

**Modern Military Academies and the Making of the
National Revolutionary Army, 1924-1928**

By

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
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Thesis Declaration

I declare that this thesis is the result of my own original work and all sources used have been acknowledged. No part of this thesis has been submitted for examination for any other degree."

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Lim Choo Hoon', written in dark ink. The signature is fluid and somewhat stylized, with the first name 'Lim' being the most prominent.

Lim Choo Hoon

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ABSTRACT

The nationalist revolution of 1924-28 has been traditionally treated in terms of a political revolution staged by Sun Yatsen and his radical party members with the help of Russian Comintern agents to reunify China. Most studies of the nationalist revolution have ignored that the unification was achieved largely through military means led by Chinese officer corps who were trained in military academies in China and abroad. This thesis argues that the introduction of modern military academies in China since the late Qing dynasty has created a system of military schools which spread across the country and a generation of Chinese officer corps who were the power-brokers in early Republican years. The history of the Huangpu Military Academy exemplified the role of modern military academy and the officer corps. The National Revolutionary Army was created from a military academy and subsequently expanded to become a force to be reckon with. It is further argued that the nationalist revolution coincided with the officer corps long term objective of re-establishing a national army which had been absent since the demise of Yuan Shikai in 1916. This was made possible when the Guomintang legitimised the southern armies as its party army. Hence, the party army assumed the role of the central and national army. The history of the Huangpu Military Academy was an effort of the Guomintang, the Chinese officer corps, with the help of the Russian military assistance and the Chinese Communist Party cadres to transform provincial armies into a party army. With this army, it hoped to defeat major warlords in the North and reunify China. Although the Northern Expedition did bring about a partially united China centred on Nanjing, the country was still divided. Reasons for this outcome are complex. One of the basic reasons was that neither the Guomintang nor the officer corps was strong and united to forge a united China. Meanwhile, the Nanjing government continued to build its central army in a manner similar to its early effort: modern military technology, foreign advisers, and modern military academy. The main difference in this attempt, as compared to the previous efforts, lays in its leadership. This time, the efforts came from the academy-trained officer corps rather than the traditional Confucian scholars or politicians.

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Many individuals contributed ideas and offered moral support along the way. Thanks to all my supervisors and advisers, in particular, Professor Mark Elvin for sharing his understanding of Chinese history and (financial support for the field study trip to China, Taiwan and Hong Kong); Professor Peter Dennise for reading and commenting the various chapters of the dissertation and all moral support I received during my stay in Canberra; Dr Lo Hui-min and Dr Huang Jianli for their invaluable comments and general support during the research and writing stages. During the extensive field study trip, I had also received many stimulating ideas from many scholars in Australia, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and interviewed several Huangpu graduates. The list is too long to mention here. I am very grateful to all of them for their suggestions, for sharing their personal diaries, notes, photographs, books, and above all, their warm hospitalities during my visits.

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is about the history of the Huangpu Military Academy and roles of the Chinese officer corps in the Nationalist Revolution. In May 1924, Sun Yatsen with the Russian assistance established a military academy on Huangpu, a small island in the muddy delta of the Pearl River south of Guangzhou. This later became the well-known Huangpu Military Academy, dubbed as the "cradle" of the Chinese revolution. During its most active years, 1924 to 1928, the Huangpu Military Academy and its two principal branches--Chaozhou (Guangdong) and Wuhan (Hubei)--graduated six classes of students and contributed to the Guomindang's unification effort up through 1928 and during its subsequent rule in China.¹ The "cradle" altered the course of the Chinese revolution in ways unforeseen even by the Republican's founding father. The Huangpu alumni, whose members were drawn from its faculty and graduates, furnished the leadership of both the Nationalist and Communist armed forces as they struggled for control of China from 1927-1949.

In 1926 the Guomindang armies, together with its United Front partners the Chinese Communist Party and the Russian advisers, launched a military expedition from Guangzhou against the warlords in central and northern China. This was the famous Northern Expedition of 1926-28 where both the civil and military organisations were mobilised under the Guangzhou government. The army of the Guomindang--the National Revolutionary Army, comprised of eight army corps from southern China with a total strength between 100,000 and 150,000 men, some forty vessels and a small squadron of aircraft. At the end of the Northern Expedition in 1928, however, the size of the army grew to more than forty corps. The National Revolutionary Army thus far was the largest group of participants in the Northern Expedition.

The basic aim of this dissertation is twofold. Firstly, it aims to examine the nature and character of the Huangpu Military Academy and why it became the centre of the Nationalist Revolution in the 1920s. Secondly, it examines the roles of Chinese officer corps, who were the products and later leaders of modern army and military academy, in the making of the National Revolutionary Army and shaping the course of the Northern Expedition.

¹ The Central Military Academy replaced the role of the Huangpu Military Academy when the Guomindang established its capital at Nanjing in 1927. Huangpu closed down in 1929 after a series of internal struggle and financial difficulties. *Lujun junguan xuexiao xiaoshi* (A history of the army officers' academy), compiled Lujun junguan xuexiao bianzuan weiyuanhui (The army officers' academy editorial committee). Taipei: Fangshang Military Academy, 4th bian, 4-125-6, 1969.

Previous Studies

Despite the crucial roles of the military in the Nationalist Revolution, no serious attempts have been made to look at Huangpu Military Academy and the National Revolutionary Army from a military perspective. The historiography of the Nationalist Revolution has been predominantly political. A major approach has been to study Sun Yatsen and the Guomindang's attempt to resurrect the "abortive" revolution of the 1910s, and their collaboration with the Chinese Communist Party and Russian Comintern agents to stage a movement from the South which would sweep across warlords' controlled central and northern China.² In this approach, the Huangpu Military Academy was presented as one of the key institutions recommended by the Russians to build a Party Army modelled on the Soviet Red Army. A system of political commissars was introduced and would play a crucial role in reforming the regional armies.³ This Russian-guided new form of army--the National Revolutionary Army, would eventually, as in the case of the Bolshevik in the Russian Civil War, defeat the warlords and reunite China. In this context, the Huangpu Military Academy was a key instrument in converting regional armies into the National Revolutionary Army. To these authors, the Russians' doctrine, money, expertise in guiding the revolution were the decisive factors contributing to its success.⁴ The Huangpu Military Academy was a revolutionary institution as it changed the Chinese army from the bottom up.

According to this Marxist-populist or Trotskyist interpretation,⁵ the villains of the Nationalist Revolution were Chiang Kaishek and Stalin, betrayers of a revolutionary movement that proper leadership might have led to victory. The Guomindang left-wing and the Chinese Communist Party leaders were portrayed as tragic-comic figures. It

² The most authoritative work in this approach is C. Martin Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928*. This work is a detailed inquiry into the source of the Guomindang's political inspiration and course of its march to Nanjing.

³ For an analysis of the institutional change, see Richard B. Landis, "Institutional Trends at the Whampoa Military School: 1924-1926." Ph.D. diss., the Washington University, 1969; Thomson Marvin Williamsen, "Political Training and Work at the Whampoa Military Academy prior to the Northern Expedition." Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1975.

⁴ See for example C. Martin Wilbur and Lien-ying How, *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989.

⁵ See for example works such as Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961; Hua Gang, *Zhongguo da geming shi, 1924-1925* (A history of the great revolution, 1924-1925), first published in the 1930s, reprint Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1982; and *Zhonghua minguo shigang* (An outline history of the republican China), editors Zhang Xianwen et al. Henan: Renmin chubanshi, 1985.

showed the nameless masses, propelled onto the political scene with a little Communist coaxing, were the true but betrayed heroes.⁶ Even the work of Donald Jordan, the only Western scholar who treats the Northern Expedition as its subject of inquiry, has been influenced by this interpretation though his main focus is the Northern Expedition.⁷

Many scholars in Taiwan and mainland China also treat the 1920s as a "great revolution" but they differed on the roles of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party in this movement and the outcome of the revolution. The Guomindang's histories place great emphasis on the leadership roles of Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek.⁸ Although Sun laid down the direction and stages of revolution for the party and the state in his *jianguo dakang* (outline of national reconstruction) he did not live to see the success in the Northern Expedition he had. Sun invited the Russians to assist in the revolution. The founding of the Party academy, the Huangpu Military Academy, was one important policy which paved the way for the subsequent build-up of the National Revolutionary Army. The vision of the "Father of the Nation" (guofu) was fulfilled by Chiang Kaishek who was the commandant of the Huangpu Military Academy and commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army.⁹

Historians from mainland China see the first United Front under Sun Yatsen as a "great revolution" because large number of labours, farmers, students, intellectuals and

⁶ For a critical review of villain-hero and tragedy-romance approach, see John Fitzgerald, "The Irony of the Chinese Revolution: The Nationalists and Chinese Society", in *The Nationalists and Chinese Society 1923-37: A Symposium*, 13-43, Melbourne: University of Melbourne, 1989.

⁷ Donald A. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: The Chinese National Revolution, 1926-1928*. Although Jordan stresses the importance of battles in this study, this work was a political-military history of the Northern Expedition. In Part III of this work, for example, Jordan devotes one third of the work to examining the roles of the masses in the expedition.

⁸ See *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 2 vols., Taipei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyiju (National military history and translation bureau), 1984; *Huangpu jinguan xuexiao xiaoshi jianbian* (A brief history of the Huangpu military academy), Taipei: Guofang bu shizheng ju (The historical and Political Bureau of the ministry of national defence), 1986; Gong Lequn. *Huangpu jianshi* (A short history of Huangpu). Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1971.

⁹ *Beifa jian shi* (A brief war history of the northern expedition), ed. Guofangbu shizhengju. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1970; *Beifa tongyi* (The northern expedition and unification of China), Chief editor Wego W.K. Chiang {Wei-Kuo}. *The History of the Chinese National Revolutionary War*, Part II, 4 vols, Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gongsi (Liming cultural publication company), 1980; *Beifa tongyi wushi zhounian tekan* (A special publication in honour of the 50th anniversary of the northern expedition), Taipei: Guofangbu shizhengju, 1978; *Beifa zhanzhi* (A war history of the northern expedition), 4 vols, Taipei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyiju (National military history and translation bureau), 1959.

military were mobilised in the movement against the regimes of northern warlords.¹⁰ The revolution, however, was a failure because Chiang Kaishek and right-wing Guomindang members betrayed Sun Yatsen's "three cardinal policies"--collaboration with Russians, the Chinese Communist Party, and farmers and labours-- and surrendered to forces of imperialism, warlords, feudalism and capitalism.¹¹

Another interpretation for Huangpu and the National Revolutionary Army history is the political-military factionalism approach. F. F. Liu's *A History of Modern Military History* begins his study on conflicts between Soviet advisers' and the Chinese Communist Party and the rise of Chiang Kaishek in the first United Front¹². Looking primarily at the Guomindang's military affairs, he argues that it was through the Huangpu Military Academy that Chiang rose to become a leader in the party. In a more recent book, entitled *Jiang Jieshi yu Huangpu xi* (Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu's faction), the authors attempt to account for the rise and fall of Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu faction. It traces Chiang's early military life and events leading to the founding of the Huangpu Military Academy and the Huangpu clique. The clique includes instructors and graduates of the Huangpu Military Academy who embraced the "Huangpu Spirit" (defined as loyalty to Chiang, party and the state; anti-Communism; and self-sacrifice).¹³ In this work, the formation of Huangpu clique in Guangzhou was treated in detail. Since the book focuses on Chiang Kaishek and his clique, the work suffers from common weaknesses of adhering too closely to partisan history. The so-called "collapse" of Chiang and the Huangpu clique refers to events in mainland China and ignores the continued existence in Taiwan after 1949.

¹⁰ *Huangpu junxiao shiliao, 1924-1927*. (Historical materials on the Huangpu military academy, 1924-1927, a continuation), compiler Zhao Liping, editor Chen Yipei et al. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1994; *Huangpu junxiao jianxiao liushi zhounian jinian ce, 1924-1984* (The 60th anniversary commemorative magazine of the founding of the Huangpu Military Academy, 1924-1984), Edited Huangpu junxiao tongxuehui (The Huangpu alumni). Beijing: Changcheng chubanshe, 1984, and *Zhonghua minguo shigang*.

¹¹ This kind of statement is very common in Chinese mainland publications. See for example, Deng Yingchao's Preface to *Huangpu junxiao jianxiao liushi zhounian jinian ce* (Magazine for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Huangpu military academy), Beijing: Huangpu Alumni, 1984.

¹² F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949*. New York: Kennikat Press, 1956. This work was originated from his dissertation "The Nationalist Army of China: An Administrative Studies of the Period 1924-1926" from Princeton University.

¹³ Chen Yusheng and Zhang Guangyu. *Jiang Jieshi he Huangpu xi* (Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu clique). Kaifeng: Henan chubanshe, 1994; Xie Benshu and Hongping Nie. *Jiang Jieshi he xinan difang shili pai* (Chiang Kaishek and the south-western military factions). Zhonghua minguo shi congshu, Henan: Henan chubanshe, 1990; Zhang Guangyu, *Di yi ce guogong hezuo shiqi de guomin geming jun* (The national revolutionary army during the first co-operation between the GMD and CCP). Wuhan: Wuhan University Publication, 1989.

Another approach is to treat the Huangpu Military Academy in the context of student nationalism.¹⁴ Lincoln Li's work is primarily a comparative study of the political life of the Huangpu Military Academy at Guangzhou, the Resistance University at Yanan, and the Associated University of the Southwest (Lianda). The study draws some of the disparate threads together to appreciate how such elite groups competed in the process of rebuilding a system during the Republican China, 1924-49. Li examines the critical role of the students as a political force during China's reunification in 1927 and again in 1949 in the context of cultural and ideological debates--the New Culture and May 4th Movement--and student politics. Li argues that Chinese student nationalism, despite its radical image, represents a prominent feature of continuity in Chinese socio-political culture.

In sum, scholars have examined the roles of the Russians, the political commissar system, Guomindang's leaders, Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu clique, the Chinese Communist Party and the mass movement, and the Huangpu's students. However, how could one explain why such a national movement took place at a military academy? Why did such a large group of officer corps take part in the Nationalist Revolution? The roles of Chinese officer corps, and the military academy have not been subjects of any serious inquiry. It may be that the military men were seen as passive, opportunists and reactionaries and not as the main driving force of the nationalist revolution. However, in reality the picture is different. Modern military academy was introduced to China as early as 1885. After about 38 years of development it had produced a great number of officer corps that had spread all over the country and constituted a most well organised and modernised force in the early Republican years (see Table 1).

Approach of the Study

The basic approach of this study is to look at modern military academies and its impact on the development of the modern Chinese national army. It will examine broader issues such as the circumstances which led to the rise of military men like Chiang Kaishek and other military officers; the relationship between the officer corps and the state, party and the society at large and conflicts between the regional and the central armies. The modern military academy was introduced in a big way by the Qing's government to build a modern central army. To meet the manpower requirements, national military education

¹⁴ Lincoln Li, *Student Nationalism in China, 1924-1949*. New York: State University of New York, 1994.

was introduced in the early 1900s with basic military education at provincial military schools and higher level schools for the brightest and ablest young men in the major cities and the capital. After graduation, these officers were posted by the central government to provincial and capital military organisation. Many of them served as staff officers to various governmental offices and military instructors in military academies that spread around the country. During the warlord period, they were the principal staff of regional warlords. They helped to run the administration and fought war in time of conflicts with other warlords.

This study separates the Chinese officer corps from the Guomintang-CCP United Front and the warlords of the 1920s, and treats the officer corps as a single interest group in the Nationalist Revolution. They derived their common identity from their education in modern military academies. They grew up during the change of regimes from Imperial to Republican China. They immersed with Chinese nationalism and believed "strong army the basis of a strong China" ideology.

Contribution to Historiography

By looking through the prism of the Huangpu Military Academy and the roles of Chinese officer corps in the National Revolutionary Army, this dissertation presents the military dimension of the Nationalist Revolution. The main thesis is that the Nationalist Revolution represents not only a political movement of the 1920s but also the continued attempts by the Chinese officer corps to recreate a national army in the context of a new political environment. Although the ideas and structure of the Party Army came from the Guomintang and the Russian Red Army respectively, with the Russian advisers playing an important role in the build-up of the National Revolutionary Army, the development of the Huangpu Military Academy and the Party Army was the result of efforts by the Chinese officer corps. The period 1924-28 was a turning point for Chinese national army and military academy where the relationship between the military and political party was institutionalised. In the Guomintang, the political leadership had since in the hands of military strongmen. In the Chinese Communist Party, the role of the military was formalised but it came under the firm control of the party leadership. Mao's famous dictum: "Power came from the barrels of the guns" but it was the party that controlled the guns and never the other way.

Definitions and Terms

The modern military academy originated from the West. It had three basic characteristics: the use of Western arms, Western battle drills, and a command and staff organisational structure with various supporting arms under its control. In general, there were two basic types of officers' training in the armed forces. Military training schools for officers--military academy for officer cadets to war college for senior officers, junior ranks (non-commissioned officers), and various supporting arm specialists (such as artillery, combat engineers, medical etc. for the army). These training schools usually came under the provincial or central governments control. The other type was unit military training for officers and soldiers. The Model Battalions and Training Regiments, for examples, were used in Chinese armies during the turn of the century. These training units would train sub-units for operations. Unit training would emphasis combat skills from individual field training to section, platoon, company, battalion, and regiment military exercises. In time of exigency, units might also conduct short training courses for officers and other ranks to fulfil the manpower shortage. These kinds of short training courses were most common in the Chinese armies during late Qing and early Republican years.

In this thesis, military academies refer mainly to military training schools under the control of the provincial and capital governments. In early Republican years regional warlords controlled most of the provincial military schools and military schools lost its the importance and appeal as national institutions.

The most common definition of the National Revolutionary Army is the Party Army of the Guomindang. When Guomindang established the National Government in Guangzhou on 1 July 1925, it decided to reorganise its armies and place them under the party control. On 26 August 1925, units loyal to the Guomindang were organised into five corps. These were the original National Reconstruction Army (*Jianguo jun*) which took part in the early Sun Yatsen's Northern Expedition, and units of the Huangpu Military Academy which was part of the First Eastern Expedition forces. It was through the party military academy at Huangpu that the Guomindang gradually established control over the military. However, party control of the army had its limitations. This was clearly manifested in the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident of 1926 and the breakdown of the United Front during the Northern Expedition in 1927.

This thesis defines the National Revolutionary Army as the Guomindang's army but under the leadership of the Chinese officer corps. These officers were the products of modern military academies from both China and abroad. The rally base for this group of officers was the Huangpu Military Academy. Although the Nationalist Revolution of the

1920s was a political movement, the military played a crucial role in this reunification of China. The army played an essential role in Guangdong's unification in 1925 and in the Northern Expedition of 1926-28. The completion of the Northern Expedition ushered in the Nanjing regime until the Japanese invasion in 1937.

New Sources¹⁵

Apart from the Guomindang archives at Yangmingshan in Taipei, there are substantial new Chinese sources on Republican China released from the Nanjing Second Historical Archives in mainland China. These include the 10-volume *Zhongyang lujun junxiao shigao* (Draft history of the central military academy) the official records of Huangpu; the multi-volume *Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian* (Historical materials of the republican China); *Beifa zhenzhong riji* (The war diary of the northern expedition, July 1926 to May 1928), *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao* (A draft chronological biographical of Chiang Kaishek); Guangdong Revolutionary History Museum compiled, two-volume *Huangpu junxiao shiliao*; Zhang Bofeng and Li Zongyi edited, *Beiyang junfa, 1912-1928* (The beiyang warlords, 1912- 1928), six volumes. There are also many memoirs of Huangpu alumni published recently. In addition, personal interviews were conducted during the research field trip to China in 1992-3.

As for Russian sources, C. Martin Wilbur and Lien-ying How, *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927*; and Tony Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Sneevliet* (Alias Maring), 2 vols, contain details of Comintern agents' and Russian military advisers' activities during the 1920s.

Scope

The thesis examines the Huangpu Military Academy and its impact on the making of the National Revolutionary Army. It will study the process of military reforms during Late-Qing and the early Republican years, in particular, the roles of modern military academy and the officer corps. Military training, organisation, leadership, and warfare during the 1920s will also be main subjects of this study.

¹⁵ For a detailed list, see "Notes on Sources of the Huangpu Military Academy and National Revolutionary Army" attached behind the thesis.

study of the development of modern military academies in China and their impact on the Chinese officer corps. It will look at the circumstances under which modern military academy was introduced into China, through the study of the Tianjin Preparation School to the national military educational system. It will highlight two processes: the military modernisation process in China which includes the introduction of modern technology, modern operational doctrine of combined arms tactics and operations in Chinese army; and the process of Chinese Military Nationalism in modern military academies. Military defeats by foreign armed forces in China during the turn of the century and the exposure to foreign military education, especially the concept of the Japanese Meiji Restoration's slogan of "*fukoku kyohai*" (a rich country, a strong soldier) were the key motivations for Chinese military nationalism. *milking*

Chapter Two will discuss Sun Yatsen's contribution to the Huangpu Military Academy. Sun's military thought, the influence of the Russian Revolution and the Civil War on the Guomindang, and the military exchanges between the Russians and the Guomindang will be traced.

Chapter Three will look at the roles of Chiang Kaishek and the Chinese officer corps in establishing the Party military academy and Party army at Huangpu. It will examine sources of finance and arms, training, organisation and key personalities of the Huangpu Military Academy in its first two years. It will also look at the Huangpu army and the circumstances in which the academy turned an army.

Chapter Four, entitled The Emergence of the Party Army, looks at the formation of the Academy Army, the Party Army and the National revolutionary Army in 1924-5. This development coincided with the Guomindang's effort in unifying Guangdong.

Chapter Five will study the military reform of the Guomindang Party Army through the re-organisation of Huangpu into the Central Military Political Academy. This chapter will examine Guomindang efforts to control the National Revolutionary Army in 1926 and its impact on the National Revolutionary Army. The result of party control of the army was a mixed one. Structurally, there was a centralised command and the Guomindang was in control of Guangdong's finance. But actual command of individual corps of the National Revolutionary Army was in the hands of individual commanders.

Chapter Six examines the National Revolutionary Army prior to the Northern Expedition. This chapter looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the original eight corps

of the National Revolutionary Army. Among the eight corps, I and IV were responsive to the central high command, IV and VII Corps had higher fighting capabilities. The National Revolutionary Army prior to the Northern Expedition was a very weak force.

Chapter Seven is about the National Revolutionary Army and the Northern Expedition. It traces the involvement of the National Revolutionary Army in the Northern Expedition during 1926-28. It will examine factors contributing to the success of the expedition and problems faced by the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition.

The final chapter highlights the institutionalisation of the Huangpu's legacy during the post-Northern Expedition period. It will look at the context of the post-Northern Expedition China and discuss the reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army into the Central Army. The setting up of the Central Military Academy, and other military short courses, and the roles of the German advisers in Nanjing will be discussed. It ends the chapter with a discussion of the Huangpu spirit and the Third Party Movement.

Chapter 1: Modern Military Academies and the Emergence of the Officer Corps in China, 1885-1923

The origins of modern military academy could be traced from the late 17th century when European countries began developing permanent national armies although the founding of academies themselves did not begin until the mid-18th century. Until the 20th century, training emphasised the handling of weapons, the drilling and management of men, tactics and strategy, and ceremonial. To accommodate the increasing part played by science, technology, and organisation in modern warfare, the content of the instruction has broadened to include more scientific, technical, and general subjects. At the same time, cadets began to be drawn from much wider social strata than hitherto.¹⁶

One of the first countries to develop a comprehensive and efficient scheme of military education was Prussia. The country had such early brilliant reformers as Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August von Gneisenau, and Carl von Clausewitz and whose complex of military institutions in the 19th century would elicit the respect and often the imitation of other military powers. At the base of the officer-training system were eventually eight cadet schools, more or less for the upper class or elite, and ten war schools for the less select--both training men for commissions. At the apex of the system was the venerable War Academy, or *Kriegs Akademie*, at Berlin, founded in 1810 and offering the highest advanced education for commissioned officers. A great complex of technical and auxiliary schools, such as for cavalry and engineering, filled in the system. After World War I the entire complex was disrupted, though the military tradition persisted.¹⁷

Among the countries that closely imitated the Prussian system were Austria-Hungary, Tsarist Russia, and Japan. The first real military academies in Prussia were established in the mid-19th century. In Japan, the principal schools for the training of officers were the Army Academy founded 1868 and the Naval Academy founded 1869. Immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917, a new centralised Soviet military academy was founded in Moscow, followed by the founding of naval, air,

¹⁶ See Showalter, Dennis E., "Caste, Skill, and Training: The Evolution of Cohesion in European Armies from the Middle Ages to the Sixteenth Century", in *The Training and Socializing of Military Personnel*, edited by Peter Karsten, New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998, 1-25; and Barnard, Henry, "Introduction", in *Military Schools and Courses of Instruction in Science and Art of War*, rev. ed., Henry Barnard editor, reprint of 1872, ed., New York and London: Greenwood Press, 1969.

¹⁷ Barnard, *Military Schools and Courses of Instruction in Science and Art of War*, Part II: Prussia, 27-297.

engineering, and military political academies. In China, the first modern Western-styled military training institution was established in 1885 although the national military academy and a staff college were officially opened only in 1912.

Scholars on modern Chinese history have discussed extensively the unprecedented military expansion of the Chinese army during the turn of the 19th and 20th century and its impact on the politics of the early Republican years.¹⁸ What has been less well acknowledged is that apart from this quantitative growth of military strength, the Chinese officer corps had also undergone a qualitative transformation. The transformation of the officer corps was brought about directly by in the introduction of modern Western-styled military academy. In a short period of 38 years modern military academies were developed from a humble provincial military preparatory school in 1885, to a full-fledged national military academy and a staff college in 1912, together with a whole range of military specialist schools.¹⁹ According to one military observer, by 1906 there were about thirty-five military schools throughout China offering various types and levels of training, with a total enrolment of 6,307 students, including 787 officers and officer-cadets, and about 2,072 non-commissioned officers. In the overseas military institutions, there were another 691 officers and cadets studying in Japan and several European countries.²⁰ By the time of its closure in 1923, the Baoding Military Academy had produced 6,574 military officers (see Table 2).

This chapter aims to examine the development of modern military academies in China from late-Qing to early Republican. It will attempt to ask four basic questions: why did modern military academies introduce in China? Who were the advocates and how did they organise them? What were the events that shape the development? What

¹⁸ Literature on the growth of Chinese army in the Late-Qing and early Republican periods is vast. See for examples, Franz Michael, "Military Organisation and Power Structure of China during the Taiping Rebellion." *Pacific Historical Review* 18, no. 4 (November 1949): 469-483; Luo Ergang, "Qingji bing wei jiang you di qiuyuan (The origins of the personal armies in the late period)." *Zhongguo shehui jingji shi jikan* (Journal of Chinese Social and Economic History) 5, no. 2 (1937): 235-250; Wang Ermin, *Huaijun zhi* (A treatise of the Anhui Army). Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1967; and Ralph L. Powell, *The Rise of the Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955.

¹⁹ See Richard J. Smith, "The Reform of Military Education in Late Ch'ing China, 1842-1895." *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 18 (1978): 16-39; Wang Jiejian, "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang (The establishment and influences of the Beiyang preparatory school)." *Lishi xuebao* (Bulletin of the Historical Research, National Taiwan Normal University), 4 (April 1976): 317-343.

²⁰ Powell, *The Rise of the Chinese Military Power*, 235-6. The author cites a report by the French General Staff in the Second Bureau of the General Staff, "La reorganisation militaire de la Chine." *Revue militaire des armees etrangeres* 67 (March 1906): 242-271.

was the impact of these military academies on Chinese modern history?

Before turning to Chinese military academy some basic concepts and framework may be helpful in the analysis. Education for a profession can only be sensibly discussed in terms of its function in preparing those being educated for roles in the profession. Accordingly, any analysis of the development of the military academy should begin with a brief description of the profession of arms, its duties and skills essential to the practitioners. The literature of Western military sociology has long used the concept of military professionalism for the discussion of military's role in society. Two concepts, in particular, have been widely discussed and could be useful in this study. They are, firstly, the concept of the military as a profession. A profession is usually defined in terms of an occupation whose members possess three characteristics.²¹ The first is "expertise" or "specialised theoretical knowledge", which is the product of education and experience setting them apart from those without such preparation. A second characteristic is "responsibility", or a system of ethics, which guides their behaviour in a social context and involves the performance of a service for the society. The third characteristic is "corporateness", or *esprit de corps*, which constitutes a high degree of consciousness of themselves, and others of the profession, as a group, distinct from other groups. Bengt Abrahamsson has said that this "stems from their collective attachment to certain doctrines and methods".²² Samuel Huntington's classic work on civil-military relations, *The Soldier and the State*, concludes, "the modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern officer a professional man".²³

The other useful analytical tool in the discussion is the concept of military professionalisation. The professionalisation of the officer corps is a relatively recent development brought about by the twin forces of industrial development and modern nationalism. New technology and the more complex forms of organisation that

²¹ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, New York: Random House, 1957, 8-9; Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalism and Political Power*, Beverly Hills: Saga Publications, 1972, p. 15; Gerke Teitler, *The Genesis of the Professional Officers' Corps*, Beverly Hills: Saga Publications, 1977, 6-8; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, New York: The Free Press, 5-7.

²² Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalism and Political Power*, p. 15.

²³ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 7. The analysis of this work has formed part of the foundation for much of the social science work on military organisation. Huntington's argument centred on the concept that the "expertise" of the officer corps is essentially "the management of violence" as stated by Harold Lasswell, "and not the violence itself." The duties of the officer, Huntington states, "include (1) organising, equipping, and training of this force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operations in and out of combat." *Ibid.*, 11-13.

corresponded to it have progressively raised the level of skill required to direct troops in battle. These and other activities related to the management of armed forces could no longer be performed simply as honorific avocation. Thus, officership ceased to be a part-time pursuit and became a lifetime career. Meanwhile, with the emergence of new political forces, armies whose officers were tied to the sovereign by an oath of personal fealty increasingly took on the character of a national military establishment whose officers, even more than the men they led, were responsive to patriotic appeals. To be sure, some ingredients of the old status honour did survive in the codes of professional officers, but their meaning and significance changed once they became assimilated and subordinate to more inclusive notions of duty to people and nation.²⁴

The concept of professionalism provides a useful framework for the analysis of many aspects of the military education and of the officer behaviour. In the case of modern Chinese military, although China did not experience the industrial revolution, she experienced the twin developments of modern military technology and nationalism at the turn of the century. Western-styled military academies were founded to train professional officer corps for the modern warfare. The process of professionalisation also coincided with the development of Chinese nationalism. Events of the 1911 Revolution and the subsequent internal conflicts between the central and the provincial governments had greatly politicised the officer corps.

There are risks, however, in adhering too closely to the method of analysis that has been developed from the European and American armed forces. Although the Chinese military traditionally had been an important political force as almost all dynasties were established by military force, the Chinese military did not enjoy high social status culturally. Despite some well-known military commanders in history, political leadership was the domain of Confucius scholar-officials. In addition, unlike the European nation-states or the independent United States of America where military academies were established on a national basis for a national army, modern military academies in China were provincial based serving primarily provincial armies. It was only after the beginning of the twentieth century that efforts were made to create a modern army and a national military education system. This effort of creating a centralised national army through a centralised military education system suffered a large setback following the 1911 Revolution. The closure of the Baoding Military Academy, the first national military academy, in 1923 marked a complete collapse of

²⁴ The development of professionalism has been a major theme in many historical studies of the officers in particular nations, such as M. Kitchen, *The German Officer Corps, 1800-1914*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968; M.A. Lewis, *England's Sea Officer: The Story of the Naval Profession*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1939; A. Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, 2nd ed., New York: Meridian Books, 1959.

the plan.

It is in this context this chapter aims to examine Chinese military academies. It will first look at the decline of the Qing central armies and attempts to rebuild the armies at the provinces. The process coincided with the introduction of modern military technology and military academies to China. Although the plan for creating a national army did not materialise military academies were built throughout the country in the 1920s. Military academies became political bases for various power groups and their products--the officer corps--the political brokers in early Republican China.

Decline of the Qing Central Armies

Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the Qing dynasty's regular army, *qing zhi jun* (nationally instituted army), consisted of two main forces. The first was the Banner Army (*baqi*, literally the "eight banners") established before the Manchu conquest of the China proper.²⁵ The Banner Army derived its name from the individual "banners," or units each with its own distinctive coloured flag. The membership of the Banners was hereditary and originally reserved for the Manchu but later expanded to include Mongols and the Han Chinese in the course of military conquest into the central China. For most of the Qing period, the Manchu soldiers outnumbered both the Mongols and Han by about three to one. By the mid-nineteenth century the Banners probably had about 250,000 soldiers, including some 10,000 officers and an additional 45,000 supernumeraries and retainers.²⁶ As most of the Banner Army was deployed in garrisons around Beijing or along the northern frontiers protecting the Manchu homeland and key strategic locations, it was considered as the national guard.

The other regular imperial army of the Qing armies was known collectively as the Army of the Green Standard (*luying*). It was formed after the Manchu conquest of China from the remnants of the Ming dynasty originally an auxiliary military force, it

²⁵ The most detailed English-language treatment of the Qing's Eight Banner and Green Standard armies is Thomas Wade, "The Army of the Chinese Empire." *The Chinese Repository* 20, no. 5-7 (May 1851): 250-280; 300-340; 363-422. For the Chinese sources see Luo Ergang, *Luying bingzhi* (A treatise of the Green Standard Army). Chongqing: 1945; for recent works, see Richard J. Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-nineteenth Century, 1850-1860." *Journal of Asian History* 7 (1974): 122-161; Liu Kwang-ching and Richard J. Smith, "The Military Challenge: The North-west and the Coast." *The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Volume 11, Part 2*, 202-273. Editors John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

²⁶ Fang Chao-ying, "A Technique for Estimating the Numerical Strength of the Early Manchu Military Forces." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 13 (1950): 208; Robert H.G. Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970, 24-33.

was created to preserve order in the provinces. The officers of these units could be either Manchu or Han, but enlisted soldiers were Han. The soldier's tenure of the Green Standard army was hereditary, and the system was called *shibing*.²⁷ The Green Standard forces were distributed in small numbers throughout China, and by the nineteenth century their numbers probably totalled about 660,000.²⁸ Although the Green Standard Army was over twice as large as the Banner Army, the Banner Army's garrisons were larger. They were deployed in key strategic points to protect the imperial court and check upon the more fragmented Green Standard forces as well.²⁹

The Banner Army began to decline soon after the Manchu had conquered China. The quality of Banner officers suffered as talented Manchus found better career opportunities within the dynasty's civil administration, leaving less able men to command the Banner forces. With fewer wars to fight, sedentary garrison life also quickly blunted the military skills and martial ardour that had originally characterised the frontier soldiers of the Banner Army. Banner soldiers, were forbidden to leave military service for other occupations. Yet, they were also demoralised by policies that kept their pay constant despite rising prices. By the mid-eighteenth century the Banner Army had become an indolent force that could no longer be relied on to meet the dynasty's defensive needs.³⁰

The Green Standard forces maintained their effectiveness for a longer period, but standards also decline when officers who ignored military training and lined their pockets from their men's which was already very low pay. In order to survive, Green Standard soldiers were forced to moonlight; often they simply deserted. This only encouraged officers who embezzled further and maintained the fiction of full-strength units. By the nineteenth century, many Green Standard units were reduced to one-half and in extreme cases to one-sixth, of their official size.³¹

²⁷ Under the system of *shibing* the father joined the service for life and the sons were put on reserve. When the father retired at the age of sixty, the son then entered the active service. The hereditary soldiers, whose files were kept in the Board of War, were distinguished from the common people. A military career became a hereditary profession.

²⁸ Luo Ergang, *Luying bingzhi* (A treatise of the Green Standard Army), p. 2.

²⁹ At different times, the official number of Banner Army troops ranged from around 170,000 to almost 300,000 men, while the Green Standard Army varied from 590,000 to 660,000 men. The actual rather than official number of troops was often considerably less in both forces. See Powell, *op. cit.*, 11-13.

³⁰ Wu Wei-ping, "The Development and Decline of the Eight Banners", Ph.D dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1969, 75-112.

³¹ Michael, "Regionalism," xxxiii-xxxv; Luo Ergang, *Xiangjun xinshi* [A new record of the Xiang Army] (Changsha: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1939), 2-15.

The serious consequences of the decline of the Qing army did not become fully apparent until the nineteenth century, when the dynasty faced a series of external and internal military threats. The White Lotus uprising of 1802 in Hubei and Sichuan, for example, had exposed the impotence of the Qing regular armies. Instead, it was the militias (*tuanlian*) and more highly militarised local mercenary corps (*xiangyong*, literally "village braves") raised by local elite for community self-defence that eventually suppressed the rebels.³² Externally the Opium War (1839-42) initiated a period of more forceful Western pressure on China to open up to foreign trade and religions. China's defeat in this war exposed the weak and demoralised condition of its armies and raised questions about the Qing dynasty's ability to provide more than minimal defence, but Western military threats were for a time blunted by treaty concessions.

Zeng Guofan and the Xiang Army

A more serious challenge came from a series of internal rebellions, the most significant of which was the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64). In 1850 when the Taipings first initiated their uprising, the Green Standard army was again proved to be no match for the rebels. The Jiangnan headquarters of the Green Standard army was twice routed. The steady defeat of both Banner and Green Standard forces by Taiping armies endangered the very existence of the dynasty and the court's attention was drawn to the only forces that showed some success against the rebels, namely, the militia. The central government, in the past, did not sanction local paramilitary units because of concern that the militia could potentially become landlord vigilantes. The leaders of local militia were often members of the local gentry and sometimes even connected with local secret societies and gangsters.³³ They came from the same social stratum that produced the Taiping leaders such as Hong Xiuquan and his cousin Feng Yunshan. If the Qing court were to name the official gentry³⁴ as militia leaders, the upper gentry

³² Luo Ergang argues that the Banner forces were ineffective as early as the time of the White Lotus Rebellion at the end of the eighteenth century. The Green Standard's decline followed and this was thoroughly exposed at the time of the Opium War. See his "*Qingji bing wei jiang you di qiyuan* (The origins of the personal armies in the late period)", 237-240.

³³ For example, the Society of God Worshipers (*Baishangdi hui*) which was established by the Taiping leaders was in contact with the anti-Manchu Triad Society that was active in southern and central China. Though differences in creed and practice prevented any formal merger, the Triad members joined as individuals which required them to disavow earlier triad commitments and accept the Society's religious tenets. Later, the Taiping's accepted tactical alliances with the Triads and others. This form of alliance is typical of Chinese power games.

³⁴ There are several definitions of the gentry. Chang Chung-li in his work divides the gentry into two strata. The lower gentry includes those who passed the first level of examinations, those who purchased their academic title, and certain other holders of minor titles. The upper gentry comprises the holders of

might transform their militia into the constituents of a provincial military machine. In normal time such risk was considered too great. But during the Taiping Rebellion, besides the impotent of the regular armies, there was an additional factor that convinced the central government that it could rely on the official gentry against the rebels. The Taipings were not only fighting against the imperial government, they were engaged in a crusade to establish a new order, at least in the beginning, which was anti-Confucian and anti-gentry. It was seen as a threat to Confucian culture and the dynasty that claimed to preserve it. Believing that the gentry's allegiance was secure because of these circumstances, the throne decided in late 1852 to appoint the first of 43 militia commissioners from among high officials home on leave. The appointment of the imperial commissioners (*qiuchai dachen*) was the first important step toward the formation of the regional armies to fight the rebels.³⁵

One of these commissioners, and the most important person in the subsequent development of new military forces, was Zeng Guofan. Returning to his native Hunan in 1852, Zeng realised that purely local-level militarisation would be insufficient to defeat the Taipings. While retaining the impression that he was simply promoting militia recruitment, Zeng set about creating a new and larger military organisation. He was not only absorbing local mercenary corps but also recruiting new soldiers. Zeng eventually raised over 130,000 men for his Xiang (Hunan) Army. This army became the model for the formation of other similar forces, the most important of which was Li Hongzhang's Huai (Anhui) Army. These new forces, the *yongying* (literally "brave battalions"), provided the military power that finally ended the mid-century rebellions and restored peace to the empire.³⁶

Militarily, the Xiang Army was modelled on the well-known Ming general Qi

higher examinations degrees and those holding official titles, whether in combination with or without higher degrees. The basic difference between these two groups is that only the upper gentry qualified for appointment to office, the lower gentry to purchase office or pass higher examinations. The status differences between these two groups were made clear in every aspect of life. See Chang, Chung Li. *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on their Role in the Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955, 5-8.

³⁵ For a discussion of the preservation of the Confucian culture and social system as a factor in the Qing's suppression of the Taiping rebellion, see Xi Yan, "Wu ben zhe lie, you ben zhe chang: Xiang jun, Taiping jun yu wenhua chuantong" (The cultural tradition and the armies of Xiang and Taiping), *Yuandao*, 1 (1995).

³⁶ For studies of the Xiang Army and the Huai Army, see Luo Ergang's *Xiangjun xinzhì* and Wang Ermin's *Huaijun zhi* [Treatise on the Huai Army] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1967). Philip A. Kuhn's *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarisation and social Structure, 1796-1864* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970) shows that the *yongying* represented a new form of military organisation, correcting the tendency of many scholars to view them simply as enlarged militia.

Jiguang. Qi was disillusioned by the ineffectiveness of the hereditary Ming garrison forces against the Japanese pirates, so he reorganised and re-trained them into a fighting fit army.³⁷ Taking Qi's method as his model, Zeng attempted to do likewise with the Xiang Army. Zeng's military organisation and training emphasised smaller but effective tactical units; rigorous standards for recruitment and selection; the fostering of personal loyalties within a tight command structure; and strict discipline and training. In short, the emphasis was on command and control of troops, rather than on weaponry or tactics.

Unit cohesion was given high priority in the formation of the Xiang army. Departing from the bureaucratic structure of the regular military system, the Xiang and Yong commanders often chose their subordinate officers from among relatives, friends, or classmates. These commanders then elected subordinate staff and commanders, who in turn, personally supervised the recruitment of their soldiers. Reflecting this contact based organisation, these units at the lowest level were often identified by the names of the men who both recruited and led them. These units were in fact so closely identified with the individual leaders who formed them that they often had to be disbanded upon their deaths. In addition, soldiers of individual *yongying* units were usually recruited from specific localities, and the army as a whole came from a particular region or province. Close personal ties among officers, and between officers and their men were encouraged.

Officer candidates were carefully screened and included a high percentage of literati. The selected officers were relatively well paid. As for the rank and file soldiers, preference was given to those with peasant backgrounds. They were considered hardworking, hardy and obedient.³⁸ Soldiers were treated decently and strict moral standards accompanied by neo-Confucian indoctrination were imposed on officers and ordinary soldiers.

To finance his army, Zeng realised that the usual revenue sources for the militia, namely contributions from the wealthy gentry in an area, would be inadequate,

³⁷ For Qi Jiguang's effort against Japanese pirates, see James F. Millinger, *Chi Ch'i-kuang*, chapter 2.

³⁸ A gentry officer and peasant soldiers combination had been a constant feature in both the Taiping and the Xiang armies. The preference for peasant soldiers was sometimes interpreted as proletarians' participation in the peasant movement by Marxist historians. But in most instances, it was for practical military rather than ideological consideration that peasants were considered good material soldier. For more information on Zeng's Xiang Army, see Wang Kaiyun, *Xiangjun zhi* (A treatise of Hunan Army). Taipei: Wenyan Publisher, 1964, 443-4.

especially since he intended to pay his troops well.³⁹ Zeng therefore was obliged from the start to resort to a variety of fiscal expedients, the most notable being a new excise tax, the *lijin*.⁴⁰ The increase in revenue allowed Zeng in bringing various local militia units together into a large organisation, giving them a unified strategic direction, and providing them with access to broader sources of financial support.

Zeng's contributions, in the words of one scholar, can be summarised as follows: "...his unique clarity of orientation, added to his high official connections, provided a standard around which he could rally the ablest of the provincial elite. His deep-rooted neo-Confucianism, added to Qi Jiguang's scheme of military organisation, provided a framework within which personal loyalties could be reconciled with central command."⁴¹ Although the Xiang Army eventually failed to achieved the ideal that Zeng and his followers envisaged, it represented a marked improvement over the Banner and the Green Standard forces. The success of Zeng's Xiang Army was highly praised and was endorsed by the imperial court as a standard and model for all the rest of Chinese armies.⁴²

Li Hongzhang and Western Military Training

During the Taiping Rebellion, foreign military forces were involved in the protection of installations and counter-rebellion campaigns. The British and French troops played a significant role in the defence of Shanghai up to 1862. Western nations also offered military training and equipment. The Chinese leader who was responsible for co-ordinating this effort was Li Hongzhang. Li was then still below the age of forty but was already on his way to a long and prestigious career.⁴³ His first major

³⁹ Although Zeng held a special commission from the throne to oversee the organising of the militia in Hunan, for several years after he had launched his army, Zeng was not assigned any official post in the regular bureaucratic hierarchy of the province which would allow him to tap this conventional of revenue.

⁴⁰ Introduced in 1853, the *lijin* was essentially a transit tax on various commodities. Because it was a new tax no yet under the control of the central government, it was a flexible fiscal instrument. For a detailed discussion of *lijin*, see Luo Yudong, *Zhongguo lijin shi* (History of China's *lijin*), Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936.

⁴¹ Philip Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China*, p. 167.

⁴² Zeng's methods of organising and managing the army were subsequently documented by Cai E in the *Zeng Hu zhibing yulu zhushi* (Interpretation of Zeng Guofan and Hu Runzhi military quotations) when he was commanding the Yunnan Army. Chiang Kaishek re-edited and reprinted the book while he was the Commandant of the Huangpu Military Academy in 1924. This book was a training manual for the commanders, staff and students of Huangpu.

⁴³ References on Li Hongzhang see *Li Wenzhong gong quanji* (Complete Papers of Li Hongzhang). Nanjing, Shanghai and Taipei: Commercial Press, reprint of 1908, Nanjing; Wenhai, 1962; Spector,

assignment came in 1861 when he was put in charge of an army formed recently out of units from Zeng's Xiang Army. As the majority of the soldiers were recruited in the Huai River valley, this army was known as the Huai Army. In 1862, Li's force was shipped to Shanghai with the help of British transports and Li took over command of the Shanghai's defence. The imperial court concurrently appointed him as the governor of the neighbouring Jiangsu province. By mid-May of 1862, the Huai Army had gone into action, operating in close conjunction with the American adventurer Frederick Townsend Ward's small independent unit of some 200-300 men.⁴⁴ In the summer, Li's units were also aided by the participation of regular British and French forces. Though frequently outnumbered, this combination of forces repeatedly thwarted Taiping efforts to capture Shanghai. Foreign mercenaries also played an active role when the Chinese forces moved to regain eastern Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces. Frederick T. Ward was wounded in late September in a battle at Ningpo. Henry Burgevine, and then a British officer, Major Charles Gordon took his place. Major Gordon assumed command on 24 March 1863 of the "Ever-Victorious Army" numbering 5,000 to 6,000 men. This force operated under the general command of Li Hongzhang.⁴⁵

The better than expected performance of the combined forces impressed the imperial Qing government and convinced them of the value of Western training. In 1865, six Green Standard units were chosen from the capital for Western-style training in Zhili. They were equipped with modern arms and trained in the Western battle drill. These units were known as the Disciplined Force (*Lianjun*, or the retrained army). In addition, an imperial edict of 1862 directed Zeng Guofan and others to select a group of officers for training by foreign officers stationed at Shanghai and Ningpo. These officers were assigned to take over the roles played by foreigners in the "Ever-Victorious Army". At this point, Li wanted to send officers to the US Military Academy at West Point, and explore the possibility of establishing a military school in China with the help of the American general Emory Upton, but the plans did not

Stanley. *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964; and Bland, John O. P. *Li Hung-Chang*. New York: Constable, 1917.

⁴⁴ For accounts of the Western military involvement in China during the Taiping Rebellion see Richard J. Smith, *Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China*. New York: Millwood, 1978; Robert Rantoul, *Frederick Townsend Ward*. Salem: The Essex Institute, 1980; and for French military, the diary of a French commander of the "Ever-Triumphant Army" see Steven A. Leibo, *A Journal of the Chinese Civil War 1864 By Prosper Giquel*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985.

⁴⁵ For Charles Gordon, Richard J. Smith, *Mercenaries and Mandarins*; Bernard Allen, *Gordon in China*. London: Macmillan, 1933; and Demetris Boulger Demetris. *The Life of Gordon*. London: T.F. Unwin, 1896.

materialise.⁴⁶

By the mid-1870s, although Li was fully aware of the value of a modern military education, his priority then was to train a small group of Chinese officers to take over the foreigners' roles in the army. However, this need, was in sufficient to justify the cost of establishing a military academy then. Li sent the first group of Chinese officers to the German *Kriegsschulen* for training in 1876.⁴⁷ Seven officers were selected from the Huai Army, and a German instructor named Lehmayr accompanied them. Li planned to employ these officers as instructors in the Huai Army upon their return. However, this plan fell short of expectations. Of the seven sent to Germany for training, two were recalled before they completed their three-year course because of frivolous attitude and poor progress. One became sick and died, and only three successfully completed the course. One of the three, Wang Desheng, stayed on in Germany until 1881, receiving additional specialised training in Berlin. Wang was later to emerge as a prominent figure in the Huai Army commanding Li's crack personal guard unit *Jinjun*. Wang eventually achieved the rank of *zongbing*, the commander-in-chief.⁴⁸ In the meantime, Li continued to hire a small group of French and Germans as instructors.

Financial constraint was important in limiting Li's military reform efforts. His incessant struggle against declining revenues has been amply documented.⁴⁹ During the 1870s, the entire Huai Army's annual income averaged well above three million taels but in the late 1880s, it had dwindled to less than two-and-a-half million. The high cost of modern arms forced Li to continue paying his army three-quarters of their original salaries, leaving one quarter in permanent arrears paid upon retirement. In addition, the central government also sought to oversee some army expenditures such

⁴⁶ Sending Chinese students to West Point did not materialise because of the American Civil War. The proposal by Emory Upton to establish a military academy in China was rejected by Li as it was too expensive. Upton's proposed to employ nine professors and instructors from the United States, and to have a six-year program of instruction in English. Charles Gordon in 1880 also urged Li to set up a military academy. See Holcombe, Chester. *China's Past and Future*. London: 1904, 82-3; Michie, Peter. *The Life and Letters of Emory Upton*. New York: 1885, 309-310; *Li Wenzhong gong quanji* (Complete Papers of Li Hongzhang), "Letters to Zongli Yamen", 4: 39a-41a.

⁴⁷ *Qing shigao*, Bing, Chapter 3.

⁴⁸ See Wang Ermin. *Huaijun zhi* (A treatise of the Anhui Army). Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1967, p. 203; *Li Wenzhong gong quanji* (Complete Papers of Li Hongzhang), "Letters to Zongli Yamen", 4:39-43 and "Memorials", 27: 4-5.

⁴⁹ Spector, *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army*, chapter 7; Wang Ermin, *Huaijun zhi* (A treatise of the Anhui Army), 275-290.

as transport, fuel and the wages of *changfu* labourers as legitimate disbursements.⁵⁰

Military Self-Strengthening

Despite the dynasty's eventual success in quelling internal rebellions, the defeat in the Anglo-Chinese War in 1860 was a reminder of its continued vulnerability to foreign threats. Even as they emerged as the dynasty's strongest forces, the Xiang and Huai armies remained vastly inferior to the foreign armies. Therefore, as part of a more general program of self-strengthening, the dynasty approved a number of measures aimed at revitalising its armed forces through the adoption of Western armaments. The Tongzhi Restoration, as it was called, was launched in 1862 and extended to the 1870s. It sought to introduce Western technology, especially in the military realm to strengthen its military against internal and external threats.⁵¹

The Qing dynasty's military self-strengthening was a comprehensive effort that involved both its naval and land defences. On the naval side these efforts entailed the creation of a modern navy based on the Western model. By the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, this new navy, commonly known as the Beiyang Navy, consisted of sixty-five warships and forty-three torpedo boats.⁵²

Efforts to strengthen the dynasty's land forces focused primarily on the introduction of modern Western military weaponry into established forces. Some *yongying* had been partially equipped with Western arms during their struggle against domestic rebellions. With the restoration of peace, some efforts were made to arm all armies including the Green Standard and the Banner forces with modern weaponry.

The Chinese also constructed arsenals and factories to produce modern weapons and ammunition to reduce their dependence on foreign armament sources. By 1894 there were nearly ten such arsenals. The most famous was the Jiangnan Arsenal,

⁵⁰ *Changfu* were labourers recruited by the individual battalions numbered around 100-150 each, to assist in the unit operations. This system was implemented by Zeng Guofan during the counter-Taiping rebellion as a form of logistics soldiers. See Wang Ermin, *Huaijun zhi*, 284-9.

⁵¹ For the Tongzhi Restoration, see Mary C. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung Chih Restoration, 1862-1874*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957; and Chen Tao ed. *Tongzhi zhongxing jingwai zouji yuebian* (Compilation of Tongzhi Restoration Memorials). Taipei: Wenhai, reprint of the 1875 edition, 1966; Kuo Ting-Yee and Liu Kwang-Ching. "Self-Strengthening: The Pursuit of Western Technology." *Cambridge History of China*, vol. 10, part 1, 491-542, Cambridge University Press, 1978.

⁵² For an account of the naval development during this period, see John L. Rawlinson, *China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967.

established by Li Hongzhang at Shanghai in 1867.⁵³ The production of these arsenals, however, was uneven and never completely met the needs of China's armies. In the end, many Chinese soldiers, especially those in unreconstructed old-style forces, continued to be armed with traditional weapons.

Tianjin Military Preparatory School

The Tianjin Military Preparatory School (*Tianjin wubei xuetaang*) was the first army training school that adopted a Western military training syllabus and method.⁵⁴ Its organisation, finance, enrolment and management policies were in many ways, similar to its navy counterparts, the Fuzhou Navy Yard and Tianjin Naval School established before it.⁵⁵ But its aim was different from the Tianjin Naval School. Li established the naval school in 1880 to prepare for the formation of the Beiyang Navy that was to be formed in 1885. This was not the case for the Tianjin Military School. Li's main aim in setting up the Tianjin Military School was to upgrade military skills and knowledge and to attract a pool of talents to serve in the army.⁵⁶

The Tianjin Preparatory Military School was first proposed by two of Li Hongzhang's trusted lieutenants Zhou Shengchuan and Zhou Shengbo.⁵⁷ The Zhou's brothers commanded one of the best units of the Li's Huai Army, the 10,000 strong the Sheng Army, *Shengjun*. From their long association with Li, dating from the Taiping period, Zhou Shengchuan was convinced of the value of Western training and arms,

⁵³ For the introduction of Western arms and a survey of Chinese arsenals, see Wang Ermin, *Qingji bingong ye de xingqi* (The rise of defence industry of the Qing period), Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1978; and Thomas L. Kennedy, *The Arms of Kiangnan: Modernisation and the Chinese Ordnance Industry, 1860-1895*, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1978.

⁵⁴ The military preparatory school, *Wubei xuetaang*, refers to provincial military school set up during 1885-1906. The course duration was about two to three years and designed initially for in-service officers to be trained in the Western military tactics and operations. But since late 1890s it started to train fresh recruits. The most detailed study of the Tianjin Military School so far is Wang Jiejian, "Beiyang wubei xuetaang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang (The establishment and influences of the Beiyang preparatory school)", *Lishi xuebao* (Bulletin of the Historical Research, National Taiwan Normal University), no. 4 (April 1976).

⁵⁵ For the Tianjin Naval School see Liu Kwang-ching and Richard J. Smith. "The Military Challenge: The North-west and the Coast." *The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911*, Volume 11, Part 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, 247-250.

⁵⁶ Li Hongzhang, *Li Wenzhong gong quanji* (Complete Papers of Li Hongzhang). Taipei: Wenhai, 1968. Memorials 35: 33; and 53: 42-3.

⁵⁷ Zhou Shengchuan, *Zhou Wuchuan gong yiji* (Zhou Shengchuan's papers, posthumously collected), 1, 4: 36b-32; Wang Jiejian. "Beiyang wubei xuetaang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang (The establishment and influences of the Beiyang preparatory school)".

and he took pride in his knowledge of Western military science and technology.⁵⁸ But Zhou resisted any suggestions by foreign advisers to modify the military system or command structure.⁵⁹ Zhou lauded the paternalism and interpersonal rapport that characterised the Huai Army. He in fact, employed many relatives in his own units. Despite his great admiration for the skill and knowledge of foreign-trained officers such as Jia Lianbiao, one of China's first three returned German-trained officers, Zhou did not recommend him for higher appointments in the Green Standard Army. Zhou took pains to point out that foreign-trained officers trusted only by their own commanders and not well accepted in other units, even in the Huai Army. In addition, Zhou also lamented that although Western arms were used, the spirit of the Western drill had not permeated the Chinese armies. The Huai Army officers had an inherited distaste for the active involvement in drill, especially the Western-styled drill.⁶⁰ Zhou was unsuccessful in getting his battalion and company officers to involve in training despite repeated warnings. Zhou admitted in several occasions during the early 1880s that his vaunted *Shengjun* had declined after two decades of existence. He complained that the experienced officers lacked vigour while the new and brave officers lacked knowledge.⁶¹ Zhou's difficulty in maintaining the standard of the Huai Army during peacetime was typical of Chinese armies. The Chinese officer corps constantly sought to identify with the civil officials and higher civil offices in the imperial bureaucracy. To be in high command, one sought advancement not so much in military appointments but in the civil service offices, just like Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, Zuo Zhongtang and many other civil officials who held both high civil and military offices. Chinese military officers did not value too greatly military expertise and professionalism and did not regard a military career as a permanent profession. In any case, to halt this declining trend in the Huai Army, Zhou suggested to Li Hongzhang shortly before his death, that a foreign-style military school be established.⁶² Zhou was apparently fearful of upsetting vested interests within the Huai Army, he proposed that only selected officers in the Huai Army needed to train there.

⁵⁸ In his writings, Zhou exhibited a very progressive outlook in that he appreciated not only Western weapons and tactics but also certain aspects of Western science and medicine. See *Zhou Wuchuan gong yiji*, 1.1.2: 17b-18; Wang Ermin. *Huaijun zhi*, 146-7.

⁵⁹ For example, on the question of universal conscription, although Zhou was fully aware of the system practiced in France and Germany, he ruled out the possibility of adopting it in China.

⁶⁰ *Zhou Wuchuan gong yiji*, "Supplement", 1: 14b, 20, 23b, 35b-37b; 1.4: 36b-37.

⁶¹ *Zhou Wuchuan gong yiji*, 1.1: 19b; 1.1.2: 41b-42; 2.2: 22b.

⁶² Wang Jiejian. "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang", 3-4; 23-24.

There were additional factors favourable to setting up a new training school. Zhou's proposal came at a time of the Sino-French War (1884-85) where there was a demand for military officers. There was also a group of German officers in Tianjin who had completed their assignments. This group of German officers provided the necessary Western instructors to assist in the new military training school. Li Hongzhang took up Zhou's proposal and the school was soon established.

Three types of courses were offered in the Tianjin Military School. A one-year (but later extended to two) short course for in-service Huai Army officers. The first class of about one hundred and fifty men was selected from various units of the Huai army stationed in Zhili (Hebei), Guangdong, Guangxi, Sichuan and some units of the Green Standard who were trained in Western drills (*Lianjun*). It also included some civil officials who were "willing to learn about military affairs".⁶³ The basic requirements for entry were good health, intelligence and literacy. This course offered training in artillery, infantry, cavalry and engineering. The second type was the five-year course offered to those without prior military training. Students were recruited from outside the army aged between thirteen and sixteen. There were forty students in the first course that began in the spring of 1887. In the first three years, the emphasis was on general education. The main subjects included Chinese studies and history, mathematics, foreign languages, astronomy, geography, natural sciences, surveying and drafting. The last two years of the course were mainly military subjects that included weapon studies, tactics, military strategy, fortifications, operational procedure and drill. In 1890, railway engineering and administration was included.⁶⁴ This was to meet the manpower demand for the construction of Luhan railway line. The third type of course was only for the Manchu Banner officers and the members of the royal family.⁶⁵

Foreign instructors were responsible for the instruction in Tianjin Military School. The classroom lessons conducted by the German instructors were extremely slow and painful. A typical classroom lesson would require three persons: the German instructor would give the lesson in German, a Chinese translator would translate into Chinese, and a Chinese instructor would write it down and then explain it to the class. In a single lesson, about 300 to 400 words were said yet the process was usually

⁶³ *Ibid.*, "Memorials", 53: 43.

⁶⁴ Wang Jiejian. "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang", p. 4.

⁶⁵ The Tianjin Military School was the predecessor of the Manchu Military School set up at the turn of the century.

confusing and chaotic due to difficulties in translating technical terms and lack of preparation. Apart from the classroom lessons, field-training exercises formed an important part of the curriculum. Two garrison camps, one in Weihaiwei (Port Arthur) and the other in Shanghaiguan were used for this purpose. In addition, students were attached to active units for real operations. In 1891, for example, it was reported that students were sent to the front line to observe actual battles against rebel forces at Jehol and elsewhere.⁶⁶

They were three main departments in the military school, the superintendent office, the faculty, and the general affairs office. The faculty was the largest department, which included the Chinese and foreign instructors, translators and drill instructors. The foreign instructors were all Germans numbered about twelve. The first superintendent was Yang Zonglian, a civil official with a rank of *taotai*. Although Yang had served under Li Hongzhang and was experienced in administering the Huai Army, the Germans did not respect him. In 1889, after a serious conflict with the chief German instructor, Major Richter, who threatened to resign if the problem was not resolved, Yang left the military school. After that, the post of the superintendent was left vacant for many years.⁶⁷

The main financial source for the Tianjin Military School came from the Beiyang maritime defence budgets with annual operational costs of 50,000 taels.⁶⁸ The highest expenditure of the school was the salary of the instructors and students' subsidies.

In addition to the Tianjin Military School, Li Hongzhang had also sent a group of five artillery graduates to Germany for advanced studies in 1889. They were Duan Qirui, Wu Tingyuan, Shang Dechuan, Kung Qingtang and Xi Yuzao. After about a year of instruction at the military academy in Berlin, they were attached to the Krupp factory in Essen for practical lessons on gunnery and construction of fortifications.⁶⁹

The Tianjin Military School was in operation for sixteen years. It trained about 1,500 officers from 1885 to 1900. Most of the graduates were appointed as military instructors in various units and the better ones were retained in the school. Although

⁶⁶ Wang Jiejian. *Op. cit.*, pp. 8, 10.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁶⁸ Li Hongzhang. *Li Wenzhong gong quanji*, "Memorials", 63, 64, 70, 71; Wang Jiejian. "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang", p. 7.

⁶⁹ Wang Jiejian. "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang", 8-9.

plagued by poor management, limited finances, problems with foreign instructors, and difficulty in attracting young talents to attend the course, it survived until 1900. In that year, the Boxer rebels destroyed the school premises and this brought the military school to its final closure.

The Tianjin Military Academy had achieved little in terms of upgrading modern military skills. The overall standard of military training was poor. Modern weapons were generally inadequate and lacked standardisation. Cavalry training were superficial, as there were insufficient horses to conduct any meaningful training.⁷⁰ The military defeat during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 testified to basic weaknesses of the Chinese armies and the war almost wiped-out the entire Huai Army.

The impact of the Tianjin Military School, however, was stronger in the political and social fields. The new content of military education, which emphasized modern military techniques, qualified graduates to assume the role of military experts. Although their number was small and did not play any significant role initially, the graduates of the Tianjin Military School were the pioneers of the professional military officers. In the post-1895 military build-up and the formation of the New Army, the Tianjin graduates occupied the front rows of the new military establishment. According to one account, among a group of thirty prominent military leaders in the early Republic, twenty-five of them had attended the Tianjin Military School and later served in the Yuan Shikai's New Army during the period of 1895-99.⁷¹

The Tianjin Military School also helped to forge a common identity and allowed greater career mobility among its graduates. Before the Tianjin Military School, military officers in the Chinese armies came mainly from the rank and file. Their identity had always been with the units in which they served rather than with the officer corps as a whole. By attending courses in Tianjin where officers from various units were put together, studying under the same roof and living in the same quarters for two years or more, the comradeship, and above all, the qualification of a trained-professional military officer would provide a common identity among them.⁷² This

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁷¹ Other than the first class graduate such as Duan Qirui, subsequent courses graduates included Cao Kun, Sun Chuanfang and Wu Peifu. This was the so-called "Xiaozhan clique". They were not only furnished the leadership but also marked the beginning of the two big factions of the northern Beiyang Army, the Zhili and Anhui cliques. During the 1911 revolution, they showed remarkable unity in giving support first to the Manchu throne and later to Yuan Shikai. See Chen, Jerome. "Defining Chinese Warlords and their Factions." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 31, no. 3 (July 1968): 575.

⁷² Before the Tianjin Military School, military training in the Xiang and Huai Armies was on a

marked the formation of the modern military-officer corps in China. In addition, being a modern military school, Tianjin provided a common basis of professional education which allowed more readily the modern principle and practice of inter-postings of officers, at least within Yuan Shikai's armies. This was a significant departure from the Xiang and Huai armies' practices.⁷³

The Guangdong Naval & Military School

Zhang Zhidong was another key reformer and one of the prime movers of the Qing government policy.⁷⁴ He had been the governor of Guangdong, Jiangsu and governor-general of Hubei-Hunan for nearly thirty years since the mid-1880s. He was one of the earliest and most enthusiastic advocates of modern military school and was keen to send Chinese students to overseas, especially Japan, for further training and education. Zhang's efforts in promoting military schools in central and southern China had long and lasting effects on the development of military school in modern China.

Apart from the Tianjin Military School, the Guangdong Naval and Military School was the other modern military school established before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. In 1885, Zhang Zhidong began to employ German instructors in his newly organised *Changshengjun*, the Guangdong Victorious Army. Two years later, to "entice men from good families" into the new officer corps in Guangdong, he founded the Naval and Military School at Huangpu, near Guangzhou, the venue of the 1920s' Huangpu Military Academy. Although Zhang, in theory, felt that naval and military training were equally important, in practice he placed greater emphasis on the navy because of the Guangdong's long coastline. The naval part of the school was modeled after the Fuzhou Naval School and Tianjin Naval School. It drew some of its early faculty and students from both institutions. Wu Zhongxiang, who had served for ten years as the chief administrator at the Fuzhou Naval School and had assisted Li Hongzhang in setting up the Tianjin Naval School, became the first director of the

battalion basis; officers and men from different battalions had never attended training together. As the saying went: "jiang yu jiang bu xiang xi, bing yu bing bu xiang zhi" (officers from different units did not meet each other and their soldiers did not know each other either), *Xiangjun zhi*, vol. 20, p. 1.

⁷³ For details see Mackinnon, Stephen R. "The Peiyang Army, Yuan Shih-kai, and the Origins of Modern Chinese Warlordism." *Journal of Asian Studies* XXXII, no. 3 (1973): 415-422.

⁷⁴ For Zhang Zhidong's biography and reform programs see Xu Tongxin. *Zhang wenxiang gong nianpu* (Chronological biography of Zhang Zhidong), 10 juan. Shanghai: Shangwu, 1944; *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji* (Complete works of Zhang Zhidong). Wang Shudan ed., reprint, Taipei: Wenhai, 1963; William Ayers, *Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971; and Bays, Daniel H. *China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-Tung and the Issues of A New Age, 1895-1909*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1978.

naval division of the Guangdong Naval and Military School. Like Li Hongzhang's Tianjin Military School, Zhang followed the German model and offered courses in artillery, infantry, cavalry and military engineering. It also offered foreign languages--German and English--and the best graduates were sent abroad for advanced courses.⁷⁵

While Li Hongzhang's military school at Tianjin would not allow students to take civil examinations, Zhang would permit his students to do so. Zhang gave dual emphasis on both Chinese studies as general education, and military studies as professional training. Students in the school were required to read from the Chinese classics in order to "strengthen the roots" everyday before the classes commenced.⁷⁶ Instructors were mainly Chinese and only one or two German instructors taught in the first class of seventy students.

Graduates of the Guangdong Naval and Military School were served in provincial establishment. Before 1895, graduates were absorbed into military school or as instructors in various military units. After 1896, some graduates were selected to staff Zhang's Self-Strengthening Army, and some were employed as instructors in the Hubei Military School set up by Zhang in 1896.

The existence of the Guangdong Naval and Military School was short. Zhang's transfer in 1894 first to Nanjing and later Wuchang was nonetheless a serious setback to the military school. His successor Li Hanzhang, was not keen on military reform and thwarted plans for expansion. The school was eventually closed during the tenure of the conservative Guangdong's governor Kangyi. The Tianjin and Guangdong were the only two military schools established in the 1880s. It was not until the mid-1890s that the military schools were set up in greater number.

The Hubei Military School

When Zhang Zhidong was transferred from Guangzhou to Nanjing in 1894, he opened the Jiangnan Military School the following year. Five German instructors were engaged to train about 150 students. The military school also included a railway engineering course to meet the demand for railway construction personnel. The school was funded mainly by the customs revenue and supplemented by the Jiangsu provincial

⁷⁵ Ayers, William. *Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China*, 108-110.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 108-113.

budget.⁷⁷ When Zhang again transferred to Wuchang as Governor-general of Hunan and Hubei, he set up yet another military school in 1896, the Hubei Military School.

The background for Zhang's further attempts to build more military schools was the disastrous and humiliating Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. A direct consequence of the Sino-Japanese war was the demise of Li Hongzhang, his Beiyang Navy and the Huai Army. In 1895, the central government approved plans to construct two military units based on the updated organisational and technical procedures. One of these units was the Self-Strengthening Army under Zhang Zhidong with its headquarters in Nanjing. The other was the Newly Created Army under Yuan Shikai based in Zhili. Both armies followed some of the techniques of Zeng Guofan but placed much greater emphasis on German and later Japanese training and weaponry. Military schools were set up in various provinces to meet the demand of this military expansion.

The Hubei Military School, operated on similar lines to the Jiangnan Military School but with larger course capacity and number of staff. When it opened for enrolment in 1897, about four thousand applied for entrance even though the course capacity was only 120. Zhang was forced to restrict the entry age to 18 and below, and raise qualifications to those who possessed the civil or military degrees, and sons of reputable gentry or official families.⁷⁸ In addition, interviews and preliminary tests were conducted to select the qualified candidates. The interest in enrolment in the Hubei Military School was in sharp contrast to the Tianjin Military School about twelve years ago. When its first five-year course was launched, it could assemble only 40 students. This suggests a new attitude toward the profession of arms inspired by rising Chinese nationalism and new career opportunities in the military.

The teaching faculty consisted of about ten instructors, three Germans, one Japanese and the rest Chinese, and about twenty supporting staff. From 1904, Zhang employed three more Japanese instructors to the faculty. The German designed curriculum placed great emphasis on military subjects and practical field exercises. General education subjects such as Chinese studies and history were not included in the three-year course. The Hubei Military School also assisted the provincial army by

⁷⁷ See *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji* (Complete works of Zhang Zhidong). Wang Shudan ed., reprint, Taipei: Wenhai, 1963, Memorials 41, 8-9; Li Shoukang, "Qingji xinjun zhi bianlian jiqi yanbian (The organisation and development of the new army during Qing period)." *Zhongguo lishi xuehui shixue jikan* (Collected Papers on Chinese History of the Chinese Historical Society), no. 2 (April 1970), p. 85.

⁷⁸ *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji* (Complete works of Zhang Zhidong), 120 *juan*: Correspondence 35, 14-15; 17-19.

forming a special Training Regiment to teach the battalion Western-styled drills and tactics.⁷⁹

The graduates of the military school were in demand as more military schools were set up in various parts of China. In 1898, twenty-four graduates and the next year nineteen were selected for further training in Japan. In 1902, Zhang instituted an advanced course modelled on the Japanese military academy, *Rikugun shikan gakko*. This was a two-year course designed for graduates in advanced infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineering training. In the first year, students attended classes in the school, and in the second year on unit attachments. Under Zhang's leadership, the Hubei Military School became one of the best military schools in China prior to 1904 military education re-organisation.⁸⁰

By 1904, all except three provinces in China had military schools. According to one account, there were three military schools in Zhili, two in Hubei and all but three of the remaining sixteen provinces had one with a total enrolment of 3,344 (2,100) students. The three provinces without military schools were, Guangxi, where governmental control was constantly challenged; Gansu which was too poor, and Henan where the governors were too reactionary.⁸¹ Chinese, Japanese and German military instructors were employed in these schools. The emphasis of the training was on practical military subjects with fewer or no general education subjects.

Japanese Military Training

While the military schools continued to grow after the Hubei Military School,⁸² there was a trend towards replacing the German with Japanese military instructors and sending more students to Japanese instead of European military training institutions. In

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 104 juan: Correspondence 19, 24-25. The Training Regiments set up to train military units were a common feature in the Chinese army since then. The Huangpu Military Academy had also the same arrangements to train the party army.

⁸⁰ Hu Junzhong ed. *Zhang wenxiang gong nianpu* (Chronological biography of Zhang Zhidong), 6 juan, Taibei: Wenhai, 1964, in juan 5, p. 14.

⁸¹ *The North China Herald*, 27 January 1905, an article on "Military Academies in China", 209-210.

⁸² According to one Chinese source, in late Qing Dynasty there were over 200 military schools all over China. This number could be exaggerated. By 1906, one can identify about 27 military schools. There were organised by provincial governments with little or no guidance from the central government. As a result, there was a lack of standard of organisation, weapons, drills and operational procedures. See Sheling Waishi (pseud.). "Baoding junguan xuexiao cangsang shi (A turbulent history of the Baoding military academy)." *Chunqiu*, no.63 (16.2.1960), p. 2 and Powell, Ralph L. *The Rise of the Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, 235-6.

the past, the Chinese were great admirers of the German military system. To the Chinese officials, German troops were an impressive sight when performing precision drills and marching, which the Chinese called the "yabucuo", the duck march. Moreover, Germany did not pose any threat to China, at least before the 1897 German seizure of Jiaozhou and Shandong, which Chinese officials found it difficult to trust Westerners that offered to share their military knowledge.⁸³ Furthermore, the presence of the German officers could be used to offset British domination of such organs as the Maritime Customs Bureau, thus playing one country off the another. For their part, the Germans cultivated Chinese officials in order to provide a market for arms, in particular, those manufactured by Krupp.⁸⁴ Krupp manufacturers offered subsidies to German instructors in China if they could persuade the Chinese army to use German weapons.⁸⁵

The Japanese military had definitely impressed the Chinese when they defeated them in 1894-95, and the Russians in 1904-05. But there were also a number of practical reasons why the Chinese military turned to the Japanese during the turn of the century. Japanese instructors were cheaper than Europeans. This was an important consideration for provincial governors and governors-general who had to finance military schools from their own treasuries. In addition, at a time when advanced military training was unavailable in China, using the Japanese model would permit Chinese military students to supplement their basic training in China with higher education in Japan, at far less cost than at equivalent French and German institutions.⁸⁶ The shorter distance between Japan and China also made supervision of Chinese students there easier and less expensive. The Japanese language is easier than German or French for Chinese to learn. The pool of Chinese interpreters was greater to assist in

⁸³ See Biggerstaff, Knight. *The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China*. Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1961, p. 72.

⁸⁴ During and after the Taiping Rebellion, Li Hongzhang through the arrangement of the German Ambassador in Tianjin purchased 102 Krupp artillery pieces; 5000 each of the Hoschkiss and Mauser rifles for the Chinese army. The new artillery battalions formed in the 1870s were equipped with Krupp artillery guns. *Li Wenzhong gong quanji* (Complete Papers of Li Hongzhang), Memorial 49: 4-5.

⁸⁵ See Schrecker, J. *Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, pp.7-11; and Gadoffre, C. "Vallee du Yangtze: les Troupes Chinoises et leurs Instructeurs (translated by James Rockwell)." *Journal of the United States Infantry Association*, no. 1 (July 1904): 11.

⁸⁶ Take the case of the Tianjin Military School: the monthly salary of the Chinese Chief Instructor, who also had to perform translation, was earning about silver 100 taels; the Personnel Officers 50 taels; and the Chinese Instructor 20 taels. For the German instructors, the monthly salary ranged from 120 to 300 taels depending on seniority and appointments. In addition, they were also given travelling allowance for home leaves and other incentives. *Li Wenzhong gong quanji* (Complete Papers of Li Hongzhang), Translated Correspondence 19, "On the resignation of the German instructor", p. 28.

the Japanese instructors in various military schools. On the other hand, Japanese could generally learn Chinese more easily than a European, so the number of Japanese who knew Chinese was also larger.

Zhang Zhidong came out strongly in support for Japanese education in 1898. He argued that not only was study in Japan cheaper and more convenient than Europe, but it had less language problems and would also be easier to supervise and control students' activities.⁸⁷ Moreover, Confucian ethics were still stressed in Japanese school system and that would be a good moral influence upon the Chinese students.⁸⁸ Beginning in 1898, Zhang sent frequent inspection missions to Japan to learn how to build a modern school system in his own provinces, and he sent ever increasing number of civil and military students on provincial government stipends to pursue training courses in Japan.⁸⁹ Zhang strongly believed in the value of study in Japan and took great care to look after those students whom he sent there. During his tenure as the Governor-general of Hubei and Hunan provinces in the years between 1889-1907, he sent more young Chinese to Japan from his provinces than any other province. In fact, many students from other provinces came to enrol schools in Hunan and Hubei in order to qualify for study in Japan. Zhang used to talk to students, as a kind of pep talk, before their departure. He urged them to work hard, be serious in their studies, stay away from troubles and returned to serve the country upon completion. He was conscientious to look after each returning student by arranging good jobs or recommending them to central government, other provincial officials and schools around the country.⁹⁰ Many of the returned students were in fact taken away from Hubei by various military commands, the Ministries of Finance and Education in Beijing, top schools and other leading officials.⁹¹

⁸⁷ According to one study, by 1911 the total number of Chinese studying in Japan had reached at least 18,000 and effective students' supervision had become an important issue. Despite the very active students' movement in Japan, the Qing government had quite a good control of the situation. Shi Jin, *Zhongguo xiandaihua yundong yu Qindao liu Ri xuesheng* (The modernisation of China and Chinese Students in Japan during the late Qing period). Taipei: 1967. On the supervision by the Qing officials of Chinese students' activities in Japan, see Bays, Daniel H. "Chinese Government Policies Towards the Revolutionary Students in Japan After 1900: Reassessment and Implications." *Journal of Asian Studies* 7 (1973): 152-177.

⁸⁸ *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji* (Complete works of Zhang Zhidong), 203:7.

⁸⁹ For the discussion of Zhang Zhidong's policy in sending students to Japan, read one of the returned students comment, Ji Yiqiao. "Xianxian wenxiang gong shijian" (Talking about the life of the former worthy Zhang Zhidong), *Hubei wenxian* (Documents of Hubei) 2 (1967); and also Bays, Daniel H. *China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-Tung and the Issues of a New Age, 1895-1909*. USA: Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1978, chapter 6.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 20.

⁹¹ *Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji* (Complete works of Zhang Zhidong), 228: 17b. This is an important

The number of Chinese students studying in the Japanese military institutions grew rapidly after 1903. It is estimated that between 1904 and 1911, about 800 Chinese officers in the Chinese army had graduated from or studied in the Japanese military schools, some 630 officers had been trained in the prestigious Japanese Military Academy.⁹² All of them had to attend the *Rikugun seijo gakko*, a preparatory school designed specially for Chinese Students, for two (before 1906) to three years, before proceeding to *shikan gakko*, the Japanese Military Academy, or lesser military schools such as the military police, survey, and logistics. All of them while in Japan had been subject to a variety of influences. Foremost was the first-hand experience of seeing Japan, a nation strengthened to a point of superiority over both China and Russia, and realising more than ever the impotence of the Chinese government.⁹³ China's inability to keep the Russians out of Manchuria in 1903 particularly provoked the students' rage at their government.⁹⁴ Furthermore, students in Japan must have noticed the high status accorded soldiers there, in sharp contrast to their own status in traditionally. Nor could they have been unreceptive to the debates ranging among Chinese reformers and revolutionaries in Japan at the time. The horizons of students were also broadened by their contacts with non-military students in Japan and with translations of Western political literature. Jiang Fangzhen, for instance, was active in reformist debate in his capacity as editor of the *Tide of Zhejiang*. This journal and others like it broadened the awareness of their readers by reports and opinions on scholarship, current events and literature.⁹⁵ Upon graduation, most were immediately employed as instructors in their provincial military schools. New political and military ideas and opinions such nationalism, monarchical-constitutionalism, republicanism,

evident that a provincial-based military academy had a national outlook.

⁹² Main references for the Chinese students in Japanese military schools include, *Riben lujun shiguan xuexiao Zhonghua minguo liuxuesheng minbu* (Students records of graduates of the Shikan gakko during the Republican China). Guo Rongsheng ed., Taipei: Wenhai, 1976; Shi Jin, *Zhongguo xiandaihua yundong yu Qindmo liuRi xuesheng* (The modernisation of China and Chinese Students in Japan during the late Qing period). Taipei: 1967; Saneto Keishu, *Chugokujin Nihon ryugaku shi* (A history of Chinese students in Japan). Tokyo: 1960; Wang Longzhong reprint. *Liudong lujun shiguan xuexiao tongxuelu* (Records of the Chinese shikan gakko graduates). Taipei: Kept in the library of the Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiu shou (Institute of Modern History, the Academia Sinica). As well as Fung, Edmund S.K., *The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution*, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980, 72-73; MacKinnon, Stephen R., *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, 93-94.

⁹³ See for example Yen Xishan's comment in Li Shoukong, "Qingji xinjun zhi bianlian jiqi yanbian (The organisation and development of the new army during Qing period)." *Zhongguo lishi xuehui shixue jikan* (Collected Papers on Chinese History of the Chinese Historical Society), no. 2 (April 1970): 136.

⁹⁴ Harrell, Paula. "The Years of the Young Radicals: The Chinese Student in Japan, 1900-1915". Ph D dissertation, Columbia University, 1970, p. 111.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 48-49.

and militarism that many students acquired in Japan were passed on to their fellow officers when they returned to China. Since the Japanese trained students were employed nationwide, their thinking and influence in the military schools became fairly well spread throughout the country.

The New Armies and the National Military Education System

The ignominious defeat of imperial forces along with the Boxers in 1900 provided further evidence of the urgent need to create a new military force on the Japanese-Western model. A comprehensive and ambitious military reform plan was formulated in Beijing. The military reform of 1901-1907 covered essentially three broad directions. First, the abolition of the old examination system; second, the creation of a system of recruitment, training, equipping and organisation similar to any of the world advanced armies; third, the formation of a truly national armed forces with the central government taking over the tasks of co-ordination and ultimate authority.

The traditional military examinations were eliminated in 1901 after a series of petitions submitted by Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi.⁹⁶ New directives from the central government also ordered all governors-general and governors to establish military schools in each province. The military schools created earlier by Zhang Zhidong, Li Kunyi and Yuan Shikai served as models. These three men supervised the drafting of new regulations to govern military education. At the same time, a new organisation structure for the military was formulated. A national standing army was to be formed, together with reserve units that could be mobilised in the event of war. It also proposed the establishment of a separate national police force. Personnel for these units were to be selected from the Army of the Green Standard, provincial militia, and other existing forces. Those judged unfit were to be discharged. Those chosen for the new army and police force would be given specialised training, modern equipment and uniforms and better salary. These were ambitious proposals, if fully realised on a national scale would have had far-reaching repercussions. However, this national reform program was at first focused primarily on a few regions and was carried out chiefly in armies under Zhang Zhidong and Yuan Shikai.

⁹⁶ For Zhang and Liu memorials, see Powell, Ralph L. *The Rise of the Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912*, p. 132. For more recent study see Mackinnon, Stephen R. "The Peiyang Army, Yuan Shih-kai, and the Origins of Modern Chinese Warlordism." *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXII, no. 3 (1973): 405-423; and *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980; Fung, Edmund S.K., *The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution*, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980.

In Yuan Shikai's New Army, later known as the Beiyang Army, recruitment and training of the army began in February 1902 after Zhili province, where Yuan was the governor, received a sum of one million taels from the Empress Dowager.⁹⁷ The funds did not permit Yuan to proceed as rapidly as he originally planned. But over the next four years some major progress was made. A provincial Department of Military Administration was set up to regulate all military matters. Short-course officers' school was created to train or retrain officers of the new army. Fifty-five students were sent to Japan for advanced military education and fourteen Japanese instructors were hired to teach at the newly established officers' school at Baoding. Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army grew rapidly during 1903-1905. He had six divisions with a total strength of about 60,000 men, trained in accordance with the Japanese-German model. Strenuous efforts were made to instill professionalism and discipline in both the enlisted men and officers through a network of technical and professional military training centres. By 1905, apart from Zhang Zhidong's small units of the Self-Strengthening Army (*Ziqianjun*), Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army in the North was the most promising modern force and was also becoming the nucleus of a national army.

The organisation of the new armies was based primarily on Western model with a functional division and greater use of advanced military technology. Following the German army tables of organisation, the new army was divided into three main arms: infantry, cavalry, and artillery, along with separate engineering and other technical components. German officers were employed to aid in the initial training and the organisation of the new units.

In December 1903, in the midst of the crisis provoked by the Russian threat in Manchuria and the impending Russo-Japanese War, the central government set up a Commission for Army Reorganisation (*Lian bingchu*). Prince Qing was appointed director, Yuan Shikai the associate director, and Tieliang, a competent Manchu military man, the assistant director. This commission, which actually ran by Yuan, was intended to preside over the centralisation of the Chinese military structure. It also enabled Yuan to channel funds to his Zhili divisions. The Beiyang Army was dependent upon the Empress Dowager and the court for its support; therefore so long as Yuan remained on top in Beijing and in Zhili, he could protect his interests.

Meanwhile, proposals for military reform on a national scale continued to

⁹⁷ The funds being collected from provincial sources for military reform were allocated primarily to Yuan despite protests from various provincial governors. See MacKinnon, Stephen R. *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China*, 103-114.

emanate from Beijing and most of them reflected Yuan's ideas. The Commission for Army Reorganisation soon made its recommendations to provide a comprehensive plan for a national army. In essence, the plan called for the creation of a standing army of thirty-six divisions each with 12,500 men. This would be accomplished over a period of seventeen years. At the same time, there would be a new military education system covering elementary military schools to a national academy and staff college. There was also plan to establish a common standard of equipment and training procedures throughout the new army.⁹⁸

The proposal of a military education system, which was an imitation of the Japanese system of military training, called for standardisation of training through a hierarchy of military schools. In every province and at major garrison posts, there would be at least one military elementary school set up to conduct a three-year general education supplemented by basic military training. Since military schools had already existed in almost all provinces, should be all converted into military elementary schools. Four military middle schools to be allocated in Zhili, Hubei, Jiangsu and Shensi would offer a two-year course and four months of practical training in the ranks. Graduates of the military middle schools would be selected to attend the military academy for an 18-month course and another six months attachment to units for on the job training. Two years at the staff college would end the military education for the best young officers.⁹⁹ Under this plan, the initial education would go under the auspices of the provinces to ensure a minimally educated lower officer corps. Students continuing on to higher school would be put under the central authority. They would attend the officers' academy and staff college that would be set up in Baoding to provide a national orientation education.

