Legislation Committee in the House of Commons, the Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation and, in some respects, the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation. All these committees provide written and oral reports with recommendations to the parliament on all subsidiary legislation.

²⁵⁵ Literally, "without authority". An act may be substantively *ultra vires* (i.e. in and of itself exceeds any authority given) or procedurally *ultra vires* (i.e. didn't follow the procedures which were specified in parent legislation). An act which is beyond the powers or authority of the person or organization which took it is, by this doctrine, an invalid act and cannot stand in law; e.g. a regulation that exceeds the power delegated by the parent act. This doctrine limits the powers exercised under subsidiary legislation so that they do not exceed the powers delegated or the powers incorporated in the parent legislation itself. Skilful drafting can circumvent this doctrine by simply allowing delegated powers to be very broadly defined with additional support provided by a second reading speech that makes the policy aims of legislation very broad and clear and the type and purpose of subsidiary legislation equally broad and clear. In Singapore the second reading speech can be used to assess the parliament's intentions in passing legislation, and can therefore be an important guide to law.

²⁵⁶ s.19(c)

²⁵⁷ Ss.21 and 26

²⁵⁸ s.24

²⁵⁹ See: Jain, op. cit. pp. 95-96

Given the provisions of the Supreme Court of Adjudicature Act and the Subordinate Courts Act which limit the jurisdiction of the courts and the willingness of the political executive to use legal and extra-legal controls over the judiciary, there is very little opportunity in Singapore for the type of judicial activism in the review of subsidiary legislation that has become more common in India,²⁶⁰ Thailand²⁶¹ and Nepal²⁶² since the mid-1990s or even earlier in other common law jurisdictions.²⁶³ While it is not unusual for subsidiary legislation to be widespread in many jurisdictions, what marks Singapore out in this respect is the extent to which it is used and the degree to which the executive in making such legislation is free of interference from any effective review exercised by either the legislature or the courts. The political executive, in the form of the Attorney-General, has clearly set out its policy on judicial review in stating that there is, and implicitly should be:

A self-conscious deference by judges towards the decisions of persons who have relatively greater technical and substantive expertise and are consequently better equipped to decide ...deference and competence are grounds on which judges have also consciously avoided adjudicating in certain areas of governmental activity such as foreign relations, national security and political appointments.²⁶⁴

However, the courts can be pro-active in protecting executive power and the executive's ideological and core policy framework; "... a jurisprudence of pre-emptive strikes, indicative of the exultation of Efficiency over all other interests."²⁶⁵ This is illustrated in the decision to reject an appeal by Jehovah's Witnesses against the banning of their church under the Societies Act. In finding against the appeal, Yong Pung How CJ commented:

... any administration which perceives the possibility of trouble over religious beliefs and yet prefers to wait until trouble is just about to break out before taking action must be not only pathetically naive but also grossly incompetent.²⁶⁶

The courts therefore form part of the "administration" and judicial behaviour should therefore acknowledge executive supremacy, both political and civil service, and be congruent with executive interests.

Executive attitudes to legislation as the mechanism for the creation and maintenance of the 'rule by law' state are based on a perception that this is the essential vehicle for its

²⁶⁰ See: "A System Shakes", *The Economist*, 23 March 1996, p.29; Rajeev Dhavan, "India", *Asia Pacific Constitutional Yearbook*, 1995, pp.109-132

²⁶¹ See: "Judiciary voices strong opposition", *Bangkok Post*, 13 March 1997; "Is the draft body overstepping the mark?", *Bangkok Post*, 8 June 1997; "High Court backs down on nominees", *Bangkok Post*, 16 December 1997

²⁶² Bipin Adhikari, "Nepal", *Asia Pacific Constitutional Yearbook*, 1995, pp.157-170

²⁶³ See: "Minister says government might change laws", *Straits Times*, 15 January 1998

²⁶⁴ Tan Boon Tiek, "Judicial Review: The Singapore Law review Lecture 1987", *Singapore Law Review*, 1988, 9, pp. 66-83, pp. 75-76

²⁶⁵ Thio Li-Ann, "The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues arising from *Colin Chan v. Public Prosecutor*", *Singapore Law Review*, 1995, 16, pp. 26-103, p. 88

²⁶⁶ Singapore Law Reports, *Colin Chan vs Public Prosecutor*, 3, 662-688, p. 683

technical approach to government. Legislation is carefully drafted so that it allows few, if any avenues, for distributing power away from the executive itself, and, if it does so, the government will act to correct the error. As Walter Woon Cheong Ming, an Associate Professor of Law at NUS and currently Singapore's Ambassador to Germany has commented:

It is absolutely futile for people to talk about challenging Executive decisions in court. If it is not legal, the government will make it legal, and it will make it legal retrospectively. The judges have no choice in this. Whatever their own personal inclination, they are bound by their oaths to uphold the law.²⁶⁷

Executive and Opposition

The PAP does not conceive of its opposition in merely party political terms. It practices a doctrine which labels all opposing views as opposition, whether party politically based or not, although it has developed control mechanisms specifically for political parties as well as for individuals and the opposition that could emerge from a maturing civil society.

However, it continues the facade that the only legitimate opposition to which the government will respond is a parliamentary opposition. As constitutional lawyer Kevin Tan Yew Lee comments;

We have inherited a particular constitutional structure that is premised on the idea that it is the opposition in parliament that would check on the government. This means of checking on power is not an effective one and has not been for some time.²⁶⁸

Only three political parties, other than the PAP, have achieved parliamentary representation in Singapore since the adoption of the current constitution in 1967; the Workers' Party, the Singapore Democratic Party and its offshoot, the Singapore Peoples' Party. Since the demise of the Barisan Socialis in the early 1960s, no political party has had the membership or resources with which to build a strong electoral base. Writing in 1985, Chan Heng Chee commented that:

There is no tangible evidence to suggest that the opposition has sustained organizational operations that seek to nurture the ground between elections to build up support for the next electoral struggle. The shortage of manpower and finance and the structured dominance of the ruling party have virtually immobilized the opposition in the face of very great odds.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁷ "Stand up and be quoted", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 13 July 1991, p. 14

²⁶⁸ "Analysis: Singapore opposition silenced by system", Reuters, 9 January 1999. Available at: <http://www.singapore-window.org/sw99/90109re.htm>, 2 March 1999.

²⁶⁹ Chan Heng Chee, "Political Parties", in, Jon S. T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, *Government and Politics of Singapore*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 146-172, p. 169

The odds are indeed great. The PAP is adamant that a political opposition is unnecessary and potentially dangerous. Speaking after the PAP had lost its first parliamentary seat in 13 years, Lee Kuan Yew argued;

... if we are unlucky, like most developing countries, an opposition can make for confusion by raising false expectations of unattainable benefits from greater welfare spending, as in Britain and so many Third World countries.²⁷⁰

This view was supported by his then deputy Sinnathamby Rajaratnam who bluntly contended that "the role of an opposition is to ensure bad government."²⁷¹ The opposition is linked to a range of policies or attitudes painted by the PAP as bad for national well-being, such as the introduction of a welfare state. This is a favourite Lee bogey which his statements reveal he actually does not understand, but which the PAP hypocritically states that it rejects.²⁷² Although an analysis of the PAP welfare state is outside the scope of this study, a substantial case can be made for a residual Singaporean welfare state, the major characteristics of which are asset provision and enhancement, particularly through housing policies, education and skills oriented transfers and health, housing and education safety net provisions.

Not only is the PAP wealthy, highly organised and disciplined with all the advantages inherent in being the party in power with an enormously successful track record, but it has additional advantages based on the careful implementation of legislative impediments to opposition development and legislative supports for its overt and covert strategies to monitor and neutralise effective political opposition. These 'rule by law' tools are supplemented by the PAP's hegemonic strategy based on cooption of key individuals and social groups into one or more aspects of the hegemonic program and by the judicious exercise of the executive's coercive powers under the ISA and the civil and criminal codes. Additionally, the PAP has demonstrated that it will abuse its custodianship of administrative resources to bring opposition figures into disrepute. This tactic was followed in the 1984 election against both Ling How Doong of the SDP

²⁷⁰ *Straits Times*, 15 December, 1981, p. 1

²⁷¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 May 1982, p. 21

²⁷² Lee Kuan Yew and his successors, enjoy denigrating the welfare state, but Lee's attacks upon it demonstrate more the depth of his ignorance and ideological bias than any genuine understanding of how the contemporary welfare state has evolved and operates. For example, he contends that the British and Australian welfare states "... paid their unemployed almost as much as the employed when they lost their jobs. ... So finally the Australians gave up, and a Labour (*sic*) government in Australia struck down unemployment benefits." No part of this statement is true. This is, unfortunately, only one small example of Lee's unwillingness to even bother to understand contemporary capitalist democracies. See: "Why the welfare states failed", in Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko Tan, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas*, Singapore, Times Editions, 1998, pp. 390-392, p. 391. The supposed rejection of the welfare state by the PAP is made a lie of by Goh Chock Tong, who in 1993, noted that the average Singaporean would receive about \$570,000 in direct government subsidy during his lifetime. If Edusave is included, the total subsidy raises to \$104,000. This does not include taxation exemptions, CPF, Medisave and health subsidies. Singapore has a welfare state; it is simply not a conventional welfare state. Indeed, its welfare state approach may have much to teach others, if the pretence that it didn't exist was dropped and studies of it could be conducted. See: *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 20 March 1993, p. 5

when his personnel records from his police career were used²⁷³ and when Lee Kuan Yew threatened to reveal confidential information held by the government to discredit Workers' Party candidate R. Murugason.²⁷⁴ During this particular election, the PAP boasted that: "Politics in Singapore is very much of the clean variety, as opposed to the dirty politics that are common in many Western and Third World countries."²⁷⁵ In more recent times, this tactic has been used against opposition politicians Chee Soon Juan, Francis Seow and Tang Liang Hong as discussed elsewhere.

While this makes for an emasculated opposition, it does not mean that the opposition parties have no influence in the policy system. By choosing and emphasising particular issues, the opposition has often forced the government to address them and change or introduce new policies. One such case was the issue of rising costs which Chiam See Tong of the SDP highlighted during the 1991 elections, putting the government on the defensive and subsequently leading to the establishment of the Cost Review Committee and the Ministerial Committee on Health Policies.²⁷⁶ This debate continued until 1997 with frequent opposition involvement and the concurrent review of a range of related microeconomic and social policies.

CONCLUSIONS

The Singapore legislative system is located within a legal framework characterised by contrasting streams of law forced to co-exist within a political framework centred on the maintenance of the hegemonic control of the People's Action Party. These contrasting streams of law are:

1. A constitutional framework which, combined with an electoral system gerrymandered toward the PAP, ensures effective executive control of the constitution and the organs of state including the public service;
2. A commercial and economic legal framework that is designed to provide economic freedom so that Singapore can compete at the highest levels within the global economic and trading system; and
3. A social, political and cultural legal framework that is designed to provide maximum control over society by the PAP government, to enforce social and ethnic harmony, minimise sources of political opposition and dissent and impose a conservative social framework.

²⁷³ "Das: Public has a right to know Ling's Past record", *Straits Times*, 21 December 1984, p. 15

²⁷⁴ "He's a lawyer ... and he does this sort of thing", *Straits Times*, 24 December 1984, p. 10

²⁷⁵ Professor Lau Tiek Soon made this statement in a press interview during the 1984 elections. See: "Dirty politics 'doesn't exist in Singapore'", *Straits Times*, 17 November, 1984, p. 15

²⁷⁶ These initiatives were announced in the prime minister's National Day Address on 9 August 1992.

How these contrasting streams of law are managed is discussed more in Chapter Five. This system is succinctly summarised by Chua Beng Huat thus:

The legal system ... is an instrument of social control and of reification of social behaviour, tailored to the needs of the issues at hand by the legislative Parliament, the sole authority in law-making. Instances abound in which laws are changed and invoked retrospectively to punish violators; statutes are changed to better suit enforcement immediately after they were successfully contested by litigants, such as the removal of the Internal Security Act from judicial review after one of the government's indictments was reversed by the Supreme Court; and finally, constitutional changes are undertaken with speed because of the absolute majority of the PAP.²⁷⁷

I would only dispute this assessment on two points; the political executive is so autonomous that it makes the laws not the parliament, and further, that ministers through delegated legislation also make much additional law in Singapore, with nothing but formal parliamentary participation in the process. Chua makes a point overlooked by many contemporary commentators; the PAP is determined to shape a particular type of person and society in Singapore and the law, and its institutions, is one of its major instruments in doing so.²⁷⁸

In assessing the institutional arrangements in Singapore, a liberal democratic framework cannot apply; the system is purposely designed to counter its assumptions. Instead a legalistic statist framework has been carefully designed to perpetuate the British colonial model of government, reinterpreted through an unreformed Westminster institutional framework, aligned with a Leninist style party system with minor modifications to account for Singapore's independent status. The Westminster conventions which supposedly underlie the Singapore political system do not exist; the doctrine of the separation of powers is observed in word only; the legislature and the judiciary are disenfranchised by the executive; fundamental liberties are compromised to such a degree that they effectively do not exist except for freedom from slavery; executive controls exist to maintain a civil society which is shallow and weak and the political opposition which has no freedom in the legislature to effectively challenge the government.

In general MPs reside in the outer core executive because of their statutory functions, although some may be included in the core executive because of their personal affiliations with the prime minister or other ministers. This presence of MPs at the core may be temporary or of a greater duration according to the abilities of the MP, a policy topic or personal contacts within the core. However, in the contemporary parliament, PAP MPs are not mere pawns of the political executive; they will be heard and are

²⁷⁷ Chua Beng Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 193

²⁷⁸ The centrality of the "new man" being shaped by the PAP in its early years is well noted in commentary from the 1960s to the early 1980s. To understand its absolute centrality to the PAP nation building project see: S. Rajaratnam, "On Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's Leadership (1983), in, Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, eds., *The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam*, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1987, pp. 196-202, pp. 200-201

heard on a variety of issues including issues based on sectoral and interest representation. Further, they are influential as members of committees, usually non-parliamentary committees and they have a key function as interpreters of grassroots reactions to government policy. The parliament is more active than it has ever been and this would seem to indicate that there is an acknowledgment within the political executive at least, that in contemporary society, the parliament is expected to be more than symbolic and that the passive legitimization it attracted until 1991 has declined. However, the rules of the game are that in their criticism of the executive, MPs must not attack "the system", nor ministers personally and they must conduct most lobbying through their GPCs, often through the civil service rather than directly to ministers, and through personal contacts with ministers outside the legislature. Nonetheless, policy action by the legislature is generally peripheral and most MPs remain in the outer core most of the time.

5. THE CORE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL DYNAMICS

This chapter examines the structural relationship and the dynamics that are generated by this relationship between the political executive and the judiciary in Singapore. In particular, this chapter examines these structures and dynamics in order to determine if the judiciary forms part of the Singaporean core executive, what functions it may execute on behalf of the core executive and whether the Singaporean judiciary has adapted its Westminster framework as a consequence of its relationship with the core executive to provide a particular Singaporean approach to judicial-executive relations.

THE JUDICIARY: STRUCTURE AND CHARACTER

The judiciary in Singapore is not necessarily constitutionally independent of the legislature or the executive; in fact the constitution clearly states that its jurisdiction and powers are those which are "conferred on those Courts by this Constitution or any written law."¹ despite Article 93 investing the judicial power of Singapore in the Supreme Court. All appointments to judicial positions are made by the president on the advice of the prime minister, except the appointment of the Chief Justice in which the president exercises discretionary power. However, the president's ability to exercise his absolute discretion in such appointments is severely compromised by the high degree of executive control over the presidency as already discussed. Effectively, the executive appoints the judiciary, as in the United Kingdom and other Westminster systems. The dismissal of judges must follow an impeachment process established by Articles 98(3)(4) and (5) over which the president exercises discretionary power. However either the prime minister or the chief justice can initiate the impeachment of a judge. The parliament is restricted in its discussion of the conduct of a judge by Article 99 which requires that a motion for such a discussion must have the support of one-quarter of the members of parliament. This is easily achieved in a disciplined Westminster legislature and places such action under the direct control of the executive.

Judicial tenure in the subordinate courts is even more precarious as it is not conferred by the Subordinate Courts Act. Judges in these courts are civil service officers in the Singapore Legal Service, usually from the Attorney-General's Chambers, who are regularly rotated through the courts as part of their duties. A very few may remain in a

¹ Article 94(1); "Who should have the final say - the state or the courts?", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 14 March 1998

judicial position for some time, but there is no tenure. Subordinate court judges may be dismissed or transferred at executive whim as in the cases of a judge in 1972² and the former head of these courts, Judge Michael Khoo in 1986.³ Khoo was replaced by another career Legal Service officer, Errol Foenander who in turn was replaced by the incumbent Richard Magnus, formerly Director (Legal Services) with MINDEF. The office of judicial commissioner in the Supreme Court is likewise untenured and judicial commissioners may be dismissed by the executive. This office was specifically created for three reasons; to assist the supreme court deal with a substantial back-log of cases; as a probationary position to test new recruits to the senior judiciary both in their general capacity for higher judicial responsibilities and almost certainly for their ability to appropriately reflect the will of the executive in politically oriented cases; and as a facility for temporarily filling vacancies when permanent recruits were not available. This latter reason is a continuing frustration to the political executive, but one they are more than willing to bear to maintain political control of the superior court. The existence and use of judicial commissioners has been criticised by some analysts as being an unusual judicial office.⁴ However, such temporary appointments had been used in Malaysia for many years before being introduced in Singapore and the similar appointments exist in the United Kingdom and the United States.⁵

While the first of these reasons is strongly denied by the executive and it has gone to considerable effort to refute such charges, the record of certain judges in these cases and the proven unwillingness of ministers to undertake legal action against opponents in other common law jurisdiction for identical action, refutes these denials. One

² George reports the case of a district court judge being demoted in 1972 for rejecting a government case against a national serviceman who had a letter of complaint about national service published in the then independent newspaper *Nanyang Siang Pau*. See: T. J. S. George, *Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore*, Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 1984, pp. 213-214. At this time national service was in its infancy and the government was intolerant of any dissent with regard to this policy and its implementation.

³ In 1986, Senior District Court Judge, Justice Michael Khoo, was replaced as head of the subordinate courts and transferred to the Attorney-General's chambers following his acquitting opposition politician Joshua B. Jeyaratnam off all bar one of a number of politically inspired charges placed by the Attorney-General. Jeyaratnam's subsequent questioning in the parliament of the reason for Khoo's transfer inspired an inquiry into judicial independence which produced a predictable finding that there was no executive interference. The inquiry was conducted, not by an independent commission or counsel, but by one of the most government oriented justices of the Supreme Court, Justice Sinnathurai; the conflict of interest in such an inquiry was never acknowledged by the government. However, no senior judge has since met a similar fate, nor acquitted an opposition politician of charges brought either by the Attorney-General or by members of the PAP political executive. The government's initial claim that Khoo's transfer was a routine transfer was revealed as untrue in the heat of parliamentary debate. If the transfer was routine, why then did Khoo subsequently resign from the prestigious Legal Service and enter private practice? The government may have been disposed to act harshly against Khoo because his brother, Francis Khoo, who had fled Singapore in 1978, was seen as a leftist radical. See: Francis T. Seow, *The politics of judicial institutions in Singapore*, 1997, p. 1. Available at: <http://singapore-window.org/1028judi.htm>, 1 March 1999

⁴ Christopher Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore*, London, Macmillan, 1994, p.193

⁵ In the United Kingdom, The Lord Chancellor's Policies and Procedures, which govern the appointment of judges, specifically state that "Before being considered for any full-time judicial post, a candidate must usually have served in that or a similar post in a part-time capacity for long enough to establish his or her competence and suitability for full-time appointment". See: Lord Chancellor's Department, *The Lord Chancellor's Policies and Procedures*, p. 4. Available at: <http://www.open.gov.uk/led/judicial/appointments/japplc.htm>. In 1998, the British prime minister's wife filled such a position. In the United States, part-time magistrate judges are used within the federal judiciary; in 1994 there were 94 such appointments to assist with court workloads. See: *What is a Federal Magistrate Judge?*. Available at: <http://www.fedjudge.org/main.html>

consistent method used by the executive to demonstrate that the courts are free of political interference is the use of external assessments such as the World Competitiveness Report. These reports consistently rank Singapore's legal system very highly; sometimes as the best in the world.⁶ However, this survey, based on rankings by private sector executives, almost all of whom do not live in Singapore and have no interest or genuine knowledge of the political system, only genuinely reflects the accumulated ignorance of the respondents rather than any genuine knowledge of the Singaporean legal system.⁷ Most of these respondents probably would, for example, be amazed to learn that such a simple economic right as inalienable tenure of land does not exist in Singapore. It is the bifurcation of the court's integrity in dealing with political and non-political issues which is problematical and which is directly avoided in this survey. In 1997, Singapore's legal system was rated best in the world by the World Competitive Yearbook produced by the International Institute for Management Development (IIMD) based on its contribution to economic competitiveness. In the same year, the rival World Competitiveness Report produced by the World Economic Forum (WEF) rated Singapore's legal system fourth, but still ahead of Britain, Australia and the United States. However, in its ranking of nations on the impartiality of arbitration, the WEF report rated Singapore as 22nd with Malaysia and below Hong Kong and India while the IIMD's report ranked Singapore 14th in terms of respondents "confidence in the fair administration of justice in society".⁸

The size, structure and nature of the Singaporean judiciary, 1975-1998, is detailed in Table 5.1.

What we find in examining the Singaporean judiciary and its development from 1975 to 1998 is that Singapore does not have a professional judiciary in the same way that other English law jurisdictions have. While it is not unusual in Britain, Australia, and Canada for senior members of the bar to be elevated to the highest court from private practice, it is common for the district courts, and the magistrates court in particular, to be dominated by professional magistrates and judges who serve a substantial part of their careers on the bench in a service separate from the administrative functions of the Attorney-General's department.⁹ This is also the case in most of East Asia where there

⁶ See: World Economic Forum, *World Competitiveness Report 1993*, Davos, World Economic Forum, 1993; "S'pore's legal system rated best in world", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 2 October 1993, p. 3

⁷ Francis Seow's comments as a former Solicitor-General of Singapore, on the invalidity of this survey are worth noting. See: Francis T. Seow, *The politics of judicial institutions in Singapore*. Available at: <http://www.gn.apc.org/sfd/Links%20pages/L.../Folders/The%20Law/judicialinstits.html>

⁸ "Is Singapore's legal system getting a bad name?", *Straits Times*, 25 October, 1997, p. 1

⁹ See: Rodney N. Purvis, "Judiciary and Accountability: The Appointment of Judges", *The Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences*, 26, 2, 1994, pp. 56-67; Carl Baar, "Court Organization, Judicial Selection, and Judicial independence in Canada", *The Judges Journal*, 37, 2, 1998, pp. 44-53. For an interesting comparative jurisdictional case study see: Jonathan P. Nase, "Pennsylvania's Appellate Judges, 1969-1994", *Duquesne Law Review*, 33, 3, 1995, pp. 377-389

TABLE 5.1: Size and Structure of the Judiciary 1975 and 1985-98

Year	Supreme Court	District Court	Magistrates Court	Total	% Total Change
1998					
1998: No.	22	53	12 ¹⁰	87	+43%
1998: % change from 1995	+29%	+112%	-37%	43%	
1998: % total judiciary	25%	61%	14%	100%	
% continuing from 1995	73% (16)	43% (23) ¹¹	8% (1)	46%	
% continuing from 1990	18% (4)	17% (9) ¹²	0	15%	
% continuing from 1985	9% (2)	8% (4) ¹³	0	7%	
Lower court recruits since 1995	0	13% (7) ¹⁴	NA ¹⁵	8%	
% (No.) women	9% (2) ¹⁶	38% (20)	67% (8)	35%	
1995					
1995: No.	17	25	19	61	+33%
1995: % change from 1990	+70%	+19%	27%	33%	
1995: % total judiciary	28%	41%	31%	100%	
% Continuing from 1990	18% (3)	17% (9) ¹⁷	0	20%	
% Continuing from 1985	12% (2)	16% (4) ¹⁸	0	10%	
Lower court recruits since 1990	0	0	NA	0%	
% (No.) women	12% (2) ¹⁹	20% 5	37% (7)	23%	
1990					
1990: No.	10	21	15	46	+18%
1990: % change from 1985	+25%	+33%	-6%	33%	
1990: % total judiciary	22%	46%	33%	100%	
% Continuing from 1985	70% (7)	43% (9)	7% (1)	37%	
Lower court recruits since 1985	1 ²⁰	24% (5) ²¹	NA	13%	

¹⁰ There were actually 16 appointed magistrates in 1998, but 4 were absent on overseas study leave and so were not counted. These four were; Tham Chee Ho, Ms Lim Gek Choo, Steven Lo Pang Foo and Ms Gail Ong Sze Shuen.

¹¹ Of this group, 11 were Chinese, 5 Malay, 3 Indian or Sikh (1 Indian and 2 Sikhs) and 4 were Eurasian or another ethnic group.

¹² Of this group, 4 were Chinese, 4 Malay and 1 Eurasian. Of the four Malay judges, 3 have served since at least 1985 (Syed Alwee bin Ahmad Alsree, Abdul Rahim Bin A Jalil and Zainol Abeeidin bin Hussin) and the other, Hamzah Moosa has had a long association as a court officer and State Counsel.

¹³ Of these 4 judges, three are Malay (Syed Alwee bin Ahmad Alsree, Abdul Rahim Bin A Jalil and Zainol Abeeidin bin Hussin) and the other is Francis G. Remedios. However, there was also a small group of other judges who have had continuous court careers. These include those promoted from a magistrates position to a district judge (Liew Thiam Leng, Daniel Koh Poh Leong) and one person who held an administrative position as Deputy Registrar in the Supreme Court in 1985 and was subsequently promoted to being a district judge; Khoo Oon Soo. Thus the number of district judges who remained continuously in a judicial position was extremely small; 13% between 1985-1998, and of these three, approximately half, were Malays because of the necessity to have some Malay judges to oversee trials of Malay citizens to maintain a degree of racial equity in the courts.

¹⁴ See Kee Oon, Daphne Hong Fan Sin, David Chew Siong Tai, Lim Kwee Huat, Christopher Goh Eng Chiang, Foo Shu Ching and Lo Wai Ping.

¹⁵ Not Applicable. There is no court lower than the magistrates court.

¹⁶ In 1998, Justices Lai Siu Chiu and Judith Prakash were the only women Supreme Court judges. Both had initially been appointed as judicial commissioners, Lai on 2 May 1991 and Prakash on 1 April 1992. In 1998 there were no women judicial commissioners.

¹⁷ Of this group continuing from 1990, 10 were Chinese, 5 were Malay, 4 were Indian or Sikh and 3 were Eurasian or another ethnic group.

¹⁸ Of this group continuing from 1985, 3 are Malay (Syed Alwee bin Ahmad Alsree, Abdul Rahim Bin A Jalil and Zainol Abeeidin bin Hussin) and the other is Francis G. Remedios. This is the core group of long term district court judges.

¹⁹ In 1995, one woman was a Supreme Court judge (Lai Siu Chiu) and one a judicial commissioner (Judith Prakash). Lai had been elevated to the Supreme Court bench on 2 May 1994 and Prakash was subsequently elevated on 1 April 1995.

²⁰ Justice T. S. Sinnathuray, appointed in 1987, has been the only Supreme Court judge elevated from the Subordinate Courts since 1985.

% (No.) women	0	0	0	0%	
1985					
1985: No.	8	15	16	39	+70%
1985: % change from 1980	+13%	+67%	+33%	+39%	
1985: % change from 1975	+33%	+114%	+60%	+70%	
1985 : % total judiciary	21%	38%	41%	100%	
% Continuing from 1980	50% (4)	47% (7)	25% (4)	38%	
Lower court recruits since 1980	0	1 ²²	NA		
% (No.) women	0	0	0	0%	
1980					
1980: No.	7	9	12	28	22%
1980: % change from 1975	+17%	+29%	+20%	22%	
1980: % of total judiciary	25%	32%	43%	100%	
% continuing from 1975	67% (4)	14% (3)	0	25%	
Lower court recruits since 1975	14% (1) ²³	22% (2)	NA	11%	
% (No.) women	0	0	0	0%	
1975					
1975: No.	6	7	10	23	-
1975: % change	-	-	-	-	
1975 : % total judiciary	26%	30%	44%		
% (No.) women	0	14% (1)	10% (1)	9%	

is an even more entrenched and distinct a career judiciary based on either the French or German models.²⁴

The Singapore case is the opposite; sitting as a district judge or magistrate is simply one of a number of postings for officers within the Legal Service, especially those working within the Attorney-General's Chambers, usually a promotional posting. This is, once again, an unreflective continuation of the British colonial model as we have noted before. With the exception of ethnic minority district court judges, of whom there must be some, particularly Malays, there is no attempt in Singapore to appoint judges for long periods at the subordinate or superior courts level, and no attempt to develop a professional judiciary. Of the 162 people holding judicial office from 1975-1998, only 26 (16.1 per cent) were in court associated office²⁵ for more than three of the five year periods used in this analysis. Of this group, six (3.7 per cent) were supreme court judges and 20 (12.3 per cent) were subordinate court appointees. If we omit those newly appointed in 1998 and those already holding office in 1975 and not continuing to

²¹ Liew Thiam Leng, Alfonso Ang Cheng Ann, Sarjit Singh, Yap Chee Leong, Daniel Koh Poh Leong

²² Abdul Rahim bin Abdul Jalil, a Malay magistrate was elevated to the district court.

²³ Justice T. S. Sinnathuray was elevated from being Senior District Court Judge.

²⁴ As is the case in Indonesia, Thailand, China, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. I do not suggest, however, that this makes such careers judiciaries totally independent of the political executive. For analyses of judicial systems in contemporary Asia see: Kanishka Jayasuriya, ed., *Law Capitalism and Power in Asia*, London, Routledge, 1999; Douglas M. Johnson and Gerry Ferguson, eds., *Asia-Pacific Legal Development*, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1998; Yong Zhang, ed., *Comparative Studies on the Judicial Review System in East and Southeast Asia*, The Hague, Kluwer Law international, 1997; Andrew Huxley, ed., *Thai Law: Buddhist Law: Essays on the Legal History of Thailand, Laos and Burma*, Bangkok, White Orchid Press, 1996; Kitamura Ichiro, "The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Japan", *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 25, 2, 1993, pp. 263-274; Yang Chang Soo, "The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Korea", *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 25, 2, 1993, pp. 303-317

²⁵ In this analysis I have included contiguous periods of being a registrar or assistant registrar with a judicial appointment as a court associated office. Registrars and assistant registrars conduct preliminary hearings in both the supreme and subordinate courts.

hold office (i.e. restricting the analysis to the period 1995-1980) we find that of the 111 judicial officers 18 (16.2 per cent) had continuous appointments over three periods or more. This is not characteristic of a professional judiciary.

As shown in the above table, over the past 23 years, there has been no body of long term career magistrates or judges with the exception of a small number of Supreme Court judges. In that period, only one judge was recruited from the district court to the supreme court, Justice T. S. Sinnathuray. Of those supreme court judges sitting in 1998, only two were on the bench in 1985 and only four had been appointed between 1985 and 1990, 18 per cent of these judges. This is partially a generational issue, but not totally, as the Chief Justice and the two permanent Judges of Appeal are in their 70s, five of the other judges are in their early 60s²⁶ and of the remaining judges and judicial commissioners, four are in their mid to late 50s²⁷, six are in their early 50s²⁸ while only two are younger; Lee Sei Kin and Choo Han Teck in their early 40s. The continuing challenge to the political executive is to find within a largely passively hostile legal profession a small core of appointees who will manage political cases as required and to fill other positions with technical appointees who can maintain the superior court's credibility. The core appointees need to consist of the Chief Justice, at least two Judges of Appeal and at least one other supreme court judge, this being sufficient to ensure control of political cases.

In the district court, of the 1998 appointees, the level of retention of judges from 1985 (eight per cent) and 1990 (17 per cent) was almost identical to that of the supreme court for the same periods, nine per cent and 18 per cent respectively. Among the magistrates, it was worse; of the 1998 cohort of magistrates there were no continuations from either 1985 or 1990 and only one from 1995 and for the 1995 cohort there was similarly no continuations from 1990 or 1985. The one magistrate who did continue from 1995-1998 was Chinese, so at the magistrates courts level the maintenance of a minimal Malay or Indian presence to hear at least some minority community cases is obviously not important. Of the 1990 cohort of magistrates, only one continued from 1985, Rajaram Ramiah an Indian. This practice of actively ensuring that there is no professional judiciary within the subordinate courts, subjugates these courts directly to executive power; they are not part of an independent judiciary but an arm of executive government, part of the Singapore Legal Service, which has two branches; a Judicial Branch which staffs the courts and a Legal Branch which provides legal services to the state.²⁹ Although this analysis used five year periods as the basis of analysis, respondents in the legal profession commented that being appointed as a magistrate or

²⁶ Justices Lai Kew Chai, Goh Joon Seng, Chao Hick Tin, S. Rajendran and Warren Khoo

²⁷ Justices M. P. H. Rubin, Kan Ting Chiu, Amarjeet Singh and Lim Teong Qwee

²⁸ Justices G. P. Selvam, Lai Siu Chiu, Judith Prakash, Tan Lee Meng, Chan Seng Oon and Tay Yong Kwang

²⁹ *Structure of the Singapore Legal Service*. Available at: <http://www.gov.sg/pno/lsc/struc.html>, 26 July 1999

district court judge was a two-three year promotional rotation that was expected of most Legal Service officers in the Attorney-General's Chambers. It was also seen, particularly a district court appointment, as good preparation for leaving the public sector and going into private practice, although an analysis of movement from public to private sector practice shows that this rarely occurs. The reality is that Legal Service officers form the bulk of the judiciary and they carry into that role the norms characteristic of the civil service including implicit support for the political executive and its power arrangements.

It is obvious, however, that while political control of the judiciary has not lapsed over the past 23 years, the size, structure and nature of the judiciary has changed. The judiciary had shown substantial growth: 70 per cent from 1975-1985 and then slower growth, although it grew 43 per cent between 1995-1998 principally through a 112 per cent increase in district court appointments and a 22 per cent increase in supreme court judges. Between 1975-1998, supreme court appointments almost quadrupled and district court appointments increased almost eight fold. The magistrates court has seen far less growth, having 10 magistrates in 1975 and 12 active magistrates in 1998³⁰, although there was a steady increase to almost double the 1975 number by 1995 (19 magistrates) this was not sustained.

This concentration of growth in the district courts is a result of two major policy drivers. The first is a substantial legislative revision process undertaken since the late 1980s and accelerated under the Goh Chok Tong governments, which has made the district courts the relevant jurisdiction for almost all legal action, thus reducing the range of matters dealt with by the magistrate's and supreme courts; 95 per cent of all cases are now dealt with by the subordinate courts.³¹ The second is a determination by the executive to increase its control over the courts while actually appearing to do the opposite by refocussing the control strategy, through a series of administrative reform

³⁰ 16 magistrates were actually appointed in 1998, but four were absent on overseas study leave.

³¹ See: Yong Pung How, *Justice 21@ Subordinate Courts: Administering Justice in a Knowledge Society*, 10 April 1999, p. 1. This is a program of law revision rather than law reform in comparison to other English law jurisdictions. It is overseen by the Law Revision Commission (LRC) which is assisted by the Legislation Division of the Ministry of Law which undertakes most of the work arising from the various committees of the LRC. The LRC is an executive construct and does not operate under its own legislation and is essentially under the control of the Minister for Law. It is also assisted by the Law Reform Committee of the Academy of Law which is also dominated by executive appointees with Justice L. P. Thean as chair. This program of law revision has been substantial and has been responsible for the district court becoming the major arena of most legal activity. It has also led to a substantial publishing program, especially by Butterworths, to bring legal texts up to date. The extent of the changes cannot be dealt with here, but are reflected in such publications as: Nigel M. Robinson et al (eds.), *Construction Law in Singapore and Malaysia*, Singapore, Butterworths Asia, 1996; Saheeran Suendran bin Abdullah, Lim Tian Huat and Edwin Chew, *Corporate Receivership: the law and practice in Malaysia and Singapore*, Kuala Lumpur, Butterworths Asia, 1997; Tan Sook Yee, *Principles of Singapore Land Law*, Singapore, Butterworths Asia, 1994; Tan Lee Meng, *The Law in Singapore on Carriage of Goods by Sea*, Singapore, Butterworths, 1994; Walter Woon, *Basic Business Law in Singapore*, Singapore, Prentice hall, 1995; Tan Cheng Han, *Matrimonial Law in Singapore and Malaysia*, Singapore, Butterworths Asia, 1994; Mahinder Singh Sidhu, *The law of wills, probate, administration, and succession in Malaysia and Singapore: with cases and commentaries*, Kuala Lumpur, International Law Book Services, 1998.

initiatives, on the subordinate courts and allowing the supreme court apparently greater autonomy. As all subordinate court judges are civil servants and, as demonstrated, almost all are short-term appointees, the executive's control over the lower courts is absolute if it so wishes. The judiciary has effectively been suborned as part of the civil service; officers of the Singapore Legal Service in 1998 formed 75 per cent of the judiciary. This increase in the size and responsibility of the middle layer of the court system as part of broader judicial administrative reforms is not unusual; the Pennsylvania judicial system was similarly reformed in 1980.³² However, the independence of the judiciary has stronger constitutional and cultural guarantees in this jurisdiction than in Singapore.

The supreme court's greater autonomy was to be demonstrated by the appointment of some judges who have no obvious government connections and by allowing the court to find against the government on some matters such as the finding on the Official Secrets Act case. Unfortunately for the political executive, the Tang Liang Hong case, which could not be heard in the district court, spoilt this strategy by exposing the court's continuing political role. More recently, the role of the Chief Justice in reducing fines imposed on opposition figure Chee Soon Juan to a level where he could continue to contest elections, as desired by the government, is a clear indication of the political linkages existing between the political executive and that part of the judicial branch which is politically oriented.³³

Women in the Judiciary

The gender composition of the courts has also changed, but only recently. There were no women on the supreme court until 1991 and since April 1992 there have been two, both now judges, comprising 9 per cent of appointees. While there was one woman district court judge in 1975, there were none in 1985 or 1990 and only 5 (20 per cent) had been appointed by 1995. However by 1998, 20 of the 53 district court judges were women, comprising 38 per cent. Representation of women in the magistrates courts was almost identical to the district court until 1995 when women comprised 37 per cent of appointments. However, by 1998 the majority of active appointees were women; 67 per cent. This increase in the representation of women, now representing 35 per cent of judicial appointments, is not the result of a formal gender equity policy as the political executive remains opposed to such. Although respondents who were women lawyers uniformly commented that the cabinet, particularly Goh Chok Tong, had been keen to appoint women to the supreme court bench, it was on the basis of professional competence, not gender equity. The increase of women legal officers serving in the

³² *A Brief History of Pennsylvania's Courts*, p. p.8. Available at: <http://www.aopc.org/index/UJS/courthistory.htm>

³³ See: Agence-France-Presse, "Singapore bars outspoken opposition leader Chee from holding rallies", 5 August 1999. Available at: <http://www.singapore-window.org/sw99/90805afp.htm>, 12 August 1999

subordinate courts, as in South Korea but unlike most other East Asian nations, is a consequence of the increasing number of women lawyers, professional women's delay in marrying and having children and the meritocratic and other structural factors in the civil service system which do not actively discriminate against women.³⁴ If compared to the United Kingdom, where 43 per cent of lawyers are women,³⁵ Singapore's benchmark jurisdiction, the representation of women in judicial ranks in Singapore is impressive as illustrated in Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2: Representation of Women in Judicial ranks in Singapore and the United Kingdom, 1998

Jurisdiction	Highest Courts ³⁶	Middle Level Courts ³⁷	Magistrates Courts ³⁸	Totals
Singapore ³⁹	9%	38%	67%	34.5%
United Kingdom ⁴⁰	6%	11%	17%	11.4%

Private-Public Sector Transfers

Further analysis of those appointed to judicial positions reveals that very few of them cross from the civil service into private practice; the legal profession in Singapore is very clearly bifurcated between private and public practice except for the recruitment of judges to the supreme court from a very small number of private firms. This division has become more pronounced over the past 20 years as demonstrated in Table 5.3 below.

Supreme Court judges are usually elderly at retirement and reportedly few, if any, join firms as consultants after retirement.⁴¹ From 1987-1998, no Supreme Court judges were appointed directly from the private sector except for Yong Pung How; all others were first appointed from the position of judicial commissioner. Of the 23 judicial commissioners appointed in this period, 16 (70%) came directly from private firms. Of these 16, six (26%) had substantial public sector backgrounds. Over this period,

³⁴ For an analysis of similar rise of women judicial officers in South Korea see: Linda S. Lewis, "Female Employment and Elite Occupations in Korea: The Case of "Her Honour" the Judge", *Korean Studies*, 21, 1997, pp. 54-71

³⁵ The Law Society of England and Wales, *Fact sheet D: Employed Solicitors*. Available at: <http://www.lawsoc.org.uk/dcs/>, 11 November 1998

³⁶ In Singapore this includes all judges of the Supreme Court including Judges of Appeal. In the United Kingdom it includes: Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, Heads of Divisions, Lords Justices of Appeal and High Court judges.

³⁷ In Singapore this includes all district court judges. In the United Kingdom it includes: circuit judges, recorders, assistant recorders, assistant recorders in training, district judges and deputy district judges.

³⁸ In Singapore this includes all magistrates. In the United Kingdom it includes: metropolitan stipendiary magistrates, provincial stipendiary magistrates and acting stipendiary magistrates.

³⁹ "Judiciary", *Singapore Government Directory*, January 1998, pp. 91-97

⁴⁰ *Women in the Judiciary*. Available at: <http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/judicial/womanapp.html>. This is 1999 data.

⁴¹ It was reported by respondents that Justice A. V. Winslow and Punch Coomaraswamy were consultants for a short period after retirement (Winslow, who retired early, now teaches in the NUS Law School) and two recent retirees from the supreme court joined private firms; Goh Phai Cheng went to Harry Elias and Partners and K. Sauntharajah went to B. Rao and K. S. Rajah in 1995 and 1992 respectively. Goh Phai Cheng, T. S. Sinnathuray and Tan Teow Yeow are all on the local panel of accredited arbitrators of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre.

recruitment to the superior bench is drawn almost equally from practitioners with substantial or wholly public sector backgrounds (56 per cent) and those with wholly private sector backgrounds (44 per cent).

In the lower courts the traffic is almost all one-way; all recruitment is from the Singapore Legal Service. Of those appointed to the district court from 1975-1995, only four out of 44 (nine per cent) left for private practice and remained there.⁴² Of those appointed as magistrates during this period only six out of 57 (11 per cent) left for private practice and remained there.⁴³ Clearly, for most appointees, a position in the Singapore Legal Service is a position for life. This is a vindication of substantial efforts by the executive to attract and retain legal officers in the face of a profession which is generally hostile to it. However it also seems to indicate that state service does not predispose lawyers to seek positions in private firms or firms to seek applicants from the public sector or, in a worse case scenario, for the public sector to attract the best legal talent as, if it did, there would be a greater flow between each sector at other than supreme court level.⁴⁴ If we examine those officers of the Singapore Legal Service most eligible for jobs in the private sector, State Counsels and above in the Attorney-General's Chambers, the number of those who left for the private sector and remained there until 1999 declined severely from 1975-1995 as shown in Table 5.3 below. The efforts of the Singapore Legal Service to increase remuneration, widen its services to provide greater career opportunities and provide postgraduate training opportunities has obviously worked. This has also provided the political executive with a solution to the problem of ensuring adequate numbers of controllable, loyal, qualified people to staff the courts.

⁴² This analysis is based on their being still in private practice in 1999. This is a reasonable assumption as appointees to the subordinate courts are usually in their late 20s to early 30s on appointment, so those in these positions in 1975 should still be active in the profession. These were: Tan Seck Sam now with Quah Tan and Partners; Sarjit Singh, now with Sarjit Singh and Partners; Tan Lian Ker, now with in a one person practice; and Peter Lim Seng Lak now with Wee Swee Teow and Company.

⁴³ These were: Lee Teck Leng now with Michael Khoo and Partners; Rajaram Ramiah now with Wee, Ramaya and Partners; Mok Wing Chee, now with Chung and Fong; Chiah Kok Khun, now with Wee, Swee, Teow and Company; and Ch'ng Lye Beng and Lim Choo Eng, both with Tan Jinhwee Eunice and Lim Chooeng.

⁴⁴ The general hostility of the legal profession towards the government and the judiciary in general, or some members of it at least, has not diminished in recent years. There continues to be widespread hostility, in particular, to the Chief Justice. This is such that it is often commented upon by the judges themselves. One of the most recent occasions was when, at the admission ceremony of new advocates and solicitors in May 1999, the Chief Justice was forced to comment: "... I shall have to ... address what many judges and I feel is a growing and worrying problem facing the legal fraternity – the deterioration in the standard of professional and ethical conduct of many a lawyer today. ... it has also come to our attention that a fair number of the younger lawyers fail to conduct themselves appropriately when they come before judicial officers. ... I cannot begin to stress this enough – this is that the courts have never and will not condone or tolerate such ill manners and shoddy conduct. All lawyers must accord due respect and deference when they are before a court of law ... this sort of behaviour ... borders on contempt of court. Lawyers act in a most unprofessional and unethical manner when they display such arrogance and disrespect toward judges and other judicial officers." When the Chief Justice has to threaten charges of contempt of court against lawyers who are disrespectful of judges, the relationship between the judiciary and the legal profession are obviously low. See: Yong Pung How, *Admission of Advocates and Solicitors: Chief Justices Address*, 31 May 1999, pp. 8-10

Despite the implied existence of Westminster conventions, and in imitation of the unreformed Westminster practice of British governments,⁴⁵ the structure and nature of the Singaporean judiciary is such that it is clearly under what is effectively a sovereign executive which, exercising power through the Attorney-General, the Legal Services Commission,⁴⁶ the legislature, the presidency or the Chief Justice, can control appointments to and dismissals from the courts. An analysis of appointments to the Supreme Court since 1987 reveals the frequent use of temporary appointments, the appointment of career civil servants with strong allegiance to the government and the appointment of PAP cadre members or close affiliates of the party.

For example, the present Chief Justice, formerly CEO of the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation and personal friend of Lee Kuan Yew, in 1984, seven years prior to his appointment as chief justice, made this self-assessment of his suitability for a legal position:

Far from being distinguished in the law, I can only describe myself now as a working member of the business community, who had merely the good fortune to have a background in legal training, and some practical experience in this honourable profession before descending into the depths of the business world. ... My acquaintance with the law ceased as long ago as 1970, and before then had been confined almost entirely to Malaysia. ... I never actually practiced in Singapore ... My final departure then from the profession in 1970 must be sufficient to allow judicial notice to be taken that I had neither the ability nor the inclination to continue to persevere in the law.⁴⁷

Even allowing for modesty, this is not an appeal for consideration for appointment to the office of chief justice and head of the judicial branch of government! That said, Yong has made an exemplary contribution to the judiciary, not by way of legal expertise or by developing it as a bulwark against executive excess, but as chief executive officer of the courts through modernisation and impressive gains in efficiency

⁴⁵ Until very recently, arguably, the practice of British governments was to carefully choose High court judges who would be politically accommodating. In 1985, Stevens commented that it was "... the unwritten law of our party system; and there is no clearer statute in that unwritten law than the rule that party claims should always weigh very heavily in the disposal of the highest legal appointments. In dealing with them you cannot ignore the party system as you do in the choice of a general or an archbishop. It would be a breach of the tacit convention on which politicians and lawyers have worked the British constitution for the last 200 years." See: Robert Stevens, *Law and politics: The House of Lords as a Judicial Body 1800-1976*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1985, p. 85. While Shetreet and Waltman agree with Stevens, others, such as Lord McCluskey do not. However, there appears to be a general agreement that while party political affiliation may not in recent years be paramount, the political temper of judges is crucial to their appointment and in earlier times, party affiliation was important. See: Lord McCluskey, *Law, Justice and Democracy*, London, BBC Books, 1987, p. 54; Shimon Shetreet, *Judges on Trial*, Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Co., 1976, pp. 67-72; Jerold L. Waltman, "The Courts in England", in, Jerold L. Waltman and Kenneth M. Holland, eds., *The Political Role of Law Courts in Modern Democracies*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1988, p. 21 and pp. 117-118.

⁴⁶ The Legal Services Commission, a public service commission for the legal service, controls appointments to the subordinate courts. It is chaired by the Chief Justice and appointments to it are completely controlled by the executive. It is as independent of the executive as the Public Service Commission; i.e. not at all.

⁴⁷ Yong Pung How, "Braddell Memorial Lecture 1984: Common Sense in the Law and Business", *The Malayan Law Journal*, January 1985, pp. xiv-xviii, p. xiv

Table 5.3: Singapore Legal Service Lawyers In Private Practice In 1999 From 1975, 1990 And 1995 Attorney-General's Chambers Cohort

Cohort Details	1975	1990	1995
Cohort size ⁴⁸	22	41	84
% (no.) cohort still in public service in 1999 ⁴⁹	36% (8)	68% (28)	75% (63)
% (no.) in private practice in 1999	32% (7)	15% ⁵⁰ (6)	8% (7) ⁵¹
% (no.) known to be debarred, dead or emigrated	4% (1) ⁵²	0	0
% (no.) retired from public service ⁵³	5% (1)	2% (1) ⁵⁴	1% (1) ⁵⁵
% occupation unknown in 1999 ⁵⁶	23% (5)	15% (6) ⁵⁷	15% (13) ⁵⁸
TOTALS	100%	100%	100%

in support of range of policies for developing Singapore's services sector, unfortunately, sometimes at the price of an erosion of citizen's legal rights. In providing, what one would hope was an unthoughtful summary of his first round of reforms at the beginning of the 1995 legal year, Yong described them to his professional colleagues as resulting in the development not of an improved justice system, but as an efficient state killing machine:

⁴⁸ This analysis is restricted to all staff in the Attorney-General's Chambers classified from Senior State Counsel to State Counsel. A large number of Legal Service officers are also located in the Ministry of Law. However attempts to match SLS occupied positions across the 15 year analysis period has proven impossible and so these officers have been excluded. Some of whom also serve in the Ministry of Law, Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home Affairs and other ministries. MINDEF does not list its legal officers or the majority of its ministerial structure in the Singapore Government Directory, as does the Internal Security Department, so Legal Service officers in these locations cannot be identified.

⁴⁹ Includes three judges of the Supreme Court: S. Rajendran, Warren Khoo and Chao Hick Tin. Of these three, Rajendran and Khoo had left the Legal Service for the private sector and subsequently re-entered the public sector as supreme court appointees. If we include these two as private sector lawyers, 41% of this cohort left the legal service for private practice. Others include: Goh Phai Cheng, Lawrence Ang Boon Kong, Adab Singh, Jeffrey Chan Wah Teck,

⁵⁰ These included: Ang Sin Teck (Rajah Loo and Chandra), Yang Ing Loong (Lee and Lee), Huang Yen San (Drew and Napier), Sheik Mustafa bin Abu Hassan (Sheik Mustafa and Co.), Ismail bin Hamid (Edmond Pereira and Partners), Ng Yuen (Shook, Lin and Bok) and Palaniappan Sundararaj (Derrick Ravi and partners).

⁵¹ This includes: Tan Wah Nam (Lee and Lee), Joanna Foong Chi Yuen (Rodyk and Davison), Phua Aik Siew (Wong partnership), Lionel Tan I Kwok (Rajah and Tann), Chua Eu Jin (Rajah and Tann) and Rajiv Nair (Shook, Lin and Bok).

⁵² Glenn J. Knight was debarred as a result of being found guilty of corruption while Director of the Commercial Affairs Department.

⁵³ This includes Lee Show Sian

⁵⁴ Mrs. E. A. Chan

⁵⁵ Errol Carl Foenander. Goh Phai Cheng who was Parliamentary Counsel in 1995 was not counted as this office is not included in the analysis.

⁵⁶ This includes officers not listed in the 1999 Singapore Government Directory. These officers could be employed in security, intelligence or other positions not listed in the directory. They may also be dead, retired, have emigrated or be in security classified positions. These include: Low Lin Kok, R. Pala Krishnan, Miss Animah bte Abdul Gani, Susan Wong Liang Him, Mohamed Harith bin Mohamed Kassim.

⁵⁷ This includes: Loke Yoon Kee, Lee Show Sian, Chua Eng Hui, Tan Chee Meng, Miss Joyce Huen Suling and Lim Yew Jin.

⁵⁸ This includes: Samtani Anilkumar K, Ms Kwan Chiu Wan, Ng Der Lim, Lee How Chih, Ch'ng Lye Beng, Lim Yew Jin, Miss P. Arul Selvamalar, Miss Shoba Gopalakrishnan, Andy Wong Yin Soon, Lim Keng Yeow, Lim Tse Haw, Kessler Soh Boon Leng, Eugene Lee Yee Leng. Three are women officers and are assumed to have resigned or be on maternity leave. The others are not employed in private sector law firms and so are assumed to be placed in MINDEF, ISD or a GLC.

We have now reached the stage when criminal cases can be disposed of by the high court in about six months. Criminal appeals are disposed of by the court of appeal in about six months. *And condemned prisoners can be disposed of by the prison authorities in about six months.*⁵⁹

In response, the audience hissed him. Little wonder that the legal profession demonstrates little support for the government beyond those co-opted to manage the profession on behalf of the PAP and to assist in managing the state. Efficiency has replaced Justice as the god of the courts.

As can be seen, almost half of appointees to the Supreme Court are drawn from the Attorney-General's Chambers or were formerly senior officers of this department before going into private practice and then into the judiciary. If we continue to accept that it is irrelevant for senior civil servants to be PAP members or cadres as argued earlier, those appointed with formal or informal affiliation to the PAP form 85 per cent of Supreme Court appointees. Those not obviously linked to the PAP comprise 15 per cent. When we further analyse appointments as in the second table above, those being appointed directly from the Attorney-General's Chambers comprises 32 per cent with the others with a background in that office coming directly from private sector firms. Most of the private practitioners appointed are from firms with a long record of affiliation with the PAP; Allen and Gledhill⁶⁰ and Drew and Napier in particular, although not all appointees from these firm, such as Justice Judith Prakash from Drew and Napier, are PAP cadres or close PAP affiliates; many of these, like Prakash are "technical" appointees who can expect not to preside over political cases.⁶¹ The background of some judges is varied and mask their PAP affiliations. For example, Mohideen MP Haja Rubin was an executive in the Straits Times Group from 1967-73, a legal adviser to Wee Kim Wee, chief executive of that company, PAP cadre and later president, before he joined David Marshall and Company as a partner. Others have a simpler career such as S. Rajendran who was a former Senior State Counsel before joining Khattar, Wong and Partners, another large law firm closely associated with the government and from there being appointed to the bench.⁶²

⁵⁹ Cited in: Maggie O'Kane, "Eye of a Tiger", *The Guardian Weekly*, 20 May 1995, p. 4

⁶⁰ Chen Choon Joong, Managing Partner at Allen and Gledhill is on the boards of several government companies including Singapore power and TDB Holdings, the holding company for the Trade Development Board. In 1997-98 he was also the chairman of Power Supply Limited.

⁶¹ Prakash has sat on a defamation suit brought by PAP MPs against 12 Workers Party members, in September 1997. However, this case was rather straightforward as the defendants reached an agreement with the claimants in which they admitted partial liability. The court hearing lasted 30 minutes. All the participants in the case were from the Indian community, as is Prakash. It is generally thought among those interviewed that Prakash is not a PAP cadre and is reluctant to accept political cases. See: "WP and a MP: 12 members to pay \$200,000 for defaming MPs", *Straits Times*, 9 September 1997

⁶² In 1997-98, Khattar Sal Pat, Managing Partner of Khattar Wong and Partners was a director of Sembawang Corporation and has been a member of the Public Service Commission (1990-1998) and the Presidential Council for Minority Rights (1993-1998), and in 1998 was also a member of the Police and Civil Defence Service Commission and the Singapore Labour Foundation affiliated with the NTUC.

However, few non-PAP affiliated appointments are made to the bench and those that are made are usually recruited as technical experts, essential to support the policies underlying the current policy priorities of development of the service sector and knowledge economy policies in which legal services play a crucial role. The bench thus maintains its technical abilities, appears increasingly non-political and stays firmly under executive control.

Para-Judicial Structures

The separation of the political and technical legal responsibilities of the courts has been augmented, particularly since 1995⁶³ by an increased emphasis on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, particularly for commercial disputes, a policy strongly supported by both the political executive and the Chief Justice.⁶⁴ While the standard arguments for ADR mechanisms hold true for Singapore as elsewhere⁶⁵ and they are now a standard part of business practice, they also offer a partial and convenient solution to the problem of the political role of courts being perceived as interfering with their responsibilities in commercial law in legal systems characterised by executive dominance of the judiciary as in Singapore, or by inefficiency or corruption.

In Singapore two bodies have been established with a view to servicing foreign companies and domestic companies dealing with foreign companies: the Singapore Mediation Centre (SMC) established under the Singapore Academy of Law⁶⁶ and funded by the Ministry of Law and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), incorporated as a private company but subject to the provisions of the International Arbitration Act 1994. The SMC deals principally with disputes between be brought to bear.⁶⁷ The abolition of appeals to a non-Singaporean tribunal is, in

⁶³ The International Arbitration Act was passed in 1994, and came into effect on 27 January 1995. It effectively brought the Singapore International Arbitration Centre which had been established in 1991, under government control and made it subject to the provisions of the act which implemented the UNITRAL model law on international arbitration in Singapore. It also provided, under s.32(1) for the making of the International Arbitration (New York Convention Countries) Order 1995 which implemented Singapore's accession to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958. The Attorney-General is chairman of the SIAC board.

⁶⁴ The Chief Justice has made numerous statements and speeches on the development of ADR mechanisms since 1994. See: *Chief Justices Address at the Official Opening of the Singapore Mediation Centre*, 16 August 1997; *Chief Justice's Keynote Address International Mediation Conference*, 18 August 1997; *Admission of Advocates and Solicitors Chief Justices Address*, 31 May 1999

⁶⁵ The conventional wisdom on the establishment of ADR mechanisms is that it reduces cost and time in comparison to litigation through the courts, reduces court workloads and is more productive in maintaining commercial relationships following the settlement of the dispute. For a contemporary analysis of ADR in the some Asian nations, including Singapore, see: "Alternative Dispute Resolution in India, Indonesia, Japan and Singapore", *Asia Business Law Review*, 19, 1998, pp. 36-41

⁶⁶ The chairman of the SMC board is a supreme court judge; Justice Goh Joon Seng in 1999. The SMC Advisory Committee is dominated by public sector appointees; three of the five members are judges or senior civil servants. See: http://www.mediation.com.sg/smc_idx.html

⁶⁷ Cited in: Francis T. Seow, *The Politics of Judicial Institutions in Singapore*, 1997, p. 1. Available at: <http://singapore-window.org/1028judi.htm>, 1 March 1999, p. 2

Table 5.4: Type of Appointees to the Supreme Court 1987-1997⁶⁸

Type of Appointee	Civil servant or ex-senior civil servant ⁶⁹	PAP affiliate or cadre practitioner	Non-PAP affiliated practitioner	Person qualified but not practicing ⁷⁰	TOTAL
Number	11	11	5	1	28
%	48%	33%	15%	4%	100%
Person	Chao Hick Tin Tan Teow Yeow Goh Phai Cheng K. Sauntharajah Kan Ting Chiu Chan Seng Onn Lee Seiu Kin T.S. Sinnathuray S. Rajendran Warren Khoo Tay Yong Kwang	J. Grimberg M. Karthigesu Goh Joon Seng M.P. Rubin M. Hwang Tan Lee Meng Choo H. T. P. Coomaraswamy Lai Kew Chai ⁷¹ G. P. Selvam Thean L. P.	Lai Siu Chiu J. Prakash A. Singh Lim T. Q. Lau Lok Sam	Yong P. H.	

⁶⁸ Appointees holding office in 1987 are included. It is difficult to categorise appointments as any categorical system will inevitably have overlapping categories. This categorisation has been selected as it allows the clearest delineation, albeit, a still murky one. Many of the appointees fit into more than one category. For example, Yong Pung How is not thought to be a PAP cadre, yet he is PAP affiliated through Lee Kuan Yew, has been a former executive in a GLC (Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, MRT Corporation and Singapore Broadcasting Corporation), was a former practicing lawyer but not in Singapore and was appointed to the Supreme Court from the private sector. Biographical details of appointees after 1991 are not available from Singapore or Malaysian law journals. Data also included from interviews of legal professionals.

⁶⁹ This category includes appointments from the higher education sector, statutory boards and GLCs.

⁷⁰ This is the appointment of Yong Pung How, the present Chief Justice.

⁷¹ Justice Lai was formerly a partner in Lee and Lee, the law firm started by Lee Kuan Yew and his brother and in which Lee's wife, Kwa Geok Choo is a consultant.

Table 5.5: Source of Appointees to the Supreme Court 1987-1997

Source	Attorney-General's Chambers ⁷²	Allen and Gledhill	Drew and Napier	Lee and Lee	Other Private Practice	NUS Law Faculty	Other	TOTAL
No.	9	4	3	1	9	1	1	28
%	32%	14%	11%	4%	32%	4%	4%	100% ⁷³
Names	Chao Hick Tin Tan Teow Yeow Goh P. C. K Sauntharajah Chan S. O. Lee S. K. Tay Y. K. P. Coomaraswamy T.S. Sinnathuray	M. Karthigesu M. Hwang Lai Siu Chiu Lau L. S.	J. Grimberg J. Prakash G. P. Selvam	Lai K. C.	Thean L. P. Goh J. S. M.P. Rubin Kan T. C. A. Singh Lim T. Q. Choo H. T. S. Rajendran Khoo L. H.	Tan L. M.	Yong P. H.	

⁷² This includes appointees drawn from the subordinate courts which are under the control of the Attorney-General.

⁷³ The total is actually 101% with 1% due to rounding error.

two or more Singaporean parties and the SIAC deals with disputes involving one or more non-Singaporean parties, although the SMC may deal with any dispute referred to it. In relation to MNCs and other foreign companies operating in Singapore, it is these mechanisms in association with the case management strategies of the Economic Development Board and Trade Development Board which ensure that foreign companies investing and operating in Singapore do not have to fear the courts; their political role is kept strictly separate from their economic role. In particular, it is a lack of understanding of the crucial role of the EDB and TDB by foreign legal critics, such as the Bar Association of the City of New York, which has led in the past to erroneous conclusions about the reliability of Singaporean courts in relation to economic issues.⁷⁴ These two statutory authorities, particularly the EDB, act as a buffer and mediator between foreign companies and all other state agencies so as to ensure that as much as practical, no dispute arises between the state and these companies that could give rise to litigation with the state or with domestic companies.⁷⁵

In addition to these mechanisms, a comprehensive ADR infrastructure has been developed both within the subordinate courts and across a number of policy domains which have been identified as major sources of litigation.⁷⁶ Within the subordinate courts, a Primary Dispute Resolution Centre has been established, the Juvenile Court has implemented a number of mediation strategies and established a mediation/social intervention based Family Justice Centre.⁷⁷ The subordinate courts have also joined the Court Dispute Resolution International (CDRI) regime which involves "cross-border real time co-mediation with judges from other jurisdictions", including Australia and the United Kingdom with plans to extend this mechanism to include European and North American jurisdictions.⁷⁸ The Ministry of Law has also established Community Mediation Centres to augment the subordinate courts mediation mechanisms.

The last vestige of complete independence in the judicial system, appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, was abolished in February 1994, despite Lee Kuan Yew previously insisting that Singapore should "allow a review of the judicial process that takes place here in some other tribunal where obviously undue influence cannot

⁷⁴ The Bar Association's report of the decline of the rule of law in Singapore warned foreign companies that the political role of the courts, seen to be a corrupting influence, would lead to the courts being unreliable in commercial matters. This has not happened. The Singaporean judiciary very clearly differentiates between its political and economic responsibilities.

⁷⁵ This may, on occasion, involve EDB intervention between GLCs and foreign companies as well as ministries and statutory boards. The EDB is represented on all GLC holding company boards.

⁷⁶ See Yong Pung Howe, *Justice 21@ Subordinate Courts: Administering Justice in a Knowledge Society*, 10 April 1999, pp. 3-5

⁷⁷ This involves the use of peer mediation, family conferencing, family care conferencing and youth care programs in association with the Ministry of Community Development's social work services. See: *ibid.*, p. 4

⁷⁸ See: Yong Pung Howe, *Justice 21@ Subordinate Courts: Administering Justice in a Knowledge Society*, 10 April 1999, p. 3

itself, no cause for concern; New Zealand acted in 1996 to do likewise,⁷⁹ as has Australia. The principal concern is that the indigenous judicial system be sufficiently mature to defend the rule of law, maintain the independence of the judiciary and, at the most basic level, be able to provide balance in the exercise of state power over citizens. Given that the Privy Council⁸⁰ and several international judicial organisations⁸¹ had castigated the Singaporean judiciary for failing to uphold such standards, it is difficult not to conclude that the executive replaced the Privy Council with a domestic Court of Appeal as a means of maintaining executive control of the judiciary and minimising international criticism of the judicial-executive nexus and the executive's occasional overt abuses of power. That criticism and executive action against it, has increased, is an indication of executive disdain for international judicial standards, the degree of its infatuation with total control of domestic institutions and its inability to permit more than a modicum of open debate of its power arrangements. The behaviour of the executive in prosecuting any negative domestic, or domestically published criticism of executive dominance of the courts while failing to sue similar or identical commentary in Hong Kong,⁸² Australia⁸³ or the United States⁸⁴ establishes that the executive is only too aware of the truthfulness of the assertions and will not risk attacking its critics in jurisdictions where courts are less attuned to its goals.

Developing a Singaporean Canon and System

This willingness of the executive to use the courts to its own ends has also been accompanied by a sophisticated strategy, overseen by the Chief Justice and the Minister for Law, S. Jayakumar, to increase the involvement of the Singaporean judiciary in international judicial conferences and associations by emphasising the technical, structural and management reforms implemented since 1991 and avoiding

⁷⁹ "Legislation abolishes appeals to the Privy Council", *New Zealand Executive Government News Release Archive*, 18 June 1996. Available at: http://www.executive.govt.nz/minister/graham/dgn180696_1.htm, 1 March 1999

⁸⁰ In respect of B. J. Jeyaratnam's appeal to overturn his disbarment as a legal practitioner in Singapore by the Supreme Court, the Privy Council commented that he (and his co-appellant Wong) "...have been fined, imprisoned and publicly disgraced for offences of which they were not guilty ... but, because of the course taken by the criminal proceedings, their Lordships have no power to right the other wrongs which the appellant and Wong have suffered." See: Privy Council Appeal No. 10 of 1988, p. 22

⁸¹ Singapore's judicial and legal systems have been criticised by the United States government, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the New York Bar Association, Asia Watch

⁸² For example, Hong Kong's Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang, has commented "In Hong Kong the government does not stand above the law. You can take the government to court - try doing that in Singapore...". The Singapore government took no action against Tsang or the Asia Times newspaper in response to this front page insult. See: "Feisty Tang challenges Singapore", *Asia Times*, 9 October 1996, p. 1

⁸³ The Australian Law Society criticised the decline of the rule of law in Singapore in its journal in 1988. See: "Australian lawyers and the rule of law in our region", "Controls on lawyers tightened" and "Singapore explains why the law is not enough to keep security", *Australian Law News*, August 1988, pp.4, 17, 17-18

⁸⁴ Critical commentary on Singapore's courts have been published in The Times (London) in Bernard Levy's columns, by William Safire in the New York Times, Hamish McDonald in The Sydney Morning Herald, by Amnesty International in several jurisdictions, by Asia Watch in the United States and others. See: "The misuse of law: Singapore's legal racket", *The New York Times*, 1 June 1997; "Singapore dissidents get a chance to speak freely", "Singapore dissidents get a chance to speak freely", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 29 November 1997; "Model of our own: letter by Robyn Kilpatrick", *South China Morning Post*, 30 March 1997; Francis T. Seow, *The politics of judicial institutions in Singapore*, 1997, p. 1. Available at: <http://singapore-window.org/1028judi.htm>, 1 March 1999, pp.4-5

discussion of more substantive issues. It has also provided the judiciary with a rationale for moving away from what Phang termed its "carbon copy"⁸⁵ of the English legal tradition to develop law, as with the constitution, suited to local conditions. This was reflected in changes to the way in which common law is applied in Singapore through the Application of English Law Act 1993. However, the desire to establish local precedents for political cases was probably already part of judicial thinking as reflected in the judgement on one case against the Jehovah's Witness sect in which Chief Justice Yong Pung How stated :

I am not influenced by the various views as enunciated in the American cases cited to me but instead must restrict my analysis of the issues here with reference to the local context.⁸⁶

Legislation establishes the courts as courts of limited jurisdiction,⁸⁷ thus restricting their ability to interpret law by the imposition of compulsory legislated sentencing requirements which limit the powers of inquiry and sentencing discretion of the courts. In particular, there has been a trend since the mid-1970s of revising the civil and criminal law so as to remove judicial sentencing discretion from most legislation and to limit the scope for judicial review. By this mechanism, the executive shares the judicial function; the role of the courts is to decide on the broad merits of a case; the executive does the sentencing via legislation. Much legislation, particularly that concerned with social and political control, contains mandated sentencing provisions for offences. This includes the Criminal Code, Misuse of Drugs Act, Immigration Act, Vandalism Act, Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act, Undesirable Publications Act, Internal Security Act, the Banishment Act, the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, The Undesirable Publications Act, The Environmental Public Health Act, The Singapore Broadcasting Authority Act and the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore Act.

Most of these acts⁸⁸ also specifically exclude judicial review of administrative action, or limit the courts ability to restrain executive action as do such legislation as the Societies Act, the Trade Unions Act, the Industrial Relations Act,⁸⁹ the Employment Act,⁹⁰ the

⁸⁵ Andrew B. L. Phang, "Convergence and Divergence - A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of the Singapore and Hong Kong Legal Systems", *Hong Kong Law Journal*, 23, 1, 1993, pp.1-30, p.4. Phang argued that by maintaining a legal system that was almost identical to the United Kingdom was a functional possibility in Singapore.

⁸⁶ Singapore Law Reports, *Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor*, 1994, 3, p. 681

⁸⁷ British, New Zealand, Canadian and Australian courts can also be described as courts of limited jurisdiction, as legislation defines what the courts can and cannot do in many cases. However, in the case of Singapore, the limits on court discretion in deciding cases and sentencing far exceed the case of courts in other common law nations.

⁸⁸ For example, the following acts exclude judicial review; Internal Security Act, the Banishment Act, the Trade Unions Act and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act.

⁸⁹ This act prohibits the Industrial Relations Court from adjudicating on almost all personnel related matters and prohibits them from being the basis of an industrial dispute; e.g. promotions, transfers, recruitment, redundancy terminations, misconduct terminations or the allocation of duties to employees. In these cases dispute resolution procedures managed by the Ministry of Manpower, not the courts, are established by s.35(2-9) of the Industrial Relations Act and s.14(2-8) of the Employment Act. An office called the "Labour Court" is located within the Labour Relations and Welfare Division of the Ministry of Manpower, but it is not part of the judicial system but rather a

Government Proceedings Act,⁹¹ the Passports Act,⁹² the Income Tax Act,⁹³ and the Education Act.⁹⁴ If one takes the Trade Unions Act as an example, it can be demonstrated that sensitive social and political domains are subject to autonomous executive control. For example, s.18(2) of this act provides that the decision of the Minister for Manpower is final on any decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions and not subject to review by the courts. Given that the registrar has powers to register or deregister unions at his own discretion, this provides the Ministry of Manpower, with the approval of its minister, with unfettered control over unions.⁹⁵ This is the basis of what Chan termed the "administrative state", allowing as it does, in association with a depoliticised or hegemonised populace, almost unfettered executive and bureaucratic autonomy in the governing of the nation.⁹⁶

Other controls also exist. For example, the Judges Remuneration Act 1994, provides for the salaries of judges of the Supreme Court to be paid at the discretion of the Minister of Finance, not by the parliament nor an independent tribunal. There is no avenue for appeal against a determination by the minister, although the constitution protects remuneration insofar as, a judge's conditions of service cannot be changed to his detriment following appointment.⁹⁷ There is also no requirement that salaries or other

conciliation office for minor industrial disputes. However, disputes relating to collective bargaining are referred to the Industrial Arbitration Court under ss.42-43, but the decisions of this court cannot be appealed to a higher court.

⁹⁰ Under s.14(8) of this act, the decision of the Minister for Manpower in respect to an alleged wrongful dismissal is final and cannot be challenged in the courts.

⁹¹ For example, s.27 of the Government Proceedings Act, prohibits a court from granting an injunction against the government. For an example of the use of this provision, see: *Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd and Others v The Attorney-General- High Court, Goh J*, 14 August 1994 in which the Attorney-General successfully argued that the Singapore International Arbitration Centre and the courts, could not place an injunction on the Public Works Department to restrain it from access to a contract bond. See: "Case Briefs", *Singapore Arbitrator*. January 1995, pp. 8-11

⁹² Under s.3(1)(g) of the Passports Act (and by Passports Regulation 15(1)(a) the Controller of Immigration can cancel and impound a passport at his discretion. Appeals against such an action only lie to the Minister for Home Affairs whose decision is not reviewable by a court.

⁹³ Under the Income Tax Act, appeals against taxation assessments lie with the Income Tax Board of Review, not a court. This tribunal is usually chaired by a subordinate court judge. The Comptroller of Income Tax has, however, other unreviewable powers under this act. For example, under s.87 the Comptroller of Income Tax can direct police and immigration officials to stop a person leaving the country if that person has unpaid taxes or is, in the opinion of the Comptroller, liable to make payment. Appeals to this power lie to the Minister of Finance and may not be reviewed by a court.

⁹⁴ e.g. s.60(3)

⁹⁵ There are multiple and overlapping provisions for the registrar to register or deregister unions. The most generic provision for deregistration is found in s.15(5) by which the registrar may withdraw or cancel the registration of any union "... which has failed to show cause ... or which, having shown cause, has failed to satisfy him." Registration provisions are found in ss. 10 and 14, but even if applicant unions meet the few criteria for registration, the registrar is not compelled to register them. Similarly, under s.15, although a trade union may breach the act and be liable for deregistration, the registrar is not obliged to deregister the union.

⁹⁶ Chan Heng Chee, "Politics in an Administrative State: Where Has the Politics Gone?", in, Seah Chee Meow, ed., *Trends in Singapore*. Singapore, ISEAS, 1975, pp. 51-68. In a later article, Chan attempts, unsuccessfully I think, to differentiate between her concept of an 'administrative state' and Riggs' 'bureaucratic polity'. See: Chan Heng Chee, "The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System", in, Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*. Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 70-89, p. 78

⁹⁷ Of course, any constitutional provision can be easily changed by the parliament in the form and composition it has had since 1963, so such guarantees are qualified.

components of a remuneration package be uniform.⁹⁸ In 1997 it was reported that the remuneration of judges comprised salary, provision of a prestigious motor vehicle,⁹⁹ government accommodation (or the payment of a housing allowance in lieu of) and other benefits which would include a 13th month additional salary payment and performance bonuses of a minimum of three months salary and a maximum of nine month's.¹⁰⁰ A summary of estimated benefits is provided in Table 5.6. The amounts calculated in this table are in marked contrast to the annual pensionable salaries of judges which were set in 1995 at \$347,400 for the Chief Justice, \$253,200 for the Judges of Appeal and \$234,600 for other judges and judicial commissioners.¹⁰¹ This level of remuneration is a strong incentive for judges to both resist monetary corruption and to conform to the executive will, but is equally a necessary strategy for recruiting talented lawyers to the bench. It would be unfair, however, to view this level of remuneration as excessive in the context of the income of senior practitioners in Singapore's legal profession. It is probable that partners in the larger law firms such as Drew and Napier and Allen and Gledhill as well as partners in medium size firms such as Harry Elias and Partners and David Lim and Partners¹⁰² achieve, in most years, income well in excess of \$1 million, with senior partners and Senior Counsel probably double this amount. Given that a comfortable, not extravagant, family home in a good neighbourhood would cost approximately \$5 million in 1997, judicial salaries are undoubtedly good, but not grossly excessive in comparison to the private sector. Neither could one say that they are excessive in respect of remuneration for senior lawyers in Australia,¹⁰³ the United Kingdom and the United States, although they are vastly superior to judges salaries in these jurisdictions. To address this issue equitably,

⁹⁸ This includes entitlements such as travel, supply of a motor vehicle, medical insurance payments, supplementary income such as bonuses and variable allowances, pension entitlements, access to government holiday houses, among others. See: *Sunday Times*, 21 July 1996

⁹⁹ Judges receive a government provided Mercedes Benz or similar luxury vehicle. On visits to the courts and clubs frequented by judges, the author sought out these vehicles all of which have a special number-plate beginning with the letter J and a number (the Chief Justice's is J1) and was able to verify the provision of these vehicles. Government officials refused to provide information on salaries and remuneration components and the Prime Minister's office will admit to only having a fleet of six state vehicles, despite many senior public servants being provided with government vehicles fitted with the special Q series number plates. Q stands for 'quartermaster', yet another colonial hang-over.

¹⁰⁰ Francis T. Seow, *The politics of judicial institutions in Singapore*, 1997, p. 1. Available at: <http://singapore-window.org/1028judi.htm>, 1 March 1999, pp.4-5

¹⁰¹ The pensionable salary is that portion of the total remuneration package which is guaranteed and cannot change. It forms the basis upon which the judges' public service pensions are calculated. See: *Judges Remuneration (Annual Pensionable Salary) Order S331/94*

¹⁰² In March 1999, Drew and Napier and Allen and Gledhill were Singapore's two largest law firms. Drew and Napier employed 170 lawyers and had 47 partners. Allen and Gledhill had 149 lawyers and 48 partners. Harry Elias and Partners had 36 lawyers and 16 partners and David Lim and Partners had 17 lawyers and 8 partners. See: *The largest firms*. Available at: <http://www.worldlegalforum.co.uk/Asia&Africa/Singapore/Surveys>

¹⁰³ For Australia see: Andrew Burrell, "Lawyers notch up record year for income increases", *The Australian Financial Review*, 28 July 1999, p. 3. This reported total remuneration for senior lawyers as ranging from \$A1.2 million to \$550,000. For the United Kingdom see: "One in 4 QCs earn over £1/4 million", *The Guardian*, 5 July 1999. This report, which did not include the top 25 per cent of earners, revealed that one-quarter of Queen's Counsels had gross incomes in excess of £346,000. For the United States see: Margaret Cronin Fisk, "Most lawyers benefit from boom", *The National Law Journal*, 1999. Available at: http://www.nlj.com/1999/get_paid_0614/index.html. In this report, the remuneration of general counsel of large corporations ranged from \$US297,000 to \$US3,110,000 with an average income from selected companies of \$US1,038,516.

one must ask whether Singaporean judges are paid too much or those in other jurisdictions too little and, in association with this, whether there should be a connection between judicial salaries and the salaries of senior lawyers in the private sectors. These are issues which cannot be addressed here, but it is fair to observe that Singapore has aligned salaries in all branches of government with the private sector in a way that is far more equitable than other comparable jurisdictions. The important question from a public policy and public management perspective is whether this strategy provides better government and better public administration? In addition to remuneration, the working conditions of judges has also been greatly improved providing a lifestyle that may be more attractive than private practice for some senior lawyers. For example, due to the automation of all court business procedures supreme court judges rarely have to take work home and the work day usually finishes at 6 pm.¹⁰⁴ This is in marked contrast to the private sector.

Table 5.6: Estimated Remuneration of Singaporean Judges 1997

Rank of Judge	Base Monthly Salary	Base Annual Salary ¹⁰⁵	Potential Perform. Bonus ¹⁰⁶	Potential Employer CPF ¹⁰⁷	Additional Benefits ¹⁰⁸	Minimum Potential Salary ¹⁰⁹	Maximum Potential Salary
Judge Chief Justice	\$68,340	\$630,000	\$615,060	\$249,000	\$96,000	\$934,008	\$1,590,060
	\$105,000	\$1,260,000	\$945,000	\$441,000	\$96,000	\$1,734,000	\$2,742,000

The most basic level of control over the courts is, however, the executive's ability to control the points of entry of cases to the judicial system through the police and the public prosecutors. If a public prosecutor or a police officer of inspector level and above chooses not to refer a case for prosecution, then it remains out of the jurisdiction of the courts and under executive discretion. There have been several recent cases where this has happened involving political issues, one of which is examined below.

During the 1997 elections, the prime minister and the two deputy prime ministers, Lee Hsien Loong and Tony Tan, entered polling booths in the Cheng San, Bukit Gombak and McPherson constituencies, where none were candidates, without the prior permission of the electoral officers in charge of the booths. This was clearly in contravention of section 39(4) of the Parliamentary Elections Act and a complaint was

¹⁰⁴ As reported in an interview with Jaya Prakash, husband of Justice Judith Prakash. See:

¹⁰⁵ Includes 13th month payment as for the civil service.

¹⁰⁶ Minimum performance bonus is three months salary; the maximum is assumed to be nine months as this is equivalent to the upper echelons of the Administrative Service.

¹⁰⁷ Normal CPF contribution is 20% of salary plus bonuses.

¹⁰⁸ Based on the conservative pricing of housing at \$3,000 per month and vehicle rental of an E class Mercedes Benz saloon at \$5,000 per month; a total of \$96,000 per year. This does not include the cost of providing the Chief Justice with a chauffeur, entertainment expenses or a residence or housing allowance greater than that provided to other judges of the Supreme Court.

¹⁰⁹ This includes: base annual salary + one month's performance bonus + 20% employer CPF payment based on 13 month's salary + the additional benefits listed in the table. This is the absolute minimum that could be paid, except in those cases where the government reduces all CPF contributions nationally.

subsequently lodged with the police by the opposition Workers Party.¹¹⁰ Rather than initiate an investigation of the prime minister and deputy prime ministers, the police requested a clarification of the provisions of the Parliamentary Elections Act.

The advice provided by the Attorney-General, himself a member of the executive, was an exercise in both intellectual arrogance and incredulity. In essence the government's chief legal adviser used geometrical principles to argue that; (1) the act prohibits unauthorised persons from being within 200 metres of a polling station; (2) the centre of the 200 metres circular prohibited area is the polling station itself; (3) therefore the area of the polling station cannot be considered as part of the 200 metre circular prohibited area; (4) because the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers were inside the polling stations themselves, i.e. the neutral centre of the prohibited area, they could not be in contravention of the act as they were not within 200 metres of the polling station but in the station itself. This explanation was even accompanied by appropriate geometric diagrams. Apparently the alleged miscreants used top secret MINDEF technology and beamed into the polling stations Star Trek style, thus not crossing the 200 metre perimeter!

The Attorney-General then chose to cite the Elias Report¹¹¹ on which the relevant legislation was based, but in doing so chose to ignore the report's intentions in respect of these provisions (removing "undue influence or harassment" in the vicinity of polling stations) and instead focussed on the report's technical examples of how such intentions might be avoided; not allowing the establishment of any "desk or table near the entrance to any polling station".¹¹² This interpretation was provided, even though the police had been directed on polling day to question Chee Soon Juan, Secretary-General of the opposition SDP, as to whether he had contravened the same legislation by canvassing for votes at a polling booth, while casting his vote in the constituency in which he was standing.¹¹³ The Attorney-General's explanation was rejected by both the Worker's Party and the Singapore Democratic Party.¹¹⁴ One of the interesting associated outcomes of this conflict was a statement by Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee during parliamentary debate, rejecting the Attorney-General as being a member of the executive, and asserting that this office provides independent advice to the executive, despite the office being created in Chapter Two of the constitution which

¹¹⁰ "Please explain: Worker's Party call to public prosecutor", *Straits Times*, 15 July 1997

¹¹¹ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Corrupt, Illegal or Undesirable Practices at Elections*, Singapore Parliament, Cmd 7 of 1968

¹¹² Letter from the Attorney-General to Professor S. Jayakumar, Minister for Law, dated 21 July 1997. Available at <http://www.singapore-window.org/ag0721.htm>, 2 January 1999

¹¹³ "Unauthorised persons inside polling stations: SDP's response", letter from Chee Soon Juan, Secretary-General, Singapore Democratic Party to the Attorney-General, 12 August 1997. Available: <http://www.singapore-window.org/sdp0812.htm>, 14 March 1998

¹¹⁴ "Unauthorised persons inside polling stations: SDP's response", letter from Chee Soon Juan, Secretary-General, Singapore Democratic Party to the Attorney-General, 12 August 1997. Available: <http://www.singapore-window.org/sdp0812.htm>, 14 March 1998

establishes the executive.¹¹⁵ There is not necessarily a conflict in these roles as long as the independence of the judiciary is genuinely guaranteed and respected, as it is in Britain, although this is done more by convention and political culture than by stronger constitutional guarantees. In this jurisdiction, the Lord Chancellor is not only the head of the judicial branch of government, he is a member of the cabinet and can sit on cases as a Lord of Appeal as president of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords.¹¹⁶ Additionally, the highest court of appeal, the Privy Council, forms part of the legislature. In these ways, the doctrine of the separation of powers is compromised in the United Kingdom, but it is a compromise guarded by powerful conventions, the breaking of which would force major changes in the political system.

Although the political executive has consistently denied that it interferes in the operations of the judiciary,¹¹⁷ and recently even a judge has been forced to deny it,¹¹⁸ it cannot hide the judgements of its judges from public scrutiny. The issue is not whether, over dinner in the restaurant at the Academy of Law, ministers and civil servants may attempt to steer judges towards a particular outcome in a particular case. No knowledgeable analyst believes, as Justice Rajarendran states in his refutation of executive interference in the courts, that "private directives to the judge from the executive" are provided to Singaporean judges; this assumes a gullible naivete on both the part of the PAP and critics of the Singapore justice system.¹¹⁹ Judges are appointed in Singapore on the same basis that they are in all jurisdictions; because the political executive is certain that, in having appointed them, they will maintain and preserve the existing system. If any judge lacks the intelligence and perception to understand this and thus requires direct instruction of how to behave in political trials, it is obviously a poor appointment and would be quickly overturned; the Singaporean political executive makes few mistakes of this kind. Such appointments are not made to the Supreme Court bench and, given the scope of executive power, are easily remedied by the removal of the offending judge.

¹¹⁵ *Singapore Parliamentary Reports*, 68,, 14 January 1998, col.86

¹¹⁶ Lord Irvine of Lairg The Lord Chancellor, *Speech to the Third Worldwide Common law Judiciary Conference, 5 July 1999*. Available at: <http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/speeches/1999/5-7-99.html>. See also: Marcel Berlins, "Writ Large", *The Guardian*, 6 July 1999, in which Berlins raises the issues of conflict of interest in the Lord Chancellor sitting on appeals as a Law Lord.

¹¹⁷ For recent examples see: "Libel laws here 'cannot ape others', *Straits Times*, 27 November 1998; "Singapore regrets US human rights report", *Reuters*, 20 April 1998; "Amnesty engaging in 'propaganda campaign' ", *Straits Times*, 14 October 1997

¹¹⁸ Justice Rajendran was forced to release a statement to the press following the Tang Liang Hong and Jeyaratnam trials in 1997. This in itself is unusual and demonstrates the pressure being brought to bear on the Supreme Court by it's failure to separate political action by the PAP from the national interest. See: "S'pore judiciary is open: Justice Rajendran", *Straits Times*. 30 September 1997

¹¹⁹ A political role is played within the Supreme Court and the Subordinate Courts by their respective registrars. Those appointed to these positions are responsible for assigning judges to each case and therefore require a particular sensitivity to the political implications, if any, of cases. The Registrars are aware (as is most of the Singaporean middle class and all of the legal profession) which judges are most sympathetic to the PAP, thus making choices rather obvious. The Chief Justice and the Senior District Judge respectively approve the roster of cases proposed by the registrars in the Supreme Court and Subordinate Courts respectively and so also play a political role in the allocation of cases to what are called 'reliable' judges.

The Achilles heel of the Singaporean judiciary in political cases is not executive instructions piped by email from the lofty heights of the Alpha domain¹²⁰ of GEMS (the civil service electronic messaging system); it is the judgements of the learned judges themselves. While pristine in their commercial judgements, in political cases they condemn themselves out of their own mouths and through their court procedures. It is this which provides clear evidence of the intellectual games which some judges are forced to play in order to meet the political outcomes required of the executive; not according to instruction, but according to convention and political culture. If judgements claimed by critics to be politically motivated are assessed according to criteria used by judges in other common law jurisdictions; that is by the same standards which Singaporean judges claim they are applying, they consistently fail the test.

The basis of the extensive criticism of the Singaporean judiciary by judicial bodies, which has grown in magnitude over the past 20 years, has not (at least originally) been based on any particular antipathy towards the PAP. It has been based on disbelief that a judicial system can perform so consistently within the principles of English law on most matters, and then betray these principles without protest in political cases, as evidenced in recorded judgements.¹²¹ The Singapore government focuses its misinformation campaign in defence of the judiciary at international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch, or asserts that the most damning criticisms, those by other judicial institutions which have based their attacks principally on the actual performance of judges and the management of cases, are based on wrong legal interpretation.¹²² The Bar Association of the City of New York, the International Commission of Jurists in Canada, Australia and its international office in Geneva, the Privy Council and eminent internationally renowned senior counsel such as John Platts-Mill QC, Frank Galbally QC,¹²³ Anthony Lester QC,¹²⁴ Geoffrey

¹²⁰ The Alpha domain is the restricted area within the Government Information Infrastructure within which the Administrative Service, ministers and senior armed forces and security officers communicate and share documents and discussion groups. Within this domain all participants have a secret email identification that is not published except within the domain, thus restricting access and allowing identification of domain originated messages. The existence of the domain itself is also supposed to be restricted.

¹²¹ For example, in Justice Rajendran's judgement in the case of Goh Chok Tong vs J. B. Jeyaratnam heard from 8-12 August 1997, the ICJ observer, Canadian Judge Paul Bentley commented on the logic of the judgement: "The logic escapes me! Rajendran indicated that he was adopting the reasoning of the English House of Lords in Rubber Improvements Ltd. v Daily Telegraph Ltd ... as the correct interpretation of the law of defamation ... On this reasoning, Jeyaratnam's words to the crowd could not be defamatory. Yet the conclusion of Judge Rajendran runs in clear opposition to the ration in the "Lewis" case."

¹²² The Singapore government did publicly respond to the report to the International Commission of Jurists by Stuart Littlemore on Justice Rajendran's trial of J. B. Jeyaratnam in 1997. See: "Jurists' body claims S'pore court compliant", *Straits Times*, 3 October 1997. Arguments by the Ministry of Law that only its lawyers have the capacity to properly interpret Singaporean law is typical of the intellectual arrogance and lack of genuine international experience of most of Singapore's governing elite.

¹²³ Galbally, observing the trial of student activist Tan Wah Piow in the court of Justice T. S. Sinnathuray, commented that: "In Australia, the case would be laughed out of court ... the evidence and procedure ... would, in my opinion, have aborted any trial in Australia ... In my opinion, it is just a political trial." See: Francis Seow, *The politics of judicial institutions in Singapore*, p. 5-6 Available at: <http://www.singapore-window.org/1028judi.html>

Robertson QC,¹²⁵ George Carmen QC, Judge Paul Bentley,¹²⁶ and Stuart Littlemore QC¹²⁷ have all criticised judgements in political cases in Singapore, not on the basis of political belief, but according to the established legal principles of common law nations, the same standards Singapore professes to follow. It is equally telling that, although Lee Kuan Yew and other PAP leaders have retained British QCs for their cases, none of these has gone to print to defend the Singaporean judiciary in these controversial cases. In particular, the use of the law of defamation to silence critics by bankrupting them, or in the case of the opposition Workers' Party to wind it up,¹²⁸ also indicates collusion between banks in Singapore, the executive and certain judicial officers. The political leadership has demonstrated its ability to obtain financial information on whomsoever it pleases, from all local trading banks, either under the ISA, the Securities Industry Act, the Banking Act or the Companies Act.¹²⁹ The government has been less successful in obtaining information on the assets of those accused in political cases, except for Malaysia and Hong Kong.¹³⁰ The unusual nature of this use of defamation law to suppress political opposition was even acknowledged by the Attorney-General of Singapore as justification for defamation action being taken against academic Christopher Lingle in 1994.¹³¹ Thus we are also presented with

¹²⁴ Lester represented Teo Soh Lung, one of the accused in the Marxist conspiracy case and was banned from continuing his representation and from ever practising in Singapore during the course of the case. Lester was obviously too formidable an opponent for those hearing these cases. Lester commented that his debarment in Singapore was due to "a combination of half-truth, breach of confidence and pure fiction." On the part of the government. See: Bernard Levin, "An all-consuming spite", *The Times*, 10 April 1989

¹²⁵ See: Geoffrey Robertson, *The Justice Game*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1998, pp. 229-240

¹²⁶ Judge Bentley is a judge of the Intro Provincial Court in Canada. See: Judge Paul Bentley, "The Politics of Defamation in Singapore, *The Provincial Judges Journal*, Autumn, 1997. Available: <http://www.singapore-window.org/80217can.htm>

¹²⁷ Stuart Littlemore, *Report to the International Commission of Jurists Geneva, Switzerland, on a Defamation Trial in the High Court of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong vs J. B. Jeyaratnam August 18-22*. Available at: <http://www.singapore-window.org/igjprep.htm>, 12 December 1998

¹²⁸ In a case decided in May 1999, the Appeals Court upheld a defamation action against the Workers' Party which will lead to it being wound-up as the party has insufficient funds to pay the damages awarded. If the party ceases to exist, its parliamentary members will also lose their seats, thus leaving only one opposition MP in the parliament. See: *Agence France-Presse*, "Workers' party faces closure after losing damages appeal". Available at: <http://www.singapore-window.org/sw99/90520afp.html>

¹²⁹ For example, the pressure applied by the government on Francis Seow's bankers to withdraw his business line of credit and foreclose on loans. See: Francis T. Seow, *To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison*, New Haven, Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, pp. 59-60. Such financial information can be obtained by either the ISD or the CAD, or, as in Seow's case by a direct request from the prime minister.

¹³⁰ While Francis Seow's Malaysian and Hong Kong bank details were provided to the government, Tang Liang Hong refused to divulge his offshore assets and no nation has so far volunteered to assist the Singapore government find them, despite the Singapore courts issuing a Mareva injunction against Tang to freeze all his assets which should be honoured in all countries. Details of Tang's Malaysian holdings were readily provided to the Singaporean authorities. One can only assume that some reciprocal arrangement exists between the two government in respect of the assets of opposition political figures, abetted by the fact that Malaysian banks value their Singaporean business too much to have a dispute with the Singaporean government. See: Santha Poorjitham, "The Ruling Party vs Tang", *Asiaweek*, 28 February 1997

¹³¹ Lingle had, in a op ed piece for the *International Herald Tribune*, commented that one of the methods for suppressing dissent in Singapore included "relying upon a compliant judiciary to bankrupt opposition politicians." Although Lingle did not mention Singapore by name, Chan Sek Keong, the Attorney-General, in justifying libel charges against Lingle, pointed out that from 1971-1993, 11 opposition politicians had been bankrupted through actions brought against them by PAP politicians and that this had only happened in Singapore. Therefore, Lingle must have meant Singapore. The Attorney-General was forced to demonstrate that only in Singapore could a "compliant judiciary" possibly exist in order to press charges against Lingle. See: Warren Fernandez, "Judge: Enough Evidence for a Case Against Lingle, Four Others.", *Straits Times*, 26 December 1994, p. 2.

another irrefutable record of the courts inconsistencies in defamation cases, the quantum of damages as shown in Table 5.7 below.

Table 5.7: Comparison of Damages Awarded in Political and Non-Political Defamation Cases in Singapore 1959-1997¹³²

Year	Actions by PAP Politicians	Damages Awarded	Year	Actions by Non Politicians	Damages Awarded
1999	R. Ravindram MP	\$265,000			
1997	S. Jayakumar, S. Vasoo, K. Shanmugam and R. Sinnakaruppan and Chandra Das vs. The Worker's Party and 12 of its leaders.	\$200,000 and rights to greater damages waived by claimants. ¹³³			
1997	Various PAP Cabinet ministers vs. Tang Liang Hong	\$5.825 million	1996	Company - imputation of incompetence	\$20,000
1996	Lee Kuan Yew & Lee Hsien Loong vs. Tang Liang Hong	\$1.05 million	1995	Importer - imputation of bogus goods	\$100,000
1994	Lee Kuan Yew vs. International Herald Tribune	\$400,000	1994	Bank - imputation of negligence	\$50,000
1990	Lee Kuan Yew, Lee Hsien Loong and Goh Chok Tong vs. International Herald Tribune	\$650,000	1992	Architect - imputation of unethical conduct	\$45,000
1989	Lee Kuan Yew vs. J. B. Jeyaratnam	\$230,000	1992	Architect - imputation of fraud	\$60,000
1988	Lee Kuan Yew vs. Seow Khee Leng	\$250,000	1981	Lawyer - imputation of dishonesty	\$25,000
1979	Lee Kuan Yew vs. J. B. Jeyaratnam	\$130,000	1969	Lawyer - imputation of insolvency	\$7,350

The acts of intellectual desperation which must be resorted to by some judicial officers only serves to demonstrate that the political executive has chosen to jettison key aspects of the Westminster conventions and selectively disregard the rule of law for political gain. Such behaviour points to both the extraordinary degree of autonomy enjoyed by the political and civil service executives and the high degree of instability inherent in the PAP's structuring of power relations in Singaporean society. A highly stable political system does not require the institutionalisation of political and judicial

¹³² Except for that separately noted, data was provided by the registrar of the Supreme Court to Stuart Littlemore in 1997 and included in: Stuart Littlemore, *Report to the International Commission of Jurists Geneva, Switzerland, on a Defamation Trial in the High Court of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong vs J. B. Jeyaratnam August 18-22*. Available at: <http://www.singapore-window.org/icj/brep.htm>, 12 December 1998. All figures are in Singapore dollars. 1999 data added by the author from: Agence France-Press, "Workers' Party faces closure after losing damages appeal". Available at: <http://www.singapore-window.org/sw99/90520afp.html>

¹³³ "WP and a MP: 12members to pay \$200,000 for defaming MPs", *Straits Times*, 9 September, 1997. In this case, a bargain was struck in which the defendants admitted liability and agreed to publish apologies in the press and the claimants agreed to forego a more substantial damages claim.

deceit. The signing of declarations, such as the *Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary*, does nothing to remedy the lack of judicial independence in Singapore. As the statement was signed by the Chief Justice, not a minister and is not supported by Singapore legislation, it has no power.¹³⁴ More importantly, however, it simply conflicts with Singaporean power arrangements as evidenced by Winslow's comment that within the Singaporean legal environment¹³⁵ "Judges and the legal profession think in terms more of concepts like the Rule of Law than of constitutional supremacy, independence of the judiciary, and of rules of natural justice rather than judicial review."¹³⁶

In assessing the role of the judicial branch in maintaining unfettered executive power in Singapore, care must be taken to ensure that the institutional arrangements and the political role of certain judicial officers do not indict all the judiciary and that the power of the court is not equated with unidirectional power arrangements which favour the executive. The political executive needs, in particular, a supreme court which is seen as, and is capable of, maintaining the confidence of the international business community in commercial litigation. This provides the bench with some power vis a vis the political executive, but it is a power that must be carefully exercised. For example, even under Lee Kuan Yew's administration, the Chief Justice's opinion on the recruitment of judges and how they were appointed placed at least some constraints on the prime minister.¹³⁷ The present chief justice is an even more formidable character than the first and his control of the judiciary and power vis a vis the political executive seems to be uniformly accepted as is his support of that executive's political and policy strategies. Indeed, this alignment of judicial and political interests was explicitly endorsed by the courts in 1989 in the judgement of the Court of Appeal in the case of *Dow Jones (Asia) Inc. v The Attorney-General*:

The Court rejected the trial judge's definition that engaging in domestic politics is a matter for the Minister and not the courts to decide. However, it also rejected the argument that the meaning should be restricted to involvement in electoral processes and espousal or editorial support for a political party.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ See: "Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the Lawasia Region", *CJIL Yearbook*, March 1998, pp. 110-121. The International Commission of Jurist's Centre for the Independence of Judges and lawyers, criticised many of the provisions in the agreement. See: "CJIL Observations on the 1995 Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary", *CJIL Yearbook*, March 1998, pp. 123-128

¹³⁵ Valentine S. Winslow, "The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore", in Lawrence W. Beer, ed. *Constitutional Systems in Late Twentieth Century Asia*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1992, pp. 627-655. Winslow is an Associate Professor of Law at the NUS Faculty of Law and a former judge of the supreme court.

¹³⁶ Valentine S. Winslow, "The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore", in Lawrence W. Beer, ed. *Constitutional Systems in Late Twentieth Century Asia*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1992, pp. 627-655, p. 649.

¹³⁷ In an interview which included his recruitment to the Supreme Court, Justice Karthigesu noted that although he told the prime minister (Lee Kuan Yew) that he would prefer an initial appointment as a judge of the supreme court, Lee commented that the then Chief Justice would not accept that and he could only offer him a judicial commissioner's appointment until a new Chief Justice was appointed. See: "In Conversation: An Interview with the Honourable Justice of Appeal M Karthigesu", *Singapore Law Review*, 16, 1995, pp. 1-13, p. 10

¹³⁸ *Malayan Law Journal*, 1989, 2, p. 396

Some informants were of the opinion that several of the recent appointees to the supreme court bench only accepted appointment on condition that they were not to be involved in political trials. There exists within the Supreme Court judiciary since 1991, a group of judicial commissioners and judges who do not participate in political trials. This is the group appointed as 'technical judges'; a group absolutely necessary to maintaining Singapore's reputation for a quality legal system in commercial and business related law. The superior judiciary can therefore be divided into those "dependable" judges allocated political cases and those who are not. In the past, the superior judiciary could be counted on almost to a man¹³⁹ to support the executive; Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin, Justices Choor Singh, Tan Ah Tah, T. Kulasekaram, A. Wahab Ghows, T. S. Sinnathuray, Lai Kew Chai, L. P. Thean,¹⁴⁰ F. A. Chua, Chan Sek Keong, A. P. Rajah and Punch Coomaraswamy, many of whom were elevated from the civil service¹⁴¹ and some from the parliament and were PAP cadres before elevation to the bench. Although some of this older group, such as A. V. Winslow were not thought of as entirely dependable by Lee Kuan Yew,¹⁴² there were no obvious opponents of the executive among this group. Of them, only Lai and Thean remain on the bench and both are in their seventies. The 'political' judges most clearly now include; Chief Justice Yong,¹⁴³ the two permanent Judges of Appeal,¹⁴⁴ and Justices Lai Kew Chai, Goh Joon Seng, S. Rajendran, Chao Hick Tin and G. P. Selvam.¹⁴⁵ Of these judges, Yong, Kathigesu,¹⁴⁶ Lai and Thean, all in their mid-70's belong to the PAP Old Guard generation with Yong a personal friend of Lee Kuan Yew's,¹⁴⁷ Lai being a former senior partner in Lee and Lee¹⁴⁸ and a personal friend of Lee Kuan Yew and his wife Kwa Geok Choo, Chao,¹⁴⁹ and Rajendran¹⁵⁰ were loyal recruits from the Attorney-General's

¹³⁹ This should be taken literally; there were no women judges prior to 1991.

¹⁴⁰ Justice Thean was at one time in the same firm as Chief Justice Yong; Shook, Lin and Bok.

¹⁴¹ Such as A. Wahab Ghows, former Solicitor-General, Punch Coomaraswamy, former Deputy Speaker of Parliament and Sinnathuray who's career was entirely within the Attorney-General's Chambers and as a District Court Judge prior to his elevation to the Supreme Court.

¹⁴² A. V. Winslow was eventually moved to the Law Faculty at NUS and given an academic position, although he had made no judgements that obviously opposed the government.

¹⁴³ Although the Chief Justice has a clear responsibility for supporting the PAP regime, he does not directly become involved in political cases, but works with the registrar of the Supreme Court to ensure their effective management by judges willing to accept political cases.

¹⁴⁴ Justice Mootatamby Kathigesu and Justice L. P. Thean. The third judge required to comprise the court of appeal, which may make majority decisions, is selected from among the other Supreme Court judges.

¹⁴⁵ All of these, except the Chief Justice, have been over trials involving J. B. Jeyaratnam and Tang Liang Hong and other Workers Party members in recent years.

¹⁴⁶ Kathigesu was a colonial district judge, a partner in two large Singaporean law firms; Allen and Gledhill and Rodyk and Davidson, and for a long period an arbitrator in Regional Centre for Arbitration in Kuala Lumpur. He has had several affiliations with the PAP government; member of the Income Tax Board of Review, Judge-Advocate of the Military Court of Appeal, chairman of the Hindu Advisory Board and a member of the Senate of the Academy of Law.

¹⁴⁷ They studied together in Cambridge and maintained contact after Yong returned to Kuala Lumpur where he practised for many years before moving to Singapore.

¹⁴⁸ The law firm founded by Lee Kuan Yew and his brother and in which his wife Kwa Geok Choo also worked. Kwa was retained as a consultant to the firm until recently. Goh Chok Tong's wife is also a partner in Lee and Lee.

¹⁴⁹ Chao Hick Tin, a graduate of the University of London, prior to his judicial appointment was Head, Civil Section, Attorney-general's Chambers, State Counsel and Deputy Senior State Counsel. He has also held positions as director of the Post Office Savings Bank, Sembawang Group and the Export Credit Insurance Corporation. He was awarded the Public Service Medal in 1976 and the Public Service Star in 1984. It is assumed that he is a PAP cadre.

Chambers and Selvam was a senior partner in Drew and Napier,¹⁵¹ a strong pro-PAP firm which often acts for the Lees and Goh Chok Tong, and believed to be a PAP cadre.

While this is a useful and necessary distinction between the judges of the supreme court, it should also be noted that most of the judges recently appointed because of their assured political support are also perceived as experts in particular areas; for example, Selvam is an acknowledged expert in maritime law.¹⁵² These are not just political appointees, but proficient senior lawyers.

The Executive and the Legal Profession

Within the Westminster conception of the judiciary as the third branch of government, the legal profession plays a special role as all solicitors and barristers are deemed to be officers of the Supreme Court or the equivalent court of registration for lawyers. The legal profession therefore has a privileged relationship with the judiciary and through this, a relationship with the legislature that is unimpeded by the formal restrictions placed on the judiciary, principally by convention. The legal profession therefore frequently comments on legislation, advises on its drafting, can act as a sounding board for executive policy proposals and may act to defend or protect the judiciary from what is seen to be unfair criticism in general or assault from either of the other two branches of government. In Singapore, this role has been gradually diminished as the profession has become more and more regulated. Two statutory bodies, the Singapore Academy of Law and the Board of Legal Education as well as the Law Society of Singapore which is subject to political participation controls under the Legal Profession Act, similar to those imposed by the Societies Act on all other social organisations in Singapore, are the profession's regulatory bodies.

The Law Society has responsibility for partially regulating the legal profession and represents practising lawyers, but not the judiciary and legal academics. From at least 1977 until 1987 there had been tension between the government and the Law Society based on a perception by the government that the society was too critical of the legal infrastructure developed to support the government's social and political control objectives: a conflict between a rule of law perspective by the society and the rule by law practices of the government. This tension had been exacerbated over this period by the society, or influential members of it, criticising the government in relation to

¹⁵⁰ Rajendran was a former State Counsel and Senior State Counsel in the Attorney-General's Chambers before leaving for the private sector and becoming a senior partner in Khattar, Wong and Partners from where he was called to the bench.

¹⁵¹ See: "SUP chief issues public apology", *Straits Times*, 22 December 1094, p. 18

¹⁵² This was one of Selvam's major areas in private practice. He has also published in this area, although not in recent years. See: G. P. Selvam, "Singapore: Some Recent Developments in Maritime and Admiralty Law", *Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly*, may 1985, pp. 209-216

foreign law firms¹⁵³, amendments to the penal code¹⁵⁴, executive interference in the administration of the courts¹⁵⁵, changes to the legislation regulating the legal profession¹⁵⁶ and culminated in the participation of the president of the Law Society in opposition politics.¹⁵⁷ On its part, the government has attacked the society for participating in politics, although its legislation until 1986 required it to comment on legislation, and of not defending the nation's legal system against foreign criticism.¹⁵⁸ During the hearings of the Select Committee on the Legal Profession Amendment) Bill in 1986, Lee Kuan Yew threatened the Law Society council members subpoenaed to appear, in stating:

It is my job as prime minister in charge of the government to put a stop to politicking in professional bodies. If you want to politick, come out ... You want to politick, you form your own party or join Mr. Jeyaratnam ... You think you can be smarter than the government and outsmart it, well, if you win, you form the government. If I win, we have a new Law Society. It is as simple as that.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵³ The government permitted foreign law firms to establish themselves in Singapore from 1980 and allowed domestic banks to employ foreign lawyers from 1981, against the objections of local law firms. See: Law Society of Singapore, *25Years: A Brief Retrospective*, Singapore, Law Society, 1995, sections D, E, and F. Available: <http://www.lawsoc.org.sg/about/history.html>

¹⁵⁴ Objections by a large number of Law Society members to changes in the Penal Code in 1984 that would impose mandatory jail sentences for certain offences upset the government. See: Law Society of Singapore, *25Years: A Brief Retrospective*, Singapore, Law Society, 1995, sections D, E, and F. Available: <http://www.lawsoc.org.sg/about/history.html>

¹⁵⁵ Allegations in 1986 by a Society member that the government had interfered in the Subordinate Courts judiciary resulting in a Commission of Inquiry by the government which was shadowed by a Society sub-committee. This was a particularly sensitive issue as the accusation was made in association with charges brought against opposition member J. B. Jeyaratnam. Senior District Judge Khoo, who had acquitted Jeyaratnam of fraud charges on appeal, had been transferred by the government from his judicial position to the Attorney-General's Chambers in August 1984, demonstrating the executive's absolute control over the judiciary. In early 1986, during parliamentary debate on amendments to the Subordinate Courts Act, to limit further the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts, Jeyaratnam raised the issue of whether Judge Kohl's transfer had been politically motivated. This issue was taken up by a young woman lawyer on the Council of the Law Society, Teo Soh Lung, who in 1988 was arrested under the ISA as one of a group of "Marxist conspirators" attempting to overthrow the state. In any matter involving J. B. Jeyaratnam, the long term personal enmity between he and Lee Kuan Yew should never be forgotten as a factor in the government's reaction.

¹⁵⁶ Disagreements with the government over changes to the Legal Profession Act in late 1986 to strengthen disciplinary proceedings undertaken by the Society resulting in a parliamentary select committee being established to examine the amendments and the subsequent establishment by the government, with minimal prior consultation with the Society, of the Singapore Academy of Law in 1988. This legislation provided for compulsory membership and financial contributions for all legal practitioners, removed the legal education responsibilities from the Law Society, gave non-lawyers eligibility for membership, and established an administrative structure for the Academy that gave the government substantial indirect control of it. This effectively made the Academy the Republic's major legal professional body. "The Singapore Law Academy: Will it hurt the legal fraternity?", *Straits Times*, 4 February 1996

¹⁵⁷ In 1986 when Francis Seow, President of the Society, publicly criticised through letters to the *Straits Times*, amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Act that would restrict the circulation of foreign publications, relations between the society and the government became very tense. This resulted in a continuing conflict that year between the society and the government as the government accused the society of involving itself in politics, despite the then provisions of the Society's legislation which required it to "... assist the Government and the Courts in all matters affecting legislation and the administration and practice of the laws of Singapore."¹⁵⁷ This was compounded by Seow's subsequently entering parliament as an opposition member and his eventual arrest by the government in May 1988 under the Internal Security Act and his subsequently seeking political asylum in the United States. See: Francis Seow, *To catch a Tartar*, ; and, Law Society of Singapore, *25Years: A Brief Retrospective*, Singapore, Law Society, 1995, sections D, E, and F. Available: <http://www.lawsoc.org.sg/about/history.html>

¹⁵⁸ The Attorney-General, Chan Sek Keong in November 1995, criticised the Law Society for not defending the Singaporean legal system against foreign criticism, although if it had done so, the society would have breached government warnings for it not to involve itself in politics. See: "The Singapore Law Academy: Will it hurt the legal fraternity?", *Straits Times*, 4 February 1996

¹⁵⁹ Cited in: Daniel Bell, "Dissent Reassuring", *Sunday Morning Post*, 11 July, 1999, p. 4

The Singapore Academy of Law, of which Lee Kuan Yew and his wife are members, a statutory body to control the entire legal profession, was subsequently set up in 1988 under the Singapore Academy of Law Act.¹⁶⁰ Members of the Academy comprise lawyers, judges, academics and persons interested in the law and the legal system in general, thus allowing membership by non-lawyers such as parliamentarians and businessmen. The statutory functions of the Academy include legal research, law reform and development, continuing legal education and examination of persons intending to practise law.¹⁶¹ In November 1995, the Singapore Academy of Law Act was amended to empower the Academy to undertake additional statutory functions¹⁶² which removed from the province of the Law Society any possibility of its being involved in political issues or advising in any substantive way on the development of the law. The province of the Law Society is the general administration of the practising legal profession, although even in this its powers are limited.¹⁶³ The Singapore Academy of Law Act effectively places the legal community's advising to government function under the control of government proxies. An examination of the membership of the Senate and major committees of the academy clearly demonstrates the degree of government control of the academy, exercised in this case through the judiciary and senior members of the PAP legal cadre cohort.

Table 5.8: Analysis of Membership of the Senate of the Singapore Academy of Law 1998¹⁶⁴

Member Category	Current judges	Current JCs*	Former judges or JCs	Academics	The Attorney-General	Law Society	Practitioners ¹⁶⁵	TOTAL
Number	14	6	2	2	1	2	5	32 ¹⁶⁶
Cumulative	63%	[19%]	[6%]	[6%]	[3%]	[6%]	[16%]	[100%]
ve			69%	75%	78%	84%	100%	

* Judicial Commissioner

¹⁶⁰ Singapore Academy of Law Act, Chapter 294A, Revised Edition 1989

¹⁶¹ The original statutory functions of the Academy of law were: to promote the advancement and dissemination of knowledge of the laws and the legal system; to promote legal research and scholarship and the reform and development of the law; to provide continuing legal education for its members; to provide for the training, education and examination by the Academy or by any other body, of persons intending to practise the profession of law; to provide the facilities for the social interaction of its members; to promote good relations and social interaction amongst members and between members and law students and persons concerned in the administration of law and justice in Singapore.

¹⁶² These additional functions were: to appoint persons as notaries public or commissioners for oaths and to authenticate their signatures; to undertake activities and projects relating to the study, development and operation of laws and legal systems and the facilities, information technology and infrastructure in support thereof. to provide consultancy and other services relating to the study, development and operation of laws and legal systems and the facilities, information technology and infrastructure in support thereof.

¹⁶³ For example, the Law Society's inquiry and disciplinary committees are not established by the Society itself, but rather by the Chief Justice.

¹⁶⁴ Available: http://www.sal.org.sg/a_salorg.html, 16 March 1999

¹⁶⁵ Two of the practitioner members are Senior Counsel (Giam Chin Toon SC and V. K. Rajah SC)

¹⁶⁶ Not including the secretary to the senate.

The chief justice is the president of the academy and chairman of the executive committee. The Attorney-General is a vice-president (of which there are five) and also sits on the executive committee. The other vice-presidents are the senior judge of the Court of Appeal, the dean of the Faculty of Law at NUS, the president of the Law Society and a former judicial commissioner and Senior Counsel, Joseph Grimberg who is seen as a reliable supporter of the PAP, if not a cadre. The executive committee of the Academy comprises the president, all five vice-presidents, the vice-president of the Law Society and two judges.

Currently, foreign law firms are prohibited from practising in Singapore even with a Singaporean partner, but may only establish themselves to advise clients on foreign or international law,¹⁶⁷ resulting in a local monopoly on legal advising on Singaporean law and representation in Singaporean courts. At the discretion of the courts, foreign lawyers can apply for temporary admission to represent clients as has occurred in several prominent defamation cases involving political figures.¹⁶⁸ In September 1997, the Minister for Law established a Legal Services Review Committee to advise of strategies for ensuring that the legal services sector could adequately support the policy push towards a services oriented economy. The committee's report was delivered in June 1999 and recommended two mechanisms for closer relationships between foreign and domestic law firms; joint ventures and formal alliances with an initial cap on five joint ventures.¹⁶⁹

This strategy was augmented by amendments to the Legal Profession Act in early 1993 which restricted the registration of lawyers in Singapore to graduates of certain designated universities. This was supposedly to maintain the quality of lawyers practising in Singapore, but appears to have been principally aimed at reducing the number of foreign trained lawyers entering the profession, as these, like Francis Seow, Chiam See Tong and others, had a propensity for non-conformity. There was also apparently a particular concern that those educated in Indian law schools were being corrupted by an Asian Westminster system that was a workable, if tarnished, democracy. The new rules restricted legal registration from 1 May 1993 to those enrolled at 15 English universities,¹⁷⁰ and after 1 January 1994, also those at nine selected universities in Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand and Canada.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ Barbara Leitch LePoer, *Singapore: Background and U.S. Policy Issues*, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 1995, p. 1

¹⁶⁸ For example, in the Barings fraud case, Nick Leeson was represented by British lawyer Stephen Pollard. See: "Nick Leeson". Available: <http://www.star.net/people/~cousy/pool98/dm/leeson.htm>, 4 November 1998. In the Tang Liang Hong defamation case, Mr. Tang has been represented by British Queen's Counsel Charles Gray. Available: <http://www.ozemail.com.au/~tanktalk/judgm.htm>, 4 November 1998. Similarly, veteran opposition figure J. B. Jeyaratnam has also been represented by British lawyers in the past.

¹⁶⁹ "Singapore swing suits lawyers", *Law Society Gazette*, 26 June 1999, p. 52

¹⁷⁰ All Scottish, Irish and Welsh universities were excluded, whereas previously all British law degrees had been recognised.

¹⁷¹ Legal Profession (Qualified Persons) Rules 1994

Students trained at these institutions also had to complete a Diploma in Singapore law at NUS after returning to Singapore so as to acclimatise them to the domestic legal environment. These rules restricted entry to the profession in two ways; by rejecting graduates of universities not included in the rules and by relying on the foreign universities to restrict the number of Singaporean students enrolled in their courses because of limited course places.

The political executive will also use more direct means to control lawyers when necessary, by directly damaging their income, assets or professional reputation by using administrative instruments. In 1976 a lawyer was imprisoned under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act for seeking a judicial review of the conviction of his client who was also being held under that act.¹⁷² It was also reported in one interview, that between 1995-97 following the International Herald Tribune (IHT) defamation case, local counsel for the IHT, Howard Cashin,¹⁷³ had all his property holdings except his family home forcibly acquired by the government under the Land Acquisition Act leading him to lose many hundreds of thousands of dollars in assets.¹⁷⁴ Cashin had previously been the target of executive wrath when he had acted as junior counsel for Geoffrey Robertson QC in a libel suit brought by Lee Kuan Yew against the *Far East Economic Review*. On the day the case commenced, Robertson reports that a loyal PAP member sued for divorce on the grounds that Cashin had committed adultery with his wife, with Lee Kuan Yew's press secretary handing out press releases on the allegations in the Supreme Court chambers.¹⁷⁵ It does not pay to carry out one's oath as a solicitor and barrister with too much vigour or inclusiveness in Singapore.

The development of legislation controlling the legal profession over the past 20 years has now provided the government with almost total control of the profession and has depoliticised it. The profession has no watchdog brief for monitoring the government's legislative program, although the Academy of Law provides advice to the government on request. However, as demonstrated above, it is firmly under the control of the executive through a proxy judiciary and members of the PAP legal cadre cohort. As was predicted in 1987, Singaporean lawyers have been "... reduced to the role of technicians who facilitate commercial transactions."¹⁷⁶

¹⁷² See: Christopher Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore*, London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 204

¹⁷³ Cashin is a senior partner in Lim Hua Yong and Co, a small law firm.

¹⁷⁴ Cashin's own house was reportedly also acquired but Cashin and his family have been allowed to remain in the house on a monthly rental basis. The obvious implication is that if Cashin crosses the political executive again, he will be forced to leave his family home.

¹⁷⁵ Geoffrey Robertson, *The Justice Game*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1998, p. 236. The person making the allegations is reported to have been William Cheng, a long time colleague of Lee Kuan Yew's. Cheng was a senior officer in Special Branch, the precursor to the Internal Security Department, before joining the mainstream civil service. He was Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education, 1963-1972, then executive chairman of the Central Provident Fund board 1973-1978. See: Lee Kuan Yew, "Mass Politics and Parliamentary Politics", *Petir*, 1, July 1978, pp. 2-21, p. 4

¹⁷⁶ Nancy Batterman and Eric Schwartz, *Silencing All Critics: Human Rights Violations in Singapore*, New York, Asia Watch, 1989, p. 2

This has not, however, produced a fully compliant legal profession, as signified by the incident at the ceremonial opening of the 1995 legal year where large numbers of lawyers hissed the Chief Justice as he extolled the virtues of his administrative reforms which had led to doubling the disposal of capital cases by removing virtually all protections for the accused.¹⁷⁷ Similarly, at a Law Academy function in 1998, large numbers of people talked and joked while the Attorney-general and the Chief Justice were giving speeches. The technicians have not completely forgotten the purposes of their profession.

CONCLUSIONS

The New York Bar Association has criticised what it sees as the decline of the rule of law in Singapore, including in its assessment not only social and political law, but also commercial law and stringent criticism of the Singaporean legal profession's capacity to adequately represent foreign companies in any dispute with the Government.¹⁷⁸ There is a perception, even amongst government officials in other Asian nations, such as Hong Kong, that in Singapore the government is above the law.¹⁷⁹ In terms of commercial law there is little, if anything, to fear however about litigating against the Singapore government. The New York Bar Association's report is severely deficient in understanding the way in which the Singapore government works with foreign firms, especially through its four principal industry boards; the EDB, TDB, PSA and the NSTB. The same control philosophy that works on the basis of "leave nothing to chance" that has produced severe distortions in the social and political aspects of the constitutional and legal framework, have led to very sophisticated business relationship practices between government agencies and foreign firms, and increasingly, domestic companies. These practices ensure that little substantial litigation takes place between the government and foreign firms because of the government's determination to provide a legal, economic and social environment conducive to business. By using its "cluster strategy", the EDB and associated government agencies such as the TDB, holistically case manage their MNC and indigenous clients in such a comprehensive way that resort to legal means to settle a

¹⁷⁷ Recounted by lawyers interviewed.

¹⁷⁸ Beatrice S. Frank et al, *The Decline of the Rule of Law in Singapore and Malaysia: A Report of the Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York*, New York, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1991, p. 98

¹⁷⁹ For example, Hong Kong's Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang, has commented "In Hong Kong the government does not stand above the law. You can take the government to court - try doing that in Singapore...". The Singapore government took no action against Tsang or the Asia Times newspaper in response to this front page insult. See: "Feisty Tang challenges Singapore", *Asia Times*, 9 October 1996, p. 1

dispute arises in only the most difficult of cases; the level of support from these agencies is such that legal action would completely undermine the business relationship. Many foreign commentators are either unaware of this practice or choose to ignore it and therefore wrongly conclude that legal action against the Singapore government is difficult rather than unnecessary.

The other side of this picture is the design of the legal system to ensure that it is conducive to continued PAP political control through perpetuation of its hegemonic program. The notions of judicial independence and autonomy have no institutional basis in Singapore. Jayasuriya comments:

While executive dominance and structural incentives have shaped judicial independence and autonomy, in recent years corporatist ideology has played a decisive role in shaping judicial attitudes and behaviour. The dominance of this ideology has enabled the judiciary to have autonomy, but it is an autonomy that lies within the bounds of state ideology. Hence, it could be argued that it is an autonomy within the executive rather than outside as one finds with customary notions of the 'separation of powers'...It is clear that this notion of deference to executive competence amounts to the argument that judicial action needs to be congruent with the interests of the executive.¹⁸⁰

Despite the pragmatic public management systems that complement and soften the legal regime in the commercial sphere, the legal system remains one of the principal means by which the PAP core executive rules the nation. It is not by 'terror' as Tremewan would have us believe,¹⁸¹ but by a cold, technical, legalistic implementation of a system of law in which social and political controls are traded off for an economic pact with the simple majority of voters that the PAP executive rules, combined with a passionate belief in their 'manifest destiny' buttressed by a selective insularity reinforced by a skilfully managed media system that reinforces the legal instruments of coercion.

As with all other institutions, executive control of the judiciary is exercised through it being subject to executive discretion in the exercise of detention without trial laws and indirect constitutional executive authority over the judiciary. In specific reference to the judiciary, control is also exercised by the removal of any external source of review of Singapore's courts, by legislation to curtail the sentencing prerogatives of the judiciary and the terms and conditions of appointments, such as annual re-appointments of judges older than the retirement age and the payment of salaries which are under the direct authority of the executive through the Minister for Finance.

¹⁸⁰ Kanishka Jayasuriya, "Corporatism and judicial independence within statist institutions in East Asia", in Kanishka Jayasuriya, ed., *Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia: The rule of law and legal institutions*, London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 173-204, p. 186

¹⁸¹ Christopher Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore*, London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 199

We can conclude that the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General are members of the core executive in Singapore and that other members of the Supreme Court judiciary and the Senior District Judge form part of the outer core, particularly the judges of the Court of Appeal. The remainder of the judiciary are part of the administrative machinery of state and have no status within the core executive, or at best may be located in proximity to the core executive in relation to certain, usually political, cases. As we found in the previous examination of the relationship between the legislature and the core executive, in Singapore, the Westminster conventions do not exist; the doctrine of the separation of powers is observed in word only; the legislature and the judiciary are disenfranchised by the executive and the legal profession has almost no independence from executive government.

The judicial system has been hegemonised and interprets its role in terms of the overall goals of the political executive, thus allowing it to operate a bifurcated legal system which differentiates strongly between economic rights on the one hand, which are highly protected, and legal and social rights on the other, which are not. However, even economic rights are subjugated to the political program as the use of land acquisition and taxation legislation has demonstrated. The judiciary are, however, not as compliant as some would have us believe. The contemporary judiciary, because of the demonstrated inability of the political executive to recruit sufficient judges of genuine ability in the 1980s, and the continued passive hostility towards it by much of the legal profession, has had to accept that some of its judges will not act on its behalf in all circumstances, and some, perhaps, not at all. The contemporary judiciary is the result of a compromise, the exact nature of which we are uncertain, which balances the need for a reputable, talented judiciary with the requirement by the political executive for the judicial system to assist with the control of political opposition. This negotiated balance is qualitatively different from the relationship that characterised that between the Lee governments and their Supreme Court.

6. THE CIVIL SERVICE AND CORE EXECUTIVE DYNAMICS

This chapter examines the relationship between the political executive and the civil service executive. It attempts to clarify the structure and dynamics which provide the framework for interaction among ministers, public service institutions and the quasi-institutional structures that facilitate management of the state by the core executive. It thereby assesses whether a case can be made for the inclusion of the public sector executive within the core executive and, if so, how it operates in managing the state in concert with the other components of the core executive, particularly the political executive. It is important to note that, as with preceding chapters, an attempt is made to examine the character of the relationship between the Goh Chock Tong governments and the civil service.

THE SINGAPORE PUBLIC SECTOR: STILL AN IRON CAGE?

It should be no surprise that control of the public service by the political executive in a Westminster-style state is absolute. In Britain and other Westminster style jurisdictions, convention, not law, is the protector of what public sector autonomy exists. In Singapore, no such convention exists and what little did exist during the colonial period was purposely and effectively jettisoned by the PAP as discussed previously.

The Singapore constitution is peculiar, in respect of other Westminster style constitutions, in that it contains many provisions for the administration of the public service and all major regulatory changes to the service require constitutional amendments. This would seem to be a particularly clumsy administrative mechanism, but it has one strength; it forces all significant public service changes to go through the legislature, thus requiring a two-thirds majority vote. In the event of a non-PAP government being in office without such a majority, it means that a PAP opposition can act as a protector of "its" public service, inherited by a non-PAP government. If a non-PAP government does not have this majority, no major changes can be made to the public service; it is yet another reserve safety control device in accord with the 'leave nothing to chance' maxim which drives institutional design in Singapore.

A specific provision is made in the constitution for the control of the promotion of the most senior Administrative Service officers above a particular level (called "the significant grade") whereby such appointments may only be made by the President on

the advice of the prime minister.¹ Article 154 also guarantees that all government employees "... whatever race in the same grade of the service of the Government shall, subject to the terms and conditions of their employment, be treated impartially." The Constitution also established the basis of promotion as being on "... the basis of official qualifications, experience and merit."²

Public service schemes of service, regulations for recruitment, service, promotion, conduct and discipline and allowance for the Public Service Commission to operate in accordance with its constitutional functions is provided for in Article 116. The Public Service Commission and the Legal Service Commission are established by Articles 105 and 111 respectively. Public service pension matters are provided for in Articles 112-115.

The public sector environment is highly constrained in Singapore, due to the culture of secrecy and the continuation of a command and control management approach from the colonial era. Underlying this culture is a raft of legislation and public sector management guidelines that reinforce these cultural traditions. In addition to the provisions for the public service within the constitution as detailed above, several pieces of legislation supported by subsidiary legislation provide the operational framework for the public service. It is these acts which enforce a rigid secrecy and insularity upon the public service and the civil service in particular. The most important legislation is detailed below.

The Official Secrets Act 1970. Based on eponymous British legislation, this Act prohibits any act which is defined as "prejudicial to the safety or interests of Singapore" and the communication of any information or document by any person holding any government office to another person not specifically authorised to receive it. The Act also makes it an offence to encourage another person to supply such a document or information and, rather harshly, defines all partners, directors or officers of a firm or corporation in which a person is found guilty of an offence under this Act as equally guilty unless such persons can prove "... that the act or omission constituting the offence took place without his knowledge or consent."³ A person suspected of committing an offence under this act may be arrested without warrant. The Act also allows the president to confer the powers of a police officer on any person for the purposes of the Act, including a civil servant. If found guilty under this Act, the maximum penalty is a \$20,000 fine and a prison term of 14 years.

¹ Article 111(a)

² Article 110 (2) of the Constitution

³ Article 16(3) of the Constitution

The influence of this act on the maintenance of a culture of secrecy which defines accountability only as being to the executive cannot be underestimated. In my interviews of public service officers, the inability or unwillingness of an officer to answer even the most simple of questions was based on reference to this act. This may have been a convenient excuse for some, but it was obviously a deep concern for others, particularly officers outside the Administrative Service. One indication of the paranoia associated with the act can be gauged from a complaint from one civil servant that his ministry's filing system had so many "secret" categories, that it even had a category "secret-miscellaneous" in which everything that wasn't otherwise secret could be filed!⁴ In effect, in order to protect themselves, public servants classified almost everything as secret. The effect of this act has been somewhat softened, at least in law, by the finding by the High Court in March 1998, that regardless of the classification of documents by the public service, it is the responsibility of the courts to determine what is and is not a state secret.⁵ This case is examined later in this chapter.

The Prevention of Corruption Act. This Act provides extensive powers of investigation and severe deterrents for corrupt behaviour. These include:

1. The power to investigate not just a suspect person, but also that person's wife, children or agents including their financial and other records if required;
2. The power to require the attendance of witnesses at a place designated by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and interview them;
3. A provision that even if a bribe was not accepted, a person is guilty of an offence if he intended to commit an offence; and
4. The estate of a person found to be corrupt within six years of death could be penalised under the act.⁶

Until recently, the act also stipulated that an offence outside Singapore could be treated as if it occurred inside Singapore. However, in 1998, the High Court ruled this provision invalid.

Internal Security Act 1989. Although this Act has no specific provisions relating to the public service, its discretion is so broad and it is so completely an instrument of the executive, that it cannot be ignored as a general instrument of political and social control which also has an impact on the public service and the behaviour of public officers. This Act allows for what is effectively unlimited detention without trial⁷ on the

⁴ "Miscellaneous secrets?", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 13 July 1991, p. 14

⁵ "Who should have the final say - the state or the courts", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 14 March 1998, p. 14

⁶ Hilton L. Root, *Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise of East Asia*, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 46

⁷ Although Article 151(1)(b) of the Constitution forbids preventative detention of a citizen for more than three months, this is conditional upon the report of an advisory board which considers representations by the detainee and

certification of a cabinet minister⁸, the Secretary to Cabinet or an authorised minister for any reason, forbids judicial review of such orders except to review that the procedures specified in the Act were carried out,⁹ places release from detention in the hands of the executive not the courts and provides for only the internal review of detainees' situations and eligibility for release. It also provides for detention without trial, special powers relating to subversive publications, the prohibition of organizations and associations of a political or quasi-military character, the control of entertainment and exhibitions, restrictions on the freedom of speech, assembly, association and movement, and the powers of curfew, search and seizure.¹⁰ This Act executes Article 149 of the constitution which, among other things, gives the state power to act against those whose actions:

1. 'excite disaffection against the President or the Government'; or
2. promote ill-will among different races or classes likely to cause violence; or are prejudicial to the security of Singapore.

The Penal Code. The Penal Code contains special provisions in relation to public officers charged with or found guilty of an offence against the code and many other acts and provides penalties in excess of those applied to non-public servants under the code.

The Evidence Act 1990. This Act contains a provision which forbids the production of any unpublished government records 'relating to affairs of State' as evidence in a court except with the permission of the permanent secretary subject to the control of the president.¹¹ Additionally, public officials cannot be compelled to answer questions in court, either related to his official duties¹², or which are questions that it would ordinarily be improper for any person to ask¹³, or if they would "... disclose communications made to him in official confidence (either oral or written) when he considers that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure."¹⁴ The Act also prohibits a court from inspecting a document if it relates to "affairs of state".¹⁵ This Act

advises the President on any extension or termination of the detention. This provision is weakened, however, by Article 151(4), which provides for the authority ordering the detention to reject the recommendations of the advisory board and seek Presidential approval for continued detention.

⁸ As provided for in Article 150 of the constitution

⁹ Full judicial review if orders made under this Act was revoked by the Internal Security Act (Amendment) Act 1989, following judicial orders to release some of those arrested as part of the 1988 "Marxist conspiracy" case, thus placing control of ISA orders wholly in the hands of the executive.

¹⁰ Cited in: Jon S. T. Quah, "Meeting the Twin Threats of Communism and Communalism: the Singapore Response", in Chandran Jeshurun, ed., *Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985, pp. 186-217, pp. 207-208

¹¹ Evidence Act 1990, s.123

¹² Evidence Act ss.123-133

¹³ Evidence Act 1990 ss.150-151

¹⁴ Evidence Act 1990 s.126

¹⁵ Evidence Act 1990 s.162(2) states: "The court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document unless it refers to affairs of State or takes other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility."

therefore provides for the total control of the release of information by public officials which might be detrimental to the government and also provides substantial protection for both the government and its officials from investigation by the courts through an extremely broad claim of executive privilege.¹⁶

The Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985, grants the parliament and its committees the power to command the attendance of any person and the supply of any document required by the parliament or committee as it sees fit to demand.¹⁷ However, the Act protects public officers from this provision and specifically excludes them from it if the president certifies that "... the evidence relates to affairs of State and that the public interest would suffer by the production thereof."¹⁸ This Act also defines a number of offences against the parliament which are punishable by the parliament, especially the publication of anything which 'reflects on the character' of the Speaker or members of the parliament itself.¹⁹ This effectively prohibits criticism of the parliament or the government by public servants and others whether in an official or private capacity.

Statutory Boards and Government Companies (Protection of Secrecy) Act 1995. This Act extends provisions similar to the Official Secrets Act to statutory boards and government companies. The major difference is that the sanctions are significantly less, being a fine not exceeding \$2000 and/or imprisonment not exceeding one year. It is interesting that this act, while applying to all 21 major statutory boards and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, does not apply to the government's major holding company Temasek Holdings but rather to only some of its subsidiaries.²⁰ Why this is the case is unknown, as Temasek is a private company wholly owned by the government.

This body of public sector legislation is reinforced by subsidiary legislation in the form of public service regulations. These are principally contained in the Instruction Manuals²¹, the Delegations of Powers (Ministry of Finance) Notifications,²² Public

¹⁶ For a more complete discussion of the implications of the Evidence Act 1990 for public officials see: Jeffrey Pinsler, *Evidence, Advocacy and the Litigation Process*, Butterworths, Singapore, 1992; Rafiah Salim, *Evidence in Malaysia and Singapore: Cases, materials and commentary*, Butterworths, Singapore, 1989; M. P. Jain, *Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore*, 2nd ed., Malayan Law Journal, Singapore, 1989

¹⁷ parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985 ss.12-15

¹⁸ parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985 s.16(1)

¹⁹ parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act 1985 s.31((g)-(k)

²⁰ See: Schedule 1, Statutory Bodies and Government Companies (Protection of Secrecy) Act 1995

²¹ Instruction Manuals (IMs) which are the public management guidelines for the civil service within which most regulations are incorporated. Permanent Secretaries may, under the authority vested in them by Article 34(3) of the constitution, issue management directives for their own ministries, but these must be consistent with the Instruction Manuals and other laws and subsidiary legislation made under other constitutional provisions and may be overridden by ministers exercising their authority under Article 30.

²² These notifications, made under s.19 of the Financial Procedure Act, provide financial delegations to ministers and public officials including in respect of financial losses, (including those in which fraud or negligence may be involved). See: Delegation of Powers (Ministry of Finance) Notification 1998, *Republic of Singapore Government*

Service (Special and Senior Personnel Boards) Orders²³, and the Public Service Commission (Personnel Boards) Orders.²⁴ There is also specific subsidiary legislation to maintain public service discipline, principally the Public Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations²⁵, the Public Service Commission (Delegation of Disciplinary Functions) Directions 1997²⁶, and the Public Service (Personnel Boards and Appeals Board) Regulations.²⁷ It is of interest to note that officers in the Administrative Service are excluded from disciplinary action under these regulations.

The daily operations of the Singapore civil service in particular are regulated by this subsidiary legislation. As statutory boards are not part of the civil service, they operate according to guidelines approved by the relevant board, but broadly in conformity with civil service guidelines. In regulating themselves, statutory boards must act in conformity with the accountability and financial provisions specified in Articles 22(a), (b) and (f) of the constitution. Government companies must take account of similar requirements specified in Articles 22(c), (d) and (f). Subsidiary legislation relevant to the Singapore Armed Forces will not be considered in this study.

While it has no direct relevance to the public sector, the frequent use of the Defamation Act 1957 by the government to silence and attack its critics implies that any criticism of the government must be carefully chosen in terms of wording and location so as to avoid prosecution under this legislation. This would include criticism of the public service, boards and GLCs. It must be said, though, that the Defamation Act is not widely used by the government except in the context of political campaigns,²⁸ although recently at least one business commentator has refused to publish his thoughts on

Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement, 8, 1998, 20 February 1998, pp.217-234 re delegations to write off financial losses, public stores, debts, overpayments and irrecoverable revenue. They also relate to monies associated with GLCs. See: Delegation of Powers (Ministry of Finance) (No. 2) Notification 1998, *Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement*, 28, 1998, 22 May 1998, pp.975-976, re EDB Investments Pty Ltd.

²³ Under these Orders, the permanent secretary to the Prime Minister's Office appoints members of the Personnel Boards. For example: Public Service (Special and Senior Personnel Boards) (Amendment No. 2) Order 1998, *Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement*, 20 February 1998, p.849

²⁴ These orders depend upon the authority of Article 110(d)(1), (2) and (4) of the Constitution to establish regulations for the establishment and operation of Personnel Boards in ministries and departments of the civil service. For example: Public Service (Personnel Boards) Order 1994, *Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement*, 27 June 1997, p.3639

²⁵ These provide the framework for the laying, hearing and execution of disciplinary charges against public officials, including prescribed punishments for offences. For example: Public Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations 1994, *Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement*, 26 September 1997, p.6853

²⁶ These regulations provide delegations to Permanent Secretaries to investigate alleged breaches of discipline and to take action against officers guilty of an offence. See: Public Service Commission (Delegation of Disciplinary Functions) (Amendment) Directions 1998, *Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement*, 24, 1998, 24 April 1998, p. 877. Disciplinary regulations are also provided for specialist services as well as the general civil service, e.g. the Public Service Commission (Prison Officers) (Disciplinary Proceedings - Delegation of Functions) Directions 1997.

²⁷ These regulations provide the framework for public service appeals against disciplinary charges and promotional outcomes. For example: Public Service (Personnel Boards and Appeals Board) (Amendment) Regulation 1998, *Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Subsidiary Legislation Supplement*, 9 April 1998, p.847

²⁸ An excellent legal analysis, with cases, of the Defamation Act 1957 is provided in: Keith R. Evans, *The Law of Defamation in Singapore and Malaysia*, 2nd ed., Singapore, Butterworths, 1993

Singapore's financial system from fear of defamation action by Singaporean banks, including government owned banks.²⁹ Thus the government's use of this legislation to suppress political freedom threatens to tarnish its reputation for supporting economic freedom. Foreigners are not accustomed to working in a legal system bifurcated by political control prerogatives.

The public service is also controlled through the industrial relations system. There is no specific public sector employment legislation in Singapore. The public sector makes use of the same law that applies to all workers, with some exception. For example, all officers of the Administrative Service and certain other categories of senior officers are forbidden to join a trade union or a political party, although all Division 1 officers may. These senior officers, who are the category of officer that works most closely with ministers and politicians, are organised not into industrial relations organisations, but into professional social clubs, in the case of the Administrative Service, the Alpha Society.³⁰

Industrial relations legislation consists of the:

1. **Employment Act** which regulates the terms and conditions of service of employees;
2. **Industrial Relations Act** which regulates the relationship between employers and unions;
3. **Trade Unions Act** which regulates the establishment and management of unions;
4. **Trade Disputes Act** regulates industrial action;
5. **Workman's Compensation Act** provides rules for the compensation of workers injured or killed at work;
6. **Retirement Age Act** provides for the minimum retirement age of workers;
7. **Factories Act** establishes an occupational health and safety regime for factories; and the
8. **Employment of Foreign Workers Act** regulates the recruitment and employment of foreign workers.

All of this legislation applies to the public sector, except for the Singapore Armed Forces, the Factories Act and the Employment of Foreign Workers Act which do not apply to the public service, but do to GLCs.

²⁹ In his recent book, Phillippe Delhaise, an experienced senior Asia based financial sector analyst, refused to discuss Singapore banks because of fears of defamation action being taken against him by those banks under Singapore law. See: Phillippe F. Delhaise, *Asia in Crisis: The Implosion of the Banking and Financial Systems*, Singapore, John Wiley and Sons (Asia), 1998, p. 180 and p. 193

³⁰ In typical Singapore fashion, hierarchy is very important, thus the officers of the Administrative Service are the premier service, the first, hence alpha.

This legislation has developed an industrial relations environment characterised by:³¹

1. The exclusion of certain categories of senior public officials from union representation;
2. The application of generic industrial relations laws to those public officials not excluded from union membership;
3. Government dominance of the industrial relations system in all aspects through a policy of industrial tripartism among government, unions and employers, especially through the National Wages Council;
4. A strong, centralised union movement under government control;
5. A concern with economic growth, political stability and industrial harmony over traditional workers rights;
6. No tolerance of substantial industrial conflict, although small company specific industrial action is tolerated;
7. The imposition of a non-adversarial approach to industrial conflict resolution through labour-management committees and at a higher level, a corporatist mediation structure involving the NTUC, the Ministry of Manpower, the Singapore National Employers Federation (SNEF) and the Industrial Arbitration Court. This non-adversarial approach is specified in the Trade Union Act;³²
8. The extensive use of house unions on the Japanese model in association with collective bargaining, including in the public sector;
9. Control of wages through a Tripartite National Wages Council although Administrative Service salaries, allowances and bonuses are under the discretion of the political executive;
10. The integration of social and industrial policy instruments within the collective bargaining process e.g. education and training provisions subsidised by the government; contributions to the Central Provident Fund; the use of productivity measures (e.g. Quality Control Circles, or, in the public sector Work Improvement Teams (WITs) and suggestion schemes); productivity-linked performance related payments in addition to base salary; medical benefits; and
11. The development by unions of large commercial and co-operative business enterprises and investment funds under the provisions of s.48(g) of the Trade Unions Act to encourage union membership.

The other major mechanism for control of the public service is through pay and conditions, as also noted by Paul.³³ Singapore has what is arguably, the best paid and

³¹ For detailed analyses of the Singapore industrial relations system see: Venkatraman Anantaaman, *Singapore Industrial Relations System*, Singapore, McGraw-Hill, 1990; Tan Chwee Huat, *Labour Management Relations in Singapore*, Singapore, Prentice Hall, 1995; Evelyn Wong, "Labour policies and industrial relations", in Linda Low and Toh Mun Heng, *Public Policies in Singapore: Changes in the 1980s and Future Signposts*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1992, pp. 144-169. For a more critical view see: Frederic C. Deyo, *Beneath the Miracle: labour Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989

³² The Trade Union Act was amended in 1982 to remove adversarial representation as a function of registered unions.

³³ Erik C. Paul, "Obstacles to Democratization in Singapore", *Centre for Southeast Asian Studies Working paper*, Monash University, 78, 1992, p. 12

best housed public service in the world.³⁴ The upper grades of the Administrative Service and the senior ranks of all services (e.g. the Accounting Service, the Education Service, the Engineering Service) are superscale grades, the remuneration levels of which are determined through reference to the formula used for pegging these salaries to private sector salaries for ministers and senior officials.³⁵ Other benefits to these officers are determined by cabinet on the advice of the Permanent Secretary, Public Service Division, PMO, through the relevant minister. Administrative Service officers receive an allowance additional to their salaries.

All salaried public servants also receive additional benefits including subsidised rental of holiday homes,³⁶ low-interest loans for housing, motor vehicle and other purchases (e.g. computers and home renovations), low-cost membership of the subsidised Civil Service Club with sport and recreation facilities, generous subsidised health benefits,³⁷ group insurance cover,³⁸ interest free study loans³⁹ and generous leave entitlements.⁴⁰ An indication of the salary levels paid to senior public servants is provided in Table 6.1 below.⁴¹ These salaries are not restricted to a very small group of senior officers, but to the overwhelming majority of Division 1 officers (approximately 28% of the civil service) and to some Division 2 officers who comprise approximately 30% of the civil service. These salaries are the base salaries for these officers. All officers also receive what is called a "variable component" usually equivalent to one month's salary and a performance bonus which may be between two and nine months

³⁴ Since the early 1990s, the public sector building program has provided almost all ministries and boards with accommodation of the highest quality, often incorporating fitness, creche, recreation and dining facilities of a high standard. Among the new buildings provided have been those for the Internal Revenue Service, the Ministry of Education, the Central Manpower Base, the Civil Service College, the Ministry of Finance, the Prime Minister's Office, the Parliament, Trade Development Board, ISEAS and a major higher education building program.

³⁵ Singapore Prime minister's Office, *Competitive Salaries for Competent and Honest Government: Benchmarks for Ministers and Senior Public Officers*, Singapore, Prime Minister's Office, 1994

³⁶ All officers can apply for use of holiday chalets at Loyang and Changi areas in Singapore and at the resort areas of Fraser's Hill and Cameron Highlands in West Malaysia.

³⁷ Medical costs in Singapore are relatively high as the country has a medical system equivalent to advanced industrialised nations. The government subsidies to public servants are very generous, amounting to a subsidy rate of 85% for an officer and 60% for each officer's dependents for costs incurred at Government Outpatient Dispensaries, Specialist Outpatient Clinics and Accident and Emergency Departments at government and restructured hospitals (ie the majority of hospitals) and the National University Hospital. If the officer attends other clinics the subsidy is \$10 per visit. However, the subsidy is limited to \$350 per year. The government also pays a 1% contribution to each officer's Medisave health cover account to a maximum of \$840 per year. Dental costs are subsidised at a maximum rate of \$70 per year. These benefits are heavily used; although only 4.4 per cent of Singaporeans hold the Civil Service Card which entitles them to medical subsidies, they accounted for 20 per cent of class A medical services and 10 per cent of Class BI medical services. See: Chay Wai Chuen, "Beyond the Free Market", *Petir*, May/June 1994, pp. 55-61, p. 57

³⁸ This group insurance cover is usually provided through the NTUC's insurance company, thus providing a large guaranteed market for this quasi-state organisation.

³⁹ The study loans are to a maximum of \$4,500 for a course in Singapore and \$9,000 for an overseas course and are interest free. Officers are bonded to the respective agency following the completion of the course.

⁴⁰ Normal leave entitlements are 21 days recreation leave per year, 30 days sick leave (extended to 60 days if hospitalised), paid maternity leave of 56 days per child and special leave of 5 days per child under 6 years of age. This is far more generous than public sector leave in Australia.

⁴¹ These salaries are 1995 figures. In August 1998 a request for the current salary levels was refused by the Public Service Division, Prime Minister's Office, without any explanation. Data from: Singapore Public Service Commission, *Scholarships Bursaries Study Loans 1995*, Singapore, Public Service Commission, 1995

additional salary per year.⁴² Officers at and above division head level also receive additional payment for sitting on the boards of statutory agencies and GLCs. The quantum of this additional income could not be ascertained as requests for this information from the Public Service Division of the Prime Minister's Office and the Public Service Commission were uniformly refused. This information is also not provided to the parliament through any regular reporting mechanism. As these salaries are based on monitored market rates, they both rise and fall in response to market conditions.

As can be seen from the components of the public sector operational framework, a distinction is made between the public service as a whole and the Administrative Service, the civil service elite corps that controls ministries and statutory boards. This distinction is mirrored in the SAF through the Wrangler Project⁴³ and its successors, in that officers assessed as capable of joining the general staff were provided with additional training, rapid promotion and challenging assignments to test and develop management and policy abilities. In this study, the SAF officer corps will not be explicitly examined. However, it is important to note that these complementary

Table 6.1: Singapore Public Service Executive Remuneration 1998

Indicative Rank	Scale	Monthly Salary	Employer Paid CPF per year ⁴⁴	Potential Bonus ⁴⁵	Potential Annual Salary ⁴⁶
Permanent Secretary / Deputy Prime Minister	Staff Grade V	\$48,400	\$116,160	\$435,600	\$1,182,220
Permanent Secretary / Deputy Prime Minister	Staff Grade IV	\$41,500	\$99,600	\$373,500	\$1,013,860
Permanent Secretary / Cabinet Minister	Staff Grade III	\$34,600	\$83,040	\$311,400	\$845,500
Permanent Secretary / Senior Minister of State	Staff Grade II	\$30,000	\$72,000	\$270,000	\$733,260
Permanent Secretary / Minister of State	Staff Grade I	\$25,400	\$60,960	\$228,600	\$621,020
Permanent Secretary	Superscale A	\$21,700	\$52,080	\$195,300	\$530,740
Permanent Secretary	Superscale B	\$18,300	\$43,920	\$164,700	\$447,780
Permanent Secretary, Senior Education Officer, Legal Officer	Superscale C	\$15,200	\$36,480	\$136,800	\$372,140
Permanent Secretary, Senior Education Officer, Legal Officer	Superscale D1	\$12,900	\$30,960	\$116,100	\$316,020
Permanent Secretary, Senior	Superscale D	\$11,700	\$28,080	\$105,300	\$286,740

⁴² For example, in the Legal Service, those officers classified from Legal Officers Grade 1 (Staff Grade 3 rank) to Superscale E1 receive up to 9 months performance bonus as a variable component; those from superscale E to the upper timescale band receive up to three months bonus and those at the entry level which is only one grade receive up to two months bonus. See: *The Legal Service: Salary and Progression*, available at: <http://www.gov.sg/pmo/lsc/sal.html>, 10 June 1998

⁴³ This was a management development project for the group of SAF officers assessed as having the potential to join the general staff, approximately by age 32. Lee Hsien Loong, Lee Hsien Yang and George Yeo were members of this group.

⁴⁴ Prior to 1 January 1999, this employer payment was 20% of base salary. From 1 January 1999 until further notice, this payment was reduced to 10% as a budgetary measure resulting from a recessionary economy. It is expected that the original standard 20% rate will be re-introduced when the economy recovers.

⁴⁵ This is dependent upon (a) the personal performance of the officers and (b) national economic performance.

⁴⁶ Includes one month variable allowance or Non-Pensionable Annual Allowance and the total for all health subsidies of \$1,260 per year.

Education Officer, Legal Officer Permanent Secretary, Senior Education Officer, Legal Officer	Superscale E1	\$10,850	\$26,040	\$97,650	\$266,000
Permanent Secretary, Senior Education Officer, Legal Officer	Superscale E	\$10,000	\$24,000	\$30,000	\$185,260
Permanent Secretary, Senior Education Officer, Legal Officer	Superscale F	\$9,200	\$22,080	\$27,600	\$170,540
Deputy Secretary, Executive Officers, Legal Officer, Senior Education Officer Colonel SAF & CDF	Superscale G	\$8,400	\$20,160	\$25,200	\$155,820
Senior Education Officer, Lt. Colonel SAF & CDF, Legal Officer, Chief Nursing Officer, Police Superintendent	Superscale H	\$7,600	\$18,240	\$22,800	\$141,100

programs do interact as some senior field rank staff⁴⁷ and members of the general staff are inducted into the Administrative Service or the Corps of Senior Administrators following their retirement from active duty in the regular SAF.

Ministers and the Administrative Service

The political executive's relationship with the public service is not one of simple unidirectional control. As discussed in Chapter Three, the interaction between the political and public service executive (essentially the Administrative Service) goes beyond that of minister-bureaucrat to incorporate both within a partnership in managing the state. Ministers have an executive function in Singapore; they are actively involved in running their ministries and they work in the ministry buildings side by side with Ministry staff, usually with their offices on the same floor adjacent to the Permanent Secretary and deputy secretaries. However, the relationship with the civil service, or with boards is not a simple one of command and control. In particular, the relationship of ministers with the Administrative Service is complex and based on an historical pact, made shortly after the assumption of power by the PAP in 1959, by which the governance of the nation is shared by both the political and public service wings of a technocratic oligarchy, based on perpetuating a slightly modified model of British colonial control.

The only recent study in which a consideration of intra-executive dynamics has been considered is that by Ho in 1995.⁴⁸ Through the examination of three case studies, Ho demonstrates the strong cohesion, though somewhat reduced autonomy of the core executive but notes its lack of consistent internal cohesion on specific policy issues, as demonstrated in internal conflicts between bureaucrats and politicians and consultations on the imposition of the initially unpopular policy of limiting motor vehicle numbers through a quota system. It is notable that in this case, the role played

⁴⁷ Those officers with the rank of major and above.

⁴⁸ Ho Khai Leong, "The Politics of Problem Definition and Agenda Setting in Singapore", *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 3, 2, December 1995, pp. 66-89

by MPs and specifically the chairman of the GPC⁴⁹ on Communications and Information, Hong Hai, were significant, as was the parliamentary select committee established to assist in developing this policy.⁵⁰ In this case, the select committee and the GPC were used to assess community response to the policy, a strategy that has become increasingly common under Goh Chok Tong governments. As Ho concludes;

... it is reasonable to suggest that the VQS⁵¹ is a case of inside initiative coupled with consultation by elites with the general public ... However, policy outcomes suggest that countervailing pressures outside the governmental circle were restricted and that the various inputs from the public on policy formulation were very much limited to fine-tuning and incremental modifications on details rather than on broad principles. In other words, the politics of accommodation and exchange, as it exists, is very much an exercise in unequal bargains, and the subsequent results reflect that particular process.⁵²

Ho's conclusions are evidence of a continued intimate partnership between ministers and the higher Administrative Service officers. It also indicates their ability to dominate other actors in the policy process but also their willingness to listen to public opinion, particularly when it is obvious that a policy or proposed policy might meet substantial middle class resistance.

This partnership is evidenced by the pattern of recruitment to the political executive. Speaking in the parliamentary debate over the major changes to ministerial salaries in November 1994, Lee Kuan Yew noted that between 1980-1994, only two ministers had been recruited from the private sector with no previous experience in the higher civil service; Tony Tan and Yeo Ning Hong.⁵³ That debate was not only over ministers' salaries, but higher public service salaries, as ministers and the most senior public servants share the same salary scale. This scale is used to determine which public servants are senior to which ministers.⁵⁴ All of the cabinet in 1998, except two members, came from the Administrative Service, the SAF general staff or the public sector; 20 per cent of MPs elected in 1997 came from the civil service or statutory boards,⁵⁵ and as we saw in Chapter Three, ministers saw the relationship as a close partnership. It is, however, a partnership substantially hidden from the public gaze and not characterised by uniformity. Koh's study of the Administrative Service has shown that, at least at the most senior levels of the Administrative Service, (permanent secretary and deputy secretary) bureaucrats are principally concerned with strategy

⁴⁹ Government Parliamentary Committee. These committees are PAP party committees – they have no constitutional status.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 71-72

⁵¹ Vehicle Quota Scheme

⁵² Ho, *op. cit.*, p. 75

⁵³ Lee Kuan Yew, "How much is a good minister worth?", in, Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez and Sumiko Tan, eds., *Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas*, Singapore, Times Editions, 1998, pp. 331-342, p. 334

⁵⁴ In interviews with public servants and others, comments on the seniority of certain public servants vis a vis ministers was invariably based on their classification, as ministers and public servants share the same classification scale as shown in Table 6.1. The entry grade for ministers is Staff Grade 1 on this scale.

⁵⁵ See Chapter 4, Table 4.2

formulation, policy making and consultations with ministers, politicians and other senior bureaucrats in relationships that are described as collaborative.⁵⁶ However, Koh's study also identified different and contradictory perceptions of the relationships between ministers and Administrative Officers, with some officers reporting that there needs to be greater differentiation between the roles and others that there should be a greater 'fusion'.⁵⁷

As Koh's study indicates, in the absence of any severe threat to the nation building hegemonic program that has emerged from the PAP's long period of control, tension has been evident in this power sharing relationship for some time. In 1991, Goh Chok Tong criticised his former Administrative Service colleagues for lacking political sensitivity.⁵⁸ Ong Teng Cheong, then PAP Chairman and First Deputy Prime Minister told PAP MPs and ministers that they had to differentiate themselves from bureaucrats⁵⁹ and to be more flexible in responding to unanticipated policy impacts.⁶⁰ Koh reports that in choosing between competing policies or implementation methods, there is "... sometimes a battle with the political leadership in this area"⁶¹ as there is in all political systems. The balance of power also seems to have shifted towards the political executive with some of Koh's respondents noting that too many of the new generation of permanent secretary do not have the courage to directly challenge ministers.⁶² However, respondents in both my 1995 and 1998 interviews indicated that while this was only true of a minority of permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries, the issue was one more of style than substance. The current generation of senior Administrative Officers had matured in a more stable political and policy environment than the 'Old Guard' permanent secretaries, were dealing with ministers very similar to themselves in educational and socio-economic terms and preferred a less confrontationist approach to resolving conflict. It was also important to note that most of the current members of the cabinet also preferred this approach unlike Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, Toh Chin Chye and other Old Guard ministers who were renowned for their domineering and authoritarian style as well as for their robust debate of policy and administrative issues.

However, Lee Kuan Yew has noted this sameness of the political and public sector executives is in itself, a problem; they do not challenge one another and are guilty of "intellectual in-breeding."⁶³ Administrative Service officers interviewed in 1998 were

⁵⁶ Gillian Brigette Koh Lim Choo, *A Sociological Analysis of the Singapore Administrative Elite. The Bureaucracy in an Evolving Developmentalist State*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sheffield, June 1995, pp. 201-207

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 308-313

⁵⁸ "Core team to take on core govt jobs", *The Straits Times*, 6 July 1991

⁵⁹ Sumiko Tan, "Help the common man achieve his goal", *The Straits Times*, 17 November 1991

⁶⁰ "Perception gap dividing people and govt, says Teng Cheong", *The Straits Times*, 12 August 1992

⁶¹ Koh, *op. cit.*, p. 138

⁶² *ibid.*

⁶³ *Straits Times*, 12 November 1994, p. 16

aware of this criticism and commented that it had a considerable influence on interaction within the core executive, as concerns over this issue had led to particular strategies for policy development and review being adopted to overcome it. These included on-line discussion groups in the alpha domain, electronic noticeboards, involving selected "outsiders" in brainstorming, using consultants and using a variety of planning strategies.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE, POLITICAL PARTNERING AND POWER SHARING

The relationship between ministers and the bureaucratic executive is not determined by these structural factors alone; a major determinant is dynamics within the political executive itself, as these intrude into the relationship between the two executives and help define and shape it.

In this section we examine some aspects of the dynamics of the relationship between the political executive and the public sector executive and assess the impact of this on the way in which the two executives work together within the contemporary core executive.

Relations between the bureaucratic and political executives are neither as constantly comfortable as Ho suggests, nor as uniform and consensual as Lee Kuan Yew suggests. Tensions do exist within the core executive and particularly in the relationships among ministers and between ministers and the most senior ranks of the Administrative Service; permanent secretaries and deputy secretary level officers in ministries and boards. Only this most senior level of bureaucrat will be considered in this study. These tensions have arisen from natural and generally predictable causes;

1. The generational transfer of power to the contemporary political executive;
2. The continued desire for power and influence by Lee Kuan Yew and his family and the lack of widespread support for this within the core executive;
3. The changing nature of Singaporean society driven by the PAP's economic success, particular increased affluence, higher educational levels and a burgeoning middle class which has grown increasingly immune to the PAP's political control strategies;
4. The inability of the middle class to achieve genuine political participation except through PAP co-option;⁶⁴
5. The complexity of the post cold war policy environment in an international economy which is becoming more globalised interdependent;

⁶⁴ Garry Rodan, "The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and its Political Significance", in Garry Rodan, ed., *Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and economic Directions in the 1990s*, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1993, pp. 52-71

6. The isolation of Singapore as a soft authoritarian state as Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines continue democratising and discarding the "Asian democracy" approach of the 1970s and 1980s;
7. The maturing of the electrical manufacturing, petrochemical, transport and tourism sectors of the economy and the need to supplement these with alternative activity that has potential for high growth;
8. The high risk strategies which have characterised much of the government led development of the external economy; and
9. The globalisation of communications and media through satellite transmission and the internet to compete with domestic media and erode government control of the media.⁶⁵

The key factor underlying the major fault lines within the core executive is the generational transfer of power and leadership succession following Goh Chok Tong's retirement from the prime ministership. This power game is based on an inherent contradiction in Lee Kuan Yew's approach to his succession which has been worsened by events beyond his control, including Lee Hsien Loong's cancer in 1994, Lee Hsien Yang's continued refusal to enter politics, Goh Chok Tong's slowly increasing power and autonomy within the cabinet and the development by Goh Chok Tong of two key support bases as the foundation of his power base; within the party, particularly the parliamentary party and within MINDEF and the SAF.

While Lee planned and designed his succession with as much control as possible as depicted in Chapter One, the final decision to appoint Goh Chok Tong as his successor was accompanied by a number of contingency strategies. These included his possible assumption to the elected presidency, the medium term removal of Goh (also possibly to the presidency, a major GLC or the GIC) and his replacement by Lee Hsien Loong, and a worse case scenario of splitting the PAP with the major remnant under Lee Hsien Loong and a more moderate faction under Tony Tan, presumably assuming the assumption to power of Lee Hsien Loong.⁶⁶ Huxley hints that Lee may have been able to use the SAF to support a quasi-martial law regime.⁶⁷

None of these options was realised. It soon became obvious that, while the party and the nation were generally grateful to Lee for his achievements, Goh was a welcome

⁶⁵ See: Garry Rodan, "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore", *Political Science Quarterly*, 113, 1, 1998, pp. 63-84

⁶⁶ "Finally Being His Own Man. Finally, Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia and Himself, *Asiaweek*, 25 November 1999. Available at: <http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/interview/goh.chok.tong>. Goh comments that this proposition was seriously considered twice; first in 1984 and then again in approximately 1994 when Tony Tan and Lee Hsien Loong were both deputy prime ministers. In 1992, Shee commented at an Institute of Policy Studies conference, that a two-party system could only emerge in Singapore through a split in the PAP. See: Shee Poon Kim, "Domestic Politics", in, Arun Mahizhnan, ed., *Singapore: The Year in Review 1992*. Singapore, IPS, 1993, pp. 26-41, p. 36

⁶⁷ Tim Huxley, "The Political Role of the Singapore Armed Forces Officer Corps: Towards a Military-Administrative State?", *SDSC Working papers*, 279, 1993, p. 17

change. His modesty, consultative instinct, even his initial interpersonal and political ineptness, although tinged with what was seen as arrogance, was soon appreciated as having a more common touch. Lee had also trawled through all possible candidates for elected office, been rejected by many, tried out the remainder and discarded them, often brutally. This had alienated a very large sector of the nation's intellectual and business elite - they wouldn't provide themselves as political fodder again, so the source of alternative leaders was becoming resistant to recruitment.⁶⁸ Age had also started to erode Lee's support base among older members of the former core executive who had moved to the outer orbit of the second generation core, had retired or died. Options were further eroded when Ong Teng Cheong and Lee Hsien Loong both contracted cancer. It was at this point that the elder Lee began to at last hand over the final institutional levers to Goh; principally the Secretary-Generalship of the PAP, although he insisted on retaining control or at least significant influence over four areas essential to his personal need for control: the Gurkha Contingent,⁶⁹ the chairmanship of the Defence Council, the chairmanship of the GIC and membership and control over the membership of the Council of Presidential Advisers. All other policy and administrative areas which impacted on these had to be negotiated with Lee and those allied to him until 1997 when Goh's substantial election victory finally cemented his credentials with Lee as a tough uncompromising leader.⁷⁰

This management of the transition from Lee Kuan Yew was a very challenging task for Goh, particularly as he had a narrow personal support base and, at least initially, seemed to be too dependent on Lee. Goh had stated on many occasions that he was not, could not and would not be Lee Kuan Yew.⁷¹ What he was also saying more quietly, and more frequently after 1991 as his tenure extended, was that Singapore did not need another Lee; times had changed and so must the leadership, a stance eventually conceded by Lee himself.⁷² This perception that the core executive needed to move beyond the Lee family has been reinforced by the lack of consistently strong support for Lee Hsien Loong's ascent to the prime ministership among the political executive in particular. In fact, from December 1993 until November 1999, Goh Chok

⁶⁸ For example, Lee Hsien Loong admitted in 1994 that the PAP cannot attract number of people it requires for planning its leadership succession. See: "S'pore may be in for succession problem", *Straits Times*, 25 July 1994, p. 1. This was again conceded in 1999 by Goh Chok Tong. See: Goh, 1999, op. cit.

⁶⁹ The Gurkha Contingent theoretically is a neutral riot control force and has responsibility for guarding key national institutions such as the Monetary Authority of Singapore. There are no Gurkha guards at such installations. Rather the Gurkha Contingent has three responsibilities; guarding Lee Kuan Yew's private residence, guarding the Istana offices of the prime minister and senior minister and guarding ISD detention centres. It is undoubtedly capable of riot control, but there have been no riots in Singapore for over 30 years. Lee's personal bodyguards, as for all ministers, are ISD officers specially trained at the FBI Academy.

⁷⁰ "Finally, Being His Own man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia - and himself", *Asiaweek*, 25 November 1999. Available at: <http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/interview/goh.chok.tong/index.html>

⁷¹ Goh emphasised this in his maiden speech to parliament as prime minister. See: Alan Chong, *Singapore's New Premier Goh Chok Tong*. Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk, 1991, p. 26

⁷² See Lee's comments in: "Lee Kuan Yew on Asean, the economy and S'pore", *Asiaweek*, 21 May 1999. Available at: <http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/99/0521/natl.html>

Tong avoided giving explicit public support to Lee Hsien Loong as his successor.⁷³ In interviews with members of the core executive in 1995, 1997 and 1998, the overwhelming majority indicated that Lee Hsien Loong was less popular than Goh Chok Tong within the party and cabinet and that it should not be assumed that Lee will be the next prime minister. The consensus seemed was that this decision would not be one imposed by either Lee Kuan Yew or Goh Chok Tong; it would be done on the same basis as Goh's succession – by the cabinet in consultation with the inner core executive⁷⁴ – but without Lee Kuan Yew's overwhelming influence. Goh could nominate a candidate, but equally, others could be nominated and the outcome has to be a negotiated settlement within the core executive.⁷⁵ One indicator of Goh Chok Tong's control of the party is the fate of the cohort of MPs recruited in 1988 under Lee Hsien Loong's patronage. Of this group, only three became ministers – Mah Bow Tan, George Yeo and Peter Sung. Of these, Mah and Yeo are more oriented towards Goh and Sung left parliament in 1997. Of the 1991 cohort, chosen by Goh, Ker Sin Tze and Lim Hng Kiang entered cabinet and in 1992, followed by Teo Chee Hean from MINDEF in the 1992 by-election. Lim and Teo are now senior cabinet ministers, nominated by Goh as part of the inner group of very talented ministers which also includes Lee Hsien Loong and George Yeo.⁷⁶

There has been speculation that the political executive is split between a Lee faction and a Goh faction or, if not a faction, an informal grouping around these two.⁷⁷ This has been denied and the political executive is keen to project an image of party and cabinet solidarity, although even Goh admits that the solidarity extends mainly to the membership sharing "the same philosophy and the same vision on how Singapore should be governed."⁷⁸ While it is certain that there are no formal factions in the PAP and cabinet, the core executive like all human groups, is undoubtable split along lines of personal affiliation, style and the means of governance.⁷⁹ What my interviews indicated was that there have been and are splits within the cabinet and the core executive, that these generally revolve around issues of general long-term strategy (which must be eventually resolved) and particular policies (which may remain

⁷³ Goh commented in April 1993, following Lee's return to duties after treatment for his cancer, that he was his choice as successor. However, a search of the Singapore Press Holdings Newlink database failed to find any public statement to this effect after that date. In his interview with *Asiaweek* in November 1999, Goh commented regarding Lee's elevation to the prime ministership: "It seems to be a given that he will succeed sometime after 2002." This is still not a strong endorsement. See: Anna Teo, "PM Goh says BG Lee remains his choice of successor", *Business Times*, 12 April 1993, p. 1; and, Goh, 199, op. cit.

⁷⁴ Lee Kuan Yew commented that choosing a successor prime minister was not the incumbent prime minister's decision but rather that "it is the members of the party core-group, not the Prime Minister, who decide on who should inherit power." See: Chong, op. cit., p. 67

⁷⁵ For Goh's comments on his own elevation see: Chong, op. cit., pp. 8-9

⁷⁶ "Finally His Own Man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia – and himself", *Asiaweek*, 25 November 1999. Available at: <http://cnn.com/ASIANMOW/asiaweek/interview/goh.chok.tong/index.htm>

⁷⁷ Chong, op. cit., pp. 58-72

⁷⁸ *ibid.*, p. 8

⁷⁹ Shee, 1993, op. cit., p. 36

unresolved), but that an enduring problem within the core has been the degree of Goh's genuine independence from Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong and the question of the latter's possible succession to Goh Chok Tong. Some have indicated that the loss of five cabinet ministers and a minister of state from the political executive between 1992-1994 is an indication of considerable disenchantment with the continuing influence of the Lees and Goh's inability to displace them or limit their influence.⁸⁰ These issues inevitably intrude into the relationship between the most senior bureaucrats and the political executive because of their essential inter-dependency. It is these two larger issues which we will study further in an attempt to make more explicit the dynamics within the core executive and the nature of the relationships between the political and public sector executives.

A major issue that has shaped bureaucratic/ministerial relationships for much of the past 10 years is the place and power of Lee Hsien Loong within the ministry and his possible future. While Lee has many supporters, he has also alienated many because of what is seen as his arrogance and the autonomy he demonstrates in his relationships with other cabinet ministers; characteristics which, seven years after he joined the cabinet under Goh's sponsorship, he had not curbed. In 1990, an incident occurred in a pre-cabinet meeting which was the beginning of entrenching further among many in the core executive, resistance to Lee Hsien Loong's long term ambitions for the prime ministership.⁸¹ Prior to this meeting Lee Hsien Loong had gone to the office of Richard Hu, the Minister for Finance, and removed a number of files without Hu's permission. At that time Lee's office was on the 48th floor of what is now Temasek Tower and Hu's was on the 50th floor. At the pre-cabinet meeting Hu took Lee to task for doing this and was supported by Tony Tan. Lee's response was aggressive and insulting, he directly insulting Tan and Hu, a man of his father's age. This was a double insult to Hu, who was Lee's superior in cabinet and a person of an age which should of itself deserve respect in Chinese society. Suppiah Dhanabalan intervened and chastised Lee for his behaviour, demanding that he apologise to Hu, withdraw his remarks and not interfere in other minister's portfolios. A heated exchange occurred into which a number of other issues intruded and eventually Lee lost his temper, reached across the table and slapped Dhanabalan across the face. This caused an uproar in the cabinet and Lee was severely chastised by Goh Chok Tong. Dhanabalan stormed out of the room and did not return for some time. Lee, in response to a demand from Goh, subsequently apologised to Dhanabalan, Hu and Tan. Hu, Dhanabalan and Tan all initially stated that they would leave the cabinet as a result of this incident. Goh later

⁸⁰ Although he does not state this view, Cherian George raises these departures from cabinet as a major problem. See: Cherian George, "Domestic Politics", in, Yap Mui Teng, ed., *Singapore: The Year in Review 1994*, Singapore, IPS, 1995, pp. 52-60, p. 52

⁸¹ This information was reported to me by three informants, one of whom had access to a member of the political executive (but not of cabinet level) who had a first hand account of this incident.

took up the matter with Lee Kuan Yew who reportedly verbally thrashed his son over the matter. This was apparently followed by a more sober, educational but equally critical assessment from Lee Hsien Loong's mother, a talented through background political adviser. Lee Kuan Yew met later that day with Hu, Tan and Dhanabalan apologised for his son's behaviour and requested that they not resign, supported by a similar request from Goh Chok Tong. All held out for some time, but eventually Hu agreed to stay, but Dhanabalan and Tan both resolved to leave. This they did following the August 1991 elections, all without a public a word against Lee Hsien Loong, continuing to subscribe to the tenet of all secrets staying within the PAP family.⁸² While this is reportedly Lee Hsien Loong's worse outburst in cabinet and he has obviously learnt from the experience by moderating his behaviour among the political leadership, he has reportedly not done as much in his dealings with the civil service. Every senior public sector official with whom I discussed the succession issue, off the record, rated Goh above Lee in terms of being of prime ministerial calibre and rated Goh as having far more support in the civil service, party, the GROs and the cabinet than Lee, although Lee has probably been more successful at developing support within the civil service than elsewhere. On the question of Lee's succession to the prime ministership, considerable doubt was expressed as to its inevitability, many pointing out that the cabinet was very talented and that there were a number of potential ministers recruited in the 1997 elections. However, this tension regarding Lee Hsien Loong and Lee Kuan Yew's eventual retirement continues to dog the political executive and to strongly influence its interaction with the senior bureaucracy. Both Lees have their own power bases; the father's built on his historical contributions, but now declining rapidly in terms of personal power and the son's within part of the Administrative Service, the business community and less so within the party and parliament.