The number and size of the military elementary schools increased with the abolition of the civil service examination system in September 1905. By the 1905, every province except Gansu and Henan had its own military elementary schools (most of them had one, but bigger provinces were allowed to have two) with a total enrolment of about 3,344 students, although the 1904 plan projected about 2,000

⁹⁸ For details of the imperial decree, military re-organisation and the Commission report, see *Guangxu zhengyao* (Important political events of the Guangxu reign), Shen Dongsheng, Dong Yuan and Dong Run eds., Shanghai, 1909, 25: 37a and 38a-41a; also Powell, Ralph L. *The Rise of the Chinese Military Power*, 173-180.

⁹⁹ *Zouding lujun xuetang banfa ershi tiao* (Twenty regulations regarding the organisation of the military schools), *Dongfang zazhi* (Eastern miscellany), 1: 12, December 1904. Also, Powell, *The Rise of the Chinese Military Power*, p. 181.

students annually.¹⁰⁰ About 90 per cent of them would be admitted to the four military middle schools. From here, about 1,500 were expected to graduate each year and assigned to military units.¹⁰¹ Military schools previously attracted students mainly because they were free. With the abolition of the civil service examinations, the military profession seemed more attractive as the government elevated military officers to the same rank as civil officials. As a result, a more positive attitude toward the military was emerging. A widening circle of people within China's political, economic and educational elite began to accept the vital importance of developing a modern and effective national force. An image of the new military man was emerging: he should be someone who is literate, disciplined, physically and mentally fit, motivated by patriotism and capable of handling sophisticated equipment.

In 1906, the Army Reorganisation Commission and the Board of War (*Bingbu*) were merged into the Ministry of the Army under Tieliang. Greater control now exercised by the central and the military authority was in the hands of the Manchu. The court attempted in 1907 to consolidate further its control over the military schools when Tieliang pressured Yuan Shikai to place the schools at Baoding under direct supervision of the Army Ministry. Achieving control over the Baoding military institutions was important because many of the students were from other provinces. With military schools in virtually every province by 1909, the central government was ready to implement the second stage of the 1904 plan for a hierarchy of schools. There were sufficient instructors who had trained in Japan and at local military schools to supply the new schools. By the end of 1909, four military middle schools were set up at Qinghe (Zhili), Nanjing, Wuchang and shortly thereafter Xi'an (Shensi). The next step was the setting up of the military academy at Baoding to accommodate the first batch of graduates from the two-year middle schools. The military academy was opened in 1911 at Baoding with the full-term academy scheduled to commence the following year.¹⁰² Thus, on the eve of the 1911 Revolution, the Qing government had carried out more than half of its original plan for a military education system and laid the foundation for a national system to train a corps of officers.

The progress of the military build-up of the New Army was slow. By the end

¹⁰⁰ *The North China Herald*, 27 January 1905, an article on "Military Academies in China", 209-210.

¹⁰¹ Zhu Wu, "Woguo zhi lujun (The army of our country)," *Guofang bao* (Defence journal) 1, no. 2 (1910): 68-70.

¹⁰² Zhu Wu, "Woguo zhi lujun (The army of our country)," *Guofang bao* (Defence journal) 1, no. 2 (1910): 47-74, 67. Also *The China Yearbook*, London: George Routledge, 1912, p. 246.

of 1910s, only six of the originally planned thirty-six divisions (two in each province) were created. Of the six, four stationed in Zhili and Shangdong were organised by Yuan Shikai. Nanjing and Wuchang had one division each set up by Duanfang and Zhang Zhidong respectively. In addition, there were twelve mixed brigades in various provinces. The Japanese system of training was used in these units.¹⁰³ The total army strength was estimated to be under 200,000, although the Chinese official records indicated over one million.¹⁰⁴ The military reform of the army stressed local recruitment of soldiers for divisions stationed in the province rather than the use of non-natives, but greater care in selection was emphasised.¹⁰⁵ The main problems remained the lack of provincial support, serious financial shortfall, and the delicate relationship between the central and provincial governments. Therefore by 1911, with the exception of the Beiyang divisions, the national army existed largely in name only. The progress of the education reform, on the other hand, though faced with similar problems had achieved greater results. Again, Zhili and Hubei led the way. Officers who had graduated from military schools were being assigned to various provinces. They made great effort to recruit promising officer candidates through various promises and emoluments including better pay.

Politicisation of the Officer Corps

The humiliation of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, and the subsequent Chinese weakness in the face of Western and Japanese military intrusions during the Boxer Uprising and the Russo-Japanese War, aroused widespread concern in China, especially among the educated elite, that her national existence was endangered by encroaching imperialism. A profusion of magazines and newspapers helped to spread the nationalist message, while new means of political expression emerged in the form of public meetings, petition drives, and political clubs.¹⁰⁶ The politicisation of the Chinese society that began in late Qing did not cease with the 1911 Revolution but

¹⁰³ This observation was made by Col Igata in 1909, the Japanese military adviser to Zhang Zhidong, after returning to Tokyo. Col Igata commented although positive reforms were made, the military in China was still in "a state of infancy". He felt that Chinese soldiers lacked "martial spirit" and China needed a conscription system like Japan had, to beef up her military power. See "Colonel Igata on China", *North China Herald*, 3 July 1909, p. 35.

¹⁰⁴ See Powell, *The Rise of the Chinese Military Power*, 288-9.

¹⁰⁵ The practice of recruiting soldiers from common locals has many practical values. By taking in people from the same area can minimise problems of dialect, food and general customs whereby reducing prejudices and conflicts among soldiers.

¹⁰⁶ Mary Rankin's studies has shown the creation of the "public sphere" and the formation of elite political activism and oppositional public opinion in the nineteenth century China as a result of foreign imperialism. See Mary B. Rankin, *Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986.

carried through the first two decades of the Republic to even larger segments of society.

The politicisation of the military was first concentrated in the military schools. Lucian Pye has suggested that modern military training in itself sensitises army officers in developing nations to their country's backwardness and thus increase their inclination to intervene in politics.¹⁰⁷ But in the case of China, the politicisation of many military students preceded their enrolment in military schools. The concentration of large number of students, both military and civil, in urban centres created the environment for an uneven greater spread of nationalist and even revolutionary ideas. The politicisation of the military students thus had less to do with their military studies than with the conditions responsible for the general politicisation of China's modern educated students.

The following discussion will examine the response of the officers corps to 1911 Revolution, and the rise and fall of the Baoding Military Academy in the first two decades of the Republic. The case of Baoding demonstrates the politicisation of the officer corps was much more widespread after 1911 and the disintegration of China after 1916 created a greater divisive effect than the 1911 Revolution.

The 1911 Revolution

Apart from the general political dissatisfaction of the imperial government, the military reform in late Qing dynasty could have created unhappiness among the military. The drive to modernise the army had produced efforts at stricter discipline, more arduous training, and weeded out the unfit. These efforts, together with the accelerated attempts to transfer primary authority over the military to the central government, had aroused apprehension and resentment. On the other hand, reform was not successful enough to eliminate the traditional grievances: inhumane treatment, inadequate living conditions and arrears in pay. The Beijing government's financial difficulties resulted in pay reductions and inadequate resources for many units. Morale correspondingly plummeted. The revolutionaries thus found rich soil to work upon. Revolutionaries committed to Sun Yatsen and his program had been manufactured in increasing numbers in Japan. By 1910's, many returned to China, and were installed in various units as junior officers. They were committed to the overthrow of the Qing. Not only the Tongmeng Hui but also the Guangfu Hui played a significant role in

¹⁰⁷ Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernisation", in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped countries*, ed. John J. Johnson, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, 77-78.

subverting elements of the New Army.¹⁰⁸

A significant portion of the military, however, was not prepared to support the revolution. In the North, the old Beiyang armies remained largely immune to revolutionary influences. One reason lay in the fact that these units were generally well-financed, and therefore had fewer grievances relating to pay and rations. Nor did the North have a strong anti-Manchu legacy to infect junior officers and men in the ranks. In the South, where revolutionary penetration had been much greater, some units could be counted within the revolutionary camp, and a large number were considered unsafe from the government's standpoint. Yet, except in Hubei, the revolutionaries had not scored either the propaganda victories or the organisation gains required for sustained support from within the existing military forces. Nor had the building of new military units by revolutionaries progressed beyond an embryonic stage. There was, to be sure, a sizeable number of military men and units impregnated with political doubts but ready to jump on the radical bandwagon if success appeared imminent. The younger officers were especially vulnerable. But the military assessment at that time would point out that any revolution was likely to prove premature.¹⁰⁹

Although a military uprising by the Hubei New Army that set the 1911 Revolution in motion, those involved were mainly common soldiers and junior officers, most of whom ranked no higher than platoon commanders.¹¹⁰ Most career-minded middle- and upper-echelon officers were unwilling to risk active participation in revolutionary organisations involved in the plotting of the uprising. This does not mean that they were necessarily opposed to the idea of revolution once they saw it had some chance of success. Whether out of idealism or opportunism, a good number of the company, battalion, and even regiment commanders eventually came forward to

¹⁰⁸ For more about the revolutionaries within the armies, see Fung, *The Military Dimension of the Chinese*, 114-144. Fung gives an extensive account of military participation in various revolutionaries societies and groups in Hubei prior to Wuchang uprising. Fung regards the Hubei army as atypical in the large number of revolutionaries within it. For the activities of Guangfu and Zhejiang, see Zhang Yufa, "The Restoration Society and the Revolution of 1911". Paper presented in the Conference on 1911 Revolution, 1981, Taipei.

¹⁰⁹ This point was made very clearly by Sun Yatsen in 1924, his address to the official opening of the Huangpu Military Academy. Sun accused the professional military officers who were trained in the overseas and local military schools of not playing any important roles in the 1911 Revolution as they did not believe the revolution would succeed. See *Zhongyang lujun jinguan xuexiao shigao* (Draft history of the central military academy), Nanjing, c1936, vol.1, pp. 1-107 to 1-117. The English translation of the speech is included in the Appendix A.

¹¹⁰ Shao Baichang, "Xinhai Wuchang shouyi zhi qianyin houguo ji qi zuozhan jingguo" (The causes and effects of the 1911 Wuchang uprising and its military operations), *Hubei wenxian*, 10 (10 January 1969): 17-20.

support the revolution in the days following the success of the Wuchang uprising.¹¹¹

Baoding Military Academy

Military schools were interrupted by the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution. Many students joined in the revolutionary activities but others simply returned home when their schools closed. It was not until the fall of 1912 that the political situation had stabilised and most of the schools reopened. The new Republican administration formed the Department of Military Education as one of the eleven departments in the new Army Ministry headed by Duan Qirui, a graduate of the Tianjin Military School. The new department had the responsibility for formulating regulations, textbooks, courses, discipline and examinations. In 1915 it became the Army Training Commission, incorporating the functions of the Military Education Publications Office that had been in charge of standardising textbooks.¹¹²

The military elementary schools were retained but the middle schools at Xi'an and Nanjing were not reopened, and those at Qinghe and Wuchang were renamed as First and Second Military Preparatory School respectively.¹¹³ By 1912, there were about 1,700 graduates who had completed the two-year middle school course. They served six months as student officers in the regular army and passed the examination to enter Baoding Military Academy forming the first class of this new national military academy.¹¹⁴

The Baoding Military Academy,¹¹⁵ was the officers' highest-level school and a national meeting ground for China's future military leaders. The academy was located on an open plain outside the east gate of Baoding, Zhili province. The area

¹¹¹ A list of seventeen lower officers, mainly company and platoon commanders, who joined the revolt in the first day is given in Cao Yabo, *Wuchang geming zhenshi* (True story of the Wuchang revolution), Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1930, 2: 79; for examples of higher officers who hid or fled during the uprising but returned to accept positions in the revolutionary armies or government, see Wu Xinghan, "Wuchang qiyi sanri ji" (Three-day record of the Wuchang uprising), in *Xinhai geming*, ed. Zhonghua shixuehui, 5: 84.

¹¹² *Lujun xingzheng jiyao* (An account of the army administration), 291-309.

¹¹³ *Lujun bu* (Army ministry) comp. *Lujun xingzheng jiyao* (An account of the army administration). Beijing 1906, reprint, Taipei: Wenhai, 1971, pp.327, 229.

¹¹⁴ Sheling Waishi (pseud.). "Baoding junguan xuexiao cangsang shi" (A turbulent history of the Baoding military academy). *Chunqiu*, 63-73 (16.2.1960-1.7.1960), no.63, p.3.

¹¹⁵ The official name in Chinese, *Lujun junguan xuexiao*, the Army Officers' Academy, was adapted from the Japanese Military Academy, *Rikugun shikan gakkō*. After Baoding, the other military academy which used the name of *Lujun junguan xuexiao* was the Huangpu Military Academy.

surrounding the academy was particularly suited for military training. The campus consisted of a large rectangular area with dining halls and lecture rooms at each end, flanked by two one-story buildings that served as student hostels and classrooms. A large exercise field, a stable, an arsenal and various storehouses rounded out the facilities.¹¹⁶ This campus served as the focus of a 18-month program in military training. The course offered only a few general education subjects. Instead, the curriculum stressed military tactics, weaponry, fortifications, topography and minor subjects such as management, health, horsemanship and foreign languages. Students entering the academy were grouped into various units: infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering or logistics. They would remain with the units throughout the entire course. Infantry was by far the most popular, in 1914 there were six infantry companies (*dui*), two each of cavalry and artillery and one each of engineering and logistics (see table 3).¹¹⁷

The timing of the founding of the Baoding Military Academy, however, was most unfortunate because the post-1911 Revolution China was still forging a new political system through intense political struggle between the military and revolutionaries, and among various political factions. The Baoding Military Academy soon fell victim to political controversy and uncertainty. The appointment of the academy's first Commandant, Zhao Lidai, triggered-off a series of incidents at the academy. Zhao had been the director of the Army Short-Course School¹¹⁸, standard was equivalent to, or even lower than the military middle schools. It was reported that Zhao was close to the Army Minister Duan Qirui, and when he appointed many of his former students from the Army Short-Course School as instructors, the young and idealistic Baoding students were extremely unhappy.¹¹⁹ Troubles between the academy's board and students soon started when the commandant tightened the discipline and dismissed students who violated its regulations. Many students interpreted this move as the Commandant's attempt to get rid of students who supported the revolution. They therefore decided to challenge the authorities by staging a strike, demanding Zhao's ouster, better instructors, re-admission of expelled

¹¹⁶ Sheling Waishi (pseud.). "Baoding junguan xuexiao cangsang shi (A turbulent history of the Baoding military academy)." *Chunqiu*, no. 63, p.5; Li Zonghuang. *Li Zonghuang huiyilu* (The memoirs of Li Zonghuang), 284-285.

¹¹⁷ Liu Zhi. *Wo di huiyi* (My recollections), p. 7.

¹¹⁸ The *Tongguo lujun sucheng xuetaang*, set up by Yuan Shikai was the predecessor of the Baoding Military Academy.

¹¹⁹ For the Baoding Military Academy see Li Zonghuang. *Li Zonghuang huiyilu*, 28-39; and Sheling Waishi, "Baoding junguan xuexiao cangsang shi", 2-4.

students and non-discrimination against students with radical opinions.¹²⁰ But the central authorities would not back down. At Duan's orders, two regiments from the Beiyang garrison at Baoding surrounded the academy. For over a month the situation was deadlocked. Finally, in October, after receiving an ultimatum from Duan to call off the strike or face punishment, the students marched *en masse* to Beijing to garner public support. In the capital, the students won overwhelming public sympathy. The governors of Hubei, Sichuan, Yunnan, Jiangxi and Anhui urged Duan to compromise. Duan was forced to give in, rescind his orders, and appoint a new commandant. The thousand students who had marched to the capital returned to Baoding in triumph.

The Baoding Military Academy's new Commandant was Jiang Fangzhen (Jiang Baili), a well trained professional military officer and a graduate of the Japanese Shikan gakko. He had only recently returned to China after attending an advanced military course in Germany. Jiang was thirty-five years old when appointed. He was enthusiastic about making Baoding a first-rate military academy. In his inaugural speech to cadets and staff, he stressed patriotism and self-discipline, and urged them to set high standard for both training and discipline.¹²¹ He replaced the old short-course instructors with capable officers from the units and better trained Japanese and other overseas military academy graduates. He held frequent inspections and even taught courses. He paid particular attention to discipline, welfare, the standardisation of working procedures, the physical appearance and uniforms of each student. He instituted a mutual supervision where each group of seven students was responsible for the conduct of its individual members. To inculcate social etiquette among his students and staff, he even introduced the mess dining-in at the academy.¹²² Within the first three months of his appointment, the academy improved vastly.

Although Jiang was ambitious in his plans for the academy, but Beijing was neither keen nor ready for expansion and preferred to maintain the status quo. The commandant's reformist approach soon brought him into conflict with the Army Ministry. This disagreement mirrored the long-standing conflict between new and old

¹²⁰ Liu Zhi, *Wo di huiyi* (My recollections), p.7; Tao Juyin, *Jiang Baili xiansheng juan* (Biography of Jiang Baili), Shanghai: Zhonghua, 1948, p.36; Gong Hao, *Gong Hao xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Record of the interviews with Mr Dong Hao), Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1962, p.26; Hu Zongduo, *Hu Zongduo xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Record of interviews with Mr. Hu Zongduo), Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1962, p. 6.

¹²¹ Sheling Waishi, "Baoding junguan xuexiao cangsang shi", p.3; *Li Zonghuang huiyilu*, p.43.

¹²² Gong Hao, *Gong Hao xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Record of the interviews with Mr Dong Hao), p.127; Tao Juyin, *Jiang Baili xiansheng juan* (Biography of Jiang Baili), 38-42; *Li Zonghuang huiyilu*, 45-46.

army styles. Jiang's cadets were not likely to fit in with the old-style approach of officers who were in charge of the system and feared the influx of devoted and intelligent Baoding officers into the army. Jiang had no supporters within the army to defuse the situation. The conflict was finally brought into open by Jiang's repeated requests to the ministry for funds to improve the academy. But his proposals were all denied. In June 1913, after returning from yet another futile trip to Beijing, Jiang ordered students and staff to assemble in the main lecture hall. After a few remarks stating that he had failed in his attempt to improve the academy, he drew his pistol and shot himself. He was saved by his alert assistant, but injured his arm. Jiang's action shocked not only the Baoding cadets and staff, but also political circles throughout the country. Provincial governors expressed their distress by sending cables to Yuan Shikai. Yuan sent his personal Japanese physician and nurse to attend to Jiang. (The Japanese nurse who attended to Jiang later married him.) The incident occurred at the end of the academic year. Influenced by the event and spurred on by the outbreak of the Second Revolution, a number of students withdrew from the academy. When classes resumed later that year, a new commandant (Qu Tongfeng) was appointed. Qu was a Shikan gakko graduate and a personal friend of Duan Qirui. Qu took stern action against those students who took part in the 1913 "Second Revolution" in the south and expelled more than 500 cadets. Sharp divisions between the northerners and southerners at the academy were apparent.

The Baoding Military Academy's third upheaval came in May 1915 when Yuan Shikai consented to the Japanese Twenty-One Demands. Joining the nation-wide protest against the Beijing government, the Baoding cadets went on strike in defiance of the authorities. However, without much external support, the students' protest soon lost its momentum and the strike was called off.¹²³ But Qu was removed as Commandant because he was unable to control the students. A division commander of the Baoding garrison, Wan Ruxian, filled his place. Wan was a graduate of the Tianjin Military School and later went to Japan for further military training. He had been a commander in his entire career and a trusted officer of Yuan Shikai.¹²⁴

Throughout its eleven years of existence, the Baoding Military Academy conducted nine training courses and produced a total of 6,574 graduates.¹²⁵ A great

¹²³ Hebei Baoding wenshi zhiliao yanjiuhui comp. *Baoding lujun junguan xuexiao* (The Baoding military academy). Baoding, Hebei: Renmin chubanshe, 1987, pp. 29-30.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*; on Wan Ruxian see Wang Jiejian, "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang", 13.

¹²⁵ The statistical data of the Baoding Military Academy can be found in Lujun bu (Army ministry) comp. *Lujun xingzheng jiyao* (An account of the army administration). Beijing, reprint, Taipei: Wenhai,

majority of them were infantry, followed by artillery, cavalry, engineering and logistics officers (see table 2 and 3). Most of them returned to their own provinces after graduation. Many served as instructors in provincial military schools and others as staff officers in provincial military headquarters. A few were appointed junior officers and then moved up to become company or battalion commanders.¹²⁶ Baoding graduates had advantages in certain provinces. In Shanxi and Sichuan, high-ranking commissions were assigned to Baoding graduates. In Shanxi, Yen Xishan employed graduates from both Baoding and his own Military Instruction Corps to serve in his high command. In Sichuan, officers educated at Baoding worked well with local military course graduates.¹²⁷ Baoding's graduates also tended to be concentrated in the provincial armies of Hunan, Guangxi, Guangdong. In Hunan and Guangxi, the Baoding's graduates emerged to become the most influential leaders in the early 1920s.¹²⁸

The events of 1915-6 seriously affected the operation of the Baoding Military Academy. The Beijing government was openly challenged when Yuan Shikai's declared himself as emperor in 1915. Cai E¹²⁹ in Yunnan organised a National Protection Army (*Huguojun*) to oppose Yuan's monarchical movement. Yuan Shikai was forced to resign in disgrace and died soon after. However, the overthrow of Yuan caused the unravelling of centralised authority and inaugurated a long, debilitating military separatism commonly known as the warlord era. Many national military schools were closed including the First Military Preparatory School at Qinghe.

1971, in the 1916 edition, p. 327 and 1920 edition p. 229; and also *Lujun junguan xuexiao tongxuelu* (*Alumni of the Baoding military academy*), in the "Tongxuelu", 1-735.

¹²⁶ See the memoirs of the Baoding graduates such as the first batch officer Wan Yaohuang, "Wan Yaohuang huiyilu (3)" (The memoirs of Wan Yaohuang), *Zhongwai zazhi*, 16: 1-17, 1974-1975; and second batch graduate Qin Dechun,

¹²⁷ Sheling Waishi, "Baoding junguan xuexiao cangsang shi, 4-6; Gillin, *Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949*. Princeton, p.26; Zhou Guokai, *Minguo Sichuan Shishi* (Historical events of Sichuan during the Republican China), Taipei: Shangwu, 1969, p.102; Zhang Zhonglei, *Qingmo minchu Sichuan di junshi xuetang ji Chuan paixi* (*Military academies and military cliques in Sichuan during the late Qing and early Republic*) in *Xinhai keming huiyilu* (*Memoirs of the 1911 revolution*). Beijing: 1962, p.351.

¹²⁸ Gong Hao. *Gong Hao xiansheng fangwen jilu* (Record of interviews with Mr. Gong Hao). Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1962, p.5.

¹²⁹ Cai E was a Hunanese with a civil degree of *shengyuan* and a graduate of the Japanese *Shikan gakko*. During his stay in Japan, he had been associated with reformist and revolutionary movement. Cai was recruited by Yuan Shikai to Beijing in 1912 to serve in the Ministry of War. But his radical activities soon landed him in prison. Cai was released in mid-July 1915 and headed south to Yunnan. In the fall, he organised old and newly recruited units into a National Protection Army of 10,000 men. Cai was also in touch with Liang Qichao and may have had some Japanese financial support as well. See Sutton, *Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 1905-25*, USA: Ann Arbor,

Provincial schools were kept in operation solely by provincial authorities. The quality of these schools depended on the care that individual leaders took in overseeing them. The Yunnan Military School was notable for its high level of instruction.¹³⁰ After 1916, the original 1904 national military education plan existed only in name and all military schools reverted to the pre-1904 situation of serving the regional armies. The Baoding Military Academy also lost its appeal as a national institution and finally closed its doors permanently in 1923.

Conclusion

In the last century of the Qing dynasty, the structure of the imperial army had undergone a fundamental change. The regional-based armies, or *yongying*, created to counter the internal rebellions, had emerged as an important part of the Qing army. Although it was originally set up as a stop-gap measure in a crisis situation, the regional armies became not only an accepted military system operating alongside the two regular systems of the Banner and the Green Standard, but also the dominant military system of the late Qing army.

The development of modern military academies in China was shaped by both inherent organisational and institutional factors of the army as well as external environment. When the first modern Western-styled military school was founded in Tianjin in 1885, it had great difficulty in attracting talent for its courses. The problems were multi-faceted which included the traditional lack of respect toward the military profession, anti-foreigner sentiments, a contempt for manual labour, and above all, competition with the civil service. Before 1898, career prospects for Western-trained military officers were limited. The military professional qualifications obtained from the military academies was also sometime a liability to career development, since officers from the rank and file were preferred and trusted more by unit commanders. The situation did not improve until the military build-up following the defeat of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. The demand for more and better-trained military officers soon ushered in a surge of military academies in China. In an unprecedented administrative reform initiated by the central government, the aged-old examination system was abolished, first the military examinations in 1901, and later the civil

University of Michigan Press, 1980.

¹³⁰ The Yunnan Military Academy was renowned for its fine instructors and well-trained cadets. See *The China Yearbook, 1925-1926*, p. 1139; and Sutton, *Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic, 1905-1925*.

examinations in 1903. In 1904, a national military education plan was formulated and soon implemented.

The role of the military academies expanded rapidly in the last three decades of the Qing rule. When it was first started, the military academy was serving the regional army of Li Hongzhang and concentrating on specialised training such as the artillery and ordnance. By the first decade of the twentieth century, military education was organised and centralised on a national basis. Military academies provided not only training for various arms and military supporting services, but also a broad-based education and progressive advancement culminating overseas military education for the brightest and ablest young Chinese. The impetus for rapid expansion of military academies was the creation of a national army. It was in this context that modern military academies became more than technical training schools. They were deemed as essentials if China were to become a modern state.

In its search for a modern army, the Chinese borrowed heavily from foreign armies, in particular, the German and the Japanese. In spite of being defeated by the Japanese in the war of 1904-5 and constantly being threatened in the northern provinces, the Japanese military system was the model for the Chinese military education. The decision was a rational one. It is easier to learn from the Japanese as both nations shared many common cultural traditions. But most important for the Chinese, the Japanese was an emerging Asian power. Her success in building up a strong military could always serve as an example for the Chinese.

The surge of military schools at the turn of the century was influenced by the rise of nationalism. Political issues of great concern to China's survival and her future had affected every Chinese student, and educated military students were no exception. The availability of print-media and the opportunity to discuss major national and international issues in schools, particularly, among the overseas students, military students became much more conscious of China's problems and her position in the region. The military students heightened political consciousness found expression in the domestic political scene. Many were involved in the 1911 Revolution. But greater participation of the officer corps in politics came after the North-South division of the country following the events of 1913 and 1916.

The national education program continued to develop even after 1911 but under great stress and tension. The most important event was the creation of the Baoding Military Academy in 1912. This was the first national military academy based on Western military professional concept although many of its organisational and

doctrinal principles were Japanese. The Baoding Military Academy, unfortunately, was caught in the North-South divide, and after the demise of Yuan Shikai in 1916, military separatism soon engulfed the entire country. The Baoding Military Academy was seriously affected by these political events and started to lose its appeal as a national institution. The pre-1904 situation of regional armies creating their own military training schools prevailed once more albeit, this time it was more "professional" in some cases as many regional army commanders were the academy-trained officers.

A divided China and a weak central government was a great setback for many young, politically conscious and well-trained military officers. Since the "self-strengthening" movement of the 1860s, China had been struggling to stay independent and was moving slowly to regain her position as a power in Asia if not the world. All this effort would not be sustained without a united China. On a personal level, military separatism was unfavourable to the professional and academy-trained officers. Without a central government, their career opportunity would be confined to a particular region. Most would end up in training institutions as instructors or staff officers in the command headquarters, few fortunate ones might be appointed as commanders.

Within three decades, the Chinese officer corps was transformed. A modern officer corps had emerged in early twentieth century and destined to play an important role in the national affairs. Within the officer corps, an internal transformation of the leadership had also been taken place. The very first generation of Tianjin graduates had, in early Republic, assumed power in the centre. They were perceived, however, by the younger generation officers, especially those Japanese and Baoding trained graduates, as the main stumbling blocks for building a genuine national army and achieving a united Republican China.

The Late-Qing military reform had created a Chinese officer corps but without a national army. The emergence of the officer corps with their spread in all over the country representing one of the most well-organised forces to be reckon with in the early years of the Republican China. Although the development of a national modern military education represented by the Baoding Military Academy was terminated in 1923, attempts to revitalise a national military academy would continue thereafter. The founding of the Huangpu Military Academy in 1924 and its successor the Central Military Academy in Nanjing in 1927 could be seen in the context of this wider development.

Chapter 2: The Party Army and Party Army Academy: Sun Yatsen's Prescriptions for the National Unification

"...Our revolution has been in existence for thirteen years, but what we now have is a republic in name only and not in substance...In the thirteen years of our revolution, there has never been a single military organisation struggling for the same cause as the revolutionary party. I dare say that in the past thirteen years, China did not have any troops that could be regarded as the revolutionary armies. ...I am now asking you not to fear death and follow the footsteps of the martyrs...to build from this five hundred cadets.... an ideal revolutionary army..."¹³¹

On 16 June 1924, Sun Yatsen accompanied by Madam Sun, party leaders, commanders of various armies, officials of his government and the Soviet advisers, inaugurated the official opening of the Army Officers Academy¹³² at Huangpu in Guangzhou. In this day-long ceremony, Sun presented the academy flag, heard the swearing of the academy oath, and reviewed student-cadets on the parade. He then delivered a long and inspirational speech. In it, he compared the Russian and the Chinese revolutionary experience and wondered why the Russians had succeeded while China's results had been meagre after thirteen years of revolution. He then concluded that the Russia's secret was its creation of a revolutionary army to consolidate its victory. Sun announced that China would soon have its revolutionary army and the Huangpu cadets would be its foundation. The academy's purpose was to produce a reliable and politically indoctrinated corps of junior officers as essential element in a new and loyal party army.¹³³

The establishment of the Huangpu Military Academy was an important milestone in the Chinese military modernisation process. It was through Huangpu that the system of the party control of the military and the party army was endorsed and implemented in the Chinese military. This characteristic of the Chinese armed forces has since been

¹³¹ The inaugural speech of Sun Yatsen at the official opening of the Huangpu Military Academy, *Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao shigao* (Draft history of the Central Military Academy), Nanjing, 1936, 1: 5-10. For the English translation of the speech see appendix 1.

¹³² In Chinese, *Lujun junguan xuexiao* (The central military school), but better known as the Huangpu Military Academy.

¹³³ *Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao shigao* (Draft history of the central military academy), Nanjing, c 1936, vol.1: 1-107 to 1-109. An English translation of the speech is included in the Appendix 1.

accepted in both the Nationalist armed forces in Taiwan and the People's Liberation Army of China.

This chapter aims to examine the contributions of Sun Yatsen towards the establishment of the Huangpu Military Academy. A central question pertaining to Sun Yatsen's contribution is the influence of the Communist ideology and the Russian Red Army. The political motives of Sun turning to the Soviet Communist Third International (Comintern) are well documented, but not so on the military motives concerning the Guomindang (GMD) and Comintern collaboration. What was Sun's military thought? How did he perceive the role of the military in his revolutionary process? Why did Sun Yatsen turn to the Russians for military assistance? What kind of military assistance did Sun obtain from the Russians? How important was Sun's roles in the establishment of the party army and party academy? This chapter attempts to discuss the above questions.

Sun Yatsen's Military Thought

Before looking at Sun's military thought some caveats may be in order. Sun in his lifetime spent a considerable amount of time studying and writing, and attempting to develop a modern philosophical paradigm for the modern China. However, he was a political activist spending most of his time travelling and organising political activities, rather than reflecting and writing theoretical treatise. Moreover, many of his manuscripts were destroyed when forces under Chen Jiongming bombarded his presidential palace in Guangzhou in 1922. In short, Sun's military thought, as reflected in various works and speeches, was neither complete nor coherent in style or content. The following analysis of Sun's military thought is based on his political activities and speeches during the last twenty years of his political career.

Sun sees war as neither an aberration nor a permanent feature of human existence. He defines war as a goal-oriented activity with a specific political objective. For him, the use of force has two main purposes. Firstly, it is to overthrow the corrupt and ineffective Manchu regime that brought hardship and injustice to Chinese people. Secondly, to use force to bring about a conducive condition for national development that will benefit its people. Once these two goals are achieved, a democratic government will take over the day-to-day running of a country and hereby bring in wealth and prosperity to its people. In short, war is a means to political ends. The political end is to realise the system of republicanism through the application of the

Three Peoples' Principles. Force will be used to abolish the corrupt regime and to pave the way for the subsequent national re-construction.¹³⁴

Sun's concept of war was similar to the rational-realist school but was very different from the Marxist-Leninist concept of war.¹³⁵ Karl Marx interprets war as an inevitable process of class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The old ruling classes would vainly use any means to postpone their inevitable overthrow. Wars cannot be abolished unless classes are abolished and socialism is created.¹³⁶ Marx depicts this conflict as basically a vertical conflict between upper and lower classes. Lenin carries Marx's doctrine to the horizontal level and includes the clash of capitalist powers. Capitalist powers go to war for the right to seize and subjugate less-developed peoples, overseas markets, and sources of new materials. This new dynamic process, added to Marx's vertical conflict, was the "highest" form of bourgeois exploitation, the true manifestation of a dying ancient regime, and the chief cause of modern war.

The main elements in Sun's use of force prior to 1911 Revolution were the secret societies and young serving soldiers. Members of the secret societies were poorly trained and armed, and they were no matches against the Qing's armies. The young, idealist and better-educated Chinese soldiers, on the other hand, were mainly from the junior ranks of the New Army and were scattered in various military units. They were too weak to stage a revolt against the establishment. Sun had an American military adviser Colonel Homer Leo prior to 1911 Revolution. Leo was supposed to help raising funds and military training in America to stage revolts in China. Leo was supposed to lead the revolutionary army of the secret Heaven and Earth Society in China. However, due mainly to lack of financial support, the scheme failed to materialise.¹³⁷ When the October Revolution occurred, it started very much as a military mutiny against poor military management as much as a political revolution to

¹³⁴ For a discussion of Sun's military thought, see Wang Yibing, *Guofu jianguan jiaoyu sixiang zhi yuanjiu* (A study of Sun Yatsen's thought on military officer education). M.A. thesis, the Political Studies Institute of the Political Warfare School, Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1991, 78-88; Sun Zhongshan junshi sixiang yu shijian (Military thought and practice of Sun Yatsen). Sun Li and Guo Zuyu et al ed., Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe (Military science publications), 1989, 19-68; Tai Hung-chao, "The Approach to Peace and War", in *Sun Yat-sen's Doctrine in the Modern World*, Chu-yuan Cheng ed., Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1989, 160-175.

¹³⁵ Main representatives of this rational-realist view of war are Sun Zi and Clausewitz. See Wang, *Guofu jianguan jiaoyu sixiang zhi yuanjiu*, 78-88.

¹³⁶ Semmel, Bernard. *Marxism and the Science of War*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, 147-153, 164-171; *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army: A Soviet View*. Translated from Russian by Donald Danemanis, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, 13-20.

topple the Manchu regime. Once the uprising spread over the country, it was the local military commanders rather than the Nationalist revolutionists who were in charge of the day-to-day affairs. The military although overtly adhering to the revolution was beyond the control of neither Sun Yatsen nor the Nationalist Party (see Chapter 1).¹³⁸

The fate for Sun and his party was deteriorated further in the subsequent years. During Yuan Shikai's reign Sun went to Japan once again and had a falling out with Huang Xing over a change in policy. Sun, who once sought less violent subversive means, changed to endorsing a violent military solution, while Huang, who once sought military means, now turned to diplomacy. After Yuan's death, Sun set up a rival military government in Guangzhou in September 1917. Like the northern government, Sun relied on warlord armies in the South for his military, but the local provincial commander, Chen Jiongming, betrayed Sun and drove him out of the city, burning Sun's office and papers and forcing him to flee.¹³⁹ Thwarted by a lack of broad public support, unreliable regional militarists, rivalries, betrayals, and military failures, Sun spent considerable time writing between 1917 and 1921 on national reconstruction for China and planning for the revitalization of his revolutionary movement.

The Party Army

After a series of failures since 1911, Sun Yatsen finally wrote his ideology on papers in 1924. Sun's revolutionary ideology is revealed in a series of policy statements on socio-economic, psychological, and political reconstruction. *The Outline of National Reconstruction (Jianguo dakang)* contains his main ideological precepts drafted in 1924. However, many of the ideas in this work were in fact derived from the Tongmenhui (the Alliance Party) Manifesto of 1905 but were treated to greater refinement and elaboration.

The primary section of *The Outline of National Reconstruction* is a short 25-article document summarises Sun's priorities and key components of his theory of revolution.¹⁴⁰ Sun had also sketched the outline of an ambitious work on national

¹³⁷ See Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, 67-72; Tom Alexander, "Ambitious Little Romancer"—or Visionary Genius?, *Smithsonian*, Jul 93, Vol. 24 Issue 4, 102-115.

¹³⁸ For a discussion of the military role in the 1911 Revolution, see Edmund Fong, *The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution*.

¹³⁹ For a detailed account of Sun-Chen conflict, see Chen Manling, "Chen Jiongming yi yuejun (Chen Jiongming and Guangdong army)." M.A. thesis, the Department of History, Taiwan National University of Political Science, 1983, 247-320.

¹⁴⁰ See *Guofu quanji*, Taibei, 751-754; Lo, *Guofu nianpu*, vol. 2, p. 108.

defence but he did not complete the work before his death in 1925.¹⁴¹ In *The Outline of National Reconstruction*, Sun divided the revolutionary process into three-stages: military dictatorship, political tutelage, and constitutional democracy. The first period will be a period of destruction. There would be martial law, and the revolutionary army would destroy the old regime, eradicating official corruption, and reforming evil practices. During the second period a provisional constitution will go into effect, local autonomy would be introduced, and popular rights would be promoted. The first two stages were the transitional periods leading to the final goal of the constitutional democracy.

Sun's main contribution to the revolutionary theory was his introduction of the intervening stage of the political tutelage.¹⁴² According to Sun, the Guomindang's major responsibility during the political tutelage stage included mobilising people to participate in the political process, electing and recalling local officials, and legislating or abrogating local laws. The party should help local government achieve fiscal independence through promotion of economic reconstruction in industrial and commercial investment, exploitation of natural resources, the development of transportation and land reclamation. Finally, the party should help local governments to promoting justice and social welfare. This would include census surveys, land tax and land reform, education policies implementation, medical care, relief, and care of the young and aged.¹⁴³ In short, Sun perceived that before democracy could be realised in China, the Guomindang would have to guide the government with the help of its army.

The roles of the military in the Nationalist revolutionary process are also touched upon in Sun's Three People's Principles (*Sanmin zhuyi*). This document is the most important work of Sun Yatsen as it set forth the basic policy to bring about a new

¹⁴¹ Sun Yatsen divided the National Defence into sixty-two chapters. His intention was conveyed to Liao Zhongkai in a letter dated 8 July 1921. *Guofu quanji*, Taipei, vol. 3, 789-790.

¹⁴² While other revolutionary theorists either insisted on perpetual dictatorship of a particular class or group, or expect democracy to follow revolution immediately, Sun introduced the period of political tutelage during which the revolutionary party was assigned the role of educating the people and training them to assume increasing responsibilities in self-government. The emphasis on political tutelage is clearly shown in his work *Jianguo dakang*. While constitutional democracy was discussed in seven articles (19-25); the stage of military dictatorship was only two articles (6-7); the political tutelage was discussed in eleven articles (8-18).

¹⁴³ "Jianguo dakang", in *Guofu chuanji*, 1: 1-15; 6: 160-65.

political and economic structure in China.¹⁴⁴ *Sanmin zhuyi* discusses nationalism, democracy and livelihood as the main ideological doctrine to guide the nationalist revolution. In his discussion of nationalism, Sun expounds his concepts and principles for which the military will have to work within the context of the new political structure.

Sun Yatsen looked at nationalism in China as an evolutionary process. He described nationalism both as an immediate objective to overthrow the Manchu rule and as a process of political reconstruction in the post-revolutionary periods. To achieve these goals, he emphasised developing a deep-rooted consciousness of nationalism among the Chinese people. Nationalism was to serve as a rousing creed to unite dissident individuals and groups throughout China. In short, Sun perceived that before democracy could be realised in China, the Guomindang would have to guide the government with the help of its army.

What is missing is the specific role of the military in this revolutionary process, surprisingly for a party that depended on armed revolt. Sun's scant attention to military matters can be partially attributed to his unfamiliarity with military matters but more fundamentally to his basic commitment to Western-styled constitutional democracy. Thus, once the Republic was proclaimed in 1911, he was ready to let the Guomindang play by parliamentary rules. Even in the post-1911 period, although Sun was convinced, reluctantly, that the party required an army, during the last years of his life, he devoted far more attention to refining his theoretical construct than to assuming active leadership over military affairs.

Influence of the Russian Revolution and the Civil War

Preoccupied with military unification of China, Sun Yatsen and his supporters were impressed by the Bolshevik experience in the revolution and the civil war. In 1919, Sun was said to have sent several of his associates to Russia to study the Russian revolution. They included Liao Zhongkai, Zhu Zhixin and Li Zhangda.¹⁴⁵ Li Zhangda subsequently visited Russia in January 1921, accompanied by a pro-Bolshevik Liu Qian

¹⁴⁴ *Sanmin zhuyi* may have developed in the early 1890s. The term was officially proposed by Sun Yatsen on 20 October 1905 and publicised on 2 December 1906. Sun rework his material in the form of public lectures and he nearly completed most of his work in 1924. *Sun Zhongshan chuanji*, Beijing, vol. 1, 288-289; *Guofu chuanji*, Taipei, vol. 2, 80-81.

¹⁴⁵ A Russian tutor was engaged to teach them Russian. Xie Xiangning, *Huiyi Sun Zhongshan he Liao Zhongkai* (Remembering Sun Yatsen and Liao Zhongkai), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957, p. 2.

who was the head of an organisation of the Chinese inhabitants living in the northeastern borders of Amur province.¹⁴⁶

Chiang Kaishek recalled some years later how he regarded the Bolshevik Revolution as "the dawn of a new era". He was also reported to have said at that time "if anyone should denounce the Russian Revolution, I would vigorously defend it, and should anyone voice criticisms against the Chinese Communist Party, I would resolutely refute them".¹⁴⁷ In 1921 when drawing up a set of military plans for Sun Yatsen, he had the idea of going to Russia to prepare a portion of the strength there.¹⁴⁸

Dai Jitao in an open letter to Chen Jiongming in 1920, who was leading the Guangdong Army in Fujian, urged Chen to emulate Leon Trotsky, the Bolshevik War Commissar, who had created the Red Army and used it for popular indoctrination. Dai proposed to adopt the Red Army system selectively arguing that the Guomindang keep its own ideology, while emulating the model of a revolutionary army. He defined the revolutionary army as "a body of men capable of propagating the party's ideology" in which every soldier possessed "initiative and discernment". Only such an army, Dai maintained, was "capable of sweeping away the old and creating a new order" in China.¹⁴⁹

Zhu Zhixin treated the concept of the party army in greater detail in an article entitled "The Psychology of the Soldiers and its Reconstruction".¹⁵⁰ Zhu singled out two obstacles to building a new order in China during the late 1910s. They were:

¹⁴⁶ Li Yunhan, *Cong ronggong dao qingdang*, 1: 115, 124, n.75.

¹⁴⁷ Jiang Zhongzheng, "Zhongguo guomin geming he E guo gongchandang gongchan geming de qubie" (The different between the Chinese nationalist revolution and the Russian communist revolution), *Xinshengming* (The new life), 2, 5: 4, 1 May 1929.

¹⁴⁸ Mao Sicheng, *Minguo shiwu nianqian zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng*, 112-114. The plan will be discussed in the chapter later.

¹⁴⁹ Dai Jitao, "Zhi Chen Jiongming lun geming dexin" (Letter to Chen Jiongming concerning the revolution), 13 January 1920, *Jianshe*, 2, 1: 177-184, February 1920. A good discussion of Russians' influence on the Nationalist Party, see Leong, Sow-theng, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-1926*. USA: University Press of Hawaii, 1976; and "Sun Yatsen's International Orientation: The Soviet Phase, 1917-1925." in *Sun Yatsen: His International Ideas and International Connections*, 53-88. Editor. Wong, J.Y. ed. Australia: Wild Peony Pty Ltd, 1987, 60-71.

¹⁵⁰ Zhu Zhixin, "'Bing de gaizao yu qi xinli" (The psychology of the soldiers and its reconstruction)," *Zhu Zhixin ji* (Collected works of Zhu Zhixin), 2: 359-409. Zhu was an active Guomindang leader who had been a trusted staff of Sun Yatsen before his sudden death in 1920. He was a military reformer. For a study of Zhu Zhixin, see Lu Fangshang, *Zhu Zhixin yu Zhongguo geming* (Zhu Zhixin and the Chinese revolution). Taipei: Dongwu University, 1978.

firstly, the omnipotence of the military; and secondly, the use of the military by those with money to pay for its services. Every student demonstration and every workers' strike in recent years, he stated, had been suppressed with the help of mercenaries by those who were determined to preserve the *status quo*. Money and soldiers, the two ingredients of the reactionary power, were the same indispensable ingredients for its destruction. However, the character of the armed forces would have to be vastly different from a mercenary army with soldiers who were servile, unreliable, or prone to desert. Such soldiers would be useless for social reform unless instilled with a new consciousness. "Our immediate task", Zhu wrote, "is to create a life for the soldier which is permeated with ideological consciousness, so that every soldier is hopeful, self-reliant, and possesses a sense of spiritual equality with everyone else, i.e. a complete reconstruction of the psychology of the soldiers".

According to Zhu, one way of achieving the new consciousness was to create an army of soldiers who were part-time workers. Each soldier then could earn a living while being a soldier. Such a semi-worker army would be equivalent to the newest Soviet Russian worker-army. In Russia, employment ensured a living for the Red Army soldiers while Bolshevism gave them a sense of purpose in life. Free from immediate material want and certain of the long-term goal, the Red Army was able to march from victory to victory. Zhu evidently learned about the fact that the Russian Red Army had many Chinese within it, and he took this as proof that there was no inherent obstacle to reforming the psychology of the Chinese soldier.¹⁵¹ The ideology that would appeal to the soldier would be one that could satisfy his immediate needs as well as promise him a new life in the future. Zhu believed that "if we (the Chinese) want to reconstruct the society we must destroy the social stratification based on wealth and lay the foundation for socialism. If we can persuade the Chinese working people with the argument that their misery is rooted in the defects of the social structure, they will embrace such an ideology of their own and lay down their lives for it".¹⁵² Although both the Chinese peasants and workers would be susceptible to such an appeal, Zhu nevertheless believed that urban workers made better soldiers in a revolutionary army because they were economically worse off. He pointed to the worker origin of the Red Army to support his point of view. Because of their working class background such soldiers would be better able to understand the real interest of

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 394.

workers, and he therefore most likely to lay down their lives on behalf of his ideology.¹⁵³

It is interesting to note that the attention of Sun Yatsen and his associates was confined exclusively to the military aspect of the Bolshevik Revolution. They said hardly anything about the Leninist party organisation or the mobilisation of mass support as the means to power, which played such a key role in the coming to power of the Bolsheviks. Instead, what Sun and his supporters admired most was how the new regime maintained power through the Red Army created after the October Revolution. Sun's military preoccupation is easily explained by the fact that he had time and again been frustrated in his endeavours by the lack of an army that was obedient to his will.

Sun Yatsen's Delegation to Moscow

Sun Yatsen's interest in the Russian Red Army, however, did not exclude his attempt to obtain Russian military aid to fight the Chinese warlords. During the summer of 1923 Sun Yatsen sent a delegation, headed by General Chiang Kaishek, to Moscow to negotiate for military aid. Besides Chiang, the delegation included Wang Tengyun, Shen Dingji and Zhang Tailei, the latter two were Communists who were also members of the Guomindang. The purpose of the delegation, according to a highly classified introductory letter written by Sun Yatsen, was to "discuss ways and means whereby our friends there (the Soviet Union) can assist me in my work in this country. In particular, General Chiang is to take up with your government and military experts a proposal for military action by my forces in and about the regions lying to the Northwest of Beijing and beyond. General Chiang is fully empowered to act on my behalf."¹⁵⁴

The Delegation arrived in Moscow on 2 September. On 9 September, Chiang met the deputy chief of the Revolutionary Military Council, E. M. Skliansky, and the commander-in-chief of the Red Army, General S. S. Kamenev. In this meeting Chiang requested specifically for three kinds of military assistance, namely: (1) more military advisers to assist in the setting up of an army along the line of the Red Army; (2) the opportunity to learn about the military organisation, training and operations of the Red

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 409. Zhu appended to his article the statutes of the Red Army, issued by the Soviet government on 15 January 1920.

¹⁵⁴ Professor Allen Whiting obtained this letter from Louis Fischer who knew Karakhan personally. Karakhan showed the letter to Fischer who published part of it in his autobiography, *Men and Politics*, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1941, p.138. Cited in Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China*, p.243.

Army; (3) to negotiate with the Russian authorities the war plan for the Northwest China.¹⁵⁵

"The Northwest Plan"

Sun Yatsen's proposal for joint military actions with foreign powers in the Northwest China can be traced as early as in 1918.¹⁵⁶ In the closing months of the Great European War, Sun argued that Germany and China should cooperate to free China from the dominance of England, Japan and their allies. Sun sent Abel Cao¹⁵⁷ to Berlin with a proposal that Germany and Russia should jointly organise and equip about 12,000 Chinese living along the border of Russia, together with about 10,000 (a division) German troops supported by 3 to 5 aircraft, to capture Beijing. In exchange, Germany could procure food and raw materials in China and transport them home by the Russian railways. Once the Beijing government was overthrown, Germany could assist China financing, help her regain control of maritime customs and construct railways. Germany could also help modernise China education system and develop technical skills so that Chinese products could be transported across Russia to Germany. Although this was a very unrealistic scheme, and bad timing since Germany was on the road to surrender, the proposal contained several ideas that Sun Yatsen continued to pursue in later years.

Early in 1920, Sun Yatsen met a Chinese communist Liu Chang in Shanghai who showed him a military plan involving the Soviet Union to overthrow Beijing government. Liu, better known to the Russians as Federov, was a member of an *émigré* group, the Organisation Bureau of Chinese Communists in Russia. The plan, presumably formulated by the group, called for a march to Beijing in conjunction with the drive from the South. It proposed an immediate unification of the revolutionary movement of Chinese forces situated in the territory of South China, Central Russia and the Far East. "From the Russian borders the drive would proceed through Xinjiang and

¹⁵⁵ Dieter Heiznig, *Sowjetische Militärberater bei der Kuomintang, 1923-1927*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1978, p.111. Heiznig's source is based on the Russian Baranovskij-Protokolle archives.

¹⁵⁶ Li Guoqi, "Dequo dangan zhong yonguan zhongguo canjia ti 1 ci shijie dazhen ti jixiang jizai" (some records in the German archives concerning China's entry into the first world war), *zhongguo xiandai shi zhuanqi yanjiu baogao*, no.4, Taipei: Zhonghua minguo zhiliao yanjiu zhongxin, 1974, 317-343.

¹⁵⁷ Chinese name is Cao Yabo. A Christian and Oxford university graduate, he joined the Revolutionary Alliance Party, Tongmen hui, in 1905. He was a member of Sun Yatsen's southern military government since 1917. *Minguo Renwu Daxidian* (Biographical dictionary of the Republican China), Hebei renmin chubanshi, 1991, p.811.

Manchuria and the leading centre of the revolutionary march would be in Blagoveshchensk on the Amur.¹⁵⁸

Sun Yatsen's request for the Soviet military aid was made officially in a letter to Adolph Joffe of 20 December 1922. In the letter, Sun told the emissary that he planned to reform his army and the party, and also intended to organise an expedition to take Beijing. He outlined a scheme to lead an army of about 10,000 from Sichuan through Gansu to Inner Mongolia for a northwest attack on the Chinese capital. Sun explained that since his resources were insufficient and he lacked specialists capable of organising an army, he would like to receive financial and advisory aid from the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁹

Following a series of talks between Sun and Joffe in Shanghai in January 1923, they issued a joint statement on 26 January to the press. Although the Joint Statement publicly acknowledged the official relationship between the Soviet Union and the Southern government, it revealed nothing about agreements by the Soviet to help Sun.¹⁶⁰ After Joffe had left Shanghai for Japan, Sun sent his closest associate, the American-born and Japanese educated Liao Zhongkai to Tokyo to continue discussion with Joffe. The Nationalist Chinese sources are particularly reticent about these meetings. No substantial sources have been revealed on these supposedly month-long talks in Tokyo. It is not known that whether any further agreement was reached. But in March 1923, the Soviet Russians moved actively to assist Sun by sending some \$2 million to the revolutionary government. On 1 May, they sent a telegram to Sun expressing "readiness to render necessary assistance to China."¹⁶¹ In June, a team of

¹⁵⁸ Liu Chang submitted a report of the plan which is preserved in the Russian archives. M.A. Persists, "The Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National-Liberation Movement (1918-July 1920)", in *Komintern: Vostok: Bor'ba za leninskuiu Strategiu i Taktiku v Nazional'no Osvoboditel'nom Dvizhenii* (Comintern and the East; the struggle for the Leninist strategy and tactics in the national liberation movement), Moscow: Glav. Red. Vost. Lit., 1969, 87-89. Cited in Wilbur, *Sun Yatsen*, p.116.

¹⁵⁹ During the period from August to December 1922, Sun and Joffe exchanged at least seven letters: four from Joffe and three from Sun are preserved in the Soviet Archives. In recent years, the PRC Central Archives in Beijing and the Soviet Archives have been exchanging sources. Two letters by Sun to Joffe dated 27 August and 20 December 1922 have been published by the PRC Central Archives. See "Sun Zhongshan shuxin liangfeng" (Sun Yatsen's two letters), *Dang de wenxian* (Party Archives) no.1, 1991, 54-56.

¹⁶⁰ The statement first appeared in the China Press on 27 January 1923. The complete text is included in Wilbur, *Sun Yatsen*, 137-138.

¹⁶¹ R.A. Mirovitskaia, "Mikhail Borodin (1884-1951)", in *Vidnye Sovetskiiye Kommunisty--Uchastniki Kitaiskoi Revoliutsii* (Outstanding Soviet communists--the participants in the Chinese revolution) Moscow: Akad. Nauk SSSR, Institut Dal'nego Vostoka, "Nauka", 1970, 22-40. Sources are based on the Soviet archives. Cited in Wilbur, *Sun Yatsen*, p.148.

five military officers, originally despatched for Beijing, visited Guangzhou to advise Sun on military matters.¹⁶²

As a result of these positive moves, Sun's optimism increased. He instructed Chiang Kaishek in July to organise a delegation representing him to visit Russia "reciprocating an ambassadorial visit and to investigate government and party affairs."¹⁶³ Chiang Kaishek was then thirty-five years old and had been a staff officer in Generalissimo Sun's field headquarters at various times. He had earlier indicated to Sun of his desire to be assigned the mission to the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁴ Chiang was selected to head the delegation despite his junior status as the mission was to be military in nature, and top on the agenda was the discussion of "the Northwest Plan". Chiang Kaishek's first meeting with Skliansky and General Kamenev took place on 9 September in Moscow.¹⁶⁵ Chiang's presentation consisted of three parts: (1) the current military and strategic situation; (2) proposal of two military bases; (3) plans for the invasion of Beijing. The delegates first analysed the vulnerability of the Sun Yatsen's southern government. The southern army lacked manpower and arms; soldiers' morale was low and commanders were unreliable. To make the situation worse, Guangdong was in a precarious strategic position. In the rear was hostile British Hong Kong; in the front, the British and American gunboats patrolled the Yangtze River. The foreign imperialist powers would not allow the southern army to defeat the northern Wu Peifu decisively since this might disrupt the balance of power and thus the interests of foreign powers. Given this situation, the southern army's general staff resolved to transfer the centre of military operations northwest along the Sino-Russian and Sino-Mongolia borders. Therefore, the Guomindang sought the co-operation of the Soviet military on

¹⁶² I.A. Chereparov, *Zapiski Veonogo Sovetnika v Kitae i iz Istorii Pervoi Grazhdanskoi Revoliutsionnoi Coiny, 1924-1927* (Notes of a military adviser in China: from the history of the first revolutionary civil war in China, 1924-1927), 1: 6-7, II, Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute Norodov Azii, "Nauka", 1964.

¹⁶³ Mao Sicheng, *Shiwu nian yiqian zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng* (Mr Chiang Kaishek before 1926), HongKong: Longman shudian, 1965, p.218.

¹⁶⁴ The desire was indicated in a letter dated 17 July 1923 which he left behind before departing Guangzhou. See Pichon P.Y. Loh, *The Early Chiang Kaishek: A Study of His Personality and Politics, 1887-1924*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 86-87.

¹⁶⁵ The following account is based on Chiang Kaishek's "A New Future for the Chinese Revolution"; supplemented by Heiznig, *Sowjetische Mitlanberater bei der kuomintang, 1923-1927*, 111-6. "A New Future of Chinese Revolution" (*Zhongguo geming xin qiantu*) was shown to the author in Beijing by Mr Yang Kuisong, a research fellow with the Institute of Modern Chinese History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Mr Yang was a researcher in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Archives (*Zhongyang dang'an guan*) before coming to the Institute of Modern History. This document is kept in the Central Archives which is closed to the general public and has not been published.

their military plan. The delegates identified the enemies in this operation as Wu Peifu and his allies.

Since the primary military objective would be Beijing with the two secondary objectives being Taiyuan and Xi'an, the delegates proposed to set up two military bases in the northwest. They were Urga (present day Utan-Batar or Utaanbaator) in Mongolia; and Urumchi (Wulumuqi in Chinese, present day Urumqi) in Xinjiang. Based on the time and space analysis of the routes of advance to Beijing, Urga was an ideal base for launching offensive operations, where Urumchi an ideal rear base. The delegates realised the diplomatic difficulty of using these bases and suggested that the initial military build-up to be in the Soviet territory and in the Red Army's name. They proposed to recruit Chinese and Chinese soldiers living along the borderlands and in western Manchuria. The new army would be organised on the pattern of the Red Army. The strategic advantages of these two bases would help to balance the deficiency of the southern army.

The delegates went on to elaborate the plan for the military build-up at Urga, which would be the location of the main attack force. A time frame of one and a half years and in three phases had been planned for this project (details are in the Appendix 2-1).

Chiang argued that the northwest offensive would coordinate forces in Central China--guerrillas and bandits in Shenxi, who had already started fighting with Wu Peifu's forces. The main tasks of the guerrillas would be to carry out operations--such as to sabotage railway lines, bridges and organise propaganda activities--behind the enemy lines. The delegates therefore proposed to organise the masses and guerrillas in Central China and reinforce them with units from the South to create an anti-Wu Peifu front in Shenxi.¹⁶⁶ A list of cities and publications for the propaganda campaign was attached in the appendix to the report. At the end of the presentation, the Russians requested a written plan and time to learn more about the actual conditions in China.

On 11 November, a second meeting was called and the reply from Skliansky and Kamenev was unfavourable. Skliansky told the Chinese Delegation "to begin military operations in the way stated in the submitted project would be an adventure

¹⁶⁶ Chiang Kaishek's "A New Future for the Chinese Revolution" did not mention the guerrilla activities in Shenxi. But the Soviet archives have such a record. A.I. Kartunova, "Sun Yatsen and Russian Advisers: Based on the Document from 1923-1924" (in Russian), in *Sun Yatsen, 1866-1966: Sbornik Statei Vospominanii, Materialov* (Sun Yatsen, 1866-1966: a collection of articles, reminiscences and materials), Moscow: Glav. Red. Vost, Lit., 1966, pp.170-189. Cited in Wilbur, *Sun Yatsen*, 152-3.

doomed in advance to failure." He emphasized the need for careful and prolonged organisational and political work among the masses, as well as military preparations. Only thereafter could large-scale military operations be undertaken successfully.¹⁶⁷ However, Skliansky offered the Chinese military training in the Soviet Union. The Chinese could send 3-7 officers with the rank of above battalion commander to the General Staff College, and 30-40 officers to various military schools every year. As for the request for more Soviet military advisers, Skliansky expressed the difficulty in recruiting senior officers with Chinese backgrounds. But the decision would depend on the feedback from the first team of advisers who were already in China. Skliansky also organised visits to the army, air force, navy training institutions and arms industries for the Chinese Delegation.¹⁶⁸ On 27 November, during his farewell call on Trotsky, Chiang was told to take a verbal message to Dr. Sun, telling him that "except direct participation by the Soviet troops, Soviet Russia will do her best to help China in her national revolution by giving positive assistance in the form of weapons and economic aid."¹⁶⁹

The Soviet Russian rejection of "the Northwest Plan" came when Chiang Kaishek attended the Comintern's Executive Committee meeting on 25 November, where he was invited to give a speech. A resolution "On the National Liberation Movement in China and the Guomintang" was then passed by the Presidium. The resolution began with a statement that the national liberation movement in China headed by the Guomintang was at the organisational stage. After its successful revolution against the Manchu dynasty, the Guomintang failed to complete the destruction of feudalism mainly because it did not bring the broad masses of peasants and townsmen into the struggle but depended, rather on military means against the reactionary agents of imperialism. The Presidium however, noted that revolutionary elements in the Guomintang headed by Dr. Sun now realised the need for close union with the masses to expand the base of the revolutionary movement in China.¹⁷⁰ This resolution depicted the reformation of the Guomintang and the direction of the future Chinese revolution that leaders in the Soviet Union intended it should bring about--a broad based political revolution rather than a simple military solution. Michael

¹⁶⁷ Kartunova, 179-160; Wilbur, p.153; Heinz, 115-7.

¹⁶⁸ Mao Sicheng, *op. cit.*, 206-208, 211-212.

¹⁶⁹ Chiang Kaishek, *Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-up at Seventy*, New York: Farrar, Strans and Cudahy, 1957, p.22.

¹⁷⁰ Resolution, Presidium, Communist International Executive Committee, On the National Liberation Movement in China and the Guomintang, Mao Sicheng, p.234.

Borodin, an experienced and senior Comintern leader, had been chosen to guide this political process.¹⁷¹ Given such a reply, the dream of "the northwest plan" was virtually shattered. Chiang Kaishek's enthusiasm for the Russian military aid turned from disillusionment into anger.¹⁷² The delegates departed Moscow earlier than scheduled. When Chiang arrived in Shanghai, he submitted a report to Sun Yatsen expressing doubt of the Russians' intention and sincerity, and cautioned against Sun's collaboration with the communists.¹⁷³

Russian Advisers' Assessment of the Guomindang Armies

Other than the Comintern Presidium resolutions, the first group of the Soviet Russian military advisers who came to Guangzhou in October 1923 reported unfavourably of the military situation in the Sun Yatsen southern army.¹⁷⁴ They found the situation in Guangzhou totally confused and chaotic. The only military unit completely subject to Sun's orders was his 150-200 strong personal bodyguards. The other military forces were independent units, which could be categorised, in three main groups. First, the Yunnanese army comprising Generals Yang Xiwen and Fan Shisheng, and the Guangxi army of General Liu Zhenghuan. These units had been expelled from their native provinces, entered Guangzhou, the richest province in the South, in order to improve their financial condition and return to their own provinces. Their individual allegiances to Sun Yatsen and his "grandiose plans" were of a hesitant and tentative in nature. The Russian called these military leaders "the old-style warlords" and their units "the allied armies". Secondly, the Hunanese army of Generals Tan Yankai, and Fan Zhongxiu¹⁷⁵ and Cheng Qian; and a peace preservation force the gendarmerie of General Wu Tiecheng. Although they were supposed to be old comrades-in-arms of Sun Yatsen, they maintained strict independence when it came to questions about the management and provision of their own units. The third main

¹⁷¹ For a good account of Borodin's activities in China, see Lydia Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925*, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, UMI, 1979, 220-45.

¹⁷² It was reported that he fell ill and was hospitalised after learning the outcome. Heiznig, p.121.

¹⁷³ The report, according to Li Yunhan of the Guomindang Archives in Taipei was lost during the 1920's. Several statements expressed by Chiang on Russian communists are included in Mao Sicheng, *op.cit.*, 215-217.

¹⁷⁴ The following account is based mainly on "The National Revolutionary Army: Short History of its Origins, Development and Organisation" (Hereafter "N.R.A."). Although this represents the Russian perspective, apart from the cultural bias and some inaccurate facts, it is a realistic and down to earth assessment of the Sun Yatsen's southern army in 1923-1924.

¹⁷⁵ Fan Zhongxin was Henanese army rather than Hunanese army.

group of the military was the Guangdong army under General Xu Chongzhi. The Russians saw General Xu as a cunning opportunist who represented Guangdong provincial comprador and the Guomindang right interests. In addition, many "petty armies" of individual generals, often no more than a hundred men each, inundated Guangzhou.¹⁷⁶

The Russian found Guangzhou divided into various regions and each under the loose control of one or another "allied general". In each of these regions, the commanding general was responsible for management of political, military and economic affairs. Thus, each of these armies was able to accumulate wealth for his own use. As their independent status was guaranteed by sufficient force of arms and financial autonomy, the military commanders felt constrained to obey only those orders of the Sun's southern government, which happened to coincide with their desires and interests. The Russian saw these "allies" ruining the material well being of Guangdong province. Their predatory policy toward the population had resulted the people's hatred of the army and the government.

Military administration was as disjointed and beyond the political control of the headquarters. Each of the independent armies managed its own account and responsible for its own organization. The absence of unified budgetary procedures and a centralised paymaster system produced a great deal of graft and inefficiency.

According to the Russians, the quality of the officer corps was very low. They believed among the higher-ranking officers, a majority had no military training. Many senior officers had only recently emerged from banditry.¹⁷⁷ They turned everything over to officers of middle or lower rank who had had some military education. Middle-ranking officers were often appointed by virtue of familial ties or friendship with their unit commanders. Junior officers were usually old soldiers who rose from the rank and file. They had survived long years and had obtained sufficient experience to lead troops. These men served as small unit commanders in both training situation as in actual combat. In all officers grades, political convictions was weak. The senior officers were members of the Guomindang in name without much conviction or

¹⁷⁶ N.R.A., 480-481.

¹⁷⁷ This is quite exaggerating. For example, of the eight military leaders mentioned in the early part of the account, Cheng Qian and Xu Chongzhi were graduates from the Japanese Shikan Grakko; Fan Shisheng and Yang Xiwen were graduates from Yunnan Military Academy; Tan Yankai and Wu Tiecheng did not have a military education but certainly were not emerged from bandits. *Minguo Renwu Daicidian* (Biographical dictionary of the Republican China), 377, 588, 1144, 1227, 1502, 1644.

dedication. The middle range officers were not interested even in joining the party, and junior officers were almost universally illiterate and therefore without political interest.

As for military logistics, the Russians noted that supply was haphazard. Each military commander occupying an area was responsible for collecting taxes in that region. He was free to consider the tax revenue as his own income. He spent as little as possible on the maintenance of his troops and units. What he did locate passed down through subordinate officers, each of whom kept a proportion for himself so that very little reached the soldiers. "Everybody was stealing, beginning from the commander of the army down to the company commanders."¹⁷⁸ The rifles carried by combat troops were of various calibres and models from various Chinese arsenals and foreign suppliers. Ammunition was purchased from any one of a number of available arsenals but no one was able to keep accurate records of them. Commanders at all levels were able to stockpile ammunition for their personal advantage (which might mean either sale or unauthorised use).

Regarding the training of troops, there were neither specialised training cadres nor organised training programme in most units. Little or no emphasis was given to rifle shooting practice. Soldiers were not taught the value of scouting and reconnaissance nor communication service and engineering work in operations.

In sum, the Russian advisers viewed the fighting value of Sun's armies in Guangzhou as virtually nil. They assessed that in the face of any serious armed invasion; the forces would be at a tremendous disadvantage. By virtue of the tenuous relationship between Sun Yatsen and his subordinate military leaders, the southern government was unable to act forcefully. The independent subordinates diluted its authority. Its energy was used in negotiating and cajoling with the military leaders under its supposed control. The high command was more concerned with maintaining the goodwill of its subordinate generals than with military operational matters.¹⁷⁹ This was the situation that confronted the Russian advisers when they first arrived in Guangzhou.

In conclusion, Sun Yatsen's main contribution to the Huangpu Military Academy was two-fold. It was his revolutionary ideology that gave a positive role for the military. However, Sun was vague on detail as to how the military specific roles

¹⁷⁸ "N.R.A." p.483.

¹⁷⁹ "N.R.A.", p.484.

were in the movement. It was not only Sun but other Guomindang's members were equally concerned about the reform of the military in order to convert them into a positive force of the Nationalist revolution. The other main contribution of Sun was his attempts to solicit Russian military support.

Since the rebellion of Chen Jiongming in 1922, Sun needed to re-establish a new party army and a new base to free himself from dependence on mercenary armies. Desperately, he sent Chiang Kaishek to Moscow to seek a new solution. Chiang proposed to establish an army along the line of the Soviet Red Army and build two military bases along the Sino-Soviet borders to prepare for an offensive drive against Beijing. Setting up a new military academy would be a first small step toward achieving this military plan within two years.

It is difficult to determine how much the Russian Revolution and the Red Army have inspired Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek. But one thing is clear, Sun and the Guomindang were seeking desperately for foreign aid and assistance to revitalise the nationalist struggle against the military separatists and foreign powers in China. To this end, Sun Yatsen, the Guomindang and Chiang Kaishek were prepared to accommodate Communism and accept the practice of political control of the army in exchange for Soviet-Comintern aid.

Militarily, "the Northwest Plan" was against the Soviet Russian national interests. The Soviet Union main security concerns in China were north-eastern coastal provinces and Siberia. Security dictated that the Soviet Union control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and that it maintained the dominance position in northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia against Japan. Sun Yatsen's "Northwest Plan" was not only unable to contribute to this security interest but also risked war with Japan and other powers. As the Soviet Union emerged from the devastations of revolution and civil war, the last thing it wanted was to be drawn into another war in China. Moreover, Sun Yatsen was not in total command of the southern army. As the Soviet military advisers rightly pointed out, Sun had to clean up the mess in Guangdong and established his own army before any military offensive could be contemplated. The Russians decided to support Sun's southern government because they saw Sun as a potential leader of the Chinese national liberation movement. The Russians were ready to back Sun conditionally if he would reform his party, make anti-imperialism its goals, accept the communist party working within to create a mass proletarian movement.

The proposal for a new party military academy was reportedly endorsed in the Guomindang First National Congress held in Guangzhou in January 1924. The new

academy would differ in basic and substantial ways from any existing Guangzhou military schools.¹⁸⁰ Of primary importance were the academy's subordination to the Guomindang and its cadet corps would be from all over the country rather than from a single region of one or another military separatist. This would form the basis upon which a new national revolutionary army was to be built upon.

The birth of the Huangpu Military Academy seemed to be a satisfactory compromise by all except one person--General Chiang Kaishek. Being a young and able military upstart,¹⁸¹ Chiang was more interested in military action than military training. The Soviet Russian rejection of his "northwest offensive plan" was a great disappointment. Chiang's background, however, made him a very ideal candidate for the post of the Commandant of the party military academy. He was a well-trained professional soldier, a party and Sun Yatsen loyalist, and above all, a military leader who had no troops of his own. But Chiang was not keen on the job. He resigned from the Chairmanship of the Preparatory Committee and refused to return to Guangzhou even after several appeals by Sun Yatsen and other members of the Guomindang. Chiang finally returned to Guangzhou after much persuasion and took up the Commandant post only a month before the beginning of the first course of the Huangpu Military Academy.¹⁸² Yet, Chiang had not given up his hope. As the years unfolded, he made serious attempts to make the Huangpu Military Academy a military unit and constantly prepare it for campaigns against the regional armies.

¹⁸⁰ The existing military school in Guangzhou under General Chen Qian was a good example. The cadets and staff of Chen Qian's military school had been recruited almost entirely in Guangdong and Hunan. These were the provinces where Chen Qian maintained his base of power and network of relationship. For a detailed discussion on this aspect, see John J. Fitzgerald, Chapter 3, "Military Politics", in "Hollow Words: Guomindang Propaganda and the Formation of Popular Attitudes toward the National Revolution in Guangdong Province, 1919-1926." Ph.D. diss., Australian National University, 1983, 68-73.

¹⁸¹ Chiang gained Sun Yatsen's confidence and trust mainly during the Cheng Jiongming's revolt in 1922 where he risked his life to protect Sun.

¹⁸² *Zhongyang lujun jinguan xuexiao shigao* (Draft history of the central military academy) vol. I.

Chapter 3: Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu Military Academy

The development of the Huangpu Military Academy in Guangzhou can be divided into distinctive two periods. The first period covers from its inception in May 1924 to January 1926 when the academy was named the Army Officers Academy (*Lujun junguan xuexiao*). This was the most eventful and traumatic time for Huangpu. The new academy had to train not only officer cadets but also to form its own army to fight for its own survival. In less than two years, three classes of cadets graduated and Huangpu developed from two infantry regiments to a corps known as the I Corps of the National Revolutionary Army. During this period, Huangpu's units participated actively in Guangdong's unification and the subsequent re-establishment of the Nationalist Government in Guangzhou on 1 July 1925. In the second period, Huangpu was renamed the Central Military and Political Academy. The roles of Huangpu expanded to training officers from other units of the National Revolutionary Army. The main role of the Central Military and Political Academy was to prepare the National Revolutionary Army for the Northern Expedition.¹⁸³ The next two chapters will focus on the first period. The second period will be discussed in Chapter 5.

The history of the Huangpu Military Academy has been dealt with in various aspects such as the political struggle between the Chinese Communist Party and Guomindang, the role of the Russian advisers and the rivalries between the Guomindang Left and Right factions. But few scholars have paid attention to the role of the Chinese officer corps. It is ironic, since Huangpu was a military academy and the majority of the staff were military officers. This chapter will focus on the role of the Chinese officer corps represented by Chiang Kaishek, the Commandant of the Huangpu Military Academy, in the early years of the establishment of the academy. It will examine the following key questions. What were the problems of the Huangpu Military Academy during its early years? What kind of assistance the Russians had given to the academy? Who were in control of the academy? Why was Huangpu Military Academy turned out to be an army?

The Military Staff

When the Huangpu Military Academy was first established, the main bulk of its

¹⁸³ *Huangpu junxiao shigao* (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), I: 203-220.

military officers came from the Guangdong Army.¹⁸⁴ Heading the list was its commandant Chiang Kaishek. Although Chiang knew Sun Yatsen when he was a cadet in Japan, he began working directly for him only in 1918 when Sun invited him to join the Guangdong Army. Chiang came to know Sun Yatsen through the introduction of Chen Qimei who was a strong supporter of Sun's revolutionary cause. After the death of Chen Qimei in May 1916, Chiang Kaishek began to work for Sun Yatsen. Sun first sent him to serve Ju Zheng, the head of the revolutionaries' Northeast Army in Shandong who was against Yuan Shikai. But the sudden death of Yuan Shikai had changed the entire political scene and he was no more required. Chiang then moved from Beijing to Shanghai. It was during his stay in Shanghai that he drafted several military plans of the southeast regions for Sun.¹⁸⁵

In 1918, Sun invited Chiang to join the newly formed Guangdong Army under the command of Chen Jiongming. He was made head of Field Operations, and later, the commander of the 2nd Detachment in Yongtai, which was about 20 kilometers from Fuzhou. It was here that his forces were defeated and Chiang wanted to be relieved from command but Chen Jiongming insisted that he remained.¹⁸⁶ It is clear from his personal account that Chiang was very dissatisfied with the Guangdong Army. He frequently complained of "factionalism" among fellow officers that conspired against him. He thought one reason for this might be that most of the officers were Guangdong natives whereas he was a Zhejiang native.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ See Liu Fenghan, "Huangpu zao qi zuzhi ji ren shi fen xi (An analysis of the organisation and personnel during the early years of the Huangpu military academy)." *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 212-321. Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau) edited. Taipei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau), 1984.

¹⁸⁵ See *Zongtong Chiang gong dashi zhangbian chugao* (Preliminary draft of important affairs based on various sources and arranged chronologically relating to President Chiang), 1:20-25. Taipei: Guomindang, 1978; *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 27 and 30; Furuya, *shokai-seki hiroku*, 5: 99/1119-107/1127; also Scalapino, Robert A., and George T. Yu. "On the Horizon: Young Chiang and Mao", in *Modern China and its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional Order, 1850-1920*. Chapter 12, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1985.

¹⁸⁶ It was reported that in this battle, Chiang volunteered to lead a surprise attack (qi bing) on Fuzhou in order to break the stalemate, but the reinforcement from the defenders thwarted the assault. See *Yuejun shishi jiyao*, p.13; and Mao, *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, p.30.

¹⁸⁷ Chiang at this time was having some emotional and physical problems as well. In a letter dated 9 July to Deng Keng, Chiang said he was suffering from gastric problems and insomnia, and that he was mentally exhausted. He also complained that other officers were discriminating against him. See Furuya, *shokai-seko hiroku*, 5: 155/1175-156/1176; Mao, *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, 35-6.

Chiang complained that he could do little to improve the 2nd Detachment since it was well entrenched in old habits when he took command. His ideas to improve the fighting capabilities could not be carried out in the unit. He found the quality of the officers deplorable. Most of the officers were collected haphazardly, so he could not get experienced and competent men to assist him. Once they were engaged, it was practically impossible to get rid of them.¹⁸⁸ On 12 July, Chiang handed his resignation although he appeared to have remained in Fujian until September. Since then until the end of 1921, Chiang spent much time in Shanghai and Zhejiang, although at the urging of Sun and other Guomindang leaders, he made several brief trips to Fujian and Guangdong but always retreating after a few days or weeks.

There were other military officers in the Guangdong Army who joined Huangpu in 1924. Most of them were graduates of Baoding, Yunnan and Japanese Shikan Gakko military academies (see table 10). They first served as the academy's military instructors, and later commanders of the academy army. Among them, graduates from the Shikan Gakko and Baoding occupied middle and higher appointments; whereas the lower ranking officers were mainly from the Yunnan Military Academy.¹⁸⁹ Until the reorganisation of the academy in March 1926, the instructors in Huangpu were predominantly Baoding graduates, and the infantry and artillery were the main two arms.¹⁹⁰ As for the junior officers at the company and platoon levels, they were from the Guangdong Guards' Military School (*Jingwei jun jianwu tang*) and Xijiang Military School.¹⁹¹ As the majority of these officers were not natives of Guangdong (see table 12

¹⁸⁸ See Chiang's letters to Deng Keng, dated 21 June and 7 July 1919, in Mao, *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, 35-6.

¹⁸⁹ The Baoding and Shikan Gakko graduates were the better trained officers and naturally the preferred candidates for the Huangpu Military Academy. But more important perhaps, they were also being discriminated against by the regional armies whose commanders always preferred "trusted" rather than well-trained officers to be their subordinates. For the general discrimination against the Baoding graduates among the regional armies, see Lin Dezheng, "Baoding junguan xuexiao zhi yanjiu, 1912-1924" (A study on the Baoding military academy, 1912-1924), M.A. thesis, National Political University of Taiwan, 1980, p. 188. The lower ranking officers from the Yunnan Military Academy was mainly introduced by Wang Boling where he had been teaching for seven years before joining Huangpu. See Wang Boling in Liu Shaotang ed. *Minguo renwu xiao zhuan* (Brief biographies of Republican personalities). Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue, 1972, 3: 9; and Wang Boling, "Huangpu chengli zhi huiyi" (Recollections of the founding of the Huangpu), in *Zhuanji wenxue* (Biographical literature) 15: 95, and 16: 86.

¹⁹⁰ Among the 69 Baoding graduates, 14 were infantry, 10 from artillery, 10 each from logistics, engineering, the cavalry, and the rest were unknown. Among these, 22 came from the Third Class, 15 from the Second Class, 14 from the Sixth Class. See table 11 for details.

¹⁹¹ *Huangpu junxiao shigao* (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), vol. 1, part 1, 1-102.

for the provincial background of military staff), they could be seen as the southern representation of the new Chinese officer corps.

Not only the key founding military officers of Huangpu came from the Guangdong Army, but few even held concurrent appointments in both Huangpu and the Guangdong Army. For example, the commandant Chiang Kaishek was the Chief of Staff, and the head of Training Department of the Guangdong Army;¹⁹² and Li Jishen, head of the Training Department of Huangpu, was the commander of the 1st Division of the Guangdong Army.¹⁹³ Others like Yu Feipeng, who was one of the Preparatory Committees and subsequently Deputy Head of the Academy's Logistics Department, served in the Guangdong Army's Command Headquarters as acting Chief Auditor (*dai shen ji chu*)¹⁹⁴. Deng Yanda, the deputy head of the Training Department was the commander of the 3rd Regiment, the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division concurrently.¹⁹⁵ Qian Dajun, one of the military instructors in Huangpu, was the Chief of Staff of the 1st Division of the Guangdong Army.¹⁹⁶ Liu Zhi, another instructor, was the Chief of Staff of the Guangdong Army Command.¹⁹⁷ Yan Zhong, was a battalion commander and deputy commander of the 3rd Regiment in the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division.¹⁹⁸ Others such as Ye Jianyin, the Deputy Head of the Instructional Department, was a native of Meixian, Guangdong, and a graduate of Yunnan Military Academy. He joined the Guangdong Army since its inception in 1918. Ye's position in the Huangpu Military Academy thus placed him at a level equivalent to that of Zhou Enlai, the deputy head of the Political Department, and Deng Yanda, the deputy head of the Tactics Department.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹² The appointment was made on 13 October 1924. See *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, p. 249; Loh, Pichon P.Y., *The Early Chiang Kai-shek*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, p. 101.

¹⁹³ When Deng Keng was the chief of staff of the Guangdong Army and commander of the 1st Division in 1921 he invited Li Jishen to Guangzhou. Deng appointed him chief of staff of the 1st Division. When Deng was assassinated in March 1922 and Chen Jiongming staged a coup in Guangzhou on 16 June, Li Jishen participated in the campaign that drove Chen from Guangzhou in the spring of 1923. See *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, editors Howard L. Boorman, and Richard C. Howard, II: 293-99, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967; Liu, Shaotang ed. *Minguo renwu xiao zhuan (Brief biographies of Republican personalities)*, 5: 123.

¹⁹⁴ See *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, 4: 181.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.* 3: 313; and Zhang Guang Yu. *Deng Yanda chuan (The biography of Deng Yanda)*. Wuchang: Wuhan University Publication, 1993, 17-18.

¹⁹⁶ *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, 6: 442.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 2: 271; and Liu, Zhi. *Wo di huiyi (My recollections)*. Taipei: Guanglong, 1966, p. 21.

¹⁹⁸ It is probably this close association with the group of the Huangpu's staff that he turned to communism. *Ibid.* 4: 426.

¹⁹⁹ For the biography of Ye Jianyin, see the *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, 4: 23-26;

The experience of the Guangdong Army during 1918-1923 apparently was useful when they embarked on setting up a military academy and an army at Huangpu in 1924.

Chiang Kaishek's Resignation

On 16 January 1924, Chiang Kaishek arrived in Guangzhou in time for the convening of the Guomindang's First National Congress of Delegates although Chiang was not a delegate. On 24 January, Sun appointed an eight-member Preparatory Committee headed by Chiang to organise the new academy.²⁰⁰ But after only two meetings Chiang suddenly decided to leave Guangzhou. Before he left, he gave some money to the committee members telling them to return to their original posts.²⁰¹ Chiang was persuaded to resume his chairmanship only on 21 April, two weeks before the first class was to start their training in the new academy. Chiang's resignation on 21 February 1924 as head of the Preparatory Committee was an early indication of discord and lack of agreement on the question of setting up a party-army academy.

Different reasons have been advanced for Chiang's departure.²⁰² Bao Huiseng gives the reason that Chiang refused to serve under Cheng Qian, who was Sun's first choice to head the new academy. According to Bao, it was Zhang Jingjiang who went to Guangzhou to persuade Sun to appoint Chiang head of the academy.²⁰³ MacFarquhar, on

the *Far East Economic Review*, 6 November 1986, p. 32.

²⁰⁰ Other than Chiang Kaishek, other members were: Wang Boling, Deng Yanda, Lin Zhenxiong, Yu Feipeng, Sung Rongchang, Zhang Jiarui, Shen Yingshi. For detail of appointment and the names of the Preparatory Committee, see Luo Jialun and Huang Jilu eds. *Guofu nianpu zengding ben (A chronological biography of the father of the country, enlarged and revised edition)*. 3rd ed., 2 vols. Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang, Party History Commission, 1969, 1059; 1073-4.

²⁰¹ See one of the committee members Wang Boling's account in "Huangpu chengli zhi huiyi (Recollections of the founding of Huangpu), Part 1." *Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical literature)* 15, no. 6 (December 1969): 82-86. Wang said that the Preparatory Committee initially could not find a proper place to start their work. The allied armies did not like the idea of another military academy in Guangzhou. The first few meetings had to convene in Sun's cabin on board of a ship, *ibid.*, p.82. Chiang's resignation in early 1924 was also criticized by Ye Jianying, who was the Deputy Head of the Training Department in Huangpu. Ye later became one of the People's Liberation Army Field Marshals after 1949. See Ye Jianying, "Sun Zhongshan sansheng de jian jun sixiang he da wu wei jingshen (Mr Sun Yatsen's thought on the building of the army and the spirit of fearlessness)." *Wen hui bao (Wen hui newspaper)*, (1956).

²⁰² John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, 229-230, in particular, argues disagreement between the Chinese officers and the Russian advisers, and suspicion of the Russian's motives; see also *Geming wenxian (Documents on the revolution)*, 11: 1239-1300.

²⁰³ Bao Huiseng was a member of the Chinese Communist Party, and in 1925 he was appointed as the Head of the Political Department of the Huangpu Army during the First Eastern Expedition. See his memoir *Bao Huiseng Huiyilu (Reminiscence of Bao Huiseng)*. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p. 151.

the other hand, thinks that once Chiang Kaishek had the experience of his Russian journey, he became the prime candidate for the position of chairman of the preparatory committee, and as head of the preparatory committee he was the obvious candidate for the job of commandant.²⁰⁴ But there is no available document indicating that the selection of Chiang as head of the Preparatory Committee was made because Chiang was to be the Commandant. There is, however, some evidence regarding the change of appointment of the head of the new academy. According to an early set of regulations for the academy which may have been drawn up by the Preparatory Committee, the first general rule stated that the Generalissimo (Sun Yatsen) was the chief principal (commandant) of the academy; and Rule 15 states that there was to be an assistant chief who would be second in command.²⁰⁵ But in fact, when Chiang Kaishek finally returned to Guangzhou, it was reported that Sun "especially appointed" him principal of the Huangpu Military Academy on 2 May.²⁰⁶

Finance and Arms

The most crucial factor in determining the Huangpu Military Academy's future, however, was sources of financial support and arms procurement. Chiang Kaishek's resignation letter stressed the financial uncertainty of the new academy.²⁰⁷ In reply, Sun Yatsen reassured Chiang on 29 February 1924 that the financial problem had been settled, although he did not explain how it was done.²⁰⁸ Liao Zhongkai also telegraphed

²⁰⁴ Roderick L. MacFarquhar, "The Whampoa Military Academy," *Harvard Papers on China* Vol. IX (1955): 150-1.

²⁰⁵ *The Whampoa Military School: A Report Compiled from Soviet Documents*. U.S. National Archives: Record Group 165, Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, 2657-1-281/120, articles 1, 15, and 17a. This report is written by the Russian advisers in Guangzhou and the document was seized during the 1927 raid of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing and compiled by the American military attaché's office.

²⁰⁶ The Guomindang Archives account of the founding of the academy states that Sun appointed himself leader (*zongli*) of the academy with Chiang Kaishek as principal. See *Geming wenxian*, 8: 1167-8; and Qian Dajun, "Huangpu junxiao kaichuang zhiqi zhi zuzhi" (The organization of the Huangpu military academy in its initial period), *Geming wenxian*, 10: 1465-1470. The Russian adviser's account also confirms that Sun was to be the head of the academy and Chiang, presumably would be deputy director. See Cherepanov, A.I. *Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae; iz Istorii Pervoi Grazhdanskoi Revoliutsionnoi Cony, 1924-1927* (Notes of a military adviser in China: from the history of the First Revolutionary Civil War in China, 1924-1927). Moscow: Academy of Sciences of USSR, Institute Norodov Azii, Nauka, 1964, p. 85.

²⁰⁷ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 12 January 1924, p. 156.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 26-29 February 1924, 159-160.

Chiang on 3 April saying "as to the funds for the military academy, I will not ask about disbursements, and you will not ask about their sources. There is no lack of funds and you can proceed to administer with peace of mind."²⁰⁹ According to the Guomintang sources, the initial funds for the founding and maintenance of the new academy came mainly from Guangdong taxpayers. Wang Boling states that Liao Zhongkai, whom he called the academy's "kind mother" (*cimu*), did valuable works in raising funds and winning people over to the idea of the academy. Liao obtained a grant of about \$233,250 (or \$186,600 silver dollars) for initial expenses from the Guangzhou government.²¹⁰ Chiang's diary also states that on 22 May, the Financial Council of Guangzhou decided that, apart from the founding funds, the Provincial Finance Office, the Guangzhou Municipal Finance Office, and the Army Estimates Office would each provide \$5,000, and the Public Safety Bureau (the Guangzhou Police) contribute \$15,000 monthly.²¹¹ The total monthly expenses for the academy were \$30,000. As there are very little available sources on Huangpu's budget, it is extremely hard to tell how much of the funds were actually delivered to Huangpu.²¹² What is certain, however, is that the commanders of the allied armies frequently interrupted payments.²¹³ Moreover, the budget accounts preserved in the Guomintang Archives only document the running costs of the academy and contain nothing dealing with the academy army (for the first six months of the academy's budget see tables 4 and 5).

It has been traditionally believed that the main financial sources for the founding

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 30 March 1924, p.175. For an analysis of correspondence between Chiang and his colleagues in Guangzhou during this period see Loh, *The Early Chiang Kai-shek*, 92-96.

²¹⁰ The amount of \$233,250 was in Guangdong dollars. The original figure was in silver dollars of \$186,600. But not all the full amount was eventually delivered, see tables 4 and 5 for details; also Wang Boling, "Huangpu chuangshi zhi huiyi (Reminiscences concerning the founding of Huangpu)." *Huangpu jikan (Huangpu quarterly)* 1, no. 1 (3 January 1939), p. 9; and also Yu Feipeng, "Huangpu junxiao kaijian shi zhi huiyi" (Reminiscence of the founding of the Huangpu military academy), *Geming wenxian*: 10: 1453, Yu was a member of the preparatory committee and when the Huangpu Military Academy was founded he was the deputy head of the Supply Department.

²¹¹ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 22 May 1924, p.192.

²¹² The Guomintang Archives has only one account balance sheet for January-May 1924 indicating that the Huangpu expenditure was within the allocated budgets for both the initial founding and monthly expenses; see *Zhongyang shang zongli ji zhi jian weiyuan hui qing zhun he Huangpu baoxiao cheng han* (Document on the budget of Huangpu for the zongli (Sun Yatsen) and inspection committee approval), 454/47.5.

²¹³ Liao Zhongkai complained to Chiang Kaishek that he had to chase after the payments personally late into the night after some allied commanders had finished their opium smoking sessions. See *Huangpu junxiao shigao* (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), *Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao* (Central military officers' academy), Nanjing, The Second Chinese Historical Archives, 1936, Part 2, p.1.

of the Huangpu military academy came from Soviet Russia.²¹⁴ In February 1924, a joint commission of Chinese officials and Russian advisers under the chairmanship of Sun Yatsen prepared an estimate of the funds needed to set up the academy. The figures given by the chief Russian military adviser, V. K. Bliukher, in his diary indicate that the Soviet Union supported the Huangpu Military Academy financially until October 1925.²¹⁵ He also stated that Borodin regularly subsidised the Huangpu Military Academy and by October 1924 the monthly subsidy may have been \$100,000 Guangdong dollars.²¹⁶ In an interview, Borodin, the chief political adviser, said that the Russian government made a grant of three million roubles for the organisation of the new military academy and its initial running expenses.²¹⁷ The Guomindang's historians challenged this figure although they do acknowledge Russian financial support.²¹⁸ But how and when these Russian funds were spent remains a mystery.²¹⁹ What is important to note is that the Russian funds were used not only to establish the new academy but also to build the army at Huangpu. Above all, the academy expanded very rapidly after its inception. In May

²¹⁴ C. Martin Wilbur holds strongly to the view that large Russian funds were spent on the new academy, see "Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification Under the Nationalist Regime, 1922-1927," in *China in Crisis, vol. 1*, eds. Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou. USA: University of Chicago, 1968, 233-234; and *Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, 209; 351.

²¹⁵ See Kartunova, A. I. *V. K. Bliukher v Kitae, 1924-1927 gg : Dokumentirovannyi ocherk dokumenty* (V. K. Bliukher in China, 1924-1927: document outline, documents), Moskva: Nauka, 1970, p. 54.

²¹⁶ In a conversation between Bliukher and Liao Zhongkai on 18 November 1924, Liao told Bliukher he was still waiting for the remainder of last month's (15 October-15 November) funds and requested that in the future the monthly funds should be in one or two instalments. Bliukher also mentioned that the Yunnan Military Academy had also received Russian financial support although on a less regular basis. See Kartunova, A. I. *V. K. Bliukher v Kitae, 1924-1927 gg*, 54-5; and Holubnychy, Lydia. *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925*. New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, UMI, 1979, 412-3.

²¹⁷ Three million roubles would have amounted to about Chinese \$2,700,000. The money was given in instalments. See Fischer, Louis. *Men and Politics: An Autobiography*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1941, p. 138. Fischer interviewed Borodin ten times between 26 February and 4 June 1929.

²¹⁸ See in particular Wang Zhenghua who argues that there is no convincing evidence to indicate that all the Russian financial contribution was spent on Huangpu; see "Huangpu jianxiao jin fei cu tan (Preliminary study of the finance of the founding of the Huangpu military academy)." *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 437-482. Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau) edited. Taipei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau), 1984, 437-482.

²¹⁹ It is interesting to note that Huangpu's sources including participants' reminiscences and the academy's records have never mentioned the Russian funds. This is in marked contrast to the arms supplies from Soviet Russia, which most of the Huangpu sources acknowledged.

1924, soon after the academy opened, it had about 407 staff and 499 students, a total strength of 906. In November, the academy staff had increased to 1,500 and students to 2,200, with a total strength of 3,700, a fourfold increase in just four months. If one were to calculate the salary required for the expansion, and base this on the July salary standard of an average of \$16 a person, the salary cost per month would have been about \$14,498 in May 1924, in November \$59,200, and thereafter \$60,000 or more in the following months (see table 6 for the salary scale).

In September 1924, Chiang Kaishek also proposed setting up two Training Regiments (*jiadao tuan*) in Huangpu consisting of three infantry regiments, one artillery and one engineering battalion with a total strength of 3,769. The initial cost of this military build-up was \$2,720,000.²²⁰ The 1st Training Regiment was formed in November commanded by He Yingqin, and on 26 December the 2nd Training Regiment came into being under Wang Boling. The Russian chief military adviser V. K. Bliukher estimated the cost of one Training Regiment at about \$85,000 per month.²²¹

The arms supply sources to Huangpu are less controversial than those of financial aid. Arms supply came from three main sources. Before Huangpu commenced its first training class in May 1924, the academy had only 230 rifles and limited cartridges.²²² Sun Yatsen had ordered 600 rifles from the Guangdong Shijing Arsenal but only 230 were delivered. The Guangdong arsenal was under the control of the Yunnan Army and they resisted handing over the rifles to the Huangpu Military Academy. It was only after Sun's personal intervention that the rest of the rifles were eventually delivered.²²³ Another source of arms came from the seizure of armaments from the Guangzhou Merchant Corps.²²⁴ On 9 August, Sun ordered Chiang, as the commander of Changzhou

²²⁰ This figure excludes 12 field artillery pieces. The proposal was submitted by Chiang Kaishek and Liao Zhongkai to the Guomindang Central Executive Committee, 19 September 1924, file no. 454/49. Unfortunately, there is no detailed plan attached to this letter. Chiang's proposal for setting up two Training Regiments, see *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 11 August, 3 September 1924, 225-6, 231.

²²¹ See "Bliukher's Grand Plan of 1926", the *China Quarterly*, no.35, Jul-Sept 1968, p.26.

²²² In a letter to Liao Zhongkai, Chiang requested another 350 rifles and 50 to 100 cartridges for each rifle to be sent to Huangpu before 15 May 1924 when the academy commenced its training. The original letter is on display in the Exhibition Hall of the Guomindang Archives in Taipei.

²²³ The manager of the arsenal Ma Chaoju was kidnapped by the Yunnan Army for supplying Huangpu rifles. It was only after Sun Yatsen's intervention that Ma was released. See Ma Chaoju's speech in *Lujun junguan xuexiao sishi zhounian xiaoping zhuanji* (The 40th anniversary magazine of the Huangpu military academy), Taipei, 1965, p. 15.

²²⁴ See *Huangpu junxiao shigao* (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 10 parts, 8 vols,

fort, to seize a consignment of armaments for Guangzhou. According to British accounts, this arms consignment ordered by the Guangzhou Merchant Corps contained 4,850 rifles with 1,150,000 cartridges; 4,331 automatic rifles and 2,060,000 cartridges; and 660 pistols with 164,000 cartridges.²²⁵ Cherepanov recalled that when the armaments were finally returned to the Merchant Corps on 10 October, there were only about 2,149 rifles, 1,851 pistols and 125,000 rounds of ammunition.²²⁶ Apart from those distributed under the orders of Sun Yatsen to his Northern Expedition forces, most of the armaments were retained at Huangpu. The last but the most important source of armaments was from the Soviet Russia. The first shipment of Russian arms which arrived on the *Vorovsky* on 8 October 1924, consisted of eight thousand rifles with five hundred cartridges per rifle, and some machine guns and artillery pieces. The Russian ship was greeted with cheers when it arrived at Huangpu.²²⁷ Sun Yatsen was then at Shaoguan organising his northern expedition campaign, and when he heard of the Russian ship's arrival, he ordered Chiang to off-load the armaments directly at Huangpu in defiance of customs regulations.²²⁸ Before the end of 1926, another two to three Russian arms shipments arrived in Huangpu.²²⁹ Among the armaments procured for Huangpu, the most valuable perhaps were the artillery pieces, which formed the main bulk of the artillery units of the Huangpu army. There was also a number of aircraft,

Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao (Central military officers academy) comp. Nanjing, The Second Chinese Historical Archives: Huadong gongxueyan chubanshu yingyin (Huadong industrial college photocopied), 1936, vol. 1, 1-129 to 1-136.

²²⁵ See the report of the British Consulate General (Canton) to the British Legation (Peking), dated 21 August 1924, F.O. 228/3109, p.320. This report was shown to me by Mr. Chen Cungong of the Institute of Modern History, the Academia Sinica during my research field trip in Taipei.

²²⁶ A. I. Cherepanov, *Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae; iz Istorii Pervoi Grazhdanskoi Revoliutsionnoi Ceny, 1924-1927*, p. 97.

²²⁷ Wang Boling, "Huangpu chengli zhi huiyi" (Recollections of the founding of Huangpu), *Zhuanji wenxue* (Biographical literature) 16, no. 6 (December 1969): 95-96.

²²⁸ *Guofu quanji*, 5: 571, which has Sun's hand written note to Chiang dated 3 October 1924.

²²⁹ Taiwanese scholar Sun Zilhe argues that there were at least three more arms shipment from Russia before the end of 1926, see "Cong Huangpu jianjun dao beifa" (From the military build up at Huangpu to the (1926) Northern Expedition), *Zhonghua minguo lishi yi wenhua taoluhui* (History and culture seminar on the republican period), 4: 16-17; whereas Chen Cungong argues there were five shipments: see his article "Huangpu jianxiao qianhou zai hua nan de su'e junshi guwen (The Russian military advisers' activities in southern China during the founding of the Huangpu military academy)," *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 367-436. *Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju* (National military history and translation bureau) edited. Taipei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau), 1984, 131-2. Chiang Kaishek in his book however, mentions only two Russian arms shipments to Huangpu: see *Su'e zai zhongguo* (Soviet Russia in China), Taipei, Zhongyang wenwu gongying shi, 1957, p. 271.

aviators and navigators, sent to Guangzhou during 1925 and 1926.²³⁰

The Recruitment Plan

The documentary evidence of the Guomindang reveals that the party's Central Executive Committee (CEC) maintained some control in the early preparation of the new academy. This was apparent in the cadets' recruitment policy. The Preparatory Committee headed by Liao Zhongkai decided on the original plan for the recruitment of cadets on 10 February. Party members who attended the First National Guomindang Congress would carry out recruitment. A total student body of 324 and a quota of each province were established.²³¹ Twelve students each were to come from the following provinces: Hunan, Guangdong, Yunnan, Shanxi, Guangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, and Hebei which constituted 168 students. Fifty students would come from Manchuria, Jehol (Rehe) and Harbin. Another fifteen students each would come from Guangdong, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangxi and Henan armies stationed in Guangdong. Twenty places were reserved for family members of the Guomindang's martyrs. Lastly, the remaining eleven places were allocated to less qualified students, or the reserve as they were called.²³²

From this student quota, we can discern several points of the initial planning. Firstly, in the minds of the key Guomindang leaders, the Huangpu Military Academy was to be a national institution where the majority of the provinces would be represented. This idea coincided with the Russian Red Army policy but it was also a pattern of the Baoding Military Academy when it first established in 1912 (see chapter one). The multi-provincial quota was also consistent with Sun's attempt to establish a multi-provincial personal bodyguard earlier in 1910 when he first set up his Guangzhou Military Government. Party members in Sun's confidence recommended candidates for recruitment. Until Chen Jiongming's rebellion in the summer of 1922, the bodyguard had less than 100 men. But after Sun's return to Guangzhou in February 1923, this unit

²³⁰ See Cherepanov, A. I. *Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya (Zapiski Voennogo Sovetnika) 1926-1927* (The Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army of China: Notes of a Military Adviser, 1926-1927. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1968, p. 202.

²³¹ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 156-7. This number of 324 was decided, according to Chiang Kaishek, based on the maximum capacity of the buildings of the former army and navy schools on Changzhou Island. Also in *Huangpu congshu* (Huangpu Collections), Shanghai: 1928, part 1, "The Twenty-Fifth Speech of the Commandant", 149; also in Richard Landis, "Institutional Trends at the Whampao Military School" chapter 3.

²³² *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, vol. 1, bian 1, 1:102-103.

size had increased to 360 men and been divided into two companies. Most of them came from Hunan and Guangdong, and smaller numbers from Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangxi, and other northern provinces. In early 1924, Yao Guanshun, a native of Sun's own hometown, commanded the force. Secondly, the Manchuria quota is an interesting one. This high quota of fifty students represents Sun's plan of military alliance with Zhang Zuolin against the Zhili faction of Wu Peifu even after accepting Russian assistance. Sun's goal was to develop his relationship with Zhang Zuolin in preparation for the development of a joint military effort against the Zhili faction. This plan was evidenced when Zhang Zuolin launched his offensive in the north in 1924, and Sun responded with the ill-prepared Northern Expedition.²³³

Thirdly, the allocation of fifteen students to the allied forces in Guangzhou signifies the Guomindang's policy of integrating the main allied armies through Huangpu. Seen in this light, in the eyes of the party, the Huangpu Military Academy was to be a common training school for future military officers of the Guomindang.

The recruitment was carried out secretly in most provinces by party members, mostly those who attended the First National Congress held in Guangzhou in January 1924. At the congress, party members were told to recommend potential candidates from their provinces. Shanghai and Guangzhou became the screening and testing centres.²³⁴ An Examination Committee was established to administer the final test in Guangzhou. And to the surprise of the committee, they found many more students were arriving in Guangzhou than they expected. About 3,000 applicants appeared in Guangzhou during March and April. But only 1,200 were examined in the first round written test on 27 March at the Guangdong High Normal School (the predecessor of the Guangdong and later Zhongshan universities) and only 200 to 300 passed the test.²³⁵ Between March and April, when lists of successful candidates were published, the Examination Committee made major changes to the original plan. Subsequently, they administered a second

²³³ For an account of the 1924 Northern Expedition, see C. Martin Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen: frustrated Patriot*, 254-58.

²³⁴ The recruitment had to be carried out in secrecy as the military warlords in these provinces were hostile to Sun and his party. According to the original plan, all candidates were to be tested twice, one in the screening centres and another in Guangzhou. But this was not made clear to the candidates and thus created such confusion. See Richard Landis, "Institutional Trends at the Whampao Military School", 71-77.

²³⁵ See Leng Xin, "Huangpu shenghuo zhuyi (The Huangpu military academy life remembered)," *Ziyou tan* (Free speech), 15: 3, March 1964; and F.F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949*, p. 9.

examination with emphasis on the oral interview to give due consideration to those candidates weak in written work. The final enrolment for the first class rose to 470, consisting of 350 fully qualified and 120 reserve students.²³⁶

In view of the fact that a second oral examination was needed, the conclusion is quite clear that the vast majority of the 1,200 who took the first test had serious difficulty expressing themselves in writing. This could mean that many applicants did not have the equivalent of a middle school qualification, the standard admission requirement for the Baoding Military Academy. The Guomintang deemed this education qualification as important but not the Commandant Chiang Kaishek. In a telegram to Liao Zhongkai from Shanghai, Chiang expressed his preference for northerners. He told Liao to take in as many northerners as possible even at the expense of lowering the educational standard. To remedy the education gap, he proposed that the class be divided into two--a senior class for fully qualified students and a junior class for the reserve students who would eventually be promoted qualified students.²³⁷

Chiang's preference for northerners is interesting. While Sun Yatsen was interested in forging a military alliance with Manchuria's warlord Zhang Zuolin, Chiang's interest in the northerners was a tactical and purely military consideration. The northerners were physically fitter, more hard working and obedient. This made them better soldiers. Perhaps more importantly, taking in northerners gave access to useful information about places, where operational maps were lacking. This factor was proved to be critical in the subsequent campaigns during the Northern Expedition.²³⁸

The First Class also included twenty-nine candidates who had failed in the qualifying examinations for the lower ranking officers; twenty students who came from Sichuan, and 146 students from the original Chen Qian's Army Officers' School who joined the First Class only in November (see tables 7 and 8 for detail). The cadets were divided into five companies (*tui*). The first three companies were made up of fully qualified students. The fourth was the reserve company, and a special sixth company

²³⁶ *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, 1: 102-103.

²³⁷ The telegram to Liao Zhongkai dated 2 April 1924 can be found in *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 2 April 1924, p. 176.

²³⁸ In view of the severe limitations of operational maps and military intelligence available to the subsequent National Revolutionary Army, the advantage of local knowledge would be an important factor. This was well demonstrated in the subsequent Northern Expedition that will be discussed in the later chapter.

was later created from Chen Qian's defunct army school.²³⁹

When the academy finally commenced its training, the actual provincial breakdown of student differed greatly from the original party's quota. If we were to look at the first four companies of the original recruits, among 489 of them, 106 (or 21.7 per cent) were from Guangdong; 69 (14.1 per cent) from Hunan; 57 (11.6 per cent) from Shaanxi. These three provinces constituted 47.4 per cent of the total students' strength. Manchuria and north-east regions fell far short of expectation, only four of the original quota of fifty joined in. Shaanxi was the only exceptional one consisting of 57 (8.98 per cent) students. If we were to add the sixth company in the table, the cadets from Hunan rank top on the list with a high 29.13 per cent and cadets from Guangdong came second with 17.17 per cent.

Those who failed to qualify for the first class, about 730 of them, were given an option to join the preparatory course or entry into 2nd and 3rd classes. They had come from various parts of China and were afraid to return to areas controlled by warlords hostile to the Guomindang. Therefore, many who joined the second some join the third class were those who failed the entrance examinations for the first class.²⁴⁰

Recruitment for the third, fourth and later classes appeared to be much better organised.²⁴¹ During the recruitment for the third class, Chiang Kaishek personally put Chen Guofu, a Zhejiang native, in charge of the recruitment in Shanghai. Chen was not only recruiting cadets but also soldiers for the Huangpu Army.²⁴²

²³⁹ The classification of students in each class and the dates of graduation can be very confusing. For example, for the First Class, some sources include only the first four companies but others include all the five companies. The sixth company is more correctly considered an integral part of the First Class as the pictures of its members appeared in the First Class Students Directory (*tongxue lu*). Similar confusion abounds also for successive classes as branches were established in Chaozhou, Nanning and Wuhan. This situation would improve only after the academy had moved to Nanjing in 1927.

²⁴⁰ Leng Xin, "Huangpu shenghuo zhuiyi", 15: 3.

²⁴¹ The recruitment drives were launched at the end of 1924 and early 1925; and in the summer and autumn of 1925 at the beginning of the recruit training periods. The recruiting training was introduced in the Third Class and after.

²⁴² In his reminiscence, Chen notes that the Third Class was recruited during the First Eastern Expedition. However, at least part of the class may have been recruited prior to the expedition because it was included in the list of units comprising the Huangpu army. See Chen Guofu, "Jianjun shi zhi yi ye (One page in the history of creating the army)." *Geming wenxian* (Documents on the revolution), Taipei: Zhongyang wenwu kungying she, 1973, vol. 10, 27-8.

Apart from cadet recruitment, the party CEC was also involved in the selection of lower ranking officers to lead the cadets' units, and the financial disbursements of the academy expenses.²⁴³ The Committee monitored closely the recruiting standards of the staff and students and, in some instances, did not hesitate to interfere and exercise its decision-making authority. For example, Liao Zhongkai, acting for the standing committee of the CEC, informed the Shanghai recruitment personnel that middle school (*zhong xue*) graduates were qualified to take the entrance examination for the engineering class only if they had graduated under the old middle school system. If the prospective students had undergone a new system of education, then graduation from high school (*gao xiao*) was required.²⁴⁴ The CEC was also the communication channel between Huangpu and the two recruitment centres operating in Shanghai and Guangzhou.²⁴⁵ Throughout this early period, most of the documents dealing with Huangpu matters had official seals and were co-signed usually by Liao Zhongkai and other CEC committee members. Liao's position in the CEC worked in combination with his role as Party representative of the Huangpu Military Academy, and his prestige in the Guomindang make him a very potent figure in Huangpu affairs. His authority and influence, however, are seldom mentioned in the writing of the official history of the academy.²⁴⁶

The Party Representative System

The system of the Party representative, similar to the Soviet Red Army political commissar, was introduced in Huangpu since its inception. Structurally, the Party representative shared the power and responsibility with the commandant in making all major decisions with regard to the school's administration within the academy. The

²⁴³ For example, in reply to a request from Shanghai recruiters for reimbursement of \$3,500 already spent, Liao Zhongkai indicated he did not understand how the money had been used. He wanted specific information before he undertook reimbursement. He reiterated that successful candidates were to be given only \$15 travel expenses. *Guomindang Archives*, 52/454-1.

²⁴⁴ There are several pieces of correspondence dated August 1924 between the CEC and the Academy dealing with recruitment of officers to lead a new engineering class. *Guomindang Archives*, 52/454-7; 52/454-8,-9,-10, August 1924.

²⁴⁵ For example, the committee informed Huangpu when successful applicants had been sent from Shanghai and when they might be expected at Guangzhou. In addition, the committee had also coordinated with Ho Yingqin, the Chief Instructor of the Huangpu Military Academy on the arrangements for the entrance examinations that was held at the Guangdong University for lower ranking officers. *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶ For example, in *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, which was compiled during the 1930s, the position of Liao Zhongkai always appears after Chiang Kaishek. There is just one of the examples of the Huangpu history compiled by the Guomindang's officials the tendency of giving Chiang much more prominent than he deserved.

commandant's orders were invalid unless countersigned by the Party representative. When Chiang Kaishek was named the Commandant (*xiaozhang*) on 2 May 1924, Liao Zhongkai was appointed as the Party representative (*dang daibiao*) of the Huangpu Military Academy on 9 May the same year.

Unlike the dual leadership in the Red Army officer-commissar system which had a confrontation tendency, the two Guomintang colleagues agreed most of the time on policy of the academy. In fact, Liao and Chiang formed perhaps the best civil-military team the Guomintang could offer at the time. Both of them possessed similar qualities such as pragmatism, dynamism and were extremely capable in administration. Moreover, thanks to the heavy burden of Liao's many concurrent responsibilities, Chiang soon gained tremendous authority within the academy, even to the point of acting as a chief political instructor for indoctrinating staff and cadets.²⁴⁷

The party control of Huangpu, which was dependent on individuals rather than the institution, however, disappeared soon after Liao Zhongkai's assassination in August 1925. Liao's death caused fundamental changes in officer-commissar relations in the highest echelon of the Guomintang's military hierarchy. The cordial and cooperative relationship was replaced by distrust and conflict between the next Party representative Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kaishek.²⁴⁸ The tense relations reached its climax in the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident on 20 March 1926 when Chiang unilaterally declared martial law in Guangzhou and took into custody the Russian advisers and the Chinese Communist members in the academy.²⁴⁹ After this incident, the position of the Party representative in the academy was left vacant for some time, and was abrogated later as

²⁴⁷ For example, in the first seven months after the opening of the Huangpu Military Academy, Chiang Kaishek gave about 49 lectures, where Liao Zhongkai gave four, Tai Jitao, Shao Yuanzhong, and Hu Hanmin one each, the Russian advisers two. See *Guojun zhenggong shigao*, 1: 93-95. The high frequency of Chiang Kaishek's speeches and the all-inclusiveness of their contents partly explained why the Huangpu graduates would later view Chiang as their political leader when the Guomintang was divided by political and ideological confusion soon after Sun's death.

²⁴⁸ Wang was another senior member of the Guomintang who succeeded Sun Yatsen as the chairman of the party and military council. He was, however, seen by many Guomintang conservatives as a pro-Communist and pro-Comintern. See Li, Yunhan. "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong (Sun Yatsenism society and the early years of anti-communist activities)." *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau) edited. Taipei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau), 1984, 71-114.

²⁴⁹ Although this event had great impact on the Guomintang and Comintern-Chinese Communist United Front collaboration, the detail of the incident remains a historical enigma. This topic will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter.

Wang left China in self-exile to France, allegedly for medical treatment.²⁵⁰ Subsequently, no one was appointed Party representative of the Huangpu Military Academy.

The Political Department

The other department staffed by civilian officials was the Political Department. Until February 1926, eight heads and deputy heads were appointed to the Political Department of the Huangpu Military Academy (see table 9). Dai Jitao (or Dai Chuanxian), the first head of the Political Department, was assisted by three high-ranking Guomindang members assigned as instructors. Wang Qingwei taught the Guomindang history, Hu Hanmin the party ideology of the Three Principles of the People, and Shao Yuanzhong taught political economy.²⁵¹ It should be noted that like Liao Zhongkai, the Party representative of the Huangpu Military Academy, Dai, Wang, Hu and Shao were all senior civilian Guomindang members. They held both greater prestige and higher positions in the party than the Commandant Chiang Kaishek at that time. They were all full members and Shao was an alternate member of the first Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Guomindang set up in January 1924. Chiang Kaishek, who then held the rank of Major-General, was not a CEC member and was a subordinate of Xu Chongzhi who was the head of the Guomindang Military Affairs Committee, an alternate member of the CEC, and Commander of the Guangdong Army where Chiang was his Chief of Staff.²⁵² This arrangement clearly demonstrated the ideal of civilian party control over the military. This ideal, however, was not realised in practice. These party members simultaneously held so many other important positions in the civil sector that they had little time to do party-political work at the academy. The first head of the Political Department, for example, seldom came to the academy, and his duties were devolved upon Zhou Enlai, who formally assumed the head in April 1925.²⁵³ Furthermore, in the situation when the political instructors were unable to teach regularly and when there were no formal curricula to follow, the ideological-political education was substituted by commandant Chiang's intensive "spiritual speeches" to the cadets,

²⁵⁰ Wang was implicated in the assassination of Liao Zhongkai; his exile was a face-saving measure for the Guomindang and him.

²⁵¹ See *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, bian 7, 7-229.

²⁵² *Guojun zhengong shigao* (A draft history of the political work of the national army), 1: 38-39, 48-49, and 95; and *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, 2: 125.

²⁵³ *Guojun zhengong shigao* 1: 102.

especially during the First and Second Class.²⁵⁴

Political education, which was the main responsibility of the Political Department, in the Huangpu Military Academy was not institutionalised until the reorganisation of academy in January 1926. The political training curricula were more systematically organised and taught beginning from the Fourth Class. Political training then became required subjects for all students regardless of their specialties. And a special political class for intensive political training was formed for those who majored in politics.²⁵⁵ Political education covered a wide variety of topics including: Party Ideology, Basic Party Policies, Party History, Comparative Political Economy, Party Organisation, Party Leaders' Speeches, Comparative Politico-Economic, Finance, and Analysis of Social Movements. In addition, practical skills for conducting propaganda and social mobilisation such as oration, drama, singing and leaflet posting were required for all students.²⁵⁶

The Political Department did not play a very active role in the early period. But once the Training Regiment was formed, it became the main organisation responsible for the political work of the unit. Their activities and contributions were more clearly demonstrated during the two eastern expeditions in 1925. [Detail will be discussed in the next chapter.]

Military Training

Three departments took charge of military training at the Huangpu Military Academy. There were: the Instructional Department (*jiaoshou bu*), which was responsible for doctrinal and theoretical subjects; the Training Department (*jiaolian bu*), that looked after the tactical and technical lessons, and cadets' daily routine; and the Chief Instructor Office (*zong jiaoguan shi*), which supervised the instructors and the conduct of the lessons.²⁵⁷ On 30 January 1925, the departments of instruction and tactics

²⁵⁴ See Huangpu junxiao shigao, 1: 102-3.

²⁵⁵ The non-politics majors of the Fifth Class, for example, received a political education of 162 periods, about 70 minutes for each, while the politics majors received 445 periods. *Guojun zhenggong shigao* (A draft history of the political work of the national army), 1: 105-110.

²⁵⁶ The topics for political education were better organised only after Sixth Class, yet one should take into consideration this was during the time of the Northern Expedition where the priority of the academy was to train more cadets to fill in the front line of the battle.

²⁵⁷ See Huangpu junxiao shigao, 2: 55.

merged to form a single Education Department (*jiaoyu bu*).

Well-qualified Chinese instructors with the assistance of foreign advisers staffed the Instructional Department of the academy at the beginning. The head of the Instructional Department was the thirty-six years old Wang Boling. Wang was a Jiangdu native in Jiangsu, and a graduate of the Baoding Preparatory Course, the Japanese Shikan Gakko, a contemporary of Chiang Kaishek in Tokyo. Before arriving in Guangzhou, he had been head of the Education Department of the Yunnan Military Academy.²⁵⁸ Wang believed that the academy's aim was to train junior commanders who could be deployed at the front line of the battle. He, therefore, emphasised individual field-craft such as weapons handling; shooting and bayonet fighting, and tactical formation training for platoon and section levels.²⁵⁹ During the preparatory stage of the academy Wang had the assistance of a small group of Japanese military officers in the planning of the military training curriculum.²⁶⁰ Wang's deputy was Ye Jianying, a very capable staff officer from the Guangdong Army.²⁶¹ There were about 18 Chinese instructors and three Russian military advisers under Wang. Three Russian advisers were assigned to assist Wang in early 1924, they were Alexander I. Cherepanov, Vladimir Poliak and Nikolai Tereshatov, all fresh graduates of the Red Army's Military Academy. They were also the first three Russian military advisers to work with the Guomindang in Guangzhou.²⁶² In addition,

²⁵⁸ For Wang Boling, see his account in "Huangpu chuangshi zhi huiyi (Reminiscences concerning the founding of Huangpu)." *Huangpu jikan* (Huangpu quarterly) 1, no. 1 (3 January 1939); and Wang, Boling, He Yingqin, Chen Zhicheng et al. *Huangpu jianjun shihua* (Historical Notes on Whampoa and its Founding of the Army). Chongqing: Da Di Bookstore, 1944. According to one source, Wang was a very well trained and talented military officer. See Liu Fenghan, p. 221.

²⁵⁹ Wang Boling, "Huangpu chengli zhi huiyi" (Recollections of the founding of the Huangpu), *Zhuanji wenxue* (Biographical literature), 16, 3: 87; 4: 87.

²⁶⁰ It is believed that the Japanese military advisers were invited by Wang Boling, see Sasaki Toichi. *Nanpō kakumei seiryoku no jisso to soho hiham* (The situation report and commentary on the strength of the southern revolution). Osaka: Takshi / Osakayagshoten, 1927. The author of this report was the Japanese military attache in Beijing who knew Wang Boling personally. See Takeuchi Minoru's "The Huangpu military academy", p. 60 / 714.

²⁶¹ Ye Jianying was one of the ten field-m Marshals of the Chinese Communist People's Liberation Army promoted in 1955. He was a native of Meixian, Guangdong and a graduate of the Yunnan Military Academy. Prior to joining the Huangpu Military Academy, Ye was a general staff officer of Xu Chongzhi and Deng Keng in the Guangdong Army. For his biography see *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, editors Howard L. Boorman, and Richard C. Howard. vol. 1, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 23-26.

²⁶² See Cherepanov, A.I. *Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae; iz Istorii Pervoi Grazdanskoi Revoliutsionnoi Cony, 1924-1927* (Notes of a military adviser in China: from the history of First Revolutionary Civil War in China, 1924-1927). Moscow: Academy of Sciences of USSR, Institute Norodov Azii, Nauka, 1964, 90-103.

there were also a few Japanese military instructors teaching bayonet fighting and other military lessons to the First Class.²⁶³

The Training Department was in charge of training of cadets. Its head was Li Jishen, a graduate of the Beijing Staff College and a veteran of the 1st Division of the Guangdong Army. Li was a Guangxi native and a graduate of the Guangdong-Guangxi Military Middle School in Guangzhou and the Military Staff College at Beijing. After graduation, he remained at the staff college as an instructor. He also served as an editor in the Research Bureau of the Ministry of War. In 1921 Li went to Guangzhou at the invitation of Deng Keng, the chief of staff of the Guangdong Army and commander of the 1st Division. Deng appointed him chief of staff of the 1st Division. When Deng was assassinated and Chen Jiongming staged a coup in Guangzhou on 16 June 1922, Li participated in the campaign that drove Chen out of Guangzhou.

Li's deputy was Deng Yanda, a native of Huizhou, Guangdong. Deng enrolled at Guangzhou's Huangpu Military Primary School when he was 12 and his classmates included Hsueh Yuch and Yeh. Deng was the youngest cadet in the class but his performance as a student soon brought him to the attention of the school's dean, Deng Keng. He entered the Guangdong Short-Term Military School and graduated in 1914. After studying at the Second Military Preparatory School in Wuchang from 1914 to 1916, he spent the years from 1916 to 1919 at the Baoding Military Academy. In 1919 he was assigned to field duty as a junior officer in the Northwest Frontier Defence Army of Xu Shucheng. In 1920 Deng Keng summoned his former pupil to Zhangzhou and placed him in command of a unit there. Following the reoccupation of Guangzhou by the Guangdong Army in October 1920, Deng Keng became commander of the 1st Division of the reorganised Guangdong Army, and Deng Yanda became his staff officer and commander of an infantry battalion. Deng Yanda and his battalion were assigned in late 1921 to serve as a garrison unit guarding Sun Yatsen's Guilin field headquarters. After the assassination of Deng Keng at Guangzhou in March 1922, and the subsequent attempted coup by Chen Jiongming, and the flight of Sun Yatsen to Shanghai, Deng Yanda and other officers such as Zhang Fakui and Chen Jitang worked to preserve the integrity of the 1st Division in supporting Sun Yatsen against Chen Jiongming. In winter

²⁶³ According to Song Xilian, a graduate of the First Class, about two to three Japanese non-commissioned officers (NCOs) specialised in bayonet-fighting and grenade-throwing drill were hired by the Huangpu Military Academy for three months; military subjects such as tactics, weapon training, field fortifications, and topography etc., were modelled on the Japanese Shikan Gakko and Baoding Military Academy. See his *Yinquan jiangjun: Song Xilian zishu* (The lackey general: memoir of Song Xilian). 2 vols., Taipei: Li Ao chubanshe, 1990, 1: 17.

1922, the 1st Division joined with armies from Yunnan and Guangxi in driving Chen Jiongming out of Guangzhou. During this period, Li Jishen became the commander of the 1st Division, and Deng Yanda was named commander of its 3rd Regiment.²⁶⁴

Finally, there was the Chief Instructor whose main responsibility was to supervise the military instructors of the academy. The first Chief Instructor was He Yingqin, one of the most highly trained professional officers in the Huangpu Military Academy. He was a product of the late military education reform and received the best military education possible for an officer of his generation. He began his military education at the Guizhou Army Primary School when he was eleven, and he graduated and continued to study the Third Army Middle School at Wuchang. He attended the Shimbu Gakko, and later, the Shikan Gakko under the sponsorship of the Imperial Qing War Ministry. But he returned to China to serve under Chen Qimei when the 1911 Revolution exploded at Wuhan. In 1913 he led an infantry battalion of the Jiangsu Army in his home province. He returned to Japan to finish his military education in 1913 and graduated from the Shikan Gakko and returned to Guizhou in 1916. He was assigned various appointments, which included the commanding officer of the 4th Infantry Regiment and the dean of studies at the provincial Guizhou Military Academy. He became very active in reform activities and established the "Young Guizhou Society". Many important political and military figures saw He as a threat to local stability. Under great pressure he fled Guizhou and took refuge with in Yunnan under Tang Jiyao. He served as dean of studies at the Yunnan Military School in Kunming since summer of 1922. However, his Guizhou opponents seemed to have followed him to Yunnan. He was shoot by an assassin and seriously wounded, and retreated to Shanghai for about a year to recuperate. In early 1924 he joined Sun Yatsen as a staff officer in the Sun's Guangzhou headquarters. He was thirty-four when he arrived for what was evidently his first assignment with the Guomindang.²⁶⁵

Officers' Cadets Training

During the time of the Army Officers' Academy, which trained the First to the Third Class, the Huangpu cadets' military training was similar to the curriculum of other regional military schools of the time. It drew heavily on Japanese training teachings and techniques. The original duration of the course was only six months. The course was

²⁶⁴ See *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, editors Boorman and Howard. III: 260-61.

²⁶⁵ See *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, editors Boorman and Howard. II: 79-84.

extended to a year from the Third Class. The emphasis of the training was on fieldworks training and operational procedures rather than parade ground marching and ceremonies.

The First Class cadets' six-month training program was divided into two general phases: preparatory training for basic military skills, and a course proper, where classroom instruction and field training lessons were taught. The First Class received only the infantry training but infantry tactics and operations became the major focus of the subsequent classes. The curriculum expanded in the Second Class and cadets were organised into infantry, engineer, artillery, logistic and military police units. In the Third Class, a cavalry course was added on, and in the Fourth Class, a political propaganda course²⁶⁶ was introduced.

For the first half of the six-month cycle, the cadets had no free days. Engaged in the daily routine of classroom lectures, field exercises, and political training, no one was allowed to leave Huangpu Island.²⁶⁷ Special political instructors, such as Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, Shao Yuanzhong, Liao Zhongkai, and Kan Naiguang were invited to provide lectures even on Sundays.²⁶⁸ During these months, cadets received no homework assignments. They merely reviewed each day's work during the two evening hours set aside for self-study (*zixiu*). At the end of the first three months, they took a mid-term examination. And all but half a dozen or so of the students passed onto the second half of the cycle.²⁶⁹

During the remaining three months, cadets received regular homework assignments in tactical problems. The students were allowed to journey to Guangzhou every Sunday on boats provided by the school. At the end of the cycle in late October 1924, the First Class took a terminal examination that merely tested the students' level of knowledge and proficiency, but did not deny anyone the opportunity to continue in the

²⁶⁶ For the Fourth Class, which came about during the transition from the Army Officer's Academy to the Central Military and Political Academy, there were more than 2,600 cadets on the course. The cadets were organised into two regiments, one regiment for the infantry, and the other regiment for special arms such as artillery, engineering, logistic, cavalry, military police and politics. See *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, 2: 137-138.

²⁶⁷ MacFarquhar, Roderick L. "The Whampoa Military Academy," p. 158, Chart 2 indicates the daily time schedule, and on p. 160 states that the instructional staff were not permitted to maintain their families on the island. Chung Wei, Personal Interview indicates in some detail the restricted nature of cadet life during the first three months of the first class cycle.

²⁶⁸ Chung Wei, Personal Interview; and *Geming wenxian*, 11: 1765.

²⁶⁹ MacFarquhar, *op. cit.*, p.158, Chart 2 refers to the self-study period as "6.15--8.30 Preparation".

revolutionary profession. Upon completion of their training cycle in October 1924, the majority of the First Class students were appointed as probationers (*jianxi guan*) to the 1st and 2nd Training Regiments. For each two months of training at Huangpu, a cadet was obliged to serve the Guomindang for one year. In effect, the majority of the graduates had obligated themselves for three years' service.²⁷⁰

From the Second Class onwards, cadets were organised into units representing various branches of military work: infantry, engineer, artillery, and transportation.²⁷¹ Beginning with the Third Class, a recruit-training period of approximately six months' duration became a standard part of the training cycles. The launch of the first and second Eastern Expeditions coincided with the recruit training periods of the Third and Fourth classes. Cadets took part in these expeditions as support units at Huangpu or Guangzhou. The conclusion is inescapable that one reason for the extended recruit status lay in the need to engage in non-school activities.²⁷² As with the second class, the majority of the cadets in the latter classes were formed into infantry units during the training periods of the class cycles. The third class comprised only infantry and cavalry students, while the fourth consisted of infantry, artillery, engineer, intendancy, and political units.

In the rapidly evolving military-political situation at the end of 1925, and beginning of 1926, many graduates of the Second and Third classes were appointed directly to posts as officers and party representatives in successive Training Regiments. They did not serve their probations as the first class graduates did.

Formation of the Training Regiments

Despite the intended plan of the Guomindang's efforts to build a party academy, the condition of Guangzhou, however, was hostile to its development. The first serious crisis after its inception came in August 1924, two months after its official opening. The event is commonly called the Guangzhou Merchants' Corps Incident. Essentially, the incident was a contest of power between leading merchants of Guangzhou and the government of Sun Yatsen. The incident became a crisis for the Guomindang because it

²⁷⁰ See *Huangpu zongshu*, I: 143, "Commandant's Twenty-fourth Speech".

²⁷¹ See the *Thirteenth Class Directory*, 41-43.

²⁷² *Beifa zhanzhi* (A war history of the northern expedition), I: 295, 307 indicates the support status of the later classes.

occurred at a time when Sun Yatsen was preparing his Northern Expedition in Shaoguan.²⁷³ With the main bulk of the Guomindang's forces concentrating around the Guangdong-Hunan borders, the responsibility of defending Guangzhou fell on the party academy. As the details of the incident are fairly well known, only an outline of the events will be given here.²⁷⁴

Towns in Guangdong had traditionally kept self-defence corps maintained by the contributions from shop owners and well-to-do residents. In 1923, when the Yunnan and Guangxi armies, or commonly called the "guest armies", entering Guangzhou under the invitation from Sun Yatsen, the Guangzhou Merchants' Corps was revived. Other self-defence units in the neighbouring towns were also established or enlarged their corps. The strength of the Merchants' Corps in Guangzhou alone, excluding Honam, consisted of close to 4,000 recruits plus about 2,000 reserves. Outside Guangzhou the strength of the corps varied greatly. One of the largest corps the Foshan unit was made up of about 1,600 men. The Jiangmen Corps, on the other hand, claimed to have 600 men.²⁷⁵ Initially, the Merchants' Corps was to defend their interests against the "guest armies" in the cities who were causing financial hardship for local merchants. By early 1924, however, the ill-feeling among leading merchants in Guangzhou against Sun Yatsen reached a new height when they saw the growing Guomindang connection with the Communist party and its attendant policy of organising labourers in union against the merchant class and traditional craft guilds.

In May 1924, a federation of the Guangdong Merchants' Corps was formed which

²⁷³ This is also another example of Sun Yatsen's priority of his northern military expedition over the slow and painful build-up of party academy. For an account of the 1924 Northern Expedition, see C. Martin Wilbur, *Sun Yatsen*, 254-58.

²⁷⁴ Details of the Merchants' Corps incident can be found in Wilbur, C. Martin. "Forging the Weapons: Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang in Canton, 1924". Mimeographed, New York: East Asian Institute of Columbia University, 1966, 89-93, 100-5; and his *Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, 249-264; a detailed pro-merchants account is "Guangdong kouxiechao (The retention of arms crisis in Guangdong)." Reprinted in *Yijiuershi nian Guangzhou shangtuan shijian* (The merchants's corps incident of 1924), Hong Kong: 1974, and in *Zhonghua minguo shi dang'an ziliao huibian* (Archival materials for the history of the Republican China, volume 10), 2:117-9, compiled by the Second Historical Archives, Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji chubanshe; Record of correspondence during the incident can be found in *Zhonghua minguo shi dang'an ziliao huibian* (Archival sources of the Republican China), volume 4, part 1, 767-93, compiled by the Second Historical Archives, Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji chubanshe.

²⁷⁵ "Guangdong Kouxiechao", p. 94; Zhang Junqian and Chen Guo, "Foshan shangtuan jianwen (Information of the Foshan merchants)." *Foshan wenshi ziliao* (1982): p. 43; and Huang Dingsan and Zhu Liyu. "Yijiuershi nian qianhou Jiangmen shangtuan huodong jianwen huiyi (The activities of the Jiangmen merchants' corps in 1924 remembered)." *Wenshi ziliao xuanji*, 2 (1961): 128.

had a central command (*lianfang zongbu*) for all the Guangdong Merchants' Corps and Chen Lianbo was the commander-in-chief.²⁷⁶ The Guomintang administration was understandably wary of the creation of a united force which was spreading through the Pearl River Delta area and potentially hostile to the regime. In July, the Merchants' Corps tested its strength against Sun's government by using the corps to picket Guangzhou in protest against a fifty percent sales tax on land transfers. They won the case and the tax was withdrawn. The merchants later created a Traders' Protective League to decide what new taxes they would accept. Such independent body was a threat to Sun's government who was always in need of funds.

The immediate cause of the conflict between Sun Yatsen's Guangzhou government and the merchants was the dispute over the establishment of a shipment of armaments ordered by the Merchants' Corps. Chen Lianbo placed a large order of arms in Belgium, and in mid-1924, the arms were shipped on a Norwegian freighter, the *Hav*, destined for the Merchants' Corps and some units of the Yunnanese forces. When the vessel arrived in Guangzhou waters on 8 August, Sun, in anticipating of a crisis, ordered Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu's cadets with the help of two gunboats from the Guangzhou Navy to escort the vessel to Huangpu and detained all the arms in the Huangpu Military Academy. The shipment consisted of nearly 10,000 German rifles, Mauser pistols and revolvers, and more than three million rounds of ammunition.²⁷⁷ Sun proposed to hold the arms pending an investigation. He suspected that Chen Lianbo was in alliance with Chen Jiongming.

A long and protracted negotiation between the government and the merchants took place in the next two months. The merchants demanded the return of their arms and threatened a general strike. Early in October, General Li Fulin, who succeeded Sun Fo as acting mayor of Guangzhou, attempted to mediate the matter. He worked out an agreement for the return of 5,000 rifles to the merchants for which they would pay \$200,000 and permit a citywide assessment equivalent to one month's house rent.

²⁷⁶ The head of the Guangzhou Merchants Corps was Chen Lianbo, a former chairman of the Guangzhou General Chamber of Commerce who was also a comprador of the Guangzhou branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Chen and his brother, who was the chairman of the Guangzhou General Chamber of Commerce, were active in shipping, mining, banking and insurance. They were the leaders of the Chinese business community and had ties with the British.

²⁷⁷ Zuo Lu, *Zhongguo Guomindang shigao* (A draft history of the Guomintang). 2nd ed., Taipei: Commercial Press, 1965, 1158-9; Chen Xunzheng. "Guangzhou shangtuan shibian (The Guangzhou merchants corps incident)." *Geming wenxian* (Documents on the revolution), 10: 1470-3. List of arms seized see *China Weekly Review*, 6 September 1924, p. 27.

According to a public statement from the Sun's government, the rifles were handed over to Li Fulin on 9 October in the presence of the representatives of the Merchants' Corps, although at the last minute, the government hold back 1,000 rifles and some of the ammunitions.²⁷⁸

On 10 October, the Republican national day, while the Merchants Corps were unloading its arms on the Guangzhou waterfront, a violent clash erupted between them and a parade of Huangpu cadets, labourers and students. The parade leaders demanded the right to march along the waterfront but the Merchants' Corps refused to give way. Someone started shooting, and the Merchants' Corps opened fire on the parade contingents. About a dozen parade marchers were killed, eight Merchants' Corps militias wounded, and many spectators killed, wounded, or drowned trying to escape from the fighting.²⁷⁹ The merchants immediately ordered a general strike, asserting that less than half of their arms and ammunitions had been returned. On 13 October, the government brought some 5,000 troops into Guangzhou and ordered to disarm the Merchants' Corps. It also declared martial laws and ordered the shops to open immediately. The next day, Sun ordered the following units placed under the command of Chiang Kaishek: the Gendarmes, the workers and farmers' self-defence corps, the aviation unit, the armoured car battalion, the Huangpu Military Academy, and the Yunnan Army School. According to Chiang, on the night of 15 October, he ordered an attack on the stronghold of the Merchants Corps that ended in a complete victory for the Guomintang.²⁸⁰

What is interesting to note is that at the heat of the incident Sun Yatsen was prepared to give up Guangzhou and Huangpu. In a letter to Chiang Kaishek dated 9 September, Sun stated "three vital reasons" why it was necessary to carry out the Northern Expedition. He argued he would be dead if he were to remain in Guangzhou. He said there were three main threats to his position: the British navy (which presumably would be supporting the merchants); forces of Chen Jiongming in the eastern

²⁷⁸ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 9 October 1924, 242-45.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 12-17 October 1924, 248-51; *Geming wenxian*, 10: 1471.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 14 October 1924, 249-50. According to A.I. Cherepanov, forces under Chiang included: 800 Huangpu cadets, 320 members of the Workers Militia and Peasant Detachment, 220 cadets from the Hunan Military School and 500 from the Yunnan Military School, 250 servicemen from two armoured trains, and about 2,000 from the police units (Gendarmes) of Wu Tiencheng. But he disputed Chiang's account by saying these units designated to crush the rebellion were under the command of Sun Yatsen personally who directed all the operations. See *Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya (Zapiski Voennogo Sovetnika) 1926-1927* (The Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army of China: Notes of a Military Adviser, 1926-1927). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1968, 115-6.

Guangdong; and the "guest armies" which were ruining the city. The only hope, therefore, was to abandon Guangzhou and find a new opportunity through the battlefield in cooperation with the warlords of Fengtian and Zhejiang in the effort to overthrow Cao Kun and Wu Peifu.²⁸¹ He instructed Chiang on 7 October to transfer the Russian arms immediately to Shaoguan. Two days later, when the Merchants Corps trouble was at its height, he sent Chiang a secret telegram with orders to abandon Huangpu and to send all weapons and students to Shaoguan to concentrate on the Northern Expedition.²⁸² Chiang turned down Sun's order and insisted that he should abandon the Northern Expedition instead and concentrate his forces to suppress the Merchants Corps in Guangzhou.²⁸³ This incident is also a telling example of the importance of foreign arms and the viability of Guangzhou as a revolutionary base for the Guomindang.

It was during the trouble of the Merchants' Corps that the Training Regiment (*jiaodao duan*)²⁸⁴ was formed. In August 1924, Chiang Kaishek wrote to the Guomindang CEC and proposed that work should proceed towards the organisation of two Training Regiments in Huangpu.²⁸⁵ Each regiment would consist of three infantry battalions, one artillery battery and one engineering company with a total strength of 3,769.²⁸⁶ Chiang delegated responsibility for setting up these units to his staff in

²⁸¹ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 9 September 1924, 232-234. In a proclamation on the objectives of the Northern Expedition issued on 18 September, however, the Guomindang declared that the Northern Expedition was anti-imperialist and anti-militarist. *Geming wenxian*, 10: 1489-1491.

²⁸² *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 7 October 1924, 241; 9 October, 242-245.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁴ Some scholars such as Landis and Williamsen translate the term *Jiaodao tuan* as "the indoctrinating regiment". They might have felt the regiments received more political and psychological training than military training. But in this thesis, it argues the opposite, that in Huangpu, the main emphasis is on military training and supplemented by political and psychological training to strengthen the military command and control system. It's therefore translated the term as the training regiment, closer to its original meaning from the Japanese terminology.

²⁸⁵ The Guomindang had, in the past, attempted to form its own armies, but, none of these attempts lasted for more than few months. As early as in November 1923 the plan for creating a party army was again proposed by Liao Zhongkai when Guangzhou was under the threat of forces of Chen Jiongming but the idea was soon dropped when the threat subsided. "Minutes of 5th Meeting of the Provincial CEC of the Guomindang, 12-15 November 1923", cited in Lu Fanshang, "Xian zongtong Jianggong yi huangpu junxiao de chuangujian (Former President Chiang Kaishek and the founding of the Huangpu military academy)", *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 25-50.

²⁸⁶ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 11 August 1924, 225-227; *Guojun zhenggong shigao* (A draft history of the political work of the national army), 134-5.

Huangpu. He appointed He Yingqin,²⁸⁷ then the Chief Instructor of the academy, and Wang Boling was appointed as commander, the head of the Instructional Department, to manage the work for organising the Training Regiments. The 1st Training Regiment was established in October and the 2nd Training Regiment was formed in December 1924. Both He and Wang were appointed the regiment commanders respectively. The Training Regiments were organised in the triangular pattern of three battalions per regiment, three companies per battalion, and three platoons per company.²⁸⁸ The academy military staff took up the appointments of commanders and staff of the regiments and battalions. At the company and platoon levels, positions were filled by the First Class of the Huangpu graduates either as commanders or probationary officers (*jianxi guan*).

The recruitment of soldiers for the two regiments was assigned to Chen Guofu, a close associate of Chiang Kaishek. The enlisted men of the two regiments were recruited primarily from the Yangzi River basin, much in the same places where most of the cadets of the first three classes came from. Chen's memoirs describe how he led a group of nine men to three provinces, namely Jiangsu, Zhijiang, and Anhui, and the cities of Jinhua, Wenzhou, and Xuzhou provided the most of the recruits.²⁸⁹

The organisation of the Training Regiment is another manifestation of the Japanese and the Russian military influence on the Chinese army. The term Training Regiment is adopted from the Japanese name for military preparatory training, *rikugun kyodo* (*lujun jiaodao*). While the Japanese preparatory concept implied preparation for a subsequent basic and formal military training, the Huangpu training concept implied preparation for subsequent organisation into active duty units. Setting up training regiments for recruits were common among the Chinese armies in the 1920s. Cheng Qing in 1923, for example, also wanted to establish a Central Army Training Regiment (*Zhongyang lujun jiaodao tuan*) under the Guangzhou military administration.

The Huangpu's Training Regiments, however, had a new element--the Party representative system, which was based on the Soviet Red Army model of political

²⁸⁷ Another native of Chiang Kaishek's Zhijiang province but a very well-trained officer who was a graduate of Baoding and Japanese academies. He came to Guangzhou in January 1924 at the age of 34 and was involved heavily in most of Huangpu's affairs. He was also a staunch supporter of Chiang Kaishek.

²⁸⁸ *Huangpu junxiao shigao* (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 5th bien, 6: 115-6.

²⁸⁹ Chen Guofu. "Jianjun shi zhi yi ye (One page in the history of creating the army)." *Geming wenxian* (Documents on the revolution), 27-36.

commissar. The initial Japanese concept, *kyodo*, continued to be used at Huangpu (as *jiaodao*), but in a distinctive sense of a combined military training and operational unit in one. This particular Huangpu formulation was just another example of the distinctive atmosphere surrounding the academy, and symbolised the wedding of Japanese military learning with the unique revolutionary technique of the Russian Red Army.

Apart from the Japanese and Russian organisational concepts and techniques, the Training Regiment had also absorbed the traditional Chinese military management methods. In October 1924 Chiang Kaishek published the Zeng-Hu military quotations as a training manual for the staff and students of Huangpu.²⁹⁰ Chiang explains he was particularly impressed by Zeng Guofan's efforts in transforming the ill-trained and poor morale militia troops into a fighting-fit army. Chiang believed that the very basis of Zeng's success was "morality". It was the high moral standard practice based on Confucian ethics in the army, combining the military talents of Hu Runzhi and Zuo Zongtang that finally defeated the Taiping rebels. Chiang expressed his gratitude to Cai E who first compiled the quotations of Zeng Guofan and Hu Runzhi when he was in charge of the Yunnan Army. In addition, Chiang also included Zuo Zongtang's quotation in the work. He strongly believed that winning "the hearts and minds" was the basis to a strong army.²⁹¹ Chiang felt that the Guomindang's Three Principles of the People could be used as a moral standard and destiny for the new army.

To maintain high military discipline, the "Code of Reciprocal Responsibility" (*lian zuo fa*), was promulgated in January 1925.²⁹² The code stated that in order to achieve national unification and implement the Three Principles of the People, an officer had to adopt a spirit of sacrifice. When in battle with the enemy, there would be no retreat. The code also spelled out the punishment for retreating. If the unit commanders, from corps

²⁹⁰ *Zeng Hu zhibing yulu zhushi* (Interpretation of Zeng Guofan and Hu Runzhi military quotations), edited and interpreted by Cai E, Jiang Zhongzheng, and Fei Nuchun. Guangzhou, Taipei: Huangpu Military Academy, Liming wenhua shiyeh, 1924. The book contains 13 chapters was first compiled by Cai E when he was commanding the Yunnan Army.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, "Preface", 1-3. According to Chiang, he selected these quotations when he was looking through the war history of the Taiping Rebellion. Initially, his interest was the Taiping's reforms. But was attracted by the military talents of the Qing's official-generals such as Zeng Guofan, Hu Runzhi and Zuo Zongtang and decided their ideas should be studied first as these were most relevant to his officers. This is a good example to show that when confronting with the question of military management, practical ideas, such as how an army be best organised and managed, ranks much more important than ideology of the Taiping Rebellion.

²⁹² *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 4 January 1925, p. 293, which lists the five basic regulations of the *lian zuo fa*.

to section commanders, retreated with his unit, the commander would be executed. If the commander stayed and killed by the enemy but the rest of his unit retreated, then the subordinates at the next level would be executed. In the extreme, if a section retreated and the section commander stayed and killed, the entire section was to be executed.²⁹³

With the basic ideology and the code of conduct promulgated, the mechanism that put these ideas into practice was the Party representative system. The term *dang daibiao*, literally means "Party representative", is supposed to represent the interests of the party and to do its bidding within the military organisation.²⁹⁴ The title was the same as that of the party official at the top of the Academy hierarchy. The system of the Party representative, or the political commissar in the Soviet Red Army, in the military was designed for civilians and the party control of the military. Its main responsibilities included two types of work--the party work and political work. In some literature, these two terms have been used simultaneously or interchangeably, but in fact, there are two different activities. The party work was conducted by the Party representative through the Special Party Headquarters (*tebie dangbu*)²⁹⁵ to ensure party leadership and the implementation of the party policies in the military. Its functions were basically political. The political work, on the other hand, was conducted by the Political Department to promote military effectiveness through handling human affairs concerning the military. Its functions were military. The term "political work" is rather misleading, as the nature of its work was not handling "political" affairs. In fact, the so-called "political work" was more closely resembled to the modern concept of the management of human factors, as oppose to material factors such as weapons and logistics, in promoting military effectiveness. The real political function in which party's control of

²⁹³ Confusion has arisen over the code of the *lian zuo fa*. Some scholars have treated it literally, as if they were the martial laws that were to implement in all cases. In fact on record, there was only one case that an officer was being executed for treating during the 1930s. This was the case of Yang Shaoqiu, a graduate of the Third Class of Huangpu who was the commander of the 8th Regiment of the elite 2nd Division in 1931 against the CCP. See Wang Zhonglian, *Zhengchen huiyulu* (Reminiscences of a distant journey), Taipei: privately printed, 1979, 86-87. The code should be seen as a goal to which the officers strove. It was also the formal embodiment of these same officers' own pride in their spirit and motivation.

²⁹⁴ See Chen Xunzheng, "Dang jun zhi jianli" (The founding of the party army), *Geming wenxian*, 10: 4.

²⁹⁵ When the first executive committees were elected on 3 July 1924, it was named the Special District Party Headquarters (*tebiequ dangbu*) which come under the direct control of the Central Party Headquarters. Its name changed to Special Party Headquarters (*tebie dangbu*) in September 1925 which was the standard name used by the rest of the National Revolutionary Army. In each of the election of the executive committee, the Commandant had always the head rather than Academy Party Representative. It just to show the limits of party control of Huangpu. *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, 7: 17-25.

the military was exercised through the party work.²⁹⁶

Theoretically, Liao Zhongkai being the Academy's Party representative would select and appoint men to serve as Party representatives in the Training Regiments. In this way, Liao was their superior officer at the top of a direct chain of command. The Party representative at company level reported directly to his superior, the regiment-level representative. The regimental Party representative reported only to Liao Zhongkai, who was operating as Academy Party representative.²⁹⁷ Party representatives were assigned to their separate but equal command roles soon after the units of the Training Regiments were organised.²⁹⁸ They were assigned to every echelon from the company level and above. Although in most cases the Party representative held a rank lower than the commander at each echelon, the line of command had to accept his position as equal to him. Each Party representative was subordinated only to his higher echelons and not to the commanders.²⁹⁹ In practice, however, Liao was hardly present in Huangpu as he was always tied up with party and provincial government affairs as mentioned earlier, and the staff of the Political Department carried out most of his works. In the end, it was Chiang Kaishek who was really in-charge of the Party representatives and the political work in Huangpu.

In a sense, the system of the Party representative was introduced to the Training Regiments to promote military efficiency and to check on the abuse among the ranks. There were at least four known missions specified for the Party representatives. Firstly, they were to teach the revolutionary values of the Guomindang. These instructional or indoctrination efforts of the Party representatives enabled the troops and officers of the regiments to understand the meaning and significance of the national revolution. Secondly, they were to promote discipline, and this was to be done through the inculcation of spiritual unity, the Guomindang's version of *esprit de corps*. The third mission was that of supervising, or at least overseeing, the actions of officers in their units. In so doing the representatives would be able to do their parts in improving the

²⁹⁶ The Soviet Red Army had made such an distinction as early as in the 1920s. For a discussion of the party and political work, see Cheng Hsiao-shih, *Party-Military in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, 38-45.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁹⁸ For the list of the names of the initial Party representatives, see *Guojun zhenggong shigao*, 136-137.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1: 135.

living conditions and general situation of the enlisted men. The fourth area of activity specified was a responsibility for all propaganda work conducted within the military organisation. In short, the main responsibility of the Party representative was primary the political work.³⁰⁰

In conclusion, from the above discussion the basic character and nature of the Huangpu Military Academy has already taken shape in its formative years. Although the Guomindang, with the aid from the Russian advisers, might have planned to set up a national party military academy based on the Russian Red Army Command School, Huangpu was in fact a military training course (*ganbu xuexiao*). The Guomindang's plan could not be realised given the conditions in Guangzhou then. The hostile environment in Guangzhou towards Sun Yatsen and the party, and the rivalries among the various armies of the Guomindang soon forced the new academy to embark on building its own army units. To some extent, this pattern of development was common in any military build-up (such as the Guangdong Army) then, but this also coincided with the plan Chiang Kaishek presented to the Russians in Moscow a year early. The main differences were that, the sequence of the buildup was supposed to be the military build-up first followed by the cadets training; the base was to be at the northwest borders rather than in Guangzhou. In a sense, this proved that Chiang Kaishek's reading of the military situation was realistic.

Contrary to most of the studies on the Huangpu Military Academy, the roles of the cadets were less important given the short time available for their stay in the academy and their training being constantly disrupted by various events in Guangzhou. The party officials were given a dual command role in Huangpu but did not fully exercise their power to control the academy. They were too busy with party affairs and Huangpu was simply too insignificant to attract their attention. Most of their works were left to junior deputies or assistants. It was the military staff, headed by the Commandant, who was in control of the academy. Their past military education and experiences serving various

³⁰⁰ The political work in the military covered a wide range of activities, most were directly or indirectly relating to military operational matters. In a talk given by a Russian adviser to the Chinese audience in October 1925, he explains briefly the main duties and responsibilities of a Party representative in the military which include the following: 1. maintenance of the party discipline; 2. performing the education and propaganda work among soldiers and the people; 3. internal surveillance of the behaviour of military officers and the treatment of soldiers; 4. to minimise soldiers' desertion, in particularly, during wartime. V. A. Stepanov, "The Political Commissar System in the Russian Red Army." *Zhongguo junren*, no. 17 (recorded by Huang Jinhui in Chinese entitled "E' guo hongjun dangdaibiao zhidu): October 1925, 5-12. At the end of the speech, there was also a question-and-answer session where several questions on the practice of the party representatives system in the military were raised.

armies, in particular, the Guangdong Army were more decisive in shaping the academy.

The Russian assistance in the forms of financial support and arms supplies were crucial in the setting up of Huangpu. Apart from the material aid, the Russian advisers' contribution in the early years was not as great as described by some studies. The highly volatile and emotional charged situation in Guangzhou was even too much for the Guomindang leadership to grapple with, not to mention foreigners whose knowledge and language were lacking. However, the Russian advisers' contribution would increase when the armies of the Guomindang moved into operations and expansion.

As the Party's military school faced a great problem trying to survive in a hostile environment, with the greatest threat came from within, it had to form its own army to defend for itself. The Huangpu's Training Regiments offered the most interesting features of the East-West military concepts of organisation and training. In essence, it adopted the Japanese basic tactical training, the traditional Chinese emphasis of human management, but with a Russian Red Army command and control system in the form of Party representatives in its units.

With the formation of the Training Regiments, Huangpu was in effect, a military unit. The academy's headquarters turned command headquarters; its staff were appointed commanders, staff officers, and political officers; and its graduates the junior officers or *ganbu*. Once the Academy's Army (*xiao jun*) was in place, it was ready to take part in military campaigns to break away from the restrictions imposed by the conditions in Guangzhou.

Chapter 4: The Emergence of the Party Army

The year 1925 was a turning point for the Huangpu Military Academy. Firstly, Huangpu was converted from an academy to an army and participated actively in the campaign to unify Guangdong. The success of this campaign, although was not achieved by the Huangpu units alone, had contributed to the re-establishment of the National Government on 1 July 1925.³⁰¹ Secondly, through these campaigns conducted in Guangdong, a new operational doctrine was worked out against the local militarists. The favourable results of this doctrine helped to boost the confidence of the military leadership and paved the way for the launching of the Northern Expedition in mid-1926. Thirdly, Huangpu's Academy Army was officially endorsed as the Party Army of the Guomindang on 12 April 1925 and by the second quarter of 1925; it became the I Corps of the Guomindang's National Revolutionary Army.³⁰² With this endorsement Huangpu was elevated to the central stage of the Party Army.

This chapter aims to analyse the process of transforming Huangpu from an insignificant academy to become a leader of the Guomindang's National Revolutionary Army: how it came about; and why it succeeded. Specifically, it will deal with two main subjects: the nature of conflict in Guangdong prior to its unification under the Guomindang; and the role of Huangpu in this unification process. The emphasis of the analysis will be on the power relations among the militarists in Guangdong as well as the operational aspects of the unification campaigns. The basic thesis of the chapter is

³⁰¹ The Guomindang's works on Guangdong unification usually attribute its success either to Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu's Academy Army (*xiaojun*) almost single handedly. Examples of this distortion in favour of the Huangpu's units to the exclusion of seasoned troops of the Guangdong Army can be found in all descriptions of the 1925 campaigns published in Taiwan. See for examples, *Guojun zhengggong shigao* (A draft history of the political work of the national army). Taipei: Central Political Department, Ministry of National Defence, 1960, p. 149; *Lujun guanxiao sishi zhounian xiaoqing zhuanji* (A special magazine commemorating the forty anniversary of the army officers' school). Fengshan: Huangpu Publication, 1964, p. 2.

³⁰² The Guomindang historians use the term "Party Army" very loosely. It sometimes refers to the armies of the party such as the Guangdong Army. Before the First Eastern Expedition, Huangpu was officially called the Party Military Academy. It was named the Party Army by the Guomindang's CEC only after the expedition on 12 April 1925. When the National Revolutionary Army formed in August 1925 it was also called the Party Army. See *Zhongguo Guomindang jiu shi nian dashi nianbiao* (Major events of the Guomindang in the last ninety years), Guomindang Party History Committee compiled, Taipei: 1984, 181-2.

that the Guangdong unification was brought about not by any deliberate policy by the Guomindang or the United Front but through a series of external and internal threats from both within the province and the party.

Nature of the Conflict

Since Sun Yatsen's return to Guangzhou on 21 February 1923, the Guomindang faced difficulty in trying to organise a government without adequate funds and no real command over military forces. Sun tried to arrange for a large development loan from the British interests and secure a few million dollars from Chinese businessmen in Hong Kong, but to no avail. The failure was mainly due to Guangdong's unstable military situation. Then the Guomindang government in Guangzhou controlled only about a third of the province. This covered the central part which included the north-south railway from Guangzhou to Shaoguan; the region along the Pearl River (Zhujiang), and the deltas of the West River (Xijiang) and East River (Dongjiang). The rest of the province was in the hands of Chen Jiongming and his allies.³⁴³ Within the Guomindang controlled region, various armies nominally under Sun Yatsen occupied different areas in a semi-autonomous state.³⁴⁴

In April, Shen Hongying, one of the generals who assisted Sun in ousting Chen Jiongming, tried to seize control of Guangzhou. After nearly a month long battle by the combination of forces collaborating with Sun, Shen was driven back. However, shortly after Shen Hongying's suppression, a coalition of generals under Chen Jiongming closed in to capture Guangzhou from the east. In retaliation, Sun tried to organise an attack on Chen's base at Huizhou. This campaign went on intermittently during the second half of 1923. Sun's armies demanded cash to go into battle. Money was raised through imposing extra levies and the sale of public properties to finance this campaign.³⁴⁵

³⁴³ Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 150, Map 1.

³⁴⁴ According to Cherepanov among them the Yunnan Army was the strongest and best armed. In Guangzhou, it had about 23,000 troops and the tax revenue it collected estimated to about \$3,190,000 per month. *Zapiski*, p. 36.

³⁴⁵ For an interesting discussion of Sun Yatsen's problems in Guangzhou, see C. Martin Wilbur, "Problems of Starting a Revolutionary Base: Sun Yatsen in Guangzhou, 1923". *Bulletin of the Institute of*

During this time Sun Yatsen and the Guomindang's popularity in Guangzhou was also at its lowest. Besides heavy taxation and the presence of extra-provincial armies in the city, Guangzhou residents were afraid of Sun Yatsen and his party sympathetic attitude towards the Communist Party and the Russian Comintern. They were worried that Sun might turn Guangzhou into a Bolshevik state. By early 1924, this fear among leading merchants in Guangzhou against Sun Yatsen was growing acute. They hoped to build up their forces and ultimately to expel him (see chapter 3).³⁴⁶

The condition in Guangzhou was so hostile that Sun Yatsen considered giving it up as a revolutionary base. The opportunity came in September. In central China, Wu Peifu had been attempting to unite China by force. And only Manchuria, Zhejiang, Shanxi, and the southernmost provinces of China were outside the sphere of the Zhili clique. Opposing Wu was a loose alliance headed by Zhang Zuolin, leader of the Fengtian clique, Duan Qirui, leader of the Anfu clique, Lu Yongxiang, military governor of Zhejiang, and Sun Yatsen. In mid-1924, a contest for control of Shanghai had been brewing between a member of the Zhili faction, Qi Xieyuan, military governor of Jiangsu, and Lu Yongxiang, who controlled the Shanghai area through his subordinate, He Fenglin. General Lu telegraphed Sun Yatsen on 4 September, asking him to help by sending troops to threaten the rear of Wu Peifu's subordinates.³⁴⁷

During the first week of September, Sun Yatsen decided to launch a Northern Expedition from Shaoguan, the end railway station located about 140 miles from Guangzhou near Guangdong's mountainous border. From here he set up his military headquarters and gradually assembled various "guest armies" from Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Yunnan. General Tan Yankai, the leader of the Hunan Army, was appointed commander-in-chief, and the various units were named the National

Modern History, Academia Sinica (Taipei), IV, pt.2 (1975): 1-63.

³⁴⁶ For a discussion of the Guangzhou merchants against Sun Yatsen, see Chapter 3.

³⁴⁷ For the general account of the Zhili-Fengtian conflicts, see Li Chien-nung, *The Political History of China, 1840-1928*, pp. 468-470; James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang*, 130-133.

Reconstruction Army (*Jianguojun*). In addition, Sun also took with him his own guard, a company of cadets from Huangpu Military Academy, part of the Gendarmes of Wu Tiecheng, and a "farmers' army" under Tan Pingshan, comprising students of the Second Class of the Farmers' Movement Training Institute. Yang Ximin's Yunnanese forces and the Liu Zhenhuan's Guangxi troops would not participate in the expedition. Sun left Hu Hanmin to look after Guangzhou and appointed him the acting Generalissimo.³⁴⁸

Although the decision to launch a Northern Expedition was reached in meetings of the Guomindang Political Council and a military conference in the Generalissimo's Headquarters between 3 and 10 September, there was considerable opposition to the expedition within Sun's staff.³⁴⁹ Liao Zhongkai wanted to resign on 23 September as Finance Minister on the ground that he was unable to provide Sun with supplies. Chiang Kaishek asked to resign as the Commandant of the Huangpu Military Academy on 16 September because he refused to send more than one company of cadets for the expedition. The Russian advisers were also against it. Borodin wanted Sun to concentrate on the mass movement rather than military adventures. And Bliukher, who had just arrived in October, felt that Sun military effort should first wipe out Chen Jiongming's forces.³⁵⁰ The Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee was also against it, according to Qu Qiubai.³⁵¹ On 10 October, Chen Duxiu wrote to Voitinsky, stating, "we consider that the Guomindang should discontinue its military actions (including the Northern Expedition) and leave the Guangdong Government."³⁵² Deng

³⁴⁸ For accounts of the expedition, see *Geming wenxian*, 10: 1484-1498; *Guofu nianpu*, 1128-1145.

³⁴⁹ See *Guofu nianpu*, p. 1133; *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 16 September 1924, p. 235.

³⁵⁰ According to Lydia Holubnychy, Borodin's stand on this issue was uncertain, see her work *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925*, 449-450; Bliukher, who arrived in Guangzhou only in October 1924, according to Kartunova, believed the first task for the Guomindang was to finish off Chen Jiongming and secure the Guangzhou base, see "Vasilii Bliukher (1889-1938)," *Vidnye Sovetskie Kommunisty--Unchastniki Kitaiskoi Revoliutsii* (The understanding Soviet communists, participants in the Chinese revolution), 41-65.

³⁵¹ Qu Qiubai, *Zhongguo geming zhong zhi zhenglun wenti* (The controversial questions on the Chinese revolution), p. 165.

³⁵² Glunin, "Comintern and the Formation of the Communist Movement in China," p. 274, which quotes part of Chen's letter to Voitinsky.

Zhongxia voiced his opposition in the October issue of a new labour journal, stating plainly that, "the Northern Expedition had nothing to do with the true revolution of national liberation and the unions' and farmers' associations should not get involved in it."³⁵³ Cai Heshen opposed it in the Communist journal *Xiangdao zhoubao* (Guide Weekly).³⁵⁴

Two major events that occurred in October and November, however, soon changed Sun Yatsen's mind on the Northern Expedition. In October, the Merchants Corps Incident ended with the Guomindang government troops led by Chiang Kaishek storming of its headquarters. A dramatic political change in Beijing also altered the situation in Guangdong. The Second Zhili-Fengtian War which began in the summer of 1924 reversed completely when Feng Yuxiang brought his troops back to Beijing instead of fighting the opponent Zhang Zuolin's Manchurian Army. Caught between Zhang's forces on the front and Feng and his fellow conspirators at his rear, Wu Peifu was forced to flee from Tianjin by sea and eventually made his way to Wuhan. On 2 November Cao Kun, whose presidential palace in Beijing was surrounded by Feng's forces, announced his resignation though he remained under house arrest for two years.³⁵⁵ Soon after the coup, Feng Yuxiang and his allies invited Sun to Beijing to participate in national unification.³⁵⁶ Under these circumstances Sun decided to abandon the Northern Expedition although some of the forces were already in Hunan and Jiangxi. He made the journey to Beijing, which turned out to be his last. He died of cancer in Beijing on 12 March 1925.

In the winter of 1924-25, after Sun Yatsen's departure from Guangzhou to

³⁵³ *Zhongguo gongren* (The Chinese workers) October 1924.

³⁵⁴ *Xiangdao zhoubao*, no. 83, 17 September 1924.

³⁵⁵ James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang*. USA: Stanford University Press, 1966, 130-148. The author gives no suggestion that Sun Yatsen was involved in the plot nor knew anything about it.

³⁵⁶ In the two telegrams sent on 27 October, Sun indicated his interest in going to Beijing; he then returned to Guangzhou from Shaoguan on 30 October, and on 1 November, he received an invitation. Sun made public his intention to proceed to Beijing on 4 November. *Sun Zhongshan nianpu changbian*, 2: 2043-2052.

Beijing, Chen Jiongmíng began preparation for a comeback. Interestingly, Chen named his coalition of forces, allegedly numbering some 50,000 men, the "Save-Guangdong" Army (*Jiuyuejun*).³⁵⁷ Its main objective was the unification of Guangdong by getting rid of the extra-provincial armies and returning the power of provincial government to Guangdong people. The principal commanders under this army were Ye Ju, Yang Kunru, Hong Zhaolin, and Lin Hu. Merchants of Guangzhou might have supported Chen financially after the defeat of the Merchant Corps by Sun's forces in mid-October. He assigned three fronts to retake Guangzhou: Ye Ju commanding the centre, Hong Zhaolin the left (south), and Lin Hu the right. Yang Kunru garrisoned the fortress of Huizhou.³⁵⁸

Seen from this perspective, the unification campaign in Guangdong was an internal provincial war for the control of Guangzhou. Militarily, Guangzhou would be secured only if the hinterlands of the east and south of the province were occupied. Sun Yatsen was not confident of victory, whether by force of arms or mass movement. Instead, he was looking for military alliance with the northern warlords so as to launch his Northern Expedition from Shaoguan. When Chen Jiongmíng's forces approached the northern border of Jiangxi and Guangdong, threatening the rear of the Northern Expeditionary troops, the Guomindang was forced to fight a two-front war, one in the north at Hunan and Jiangxi, the other in eastern Guangdong. Internally, the Guomindang also had to content with the unreliable Yunnan and Guangxi extra-provincial armies in Guangzhou. The challenges to the Guomindang in this war were, therefore, one, to assemble sufficient troops to defend Guangdong; and second, to

³⁵⁷ Deng Wenjiang, "Guangdong jun jishi" (A record of the Guangdong army), *Jindai shi ziliao*, no. 3, 1958, 68.

³⁵⁸ For a full account of the First Eastern Expedition from the Guomindang sources, see *Huangpu junxiao shigao* (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 6: 121-157; *Geming wenxian* (Documents on the revolution), vols 10 and 11: 1523-1677; "Di yi ci dongjiang shizhanji (A record of the first eastern expedition)." *Junshi zhengzhi yuekan* (Military and political affairs monthly), (March 1926) 3: 1-29; "Dongzheng canzhan baogao (A report on joining the second eastern expedition)." *Junshi zhengzhi yuekan* (Military and political affairs monthly), (February 1926) 2: 20-46. For detailed day-to-day battle reports of the 1st Training Regiment of the Huangpu Military Academy, see Liu Bingcui, *Geming jun di yi ci dongzheng shi zhan ji* (Factual battle reports of the revolutionary army during the first eastern expedition). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1928; for the Russian's account, see his detailed memoir by Cherepanov, *Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae* (Notes of a military adviser in China). Moscow: Academy of Sciences of USSR, Institute Norodov Azii, Nauka, 1964, 148-207.

attack forces of Chen Jiongming in eastern Guangdong if Guangzhou were to continue to be the revolutionary base for the Guomindang.

The Guomindang Forces

In January 1925, the units available to the Guangzhou government against Chen Jiongming's forces were formed into an "Allied Army" under the titular command of General Yang Ximin.³⁵⁹ The Allied Army also envisaged three fronts of battle: on the north, designated as the Left Wing force; one in the Centre as the Central force; and one in the south as the Right Wing force to answer each of the threat. On 1 February when the expedition began, two Yunnanese corps under Fan Shisheng were assigned the Left Wing force facing Lin Hu;³⁶⁰ in the centre, the Guangxi army of Liu Zhenhuan was assigned to capture Huizhou; and in the south, the Right Wing force consisted of several units of General Xu Chongzhi's Guangdong Army and the two Huangpu training regiments. This force was to clear the Guangzhou-Jiulong (Canton-Kowloon) railway and then advance on a route near the southern coast to seize Chaozhou and Shantou.³⁶¹

In this campaign, commonly known as the First Eastern Expedition, the Yunnan and Guangxi armies did little fighting, but the southern Right Wing carried through its mission in about six weeks. This force numbered over 10,000 men when all were committed. Of these the Huangpu contingents, the Academy Army (*xiaojun*) commanded by Chiang Kaishek contributed less than 3,000 men without battle

³⁵⁹ This was a separate force from General Tan Yankai's Northern Expedition Army. Although the Guomindang's forces were superior in number compare to Chen Jiongming's units they had to look after two fronts: the Northern Expedition in Hunan and Jiangxi in addition to the East River region in Guangdong. Yang Ximin was given command simply because he had the largest troops, about 30,000 men, of all the rest of the armies. Chen Xunzheng, "Ti yi ci dongzheng" (The first eastern expedition), in *Geming wenxian*, 10: 1522.

³⁶⁰ In the original plan, the Right Wing force was assigned to the Yunnan army but during implementation it became the Left Wing force. No specific reasons were given except that the situation had changed. *Gemingjun ti yi ci dongzheng shizhanji* (The war diary), 5, 9.

³⁶¹ In the earlier plan, the Yunnan Army under Yang Ximin was assigned as the Left Wing force but on 1 February it changed roles with the Guangdong Army. No specific reasons were given although it is generally assumed that Yang Ximin was not interested in the fight against Chen's forces. Chen Xunzheng, *op. cit.*, 10: 1527-1528.

experience. In a nutshell, the First Eastern Expedition encompassed two main phases of operations.³⁶² The first phase which began early in February 1925 involved the successful clearing of the railway to Jiulong, and the eastward drive through Danshui to Haifeng, and onward to Chaozhou and Shantou. They were captured on 5-7 March. Chen Jiongming fled to Hong Kong. On 1 March, however, General Fan Shisheng withdrew his troops facing Lin Hu, took them off to Guangxi to block an attack on Guangzhou by forces sent by Yunnan governor, Tang Jiyao. The second phase of the Eastern Expedition saw the defeat of Lin Hu's forces, which threatened the rear of the troops that had pushed rapidly to Shantou. Part of these troops wheeled back and defeated Lin's forces at Mianhu in a fierce and costly battle in which the 1st Regiment of the Academy Army distinguished itself. The victors then pursued their enemies toward the northeast direction, taking Wuhua and Xingning on 18-20 March. The Guangdong 2nd Division captured Meixian on 22 March. Most of the remnants of Lin Hu's army retreated to the Jiangxi border while troops of Hong Zhaolin and Ye Ju found haven in Fujian. On 20 April, Yang Kunru surrendered the Huizhou fortress to the Yunnan Army on the promise that his troops would be incorporated into it. Thus, the Guangzhou government's power was extended into eastern Guangdong.

Although most Guomindang and Russian works stress the decisive role of the Huangpu units in the Eastern Expedition, the Academy Army was originally excluded from the expeditionary forces. It was through Chiang Kaishek's insistence, as chief of the general staff of the Guangdong Army, that Huangpu forces were eventually grouped under the Guangdong Army.³⁶³ The reasons for excluding Huangpu were understandable. In January 1925, it was only seven months old, its 1st Training Regiment was founded only in October 1924, and the 2nd Training Regiment in December the same year. What is intriguing is the question of why Huangpu want to participate in this campaign?

³⁶² Details of the Eastern Expedition are well described in the war chronicles such as *Beifa zhanshi* (A war history of the northern expedition); "Beifa tongyi" (The northern expedition and unification of China), Chief editor Wego W.K. Chiang {Wei-Kuo}. *The History of the Chinese National Revolutionary War, Part II* ed. vol 2.

³⁶³ *Geming jun di yi ci dongzheng shi zhan ji* (War diary of the revolutionary army during the first eastern expedition). Liu Bingcui comp., Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1928, 5-9.