Goh has had to work around these Lee fiefdoms to develop his own power base. This he has done by concentrating on two areas; control of the party machine and the parliamentary party since 1991⁸³ and establishing clear control of and support from within the Ministry of Defence and the SAF.⁸⁴ A third area over which he seems to

⁸² For the official story on why Dhanabalan and Tan resigned see: "Dr. Tan: I'll return to public office if my services are needed", and "Decision to step down not a hasty one, says Dhana", *Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 14 September 1991, p. 3

⁸³ In 1988 Lee Hsien Loong had played a major role in preselecting candidates. This changed somewhat after 1991, but after 1994 Goh assumed almost complete control of party preselection, no personally, but by working through the party's selection committee process.

⁸⁴ Goh was Second Minister for Defence from June 1981 and Defence Minister from January 1984-1991. Under the Armed Forces Act, the Minister has virtually autonomous control of the SAF including selection, promotion and allocation of all officers. In respect of his powers as Defence Minister Goh has commented: "I can tell you that I am most uncomfortable at the authority which I have as Minister for Defence. ... I can appoint the Chief of Staff, Chief of General Staff, Air Force Commander, Navy Commander, Army Commander. I can promote, I can transfer, I can demote without legally having to consult the Prime Minister ... I don't feel comfortable because the potential for abuse is that it is very easy for a potential mischief maker, who is a Defence Minister, to build up the military behind him..." See: *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 20 August 1988, p. 5

have control is also the Information and Arts portfolio and through it media policy, although I was not able to satisfactorily verify this in interviews. The dominant view was that George Yeo, the Minister for Information and the Arts, was a strong supporter of Goh and worked closely with him in reworking the media and cultural boundaries imposed by the government. His weakness in this area has been a lack of control over Singapore Press Holdings, still overseen by Lee Kuan Yew's old ministerial associate Lim Kim San, although in 1998, with Lim being 84 years of age and reportedly ill, this must soon pass. The party base allows Goh control of parliamentary candidates and therefore control of the parliament and the development of support networks throughout the housing estates and the PAP community sector. He has also appointed several hundred new cadres and retired many in the older generation, thus rebuilding the party's constituency infrastructure. It is Goh's power base within MINDEF that is of interest to this study, as it illustrates some aspects of the dynamics that characterise the relationship between the political and bureaucratic executives.

The MINDEF power base has allowed Goh the opportunity to slowly increase his control in areas previously seen to be under Lee family domination. Selected retiring⁸⁵ officers from the SAF officer corps have been moved into the Administrative Service; the Security and Intelligence Division of MINDEF has been developed as an alternative source of advice to the ISD on security matters; the defence related GLCs are populated with retiring SAF officers at board and executive level, providing influence over Singapore Technologies despite the presence of Lee Hsien Loong's wife as President and CEO of this conglomerate. Some observers, such as Huxley, have contended that Lee's base in MINDEF and the SAF is substantial, but there seems to be little evidence of this.⁸⁶ His rise to be Chief of the General Staff by the age of 32 did little to endear him to the regular SAF officer corps. George Yeo, not Lee, heads the SAF Reservists Association and Yeo had substantial support earlier in his career from the then Defence Minister Dr. Yeo Ning Hong and Goh Keng Swee.⁸⁷ The latter, in particular, at that time still had considerable influence in the SAF and reportedly was not a supporter of Lee Hsien Loong. In more recent times, it was Goh who recruited Teo Chee Hean from the SAF for the 1992 by-election, not Lee, although Lee, through his oversight of the Administrative Service vets the transfer of senior SAF officers to the civil service. This also, however, is vetted by Goh's office and, at the most senior levels, by the cabinet. In establishing his power base in MINDEF, Goh had to first build close relationships with

⁸⁵ Remembering that officers from Lt. Colonel rank and above will retire between 35-40 if they are appointed to another position in the public sector, including in a GLC.

⁸⁶ Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 9. Huxley has excellent information sources in the SAF, but I think his sources provided information in the context of the mid 1980's, before Goh had become Defence Minister.

⁸⁷ Huxley supports the view that Yeo was a protégé of Dr. Yeo Ning Hong's. They are not related. See; Huxley, *op. cit.*, p.16


several key MINDEF bureaucrats and develop these into a loose coalition of interests which would allow him to develop autonomy within the ministry independent of the constitutional authority of his office. This he did by aligning himself with a group led by Lim Siang Guan, formerly Lee Kuan Yew's Principal Private Secretary, 1978-1981, and permanent secretary in MINDEF from 1982-1994. Lim, a tough, conservative, highly intellectual administrator with a technocratic passion for efficiency, also has a fine political sense. His conservatism matched Goh's, while his political sense sharpened Goh's initially less developed political abilities. Goh's demonstrated administrative ability and desire for a change of style in government was also matched by Lim's entrepreneurial instincts and ability to innovate in public sector management while maintaining strong central control of the public sector, as demonstrated in his husbanding of the PS21 reforms outlined in Chapter Two and his substantial role in redesigning the government's coercive instruments as detailed in Chapter Eight. It is on this foundation, with the cooperation of most of his ministerial colleagues including Lee Hsien Loong, that Goh has built his premiership. This type of partnering between the political executive and the bureaucratic executive is common in Singapore. Although ministers are rarely allowed by the prime minister to work for long periods with the same Administrative Officers, the number of people managing the state at the highest levels is small and natural networks and alliances develop and are an integral part of the core executive structure and dynamics.

Bureaucrats and Ministers: Policy Community Cowboys or Rustlers?

One other characteristic of the dynamic between the two executives, is the way in which they cooperate to develop and manage policy communities and networks. In questioning Administrative Officers and MPs on this issue in 1998, it was unanimously agreed that in Singapore policy networks are mediated through the political and bureaucratic executives with respondents generally describing this arrangement as corporatist. Business, industry and other civil society groups were seen as having no autonomy to initiate policy except in rare cases of broad public rejection of a government program or proposal. In fact, in discussions with several officers, it was indicated that the term 'policy community' was often used in certain ministries and that senior officers had a clear understanding of themselves as shaping and managing such communities as part of their portfolio management responsibilities. The examination of such communities is a very important aspect of the dynamics of the core executive, but can only be examined in passing in this study.⁸⁸ An example of these policy networks, the economic policy network, is provided in Diagram 6.1.

⁸⁸ This thesis had initially been a study to examine the policy communities and networks underlying the interaction of science and technology, education and labour market policies, but it was unable to proceed because network participants would not agree to being involved in the study.

Diagram 6.1: Singapore Economic Policy Network 1998



As we can see from the above, the dynamics of the leadership transition from Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong are characterised by the development by Goh of a personal power base within the bureaucracy and his allying himself with particular bureaucratic and political groupings. This reflects the inherent nature of the relationship between the higher civil service and the political executive; one in which oligarchic control is principally shared between the two. We can conclude therefore that the relationship between ministers and the senior Administrative Officers is close, collaborative, but not uniformly so, as it is characterised by divisions based on personal allegiance and different views of long-term political orientation. Some aspects of how this relationship functions is examined in the case study below.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE BUREAUCRATIC/POLITICAL PARTNERSHIP

One illustration of the complexity of the relationship between the higher public service and the political executive is the events leading to the Supreme Court judgement on the interpretation of what constitutes a secret under the Official Secrets Act (OSA) 1998. This was a major issue in executive control over the public service, as the OSA, in association with the Corrupt Practices Act (CPA) has been the lynchpin of executive public sector sanctions since before independence. This decision on the OSA, handed down by Chief Justice Yong Pung How, placed the courts as arbiter of what should be defined as a state secret, rather than the executive, thus removing the executive from direct control over public servants through the OSA. Although I was not able to interview the participants in this and related cases on this issue, I was able to discuss the matter with a number of civil servants and others with knowledge of it as well as review the literature. The details, as reported, and conclusions are as follows.⁸⁰

Secrecy, Paranoia and the Struggle for a New Paradigm

In June 1992, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Administrative Service officer and director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore's (MAS) Economics Department, met with Manu Bhaskaran, economics research director of Crosby Securities, in his office at the MAS building in a routine meeting between a financial sector executive and the sector's regulatory authority. Chan Chia Lin, another MAS economist also attended the meeting. During the meeting, Shanmugaratnam referred to a document on which the

⁸⁰ This case study draws upon confidential interviews, news reports and parliamentary debates. See: "Five fined between \$1,500 and \$6,000 each" and "Prosecution is not out to exact retribution, says A-G", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 2 April 1994, p. 4; "OSA case: Govt out to plug leaks", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 9 April 1994, p. 14; "Minister says government might change laws", *Straits Times*, 15 January 1998; "Who should have the final say - the state or the courts?", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 14 March, 1998, p. 14. The official headline on the case, which was actually harder in tone than the domestic news reports, can be found in: "Singapore Secrets", *The Economist*, 23 April 1994, p. 4. A sceptical view of the case highlighting some of its peculiarities was previously published in: "Singapore Keeping Secrets", *The Economist*, 9 April 1994, p. 32.

unreleased confidential flash estimate of economic growth for the second quarter on 1992 was recorded.⁹⁰ The flash estimate is considered secret until officially released by MAS. In this particular case the overall flash estimate was 4.6% and was accompanied by an analysis of economic growth by economic sector, from which the overall flash estimate is calculated.

During this meeting Bhaskaran, apparently without Shanmugaratnam's knowledge, somehow accidentally saw the flash estimate figure, recognised that it might be the unreleased flash estimate and noted it. After the meeting, Bhaskaran relayed the flash estimate to his colleague Raymond Foo Jong Chen and Kenneth James, technology editor for the *Business Times* newspaper for their personal and confidential use in the realisation that the estimate was still secret and he was not authorised to have knowledge of it. It seems that the single figure that Bhaskaran relayed to Foo and James may have been only one part of the leaking of the flash estimate, as it was also believed in some quarters of the Ministry of Finance, particularly by Government Statistician Paul Cheung, that the *Business Times* had details not only of the gross flash estimate (4.6%) but also a breakdown of the estimate by economic sector. The flash estimate was subsequently published in the *Business Times* edition of 29 June 1992. In the subsequent court case, there was no clarification of how full details of the flash estimate may have become available to the *Business Times*. The two main competing theories were that Bhaskaran saw the entire flash estimate during the meeting with Shanmugaratnam, possibly when the MAS officers were called from the room, or that another source had provided them after the meeting with MAS. A third view was that Shanmugaratnam leaked the figures, supported by other senior civil service figures, as part of strategy to force greater openness in economic statistics and media reporting in Singapore because this is essential to the drive to build the infrastructure for a knowledge based economy; the new economic paradigm adopted for Singapore to complement the still successful manufacturing strategy. The veracity of this view is unknown.

Foo, who is not an economist and who apparently did not understand exactly what the flash estimate was, discussed it over lunch with Kelvin Quek Eng Cheong and Choy Choon Ho, economists in the MTI's Research Division.⁹¹ Quek questioned Foo as to the source of his knowledge of the flash estimate as he knew that it had not then been officially released and so informed Foo. Foo subsequently met with another government economist, thought to be from the Department of Statistics within MTI

⁹⁰ In Singapore, flash estimates are the preliminary estimates of economic growth, calculated each quarter. Growth is estimated by economic sector and cumulated into a single overall growth figure. This single figure is what is usually referred to as the flash estimate.

⁹¹ Quek and Choy were well thought of, having been assigned to the secretariat for the politically sensitive Cost Review Committee in 1992-93.

and later sent two faxes to Crosby Securities offices overseas including details of the flash estimate, and circulated details of the flash estimate within his company.

Following Kenneth James, the journalist, being provided with the overall flash estimate by Bhaskaran, he communicated it to Patrick Daniel, the editor of the *Business Times*, an economist, former Administrative Service officer in MTI, former Principal Private Secretary to Lee Hsien Loong and who had also been secretary to the ministerial level Economic Committee under Lee Hsien Loong in 1985-86.⁹² Daniel subsequently discussed the estimate with Dr. Paul Cheung, Chief Statistician and head of the Department of Statistics within MTI. Cheung seemed, at least initially, not to have been perturbed that the *Business Times* had either the flash estimate or such a good approximation of it as to be the same and suggested that the use of the 4.6% figure could be useful in dampening the current market bullishness, if published. Daniel authorised the publication of the figure, citing it as the official flash estimate, on 29 June 1992 in the *Business Times*.

The publication of the figure, before its official release, immediately raised questions in several agencies: MAS, the Ministry of Finance, the Economic Development Board and the Ministry of Trade and Industry at the officer level and among Permanent Secretaries and Ministers in their weekly meetings with ministry senior executives. The MAS and EDB boards also are reported to have discussed the issue.

At this stage, it was not obvious to ministers and permanent secretaries as to where the *Business Times* had obtained the flash estimate. Officers in the Research Division of MTI and in the Department of Statistics had directly discussed with Daniel and Foo, their knowledge of the flash estimate. However, it seems that although both these MTI officers were aware that the flash estimate had not been officially released, MTI was unsure if MAS had decided to leak the estimate to help dampen market sentiment in a bull market. Whether MTI bothered to check this with MAS is unknown, but considered unlikely; rather, it is thought that MTI did nothing about it. If MAS did leak the estimate or inadvertently caused it to fall into the hands of the press, it was MAS' problem. It was apparent to all who were aware of the leak that it was an obvious breach of the Official Secrets Act (OSA).

As breaches of the OSA are considered to be breaches of security, a referral was therefore made, not to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), but rather to the Internal Security Department (ISD) which has responsibility for policing the OSA. The ISD, while technically part of the

⁹² Daniel had also sat on various important government committees, such as the IT2000 Steering Committee charged with developing the National Information Technology Plan, 1991-92. He obtained a BA (Hons) in engineering science and economics from Oxford University and a Master of Public Administration from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Ministry of Home Affairs, is actually an independent department with ministry status which also reports directly to the prime minister's personal Istana office. In 1992, it was believed that the head of the ISD at that time, Tjong Yik Min, still reported to Lee Kuan Yew as well as Goh Chok Tong.⁹³ However, at that time, Lee had his own man at ISD, Deputy Director Yap Kok Peng, one of the three deputy directors within the department.⁹⁴ There could, therefore, have been conflicting demands made on the ISD by the political leadership in this case, although this cannot be verified.

The ISD began its investigation on August 13 by interviewing Daniel, the editor of the *Business Times*, James and several other journalists. At a National Day dinner on 15 August, Lee Kuan Yew criticised Goh Chok Tong by commenting that if he were still prime minister "... he doubted if Business Times would have used illegally obtained or leaked official figures."⁹⁵ Lee seemed to be of the opinion that Shanmugaratnam leaked the flash estimates. The ISD then followed the trail of information and documentation until it concluded that Shanmugaratnam was the originating source. A report was then made to the prime minister's personal office and subsequently referred to Dr. Andrew Chew, then Permanent Secretary (Special Duties) in the PMO. The report apparently included background details on all five people involved in the case and the two MTI officers who were aware of the leak, and concluded that this particular breach of the OSA was unusual in terms of the people involved, the fact that none involved had gained financially or in any other way, the economic nature of the breach itself and ISD's inability to understand whether the breach was actually of any significance. Chew was apparently concerned about the people involved and the necessity to take a more considered course of action than simply charging all concerned under the OSA. Chew was apparently not one of the group that could be considered involved if the flash estimate data was leaked.

The report was then circulated to Lee Ek Tieng, Managing Director of MAS and the permanent secretaries in MTI (Lam Chuan Leong), MOF (under which MAS is placed), the Public Service Division of MOF and the Attorney-General's Chambers. MOF also referred the report to its Commercial Affairs Department which monitors the finance and securities industries. At this time, the two permanent secretaries in MOF were Ngiam Tong Dow and Dr. Andrew Chew, both of whom also held concomitant permanent secretary appointments in the PMO. Dr. Chew, as permanent secretary PSD, was also Head of the Civil Service. It is of note that the report was sent to ministers through their permanent secretaries; it was also discussed at a meeting of the Committee of Permanent Secretaries under Chew's chairmanship. This line of

⁹³ The alternative scenario supported by a minority of informants was that while Tjong reported to Goh, his deputy Benny Lim Siang Hoe, reported to Lee.

⁹⁴ At this time Benny Lim was Deputy Director (Operations) and Yap was Deputy Director (Corporate).

⁹⁵ "On Senior Minister: We understand each other's way of working", *The Straits Times*, 5 December 1992, p. 3

communications is again critical to the way in which political executive-Administrative Service dynamics played out in this case.

While full details of the report are not known, it apparently recommended prosecution of all involved in the case as well as civil service disciplinary action against Shanmugaratnam, Paul Cheung head of the Department of Statistics and Kelvin Quek Eng Cheong in MTI and possibly, Shanmugaratnam's dismissal. The report apparently took "the typical ISD hard line" as one respondent noted. Before discussing the reaction of permanent secretaries to the report, it is important to first understand why they acted to soften the ISD recommendations in order to protect Cheung, Shanmugaratnam, and to a lesser degree Daniel and Quek, and consequently press for changes in the OSA regime.

Tharman Shanmugaratnam, a President's Scholar, graduated from the London School of Economics with a first class honours degree in economics, obtained a masters degree in economics from the University of Cambridge and later the Master of Public Administration degree from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He joined the Administrative Service and was subsequently posted to the Monetary Authority of Singapore. There he excelled in both technical and general policy analysis, becoming by the age of 33, director of the Economics Department of MAS, the most prestigious of its departments. Shanmugaratnam demonstrated considerable potential early in his career and was rapidly promoted. He was also considered a person of immense integrity and dedication with high moral values, a good intellect, a flexible thinker, an officer of Indian descent who mixed comfortably with people of all backgrounds, supportive of the government, modest and personable, if a little too overconfident on occasions. He was, in short, an Administrative Officer with high potential for a permanent secretary's position or even transfer to the political wing as a potential minister following the retirement of an Indian minister such as Jayakumar.

MAS has always been a relatively small organisation, but as the central bank and a central economic policy agency, it has always had major political and civil service figures on its board and in senior management positions. By 1989⁹⁶, Shanmugaratnam had come to the notice of not only his managing director, J. Y. Pillay, an almost mythical figure in the civil service and a permanent secretary of a level that outranked most cabinet ministers, but also of the very influential members of the MAS board. These included Dr. Richard Hu Tsu Tau, long-time Minister for Finance and former Managing Director of the GIC; Dr. Goh Keng Swee, retired Deputy Prime Minister, still

⁹⁶ At this time Shanmugaratnam was Assistant Director, External and Special Projects Division, Economics Department, MAS. He was head of this division.

a powerful political figure and immensely respected in the civil service and business; Lee Ek Tieng, then permanent secretary Finance and Revenue Divisions MOF; Lim Siong Guan, former Principal Private Secretary to Lee Kuan Yew and long-serving permanent secretary in MINDEF; and Chua Kim Yeow, managing director of the government owned POSBank.⁹⁷ In late 1989, Pillay was replaced as managing director of MAS by Lee Ek Tieng who is close to Lee Kuan Yew and has worked with him, on and off, since the early 1970's.⁹⁸ This was (and to a degree still is) one of the most powerful groups of people in Singapore, all of whom have close ties with Lee Kuan Yew and all of whom have his respect.

Approximately 18 months after Lee Ek Tieng became managing director of MAS, Shanmugaratnam was promoted to Director, Economics Division under Dr. Teh Kok Peng, then, as now, one of the deputy managing directors. An indication of Shanmugaratnam's ability is that he is now also a deputy managing director, but actually ranks higher in policy terms because of his present responsibilities.⁹⁹ From this time onwards, he developed a close working relationship with Lee Ek Tieng and received even greater exposure to the MAS board. By the time the "flash estimate" incident occurred, there was widespread agreement among this group of senior Administrative Officers and board members, on Shanmugaratnam's high intellectual and ethical standards, work performance and potential.

When the ISD report reached Lee Ek Tieng with recommendations which would ruin Shanmugaratnam's civil service career and imperil those of another senior Administrative Officer (Cheung), and a former Administrative Officer and political adviser (Daniel), Lee conferred with Shanmugaratnam and his deputies. After verifying the facts of the case and obviously making a decision to support Shanmugaratnam, it is reported that he quickly began to gather support among board members and other senior contacts, including Goh Keng Swee and Pillay, for finding a way by which the ISD recommendations, or the outcomes from them would not damage the Administrative Officers involved or the Administrative Service as it moved increasingly into a policy environment where greater risk taking was required.

⁹⁷ Post Office Savings Bank of Singapore, a GLC.

⁹⁸ Lee Ek Tieng was one of a group of bright young men given senior appointments early in their careers and nurtured by Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee. Lee Ek Tieng worked in the Prime Minister's Office under Lee as head of the Anti-Pollution Unit, then an important policy body, from 1970-1972. He was promoted to acting permanent secretary, later confirmed, in the Ministry of the Environment on its creation under Lee's close friend Lim Kim San in 1972.

⁹⁹ Shanmugaratnam's present position as Deputy Managing Director (Financial Supervision) actually places him as second-in-charge at MAS, as Dr. Teh Kok Peng's responsibilities have now been split between MAS, where he is responsible for international economic issues and GIC, where he concurrently holds the position of Deputy Managing Director, Special Investments and Real Estate Departments. This is a consequence of the restructure of MAS undertaken after Koh Beng Seng, Deputy Managing Director (Banking) resigned following a severe policy disagreement with Richard Hu and Lee Hsien Loong shortly after Lee was appointed as chairman of the MAS board and Koh Yong Guan, formerly 2nd Permanent Secretary in MOF, was appointed as Managing Director of MAS.

Lee is also reported to have contacted Lim Kim San, chairman of Singapore Press Holdings and one of Lee Kuan Yew's closest friends, to seek his agreement to his strategy for dealing with the ISD report. Lim apparently agreed with reservations, to support Lee.

Lee's strategy in this regard had apparently two foci; the ISD was intending to prosecute a senior officer on the basis of what amounted to "having an untidy desk"¹⁰⁰ and another on the basis of giving sound financial market advice which would actually benefit government policy,¹⁰¹ and the fact that the OSA's definition of secret, was so old and broad as to be outdated and, indeed, damaging to many of the more recent policy goals of government, particularly those oriented to a service economy. It was considered to be colonial legislation inappropriate for modern Singapore and required revision, albeit, conservative revision.

To counter the ISD report would take some time and so stalling tactics were implemented. These centred on one of MAS' central new policy tasks; the development of Singapore into a financial centre to challenge Hong Kong and Sydney and take second place after Tokyo as an East Asian financial centre. Central to this policy were the way in which government financial information was to be released, a print media with greater freedom to investigate and report on the financial sector with minimum supervision and the development of a perception in the foreign investment community that Singapore could be more open and the government less repressive than its general image overseas projected. This policy formed part of a general policy shift from a principal focus on manufacturing, petrol-chemicals and transport services to the greater development of the services sector and a knowledge economy; a principal component of which is less visible government control and oppression and a more open media environment. The strength of this strategy was that it was actually based on genuine policy concerns; none of the ministers involved are easily fooled, so any less rigorous a strategy could have had negative repercussions and have led to greater conflict. This strategy was supported by the MAS board and MOF, and subsequently accepted by the ministers involved, including Lee Hsien Loong in MTI and Richard Hu in MOF. Lee Hsien Loong was reportedly particularly concerned to protect Cheung and Daniel, as Daniel had previously been his Principal Private Secretary and Cheung was a close senior ally in the Administrative Service.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Reported to be Lee Ek Tieng's summation of the case against Shanmugaratnam. He apparently repeated this comment to Lee Kuan Yew and other ministers.

¹⁰¹ Paul Cheung's comments about using the leaked flash estimates to dampen a bull market.

¹⁰² Cheung a demographer, had reportedly been recommended to Lee as a suitable appointee as Chief Statistician by Dr. S. Vasoo, a conservative PAP MP aligned to Lee Hsien Loong and head of the Department of Social Work and Psychology at NUS. Cheung, who received his Ph.D from the University of Michigan in 1983, was a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Social Work and Psychology before his appointment as Chief Statistician. The sensitivity of this position is that the Department of Statistics has to keep two different sets of statistics; one for public consumption and one for internal government consumption.

As this strategy of studying the policy implications of the ISD report unfolded, it is important to note that neither Shanmugaratnam nor any of the others involved in the case were stood down or acted against. At the same time, Lee Ek Tieng and others were beginning to work on a solution to soften the ISD recommendations and establish grounds for either a review of the OSA, possibly based on those done in Britain and Malaysia, or to find another way of circumventing such "accidental" charges being layed again. This was to take some time, as there was neither unanimous support among permanent secretaries nor ministers about either the desirability of this approach or about not acting on the ISD report, prosecuting quickly and moving on. It seems that this issue caused dissent even within the group which is usually supportive of the hard "control" line advanced by Lee Kuan Yew; Lee Hsien Loong, Wong Kan Seng and Jayakumar. This conflict centred on a desire by some to make sure that the OSA regime was not compromised, even by senior Administrative Officers, and a recognition that prosecuting those involved could have two significant detrimental outcomes; alienation of a large number of serving, particularly younger AOs, among whom rumours of the case had already spread, and imperilling the new liberalisation of financial services policy and the associated knowledge economy policy drive. This conflict was not to be settled easily or quickly.

It appears that by mid-1993, Goh Chock Tong had become directly involved in this issue, as had the cabinet and the Council of Permanent Secretaries, and pressure mounted to find a solution that all could live with. All prosecutions under the OSA have to be approved by the Attorney-General,¹⁰³ so it was possible for the charges to be dropped by the Attorney-General withholding his consent. As it was widely known in the public service, academic and business communities that the publication of the flash estimates had been illegal, it was considered impossible to not prosecute; to do so would smack of special favours and hypocrisy. A compromise agreement was reach that all those directly involved in the case (Shanmugaratnam, Daniel, Bhaskaran, Foo, James) would be prosecuted. The two MTI officers who were less directly involved, Cheung and Quek, would not be charged or prosecuted. Those prosecuted were to plead not guilty and dispute the prosecution on the facts of the case, accept the judgement and not proceed to appeal if found guilty. The government's case was to be prosecuted by the Attorney-General himself and was to include a recommendation that a non-custodial sentence only be considered; that is, each of the accused, if found guilty were to be fined.

¹⁰³ Official Secrets Act, s.14(1). However, a person may be arrested and charged, or a warrant issued for his arrest without the approval of the Attorney-General, although no further proceedings may take place without that approval.

Twenty-two months after the publication of the flash estimates in the *Business Times*, the case was prosecuted before the head of the Subordinate Courts, Senior District Judge, Richard Magnus. Appearing before Magnus were the Attorney-General Chan Sek Keong for the prosecution, a rare event in itself as he is Magnus's official superior,¹⁰⁴ and some of Singapore's most eminent counsel, including Michael Khoo¹⁰⁵ and K. Shanmugam, both of whom are Senior Counsel.¹⁰⁶ Shanmugam is also a PAP MP who has also appeared for Lee Kuan Yew, most recently against Tang Liang Hong of the Workers' Party. The trial lasted 43 days and the final judgement was that all five were guilty and were fined. It is notable that Shanmugaratnam was fined \$1,500, an amount that would allow him to contest elections in future if required, almost certainly as a PAP candidate.

All returned to their previous positions, notably Shanmugaratnam to MAS and Daniels to SPH, with no further disciplinary internal proceedings taking place against them. Shanmugaratnam was subsequently promoted to Deputy Secretary (Policy) in the Ministry of Education under Lim Siong Guan in March 1995 to 1998, whereafter he returned to MAS where Lee Ek Tieng is deputy chairman of the board and Lee Hsien Loong is chairman. He now works closely with Lee Hsien Loong as a major policy player in the liberalisation of the financial system. Cheung and Quek continued in their positions at MTI, with Quek being later promoted prior to leaving MTI for the private sector in early 1995.¹⁰⁷

Daniel continues to be a key figure within the media and economic policy community, maintaining his position as editor of the *Business Times*, member of the Financial Reporting Standards Consultative Committee's Advisory Committee, chairman of the Singapore Business Awards Organising Committee, member of the National Library Board, of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Trade Development Board.¹⁰⁸ In 1998, he oversaw the redevelopment of the Straits Times Index, the daily trading indicator for the Singapore Stock Exchange.¹⁰⁹ Bhaskaran's career also continued unabated, resulting in his eventual appointment as Managing Director of SG Securities following the acquisition of Crosby Securities by Societe-Generale.

¹⁰⁴ The Attorney-general has control of all Subordinate Court appointments under the Subordinate Courts Act.

¹⁰⁵ Following a career in the Attorney-General's Chambers, Michael Khoo Kah Lip was appointed Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court before becoming a District Judge and finally head of the Subordinate Judiciary as Senior District Judge. He was transferred from this position to the Attorney-General's Chambers as a result of acquitting J. B. Jeyaratnam on all but one of a number of charges brought against him by the government in 1986, although the government denies this. He subsequently went into private practice. He is one of Singapore's most notable and respected lawyers.

¹⁰⁶ Singapore's equivalent of Queen's Counsel

¹⁰⁷ Quek was promoted to Senior Assistant Director in 1993 in the Research and Planning Division of MTI, the position he held on resigning from the civil service.

¹⁰⁸ "Appointment of New TDB Board", *TDB Press Release*, 11 January 1999

¹⁰⁹ "55-stock Straits Times Index unveiled", *Business Times*, 29 August 1998, p.1

The lack of impact of the court case on those involved has led some to conclude that the leaking of the flash estimate was deliberately undertaken in order to precipitate a conflict within the core executive and make starkly obvious the need to move beyond the command and control paradigm and to push for sweeping change in economic policy so that the services sector could be developed with a priority previously only accorded to the manufacturing and transport services sectors. Given the actors involved, this is certainly possible and if so, may indicate that the forces for change supporting the new paradigm are stronger within the civil service than the political executive and that the cohesiveness of the two groups has come under increasing strain as economic policy has been more critically debated and the full impact of the contemporary form of globalism becomes apparent. It also indicates that the political executive is in control of the bureaucratic executive, that this control is not absolute and must be negotiated and that the autonomy of both these components of the core executive is constrained by the other.

This was not, however, the end of the story. The issue of what to do about preventing such an "accidental" prosecution from again happening, had not been agreed upon. A group of permanent secretaries, led by Lee Ek Tieng, were still determined that the OSA had to be modified to both fit the new policy environment and to protect the Administrative Service from a rule bound, control oriented, unaccountable ISD. This particular incident seems to have increased awareness among some ministers and senior AS officers that the autonomy granted to the ISD by Lee Kuan Yew's personal patronage, its minister's willingness to accede to this and its virtual monopoly on internal security powers and resources was a two-edged sword.

While providing a valuable surveillance, intelligence and suppressive capability to government, the ISD was also a potential threat to the liberalisation of policies and political climate if it was to continue to narrowly define and operationalise its activities. The national risk profile and the lynchpin assumptions on which the ISD operated were partially outdated and possibly dangerous if they remained unchanged. If the ISD could not be made more formally accountable and influenced to change in the short term, as this may lead to direct confrontation with Lee Kuan Yew, some of its teeth had to be gently pulled to ensure that it did not bite innocent bystanders as it defended the state against perceived threats; particularly if those bystanders are busily changing the system so that it was at least seen to be, if not actually being, more open.

This was a conflict between those who recognised the broader social and political risks that were necessary in liberalising the financial, communications, media, academic, research and cultural sectors as the path to sustainably protecting Singapore's economic and political future, and those who wished to continue to separate social and

political control from economic policy as had been the case since 1963. With the move to a knowledge economy and service industry focus this partitioning of control policies could not work as the success of these economic sectors are assumed to be based on a more open education and social system within which risk taking and creativity could flourish. This is an extremely difficult cognitive shift for the risk averse inhabitants of the Singaporean core executive, particularly the more conservative who have been convinced of Lee Kuan Yew's vision of a "new society" based on his views on eugenics, race, culture and society-state dynamics.

The boundaries in this debate over the "new" economy and its social and political impact were not neat and, in typical Singaporean fashion were full of contradictions, not least of all because of the constant conflict between the paranoia that the official ideology fosters among the core executive and social, economic and political realities with which parts of it necessarily clashes. Many of the permanent secretaries and ministers involved in pushing for change were traditionally oriented to the Lee command and control approach, but were forced to admit that the new economic policies had to be pursued, albeit at some risk.

Those who were more oriented to greater openness and less (at least less obvious) control, were reluctant to greatly reduce the blatantly coercive power operationalised through the ISD and the OSA, but wanted greater control and accountability for the ISD, a distancing of the ISD from Lee Kuan Yew's personal influence and the development of a more contemporary and relevant risk profile based on contemporary security lynchpin assumptions. Changes to the OSA regime arising from the flash estimates case therefore became subsumed in a wider debate among the component groups in the core executive about the nature of social and political control, the loci of that control and the necessity to push ahead with financial sector and knowledge economy reforms. This debate was informed by the scenarios developed within MINDEF, information on social changes from the People's Association, the Feedback Unit, MPs, GROs and the Institute of Policy Studies and, at a more visceral level, by the presence of four opposition MPs in the parliament.

This debate still continues, but as an indication of progress a resolution of the OSA problem was eventually reached in 1997 following the success of an appeal by lawyer Christopher Bridges against his conviction for alleged offences under the OSA¹¹⁰ The Court of Appeal in this case was presided over by the Chief Justice. Again, the Attorney-General was personally involved in this case, although he did not appear in court. Instead, he sought clarification from the Court of Appeal on eight questions

¹¹⁰ This case will not be dealt with in detail here. See: "CJ rules on what information is not an official secret", *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 25 January 1997, p. 2

which would clarify the application of the OSA.¹¹¹ The Chief justice has, at December 1998, not responded to the questions. The solution was to take the responsibility of deciding on what a state secret was out of the hands of the ISD, ministers and AOs and transfer the responsibility to the courts. While this still does not stop the political executive from discretionary use if the ISD to arrest, imprison and charge people under the provisions of the ISA with passing state secrets as a breach of national security, it goes some way towards redefining how the OSA and, to a lesser degree, the ISA regimes will operate. It was a small victory for the more moderate group within the core executive, but did not deprive the ISD of any power and can be seen as a small step by the more conservative group to acknowledging that control strategies must change to suit the times. The nature of these changes is examined, in part, in Chapter Eight.

BEYOND THE PUBLIC SERVICE: QUASI-INSTITUTIONS AND THE CORE EXECUTIVE

Beyond the formal, constitutionally defined boundaries of the public sector, lie a number of state bodies, which may be called quasi-institutions, that are also essential to the functioning of the Singaporean core executive. These institutions are also, on the whole, bodies which operate on the basis of close collaboration between the public sector executive and the ministry. It is within the quasi-institutional core that the core executive's operations are most hidden, although there appear to be no genuine reasons why this should be so, other than an obsession with state secrecy. The quasi-legal institutions of relevance to this study comprise:

1. The Defence Council;
2. The Coordinating Board;
3. The Directorship and Consultancy Appointments Council;
4. NTUC-PAP Liaison Committee; and the
5. Committee of Permanent Secretaries.

The organisational relationship of these components to the political executive is detailed in Diagram 6.1.

The Defence Council


The Defence Council may have been established by a cabinet decision in 1965, as reported by one respondent, but this cannot be confirmed. All civil service officers interviewed denied its existence, although it was known off the record. The council

¹¹¹ Lim Li Hsien, "CJ to review prosecutor's questions", *The Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 1 March 1997, p. 3

reportedly meets quarterly principally for briefing on the state of external and internal security assessments. Meetings are reported as taking place in association with meetings of the Armed Forces Council. The council also meets when there is a perceived major threat to national security, either externally or domestically. It has no legislative basis and, like the British intelligence services until recently and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, is a construct of executive decree, established by a cabinet decision. In developing such agencies the Singaporean core executive does not come into conflict with the Westminster constitutional tradition. Unlike other Westminster states however, its internal and external intelligence services have been created as ministries in their own right although they are placed organisationally to appear as departments of MHA and MINDEF respectively. The ISD was established through the renaming and restructuring of the Police Special Branch in 1966. However, it is understood that the creation of the SID in 1970 was the result of approval of a cabinet minute in February 1970 which outlined the scope of its operations, its relationship to the SAF, MINDEF, the ISD and the SPF as well as its relationship with Malaysian, British, Australian and New Zealand external intelligence agencies which have a presence in Singapore.¹¹²

¹¹² This seems to be confirmed by comments by Toohy and Pinwill. See: Brian Toohy and William Pinwill, *Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service*, Melbourne, William Heinemann, 1989, p. 74

Diagram 6.2: Organisational Relationships of Quasi-Institutions to the Political Executive and Public Service:1999



In 1997, the Defence Council was reported to be chaired by Lee Kuan Yew, not Goh Chok Tong, although the deputy chairman was the Minister for Defence, Tony Tan. Following the success of the 1997 elections, Goh Chok Tong is reported to have assumed the chairmanship of the council. In 1998, the council included the Ministers for Defence (including the Second Minister for Defence), Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Information and the Arts, the permanent secretaries in all these departments, (including both MINDEF permanent secretaries), the Director SID, Chief of Defence Force, Director Joint Operations and Planning Directorate MINDEF and the Director ISD. Other members can be co-opted as required and it is reported that Dr. Goh Keng Swee and Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, both former Defence Ministers, have attended meetings in recent years.

The Defence Council has one standing committee, the Security and Intelligence Committee (SIC). The SIC is reported to meet monthly and to have general day-to-day responsibility for oversight of SID and authorising those SID activities that its Director must seek approval for under his operational directive. The SIC is chaired by the Minister for Defence and includes the Minister for Home Affairs, permanent secretaries from MINDEF and MHA, the Directors SID and ISD and the prime minister's principal private secretary.

In the event of a national emergency, the council's decisions, are carried out by a sub-group of the council membership known as the Executive Group chaired by the Permanent Secretary MINDEF and reporting to the Minister for Defence. In 1991 we know that the Executive Group's core members comprised the permanent secretaries of MINDEF, MHA, MFA and MITA¹¹³, but it is most probable that the group also comprises both the Director SID and the Director ISD as well as the Commissioner of Police and the Commissioner for Civil Defence as required. The Executive Group operates under the general direction of the Minister for Defence or, if required, the prime minister.

The Coordinating Board

The Coordinating Board, like the Directorships and Consultancy Appointments Council (DCAC), was a secret body until its existence was revealed in 1985 in the *Straits Times*.¹¹⁴ The exact composition and status of the Coordinating Board was not revealed at that time, but it seems that it was a cabinet committee or a cabinet committee that some senior bureaucrats also sat on. The function of the board was to coordinate major developments across the public sector. If Lee Kuan Yew, under

¹¹³ "Teams that tackled crisis", *Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 30 March 1991, p. 2

¹¹⁴ Leslie Fong, "Big 7 control 490 Government Companies", *Straits Times*, 6 April 1985, p. 11

whom the board was established, did not want to do this through the cabinet, it would be reasonable to assume that the board acted as some type of enlarged kitchen cabinet for Lee, operating under the general direction of a cabinet decision. In 1998, I was unable to ascertain if the board still existed, but from what indications were available, it seems that its functions have now been subsumed by cabinet and the prime minister's personal office. Vennewald still assumed it existed in 1994, but this assumption was also based in the 1985 information.¹¹⁵ The board may have been transformed into the standing ministerial committee, chaired by Lee Hsien Loong, which has oversight of very large government investments of S\$500 million or more, revealed in January 1998 by Dr. Richard Hu.¹¹⁶ This committee, which remained unnamed, consisted of Lee Hsien Loong (chairman), Dr. Hu, Dr. Tony Tan, the Minister for Trade and Industry (Then Lee Yock Suan) and the Minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo.

The Directorship and Consultancy Appointments Council

The Directorship and Consultancy Appointments Council (DCAC) is situated within the Temasek Holdings offices and is responsible for all appointments to the boards and senior executive positions of government companies, including the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) and subsidiary companies of all statutory boards. Appointments to DCAC are suggested by the council itself and approved by the cabinet. DCAC has no legislative basis and, indeed, was considered a government secret until April 1985, but it may have been operational since 1971.¹¹⁷ The council operates with the executive support of Temasek Management Services (TMS), also situated within the Temasek Holdings offices. TMS is primarily responsible for maintaining records on directors, potential directors and the most senior executives in GLCs, providing headhunting and recruitment services for DCAC and for producing and circulating that most secret of government documents, the *Directory of Government Linked Companies*.¹¹⁸ The directory does not include listings for the GIC group of companies which are listed in GIC's own, equally secret, directory, nor the MAS investment companies. CDAC has a three year appointment cycle and operates a roster so that the boards and senior management of each group of companies is reviewed every three years. At the end of the three year cycle the boards are usually reshuffled

¹¹⁵ Vennewald, *op. cit.*, p. 35

¹¹⁶ "Govt investments: Take the long-term view", *Straits Times*, 16 January 1998, p. 11

¹¹⁷ *Straits Times*, 6 April 1981, p. 7

¹¹⁸ When I approached TMS to purchase a copy of the *Directory of Government Linked Companies*, in 1995, the shocked receptionist could not deal with the inquiry and rushed out of the office for executive support. I was subsequently grilled by another officer as to how I had come to know about the publication. On being informed that it was mentioned in the academic literature, she was also shocked and informed me that it was a top secret government publication and under no circumstances could I obtain a copy. TMS has also instructed the NUS library, which holds some very old editions of the directory, that it is not to be lent, even to academic staff, as these directories are still secret. I subsequently obtained a copy of the 1991 directory from my own contacts.

although a group of senior core appointees remains in control of each group of holding companies, and a new *Directory of Government Linked Companies* is issued. The last full review cycle ended in December 1997 and the next will conclude in December 2000.

In 1998, the membership of CDAC was reported to include:¹¹⁹ Suppiah Dhanabalan, Chairman, Quek Poh Huat, President Temasek Holdings, Er Kwong Wah, Chairman TMS¹²⁰, Lee Hee Seng, Chairman Overseas Union Bank¹²¹, Dr. Andrew Chew, Chairman PSC,¹²² Tay Siew Choon, President ST Industrial Corporation,¹²³ Lee Ek Tieng, Managing Director of GIC,¹²⁴ Ho Ching, President and CEO ST Group, Eddie Teo, Permanent Secretary MINDEF, Alan Chan Heng Loon, Deputy Secretary, MFA, Goh Wee Chee, Ngiam Tong Dow, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Finance, Michael Fam, executive chairman Fraser and Neave, Lim Siong Guan, Permanent Secretary PMO and MOE and director Temasek Holdings, Koh Boon Hwee, executive chairman of Wuthelam Holdings, chairman Singapore Power and director Temasek Holdings, Ng Kee Choe, President of DBS Bank and Lau Chan Sin, Deputy President and Chief Operating Officer of DBS Bank. Of these members, Dhanabalan, Quek, Koh, Lim and Ngiam were also members of the board of directors of Temasek Holdings.

NTUC-PAP Liaison Committee

As detailed in Chapter Three, the NTUC leadership and the cabinet agreed in June 1980 to the establishment of an NTUC-PAP Liaison Committee and, as part of this arrangement, for the Secretary-General of the NTUC to be appointed as Minister Without Portfolio within the cabinet. The committee was chaired by the Secretary-General of the NTUC and included at that time, Goh Chok Tong, Ong Teng Cheong, S. Dhanabalan, and Ahmad Mattar, and four NTUC representatives headed by Devan Nair.¹²⁵ It was provided with administrative support by the Ministry of Labour. It is not known if the committee still exists as information on it could not be obtained from the NTUC or the PMO. However, it is likely, given the poor working relationship between firstly Lim Chee Onn and Lee Kuan Yew and then Goh Chok Tong and Ong Teng Cheong when they respectively headed the NTUC and the government, that the committee was allowed to lapse at some time after Goh became prime minister. If the

¹¹⁹ Based on off the record interviews. There was some inconsistency among respondents on this issue, so only those names that were consistent across respondents are noted here.

¹²⁰ Er is a former permanent secretary in the civil service, his last position before retiring in 1994 being Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education.

¹²¹ Also confirmed in a newspaper report. See: Conrad Raj, "Dhanabalan to leave SIA to head DBS", *Business Times*, 7 April 1998, pp. 1-2, p. 2

¹²² Among other appointments, Dr. Chew is also a former Head of the Civil Service, Permanent Secretary Health and PMO, chairman of the PSC and a director of Temasek Holdings.

¹²³ ST Industrial Corporation incorporates all the defence related GLCs except for ST Aerospace which provides aerospace services to both the military and civilian sectors.

¹²⁴ Lee Ek Tieng was also managing Director of MAS, Permanent Secretary (Special Duties), PMO and Head of the Civil Service.

¹²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 167

committee has lapsed, its functions are probably now incorporated jointly with the cabinet and ministerial committees on policy issues, and within the relationship between the Ministry of Manpower and the NTUC Research and Administration Unit.

Committee of Permanent Secretaries

This committee is the coordinating committee for permanent secretaries including the CEOs of the major boards; the civil service equivalent of cabinet. It is more loosely structured than its political equivalent, is chaired by the Head of Civil Service and reportedly meets fortnightly the day after cabinet meetings, or after cabinet meetings when necessary. It receives secretarial support from within the portfolio in which the Head of Civil Service is located, not from the PMO. It appears that this committee, like its British counterpart, is an administrative, not a legal construct, and is not underwritten by a cabinet decision. If necessary, the chief executives of statutory boards who are below permanent secretary level may be invited to attend meeting. This body is also supposed to be secret, with some respondents denying its existence and others acknowledging it. Again, there appears to be no reasonable rationale for making a coordination body, the equivalent of which exists in virtually every civil service in the world, a secret, but it apparently is.

CONCLUSIONS

The relationship between the political and public sector executives is a close, collaborative partnership. The higher civil service bureaucrats undoubtedly reside within the core executive and their power and responsibilities are negotiated rather than being the outcome of a uni-directional exercise of power from ministers to bureaucrats. While the political executive remains in control, it cannot do this at the expense of alienating the bureaucratic executive; each needs the other because of the lack of scope for replacements within each executive and the influence of scale; organisational, societal and geographical. The Administrative Service consisted of 247 officers in 1998 and of these 70 were at permanent secretary and deputy secretary level,¹²⁶ of whom 24 were at permanent secretary level.¹²⁷ It is these latter officers, who

¹²⁶ These officers were: Moses Lee Kim Poo, Lim Hsiu Mei, Lee Chiong Giam, Eddie Teo Chan Seng, Peter Ho Hak Ean, Chua Siew San, Tan Kee Tong, Lim Siong Guan, Chiang Chie Foo, Wee Heng Tin, Lam Joon Khoi, Lee Miew Boey, Tan Gee Paw, Wang Mong Lin, Ngiam Tong Dow, Koh Yong Guan, Jaspal Singh, Tan Yong Soon, Lee Ek Tieng, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Koh Beng Seng, Koh Cher Siang, Alan Ow Soon Sian, Tan Chin Tiong, Kishore Mahubani, Koh Yong Guan, Tan Yoke Meng, Peter Chan Jer Hing, Tan Boon Huat, Benny Lim Siang Hoe, Lu Cheng-Yang, Niam Chiang Meng, Choo Watt Bin, Lim Siam Kim, Christopher Chia, Tan Chin Nam, Lim Han Soon, Goh Kim Leong, Lau Wah Ming, Lam Chuan Leong, Low Puk Yeong, Lam Siew Wah, Tan Guong Ching, Tan Kim Siew, Tan Wee Kiat, Khaw Boon Wan, Peter Ong Boon Kwee, Finian Tan, Philip Yeo Liat Kok, Ho Meng Kit, Gong Wee Lik, Daniel Selvaratnam, Lim Neo Chian, Stephen Yeo Siew Chye, Lee Suan Hiang, Ong Ho Sim, Chong Lit Cheong, Yeo Khue Leng, Barry Desker, Ridzwan Dzafir, Wong Chooi Sen, Tan Tee How, Lim Soo Hoon, and Pek Siok Ching and Lim Hock Chuan. See: Singapore Ministry of Information and the Arts, *Singapore Government Directory January 1998*, Singapore, MITA, 1998

comprise the Committee of Permanent Secretaries, that are permanent members of the Singaporean core executive because of their executive portfolio responsibilities, their management of policy communities and networks and the intimate nature of their relationship with the political executive. In managing the bureaucracy and coordinating the policy networks that underlie the formal institutional framework, they work closely with the 16 cabinet ministers, eight ministers of state and five parliamentary secretaries that comprise the ministry.

As can be seen from the case study and the economic policy network outline, the dynamics of the relationship between the political and public sector executives is complex. It is, however, not characterised by bitter factionalisation or feuds. It is essentially a pragmatic, negotiated relationship which, regardless of splits within it, operates within a policy program to which all must adhere once changes to it are negotiated. Where conflict occurs it is usually over the direction of broad national strategy, personal style or policy means. The core executive culture is one wherein these conflicts are settled as quickly as possible, where entrenched schisms are strongly discouraged and members are expected to "get on with the job" because "we're all in the same boat" – a small boat. In the rare cases in which differences are irreconcilable, both ministers and senior public servants usually leave the public sector or move to another area, such as the GLC sector.

¹²⁷ Teo Ming Kian, Moses Lee Kim Poo, Eddie Teo Chan Seng, Peter Ho Hak Ean, Lim Siong Guan, Chiang Chie Foo, Tan Gee Paw, Ngiam Tong Dow, Koh Yong Guan, Lee Ek Tieng, Koh Cher Siang, Tan Chin Tiong, Kishore Mahubani, Koh Yong Guan, Peter Chan Jer Hing, Niam Chiang Meng, Tan Chin Nam, Goh Kim Leong, Lam Chuan Leong, Khaw Boon Wan, Philip Yeo Liat Kok, Ho Meng Kit, Barry Desker and Ridzwan Dzafir.

7. THE CORE EXECUTIVE, STATUTORY BOARDS, AND GOVERNMENT LINKED CORPORATIONS

This chapter is an analysis of who controls the statutory board and GLC sectors within the Singaporean public sector. As was illustrated in Chapter Three in the discussion of what and who might comprise the Singaporean core executive, several public sector analysts, including Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, raised the issue of these two sectors, but particularly the GLC sector, being unaccountable to any but the political executive. The hidden nature of the control of this "state directed capitalism" is a major feature of the Singaporean public sector. The secretiveness of the GLC sector is reinforced by most of its senior executives and board members being listed in a secret government publication, and with the sector being managed by two large state corporations chaired by PAP cadres, which issue no annual reports and are not publicly unaccountable, even to the parliament. This chapter also attempts to identify which board members from these two sectors are in the core executive and to examine the basis on which people are appointed to these boards as a means of understanding the way in which they relate to the core executive.

STATUTORY BOARDS AS A COMPONENT OF THE CORE EXECUTIVE

Statutory boards and GLCs are the executive arms of the public sector, conventionally viewed as being coordinated by the predominantly policy oriented civil service ministries. For this study an analysis of the directorships of 80 statutory boards and major standing committees from 1988-1998 was undertaken to examine who comprises the core group of board appointees in 1998 and how this group has developed over the 11 year period covered by the analysis. Data has been drawn principally from the January editions of the *Singapore Government Directory* and from newspapers, magazines and other sources where necessary, including searches of the *Straits Times* Newslink database.

The standing committees were derived from the *Singapore Government Directory* for this period, and included the Community Improvements Project Committee and its predecessor the Projects Committee, the Feedback Unit Supervisory Panel, the Publications Appeal Committee, the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony, the Singapore Council of Social Service and its successor, the National Council of Social Service, the Singapore Labour Foundation, the Singapore Medical Council, the governing bodies of all polytechnics

and universities and the Singapore Sports Council. A full list of the boards and committees included in the analysis is provided in Appendix 3. Throughout this chapter the term 'boards' will be used to describe all the bodies included in this analysis.

Two analyses will be undertaken of board representation; an initial brief analysis by business sector and a subsequent analysis of individual appointments. The first attempts to identify under what institutional arrangements, if any, appointments are made to boards, and the second to identify the group of people who have the greatest influence on statutory boards, particularly the core group of major boards broadly separated into those concerned with economic policy, social policy and political management.

Organisational Representation on Statutory Boards: 1988-1998

In the period 1988-1998, 5519 appointments of 1236 people, of whom 80 (6.4 per cent) were non-Singaporeans, to boards and major committees were identified. Of this group of appointees, their organisational affiliations were identified except for a group of 119 people, 58 per cent of whom were members of ethnic community related boards and who could not be adequately traced because of my inability to access the media and literature in Tamil, Malay and Gujarati¹.

In Table 7.1, a sectoral breakdown of board representation is presented. It is notable that no genuine community sector could be identified in the pattern of representation.² As can be seen from Table 7.1, representation on statutory boards is dominated by public sector entities. The total public sector component of board representation for the sample period on an annual basis is provided in Table 7.2. As can be seen, the public sector has almost two-thirds of the representation on boards. This is disaggregated by public sector components in Table 7.3.

As detailed in Table 7.3, statutory boards are dominated by boards themselves, represented either on other boards or with a board being highly represented on its own board. Ministries are also highly represented as one would expect; after all, the board are theoretically responsible to their ministry for the achievement of policy outcomes.

¹ This group of 69 people were members of the Sikh Advisory Board, the Hindu Advisory Board, the Hindu Endowments Board and MUIS.

² In the 11 year period covered by the analysis, only the Singapore Indian Fine Arts Society, Jamiyah, the Orchid Society of Southeast Asia, the Shaw Foundation, the Singapore Action Group of Elders, The Substation, Yayasan Mendaki and the YMCA were the only organisations represented on boards which could be broadly termed community groups; a total of 8 over 11 years. It is doubtful that a convincing argument could be made that even this representation is genuinely community representation.

**Table 7.1: Sectoral Representation on Statutory Boards in Singapore
1988-1998**

Type of Organisation	Number of agencies/companies in each type	Number of Positions	% of positions	Average Number of boards on
Statutory Boards	34	1322	23.95	6.9
Ministries	18	1065	19.3	12.17
Private sector Singaporean companies with > 5 positions	74	828	15.0	2.9
GLCs	16	495	8.97	7.8
Foreign companies	48	404	7.32	3.72
Singaporean companies with < 5 positions	158	407	7.38	-
Members of Parliament and former members	42	308	5.58	1.9
Unknown	118	303	5.5	-
Ministers and former ministers	30	216	3.91	1.7
NTUC	1	112	2.0	1.5
Judiciary	13	43	0.78	1.2
PAP cadres without discernable affiliations	3	16	0.29	2
TOTALS	555	5519	99.98	1.6

**Table 7.2: Total Public Sector Board Representation
1988-98³**

Year	Total Positions in Each Year ^f	Public Sector Positions in Each Year	Public Sector Positions As % of Annual Total
1988	353	231	65.43
1989	334	219	65.57
1990	331	217	65.56
1991	362	240	66.3
1992	395	254	64.3
1993	413	262	63.44
1994	709	415	58.53
1995	731	417	57.05
1996	485	325	67.01
1997	538	348	64.68
1998	868	520	59.9
TOTALS	5519	3448	63.43⁴

³ Positions occupied by Singapore Press Holdings appointees are excluded from this count.

^f Position totals fluctuate among years due to the restructuring of the board sector and the creation of new boards.

⁴ The difference in the totals for the percentage of positions between Table 7.2 and Table 7.3 is due to rounding error.

Table 7.3: Public Sector Representation on Statutory Boards in Singapore 1988-1998 by Sector Components

Type of Organisation	No. of Agencies, Persons	Number of Positions	% of Positions	Average Number of Boards On
Statutory Boards	34	1322	24.0	6.9
Ministries	18	1064	19.32	12.17
GLCs	16 ⁵	495	8.85	7.8
Members of Parliament and former members	42	308	5.58	1.9
Ministers and former ministers	30	216	3.91	1.7
Judiciary	13	43	0.78	1.2
TOTALS	153	3448	62.48	5.28

The other major public sector bureaucracy, the GLCs have slightly less than half of the representation of the ministries. The combined weight of serving and former MPs and ministers provides greater representation for this group than the GLCs; 9.49 per cent of positions, with the average representation of MPs and ministers being 1.9 and 1.7 respectively. The judicial arm of government is poorly represented, with 13 judges occupying 43 positions over the 11 year period on an average of 1.2 positions each.

Private sector Singaporean and foreign companies have greater representation than all public sector groups except for statutory boards and ministries. Total private sector representation accounts for 29.55 per cent of positions, three times the representation of the GLC sector. The NTUC, which has its own company and investment sector to manage, only accounts for two per cent of positions.

We can conclude from this data that the statutory boards were dominated by the public sector with minor private sector representation, accounting for 62.44 and 29.55 per cent respectively; a total of 91.99 per cent for the two groups with virtually no representation from community and business organisations, no GRO representation and a very low level of union representation. Such an analysis would challenge the proposition that the Singaporean public sector is characterised by statist corporatist arrangements, as community and union representation is negligible. Rather, it would support the view that it is elitist or oligarchic. This data, however, only provides us with an indication of the breadth of representation. We also need to disaggregate this data to understand what the actual pattern of representation tells us about the broad sectors already identified. It is also important to ask whether the individuals on each board are actually representing their organisations or are appointed in an individual capacity and, if so, what is the basis of so doing. As much as is possible, we should also

⁵ GLCs are counted in holding companies and as conglomerates incorporating subsidiary companies.

seek to determine what the basis of representation is when a person has multiple representation possibilities. In the next two sections we will examine these two aspects of the data: disaggregation of the public sector and the private sector representational data.

Personal Representation on Statutory Boards: 1988-1998

As already noted, 1246 people, of whom 80 (6.4 %) were non-Singaporeans, were identified as having been appointed to boards and major committees for the period of this analysis. When board secretary positions are removed, 1235 people remain. These were analysed in terms of the sector from which they originated and in terms of the number and nature of appointments.

As can be seen from Table 7.4 the highest representation came for Singaporean private sector companies. However, if the public sector classifications are amalgamated, this sector is the source of most appointees; 55.1 per cent.

The number of appointments held by individual board members varies greatly however as shown in Table 7.6 below. As can be seen, just over one quarter of appointments were for one year only for the sample period. However, 72 of these (5.8 per cent) were made in 1998 thus indicating that this proportion of the total sample may be new appointees rather than just one-off appointments. However one-off appointments seem to be common but small in number; in 1997, 13 of these appointments were made, 10 in 1996, 17 in 1995, 19 in 1994, 4 in 1993, 6 in 1992, 8 in 1991, 7 in 1990, 5 in 1989 and there were 30 people in 1988 who were either one-off appointments or who retired from a board by the following year. For example, by 1989, Anuar Hedwig had retired as director of the National Library,

Table 7.4: Sectoral Source of Individual Appointments to Statutory Boards in Singapore: 1988-1998

Sector	No. positions	% of total
Private Sector Singaporean Companies	248	20.1
Civil Service	172	13.9
Higher Education	130	10.5
Foreign Companies	122	9.9
Unknown	118	9.6
Boards	118	9.6
GLCs	106	8.6
MPs	67	5.4
MINDEF	42	3.4
SAF	32	2.6
NTUC	22	1.8
Industry Associations	14	1.1
Judiciary	12	1.0
School Representation	11	0.9
Cultural Organisations	09	0.7
Community Representation	05	0.4
Philanthropic Foundations	04	0.3
Religious Organisations	02	0.2
Town Council	01	0.1
TOTALS	1235	100.1

Table 7.5: Proportion of Public Sector Appointments to Statutory Boards in Singapore: 1988-1998

Sector	No. Positions	% of Total
Civil Service	172	13.9
Higher Education	130	10.5
Boards	118	9.6
GLCs	106	8.6
MPs	67	5.4
MINDEF	42	3.4
SAF	32	2.6
Judiciary	12	1.0
Town Council	01	0.1
TOTALS	680	55.1

Chew Seong Yean from the HDB, the prime minister had agreed to Dr. Augustine Tan's and Ng Kah Ting's desire to retire from political life by the next election and BG George Yeo had resigned from the regular SAF and was preparing to contest a by-election for the PAP. If we wholly discount the 1988 single appointments, this leaves us with a total of 72 of these appointments; only 5.8 per cent of the total. Of this sample, 88.2 per cent hold less than 10 board positions. As we are concerned with identifying

those at the core of the political system, in this analysis we will focus on the nature of those who have held more than 10 board positions over the 11 year period of the sample.

Table 7.6: Number of Appointments Held By Individual Members on Statutory Boards in Singapore: 1988-1998

No of Appointments	No. of people in category	% of total	Cumulative %
1	317	25.7	25.7
2	261	21.1	46.8
3	186	15.1	61.9
4	104	8.4	70.3
5	57	4.6	74.9
6	51	4.1	79
7	52	4.2	83.2
8	41	3.3	86.5
9	21	1.7	88.2
10	30	2.4	90.6
11	21	1.7	92.3
12	16	1.3	93.6
13	11	0.9	94.5
14	8	0.6	95.1
15	12	1.0	96.1
16	4	0.3	96.4
17	3	0.2	96.6
18	5	0.4	97
19	7	0.6	97.6
20	6	0.5	98.1
21-41	22	1.8	99.9
TOTALS	1235	99.9	99.9

Analysis of Highly Represented Board Members

Those board members holding 10 or more positions account for 11.8 per cent of the sample; a total of 145 people. A listing of these people is provided in Appendix 4. Of these, 59 (4.8 per cent) hold 15 positions or more. These people are listed in Table 7.7 below. A further eight people held 14 positions. These were Er Kwong Wah,⁶ Michael Fam Yue Onn,⁷ Hiew Siew Nam,⁸ Professor Tommy Koh Thong Bee,⁹ Leong Charn

⁶ A Permanent Secretary in the Civil Service, last appointment being to the Ministry of Education. He is now retired.

⁷ Chairman and Managing Director of Fraser and Neave, one of the largest food and beverage companies in Singapore. Fam is an Old Guard PAP cadre, close to Lee Kuan Yew and a long time member of the Council of Presidential Advisers of which he was still a member in 1998. He has been associated with the PAP since the late 1960s.

⁸ Hiew was formerly the Director of the Public Works Department in the Ministry of National Development. On retirement he received a position as Director, Project Completion, with SL Marina Centre Developments which he still holds.

⁹ Former Dean, Faculty of Law, NUS, then seconded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was Ambassador to the United States for almost 20 years. On returning to Singapore, Koh was appointed inaugural Director of the Institute of Policy Studies, then an Ambassador-at-Large and eventually chairman of the National Arts Council. He relinquished the NAC chair in 1997. He is one of the most urbane and internationally experienced of PAP proto-cadres, making him a force for moderation and a strong supporter of the need to liberalise many aspects of the regime's social, economic and political structures.

Huen,¹⁰ Lew Syn Pau,¹¹ Ridzwan Tuan Haji bin Haji Dzafir,¹² Patrick Yeoh Khwai Hoh.¹³ This provides us with both an historical perspective on those most influential on statutory boards as well as a contemporary view.

However, our concern is with the contemporary core executive. If we therefore restrict the analysis to those holding board positions in 1998, we are left with a total sample of 684 people holding 852 positions. Of these, only five have held nine positions or more over the 11 year sample period; Associate Professor Bernard Tan with 18 positions, Michael Fam Yue Onn with 14 positions, Dr Andrew Chew with 12 positions, Tan Kin Hian with 11 positions and BG (NS) Lam Joon Khoi with nine positions. Only 25 people have 3 positions or more, 20 have two positions and the remainder, 213, have only held one position. This would indicate that the 1998 appointments heralded the beginning of a substantial renewal in board memberships. This issue is pursued in the following analysis which examines the state of board membership in 1998 so that we can better identify the core people managing this part of the public sector.

¹⁰ Leong is a senior partner of RDC Architects, one of the most highly represented private sector firms on boards. He is assumed to be a PAP cadre. He has only held appointments since 1990 on the HDB, SPBOG and the STITB.

¹¹ Lew is an MP and was variously, Secretary, Metal Industries Workers Union (1988-93) and Assistant Director (Industrial Relations) in the NTUC Administration and Research Unit. He is now General Manager, Comfort Group, the privatised former NTUC Comfort Cooperative, still predominantly owned by NTUC interests.

¹² Ridzwan is a long time managing director of the TDB and a member of the Council of Presidential Advisers and the Presidential Council for Minority Rights. He also hold two non-residential ambassadorial appointments. He is an excellent example a public service proto-cadre.

¹³ Yeoh is a director on the DBS board and is president of DBS Bank. However, many of his former responsibilities have now been transferred to the American CEO appointed in 1997, John Olds and his board representation is declining. Olds is not represented on any board, but was appointed to the DBS board after the survey period.

Table 7.7: Board Members With 15 or More Positions on Statutory Boards in Singapore: 1988-1998

NAME	No. Pos.	ORGANISATION
1 Tan Chin Nam	44	EDB, GM
2 Cham Tao Soon, Dr	41	NTI, President
3 Yu-Foo Yee Shoon	39	MP-NTUC, VP
4 Cheong Siew Keong, Dr	34	MRTC
5 Tan Swan Beng, Dr Prof. (Adj.)	32	MND, PWD, DG
6 Lim Pin, Prof.	31	NUS, VC
7 Liu Thai Ker	30	HDB, CEO, DS
8 Othman bin Haron Eusofe	28	MP-NTUC, ASG
9 Chen Seow Phun, Dr John	27	MP
10 Lee Chang Leng, Brian, Prof.	26	NTI, Elec. & Electronic Engineering
11 Lee Ek Tieng	26	MOF, PS (Revenue Div)
12 Chong Yew Fook, Charles	24	MP
13 Yeo Seng Teck	24	TDB, CEO
14 Yip Soon Kwong, John	24	MOE, Director of Education
15 Hu Tsu Tau, Dr Richard	23	Minister for Finance
16 Tay A K, Keith	23	KPMG Peat Marwick
17 Chandra Das, S	22	MP
18 Goh Kim Leong	22	MOE, PS
19 Lim Swee Say	22	NCB, GM
20 Lee Hee Seng	21	PSC member & OUB, MD
21 Pek Hock Thiam	21	STB, ED
22 Zulkifli bin Mohammed	21	MP-Political Secretary, MCD
23 Chew Chin Tiong, A/P Ernest	20	NUS, Head, Department of History
24 Goh Chee Wee	20	MP
25 Koh Boon Hwee	20	HP Singapore
26 Sim Kee Boon, DUBC, PJG	20	Keppel Corp & former Head of Civil Service
27 Su Guaming, Dr	20	MINDEF, DSO, Director
28 Wong Lee Hoong	20	TH-Singapore Treasury Building
29 Hong Hin Kay, Albert	19	RSP Arch, Planners, Engineers
30 Lim Hock San	19	CAAS, DG
31 Lim Yong Wah	19	DBS Bank, Exec. VP
32 Tan Eng Beng	19	MOL, Lab Welfare Div, Div. Dir.
33 Tan Guong Ching	19	MCL, PS
34 Tan Wee Hin, Leo, Prof.	19	NIE, Dir & Dean, Schl Science
35 Wee Chow Hou, A/P	19	NUS, Dean, Bus Admin Faculty
36 Khattar, Sat Pal	18	Khattar Wong & Part, Solicitors
37 Law Song Seng, Dr	18	VTIB, Director
38 Lee Kim Poo, Moses	18	SBA, GM, DS
39 Othman Dunu bin Wok, Tuan Haji	18	Former minister & NTUC-Overseas Investment
40 Tan, Bernard A/P BBM, PPA(P), PBM	18	NUS, Dir Office Stud Affairs
41 Goh Keng Swee, Dr	17	MP- former Deputy PM
42 Koh Cher Siang	17	MCD, PS
43 Lua Cheng Eng	17	NOL, CEO
44 Lee Chiong Giam	16	PA, Chief ED
45 Lee Keh Sai	16	K S Lee & Associates, Principal Consultant.
46 Sinnakaruppan, Ramasamy	16	MP-NTUC, Research Unit, Deputy Director
47 Teo Hwee Choo	16	MOE, Director, Admin. Div.
48 Chan Sek Keong	15	Attorney-General
49 Chen Min Liang, Peter	15	SHELL, Eastern Petrol.
50 Ho Meng Kit, BG (NS)	15	EDB, MD
51 Lim Siong Guan	15	MINDEF, PS
52 Lim, Gloria, Prof.	15	NUS, Dept. Botany
53 Pek Beng Choon, Col. (NS)	15	NUH, CEO
54 Tan Chee Chuan, Steven	15	SAMAS Management Consult, MD.
55 Tan Chin Tiong BG (NS)	15	MHA, PS
56 Tan Kim Siew, Dr Col. (NS)	15	MND, Director, Housing
57 Tan Yam Pin	15	Asia Pacific Breweries, Group GM
58 Tien Sing Cheong	15	INTRACO, COO
59 Wang Kai Yuen, Dr	15	Xerox Sing. Software Centre

STATUTORY BOARD MEMBERSHIP IN 1998

As outlined in Table 7.8, in 1998 there were 868 positions on the sample boards, filled by 667 appointees. Of this group, the public sector accounted for 375 people filling 524 positions, the private sector for 197 people filling 241 positions and there were 67 people from unknown organisations filling 70 positions. The remainder came from the NTUC, schools, community and industry organisations. Thus the public sector accounted for 58.8 per cent of the total people and 59.9 per cent of board positions and the private sector accounted for 31.4 of the appointees and 48.7 per cent of the positions. Appointees of unknown origin accounted for 9.8 per cent of appointees and 8.2 per cent of positions. Forty-three (64.2 per cent) of the unknown appointees were members of ethnic community advisory boards and not of major economic and social policy boards. A summary of board representation by sector is provided in Table 7.8.

Table 7.8: Summary of Major Sectoral Representation on Statutory Boards in Singapore: 1998

Sector	No. people	% of people	No. positions	% of positions
Public Sector	375	56.1	524	60.42
Private Sector	197	29.5	241	27.55
NTUC	11	1.6	14	1.6
Community Organisations	15	2.3	16	1.9
Philanthropic Trusts	2	0.3	2	0.2
Hong Kong govt.	1	0.15	1	0.12
Unknown	66	9.9	70	8.1
	667	99.85	868	99.89

With 59.9 per cent of board positions filled by public sector appointees in 1998, boards are now slightly less dominated by this sector when compared to the 11 year average of 63.43 per cent, indicating that the proportion of public service appointees has declined slightly. This may reflect the recent trend in public sector representation. Such representation was almost constant from 1988-1993, fluctuating only 2 per cent in this period and then dropped by almost 5 per cent in 1994 and a further 1.5 per cent in 1995. It then leapt by 10 per cent in 1996 to 67.01 per cent and then declining to its 1998 level. This may indicate that there is emerging either a reluctance by non-public sector people to be involved in public sector management, a reluctance by government to involve people outside its sphere of control, or a congruence of both trends. The 1998 data certainly provides no evidence of an emerging trend towards greater involvement by those outside the government's sphere of control.

Table 7.9: Singapore Statutory Board Membership By Sector in 1998

Sector	No. people	% of people	No. positions	% of positions
Higher Education	83	12.4	113	13
GLCs	61	9.1	76	8.8
Ministries	58	8.7	70	8.1
Boards	56	8.4	87	10.0
MPs & Ministers	42	6.3	63	7.3
Property	24	3.6	27	3.1
Finance	23	3.4	33	3.8
Permanent Secretaries	22	3.3	48	5.5
MINDEF	22	3.3	24	2.8
Deputy Secretaries	20	3.0	28	3.2
Architects	17	2.5	20	2.3
Medical	17	2.5	19	2.2
Lawyers	15	2.2	23	2.6
Media	12	1.8	14	1.6
NTUC	11	1.6	14	1.6
IT	11	1.6	13	1.5
Accountants	10	1.5	15	1.7
Petrochemicals	9	1.4	10	1.2
Electronics	9	1.4	11	1.3
Industry associations	9	1.4	9	1.0
Manufacturing	9	1.4	11	1.3
Engineers	6	0.9	8	0.9
Food & Beverage	7	1.0	9	1.0
Judiciary	5	0.7	7	0.8
Arts	6	0.9	6	0.7
SAF	5	0.75	7	0.8
Trading	5	0.75	5	0.6
Community organisations	5	0.75	5	0.6
Independent schools	3	0.5	4	0.5
Dentists	3	0.5	3	0.35
Tourism	2	0.3	2	0.2
Philanthropic Trusts	2	0.3	2	0.2
Retail	2	0.3	2	0.2
Town Councils	1	0.15	1	0.12
Hong Kong govt.	1	0.15	1	0.12
Transport	1	0.15	1	0.1
pharmaceuticals	1	0.15	1	0.1
Jewellery	1	0.15	1	0.1
Management consultants	1	0.15	1	0.1
Shipping	1	0.15	1	0.1
Social research	1	0.15	1	0.1
Recreation	1	0.15	1	0.1
Religious Organisations	1	0.15	1	0.1
Unknown	66	9.9	70	8.1
TOTALS	667	99.85	868	99.89

Public Sector Representation

An analysis of public sector representation on boards is provided in Table 7.10.

Table 7.10: Public Sector Representation on Statutory Board in Singapore 1998

Sector	No. people	% of people	No. positions	% of positions
Higher Education	83	12.4	113	13
Boards	56	8.4	87	10.0
GLCs	61	9.1	76	8.8
Ministries	58	8.7	70	8.1
MPs & Ministers	42	6.3	63	7.3
Permanent Secretaries	22	3.3	48	5.5
Deputy Secretaries	20	3.0	28	3.2
MINDEF	22	3.3	24	2.8
Judiciary	5	0.7	7	0.8
SAF	5	0.75	7	0.8
Town Councils	1	0.15	1	0.12
TOTALS	375	56.1	524	60.42

As can be seen, the higher education sector, dominated by appointees from NUS, had more board directorships than any other part of the public sector, followed by board appointees, GLC, ministry and current and former MPs. It is notable that the level of representation from MPs is higher than that of permanent secretaries, although slightly less than permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries combined. Representation from the SAF is particularly low, although when combined with MINDEF, increased to 3.6 per cent, the highest for any one ministry.

Private Sector Representation

An analysis of private sector representation on statutory boards is provided in Table 7.11.

Representation from this sector was dominated by the property and finance sectors. If the property, architects, engineering and tourism sectors are combined as property related industries, this combined sector would account for 6.3 per cent of private sector representation. If we also combined the finance and accountant categories into a combined finance sector category, this would represent 5.5 per cent of directors. Therefore, these combined property and finance categories would account for 12 per cent of the total directorships and 43.6 per cent of the private sector directorships.

Table 7.11: Private Sector Representation on Statutory Board in Singapore 1998

Sector	No. People	% of People	No. Positions	% of Positions
Property	24	3.6	27	3.1
Finance	23	3.4	33	3.8
Architects	17	2.5	20	2.3
Medical	17	2.5	19	2.2
Lawyers	15	2.2	23	2.6
Media	12	1.8	14	1.6
IT	11	1.6	13	1.5
Accountants	10	1.5	15	1.7
Petrochemicals	9	1.4	10	1.2
Electronics	9	1.4	11	1.3
Industry associations	9	1.4	9	1.0
Manufacturing	9	1.4	11	1.3
Engineers	6	0.9	8	0.9
Food & Beverage	7	1.0	9	1.0
Trading	5	0.75	5	0.6
Dentists	3	0.5	3	0.35
Tourism	2	0.3	2	0.2
Retail	2	0.3	2	0.2
Transport	1	0.15	1	0.1
Pharmaceuticals	1	0.15	1	0.1
Jewellery	1	0.15	1	0.1
Management consultants	1	0.15	1	0.1
Shipping	1	0.15	1	0.1
Social research	1	0.15	1	0.1
Recreation	1	0.15	1	0.1
TOTALS	197	29.5	241	27.55

Union Representation

NTUC representation was by 11 people for 14 positions. However, this was supplemented by nine MPs with NTUC affiliation as employees or office holders and by Ng Ser Miang who is a director of several GLCs and of the NTUC Fairprice Co-operative. Thus NTUC interests are represented by 20 people in 36 positions, four per cent of the total. This is obviously not a significant level of representation, although the affiliation of several MPs with the NTUC compensates for this. There was no representation from individual unions; all representation was from the NTUC meritocratic elite.

Community Sector Representation

Representation from the community sector is shown in Table 7.12 below.

The inclusion of independent community organisations on statutory boards is not typical of representation from this sector. Six directorships come from the arts

category; Robert Lau Kuo Kwong, Executive Chairman of the Singapore Arts Centre, T. Sasiathan the Artistic Director of The Substation theatre, the Chinese language writer

Table 7.12: Community Sector Representation on Statutory Board in Singapore 1998

Sector	No. people	% of people	No. positions	% of positions
Arts	6	0.9	6	0.7
Community organisations	5	0.75	5	0.6
Independent schools	3	0.5	4	0.5
Religious Organisations	1	0.15	1	0.1
TOTALS	15	2.3	16	1.9

Goh Sin Tub, Dorai Natarajan, member of the executive committee of the Singapore Indian Fine Arts Society¹⁴ and the owners of two fashion firms; Sarkasi Said Tzee and Su Yeang. Of this group, the Singapore Arts Centre and The Substation are substantially government funded and Lau is a former civil servant, once chairman of the Singapore Theatre Trust and an employee of the Institute of System Science, so these organisations are at best quasi-government. The community organisations' directors comprise Kenneth Tan from the Singapore Film Society, Dr. Isa Hassan and Ali Sumardi of Yayasan Mendaki, Yusof Alsagoff of the Orchid Society of Southeast Asia and Ong Yong Wan of the Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service. Of these organisation, Mendaki and the Red Cross are government controlled and are not genuine community organisations. However, Kenneth Tan is a member of the Film Appeal Committee and Yusof Alsagoff is a member of the National Parks Board, and both come from organisations that are genuine community organisations without overt or covert government control.¹⁵ The three directors from independent schools also cannot be deemed to be independent of government influence, as over 80 per cent of their funding comes from the Ministry of Education which also has final oversight and control of them. Members of the boards of independent schools must also be approved by the Minister for Education prior to appointment. These schools are also strongly affiliated with the governing elite. The one religious organisation identified, the Roman Catholic Church, is a target of covert government control. Other religious organisations from the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities do have representation on the Council for Religious Harmony and on minor boards, but they could not be identified in this survey.

No GROs are represented on statutory boards.

¹⁴ Dorai Natarajan was previously president of the Indian Fine Arts Society, but continued his board membership after relinquishing this position.

¹⁵ It is taken for granted that, as with all civil society organisations, these societies are under the final control of the Registrar of Societies.

Organisations Most Represented on Boards

The organisations with the highest level of representation on statutory boards in 1998 are listed in Table 7.13 below. These organisations account for 409 directorships and 47 per cent of the total board seats. As can be seen, the only private sector organisations among this elite group are RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers, Overseas Union Bank, Esso and Singapore Press Holdings (SPH). As the latter is privately held but government controlled, it is treated in this study as a GLC. The only other technically, non-public sector organisation represented is the NTUC, but it is effectively a part of the government. The most highly represented source of directors is from NUS, followed by the defence organisations, MPs and the Ministry of Education. If former MPs are combined with sitting MPs, this group was the second highest source of board directors with 7.2 per cent of representation.

Table 7.13: Organisations Most Represented on Statutory Board in Singapore 1998

Organisation	No. Boards Represented on	No. positions held	% of total positions
National University of Singapore	34	66	7.6
Ministry of Defence & Singapore Armed Forces	31	37	4.3
Members of Parliament	24	43	5.0
Ministry of Education	22	29	3.3
Nanyang Technological University	17	22	2.5
National Trades Union Congress	14	14	1.6
Ministers and Former Ministers	12	19	2.2
Ministry of Health	11	29	3.3
Economic Development Board	9	15	1.7
Ministry of Information and the Arts	9	9	1.0
Singapore Press Holdings	8	9	1.0
National University Hospital	8	8	0.9
RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers	8	8	0.9
Ministry of Home Affairs	7	9	1.0
Ministry of Finance	7	9	1.0
Attorney-General's Chambers	7	7	0.8
Housing and Development Board	7	7	0.8
Prime Minister's Office	7	7	0.8
Health Corporation of Singapore	6	17	2.0
Ministry of Community Development	6	7	0.8
Public Works Department	6	6	0.7
Overseas Union Bank	6	6	0.7
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	5	6	0.7
Esso	5	5	0.6
Singapore Polytechnic	4	5	0.6
Ministry of Law	3	6	0.7
National Archives Board	2	4	0.5
		409	47%

Table 7.14: Highest Representation by Persons on Statutory Boards in Singapore: 1998

No	Name	Pos. 1988-1998	Organisation	Sector	No. Boards
1	Tan Wee Hin, Leo, Prof. PPA(E), PBM	19	NIE, Director	Education	6
2	Niam Chiang Meng PPA(P)	09	MITA, PS	PS	6
3	Cheong Siew Keong, Dr BBM, BBM(L)	34	NUH, Chairman	GLC	5
4	Sinnakaruppan, Ramasamy	16	MP, Assist. Secretary-General, NTUC	MP	5
5	Tan Kim Siew, Dr. Col. (NS)	15	URA, CEO, Chief Planner	Board, CEO	5
6	Su Guaning, Dr.	20	MINDEF, DS (Technology)	DS, MINDEF	4
7	Khattar, Sat Pal PPA(P)	18	Khattar Wong & Partners	Lawyers	4
8	Chew G K, Andrew, Dr.	12	PS, PMO (Retired)	PS	4
9	Yeo Siew Chye, Stephen	11	NCB, CEO	Board, CEO	4
10	Lam Joon Khoi, BG (NS)	09	MOE, DS (Policy)	DS	4
11	Ng Chee Tat, Philip	09	Far East Organisation, CEO	Property	4
12	Wee Heng Tin PPA(P), PPA(G), PBS	08	MOE, Director-General of Education	PS	4
13	Wong Nang Jang	08	OCBC, Executive Vice President	Finance	4
14	Chiang Chie Foo	06	MOE, PS (2 nd)	PS	4
15	Cham Tao Soon, Dr.	41	NTU, President	Education	3
16	Yu-Foo Yee Shoon	39	MP, Dep. Secretary-General, NTUC	MP	3
17	Lim Pin, Prof.	31	NUS, Vice Chancellor	Education	3
18	Liu Thai Ker, PJG PPA(E)	30	RSP Architects, Planners & Engineers	Architects	3
19	Chong Yew Fook, Charles	24	MP, Adviser, Pasir Ris CCC	MP	3
20	Lim Swee Say	22	MP, Dep. Secretary-General, NTUC	MP	3
21	Lee Hee Seng, PJG, DUBC	21	PSC Chairman & OUB Chairman	Finance	3
22	Chew Chin Tiong, Ernest, A/Prof.	20	NUS, Department of History	Education	3
23	Sim Kee Boon, DUBC, PJG	20	Executive Chairman, Keppel Corp & former PS, Head of Civil Service	GLC	3
24	Lim Hock San, PPA(E)	19	United Industrial Corp., President & CEO	Manufacturing	3
25	Tan Eng Heng BBM, BBM (L)	19	Asia Life Insurance Society, Chairman	Finance	3
26	Lee Kim Poo, Moses	18	MCD, PS	PS	3
27	Chan Sek Keong	15	Attorney General	PS, AG	3
28	Ho Meng Kit, BG (NS)	15	EDB, Managing Director	Board	3
29	Lim Choo San, Michael	13	Price Waterhouse, Managing Partner	Accountants	3
30	Fang Ai Lian	11	Ernst & Young, Managing Partner	Accountants	3
31	Selvaratnam, Daniel	11	EDB, Assist. MD (Internation. Policy)	Board	3
32	Tan Kin Lian PBM	11	NTUC Income	NTUC	3
33	Desker, Barry, PPA(E)	10	TDB, CEO	board, CEO	3
34	Koh Yong Guan PJG	10	MOH, PS & MD MAS	PS	3
35	Lee Suan Hiang, PPA(P)	10	SPSB, CEO	Board, CEO	3
36	Nee Yeh Ching, Andrew, Prof.	10	NUS, Dean, Faculty of Engineering	Education	3
37	Tan Ee Ping	10	Tan Ee Ping & Partners, Principal	Lawyers	3
38	Arun Mahizhnan	07	Dep. Director, Inst. of Policy Studies	Board	3
39	Magad, Ahmad Mohamed	06	MP & II-IV Singapore, MD	MP	3
40	Chee Yam Cheng, A/P PPA(P)	04	MOH, Dep. Dir, Medical Services	Ministry	3
41	Wang Gungwu, Prof.	04	NUS, Chair, Institute of East Asian Political Economy	Education	3
42	Cheong, Benedict	03	MHA, Director, (Operations), SPF	Ministry	3
43	Leong Keng Thai	03	TAS, Director-General (DS level)	Board	3
44	Seng Han Thong	03	MP, NTUC, Director (Organisational Management) & GM, Chinese, SPH	MP	3
		654			153

GLCs AS A COMPONENT OF THE CORE EXECUTIVE

Two analyses of the leadership of GLCs were undertaken. One was based on the 1991 *Directory of Government Linked Companies (DGLC)* and the other on annual reports for the financial years 1996-97 and 1997-98, whichever was most recently available for each

company at the time fieldwork research was undertaken. Attempts to obtain a copy of any post-1991 *Directory of Government Linked Corporations*¹⁶ met with no success. Vennewald has already conducted an analysis of GLCs based on the 1991 *DGLC* and this study did not wish to replicate it. However, an analysis was conducted to verify Vannewald's findings as he did not have access to the full 1991 *DGLC* as I have. Vannewald's focus was also on testing a particular theoretical construct; Evers and Schiels' neo-marxist, class formation oriented 'Strategic Group Concept'.¹⁷ The focus of the present study, while partially concerned with the same group analysed in Vannewald's work, is focussed on an empirical analysis of who governs Singapore and how they govern and has no concern for class formation theory. Rather, my concern is to not only identify the core executive, but to use this analysis of GLCs to identify particular strategies of governance used by the core executive in managing this component of the public sector and comparing them with those strategies identified in other analyses within the study. This analysis of the 1991 *DGLC* is therefore oriented to identifying the core executive, its governance strategies and its linkages throughout the hegemonic political and public management system. This analysis is augmented by a more contemporary analysis of those GLCs, the annual reports of which could be obtained in mid-1998.