According to 1st Training Regiment's Wang Jun, one of the battalion commanders, the original intention of the Huangpu units joining the First Eastern Expedition was to allow the officers and soldiers a chance to witness a real operation. There was no plan to participate in the battle as the other "Allied Army" would not allow Huangpu's involvement.³⁶⁴ In addition, Liu Bingcui, who was the general staff officer of the 1st Training Regiment and compiler of the war diary of the first Eastern Expedition, explains that since Sun Yatsen left Guangzhou for Beijing, Huangpu was without Guomindang protection and was in danger of being eliminated by the hostile generals of Yunnan and Guangxi armies. And instead being a vulnerable target, it was better to take part in the campaign and moved out of Guangzhou.³⁶⁵

In this expedition, the 2nd Division and the 7th Brigade of the Guangdong Army had the responsibility of securing the right (south) flank of the battle line extending from the Pearl River near the mouth of the East River moving north-west toward the North River valley.³⁶⁶ Considering the superior forces available to Chen Jiongming to counter the Right Wing forces, which numbered only about 10,000 men, this mission was formidable.

The Soviet military advisers were important to the campaign according to Cherepanov's detailed and vivid account. Twenty of them participated.³⁶⁷ General

³⁶⁴ In addition, Wang Jun also summarised two important reasons that contributed to Huangpu's success: the situation (*tianshi*) and the good working relationship (*renhe*) apart from the ideological indoctrination. Wang Jun, "Di yi ci dongzheng jishi (A factual account of the First Eastern Expedition)." *Junshi zhengzhi yuekan* (The military-political Affairs Monthly), no. 3 (March 1926): 24. Wang was the commander of the 3rd Battalion in the First Training Regiment during the First Eastern Expedition. He was a native of Guangdong Deng Mai (Hainan) and a graduate of the 14th Class (Engineer) Japanese Shikan gakko (July 1923).

³⁶⁵ Liu gives three reasons which led to Huangpu's participation in the Eastern Expedition. The other two reasons were that: Huangpu was set up by Sun Yatsen and should participate in all Guomindang's campaigns; and that Huangpu units were better trained and better armed than most of the other Guomindang forces. *Gemingjun di yi ci dongzhengshi zhanji*, Liu Bingcui comp., p. 10.

³⁶⁶ Chen Xunzheng, *Geming wenxian*, 10: 1594; Liu Bingcui, *Gemingjun di yi ci dongzheng shizhanji* (Factual battle reports of the revolutionary army during the first eastern expedition). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1928, map 1.

³⁶⁷ See Cherepanov, A. I. *Zapiski*, 148-207. The list of nineteen Soviet officers who participated in the Eastern Expedition is included in *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, "Guangzhou", 3: 104-106.

Bliukher accompanied the field commander, General Xu Chongzhi, and offered day-to-day tactical advice. General V.A. Stepanov was adviser to General Chiang Kaishek, Cherepanov accompanied General He Yingqin, commander of the 1st Training Regiment of Huangpu. Artillery expert General Timothy A. Beschastnov and cavalryman Colonel Nkulín assisted him. Colonel Pallo (or Pollo) advised General Wang Boling, commander of the 2nd Training Regiment, assisted by Colonel N.G. Vasillev. General I. Zilbert served as adviser to general Wu Tiecheng, commander of a brigade of gendarmes. General Zhang Mingda, commanding an infantry division of the Guangdong Army, had Shneider as his civilian political adviser. General E.A. Yakovlev and Colonel Vasillev were engineering experts; and Colonel M.I. Dratvin was the communications specialist. Admiral Smirnov advised the commanders of a river gunboat flotilla, which proved ineffective. These and other advisers marched with the troops, some covering as much as 750 kilometres. They also fought in some of the battles, under considerable danger. Before the campaign was over it became streaming hot in eastern Guangdong. Cherepanov contracted dysentery.

From February, March and April 1925, the Guangdong Army's units executed a series of highly successful flanking manoeuvres. It started in the south of Dongguan, near the mouth of the Pearl River, and north toward Hailufeng and Meixian areas respectively. In this operation, the Guangdong Army units defeated Chen Jiongming's forces. In about sixteen main encounters with the Chen Jiongming's forces in the February to April for example, the Academy Army fought side by side with one or more Guangdong units in a few battles. The first battle was Dongguan on 4 February; seizure of Danshui on 14 February including an attack on Chen Jiongming's forces the next day; and the battle of Xingning on 20 March. While the Guangdong Army fought ten battles independently, the Academy Army fought only two battles without the additional strength of the Guangdong Army.³⁶⁸ A number of The Guangdong Army units performed heroically in the campaign, they borne the brunt of combat and thus held down Huangpu casualties.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁸ *A Chronology of Important Military Events in the Republican China*, Yeh You-kang and T. M. Williamsen comp., Part I: 1924-1928, Taipei, 1971, pp. 1925-4 to 1925-9.

³⁶⁹ This point is not well-recognised in most of the battle accounts. The commander of the 1st

The Academy Army in the Eastern Expeditions

Although Huangpu's units were operational inexperienced and only two regiments of about 1,200 combatants in each regiment, it was a close-knit formation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, its faculty members served as senior commanders and Party representatives; First Class graduates filled the junior commander and Party representative posts; and enlisted men, recruited principally from Jiangsu and Zhejiang, came from the senior officers' natives places.

The Academy Army was also well equipped and armed by Chinese standards. Officers were equipped with mauser pistols, while enlisted men carried the 7.9 mm mauser rifle which was manufactured at the Shijing Arsenal in Guangzhou. Each regiment included a machine gun company, equipped with six French-made air-cooled machine guns.³⁷⁰ Cherepanov's discussion of the ammunition shortage, which beset most armies in 1925, is revealing about the margin of superiority sustained by the Training Regiments in this area. Although the Huangpu units were only issued some 200-250 cartridges to their soldiers for the entire First Eastern Expedition, about 50 rounds per battle, Cherepanov states that their ammunition supply exceeded that of the bulk of the rest of the other units.³⁷¹

Although operating alongside the Guangdong Army, the Training Regiments had contributed decisively at certain crucial junctures. The mobility and physical stamina the Training Regiments exhibited in their advance to Haifeng and Meixian proved comparable, if not superior, to that of the many other armies. This can be

Regiment He Yingqin recalls that in the Battle of Mianhu, about two thirds of one of his battalion was wiped out. Among them, two of the three company commanders and seven platoon commanders were killed in action. If not for the 7th Brigade of the Guangdong Army, the casualty rate could even be higher. He Yingqin, "Mianhu zhanyi zhi huiyi" (Remembering the battle of Mianhu), *Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao*, January-June 1925, 244.

³⁷⁰ See Collier and Lai, *Organisation Changes in Chinese Army, 1895-1950*, footnote 3 to Chart 16, p.78.

³⁷¹ Cherepanov, *As Military Advisers*, p. 132.

attributed to their realistic field training and the quality of the Huangpu troops. Impressed by the hardy Chinese soldiers, Cherepanov comments:

"...During the advance we were repeatedly forced to leave the railway and this to some extent reminded us of usual theatres of military operations. We felt ill at ease in completely unfamiliar conditions. ...The soldiers were lightly dressed: tunics of fine blue cotton fabric, short trousers ending above the knees, sandals woven out of a certain type of twine, puttees, and the Red Army-type caps covered with oilcloth for protection against the rain. Some of them had large round grass hats hanging on their backs, others carried umbrellas or rolled rubberised tent-cloth. All of these supplies protected the soldiers from tropical rains on the march. ...While marching the Chinese did not rest for 10 minutes after every 50 minutes. The soldiers did not tire as easily because of their light uniforms and because they marched in single file. Only 15 to 20 minutes stops were made very 2 to 3 hours depending on the steepness of the hills. Longer stops for dinner were not made as they were no field kitchens. The soldiers ate in the morning, before setting out, and at night. Since the food consisted mostly of rice and greens, it was cooked very quickly."³⁷²

In battles, the Huangpu's units stood out in two areas: their tenacity and aggressiveness in pitched battle, and their political mobilisation activities. This was witnessed during the two most critical junctures of the campaign: the assault on the fortified city of Danshui, and the subsequent battles of Mianhu and Xingning. Both regiments participated in the assault on Danshui, on 13 February 1925, an attack which had to be planned and executed quickly before Chen Jiongming's reinforcements could arrive. Russian reports commended the initiative of the regiments in improvising ladders and ladder-substitutes to scale the walls on short notice, and also their aggressiveness in securing the city. On 13 March both regiments also battled the forces of Lin Hu, which were threatening the advance of the Right Wing toward Haifeng on the flank, at Mianhu. The 1st Regiment inflicted particularly severe casualties on Lin Hu's forces, which was several times the size of the Huangpu units. The Huangpu's units forced their withdrawal. The 2nd Regiment bore the brunt of the assault on Xingning, which was also strongly defended by Lin Hu on 21 March. Both regiments

³⁷² Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, 184-185; *As Military Adviser in China*, p. 119. The marching schedule is also stated in *Gemingjun ti yi ci dongzheng shizhanji* (War diary), 60-61.

also operated better than most of the Guangdong units in the subsequent pursuit of Chen Jiongmíng's defeated units. Casualties sustained by the staff and First Class graduates were 156 killed and 182 wounded.³⁷³ Over 600 non-commissioned officers were also killed or wounded.³⁷⁴

The Political Work

The Guomíndang army faced the major of winning the support of the local and rural population as it moved into eastern Guangdong. A friendly and cooperative local population was important in ensuring smooth military operations in these areas. The local residents could supply the Guomíndang army with rice, water, and shelter while on the march in the villages along the route of advance. In addition, the movement of supplies forward once the luxury of rail transport had ended required the contracting of local "coolie" labour.³⁷⁵ To solve the problems the army would negotiate with the village head person to purchase goods and services required for the entire unit. The army strictly forbid its troops to loot, requisition food and housing individually, exploit porters, or carry out unfair business dealing with merchants. Party representative attached to each unit down to company level tried to uphold these ideals. Apart from the logistics and supplies, the rural people were also an important source of combat intelligence. They could guide the army through the rough rural countryside and they could also collect intelligence about enemy locations and numbers. With little or no intelligence support of their own this was a valuable contribution.³⁷⁶

³⁷³ *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, 6: 197.

³⁷⁴ *Beifa zhanshi* (A war history of the northern expedition) I: 137-263.

³⁷⁵ In the war diary of the 1st Training Regiment reveals a pattern of the army arriving at a new destination and going through the important routine of negotiating with local villagers for supplies of rice and shelter for the soldiers. *Gemingjun di yi ci dongzheng shizhanji*, 18, 57, 60 for examples.

³⁷⁶ Cherepanov complained of the serious lack of topographic maps in the 1st Training Regiment. In his memoir, he says "...instead, they were given schemes without a scale. The schemes did not show the nature of the terrain, roads, etc. and there were only straight lines between large settlements indicating the existing lines of communications; telegraph or telephone. We had no military or geographical descriptions of the area and tried to make up for this lack of information by questioning the officers who were familiar with the area. We also made extensive use of local guides". A.I. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, 184-185; *As Military Adviser in China*, p. 119.

The personnel available and competent to operate in this military-civilian cooperation sphere were the Huangpu's Party representatives (*dang daibiao*). The eastern expedition campaign was a test of the efficacy of the earlier training at Huangpu. Party representatives were charged with several responsibilities. Firstly, the political education of the troops as a continuation of the political training had already in progress.³⁷⁷ While on the march, soldiers' behaviour would have to be carefully directed and monitored so that the villagers would not be unnecessarily disturbed by the rowdy troops. Several devices were designed to serve this end. Wall posters, pamphlets and printed bulletins were used to inform soldiers and peasants alike. Large numbers of Guomindang's friendly newspapers, which probably sponsored by the party were carried to the military units from Guangzhou and Shanghai. Since soldiers in the Guomindang ranks, like soldiers everywhere in China, still were illiterate, these newspapers of the Republican Daily (*Minguo ribao*) must have been distributed only to the officers of the regiments and to the cadet formations.³⁷⁸

Another responsibility of the Party representatives was the collection and reporting of military intelligence. The timely intelligence secured from local residents made it possible for the Huangpu troops to envelop enemy formations and surprise them in other ways.³⁷⁹ Cherepanov reports there were no aircraft or cavalry for battlefield reconnaissance missions,³⁸⁰ and thus we may understand that the value of local intelligence contribution.

The propaganda teams (*xuanchuan dui*) were assigned to clandestinely penetrate enemy-held areas. These teams came under the command of the Special Party Headquarters (*tebie qu dangbu*) that was responsible for political proselytising and propaganda work outside of the military formations in the villages and towns of rural

³⁷⁷ *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, 7: 258; *Guojun zhengong shigao*, p. 152.

³⁷⁸ *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, 7: 261; states that one hundred copies of each newspaper were ordered for each distribution.

³⁷⁹ *Guojun zhengong shigao*, 200-202.

³⁸⁰ Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 184.

Guangdong.³⁸¹

The propaganda teams duties were to spread the news that the Guomintang's revolutionary troops would in no way abuse their fellow residents.³⁸² Nationalistic propaganda emphasised the dual themes of foreign anti-imperialism and local militarists oppression. Once a military objective was selected, villages in the vicinity became the targets of the propaganda teams. Once team members in civilian clothes had slipped through territory occupied by the opposing troops of Chen Jiongming, they proceeded to paint slogans on walls, put up wall poster propaganda, distribute leaflets, and through discussions and other means generally pass the word that the Guomintang revolutionary soldiers would not make themselves unwelcome guests.³⁸³ The songs and slogans developed as indoctrination instruments at the Huangpu Military Academy now proved useful in persuading the people of the small villages and towns in southern China of the essential difference between the Guomintang revolutionary military men and the desperate men serving as soldiers under warlords who threatened local residents with loss of life and property.³⁸⁴ Their propaganda efforts to win the people's support and create unity between troops and the people paid off. Farmers responded by acting

³⁸¹ While the Party representatives who were working within the army were under the control of the Political Department, the propaganda teams went under the Special Party Headquarters of the Huangpu Military Academy. In 1925 Liao Zhongkai controlled the Special Party Headquarters. For information on division of labors between the Political Department and the Special Party Headquarters, see *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, 7: 261; *Guojun zhenggong shigao*, 147-148, 152.

³⁸² *Guojun zhenggong shigao*, p. 152.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, 150, 201-202. The true significance of propaganda teams on the First Eastern Expedition may not lie in the quantity of work, as Cherepanov attempts to relate by indicating numbers of pamphlets distributed: 100,000 for the peasants, 500,000 for soldiers. The large number of leaflets for soldiers indicates they were distributed not primarily to troops trained at Huangpu. While one may speculate they were intended for persuasive use against the armies of Chen Jiongming, the printed hand-outs may also have been useful within the ranks of Xu Chongzhi's units among soldiers less committed to revolutionary ideals than those influenced at Huangpu. Cherepanov testifies that peasant response to the leaflets, and presumably the other activities of propaganda squad members, was very favourable. He gives evidence of this by mentioning that a large number of volunteer porters and workers who helped the Guomintang in the Haifeng-Lufeng area in north-eastern Guangdong.

³⁸⁴ In much of the area under the administration of Chen Jiongming, this kind of propaganda strayed somewhat from the truth. The conclusions of two scholars indicate that Chen's administration generally was enlightened and progressive. C. Martin Wilbur, "Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification Under the Nationalist Regime, 1922-1927," in *China in Crisis*, editors Ho Ping-ti and Tang Tsou, p. 216; Winston Hsieh, "The Ideas and Ideals of a Warlord: Chen Chuang-ming, 1878-1933," *Papers on China* (1962): 198-252.

as guides, message carriers, spies, and porters. Chiang Kaishek's recalls lively vignettes of the work of the propaganda teams and the popular response in his diary.³⁸⁵

Cherepanov also claims the successes for the propagandists.³⁸⁶ For example, it was reported that at Luojingba in the celebrated battle for Mianhu, one thousand farmers took up primitive arms--spears and farming implements--to engage in combat with the contingent of enemy troops under Chen's subordinate commander Liu Hu.³⁸⁷ They had also participated with the Guomintang units in pursuit of Lin Hu's defeated soldiers.³⁸⁸

At Haifeng, Cherepanov attributes the cordial welcome received the Guangdong Army units to the aggressive political mobilisation work by the Party representatives in collaboration with the local 1,000-man Guomintang organisation. Before departing Haifeng, they took measures to establish peasant guerrilla companies, which included a military training school and thirteen teaching staff who were Huangpu First Class graduates. The school also set up peasant agitators training assisted by the Party representatives. However, the organisational work done by the Communist Peng Pai³⁸⁹ together with large numbers of peasants in Haifeng. Chen Jiongming's recent

³⁸⁵ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao* (A draft chronicle of Chiang Kaishek), 304-306, 317, 324-325; Cherepanov also talks about the preparation and distribution the propaganda pamphlets in *Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae*, 201-202; the chief of staff of the Huangpu 1st Training Regiment Liu Bingcui attributes the success of the first expedition to the extraordinary good military-civilian relationship and the ways in which the local populace aided the military campaign, see Liu Bingcui, *Gemingjun di yi ci dongzheng shi zhan ji* (*Factuel battle reports of the revolutionary army during the first eastern expedition*). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1928, 336-337.

³⁸⁶ Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, 200-201.

³⁸⁷ Lin Hu and his troops were in fact at Mianhu; they also engaged Guomintang units in several other encounters as well. This is described by both Cherepanov and Guomintang historians.

³⁸⁸ *Guojun zhenggong shigao*, p. 151.

³⁸⁹ Peng Pai was a Haifeng native who undertook to organise Haifeng Peasants' Association in 1921. The Association was crushed by Chen Jiongming in March 1924. Peng fled to Guangzhou where he soon became the most active leader in the Guomintang's hesitant move towards the rural population. The Guomintang established a Peasant's Bureau in its central headquarters with Peng Pai as its secretary; and it sanctioned the creation of a Peasants' Movement Training Institute to prepare cadres to organise peasants' associations. Mao Zedong directed the Institute's final session in mid-1926. For detail, see Fernando Galbiati, *Peng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1985, chapter 5.

disbandment of that union organisation, may have been much more effective in motivating peasants in that locale to do voluntary work than the pamphleteering of propagandists.³⁹⁰

Three out of six Party representatives in the battalions of the 1st and 2nd Regiments three were Communists. The Propaganda teams had a mixture of Communist and non-Communist members, but the Communist Party sent its own cadres into conquered areas to organise farmers associations and labour unions.³⁹¹ Competition soon broke out between activists in both camps—"pure Guomintang members" and those "sitting on the fence" of both parties. Cherepanov relates that the Party representative of the 1st Regiment, Miao Bin, organised within his unit "a department of a so-called Society for the Study of Sun Wenism, which perverted the revolutionary character of the teachings of Sun Yatsen, and came out against the unity of the national front". Li Zhilong, a Communist Party representative of the 2nd Battalion, came out in opposition of Miao. Chiang Kaishek immediately transferred Li to Huangpu. Miao then tried to organise a department of the Society in the 2nd Regiment, but he "received due rebuff from the regiment's Party representative," as Cherepanov put it.³⁹²

This was an early glimpse of a very bitter conflict between two factions in the emerging Party Army. The most probable date for this emergence of an anti-

³⁹⁰ *Guojun zhengcong shigao*, 200-202. An impartial student of the peasants' movement in Guangdong reports that in the area of Haifeng, Lufeng, and Wuhua, organisers directed a peasants' corps to help the revolutionary troops in transport, secret service, and labour. They attacked the rear of Chen's armies, interrupted communications, and seized enemy supplies. On 28 February, the day after the city had been taken by the revolutionary army, Peng Pai arrived in Haifeng, and worked to restore his previously developed peasants movement. *Xiangdao zhoubao*, 1 May, 12: 1030-1036; Chang Tzu-ch'iang, *The Farmers' Movement in Kwangtung*. Translated by the Committee on Christianising Economic Relations. Shanghai: National Christian Council of China, 1928, 9, 31.

³⁹¹ Chen, Nengzhi. "Huangpu jianxiao chu qi zhong gong fen zi de shentou huo dong (The communists' infiltration activities during the early years of the founding of the Huangpu military academy)." *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 155-212. Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau) edited. Taipei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau), 1984, 182-184.

³⁹² Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 289.

Communist organisation within the army seems to be between 12 and 24 April, according to the deductions of Li Yunhan. Chiang Kaishek's position in this conflict seems ambiguous. Bao Huizeng who was a Communist recalled Chiang making a speech at a banquet in Chaozhou in honour of officers who participated in the campaign, in which he said: "Although counter-revolutionary forces are very powerful, the Guomintang and the Chinese Communist Party are cooperating and we have the support of the people of the whole country. The Leader is dead, but there still is Adviser Borodin to lead us." So, Guomintang rightists accused Chiang of joining the Communist Party, according to Bao.³⁹³

Rebellion of the Yunnan and Guangxi Generals

The First Eastern Expedition was a fruitful campaign for the Huangpu units. Units fighting in eastern Guangdong captured large stocks of equipment. They captured almost 12,000-13,000 rifles, 110 machine guns, 30 ancient cannons, 6 modern mountain guns, 8 million cartridges of various gauges, and 1,500 shells. The Academy Army got about one-third of this large quantity of arms. These arms would be useful, for Moscow had just given General Bliukher 450,000 roubles for the formation of new units.³⁹⁴ The officers and troops of the two regiments gained valuable battle experience, and Chiang Kaishek's prestige grew. On 13 April, the Guomintang Central executive Committee resolved to reorganise the Academy Army as the Party Army, and on 1 May it appointed Chiang Kaishek its commander.

The Eastern Expedition, however, weakened the position of the Guomintang leaders in Guangzhou, since the main bulk of its loyal troops were away in the newly

³⁹³ Bao Huizeng, *Bao Huizeng Huiyilu* (Reminiscence of Bao Huizeng). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, 171-172; and Li Yunhan, "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong (Sun Yatsenism society and the early years of anti-communist activities)", 71-114. *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), p. 83.

³⁹⁴ Cherepanov, *Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae*, p. 200. A letter from Moscow to the Russian Military Attache informed him of this allocation, and also 100,000 roubles for the upkeep of the Huangpu Military Academy for two months. Mitarevsky, N. *World-wide Soviet Plots, as Disclosed by Hitherto Unpublished Documents Seized at the USSR Embassy in Peking*, Tientsin: Tientsin Press, n.d., p. 39.

conquered territories. This left Guangzhou and its neighbouring towns more firmly under the control of the Yunnan and Guangxi forces. Hu Hanmin headed a government that had little power to govern. The Yunnan and Guangxi commanders also tended to monopolise tax revenues. They were thought to be conspiring to overthrow the pro-Leftist Guomintang leaders.³⁹⁵

During May 1925 some Guomintang leaders in Shantou planned to bring troops back from eastern Guangdong to drive out the Yunnan Army of General Yang Ximin and the Guangxi troops of General Liu Zhenhuan. The political situation in Guangzhou became tense, and by 22 May, Hu Hanmin and other members of the civil government had withdrawn to Henan Island (opposite Guangzhou) under the protection of Li Fulin and Wu Tiecheng. It was during this critical period that some members of the Guomintang Central Executive Committee (CEC) met for the Third Plenum, from May 18 to 25. A manifesto announced the acceptance of Sun Yatsen's will as the Guomintang's guide, and the CEC declared that all who accepted it would be considered comrades. The party made clear its stand of its revolutionary struggle against imperialism and warlords, and continue to aid farmers and workers in mass movement. The plenum confirmed the policy to admit of Communists to the Guomintang and affirmed the intention to fight imperialism together with Soviet Russia. It cited Sun Yatsen's letter to Soviet Russia (read to him and signed the day before his death) as the basis for the Manifesto on the Current Situation. In it, the CEC declared that Soviet Russia had abolished the unequal treaties between Russia and China, and supported the Chinese people's struggle in the movement for abolition of the unequal treaties. The Third Plenum also adopted resolutions on the reorganisation of the army with the warning that all who opposed it would be dealt with severely. According to Wang Jingwei, the plenum also decided to keep the Political Council.³⁹⁶

³⁹⁵ "Hu Hanmin guanyu yanzhong chufa panjun Yang Ximin Liu Zhenhuan bu tongdian" (Telegram from Hu Hanmin announcing Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan be punished), *Hailujun dabanying gongbao*, no. 14, 1925, reprint in *Zhonghua mingushi dangan ziliao huibian*, 4 b: 846.

³⁹⁶ *Zhongguo Guomintang zhongyao xuanyan xunling ji* (Important declarations and instructions of the Guomintang of China). n.p.: Political Department of the Military Academy of the Guomintang of China, December 1925, 41, 60-64; Li, Yunhan. *Cong ronggong dao qingdang* (From the communist admission to the party purification), 364-367.

The radical tone of the manifestos, the reaffirmation of admission of Communists into the Guomindang, and the reassertion of close relations with Soviet Russia mark the rise of a Leftist leadership in Guangzhou and their defiance of the Party's conservatives.

In a well-planned, brief military campaign during the first two weeks of June 1925, the Leftist Guomindang leaders solidified their control over the Guangzhou area. The battle for Guangzhou lasted from 6 June through 12 June.³⁹⁷ Major fighting took place along the Jiulong-Guangzhou Railway. The combined Guomindang forces that marched back from eastern Guangdong took Shilong, a town on the approach to Guangzhou on 8 June. Another element of the Guangdong Army marched on to Guangzhou from Sanshui to the city's western outskirts. The Hunan and Jiangsu armies descended the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway and were at the north of the city. The ring round Guangzhou was closed. On 11 June, the Guomindang's forces started a drive in two columns toward the high ground north and east of Guangzhou, where the Yunnan and Guangxi armies had prepared defences.

Before joining the battle in Guangzhou, the Academy Army was enlarged to a brigade of three regiments through incorporation of additional First Class graduates and soldiers from a reorganised Guangdong unit. He Yingqin, the 1st Regiment commander, was promoted concurrently to command the brigade and Zheng Yingshi and Chen Dajun served as the 2nd and 3rd Regiment commanders respectively. The Huangpu regiments in eastern Guangdong formed part of Chiang's Eastern Group of Guangzhou's forces. Meanwhile, the Huangpu cadets in Guangzhou joined the Guomindang's Southern Group forces. Both participated in a successful assault on Guangzhou on 12 June. While the Training Regiments besieged the city from the east, the Huangpu cadet regimental force (8 companies) under the command of the acting dean Hu Qian combined with other units of the Southern Group to cross the Pearl River and launched a flanking attack on the Yunnan forces defending Guangzhou in the south. After occupying the city, cadets and portions of the Training Regiments

³⁹⁷ For a general account of the campaign, see *Geming wenxian*, 11: 1704-1706; *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, 1-14 June 1925, pp. 369-376; Bao, Huizeng. *Bao Huizeng Huiyilu* (Reminiscence of Bao Huizeng), 170-178.

temporarily formed the city garrison. As such, they participated in the disarming of the Yang-Liu 20,000-man force. According to Cherepanov, combining with the Huangpu cadets in crossing the Pearl River were some 500 soldiers of Wu Tiecheng, 1,000 of Li Fulin's troops, Sun Yatsen's former bodyguard company, and 250 cadets from the Hunan Military School (*jiangwutang*). The force numbered 2,880 men. The cadet units, augmented by artillery, constituted the 1st Regiment; the remaining units formed the 2nd Regiment.³⁹⁸ After the battle, Chiang Kaishek became garrison commander of Guangzhou and soon brought the disordered city under control.

The Formation of the National Government

After the victory, the Nationalist leadership began to re-establish a National Government in Guangzhou. On 14 June the Political council, which had met only once since Sun Yatsen's departure for the North, resolved that the government should have nine ministries. These ministry heads would form a council and elect a chairman. The Guomindang's Political Council would decide on government policy and executed in the name of the government. The men who made this decision were Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, Liao Zhongkai, Wu Chaoshu (C.C. Wu), with Michael Borodin as adviser.³⁹⁹ The next day the Guomindang Central Executive Committee passed four resolutions: The Guomindang Central Executive Committee shall be the supreme organ; the Generalissimo's Headquarters shall be reorganised as the National Government; the *jianguo* armies and the Party Army would be renamed the National Revolutionary Army; and military administration and fiscal administration shall be reformed. During the next two weeks the small group of men began to implement these resolutions by selecting officials, writing regulations, and issuing pronouncements. On 1 July they formally established the National Government of the Chinese Republic; on the third they announced a new Guangdong Provincial Government, and a new Guangzhou Municipal Government the following day. The Central Executive Committee

³⁹⁸ A.I. Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, 263-264; *As Military Advisers*, 152-153. A short summary of the campaign against Yang-Liu is contained in *Military Campaigns in China: 1924-1950*, document prepared under the auspices of the office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

³⁹⁹ Li Yunhan. *Cong ronggong dao qingdang*, p. 373.

appointed a new National Government Military Council and proclaimed its regulations on 5 July. On 24 July regulations for the National Government's Ministry of Finance, a key organ in the effort to centralise revenues, were announced.⁴⁰⁰

Fifteen men in Guangzhou held all the positions of importance in these various organs, but among them six stood out: Wang Jingwei, Liao Zhongkai, Hu Hanmin, Tan Yankai, Xu Chongzhi, and Wu Chaoshu. Wang Jingwei, however, was chairman of the National Government Council and of its five-man Standing Committee (hence "chairman" of the government), chairman of the Military Council, and early in July had become chairman of the Guomintang Political Council.⁴⁰¹ Anti-Communist sources charge that Borodin and the members of the Guomintang Political Council engineered Wang Jingwei's election as chairman of the National Government. Previously, Hu Hanmin had been acting generalissimo and governor of Guangdong province. In the reorganisation, the latter position was left vacant and the province was to be governed by a council of seven. Hu Hanmin's new position was as foreign minister of the new National Government, which had no international status. Clearly his colleagues, probably on Borodin's insistence, had demoted him.⁴⁰² Liao Zhongkai, the Left leader who most firmly supported Sun Yatsen's Russian orientation, was named minister of finance, a key position because the Guomintang was determined to centralise in its own hands the financial resources controlled by army generals. In addition, Liao kept his posts as Party representative to the Huangpu Military Academy and the Party Army and remained chief of the Guomintang Labour Department and of its Farmers Department, and minister of finance in the Guangdong Provincial Government.

According to its charter, the Military Council of the Government of the Chinese Republic would be directed and supervised by the Guomintang. It would control all

⁴⁰⁰ *Geming wenxian*, 20: 3801-3820.

⁴⁰¹ Li Yunhan, *Cong ronggong dao qingdang*, 374-375; *Geming wenxian*, 20: 3808-3814.

⁴⁰² According to Chen Gongbo, Xu Chongzhi had a long feud with Hu Hanmin, Tan Yankai and Zhu Beide. See his *Ku xiao lu*, 28-29; Jiang Yongjing, *Hu Hanmin xiansheng nianpu gao* (Chronological biography of Hu Hanmin). Taipei: Guomintang Executive Committee Historical Commission, 1978, 232-237.

military, naval, and air forces and all military organs within the territory of the government. The minister of military affairs would be one of its members. The Military Council was conceived as a body coordinate to the Government Council. Both received their orders "from the Guomindang," and the Military Council would have various functional offices in charge of military matters, just as the government had ministries in charge of civil affairs.⁴⁰³ As matters evolved, both councils came under the authority of the Guomindang Political Council. Party control of the Military Council was apparent from the appointment of the Military Council members. Four of the original eight members--Wang Jingwei (chairman), Liao Zhongkai, Hu Hanmin, and Wu Chaoshu--were civilian party members all with seats on the Political Council. The others were commanders of troops, Tan Yankai, Xu Chongzhi, Chiang Kaishek, and Zhu Beide. Tan and Xu had recently been added to the Guomindang Political Council. As chairman of the Military Council, Wang had the power to make final decision on all questions.⁴⁰⁴ In a letter to all officers and men, the Military Council summed up the principle of Party control of the military. The Guomindang, it said, should direct and supervise all political and military organs of the government.⁴⁰⁵ The Military Council had the functions of the supreme command with a General Staff directly subordinate to it.⁴⁰⁶

The day after the victory, the Guangdong Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a proclamation directed nominally to workers, farmers, revolutionary soldiers, and all oppressed people. After denouncing warlords, imperialists, and reactionaries, it offered an ambitious list of nine reforms that a truly revolutionary government should institute: protection of the basic rights of free speech, publication, assembly and association; unified government administration, and prohibition of local rule by military; unified finances, reformed taxation, and prevention

⁴⁰³ *Geming wenxian*, 20: 3805-3806, 3818-3819.

⁴⁰⁴ For the organisation of the Military Council see "Notes on Several Meetings of the Military Council", Document 10, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 4.

⁴⁰⁵ *Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyao xuanyan xunling ji*, 48-50.

⁴⁰⁶ "The National Revolutionary Army: Short History of its Origin, Development, and Organisation", Document 3, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 485.

of armies from usurping tax-collecting organs; unified military administration and prohibiting armies from harming the people; prohibition of [opium] smoking and gambling; regulation of commerce, opening riverine communications, and road building; increase in educational opportunities, teachers, and expenditure; extermination of bandits; and reduction of the numbers of defence forces. The proclamation also listed eleven specific reforms required by workers, farmers, and soldiers, such as protection of the right to organise and to strike, workers' insurance, a minimum income law for farmers and protection against rack rents, guaranteed wages for soldiers, etc.⁴⁰⁷

Assassination of Liao Zhongkai and the Military Reorganisation

As the Guomintang's Left Wing leaders were on the rise in August 1925, several sources of resentment against their policies also emerged. There was resentment about the economic disruption brought on by the anti-British strike and boycott, the power of Communists in the Strike Committee and its organs, and the pickets's enforcement of a blockade against shipment of goods to Hong Kong in regions that normally traded with the colony. Hostility focused on the Leftist leaders, their Russian advisers, and the Communists in Guangzhou. Their opponents charged them with trying to "Bolshevise" Guangdong. A power struggle emerged between those who saw their economic and social positions threatened and those who were determined to create a new, revolutionary social and political structure. The conservatives main targets apparently were Liao Zhongkai, Wang Jingwei, and Chiang Kaishek.⁴⁰⁸

The main oppositions to the radical wing of the Guomintang in Guangzhou

⁴⁰⁷ Guangdong qu dang, *Tuan yanchiu shiliao, 1921-1926* (Historical materials on the Communist party and youth corps in Guangdong), 144-148.

⁴⁰⁸ Wang Jingwei, "Political Report made to the Second Congress of the Guomintang", 6 January 1926, *Geming wenxian*, 20: 3851-3870; Chiang Kaishek, "Military Report made to the Second Congress of the Guomintang", 6 January 1926, *Geming wenxian*, 11: 1756-1763; for an analysis of the assassination of Liao Zhongkai, see Chan Fook-lam, Gilbert, "A Chinese Revolutionary: The Career of Liao Chung-k'ai (1878-1925)", a Ph D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1975, 403-423; for an analysis based on the Guomintang's archives, see Li Yunhan, *Cong ronggong dao qingdang* (From the communist admission to the party purification). 2 vols., Taipei: Zhongguo xueshu zhuzuo jiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1966, 375-392;

included the following. General Li Fulin and Wei Panging on the Henan Island, and Liang Hongkai and Zheng Runqi in the west of the Pearl River and southeast of Guangzhou. In addition, Chen Jiongming's generals were expanding their areas of control in the eastern Guangdong, while General Deng Benying in the southwest was still hostile to Guangzhou. There was also pressure from the British. British and Chinese merchants in Hong Kong were suffering serious losses due to the Guangzhou-Hong Kong strike and boycott.

By mid-August Guangzhou was filled with apprehension and rumours that some alliance of external and internal foes of the radicals Guomindang would emerge. The government began to send in troops to various potential danger spots and the military Council imposed censorship to all reports of troop movements except those sanctioned by them. Trouble erupted on the morning of 20 August 1925, when three assassins shot and killed Liao Zhongkai and his companion Chen Qiulin editor of the *Minguo ribao*, in front of the party headquarters. A Special Committee was set up consisting Xu Chongzhi, Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kaishek with full authority to deal with the crisis.⁴⁰⁹ Evidence began to point suspicion toward a group of conservative Guomindang veterans and some higher officers of the Guangdong Army.⁴¹⁰ It was suspected that Zhu Zhuowen, Hu Yisheng, Lin Zhimian and other members of the conservative political club, the *Wenhuatang*, under Hu Hanmin's patronage had plotted the assassination in conspiracy with generals Wei Bangping and Liang Hongkai.⁴¹¹ The Special Committee ordered their arrest. The task was given to the garrison command of the Chiang Kaishek. On 25 August the Huangpu forces began their arrests. Several generals and higher officers of the Guangdong Army were arrested and their troops in

⁴⁰⁹ Chiang Kaishek's appointment to the Special Committee was a turning point in his career. He had previously held no important political post in party or government; he was not a member of the CEC, the Political Council, or the National Council. Chiang's military position was also considerable strengthened when portions of Xu Chongzhi's Guangdong Army were incorporated into his I Corps.

⁴¹⁰ The Guomindang's archives on the investigation of the assassination of Liao Zhongkai can be found in *Zhongguo mingquoshi dang'an ziliao huibian*, vol. 4 a, 274-286.

⁴¹¹ For more on political activities of the *Wenhuatang*, see Chen Gongbo's report on the investigation on the Liao Zhongkai assassination, in *Zhongguo mingquoshi dang'an ziliao huibian*, 4 a: 280-281; and Li Yunhan, *Cong ronggong dao qingdang*, 382-384.

and around Guangzhou were disarmed.⁴¹²

Hu Hanmin's and Xu Chongzhi's positions became precarious after their arrests. Hu Hanmin was implicated since Lin Zhimian was one of his followers and Hu Yisheng was his younger cousin. Chiang Kaishek placed Hu under detention at Huangpu and later despatched him to the Soviet Union.⁴¹³ Other party conservative stalwarts such as Lin Shen and Zou Lu were also sent out of Guangzhou in a "Diplomatic Delegation". Most of the officers charged with participation in military plot were Xu Chongzhi's subordinates. Xu although a Special Committee member was also kept under surveillance and later departed for Shanghai.⁴¹⁴ In a long letter which was tantamount to a verdict and a criminal sentence, Chiang Kaishek spelled four main charges against Xu Chongzhi. He first accused Xu's Guangdong Army of being a warlord army interested only in getting rich and ignoring the Guomindang's revolutionary cause; he then accused Xu of embezzling a large amount of tax revenue belonging to the Guangzhou government and funds for the eastern expedition against the forces of Chen Jiongming; thirdly, Chiang accused Xu of monopolising the revenues of the Central Bank and refusing to distribute them to other armies; lastly, of being involved in Liao Zhongkai's assassination.⁴¹⁵ It is interesting to note that of the four main crimes, two were alleged embezzlement of funds. Xu and his army, in this case, was a major obstacle to Guangdong's unification apart from Chen Jiongming and other extra-provincial forces. Thus, between 19 and 23 September 1925, the balance of

⁴¹² Early reports mention that about a hundred officials and officers were arrested. *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 23-25 August 1925, 409-410; Wang Jingwei, "Political Report Made to the Second Congress".

⁴¹³ For a detailed account of Hu Hanmin, see Jiang Yongjing, *Hu Hanmin xiansheng nianpu* (Chronological biography of Hu Hanmin), Taipei, Guomindang Central Executive Committee Historical Commission, 1978, 337-350, which describes Hu Hanmin's departure for Russia after the event of the Liao's assassination.

⁴¹⁴ Chiang Kaishek's overt thrust against his rivals began on 19 September, with the approval of Wang Jingwei. Chiang sent the powerful 1st Division of the NRA to guard the capital against any internal revolt, and secretly mobilised other units to disarm the forces of Zheng Runqi, commander of the 3rd Division at Humen and Dongwan, and Mo Xiong, 3rd Brigade commander stationed at Shilong east of the city. The next day Chiang sent Chen Mingshu to escort Xu Chongzhi onto a vessel bound for Shanghai. The Political Council resolved to "permit" Xu to relinquish his posts as minister of war and commander of the Guangdong Army. *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 425-429.

⁴¹⁵ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 19 September 1925, 425-428.

power in Guangzhou shifted dramatically in favour of the radical Guomindang members headed by Wang Jingwei, and the emerging Party Army commander Chiang Kaishek.

On 26 August, the day after the initial arrests, the Military Council decided to organise the National Revolutionary Army. There would be five main corps. The Party Army commanded by Chiang Kaishek was to become the I Corps. The Hunan commanded by Tan Yankai would lead the II Corps. The III Corps was created from the Yunnan army under Zhi Peide. The Guangdong Army would become the IV Corps commanded by Li Jishen.⁴¹⁶ Li Fulin's Fu Army was designated the V Corps. Other smaller units would retain its command structure but they would come under a unified administration.⁴¹⁷

The sweeping military reorganisation that led to the creation of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) in August 1925 provided the opportunity for the rise of the Huangpu's Party Army. Three divisions were organised to constitute the I Corps' 1st and 2nd Divisions in the late summer, with Third Class graduates filled in the 3rd Division in October. The rank and file of the three divisions comprised soldiers from the disbanded Yang-Liu forces (3,000-4,000) and the reorganised 4th Guangdong Division.⁴¹⁸ The I Corps assumed the stance of an elite group, receiving top priority with regard to equipment and supplies.

The Huangpu system for creating a disciplined and committed party armed force was been fully endorsed by the party by the time of the second Eastern Expedition. As further campaigns were successfully completed, Huangpu staff and graduates filled in warlord units reorganised and incorporated them into the growing

⁴¹⁶ Li Jishen was the commander of the 1st Division of the Guangdong Army numbering about 6,000 men. His connection with the Guangdong Army went back to 1921 when Deng Keng appointed him chief of staff of the 1st Division (see previous chapter for detail). The Russian advisers identified Li and the 1st Division as reliable.

⁴¹⁷ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 26 August 1925, p. 410.

⁴¹⁸ Collier and Lai, *op. cit.*, p. 85; *Beifa zhanshi*, 1: 291.

units of the I Corps. Basic to the process remained the Training Regiments, which increased to a total of six prior to the end of 1925. A look at the top-level command structure of the I Corps would testify to this. During the second Eastern Expedition, the 1st Division commander, five of the ten principal commanders of the 1st and 2nd Divisions and two regimental Party representatives had served earlier in the first two Training Regiments.⁴¹⁹

The Second Eastern Expedition

In late 1925, the Guomintang government's position in Guangzhou was once again seriously threatened.⁴²⁰ On the east, Chen Jiongming's forces were closing in on the city. It seemed that the Sichuan general Xiong Kewu in the north, and Deng Benying and Wei Bangping in the south were joining in the attack. Faced with this hostile coalition, the Guangzhou government decided to put down Chen Jiongming's forces first, since he was the most dangerous and the most closely connected with Hong Kong. Hong Kong was said to be supporting Chen Jiongming financially. After that Xiong Kewu would be disarmed. Thereafter, the rebellions in the south would be suppressed.

With great effort, the newly formed National Government was able to raise several units out of reliable forces although they were extremely heterogeneous in numerical strength and armament.⁴²¹ A preparation for the second Eastern Expedition was a main item on the agenda at a joint meeting of the Guomintang Political Council

⁴¹⁹ *Geming wenxian*, 10: 1469-1470; *Beifa zhanshi*, 1: 150-151. The eight officers were He Yingqin (1st Division commander), Liu Zhi, Shen Yingshi, Jin Fozhuang, Chen Dajun, Liu Yaochen, Jiang Dingwen and Yan Fengyi.

⁴²⁰ Although historical accounts of 1925 most frequently define two separate military expeditions into the East River region, it is well understood that the break-off of hostilities toward the end of May 1925 was necessitate by the higher military priority arising back at the revolutionary centre at Guangzhou and not because the objectives of the expedition had been secured. The second eastern expedition was but a continuation of the first and was fought over the same political and military objectives.

⁴²¹ "The National Revolutionary Army: Short History of its Origins, Development, and Organisation", Document 3, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 486.

and the National Government Military Council in September 1925.⁴²² The budget for military expenditure was the main subject. Wang Jingwei called upon the new minister of finance, T.V. Song for a report and then asked each commander to present his financial statement. From the replies it is evident that the effort to centralise tax collection and military payments had not progressed. Revenue lagged behind expenses in that every major component of the National Revolutionary Army, and payment of troops was seriously in arrears. General Cheng Qian had to sell rifles in order to feed his men. Thus, the plan to create five corps and to rationalise the army's structure was still far from realisation.⁴²³

The strengths of Chen Jiongming's forces were estimated to be around 30,000 supported by some machine gun and artillery forces. It began its advance from Haifeng, Hepu, and Meixian on 1 October.⁴²⁴ According to the Russian adviser, there was a danger that the enemy might overrun the government forces and take Guangzhou.⁴²⁵ To counter this threat, the Military Council assigned some 21,000 men

⁴²² The meeting was held after the assassination of Liao Zhongkai as the minutes of the joint meeting was dated 22 September 1925. The Russian version of the minutes, captured in the Beijing raid, is included in *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian* (Collection of documentary evidence of the Soviet Russian conspiracy). Beijing jingcha zongju bianyi (Beijing police headquarters compiled and translated). Beijing: Beijing Metropolitan Police Headquarters Inspection Bureau, Commission for Translation and Compilation, 1928, 11: 45-53. The account of the minutes of meeting is based on this text.

⁴²³ *Ibid.* According to the Russian minutes, T.V. Song reported that the ministry collected between \$1.9 and \$2 million a month, and that for the October the figure would be \$2.2 million. Monthly expenditure, however, was \$2,420,000 of which \$1,870,000 was required for troops and military installations, excluding the Huangpu Military Academy's expenses. Based on these estimates, we may deduce that 93 percent of the ministry's current revenue and at the least 83 percent of the projected income would go towards routine military purposes. These figures did not take into account the costs of the projected Eastern Expedition, which was estimated at \$700,000. Li Fulin's army received nothing from the ministry.

⁴²⁴ See Chen Xunzheng, *Geming wenxian* (Documents on the revolution), 11: 1733, for more on the enemy strengths. It mentions an additional two to three thousand troops under Yang Kunju and several hundred under Mo Xiong garrisoning Huizhou. But Cherepanov says the enemy troops numbered only 20,000-22,000. See also Cherepanov, A. I. *Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae*, p.334. For a full account of the Second Eastern Expedition, see *Huangpu junxiao shigao* (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 6: 172-198; *Geming wenxian* (Documents on the revolution), 11: 1733-1744; *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, "Guangzhou", 3: 34-48.

⁴²⁵ "Kuibyshev's Report on Military Development in Kwangtung", Document 22, *Missionaries in Revolution*, p. 566. This document presents a general picture of military developments in Guangdong in the last three months of 1925 as understood by the new head of the Russian military mission in the south, N.V. Kuibyshev. In his report to Beijing, written in January 1926, he emphasised the dangerous threat to

to the eastern front commanded by Chiang Kaishek, commander of the I Corps. He controlled the 1st and 3rd divisions of the I Corps (about 6,000 men) and the IV Corps, minus the 10th Division (6,000 men); a Danshui Group made up of two brigades and two independent regiments of the former Guangdong Army (3,000 men); seven battalions of the Independent Division under Wu Zhongxi; four regiments under Cheng Qian (1,500 men); and a miscellany of extra-provincial units from Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei (2,500-3,000 men). Guangzhou was guarded by part of the 2nd Division of the I Corps, cadets in the schools of the I, II, and III Corps, and the navy.⁴²⁶

The first important objective was Huizhou, a nearly impregnable fortress, garrisoned by Yang Kunju.⁴²⁷ In a typical seize battle against fortress, the attack began with many hours of artillery bombardment on 13 October. It was followed by specially selected units of the "braves" who rushed to the walls with scaling ladders but they were driven back with heavy losses. The attackers only succeeded in mounting the walls and capturing the city after intensively bombarding the fortress the next day. The casualties of the 4th Regiment that led the attack were high. The regimental commander Liu Yaochen was killed and nearly half of the regiment were wiped out.⁴²⁸ The National Revolutionary Army captured 3 cannons, over 2,000 rifles, few machine

Guangzhou posed in September 1925 by its enemies. The government faced total destruction but was able "by swift and determined measures" to resist internal opponents and the enemy armies, "thereby acquiring a strong and firm position by November 1925".

⁴²⁶ *Geming wenxian*, 11: 1734, provides a detailed list of units. For Chinese sources on the second Eastern Expedition see also "Di er ci dongzheng jiliu, September-November 1925 (A brief account of the second eastern expedition)." *Guomin zhengfu junshi weiyuanhui dang'an* (Military council archives of the national government), in *Zhonghua mingguoshi dang'an ziliao huibian* (Archives of the Republican China), 4 b: 859-878.

⁴²⁷ For a detailed account of the battle for Huizhou and other major battles; see "Dongzheng canzhan baogao (A report on joining the second eastern expedition)." *Junshi zhengzhi yuekan* (Military and political affairs monthly), no. 2 (February 1926): 20-46; Xie Cilin, "Dongzheng jingguo qingxing (The second eastern expedition)." *Junshi zhengzhi yuekan* (Military and political affairs monthly), no. 2 (February 1926): 47-57; He Chi, "Dongzheng zhanshi: di er ce Dongzheng zhanji (A war history of the eastern expedition: a battle record of the second eastern expedition)." *Junshi zhengzhi yuekan* (Military-Political Affairs Monthly), no. 4 (April 1926): 1-28; Gu Zhutong, "Huangpu dongzhen." *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 52-62.

⁴²⁸ "Di er ci dongzheng jilu, September-November 1925 (A brief account of the second eastern expedition)", p. 867.

guns.⁴²⁹

In his memoirs, A. I. Cherepanov, adviser to General He Yingqin, commander of the first Column, gives a vivid and detailed account of the battle, which he witnessed at close range. Huizhou city was protected by high walls and water on all sides except for a land approach to the north gate and a narrow causeway leading through a lake to the west gate. He describes the assault by hastily organised teams which though covered by artillery bombardment, were mowed down as they tried to rush the north wall or were pinned into a ditch some fifty meters away. Snipers picked off the officers and Party representatives, who wore khaki uniforms that distinguished them from the troops in blue. The second assault was better prepared and was led by a Communist party representative. The Russian engineer, E. A. Yakovlev, was among the first wave of attackers to scale the wall. The fortress of Huizhou was actually taken by Communists, says Cherepanov, who disparages Chiang Kaishek's role in this battle.⁴³⁰

With Huizhou captured, the National Revolutionary Army now faced the enemy's main forces, but intelligence concerning its concentrations was poor. Understanding that its main strength was in the Hepu-Heifeng region, the National Revolutionary Army decided to send the I Corps (minus the 2nd Division), the IV Corps (minus the 10th Division), and the Danshui Group against the enemy's main force around Haifeng. General Cheng Qian, with reinforcements and the extra-provincial units, was sent to take Heyuan and Laolong in the north-east to cut off the enemy's escape routes to Jiangxi and Fujian.⁴³¹

⁴²⁹ Xie Cilin, "Dongzheng jingguo qingxing (The second eastern expedition)", *Junshi zhengzhi yuekan* (Military and political affairs monthly), no. 2 (February 1926): 55.

⁴³⁰ Cherepanov, A.I. *Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae*, 334-354.

⁴³¹ The Russian adviser N.I. Konchits was accompanied Cheng Qian on this march. In his diary account Konchits describes the second Eastern Expedition campaign from 17 October to 16 November 1925, the Huizhou battle to the drive against enemy remnants on the Guangdong-Fujian border. Konchits, N. I. "In the Rank of the National Revolutionary Army of China." *Sovetskie Dobrovoltsy v Pervoi Grazhdanskoi Revoliutsionnoi Voine v Kitae; Vospominaniia* (Soviet volunteers in the first revolutionary civil war in China; reminiscences), 24-95. Akademia Nauk SSSR, Institut Norodov Azii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1961, 37-62.

In the meantime, the situation in the south and west of Guangzhou became critical to the National government. The Military Council had to withdraw the IV Corps from the East River area and send it to assist the campaign against Deng Benying at the northern front. In spite of this weakening, the 1st Division and the Danshui Group each defeated strong enemy units under Lin Hu and Hong Zhaolin, opening the way for the recapture of Shantou. The Danshui Group fought a major victory by taking 5,000 prisoners, 5,000 rifles, 15 cannons, and 50 machine guns.⁴³² With the recapture of Haifeng and Lufeng, the Communist peasant organiser Peng Pai was able to return and start rebuilding the shattered peasants' movement.

In the North River region the Guomintang was also successful in disarming and driving off the Sichuan forces of Xiong Kewu, an old revolutionary and a member of the Guomintang Central Executive Committee. Xiong had brought his Sichuan troops into northern Guangdong in August 1925. According to Wang Jingwei's report to the second Guomintang Congress, the Nationalist Government assigned General Xiong four counties in the extreme north-west of Guangdong for his source of income. On 1 October, according to Wang, a representative of Chen Jiongming came to see Zhu Peide, telling him that Chen and Xiong long had an agreement. He even offered Zhu \$300,000 to persuade him to join them. This led to the discovery of much evidence leading to the arrest of Xiong Kewu and some of his staff on 3 October in Guangzhou. Hence it was necessary to send the II and III Corps of the National Revolutionary Army to disarm the Sichuan Army.⁴³³

⁴³² Battle accounts of Danshui varied greatly in the Chinese and the Russian versions. In *Geming wenshan*, 11: 1740-1741, gives the credit of defeating the enemy to Huangpu 1st Division although it acknowledges the contribution of General Feng Yipei forces in this battle. The Russian account by Teslenko, however, gives the greatest credit in defeating the enemy to Feng Yipei forces. It describes General Feng's forces penetrating deep into the enemy's rear thereby closing-off its retreat. Thus, when the Huangpu 1st Division and the Guangdong Army 1st Division attacked, the enemy collapsed. In this battle, 10,000 soldiers were taken prisoners, and 8,000 rifles collected. See Teslenko, Ye V. "From Guangzhou to Wuhan." *Sovetskie Dobrovoltsy v Pervoi Grazhdanskoi Revoliutsionnoi Voine v Kitae; Vospominaniia* (Soviet volunteers in the first revolutionary civil war in China; reminiscences), 96-125. Akademia Nauk SSSR. Institut Norodov Azii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1961, p. 107. Cherepanov on the other hand, mentions about 6,000 prisoners, 15 cannons, 50 machine guns, and 6000-7000 rifles captured. See *Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae*, p. 359.

⁴³³ Wang Jingwei's political report made to the Second Congress of the Guomintang, on 6 January 1926, in *Geming wenshan*, 20: 3868-3869; and Chiang Kaishek's military report made on 1 January, in *Geming wenshan*, 11: 1762.

The pacification of southern Guangdong began on 24 October. Chen Mingshu's force was compelled to retreat westward to Dansuike. Chen was determined to hold because of an important railway bridge (on the Sunning Railway).⁴³⁴ It had been under the enemy attack until 29 October when rescuing forces arrived. These were Jiangxi troops from Wuzhou,⁴³⁵ and units from the II and III Corps, redeployed after their attack on the Sichuan Army. General Zhu Peide was put in command of the campaign around late October. He drove the enemy south and west, and from this time on the National Revolutionary Army made steady progress in clearing south-western Guangdong of bandits and Deng Benying's armies. By mid-December, the IV Corps under Li Jishen had been assembled around Gaozhou; Li replaced Zhu Peide as general commander of the southern campaign, and the II and III Corps units were sent back north. On 21 December, the VI Corps prepared its assault on Hainan Island where Deng Benying had retreated.⁴³⁶

Political work was also featured prominently in second Eastern Expedition. When the Military Council was established early in July 1925 a Political Training Department was set up within it. On 27 July, the Guomindang Political Council appointed Chen Gongbo as its director.⁴³⁷ On 28 September, the Guomindang Central Executive Committee appointed Chou Enlai as the Party representative of the I Corps and other men as Party representatives in each of its eight regiments. At least three of the eight were Communists.⁴³⁸

⁴³⁴ *Geming wenxian*, 11: 1740. According to this account, the 12th Division revolted at Jiangmen forcing Chen Mingshu's retreat. It was at this time the Military Council decided to re-deploy elements of the 4th Corps led by Li Jishen from the East River back to southern Guangdong.

⁴³⁵ *Chiang Jieshi nianpu*, 12 October 1925, p. 439. According to Chiang, the participation of the Guangxi troops was preceded by a conference at Wuzhou on the unification of Guangdong-Guangxi.

⁴³⁶ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 20 December 1925, p. 483.

⁴³⁷ Chen Gongbo was a founder of the Chinese Communist Party but was by now no longer a member. Chen had only recently returned from the United States and had joined the Guomindang, apparently as a protege of Liao Zhongkai.

⁴³⁸ The Communists who could be identified were Zhou Enlai, Bao Huizeng, Jiang Xianyun, and Zhang Jiyun. See *Guojun zhengong shigao* (A draft history of the political work of the national army), 157-167.

As in the previous eastern campaign, political work took two main forms-- among the troops and among the populace. Political workers in the units were expected to be exemplars of valour. In his description of the battle for Huizhou city, Cherepanov reports that the Party representatives (or "Commissars" in his word) of the 4th Regiment, which would lead the attack, were assembled and instructed to serve as examples to the soldiers during the assault. In the second assault, it was Communist company Party representatives who led the three-man teams with ladders to the city walls. Cherepanov saw one of them right under the wall waving the company flag before the ladders were set up. Summing up the victories of the East River campaign, Cherepanov gives great credit to the Party representatives of the I Corps at the regiment, battalion, and company levels, the majority of whom, he says, were Communists. And they rapidly won the confidence of the soldiers.⁴³⁹

As for the work of the propaganda squads that were deployed in front of the operational units, the second Eastern Expedition saw an improvement in organisation and quality of work. Company or squadron sized propaganda unit was formed with a strength of 237 men, a majority of whom could speak local dialects, was organised by 2 October.⁴⁴⁰ Its members were attached to the headquarters of the three manoeuvre columns of the expeditionary forces (for a report of one of the propaganda squads, see Appendix 2).

Chiang Kaishek's personal records contain accounts of triumphal entries into captured places during the eastern campaign where carefully organised welcoming crowds were on hand with banners, slogans, and songs for his entry. For example, after elements of the I Corps had taken Shantou, Chiang entered the city by boat on 6

⁴³⁹ Cherepanov, *Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae*, 339, 360.

⁴⁴⁰ Of utmost significance for the propagandist's work was his ability to communicate with the peasants. Within the squadron 18% of the personnel were felt to be able to speak the local dialect peculiar to the rural areas of the East River basin. Another 30% spoke the species of Guangdong language spoken pre-dominantly in the large city of Guangzhou, and 5% of the men could speak Hakka, a valuable skill in Guangdong. Sixty-five percent of the personnel spoke Mandarin as their native dialect and only 5% were unable to speak the "national" language. Although there is no indication how language skills were spread throughout the propaganda platoons and squads, there is reason to believe the language problem was appreciated and that dialect speakers were identified for utilisation in propaganda work. *Huangpu junxiao shigao*, 263-367. A summary of this document is attached in the Appendix 2.

November. A large gathering was at the dock, and the next day, Saturday, there was an even larger welcoming meeting followed by a parade.⁴⁴¹ In this gathering, Zhou Enlai, He Yingqin, Chiang Kaishek, and his adviser, General Rogachev addressed the crowd. Chiang praised the cooperation of the people and the troops, which he said, had made the victory possible. He proclaimed his program: to restore the labour unions and self-governing organisations of all classes, to abolish unequal treaties, to control the maritime customs, and prohibit gambling and opium smoking. He ended with praise for the Russian Revolution and slogans of support for the World Revolution. A few days later, on reading the report of the propaganda squads, Chiang was favourably impressed by the effects of the propaganda upon the discipline and morale of the troops as well as by the help it elicited from the public.⁴⁴²

Workers and farmers were said to have assisted in the eastern and southern campaigns. According to Deng Zhongxia, striking workers organised a transportation corps to move supplies to the fighting front, a propaganda corps to work among the people, and a medical corps to rescue wounded from the battlefield. The strikers' picket corps petitioned to be allowed to join the eastern campaign, but the government assigned the corps to stabilise the rear. Deng says that several tens of workers died during the campaign and many hundreds fell ill from overwork.⁴⁴³ Lo Qiyuan asserted that more than 500 farmers lost their lives during the East River campaign while assisting the revolutionary army, and that the quick defeat of Deng Benying owed much to the help given by the farmers.⁴⁴⁴

The success of the political work in the Huangpu units forced some senior officers in the National Revolutionary Army to change the attitude toward the introduction of political training in their units. Until June 1925 only Huangpu troops

⁴⁴¹ Jiang Jiushi nianpu, 6-7 November 1925, 453-454.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, 15 November 1925, 459-460.

⁴⁴³ Deng Zhongxia, *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jianshi* (A brief history of the Chinese labor movement). n.p.: Hua Zhong xinhua shudian, 1949, p.132.

⁴⁴⁴ Lo Jiyuan, "General report on [farmer] association business." *Zhongguo nongmin* (Chinese farmers) (June 1926): p. 660.

had political training. In other units there were only occasional political lectures. This was because of resistance by the generals, who feared the loss of their independence. To counteract this attitude, the Russian advisers explained to them that the political work did not threaten them with diminution of their authority but, on the contrary, would increase it; that, in connection with the growth of political consciousness, the fighting capacity of their units was growing too.⁴⁴⁵ The fighting capacity of the Huangpu troops was always cited as an example of the advantage of carrying out political work.

For the Russian advisers, however, there was a special purpose for introducing political training in these units. "Our leaders wanted, of course, quite the contrary, i.e. to undermine the authority of several independent generals and to disorganise their units. The subsequent events confirmed the soundness of our line of conduct--the destruction of Yunnan and other troops, the dismissal of counter-revolutionary generals".⁴⁴⁶ These events, according to the Russians, forced the generals to acknowledge, in principle, the necessity of political work and they began to request the Russian mission and the government to assign instructors and political workers to their units. This change of attitude took place toward the end of 1925, but due to shortage of personnel it was possible only to organise political sections at the corps level. An exception was the 10th Division of the IV Corps, in which political work had been introduced much earlier.⁴⁴⁷

In conclusion, Huangpu's participation in Guangdong's unification was a matter of its own survival. By September of 1924, Sun Yatsen would abandon Guangzhou in favour for a northern expedition. But once the main bulk of the Guomindang armies moved into the Hunan and eastern Guangdong, Guangzhou came under threat and Huangpu's position was in great danger. The threat came not only from externally forces of Chen Jiongming but also internally from units of the "Allied Army" of the

⁴⁴⁵ "Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang, Early 1926", Document 26, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 606.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁷ Konchits, N. I., *op.cit.* This was the division to which Konchits was its adviser.

Yunnan and Guangxi. *Guomindang's political role in the 1920s*

The premature and inexperienced Huangpu Training Regiments fought hard in battles together with experienced Guangdong Army units. They had also learned how to cultivate local population to support its operations. The good performance of the two Training Regiments was the results of better command and control of the units by officers and Party representatives. Command and control was extremely important as most battles involved were fought at battalion and company level, and its areas of operations were hostile to the Guomindang's army. Although the achievements of the propaganda squads were difficult to assess⁴⁴⁸ the abiding significance of this early employment of propaganda teams inspired the military and political leadership of the Guomindang for future work. The military-political campaign, however, was a two-edged sword. The seeds of political rivalry between members of the Guomindang and the Communist were sowed in the units of the Party Army.

For the Russians, the campaign for the unification was also a learning experience. Trained in European combined-arms tactics and operational staff work, the Russians expertise found little relevant in this campaign. The rugged closed terrain of the rural Guangdong and low-level infantry operations were hazardous to Russian officers and mainly were down with dysentery. However, the Russian advisers performed a useful role in coordinating operations between front line units and headquarters. They also contributed to the organisation of the political work both within the army, and between troops and local residents.

Finally, the rise of the Huangpu's units to become the first Party Army was attributed to, not just their battle performance, but also the demise of powerful regional army commanders such as Yang Xiwen, Liu Zhenhuan and Xu Chongzhi. In the course of the rivalry within the Guomindang, Huangpu sided with the radical left-wing group to continue the united front policy. It was a policy that Huangpu could depend upon

⁴⁴⁸ It is interesting that no source is able to provide any sort of detailed story of propaganda squad's achievements. Combined with the absence of reporting on the part of the willing Russian adviser, this lack leads to the suspicion that the quantity of effort and achievement on the part of propaganda squads, however many were formed, could not have been great.

and developed it further to take on more crucial role in the future.

By 1 July 1925, when the National Government was established the armies of the Guomindang was also reorganised. Leading the formation of the National Revolutionary Army were Huangpu's Training Regiment units that had expanded to become the I Corps. The year 1925 was truly a turning point for the Guomindang and the Huangpu Military Academy. The success of the unification marked the end of militarists' domination in Guangdong. For the first time in the Guomindang history, the centralise control of the administration and the army seemed to be insight. The success of this centralisation process, however, depended on the party ability to control the provincial finance as well as the willingness of the Party Army under its control.

Chapter 5: The Central Military Political Academy: Centralisation, Politicisation and Conflict

On 12 January 1926, the Guomindang Military Council, the highest military decision-making body of the National Government in Guangzhou, decided to change the name of the Army Officers' Academy at Huangpu to the Central Military Political Academy. According to the Council, the change was necessary to amalgamate various military schools of the National Revolutionary Army into one training institution.⁴⁴⁹ This decision was significant at least in two aspects. One, it represented the party's serious attempt at military centralisation and reform; and two, it wanted the Central Military Political Academy to carry out centralised training for all the units under the party. Huangpu was given a key role in shaping the future of the National Revolutionary Army in both aspects.

Traditionally, the Central Military Political Academy has received only a scant treatment from scholars. Most would assume it was similar to its predecessor.⁴⁵⁰ The aim of the chapter is to analyse the centralisation and politicisation process of the military under the Guomindang by looking at the restructuring of the Huangpu Military Academy into the Central Military Political Academy. It argues that the Central Military Political Academy was the party academy Sun Yatsen and the Guomindang wanted to create in 1924. The party's involvement in the academy affairs and the Russians' participation in the military of the Guomindang government reached a new height with the reorganisation of Huangpu in 1926. However, greater participation does not always lead to greater unity. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case. Just before the launching of the Northern Expedition in mid-1926, the Guomindang confronted an internal crisis which nearly broke up the United Front of the Guangdong government. What came out in this crisis were the limit of the role of Russian advisers and the power of the Chinese officer corps in determining the course of the Nationalist Revolution.

Chiang Kaishek's Proposal for the Military Expansion

⁴⁴⁹ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, 12 January 1926, p. 515.

⁴⁵⁰ See for example, the works of C. Martin Wilbur, Richard Landis, and articles in *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Huangpu military academy) published in Taiwan, and *Huangpu junxiao shiliao* published in mainland China. Donald Jordan even mistakenly regards the Central Military Political Academy as the official name of Huangpu, see his *The Northern Expedition*, p. 231.

When the National Government was formed on 1 July 1925, Chiang Kaishek had already worked out a plan for the reorganisation and expansion of the National Revolutionary Army. This plan was first sent to Bliukher for his comments.⁴⁵¹ In his covering letter, Chiang explained the plan was first formulated at the height of the Shamian Incident when the threat from Britain in Hong Kong seemed imminent. In view of the Guangzhou's highly dangerous location, he proposed that a special committee on military contingency planning be set up within the Military Council.⁴⁵²

In essence, Chiang's proposed military expansion touched on three major questions: the military budget, military reorganisation, military preparation for the Northern Expedition after Guangdong's unification. He correctly predicted that the Guangdong conflict would be settled in three months. He estimated once Guangdong was unified, provincial revenue would increase to between \$35 million and \$40 million a month. This amount could support army 65,000 to 70,000 strong; a small navy fleet; defence fortifications of Guangzhou; expansion of arsenals, training schools and other expenditures necessary for the preparation for the Northern Expeditionary force (see tables 12 and 13).

Chiang's ambitious proposals were discussed subsequently in the Military Council meeting on 7 July. In the meeting, he summarised his ideas into six main points: (1) the development of a closer relationship with the revolutionary forces in the south-west (in particular Guangxi and Sichuan) and the opening of a second front by joining north-west (Gansu and Shaanxi) progressive forces to form a north-western and south-western line against the northern warlords;⁴⁵³ (2) the retrain the warlord soldiers to become a revolutionary army; (3) the centralisation of Guangdong finance in order to support military expansion; (4) the reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army; (5) the employment striking labour to construct the railway line; (6) the merging of

⁴⁵¹ Chiang Kaishek. "Junzheng yijianshu" (Paper on military policy proposal). *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao* (A draft chronicle of Chiang Kaishek's life), 1 July 1925: 380-383; there was no addressee on this record. However, in the Russian document this paper was addressed to Bliukher dated on 26 June 1925, see "Chiang Kaishek's Letter to Bliukher", Document 7, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 502-5.

⁴⁵² "Chiang Kaishek's Letter to Bliukher", p. 502.

⁴⁵³ This was essentially the North-west plan of 1923. Chiang envisaged decisive battles being fought in Hunan and Jiangxi, and proposed merge with Guangxi and ally with the forces of Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan.

Guangdong with Guangxi so as to expand the revolutionary base.⁴⁵⁴ Among the six main proposals, two were concerned with the re-training and reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army.

Bliukher's Grand Plan

At the end of summer of 1925, the foremost of the Russian military advisers, General Bliukher, had also sketched out the essential moves and basic goals for a reorganisation and consolidation program for the National Revolutionary Army.⁴⁵⁵ The major problem Bliukher wrestled with his "grand plan" was the core issue of centralised control of the military units. The reorganisation of forces associated with the Guomindang in order to consolidate command and control would become a military problem of highest priority once operations against Chen Jiongming was over.

When Bliukher wrote his prognosis in September of 1925 he was determined to improve the quality of leadership in the National Revolutionary Army through training. He was concerned about both the tactical and political cadres and saw the need to train lower and higher level officers. He recognised the need to form several schools within the next few months. He wanted a staff training school for the headquarters' staff personnel- a school located at or similar to the Huangpu Military Academy that would train tactical, small unit leaders for command of platoons, companies, battalions and regiments; schools for military-political workers; a non-commissioned officers academy for the most advance enlisted men. Bliukher wanted a refresher course for the middle and upper ranking officers (presumably officers who were too old and too

⁴⁵⁴ Chiang Kaishek. "Jianyi junshi weiyuanhui geming liuda jihua" (A six-point proposal on revolution for the military council). *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao* (A draft chronicle of Chiang Kaishek's life), 7 July 1925: 384-392.

⁴⁵⁵ This is difficult to tell whether Chiang Kaishek or Bliukher originated the military plan for reorganisation. What is certain is that both, as military men, had identified the military problems of the Guomindang although the emphasis of each solution varied. This will be discussed later. Vasilii K. Bliukher, "Prospects for Further Work in the South, or the Grand Plan of Kuomintang Military Activity for 1926." *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927*, 508-516. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989. This a reprint of the article "Blucher's "Grand Plan" of 1926", in the *China Quarterly*, no. 35 (July-September 1969): 18-39. This document was first published by A.I. Kartunova in *Narody Azii i Afrika* (Peoples of Asia and Africa), the fiftieth anniversary issue, no. 5, 1967, 144-156. The document was obtained from the Central Archives of the Party, Institute of Marxism and Leninism, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Bliukher left Guangzhou in the summer of 1925 because of conflict with the chief Political Adviser Borodin. He wrote this on his way out of China at the conclusion of his first period service. He was out of China during the Second Eastern Expedition and the period of centralisation and reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army.

senior to have benefited from training Huangpu's. In short, Bliukher was concerned with developing all the specialist skills and technical abilities that are integral to a modern military establishment particularly, artillery and machine-gun training, communications and combat engineer, military medicine, logistics and naval training.⁴⁵⁶

Bliukher was explicit about the need for all training facilities to be under control of the Military Council. He wanted a uniform tactical and political doctrine in all curricula. Bliukher was also concerned about the forthcoming campaign to the north. In this regard, he was concerned with the problems posed by local dialects within China, a point of concern shared by Chiang when soldiers of the Huangpu Training Regiments were recruited. He expressed preference for officers and non-commissioned officers to be recruited from Hunan and Jiangxi, the first two provinces in the northern expedition campaign. Bliukher's preference in establishing this requirement was both political and tactical. He wanted them to be representatives between the army and peasants because of their ability to communicate with the local people. From the military point of view the men from Hunan and Jiangxi would know the terrain of their home provinces, and that knowledge was critical since the army lacked good quality military maps.⁴⁵⁷

It is clear that both Chiang and Bliukher shared many common concerns over the problems regarding the military reorganisation and expansion since the National Government was established. Their proposed solutions, however, differed in emphasis and details. Chiang's main preoccupation was the Northern Expedition. He was less concerned with or simply ignored the immediate organisational and technical problems of the military reorganisation.⁴⁵⁸ Bliukher, on the other hand, was concerned with the fundamental structure of the military system. He wanted to transform the National Revolutionary Army to a fighting fit army equipped with modern weapon system, operational doctrine and capable military leadership.⁴⁵⁹ Theoretically, these two sets of

⁴⁵⁶ Bliukher, Vasilii K. "Prospects for Further Work in the South, or the Grand Plan of Kuomintang Military Activity for 1926", 513-514.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁸ The reorganisation of the Guomindang's armies was a daunting task which required much more effort, money and time than what Chiang and other Military Council members predicted. The problems of military reorganisation will be discussed in the later part of the chapter.

⁴⁵⁹ The Russian archival records on the Central Military Political Academy were complete than those of its predecessor the Army Officers' Academy. This is one indication that the Russian advisers' influence in Huangpu is much greater during this period.

proposals seemed complementary--one stressed on the overall objective and the other on organisation. But on practical terms, they varied a great deal. Bliukher's plan was sensitive and hit at the very basis of the Chinese army--the person relationship between commanders and their troops. The Russian's proposed centralisation process by the Russian would, in effect, transfer the loyalty of the soldiers to the party depriving the commanders of the only asset they possessed. They had already given up the territory they occupied and the practice of collection of tax revenue to the National Government. Chiang's plan, on the other hand, demanded only the loyalty of the commanders to the party and retained the original structure of unit loyalty to its commander. The party would encourage the establishment of the system of Party representative in all the units but the appointment would be made with the consent of the commanders. To an example, Chiang was the first to carry out the reform in the I Corps. In the meantime, work soon began to centralise the military command and reorganise the National Revolutionary Army. Although Bliukher left Guangzhou in the summer of 1925 and returned to the Soviet Union, his plan was carried by his successors in early 1926.

Central Military Policy Making Organs

The first step towards the military reform was to institutionalise the process of policy making. The Guomindang's Political Council would now determine the political character of the army, fix its budget and numerical strength, and decide on questions of peace and war. (see the organisational chart attached).⁴⁶⁰ It would also appoint the chairman of the Military Council, the chief inspector, and the minister of war, and confirm the appointments of members of the Military Council, corps commanders, chief of the central administration of the army, chief of the Naval Bureau, of the army air service, and of the Central Military Political Academy.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁶⁰ According to the Russian advisers' report, the Political Council was the supreme organ of the National Revolutionary Army. It recorded that Guomindang Political Council would deal with "all questions of principle, of a military character", and until the end of 1925 even technical questions of army administration were discussed there in order to protect the government from excessive demands of the generals. "Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang, Early 1926", Document 26, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 602.

⁴⁶¹ "Organisation of the highest Organs for Administration of the Army", Document 27, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 616-618. Within the report, submitted by L. Grey, there is an attached copy of what appear to be statutes of the Political Council in its military capacity. However, who the members were in the Political Council is not stated in these statutes. (The council was translated as "bureau" in the report.) The true identity of Grey is not clear. According to Wilbur, Grey was sent to Guangzhou to replace Smirnov ("Svetlovsky") who was to be sent back to the Soviet Union on 1 September 1925 to finish his studies in the Navy Academy. Grey signed the Document 36, which was a report on the Guangzhou navy on 15 March 1926. Presumably he was the Soviet adviser to the navy in Guangzhou. See Document 36, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 653.

Under the Political Council was the Military Council. Members of the Military Council were ex-officio members of the Guomindang. By March 1926 it had eighteen statutory members of whom three--the chairman, the chief inspector (or inspector general of the National Revolutionary Army), and the minister of war--formed a Presidium. The Presidium which, in mid-March would have consisted of Wang Jingwei, Chiang Kaishek and Tan Yankai, met twice a week, before decisions were presented to the weekly council meetings. Next came the heads of the three central organs under the Military Council--the General Staff, the Political Department, and the Department of Supplies (translated as Administration in the Russian report). The six corps commanders, the heads of the navy, army air service, and the Central Military Political academy were also members of the council. And finally three ministers in the government--foreign affairs, internal affairs, and finance made six. Looking at this organisation the Military Council appeared to have considerable authority since it was made up of men of the highest command and administrative responsibility.⁴⁶²

The Military Council had the authority to approve all fundamental planning conducted by the subordinate offices. Their power encompassed plans for military organisation, military supply, training, all service responsibilities and duties of all personnel. The Military Council, in short, constituted an additional level of authority above that more usually provided by the general staff office and commanders. By placing the supply and political departments outside the general staff, additional weight could be given to those two extremely important functions.

In December 1925, the Military Council began to exercise its control on various military units through the allocation of the military budget. Each corps' commander joined his unit's Russian adviser and the Chief of General Staff to form a corps-level reorganisation task force. Each task force was required to develop the measures either to reduce or expand corps manpower to fit budgeting constraints. Operating with a temporary force structure of five corps and two independent divisions, units, which were not integrated into these forces, were to be disbanded. The Chief of Staff was responsible for submitting plans for this type of disbandment. The task force was also required to form corps and division-level staff. It required to submit to the General Staff honest, regular reporting of troop strengths" that would support realistic budgeting

⁴⁶² In January 1926, a monthly journal began publication in the name of the Military Council, entitled, *Junshi weiyuan hui junshi zhengzhi yuekan* (Military and Political Monthly of the Military Council). This series is a valuable source material as it contains details of the key military decisions and campaigns, and reflects the revolutionary clan of the times.

procedures.⁴⁶³ The task force was charged to begin work as soon as the reorganisation directive was received from the Military Council. Their first effort would be directed at becoming intimately familiar with the unit. On the basis of this familiarity, the task force developed its plan. The corps commander was then responsible for implementation. Disagreements within the task force would be handed over to the Military Council for adjudication. The Military Council set the completion date for reorganisation on 30 January 1926.⁴⁶⁴

The first of the central organs under the Military Council was the General Staff. The General Staff was in charge of the actual execution of unit reorganisation and operational readiness of the National Revolutionary Army. This was an extremely difficult task as it entailed direct encroachment into the "private property" of the National Revolutionary Army's senior officers. Therefore, the commanders did not readily accept it. It could get in touch with the military units, much less direct the units' administration.⁴⁶⁵ To enhance the authority of the General Staff and create a closer connection between it and the army units, General Li Jishen was appointed chief of the General Staff. This was done on 23 February 1926. His adviser was General Victor P. Rogachev.⁴⁶⁶

The Political Training Department, which came directly under the Military Council, and was the same level as the General Staff and the Supply Administration, was given much more prominent role.⁴⁶⁷ It was modelled after the Soviet Central Political Administration (P.U.R.), and Party representatives were equivalent to the political commissars in the Red Army. The underlying purpose of this system may be summarised as politicisation, reformation, and control. To be effective revolutionary instruments, the officers and troops in the National Revolutionary Army must be

⁴⁶³ "Instructions to the Commission for the Reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army", Document 21, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 562-563.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 563.

⁴⁶⁵ "General Characteristics of the Armed Forces of the National Government", Document 28, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p.620.

⁴⁶⁶ See *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, 23 February 1926, p. 540; "Instructions to the Commission for the Reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army", Document 21, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 562.

⁴⁶⁷ The Political Department is discussed in detail in several long reports by the Russian advisers, see for examples, "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army", Document 37, 655-667; "Regulations Governing the Political Directorate of the National Revolutionary Army", Document 38, 669-671, *Missionaries of Revolution*.

infused with the Guomindang's ideology. It was the duty of the Party representatives to indoctrinate them. Another purpose of the system was to provide the Guomindang with an instrument for control over commanding officers. The Guomindang faced a problem similar to that of the Russian Communist Party during the Civil War days, the officer corps inherited from and trained under a previous regime which was not necessarily trustworthy. However, these were high ideals and required great effort and longer time to implement. In addition, reform could be abused easily. The Chinese Communist Party, for example, was using the system to gain influence in the Guomindang's armed forces, assisted by the Russian advisory mission.⁴⁶⁸

The Department of Supplies had a crucial role in the centralisation process. National Revolutionary Army saw logistic support and pay as functions of service of supply. The key challenge to the department was firstly, how to compel independent commanders to permit taxes in their territories to be collected by the central authority instead of the commanders appointed agents. Only if revenues were centralised and military payments controlled by the centre could the armies be reorganised and converted from private empires into a unified military force.

There were other reasons why implementing a centralised supply system was extremely difficult. Apart from avarice and self-aggrandisement there were other problems peculiar to the Chinese cultural milieu. A commander who recruited subordinates assumed a personal obligation, one which was clearly recognised by subordinate and superior alike, to house, cloth, feed, and pay his men. The commander was not perceived as simply the uninvolved agent of a superior officer or a provincial or even national government, no matter what name his army might bear. This tradition was strong and unyielding and no commander could easily escape his responsibilities under it.

By January 1926, the Department of Supply seemed to have made some progress in achieving its objectives. One of the Russian advisers commented on the "adoption by the whole army of a plan of regular supply of finances, artillery, material, etc., through the central military organs" and was impressed by a "gradual departure

⁴⁶⁸ "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army", Document 37, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 661. This document provides a short history of political work in the National Revolutionary Army, a comprehensive view of its accomplishments as of about mid-March 1926, and also an intimate account of Communist penetration of the army's political apparatus—all through Russian eyes.

from the most characteristic features of the Chinese militarism."⁴⁶⁹ The Department of Supply had succeeded in becoming the actual paymaster of the National Revolutionary Army according to the Russians. The system of the military collecting taxes directly from the local population to support itself was under control, except in the frontier regions which were beyond the government reach.⁴⁷⁰ The department also began to supervise the work of Guangzhou's arsenals and all its production was at its disposal. This was another crucial element of centralised control. By the end of March, the department expected to have enough data on the armament of the National Revolutionary Army to develop a general plan of procurement for re-equipping the forces. The department also had a plan and a budget allocation of \$194,444 (Guangzhou dollars) per month.⁴⁷¹ Despite many limitations in the work of the Department of Supply it had achieved some success in its attempt to eliminate the system of tax collection by independent commanders.

Reorganisation of Training--The Central Military Political Academy

On 12 January Wang Jingwei, chairman of the Military Council, formally proposed to the Council that military and political training be uniform, and all academies established by the several armies and all separate officer training units be brought together at Huangpu. The new school should be called the Central Military Political Academy (*Zhongyang junshi zhengzhi xuexiao*). This resolution was unanimously adopted, but it would take some time to carry out. The academy opened officially on 1 March 1926.⁴⁷² By concentrating the best instructors and training means in one centralised training institution, it hoped to achieve the following four major objectives: 1) to provide the best political training possible for the officers; 2) to overcome the provincial separatist tendencies of the officers; 3) to provide the best and

⁴⁶⁹ "Characteristic feature" refers mainly the system of military units collecting taxes from the local population. "General Characteristics of the Armed Forces of the National Government", Document 28, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 620-621.

⁴⁷⁰ "Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang, Early 1926", Document 26, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 605.

⁴⁷¹ "Report: The Department of Supply", *U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911-1941*, Reel XI, 0822, US National Archives: A Microfilm Project of the University Publications of American, Inc, 1983.

⁴⁷² *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, 12 January, 1 March 1926, 515, 541. However, the Russian reports of the opening date as 8 March 1926. See "The Kuomintang Whampoa Military School: A Report Compiled from Soviet Documents." *U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911-1941*, Reel XI, 0469.

uniform military training for the officers; and 4) to provide the best equipment and provisions for all forms of training.⁴⁷³

Consolidation of training in one location offered a number of advantages to the Guomintang leaders. Apart from saving costs and easier management, they could expect improved instruction if the best instructors were selected to teach at Huangpu. The uniform teaching of political subjects, which had been developed in Huangpu, could also be implemented.⁴⁷⁴ Above all, they could also hope to integrate officers into the Guomintang revolutionary movement and educate them about concept of service to the party, and the nation. In this way, the army building would serve as a positive part of the general process of nation building.

Reorganisation of Huangpu

The reorganised Huangpu Military Academy would take on the expanded roles. For the first time, a formal organisational structure was created to regulate the activities of the academy. The first task was the establishment of a Advisory Council consisting of the Commandant, as chairman, and the Russian adviser with the Military Council, the Chief of General Staff, the head of the Guomintang's Political Council, and the principal Russian adviser to the academy as members. The board's main function was to ensure that academy policy was in accordance with Guomintang policy. It would also look after matters such as student recruitment and the posting of graduates upon completion of the course. The second was the Academy Staff Council chaired by the Commandant to oversee the training programs and regulations of life and work at the academy. Its members included all heads of departments and the Russian advisers.⁴⁷⁵

Besides the two councils, the structure of the reorganised academy had also expanded to include a Commandant, a deputy, three main departments, and five major

⁴⁷³ "The Kuomintang Whampoa Military School: A Report Compiled from Soviet Documents." *U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911-1941*, Reel XI: 0469, p. 12. This is a detailed and a complete 36-page prospectus for the new academy (but we are not certain whether it is a draft or the finally approved document); also in "Plan and Regulations for the Central Military Political Academy of the National Revolutionary Army", Document 24, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 584-593.

⁴⁷⁴ Before the consolidation, there were officers' schools in the I (Huangpu), II, III and IV corps of the National Revolutionary Army. "Kuibyshev's Report on the military Developments in Kwangtung", Document 22, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 569-570.

⁴⁷⁵ "The Kuomintang Whampoa Military School: A Report Compiled from Soviet Documents." *U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911-1941*, Reel XI, 0469, p. 13.

instructional programs, each under a section chief (see the organisational chart attached). Chiang Kaishek was the commandant. Three main training departments were Education (the former Education and Training departments had merged into one), Sanitation/Medical service, and Politics. The head of the Education Department was also the deputy Commandant. Various chiefs of sections, such as tactics and arms of the special branches, and an officer with the rank of a colonel who was a direct subordinate for political training assisted him.⁴⁷⁶

The head of the Political Department served as the Commandant's assistant for political affairs. But his appointment was by the party Political Council. Its main responsibilities were to mould the political attitudes-- conduct training in political indoctrination and propaganda at Huangpu.⁴⁷⁷ In addition to providing political lessons for the normal military courses, it introduced a new political course for the Fourth Class to train political specialists to work in the units of the National Revolutionary Army.

Within the academy, a Technical Department (only section-sized) was created and directly under the Commandant. This department was responsible for the training of military engineer and communications. It offered a twelve-month course for serving officers from the units.

The primary aim of the academy was to train all the junior officers (*ganbu*) required by the National Revolutionary Army. The number of admissions was determined by the expected requirements of platoon and company leaders. Most of the training programs had two sections, one for non-commissioned officers (or the NCOs) brought in from the ranks, and the another for potential officers recruited from students, cadets in other corps' schools, and enlisted men of great promise. When the academy opened under its new name, there were more than 2,650 students, including those from the Fourth Huangpu Class and cadets from the other military schools.⁴⁷⁸

Most of the students were trained as infantry officers, but there were also small classes in artillery, engineering, communications, and supply work (quartermaster). In

⁴⁷⁶ The colonel had dual role to fulfil in that he also the direct subordinate of the head of the Political Department. "The Kuomintang Whampoa Military School", 16-17.

⁴⁷⁷ This responsibility was mainly the province of the Party Representative of the academy two years ago.

⁴⁷⁸ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, 8 March 1926, 542-544.

each case, the chief instructor was responsible to both the head of the Academy's Training Department and to the relevant inspector in the General Staff or to the Department of Supply.

In October 1926 the Fourth Class, the first batch of 2,500 men of the reorganised central academy graduated. They included, 800 officers, 850 non-commissioned officers, 450 political officers, and about 150 specialists each in artillery, engineering, and supply service, according to the Russian adviser to the academy Kumanin. Almost a third of the men were Hunanese; the rest were natives of Guangdong, Sichuan, and the Yangzi Valley provinces. As for social origin, nearly half were reported to be peasants, 350 merchants, 347 students, and 63 labourers. Eighty percent were middle school graduates, 10 percent high school graduates, 8 percent graduates of military schools, and 2 percent had only a primary school education.⁴⁷⁹ After graduation, the majority of them were assigned to Chiang's headquarters. Some 150 were sent to the I Corps, 100 to the training division of the school, and another 150 to other corps.⁴⁸⁰ In a different report, Naumov ("Kalachev") stated that the graduates of the Fourth Class were of a pronounced Left disposition, and that almost 500 of them were Communists.⁴⁸¹

Another Russian adviser S. N. Naumov ("Kalachev") gives an interesting account of how the political course came about and how political officers were trained. At the end of 1925, he writes, "the Chinese Communists brought up the methods of the establishment of a political class at the Huangpu in an especially acute manner....Zhou Enlai took active part in working out the program of study and the regulations of the political class. He was aided by Russian military advisers: I. Ya Razgon, A. I. Cherepanov, Stepanov, V.P. Rogachev, I. K. Mamaev." In February 1926, 500 students started their course in political training; "the best and most literate students made up the

⁴⁷⁹ "The Central Military Political Academy (October 1926), a report by F.M. Kumanin", Document 70, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 777-780. This report dated 30 October 1926, was presumably by F. M. Kumanin, who was the deputy senior adviser to the Central Military Political School at Huangpu. Kumanin ("Zigon") took up this Guangzhou job in the autumn of 1926. According to Vishniakova-Akimova, Kumanin arrived in Guangzhou in the autumn of 1926 and went north on 15 November with the first group of the National Revolutionary Army officers. Vishniakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-1927*, 313, 225. Wilbur thinks that the report was Kumanin's first impression on an inspection shortly after the graduation of the Fourth Class in October 1926.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 780.

⁴⁸¹ "Naumov's Report on Military and Political Conditions in Kwangtung", Document 72, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 791.

political class." The students had to master political sciences topics such as "the three principles of Sun Yatsen; the national revolution in China; the international political and economic situations; the political and economic situation of China and the USSR; the history and theory of socialism; the history of the world revolutionary movement." Other topics were the peasant movement, the trade union movement, and the youth movement in China; and questions of agitation, propaganda, and political work in the army. After A. S. Bubnov arrived in Guangzhou on 13 March, he lectured on Russian military thought. The program also provided practical training and the students had to learn military science.⁴⁸²

The Central Military Political Academy was in bad shape when Kumanin inspected it after the graduation. Furniture and rubbish were scattered about, and there was a shortage of books and equipment for the incoming class. The Russian rifles and machine guns were dirty. Officers and cadets did not seem to understand the use of the sighting mechanism, Kumanin observed.⁴⁸³ He was particularly critical of the performance of the Fourth Class. Cadets' discipline was poor, and he found much to criticise in the mock battles he observed carried out by the graduate of the class. Planning for the exercises was fairly satisfactory, but operations in terms of scouting, skirmishing, and rifle fire were poor. "The marksmen can produce only the effect of crackers, but by no means an effective fire." Commanders "act without thinking and only in order to do something and not remain inactive." He saw practically no communication between units, only bungling. The attacks were slow--the two sides lay facing each other at a distance of about 1,000 meters "and continuing to shoot to the last cartridge".

As other Russian advisers before him had done, Kumanin made a number of suggestions for improvement. According to him, all articles belonging to the school must be inventoried and properly distributed to storehouses. The men must be trained to handle and keep their arms properly. Classes must be supplied with textbooks and other requisites before the next term commenced. It was scheduled for 1 November, two days after the report. The curriculum should be revised to place special attention upon shooting and training for field service. A shooting gallery and small target range

⁴⁸² S. N. Naumov, "The School of Huangpu", 131-134, in *Akademiia Nauk SSSR. Institut Narodov Azii*. Cited in Wilbur and Hov, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 278, n. 70.

⁴⁸³ "The Central Military Political Academy (October 1926), a report by F.M. Kumanin", 777-778.

must be constructed, and training be given in firing small calibre arms. Kumanin also advocated that a Military Scientific Society be organised in the school.⁴⁸⁴

Although the Russians advisers' reports may be unduly critical of the Huangpu's students, it showed that, to some extent, the rapid expansion of the academy might have created some deterioration of the standard of training.

Ideological Conflicts

The politicisation of the National Revolutionary Army, in particular the I Corps, had its negative effects. The most serious negative impact ideological conflict that occurred at the Central Military Political Academy. Although the ideological conflicts in the National government did not start from the military, it had certainly provided a site for an open confrontation since the Central Military Political Academy was now at the centre stage of the United Front politics. At the climax of the Guangzhou Merchants Corps incident in October 1924, the Guomindang's branch of the Huangpu Military Academy created the Chinese Young Military Representative Society (*Zhongguo qingnian junren daibiao hui*) to recruit promising members from other units around Guangzhou. After a slow start, the Communists began to dominate the society.⁴⁸⁵ On 1 February 1925 the Chinese Young Military Representative Society was reorganised and named the League of Chinese Military Youth. It began publishing *Zhongguo junren* (The Chinese Soldier) and *Qingnian junren* (Military Youth). Bao Huizeng remembered that the League developed very quickly under Communist leadership which penetrated many military units in Guangdong by February 1925, it claimed to have a membership of 2,000.⁴⁸⁶

Because of its growing influence, the League of Chinese Military Youth soon got into trouble with the Guomindang right-wing's the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism. Through the influence of Dai Jitao and the propaganda activity of the Western Hills Conference (a Right-wing Guomindang group), the competition between the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism and the communist-controlled League of Chinese Military Youth grew more intense. Each faction attempted to mobilise support

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 779.

⁴⁸⁵ *Huangpu junxiao shiliao*, Part 6: 329-336.

⁴⁸⁶ *Huangpu junxiao shiliao*, Part 6: 332; Bao Huizeng, *Bao Huizeng huiyilu* (Memoirs of Bao Huizeng), p. 154.

in and outside the academy and the I Corps. Their rivalries reached Chiang Kaishek's headquarters. On 8 December, the Commandant called a meeting of political workers in the I Corps and Party representatives of various levels to discuss harmonisation. Chiang proposed the following solution: (1) Agitation by Communists in the academy should be conducted openly; and (2) Guomintang members in the academy wishing to join the Communist Party should announce their intention and seek permission from the Special Guomintang Branch in the Academy.⁴⁸⁷

There are conflicting accounts of the problems between the two organisations. According to Hsu Kai-yu, who interviewed many former Huangpu cadets and instructors, trouble started when Wang Jingwei gave Rightist agitators authorisation and financial support to inaugurate the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism in December 1925. The head of the Academy's Political Department, Zhou Enlai on the other hand, enlisted Borodin's support. The Russian threatened Wang with the withdrawal of all Russian aid if the organisers of the Society could not be stopped. Wang then led a delegation, which included Chen Cheng, He Zhonghan, Huang Zhenwu, and Pan Yuchang to plead with Borodin. Borodin yielded but warned Wang of the consequences according to this account.⁴⁸⁸ Cherepanov has a different version of events. In his account the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism planned a mass rally for 29 December. At the rally, it would urge the forthcoming Second National Congress, of the Guomintang to pass a resolution supporting the Western Hills Conference's resolution against the Russian military advisers. "However, the Russian advisers in Guangzhou decisively declared that if such a resolution were passed, all of them would quit. The Society backed down and sent their representatives to the Left-Wing Guomintang and Russian advisers with assurances that they would not use counter-revolutionary slogans at the rally." Apparently Wang Jingwei was so worried, that on 28 December, he sent a telegram to Chiang Kaishek, informing him of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism's plans for a great demonstration the following day. He warned that they would pass out handbills with Western Hills propaganda. Chiang sent Wang a stern telegram, telling him to stop it.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁷ See *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao* (A draft chronicle of Chiang Kaishek's life), 8 December 1925, pp. 470-471.

⁴⁸⁸ See Hsu Kai-yu, *Chou En-lai: China's Gray Eminence*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1968, 55, 243, n.8; see in particular, 52-55, which discusses the conflict between the League of Young Soldiers and the Society of Sun Wenism.

⁴⁸⁹ Cherepanov, *Severnnyi Pkhod Natsional'no-Revolutsionno Armii Kitaya* (*Zapiski Voennogo Sovetnika*) 1926-1927 (The Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army of China: Notes of

The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism held its rally and was formally inaugurated at a congress on 29 December where it issued its first manifesto. According to Cherepanov, the demonstration backtracked on its original plan. It came out in support for the planned Second National Congress of the Guomindang. He writes that the Society was unable to rally many people or win the participation of many important organisations in Guangzhou.⁴⁹⁰ Li Yunhan on the hand, who based his account on reports from the Guangzhou *Minguo ribao* of 30 December, says that at the Society's inaugural ceremony Wang Jingwei addressed a great gathering on Zhongshan University's parade ground. Later the Guangzhou Students League paraded and issued a public letter upholding the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism. According to Chen Gongbo, who was acting president of the university, the student body was torn by the conflict between Leftists and Rightists.⁴⁹¹

The League of Chinese Military Youth and the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism both aspired to become national organisations. By June 1925 the League claimed to have set up bureaus in North China, Manchuria, the Yangzi valley, and the Southwest.⁴⁹² The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism had organised local units in Shanghai in November and in Beijing in December 1925, societies in Nanjing, Wuhan, Wuhu, and Zhangde sprang up in early 1926. Apparently Sun Fo and Dai Jitao acted behind the scenes as did members of the Western Hills Faction. Its members were mainly middle school and college students. Just as in Guangzhou, the Society opposed the Communist Party and its Youth Corps everywhere. They accused them of preaching conflicting ideologies.⁴⁹³

a Military Adviser, 1926-1927. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1968, 73-74; *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 28 December 1925, p. 490.

⁴⁹⁰ Cherepanov, *Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya*, p. 74; Li, Yunhan. "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong (Sun Wenism society and the early years of anti-communist activities)." *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), p. 86.

⁴⁹¹ See Li, Yunhan. "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong", p.86; Chen Gongbo, *Ku xiao lu* (Memoirs with a bitter smile), 1: 52-53.

⁴⁹² Their work in the North was not well known. If they tried to recruit promising younger officers and cadets in northern military academies, it must have been secret and dangerous work. Li Yunhan. "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong", p. 88, citing a statement in *Zhongguo junren*, no. 6, written by Wang Yifei.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, 91-103.

In Guangzhou the conflict between the two organisations raged on. The Russian gives an interesting contemporary interpretation of the struggle between the two societies.⁴⁹⁴ It comments that Chinese Communist Party member working in the army made an error in opposing the Society of Sun Wenism and declaring its work counter-revolutionary. Rather they should have taken an active part to gain influence in the organisation. By opposing them, the Rightist elements in the Guomintang gained strong influence in the Society and converted it into a tool for their struggle against the Left. The conflict reached fever pitch that "some comrades even raised the question of the total elimination of Communists from the army." Apparently, Borodin was one of these comrades they wanted to remove. They put forward the slogan, "The Communists must be excluded from the Guomintang". To put an end to this state of affairs, "measures of a decisive character" were undertaken by Chiang Kaishek. "The leaders of this Society after individual undergoing proper 'schooling,' publicly denied their program. In a public declaration, they also acknowledged the need to struggle against imperialism to the end and work jointly with the Communists, to organise peasants, workers, and students, and to tighten discipline in the Guomintang. This "schooling" probably took place on 1 January 1926 when Chiang Kaishek "harshly warned" Hui Dongsheng and others about the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism's activities.⁴⁹⁵ It could also have taken place at a joint meeting of the two rival societies held at the academy on 2 February 1926.⁴⁹⁶ After this event, says the Russian adviser, "the Military Section of the Communist Party's Provincial Committee instructed its members to take an active part in the affairs of the Society." The Political Training Department (P.U.R.) directly controlled and guided the Society's work in the army. A tendency was discernible to make this Society "proceed to its own liquidation." The Russian anticipated that "in the near future this problem will totally dwindle away from the army"⁴⁹⁷

On 2 February 1926, Chiang Kaishek and Wang Jingwei called a joint meeting of officers from the two bodies, to hammer out a truce at the Central Military Political Academy. The Leagues representatives were Li Jishen, Zhu Yijun, and Zhang

⁴⁹⁴ "Political Work of the National Revolutionary Army", Document 37, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 662-663.

⁴⁹⁵ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 1 January, 1926, p. 502. This was just after the formal inauguration of the Society and the issuance of its Manifesto.

⁴⁹⁶ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 2 February 1926, p. 535.

⁴⁹⁷ "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army", p. 663.

Zhixiang. And the Society had Pan Yujiang, Ke Wuchi, Yang Yaotang, and Miao Bin for representatives. Li Zhilong was soon to be appointed head of the Political Department of the Southern Navy and become a principal character in the *Zhongshan* Gunboat Incident of 20 March. Miao Bin had recently been elected a reserve member of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee. The chairman of the Society among Huangpu graduates, Ho Zhonghan, had left for Moscow to enter the Frunze Military Academy. The solutions for resolving the intra-party conflict that emerged were: (1) the officers (*Ganbu*) of each society should be allowed to join the other; (2) within the academy and the First Corps, the two organisations should accept the direction of the commandant and Party representative-i.e. Chiang and Wang; (3) military officers of the rank of regimental commander and above, except for Party representatives, were prohibited from joining the two societies; (4) if members of the societies had occasion to mistrust each other, they could appeal to the commandant and academy party representative for a solution.⁴⁹⁸

Chiang subsequently organised the Huangpu Alumni Association for the graduates. Chiang attended the inaugural meeting and gave three speeches on 27 June. Two days later he visited the association and commended it for its organisational plans.⁴⁹⁹

The Zhongshan Gunboat Incident

The ideological conflict among the students of the Central Military Political Academy and in the units of I Corps was not National Government's only problem. The rapid pace of military reform in Guangzhou had also created friction between commanders and the party leaders on the one hand, and between commanders and Russian advisers on the other. The Guangzhou government's leadership crisis was clearly demonstrated on 20 March 1926 in the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident.

⁴⁹⁸ See *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, 2 February 1926, p. 535; Li Yunhan. "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong", p. 90.

⁴⁹⁹ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 27, 29 June 1926, 592-594. The association was to have a president, a secretary, twelve standing committee members, and three branches dealing with general affairs, organisation, and propaganda.

According to Chiang Kaishek⁵⁰⁰, the acting chief of the Naval Bureau, Li Zhilong, ordered the gunboats S.S. *Zhongshan* and *Baobi* to Huangpu on the evening of 18 March.⁵⁰¹ Li Zhilong was a Naval Academy graduate at Yantai (Chefoo), Shandong and also a graduate of the First Class Huangpu Military Academy. He was also a member of the Communist Party. The vessels stood off the Central Military Political Academy all night with steam up at ready and fully armed. Chiang Kaishek who was in Guangzhou, was very surprised when he heard of this, since he had not ordered the vessels to Huangpu. Between 9 and 10 the following morning, a person whom Chiang declined to name phoned to ask when Chiang was leaving for Huangpu. When the person rang a third time, Chiang became suspicious and replied that he had not decided whether to return to Huangpu. Within an hour, Li Zhilong phoned to ask whether he might return the *Zhongshan* to Guangzhou to be ready for an inspection by the visiting team (the Bubnov Commission). Chiang refused to order the return of the vessel since he did not order its move to Huangpu in the first place.. He then demanded to know who had ordered the move, and Li was reported to have replied that it was a telephone order from Deng Yenda, which he understood to have come from Chiang Kaishek. The *Zhongshan* returned to Guangzhou on 19 March evening, after dark, but again with steam up and arms at the ready. Under these circumstances, according to Chiang, he became even more suspicious. And at dawn he sent the Naval Academy's deputy commandant, Ouyang Ge, with troops to board the vessel, put it under guard and arrest Li Zhilong. In addition, Chiang put Guangzhou under martial law.⁵⁰² Liu Zhi, a recently appointed commander of the 2nd Division of the I Corps and the main garrison force for Guangzhou, had all Communist Party representatives and political workers in the division arrested.⁵⁰³ Chinese guards at the Russian advisers' residence and at the

⁵⁰⁰ Much of the information available on the *Zhongshan* Gunboat Incident comes from three public accounts by Chiang Kaishek on 22 and 23 March and on 20 April. *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 548-550, 570-577.

⁵⁰¹ Hsu Kai-yu, *Chou En-lai: China's Gray Eminence*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1968, p. 242, n. 25. According to the author, Li was the head of the Naval Bureau's Political Department, but in the absence of Smirnov, who held the position of chief of the bureau, Wang Jingwei had appointed Li as acting chief.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.* According to Hsu Kai-yu, Ouyang Ge was a brother of Ouyang Lin, the navy's chief of staff, who had been involved in illegal dealings and had fled to Hong Kong. Ouyang Ge is said to have "framed" Li Zhilong in the incident. The Nationalist Government's public announcement blamed Ouyang Lin, the deputy chief of the Naval Bureau, for leaving his duty so that the naval squadron was without leadership and *Zhongshan* acted illegally. The government had arrested and published those responsible. See Zhi Zhong (pseud.). "An Investigation of the Guangzhou Incident [20 March 1926]". In *Xiangdao zhoubao*, p. 1379, 3 April 1926, 148: 1379-1381.

⁵⁰³ Liu Zhi. *Wo di huiyi (My recollections)*. Taipei: Guanglong, 1966, 36-37. Liu Zhi makes a point of his cooperation with Ouyang Ge, who was from his native county, Ji'an (Chian xian), Jiangxi.

Hong Kong-Guangzhou Strike Committee's headquarters were disarmed, and many Communists were arrested.

There are many interpretations of the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident.⁵⁰⁴ In general, two divergent lines of interpretation can be discerned. The first is that it was a Russian and Chinese Communist plot to kidnap Chiang Kaishek abroad the *Zhongshan* and force him to go to Vladivostok. They would then overthrow the government replaced it with workers' government. Wang Jingwei may have been privy to the plot. Chiang Kaishek is pictured in this line of explanation to have discovered a plot against him and taken action on 20 March to smash it. Chiang himself consistently advanced this interpretation. For example, about six months after the event, he reportedly told Chen Gongbo that Wang Jingwei had plotted to have Chiang inspect a visiting Russian vessel where he would be kidnapped and taken to Vladivostok and Moscow.⁵⁰⁵ Chen Jieru, a legal consort of Chiang Kaishek and his constant companion from 1920 to 1927, also confirms that it was Wang Jingwei who planned to plot against Chiang.⁵⁰⁶

Proponents of the opposite line say that the Guomindang rightists, particularly leaders of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism, planned a coup against the

⁵⁰⁴ For the Guomindang's interpretation, see Chen Gongbo, *Ku xiao lu*, vol. 1; Li Yunhan, *Cong ronggong dao qingdang*, 483-491; and the most recent study is by Jiang Yongjing, "San yue er shi ri shi jian zhi yanjiu (Research on the 20th March incident)," *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji* (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 115-154; Wu Tienwei explores various interpretations and concludes that here probably was a conspiracy involving some Chinese Communists and Russian advisers inspired by "Kisan'ka" and Wang Jingwei, see "Chiang Kai-shek's March Twentieth Coup d'Etat of 1926," *China in the 1920s: Nationalism and Revolution*, Editors Gilbert F. and Etzold, Thomas H. Chan. New Viewpoints, 1976, p. 612; see also Hsu Kai-yu, *Chou En-lai: China's Gray Eminence*, 56-57, 243-245, for a sophisticated interpretation.

⁵⁰⁵ Chen Gongbo, *Ku xiao lu*, 1: 72.

⁵⁰⁶ Chen Chih ju (Jieru), *Chiang Kai-shek's Secret Past*. Edited and introduced by Llyold Eastman, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, chapter 18, 176-185. This autobiography is written by Chiang's legal consort and companion from 1920-1927 Chen Jieru. Chen bore Chiang a daughter. After their separation, Chen lived in retirement in US, Shanghai and Hong Kong where she wrote her account of the life with Chiang. She died in 1971. This work was suppressed by the Guomindang, but apparently a copy came into the hands of her grandson Chen Zhongren. He quoted parts of it in an article that has a section on Zhongshan Gunboat Incident. Chen essential point was that Wang Jingwei planned to have Li Zhilong kill Chiang. And learning that Chiang was going to Huangpu, faked an order in Deng Yanda's name for Zhongshan to proceed there. Wang then asked his wife Chen Bijun to telephone Chen Jieru to learn when Chiang planned to depart on the gunboat, on the pretext that Wang was to accompany him. She telephoned five times arousing Chen's suspicious. She reported these strange calls to Chiang, who realised seriousness of the situation, investigated, and then took the action he did on 20 March to seize the gunboat and Lui Zhilong. He also put Wang under house arrest, but declined to reveal that suspicious caller was Wang Jingwei's wife. Thus, Jieru's account elaborates on Chiang's contention that Wang plotted against him.

Communists and the Russians. Chiang Kaishek, was either part of the plot or tricked into believing that the Communists intended to oust him, and hence would play into the hands of the Society. This is the line, with variations, taken by three Russian advisers--Cherepanov, Konchits, and Vishnyakova-Akimova--and by Yuriev, who studied many contemporary newspaper accounts.⁵⁰⁷ The interpretation that the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism plotted a coup was hinted at by Zhi Zhong in the official Communist publication, *Xiangdao zhoubao*, as early as 3 April 1926.⁵⁰⁸ A year later, Zhou Enlai commented on a statement by Peng Shuzhi, which named four members of the Society who allegedly forged an order by Chiang that tricked Li Zhilong, and who also allegedly told Chiang of a plot to deport him to Russia. Zhou stated that the correct list of names of the principal plotters was Wang Boling (commander of the 1st Division, I Corps), Ouyang Ge, Chen Zhaoying, and Hui Dongshen, but it should not include Miao Bin. Communist historians have consistently blamed Chiang, and usually point to Rightist plotting.⁵⁰⁹

What actually happened is still unknown for now as impartial archival evidence is unavailable. It is possible that each side had planned action against the other. The chief of the Russian adviser Kuibyshev was certainly hostile to Chiang Kaishek. He saw Chiang as an obstacle to his plan for "rigid centralisation" of the National Revolutionary Army and its subordination to the central military organ. Wang Jingwei who apparently was close to Kuibyshev and may have indicated to Chiang that he should take a trip to Russia. Apparently, there were signs of an anti-Chiang movement in Guangzhou before 20 March according to Chiang's own account.⁵¹⁰

It is not the intention of this chapter to untangle and analyse the various factors that underlie the incident. What is interesting about this incident is that it shows the tremendous tension excited by the National Revolutionary Army's process military reform. This is evidenced in the post-incident settlement of the main parties involved.

⁵⁰⁷ Cherepanov, *Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya (Zapiski Voenogo Sovetnika) 1926-1927*, 201-202; Konchits, N.I. "In the Rank of the Revolutionary Army of China," contains of diary entry for 5 April recording what Cheng Qian told him; Vishniakova-Akimova, *Dva Goda v Vosstavsheme kitae, 1925-1927*, 310-314.

⁵⁰⁸ *Huangpu junxiao shiliao*, 361-367. This is a reprint of the *Xiangdao zhoubao*, 3 April 1926, 148: 1381.

⁵⁰⁹ *Huangpu junxiao shiliao*, 353-354, the reprint of *Xiangdao zhoukan*, nos. 192 (March 1927), 193 (6 April 1927); Bao Huizeng, *Bao Huizeng huiyilu*, 194-217.

⁵¹⁰ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 548-550.

Immediately after the incident there seems to have been a continuous round of discussions between Chiang Kaishek and other leading figures in Guangzhou. Wang Jingwei, who was ill then, was said to be furious at Chiang's unilateral action. Political Council held a meeting on 22 March but no public statement was announced. Wang reportedly went into a hospital the next day, and then "disappeared".⁵¹¹

According to Zhang Guotao (Chang Kuo-t'ao), who arrived in Guangzhou about ten days after the incident to make a personal investigation, members of the Wang Jingwei clique demanded Chiang Kaishek be suppressed. All the National Revolutionary Army officers except the I Corps were dissatisfied with Chiang because he favoured the I Corps at the expense of the others. However, Wang's withdrawal left them leaderless.⁵¹²

Chen Gongbo remembers the Political Council meeting on 22 March which was held at Wang Jingwei's bedside. He mentions three key points of discussion. One concerned methods to restrict Communist Party activities; another was the decision to ask the Russians to recall "Kisan'ka." Chen had heard that, Chiang Kaishek had constant disagreements with the Russian; and the third was concerned with settling the Hong Kong-Guangzhou Strike.⁵¹³

During Wang Jingwei's seclusion, Tan Yankai acted as chairman of the National Government and became an intermediary between various factions to stabilise the situation, according to Zhang Guotao, Zhang describes Tan as very close to Chiang then.⁵¹⁴ Zhang Renjie (Jingjiang) arrived in Guangzhou on 23 March and became Chiang's adviser in settling matters. Chiang formally petitioned the Military Council to punish himself for his necessary action on 20 March. He wrote on 26 March to Wang Jingwei, chairman of the Military Council, asking for leave. But Wang had already indicated his own intention to resign. Chiang also wrote individually to Tan Yankai,

⁵¹¹ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, 22 March 1926, 548-550.

⁵¹² Chang Kuo t'ao. *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927*, 1: 498-499.

⁵¹³ Chen Gongbo, *Ku xiao lu*, 1: 63. According to the author, Eugene Chen, T.V. Soong, and he were appointed as a committee to negotiate with the Hong Kong Government. But as Eugene Chen had not yet returned to Guangzhou C.C. Wu then became the third member appointed. Chen Gongbo also recalls that the next day Wang Jingwei refused to receive visitors, and a few days later he learned that Wang was no longer at his residence. Wang disappeared.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Zhu Peide, Li Jishen, and other generals, as well as to T.V. Soong, minister of finance, to tell them that he was retiring. He also urge the return of Wang. Chiang then went off to Humen, to fortifications thirty miles south of Guangzhou. According to Chiang, T.V. Soong followed him there and pleaded with him, on behalf of all the comrades, not to depart. Chiang consented.⁵¹⁵ However, he absented himself until 1 April, using his time to inspect the 20th Division, located in the Dongwan region. He also prepare policy documents to present to the leadership.

Chiang's attitude toward the Chinese Communists appeared to be equivocal. While he implied that they had instigated the *Zhongshan* Incident to overthrow him, he did not publicly accuse them of conspiracy. Most Communists were released after the incident. In his speech to the Central Military Political Academy's cadets on 22 March, Chiang declared that it was not yet clear who was guilty of the suspicious behaviour of the *Zhongshan*. He added that even if Li Zhilong were guilty, it was an individual matter and not one that involved the entire organisation (the Communist Party).⁵¹⁶

On 3 April, Chiang introduced a proposal to the Guomindang's Central Executive Committee to readjust the army, stabilise the Party, and set a date for the Northern Expedition. On the matter of Guomindang-Communist relations, he proposed that: (1) A plenum of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee be convened to regulate discipline and investigate certain elements in the Party and army. (2) Communists must not criticise Sun Yatsen's character and should be devoted to the Three Principles of the People in their work. They should also abolish all secret organisations and activities within the Guomindang, notify Guomindang authorities about all policies and instructions of the Communist Party, and register all Communist members of the Guomindang with the proper Guomindang authorities. Furthermore, they must not occupy more than a third of the membership of the Central Executive Committee. (3) A joint Guomindang-Communist Party conference be called to settle all difficulties.

In the proposal, Chiang suggested that the Russians serves strictly as advisers and should not hold any administrative posts. They should not exceed the limits of their position without obtaining permission from their respective superior officers--that

⁵¹⁵ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 23-26 March 1926, 550-551.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 22 March 1926, 548-550.

is, Chinese officers. However, he reaffirmed the policy of cooperation with the Russians as well as the Chinese Communists.⁵¹⁷

At the same time Chiang issued a public telegram accusing the Western Hills faction for ignoring his warnings about holding their own Second National Congress of the Guomindang in Shanghai.⁵¹⁸ Chiang claimed that he was distressed at the thought of the Right Wing's alliance with imperialists aiming to destroy the Guomindang and the government. He continued to denounce the Right Wing in no uncertain terms in subsequent speeches.

On the specific issue of Communists who were also Guomindang representatives in the army, Chiang's attitude was hazy. He proposed the temporary withdrawal of all Party representatives for further training on the grounds that conflict between Communists and non-Communists in the First Corps had assumed dangerous proportions. He also said that Communist and anarchist elements should be withdrawn because the National Revolutionary Army was founded on the Three Principles of the People. Yet, he declared that the system of Party representatives should not be abolished.

While, Chiang appeared to be conciliatory toward the Russians as a group but insisted he Kuibyshev ("Kisan'ka"), the head of the military adviser, Rogachev, and Razgon ("Olgin") be sent away. Chiang recalls that he met a Russian adviser and Bubnov ("Ivanovsky"), the head of a Russian Commission visiting Guangzhou, on the evening of 20 March Bubnov complained about Chinese troops surrounding Russian quarters and the disarming of their guards. Chiang apologised and assured the Russians that the troops would be withdrawn shortly and the guards restored.⁵¹⁹ On the morning of 22 March, a representative of the Soviet Embassy, Solovyev, confirmed with Chiang that the problem concerned particular individuals and not the Soviet Union itself. The representative then told Chiang that Kuibyshev and Rogachev would be sent back to the Soviet Union.⁵²⁰ Solovyev, then attended Guomindang Political Council meeting concerned to settle the incident. The first of their three resolutions affirmed

⁵¹⁷ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 3 April 1926, 3 April 1926, 553-558.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 554.

⁵¹⁹ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 20 March 1926, p. 547.

⁵²⁰ *Ibid.*, 22 March 1926, p. 548.

cooperation with the Russians but was also firm about Guomintang autonomy "...our Party should continue cooperation with the Soviet Russian comrades and increase our intimate relations. Russian comrades with differing opinions concerning work should leave Guangzhou immediately, but the rest should be invited to stay as advisers." The other resolutions granted Wang Jingwei a leave because of his illness and were concerned with the investigation and the trial of chief suspect, Li Zhilong.⁵²¹

Chiang was highly conciliatory in public about the friendship with the Russians. In an interview with the *Guangzhou minguo ribao*, a Guomintang organ, he expressed profound regret that the Russians had been inconvenienced on 20 March due to subordinates misunderstanding of his orders. Chiang denounced reports of his hostility toward the Russians and Communists as fabrications of the "running dogs of imperialists," who wished to overthrow the government. He emphasised that there was definitely no change in the policy of alliance with Soviet Russia.⁵²²

The Russians moved rapidly to carry out their side of Solovyev's agreement with Chiang. On the evening of 24 March, Kuibyshev, Rogachev, and Razgon sailed from Guangzhou on the Soviet vessel *Lenin's Memory*, together with members of the Bubnov Commission.⁵²³ Bubnov had a farewell discussion with Chiang, during which they exchanged their conflicting opinions concerning the strategy of the Chinese revolution.⁵²⁴

Before departing, Bubnov held a meeting of the Russian advisers in Guangzhou on 24 March at which he analysed the social roots of the incident, gave a critique of the performance of the Russian mission and the work of the Chinese Communists, and recommended new procedures.⁵²⁵ He assessed the 20 March event as a "small semi-uprising, directed against the Russian advisers and Chinese commissars." In his

⁵²¹ Li Yunhan, *Cong ronggong dao qingdang*, p. 492, is based on the minutes of an extended Political Council meeting.

⁵²² *Guangzhou minguo ribao*, 27 March 1926, reprint in *Huangpu junxiao shiliao*, p. 368.

⁵²³ Vishniakova-Akimova, *Dva Goda v Vosstavsheme kitae, 1925-1927*, 212-213.

⁵²⁴ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 24 March 1926, 550-551. Chiang argues, among others, that the foremost task of the party is to prepare for the launching of the Northern Expedition. To achieve this task the unity of the party and the army are the prerequisites.

⁵²⁵ Cherepanov, *Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya*, 82-86; *As Military Advisers*, 211-213.

opinion, it reflected the conflict between centralised state power and militarism; between the petty urban bourgeoisie and the proletariat; and finally between the Left and Right wings of the Guomindang. He equated the Right Wing members with the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism. Bubnov pointed out the major mistakes in military work and in general political leadership which had directly provoked the incident. There was an overestimation of the strength and unity of the Guangzhou leadership and failure to foresee the conflict within the national government and army.⁵²⁶

Bubnov then cautioned the approximately 58 Russian workers to be more sensitive to the Chinese military's nationalism and not provoke their displeasure by pressuring them. Nor should they step out of their roles as advisers and take direct command of Chinese troops doing so, he predicted, would lead to a series of disastrous consequences. It would frighten away the rich bourgeoisie, cause the middle-class bourgeoisie to vacillate, revitalise the Chinese militarism practices, strengthen and inflame the contradictions between the Guomindang's Right and Left Wings. This would raise a wave of anti-Communist sentiment, and create a crisis in the National Government. Bubnov tied all their subsequent work to the northern campaign, but he cautioned against its being regarded as a purely military venture. "To launch the Northern Expedition without precise and definite slogans and to contemplate...[it] without touching the peasant masses-this means to commit a complete mistake," Bubnov said.

In the political field, Bubnov urged the advisers to work with the Left Wing of the Guomindang, which he regarded as still weak, disunited, and out of touch with the masses. Such work should be aimed at directly strengthening the Guomindang itself. "I admit that this work...will demand flexibility, very calm, and very restrained tactics from the Chinese Communist Party," he said. Though praising some aspects of the Communist Party's recent development, he criticised the Chinese comrades for insufficient connection with the proletariat, for sectarian tendencies, and for excessive attention to military work.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.* p. 86. Cherepanov has an addition statement which says that another shortcoming is not "exposing and liquidating those tremendous extremes in military work which were clearly revealed during the course of March events". This sentence is not translated in the official English version of Cherepanov's memoirs.

Before leaving, Bubnov also gave an interview to the Communist journal, *Xiangdao zhoubao*. In it, he emphasised that, although Li Zhilong and some fifty others had been arrested, none had been killed; that Chiang said he was neither anti-Russian nor anti-Communist; and that he seemed to understand that the Communists did not plot to overthrow the government or him. The storm, therefore, already had been calmed and only the disruptive incitement of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism had not been stopped. He warned against this danger to the Chinese revolution.⁵²⁷

Bubnov put his finger on several specific points which also appeared in a report on the 20 March Incident⁵²⁸. General V.A. Stepanov, who succeeded Kuibyshev, reported Russian adviser's meeting on the incident about two weeks later, reiterating the points made by Bubnov. He commented the Russian's major "errors" was that they had pushed for the centralisation of the army too quickly without taking adequate account of the psychology and habits of the Chinese generals. The party representative (commissars) and the Russian advisers had controlled the generals too tightly. As Bubnov put it, "five dog-collars were put upon the Chinese generals". The "five collars" he referred to were the General Staff, Supply Department, the Political Department (P.U.R.), Party representative, and advisers.

In short, it appears that within a few days of the incident the Russians on the scene had set to work to appease with Chiang Kaishek. They criticised their own errors and cautioned themselves to be sensitive to the Chinese nationalism. Most significantly, the Russians started to realise their inferior positions in the Guomindang government. Their influence in the party had been seriously weakened as the result of the departure of Liao Zhongkai and Wang Jingwei. The Chinese Communist Party was too weak a force to contend for power. The most powerful force in Guangzhou was the military led by Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu's I Corps which they had been trying to strengthen in the past two years. The Russians had to work with them if they wanted to continue their presence in Guangzhou.

⁵²⁷ Zhi Zhong, "An investigation of the Guangzhou incident", which includes: "An interview with Ivanovsky and others", *Xiangdao zhoukan*, 148: 3 April 1926.

⁵²⁸ "Stepanov's Report on the March Twentieth Incident", Document 50, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 703-707. General Stepanov had served in Guangzhou since October 1924. He was an adviser to Chiang Kaishek in the two eastern expeditions and the campaign against Yang Xiwen and Liu Zhenhuan in 1925. He succeeded Kuibyshev as head of the Soviet Military Group in Guangzhou on 24 March and held the post until Bliukher arrived in May 1926.

In conclusion, the experience of the late 1925 and early 1926 reform and the reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army had both positive and negative effects. The most positive development was the centralisation of the army under one, albeit loose, command. This was achieved through financial control and centralised training for the cadres of all the National Revolutionary Army. However, the result of the structural reform in these units was mixed. The I and the IV corps accepted the change more readily but others were not. These reformed units, however, had invited political rivalries from within the army units and among political parties. They needed time to work out many teething problems, but time was not on the Guomindang's side. The active involvement of the party leadership, the Russian advisers, and the Chinese Communist Party activists in the reorganised National Revolutionary Army soon ran into conflict between the party and the military on the one hand, and within the various army units on the other. The appeal for greater restraint by all parties was the only solution that could help to save the revolutionary government from breaking up. What had emerged after this internal crisis was the recognition of the position of the Chinese officer corps. They held the balance between the various competing groups in the United Front. They were also the arbiters of conflict among the power groups.

[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to the quality of the scan. It appears to be a continuation of the author's analysis, possibly discussing the role of the officer corps and the internal dynamics of the United Front.]

⁷⁰ See, for example, *Journal of Modern Chinese Studies*, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020.

Chapter 6: The National Revolutionary Army Prior to the Northern Expedition

In June 1926, less than six months after Guangdong's unification, the Guomindang decided to launch the Northern Expedition. However, the National Revolutionary Army was still in the midst of change and suffered from the regional army's many weaknesses. The National Revolutionary Army had now expanded to eight corps. This included: the original five corps which were formally established on 26 August 1925; the newly formed VI Corps commanded by Cheng Qian in January 1926; the combined Guangxi forces into VII Corps in late March; and just prior to the expedition in July 1926, the Hunan troops led by Tang Shengzhi which became the VIII Corps. When the Northern Expedition began, only the first six corps were actually preserved in Guangdong. The VII Corps was still in its native Guangxi, and the VIII Corps was in Hunan.

This chapter aims to look at the nature of the National Revolutionary Army by examining the formation, the leadership, readiness and fighting experiences of the troops in each of the units of the National Revolutionary Army. Traditionally, scholars have debated on two key but closely related questions regarding the National Revolutionary Army. The first was whether the National Revolutionary Army was a unified army before the Northern Expedition; the second was the impact of massive defections of troops to the National Revolutionary Army. F. F. Liu claims that Guangzhou was "forging a unified force out of the disparate elements of the various provincial units then existing in South China". He also claims these forces were "standardised and indoctrinated".⁵³² Donald Jordan also stresses the unity of the base on the eve of the expedition and credits that unity to the success of the campaign.⁵³³ To these scholars, a unified National Revolutionary Army would seem to answer the question of why such a small force could take on and defeat the much larger forces of Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang forces. But they felt that the massive defections of the warlord armies had created disunity in the National Revolutionary Army. Donald Jordan argues that the National Revolutionary Army's decision to accept warlord defections and the National Revolutionary Army's inability to control their behaviour created significant problems both for itself and the Nationalist Government at

⁵³² Liu, F. F. *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949*. New York: Kennikat Press, 1956, p. 16.

⁵³³ Donald A. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928*. Honolulu, USA: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, 288-9.

Nanjing⁵³⁴ later on. James E. Sheridan was also struck by the defectors' importance, noting that the original National Revolutionary Army was diluted by large number of militarists enrolled directly into the National Revolutionary Army. Sheridan argues that mass organisations made civilian control of the military possible during the early stages of the Northern Expedition. But their destruction meant that power passed to the military "just when the military, as a result of the absorption of the warlords, was becoming less committed to the goals and principles of the Guomintang".⁵³⁵ Sheridan echoes the theme in a later work: "The number of warlord units in the National Revolutionary Army ultimately far outnumbered the original components of the army. These militarists had various political ideals, goals, and attitudes...The absorption of so many diverse interests into the Kuomintang...inevitably weakened Kuomintang unity and perhaps adulterated Kuomintang nationalism."⁵³⁶

This chapter will argue that the National Revolutionary Army was already a very complicated and diverse forces prior to the outset of the expedition. With exception of the I, VI and VII Corps, the National Revolutionary Army before the Northern Expedition was not well-unified but a very diverse force that closely resembled the other warlord forces of the same period. Thus, the lack of unity before the start of the expedition suggests that one does not have to look for reasons why the armies split during the campaign. During the Northern Expedition, only three of the original eight units would do any serious fighting. Only the I Corps was really responsive to Chiang Kaishek's orders although the other two would cooperate with the I Corps during certain battles. In addition, this chapter will raise another question which has been ignored by scholars. That is, in view of the inherent divisions within the Guomintang and Chinese Communist Party, and among units of the National Revolutionary Army, how did this delicate alliance hold together till at least mid-1927?

The National Revolutionary Army

When Chiang Kaishek issued mobilisation orders on 1 July 1926, the National Revolutionary Army's strength may have been between 100,000 and 150,000 men,

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, 276-295.

⁵³⁵ James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang*. USA: Stanford University Press, 1966, p. 240.

⁵³⁶ James E. Sheridan, *China in Disintegration*, New York: The Free Press, 1975, p. 179.

organised in eight corps and six regiments.⁵³⁷ Cadets of the Central Military Political Academy at Huangpu formed several regiments. However, since almost all the units had to guard their base areas, the actual force available for the Northern Expedition was probably less than 65,000 in the beginning.

The size of each of the National Revolutionary Army corps varied widely. While the V Corps under Li Fulin had only two divisions organised into eight regiments and one battalion, the I Corps commanded by He Yingqin comprised five divisions, with a total strength of nineteen regiments (see table 16).⁵³⁸ Its opponents, the three militarist groupings in central and northern China outnumbered the National Revolutionary Army by at least two times in troop strength. Official Guomintang sources estimate Wu Peifu's and Sun Chuanfang's strength at more than 300,000 each; Zhang Zuolin's at more than 350,000.⁵³⁹ Cherepanov, Russian adviser to the I Corps of the National Revolutionary Army, gives a similar estimate for Wu's forces and far lower estimates for those of Sun and Zhang.⁵⁴⁰

In preparation for the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kaishek organised a General Commander-in-Chief Headquarters which would be the supreme command organ during wartime. However, the commander-in-chief's authority was limited as the National Revolutionary Army was essentially a decentralised force with individual commanders exercising command through personal relationships with the subordinates. Directly responsive to Chiang's order were the I and the IV Corps.

The I Corps

⁵³⁷ The estimates on the strength of the National Revolutionary Army varies, Hollington K. Tong and Cherepanov gives the figure of around 100,000; see Hollington K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek: Soldier and Statesmen*. Shanghai: 1937, p. 63; Cherepanov in *Severnyi*, pp. 110, 107, 115, gives a similar number. But *Beifa zhanshi* (The war history of the northern expedition), 2: 321, states the National Revolutionary Army strength had less than 150,000.

⁵³⁸ *Geming wenxian* (Documents on the revolution), 12: 1802-1805. It states that the Second Corps under the command of Tan Yankai had three divisions in twelve regiments; the Third Corps under Zhu Peide had three divisions in eight regiments and two battalions; the Fourth Corps under Li Jishen had four divisions in thirteen regiments; the Sixth Corps under Cheng Qian had three divisions in nine regiments and two battalions; the Seventh Corps under Li Zongren had nine brigades totalling eighteen regiments and two battalions; the Eighth Corps under Tang Shengzhi had four divisions and two regiments totalling seventeen regiments; in addition, there were two divisions of undetermined strength that had recently been incorporated.

⁵³⁹ See *Geming wenxian* (Documents on the revolution), 12: 1780-1787.

⁵⁴⁰ Wu Peifu's troop strength was about 210,000; Sun Chuanfang's 157,000; and Zhang Zuolin's 190,000. See Cherepanov, *Severnyi Pkhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya*, p. 115.

The I Corps was considered by all--the Guomindang, Chinese Communists and the Russians--as one of the only truly "revolutionary" units.⁵⁴¹ The significance of the I Corps lies in the fact that it was created for the purpose of the Northern Expedition. Unlike the other units that participated in the Northern Expedition, the I Corps was not a redesignated or reorganisation of some other existing unit. I corp was the result of the expansion of the various Training Regiments set up by the instructors and students of the Huangpu Military Academy. Although some of the officers had served in the Guangdong Army, most had come to Guangzhou as individuals, and, not as the commanders of other warlord units. This force was young, highly nationalistic, but without very much practical experience. In addition to being a regionally diverse unit, the I Corps was also well educated of its officers had gone to higher military education institutions such as Baoding Military Academy, the War College, or to military schools in Japan (see table 15). This made the composition of the I corp diverse and freed it of its dependency on officers bound by provincial or school ties. While it lasted, the I Corps had three commanders: Chiang Kaishek, 1925-6, He Yingqin, 1926-7, Liu Zhi, 1927-8. All were military staff of the Huangpu Military Academy since its inception. However, despite its officer corp fervour, I Corps was the least experienced of all the units gathered in Guangdong had only been in existence less than two years. Few of its senior officers had ever held positions as combat commanders before to 1925. Instead they had served as instructors or staff officers. Its junior officers had graduated from Huangpu in November 1924 or September 1925, only nine months prior to the expedition. Their only combat experience consisted of the two Eastern Expeditions. It was probably for this reason that the I Corps played a minor role in the early stages of the expedition, with many remaining in Guangdong as a rearguard unit. Some divisions would participate in the attack on Wuchang and Nanchang in the later part of 1926, but the entire corps did not engage with any major opponents until mid-1927, after the split with the Chinese Communist Party.

Although it lacked experience, the I Corps was distinguished by its fighting style. As discussed in the previous chapter, the highly motivated officers, guided by

⁵⁴¹ For sources about the National Revolutionary Army, see *Geming wenxian* (Documents on revolution), 12: 1798-1805; *Huangpu junxiao shigao* (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 6: 213-215; *Guomin gemingjun fazhan xulie* (a brief development of the National Revolutionary Army), Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987, 9-14; for Russian sources see, "The National Revolutionary Army: Short History of its Origin, Development, and Organisation (to March 1926), Document 3; "Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang (Guomindang), Early 1926 (March 1926), Document 26, in *Missionaries of Revolution*.

the "win or die", *lianzuofa*, philosophy, combined with strong political work within its units and among the general public brought a new style of warfare in China. Although their tactics might sometimes be faulty, their zeal and willingness to fight, and their ability to sustain casualties without breaking made them all but invincible against warlord armies.

The I Corps was also the darling of the Russians for these same reasons. The Russian advisers describe it as the largest, the best trained and equipped, and the most thoroughly indoctrinated.⁵⁴² They said that this corps was "a loyal bulwark of the Revolutionary Government" and would be the "shock troops" of an anti-North expedition. The Russians also identified features a peculiar to the I Corps-- its extensive political work among the population while campaigning and its steadfast refusal to loot. The Russian predicted that as word of this unusual behaviour spread among the populace, the Huangpu troops would be welcomed, as they had been during the expeditions against Chen Jiongming. Chiang Kaishek had been commander of the corps until January 1926. According to a Russian's report, Chiang was regarded as one of the most loyal followers of Sun Yatsen and one of the best revolutionaries. It describes that from his speeches, Chiang might be regarded as a Communist, "but looking more deeply at his convictions, one sees that he belongs to typical "intelligentsia" of the radical kind, after the pattern of the French Jacobins." By character, the writer asserts, Chiang was irresolute but stubborn, and because of his character he could not have obtained much success as a leader of troops in battle without the aid of the Russian instructors. Chiang's rapid advancement "with our aid" began after the opening of the Huangpu Academy. "He is so connected with us that the possibility of a rupture on his part can hardly be admitted".⁵⁴³ This prediction, which reveals some anxiety, was written about two weeks before the 20 March Zhongshan Gunboat Incident.

The II Corps

Unlike the I Corps which was newly created, the II Corps had already had a long and eventful history prior to the Northern Expedition.⁵⁴⁴ Its commander Tan

⁵⁴² "Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang (Guomindang), Early 1926 (March 1926), Document 26, *op. cit.*, 599-601.

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 609.

⁵⁴⁴ For a history of the II Corps, see "Guomin gemingjun di er jun lueshi" (A brief history of the II corps of the national revolutionary army), *Junshi zhengzhi yuekan*, no. 3 (1926): 47.

Yankai was a Hunan native who had been a Qing dynasty *jinshi* and Hanlin compiler. Active in Hunan politics since 1911 Revolution, Tan had been forced out of the province in 1920. He then journeyed to Shanghai and later to Guangzhou in 1923. In Guangzhou, Sun Yatsen named him the commander of the Bandits Suppression Army (*Taozeijun*) and then went to Hunan to rally his subordinate Zhao Hengti who had succeeded Tan as ruler of Hunan.⁵⁴⁵

In 1924, Tan led this force, now designated as the Hunan Reconstruction Army (*Hunan jianguojun*) into Jiangxi in another of Sun Yatsen's ill-fated Northern Expeditions but was quickly forced back. By the time of this defeat, Tan had withdrawn from active command although he continued to hold the title of corps commander until 1928. Due to Tan increased involvement in national politics, actual command devolved to his subordinate Lu Diping. Lu was also a Hunan native and a graduate of the junior officer's training academy (*bingmu xuetao*) under the Qing military education system. He began his career in the New Army and was a follower of Tan since the 1911 Revolution. Lu rose to division commander in the Hunan Army when he withdrew from the province and followed Tan to Guangzhou in 1924. Lu served as acting commander throughout the entire campaign of the Northern Expedition.⁵⁴⁶

The II Corps was originally one of the "guest armies" in Guangzhou. It was a Hunan force that wanted to return home. During his sojourn in Guangdong, Tan maintained a Hunan government-in-exile preparing for the day when he would return to rule his native province.⁵⁴⁷ This unit was probably bound together primarily by provincial ties and was not particularly well-educated (see table 14).

It might be supposed that the II Corps would be the logical vanguard for the attack into Hunan. Using political workers, Guangzhou might have been able to build on the irredentist feeling to create a highly motivated force. Instead, very little political work seems to have done within this unit which jealously guarded its autonomy. It

⁵⁴⁵ *Tan Zu'an xiansheng nianpu* (A chronological biography of Mr Tan Yankai), Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang dangshi weiyuanhui, 1979, p. 57.

⁵⁴⁶ *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, editors Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard, II: 451; *Zhuanji wenxue*, XXXI: 3 (September 1979), p. 179; Hu Naian, "Xinxiang junzhi" (Record of the Hunan new army), *Zhuanji wenxue*, XII: 2 (February, 1928), 7-8.

⁵⁴⁷ Hu Naian, *op.cit.*, 10, 20.

went so as far as to refuse to accept junior officers who had graduated from Huangpu.⁵⁴⁸ In fact, the II Corps did not participate in the Hunan invasion at all but was sent instead into Jiangxi only after the expedition well under way.⁵⁴⁹ This unit was neutral during the Nanjing-Wuhan split, but Lu later led the unit to join Nanjing. The II Corps expanded to add the XIV Corps in 1927. These two units were reduced to divisions, the 18th and 50th in late 1928. Both units were eventually re-made into Central Army divisions.

The III Corps

The III Corps, like the II Corps was also a provincial army, in this case the Yunnan units that fled to Guangdong after being ousted from its native province. Zhu Peide commanded the unit from 1925-1927, and by Wang Jun from 1927-1928. Both commanders were Yunnan natives who had graduated from Cai E's Yunnan Military Academy. This unit may well have been the least revolutionary and most extractive force in the province. It collected its own taxes and levied tariffs as it chose. The III Corps had not participated in earlier campaign nor later did it exhibit any particular military ability.⁵⁵⁰ By 1927, the unit had moved to Jiangxi and its commander tended to rule as his personal territory while trying to avoid becoming entangled in Nanjing-Wuhan split. Under Wang Jun, marginally better general than Zhu, the unit participated in the 1928 Shandong campaign but only as part of the reserve. The units were reorganised as 7th and 12th Divisions at the end of the expedition and later re-made into Central Army divisions.

The IV Corps

⁵⁴⁸ No Huangpu graduate commanded troops in the II Corps. The Russian's report states that due to a shortage of political workers political work had not yet accomplished much in this corps. The Russians, however, regarded Tan Yankai as a revolutionary, "though not of the very radical type." The Revolutionary Government and "our leaders" regarded him as trustworthy and as a loyal partisan. *Ibid.*, p. 609.

⁵⁴⁹ Reason that the II Corps were despatched to Jiangxi rather than Hunan might have to do with the objection of Tang Shengzhi who did not want any Hunanese military leaders involved in the Hunan campaign.

⁵⁵⁰ On Zhu Peide, see *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, editors Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard, II: 453-7; *Zhuanji wenxue*, XXIX: 6 (June, 1976), p. 122; *Zhu Gong Yizhi shilue* (A brief history of Zhu Peide), n.p., n.d., 1-9; on Wang Jun, see *Dangdai Zhongguo mingren zhi*, (Biographies of famous contemporary Chinese), Shanghai: Shijian pinglun chubanshe, 1938, 129-130.

Apart from the I Corps, the IV Corps was the other revolutionary unit in Guangdong on the eve of the Northern Expedition. The IV Corps was basically made up of the 1st Division of the Guangdong Army. Its commander Li Jishen had commanded the 1st Division. During its formation in 1925, the senior officers were almost all natives of Guangdong and graduates of Baoding Military Academy, many came from the Sixth Class. During the Northern Expedition the IV Corps became seriously divided. Much of what Harold Isaacs argues about the Northern Expedition appears to apply to the IV Corps.⁵⁵¹ Although its nationalism was reinforced by provincial, school and class ties, the IV Corps functioned as a unit only up till the time of Nanjing-Wuhan split, when its splintered into five different groups.

Torn between provincialism and nationalism, as well as between social and national revolution, the unit split into groups that warred with Chiang Kaishek for the possession of Nanjing; with the Communists for the possession of Wuhan; and with each other for the control of Guangdong itself. Ye Ting went with the Communists; Zhang Fakui followed Wang Jingwei; Chen Mingshu and Chen Jitang concentrated on fighting one another. Represented here are all the conflicting values held by those who participated in the Northern Expedition.

For what was essentially a reconstituted warlord force, the IV Corps was remarkably well educated. And like the I Corps, it was led by some remarkably talented officers who were willing and able to fight. At the outset, at least, it was probably the best unit of the National Revolutionary Army.⁵⁵²

During the course of the Northern Expedition, the IV Corps had a number of commanders. After the Nanjing-Wuhan split, there were two units had claimed to be the IV Corps. The principal figure was, however, the corps commander Li Jishen. Li was a native of Guangxi, an exceptional non-native commander, who had risen to top in the Guangdong Army. When Huangpu was established in 1924, Li was the deputy commandant and became the head of the Military Training Department although he was not active in these posts. Nonetheless, he did accept large number of Huangpu

⁵⁵¹ Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. The IV Corps had the only Communist unit commander Ye Ting who commanded an Independent Regiment. In fact, it is likely that the IV Corps had the highest concentration of regular Communist officers, other than political party representatives, of any unit, although the I Corps had also a sizeable contingent.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 609.

graduates into his units, the only unit apart from the I Corps to do so. When the expedition began, Li stayed behind with two of the unit's four divisions. Other commanders of the IV Corps include Zhang Fakui, Huang Qixiang, and Miao Peinan. Of the four divisions made up of the IV Corps in 1926, each expanded to a larger size or became a corps.

The V Corps

Of all the military groupings in Guangdong, the V Corps was the most colourful. Made up primarily of Guangdong smugglers and pirates, the unit was commanded by Li Fulin who was an ex-pirate. This force did not participate in the Northern Expedition but remained behind in Guangdong. It appears that it was most probably enrolled in the National Revolutionary Army only to prevent it from allying with any of the Guomindang's enemies outside the province. During the Guangdong civil wars of 1927, this force was taken over by Xu Qingtang, a senior officer of the IV Corps. Li Fulin was a Guangdong native who had no formal military education. He had a long history of association with Sun Yatsen, however, and had participated in one of Sun's earlier attempts at overthrowing the Qing government at Annam. A member of the Tongmenghui since 1907, Li had also participated in most of the early Northern Expeditions. Li was ousted in 1927 and fled to Hong Kong but returned to rally his subordinates after the Japanese invasion.⁵⁵³

The VI Corps

The VI Corps was the first unit to join the National Revolutionary Army since August 1925. According to He Chengjun, the basis of this force was a unit he had commanded in Fujian during an earlier Northern Expedition in 1923-1924, comprising officers from Hubei and troops from Fujian. This unit was renamed the Attack Hubei Army (*Gong-E-jun*) in 1925, when it was commanded by Cheng Qian.⁵⁵⁴ In January 1926, this unit was designated the VI Corps with Cheng still in command. The unit was quite complicated, as it shared neither school nor provincial ties. But it was

⁵⁵³ For Li Fulin, see *Chuanji wenxue*, XXX: 6 (June, 1977), p. 129; "Guomin gemingjun di wu jun shilue" (A brief history of the V corps of the national revolutionary army), *Guangdong wenxian* (Documents on Guangdong), IX: 1 (March 1979), 52-55.

⁵⁵⁴ He Chengjun, *Bashi huiyi* (Recollections at 80), Taipei: privately printed, 1961, p. 39. Donald Jordan claims that the VI Corps was a Hunanese force that had been defeated and taken over during the Second Eastern Expedition. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition*, p. 24. It is possible that the Hunanese force Jordan is talking about was added to the *Gong-E-jun*.

distinguished by having the highest percentage of officers, who were from the Japanese military schools graduates, within its officer corps. Cheng Qian was a Hunan native and Qing dynasty *xiu cai* who had also studied in Japan. Like Tan Yankai, Cheng began his early career in Hunan, but was ousted from the province in one of its internecine wars in 1920. He eventually made his way to Guangzhou where he joined Sun Yatsen. Cheng served in a variety of high-level positions in the Nationalist Government at Guangzhou, including Minister of War.⁵⁵⁵

This unit had a somewhat mixed background and may well have been an amalgam of several different units. It did not do well during the Northern Expedition. Prone to operate without orders, it suffered heavily in the first, abortive attack on Nanchang and was later blamed for instigating the Nanjing Incident.⁵⁵⁶ With the Nanjing-Wuhan split, and VI Corps also split. Cheng led part of the unit, presumably the Hunanese half, back to Wuhan, while the remainder stayed with Nanjing.

The VII Corps

The first six corps of the National Revolutionary Army were units in Guangdong which had been with the Guomindang in early campaigns. The VII and VIII Corps, on the other hand, joined the National Revolutionary Army only just prior to the Northern Expedition. In fact there were never present in Guangdong throughout the Northern Expedition. The inclusion of these two units was based on political as well as military considerations.

While military preparation was underway in Guangdong, political preparation for a northern expedition was also moving ahead. One task was to bring neighbouring Guangxi province into the fold, and another was to find supporters in Hunan province to the north. The elections of Li Zongren and Huang Shaohong as reserve members of the Guomindang Central Supervisory Committee and the National Government Council signified an intra-provincial alliance in the making, since Generals Li and Huang, together with Bai Chongxi, had only recently established their authority over Guangxi.

⁵⁵⁵ *Chuanji wenxue*, XXIX: 5 (May 1976), p. 123; Wu Xiang-xiang, "Cheng Qian wanjie bujie" (Cheng Qian lost his integrity in his later years), *Chuanji wenxue*, XVI: 4 (April 1970), 17-22.

⁵⁵⁶ In the Nanjing Incident, the 19th Division of the VI Corps refused to obey Chiang's order to move north from Nanjing. As a result, Chiang ordered the removal of its commander and the unit's disarmament. *Jiang zongtong milu* (The secret diary of president Chiang), Taipei: Zhongyang ribao, 1975, 1: 112, 121-122, 152.

On 26 January, after the close of the second Guomindang National Congress, a high-level delegation from the National Government, escorted by General Bai, arrived in Wuzhou on the border between the two provinces to confer with the Guangxi leadership about bringing the province into the National Government system. General Bai returned with the delegates to Guangzhou, and on 17 February the Political Council appointed him, together with Wang Jingwei, Deng Yankai, Chiang Kaishek, T.V. Song, and Li Jishen as members of a commission to work out details of political, financial, and military unification of Guangdong and Guangxi.⁵⁵⁷

The lack of unity and standardisation among the original six corps of the National Revolutionary Army was exacerbated in March 1926 when the Central Political Council of the Guomindang passed three resolutions providing for the unification of the Guangdong and Guangxi under the Nationalist Government at Guangzhou.⁵⁵⁸ On 24 March, Guangxi accepted the designation of its two armies as the VII Corps, thus becoming the first and the largest unit to join the National Revolutionary Army outside Guangdong.

Guangxi military leaders comprising Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Huang Shaohong, who had expelled units professing loyalty to Wu Peifu in Guangxi recently, led the VII Corps. So the new leaders of Guangxi had a common enemy as Guangzhou. The Guomindang, weak as it was, could at least recognise the new leadership and confer on it a sort of legitimacy.⁵⁵⁹ Most importantly, in the short run, Guangxi offered them an ally against Hunan, a province still loyal to Wu, and the province where most of their enemies had fled.

The alliance of Guangdong and Guangxi, however, was more apparent than real, the Guangxi leaders jealously guarded their autonomy throughout the Northern Expedition.⁵⁶⁰ The VII Corps was, despite of the poverty of the province, a remarkable force, well commanded and well trained. The officer corps, bolstered by provincial and

⁵⁵⁷ Li Zongren, *Li Zongren huiyilu* (The memoirs of Li Zongren), Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1986, chapters 14 and 19; Guo Tingyi, *Zhonghua minguo shishi rizi* (Historical chronicles of the Republican China), vol. 2, entries for 26 January and 17 February 1926.

⁵⁵⁸ "Resolutions on the Unification of Government, Military and Finance between the Guangdong and Guangxi, 13 March 1926", *Zhonghua minguo dang'an ziliao huibian*, 2: 910-912.

⁵⁵⁹ Diane Lary, *Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937*. London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 58.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 60-62.

school ties, was young and highly nationalistic. Notably, the VII Corps had only a small percentage of officers educated outside the province, and none outside the country.

The VII Corps played a key role in all the crucial battles and campaigns of the Northern Expedition, the only unit to do so. With the IV Corps, it led the way through Hunan in 1926 and fought the battles along the Hunan-Hubei border. With the I Corps, it defended Nanjing against the Sun Chuanfang's counterattack at Longtan in 1927. Later that year, it was responsible for leading the "Western Expedition" against Tang Shengzhi and Wuhan. By early 1928, the VII Corps controlled not only its native Guangxi, but also Hunan and Hubei. During the process, the VII Corps expanded and added more four corps. Thus, by the end of the expedition, the Guangxi leaders still controlled the largest military force within the National Revolutionary Army, larger even than that controlled by Chiang Kaishek. Due largely to this, Guangxi strongly resisted the 1928 disbandment and was the first group to revolt against Nanjing in 1929.

During the period of its existence, the VII Corps was commanded first by Li Zongren and later by his long-time subordinate Xia Wei. Li was a Guangxi native who had graduated from Guangxi Military Primary School before going to Guangxi Rapid Course Academy. Thus, Li had ties to Baoding schoolmates, via the military primary school, and other Rapid Course graduates. Li rose within Lu Rongting's Guangxi Army until its defeat in 1921. Then, he spun off to become an independent local militarist. During 1923-1924, Li established ties with the leaders of the Guangxi Model Battalion. All were Baoding graduates-- Bai Chongxi and Huang Shaohong. The Li-Bai-Huang group, as it came to be called, was a triumvirate of three talented men who worked well together until the early-1930s when Huang opted to go with Nanjing. During the Northern Expedition, Li commanded the VII Corps, Bai acted as Chiang Kaishek's chief of staff and chief strategist, while Huang remained behind to control the base.

During the Nanjing-Wuhan split, Li placed himself firmly on the side of Chiang Kaishek and helped He Yingqin purge his I Corps. Still, Li guarded the autonomy of both his army and his province closely. He refused to accept Huangpu graduates and

was the most successful of the corps commanders in limiting the influence of the political Party representatives sent from Guangzhou.⁵⁶¹

The VIII Corps

While Guangzhou was busy recognising and re-designating its military units, civil war had broke out in neighbouring Hunan. On 1 June 1926, Tang Shengzhi, a local warlord who commanded the 4th Hunan Division, enrolled in the National Revolutionary Army as commander of the VIII Corps, after being defeated in the Hunan civil war. He was the first warlord to join the National Revolutionary Army. Of all the units that joined the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition, this unit was usually treated by as the most important, supposedly because it made the National Revolutionary Army's invasion of Hunan possible. And it is usually supposed that Tang's decision was forced upon him by the mass movements that were shaking the province at the time.

In fact, Tang's manoeuvre had little to do with mass movements but a great deal to do with the inner working of the Hunan political scene. Donald Jordan who had conducted a thorough review of mass movements, concluded that Tang's decision was a typical warlord-like manoeuvre in a warlord war.⁵⁶² Following his defeat, Tang went hat in hand, to Guangzhou looking for help that many there were loathe to provide. Thus, the notion of the National Revolutionary Army poised on the Hunan border and prepared to fight its way into the province, but fortunately assisted by Tang's timely defection, is probably not correct. It is more likely that the National Revolutionary Army eased into the Northern Expedition, by taking advantage of Tang's problems to go North via Hunan rather than using the traditional invasion routes through Jiangxi or Fujian.

It was clear in 1925 that Tang, then the commander of the 4th Division, was ready to seize all of Hunan. His division was the largest of the four indigenous units that had been organised in the province since the ouster of Tan Yankai, now the commander of the II Corps, in 1923. The governor of the province was Zhao Hengti, a

⁵⁶¹ This is according to Li, who also notes that the 150 graduates of the Four Class who were sent to his units as probationary officers were haughty undisciplined and would not obey orders. *Li Zongren huiyilu* (The memoirs of Li Zongren), p. 193.

⁵⁶² Donald A. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928*. Honolulu, USA: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, 70-74.

provincial warlord, who had organised the effort to expel Tan, but Zhao only ruled the province through the concurrence of the four division commanders, only one of whom was actually Zhao's subordinate. The other three were local warlords. Zhao in turn, was nominally subordinated to the overlord Wu Peifu, who had little real power in the province.

If Tang's plan had succeeded, the Northern Expedition would in fact have had to fight its way into Hunan, or at least take the more traditional route north. Thus, Guangxi leaders, whose province also bordered Hunan, but not Jiangxi or Fujian, bombarded Guangzhou with a stream of messages urging the Guomindang to take advantage of the situation.⁵⁶³ It was fortunate that they had been in touch with Tang since 1925. This Guangxi pressure increased after Tang visited Wuzhou secretly in January 1926, to discuss the upcoming campaign with the Guangxi leaders and with Tan Yankai, the commander of the II Corps.⁵⁶⁴ On 18 February, Tang sent delegates directly to Guangzhou but little is known of the visit.⁵⁶⁵ By this time, Guangxi leaders had emerged along with Chiang Kaishek and Tan Yankai, as the most vocal supporters of the Northern Expedition, which was still opposed by the Russian advisers.⁵⁶⁶ Apparently assured of at least southern neutrality, Tang began to move in mid-February and advanced from Hengyang to Yuezhou within two weeks without the help of mass movements or political workers. Zhao Hengti fled the province on 26 February 1926.⁵⁶⁷

In possession of the provincial capital, Tang appealed to Wu Peifu, and not Guangzhou, to legitimatise his victory by naming him the governor. But Wu, who had earlier encouraged Tang's revolt, now betrayed him and refused to recognise him.

⁵⁶³ Li Zongren, *Li Zongren huiyilu* (The memoirs of Li Zongren). Recorded by Tang Degang, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1986, 143-145.

⁵⁶⁴ Zeng Shengzhai, "Wo yu Tang Shengzhi ti junshi guwen" (I and Tang Shengzhi military adviser), *Yiwenzhi*, 30 (March 1968), p. 28.

⁵⁶⁵ Hu Nai'an, "Jiushi xinyi" (Old things and new ideas), *Chuanji wenxue*, IX: 6 (December 1966), 39-40.

⁵⁶⁶ Jordan claims that Guangzhou had signed an alliance with Tang in February but provides no evidence for it. Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 72. This claim seems unlikely given the split in Guangzhou. What Tang probably wanted from Guangzhou was not an alliance but a pledge of neutrality, or a promise that Tan Yankai would not move into southern Hunan while Tang was attacking the north. If so, Guangzhou could cheerfully assent. It had no intention of using Tan's marginal force. Diane Lary states that Guangxi was making false claims about such an alliance. Diana Lary, *Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937*. London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 65.

⁵⁶⁷ Zhang Chunyi, *op. cit.* (?); Li Pinxian, "Rongma shengya" (A life in the military), *Zhongwai zazhi*, XV: 1 (November 1973), p. 49. Li was one of Tang's top subordinates at the time.

Moreover, Wu ordered Tang to withdraw to his original base, and named Ye Kaixin commander of the "Protect Hunan Army". It was ordered to re-invade Hunan and oust Tang. Wu went so far as to place some of his Hubei units under Ye.⁵⁶⁸ Tang refused to vacate Changsha and declared himself governor of Hunan on 25 March. On the same day, Tang met with two more delegates from the Guomindang: Bai Chongxi, deputy commander of the Guangxi VII Corps, and Chen Mingshu, a division commander in the IV Corps. But this meeting did not produce any help for Tang as the Russian advisers continued to oppose a northern expedition. Lacking anyone to legitimatise his conquest of Hunan, and outnumbered by a reinforced Ye Kaixin, Tang withdrew from Yuezhou and in early April from Changsha. By late April, Tang had retreated to his original base area.⁵⁶⁹

The Hunan civil war provides a good example of warlord warfare and politics at work. Despite the large number of soldiers who had advanced and retreated over large areas, there had been almost no fighting. In fact, there may have been as many public telegrams sent as bullets fired. The war was one of manoeuvre and perception, and the results were determined even before any fighting took place. Because Tang's force was larger than Ye's, Tang had advanced and Ye had retreated. After Ye's troops had been reinforced, Ye had advanced and Tang had withdrawn. Finally, there had been little evidence of loyalty involved on the part of the various local warlords all of whom acted in self-interest. [The only exception may be Ye Kaixin who had withdrawn from Hunan with his superior Zhao Hengti. The characteristics of Chinese warlord warfare will be discussed in the next chapter.]

With Tang now retreating back towards the Hunan-Guangxi border, Li Zongren responded, apparently without the permission from Guangzhou, and began to move troops into Hunan, some two months prior to the official "launching" of the Northern Expedition. The first unit as part of Li Jishen's IV Corps from Guangzhou was dispatched to Hunan in early June.⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁶⁸ Li Pinxian, *op. cit.*, 49-50; Zhang Chunyi, *op. cit.*

⁵⁶⁹ Li Zongren, *op. cit.*, p. 145; Zhang Chunyi, *op. cit.*, 591-592.

⁵⁷⁰ Li Zongren, *op. cit.*, 145-6; Li Pinxian, *op. cit.*, p. 51. The ease of these units' move into Hunan clearly suggests that Guangxi and Guangdong had already seized the control of the passes between their provinces and Hunan either during Tang's advance or earlier. Thus, there is no reason to believe that Tang's defection helped the National Revolutionary Army "cross, unopposed, the difficult Nanling mountains", as claimed by Donald Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

After Li Zongren's units arrived in Hunan, Tang who was still opposed by Ye Kaixin, agreed to enrol in the National Revolutionary Army. He accepted the designation units under his control as the VIII Corps with himself as commander. Despite the claims of some, Tang was of little value to the National Revolutionary Army. He would stay in Hunan and Hubei, and even there would do little fighting. This was typical of almost all of the local warlords who joined the National Revolutionary Army, just as it had been the case during the entire warlord era. A year later, however, Nanjing would change the rules, move on the local warlords like Tang and break them up.

The VIII Corps was a purely provincial force with the bulk of its officers from only a few *xian*. In addition, the unit was also bound together by school ties with many Baoding schoolmates and classmates within its ranks (see tables 14 and 15).

During the Northern Expedition, Tang Shengzhi and later By Li Pinxian commanded the VIII Corps. Tang, like most of his subordinates, was a native of Hunan and a Baoding graduate. He had risen within the Hunan Army and had participated in the various wars to drive the non-Hunanese (*waishengren*) from the province and establish its effective independence. During the period of his tenure, Tang expanded his control from Hunan into Hubei and part of Anhui. Li Zongren drove Tang from power during the 1927 Western Expedition. After his abortive 1929 rebellion, Tang went into retirement until the war with Japan. Li Pinxian, also a Hunan native and Baoding graduate, took over the unit in 1927. When this unit was reorganised as the 51st Division in 1928, Li remained in command and joined Tang's 1929 revolt. After this was defeated, Li went to Guangxi and joined the Guangxi clique.⁵⁷¹

Commanders' Political Orientation

It is interesting to note the Russian advisers evaluated commanders and their units in terms of political orientation at the start of the Northern Expedition. Cherepanov recalls that they still considered Chiang Kaishek's I Corps and Huangpu, as the Guomindang's centrist mainstay, although Chiang had greatly weakened the Communist and Leftist influence at the academy after the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident. The Russians were concerned about the embryo of a pro-Japanese clique led by I Corps commander He Yingqin and his deputy, Wang Boling, a principal leader of the Rightist

⁵⁷¹ Li Pinxian, *op. cit.*, passim.

Society for the Study of Sun Wenism.⁵⁷² Blagodatov ("Rollan"), who was transferred to Guangzhou after the Second Guominjun's defeat in Henan in early 1926, estimated that the I Corps and Huangpu together comprised 20,000 men. Although Huangpu had begun evolving toward the Right, Blagodatov cites the Political Department's estimates showing that 60-70 percent of Huangpu students belonged to the Left. The I Corps' political apparatus, however, was in the hands of members of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism.⁵⁷³ S.N. Naumov ("Kalachev"), appointed adviser to Huangpu in November 1925, asserts that Communists and Leftists were still in dominant positions at Huangpu, where he says there were 400 Communists.⁵⁷⁴

Russian advisers regarded Tan Yankai's II Corps, Zhu Peide's III Corps, and Cheng Qian's VI Corps, as a Leftist grouping. Cherepanov recalled that these three corps held the most favourable attitude toward the advisers. II Corps was led according to relatively "democratic principles" of leadership. The Russians considered III Corps commander Zhu Peide a Leftist; he had drastically changed his attitude toward Chiang after 20th March and spoken against him. Political work was expanded in these three corps. According to Cherepanov, Tan Yankai requested for Communist political workers in his units. Political workers in each of his regiments were increased from three to ten. Forty to forty-five workers staffed the III Corps' Political Department. Communists who had left the I Corps were assigned to Cheng Qian's VI Corps at his request.⁵⁷⁵ A Chinese Communist source confirms that many political workers in the II Corps's Political Department headed by Li Fuchun and the VI Corps's Political Department headed by Lin Zihan were Communists.⁵⁷⁶ Both Li and Lin were leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.

⁵⁷² Cherepanov, *Severnyi Pkhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya*, 110-112.

⁵⁷³ Blagodatov, A. V. *Zapiski o kitaiskoi revoliutsii, 1925-1927 gg* (Notes on the Chinese revolution of 1925-1927). Moscow: "Nauka", Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of Oriental Studies, 1970, p. 139.

⁵⁷⁴ Naumov, S. N. "The school at Huangpu." *Sovetskie Dobrovoltsy v Pervoi Grazhdanskoi Revoliutsionnoi Voine v Kitae; Vospominaniia* (Soviet volunteers in the first revolutionary civil war in China; reminiscences), 126-139. Akademia Nauk SSSR. Institut Norodov Azii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1961, p. 136.

⁵⁷⁵ Cherepanov, *Severnyi Pkhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya*, 110-114.

⁵⁷⁶ Hu Hua, *Zhongguo xin minzhu zhuyi geming shi* (A history of the Chinese new democratic revolution). 2nd ed. Guangzhou: Xinhua Bookstore, 1951, p. 71.

Blagodatov estimates that this "so-called Leftist group" comprising the three corps, and led by Tan Yankai, totalled thirty thousand men, most of whom were not natives of Guangdong. The group had connections with the Guomindang Left-wing. Those who refused to accept Chiang's dictatorship leaned on it. The commanders of the three corps were connected through the Baoding Military Academy,⁵⁷⁷ the prestigious military school in North China. Baoding's graduates held many of the senior posts in both the National Revolutionary Army and (Beiyang) militarist armies during the Northern Expedition.

According to Cherepanov, Russian advisers considered the IV and V Corps, together with the two corps that had recently declared allegiance to Guangzhou--the VII Corps of Guangxi leader Li Zongren and the VIII Corps of Hunanese Tang Shengzhi--"more to the Right." However, they classified Bai Chongxi, another Guangxi leader who served as acting chief of staff of the National Revolutionary Army, as a Leftist. In their view, the fighting efficiency of the IV Corps under Li Jishen's command was second only to the I Corps.⁵⁷⁸ The IV Corps resented the I Corps' privileges, Blagodatov said. Its commanders were hostile to the peasant and labour movement, he alleged. The IV and VII Corps were connected through Baoding ties and were joined by the VIII Corps as well as the VIII and X corps, which had just been incorporated into the National Revolutionary Army. In Blagodatov's view, this grouping lacked political leadership because Li Jishen was too "colourless". The V Corps joined none of these groupings. Its commander, Li Fulin, who did not hold a high Party post, joined the Right and had ties with local landlords and merchants.⁵⁷⁹

In a separate report dated 9 August 1926, the Russian adviser revealed anxiety about the commander of the VIII Corps, Tang Shengzhi's loyalty to the National Government.⁵⁸⁰ On 30 July, less than three weeks after the occupation of Changsha,

⁵⁷⁷ Blagodatov, *op cit.*, p. 139.

⁵⁷⁸ Cherepanov, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁵⁷⁹ Blagodatov, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁵⁸⁰ "Nefedov's Report on the Eighth Army, (9 August 1926)", Document 66, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 765-766. Nefedov (Pavlov) was the military adviser to the Tang Shengzhi's VIII Corps shortly before the Northern Expedition began. This report was compiled barely two months after the appointment of Tang as the commander of the VIII Corps.

Tang organised the Hunan provincial government and assumed the post of chairman. He was concurrently the commissioner of military affairs.⁵⁸¹

The VIII Corps also expanded rapidly through the incorporation of defecting units. The Russian adviser reported that Tang had carried out his policy of organising and training twenty-eight regiments. Should the National Government fail to appoint him to the highest position, he would sever connections with the National Government. This possibility depended on the reaction of parties opposed to him and on his ability to form alliances. Tang was already talking about the idea of separation, but barring unforeseen circumstances, the Russian adviser thought it unlikely that he would break away at Wuhan. But after the occupation of Wuhan by the National Revolutionary Army, the relative strength of all parties concerned prevented such an eventuality.⁵⁸²

The same report was also severely critical of Liu Wendao, the Guomindang Party Representative to the VIII Corps and head of its Political Department. Tang's former schoolmate at Baoding, Liu had played a significant role in gaining Tang's initial adherence to the National Government. In late 1925, he had gone to Hunan to persuade Tang to join forces with the National Revolution and in the following January had gone to Guangzhou to serve as a bridge between Tang's army and the National Revolution Army.⁵⁸³ Shortly after, Chen Mingshu, commander of the 10th Division of the IV Corps, and the Guangxi leader General Bai Chongxi, both also Tang's schoolmates at Baoding, had visited Hunan. The Russian adviser reported that the VIII Corps actually did no Guomindang work. Liu Wendao engaged in other activities. He was not closely connected with the Guomindang and was extremely hostile to the Chinese Communist Party. He had no confidence in the Political Department and did not trust its personnel, suspecting many to be Communists. The Russian adviser identified him with a group of officials who had connections with compradors, as

⁵⁸¹ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 30 July 1926, p. 631. Early in June, while Tang was being rescued by the National Revolutionary Army units, he organised a provisional provincial government at Hengyang and assumed the chairmanship. *Ibid.*, 4 June 1926, p. 595. In his report, Nefedov, the Russian adviser whom Bliukher had sent to Hunan, described Tang as lively, resolute, and radical in speech. He acted with great determination and promoted Buddhism in his army. Nefedov apparently conducted a thorough investigation, for he observed that while Tang forbade smoking on the grounds that he himself did not smoke, he must have been hypocritical because two fingers on his right hand were "stained as dark as smoked sausages". Document 66, *op. cit.*, p. 766.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*, 765-66; for Liu Wendao, see Wu Xiangxiang, *Minguo baren zhuan* (One hundred biographies of the republican period), 3: 154, 141, 137.

hostile to the Chinese Communist Party. He believed they exercised influence over Tang. The various cliques within the VIII Corps, on the other hand, were unimportant because they were all loyal to Tang and held moderate opinions.⁵⁸⁴

Organisation of the Corps

The Russian advisers had also reported in detail the organisation and conditions of units in the National Revolution Army prior to the Northern Expedition. It comments that there was no uniform organisation of the army corps in the National Revolutionary Army. The corps was the largest unit and was designed to carry out an independent military mission or warfare on a large sector of the front.⁵⁸⁵ The corps should have three divisions, each made up of three regiments, each regiment of three battalions, and so on through company to platoon (see table 16). However, some of the corps had only two divisions, others three, still others four, and their numerical strength varied from twelve thousand to twenty-three thousand. Subordinate to the corps commander were the divisions, the Corps Staff, a Political Section, and a Gendarmerie Battalion. Subordinate to the chief of staff were the Administration of Supplies, Engineering section, Communications section, and a sanitary section. In some army corps there was an regiment, others only an Artillery Battalion. The strength of the artillery battalion varied greatly among the corps, and it seemed impossible to transfer guns from one corps to another.⁵⁸⁶ However, the overall combat service support for the corps was extremely weak. There were no cavalry or engineer arms in the National Revolutionary Army. The communications arms could only provide radio, lines and field telegraph among corps and between corps and the higher headquarters services.

The division was more definitely and uniformly organised than the corps. As a unit, the division comprised exclusively of infantry. It had supporting arms for machine guns and small engineering and communications sections with no technical

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 766. The Russian adviser observed that, however, like other groups, the Baoding Clique was not a strong organisation. Formed as a result of jealousy of Chiang, it might be divided into leaders and followers. The important elements were Tang and his army and Chen Mingshu. Nefedov warned that Soviet policy toward Tang was not clear. The Russians should not miss any opportunity to defend their objectives.

⁵⁸⁵ The following are based on the Russians' appraisals of the Nationalist military forces in March 1926. "Organisation of an Army Corps and Its Component Units", Document 32, *Missionaries of Revolution*, 632-33, provides a description of the organisation of the army corps of the National Revolutionary Army prior to the Northern Expedition.

⁵⁸⁶ "Organisation of an Army Corps and Its Component Units", Document 32, *op. cit.*, p. 632.

equipment. The regiment was also well-defined with three battalions or sixteen companies. Each regiment had a machine gun company but the number of machine guns varied. This was dependent on the total number of machine guns available to the army corps. Machine guns were at the disposal of the regimental commander, and in wartime they were distributed to the platoons of battalion. The regiment was organised as a fundamental fighting unit which could fulfil an independent mission.⁵⁸⁷ As for the VII and VIII Corps which joined the National Revolutionary Army only in March and June 1926, they still retained their original organisational structure and unit designation (see table 14).

Staff Officers

Staff officers trained in modern warfare were in short supply except in the I Corps which had a staff officer system since the summer of 1925.⁵⁸⁸ In most of the corps headquarters army staff offices merely had clerical functions. There were few properly trained chiefs of staff or staff officers in the National Revolutionary Army. Staff organisation at corps, division, and regiment level was still being created and they could perform only minimal duties. These were: to keep elementary personnel records; to introduce some system into military preparations; to systematise intelligence data; to utilise auxiliary troops effectively; and, most importantly, to direct lower units as fully as possible and maintain close liaison with the higher-unit staff. Even these "most simple duties" could not yet be done properly since the work was so new and they were short of trained personnel, who could keep to the habit of executing orders exactly.⁵⁸⁹

A separate report describes the characteristics of the officers of the National Revolutionary Army. About three hundred Baoding alumni served in the South, making up the majority of the regimental commanders and general officers. They had their separate association and club. There were also graduates of the provincial military academies, such as Jiangsu and Yunnan. The latter was considered the best of the provincial schools. A few higher officers had been trained in Japan. About eight hundred junior officers were graduates of the Huangpu Military Academy. They were mostly platoon, company, and battalion commanders, and they were the majority in the I Corps and in the Independent 2nd and 20th Divisions. The Russians describe them as

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 633.

⁵⁸⁸ "Organisation and Functions of Army Staffs", Document 33, *op. cit.*, p. 634.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Document 33, p. 635.

"having revolutionary spirit, energy, and impetus, they greatly differ from the rest of the officers". Among them, according to the Russians estimate, that 6 percent of the Huangpu graduates were Communists. Junior officers in other corps apparently were graduates of the six-month courses given in separate schools of each unit.⁵⁹⁰

The material conditions of the officers were unsatisfactory. Salaries were seldom paid in full or on time. The average officer received no more than \$30 to \$40 per month, which "inevitably drives officers to embezzlement of public funds." There were no prescribed rules for promotion, support of families, pensions, etc., though plans were being drafted. The monthly pay scale of officers in the I Corps ranged from \$40 to \$50 for a second lieutenant, upward to \$216 to \$240 for a colonel. The implication appears to be that officers in the I Corps actually received markedly higher salaries than those in other corps.⁵⁹¹

Troops of the National Revolutionary Army

The National Revolutionary Army troops were the product of past militarist practices and of the current recruitment system, according to Russian reports which gave some interesting details.⁵⁹² Generals of extra-provincial armies in Guangdong always preferred to recruit soldiers from their native provinces rather from Guangdong. They believed such troops could not desert with rifles, as they were unfamiliar with the Guangdong dialect. They could scarcely exist outside their military units. Officers were also recruited from the general's home province and were closely linked to the men. Such officers usually "followed their 'boss,' the fellow countryman-general." The influence of this system persisted to some extent in the II, III, IV and V Corps, and some generals still incorporated officers and men who had surrendered or been taken prisoner⁵⁹³ into their units.

Recruitment was decentralised. Each corps commander, and even some division commander, arranged for the recruits he needed by sending recruiting agents with funds to specific regions in the central and northern provinces. In Hunan, Zhejiang, Jiangsu,

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 627.

⁵⁹¹ "Characteristics of the Officer Personnel of the Army", Document 30, *op. cit.*, p. 628.