The GLC Leadership in 1991

In the 1991 *DGLC*, 428 companies are listed, 343 of which are under GLC holding companies and 85 of which are under the control of statutory boards. The *DGLC* does not list companies associated with MAS, the GIC or Singapore Telecommunications, therefore the total GLC sector cannot be covered. Of those, companies listed, 33 are joint venture companies with foreign entities in which GLCs have a minority stake. These have been excluded from this study, leaving 395 companies of interest. The placement of these companies by their holding companies, boards and ministries is detailed in Table 7.15 below.

Table 7.15: Numbers of GLCs by Holding Company, Ministry and Board 1991

HOLDING COMPANY OR BOARD	NO. COMPANIES	% OF TOTAL
Temasek Holdings (Private) Ltd	212	49.5
Singapore Technologies Holdings	71	16.6
MND Holdings (Private) Ltd	54	12.6
Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	6	1.4

¹⁶ This is the new title for what was previously the *Directory of Government Linked Companies*.

¹⁷ Werner Vennewald, "Technocrats in the State Enterprise System of Singapore", *Asia Research Centre Working Paper*, 32, November 1994, p.4

Commercial and Industrial Security Corporation	1	0.2
Economic Development Board	3	0.7
Housing And Development Board	5	1.2
Jurong Town Corporation	9	2.1
National Computer Board	2	0.5
National University of Singapore	1	0.2
Port of Singapore Authority	21	4.9
Post Office Savings Bank	6	1.4
Public Utilities Board	1	0.2
Singapore Broadcasting Corporation	2	0.5
Sentosa Development Corporation	1	0.2
Singapore Institute of Standards and Research	4	0.9
Singapore Tourist Promotion Board	6	1.4
Telecommunications Authority of Singapore	11	2.6
Trade Development Board	9	2.1
Urban Redevelopment Authority	3	0.7
TOTAL	428	99.9

The four major GLC holding companies in 1991 were Temasek Holdings (Private) Ltd, Singapore Technology Holdings, MND Holdings, Health Corporation of Singapore, all allocated to the MOF Revenue Division for oversight.¹⁸ In analysing these companies, they were each allocated a level of importance, to assist in identifying where the core GLC appointees were allocated. These levels ranged from 1 (the four major holding companies) to 6, the least important level comprised of small companies. The definition of each level is detailed in Appendix 5. The total number of GLCs by level is detailed in Table 7.16 below. These levels were used to calculate a rank based on the importance and spread of directorships held by each director using the formula:

$$\text{Director's Rank} = \frac{\text{Mean Rank of Companies}}{\text{Number of Companies}}$$

Using this formula, the lower the director's score, the higher the rank. Therefore, the most important directors have scores between 0-0.5 and the least important directors have a score of 6.

Table 7.16: Number of GLCs by Level in Sample 1991

Level	1	2	3	4	5	6	TOTAL
No. Companies	4	10	38	156	147	40	395
%	1%	2.5%	9.6%	39.5%	37.2%	10.2%	100

The boards of the GLCs included in this sample, which provides the best sample currently available,¹⁹ provides 1199 directorships (including chairmanships) filled by

¹⁸ The Directorship and Consultancy Appointments Council, *Directory of Government Linked Companies 1991*, Singapore, Temasek Management Services, 1991, pp. 293-297

¹⁹ Even if all publicly available records were purchased for all GLCs, this would only provide a partial sample as the majority are still not publicly listed and the MAS and GIC companies are all privately held, many of them outside

574 people of whom 263 were appointed as chairmen. Of these people, 48 come from the civil service, 41 from the military,²⁰ 99 come from statutory boards, 42 come from the private sector and the organisational affiliation of 97 is unknown. The breakdown of directors by sector is provided in Table 7.17 below.

Table 7.17: 1991 GLCs: Representation by Sector

CATEGORY	NUMBER OF DIRECTORS	% OF TOTAL DIRECTORS	NO. OF BOARD SEATS	% OF TOTAL BOARD SEATS
GLCs	209	36.4	578	48.22
Boards	99	17.2	269	22.5
Unknown	97	16.9	118	9.84
Civil Service	48	8.3	88	7.35
Private Sector	42	7.3	54	4.47
Military	41	7.1	44	3.67
Foreign	29	5.1	29	2.42
MPs and Ministers	8	1.4	16	1.33
Judiciary	1	0.2	3	0.25
TOTALS	574	99.9	1199	100.05

As shown in Table 7.18 below, altogether, the public sector completely dominates GLC directorships with 70.7 per cent of directorships.

Given that available public sector documentation was exhausted in identifying all directors, it is most probable that the majority of those classified as unknown are from the private sector, although some may be from the GIC and a few from publicly unlisted public sector positions. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the true private sector representation is close to 24.2 per cent.

Table 7.18: Public and Private Sector Breakdown of GLC Directorships 1991

SECTOR	NUMBER OF DIRECTORS	% OF TOTAL DIRECTORS
Public Sector	406	70.7
Private Sector	42	7.3
Unknown	97	16.9
Foreign	29	5.1
TOTALS	574	100

Singapore. Therefore the 1991 DGLC, although still a secret document and now dated, provides the best sample currently available.

²⁰ The military group includes the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).

As can be seen from the above analyses, the GLC sector accounts for roughly one-third of the directors and statutory boards for one-sixth; the two sectors combined provide 54.6 per cent of directorships.²¹ The representation of all directors by their organisational affiliation is provided in Table 7.19, GLC representation is shown in Table 7.20, and statutory board representation in Table 7.21 and ministry representation in Table 7.22.

Singapore Technologies and the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) are the only organisations with dominant positions; 14.26 and 11.84 per cent of the total directorships held respectively – 26.1 per cent combined. These figures are approximately proportionate to the number of GLCs in each of these groups; 16.6 per cent in the Singapore Technologies Group and 12.6 per cent in the MND Holdings Group which consists only of DBS and its subsidiaries.²²

²¹ In this analysis, although the Post Office Savings Bank is technically a statutory board, it is treated as a GLC as it was amalgamated with the Development Bank of Singapore in 1998.

²² The Directorships and Consultancy Appointments Council, *Directory of Government Linked Companies 1991*, Temasek Management Services, Singapore, 1991, pp. 239-282

Table 7.19: 1991 GLCs: Representation by Organisation

CATEGORY	NUMBER OF DIRECTORS	% OF TOTAL DIRECTORS	NO. OF BOARDS	% OF BOARD SEATS HELD
Sing. Technologies	34	5.9	171	14.26
DBS	39	6.8	142	11.84
Unknown	100	17.4	118	9.84
Keppel Group	20	3.5	51	4.25
SIA	26	4.5	50	4.17
PSA	29	5.1	45	3.8
Other Private Sector	34	5.9	46	3.8
NOL	9	1.6	45	3.75
MINDEF	41	7.1	44	3.67
Foreign	29	5.1	29	2.42
Sembawang Group	8	1.4	28	2.34
Temasek Holdings	10	1.7	28	2.34
TAS	13	2.3	26	2.17
JTC	7	1.2	25	2.1
HDB	10	1.7	24	2.0
EDB	7	1.2	23	1.9
TDB	10	1.7	21	1.75
URA	4	0.7	19	1.58
POSB	5	0.9	18	1.5
INTRACO	6	1.0	17	1.42
MPs & Ministers	8	1.4	16	1.33
PMO	5	0.9	16	1.33
SISIR	8	1.4	15	1.25
RDC	6	1.0	14	1.17
MOH	4	0.7	13	1.08
MND	8	1.4	10	0.83
MOE	2	0.3	10	0.83
NUS	10	1.7	10	0.83
HCS	5	0.9	8	0.67
UOB	5	0.9	8	0.67
MHA	6	1.0	7	0.6
MTI	3	0.5	7	0.6
NCB	3	0.5	7	0.6
SNP	4	0.7	7	0.6
STPB	5	0.9	7	0.6
MCI	5	0.9	6	0.5
NTU	3	0.5	6	0.5
SDC	2	0.3	6	0.5
PUB	5	0.9	5	0.42
SBC	4	0.7	5	0.42
ECICS	2	0.3	5	0.42
CAAS	2	0.3	4	0.33
MCD	3	0.5	4	0.33
MFA	3	0.5	4	0.33
MOF	4	0.7	4	0.33
AGC	2	0.3	3	0.25
Judiciary	1	0.2	3	0.25
NatSteel	2	0.3	3	0.25
SMRT	2	0.3	3	0.25
MAS	1	0.2	2	0.17
MINLAW	2	0.3	2	0.17
MOM	1	0.2	2	0.17
Singapore Petroleum	2	0.3	2	0.17
CISCO	1	0.2	1	0.08
Construction	1	0.2	1	0.08
Technology				
GIC	1	0.2	1	0.08
NUH	1	0.2	1	0.08
SingTel	1	0.2	1	0.08
	574	99.6	1199	100.05

Table 7.20: Representation by GLCs on GLC Boards 1991

CATEGORY	NO. OF SEATS	% OF BOARD SEATS HELD
Sing. Technologies	171	14.26
DBS	142	11.84
Keppel Group	51	4.25
SIA	50	4.17
NOL	45	3.75
Sembawang Group	28	2.34
Temasek Holdings	28	2.34
POSB	18	1.5
INTRACO	17	1.42
HCS	8	0.67
SNP	7	0.6
ECICS	5	0.42
NatSteel	3	0.25
SMRT	3	0.25
Singapore Petroleum	2	0.17
CISCO	1	0.08
Construction Technology	1	0.08
GIC	1	0.08
NUH	1	0.08
SingTel	1	0.08
	583	48.63

Statutory board representation is dominated by those commercially oriented boards concerned with infrastructure development such as the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore, Jurong Town Corporation and the Housing and Development Board (HDB). All have relatively high levels of directorships; 3.8, 2.17, 2.1 and 2.0 per cent respectively.

Table 7.21: Statutory Board Representation on GLC Boards 1991

Category	No. of Boards	% of Board Seats Held
PSA	45	3.8
TAS	26	2.17
JTC	25	2.1
HDB	24	2.0
EDB	23	1.9
TDB	21	1.75
URA	19	1.58
SISIR	15	1.25
NUS	10	0.83
NCB	7	0.6
STPB	7	0.6
NTU	6	0.5
SDC	6	0.5
PUB	5	0.42
SBC	5	0.42
CAAS	4	0.33
MAS	2	0.17
	250	20.92

Ministry representation, other than by MINDEF, was relatively minor as shown in Table 7.22 below.

Table 7.22: Ministry Representation on GLC Boards: 1991

Category	No. of Boards	% of Board Seats Held
PMO	16	1.33
MOH	13	1.08
MND	10	0.83
MOE	10	0.83
MHA	7	0.6
MTI	7	0.6
MCI	6	0.5
MCD	4	0.33
MFA	4	0.33
MOF	4	0.33
AGC	3	0.25
MINLAW	2	0.17
MOM	2	0.17
TOTALS	88	7.35

The type of GLCs on which ministries were representation did not follow a consistent pattern. Some ministries, such as Health and MINDEF, are predominantly represented on GLCs integral to their policy community; the Health Corporation of Singapore and its Subsidiaries and Singapore Technologies respectively. Others have a more general representation. All ministries are represented at almost all levels of company from 2-5, with most representation at levels 2-4, the major operating companies.

As can be noted from Table 7.19, no organisation other than Singapore Technologies and the Development Bank of Singapore has more than five per cent of directorships. Only 12 organisations (22 per cent) had two per cent or more of the total directorships. These organisations combined account for 56.69 per cent of total directorships and are clearly the most dominant in the management of the GLC sector. This group is shown in Table 7.23.

It is significant that the only ministry with a substantial spread and level of directorships is MINDEF, not the Prime Minister's Office nor the Ministry of Finance.²³ Six GLCs together account for almost 43 per cent of directorships; Singapore Technologies, DBS, the Keppel Group, Singapore International Airlines (SIA), Sembawang Group and Temasek Holdings.

²³ Of MINDEF's 44 directorships, 40 are within the Singapore Technologies Group, one in an NCB subsidiary and three in Temasek Holdings companies. Of the 44 Singapore Technologies directorships, 10 are in the armaments and military related Chartered Industries of Singapore Group.

Table 7.23 Organisations With the Highest Level of Directorships in GLCs: 1991

No.	Organisation	% of Directorships
1.	Sing. Technologies	14.26
2.	DBS	11.84
3.	Keppel Group	4.25
4.	SIA	4.17
5.	PSA	3.8
6.	NOL	3.75
7.	MINDEF	3.67
8.	Sembawang Group	2.34
9.	Temasek Holdings	2.34
10.	TAS	2.17
11.	JTC	2.1
12.	HDB	2.0
	TOTAL	56.69

Other GLCs, boards and ministries have relatively low levels of representation, although some have high levels in a limited type of GLC. For example, the Ministry of Health, principally through Dr. Kwa Soon Bee, has a high level of representation on HCS subsidiary boards.²⁴ This practice of having representation on subsidiary and associated companies of a ministry, GLC or board is characteristic of the pattern of board representation and is to be expected.

Analysis of GLC Board Directors 1991

Using the formula previously used, each director was allocated a rank based on the number of companies of which he was a director and the level of those companies. The most important directors; those with scores between 0-0.5, are listed in Table 7.24 below; a total of 33 directors.

This group accounts for 27.02% of total board seats. Eight of this group are either chief or senior executives of statutory boards, four are civil service permanent secretaries, 19 are either chief or senior executives of GLCs, one is an MP and one other's institutional affiliation is unknown.

The group of directors with ranks of 1 or less amount to 77 people, representing 43.6 per cent of board seats. Those with a rank of 2 or less amount to 202 people and account for 61.8 per cent of board seats. Those with a rank of 3 or less amount to 311

²⁴ Kwa chaired all hospital and national specialist centre boards (eg. the Singapore National Eye Centre Pte Ltd) as well as being chairman of the HCS board and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health. In fact, 11 of the 13 directorships held by MOH officials are in HCS or health related companies. The other two boards on which he was represented were Singapore Zoological Gardens and Jurong Bird Park.

Table 7.24: Most Represented People on GLC Boards 1991

NO.	NAME	SUBSTANTIVE AFFILIATION	SECTOR 25	NO. COMP.	RANK 26
1	Quek Poh Huat, Col (NS)	President, Singapore Aerospace Limited	G	20	0.2
2	Lua Cheng Eng	CEO, Neptune Orient Lines Limited	G	17	0.23
3	Lai Chun Loong	President, Chartered Industries of Singapore	G	15	0.24
4	Wong Kok Siew	President, ST Industrial Corporation	G	16	0.24
5	Ho Ching	Executive VP, ST Ventures	G	17	0.25
6	Ngiam Tong Dow	CEO, DBS & PS	G	6	0.25
7	Au Eng Kok	MD, Pidemco Land Pte Ltd	G	15	0.28
8	Lim Ming Seong	Group President, STH	G	11	0.28
9	Hwang, P. Y.	Former chairman, EDB	B	6	0.31
10	Lum Choon Wah	MD, Temasek Holdings	G	11	0.31
11	Ng Kee Choe	Executive VP, DBS	G	13	0.31
12	Kwa Soon Bee, Dr.	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health	C	10	0.32
13	Hsu Tse-Kwang	Executive Chairman, Sembawang Holdings	G	11	0.32
14	Tan Soo Nan	Executive VP, DBS	G	13	0.34
15	Hsuan Owyang	Chairman, HDB	B	9	0.35
16	Toh Ho Tay	Director, Fleet Management Division, NOL	G	11	0.36
17	Wee Soon Lock, Michael	Executive VP, DBS	G	11	0.36
18	Lam Chuan Leong	Permanent Secretary, MTI	C	4	0.38
19	Han Cheng Fong, Dr.	CEO & MD, DBS Land Ltd	G	11	0.39
20	Ng Kiat Chong	Executive Director, PSA	B	9	0.42
21	Erk Kwong Wah	Permanent Secretary, MOP	C	9	0.42
22	Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick	President, DBS Ltd	G	7	0.43
23	Yeo Liat Kok, Philip	Chairman, EDB	B	4	0.44
24	Mak Kai Tye, Francis	Executive Chairman, Jurong Environmental Engineering	B	9	0.46
25	Lee Chee Yeng	Director, Information Systems Division, PSA	B	9	0.47
26	Yeo Seng Teck	Chief Executive Director, TDB	B	8	0.47
27	Chew Guan Khuan, Andrew	Permanent Secretary & Head of Civil Service	C	6	0.47
28	Das, S. Chandra	MP & Executive Chair, NUR Investment and Trading	L	6	0.47
29	Lim Yong Wah (Mrs) @ Lee, Dorcas	Unknown	U	6	0.47
30	Lee Ek Tieng	MD, MAS and Chairman, PUB	B	2	0.5
31	Chong Kie Cheong	Senior VP, DBS	G	8	0.5
32	Loh Chuk Yam	GM, Singapore Precision Industries	G	8	0.5
33	Teo Soon Hoe	Exec. Director, Keppel Corporation Limited	G	6	0.5
TOTAL				324	

people who account for 80 per cent of board seats. Directors with a rank greater than 3 are associated principally with boards of levels 3-6 and will not be considered in this analysis. Those of interest who may be members of the core executive will be associated with level 1 and 2 companies and have a score of 0.05 or less. The distribution of directors by rank and institutional affiliation across companies by level is shown in Table 7.25 below.

²⁵ Coding: B=Statutory Board; C=Civil Service; G=GLC; L=Legislature (MPs); U=Unknown

²⁶ Rank is calculated according to the following formula: Rank = $\frac{\text{Mean Rank of Companies}}{\text{Number of Companies}}$

Table 7.25: Distribution Of Directors By Rank And Institutional Affiliation Across GLCs By Level 1991

CHARACTERISTICS	REPRESENTATIONAL LEVEL					
	0-.5	.51-1	1.1-2	2.1-3	3.1-4	4-6
% of People	5.7	13.4	35.2	54.2	83.6	100
No. of people	33	77	202	311	481	574
% of seats	27.02	43.6	61.8	80	93.2	100
% of level 1, 2 & 3 chairs	38 (73%)	49 (94%)	52 (100)	0	0	0
GLC	19	47	100	139	184	209
Board	7	16	34	53	87	99
Civil Service	5	8	21	28	44	48
Military	0	3	14	27	38	41
Private Sector	0	1	12	25	35	42
Unknown	1	1	15	31	67	97
MPs	1	1	4	4	6	8
Foreign	0	0	1	4	19	29
Judiciary	0	0	1	1	1	1

There are only four level 1 companies: MND Holdings Private Ltd, Hospital Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd (HCS), Temasek Holdings and Singapore Technology Holdings Pte Ltd (STH). MND Holdings is comprised of only one group of companies; the DBS group. All of the Level 1 companies are chaired by permanent secretaries.²⁷ All of the Level 1 companies are dominated by civil servants or permanent secretaries but all have substantial representation from other parts of the public sector. As can be seen from Table 7.26, and from the previous analysis by organisation, GLC affiliated directors dominate the boards at all levels below level 1 or, at least have equal representation to other sectors. The members of each level one board are detailed in Appendix 6. It is clear that these directors are core actors in the management of the GLC sector. It is below this level that identifying the other core GLC actors becomes more problematical.

As shown in Table 7.24, most of the highest ranking directors are drawn from the GLCs; 19 of the 33 listed, 58 per cent of the total. Another eight are drawn from statutory boards (24 per cent), 4 from the civil service (12 per cent), one is an MP and the affiliation of one is unknown. It is obvious from this analysis that below the level 1

²⁷ Dr. Andrew Chew Guan Khuan, (MND Holdings) Dr. Kwa Soon Bee (HCS), Lee Ek Tieng (Temasek Holdings) and Ngiam Tong Dow (STH). Chew was Head of the Civil Service, Kwa, Permanent Secretary, Health, Lee was Managing Director, MAS and Ngiam was Permanent Secretary, Budget and Revenue Divisions, MOF as well as CEO of the Development Bank of Singapore. Lee, had only two GLC board positions; chairman of Temasek Holdings and a director of MND Holdings. Ngiam was chairman and CEO of the Development Bank of Singapore as well as STH and is on all level 1 boards except for MND Holdings. However he has no other directorships. Kwa was principally responsible for those GLCs associated with the Ministry of Health; the public hospital sector corporatised under the Health Corporation of Singapore of which he was chairman.²⁷ His other directorships are minor. Chew had broader representation; in addition to being chairman, MND Holdings, he was also chairman of Singapore Biotech, Temasek Management Services and Singapore Treasury Building. He was also a director of Temasek Holdings and National University Hospital. The only other permanent secretary with more than one level 1 directorship was Lam Chaun Leong who was on the HCS and STH boards.

holding companies, the GLC sector is principally self-managing and that the GLC senior executives are responsible for it. This is demonstrated in Table 7.27 which lists the chairmen of all companies from Levels 1-3. Of these 52 companies, six (12 per cent) are chaired by statutory board officers,²⁸ 16 (31 per cent) by permanent secretaries²⁹ (12 if Level 1 companies are excluded) and 28 (54 per cent) by GLC senior executives.³⁰ One is chaired by an MP³¹ and one by Fock Siew Wah from the private sector.³² Altogether, the top 52 companies are chaired by 30 people, the majority of whom are drawn from the GLCs themselves. Of these, an elite group is readily identifiable, being those with representation of a large number of high level boards. These are listed in Table 7.26.

These 14 are the top GLC executives with substantial responsibility for management of this sector. They are not employed in any other sector; the GLC sector is their base. However, as with other sectors, many of them have parallel appointments in the statutory board sector. These responsibilities are detailed in Table 7.28 below.

As is evident from Table 7.28, the only director in this group with substantial responsibilities outside the GLC sector is Quek Poh Huat who is chairman of SISIR and a member of the Trade Development Board. This would indicate that this sector is very self-contained; its priority is the commercial and profitable operation of its businesses, not public sector management or national economic policy. In fact, of those directors from GLCs with ranks below 1, only five had substantial appointments to economic policy boards in 1991; Ng Pock Too³³ to the Economic Development Board where he once worked, Lim Chee Onn³⁴ to the Urban Redevelopment Authority Board, Dr. Cheong Choon Kong³⁵ as chairman of the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, Lock Sai Hung³⁶ to the POSB board and Tien Sing Cheong³⁷ to the TDB board. One other GLC executive, Yap Neng Chew³⁸ was a member of the politically sensitive Appeals Board (Land Acquisition) and Valuation Review Board. At this time, Ng and Lim were MPs and so these appointments may have been more in this capacity than their GLC

²⁸ Of the statutory board executives, two are of permanent secretary rank; Philip Yeo Liat Kok from the EDB and Dr. Cham Tao Soon from NTU.

²⁹ Of the group of permanent secretaries, one officer Tan Boon Tiek, the Attorney-General, is equivalent to a permanent secretary.

³⁰ Of the GLC senior executives, two are former permanent secretaries; Herman Hochstadt, Sim Kee Boon.

³¹ Pidemco Land was chaired by Dr. Hong Hai. Hsu Tse-Kwang, Executive Chairman of Sembawang Holdings was previously the Commissioner of Inland Revenue.

³² Singapore mass Rapid Transit Corporation

³³ Ng was Group CEO, Sembawang Holdings, CEO, Sembawang Maritime Pte. Ltd. And Group Chief Executive, Sembawang Shipyard Ltd.

³⁴ Lim was Senior Executive Director, Keppel Corporation Limited, MD, Straits Steamship Land and MD, Streamers Maritime Holdings.

³⁵ Cheong was MD, Singapore Airlines Limited.

³⁶ Lock was MD, The Insurance Corporation of Singapore.

³⁷ Tian was CEO, Intraco.

³⁸ Yap was Executive Chairman, International Development and Consultancy Corporation (Pte) Ltd.

appointments. Ng's appointment to the EDB was cancelled following him losing his parliamentary seat in the 1991 election. Therefore, of the top 47 GLC executives,³⁹ only

Table 7.26: Principal Directors in GLCs 1991

No.	Name	Substantive Affiliation	No. Director -Ships	Rank
1.	Quek Poh Huat, Col (NS)	President, Singapore Aerospace Limited	20	0.2
2.	Lua Cheng Eng	CEO, Neptune Orient Lines Limited	17	0.23
3.	Lai Chun Loong	President, Chartered Industries of Singapore	15	0.24
4.	Wong Kok Siew	President, ST Industrial Corporation	16	0.24
5.	Ho Ching	Executive VP, ST Ventures	17	0.25
6.	Au Eng Kok	MD, Pidemco Land Pte Ltd	15	0.28
7.	Lim Ming Seong	Group President, STH	11	0.28
8.	Lum Choon Wah	MD, Temasek Holdings	11	0.31
9.	Ng Kee Choe	Executive VP, DBS	13	0.31
10.	Tan Soo Nan	Executive VP, DBS	13	0.34
11.	Toh Ho Tay	Director, Fleet Management Division, NOL	11	0.36
12.	Wee Soon Lock, Michael	Executive VP, DBS	11	0.36
13.	Han Cheng Fong, Dr.	CEO & MD, DBS Land Ltd	11	0.39
14.	Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick	President, DBS Ltd	7	0.43
			192	

³⁹ Of the 77 directors with ranks of 1 or less, 47 were GLC executives.

Table 7.27: Chairmen of the Top GLCs 1991

No	Name	Sector ⁴⁰	Level ⁴¹	GLC	GLC Group
1	Au Eng Kok	G	3	Resources Development Corp.	TH
2	Cham Tao Soon, Dr.	B	3	Sing. Automotive Engin Priv (ST)	ST
3	Chew Guan Khuan, Andrew, Dr.	C	1	MND Holdings Private Ltd	MND
			3	Singapore Biotech Pte Ltd	TH
			3	Temasek Management Services	TH
4	Er Kwong Wah	C	3	Sembawang Engineering (SH)	TH
5	Fock Siew Wah	U	2	Singapore MRT Limited	TH
6	Ho Ching	G	3	Chartered Electronics Industries	ST
7	Hochstadt, Herman R.	G	2	Neptune Orient Lines Limited	TH
			3	Export Credit Insurance Corp.	TH
8	Hong Hai, Dr.	L	3	Pidemco Land Pte Ltd	URA
9	Hsu Tse-Kwang	G	2	Sembawang Holdings	TH
			3	Sembawang Maritime Pte Ltd (SH)	TH
			3	Sembawang Shipyard Ltd (SH)	TH
10	Hwang, P. Y.	B	2	Intraco	TH
			3	Petrochemical Corp. of Singapore	TH
11	Kwa Soon Bee, Dr.	C	1	HCS Pte Ltd	HCS
			3	Singapore General Hospital Pte	HCS
			3	Kandang Kerbau Hospital Pte Ltd	HCS
			3	Tan Tock Seng Hospital Pte Ltd	HCS
12	Lai Chun Loong	G	3	Tao Payoh Hospital Pte Ltd	HCS
			3		
13	Lam Chuan Leong	G	3	Chartered Metals Industries (ST)	ST
14	Lee Ek Tieng	C	1	Singapore Aerospace Limited (ST)	ST
15	Lee Ek Tieng	C	1	Temasek Holdings	TH
16	Lim Chee Onn	G	3	Steamers Maritime Holdings	TH
17	Lim Ming Seong	G	3	Singapore Shipbuilding & Engin.	ST
			3	ST Ventures	ST
18	Loh Wing Siew	G	3	Keppel Engineering Pte Ltd	TH
19	Lum Choong Wah	G	3	Singapore National Printers Ltd	TH
20	Ngiam Tong Dow	C	3	DBS Finance Ltd	MND
			3	S. Polymer Corporation (DBS)	MND
21	Pillay, J. Y.	C	1	STH	ST
22	Quak Poh Huat	G	2	DBS Ltd	MND
			3		
23	Sim Kee Boon	G	2	Singapore Airlines Limited	TH
			3	Singapore Aerospace Engineering	ST
24	Tan Boon Teik	C	3	Singapore Computer Systems	ST
			3	Keppel Corporation Limited	TH
			3	Far East Levingston Shipbuilding	TH
			3	Keppel Bank of Singapore	TH
25	Wong Kok Siew	G	3	Keppel Finance Limited	TH
			3	Straits Steamship Land	TH
26	Wong Lee Hoong	G	3	S. Petroleum Company (DBS)	MND
			3	The Insurance Corp. of Sing DBS	TH
27	Yap Neng Chew	G	3	S. Electronic & Engineering	ST
28	Yeo Liat Kok, Philip	B	3	S. Precision Industries	ST
			2		
29	Yeo Seng Teck	B	2	Singapore Pools Private Limited	TH
			3	International. Dev and Consult Corp.	TH
30	Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick	G	2	Chartered Industries of Sing (ST)	ST
			3	ST Industrial Corporation	ST
30	Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick	G	3	TDB Holdings Pte Ltd	TDB
			3	DBS Land Ltd	MND
			3	NDC Merchant Bank Ltd	MND

Table 7.28: Statutory Board Positions Held by Top GLC Directors

⁴⁰ Sector in which appointee is substantively employed.⁴¹ Level of company. Level 1 companies are the major holding companies.

No.	Name	Statutory Board Positions
1	Quek Poh Huat, Col (NS)	Chairman, SISIR
2	Lua Cheng Eng	Member PSA board Member, National Maritime Board
3	Lai Chun Loong	Member, Singapore Polytechnic Board of Governors
4	Wong Kok Siew	No statutory board appointments
5	Ho Ching	Member, Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research
6	Au Eng Kok	No statutory board appointments
7	Lim Ming Seong	Member, Temasek Polytechnic Board of Governors
8	Lum Choon Wah	No statutory board appointments
9	Ng Kee Choe	Member, Ngee Ann Polytechnic Council
10	Tan Soo Nan	No statutory board appointments
11	Toh Ho Tay	Member, Singapore Polytechnic Board of Governors
12	Wee Soon Lock, Michael	No statutory board appointments
13	Han Cheng Fong, Dr.	No statutory board appointments
14	Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick	Member, Temasek Polytechnic Board of Governors Member, Board of Commissioners of Currency Singapore

six had any appointments of significance to statutory boards in 1991. This indicates that the GLC leadership, except that provided by sitting MPs, is highly autonomous, separate from the rest of the public sector and that most of its leaders might only participate peripherally in the core executive, if at all.

THE GLC LEADERSHIP IN 1998

The data used in this section was collated for the period 1996-1998 and is based on annual company reports, searches of the company records of the Singapore Registrar of Companies and Businesses and where these were inadequate, newspaper and other published reports and news. The data is limited in that it does not cover all GLCs; it is the best that could be obtained during fieldwork in mid-1998. Searches were made of several libraries in Singapore to obtain the data; the National Reference Library, the Trade Development Board library, the Stock Exchange of Singapore library, the libraries of the National University of Singapore and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. It includes some GLCs not covered in the 1991 analyse above, but it should be noted that most GLCs, are privately held companies and do not submit publicly available annual reports to the Stock Exchange of Singapore or the Registrar of Companies and Businesses. Their details are only included in the *Directory of Government Linked Corporations*, of which I could not obtain a 1998 copy as it is still classified as a secret government document.

Between 1991 and 1998, considerable restructuring and rationalisation was undertaken in the GLC sector, thus making a direct comparison between 1991 and 1998 GLC data somewhat difficult. Companies formed under statutory boards, except for MAS and EDB were transferred to the four major holding companies and a more rational group structure was developed for each of the holding companies with business units being

transferred, amalgamated or sold under the overall direction and coordination of Temasek Holdings. Each major holding company was re-organised around a small number of core businesses and the extensive diversification that had taken place among GLCs in the previous 20 years was curtailed. These significant changes to the GLC sector and their policy implications are deserving of a study of their own and will not be examined in detail here, although major initiatives need to be noted. STH was renamed, Singapore Technologies (Private) Limited (STPL) and reorganised. Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation was amalgamated with the Sembawang Corporation in October 1998 to form SembCorp Industries.⁴² Some public sector departments were corporatised, notably the Public Works Department as PWD Corporation (Private) Limited, and some were made into statutory authorities, notable the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.⁴³ Two other major changes were also made; the Port of Singapore Authority was corporatised as PSA Corporation and the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) was amalgamated with the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS). POSB had been formed as a statutory board because of political sensitivity due to it being the largest provider of housing loans to the HDB housing sector, although it operated as a fully commercial entity. In this analysis, POSB will be treated as a GLC rather than a statutory board.

This re-organisation of the GLC sector was accelerated and given a policy and operational framework by the recommendations of the Report of the Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness (CSC), handed down in November 1998. Although it had been *de facto* policy for some time, the CSC's recommendations that the GLC sector be the incubator for the development of a group of strong internationally competitive Singaporean owned MNCs, provide the policy framework for the rationalisation of the sector.⁴⁴ The committee also recommended that the government continue to "play an active role to support and facilitate the private sector..."⁴⁵ As major GLC executives were well represented on the CSC committees, this rationalisation actually commenced prior to the CSC's report being handed to the government.⁴⁶ By late 1998, the supervisory role of Temasek Holdings as the umbrella holding company was enhanced and it was re-organised with, among other changes, Temasek Management Services being bought under closer Temasek's control. In particular, MND Holdings was bought operationally into the Temasek fold⁴⁷ with Ng Kin Meng acting as secretary to

⁴² SembCorp Industries, *Annual Report 1998*, Singapore, SembCorp Industries, 1999, p. 1

⁴³ It is worth noting that this organisation is no longer listed in the *Singapore Government Directory*.

⁴⁴ Recommendations 40 and 41 of the CSC report. See: Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness, *Report of the Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness*, Singapore, SNP, November 1998, p. 10

⁴⁵ Recommendation 52 of the report. See: Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness, *Report of the Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness*, Singapore, SNP, November 1998, pp. 11-12

⁴⁶ Members of the main committee holding GLC directorships included; Peter Seah Lim Huat, Kwa Chong Seng and Lim Ho Kee. Seah was, and is, a member of the GIC board.

⁴⁷ The two companies had been housed in what is now Temasek Towers for some years, but TMS had been more independent of Temasek Holdings in its day to day operations prior to 1997.

both companies in 1998 and the secretariat for both companies being located within Temasek's offices. The commercial companies under the TDB, NSTB and EDB were reorganised under holding companies⁴⁸ with the EDB investments split between EDB Investments and EDB Ventures. Singapore Technologies Holdings was renamed Singapore Technologies Private Limited (STPL) and it appears to have become the pre-eminent holding company in some ways with considerable influence over Temasek Holdings. In 1998, the former president of STPL, Quek Poh Huat, was also President of Temasek Holdings, but Quek's base was in SPTL, not Temasek Holdings.

Temasek Holdings adopted a number of supervisory strategies, eventually made public in 1999, which will impact on the composition of boards and the tenure of directors, at least at any one company. These strategies, which actually reflect standard Singapore Civil Service practice, include separating CEO and chairman appointments, more frequent rotation of directors and specifying corporate performance benchmarks for each major group of GLCs.⁴⁹ These policies will probably not expand the pool of directors, but will ensure their rotation through various GLCs over a six to nine year period. Additionally, civil service oversight of Temasek Holdings by the economic policy community was enhanced by upgrading the MTI seconded officer in Temasek's headquarters to Deputy Secretary level from Director level and increasing its Temasek rank from Senior Vice-President to Executive Vice-President. In 1998, this position was filled by Peter Ong Boon Kwee, Deputy Secretary in MTI. Ong's task was to report in general on the performance of the GLC sector, through MTI to the major economic policy bodies and to develop his own understanding of the GLC sector so as to better inform economic policy making.

By 1998, the GLC sector had undergone substantial changes when compared to 1991, which is the last date at which we had an accurate and almost complete oversight of this sector, albeit without detailed information on GLCs associated with the GIC and MAS.

Analysis of GLC Leadership in 1998

Does the contemporary GLC leadership participate in, or contribute to, the core executive? This section attempts to answer this question through an analysis of GLC leadership in 1998.

⁴⁸ TDB Holdings and NSTB Holdings.

⁴⁹ Conrad Raj and Patrick Daniel, "Temasek fine-tunes stewardship of companies", *Business Times*, 25 June 1999

More than 800 GLCs were identified and of these 657 were deemed to be significant enterprises. Many of those excluded were small property subsidiaries, inactive companies or small companies with niche services or markets, small overseas subsidiaries or companies in which a GLC had equity of less than 20 per cent. The details of directorships of many companies incorporated both in and outside Singapore could not be obtained because these private companies did not have to lodge annual reports and because of cost and time constraints.⁵⁰ The full list of significant companies is provided in Appendix 7.

In this analysis only companies at Levels 1-3 for which directorship details could be obtained were included. Defining the company level below Level 3 in the absence of the relevant *Directory of Government Linked Corporations* and access to detailed corporate information, is difficult and probably inaccurate, so these companies were excluded. Even defining companies at Level 3 was problematical as details for companies such as EDB Investments and EDB Ventures, which probably are Level 3 companies, could not be obtained. Of those companies identified, 83 are level 1-3 companies for which directorship information was available, using the criteria established for the analysis of the 1991 DGLC companies listings. The breakdown by level is shown in Table 7.29. The listing of these companies is at Appendix 8.

Table 7.29 : List of Level1-3 GLCs in Singapore: 1998

LEVEL	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	TOTAL
No.	5	18	60	83
% of Total	6%	22%	72%	100%

There are six level 1 companies included in the analysis: Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd., Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), MND Holdings (Pte.) Ltd., Health Corporation of Singapore Pte. Ltd., Singapore Technologies Pte. Ltd., and Singapore Telecommunications Limited. This is the same number of holding companies as in 1991, but in that analysis, the GIC and Singapore Telecommunications were not included. In this analysis, only some details of GIC companies were obtained and are included. However, these companies provide us with little information of GIC's holdings and company structure which are worthy of a study of their own.

⁵⁰ I estimate that, including GIC companies, there are probably in excess of 2000 GLCs. To fully study these, including the large number incorporated in Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, Panama, Ireland, Luxembourg and other countries, the cost would probably exceed \$100,000. Just to obtain the details of GLCs available from the Registrar of Companies and Businesses in Singapore would cost at least \$4000 in initial search costs alone and a further cost of at least \$3000 to identify major directors.

A total of 241 directors were identified for level 1-3 companies, filling 446 directorships. Directors are listed in Appendix 9. The sectoral affiliation of the directors is shown in Table 7.30 below.

Table 7.30: Sector Representation on Level 1-3 GLC Boards: 1998

Sector	No.	% Of Total
GLC	75	31.1
Private Sector	51	21.2
Civil Service	31	12.9
Board	24	10
MP	20	8.3
Unknown	20	8.3
Military	14	5.8
Foreign	5	2.1
NTUC	1	0.4
TOTAL	241	100

Of the 241 directors, 69 (28.6 per cent) had a ranking of 1 or below for the importance of their combined directorships. These directors are detailed in Appendix 10. Of this group, 38 (15.8 per cent) had a ranking of less than one and are included in Table 7.33. Of those 69 directors with a rank of one or less, the sectoral representation is as shown in Table 7.31 below.

Table 7.31: Sectoral Representation Among Directors with a Rank ≤ 1 in GLCs: 1998

SECTOR	GLC	Civil Service	MPs	Military	Board	Private Sector	Unknown	TOTAL
No.	19	13	11	5	3	16	2	69
% of Total	28	19	16	7	4	23	3	100

As can be seen, the public sector accounted for 74 per cent of representation with the GLC sector itself taking almost one-third of positions approximately equal to its overall representation among Level 1-3 companies. In this top group of directors, the civil service, MPs and the military increased their representation, although the latter, only marginally. Civil service representation was almost 50 per cent more than its general representation, MPs almost doubled their level of representation while that of the statutory boards was cut by two-thirds from 10 to three per cent indicating that board representation is predominantly on boards below Level 3.

Public sector representation was almost exclusively by the most senior level of officials. Eight permanent secretaries are included from the ministries of Home Affairs, Law,

Trade and Industry, Community Development, Finance, the Prime Minister's Office, the Inland Revenue Authority and the Head of Civil Service, Lee Ek Tieng. One former permanent secretary, Er Kwong Wah, who retired during 1998 to an *amakudari* position within the Sembawang group, was counted as a civil service representative.⁵¹ Four deputy secretaries are also included from the ministries of Communications, Finance, Health and Home Affairs. The Ministry of Finance Deputy Secretary, Dileep Nair, was for part of 1998, CEO of POSBank.

Statutory board representation was of equally a high calibre. Heading this group is Philip Yeo Liat Kok, executive chairman of the Economic Development Board and equal in rank to a cabinet minister⁵² and to the other top ranking permanent secretary Lim Siong Guan who was promoted to Head of Civil Service in 1999.⁵³ The other two board representatives are Cham Tao Soon, President of Nanyang Technological University and Walter Woon, Associate Professor of Law at NUS and currently ambassador to Germany.⁵⁴

Representation from the military sector was not by active SAF officers, but from senior officers now occupying *amakudari* positions in the public sector. Winston Choo Wee Leong was formerly Chief of Defence Force and Han Eng Juan formerly Chief of Army. James Leo Chin Lian was a former Chief of Navy and the other two were senior general staff officers, Lee Hsien Yang and Lim Meng Kim. Lee, Lee Kuan Yew's younger son, was formerly Director, Joint Operations and Planning Directorate,⁵⁵ and Lim Meng Kim was formerly commander, Singapore Medical Corps.

Of the 11 current and former MPs represented, five are current cabinet ministers, three are former cabinet ministers, two are former MPs and there was one serving MP, Yu-Foo Yee Shoon. The current cabinet ministers included both deputy prime ministers, Tony Tan Keng Yam and Lee Hsien Loong, the Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, the Minister for Finance, Richard Hu Tsu Tau and the Minister for National Development,

⁵¹ Er Kwong Wah's last appointment was as Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Community Development. He was replaced by Moses Lee Kim Poh.

⁵² Both Philip Yeo and Lim Siong Guan were promoted to Staff Grade II in September 1996. Staff Grade I is the entry level for cabinet ministers, thus placing them above the rank of junior ministers. See: "EDB chief, PMO perm sec top Admin Service promotions", *Business Times*, 9 September 1996

⁵³ Yeo, who is the most consistently dominant figure in the economic policy community over the past 10 years following the retirement of Goh Keng Swee, was Lim's major contender for the position of Head of Civil Service, but was reportedly passed over because of his public clash with parliamentarians in 1998 over how to deal with public employees breaking their scholarship bonds. Yeo directly criticised several MPs who strongly objected to the prime minister about a public servant publicly criticising them in the media. This led to a perception that Yeo could not handle political issues well. He resigned from the Administrative Service on 31 March 1999 but retained his EDB position and received additional appointments as chairman of SembCorp Industries, deputy chairman of NSTB and chairman of Pidenco Land. See: *At the Helm*. Available at: http://www.sedb.com.sg/helm/at_ch.html. Yeo was also reported to have clashed with the prime minister on some issues and also with Lee Hsien Loong over economic policy.

⁵⁴ Woon was previously a Nominated Member of Parliament and a mild critic of the government in this capacity.

⁵⁵ Lee Hsien Yang's older brother, Lee Hsien Loong, now Deputy Prime Minister, also held this position prior to his entry to politics.

Lim Hng Kiang. Three former senior ministers, now occupying senior GLC *amakudari* positions were Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, former Minister of Defence, Suppiah Dhanabalan who had occupied multiple portfolios, principally in economic policy and foreign affairs and Lim Chee Onn who had headed the NTUC. The two former MPs were Bernard Chen Tien Lap (also a former deputy secretary) and Dr. Hong Hai. As Hong was only a one term MP (1988-1991) and had retained his position as chairman of Pidemco Land for the duration of his term, it is debatable whether he can be classified as an MP, but this demonstrates the fluidity of the core executive in Singapore; to some degree, formal institutional affiliation is irrelevant – it is the person who counts, not the institution.

Private sector representation was also from executives of the highest level in major national firms. These include the chairman or chief executives of Wing Tai Holdings, Shell Group, Fraser and Neave, Hewlett-Packard, Esso, Union Bank of Switzerland Asia, Overseas Union Bank, Schroders International Merchant Bankers, Times Publishing, Inter-Roller Engineering⁵⁶ and United Overseas Bank. Additionally the senior partners of two of the nation's largest law firms held GLC directorships; Chen Choong Joong of Allen and Gledhill and Sat Pal Khattar from Khattar Wong and Partners. The managing partners from Price Waterhouse, Michael Lim Choo San, and Keith Tay Ah Kee from KPMG Peat Marwick, also held directorships. Of this group, three are presumed to be Old Guard PAP cadres; Michael Fam Yue Onn, Sat Pal Khattar and Lim Yong Wah. If we also include in this category directors who have been placed in another category (i.e. Dr. Hong Hai and Wong Hung Khim), we can also add the Haw Par Corporation and DelGro Corporation.⁵⁷

The directors from the GLC sector reflect those of the other sectors, in that they are generally of the most senior rank of executives. Included in this group are 16 directors who are either the chief executives or deputy chief of their companies; NatSteel, POSBank, Keppel FELS, ECICS, Singapore Power, Chartered Industries of Singapore, DBS Bank, Keppel Corporation, Neptune Orient Lines, Singapore Technologies, SembCorp Industries and Temasek Holdings. Of this group, DBS Bank has three directorships. If we also include in this category directors who hold senior GLC positions but have been placed in another category (eg. Lee Hsien Yang, Bernard Chen and Lim Chee Onn), the chief executives of Singapore Telecommunications, Singapore Post, Intraco, Keppel Land, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering and the Health Corporation of Singapore can be added. In the GLC sector, several of the GLC chairs are filled in an executive capacity as is the case with Keppel FELS (Choo Chiau Beng)

⁵⁶ Inter-Roller is not a major national firm, although it is a successful medium size Singaporean firm. It designs, manufactures, installs and maintains material handling, air handling and pollution control equipment. It exports much of its production and has plants in Singapore and Malaysia. It had sales in 1998 of \$32, 282, 437. See: Wright Investors Service. Available at: <http://www.wisi.com>.

⁵⁷ Hong has been chairman of Haw Par since 1991 and DelGro purchased Singapore Bus Services in 1997.

and Singapore Power (Ho Kwong Ping). Only two directors, Quek Poh Huat and Quek Chee Hoon, came from Temasek Holdings.⁵⁸

Of this group of 69 top GLC directors, a smaller group of 38 directors had ranks of less than one. This is the most elite group of directors of GLC boards whose details are provided in Table 7.33 below. In this smaller group, if we classify only according to current employment, 24 of the 38 positions (63 per cent) are held by GLC executives, four (11 per cent) are held by permanent secretaries or deputy secretaries, eight (21 per cent) by senior private sector executives, one by an NTUC official⁵⁹ and one by a statutory board chief executive. In this group therefore, the public sector provides 76 per cent of directors. Of this public sector group, nine (24 per cent) are or have been either permanent secretaries or deputy secretaries (increasing to 13 and 34 per cent if we include ex-SAF general staff officers in this group),⁶⁰ six (16 per cent) are or have been either MPs or ministers⁶¹ and only 12 (32 per cent) have had predominantly GLC careers.⁶² The most dominant among this group is Quek Poh Huat, President of Temasek Holdings, as he was in the 1991 analysis. The importance of this group must also be examined in the context of those who chair the major GLCs. This group is listed in Table 7.32 below.

⁵⁸ At this time, Quek was an Executive Vice-President and Head, Direct Investments Group of Temasek Holdings. Quek Poh Huat was the President of Temasek Holdings.

⁵⁹ Yu-Foo Yee Shoon who was also an MP and serves on NTUC companies and several statutory boards.

⁶⁰ Including the ex-SAF officers, this group consists of: Khaw Boon Wan, Er Kwong Wah, BG (NS) Lee Hsien Yang, Lee Ek Tieng, BG (NS) Lim Chuan Poh, RAdm (ret.) James Leo Chin Lian, Moses Lee Kim Poo, Ngiam Tong Dow, Sim Kee Boon, Bernard Chen Tien Lap, Dileep Nair, BG (NS) Foo Kok Swee, Lim Chee Onn.

⁶¹ This group consists of: Lim Chee Onn, Suppiah Dhanabalan, Dr. Hong Hai, Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, Yu-Foo Yee Shoon and Bernard Chen Tien Lap.

⁶² This group consists of: Quek Poh Huat, Loh Wing Siew, Teo Soon Hoe, Lua Cheng Eng, Ang Kong Hua, Lai Chun Loong, Wong Hung Khim, Choo Chiau Beng, Ng Kee Choe, Oon Kurn Loon, Lau Chan Sim and Quek Chee Hoon.

Table 7.32: Chairman of Level 1 and 2 GLCs
and Selected Level 3 GLCs in Singapore 1998

NO.	NAME	COMPANY	LEVEL	SECT
1.	Lee Kuan Yew	GIC	1	L
2.	Yeo Ning Hong, Dr	ST Group	1	L
		PSA Corporation Limited	2	
3.	Lee Kim Poo, Moses	Health Corporation of Singapore	1	
4.	Lee Ek Tieng	MND Holdings Pte. Ltd.	1	
5.	Lua Cheng Eng	Neptune Orient Lines		
6.	Yeo Liat Kok, Philip	SembCorp	2	B
7.	Lee Kim Poo, Moses	POSBank	2	C
8.	Ang Kong Hua	Intraco	2	G
9.	Dhanabalan, Suppiah	Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited	1	L
		Singapore Airlines Ltd	2	
		DBS Bank (+ POSBank)	2	
10.	Koh Boon Hwee	Singapore Telecom	2	P
		Singapore Post Group	2	
11.	Wong Kok Siew	ST Industrial Corporation (Transferred to Deputy Chair, SembCorp)	2	G
12.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	Chairman, Sembawang Corporation Ltd	2	P
13.	Cham Tao Soon	NatSteel Ltd	2	B
14.	Fam Yue Onn, Michael	Singapore Airlines	2	P
15.	Goh Kim Leong	Singapore MRT Ltd	2	C
16.	Ngiam Tong Dow	DBS Bank	2	C
17.	Lim Kim San	Executive Singapore Press Holdings	2	L
18.	Sim Cheok Lim	CISCO	3	P
19.	Hochstadt, Herman Ronald	ECICS Holdings Ltd	3	C
20.	Er Kwong Wah	Sembawang Maritime Ltd	3	C
		Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	3	
21.	Ho Kwon Ping	Singapore Power	3	G
22.	Tan Guong Ching	ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	3	C
23.	Cheong Quee Wah	Executive Sembawang Resources Ltd	3	G
24.	Khaw Boon Wan	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	3	C
25.	Quek Poh Huat	ST Aerospace Limited	3	G
26.	Chen Tien Lap, Bernard	Teledata Singapore Ltd	3	L
27.	Goh Yong Hong	Singapore Pools (Private) Limited	3	C
28.	Lua Cheng Eng	Jurong Shipyard Ltd/Sembawang Shipyard Pte Ltd	3	G
29.	Teo Soon Hoe	Keppel Finance	3	G
30.	Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm (ret.)	ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	3	M
31.	Loh Wing Siew	Keppel Marine Industries	3	G
		Keppel Integrated Engineering	3	
32.	Choo Chiau Beng	Keppel FELS	3	G
33.	Lim Yong Wah	Pidemco Land Pte Ltd	3	L
34.	Sim Kee Boon	MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd	3	G
35.	Lum Choong Wah	SNP Corporation	3	G
36.	Ho Ching	ST Aerospace	3	G
37.	Lau Chan Sin	DBS Land	3	G

Table 7.33: Most Represented People on GLC Boards 1998

NO	NAME	POSITION & COMPANY	NO. COMP	RANK	SECT
1.	Quek Poh Huat	President, Temasek Holdings & Director & former President, Singapore Technologies Pte Ltd	6	0.28	G
2.	Khaw Boon Wan	Permanent Secretary, MTI	9	0.3	C
3.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Chair, MD, Wing-Tai Holdings Ltd		0.34	P
4.	Er Kwong Wah	Executive Chair, Sembawang Marine & Logistics & former permanent secretary		0.34	C
5.	Lim Chee Onn	Deputy Chair & MD, Keppel Land. Former MP, minister and deputy secretary.	7	0.37	L
6.	Dhanabalan, Suppiah	Chair, Singapore Airlines Ltd (Until 30/5/98) & Executive Chair, DBS Bank (+ POSBank) (From 30/5/98)	4	0.38	L
7.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	President, CEO, Overseas Union Bank Ltd	5	0.4	P
8.	Loh Wing Siew	MD, Keppel Corporation	7	0.41	G
9.	Teo Soon Hoe	ED and Group Finance Director, Keppel Corporation	7	0.43	G
10.	Koh Boon Hwee	MD, Hewlett-Packard Singapore	3	0.44	P
11.	Lua Cheng Eng	CEO & Deputy Chair, Neptune Orient Lines Ltd	5	0.44	G
12.	Ang Kong Hua	MD President, NatSteel Ltd.	5	0.48	G
13.	Lee Ek Tieng	MD, GIC & Head of Civil Service	2	0.5	C
14.	Hong Hai, Dr.	Former MP & CEO, Haw Par Corporation	3	0.56	L
15.	Lai Chun Loong	President, Chartered Industries of Singapore	5	0.56	G
16.	Lee Hsien Yang, BG	President & CEO, Singapore Telecommunications Ltd.	3	0.56	M
17.	Lim Chuan Poh, BG (NS)	Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Communications & former Chief of Army, Singapore Armed Forces	3	0.56	C
18.	Lim Yong Wah	Chairman, Pidemco Land & Old Guard PAP cadre	3	0.56	G
19.	Wong Hung Khim	Chair, CEO, DelGro & former President/CEO Singapore Telecom	3	0.56	G
20.	Yeo Ning Hong, Dr	Former MP and cabinet minister. Executive Chairman, PSA Corporation	3	0.56	L
21.	Choo Chiaug Beng	Chair & MD, Keppel FELS	5	0.6	G
22.	Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm (ret.)	Executive Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering. Former Chief of Navy.	4	0.63	M
23.	Ng Kee Choe	President, DBS Bank	4	0.63	G
24.	Wee Ee Cheong	Deputy President & Director, United Overseas Bank Ltd	4	0.63	P
25.	Cham Tao Soon	President, Nanyang Technological University	3	0.67	B
26.	Thai Chee Ken	Chair, Schroders International Merchant Bankers Ltd	4	0.69	P
27.	Foo Kok Swee, BG (NS)	Director, MD ⁶³ & Deputy Chair, ECICS Holdings Ltd	4	0.75	G
28.	Lee Kim Poo, Moses	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Community Development	2	0.75	C
29.	Ngiam Tong Dow	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance	2	0.75	C
30.	Yu-Foo Yee Shoon	MP, Deputy Secretary-General, NTUC	2	0.75	L
31.	Fam Yue Onn, Michael	MD, Fraser and Neave & Old Guard PAP cadre	3	0.78	P
32.	Oon Kum Loon	Executive Vice-President, DBS Bank	3	0.78	G
33.	Sim Kee Boon	Executive Chair, Keppel Corporation and former permanent secretary	3	0.78	G
34.	Chen Choong Joong	Managing Partner, Allen and Gledhill, Solicitors	3	0.89	P
35.	Chen Tien Lap, Bernard	Director, CEO, Intraco Ltd, former MP and Deputy Secretary	3	0.89	L
36.	Lau Chan Sin	Director, Deputy President and Deputy COO, DBS Bank	4	0.89	G
37.	Nair, Dileep	Director & CEO, POSBank & Deputy Secretary, MOF	3	0.89	C
38.	Quek Chee Hoon	Executive Vice President & Head, Direct Investments Group of Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd	3	0.89	G

THE CORE MANAGEMENT OF BOARDS AND GLCS IN 1998

Statutory Boards and Strategies of Governance

From the analysis of the composition of statutory boards for the period 1988-1998, it is possible to identify a number of major governance strategies for managing these two

⁶³ MD from at least 1988-1991, then President & CEO 1992-1995.

sectors. The full analysis of board directorships for this period is provided in Appendix 11. A total of 13 strategies have been identified and are listed below.

1. Total dominance of statutory boards by the public sector. Approximately two-thirds of directors come from this sector. Of board appointees, 93.6 per cent were Singaporean. On average, public sector appointees accounted for 63.4 per cent, Singaporean private sector appointees for 20.1% and foreign companies 9.9 per cent, the NTUC accounted for only 1.8%, industry associations, 1.1 per cent and all community organisations combined (cultural, community, religious and philanthropic), only 1.6 per cent. Most public sector appointments were from the civil service (13.9 per cent and the higher education sector (10.5 per cent) the latter dominated by the NUS.

2. Statutory are substantially self-managing and take responsibility for their own performance. The greatest source of statutory board directors is from statutory boards themselves, then ministries, private sector Singaporean companies and then from ministers and former ministers combined, followed by GLCs and foreign companies.

3. Exclusion of NTUC representation and particularly, exclusion of rank and file union members and executives. Union representation on boards was negligible at an average of 2 per cent. NTUC directors were wholly from the NTUC meritocratic elite who derived from the public sector or the parliament, not from rank and file union members or even union secretaries.

4. Exclusion of community sector representation. No genuine community representation could be identified, including representation from the government affiliated GROs, of which there was none.⁶⁴

5. The inclusion of minority private sector representation through the cultivation of a pool of private sector directors which has long term stability and comprises people who are of cadre or proto-cadre status; ie. They are supportive of the government and participate in board management in technical terms, not ideological or political terms. The individual counts more than the company or business sector, although in some minor boards, such as the Dental Board, the Board of Architects and other specialist

⁶⁴ In the 11 year period covered by the analysis, only the Singapore Indian Fine Arts Society, Jamiyah, the Orchid Society of Southeast Asia, the Shaw Foundation, the Singapore Action Group of Elders, The Substation, Yayasan Mendaki and the YMCA were the only organisations represented on boards which could be broadly termed community groups; a total of 8 over 11 years. In 1998, in the community sector, only two genuine community representatives were identified; Kenneth Tan from the Singapore Film Society on the Film Appeal Committee and Yusof Alsagoff from the Orchid Society of Southeast Asia on the National Parks Board. There is no representation from national women's organisations, welfare, educational, sports, cultural, clan associations or any of the other myriad community organisations that exist in Singapore. Also, no GROs are represented on statutory boards, so it is obvious that they are retained within the political and micro-administration domains⁶⁴ rather than at the policy making level.

professional boards, directors are almost wholly from the profession concerned or an associated profession. This is not to say that profession and business sector do not count; they do; Both Singaporean and foreign executives are requested by the government to "put something back into Singapore" by participation on boards to which they can contribute expertise. The pattern of participation most discernible is that almost no companies participate in boards wholly in their business sector. Once a particular director is found to be reliable, he will be asked to serve on a number of boards, most of which will not be connected with his occupation or business. The only major private sector companies represented on boards over the 11 year study period were RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers (RSP) and Overseas Union Bank (OUB), unless one counts Singapore Press Holdings which is privately held but government controlled.

While some companies were allocated to directorships in boards related to their business sector, such as banks to the BCCS and MAS, the overwhelming majority of private sector appointments were not to boards related to their business sector. For example, while RSP was given directorships in sector-related boards such as BOA, STITB, ABLA, HDB, NHB and CIDB, it was also given directorships in non-sector related boards including SBC and SBA, NAC, STB and CPF. OUB had directorships in sector-related boards such as BCCS, EDB and PAB, but also in non-sector related boards such as SBC and SBA, NUS, PSC, NPBOG, CAAS, HDB, TAS and the FAC.

As one examines appointments, it is obvious that what matters is the person more than the company affiliation. For example, in the cases of Michael Fam Yue Onn and Keith Tay Ah Kee, two of the most prominent private sector appointees, their directorships continued irregardless of their company affiliation over the period studied, and in Fam's case, over a 30 year period. An analysis of the match between company business sector and board appointments is shown in Table 7.34.

Table 7.34: Matching of Statutory Board Directorships with the Business Sector of the Director's Employer in Singapore 1988-1998

Company	Business Sector	Board Appointments	Match
Esso	Petrochemicals	EDB, PSC, SPBOG, SSC, NUS, ITEBOG, LLB, SPSB, JTC, CAAS, BOA, NSTB	Partial
Fraser & Neave	Food & Beverages	NTU, ITEBOG, CPA, NUS, PSC	No
Descon Chartered Architects	Architects	People's Association	No
Price Waterhouse	Accountants	POSB, MRTC, FAC, LTA, CIDB, NTU, NPB, PAC	Partial
Khoo Joo Ewe & Partners	Solicitors	PSC, PCMR, SLL, PCIDSC, SSC	No
Yeo Hiap Seng Limited	Food & Beverages	SCB, TPBOG, SSC, TDB	Partial

Asia Life Insurance Society	Insurance	PSC, PCDCS, IRAS, LSC	No
Scotts Holdings	Property	TPBOG, NHB, NAC, STB	Partial
K S Lee & Associates	Solicitors	SPBOG, ITEBOG, NAPC, STITB	Partial
Hong Leong Group	Property & Finance	SPSB, CAAS, SCSS	Partial
Asia Pacific Breweries	Food & Beverages	PSC, NUS	No
Eye Centre & Surgery	Ophthalmologist	SCSS/NCSS	No
Lee & Lee	Solicitors	PUB, ISEAS, SAM	Partial
Kuok (Singapore)	Commodity Traders	TDB, NAC	Partial
Tan Fe Ping & Partners	Consulting	BOA, CIDB, SPSB	Yes
	Engineers		
Baker Marine Energy	Marine Engines	CPF, JTC	No
Charles N Mendis & Partners	Solicitors	SCB	No
Far East Organisation	Property	CIDB, NAC, STB, STOTB	Partial
SAMAS Management Consultants	Management	ABLA, NAPC	Partial
	Consultants		
Thorne Ship Management	Shipping	NMB	Yes
Yokogawa Electric Asia	Electronics	NSTB, ITEBOG, NAPC	Yes
Compaq/Digital	Electronics	SCB, LTA	Partial
DP Architects	Architects	BOA, ACM, HDB, NHB	Yes
Du Pont	Chemicals	JTC, TAS, NUS	Partial
Motorola	Electronics	EDB, NSTB, SPBOG, SPBS	Yes
Squire Mech Pte Ltd	Electrical Engineers	SPSB, SPBOG, LLB, BOA	Partial
Bankers Trust	Banking	PSA	No
Charles Toh Clinic	Medical	PSC	No
Singardo Trading	Trading	NAC	No
The Yeoh Clinic	Medical	SAM, NHB	No
Jardine Matheson Group	Trading	ITBOR, CPF, SCSS	No

6. Cliques of directors are not allowed to develop, a strategy perhaps implemented either as an anti-corruption method or as a method of dispersing power over boards so that no single group can develop a power base in a group of boards, or for both reasons.

7. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have a right of representation. There is moderate SAF representation, little by the Singapore Police Force (SPF), and no representation over the 11 years from the Singapore Civil Defence Force.

8. The intellectual resources of the nation must participate in public sector management. The NUS was the most highly represented body of all on statutory boards,⁶⁵ more than any of the economic policy boards such as the EDB and the TDB, 33 per cent more than the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), the most highly represented of the ministries⁶⁶ and more than twice as much as the next most represented ministry, the Ministry of Education (MOE).⁶⁷

9. GLCs should not be highly involved in statutory board management, but should concentrate on their own sector. GLC appointees accounted for only 8.85 per cent of statutory board directorships.

⁶⁵ The NUS has a total of 357 places on 40 boards over the study period.

⁶⁶ MINDEF accounted for 4.9 per cent of positions and for 25 per cent of total ministry representation.

⁶⁷ The MOE had 2.95 per cent of positions and 15 per cent of total ministry representation.

10. Private sector directors should be highly educated and drawn principally from the elite professions. Singaporean companies with five or more board positions over the study period accounted for 14.85 per cent of total directorships. More than half of the representation from this group was provided by lawyers (15.1 per cent), property development and construction (including engineers), medical practitioners, architects, accountants and the finance sector.

11. Industry associations are not relevant to the management of statutory boards.

12. The expertise offered by foreign companies should be utilised by boards directly concerned with the business or industry specialty of these companies. Twenty-six foreign companies had significant representation on boards, the most highly represented group being the information technology and telecommunications group, comprising eight companies, all of whom were involved with boards in their industry sector.⁶⁸ Of these companies it is of note that their executives sitting on boards were almost wholly Singaporean.⁶⁹

13. A small inner group of directors and chairman should have multiple long term representation on statutory boards to develop expertise in their management, encourage stability and to be responsible to the political executive for their management. Those board members holding 10 or more positions accounted for 11.8 per cent of the directorships; a total of 145 people. Of these, 59 (4.8 per cent) held 15 positions or more and formed the core of statutory board directors. A further eight people held 14 positions. These were Er Kwong Wah,⁷⁰ Michael Fam Yue Onn,⁷¹ Hiew Siew Nam,⁷² Professor Tommy Koh Thong Bee,⁷³ Leong Charn Huen,⁷⁴ Lew Syn Pau,⁷⁵ Ridzwan Tuan Haji bin Haji Dzafir,⁷⁶ Patrick Yeoh Khwai Hoh.⁷⁷

⁶⁸ These companies were, in the following order; Hewlett Packard, Siemens Group, Xerox Singapore Software Centre, Compaq/Digital, Motorola, NEC, IBM Singapore Pte Ltd and Connor Peripherals. Some of these companies were highly ranked; Hewlett Packard at 43rd, Siemens at 60th and Xerox Software at 75th.

⁶⁹ These directors were: Koh Boon Hwee, Alexander Chan Meng Wah, Cheah Kean Huat, Victor Ang, Sunny Chan Han Tiong and Frank Cloutier for Hewlett Packard; Dr. Wang Kai Yuen for the Xerox Singapore Software Centre; Lim Soon Hock and Darke M. Sani for the Compaq/Digital group, John Wong and Yang Boon Kiat from IBM, Noel Hon Chia Chun from NEC Singapore, Chan Hua Bee and Dr. Joe Chen Yuk Fu from Connor peripherals.

⁷⁰ A Permanent Secretary in the Civil Service, last appointment being to the Ministry of Education. He is now retired.

⁷¹ Chairman and Managing Director of Fraser and Neave, one of the largest food and beverage companies in Singapore. Fam is an Old Guard PAP cadre, close to Lee Kuan Yew and a long time member of the Council of Presidential Advisers of which he was still a member in 1998. He has been associated with the PAP since the late 1960s.

⁷² Hiew was formerly the Director of the Public Works Department in the Ministry of National Development. On retirement he received a position as Director, Project Completion, with SL Marina Centre Developments which he still holds.

⁷³ Former Dean, Faculty of Law, NUS, then seconded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was Ambassador to the United States for almost 20 years. On returning to Singapore, Koh was appointed inaugural Director of the Institute of Policy Studies, then an Ambassador-at-Large and eventually chairman of the National Arts Council. He relinquished the NAC chair in 1997. He is one of the most urbane and internationally experienced of PAP proto-cadres, making him a force for moderation and a strong supporter of the need to liberalise many aspects of the regime's social, economic and political structures.

⁷⁴ Leong is a senior partner of RDC Architects, one of the most highly represented private sector firms on boards. He is assumed to be a PAP cadre. He has only held appointments since 1990 on the HDB, SPBOG and the STITB.

GLCs and Strategies of Governance

When we look at the data for GLCs for 1991 and 1998 what strategies of governance can we identify? The major characteristics of the pattern of governance of the GLC sector still discernible in 1998 were:

1. Maintain control of GLCs by appointing an overwhelming number of public sector directors. In 1998, this level of representation was 74 per cent.
2. Public sector appointees to GLC boards should come from the Administrative Service and be at the higher levels of the civil service and statutory boards. Public sector representation was almost exclusively by the most senior level of officials, including eight permanent secretaries, one former permanent secretary and four deputy secretaries.
3. Private sector appointees to GLC boards should be from the highest level of the private sector; from large companies and include the most senior level of management in those companies. Private sector representation was also wholly from executives of the highest level in major national firms. These include the chairman or chief executives of Wing Tai Holdings, Shell Group, Fraser and Neave, Hewlett-Packard, Esso, Union Bank of Switzerland Asia, Overseas Union Bank, Schrodgers International Merchant Bankers, Times Publishing, Inter-Roller Engineering⁷⁸ and United Overseas Bank. Additionally the senior partners of two of the nation's largest law firms held GLC directorships; Chen Choong Joong of Allen and Gledhill and Sat Pal Khattar from Khattar Wong and Partners. The managing partners from Price Waterhouse, Michael Lim Choo San, and Keith Tay Ah Kee from KPMG Peat Marwick, also held directorships.

⁷⁵ Lew is an MP and was variously, Secretary, Metal Industries Workers Union (1988-93) and Assistant Director (Industrial Relations) in the NTUC Administration and Research Unit. He is now General Manager, Comfort Group, the privatised former NTUC Comfort Cooperative, still predominantly owned by NTUC interests.

⁷⁶ Ridzwan is a long time managing director of the TDB and a member of the Council of Presidential Advisers and the Presidential Council for Minority Rights. He also hold two non-residential ambassadorial appointments. He is an excellent example a public service proto-cadre.

⁷⁷ Yeoh is a director on the DBS board and is president of DBS Bank. However, many of his former responsibilities have now been transferred to the American CEO appointed in 1997, John Olds and his board representation is declining. Olds is not represented on any board, but was appointed to the DBS board after the survey period.

⁷⁸ Inter-Roller is not a major national firm, although it is a successful medium size Singaporean firm. It designs, manufactures, installs and maintains material handling, air handling and pollution control equipment. It exports much of its production and has plants in Singapore and Malaysia. It had sales in 1998 of \$32, 282, 437. See: Wright Investors Service. Available at: <http://www.wisi.com>.

4. Holding companies should be controlled by key Administrative Service officers at permanent secretary level, former Administrative Service officers or former ministers who are, or have been, part of the core executive.
5. GLCs should be substantially responsible for their own management and performance without drawing heavily on the civil service, statutory boards or the political executive for supervision. Most GLC directors came predominantly from the GLC sector itself, then from statutory boards and then from civil service ministries.
6. The GLC sector's priority is to be profitable and commercially viable above all else.
7. Appointments of directors should be made so that no cliques of directors with control over major groups of GLCs or groups of holding companies can develop. Multiple directorships should be made across various holding company groups.
8. Community or consumer representation is not required on GLCs.
8. The strategic framework of individual GLCs and, in particular, their holding companies, should be to plan over the medium to long term to develop commercially so as to achieve national economic policy goals, particularly the development of a number of globally competitive Singaporean owned MNCs.

CONCLUSIONS: THE CORE EXECUTIVE IN THE BOARD AND GLC SECTORS IN 1998

In 1998, the above analyses provide us with a core group of board and GLC actors which comprise 78 people as shown in Table 7.36. Of this group only four are highly represented on both statutory boards and GLC boards; Dr. Cham Tao Soon, Moses Lee Kim Poo, Yu-Foo Yee Shoon and Sim Kee Boon. However, among this group, 37 people (47 per cent) have positions on both GLC boards and statutory boards, 16 (21 per cent) hold GLC directorships only and 25 (32 per cent) hold statutory board directorships only. Sectoral representation within this group is as shown in Table 7.35 below.

Table 7.35: Sectoral Representation Among the Major Group of GLC and Statutory Board Directors in Singapore: 1998

Sector	Board	Civil Service	GLC	MPs	Private Sector	NTUC	TOTALS
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No.	14	16	19	10	18	1	78
%	18	21	24	13	23	1	100%

As can be seen from Table 7.36, 76 per cent of this top group of directors come from the public sector. However, as with all senior officers in the Singaporean public sector, the differentiation between officers based on their current public sector appointments is largely arbitrary as these officers move between the sectors during their career, although movement between boards and the civil service into GLCs is less common than between GLCs and the private sector. For example, of those directors from statutory boards, if we exclude the 6 directors who are from the higher education sector,⁷⁹ of the eight remaining directors five had served in the civil service; Stephen Yeo Siew Chye, Lee Suan Hiang, Leong Keng Thai, Barry Desker and Dr. Tan Kim Siew. Of those directors from the GLC sector, if we include the Ministry of Defence as part of the civil service, seven of the 19 have had civil service or board careers, including two former permanent secretaries, Sim Kee Boon and Er Kwong Wah, a former deputy secretary, Bernard Chen Tien Lap⁸⁰ and a

⁷⁹ To the best of my knowledge, none of these higher education appointees has had substantial careers in the civil service or non-education statutory boards. These directors are; Professor Leo Tan Wee Hin, Professor Andrew Nee Yeh Ching, Professor Wang Gungwu, Assoc. Professor Ernest Chew Chin Tiong, Professor Lim Pi and Dr. Cham Tao Soon.

⁸⁰ Chen is also a former MP and minister also.

Table 7.36: Core People on Statutory Boards and GLCs in Singapore:1998

NO.	NAME	POSITION & COMPANY
1.	Ang Kong Hua	MD President, NatSteel Ltd.
2.	Arun Mahizhnan	Dep. Director, Inst. of Policy Studies
3.	Cham Tao Soon	President, Nanyang Technological University
4.	Chan Sek Keong	Attorney General
5.	Chee Yam Cheng, A/P PPA(P)	MOH, Dep. Director, Medical Services
6.	Chen Choong Joong	Managing Partner, Allen and Gledhill, Solicitors
7.	Chen Tien Lap, Bernard	Director, CEO, Intraco Ltd, former MP and Deputy Secretary
8.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Chair, MD, Wing-Tai Holdings Ltd
9.	Cheong Siew Keong, Dr BBM, BBM(L)	NUH, Chairman
10.	Cheong, Benedict	MHA, Director, (Operations), SPF
11.	Chew Chin Tiong, Ernest, A/P PBM	NUS, Department of History
12.	Chew G K, Andrew, Dr.	PS, PMO (Retired)
13.	Chiang Chie Foo	MOE, PS (2 nd)
14.	Chong Yew Fook, Charles	MP, Adviser, Pasir Ris CCC
15.	Choo Chiau Beng	Chair & MD, Keppel FELS
16.	Desker, Barry, PPA(E)	TDB, CEO
17.	Dhanabalan, Suppiah	Chair, Singapore Airlines Ltd (Until 30/5/98) & Executive Chair, DBS Bank (+ POSBank) (From 30 /5/98)
18.	Er Kwong Wah	Executive Chair, Sembawang Marine & Logistics & former permanent secretary
19.	Fam Yue Onn, Michael	MD, Fraser and Neave & Old Guard PAP cadre
20.	Fang Ai Lian	Ernst & Young, Managing Partner
21.	Foo Kok Swee, BG (NS)	Director, MD ⁸¹ & Deputy Chair, ECICS Holdings Ltd
22.	Ho Meng Kit, BG (NS)	EDB, Managing Director
23.	Hong Hai, Dr,	Former MP & CEO, Haw Par Corporation
24.	Khattar, Sat Pal PPA(P)	Khattar Wong & Partners
25.	Khaw Boon Wan	Permanent Secretary, MTI
26.	Koh Boon Hwee	MD, Hewlett-Packard Singapore
27.	Koh Yong Guan PJG	MOH, PS & MD MAS
28.	Lai Chun Loong	President, Chartered Industries of Singapore
29.	Lam Joon Khoi, BG (NS)	MOE, DS (Policy)
30.	Lau Chan Sin	Director, Deputy President and Deputy COO, DBS Bank
31.	Lee Ek Tieng	MD, GIC & Head of Civil Service
32.	Lee Hee Seng, PJG, DUBC	PSC Chairman & OUB Chairman
33.	Lee Hsien Yang, BG	President & CEO, Singapore Telecommunications Ltd.
34.	Lee Kim Poo, Moses	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Community Development
35.	Lee Suan Hiang, PPA(P)	SPSB, CEO
36.	Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm (ret.)	Executive Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering. Former Chief of Navy.
37.	Leong Keng Thai	TAS, Director-General (DS level)
38.	Lim Chee Onn	Deputy Chair & MD, Keppel Land. Former MP, minister and deputy secretary.
39.	Lim Choo San, Michael	Price Waterhouse, Managing Partner
40.	Lim Chuan Poh, BG (NS)	Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Communications & former Chief of Army, Singapore Armed Forces
41.	Lim Hock San, PPA(E)	United Industrial Corp., President & CEO
42.	Lim Pin, Prof.	NUS, Vice Chancellor
43.	Lim Swee Say	MP, Dep. Secretary-General, NTUC
44.	Lim Yong Wah	Chairman, Pidemco Land & Old Guard PAP cadre
45.	Liu Thai Ker, PJG PPA(E)	RSP Architects, Planners & Engineers
46.	Loh Wing Siew	MD, Keppel Corporation
47.	Lua Cheng Eng	CEO & Deputy Chair, Neptune Orient Lines Ltd

⁸¹ MD from at least 1988-1991, then President & CEO 1992-1995.

48.	Magad, Ahmad Mohamed	MP & II-IV Singapore, MD
49.	Nair, Dileep	Director & CEO, POSBank & Deputy Secretary, MOF
50.	Nee Yeh Ching, Andrew, Prof.	NUS, Dean, Faculty of Engineering
51.	Ng Chee Tat, Philip	Far East Organisation, CEO
52.	Ng Kee Choe	President, DBS Bank
53.	Ngiam Tong Dow	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance
54.	Niam Chiang Meng PPA(P)	MITA, PS
55.	Oon Kum Loon	Executive Vice-President, DBS Bank
56.	Quek Chee Hoon	Executive Vice President & Head, Direct Investments Group of Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd
57.	Quek Poh Huat	President, Temasek Holdings & Director & former President, Singapore Technologies Pte Ltd
58.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	President, CEO, Overseas Union Bank Ltd
59.	Selvaretnam, Daniel	EDB, Assist. MD (International Policy)
60.	Seng Han Thong	MP, NTUC, Director (Organisational Management) & GM, Chinese newspapers, SPH
61.	Sim Kee Boon	Executive Chair, Keppel Corporation and former permanent secretary
62.	Sinnakaruppan, Ramasamy	MP, Assist. Secretary-General, NTUC
63.	Su Guanng, Dr.	MINDEF, DS (Technology)
64.	Tan Ee Ping	Tan Ee Ping & Partners, Principal
65.	Tan Eng Heng BBM, BBM (L)	Asia Life Insurance Society, Chairman
66.	Tan Kim Siew, Dr. Col. (NS)	URA, CEO, Chief Planner
67.	Tan Kin Lian PBM	NTUC Income
68.	Tan Wee Hin, Leo, Prof. PPA(E), PBM	NIE, Director
69.	Teo Soon Hoe	ED and Group Finance Director, Keppel Corporation
70.	Thai Chee Ken	Chair, Schroders International Merchant Bankers Ltd
71.	Wang Gungwu, Prof.	NUS, Chair, Institute of East Asian Political Economy
72.	Wee Ee Cheong	Deputy President & Director, United Overseas Bank Ltd
73.	Wee Heng Tin PPA(P), PPA(G), PBS	MOE, Director-General of Education
74.	Wong Hung Khim	Chair, CEO, DelGro & former President/CEO Singapore Telecom
75.	Wong Nang Jang	OCBC, Executive Vice President
76.	Yeo Ning Hong, Dr	Former MP and cabinet minister. Executive Chairman, PSA Corporation
77.	Yeo Siew Chye, Stephen	NCB, CEO
78.	Yu-Foo Yee Shoon	MP, Deputy Secretary-General, NTUC

former Chief of Navy, RAdm. James Leo Chin Lian. The other members of this group are; BG Foo Kok Swee, Quek Chee Hoon and Lim Hock San. Of the MPs who are directors, four have had civil service experience; Suppiah Dhanabalan, Lim Chee Onn, Ramasamy Sinnakaruppan and Lim Swee Say. Of those directors from the private sector, only Liu Thai Ker had previous experience in the civil service and statutory board sectors, his position with RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers being an *amakudari* position. Overall, of the 78 directors, 10 (13 per cent) had substantial careers in MINDEF or were regular SAF officers. Only one of the directors in this top group was from an NTUC affiliated organisation; Tan Lin Kian, CEO of NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative.

There are several other characteristics of note for this group of top directors. Among them, many of the chief executives of the major boards are not represented except for Lee Suan Hiang of SPSB, Barry Desker of the TDB, Tan Kim Siew of the URA, Leong

Keng Thai of TAS and Koh Yong Guan of MAS. This would indicate that while these officers are major policy actors, their efforts are concentrated on management of their boards and immediate responsibilities. Those chief executives not part of the group of top directors includes Philip Yeo Liat Kok⁸² of the EDB (although Ho Meng Kit, the Managing Director of EDB is represented), Ko Kheng Wah of JTC, Stephen Yeo Siew Chye of NCB, Ong Ho Sim of the PUB, Chong Lit Cheong of the NSTB, Yeo Kee Leng of the STB, Tan Guong Ching of the HDB, Lim Han Soon of the CPF, Koh Cher Siang of IRAS, Lim Hock Chuan of the SBA and Wong Woon Leong of CAAS. All of these officers sit on their own boards and all are major actors in their own policy communities; they could not be excluded from the core group of board and GLC directors.

Another feature to note is the absence of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Kwah Boon Wan, from all statutory boards within his portfolio, thus lowering his level of representation. During 1998, Kwah did not sit on any of his ministry's boards, thus indicating their relative autonomy from his oversight. This is not surprising, given that the chairman of the EDB, Philip Yeo is a higher classification than Kwah and Lee Suan Hiang of SPSB and Barry Desker of the TDB are of a rank equivalent to Khaw's. In fact, the EDB is almost wholly autonomous from MTL. Its board comprises seven EDB senior executives, three non-executive directors, all of whom worked with Philip Yeo previously in MINDEF and five directors from the private sector, four of whom are foreigners. Thus, of the 12 Singaporean directors of the EDB, five worked with Philip Yeo in MINDEF; Ho Ching, Ho Meng Kit, Lim Swee Say, Peter Ho and MG (NS) Lim Neo Chian; five are career EDB officers; Gong Wee Lik, Daniel Selvaratnam, Shirley Chen, Teoh Song Sea and Liow Voon Kheong and the last is Philip Yeo himself.

Also absent from the group of core statutory board and GLC directors are all of the heads of higher education statutory boards except for NUS, NTU and the NIE. No polytechnic principals are present. Of the 22 permanent secretaries,⁸³ eight are represented; Chan Sek Keong, Lee Ek Tieng, Niam Chiang Meng, Chiang Chie Foo, Koh Yong Guan, Moses Lee Kim Poo, Ngiam Tong Dow and Khaw Boon Wan. All the other civil service directors are at deputy secretary level, except for Dr. Andrew Chew Guan Khuan who was the immediate past Head of Civil Service who retired at the end of 1997.

⁸² Philip Yeo Liat Kok's position at EDB is an executive chairman, so he effectively runs the organisation. In this particular case, he is assumed to take precedence over Ho Meng Kit, the EDB's Managing Director. The EDB is also represented by Daniel Selvaratnam, its Assistant Managing Director (International).

⁸³ This number includes the Attorney-General, although constitutionally he is a member of the executive, he acts more as a permanent secretary and is not a member of the cabinet.

Representation from the major GLCs was provided by Ang Kong Hua of NatSteel, Bernard Chen Tien Lap of Intraco, Lai Chun Loong of Chartered Industries of Singapore, Lee Hsien Yang of SingTel and Singapore Post, Lim Yong Wah of Pidemco Land, Loh Wing Siew and Sim Kee Boon of Keppel Corporation, Lua Cheng Eng from NOL, Dileep Nair from POSBank, Ng Kee Choe from DBS Bank, Quek Poh Huat of Temasek Holdings and Seng Han Thong of Singapore Press Holdings. Overall, the DBS group had three directors in this top group, the Keppel group had five, Singapore Technologies and Temasek Holdings had two each while the other GLCs represented had one each. Of the 44 top GLCs, 28 are represented by their chairmen in this list of top directors. These include all the level 1 GLCs⁸⁴ except the GIC (although Lee Ek Tieng, the managing director of the GIC is in the list); 10 of the level 2 GLCs – Intraco, NatSteel, Singapore Airlines, DBS Bank, POSBank, Singapore Telecom, Singapore Post, SembCorp Industries, NOL and PSA Corporation – and 14 level 3 GLCs; Teledata, KeppelFELS, Sembawang Marine, Temasek Management Services, Singapore Cable Vision, DBS Land, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering, Pidemco Land, Keppel Maritime Industries, Keppel Integrated Engineering, Jurong Shipyard/Sembawang Shipyard, ST Aerospace, MobileOne and Keppel Finance. The majority of these companies are older GLCs which can be expected to have the more experienced directors and executives.

The private sector directors come overwhelmingly from either finance sector or property sector related firms; of the 18 directors from this sector, eight (44 per cent) come from the finance sector, five from the property sector (28 per cent), two from major national law firms, one from a transport company, one from the information technology sector and one from the food and beverage sector. The nature of these directorships is further discussed below in the context of the findings from all the analyses contained in this chapter.

Analysis of this group of top directors in statutory boards and GLCs in 1998 indicates that responsibilities across the statutory board and GLC sectors are not concentrated in the hands of a few permanent secretaries or others, and that the tendency in the late 1990's is to move away from the very small *camarilla* of permanent secretaries revealed in Vennewald's 1991 analysis to a more distributed leadership style. It also indicates that the most influential people are bifurcated between the two sectors; there are people who manage statutory boards and people who manage GLCs and while a larger group is represented on both statutory boards and GLC boards, the most important people in each sector tend to concentrate their efforts on their particular sector. A group of dominant individuals does exist, it is a rather large group, it is

⁸⁴ The level 1 GLCs represented include; Temasek Holdings (Suppiah Dhanabalan), MND Holdings (Lee Ek Tieng), the Health Corporation of Singapore (Moses Lee Kim Poo) and the ST Group (Dr. Yeo Ning Hong).

overwhelmingly from the public sector and does overlap the boundaries between boards, GLCs, the civil service and the military establishment.

We can also conclude from this analysis that statist corporatist arrangements do not characterise state-society relations in Singapore. Rather, while some corporatist-like arrangements occur, the most consistent pattern of state-society relations is elitist and oligarchic, therefore supporting the notion of PAP hegemony as being oligarchic. The working class is wholly excluded from any direct representation on statutory boards and GLCs, while the inclusion of community organisations, trade unions and industry associations is at such a negligible levels as to be inconsequential.

8. STRATEGIES OF GOVERNANCE: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO COERCION AND CONSENT BUILDING

This chapter examines selected key strategies in the governance repertoire of the Goh Chok Tong governments, in order to illustrate the approach taken by the contemporary core executive. In discussing the implications of these governance strategies, the linkage between the coercive functions of the state and its consent building functions is then examined. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how the contemporary core executive draws upon its historical political and public management roots and is developing new strategies to maintain the PAP's hegemonic program in the face of considerable social and economic change driven by Singapore's heavy dependency on the global trade regime and its increasing integration into the new international information and media regime.