⁵⁹² "Characteristics of Enlisted Personnel", Document 31, *op. cit.*, 629-631.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 629.

and Anhui recruitment had to be done secretly. The agent would bring or send his recruits to Guangzhou in groups of one or two hundred, at a cost of fifteen or twenty dollars per man. The majority of higher and middle ranking officers also believed that Guangdong men made poor soldiers and were so provincial in outlook that they would fight only to defend their province. Hence, most generals thought it best to use northern troops for the prospective northern campaign.⁵⁹⁴ This turned out to be a gross miscalculation of Guangdong men's fighting ability as seen in major battles of the Northern Expedition involving the IV Guangdong Corps (this will discuss in the next chapter).

The recruitment system in the central and northern provinces had not been able to provide better quality soldiers. Agents hired men without careful selection so that "there are many men in the army who are sick, physically weak, and unfit for military service" according to a Russian's report. It states that previously, professional soldiers had been recruited but now "workmen, peasants, unemployed coolies and also brigades are being enlisted." Criminal and depraved elements were getting into the armies.⁵⁹⁵

The Russian's report also gave considerable information on the health of the NRA's troops⁵⁹⁶ which was far below expectation. About 5% suffered from beriberi as a result of their poor diet, while about 2% had malaria and 1% suffered from dysentery. There were many other diseases that had been discovered. The only groups that had been carefully examined were the students of the Huangpu Military Academy. Out of 5,790 men examined, 15 percent were found fit only for inactive duty, and 153 had to be dismissed altogether.⁵⁹⁷ Considering that the students were in better condition than the troops, a greater percentage of the troops would be found unfit for military service.

The I Corps was made up largely of men from Zhejiang (General Chiang Kaishek's home province) and from Jiangsu, Anhui, and Shandong.⁵⁹⁸ Yet, there were differences among the divisions. The 1st Division, the one formed from the original

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 630.

⁵⁹⁶ "Report on Sanitary Conditions in the National Revolutionary Army of the Canton Government as of March 15, 1926", Document 34, *op. cit.*, 636-639. The author of Document 34 apparently was a Russian physician in the National Revolutionary Army.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 638.

⁵⁹⁸ "Characteristics of Enlisted Personnel", Document 31, *op. cit.*, p. 629.

Training Regiment at Huangpu, comprised mainly of Zhejiang and Jiangsu men.⁵⁹⁹ The 3rd Division was a mixture of natives of Hunan, Guangdong, and Anhui, while the 14th Division was from Guangdong. The II Corps was made up entirely of Hunan men, General Deng Yankai's province, and recruitment continued there. The III Corps was largely Yunnanese, reflecting General Zhu Peide's nativity. The IV Corps consisted of Guangdong natives, though its commander, Li Jishen, was a native of Wuzhou, Guangxi. General Li Fulin's V Corps was a native of Guangdong, while the VI Corps under the Hunan general, Cheng Qian, had a mixture of Hunan, Guangdong, and Hubei troops, a result of a recent reorganisation.⁶⁰⁰

The pay scale I Corps soldiers ranged from \$10 a month for a second class private to \$20 for a sergeant. In several other corps the pay scale was lower. A soldier receiving \$8 a month would have \$5 or \$6 deducted for his maintenance. Nevertheless, "for many of them, two or three bowls of rice a day and clothing is, in comparison with their former condition of living, a very alluring prospect." Yet, "although the food and equipment of the soldiers are comparatively sufficient, the lodging conditions and especially regularity in pay are far from satisfactory."⁶⁰¹

The training of the troops was completely unsatisfactory, according to another Russian's report. This was due to "the absence of proper instruction, the inertness of the old officer personnel and especially the ignorance and inexperience of the junior officers," who had graduated from the various southern academies. Drill regulations and textbooks on tactics had been compiled from German and Japanese materials dating from the beginning of the century. Each corps trained its troops according to its own program, but left the work to the junior officers, resulting in an "irrational waste of time."⁶⁰² Too much time was spent on drill for the parade ground or on lectures to illiterate Chinese soldiers rather than on shooting and battle drill, the Russian

⁵⁹⁹ For the recruitment of the Training Regiments, see Chen Guofu. "Jianjun shi zhi yi ye (One page in the history of creating the army)." *Geming wenxian* (Documents on the revolution), 1458-1461. In it, Chen gives a graphic account of recruiting in Zhejiang, Anhui and Jiangsu, and the need for secrecy, and of the difficulties in shipping recruits from Shanghai to Guangzhou during early 1925 and April 1926. After which Chen turned over his responsibility to others. His organisation had recruited more than 4,000 new troops at an average cost (including losses of men spired away by other commanders) of a little more than \$21.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 629.

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 630.

⁶⁰² "The Training of the National Revolutionary Army for War", Document 29, *op. cit.*, 623-26.

commented. For example, a two-hour battles in which 10,000-11,000 cartridges were fired might result in only ten to twenty casualties or even less. The author of the report also cited statistics of the low standard of marksmanship from the results of target practice: at one hundred metres only 10 percent hit the target; at seventy metres, 50 percent missed. This was due to improper instruction but also to the bad condition of the rifles.⁶⁰³ In the Russian's opinion, worst of all, was the neglect of training for actual combat. Troops were not taught to report battle situations properly and as a result the commander was never exactly informed about the enemy. Communications between units was very inefficient and mutual support between units inadequate. Soldiers were not taught to adapt themselves to terrain. Tactical exercises were carried out in a routine and careless manner.⁶⁰⁴ The Russian adviser predicted that it would be most difficult to improve war training. It was not merely a matter of issuing new programs and instructions, but of retraining the officers. The report concluded with a note of despair that as a result of two years' work by the group of Russian instructors, "very little has been accomplished". The report explained this by the fact that much of the time had been spent in campaigning, and only since the end of the last Eastern Expedition in Guangdong had it been possible "to take this matter systematically in hand". Since then, regulations regarding training were being prepared and a plan of military exercises with necessary instructions was almost completed. It recommended that unless there was "at least one adviser to a division no substantial results can be expected from this work".⁶⁰⁵

The Guangzhou Arsenals

The Guangzhou Arsenals located about sixteen kilometres outside the city, was considered to be the third largest in China. The small arsenal in the northern part of the city had been taken over after the defeat of the Yunnan Army. According to the Russians, the production sections the arsenals reported their combined monthly capacity as: 1,100,000 cartridges, 800 rifles, 4 machine guns, and 400 artillery shells. They could repair 300 rifles, 6 machine guns, and 2 cannons a month. The capacity would be increased by installing machinery that had been purchased previously and by

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 625.

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 625-6.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 626.

other machinery taken over from Chen Jiongming's arsenal at Shantou.⁶⁰⁶ It is evident the according to this estimates that the arsenals at Guangzhou simply could not meet the need of the National Revolutionary Army in several years, even with a somewhat enlarged capacity.

The Air Force

Apart from the eight army corps, the National Revolutionary Army had also a small aviation service in Guangdong. The aviation service was started by Sun Yatsen in 1916 but the progress was slow. By the time the Russian advisers had arrived in 1924, they found a confused situation.⁶⁰⁷ After a fire had destroyed all the equipment, four German instructors had been engaged and steps had been taken to purchase some machines. A tiny squadron of two Curtis trainers and one hydroplane was created. Outfitted with bombs, which were "mostly of no use," the planes took part in all the previous two years campaigns during the previous two years, demonstrating to the Chinese generals "the boundless possibilities afforded by this branch of the service."⁶⁰⁸

In June 1925, when the Guomindang Political Council confirmed the reorganisation plan for the armed forces, it decided to allocate half a million dollars from the military budget for the organisation of the air service, and to send a commission to the Soviet Union to seek support for the purchase of machines and for training.⁶⁰⁹ The council also decided to create a commercial aviation service between Guangzhou and Shantou and Guangzhou and Wuzhou. The "Friends of Aviation" Society was organised to raise money; it succeeded in gathering about \$25,000, to construct an aerodrome.⁶¹⁰ A Junker 13 passenger plane was purchased from the Soviet

⁶⁰⁶ See Document 26, p. 612. This report states that supplementary equipment for the arsenal was ordered in 1923 and arrived in Guangzhou by end of 1924. But the government lacked Ch\$1,500,000 to pay for the equipment, it remained in warehouses until the end of 1925. The government intended to pay for the equipment and install it at the beginning of 1926.

⁶⁰⁷ "Aviation." *Missionaries of Revolution*, Document 35: 640-643.

⁶⁰⁸ Another document written a few weeks earlier said that only two of the four available plans could fly, and their range was no more than 10 to 15 kilometres. See "Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang, Early 1926.", *op. cit.*, Document 26: 607.

⁶⁰⁹ "Aviation", Document 35: 641-3, *op. cit.*

⁶¹⁰ In a report to the Second National Guomindang Congress on 9 January, it states that overseas Chinese had contributed to the Aviation Society, the amount is as follows: HK\$12,914, Guangzhou \$20,146, and Francs 32,895. See *Zhongguo Guomindang di yi, er ci quanguo daibiao dahui huiyi shiliao* (Minutes of the First and Second National Congress of the Guomindang), I: 231, the Chinese Second Historical Archives, Jiangsu: Guji chubanshe, 1986.

Union and was "quite suitable for flying in Guangdong province for propaganda purposes." The Russian adviser on aviation L. Grey expected with the province's improved financial situation, it would be possible to establish civil air lines in the near future.⁶¹¹

The work of military aviation was proceeding in two directions: training of personnel and purchase of machines. Six men were sent to Russia for training in September 1925. A preparatory training school was set up in Guangzhou with the "modest task" of training pilots for the Curtis machines. Two German officers gave the instruction, and a mixed Russo-Chinese squadron was established. It would be commanded by a Russian aviator and consist of Russian fliers and instructors, with the Chinese performing auxiliary service.⁶¹²

The Russian adviser L. Grey stressed the great potential importance of aviation for the coming northern military campaign: to provide liaison between corps and divisions, to photograph enemy locations and provide photographic substitutes for maps, to demoralise the enemy and heighten the morale of the Nationalist troops, to bomb and strafe the enemy, protect lines of communication, suppress counter-revolutionary movements in the rear, etc. He then recommended the purchase of forty-six planes of three types to be formed into three squadrons, and sending thirty to forty students to Russia for training, especially in the auxiliary services⁶¹³ immediately.

The war diary of the National Revolutionary Army records that the commander-in-chief Chiang Kaishek inspected the Russian aircraft on 21 July 1926. It was a large aircraft (presumably a bomber) and the Russian pilot was very skilful according to the diary.⁶¹⁴ During the Northern Expedition, Guomindang sources also report the Aviation Bureau move to the front (or outskirts as the source calls it) of Wuchang on 6 September. It credits the planes positive contributions in bombing, reconnaissance, and distribution of leaflets although it does not mention the pilots were Russians.⁶¹⁵ Two

⁶¹¹ "Aviation", Document 35: 641, *op. cit.*

⁶¹² *Ibid.*, 640, 642; also Vishnyakova-Akimova. *Dva Goda v Vosstavsheme kitae, 1925-1927*, p. 186.

⁶¹³ "Aviation", Document 35: 641-2, *op. cit.*

⁶¹⁴ *Beifa zhengzhong riji*, 21 July 1926, p. 19.

⁶¹⁵ *Geming wenxian*: 12: 1991-1992.

Russian aviators Sergeev and Kravtsov took part in the battle of Wuchang. Sergeev states that they left Shaoguan on Bliukher's order to Wuchang front in mid-September 1926. Their main task was throwing bombs, distributing leaflets, and firing machine guns from an altitude of fifty metres to disperse enemy concentrations at city gates. In general, the air attack had helped the National Revolutionary Army in breaking through the walled-city, boosted the morale of own troops and caused panic among enemy troops.⁶¹⁶ However, another report, mentions that although eight aviators were at the front line, they did not fly because of the lack of plane and that they were not "instructed well enough".⁶¹⁷

The Navy

The Guangdong government's navy was also in a dilapidated state, according to L. Grey.⁶¹⁸ In 1926, there were forty-four vessels in the active fleet, eleven of them sea-going. Most had not been repaired on dry dock for a decade, but now this work was being carried out as finances and political conditions permitted. The army also had a great variety of cannons and machine guns, but some of the cannons were completely obsolete. Only half the shells and three-fourths of the machine-gun cartridges were good for firing. Machinery and ship bodies had not been repaired since the ships were built and were falling into decay. It would take a year and cost \$20,000 to put them into shape. This fleet, nevertheless, carried out several missions. Some gunboats were assigned to corps commanders in distant parts of the province. Some, under the direct command of the Military Council, were suppressing pirates in the delta and on the high seas. Other gunboats were blockading Hong Kong in conjunction with the Strike

⁶¹⁶ "Aviation", Document 35: 642-3, *op. cit.*; Sergeev, V. "Reports of the senior aviation advisers of the National Revolutionary Army Sergeev on the action of the aviation in the northern expedition, 1 March 1927". *Istoricheskii Arkhiv*, 4 (1959): 126.

⁶¹⁷ "Kostuchenko's Report on the Bureau of Aviation and General Plan for the Organization of the Air Services in the National Revolutionary Army", Document 71, 3, 7; *op. cit.*; also *Beifa zhengzhong riji*, 22 August 1926, p. 67.

⁶¹⁸ "The High Sea and River Patrol Fleet of the Kuomintang Government." *Missionaries of Revolution*, Document 36: 644-653. Document 36 gives details about the southern fleet as it was early in 1926. This information which probably cannot be found in any other source. After forty-eight days of work within the southern navy, L. Grey wrote a devastating report on the condition of the ships, their guns, and the officers and crews. In his own words, "As it is at present, with its worthless ships, its rotten machinery, and its incompetent personnel, the whole Chinese fleet is an obsolete thing, capable only of political blackmailing, of opium traffic, and of extorting money by all means from the population and the merchants. It is unable to give battle...because of the condition of its armament and the moral character of its personnel", *ibid.* Doc 36: 652.

Committee, and guarding the sea approaches to Guangzhou. The remainder were under repair or waiting their turn.

Grey hoped that a strong nucleus of a navy could be created in the South which, the rest of the Chinese fleet could be formed in the future. He seems to have modelled this on how the Huangpu Military Academy and its training regiments had been the nucleus from which the I Corps of the National Revolutionary Army had grown. He insisted that school for officers and training courses for sailors must be arranged at Guangzhou and Huangpu. The alternative, he felt, was to wait until bases of the fleet in North China had been taken by land, and it is clear he was not recommending this, because training classes had already begun.

A class for 100 signalmen would open on 25 March, and classes for artillerymen and engineers would begin late June. These were for sailors from the ranks or recruits from the Seamen's Union. But their educational work department faced familiar difficulties: lack of textbooks on naval subjects in Chinese, and prospective teachers who had studied in a variety of naval academies abroad had no practice in teaching. Still, Grey was hopeful that some results would be achieved to form the basis of educational work in the future navy.⁶¹⁹

As for the accomplishments, according Grey, the southern fleet, which only recently had consisted of seven groups under seven commanders, was united. Party representatives (commissars) had been appointed in principal ships. Arrangements had been prepared for strikers and Communists to replace part of the crews, though so far, the only Communist in the fleet was the chief of the Naval Political Council (Bureau).⁶²⁰ However, there were seventeen Communist political workers in the navy.⁶²¹ The staff had been organised according to European standards, and higher officers were being trained for staff work. Budgets and plans had been prepared for schools and training courses, and a schedule for repairs of seagoing vessels had been made. A special commission was examining enlisted personnel, and a vigorous campaign had been mounted against graft and theft. It was now possible to keep the work of some sections of the staff secret. A Political Section had been organised, most

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Doc 36: 651.

⁶²⁰ This probably refers to the appointment of Li Zhilong.

⁶²¹ "Number of Members of the Chinese Communist Party in the National Revolutionary Army." *Missionaries of Revolution*, Document 43: 685.

of its work being done on the gunboats, and a club for officers had been organised by the Political Section.⁶²²

Grey predicted many future difficulties in the future attempt to revive the fleet and its efficiency. In fact he had developed the greatest contempt for the Chinese naval officers. He alleged "the difficulties are not only of a financial character but they result also from the incompetence of the staff and of the government as a whole in naval matters.... In general, it may be said none of the officers knows his business theoretically or practically and, as a matter of fact, none of them deserves to be called a naval officer, not only in regard to ability, but also with respect to his moral character". They were opium smokers and grafters, he charged, and were counter-revolutionaries not for political but for material reasons. He thought they knew absolutely nothing of tactics, astronomy, navigation, artillery, mines, shipbuilding, mechanics, and other naval sciences. Senior noncommissioned officers of long experience performed these special functions. The officers received good salaries and knew they could not find employment in the commercial fleet because of their ignorance, so they "stick to the navy like a louse to the skin." It was not easy to dismiss an officer. But Grey believed they must be replaced as soon as a new contingent could be trained in a naval academy that would open soon.⁶²³

Overall, the navy did not play an active part in the Northern Expedition except two naval concentrations conducted on the east coast, one at Fuzhou and other at Shanghai. The deployment of ships at Shanghai was particularly crucial as they could have prevented the possibility of enemy disrupting military crossing or transport of troops on the lower Yangzi.⁶²⁴

The Military Budget for the Northern Expenditure

The Guangdong government had been in the red for many years and the financial situation was especially critical during 1925-1926, the period of launching the Northern Expedition (see table 17). The Guangdong government's military budget had also reached a critical point in 1926 consuming fourth-fifth of the entire provincial

⁶²² "The High Sea and River Patrol Fleet of the Kuomintang Government." *Missionaries of Revolution*, Document 36: 652-3.

⁶²³ *Ibid.*, Doc 36: 653; 649-501.

⁶²⁴ *Geming wenxian*, 12: 1780-9; *Beifa zhanshi*, 1: 62-8.

revenue (see table 18). From 1915 to 1921, the military budget was between \$11,377,000 and \$23,593,000, with an average of \$17,481,636 per annum. 1923-1924 was the lowest with only \$8,815,000 and \$6,208,000 respectively. This was the period of division in Guangdong where most of the province was dominated not only by Chen Jiongming and his supporters but also the regional armies friendly to the Guomindang. This situation was corrected in 1925 after the launching of the First Eastern Expedition and the suppression of Yunnan-Guangxi generals. The military budget increased from \$35,943,000 in 1925 to \$83,266,000 in 1926. The main expenditures went to the expansion of the National Revolutionary Army and the financial aid to the armies supporting the Guomindang. According to the Finance Minister Song Ziwen's report to the Central Committee on 9 November 1926, 78.28% of the Guangdong government expenditure in 1925-26 went to the military. Other than the National Revolutionary Army, the Guomindang contributed monthly to the VII and VIII Corps \$200,000 and \$400,000 respectively. It also assisted Feng Yuxiang's army with \$500,000 monthly and to those armies defected to the Guomindang in Henan and Fujian.⁶²⁵

Finances were a perpetual problem throughout the Northern Expedition and it later became a source of conflict between the Wuhan Left Wing and Chiang Kaishek at Nanchang. On 21 December 1926, Chiang wired Finance T. V. Song and Deng Yanda to pay the VIII and X Corps in western Hubei immediately. On 24 December he wired Song informing him that VII Corps troops in Hubei had mutinied for lack of pay and asked Song to devise measures to maintain regular payment to the army. The next day Chiang wired Song complaining that the Central Bank in Guangzhou had declined to pay the army on the grounds that it must await Song's return to Guangzhou. Chiang stated that the delay appeared intentional. In a second wire to Song the same day, Chiang asked whether it was true, as reported by He Yingqin in Fuzhou, that the I Corps' expenses henceforth must be raised in Fujian and that the Finance Ministry would stop payment as of 1 December. On 31 December Chiang wired Song, requesting him to supply funds immediately for the previous and current months. He emphasised the gravity of the situation and urged Song not to base his attitude toward the National Revolutionary Army's corps on his attitude toward Chiang himself.⁶²⁶

⁶²⁵ *Geming wenxian*, 20: 167-168, for Song Ziwen's report to the Central Committee; *Guangdong sheng difeng caizheng* (The Guangdong financial policy), II: 394-417, for detail of the expenditure.

⁶²⁶ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, entries for December 21, 24, 25, and 31, 1926, in 856-860; 862-866; 874-5.

Chi Hsi-Sheng argues that financial constraints could have also affected the strategy of the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition.⁶²⁷ Purely logistic calculations probably would have led the Guomindang to mount the expedition along the Guangzhou-Hankou railway. But the financial centres in lower Yangzi delta were probably valued more than the industrial assets in Wuhan. Significantly, the most loyal units were assigned the task to take Shanghai through the provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang even though the transportation system along the route was quite backward. In addition, he further argues that financial calculations also might dissuade the Guomindang leaders from seeking a destruction of all their opponents along the expedition's path. Instead, they aimed at annihilating only a few intransigent foes. In the short run, it definitely appeared to be cheaper to buy the alliance of opposing militarists than to destroy them.⁶²⁸

The seizure of the lower Yangzi delta, however, failed to produce a fundamental change in the Guomindang's financial position. The National Revolutionary Army continued to experience frustration in its effort to fill up its war chest. Consequently, the government was able to plan a very limited campaign against the warlords still entrenched in North China, and declared itself victorious as soon as Beijing was taken, even though the entire Manchuria and many other provinces remained beyond the effective power of either the Guomindang army or civil administration.

Russians' Attitudes towards the Northern Expedition

The Russian military advisers had mixed reactions to the 1926 Northern Expedition. Although those who were present in Guangzhou generally accepted the necessity of a northern Expedition they differed in their views about the timing and contents of the campaign. The Russians' views were fully expressed during the Bubnov Commission's visit in Beijing in early 1926.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁷ Chi Hsi-sheng, "Financial Constraints on the Northern Expedition." Conference on the Early History of the Republican of China, 1912-1927, 249-69. Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 20 August 1983..

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁹ Andrey Sergeyevich Bubnov, who used the pseudonym "Ivanovsky" in China, had been an important political commissar in the Red Army during the civil war in Russia, and had been appointed head of the Central Political Administration of the army in 1924. The secret mission that he headed was to study the work of the Russian aid missions in China and to recommend policy for the future. Other members of the commission were also members of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. They were I. I. Lepse, representative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Profintern, N. A. Kubyak, secretary of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Bolshevik (All-Union Communist

In February, Borodin and three of the most experienced military advisers in Guangzhou, Tereshatov, Cherepanov, and Sakhnovsky ("Nilov") went to Beijing to report to the Bubnov Commission. Sakhnovsky, who had been in Guangzhou since June 1924, stated his belief that within two or three months the National Revolutionary Army could launch a successful campaign into Central China, and then it could liberate Beijing. Nikolai Tereshatov, one of the first military advisers to reach Guangzhou, believed a year of political preparation in Guangdong and neighbouring provinces, as well as an accumulation of weapons and supplies, would be needed first. A. I. Cherepanov, the source for this report on the Bubnov inquiry, stated that a northward campaign must be accompanied by an uprising of the peasantry, but that the "national revolutionary united front", as he called it, lacked a precise agrarian program to bring on such an uprising.⁶³⁰

According to Cherepanov,⁶³¹ Borodin believed it was necessary first to promote an agrarian revolution, for, in his opinion, "the chief bulwark of imperialism in China and particularly in Guangdong, was the medieval land-owning system, and not the warlords." He fully realised the tremendous difficulties he would face in persuading the Guomindang to support such a revolution; to do so it might be necessary to split the party and drive out its conservatives. Yet, he argued in favour of a northward campaign on two grounds. First, if Wu Peifu were victorious in his wars in the North, the British would be sure to try to set him on Guangzhou; and second, the economic situation in Guangdong had so improved as a result of recent military campaigns, strengthening of the government, and stabilisation of finances, that many Guomindang members had

Party), and R. V. Longva, an officer with a distinguished military career, who later became the military attache in Beijing. See Cherepanov, A. I. *Severnii Pukhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya* (Zapiski Voenogo Sovetnika) 1926-1927, p. 16; *As Military Adviser*, p. 175;

Vishniakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-1927*, p. 239; Jacobs, Dan N. *Borodin: Stalin's Man in China*, p. 193.

⁶³⁰ See Cherepanov, *op. cit.*, 16-21; *As Military Adviser*, 181-182. Cherepanov apparently was on Borodin's side who believed the Northern Expedition should be both political and military at the same time; whereas Bliukher seemed to be more interested in concentrating on military matters first before politics.

⁶³¹ Cherepanov describes Borodin's views because Borodin allowed him to see the report he intended to give to the commission. The report is still retained in an archive in Moscow, and both Cherepanov and the modern Russian scholar, R. A. Mirovitskaia, studied it. Cherepanov, *Ibid.*, 24-30; R. A. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade." *Leninskaia Politika SSSR v Otnoshenii Kitaya* (The Leninist policy of the USSR with regard to China), 20-67. Moscow: "Nauka", 1968, p.38; and "Mikhail Borodin (1884-1951)." *Vidnye Sovetskiiye Kommunisty-Uchastniki Kitaiskoi Revoliutsii* (Outstanding Soviet Communists-the participants in the Chinese revolution), 20-40. Moscow: Akad. Nauka SSSR, Institut Dal'nego Vostoka, "Nauka", 1970, 33-37.

concluded that now was "a time for resting." They were ready to forget the "National Revolution" for the sake of enriching themselves; hence, it was necessary to get the Guomindang out of Guangdong. In his report to Bubnov on the necessity of an agrarian revolution to accompany the Northern Expedition, he explains "It is necessary to pursue a policy to ensure that along its entire route of advance the army would carry out measures that would bring the peasantry to its feet and attract it to our side." He argued it would be up to the expedition either to solve the agrarian question, or at least begin to tackle it. "It is one thing to smash the generals, but to start changing land relations and the system of taxes is incomparably more difficult... Here one may encounter the resistance of whole classes." After his return to Guangzhou, he would work out a program for agrarian revolution that would differentiate the coming Northern Expedition from Sun Yatsen's previous campaigns. His projected program also included strengthening the Left Wing in the Guomindang and in the army; work among the peasants; strengthening the trade unions and infiltrating them with Communists; the growth and improvement of the Communist Party; and concentrating that party's efforts on its main tasks, one of which would be participation in the organisation and carrying through the Northern Expedition.⁶³² Clearly, this agenda would take much time to execute; it was not an argument for haste in launching a great political-military campaign.

The Bubnov Commission's final conclusion was that the conditions for a northern expedition had ripened and that it was necessary to prepare for a move to the North in six months. According to Mirovitskaia, Bubnov's report recommended to Moscow that it satisfy all of Guangzhou's requests.⁶³³ The Russian arms supplies were sent to Guangzhou from Vladivostok in May and June 1926. These included 13,694 rifles, 11 million cartridges, 65 machine guns, 12 mountain guns, 9 guns and 9 airplanes.⁶³⁴ The cost amounted to 564,148 roubles, payable on delivery. The supplies did not include spare parts for artillery and munitions.⁶³⁵ Six Russian ships regularly

⁶³² Mirovitskaia, R. A. *Soviet Volunteers in China, 1925-1945*, p.45.

⁶³³ Mirovitskaia, R. A. "The First Decade," p. 50.

⁶³⁴ See Mirovitskaia, R. A. "The First Decade", 49-50, which based on Soviet archives. Chiang Kaishek, however, mentions that Russian supplies arrived on 6 July, in *Jiang Jieshi nianpu*, p. 607. Another source by A. Yurkevich which quotes from A. Kalyagin's *On Foreign Road*, p.13, that between October 1924 and October 1926, the USSR shipped 24 aircraft, 157 field cannons, 48 mountain cannons, 128 mortars, 295 machine guns, 73,993 rifles and other armaments and materials to Guangzhou. See "The Huangpu Military School and the Chinese Revolution." *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1985, 4: 101.

plied between Vladivostok and Guangzhou loaded with oil, arms, and disassembled planes.⁶³⁶

Other than the situational factor, the Russians' support for a northern Expedition was also motivated by self interest. One result of the decision to launch the Northern Expedition was the opportunity it provided for Russian advisers to expand their work. Their activity had been sharply curtailed after the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident, as one of the Russian advisers put it, "they almost did not let us work" at the Huangpu Academy.⁶³⁷ Once the preparation for the Northern Expedition was underway, the Russian advisers were actively taking part in the work of drawing up plans and making other arrangements for the northern campaign.

The CCP's Participation in the Northern Expedition

The Chinese Communist Party's leadership initially also opposed to the National Government's decision to launch the Northern Expedition, but it soon changed course and directed Party members to arouse farmers to support the campaign. In its Second Enlarged Plenum convened in Shanghai from 12 to 18 July 1926, the Central Committee of the CCP deliberated a multitude of problems confronted by the party.⁶³⁸ Among them, most immediate problem was the CCP's policies toward the Northern Expedition. The leadership of the party was divided on this issue.⁶³⁹

The Central Committee's Political Report adopted at the July Plenum questioned the Guomindang government's decision to launch a full-scale Northern

⁶³⁶ *Soviet Plot in China*, p. 61. The draft of a telegram to Borodin dated 27 August 1926, lists the supplies already concentrated or to be assembled in a week's time at Vladivostok. The telegram apparently sent by the Russian military attache in Beijing, Egorov. The currency is not indicated.

⁶³⁷ Vishniakova-Akimova, *Dva Goda v Vosstavsheme kitae, 1925-1927: Vospominania*, p. 177.

⁶³⁸ See "Reports of Senior Artillery adviser Borodin on the Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army of China." *Istoricheskii Arkhiv*, no. 4 (1959): 105; Cherepanov, A. I. *Severnyi Pkhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya*, p. 120.

⁶³⁹ The original Chinese documents of the Second Enlarged Plenum of July 1926 have been found among the Beijing Raid papers. These include the Central Committee's political report and twelve resolutions. The following discussion of the CCP's policies toward the Northern Expedition is based on the documents 1, 53, 58 of the *Missionaries of Revolution*.

⁶⁴⁰ The Russian reports that there was no unanimous opinion among the CCP members. Certain organs and comrades opposed it and other members supported it. See "A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party", Document 1, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

Expedition. "In the South, the dispatch of the forces of the National Government signifies nothing more than a defensive war against the anti-Red army's penetration into Hunan and Guangdong. It does not signify a real revolutionary northern expedition".⁶⁴⁰ The Central Committee stand reflects Chen Duxiu's article entitled "The National Government's Northern Expedition" (*Lun guomin zhengfu yu beifa*) published a few days earlier in the CCP organ *Xiangdao zhoubao*. In it, Chen argues that judging from the National Government's political position, its army's strength, fighting capabilities, and revolutionary understanding, the time had not arrived for a revolutionary northern expedition. He then concluded that the present problem was not how to carry on the Northern Expedition but how to defend against Wu Peifu's southern expedition, the anti-Red armies invasion of Guangdong, and the anti-Red activities of compradors, local bullies, bureaucrats, and the Right Wing within the Guomindang.⁶⁴¹ The Central Committee's attitude is reflected in the Enlarged Plenum's documents, which contains only one explicit reference to the Northern Expedition.⁶⁴²

The CCP Central Committee's position evoked opposition from some of its leaders. According to Chang Guotao, a majority of the Central Committee at the Plenum, including Chen Duxiu and Peng Shuzhi, Chen's protege who headed the Propaganda Department, did not think highly of the expedition and doubted that the National Revolutionary Army could reach Wuhan. But Chang, Tan Pingshan, and Qu Qiupai demanded positive participation in the campaign.⁶⁴³ Qu, in fact, believed that the CCP should strive for hegemony during military operations.⁶⁴⁴ Tan Pingshan advocated using the expedition for the primary purpose of spreading agrarian revolution throughout China.⁶⁴⁵ The Communists in Guangdong also generally supported the

⁶⁴⁰ "Political Report of the Central Committee", Document 53, *op. cit.*, p. 723. Li Yunhan refers to the document as Chen Duxiu's political report in *Cong ronggong dao qingdang*, 2: 599.

⁶⁴¹ Chen Duxiu, *Lun guomin zhengfu yu beifa* (The National Government's Northern Expedition), *Xiangdao zhoubao*, no. 161 (July 1926), 1584-85.

⁶⁴² In one document it states that Communist must use various events such as May Thirtieth and the Northern Expedition for propaganda tours in the countryside to organise farmers's associations and similar groups. See "Resolutions on the Peasant Movement", Document 58, *op. cit.*, p. 749.

⁶⁴³ Chang Kuo-t'ao (Guotao), *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927*, 2: 526.

⁶⁴⁴ Bernadette Yu-ning Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai (Qu Qiupai): From Youth to Party Leadership (11899-1928), p. 178, citing Qu's *Zhongguo geming zhong zhi zhenglun wenti*, 1st ed., April 1927, 112, 170.

⁶⁴⁵ North and Eudin, ed., *M.N. Roy's Mission in China*, p. 35, which based on Roy's interview with Robert North in 1951.

campaign.⁶⁴⁶ Mao Zedong called for organisation of farmers during the expedition. At a meeting of the Guomintang's Farmers' Movement Committee on 30 March 1926, he proposed a motion to devote careful attention to the farmers' movement in the provinces to be crossed by the National Revolutionary Army.⁶⁴⁷

The Central Committee had more than those reasons advanced by Chen Duxiu for opposing the Northern Expedition. A major factor was its weakness relative to the Guomintang led by Commander-in-Chief Chiang Kaishek. The resolutions of the Guomintang CEC Second Plenum in May 1926 restricting Communist activity in the Guomintang had brought about sweeping changes at the Guomintang's Central Party Headquarters. The organisational outline of the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters published the next day placed all units of the army, navy, and the air force under the Commander-in-Chief's command. Article 8 invested in him the power of direction over military, civil, and financial organs of the National Government.⁶⁴⁸ Zhang Guotao memoirs indicate that the CCP began to cultivate its own armed forces after the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident. The CCP transferred more than forty Communists to the Independent Regiment of the IV Corps as junior and middle-ranking cadres. Ye Ting, the commander, was a Communist who kept his party affiliation secret. Before the regiment set out for Hunan in May, Zhang instructed Communist members of the unit to establish contact with underground CCP organs in various localities and raised money for the purchase of weapons and ammunition for the regiment. Russian advisers also did whatever they could to strengthen the regiment.⁶⁴⁹

Confronted with the danger of party division over the issue of the Northern Expedition, the Central Committee of the CCP changed its attitude toward the Northern Expedition shortly after the July plenum. In a directive to correct divisions within the

⁶⁴⁶ Chang Kuo-t'ao, *op. cit.*, 1: 526; Cherepanov, *Severnyi Pkhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya*, p. 143.

⁶⁴⁷ Stuart R. Schram, *Political Leaders of the Twentieth Century: Mao Tze-tung*, England: Penguin Books, 1966, p. 88.

⁶⁴⁸ *Geming wenxian*, 12: 1801-02.

⁶⁴⁹ Chang Kuo-t'ao, *op. cit.*, 1: 526-27; Zhou Shidi, a Communist officer of the Independent Regiment, states that after the establishment in the winter of 1925, all new soldiers and many cadres above the company level were Communists. See "Zhou Shidi huiyilu", reprint in *Huangpu junxiao shiliao*, 327-28. For the Russians' aid to the Independent Regiment, see Cherepanov, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

Party regarding the campaign, it declares that unity was essential and that the peasantry should be aroused to support the expedition.⁶⁵⁰

Although the Chinese Communist Party was eager to convert military men and had organised the League of Military Youth in 1925 for that purpose, the Party apparently was slow in creating an organisation among its military comrades to compete with the Guomindang nuclei in almost all units of the National Revolutionary Army.⁶⁵¹ The Communist Party had a secret Military Section in the Guangdong Provincial Committee and the Shanghai Central Committee (one of its functions was to guide the nuclei of the Communist Party which existed as illegal organisations in southern armies) but much of its work was directed toward enemy armies and local paramilitary forces.⁶⁵²

On the eve of the Northern Expedition in July 1926, the Central Committee criticised the ineffectiveness of the Party's military work "our organisation appears to be a study group," it complained.⁶⁵³ "Although our comrades' attention has most recently been directed to the military movement, they tend to emphasise manoeuvring high-ranking military officers" instead of "systematically preparing for armed uprisings." The Party urged its members should try to organise soldier's cells in "reactionary militarist" (warlord) armies, arsenals, and ordinance bureaus.⁶⁵⁴

In the plenum of the Central Committee held in December 1926, however, the Party made the decision to build nuclei in the army but only among commanding officers and not the rank and file. The Russian could have influenced the decision. Voitinsky, the Comintern's chief representatives to the Chinese Communist Party, opposed such policy by saying that Moscow had decided against organising Communist nuclei in the National Revolutionary Army. The main reason was "the fear

⁶⁵⁰ "A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party", Document 1, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

⁶⁵¹ Document 3, "The National Revolutionary Army: Short History of its Origin, Development, and Organisation (to March 1926)", *op. cit.*, p. 488.

⁶⁵² Its efforts were mostly directed towards enemy forces or assisting in the creation of workers' and peasants' armed groups. Document 44, "The Military Section Attached to the Provisional (Provincial) Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party", *op. cit.*, 686-88.

⁶⁵³ Document 65, "Resolutions on the Military Movement", *op. cit.*, 762-63.

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 763.

of revolutionising the army which pervades some party leaders."⁶⁵⁵ Behind that fear, no doubt, was the cardinal policy of the Comintern's Executive Committee, accepted by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, to work within the structure of the Guomindang and avoid "premature differentiation"--that is, the inevitable inter-party conflict. Discovery of Communist activity, particularly organisational activity, within the National Revolutionary Army would intensify the hostility of the Guomindang's Centre and Right wings, and even of Leftist allies, a prospect the Communist Party's Central Committee greatly feared.

In conclusion, with the exception of the I Corps, the National Revolutionary Army prior to the Northern Expedition was a very diverse regional force resembled warlord armies in the South China at the time. In terms of the command structure, the commander-in-chief had a direct command of the I Corps and general control of the rest of the army corps. The Party representatives appointed by the Guomindang assisted the corps command, and Russian advisers were assigned to the each corps. However, the personal and provincial nature of corps composition would allow the commanders of the corps to continue exercise personal control of their units. In this sense, each of the unit was very much an independent entity.

The overall National Revolutionary Army's strength and weaponry was weak as compared to its opponents. Among the units of the National Revolutionary Army, only three of the original eight corps, the I Corps, IV Corps and VII Corps, had the fighting capability. During the Northern Expedition, these three units would do most of the fighting (will be discussed in detail in next chapter). The leadership of these three corps would be decisive in determining the direction of the Guomindang revolution. In addition, as the fighting capability depended much more on the human elements--the fighting spirit, unit cohesion and leadership--than on technology, the requirements of the Russian expertise for modern warfare would be less important than its arms supplies.

Although the hard-pressed provincial financial budget and Russian aid were sufficient to maintain the original units of the National Revolutionary Army, it could not sustain the war for long or maintain the ever-expanding army of the Guomindang.

⁶⁵⁵ Nassanov, N., N. Fokine, and A. Albrecht. "The Letter from Shanghai, March 1927." *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, 397-432. Leon Trotsky. New York: Paragon Book Gallery, 1966, 421-423.

The Russians and the Chinese Communists were forced by circumstances to launch the northern expedition in the hope of increasing their presence and influence in some units of the National Revolutionary Army. Their influence was particularly strong in the IV Corps. Apart from this unit, their influence was very limited.

The National Revolutionary Army's officer corps had been an important and decisive factor. Through the school ties and teacher-student relationship, these officers had their own internal network to forge temporary unity. They shared a common nationalistic ideology such as the belief in a unified China and an active role of the military in national affairs. The alliance of the Guangdong-Guangxi was a manifestation of the officer corps trained in the same military academies that shared a similar outlook and concern for the political situation in China. However, most of them were also realistic to recognise that their immediate interests lay in the control of their own province and a friendly relationship with its neighbours. To a great extent, the launching of the Guomindang's Northern Expedition was a direct result of the VII Corps, the Guangxi units, involvement in the affairs of its neighbouring Hunan border. The commander of the VII Corps sent its troops there even before the Guomindang in Guangzhou made the decision. During the Northern Expedition, the IV, VII, and the I Corps did most of the fighting. The success of the Northern Expedition would depend very much on these units' performance and above all the commitment and co-operation of the officer corps in these units.

The success of the Northern Expedition was largely dependent on the cooperation of the officer corps. The success of the Northern Expedition was largely dependent on the cooperation of the officer corps. The success of the Northern Expedition was largely dependent on the cooperation of the officer corps. The success of the Northern Expedition was largely dependent on the cooperation of the officer corps.

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¹⁰⁸ See also the role of the officer corps in the Northern Expedition. *China Quarterly* 10 (1961), pp. 1-12. See also the role of the officer corps in the Northern Expedition. *China Quarterly* 10 (1961), pp. 1-12.

¹⁰⁹ Robert H. Ross, *The Rise of the Chinese Revolution* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952), p. 147.

¹¹⁰ David S. G. Good, *The Northern Expedition: A Study of the National Revolutionary Army, 1926-1928* (London: The University Press, 1962), p. 107.

Chapter 7: The National Revolutionary Army and the Northern Expedition

On 9 July 1926, the Guomindang officially launched the Northern Expedition. Once under way, the Northern Expedition split into three fronts. The first important action occurred on the Hunan front. The IV, VII and VIII Corps of the National Revolutionary Army accompanied by the Russian advisers and many left-wing Guomindang and Communists first moved into Changsha and then struck toward the inland city of Wuhan, the main power base of Wu Peifu. With Wuhan under seizure, the main central column, under Chiang Kaishek's command, marched into Jiangxi Province and made for Nanchang and then Nanjing. Finally, a coastal column under He Yingqin, comprising the I Corps, followed through Fujian and Zhejiang. By April 1927, the National Revolutionary Army took Hunan, Hubei, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui, Zhejiang, and parts of Jiangsu within the first nine months.⁶⁵⁶ The expedition was disrupted following the Nanjing-Wuhan confrontation but was resumed in early 1928. By the end of 1928 and after Zhang Xueliang pledged his allegiance to the National government in Nanjing, China was nominally under the banner of Guomindang.

The success of the Northern Expedition in 1926-28 has attracted many scholars' interests on the subject. Harold Isaacs advanced that the success of the Northern Expedition was political. He states that "...the masses of ordinary people rose in a veritable tidal wave that swept the expeditionary armies to the banks of the Yangtze [Yangzi]. The spontaneous rising of the people gave the Kuomintang [Guomindang] armies little more to do other than occupy the territories that had already been seized for them."⁶⁵⁷ This view has since been strongly disputed. Most notably by Donald Jordan who concludes in his study of mass movements during the Northern Expedition that its military aspects were more important than admitted even by the participants themselves.⁶⁵⁸

It is not the intention of this chapter to examine the Northern Expedition of 1926-1928 in its entirety. Instead, its primary aim is to look at the role of the National

⁶⁵⁶ *Beifa jianshi* (A brief battle history of the northern expedition), Taipei: Guofangbu shizheng ju, 41-99; *Beifa tongyi* (The northern expedition and the unification of China), edited by Chiang Wego, 1: 7-8; 3: 119-120, 122-138.



⁶⁵⁷ Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 111.

⁶⁵⁸ Donald A. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928*. Honolulu, USA: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, p. xi.

Map 7-1:

LOCATION OF PRINCIPAL CLIQUES
AND WARLORDS BEFORE THE BEGINNING
OF THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION, 1926*

Code or area:



Controlled by:

Fengtian clique

Sun Chuanfang

Guominjun

Wu Peifu

Shanxi
Shaanxi
Sichuan


Yan Xishun
Liu Chenhua
Several warlords
(constant state
of flux)

Yunnan and
Guizhou


Tang Jiyao

Guangxi
Guangdong

Guangxi clique
Guominjing



*Source: Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord*, p. 192.



Main lines of the Northern Expedition, 1926-7.

Revolutionary Army in the expedition. As the last chapter is devoted to examining the conditions and battle readiness of the National Revolutionary Army, this chapter will focus on the performance of the National Revolutionary Army in the Northern Expedition. It aims to examine two key questions. Despite being a smaller political-military group in the South, why did the Guomindang launch the Northern Expedition in 1926? Why was the Nationalist Revolutionary Army able to defeat the two powerful militarists Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang, which had a total strengths of three times the National Revolutionary, in central and southern China? Through the discussion of these questions it hopes to shed light on the contribution, strengths and weaknesses of the National Revolutionary Army.

Launching the Northern Expedition in 1926

Since 1917, Sun Yatsen had wanted to organise a military campaign to reunite China. He envisioned such a military expedition would start from his base in Guangzhou, unite progressive elements along the way, and together they would strike northward against entrenched militarism and foreign imperialism. Sun in this lifetime had organised two northern expeditions but with little success. Various reasons attributed to it, chief among them was his dependence on mercenary warlord armies and the Guomindang was too weak to challenge the northern militarists (see previous chapters for details).

Sun Yatsen's ambition to reunite China by force provided the general motivation but not specific reasons why another northern expedition was conducted in July 1926. The specific factors for launching the Northern Expedition in 1926 could be found in the military situation of mid-1920s. Arthur Waldron, in his recent work, provides a new interpretation of the Chinese nationalism in the 1920s. By looking at the nature of warfare and focusing tightly on the civil war in 1924, he argues "the disruption and destruction caused by the wars of 1924" as indispensable preconditions which paved the way for the subsequent May Thirtieth Movement and the Nationalist Revolution. His basic thesis is that, contrary to common belief that Chinese nationalism in the 1920s was created by various political movements under the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang, political events such as the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925 and the Nationalist Revolution of 1926-28 were developed as a direct consequence of the wars of 1924. The wars of 1924, as defined in the book, are the Jiangsu-Zhejiang War (28 August-2 October) and the Second Zhili-Fengtian War (17 September--23 October). The author believes these wars are significant because

"militarily, these wars marked the arrival in China of something new and deeply destabilising, which was fighting in the style of the First World War in Europe. *Jiazi* year (1924) saw the first example in Chinese history of a new kind of war fighting: *litizhan*--"three dimensional" or "combined arms warfare", in which operations by infantry, cavalry, ships, and aircraft were co-ordinated in the service of a single strategic plan."⁵⁵⁹

It is a fresh perspective to argue that the First World War technology and tactics transformed warfare in China, raising stakes, costs and impacts. The civil war had destroyed political confidence, and cleared the way for radical revolution and nationalism. Although one may take up issues in this work such as the impact of warfare on Chinese politics it is generally acceptable that the civil wars in mid-1920s had weakened the power of the northern militarists.⁶⁶⁰

The power balance in 1926 China was an important consideration for the Guomindang but the impact was not the void of power but the threat of the Guomindang's allies' security in the northern and central China. The defeat of the First Guominjun, the potential revolutionary ally of the Guomindang, in Tianjin and the re-emergence of Wu Peifu in Central China had a direct impact on the launching of the Northern Expedition. By the end of December 1925, Feng Yuxiang's First Guominjun

⁵⁵⁹ Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925*, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Waldron seems to treat "three dimensional" and "combined arms warfare" as the same. In fact, they are quite different. The "combined arms warfare" refers to the deployment of various arms of the land forces such as the infantry, tank, artillery and engineering in military operations. In a "three dimensional" warfare where land, sea and air forces are deployed in battles, it is called a "joint-service" operations. For the strategic plan, see p. 9.

⁶⁶⁰ For example, in Chapter Three: Armament and Tactics, the book describes in some length a list of weaponry and arsenals available in 1924 but it makes no attempt to assess the operational capabilities and performance. The author seems to assume that the presence of a large quantity of weaponry and numerous arsenals would naturally lead to higher levels of destruction, the kind of situation as seen in the European War of 1914-1918. The equation is never so simple. China had been defeated practically in all external wars since the Opium Wars of 1839. In each of these wars, she had overwhelming superiority of arms, *albeit* obsolete, and troops over its opponents. In battles, the effective use of arms is always much more important than the hardware and its number alone. This is the domain of tactics. By definition, tactics entails the deployment of arms and manpower in battle. Training and education of military officers and soldiers; the organisation of the battle formation; the operational doctrine, i.e. offensive and defensive doctrines; operational staff and planning in the high command, such as the general staff system which played such an important role in the European Great War of 1914-1918; the relationship between geographical and topographical conditions and the tactical deployment of troops and weapons; the logistics supply system; the command and communications system, e.g. the use of telegraph and field telephone in the battle; etc. These are the common tactical and operational issues of the major armies of the European Great War which the author claims to have taken as criteria for comparison to the wars of 1924 in China. Unfortunately, none of these issues are discussed except the use of the railways. Yet, major battles in the 1924 wars were fought outside the railway lines.

had succeeded in capturing Tianjin. But his ally, Guo Songlin, who had staged a revolt against Zhang Zuolin, had been crushed. Feng then announced his retirement on 1 January 1926, probably in the face of the alliance between Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu against him. During February, the Second and Third Guominjun, nominally under Feng's command, simply collapsed under attack by the Wu and Zhang forces. In March, the First Guominjun found itself in an impossible military situation in Tianjin and had to be evacuated to Feng's headquarters at Kalgan.⁶⁶¹ In Central China, Wu Peifu's comeback in October 1924 had been a slow process since his defeat in the Second Zhili-Fengtian War. However, with the death of General Xiao Yaonan, Wu's former subordinate and his supporters in Hubei, Wu acquired Xiao's resources in February 1926. He allied himself with Zhang Zuolin for a combined drive against their mutual enemy, Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun. Based in Hubei, Wu Peifu also had a hand in the politics of neighbouring Hunan and Jiangxi. On 13 March, Wu offered assistance to the governor of Hunan, Zhao Hengti, who had been driven out by Tang Shengzhi.⁶⁶² In Jiangxi, Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang agreed to upset Fang Benren, the military governor, who might have had a quasi-alliance with Guangzhou. On 1 April, Fang left Nanchang for Shanghai, and Deng Ruzhuo, the protege of Wu and Sun, announced that he was commander in chief of the Jiangxi army.⁶⁶³ Therefore before the end of April, the Nationalists' quasi-allies had suffered serious setbacks. With Wu's support, Ye Gaixin had driven Tang Shengzhi back to his base in Hengyang, in southern Hunan, and Tang was calling for help from the Guomintang members in Guangzhou. In fact, prior to the official launch of the Northern Expedition in early July

⁶⁶¹ For more on the revolt of Guo Songlin, see "Guo Songlin fan Feng zhanzheng" (The rebellion of Guo Songlin against Fengtian), V: 262-307, *Beiyang junfa, 1912-1928* (The beiyang warlords, 1912-1928). Editors Zhang Bofeng and Li Zongyi. Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 1990; for wars between Feng Yuxiang and Zhili-Fengtian armies, see "Guominjun yu beifang ge pai junfa de hunzhan (The mixed war between Feng Yuxiang's army and the rest of the northern warlords)", V: 308-342, *Ibid.*, for the Russian accounts of the Guominjun, see Julie How's study, "Russian Advisers with the Kuominchun, 1925-1926: A Documentary Study," *Chinese Studies in History* XIX, no. 1-2 (September 1985): 50-70.

⁶⁶² Before the end of April, Tang Shengzhi was one of the Nationalists' quasi-allies. When Tang was driven back to his base in Hengyang (in southern Hunan) by Ye Gaixin with Wu's support, he called the Guomintang in Guangzhou for help. By 25 March, the Nationalist delegates, Chen Mingshu (commander of the NRA's 12th Division of the IV Corps) and Bai Chongxi (the NRA's Chief of staff of the VII Corps), had arrived in Changsha to negotiate with Tang. By the end of the month Tang had driven Ye Gaixin, across the border into Hubei, but this immediately brought on Wu's counteraction. Guo Jianlin, *Wu Peifu da zhuan*, II: 640-42.

⁶⁶³ For details of Sun Chuanfang in Jiangxi, see "Wusheng lianjub yu Fengxi zhan zheng" (The war between the federation of five provinces and Fengtian), V: 222-25, *Beiyang junfa*.

1926, units of the VII Corps of the National Revolutionary Army were already engaged in operations against Wu Peifu's supporters in Guangxi-Hunan borders.⁶⁶⁴

As early as 3 April, Chiang Kaishek proposed to the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang six basic policies to prepare for the Northern Expedition. They included, firstly, to affiliate with Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun and get its army to retreat to the Northwest to consolidate its strength. Secondly, to "unite" with Soviet Russia to increase the power of the revolution. Thirdly, to send delegates to Sichuan and Guizhou to persuade them to entangle with the armies of Hubei and Yunnan. Fourthly, to unite with Hunan and Guangxi for an offensive-defensive alliance and prepare for a joint military effort troops to hamper a southern move by Wu Peifu's army. Fifthly, to affiliate with Sun Chuanfang so he would take a neutral rather than a hostile stand. Lastly, to decide within three months whether Guangdong and Guangxi will actually launch a Northern Expedition if preparations have been completed.⁶⁶⁵ In brief, the basic strategy was to prepare a northern expedition against Wu Peifu in Hunan and Hubei; to ally with Feng Yuxiang who would hold the Fengtian forces in the North; and to negotiate with Sun Chuanfang in the southeast so as to delay his involvement in the conflict.

The Russians, however, give a different account of the strategic plan. Cherepanov recalls that by the time Bliukher returned to Guangzhou in May 1926 to replace Kuibyshev as the chief military adviser, he found a strategic plan had been worked out. The plan called for occupation of Hunan and Jiangxi and an advance into Hubei. Three National Revolutionary Army corps were to invade Jiangxi and the other four to take Hunan. This meant fighting Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang simultaneously. Therefore, from the first day of his return, Bliukher sought to change the strategic plan to confine operations to Hunan. After numerous conferences he dictated a new plan to Li Jishen, the chief of staff, calling for them to take Hunan and Wuhan and then uniting with Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun. The National Revolutionary Army units were to concentrate on 13 July at various designated points. The new plan was approved at a meeting of the Military Council on 23 June.⁶⁶⁶

⁶⁶⁴ *Li Zongren huiyilu* (The memoirs of Li Zongren), interviewed by Tang Dekang, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 2nd., 1988, 192-95. The commander of the VII Corps Li Zongren sent his forces to aid Tang Shengzhi without prior approval of the Guomindang. Li only informed Guangzhou about his decision and urged the Guomindang quickly launch the Northern Expedition.

⁶⁶⁵ *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 3 April 1926, p. 555; *Beifa riji*, 1 July 1926, 6-7.

⁶⁶⁶ A.I. Cherepanov, *Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revolyutsionno Armii Kitaya*, 123-127.

What the Russians failed to mention was the fact that the crisis in Hunan had a strong influence on the plan of the Northern Expedition. Hunan shares a common border with Guangxi and it was in the interest of the VII Corps (The Guangxi forces) to aid Tang Shengzhi in order to halt Wu Peifu from threatening his position. There was another reason why the National Revolutionary Army would not be able to commit all its forces in Hunan. Among the eight corps, three were originated from Hunan. The II and VI Corps, commanded by Tan Yuankai and Cheng Qian, were Hunanese and had previously crossed fire with Tang Shengzhi (see the previous chapter). These two corps were definitely unwelcome in Hunan. Therefore, they and other less battle-worthy corps were deployed along Guangdong-Jiangxi borders. The Hunan front was given to the IV, VII and VIII of the National Revolutionary Army. The Russian advisers accompanied them and many left-wing Guomindang and Communists who had close association with local labour and peasant organisations.

In summary, the prime mover for the 1926 Northern Expedition was the National Revolutionary Army spearheaded by its Commander-in-Chief, Chiang Kaishek. The National Revolutionary Army was keen to pursue a northern expedition in 1926 as they saw the opportunity to strike when major militarists were relatively weak. With the Russians' aids, both in armaments and military advice, Chiang and the National Revolutionary Army planned a strategy of taking its main opponents one at a time. The deployment plan of the National Revolutionary Army was carefully worked out along the lines of regional sensitivity and conditions in each province. Regional identity and power conflicts were important considerations. The expedition was certainly a brilliant decision made at the right time and the right place. The decision also reflected a strong presence of the National Revolutionary Army's leadership in driving the Northern Expedition.

Regionalism and Nationalism

Other than the right decision, the National Revolutionary Army was also skilful in manipulating the sentiments of both regionalism and nationalism in the Northern Expedition. Chiang Kaishek and his commanders understood these two currents flowing through China simultaneously and often manipulated their strengths effectively. In his inaugural speech as Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army Chiang offered other militarists who were willing to follow the Guomindang's Three People's Principles to join in the expedition. He promised that he

would treat them "absolutely without bias of regional distinction of the North and South, neither with feeling of gratitude or resentment or with differentiation of the old and new (units)."⁶⁶⁷

The regional identity of the North and the South had developed over a long period of time but became more politically pronounced after the 1911 Revolution (see Chapter 1). This distinction was rooted in very real and different subcultures.⁶⁶⁸ In his study of warlord politics, Ch'i His-sheng observes the northern warlords explicitly warned their followers "the forthright and honest northern soldiers could never expect to receive a fair deal from those cunning and treacherous southerners." As the result, few high-ranking northern generals defected or surrender to the Guomindang without a serious battle. Ch'i further argues that the wide gap in political style, ideological outlook, educational background, and personal loyalties between the northern and southern military groups let them to conclude that compromise was impossible.⁶⁶⁹ During the Northern Expedition the National Revolutionary Army was successful in using regional identity to convince many local militarists from provinces south of the Yangzi River to come over the Guomindang's side. The Guomindang also succeeded in mobilising mass and civilian support mainly in the South. This has led Donald Jordan to conclude that although the Guomindang proclaimed nationalism as its goal, it took every chance to address regional identity when it tried to make southern militarists defect. However, Jordan attributes the uncompromising attitudes between North and South was mainly due to educational differences.⁶⁷⁰

Closely related to the North-South divide is the question of ideology. The ideological ferment and conflict between the North and South was even more diverse and complicated. Hu Shi and a number of his contemporaries argue that there did exist a "new China" and a "old China". Hu commented in 1926 that he saw the fifteen-year Republican China as a failure but a failure of the "old China." "New China had never

⁶⁶⁷ *Beifa riji*, 9 July 1926, 13-16.

⁶⁶⁸ See Chen Xulin, *Zhongguo nanbei wenhua guan* (A critical survey between northern and southern culture in China). Taipei: Mutong chubanshe, 1976; and *Zhongguo wenhua de chulu* (The opening for Chinese culture). Shanghai: Shangwu, 1934, 124-145.

⁶⁶⁹ Ch'i His-sheng, *Warlord Politics*, 115.

⁶⁷⁰ Jordan, *Northern Expedition*, 74, 85-9, 285-86.

been in power" yet. Therefore, the fundamental problem in China, Hu argued, had been a "conflict between the new and the old."⁶⁷¹

Hu Shi saw the Russian sponsored reorganisation of the Guomindang in 1924 a step to enlist students who were inspired not by left-wing communist ideology but by the ideas of the New Cultural Movement. Hence he regarded the Russian-Guomindang co-operation a part and consequence of the larger movement he named the "Chinese Renaissance". He defined the Guomindang's movement in 1927 a conscious attempt to work out solutions for our own problems in the light of our own needs and in the light of our historical heritage." In brief, he saw it as a "new revolution from within". Hu proclaimed that the Guomindang was "probably the only movement" that could defend China against the foreign powers, and more importantly, end military rule. It marked "the first time since the founding of the Republic that a new force, a revolutionary army, has appeared on the scene." He believed it might "bring to China, if not a fundamental, at least, a transitional salvation" and he predicted that "it was tending towards a basic salvation."⁶⁷² Thus, in 1926 he publicly admitted the Guomindang's movement as part of the New China or Young China.

Ideology and Indoctrination

Diana Lary suggests that in order to end warlordism in the 1920s' China she needed a military force to unite all regional forces and that this military force must commit itself with a higher ideological goal to crush regional militarism.⁶⁷³ The importance of ideology in the 1920s was manifested in the proliferation of "isms" in China. Among them, nationalism was certainly the most potent. Like in many other nations, the power of nationalism lay in how it touches people's feelings rather its theoretical discourse. For the majority of the Guomindang's participants, slogans directed towards emotions were much more important than elaborated theoretical constructs. Among the Guomindang's leadership, Chiang Kaishek was probably the one who fully realised and intended to use nationalism in the Northern Expedition. Chiang grasped its utility through his appreciation of the power of regional identity. He argues that if the northern warlords could not win a war in the hostile South, then

⁶⁷¹ "China at the Parting of the Ways", in *Hu Shi de riji*, 26 November 1926.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*; Hu Shi et al., *Forward or Backward in China*. Beijing: Peking Leader Press, 1927, 5-9. See also Patrick Cavendish, "The New China of the Kuomintang" in Jack Gray, ed., *Modern China's Search for a Political Form*, London, 1969, 139.

⁶⁷³ Lary, Diana. *Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937*. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.13.

certainly the imperialist powers could not conquer an aroused populace in a war in the Chinese interior. He, therefore, discounted the threat of foreign retaliation, whether or not he adopted an extreme nationalist position. Just as important, if the National Revolutionary Army was to fight any imperialist power, it would immediately win popular support throughout the country. In such a context, even defeat would eventually benefit the Guomintang more than any other Chinese contender.⁶⁷⁴

The Guomintang's was not the only army adopting ideology for its soldiers. In fact, it was the northern militarists who started introducing ideology in the army. Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang adopted indoctrination or spiritual education in their armies before they allied with the Guomintang and modelled the Russian military methods. In Hunan, Tang Shengzhi applied Buddhism as his ideology. When he joined the Guomintang in 1926, Tang managed to combine Buddhism and revolutionary principles to cultivate a "Buddhist Revolution". The National Revolutionary Army generally displayed a high degree of group solidarity and this could have driven other northern militarists to become more ideological. Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu at first referred to Feng's Guominjun as "reds" but that label soon went primarily to the National Revolutionary Army.⁶⁷⁵

The ideological distinction between the North and South, however, had also a political dimension. Some northern militarists used the term "reds" to gain support from foreign powers. Other might single out the difference in order to promote unity of the northern militarists. Before Hunan and Hubei became "red", the ideological distinction was not so strong and clear. Wu Peifu was willing to adopt the "anti-red" banner to co-operate with Zhang Zuolin in fighting against Feng Yuxiang. But he would resist Zhang's military support in fighting against the Guomintang in his controlled territory. These two examples indicate the limited role of ideology in the minds of major militarists. For the same reason, Sun Chuanfang did not support Wu

⁶⁷⁴ Chiang Kaishek, "Military Plan to the Military Council", 7 July 1925, *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao*, 384-92; "Address at the Military Council", 26 July 1925, *Jiang Zhongzheng xiansheng yanshou ji* (Chiang Kaishek's speeches), comp. by Jia Betao, (Shanghai, 1925), 101-112. For Chiang's belief that a war between Britain and the Guomintang "might unite the rest of China" see William R. Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1971, p.129, where the author cited J.W. Jamieson, the British consul at Guangzhou shared Chiang's perception.

⁶⁷⁵ Ch'i, *Warlord Politics*, 54-56, 95-100, 115; Donald G. Gillin, *Warlord Yen His-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1945*, 59-65; James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang*, 78-83. For Tang Shengzhi's Buddhist Revolution, see Li Pingxian, *Li Pingxian huiyilu* (Memoirs of Li Pingxian), Taipei, 1975, 59-62.

nor urged other northern militarists to support Wu during the Hunan and Hubei campaign until Sun was attacked by the National Revolutionary Army.⁶⁷⁶

In brief, the Guomindang had been a national political party with a nationalist ideology. Since 1921, however, it had been associated with the South as it built its revolutionary base in Guangzhou. The Party had created a new agenda but it had to respond to the needs and objectives of the South. Although its followers were mainly southerners, the Guomindang had, in the words of one author, "evangelised throughout China and could boast a membership that was at least nominally representatives of all the region."⁶⁷⁷ Ideology was an important and effective propaganda tool to the National Revolutionary Army. The simplified Three Peoples' Principles was able to provide the soldiers with a clear purpose--to save the nation from the oppression of imperialism and warlordism, for which they fought.

One issue that scholars have been debating is that did political propaganda directly promote military success? Donald Jordan has corrected the previous belief that there was a mass wave of propaganda teams at work ahead of the National Revolutionary Army. Most propaganda teams in fact followed the Guomindang's army. Even if they were ahead of the troops, the propaganda teams were there to distribute leaflets or write some Guomindang' slogans on the walls. In the urban areas such slogans and leaflets might have excited the young and educated Chinese but such areas were usually far from the battlefield. In the countryside, where battles were decided, it is doubtful that propaganda had much impact on the residents.⁶⁷⁸ Guo Moruo, who was in charge of propaganda in the Party Army during the early period of the expedition, recalled that the propaganda teams were facing difficulty just to follow the advance of the troops, not to mention doing anything else.⁶⁷⁹

The political workers of the National Revolutionary Army also reported difficulties in Guomindang occupied area of Henan. The literacy rate was general low and the effect of written slogans was greatly reduced. The Henan people spoke

⁶⁷⁶ See *Beiyang junfa*, V: 380-391, the exchange of telegrams among Wu Peifu, Zhang Zuolin, Sun Chuanfang and other northern militarists.

⁶⁷⁷ Jordan, *Northern Expedition*, 289.

⁶⁷⁸ The US military intelligence observed the relationship between the military success and propaganda, *US Military Intelligence Reports*, XXV, 11411.

⁶⁷⁹ Guo Moruo, *Geming chungkuo* (Events during the revolution), Shanghai: Haiyan Bookstore, 1947, 287-331.

different dialects and it as difficult for the southern political workers to communicate with local residents.⁶⁸⁰ If political works under the occupied area was difficult, it would even worse in areas under the control of hostile forces. Thus, the political propaganda failed to achieve the same results as in the Eastern Expedition.

The Party-Army Relations

The close relationship between the civilian and the military within in the Guomindang was another contributing factor to the Northern Expedition success. The re-organised Guomindang after 1924 provided the structure and channels that would bridge and integrate the civilian and military components of the Party. As Wang Jingwei explained, "the previous failure of our Party was because of the separation between the Party and the army." "We have now established this [Huangpu] academy for the purpose of unity between the belief and force. For the sake of belief, we have established the Party; for the sake of force, we would build up an army... the Party and the army, therefore, were interdependent for survival. The Party created the army, without the Party, there would be no army. The Party depended on the army, without the army, the Party would not exist".⁶⁸¹ One of the instructors of the Huangpu Military Academy, Ye Jianyin, who later became a leading general in the Communist Army, summarised this relationship as that "the army was converted form the Party; the Party's accomplishments and achievements depended on the army (jun yi dang hua, dang yi jun cheng)."⁶⁸²

Hu Shi also applauded the integration of the Party and the army. He observed that not only were there Party representatives in every military units, but "the whole Party was more or less under a military type of discipline." He concluded, "The army thus organised had certainly won victories over the older armies which were not organised."⁶⁸³ Wellington Koo called it "unprecedented element in China, the political organisation supporting the military actions contributed to the success of the National Revolutionary Army."⁶⁸⁴ Overall, although, the new relationship between the Party and

⁶⁸⁰ *Beifa zhanzheng in Henan* (The northern expedition in Henan), comp. by Henan sheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui. Kaifeng: Henan chubanshe, 1985. See reports on 319, 327, 322, 358-59.

⁶⁸¹ *Hunagpu junxiao shiliao, 1924-1927*, p. 43.

⁶⁸² Pan Qiaoshi, "Geming hongliu zhong de Ye Jianyin" (Ye Jianyin in the stormy water of revolution), *Xinghuo liao yuan*, bimonthly, Beijing, special issue, 1983, p. 8.

⁶⁸³ Hu Shi, "Addressing at the Royal Institute of the International Affairs", 9 November 1926, *Journal Royal Institute of International Affairs*, V: Nov-Dec December 1926, 278-9.

the army was complex and often troublesome, it brought about a rare integration of civil-military resources that put the National Revolutionary Army above other major militarists.

Defections and Decisive Battles

Scholars who have studied Chinese warlordism generally agree that by mid-1926, warlordism had evolved into a political and military system with a set of rules and perceptions that governed the resolution of its conflicts. In his study of warlord politics during the Republican China, Lucian Pye focuses on the limits of the warlords' political structure. Pye argues that warlord politics is essentially factional, formed by groups whose main purpose is the search for power. When the group around the warlord is small, loyalty is gained through the use of particularistic ties such as teacher-student and sworn brother relationship.⁶⁸⁵ However, as the size of the warlord's forces expanded and the number of subordinates increased, the central power would be unable to hold the structure together. This was particularly true when a warlord emerged as a multi-provincial figure, a "super-warlord" ("super-*dujun*" or overlord)⁶⁸⁶, who had to deal with subordinates who were now warlords themselves. As these subordinates ran their own provinces, they placed conflicting demands on the "super-warlord" for arms or resources. So, when the "super-warlord" was unable to meet all the demands placed on him, he had to sacrifice efficiency for loyalty. At the same time, the "super-warlord" would have to find a new way to bind his top subordinates by tempting them with the prospect of future rewards.⁶⁸⁷ If the "super-warlord" continued to prosper, or expand, the subordinates would remain loyal. If not, they would begin to look elsewhere. This would, in turn, produce a rapid downward spiral, as one defection produced others.⁶⁸⁸ Thus, concludes Pye, no warlord could expand beyond his ability to manage his personal ties with his subordinates.

⁶⁸⁴ Gu Weijun [V.K. Wellington]. *Gu Weijun huiyilu* (Reminiscences of Gu Weijun), Vol. 1: 303.

⁶⁸⁵ Lucian W. Pye, *Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernisation of Republican China*. New York: Praeger, 1971, p.49.

⁶⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 50, 52.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 52-55.

Ch'i Hsi-sheng in his study of warlord politics also analyses the internal dynamics of the relationships within a warlord faction and agrees that a warlord could not expand beyond his ability to maintain the loyalty of his subordinates. He agrees that at a certain point the subordinates would be motivated by pure self-interest.⁶⁸⁷ But Ch'i also believes that the warlord system has its own build-in constraints that he terms "a balance of power". Ch'i argues that when one or another warlord expands to a certain point, the other warlords will ally against him, thus balancing his power.⁶⁸⁸

In addition, there was another constraint to the warlord power that is not discussed by either Pye or Ch'i. Below the "super-warlord" and the provincial warlords was another layer of militarists who were closely attached to the ground. These were small, sub-provincial, usually rural figures who were not part of any warlord or "super-warlord" units but who were counted as his subordinates because they controlled the territory within that claimed by them. These local warlords represent a third constraint on the warlord's power. These warlords were able to exercise real authority at the local level.

The behaviour of these local "subordinates" was not controlled by particular ties or by the promise of rewards because they already had held their territory and had not gained it through the action of the major militarists. Thus, local militarists' behaviour was quite different from the major militarists discussed by Pye and Ch'i. Specifically, these local militarists were tied to their localities and to the revenues that they derived from it, and they would try to maintain their hold on them regardless of whom the major militarists might be. They were the true exemplars of the "pure self-interest" discussed by Ch'i Hsi-sheng. As we shall see in the Northern Expedition, some militarists did retreat with their overlords despite the fact that this meant the loss of their base. Local militarists almost never withdrew; they merely came to terms with the new overlord.

By the mid-1920s, the general situation in the warlord-controlled regions was that, overlords ruled their territory through the provincial warlords; the provincial warlords, in turn, ruled through the acquiescence of the local warlords. Thus, overlords such as Wu Peifu might claim the provinces of Hunan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan,

⁶⁸⁷ Hsi-sheng Chi, *Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976, see "Calculations of Self-Interest" in Chapter 3, 47-54.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 51-54.

Henan and Hubei in 1926, but in fact, he had little power in the first, and none whatsoever in the other provinces where he "ruled" through the local warlords.⁶⁹¹

Another important factor that governed a warlord's behaviour in conflict was the power perception of the parties involved. In an era when wars were frequently declared but seldom fought, conflicts were resolved by perception. Lucian Pye calls it the "logic of power", by which major warlords (overlord and provincial warlords) decided to align with one another to determine the results of conflict politically, by achieving the perception that one warlord's force was more powerful than another.⁶⁹² Ch'i Hsi-sheng also discusses the use of mutinies, defections and other political means to solve disputes by creating coalitions that look too powerful to oppose, as well as the problems faced by smaller warlords with having to choose between two camps.⁶⁹³ All of this manoeuvring was aimed at the perception of victory. In practice, these perceptions had hardened into what might be called "rules" that governed not only the warlords' behaviour, but also determined the outcome of the conflict. There was, of course, bloody fighting among warlords, some even fairly stiff battles, but these usually occurred only after the "rules" could not determine the victor, or in some rare occasions, when the loser refused to accept the result.

During the Northern Expedition, some of the characteristics of warlord warfare were exhibited, but there were some fundamental changes in the conduct of warfare by the National Revolutionary Army. The traditional patterns of warfare such as defection and the new tactics of the National Revolutionary Army--to fight a decisive battle--could be discerned in the Northern Expedition. The following military campaigns of the National Revolutionary Army in central and southern China are just a few examples.

The Hunan-Hubei Campaign

In the mid-1920s, Hunan became part of Wu Peifu's territorial base because the provincial warlord Zhao Hengti professed allegiance to Wu. Zhao's power, in turn, was

⁶⁹¹ On the relationship between the overlord and the local warlord, James Sheridan notes Feng Yuxiang's problems with the local warlords in Shanxi. See James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-siang*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966, 103-107.

⁶⁹² Lucian W. Pye, *Warlord Politics*, p. 167.

⁶⁹³ Hsi-sheng Chi, *Warlord Politics in China*, 33-40, 59-60.

limited by the existence of three local warlords who controlled most of the rest of the province. Wu had no troops directly under him in the province in 1926. Thus, as the National Revolutionary Army began to enter the province in spring and summer that year, all the warlord units in the province had to face the same decisions forced upon them by Tang Shengzhi's advance northward through the province earlier that year.

In fact, the two campaigns (see previous chapter on the VIII Corps) looked remarkably similar, and also appeared to closely resemble other warlord campaigns of the period. First, none of the local warlords, apart from Tang, would fight either for or against the National Revolutionary Army. This had been the case during Tang's original advance, as the locals awaited the outcome of the battles between Tang and Wu Peifu. The provincial warlord responded to the logic of force by withdrawing into Hubei to join the regular force of Wu Peifu, just as he had during Tang's first advance.

The result is that the National Revolutionary Army found no one to fight in Hunan, and the army was able to move northward quickly, although the National Revolutionary Army moved no more quickly than Tang had earlier.⁶⁹⁴ The closest thing resembling a battle was a skirmish at the Guluo River where the National Revolutionary Army casualties were more than ten officers and 200 men.⁶⁹⁵

There were several groups of warlord units in Hunan on the eve of the Northern Expedition. First, there were the indigenous Hunanese units nominally or actually loyal to the provincial warlord Zhao Hengti. The four divisions were all Hunanese and all contained a fairly high percentage of Baoding graduates. Yet, the four unit commanders reacted differently to the invasion of the National Revolutionary Army, just as they had done during the earlier advance. Tang Shengzhi had already joined the National Revolutionary Army. He Yaozu led his unit into Jiangxi, a province under Sun Chuanfang, to wait the outcome of the battles between the National Revolutionary Army and Wu Peifu. Liu Xing's division had already been split following Tang's arrest of Liu in March. Ye Qi took over most of the force for Tang, and accompanied him the

⁶⁹⁴ Tang's first advance had taken a little over two weeks. Guangzhou declared the Northern Expedition on 9 July and arrived in Yuezhou on 22 August. For detail, see *Beifa zhenzhong riji* (The war diary of the northern expedition), July 1926 to May 1928, Guomin gemingjun zongsiling bu canmou chu (The general staff department of the general headquarters of the national revolutionary army). Reprint by *Jindai pihai*, vol. 14. Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1988, 13-76.

⁶⁹⁵ *Beifa zhenzhong riji*, p. 76.

spring campaign. When Tang was forced to retreat, Ye joined Zhao Hengti. With Tang again on the advance, Ye joined him once again. His unit had yet to move.⁶⁹⁶ Once Chiang Kaishek had defeated Wu Peifu in Hubei, both Ye and He joined the National Revolutionary Army.⁶⁹⁷

The second militant group in Hunan comprised the fixed forces from Jiangxi and Guangdong that had fled to Hunan following their ouster from their native provinces that they controlled in the name of Wu Peifu. These units were either unwilling or unable to make their peace with the National Revolutionary Army and continued to withdraw northward even after Wu had been defeated.

The third group of units in Hunan were the Hubei troops that occupied the Hunan-Hubei border. Regular troops of Wu Peifu for the most part, withdrew into Hubei to fight the National Revolutionary Army on more favourable terrain. The one exception was Xia Douyin's 2nd Hubei Mixed Bridge, which joined Tang's VIII Corps. The fourth group was made up of the "Help Hunan Army" which like the Hubei troops withdrew into Hubei to fight the National Revolutionary Army.

The fifth group comprised Guizhou Army units commanded by Yuan Zuming. Yuan, the governor of Guizhou and a provincial warlord only nominally subordinated to Wu Peifu, had taken the advantage of Wu's problems in eastern Hunan to push out southwest of Hunan. With Wu now in retreat, and with neighbouring Guangxi already with the National Revolutionary Army, Yuan did the same, and his units were enrolled as the VIII, X, XII Corps in July and August, thus "legitimatising" his new territory in Hunan.⁶⁹⁸

⁶⁹⁶ *Beifa zhanshi*, II: 337.

⁶⁹⁷ Ye Kaixin and his troops joined as the XXXIV Corps. *Beifa zhanshi*, II: 648. He Yaozu joined the National Revolutionary Army in Jiangxi as the XXXX Corps, but he was arrested in 1928. The unit was later reorganised as the 8th Division of the Central Army. "He Yaozu", *Chuanji wenxue*, XXXV:1 (July 1969), p. 147.

⁶⁹⁸ See *Beifa zhanshi*, I: 361, 405. The three units did very little fighting and had no apparent impact on the outcome of the Northern Expedition. Two of the three corps commanders and several subordinate commanders were executed by the Central Army in July 1927, and the units were either taken over or returned to Guizhou. Donald Jordan, on the other hand, claims that these units "were readied to rush eastward through Hunan toward the Jiangxi border", and that "their presence in western Hunan allowed the National Revolutionary Army to concentrate its forces elsewhere." However, Jordan offers no evidence to prove this. The Guomindang official history points out that the units refused to obey orders. See his *The Northern Expedition*, 265-6, 278-9. On the poor quality and rapacious nature of these units, see Wan Yaohuang, *op. cit.*, XVII: 2 (February 1975), p. 78; Chen Xisheng, *op. cit.*, 185-6; *Beifa zhanshi*, I: 70-1. In fact, the NRA had no flank to defend from the west, as it had no enemies to the west.

In all, there were twenty-three warlord units in Hunan on the eve of the Northern Expedition. Among them, eleven withdrew from the province, five joined the National Revolutionary Army, three disappeared altogether, one was disarmed and three were neutral.⁶⁹⁹ Thus, the eleven that withdrew and the three neutral units indicate that well over half the units in Hunan were still uncertain of the outcome because the National Revolutionary Army had still not been tested against Wu Peifu's regular force. In terms of the rules of the warlord warfare, these unit commanders would wait until the situation became clear. Their movements had nothing to do either with mass movements or the unity of the National Revolutionary Army that had yet to fight a battle.

Although Wu Peifu had not contested Hunan, he would stand against the invasion of Hubei. Wu's control of Hunan had not been very strong. He had few troops there and the province shared a long border with Jiangxi which was under Sun Chuanfang. Wu could afford to cede Hunan to the National Revolutionary Army temporarily. If he could win the battle in Hubei, it would be easy enough to return to Hunan.

For the National Revolutionary Army, now in northern Hunan, the decision was divided. Some wanted to continue to move north, against the forces of Wu Peifu, while others wanted to move east into Jiangxi against Sun Chuanfang. After what was reported to have been a particularly heated military conference, the National Revolutionary Army divided into two main forces, one to keep an eye on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, and the other to march north against Wu Peifu.⁷⁰⁰

The battle in Hubei could be divided into two stages. First, there were the battles at the border, at Dingsiqiao, Xianning and Heshengjiao. Second, there were the

if there was a need to defend such a flank, it would have been handled by the units under Li Zongren that had been left behind in Guangxi.

⁶⁹⁹ There were no reasons given for units disappearance during this period. It could be that these units were quite small and they were either absorbed directly into a larger unit without the commanding officers or simply disbanded. The "neutral units" refers to local warlords who were not near the main area of military activity or who withdrew to such an area until the battle was over before deciding which side to join.

⁷⁰⁰ For Li Zongren's account of the conference, see *Li Zongren huiyilu*, 171-174. Although Li frequently distorts the facts to promote his own sagacity, it seems to be true when he claims that he and Tang Shengzhi wanted to go north against Wu Peifu, while Chiang was presumably motivated by a desire to achieve a link with the remainder of his I Corps which was still in Guangdong along the border with Jiangxi and Fujian.

battles for the walled cities: Wuchang, Hankou and Hanyang (see map 7-3). During these battles, the National Revolutionary Army's goal was to ignore the local warlords, find Wu's regular units, forced them to fight and to destroy them--something quite different from warlord warfare. The new tactics of the three core units of the National Revolutionary Army would be put to the test.

Using the IV and VII Corps as the vanguard, Chiang sent the IV Corps directly against the railroad bridges of Dingsi and Hesheng, while the VII Corps circled around to try to encircle Wu from the rear. The battle for the bridges was bloody; the IV Corps forced its way across them under the artillery that Wu had installed on the heights commanding the bridges, in addition to the guns of the armoured railroad cars Wu had transferred south. The attack began on 26 August, and lasted six days, ending with the IV Corps' capture of Heshengqiao on the 31 August.⁷⁰¹

The IV and VII Corps fought a bloody battle and accomplished a significant victory in this campaign. Although Wu Peifu had enjoyed superiority in manpower, weaponry and terrain, they had attacked nonetheless. Most significantly, the junior officers of the IV Corps had proved singularly courageous by leading the charges across the bridges, and also by leading small units up into the mountains to silent Wu's artillery. Wu's warlord conscripts were no matches for the IV Corps motivated troops. Faced by the willingness of the IV Corps to sustain casualties by assaulting the bridges directly, most of Wu's troops simply surrendered.⁷⁰²

In this battle, IV Corps troops exhibited most of the military advantages it enjoyed over its opponents: the willingness and ability to sustain casualties, as demonstrated by the assaults on the bridges; the importance of a qualified and motivated junior officer corps, who commanded both of these efforts; a disregard for the "rules" of warlord warfare, which dictated that attack only with superiority forces.

⁷⁰¹ There are dozens of accounts of the battles for the bridges. Some of the first hand versions are from Li Zongren, *op. cit.*, 181-182; Li Pinxian, *op. cit.*, XV: 2 (February 1974), 74-75; *Beifa tungyi wushi zhounian tekan* (A special publication in honour of the 50th anniversary of the northern expedition), Taipei: Guofangbu shizhengju, 1978, 104-106; and the official version, *Beifa zhanshi*, 401-432.

⁷⁰² In all, the IV and VII Corps had 32 officers and 235 soldiers killed, 41 officers and 769 men wounded. *Beifa zhanshi*, p. 418, chart 26; p. 428, chart 29. By comparison, the NRA captured almost 6,000 officers and men. *Ibid.*, p. 417, chart 25, p. 427, chart 28.

Wu Peifu was forced to withdraw while his forces remained inside the walled cities. The impregnability of the walled cities was overrated in warlord warfare, especially with the advent of modern artillery. More importantly, as the I Corps (formerly the Huangpu Army) and the IV Corps had demonstrated against Chen Jiongming's forces in 1925, walled cities were vulnerable to direct assault, provided that the attacking force was willing to sustain the casualties usually in an effort to scale the city's walls. Thus, despite the objections of some of the other commanders, Chiang ordered direct assaults on Hanyang and Hankou.

The man defending Hanyang, Liu Zuolong, had no heart for this type of warfare and as soon as his outlying positions had been overrun, he surrendered to the National Revolutionary Army rather than face a direct assault.⁷⁰³ On 7 September, Wu Peifu abandoned Hankou and the National Revolutionary Army occupied the city the next day. Wu's made his last stand in Wuchang, Hubei. Wuchang's thick walls stood against the National Revolutionary Army's artillery and successfully repelled several bloody attempts to scale the walls. After these defeats, which were criticised by Li Zongren and others as suicidal,⁷⁰⁴ Chiang called a halt to the attack, and ordered the city laid siege. Thus, despite his emphasis on direct assault as the primary means to defeat the warlords, Chiang also believed--as he had told the cadets at Huangpu--that other means should be used if "blood and guts" failed.

Wuchang was thus bypassed, and Chiang ordered the IV Corps to move up the Pinghan Railroad to seize the pass between Henan and Hubei. In the warlord warfare, provinces were only under control if they were perceived as being under control, and that capture of the passes between provinces was the primary means to effect that perception. This was particularly true if Chiang intended to leave four divisions of Wu's troops inside Wuchang. The IV Corps seized the pass by occupying Wushengguan and Xintian on 16 September. The fate of Wuchang was sealed, because

⁷⁰³ Liu Zuolong was originally commander of the Hubei 2nd Division. He later enrolled as the commander of the XV Corps of the NRA. Liu was executed and his forces broken up by Nanjing in 1927. Wan Yaohuang, *op. cit.*, XVII: 2 (February 1975), 80-81; Li Pinxian, *op. cit.*, p. 75; Hu Yibo, "Bashi huiyi" (Memories at 80), *Hubei wenxian*, 39 (July 1976, p. 67; Hu Yibo, "Cheng Zhongsu xiansheng shilu" (A biography of Mr. Cheng Ruhuai), *Hubei wenxian*, 12 (July 1969, 42-43. Hu Yibo served under Liu at the time. According to the above accounts, none of them mentions mass movement forced Liu's decision on him. Liu defected because he was surrounded and did not want to fight.

⁷⁰⁴ Li Zongren, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

Wu could not use his troops in Henan to break the siege, and the four divisions of Wu's troops surrendered on 10 October.⁷⁰⁵

Wu's defeat was complete and overwhelming. Not only had he lost Hubei Province, he also lost over half the troops under his command. Of Wu's four indigenous Hubei divisions, all local warlords, Liu Zuolong's--as noted above-- joined the National Revolutionary Army, while the others were either destroyed or captured. Of the three Henan divisions, two of his regular troops that brought to Hubei were destroyed. One, commanded by Yan Riren, was destroyed outside Wuhan.⁷⁰⁶ Another, commanded by Wu Junjing, surrendered at Wuchang. Because this unit was not a local warlord force, it was not enrolled in the National Revolutionary Army. Rather, all the top officers were removed and returned to their native Henan. The force was then placed under He Duiding.⁷⁰⁷ The last Henan division, a local warlord unit that had served under Sun Yatsen in an earlier Northern Expedition, was enrolled in the National Revolutionary Army.⁷⁰⁸

In addition to the indigenous troops, Wu also lost four of his five other regular divisions. One was destroyed at the battles for the railroad bridges, one withdrew into Sichuan where the local warlords there broke it up, and two were captured with the fall of Wuhan. Only one, commanded by Jin Younuo, was able to escape to Henan.⁷⁰⁹ The loss of these units, the pillar of Wu's power, marked the end of his status as a multi-provincial warlord, although he would try to hold out in Henan for a while longer. Wu's Hubei defeat also triggered the local warlords in Sichuan, the only other province still nominally loyal to Wu, to defect to the National Revolutionary Army.