Central to the power dynamics of the core executive in Singapore are the use of the coercive and consent building instruments of the state. In this chapter we examine the nature of these instruments and their use as strategies of governance by the core executive. In particular, we focus on the coercive instruments available to the core executive and how these form part of their distinctive governance strategy. These complementary hegemonic strategies are based not only on legislation and public management mechanisms, which can be divided into those supporting the coercive framework and those which facilitate the development of consent, but also upon a technological capability to support these strategies being developed inside and outside the public sector, under the guidance and control of the political executive. Both the coercive and consent building frameworks have covert and overt components. Both sets of instruments and strategies of the core executive are derived from the Total Security framework adopted by the government. Within this framework, "Total Security is Total Defence plus active diplomacy plus internal security."¹ In this context, internal security is broadly defined and includes social cohesion, toleration and national identity; there are definitely positive aspects to the concept of internal security shared by the core executive in Singapore, although its negative aspects are often the focus of analysis.²

¹ "Defence 'must not be left to the economic underclass'", *Straits Times*, 14 December, 1991, p. 2

² This view was expressed by all Administrative Service officers I have interviewed. While several acknowledged that many people thought of internal security in terms of coercive control, this was not what was generally meant. Since 1997, Goh Chok Tong, through the development of CDCs and the Singapore 21 agenda, has been encouraging the use of more positive terms for social cohesion, such as 'heartware' and 'community bonding'.

In this study, the consent framework will not be examined in detail as its components have been the subject of considerable research over the past 30 years and much is already known of their nature, structure and functions. Rather, what I wish to do in this chapter is illustrate the ways in which the consent-building and coercive strategies interact and are mutually supportive in maintaining the balance essential to the durability of the hegemonic program. In some cases, what I term consent building mechanisms have been identified more as mechanisms of coercion by some, such as the media,³ but many of these mechanisms fulfil both roles. An overview of these components and their relationship to the coercive framework is essential in understanding the way in which the contemporary core executive used these mechanisms as strategies of governance within the hegemonic framework.

ASPECTS OF CONSENT BUILDING

By its very nature, consent is a far more difficult strategy to identify and track; it is more often covert than overt and it places responsibility on both the consent-seeking party and the consent-giving party, thus blurring the boundaries between the two. The major strategy in the consent framework is the shaping of opinion and attitude; what was once called propaganda, but which is now termed "psychological" and "social" defence within the Singaporean executive's Total Defence framework. This strategy has a number of components, principal among which are:

1. Control of the media;
2. Control of the nation's communications infrastructure;
3. Political socialisation through compulsory national service for all male citizens and the GRO network; and
4. Community consultation in policy making.

The consent framework is promoted through a legislative infrastructure which complements the coercion framework, the essential components of which are; the Peoples' Association Act, the Housing and Development Board Act, the Town Councils Act, the Societies Act, the Public Entertainment Act, the Environmental Public Health Act, Administration of Muslim Law Act, Legal Profession Act, the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act, Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, Singapore Broadcasting Act, the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore Act and the Enlistment Act. Some of the more consent oriented legislation also has coercive functions as well, but these are exercised usually within a consent facilitation

³ For example, see: Lily Z. Rahim, "Singapore: Consent, coercion and constitutional engineering", *Current Affairs Bulletin*, December 1993/January 1994, p. 21

framework; such as justifying the control of the media and communications infrastructure on the grounds of social cohesion and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony legislation on the basis of curtailing inter-ethnic conflict by discouraging aggressive religious proselytization. It is in this balancing of coercive forces within consent building that ideology plays its most important role; ideology provides the justification for coercion to be exercised in order to promote consent. In Singapore, the control of the communications infrastructure and the media are the foundations on which consent building strategies are based and operate.

Media and Communications Infrastructure: Strategies for Control

The basis of the core executive's media based consent building strategies is based on public ownership or control, directly or indirectly, of the nation's communications infrastructure, or in the absence of such ownership, the ability to maintain surveillance of all media and media users as required by components of its coercive strategies.

In 1998, the Singapore government, directly or indirectly owned almost all the nation's telecommunications infrastructure including:

1. Singapore Telecommunications Limited⁴
2. MobileOne (Asia) Pte. Ltd (M1).⁵
3. SunPage⁶
4. Television Corporation of Singapore
5. Radio Corporation of Singapore
6. Singapore International Media
7. Media Corporation of Singapore
8. Singapore Cable Vision (SCV);⁷
9. 1-Net Pte. Ltd.⁸;
10. CyberWay ISP;⁹

⁴ In 1998, Singapore Telecommunications was 76 per cent government owned.

⁵ M1 is a consortium comprising Keppel Corporation (35%), Singapore Press Holdings (35%) Cable and wireless (15%) and Cable and Wireless HKT (15%). Thus government affiliated interests control 70% of the company. Keppel Corporation chairs the M1 board.

⁶ SunPage is a subsidiary of Singapore Technologies.

⁷ SCV is an associated company of ST Telemedia. Its shareholders comprise: Media Corporation of Singapore (31%), MediaOne International (25%), Singapore Technologies Pte. Ltd. (24%) and Singapore Press Holdings (20%). The company is therefore 80% owned by GLCs and 20% by a government affiliate – SPH. Originally, the company was 25% owned by Continental CableVision of the United States which also had the original management contract for the company. However, disputes over management style and business strategy led the Americans to leave the consortium in late 1997. See: "Singapore CableVision to get new president from next Jan", *Straits Times*, 16 December 1997, pp. 1-2

⁸ This company is owned by a consortium comprising: SingCom Investments Pte. Ltd. (a wholly owned subsidiary of the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore), Singapore Telecommunications, Singapore Cable Vision, Pacific Internet and CyberWay. It is therefore almost wholly government owned.

⁹ ISP=Internet Service Provider. In 1998, CyberWay was wholly acquired by the StarHub Consortium and is therefore predominantly government owned.

11. Pacific Internet ISP;¹⁰
12. The StarHub Consortium for alternative fixed basic and cellular telephony;¹¹
13. STAR (ST Advanced Radio);¹²
14. ST Mobile Data;¹³ and
15. ST Teleport satellite earth station and transmission service.

This infrastructure places the government in direct or indirect control of almost all domestic telecommunications facilities, all international telecommunications connections such as submarine cables and satellite earth stations, all television stations, almost all radio stations and 90 per cent of the radio audience,¹⁴ all internet service providers, the only national digital trunk radio service, all fixed and cellular telephony services and all paging services. The control of telecommunications infrastructure extends to the banning of private ownership of satellite dishes, although they may be used by businesses under licence. To a large degree, the cable television services available through the SingaporeOne broadband service are being presented as making satellite reception irrelevant. This approach is reinforced by providing the first SingaporeOne cable point in HDB flats free of charge.¹⁵ However, this approach retains control over domestic content somewhat in the hands of the government, although international news networks such as CNN and BBC World News are available through SingaporeOne.¹⁶ As the telecommunications surveillance capability of the coercive framework has matured, particularly since 1995, it has become less important for the telecommunications infrastructure to be wholly government controlled. It is likely that the government will always retain direct or indirect control of the major telecommunications backbone services, such as SingTel and SingaporeOne, but it is possible that it will slowly relinquish ownership of other assets if this is commercially acceptable.

Control of the national television and radio networks provides the government with

¹⁰ In October 1998, SembCorp ventures owned 74.99 % of Pacific Internet.

¹¹ The StarHub consortium is a joint venture between Singapore Technologies Telemedia, Singapore Power, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation and British Telecom. Its majority interests are government affiliated. See: *Singapore Technologies Annual Report 1997*, Singapore, Singapore Technologies, 1998, p. 26

¹² STAR is the nation's only digital public trunked radio operator. See: *Singapore Technologies Annual Report 1997*, Singapore, Singapore technologies, 1998, p. 26

¹³ St Mobile data is the major operator of mobile data services using the RF spectrum. It is a joint venture of ST Telemedia, BellSouth Mobile data and the Comfort Group predominantly owned by NTUC.

¹⁴ The Radio Corporation of Singapore owns and operates 12 of the nation's 18 radio stations but has 90 per cent of the radio audience. All other radio stations are operated by government affiliates, NTUC, the Singapore Armed Forces Reservists Association (SAFRA) and the National Arts Council except the national cable radio Rediffusion service. See: *Speech by DPM Lee Hsien Loong at the launch of Radio Corporation of Singapore's Commercial digital Audio Broadcast Service*. Singapore, RCS, 19 November 1999

¹⁵ "Cabling of landed properties delayed", *Straits Times*, 16 December 1997, p. 3. This is in comparison to approximately \$1,000 for a cable modem connection to a house.

¹⁶ To what extent the Singapore government will attempt to censor these channels is unknown. It is conceivable that the government may use loss of access to the lucrative Singapore market to pressure these channels to avoid topics on Singapore which the government might object to.

the opportunity to shape news and current affairs as it wishes. As with other aspects of hegemonic control, there is little evidence that the government is proactive in doing this; within the hegemonic system, the media become self regulating and able to design such programs to fit the hegemonic parameters. Such control has recently extended to other aspects of television programming in particular. Since 1996, under funding provided through the EDB's Local Industry Upgrading Programme ((LIUP),¹⁷ the various television GLCs have been funded to develop increased local cultural and general programming content, including a greater amount of current affairs, as part of a strategy to develop a greater sense of national identity and community, and to exclude foreign content,¹⁸ a covert consent building strategy.¹⁹ This has resulted in television programs such as "Perspective", a current events program,²⁰ a Chinese drama program commissioned by the Singapore Labour Foundation and the NTUC,²¹ the launching of television programs to support the compulsory National Education curriculum in all schools,²² increasing Hokkien, Cantonese and other dialect programs on SCV to enhance understanding of traditional Chinese culture,²³ and a substantial increase in Malay language documentary and current affairs programs between 1995-1997.²⁴

In addition to the telecommunications infrastructure, the government, under the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act (NPPA), exerts complete control over the print media. This legislation gives the government right of approval over certain levels of share transactions in Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), the right to appoint certain directors to the board of Singapore Press Holdings as well as informal powers over this company. These informal powers extend to approving or nominating the appointment of the general manager of SPH. In the past, the former heads of the SID, S. R. Nathan and the ISD, Tjong Yik Min, have been appointed to this position on the nomination of the government. Tjong is the current president of SPH after having previously been appointed permanent secretary in the Ministry of Communications. He is widely seen as being groomed to succeed Lim Kim San, former minister and PAP cadre who in 1998 was 84 and reportedly ill. Additionally, it has been reported that the government has frequently transferred former members of the ISD to SPH as managers or

¹⁷ Ong Sor Fern, "New series and specials on Premiere 12", *Straits Times*, 26 June 1997, p. 16

¹⁸ In 1997, a committee reviewed the programming of all TCS channels and criticised much of it for reflecting foreign values. The committee recommended increase production of Singapore made programs that "reflect local culture and values." See: "Not many lapses in standards" and "Children's Programmes", *Straits Times*, 10 July 1997.

¹⁹ I am grateful to Chua Beng Huat for his insightful comments on this aspect of the contemporary thinking of the political executive on this matter. He also deals with this shift towards a community orientation in state ideology in: Chua Beng Huat, *Political Legitimacy and Housing: Stakeholding in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1997, especially Chapter 8

²⁰ "Perspective that jolts viewers on current affairs", *Straits Times*, 23 June 1997, p. 4

²¹ "Union's \$1 m TV series a showcase for workers", *Straits Times*, 17 April 1997, p. 3

²² "Schools rush to get antennas fixed", *Straits Times*, 8 May 1997, p. 1

²³ "Cable TV to screen more Chinese dialect shows", *Straits Times*, 11 May 1997, p. 34

²⁴ "STV12 aims to educate, reform", *Straits Times*, 18 December 1997, p. 15

journalists.²⁵ A number of former Administrative Service officers have also been 'transferred' to SPH, such as political editor Han Fook Kwang.

In addition to the control of newspapers and magazines, the NPPA gives the government to right to require approval of all printed material which is distributed to the public. Foreign magazines and publications are also licensed under s.16 of the NPPA and may be required to lodge a security deposit. In 1996 three foreign magazines were required to lodge a security deposit as part of their circulation permit; the *Far East Economic Review*, *Asia Week* and the *Asian Wall Street Journal*.²⁶ Since 1986, the government has used the NPPA to restrict the circulation of five foreign publications; the three publications required to pay deposits above and *Time* magazine on the grounds that "all four publications had interfered in Singapore's domestic affairs."²⁷ In 1997, the July issue of the British *Vogue* magazine was banned because of the inclusion of an "offensive" article on drug use.²⁸ This reflect the external focus of the government's media based consent building orientation; while control of the domestic media is complete, all possible sanctions will be used to stop foreign media from criticism of issues with which the government has a particular sensitivity, whether they be political, social or cultural.

The press in most countries, with the exception of the business press or specialist papers, provides news for a mass audience. The information provided carries a minimum of analysis, of forecasting or contextual information on stories; that which is provided will usually be provided by the agency or organisation from which the story is sourced. This is not the case in Singapore. There the media, in particular the print media, has a definite didactic orientation. Stories are placed in a context, analysis is routinely provided, technical terms are explained, particular columns to provide further analysis are not unusual. Singapore Press Holdings maintains a well staffed research group which supports this function, undertakes its own opinion polls and other surveys and feeds this information into its newspapers. In Singapore it is unquestionable that:

The media has an important role in nation building because of its reach and its influence on the population. ... Newspapers play an important part in the transmission of cultural values. And values provide the tools for economic and social success, and for holding a nation together.²⁹

In 1980, Gaskil commented with regard to the use of the media by the PAP that:

²⁵ Two of my informants commented that they had been interviewed off-the-record by Han Fook Kwang, political editor of the *Straits Times* and Warren Fernandez, assistant political editor on the same newspaper, in such as way as to indicate that the interview was not for the newspaper but for the ISD. None of these interviews appeared in the press.

²⁶ Based on correspondence from the Ministry of Information and the Arts.

²⁷ *Singapore and the Foreign Press*, Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1988, p. 1

²⁸ "British Vogue July issue barred for drugs article", *Straits Times*, 18 July 1997, p. 1

²⁹ Goh Chok Tong, "The media's different worldviews", *Straits Times*, 9 September 1998, p. 33

Reasonable grounds exist for believing that economic and other pressures against all opposition groups (exerted in part through control of the media) make elections very unfair.³⁰

This was still the case in 1996 according to Rodan's assessment³¹ and is undoubtedly still true. However, this coercive function is very narrowly targeted. The most important function of government control of the media is consent building, or in the terminology of Total Defence, social and psychological defence. This aspect of control of the print media is evidenced by the considerable degree of editorial independence provided to the editors of the newspapers in each major language, a fact not usually acknowledged by non-Singaporean researchers. For example, in reporting religious or racial conflict outside Singapore, the different language newspapers take editorial stances which fit the hegemonic markers for their audiences; these markers do not mean uniformity in reporting, they seek, in this context, a reinforcement of racial and religious tolerance, a key consent building goal of the PAP.³²

National Education and Political Socialisation Strategies

The use of compulsory national service in the armed forces, the police or the civil defence forces is a central part of the consent building regime, integral to the PAP's efforts to develop a distinct Singaporean citizenship.³³ Only an indication of its role and influence can be provided in this thesis. Its goal is not simply to develop an effective citizen defence force, but also to provide a lengthy and well planned program of political socialisation as an integral step in enhancing social cohesion and internal security.³⁴ In 1973, Goh Keng Swee, founding father of the SAF, noted that:

The defence build-up has to be supplemented by a parallel increase in the robustness of the civilian population, if we are not to throw away the enormous effort and money we have put into it. We must discard the migrant parvenu values ... we must sharpen our awareness of our collective or national interests.³⁵

The importance of this program as a political socialisation strategy, involving all males from 18-40 of age and extended to 50 years of age for officers, was indicated by Lee Hsien Loong following the "Marxist conspiracy" case. Commenting on the fact that most of those arrested in this case were women, Lee stated:

³⁰ Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1981*, Oxford, Clio Press, 1981, p. 396

³¹ Garry Rodan, "Elections without representation: The Singapore experience under the PAP", in R. H. Taylor, *The politics of elections in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge, Cambridge university Press, 1996, pp. 61-89, p. 82

³² Evelyn Yap, "BG Yeo: NS vital for racial peace", *Straits Times*, 23 August, p. 12

³³ It is notable that the major contemporary work on citizenship in Singapore completely omits any mention of the function of national service. See: Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995

³⁴ Evelyn Yap, "BG Yeo: NS vital for racial peace", *Straits Times*, 23 August 1998

³⁵ Goh Keng Swee, *The Practice of Economic Growth*, Singapore, Federal Publications, 1995 p. 237

One of the reasons there were so many women among those arrested as subversives may be because they are exempt from national service and, therefore, failed to be properly inculcated with Singapore national ideology.³⁶

The importance of the program in underwriting the government's racial tolerance and ethnic harmony stances was emphasised by BG George Yeo in 1998:

As long as we have a good government, and our own police and army, whatever racial or religious problems that may arise from time to time, can be contained or minimised. ... National Service is, therefore, a very important institution in Singapore against both internal aggression and internal threats.³⁷

This inculcation program is designed by the National Education Office within the Defence Policy Group in MINDEF and implemented by all training units. It includes an emphasis on the need for a strong government and incorporates a PAP oriented analysis of domestic politics. Since 1997, MINDEF's national education course has provided the framework for the new National Education curriculum being implemented in all schools by the Ministry of Education, initially under the direction of the former permanent secretary of MINDEF, Lim Siong Guan.³⁸ In this way, all Singaporeans are now bought into MINDEF's political indoctrination program rather than just adult males.

The MINDEF's National Education framework is also used within all uniformed youth services in Singapore as part of their training, particularly the National Cadet Corps. This involves approximately 50 per cent of the high school population, although it includes more male students than female students.³⁹ These organisations involve their members in Total Defence oriented training which, for example in the Boy Scouts, provides for the award of a series of Total Defence badges.⁴⁰

GROs AND POLITICAL SOCIALISATION

Although the role of the GROs in their relationship to the core executive has been excluded from this study, it is meaningful to briefly note the extent to which they penetrate society as agents of the core executive. The GROs are the basis for political action in the HDB heartlands; it is they which, under the overall direction of the People's Association (PA), act as the agents of the core executive in the housing estates where most people live. As Tan has noted;

³⁶ *Far East Economic Review*, 31 August 1988, p. 35

³⁷ Evelyn Yap, *op. cit.*

³⁸ Based on an interview with the head of the MINDEF National Education Office, Major Gregory tan, in 1998.

³⁹ Based on an estimate by a Ministry of Education official.

⁴⁰ *TD Focus: The Total Defence Electronic Newsletter*, January/February 1996. Available at: <http://www.mindef.gov.sg/midpa/td2/badge.html>

At the more structural level, the vigorous promotion of government-sponsored grassroots organisations could be seen as the attempt by the government to organize, communicate and control its citizens, especially the large proportion living in the newly created Housing and Development Board estates.⁴¹

The political executive has never been coy about the critical role of the GROs as an instrument of the core executive, citing them as a key part of the political infrastructure since 1960 with the founding of the PA.⁴² In 1998, the PA's organisation of the GROs included responsibility for all GROs as detailed in Table 8.1 below. As can be seen from the table, GROs involve large numbers of people in their administration, all on a voluntary basis. In 1997, the GROs offered 74,340 courses and activities in which there were 8,563,500 participants.⁴³ It is obvious from this summary data, that the GROs are extensively involved in their communities. While most of this involvement is not overtly political, it takes place within a socio-political framework constructed by the PAP and intended to promote consent for its political program.

Town Councils and Community Development Councils

The dominance of the civil service in the management of the state was supposed to be partly diffused by the introduction of town councils in 1988, and further by Community Development Councils (CDCs) in 1997. These decentralisation strategies were accompanied by the PS21 program to reform the public sector by improving services to citizens, increasing efficiency and defusing the general perception of the bureaucracy as insular and arrogant. However, town councils are chaired by MPs and

Table 8.1: People's Association Grassroots Organisations

GRO	No.	Membership
Community Development Councils	9	230
Citizen's Consultative Committees	83	2,780
Community Centre/Club Management Committees	105	2,730
Residents' Committees	486	11,260
Neighbourhood Committees	14	220
Civil defence Executive Committees	81	1,310
Women's executive Committees	97	1,500
Youth Executive Committees	93	1,540
Senior Citizens' Executive Committees	271	3,920
Area Sub-Committees	65	780
Boys' Club Management Committee	13	200
Sea Sports Club Management Committees	5	70

⁴¹ Tan Liok Hee, "Voluntary Associations as a Model of Social Change", *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, 2, 14, 1986, pp. 67-79, p. 78

⁴² See: Lee Kuan Yew, "Nation Building and the People's Association", in Jackie Sam, ed., *The first Twenty Years of the people's Association*, Singapore, The People's association, 1980, pp. 7-17; and, *Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the people's association at the people's association Long Service and Staff Commendation Awards Presentation Ceremony*, Singapore, People's Association, 26 July 1997.

⁴³ All data provided by the People's Association, September 1998.

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1,322

26,540

members appointed by the prime minister rather than elected, with members predominantly appointed from local GROs with clear government or PAP affiliations. Further, town council administrations were staffed by former public servants or public servants on secondment, at least in the PAP controlled councils which have been the overwhelming majority. In essence, the town councils are localised public housing estate management committees and partial substitutes for the HDB, as described by Low, but they are far from being self-determining and allowing "participation by the residents in truly local issues."⁴⁴

The CDCs are similarly structured and controlled.⁴⁵ There has been no "evolution of 'grassroots democracy'"⁴⁶ in these initiatives, especially as a major role for the CDCs is to "be an umbrella body, overseeing existing grassroots bodies such as the Citizens Consultative Committees, the Community Centre Management Committees, and the Residents' Committees."⁴⁷ and to administer a number of government welfare schemes including public assistance, the Rent and Utilities Assistance Scheme and the Medifund Scheme.⁴⁸ It should be noted that prior to the institution of the CDCs, Goh Chok Tong had described the Residents' Committees as "grassroots Parliaments"; he is obviously committed to the concept of consultation, but it is only consultation; it is not democratic dialogue.⁴⁹ The CDCs, like the town councils are merely mechanisms for redistributing ministry and statutory board functions to highly controlled local government agencies with limited budgets, limited responsibilities and little political autonomy. There has been no rolling back of the state in these initiatives, although there has been a minor dispersal of limited power over a small policy domain in response to electoral dissatisfaction with the HDB's inability to become genuinely client-focussed and acknowledge the importance of the connection between citizenship, electoral satisfaction with government and the standard of its services. CDCs have been established because town councils have failed, in Low's terms, "to become centres for social and political communication and interaction."⁵⁰ Whether the CDCs are genuinely supposed to aspire to such an achievement is arguable and some more time will be necessary before their role and function can be fully analysed.

⁴⁴ Linda Low, *Professionals at the Crossroads in Singapore*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1996, p.195

⁴⁵ Nine CDCs had been established by 1998, all headed by PAP MPs with members appointed by the prime minister. See: Leong Ching Ching, "9 CDCs for Singapore", *Sunday Times*, 3 August 1997, p. 1; and, Jason Leow, "National helpline reaches out to all in need", *Straits Times*, 10 January 1998, p. 57

⁴⁶ Chua Lee Hoong, "Mayors and CDCs: election strategy or radical political change?", *Straits Times*, 24 August 1996, p. 30

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁸ Pang Gek Choo and Leong Ching Ching, "CDCs to administer three government schemes", *Straits Times*, 30 March 1997, p. 29

⁴⁹ Bertha Henson, "PM calls for grassroots Parliaments", *Straits Times*, 8 June 1991, p. 1

⁵⁰ Low, 1996, *op. cit.*, p.195

What the establishment of town councils and CDCs has achieved, is the placement of the management of the main 'bread and butter' issues of HDB estate management and minor government program management close to citizens and the greater involvement of GROs in the most basic level of state management. This has probably helped defuse citizen dissatisfaction with the perceived poor level of service previously provided by the more centralised bureaucracies and possibly dissatisfaction with the government's acceptance of this.

Community Consultation Strategies

The Goh Chok Tong government was supposed to herald a new era in which government was to be "consultative and participative."⁵¹ The development of genuinely consultative governments under Goh has taken some time, principally, it is asserted by many interviewed, because he had considerable resistance from the bureaucracy, Lee Kuan Yew and large numbers of parliamentary members who were not convinced that there was anything to gain by this approach. In fact, there was a fear that Goh's style would send signals that the government was weak and indecisive. However, Goh has slowly and persistently pushed this agenda, although not with outstanding success before 1995. The Catherine Lim episode in December 1994, galvanised the middle classes in particular to question the authenticity of Goh's consultation agenda. Dr. Lim wrote a letter to the *Straits Times* questioning whether the government had changed under Goh and asserting that it didn't seem to have done so; there was no evidence of a greater degree of consultation and participation in government according to Lim. The reaction from Goh's press secretary was a classical old-fashioned Singapore public service slap down, challenging Dr. Lim, a mild apolitical academic, to join a political party or not bother commenting on national politics. The public outcry about this approach resulted in a more conciliatory letter from Goh to the newspaper and his subsequently being questioned on the matter in the parliament.⁵²

From 1995 onwards, the governments efforts to be more participative and consultative became more apparent and received greater publicity. These efforts targetted the middle classes; working class participation was, at best, mediated through the GROs, Meet-the-People Sessions, ministerial walkabouts and the traditional political "show the face" strategies. The public sector meritocracy was only interested in consulting

⁵¹ Alan Chong, *Singapore's New Premier Goh Chok Tong*, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk Paperbacks, 1991, p. 41

⁵² See: *Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report*, 63, 11, 23 January 1995, pp. 1016-1022

with their meritocratic equals, an attitude that was emphasised in interviews.⁵³

By 1998, the consultative mechanisms of government consisted of:

1. An expanded Feedback Unit characterised by a greater number of community feedback sessions. By 1998, the Feedback Unit had increased its inputs to three times the 1995 level.⁵⁴ In June 1998, the unit held the first of its national Feedback conference with 400 participants, pledged itself to continuation of the annual conference, to increase its feedback groups by six and to double participation in feedback sessions.⁵⁵
2. Government Parliamentary Committees have resource panels and undertake community visits and consultations with GROs, private sector companies and other organisations.⁵⁶
3. Ministries have resource panels and various ad hoc advisory committees to assist with policy development.⁵⁷
4. The economic policy agencies have integrated industry consultation, including with SMEs, into their policy development processes.⁵⁸
5. Community and industry representation on major government committees such as the Singapore 21 Committee which also held public hearings, focus groups, community meetings and a public conference to obtain responses to its recommendations on a general public policy framework for the beginning of the next century.⁵⁹

While the amount of consultation has increased, perceptions of the government's willingness to consult and the breadth of consultation are still largely negative; principally because the increase started from a very low base and the resistance of a core executive still operating on an administrative model of government does not greatly value broader, more democratic forms of consultation. In a survey, reported in June 1998, the government scored consistently low on issues related to consultation and participation. Only 22 per cent of respondents agreed that government consults enough, 34 per cent agreed that the government is open and easy to talk to, 45 per cent agreed that there were enough feedback channels, 25 per cent agreed that there was freedom of speech, but 57 per cent agreed that the government was open to good suggestions.⁶⁰ Although there are no comparable benchmark surveys available to compare this result, the fact that the survey was undertaken denotes the importance of the consultation strategy. Perhaps the best indication of the government's desire to engage more with civil society, following the major consultations that were integral to

⁵³ The usual response to the question on working class or general, participation in policy consultation was that only those who were thought to be able to offer something were consulted; ie. University graduates or successful businessmen at least.

⁵⁴ Interview with Goh Chye Boon, Head, Feedback Unit, 1998.

⁵⁵ Alison De Souza, "More say in policies, please", *Straits Times*, 20 June 1998, p. 2

⁵⁶ Interview with Dr. S. Vasoo, Chairman, GRC on Community development, 1998.

⁵⁷ Chua Mui Hoong, "Are people getting through to government?", *Straits Times*, 4 July 1998

⁵⁸ Interviews with NSTB, EDB, TAS and MTI officers in late 1995.

⁵⁹ "S'pore 21 panel to hold public conference", *Straits Times*, 7 March 1998

⁶⁰ "Govt: How public sees it", *Straits Times*, 20 June 1998

the Singapore 21 Committee, was the holding of a two day conference on civil society in May 1998, under the auspices of the Institute of Policy Studies. However, this conference also illustrated the tensions that still exist in state society relations; it was invitation only, closed door, the results were never published and no major initiatives seem to have emerged from it.

As Raymond Lim, founder of the political discussion group The Roundtable commented in relation to this conference and state-society relations:

In Singapore the state is extremely powerful. The Government calls the shots here. Civil organisations only test rather than determine the limits of growth of civil society.⁶¹

Bilveer Singh sums up the dilemma of the Singaporean core executive in its inability to increase involvement in the political process and broaden its legitimacy beyond economic performance and its instinct to maintain total control, despite the greater use of consultative strategies:

... especially since 1985, the country has become more pluralistic and open, with greater avenues for political participation and expression introduced. The problem, however, remains because all the aces are in the hands of the government and this is what has deterred many Singaporeans from involvement in national politics.⁶²

Conclusion: Strategies for Building Consent in Singapore

The basic menu of consent building strategies in Singapore are:

1. The existence of an elected parliament and regular elections, irregardless of the nature of the electoral system.
2. The government's success in maintaining constant economic growth over almost its entire period of government.
3. The success of the PAP governments' ability to provide high quality national housing for virtually the entire population.⁶³
4. Government ownership or control of the national telecommunications infrastructure and its content.
5. Government control of the national print media and of the foreign print media circulated within the republic and its content.

⁶¹ "What grows beneath the banyan tree?", *Straits Times*, 2 May 1998

⁶² Bilveer Singh, *The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited: A Study of Singapore's Post Cold-War Foreign Policy*, Jogjakarta, Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999, p. 122

⁶³ This as an essential strategy is assumed. The most cogent argument for it is provided by Chua Beng Huat. See: Chua Beng Huat, *Political legitimacy and Housing: Stakeholding in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1997

6. A political socialisation system that operates overtly and covertly through GROs, national youth organisations, the education system and the media.
7. An approach by the core executive to policy issues and public management characterised by didactic and pedagogical strategies, supplemented by feedback and feedforward mechanisms operated through the civil service, the GROs and the media.

COERCIVE STRATEGIES IN GOVERNANCE

In this section, an overview of the structural characteristics of the coercive framework is provided and then a study of how the contemporary core executive has amended this framework in response to political, social and economic pressures since 1990 so as to make it more hidden, less socially intrusive, but without reducing its power.

The Structural Framework of Coercion

The coercive framework is principally based upon a select body of legislation, although it must be said that virtually all Singapore legislation is designed by the Parliamentary Counsel to maintain executive control, minimise judicial review, provide intrusive powers to the police and agencies which have dual public administration and political coercion roles often without warrant or independent review procedures. Principal among this body of legislation are: the Internal Security Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act, the Banishment Act, Enlistment Act, the Police Force Act, the Vigilante Corps Act,⁶⁴ the Singapore Armed Forces Act, the Trade Union Act, the Penal Code, the Undesirable Publications Act, the Film Act,⁶⁵ the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act, the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, the Public Entertainments Act, the Planning Act, the Land Acquisition Act, the Regulation of Imports and Exports Act, the Essential Information (Control of Publications and Safeguarding of Information) Act, the Singapore Broadcasting Authority Act, the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore Act, the Computer Misuse Act, the Banking Act⁶⁶ and the Environmental Public Health Act and the subsidiary legislation related to all this legislation.

⁶⁴ Both the Police Force Act and the Vigilante Corps Act are principally instruments for the administration and discipline of these two police forces, including the Special Volunteer Constabulary which is a third police force. There are also two other smaller police forces, both subject to the control of the Police Commissioner, the Port Police and the Airport Police. The powers of officers of these agencies is defined principally by other legislation. The Commercial and Industrial Security Corporation (CISCO) is also an auxiliary police force.

⁶⁵ Amendments to the Film Act in 1998 made it an offence to produce, distribute or publicly shown films or videos of a political nature. The penalty for a breach of this provision of the act is a fine of \$62,000, 2 years imprisonment or both. This, of course, does not apply to the incumbent government's use of publicly owned media for its own political purposes. See: Andrea Hamilton, "Questions of Censorship: A ban on political film and video sparks debate", *Asiaweek*, 27 March 1998

⁶⁶ s.47 of the Banking Act allows the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to inquire into the credit provided by any bank to any customer under certain conditions. However, such information is allowed to be gathered as part of a

Many of the control provisions of these acts are not discernible from their titles. For example, the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act is the principal act preventing strikes and management lockouts in essential services industries such as water, gas and electricity supply industries. The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act has provisions for search, arrest and indefinite detention identical to the Internal Security Act in order to curb religious extremism. In relation to the Land Acquisition Act, its use for political or administrative purposes has been admitted. Richard Clutterbuck noted in 1984 that;

"it was represented to the author that this (the power of compulsory acquisition of land for development under the Land Acquisition Act of 1966) enabled government officials to apply pressure on individuals to conform over some quite different matter by hinting that their property might be requisitioned under the Act at 1973 prices."⁶⁷

It is also possible to include the Housing and Development Board Act in this category as the supply and control of public housing to 91 per cent of the population provides the government with a potent coercive instrument as was demonstrated by the use of public housing upgrading policy as an inducement to support the government in the 1997 and earlier elections. In all opposition wards in the 1997 elections, the government directly threatened to withhold upgrading of HDB flats if opposition members were re-elected. Additionally, the national concrete spalling repair program aimed at repairing older HDB blocks was withheld from the opposition electorates until 1999. The use of this policy has been explored elsewhere, especially by Chua and others, and its dimensions are so complex that it is beyond the scope of this thesis.⁶⁸ However, it must be acknowledged as one of the most fundamental instruments used for coercion, although I would argue that its principal use is for building consent in support of the PAP regime.

A number of professionals also commented during interviews that the various acts by which they are registered could also be considered as having a coercive function as

general inspection of the bank under ss.44-45, although it must remain confidential to MAS. Under s.47(4)(d) such information must be supplied under if permitted under any other law (such as the Internal Security Act) or in the investigation of a criminal offence, even though charges may not have been laid. A seminal issue in these provisions is whether the confidentiality of any information is limited to MAS or, as an executive agency of the government, that confidentiality extends beyond MAS. Given the political uses made of such information in the Francis Seow and Tang Hang Leong cases, the confidentiality of any customer information in a Singapore bank must be suspect.

⁶⁷ Richard Clutterbuck, *Conflict and Violence In Singapore and Malaysia 1945-1983*, Singapore, Graham Brash, 1984, p. 343

⁶⁸ Several works examine the political function of housing policy in Singapore: Chua Beng-Huat, *Political Legitimacy and Housing*, London, Routledge, 1997; Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 113-139; Linda Low, *The Political Economy of a City-State: Government-made Singapore*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 179-194; Phang Sock Yong, "Housing Policy Changes in Singapore", in, Linda Low and Toh Mun Heng, *Public Policies in Singapore: Changes in the 1980s and Future Signposts*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1992, pp. 114-126; Tan Sook Yee, *Private Ownership of Public Housing in Singapore*, Singapore, Times Academic Press, 1998; Cedric Pugh, "The Political Economy of Public Housing", in, Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 833-859

registration boards incorporated under this body of legislation have considerable discretion in determining whether a person is of good character and morals as uniformly required by legislation.⁶⁹ Medical practitioners, dentists, nurses, contact lens practitioners, engineers, architects, bio-medical laboratory scientists, lawyers, land surveyors, pharmacists and accountants are all registered professions, although the social professions - teachers, social workers, psychologists - are not. For those professions, such as the medical profession, which have legislated peak bodies, voting for some of these is compulsory and failure to vote attracts fines and the possibility that professional registration will be withheld.⁷⁰ There is therefore official compulsion for the more elite professions to be involved in their own co-option within the hegemonic system.

The centrality of the coercive framework to the success of the hegemonic program is revealed in a comment by Goh Keng Swee in 1988 that the most important prerequisite for the PAP's success had been "an efficient secret police."⁷¹ This secret police,⁷² operating principally as the ISD also incorporates the Police Security Branch (which includes the police Internal Security Unit), the Police Intelligence Division, the Criminal Investigation Department, the Prisons Department Intelligence Branch in association with the Customs and Excise Department, the CPIB and special postal and telecommunications surveillance units in Singapore Post and Singapore Telecom installations. Within the civil service, the ISD and the Security Intelligence Division (SID) attached to MINDEF and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), are actually independent departments which for administrative reasons are placed within ministries.⁷³

Despite the organisational autonomy of the ISD, SID and CPIB, the MHA Joint Operations Division (JOD) maintains closer operational linkages with these

⁶⁹ For example, under the *Legal Profession Act*, s.82A(3)(a), a solicitor, whether practising or not, may be subject to disciplinary proceedings if that person "has been guilty in Singapore or elsewhere of such misconduct unbefitting a legal officer or an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession;". What defines behaviour befitting an honourable profession is obviously open to wide interpretation. One example provided in interview was that any male homosexual solicitor in Singapore, where male homosexuality (but not female homosexuality) is illegal, could be easily struck off the role of solicitors. Needless to say, male homosexual who are solicitors or other registered professionals do not get involved in politics in Singapore, although there have been several prominent PAP affiliated figures who were homosexual, but not publicly so.

⁷⁰ Voting for the membership of the Singapore Medical Council has been compulsory since 1998. Registered medical practitioners who fail to give a valid reason for not voting (e.g. absence overseas) are fined \$500. Failure to pay the fine will result in registration being denied and the practitioner may be struck off the medical register and barred from practicing. See: "Penalties 'not too harsh' for doctors who don't vote", *Straits Times*, 26 November 1998

⁷¹ Cited in: Melanie Chew, "Human Rights in Singapore: Perceptions and Problems", *Asian Survey*, 34, 11, 1995, pp. 933-945, p. 942

⁷² Much of the information in this section comes from interviews with seven serving or former officials associated with internal security matters.

⁷³ The status of various departments and ministries and their relationship to the personnel board system introduced in 1997, is outlined in "Ministries under Senior Personnel Board" on the web site of the Public Service Division. See: "Personnel management Authority - Ministries under Senior Personnel Board". Available at: <http://www4.gov.sg/pmo/pdb/system/pb.html>

organisations, although the information and operational hierarchy is such that on national security, rather than criminal intelligence, matters, SID and ISD are at the top of the information and intelligence analysis hierarchy and on political security issues ISD takes fundamental responsibilities, but supposedly now with SID oversight.⁷⁴ This infrastructure, has been coordinated, in large part, since February 1997 through the Joint Operations Division (JOD) of the Ministry of Home Affairs assisted by the Intelligence liaison Unit in the Police Intelligence Department, but despite this, there is still considerable compartmentalisation of operations and control of major intelligence resources, such as the national intelligence data warehouse and associated analytical functions remain under ISD and SID, rather than MHA, control.⁷⁵

The ISD retains responsibility for most domestic political and social surveillance for which it can also call upon the services of the non-uniformed specialist police branches as required. Indeed, it is still common to rotate senior police officers through ISD as part of their career development and to retain strong operational links.⁷⁶ It continues to provide extensive physical and communications surveillance of citizens and now reports to both the Minister for Home Affairs and the Prime Minister's Istana office as a consequence of Goh Chok Tong's preference for a rationalisation of functions, for ministers to take responsibility for their portfolios and to have a greater supervisory role than to have many specific units reporting directly to his office.⁷⁷

Prior to 1997, it was reported in interviews that internal security status reports went simultaneously to both Goh Chok Tong and Lee Kuan Yew. However, after the 1997 election and the implementation of the "Home Team" concept, the prime minister changed the primary reporting line to Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs and one of Goh Chok Tong's kitchen cabinet, with the secondary reporting line being to the prime minister's Principal Private Secretary, Tan Tee How, who has a background in intelligence and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Lee Kuan Yew's direct involvement in internal security now seems to have passed, but as in all areas, he continues to make

⁷⁴ Singapore's external intelligence activity will not be considered here, although it should be noted that the small external service is sometimes used to monitor banished citizens or PAP political enemies residing overseas. As in Britain until recently, the military and external intelligence organisations operate under cabinet directions not legislation. For a report on one alleged operation of the external intelligence wing see: "FBI investigates burglary with claimed links to Singapore secret police", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 October 1997

⁷⁵ Manpower limitations which have applied to other ministries have not been applied to either the ISD, SID, CPIB or the DSO in recent years. In fact, the recruitment of Division 1 officers (graduates) and the allocation of Administrative Service officers to ISD and SID has increased since approximately 1990, accompanied by a high level of recruitment and the advanced postgraduate training of staff in DSO.

⁷⁶ For example, Sim Poh Heng and Tan Seck Kang, both who have served as Director, Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB), had substantial ISD careers after being transferred to the ISD from the SPF. See: "Ministry of Home Affairs Press Statement", Ministry of Home Affairs, 19 March 1999. Available at: <http://www.mha.gov.sg/190399.html>. The current Deputy Director of CNB, Tan Seck Kang has also served in ISD, current Director, ISD, Benny Lim came from the SPF and two of the current deputy directors in ISD, Ismail bin Ranting and Lim Poh Quee are also from the SPF. See: "Mandy Goh promoted to senior ASP", *Straits Times*, 6 November 1984, p. 14

⁷⁷ The reporting line to the Prime Minister's Office is reported to be through the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary, currently Tan Tee How who also liaises with Lee Kuan Yew's Principal Private Secretary (Heng Swee Keat) on important internal security matters.

his views known is he so wishes, although the degree of direct influence this has over the prime minister and cabinet has been questionable for some time. However the distinct impression now is that he is not involved directly in these matters as Goh Chok Tong insists on a more subtle approach to internal security in order to avoid a repetition of mistakes such as the perceived fiasco of the "Marxist conspiracy" which was under Lee's direct control.

Lee Hsien Loong is reported by some informants to have no direct involvement with or control over the security agencies but is reputed to have secondary sources of information and probably some influence on them, at least within the ISD. How accurate such assessments are is unknown, but it is unlikely that Goh's position is so weak that he does not exercise considerable authority over this area. It is also obvious that, although Lee Hsien Loong has had considerable influence over the civil service since the Public Service Division began reporting to him in 1994, he has had no direct responsibility for internal security or defence issues since Goh Chok Tong has been prime minister, from late 1991, whereas Goh has retained considerable influence over MINDEF and the SAF and slowly taken control of internal security matters as he has consolidated his premiership. In 1998, some informants still supported the perception that the ISD had a reporting line to Lee Hsien Loong, based on Lee's supposed association with the former director of ISD, Tjong Yik Min who also attended Catholic High School and National Junior College one year behind Lee.⁷⁸ If such a relationship did exist, it is doubtful that it long survived Goh's ascension to the prime ministership.⁷⁹

Contemporary Approaches to Managing Coercive Strategies

These coercive mechanisms and strategies are underwritten by a surveillance system which relies on four principal sources of information; telecommunications surveillance through dedicated interception facilities in all major SingTel switching nodes and surveillance of cellular voice and data systems through MHA and SingTel's facilities,⁸⁰

⁷⁸ This is also the view taken by an anonymous contributor to the *Far East Economic Review* in 1988. See: Singapore Inc.'s corporate security service", *far east Economic Review*, 30 June 1988, pp. 21-22

⁷⁹ Given the seniority based nature of Singapore's high schools and junior colleges, the one year age difference between Tjong and Lee would be such that they would have had little opportunity to develop a friendship based on simply attending the same schools. Tjong attended university in Newcastle Australia and Lee went to Cambridge, so if any friendship between the two existed, it was formed on a basis other than attendance at the same schools. Both also had separate postgraduate education destinations, Tjong completed an MSc in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at NUS in 1979, whereas Lee completed his MPA at Harvard in 1980.

⁸⁰ It was reported that there are definitely dedicated interception facilities built into the major switches at Comcentre, Telecentre, the Pickering Operations Complex, the Sentosa Earth Station and the major SingTel switching facilities to which the satellite downlinks from Tuas and Loyang are connected. The Pickering Operations Complex is the principal centre for telecommunications monitoring as it has high capacity digital networks which connect the Bukit Timah and Sentosa earth stations and the international submarine cables at Katong and Tuas to this complex. See: "A move to give users tip-top service", *Straits Times*, 29 July 1988, p. 9

Police Security Branch, ISD and SPF field operatives, and an informer network that includes PAP cadres and others. These information collection mechanisms are now supported by a sophisticated intelligence analysis capability shared between the major security and police agencies which has been developed since approximately 1985. As George has commented this has been an extremely successful strategy:

What consolidated the achievements of the police was the system of area control that Lee established through a network of civilian and paramilitary organizations. The backbone of these organizations was provided by the unseen but ubiquitous cadres of the PAP, perhaps numbering no more than 2,000. Recruited with great care, passed through several security sieves and forever sworn to keep their status secret, the PAP cadres have functioned in close coalition with the political leadership and the Special Branch. They have acted as the government's liaison men and community watchdogs, vigilantly keeping their eyes and ears open in every constituency of the republic, every trade union and student organisation, clan association and religious group.⁸¹

However, contemporary surveillance and control strategies, while not excluding the traditional approaches, have progressed well beyond these proven methods. The traditional physical and postal surveillance strategies, based on ISD district officer networks (based principally on the old colonial districts – approximately 20), Leninist style informer cells, in-field undercover officers working in various high-contact professions, as well as networks of cadre and non-cadre paid and unpaid informers in unions, schools, religious organisations,⁸² the media, the public service, GLCs, large companies and the middle class professions on which these agencies relied,⁸³ have been gradually supplemented by community policing strategies adopted from Japan⁸⁴ and, more importantly, telecommunications based surveillance, for which capability planning commenced within SID and MINDEF from at least 1984 and probably earlier under the Systems and Computers Organisation first headed by Philip Yeo Liat Kok and established in 1979.⁸⁵ While tapping of the domestic and international telephone systems had been common practice in colonial times and has continued, this has been supplemented by interception of electronic mail (email) and other data streams, including the development of a considerable capacity to infiltrate personal computers connected to the internet and private data systems.

⁸¹ T. J. S. George, *Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore*, Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 1984, p. 183

⁸² The surveillance of religious organisations, especially those with a record of inter-ethnic proselytising, has been a major concern of the political executive. In the *White Paper on Maintenance of Religious Harmony*, released in December 1990, a report by the ISD on "Religious Trends – A Security Perspective" was included to highlight the potential for religious based ethnic conflict.

⁸³ See: "Singapore Inc.'s corporate security service", *Far East Economic Review*, 30 June 1988, pp. 21-22

⁸⁴ The Japanese *koban* system has been adapted by the SPF for local use. This provides a police presence in all neighbourhoods and a low level community surveillance capability as well as a heightened police response capability. See: W. T. Austin, "Crime and Control", in K. S. Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989

⁸⁵ "Defence men for security conference", *Straits Times*, 21 December 1984, p. 18

COMMUNICATIONS BASED SURVEILLANCE

This capability was already in place by 1987 with the first generation of email software,⁸⁶ but has been considerably enhanced since 1993 with the implementation of a number of special projects through the Ministry of Home Affairs' Computer Systems Division (CSD)⁸⁷, in association with the NCB, MINDEF⁸⁸ and specialist domestic and international security consultants.⁸⁹ In 1998 within MHA, special support for surveillance operations is provided by two branches of CSD; the MIS/Surveillance Branch and the Investigation and Intelligence Project.⁹⁰ In 1998, it was reported that voice intercepts were retained for two months by ISD and email intercepts for three months. Those intercepts of particular interest are, of course, retained on file. Email intercepts are easily stored as they are text files, and it was reported that the retained voice intercepts were then being retained using compression technology so that audio files can be attached to a surveillance subject's file.

Surveillance of mobile voice and data was enhanced in 1995 with the installation for Singapore Telecommunications (SingTel), on behalf of the ISD, of a national system for intercepting cellular telephone signals, reportedly using Siemens technology, which

⁸⁶ Francis T. Seow, *To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison*, New Haven, Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1994, p.90

⁸⁷ Formerly the Computer Information Systems Department (CISD).

⁸⁸ This has included MINDEF's Security Intelligence Division, its Signals Intelligence Group and the Information Technology Group within the Defence Science Organisation.

⁸⁹ MINDEF is the agency which sets computer and telecommunications intelligence security standards and procedures in consultation with the NCB. MINDEF bases its standards on those adopted by the United States Department of Defence, specifically the Defence Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment Standard overseen and maintained by the U.S. Defence Information Systems Agency (DISA). Most DISA standards are publicly available. Like the United States, Singapore's National Information Infrastructure (NII) has been designed with considerable input from the military and law enforcement agencies and incorporates the requirements for the national Defence Information Infrastructure (DII). MINDEF supposedly has an official liaison relationship with the US National Security Telecommunications and Information Security Systems Committee (NSTISSC), chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defence, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. In maintaining its technological capability in DII development, Singapore also maintains close working relationships with Israel's state security agencies and its associated state and private sector companies, the FBI and Australian military intelligence and signals intelligence agencies and also uses private sector American consultants as required. Although the only known foreign agencies which maintain a direct link with ISD are the Israeli agency Mossad, the FBI and the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation, others assist internal surveillance indirectly through their MINDEF link. The United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation which has a regional station in Singapore, provides some training to ISD, SID and MSD officers through these officers being seconded to the Singapore Police Force during FBI training placements. In 1998 32 Singaporeans were trained at the FBI Academy. In 1991 it was reported that approximately 40 SPF officers are sent for advanced overseas training to the FBI, Scotland Yard and the Japan National Police Academy. See: Mahesh Nalla, "Singapore", in, Department of Justice, *World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems*, Washington DC, Department of Justice, 1996. Available at: <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjsin.txt>. For the Australian association see: Brian Toohey and William Pinwill, *Oyster: The History of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service*, Melbourne, William Heinemann, 1989, pp. 74-75. For information on Mossad activity in Singapore see: Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, *Every Spy a Prince: the Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1990, pp. 155-156, and; Jeffrey Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organisations*. Cambridge (Mass.), Ballinger Publishing Company, p. 198. For an indication of the CIA and FBI presence in Singapore see: "Spy incident a sobering reminder for Singapore", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 30 November, 1996, p. 12. For FBI training see: *Ministry of Home Affairs Spokesman's Comments on Visit of FBI Director*. Available at: <http://www.mha.gov.sg/7nov99.html>. Information on international participants in FBI training programs was available from the FBI Academy's website in 1998, but was removed during 1999.

⁹⁰ See: Ministry of Information and the Arts, *Singapore Government Directory, July 1998*, Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1998, p. 502

was enhanced in 1998 to also include the capability to intercept and decode CDMA signals.⁹¹ This system may have been linked to the trial of electronic tags for a category of released prisoner, called reformative trainees, in 1997.⁹² It may also have been as a consequence of this system that in 1995 all Administrative Service and other senior officers were issued official guidelines indicating the restrictions which should apply to conversations by cellular telephones. The existence of infrastructure to monitor the cellular telephone network was hinted at in parliament in 1997, but no details were revealed.⁹³ This interception system is reportedly managed through SingTel's Information Security Department and includes staff seconded from ISD, SID and has liaison arrangements for access by the CPIB, CAD and MSD based on requests from these agencies.

Paradoxically, this capability for surveillance has been developed in association with the MHA's responsibility for enforcing the Computer Misuse Act, for which it has established an Information Security Services team of IT security analysts.⁹⁴ The Computer Misuse Act specifically empowers "any police officer or a person Authorised in writing by the Commissioner of Police" to access and inspect any computer, search the computer, access any code, software or technology and to investigate those operating any computer, and to demand decryption information and access to any encrypted data⁹⁵ if "there is reasonable cause to suspect (it) is or has been in use in connection with any offence under this Act..."⁹⁶ The act also permits arrest without warrant.⁹⁷ Some of these powers must be approved by the Public Prosecutor before being exercised.⁹⁸ However, if the matter related to an internal security or political investigation, such authorisation would be automatic.

These enhancements have included the acquisition and use of high performance computers, specialised software for communications traffic surveillance,⁹⁹ the

⁹¹ It was reported that this installation was undertaken by Siemens possibly jointly with Uraco Technologies Pte. Ltd., which is the Singaporean distributor of radiotelecommunications equipment manufactured by Siemens, Marconi, Hirschmann Rheinmetall Elektronik of Germany and Harris Corporation of the United States. All manufacturers produce radio frequency equipment. The CDMA standard, derived from US military communications research, is used by MobileOne for its cellular telephone network.

⁹² See: "Addenda to Presidential Address, Ministry of Home Affairs", *Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report*, 26 May 1997, p. 38

⁹³ The Minister for Communications, Mah Bow Tan, indicated in the debate of the Committee of Supply, that telephone companies had taken measures to combat security breaches of the cellular telephone system, but did not give details. See: *Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report*, 29 July, 1997, p. 1198

⁹⁴ "CSCP sites promote Computer Security", *Use IT*, 1, 1995, p.7

⁹⁵ s.15

⁹⁶ s.15(2)

⁹⁷ s.16, if "reasonably suspected of committing an offence"

⁹⁸ s.15(3)

⁹⁹ The capacity of the MHA to use specialised software to investigate an individual's person computer was revealed in April 1999, when a user complained that an MHA officer had scanned her computer without authorisation. It subsequently emerged that the MHA IT Security Unit had been asked to scan 200,000 on line PCs by SingTel supposedly to look for a trojan horse virus. Why an ISP would wish to scan its customers computers to look for virus against which its main systems should have defences is difficult to understand. See: Geoffrey Pereira, "Privacy of

implementation of a dedicated high security network within the civil service data and communications network and the development of software engineering and manufacturing capabilities for covert network surveillance. Surveillance data is processed using high performance database software with data mining and complex cross matching capabilities for file comparison and profile building. This has resulted in the development of a series of computer databases within a central data warehouse of people under surveillance which stores intercept data and also into which photographic and print information is optically scanned to provide a complete on-line file of large numbers of citizens and other residents.

This data warehouse, supposedly located within the major government communications and data centre on Sentosa adjacent to the Sentosa earth station, is managed by ISD and is linked to the People Hub database in the National Registration Department. It is also being progressively linked to other hub databases including the database of registered societies and their officers maintained by the Registrar of Societies as these are developed as part of the TCP/IP based civil service integrated network which has replaced the first generation IDNet for public sector communications.¹⁰⁰ For example, the information maintained on the database of the Registrar of Companies and Businesses and the Registrar of Vehicles can be accessed as required, apparently at no cost to MHA.¹⁰¹

Since at least 1996, the ISD and the Singapore Police Force have been interested in integrating relevant information from the Land Data Hub,¹⁰² the first stage of which was completed in December 1994 by the Ministry of Law and NCB into MHA and ISD databases. This seemingly innocuous connection, the second generation of which was implemented as the Integrated Land Information System (INLIS) on 24 October 1998 and soon to include the Self-Service Map Production System (SMAP), provides various categories of digitised data to government agencies. This includes data on individual citizen's residential locations based on the new postcode system which identifies individual buildings and allows these to be categorised by street, building name, electoral division, census boundaries and the People's Association district boundaries which the ISD also uses to define its operational districts. This is now being supplemented by a complementary application, Address Point, which will allow the linking of postal codes to geographical coordinates. Although the Land Systems Support Unit in the Ministry of Law currently manually processes data requests from

surfers safe, says SingNet", *Straits Times*, 1 May 1999; Chong Chee Kin, "No Invasion of privacy: SingNet", *Straits Times*, 1 May 1999

¹⁰⁰ "New Life for IDNet", *Use IT*, 2, 1995, p. 9

¹⁰¹ This database is not publicly searchable, although citizens can purchase company and director searches from the Registrar of Companies and Businesses which then conducts the search and provides results.

¹⁰² "Cross ministry project puts Singapore on world map", *Use IT*, 2, 1995, p. 12

MHA, it is planned to have direct connection with all INLIS subscribers through the public sector high bandwidth wide area network (WAN) in the near future.¹⁰³

One other area which supplies information to the ISD on demand is the enforcement and compliance divisions of the Internal Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS). The progressive implementation of database connections through this WAN, and the progressive implementation of high performance hardware and database software in key database hubs and agencies¹⁰⁴ will soon allow all information on any citizen to be collated by security agencies through the use of crossmatching software on their supercomputer platform. Additionally, MHA is continuing to develop specific software products to assist in criminal and non-criminal surveillance,¹⁰⁵ such as the Name Search System, implemented in April 1998. This system allows multiple agencies to collate information on individuals by a simple name search across multiple ministry databases.¹⁰⁶ All of these initiatives conform to the civil service component of the National Information Infrastructure initiative which commenced in 1993 under the direction of NCB.¹⁰⁷

As almost every commercial and all government transactions in Singapore require the use of a person's NRIC national identity number,¹⁰⁸ the extent of surveillance possible is considerable. All Singapore legal residents 12 years of age and over,¹⁰⁹ whether citizens or not, must register and carry at all times, a national identity card. Those who register at 12 must re-register at 17 years of age as a check on all males who then become eligible for compulsory national service in either the military or civil defence forces.¹¹⁰ It is planned that these cards evolve into computer encoded smart cards with

¹⁰³ Singapore Ministry of Law, *Integrated Land Information Services (INLIS) Fact Sheet*, Singapore Ministry of Law, 1999. Also available at: http://www.gov.sg/molaw/lssu/projects/inlis/inlis_fact_sheet.html

¹⁰⁴ For example, the new SIR Building (Singapore Immigration and Registration Building) at Lavender contains a large data processing facility for all national registration and immigration records and provides these facilities, and special data analysis services for use by other agencies as required for other purposes. As with all the new buildings being constructed as part of the public service construction program, this building is wired with optical fibre cable and has high capacity ISDN connections to the civil service data communications network.

¹⁰⁵ The Singapore Police and judicial system is now highly computerised with systems integration between the two areas. For example, some of the older system now being upgraded to conform to the new broadband network include: Tickets and Summons System, Magistrates Appeal System, Crime Arrest System, Subpoena System, Police Summons System, and the Electronic Court Document handling System.

¹⁰⁶ The Name Search System (NSS) actually replaces an older system which was not as intelligent. In executing a search, the NSS accesses databases across the MHA and is currently used by MHA agencies (Singapore Police, Central Narcotics Bureau, ISD, Singapore Immigration and Registration) and the Ministry of Manpower. It will be made available to other ministries. See: "MHA commissions new Name Search System", *JT Impact*, July 1998, p. 3

¹⁰⁷ Michael Yap, "Paving the Information Highway". Available at: <http://www.ncb.gov.sg/ncb/speeches/96/nii/tsld001.htm>. At this time, Michael Yap Kiam Siew was Director Information Infrastructure and New Media/Internet Cluster at the National Computer Board. In May 1998 he was appointed Deputy Chief Executive of NCB and from 1 March 1999, he has been Chief Executive.

¹⁰⁸ National Registration Identity Card number

¹⁰⁹ It is believed that this age was set by Lee Kuan Yew as it is the age at which, during the 1950s and 1960s, students enrolled in the first year of Chinese Middle Schools which were strongholds of the Barisan Socialist opposition. These schools no longer exist, but this is one indication of how a social model based on this period is still imposed on Singapore because of Lee's historical experience and personal paranoia.

¹¹⁰ Subsidiary legislation requires that if a card is lost or damaged or a card holder's address changes, this must be reported within 14 days to a police station or the National Registration Office.

a memory chip, which increases the ways in which they can be integrated into a national surveillance system, reflecting the format of the SAF Card introduced into the Singapore Armed Forces in 1995.¹¹¹ A trial with this goal in mind was started in 1997 and involved 50,000 people using a smart card with a high level of encryption.¹¹² A similar smart card is already being used by Singapore Immigration for frequent visitors, particularly daily workers commuting from Malaysia.¹¹³ In 1996, a service wide smart identity card was introduced for all civil servants and is used for authorising and monitoring access to all "buildings, offices, carparks, data, computer networks, electronic mail and workflow applications."¹¹⁴ The NRIC system has been supplemented by the introduction of the Student Identification Pass (SIP) in early 1997 to replace students' TransitLink Concession Cards. The credit-card like SIP, valid for six years, contains pre-printed particulars of students with the holder's photo. From 1998, the SIP will allow students to access the National Library and its branches and there are plans for introducing integrated chip (smart card) technology to the SIP. The NCB notes that with these developments, "The SIP could then be used as a tool for tracking class attendance, accessing school premises, computers and laboratories, and even as a Cashcard."¹¹⁵

All of these have now been supplemented by the Cashcard system which was initially introduced under pressure from MAS as an electronic funds system in an effort to reduce the costs associated with circulating currency. However, personalised Cashcards, which may have a value of up to \$500, can also be used for a variety of identification purposes as well. Personalised Cashcards have been issued to more than 500,000 trade unionists and linked to a customer rewards program to promote usage,¹¹⁶ and all students of NUS have also been issued with personalised Cashcards.¹¹⁷ In June 1998, the Land Transport Authority (LTA) issued a contract for five million smart cards and associated readers to replace the existing integrated transport payment card (TransitLink card). These new cards, which are personalisable, will be trialled in early 2000 and fully implemented by 2002.¹¹⁸ Travel data on these cards will be real time monitored through the Mass Rapid Transit system as fares are calculated on travel segments be completed in minimum times. Cashcards are also required to use those roads which are subject to Electronic Road Pricing (ERP). The ERP relies upon a

¹¹¹ "SCO success benefits others", *Computer Times*, 1 September 1991, p. 12

¹¹² "50,000 to take part in electronic ID trials", *Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 30 November 1996, p. 1

¹¹³ The Immigration Autoclearance System allows a holder to pass through an automatic immigration checkpoint without being manually checked by an immigration officer. Each journey is logged into the Immigration Department database.

¹¹⁴ "PS Card - Don't Leave Home Without It", *IT Impact*, September 1996

¹¹⁵ "Student Identification Pass - A Pass to The Future", *IT Impact*, October 1997, p. 5

¹¹⁶ *NTUC, STCS & NCB Joint Venture Signing Ceremony For NTUC Link Pte Ltd*. Available at: <http://www.st.com.sg/p0428.htm>, 1 May 1998

¹¹⁷ *NUS Smart Card System*. Available at: <http://www.nus.sg/Major/smart.html>, 2 April 1999

¹¹⁸ *Award of Contract for the Enhanced Integrated Fare System*. Available at: <http://www.lta.gov.sg/new/PR%20-%20EIFS%205.html>, 22 June 1998 and 3 April 1999

Cashcard inserted into an In-vehicle Identification Unit (IU); funds are automatically deducted from the card, and the number of the IU recorded as a vehicle drives under an electronic monitoring gantry above each monitored road. The IU identification is linked to the vehicle and owner details in the database of the Registrar of Vehicles. This data is also included in the Land Transport Authority's strategic long term planning for an integrated intelligent transport system, implementation of which has already commenced. How this system will be able to track individual vehicles as the ERP is expanded is not publicly known, but the possibility should not be dismissed.¹¹⁹

The importance of ITT¹²⁰ based surveillance is reflected in the increased recruitment of information technology staff to all surveillance agencies and branches since 1993, and in particular by the appointment of Chew Hock Yong, a former Ministry of Communications official with a background in telecommunications policy, as Director of JOD in 1997. Complementary organisational reform was also undertaken within the CPIB with the formation of the Computer Information Systems Unit which has now substantially integrated its systems with the MHA. Although the reporting line for the CPIB remains to the PMO, and therefore to Lee Hsien Loong as the minister with direct responsibility, it is now operationally integrated with the MHA internal security structure, although it maintains its own IT systems. The CPIB also maintains close links with the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) within the Revenue Division of the MOF which is responsible for combating complex commercial frauds and white collar crime. The CAD is responsible for investigating and prosecuting offences under the Securities Industry Act, the Companies Act and the Drug Trafficking (Confiscation of Benefits) Act. It does this by tracking share and financial transactions and maintains a database on these and has powers to investigate all financial transactions of interest to it. This provides unlimited access to banking and financial information of individuals and companies, although ISD also has this access under the Internal Security Act.¹²¹ The CAD also refers other offences disclosed in the course of investigations to other enforcement and security agencies. CAD apparently has access to MHA and ISD surveillance databases as required and maintains its own surveillance databases on company directors, shareholders and executives which are made available as required to other surveillance agencies.

¹¹⁹ Four components of the Integrated Transport Management System (ITMS) have currently been developed; the ERP, the GreenLink Determining System (GLIDE) which controls traffic lights and flow rates through major intersections, the Expressway Monitoring and Advisory System (EMAS) and TrafficScan which uses the satellite facilitated Global Position System installed in 7,500 taxis to assess traffic speeds and flow rates. ITMS is expected to be fully operational by 2002. See: *Launch of TrafficScan*. Available at: <http://www.lta.gov.sg/projects/trafficscan.html>, 2 May 1999

¹²⁰ Information Technology and Telecommunications

¹²¹ See: Monetary Authority of Singapore, *Directives to banks: Directive 12*, 1 November 1985. This directive addresses the issue of banking secrecy and advises that the Internal Security Act and other legislation, allows access to individual bank records.

The growth of information technology (IT) usage in Singapore, strongly encouraged by the government, is not only a boon to efficiency and economic competitiveness, but a blessing for the domestic intelligence agencies as the main target for surveillance is the middle class which is a high user of email and on-line services in general. The surveillance of domestic email¹²² and low level encrypted data is relatively simple and in Singapore is reported to be a major activity of the Police Security Branch's Loewen Road facility and the ISD's information systems team at its Phoenix Park headquarters and possibly its Aljunied facility.¹²³ The interception of international email and other data traffic is reportedly undertaken in association with the Information Security Department of Singapore Telecommunications (SingTel) by seconded ISD staff at all major exchanges as mentioned earlier. Additionally, similar but more targeted surveillance is undertaken by MINDEF's externally oriented Security and Intelligence Division and the defence community oriented Military Security Department, principally of the defence related government linked companies and their foreign partner companies, MINDEF itself and selected high security classified personnel. Surveillance of the civil service, statutory boards and non-defence related GLCs remains the principally the province of the ISD, CPB and CAD agencies.

While voice surveillance continues through the security sections in major telephone exchanges, this is targeted surveillance which has to account for the six major Chinese dialects,¹²⁴ six Indian languages,¹²⁵ English and Malay, at least,¹²⁶ and is time consuming and resource intensive. It is therefore used for the surveillance of the political opposition, selected non-governmental organisations, MPs and NMPs,¹²⁷ religious organisations and those organisations and individuals thought to be pushing the PAP's so called 'boundary markers'. Ministers and their families are also placed under protective surveillance, although there is no demonstrable need for this in Singapore. Similarly, there appears to be no demonstrable need for the state to retain 1400 Gurkhas to serve principally as an ISD guard force and a personal home and Istana guard for Lee Kuan Yew, but this is still done.¹²⁸ In addition to this type of surveillance,

¹²² ISD retains this data for three months but adds data to and from its surveillance subjects to the database files maintained on these people. International email and data intercepts are treated in the same way.

¹²³ The ISD maintains a facility in Aljunied, which is reportedly principally concerned with intelligence analysis and fieldwork coordination. The ISD is also reported as having 26 small district offices across the island which are used for fieldwork coordination.

¹²⁴ Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka, Hainanese and Foochow

¹²⁵ While Tamil is the major language among citizens descended from settlers from the Indian sub-continent, it is not overwhelmingly dominant among this population. Four other languages are spoken by significant Indian minorities; Telegu, Malayalam, Punjabi, Hindi and Bengali.

¹²⁶ The ISD appears to have a capacity to monitor all foreign language conversations by recording them and then arranging for translation. It has little in-house capacity to monitor Thai, Tagalog, Japanese, Burmese or regional dialects or minor languages.

¹²⁷ The surveillance of MPs and NMPs is reportedly on a random basis, but may be heightened in relation to particular issues.

¹²⁸ The Gurkha Contingent is supposed to guard key state installations and is nominally assigned as part of the Singapore Police Force. In reality they only guard four politically sensitive sites; the Whitely Road Detention Centre and the Moon Crescent Prison used by the ISD, Lee Kuan Yew's home and its immediate vicinity and the interior of

the ISD also collates on-line dossiers on a large number of individuals, both Singaporean and expatriate, from both its own resources as well as with assistance from other ministries, boards and to a lesser extent GLCs, seemingly on the basis of them being of "possible interest".

The Surveillance Bureaucracy

The need to develop more sophisticated electronic surveillance systems which can automatically scan speech, rather than rely on manual surveillance, has been a priority for the Defence Science Organisation (DSO), now the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) since at least 1993. In 1996, after Apple Computer closed its very successful speech recognition research and development unit in Singapore,¹²⁹ it was reported in interview that the DSO had recruited several of the unit's staff to create a speech recognition unit to develop software comparable to that used by the United States' National Security Agency in its Echelon telecommunications surveillance system. The exact status of this project was not able to be determined in 1998, but given the resources that the DSTA and other government research groups have allocated to software engineering, it is probable that the project to develop multi-lingual speech recognition software has progressed considerably and may be operational. The principal organisation reported to be working with the DSTA on software engineering projects is the Command, Control, Communications, Computers and intelligence Organisation (C4IO) within MINDEF, which from April 2000 will be integrated into the DSTA.¹³⁰ Between them, the two organisations employ at least 900 engineers including at least 500 software specialists.¹³¹

From approximately the late 1980s under Goh Chok Tong and Dr. Yeo Ning Hong, and particularly following the return of Tony Tan to the cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence in 1995, the Security Intelligence Division (SID) within MINDEF has been strengthened and better resourced. The reasons for this have been to reposition SID as the national intelligence organisation responsible for coordinating

the Istana where the prime minister and the senior minister have their offices. For the status of the contingent in 1989 see: House of Commons Defence Committee, *First Report: The Future of the Brigade of Gurkhas*, London, HMSO, 1989

¹²⁹ This unit of Apple Computer Corporation developed the first commercially viable Chinese speech recognition software. Apple did not proceed with the product.

¹³⁰ "New IT systems to support strategic uses", *Electronic Interface*, June 1999. Available at http://apps.mindef.gov.sg/scointerface/Jun99/DSC_Speech.htm

¹³¹ In 1994, DSO as it then was, was reported to employ more than 300 engineers, but in 1998 I was told that there were approximately 500 engineers and scientists employed in DSTA, including approximately 100 software engineers. See: "Secrecy marks work of defence scientists", *Straits Times*, 6 May 1994, p. 27. In 1997, the Command, Control, Computers and Systems Organisation (as it then was), was reported to employ 400 engineers, all of whom were software engineers. See: "Singapore puts force integration into place", *Janes Defence Weekly*, 30 April 1997, pp. 25-29, p. 26. In 1999, the C4IO was reported to employ "about 500 IT professionals" and was looking to recruit another 100 per year. See: "Derring-do spirit will live on", *Computer Times*, 1 September 1999, p. 13

domestic and external intelligence (and thus for moderating and counter-acting to some degree the autonomy of the ISD), enhancing the integration of signals intelligence analysis with other intelligence and enhancing the planning capability of MINDEF and the government in general. This enhanced role of SID has been associated with a more active Security and Intelligence Committee, the executive intelligence arm of the Defence Council. The development of a more integrated intelligence apparatus has been accompanied by the gradual promotion of Eddie Teo Chan Seng, long time deputy director and eventually director of the Security and Intelligence Division (SID) and his eventual appointment as Permanent Secretary, MINDEF in late 1994 and then Permanent Secretary, PMO in late 1998.¹³² Although MINDEF has no specific brief for such activity under the Singapore Armed Forces Act, it is not incompatible with the act and can easily be accommodated within the administrative arrangements covered in the General Orders of the Ministry of Defence.¹³³ Also, within a Westminster-style political system, the cabinet can simply assign any responsibility it thinks fit to an executive agency of government, without legislation, as long as it is not in conflict with the constitution.

This development of SID has included the recruitment of a large number of Division 1 graduate officers and some Administrative Service recruits, with both the ISD and SID now having approximately 40 Administrative Service positions each in 1998, a considerable number in comparison to most ministries and boards.¹³⁴ Many of these recruits have technical backgrounds in communications and information technology, who have received specialist overseas training in a range of intelligence skills, including IT based surveillance and intelligence analysis.¹³⁵ However, ISD and SID recruitment has also included large numbers of social science and humanities graduates as intelligence analysts and planners to increase its capacity for political analysis both domestically and in its immediate strategic vicinity, as the analytical capabilities of ISD in particular were thought to have required considerable development. Within the ISD, the recruitment of large numbers of AOs and Division 1

¹³² On promotion to Permanent Secretary, MINDEF, Teo was replaced as director of SID by Joseph Koh another Administrative Service officer and a Senior Deputy Director at SID. Koh had been the intelligence services officer at Singapore's embassy to the United States under S. R. Nathan immediately prior to his appointment as director, reputedly responsible for overhauling and renewing the SID's North American section, its largest outside Southeast Asia. Koh was appointed as Singapore's Trade Representative to Taipei from mid-1996 (a position with reportedly military and intelligence liaison responsibilities) and was replaced by Col. Choi Shing Kwok, former Senior Deputy Director, SID who had a long SID career. Choi was promoted to Brigadier-General in 1997 and still heads SID. Teo's mentor in SID was S. R. Nathan who subsequently was ambassador to Malaysia and the United States and is now Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Nathan assumed the presidency of Singapore in August 1999.

¹³³ General Orders are the ministry's organisational arrangements which cover both the SAF and the civilian components of the ministry. They are made under s. 199 of the Singapore Armed Forces Act and are not published in the Government Gazette or otherwise made public.

¹³⁴ This figure is calculated from discrepancies in the data provided by the PMO in 1998 on the allocation of Administrative Officers between ministries, boards and GLCs.

¹³⁵ It seems that SID has been recruiting scientific specialists (e.g. electronic and signals engineering) from NTU and more generalist graduates from NUS, but not exclusively.

officers with no police background is also being undertaken to push the organisation towards a more contemporary definition of its role.¹³⁶ It is also an attempt by the political executive to address the disquiet felt by many ISD officers that they have in recent years become a political police more than a genuine security service. It is the hope of the political executive that the development of a considerable analytical capability that principally addresses socio-political issues, but remains capable of providing the party political analyses required by the political executive, will allay some of this disquiet.

The re-development of SID has been pursued as a result of disquiet among the more moderate ministers and their AS supporters over the continued influence of Lee Kuan Yew over the ISD following his retirement from the prime ministership, its lack of accountability and its unwillingness to change its culture and style, which drew strongly on its policing and Special Branch background. The enhanced role for SID is supported by Goh Chok Tong, who as Minister for Defence and Second Minister for Defence from 1981-1992, has developed strong links with the SAF and nurtured support among the SAF officer corps and MINDEF senior executive as a group of largely moderate officers who take a long term strategic view of Singapore's policy options. This is not surprising given Goh's reported animosity to the ISD following its embarrassment of him and other ministers in April 1988 over his agreement to set up a judicial commission to inquire into complaints of mis-treatment by the ISD of former detainees. The ISD did not bother to brief Goh on the fact that the allegations were true and the decision was overturned by Lee Kuan Yew on his return from a short overseas trip. The development of the SID's capabilities and the expansion of its brief decreases somewhat the ISD's monopoly on internal security and provides the political executive with another, probably more moderate viewpoint. This can only be good for Singapore, but perhaps not for the ISD old school or the more hardline members of the political executive.

Surveillance capability has been supported by technical training of staff overseas and more recently in Singapore by officers undertaking such courses as the Specialist Diploma in Information Systems Security offered by Temasek Polytechnic,¹³⁷ and postgraduate programs at the Centre for Signals Processing at NTU, the Centre for Wireless Communications and the Centre for Security Systems at NUS and in the Kent Ridge Digital Labs.¹³⁸ The two universities have over the past 10 years developed a

¹³⁶ This is hinted at by Home Affairs minister Wong Kan Seng in his address to ISD officers in August 1998. See: *Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs at the ISD's 50th Anniversary Gala Dinner*. Singapore, Ministry of Home Affairs, 22 August 1998

¹³⁷ This course commenced in June 1999.

¹³⁸ Formerly the Institute of Systems Science, but amalgamated in January 1998 with the Information Technology Institute. It is also located close to the Institute for Microelectronics which undertakes hardware and electronic design research.

formidable capability in almost all aspects of information technology and telecommunications, building impressive intellectual capital which can support advanced surveillance and security systems. This capability is located principally within the engineering faculties at NUS¹³⁹ and NTU¹⁴⁰ and includes the development of satellites,¹⁴¹ and other technologies within a large number of specialist research centres. Research at NTU in these technologies has been so successful that two companies have been spun-off from the research teams to commercialise signal processing¹⁴² and secure communications technologies.¹⁴³ A significant industrial capability to support ITT surveillance has also been developed domestically, principally within the Singapore Technologies group of companies, especially Singapore Technologies Electronics and its subsidiaries such as CET Technologies. CET works with specialist research centres at NTU, NUS and the DSTA to develop Singaporean technologies for the information and communications security. It also distributes security products for a range of international manufacturers in this area.¹⁴⁴ Consultancy services are also provided by other GLCs, such as the IT Security Centre within National Computer Services Pte. Ltd., and CISCO. Within the DSTA, software security applications are a major activity of the Computer Systems Group headed by Christopher Ting. Although this industry and intellectual infrastructure is primarily aimed at industrial development to meet the nation's ambitious knowledge economy goals, it nonetheless provides the government with considerable surveillance capability.

The Legal Framework for Surveillance

This surveillance activity is facilitated by a number of legislative provisions. For example, the use by citizens of cryptography software to reduce or repel government

¹³⁹ At NUS, these centres include the: Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and processing, Centre for Wireless Communication, Data Storage institute, Institute for High Performance Computing, Institute of Microelectronics, Centre for Heuristics in Information Mining and Extraction, Centre for Internet Research, Centre for Systems Security, Centre for Telemedia, Centre for Computational Mechanics, Centre for Intelligent Control, Centre for Microwave and RF, Centre for Optoelectronics and the Centre for Wavelets, Approximation and Information Processing.

¹⁴⁰ At NTU, these centres include the: Centre for Advanced Information Systems, Centre for Advanced Media Technology, Centre for High Performance Imbedded Systems, Centre for Mechanics of Micro-Systems, Centre for Signal Processing, Information Communication Institute of Singapore, Information Management Research Centre, Microelectronics Centre, NTU-DIGITAL Network Technology Research Centre, NTU-SGI Centre for Graphics and Imaging Technology, satellite Engineering Centre, Global Positioning Systems Centre.

¹⁴¹ For details of the Merlion satellite project see: Tai Wei Chua and others, "Merlion L & S band System", in *Proceedings of the 13th Annual ALAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites*, Utah State University, 23-26 August 1999. This paper was developed by the Satellite Engineering programme researchers in the Division of Communication Engineering, School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, NTU. The military capability of this program, is hinted at in an assessment by *Janes Defence Weekly*. See: "Singapore edges closer to satellite reality", *Janes Defence Weekly*, 28 April 1999, p. 14.

¹⁴² Multitech Products Pte. Ltd. Was spun off in 1995.

¹⁴³ Datmark Technologies Pte. Ltd. Was spun off in 1998 and had developed technologies associated with digital security, encryption technology, copyright protection of digital products, secure communications and e-commerce transactions. CET Technologies, a subsidiary of ST Electronics within the defence industry sector has a 10 per cent stake in Datamark with an option to increase this to 51 per cent.

¹⁴⁴ For a brief overview of CET's products and services see their internet site at: <http://www.cet.st.com.sg>

surveillance is prohibited in Singapore. Encryption software is a prohibited import controlled by the Trade Development Board, making Singapore, in 1996, one of only six nations that follow such a policy.¹⁴⁵ The use of communications interception technology by the police or any organisation or person which may broadcast a signal can be exempted from licensing or registration by the Singapore Broadcasting Authority under s.32 of the Singapore Broadcasting Authority Act (hereafter the SBA Act). This act also prohibits the import, manufacture, sale or hire of any "unauthorised decoder" under s.60,¹⁴⁶ allows the CEO of SBA to provide any officer of the authority the powers of arrest and entry and seizure without warrant under ss.64-65, provides the Minister for Communications with the power to hear and decide on appeals without any further recourse to the courts (s.72(4)), allows the minister to exempt any person or class of persons from the provisions of the act (s.73) and allows the minister to change, at his absolute discretion, the definitions of what constitutes broadcasting apparatus and licensable broadcasting service (s.78). The SBA Act also allows the authority to make subsidiary legislation to control licensing of service and content providers and, under s.21 to impose licensing conditions. These conditions, as set out in the Singapore Broadcasting Authority (Class Licence) Notification 1996, require the licensee to fully comply with the laws of Singapore, to ensure that no service or content is against the public interest, public order or national harmony and requires that the Internet Service Provider "faithfully and truthfully furnish such information, and furnish such undertakings, as the Authority may require in connection with the provision of the Internet Service Provider's service".¹⁴⁷ This empowers the SBA to request lists of customers of each ISP, their registered IP address¹⁴⁸ and their registered on-line nickname¹⁴⁹ for internet chat and communications purposes. This provision, if combined with, or substituted by the provisions of the ISA, means that the Minister for Home Affairs could, either directly or indirectly require this information and at the

¹⁴⁵ Under the First Schedule of the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations of 1995, "The import of scrambler. or encryption hardware or software capable of re-arranging signs, signals, writing, sounds, or intelligence for the purpose of secrecy" is controlled. This means that the government can import such software and hardware but citizens cannot, although some commercial applications are allowed. All commercial applications must be justified to the TDB and registered with the Licensing Department of the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore. This provides TAS with details of the exact software used by each company, thus making it much easier for security agencies to decode data from these companies should they so wish. See: Wayne Madsen, *Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy*, Global Internet Liberty Campaign. Available at: <http://www.gilc.org/crypto/crypto-survey.html>, p. 29

¹⁴⁶ The penalty is a \$40,000 fine, three years imprisonment or both. While one reason for this provision is to protect coded pay-TV signals from piracy, it also protects the transmission of policy and security services coded radio signals.

¹⁴⁷ *The Singapore Broadcasting Authority (Class Licence) Notification 1996*. Available at: <http://www.sba.gov.sg/work/sba/internet/>, 12 December 1998

¹⁴⁸ Internet Protocol address. This is the address of each computer linked to the internet; it has an internet node number which can be traced to a telephone number and through that to an address.

¹⁴⁹ It is common practice in Singapore for people engaged in Internet Relay Chat (IRC) to register their on-line nickname with the ISP and the chatroom moderator to prevent others from using their name and sending messages disguised as originating from another person. These nicknames are linked to the person's ISP account and real name. In reality, this provides no protection from government officers wishing to identify a person, regardless of the ISP privacy statements as these have no basis in law other than perhaps a tenuous existence as part of a contract which can be overridden by other laws as discussed in this section.

same time prohibit the ISP companies from making the supply of the information public.

The Telecommunications Authority of Singapore Act (hereafter the TAS Act) provides most of the legislative basis for telecommunications and postal surveillance. It allows all foreign postal articles to be opened under s.59 and any article suspected of being in contravention of the act or its regulations to be opened under s. 69. Under this latter provision any offending article may be dealt with in any way the postal authority wishes.¹⁵⁰ All radio communications equipment must be licensed (s.70) and any police officer of sergeant rank and above, may seize any communications equipment without warrant (s.74). This act also empowers the Minister for Communications or a court to allow the interception of any message under s.78(1)(b), and prohibits the sending by post of any material that is "indecent, obscene, seditious, scurrilous, threatening or grossly offensive character."¹⁵¹ The minister is also provided with discretionary powers, without recourse to judicial review, to issue any direction he thinks fit "in the interests of public security, national defence..."¹⁵² and such directions may include, in the case of telecommunications, prohibition or regulation of telecommunications usage in specific or general cases, the seizure of telecommunications equipment or the "stopping, delaying and censoring of messages and the carrying out of any other purposes which the minister thinks necessary..."¹⁵³

In the case of postal articles, the minister has absolute discretion to direct the "... interception or detention of any postal article", to direct that any such article be delivered to a nominated addressee and be dealt with in any manner the minister thinks fit.¹⁵⁴ The minister can also direct that any official directed to undertake these actions "... not disclose any directions given to that person..." under the above provisions, "... if the Minister notifies that person that the Minister is of the opinion that the disclosure of the directions is against the public interest".¹⁵⁵ A certificate signed by the minister stating that a particular direction "... was in the public interest or in the interests of public security, national defence or relations with the government of another country" is sufficiently "conclusive evidence" that a "public emergency" exists that requires the exercise of these powers.¹⁵⁶ These powers can obviously be used to authorise police, ISD and officers of other surveillance agencies to seize and examine all mail or telecommunications transmissions from all opposition political parties or other classes of citizens and for this to remain secret. As these directions can be made to any

¹⁵⁰ s.69(3)

¹⁵¹ s.93(a). The penalty is a \$10,000 fine or three years imprisonment or both.

¹⁵² s.116(2)(b)

¹⁵³ s.116(3)(a)

¹⁵⁴ s.116(b)(i) and (ii)

¹⁵⁵ s.116(6)

¹⁵⁶ s.116(10)

company or the employees of any company licensed to deliver telecommunications or postal services under the TAS Act, the government has a vested interest in maintaining control of the postal and telecommunications service providers so that its surveillance capacities are not weakened by organisations unwilling to conform to ministerial direction.

Legislative provisions made under the TAS Act and the SBA Act, while facilitating surveillance, are mild compared to the provisions of the Internal Security Act (ISA) but are still considerable. This act allows for:

- 1 The surveillance of any person considered to "be acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Singapore or any part thereof or to the maintenance of public order or essential services" with regard to residence, employment, travel, meetings or membership or involvement in any organisation;¹⁵⁷
- 2 The surveillance of all publications so as to ascertain whether they might incite violence, counsel disobedience of the law or any lawful order, lead to a breach of the peace, promote hostility between races or classes or be prejudicial to the national interest, public order or security of Singapore;¹⁵⁸
- 3 The surveillance of all printed material which either has been proscribed at the absolute discretion of the minister responsible¹⁵⁹ or of any document "containing any incitement to violence, or counselling disobedience to the law or to any lawful order, or likely to lead to any breach of the peace",¹⁶⁰ or any document which "spreads false reports or makes false statements likely to cause public alarm",¹⁶¹ or any "subversive" document;¹⁶²
- 4 The surveillance of discussion or conversation so as to apprehend anyone who "by word of mouth ... spreads false reports or makes false statements likely to cause public alarm";¹⁶³
- 5 The statutory review by the minister of all appointments to all registered societies, community organisations, companies, and any other body legally constituted under any law and empowering the minister to veto any appointment which the minister considers at his absolute discretion to be "prejudicial to the interests of Singapore",¹⁶⁴ and for any such order by the minister to remain secret except by government officials in the course of their work;¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁷ s.8 and s.10

¹⁵⁸ s.20

¹⁵⁹ ss.20-24

¹⁶⁰ s.25

¹⁶¹ s.26

¹⁶² s.27. Subversive document is defined as any document which in part or whole has a tendency to excite organised violence, "support, propagate or advocate any act prejudicial to the security of Singapore or the maintenance or restoration of public order ... inciting violence ... or counselling disobedience to the law" (s.27(3)(b), or the invitation of support for such acts (s.27(3)(c). Under s.27(4), every document "purporting to be a subversive documents shall be presumed to be a subversive document until the contrary is proved", thus placing the onus of proof on the accused and not the government.

¹⁶³ s.26

¹⁶⁴ s.40

¹⁶⁵ s.40(3)

6 The surveillance and retention of personal records on all persons seeking admission to any institution of higher educations and forbidding the admission of students without a certificate of suitability,¹⁶⁶ and

7 The surveillance, control of movement and occupation, eviction and registration of any person within a declared security zone.¹⁶⁷

Within this legislative and policy regime, MINDEF, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and to a lesser degree, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the PMO have therefore developed a complete set of surveillance strategies, technologies and products which have now been integrated into a formidable instrument of covert government control. Most the coercive resources of government which can be used for domestic surveillance of citizens, except for the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, have now be centralised within MHA and MOF, although other agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, (actually a statutory board under MOF) can also be form part of the coercive repertoire when required.¹⁶⁸

While the government has stated that it will not use IU data, available from the RP system, to track citizens, it has not introduced any legislation to prevent this or other data being so used, nor established any procedures for independent verification of data usage. This is in line with its policy that all data collected by the government belongs to the government and may be used at the government's discretion. Although the NCB has endorsed the implementation of the TRUSTe privacy program in the public sector from early 1999, this privacy protection protocol and independent assurance system has no capacity to monitor or check the use of data by government agencies. Rather, this system is heavily dependent upon consumer complaints for assessing breaches of privacy on particular systems, and is specifically oriented to internet servers and sites and does not cover government systems.¹⁶⁹ When the issue of data privacy was discussed with officers of all government agencies interviewed, the general interpretation was that the government and the civil service viewed privacy protection as protection from illegal access from outside the public service or protection from the

¹⁶⁶ s.42. The government ceased requiring certificates of suitability in 1992, but has not amended the Internal Security Act to remove this provision. The change in policy has been administrative only, not substantive. This provision was administered by the Ministry of Education which relied on teachers to review each student's official ministry file before issuing a certificate. This ministry therefore played a key role in the identification and classification of students thought to be undesirable on academic, political and other grounds. Hearsay evidence from discussions with teachers in government and independent secondary schools and junior colleges indicates that this provision was not treated very seriously by the vast majority of teachers from the mid-1970s onward and that it was generally ineffective with rare exceptions. It certainly failed to stop middle class children from receiving a tertiary education as they could enter foreign universities without the certificate.

¹⁶⁷ All of Part III of the act; ss.48-72. This part contains a large number of provisions which are outside the scope of this thesis. Among them are provisions for the seizure of buildings, lands, vehicles, aircraft, the requisition of accommodation and the killing of persons within designated danger areas by police and other authorised persons.

¹⁶⁸ For an example of how the Income Tax Act may be used for political purposes, see: Francis T. Seow, *To Catch a tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison*, New Haven (Conn.), Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, pp. 241-256

¹⁶⁹ Courtney Macavinta, "Short take: Singapore endorses TRUSTe privacy program", *CNET News.com*, 8 December 1998. Available at: <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,29686,00.html>, 5 January 1999. The TRUSTe system is an industry funded self-regulation system for privacy protection. See: <http://www.truste.org>

sale of confidential data by corrupt officers. Only two of the 12 officers with whom this issue was raised acknowledged that there could be inappropriate use of data on citizens by government; the others defended discretionary access by the public service on public interest and national security grounds - perennial bureaucratic reasoning in Singapore. The concept of citizens having a right to be protected from the state was simply not accepted; the state acted correctly; only corrupt officers would harm citizens and although it happened, there were safeguards to stop this.

This coercive role of the SPF and its associated agencies has led it to having, not unexpectedly, a rather negative community image. Since 1997, the MHA has tried to counteract this with consent building strategies which focus community attention on the protective and safety aspects of these agencies. These strategies, building on the neighbourhood policing initiative have included introduction of the Community Safety and Security Programme which includes the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme and the cooperative develop of Community Focus Plans with GROs and CDCs,¹⁷⁰ a high profile recruitment and "Home Team" advertising campaign¹⁷¹ and an outreach program for the ISD.¹⁷² The Community Focus Plans are a form of neighbourhood watch planning and strategy framework, jointly developed in association with Community Development Councils and grassroots leaders and so have probably had almost no impact on the general perception of the SPF.

The ISD outreach program has involved ISD officers speaking to "more than 6000 educationists, grassroots leaders, civil servants and even journalists."¹⁷³ With its focus on the historical role of the ISD during the 1950s and 1960s, a period that is almost totally foreign to Singaporeans under 30 years of age, is also doubtful that this campaign has persuaded many Singaporeans that the ISD has a role requiring its current powers in contemporary society. The topic of the desirability of Administrative Officers working in the ISD has also surfaced in the domestic press, in response to several AO who were posted to the ISD, buying themselves out of their bonds.¹⁷⁴ The only one of these campaigns which may have had any success is the Home Team advertising and recruitment campaign, although it is impossible to judge that at this time.

¹⁷⁰ *Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs at the Police Workplan Seminar, 9 march 1999.* Available at: <http://www.mha.gov.sg/090399.html>

¹⁷¹ *Speech by Mr Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs, at the Home Team Senior Officers' Promotion Ceremony '99, 30 July 1999.* Available at: <http://www.mha.gov.sg/30jul99.html>

¹⁷² *Speech by Mr Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs, at the ISD's 50th Anniversary Gala Dinner, 22 August 1998.* Available at : <http://www.mha.gov.sg/220898.html>

¹⁷³ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ "Safety keeps the icebergs silent", *Straits Times*, 8 April 1998

CONCLUSIONS:

The mix of coercive and consent building strategies used by the core executive in Singapore is a complex and, at times contradictory, mix which has to deal with policy application within a multi-ethnic population that, contrary to the opinion of some, is not passive in the face of government.

The political thinking behind the development of this mix of consent building and coercive approaches in the Singapore was outlined by Goh Keng Swee, one of its principal architects:

In inculcating group loyalties or group consciousness, we have avoided trying to stifle or inhibit the sturdy individualism which is so strong a part of the Singaporean's character. Instead of this, we have exploited this individualism by providing, as I said before, a judicious mix of incentives and deterrents when these are necessary. There is, of course, nothing normally wrong about this. It is a normal function of government. However, we found out that, whatever the rewards and deterrents, we have to take certain safeguards. First, we must secure the general acceptance of intended goals, and this is best done only by open and clear explanation and by free debate. Next, the application of policy must be carried out with manifest justice and equity. Incentives should be open freely and fairly to whoever wishes to make the effort. As regards deterrents, adequate safeguards must be introduced against penalizing the innocent. Finally, the course of action to be pursued must be seen by the people to be sensible and practical.¹⁷⁵

The core executive in 1998 seems to adhere to this framework. It has introduced a strategy of hiding the coercive instruments of the state as much as possible, developed greater subtlety in its management of these instruments and is busily attempting to meet the challenges of a highly educated population and a globalised economy in its redesign of its consent building instruments. However, the apparent openness of many of the new consent building strategies is now underwritten by a state surveillance system with greater capabilities than any of its predecessors; another application of the "leave nothing to chance" principle. It appears though, that the core executive while accepting that its desire to maintain an enormous level of control over society may be contradictory to the achievement of many of its economic and other goals, has adopted an approach of slow, controlled change, although a move towards any kind of political pluralism or even a basic two-party system seems beyond its present capabilities. The application of the coercive and consent building strategies detailed above are integral to the way in which the rate of change is being controlled by the core executive so as to meet its broader goals.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Goh Keng Swee, *The Economics of Modernization and Other Essays*, Singapore, Asia Pacific Press, 1972, p. 283

¹⁷⁶ For an acknowledgment of the core executive's awareness and scope of the need for change, see: Nigel Holloway and Lawrence Minnard, Singapore's Big Chance?, *Forbes*, 29 November 1999, pp. 42-46, p. 46

9. Conclusion: The Core Executive In Singapore: Structure, Dynamics and Prospects

This study has attempted to provide an analysis of the contemporary Singaporean core executive in terms of its structure, dynamics and the strategies of governance that facilitates its operation. It has also sought to determine whether this executive has differentiated itself from the Lee Kuan Yew governments that preceded it. In this chapter, the conclusions of the study are presented and an assessment of the implications of the analysis for the future of the present core executive arrangements is presented.

IDENTIFYING THE SINGAPOREAN CORE EXECUTIVE

This study has demonstrated that the Singaporean core executive comprises the following thirteen components:

1. The prime minister;
2. The political executive including cabinet and non-cabinet ministers;
3. The Speaker of the parliament;
4. The Attorney-General;
5. The Chief Justice, the judges of the Court of Appeal and the Senior District Judge
6. Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries in the civil service and their equivalents in the statutory boards if not in the Administrative Service
7. Administrative Service officers other than those in (6) above within the public sector executive in the civil service, statutory boards;
8. 78 key members of statutory boards and GLC boards and the chief executives of the major government holding companies and GLCs;
9. The General Staff of the SAF;
10. Members of the Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA);
11. The Chairman of the Public Service Commission
12. The Auditor-General; and
13. Other actors derived from the NTUC, the private sector and possibly the GROs, although the latter have not been included in the study in any substantive way.

The 178 key members of the Singaporean core executive are listed in Tables 9.1 and 9.2. Table 9.1 includes ministers, statutory office holders, the most senior of the SAF general staff and key members of the CPA not covered by any other category. Table 9.2 includes all others identified as being principal core executive actors through the analyses in the previous chapters.

The political executive consists of the cabinet and other ministers. There is no inner or outer cabinet and non-cabinet ministers are under the direction of ministers of cabinet rank. Ministers and the senior members of the Administrative Service have an integrated salary system which allows the relative influence and power of individuals within the two groups to be compared. This is just one aspect of the degree of integration between these two groups which comprise the inner core executive.

Table 9.1 Members of the Singaporean Core Executive who are Ministers, Statutory Office Holders and SAF General Staff

<p>Cabinet</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Goh Chok Tong 2. Lee Kuan Yee 3. Tony Tan Keng Yam 4. Lee Hsien Loong 5. S. Jayakumar 6. Richard Hu Tsu Tau 7. Lee Yock Suan 8. Wong Kan Seng 9. Yeo Cheow Tong 10. George Yeo Yong-Boon 11. Lee Boon Yang 12. Mah Bow Tan 13. Lim Boon Heng 14. Lim Hng Kiang 15. Abdullah Tarmugi 16. Teo Chee Hean <p>Other Ministers</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 17. Aline K. Wong 18. Sidek Bin Sariff 19. Peter Chen 20. Ow Chin Hock 21. Othman Bin Haron Eusofe 22. Matthias Yao Chih 23. Ho Peng Kee 24. John Chen Seow Phun 25. Eugene Yap Giau Cheng 26. Yatiman Yusof 27. Tang Guan Seng 28. Mohamad Maidin BPM 29. Koo Tsai Kee 30. Chan Soo Sen <p>Others</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 31. Robin Chan – Elections Department 32. Tjong Yik Min - SPH 33. Lee Hee Seng -PSC 	<p>Attorney-General</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 34. Chan Sek Keong <p>SAF</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 35. Lt.-Gen Bey Soo Khiang 36. BG Ng Yat Chung 37. BG Lee Fook Sun 38. BG Lim Chuan Poh 39. BG Raymond Ng Teck Heng 40. RAdm Richard Lim Cherng Yih 41. Prof Lui Pao Chuen <p>Security Services</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 42. BG Choi Shing Kwok – SID 43. Lim Siang Hoe Benny – ISD 44. Chua Cher Yak - CPIB <p>Judiciary</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 45. Chief Justice Yong Pung How 46. Justice L. P. Thean 47. Justice Kathigesu Mootatamby 48. Richard Magnus <p>NTUC</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 49. Seng Han Thong MP 50. Lim Swee Say MP 51. Hawazi Daipi MP 52. R.Sinnakaruppan MP 53. Ong Ah Enh MP <p>Council of Presidential Advisers</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 54. Lim Kim San 55. Lee Seng Wee 56. Michael Fam Yue Onn
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Table 9.2 Members of the Singaporean Core Executive in 1998 in Addition to the Ministry, Statutory Office Holders and SAF General Staff

1. Ang Kong Hua	42. Lee Chiong Giam	82. Ridzwan Dzaafir
2. Arun Mahizhnan	43. Lee Ek Tieng	83. Seah Lim Huat, Peter
3. Cham Tao Soon	44. Lee Hsien Yang, BG	84. Selvaretnam, Daniel
4. Chan Jer Hing Peter	45. Lee Kim Poo Moses	85. Shanmugaratnam, Tharman
5. Chee Yam Cheng	46. Lee Miew Boey	86. Sim Kee Boon
6. Chen Choong Joong	47. Lee Suan Hiang	87. Singh, Jaspal
7. Chen Tien Lap, Bernard	48. Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm (ret.)	88. Su Guanng, Dr.
8. Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	49. Leong Keng Thai	89. Tan Boon Huat
9. Cheong Siew Keong, Dr	50. Lim Chee Onn	90. Tan Chin Nam
10. Cheong, Benedict	51. Lim Choo San, Michael	91. Tan Chin Tiong
11. Chew Chin Tiong, Ernest,	52. Lim Han Soon	92. Tan Ee Ping
12. Chew G K, Andrew, Dr.	53. Lim Hock Chuan	93. Tan Eng Heng
13. Chia, Christophèr	54. Lim Hock San	94. Tan Gee Paw
14. Chiang Chie Foo	55. Lim Hsiu Mei	95. Tan Guong Ching
15. Chong Lit Cheong	56. Lim Neo Chian	96. Tan Kee Tong
16. Chong Yew Fook, Charles	57. Lim Pin, Prof.	97. Tan Kim Siew
17. Choo Chiau Beng	58. Lim Siam Kim	98. Tan Kin Lian PBM
18. Choo Watt Bin	59. Lim Siong Guan	99. Tan Tee How
19. Chua Siew San	60. Lim Soo Hoon	100. Tan Wee Hin, Leo, Prof.
20. Desker, Barry	61. Lim Yong Wah	101. Tan Wee Kiat
21. Dhanabalan, Suppiah	62. Liu Thai Ker	102. Tan Yoke Meng
22. Er Kwong Wah	63. Loh Wing Siew	103. Tan Yong Soon
23. Fang Ai Lian	64. Low Puk Yeon	104. Tan, Finian
24. Foo Kok Swee, BG (NS)	65. Lu Cheng-Yang	105. Teo Chan Seng Eddie
25. Goh Kim Leong	66. Lua Cheng Eng	106. Teo Ming Kian
26. Gong Wee Lik	67. Magad, Ahmad Mohamed	107. Teo Soon Hoe
27. Ho Hak Ean Peter	68. Mahbubani, Kishore	108. Thai Chee Ken
28. Ho Meng Kit	69. Nair, Dileep	109. Wang Gungwu, Prof.
29. Hong Hai, Dr,	70. Nee Yeh Ching, Andrew	110. Wang Mong Lin
30. Khattar, Sat Pal	71. Ng Chee Tat, Philip	111. Wee Ee Cheong
31. Khaw Boon Wan	72. Ng Kee Choe	112. Wee Heng Tin
32. Koh Beng Seng	73. Ngiam Tong Dow	113. Wee Heng Tin
33. Koh Boon Hwee	74. Niam Chiang Meng	114. Wong Chooi Sen
34. Koh Cher Siang	75. Ong Boon Kwee Peter	115. Wong Hung Khim
35. Koh Yong Guan	76. Ong Ho Sim	116. Wong Nang Jang
36. Lai Chun Loong	77. Oon Kum Loon	117. Yeo Khee Leng
37. Lam Chuan Leong	78. Ow Soon Sian Alan	118. Yeo Liat Kok Philip
38. Lam Joon Khoi	79. Pek Siok Ching	119. Yeo Ning Hong, Dr
39. Lam Siew Wah	80. Quek Chee Hoon	120. Yeo Siew Chye Stephen
40. Lau Chan Sin	81. Quek Poh Huat	121. Yong Pung How, Chief Justice
41. Lau Wah Ming		122. Yu-Foo Yee Shoon

The judiciary is generally excluded from the core executive as only the Supreme Court has any degree of constitutional autonomy; the remainder of the judiciary is incorporated within the civil service. Five judicial officers can be counted within the core executive; the Chief Justice, the three judges of the Court of Appeal and the Senior District Judge who heads the lower courts. Of these officers, only the Chief Justice could be included as a permanent member of the inner core executive.

The Administrative Service consisted of 247 officers in 1998 and of these 70 were at permanent secretary and deputy secretary level,¹ of whom 24 were at permanent secretary level.² It is these latter officers, who comprise the Committee of Permanent Secretaries, that are permanent members of the Singaporean core executive because of their executive portfolio responsibilities, their management of policy communities and networks and the intimate nature of their relationship with the political executive. In managing the bureaucracy and coordinating the policy networks that underlie the formal institutional framework, they work closely with the 16 cabinet ministers, eight ministers of state and five parliamentary secretaries that comprise the ministry. This combined group of the most senior bureaucrats, the chief executives of the key boards and GLCs and ministers are at the heart of the Singaporean core executive.

In the statutory boards and GLC sectors, 78 key members of the core executive were identified and are also included in Table 9.1. In addition to these, the senior managers of boards (most of whom are in the Administrative Service) and GLCs must be included.

The role of the NTUC as a whole in the core executive appears, on close analysis, to be bifurcated if one makes a distinction between the NTUC headquarters and the body of trade unions. The principal offices of the NTUC have been incorporated into the political executive or the legislature and through these mechanisms, the NTUC has representation within the core executive, including the cabinet and the parliament. However, officer bearers from trade unions (e.g. secretaries) or rank and file union

¹ These officers were: Moses Lee Kim Poo, Lim Hsiu Mei, Lee Chiong Giam, Eddie Teo Chan Seng, Peter Ho Hak Ean, Chua Siew San, Tan Kee Tong, Lim Siong Guan, Chiang Chie Foo, Wee Heng Tin, Lam Joon Khoi, Lee Miew Boey, Tan Gee Paw, Wang Mong Lin, Ngiam Tong Dow, Koh Yong Guan, Jaspal Singh, Tan Yong Soon, Lee Ek Tieng, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Koh Beng Seng, Koh Cher Siang, Alan Ow Soon Sian, Tan Chin Tiong, Kishore Mahbubani, Koh Yong Guan, Tan Yoke Meng, Peter Chan Jer Hing, Tan Boon Huat, Benny Lim Siang Hoe, Lu Cheng-Yang, Niam Chiang Meng, Choo Watt Bin, Lim Siam Kim, Christopher Chia, Tan Chin Nam, Lim Han Soon, Goh Kim Leong, Lau Wah Ming, Lam Chuan Leong, Low Puk Yeong, Lam Siew Wah, Tan Guong Ching, Tan Kim Siew, Tan Wee Kiat, Khaw Boon Wan, Peter Ong Boon Kwee, Finian Tan, Philip Yeo Liat Kok, Ho Meng Kit, Gong Wee Lik, Daniel Selvaretnam, Lim Neo Chian, Stephen Yeo Siew Chye, Lee Suan Hiang, Ong Ho Sim, Chong Lit Cheong, Yeo Khue Leng, Barry Desker, Ridzwan Dzafir, Wong Chooi Sen, Tan Tee How, Lim Soo Hoon, and Pek Siok Ching and Lim Hock Chuan. See: Singapore Ministry of Information and the Arts, *Singapore Government Directory January 1998*, Singapore, MITA, 1998

² Teo Ming Kian, Moses Lee Kim Poo, Eddie Teo Chan Seng, Peter Ho Hak Ean, Lim Siong Guan, Chiang Chie Foo, Tan Gee Paw, Ngiam Tong Dow, Koh Yong Guan, Lee Ek Tieng, Koh Cher Siang, Tan Chin Tiong, Kishore Mahbubani, Koh Yong Guan, Peter Chan Jer Hing, Niam Chiang Meng, Tan Chin Nam, Goh Kim Leong, Lam Chuan Leong, Khaw Boon Wan, Philip Yeo Liat Kok, Ho Meng Kit, Barry Desker and Ridzwan Dzafir.

members cannot be found within the core executive, as their influence is mediated through the NTUC's internal structures and then transferred to the core executive by the headquarters group. Those who represent the union movement are virtually indistinguishable from civil service bureaucrats, which many of them formerly were. There is no route to power for working class union office bearers in Singapore. The closest one comes to a professional unionist in the core executive is Yu-Foo Yee Shoon, who has worked as a union organiser for almost her whole career, but has never been a rank and file unionist. But despite her impressive credentials and enormous contributions, even she is undervalued within the core executive, probably because of what seems to be the inherently misogynistic character of the political executive.³ We can see from this that Rodan's contention that the working class is substantially excluded from political participation is undoubtedly correct for the period 1988-1998.⁴

GRO representation is totally absent from the core executive as are community and industry organisations. Industry organisations may be occasionally represented, but it would appear that their interests are predominantly represented at a lower level through particular policy networks which mediate their concerns to the core executive. Industry interest representation appears to be mediated through the 'business' MPs and the representation of individual business executives on statutory boards, GLC boards and government advisory committees.

The party has no role within the core executive. My conclusions are that the party is largely irrelevant in terms of the core executive's management of the state except at election times because of the inherent nature of the party. I do not agree that the PAP is a cadre party, the view proposed by Pang and generally ascribed to since 1972. The party executive appoints the cadres, they are not elected.⁵ The executive can remove cadre membership and it can only be restored through an Ordinary Party Conference (OPC) held every two years.⁶ Although cadres have a right to attend the OPC, the

³ Yu-Foo Yee Shoon is a Chinese educated, English speaking graduate who is Assistant Secretary-General of the NTUC. Some of her responsibilities can be gleaned from this study although the breadth of her responsibilities cannot be outlined in detail here. As an indication, she sits on GLC and statutory boards, has been a member of virtually every high profile policy committee and advisory body, is a MP, a senior NTUC officer and adviser to multiple organisations. She works very well at the community level, has good rapport with the Chinese dialect speaking HDB heartland and is widely respected. Her only flaw seems to be the lack of a postgraduate qualifications; hardly a rational reason for limiting a person of such potential from higher political office.

⁴ Garry Rodan, "Preserving the one-party state in contemporary Singapore", in Kevin Hewitson, Richard Robinson and Garry Rodan, eds., *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1993, pp. 75-108, p. 104

⁵ Central Executive Committee, PAP, *Constitution of the People's Action Party*, Singapore, PAP, 1984, Article IV(1)(l)

⁶ *ibid.*, Article IV(4). This article is a very clever piece of wording. It means that the Central Executive Committee (CEC) can expel any number of members and they cannot appeal except to a special committee appointed by the CEC. Obviously, such a committee would carry out the instructions of the CEC. The expelled cadres can then appeal to the biennial Ordinary Party Conference. If there was a considerable split in the party, the appointment of new cadres so as to control the Ordinary Party Conference could be easily arranged. Thus, the CEC is left in control and avenues of appeal against expulsion are effectively closed. An expelled member's willingness to fight against expulsion must also take account of whether the CEC, acting as the political executive, might also want to take

party executive is reported to invite selected cadres to the biennial conference, of which only 10 per cent need attend.⁷ The party has no mechanisms by which the executive can be held accountable except the OPC which the CEC itself controls through its control of the cadre membership. Cadre membership does not guarantee a political appointment, so there is no established route from party membership to parliamentary membership, despite this happening occasionally. The executive itself is self-perpetuating; it controls the OPC which elects it and the CEC itself has the power to coopt up to six members to its own ranks.⁸ The PAP is therefore a party of the executive which uses cadre and ordinary members as partners in its hegemonic program, but not as its masters. Almost certainly, the role of cadres in government is small. Their most important role is in social surveillance, political intelligence and working with the GROs. The minimum ten per cent of cadres required for an OPC can probably be met by PAP MPs and, if need be, their wives or other family members. This leaves the political executive firmly in control of the party and relegates the party to an election and political intelligence organisation with a greater role in pre-school education and political socialisation than it has in the central policy debates of government. Party branches are almost wholly focussed on the 'bread and butter' issues handled by town councils and CDCs; on implementation not policy development.

The SAF General Staff also appear to have a bifurcated role, but obviously lie within the core executive. While enlisted in the regular SAF, they manage the defence and security policy domain through the SAF and MINDEF, by allocation to defence related GLC boards and, increasingly through secondment into the Administrative Service to civil service postings and ambassadorial appointments. Following their retirement from the SAF, members of the general staff enter the GLC senior executive, the Administrative Service or are given senior statutory board appointments; some enter politics. There appears to be a trend of recruiting SAF General Staff and senior field staff officers into the Administrative Service to make up for a shortfall in recruitment to that service, indicating what may be an increasing dependence on the SAF officer corps for core executive members.

The extent of private sector participation within the core executive as examined in this study supports Chalmers assertion that this has increased since the mid-1980s. Whether this has changed the dynamics of policy making, is more questionable. It would appear that at least in the economic policy domain if in no other, private sector

administrative action against the expelled cadre, such as a taxation audit, in order to deter such an appeal. Party members know that challenging the CEC is also challenging the government, so there is little likelihood of members acting in such a way as to require expulsion. If disagreements exist, it is much easier to resign from the party.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 5 (7)

⁸ *ibid.*, Article 7(1)(A)

actors have been influential, particularly in the present drive to reform and liberalise the financial sector. However, in general, private sector actors within the core executive appear to be PAP cadres or proto-cadres selected on this basis rather than purely as industry representatives who can participate within the core executive under corporatist-type arrangements. It must be concluded that they have only a limited capacity to influence the policy system or the political executive that operationalises the core executive.⁹

At the centre of the core executive in 1998 is a small group that, as one would expect, revolved around the prime minister. Lee Kuan Yew is not a member of this group, but he intrudes into it on issues on which he wishes his opinion to be heard; the behaviour, but not always the opinion, is accepted by Goh. This group included Goh's kitchen cabinet, the cabinet, and a few people from each of the major sectors; the civil service, the statutory boards, the GLCs and the military. Goh appears to not be personally close to any of the supreme court judges and they are not included in this circle. Goh's kitchen cabinet reportedly includes at least Tan Cheng Bok, Matthias Yao, Lim Siang Guan, Chiang Chie Foo, Tang Guan Seng, Tan Tee How and Lim Chee Onn. It probably includes others who could not be identified in this study. We do know that Goh is a very private person and that it is unlikely that he would have a large kitchen cabinet or circle of confidants.¹⁰ The most influential cabinet ministers appear to be Lee Hsien Loong, Tony Tan, Lim Hng Kiang, Teo Chee Hean, George Yeo and Wong Kan Seng.

STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CORE EXECUTIVE

The *realpolitik* of Singaporean institutional arrangements is this: the cabinet controls the government, the legislature, the party and approximately 60 per cent of the nation's GDP through the GLCs. There are no alternative sources of power; civil society remains shallow, the media and telecommunications systems are government controlled, almost all political discourse is mediated through government controlled or linked mechanisms and there are no independent means of accountability for the executive other than general elections within a gerrymandered electoral system. The power of the office of president is compromised in constitutional and power relations terms. The PAP almost wholly controls the parliament and can therefore, given that constitutional changes generally require the support of two-thirds of members, change the constitutional at will, with limited exceptions. The constitutional power exists for the government to override any fundamental liberty with the exception of freedom from slavery. These institutional arrangements allow the government to implement a

⁹ Ian Chalmers, "Loosening State Control in Singapore: The Emergence of Local Capital as a Political Force", *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, 20, 2, 1992, pp. 57-84, p. 75

range of strongly coercive instruments of governance which it has done. These, however, are rarely used, are used almost wholly against the small political opposition and are offset by a panoply of consent building mechanisms based on control of the media, political socialisation mechanisms and the penetration of the social structure of HDB estates by social, cultural, sporting and community organisations under the direction of government and quasi-government agencies and overseen by a Leninist system of appointed advisors.

These institutional arrangements, directed as they are from the centre and lacking the support of approximately 40 per cent of adult citizens¹¹, are in themselves, rather fragile. The PAP has made it known in many ways that the democratic surface structure of the hegemonic framework through which it governs is not based on a stable state-society relationship and therefore is not characterised by representation or other rights. In this regard, a senior second generation PAP leader in the late 1980s, told Raj Vasil:

We have achieved an economic miracle.... it is this that is sacrosanct to us. It can't be allowed to be jeopardized by anybody... We would have little hesitation in not allowing the electorate, if at a given moment it is hoodwinked or bribed, to elect people to Parliament who in our judgement would do harm to the national interest and the common good of the community.¹²

The speaker obviously did not anticipate the PAP's descent into electoral bribery in the 1997 elections or more probably holds that PAP bribery is qualitatively different from other bribery. Lee Kuan Yew has been even more forthright about the fragility of the constitutional facade behind which PAP hegemony has prospered. In responding to questions from William Safire at the World Economic Forum at Davos in 1999 on the degree of control he exercised in Singapore before the leadership transition, Lee remarked:

You are wrong. No. We run a system right? I have seen what's happened in Indonesia, and I knew it was going to happen to Singapore if I did not prepare for succession. Because it was so easy just to carry on. I couldn't be removed. But if I had institutionalised it around me, it would have collapsed. So I institutionalised it around the office.¹³

Although Lee was trying to demonstrate the strength and stability of the Singaporean political system, what he actually revealed was its narrow foundation, its strongly coercive nature and therefore its instability. This is a logic which is not acknowledged by the Singaporean core executive; control is strength and stability, even if it is

¹⁰ Alan Chang, *Singapore's New Premier: Goh Chok Tong*, Petaling Jaya, Pendaluk Publications, 1991

¹¹ Although the opposition vote in the 1997 general elections was 35 per cent, the consistently historical figure is between 40-45 per cent.

¹² Raj Vasil, *Governing Singapore: Interviews with the new leaders*, Singapore, Times Books International, 1988, p. 154

¹³ "Whose really in charge of Singapore?", *Australian Financial Review*, 2 March 1999, p. 16

imposed control. This protection of "the system" means the protection of the PAP and its hegemonic program from any threat above a casual level. The extremism by which this hold on power is characterised is evidenced by the infrastructure and dynamics revealed in this study which facilitate unbridled executive power over the Singaporean state. In this respect, Goldring has commented;

... the most serious violation of human rights through the use of internal security and preventative detention legislation is currently taking place in Singapore, where there is no apparent threat to a stable social order, where standards of living are second only to Japan in Asia, and rapidly overtaking those in Australia and New Zealand, and where there are high levels of education. The only plausible reason for the use of these laws in Singapore is the desire of the present Prime Minister and the ruling elite to preserve their own power on their own terms. ... in this sort of political climate rationality has no place.¹⁴

This lack of political rationality was initially driven by Lee Kuan Yew and his associates in the belief that the system they had designed in the 1960s was best for Singapore and a determination that it remain without any genuine political challenge to its structure and control.

Since 1992, the current leadership has moved away from the one-man dominant rule of Lee Kuan Yew which existed from approximately 1984 - 1991 and under Goh Chock Tong's leadership has re-instituted the collective executive rule which prevailed before 1984.¹⁵ This has not changed the power, functions or institutional controls of the executive; it has merely re-distributed them among the executive. This has allowed a greater contestability of ideas, more obvious divergence in policy approaches (such as the marked differences in economic policy between Tony Tan and Lee Hsien Loong in 1985¹⁶) and a policy environment more characterised by negotiated outcomes; but with negotiations restricted almost wholly to the core executive. No genuinely corporatist arrangements exist by which policies are negotiated between the political executive and social interests outside the core executive.

This limited openness has been extended to the parliament which is demonstrably more active, which uses its committee system to seek greater legitimacy for controversial legislation, but still has only marginal influence on the policy system.

¹⁴ John Goldring, "The legal profession and government in Singapore and Malaysia", *Australian Quarterly*, 60, 4, 1988, pp. 488-498, pp. 491-492

¹⁵ Tilman also rejects the idea of one man rule by Lee Kuan Yew, although most people interviewed for this study from outside the civil service still thought in these terms. See: Robert O. Tilman, "The Political Leadership: Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP Team", in Kernal Singh Sandu and Paul Wheatley, eds. *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*. Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 53-69, pp. 59-61

¹⁶ A summary of these differences on appropriate policy responses to the 1985 recession is provided in: T. S. Selvan, *Singapore: The Ultimate Island*, Melbourne, Freeway Books, 1991, pp. 145-146. Given that Tony Tan provided his policy solutions to the annual dinner dance of the Administrative Service's in-house club, the Alpha Society, it can be assumed that he had considerable support within the AS for his views. These were ignored by Lee Hsien Loong's final report to Tan, to whom he then supposedly reported. This is an initial indication of the high degree of autonomy Lee exercised, even as a new and inexperienced junior minister reporting to a minister whose economic policy and practical business experience was vastly superior to his.

Strategies to promote broader community consultation which is almost wholly restricted to the middle class have also been implemented, designed as a pressure valve for middle class frustrations with the inflexibility of the political system. These mechanisms almost wholly exclude the working class except through limited closed-door focus group sessions by the Feedback Unit and the union based consultation programs operated by the NTUC.¹⁷ As one senior administrator involved in this strategy commented:

Of course we're a pressure valve. We have to find more ways of letting them have their say, to talk to us and feel they are being heard. Then we have more of a chance to bring them on board, to see why we're doing what we're doing ... to show them that we can listen and we'll take good suggestions seriously ... but really we don't have any other strategy to deal with this discontent ... you're either in the system or you're not and that's too black and white for most people ... a lot of them don't accept it – they stay away.¹⁸

New (Coercive) Foundations for Old Structures

Underlying this 'new' approach, the institutional arrangements which underpinned successive Lee Kuan Yew government survive within a more sophisticated and covert framework. The implementation of the new technologies of surveillance now provide the Singaporean core executive with greater knowledge and potentially greater control over its citizens than ever before. Using this technology, the PAP government was able to tell the electorate that opposition politician Chee Soon Juan broke a hunger strike, by eating in the privacy of his own house.¹⁹

This covert framework extends to the hidden aspects of institutional arrangements and the contemporary core executive's management of political opposition. It is precisely because parliamentary opposition has been so compromised by the PAP's design of the constitution, the legal system, the standing orders of the parliament and the media and communications infrastructure that it demands that any opposing views only take place within the political arena and not within the broader, less controlled institutions of civil society. Its preference is to co-opt informed and intelligent opposition and to constrain debate within its own ranks and fora. The PAP is not inured to public opinion; Lee Kuan Yew has acknowledged that public opinion is a strong policy

¹⁷ Several senior bureaucrats and MPs agreed in interview that the need to provide avenues to release middle class frustrations with the political system was a major driver of these strategies. The head of the Feedback Unit in 1998, Goh Chye Boon, agreed that the unit's feedback sessions, while including some people from working class occupations, probably included many more people with higher education levels who were felt to be able to contribute more to a dialogue session.

¹⁸ Interview, August 1998

¹⁹ Sangwon Suh and Santha Oorjitham, "No Holds Barred", *Asiaweek*, 17 January 1997, p. 13. The PAP distributed an open letter to the electorate claiming that Chee Soon Juan had eaten a meal cooked by his wife while he was on a hunger strike. Chee took no action against the government.

determinant.²⁰ However, fighting small political skirmishes with a large number of civic groups is a direct danger to any hegemonic order as it displaces consent and forces the exercise of coercive powers which, over any lengthy period, turns public opinion actively against the hegemonic structure. Hegemony requires a balance of consent forces and coercive forces within a relatively stable ideological and political framework to be self-sustaining. Thus the PAP has structured the system to ensure that most, if not all, political conflicts take place in the highly controlled environment of institutionalised politics and that more public political discourse is mediated through government controlled media. Opposition in any political environment requires people, funding, organisation (preferably national and across ethnic lines where ethnicity is an issue), equitable access to media and a political system that promotes diversity of opinion. Access to all of these resources by groups opposing the PAP are or can easily be, controlled.

An Unchanging Constitution

Although this interpretation of institutional arrangements is rejected as "conspiracy theory" and "overly simplistic" by Dr. Kevin Tan Yew Lee, one of Singapore's most knowledgeable constitutional lawyers, he provides no substantive explanation for the executive controls built into the constitution and the state's associated institutional structure, particularly the elected presidency²¹ and is presumably ignorant of the new strategies of surveillance which have been implemented to underwrite the constitutional foundations of hegemony. The problems inherent in the constitutional provisions for the elected presidency are more accurately analysed by Thio Li-Ann, also of the NUS Law Faculty. Thian notes that under Article 22(L)(3), the provisions for removing the president from office are "so broadly defined that one could argue that presidential activism could count as violation of the constitution..."²²

I do not argue that Singapore should have retained a "pure" form of Westminster constitution; no such thing exists. Constitutions that function well are ethno-centric and reflect both the realities and aspirations of the society to which they apply; there is

²⁰ In an exchange with William Safire, the *New York Times* critic who has been a vehement opponent of the PAP regime, the following exchange took place: Lee Kuan Yew: "I'm not going to pretend that I don't have influence. In the final analysis, if I totally disagree with a policy, and I think it's ruinous, I'll stand up in parliament and attack it, and go public, and shake public opinion against policy." Safire: "And so you think public opinion is what drives decisions?" Lee: "Absolutely. Yeah" See: "Whose really in charge of Singapore?", *Australian Financial Review*, 2 March 1999, p. 16

²¹ Tan comments paradoxically that provisions such as the elected presidency exist to ensure that good people occupy the office while ignoring the government controlled selection process, rejects the notion that the constitution is designed to shore up PAP control, then suggests that society is too tightly controlled and that a review of how the government is run is required. See: Ravi Veloo, "Why more power should be given to Singaporeans", *Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 8 March 1997, p. 15

nothing wrong with 'modifications' per se. What is of concern is that these modifications and the resulting constitutional framework actually does provide stable government as well as allow for social, economic and political development unfettered by inflexible limitations of any kind. Societies change, and to be successful the constitutional framework which governs them needs to change in response to this and for that change to be legitimated by citizens; not at the whim of an executive irregardless of the political rationale.

Change must be balanced by stability; not an imposed stability which is inherently unstable in the long term, but a stability which each society establishes for itself through negotiated social exchange between the ruled and those who would and do rule. As the French discovered from the failure of their Third and Fourth Republic constitutions, bad constitutional design can lead to economic and social upheaval and possibly even war.²³ This European experience of poor constitutional design has been mirrored in both South Korea²⁴ and Taiwan²⁵ in recent years. In these latter cases the resulting transitions to more democratic regimes was facilitated by the ability of oppositions to organise even in the face of authoritarian regimes and the willingness of the parties in power to put national interests before party interests. Good constitutional design provides political institutions capable of self-reform in alignment with social, economic and political forces for change.

The Singapore constitution provides the nation with only one road to self reform; through the PAP. This is an historically dangerous strategy; effective long-term national institutional strategies require society stabilising options to be built into the system, not monopolies which are inherently unstable in the long term. Such a monopolistic approach provides such a high degree of autonomy and lack of accountability for the political executive, that it can become so separated from society that it begins to operate on the basis of a framework with which the broader society cannot identify.

²² Chua Lee Hoong, "Containing powers of the EP: Cabinet has 'two arrows', *Straits Times Overseas Edition*, 26 October 1996, p. 15

²³ For analyses of the shortcomings of the constitution of the Fourth Republic see: Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce, *Political Representation in France*, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1986; and, John Bell, *French Constitutional Law*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992. For a specific analysis of the role of cabinet and ministers see: Arco Timmermans, "The role of cabinet ministers in the French Fourth Republic", in, Michael Laver, *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 141-159

²⁴ For analyses on constitutional and regime transition in the Republic of Korea see: Kal Bong Kun, "The Korean Constitution and Presidential Transition", *Doshiha kogaku*, 232, 30 September 1993, pp. 118-129; Paik Young Chul, "Political Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea", *Korea and World Affairs*, 18, 4, 1994, pp. 730-781; Im Hyug-Baeg, "Politics of Democratic transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea", *Korean Journal of Social Science*, 21, 1995, pp. 133-146

²⁵ For analyses on constitutional and regime transition in Taiwan see: Piero Tozzi, "Constitutional Reform on Taiwan: Fulfilling a Chinese Notion of Democratic Sovereignty?", *Fordham Law Review*, 64, 3, 1995, pp. 1193-1207; and, Chiu Hung Dah, "Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan", *Issues and Studies*, 29, 1, 1993, pp. 1-17

Accountability and the Core Executive

When discussing the accountability of the public sector and the transparency of government in Singapore with those close to or in the core executive, it is assumed by the majority that the system is transparent and accountable; they see themselves as honest people with the best interests of Singapore at heart – and for the most part they are. However when one challenges these respondents to draw an accountability chart or outline the instruments by which transparency is provided, nothing appears except a conversion of these assumptions at a point which comprises elections and the political executive. There is almost no concept of accountability or transparency within the core executive beyond this; the idea of having the parliament or any genuinely independent person or body which can hold the core executive to account for its actions is repugnant and dismissed as irrelevant. Moreso, disinformation is provided to assure Singaporeans, and to a lesser degree foreigners, that accountability and transparency exist. For example, Bilveer Singh notes that in relation to the Internal Security Act and other laws that allow unfettered executive discretion in the detention of any person:

What is ... important for the Singapore Government is to make transparent to the international community .. that these laws are not abused and that sufficient safeguards are present in the system to ensure this. In this connection, the Elected President and the Advisory Council on Criminal Law can advise the government on the various cases with reference to the above legislation.²⁶

As has been illustrated in previous chapters, the president has neither the power, resources nor institutional independence to counter the executive will and the Advisory Council on Criminal Law is a group of civil servants with nominal representation from the private legal sector, comprising cadres or proto-cadres and is completely under the control of the political executive.²⁷ It can be abolished at the stroke of a pen by the Minister of Law. These are not institutional arrangements for providing transparency and accountability.

There is no genuine separation of powers in Singapore; the modern Westminster version of liberal democracy does not apply, although Singapore conforms almost totally with the unreformed Westminster system minus the constraints of convention which the British did not transfer to their colonies. The independence of the judiciary and the legislature are so compromised by institutional design and the possibility of the executive's exercise of legal and extra-legal powers to enforce political conformity, as to be negligible. As a former supreme court judge and Attorney-General

²⁶ Bilveer Singh, *The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited: A Study of Singapore's Post Cold-War Foreign Policy*, Jogjakarta, Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999, p. 120

has commented, the Singaporean core executive cannot think in terms of a separation of powers;

... the problems inherent in the separation of powers doctrine may however be regarded as the inevitable open-endedness of linguistic categories and the imperfectability of our mental constructions. The result is that reliance upon general ideas of constitutional arrangement is inevitably flawed.²⁸

The Singaporean core executive answers to no-one but itself; whether aggregated or through intra-executive resource exchanges. This lack of accountability has challenged the moral integrity of state-society relations and the political system; it is a relationship which, to be durable and effective, must be prepositioned on trust but in Singapore there are no independent institutional indicators with which to verify that trust, so it is generally absent. Therefore, while 88 per cent of the population trust the government to run the country in the broadest of senses, very few trust the government in terms of how it runs the country.

In a recent survey of regular Feedback Unit respondents²⁹, 81 per cent of citizens saw the media as a tool of the government, 75 per cent thought there is no freedom of speech, 66 per cent thought the government is closed and difficult to talk to, 72 per cent thought the government incapable of accepting criticisms, 67 per cent wanted the government to consult more on policies and, most positively, 48 per cent didn't trust their MP to represent their interests.³⁰

The core executive seems to believe that economic performance is an adequate substitute for trust, but this can only carry the relationship for so long. This lack of accountability, except for elections within a gerrymandered electoral system, is complicated by the high levels of remuneration provided to the core executive and those aspects of their public duties, including remuneration, hidden within the GLC and statutory board sectors.³¹ Although it is obvious that remuneration in particular is based on performance; good performance in running or assisting with, the effective running of the state, eventually the electorate will question why some aspects of core executive activity continue to be hidden. It is only human to question why. In this respect it has been noted:

²⁷ The Advisory Council on Criminal Law is of such little consequence that it is no longer listed in the *Singapore Government Directory*, in 1998.

²⁸ Tan Boon Tiek, "Judicial Review: The Singapore Law Review Lecture 1987", *Singapore Law Review*, 1988, 9, p. 69-83, p. 82.

²⁹ The Feedback Unit surveyed its regular respondents and the data presented reflects this. Methodologically, one can assume that their may be a positive bias in the results, as these respondents are in regular contact with the Feedback Unit and so probably feel that they have access to the government, even if indirectly. It is probable that a random survey of citizens would have provided a different result. See: Chua Mui Hoong, "Are people getting through to the government?", *Straits Times*, 4 July, p. 2.

³⁰ "Govt: How public sees it", *Straits Times*, 20 June 1998, p. 1.

Intellectuals and professionals sense an atmosphere of corruption - not corruption of money, for there is nothing in Singapore corresponding to the activities of families of Presidents of some of the ASEAN countries, but corruption in the disbursement of power and influence.³²

But Goldring's comment is not new. In 1973 George noted:

Even Singapore's famous graftlessness has an unseen face. Petty bribery is, of course, unknown and no minister or government official grows fat on illegal takings - a unique virtue in Southeast Asia. But this does not preclude the existence of a form of political corruption. Falling in with the government's line of thinking is recognized as a way of getting official favours such as the allotment of choice apartments; a proportion of housing estates' accommodation is set apart as a reward for political support. Government pressure through red tape is brought to bear on industrialists and traders ... If, however, the businessmen concerned are personally close to the top political hierarchy, they are spared the pressures.³³

There need be no such sense in Singapore if the core executive is as transparent as it claims. Maintaining systems which generate this type of comment can only erode state-society relations. This lack of accountability is such an accepted part of the hegemonic system that official statements on public morals and values lose any potency in the wider society. When Lee Kuan Yew makes statements such as:

"An Asian society cannot be held together without a sense of what is high and honorable and what is low and despicable."³⁴

few ordinary non-party political Singaporeans take them seriously. The admittedly few despicable acts of the state are well known on this small island; they are generally accepted, but not necessarily supported, for a variety of reasons, the principal being that the hegemonic program has simply squeezed all practical possible alternatives out of the national consciousness and that the economic contract that defines state-society relations more than the social contract, is still being fulfilled. However, the capacity for this contract to continue to underpin state-society relations is limited. Writing in 1989, Chan Heng Chee noted that the transition from the Lee to the post-Lee governments would probably lead to a resolution of the conflict which emerged from the mid-1980s between public aspiration for more political openness and the goals of the political elites, a redefining of the contract:

There may be a time lag and compromise between popular demands and their implementation but a resolution must be reached; and a compromise in Singapore will ultimately be struck: for the leadership, somewhere between economic effectiveness and political stability; for the

³¹ For example, in making the *Directory of Government Linked Corporations*, a restricted, secret document.

³² John Goldring, "The legal profession and government in Singapore and Malaysia", *Australian Quarterly*, 60, 4, 1988, pp. 488-498, p. 494.

³³ T. J. S. George, *Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore*, Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 1984, p. 213.

³⁴ "Singapore minister decries tech", Reuters, 30 October 1998. Available at: <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,28147,00.html>

citizenry, somewhere between economic well-being and increased political participation.³⁵

Chan's compromise is not being negotiated by the contemporary core executive. Instead, the prime minister is asserting that the future, in power arrangement terms, will be a reflection of the past:

But you must believe that the PAP knows best. If you don't believe in that, then we have no business in government. Having said that, it doesn't mean we have a monopoly of views. We know best, but we listen to views from elsewhere. If the views are sensible, we co-opt them as our own – or make them into our policies. So that's also part of knowing best. But in the end, I believe that we are the people who can make the best judgement of where Singapore should go.³⁶

Such views provide no framework in Singapore for evolution towards institutional arrangements that are more robust and stable and through which hegemonic arrangements begin to be replaced by those which are more socially legitimated.

This study has demonstrated that the power structures characteristic of contemporary governance in Singapore are virtually devoid of this evolutionary potential. They are not corporatist, either as state or societal corporatism. As for state corporatism, mediating structures are imposed by the state, by they are almost wholly limited to the state's relationship with unions which in Singapore are not representative of most workers, nor of class interests. Network structures are not highly formalised because all policy networks operate at the discretion of the political and civil service executives, with other policy actors almost powerless to initiate policy community or network activity. Equally, the working class, industry, business and community organisation have no power to negotiate with the political executive in resource exchange terms and therefore neither societal corporatist structures, nor 'private interest governance' have emerged.

Instead, what one encounters in Singapore are networks, policy and governance mechanisms developed, controlled and overseen by the core executive through the exercise of its own power, not through negotiations within a balanced state-society power framework. Entry into these networks and mechanisms by those outside the public sector is through selection by the core executive, not by negotiation or affiliation with civil society, union or other types of organisations independent of the party or the government. This has been demonstrated through the analysis of the membership of statutory boards and GLC boards in Chapter Seven. What this clearly demonstrates is that Singapore is governed through hegemonistic structures, strategies and power

³⁵ Chan Heng Chee, "The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System", in Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, eds., *The Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, Singapore, ISEAS, 1989, pp. 70-89, p. 87

relations. These have some characteristics of state corporatism, but are principally oligarchic and elitist and somewhat reflect garrison state arrangements.

John Hall, noted, I believe correctly, that to fully understand the possibilities of the modern state, we must move away from narrow traditional definitions of state power defined by the ability to coerce as a sum-zero game with the state always the winner. This has obvious limitations, which in due course limit the ability of the state, particularly the small vulnerable state, to achieve its full potential. Hall concludes that "... societal energy is likely to be enhanced when social institutions are designed so that the contributions made by many can be synthesised and utilized."³⁷ Such a synthesis is society-directed, not state-directed so that its inclusiveness harnesses societal energy in a way that is self-sustaining.

The efforts of the contemporary core executive to harness societal energy is partial, narrowly targetted and in the longer term prone to failure as it does not attempt to genuinely renegotiate state-society relations, but to broaden the hegemonic co-option strategy by making it shallower, occassional and requiring less commitment by involving the middle class, in particular, in consultations. If contemporary institutional arrangements continue, its most likely outcome in the next 10-15 years is even more widespread political apathy than is now apparent. The concern expressed by the present core executive, that Singaporeans will look upon their country in terms of "Hotel Singapore", could well become true. But whereas, the government is concerned that the problem lies with the hotel's customers (citizens), it seems apparent that it is with the hotel management (the government) that most problems lie. The contemporary Singaporean core executive needs to rework its domestic governance scenarios based not on projecting present institutional arrangements based on a 1960s conception of Singaporean society into the future, but by testing alternative arrangements that can genuinely harness the synergy inherent in a legitimated state-society relationship. To do this the institutional framework must change, preferably through a process which is evolutionary and which will see the gradual development of a more contested political system which the PAP can learn to accept.

CORE EXECUTIVE DYNAMICS

The major driver in the internal dynamics of the Singaporean core executive from at least 1992, and certainly from 1994 when Lee Hsien Loong was diagnosed with cancer, to the present time, has been the transfer of power from the Lee family to another group within the core executive. This is more a struggle about means, personalities and

³⁶ "Finally, Being His Own man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia - and himself", *Asiaweek*, 25 November 1999. Available at: <http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/interview/goh.chok.tong/index.htm>

power domains and to a lesser degree about style of governance than about basic ideology, democratisation or fundamental changes to state-society relations. Chan, almost 25 years ago, assessed Singaporean intra-executive conflict as being driven by disputes about means, resource allocation and the autonomy of policy domains and my research has shown nothing that would challenge this assessment, except to add inter-personal conflict as a factor.³⁸ What is not talked about openly is the increasing demarcation of core executive actors around the issue of prime ministerial succession, the timing of Lee Kuan Yew's retirement from politics and the role of the Lee family within the core executive. Goh Chok Tong hinted that Lee Hsien Loong did not have a natural or automatic route of accession to the prime ministership when, in 1992 in an interview with *Asiaweek*, he noted that the issue of Lee Hsien Loong being prime minister would not arise for 10-15 years, indicating that he himself had every intention of staying in command and seeing Lee Kuan Yew off the political stage.³⁹ This was still his view in 1999.⁴⁰

In developing and consolidating the strategy to move political leadership away from the Lee family, Goh has developed three centres of power. The first is the party, the second is the development of a power base with MINDEF, and the third is the extension of the MINDEF power base, in association with Lim Siang Guan and a number of other second generation AOs into the public sector. Since Goh unexpectedly increased the PAP vote in the 1997 elections, he has been able to consolidate his power and increase his autonomy from Lee Kuan Yew and the cabinet. This has allowed him to finally take control of the Defence Council and the Council of Presidential Advisers and reduce his need to negotiate on certain issues with the Lees.

Control, of the party since 1992 has allowed Goh to shape the parliamentary party to his liking. He has not done this by sharply differentiating between himself and Lee Hsien Loong or other senior ministers, but has balanced his control of the party so that no such division is apparent from outside the core executive. Lee remains influential within the party, but not in control. Goh's control of the party has also focussed on replacing most of the older community based cadres in the branches and GROs that were hostile to the current leadership in the 1980s. He has integrated political recruitment and training for political office more closely with the party branches, but beyond this and an political intelligence function, the party remains isolated from the core executive.

37 John A. Hall, *Coercion and Consent: Studies on the Modern State*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994, p. x1

38 "Comments on Current and Future Trends", in Seah Chee Meow, ed., *Trends in Singapore: Proceedings and Background Paper*, Singapore, Singapore university Press, 1975, p. 141-142

39 "DPM's cancer: 'Govt prepared for worst, hoping for best', *The Straits Times*, 5 December 1992, p. 3

40 See: "Finally, Being His own man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia - and himself", *Asiaweek*, 25 November 1999. Available at: <http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/interview/goh.chok.tong/index.html>

Under the current core executive, the public sector executive remains highly autonomous from society and, to a degree, its leadership has considerable autonomy from the political executive. This autonomy is largely based on the influence of scale in Singaporean society. It is a small country demographic and geographically. It is not easy in Singapore to replace even small numbers of the public sector elite, of which in 1998 there were approximately 300, if there was any great schism between the political executive and the public sector executive. This provides a public sector management environment which is more negotiated than most commentators acknowledge or the core executive admits. This is not to say that there are major difference between the two executives; there are not. What difference exist are usually over means and personalities and are shared across the two executives more than between them.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the relationship between the public service executive and the political executive is not symbiotic, as it is often described, but conjugal. Although all public bureaucracies have a symbiotic relationship with their controlling political institutions if one uses this biological metaphor – each is dependent on the other for certain essential functions. A more accurate description in the Singapore case uses the mathematical term “conjugal” whether from optics or geometry. If one takes a geometrical meaning, two points are conjugal if they are so related as to be interchangeable in the enunciation of certain properties. So too, in many ways, is the senior civil service in Singapore interchangeable with the political executive in relation to certain activities, particularly in the management of policy networks and communities. It is only in relation to institutionally specified political or bureaucratic roles that the two groups are differentiated.

THE CONTEMPORARY CORE EXECUTIVE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A MATURE DEMOCRACY

Anyone looking for a transition to liberal democracy in Singapore within the next 15 years is bound to be disappointed. In the 1998 interviews, all respondents commented that they did not expect Singapore to be fully democratised for at least the next 12-15 years. The majority of respondents justified this time frame on the basis of the passing of the contemporary core executive and the death of Lee Kuan Yew. Most expect Lee to live as long as his father – until his mid-90s – and to still have sufficient influence on the political system to stop or inhibit any progress toward full democratisation. While I agree with the general time frame, I cannot agree with a rationalisation based on Lee's continuing control. This grossly underestimates Goh Chok Tong and the capacity of the current core executive to plot its own course for Singapore. It also does Lee himself

an injustice; he is far more adaptable than most give him credit for, admittedly tempered by an instinct for control and a habit of wielding power.⁴¹ What was more interesting regarding any transition to full democracy was that all respondents also agreed that there was no discernible strategy by the PAP to foster this transition; instead, its instinct to coopt and control any non-PAP political developments continued; some commented, almost unthinkingly.

Yet, it would appear from the conflicts which have taken place within the core executive over the political implications of the transition to a knowledge based economy, the increasing impact of globalisation and the changing nature of Singaporean society, that it is only too aware that such a transition may be necessary to maintain its program. One of the major trends pushing the need for the PAP to support this transition is the increasing unwillingness of the broader middle class to be recruited into the present political system, which by design largely excludes the working class. I believe that what we are now seeing in Singapore is a 'crisis of recruitment': a withdrawal of labour from the PAP system by those outside the public sector, as the only acceptable response to objecting to its continuance in its present form. For example, of the 23 PAP recruits to parliament in 1997, 17 came from the PAP's immediate locus of control – 13 were current or former public servants (seven of whom were either in the Administrative Service or the Singapore Legal Service), 3 were journalists from SPH and one was from the NTUC. In all, 74 per cent of these new recruits could be classed as public sector recruits. As was demonstrated in Chapter Five, recruitment to the judiciary is also problematical with substantial passive resistance from the legal profession to judicial recruitment.

This is compounded by the failure of the key public sector feeder to the ministry, the Administrative Service, to meet its recruitment targets and thus fall back on a dependence on the SAF for new recruits.⁴² This is compounded by the failure to recruit high numbers of school leavers through SAF scholarships, the president's scholarships and PSC scholarships. These comprise about 145 in total each year, but in 1998 only three applicants for the president's scholarships met the criteria, an historically low level. The EDB, however, offers over 300 scholarships by itself or jointly with other organisations and a work environment that generally insulates its staff from politics

⁴¹ In 1999, Goh Chok Tong noted that in his relationship with Lee, Lee "gives his views. I don't take offence." Obviously Lee's views rarely gel with Goh's. See: "Finally, Being His own man: Goh Chok Tong on Singapore, Asia – and himself", *Asiaweek*, 25 November 1999. Available at: <http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/interview/goh.chok.tong/index.html>

⁴² In 1996, Lim Siong Guan, then Permanent Secretary, PMO, told a meeting of Administrative Officers that the Administrative Service had failed to meet its recruitment targets for several years and that the service would have to rely on other avenues to at least meet its minimum targets. These 'other avenues' so far seem to be restricted to the SAF and two appointments from the private sector. Data from interview with senior Administrative Officer.

and easily leads to private sector employment.⁴³ It is this latter road that is attracting school leavers, not a path that leads one into government. If this trend continues, and it most probably will, it indicates that society is beginning to isolate the political centre by withdrawing its willingness to be co-opted into it.

Active resistance to PAP hegemony is pointless to most Singaporeans. However, there is nothing the PAP can do to force people to participate within that part of the system which recruits for the political or public service executives. If these trends are genuine and they continue, the core executive will be forced to draw the political executive from an increasingly smaller pool, almost wholly from the public sector, until its oligarchic nature becomes so apparent that it could cause considerable social discord or, more probably, almost complete political apathy. If you exclude everyone from the game, it's impossible to then blame them for not wanting to play. The only way to have more people play is to change the rules, or increase the size of the team; the latter strategy seems increasingly to be not available.

The current approach to increasing consultation with the middle class is only a temporary and partial answer to the long term need to recruit political and public sector talent and to maintain support for a stable, highly legitimised government, whether PAP or not. To continuing winning in the long term, the PAP will need to surrender its tendency for overwhelming control of everything. Given the surveillance and covert control structures built into the existing system, even if the PAP begins on a path of institutional, not necessarily, liberal democratic, reform, it does so with enormous advantages over its political opponents, have little to risk in the next 10-15 years and much to gain from appearing willing to share power and be more accountable.

The basic question to be addressed is whether the structure, dynamics and strategies which characterise the contemporary core executive provide the best system to assure Singapore of long-term political stability to meet its national development goals? There are certainly many within the present core executive who believe so; there are others who obviously don't. It is not a question necessarily of the PAP losing power; it is a question of whether the PAP can mature as a political party, rather than remain a technocratic oligarchy, to engage in authentic political contestation as a necessary means of maintaining social and national cohesion? At the moment, the political system, including the constitution is designed on a winner-take-all basis with number of additional features which allow the loser, presumably the PAP, to spoil the governance system if it attains more than one-third of the vote, a reasonable outcome if

⁴³ Data from EDB, PSC and MINDEF, 1998.

it did lose office. The post-Lee core executive has done nothing to change this. In a small nation this is a very destructive strategy; one that shows greater concern with the PAP holding onto power than it does for the long term national good, if one has enough political acumen and emotional maturity to separate the PAP's welfare from the nation's.

If the PAP was to adopt a program for a transition to a more democratic system, what would be required? The program below suggests a broad outline that would transform the political system, without necessarily displacing the PAP program, whether implemented by itself or by another party that shared much of its approach. This is a program for a bi-polar hegemonic system, not a transition to liberal democracy; that is inconceivable in contemporary Singapore given the way in which the PAP has structured political institutions, discourse and dynamics. Such an approach matches the type of political representativeness in Singapore, as Rodan notes:

... a less recognised constraint is the ideological success the PAP has had with opposition parties themselves. Their implicit acceptance of elitist PAP assumptions about the purpose and process of government also stifles the development of an alternative politics that could find expression through the ballot and offer voters a significant choice. At both the structural and ideological levels, politics as a process of representation has yet to achieve legitimacy in Singapore.⁴⁴

So complete is the PAP's ideological hegemony, that it has co-opted opposition political parties into its domain:

Neither major opposition party, then, directly contests the ruling party's central ideological concepts. This does not necessarily indicate a conscious endorsement of PAP ideology, but it does at least reflect an inability to formulate alternatives; surely an important measure of the PAP's ideological hegemony.⁴⁵

It is logical therefore that a transition to a more contested political system must accept and come from within this hegemonic framework. This is a safe path for the PAP and Singapore to a more representative and legitimate political system. It is safe because it builds upon a broad ideological and social consensus developed by the PAP through its consent building strategies: a consensus that over the next decade or so, can be separated from the PAP as a party and government and be seen as a more socially legitimated political framework for the nation as a whole. This would reflect the approach taken in the historical development of the Westminster system in Britain; the political system can be robust and adversarial, because the political culture and

⁴⁴ Garry Rodan, "Elections without representation: The Singapore experience under the PAP", in R. H. Taylor, *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia*. The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 61-89, p. 63

⁴⁵ Garry Rodan, "State-society relations and political opposition in Singapore", in Garry Rodan, ed., *Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia*, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 96-127, p. 118

institutions are based on a broad fundamental consensus on the framework for governing the nation. This point is aptly made by Lord Balfour;

Our whole political machinery pre-supposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker; and so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously disturbed by the never ending din of political conflict.⁴⁶

In a Singaporean bi-polar hegemonic political arrangement, the state should continue to have safeguards against ethnic and religious conflict, but it could safely implement a political system in which the 'din of political conflict' was as moderate as that of its British ancestor and in which a strong state can act decisively and relatively autonomously when this is absolutely necessary for the national good.

A MODERNISATION PROGRAM FOR SINGAPOREAN DEMOCRACY

A transition to a bi-polar hegemonic system is a reasonable step in the evolution of the governance of Singapore. It assures the continuation of the broad PAP framework through the creation of a two party system within which both parties share allegiance to certain broad ideological positions and a governance framework derived from the current model. However it introduces greater and more authentic competition into the political system, should moderate the harsh and socially divisive approach to opposition practiced by the current government as the existing political parties become more marginalised within a predominantly two party system, and increase the legitimacy of government. This approach will also provide a more controlled evolutionary path for democratic development in Singapore by defusing much (but certainly not all) of the passive resistance to the PAP.

Such a program requires an institutional reform program to restructure "the system" so that it can facilitate bi-polar hegemony.

The Institutional Reform Program

The major components of an institutional reform program for Singapore are sketched out below. A detailed program is not possible within the context of this study. The major components are: constitutional reform, electoral reform, judicial reform, parliamentary reform, public sector reform and the development of a proto-PAP political party.

⁴⁶ Lord Balfour, "Preface", in, Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1949, xxiv

Constitutional Reform

The constitution needs to be reformed in several ways, including removal of all those articles which would better reside in legislation: most of the public sector management provisions and many of the citizenship, financial and special provisions. This would then place contestation of these matters within the legislature requiring the government to pass legislation on a simple majority vote. This strategy starts to break down the brinkmanship and divisions inherent in having such mundane administrative matters dealt with as major constitutional matters requiring a two-thirds majority in the parliament. The restrictions on fundamental human rights need to be changed to conform to the current realities of Singaporean society, associated with a jettisoning of the 1960 model of Singapore on which the core executive is now operationalised. The powers of the president need to be unequivocally defined, the limitations on candidacy for this office need to be broadened at least and a constitutional role for the Supreme Court should be considered. A guarantee of the equality of votes and the establishment of an independent electoral commission appointed by the president should also be included to underwrite a revision of the electoral system. Compulsory retirement from public office by statutory office holders should also be insisted on by the constitution to force generation renewal upon the political executive, particularly for judicial offices.

Electoral Reform

At the very least, the number of GRC should be halved over the next 15 years and the numbers of MPs in each reduced to three. All other constituencies should be single member constituencies and the electoral laws should be revised to assure a balance of racial and religious representation among the single member constituencies. This should be presided over by an independent electoral commission appointed by the president on which no serving public servants are represented. This allows the possibility of the number of opposition members increasing slowly over a 15 year period thus bedding down the other complementary reforms slowly over three elections and one generation of voters.

Judicial Reform

It is essential that a judiciary genuinely independent of the political executive be developed. Given the age profile of the present Supreme Court judiciary, this is a matter which could be acted upon in the near future. Lawyers in Singapore are only too well aware of the nature of Singaporean society and the ways in which justice

should be administered in a multi-ethnic society. Those talented enough to join the Supreme Court in particular do not need to act on behalf of the political executive to protect society. A genuine commitment to an independent judiciary will find willing recruits, although to establish its authenticity, the core executive will have to lose a few political court cases gracefully first. This requires a degree of emotional maturity which the political executive in particular has failed to demonstrate in the past. The subordinate judiciary could remain functionally within the civil service under these arrangements and its structure reviewed at a later stage.

Parliamentary Reform

Reform of the legislature should include making membership of parliament a full time occupation. If need be, salaries should be established at a relatively high level and be pegged to the same scale as for civil servants and ministers. MPs should be provided with offices in their constituencies, a motor vehicle, support staff and an office adjacent to the new parliament house so that they can adequately conduct their duties. Ministers could be provided with a small number of independent, non civil service staff so as to establish a corps of political trainees for both major parties. The Standing Orders of the parliament should be revised to remove the infringements on parliamentary privilege, standing committees in certain areas established and a practice of genuine budgetary review of estimates be handled by these committees. The gradual introduction of these reforms will support the development of parliamentary oversight skills and of a culture of public sector accountability within the executive, the parliament and the public sector. All public bodies should be required to provide annual reports to the parliament which must meet minimum uniform guidelines for accountability and transparency. Senior officers in the Parliamentary Service should be trained in committee accountability practices and parliamentary practices for these committees developed and incorporated in Standing Orders. The number of support staff for the parliament should be increased as required.

Public Service Reform

The initiatives taken under the PS21 program should be extended to develop a culture of public sector accountability in the civil service, statutory boards and GLCs. All officers of division head level and above whether in the Administrative Service or not, should be expected to attend hearings of parliamentary committees, attend budget estimate hearings and be trained in parliamentary accountability. The civil service, statutory boards and GLCs need to be made genuinely accountable so that citizens

clearly understand their status and management. This is an important step in building greater trust between the electorate and the political executive. All boards, GLCs and ministries should publish annual reports that are tabled in the parliament, with possible limitations for genuine national security reasons, such as limiting the annual reports of MINDEF and the DSTA to information that has no security sensitivity.

To assist the Administrative Service in particular, for five to six years small numbers of AOs (possibly 5 per year) should be sent on secondment to parliaments in Britain, Canada, New Zealand or Australia, to gain a working knowledge of parliamentary committees systems suitable for Singapore and their role in public sector accountability. Regulations restricting the involvement of Administrative Officers in political parties should be abolished and provision made for these officers to stand for parliament and be MPs while retaining their AS positions which can be resumed if they lose their seats. This provision should also apply to all civil service officers.

Development of a Proto-PAP Opposition Party

A viable opposition party should be nurtured which can progress the nation towards the development of a genuine two-party system over the next 20 years. This cannot be achieved by splitting the PAP; the PAP needs to adjust its political control strategies to allow this party to develop and, almost certainly, to covertly sponsor it. To have any genuine success, this new party must be a child of the PAP in its initial stages, probably the first 10 years. This party should be a moderate political party with a common ideological and policy framework to the PAP, with which the PAP feels it can share power without necessarily, in the long-term, sharing a common view on all issues. This program for nurturing another hegemonically oriented party must include the gradual termination of the program of overt political harassment that makes the development of viable opposition parties impossible. The possible core membership of such a party already exists and, with certain guarantees, could begin the task of developing a second conservative political force in Singapore.

Strategies for assisting this party to mature and develop should be devised, including their members playing a role in the various components of the hegemonic structure, especially the GROs, GLCs and statutory boards. This small and growing alternative party should develop relationships with the civil service, either directly through civil service membership of the party, through the parliamentary system and by other mechanisms such as being on ministry resource panels, government committees and advisory bodies. The electoral laws may need to be changed to allow public funding of elections perhaps based on the Australian model, or a strategy devised whereby the

nascent political party receives enough funding to ensure its development. At the same time, the PAP needs to refine its funding arrangements so that they are also more transparent, particularly its relationship with the NTUC.

Any program for movement from the current unipolar hegemonic political system has to account for resistance to it. In the present core executive such resistance could be led by Lee Kuan Yew whose personal commitment to his creation is encapsulated in his declaration that:

I have spent a whole life-time building this and as long as I am in charge nobody is going to knock it down.⁴⁷

However, Lee, if anything, has also proven to be flexible when required. Any initiative such as a move to a bi-polar system need not, and should not, be overly influenced by any one person. The current core executive are quite capable of deciding such a strategy whatever the opposition from within the core executive, if they feel that it is essential to Singapore's continued prosperity and good.

CONCLUSION: THE CORE EXECUTIVE, THE HEGEMONIC PROGRAM AND POLITICAL MATURATION

This study has attempted to examine how the core executive in Singapore operates within an hegemonic political system; a system operationalised by strong, partly balanced forces of state coercion and social consent designed and controlled by the core executive, its executive agencies, its business enterprises and its extra-institutional bodies.

Our knowledge of how hegemonic power is developed and operates has its foundations in the coercive institutional instruments of the state. But within an hegemonic system, this coercive power is transformed through a set of tacit 'rules of the system' which are acknowledged, acted upon and reproduced by individuals and groups, reflected back into the institutional structure and its concomitant social structure, to reinforce, soften but not diminish hegemonic coercion and maintain consistency with the hegemonic ideology and structure. In particular, we can observe these 'rules of hegemonic consent' in within the institutional structure and in the way those communities and social networks close to the core executive function; the policy communities and policy networks.

While the rules of hegemonic consent also operate in the broader society, they are not as apparent; they are softened, as it is essential if the hegemonic program is to be

successful and perpetuated, that both the coercive instruments and the rules of consent be tacitly understood, known or suspected but not be overwhelmingly present as this promotes social resistance. This partially hidden nature of hegemonic instrumentality is best achieved by balancing coercion and consent functions between complementary loci of power - institutions and society. Therefore, the rules of consent 'soften' coercive power because a constant emphasis on coercion would undermine the perpetuation of hegemony as it would facilitate resistance, not consent, and produce a simple authoritarian regime, not an hegemonic regime. Likewise, if such a system gives greater emphasis to consent and less to coercion, state corporatism rather than hegemony is produced and non-state actors have greater autonomy to penetrate the core executive and shape the state.

This is one of the principal reasons political scientists find Singapore so annoying; understanding how hegemony functions is complex and on the surface, seemingly contradictory. For many analysts, Singapore does not obey the rules of political science, as crude as these may be at this stage of the discipline's development. It is the only wealthy nation in the world that is not a genuine liberal democracy. It has had one party rule and a semi-authoritarian regime for 40 years, but demonstrated long term sustained economic growth. This has produced a large middle class that has not developed a political opposition to the authoritarian regime nor demanded full democracy. The nation has been presided over by one dominant man but there is no personality cult, although there appears to exist a mixture of fear and respect regarding Lee Kuan Yew and his family which may, perhaps, be now diminishing.

The nation is highly militarised, but the military was created by a civilian government during peace time and has no connection with the establishment of the state, nor an historical existence; the military is a creature of the civilian administration with its power structure carefully designed to minimise its political autonomy and optimise its defence function. The military is represented in the legislature, the executive and the various public bureaucracies, but there is no evidence of military government as it would normally be understood. The state is largely autonomous but its rulers could not be classed as rent-seekers although they earn the highest public sector salaries in the world calculated on a transparent market-linked basis. The bureaucracy has direct power over very substantial financial and other resources, but the level of money corruption is minuscule. The large Malay ethnic minority, usually hostile to ethnic Chinese (as recently evidenced in Indonesia), co-exists peacefully with the Chinese majority; there have been no inter-racial clashes since 1969. Is there something very right, very strange, or both about this tiny, rather insignificant nation?

⁴⁷ Lee Kuan Yew, cited in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 December 1980

In attempting to answer this question, commentators generally classify the Singaporean state as corporatist, authoritarian or oligarchic. These labels are not necessarily misplaced; all have venerable theoretical and empirical roots in political science and apply at least partially to Singapore. They do, however, fail to explain the full nature of Singaporean state-society relations which I have argued are based on hegemony; not a Gramscian hegemony, because under the Singaporean system, it could be argued that the working class benefits except in political control terms.⁴⁸ It is therefore a neo-Gramscian hegemony. It is in some sense corporatist, authoritarian and oligarchic and even elitist with overtones of the garrison state; but it is also more than all these separately.

Most contemporary political thought is uncomfortable with the idea, let alone the exercise of, raw unbridled state power, except when it can be classified as belonging to states or groups which are at war or somewhat out of the ordinary; nations we can accuse of 'state terrorism', institutionalised oppression or label as theocratic, dictatorial or somehow peculiar and outside the typology of 'normal' states by which we usually mean some variant of the liberal democratic state. Contemporary political thought is fascinated by the complexity of advanced industrialised societies and the essentiality of consent to the functioning of these societies whether internally or between states; those nations below this level are regarded as the domain of development specialist, rather in the way that paediatrics is an interesting, even essential medical specialty, but not 'the main game' in medicine. In relation to Singapore, Tremewan makes a typical assessment:

The ordering of society is most effectively achieved by consent. However, when consent is not forthcoming or the ordering process requires the rapid breakdown of existing social relations, then various degrees of coercion become necessary.⁴⁹

It may be unpopular or even distasteful to ponder the necessity of coercion to state functioning and governance in modern nations, but intellectual fashion and the emotional preferences of analysts have little influence on the hard realities of running a country whether democratically or not; the constant and necessary role of coercion in all forms of governance cannot be ignored – it is an essential factor in state-society relations.

The key issue is not state coercion itself but the transparency, accountability and appropriateness of its use within a particular state and the degree to which it is accepted by citizens within a stable framework of state-society relations. This is not to

⁴⁸ Gramsci conceived of hegemonic arrangements as being opposed to the interests of the working class.

deny that a concern for political complexity in terms of game playing, resource exchange, governance, pluralist competition and civil society dynamics is not legitimate or relevant. Rather, these approaches, while pregnant with valid insights, each of themselves provide limited assistance in the analysis of a society and political system that does not conform to the classificatory criteria of liberal democracy, authoritarian (whether fascist, communist or simply militarist), oligarchic, or elitist because it depends for its reproduction and continuity on strong, balanced forces of both coercion and consent mediated by a quasi-autonomous state. The answer lies in understanding the complexity and dynamics of hegemony, as this study has attempted to do. It is the structure and particularly the dynamics of hegemony as implemented in Singapore through a combination of institutional and extra-institutional mechanisms, which provides us, if not with the full answer, at least with a valid description of hegemony in action under the direction of a Westminster based core executive. This in association with the small size of this nation provide much of the explanation of why Singapore is as it is. The scale of society, geography, culture and institutions is such that if one remains dedicated to staying in Singapore, one must negotiate and compromise to a degree greater than in large more dispersed polities. In Singapore, there is no where to hide, so even the PAP must negotiate moreso than it perhaps would like us to believe.

The contemporary Singaporean core executive has been faithful to Lee Kuan Yew's regime reproduction aims. Since the transfer of power from Lee, it has done nothing to significantly change institutional arrangements, it has retained the PAP's ideological and operational framework and a profound belief in its 'manifest destiny' as the vehicle for national salvation. It has been, on occasions more consultative, but the essential nature of state-society relations have actually deteriorated as evidenced by the 'crisis of recruitment' being experienced by the regime. Its most significant changes have been marginal in their impact on the hegemonic program: reform of the public service through increased efficiency and a service orientation, a more active but nonetheless largely powerless legislature, a larger and more dynamic party organisation but one still isolated from the centre of power. Other changes have significantly strengthened hegemony, particularly the development of advanced surveillance and intelligence techniques for monitoring citizens and political opposition. These hegemonic enhancement strategies have been more sophisticated and covert than those used by the Lee governments, perhaps a hallmark of the current core executive. It is probable that the current core executive will have increasing difficulty reproducing itself. By comparison, it may eventually seem that Goh Chok Tong's succession was relatively easy.

⁴⁹ Christopher Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore*, London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 187

The greatest challenge facing the contemporary core executive in Singapore is not economic or social; it is the challenge of providing Singapore with a political system that is robust and has genuine legitimacy, that is not enforced from above, but transparently accepted as legitimate from the grassroots. One possible, although not easy route to this, is the preparation of a bi-polar hegemonic system over the next 15 years and the concurrent preparation of the next generation of PAP leadership to have the ability to rotate power between the two parties in peaceful transitions. The current core executive has the intellectual and organisational ability to achieve this task. However, they have unfortunately demonstrated that they do not seem to have the will with which to tackle it. This bodes ill for Singapore in the long-term. I look forward to being proven wrong, but expect to be disappointed.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

THE PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY'S DEVELOPMENT FROM 1971 TO 1995

Compared to the structure of the People's Action party depicted by Pang in 1971¹, (see Diagram 1 below), by 1995 the party had been greatly restructured, although the Central Executive Committee has remained the controlling authority, assisted by a Party Headquarters Executive Committee (HQ Exco) established in sometime before 1988,² probably between 1984 and 1988 after Goh Chok Tong had been designated as prime minister designate. In recognition of the central role of branches in the reformed party organisation, bimonthly meetings of branch secretaries are also now held in order to coordinate branch activities and to ensure uniform dissemination of party and government decisions.³

The party's major policy making forum, the biennial Party Conference⁴ has been supplemented by an annual PAP Convention, but both are relatively short and still rubberstamp the CEC policy agenda, although debate on policies is now more encouraged. In 1995, the HQ Exco was assisted by 13 headquarters committees, but in 1998, Wong Kan Seng mentioned that only nine headquarters committees existed.⁵ In line with the civil service strategy of devolving authority and responsibility to functional units from the central agencies, the party centre was restructured as a support and facilitation centre and responsibility for most party activity devolved to the branches.

The party secretariat, which was always small, is possibly smaller than it was, having a permanent staff of "fewer than 10".⁶ Even with the establishment of the PAP Community Foundation (PCF), it appears that there was no temptation to develop a larger central bureaucracy as the PCF's recruitment, appointment and supervision responsibilities were transferred to PCF branches which are under the general direction of the PAP branches in each constituency. Advice on PCF teacher qualifications, curriculum and facilities standards is provided by the Ministry of

¹ Pang actually based her structural analysis on the party as of 1968. See: Pang, 1971, op. cit., p. 25

² Koh Buck Song, "The PAP cadre system", *Straits Times*, 4 April 1998

³ "Our plans for the year", *Petir*, January/February 1995, p. 91

⁴ The Party Conference is a one day event. See: Goh Chok Tong, "Will Singapore be as Prosperous 30 Years Hence?", *Petir*, January/February 1995, pp. 7-14. The PAP Convention is a half-day event. See: "PAP Convention 1993", *Petir*, January/February 1994, pp. 6-7

⁵ Koh, 1998, op. cit. These committees were: Appointments, Constituency Relations, Education, Information, PAP Awards, Political Education, Publicity and Publications, Social and Recreational and Malay Affairs. It is assumed that the Education Committee was concerned with the National Education program.

⁶ Koh, 1998, op. cit.

Education, and the PCF training institution, the Institute of Early Childhood Education, is headed and staffed mainly by academics from the Institute of Education, demonstrating that the PAP's use of government resources to support its party activities remains a standard strategy for both decreasing party costs and limiting party autonomy by maintaining executive control through the political executive and the civil service.


The CEC elected in 1995 demonstrated the degree of control Goh held over the party. Of the 16 members, in addition to Goh himself there were nine members aligned to Goh; Tony Tan as chairman and Lim Boon Heng, Abdullah Tarmugi, George Yeo, Lee Boon Yang, Lim Hng Kiang, Aline Wong, Teo Chee Hean and Tan Cheng Bock as members. While Lee Hsien Loong chaired the Party Headquarters Executive Committee and his wife's cousin, Wong Kan Seng was his deputy, the First and Second Organising Secretaries and the Organising Secretary (Special Duties) and six of the eight ordinary members were aligned to Goh.⁷ Of the other 12 headquarters committees, seven were chaired by Goh supporters⁸ and of the eight district advisers, five were, although the district advisers, chairman and deputy chairman positions were more balanced than the headquarters committees between Lee and Goh supporters.⁹ The party journal, *Petir* was also under the editorship of an MP and Goh supporter, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee.

⁷ The First Organising Secretary was Lee Boon Yang, the Second Organising Secretary was Matthias Yao and the Organising Secretary (Special Duties) was Ow Chin Hock. The ordinary members obviously aligned to Goh include: George Yeo, Lim Boon Heng, Lim Hng Kiang, Abdullah Tarmugi, Teo Chee Hean and Aline Wong.

⁸ These were: Appointments (Teo Chee Hean), Current Affairs (Ho Peng Kee), Education (R. Sinnakaruppan), Malay Affair Bureau (Abdullah Tarmugi), Publicity and Publications (Ho Peng Kee), Women's Wing (Aline Wong) and Young PAP (George Yeo).


⁹ These were: City North (Lee Boon Yang), City South (Lim Hng Kiang), City West (Lim Boon Heng), Suburban East (Mah Bow Tan), Suburban West (Yeo Cheow Tong). Lee Hsien Loong was district adviser for Suburban Central District.

DIAGRAM 1: THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PAP: 1968¹⁰



¹⁰ *ibid.*

DIAGRAM 3.2: THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PAP: 1996¹¹



¹¹ "HQ Committees 95/96", *Petir*, March/April, 1995, pp. 22-24

Development of the PAP Community Foundation

Reform of the party has been focussed at the branch level and also, since 1992, in consolidating the PAP Community Foundation's (PCF) control of the national pre-school system¹² in association with the government funded People's Association Day Care Service¹³ and the NTUC Child Care Centre network.¹⁴ Since 1993 the PCF has also worked with the National Library Board (NLB) in establishing and controlling a the national Children's Community Library network.¹⁵ The PCF branch network in integrated with the party branch network to the degree that they are based on constituencies and that there is one PCF branch for each PAP branch.¹⁶ The PCF branch is headed by salaried staff who oversee PCF facilities in each area but also includes volunteer members. The PCF is therefore the only part of the party which has developed a large number of salaried staff. However, the PCF education centres (kindergartens), childcare centres and student care centres need to respond to commercial demand for childcare and kindergarten places and so are established in relation to demographic and socio-economic demand.¹⁷ In 1999 there were 375 PCF education centres across the island, 35 children's libraries funded by the NLB but operated by the PCF, 14 child care centres¹⁸ and 14 student care centres¹⁹ and the Tampines East 3-in-1 Family Centre which has before school, after school and kindergarten facilities.²⁰ It would not be an exaggeration to say that the island is saturated with PCF facilities. The PCF is overseen by the PCF Board of Trustees chaired by the chairman of the PAP²¹ and a PCF Management Council comprised mainly of PAP MPs and chaired by the Minister of State for Education.²² PAP branches have oversight of the PCF branches and facilities and in 1994 some branches organised

¹² "PCF Teachers' Seminar 1994", *Petir*, September/October 1994, p. 80 - 87, p. 80. The Ministry of Education ceased its Preparatory Year Programme for preschoolers in 1992 and transferred the responsibility for pre-school education to the private sector, principally to the PCF, but also to other organisations, such as Mendaki for Malay pre-schoolers. However, the ministry provides up to 90 per cent of the capital cost of upgrading PCF facilities to meet ministry requirements and sets standards for facilities, equipment and curriculum.

¹³ *Speech by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs and member of parliament for Bishan-Tao Payoh Group Representation Constituency at the Joint Graduation Ceremony for the Students of Bishan East PAP Community Foundation and PA Bishan Child Care Centre on Friday, 13 November 1998 at 9.30 am at Bishan Community Club*. Singapore, Media Division, Ministry of Information and the Arts, p. 1. There were 28 PA Child Care Centres in 1999.

¹⁴ There were 25 NTUC Childcare Cooperative child care centres in 1999, two kindergartens and a parent support centre operated under the NTUC Childcare Co-operative. Available at: <http://www.ntuc.childcare.com.sg/cchty.htm>

¹⁵ George Yeo, *Libraries for a Renaissance City. Speech at the launch of the National Library Board's New Direction and Logo, 3 July, 1996*. Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, 3 July 1996, p. 1. Available at: <http://cyberfair.gsn.org/cgss98/ver2/nlb.htm>

¹⁶ "PCF Teachers' Seminar 1994", *Petir*, September/October 1994, pp. 80-87, p. 81

¹⁷ For example, in 1999 there was only one PAP education centre in the wealthy Tanglin area. There were 15 in Tao Payoh which is largely HDB estates plus four student care centres and a children's library.

¹⁸ Including those in the Yuhua Happy Days Before and After School Care Centre.

¹⁹ The PCF has only a small responsibility for Student Care Centres as there are a total of 119 nationally.

²⁰ This data on PCF facilities was derived from the Singapore White Pages Telephone Directory. Available at: <http://www.phonebook.com.sg>.

²¹ Koh, 1998, op. cit.

²² "Teachers training is essential in quality preschool education", *Petir*, March/April 1994, pp. 39-41

workshops and training for PCF teachers.²³ The creation of the PCF and its nationwide facilities provides an important recruitment facility for the party, provides each party branch with additional community responsibilities and further entrenches its presence in everyday life. The PCF also provides an avenue for direct political contact between the party and the electorate when required. For example, in 1994 after the PAP once again losing the Potong Pasir electorate to Chiam See Tong of the SDP, Andy Gan Lai Chiang, chairman of the local PAP branch and former PAP candidate, used the PCF kindergarten enrolment process to personally interview all parents who were applying to place their children in the kindergartens. He later established a Parents-Teachers Committee and also used the PCF facilities for community meetings and Meet the People sessions.²⁴ The PCF obviously has a political function over and above its principal preoccupations with education and political socialisation.

The Branch Network

There were 81 PAP branches in 1994, one in each constituency and, in GRCs, one in each constituency ward²⁵ or division²⁶ expanded to 83 branches by 1998, again one in each constituency. However in 1995, a search of *Petir* identified only 71 active PAP branches, but 81 active Young PAP branches²⁷ and a search of the 1999 telephone directory identified only 45 branches that were active enough to have a telephone number listed; there is therefore obvious differences among the branches in terms of membership, community support and mobilisation capacity.