The Battle of Jiangxi

⁷⁰⁵ In addition to the IV Corps, the 2nd Division of Chiang's I Corps also participated in the assaults. See Liu Zhi, *Wodi Huiyi* (My reminiscences), Taipei: privately printed, 1966, p. 38. Liu was the commander of the division. The VI and VII Corps lost 47 officers and 463 men killed, and 44 officers and 603 men wounded. See *Beifazhanshi*, p. 471, chart 34, a full account of the battle is in 433-475.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 434.

⁷⁰⁷ Wu Junjing was executed in 1928 and the force broken up. Liu Jianru, *op. cit.*, 61-63.

⁷⁰⁸ *Jiang zongtong milu*, VII: 156.

⁷⁰⁹ Jin's unit was later taken by Feng Yuxiang. Chen Senfu, *Xishou xinbeijun* (The northwest army in detail), Taipei: Dehua chubanshe, 1974, p. 446.

Sun Chuanfang, the ruler of the five provinces of the lower Yangzi basin, now faced the National Revolutionary Army on two fronts. At the time, Sun was in control of Jiangxi, Fujian, Anhui, Zhejiang and Jiangxi. Like Wu Peifu, Sun's power was based on the troops directly loyal to him, but also on the concurrence of indigenous local and provincial warlords in all five of the provinces that he claimed. In addition, Sun was a new ruler, he had conquered Fujian and Zhejiang in 1924 and had added the other three provinces only the year before. So, his base was in no sense a "natural" one, defined as a unit by either terrain or precedent. Most of his subordinate provinces had been part of other major warlord groupings during the period, and all had served under a progression of warlords while maintaining their hold on local power. Like the local warlords in Hunan, most of the local warlords in Sun's five provinces would await the outcome of the battles between the regular troops of the major warlord and the vanguard of the National Revolutionary Army before deciding which way to go. For his part, Sun responded to the imminent attack on Jiangxi by ordering his subordinate commander in Fujian to invade the Guangdong base of the National Revolutionary Army, and by moving a number of his units into Jiangxi, where he prepared a trap for the main force of the National Revolutionary Army. Sun's hold on his area was apparently so weak that once he had been defeated in Jiangxi and Fujian, he ceded his entire base to the National Revolutionary Army, as we shall see, and would not counterattack until mid-1927.

For Chiang Kaishek, the battles in Jiangxi would underscore the difficulty of leading the loosely organised National Revolutionary Army forces that were so incompletely unified at the outset of the expedition. Although his original strategy for invading Jiangxi was sound the actual campaign was poorly executed. Several units were out of control. Part of the reason for this was that the campaign in Jiangxi saw the participation--for the first time--of some of the more warlord-like members of the National Revolutionary Army, and particularly of the XI Corps. Their irregular behaviour allowed Sun Chuanfang, who commanded troops of much higher calibre than those under Wu Peifu, to defeat units of the National Revolutionary Army. During this campaign the National Revolutionary Army behaved very much like all of Sun Yatsen's earlier efforts.

Before the invasion was launched, another local militarists joined the National Revolutionary Army, Lai Shihuang, commander of the indigenous Jiangxi 4th Division. Lai's unit was stationed in southern Jiangxi, far from the arena of combat. It did not defect but rejoined Guangzhou. A long-time member of the Guomindang, Lai had

served under Sun Yatsen during the early 1920s, and had participated in the 1922 Northern Expedition. Following the failure of that effort, Lai had stayed on in southern Jiangxi near the border with Guangdong. In 1925, Lai had received his designation as a member of Sun Chuanfang's Jiangxi Army, but in fact remained autonomous. In 1926, Lai renewed his contacts with Guangzhou, which prohibited Xiong Shihui, a fellow provincial and like Lai, a graduate of the Second Class of Boading to contact Lai in July. In August, this force was enrolled in the National Revolutionary Army as the XIV Corps, and Xiong stayed on as political representatives and commander of one of Lai's subordinate divisions.

The National Revolutionary Army entered Jiangxi in September by three routes (see map 7-4). The II and III Corps advanced along the railroad from Changsha to Pingxiang and then overland to Nanchang. The VI Corps along with two divisions of Chiang Kaishek's I Corps, under Wang Boling, were to move overland toward De'an. There, they would cut the rail line linking Nanchang and Jiujiang. Finally, the VII Corps, and the IV Corps⁷¹⁰ which had led the way through Hunan and Hubei, was ordered to advance southward along the Yangzi River from Wuhan to Jiujiang, cutting off any reinforcements. The VII Corps would then move down the railroad to link up with the I and VI Corps for an attack on Sun's forces in Jiangxi.

For his part, Sun did not contest the National Revolutionary Army's invasion of the province. His plan apparently was to allow the I and VI Corps to capture the provincial capital of Nanchang uncontested, in preparation of a surprise counterattack. According to the rules of warlord warfare, which dictated that walled cities were impregnable, Sun's decision to withdraw voluntarily was a bold gamble. Like Feng Yuxiang, who used a similar ploy, the intent was to induce overconfidence in the invading force, which was supposed to believe that the enemy would only abandon a walled city if his troops were in total retreat.⁷¹¹

⁷¹⁰ The IV Corps at that time was advancing northward to the Hubei-Honan border, as discussed above.

⁷¹¹ Donald Jordan, on the other hand, attributes the uncontested advance into Jiangxi to a defection, that of Fang Benren, who Jordan calls "Sun's Jiangxi man." Jordan claims, albeit without evidence, that Fang timed his defection when he had "his troops aligned at the strategic Pingxiang Pass" dividing Hunan and Jiangxi. Jordan, *op. cit.*, 265, 279. There are several problems with Jordan's view. First, Fang was not Sun's subordinate. He was a local warlord who, like Lai Shihuang, discussed above, had close ties to the Guomindang and had participated in earlier Northern Expeditions. Second, although Fang's defection might explain why Sun allowed the VII Corps to enter the province, it does not explain why Sun abandoned Nanchang. Finally, Fang had no troops with which to defect, neither at Pingxiang nor anywhere else. See Hollington Tong, *Chiang Kaishek*. Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1953, p. 13; *Zhonghua minguo zhanyi dashi jiyao* (A record of the major battles and events of the republic of China),

Sun's plan was an initial success. The VI Corps abandoned its original goal, De'an, and made for Nanchang instead, once it learnt that the city was undefended. Still accompanied by two divisions of the I Corps, this force entered the city on 18 September. Sun moved quickly to close the trap, and the units at Nanchang, lacking reinforcements, were forced to abandon the city in great disorder. The defeat apparently turned into a rout, and Chiang ordered the arrest and court martial of Wang Boling, his long-time associate. Wang was charged with not having reinforced Nanchang quickly enough. As in the past, such failures were always punished, regardless of the stature of the individual.⁷¹²

Li Zongren, still moving south, arrived at the rendezvous point, and found no one there. But, unlike the troops that had occupied Nanchang, Li apparently knew that the Jiangxi campaign was designed to search and destroy Sun's troops, not capture his cities. Thus, rather than wait, Li abandoned his orders and marched on Ruoxi, west of De'an, where another of Sun's units was waiting in ambush. Li attacked on 30 September, and destroyed the Jiangsu 4th Division in an all-day battle. Both the division and brigade commanders were killed, and at least 2,000 men captured.⁷¹³ Li, still out of contact with the rest of the invasion force, then returned to De'an that he occupied, but it was one week too late for the National Revolutionary Army troops at Nanchang. Isolated and faced with a counterattack from the south, Li withdrew to the west.

Taipei: Guofangbu Shizhengju, 1962, 15-16. Despite his designation as Military Governor of Jiangxi Fang had no troops of his own. The units in Jiangxi were controlled either by Sun himself or the various local warlords. The NRA designation that Fang accepted, command of the XI Corps (A), existed only on paper. See *Zhonghua minguo dashiji*, *op. cit.*, p. 233; Wen Gongdao, *op. cit.*, I: 449.

⁷¹² *Beifa zhanshi*, 496-497. Wang was Chiang's schoolmate from Baoding, and had been his classmate at Shikan Gakko. Wang was not executed, despite the dictates of the *Lianzuofa*, but he never held another combat command. "Wang Boling," *Zhuanji wenxue* XXIV: 2 (February, 1979), p. 143; Zhou Yingnong, "Beifa chuqi di huiyi: Jiangxi shiqi", (Recollection of the early northern expedition: the Jiangxi period), *Jiangxi Wenxian*, no. 69 (July 2, 1972), p.4; Liu Zhi, *op. cit.*, p. 42. Liu Zhi succeeded Wang to command. Sun Yuanliang, a very fast-rising graduate of the Huangpu First Class, was also blamed for the defeat and cashiered. Sun was able to return to command during the 1930s. Zhou Yingnong, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁷¹³ Li Zongren, *op. cit.*, 187-188. The official history *Beifa zhanshi* claims 2,000. Li admits that his victory was only possible because the enemy unit had been forced to fight without reinforcements; the remainder of Sun's troops were than attacking Nanchang. Although Li's claims that he faced an enemy force of 30,000 seem exaggerated, it was a tough battle, and the VII Corps probably did suffer 2,000 casualties. Li Zongren, *op. cit.*, 188-189; *Beifa zhanshi*, *op. cit.*, 518-520.

Chiang Kaishek now moved to restore order, and the original campaign was resumed a month later. The VII Corps was again ordered to attack De'an, in conjunction with an assault on Nanchang. Sun now dug in to defend the two cities, and the fighting was fierce, with heavy casualties on both sides. De'an fell on 2 November and Jiujiang was occupied on 5 November. Completely cut off, Sun's troops at Nanchang surrendered on 8 November.⁷¹⁴ In a pattern that was now becoming familiar, the warlord forces cracked under sustained assault. Sun's losses were enormous and far out of proportion to the scale of the battle, suggesting both poor tactics and mass panic.

Sun's losses in Jiangxi were, like those of Wu Peifu in Hubei, remarkable. Only three of his 11 divisions were able to withdraw back to Anhui or Zhejiang. Of the 12 brigades that Sun had brought to Jiangxi, only five were able to return to Anhui or Zhejiang. While Sun was being defeated in Jiangxi, the other half of his military plan, the invasion of Fujian, was also going awry. Following the collapse of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, similar defections occurred in Fujian, Zhejiang and Anhui.

The Nanjing-Wuhan Split

After the National Revolutionary Army successfully captured the lower Yangtze valley it began to split. The most basic division was a split between Wuhan and Nanchang. After the capital had been moved north from Guangzhou to Wuhan, the Chinese Communist Party backed the Guomintang government there and the Leftist Guomintang headed by Wang Jingwei, and the IV and VIII Corps supported Wang. The period of the Wuhan government from late 1926 into May 1927 saw the Russian Advisory Group and their Chinese Communist lieutenants reach a peak of authority. Tensions escalated when the Guomintang Left proposed the implementation of peasant land confiscation, execution of landlords and strike disorders in the cities.⁷¹⁵ During this time, a Huangpu branch school was established in Wuhan responsible for the training of the political workers for the National Revolutionary Army. With the split of

⁷¹⁴ Li Zongren, *op. cit.*, p. 191. Li claims to have captured 30,000 men, probably an inflated figure. For the battle of Nanchang, see Liu Zhi, *op. cit.*, 40-53. Liu commanded a division of the I Corps. Other accounts include Gan Guoxun, "Wu di jungma shenghuo," (My life in the military) *Zhongwai zazhi* XIX: 3 (March, 1976), p. 41; Hu Naian, "Jiushi huiyi," (Recollections at 90) *Zhuanji wenxue*, IX: 6 (December, 1966), 40-41. The official version is *Beifa zhanshi, op. cit.*, 477-564. Casualty lists can be found in *Ibid.*, vol. IV, Appendix, 2-7.

⁷¹⁵ For a discussion of the Wuhan-Nanjing split, see C. Martin Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China*, 77-94, 113-124.

Wuhan and Nanjing, the Wuhan's branch came under the control of the Left Guomindang.⁷¹⁶

Opposing them was the Guomindang government at Nanjing, established by Chiang Kaishek and his generals and backed by the I Corps and Li Zongren's VII Corps. Thus, the split was ideological (right versus left), personal (Chiang Kaishek versus Wang Jingwei), and military (between those who wanted the Northern Expedition to move north to join Feng Yuxiang versus those who wanted to go north through Jiangsu).⁷¹⁷ One important consideration for Chiang and his officers was that with the Communist Party and Leftist Guomindang triumphant in Wuhan, he lost access to the arsenal there. The only other arsenal of comparable importance was at Jiangsu (see previous chapter on the Guangzhou Arsenal). In addition, it is important to note that the split was also geographic, as the local warlords once again pledged allegiance to the government in their area. Thus, units from Guangdong, Hunan and Hubei supported Wuhan, while units from Guangxi and the lower Yangzi valley supported Nanjing.

Ideologically, the split pit those who might be characterised as socialists and nationalists (Wuhan) against those more purely nationalistic (Nanjing). One of the many ironies inherent in the split was that Wuhan depended so heavily on the support of Tang Shengzhi's VIII Corps. Tang was neither a socialist nor a nationalist and opposed any activity that might undercut the profits he and his subordinates were deriving from their new base in Hunan and Hubei. Once the IV Corps decided to pull out and return to its native Guangdong, the Wuhan Government was totally dependent upon Tang. But the very mass movement that had been built after Hunan was captured, and from which the civilians derived their power threatened Tang. He would thus turn and crush the nascent trade union and peasant movements.⁷¹⁸

⁷¹⁶ For detail of the Wuhan's branch of the Huangpu school, see Zhang Guangyu, *Wuhan zhongyang junshi zhengzhi xuexiao* (The central military-political academy of Wuhan), Hubei: Renmin chubanshe, 1987.

⁷¹⁷ Chiang Kaishek presumably was loathe to link up with Feng Yuxiang because it would have meant an alliance with a warlord force, and also because Feng's army was so much larger than his own. Borodin supposedly wanted to go north to link up with Feng because the Communists had sympathisers inside his units. See James Sheridan, *China in Disintegration*, New York: The Free Press, 1975, p. 171. Others claim that Chiang wanted to go to Shanghai because he could link up with the bankers there. See O. Edmund Clubb, *20th Century China*, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964, p. 136.

⁷¹⁸ See Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927* (New York: Wm Norton and Co., 1958), 102-153, for a fuller discussion of Wuhan's dilemma. For a Russian's assessment of Tang

Chiang Kaishek struck first when he purged the Communist and Leftist officers from his I Corps in late April and early May. Chiang requested and received assistance from Li Zongren's VII Corps, which admitted no Communists or political officers into its ranks, to conduct the purge. Among those ousted were two talented division commanders, Xue Yue and Yan Zhong, both Guangdong natives. They had close ties with the officers of the IV Corps, which was supporting Wuhan. The purge of Yan and Xue, therefore, may have had as much to do with provincialism as ideology. In addition, another dozen junior officers were purged.⁷¹⁹ Chiang then used the I Corps and Zhou Fengqi's XXVI Corps, a local Zhejiang warlord unit, to purge Shanghai. Chiang's units and most of his base were now secured, and most importantly, he had access to his own source of revenue, the Shanghai bankers,⁷²⁰ as well as his own arsenal.

In Hunan, the first to move was Xu Kexiang, then garrison commander of Changsha. Xu, a local warlord nominally subordinate to Tang Shengzhi, struck on 21 May, precipitating what is now known as the *Ma ri* (Horse Day) Incident, breaking up the trade unions and other organisations of Communist Party power in the city.⁷²¹

Other local warlords were also unhappy with the spread of Communist mass organisations. Xia Douyin, another of those only nominally subordinate to Tang, conducted his own purge in western Hunan and then began to advance on Wuhan itself, while most of the regular troops were in the north fighting in Henan. But Xia's marginal unit was defeated outside the city by local peasants troops led by cadets from the Wuhan branch of the Huangpu Military Academy. By mid-May, Xia had withdrawn to

Shengzhi who ambitiously wanted to take over Chiang Kaishek's place and attempted to seek the support of the CCP and Comintern, see "Tairov's Report to Borodin on the Situation at Wuhan," *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927*, Document 69: 771-776. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989, 775-6.

⁷¹⁹ Li Tsung-jen, *The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1979, 207-210. Li says he sided with Chiang during the split because he feared Chiang's military dictatorship less than he feared the CCP.

⁷²⁰ Parks M. Coble, "The Guomindang Regime and the Shanghai Capitalists, 1927-1929," *China Quarterly*, no. 77 (January-March, 1979) has an excellent account of Chiang's relationship with the bankers.

⁷²¹ Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, 234-237. Xu's own account is Xu Kexiang, *Ma'ri Changong huiyilu* (Reminiscences about the Communists and the Horse Day Incident), Taipei: privately printed, n.d..

the west.⁷²² Later, the Chinese Communists would recall Xia's actions as the most cruel during the period, and him as the most "bitterly revengeful" of the anti-Communists.⁷²³

The split, with its concurrent weakening of what had been central authority, was a boon to the local warlords, who became bolder. In Jiangxi, for example, Zhu Peide, whose II Corps had been one of the original National Revolutionary Army units, and who was being wooed by both Nanjing and Wuhan, took advantage of the situation to launch a coup in the province and seize it for him.⁷²⁴ With no one able to enforce obedience, Zhu would stay on in Jiangxi until 1930, when Chiang Kaishek ousted him.

In Guangdong, long-time Chiang Kaishek supporter Qian Dajun, who had been left behind with a division to guard the original base, began his purge in early April and declared martial law on the 16 April. He moved against a local warlord unit sympathetic to the Communists, commanded by Chen Jiayou.⁷²⁵ Qian then marched into southern Jiangxi against Zhang Youren, a supporter of Zhu Peide, and captured his unit.⁷²⁶

The purge of the Chinese Communists even by minor militarists was important. The Communist Party could organise mass movements such as peasant associations and trade unions. But it could only maintain them if it could defend them. Otherwise, even the poorly-led local warlords could defeat them if they wished. Later, after the formation of the Red Army, the Communist Party could carry out its activities under the protection of the army.

⁷²² Meng Da, "Wo canjia Guomin geming qianqi di huiyi," (Recollections of my participation in the early period of national revolution) *Shandong Wenxian*, III: 2 (20 September 1977), 112-113. Meng had been a cadet at the Wuhan branch of the Central Military-Political Academy and fought in the battle.

⁷²³ Nym Wales, *Red Dust*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, p.360.

⁷²⁴ Zhou Yingnong, "Beifa chuqi di huiyilu" (Reminiscences of the early stage of the northern expedition), *Jiangxi wenxian*, no. 69, (2 July 1972), 7-8. Zhou was serving in the provincial government at the time.

⁷²⁵ Qian Dajun, "Qian Muying shangjiang qishi zizhuan (The autobiography of General Qian Dajun at seventy), Taibei, privately printed, n.d., 14-15.

⁷²⁶ *Ibid.*

In all, there were three different military actions against the Communists. First, Chiang Kaishek, Li Zongren and Qian Dajun removed suspected Communists from their own military units. Second, these same men then moved against local Communist Party organisations that had sprung up in the areas they controlled. Third, local warlords crushed peasant organisations in their base areas.⁷²⁷ The latter was not necessarily allied with Chiang but they definitely make use of the opportunity open to them.

The split also meant a sharp reduction in Chiang's territory, because Hubei, Hunan and Guangdong followed Wuhan, and later had to be "re-captured" by the Central Army. Only Zhejiang, Jiangsu and possibly Anhui remained, and Chiang's control of these was far from secure.

The Battle of Longtan

The Battle of Longtan was another major test for the National Revolutionary Army. It was the final major offensive launched by Sun Chuanfang's forces on the National Revolutionary Army for the occupation of Nanjing. Sun's defeat resulted in the total loss of his power base. To the Guomindang, the successful conclusion of the Battle of Longtan marked the control of Nanjing firmly in the hands of the National Revolutionary Army. It also marked the end of the Northern Expedition in southern and central China.

The Battle of Longtan took place after Chiang Kaishek resigned from his command on 12 August 1927. Chiang's resignation was a direct result of the failure in defending Xuzhou against the *Anguojun* of Zhang Zongchang's attack. But it was also reported that Chiang left to facilitate the possible cooperation between Wuhan and Nanjing.⁷²⁸ With Chiang left the National Revolutionary Army, Li Zongren and Bai

⁷²⁷ Li Pinxian, "Rongma shengya" (A life in the army), *Zhongwai zazhi*, XV: 2 (December 1973), p. 78, which provides some interesting discussions about the local warlords' reaction to the new peasant organisations.

⁷²⁸ The reasons for the resignation are not altogether clear but it is believed that military defeat and disagreements within his command were the most important factors. Wan Yaohuang, who attended the meeting in which Chiang resigned, reports that Chiang said he would resign if it would facilitate cooperation between Wuhan and Nanjing. While such resignation might have been pushed by Li Zongren, who claims that he did not want war with Wuhan, what must have alarmed Chiang the most was the attitude of his long-time supporter and associate He Yingqin. Faced with He's silence, Chiang left the podium and returned to Shanghai. See Wan Yaohuang, "Wan Yaohuang huiyilu" (The memoirs of Wan Yaohuang), *Zhongwai zazhi*, XX: 1 (July 1976), p. 121. Li Zongren denies that he forced Chiang to resign, see *Li Zongren huiyilu*, p. 222.

Chongxi joined with I Corps commander He Yingqin to stem Sun's advance. A defence line was drawn up along the Yangzi, just as it was in April, during the first Sun Chuanfang counterattack. Emboldened by Nanjing's apparent inability to regroup, Sun prepared to cross the river.⁷²⁹

Sun began with an artillery attack on Nanjing, apparently trying to convince the I and VII Corps commanders that his attack would come from this direction. Then, during the night of 25-26 August, Sun began ferrying his troops across the river at five points east of Nanjing. He aimed his main force at Longtan Station along the railroad connecting Nanjing and Shanghai. Sun was initially successful, and was able to land most of his troops without incident. They cut the railroad, thus splitting the I and VII Corps.

Sun threw his entire remaining force into the attack. It probably consisted of 11 divisions and six brigades, about 70,000 men. In all, Sun had no options left. He had no reserves, no reinforcements, and his line of retreat and supply was unguarded. In addition, he destroyed the boats he had used to cross the river.⁷³⁰ But Sun's move was not as risky as it appeared. With the National Revolutionary Army in disarray, and Chiang Kaishek in retirement, the I and VII Corps should have withdrawn since Sun was determined to fight to the last man.

Sun had another advantage in this attack that was the participation of Tang Shengzhi. The I and VII Corps withdrew originally from Shandong to face Tang's attack in Nanjing. Tang was coordinating his advance with that of Sun, hoping to squeeze Chiang Kaishek's troops out of the lower Yangzi basin altogether.⁷³¹ Tang's advance was delayed, however, first by the 1 August Nanchang Uprising, second by the loss of the IV Corps, which had gone to Fujian, and then by the opening of negotiations

⁷²⁹ Wang Yaohuang, *op. cit.*, p. 122. Wan gives a good account of the gallows humour of the NRA's top commanders at the time.

⁷³⁰ Li Zongren, *op. cit.*, p. 229; *Beifa zhanshi*, p. 852, chart 61.

⁷³¹ One of Tang's subordinates claims that Tang had spoken to his officers in late June about taking advantage of Sun's advance to attack Nanjing, and reports many details of the plan. See Li Pinxian, *op. cit.*, XV: 3 (January 1974), p. 43. But Li also states that by the time of the Longtan attack in August, Tang had changed his mind primarily because of Chiang Kaishek's resignation and the opening of the negotiation between Nanjing and Wuhan. Li then claims that any report of an advance in August was a rumour spread by Jiang Boli. Li Zongren claims to have been told by Tang's other subordinates that Jiang Boli had been, in fact, the intermediary between Tang and Sun. See Li Zongren, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

between Wuhan and Nanjing. Finally, one cannot discount the possibility that Tang betrayed Sun, preferring to allow him to fight Nanjing alone, after which he hoped to pick up the pieces.

In any case, with Tang's advance was halted, the I and VII Corps were able to concentrate on Sun's troops. They did not panic following Sun's crossing of the Yangzi. In fact, the commanders treated it as an opportunity to fight and destroy his units just as they had in the decisive victory in Jiangxi the year before. Thus, although outnumbered by more than two to one, the I and VII Corps went on the offensive, and attacked Sun's recently seized positions. The key to the battle, as was true of so many warlord battles, was the small-scale action for the control of the heights (and therefore artillery) that commanded the battlefield. Once again, the junior officers of the emerging Central Army distinguished themselves. The I and VII Corps defeated and captured all of Sun's outlying positions by 30 August. At that point, they closed on Sun's main force at Longtan. On the next day, at 2.00 p.m., Sun surrendered his entire force, and fled north in disguise.⁷³²

The six-day battle at Longtan was the largest and most ferocious of the Northern Expedition. It marked the real end of Sun Chuanfang's power in China, although he would hang-on to some remnants of it under Zhang Zuolin. Of the 60,000 to 70,000 troops that Sun had transferred across the river, almost 10,000 had been killed or wounded, and 20,000 to 30,000 captured. In turn, the I and VII Corps had possibly suffered as many as 8,000 casualties.⁷³³

By any standards, it was a major battle, but by warlord standards it was incredible. Both sides had risked the destruction of their armies in the battle, an unprecedented move. Once again, Nanjing had demonstrated that it had brought a new

⁷³² Longtan remains, after Tai'er zhuang (where Bai Chongxi was again combined with Huangpu troops), the single most chronicled campaign in the Guomindang history. *Beifa zhanshi*, *op. cit.*, 851-916, which weighed in favour of the I Corps' contributions. This is however more than balanced by Li Zongren's account who claims that He Yingqin lost his nerve following Sun's crossing of the river, and that only Li's reassurance persuaded He to commit the I Corps to battle. Li Zongren, *op. cit.*, 229-233. Other accounts of the battle include, Liu Zhi, *Wo di huiyi* (My reminiscences), Taipei: privately printed, 1966; 58-61; Jiang Chunzhang, "Dongzheng beifa si da zhanyi" (Four major battles of the eastern and the northern expedition), *Zhongwai zazhi*, XVI: 2 (August 1979), 80-82; He Yingqin, "Beifa di huiyi" (Memories of the northern expedition), *Zhuanji wenxue*, XXXIII: 1 (July 1978), 21-22; Huang Kunshan, "Longtan zhiyi" (The battle of Longtan), *Guangxi wenxian*, no. 2 (September 1978), 44-45. These are all first hand accounts.

⁷³³ *Beifa zhanshi*, 897-899.

type of warfare to China. Specifically, the I and VII Corps had demonstrated the value of a highly motivated and well-trained junior officer corps. In addition to their ability to win any and all small-scale actions, their ability to respond quickly to the attack, to mobilise troops and get them into position, all depended upon the junior officers. In short, the army was more flexible and more mobile, because decisions could be delegated, and once delegated, were implemented.⁷³⁴

Following the Longtan victory, Nanjing began its third advance northward through Jiangsu and Anhui led by the I and VIII Corps. Once again it aimed at the seizure of strong points in southern Shandong to secure the lower Yangzi basin. Faced with an advance from the troops under Feng Yuxiang, Sun Chuanfang and Chang Zongchang once again withdrew with only token resistance. Nanjing captured Xuzhou on 16 December. Once again, and for the final time, Nanjing was in control of the lower Yangzi.⁷³⁵

The Final Phase

Following the Battle of Longtan and Li Zongren led westward expedition against Tang Shengzhi in Wuhan, Chiang Kaishek returned to China and resumed command of the expedition in early 1928. He immediately ordered the National Revolutionary Army to advance into southern Shandong. During his absence no one emerged to succeed him. This seemed to demonstrate his indispensable role in the National Revolutionary Army.

By this time, the National Revolutionary Army was no longer fighting alone. Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan soon joined in; the National Revolutionary Army was renamed the First Army Group, together with Feng Yuxiang's forces as the Second and Yan Xishan's Third Army Groups. The Third Army Group moved eastward against Zhang Zuolin and bore the brunt of the fighting.⁷³⁶ Following Zhang's decision to

⁷³⁴ *Beifa zhanshi*, 915-6, cites spirit, mobility and flexibility as the key reasons for the victory.

⁷³⁵ Liu Zhi, *op. cit.*, 60-62; *Beifa zhanshi*, 1020-40, 1052-64.

⁷³⁶ The only battle of significance for the southern troops occurred as Nanjing moved into Shandong to capture northern defence positions for the new base. These were at Yutai, near Linyi. See Wan Yaohuang, *op. cit.*, XX: 2, (August 1976), p. 128; *Beifa zhanshi*, IV: 1213-1219; Wang Gongyou, "Kang ri chuqi guojun shou budong di huiyi" (Reminiscences of the nationalist army's defence of the eastern Jiangsu during the early stage of the war against Japan), *Zhuanji wenxue*, XXII: 2 (February 1973), p. 51.

withdraw into Manchuria, the Japanese assassinated him. His son, Zhang Xueliang, succeeded him and he promptly declared his support for the Guomindang, thus marking the "unification" of China.

In conclusion, the Guomindang's decision to launch the Northern Expedition in 1926 was mainly due to military factors. The main impetus was the attack by the two most powerful militarists cliques of Zhili and Fengtian on Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun. If the Guominjun was destroyed, it would not only mean the loss of a major northern ally but also mean that the Guomindang would have to confront its most formidable opponents directly. This grave consequence forced even the most unwilling United Front partners, the Chinese Communist Party, and its sponsor, the Comintern, to agree that the Northern Expedition had to start. The alliance with Feng Yuxiang became even more urgent when the pro-Wu Peifu faction of the Hunan army was preparing to attack units of Tang Shengzhi. The crisis in Hunan soon involved the VII Corps of the National Revolutionary Army. It also led to Tang's request for reinforcements and joining the Guomindang.

The National Revolutionary Army's winning formula in the Northern Expedition was both political and military. The use of regional and national appeals, the effectiveness of political indoctrination and propaganda campaigns played important roles in preparing the ground and soldiers for combat. The decisive leadership of Chiang Kaishek and his ability to lead the National Revolutionary Army had contributed greatly to the speedy advance of the National Revolutionary Army in central China. Lastly, bloody battles and the traditional defection had won National Revolutionary Army territories and numeral forces to its side. However, not all the National Revolutionary Army units contributed equally during the campaign. Among the original eight corps that took part in the Northern Expedition, only the VII, IV, VIII and I Corps were actively involved in the battles. The early occupation of Hunan and Hubei laid the foundation of the Guomindang's further expansion in the Central and Northern China. As these units were the main fighting forces of the National Revolutionary Army, the behaviour of its commanders played a crucial role in deciding the direction of the campaign. When the Guomindang was divided into Wuhan and Nanjing factions, the military support of the regimes became decisive in the survival of the regime. When the commanders of the IV and VIII Corps withdrew his support of Wuhan, the regime simply collapsed.

The split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party also seriously weakened some units of the National Revolutionary Army. The split, coupled with the high casualty rate during the campaign, seriously affected the IV Corps as it could hardly recover again. On the other hand, the split had little impact on the VII Corps. Being the least affected by the pre-expedition reorganisation, it managed to maintain its original structure and key personnel intact throughout the Northern Expedition. Its support for the Nanjing regime was crucial to the latter's survival.

The defection of local warlords to the National Revolutionary Army was a two-edged sword. Although defection assisted the National Revolutionary Army in concentrating on seeking out and destroying the regular troops of the multi-provincial warlords, the rapid expansion of the National Revolutionary Army created both command and control, as well as logistic and maintenance problems. By the end of 1928, over 100 units had joined the National Revolutionary Army.⁷³⁷ Nanjing would have to decide whether to use and reorganise them as regular, loyal and competent members of the Central Army, or break them up. This was one of the reasons why the commander of the National Revolutionary Army needed to end the Northern Expedition as soon as possible. It needed to regroup and supply these ever expanding forces before they went out of control.

⁷³⁷ The troops of the Second and Third Army Groups of Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan are not considered here. Among them, 24 of the 100 units were the original eight corps plus the 16 additional units they had created. Of the 80 warlord units that had joined the National Revolutionary Army, 32 had already been broken up by the end of the Northern Expedition. Two had opted to go with the Chinese Communists. Of the 47 remaining units, ten were in faraway Yunnan and Sichuan. Only 24 of the units that had joined the National Revolutionary Army were located, in 1928, in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui or Fujian. Details of the units of the National Revolutionary Army, see Zhang Guanyi, *Guomin gemingjun*, chapters 3 and 4, 130-252.

Chapter 8: The Legacy of the National Revolutionary Army

The National Revolutionary Army was split into three major groups after the Northern Expedition. After they were purged in 1927, the Chinese Communist Party conducted two abortive uprisings in the same year and retreated into the countryside and built its own Red Army. Some commanders within the National Revolutionary Army challenged Commander-in-chief Chiang Kaishek's legitimacy in the post-Northern Expedition China. The issue was partially settled in the battlefield in 1928-30. Although Chiang's Nanjing army won these battles, regional armies were allowed to operate in a semi-autonomous manner throughout most of the 1930s. In Nanjing, Chiang Kaishek, who had the support of both the military and the conservative members of the Guomindang, began to rebuild the National Revolutionary Army into a Central Army with a mantle of the Party Army.

This chapter looks at the Nanjing government's efforts to transform the Party Army into a national army after the Northern Expedition. It will first discuss the post-Northern Expedition problems faced by the Nanjing government and the failure of the unit disbandment conference in 1928. This will be followed by a discussion of two key legacies of the Party Army: the formation of the Central Army and the establishment of the Central Military Academy in Nanjing. The last part of the chapter will discuss the military ethos of the Huangpu spirit and the "Third Party Movement" in the post-Northern Expedition era.

Post-Northern Expedition Problems

In the post-Northern Expedition years, two major problems confronting the Guomindang required immediate actions: the first was its mounting financial difficulties, and the second was the creation of a new political and military order in China. At the end of the northern expedition, nothing threatened the Nanjing government more than the crushing financial burden imposed by the military expenditure. According to He Yingqing's March 1929 report, the actual annual military expenditure at the end of the Northern Expedition stood at \$350 million.⁷³⁸ This means that even of the entire budget was paid for the military, there still be a shortfall of 30 million.⁷³⁹ The Nanjing government clearly could not function as a central authority

⁷³⁸ *The China Yearbook, 1929-30*, 629.

⁷³⁹ Chiang Kaishek, *Jianguo caibing zhi yi yi* (The meaning of troops reduction for reconstruction),

while maintaining such a bloated military establishment. In practical terms, the first military policy of the government in the post-expedition era was to devise a scheme to reduce military spending by 60% through drastic curtailment and reorganisation of the nation's multifarious armies.

The second problem of creating a new political and social order was equally daunting. By the end of the Northern Expedition, only Jiangsu and Zhejiang came under direct jurisdiction of the Nanjing regime.⁷⁴⁰ The Guomindang, as scholars have noted repeatedly, was not strong enough to force the unity of the many diverse elements that made up China at that time.⁷⁴¹ Chiang Kaishek apparently did not believe that a political party could control the local, provincial and multi-provincial militarists who claimed their political authority based on the armies they commanded. Despite the nominal allegiance of these figures to the Guomindang, these militarists would still have to be met and defeated in battle before they would actually subordinate themselves to the Nanjing Government.

What the Northern Expedition had achieved, however, was to capture legitimacy for the Guomindang which was then the nominal national political authority. It also moved the capital from Beijing (now Beiping) to Nanjing. For the next 10 years, still nominally under the Guomindang mantle, the Nanjing's Central Army would attack the various militarists, forcing them to acknowledge Nanjing's supremacy. But most militarists would refuse to do this until the Central Army had defeated them in battle, or invaded their province.

During the 1930s, the Nanjing government would act on various levels. On the international scene, Nanjing was increasingly recognised as the seat of the central government. Domestically, Chiang would have to interact with the regional overlords (those militarists who controlled more than one province) in a different way. Chiang

162-64.

⁷⁴⁰ These two provinces were the only two to fulfil their tax contributions. For an account of tax contributions by the provinces, see "Finances of the Nationalist Army," *The China Weekly Review*, 17 September 1927; Paul K.T. Sih, ed., *The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927-1937*, New York, 1970, 86.

⁷⁴¹ For examples, see Lloyd Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937*. Cambridge, Mass: 1974, p. 9; F. Gilbert Chan, *China at the Crossroads: Nationalists and Communists, 1927-1949*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, p. 1; Hung-mao Tien, *Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-1937*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972, p. 4; James Sheridan, *China in Disintegration*, New York: The Free Press, 1975.

used a divide and rule strategy. Chiang's first priority was to play them off against one another. But Chiang did not just pursue this policy in order to survive; he did it to buy time to defeat them individually.

At the local level, on the other hand, Chiang acted behind the facade of Guomindang unity and used the mantle of Guomindang legitimacy to create a new political and military order. Chiang and his supporters believed that this military and political unity needed to be accomplished before a unified political party could be established. Otherwise, as Chiang believed, various regional and local militarists would act within the party as geographic factions--based on their military power--to prevent the party unity. Thus, once Nanjing had defeated a multi-provincial overlord and taken over his province(s), the Central Army, in the name of the Guomindang, would move in and take over the troops. These units would either obey Nanjing's orders or they would be broken up or chased out from their bases. In this respect, the loyalty of the Central Army was crucial in defeating other militarists.

Rebuilding the Party and Army

Chiang Kaishek had other choices to rebuild the country. The most obvious would have been to rebuild the party and to use the Guomindang as a mechanism for political control. It is unlikely that Chiang Kaishek and his associates ever seriously entertained the option of unifying China by purely or even predominantly political means. Even those within Chiang's coterie who might have tended toward such views--such as the Blue Shirts, paid no more than lip service to the use of political means to accomplish it. For example, Deng Wenyi, one of the most important leaders frequently identified with the Blue Shirts, put much more emphasis on building an army than on building a party. During the late 1920s, Deng served as director of the Political Department of the Huangpu Military Academy. A Huangpu First Class graduate who had studied in the Soviet Union, Deng compiled a collection of lectures delivered at the academy in 1929. In retrospect, this compilation appeared to represent Nanjing's blueprint for the 1930s.⁷⁴²

Deng argued that with the nominal end of the Northern Expedition, Nanjing

⁷⁴² Deng, who later raised high in the Central Army, was heavily involved in political work. In 1929 he was serving as the director of the Political Office (*Zhengxun chu*) of the 10th Division. Deng Wenyi, *Gemingjun wenti zhongzhong* (The problems of the revolutionary army are serious), n.p.: Bati shudian, 1929.

should focus on two goals: completion of the revolution, and victory in what he was already calling World War II with Japan. Deng noted that despite the Northern Expedition's completion, the revolution (i.e. Chiang Kaishek's revolution) was not complete. Nanjing still had to subdue the local militarists (which Deng called bandits), destroy the remaining provincial militarists and overlords, and thus unify China. If this were done, argued Deng, the course of World War II would not matter, the nationalist revolution could be protected. Conversely, if China were not unified by the start of the war, the revolution would be endangered; the militarists could unify with the imperialists to protect their autonomous status.⁷⁴³

Deng raised two problems that Nanjing faced in the late 1920s. First, the army had expanded too rapidly, and the behaviour of many of the new units was not revolutionary. Second, there were still a number of militarists not even nominally allegiant to the Guomindang. To solve the first problem, Deng asserted that Nanjing must streamline and consolidate the marginal units. Defector units that were reasonably good could be changed, while the others would be destroyed.⁷⁴⁴ Deng was concerned not only to reform provincial armies but also to prevent them from re-emerging. Thus, if China could not destroy provincial militarists, Deng predicted unification would be in question and foreign powers could enter China via these same militarists.

Deng's proposals appeared to range beyond suggestion for the army. He also argued for the rebuilding of the party as well. Deng coined the slogan that China must "politicise the military and militarise the party" (*Danghua jun; junhua dang*).⁷⁴⁵ A strong party organisation would then have a loyal revolutionary army to do its bidding and enforce its will. This, Deng claimed, would unify China. Still, despite his arguments, Deng did not lay down any concrete proposals for party-building. Rather, it seems that he was proposing the idea of a strong party as a long-term goal. Deng recognised that the party in 1928 was a facade for unity, but concluded that they could only change the situation after military unification.⁷⁴⁶ Thus, the bulk of Deng's argument focused on what was required to politicise the military, on political education,

⁷⁴³ *Ibid.*, 71-73.

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁷⁴⁶ Indeed, Deng was sharply critical of the Guomindang in 1929 and lists some 17 different factions and groupings within it, both political and military. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

and on the role of the political officers within regular military units.⁷⁴⁷ Party work--*junhua dang*--could wait.

It appears that the military may have been guilty of belief in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because of their distaste for the party, they ignored the party in the pursuit of the unification. This decision may also affect party work in areas cleared of militarists. Chi Hsi-sheng argues that civil bureaucrats became "excessively dependent" on using the military to clear areas before they could move in. Over time, the party mentality became one of "complete dependence" on Nanjing's military superiority.⁷⁴⁸ While it is not possible to determine any sort of direct cause and effect relationship between Deng's report and Nanjing's subsequent actions, Deng's report, in retrospect, had announced the agenda for the 1930s. They included: streamlining the military and politicising it; breaking up the remaining major regional militarists; subdued the local militarists by either absorbing or destroying them; using the army that was thus constructed against foreign imperialists. This was what Nanjing did during the 1930s. Deng was also accurately predicted what would happen if Nanjing tried to fight the Japanese before the complete unification of China: the regional militarists would take advantage of the situation to expand again.

Disbandment and Rebellion

In late 1928, as Nanjing concentrated on streamlining its army, the country focused its attention on disbandment. Despite the emphasis given by contemporary observers to disbandment, it is difficult to take seriously the notion that any of the militarists or Nanjing would actually disband its army. A disbandment conference of one type or another had followed almost all of the major wars in warlord China, and Nanjing was careful not to make an exception. All of the major regional militarists, including Li Zongren and Fung Yuxiang, had publicly called for disbandment in hollowed tones. Predictably, however, the Disbandment Conference itself soon became enmeshed in the question of who was going to disband and how many troops. It would appear that all the parties, including Nanjing, were jockeying for the moral high ground. No one disbanded in the end.

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 126-198, which provides a very detailed discussion of how such work should be done.

⁷⁴⁸ Chi Hsi-sheng, *Nationalist China at War: Military Defects and Political Collapse, 1937-1945*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982, p. 204.

This political jockeying continued during the 1930s, especially by those who tried to resist Nanjing by frequently couching their propaganda in terms of Sun Yatsen or Guomindang ideology. As we noted before, one of the most important characteristics of warlord warfare was the effort to portray oneself as cloaked in legitimacy. Nanjing, having broken with much of what Sun had originally espoused was still intent on legitimising its political power by claiming to pursue Sun's "Three Principles of the People". In addition, some regional militarists such as those from Guangdong and Guangxi claimed that they were the only true keepers of Sun Yatsen's original revolutionary flame. Although this study will not review such propaganda exchanges, the rhetoric exchanged at the time of the Disbandment Conference is a good example of the ideological aspect of a struggle between armies and their personalities.⁷⁴⁹

The ritual of the proceedings is highlighted by the outrageous goals set by the participants. In July 1928, He Yingqin delivered a report stating that China had about 2.2 million soldiers in 300 divisions. He set a target of 80 divisions to be manned by 1.2 million soldiers.⁷⁵⁰ This would have meant the loss of not just one million soldiers but also 220 division commands, along with concurrent numbers of corps and army commands. A week later, on 11 July, military figures at the Tangshan Conference, where they agreed on even more reductions, and the next days signed a document calling for only 60 divisions.⁷⁵¹ The formal conference opened on 1 January 1929 and issued a stream of statements and resolutions. It closed two years later in flurry of paper without achieving any major change.⁷⁵²

The only result of the conference was the temporary agreement to redesignate

⁷⁴⁹ Over the last fifty years some scholars have been analysing Chiang Kaishek's work in terms of what Sun Yatsen had originally proposed. For example, Chi Hsi-sheng, argues that Chiang's problems during the war with Japan stemmed from his abandonment of the "Three Principles of the People", which in fact had occurred earlier than the World War I. See his *Nationalist China at War: Military Defects and Political Collapse, 1937-1945*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982, p. 204.

⁷⁵⁰ *Zhonghua minguo zhanyi dashi jiyao* (A record of major battles and events of the Republican China), Taipei: Guofangbu shizhengju, 1962, III: 16.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 16-17; Wan Yaohuang, "Wan Yaohuang huiyilu" (The memories of Wan Yaohuang), *Zhongwai zazhi*, XX: 5, p. 102.

⁷⁵² The claims and counter-claims are aired in *The Memories of Li Tsung-jen*, Westview Press, 1979, 256-261; James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlords: the Career of Feng Yu-hsiang*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 242-243.

various military units. The corps, which had been the basic unit of the Northern Expedition, was abolished. The division became the basic organisation unit. [This may represent disbandment on paper] Each of major regional militarist was given a set of new division designations. Some accepted these but other did not. Still the new system would be used until 1938. In fact, one of the tests of Nanjing used to determine the attitudes of the a regional militarist would be whether or not the commander accepted the new designations.

Creation of the Central Army

The Disbandment Conference's failure had no discernible effect on Chiang Kaishek. Beginning in August 1928, even before the Northern Expedition was over, he had started to reorganise units under his command. The result was the formal beginning of the Central Army. This reorganisation involved both the Huangpu units and the local militarists that Nanjing had absorbed during the Northern Expedition. First, the Huangpu units subordinate to Chiang, the I, VIII, XXXII, and XXXXVI Corps and Guard units were abolished. He reorganised them into four divisions--the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 9th Divisions. This, in fact, was a typical disbandment on paper, twelve divisions had been reduced to four. In the process, Nanjing also reshuffled command so that most officers now had new superiors and subordinates. Chiang's former I Corps, for example, was split in half with officers sent to both the 1st and 9th Divisions. Thus, Nanjing reorganisation was more than just a simple re-designation of corps and divisions which would have been the case in most major armies such as that of Li Zongren, Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan. This intra-posting would become the norm within the Huangpu units whereby no officers could rise to power by advancing only within one unit, or under one commander. This inter-positing and exchanges of various Huangpu division officers is an important attribute of a modern army.

Chiang set up two more Huangpu divisions shortly afterwards, the 10th and the 11th.⁷⁵³ These units were originally mixed divisions. The officers' corps comprised of both Huangpu graduates and officers from the regional militarist units. By the end of

⁷⁵³ The 10th division was formed from the Guizhou units that joined the NRA as the Xth Corps and the XXXXVI Corps. The division commanded by Huangpu officers and cadets was used to mop up local militarists and bandits in Hunan. The 11th Divisions was formed from the XVII Corps, a Sun Chuanfang unit that had joined the NRA in Fujian, and the Huangpu's Guard unit (*jingwei jun*), an elite unit command by Chen Cheng. *Guomin gemingjun dongglujun zhanshi lilue* (An outline record of the east-route army of the national revolutionary army), ed. by Chief Training Department Office, n.p., 1930, 138-144. No. 787/16722, Second Historical Archives, Nanjing.

1929, however, all but three of the officers who had served as a regiment commander or higher in the militarist units had been purged, and the units were then commanded by officers who served under Chiang in Guangzhou prior to the Northern Expedition, or Huangpu graduates.⁷⁵⁴

The other X Corps survivor was Pan Shanzhai, who broke from the X Corps to join the XXXIII Corps. Pan was apparently not included in the 1928 reorganisation. His units operated in Anhui and Hubei. This unit underwent a series of reorganisations until Pan was removed. It was designated the 94th division in 1936.⁷⁵⁵ The six Huangpu divisions shared three major characteristics. First, their officers tended to be interchangeable. Second, the officers, as seen in Chiang's I Corps during the Northern Expedition, would include men from most of the provinces in China. The provincial based divisions would be abolished. Finally, over Huangpu graduates occupied half of the top command posts of these three divisions.

While Nanjing was setting up the original six divisions, it was also preparing for further expansion, a process that would continue through the 1930s. It began to establish "skeleton units" which consisted of a headquarters and a few officers but without actual troops. Most commonly, these were designated as training divisions. For example, graduates of the Seven Class of the Central Military Academy were sent to set up several of these units in late 1929. They took over and trained various local militarists and then began to use them in combat. These units would later be designated as regular divisions.⁷⁵⁶

The Central Military Academy

Apart from the build-up of the Central Army, The Nanjing government also established a Central Military Academy (*Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao*). Since its inception in 1928 till its removal to Chengdu in 1937, the Central Military Academy in Nanjing produced 6,000 junior officers and retrained many more the National

⁷⁵⁴ For a list of names, from regimental commanders and above, see *Ibid.*, 144-50.

⁷⁵⁵ *Guomin zhengfu gongbao*, 104, (February 1936), p. 1, Order, no. 1974. Similarly, in the XVII and XXXVIII Corps, the original militarists were subsequently removed from command and they were replaced by Huangpu officers and graduates.

⁷⁵⁶ Qian Dajun, *Qian Muyin shangjiang qishi zizhuan* (General Qian Dajun's autobiography at 70), Taipei: privately printed, n.d., p. 7. Qian commanded one of these units.

Revolutionary Army officers. The Central Military Academy trained an average of 1,000 cadets a class in the full two-year course preceded by a year in the rank. The enrolment was overwhelming for each successive class. For example, the 12th Class of 1935, the recruitment committee had to select 700 entrants out of 10,000 applicants.⁷⁵⁷ Chiang Kaishek continued to be the Commandant, a post he held for life. The deputy commandant, who was also the head of the education, took charge of the day-to-day running of the academy (*xiaoyu chang*). Zhang Zhizhong, whom Joe Stilwell praised as a "scholarly soldier of the best type", held the post for ten years.⁷⁵⁸ During this time the German advisers were engaged to serve in the Central Military Academy and in the Central Army.⁷⁵⁹ Observers were impressed with the general air of efficiency, the smart drill, its building and facilities as a modern military academy.

The Central Military Academy was larger and better equipped than its precursor at Huangpu on Changzhou Island.⁷⁶⁰ The premise of the Central Military Academy was spacious. It consisted of a large parade ground, a library, an auditorium for 3,000 people, ball courts and gymnasiums, an indoor swimming pool, several weapons museums, a bridge-building lake, bayonet grounds, automatic weapons range, and modern arms for a full student regiment. The Academy's importance was underscored when Chiang Kaishek who became titular President, made national addresses on its campus. He also built a house close by, and entertained in the officers' mess.⁷⁶¹

⁷⁵⁷ *Lujun junguan xuexiaoshi* (History of the military academy), Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., Taipei, Guofangbu shizhengju, 1964, 3373.

⁷⁵⁸ J.W. Stilwell, "Military Schools and Colleges: The Central Military Academy", USWD 2277-I-19:18. Zhang was a Baoding graduate and joined Huangpu after quitting from Guijun junguan xuexiao (the Guangxi Officers School). He was one of the founders and company commanders of recruitment training for the Third Class. After joining Huangpu, he served also as staff officer in the National Revolutionary Army. He was responsible for the setting up Wuhan Branch School. During the split, after some hesitation, he joined Chiang Kaishek in Nanjing. He became the head of the Central Military Academy's Training Department (*xiaoyu chang*) and deputy commandant from 1928 to 1938. Zhang Zhizhong, "Huangpu jingshen yu guomin geming" (Huangpu spirit and the national revolution). *Changsha fengxiao jingli ban tongxuelu* (The alumni directory of the administrative class of the Changsha branch's Huangpu military academy), Changsha: 1938.

⁷⁵⁹ Although the Germans' participation in the Central Military Academy was apparent, they were scarcely mentioned in the institutional histories and the class yearbooks. Up till 1936, it was estimated between five and seven German advisers taught full time at the Central Military Academy; that about four or five taught at the War College; and one or two were attached to each of the specialist schools. For details see Donald S. Sutton, "German Advice & Residual Warlordism in the Nanking Decade: Influences on Nationalist Military Training and Strategy." *China Quarterly* 91 (September 1982): 386-410; especially footnotes 24, 25.

⁷⁶⁰ *Lujun junguan xuexiaoshi* (History of the military academy), 3244, 3283, 3302, 3333, 3344, 3370.

⁷⁶¹ Interviews with Qiu Xingxiang (5th Class) in Nanjing; and Zeng Huiqi, "Huiyi zai Nanjing

In 1932, the War College in Beijing was also moved to Nanjing. The War College was much less generously equipped and its effects were more limited. The three-year course of about 100 officers taught map planning, war games and high command skills. Chiang Kaishek was again the Commandant and the head of the Education (*xiaoyu chang*) was Yang Jie, a Japanese-trained graduate of the Yunnan Army.⁷⁶² Americans officers were struck by the trainees' enthusiasm and praised the training plan which sent them back twice a year into the regular army for manoeuvres.⁷⁶³ But few of the generals whom Chiang would rely on went for retraining.

Besides the military academy and war college, military schooling was gradually extended. New artillery and infantry schools were added in 1933; cavalry and tank schools by 1934; and intelligence and engineering schools by 1935; and branch academies for a total of 8,500 officers had been set up by June 1936 in Wuchang, Luoyang, Yunnanfu, and Chengdu.⁷⁶⁴

The German Advisers

Another familiar phenomenon was the presence of foreign military advisers, but this time they were German. Up to 1936, between five and seven advisers taught full time at the Central Military Academy; and about four or five at the War College.⁷⁶⁵ The

zhongyang junxiao xuexi shenghuo pianduan" (Memories of the life in the central military academy in Nanjing), *Zhengrong suiyue* (Years of the extraordinary times), 161-170, Guangdong Huangpu Alumni, ed., Guangdong: Shifan xueyuan, 1991.

⁷⁶² For the war college, see *Minguo shiqi de lujun daxue* (The war college of the Republican China), ed. by Jiangsu sheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui and Zhongguo di er lishi dangnguan. Nanjing: Jiangsu wenshi chubanshe, 1994; especially memoir of Guo Rugui, "Wu zai lujun daxue, 1932-1937 (My war college's years, 1932-1938)", 52-76.

⁷⁶³ See a report by Major Constant's visit on 16 December 1932, USWD 2277-1-24. However, Joe Stilwell called the War College "the most inadequately housed military school in or about Nanjing", on the basis of observations by Captains Crist and Tormey, in USWD 2277-1-19:17, 6 May 1936.

⁷⁶⁴ See reports by Lt-Col Drysdale, 2 May 1935, USWD 2277-1-19-26; Stilwell's report, 17 June 1936, based on inspections by Captain F.N. Roberts *et al.*, USWD 2277-1-19-18; and Major Constant, 27 February 1933, USWD 2657-1-357:23.

⁷⁶⁵ In 1934, the German advisers were Generals Spemann (artillery), Streccius (air), Gudowius and Starke and Colonel Lucht and Lt-Col Guse, also present were Colonel Bade and Lt-Col Nolte, and Captain von Hunolstein. For the German advisers, see Fu Baozhen, "Zai hua Deguo junshi guwen shizhuan", *Zhuanji wenxian*, 25 (August 1974), 81-82, also his other articles published in *Zhuanji wenxue*, vols. 24, 25, 26, 28 and 30, (1974-77); Donald S Sutton, "German Advice & Residual

Germans were responsible for the teaching of tactics with the help of interpreters. Former generals mostly taught at the War College and colonels at the Academy usually in their speciality. Some helped to translate German manuals, which by 1933 completely supplanted the old Japanese-based ones.⁷⁶⁶

By the time German advisers were repatriated, there were 68 serving in the Central Army. This figure excluded seven who had died in China, four who were dismissed before contract expired, and 13 who left at their own request before completing their contracts, 14 who left because of illness, and six after one year contracts expired. Thirty-one of the 68 stayed for two to seven years.⁷⁶⁷

Although there were many German advisers in Nanjing, their influence in the Central Army, as in the case of Russian advisers in Guangzhou, had its limitations. A substantial number of Japanese-trained officers wanted to see a balance be maintained. A typical case to illustrate this is the establishing of artillery school in Nanjing. Seeing that the army lacked fire power, a German adviser Wetzell recommended setting up an artillery school, and Captain Gilbert was assigned to organise it. The Nanjing government accepted the idea but rejected Wetzell's recommendation to have Gilbert train the teaching staff. Instead, they appointed the Japan-trained Chinese instructors. When the school opened in 1932 offering a eight-week course to a class of 80 officers, only two of its 27 instructors were German. This case demonstrates the kind of vested interest opposed to German methods.⁷⁶⁸

Short Course and Training Regiment

The Central Military Academy's greatest weakness was its limited capacity to produce out the number of officers required to fill one to two million men under arms

Warlordism in the Nanking Decade: Influences on Nationalist Military Training and Strategy." *China Quarterly* 91 (September 1982): 386-410. For a detailed study of the German advisers with the Nanjing government, see William C. Kirby, *Germany and Republican China*. California: Stanford University Press, 1984.

⁷⁶⁶ Fu Baozhen, "Zai hua Deguo junshi guwen shizhuan", *Zhuanji wenxian*, 25 (August 1974), 81-82.

⁷⁶⁷ Sutton, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 25.

⁷⁶⁸ For a description of the artillery school, see Wang Qianan, "Deguo guwen zai Nanjing shiqi gongzuo de huiyi" (German advisers during the Nanjing period), *Zhuanji wenxian*, 27, 4, (no 161, October 1975), 53-54.

in China in the 1930s. As noted earlier in the chapter, the total output of fully trained cadet officers at Nanjing was only 1,000 a year. Since the German system was only adopted from the 6th Class in 1931, it means that fewer than 6,000 graduated by the end of the 12th Class in January 1938. In order to make up the shortage of number, branch schools and short courses were reintroduced. Although these measures produced more graduates the officers were of a much lower calibre.⁷⁶⁹ In 1933 and 1934, some 10,000 officers went up for two-week courses at the summer resort of Lushan. At Lushan, they were taught the latest principles of the anti-Communist campaigning, and exposed to ideological Chiang Kaishek's "baptism of fire". Chiang strongly believed that given the time constraints similar to the early years of Huangpu, political indoctrination was the best alternative to conventional military training.⁷⁷⁰ The second method was the more elaborate retaining class of up to one year, for middle ranking and a few senior officers at both the War College and the Central Military Academy. One difficulty here was that established officers were reluctant to leave their troops, a reflection of the persisting underlying reality of private militarism.

The third and most serious retraining effort was the Training Brigade, the Lehrbrigade, proposed by Seeckt to Chiang Kaishek during his first visit to China in 1933. The Dresden-educated Gui Yungqing set it up. One purpose of this non-combatant unit was to prepare middle and higher ranking officers to work with the fully German-educated officers. Once again, practice took priority over theory. In the brigade's infantry regiments, artillery battalion, engineers, communications and tank companies, and the cavalry squadron, Chinese officers could practice the articulation of the different arms. That six advisers were still attached to the Training Brigade in May 1937 indicates its significance.⁷⁷¹

Of all the German contributions to the army reform, the most famous was the Training Divisions. Unlike the later Training Brigade, the Training Division was an actual fighting force. Bauer proposed it as the nucleus of a truly modern army. The

⁷⁶⁹ *Lujun junguan xuexiaoshi*, 3244, 3283, 3302, 3333, 3344, 3370; Harry H. Collier and Thomas M. Williamsen, *The First and Second Infantry Battalions, 21st Class, Chinese Military Academy Student Directory*, Taipei, 1970, 1: 4-12.

⁷⁷⁰ Though nine Germans were present it was of more political than military significance. This brief programme continued in E'mei in 1925. For greater details, see Peng Guodong ed., *Jiang Jieshi, xiansheng jiayan leichao*, Shanghai, 1937, 479-80, 456-62; Chiang Kaishek, ed., *Lushan junguan xunlianji*, n.p., n.d.; *E'mei junguan xunlianji*, n.p., 1935; William W. Whitson, "Jiangxi jiaofei zhi jiantao", *Zhanshi huikan*, 1 (April 1969), 35.

⁷⁷¹ Donald S Sutton, "German Advice & Residual Warlordism in the Nanking Decade", p. 393.

original Training Corps (*xiaodao dui*) incorporated units of infantry, heavy infantry, cavalry, engineers, and communications. Each had its German adviser, under the overall supervision of the energetic Colonel Wangenheim. The pro-German General Feng Yipei commanded them. The force was soon expanded to regimental size, and in 1930 was named the first Training Division. A second Training Division was formed from the training corps at the Central Military Academy.⁷⁷²

These two divisions, designated as the 87th and 88th Division, were the best-armed and most carefully trained in China. In accordance with Bauer's insistence on the close tactical co-operation of rifles with other arms on the battlefield, each division had light anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and at least 12 of the newest Krupp-designed 75 mm Bofors guns. In 1933, the 87th Division consisted of two infantry brigades each 4,500 strong, and a special Unit brigade numbering about 6,000. Each infantry brigade was divided into two regiments of three battalions, each battalion into three rifle and one machine-gun companies. Besides a large German-style staff corps, there were six or seven attached political workers from the Officers' and Soldier Moral Welfare Society attached to each regiment.⁷⁷³ The personnel were young, well-paid and well-trained officers in their mid-thirties. Ninety per cent of them from the Huangpu Military Academy, and were imbued with "what they proudly called the revolutionary spirit".⁷⁷⁴ These were the units intensively trained by the advisers.⁷⁷⁵ As the 88th Division commander later wrote, "apart from the central military schools, these two divisions were the only units with German advisers engaged in training".⁷⁷⁶ Germans advised a number of other divisions and training units, but rarely for more than a year or so, or in a ratio much larger than one adviser to a division, that is, one to 700 officers. By contrast, with one adviser per regiment in the first few years, the Germans

⁷⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷⁷³ Wang Qianan, *op. cit.*

⁷⁷⁴ Lt-Col W.S. Drysdale, "The 87th Division, the Chinese national army", 24 January 1933, in USWD 2009/230: 1. Both divisions took in more recent graduates of the Central Military Academy, e.g. 40 each from the 8th Class of 712 graduating in May 1933.

⁷⁷⁵ In spite of Seeckt's wish to create a nucleus of 10 new divisions, about eight German-trained divisions were formed in 1937. Liang Hsi-Huey, *The Sino-German Connection: Alexander von Falkenhausen between China and Germany, 1900-1941*, Ph D dissertation, Assen/Amsterdam, 1978, p.90, citing the Starke papers for divisions "reorganise and trained by the Germans". By 1937, there were probably eight German-armed divisions (80,000 each), and about 220,000 more following German-style training. See Lloyd E. Eastman, "The war years, 1937-1945", *China Under Nationalist Rule: Two Essays* (Urbana, n.d.), p. 96.

⁷⁷⁶ Sun Yuanliang, *Yiwan guangnian de yishun*. (Taipei, 1972), p. 136.

in the 87th and 88th could have daily contact with most officers and closely supervise combined-arm tactics.

Different approaches adopted by the Chinese and German advisers toward military training were apparent. The Germans, based on their experience in World War I, sought mobility, concentration and close combination of all arms. Although the Chinese realised the importance of the combined arms tactics, they emphasised the integration approach of social, political and military efforts, a lesson they had learned from the Guangdong's unification and the Northern Expedition. The Chinese officers believed that any vigorous joint operations would presuppose a well co-ordinated unit. But this was not easily available in the 1930s. The various provincial commanders simply did not trust each other. For example, should the Guangdong troops of Chen Jitang lag behind, no co-ordinated plan would materialise. As late as 1933, poor relations among commanders had a devastating effect on troops already discouraged by arrears of pay and Communist leniency toward captives and defectors. Local militarists continued to cling to their control over territorial taxes levied to argument funds doled out from Nanjing. Energetic pursuit of the "red bandits" would have meant giving up control of such taxes and becoming dependent on Chiang Kaishek.

The Huangpu Spirit

Apart from the Central Army's reorganisation, the post-Northern Expedition also witnessed the institutionalisation of the Huangpu Spirit as the Central Army's military ethos. Most established armies have a set of military ethos for servicemen and women. The German sense of honour was rooted in the Christian faith and heroic tales from its tradition expressed in the concept of Prussian *Kriegsschulen* and *kasina*. A Japanese soldier's honour was rooted in the samurai code and the history of their heroic exploits in the spirit of *Yamatodamashii* (the spirit of the Yamoto race) and *bushido*. When Jiang Boli was the commandant of the Baoding Military Academy he introduced the *bushido* spirit to the cadets but it failed to create much impact on the officer corps.⁷⁷⁷ The English officer corps was specially concerned with the development of the officer' character, particularly, a sense of honour. A soldier's foremost duty was to

⁷⁷⁷ For more on the Chinese bushido see Liang Qichao, *Zhongguo zhi wushi dao* (China's bushido). Taipei: Taiwan Zhonghua, 1957. This book embodies the outlook of Baoding's third and most influential commandant, Jiang Boli, who eulogised the role to be played by China's soldiers. He envisioned them as the saviours of the nation. It suggests that Chinese trained professional soldiers of the future would have ideas of modern nationalism that were minglings of notions borrowed from the West with traditional concepts about the heroic qualities of the soldier.

fight. His training in the classroom, on parade grounds, or in the barracks centred on the elimination of his cowardice, his fear of death. To achieve this, he needed moral discipline and such institutional arrangements as duelling, brutalization and punishment.

In the Chinese army, the sense of honour for being a soldier was not explicit. It is subsumed under traditional personal cultivation and principles of being a man and there was no formal institutional arrangement to strengthen it. Chiang Kaishek was probably the first modern army trainer who paid some attention to this problem. A complete expression of Chiang Kaishek's military ethos was the Huangpu spirit. According to the Commandant, the Huangpu spirit consisted of the spirit of self-sacrifice, unity and responsibility. These three elements were interrelated and the sum total of them was the spirit of revolution. This meant possession of ideology, thought, organisation, leadership, and the determination to succeed.⁷⁷⁸ For Chiang, the spirit of Huangpu was exemplified by staff and students of the Huangpu Military Academy during the unification of Guangdong and the Northern Expedition. And this was the Guomindang's official version of the Huangpu spirit. In essence, it is a set of military ethics for the Central Army and subsequent Taiwanese military. It is still being taught in the Fengshan Military Academy and other military schools in Taiwan today.⁷⁷⁹

For most of the people from the Huangpu Military Academy, the Huangpu spirit was best remembered in the early years of academy on Changzhou Island. One form of Huangpu spirit is the teachings of basic values. The earlier training at Huangpu focused on the "internal training" which would remake them as individuals by nurturing in each cadet a revolutionary conscience. This conscience would serve as constant point of reference in his future military career. For most Huangpu Military Academy's students in Guangzhou, the teachings were clearly manifested in the forms of many parallel couplets (*lianyu*) which hung on the Academy's doors and gates during 1924-1927. The cadets were encouraged to memorise these couplets and to meditate on their meaning. On either side of the Academy's front gate were *lianyu* derived from Sun Yatsen's speech at the school's opening ceremonies that read: "The blood of martyrs is

⁷⁷⁸ "Huangpu jingshen" (The Huangpu Spirit), Lujun junguan xuexiao sanshiwu zhounian xiaqing jinian xunci (The Commandant's speech for the 35th anniversary of the founding of the academy), *Zongtong dui junshi jiaoyu xunci xuanji* (Select speeches of the president on military education), vol. 4: 1954, Taipei: Ministry of National Defence, 1964.

⁷⁷⁹ This was confirmed by the Curator of the Fangshan Military Academy during my visit on 22 August 1993.

the flower of the ideology".⁷⁸⁰ Sun Yatsen's speech to the First Class of the Huangpu cadets on 16 June 1924 was adapted into the Republican China's national anthem. It reads: "Sanmin zhuyi (the three peoples' principles) is respected by our party for building the nation and to promote the great commonwealth. You are the knights (*shi*) who will rise with us. Be the advance guard, be not careless in carrying out the ideology (*zhuyi*). Be diligent, be brave, be true, be loyal and with one heart and one mind carry through the end." Another *lianyu* presented to Chiang Kaishek by Chen Qimei read: We must rely on each other to the end in peace and in danger in the days ahead; we must taste together the sweetness and bitterness of the days ahead.⁷⁸¹ There were also couplets with neo-Confucian messages like: "Exhaustively study the principles at the point where a thing begins, meticulously study the moment when the heart's intention is moved."⁷⁸² There was also couplet from the Song loyalist Wen Tianxiang who read: "Nourish the orthodox forces (*qi*), follow the complete individuals of the past and the present."⁷⁸³

The essence of Chiang Kaishek's six training principles was also captured in the following catchy verse. "Teach them to be men, teach them to be modern men, teach them to be modern Chinese men; teach them to be soldiers, teach them to be modern soldiers, teach them to be modern Chinese soldiers."⁷⁸⁴ They were also imbued with Chiang Kaishek's belief that "to use soldiers is not as good as using the people; to teach the people we must teach them as we would teach troops." A similar idea was contained in the slogan: "Make of yourself a pattern for others."⁷⁸⁵ The Huangpu and Central Military Academy cadets were models of ideological and moral pursuit whose exemplary behaviour would transform society. Like a good knight-errant or a Confucian *junzi*, he was to renounce rank and money and work instead wholly for the

⁷⁸⁰ Deng Wenyi, "Huangpu xuesheng wushi nian" (Fifty years as a student of Huangpu", in *Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji*, 99; *Zongjun baoguoji* (Joining the army to repay the country), 28-30. It is striking how strongly Huangpu training methods influenced the future course of the Republican history. The *lianyu* memorised by the cadets of 1924 continue to be learned today by military trainees in Taiwan.

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28. This couplet aptly captured the tone of Huangpu friendships was prominently erected by the sides of Huangpu's gates.

⁷⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁷⁸³ Wen Tianxiang (1236-1282) was a Song patriot who was executed by the Mongols. Before his death he wrote the *Zhengqi ge*.

⁷⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 33, 29-30.

good of the nation. His training aimed to help him act resolutely in situations where the faint-hearted or ambivalent party elements might hesitate.

Huangpu cadets were also urged by their Commandant to respect the people and to be willing to perform menial tasks without hesitating over about the propriety of manual labour.⁷⁸⁶ At the end of the lecture, for example, cadets themselves should move the chairs back into place. They should also take the initiative in mending clothes, carrying water, and emptying "night-soil", and not wait for the orderlies to perform these unpleasant tasks. They should be frugal and not use their positions to acquire wealth or possession.⁷⁸⁷

At the Central Military Academy, as in Huangpu, one could almost imagine that one was to be a national hero in the future years. The cadet corps would unify China and revenge all the humiliation wreaked on her by foreign powers. The commandant held up to his mesmerised pupils a mirror which showed each of them in the most flattering possible way. In return, he demanded of them obedience and loyalty which verged on servility. Many were too happy to make the exchange.

Huangpu Officers and the Third Party Movement

Not all officers of the Huangpu's units gave their allegiance to the Guomindang or embraced Communism. A small group of them could not subscribe to the political programme of either party. Instead they attempted to fashion a "non-communist but left-wing alternative to the Kuomintang (Guomindang)".⁷⁸⁸

The popular and influential former Huangpu faculty member Deng Yanda was one of the leaders of this group which became known as the "Third Party" (*ti'san dang*). Soon after the Guomindang-Chinese Communist Party split, he proposed that adherents of both parties be incorporated into a party dedicated to achieving a radical revolution through a national party. Although the Guomindang soon disowned Deng,

⁷⁸⁶ Deng Wenyi, *Huangpu xunlianji* (Huangpu training collection), p. 29.

⁷⁸⁷ Huangpu's rhetorical war on privilege was echoed in many of the propaganda works of the New Life in the 1930's. The condemnation of selfish gain and obviously obnoxious vestiges of the "feudal" social order was the Right's equivalent of the doctrine of the class struggle. Eastman, *Abortive Revolution*, p. 48.

⁷⁸⁸ Donald Gillin, "Problems of Centralisation in Republican China: The Case of Ch'en Ch'eng and the KMT." *Journal of Asian Studies* 29, no. 4 (August 1970): 837.

he and former Communist Tan Pingshan formed the so-called Provincial Action Committee of the Guomindang in Hong Kong in 1929. This event laid the foundations for the Third Party.⁷⁸⁹

Leaders of various political persuasions rallied to support Deng, a number were from the Huangpu alumni. The most prominent of the Huangpu men were Yan Zhong and Ji Fang, both formerly from the academy faculty. Yan's association with Deng may have been primarily personal. Yan was a Baoding graduate and a subordinate of Deng's in the 1st Guangdong Division prior to 1924. He seems to have taken his political cues from his mentor both at the academy and later after 1927. Ji Fang, who served as head of the Organisation Section of the General Political Department under Deng during the Northern Expedition, also disengaged himself from the Guomindang soon after the split. After a two year sojourn in Shanghai where he founded and edited liberal journals (the Blitz and Light-house), Ji joined the Third Party in the 1930. The actions of these officers spurred other military leaders to follow suit.

Some pro-Communist Huangpu officers were among the radical elements who flocked to Deng's Third Party in the early 1930s. The period 1928-1931 were lean years for the Communists in the isolation of their rural base areas. Xu Jishen and Zhou Shidi (both from First Class) were among the young Red Army leaders who felt that a continuation of the armed struggle against Nanjing was useless and looked to support a radical group within the Guomindang. Xu, commander of the Red Fourth Corps' 12th Division in the E-Yuwan base, grew so disenchanted with the prospects for Communism that he deserted the Red Army with most of his forces to join Deng in Hong Kong in 1931.⁷⁹⁰

Zhou Shidi also became disillusioned with Communism during the Nanchang retreat, deserted the Red Army and fled to Japan. He became acquainted with Third Party elements there, and returned to join the party in China to participate in the short-lived Fujian Rebellion mounted by Chiang Kaishek's leftist opposition in December

⁷⁸⁹ For details see, Zhang Gangyu, *Deng Yanda zhuan* (The biography of Deng Yanda). Wuchang: Wuhan University Publication, 1993, chapter 9, 190-207.

⁷⁹⁰ *Zhonggong junren zhi* (Biographies of the Chinese Communist military leaders), Editor Huang Chenxia, Hong Kong: Research Institute of Contemporary History, 1968, 276-77; Wales, Nym (Helen Foster Snow), *Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Communists, as told to Nym Wales*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, p. 156.

1933. Zhou's reasons for participating in the revolt were unclear. Zhang was a leader in the Fujian Revolt, and the 19th Route Army. The 19th Route Army, staffed with Guangdong Huangpu graduates, undoubtedly included close associates of Zhou, who was himself a Hainan native. This affiliation may help to explain how Zhou reportedly moved up so quickly to assume command of a regiment during the campaign.⁷⁹¹

Since the Third Party remained for a time within the Guomindang fold, the Provisional Action Committee attracted a substantial number of young officers who still were considered loyal to Chiang. Chen Cheng, a Huangpu officer then serving as commander of the 18th Route Army, furnished the best example of the leader who belonged to both camps. Despite his devotion to Chiang, his radical social and economic philosophy impelled him to closely associate with Deng.

The history of the Third Party is scanty. It continued to exist after Deng's death, with Zhang Bojun and the Guangdong General Huang Jixiang assumed Deng's mantle as leader. The Fujian Rebellion dealt another severe blow to the party's aspirations as Cai Tingkai's sympathetic 19th Route Army was decimated during the operation. Its remnants were ultimately absorbed into either the Guomindang forces or the Red Army. Huangpu officers Chen Cheng and Zhou Shidi seem to have influenced the decisions taken by the 19th Route Army cadre at this time. Zhou was the highest ranking Communist officer who joined the Red Army. He undoubtedly swayed a number of other officers to join him at that time; and some three years later he is reported to have induced another large group of former 19th Route Army soldiers in Shenxi to change sides.⁷⁹² Chen Cheng is also reported to have coopted most of the Third Party membership after Deng's death. Chen succeeded in securing the loyalty of most 18th Route Army cadre to Chiang. He continued to command the allegiance of Huang Qixiang, one of Deng's successors, and ensured that most of the defeated 19th Route Army returned to the Guomindang fold.⁷⁹³ The Third Party, shorn of its own

⁷⁹¹ *Zhonggong junren zhi*, p. 197; Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 232; Smedley, Agnes, *The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh (Zhu De)*. Monthly Review Press, 1956, p. 210; *Who's Who in Communist China*, 2 vols., Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 2nd rev. edn 1969-70, 1969, p. 152.

⁷⁹² *Zhonggong junren zhi*, p. 187; *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, p. 232. For details concerning Zhuo Shidi's enticement over to the Red Army after the Battle of Baozuo (Shenxi), see Huang Yuren, "Yi huangpu." *Gujin*, over four issues, from number 1 to 4 (20 August 1905 to 5 September 1964).

⁷⁹³ Gillin, "Problems of Centralisation in Republican China: The Case of Ch'en Ch'eng and the KMT", 837-38.

military power, never regained its former potency.⁷⁹⁴

In sum, leaders with Huangpu's affiliations led the Third Party movement. The military units that supported it, the 18th and 19th Route Armies, had a substantial number of Huangpu officials and alumni. They were influential in redirecting the loyalties of the Third Party military leaders to either the Guomindang or the Communist.

In conclusion, the post-Northern Expedition realities imposed great constraints on the Nanjing regime. The military solution appeared to be most desirable to the ruling elite since many were military men. They realised that "power came from the barrels of the guns" more than anything else. The Nanjing regime needed to continuously fight the Chinese Communist guerrillas in the countryside. It had to suppress regional militarists who revolted against Nanjing government. Finally, it had also to win over officers of the Third Party movement. In the meanwhile, the legacy of the Huangpu Military Academy and the Party Army was institutionalised in Nanjing by the creation of the Central Military Academy and the Central Army. In this process, the German advisers played important roles in this transformation. Chiang Kaishek might have preferred the German model of professional officer corps and the combined-arms tactics doctrine. But he had to balance the influence of German advisers and the Japanese-trained Chinese officers on the one hand, and military and political training on the other hand. Above all, the demand for officers in the Central Army and anti-Communist campaigns in the countryside soon forced Chiang to resort to shorter courses and political training more than the conventional military training as envisaged by the German advisers in the Central Military Academy. The greatest legacy of Huangpu and the Nationalist Revolutionary Army was the Huangpu spirit. Essentially it was an ideology of military nationalism, which contained certain individual basic values, and Chinese nationalism. The Huangpu spirit spread not only among commanders in the Central Army but also in Communist Red Army and the Third Party movement who had associated with Huangpu in Guangzhou. It was this spirit of putting the unity of the country in first priority that allowed commanders of three camps to change side occasionally and to forge a second United Front during the Japanese invasion of China in 1937-45.

⁷⁹⁴ Ji Fang retained his commitment to the Third Party programmes up until 1949, despite the fact he served as a military commander in Chen Yi's New Fourth Army in Sino-Japanese War. When the Third Party was resuscitated in 1947, Ji Fang became one of its most important members. *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, 164-5.

Conclusion

The military dimension of the modern Chinese history has received a greater attention by scholars lately. The focus of study has shifted from the warlord study to wider issues of military modernisation process and structural change that occurred in the military and their impact on the Chinese society.⁷⁹⁵

This dissertation challenges the traditional approach that subsumes the history of the Huangpu Military Academy and the National Revolutionary Army under the Guomindang's movement. Instead, it treats modern military academy as its main subject of inquiry and look at broader issues of the military modernisation and its impact on Chinese society. It also attempts to explain, from a military perspective, why the Huangpu Military Academy and the National Revolutionary were successful during 1924-1928 and how did these successes transform modern Chinese military and politics.

The military as a social institution has always been shaped by the society and politics of the period. But the military has also its dynamic and is able to assert its influence on the society as well. The modern military academy is no exception. The creation of modern military academies in China during the turn of the 19th and 20th century had a great impact on the Chinese military in early 20th century. The rise of Chinese officer corps was a direct consequence of modern military academies. In term of leadership, graduates of modern military academies stood at the forefront of the national political scene in early Republican years. Graduates of the Tianjin Military Academy filled in the first generation of military leadership and they hold key positions in the military bureaucracy in the 1910s. Likewise, the Baoding Military Academy graduates assumed the leadership roles in the 1920s; the Huangpu Military Academy and Central Military Academy provided leadership of the 1930s and 40s. Organisationally, the military stresses discipline; esprit de corps; collective action and the power of using violence and force. If one were to compare with other

⁷⁹⁵ See Hans Van de Ven, "Recent Studies of Modern Chinese History," *Modern Asian Studies* 30, no. 2 (May 1996): 225-269. They are eleven articles in this a special issue on the subject of War in Modern China; for earlier work see Edmund Fung, *The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution: The New Army and its Role in the Revolution of 1911*. Australia: Australian National University Press, 1980.

modern institutions such as political party, labour, farmer and student unions, military academies had much longer years of development, numerically stronger and wider spread in the country. It was the best organised and the most powerful of all the political organisations, at least before the Japanese invasion in 1937. The process of the officer corps emerging to take over the government began in late 1910s and completed in the late 1920s, a period coincided with the founding and development of the Huangpu and Central Military Academy in Guangzhou and Nanjing respectively.

Although modern military academies set up in China at different period and under varied circumstances, there were common features in these training institutions. The presence of foreign military advisers was a common feature in many Chinese military training schools. Li Hongzhang and Chiang Kaishek preferred the German military models and hired the German advisers. Zhang Zhidong, Liu Kunyi and Yuan Shikai sought the service of the Japanese military officers. Sun Yatsen and Zhu Zhixin went after the Russian Red Army system. Secondly, the primary purpose of modern military academies was to upgrade military skills so as to prepare for the formation of a new military unit. The formation of the New Army at the turn of the 20th century and the Party Army of the Guomindang in the 1920s shared a common characteristic that the new unit had a national identity and destined to play the role of the central army.

The experience of the Huangpu Military Academy shared some of these elements but also created some additional ones. The most important new element is the Party Military Academy and Army. The married between the military and political party was a breakthrough to establish a new military-political structure in the warlord China where military separatism had weakened the national unity. Sun Yatsen's main contribution to the Huangpu Military Academy was the introduction of the Party army. Sun's ideas were novel but they lacked details. Sun and some of the Guomindang members found the Russian Red Army attractive. But Sun had other military agenda other than learning from the Red Army. He and his colleagues wanted military aid and assistance to fight regional militarists and foreign powers. The military assistance formed a substantial part of the Guomindang-Comintern collaboration in the 1920s.

Contrary to the common belief, the Huangpu Military Academy was not also an academy but also an army. Huangpu established its own army to protect its own existence in hostile Guangzhou. Although it was a Guomintang's military academy, the Party control of the academy was lax and the Chinese officer corps led by Chiang Kaishek played a crucial role in determining the development of the academy. Huangpu established its own army as early as 1924 and it started to take part in local conflicts such as the Merchant Corps crisis and the Eastern Expedition.

The success of the Eastern Expedition in 1925 had led to the formation of the Party Army, and later, the National Revolutionary Army. The Huangpu Military Academy was then reorganised and expanded to become the Central Military and Political Academy. Its primary mission was to convert provincial armies and integrate these units into a central army of the Guomintang. The process was protracted and uneven as demonstrated by many conflicts among members of the Guomintang and the Communist Party on the one hand, and commanders of the Party army on the other. In addition, the Russian advisers were also involved in the rivalry for power. The conflict from within the Guomintang reached its pick in Zhongshan Gunboat Incident and the Commandant of the Central Academy reacted swiftly to quell the challengers. This was the turning point for Chiang Kaishek who emerged as a strong leader of both the military and the party.

It was the development of Huangpu units--the Academy Army, the Party Army and I Corps of the National Revolutionary Army--that explained the fast progress of Huangpu in Guangzhou. The formation of the National Revolutionary Army spearheaded by Huangpu's I Corps coincided the unification of Guangdong and the preparation for the Northern Expedition. Within a short period of two years, a seven-corps National Revolutionary Army was formed.

Russian military aid and advisers played an important role in setting up Huangpu and the National Revolutionary Army. Unlike other foreign military advisers the Russian military assistance included monies and arms to help the Guomintang. These material supports were crucial in the first two years when funds and military resources were in the hands of regional armies. Russian aid thus helped to create the Party academy and Huangpu army.

The system of the political commissar, or the Party representative, was introduced originally to assist the Party to control the army. However, the system of control did not produce the same effect in the Guomintang army as in the Russian Red Army. For the Guomintang the Party representative was used against regional armies who joined in the Party army, or as liaisons between the army and the civilian population in areas of operations. In short, the Party representative was primarily useful in establishing the Party Army and in military operations. This was a vast distinction from the Russian Red Army where political commissars were deployed by the party to check on the "military specialists"—the professional officer corps. In the case of the Guomintang army, the officer corps used it to check on former regional armies. Therefore, the main beneficiaries of the Russian Red Army model and military assistance went directly to the Guomintang military headed by Chiang Kaishek rather than the party.

During the preparation for the Northern Expedition, the Russian advisers also played important roles in the reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army. They were active in co-ordinating the General Staff headquarters and the army corps, the navy and the air force headquarters. In fact, they formed an internal system of communications between the General Staff and the rest of the corps and service commands. This command and control system would be useful in inter-corps operations and battles, which required more than two corps. But during the Northern Expedition it was the smaller units, which were below corps level, fought most of the battles. Hence, the usefulness of Russian military advisers during the Northern Expedition was limited. Instead, the traditional Chinese warfare of inducing opponent subordinates to defect gained importance during the expedition.

Russian military advisers and assistance to the Guomintang were important but the Russians were definitely not in control of any military units. They realised this in the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident in early 1926. The Russian influence diminished as the Northern Expedition progressed.

The Chinese officer corps formed the backbone behind the establishment of the Huangpu Army, the Party Army, and the National Revolutionary Army. The officer corps protected the Party Army against the threats from regional armies. They

gained the support of the Russian advisers because of their common military outlook that placed national unification beyond sectarian interests, and the view that the military had a decisive role in this unification effort. This was particularly evident in the cordial working relationship between Chiang Kaishek and Bliukher before the Northern Expedition.

Although Huangpu did not play the key role in the Northern Expedition, it was the main co-ordinating body of the Guomindang's effort in launching the attack in central China. It played co-ordinating roles through its Baoding network among commanders and staff officers of the National Revolutionary Army, and between the National Revolutionary Army and other regional armies. The Northern Expedition's success came through the elimination of major regional militarists in central China and through inducement of military defections to the National Revolutionary Army. The officer corps contributed decisively on both counts.

Some scholars argue that Huangpu cadets were of higher quality. Ch'i Hsi-Sheng believes that "from the beginning the quality of the Whampao [Huangpu] cadets was high... [and] Whampao's applicants were superior to those of all the military schools in the nation, and in some cases they were even superior to the graduates of other military schools."⁷⁹⁶ Many cadets later recalled that the enrolment requirements and examinations for applications were not so strict as the Guomindang's documents might suggest. Certainly, Huangpu cadets were not superior to either cadets or graduates of Baoding Military Academy. Baoding cadets had nine-year preliminary formal military school training and were required to spend a full two-year officer's training at Baoding.⁷⁹⁷

In terms of the battlefield performance, Huangpu's cadets fought courageously in the Eastern Expedition. They suffered 217 deaths from a total strength of 2327 (from Classes 1 to 3). Huangpu's cadets, however, did not fight as well in the Northern Expedition and the death of the graduates in the battlefield declined sharply.