The island is divided into eight districts each of which has a minister as district adviser, an MP as chairman and deputy chairman and district executive committees comprising a chairman, deputy chairman and another MP.²⁸ In some constituencies the branch structure is augmented by a regular meeting of all GROs and party branches, such as the Thompson Executive Committee established by Leong Horn Kee MP, now

²³ "Suburban West District forms a Branch Secretaries' Committee", *Petir*, March/April 1994, p. 57

²⁴ "Winds of Change", *Petir*, March/April 1994, pp. 30-33. Despite these initiatives, Gan still lost to Chiam in the 1997 elections but with a slightly increased vote.

²⁵ The term ward is used colloquially but the term division is the official sub-component of a GRC.

²⁶ "What is our course of action?", *Petir*, July/August 1994, p. 93


²⁷ *Petir* is the PAP's official journal.

²⁸ *Petir*, January/February 1995, p. 85

within the Bishan-Tao Payoh GRC.²⁹ In each branch there was a Young PAP branch and in many, but not all branches, a Women's Wing branch, the Women's Wing having

²⁹ "Always on the move", *Petir*, March/April 1994, pp. 35-37, p. 36

DIAGRAM 3: PAP COMMUNITY FOUNDATION: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 1995



been established in July 1989.³⁰

The Young PAP organisation was a recasting of the PAP Youth Wing, established shortly after the party was founded, defunct since the mid-1960s and resistant to initiatives under Lee Hsien Loong's leadership to revive it in the mid-1980s. One MP is allocated to chair each branch and is assisted by a deputy chairman, a branch secretary and a branch executive committee. Each branch has a minister as an adviser and also a second adviser who may be drawn from among the ministers, MPs, the NTUC or from the ranks of cadre members. Branch advisers are allocated by the Headquarters Executive Committee from the MPs in the same constituency or ward as the branch. This pattern is similar for the Young PAP and the Women's Wing branches. In 1995, George Yeo was chairman of Young PAP and Aline Wong chairman of the Women's Wing. The Young PAP Executive Committee also had Lim Hng Kiang as vice-chairman and three MPs as members. The Women's Wing also has a representative on the Young PAP Executive Committee. In 1995, Young PAP district chairmen were not MPs, although one, Yeo Guat Kwang, was elected to parliament in 1997.³¹ The Women's Wing is coordinated at the district level by District Women's Wing Executive Councils. In at least one district, Suburban West, coordination is assisted by the establishment of a District Branch Secretaries' Committee, chaired by the district chairman.³²

Party membership is controlled by MPs at the branch level who, in association with branch secretaries, recruit. Cadre membership is, however still controlled by the CEC.³³ The party does not publish membership figures, but in 1994 it was reported that 40,000 party activists attended a PAP community day.³⁴ However in 1998, Wong Kan Seng stated that there were "more than 10,000 ordinary members" in the party and "more than 1000" cadre members.³⁵ Wong also commented that from 1996-98 more than 1,000 members were recruited each year, indicating that in 1995 there were only 8,000 members nationwide, supplemented at election times by approximately 40,000 non-member volunteers. Branches were said to have approximately 100 members each, which roughly tallies with a national membership of 8,000-10,000. This does not appear

³⁰ "Three Golden Rules", *Petir*, July/August 1994, pp. 63-65. Recruitment to the Women's Wing is slower than general recruitment. See: "Women must be seen and heard", *Petir*, July/August 1994, pp. 75-79, p. 77

³¹ "What is our course of action?", *Petir*, July/August 1994, p. 93-95, p. 95

³² "Suburban West District forms a Branch Secretaries' Committee", *Petir*, March/April 1994, p. 57

³³ Koh, 1998, op. cit.

³⁴ "PAP Community Day 1994", *Petir*, November/December 1994, p. 48. The figure of 40,000 was supposed to exclude family members.

³⁵ Koh, 1998, op. cit.

to include members of the PCF branches which are overseen by the party branches. PCF branch members do not have to be party members.

Party Membership Activities

In addition to events such as the PAP Community Day for party members, the party has introduced a number of national training programs for party members including from 1994 a biannual two day Political Induction Course limited to 100 selected party members.³⁶ From at least 1993, the Women's Wing's annual Leadership Skills Training Workshop comprising a series of half-day modules³⁷ and from 1994 the Political Education Committee started holding workshops on how to conduct and manage Meet the People sessions (MPS).³⁸ National awards ceremonies held at the annual PAP Convention are supplemented by annual award ceremonies at the district level.³⁹ The headquarters Current Affairs Committee also organises regular current affairs talks for branch secretaries and party activists and all branches and wings of the party are expected to follow this pattern at the local level.⁴⁰

The Women's Wing organises national public fora on political issues, including joint meetings with AWARE and SCWO,⁴¹ and the NTUC Women's Programme,⁴² an annual two day political education residential seminar,⁴³ the annual International Women's Day Family Outing⁴⁴ and also local meeting on political and non-political matters.⁴⁵ The number of national events is limited however; in 1994 there were only five national Women's Wing events. The Young PAP has established a Policy Studies Group chaired by a senior backbencher which organises bi-monthly round-table discussion groups and other political education events involving MPs, GRO leaders and PAP branch

³⁶ "Rites of Initiation: PAP holds its first Political Induction Course", *Petir*, January/February 1994, pp. 41-48; "Challenges of the future", *Petir*, September/October 1994, pp. 23-27. It is also called the Political Induction Programme

³⁷ "Returning to familiar ground", *Petir*, September/October 1994, pp.65-67; and, "Doing just fine", *Petir*, January/February 1994, p. 95

³⁸ "Learning from each other", *Petir*, July August 1994, p. 60

³⁹ "District Award Presentation Ceremony", *Petir*, January/February 1994, pp. 39. The national awards are usually presented in December at the PAP Convention and the district awards in January at district ceremonies.

⁴⁰ "Learn to accept and live with each other", *Petir*, March/April 1994, p. 7

⁴¹ "Break the mould", *Petir*, November/December 1994, pp. 73-77

⁴² "What is Good Government", *Petir*, May/June 1995, pp. 37-41, p. 41

⁴³ "Coming of Age", *Petir*, May/June 1995, pp. 30-35

⁴⁴ "Family Outing", *Petir*, March/April 1995, pp. 63-64

⁴⁵ "More than just politics", *Petir*, November/December 1994, pp. 79-82

members.⁴⁶ This are not apparently attended by large numbers of members however; only 13 members attended the meeting on 4 August 1994.⁴⁷ These alternate with bi-monthly lunch meetings to which speakers from parliament, academia, the business community and GROs are invited.⁴⁸ District and branch activities are varied and integrate with the activities of Community Centres, CCCs and Residents' Committees, including sport, cultural and social events,⁴⁹ but also include political education workshops such as how to run and contribute towards MPS.⁵⁰ International visits to Indonesia,⁵¹ Malaysia,⁵² and China⁵³ had been made in 1994 and 1995 by Young PAP delegations under the leadership of ministers. Meetings were also held with the Malaysian Minister for Foreign Affairs⁵⁴ and the American ambassador.⁵⁵ With the establishment of town councils and CDCs, newsletters and CDC newspapers have also been used to publicise activities by party affiliated organisations and GROs thus once again transferring party functions into the public sector.

The Branches and the Leadership

As with other institutional components, such as GROs and the NTUC, the autonomy of the party and its branches is limited by having the legal, financial and major functional controls under the supervision or in the hands of members of the political executive. The party's main functions, exercised through the branch network are to;

1. Recruit members, especially members with parliamentary or ministerial potential and young members of the post 1965 generations;
2. Provide the basic political socialisation for these recruits;
3. Defend and sell the government's policies 'on the ground', particularly among the Chinese educated majority;
4. Provide feedback to the government through MPs, the Feedback Unit, CDCs, Town Councils and occasionally the police and ISD on community reactions to policies, communal dissent and pro-and anti-government groups; and,

⁴⁶ "Nature or nurture", *Petir*, November/December 1994, pp. 83-85

⁴⁷ "Spare the rod?", *Petir*, July/August 1994, pp. 103-105, p. 103

⁴⁸ "Ride with the tide", *Petir*, November/December 1994, pp.87-89

⁴⁹ Ho Peng Kee, "Bridging the affective divide", *Petir*, September/October 1994, pp.3-4

⁵⁰ "Young PAP Suburban East District organises a workshop cum sharing session", *Petir*, May/June 1995, pp. 59-61

⁵¹ "Building a new bridge", *Petir*, July/August 1994, pp. 99-101

⁵² "Lesson of the day", *Petir*, January/February 1994, 89-91

⁵³ "Red-Letter Mission", *Petir*, May/June 1995, pp. 46-49

⁵⁴ "Learning to be good neighbours", *Petir*, March/April 1994, p. 53

⁵⁵ "What Makes America Tick?", *Petir*, May/June 1995, pp. 51-53

5. Advance the party's membership drive and policy agenda through the PAP Community Foundation, Community Centres in association with the People's Association, the CCC and RC network and other GROs.

The political socialisation of new ministers by MPs and branch secretaries is a particularly important task. Speaking in 1994, Loh Meng See, MP for Kampong Glam GPC commented that;

New leaders like BG George Yeo, Lim Hng Kiang and RAdm Teo have been brought into the ranks. They need to be filled in on the political background of our constituencies. Only our Branches can do that.⁵⁶


This is achieved by ministers, acting as adviser to branches or in their capacity as chairmen of district executive committees, undertaking bi-monthly 'walkabouts' in constituencies, meeting with GROs, Young PAP, Women's Wing and PCF branches, taking responsibility as advisers to community centres, CCCs and RCs. This is a considerable demand upon ministers and branches; walkabouts, for example, may take up to several hours and involve up to six other MPs and meeting with a number of GRO leaders and members and participating in community events.⁵⁷ MPs also have a responsibility for resolving conflicts at the branch and GRO level, an apparently and not surprisingly common problem.⁵⁸ The responsibilities of ministers, MPs and branch secretaries at the branch level are detailed in Diagram X below. What this picture of the party in 1996 (and partly 1999) demonstrates is that Pang's party of the 1970s no longer exists. The party has been revitalised and the branch structure and executives incorporated into the outer circle of the political executive. They have been given responsibility for a number of specific political intelligence and political socialisation tasks; selling government policies at the grassroots, controlling GROs and the PCF network, the political socialisation of MPs and ministers, recruitment of members, the initial testing of ministerial candidates and political intelligence feedback and feed-forward to MPs, ministers and government agencies. However the party remains firmly under the control of the political executive, but with increased influence although this is influence distributed through the organisational structure, not cumulated within a party bureaucracy.

⁵⁶ "Learning from change", *Petir*, July/August 1994, pp. 37, p. 37

⁵⁷ "Some things never change", *Petir*, May/June 1994, p. 67

⁵⁸ "Starting over with an edge", *Petir*, January/February 1994, pp. 78-83, p. 83

DIAGRAM 4: THE PAP AT THE GRASSROOTS 1995
MINISTERIAL AND MP RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE PAP BRANCH LEVEL 1995



Appendix 2

Singapore Parliament - Select Committees: 1950-1997

No.	DATE	COMMITTEE
1	1997	Singapore. Parliament. Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament. Report of the Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament: presented to Parliament, 23rd September, 1997. [Singapore : Singapore National Printers], 1997.
2	1996	Singapore . Parliament . Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament. Second report of the Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament : presented to Parliament, 28th August, 1996. [Singapore : Singapore National Printers] , 1996.
3	1996	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on Verification of Health Care Subsidy of Government Polyclinics and Public Hospitals. Report of the Select Committee on Verification of Health Care Subsidy of Government Polyclinics and Public Hospitals : presented to Parliament on 30th September, 1996. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Government Printers , 1996.
4	1996	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Women's Charter (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Women's Charter (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 5/96) : presented to Parliament on 15th August, 1996 / [Tan Soo Khoon, chairman]. [Singapore] : Government Printers , 1996. Tan Soo Khoon Chairman
5	1996	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Advance Medical Directive Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Advance Medical Directive Bill (Bill no. 40/95). Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by the Govt. Printers , 1996.
6	1995	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Bankruptcy Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Bankruptcy Bill (Bill no. 16/94). Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Government Printers , 1995
7	1995	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Maintenance of Parents Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Maintenance of Parents Bill (Bill no. 13/94). Singapore : SNP Corporation , 1995.
8	1994	Singapore . Parliament . Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament. Report of the Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament: presented to Parliament, 31st August, 1994. [Singapore : Singapore National Printers] , 1994.
9	1994	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on Patents Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Patents Bill. (Bill no. 4/94/A) Singapore : Printed for Govt. of Singapore by Singapore National Printers , 1994.
10	1993	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on Goods and Services Tax Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Goods and Services Tax Bill (Bill no. 14/93). Singapore : Printed for Govt. of Singapore by Singapore National Printers , 1993.
11	1993	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Land Titles Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Land Titles Bill (Bill no. 36/92). Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printer , 1993.
12	1993	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 33/92). Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1993.
13	1992	Singapore . Parliament . Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament. Report of the Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament: presented to Parliament, 31st August, 1992. [Singapore : Singapore National Printers] , 1992.
14	1992	Singapore. Parliament . Select Committee on the Drug Trafficking (Confiscation of Benefits) Bill (Bill No. 17/92) Report of the Select Committee on the Drug Trafficking (Confiscation of Benefits) Bill (Bill No. 17/92). Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , [1992]

15	1991	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Architects Bill (Bill no. 9/91), Professional Engineers Bill (Bill no. 10/91), Land Surveyors Bill (Bill no. 11/91) Report of the Select Committee on the Architects Bill (Bill no. 9/91) Professional Engineers Bill (Bill no. 10/91), Land Surveyors Bill (Bill no. 11/91). Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by Singapore National Printers , 1991.
16	1990	Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament. Report of the Special Select Committee on Nominations for Appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament: presented to Parliament, 19th November, 1990. [Singapore : Singapore National Printers], 1990.
17	1990	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 3) Bill (Bill no. 23/90) Report of the Select Committee on the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment no. 3) Bill [Bill no. 23/90]. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , [1990].
18	1990	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill (Bill no. 14/90) Report of the Select Committee on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill (Bill no. 14/90). Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , [1990]
19	1990	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 2) Bill (Bill no. 41/89) Report of the Select Committee on the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment no. 2) Bill [Bill no. 41/89]. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1990.
20	1990	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on Land Transportation Policy. Report of the Select Committee on Land Transportation Policy : presented to Parliament, 2nd January, 1990. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by Singapore National Printers , [1990]
21	1989	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 24/89). Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1989.
22	1988	Group representation constituencies : a summary of the report of the Select Committee. [Singapore] : Information Division, Ministry of Communications and Information , [1988 - [Report given by the Select Committee for the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill and the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 2) Bill.]
23	1988	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Building Control Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Building Control Bill (Bill no. 3/88). Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1988.
24	1988	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Bill [Bill no. 7/88] : presented to Parliament on 16th August, 1988. Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , [1988]
25	1988	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 23/87) and the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 2) Bill (Bill no. 24/87) Report of the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 23/87) and the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 2) Bill (Bill no. 24/87) Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1988.
26	1987	Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Human Organ Transplant Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Human Organ Transplant Bill [Bill no.26/86] : presented to Parliament on 22nd April, 1987 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] Singapore : Singapore National Printers Ltd , 1987.
27	1987	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill [Bill no. 9/86] : presented to Parliament on 12th March, 1987 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] [Singapore] : Singapore National Printers , 1987.

28	1987	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill [Bill No.10/86] : presented to Parliament on 25th June, 1987 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] Singapore : Singapore National Printers (Pte.) Ltd. , 1987.
29	1986	Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Copyright Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Copyright Bill (Bill no. 8/86). Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by Singapore National Printers, 1986.
30	1986	Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill [Bill no. 20/86 86] : presented to Parliament on 16th October, 1986/ [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] Singapore : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , 1986.
31	1985	Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Requisition of Resources Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Requisition of Resources Bill [Bill no.4/85 85] : presented to Parliament on 16th August, 1985 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] [Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , [1985]
32	1984	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Companies (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 16/83). Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1984.
33	1981	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Central Provident Fund (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Central Provident Fund (Amendment) Bill (Bill no. 3/81). [Singapore] : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , [1981]
34	1980	Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Private Hospitals and Medical Clinic Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Private Hospitals and Medical Clinics Bill [Bill no.35/79 79] : presented to Parliament 9th July, 1980 / [Tang See Chim, chairman] [Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , [1980]
35	1980	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Women's Charter (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Women's Charter (Amendment) Bill (Bill no.23/79) : presented to Parliament on 25th February, 1980 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman]. [Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , [1980]
36	1979	Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation Bill [Bill no.31/79 79] : presented to Parliament on 28th November, 1979 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] [Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , [1979]
37	1979	Singapore. Parliament. Select Committee on the Co-operative Societies Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Co-operative Societies Bill [Bill no.14/79 79] : presented to Parliament on 23rd August, 1979 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] [Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd , [1979]
38	1978	Singapore . Select Committee on the Singapore Red Cross Society (Incorporation) (Amendment Bill). Report of the Select Committee on the Singapore Red Cross Society (Incorporation) (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore : by the Singapore National Printers , 1978.
39	1978	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Central Provident Fund (Amendment No.2) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Central Provident Fund (Amendment No.2) Bill [Bill no.18 / 78] / presented to Parliament on 25th September, 1978 / [Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman] Singapore : Singapore National Printers , 1978.
40	1976	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill, presented to Parliament on 24th June, 1976. [Singapore] : The Committee , [1976]
41	1976	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1976.

42	1976	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1976.
43	1976	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Evidence (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Evidence (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Printed for the Govt. of Singapore by Singapore National Printers , 1976.
44	1976	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Residential Property Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Residential Property Bill. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1976.
45	1975	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Travel Agents Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Travel Agents Bill : presented to Parliament on 28th October, 1975. [s.l. : s.n. , 1975 or 1976] ([Singapore] : Singapore National Printers, Govt. printers)
46	1975	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Medicines Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Medicines Bill : presented to Parliament on 6th November, 1975. [Singapore] : Singapore National Printers (Govt. Printers) , [1975]
47	1975	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Workmen's Compensation Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Workmen's Compensation Bill : presented to Parliament on 15th July, 1975. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , [1975]
48	1974	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Roman Catholic Archbishop Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Roman Catholic Archbishop Bill, presented to Parliament on 26 th November, 1974. [Singapore] : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , [1975]
49	1974	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Newspaper and Printing Presses Bill. Report. Singapore : Singapore National Printers (Pte) Ltd.] , 1974. Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman.
50	1973	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Urban Redevelopment Authority Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Urban Redevelopment Authority Bill. Singapore : Printed for the Government of Singapore by the Singapore National Printers , 1973.
51	1972	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Employment (Amendment) Bill and the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill. Written representations and oral evidence submitted to the Select Committee on the Employment (Amendment) Bill (bill no. 22/72) and the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill (bill no. 23/72).
52	1972	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Factories Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Factories Bill, presented to Parliament on 28th December, 1972. Singapore : Parliament of Singapore , 1972]
53	1970	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Professional Engineers Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Professional Engineers Bill. Singapore : Printed by Government Printer, Singapore , 1970.
54	1970	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Land Surveyors Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Land Surveyors Bill. Singapore : Printed by the Government Printer, Singapore , 1970. Yeoh Ghim Seng, chairman.
55	1970	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the National Sports Promotion Board Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the National Sports Promotion Board Bill. Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1970.
56	1969	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Recovery of Possession of Controlled Premises (Special Provisions) Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1969. P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
57	1969	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Hire-Purchase Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1969. P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
58	1969	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Printed by Government Printer, Singapore , 1969.
59	1969	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1969.

60	1969	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Abortion Bill and the Voluntary Sterilization Bill. Report Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1969]. P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
61	1968	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Hindu Endowments Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1968 P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
62	1968	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Singapore Council of Social Service Bill. Official report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1968. P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
63	1968	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Medicines (Advertisement and Sale) (Amendment) Bill. Official report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1968 P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
64	1967	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) Bill. Official report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1967. P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
65	1967	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Ngee Ann College Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1967. P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
66	1967	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Companies Bill.Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1967 P. Coomaswamy, chairman
67	1967	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Intestate Succession Bill. Report [Singapore : Govt. Print.], 1967. P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
68	1967	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Women's Charter (Amendment) Bill. Report Singapore : Govt. Print.], 1967. P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
69	1966	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Inheritance (Family Provision) Bill. Official report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1966 A. P. Rajah, chairman
70	1966	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on Land Acquisition Bill.Official report.Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1966. P. Coomaswamy, chairman.
71	1966	Singapore . Parliament . Select Committee on the Administration of Muslim Law Bill. Official report / Parliament of Singapore, Select Committee on Administration of Muslim Law Bill. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1966 A. P. Rajah, Chairman
72	1965	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1965
73	1965	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Bill. Report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1965 A. P. Rajah, chairman
74	1965	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Land Acquisition (Amendment No. 2) Bill. Report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1965 A. P. Rajah, chairman.
MALAYSIA		
75	1963	Singapore . Select Committee on the Local Government Integration Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1963
SELF-GOVERNMENT		
76	1962	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Legislative Assembly (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1962
77	1962	Singapore . Select Committee on the Singapore National Referendum Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1962
78	1962	Singapore . Select Committee on the Tariff Advisory Commission and Customs (Amendment) Bills. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1962.
79	1962	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Public Utilities, Local Government Intergration, Planning (Amendment), Pensions (Amendment) and Housing andDevelopment (Amendment) Bills Report. [Singapore : Printed by Govt. Printer , 1962 Sir George Oehlers, chairman
80	1962	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Singapore Society of Accountants Bills. Report Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1962 George Oehlers, chairman
81	1961	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Tan Tock Seng's Hospital (Transfer) Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1961
82	1961	Singapore. Legislative Assembly. Select Committee on the Queen Street and Silat Road Sikh Gurdawaras Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. Office, 1961

83	1961	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Women's Charter Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Women's Charter Bill. Singapore : Printed by Govt. Printer , 1961. George Oehlers Chairman
84	1961	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Agricultural Leases Bill and the Control of Rent (Amendment No. 3) Bill. Report Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1961]. George Oehlers Chairman
85	1961	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Administration of Muslim Law Bill. Report Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1961]. George Oehlers Chairman
86	1960	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Prevention of Corruption Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1960
87	1960	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Lembaga Gerakan Pelajaran Dewasa Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1960
88	1960	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Pawnbrokers (Amendment) Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1960.
89	1960	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Societies (Amendment) Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1960]
90	1960	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Mutual Benefit Organizations Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1960
91	1960	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill. Official Report. Singapore , 1960
92	1960	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Evidence (Amendment) Bill. Report Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1960
93	1960	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Women's Charter Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Women's Charter Bill. Singapore : Printed by Govt. Printer , 1960. George Oehlers Chairman
94	1960	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Muslims (Amendment) Bill. Report of the Select Committee on the Muslims (Amendment) Bill. Singapore : Printed by A.G. Banfield, Government Printer , 1960.
95	1959	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Control of Manufacture Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1959
96	1959	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Nanyang University Bill. Official report / Singapore Legislative Assembly, Select Committee on Nanyang University Bill. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1959
97	1959	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Secretary of the Synod of the Diocese of Singapore Bill. Report [Singapore : Govt. Print Off. , 1959
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT		
98	1958	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Good Shepherd Nuns Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1958
99	1958	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Kwong Wai Shiu Hospital (Amendment) Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1958]
100	1958	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Housing and Development Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1958]
101	1958	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Planning Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1958
102	1958	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Police Force Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1958]
103	1958	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Public Entertainments Bill. Report [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1958
104	1958	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Factories Bill. Report [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1958 G. E. N. Oehlers, chairman
105	1957	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Singapore Citizenship Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1957]
106	1957	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Clerks Employment Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1957].
107	1957	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Education Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1957
108	1957	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Local Government Elections Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1957

109	1957	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Shop Assistants Employment Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1957]
110	1957	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Little Sisters of the Poor Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1957]
111	1957	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Local Government Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off.] , 1957
112	1957	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Seamen's Registry Board Bill. Official Report. 1957
113	1957	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Muslims Bill. Official report. Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1957
114	1957	Singapore. Legislative Assembly. Select Committee on Languages in Legislative Assembly Debates. Report [microform]. [Singapore : Govt. Print. Off., 1957] Sir George Oehlers, chairman
115	1957	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Luxury Tax Bill. Special report Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1957].
116	1956	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Land Titles Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1956]
117	1956	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Singapore Youth Sports Centre Incorporation Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1956]
118	1956	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Shop and Office Employees Bill. Report [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1956]
119	1956	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Languages in Legislative Assembly Debates. Reports Singapore : Govt. Print. Off. , 1956].
120	1955	Singapore . Legislative Assembly . Select Committee on the Labour Bill. Official report. [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1955]
COLONIAL PERIOD		
121	1954	Singapore . Legislative Council . Select Committee Appointed to Examine and Report to the Legislative Council on the Bill the Short Title of which is the Criminal Procedure Code 1954. Report [Singapore : Legislative Council. Select Committee Appointed to Examine and Report to the Legislative Council on the Bill the Short Title of which is the Criminal Procedure Code , 1954].
122	1950	Singapore . Legislative Council . Select Committee to Examine and Report on the Holidays Ordinance (Chapter 174). Report [Singapore : Govt. Print. , 1950]. C. H. Butterfield, chairman

Appendix 3

Singapore Statutory Boards and Principal Committees

BOARD/COMMITTEE	ABBREVIATION
Appeals Board (Land Acquisition)	ABLA
Asian Civilisations Museum Board	ACM
Board of Architects	BOA
Board of Commissioners of Currency Singapore	BCCS
Central Provident Fund Board	CPF
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore Board	CAAS
Commercial and industrial Security Corporation	CISCO
Community Improvements Project Committee	CIPC
Construction Industry Development Board	CIDB
Contact Lense Practitioners Board	CLPB
Council of Presidential Advisers	CPA
Dental Board	DB
Economic Development Board	EDB
Feedback Unit Supervisory Panel	FUSP
Film Appeal Committee	FAC
GST Board of Review	GSTBOR
Hindu Advisory Board	HAB
Hindu Endowments Board	HEB
Hotels Licencing Board	HLB
Housing and Development Board	HDB
Income Tax Board of Review	ITBOR
Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore	IRAS
Institute of Southeast asian Studies	ISEAS
Institute of Technical Education Board of Governors	ITEBOG
Jurong Town Corporation	JTC
Laboratory Board	LB
Land Surveyors Board	LSB
Land Transport Authority	LTA
Legal Services Commission	LSC
Liquors Licencing Board	LLB
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura	MUIS
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (This is the new name for the Port of Singapore Authority - PSA - so include them both as MPA)	MPA
Monetary Authority of Singapore	MAS
Nanyang Polytechnic Board of Governors	NPBOG
Nanyang Technological University Council (Includes Nanyang Technological Institute Council)	NTU
National Archives Board	NAB
National Arts Council	NAC
National Computer Board	NCB
National Council of Social Service	NCSS
National Heritage Board	NHB

National institute of Education Council	NIE
National Library Board	NLB
National Maritime Board	NMB
National Museum of Singapore	NMS
National Parks Board (Don't use for old National Productivity Board - put this under SPSB)	NPB
National Science and Technology Board	NSPB
National University of Singapore Council	NUS
National Youth Council	NYC
Ngee Ann Polytechnic Council	NAPC
Peoples Association	PA
Pharmacy Board	PB
Post Office savings bank of Singapore Board	POSB
Presidential Council for Minority Rights	PCMR
Presidential Council for Religious Harmony	PCRH
Professional Engineers Board, Singapore	PEBS
Projects Committee	PC
Public Service Commission	PSC
Public Accountants Board	PAB
Public Utilities Board	PUB
Publications Appeal Committee	PAC
Science Centre Board	SCB
Sikh Advisory Board	SAB
Singapore Art Museum	SAM
Singapore Broadcasting Authority (Include under this Singapore Broadcasting Commission - SBC - which was the previous name)	SBA
Singapore Council of Social Service	SCSS
Singapore History Museum Board	SHM
Singapore Labour Foundation	SLF
Singapore Medical Council	SMC
Singapore Nursing Board	SNB
Singapore Polytechnic Board of Governors	SPBOG
Singapore Productivity and Standards Board	SPSB
Singapore Sports Council	SSC
Singapore Totalisator Board	STOTB
Singapore Tourism Board	STB
Strata Titles Board	STITB
Telecommunications Authority of Singapore	TAS
Temasek Polytechnic Board of Governors	TPBOG
Trade Development Board	TDB
Urban Redevelopment Authority	URA
Valuation Review Board	VRB

Appendix 4

Members of Statutory Boards in Singapore Holding 10 or More Positions: 1988-1998

	NAME	No. Pos	ORGANISATION
1.	Tan Chin Nam	44	EDB, GM
2.	Cham Tao Soon, Dr	41	NTI, President
3.	Yu-Foo Yee Shoon	39	MP-NTUC, VP
4.	Cheong Siew Keong, Dr	34	MRTC
5.	Tan Swan Beng, Dr Prof (Adj)	32	MND, PWD, DG
6.	Lim Pin, Prof	31	NUS, VC
7.	Liu Thai Ker	30	HDB, CEO, DS
8.	Othman bin Haron Eusofe	28	MP-NTUC, ASG
9.	Chen Seow Phun, Dr John	27	MP
10.	Lee Chang Leng, Brian, Prof	26	NTI, Elec. & Electronic Eng
11.	Lee Ek Tieng	26	MOF, PS (Revenue Div)
12.	Chong Yew Fook, Charles	24	MP
13.	Yeo Seng Teck	24	TDB, CEO
14.	Yip Soon Kwong, John	24	MOE, Dir Education
15.	Hu Tsu Tau, Dr Richard	23	Minister for Finance
16.	Tay A K, Keith	23	KPMG Peat Marwick
17.	Chandra Das, S	22	MP
18.	Goh Kim Leong	22	MOE, PS
19.	Lim Swee Say	22	NCB, GM
20.	Lee Hee Seng	21	PSC member & OUB, MD
21.	Pek Hock Thiam	21	STB, ED
22.	Zulkifli bin Mohammed	21	MP-Political Secretary, MCD
23.	Chew Chin Tiong, A/P Ernest	20	NUS, Head, Dept History, Fac Arts Soc Sciences
24.	Goh Chee Wee	20	MP
25.	Koh Boon Hwee	20	HP Singapore
26.	Sim Kee Boon, DUBC, PJG	20	KG-EC, Keppel Corp & former PS, Head of Civil Service
27.	Su Guanng, Dr	20	MINDEF, DSO, Director
28.	Wong Lee Hoong	20	TH-Singapore Treasury Bldg?
29.	Hong Hin Kay, Albert	19	RSP Arch, Planners, Engrs
30.	Lim Hock San	19	CAAS, DG
31.	Lim Yong Wah	19	DBS Bank, Exec. VP
32.	Tan Eng Beng	19	MOL, Lab Wel Div, Div. Dir.
33.	Tan Guong Ching	19	MCI, PS
34.	Tan Wee Hin, Leo, Prof	19	NIE, Dir & Dean, Schl Science
35.	Wee Chou Hou, A/P	19	NUS, Dean, Bus Admin Fac
36.	Khatter, Sat Pal	18	Khatter Wong & Part, Solicitors
37.	Law Song Seng, Dr	18	VTIB, Director
38.	Lee Kim Poo, Moses	18	SBA, GM, DS
39.	Othman Dunu bin Wok, Tuan Haji	18	Minister - Former minister & NTUC-Overseas Investment
40.	Tan, Bernard A/P BBM, PPA(P), PBM	18	NUS, Dir Office Stud Affairs
41.	Goh Keng Swee, Dr	17	MP- former Deputy PM
42.	Koh Cher Siang	17	MCD, PS
43.	Lua Cheng Eng	17	NOL, CEO
44.	Lee Chiong Giam	16	PA, Chief ED
45.	Lee Keh Sai	16	K S Lee & Assoc, Prin Consultant.
46.	Sinnakaruppan, Ramasamy	16	MP-NTUC, Research Unit, Dep Dir
47.	Teo Hwee Choo	16	MOE, Dir, Admin. Div.
48.	Chan Sek Keong	15	Attorney-General
49.	Chen Min Liang, Peter	15	SHELL Eastern Petrol.
50.	Ho Meng Kit, BG (NS)	15	EDB, MD

51.	Lim Siong Guan	15	MINDEF, PS
52.	Lim, Gloria, Prof.	15	NUS, Dept. Botany
53.	Pek Beng Choon, Col (NS)	15	NUH, CEO
54.	Tan Chee Chuan, Steven	15	SAMAS Mngmt Consult, MD.
55.	Tan Chin Tiong BG (NS)	15	MHA, PS
56.	Tan Kim Siew, Dr Col. (NS)	15	MND, Dir, Housing
57.	Tan Yam Pin	15	Asia Pacific Breweries, Malayan Breweries, Dir, Group GM
58.	Tien Sing Cheong	15	INTRACO, COO
59.	Wang Kai Yuen, Dr	15	Xerox Sing. Software Centre & Dir, POSB Computer Services
60.	Er Kwong Wah	14	MOE, PS
61.	Fam Yue Onn, Dr Michael DUNU (1st Class)	14	Fraser & Neave (S)
62.	Hiew Siew Nam, Dr	14	MND-Former DG, PWD-Dir (Project Completion), SL Marina Centre Dev ¹
63.	Koh Thong Bee, Tommy, Prof	14	IPS, Director
64.	Leong Charm Huen	14	RDC ² Architects, Director
65.	Lew Syn Pau	14	MP- NTUC AD (Industrial Relations)
66.	Ridzwan Tuan Haji bin Haji Dzafr	14	TDB, MD
67.	Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick	14	DBS Bank, Dir, President
68.	Gwee Tack Hai, Eric	13	ESSO Sing, Marine & Supply Dir,
69.	Koh Juan Kiat	13	SPSB
70.	Koo Tsai Kee	13	MP- NTI, Sen. Lecturer
71.	Lee, Pamela	13	STB, Div. Dir.
72.	Lien Ying Chow	13	OUB, MD
73.	Lim Choo San, Michael	13	Price Waterhouse, Partner
74.	Loh Kwok Hoong, Victor	13	Philips Singapore, Chair & Pres.
75.	Mohamad Maidin BPM	13	Parliamentary Secretary, MITA
76.	Teo Chiang Long	13	See Hoy Chan (S), ED
77.	Wee Cho Yaw	13	OUB, Chair, United OUB
78.	Wong Hung Khim	13	TAS, GM, CEO
79.	Chen Ai Ju, Dr	12	MOH
80.	Chen Charng Ning, Prof	12	NUS, Dy Pres & Dean, Schl Civil & Struct. Engng
81.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	12	WING TAI Holdings, Dy MD
82.	Chew Guan Khuan, Dr Andrew	12	CPF Board
83.	Chuang Kwong Yong	12	HDB, CEO
84.	Coomaraswamy, M.	12	Cooma, Lau & Loh
85.	Ho Cheok Sun	12	MND, Director (Infrastructure)
86.	Hsuan Owyang	12	HDB, Chair
87.	Lee Kuan Yew	12	Prime Minister
88.	Lim Boon Hang	12	MP-NTUC Research Unit
89.	Lim Kim San	12	MP- former minister & AO
90.	Low Sin Leng	12	MOF, Dir., Budget Div.
91.	Low Wong Fook	12	MOL, Dir. Lab Wel Div.
92.	Ngiam Tong Dow	12	MOF, PS, Budget Div.
93.	Tay Jwee Hwa, Thomas	12	NTUC, Sing. Maritime Offs' Union
94.	Yong Pung How, Justice	12	OCBC, MD.
95.	Choe Fook Cheong, Alan	11	RSP Arch, Planners, Engrs
96.	Chua Sian Eng, Dr	11	MND, Parks and Recreation Dept
97.	Chua Teck Chow, Robert	11	ACE Daikin (S), MD
98.	Fang Ai Lian	11	Ernst & Young
99.	Hylkema, Bonno H	11	Philips Sing., Chair, MD
100.	Khoo Cheng Lim, A/P	11	NUS, Dean, Faculty of Architecture & Building
101.	Khoo Teng Chye	11	URA, CEO, Chief Planner
102.	Lin Cheng Ton	11	Nanyang Polytechnic, Prin/CEO
103.	Loh Choo Kiat, Robert, Dr	11	Eye Centre and Surgery

¹ Marina Centre Developments is a subsidiary of POSB.

² Regional Development Consortium Architects

104.	Lye Hoeng Fai	11	ST-Sing. Electronic & Engin. GM
105.	Pillai, Philip N, Dr.	11	Shook Lin & Bok, Partner
106.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	11	OUB, President
107.	Selvaretnam, Daniel	11	EDB, Dir (Plan)
108.	Shelley, R A	11	Metta Energy Resources
109.	Tan Kah Hoe, JP PBM	11	Descon Chartered Achit and Planners
110.	Tan Kin Hian	11	PA, Dir (Corp Services)
111.	Teh Kong Leong	11	MCI, Dir., Marine Dept
112.	Teo Ming Kian	11	MINDEF, DS (Technology)
113.	Wong, John	11	IBM Singapore Pte Ltd
114.	Yeo Liat Kok, Philip	11	EDB, Chair
115.	Yeo Siew Chye, Stephen	11	MINDEF, Dir, Sys & Comp Org
116.	Ang Kong Hua	10	Natsteel, MD
117.	Ch'ng Jit Koon	10	MP-Minister of State for Com. Dev
118.	Chen Tze Penn	10	MCI
119.	Chng Hee Kok	10	MP, Tampines GRC
120.	Chong Chi Tat, A/P	10	NUS, Vice-Dean, Fac Science
121.	Chu Y. J., Paul	10	
122.	Desker, Barry	10	TDB, CEO
123.	Goh Hock Li, Steven	10	Metro
124.	Goh Yong Hong	10	MHA, Commission, SPF
125.	Hang Chang Chieh	10	NUS, Fac Engrg
126.	Hochstadt, Herman Ronald	10	TH-Inno Pacific Holding, Chair
127.	Hong Hai, Dr	10	MP- Polytek Wearnes Holdings, MD
128.	Khoo Kay Chai	10	Singapore Polytechnic, Principal
129.	Ko Kheng Hwa	10	EDB, Dy MD International
130.	Kog Yue Choong, Dr	10	HDB (former Sr Structural Engr) & Beca Carter Hollings & Ferner (SE Asia), Director
131.	Koh Yong Guan	10	IRAS, PS, (Commissioner Inland Revenue)
132.	Lam Pin Foo	10	SHELL Companies in Sing.
133.	Lee Ching Yen, Stephen	10	Great Malaysia Textile Mfg, MD
134.	Lee Suan Hiang	10	EDB, Dep. MD
135.	Lum Kwan Sung, Raymond	10	TH-Lum Chang Holdings
136.	Nee Yeh Ching, Andrew, Prof	10	NUS, Mech & Produc. Eng Dept.
137.	Sim Cheok Lim	10	TH-director of several GLCs
138.	Tan Ee Ping	10	Tan Ee Ping & Partners, Dir
139.	Tan Keng Joo, Tony	10	HDB, Dep. Chf Architect
140.	Tan Kong Yam, Dr	10	NUS, Sr Lecturer, Dept Business Pol
141.	Tan Lien Seng	10	MND, Dy Dir (Dev. & Building Ctrl)
142.	Thai Chee Ken	10	Price Waterhouse
143.	Tiruchelvarayan, Chelliah	10	
144.	Varaprasad, N, Dr.	10	Temasek Poly, Principal/CEO
145.	Yeo Chee Yeow, Alan	10	Yeo Hiap Seng, Chair, MD & KG-Director Keppel Bank 1990-97 & Dir, NOL, 1988-1992

APPENDIX 5

DEFINITION OF THE CLASSIFICATION LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LINKED COMPANIES IN SINGAPORE

Six levels are defined for GLCs as detailed below.

LEVEL 1. These are the major holding companies: Temasek Holdings (Private) Ltd, Singapore Technology Holdings, MND Holdings, Health Corporation of Singapore.

LEVEL 2. These are the major operating companies under the holding companies. For example, under Temasek Holdings, second level companies include: Intraco Ltd, Keppel Corporation Ltd, Neptune Orient Lines Limited, Sembawang Holdings Private Ltd., Singapore Airlines Limited, and Singapore MRT Ltd.

LEVEL 3. These are the operating companies which comprise the level two companies. The level three and level four companies are the operating heart of the GLCs; the profit centres. Level five and level six companies are smaller companies which may contribute to corporate activity but in a limited way. For example, within Keppel Corporation Ltd., level three companies include; Far East Livingston Ship Building Ltd. (FELS); Keppel Bank of Singapore Ltd., Keppel Engineering Pte Ltd., Keppel Finance Ltd., Steamers Maritime Holdings Ltd., and Straits Steamship Land Ltd. These are substantial subsidiaries with large numbers of employees and large businesses. This group also includes companies which may be smaller than others in the group, but which have a particular strategic or policy importance. For these latter reasons, Singapore National Printers and Temasek Management Services are classified as level three because they are crucial companies acting as the government's printer and the management arm of the Directorship and Consultancy Advisory Council respectively. For strategic reasons, Chartered Metal Industries Private limited is classed as level three because of its critical role in the manufacture of military ordnance.

LEVEL 4. These are companies which are similar to those in level three, but are smaller in terms of staff, industry share or are less critical in strategic terms. For example, within the DBS Group, DBS Securities Holding Pte Ltd, DBS Factors Ltd., DBS Asset Management Ltd are all classified at level four, while DBS Land is classified at level three. These smaller companies are essential components of the DBS Group, but are smaller in scope than DBS Land or The Insurance Corporation of Singapore within the Intraco Group. In classifying companies as level four, there was a bias towards classifying small finance and realty companies at this level rather than level five as it

was assumed that the underlying assets were probably more significant than for an engineering or service company.

LEVEL 5. These are companies which are small in terms of employees and scope, which may be small joint ventures with foreign investors in niche markets, have a monopoly on a particular service or which operate or control one small business entity. For example, DBS Securities Nominees Ltd., Gemplus Technologies Asia Pte. Ltd., SAE Inspection Services, and Aero Laundry and Linen Services Pte. Ltd. are classified at this level.

LEVEL 6. These are companies which are also small, as with level five companies, but which may be only associate companies of a GLC, some with significant foreign ownership. Companies for which almost no details are provided, in which no board details are provided or which seem to have no business activity have been placed at this level, if they were not completely excluded from the sample. For example, Singapore Airport Bus Service, Jurong Country Club Pte. Ltd., Singapore Cable Car Pte Ltd., and Singapore Treasury Building Private are classified at this level.

Appendix 6

Directors Of Level 1 Glc Boards 1991: The Major Holding Companies

TEMASEK HOLDINGS (PRIVATE) LIMITED

BOARD POSITION	SUBSTANTIVE AFFILIATION	SECTOR
Lee Ek Tieng (Chairman)	MD, Monetary Authority of Singapore	Board
P.Y. Hwang (Deputy Chairman)	Former chairman, Economic Development Board	Board
Lum Choong Wah	MD, Temaek Holdings	GLC
Hsu Tse-Kwang	Executive Chairman, Sembawang Holdings	GLC
Yeo Seng Teck	Chief Executive, Trade Development Board	Board
Herman R. Hochstadt	Executive Chairman, Export Credit Insurance Corporation of Singapore (ECICS) and former permanent secretary	GLC
Tan Chok Kian	Singapore trade representative, Taiwan and former permanent secretary	Civil Service
Chris Liew Peng Fook	Accountant-General, Ministry of Finance	Civil Service
Michael Fam Yue Onn	MD, Fraser and Neave and Old Guard PAP cadre.	Private Sector
Ngiam Tong Dow	Chairman and CEO, Development Bank of Singapore and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance	GLC & Civil Service
Dr. Andrew Chew Guan Khuan	Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister's Office and Head of Civil Service	Civil Service
Hsuan Owyang	Chairman, Housing and Development Board	Board

SINGAPORE TECHNOLOGIES HOLDINGS (PRIVATE) LTD.

BOARD POSITION	SUBSTANTIVE AFFILIATION	SECTOR
Ngiam Tong Dow (Chairman)	Chairman and CEO, Development Bank of Singapore and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance	GLC Civil Service
Lim Song Guan (Deputy Chairman)	Permanent Secretary, MINDEF	Civil Service Board
Philip Yeo Liat Kok (Chairman, Executive Committee)	Chairman, economic Development Board	
Lt. Gen. Winston Choo Wee Leong	Chief of Defence Force	Military
Lam Chuan Leong	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry	Civil Service
Koh Yong Guan	2 nd Permanent Secretary, MINDEF	Civil Service Board
Tan Chin Nam	Chairman, NCB, MD, EDB, member Singapore Polytechnic BOG, EDB, NPC and Science Council boards.	
Teo Ming Kian	Deputy Secretary (Technology) MINDEF	Civil Service
Lim Ming Seong	Group President, Singapore Technologies Holdings	GLC

MND HOLDINGS (PRIVATE) LIMITED

BOARD POSITION	SUBSTANTIVE AFFILIATION	SECTOR
Dr. Andrew Chew Guan Khuan	Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister's Office and Head of Civil Service	Civil Service
Lee Ek Tieng	MD, Monetary Authority of Singapore	Civil Service Board
Hsuan Owyang	Chairman, Housing and Development Board	
Au Eng Kok	MD, MND Holdings Private Ltd & MD, Pidemco Land Pte Ltd	GLC

HEALTH CORPORATION OF SINGAPORE PTE LTD

BOARD POSITION	SUBSTANTIVE AFFILIATION	SECTOR
Dr. Kwa Soon Bee	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health	Civil Service
Lam Chuan Leong	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry	Civil Service
Lim Yong Wah	Unknown	Private Sector
Ngiam Tong Dow	Chairman and CEO, Development Bank of Singapore and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance	Civil Service
Wong Hung Khim	President and CEO TAS, and director, Singapore Telecom	Board

Appendix 7

List of Principal Singapore Government Linked Corporations Identified in 1998

No.	LEVEL ¹	COMPANY
1.	4	AAPT Ltd. (Australia)
2.	4	Abacus Travel Systems Pte. Ltd.
3.	4	ACASIA Communications Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia)
4.	4	Acoustic Imaging Technologies Corporation (USA)
5.	5	Advanced Info Services Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
6.	6	Advanced Materials Technologies Pte. Ltd.
7.	6	Aero Laundry and Linen Services Pte. Ltd.
8.	5	Aerospace Engineering Services Pte. Ltd. (Australia)
9.	5	Agilis Communication Technologies Pte. Ltd.
10.	5	Airline Rotables Ltd. (UK)
11.	3	Allied Ordnance of Singapore Pte. Ltd.
12.	5	Allied Ordnance of Singapore (Taiwan)
13.	5	APLS-Bok Seng Logistics Pte. Ltd.
14.	6	Aquagen International Pte. Ltd.
15.	4	Arab Heavy Industries PJSC (Dubai)
16.	4	Arcasia Land Pte. Ltd.
17.	5	Asfinco Singapore Ltd.
18.	4	Asia Leasing Ltd.
19.	5	Asia Pacific Environment Equipment Manufacturing (Vietnam)
20.	5	Asia Pacific Investment Company Ltd.
21.	5	Asia Pacific Logistic Services Pte. Ltd.
22.	6	Asian Aerospace Pte. Ltd.
23.	6	Asian Frequent Flyer Pte. Ltd.
24.	6	Asia-Pacific Star Pte. Ltd.
25.	5	Atlantis Shipyard Pte. Ltd.
26.	5	Attwood Agencies PteLtd
27.	4	Attwood Holdings PteLtd
28.	5	Attwood Impex (Thailand) Co. Pte. Ltd.
29.	5	Auspice Pty. Ltd. (Channel Islands)
30.	4	Australand Holdings Ltd.
31.	5	Automation Leasing and Consultancy Pte. Ltd.

¹ Levels 4-6 are indicative only and are not based on classifications used in the *Directory of Government Linked Corporations*. Only levels 1-3 are definitive.

32.	5	Aviation Software Development Consultancy India Ltd.
33.	6	Aviserv Ltd. (UK)
34.	4	Bangkok Synthetics Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
35.	5	Bankok Straits Shipping Ltd. Part
36.	5	Batamindo Industrial Management Pte. Ltd.
37.	6	Beijing Airport Inflight Kitchen Ltd.
38.	5	Beijing Asia Pacific First Star Communications Technology Co. Ltd.
39.	6	Beijing Aviation Ground Services Co. Ltd.
40.	6	Beijing Uni-Sin Telecommunications Technology Co. Ltd. (PRC)
41.	2	Belgacom S. A. (Belgium)
42.	5	Bintan Industrial Estate Management Pte. Ltd.
43.	4	Bintan Resort Ferries Pte. Ltd.
44.	4	Bintan Resort Management Pte. Ltd.
45.	4	BMC Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC
46.	5	BST Elomasters Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
47.	5	Bugis City Holdings Pte. Ltd.
48.	6	Bukit Sembawang Estates Ltd.
49.	4	Burwill Holdings Ltd.
50.	5	California Avi-Tron (1994) Inc. (USA)
51.	4	Camsin Corporation Pte. Ltd.
52.	4	Capital Square Pte. Ltd.
53.	4	Cargo Community Network Pte. Ltd.
54.	4	CDC Construction and Development Pte. Ltd.
55.	4	Cellular Data Inc. (USA)
56.	5	Centre for International Transactions Ltd. (Vietnam)
57.	6	Centrepont Properties Ltd.
58.	5	Centurion Bank (India)
59.	5	CET Technologies Pte. Ltd.
60.	5	Changi International Airport Services Pte. Ltd.
61.	5	Changi International Logistics Centre
62.	5	ChangZhou Da Zhong Wire Products Co. Ltd. (PRC)
63.	5	Channel Links Pte. Ltd.
64.	4	Chartered Ammunition Industries Pte. Ltd.
65.	4	Chartered Electro-Optics Pte. Ltd.
66.	2	Chartered Industries of Singapore
67.	3	Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd.
68.	5	Chartered Systems and Networks Co. Ltd. (PRC)
69.	4	Chatered Systems and Networks Pte. Ltd.
70.	5	Chengdu Leisure Planet Co Ltd.
71.	5	Chesterton International Property Consultants Pte. Ltd.

72.	5	China Canton Investments Ltd.
73.	6	Chiwan Petroleum Supply Base Co. Ltd. (PRC)
74.	6	CHK Chieng Huat Service Co. Ltd. (PRC)
75.	4	CIE Manufacturing Pte.Ltd.
76.	3	CISCO
77.	4	CISCO International Pte. Ltd.
78.	5	CISCO Security Storage Pte. Ltd.
79.	4	CityCab Pte. Ltd.
80.	5	Cleantech Services Pte. Ltd.
81.	4	CMA Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC
82.	4	CNC Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC
83.	5	Cognos Far East Pte. Ltd.
84.	5	Color Point Security Pty Ltd.
85.	5	Combustor Airmotive Services Pte. Ltd.
86.	5	Composite Technology International Pte. Ltd.
87.	5	Computer Processing Services (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.
88.	4	Construction Technology Pte. Ltd.
89.	5	COSEM Pte. Ltd.
90.	5	C-Pak Pte. Ltd.
91.	4	Credinet Singapore Pte. Ltd.
92.	4	Credit POSB Pte. Ltd.
93.	4	CSA Holdings Ltd.
94.	4	CSN Systems Inc. (Philippines)
95.	4	CWT Distribution Ltd.
96.	3	CyberWay Pte. Ltd.
97.	4	D2K Inc. (USA)
98.	5	DalFort Aerospace GP Ltd. (USA)
99.	5	Dangerous Goods Management (S) Pte. Ltd.
100.	5	Data Network Solutions Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
101.	5	Datapulse Technology Ltd.
102.	5	DB Nominees Pte. Ltd.
103.	4	DBS Asset Management Pte. Ltd.
104.	4	DBS Bank Philippines Inc.
105.	4	DBS Card Centre Pte. Ltd.
106.	5	DBS China Square Ltd.
107.	5	DBS Computer Services Pte. Ltd.
108.	4	DBS Factors Pte. Ltd.
109.	3	DBS Finance Ltd.
110.	3	DBS Land Ltd.
111.	5	DBS Nominees (Private) Ltd.

112.	5	DBS Property Services Pte. Ltd.
113.	4	DBS Securities Pte. Ltd.
114.	4	Delifrance Asia Pte. Ltd.
115.	2	Development Bank of Singapore Ltd.
116.	4	DHM Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC
117.	5	DL Properties Ltd.
118.	5	Dorner Surgical Products Inc. (USA)
119.	6	Dornier Asia Medical Systems Pte. Ltd.
120.	4	Dornier India Medical Systems Pte. Ltd.
121.	4	Dornier Medical Systems Co. Ltd. (PRC)
122.	5	Dornier Medical Systems do Brazil Ltda.
123.	5	Dornier Medical Systems Ltd.
124.	4	Dornier MedizinLaser GmbH (Germany)
125.	4	Dornier Medizintechnik GmbH (Germany)
126.	3	Dornier Medtech Holdigs GmbH (Germany)
127.	4	Dornier Surgical Systems GmbH (Germany)
128.	5	Dornier Therapy systems Inc. (USA)
129.	4	Double Peak Holdings Ltd.
130.	5	d-Post (Thailand) Co. Ltd.
131.	5	DSS World Sourcing Ltd.
132.	5	Eastech Steel Mill Services Pte. Ltd.
133.	6	Eastel Construction Pte. Ltd.
134.	5	Eastern Bricks Pte. Ltd.
135.	5	Eastern Concrete Pte. Ltd.
136.	5	Eastern Industries Pte. Ltd.
137.	5	Eastern Maritime Pte. Ltd.
138.	5	Eastern Pretech (Malaysia) Pte. Ltd.
139.	5	Eastern Pretech Pacific Pte. Ltd.
140.	5	Eastern Pretech Pte. Ltd.
141.	6	Eastern Steel Services Pte. Ltd.
142.	6	Eastern Wire Ltd.
143.	5	ECIC Management Pte. Ltd.
144.	4	ECICS Credit Insurance Ltd.
145.	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd.
146.	4	ECICS Management Pte. Ltd.
147.	4	ECICS Ventures 2 Pte. Ltd.
148.	4	ECICS Ventures Pte. Ltd.
149.	5	ECICS-COFACE Guarantee Company (Singapore) Ltd.
150.	4	EDB Investments Pte. Lte
151.	4	EDB Ventures Pte. Ltd.

152.	5	Edo Sushi Pte. Ltd.
153.	5	El Marine Pte. Ltd.
154.	5	El Resources Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia)
155.	5	EM Services Pte. Ltd.
156.	4	ENV Corporation
157.	5	Ethylene Glycos (S) Pte. Ltd.
158.	6	Family Leisure Pte. Ltd.
159.	5	FHTK Holdings Ltd.
160.	5	Fima Corporation Berhad
161.	4	First Capital Corporation Ltd.
162.	6	First Pacific Land (Vietnam) Ltd.
163.	6	Flannigan Investment Pte. Ltd.
164.	4	Form Holdings Ltd.
165.	4	Forward Media Sdn. Bhd. (Brunei)
166.	6	FPSL Watco Ltd.
167.	6	Freight Links Express Distripark(Colombo) Ltd.
168.	6	Freight Links Express Holdings (Australia) 1997Ltd.
169.	5	Freight Links Express Holdings Ltd.
170.	4	General Securities Investments Ltd.
171.	2	GIC (London Office) Private Ltd.
172.	2	GIC (Realty) Private Ltd.
173.	2	GIC (Ventures) Pte. Ltd.
174.	4	GIC (Thailand) Pte. Ltd.
175.	2	GIC Special Investments Pte. Ltd.
176.	3	GMCRC Inc. (Philippines)
177.	1	Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte. Ltd.(GIC)
178.	5	GP Batteries International Ltd.
179.	5	Greenfield Development Pte. Ltd.
180.	6	Guangdong Guan Sin Auomotive Rebuilding and Repair Co. Ltd. (PRC)
181.	5	HBM Print Ltd.
182.	1	Health Corporation of Singapore Pte. Ltd.
183.	4	Health Services Investment of Singapore Pte. Ltd.
184.	5	Health Services Management of Singapore Pte. Ltd.
185.	4	Ho Bee Holdings (Pte. Ltd.)
186.	5	Hofmann DMT GmbH (Germany)
187.	5	Hog Auction Market Pte. Ltd.
188.	6	Holland Realty Pte. Ltd.
189.	5	Huntsmen Offset Printing Pte. Ltd.
190.	5	Ideas Investment Pte. Ltd.

191.	5	IMC Pan Asia Alliance (Pte.) Ltd.
192.	4	IMCB Holdings Pte. Ltd.
193.	5	Indeco Consultants Pte. Ltd.
194.	6	Infolink Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
195.	4	Information Holdings Asia Pte. Ltd.
196.	4	Information Network Services Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia)
197.	5	INS (Hong Kong) Ltd.
198.	5	Integrated Decision Systems Consultancy Pte. Ltd.
199.	5	Integrated Communications Sdn. Bhd. (Brunei)
200.	5	Integrated Databases India Ltd.
201.	5	Integrated Information (Hong Kong) Ltd.
202.	5	Integrated Information (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.
203.	6	Integrated Information Pte. Ltd.
204.	6	Integrated Media Services (Taiwan) Co. Ltd.
205.	4	Integrated Plastics Technology Pte. Ltd.
206.	5	Inter Corn Co. Pte. Ltd.
207.	5	InterCorn (1983) Company Ltd.
208.	6	Interlocal Co. Pte. Ltd.
209.	6	Interlocal Exim Pte. Ltd.
210.	5	International Cuisine Ltd. (UK)
211.	6	International Engine Component Overhaul Pte. Ltd.
212.	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd.
213.	4	International Factors (Singapore) Management Services Ltd.
214.	5	International Factors Group S.C. (Belgium)
215.	4	International Factors Leasing Pte. Ltd.
216.	4	International Factors Management Services Pte. Ltd.
217.	4	International Technology Park, Bangalore
218.	2	Intraco Ltd.
219.	4	Intraco Trading Pte. Ltd.
220.	4	Intra-Motors (S) Pte. Ltd.
221.	5	ITS Technologies Pte. Ltd.
222.	6	Joint Shipyard Management Services Pte.Ltd.
223.	4	JTC International Pte. Ltd.
224.	6	Jurong Bird Park (Pte.) Ltd.
225.	6	Jurong Country Club Ltd.
226.	6	Jurong Districentre Pte. Ltd.
227.	6	Jurong Marine Services Pte. Ltd.
228.	5	K Investment Holdings Pte. Ltd.
229.	5	KAC Holdings Ltd.
230.	5	Kapal Management Pte. Ltd.

231.	6	Kephinance Investment (Mauritius) Pte. Ltd.
232.	5	Kephinance Investment Pte. Ltd.
233.	3	Keptal Holdings Pte. Ltd.
234.	3	Keppel Bank of Singapore Ltd.
235.	5	Keppel Batangas Dockyard Inc.
236.	4	Keppel Bullion and Futures Pte. Ltd.
237.	5	Keppel Cairncross Shipyard Ltd.
238.	5	Keppel Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works Inc.
239.	4	Keppel Communications Pte. Ltd.
240.	2	Keppel Corporation Ltd.
241.	3	Keppel Engineering Pte. Ltd.
242.	4	Keppel Factors Pte. Ltd.
243.	3	Keppel FELS
244.	3	Keppel Finance Ltd.
245.	5	Keppel Finance Nominees Pte. Ltd.
246.	5	Keppel Harbour Redevelopment Ltd.
247.	4	Keppel Hitachi Zosen Ltd.
248.	6	Keppel Houston Group Partnership Inc. (USA)
249.	4	Keppel Insurance Pte. Ltd.
250.	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering
251.	4	Keppel Investment Management Ltd.
252.	5	Keppel IVI Investments Inc.
253.	3	Keppel Land ²
254.	6	Keppel Land (Hong Kong) Ltd.
255.	4	Keppel Land (Tower D) Pte. Ltd.
256.	5	Keppel Land Agtex Ltd.
257.	5	Keppel Land International Ltd.
258.	4	Keppel Land Properties Pte. Ltd.
259.	4	Keppel Leasing Pte. Ltd.
260.	4	Keppel Logistics Pte. Ltd.
261.	3	Keppel Marine Industries Ltd.
262.	5	Keppel Monte Bank Inc.
263.	4	Keppel Philippines Marine Industries Ltd.
264.	4	Keppel Philippines Properties Inc.
265.	4	Keppel Phillipines Holdings Inc.
266.	6	Keppel Power Systems Pte. Ltd.
267.	4	Keppel Securities Philippines Inc.

² A large number of Keppel Land subsidiaries were identified: 137 subsidiary companies, 5 associate companies and 17 inactive companies; a total of 159. Of These, only the most significant are included in the table.

268.	4	Keppel Securities Pte. Ltd.
269.	3	Keppel Shipyard Pte. Ltd.
270.	5	Keppel Sing Loong Investments Pte. Ltd.
271.	4	Keppel Transport & Telecommunications
272.	4	KeppelFELS Energy and infrastructure Ltd.
273.	5	KI Investments (HK) Ltd.
274.	6	Kinetic Ltd. (Australia)
275.	5	Kong Siang (Pte.) Ltd.
276.	5	Kong Siang Liquor Pte. Ltd.
277.	5	KPN-ST Logistics Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
278.	5	KSAT Satellite Networks Co. Ltd. (PRC)
279.	6	Laguna National Golf and Country Club
280.	3	Lanka Communications Services (Private) Ltd. (Sri Lanka)
281.	5	LimeTreat (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.
282.	6	Logistics Training and Consultancy Pte. Ltd.
283.	4	Lum Chang Holdings Ltd.
284.	4	Lung Kee Metal Holdings Ltd.
285.	5	MACS-ECICS Insurance Brokers Pte. Ltd.
286.	4	MAP Services Pte. Ltd.
287.	4	Marina Centre Holdings Pte. Ltd.
288.	5	Marine Brokers Pte. Ltd.
289.	5	Martinique Investments Pte. Ltd.
290.	5	Meadowville Investment Pte. Ltd.
291.	5	Mechmar Keppel Engineering Sdn Bhd
292.	5	Medeclin Tageskliniken fur ESW-Therapie GmbH (Germany)
293.	2	Media Corporation of Singapore
294.	5	Meditron Pty. Ltd. (Australia)
295.	6	MicroAsia Private Ltd.
296.	6	Mima International Pte. Ltd.
297.	3	MobileOne (Asia) Pte. Ltd.
298.	4	Monte De Peidad & Savings Bank
299.	6	Multi-Media Communications Sdn. Bhd.
300.	4	MultiTech Products Pte. Ltd.
301.	5	Myanmar Investment Fund (Singapore) Ltd.
302.	4	Nanyang Press (Holdings) Berhad
303.	5	Nanyang Press (Malayasia) Berhad
304.	5	National Cement Industry Pte. Ltd.
305.	5	National Skin Centre Pte. Ltd.
306.	4	National University Hospital (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
307.	5	NatSteel Abrasives Pte. Ltd.

308.	3	NatSteel BroadwayLtd
309.	5	NatSteel Chemicals (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.
310.	4	NatSteel Chemicals Ltd.
311.	3	NatSteel Electronics Ltd.
312.	6	NatSteel Guinard Oil Services Pte. Ltd.
313.	2	NatSteel Ltd.
314.	4	NatSteel Resort International Pte. Ltd.
315.	4	NatSteel Trade International Pte. Ltd.
316.	5	NatSteel Trade International Pte. Ltd. (Singapore & Myanmar)
317.	4	NatSteel Vina Co. Ltd. (Vietnam)
318.	5	NatSteel-Katayama Chemicals Pte. Ltd.
319.	5	NBC Containers Depot Co. Ltd.
320.	5	NCS Information technology (Suzhou) Co. Ltd. (PRC)
321.	4	NDC Merchant Bank Ltd.
322.	2	Neptune Orient Lines Ltd.
323.	3	New Changi Hospital Pte. Ltd.
324.	3	NSTB Holdings Pte. Ltd.
325.	5	Nusantara Technologies Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia)
326.	6	Ocean & Capital Properties Pte. Ltd.
327.	4	Ocean Properties Pte. Ltd.
328.	6	Offshore Joint Services (Bases) Co. of Singapore Pte. Ltd.
329.	4	OIL (Asia) Pte. Ltd.
330.	5	Omni Industries Ltd.
331.	5	Orchid Marine Services Pte. Ltd.
332.	4	Ordinance Development Engineering Company of Singapore (1996) Pte. Ltd.
333.	5	Orix Leasing Singapore Ltd.
334.	5	P.T. Ria Bintan
335.	5	P.T. Sentral Tanjungan Perkasa
336.	5	P.T. Straits CM Village
337.	4	Pacific Carriers Ltd.
338.	4	Pacific Century Regional Developments Ltd.
339.	4	Pacific International Lines (Pte.) Ltd.
340.	3	Pacific Internet Pte. Ltd.
341.	4	Pacven Investments Ltd.
342.	5	Pacven Walden Management Singapore Pte. Ltd.
343.	6	Pager Sales Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
344.	5	Palau Holdings Pte. Ltd.
345.	5	Pan Asian Pacific Aviation Services Ltd.
346.	6	Pasir Panjang Realty Pte. Ltd.

347.	3	Petrochemical Corporation of Singapore (Pte.) Ltd.
348.	3	Pidemco Land Pte. Ltd.
349.	5	PIL Travels (Private) Ltd.
350.	4	Pittco Investment Pte. Ltd.
351.	4	Plastics and Metal Industries (S) Pte. Ltd.
352.	5	Polymer Coating Technologies of Singapore Pte. Ltd.
353.	5	POSB Computer Services Pte. Ltd.
354.	4	POSB Investment Pte. Ltd.
355.	5	POSBank Centre Pte. Ltd.
356.	2	Post Office Savings Bank Pte. Ltd.
357.	4	Power Supply Ltd.
358.	4	PowerGas Ltd.
359.	4	PowerGrid Ltd.
360.	4	PowerSenoko Ltd.
361.	4	PowerSeraya Ltd.
362.	4	Primary Industries Pte. Ltd.
363.	2	PSA Corporation Ltd.
364.	4	PSA Marine (Pte.) Ltd.
365.	4	PT Bank DBS Buana (Indonesia)
366.	4	PT Bukaka SigTel International (Indonesia)
367.	5	PT Pantai Indah Tateli (Indonesia)
368.	6	PT Pulomas Gemala Misor (Indonesia)
369.	6	PT Purimas Straits Resort (Indonesia)
370.	6	PT Purosani Sri Persada (Indonesia)
371.	3	PT SkyTelindo Services (Indonesia)
372.	5	PT SSE-Van Horst Indonesia
373.	4	PWD Consultants Pte. Ltd.
374.	2	PWD Corporation Pte. Ltd.
375.	4	PWD ENV Pte. Ltd.
376.	5	Quang Ba Royal Park JV Co.
377.	5	R C Hotel Pte. Ltd.
378.	4	Radio Corporation of Singapore
379.	5	Raffles City Pte. Ltd.
380.	4	Raffles Holdings (1995) Pte. Ltd.
381.	5	Raffles Hotel (1886) Ltd.
382.	5	Raffles Marina Ltd.
383.	6	Raffles Nominees (Pte.) Ltd.
384.	5	RCC Holdings Pte. Ltd.
385.	5	Reliance Contractors Pte. Ltd.
386.	6	Renown Property Holdings (M) Sdn Bhd

387.	5	RISIS Pte. Ltd.
388.	5	Rohr Aero Services Asia Pte. Ltd.
389.	5	Runhong Engineering Co. Ltd. (Taiwan)
390.	6	Safe Bintan Resort Ltd.
391.	4	Safe Enterprises Pte. Ltd.
392.	5	Safe Margin Investments (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
393.	6	Safe Superstore Pte. Ltd.
394.	5	Safe Technology Pte. Ltd.
395.	6	SAFE-Mansfield Travel Group Pte. Ltd.
396.	6	Safra Radio Pte. Ltd.
397.	6	Safra Resort and Country Club Pte. Ltd.
398.	5	Saigon Centre Holdings Pte. Ltd.
399.	5	Saigon Mobile Telephone Centre (Vietnam)
400.	5	Samaero Company Pte. Ltd.
401.	5	SATA Catering Pte. Ltd.
402.	5	SATS Security Services Pte. Ltd.
403.	6	SCS Australia Pty. Ltd.
404.	4	SCS Computer Systems (UK) Ltd.
405.	5	SCS Computer Systems Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia)
406.	4	SCS Information Technology Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia)
407.	4	SCS New Zealand Ltd.
408.	5	Securities 2000 Inc. (Philippines)
409.	4	Sedona Hotels International Pte. Ltd.
410.	5	SEET Electronics and Engineering Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia)
411.	2	Sembawang Corporation Ltd. (SembCorp)
412.	3	Sembawang Engineering and Construction Pte. Ltd.
413.	4	Sembawang Gas Pte. Ltd.
414.	5	Sembawang Leisure Pte. Ltd.
415.	3	Sembawang Marine & Logistics
416.	3	Sembawang Maritime Ltd.
417.	3	Sembawang Properties Pte. Ltd.
418.	3	Sembawang Resources Ltd.
419.	3	Sembawang Shipyard Pte. Ltd.
420.	4	Sembawang Utilities and Terminals Pte. Ltd.
421.	5	Sembawang Wah Kwong Shipping Pte. Ltd.
422.	4	SembCorp Energy Pte. Ltd.
423.	5	SembCorp Parks Management Pte. Ltd.
424.	4	SembCorp Waste Management Pte. Ltd.
425.	6	Sentosa Cove Pte. Ltd.
426.	6	Sentosa Golf Club Ltd.

427.	6	Service Quality (SQ) Centre Pte. Ltd.
428.	5	SH Tours Ltd.
429.	5	Shanghai Elite Electric Vehicles Co. Ltd.
430.	6	Shanghai Sunjoy Systems Integration Ltd.
431.	4	Shinawatra Paging Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
432.	5	SIA Engineering Company Pte. Ltd.
433.	5	SIA Mauritius Ltd.
434.	3	SIA Properties Pte. Ltd.
435.	6	SIAEC Services Pte. Ltd.
436.	5	Siam United Hi Tech Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
437.	3	SilkAir Pte. Ltd.
438.	4	SIM Communications Pte. Ltd.
439.	5	Sinawatra Datacom Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
440.	4	Singa Infrastructure Management Pte. Ltd. - GIC
441.	4	Singamas Container Holdings Ltd. (Hong Kong)
442.	5	Singapore Aerospace (UK) Pte. Ltd.
443.	2	Singapore Aerospace Manufacturing Pte. Ltd.
444.	4	Singapore Aircrat Leasing Enterprise Pte. Ltd.
445.	5	Singapore Airlines (Mauritius) Ltd.
446.	2	Singapore Airlines Ltd.
447.	5	Singapore Airport Bus Services Ltd.
448.	5	Singapore Airport Terminal Services Pte. Ltd.
449.	6	Singapore Airposrt Duty-Free Emporium (Private) Ltd.
450.	5	Singapore Arts Centre Ltd.
451.	4	Singapore Aviation and General Insurance Company (Pte.) Ltd.
452.	5	Singapore British Engineering Pte. Ltd.
453.	6	Singapore Cable Car (Pte.) Ltd.
454.	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd.
455.	4	Singapore Clearing House Pte. Ltd.
456.	4	Singapore Computer Systems Ltd.
457.	5	Singapore Corporation of Rehabilitative Enterprises (SCORE)
458.	5	Singapore Dalian Port Investment Pte. Ltd.
459.	6	Singapore Dance Theatre Ltd.
460.	6	Singapore Discovery Centre Ltd.
461.	4	Singapore Dress Pte. Ltd.
462.	4	Singapore Engineering Software Pte. Ltd.
463.	4	Singapore Environmental Management and Engineering Services Pte. Ltd.
464.	6	Singapore Flying College Pte. Ltd.
465.	4	Singapore Food Industries Pte. Ltd.

466.	6	Singapore Gamma Knife Centre Pte. Ltd.
467.	5	Singapore General Aviation Services Pte. Ltd.
468.	3	Singapore General Hospital Pte. Ltd.
469.	4	Singapore International Arbitration Centre Ltd.
470.	5	Singapore International Foundation Pte. Ltd.
471.	3	Singapore International Media Pte. Ltd.
472.	6	Singapore Jamco Pte. Ltd.
473.	4	Singapore Leisure Industries Pte. Ltd.
474.	4	Singapore Logistics Consortium Pte. Ltd.
475.	5	Singapore Manufacturers Service Pte. Ltd.
476.	6	Singapore Mint Pte. Ltd.
477.	2	Singapore MRT Ltd.
478.	5	Singapore Offshore Petroleum Services (Private) Ltd.
479.	3	Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd.
480.	3	Singapore Pools (Private) Ltd.
481.	2	Singapore Post Pte. Ltd.
482.	4	Singapore Power International Pte. Ltd.
483.	3	Singapore Power Ltd.
484.	4	Singapore Precision Industries Pte. Ltd.
485.	5	Singapore Precision Repair and Overhaul Pte. Ltd.
486.	2	Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. ³
487.	4	Singapore Suzhou Industrial Holdings Pte. Ltd.
488.	4	Singapore Suzhou Township Development Pte. Ltd.
489.	3	Singapore Technologies Marine Ltd.
490.	1	Singapore Technologies Pte Ltd. ⁴
491.	1	Singapore Telecommunications Ltd.
492.	4	Singapore Television 12 Pte. Ltd.
493.	6	Singapore Test Services Pte. Ltd.
494.	4	Singapore Utilities International Pte. Ltd.
495.	4	Singapore Vietnam Investments Pte. Ltd.
496.	5	Singapore Zoological Gardens Pte. Ltd.
497.	5	Singapore Cleanseas Pte. Ltd.
498.	4	Singatronics Ltd.
499.	6	SingCom (Australia) Pty. Ltd.

³ Government direct and indirect ownership of Singapore Press Holdings is minor. However, it is listed here as the government exercises complete control of its management, board appointments and monitors and approves its share trading under the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act.

⁴ A total of 299 subsidiaries of Singapore Technologies Pte. Ltd. were identified. Only those considered to be significant in terms of size or strategic value are included in this table.

500.	6	Sing-Mas Investment Pte. Ltd.
501.	4	SingNet Pte. Ltd.
502.	5	Sing-Tech Precision (Suzhou) Co. Ltd.
503.	4	Singtel Aeradio
504.	4	Singtel Investments Private Ltd.
505.	4	SingTel Mobile Pte. Ltd.
506.	3	SingTel Ventures
507.	5	SingTel Yellow Pages Pte. Ltd.
508.	5	SNP Cambec Pte. Ltd.
509.	3	SNP Corporation
510.	5	SNP Offest (M) Sdn Bhd
511.	4	SNP Printing Pte. Ltd.
512.	5	SNP Publishing Pte. Ltd.
513.	4	SNP Security Printing Pte. Ltd.
514.	6	South China Towing Co. Ltd. (PRC)
515.	4	Southern Bank Berhad (Malaysia)
516.	5	Southern Natsteel (Xiamen) Ltd. (PRC)
517.	5	Southern Pipe Industry (Malaysia) Sdn.Bhd.
518.	5	Southern Rubber works Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia)
519.	5	Southern Steel Berhad (Malaysia)
520.	6	Southern Wire Industries (Malaysia) Pte. Ltd.
521.	4	SouthQuay Global Markets Ltd. (HK)
522.	5	Springwood Technology Pte. Ltd.
523.	5	ST Advanced Radio Pte. Ltd.
524.	3	ST Aerospace Engineering Pte. Ltd.
525.	5	ST Aerospace Engines Pte. Ltd.
526.	2	ST Aerospace Ltd.
527.	5	ST Aerospace Supplies Pte. Ltd.
528.	5	ST Aerospace Systems Pte. Ltd.
529.	4	ST Agritech International Pte. Ltd.
530.	4	ST Architects and Engineers Pte. Ltd.
531.	4	ST Assembly Test Services Ltd.
532.	4	ST Automotie Industrial Pte. Ltd.
533.	5	ST Aviation Resources Pte. Ltd.
534.	3	ST Capital Ltd.
535.	5	ST Computer Systems (HK) Ltd.
536.	4	ST Computer Systems and Services Pte. Ltd.
537.	3	ST Construction Pte. Ltd.
538.	4	ST Development Pte. Ltd.
539.	3	ST Electronics Pte. Ltd.

540.	4	ST Electronics Systems Assembly Pte. Ltd.
541.	4	ST Fund Management Pte. Ltd.
542.	2	ST Industrial Corporation (Amalgamated with Sembawang Corporation in October 1998)
543.	4	ST Infrastructure Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd.
544.	4	ST Logistics Pte. Ltd.
545.	5	ST Medical Services Pte. Ltd.
546.	4	ST Merchant Capital Pte. Ltd.
547.	5	ST Mobile Aerospace Engineering Inc. (USA)
548.	5	ST Mobile Data Pte. Ltd.
549.	5	ST PAE Holdings Pty. Ltd. (Australia)
550.	4	ST Property Investments Pte. Ltd.
551.	3	ST Shipbuilding and Engineering Pte. Ltd.
552.	5	ST SiChuan XingRong Communication Co. Ltd. (PRC)
553.	5	ST Simulation Systems Pte. Ltd.
554.	4	ST SunPage Pte. Ltd.
555.	4	ST Telecommunications Pte. Ltd.
556.	4	ST Telemedia Pte. Ltd.
557.	4	St Teleport Pte. Ltd.
558.	5	STA Automotive Inspection Pte. Ltd.
559.	6	STA Detroit Diesel-Allison (Malaysia) Pte. Ltd.
560.	6	STA Detroit Diesel-Allison (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
561.	6	STA Investment Pte. Ltd.
562.	5	ST-Airport Services Pte. Ltd.
563.	5	Star Kingdom Investment Ltd.
564.	4	StarHub (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
565.	4	ST-China Technology Ltd.
566.	4	STCS Electronics Investments Pte. Ltd.
567.	5	ST-Da Sing Pte. Ltd.
568.	5	ST-Da Yang Foods Pte. Ltd.
569.	4	Steamers Containership Holdings Pte. Ltd.
570.	5	SteelAsia Manufacturing Corporation (Philippines)
571.	6	STEL Information Technology (Shangai) Co. Ltd.
572.	5	ST-KWE Logistics Pte. Ltd.
573.	5	Stockwell (Thailand) Company Ltd.
574.	5	Stockwell Investments Pte. Ltd.
575.	6	Straits (USA) Inc.
576.	5	Straits Properties Ltd.
577.	4	Straits Property Investments Pte. Ltd
578.	6	Straits Realty (Texas) Inc.

579.	4	Straits Shipping Pte. Ltd.
580.	4	STSE Engineering Services Pte. Ltd.
581.	5	ST-Straco Pte. Ltd.
582.	5	ST-Zerust (SEA) Pte. Ltd.
583.	4	Subic Shipyard and Engineering Inc. (Philippines)
584.	5	Sun Cruises Holdings Pte. Ltd.
585.	5	Superbowl Holdings Ltd.
586.	5	Superior Metal Printing Ltd.
587.	5	Suzhou Eastern Cement Products Ltd. (PRC)
588.	6	Suzhou Zhongxin Telecommunications Engineering Development Co. Ltd. (PRC)
589.	6	Suzue-PSA Cold Storage Pte. Ltd. (PRC)
590.	5	Tampines Mall Pte. Ltd.
591.	4	Tan Tock Seng Hospital Pte. Ltd.
592.	4	Tao Payoh Community Hospital Pte. Ltd.
593.	3	TDB Holdings Pte. Ltd.
594.	4	Technology Parks Pte. Ltd.
595.	4	Telecom Equipment Pte. Ltd.
596.	3	Teledata Singapore Ltd.
597.	5	Telescience (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
598.	5	TeleTech Park Pte. Ltd.
599.	3	Television Corporaton of Singapore Pte. Ltd.
600.	1	Temasek Holdings (Private) Ltd.
601.	3	Temasek Management Services Pte. Ltd.
602.	4	Temasek Nominees (Private) Ltd.
603.	5	Teodoro N. Romansanta Inc. (Philippines)
604.	5	Thai International Ship Breakers Company Ltd.
605.	4	The Esplanade Co. Ltd. (PRC)
606.	3	The Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd.
607.	4	The Polyolefin Company (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
608.	4	The Thai Danu Bank Public Company Ltd. (Thailand)
609.	5	Three W. Services Co. Ltd. (PRC)
610.	5	Through Transport Mutual Services (UK) Ltd.
611.	3	Times Publishing Ltd. ⁵
612.	4	TKS Enterprises Public Company Ltd. (PRC)
613.	5	TLB Land Ltd.
614.	5	Tradewinds Tours and Travel Pte. Ltd.
615.	5	Trans Maritime Pte. Ltd.

⁵ A major subsidiary of Singapore Press Holdings.

616.	4	Transit Link Pte. Ltd.
617.	4	Trans-Link Express Pte. Ltd.
618.	3	Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd.
619.	4	Trident DistriCentre Pte. Ltd.
620.	5	Tridex Pte. Ltd.
621.	4	Triumph Steel Co. Ltd. (PRC)
622.	4	TuasPower Pte. Ltd.
623.	5	Turbine Overhaul Services Pte. Ltd.
624.	5	Twinsoft Asia Pte. Ltd.
625.	5	UNIFI Communications Inc. (USA)
626.	5	Uniload Consolidators Pte. Ltd.
627.	4	United Engineers Ltd.
628.	4	United Industrial Corporation Ltd.
629.	6	VA Dynamics Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia)
630.	4	Vencap Holdings (1987) Pte. Ltd.- GIC
631.	4	Vencap Holdings (1992) Pte. Ltd.- GIC
632.	4	Vencap Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC
633.	4	Ventura Development (DST)Pte. Ltd.
634.	5	Ventura Development (Surabaya) Pte. Ltd.
635.	4	Ventura Development Pte. Ltd.
636.	5	Veronique Pte. Ltd.
637.	5	Vertex Asia Ltd.
638.	4	Vertex Investment Pte. Ltd.
639.	4	Vertex Management (II)Pte. Ltd.
640.	4	Vertex Management (III) Pte. Ltd.
641.	4	Vertex Management Pte. Ltd.
642.	3	Vickers Ballas Holdings Ltd.
643.	4	Vickers Capital Ltd.
644.	5	Vietnam Investment Fund (Singapore) Ltd.
645.	5	Vincent Intertrans (Holdings) Ltd., Hong Kong
646.	5	VisionTech Engineering Pte. Ltd.
647.	4	Wah Kwong Shipping Holdings Ltd.
648.	6	Waterfront Properties Pte. Ltd.
649.	4	WBC Investment Pte. Ltd.- GIC
650.	4	WBL Corporation Ltd.
651.	4	WEI Investment Pte. Ltd. - GIC
652.	4	Wing Lung Bank Ltd. (Hong Kong)
653.	5	Wuji Jinyang Metal Products Co. Ltd.(PRC)
654.	5	Wujin Natsteel Co. Ltd. (PRC)
655.	5	Wuxi International Management Services Pte. Ltd. (PRC)

Appendix 8

1998 Directorships Of Singapore GLCs Levels 1-3

No.	Name	Position	Lv	Company	Sect
1.	Ang Kong Hua	Director	1	GIC	G
2.	Ang Kong Hua	Chair	2	Intraco	G
3.	Ang Kong Hua	Chairman	3	NatSteel BroadwayLtd	G
4.	Ang Kong Hua	Chairman	3	NatSteel Electronics Ltd	G
5.	Ang Kong Hua	Director, MD President	2	NatSteel Ltd	G
6.	Ang Kong Hua	Vice Chair	3	Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd.	G
7.	Ang Tiek Lim, Eric	Director	3	DBS Land	G
8.	Boey Tak Hap, BG (NS)	Director	3	PowerGrid Ltd	M
9.	Boey Tak Hap, BG (NS)	President, CEO	3	Singapore Power Ltd	M
10.	Boey Tak Hap, BG ¹ (NS)	Director	3	Keppel Finance	M
11.	Boon Swan Foo	Director, Group President, CEO	2	ST Aerospace	G
12.	Boon Swan Foo	Director	2	ST Industrial Corporation	G
13.	Boon Swan Foo	Director & President	3	ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	G
14.	Ch'ng Jit Koon ²	Director	3	Keppel Finance	L
15.	Cham Tao Soon	Director	2	Keppel Corporation	B
16.	Cham Tao Soon	Chair	2	NatSteel Ltd	B
17.	Cham Tao Soon, Dr.	Director	2	Singapore MRT Ltd	B
18.	Chamroonratana, Niphat	Alternate Director	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	F
19.	Chan Fook Pong	Director	3	SNP Corporation	U
20.	Chan Heng Loon, Alan	Director Member, Audit Committee	2	DBS Bank	C
21.	Chan Jer Hing, Peter	Director	2	Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	C
22.	Chan Meng Wah, Alexander	Director	3	SNP Corporation	P
23.	Chan Wing Leong	Director	3	Pacific Internet Pte Ltd	U
24.	Chang See Hiang	Director	3	ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	U
25.	Chang Yun Chung	Director	3	Keppel FELS	U
26.	Chee Jin Kiong	Director & MD	3	Keppel Finance	G
27.	Chen Ai Ju, Dr PPA(G), PPA(P)	Director	2	Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	C
28.	Chen Choong Joong	Director	3	Singapore Power Ltd	P
29.	Chen Choong Joong	Director	2	ST Aerospace	P
30.	Chen Choong Joong	Director	3	TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd	P
31.	Chen Tien Lap, Bernard	Director Chair, Audit Committee	2	DBS Bank	L
32.	Chen Tien Lap, Bernard	Director, CEO	2	Intraco	L
33.	Chen Tien Lap, Bernard	Chair	3	Teledata	L
34.	Chen Tien Lap, Bernard	Director	3	The Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd	L
35.	Cheng Shao Shiong, Bertie	Director & CEO	2	POSBank	G
36.	Cheng Shao Shiong, Bertie	Director Chair, Audit Committee	2	ST Industrial Corporation	G
37.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Director	2	Neptune Orient Lines Ltd	P
38.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Director	3	Pidemco Land Pte Ltd	P
39.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Director	3	Sembawang Engineering and Construction Pte Ltd	P
40.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Director	2	Singapore Airlines Ltd	P

¹ Boey was Chief of Army in 1990.

² Ch'ng was an MP from 1968-1997 and 1992 - 1996, Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Community Development before retiring.