⁷⁹⁶ Ch'i, *Warlord Politics*, p.12.

⁷⁹⁷ Xu Xiangqian, "Huiqu Huangpu junxiao (Remembrance of the Huangpu military academy), in *Diyici guogong hezuozhishi de Huangpu junxiao* (The Huangpu Military Academy during the First United Front) Beijing, 1984, 21-17; Wang Dawen, "Kaoru Huangpu dierqi de qianqian houhuo"

Up to April 1927, only 101 deaths from a total graduate of 4981 (Classes 1 to 4). Chiang Kaishek confessed that the Huangpu cadets under his command during the Northern Expedition did not win even one battle before the capture of Nanchang in November 1926.⁷⁹⁸

The Northern Expedition was successful because of a combination of ideological, military and leadership factors. Although numerically weaker as compared to main regional forces of Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang, the National Revolutionary Army was perceived by many as a military force with an ideological appeal to reunify China from military separatism and foreign encroachments. The timing for launching the Northern Expedition was crucial as it allowed the National Revolutionary Army to strike when the opponents were weak, divided and unprepared. Most important, however, was the decisive battles that turned the support of many local militarists to the side of the National Revolutionary Army and the Guomindang.

The weaknesses of the National Revolutionary Army began to surface after the split of the United Front. The rivalries between Wuhan and Nanjing divided the National Revolutionary Army into two main factions. Within the two factions many smaller allies also started to act independently with little regards to the order of Commander-in-Chief. Chiang had to look for new alliances to safeguard the foothold in Nanjing. It took nearly another one and a half year and established new alliances with northern militarists to end the Northern Expedition in 1928. This was the main reason why the Northern Expedition could only achieve partial unification of China.

The most influential and critical person in the establishment of both the Huangpu Military Academy and the National Revolutionary Army was the Commandant and the Commander-in-Chief, Chiang Kaishek dubbed by the French as the "Napoleon of China". Chiang was instrumental in pushing for the Party academy and Party army. He could work with both the Guomindang officials and obtain the support of the Russian advisers to implement many development plans, some went

(Before and after I was admitted into the second class of Huangpu), *ibid.*, p.287.

⁷⁹⁸ Mao Shicheng, *Shiwu nian yiqian zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng*, p. 855; Ch'I His-sheng also noted the

against Sun Yatsen's instructions, to create an effective and creditable army. Chiang rose above many of the Guomindang's commanders because of his nationalistic outlook and pragmatic approach to the problems of the Guomindang in Guangzhou and central China. His political orientation and policy gained the support of many well-trained officers from the southern provinces. These academy-trained officers formed the bulk of Chiang's loyal supporters. Their support was crucial to Chiang in setting the Huangpu Military Academy, and in difficult times during the Northern Expedition. Even when Chiang resigned from his post of the Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army, no one would want to take over his position.

The post-Northern Expedition period saw the forces under Chiang Kaishek consolidating itself by defeating the rebellious armies, as well as building up its central army into a national army. The Central Military Academy in Nanjing was to bring about this new army. It appeared that Nanjing regime was keen in a professional army when it adopted the German model of military build-up. Under the German model, a professional army with modern technology and combined arms operations would be the standard army. Yet, situation would not allow this slow and costly build-up of the military. The demand of large number of officers to staff the ever-expanding units meant that short-course training would have to supplement officers trained in the Central Military Academy.


Looking at the development of military academies in early Republican China, the Huangpu Military Academy in Guangzhou was a transitional phase of the Chinese officer corps attempting to establish a new national army. The Guomindang's Party Army first absorbed these officers. However, unlike the Russian Red Army where the party could maintain its close control of the military, the Chinese officer corps was not only free from political party control but successfully provided leadership to the party. The Party Army was thus became the platform in which to launch a central army.

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Table 1 : Military & Political Cadres in 1923*

Institution/Year	Baoding Graduates	Shikan Gakko Graduates	GMD Members	CCP Members
1923	6574	548	1503	123



Sources: *Baoding junguan xuexiao*; C.M. Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen* (1976)

*This table compares graduates of military academies who had at least 3-5 years of military schooling to registered members of the GMD and CCP in 1923.

Table 2 Provincial Origins of the Baoding Military Academy Alumni

Province/Course	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	Total	%
Zhili	228	240	47	---	232	234	10	301	405	1697	25.81
Hubei	53	37	26	189	10	272	2	7	13	609	9.26
Henan	72	45	8	---	22	109	64	47	58	425	6.46
Fujian	59	70	106	4	---	52	92	10	3	396	6.02
Hunan	63	58	147	6	3	26	3	17	42	365	5.55
Shangdong	97	53	6	---	47	70	1	45	25	344	5.23
Zhejiang	9	34	162	2	6	85	---	32	7	337	5.13
Anhui	36	41	54	4	58	46	8	27	56	330	5.02
Jiangsu	46	54	111	---	15	73	---	14	15	328	4.99
Guangdong	54	33	15	---	1	121	---	10	8	242	3.68
Fengtian	47	10	13	---	94	8	1	31	34	238	3.62
Shanxi	58	37	2	---	68	8	2	38	2	215	3.27
Sichuan	68	62	7	2	1	47	2	11	3	203	3.09
Jiangxi	29	30	35	---	---	57	1	11	10	173	2.63
Guangxi	39	29	34	1	---	30	1	2	3	139	2.11
Shannxi	45	31	7	---	---	3	---	21	5	112	1.70
Jilin	19	21	3	---	47	5	---	5	5	105	1.60
Gansu	31	14	---	---	1	42	2	1	2	93	1.42
Guizhou	38	26	6	1	---	7	---	---	3	81	1.23
Yunnan	7	21	7	---	---	36	1	1	1	74	1.13
Heilongjiang	13	8	2	---	21	---	---	---	1	48	0.73
Suiyuan	---	---	---	---	4	1	1	---	---	6	0.09
Jehol	---	---	---	---	---	1	---	1	1	3	0.05
Xinjiang	---	2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2	0.03
Chahar	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	---	1	0.02
Mongolia	---	---	2	---	---	---	---	---	---	2	0.03
Inner Mongolia	---	---	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	0.02
Unknovn	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	5	---	5	0.08
Total	1114	956	801	209	630	1333	191	638	702	6574	100

Sources: *Lujun xingzheng jiyao* (An account of the army administration). Beijing, 1916 and 1920, reprint, Taipei: Wenhai, 1971; *Lujun junguan xuexiao tongxuehu* (Alumni of the Baoding military academy). 2nd edn, Beijing (Beijing): Wuxue shuguan, 1929.

Table 3: Baoding Graduates by Arms

Arms/Course	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	Total
Infantry	565	555	506	209	328	875	146	411	456	4071
Cavalry	189	137	90	--	79	141	45	65	76	822
Artillery	185	118	127	--	91	148	--	97	121	887
Engineering	94	80	41	--	38	88	--	37	40	418
Logistics	81	66	38	--	40	81	--	28	42	376

Sources: *Lujun xingzheng jiyao*; *Lujun junguan xuexiao tongxuelu*

Table 4: Founding Budget of Huangpu, Jan-June 1924¹

Month	Item	Credit	Debit	Balance
Jan-May	Founding Funds	160,370.500		
Jan-May	Founding Expense		131,209.157	
Jan-May	Administrative Expense		10,871.053	
Jan-May	Uniforms (Shanghai)		18,832.237	
June	Monthly Income	30,000.000		
June	Monthly Expense		30,115.971	
Jan-June	Total	190,370.500	191,028.418	-657.918

Table 5: Monthly Budget of Huangpu, May-June 1924

Month	Item	Credit	Debit	Balance
May	Monthly Income	27,500.000		
May	Expense		20,878.000	
June	Monthly Income	25,000.000		
June	Expense		29,133.000	
May-June	Total Expense	2,500.000	50,011.288	
Jan-June	Total Founding and Monthly Expense	242,870.500	241,039.706	+1,830.794

Sources: *Zhongyang shang zongli ji zhi jian weiyuan hui qing zhun he Huangpu baobao chenghan* (The budget of Huangpu for the zongli [Sun Yatsen] and inspection committee approval), file no: 454/47.5, 24 July 1924, the Guomindang Archives.

¹ Currency is in Guangdong dollars. In the original text some figures are given in silver dollar (Shanghai). The conversion is based on \$1 silver dollar being equal to \$1.25 Guangdong dollar.

Table 6: Salary Scale of the Huangpu Officers and Soldiers

Rank	First Class	Second Class	Third Class
MAJ-GENERAL	\$550	---	---
BRIG-GENERAL	\$400	---	---
COLONEL	\$300	\$240	---
LT-COLONEL	\$220	\$200	---
MAJOR	\$180	\$160	---
CAPTAIN	\$100	\$90	\$80
LIEUTENANT	\$72	\$64	\$56
2ND-LIEUTENANT	\$50	\$45	\$40
2ND-LIEUTENANT (unconfirmed)	\$35	\$30	---
SERGEANT	\$20	---	---
CORPORAL	\$14	---	---
L-CORPORAL	\$12	---	---
PRIVATE (TOP CLASS)	\$11	---	---
PRIVATE (1ST CLASS)	\$10.5	---	---
PRIVATE (2ND CLASS)	\$10	---	---
STUDENT-CADET	\$10	---	---
LABOURER	\$10	---	---

Source: *Huangpu junxiao ji dangjun xinxiang shumu biao* (Table of salary of the Huangpu military academy and army), file no. 454/33, dated July 1924, the Guomindang Archives.

Table 7: Provincial Background of the First Class Cadets

Province	1st Coy	2nd Coy	3rd Coy	4th Coy	Sub-total	6th Coy	Total	%
Hunan	23	22	21	3	69	116	185	29.13
Guangdong	26	33	30	17	106	3	109	17.17
Shaanxi	15	8	19	15	57	0	57	8.98
Jiangxi	6	6	7	6	25	19	44	6.93
Zhejiang	12	10	7	8	37	1	38	5.98
Guangxi	11	7	10	3	31	5	36	5.67
Anhui	6	6	6	7	25	0	25	3.94
Jiangsu	5	4	3	10	22	0	22	3.46
Sichuan	4	5	5	4	19	1	20	3.15
Hubei	4	5	4	4	17	0	17	2.65
Guizhou	1	4	4	6	15	0	15	2.36
Yunnan	0	0	0	13	13	1	14	2.20
Henan	1	2	3	5	11	0	11	1.73
Shandong	3	2	1	5	11	0	11	1.73
Shanxi	4	2	1	3	10	0	10	1.57
Fujian	3	3	2	2	10	0	10	1.57
Hebei	1	2	0	1	4	0	4	0.63
Gansu	1	0	0	2	3	0	3	0.47
Inner Mon	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	0.31
Jilin	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.16
Heilongjian	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.16
Total					489	145	635	100.00

Source: *Huangpu junxiao shiliao*, "Students directory", 522-530.

Table 8: Provincial Background of First to Third Class Cadets

Province	First Class	Second Class	Third Class	Total	%
Hunan	197	75	220	492	21.14
Guangdong	108	107	226	441	18.95
Zhejiang	37	66	173	276	11.86
Jiangxi	42	52	100	194	8.34
Sichuan	21	49	100	170	7.31
Jiangsu	24	10	100	134	5.76
Hubei	16	23	78	117	5.03
Anhui	25	15	76	116	4.98
Guangxi	37	15	37	89	3.82
Shaanxi	57	4	7	68	2.92
Guizhou	15	13	26	54	2.32
Shandong	11	6	26	43	1.85
Yunnan	13	3	18	34	1.46
Fujian	11	6	16	33	1.42
Shanxi	10	2	12	24	1.03
Henan	10	0	10	20	0.86
Hebei	4	2	3	9	0.39
Korea	0	0	4	4	0.17
Gansu	3	0	0	3	0.13
Mongolia	2	1	0	3	0.13
Jilin	1	0	1	2	0.09
Heilongjian	1	0	0	1	0.04
Total	645	449	1233	2327	100.00

Sources: *Huangpu junxiao shiliao*, vol 2, 4th bian, pp. 4,17,31; *Huangpu junxiao shiliao*, p. 93.

Table 9: Heads of the Political Department of Huangpu
May 1924-Jan 1926

Name	Province	Education/Institution	Appointment	Date
Dai Jitac	Sichuan	Japanese University (Law)	Head	10.5-28.6. 1924
Zhang Songnian	Hebei	French University	Acting Head	28.6.1924-5.1925
Shao Yunchong	Zhejiang	US Wisconsin and Columbia Universities	Head	9.-11.1924
Zhou Enlai	Zhejiang	(studied in France institution unknown)	Acting Head	11.1924-2.1925
Bao Huiseng	Hubei	Hubei Teachers' Training College	Acting Head	11.1924-2.1925
Shao Lizi	Zhejiang	Traditional Chinese education		7.1924
Wang Jingwei	Guangdong	Japanese Law Short Course		14.9.1924-1926
Lu Yi	Hunan	unknown		10.1924-2.1926

Table 10: Education Background of the Huangpu Military Academy Military Staff of the First, Second, and Third Courses (1924-1925)*

Names of the Academy/School/University	No.	%
Baoding Military Academy	69	78.41
Shikan gakko (Japanese Military Academy)	11	12.50
Beijing Army Surveying School	3	3.41
Second Army Preparatory School	1	1.14
Jiangxi Military School	1	1.14
Zhejiang Military School	1	1.14
Baoding Senior Officers' Short Course	1	1.14
Nanyang University, Department of Electrical Engineering	1	1.14
TOTAL	88	100

Table 11 Provincial Origins of the Huangpu Military Academy Military Staff(1924-5) *

Provinces	No.	%
Jiangsu	19	21.59
Jiangxi	16	18.18
Zhejiang	11	12.50
Hubei	9	10.23
Guangdong	8	9.09
Fujian	7	7.95
Hunan	5	5.68
Anhui	4	4.55
Yunnan	4	4.55
Henan	2	2.27
Guizhou	1	1.14
Sichuan	1	1.14
Guangxi	1	1.14
Total	88	100

* Sources: Qian Dajun, "Huangpu chuangli shiji renwuzhi", *Huangpu jianshi*, Liu Fenghan, "Huangpu zhuoji zuzhi jiji renwu fenxi", *Huangpu junxiao tongxuelu*, Hunan Archives comp; *Riben lujun shiguan xuexiao liuxuesheng minglu*, *Lujun jianguan tongxuelu*

Table 12 : Monthly Revenue of the Guangzhou Government

Year	Revenue (\$)	Remarks
1924	667,000	Yearly average
1925	1,584,375	Yearly average
1926	14,731,207	Month of July

Source: George Sokolsky, "A Visit to Hong Kong and Canton", *China Express and Telegraph*, London, 1926. Cited in C. Martin Wilbur, "Military Separatism and Reunification, 1922-1937", p. 227.

Table 13 : Revenue of the Guangzhou Government, January 1925 (before the first Eastern Expedition)¹

Revenue	(\$)	Remarks
Guangzhou Government	1,584,375	Yearly average based on George Sokolsky's account
Guangdong Army	910,000	Month of January, based on the records of the Guangdong Army
Yunnan Army	3,190,000	Based on Cherepanov's estimates

Sources: *Zhonghua minguooshi dang'an ziliao huibian*, 4 b: 1076; Cherepanov, *Zapiski*, p. 36; C. Martin Wilbur, "Military Separatism and Reunification, 1922-1937", p. 227.

¹ According to Chiang Kaishek, the total revenue for Guangdong province could reach about 35 million to 40 million per month. These figures are exaggerated. More realistic amount is half about of it as in George Sokolsky's account.

Table 14 : The National Revolutionary Army, July 1925-June 1926

Unit	Commander	Remarks
I Corps 1st Division 2nd Division 3rd Division 14th Division 20th Division Reserve Regiment Artillery Regiment Guard Regiment	He Yingqin Wang Boling Liu Zhi Tan Shuqing Feng Yipei Qian Dajun Zhang Zhen Cai Zhonghu Zhu Yizhi	The 1st and 2nd Divisions were reorganised from units of the Party Army. The 3rd Division was formed in the latter half of 1925 from a portion of the Guangdong Army at Guangzhou. Total strength: 5 divisions and 3 regiments, or 19 regiments.
II Corps 4th Division 5th Division 6th Division Training Division Artillery Regiment	Tan Yankai Zhang Huizan Tan Daoyuan Dai Yue Chen Jiayou Xie Muhan	Reorganised from <i>Jianguo xiangjun</i> (Hunan Army units) at Guangzhou in the latter half of 1925. Total strength: 12 regiments.
III Corps 7th Division 8th Division 9th Division Military Police Battalion Artillery Battalion	Zhu Peide Wang Jun Zhu Shigui Zhu Peide Wu Xuanguo Zhang Yanchuan	Re-organised from the <i>Jianguo dianjun</i> (Yunnan Army units) at Guangzhou in the latter half of 1925. Total strength: 8 regiments and 2 battalions.
IV Corps 10th Division 11th Division 12th Division 13th Division Independent Regiment Artillery Battalion Artillery Battalion	Li Jishen Chen Mingshu Chen Jitang Zhang Fakui Xu Jingtang Ye Ting Guo Siyan Xue Yangzhong	Reorganised from <i>Jianguo Yuejun</i> (Guangdong Army units) at Guangzhou in the latter half of 1925. Total strength: 13 regiments and 2 battalions.
V Corps 15th Division 16th Division 1st Independent Regiment 2nd Independent Regiment	Li Fulin Li Jun Lian Bingzhang Liang Lin Lin Zhu	Reorganised from Fu Army units, a militia force at Guangzhou in the latter half of 1925. Total strength: 8 regiments and 1 battalion.
VI Corps 17th Division 18th Division	Cheng Qian Deng Yanshan Hu Qian	Reorganised from units of the Hunan Army and a division of the Guangdong Army at

19th Division Artillery Battalion Artillery Battalion	Yang Yuanjun Mo Xide Lo Xinyuan	Guangzhou in the latter half of 1925. Total strength: 9 regiments and two battalions.
<p>The above six corps were formed before January 1926. On the eve of the Northern Expedition in June 1926, the following two corps were added to the National Revolutionary Army.</p> <p>These two corps retained their original organisation and did not conform to the NRA.</p>		
VII Corps 1st Brigade 2nd Brigade 3rd Brigade 4th Brigade 5th Brigade 6th Brigade 7th Brigade 8th Brigade 9th Brigade	Li Zongren Xia Wei Li Mingrui Wu Tingyang Huang Xuqu Liu Rifu Wei Yunsong Hu Zongduo Zhong Zipei Lu Huanyan	Reorganised from the Guangxi Army units on 24 March 1926. Even after joining the NRA, it retained its original organisation structure and units designation. Total strength: 18 regiments and 2 battalions.
VIII Corps 2nd Division 3rd Division 4th Division Training Division 5th Division Hubei 1st Division Training Regiment Artillery Regiment	Tang Shengzhi He Jian Li Pinxian Liu Xing Zhou Lan Yeh Qi Xia Douyin Zhou Rongchong Wang Xitao	Reorganised from the 4th Division of the Hunan Army on 2 June 1926 when the NRA moved toward Hunan. Total strength: 17 regiments. (Each division had 4 regiments whereas the early first six corps had 3 regiments)

Sources: *Geming wenxian*, 12: 1802-5; *Beifa zhanshi*, chart 17.

Table 15: Education Background of the National Revolutionary Army Military Commanders prior to the Northern Expedition*

	1st Corps	2nd Corps	3rd Corps	4th Corps	5th Corps	6th Corps	7th Corps	8th Corps	Total
Baoding Military Academy	12	5	3	13	--	2	17	27	79
Shikan gakko	4	2	--	1	--	5	--	12	24
Army War College	2	--	--	1	--	--	1	3	7
Huangpu Military Academy	1	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	2
Wuchang Military Preparatory School	2	--	--	1	--	--	2	--	5
Provincial Short Military Course	--	1	--	4	--	--	1	--	6
Provincial Military Schools	2	2	6	2	--	--	3	2	17
Units Training Courses	--	--	1	1	--	--	1	--	3
No Formal Military Training	3	--	--	1	1	--	--	--	5
Militia Training	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	1
Traditional Education	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	1
Others	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	1
Unknown	5	11	3	2	11	5	8	--	45

* The military commanders include all line officers from regiment commanders and above, and all chiefs of staff in the divisions and corps.

Sources: Chen Xunzheng, *Guomin gemingjun zhanshi chugao* (A draft history of the national revolutionary army), Taipei, 2nd edn, 1952, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 37-9; *Beifu zhanshi* (War history of the northern expedition), Taipei, Historical and Political Department, Ministry of the National Defence, 1959, vol. 2, table 17; Huang Xuchu, "Lia guang gemin di tongyi jingguo jixiang" (Details of the revolutionary unification of Guangdong and Guangxi), *Chunqiu*, vol. 12, no. 5; *Lujun jinguan tongxuehu* (Army officers alumni), Beijing, Wuxue Bookshop 1929; *Lu hai kong jinguanzuo renguan mingbu* (Army, Navy and Air Force Officers Appointments Book), compiled by the Military Committee Office, 1936; *Riben lujun shiguan xuexiao luxuesheng minglu* (Records of the Shikan gakko graduates), Taipei, Wenhai Publication, 1977; *Yunnan lujun jiangwudang tongrenlu* (Yunnan army school alumni), Yunnanfu, c1910.

Table 16: Organisation and Strength of a standard Corps in the National Revolutionary Army*

Unit	No of Officer	No of Soldier
Corps = 3 x Divisions	768	8748
Division = 3 x Regiments	255	2916
Regiment = 3 x Battalions	84	972
Battalion = 3 x Companies	26	324
Company = 3 x Platoons	8	108
Platoon = 3 x Sections	2	36
Section = 6 x Groups	2	12
Group	--	2

* In principle, this was the standard organisation of the all the National Revolutionary Army. But in practice, all the battalions had 4 companies, and some divisions had 4 divisions, 3 combat and 1 training divisions.

Source: Wen Gongzhi, *Zuijin sanshinian zhongguo junshishi* (The Chinese military history of the last thirty years), Taipingyang Bookshop, Shanghai, 1930, 77-78.

Table 17: Provincial Budget Balance of Guangdong, 1912-1926

Year	Revenue (\$)	Expenditure (\$)	Balance (\$)
1912	38,139,000	31,834,000	6,305,000
1913	19,679,000	27,764,000	-8,085,000
1914	20,428,000	22,975,000	-2,547,000
1915	19,938,000	24,261,000	-4,323,000
1916	25,057,000	38,247,000	-13,190,000
1917	28,016,000	40,173,000	-12,157,000
1918	28,856,000	40,113,000	-11,248,000
1919	32,178,000	47,056,000	-14,878,000
1920	22,382,000	36,694,000	-14,312,000
1921	30,466,000	41,076,000	-10,610,000
1922	24,108,000	33,704,000	-9,596,000
1923	13,818,000	16,724,000	-2,906,000
1924	9,746,000	12,196,000	-2,450,000
1925	50,374,000	70,284,000	-19,913,000
1926	84,822,000	125,430,000	-40,608,000

Source: *Guangdong sheng difang caizheng* (Provincial financial policy of Guangdong), edited by Xiong Neng, II: 414-417.

Table 18: Military Expenditures of Guangdong, 1912-1926

Year	Administration Expenditure (\$)	Military Expenditure (\$)	Other Expenditures (\$)
1912	12,085	19,749,000	-----
1913	6,831,000	19,461,000	1,472,000
1914	6,812,000	12,504,000	3,659,000
1915	5,373,000	11,377,000	7,511,000
1916	5,240,000	14,327,000	18,680,000
1917	4,982,000	15,187,000	20,004,000
1918	4,509,000	15,703,000	19,901,000
1919	6,418,000	21,319,000	19,319,000
1920	5,643,000	16,319,000	14,732,000
1921	5,073,000	23,593,000	12,410,000
1922	3,575,000	22,759,000	7,370,000
1923	2,002,000	8,815,000	5,907,000
1924	1,439,000	6,208,000	4,549,000
1925	7,372,000	35,943,000	26,969,000
1926	18,984,000	83,266,000	23,180,000

Source: *Guangdong sheng difang caizheng* (Provincial financial policy of Guangdong), edited by Xiong Neng, II: 413-417.

APPENDIXES

1. Dr. Sun Yatsen's Inaugural Speech At the Huangpu Military Academy Opening Ceremony on 16 June 1924
2. The Soviet Red Army and Command Schools
3. The Daily Questions-and-Answers for the Soldiers (Shibing rike wenda)
4. Maxim/Motto of the Revolutionary Army (*Geming geyan*)

Appendix 1:

DR SUN YATSEN'S INAUGURAL SPEECH AT THE HUANGPU MILITARY ACADEMY OPENING CEREMONY ON 16 JUNE 1924

The opening ceremony of the Huangpu Military Academy was held on 16 June 1924. In the morning at around eight, invited guests, academy staff and students assembled on the parade ground waiting to welcome the guest-of-honour Dr Sun Yatsen. The guests included members of the Guomindong's Central Executive Committee Wu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, Zhang Ji; Minister of Defence General Cheng Qian and his deputy Wu Qian, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Chaoshu; Commanders of Guangdong Army General Xu Chongzhi, the Hunan Army General Tan Yankai, the Yunnan Army General Yang Xiwen, the West Route Army General Liu Zhenghuan; and the Head of the Guangdong Civil Administration Sun Ke etc.. Dr Sun accompanied by Madam Sun, went on to the stage at nine a.m. and spoke for about two hours. The following speech is translated from *Zhangyang lujun jinguan xuexiao shiqiao* (Draft history of the Central Military Academy), Nanjing, c1936, vol 1.

Today, we celebrate the opening of our military academy. Why do we establish this academy? Why must we have this academy? You gentlemen all know that our revolution has a history of 13 years, but what we now have is a Republic in name only; so our revolution of 13 years is still a failure. Until today it remains a failure. But what about the world revolution? How about other revolutions which took place after ours? Six years ago, a neighbouring country which has a mutual border with China of more than 10,000 *li*, which is larger than China, and is a part of both Europe and Asia, and which was one of the powers before World War I, this country had a revolution during the War. They had their revolution six years later than we did. What is this neighbouring country? It is Russia. Its revolution came six years after us, but it was thoroughly successful. Let us compare the histories of these two countries. Domestically, our revolution was against the alien Manchurians; the Qing Emperor was weak when we revolted, and the administration was corrupt. At that time the Manchurian monarch was the weakest while the Russian was one of the strongest in the world. Thus, we might say that in China the revolt was against a very weak emperor, while the Russians revolted against a very powerful one. In this respect, the Chinese revolution was easy and the Russian difficult. Externally, the Russian Revolution encountered very strong resistance from other powers, but in

China no one bothered us after our revolution. Before the revolution, the foreign powers planned to divide China, and we feared they might intervene. However, they took no action. The Russian revolution not only met with the foreign intervention verbally, but also with armed forces. The troops of Britain, France, the United States of America, Italy, Japan, and other minor nations invaded the territory of Russia. It seemed as if the whole world was intervening. So we can see that our evolution was against a very weak government, while the Russians were dealing with a very powerful domestic government and all the foreign powers of the world. Therefore, externally, the Chinese revolution was easy and the Russian Revolution was difficult. But how did the Russian Revolution become so successful, overcoming so many difficulties within the short period of six years? And why is it that our revolution, facing fewer obstacles, and with twice the amount of time, has proven unsuccessful?

We have discovered the reason producing these different results of the Chinese and Russian revolutions, and we have taken it as a lesson. And it is also the reason why we are here today. What lesson is it? It is that during the revolution, the Russians had political party members to serve as a vanguard in the struggle with the Czar, and once the latter was overthrown, they built a revolutionary army to continue fighting. Therefore, even though there were many obstacles, they were able to overcome them all in a very short period of time. During our Revolution, the most famous party-members in Guangdong were the seventy-two martyrs, and many others in various provinces. Because of their sacrifices the uprising in Wuchang was followed immediately in other provinces and finally the Qing Monarch was overthrown and the Republic of China was founded. However, the revolution was only partially successful. As we did not have a revolutionary army to carry out the will of the Revolutionary Party, so even today the foundation of the Republic is weak—although the bureaucrats and warlords do not dare openly to change the name of the Republic. The reason, in simple words, is that our Revolution has been simply the struggle of the Party, not of a revolutionary army. This is why bureaucrats and warlords can control the Republic, and our revolution has not been successfully concluded.

What hope do we hold for this Academy? It is that we are starting our revolutionary careers over again from today. We are going to make the cadets of this Academy into the central core of our revolutionary army. You cadets will be the backbone of the Revolution and with you as our revolutionary armed force, our

revolution will be successful. Without a strong revolutionary army, the Chinese revolution will remain forever a failure. So our one and only hope for this Academy is to establish that revolutionary army and save China from her peril. What is the revolutionary army? How can you cadets determine whether you want to become a part of the revolutionary army? What are the qualifications for membership in this revolutionary army? If we wish to know how to become one of the revolutionary soldiers, we must follow the examples of our martyrs, and struggle as the revolutionary party does, struggle for the goals of the revolutionary party. Then we can call ourselves the revolutionary army.

In the 13 years of our Chinese Revolution, there has never been a single military organization struggling for the same cause as the revolutionary party has. I dare say that in the past 13 years China did not have troops which could be regarded as a revolutionary army. There are a certain number of troops in Guangdong fighting on the same side as the revolutionary party, but I dare not call them the revolutionary army. They are working with our revolutionary party, but why is it that I can not call them the revolutionary army? The reason is that they have not had revolutionary training, and that they do not take a revolutionary position. What is the revolutionary position? It is sharing the same experiences as the revolutionary martyrs. Today, the enlisted men of the military units in Guangdong know nothing about the activities of the martyrs. Besides, as China is suffering from poverty, there are many people who say they want to join the revolution--just because they are suffering from hard living conditions. But once they have attained some positions, they turned away and opposed the revolution. This was why the troops of Chen Jiongming, who called himself a revolutionist, shelled Guanyinshan and fought against the government of the South. The troops, which called themselves revolutionists and worked under the same revolutionary government, fought against each other because of their own greed, and they did things even the enemy would not do. Therefore, we can see clearly that the troops who lack comprehension of the causes of revolution will never free themselves from selfishness and will be most unreliable once their own interests are at stake. This is why our revolution has met successive failures.

I am here today to urge you gentlemen to treat the past successes and failures as a dream and never to be returned. Beginning from today, we shall build the foundation of the Revolution and establish an ideal revolutionary army. Knowing that our purpose is to build up a revolutionary army, and coming as you do from far away,

you gentlemen must have enough determination to devote yourselves to the career of revolution. But where will we start? We must begin with our hearts. We must eliminate bad thoughts, habits, and characteristics; all evilness, all unrighteous and unkind characteristics must be eliminated. You gentlemen must start the political revolution from your hearts. If you do, our future in revolution is promising. If not, even you who are here studying military science in this modern military academy cannot become a part of the revolutionary army, nor accomplish the ends of revolution. You gentlemen must first have the determination of revolutionaries, with which you will make yourselves the officers of the revolution very soon. We must accomplish our revolutionary tasks with full commitments to save the Nation and the people by carrying out the Three Principles of the People and the Five-power Constitution.

Even you gentlemen with a great deal of combat experience, who occupy large amounts of land and command tens of thousands of men, you are still not necessarily members of the revolutionary army. There are two kinds of bad military men in China. One is the military men within the revolutionary party; they absolutely oppose the revolution. What they have in mind are higher positions, riches, destruction of the republic, and restoration of the Monarchy. If you gentlemen want to maintain the Republic and to eliminate these types of military men, you must determine today that after attaining success you will not become one of the selfish commanders of divisions or brigades, nor a tyrannical warlord.

After you make up your mind, how can you get across the second threshold of revolution? What is the second threshold of revolution? It is done by following the example of the revolutionary martyrs. It is nothing exceptional, only the willingness to sacrifice your lives for your country. How was our struggle accomplished in the past? Most of the struggling was done with our bare hands; we were luckily even to have a few pistols and grenades. We continually fought the Qing troops with such weapons. But how many troops were there all over the country? There were Green Banner units, the navy, patrol battalion, and then the new army, totalling more than 1 million men. For example, on 29 March in the year of Xinhai(1911), there were more than 50,000 troops in Guangzhou, including the navy units under Li Zhun, army units under Zhang Mingzhi, the new army units at Yantang, and the Manchurian garrisons. There were only several hundred revolutionists. In that uprising, 72 men of the revolutionary party were killed, although many survived. At the time only

about 300 men in the assault force were armed, and they fought against more than 30,000 enemy soldiers. This is what we called revolutionary determination, daring to fight one against one hundred.

Now, here, we have gathered together this military instructors, officers, and cadets. Please tell me if this kind of behaviour is tactically reasonable in the study of military science? Is there any historical example of one fighting against one hundred? According to my understanding, no such tactics have been employed in the past. Ordinarily, it is rare to use one man against ten. Our ancient art of war says to attack if you have twice as many men as the enemy, and to besiege if you outnumber the enemy by ten times. In modern times, we usually take the defensive or withdrawal if we equal the enemy in number. This is what has been called tactical necessity in the past, and also at present. But in the Guangzhou Uprising 13 years ago, the revolutionists used only pistols and grenades against a superior enemy who was equipped with rifles and artillery. Finally, 72 revolutionists were killed and others believed that they failed. Actually, they were successful; for they had taken the office building of the Provincial Governor and driven the Guangdong-Guangxi military Governor away. The reason the revolutionaries finally failed was that reinforcements did not arrive on time. Besides the 300 men of our charging party were ill-equipped. If anyone of them had been well equipped, they might have succeeded. Comparing the enemy's situation and ours afterward, one must decide it was not that their 30,000 had beaten our 300 men, but that we were defeated by our own poor planning. If our operation had been well planned, it would have been successful.

After the Guangzhou Uprising in the year of Xinhai, there was the Wuchang Uprising, which ended successfully. But how about the situation at that time? There were not more than three hundred revolutionists in Wuchang and Hankou, and not more than a hundred of them were members of the Revolutionary Party. They looked almost everywhere before finding two boxes containing a total of one hundred rounds of ammunition for their small arms. They then started the action with the Engineering Battalion stationed within the city. They were immediately supported by the Artillery Battalion from outside the city, and the latter moved their artillery pieces downtown to seize the Military Governor's Office and to drive Ruizhi out of town. There were more than 20,000 Qing troops in Wuchang, including the 8th *Zhen* (Division) of the New Army Yangtze River naval units, and old army units known as the Patrol Battalion. Against the enemy of 20,000 men, each member of the Revolutionary

Army, altogether not more than one hundred men, had to take care of five hundred men. In the Guangzhou Uprising, we used one against one hundred, but it failed. In the Wuchang Uprising we used one against 500, and we won. Therefore, revolutionary struggles cannot be considered in the same terms as the art of war in the past or at present, neither in foreign countries nor in China. Nevertheless, this kind of struggle is not new to the history of revolution. If we keep the revolution moving step by step, no one can say we will not overcome the superior numbers of the enemy.

Some of you instructors came from abroad, and some from Baoding Military Academy, but it is ordinary military science that is being taught in military schools all over the world. So what you gentlemen will teach is ordinary military science, that which you have studied. Our Cadets will probably learn ordinary military science according to the norm. With this kind of knowledge, can you become members of the revolutionary army? The path to membership in the revolutionary army cannot be sought in knowledge; it can only be gained through devotion and determination. In the Academy you Cadets must follow the directions of the instructors, and obey the orders of your senior officers, and learn by heart everything the instructors teach. Some of you with higher wisdom may turn out to be better than your instructors. However, you must remember everything taught by the instructors, for it may be helpful some day. In comparison, the members of the Revolutionary Party did not have the opportunity to secure a military education, but you, at least, will be given six months training in this Academy. In the past, members of the Revolutionary Party received only handguns, but you have good rifles. In the past, the Revolutionary Party could gather together for action at any one place two or three hundred men at the most, but you already have five hundred men in this Academy. With such favourable conditions, if you have the necessary devotion and determination prerequisite to participation in the Revolutionary Party, the five hundred men with five hundred rifles alone can achieve excellent revolutionary goals.

Whether the troops are revolutionary or not depends on the revolutionary devotion of the officers and men, not on how good the weapons are. Without devotion and understanding of the reasons behind revolution, you cannot succeed. This was the case with the latter Qing dynasty New Army, which had good rifles and artillery pieces, and with the navy, which had powerful men-of-war and torpedo boats. But they still could not glorify the career of revolution. Thus, later, in the Wuchang Uprising, they became the tools of the Revolutionary Party. In general, revolution is

an extraordinary career which cannot be judged according to ordinary standards. In the past we have tried very hard to persuade Chinese overseas students at military and naval academies in Japan, American, and Europe they should join our revolutionary party, but many of them refused and opposed the revolution. But what was in the mind of those intellectual military men who were against the revolution? After careful study and investigation we discovered they thought, as military experts, that the Revolutionary Party had no chance of success employing one man against one hundred, and one hundred against ten thousand. There is no need for us to argue about this, but I just wish to remind them of who finally overthrew the Qing Monarchy. At the time, we had the assistance of some militarists, but the primary driving power was a mere handful of revolutionary party members. The intellectual military men at that time did not approve of revolution, for they thought it was tactically impossible for the few to defeat the many. Therefore, the Revolutionary Party did not include many military men who had real military expertise. The Xinhai Revolution was soon followed by the overthrow of the Qing Monarchy because there were uprisings everywhere, all over the country, which repeated the Wuchang revolt. Duan Jirui then led the military men by publishing a circular cable supporting the Republic. And the Revolutionary Party had to compromise to accept militarily. Therefore, the success of the Xinhai Revolution actually did not depend on those military men who had real military knowledge. You must keep in mind that revolution is not an ordinary career and cannot be judged by ordinary standards. When at school, you just have to pick up as much knowledge as you can, and with the revolutionary spirit, you can put to optimum use what you have picked up. Without revolutionary spirit, no matter how much you have studied, you are still useless. We begin this Academy today, but the warlords in the North already have had the Baoding Military Academy and the Beijing War College for a long time. Compared with our school, theirs have longer histories, more alumni, and are better furnished. Ours is far behind theirs in every way. If we use material comparisons, and judge by ordinary standards, then how can we reform China? However, the officers and men of the North are bound together only by their mutual desires for higher positions, riches and better living; they think nothing of saving the nation and the people, and they lack any devotion to revolution. This was true in the Qing Dynasty, and it is also true of the troops of Cao Kun and Wu Peifu.

The revolutionists without military knowledge were able to overthrow the Qing Monarchy, so it will be easier for our revolutionary army with military

knowledge to eliminate Cao Kun and Wu Peifu. But in our present position, the revolutionary spirit is most essential to our success against them. Otherwise, no matter how strong we are, we will be eliminated by them. Six years ago, Russia organized the revolutionary army at the same time they began their revolution, in order to eliminate both the old party and alien enemies. Now we are following the example of Russia in starting this Academy. After 13 years of revolution, China needs this Academy and a revolutionary army, for a revolutionary army is most essential to the construction of a new nation.

You gentlemen came to study in this Academy and have listened to my speech today; of course you have determined to be part of the revolutionary army. But what is the first and basic requirement for membership in the revolutionary army? First we must have knowledge, and then we must be very brave; these are the basic requirements for the revolutionary army. But how can we gain knowledge? The way to accumulate knowledge is not to pick up only what the instructors teach in the classroom. It requires your own inspiration. You must spend studying all the books, magazines and newspapers concerning military science and revolution. For once you learn how, it will be easy for you to glorify the spirit of revolution by following the steps of our martyrs and sacrificing yourselves to build a foundation for the Republic of China. Thus you will bring the Three Principles of the People into reality, and accomplish, as the Russians have done, your revolutionary mission. Not until China can stand as tall as the Russians do with other nations in the world, can the people of China exist among mankind. If we fail in our revolution, China will decline and 400 million people will perish. The country and people are yours, and you gentlemen must save them. The revolutionary army is the only means of salvation, and that is why we have this Academy: to rear the revolutionary army for national salvation. You gentlemen will be the backbone of the revolutionary army, and you have on your shoulders the responsibility for saving the country and people; toward this end, you must study hard beginning today. After graduating and becoming part of the revolutionary army, you must fight bitterly those who jeopardize the Republic, one of you against one hundred of them.

But how can you be capable of fighting single-handedly against one hundred? Who can supply the standard for qualification as a member of the revolutionary army? It is the martyrs. We have to do as they did, to sacrifice our lives, and to give up all personal rights in favour of national salvation. Thus, we can transform

ourselves into fearless military revolutionaries. The qualification of revolutionists is to not fear death. But how can we not fear death? Again, by following the examples of our martyrs. Today I speak to you as a revolutionist, ready to die. I frequently took part in past uprisings, and have never once valued my life; I was never wounded. So I am able to tell you today the 'how' of not fearing death. There is, I dare say, no secret spirit in the revolutionary party, except that of not fearing death. With this kind of courage, we can overcome death. For we know everyone must die; but our deaths have value. Once you understand the reason, we may say death is what we are waiting for, the quicker the better, and preferably in front of enemy weapons. With such courage and determination, we can fight single-handedly against one hundred enemies. For in their minds they think it is lucky to live. We feel that it is lucky to die for the cause. With such great differences in attitude toward life and death, naturally we are without equal.

Viewing death as good luck and even looking forward to death is not an imaginary frame of mind, but it is actually held. For instance, there was an overseas Chinese student in Japan, named Chen Tienhua who had revolutionary spirit, but did not have the opportunity to show it. He drowned himself in the sea to show his willingness to sacrifice for China. In addition, there was another Chinese student, named Yang Dusheng, in England, who drowned himself in the sea, for he already understood the truth of revolution; he could not wait for the time to come, and he was hurt to see the corrupt condition of China. What were Chen Tienhua and Yang Dusheng? They were revolutionists with enthusiasm and boiling blood. They drowned themselves because they could not find a desirable place to die. It is a pity. But by their deaths we can tell that once someone is impressed by the spirit of revolution, and understands the true meaning of revolution, he will regard death for the revolution as a matter of nobility and happiness. And they will be glad to be killed by the bullets of the enemy on the battlefield fighting for their cause. With a willingness to die, the true revolutionists of the past could fight one hundred enemy apiece, and dared to revolt repeatedly. This was why the revolution succeeded. But you cannot find such examples in the books of military science, either abroad or in China. These can only be seen in the history of revolution, although such case histories are rather extraordinary. So we must have extraordinary devotion to follow such extraordinary examples, and it is then that we can look down upon death and die willingly. If everyone does the same, then we can use one hundred men against ten thousand, and ten thousand against one million. Now if we have a revolutionary force

of ten thousand men, we can easily unify China, for there are not more than one million troops opposing the revolution. It is because we do not have the force of ten thousand that the greedy and tyrannical warlords dare to act throughout the country, to accomplish evil and plot the overthrow of the Republic. For the maintenance of the Republic, and to eliminate the tyrannical warlords, I am now asking you to look down upon death and to follow the steps of the martyrs. And furthermore, I wish to build up, with your five hundred cadets as the foundation, my ideal revolutionary army, with which we can accomplish our revolution; China can be saved, and 400 million countrymen can be delivered. The career of revolution is to save your country and people. I have shouldered these revolutionary responsibilities my whole life. As cadets of this Academy, I ask you gentlemen, starting from today, to take these as our mutual responsibilities.

Appendix 2:

THE SOVIET RED ARMY AND COMMAND SCHOOLS

After coming to power in 1917, the Bolshevik devoted their energies throughout 1918 to creating a Red Army in response to the threat posed by foreign and domestic enemies. Before the spring of 1918, the Red Army mainly consisted of the socialist militia. Revolutionary soldiers and sailors joined the Red Guard detachments to form the first volunteer units in Moscow, Petrograd, Ivanova-Voznesnsk, and the cities in the Urals.¹ However, the renewed German offensive in February 1918 created a panic, and subsequently the Central Executive Committee of Soviet decreed universal military training for workers and peasants. The Universal Military Administration (*Vsevoluch*) was established to train all eligible citizens in an eight-week course with minimal disruption of their workdays. On 19 March 1918, after L.D. Trotsky took command of the army, the Council of People's Commissars sanctioned a large-scale recruitment of former tsarist officers and non-commissioned officers, commonly called the military specialists. By the end of 1918, the Red Army counted 22,000 former generals and officers, and 13,000 former non-commissioned

¹ References pertaining to the Red Army and Command Schools are from: John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command: A Political-Military History, 1918-1941*. London: Macmillan, 1962; Dimitrii Fedotoff-White, *The Growth of the Red Army*. Princeton New Jersey: Princeton, 1944; T.F. Kariaeva, *Direktivy komandovaniia frontov krasnoi armii (1917-1922 gg.): sbornik dokumentov v 4-kh tomakh*. Moskva: Institut voennoi istorii, August 1971.

officers of the tsarist army. As late as 1921, after sustained efforts to train Red commanders from workers and peasants, 34 per cent of the 217,000 command personnel were military specialists. Because these men held critical posts in the military command, the academies and supply administration, they slowly regained their influence within the Red Army.

Military-Political Commissars of the Red Army

The rise of the military specialists in the Red Army met with determined resistance from within the revolutionary government as many Bolsheviks harboured deep suspicions about the loyalty of these professional military officers. In response to these criticisms, the Bolshevik leadership reformed and expanded the institution of the political commissars in the Red Army. It began to institute the three-man revolutionary military councils (*revvoensovety*), where two commissars watched over one military specialist, to direct the war effort at all levels of command. Based on this dual command structure, orders were to be obeyed only if they bore the signatures of both officer and commissar. During the Civil War, the commissars' responsibilities grew to include supervision of party members, maintenance of troop morale and organisation of political education.

The Command Schools

The system of command schools was founded in February 1918 by the order of Trotsky to train a large number of military-political commissars for the Red Army.² By January 1921, a total of 151 command courses, each of three or four months' duration, were operating concurrently in numerous schools. During these three years, 1918-21, about 39,914 commissars graduated from these courses. With no requirement for competitive entrance examinations, the schools accepted applicants who did not have any prior military experience, as well as those from existing military units. Successful applicants, however, had to provide school or military records testifying to their ability to read, write, calculate, and more importantly, had to possess documents that reflected their loyalty to the Bolsheviks and the Soviet government.

The curriculum of the command schools included military drill, language,

² Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, 32-3; Fedotoff-White, *The Growth of the Red Army*, 51-62.

history, mathematics (arithmetic and geometry), hygiene, and political indoctrination. Students with previous military experience were enrolled in three-month courses which stressed the study of tactics, fortifications, artillery, military topography, administration, drill, and political indoctrination. In most cases, the indoctrination was taught by political commissars and the military subjects by military specialists. During the second half of 1919, the school shortened the training period and curtailed political indoctrination in order to meet the heightened demand for graduates. Nevertheless, this change did not reduce the number of students who became communists before graduation. The courses of these schools were, therefore, "an important breeding-ground for new communist party membership" in the Red army.³ The communist members among command school graduates ranged from a low of 54 per cent in 1918 to between 62 per cent and 70 per cent in 1919 to 1921.

The school administration remained in the hands of both the military specialists and political commissars appointed by the Soviet government. When the question of ultimate responsibility between the military specialists and political commissars arose, Trotsky announced that either of them might eventually assume full responsibility for administration of a particular school. By 1925, the concept of unitary command had been adopted in the entire Red Army.

Overall, there was a significant increase in the number of training establishments in the period immediately following the year 1918 as the need for junior commanders in the Red Army grew. In 1918 there were merely 13 military schools; by 1919 the number increased to 63, in January 1920 to 91, and in October 1920 to 153. At a lower level there were numerous short courses for the "command staff" of front armies, which by the end of 1920 had produced 39,329 commanders trained directly in courses conducted in the field by front commanders.⁴ The short

³ Fedotoff-White. *The Growth of the Red Army*, p. 59.

⁴ Shatagin, N. I. *Organizatsiia i stroitel'stvo Sovetskoj armii v period inostrannoj voennoj interentsii i grazhdanskoi voiny (1918-1920 gg)*. Moskva: Voennoe Izd-vo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuzo SSR, 1954, 220-1.

course was indeed a characteristic of an educational system which had to train thousands of young officers in a critical national emergency, and which would be dispensed with in peacetime.

Appendix 3:

THE DAILY QUESTIONS-AND-ANSWERS FOR THE SOLDIERS (SHIBING RIKE WENDA)⁵

On the relationship between the army and the people:

1. Question (Q): Have we seen the suffering of the people?
Answer (A): Yes, we have seen their suffering.
2. Q: Who provides our clothing, food, and housing?
A: The people provide our clothing, food, and housing.
3. Q: Why do we labour for the revolution?
A: We want to save the people and the country.
4. Q: What is the purpose of our revolution?
A: We want to carry out the three principles of the people.

On national revolution:

5. Q: Why must we have a national revolution?
A: Because we are suffering from the oppression of foreign nations.
6. Q: Why must we have a democratic revolution?
A: Because we suffer from inequality.
7. Q: Why must the revolution improve the people's livelihood?
A: Because we are suffering from class inequality between the rich and the poor.

On the Three Principles of the People:

8. Q: Do we all understand the three principles of the people?
A: Yes, we understand.
9. Q: Are we able to act in accord with these principles of the people?
A: We will strive for their realisation.
10. Q: How can we accomplish the tasks given in the three principles of the people?

⁵ Extracted from *Huangpu junxiao shigao* (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy). Zhongyang 1

A: We must destroy all tyrannical power and force, and give up our lives and privileges in order to recover equality and happiness for mankind.

11. Q: Are we able to shoulder such heavy responsibility?

A: We must shoulder this burden.

12. Q: Is what we say consistent with what we do?

A: Yes.

13. Q: Why must we be revolutionaries?

A: Because we want to save the people from their distress.

14. Q: What causes the distress of the people?

A: The oppression of capitalists and warlords, the aggression of imperialists.

15. Q: Where do our supplies come from?

A: From the people.

16. Q: Why do the people supply us?

A: The people want us to save them.

17. Q: To save the people, what is our duty?

A: There is no alternative other than using our whole strength and energy even until death.

18. Q: What guidance do we have for use in saving the people?

A: The three principles of the people.

19. Q: What is the symbol of the three principles of the people?

A: The Guomintang flag with a white sun on a blue sky background.

20. Q: What is the price of the white sun on a blue sky flag?

A: The heads of our martyrs.

21. Q: Why did our martyrs sacrifice their lives?

A: Because they wanted to carry out the three principles of the people and save the people.

22. Q: How can we continue the lives of our martyrs?

A: We must be obedient to discipline and carry out the three principles of the people.

23. Q: How can we put the three principles of the people into effect?

A: The only path is through sacrifice and struggle.

24. Q: What is our life?

A: The three principles of the people.

25. Q: What is our duty?

- A: To carry out the three principles of the people.
26. Q: When will we accomplish our mission?
A: There is no end until death.
27. Q: Have you forgotten the cruelty of the rebels?
A: The cruelty imposed on the Guomindang by the rebels is the disgrace of a lifetime for all Guomindang members.
28. Q: Will you forget the perversity and tyranny of the national traitors?
A: To tolerate the perversity and tyranny of the national traitors is the greatest disgrace for Chinese nationals.
29. Q: Have you seen the oppression of tyranny?
A: It is a great disgrace for Chinese nationals to tolerate the oppression of tyranny.
30. Q: Do you understand the three principles in which you believe?
A: I already understand that the three principles of the people are my life.
31. Q: Have you identified your enemy?
A: I know my enemies are national traitors, rebels and the tyrannical powers.
32. Q: Do you comprehend your disgrace?
A: I feel the shame for myself and for my country.
33. Q: How can you remove your disgrace?
A: By making every effort toward the revolution.
-

Ten requirements for the success of the revolution:

34. Q: How can the revolution be successful?
A: There are ten requirements for the success of the revolution.
35. Q: What is the first requirement?
A: No fear of death.
36. Q: What is the second requirement?
A: No greed for money or wealth.
37. Q: What is the third requirement?
A: To be able to endure hardship and toil.
38. Q: What is the fourth requirement?
A: To honour a good reputation and to have a sense of shame.
39. Q: What is the fifth requirement?
A: Observe the three principles of the people and obey the discipline.
40. Q: What is the sixth requirement?

A: Eliminate prejudice.

41. Q: What is the seventh requirement?

A: Love the people.

42. Q: What is the eighth requirement?

A: Be loyal to your job and duty.

43. Q: What is the ninth requirement?

A: Keep the spirit of unity.

44. Q: What is the tenth requirement?

A: Be consistent from beginning to end and fulfil our final duty.

"How would we give happiness to the people of the world?"

"Do you think it is a great dream?"

"I believe it is, and we do not know what will be the result."

"We know it would only help us to get along with the world, but we will try to help."

"We would like to help the world of the future, but we must first help the world of the present."

Appendix 4:

MAXIM/MOTTO OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (*GEMING GEYAN*)⁶

"We have established this academy for nine months,
Yet, the rebel leader Chen Jiongming is still at large at Huizhou."

"Ask our comrades, where are your courage? Where is your determination?
Why until today, we are still unable to wipe out the rebels?"

"How could we ever implement the Three Principles of the People?
Do you think it is a great shame?"

"Fellow comrades, we do not know when will be the next battle.
We know we could only wash away all the shame once we received the order for
battle."

"We could then fulfil the wishes of the Prime Minister (Sun Yatsen) and other
comrades, and calm the soul of the martyrs."

⁶ Extracted from *Huangpu junxiao shigao* (*Draft history of the Huangpu military academy*), Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao (Central military officers' academy) comp. 10 parts, 12 vols., reprint of the 1936 ed. by Beijing: Dangan chubanshe (National archives publication), 1989, vol.7: 256-7.

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

1. Li Mo'an (Graduate of Huangpu's First Class)
2. Su Wenqiu (First Class)
3. Song Ruike (Third Class)
4. He Chongxiao (Fourth Class)
5. Wen Jiang (Fourth Class)
6. Qiu Xingxiang (Fifth Class)
7. Chen Ruihe (Fifth Class)
8. Yu Yan (Sixteenth Class)
9. Mai Tangna (Seventeenth Class)
10. Xia Shiduo (Seventeenth Class)

Notes on Sources of the Huangpu Military Academy & Nationalist Revolutionary Army

Documentary sources on the history of Huangpu Military Academy and the Nationalist Revolutionary Army are vast. Most of the official records are kept in Taiwan and China. Other than Chinese records there are various contemporary diplomatic and military correspondence, reports, and participants reminiscences and memoirs in Russian, Chinese, English and Japanese languages.

The greatest repository of Huangpu Military Academy records and documents is in Taiwan. The official publication of the ten-volume *Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao shigao* (Draft history of central military officers academy) compiled by the Central Military Academy in 1936, gives a comprehensive and basic chronological narrative of Huangpu Military Academy history from its inception to 1935. The original records of enrolment, students bio-data, admission procedures and examinations, alumni directories, correspondence of key personnel, reports by the Commandant to the Military Council of the Guomindang on various matters of the academy are kept in the Guomindang Archives. Many documents from these archives are available in *Geming wenxian* (Documents of the revolution). Volumes 10, 11 and 12, in particular, contain a large amount of material on Huangpu Military Academy. In 1954, Guomindang Archives published *Huangpu jianjun sanshi nian gaishu* (A brief narration of Huangpu and building of the army in the last thirty years).

On Sun Yatsen's career and involvement in the Huangpu Military Academy, the National Historical Commission has published important collections such as the two-volume chronological biography of Sun Yatsen, entitled *Guofu nianpu*, and a multi-volume collection of Dr Sun's writings, speeches and correspondence, *Guofu quanji*.

Archives on Chiang kai-shek and Huangpu Military Academy include *Huangpu congshu* (Huangpu collections) which contain many of Chiang's addresses to the students; *Huangpu jian jun shihua* (Historical notes on Huangpu and the founding of the army); and *Chiang kai-shek de geming gongzuo* (The revolutionary activities and selected works of Chiang kai-shek) provide a good account of Chiang and other staff members' experiences of conducting the first few classes.¹ There are still some records concerning Chiang kai-

¹ These sources have been used extensively by F. F. Liu in *A Military History of Modern China*, Part

shek and Huangpu Military Academy kept in the classified *Da'xi* Archives which have yet to be released to the public.

Some of the political lectures delivered during the course to the cadets such as Dai Jitao's *Guomin geming yu zhongguo guomindang* (The national revolution and the Chinese nationalist party) and Hu Hanmin's *Geming lilun yi geming kungou* (Theory and practice of revolution) are also available in the Guomindang Archives.

The Historical and Political Bureau (*Shizheng ju*) of the Ministry of Defence in Taiwan has published several works on Huangpu Military Academy and war histories during the 1920s. It publishes a two-volume *Huangpu junxiao liushi zhounian lunwen ji* (Papers on the Huangpu military academy in commemoration of the sixty years since its Founding) and a single volume *Huangpu junguan xuexiao xiaoshi jianbian* (A brief history of the Huangpu Military Academy) in 1986. It has also compiled *Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao ge ke feng xiao pian zian* (Organisation of the central military academy and its branches), and *Lujun junguan xuexiao yan ke shi* (History of the development of the army officer cadets school) in previous occasions and they are available only at the Bureau. These works are based primarily on the 1936 version of the *Draft History*. On campaign history, there is a four-volume *Beifa zhanshi* (Battle history of the northern expedition) and *Beifa tongyi* (Unification through the northern expedition) which provide detailed accounts of the National Revolutionary Army, especially the I Corps (the Huangpu Army commanded by Chiang kai-shek) in battles.

Other than the official archival records, there are a number of personal records such as the *Yan Xishan Archives*, newspapers and journals of the 1920s, and oral history interviews of senior officers of the National Revolutionary Army are available in the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. These are useful supplements to the official records.

In mainland China, Archives of Republican China (*Minguo dang'an*) in the Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing is the most important repository of Huangpu and the National Revolutionary Army archives. It has published the reprint of the ten-volume *Draft History of the Central Military Officers' Academy* first published in 1936 with a new title

Washington: Kennikat Press, 1956, and R. L. MacFarquhar in his article "The Whampoa Military Academy", *Papers on China*, 1955.

Huangpu junxiao shigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy). The Second Historical Archives has also published the multi-volume *Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian* (Historical materials of the republican China), and *Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao* (A draft chronological biographical of Chiang Kaishek). Contemporary journals such as *Qingnian junren* (Young soldiers), and the *Geming jun* (Revolutionary army) series contain detailed accounts of the first and second Eastern Expedition campaigns are available in the Second Historical Archives. For Huangpu's roles in the first Eastern Expedition, *Gemingjun di yi ci dongzheng shi zhan ji* (War diary of the revolutionary army during the first eastern expedition) compiled by Liu Bingcui is a valuable source. Liu Bingcui was then chief of staff of Huangpu's 1st Training Regiment. This work, based on battlefield diary of the Staff Department of the regiment and official war bulletins, was first published in Shanghai by Zhonghua shuju in 1928. A reprint is produced in the United States by Xerox Systems Centre, Washington D.C, 1971. At the provincial level, archives in Guangdong have over the years restored many valuable sources concerning the history of the First United Front. Few works have been published in recent years. One is *Huangpu junxiao shiliao, 1924-1927* (Historical materials on the Huangpu military academy, 1924-1927) and its supplement *xubian*, edited by the Guangdong Revolutionary Museum and published in 1983 and 1994 respectively. The other is *Di yi ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqide Huangpu junxiao* (The Huangpu military academy during the period of the first revolutionary civil war) edited and printed by the Cultural and Historical Material Press (*wenshi ziliao*) in commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the academy. The former depicts the founding and development of the academy, its training and political education, achievements and the struggle between the nationalists and communists in the academy. The latter contains the reminiscences of the leading members, instructors, students of the academy, including those of Sun Yatsen, Zhou Enlai, He Xiangning, Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangnian, as well as those of Song Xilian, Tan Yizhi, and Song Ruike. As for the Second Eastern Expedition, the Cultural Bureau of Huizhou Prefecture and the Huizhou City Museum edited, in 1981, *Guomin geming jun di er ci dongzheng* (Historical material on the second eastern expedition of the national revolutionary army). Furthermore, there are contemporary newspapers and periodicals including *Guangdong minguo ribao* (Canton republic daily), *Lingdong minguo ribao* (Lingdong republic daily), *Zhongguo qingnian* (China youth) and *Zhongguo nongmin* (Chinese peasants) available in Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. *Zhou Enlai tongzhi zai chaoshane* (Comrade Zhou Enlai in Chaozhou and Shantau) is a compilation of papers presented in the symposium of Comrade Zhou Enlai's revolutionary activities in Chaozhou and Shanton held in November 1984. These are useful sources in understanding, albeit the

communist version, of the Huangpu Military Academy in Guangdong.

On the Northern Expedition, most important first hand material was *Beifa zhenzhong riji* (The war diary of the northern expedition. July 1926 to May 1928), compiled by Guomin geminjun zongsiling bu canmou chu (The general staff department of the commander-in-chief headquarters of the national revolutionary army). Reprinted by *Jindai baihai* in 1988. In addition, there is the diary of Lin Bogu, *Beifa zhanzheng ziliao xuanji* (Selected material on the northern expeditionary war) published by the Party School Press of the CCP Central Committee in 1981. This is also a first hand material on the northern expedition of 1926-28.² In particular, it contains main battles fought by the II, IV and VI Corps.³ It also includes material translated from the documents of the CCP delegation to the Comintern concerning seven battles in the Northern Expedition: the Battle of Lutian and Longjiawan., the Battles of Liling, Pingjiang, Dingsi Bridge, Hesheng Bridge, Wucheng., and the Battle of De'an, Gushan, Wanjialong, Mahuiling and Jiuxianling.⁴ Some of the memoirs of participants in the Northern Expedition have also been published. Guo Mojo's *Beifa tu ci* (On the path of the northern expedition) and Zhou Shidi's *Beifa gianwei* (The vanguard of the northern expedition) are the better known. Guo Mojo was then Director of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army. His memoirs discuss many historical figures and events written six to seven years after the Northern Expedition. Zhou Shidi was then commander of the Armoured Car Brigade under the leadership of the CCP. His brigade later joined Ye Ting Independent Regiment and he was once appointed as acting regimental commander.⁵

² See *Research on Modern History* (Jindai shi yanjiu), 1980: 3. During the Northern Expedition, Lin was the Party representative of the Sixth Army and concurrently head of the army's political department. His diary portrays the CCP's alliance with the Guomindang-Left to oppose Chiang Kai-shek. The diary also gives a brief account of the struggle concerning the National Government's move to Wuhan in December 1926, the struggle over how to attack Nanjing, and the meeting at the Third Plenum of the Second Central Committee of the Guomindang.

³ Originally published in the third and eleventh issues of the Political Correspondence of the Party Centre (Zhongyang zhengzhi tongxun).

⁴ There is a problem of translation of these battles. The original drafts were translated from foreign languages, as most of the names of people and places were not translated into Chinese, they had to be transliterated when incorporated into this book. The problem could be solved by checking them against similar material and books.

⁵ In his memoirs, Zhou explains that the Independent Regiment was also called "the iron army" because of the presence of the Armoured Car Brigade. As the regiment was subordinate to the Fourth Army, many generally referred to the Fourth Army as "the iron army". This is also the reason why the Red Army was named the Fourth Army when it first set up its own armed forces.

In addition, Huangpu Alumni in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Wuhan also keep updated alumni lists and photographs. The alumni associations are also the best place to get in touch with Huangpu graduates.

In Hong Kong, the libraries of the Supreme Court and South China Post Daily preserve a number of major Chinese and English newspapers and periodicals published in Hong Kong and southern China provinces in the 1920s. The Fung Ping Shan Library of Hong Kong University has a good collection of sources on modern southern Chinese history. For example, *Gemingjun di yi ci dongzheng shi zhan ji* (War diary of the revolutionary army during the first eastern expedition) compiled by Liu Bingcui is available there.

Although sources on the Huangpu Military Academy in China are more scattered and less well-organised, there are some documents which are not available in Taiwan. Even for those sources which are available on both sides of the Straits, comparisons can be very useful to check the authenticity and fill in the gaps due to censorship.

The period 1924 to 1927 marks the involvement of the Communist International and Soviet Union in Chinese politics and the military on a large scale. The establishment of the Huangpu Military Academy depended a great deal on Soviet assistance. Specific sources pertinent to the study of Huangpu Military Academy are memoirs, diaries and reports by Russian advisers, numbered some 50, who served in the Huangpu Military Academy and the National Revolutionary Army during 1924 to 1927. A. I. Cherepanov has published his memoirs *Zapiski voennogo sovetnika v Kitae* (Notes of a military adviser in China) and *Severnyi pokhod natsionalno revoliutsionnoy armii Kitaya*⁶ (The northern expedition of the national revolutionary army of China) in 1964 and 1968 respectively. Other memoirs include V.M. Primakov, *Zapiski volontera: grazhdanskaya voina v Kitae*⁷ (Notes of a volunteer: the civil war in China), N.I. Konchits, *Kitayskie dnevniki 1925-1926* (Chinese diaries 1925-1926), M.I. Kazanin, *V shtabe Bliukher: vospominania o Kitayskoy revoliutsii* (In Bliukher's headquarters: reminiscences of the Chinese revolution);

6 English translation of abridged Russian text is Sergei Sosinsky, *As Military Adviser in China*, Moscow, 1982.

7 This book was originally published in 1930 under the name of Henry Allen, an Anglicised form of Primakov's Chinese pseudonym Heng-li Lin, and purported to be the reminiscences of an English volunteer instructor in General Feng Yuxiang's army.

Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Dva goda v vosstavshem kitae, 1925-1927*⁸ (Two years in revolutionary China, 1925-1927); all have relevant references relating to the Huangpu Military Academy and the National Revolutionary Army. These materials would have been considerably enriched had Borodin or Bliukher compiled their own recollections.

On 6 April 1927, Chinese police in Beijing raided the Soviet military attache's office and carted off a great volume of documents generated by Soviet Russian activities in assisting the Nationalist Revolution, and some documents of the Chinese Communist Party. Many of these documents have been translated and published by C.M. Wilbur and Julie How.⁹ The Institute of the Far East, Academy of Sciences, in Moscow has also published in 1986 *Kommunisticheskii International i kitaiskaia Revoliutsiia: Dokumenty i Materialy* (The communist international and the Chinese revolution: documents and materials).

For the American archives, government archives concerning China are preserved in the National Archives in Washington. Dispatches from the American legation in Beijing and from consular officials in Guangzhou, Changsha, Hankow, Nanjing and Shanghai are useful for the period. The National Archives also contain information provided by military and naval intelligence, and from commercial attaches in China. Particularly interesting reports include "Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929", "US Military Intelligence Report: China, 1911-1941", which has a detailed report on "Whampoa Military School: A Report compiled from Soviet Documents (A-44)". These are now available on microfilms.

The US Army Office of Military History in Taipei has compiled *Organisational Changes in the Chinese Army, 1895-1950* in 1969 by Harry H. Collier and Chin-chin Lai; *A Chronology of Important Military Events in the Republic of China, 1924-1950* by T. M. Williamsen in 1971; a field level monograph prepared under auspices of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of Army in 1966, *Major Campaigns in Chinese Modern Military History*, and two field projects entitled "Whampoa Graduates on Taiwan" and by William W. Whitson, "Lesson from China (Kiangsi, 1934)" in 1966.

⁸ English translation is available.

⁹ See the list of publications in C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How (ed), *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

British archives in the Public Record Office in London has also compiled correspondence of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office from China and Hong Kong. The series FO 405 "confidential print" is particularly informative. It contains important documents from and about China, printed for high-level circulation in the government and missions abroad, then cumulated and bound semi-annually or quarterly. FO 228 contains China consular correspondence, 1854-1930; FO 371: 12440/9156, "The National Revolutionary Army. A Short History of its Origins, Development and Organisation"; FO 371: 12502, "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army"¹⁰ are the more important records. In the War Office Archives, WO 33, "Reports and Miscellaneous Papers, 1853-1948", and WO 106 "Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1837-1948" contain relevant information regarding the Huangpu Military Academy and National Revolutionary Army in the 1920s.

As regards Japanese sources, important official documents and manuscripts (diaries and other personal papers) are kept in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Gaimusho*) and the War History Department, Defence Agency. Many of these official documents have been microfilmed and published over the years. Cecil Uyehara's *Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs* has a number of listings: "On arms trade in China" (MT 5.1.5.44, 1922-1924); "Employment of Japanese officers in China" (MT 5.1.1.14, 1898-1909); "Russia and China" (MT 2.5.2. 1-1, 1920-1926); "Canton government" (MT 1.6.1.89, 1926 and MT 1.6.1.87, 1924-1926); "Civil war" (MT 1.6.1.84, 1920-1926); "Northern Punitive Expedition of the Nationalist Army" (S 1.6.1. 5-20, 1927-1929); "Supply of arms" (MT 5.1.5.50, 1919-1926); "The Japanese Army in southern China" (MT 5.1.10. 10-1, 1900-1926).¹¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also compiled and published *Nihon gaiko nenpyo narabini shuyo bunsho, 1840-1945* (A chronology and major document on Japanese foreign policy, 1840-1945) in 1955.

As for the Army and Navy archives, John Young's checklist provides several listings: "Japanese weapons policy on China" (R 101 FO 9047, 1924); "Minutes of the Meeting of army intelligence officers in China" (R 102 FO 8222, 1925); "Future prospects

¹⁰ See Lo Hui-min, *Foreign Office Confidential Papers Relative to China and Her Neighbouring Countries, 1840-1914 with an Additional List, 1915-1937*; and Andrew J. Nathan, *Modern China, 1940-1972: An Introduction to Sources and Research Aids*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1971.

¹¹ See Cecil H. Uyehara comp. *Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 1868-1945*, Microfilmed for the Library of Congress, 1949-1951., Washington DC, Library of Congress, 1954.

for Kuomintang" (R 102, FO 8281, 1925); "Progress of the remedial conference and attitude of Kuomintang" (R 102 FO 8286, 1925); "Conditions in Fukien and hopes for Japan" (R 102 FO 8587, 1925); "Bolshevik movement in China" ; "Soviet activities in Shanghai" (R 102 FO 8694, FO 8714, 1925); "Progress of the military operations in war between Zhang Zuolin and Guo Songling" (R 102 F11230, 1926); "Opinions of American and British commanders regarding the state of affairs in China" (R 103 F11609, 1927); "Japanese policy toward current the military situation in China" (R 104 F12454, 1927); "Recent economic conditions in Canton" (R 104 F12458, 1927); "State of affairs in China" (R 104 F12502, 1927); "Study of the impetus which many lead to military operations against China" (R 104 F12551, 1927); "Organisation and functioning of Russian propaganda in the Far East" (R 104 FO 12698, 1928).¹²

It should be emphasised that there is a large quantity of Foreign Ministry and Army Ministry documents which were never microfilmed. They can be read only at the Diplomatic Record Office and War History Department, National Institute for Defence Studies, Defence Agency (Noeicho Boei Kenkyujo, Senshibu) in Tokyo. In addition to official records, the library of War History Department holds several thousand items of personal papers and records of interviews with surviving former Japanese officers. No list of these records has been published.

To sum up, the sources listed above are by no means exhaustive. There will still be other sources lying in some places undiscovered by researchers. Countries of great potential, are mainland China and the Soviet Union. More time and effort, however, are required to search for them.

¹² John Young comp., *Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy and other Government Agencies, 1865-1945*, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 1959. These were the documents American military seized during the occupation. Selected documents were microfilmed before returning to the Japanese. But because of the limited time and funds available for the project, it was said that only a mere 5% were microfilmed.

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Beiping (2047-2048)	北平 (2047-2048)
Beiping (2048-2049)	北平 (2048-2049)
Beiping (2049-2050)	北平 (2049-2050)
Beiping (2050-2051)	北平 (2050-2051)
Beiping (2051-2052)	北平 (2051-2052)
Beiping (2052-2053)	北平 (2052-2053)
Beiping (2053-2054)	北平 (2053-2054)
Beiping (2054-2055)	北平 (2054-2055)
Beiping (2055-2056)	北平 (2055-2056)
Beiping (2056-2057)	北平 (2056-2057)
Beiping (2057-2058)	北平 (2057-2058)
Beiping (2058-2059)	北平 (2058-2059)
Beiping (2059-2060)	北平 (2059-2060)
Beiping (2060-2061)	北平 (2060-2061)
Beiping (2061-2062)	北平 (2061-2062)
Beiping (2062-2063)	北平 (2062-2063)
Beiping (2063-2064)	北平 (2063-2064)
Beiping (2064-2065)	北平 (2064-2065)
Beiping (2065-2066)	北平 (2065-2066)
Beiping (2066-2067)	北平 (2066-2067)
Beiping (2067-2068)	北平 (2067-2068)
Beiping (2068-2069)	北平 (2068-2069)
Beiping (2069-2070)	北平 (2069-2070)
Beiping (2070-2071)	北平 (2070-2071)
Beiping (2071-2072)	北平 (2071-2072)
Beiping (2072-2073)	北平 (2072-2073)
Beiping (2073-2074)	北平 (2073-2074)
Beiping (2074-2075)	北平 (2074-2075)
Beiping (2075-2076)	北平 (2075-2076)
Beiping (2076-2077)	北平 (2076-2077)
Beiping (2077-2078)	北平 (2077-2078)
Beiping (2078-2079)	北平 (2078-2079)
Beiping (2079-2080)	北平 (2079-2080)
Beiping (2080-2081)	北平 (2080-2081)
Beiping (2081-2082)	北平 (2081-2082)
Beiping (2082-2083)	北平 (2082-2083)
Beiping (2083-2084)	北平 (2083-2084)
Beiping (2084-2085)	北平 (2084-2085)
Beiping (2085-2086)	北平 (2085-2086)
Beiping (2086-2087)	北平 (2086-2087)
Beiping (2087-2088)	北平 (2087-2088)
Beiping (2088-2089)	北平 (2088-2089)
Beiping (2089-2090)	北平 (2089-2090)
Beiping (2090-2091)	北平 (2090-2091)
Beiping (2091-2092)	北平 (2091-2092)
Beiping (2092-2093)	北平 (2092-2093)
Beiping (2093-2094)	北平 (2093-2094)
Beiping (2094-2095)	北平 (2094-2095)
Beiping (2095-2096)	北平 (2095-2096)
Beiping (2096-2097)	北平 (2096-2097)
Beiping (2097-2098)	北平 (2097-2098)
Beiping (2098-2099)	北平 (2098-2099)
Beiping (2099-2100)	北平 (2099-2100)

Glossary

Andong	安东
Anguojun	安国军
Anfujun	安福军
Anfuxi	安福系
Anhui	安徽
Bai Baoshan	白宝山
Bai Chongxi	白崇禧
baihua	白话
Baoding	保定
Baoding lujun sucheng xuetang	保定陆军速成学堂
baojia	保甲
baqi	八旗
Beidaihe	北戴河
Beifa	北伐
Beifa riji	北伐日记
Beijing weishu zongsiling	北京卫戍总司令
Beijing zhengbian	北京政变
Beiyang Changbeijun	北洋常备军
Beiyang dachen	北洋大臣
Beiyang junfa	北洋军阀
Beiyang zhengfu	北洋政府
Beiyangjun	北洋军
Beizhen	北镇
Benbu Zhuyue teshe banshichu	本部驻粤特设办事处
Bengbu	蚌埠
Bian Shoujing	边守靖
Bianfa	变法
bing shu	兵书
bingfa	兵法
boai	博爱
Boluo	博罗
Cai E	蔡锷
Cai Hesun	蔡和森
Cai Yuanbei	蔡元培
Cao Kun	曹锟
Caofa	操法
Changsha	长沙
Chao'an	潮安

Chaomei-Hailufeng	潮梅海陆丰
Chegang	车岗
Chen Baixu	陈白虚
Chen Duxi	陈独秀
Chen Fumu	陈孚木
Chen Gongbo	陈公博
Chen Jiayou	陈家有
Chen Jiongming	陈炯明
Chen Jitang	陈济堂
Chen Kewen	陈克文
Chen Mingshu	陈铭枢
Chen Qimei	陈其美
Chen Riguang	陈日光
Chen Yangxuan	陈扬煊
Cheng Qian	程潜
Cheng Shewo	程舍我
Dabenying Junzhengbu	大本营军政部
Dai Jitao	戴季陶
dang daibiao	党代表
dangxiao	党校
De'an	德安
Deng Benyin	邓本殷
Deng Jiayan	邓家彦
Deng Muhan	邓慕韩
Deng Yanda	邓演达
Deng Zeru	邓泽如
Deng Zhongxia	邓中夏
Ding Weifen	定惟汾
Dingsiqiao	町四桥
Dongfang Shibao	东方时报
Dongwan	东莞
Du Congrong	杜从戎
Duan Qirui	段祺瑞
Duli	独立
Enping	恩平
Fan Qiwu	范其务
Fang Qian	方潜
Fazhi xiejin hui	法治协进会
fen cao	粪草

fenbu	分部
fendui	分队
Feng Jingyun	冯景云
Feng Jupō	冯菊坡
Feng Mingguang	冯明光
Feng Ti	酆悌
Feng Yuxiang	冯玉祥
Fengtian	奉天
fu dang daibiao	副党代表
Funu xunkan	妇女旬刊
Funu zhi sheng	妇女之声
Gaizao huizhou tongzhi hui	改造惠州同志会
Gan Naiguang	甘乃光
ganhua	感化
ganbu xuexiao	干部学校
Gao Tianbo	高恬波
Gaoyao	高要
Geming	革命
Geming daobao	革命导报
Geming jinian hui	革命纪念会
Gonghe dang	共和党
gongzhai piao	公债票
Gu Mengyu	顾孟余
Gu Yingfen	古应芬
Guan J'an	管际安
Guan Peng	管鹏
Guan Shudong	管曙东
Guangdong	广东
Guangdong zazhi	广东杂志
Guangxi	广西
Guangzhou	广州
Guilin	桂林
Gujun	孤军
Guluo He	{古络河}
Guo Moruo	郭沫若
Guo Songling	郭松龄
Guofeng ribao	国风日报
guoku quan	国库券
Guomin huiyi	国民会议

Guomin xinwen	国民新闻
Guominjun	国民军
Guomindang [Kuomintang]	国民党
Haikou	海口
Hainan	海南
Hang Xinzhai	杭辛斋
Hankou	汉口
Hanyang	汉阳
Heshengqiao	贺胜桥
He Leshan	何乐山
He Xiangning	何香凝
He Yaozu	何饶祖
He Yingqin	何应钦
Heping	和平
Heshan	河山
Heyuan	河源
Hu Hanmin	胡汉民
Hu Pu'an	胡朴安
Hu Shi	胡适
Hu Shusen	胡树森
Hu Yungong	胡允恭
Huang Fusheng	黄复生
Huang Jilu	黄季陆
Huang Jusu	黄居素
Huang Longsheng	黄隆生
Huang Ping	黄平
Huang Yanpei	黄炎培
Huang Zhanyun	黄展云
Huangpu junxiao	黄埔军校
Huangpu lujun junguan xuexiao	黄埔陆军军官学校
Huangpu [Whampao]	黄埔
Huaqiang shuju	华强书局
Hufa	护法
Huiyang	惠阳
Huiyi tongze	会议通则
Huizhou	惠州
Huizhou bashu	惠州八属
Humen	虎门
Huzhu	互助

jianwu tang	讲武堂
Jiang Hao	江浩
Jiang Weifan	江伟蕃
Jiang Xianyun	蒋先云
Jiangmen	江门
Jiangxi	江西
jianxi guan	见习官
Jianshe	建设
Jiao Yitang	焦易堂
jiadao tuan	教导团
jiailian bu	教练部
jiashou bu	教授部
jiaoyu	教育
Jin Yunpeng	靳云鹏
Jing Haoru	景浩如
Jingwei jun jiangwu tang	警卫军讲武堂
Jingxiong nuxiao	竞雄女校
Jiujiang	九江
Ju Zheng	居正
Juewu	觉悟
jun zhengfu	军政府
Junren jingshen jiaoyu	军人精神教育
Junren ribao	军人日报
Junren Zhoubao	军人周报
Junshi zhengzhi zhoubao	军事政治周报
Junxiao	军校
Lai Shihuang	赖世璜
Lang Xingshi	郎醒石
Leizhou	雷州
Leng Xin	冷欣
Li Chuntao	李春涛
Li Dazhao	李大钊
Li Dingxin	李鼎新
Li Fulin	李福林
Li Fuchun	李富春
Li Hongzhang	李鸿章
Li Jishen	李济深
Li Linong	李笠农
Li Shangqin	李赏琴

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|-----------------------|--------|
| Li Xieyang | 李燮阳 |
| Li Xilian | 李希涟 |
| Li Yuanhong | 李元洪 |
| Li Yueting | 李越廷 |
| Li Zhilong | 李之龙 |
| Li Zongren | 李宗仁 |
| lianfang zongbu | 联防总部 |
| lianzuo fa | 连坐法 |
| Liang Qichao | 梁启超 |
| Liangxin | 良心 |
| Liao Zhongkai | 廖仲恺 |
| Lin Huanting | 林焕廷 |
| Lin Sen | 林森 |
| Lin Zuhan | 林祖涵 |
| Liu Xing | 刘兴 |
| Liu Kunyi | 刘坤义 |
| Liu Zhenhuan | 刘震寰 |
| Liu Zhi | 刘峙 |
| Liu Zuolong | 刘作龙 |
| Longtan | 龙潭 |
| Lu Rongting | 陆荣廷 |
| Lu Yongxiang | 卢永祥 |
| Lujun jiangwu xuexiao | 陆军讲武学校 |
| Luo Qiyuan | 罗绮园 |
| Luo Wengai | 罗文干 |
| Luoding | 罗定 |
| Ma Xulun | 马君武 |
| Mao Zedong | 毛泽东 |
| Meixian | 梅县 |
| Min xing jushe | 民星剧社 |
| Minguo ribao | 民国日报 |
| Minguo zazhi | 民国杂志 |
| Minjue | 民党 |
| minquan zhuyi | 民权主义 |
| mintuan ju | 民团局 |
| Minzhi bao | 民治报 |
| Minzhi shuju | 民智织书局 |
| Nanxiong | 南雄 |
| Nongmin yundong | 农民运动 |

Peng Pai	彭湃
Peng Sumin	彭素民
Pingyuan	平元
Qian Dajun	钱大钧
Qingnian gongzuo	青年工作
Qinzhou	钦州
Quanguo baojie lianhe hui	全国报界联合会
Qunbao	群报
san bu zhuyi	三不主义
san min zhuyi	三民主义
Shaanxi	陕西
Shandong	山东
Shanghai	上海
Shanghai jizhe julebu	上海记者俱乐部
shangmin xiehui	商民协会
Shangwu yinshuguan	商务印书馆
Shantou	汕头
Shanxi	山西
Shao Lizi	邵力子
Shao Yuanchong	邵元冲
Shaoguan	韶关
Shaonian zhongguo chenbao	少年中国晨报
Shen bao	申报
Shen Dingyi	沈定一
Shen Yanbing	沈雁冰
Shenggang bagong weiyuan hui	省港罢工委员会
Shenzhen	深圳
Shibao	时报
Shishi xinbao	时事新报
Shu Feng	曙风
Song Ziwen	宋子文
Sun Chuanfang	孙传芳
Sun Disan	孙棣三
Sun Duo [Sneevliet]	孙铎
Sun Ke	孙科
Sun Hongyi	孙洪伊
Sun Jingya	孙镜亚
Sun wen xueshuo	孙文学说
Sun Yatsen (Zhongshan)	孙逸先 [中山]

Tan Pingshan	潭平山
Tan Yankai	潭延楷
Tan Zhen	覃振
Tang Jiyao	唐继尧
Tang Shengzhi	唐生智
tebie qu dangbu	特别区党部
tepaiyuan	特派员
ti	体
Tianjin	天津
Tianjun ganbu xuexiao	滇军干部学校
Tiantang	天堂
Tongmeng hui	同盟会
Tongzi jun	童子军
Wang Boqun	王伯群
Wang Chonghui	王宠惠
Wang Jingwei	汪精卫
Wang Leping	王乐平
Wei Bangping	巍邦平
wubei	武备
wubei xuetaang	武备学堂
Wu Chaoshu	伍朝枢
Wu Jinglian	吴景濂
Wu Ming	吴明
Wu Peifu	吴佩孚
Wushengguan	武胜关
Wu Xiali	伍夏里
Wu Zihui	吴稚晖
xian juezhe	先觉者
Xiangdao zhoubao	响导周报
Xiangjiang chenbao	香江晨报
Xiao Chunu	箫楚女
xiao jun	校军
xiaozu	小组
Xijiang	西江
Xin funu	新妇女
xin jun	新军
Xin qingnian	新青年
Xin ren she	新任社
Xin Shenbao	新申报

Xinfeng	新丰
xing	醒
Xingqi pinglun	星期评论
Xinwen bao	新闻报
Xinxing	新兴
Xiong Xiong	熊雄
Xu Chongzhi	许崇智
Xu Qian	徐谦
Xu Shichang	徐世昌
xuanchuan bu	宣传部
xuanchuan dagang	宣传大纲
xuanchuan dui	宣传队
xuanchuan Jiangxi suo	宣传讲习所
xuanchuan yuan	宣传员
xuanyan	宣言
Xuwen	徐闻
Yan Zhong	严重
Yang Kunru	杨坤如
Yang Pao'an	杨匏安
Yang Shoupeng	杨寿彭
Yang Shukan	杨庶堪
Yang Ximin	杨希闵
Yang Yongtai	杨永泰
Yangchun	阳春
Yangjiang	阳江
Yanjiu xi	研究系
Ye Qi	叶琦
Ye Kaixin	叶开新
yong	用
Yuan Zuming	袁祖名
Yu Feipeng	俞飞鹏
Yu Shude	于树德
Yuan Shikai	袁世凯
yuefa huiyi	约法会议
Zhang Fakui	张发奎
Zhang Fengjiu	张凤九
Zhang Guotao	张国焘
Zhao Hengti	赵恒惕
Zhang Ji	张继

Zhang Qiubai	张秋白
Zhang Shanming	张善鸣
Zhang Tailei	张太雷
Zhang Youren	张有仁
Zhang Zhidong	张之洞
Zhang Zongchang	张宗昌
Zhang Zuolin	张作霖
Zhao Shiqin	赵士勤
Zhejiang	浙江
Zhengxue hui	政学会
zhengzhi bu	政治部
Zhengzhi gongzuo	政治工作
zhengzhi xuanchuan dui	政治宣传队
Zhengzhi zhoubao	政治周报
zhidui	支队
Zhili	直隶
Zhongguo cunwang wenti	中国存亡问题
Zhongguo guomindang zhoukan	中国国民党周刊
Zhongguo nongmin	中国农民
Zhongguo qingnian	中国青年
Zhonghua gemingdang	中华革命党
Zhonghua shuju	中华书局
Zhonghua xinbao	中华新报
Zhongyang junshi zhengzhi xuexiao	中央军事政治学校
Zhongyang lujun jiaodaotuan	中央陆军教导团
Zhou Enlai	周恩来
Zhou Fuhai	周佛海
Zhu Peide	朱培德
Zhu Zhixin	朱执信
zixiu	自修
Ziyou dang	自由党
zongdui	总队
Zou Lu	邹鲁
zu	组
zuzhi yuan	组织员