41.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Director	3	Singapore Power Ltd	P
42.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Director	3	SNP Corporation	P
43.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Director	3	Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd	P
44.	Cheong Choong Kong Dr	Chair	3	Singapore International Media Pte Ltd	G
45.	Cheong Choong Kong Dr	Director	2	Singapore Press Holdings	G
46.	Cheong Poh Kin	Director	3	ST Capital	P
47.	Cheong Quee Wah	Deputy Chair	3	Sembawang Marine & Logistics	G
48.	Cheong Quee Wah	ED	2	SembCorp	G
49.	Cheong Yip Seng	Director & Editor- in-Chief, English and Malay Newspapers	2	Singapore Press Holdings	G
50.	Chew Leng Seng	Deputy MD (Technical)	2	Singapore Airlines Ltd	G
51.	Chew Leng Seng	Director	2	ST Aerospace	G
52.	Chia Chay Poh, David	Director	3	CISCO	P
53.	Chng Hee Kok	Director	3	Singapore Power Ltd	L
54.	Choe Fook Cheong, Alan	Director	3	Keppel Land	P
55.	Chong Kie Cheong	Director	3	DBS Finance	G
56.	Chong Lit Cheong	Director	3	NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd	B
57.	Chong Phit Lian	Director & Group GM	3	Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd	G
58.	Choo Boon Tiong	Director & MD	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	G
59.	Choo Boon Tiong	Director	3	International Factors Leasing Pte Ltd	G
60.	Choo Chiau Beng	Director	3	Keppel Bank	G
61.	Choo Chiau Beng	ED	2	Keppel Corporation	G
62.	Choo Chiau Beng	Chair MD	3	Keppel FELS	G
63.	Choo Chiau Beng	Director	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering	G
64.	Choo Chiau Beng	Alternate Director	3	MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd	G
65.	Choo Chin Teck	Director	3	Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd	U
66.	Choo Wee Leong, Winston, Lt. Gen (Ret.)	Director	3	DBS Land	M
67.	Choo Wee Leong, Winston, Lt. Gen (Ret.)	Director	3	Keppel Bank	M
68.	Choo Wee Leong, Winston, Lt. Gen (Ret.)	Director	3	Keppel FELS	M
69.	Chow Kok Kee	Director & Audit Committee Member	3	Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd.	U
70.	Chua Boon Lee, Thomas	Director	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	P
71.	Chua Teck Chew, Robert	Director	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	P
72.	Chua Teck Chew, Robert ³	Director	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd	P
73.	Chua Yong Hai	Director	3	CISCO	U
74.	Desker, Barry	Director	3	TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd	B
75.	Dhanabalan, Suppiah	Chair	2	DBS Bank	L
76.	Dhanabalan, Suppiah	Director	1	GIC	L
77.	Dhanabalan, Suppiah	Chair	2	Singapore Airlines Ltd	L
78.	Dhanabalan, Suppiah	Director & Chair	1	Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd.	L
79.	Dy, Francisco J, III	Director	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd	G
80.	Er Kwong Wah	Executive Chair	3	Sembawang Marine & Logistics	C
81.	Er Kwong Wah	Chair	3	Sembawang Maritime Ltd	C
82.	Er Kwong Wah	Director	3	Sembawang Resources Ltd	C
83.	Er Kwong Wah	Director	3	Sembawang Shipyard Pte Ltd	C
84.	Er Kwong Wah	Director & ED	2	SembCorp	C
85.	Er Kwong Wah	Director	3	Singapore Power Ltd	C
86.	Er Kwong Wah	Chair	3	Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	C
87.	Faithfull, Timothy William	Director Member, Audit Committee	2	DBS Bank	P
88.	Faithfull, Timothy William	Director	2	PSA Corporation Ltd	P
89.	Fam Yue Onn, Michael	Director	2	Singapore Press Holdings	P

³ Has the malaysian honorific: Datuk, probably from the Sultan of Johore.

90.	Fam Yue Onn, Michael	Director	3	Times Publishing Ltd	P
91.	Fang Ai Lian	Director	2	POSBank	P
92.	Fock Siew Wah	Director	1	Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd.	U
93.	Foh, Elsie	Director	3	CISCO	G
94.	Foh, Elsie	Director	3	DBS Finance	G
95.	Foo Kok Swee	Director	3	DBS Land	G
96.	Foo Kok Swee	Deputy Chair	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd	G
97.	Foo Kok Swee	Chair	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	G
98.	Foo Kok Swee, Col.	Director	3	TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd	G
99.	Foo Meng Tong	Director	3	EDB Ventures Pte Ltd	U
100.	Ganesan, N.	Director & MD	3	The Insurance Corporation of Singapore	G
101.	Goh Boon Kiat	ED	3	Keppel Marine Industries Ltd	G
102.	Goh Eng Chew	Director	3	DBS Land	P
103.	Goh Eng Chew	Director	2	NatSteel Ltd	P
104.	Goh Kim Leong	Chair	2	Singapore MRT Ltd	C
105.	Goh Kim Leong	Director	2	ST Industrial Corporation	C
106.	Goh Liang Kwang	Director	3	Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	B
107.	Goh Song How	Director & MD	3	ST Construction Pte Ltd	G
108.	Goh Yong Hong	Director	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd	C
109.	Goh Yong Hong	Chair	3	Singapore Pools (Pte.) Ltd.	C
110.	Goh Yong Siang, MG	Director	2	ST Aerospace	M
111.	Goon Kok Loon	Director	3	Keppel FELLS	B
112.	Han Cheng Fong	Deputy Chair & CEO	3	DBS Land	G
113.	Han Eng Juan, MG	Director	2	POSBank	M
114.	Han Eng Juan, MG	Director	2	PSA Corporation Ltd	M
115.	Hannes, Martin Roy	Director	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	F
116.	Hawazi bin Daipi	Director	2	PSA Corporation Ltd	L
117.	Hee Theng Fong	Director	3	Television Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	U
118.	Ho Ching	Director	3	EDB Investments Pte Lte	G
119.	Ho Ching	Group Chair	2	ST Aerospace	G
120.	Ho Ching	Chairman	3	ST Capital	G
121.	Ho Ching	President, CEO	1	ST Pte Ltd	G
122.	Ho Kwon Ping	Director	1	GIC	G
123.	Ho Kwon Ping	Chair	3	Singapore Power Ltd	G
124.	Ho Tian Yee	Director	2	Singapore MRT Ltd	P
125.	Ho, Michael	Director & Group GM	3	ST Construction Pte Ltd	G
126.	Hochstadt, Herman Ronald	Chair	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd	G
127.	Hong Hai, Dr.	Director	1	Singapore Telecommunications	L
128.	Hong Hai, Dr.	Chair	3	Pidemco Land Pte Ltd	L
129.	Hong Hai, Dr.	Director	2	Singapore Post Ltd	L
130.	Hong Hai, Dr.	Director	1	Singapore Telecommunications	L
131.	Hong Tuck Kun	Director	3	DBS Finance	G
132.	Hong Tuck Kun	Director	2	Intraco	G
133.	Howe, Robert Montgomery	Director	2	DBS Bank	P
134.	Hsu, Jimmy	Director	3	GIC (Ventures) Pte Ltd	G
135.	Hsuan Owyang	Director	3	DBS Land	B
136.	Hsuan Owyang	Chair	3	Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd.	B
137.	Hu Tsu Tau, Richard, Dr.	Director	1	GIC	L
138.	Hutson, Michael William	Alternative Director	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	F
139.	Hwang Soo Jin	Director	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd	P
140.	Hwang, Sydney Michael	Director	2	PSA Corporation Ltd	P
141.	Khattar, Sat Pal	Director Member, Executive Resource Committee	2	SembCorp	P
142.	Khaw Boon Wan	Director Member, Exco	2	DBS Bank	C
143.	Khaw Boon Wan	Director	1	Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	C
144.	Khaw Boon Wan	Chair	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	C
145.	Khaw Boon Wan	Chair	3	Singapore General Hospital Pte	C
146.	Khaw Boon Wan	Director	3	Singapore International Media Pte Ltd	C
147.	Khaw Boon Wan	Director	1	Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd.	C
148.	Khoo Teng Chye	Director	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering	B
149.	Khor Poh Hwa	Director	3	Keppel Land	G

150.	Khor Poh Hwa	President & CEO	3	PWD Corporation Pte Ltd	G
151.	Ko Kheng Hwa	Director	3	Pacific Internet Pte Ltd	C
152.	Koh Boon Hwee	Chair	2	Singapore Post Ltd	P
153.	Koh Boon Hwee	Chair	1	Singapore Telecommunications	P
154.	Koh Boon Hwee	Director	1	Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd.	P
155.	Koh Cher Siang	Director	1	Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	C
156.	Koh How Eng	Director	3	NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd	C
157.	Koh Tong-Bee, Prof. Tommy	Director Member, Audit Committee	2	DBS Bank	C
158.	Koh Yong Guan	Director	2	Keppel Corporation	B
159.	Kua Hong Pak	Director	1	Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd.	G
160.	Kua Hong Pak	President, CEO	3	Times Publishing Ltd	G
161.	Kwa Chong Seng	Director	1	Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd.	P
162.	Kwa Soon Bee, Dr.	Director	3	Keppel Land	C
163.	Kwah Thiam Hock	Director & President, CEO	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd	G
164.	Kwah Thiam Hock	ED	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	G
165.	Kwek Gim Song, Benedict	President, CEO, Director	3	Keppel Bank	G
166.	Kwek Gim Song, Benedict	Director	3	ST Construction Pte Ltd	G
167.	Kwek Siew Jin, Radm (NS)	Director & MD	2	Singapore MRT Ltd	M
168.	Kwok Wai Keong	Director	3	GIC (Realty) Pte Ltd	G
169.	Lai Ching Chuan	ED	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering	G
170.	Lai Chun Loong	Director & President	2	Chartered Industries of Singapore	G
171.	Lai Chun Loong	Director	3	Sembawang Marine & Logistics	G
172.	Lai Chun Loong	Director	3	Sembawang Properties Pte Ltd	G
173.	Lai Chun Loong	Director	3	Sembawang Resources Ltd	G
174.	Lai Chun Loong	Director	3	The Insurance Corporation of Singapore	G
175.	Lam Joon Khoi, BG	Director Member, Audit Committee	2	ST Industrial Corporation	M
176.	Lau Chan Sin	Director, Deputy President and Deputy Chief Operating Officer	2	DBS Bank	G
177.	Lau Chan Sin	Chair	3	DBS Land	G
178.	Lau Chan Sin	Director	3	KK Women's and Children's Hospital Board	G
179.	Lau Chan Sin	Chair	3	NDC Merchant Bank Ltd	G
180.	Lee Beng Cheng, Billy	Director & President	3	Sembawang Marine & Logistics	G
181.	Lee Chee Yeng	Director	3	Keppel Marine Industries	B
182.	Lee Chee Yeng	Director	3	New Changi Hospital Pte Ltd	B
183.	Lee Cheok Yew	Director	3	Pacific Internet Pte Ltd	G
184.	Lee Cheok Yew	Director & CEO	3	Television Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	G
185.	Lee Ching Yen, Stephen	Director	3	TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd	P
186.	Lee Ek Tieng	Director & MD	1	GIC	C
187.	Lee Ek Tieng	Director	3	GIC (London Office) Pte. Ltd.	C
188.	Lee Ek Tieng	Director	1	MND Holdings (Pte.) Ltd.	C
189.	Lee Eng Thong, David	Director	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	G
190.	Lee Fook Sun, BG	Director	2	ST Aerospace Engineering Pte Ltd	M
191.	Lee Fook Sun, BG	Director	2	ST Industrial Corporation	M
192.	Lee Hee Seng	Director	2	Singapore Press Holdings	C
193.	Lee Hee Seng	Director	3	Times Publishing Ltd	C
194.	Lee Hsien Loong, BG	Director	1	GIC	L
195.	Lee Hsien Yang, BG	President and CEO (Appointed 1 May 1995)	2	Singapore Post Ltd	M
196.	Lee Hsien Yang, BG	Director & President/ CEO	1	Singapore Telecommunications	M
197.	Lee Hsien Yang, BG	Director	2	ST Industrial Corporation	M
198.	Lee Kim Poo, Moses ⁴	Director	1	Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	C

⁴ In 1975 *Singapore Government Directory*, spelt Moses Lee Kim Poh. He was then an Administrative Assistant - one of the lower ranks in the Administrative Service.

199.	Lee Kim Poo, Moses ⁵	Chair	2	POSBank	C
200.	Lee Kuan Yew	Chair	1	GIC	L
201.	Lee Meng Tuck, Nicholas	Director	3	Pacific Internet Pte Ltd	U
202.	Lee Seng Wee	Director	1	GIC	P
203.	Lee Suan Hiang	Director	3	EDB Ventures Pte Ltd	B
204.	Lee Suet Fern	Director	3	NatSteel Electronics Ltd	U
205.	Lee Suet Fern	Director (effective 1 April 1998)	3	Sembawang Marine & Logistics	U
206.	Lee Suet Fern	Director	3	Vickers Ballas Holdings Ltd	U
207.	Lee Theng Kiat	Director	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	G
208.	Lee Theng Kiat	President	3	ST Telemedia/ST Telecommunications	G
209.	Lee Tsao Yuan	Director	3	Keppel FELS	B
210.	Lee Yong Siang	Director	1	Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	C
211.	Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm	Director	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering	M
212.	Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm	Director	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	M
213.	Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm (ret.)	Director	1	ST Pte Ltd	M
214.	Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm (ret.)	Director	3	ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	M
215.	Leong Ka Cheong, Christopher	Director	3	Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd.	U
216.	Liew Heng San	Director	3	EDB Investments Pte Lte	B
217.	Liew Heng San	Director	3	EDB Ventures Pte Ltd	B
218.	Liew Heng San	Director (Appointed 1 May 1995)	2	Singapore Post Ltd	B
219.	Liew Mun Leong	Director	3	EDB Ventures Pte Ltd	B
220.	Lim Ah Doo	Director	3	EDB Ventures Pte Ltd	U
221.	Lim Ang Hock	Director/GM	3	Keppel Engineering Pte Ltd	G
222.	Lim Ang Hock	Director & MD	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering	G
223.	Lim Chee Onn	Director	3	Keppel Bank	L
224.	Lim Chee Onn	Director & Senior ED	2	Keppel Corporation	L
225.	Lim Chee Onn	Director	3	Keppel FELS	L
226.	Lim Chee Onn	Director	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering	L
227.	Lim Chee Onn	Dep. Chair & MD	3	Keppel Land	L
228.	Lim Chee Onn	Director	2	NatSteel Ltd	L
229.	Lim Chee Onn	Director	2	Singapore Airlines Ltd	L
230.	Lim Cherng Yih, Richard, RADM	Director	3	ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	M
231.	Lim Choo San, Michael	Director	1	Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	P
232.	Lim Chuan Poh	Director	2	ST Aerospace	C
233.	Lim Chuan Poh BG	Director	2	Singapore Post Ltd	C
234.	Lim Chuan Poh BG	Director	1	Singapore Telecommunications	C
235.	Lim Hng Kiang	Director	1	GIC	L
236.	Lim Ho Kee	Director & member Group Managing Board	1	Singapore Telecommunications	P
237.	Lim Hock San	Director	2	Keppel Corporation	G
238.	Lim Hock San	Director	3	Keppel Finance	G
239.	Lim Hock San	President, CEO	3	United Industrial Corporation Ltd.	G
240.	Lim Hup Seng	Director	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	M
241.	Lim Jit Poh	Director	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	C
242.	Lim Jit Poh	Director	3	Sembawang Resources Ltd	C
243.	Lim Kim San	Executive Chair	2	Singapore Press Holdings	L
244.	Lim Kim San	Chair	3	Times Publishing Ltd	L
245.	Lim Leong Geok	Director	3	Keppel Land	G
246.	Lim Leong Geok	Deputy Chair	2	Singapore MRT Ltd	G
247.	Lim Meng Kin, BG (NS)	Director & MD	1	Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	M
248.	Lim Ming Seong	Director	2	ST Aerospace	G
249.	Lim Ming Seong	Director	3	ST Capital	G
250.	Lim Ming Seong	Group Director	1	ST Pte Ltd	G

⁵ In 1975 *Singapore Government Directory*, spelt Moses Lee Kim Poh. He was then an Administrative Assistant - one of the lower ranks in the Administrative Service.

251.	Lim Neo Chian, MG (NS)	Chair	3	Arcasia Land Pte Ltd	M
252.	Lim Say Yan	EVP	2	NatSteel Ltd	G
253.	Lim Siong Guan	Director	1	Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd.	C
254.	Lim Tik En, David	Director	2	ST Industrial Corporation	L
255.	Lim Yong Wah	Director	1	Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	G
256.	Lim Yong Wah	Director	2	Intraco	G
257.	Lim Yong Wah	Director	3	Keppel Bank	G
258.	Lin, Chester	Director & CEO	3	NatSteel Electronics	G
259.	Liow Voon Kheong	Director	3	EDB Ventures Pte Ltd	C
260.	Lock Sai Hung	Director & MD	3	The Insurance Corporation of Singapore	G
261.	Lock Sai Hung	Director	3	Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd.	G
262.	Loh Meng See	Director	3	Keppel Marine Industries	L
263.	Loh Wing Siew	Director	3	Keppel Bank	G
264.	Loh Wing Siew	Director & MD	2	Keppel Corporation	G
265.	Loh Wing Siew	Director	3	Keppel Finance	G
266.	Loh Wing Siew	Chair	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering	G
267.	Loh Wing Siew	Director	3	Keppel Land	G
268.	Loh Wing Siew	Chair	3	Keppel Marine Industries	G
269.	Loh Wing Siew	Director	3	MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd	G
270.	Low Huan Ping	Director	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	G
271.	Low Puk Yeong	Director	3	Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	C
272.	Lua Cheng Eng	Deputy Chair	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	G
273.	Lua Cheng Eng	Director	2	Intraco	G
274.	Lua Cheng Eng	Deputy Chair, CEO	2	Neptune Orient Lines Ltd	G
275.	Lua Cheng Eng	Chair	3	Sembawang Shipyard Pte Ltd - Jurong Shipyard Ltd	G
276.	Lua Cheng Eng	Director	2	SembCorp	G
277.	Lum Choong Wah	Executive Chair	3	SNP Corporation	G
278.	Lun Giap Jin (Alias Low Ngiap Jin)	Director	3	Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd.	U
279.	Lye Fai	Director	2	Singapore MRT Ltd	G
280.	Lye Fei	Director	3	Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd	G
281.	Meng-En Lim, Judy	Director	3	Pacific Internet Pte Ltd	U
282.	Montefiore, Neil	Director & CEO	3	MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd	G
283.	Nair, Dileep	Director	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd	C
284.	Nair, Dileep	Director	3	Keppel Marine Industries	C
285.	Nair, Dileep	Director CEO	2	POSBank	C
286.	Ng Kee Choe	Director Member, Exco	2	DBS Bank	G
287.	Ng Kee Choe	Chair	3	DBS Finance	G
288.	Ng Kee Choe	Chair	3	Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd	G
289.	Ng Kee Choe	Director & Chair, Audit Committee	2	ST Aerospace	G
290.	Ng Kim Leong	Director & ED	3	DBS Finance	G
291.	Ng Kin Sze	Director	2	GIC (Ventures) Pte Ltd	U
292.	Ng Kok Song	Director	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd	G
293.	Ng Kok Song	Director	3	GIC (London Office) Pte. Ltd.	G
294.	Ng Ser Miang	Director	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	P
295.	Ng Ser Miang	Director	3	Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd.	P
296.	Ngiam Tong Dew	Chair & Chair, Exco	2	DBS Bank	C
297.	Ngiam Tong Dow	Director	1	Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd.	C
298.	Niam Chiang Meng	Director	3	Singapore Pools (Pte.) Ltd.	C
299.	Niam Chiang Meng	Director	3	Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	C
300.	Ong Boon Kwee, Peter	Director	3	EDB Investments Pte Ltd	C
301.	Ong Boon Kwee, Peter	Director	3	Singapore Power Ltd	C
302.	Ong Boon Kwee, Peter	Director	3	TDB Holdings Pte Ltd	C
303.	Ong Sing Pang	ED	3	Keppel Finance	G
304.	Oo Soon Hee	Director	2	Intraco	G
305.	Oo Soon Hee	Director	2	NatSteel Ltd	G
306.	Oo Soon Hee	Director & Audit Committee Member	3	Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd.	G
307.	Ooi Lay Leng	Director	3	GIC (Realty) Pte Ltd	G
308.	Ooi Lay Leng	Director, Secretary	3	GIC (Ventures) Pte Ltd	G

309.	Con Kum Loon	Director	3	DBS Finance	G
310.	Con Kum Loon	Director	2	Intraco	G
311.	Ow Soon Sian, Alan	Director	3	Singapore Pools (Pte.) Ltd.	B
312.	Pillay, Naganatha	Director, President & CEO	3	ECICS Holdings Ltd	G
313.	Quek Chee Hoon	Director	2	Singapore MRT Ltd	G
314.	Quek Chee Hoon	Director	3	Singapore Power Ltd	G
315.	Quek Hiong How, Raymond	Alternative Director	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	U
316.	Quek Poh Huat	Director	1	MND Holdings (Pte.) Ltd.	G
317.	Quek Poh Huat	Director & President	1	Singapore Technologies Pte Ltd	G
318.	Quek Poh Huat	Director	1	Singapore Telecommunications	G
319.	Quek Poh Huat	Chair	2	ST Aerospace	G
320.	Quek Poh Huat	President	1	Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd.	G
321.	Ridzwan Tuan Haji bin Haji Dzafir	Director	2	Intraco	B
322.	Rinck, Jacobus Johannes	Director & President	3	Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd.	G
323.	Scarampi Del Cairo, Galeazzo	Director	3	Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd.	U
324.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	Director	3	EDB Investments Pte Lte	P
325.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	Director	1	GIC	P
326.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	Director Chair, Audit Committee	2	SembCorp	P
327.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	Director	3	Singapore Power Ltd	P
328.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	Director	1	ST Pte Ltd	P
329.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	Director	3	ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	P
330.	Seek Ngee Huat	Director	3	GIC (Realty) Pte Ltd	U
331.	Seet Keong Hoe, Arthur	Alternative Director	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	G
332.	Seow, Greg	Director	2	POSBank	P
333.	Shanmugam, K.	Director Member, Audit Committee	2	ST Industrial Corporation	L
334.	Shiah, Thomas	Chair and Acting CEO	3	Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd.	G
335.	Sim Cheok Lim	Chair	3	CISCO	P
336.	Sim Kee Boon	Chair	3	Keppel Bank	G
337.	Sim Kee Boon	Executive Chair	2	Keppel Corporation	G
338.	Sim Kee Boon	Chair	3	MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd	G
339.	Sim Kee Boon	Director	2	PSA Corporation Ltd	G
340.	Sit Peng Sang	Director and Financial Controller	3	Keppel FELS	G
341.	Soh Chui Geok, Mary	Director	3	NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd	B
342.	Soh Kim Soon	Director	3	Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd.	G
343.	Su Guaning, Prof.	Director	2	ST Aerospace	M
344.	Sum Soon Lim ⁶	Deputy Chairman	3	ST Capital	P
345.	Tan Boon Huat	Director	3	CISCO	C
346.	Tan Boon Huat	Director	3	Keppel Finance	C
347.	Tan Boon Huat	Director	3	SNP Corporation	C
348.	Tan Boon Teik	Director	3	Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd.	C
349.	Tan Cheng Yaw, Jimmy, Ltc	Director	3	Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd	M
350.	Tan Chin Nam	Director	3	EDB Investments Pte Lte	B
351.	Tan Chin Nam	Director	3	EDB Ventures Pte Ltd	B
352.	Tan Chok Kian	Director	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering	C
353.	Tan Chok Kian	Director	3	ST Capital	C
354.	Tan Guong Chung	Chair	3	ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	C
355.	Tan I Tong ⁷	Director	2	NatSteel Ltd	P
356.	Tan Kee Yong	Director	3	Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd	M
357.	Tan Keng Boon	Director & Chair, Audit Committee	3	Singapore Petroleum Company Ltd.	U
358.	Tan Keng Boon	Director	3	ST Capital	P
359.	Tan Keng Yam, Tony	Director	1	GIC	L
360.	Tan Kim Siew	Director	3	Keppel FELS	B
361.	Tan Kin Lian	Director	3	CISCO	NT

⁶ Sim is a professional, independent, company director.

⁷ Tang I Tong is a professional Independent director with strong links to the Hong Leong Group.

362.	Tan Kin Lian	Director	2	POSBank	NT
363.	Tan Kok Kheng, Oliver	Director	2	NatSteel Ltd	G
364.	Tan Kok Kheng, Oliver	Director	3	ST Capital	G
365.	Tan Siew Khoon	Director	3	Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	U
366.	Tan Siew Khoon	Director	3	Singapore Pools (Pte.) Ltd.	U
367.	Tan Swee Yiow	Alternative Director	3	Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd	U
368.	Tan Tat Wai, Dr.	Director	2	NatSteel Ltd	G
369.	Tan Tiong Gie, Bernard	Director	2	Keppel Corporation	B
370.	Tan Yong Soon, BG (Ns)	Director	2	Singapore MRT Ltd	M
371.	Tang I-Fang	Director	2	Singapore Press Holdings	P
372.	Tang I-Fang	Director	3	Times Publishing Ltd	P
373.	Tang, Jackson	Director & President	3	ST Capital	G
374.	Tay Ah Kee, Keith	Director	1	Singapore Telecommunications	P
375.	Tay Koon Tek, Denis	Director	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	G
376.	Tay Koon Tek, Denis	Director & MD	2	Singapore Press Holdings	G
377.	Tay Siew Choon	Director	2	PSA Corporation Ltd	G
378.	Tay Siew Choon	Director	3	Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd	G
379.	Tay Siew Choon	Director & President	2	ST Industrial Corporation	G
380.	Tay Thiam Peng	Director	3	TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd	B
381.	Tee Tua Ba	Director	3	CISCO	C
382.	Teh Kok Peng, Dr.	Director	3	GIC (London Office) Pte Ltd	C
383.	Teng Chieh Schen	Director	3	CISCO	P
384.	Teo Cheng Guan	Director	3	Times Publishing Ltd	U
385.	Teo Joo Huak	Alternate Director	3	International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	P
386.	Teo Ming Kian	Director	3	NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd	C
387.	Teo Ming Kian	Director	2	PSA Corporation Ltd	C
388.	Teo Soon Hoe	Director	3	Keppel Bank	G
389.	Teo Soon Hoe	Director, ED and Group Finance Director	2	Keppel Corporation	G
390.	Teo Soon Hoe	Director	3	Keppel FELS	G
391.	Teo Soon Hoe	Chair	3	Keppel Finance	G
392.	Teo Soon Hoe	Director	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering	G
393.	Teo Soon Hoe	Director	3	Keppel Land	G
394.	Teo Soon Hoe	Director	3	Keppel Marine Industries	G
395.	Teo Soon Hoe	Director	3	MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd	G
396.	Thai Chee Ken	Director	3	Keppel Land	P
397.	Thai Chee Ken	Director	3	NatSteel BroadwayLtd	P
398.	Thai Chee Ken	Director	3	NatSteel ElectronicsLtd	P
399.	Thai Chee Ken	Director	2	NatSteel Ltd	P
400.	Tham Heng Mun	Director	3	Sembawang Marine & Logistics	B
401.	Thio Hoe Tong	Director	3	SNP Corporation	B
402.	Thio Su Mien, Dr.	Director	3	ST Capital	P
403.	Tie Nyuk Siong, Edmund	Director Member, Audit Committee	2	SembCorp	P
404.	Tien Sing Cheong	Director	2	ST Industrial Corporation	G
405.	Tjong Yik Min	Director, ED	2	Singapore Press Holdings	G
406.	Tong Chong Heong	Director, ED	2	Keppel Corporation	G
407.	Tong Chong Heong	Director	3	Keppel FELS	G
408.	Venhuizen, Roelf	Executive Chair	3	Petrochemical Corporation of Singapore (Pte) Ltd	P
409.	Wang Kai Yuen, Dr	Director	2	POSBank	L
410.	Wee Cho Yaw	Director	2	Singapore Press Holdings	P
411.	Wee Cho Yaw	Director	3	Times Publishing Ltd	P
412.	Wee Ee Cheong	Director	2	PSA Corporation Ltd	P
413.	Wee Ee Cheong	Director	3	Sembawang Marine & Logistics	P
414.	Wee Ee Cheong	Director	3	Sembawang Maritime Ltd	P
415.	Wee Ee Cheong	Director Member, Audit Committee	2	ST Industrial Corporation	P
416.	Wee Sin Tho	Director	3	ST Capital	G
417.	White, Emmett F.	Director	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	F
418.	Wong Boon Kong	Director (In report for 1997, states since April 98?)	3	Keppel Integrated Engineering	U

419.	Wong Hung Khim	Director	2	DBS Bank	G
420.	Wong Hung Khim	Deputy Chair ⁸	1	Singapore Telecommunications	G
421.	Wong Kingcheung, Kevin	Director & ED	2	Keppel Corporation	G
422.	Wong Kingcheung, Kevin	Director & ED	3	Keppel Land	G
423.	Wong Kingcheung, Kevin	Director	3	Safe Enterprises Pte Ltd	G
424.	Wong Kok Siew	Deputy Chair, Member, Executive Resource Committee	2	SembCorp	G
425.	Wong Kok Siew ⁹	Chair	2	ST Industrial Corporation	G
426.	Wong Woon Liong	Director	2	ST Aerospace	B
427.	Wong Yuen Weng, Ernest	Director	3	EDB Investments Pte Lte	P
428.	Woon, Walter, Assoc Prof.	Director	2	Intraco	B
429.	Woon, Walter, Assoc Prof.	Director	2	NatSteel Ltd	B
430.	Yeo Chee Tong	Director & Investment Committee Member	3	SNP Corporation	U
431.	Yeo Chee Yeow, Alan	Director	3	Keppel Bank	P
432.	Yeo Chien Sheng, Nelson	Director	3	Keppel Marine Industries	G
433.	Yeo Chien Sheng, Nelson	Director & ED	3	Keppel Shipyard	G
434.	Yeo Liat Kok, Philip	Director	3	EDB Investments Pte Lte	B
435.	Yeo Liat Kok, Philip	Chair & Chair, Executive Resources Committee	2	SembCorp	B
436.	Yeo Ning Hong, Dr	Chair	2	PSA Corporation Ltd	L
437.	Yeo Ning Hong, Dr	Chair	1	ST Pte Ltd	L
438.	Yeo Ning Hong, Dr.	Director	2	DBS Bank	L
439.	Yeo Siah Meng	Director	3	SNP Corporation	P
440.	Yeoh Khwai Hoh, Patrick	Director & President	2	DBS Bank	G
441.	Yong Lum Sung	Alternative Director & Director & President	3	Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	G
442.	Yong Ying -I	Director	3	Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	C
443.	Yu-Foo Yee Shoon	Director (Appointed 1 May 1995)	2	Singapore Post Ltd	L
444.	Yu-Foo Yee Shoon	Director	1	Singapore Telecommunications	L

⁸ Wong was formerly President and Ceo of Singapore Telecommunications from at least 1992 until 1994 when he became executive Deputy Chairman.

⁹ Wong Kok Siew was formerly president of STIC in 1991.

Appendix 9

Singapore CLC Board Directors in Level 1-3 GLCs 1998

No.	Name	Position & Company	Rank	Sect
1.	Quek Poh Huat	Director & President, Singapore Technologies Pte Ltd Chair, ST Aerospace Limited President, Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited Director, Singapore Telecommunications Limited Director, MND Holdings (Private) Limited	0.28	G
2.	Khaw Boon Wan	Director & Member, Exco, DBS Bank Chair, Singapore Cable Vision Ltd Chair, Singapore General Hospital Pte Director, Health Corporation of Singapore Director, Singapore International Media Pte Ltd Director, PSA Corporation Limited Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited	0.3	C
3.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited Director, Neptune Orient Lines Ltd Director, Pidenco Land Ltd Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Ltd Director, Singapore Power Director, Singapore Airlines Limited Director, Sembawang Engineering and Construction Pte Ltd Director, SNP Corporation	0.34	P
4.	Er Kwong Wah	Chair, PowerGas Ltd Director & ED, Sembawang Corporation Chair, Sembawang Maritime Ltd (SML) Chair, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd Director, Singapore Power Executive Chair, Sembawang Marine & Logistics Director, Sembawang Resources Ltd Director, Sembawang Shipyard Pte Ltd	0.34	C
5.	Lim Chee Onn	Deputy Chair & MD, Keppel Land Director, Keppel Bank Director, Keppel FELS Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering Director, Singapore Airlines Director, Keppel Corporation Director, NatSteel	0.37	L
6.	Dhanabalan, Suppiah	Chair, Singapore Airlines Ltd Director, GIC Chair, DBS Bank (+ PosBank) Chair, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited	0.38	L
7.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	Chairman, Sembawang Corporation Ltd Director, Singapore Power Director, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering Director, ST Pte Ltd Director, GIC	0.4	P
8.	Loh Wing Siew	Director, Keppel Land Chair, Keppel Marine Industries Director, Keppel Finance Director, Keppel Bank Director & MD, Keppel Corporation Director, MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd Chair, Keppel Integrated Engineering	0.41	G
9.	Teo Soon Hoe	Director, Keppel Bank Director, Keppel Marine Industries Director, Keppel Land Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering Director, Keppel FELS Chair, Keppel Finance Director, MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd	0.43	G
10.	Koh Boon Hwee	Chair, Singapore Telecom Chair, Singapore Post Group Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited	0.44	P
11.	Lua Cheng Eng	Director, Intraco Deputy Chair, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd Chair, Jurong Shipyard Ltd/Sembawang Shipyard Pte Ltd Deputy Chair, CEO, Neptune Orient Lines Ltd Director, SembCorp	0.44	G

12.	Ang Kong Hua	Chair, Intraco Chairman, NatSteel Broadway Chairman, NatSteel Electronics Vice Chair, Transpac Industrial Holdings Director, GIC	0.48	G
13.	Lee Ek Tieng	Director, GIC Director, MND Holdings (Private) Limited	0.5	C
14.	Hong Hai, Dr,	Director, Singapore Telecommunications Limited Chair, Pidemco Land Pte Ltd Director, Singapore Post Group	0.56	L
15.	Lai Chun Loong	President, Chartered Industries of Singapore Director, Sembawang Properties Pte Ltd Director, Sembawang Resources Ltd Director, The Insurance Corporation of Singapore Director, Sembawang Marine & Logistics	0.56	G
16.	Lee Hsien Yang, BG	President & CEO, Singapore Telecommunications Limited President and CEO, Singapore Post Group Director, ST Industrial Corporation	0.56	M
17.	Lim Chuan Poh, BG (NS)	Director, Singapore Post Ltd Director, ST Aerospace Director, Singapore Telecommunications Limited	0.56	C
18.	Wong Hung Khim	Deputy Chair, Singapore Telecom Director, DBS Bank Deputy Chair, Singapore Post Group	0.56	G
19.	Yeo Ning Hong, Dr	Chair, ST Group Chair, PSA Corporation Limited Director, DBS Group Bank	0.56	L
20.	Choo Chiau Beng	Director, Keppel Land Director, Keppel Bank Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering Chair & MD, Keppel FELLS Alternate Director, MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd	0.6	G
21.	Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm (ret.)	Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited Executive Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering Director, ST Pte Ltd.	0.63	M
22.	Ng Kee Choe	Director & Chair, Audit Committee, ST Aerospace Chair, Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd Chair, DBS Finance Member, Directorships and Consultancy Appointments Council Director & Member, Exco, DBS Bank	0.63	G
23.	Wee Ee Cheong	Director, Sembawang Maritime Ltd Director, Sembawang Marine & Logistics Director, Member, Audit Committee, ST Industrial Corporation Director, PSA Corporation Limited	0.63	P
24.	Cham Tao Soon	Director, Keppel Corporation Chair, NatSteel Ltd Director, SMRT Ltd	0.67	B
25.	Lim Yong Wah	Director, Intraco Director, Keppel Bank of Singapore Ltd Director, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	0.67	G
26.	Thai Chee Ken	Director & Chair, Audit Committee, Natsteel Director, NatSteel BroadwayLtd Director, NatSteel ElectronicsLtd Director, Keppel Land	0.69	P
27.	Foo Kok Swee, BG (NS)	Director, MD ¹ & Deputy Chair, ECICS Holdings Ltd Director, DBS Land Ltd Chair, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd Director, TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd	0.75	G
28.	Lee Kim Poo, Moses	Chair, Board of Directors, POSBank Director, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	0.75	C
29.	Ngiam Tong Dow	Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited Chair, Board of Directors Chair, Exco, DBS Bank	0.75	C
30.	Yu-Foo Yee Shoon	Director, Singapore Telecom Director, Singapore Post Group	0.75	L
31.	Fam Yue Onn, Michael	Director, Singapore Press Holdings Limited Director, Times Publishing Ltd Chair, Singapore Airlines	0.78	P
32.	Oon Kum Loon	Director, DBS Finance Executive Vice-President, DBS Bank Director, Intraco	0.78	G

¹ MD from at least 1988-1991, then President & CEO 1992-1995.

33.	Sim Kee Boon	Executive Chair, Keppel Corporation Chair, MobileOne (Asia) Pte Ltd Director, PSA Corporation Limited	0.78	G
34.	Chen Choong Joong	Director, ST Aerospace Director, Singapore Power Director, TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd	0.89	P
35.	Chen Tien Lap, Bernard	Director, CEO, Intraco Ltd Chair, Teledata Singapore Ltd Director, The Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd	0.89	L
36.	Lau Chan Sin	Member, Directorships and Consultancy Appointments Council Director, KK Women's and Children's Hospital Board Chair, DBS Land Director, Deputy President and Deputy Chief Operating Officer, DBS Bank Group	0.89	G
37.	Nair, Dileep	Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd Director, Keppel Marine Industries Director & CEO, POSBank	0.89	C
38.	Quek Chee Hoon	Director, Singapore International Media Pte Ltd Director, Singapore MRT Ltd Director, Singapore Power	0.89	G
39.	Chan Jer Hing, Peter	Director, HCS Pte Ltd	1	C
40.	Chen Ai Ju, Dr PPA(G), PPA(P)	Director, HCS Pte Ltd	1	C
41.	Cheng Shao Shiong, Bertie	Director Chair, Audit Committee, ST Industrial Corporation Director & CEO, POSBank	1	G
42.	Choo Wee Leong, Winston, Lt. Gen (Ret.)	Director, Keppel Bank Director, DBS Land Limited Director, Keppel FELs	1	M
43.	Faithfull, Timothy William	Director & Member, Audit Committee, DBS Bank Director, PSA Corporation Limited	1	P
44.	Fock Siew Wah	Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited	1	U
45.	Goh Kim Leong	Director, ST Industrial Corporation Chair, Singapore MRT Ltd	1	C
46.	Han Eng Juan, MG (NS)	Director, POSBank Director, PSA Corporation Limited	1	M
47.	Ho Kwon Ping	Chair, Singapore Power Director, GIC	1	G
48.	Hu Tsu Tau, Richard, Dr.	Director, GIC	1	L
49.	Khattar, Sat Pal	Vice Chairman & Member, Executive Resource Committee, SembCorp	1	P
50.	Koh Cher Siang	Director, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	1	C
51.	Kua Hong Pak	Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited Director & President / CEO, Times Publishing Ltd	1	G
52.	Kwa Chong Seng	Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited	1	P
53.	Lee Hsien Loong, BG (NS)	Director, GIC	1	L
54.	Lee Kuan Yew	Chair, GIC	1	L
55.	Lee Suet Fern	Director, Vickers Ballas Holdings Ltd Director, NatSteel Electronics Ltd Director, Sembawang Marine & Logistics	1	P
56.	Lim Choo San, Michael	Director, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	1	P
57.	Lim Hng Kiang	Director, GIC	1	L
58.	Lim Ho Kee	Director, & Member Group Managing Board, Singapore Telecommunications Limited	1	P
59.	Lim Meng Kin, BG (NS) ²	Director & MD, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	1	M
60.	Lim Siong Guan	Director, Temasek Holdings (Pte) Limited	1	C
61.	Oo Soon Hee	Director, Intraco Director, NatSteel	1	G
62.	Tan Boon Huat	Director, Keppel Finance Director, CISCO Director, SNP Corporation	1	C
63.	Tan Keng Boon	Director & Chair, Audit Committee, Singapore Petroleum Company Limited Director, ST Capital Director Teledata	1	U
64.	Tan Keng Yam, Tony	Director, GIC	1	L
65.	Tay Ah Kee, Keith	Director, Singapore Telecommunications Limited	1	P
66.	Tay Siew Choon	Director, ST Industrial Corporation (Transferred to SembCorp) Director, PSA Corporation Limited	1	G

² Lim Meng Kim was previously, Commander, Singapore Medical Corps, SAF.

67.	Tie Nyuk Siong, Edmund	Director &, Member, Audit Committee, SembCorp	1	P
68.	Woon, Walter, Assoc Prof.	Director, Intraco Director, NatSteel	1	B
69.	Yeo Liat Kok, Philip	Chair, Board of Directors, Chair, Executive Resources Committee, SembCorp	1	B
70.	Boon Swan Foo	Director, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering Director, ST Industrial Corporation	1.25	G
71.	Goh Eng Chew	Director, DBS Land Director, NatSteel	1.25	P
72.	Ho Ching	Group Chair, ST Aerospace Chairman, ST Capital Vice Chairman, SembCorp	1.25	G
73.	Hong Tuck Kun	Director, Intraco Director, DBS Finance	1.25	G
74.	Hsuan Owyang	Director, DBS Land Chair, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited	1.25	B
75.	Hwang, Sydney Michael	Director, Econ International Limited Director, PSA Corporation Limited	1.25	P
76.	Lee Fook Sun, BG	Director, ST Industrial Corporation Director, ST Aerospace Engineering Pte Ltd	1.25	M
77.	Lee Hee Seng	Director, Singapore Press Holdings Limited Director, Times Publishing Ltd	1.25	C
78.	Lim Hock San	Director, Keppel Corporation Director, Keppel Finance	1.25	G
79.	Lim Kim San	Executive Chair, Singapore Press Holdings Chair, Times Publishing Ltd	1.25	L
80.	Lim Leong Geok	Deputy Chair, Singapore MRT Ltd Director, Keppel Land	1.25	G
81.	Lim Ming Seong	Director, ST Aerospace Director, ST Capital	1.25	G
82.	Lin, Chester	Director & Chief Executive, NatSteel Electronics, Director, NatSteel Ltd	1.25	G
83.	Tan Kin Lian	Director, CISCO Director, POSBank	1.25	NT
84.	Tan Kok Kheng, Oliver	Director, NatSteel Director, ST Capital	1.25	G
85.	Tang I-Fang	Director, Singapore Press Holdings Limited Director, Times Publishing Ltd	1.25	U
86.	Tay Koon Tek, Denis	Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited Director & MD, Singapore Press Holdings Limited	1.25	G
87.	Teo Ming Kian	Director, NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd Director, PSA Corporation Limited	1.25	C
88.	Tong Chong Heong	Director, Keppel FELS Exec Director, Keppel Corporation	1.25	G
89.	Wee Cho Yaw	Director, Singapore Press Holdings Limited Director, Times Publishing Ltd	1.25	P
90.	Boey Tak Hap, BG (NS)	Director, Singapore Power Director, Keppel Finance Ltd	1.5	M
91.	Cheong Quee Wah	Deputy Chair, Sembawang Marine & Logistics Executive Chair, Sembawang Resources Ltd	1.5	G
92.	Chua Teck Chew, Robert ³	Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd	1.5	P
93.	Foh, Elsie	Director, CISCO Director, DBS Finance	1.5	G
94.	Goh Yong Hong	Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd Chair, Singapore Pools (Private) Limited	1.5	C
95.	Khor Poh Hwa	Director, Keppel Land Director, President & CEO, FWD Corporation Pte Ltd	1.5	G
96.	Kwah Thiam Hock	Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd ED, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	1.5	G
97.	Kwek Gim Song, Benedict	Director & President/CEO, Keppel Bank Director, ST Construction Pte Ltd	1.5	G
98.	Lee Chee Yeng	Director, Keppel Marine Industries Director, New Changi Hospital Pte Ltd	1.5	B
99.	Lee Theng Kiat	President, ST Telemedia/ST Telecommunications Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited	1.5	G
100.	Lim Ang Hock	Director/GM, Keppel Engineering Pte Ltd Director & MD, Keppel Integrated Engineering	1.5	G
101.	Lim Jit Poh	Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd Director, Sembawang Resources Limited	1.5	C
102.	Ng Ser Miang	Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited	1.5	P

³ Has the Malaysian honorific: Datuk, probably from the Sultan of Johore.

103.	Niam Chiang Meng	Director, Singapore Pools (Private) Limited Director, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	1.5	C
104.	Ong Boon Kwee, Peter	Director, TDB Holdings Pte Ltd Director, Singapore Power	1.5	C
105.	Sim Cheok Lim	Director, Keppel T&T Chair, CISCO	1.5	P
106.	Tan Chok Kian	Director, ST Capital Ltd Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering	1.5	C
107.	Tan Siew Khoon	Director, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd Director, Singapore Pools (Private) Limited	1.5	U
108.	Yeo Chien Sheng, Nelson	Director, Keppel Marine Industries ED, Keppel Shipyard	1.5	G
109.	Chan Heng Loon, Alan	Director, Member, Audit Committee DBS Bank Member, Directorships & Consultancy Appointments Council	2	C
110.	Cheong Choong Kong Dr	Director, Singapore Press Holdings Limited	2	G
111.	Cheong Yip Seng	Director, SPH	2	G
112.	Chew Keng Juea	Director, SPH	2	G
113.	Chew Leng Seng	Director, ST Aerospace	2	G
114.	Chong Kim Chang	Director, SMRT Ltd.	2	B
115.	Fang Ai Lian	Director, POSBank	2	P
116.	Goh Yong Siang, MG	Director, ST Aerospace	2	M
117.	Ho Tian Yee	Director, Singapore MRT Ltd	2	P
118.	Howe, Robert Montgomery	Director, DBS Bank	2	P
119.	Koh Tong-Bee, Tommy, Prof.	Director & Member, Audit Committee, DBS Bank	2	C
120.	Koh Yong Guan	Director, Keppel Corporation	2	B
121.	Kwek Siew Jin, RAdm (NS)	Director & MD, Singapore MRT Ltd	2	M
122.	Lam Chuan Leong	Director, SembCorp	2	C
123.	Lam Joon Khoi, BG (NS)	Director, Member, Audit Committee, ST Industrial Corporation	2	M
124.	Liew Heng San	Director, Singapore Post Group	2	B
125.	Lim Tik En, David	Director, ST Industrial Corporation	2	L
126.	Lye Fai	Director, Singapore MRT Ltd	2	G
127.	Ridzwan Tuan Haji bin Haji Dzafir	Director, Intraco	2	B
128.	Seow, Greg	Director, POSBank	2	P
129.	Shanmugam, K.	Director & Member, Audit Committee, ST Industrial Corporation (Transferred to SembCorp on amalgamation)	2	L
130.	Su Guanng, Prof.	Director, ST Aerospace	2	M
131.	Tan I Tong	Director, NatSteel	2	P
132.	Tan Tat Wai, Dr.	Director, NatSteel	2	G
133.	Tan Tiong Gie, Bernard	Director, Keppel Corporation	2	B
134.	Tan Yong Soon, BG (NS)	Director, Singapore MRT Ltd	2	M
135.	Tetsuro Kawakami	Director, SembCorp	2	F
136.	Tien Sing Cheong	Director, ST Industrial Corporation	2	G
137.	Tjong Yik Min	Director, ED, Singapore Press Holdings	2	G
138.	Wang Kai Yuen, Dr	Director, POSBank	2	L
139.	Wong Kok Siew	Chair, ST Industrial Corporation (Transferred to Deputy Chair, Board of Directors, Member, Executive Resource Committee, SembCorp)	2	G
140.	Wong Woon Liang	Director, ST Aerospace	2	B
141.	Zainal Abidin Rasheed	Director, PSA Corporation Limited	2	L
142.	Ang Tiek Lim, Eric	Director, DBS Land	3	G
143.	Ch'ng Jit Koon ⁴	Director, Keppel Finance	3	L
144.	Chamroonratana, Niphat	Alternate Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	3	F
145.	Chan Fook Pong	Director, SNP Corporation	3	U
146.	Chan Meng Wah, Alexander	Director, SNP Corporation	3	P
147.	Chan Wing Leong	Director, Pacific Internet Pte Ltd	3	U
148.	Chang See Hiang	Director, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	3	U
149.	Chang Yun Chung	Director, Keppel FELS	3	U
150.	Chee Jin Keong	Director & ED, Keppel Finance	3	G
151.	Cheng Ho Wah	Director, Teledata	3	P
152.	Cheong Poh Kin	Director, ST Capital	3	P
153.	Chia Chay Poh, David	Director, CISCO	3	P
154.	Chng Hee Kok	Director, Singapore Power	3	L
155.	Choe Fook Cheong, Alan	Director, Keppel Land	3	P
156.	Chong Kie Cheong	Director, DBS Finance	3	P

⁴ Ch'ng was an MP from 1968-1997 and 1992 - 1996, Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Community Development before retiring.

157.	Chong Lit Cheong	Director, NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd	3	B
158.	Chow Kok Kee	Director & Audit Committee Member, Singapore Petroleum Company Limited	3	U
159.	Chua Boon Lee, Thomas	Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	3	P
160.	Chua Yong Hai	Director, CISCO	3	U
161.	Desker, Barry	Director, TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd	3	B
162.	Dv, Francisco J. III	Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd	3	G
163.	Ganesan, N.	Director & MD, The Insurance Corporation of Singapore	3	G
164.	Goh Boon Kiat	ED, Keppel Marine Industries Ltd	3	G
165.	Goh Liang Kwang	Director, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	3	B
166.	Goh Song How	Director & MD, ST Construction Pte Ltd	3	G
167.	Goon Kok Loon	Director, Keppel FELS	3	B
168.	Han Cheng Fong	Director, DBS Land	3	G
169.	Han Meng Siew	Director, Teledata	3	P
170.	Hannes, Martin Roy	Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited	3	F
171.	Heng Chiang Meng	Director, Econ International Limited	3	L
172.	Ho, Michael	Director & Group GM, ST Construction Pte Ltd	3	G
173.	Hochstadt, Herman Ronald	Chair, ECICS Holdings Ltd	3	C
174.	Hutson, Michael William	Alternative Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited	3	F
175.	Hwang Soo Jin	Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd	3	P
176.	Khoo Teng Chye	Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering	3	B
177.	Ko Kheng Hwa	Director, Pacific Internet Pte Ltd	3	B
178.	Koh How Eng	Director, NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd	3	C
179.	Kwa Soon Bee, Dr.	Director, Keppel Land	3	C
180.	Lai Ching Chuan	ED, Keppel Integrated Engineering	3	G
181.	Lee Beng Cheng, Billy	Director & President, Sembawang Marine & Logistics	3	G
182.	Lee Cheok Yew	Director, Pacific Internet Pte Ltd	3	G
183.	Lee Ching Yen, Stephen	Director, TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd	3	P
184.	Lee Eng Thong, David	Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	3	G
185.	Lee Meng Tuck, Nicholas	Director, Pacific Internet Pte Ltd	3	U
186.	Lee Seng Wee	Director, GIC	3	P
187.	Lee Tsao Yuan	Director, Keppel FELS	3	B
188.	Leong Ka Cheong, Christopher	Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited	3	U
189.	Lim Cheng Yih, Richard, RAdm	Director, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	3	M
190.	Lim Hup Seng	Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited	3	M
191.	Lock Sai Hung	Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited	3	G
192.	Loh Meng See	Director, Keppel Marine Industries	3	L
193.	Low Huan Ping	Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited	3	G
194.	Low Puk Yeong	Director, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	3	C
195.	Luanne Goh-Wong Pei Leng	Director, Teledata	3	P
196.	Lum Choong Wah	Executive Chair, SNP Corporation	3	G
197.	Lun Giap Jin (Alias Low Ngiap Jin)	Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited	3	U
198.	Mallek, Anthony	Director, Teledata	3	P
199.	Meng-En Lim, Judy	Director, Pacific Internet Pte Ltd	3	U
200.	Montefiore, Neil	Director & CEO, MobileOne (Asia) Pte. Ltd.	3	G
201.	Ng Kim Leong	Director, DBS Finance	3	G
202.	Ng Kok Song	Director, ECICS Holdings Ltd	3	G
203.	Ong Sing Pang	Director & ED, Keppel Finance	3	G
204.	Ow Soon Sian, Alan	Director, Singapore Pools (Private) Limited	3	B
205.	Quek Hiong How, Raymond	Alternative Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited	3	U
206.	Rinck, Jacobus Johannes	Director & President, Singapore Petroleum Company Limited	3	G
207.	Scarampi Del Cairo, Galeazzo	Director, Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited	3	P
208.	Seet Keong Hoe, Arthur	Alternative Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited	3	G
209.	Shiah, Thomas	Chair and Acting CEO, Singapore Petroleum Company Limited	3	G
210.	Sin Kam Choi, Joseph	Director, Econ International Limited	3	U
211.	Sit Peng Sang	Director and Financial Controller, Keppel FELS	3	G
212.	Soh Chui Geok, Mary	Director, NSTB Holdings Pte Ltd	3	B
213.	Soh Kim Soon	Director, Singapore Petroleum Company Limited	3	G
214.	Sum Soon Lim ⁵	Deputy Chairman, ST Capital	3	P
215.	Tan Boon Teik	Director, Singapore Petroleum Company Limited	3	C
216.	Tan Eng Bock	Director, Teledata	3	P

⁵ Sim is a professional, independent, company director.

217.	Tan Guong Ching	Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	3	C
218.	Tan Kim Siew	Director, Keppel FELS	3	B
219.	Tan Puay Chuan	Director, Teledata	3	P
220.	Tang, Jackson	Director, ST Capital, President, ST Capital	3	G
221.	Tay Kim Hock	Deputy Chair, Teledata	3	P
222.	Tay Thiam Peng	Director, TDB Holdings (Pte) Ltd	3	B
223.	Tee Tua Ba	Director, CISCO	3	C
224.	Teng Chieh Schen	Director, CISCO	3	P
225.	Teo Cheng Guan	Director, Times Publishing Ltd	3	U
226.	Teo Joo Huak	Alternate Director, International Factors (Singapore) Ltd	3	P
227.	Tham Heng Mun	Director, Sembawang Marine & Logistics	3	B
228.	Thio Hoe Tong	Director, SNP Corporation	3	B
229.	Thio Su Mien, Dr.	Director, ST Capital	3	P
230.	Venhuizen, Roelf	Executive Chair, Petrochemical Corporation of Singapore (Pte) Ltd	3	P
231.	Wee Sin Tho	Director, ST Capital	3	G
232.	White, Emmett F.	Director, Singapore Cable Vision Limited	3	F
233.	Wong Boon Kong	Director, Keppel Integrated Engineering	3	U
234.	Wong Kingcheung, Kevin	ED, Keppel Land	3	G
235.	Wong Lin Hong	Director, Teledata	3	P
236.	Yeo Chee Tong	Director & Investment Committee Member, SNP Corporation	3	U
237.	Yeo Chee Yeow, Alan	Director, Keppel Bank	3	P
238.	Yeo Siah Meng	Director, SNP Corporation	3	P
239.	Yeo Seng Huat, Geoffrey	Director, Econ International Limited	3	U
240.	Yong Lum Sung	Alternative Director, Singapore Cable Vision Ltd	3	G
241.	Yong Ying -I	Director, Temasek Management Services Pte Ltd	3	C

Appendix 10

Directors With A Rank ≤ 1 In GLCs In Singapore: 1998

NO.	NAME	POSITION & COMPANY	NO. COMP	RANK	SECT
1.	Quek Poh Huat	Director & President, Singapore Technologies Pte Ltd	6	0.28	G
2.	Khaw Boon Wan	Permanent Secretary, MTI	9	0.3	C
3.	Er Kwong Wah	Executive Chair, Sembawang Marine & Logistics		0.34	C
4.	Cheng Wai Wing, Edmund	Chair, MD, Wing-Tai Holdings Ltd		0.34	P
5.	Lim Chee Onn	Former MP and cabinet minister Deputy Chair & MD, Keppel Land	7	0.37	L
6.	Dhanabalan, Suppiah	Chair, Singapore Airlines Ltd (Until 30/5/98) Executive Chair, DBS Bank (+ PosBank) (From 30/5/98)	4	0.38	L
7.	Seah Lim Huat, Peter	President, CEO, Overseas Union Bank Ltd	5	0.4	P
8.	Loh Wing Siew	MD, Keppel Corporation	7	0.41	G
9.	Teo Soon Hoe	ED and Group Finance Director, Keppel Corporation	7	0.43	G
10.	Lua Cheng Eng	CEO & Deputy Chair, Neptune Orient Lines Ltd	5	0.44	G
11.	Koh Boon Hwee	MD, Hewlett-Packard Singapore	3	0.44	P
12.	Ang Kong Hua	MD President, NatSteel Ltd.	5	0.48	G
13.	Lee Ek Tieng	MD, GIC & Head of Civil Service	2	0.5	C
14.	Lim Chuan Poh, BG (NS)	Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Communications & former Chief of Army, Singapore Armed Forces	3	0.56	C
15.	Lai Chun Loong	President, Chartered Industries of Singapore	5	0.56	G
16.	Wong Hung Khim	Chair, CEO, DelGro & former President/CEO Singapore Telecom	3	0.56	G
17.	Hong Hai, Dr,	Former MP, 1988-1991. President & CEO Haw Par Corporation.	3	0.56	L
18.	Yeo Ning Hong, Dr	Former MP and cabinet minister	3	0.56	L
19.	Lee Hsien Yang, BG	President & CEO, Singapore Telecommunications Ltd.	3	0.56	M
20.	Choo Chiau Beng	Chair & MD, Keppel FELS	5	0.6	G
21.	Ng Kee Choe	President, DBS Bank	4	0.63	G
22.	Leo Chin Lian, James, RAdm (ret.)	Executive Chair, ST Shipbuilding and Engineering	4	0.63	M
23.	Wee Ee Cheong	Deputy President & Director, United Overseas Bank Ltd	4	0.63	P
24.	Cham Tao Soon	President, Nanyang Technological University	3	0.67	B
25.	Lim Yong Wah	Executive Chair, Inter-Roller Engineering Ltd & Old Guard PAP cadre	3	0.67	P
26.	Thai Chee Ken	Chair, Schroders International Merchant Bankers Ltd	4	0.69	P
27.	Lee Kim Poo, Moses	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Community Development	2	0.75	C
28.	Ngiam Tong Dow	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance	2	0.75	C
29.	Foo Kok Swee, BG (NS)	Director, MD ¹ & Deputy Chair, ECICS Holdings Ltd	4	0.75	G
30.	Yu-Foo Yee Shoon	MP, Deputy Secretary-General, NTUC	2	0.75	L
31.	Oon Kum Loon	Executive Vice-President, DBS Bank	3	0.78	G
32.	Sim Kee Boon	Executive Chair, Keppel Corporation	3	0.78	G
33.	Fam Yue Onn, Michael	MD, Fraser and Neave & Old Guard PAP cadre	3	0.78	P
34.	Nair, Dileep	Director & CEO, POSBank; Deputy Secretary, MOF	3	0.89	C
35.	Lau Chan Sin	Director, Deputy President and Deputy COO, DBS Bank	4	0.89	G
36.	Quek Chee Hoon	Executive Vice President, Head, Direct Investments Group of Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd	3	0.89	G
37.	Chen Tien Lap, Bernard	Director, CEO, Intraco Ltd, former MP and Deputy Secretary	3	0.89	L
38.	Chen Choong Joong	Managing Partner, Allen and Gledhill, Solicitors	3	0.89	P
39.	Woon, Walter, Assoc Prof.	Ambassador to Germany, Associate Professor of law, Nus and former Nominated Member of Parliament	2	1	B
40.	Yeo Liat Kok, Philip	Executive Chairman, Economic Development Board	1	1	B
41.	Chan Jer Hing, Peter	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs	1	1	C
42.	Chen Ai Ju, Dr PPA(G), PPA(P)	Director of Medical Services (Deputy Secretary), Ministry of Health	1	1	C
43.	Goh Kim Leong	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Law	2	1	C
44.	Koh Cher Siang	Commissioner of Inland Revenue, IRAS	1	1	C
45.	Lim Siang Guan	Permanent Secretary, PMO & Ministry of Education	1	1	C

¹ MD from at least 1988-1991, then President & CEO 1992-1995.

46.	Tan Boon Huat	Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs	3	1	C
47.	Cheng Shao Shiong, Bertie	Director & CEO, POSBank (Retired 1998)	2	1	G
48.	Ho Kwon Ping	Executive Chair, Singapore Power & President, Wah Chang International Group (his family company)	1	1	G
49.	Kua Hong Pak	Director & President/CEO, Times Publishing Ltd	2	1	G
50.	Oo Soon Hee	Deputy President, NatSteel Ltd	2	1	G
51.	Tay Siew Choon	President, ST Industrial Corporation then MD, Deputy EO SembCorp after merger with Sembawang Corporation	2	1	G
52.	Hu Tsu Tau, Richard, Dr.	Minister for Finance	2	1	L
53.	Lee Hsien Loong, BG (NS)	Deputy Prime Minister & Chairman, MAS	1	1	L
54.	Lee Kuan Yew	Senior Minister & former Prime Minister	1	1	L
55.	Lim Hng Kiang	Minister for National Development	1	1	L
56.	Tan Keng Yam, Tony	Deputy Prime Minister & Minister for Defence	1	1	L
57.	Choo Wee Leong, Winston, Lt. Gen (Ret.)	Former Head of Defence Force and ambassador	3	1	M
58.	Han Eng Juan, MG (NS)	Chief Executive, Land Transport Authority & former Chief of Defence Force	2	1	M
59.	Lim Meng Kin, BG (NS) ²	MD, Health Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd	1	1	M
60.	Faithfull, Timothy William	CEO, Shell Group, Singapore	2	1	P
61.	Khattar, Sai Pal	Senior Partner, Khattar Wong and Partners, Solicitors	1	1	P
62.	Kwa Chong Seng	Chairman/ MD, Esso Singapore	1	1	P
63.	Lee Suet Fern	Chartered Accountant	3	1	P
64.	Lim Choo San, Michael	Managing Partner, Price Waterhouse	1	1	P
65.	Lim Ho Kee	Executive Chair, Asia, Union Bank of Switzerland	2	1	P
66.	Tay Ah Kee, Keith	Senior Partner, KPMG Peat Marwick	1	1	P
67.	Tie Nyuk Siang, Edmund	Managing Partner, Edmund N. S. Tie Property Consultants	1	1	P
68.	Fock Siew Wah	Unknown	1	1	U
69.	Tan Keng Boon	Unknown	3	1	U

² Lim Meng Kim was previously, Commander, Singapore Medical Corps, SAF.

Appendix 11

Representation on 80 Selected Statutory Boards 1988-1998

No.	Organisation	Number of Positions	% of positions	Boards ¹	n
	Singaporean companies, individuals and government agencies with <5 positions (n=159)	409	7.41		
1.	National University of Singapore	357	6.47	NTU, PCMR, NSTB, NHB, PB, NLB, NPB, SHM, NIE, NUS, URA, NCB, NAC, PUB, SPBOG, CPF, FAC, NAB, ACM, PB, SAM, SCSS, PSC, EDB, DB, GSTBOR, STITB, ITBOR, ISEAS, PAC, LTA, SPBS, SCB, NAPC, SBA, MUIS, BOA, NPBOG, VRB, TAS	40
2.	Members of Parliament and former members	308	5.58	SPSB, SLF, PSA, HDB, PUB, SPBOG, EDB, SSC, HEB, STOTB, MAS, PCMR, CPA, TAS, URA, NAPC, NAC, ISEAS, CIPC, PA, NHB, MRTC, ACM, LTA, NCB, NIE, SPSB, HDB, JTC, ITEBOG, MPA, NHB, SBA, CAAS, NTU, NUS	36
	Unknown	303	5.5		-
3.	Ministry of Defence	268	4.9	SCSS, TAS, NTU, NMB, PUB, ITEGOG, HDB, SPBOG, NPBOG, SAB, PSA, URA, SBA, NHB, SSC, CPF, LTA, CAAS, TDB, EDB, MPA, NUS, SSC, SCB, NAPC, SHM, ACM, JTC, NCB, CIDB, NIE, HAB, HEB, POSB, ISEAS, BOA, DB, NPB, SPSB, LSB, TPBOG, LSB, PA, NSTB, STB, MAS, FAC, SCB	48
4.	Ministers and former ministers	216	3.91	PCMR, VRB, STB, SPSB, PA, BCCS, MAS, IRAS, ISEAS, ITEBOG, SLF, STOTB, PSA, CIDB, PC, CIPC	16
5.	Ministry of Education	163	2.95	SCB, NIE, NAPC, SHM, SPBOG, TPBOG, NLB, NTU, SBA, NUS, ISEAS, SAM, PAC, SBC, CPF, ITEBOG, NCB, SSC, TDB, STOTB, PUB, TAS, STOTB	23
6.	Nanyang Technological University ²	152	2.75	NTU, SPBOG, CIDB, NUS, NAPC, JTC, TPBOG, PA, NSTB, SCB, LSB, PAB, ITBOR, SAM, PAC, NCB, SBA, LTA, ACM, NAB, NIE, NLB, HDB, SPBS, TDB, PUB	26
7.	National Trades Union Congress	122	2.21	SPSB, NMB, CPF, PSA, PCMR, ABLA, SPBOG, TPBOG, SSC, PAC, NPBOG, PB, POSB, CISCO, ITBOT, HDB, MPA, NUS, NAPC, NLB, ITEBOG, SLF	22

¹ In the abbreviations used, some older boards have been named as if they were the boards existing in 1998. The Singapore Tourist promotion Board is included in the Singapore Tourism Board (STB); the Singapore Institute of Standards and Research (SISIR) and the former National Productivity Board (NPB) are incorporated in the current Singapore Productivity and Standards Board (SPSB).

² Representation as Nanyang Technological Institute included in this category.

8.	Ministry of National Development	121	2.19	CPF, TAS, CIDB, BOA, SCB, NPB, NTU, NAPC, SCSS, NMB, NSTB, NLB, URA, NPBOG, CAAS, PC, LSB, VRB, GSTBOR	19
9.	EDB	107	1.94	SFSB, ITEBOG, EDB, SPBOG, ISEAS, JTC, CIDB, NCB, TPBOG, SBA, NAPC, TAS, NAC, NSTB, MPA.	15
10.	Ministry of Health	87	1.58	PB, SNB, NPBOG, SMC, DB, CLPB, LB, NAC, CPF, LLB, STB, IRAS	12
11.	Temasek Holdings Group ³	85	1.54	SSC, HEB, TDB, NHB, GSTBOR, VRB, CISCO, POSB, LTA, BOA, NTU, PCMR, CIDB, NAPC, EDB, URA, STB, ACM, NPB, ITBOR.	20
12.	Ministry of Finance	79	1.43	ABLA, PCMR, STITB, PC, NSTB, CIDB, NAB, NCB, PC, POSB, TAS, PUB, MRTC, BCCS, PAB, NPBOG, URA, IRAS, MAS.	19
13.	HDB	72	1.3	BOA, NUS, HDB, TPBOG, CIDB, NAPC, LSB, CPF, URA, FAC, ITEBOG, SCB, SCSS, ITBOR	14
14.	Overseas Union Bank Group	62	1.12	SBC, SBA, NUS, BCCS, PSC, NPBOG, EDB, CAAS, PAB, HDB, TAS, FAC, CIDB	13
15.	RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers	62	1.12	BOA, SBC, STITB, ABLA, NAC, STB, CPF, HDB, NHB, CIDB, STB, SBA	12
16.	Singapore Technologies Group	60	1.09	NPBOG, TDB, EDB, SPSB, CPF, SPBOG, NAPC, ITBOR, NSTB, ITEBOG, TPBOG	11
17.	Trade Development Board ⁴	56	1.01	PSA, JTC, NTU, EDB, NLB, ISEAS, TPBOG, CPA, PCMR, NHB.	10
18.	Singapore Tourism Board	53	0.96	SCB, NAC, TPBOG, STB, NLB, EDB, NTU, HLB, NHB, URA,	10
19.	Keppel Group ⁵	51	0.92	NAPC, TDB, SPBOG, JTC, TPBOG, CAAS, STOTB, CPA, NTU	9
20.	Ministry of Home Affairs	48	0.87	PUB, CISCO, CAAS, SSC, VRB, HDB, HLB	7
21.	Ministry of Information and the Arts	48	0.87	NLB, NAB, PAC, SHM, TAS, ITEBOG, NHB, SAM, SBA, NAC, STOTB, IRAS, NCB	13
22.	Ministry of Labour/Manpower	46	0.83	CPF, CIDB, POSB, EDB, MAS, SPSB, NUS, NLB, STB	9
23.	Judiciary	43	0.78	HLB, VRB, PCMR, LSC, ISEAS, ABLA, GSTBOR, LLB, ITBOR,	9
24.	National University Hospital	43	0.78	NIE, NPBOG, SMC, SNB, NUS, PSC, CPA, LTA, LSC, DB, SHM, SCSS	12
25.	Neptune Orient Lines Group	42	0.76	TDB, NMB, PSA, MPA, SPBOG, NAB, JTC, NHB	8
26.	DBS Bank	41	0.74	PUB, LLB, LTA, PSA, CISCO, TPBOG, BCCS, EDB, SPBOG, JTC, NAPC, STB	12

³ This does not include those companies already given separate entries such as NOL, Sembawang Holdings and Singapore Technologies. This group includes such companies as

⁴ From 1988-1994, Yeo Seng Teck was chair of both TDB and JTC.

⁵ Includes T at Lee Bank appointees from 1992-1998. Tat Lee Bank was amalgamated with Keppel bank in late 1998 to form Keppel-Tat Lee Bank, part of the Keppel Group of GLCs.

27.	Singapore Press Holdings	41	0.74	STB, NLB, ISEAS, NAC, CAAS, TAS, PSA, MUIS, NUS, PAC, LTA, SSC, PA, FAC, ACM	14
28.	National Computer Board	39	0.71 [57.35%] ^f	SCB, NPBOG, NAPC, NLB, TAS, SBA, TPBOG, EDB	8
	American TNCs with <5 positions	38	0.69	GSTBOR, NLB, EDB, TAS, SCSS, SBA, ITEBOG, NPBOG, NSTB, NTU	10
29.	National Institute of Education	35	0.63	NTU, SCB, NIE, NSTB, NPB, NAB, PSC	7
30.	Sembawang Holdings Group - GLC	33	0.6	CAAS, ITBOR, GSTBOR, PAB, CIDB, SPSB, MPA, STOTB, EDB, NAC, NAPC	11
31.	Esso Singapore	32	0.58	EDB, PSC, SPBOG, SSC, NUS, ITEBOG, LLB, SPSB, JTC, CAAS, BOA, NSTB	12
32.	Urban Redevelopment Authority	31	0.56	HLB, URA, NAC, LTA, STB, PSA, CPF, HDB	8
33.	Prime Minister's Office	29	0.53	STB, CIDB, SPSB, PA, CISCO, TDB, TAS, JTC, CPF, MAS, PCMR, PSC	12
34.	Health Corporation of Singapore Hospitals	29	0.53	SMC, SCSS, LB, NHB, SNB, PAC, CLPB	7
35.	Monetary Authority of Singapore	28	0.51	NPBOG, POSB, ISEAS, CPF, MAS, PUB, STOTB	7
36.	Ministry of Community Development	28	0.51	NLB, SSC, STOTB, NMB, ACM, SCSS, NPBOG, MRTC, MAS, POSB	10
37.	Philips Singapore	28	0.51	NUS, SPSB, TDB, NSTB, PSA, NAPC	6
38.	Port of Singapore Authority	28	0.51	TDB, ITBOR, PSA, NCB, JTC, STITB, PCMR	7
39.	Royal Dutch Shell Group (Singapore)	27	0.49	PSA, EDB, SCB, NIE, JTC, SCB	6
40.	Singapore Productivity and Standards Board	27	0.49	SPSB, TDB, ITEBOG, NCB	4
41.	Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation	26	0.47	CPA, BCCS, ITBOR, GSTBOR, ISEAS, STOTB, TDB, SBC, BCCS, SPSB	10
42.	Singapore International Airlines (SIA)	26	0.47	PUB, SCB, STB, SPSB, SBC, SBA	6
43.	Hewlett Packard Singapore	25	0.45	SSC, EDB, TAS, SCB, PUB, NSTB, SPBOG, JTC	8
44.	KPMG	25	0.45	ABLA, TAS, PSC, NTU, NHB, SPSB, URA, CIDB	8
45.	Public Utilities Board	25	0.45	VRB, NAPC, PUB, EDB, ITBOR, GSTBOR, NPB	7
46.	Telecommunications Authority of Singapore	25	0.45	CAAS, NCB, NTU, NSTB, NTU, TAS, SBA, CPF	8
47.	Ministry of Communications and Information	24	0.43	NMB, TAS, CAAS, MRTC, PSA	5
48.	The Attorney-General	23	0.42	MAS, PSMR, LSC, PAB, IRAS	5
49.	Ernst & Young	23	0.42	POSB, ITEBOG, NPBOG, TAS, SPBOG, NTU	6
	Japanese TNCs with <5 positions	23	0.42	NSTB, SPSB, NTU, EDB, BCCS	5
50.	Maritime and Port Authority ⁷	22	0.4	CAAS, MPA, SPBOG	3
51.	Singapore Broadcasting Authority ⁸	22	0.4	FAC, STB, SPSB, SBA, TAS, NAPC	6
52.	Wing Tai Holdings Group	22	0.4	TDB, STB, EDB, SPSB, TPBOG, CIDB, URA	7
53.	Fraser & Neave	21	0.38	NTU, ITEBOG, CPA, NUS, PSC	5
54.	Public Service Commission	21	0.38	PSC, PCDSC, ISEAS, LSC, MAS	5

⁶ Does not include Singaporean companies, individuals and government agencies with <5 positions, but includes all other organisations above.

⁷ Formed in 1998 by the amalgamation of the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) and the National Maritime Board (NMB). Includes, SPECS Consultants, a subsidiary company of the former PSA.

⁸ Incorporates the Singapore Broadcasting Commission's representation which the SBA replaced.

55.	Ministry of Trade and Industry	20	0.36	SPSB, NLB, STB, NLB, CPF, NSTB, PSA	7
56.	Peoples Association	20	0.36	PA	1
57.	Price Waterhouse	20	0.36	POSB, MRTC, FAC, LTA, CIDB, NTU, NPB, PAC	8
58.	Khattar Wong & Partners, Solicitors	19	0.34	PSC, PCMR, SLF, PCDSC, SSC	5
59.	MRT Corporation	19	0.34	PSC, NUS, PUB, MRTC, URA	5
60.	SiemensGroup, Singapore ⁹	19	0.34	SCB, NPBOG, ITEBOG, NAPC, CAAS	5
61.	Yeo Hiap Seng Limited	19	0.34	SCB, TPBOG, SSC, TDB	4
62.	Institute of Policy Studies	18	0.33	NAC, TDB, ISEAS, FAC, NLB,	5
63.	Institute of Technical Education	18	0.33	NIE, ITEBOG	2
64.	Ministry of Law	18	0.33	URA, SITTB, NPB, LSB, STOTB, IRAS	6
65.	Ministry of Communication	18	0.33	CAAS, NMB, LTA, JTC, TAS, NSTB, PSA	7
66.	Nanyang Polytechnic	18	0.33	SAM, SNB, NPBOG, SPSB,	4
	German TNCs with <5 positions	18	0.33	PSA, NPBOG, EDB, TPBOG	4
	Other TNCs with <5 positions	17	0.31	SPBOG, EDB, HDB, GSTBOR, CISCO, CAAS	6
67.	Asia Life Insurance Society	17	0.3	PSC, PCDSC, IRAS, LSC	4
68.	Export Credit Insurance Corporation	17	0.2	TDB, PCMR, IRAS	3
69.	Scotts Holdings	16	0.3	TPBOG, NHB, NAC, STB	4
70.	Singapore Polytechnic	16	0.3	CLPB, LB, SPBOG, VRB	4
71.	Coopers and Lybrand	16	0.29	SCSS, PDCSC, CISCO, SBA, SBC	5
72.	K S Lee & Associates	16	0.29	SPBOG, ITEBOG, NAPC, SITTB	4
73.	PAP cadres without discernable affiliations	16	0.29	PCMR, PA	2
	British TNCs with <5 positions	16	0.29	BOA, TDB, SPSB, PAB, NCB, PB, NUS, CAAS	8
74.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	15	0.27	TPBOG, CPF, MPA, NHB, ISEAS, NAC, NUS	7
75.	Xerox Singapore Software Centre	15	0.27	POSB, NPBOG, NCB	3
76.	Dresdner Bank (South East Asia)	14	0.25	BCCS	1
77.	Natsteel Group	14	0.25	NAPC, JTC, SLF	3
78.	RDC Architects	14	0.25	HDB, SITTB, SPBOG	3
79.	Allen & Gledhill Solicitors	13	0.24	POSB, SITTB, ACM, PUB, PSA,	5
80.	See Hoy Chan (Singapore)	13	0.24	NAPC, SPSB	2
81.	JTC	13	0.13	JTC, EDB, NCB, NTU	4
82.	Hong Leong Group	12	0.22	SPSB, CAAS, SCSS	3
83.	Mt Elizabeth Medical Centre	12	0.22	SCSS, DB, SAM	3
84.	Post Office Savings Bank	12	0.22	POSB, MAS, NAPC	3
85.	Temasek Polytechnic	12	0.22	TPBOG, NHB,	2
86.	Asia Pacific Breweries	12	0.22	PSC, NUS	2
87.	ACE Daikin (S)	11	0.2	JTC, TDB, ITEBOG	3
88.	CAAS	11	0.2	CAAS	1
89.	Descon Chartered Achitects and Planners	11	0.2	PA	1
90.	Ngee Ann Polytechnic	11	0.2	NAPC	1
91.	Shook, Lin and Bok, Solicitors	11	0.2	NTU, SBA, SBC	3
92.	Eye Centre and Surgery (Loh Choo Kiat)	11	0.16	SCSS/NCSS	1
93.	Lee & Lee	11	0.16	PUB, ISEAS, SAM	3
94.	Metta Energy Resources	11	0.16	PSC	1
95.	Kuok (Singapore)	10	0.19	TDB, NAC,	2
96.	Intraco	10	0.18	NPBOG, NTU, TDB, SPBOG, NAB	5
97.	Singapore Telecommunications	10	0.18	NCB, CAAS, SCB, LTA	4
98.	Sony Group Singapore	10	0.18	NCB, NTU, NSTB, EDB	4
99.	Tan Ee Ping & Partners	10	0.18	BOA, CIDB, SPSB	3

⁹ Includes Siemens Advanced engineering, Siemens Coponents, Siemens Nixdorf Information Systems, Nixdorf Computers, Siemens Engineering.

100.	Television Corporation of Singapore	10	0.18	FAC, NAPC, STB, SHM, NCB, FAC	6
101.	Baker Marine Energy	9	0.16	CPF, JTC,	2
102.	Charles N Mendis & Partners, Solicitors	9	0.16	SCB	1
103.	Cooma, Lau & Loh, Solicitors	9	0.16	NMB	1
104.	Far East Organisation	9	0.16	CIDB, NAC, STB, STOTB	4
105.	National Maritime Board	9	0.16	NMB	1
106.	Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Singapore	9	0.16	PCMR	1
107.	SAMAS Management Consultants	9	0.16	ABLA, NAPC	2
108.	Singapore Sports Council	9	0.16	NIE, SSC	2
109.	Thorne Ship Management	9	0.16	NMB	2
110.	Yokogawa Electric Asia	9	0.16	NSTB, ITEBOG, NAPC	3
111.	Attorney-General's Chambers	8	0.14	ISEAS, STITB, MPA, HEB, HAB	5
112.	Compaq/Digital	8	0.14	SCB, LTA	2
113.	DP Architects	8	0.14	BOA, ACM, HDB, NHB	4
114.	Du Pont	8	0.14	JTC, TAS, NUS	3
115.	IPC Corporation	8	0.14	NCB, NSTB, SPBOG, SPBS	4
116.	IRAS	8	0.14	PAB, STOTB, IRAS	3
117.	La Salle-SIA Arts College	8	0.14	NAC, SAM	2
118.	Lee Foundation	8	0.14	ISEAS, SAM	2
119.	Motorola	8	0.14	EDB, NSTB, SPBOG, SPBS	4
120.	National Kap	8	0.14	SCB	1
121.	Singapore Federation of the Computer Industry	8	0.14	NCB	1
122.	Squire Mechanical	8	0.14	SPSB, SPBOG, LLB, BOA	4
123.	Tropical Produce Company	8	0.14	SCB, NPB, NHB	3
124.	Bankers Trust	7	0.13	PSA	1
125.	Charles Toh Clinic	7	0.13	PSC	1
126.	CISCO	7	0.13	CISCO	1
127.	CPF	7	0.13	LSC, ITBOR, GSTBOR,	3
128.	Deloitte & Touche	7	0.13	NAPC	1
129.	George Fong Associates	7	0.13	SPBOG	1
130.	Great Malaysia Textile Manufacturing	7	0.13	TDB	1
131.	National Council of Social Service	7	0.13	NCSS, FAC	2
132.	NEC	7	0.13	NIE, NUS,	2
133.	Ngee Ann Developments	7	0.13	NAPC	1
134.	RHB Cathay Securities	7	0.13	ABLA, ITBOR, GSTBOR	3
135.	Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce	7	0.13	ISEAS, NLB	2
136.	Singapore Indian Fine Arts Society	7	0.13	PA	1
137.	Singardo Trading	7	0.13	NAC	1
138.	The Yeoh Clinic/Earl Lu Clinic	7	0.13	SAM, NHB	2
139.	Jardine Matheson Group	7	0.11	ITBOR, CPF, SCSS	3
140.	Land Transport Authority	7	0.11	URA, LTA,	2
141.	Ming-Ho Publications Company	7	0.11	NAC	1
142.	Bank Tokyo-Mitsubishi	6	0.11	BCCS	1
143.	Citibank NA	6	0.11	PUB	1
144.	Dr. James Khoo	6	0.11	ACM, NHB	2
145.	IBM Singapore Pte Ltd	6	0.11	CAAS, NCB, SCB	3
146.	JAMIAH	6	0.11	PSC	1
147.	Metro Stores	6	0.11	ITEBOG, CPF,	2
148.	National Association of Travel Agents	6	0.11	STB, SCB, NPB	3
149.	Raffles Institution	6	0.11	NIE, SHM, SCB	3
150.	Raffles Junior College	6	0.11	NIE, SCB, NUS	3
151.	Singapore Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry	6	0.11	ISEAS, NHB	2
152.	Steven Tan & Company	6	0.11	TPBOG, NAPC, ABLA, LLB	4
153.	Architects Team 3	5	0.09	BOA, HDB, SCSS,	3
154.	C K Tang	5	0.09	STB	1
155.	Caltex (Asia)	5	0.09	CAAS	1
156.	Connor Pheripherals	5	0.09	EDB, NSTB	2
157.	Eastreco	5	0.09	SPBOG	1
158.	Glaxo Wellcome plc	5	0.09	NSTB	1
159.	Haridass Ho & Partners	5	0.09	NUS	1

160.	Harry Tan & Partners	5	0.09	PAB, STITB,	2
161.	Hotel Properties	5	0.09	NAC	1
162.	Ken Air Leisure	5	0.09	NPBOG, STB	2
163.	Maersk Singapore	5	0.09	PSA	1
164.	Nanyang Academy of Arts	5	0.09	NAC	1
165.	Singapore Bus Services	5	0.09	CIDB	1
166.	SAA Partnership, Architects	5	0.09	BOA, CIDB	2
167.	Singapore malay Chamber of Commerce	5	0.09	ISEAS	1
168.	SSA Management Consultants	5	0.09	TPBOG	1
169.	Thompson Electronics	5	0.09	NPBOG, EDB, NAPC	3
170.	Watson Hawksley Engineering Consultants (Singapore)	5	0.09	TDB	1
171.	Wearne Brothers Group	5	0.09	ABLA, TPBOG	2
172.	Wuthelam Holdings	5	0.09	NTU	1
173.	National Science and Technology Board	4	0.07	NPBOG, SCB	2
	TOTAL	5520	99.61		

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 1991-1999¹

No.	NAME	AFFILIATION
1.	Ang Boon Kheng	Assistant Vice President, Direct Investments, Temasek Holdings
2.	Baharudin, Zulkifli B.	NMP
3.	Boo Kheng Hua	Director, Planning and Development, Nanyang Polytechnic
4.	Cham Tao Soon	President, NTU
5.	Chan Heng Chee, Prof.	Director, ISEAS
6.	Chan Hock Cheng, Anna	Head, Policy Planning Division, EDB
7.	Chiang, Claire	NMP
8.	Chen Shian Jan	Deputy Director, Budget Division, MOF
9.	Chiam See Tong	MP for opposition Singapore People's Party
10.	Chua Beng Huat, Prof.	Department of Sociology, NUS
11.	Gill, Bernadette	Manager, Policy and Planning Division, NSTB
12.	Goh Chye Boon	Head, Feedback Unit, 1998 and Director, National Youth Council
13.	Gomez, James	Research and project Director, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Singapore
14.	Jeyaratnam, J. B.	NMP for opposition Workers Party
15.	Koh How Eng	Director, Planning and Policy Division, NSTB
16.	Lee Lai To	Associate Professor, Singapore Institute of International Affairs
17.	Lee Tsao Yuan, Dr.	Director, Institute of Policy Studies
18.	Lee, Brian, Prof.	Dean, School of Electrical and electronic Engineering, NTU
19.	Liew Choon Boon	Head, Feedback Unit, 1995
20.	Lim Siong Guan	Permanent Secretary, PMO
21.	Lim Soo Hoon	Deputy Secretary, PMO/PSD
22.	Lim Soon Tze	Director, CDIS, MOE
23.	Lim, Eileen S. Y.	Senior IT Policy Researcher, NCB
24.	Low Bah Tee	Director, Central Singapore Community Development Division
25.	Low Thia Khiang	MP for opposition Workers Party
26.	Low Wong Fook	Director, Labour Welfare Division, MOL
27.	Mehta, Vijakumar	Executive Director, NSTB
28.	Ng Yuk Ping	Coordinator, PS21 Office, PMO/PSD
29.	Ng, James	Manager, Planning, ITE
30.	Ong Hwee Teng	Senior Officer, Research and Information Centre, National Productivity Board
31.	Ong Yen Her	Director, Labour Relations, MOL
32.	Pious, Joseph, Dr.	Director, Fast-Forward, National Productivity Board
33.	Saw Ken Wye	Deputy Director, Industry and Technology Division, NCB
34.	Seah Lye Kim	Senior Industry Officer, NCB
35.	Shanmugaratnam, Tharman	Deputy MD, MAS
36.	Siddique, Sharon, Dr.	Deputy Director, ISEAS
37.	Tan Ching Yee	Director, Research and Planning Division, MTI

¹ This list does not include public service officers or others who may have breached any act or regulation in Singapore in providing information used in this study. It only includes those who provided on-the-record interviews; approximately one-quarter of those interviewed.

38.	Tan Jek Min	Deputy Administrator, Skills Development Fund
39.	Tan Seng Hua	Deputy Director, Corporate services, IIE
40.	Tan Wee Khiang	Head, Planning, Government Systems Division, NCB
41.	Tan Yap Kwang	Director, Planning Division, MOE
42.	Tan, Judy	Senior Planning Officer, EDB
43.	Teo, Nancy	CEO, Singapore Labour Foundation
44.	Tong Yew Heng	Vice President, Direct Investments, Temasek Holdings
45.	Vasoo, S., Dr.	MP and Head, Department of Social Work and psychology, NUS. Chairman GPC on Community Development
46.	Wong Heng Tew	Senior Vice President, Direct Investments, Temasek Holdings
47.	Wong, John, Dr.	Director, Institute of East Asian Political Economy
48.	Wu, Lorna	Director, Expenditure, MOF
49.	Yong Cheng Kiat, Dr.	Director,
50.	Zainal Abidin Rasheed	Editor, Berita Harian, SPH